Geo-Strategic Approaches to Co-operative Maritime Security in Northeast Asia: With Particular Reference to Naval Arms Control, Maritime Confidence-Building Measures and Maritime Co-operation Measures

being a Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

at the University of Hull

by

Lieutenant Commander Duk-Ki Kim
Republic of Korea Navy

. BA, Naval Academy, ROK, 1984
. MA, National Defence College, ROK, 1992

June 1998
Dedication

To my parents, Jin-Chul Kim and Kwan-Ok Jun,
who have endured hardship during the period
of my absence
And to my family, Hee-Chong and Hee-Jin, whose
love produced this result
Abstract

The purpose of this study is to design a co-operative maritime security structure for Northeast Asia through the application of naval arms control and disarmament measures (both structural and operational), maritime confidence-building measures (MCBMs) and maritime co-operation measures (MCMs). In order to construct an analytical framework for such an application it is necessary to introduce sub-objectives. The first is to explore the options for providing co-operative maritime security, such as naval arms control, MCBMs and MCMs, and to assess the value of their contribution to the general co-operative maritime security framework. The second is to examine the particular points of the major regional powers' maritime security policies with a view to considering their relevance to the construction of a system of co-operative maritime security in Northeast Asia. The third is to delineate the regional geo-strategic security environment conducive to Northeast Asian co-operative maritime security in the framework of the various types of measures. The final part examines the potential conditions for the application of co-operative maritime security measures and suggests a priority of application on the basis of the regional maritime security environment.

In the last decade, the United States and Russia have been forced to change their defence policies, trim their budgets, curtail operations overseas, and re-evaluate their fundamental purposes. Nonetheless, the medium powers, such as China and Japan, continue to build and deploy naval weapons and vessels that others find threatening. Unless they reconsider their positions toward co-operative maritime security, they may miss a critical opportunity to bring stability to the high seas. In Northeast Asia, the main boundary and territorial disputes are maritime in nature, e.g. Russia-Japan (South Kuril Islands/Northern Territories), Korea-Japan (the Tok Islands/Takeshima), China-Japan (the Senkaku Islands/Tiaoyu Tao), as well as Taiwan and, in the South China Sea, the Paracel Islands/Xisha Qundao (Vietnam-China), and the Spratly Islands/Nansha Qundao (China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, Philippines and Brunei). Multilateral security activities cannot replace formal diplomatic/legal negotiations to settle maritime boundary and territorial disputes, but co-operative maritime security measures may be particularly valuable in minimising the risk of conflict in such circumstances.

Among the MCBMs, the most promising areas involve modifying existing INCSEA agreements, and establishing or expanding measures of transparency, such as compliance with the UN or an eventual regional arms register and the regular issue of credible official Defence White Papers. In the current context of strategic uncertainty and maritime force development in Northeast Asia, information exchange measures and communication measures may be the most
valuable MCBM, applicable region-wide. Co-operative maritime security measures can offer a number of benefits. The main goals of MCMs are cost reduction through shared efforts or by joint operations for humanitarian purposes, joint development of marine resources, the protection of SLOCs and prevention of sea pollution. MCMs can also be used as confidence-building measures in themselves to maintain communication when tensions heighten. MCMs indicate that neighbouring countries can work together to look after certain problems at the regional or sub-regional level. This can help not only to deter potential adversaries but also to assure extra-regional countries that no direct threat would be posed to their sea-borne trade. With functional and operational approaches, MCMs cover marine pollution, search and rescue, illegal activities, including drug smuggling, piracy and fisheries infringement.

The first area of naval arms control to be considered covers constraints on naval activities as operational naval arms control measures. General operational arms control measures could be used to cover other naval activities, or they could serve as a model for similar agreements in other areas. The provisions for notification of dangerous activities, for instance, could be broadened to include mandatory notification of all naval exercises. After the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, the United States and Russia developed stabilising rules of behaviour as their navies came into contact with each other across the world’s oceans. With the expansion of naval forces in Northeast Asia and the increased likelihood of accident and miscalculation, one could make a case for the negotiation of regional INCSEA agreements, particularly on a bilateral basis. Such agreements already exist in the North Pacific: Canada and Russia, the US and Russia, Russia-Japan and Russia-ROK. The United States and China have also signed a related agreement on maritime consultation. Operational measures at sea could be implemented by imposing restraints on naval activities and geographical limitations. Structural measures, as the second aspect of naval arms control, consist of quantitative and qualitative approaches. A quantitative approach based on ratios would inevitably affect the relative size of forces of different countries. Such agreements are difficult to achieve because of differences in geostrategic goals and asymmetries of naval forces in the region.

This thesis argues that the development of co-operative maritime security measures to the point where they become a significant aspect of the regional maritime security framework in Northeast Asia will not be easy. It is a very diverse region, where there are quite different security perceptions and maritime territorial and legitimacy conflicts which require resolution. There is also little tradition of security co-operation, at least on a multilateral basis. The maritime issues themselves are generally complicated, and the practical and operational factors involved in the establishment of effective co-operative maritime security regimes are extremely demanding.
Maritime confidence-building measures offer the greatest potential, as an initial step. As subsequent steps, maritime co-operation measures and naval arms control measures could be followed. The important question is whether or not the application of co-operative security models can be brought to the point where they can enable the effective management of the increasing complexities and uncertainties which characterise the emerging maritime environment in Northeast Asia. Current fiscal constraints might clearly provide an opportunity for Northeast Asian countries not only to consider more closely their threat perceptions but also to pursue regional co-operative maritime arrangements which rely more on mutual understanding and less on a naval arms build-up.
Acknowledgements

I would like to express special thanks to the Republic of Korea Navy which provided me with the opportunity and financial support to carry out this study at the University of Hull. My gratitude to a number of individuals who have contributed to completion of this thesis is particularly heartfelt.

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I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Keun-Wook Paik, Senior Fellow of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, for his generous help during the study. Thanks are due also to Commander In-Soo Lim, PhD, the ROK Navy, who has sent a number of source materials related to maritime strategy, and to Professor Colin S. Gray, Director of Centre for Security Studies, Dr. Tim Huxley and Dr. Sally Harris in the Department of Politics and Asian Studies at the University of Hull for their personal help. I am also indebted to Mrs. Sue O’Connell and Mrs. Barbara Shaw in the Inter-Library Loan section of the Library of Hull University.

During the process of my research, interviews, writing, and rewriting, I have benefited from the assistance of many friends and scholars. I would like to extend my thanks to each of them, especially the following: Professor Desmond Ball (Australian National University), Captain James A. Barber, Jr. (USN, Retired, Executive Director and Publisher of US Naval Institute), Mr. Pelham G. Boyer (Managing Editor, US Naval War College Review), Dr. Donald C. F. Daniel (Director, Strategy and Campaign Department, US Naval War College), Professor Arthur S. Ding (Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taiwan), Professor Shen Dingli (American Centre, Fudan University, China), Professor Stephen O. Fought, PhD (Director, Defence Analysis Course, US Naval War College), Dr. Bates Gill
Finally, the completion of this study is first of all due to the prayers of my parents, offered for me every day at dawn in my homeland. I dedicate this thesis to them. I am grateful to Hee-Chong, who has endured hardship in the performance of the multiple tasks of wife, devoted mother and teacher of a lovely daughter, Hee-Jin, through my work.

Lt-Cdr Duk-Ki Kim
Hull, England
1998
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<td>ACA</td>
<td>Arms Control Association (Washington, DC education group)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACDA</td>
<td>Arms Control and Disarmament Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADIU</td>
<td>Armament and Disarmament Information Unit (a part of the Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AECA</td>
<td>The Arms Export Control Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEGIS</td>
<td>Advanced Surface to Air Missile System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEW</td>
<td>Airborne Early Warning</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFT</td>
<td>Ocean-Going Tug</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGBN</td>
<td>Nuclear-powered Ice-Breaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGI</td>
<td>Intelligence Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALCMs</td>
<td>Air Launched Cruise Missiles</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand and US (Alliance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOE</td>
<td>Fast Combat Support Ship (Oilier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Fleet Replenishment Tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARATS</td>
<td>Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASM</td>
<td>Air-to-Surface Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Anti-Submarine Warfare</td>
</tr>
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<td>ASWFZs</td>
<td>Anti-Submarine Warfare Free Zones</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATP</td>
<td>Allied Tactical Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTU</td>
<td>From the Atlantic to the Urals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBG</td>
<td>Battleship Battle Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR</td>
<td>Bottom-Up-Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C(V)BG</td>
<td>Carrier Battle Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3I</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBMs</td>
<td>Confidence-Building Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDE</td>
<td>Conference on Disarmament in Europe (forum for CSBM talks 1984 and 1989)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
<td>Combined Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>Conventional Forces in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States (Former Soviet Republics except the Baltic States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIWS</td>
<td>Close in Weapon System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Central Military Commission (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
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<td>CNOOC</td>
<td>The Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation</td>
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<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>National People’s Congress (China)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPDR</td>
<td>The People’s Deputies of Russia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPX</td>
<td>Command Post Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRM</td>
<td>Centre for Naval Analysis Research Memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Congressional Research Service</td>
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<td>CSBM</td>
<td>Confidence- and Security-Building Measures</td>
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<td>CSCA</td>
<td>Confidence on Security and Co-operation in Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCAP</td>
<td>Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Confidence on Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDW</td>
<td>Jane's Defence Weekly</td>
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<td>JMSDF</td>
<td>Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Forces</td>
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<td>JSDF</td>
<td>Japanese Self-Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIDA</td>
<td>The Korean Institute for Defence Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCM</td>
<td>Landing Craft Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCU</td>
<td>Landing Craft Utility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>Amphibious Assault Transport, Dock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPH</td>
<td>Amphibious Assault Ship, Helicopter</td>
</tr>
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<td>LSD</td>
<td>Landing Ship Dock</td>
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<td>LSM</td>
<td>Landing Ship Medium</td>
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<td>LST</td>
<td>Landing Ship Tank</td>
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<tr>
<td>M(B)FR</td>
<td>Mutual (and Balanced) Force Reduction</td>
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<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutual Assured Destruction</td>
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<td>MCBMs</td>
<td>Maritime Confidence-Building Measures</td>
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<td>MCM</td>
<td>Mine Countermeasures</td>
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<td>MCMs</td>
<td>Maritime Co-operation Measures</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENFZ</td>
<td>Middle East Nuclear-Free Zone</td>
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<td>MIED</td>
<td>Maritime Information Exchange Directory</td>
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<td>MIMA</td>
<td>Malaysia Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIRV</td>
<td>Multiple Independently-Targeted Re-entry Vehicle</td>
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<td>MLRS</td>
<td>Multiple Launch Rocket System</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MRCs</td>
<td>Major Regional Conflicts (Contingencies)</td>
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<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Maritime Self-Defence Forces (Japan)</td>
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<td>MTCR</td>
<td>Missile Technology Control Regime</td>
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<td>MTDP</td>
<td>Mid-Term Defence Plans (Japan)</td>
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<td>MTPE</td>
<td>Mid-Term Planning Estimate (Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAS</td>
<td>New Attack Submarines (Centurion-US Navy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCAPS</td>
<td>Naval Control and Protection of Shipping</td>
</tr>
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<td>NCNA</td>
<td>New China News Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCND</td>
<td>Neither Confirm Nor Deny (US Navy policy on nuclear weapons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDPO</td>
<td>National Defence Programme Outline (Japan)</td>
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<td>NEASD</td>
<td>The Northeast Asian Security Dialogue</td>
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<td>NENWFZ</td>
<td>Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free-Zone</td>
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<td>NFA</td>
<td>The National Fishery Administration</td>
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<td>NFZ</td>
<td>Nuclear-Free Zone</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NICs</td>
<td>Newly Industrialised Countries</td>
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<td>NIEs</td>
<td>Newly Industrialised Economies</td>
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<td>NIPS</td>
<td>Naval Intelligence Processing System</td>
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<td>NNA</td>
<td>Neutral and Non-Aligned</td>
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<tr>
<td>NNFZ</td>
<td>Nordic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOWPAP</td>
<td>The North-West Pacific Region Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPCSD</td>
<td>North Pacific Co-operative Security Dialogue (Canada, York University)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPWG</td>
<td>North Pacific Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council (a part of the US and Japanese Administrations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSN</td>
<td>The New Nuclear Powered Attack Submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTM</td>
<td>National Technical Means (of Verification)</td>
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<td>NWCR</td>
<td>Naval War College Review</td>
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<td>NWFZ</td>
<td>Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCA</td>
<td>The Ocean and Coastal Areas Programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>The Office of Management for the Budget</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
OMGs  Operational Manoeuvre Groups
OSI   On Site Inspection
PACAF Pacific Airforce (US)
PACLFT Pacific Fleet (US)
PACOM Pacific Command (US)
PACT  Philippine-American Co-operation Talks
PALs  Permissive Action Links
PCC   Patrol and Coastal Combatant
PDMA  Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities
PfP   Partnership for Peace
PICES The North-Pacific Marine Science Organisation
PKO   Peacekeeping Operation (UN)
PLA(N) People’s Liberation Army (Navy)
PMC   Post-Ministerial Conference (Consultations) (ASEAN)
PRC   People’s of Republic of China
PTBT  Partial Test Ban Treaty
PV    Patrol Vessel
R&D   Research and Development
RAN   Royal Australian Navy
RBU   Rocket Bombardment Mount (Russia)
RDT&E Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation
REGT  Resurgent/Emergent Global Threat (New US Military Strategic Term)
RIIA  Royal Institute of International Affairs
RIMPAC Rim of the Pacific
RIPS  Research Institute for Peace and Security (Tokyo)
ROK(N) Republic Korea (Navy)
RTN   Royal Thai Navy
RUSI  The Royal United Services Institute (London)
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation
SAG   Surface Action Group
SALT  Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM   Surface to Air Missile
SANFZ South Asia Nuclear-weapon-Free Zone
SAR   Search and Rescue
SASW  Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare
SCM   Security Consultative Meeting (ROK-US)
SDI   Strategic Defence Initiative
SEANWEZ Southeast Asian Nuclear-weapon Free Zone
SEF   The Strait Exchange Foundation (Taiwan)
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Stockholm)
SLAM  Stand-off Land Attack Missile
SLBM  Submarine-/Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM  Submarine-/Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
SLOC  Sea-Lanes (Lines) of Communication
SOF   Strategic Offensive Forces/ Special Operations Force
SOM   Senior Officials Meeting
SOSUS Sound System for Underwater Surveillance
SPF   South Pacific Forum
SPNFCZ South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
SS    Diesel-Electric (Conventionally powered) Submarine
SSB   Ballistic Missile Submarine
SSBN  Nuclear Powered Ballistic-Missile-Carrying Submarine
SSG   Guided Missile Submarine
SSM   Surface to Surface Missile
SSN Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (US/Russia-July 1991)
STOL Short Take-Off and Landing
SWB British Broadcasting Corporation. Summary World Broadcast
T/S Team Spirit (exercise. ROK-US)
TAR-TASS The News Agency formed in 1992 by TASS (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet
TASM Tactical Air to Surface Missile. Tomahawk Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (US Navy)
TBMs Trust Building Measures
THAAD Theatre High Altitude Area Defence
TLAM/C Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile/ Conventional (US Navy)
TLAM/N Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile/ Nuclear (US Navy)
TRMs Tension Reducing Measures
TSSAM Tri-Service Stand-Off Attack Missile
TVD Theatre of Military Operation (Russian)
UAVs Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UN United Nations
UNDC United Nations Disarmament Commission
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNGA The United Nations General Assembly
UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Union)
US United States
USAf The United States Air Force
USDIA The United States Defence Intelligence Agency
USN United States Navy
USNIP US Naval Institute Proceedings
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UUVs Unmanned Undersea Vehicles
VSTOL Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing
WESTPAC Working Group for the Western Pacific
WPFFEE The Western Pacific Fisheries Consultative Committee
WPNS Western Pacific Naval Symposium
WW I (II) World War I(II)
YSLME The Yellow Sea Large Marine Ecosystem
ZOPFAN Zone of Peace, Freedom (Friendship) and Neutrality (ASEAN Countries)
Chapter I. Introduction

I. What is Co-operative Maritime Security?
Since the Second World War, international politics and relations have focused on security in terms of the ability of states to defend themselves against external military threats. Throughout history, states have tried to find the route to security by means of conquest, the creation of buffer-zones of satellite states, or spheres of influence. Security studies were accordingly defined as 'the study of the threat, use and control of military force.'¹ This realistic and practical approach to security, characterised by an emphasis on military force and nuclear deterrence, underpinned the Cold War East-West relationship. In particular, military competition figured potentially in debates about security. Recently, however, international relations scholars have been considering other approaches to the prevention and management of conflicts, which emphasise co-operation, not rivalry, and which give less weight to the military element.

In the post-Cold War era, co-operative security has arisen from European principles of 'common security.' The concept of common security was first introduced in 1982 in the Report of the Palme Commission, Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival: 'A more effective way to ensure security is to create a positive process that can lead to peace and disarmament.... Acceptance of common security as the organising principle for efforts to reduce the risk of war, limit war, and move towards disarmament means, in principle, that co-operation will replace confrontation in resolving conflicts of interest.'² This concept is based on the assumption that unilateral security is no longer effective because states are becoming too interdependent economically, politically and militarily. The potential importance of common security is that it combines the ideas of idealists and realists in an attempt to avoid increasingly fruitless competition.³

Later, the Common Security Programme in the United Kingdom, led by Stan Windass and Eric Grove, developed a concept of co-operative security, as applied to Europe. That programme's report defined co-operative security as 'a relationship between antagonists, not between allies. Although they are antagonists both sides nevertheless share significance areas of common interest: (1) in avoiding war, and especially nuclear war; and (2) in reducing the level of their military expenditure to the minimum needed for security.'⁴ The implication is that co-operative security is one of the interrelated aspects of an integrated common security
policy. For example, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE, formerly the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, or CSCE) aims at security co-operation among member states in the absence of a common external threat or enemy, and it establishes a European security regime in which the national actors are ‘neither wholly compatible nor wholly competitive.’

Since then, the concept of co-operative security was taken a stage further by Gareth Evans, the Australian Foreign Minister. He asserted that co-operative security is ‘... multidimensional in scope and gradualist in temperament; emphasises reassurance rather than deterrence; is inclusive rather than exclusive; is not restrictive in membership; favours multilateralism over bilateralism; does not privilege military solutions over non-military ones; assumes that states are the principal actors in the security system, but accepts that non-state actors may have an important role to play; does not require the creation of formal security institutions, but does not reject them either; and which, above all, stresses the value of creating “habits of dialogue” on a multilateral basis.’

Accordingly, co-operative security is regarded as security with rather than against the adversary. Of course, co-operative security would be unnecessary where potential adversaries fully trusted each other. Co-operative security replaces preparing to counter threats as the centrepiece of security planning, with preventing such threats. Its scope covers military co-operation, various confidence- and security-building measures, incidents at sea, ‘hot lines,’ and limitations on force size and weapon types. Such an approach differs from common security in that it embraces a gradual or evolutionary process. Giving prominence to flexibility, co-operative security allows for the development of informal or formal security policies, including the incorporation of the existing bilateral alliances as a basis for a multilateral security structure.

This thinking was applied to the Asia-Pacific region at the September 1990 meeting of the UN General Assembly, by then Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark. He was the first to envisage the new notion of co-operative security as he focused on the North Pacific. Since then, the idea has been pursued by the North Pacific Co-operative Security Dialogue, organised by the Centre for International and Strategic Studies at York University in Ontario, Canada. Its vision is broadly similar to the notion of common security in the European context, but it promises to be more appropriate for the Asia-Pacific region. Concerns for effective multilateral security are still being developed by governmental and non-governmental organisations in the Asia-Pacific region. On 8 June 1993, for example, the
Council for Security Co-operation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), as a non-governmental organisation, was formally established by representatives of approximately two dozen research institutes from ten countries in the Asia-Pacific region. This initiative has been outlined as "the most ambitious proposal to date for a regularised, focused and inclusive non-governmental process on Pacific security matters." It acts as a "second track" for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which has also been established as a series of official meetings, convened to discuss the possibilities and modalities for regional security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

The aspect of co-operative maritime security that specifically concerns maritime postures and relationships assumes that there is a maritime area of common interest, namely, the avoidance of threats and military confrontation. Eric Grove first explored co-operative maritime security, in the European context, in his 1990 Maritime Strategy and European Security. Co-operative maritime security, however, can be applied in Northeast Asia as well. Such a structure, which would have both military and non-military components, could be an effective means of maintaining sub-regional and regional maritime peace and stability. In fact, it is essential if military confrontation is to be reduced without chaos and without danger. Co-operative maritime security attempts not only to strengthen the mutuality of security by binding neighbouring nations together to secure common goals, but also broaden its definition beyond the traditional concerns to include naval arms control, maritime confidence-building measures and maritime co-operation measures.

Today, co-operative maritime security is a salient issue in maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region. The Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, and a leading Australian strategic analyst, Paul Dibb, argue that "Developing a co-operative approach to the maritime area is clearly a strategically important issue, not least because of the crucial nature of the sealanes passing through Southeast Asian waters and the South China Sea." Such an approach has already manifested itself; an example is the biennial Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), initiated by the Royal Australian Navy in 1988. Another is the CSCAP Maritime Co-operation Working Group, established in 1995. Its purpose is to provide "a more structured regional process of a non-governmental nature... to contribute to the efforts towards regional confidence building and enhancing regional security through dialogue, consultation and co-operation." Co-operative maritime security can both remove existing maritime problems and protect a region from external or potential threats, such as piracy, pollution, or interference with sea lanes.
II. The Emergent Geo-strategic Maritime Environment and Regional Security Concerns

The Northeast Asian region contains two large semi-enclosed seas, the Yellow and East China Seas, encompassing 362,000 square miles, and the East Sea of Korea (or the Sea of Japan, hereafter the East Sea) of 44,5000 square miles. Northeast Asia is also an area where the interests of at least four major powers intersect. The United States, Russia, China, and Japan are linked by geography and history. Korea is at the centre of greater power confronts. As a North Pacific country, Canada is also deeply involved in Northeast Asia.

Concerning maritime security issues in Northeast Asia, the participating countries are Russia, the United States, the People's Republic of China (PRC, hereafter China), the Republic of China (ROC, hereafter Taiwan), Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK, hereafter South Korea), and the People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, hereafter North Korea). Even though the United States is geographically not a Northeast Asian power, in political and strategic terms, Washington must be included as a regional balancer because of its long historical involvement and the deployment of its forces in South Korea and Japan. The Northeast Pacific Ocean and its adjoining waters constitute both a region of great strategic significance for the United States and Russia and an area in which the interests and goals of the major coastal states, such as China and Japan, sometimes conflict with each other, and with those of the other powers in the area. The United States, Russia, China, and Japan seek to protect their security and other vital goals in this region, and deploy their naval forces to achieve these objectives.

The geo-strategic maritime environment in Northeast Asia is changing. The Cold War order — marked by the possession of nuclear weapons, aggressive warfighting strategies, and the naval confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States — has been replaced by an indistinct structure reflecting the fluid state of international relations. As the two military superpowers have reduced their military presence in response to changes in international politics and growing economic constraints, so their political leverage over the region has diminished.

Step by step with the reduction in the American and Russian naval presence in Northeast Asia since the end of the Cold War has been an effort by regional navies to enhance their forces' capabilities. China and Japan continue to acquire more powerful forces. Maritime security issues are becoming a particular concern of Northeast Asian countries, which tend now to be more preoccupied with their maritime security than with internal
security and land-based threats. At a strategic level, some East Asian states are concerned about a possible power vacuum in the region, resulted from reducing Russian naval presence, and, declining US force levels, the development of naval power projection capabilities by China and Japan.

With normalisation of Sino-Russian relations, China has calculated that major threats from the superpowers would not become a reality in the foreseeable future, but there may be imminent threats from its neighbours, such as India, Taiwan and potentially Japan and some ASEAN countries. Japan dropped Russian military threats to its security from its Defence White Paper of 1991, but there is a significant sector of opinion in Japan which sees its Russian neighbour as a threat. The United States is redefining its position in the region. American policy in the 1990s has focused on a minimum forward deployment of its forces, and has declined to be the regional balancer, honest broker, and ultimate security guarantor rather than the only protector. At present, only five per cent of US armed forces are forward-deployed to foreign countries in the Pacific.

The United States is committed to the defence of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. It is seen by ASEAN powers, as well as Australia and New Zealand, as their ultimate guarantor of security. Washington is naturally reluctant to give up entirely military deployments which afford a position of strength that might be useful in the future. To the United States, Russia and China are perceived as competitive powers. After the withdrawal of its Philippine bases, and the long-term prospects of a further pullback across the Pacific, Washington began slowly to appreciate the potential value of a regional security dialogue. Because of the importance of the Asia-Pacific region for US economic and strategic goals, the benefits of establishing an institutionalised regional security structure are now clearer to Washington.

With bases in Japan, South Korea, Hawaii and Guam, the United States can still deploy military power throughout the Asia-Pacific region. One B-52 bomber group is based at Guam, and the main ground force is a division in South Korea. Other ground forces are based in Hawaii and on the US West Coast; these provide the potential for a major substantial new commitment if required. The US Navy has long played a vital role in promoting peace and stability in the region. Currently, the US Pacific Fleet includes 39 nuclear-powered submarines, 58 major surface ships and six aircraft carriers, one of which may be deployed in the Indian Ocean. The US Pacific Fleet is deployed not only to support American interests in the region but also to secure sea lines of communications from the Asia-Pacific region to Alaska and the mainland.
Russia’s growing interest in Northeast Asia dates back to the closing years of the Cold War when it was articulated by former General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s speech in Vladivostok in the summer of 1986. He declared that the Soviet Union was an Asia-Pacific power and initiated a new Russian security policy based on ‘perestroika’ and ‘glasnost’ in an attempt to break new ground in relations with both communist and democratic countries in the region. In the last decade, the Russians have clearly shifted their centre of gravity toward Northeast Asia in an effort to reassert their influence and status as a global power.

Although Russia has been reducing its military capabilities since the late 1980s, there is every reason to believe that the Russian naval presence in Far Eastern waters is still of major strategic significance. Since 1992 Russian military expenditure has declined in real terms by some 45 per cent. According to Russian official figures, the real defence spending as a share of GDP has fallen from 7.6 per cent in 1990 to 2.88 per cent in 1998. Currently, the Russian Pacific Fleet has 37 nuclear-powered and conventional submarines and 39 principal surface vessels. It has major bases on the Pacific coasts — Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk, Kamchatskij, Magadan, and Sovetskaya Gavan — and a sophisticated communications station. Russian maritime strategy concentrates on its Pacific Fleet being able to defend the Okhotsk bastion for ballistic missile submarines, and protect the Russian Far East, which contains resources essential to Russia’s future status as a regional power. A credible defensive capability does, however, have potentially offensive dimensions against Japan and South Korea and their American ally.

China is concerned about the domination of the United States as the only remaining superpower, as well the potential for Japanese militarism and the hypothetical threat that could be posed by the new Guidelines of US-Japanese Defence Co-operation in 1997. Although China currently stays as a global power, it certainly intends becoming a regional power in the Asia-Pacific region. China has made substantial efforts to modernise both its naval and air forces as increased economic development has permitted the strengthening of its national power. Although these attempts have been only a qualified success, the potential Chinese military expansion and the increasing threat that a growing power projection capability might pose to the surrounding countries in Northeast Asia could be real concerns by the early decades of the next century. Furthermore, the lack of transparency in China’s political process shows that any military procurement by the Chinese government associated with naval forward deployment under a more ambitious maritime strategy, the so-called
offshore active defence (*jinyang jiji fangyu*), will be viewed with much scepticism by the international community. This situation accentuates fears in Asia concerning China’s future military intentions and is a major factor driving the arms expansion currently unfolding in the region.

Japan is uncertain about Russian policy towards the Kuril Islands and its military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as China’s intentions toward the Senkaku and Spratly Islands. It has been said that ‘Japan will seek a greater role in international decision-making, principally in the economic arena, but also on political issues in which Tokyo has special interests — particularly Asian issues.’ The Americans have encouraged the Japanese to acquire the potential to fill any security vacuum left by the withdrawn US forces. Despite the ongoing debate in Japan about its defence and security policy, Tokyo certainly has the potential to fill the vacancy resulting from declining American military influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, there are regional fears of an ambitious Japanese foreign policy leading to a security council seat in the United Nations. Japan can easily be seen as a military great power in the region based on its conventional naval and air forces alone, despite their largely defensive nature.

Japan’s defence relationship with the United States is, however, still regarded as the key to its security, with Japan Maritime Self-Defence (JMSDF) mission having responsibility for the defence of national territory. Given the declaration of former Japanese Prime Ministers, Zenko Suzuki and Yasuhiro Nakasone, of a 1,000 mile sea line of communication defence from the Japanese mainland, Japan may consider itself to have a major naval role with regard to key regional SLOCs. This is a formidable task as Japan’s huge raw material imports pass through the choke points of Southeast Asia. Although the JMSDF is smaller than the Chinese navy in numbers, it is more sophisticated. Its latest *Kongo*-class destroyer, for example, is an enlarged and improved version of the US *Arleigh Burke*-class destroyers. With approximately 60 principal surface vessels and 16 modern submarines, the JMSDF is perhaps the fourth biggest navy in the world and one of the most capable. Since its mine-sweeping forces were dispatched to the Persian Gulf in 1991, the prospect of the Japanese navy sailing outside its home waters has been alarming its neighbours.

With the end of the Cold War, although the North Pacific region is relatively free of regional conflicts, the potential for them is serious. Given the geography of the region, the importance of maritime security is apparent. Contrary to the global trend, some Northeast Asian navies are experiencing steady growth and rapid modernisation. However, co-operative
maritime security in the broad sense should be one important tool in preventing regional conflict. There are five principal phenomena that have a particular bearing on co-operative maritime security there. The first of these is the widespread naval build-up that is part of the general acquisition of advanced weapons taking place in the region. Northeast Asia is rearming faster than Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf area, as evidenced by increasing defence budgets at a time when defence budgets are declining in most of the Third World (see Table 6-1). In China, Taiwan and South Korea, for example, defence budgets are growing by between five and more than 10 per cent a year in real terms. Japan’s annual rate of increase, though it has slowed to around three per cent, is in absolute terms the biggest in the region.

The horizontal proliferation of naval weapon systems and the modernisation of regional navies in Northeast Asia have a variety of causes. One is the lessons of the Gulf War; another is the reduction of the US and Russian military presence, especially the Russian Pacific Fleet, in the Asia-Pacific region. Further economic development is another reason for the growth of Northeast Asian navies — the great majority of trade depends on sea routes, and the protection of merchant shipping is a traditional task for navies (see Table 6-2).

Although a thaw in the Cold War began in the mid-1980s, Northeast Asian countries began to invest a greater portion of their budget in the defence sector, spending an enormous amount of money on importing weapons from abroad. In the next half decade, defence budgets will not be increased like those of the last decade, due to the economic problems from the end of 1997. Nevertheless, South Korea is the only country whose financial crisis has seriously delayed defence projects, including the Korean navy’s next generation Destroyer Programme (KDX-3).17

In fact, the level of the naval arms build-up in Northeast Asia may not be as intense as in Europe during the Cold War, and no state has yet acquired the capability to impose its military hegemony over the region. Nevertheless, inter-state rivalries just short of conflict are emerging, and most regional states are increasing their power-projection capabilities in ways that could be dangerous if political relationships deteriorate in the future. Claims that the naval expansion in Northeast Asia threatens maritime security can be exaggerated, and they often are. However, the rapid build-up of the Chinese and Japanese naval forces has heightened the perception of threat to the security of the region; except for the Korean peninsula, current security concerns in Northeast Asia are focused on China’s developing power-projection potential. Most countries in and around the region are heavily dependent on
the sea lanes over which they trade, and in the event of a crisis or war, most combat logistic support would have to use the major sea lanes that traverse the region.

Second, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was adopted as a result of the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, is a powerful institutional framework for defining and resolving maritime issues. The UNCLOS extended the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) to 200 nautical miles; because the seas of Northeast Asia are either enclosed or semi-enclosed and are studded with so many islands that nowhere does the distance from one headland or island to another exceed 400 nautical miles, much of the region’s offshore expanse has been subjected to overlapping resource claims and intense territorial disputes (see Table 6-7). Many involve claims by coastal states over the continental shelf and criteria for resolving overlapping shelf and EEZ claims.

There are territorial disputes between Russia and China on the boundary along the Amur River; between Russia and Japan over the Kuril Islands (or Northern Territories); between China, Taiwan, and Japan over a group of barren islets to the north of Taiwan, known in Japanese as the Senkaku Islands and in Chinese as Tiaoyu Tao; between Russia and the United States over the Bering Sea which indirectly or directly influences maritime security in Northeast Asia; and between South Korea and Japan over the Tok Islands (Tok-to; known in Japanese as Takeshima) in the southern part of the East Sea (see Maps 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, 6-4, and 6-5). The dispute over the potentially oil-rich Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, involving China, Taiwan and most ASEAN countries, has also created a potentially explosive situation for maritime security in Northeast Asia.

Third, offshore resources are also a related concern, particularly as the seabed off the East China Sea and in the Sea of Okhotsk is believed to be rich in reserves of oil and gas. These problems are serious enough to threaten maritime security, but they could be alleviated by maritime safety agreement and confidence-building measures. The natural resources in and under the seas of Northeast Asia are in many cases subjected to contending claims. The interests of most countries in the region are in the broadest sense economic. The North Pacific is a resource-rich region, especially in commercial fisheries. Three principal issues pertaining to the use of living resources — illegal fishing, unregulated fishing, and driftnetting — have threatened international environmental security in the Bering Sea and the adjacent North Pacific. In many ways, the disputes over the Senkakus, the Tok Islands, and the Kurils are related to these issues. These have all resulted in bitter disputes, impaired relations between victim and culprit states, and international countermeasures. Besides the United States and
Russia, the states most involved with current management practices in the Bering Sea include South Korea, North Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and China.\(^8\)

Although those countries have generally managed to avoid direct conflict, territorial claims may well disturb the stability of the region; overlapping EEZ claims are particular flashpoints. Establishing clear and recognised maritime boundaries and sovereign jurisdictions will be difficult; until such settlements are finally reached, however, various co-operative efforts and confidence-building programmes — predominantly of a maritime nature — could lessen the likelihood of conflict and promote an atmosphere of trust and mutual respect necessary for lasting agreements.

Fourth, the rapid economic development in Northeast Asia led to pollution at sea to an extent that has created regional concern. In recent years many Northeast Asian countries, including China and Russia, have pursued a policy of ‘development first and environment protection in later.’ This kind of land-based pollution dumps waste of various kinds into the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea. Nor should it be forgotten that through the Cold War era the former Soviet Union discharged nuclear waste, such as reactor coolant by the Russian Pacific Fleet, into the Sea of Okhotsk and the East Sea, causing nuclear pollution for fishing and other uses of the sea. As a result, these activities already carry substantial financial burdens owing to increased morbidity and premature mortality of fish stocks, degradation of the sea environment, and damage to critical ecosystems.

Finally, in Northeast Asia the ocean is important not only for coastal states but also for the developed countries that consider the region’s sea lines of communications so important that they maintain a military presence in the region. Thus, both direct and indirect risks to regional stability exist, including the movement of refugees, drug-trafficking, and the potential for regional conflicts arising from the absence of an institutionalised structure to manage disputes.

Furthermore, the use of the sea as a highway for commerce makes Northeast Asia a target for piracy, as has been shown in the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea and the South China Sea. From 1992 to early 1996 there was a northward shift of the focus of piracy, from the Straits of Malacca and Singapore to the Hong Kong-Luzon-Hainan Islands area, the South China Sea, and significantly, the East China Sea and beyond. In the Yellow Sea there was a single reported piracy incident in 1993, and another in 1994. Piracy is a never-ending menace to the freedom of navigation, and the incidents continue (see Table 6-3).
To date, however, not much thought has been given to applying co-operative maritime security to these issues. Long-term economic security is dependent upon the free flow of trade, which in a conflict situation would require co-operative measures to protect. During the Cold War, the protection of SLOCs was largely the preserve for the major maritime powers; it is now at least as much a concern of the regional countries themselves. Today, these problems are typically handled nationally, with a resulting potential for international conflict.

Co-operative maritime security in the region is relatively undeveloped. Regional navies in Northeast Asia have little of the transparency that developed in the latter years of the Cold War. There is no Pacific-area equivalent of the Dangerous Military Activities Agreement and system of CBMs similar to those operating in Europe under the OSCE umbrella. Aside from some bilateral agreements, like the Incidents at Sea Agreements still in force between Russia, the United States, Japan and South Korea, there are no broadly recognised procedures to provide guidelines for the conduct of naval operations in the region. Furthermore, the significance of rules for preventing or restraining maritime conflicts is increasing in the post-Cold War era, and co-operative maritime security in the broad sense could play a key part in the effort.

Given the security problems described above, a broader network of co-operative maritime security is essential in Northeast Asia where a host of political, economic, and military factors contribute to an uncertain and changing environment. Even so, much of the success of regional maritime co-operation arrangements depends on the degree of commitment of the participating countries. This study argues that co-operative maritime security would not only strengthen understanding of the mutuality of security, but also broaden the definition of security beyond the traditional approach. Co-operative maritime security includes naval arms control, maritime confidence-building measures (MCBMs) and maritime co-operation measures (MCMs). Arms control provides limitation and constraint; MCBMs reassure and build confidence; MCMs build habits of co-operation.

III. Purpose and Method of the Study
There have been various proposals on measures to achieve multilateral security in Northeast Asia. Early proposals ranged from the collective Asian security guarantee of former Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev to those made by former General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in his Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk speeches. Later proposals include the Northeast Asia Co-operation Dialogue by former President Roh Tao Woo of the Republic of
Korea, the Pacific Co-operative Security Dialogue by Minister of Foreign Affairs Joe Clark of Canada, and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Asia by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Paul Evans of Australia. None of these, however, shows any development worthy of mention.

The purpose of this study is to design a co-operative maritime security structure for Northeast Asia through the application of naval arms control and disarmament measures (both structural and operational); maritime confidence-building measures and maritime co-operation measures. In order to construct an analytical framework for such an application it is necessary to introduce sub-objectives.

The first is to explore the options for providing co-operative maritime security measures, such as naval arms control, MCBMs and MCMs, and to assess the value of their contribution to the general co-operative maritime security framework. After reviewing the theoretical debate on co-operative maritime security models, the thesis will examine case studies of naval arms control through the processes and results of structural and operational measures and the associated political and technical problems. An analysis of the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty and the 1972 USA-USSR Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over High Seas will not only provide a basis for evaluating the overall utility of naval arms control as an element of co-operative maritime security, but also offer a technical guide to co-operative maritime security in Northeast Asia.

The second aim is to examine the particular points of the major regional powers' maritime security policies with a view to considering their relevance to the construction of a system of co-operative maritime security in Northeast Asia. The third is to delineate the regional geo-strategic security environment conducive to Northeast Asian co-operative maritime security in the framework of the various types of measures. The final part examines the potential conditions for the application of co-operative maritime security measures and suggests a priority of application on the basis of the regional maritime security environment. In order to achieve its objective, the study will explore the following questions.

1. In a geo-strategic context, what are the political, security, strategic, and economic rationales for co-operative maritime security in the region? How are economic and political relations developing between states in the region? Addressing this aspect, this study attempts to explain how the countries have been endeavouring to realise their political, strategic, and economic goals in the Asia-Pacific region in the 1990s in response to changes in the international political system.
2. How significant are navies in the overall hierarchy of regional military priorities, such as in the share of budgetary funding? What are the timetables and what are the goals of naval build-ups? How do countries perceive the regional naval balance? What are the development plans for surface warships, submarines, armaments and naval aviation? What is the thinking behind maritime strategy today? This study attempts to show how navies effect military priorities and defence planning on the basis of the strategic perspectives of regional actors; how the latter perceive the regional naval balance with the reduction of US and Russian military presence in the region; and how their attempts at modernisation are faring.

3. In the context of a shifting strategic environment in the post-Cold War era, what impact have the changes had on the attitude of regional powers toward co-operative maritime security? What are the drawbacks for the co-operative security models, relating to characteristics of force structure, and boundary and territorial disputes, in the region? How can co-operative maritime security models be applied in the region? This study seeks to clarify the process of how regional countries have attempted to improve co-operative maritime security measures; what the main obstacles to the application of such models in the maritime environment have been so far; and what are the priorities for the suggested application of such measures.

In seeking to address this topic this study draws upon a range of theoretical approaches from the study of international relations, security and strategic studies. Such approaches involve neo-realism, neoliberal-institutionalism, and middle-range theories and concepts. Neo-realism seeks to understand Northeast Asia through an analysis of geopolitics and power politics among the dominant actors, inter-state relations and the dominant patterns of regional conflict and co-operation. Neoliberal-institutionalism stresses that, as states become more economically interdependent, they co-operate more and more because it is vital to their mutual benefit. This approach is more concerned with seeking to explain the necessity for Northeast East Asian co-operation and collaboration, and the growth of regional economic and security interdependence. Security and economic relations in the region, on balance, are becoming more stable as a result of this interdependence based on the establishment of multilateral institutions in the region, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) and the ARF. Middle-range theories and concepts, such as co-operative security and the balance of power, are also deployed in an effort to interpret the dynamics of intra-regional politics and to analyse the politics of the major regional powers. Thus, this study reflects an evolving convergence between neo-realism and neoliberal-institutionalism.
The methodology adopted has three dimensions. The first is a quantitative study which is in an essential starting point for comparing competing military forces, but difficulties in compiling compatible figures make the matching of raw statistics an unsatisfactory procedure. Quality can compensate for quantity to some extent. Comparing qualitative characteristics of weapons and equipment, however, is a difficult process, because key indicators are often concealed.

The second basic method employed is the historical and functional analyses of the various states’ naval missions and capabilities. In view of the difficulty associated with not only collecting accurate information about the development of the Russian, Chinese, and to some extent Japanese navies, but also assessing the complicated patterns of their naval activities, it is important to assess the utility of the research materials available from various sources. All figures and tables used in this analysis are derived from open and public sources. These publications, taken together, can provide the underpinning for further study and help to make a more acceptable, justifiable and objective judgement. The last research method will involve a comparative case study which examines co-operative maritime security in Northeast Asia in the framework of major powers’ maritime strategies and naval arms control, MCBMs as well as MCMs.

Four hypotheses are presented. First, a naval arms dynamic exists in the strategic relations between Northeast Asian countries. This naval arms build-up is related to the rapid growth of economies in the region, and security uncertainties which still have their roots in Cold War politics. Even though political and economic relations in the region are improving in the post-Cold War period, the possibility of maritime confrontation still exists. Maritime co-operative activities could prevent conflict that could arise inadvertently. The very means by which such maritime co-operation takes place also constitute a major avenue to prevent misunderstanding. Second, territorial disputes, including disputes over marine resources, will continue between regional countries. Those disputes could not be solved by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea for various reasons. But co-operative maritime security measures could be a useful means for helping solve territorial disputes through joint development of marine resources. Third, non-military security issues, such as sea pollution and piracy, could be critical in Northeast Asia. In particular, land-based industrial waste and oil spills will increase with the rapid growth of regional economies. Piracy in the seas of the Asia-Pacific will not only increase but also influence SLOC security. Large percentages of Northeast Asian trade pass through a few key straits, and these can easily be a target for
piracy. Through such multilateral co-operative activities, regional countries can share responsibilities and costs for surveillance and anti-piracy. Finally, it is speculated that co-operative maritime security will instead lead away from the existing insecurity in maritime issues to a new form of maritime stability in Northeast Asia. The new form of maritime co-operation will also bring economic benefits.

IV. The Analytical Framework and Chapter Outlines
The attempt to apply co-operative maritime security models to Northeast Asia begins with the design of an analytical framework which can be used as a generalised, hypothetical description. Co-operative maritime security is a broad concept covering a large number of naval activities, afloat and ashore. It has three dimensions: naval arms control, maritime confidence-building measures and maritime co-operation measures. Naval arms control, as a traditional approach focusing on military components, can be divided into two areas: structural measures, like the Washington Naval Treaty in 1922, and operational measures like the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement. MCBMs, which tend to focus on military components, are based on transparency measures, including port visits, command post exercises, navy-to-navy talks, data exchanges, and technological exchanges. As a developing model, MCMs, which focus on non-military as well as military components, are divided into two areas: a functional approach and an operational approach, including protection against sea pollution, search and rescue (SAR) operations, and joint development of marine resources such as oil, gas and fishery. These models conceptually overlap with each other.

Past experience shows that these models have relevance for Northeast Asia. Given the particularity and complexity of maritime security and the evolution of these models over a long period, it may be very difficult to generalise the entire maritime co-operation process. A number of naval arms control and MCBM procedures designed to achieve maritime stability and the prevention of war may be usefully applied to Northeast Asia. They might also provide a suitable framework for dialogue between states in the region.

The point of departure for the analytical framework must be the naval build-up which could result in instability in the region. This issue provides an important primary justification for co-operative maritime security in Northeast Asia. The increasing danger of non-military threats, including maritime territorial, boundary or marine resource disputes, requires a further reason for regional debate on maritime security. This suggests that both traditional and modern approaches could be adopted to counter maritime instability. The traditional approach
Figure 1-1  Analytical Framework of the Research

Maritime Security Challenges

Military Threats:
- Naval Arms Proliferation

Non-Military Threats: Maritime
- Boundary/Territorial Disputes,
- Piracy, Marine Resource Disputes
- Sea Pollution

Instability in Maritime Security

Co-operative Maritime Security

Traditional Approach
- Disarmament and Arms Control
  - Structural Measures
  - Operational Measures

Modern Approach
- Maritime Confidence-Building Measures
  - Transparency Measures
  - Constraining Measures
- Maritime Co-operation Measures
  - Functional Approach
  - Operational Approach

Common Maritime Security Interests

Maritime Threats/Conflicts at Low Level

Enhancing Understanding → Maritime Peace and Stability and Confidence
has two dimensions: naval arms control and MCBMs. MCBMs can be also included in a modern approach. MCMs can be considered as a modern approach. The major powers would widen the mutual understanding of the other side's maritime interests through the continuation of the maritime co-operation talks. Finally, co-operative maritime security measures could lead to a low level of maritime threat leading to changes in the opposing force structure to enhance understanding and confidence.

This study consists of nine chapters, including introduction and conclusion. As an introduction, chapter one presents an overview of this research. A background explanation of naval arms control as a co-operative maritime security model is provided in chapter two. Chapter three concentrates on understanding structural naval arms control in the pre-nuclear age with reference to the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty and the operational naval arms control model in the nuclear age with a case study of the 1972 INCSEA agreement. Chapters four and five respectively consider MCBMs and MCMs models with reference to their appropriateness for co-operative maritime security.

Chapter six examines in detail the reality of the geo-strategic maritime environment for maritime co-operation in Northeast Asia. It considers the challenges of the maritime environment and the prospects for maritime co-operation, beginning with a brief historical summary of security relations in the region, followed by an account of border and maritime boundary disputes, asymmetries of force structure, and asymmetries of strategy and goals in the region. Chapters seven and eight discuss the major regional powers' perspectives on co-operative maritime security based on political, strategic and economic goals in Northeast Asia. Both chapters firstly consider how and why the major powers turned their attentions to maritime security. Secondly, both chapters examine the structure, missions and capabilities of the powers' fleet forces, naval policies and strategies. Thirdly, these chapters undertake an analysis to find the rationale behind naval build-ups in the region with a view to understanding the significance of their expansions in the Pacific and South China Sea. Finally, these chapters attempt to analyse the intentions behind the increased naval activity around the region. The thrust of this part is that major powers' navies will experience important changes and that maritime co-operation, broadly defined, may be one of the best ways to manage the change in the interests of maritime peace and security.

This study is intended for two audiences. One is composed of professional maritime analysts, naval officers, security analysts, and defence planners. Academic students of East Asian political, strategic and security matters comprise the second audience. This is the first
attempt at a comprehensive analysis of modern Northeast Asian co-operative maritime security. No doubt more and better works will follow, as the political and strategic stability as well as general arms control and CBMs of Southeast Asia play an increasingly important role in regional security events.

Endnotes


12. East Asia consists of strategic sub-regions generally defined as Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. The term, Northwest Pacific, which might include some Southeast Asian countries and the South China Sea, can be used in a maritime context, while Northeast Asia is more commonly used in the expression of strategic, political and security aspect, including maritime issues. Furthermore, Mongolia is included in Northeast Asia, but it was excluded in this study because it has no naval forces.

Chapter II. The Theoretical Debate on Naval Arms Control

I. What are Disarmament and Arms Control?

A. The Relationship Between Disarmament and Arms Control
It is important to begin by defining arms control and disarmament since both these terms are used loosely and often interchangeably. Disarmament is the older term, and was generally used up to the Second World War to refer to both arms reduction and arms limitation in the numbers of a particular weapon or category of weapons. Arms control, the preferred term since the Second World War, means mutual restraint on the development, deployment, or use of particular weapons or categories of weapons, rather than reductions for their own sake. Arms control and disarmament can be undertaken bilaterally or multilaterally; disarmament can be unilateral. The moral and political perspectives of the disarmament approach are different from those of arms control. There are critical distinctions between the view taken of the acceptability of wars as an instrument of policy and the degree to which the existence of weaponry in itself acts to increase international tension. Whereas disarmament has been seen as an alternative to military strength, arms control has been seen as a complement to it.

B. The Concept of Disarmament
Disarmament always involves the total or partial reduction of arms. Total disarmament, often referred to as general and complete disarmament (GCD), ‘aims for a reduction of armament down to the bare minimum required for domestic policing purposes.’ The classic early definition of disarmament was put forward by Hedley Bull: ‘Disarmament is the reduction or abolition of armaments. It may be unilateral or multilateral; general or local; comprehensive or partial; controlled or uncontrolled.’

Unlike radicals, the more modest proponents of disarmament propose to retain some kind of weapons, but abolish the most dangerous, e.g. nuclear weapons, in a particular zone. They see the reduction as a step towards the Utopian goal of GCD. In reality the goal of GCD would be impossible to achieve without fundamental changes in the international system occurring first. Their thinking to some extent accepts the impossibility of the complete abolition of weapons and the end of use of military forces in the modern world. This approach is a reflection of the failure of attempts to achieve total disarmament.

Most disarmament proposals between 1945 and 1963 were put forward with the aim of political gain and propaganda rather than genuine efforts to disarm. The proposals were so
radical and broad that a constructive and realisable response could not be expected from any country. At first the disarmament proposals were influenced by domestic politics and public opinion. By emphasising the refusal of one country, another country could not only justify the deployment and development of new weapons but also increase the defence budget. During the 1950s the Soviet Union and the United States used this method to pose as champions of disarmament. Disarmament, in practice, had a political objective and was not purely an end in itself as a policy of the partial or total elimination of weapons.

C. The Concept of Arms Control
Arms control, as a body of thought, was developed in the late 1950s as a realistic alternative to the obvious failure of classic disarmament. The use of nuclear weapons was often considered in local conflicts: the United States more than once threatened nuclear attack against China because of its involvement in the Korean War. Thus, the escalation of the Cold War made the need to develop arms control theories of war prevention a major priority.

However, arms control discussions have generally tended to focus on the US-Soviet arms race and the problems of European security. Accordingly, the arms race questions to be raised were based on the security perspectives of the superpowers and the Western countries. The concept of arms control combines three principal activities: regulation, restriction, and reduction. The classic early definition of arms control was put forward by Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin in 1961:

We mean to include all the forms of military co-operation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it. The essential feature of arms control is the recognition of the common interest, of the possibility of the reciprocation and co-operation even between potential enemies with respect to their military establishments.

The arms control approach addresses the issue of security from quite a different perspective from that of disarmament and has a wider scope. Like disarmament, arms control is concerned with the impact of technology on arms dynamics and deterrence strategy. It differs fundamentally from the disarmament approach in that it allows for increasing or decreasing weapons, depending on the situation. The basic objective of arms control is to attempt to manage the arms dynamics by negotiation in such a way as to control an arms race and to reduce instability within a relationship of mutual deterrence.

It can be seen, therefore, that the assumptions underlying the arms control concept give rise to quite a different operational approach compared with that of disarmament. The
supporters of disarmament consider weapons to be the root and cause of international tension and war, and their solution is to reduce weaponry. Arms controllers have not sought to abolish weapons but rather have put forward methods to live with them. In the past, they believed that deterrence from war was only guaranteed by a balance of terror. However, they believed that small forces were vulnerable to marginal advantages on each side, and the strategic balance at low levels was seen as destabilising. As a result, higher force levels were maintained even than those needed for the assured destruction requirement.

II. What is Naval Arms Control?

A. The Concept and Objectives of Naval Arms Control
Naval arms control includes conventional and nuclear naval armaments. The most commonly stated objectives of naval arms control can be summarised as follows: (1) to prevent the possibility of conflict or war through the maintenance of international stability and the establishment of confidence which may be boosted by reducing tension, misperceptions, and mistrust that could arise from naval forces' activities; (2) to limit damage in war; and (3) to reduce resource expenditure. These three main objectives improve mutual peace and security in general. Nonetheless, the order of priority of these purposes must be considered according to the changing maritime environment because these objectives have reciprocal relations and their relative importance changes according to the historical environment.

Stability and the Prevention of the Possibility of War. The balance of military forces between nations influences the stability or instability of their relationship. Arms control negotiations typically have dealt with reducing the perceived threat which can result from asymmetries in their arsenals of nuclear warheads, or from the levels of their conventional forces, or from other aspects of their force postures.

Richard Fieldhouse emphasised that the objective of naval arms control must be to prevent or dissuade war by eliminating or reducing the sources of danger that stem from the naval forces or activities of nations. In fact, a traditional and comprehensive concept includes bilateral, multilateral and regional agreements. In addition, this embraces mutual negotiations, such as manpower and information exchanges with a view to building confidence.

Agreements contributing to reduce the possibility of war or conflict related to two forms of stability: crisis stability and arms race stability. Crisis stability, in Colin S. Gray's words, 'refers to the likelihood that an acute political conflict will explode into war even
Though both sides would prefer to remain at peace. The logic of crisis stability has become a central notion of the classical theory of deterrence and chiefly depends on the force structures of both sides and the perceptions of their political leadership. In the end, political leaders will consider that they would have little to gain from military action between them. 

Arms race stability means slowing down the rate of change in competitive armaments and reducing the incentives discerned by each “racing” parity to introduce new, or more, armaments. Therefore, both kinds of stability efforts aim not only to prevent massive defence spending from an arms race but also to increase mutual confidence.

An arms control agreement also provides an element of predictability for the military planners. Quantitative limitations on any forces contribute to predictability. Under the limits on battleship tonnage of the Washington Treaty of 1922, for example, the great powers could define together their plans for naval force levels and new construction programmes in the key components of their own navies.

Arms Control measures on stability and predictability should contribute to increase international confidence. In the nuclear age, arms control includes efforts not only to reduce misunderstanding but also to increase trust through the use of confidence-building measures (CBMs) which involve the communication of credible evidence of the absence of feared threat. Although arms control and CBMs overlap on relevant measures like Table 2-2 and 5-1, CBMs are only ‘arms control’ if they include the concept of restraint. The objective of CBMs is to enhance stability and peace through the reduction of the danger of a surprise attack and the chance of accidental war or a war arising from miscalculation or misunderstanding. Examples of this kind of agreement are the 1963 and 1971 Hot-line Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, a similar hot-line agreement between Britain and the Soviet Union in 1967 and the US-USSR Agreement on the Prevention of Military Incidents On and Over the High Seas in 1972.

**Limiting Damage in War.** Arms control embraces efforts to limit the destructiveness of wars. The Geneva Convention of 1864 and the Hague Conference of 1899 as well as 1907 contained provisions on certain types of weapon, such as floating mines, and restrictions on the use of naval weapons, many of which were forgotten in the years 1914-1918. Table 2-1 contains examples of this kind of limitation as applied at sea, including more recent conventions, declarations and protocols.

**Reducing the Cost of Defence.** Globally, the resources spent on armed forces are very large. But the economic benefits of arms control may not be as extensive as they might
seem at first. The destruction of armaments and verification technology can be very expensive. Therefore, the burden of arms control on some countries could be just as high as an unrestrained competition, at least in the short term.

**B. Categories of Naval Arms Control Approaches**

Historically, naval arms control measures are divided into many categories: reciprocal expenditure limitation, limits on certain kinds of naval forces, limits on naval bases and facilities, and constraint measures, including limits on areas of operation missions, exercises, and activities.

Barry M. Blechman indicated two areas of naval arms control: limits on naval inventories and naval deployments. \(^{21}\) Limits on naval inventories attempt to control numbers, types, and the efficiency of war ships. There are two kinds of possible approaches: one is an element of control on naval capacity, such as the number of vessels, ship’s tonnage, weapon systems, manpower, and expenditures; while the other is a comprehensive control on naval capacity. Limits on naval deployments attempt to control naval activities through regulating the operations of ships. For instance, there are constraints on the specific regions which some or all naval ships operate, and this includes quantitative and qualitative control on the time and period. This approach includes limits on special area and specific naval forces, for example, diesel submarines, nuclear submarines, and aircraft carriers. Other types of proposal can be included in this approach such as the denuclearisation of an ocean area and the reduction of the naval presence in a certain zone.

Richard Haass, furthermore, suggested activity constraints and confidence building at sea as the modern approach. \(^{22}\) Recently, James J. George suggested three general categories on naval arms control: (1) quantitative or structural measures on limit naval forces; (2) qualitative limits; and (3) operational restraints including advance notifications to actual exclusion zones. \(^{23}\) Richard C. Davis also added the control of naval technology transfer. \(^{24}\) Richard Fieldhouse suggested slightly different general three categories: \(^{25}\) (1) structural measures which limit inventories of naval ships, aircraft, and weapons; (2) operational measures; and (3) maritime confidence-building measures (M CBMs). In this study, naval arms control will be divided into two areas: structural naval arms control and constraints on naval operations as operational naval arms control. The types of such measures are shown in Table 2-2.
1. Structural Naval Arms Control

The structure of naval power consists of many elements: the quantitative and qualitative scope of naval ships, such as aircraft carriers, submarines, cruisers, destroyers, aircraft; the type and number of weapon systems of those platforms; manpower in active naval service; and the number and capacity of naval bases, ports, and other naval facilities for those forces. Structural naval arms control seeks to arrange the quantity and quality of those elements.

Such measures could be formal or informal, bilateral or multilateral. There have been examples of such controls in the past. With a view to assuring their development and peaceful utilisation, the Paris Treaty of 1920 stated that Norway could not install naval bases and could not permit other nations to install naval bases in the Spitzbergen Islands with Norwegian sovereignty on the archipelago. According to the treaty, these islands could not be used for war aims. The Spitzbergen Treaty has been ratified by or acceded to by 40 nations, including China and Japan. The League of Nations accepted the Treaty over the Aaland Archipelago of 1856, re-confirmed the principle of neutralisation in this area, and extended the treaty to include the neutralised area during war time. As a result, a three mile zone surrounding it was declared as a neutralised area.

The great powers ended the First World War with a fervent desire to avoid similar wars in the future. The victors had large battle fleets, and some of their leaders believed that a race to achieve superiority in this particular form of armament had helped to lead the world into war in 1914. After protracted and interactive negotiations, the Washington Naval Treaty among the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan was agreed in 1922. The contracting powers limited their respective naval armament as provided in the treaty, which included many restrictions on the great powers' naval weapons and naval activities. In particular, limitations were agreed on battleship scrapping and building programmes (Articles II and III), total tonnage (Article IV), the maximum displacement of any single capital ship (Article V), and the maximum calibre of gun armament (Article VI). This treaty was focused on an influential and comprehensive arms limitation, which influenced the military balance and the political relations of the great powers. (It will be discussed in detail in chapter three).

The Geneva Naval Conference of 1927 not only considered the result of the Washington Conference but also extended the ratios and limit of major powers' auxiliary surface combatants (cruisers and destroyers) and submarines. Although this conference started from the problem of the Washington Treaty limits on capital ships that gave rise to a
'cruiser race' between the major powers,\textsuperscript{30} it could not produce any result because the United States and Great Britain had different approaches.\textsuperscript{31} The abortive attempt at Geneva in 1927 was followed by a partially successful conference in London in 1930. Cruiser numbers were the vital point of negotiations, and the abolition of submarines remained on the agenda.\textsuperscript{32} As a result of this conference, Great Britain, the United States and Japan set ratios for cruisers, destroyers and submarines, and agreed that submarines must not engage in unrestricted warfare.

The Second London Conference of 1935 had to achieve some kind of agreement,\textsuperscript{33} since the 1930 treaty was due to expire the following year. It took place in a quite different atmosphere from that of the previous naval arms control negotiations. Germany was still not part of the main negotiations, concluding concurrently a bilateral treaty with Britain based upon a 35:100 ratio between the German and British fleets.\textsuperscript{34} Advances in Japan's naval strength and her militarist outlook provided the strategic and political impetus for the conference. Japan had given notice in 1934 that it would not adhere to the Naval Treaty System after the end of 1936,\textsuperscript{35} and in January 1936 the Japanese withdrew from the London Conference.\textsuperscript{36} Italy and France\textsuperscript{37} made it clear that they would accept no quantitative ratios of the kind that had formed the basis of past naval agreements, so the whole quantitative approach had to be abandoned. Emphasis was placed on qualitative restrictions instead. The important provisions were limits on capital ships of 35,000 tons displacement and 14-inch guns, carrier limits of 23,000 tons and 6.1-inch guns (reduced displacement, smaller armaments); a six year shipbuilding holiday for heavy cruisers (in excess of 10,000 tons); and a prohibition on the construction of any other surface combatants of between 8,000 and 17,500 tons.\textsuperscript{38} The treaty included 'escape clauses' under which a nation could ignore the treaty if other nations did, or if it stated formally that its national defence was threatened by adhering to the treaty (Part IV).\textsuperscript{39} Soon all signatories had taken advantage of such clauses.

Greece and Turkey added a protocol on naval armaments to a treaty of neutrality, conciliation, and arbitration in 1930. The two nations bound themselves not to enter into any alliance directed against the other, to remain neutral in any war involving the other country, and to submit all disputes to conciliation, and, if that failed, to arbitration. Furthermore, the two states pledged that they would give six months' notice before acquiring additional naval vessels. In spite of a shifting political climate, it was possible for the two countries to achieve the stabilisation of naval balance without actually negotiating specific limits on force levels or
warship characteristics. In this case, success depended heavily on the fact that the two countries were relatively satisfied with the existing naval balance.  

There have been only a few examples of naval arms control agreements since 1945: the 1972 SALT-I 41 and the 1979 SALT-II treaties originated from the overall balance of nuclear arms. Both included quantitative limitations of SSBN and SLBM. 42 In 1991, in an interesting example of arms control through mutual statements, the U.S., Soviet and British navies announced the removal of all tactical nuclear weapons, including cruise missiles, from their surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval aviation, except for ballistic missile submarines. 43 In July 1991 the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). On 29 January 1992 Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed a new START II agreement with the United States. 44 The agreement, which has still not been ratified by Russia, imposes a submarine launched-ballistic missile (SLBM) warhead sub-limit of one-half the total or 1,250. 45

Beyond nuclear weapons it is difficult to make formal control categories for naval forces apply to structural naval arms control today. 46 Submarines can be threatened not only by other submarines but also by surface ships and aircraft, which are based on land and shore, which can lead to the problem as to whether non-naval forces and systems should be included or not. Naval forces are partially dependent on auxiliary vessels, and maritime research ships and fishing vessels can directly accomplish reconnaissance, pursuit, communication, and intelligence operations. Merchant ships can also be used to transport weapons and manpower. Modern maritime warfare system is not simple but complex, a multidimensional affair.

2. Constraints on Naval Operations: Operational Naval Arms Control
Operational arms control "seeks to place constraints on the behaviour of armed forces and embraces such possibilities as regulations on deployment and generally the inhibitions of military actions which supposedly increase the risk of war." 47 The approach generally involves restraints on the size, location, scope, or duration of naval exercises, and geographical limitations on naval operations that would make areas of the oceans off-limits to naval ships. Such measures can have an international character like the UNCLOS and, like structural naval arms control, they could be bilateral or multilateral, and formal or informal. 48 Constraints on naval operations overlap with constraining measures of MCBMs. (For more details, see Figure 2-1, and Tables 2-2 and 4-1).
So far as area constraints are concerned, there have of course been some treaties over the years setting prohibitions on naval activity of certain types in certain areas. The 1817 Rush-Bagot Agreement between the United States and Great Britain is a naval arms control treaty that has been long-lasting and most successful. This treaty, which originated from British concern about the Great Lakes during the negotiation about the termination of the 1812 war, limited naval deployments by both the United States and Great Britain (later Canada) on the Great Lakes. Neither side could deploy more than four ships, which were not permitted to exceed 100 tons or to carry a gun larger than 18 pounds. Although this treaty was violated once, it helped to improving the two countries' relations, which have prevailed, without any conflict, since then. The agreement (revised in 1922 and 1939 to exempt revenue, police ships as well as training ships, and to permit construction as long as the new ships did not remain on the Lakes) remains in force today.

The Montreux Convention in 1936 can be considered another successful treaty. This was the last of a series of arrangements regulating the movement of merchant and naval vessels: the Treaty of Paris (1856), the Treaty of London (1871), the Treaty of Sevres (1920) and the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. The Montreux Convention includes provisions governing the deployment of warships and other vessels in the Black Sea and Dardenelles Straits. There are four principal provisions: (1) the passage of merchant ships shall be free both of restriction and of tolls; (2) non-Black Sea powers shall not be allowed to put a superior force of warships into the Black Sea; (3) Black Sea powers shall not be allowed egress for their naval forces without notification to Turkey; and (4) such egress shall not be allowed to submarines or to aircraft carriers except for very special circumstances. This convention has been maintained for 50 years, but is complex and contains many provisions that demand interpretation. Since the Second World War, regional arrangements which seek to prohibit nuclear activities, such as the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Raratonga Treaty of 1985, and suggestions on more general naval disengagement, like the Indian Ocean in 1976, have been discussed (see Table 2-1).

Constraints could take many forms depending on the specific issue and situation. For instance, constraints on naval presence, such as exercises, deployments, and bases in special areas, could be considered. Numbers of naval exercises could be limited in a specific area during a specific time, with detailed conditions and limitations on the types and numbers of participating naval ships, and on exercise time. With regard to deployment, limitations could include the types, numbers, size, and time spent in special areas. Measures could also limit
approach distance and transit through important international straits, and choke-points. In addition, naval bases and facilities can be limited according to the characteristics and times of employment.57

The basic concept of anti-submarine warfare free zones (ASWFZs) is that, in certain areas, ASW would be prohibited. The intention is to make these regions more secure for ballistic missile submarines because these zones seem to be fundamentally unverifiable and certainly restrictive during times of crisis; such zones could become a source of instability. For example, the problem of an ASWFZ at the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap (G-I-UK) would give Russia free passage to the open ocean. In theory, any surface ship or even aeroplane with ASW capabilities could not transit such an area.58 Accordingly, unlike the NWFZ which can have some benefits, the proposal on ASW free zones does not seem to have any positive impact.

Some constraints on naval operations can, however, avoid some of the problems that affect structural naval arms control. Because such measures allow participating nations to keep and construct their naval forces, it seems the easiest approach. Nevertheless, such measures interfere with traditional notions of freedom of the sea and are unwelcome to most naval officers. They could seriously undermine the operational utility of naval forces. Furthermore, it is difficult to verify compliance especially when considering the operations of submarines. Sometimes non-compliance might be wrongly suspected.

After the 1972 US-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas (INCSEA), the two countries agreed in 1973 to a protocol extending it to non-military ships. In 1989 the agreement was extended to the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (PDMA) which includes naval activities. INCSEA succeeded in limiting incidents on the high seas and helped prevent crisis situations. The great success of the INCSEA influenced several other bilateral agreements: between the UK and the Soviet Union on 15 July 1986, between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany on 25 October 1988, and between France and the USSR on 21 September 1989. The others include Russia-Japanese and Russia-South Korean agreements in 1993. (This will be discussed in detail in chapter three).

III. Difficulties of Naval Arms Control
Naval forces have great diversities in role and structure. Ken Booth described the characteristics of naval ships as follows: (1) versatility, their ability to carry out many
different tasks; (2) controllability, their ability to heighten or diminish violence as a diplomatic means; (3) mobility, their ability to independently and easily manoeuvre between seas and regions; (4) projection ability, their efficiency of transportation of manpower and fire power; (5) access potential, their ability to reach distant areas; (6) symbolism, their role as badges of national sovereignty; and (7) endurance, their ability to keep at sea. Nonetheless, there are many difficulties of naval arms control. These can be summarised into three broad categories: asymmetries in the role and structure of naval forces; the problem of comparison of naval forces; and the issue of verification.

Asymmetry in the Role and Structure of Naval Power. Despite the fact that advocates of air power or anti-navalists argue that as new technological developments appear, most of what constitutes naval forces can be replaced by other armed forces, especially by air forces, the unique roles of the navy cannot be duplicated by armies and air forces. The navy has also absorbed the effectiveness of technological developments. Professor Geoffrey Till argues that although the changes in the maritime environment make ‘traditional naval activities seem to be more open to the charge of being ‘irrelevant’ than ever before,’ old tasks, such as securing command of the sea, sea control, the defence of SLOCs and the projection of power ashore, remain essential for new navies.

Navies can be divided into three categories based on roles and force structure as follows: global navies, blue-water navies, and coastal navies. Global navies, like that of the United States (and, formerly, the Soviet Union), deploy significant naval forces in most oceans. Their operations need reliable means such as overseas bases and friendly port facilities, a strong logistic support organisation, and sufficient number of ships to be able to maintain a naval presence and to project power far from home. There may be geostrategic asymmetries, however, which can lead to differences in arms control approaches. The United States perceives itself to be a maritime nation, dependent on the ability of its navy for its interests not only to control the seas but also to ensure freedom of trade in peacetime and the re-supply of its allies in times of conflict. On the other hand, the USSR, as a continental power, depended far less on naval power to protect its national interest. (This will be discussed in detail in chapter seven).

Blue-water navies, such as those of Great Britain and France, by their very nature, can generally operate at a distance from their territories. They sometimes not only accomplish naval operations from a significant distance from shore but also possess the capacity to conduct occasional deployments and limited operations at some distance from home bases.
These navies vary considerably in size and capability. Although the Chinese and Japanese navies cannot currently be considered in this category, they may have blue-water capabilities in the next century. Some states, such as China and Japan, still have territorial disputes with friendly states which involve naval manoeuvres from time to time. Most of the states depend chiefly on sea-borne trade and open SLOC which they would seek to defend in wartime in order to survive. In addition, three of these states, China, France and Great Britain, have maritime strategic nuclear forces.

Finally, coastal navies including those of many developing countries such as South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, are exclusively deployed in waters immediately adjacent to a nation’s coastline carrying out traditional naval tasks such as maritime self-defence, protection of sovereign interests in territorial waters, protection of national economic interests in offshore waters, maritime policing and counter-smuggling duties and local search and rescue.

The Problem of Comparison of Naval Forces. The simple comparison of numbers of ships between the navies of the United States, Russia, China, and Japan is of only limited use, because each state has its own historical background and geopolitical situation which have given rise to different maritime strategies and force structures. Unlike in the days of the Washington Naval Treaty when it could be ‘traded’ against each other, modern navies contain different proportions of different types of platforms that make simple trade offs impossible. Moreover, there are significant geographical asymmetries which pose a problem for numerical comparison because ‘numerical parity in forces translates into advantage-disadvantage according to the political geography of the prospective conflict.’ In addition, it is not useful to compare total numbers of surface combatants, which can conceal gross disparities in ship size and performance. To do so also ignores a very large number of qualitative and geographical factors and constraints which may inflate or degrade relative performance. Thus, this is the least satisfactory method of naval arms control.

The Issue of Verification. According to a recent United Nation study, verification is defined as:

a process which establishes whether the parties are complying with their obligations under an agreement.... The process includes: collection of information relevant to obligations under arms limitation and disarmament agreements; analysis of the information; and reaching a judgement as to whether the specific terms of an agreement are being met.
In a broad sense, verification is a process to enhance confidence in the reliability and good intentions of participants. Although intrusive verification has become a feature of arms control agreements and the technology of verification has improved enormously, verification of qualitative limits on naval weapons capabilities might well require difficult unworkable procedures. Naval forces, because of their stealth and mobility, are not easily identified by verification systems.

IV. Conclusion
An arms control process is complex in terms of its various objectives. The overarching objective of arms control is to improve mutual security. Naval arms control has many of the generic characteristics of other forms of arms control, but it has some noteworthy differences as well. Naval arms control should be approached in the context of the overall security setting, the nature and characteristics of sea power, and the security environment after the Cold-War. Its objectives are preventing a naval arms build-up, reducing the possibility of confrontations between navies and strengthening confidence among them.

For reasons of categorisation for comparison and verification, structural naval arms control is very difficult to achieve. Operational arms control has more potential, however. The next chapter will explore this in more detail by analysing the most important examples, of each form, the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and the US-Soviet INCSEA agreement of half a century later.

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Endnotes

3. They argued that without weapons it is impossible to wage war, and since war is evil it must be abolished by eliminating the weapons with which it is fought. See Michael Sheehan, ‘Arms Control and Security’, in Roger Carely and Trevor C. Salmon (eds), *International Security in the Modern World* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 39.
4. Sheehan, *The Arms Race*, p. 188.


10. For examples by (1) reducing the threatening character of naval exercises; (2) reducing the extent and possibility of 'gunboat diplomacy'; and (3) reducing the capacity for surprise attack by naval forces. For through and comprehensive analyses of this point, see Lawrence Freedman, *Arms Control: Management or Reform?* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), 1986), pp. 6-8; Jonathan Alford, *Confidence-Building Measure and Naval arms Control*, Adelphi Papers 149 (London: IISS, 1979); and John J. Holst, 'Confidence Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework', *Survival*, vol. 25, no. 1 (January-February 1983), pp. 2-13.


20. For a detailed discussion of the background of this conference, see Bruce D. Berkowitz, *Calculated Risks: A Century of Arms Control, Why It has failed, and How It can be made to work* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987).


26. For an elaboration of quantitative and qualitative structural measures, see Richard C. Davis, 'Future Directions for Naval Arms control' in Dunn and Squassoni (eds), *Arms Control: What Next?*, pp. 105-6.


The aims of the conference were 'to devise an acceptable and workable method for preserving the principle of naval limitation; and to prevent a naval race, this to be accomplished by limiting, reducing, and standardising the size of ships and the calibre of guns and providing for the exchange of full information as to all projected and actual naval construction.' Quoted in Norman H. Davis, 'The New Naval Agreement', *Foreign Affairs*, no. 14 (July 1936), p. 580.

Hill, *Arms Control at Sea*, p. 31.

The Japanese demanded a common upper limit for the fleet strengths for Japan, Britain, and America, but, in particular, this demand gave rise to an almost insoluble problem as much as the US insisted on naval parity. See Andrew Gordon, 'The Admiralty and Imperial Overstretch, 1902-1941', in Geoffrey Till (ed.), *Sea Power: Theory and Practice*, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 38, no. 1 (March 1994), p. 69.


France took a sceptical view of this conference with concern over the Mussolini's Plan. Italy attacked on Abyssinia in October 1935 owing to the lack of commitment of other powers. It fell to Britain alone to provide the forces of so-called collective security for the League of Nations. See S. W. Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars*, vol. I: 1929-1939 (Annapolis, Md.: US Naval Institute Press, 1976), p. 354.


For the major provisions of the treaty, see Hyde, *Scraps of Paper*, pp. 271-83.


For details of the SALT-II, see Jan Prawitz, 'Naval Arms Control: History and Observations', in Fieldhouse (ed.), *Security at Sea*, pp. 47-57.


Blechman, The Control of Naval Armament, p. 31.

The United Kingdom despatched warships to revenge the American guerrilla units attacking Canada in the late 1830s. The United States kept land fortress around the Great Lakes until 1871. The treaty was not violated by participating nations since the 20th century. See David W. Ziegler, War, Peace, and International Politics (Glennview, Ill.: Scott Forsman, 1990), p. 309 and James Eayrs, ‘Arms Control On the Great Lakes’, Disarmament and Arms Control, vol. 2, no. 4 (1964), pp. 375-83.


Turkey has enjoyed complete sovereignty over the shores since 1936, when an international agreement was signed. Recently, the risk of accidents close to a metropolis of 10 million people has increased dramatically. Sixty ships (many of them tankers), for instance, passed the strait per day in 1993. The Turks insist that they have the right to regulate the passage for safety’s sake, and are trying to apply new rules to this strait because of various incidents. In March 1994, for instance, a Russian oil tanker collided with a freighter and burned, killing 19 people. Christopher Dickey and Steve LeVine, ‘Pipeline Politics’, Newsweek, 27 June 1994, pp. 30-1.

Article XVIII of this convention includes the deployment of warships from states in the Black Sea: (1) the aggregate tonnage of these ships is not to exceed 45,000 tons (at first, limited 30,000 tons); (2) no single non-littoral state can deploy ships whose gross tonnage is more than two-thirds of 45,000 tons; (3) a ship or ships whose gross tonnage does not exceed 8,000 tons can be made for an exception, if authorised by the Turkish government on humanitarian grounds; and (4) no warships belonging to a non-littoral state can remain in the Black Sea for more than twenty-one days. See Blechman, The Control of Naval Armament, pp. 32-3; ‘Maritime Law and the Soviet Union’, Survival, vol. 18, no. 6 (November-December 1976), pp. 266-71 and Harry N. Howard, ‘The Turkish Straits After the Montreux Convention’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 15 (October 1936), pp. 199-202.


As an example, President Gorbachev proposed that if the United States were to close its bases in the Philippines, it would give up its only large overseas naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. See Michael Dobbs and David Remnick, ‘Gorbachev Invalid Initiatives’, Washington Post, 17 September 1988, p. 1.


61. UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, *The Naval Arms Race*, pp. 17-18. Furthermore, Eric Grove divided naval forces into nine categories according to accounting factors, such as the types of naval forces, the sophistication of their weapon systems and level of afloat support, and the number of vessels. See Eric J. Grove, *The Future of Sea Power* (Annapolis, Md.: US Naval Institute Press, 1990), pp. 236-40.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Bilateral</th>
<th>Multilateral</th>
<th>Unilateral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Limits on ships’ tonnage</td>
<td>Rush-Bagot, 1817 Treaty of Paris, 1856</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Limits on ships’ weapons</td>
<td>SALT-I and II WNT 1991 LNT, START</td>
<td></td>
<td>US, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Renunciation of certain weapons</td>
<td></td>
<td>WNT, LNT Hague, 1907(VIII)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Limits on naval arms transfer</td>
<td></td>
<td>NPT, 1970 WNT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Forecasts on construction/decommission</td>
<td>Greece-Turkey, 1930 Argentina-Chile, 1902</td>
<td>London, 1936</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Naval staff exchange program</td>
<td>US-Various Russia-various</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Combined naval exercises</td>
<td></td>
<td>US-NATO, Various (e.g. Rimpac Exercise)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Incidents at sea agreement</td>
<td>US-Russia, China Russia-Various</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) structural measures: 1,2 (quantitative measures), 3,4,5,7 (qualitative measures); operational measures: 6, 11, 12; and naval confidence-building measures: 8, 9, 10, 13, 14.
Table 2-2 Categories of Naval Arms Control

I. Structural Naval Arms Control Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantitative Measures (Limits and Restraints)</th>
<th>Qualitative Measures (Limits and Restraints)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Limits on numbers of naval forces: aircraft carriers, destroyers, submarines, frigates, other ships, and naval aircraft</td>
<td>• Limits on weapon capabilities: range, weight and other capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Limits on numbers of weapon systems: SLBMs, SAMs, SSMs and other weapons</td>
<td>• Limits on ships’ displacement: submarines, aircraft carriers, destroyers, and other naval ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Limits on numbers of facilities: naval/air bases and fortifications</td>
<td>• Limits on naval aircraft capabilities: carrying weapons → missiles, guns, operational range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Limits on ship’s capabilities: weapons, radar contact ranges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Limits on war ship-building for a limited time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Limits on naval arms transfers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. Operational Naval Arms Control Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constraints on Naval Activities/Operations</th>
<th>Geographical Measures (Limits/Restraints)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Creating maritime zones of operational constraint</td>
<td>• Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Constraints on the level of naval presence in appropriate regions</td>
<td>• Constraints on nuclear force exercises and manoeuvres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Constraints on the level of naval activities/operations in appropriate regions</td>
<td>• A Zone of Peace/Security Zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Notification of naval deployment: submarine and ship types, numbers</td>
<td>• Establishment of safety Zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Notification on naval force manoeuvres and exercises</td>
<td>• Establishment of Firing/Exercising Zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Limits on freedom of naval activities</td>
<td>• ASW Free Zones</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2-1  Co-operative Maritime Security Models Overlapped Circles

Notes

MCBMs: Maritime Confidence-Building Measures
MCMs: Maritime Co-operation Measures
Chapter III. Case Studies of Structural and Operational Naval Arms Control Measures: The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and The 1972 Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas

Case studies for and against naval arms control measures do not conveniently lead to a simple conclusion as to whether or not they should be applied to the Northeast Asian maritime environment today. But, knowing of the weight of the conflicting arguments, one can go on to examine objectively the lessons, or otherwise, of two naval arms control measures. The 1922 Washington Naval Treaty and the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement are addressed in turn in attempt to devise possible measures for co-operative maritime security that could reduce naval threats posed to the major regional powers in Northeast Asia, and cut the military spending on naval arms build-ups, without unacceptable detriment to the legitimate use of the sea.

I. Toward the Washington Naval Treaty

The Washington Naval Conference (12 November 1921 to 6 February 1922) was the first of several attempts at naval disarmament made after the First World War. It was also an effort not only to limit naval armament by agreement among the United States, Great Britain, Japan, Italy and France, but also to stabilise the unsettled Far Eastern situation and provide for the development of an independent Republic of China. In each of these aims the conference achieved a measure of success which was to prove hollow within a few years.

A. The Historical Background

After the First World War, there was still the potential for competition in naval forces between the great powers. Only Germany, which had been defeated in the First World War, was disarmed.\(^1\) As it was believed that the war had originated from arms races in general and the Anglo-German naval arms race in particular the powers began to consider naval arms limitation. Japan and the United States were not only growing as naval powers but also challenging Britain's hegemony on the high seas. The Washington Conference was related to three separate naval balances: the global balance of Britain and the United States; the Pacific balance of Britain, the United States and Japan; and the European balance of Britain, France and Italy.\(^2\)

The chief naval threat to Great Britain, Germany, had been eliminated. Her poor economic condition, however, made the reduction of naval expenditures highly desirable.
During the 1920s, powerful domestic non-governmental organisations tried to persuade successive British governments to reduce arms expenditures. In the post-war period a combination of American dislike of the experience of the First World War and her economic policy combined to make disarmament a popular idea also on the western side of the Atlantic.

The Americans saw the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as an obstacle to the extension of their national interests and naval supremacy in the Pacific. The Japanese were not happy at the thought of losing their alliance, but they recognised that it would have to go and resolved to profit from its demise by giving way gracefully. They also wanted to relieve the pressure on their strained budget, and the moderates knew that they could not — at least for the time being — beat either Great Britain, or the United States in a naval race. The alliance was a useful ‘bargaining chip’, and the idea of an international meeting to consider Far Eastern and naval armament problems was well developed by the mid-summer of 1921.

Japan was in a position of predominance in China, a position which she had been attempting to build for herself since 1914. This brought her into confrontation with the United States. In addition, the British worried about Japan’s aspirations to control the region stretching from the Bering Straits to the Strait of Malacca. In the early 1920s the Pacific was much more dangerous than Europe, where there were few difficulties at sea because of German disarmament. Furthermore, the French and Italian navies not only had pre-Jutland ships but also had no shipbuilding programmes. Continuing the naval race among the United States, Great Britain and Japan seemed to risk another war.

B. Post-War International Relations and Politics

The United States. With the outbreak of the First World War, the European powers withdrew from the Far East, leaving the United States as the only interested power which could oppose Japan’s evident intention to expand. To America it appeared that Japan was attempting to establish control of the West Pacific with a view to the ultimate exclusion of Western nations.

At the end of the First World War, as the threat of the German fleet had been removed, the United States Navy was free to give its undivided attention to the problems of the Far East. Japan’s expansion on the Asian mainland and in the Pacific, furthermore, threatened the United States throughout East Asia. One of the major causes why the US Senate rejected the Versailles Peace Treaty was its inability to force the Japanese to retreat from the Shantung Peninsula. The United States was building a strong battle fleet, which was
based on the 1916 naval building programme designed to strengthen its strategic position in the Pacific and to achieve parity with Britain.

The new Harding Administration did not wish to accept the burdens of this naval build up if it could achieve its objectives at reduced cost through the limitation or reduction of the naval armaments of the world, and it unveiled a radical position at the outset. The United States proposed that capital ship building by the great sea powers must be halted, but that a balance of naval strength giving parity to the USA and United Kingdom must be established. Other powers would be given sufficient ratios of strength to maintain their security. At the Plenary Session on 12 November 1921, Charles Evans Hughes proposed a ten-year construction holiday for capital ships.

The United States further insisted that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would have to be ended. Hughes had asserted that 'he viewed the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in any form with disquietude... because of the effect it would have on United States opinion regarding Britain.' The American main objectives in the Pacific region focused mainly on: (1) the status of Shantung and Siberia; (2) the validity of the Open Door Policy in China; (3) the territorial integrity of China; (4) the matter of security of Japan in her home waters; (5) the status of the fortifications at Guam and the Philippines; (6) the question of the limitation of cruisers and other vessels; (8) the definition of the rules for submarine warfare; and (7) the question of cable rights for the United States at the Island of Yap.

**Great Britain.** After 1918, the Royal Navy found itself confronted by competition from the US Navy, which exploited anti-British feelings, notably regarding the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, to demand the most powerful fleet in the world. The growth of the Japanese Navy would require not only the deterrent capability of the British Fleet in the major areas but also adequate base facilities in the eastern hemisphere. The British noted that the American government was directly opposed to Japanese expansion in China, and the friendship of the United States was vital to any stable and successful British post-war policy. The Lloyd George government also feared that US economic dominance might secure the whole of China's trade.

British strategy at the Washington Conference was to improve relations with the United States without crippling those with Japan. She aimed to do this by reducing her commitments to Japan in such a way as to permit the Japanese to save face. Furthermore, the internationalisation of the Open Door Policy would not find much opposition from Great Britain, and she was ever alert for any measures which might increase the unity of her
Commonwealth. For Britain, there was, of course, the problem of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Great Britain felt an obligation to Japan which was not easily put aside, but she also wanted to consider the wishes of the United States.

After the First World War, because the cost of war had seriously eroded the military and fiscal resources available for defence, Britain realised that its strategic position was weak. Against this David Lloyd George had said, 'Great Britain would spend her last guinea to keep a navy superior to that of the United States or any other power.'\textsuperscript{18} If she had to withdraw from the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, she wished to do so as gracefully as possible to preserve good relations with both the United States and Japan. Whilst wanting to achieve a reduction in national expenditures with as much economy as possible, she also hoped that the treaty would provide an atmosphere of peace and security.\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{Japan.} Since 1910, the Japanese had thought that their dominant strategic position in Far Asia depended on the navy’s ability to compete with any forces sent across the Pacific by the great powers. Japan’s strategy thus sought to maintain a seventy-percent naval ratio of the United States and Great Britain. Japan’s major ship building plan, the so-called ‘eight-eight fleet’, called for a first-line strength of eight battleships and eight battlecruisers.\textsuperscript{20} During the late 1910s and early 1920s, Japan had not only benefited from lost production in Europe during the First World War, allowing her economy to boom, but also from the absence of any countervailing forces to enlarge her position in China. She had thus increased her military spending. In 1921, for example, fully one third of the Japanese national budget was consumed by the navy.\textsuperscript{21}

Japan’s strategy in the Far East had been expansionist for a quarter of a century or more, and she had seldom been reluctant to employ the military as a means to achieve the objectives of her foreign policy. During the First World War, the Japanese had been able to expel the Germans from Shantung, the Carolines, the Marianas, and other Pacific Islands.\textsuperscript{22} Japan’s twenty-one demands and her operations among the Pacific Islands, in Shantung and Siberia during the World War had added considerably to her economic and political empire. All of these actions had tended to antagonise the United States. Though Europe was no longer a threat to her ambitions, the growing American power could not be ignored. For this reason, the Japanese wanted to reduce the risk of the United States using its naval power to interfere with Japan’s quest for autarky through a continental empire on the Asian mainland. The Japanese starting position was that she wished to maintain her naval supremacy in Far Eastern waters, to do it with economy, to maintain her good relations with the British and
improve those with the United States. All of this was to be achieved without any substantial economic sacrifices or loss of face.

**France and Italy.** France, like Japan and the others, was concerned with national prestige. Her first demand on capital ships was for at least ten new ships, each of 35,000 tons — which would have resulted in a fleet larger than that of Japan. But the great expenditures necessary for the army to turn back the German avoided had temporarily called a halt to naval building in France. Her commitment to empire nevertheless remained, with colonies in Africa and in the Far East. French naval strategy after First World War focused on the Mediterranean, which served France as an imperial highway. Her naval problem, however, was similar to that of the Americans. France needed a large fleet because she covered two separated coasts — the Atlantic and Mediterranean shorelines. She therefore required a larger navy than that of Italy.

Italy’s strategy at Washington was very simple. She merely wanted to enhance her international stature by winning recognition of her claim of naval parity with the French. She also agreed with France that the submarine was a defensive weapon, and that it ought not to be abolished. The Italians aimed at achieving numerical parity with the French which would have given them strategic superiority in the Mediterranean. France and Italy were not called upon to scrap ships in the near future, and in any case their existing capital ships were obsolete.

**C. Naval Rivalry**

During the period from 1881-1920, the US Navy rose from a low position to second to Britain on the world-power scale. Its growth was in part due to acquisition of an island empire in the Pacific during the Spanish-American War and the increased participation in world affairs which protection of these new lands demanded. The effect of the neo-mercantilist doctrines of Alfred Thayer Mahan on the growth of the US Navy and imperial sentiment was also enormous. During the First World War, America demanded a navy ‘second to none’ which was also a specific and relative doctrine. It guided post-war US naval building toward the goal of matching the size of the Royal Navy, no matter how large the latter might grow to be. Accordingly, the Naval Act of 1916 called for a fleet equal to the strongest navy in the world: 156 ships of all classes by 1919, at a cost of approximately $600 million. However, this expenditure was redirected to building merchant ships and destroyers because of the U-boat threat to Atlantic shipping. When the war ended, the 1916 programme was resumed, and in
1919 the General Board suggested a supplementary three-year programme that would give the United States the most powerful navy in the world.\textsuperscript{31}

When the First World War ended, the Royal Navy appeared as dominant as ever: 42 capital ships to 16 American; 1,300 combatant ships to 250.\textsuperscript{32} In 1919-1920, furthermore, the British government suspended all capital ship building except for the \textit{Hood} in the hope that America would reciprocate. In the autumn of 1922, however, the Admiralty proposed to build four capital ships annually for the next five years because it estimated that the United States and Japan would have 23 and 14 modern (post-Jutland) battleships respectively by 1925, in comparison with Great Britain's.\textsuperscript{33} Politicians and journalists condemned the futility and the expense of the consequent naval race with the United States. In March 1921 Lloyd George in the end approved the construction of four new ships of the so-called Super \textit{Hood}-class battlecruisers armed with 16-inch guns, and four more with 18-inch.\textsuperscript{34}

The Japanese pursued 'the 8-8 Fleet Expansion Programme', that called for four battleships, four battlecruisers, 12 cruisers, 32 destroyers, 28 submarines, six oil tankers, and 103 other ships.\textsuperscript{35} The Japanese expected to build two capital ships each year until they had 48 ships not over the age of obsolescence — then fixed at twenty-four years. Expenditure of $40 million per year was required. In view of Japan's meagre resources, these were enormous sums.\textsuperscript{36} In 1921 the Japanese were in an anti-position to offer to scrap all or most of their capital ships than Britain, because they had actually commissioned a new battleship \textit{Nagato} — 33,800 tons, armed with eight 16-inch guns — and her sister \textit{Mutsu} was close to completion. As well, Japan was building the \textit{Kaga} and \textit{Tosa}—39,000 tons, armed with ten 16-inch guns — and the much bigger battlecruisers \textit{Amagi} and \textit{Akagi}—43,000 tons, also armed with ten 16-inch guns. They also planned two more \textit{Amagis} and two more groups of fast-battleships, some to be armed with 18-inch guns.\textsuperscript{37}

In the early 1920s the capital ship that had been the basic unit of naval strength for decades was considered the primary element of naval strength, and most strategists thought it would remain so for the foreseeable future. The technological advances in capital ships' design which had taken place since the dreadnought in 1906 had vastly increased the expense of the individual units.\textsuperscript{38} Some enthusiasts, such as Billy Mitchell, proclaimed the importance of aircraft and submarines, but few senior officials considered these new systems as constituting a serious problem to the continued supremacy of the capital ship.\textsuperscript{39}
D. Factors for the Success of the Treaty

In assessing the success of the Washington Naval Treaty as a measure of structural naval arms control several issues must be addressed. These include internal and external factors, such as economic imperatives and even the need to satisfy public expectations.

Public Opinion. The prelude of the Washington Conference offers one of the classic examples of the impact that public opinion can have on the making of foreign policy. The immediate post-war years were not only increasing the naval arms race between the United States and Japan but there was a growing fear that the conflict of interests would lead to a Pacific war. By 1921, furthermore, public opinion in the major naval powers against defence spending and the possible dangers of a further arms race was strong, and this movement made many governmental and naval leaders not only draw back from their announced shipbuilding plans but also take action to satisfy the widespread mood for naval arms control. In Britain and the United States, in particular, the pressures of public opinion on naval arms control were perhaps greater than those in any other countries. The pressure groups in these two countries working for disarmament and for peace were well-organised and powerful.

Pacifists in the United States, such as those belonging to the National Council for the Prevention of War, felt that arms caused wars and their elimination would therefore prevent conflict. The press was largely hostile to the idea of the ‘big navy’ and the labour movement was actively promoting disarmament. In particular, American enthusiasm for naval disarmament grew after December 1920, when Senator William Borah called for international agreement to reduce naval construction. Pacifists in Britain had hopes that the League of Nations could further fortify disarmament and use its moral authority to ensure peace. At the same time, Japanese domestic groups which were stirred by the foreign anti-war movement following the First World War provided strong incentives for arms limitation negotiations with other powers. Such groups considered naval limitation as a cogent step in creating a new set of international political military relations to avoid a future war.

Public opinion throughout the world was in favour of a reduction in armaments, which, many thought, would reduce the possibility of war. Political opinion (especially liberal political opinion) in most countries was thus inclined to praise the treaties, but the military establishment was not enthusiastic. At that time, the popular attitude towards the relation of armament and wars was well expressed in an epigram: ‘Big warships meant big wars. Smaller warships meant smaller wars. No warships might eventually mean no wars.'
**Political Factors.** Political factors were also conducive to arms control. They intertwined with both public opinion and domestic economics, and could play a more direct role in naval arms negotiations. In the case of Great Britain, by 1921 the political climate of world affairs, coupled with her indebtedness to America, led it to de-emphasise naval competition with the United States. The most important issue in Anglo-American relations in 1921 was the status of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which had not only been successively renewed from 1920 but also contributed to Japan's national goals in the Pacific. In the end, many members of the Lloyd George government considered naval limitation as the only way forward for their country, not only to maintain equality with the United States in naval affairs but also to avoid a prolonged naval arms race.

Prior to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels strongly favoured the resumption of the capital ship building programme so as to improve their bargaining position. Once the treaty had been drafted, the President tried to use the naval building scheme as a club to beat Congress into approving the League of Nations. He insisted that the alternative to the League would be the completion of the naval construction programme, and a vast increase in taxes which would be necessary to support a large navy. External political factors played an important role in the conference. The Washington Treaty was part and parcel of a general Far Eastern settlement related to external political issues, such as the end of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and at least a temporary resolution of the diplomatic issues concerning China.

**Economic Pressures.** Financial and political considerations often constitute an important motivation for naval arms control efforts. But economic gains are hard to assess. In particular, at the political level the pressure of public opinion for arms control was greatly reinforced by the demand for economy in public expenditure. Great Britain had emerged from the Great War in considerable economic difficulties, owing the United States a colossal sum because of war debts since the First World War. The average military expenditure of all the great powers had been, furthermore, decreased on average from 31 per cent to 18 per cent of the national budget and the per capita expenditures from $6.16 to $5.47. There were thus significant political or economic pressures on each negotiating state to cut back on defence expenditures in any event and there were pressures for further cuts beyond this.
II. The Application and Implementation of the Washington Naval Treaty

A. The System of the Treaty

The Washington Conference resulted in three principal treaties: (1) the Five-Power Treaty on the limitation of naval armaments; (2) the Four-Power Treaty on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Pacific area; and (3) the Nine-Power Treaty on a general political settlement of Far Eastern problems including China.

The Five-Power Treaty was concluded before the other two treaties and it focused on naval arms limitation among the United States, Britain, France, Japan and Italy. It established the relative strength of the capital ship fleets of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, Italy and France at 5:5:3:1.67:1.67; the largest fleets were limited to 525,000 tons of battleships and battle cruisers and 315,000 tons for Japan. No quantitative limits were established for lesser vessels, but the individual ships were limited in size to 10,000 tons and their main batteries to eight-inch guns. Aircraft carriers were limited both qualitatively and quantitatively: 27,000 tons per ship, 135,000 tons of carriers for Britain and the United States, and the same ratios as established for battleships to apply to the carrier fleets of the lesser powers as well.

The Four-Power Treaty replaced the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The signatories — Great Britain, the United States, Japan, and France — dealt with the political problems of the Pacific. The treaty was to last ten years, and guaranteed that if disagreements relating to the insular possessions and insular dominion of the signatories in the region of the Pacific arose and could not be settled by ordinary diplomacy, the contracting parties would meet at a conference to overcome the difficulties. The treaty also provided that if aggressions against the possessions of the signatories came from outside the arrangement, then the signatories would consult with one another as to the measures to be taken to meet aggression.

The Nine-Power Treaty. Another of the American political goals at the Washington Conference was to win international recognition for the territorial integrity of China and the equality of opportunity for the commercial interests of all nations in the Far East. The nine-power agreement involved the United States, Great Britain, Japan, China, France, Holland, Belgium, Portugal and Italy. The signatories agreed not to join in any treaty with other nations which would break the principle of the Open Door Policy, which was interpreted as equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations. China, on her part, undertook not to grant such advantages to any other nations except for the signatories of article three.
B. Assessing the Success of Implementation

1. Limitations of the Treaty

The great powers failed to agree on tonnage limits for cruisers, destroyers, and submarines; nor were limits agreed on the number of aircraft. It is often argued that the treaty showed that limits on any weapon system created competition race in different areas, such as auxiliary vessels\(^{58}\) which were not included in this treaty. The extent of this ‘race’, however, should not be over-estimated.

Arms Race in Cruisers. In 1921 the maximum class of light cruiser was a 9,000-ton \textit{Hawkins} carrying 7.5-inch guns built for the Royal Navy. The United States had only three modern cruisers, the British Empire \(^{63}\). Based on the \textit{Hawkins} class, the Washington Treaty limited auxiliary vessels to a maximum of 10,000 tons and restricted guns to eight inches. This limit, however, produced both a qualitative and quantitative arms race.\(^{59}\) In the middle of 1922, the Japanese announced a ship-building plan, in part to compensate the builders of cancelled capital ships. They produced a 7,100 ton cruiser with eight-inch guns. Twelve were completed in 1926-27 with four more to an enlarged 10,000 ton, ten-gun design in 1928-29. In 1927-8 four more 10,000 ton ships were laid down. By 1930, therefore, Japan had eight new ‘Washington cruisers’ with four in progress.\(^{60}\) At the same time, the Royal Navy felt constrained to build ships of the new type as its existing cruisers could not cope with a threat to trade from ships of such power. Between 1924 and 1931 Britain built no fewer than 15 eight-inch gun cruisers and planned two more, although they were cancelled in 1929.\(^{61}\)

This created a crisis for the United States, which was conspicuously short of light cruisers, even of existing designs. The US Department of the Navy concluded that the United States must build sixteen 10,000-ton cruisers with a view not only to keeping a 5:3 ratio between the United States and Japan but also to moving to parity between the United States and Great Britain.\(^{62}\) This plan ran into Congressional opposition and only eight Washington cruisers had been built by 1931, although seven more were on the stocks. In fact, overall US cruiser strength actually declined. The United States had thirty-one cruisers in 1919, and only thirty in 1929. Great Britain had 86 in 1919, 47 in 1926 and 54 at the end of the decade. There was therefore a cruiser arms race in the largest types, one which the United States lost, but the significance should not be overestimated in terms of overall construction or expenditure. The cruiser race did, however, lead to political difficulties between the United States and the United Kingdom, especially when Britain refused to limit her cruiser strength at
the Geneva Conference in 1927. Perhaps, in cruisers the critics of Washington Treaty have their different point, albeit a limited one.

_Arms Race in Submarines._ The success of the German ‘U-boats’ influenced successive British governments to press for the abolition of the submarine by diplomacy. France opposed British policy with the perception that submarines were unique weapons against the maritime great powers. The United States considered submarines as suitable weapons not only for the protection of coasts but also for contesting the Japanese command of the sea in the Pacific in the early stage of conflicts. The United States built large submarines in the 1920s, which constrained numbers; only six were commissioned. Britain built ten, all but one of smaller dimensions; and Japan 15, four large and eleven smaller. This was hardly a serious ‘arms race’ in submarines, either quantitatively or qualitatively.

_Arms Race in Aircraft Carriers._ It is often argued that by controlling traditional capital ships, the Washington Treaty encouraged the emergence of aircraft carriers. It is true that both the Americans and Japanese navies were encouraged in their build up of carrier striking forces by their acquisition each of two large converted capital ships commissioned in 1927–28, but it was likely that they would have developed carriers anyway. Fleet exercises in the 1920s would reveal the strong potential of carrier aviation for strategy and operations. The experimental carrier _Langley_, for example, had demonstrated the vulnerability of the Panama Canal to carrier attack and the importance of providing air support for the battleship in the fleet exercise of 1927–1928. The lack of constraints on aircraft did encourage Japan to invest in naval air power as a counter to capital ship inferiority with the forming of seven air wings from 1924, but such development might well have taken place anyway. The Washington Treaty probably did have some positive impact on naval air power but again, this should not be overestimated, and the treaty did limit carrier construction to the capital ship ratios.

2. _The Achievement of the Treaty_

_Preventing the Possibility of War._ The limitation of capital ships was achieved at a level which halted almost all battleship construction. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was terminated, and the United States avoided any substantial commitments. The traditional American Far Eastern policy of the Open Door was transformed into international law. The Japanese evacuated Shantung. The British publicly conceded America’s claim to naval parity. The Japanese gave the United States cable landing rights at Yap.
In the short term, relations between the Japanese and the Americans were more tranquil than those of the end of the First World War. The United States and Great Britain were not drawn further into hostility. The only cloud on the diplomatic horizon was the covert British reluctance to grant America parity in cruisers. The treaty heralded a new world order in which, it seemed, the United States would lead European and Asian powers to disarmament and peace. In the end, the treaty may have contributed in preventing an Anglo-American confrontation.

**Contribution to Regional Stability.** The political and naval arrangements at Washington led to a decade of stability in the Pacific. The signatories agreed that potentially offensive bases in the Pacific should be unfortified, which allowed the United States to control the east Pacific, Japan Far Eastern waters, and the British Empire the Indian Ocean and the Australian waters, while China was allowed to work out her own destiny without interference. The United States abandoned her superiority in battleships, but was able to conclude a political treaty related to Chinese matters. The Anglo-Japanese treaty was replaced by the Four-Power Treaty among the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan. The status quo as regards outlying naval bases and fortifications was to be maintained in the Pacific, west of Hawaii and north of Hong Kong. The naval problems of the Pacific thus seemed soluble.

**The Influence on Military Spending.** With Britain’s concessions on parity in battle-fleet strength with the United States, in particular, the two countries avoided expensive competition. In the case of the United States, the monetary savings in the 1920s deriving from not building capital ships contributed to its prosperity in the roaring twenties. The British made savings from the cancellation of the super-Hoods, the effects of which on the fleet-associated heavy industries were mitigated by construction of the two new smaller 16-inch gun battleships they were allowed.

**C. The Application of the Treaty**
The treaty can be divided largely into three categories: (1) quantitative, (2) qualitative, and (3) confidence-building measures. Quantitative measures involved limits on the total number of capital ships. Qualitative measures included limits on bases, facilities, fortifications, displacement of battleships and auxiliary vessels, the size of weapons on ships, total tonnage of capital ships and air craft carriers in a navy, and limits or a ban on deployment of all, or of some kind of new weapons. These measures were broadly effective in slowing the pace of technological development and, therefore, rivalry.
1. Limits on Individual Ships.

*Limits on Battleships.* The final ratios for capital ships were designated as 5:5:3:1.67:1.67 for the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy. The final tonnage was limited to 525,000 for Great Britain and the United States, 315,000 for Japan, and 175,000 for France and Italy. The retention and scrapping of capital ships were also designated by the rules. Concretely, this allowed the United States Navy to equal that of Great Britain and be 40 per cent greater than that of Japan.

Second, qualitative limits on capital ships were applied. That is to say, capital ships exceeding 35,000 tons standard displacement were not to be acquired by the signatories, and capital ships’ guns were generally to be 14-inch. However, 16-inch guns were allowed as a special concession to achieve balance in that category (in the two new ships Britain was allowed). Finally, control measures for limits on strategic modernisation were used. These were divided into two kinds: (1) regulations regarding the replacement plans of each of the five powers in advance, whereby standard displacement should not be increased by more than 3,000 tons, and ships under 20 years old were not allowed to be replaced (see Chapter II, Part II, Article II) and (2) a holiday in battleship construction for ten years (except for the British).

*Limits on Aircraft Carriers.* The only other category of ship dealt with at the Washington Conference was the aircraft carrier, because most delegates thought that naval aviation would be a vital element of offensive power in the foreseeable future. Therefore, it was not very difficult to achieve the limitation of carriers as well as battleships. Except for two converted capital ships, the limit on the size of the individual carrier was set at 27,000 tons and such ships were not to carry guns of more than eight inches (Article VII). The quantitative ratios of the battleship agreement were extended to the size of aircraft carriers and the two largest navies were to be allowed 135,000 tons of these vessels (Article VII). Modernisation plans for aircraft carriers, like those for capital ships, were subjected to the influence of the principle prescribed in Chapter II, Part III. Because aircraft carriers were considered experimental and their existing size was within the total tonnage limit prescribed in Article VII, no moratorium was placed on their construction.

*Limits on Other Vessels.* Other vessels could not carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches and could not exceed 10,000 tons standard displacement. Vessels not specifically built for fighting purposes under government control in time of peace were not included
within the treaty. These vessels could not carry a gun exceeding six inches in calibre, but the number of guns was not limited (see Article X and XI).

2. Limits on Naval Bases, Facilities and Fortifications
The United States, Great Britain, and Japan tried to establish political stability through the maintenance of the status quo on their respective territories and possessions in the specified area in the Pacific Ocean (Chapter I, Article 19). Signatories were not allowed to increase existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, nor their level of fortification in specified areas. The status quo area in which new fortifications were prohibited ended in the west at longitude 110°, so that Singapore was specifically excluded. With acceptance of parity with the United States, in particular, the Singapore naval base was essential for Britain to accomplish its strategic goals in the Pacific.  

3. Maritime Confidence-Building Measures
Some provisions of the Washington Treaty were somewhat similar to those of today’s maritime confidence-building measures (MCBMs) which were established in this treaty. Rules for replacement of capital ships and aircraft carriers were prepared as follows: (1) the name of the capital ships and aircraft carriers to be replaced by new construction; (2) the date of governmental authorisation of replacement tonnage; (3) the date of laying the keels of replacement tonnage; (4) the standard displacement in tons and metric tons of each new ship to be laid down, and the principal dimensions, namely, length at waterline extreme beam at or below waterline, mean draft at standard displacement; and (5) the date of completion of each new ship and its standard displacement in tons and metric tons, and the principal dimensions, namely, length at waterline, extreme beam at or below waterline, mean draft at standard displacement, at time of completion (Chapter II, Part III).

Other provisions allowed the signatories to meet to discuss new requirements that might necessitate changing the treaty. Whenever any contracting power became engaged in a war which in its opinion affected the naval defence of its national security, any such power might, after notice to the other powers, suspend for the period of hostilities its obligations under the present treaty (Chapter III, Article XXI and XXII). Within one year of the date on which a notice of termination by any power according to the change of security environment had taken effect, all of them were to meet in conference. Such methods are similar to communication and information exchange measures of MCBMs today.
III. Toward the Incidents at Sea Agreement

The first US-Soviet negotiation on incidents at sea agreement took place in Moscow 12-21 October 1971; the second round of negotiations occurred in Washington 3-17 May 1972. On 25 May 1972 the United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement with a view to avoiding and reducing the number of dangerous incidents that stemmed from the regular contacts between the two navies by setting up rules of the seas and regular meetings to work out details.

During the negotiations the Soviet desire to be treated as a naval equal was manifest to the United States, but its denial or acceptance was not treated as equally important by the US delegation, whose major concern was to prevent naval incidents at sea. The United States also gave the Soviets much of the naval superpower status that it desired in order to encourage the Soviets to accept the detailed agreement on avoiding incidents the United States desired. The United States did not enter the negotiations with any thought other than a fundamental concern to minimise the anxiety arising out of incidents at sea.

A. The Change in the Maritime Strategic Environment

Since the Second World War, few conflicts had been fought on or over the seas while many had been fought on or over land. The increasing naval activities of the United States and the Soviet Union led to ships coming increasingly into physical contact. Given the routine deployment of nuclear weapons at sea, this could have led to very dangerous unintended situations developing, with incalculable consequences. In the 1960s, Soviet naval ships frequently manoeuvred close to American ships and occasionally collided. Soviet analysts emphasised the problem of accidental war which could result from naval incidents at sea. At that time, certain disturbing signals and actions often accompanied rather authoritative assertions about the military might of the Soviet Union, such as an implied intention of pre-emption.

During the 1960s, the two superpowers not only steadily modernised their naval forces by deploying large numbers of nuclear weapons at sea, but also engaged in provocative and potentially destabilising operations over wide areas. From the 1960s, the United States was confronted on the world’s oceans by the presence of Soviet naval forces with offensive missiles and by bombers. The comparative naval balance between the United States and the Soviet Union also changed dramatically. These emergent strategic situations increased the potential for superpower conflict at sea, and made naval arms control a high priority for some analysts.
In the 1970s the United States made many agreements, such as the 1973 prevention of nuclear war agreement, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)-I and II in order not only to control the risk of war by accident or miscalculation between the United States and the Soviet Union, but also to improve direct communication links. These efforts appeared to be based largely on the idea of maintaining a capability to cause unacceptable damage to each other in the event of nuclear war. Several specialists suggested that an incidents at sea agreement might be a complementary approach to the more general Soviet-American dialogue on crisis prevention, avoidance, and management. At that time, crisis management was considered as a complement not only to unilateral military preparation but also to negotiations, arms limitation and reductions.

Since the first nuclear weapon was developed, the United States and the Soviet Union had created and developed ever-increasing numbers and kinds of nuclear weapons. Many of these were deployed at sea. Although all five nuclear powers — the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China — had nuclear-armed navies, more than 95 percent of the world’s naval nuclear weapons were in the arsenals of the two superpowers. The sea was the only area where nuclear weapon platforms of the United States and the Soviet Union actually were in physical confrontation. Incidents at sea resulted from four kinds of activities: (1) covert submarine operations; (2) more routine monitoring naval activities; (3) games of ‘chicken’; and (4) harassment for tactical military purposes.

B. Superpower Rivalry at Sea
As the Soviet Navy grew more active during the 1960s, incidents involving US and Soviet warships became increasingly frequent. In the early 1970s one American analyst noted that about 1,000 Soviet combatants and auxiliaries had already visited 60 countries’ ports in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Soviet Navy’s operational areas were geographically extended as Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov stressed the global mission of the Soviet Navy, and developed the blue-water navy and general purpose fleets, and the doctrine of a balanced fleet.

From the late 1960s, the Soviet Navy began to extend its operational areas to include the Caribbean Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the North and Central Atlantic Ocean in order not only to accomplish the extension of its support for friendly countries in the Third World, but also to advance Soviet state interests on a global scale. The Soviet Navy accomplished a variety of missions, such as naval presence, maritime patrol, search and rescue, projection of
power and strategic nuclear deterrence by the employment of a large fleet of surface ships and submarines.\textsuperscript{85}

During the INCSEA negotiations, the Soviets considered the agreement as a US acceptance of their equality on the high seas. Admiral Gorshkov stated an implicit comparison with the British acceptance of US naval parity at the 1922 Washington naval conference as follows: 'having agreed to parity for the American navy, England was no longer free to use diplomatic and propagandistic measures to control the growth of American sea power.'\textsuperscript{86}

C. Increasing Incidents and the Rising Risk of War at Sea

The term incidents at sea can be applied to a variety of dangerous maritime situations: dangerous manoeuvres, close and high-speed air and ship surveillance (buzzing), stimulated attacks on naval vessels or planes by using detection systems and weapons, accidental firing upon vessels involving the use of live ammunition that can endanger stray warships or merchant vessels during naval exercises, and other harassment that interferes with the safe navigation of ships, such as illuminating the bridge of opposing vessels with powerful searchlights.\textsuperscript{87} Generally, it means an action on the high seas by a ship or plane that endangers another vessel or aircraft. Thus, naval incidents, 'could lead people to shoot at each other with results that might be by that time impossible to control.'\textsuperscript{88} The former US Secretary of the Navy John W. Warner compared the situation before the agreement was signed in 1972 to one of playing 'chicken' at sea.\textsuperscript{89}

The purpose of Soviet harassment of US naval vessels, which in particular simulated attacks on aircraft carriers,\textsuperscript{90} demonstrated to the US Navy that Soviet warships could deny the US Navy's freedom of action that it had traditionally enjoyed on the high seas. The Soviet naval presence and capabilities could thus constrain US actions in a crisis.\textsuperscript{91} The US purpose for harassing of Soviet war vessels was quite similar. The US Navy, furthermore, harassed Soviet vessels not only to impede their operational effectiveness, but also to hinder Soviet merchant ships or trawlers probably engaged in surveillance of US naval forces and operations. Their close naval operations during a crisis put the Soviets in a position to launch an attack without advance warning.\textsuperscript{92} The US navy stated that harassment should be employed to prevent a pre-emptive attack by reducing the ability of Soviet vessels to launch a surprise attack.\textsuperscript{93}

There are many examples of these kinds of accidents. The collision which occurred between the US destroyer \textit{Walker} and the Soviet \textit{Kotlin}-class destroyer \textit{Besslednyi} in the East Sea on 5 October 1967 is one. The Soviets harassed the US aircraft carrier \textit{America} battle
group during the 1967 Middle-East War. Other incidents occurred in the aftermath of the seizure of the Pueblo by North Korea in January 1968. Additionally, a collision took place between the Soviet merchant ship Kapitan Vislobokov and the US destroyer Rowan in May 1968, and a Soviet Tu-16 Bomber, attempting to buzz US ships, crashed into the Norwegian Sea. Many such accidents involving surface ships, aircraft and submarines occurred during the late 1960s and the early 1970s. The violation of the international 'Regulations for Prevention of Collision at Sea' brought about political problems which could not be solved by normal diplomatic and political means.

Naval incidents had the potential to increase US-Soviet tensions and the risk of war. Even a relatively minor incident in itself, if ill-timed, could needlessly hinder negotiations. The U-2 incident on 1 May 1960, for example, forced the cancellation of a Khrushchev-Eisenhower summit meeting. A dangerous escalation could be initiated by various forms of harassment and counter-harassment. Bewilderment and uncertainty, which could be widespread during an inadvertent crisis, might bring about unintended hostilities in which shots were fired that could sink or damage naval forces. Few US-Soviet incidents, however, seem actually to have led to loss of life or the sinking of ships.

These incidents and confrontations, involving the development of their naval forces and missions, escalated according to the action-reaction rule and increased the dangerous possibility of collisions and incidents at sea. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt compared the confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union to the dangerous 'chicken' game. On balance, the importance of the agreement on incidents at sea grew over the years as the scope of US and Soviet naval operations extended. Regardless of the motivation behind or cause of naval incidents, the 1972 Agreement to prevent them was based on a shared perception of their dangers. Although the United States and the Soviet Union did not report the exact number of naval incidents, there were probably at least 100 naval incidents involving them in the late 1960s or early 1970s.

D. Factors for the Success of the Agreement

1. Factors Contributing to the Success of the Agreement
One of the most important factors in the success of the 1972 agreement was that the United States and the Soviet Union had their mutual interests in preventing incidents at sea. Both navies wanted not only to prevent accidents that endangered naval ships and manpower, but also to protect their naval ships and aircraft as important instruments for their national
security policies. With the development of naval technology, dangerous naval incidents at sea had been increasing. Those dangerous incidents were divided into three categories: (1) the physical danger to ships and men in collisions; (2) the increasing possibility of provoking a crisis or even war by incidents; and (3) the risk of direct escalation and combat resulting from misperception and misunderstanding by operating commanders.  

The United States essentially requested that the rules of the road should be complied with and expanded. The Americans were interested in preventing Soviet vessels from disturbing their naval vessels and aircraft activities, but refused to include the possibility of any agreement that might restrict the traditional principle of freedom of the seas by limiting the geographical area of submarines or surface deployments. The Soviets considered the agreement as an opportunity to assert their navy's equality with that of the US navy.

2. Approaches to the Agreement

The Incremental Approach. By 1970, US-USSR relations were improving and the Soviets were prepared to enter discussions, which opened in the spring of 1971. The basic conceptual approach underlying its negotiation and execution contributed to the success of the INCSEA. Unlike traditional naval arms control approaches that would demand geographic limitations on deployments, it basically assumed that US and Soviet naval ships would continue their activities at sea and engage in gunboat diplomacy which would influence political outcomes in times of crisis. The course of the negotiations, which were based on a gradual convergence of each side's initial desires towards compromise, could be referred to as the incremental bargaining of William Zartman's theory.

In October 1971 talks on incidents at sea began between the United States and the Soviet Union. Their final meetings were held on 3-17 May 1972, resulting in an agreement on 'the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas'. This was signed at the summit on 25 May 1972 by the Secretary of the Navy, John W. Warner, and the Soviet Navy Commander-In-Chief, Admiral of the Fleet Sergei G. Gorshkov. During these negotiations, American commanders at sea had been warned to avoid any incidents with Soviet naval ships that might threaten the negotiations.

The actual negotiations were divided into surface and air working groups. The surface working groups discussed the following issues: (1) rules of the road and possible signals; (2) disruption of flight operations and refuelling; (3) the definition of naval platforms; and (4) the training of weapons and sensor systems on opposing vessels. Among these issues, the most contentious was the matter of a distance formula that would modify the rules of the opposing
warships. In contrast to the general US pattern of seeking highly specific agreements, the American negotiators refused to accept Soviet proposals for a distance formula, preferring to stress good judgement and general principles. Similar disagreements arose in the talks between US and Soviet negotiations in the air group.  

*Navy to Navy Talks and the Elimination of Politics from the Negotiations.* From the beginning, the agreement had been separated from the influence of domestic and international politics. In spite of the fact that the United States was mining Haiphong harbour against Soviet shipping to North Vietnam in 1972 whilst the negotiations were going on, the treaty was signed. Both countries’ naval representatives were encouraged by the navy-to-navy nature of the negotiations. In fact, the United States believed that the Soviets had no real desire for negotiations on the topic of incidents at sea, and would use them as a means to pressure the United States for concessions at the Law of the Sea Conference. The high level businesslike nature of the negotiations also helped to persuade both sets of negotiators that the other was serious about reaching an agreement.

In contrast to other negotiations, where the US representatives came to listen to the Soviets before stating their own position, the US delegation formulated detailed proposals prior to the start of any talks and considered the likely Soviet response. It was headed by John Warner, then Under-Secretary of the Navy. The Soviet delegation consisted of even higher-ranking officials, conveying a clear interest in the talks, and was headed by Admiral Vladimir Kasatonov, Deputy Commander of the Soviet Navy; the team also included the highest-ranking officers of the Soviet Navy. After the agreement was signed in 1972, review sessions were reportedly conducted in an open, frank and professional and valuable manner. The intensive efforts of the US Navy in the preparations and actual negotiations for the agreement also helped towards the success of the agreement.

Past successive meetings related to the treaty took place despite strained Soviet-American relations like the delayed 1984 session in Moscow after the Soviet shooting down of Korean Airliner 007 in September 1983. The US Navy opposed the changes in the schedule of the meetings as Senator John W. Warner stated that ‘we should not link the operation of the agreement to problems elsewhere in the world.’ State Department officials were also worried about any move that might link the INCSEA with arms control negotiations to other political matters.
IV. The Application and Implementation of the Agreement

A. Assessing the Success of Implementation

1. The Achievement of the Agreement

The INCSEA played an active role in accomplishing international stability before the detailed negotiations on confidence-building measures elsewhere. The agreement also had a major effect on the operational procedures for naval forces. For 18 years before the end of the Cold War, the treaty played an active role; the agreement is widely regarded as a success and its contents have been developed vertically and horizontally. The treaty, as a model of operational naval arms control, provided communication and information procedures. It served as the model for a number of similar bilateral agreements, such as in 1986 between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, in 1988 between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany. The success of the treaty resulted in improved US-Soviet relations. It is appropriate to consider how this agreement might serve as a useful measure for further agreements in regional areas, such as the North Pacific.

For nearly three decades, the agreement has reduced the frequency and severity of superpower incidents while building greater trust and confidence at sea. Although incidents at sea have not been completely stopped, in Admiral Sylvester R. Foley’s view the agreement was useful in getting the Soviets to stop harassing US ships’ operations. In spite of the fact that naval accidents occurred, few serious confrontations generated dangers of escalation or political crisis. Although the two navies continued to follow each other closely in the pursuit of their activities after the agreement was signed, the more dangerous harassment, such as formation disturbance and military deception almost disappeared. Despite the fluctuations in US-Soviet relations since 1972, the US and Soviet navies resolved those incidents that occurred without their becoming diplomatic controversies. Under the INCSEA, the two navies also pledged not to interfere with operations of the other or operate in ways that could be taken as threatening. This helped to avert potentially dangerous incidents between them even during the deterioration of their relations in the 1980s.

To put it more simply, the agreement established rules for the US and Russian ships and aircraft on and over the high seas. Although the Secretary of the Navy, John F. Lehman, has stated that this agreement led to ‘a marked reduction in collisions and near collisions’, it clearly did not abolish them. In the late 1960s the number of serious incidents at sea exceeded 100 per year, but, according to Lehman, there were only about 40 potentially dangerous incidents between June 1982 and June 1983. The agreement was a useful and
essential tool for reducing superpower naval tension in peacetime. Although the Soviets regarded the agreement as displaying parity with the US Navy, the United States did not accept this formally. In the short-term, the agreement reduced the level of normal operational tension between the two navies.

2. Limitations of the Agreement

The agreement provided various principles to which both parties agreed to hold when their aircraft and ships were in close proximity. Although the Soviets continued to raise the issue and both countries agreed to study it further at the annual reviews of the agreement, the US and Soviet negotiators did not reach any agreement on a distance formula. There were substantial internal disagreements between the US State Department and the Navy over the negotiation of a distance formula. The US Navy insisted that any form of distance limitation could interfere with naval operations and complicate the aerial surveillance of Soviet warships. The question of a distance formula became critical in the subsequent negotiations.

The United States, furthermore, could not accept the extension of limitations to submarine activities, because it was felt that those activities might lead the Soviet Union to propose the establishment of submarine operating zones in which ASW would be prohibited. The United States was also reluctant to discuss submarine incidents for which any provision might not only force the disclosure of submarine locations but also compromise strategic and reconnaissance missions. However, others suggested possible extensions of the INCSEA to submarines. Rear Admiral Richard Hill recommended the following possible provision: ‘... submarines of both sides will refrain from deliberate close approaches and mock attacks on vessels of the other party, both surface and submarine; and that, if they believe a dangerous situation is developing, they will transmit in order to reveal themselves.’

The INCSEA is very much a navy-to-navy, not a government-to-government arrangement. Thus, the agreement is managed and implemented almost entirely by the navies involved. The implementation of the INCSEA has been largely (though not entirely) inoculated from spasms in the political relationships between the parties. The INCSEA does not include limits on the size of the forces involved, restrictions on deployments and regional presence, limits on the size, type or duration of exercises. It simply established procedures to reduce the dangers on the high seas. Nor were the various INCSEA provisions negotiated in the expectation that they would lead to follow-on agreements.
B. The Application of the Agreement
Agreements such as INCSEA are basically bilateral navy-to-navy agreements that extend the normal rules of the road for the safety of ships' navigation and reduce incidents at sea. They appeal to navies because they codify and make safer the freedom of the seas. Any proposals that would restrict such freedom will be unacceptable. There were similar bilateral agreements between Russia and other countries in the 1980s and 1990s — Britain (1986), Germany (1988), France (1989), Italy (1989), Canada (1989), Norway (1990), Republic of Korea (1993), and Japan (1993) — and the US-China agreement (1998). Furthermore, in May 1988, Greece and Turkey also agreed a memorandum of understanding concerning military activities on the high seas in international sea space with a desire to avoid obstructing shipping and air traffic in accordance with international instruments, rules and regulations. 121

Other broader but related agreements have also been agreed as a follow on to the INCSEA. On 12 June 1989 the Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, applied Incidents at Sea procedures to four types of activities. 122 Although the agreement covered all armed forces rather than just naval forces, it intended not only to avoid provocative military activities, but also to contain incidents and misunderstandings between the two superpowers. Other related examples are: the Hot Line Agreement and the 1971 Accidents Agreement on the prevention of the accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons, both intended not only to avoid provocative military activities but also to contain incidents and misunderstandings between the two superpowers.

The United States and the Soviet Union also agreed on the interpretation of the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. According to the 1989 Joint Statement and the 1989 Uniform Interpretation: ‘all ships including warships, regardless of cargo armament or means of propulsion, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea in accordance with international law, for which neither prior notification nor authorisation is required.’ 123

Such agreements have also the potential to influence to reduce the risk of incidents in that routine naval operations might be misunderstood and thus trigger a military response by the other side which in turn might lead to confrontation at sea. The general approach of the INCSEA could be applied to other areas. Possible future directions for building on the basis of the INCSEA might include expanding communications between commanders beyond special caution or operational areas and applying similar principles to interaction between naval and civilian vessels rather than only to naval face-offs.

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V. Conclusion

The Washington Treaty failed to achieve its intended result of ending the naval arms race and freezing the naval balance indefinitely. There are some lessons from this. Internal and external politics were a primary factor in arms control. For all the major powers, internal political debates were probably more important than either diplomatic or strategic concerns during the course of the arms control process. The new strategic balance made politicians more confident, and domestic interest groups pressed the necessity of naval arms limitations. For this reason, arms control agreements appear to be successful only between nations which have already reached some form of political arrangement. In the 1920s, political détente made naval arms control possible, but in the 1930s, politics caused the Washington system to collapse.

The Washington treaty, like most other treaties, really had little to do with the settlement of any international conflicts. Treaties are merely the formal reflection of settlements which have really arisen from the natural balancing of the elements of power and national interests. A tacit agreement for the limitation of capital ships really existed before the conference, and the Washington Treaties merely put the agreement into words. This is just another way of saying that international political stability is a prerequisite for successful arms control negotiations — in the absence of such stability no nation will voluntarily agree to the limitation of its armaments, while, if the stability is there, agreement will be easy.

It is difficult to say would such a treaty be useful today?. Modern navies cannot be readily compared and measured like inter-war navies because of the complexity and diversity of modern naval platforms. Like no longer fights like; surface ships, submarines and aircraft (both fixed and rotary winged) and land- and sea-based all interact in a way that is impossible to disentangle into arms control categories. As a result, although the Washington Naval Treaty, based on structural arms control, was in the favourable circumstance of the 1920s a qualified success, it is hard to see how a modern version could be negotiated or put into effect.

The political context of Soviet-American INCSEA talks in the early 1970s differed fundamentally from the inter-war naval talks. Because the number of incidents at sea had gone up to more than 100 incidents a year in the 1960s, the superpowers began to meet once a year under a 1972 agreement to discuss the incidents and ways to reduce the risk of confrontation. At that time, the Soviet Union and the United States had a common interest in avoiding nuclear war, but, to say the least, did not share either a common conception of
bal order or the cultural and institutional affinities that facilitated the regulation of the Anglo-American naval rivalry.

The agreement increased predictability in US-Soviet relations, and prevented possible cases that neither party wanted as well as controlling the possibility of escalation in incidents at sea. Although there are limits to the application of the provisions of the agreement, in spite of these, the agreement continued to encourage confidence-building at sea. Even though no control approach can prevent the deliberate induction of war, the INCSEA can, furthermore, reduce the possibility of accidental conflicts arising from mutual mistrust. Such an agreement also reduces the possibility of misunderstanding of potentially dangerous activities at sea, thus increasing US and Russian confidence in the non-threatening nature of each other’s naval actions.

The INCSEA does not have to prevent all incidents in order to be judged a success. A reduction in the number of incidents still counts as an overall success. There are important benefits from reducing the number of incidents and from providing regular procedures to deal with incidents that do arise. The INCSEA represented the first important military agreement between the two superpowers since the Second World War. It also established rules to avoid potentially dangerous or provocative operations when their naval vessels were in close proximity. The INCSEA provides a minimal framework for defining and discussing ‘non-provocative’ or ‘safe’ naval operations between potential adversaries in peacetime. During the Cold War, the INCSEA, furthermore, was widely regarded as a success in improving the communication between the United States and Soviet navies.

The INCSEA is a good example of successful bargaining towards a satisfactory arms control approach on constraints on naval operations. The success of the INCSEA could be attributed to the fact that the two sides were not maintaining completely different objectives. The easy conduct of incremental negotiations thus contributed to the success of the INCSEA. The basic referential symmetry of both sides also allowed them to treat the problem as simple, with by confining the military activities to which they related their negotiations and by avoiding the long-term political implications of the negotiations. A number of INCSEA records have been negotiated between Western countries and Russia over the past 25 years. The question of the acceptance of parity is important as it inhibits the United States from forming a full INCSEA with China at the moment. With the end of the Cold War, improved relations of the major regional powers in Northeast Asia not only might lead to their conforming more fully to the spirit of the 1972 agreement, but also will continue to reduce the
number of incidents, even without additional agreements. Nowadays, INCSEA negotiations are an element of co-operative maritime security in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Even though the INCSEA is an example of constraints on naval operations as an operational naval arms control measure, it could also be regarded primarily as a CBM, which brings us to the subject of the next chapter.

Endnotes


5. American high-ranking officers thought that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance not only threatened the United States, but required a large navy for Washington. Therefore, if the alliance were long continued, the United States would have to build a equal navy to the combined strength of the Japanese and British navies. See J. Merlo Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes (New York: Macmillan, 1935), p. 460 and F. C. D. Sturdee, 'Naval Aspects of the Washington Conference', in Brassey's Naval and Shipbuilding Annual, 1923, p. 68.


10. Except for the basic roles of warships, the Americans wanted warships to be able to go across the Pacific, or any other ocean to protect their rights and interests. See Edwin L. James, 'Japan seeks Warships to Dominate Far East', The New York Times, 18 November 1934, p. 4.

11. They prepared the following agenda for the first plenary session: (1) all capital ship construction would come to an immediate halt; (2) a considerable number of older capital ships would be scrapped; (3) all nations would commit themselves to a ten-year capital ship building holiday; (4) the final size of the resulting capital ship fleets should be in proportion to the present relative strengths of the naval powers; and (5) the size of the auxiliary fleets should be set in the same proportion as


20. The Japanese navy also considered five factors: (1) the Monroe Doctrine; (2) discrimination against Japanese immigrations; (3) the advocacy of the Open Door policy in China; (4) strong opposition Japanese possession of the German Pacific Islands; and (5) rapid naval expansion by the United States. Richard Overy and Andrew Wheatcroft, The Road to War (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 231-5. For further information on the Japanese eight-eight programme, see Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 1914-1922 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 122-35.


24. The guidelines for the Japanese maritime strategy were 'equality or supremacy over Italy; if possible France should match the combined German and Italian navies; and her strength should be sufficient to peak the balance in the event of a war between Great Britain and the United States.' See Joel Blatt, 'The Parity that Meant Superiority: French Naval Policy towards Italy at the Washington Conference, 1921-22. and Interwar French Foreign Policy', French Historical Studies, vol. 12, no. 2 (Fall 1981), pp. 224-7.


32. Accordingly, if the 1916 and 1919 programmes were completed, the United States would have a fleet of 50 modern capital ships in some aspects superior in firepower and durability to those of Great Britain. B. Potter, *Sea Power: A Naval History* (Annapolis, Md.: US Naval Institute Press, 1977), p. 232.


38. Although the large fleets of dreadnought battleships did not play the decisive role in naval warfare, their strategic value was important. Furthermore, the rapid advance of technology made all types of older warships very vulnerable. See Richard Natkiel and Antony Preston, *Atlas of Maritime History* (London: Binson Books, 1986), pp. 146-7.


42. In particular, the public opinion towards defence and arms control was the medium through which international politics was reflected in American politics. See Steven E. Miller, ‘Politics Over Promise: Domestic Impediments to Arms Control’, *International Security*, vol. 8, no. 4 (Spring 1984), pp. 86-7 and Norman H. Davis, ‘The American People Want Peace’, *International Conciliation*, no. 298 (March 1934), pp. 81-2.


52. Thomas Burns, Disarmament in Perspective, p. 4.


56. According to US Naval Estimates, Washington had a total tonnage of 1,302,441 to 1,753,359 for Great Britain in 1921. The three-power ratio in total tonnage was the United States 10; Britain 13.5; Japan 4.9; and the capital ship ratio was 10:13:6.8. The capital ships' ratios including ships under construction were 8.7: 10.6: 8.7. See Thomas Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference, pp. 23-4.

57. Hoover, Arms Control, p. 27.

58. The main resolutions relating to Chinese problems were: (1) raising the conventional tariff; (2) closing foreign post office and radio stations, requiring full publicity for all commitments between China and foreign nationals or states; and (3) promising withdrawal from China of foreign forces not authorised by convention. See Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1902-1922, pp. 648-66.


60. In this treaty, auxiliary combatant craft was divided into three classes: (1) auxiliary surface combat craft; (2) submarines; and (3) aircraft carriers and aircraft.

61. The Imperial Navy, for instance, tried to have superiority in ships' numbers in the Pacific, and the American Navy needed to have cruisers because it had no available naval bases in the Pacific. The Royal Navy also needed to have cruisers to protect the SLOC between the commonwealth states and the merchant fleet.


63. For a useful and manageable discussion of British shipbuilding during the treaty, see Hugh B. Peebles, Warshipbuilding on the Clyde: Naval Orders and the Prosperity of the Clyde Shipbuilding Industry, 1889-1939 (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1987), pp. 105-56.


68. Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, p. 309.

73. For further information on the replacement and scrapping of capital ships of each of the contracting powers, see Trevor N. Dupuy and Gay M. Hammerann (eds), *A Documentary History of Arms Control and Disarmament* (New York: R. R. Bowker Company, 1973), pp. 115-18.
74. The full title is Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, signed in Moscow on 25 May 1972. For the full articles of the agreement see 'Agreement on Incidents at Sea', *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 24, no. 22 (June 1972), pp. 20-3.
98. Zumwalt, On Watch, p. 393.
100. They interrupted one another’s formations by harassing each other in many ways, such as seachlight, laser light and low-flying aircraft. For a useful and manageable account of the effect and function of laser, see Barry E. Fridling, ‘Lasers Highlight Policy Blindspots’, BAS, vol. 44, no. 6 (July/August 1988), pp. 36-9; and Hugh Beach, The New Arms Control Challenges, Faraday Discussion Paper No. 19 (London: The Council for Arms Control at the Centre Defence Studies King’s College, 1993), pp. 7-8.
106. Sean M. Lynn-Jones identified three factors which could lead to accidental and unintended hostilities and conflicts, see M. Lynn-Jones, ‘The Incident at Sea Agreement’, pp. 492-4.
108. The German naval ships’ incident between Deutschland and Leipzig during the Spanish Civil War in 1937 is an example of misperception and incident at sea. See Willard C. Frank, Jr, ‘Misperception and Incidents at Sea: The Deutchland and Leipzig Crises, 1937’, NWCR, vol. 63, no. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 31-46.
111. There were 93 naval incidents involving the United States and Soviet Union between January 1968 and March 1972, see Arkin and Handler, Naval Accidents 1945-1988, pp. 35-43.
113. For examples of arguments for submarine deployments as way to reduce the probability of naval incidents, see Hamlin A. Caldwell, Jr. ‘Nuclear War at Sea’, UNIP, vol. 114, no. 2 (February 1988), pp. 60-3 and Desmond Ball, ‘Nuclear War at Sea’, IS, vol. 10, no. 3 (Winter 1985-96), pp. 29-30.
William Zartman divided the core concept of political negotiations into two categories: (1) referential and (2) incremental bargaining. For further elaboration, see ‘Negotiations: Theory and Reality’, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 29, no. 1 (1975), pp. 69-77.


Ibid., p. 159.

Wolf, ‘Soviet Naval Interaction with the United States and Its Influence on Soviet Naval Developments’, pp. 64-5.


Gordon, British Seapower and Procurement Between the Wars, p. 1599.

For further elaboration, see Arkin and Handler, Naval Accidents 1945-1988, p. 77.


For an example of this proposal, see Ken Booth, ‘Law and Strategy in Northern Waters’, NWCR, vol. 34, no. 4 (July-August 1981), pp. 3-21.


The agreement defined dangerous military activities as follows: (1) dangerous reaction to unintentional incursion; (2) hazardous use of lasers; (3) disrupting operations in special cautionary areas; and (4) interference with command and control networks.


Chapter IV. The Analysis of Maritime Confidence-Building Measures

Confidence-building measures (CBMs), which are intended to foster transparency and trust through purposely designed co-operative security measures, originated in the mid-1970s. In contrast to structural arms control, which is designed to limit, reduce or eliminate weapons systems, CBMs are intended to clarify military intentions and to reduce uncertainties about potentially threatening military activities. Under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) — as of December 1994 the Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) — multilateral agreements were reached in Europe on Confidence-Building Measures. CBMs were first discussed in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. Interest in these measures gained momentum during the 1980s with the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) that drew up a more extensive set of Confidence and Security Building Measures when these talks were resumed in Vienna in 1989. Maritime CBMs were proposed by the Warsaw Pact. The Vienna Documents of 1990 and 1992 extended the CSBMs, some of which affected maritime operations related to the shore. Independent naval operations were, however, unaffected.

Maritime confidence building measures (MCBMs) covering naval as well as non-naval activities could be considered as a larger category of CBMs, including naval confidence-building measures (NCBMs), but not limited to such measures. MCBMs shift away from constraints on naval operations applied under operational naval arms control towards the process associated with their development and application. Even though operational constraints on naval operations include the number and types of naval vessels, or particular activities conducted within defined geo-strategic areas and within a specified period of time, MCBMs have to do with openness, transparency and predictability at sea; their aims are to reduce tensions and lessen the possibility of surprise attack, or conflict due to miscalculation or misunderstanding. In spite of the fact that MCBMs conceptually overlap with operational measures of naval arms control, as shown in Table 2-2 and 5-1, this chapter will find which MCBMs might be applied to Northeast Asia.

The following discussion will address four questions: (1) What are confidence building measures, including their definition and scope? (2) What has been achieved under the OSCE, including Stockholm/Vienna accords? (3) What are maritime confidence-building
measures? and (4) Which areas of MCBMs could be applied to global and regional levels? The discussion will be preceded by an account of the historical background and concept of CBMs and CSBMs.

I. The Historical Background and Concept of Confidence-Building Measures
Confidence building is basically a process by which, firstly, mutual understanding of the political and strategic intentions of opponents in conflicts is secured, and secondly, mutual concern about strategic and military behaviour of opponents is reduced. The CSCE established a series of agreements and procedures designed to increase the security of members through enhanced military transparency and cooperation. The concept of CBMs was first used at the 1975 CSCE Helsinki Conference. The Helsinki Final Act, which was signed by 35 participants including the United States, Canada, and all European countries except Albania and Andorra on 1 August 1975, defined the basic concept of CBMs as follows: 'to reduce the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where the participating states lack of clear and timely information about the nature of such activities.'

The Helsinki Final Act also showed that the exchanges of information, the prior notification of military activities and observation were seen as the main confidence building mechanism. In spite of the fact that there is no clear-cut definition of CBMs, it is generally agreed that 'CBMs are designed to provide more openness and predictability, thus reducing tension and mistrust among nations.'

The UN General Assembly (UNGA), in the end, formally adopted the concept of CBMs in 1978 within its efforts contributing to progress in disarmament. The UNGA report's reference to disarmament took the definition of CBMs somewhat beyond the original Helsinki definition which referred principally to measures of openness and predictability. The second CSCE Review Meeting was held in Madrid in 1983 and established the guidelines, or mandate, for the Stockholm Agreement in 1986. In this, the 1975 Helsinki CBMs were supplemented by CSBMs as 'second generation measures.' With more comprehensive provisions involving mandatory on-site inspection, CSBMs were expanded in application area from the Atlantic to the Urals. CSBMs were designed to reduce the 'danger of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension.'
At Stockholm the participants agreed to additional CSBMs that required notification of exercises involving 13,000 troops, mandatory invitation of observers from other participating countries to attend military activities above a certain threshold and on-site inspection to verify compliance. Even though formal measures of 'transparency' and 'predictability' on land were initially included in the outline of the Stockholm Accords on 22 September 1986, the CSCE process did not address naval activities except where these were explicitly linked to amphibious exercise. The envisaged goal of the Stockholm CSBMs to reduce the risks of military confrontation between the East and the West, above all the danger of miscalculation and misinterpretation of military activities, had been, by and large, attained. Although simple attempts to transfer land-oriented measures to sea proved difficult, it was thought that the same general principles offered the best opportunity for successful CSBMs.

The Soviet Union first suggested inclusion of naval operations in CSBMs from the mid-1980s. The Soviet approach was based on multilateral and bilateral measures: (1) notification of given naval activities, (2) exchange of information measures; (3) limitations on numbers of large-scale naval exercises; (4) mutual restraints in naval exercises in international straits; and (5) a reciprocal limitation on naval activity by means of an agreement.

During the Vienna Talks in 1989, the Warsaw Pact (WTO) tried to include independent naval activities. This proposed the following naval arena for CSBMs: (1) notification of naval exercises involving over 20 combat ships of more than 1,500 tons each, or over five ships with at least one over 5,000 tons and equipped with cruise missiles or aircraft, or over 80 combat aircraft; (2) notification of transfers into or within the zone of naval groups of over 10 ships of more than 1,500 tons and equipped with cruise missiles or aircraft; (3) notification of maritime force transfers involving over 3,000 men to the territory of another country in the zone; (4) notification of transfers to the territory of another state of over 30 naval combat aircraft; (5) observation of exercises involving over 25 combat ships of more than 1,500 tons each or over 100 combat aircraft, and (6) limitation of exercises of over 50 combat ships and naval exercises to 10-14 days. The Vienna negotiations attempted to exclude independent naval activities from the conference because the WTO's Vienna proposal seemed totally unrealistic to Western naval officers. It seemed that MCBMs had been diminishing and were of secondary significance compared with the real concern in connection with a possible military confrontation of a large number of conventional ground forces in Central Europe. NATO officially revealed a new flexibility on the possibility of some kind of
transparency measures at sea at the ‘Sea Link 89’ Conference at Annapolis, Maryland on 13-15 June 1989.

Eric Grove has tried to develop MCBMs in terms of European maritime security. He described the necessity of MCBMs for European security as follows: ‘In a post-CFE world, where relatively high levels of naval power will remain necessary to maintain international security, it seems most appropriate to emphasise the confidence building route to international security... this approach does not of course rule out those measures of arms control or disarmament that come within the confidence building circle, for example the mutual abolition of the sub-strategic nuclear weapons that make naval forces unnecessarily threatening.’

II. What are Maritime Confidence-Building Measures?

A. The Concept and Scope of Maritime Confidence-Building Measures
It should be made quite clear that designing confidence-building measures for the maritime arena is quite different from doing so for application on land. Maritime confidence-building measures would touch neither the structure and combat organisation of existing naval forces or advantages of one alliance over another, nor their construction and modernisation programmes. But MCBMs overlap with the constraints on naval operations applied under operational naval arms control. Rear Admiral Richard Hill, RN (Ret.) noted:

The introduction, under the rubric of ‘confidence building’, of measures unrelated to the broad areas covered by CSCE is confusing and may well be counter-productive. The history of the last 20 years strongly suggests that arms control is effective mainly through agreements whose aims and limits are precisely defined; overlaps, linkage and diffusion have often aborted promising proposals and negotiations.10

Grove stressed that MCBMs should be distinguished from constraints on naval operations as operational naval arms control: ‘The aim of naval CBMs regimes is not to prevent navies doing their legitimate job of maintaining international peace and security but to enhance their capacity to do so. Such measures, which capitalise on the nature of the maritime environment, should not be regarded as a ‘slippery slope’ likely to lead to illegitimate constraints on naval operations, but as an improvement in the capacity of navies to operate to maximum effectiveness in safeguarding the new world order.’11

Radoslav Deyanov defined MCBMs as: ‘maritime confidence-building measures covering military as well as non-military activities at sea could be considered as a larger
category of CBMs... but not limited to such measures." He divided the categories of MCBMs as follows: (1) lowering the risks of naval incidents; (2) assuring the safety of international lines of communication; (3) improving understanding of security concerns; (4) increasing openness and predictability; (5) eliminating some offensive-oriented elements; and (6) improving ocean management policies.

MCBMs can be global, regional or sub-regional, and political or military, and they can be negotiated multilaterally or bilaterally or even adopted as unilateral initiatives during relevant talks between major naval powers and states in specific regions or areas of the world's oceans and seas. MCBMs not only cover naval and non-naval activities but also deal with transparency. Such measures provide the basis for consultative arrangements to reduce tensions and lessen the possibility of conflicts at sea.

B. The Objectives and Roles of MCBMs.

The basic idea of CBMs at the Helsinki Conference in 1973 was to reduce military concealment and the resultant fear by giving advance warning of military activities, such as movement or manoeuvres, and by providing for visits and exchanges between the East and the West. The UN Comprehensive Study on CBMs assessed that: 'The overall objective of confidence-building measures is to contribute towards reducing or, in some instance, even eliminating the causes of mistrust, fear, tensions, and hostilities as significant factors behind the international arms build-up.'

The US State Department also regarded CBMs as measures intended to 'increase openness, mutual understanding, and communication in order to reduce the possibility of conflict through accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication, and to inhibit opportunities for surprise attack or political intimidation, thereby increasing stability in time of calm as well as crisis.' The perception of threat may be regarded as playing a more important role than actual threat because of the possibility of a war arising through misunderstanding and miscalculation.

Changes in the maritime environment and modification of maritime doctrine could slowly bring about a wider recognition for such CBMs objectives. The basic role of MCBMs is to serve as an instrument for achieving specific results related to improved confidence and enhanced security at sea. MCBMs, which embrace the promise of serving the interests of international security and stability at sea, may be guided by the following general objectives.
Reducing the Risks and Threatening Elements of Naval Activities is one of the most widely shared objectives of MCBMs avoiding confrontation in peacetime. It is a primary objective of several existing bilateral and multilateral efforts. The provisions of such agreements as Article III of the 1972 INCSEA, which guide the behaviour of naval vessels, enhance maritime security. A number of countries support the idea of negotiating a multilateral convention on the prevention of incidents at sea, having regional or sub-regional coverage. Such an agreement should be considered complementary to the existing bilateral ones, not a substitute for them.

Reducing to a Minimum the Danger of Miscalculation and Mistrust at Sea related to Naval or Other Military Activities at Sea. CBMs should be regarded as the prerequisite for reducing the danger inherent in any misunderstanding and miscalculation of military activity, especially when the states involved in a conflict lack any clear or timely information on the nature of that activity. The awareness of what constitutes normal or abnormal military activities can reduce the dangers innately coming from misunderstanding, miscalculation and unintended crisis. Thus, MCBMs would not only enhance stability and predictability at sea, by eliminating mutual suspicion and miscalculation, but also reduce to a minimum the danger of a misperception of the other side’s actions and hence the likelihood of an inadequate or wrong response to such actions. The value of predictability has thus been widely supported as a CBM objective.

This objective of MCBMs could be global or regional, depending on the scope of application of the respective measures. The 1936 Montreux Convention, which includes important operational and confidence-building elements, for example, is an example of regional measures. Another example is a useful confidence building measures agreement between the United Kingdom and Argentina to prevent misunderstanding in the Falklands area. Such agreements have been widely recognised as a contribution to international security and stability. In a wider security aspect the basic role of MCBMs is to serve as an instrument for achieving specific results associated with improved confidence and enhanced security at sea. These results could be identified with the security objectives of the MCBMs.

Enhancing Stability and Predictability at Sea. CBMs are primarily designed to influence the perception of potential adversaries, and particularly the perception of their intentions in times of confrontation. Increased openness and predictability in naval activities can be achieved through exchange of information, observation and inspection measures. Ways in which MCBMs can enhance openness and predictability are: (1) exchange of statistical
information on naval forces, such as numbers of naval vessels, aircraft and naval facilities; (2) exchange of information on naval activities, exports and imports of naval vessels, and major weapons systems; (3) prior-notification of naval exercises and developments, presence of observers during naval exercise or manoeuvres; (4) notification of passage of submarines; (5) reciprocal port visits of warships; and (6) the provision of data for such publications as the UN Arms Register.

MCBMs would make naval forces and capabilities actively contribute to effective ocean management for the peaceful uses of the seas. Agreements upon and the commencement of the implementation of measures of mutual understanding at sea could create prerequisites for transition to the maritime co-operation aspect of the third model of co-operative maritime security.

To put it more simply, the ultimate objective of MCBMs is not only to create stability and maintain the status quo, but also to improve confidence. This objective can be achieved by increasing naval transparency, reducing the threatening elements of naval exercises and the chance that naval incidents could begin a war, limiting the risk that naval operations could lead to escalation from regional conflicts to war, creating or improving conditions for co-operation in the maritime domain, and avoiding miscalculations and restraining the use of naval force for political coercion. The pattern can be established whereby the states concerned could show that military forces in peacetime are intended only for defence and not for attack.

C. The Categories of Maritime Confidence Building-Measures
A Norwegian Defence Research Establishment report identified two main categories of MCBMs, 'those dealing with information and communication, and those dealing with operational and material limitations.' Scholars such as William H. Nelson have divided CBMs into the following three categories: (1) operational constraints; (2) observation and inspection; and (3) information exchange. Recently, Stanley B. Weeks, Science Applications International Corporation, developed a further simple categorisation of MCBMs in order to apply them to the Asia-Pacific region. He divided MCBMs broadly into three areas: (1) declaratory measures; (2) transparency measures; and (3) constraint measures. Declaratory measures include non-attack and nuclear-free zones, no nuclear attack on non-nuclear powers, regional principles of conflict-avoidance, and renouncing war. Even though they are not strictly maritime in nature, Weeks includes under his declaratory heading statements such as
the Briand-Kellogg Pact which renounced war in 1928, Soviet nuclear no-first-use pledges, the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Concord of 1976, and the ROK-DPRK Agreement which pledged non-attack and a nuclear-free Peninsula in December 1991. A secondary general category of MCBMs is transparency measures, which embrace information exchange, communication, notification, and observation and inspection measures. Notification measures have primarily been undertaken in relation to ground force manoeuvres. The third category is constraint measures, which include risk reduction agreements, exclusion/separation measures, and constraints on personnel, equipment and activities.

This study defines constraining measures as operational arm control. Transparency measures, therefore, forming the major part of MCBMs, have played an important role in reducing military tensions and contributing to the development of a post-Cold War regional and global security regime. This study embraces four main categories of transparency measures to apply MCBMs to Northeast Asia: (1) information exchange measures; (2) communication measures; (3) notification measures; and (4) observation and inspection measures (see Table 4-1).

III. The Application and Implementation of Maritime Confidence-Building Measures

A. Information Exchange Measures

Information exchanges between navies would help create transparency, openness, and confidence at sea. Information measures may include two areas: (1) standing and static naval presence, including force levels, naval doctrines, and facility details such as naval bases and support facilities; and (2) dynamic activities, including seminars and military-to-military contacts. They could include information about current and projected naval inventory levels. For effective MCBMs, a general maritime framework might also be included which would encompass the scope of non-naval activities, such as shipping volume, trade routes, fishing, mining, and other oceanographic or hydro activities. Although verifying information exchange would require an acceptable level of intrusiveness, ships' visits and exchange of officers could, if properly regulated, become major means of verification without endangering national security.

Naval data sharing could include procurement and certain deployment plans, the scrapping of naval forces, and information concerning planned exercises or weapon testing at sea. Information exchange on naval strength, as the key element to confidence, was suggested
by the Soviet Union, its allies, and the neutral and non-aligned (NNA) nations at the
Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures at Vienna in 1989. Information
data on naval forces and planning might be exchanged on a regional basis. This would prevent
threat perceptions and misunderstandings of the capabilities of other navies. Information
exchange measures might be verified by a system of visits to bases to check on numbers and
characteristics.

The information exchange of naval forces could also include institutionalised
contacts through naval staffs, war games, port visits, observation of naval activities, and
seminars on naval doctrine and strategies. Furthermore, exchanges of naval officers through
naval institutes or war collages would help each side better understand the other’s maritime
strategy, geo-strategic perspective, and strategic concerns. Reciprocal ships’ visits and fleet
reviews have a long tradition and are recognised forms of confidence-building, to show the
trust and openness. A good example of a multilateral port visit was the International Fleet
Review hosted by Malaysia in May 1990 in Penang in which sixty-three warships from
eighteen different countries participated.

Conferences and discussions on doctrine and naval force structure might also be
expanded. Naval dialogue would complement the existing practices of military-to-military
exchanges with ships’ port visits. Recently, the Asia-Pacific countries have been very positive
in this area, particularly with regard to US-Russian naval exchanges, increased ROK-Japan
and ROK-Russian naval contacts, and the PRC-Japan strategic dialogue.

There are also many kinds of sub-regional security dialogues, conferences and
workshops on the governmental and non-governmental levels, dealing with Asia-Pacific
security and confidence-building. CBMs in the Asia-Pacific region broadly include both
formal and informal measures, whether unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral, to prevent
uncertainties among states, including both maritime and non-maritime elements. The Council
for Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) has focused heavily on developing
concrete and practical measures of confidence-building. The ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF), as a semi-official meeting, has discussed the possibilities and modalities for regional
security co-operation in the Asia-pacific region from the early 1990s. The meeting has
touched on a number of CBM issues, including ‘exchanges of information among defence
planners [and] prior notification of military exercises’.

There are also many multilateral efforts as MCBMs for maritime security in the Asia-
Pacific region. The United States, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan established a series of
SLOC conferences. The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) meets biennially at head of navy level and comprises the navies of the ASEAN states, China, Japan, ROK, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea. The member navies have agreed to provide each other with information about naval forces, doctrine and, where appropriate, regional warship movements. 33

Recently, the UN Arms Register has been the focus of information exchange measures. The idea of an arms register originated from the Statistical Yearbook of the Trade in Arms, Munitions and Implements of War, which was published annually by the League of Nations between 1924 and 1938. 34 The UN Arms Register 35 for conventional arms was established in December 1991, and came into operation on 30 April 1993. The register is designed to provide transparency in the imports and exports of weapons, including warships. It covers seven categories of major conventional arms including warships. 36 Its aims are, in Owen Greene’s words, to ‘help identify destabilising accumulations of conventional arms and facilities timely international action to prevent or tackle these; reduce unnecessary suspicion; promote restraint; and provide a basis for regional confidence-building measures.’ 37 In 1993 and 1994 over 80 countries submitted reports to the UN relating to their imports and exports of conventional arms. A total of 108 countries submitted reports on their conventional arms for these two years. 38 Such reports will, as a means of reducing suspicion, increase the transparency concerning, inter alia, maritime strategy, doctrine and naval operations. The Assembly has also invited all states to participate in the UN Register system for the standardised reporting of military spending. The Malaysian Minister for Defence proposed a regional arms register to support the Arms Register regime in the Asia-Pacific region in 1992.

To put it more simply, information exchange would prevent an increase in threat, especially over security, based on the misunderstanding of other navies’ capabilities. Information exchanges and discussions on doctrine and structure are pure confidence-building measures. Such measures could help the participants in this confidence-building process discover that the participants do not wish to threaten each other. If they are really hostile, confidence-building measures cannot be useful.

B. Communication Measures
Communication measures require or encourage the creation and use of shared means of communication. This area includes hot lines for exchange of crisis information, joint crisis control centres, and cool lines for the regular distribution of required and requested
information. A hot line agreement is one form of communication measure. On 20 June 1963 the United States and the Soviet Union signed such an agreement, which grew out of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. It established a direct communications link between their governments for use in time of emergency; regular diplomatic channels required about two hours to transmit a message, while missiles could fly the distance in a short time. On 25 August 1967 the Soviet Union and Great Britain also approved a Hot Line Agreement which came into force on 27 October 1967. The hot line agreements in Northeast Asia are US-China (1997), Russia-Japan (1997), and Russia-ROK (1993).

The INCSEA agreements established special procedures for communication on unusual or dangerous naval activities. Article III (5) of the 1972 INCSEA agreement between US and Russia stated that 'when ships of the parties manoeuvre in sight of one another, such signals (flag, sound, and light) as are prescribed by the Rules of the Road, the International Code of Signals, or other mutually agreed signals, shall be adhered to for signalling operation and intentions.' The Annex of the 1986 INCSEA between the United Kingdom and Russia also included instruction for use of special signals.

The issues of maritime communications directly concern safety at sea and maritime security as a whole. The WPNS have developed a Maritime Information Exchange Directory, Tactical Signals Handbook and Replenishment at Sea Handbook. These resources, which include information about certain maritime activities, would be shared by the participating navies. Other suggestions have been made. In 1994 Captain Second Rank Alexander S. Skaridov, Russian Navy (Ret.), Lieutenant-Commander Yang Zhiqum, PLAN (Ret.), and Commander Daniel D. Thompson, USN (Ret.) examined the problems of maritime communications and proposed a 'Naval VHF Communications Regime' for air-to-ships and air-to-air contacts to reduce incidents at sea.

C. Notification Measures

Naval activities on the high seas are in some ways more transparent than those on land because of the ability to track events from one's own vessels and the ready availability of the overlying airspace by observer aircraft of any nation through a variety of tactical reconnaissance means. It is also significant that the fundamental problems must first be addressed in the context of MCBMs. Thus, Eric Grove stressed that naval activities may be discussed by looking at three factors: the nature; area; and the time that they take place.
notification of the areas in which naval activities take place might, however, present some difficulty. Naval operations are, by nature, wide-ranging. 44

The Helsinki and Stockholm accords, which are negotiated within the OCSE process, include provisions for advance notification of amphibious activities and the exchange of observation at such activities. The significant aspects of the Stockholm Document are that notification is required 42 days in advance for military exercises involving more than 13,000 men, 300 tanks, or 3,000 amphibious or air borne troops. Observation of the exercise by the other side must be offered if there are more than 17,000 regular or 5,000 amphibious or air borne troops involved. 45 The Stockholm Agreement has the potential to increase the transparency of military operations in Europe both during peacetime and in times of crisis.

Although these measures were not applied to independent naval operations, some analysts have argued that they might have potential if such notification measures would be ‘not to prevent any activities taking place, but to prevent routine non-threatening naval manoeuvres and movements being misinterpreted or just being disconcerting’. 46 The successful implementation of notification measures over a period would make patterns of naval activities more perceptible. Notification has, in fact, been practised by NATO authorities for many years. Notice to airmen/mariners (NOTAMs) is a routine, important form of notification of military activities at sea.

The advance notification of naval exercises removes the opportunity of deploying forces to troubled places under the appearance of conducting exercises. Such measures could help avoid misunderstandings and reassure countries that naval exercises or close manoeuvring are not threatening, through reciprocal openness. In spite of the fact that the UNCLOS already requires a submarine to surface in another state’s territorial seas (Article 20), the application of such notification requirements to submarines is relatively difficult because their silent undersea manoeuvres are inherently unverifiable. 47 Nonetheless, notification could help predictability in peacetime naval operations by surface ships.

D. Observation and Inspection Measures
Generally, observation measures require or encourage the opportunity to observe specified military activities. Observation measures at sea are somewhat different matters because ships are closed groups, including sophisticated weapons systems and manpower in a restricted space. Thus, observation could include briefings at coast headquarters, short visits to
operational or anchoring combatant ships and longer periods accompanying non-combatant ships, such as replenishment ships.

The observation of certain naval activities plays a useful role in the avoidance of misunderstanding and miscalculation by providing an opportunity for reassurance that the notified activity has a non-threatening character. Such measures have voluntarily implemented under the Helsinki Final Act. The Stockholm Agreement in 1986 elaborated a code of host states and observer rights. Furthermore, the Vienna Agreement in 1992 ensured non-interference with inspections and permitted more aerial surveillance. Thus, notification requirements or procedures for exchanging observers could conceivably be expanded to cover a variety of naval exercises.48

Maritime surveillance is the systematic observation of maritime areas to locate, identify and track ships, submarines and other vehicles on or under the sea. The objective is to determine the extent, nature and purpose of ship and aircraft movement and other maritime activity. Maritime surveillance may be undertaken by a variety of means including satellite, aircraft, surface ships, submarine, land-based radar, or by towed and fixed sonar arrays. Some combination of these means is usually used and thus an effective command, control and communication system is required to integrate the information from different sources and produce a co-ordinated surveillance picture.

One of the most important successes of CBMs has been the adoption of compliance and verification/inspection provisions. Indeed, one can find at least one example of MCBMs agreements to add to these measures. In the 1930 Protocol signed by Greece and Turkey, each party pledged not to order, acquire or construct naval units or armaments without having first given the other six months' notification in order to prevent any competition in the sphere of naval armaments, by means of a friendly exchange of views and explanations on either side.

The Stockholm Document included a regime of on-site inspection as a merit of verification. An inspection must begin within thirty-six hours of the request and must terminate forty-eight hours after the arrival of the team, which is limited to four inspectors. On 11th December 1989 the Soviets proposed inspection measures, as a part of MCBM, which might be accomplished by inspection through land, air, and naval bases and ships.49

One example of ship-board inspection measures can be shown. In July 1989 the Soviet Navy allowed American scientists on board the cruiser Slava at Yalta in the Black Sea to study the utility of various devices for verifying limits on nuclear weapons at sea.50 Although the United States opposed the exercise because it did not want the Soviets to inspect
US ships, it was a good start toward designing a verification package, and produced important and unexpected results. Such ship-board inspection was a part of observation and inspection measures which included monitoring of production facilities.

IV. Conclusion
CBMs have an important role to play in preventing an accidental or unauthorised use of weapon systems as well as reducing the possibilities for the emergence of crisis situations that may grow into a full-scale armed conflict. Such measures have been clearly shown to be constructive in the establishment and functioning of the structures of co-operation between the East and the West rivals in Europe. CBMs could be a workable alternative to traditional naval arms control proposals, such as the 1922 Washington Treaty, which imposed quantitative and qualitative limits on naval weapons. Today, CBMs are negotiated by various multilateral and bilateral fora and by a wide range of talks. MCBM negotiations could focus on naval transparency as an end in itself, and on naval activities such as exercises to foster predictability. In the foreseeable future, the role of MCBMs may be increased to include controlling a strategic situation so as to render it stable and predictable, and this could be achieved through consultation, communication and the exchange of information, thus reducing the risk of misguided political and military decision-making in crisis situation.

MCBMs are more important in a general way in providing greater transparency both at international and regional levels. Such measures can be seen as assisting navies in their efforts to protect world peace and security, and may contribute to global and regional stability. Transparency measures based on the UN Registry of Conventional Arms can be a significant symbol of an interest in co-operative security and the avoidance of war. By increasing information and understanding about naval activities and deployments of potential adversaries, they can help to reduce unnecessary suspicion and tensions. In fact, the discussion during the first ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference Senior Officials Meeting (PMC-SOM) in Singapore in May 1993 focused on CBM matters applicable to the Northeast Asian region, such as the registration of conventional arms in accordance with the UN Arms Register system, defence white papers, and the advance notice of and invitation to inspect military manoeuvres.

The increasing interest in MCBMs clearly merits a re-examination to assess their effectiveness and value to the major powers in the North Pacific region. On this model, MCBMs can be applied to Northeast Asia, providing the basis for consultative arrangements
to reduce the scope of naval incidents or accidents escalating into larger conflicts and for the management of regional security. Future MCBMs should, as traditional CBMs do today, help not only to increase openness, transparency and predictability but also to decrease the danger of naval conflicts at sea. Although there is still no agreed theory of MCBMs, it is argued that recent precedents in negotiating and implementing MCBMs with regional and sub-regional applicability can be regarded as a success.

Endnotes

1. The 'Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament' was included in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.


5. For an elaboration of this point, see Borawski, *From the Atlantic to the Urals*.


12. 'The Role and Security Objectives of Confidence-Building Measures at Sea', *Disarmament*, vol. 11, no. 4 (1990), pp. 84-94.


15. Quoted in Lacy, *Within and Beyond Naval Confidence-Building*, p. 25.


17. Marco Carnovale suggested five negative effects of MCBMs as follows: (1) diminish the capacity for the effective use of naval forces; (2) limit national crisis-management capability; (3) complicate preparation for defence during a crisis; (4) influence correlation of forces asymmetrically; and (5) generate negative political effects. See, 'Military Aspects of Naval Arms Control', *The International Spectator*, vol. 28, no. 4 (October-December 1993), pp. 82-3.


24. For a full discussion, see Stanley B. Weeks, 'Risk Reduction and Maritime Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific Region', a paper presented for the 11th International Conference on the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) Studies, held at The Royal Park Hotel, Tokyo, 17-18 November 1997, pp. 4-16.

25. It is important to differentiate between 'constraining measures' and 'constraint measures.' Constraining measures are limits that may be avoided by prior notification on other mitigating circumstances while constraints are considered prohibitions. The former fall in the area of maritime confidence-building measures and the latter are included the area of operational naval arms control.


28. For more thorough and comprehensive analyses of the proposals by the Warsaw Pact at Vienna on 9 March 1989, see Grove, Maritime Strategy and European Security, p. 72 and Lacy, Within and Beyond Naval Confidence-Building, pp. 44-6.


32. 'Chairman's Statement', p. 2.

33. The role and history of the WPNS, see Hirotarou Hayashi, 'History of WPNS', a paper presented for the 11th International Conference on the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOC) Studies, Tokyo, Japan, 17-18 November 1997.


35. For an elaboration of the origins and developments of the UN Arms Register, see M. Chalmers and O. Green, Implementing and Developing the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, Peace Research Report No. 22 (Bradford: Bradford University Press, 1993); 'The Development of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: Prospects and Proposals', The Non-Proliferation
36. The warship category includes all vessels and submarines armed and equipped for military use with a standard displacement of 750 metric tons or above, and those with a standard displacement of less 750 metric tons, equipped for launching missiles with a range of at least 25 kilometres or torpedoes with similar range.


42. Other scholars stated that the notification of major naval forces exercises and naval movements in sensitive areas are especially important because of naval forces characteristics, such as mobility, flexibility and ability to remain hull down over the horizon. 'Naval Arms Control: Where Do We go from Here?', Naval Forces, vol. 10, no. 4 (1989), p. 62.

43. For a useful and manageable description of this point, see Grove, Maritime Strategy and European Security, p. 79.


46. Three areas of East-West negotiations are: (1) notification of certain naval activities and the provisions for observation; (2) information exchange on naval forces and programmes; and (3) negotiations for the rationale of naval force structure, and the broad operational doctrines of the respective navies. For further elaboration, see Eric J. Grove, 'Signalling Intentions, Limiting Capabilities and Maritime Security: A Fine Line?', in Dan W. Middlemiss et al., Naval Arms Limitations and Maritime Security: A Conference Report (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhouse University Press, 1991), p. 53.


Table 4-1  Categories of Maritime Confidence Measures

I. Transparency Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Information Exchange Measures</th>
<th>B. Communication Measures</th>
<th>C. Notification Measures</th>
<th>D. Observation and Inspection Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• UN Arms Registry</td>
<td>• Regional naval hot lines</td>
<td>• Naval manoeuvres/</td>
<td>• Invitation of observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Defence White Papers</td>
<td>between fleet’s commanders</td>
<td>movements: passage of</td>
<td>• Surveillance and control zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Calendar of naval activities</td>
<td>• Maritime information</td>
<td>submarines</td>
<td>• Open skies over naval bases and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Naval doctrine</td>
<td>exchange directory</td>
<td>• Naval accidents</td>
<td>facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Exchange of naval data</td>
<td>• Multilateral maritime</td>
<td>• Test missile launchers</td>
<td>• Troop separation and monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Navy-to-navy contacts/</td>
<td>communication network</td>
<td>from naval ships</td>
<td>• Sensor/early warning station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exchanges, and meetings</td>
<td>• Mandatory consultation</td>
<td>• Living firing on the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Multilateral meeting workshop</td>
<td>on dangerous naval</td>
<td>high seas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and conferences: CSCAP, WPNS</td>
<td>activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Naval officers’ exchanges for</td>
<td>• Communication networks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education: command and staff</td>
<td>for unexpected naval</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>college</td>
<td>incidents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Non-governmental Naval Handbook</td>
<td>• A common tactical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>: Jane’s Fighting Ships</td>
<td>manual: ATP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conferences and seminars about</td>
<td>• Piracy centre</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>naval doctrine and naval force</td>
<td>• Maritime surveillance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>structure</td>
<td>communications network</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Maritime surveillance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Fleet review</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

II. Constraining Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Risk Reduction Measures</th>
<th>B. Geographical Constraining Measures</th>
<th>C. Constraining on Naval Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Incidents at sea agreement</td>
<td>• ASW free zones</td>
<td>• Manoeuvres/movements limits,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Dangerous military activities Agreement</td>
<td>• A zone of peace and security</td>
<td>by size or geographic area</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Demilitarised zones</td>
<td>• Advance notification for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Disengagement zones</td>
<td>naval movement exercises alerts</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Keep-out zones (air/sea)</td>
<td>• Limits on number of naval</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Nuclear-weapon-free zones</td>
<td>activities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Bans on simultaneous exercises/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>alerts and/or certain force/unit</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>types</td>
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Chapter V. An Analysis of Maritime Co-operation Measures

In the light of the end of the Cold War and the changing regional security environment in the Asia-Pacific, many countries have been trying to enhance their defence self-reliance to enable them to deal better with regional contingencies, with a primary emphasis on the defence of their maritime interests. Maritime security concerns are, furthermore, broadening: such as oil, gas and fish stocks. Other maritime security problems, like piracy, are also involved, requiring naval ships’ escort, offshore patrol and maritime constabulary capabilities.

Maritime co-operation measures (MCMs) are intended not only to reduce cost through shared development efforts and co-operative activities but also to promote trust and transparency with potential or past rivals. MCMs are intended to foster co-operation in both military and non-military areas. MCMs conceptually overlap with maritime confidence-building measures (MCBMs) as shown in Figure 2-1, but the success of MCMs depends on MCBMs efforts. In this context, this chapter will consider: (1) What are MCMs? (2) What is their utility as co-operative maritime security measures? and (3) How could MCMs be applied to the Asia-Pacific? It begins with an account of the concept and scope of MCMs.

I. What are Maritime Co-operation Measures?

A. The Concept and Categories of Maritime Co-operation Measures

Maritime co-operation measures include both naval co-operation and much more broadly based co-operation ventures. As Commodore Sam Bateman, RAN (Ret.) and Rear Admiral R. M. Sundardi, Indonesian Navy (Ret.) argue:

... naval co-operation encompasses all military activities associated with the sea (recognising that in some regional countries, maritime aircraft are operated by the air force); ... maritime co-operation ... is a broad concept in line with the theory of comprehensive security, encompassing the full range of activities and interests in the sea (for example, shipping, marine resources and environmental protection).

The Australian Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth Evans, and a leading Australian strategic analyst, Paul Dibb, identified maritime co-operation measures in activities including maritime safety, search and rescue, marine pollution control and maritime surveillance, as one of their two categories of security co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region.

There are no unified categories of MCMs. Different scholars and strategic analysts have different approaches. The Kuala Lumpur-based Institute of Strategic and International
Studies drafted the concept of a Maritime Surveillance and Safety Regime for Southeast Asian Waters in 1990. Desmond Ball and Sam Bateman initially reviewed the concept in 1991. Multilateral maritime surveillance regimes deal with particular problems and issues at sea, such as piracy, oil spills, protection of fish stocks, and enforcement of immigration. According to Bateman, 'Maritime surveillance is the systematic observation of maritime areas to locate, identify and track ships, submarines and other vehicles on or under the sea. The objective is to determine the extent, nature and purpose of ship and aircraft movement and other maritime activity.'

Mark J. Valencia suggested 'marine scientific research measures' as maritime co-operation approaches which are valuable to their communities: 'Successful co-operation in marine scientific research can build the confidence necessary for initiative in other spheres, and establish the basis for a jump from tactical to complex learning.' Bateman also suggested a 'maritime information and data exchange regime' as a possible form of maritime co-operation measures, overlapping with MCBMs. He recommended that '... the information system is kept to a manageable size, and to provide some focus to its output. Boundaries of the region covered by the information system or database may be defined in terms of the strategic, economic, physical chemical, biological or geological characteristics of the particular environment, depending on the purpose or function of the information systems.'

In this study, maritime co-operation measures are taken to be based on the theory of a truly comprehensive regime defining genuine co-operation in both non-conventional maritime security issues, including maritime safety, management of environmental mishaps, marine resources and coastal zone management and marine research, and conventional maritime security issues, including the security of SLOCs as well constabulary and rescue operations. MCMs will be broadly divided into two areas: (1) a functional approach, embracing non-military activities and (2) an operational approach, requiring the use of naval forces to support co-operation.

A Functional Approach. Valencia defined the concept of a functional approach in his paper on the First Meeting of CSCAP Maritime Co-operation Working Group: 'A functional approach — co-operative marine scientific on common or shared problems — could help the growth of positive and constructive common work and of common habits and interests, decreasing the significance of boundaries of conflicting claims by overlapping them with a natural growth of common and co-operative activities.'
A functional approach has also been developed in response to the jurisdictional revolution in the law of the sea reflected in the UN Convention Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The recent expansion of economic interest at sea and increasing concern over conflicts of interest among various areas, including navigation, fishing, waste dumping, and the possible implications for environmental protection have highlighted the importance of functional approaches in the post-Cold War era. The UNCLOS emphasises the importance of maritime co-operation by recognising that the problems and opportunities of ocean areas need to be considered as a whole. There are several examples of this: (1) the Timor Gap Treaty between Australia and Indonesia; (2) the Joint Development Area between Malaysia and Thailand in the Gulf of Thailand; and (3) a Korea-Japan Joint Development Zone in the Yellow Sea and East China Sea. In particular, Article 276 of the UNCLOS requests the establishment of regional marine scientific and technical research centres; Article 277 outlines the functioning of such centres. A functional approach includes the control of marine pollution and protection of the marine ecosystem and joint development of marine resources (see Table 5-1).

An Operational Approach. The UNCLOS has introduced new uncertainties into maritime issues, particularly in connection with the EEZs and archipelagic state regimes. Most maritime conflict issues in the world involve disputes over islands, continental shelf claims, EEZ boundaries and other offshore issues. New emerging maritime security concerns are piracy, pollution from oil spills and industrial waste, safety of SLOCs, illegal fishing and exploitation of other resources. These concerns are reflected in the significant maritime dimension of the current arms acquisition programmes in the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, regional states are trying to improve national capabilities in maritime surveillance and intelligence gathering. The operational approach of MCMs includes many areas: (1) cooperation for marine transport and communications; (2) research and rescue operations; (3) illegal drug trafficking; and (4) anti-piracy operations. Article 98 of the UNCLOS requires every coastal state to promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an effective search and rescue service regarding safety at sea, and co-operate where necessary with neighbouring states for this purpose. An operational approach, in the study, includes the protection of sea lines of communications and anti-piracy operations which are available for the Northeast Asian security environment.
B. The Objectives and Roles of Maritime Co-operation Measures

It is first necessary to discuss the utility of MCMs as an aspect of co-operative maritime security in the new security environment. The UNCLOS gave impetus to regional co-operation in maritime scientific research. Under the UNCLOS, most of the coastal nations of the Asia-Pacific region have formally extended their maritime jurisdictions over resources and many activities to 200 nautical miles or more, but large maritime ecosystems, fish and pollutants will still be trans-national in character. In this region, there is clearly an insufficient understanding and consideration of the trans-national and interdependent character of the ocean environment and the living resources it supports. Technological change and increasing maritime use and user conflicts make the need for regional co-operation in maritime scientific research even more obvious.\(^9\)

Article 123 of the UNCLOS requires states bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas to co-operate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties. Article 56 also gives the coastal state jurisdiction over marine scientific research. Most Asian littoral states have overlapping territorial seas and the EEZs. Therefore, applying the co-operation reflected in Article 123 to claims under Article 56 could be a fruitful way forward.

There are three challenges respecting the application of MCMs in Northeast Asia. First, marine science is increasingly influenced by international politics. This means that the UNCLOS has given rise to a basic principle of multinational regional expeditions under the auspices of international organisations, since it is difficult for a host state to refuse access to waters under its jurisdiction to only some of the participating states. Second, in the situation of competition between the major powers, China and Japan are both reluctant to participate in marine scientific research regimes unless they can dominate them. It will be necessary to present convincing arguments that such major powers can gain more from a multilateral regime than from bilateral agreements. In addition, there are difficulties of involving both China and Taiwan in any multilateral marine science regime covering areas claimed by both. Despite these problems, however, Beijing and Taipei have agreed to co-operate in offshore oil exploration in both the South China and East China Seas.\(^10\) Finally, the territorial and maritime boundary disputes that plague the region may inhibit co-operation in marine scientific research, particularly in areas of high petroleum or fisheries potential.

MCMs offer a number of benefits. Among the objectives of MCMs are cost reduction through shared joint operations for humanitarian purposes, joint development of marine
resources, the protection of SLOC and the prevention of sea pollution. However, long-term maritime co-operation can only exist if all parties perceive advantages. Co-operation always includes a give and take process. Furthermore, it is important to maintain one's own competence in order to remain an attractive partner. MCMs, therefore, occur neither spontaneously nor without effort, but require careful preparation; they lead to improved measures to cover marine pollution and illegal activities at sea, such as piracy and drug smuggling.

Second, with the cost reduction, joint efforts, such as a collective surveillance regime of joint offshore development can contribute to the exchange of related technologies with neighbouring countries. An example is the Agreement on Marine Scientific and Technological Co-operation between China and Spain, which was signed on 6 April 1992 in Madrid. It covers not only studies on protection from marine pollution, but also basic studies on oceanography, and development, use and management of marine resources.11

Third, MCMs can reduce uncertainty and disagreement due to misperception and misunderstanding through the exchange of marine scientific information and the establishment of communication links. The Zone of Co-operation in the Timor Sea between Australia and Indonesia in 1991, for example, includes joint surveillance activities. This agreement involves occasional joint exercises between the two countries, the exchange of information on the programming of surveillance units, the establishment of routine communications links between ships, aircraft and shore authorities, and the development of standardised reporting procedures.12

Finally, through operational MCMs, maritime forces can operate both on the high seas and within national maritime jurisdiction to protect maritime territory and what Michael Leifer called 'a stable maritime regime.'13 Co-operative naval activities promote trust and transparency between neighbouring countries. In the next decade, the role of the MCMs is likely to expand.

II. The Application and Implementation of Maritime Co-operation Measures

A. Functional Approach

1. The Control of Marine Pollution and Protection of Marine Ecosystem

It may be useful to engage naval forces or special institutions from several countries directly in the control of marine pollution and protection of marine ecosystems through joint scientific research exercises, observation and surveillance and enforcement exercises. Joint activities
can include regional environmental emergency planning — in particular for oil pollution emergencies from oil transfers or platforms, environmental dumping studies or rehabilitation projects. Part XII of the UNCLOS, which expresses the first attempt to develop a public international law framework in response to marine pollution and degradation of the marine environment, includes environmental provisions. This basic concept was reaffirmed as Principle II in the Rio Declaration of the 1992 UN Convention on Environment and Development (UNCED), which includes twenty-seven principles and states several others that speak most directly to environmental security concerns. Through the UNCED, the UNCLOS is regarded as the single most influential and effective instrument of environmental security for ocean areas and activities.

There are three major reasons for marine pollution, the first being ocean dumping. Most of the regional seas' conventions followed the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waters and Other Matter, popularly known as the London Dumping Convention until November 1992, when the signatory parties changed its formal name to the London Convention. The convention not only prohibits the most highly toxic substances from being dumped at all, but requires those that are dumped to be subject to careful regulation.

The second area is land-based industrial activities. The London Convention has been relatively successful in addressing some of the major pollution problems, but it omits altogether the most important source of ocean pollution, namely, land-based industrial activities. However, the Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region does prohibit completely the dumping of radioactive waste, low and high level, and demands that any such wastes be deposited in the deep seabed. The Dumping Protocols of the Barcelona Convention and of the Convention for the Southeast Asia Pacific also prohibit the dumping of any radioactive waste.

The third area is oil spills. The Torrey Canyon Incident in 1967, for example, poured millions of barrels of crude oil into the coastal waters of the UK and France. Since then, countries bordering the North Sea, highly industrialised nations which have good relations with each other, have been actively producing agreements for the protection of the marine environment. Therefore, those countries were successful in establishing several regional agreements to protect the marine environment of the North Sea.

As an integral part of the Middle East peace process, the Environmental Law Institute of the United States sponsored and published a book entitled Protecting the Gulf of Aqaba: A
The book was written by environmental specialists, both within and outside the Middle East region, and focused on the need for co-operation and communication between the parties if they were to protect the unique features of the Gulf of Aqaba. It also provided suggestions for how communications and co-operation as well as protection might be achieved. There are many opportunities to highlight the need for, and the means by which, the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, and the Tok Islands in East Sea might be protected through the joint efforts of disputant and other countries within the region. The Gulf of Aqaba exercise also highlights the role that can be played by non-governmental organisations in security matters. Again, there are a number of non-governmental organisations within the Southeast Asian region, such as the Southeast Asian Programme in Ocean Law, Policy and Management, that provide support by hosting informal sessions on maritime environmental issues in an effort to build confidence. Recently, there have been several regional conventions on the protection of the marine environment, such as the Convention for the Protection of Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region of 1986. A similar agreement could be concluded in Northeast Asia.

2. Joint Development of Marine Resources

A joint development of marine resources is an association of two or more partners who share the risks and benefits of a commercial or, in some cases, non-profit venture. In world fisheries, such partnerships typically involve private or government interests of a host country and a foreign partner. In many cases, the host country is the one with the resources, while the foreign partner is likely to be a distant-water nation with an established and technically advanced fishing industry. In fishing joint ventures, a distant-water nation participates in the harvesting of fisheries in another nation’s coastal waters, processes some or all of the harvest fish, or markets fish products, and compensates the coastal state in cash or in kind.

The seas around the Asia-Pacific region have become more vital since most regional trade is still sea borne. The use of the seas as the source of natural resources is becoming significant because they provide both raw material and energy for industrial production. Since exploitation of the seas around each country is very competitive, the problems are increasing and spreading regionally. The solution, however, is only being dealt within in ad hoc joint efforts for the development of marine resources. Such exploitation suffers from deficiencies of
techniques, technological management and insufficient funds to provide proper and efficient management.

The treaty on the zone of co-operation in the Timor Sea between Australia and Indonesia, the so-called ‘Timor Gap Treaty,’ entered into force on 9 February 1991. It provides a joint development regime in an area of the Timor Sea between Australia and Timor where Australia and Indonesia agreed the seabed boundary in 1972. This treaty also provides an example of joint co-operation in the overlapping area of the continental shelf or the EEZ. On 14 March 1997, the two countries additionally signed the comprehensive treaty, which completes the maritime boundaries drawn from 1971 to 1997, to solve problems remaining after the Timor Gap Treaty.

Territorial disputes in Northeast Asia, relating to the impasse over ownership of the Senkaku Islands, Northern Territories and Tok Islands, may be settled by way of joint economic projects. In the South China Sea, in the meantime, China has offered to enter into joint development arrangements with Vietnam and the Philippines in EEZ claim areas that overlap in these islands chains. In the Japan-Korea Joint Development Agreement in the Yellow Sea and East China Sea, each party assumes responsibility for finding a concession holder to operate in each sub-zone of the joint development area in association with a concession holder from the other party. (This will be discussed in detail in chapters six, seven and eight). By contrast, under the Timor Gap Treaty, the particular sections established by the Joint Authority often call for competitive bidding by any country in accordance with the published criteria for that bidding round; the principal criteria are the amount and equality of the exploration work bid.

B. Operational Approach

1. The Protection of Sea Lines of Communications: Maritime Surveillance and Safety Information Exchanges

The promulgation of a 200-mile EEZ under the UNCLOS has generated the need for surveillance and force-projection capabilities over resource-rich sea areas. The exploitation of marine resources in the EEZ requires control of fishing, sea-bed exploration, and harmful activities, such as pollution. Sea lanes need to be monitored for illegal activities, such as piracy, and for hazards to navigation. Areas in dispute need to be periodically patrolled both to support one’s own claims and to gain information about the activities of other claimants.

Surveillance is vital to provide a true picture of activities at sea. The surveillance component of this picture-compilation is expensive in terms of resources and time, and must
be tailored closely to the needs of each coastal state and of course to the nature of the target. Hence there is likely to be continued reliance on the more equipment-intensive surveillance instruments — surface ships and aircraft. There have been several developments which support the concept of co-operative maritime surveillance in the Asia-Pacific region: Australia and Indonesia, for example, are not only establishing co-operative procedures for maritime surveillance in the Australian and Timor Seas, but also co-operating in the ASEAN-Australia Marine Science Project concerning water flow between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Co-operation for surveillance and information exchanges in the South Pacific region are well developed. Malaysia, for example, is installing a system of sea surveillance radar along the Malacca Straits. This is under the direction of the Maritime Enforcement and Co-ordination Centre and assists in improving marine safety by emphasising safe navigation and traffic separation. It also helps to control piracy. The so-called Sea Surveillance System will also be an important national defence asset. Information exchanges between the Malaysia SSS and Vessel Traffic Information System (VTIS) operated by the Port of Singapore Authority as the core of its Computer Integrated Marine Operations System are potential means of co-operation for maritime safety and SLOC security. The VTIS is a computer-aided ship tracking system covering the Singapore Strait and the approaches to the port of Singapore based on a chain of remote radars on Singapore Island and several off-lying islands.

In the post-Cold War era, many states in the Asia-Pacific region have enhanced their defence self-reliance to enable them to deal better with regional contingencies on the basis of their own resources. SLOCs in the Northeast Asia are increasing in importance, reflecting the economic growth of countries in the Western Pacific, and the interdependence of the region’s economies. Globally, shipping densities and the value and volume of cargoes are all increasing.

Navies have always had an independent role in policing the high seas, beyond the jurisdiction of coastal states, in pursuit of pirates, slavers and mutineers. But one of the traditional naval roles is the protection of SLOCs at the higher end of the conflict or crisis, with co-operation deriving from the political will to commit maritime forces to a particular operation. WEU member states, for instance, swept mines from the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War in 1987 in response to the threat they posed to the freedom of navigation. International or regional naval co-operation could contribute the suppression of violence at sea, from criminal, terrorist or war-like activities.\(^\text{21}\)
With the increasing independence of trade and the diminished responsibility of countries of registry for merchant ships, regional navies' role should include sea patrol and surveillance in relation to information management and co-operation. Since all navies share a number of duties of surveillance and enforcement on the high seas, these could be carried out with much closer maritime co-operation in terms of programming and information management. An example of this is the International Sea Patrol, proposed by US Senate Claiborne Pell in 1969. Sea patrol includes 'responsibility for international safety regulations at sea, for operation of a world-wide rescue and service, for enforcement of international law concerning navigation at sea, for ensuring uniformity and adequacy of world-wide aids to navigation, for regulating seamen outside their own countries, and for carrying out the decisions of the World Health Organisation at sea.'²² This might be more practical on a regional rather than world-wide basis.

2. Anti-Piracy

Article 100 of the UNCLOS requires all states to co-operate to the fullest extent possible in the repression of piracy. Piracy is defined in Article 101 of the UNCLOS as any illegal acts of violence against a ship or aircraft 'on the high seas or in the other areas beyond the jurisdiction of any state.'²³ Under international law, all states have the right to arrest pirates and to punish them for acts of piracy. Under Article 58 (2) of the UNCLOS, these rules apply do not apply when piracy occurs within the territorial sovereignty of a state. Archipelagic waters are also legally within the territorial sovereignty of the archipelagic state and, hence, not subject to definition or rules regarding piracy on the high seas.

Under universally accepted international law, 'law enforcement officials may not act to enforce their laws in areas within the territorial sovereignty of another state. Therefore, the naval vessels or marine policies from one state may not enter the internal waters, territorial waters, or archipelagic waters of another state to patrol for pirates or to arrest for piracy acts, regardless of where such acts took place.'²⁴ This does not, however, rule out agreement on international co-operation or for permission for such enforcement activities to take place. Article 108 of the UNCLOS provides that all states shall co-operate in the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs engaged in by ships on the high seas. Also, any state which believes on reasonable grounds that a ship flying its flag is engaged in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs may request the co-operation of other states to suppress such traffic.
Piracy is a major threat to shipping that can arise with little warning and can attract disproportional attention to coastal states and shipping companies. Along with the shift in the centre of gravity of pirate-like attack, there has been a disturbing escalation towards the use of heavy weapons. These range from highly organised commando-style raids to the opportunistic plunderer. New protection measures, a comprehensive intelligence and tracking centre, and improved enforcement through regional and international co-operation are required to combat this. The pirates are targeting cargoes, rather than the crew’s personal effects and money. Piracy remains a concern in areas of the Western Pacific, particularly in the South China Sea and Hong Kong-Luzon-Hainan triangle.

Anti-piracy in the East China Sea, in particular, is complicated by Chinese anti-smuggling patrols, which demonstrate a somewhat loose interpretation of their rights of visit-and-search on the high seas. In the summer of 1992 Singapore and Indonesia agreed to establish direct communications links between their navies and to provide co-ordinate patrols of their navies to protect Singapore Strait shipping lanes against piracy, including co-ordinating pursuit across territorial boundaries. In the Malacca and Singapore Straits area, specific co-operative measures between neighbouring states have significantly reduced piracy incidents. In October 1992 the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the international Chamber of Commerce established a Regional Piracy Centre, which covers all the countries east of Sri Lanka to Southeast Asia and the Far East. An information and reporting centre is located in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to comply with regional law enforcement authorities.

Indonesia and Malaysia, using the long-standing Joint Border Committee mechanism for maritime co-operation — which already included joint naval and police exercises and operations in the Straits of Malacca, and procedures for regular rendezvous at sea to exchange information — also agreed in December 1992 to form a Joint Maritime Operational Planning Team to conduct co-ordinated patrols along the common borders in the Malacca Straits. In mid-1993 these two countries conducted a ten day joint patrol exercise in the Strait of Malacca. As a result of these co-operative measures and significant unilateral anti-piracy measures by Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, the piracy problem in the Malacca and Singapore Straits diminished significantly after 1992. In 1991 there were 107 reported pirate-like attacks, and 83 in 1992. In November 1997 the Malaysian and Philippines navies conducted the joint anti-piracy exercise ‘Sea Malph 1/97,’ joining a total of seven ships. This exercise was held off the coast of the east Malaysian Province of Sabah for nine days.
III. Conclusion
Co-operative and functional approaches to marine scientific research could help the growth of positive and constructive common interests, diminishing the significance of boundaries or conflicting claims by overlaying them with a natural growth of common and co-operative activities. In this context co-operation in this seemingly innocuous field can build confidence, dampen frontier tension and improve relations in this region, and so build the confidence necessary for further initiatives in other spheres.

The second area of MCMs, an operational approach, can be well co-ordinated through institutions once the basis is laid. Such an approach must include addressing sea pollution, humanitarian operations, piracy, and the protection of SLOCs. The reasons for this are twofold. First, such issues are directly associated with issues of maritime conflict and stability. The problem of resource scarcity is likely to invite traditional kinds of inter-state conflict. Until an international coping mechanism is created, the problem of resource scarcities will continue. This is conducive to triggering national competition for resource supplies, and intensifying inter-state tensions. The second reason is associated with the fact that sea pollution issues have not only created a new source of maritime security threats, but also become a major addition to a new, expanded definition of national and international security.

Endnotes
2. Ibid., pp. 8-11.
### Table 5-1 Categories of Maritime Co-operation Measures

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Chapter VI. The New Geo-Strategic Maritime Environment and Challenges for Co-operative Maritime Security in Northeast Asia

With improving geo-strategic relations, maritime security is at the forefront of current regional security concerns in Northeast Asia. Throughout the region, maritime security concerns are broadening to include piracy, sea pollution from oil spills and industrial waste disposal, protection of sea lines of communications (SLOCs), illegal fishing and offshore resources development. The Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 (UNCLOS), which introduced the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and archipelagic state rights, has also generated regional maritime disputes over islands, continental shelf claims, the EEZ boundaries, and other offshore issues. These concerns require a new emphasis on maritime defence, involving naval modernisation, maritime surveillance capabilities and maritime law enforcement operations. The current naval arms build-up includes modern surface combatants, submarines, multi-role aircraft with maritime patrol capabilities, surveillance systems, mine warfare capabilities, and electronic warfare systems.

The geo-strategic maritime environment in Northeast Asia is furthermore in the process of a profound transformation, due partly to the end of the Cold War, but, perhaps more importantly, due also to economic growth and technological modernisation of the region over the past several decades. Economic growth and technological developments, in particular, are providing the resources for extensive naval modernisation programmes and fundamentally changing the characteristics of strategic and security relations in the region. The new environment has produced greater uncertainty and new areas of potential conflict, such as disputes over competing sovereignty claims and environmental security. The following discussion will focus on security threats in the widest sense, involving sea pollution, piracy and territorial and marine resources’ disputes, as well as the regional naval arms build-up. First to be addressed is the new geo-strategic maritime environment.

I. The New Geo-Strategic Maritime Environment

A. The Increased Risk of Potential Misunderstandings and Incidents at Sea

With the regional proliferation of naval forces, including submarines, the deployment of warships in the region frequently raises issues of sovereignty and the development of marine resources. Long term programmes of naval growth and modernisation may eventually lead to
clashes between neighbours.\(^1\) There have been an increasing number of naval incidents in Northeast Asia since the end of the Cold War. On 4 June 1994 a Russian ship fired warning shots at six Japanese fishing vessels in the Kunashiri Straits, near the disputed Kuril Islands. The action was part of a campaign against illegal fishing in Russian waters in the Far East. This area has been the focus of territorial disputes between Moscow and Tokyo since the Second World War.\(^2\) Incidents involving naval ships and fishing vessels are increasing. On 11 February 1998 the US Los Angeles-class submarine La Jolla (SSN 701) collided with a South Korean fishing boat 11 kilometres off the coast of Korea. The fishing boat sank, but all five crewmen were rescued. On 12 March 1998 a South Korean fishing boat collided with a Japanese Maritime Safety Agency patrol boat off Tsushima Island, Nagasaki prefecture. The collision occurred when the patrol boat tried to inspect one of two South Korean boats which were allegedly operating in a Japanese fishing zone.\(^3\)

A second category of incidents concerns naval ships in a confrontation during operational activities and exercise manoeuvring. This happened on 27-29 October 1994 in the Yellow Sea and involved a Chinese Han-class nuclear attack submarine and the US aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk. The confrontation began when ASW aircraft from the Kitty Hawk detected the Chinese submarine off Shandong. The submarine took action to elude its trackers. Beijing threatened to sink US naval ships that if they approached its coast too closely.\(^4\) The Americans responded by dropping sonobuoys, and after renewing contact with the submarine, the Kitty Hawk and its aircraft continued to track it. In response, China sent land-based fighter aircraft, also allegedly unarmed, toward the aircraft from the Kitty Hawk. The confrontation ended when the submarine returned to base at Qingdao.

A particular risk is the continuing US practice of tracking Chinese and Russian nuclear-powered attack submarines which could cause underwater collisions. The possibility of naval aircraft incidents could increase for the 21st century. Today, the US Navy is the only force that routinely operates aircraft carriers in the region, given the demise of the Russian Pacific Fleet V/STOL carrier capability. But if the Chinese navy acquires air-refuelling capabilities and aircraft carriers, Beijing will increase naval air operations in the territorial disputes areas, such as the East and South China Seas. Such a prospect poses an increased risk of potential misunderstandings and incidents at sea. In addition to human, material, and environmental losses and damage, such events regularly revive mutual mistrust and misunderstanding.
The economic development of Northeast Asian countries means that they rely heavily on seaborne trade routes from the Northwest Pacific to all over the world. These countries' ability to access their overseas markets depends on the freedom and safety of SLOCs. Japan's oil imports, for example, cross the straits of Hormuz, the Straits of Malacca, the Spratly Islands, and the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. The development of an international cooperative scheme for SLOC security could aid the goal of deterring regional conflicts and preserving regional stability. There is a need to establish a new regional scheme for regional co-operation in order not only to ensure the security of the SLOC in the Asia-Pacific region, but also to protect international trade. Any new scheme should be organised on a burden sharing basis. The assumption of greater responsibility for SLOC protection and direct contributions to SLOC maintenance can have long-term implications for regional peace and can thereby contribute to the national interests of participating countries of the region.

The issue of piracy has attracted attention as a never-ending menace hindering freedom of navigation. According to Rear Admiral Sunihiko Kawamura, JMSDF (Ret.), Japanese vessels were taken over by vessels, presumed to be Chinese, having neither national flags nor ships' name. Since March 1991, about 60 ships have been chased, inspected, fired upon, or otherwise threatened by unidentified vessels. In the 1992-1997 period there was a significant shift of the focus of piracy from the Straits of Malacca and Singapore to the Hong Kong-Luzon-Hainan Island area — between the South China Sea and East China Sea waters. Beijing eventually claimed that rogue elements of the Chinese Customs and Public Security Bureau (not military units) were responsible. Other nations in the region were concerned that these piracy incidents might be a deliberate Chinese exercise of extra-littoral sovereignty — particularly in the South China Sea and East China Sea, Senkaku Island area — and an unofficial expansion of China's maritime claims.

After 17 incidents of piracy involving Russian ships in 1991-1993, Russia deployed naval ships to the area in mid-1993 with orders to attack any threat to shipping — whereupon such attacks promptly ceased. Japan, another target of the 78 cases in 1991-1993 where foreign vessels were boarded or shot by Chinese, proposed to the Chinese Foreign Minister during his February 1993 visit to Tokyo that officials from the two countries' coast guard authorities meet to discuss East China Sea shipping problems. China agreed to an informal June 1993 meeting, which led to the establishment of a hot-line to the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency — and incidents over the next year were reduced to only one. Elsewhere, an
embarrassing Chinese attempt in May 1994, in which a vessel was seized in Hong Kong’s territorial waters, led to an apology and a promise to avoid such incidents in the future. There are, however, still numerous incidents in the Hong Kong-Luzon-Hainan region. In the Yellow Sea, for example, there were two reported piracy incidents from 1991 to 1996. In the East China Sea there were 20 reported piracy incidents from 1991 to 1996. Nonetheless, piracy remains a serious problem in Northeast Asia like Southeast Asia, with about 80 incidents annually in East Asia (see Table 6-2).

The most pressing issue for SLOCs, which has remained unsolved for three decades, is the maritime boundary and territorial dispute over the Spratlys. (For more details, see later this chapter). Nearly half of Japan’s commerce transits the territorially contentious South China Sea, as does a third of South Korea’s. With the exception of certain individual states like China, there is no significant land transport infrastructure in Northeast Asia and trade can only be carried by sea and air. Effectively, the region is one large archipelago like Japan and Taiwan with many small islands and the region’s ports linked to each other by an expanse of sea.

C. The Increasing Possibility of Disputes Over Marine Resources
Despite recent economic difficulties, the Asia-Pacific region is likely to continue to grow relatively and rapidly. Over the long term, there will not be enough energy to meet the region’s demands unless alternative sources are developed. This future shortfall is a cause for the ongoing conflicts over natural resources and sovereignty in the South and East China Seas. Such conflict might not interfere with maritime transport in the region, but could result in re-routing of sea-borne trade on a large scale and bring significant increases in foreign and operating charges.

The North Pacific is a resource-rich region, fished intensively for commercial purposes. Three principal issues pertaining to the use of living resources — illegal fishing, unregulated fishing, and driftnetting — have threatened international environmental security in the Bering Sea and adjacent North Pacific. These have all resulted in bitter disputes, impaired relationships between victim and culprit states, and international countermeasures. Besides the United States and Russia, the states most involved with current management practices in the Bering Sea include South Korea, North Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and China.

Even though most Northeast Asian countries accepted the EEZs as a sensible system of resource management and marine environment protection under the UNCLOS, they have
not yet solved the problem of the overlapping EEZs in the Yellow Sea and the East Sea. In the region, Russia was first to accept the 200-mile exclusive fishery zone in 1976 and a 200-mile EEZ in 1984. North Korea also established an EEZ in 1977. It has already been more than three decades since the possible presence of oil in the East China Sea was hinted by the UN Economic Commission for Asia and Far East in 1969. As has become well known since, this report instantly stirred up much euphoria among the oil-hungry coastal states and triggered a bitter resource dispute in the East China Sea. But there are many limitations to marine resource arrangements without agreements on overlapping EEZs. For one thing, none of the arrangements is binding on all the coastal states, nor is any state a party to all of them.

There are bilateral arrangements for living resources between regional countries, not only to protect marine resources but also to mitigate any conflicts. For instance, the almost four decades-old 1965 Fisheries Agreement, in force between Korea and Japan, regulates fishing operations mainly around the southern part of the Korean peninsula. A 1975 Fisheries agreement, which replaced previous non-governmental agreements begun in 1955, applied mostly to the west of what would be roughly the median line between China, on the one side, and the other coastal states on the other. These two agreements were the results of long, bitter disputes over fishing rights. The main features of the Korea-Japan treaty are first, to authorise each state to adopt an exclusive 12-mile fishery zone along its coast, and second, to establish a joint control zone adjacent to the exclusive zone of Korea. The resources within the joint control zone are to be shared on an equal basis with a maximum annual catch of 150,000 tons (with a 10 per cent fluctuation) for each party for specified major types of fishing. As far as enforcement in the joint control zone is concerned, the principle of flag state jurisdiction is applied, thus denying the coastal state’s right of visits and arrest in case of the other state’s violation of the treaty. Recently, an increasing number of both countries’ fishing vessels have violated the other’s territorial waters. On 24 July 1997, for example, Japan seized a Korean shipping boat in disputed waters round the Tok Islands. In another incident, a South Korean fishing trawler and its crew were seized by the Japanese off Nagasaki Prefecture, south-western Japan, on 20 January 1998. South Korea and Japan ratified the UNCLOS, which allows the 200-mile EEZs around their shores and announced their own EEZs in 1996. Even though the two countries had ten rounds of working level negotiations to replace the 1965 fisheries agreement with a new one from May 1996 to January 1998, they failed to agree. On 23 January 1998 Japan unilaterally announced the end of the 1965 fishery agreement with South Korea. Nevertheless, Seoul opposed abolition of the fishery pact with
Tokyo. Even though the old agreement legally remains effective until July 1999, South Korea responded by saying it would terminate all restrictions on fishing operations in the voluntarily restricted waters off Hokkaido and elsewhere. The two countries have not yet agreed to a new agreement, continuing a stand-off. But it is expected that a fisheries pact might be concluded between the two countries by the coming autumn when South Korea’s President, Kim Dae-Jung, is to visit Japan.

Another example is the 1975 China-Japan Fisheries Agreement, which established the motor trawling prohibited line that motor-driven fishing boats over 600 horse power are not allowed to cross. The agreement also established several closed and conservation areas where fishing is regulated in terms of seasons and numbers of vessels. Thus, fishery relations between China and Japan are mainly regulated through consultations under the 1975 agreement. However, China, for a long time a coastal fishing country, has since the middle of the 1980s expanded its offshore and distant-water fishing operations to meet its growing domestic food and export needs. As a result, many Japanese and Chinese fishermen compete for the same resources in the areas of the East Sea and the Pacific west of Japan, often causing damage. Now it is reported that Tokyo is pressing Beijing to take effective measures to restrain Chinese fishing, particularly dragnet fishing, in Japanese coastal waters where Japanese dragnet fishing is banned.

Recently, it should be noted, some countries’ fishing vessels have violated others’ territorial waters in the Yellow Sea. According to the National Fishery Administration of Korea, for example, about 1,300 Chinese fishing vessels violated the territorial waters or the Fishery Resources protection area of Korea in 1993. In addition, the number of Chinese fishing vessels which took alleged emergency refuge in Korean ports in 1993 reached 7,779. The numbers in both case are expected to increase unless relevant measures are taken. The situation has recently worsened due to the growing number of Chinese fishing operations in the militarily sensitive area around the Five Islands in the Yellow Sea off North Korea, where the South Korean government has restricted fishing even for its own boats, for fear of possible conflicts with North Korea. Although South Korea discussed with China a bilateral fishery agreement in Seoul on 20-21 January 1998, they have not yet agreed on a new treaty including a joint fishing area in waters between the two countries.

In the field of non-living resources, with the exception of the Japan-Korea Joint Development Agreement of 1974, little progress has been made in settling of offshore boundary disputes which have prevented the active search for oil in the area. South Korea,
Taiwan and China rely on the so-called principle of natural prolongation, but Japan is isolated by the Okinawa Trough lying immediately westward of the Japanese Island of Kyushu and the Ryukyu chain. The trough has a maximum depth of approximately 2,800 metres near its southern end and shallows rapidly to 800 meters at its southernmost Ryukyu Islands. According to South Korea, Taiwan, and China, this trough would terminate the natural prolongation of Japanese territory and thus constitute a natural boundary between Japan and them. Japan decided not to apply this principle to the Okinawa Trough, but insisted on the application of the equidistant principle. Acute confrontation was eventually mitigated at least partially by the joint development agreement between South Korea and Japan. However, China immediately protested on the ground that the agreement infringed its sovereignty.

In sum, in most cases, these arrangements only manage fishing by regulating the distribution and quality of the fishing effort, such as the number of vessels, fishing seasons, and size of gear. There is no general forum in which management issues or the distribution of catches can be discussed by all interested parties. The existing bilateral fisheries commissions do not even publish decisions or the data upon which they are based. The establishment of a more comprehensive and transparent fisheries regime might well help maintain stability and prevent disputes over fishing getting out of hand.

D. Sea Pollution Problems

While the rapid economic development in Northeast Asia is recognised and applauded throughout the world, this economic growth has led to sea pollution, creating a regional concern. There are many sources of sea pollution, most of them attributed to land-based activities around certain areas. Recently, most Northeast Asian countries, including China and Russia, have presented the 'development first and environment protection later policy.' In 1991, for example, Chinese industries threw 1,836 metric tons of heavy metals into its rivers, along with 1,127 tons of arsenic and 4,666 tons of cyanides.\textsuperscript{16} China's trans-boundary sea-borne pollution, resulting from human and industrial waste into its own rivers, washes on the Yellow and East China Seas, and disturbs shared fishing resources. According to the Bohai Zone Fishery and Fishing Harbour Administration, under the Ministry of Agriculture of the PRC, for instance, some 20 per cent of fishery resources in the Bohai Sea (the norwestern extremity of the Yellow Sea) have been seriously damaged by environmental pollution and overfishing.\textsuperscript{17} The Stockholm Environment Institute stated that 'if Chinese economy grows 8.5 per cent a year for the next decades, by the year 2025 China will produce three times as
much carbon dioxide as the United States;\textsuperscript{18} that situation would also be reflected in the pollution of the Yellow Sea.

Oil spills from ships are also serious, as are trans-national marine pollution problems in Northeast Asian seas. The number of oil tankers and other vessels passing through Northeast Asian seas, including the Yellow Sea, the East Sea and East China Sea, are increasing. According to a treaty between China and Japan, for instance, from 1991 to 1995 each year China exports 10 million tons of crude oil to Japan.\textsuperscript{19} In January 1997, for instance, the Russian tanker, \textit{Nakhodka}, sank and broke in two during storms in the Sea of Japan. This incident involved large-area oil spillage — 300 kilometres northwest of Tokyo — and threatened to wipe out the port of Mikuni’s annual fishing income.\textsuperscript{20} On 2-3 August 1997, as a case in point, about 9,500 gallons of diesel fuel oil spilled from a US aircraft carrier moored at the Yokosuka base of the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet, southwest of Tokyo.\textsuperscript{21} On 12 November 1997 the Chinese vessel \textit{Chuhai} collided with a Panamanian ship, \textit{Asian Hibiscus}, in the Kammon Strait, off western Japan. Some 50 tons of heavy oil leaked from the Chinese ship.\textsuperscript{22}

The environmental impact of Soviet dumping of solid and liquid nuclear waste in the East Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the waters southeast of Kamchatka since late 1960 is an urgent problem, and its assessment requires Korean and Japanese collaboration. These dangerous disposals have continued since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For instance, the Russian Pacific Fleet dumped radioactive waste in the East Sea in October 1993; Japan and South Korea protested. Moscow also dumped about 600 tons of written-off ammunition in the East Sea on 14 February 1995.\textsuperscript{23} It has been reported that in 1992 a missile on board a ballistic missile submarine accidentally exploded in the Sea of Okhotsk near the Island of Simushir, and that an advanced missile fell overboard from a transport ship off south-eastern Sakhalin. Further, the continuing disposal of nuclear waste, such as reactor coolants, by the Russian Pacific Fleet has created a growing need to determine the extent of the pollution problem in the region.\textsuperscript{24} In October 1993 Japan agreed not only to conduct joint studies of the areas of the East Sea, but also to provide $100 million to Russia to help the decommissioning of nuclear submarines.\textsuperscript{25} There is also growing interest in Japan and Sakhalin in conducting a joint study on how to control the possible sea pollution effects of the planned development of marine resources off north-eastern Sakhalin.

Recently, the need for co-operation concerning the environmental protection of Northeast Asian seas has become evident. The UNCLOS has provisions covering the co-
operation of the bordering states of enclosed or seem-enclosed seas. According to Article 207, 'states shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources, including rivers, estuaries, pipelines and out-fall structures, taking into account internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures.' In regard to environmental management, Japan, as one of the most powerful economic states in the region, has already joined the Northeast Asian Environmental Programme with a view to establishing a new regional agreement at the governmental level.

II. Naval Arms Build-Up and Characteristics

A. Characteristics of the Naval Arms Build-Up

The relaxation of the US-centred regional security structure following the termination of the Cold War has encouraged a naval arms build-up among major regional powers, particularly between China and Japan. Over the last decade, due to economic growth, Northeast Asia's defence budgets generally grew in real terms despite no significant increased in percentage of GDP on defence. Many newspaper and journal articles often refer to an ongoing arms race in the Asia-Pacific region, compared to the decline of military forces in the rest of the world. However, it is necessary to discuss the terms, an arms race and arms build-up, to describe current naval arms proliferation in Northeast Asia. The word 'arms race' is often used by journalists and others to describe almost any bilateral or multilateral increase either in military expenditure or military hardware. Colin S. Gray referred to four basic conditions for an arms race: (1) there must be two or more parties, conscious of their antagonism; (2) they must structure their armed forces with attention to the probable effectiveness of the forces in combat with, or as a deterrent to, the other's arms race participation; (3) they must compete in terms of quantity (men, weapons) and/or quality (men, weapons, organisation, doctrine, deployment); and (4) there must be rapid increase in quantity and/or improvements in quality. How far does the Asian arms dynamic correspond to these criteria?

First, an arms race means the build-up of military forces in reaction to a similar build-up by a military rival. But no country in Asia has an openly identified enemy any more. Furthermore, there is no increase in forces driven in the main by domestic pressures or internal factors. Second, an arms race is a mutual build-up between two rival countries. But while there may be unilateral arms build-ups, there is no such thing as a unilateral arms race. Third, a true arms race is always characterised by an unusually rapid rate of mutual build-up. However, a military build-up cannot be considered a true arms race unless both
sides’ arms expenditure is not only increasing but also accelerating. Finally, the purpose of an arms race is to achieve parity or superiority vis-à-vis a military rival, or conversely to prevent a rival from doing so. Consequently, the rival nations in an arms race must be, at least at a first approximation, roughly comparable with respect to overall military capability. The Asian countries do not start from this position of comparability.

In line with the above strategic definition, the current proliferation of naval forces in Northeast Asia can be explained in terms of a naval arms build-up rather than an arms race. First, with regard to the military dimension, even the fastest-growing military establishments in the region are increasing at a rate considerably less than that observed in such traditional arms races as the Anglo-German prior to the First World War. Moreover, many nations show far smaller rates of growth, well below those that would qualify them as arms race participants by any standard, while others’ expenditures appear to fluctuate sharply over the space of a decade and a half. When we add this to the often confusing picture presented by arms expenditure among nations in the region, it would seem difficult indeed to pinpoint anything that closely resembles the arms-tension spiral that strategic analysts have in mind when they use the term arms race.

Second, while the Northeast Asian share of the total global volume of arms imports and production has nearly doubled in the last decade, absolute numbers remain low. For example, all of the nations in the region put together have acquired only 58 major ships (including submarines) from 1991 to 1997. Third, the recent trend in the region shows that the modernisation or proliferation of naval forces is aiming at the replacement of old equipment. Finally, the build-up of naval arms is caused as much by competition among the suppliers as among the buyers; the real arms race in the region is a race among the suppliers, rather than the recipients. Through the above characteristics, it can be said that the Northeast Asian region is showing a quite normal pattern of defence modernisation which should not be classified as an arms race.

A build-up of naval forces in the region is influenced by the following factors: (1) the perception of probable American withdrawal and relative decline; (2) fear of Japanese military resurgence; (3) unresolved territorial disputes; (4) EEZ protection: a new maritime mission; (5) non-military causes: economic modernisation and prestige; and (6) weapon supply-side pressures. Furthermore, the enhancement of the naval build-up in Northeast Asia can be divided into several forms: (1) the development of modern naval ships and air power with a significant capability for power projection into neighbouring countries or their offshore areas;
The issue of naval force build-up, furthermore, cannot be adequately expressed without considering the sources and transfers of military technology. The phenomenal economic growth of Northeast Asia has been partly responsible for the naval build-up, allowing the purchase of increasingly sophisticated weaponry. In 1992, for example, in excess of $1 billion was spent on weapons procurements by Pacific Rim states. With the end of the Cold War, there has been a strong, positive relationship between defence expenditure and economic growth in Asia Pacific. In fact, economic growth may have provided the chief incentive for the region’s arms procurement. In the words of Andrew Mack, ‘recent research indicates that the single best indicator for increased defence expenditure is... the rate of increase in GDP.... National economic decline may be the most effective means to control rising defence budget and hence arms imports.’ The results of the recent economic downturn seem to bear out this thesis.

Several other factors contribute to regional procurement patterns, such as a desire to upgrade and modernise obsolete equipment, the protection of trade routes and offshore resources and fear of Chinese intentions in the South China Sea. The major source for these arms has traditionally been the United States, but in recent years the European Union and Russia have dramatically increased their sales to East Asia, with a significant technology transfer component to the deals: Taiwanese companies, for example, received around $750 million of technology transfers from France in return for the purchase of 60 Mirage jet fighters worth approximately $3.8 billion. This is the consequence of a desire on the part of regional actors to reduce their political and economic dependence on the United States. In the post-Cold War era, the transfer of military technology to regional countries eager to build indigenous defence industries is certain to increase. Japan already has a large and well-equipped MSDF. China is embarking on an ambitious programme to turn its technologically backward navy into a true blue-water fleet capable of sustainable power projection. Both Taiwan and South Korea are building balanced and capable fleets.

Northeast Asian countries are also purchasing modern naval weapons and combat-support systems. To equip their new forces and to enhance the combat capabilities of existing units, the Pacific Rim countries are buying significant quantities of modern weapons and support systems. Total spending on imported arms by the major Pacific Rim powers, such as
China, Japan, Taiwan, and the two Koreas rose from an average of $2.5 billion per year in 1979-81 to $4.6 billion in 1987-89, an increase of 84 per cent. Such countries then began to invest a greater portion of their budget in the defence sector, spending an enormous amount of money for the import of weapons from abroad. From 1992 to 1996, Japan’s defence budget increased by 25.6 per cent, China’s by 25.3 per cent, Taiwan’s by 32 per cent, North Korea’s by 14.2 per cent, and South Korea’s by 36.5 per cent (see Table 6-1). From 1985 to 1995, Japan spent $11.0 billion on importing weapons, thus becoming the second largest weapons importer in the world. South Korea spent $8.8 billion, China, $6.3 billion, Taiwan, $9.0 billion and North Korea, despite its chronic economic difficulties, $3.1 billion, to import weapons from abroad. The above statistics show that Northeast Asian countries, without exception, have been engaged in military build-up programmes. Nonetheless, defence budgets will not be increased to the same degree due to economic problems within the next decade.

There has clearly been a naval arms build-up in the region, exemplified both by an increase in real defence spending and by a quantitative and qualitative increase in arms holdings. The new vessels are typically of the latest, most combat-capable types, with better surveillance systems and multi-dimensional weapons, and sensors that add anti-submarine and anti-air capabilities to the missile-armed anti-surface craft. Although the number of patrol and coastal combatants (corvettes, missile craft, torpedo and patrol craft) declined over the same period, the figures are misleading. The majority of deletions were aged and gun-equipped vessels. These have been replaced throughout the region by modern, highly effective corvettes and fast attack craft armed with guided missiles.

The strike capabilities of regional navies are being further extended by the addition of guided missiles. The number of modern anti-ship missile launchers in the region — currently around 1,600 — is likely to more than double through the 1990s, as most states are equipping their new surface combatants with Harpoons, Exocets or indigenous versions like the Chinese C-801 and the Taiwanese Hsiung Feng II. Miniaturisation and other technological advances have made it possible to pack increasing firepower onto smaller vessels. A further recent emphasis in all exporting navies has been on elements required for improved surveillance and command and control. This is largely a result of the increased perceived need to maintain watch over contested waters, but it also points to the increasing sophistication of the operations of the region’s various navies.

This acquisition is an important factor for regional navies. During an escalating crisis, pre-emptive attacks against submarines in port or on the surface are likely. The critical
point is that potentially offensive capabilities are increasing throughout the region, and once these capabilities are in place, a subsequent change of plan could transform the strategic environment. \(^4\) China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan will take delivery of new major surface combatants over the next decade, while China, Japan and South Korea will augment their submarine fleets. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan will also expand their fleets of airborne-surveillance and patrol aircraft. Missiles figure prominently in the region’s future arms procurement schemes, mostly to equip the new aircraft and naval vessels. Despite the economic downturn from the end of 1997, Northeast Asia (apart from two Koreas) will continue the naval arms build-up in the next decade.

B. Naval Arms Build-Up and Asymmetries of Naval Force Structure

Delivery of major naval ships in the region has shown a steady increase since 1989. Although the increases cannot be ascribed to any single type of ship, modern surface combatants accounted for most of them. It is likely that both China and Japan will have made definite decisions to acquire some aircraft carrier capabilities by the end of the decade. The JMSDF has already acquired a new 8,900-ton Osumi-class ‘tank landing ship,’ with a full length flight deck and dock for air cushion landing craft. Other new major surface combatants in the region include China’s Luhu-class destroyers and Japan’s Kongo-class Aegis destroyers. It is also expected that there will be an increase in modern submarine forces: Japan continues to build Harushio-class submarines, while South Korea is acquiring improved Type 209s and Taiwan is seeking to acquire 6-10 submarines.

1. The Chinese Navy

China has long produced a wide variety of naval ships, many based on Russian designs of the 1950s and 1960s. In recent years the Chinese have attempted to upgrade their equipment with imported technology and have begun to produce missiles and electronic systems of a relatively modern design. China has sought to benefit from economic hardship in Russia by purchasing Russian weapons and technology, such as Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny-class destroyers, at bargain-basement prices. Despite its economic immaturity, China has been pressing forward with a vigorous plan to modernise its naval forces, allocating a huge amount of money for military spending. In fact, China has made the greatest leap in a naval arms build-up in the Post-Cold War era. It is significant that China has been engaged in such an arms build-up in view of the relative decline in the military threat. The long-Sino-Soviet estrangement came to an end following the visit of the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to
Beijing in 1989, and the territorial dispute between them has been resolved in favour of China after Russia in May 1991 returned Damanski Island in the Amur River to China. Following the relaxation of tensions between Moscow and Beijing, China has pulled out some one million of its ground forces. However, such an action should not necessarily be regarded as part of its arms reduction plan, because its military budget since then has recorded steady growth.

Recently, the Luhu- and Luda-class destroyers, the Jiangwei-class frigates, the Houjian- and Houxin-class patrol craft, and the Dayun-class replenishment ships have entered fleet service. During Chinese Premier Li Peng's visit to Moscow in December 1996, Russia agreed to deliver two Sovremenny-class destroyers, which will give the navy improved surface strike capabilities. The development of an aircraft carrier programme and a new generation of submarines may, however, be delayed for economic constraints and technical reasons.

The People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) continues to make its submarine force — the third largest in the world in numbers — a priority. The Xia-class SSBN was launched in 1981, three years after the keel was laid. The missile launching system apparently gave trouble for several years. Two of the class may have been built, with one lost in an accident in 1985. Only one remains and rarely goes far from port. A new Type 094 SSBN is under development and due to start building soon, but its construction may be delayed because of concentration on SSNs. It will be some time before China has an SSBN force even like that of Britain and France and she will continue to rely on land-based missiles. Russian advisers are helping design a new Type 093 SSN based on the Russian Victor III, the first of which is expected to be launched in 1999 for completion in 2001. Chinese submarine construction has not been without difficulty.

Recent modernisation of the PLAN conventional submarine force has proceeded in two main categories: purchase of Kilo-class submarines from Russia (the first unit was delivered in February 1995) and an upgrade programme for the Song- and Ming-class submarines. The Ming-class diesel-electric submarines developed so slowly that foreign experts suspected technical problems as construction was suspended, then resumed. The last was launched in 1996 and thirteen are in service. The Ming has been replaced in production by the Song-class (Type 039), the first of which was running trial in 1997. In 1995 China acquired four Russian Kilos — the last pair of the newer Type 636 —, and the last one will be delivered in late 1998. There is a single Type ESSG submarine with C-801 anti-ship cruise missiles. This system is also fitted to some of the Hans for surface launch. A new
version capable of underwater launch from torpedo tubes is under development. (For further discussion, see chapter eight).

2. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force
Japan has already expanded the world’s third largest surface fleet, in response to regional insecurities and the draw-down of US forces. Any change in US strategy in the Pacific region could generate profound changes in Japanese maritime strategy. Since 1994, in the scale of the defence budget, Japan became the world’s second largest military spender. Recently, Japan’s ruling party called for an increase of 4.5 per cent in defence spending for the first time since the current budget ceiling system was introduced in 1982. Japan’s policies regarding the post-Cold War situation in Asia can be represented in part by the open expression of its intention to expand its international role in the military sector. Japan’s SDF, for constitutional reasons, is not composed of armed forces organised for the purpose of carrying out forward force projection. But they have grown into one of the most powerful military forces in the Asia-Pacific region.

The characteristics of Japan’s military capabilities can be noted in the modernisation of its naval forces. The military threat posed by Japan comes not only from its nuclear weapons potential but also the growth of its naval capabilities. Japan’s reinforcement of its ground and air forces is designed to enhance defensive capabilities, but the strengthening of its naval forces attracts world attention because it potentially represents the expansion of Japan’s projection of power. Japan is already involved in maritime operations out to 1,000 nautical miles, which takes it almost as far south as the Philippines. In regional terms, Japan has a substantial and very modern naval force, including some 100 maritime combat aircraft and 64 major surface combatants. JMSDF modernisation is currently based two basic defence-related documents — the National Defence Programme Outline, released in late 1995, and the Mid-Term Defence Build-up Plan.

The MSDF has just built four Kongo-class (9,485 tons) destroyers equipped with the Aegis system and is building the complementary Murasame-class general purpose destroyers, both types capable of operating in high-threat areas. Kongo-class destroyers were commissioned in 1993, 1995, 1996, and the last on 20 March 1998. The first Murasame-class destroyer was commissioned in March 1996 and the second of this class — Harusame — in March 1997. A further five ships in this class are planned to be in service by March 2001. Long-range surveillance duties are primarily the responsibility of maritime patrol
aircraft, while the separately controlled Maritime Safety Agency carries out Coast Guard duties. The MSDF, despite the improvement in its anti-air warfare potential, is still very much oriented towards the escort of merchant shipping out to 1,000 miles. Its ability to operate most of its forces in high-threat structuring is still doubtful as it remains essentially a sea control rather than power projection force.50

For choke point control and surveillance the MSDF has 16 submarines in two flotillas. There are seven submarines of the Harushio-class (of 2,750 tons submerged), the first built in 1990 and the last delivered in March 1997. Nine older Yuushios are being replaced by a new Oyashio-class from 1998. The Oyashio, which is equipped with large flank sonar arrays, is the first of a new class of SSKs, commissioned on 16 March 1998. It is anticipated that there will eventually be four of this class. Japan is not looking to NATO models, apparently preferring to develop its own technology and to acquire US Harpoon missiles and mines. In the wake of Japan’s recession, future naval plans have been scaled down, but the planned procurement of five submarines by the end of the century remains unchanged. Development is pursued with discretion, particularly in high tech areas, but since July 1994 a technology management group has facilitated the bilateral exchange of military technology in which there are still gaps, especially in the area of command and control. A Japanese submarine squadron takes part in RIMPAC, the multinational exercise around the Hawaiian Islands that takes place every two years involving the United States and Canada as well as South Korea. (For further discussion, see chapter nine). Its performance has not impressed at least some of its opponents.

3. Two Korean Navies
South Korea is placing greater emphasis on its long-range air and naval capabilities, procuring hundreds of new combat planes from the United States and building large numbers of new frigates and destroyers. North Korea is unable to compete with South Korea in high-tech conventional arms due to its financial problems and appears to have placed greater emphasis on the development of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Without Russian logistics assistance, however, it is questionable whether North Korea’s many Russian systems will remain workable. In late 1993 North Korea bought some 40 ageing attack submarines from Russia, ostensibly for scrap metal. The boats will probably be used for spare parts for North Korea’s own obsolescent Romeo-class submarines — basic attack
vessels with virtually no ASW potential. *Romeos* have been replaced in production in 1995 by *Sang-O*-class midget submarines used for infiltration operations.51

South Korea is building Korean Destroyer Programme (KDX)-class (*King Kwanggaeto*-class) destroyers. The first KDX was launched in October 1996 for delivery in 1998, with the second and third scheduled for hand-over in 1999. Meanwhile, the South Korean government approved the first three improved multi-purpose destroyers (KDX-2) April 1996. The KDX-2 has a full load displacement of nearly 5,000 tons. The prototype is due for delivery in 2001.52 This ship is superior to the KDX in terms of endurance, sea-keeping and combat capability. The core enhancement is an improved weapons system for anti-ship and anti-air missiles. Systems considered for the KDX-2 include the Harpoon anti-ship missile, the Mk-41 Vertical Launch System for firing standard SM-2MR Block III/IV and ASROC, and a five inch main gun.53 Even though the navy’s next generation KDX-3-class destroyer, which will be much larger than KDX-2, was on the drawing board by early 1998, the KDX-3 programme has been delayed by the 1997 economic crisis for several years. The other two main ship building programmes are *Ulsan*-class ASW frigates and *Po Hang*-class large patrol corvettes.54 South Korea’s programme for nine Type 209 submarines is picking up speed with the first of the class, *Chang Bogo*, commissioned in 1993 and due for completion in 2001. Only one of the nine is German-made, all of the others being built in South Korea. The original plans for a total of 18 submarines are unlikely to be funded,55 but current programmes aim at nine.56 The new submarine project, which will upgrade six of the existing Type 209-1200 submarines to 1,500-tonne boats with air-independent propulsion (AIP), might be delayed for several years by Korean economic problems.57

4. The Taiwanese Navy

The Taiwanese Navy has been undergoing a robust modernisation process, one that seems to envision a force-in-being rather than capability to launch an attack. Lessons learnt from the Gulf War have resulted in the Taiwanese government adopting a strategy of acquiring high technology weapons systems to upgrade its fleet. Taiwan wishes to utilise its own impressive industrial and high technology base to build ships and to develop indigenous technology so as to neutralise Beijing’s blackmail attempts. Taipei already has some experience in doing this: in the late 1970s and early 1980s it developed the Hsiung Feng missile and the Indigenous Defence Fighter. Naturally, changing circumstances have been followed by new procurement choices. Taiwan’s emphasis on amphibious warfare, for instance, has slowly declined. The
less modernised component of Taiwan’s substantial, but ageing destroyer fleet is also starting to be phased out, while the frigate fleet is expanding. Taiwan has been able to concentrate on a plan aimed at upgrading all three branches of the armed forces. In August 1991 the Defence Minister Chen Li-An pronounced ‘modernisation of weapons’ as the ‘key task,’ and, according to one report, Taiwan plans to spend $40 billion on arms over the next decade.58

The fleet’s existing 12 frigates are being increased by a further eight.59 The Kang Ding is the first of six modified French La Fayette-class (3,500 tons) frigates ordered in September 1991. The first two — Kang Ding and Si Ning — were delivered in 1996.60 On 19 March 1998 the last and sixth — Chen Du — was commissioned. Taiwan paid $2.8 billion to France in 1991 for the purchase of these six La Fayettes.61 Additional purchases of three retired US Knox-class frigates are planned up to a total of nine. The navy has five Cheng Kung-class (4,200 tons) (Kwang Hua I) guided missile frigates, which are the locally-built variant of the US Navy’s Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) and equipped with Hsiung Feng II SSMs and modern ASW systems. The Cheng Kungs are also armed additionally with two S-70C anti-submarine helicopters, and Standard SM-1 surface-to-air missiles.62 Cheng Kung- and Kang Ding-class frigates will improve Taiwan’s ability to locate and attack Chinese submarines. Two more are under construction but an improved version of Cheng Kung-class frigate (Kwang-Hua II) has been delayed indefinitely. The modern frigates are replacing older destroyers, some of which have been so heavily modernised they will remain in service for another decade. Seven Gearings have capabilities approaching to the Cheng Kung-class equipped with SM-1 and Hsiung Feng II missiles.63 Although Taiwan’s destroyers have been recently rehabilitated and rearmed, their effectiveness and reliability are hampered by age. A new class of mine-hunters is planned but no design has been selected. The 3,180 ton (61.4 metres) Italian-built oceanographic research ship Ta Kuan was commissioned in September 1995 and three US Newport-class LSTs are entering service to replace the Second World War era craft used to re-supply the offshore islands. The 5,000-ton Yuen Feng-class fast amphibious transport is also being expanded to six vessels.64

The existing submarine force of four is small, and Taiwan is facing enormous problems supplementing it. In the 1980s Taiwan acquired two 2,600-ton Hai Lung-class submarines (based on the Dutch Zwaardvis class), built in the Netherlands and armed with torpedoes capable of carrying a 250 kilogram warhead up to 12 kilometres.65 Taiwanese submarine deals with France, Germany and the Netherlands have met with protests from mainland China. Recently, it was reported that the navy had tried but failed to acquire an
export licence from other countries to build up to 12 submarines. On 5 February 1998 Defence Minister Chiang Chung-ling announced that Taiwan would develop indigenous self-construction of submarines due to failed attempts to buy modern submarines on the international market. In the preliminary stages, the navy will focus on the development of submarine hulls, torpedo launch systems and radar systems.

III. Maritime Territorial and Boundary Disputes

A. Territorial Disputes and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

The trend toward coastal state expansion is nowhere more dramatic than in Northeast Asia. Although the coastal states in the region have claimed the 200-mile EEZs, they have difficulty in delimiting their own maritime boundaries. The establishment of the EEZ, unlike the case of the continental shelf where the issue of possession is largely hypothetical unless seabed resources are proved to exist, would inevitably raise a question of delimitation; this has made coastal states cautious about extending their zones.

At stake are national rights to valuable offshore oil, gas, fisheries, and other natural resources, as well as strategic control over the free passage of foreign warships and military aircraft. As a result of the UNCLOS, much of offshore East Asia has become the subject of overlapping claims to resources and intensified territorial disputes because its seas are all enclosed or semi-enclosed and studded with so many islands that nowhere does the distance from one headland island to another approach 400 nautical miles, thus making disputes over boundary delimitation inevitable. These disputes over maritime boundaries and the exercise of maritime jurisdiction in the new maritime environment are increasing. Sea-based resources, such as oil, gas and fish, have become crucial to the economic success of Northeast Asian countries. The question of delimitation is particularly thorny in these seas, for two reasons.

In the first place, Russia and Japan have not yet reached an agreement on the issue of the four northern islands. The Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea are contested by China, Taiwan and Japan. South Korea and Japan have disputed claims over the Tok Islands in the East Sea. Perhaps the most important potential maritime flashpoint are the competing claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, which are contested by China, Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries, such as Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Unless the territorial disputes are resolved, it is extremely unlikely that the boundaries can be delimited.
The UNCLOS permits coastal states to claim a territorial sea 12 nautical miles in width. South Korea has a 12-mile territorial sea line, but Japan stays at three miles over the Eastern Korea Strait (as it is known in Korea) or the western channel of the Tsushima Strait (as it is known in Japan), leaving an 11.8-mile-wide high seas corridor. To avoid potential for disputes with other countries, Japan and Korea are currently discussing the boundary lines over the channel. These self-imposed limitations allow a high-seas passage four miles wide in the Tsugaru Strait, six miles in the Soya Strait (assuming a median-line claim by Russia), and 16 miles and 19 miles in the western and eastern channels between Japan and Russia, respectively.

The second reason is particularly relevant to the Yellow and East China Seas where continental shelf disputes have existed since 1969. Several fragmentary agreements regarding delimitation of the continental shelf are in force in the Pacific region, but there is no accepted solution regarding the delimitation of economic zones (except US-Russia), even though practically all of the overlapping 200-mile zones of the coastal states are covered in this region. The fundamental issue to be resolved relates to the differences between the parties concerned as to which principle of international law for delimitation is to be employed, as well as the geophysical nature of the seabed at issue.

B. The Basic Concept and Regional Countries’ Approaches to the Territorial Disputes

The United States has not followed a clearly defined and consistent policy in dealing with these territorial issues. Basically, Washington has avoided taking positions in favour of particular claimants. In regard to the important Russian-Japanese dispute over the Kuril Islands, Washington sees its interests best served by involving the United States in discussions designed to resolve it. The main concern for the United States is that it risks alienating one or both the disputants in the course of delicate discussions. In connection with territorial disputes in the South China Sea over the Paracel and Spratly Islands which have heightened political-military tensions, the United States has strongly emphasised its interests, including free navigation, stability in Southeast Asia, and a safe environment for exploiting the region’s resources, and in the peaceful resolution of the dispute.

Russia was the first state to introduce a 200-mile exclusive economic zone in 1984. Russia also wants the freedom not only to transit the high seas but also to fish large portions of the world’s oceans. First of all, Russia will have to resolve its territorial dispute with Japan in the Sea of Okhotsk before it can fully exploit its coastal resources. Russia has negotiated
solutions to other disputes with the United States in the Bering Sea. But it seems that in areas rich with hydrocarbons and fish, such as the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk, solutions are harder to find and maintain. With uncertainties prevailing concerning the delimitation of some coastal waters, these issues may increasingly highlight the importance of safeguarding Russia’s EEZ to protect its economic resources. However, Russia is likely to be more concerned about preventing other states from coming into its territorial waters than about its ability to exploit the coastal waters of other countries.

On 25 February 1992 China declared its ‘Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,’ which is similar to its first territorial sea law, ‘the Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea’ in 1958. China signed the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea on 10 December 1982 and officially ratified acceding to the UNCLOS on 15 May 1996. Accordingly, China’s territorial waters were extended from 37,000 square kilometres to 2.8 million square kilometres, including the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Even though there are a few discrepancies between the 1992 Chinese Territorial Sea Law and the UN Convention, there is still the possibility for international disputes, the settlement of which would not be easy. In the new law of 1992 on its territorial sea, China asserted its earlier position in clearer terms. For example, the Chinese territory from which the 12-mile limit is to be measured includes offshore islands which are the subject of disputes with Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam. This law also reaffirmed China’s claim to eight islets located about 100 miles north of Taiwan that are also claimed by Japan and Taiwan. Because of territorial disputes over the ownership of offshore islands, such as the Senkakus in the East China Sea, and the Paracels and Spratlys in the South China Sea, it would not be easy for Beijing to specify its baselines around these disputed islands and along some parts of its mainland with irregular coastlines.

Currently, China has two military zones in force, namely: (1) the Military Security Zone on the northern part of the Yellow Sea, which vessels can enter only with permission of the Chinese Authorities concerned and (2) the Military Operational Zone in the waters north of Taiwan and south of 29 degrees, in which vessels are advised not to fish (see Map 6-2). In early 1997 China announced a 200-mile EEZ off its coast which would be respected under the UNCLOS after the convention was adopted.

Japan was the first of the major coastal states in the region to establish a 200-mile EEZ with the ratification of the UNCLOS and the adoption of new legislation on 20 February 1996. Japan has been well known for its adamant position against any extension of coastal
state jurisdiction. Officially, Japan opposed a 200-mile EEZ or fishery zone until the fourth session of the UNCLOS in 1976. However, the Soviet decision to establish a 200-mile exclusive fishery zone in 1976, thus driving Japanese fishermen off its coast, was a fatal blow to Japan’s increasingly vulnerable position. In May 1977 the Japanese Diet passed a bill establishing an exclusive fishery zone with exceptions in certain areas and for certain nationals. Even though Tokyo did not establish its 200-mile fishing zone in the East China Sea and the western part of the East Sea from Japan, Law No. 76 of 1996 — The Law on the Exercise of Sovereignty Rights with Regard to Fisheries and Other Activities, and on the Other Matters, in the Exclusive Economic Zone —, which was promulgated on 14 June 1996 and entered into force on 20 July 1996, made no exceptions.

China’s and South Korea’s declarations of 200-mile exclusive zones in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea will influence Japanese fishery because these areas have been among the most important fishing grounds to Japanese fishermen. Currently, there are also maritime jurisdiction disputes with Korea over ownership of the Tok Islands and with China over the Senkaku Islands.

On 1 August 1977 North Korea proclaimed a 200-mile economic zone and a 50-military boundary zone in order to protect effectively its economic zone at sea and firmly defend its national interests and sovereignty. North Korea argued in favour of security zones, but this was very unpopular internationally, and excited even fiercer resistance from the naval powers than the idea of the 12-mile boundary. The naval powers remained opposed to the security zones idea, and in the UNCLOS they won their case by linking navigation rights in the EEZ to those on the high seas.

Like China, South Korea declared its EEZ in September 1996. There are no immediate problems of maritime boundary delimitation with China and Japan. However, it should be noted that until the early 1970s, South Korea had made attempts to negotiate the boundary of the continental shelf beneath the Yellow and East China Seas, but to no avail, mainly because China did not recognise the Seoul government. Any idea of negotiating a maritime boundary agreement in the future will be complicated by the fact that China and South Korea adhere to different principles on delimitation of maritime zones, China follows the natural prolongation of land principle, as noted above, and South Korea follows the equidistance principle. But South Korean fishing vessels were reported to have obtained fishing licences from China in September 1987 that allowed them to fish in the waters around Hainan Island, and this demonstrated a growing improvement in relations.
C. The Russian-Japanese Dispute over the Southern Kuril Islands/ Northern Territories

1. Geo-Strategic Characteristics and Historical Background

There is a territorial dispute between Japan and Russia over the Southern Kuril Islands, including the Habomais, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu, which lie at the southern end of the Sea of Okhotsk, only 20 kilometres from the northern tip of Hokkaido and the town of Nemuro. The maritime zones connected to the disputed islands embrace some 57,000 square nautical miles of waters and seabed (see Map 6-1). This dispute has been one of the principal stumbling blocks in the relations between the two countries since the end of the Second World War. Currently, the islands are part of Russia’s Sakhalin Region and Far Eastern Military District.

Historical Background. The 1855 Russo-Japanese Commercial Treaty — Shimoda — set the boundary between their territories with a line through the Kurils, north of Etorofu (Iturup in Japanese). This treaty formally recognised the four islands — Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai — to be Japanese, and the rest of the Kuril Islands as Russian. From that time, sovereignty over these islands was not in dispute until Japan was defeated in the Second World War. At the Yalta Summit in February 1945, the allies agreed that the Soviet Union should regain the southern part of Sakhalin and the two Northern Kuril Islands — Etorofu and Kunashiri — in exchange for its agreement to enter the war against Japan. Shortly after Moscow entered the war against Tokyo, the Southern Kurils — Shikotan and Habomai — which formed an integral part of the Japanese homeland were also occupied by Soviet forces. On 19 October 1956 at a Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration the Soviet Union offered to return two islands — Shikotan and Habomai — in return for a peace treaty. But when the US-Japan Security Agreement was renewed and strengthened in 1960, the Soviets declared that not even these minor islands would be returned unless all US forces were withdrawn from Japan.

From the 1960s through the 1980s, the dispute grew in prominence between Tokyo and Moscow. In the meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Japanese Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka on 28 September 1976, Gromyko stressed that the Soviet Union was not considering at all the conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty with the prerequisite of return of the Northern Territories. In November 1976 the Soviet Union unilaterally declared a 200-mile exclusive fishing zone. Subsequent negotiations between Tokyo and Moscow for an interim fishery agreement encountered rough water. On 29 January
1979 Japan’s Defence Agency announced that the Soviet Union had deployed about 2,300 ground troops on the two northern disputed islands — Kunashiri and Etorofu — and full-scale bases were being constructed there. In 1985 the Soviet Union conducted the first amphibious landing exercise in the Pacific since 1978 and the largest to date took place in August in the Kurils — Etorofu, Kunashiri and Shikotan — and Sakhalin Islands, involving more than 30 submarines and surface ships.

Since the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia has continued to control the Kurils. Russian flexibility has been substantially limited by the need to accommodate various interests such as those of the military and local government representatives. Russian nationalist are concerned that compromising territorial disputes with Japan will encourage others with claims on Russian territory. During President Boris Yeltsin’s visit to Tokyo in October 1993, he agreed to discuss the issue, but the problem was that Japan wanted Yeltsin to pay a territorial and political price that was beyond his capacity to deliver. On 6 November 1994 Russia and Japan negotiated the northern territories problems on the strength of the provisions of the Tokyo declaration, signed during President Yeltin’s visit in October 1993. Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin stressed that ‘Moscow has no intention now to return the islands... to Japan.... This issue is not easy for the Japanese people and for Japan, but it is even more difficult for Russia and the Russian people.' Although the Russians are trying to find ways in which they can strike a comprise with Japan over the disputed territories, there are no signs of a deal in sight. During the Siberia summit meeting on 2 November 1997, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Yeltsin agreed to settle the four disputed southern Kuril Islands. In December 1997 the two countries agreed in principle on fishing quotas by Japanese vessels in the 12 mile territorial sea around the disputed islands. The two countries have held 13 rounds of bilateral fisheries talks since March 1995, when the Russian coast guard shot at Japanese illegal fishing boats in the waters and detained their crews. On 21 February 1998 the two countries signed a bilateral fisheries agreement, which allows the safety of Japanese fishing boats operating in waters around the Southern Kurils from 1998, in exchange for Japan’s supply of financial and technical assistance. Under the new pact, up to 25 Japanese fishing vessels were allowed to catch a total of 1,200 tons of fish in 1998 around the Southern Kurils. During the informal talks between President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Hashimoto at the Kawana resort in Japan on 18-19 April 1998, Hashimoto proposed re-drawing the Russian-Japanese border between the islands of Iturup and Urup, dividing the Southern and Northern Kurils, in accordance with the 1855 treaty of
Nonetheless, Russian presidential spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembskii reiterated that 'the Constitution of the Russian Federation declares Russian territory inviolable and indivisible.'

2. Strategic and Economic Values

The contested islands enable Russian forces to protect and control access to the Sea of Okhotsk, where the Russian Navy deploys its intercontinental ballistic missile-firing submarines. Throughout 1992-93, Russian armed forces successfully and publicly intervened in the discussion over the Southern Kuril Islands. They mobilised parliamentary and public opinion against concessions to Japan, using arguments that, if analysed carefully, are strategically questionable. This encouraged military hard-liners to continue undermining civilian authority and official diplomacy while conducting their own truculent and provocative anti-Japan policy. Some civilian analysts claim that Admiral I. V. Kasatonov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, deliberately aimed to upstage the government. The 7,500-strong military garrison on the islands in the early 1990s is, however, now being scaled down.

In May 1997 Russian Defence Minister Igor Rodinov visited Japan and handed to Tokyo a document saying Moscow had reduced the troops in the South Kurils to 3,500 by 1995.

The waters surrounding the Kurils are also some of the richest areas for marine living resources. Although both countries have attempted to manage the dispute through a series of bilateral fishing agreements, tensions continue. This is because the formal agreements have been violated and neither side has tried to extend good relations beyond the agreements (as Norway and Russia have done in the Barents Sea). The Japanese, for example, continue to fish illegally in Russian waters. In fact, the Russians claim that Japanese violations increase every year, largely because the Japanese government makes no attempt to punish offenders. This issue received national attention when Russian Far Eastern fishermen submitted a petition to the government in Moscow, requesting that it stop signing agreements allowing foreign companies to fish in the Sea of Okhotsk.

The Southern Kurils' fishing district, including the disputed territories, covers 100,000 square kilometres of sea. Fishery resources in the Sea of Okhotsk include Alaska pollack, Pacific cod, flatfish, Pacific salmon, Pacific herring, and Alaska mackerel. Its output of fish, marketable invertebrates and water plants, estimated at an annual value of $1 billion, contributes around 45 per cent to the output of Sakhalin oblast fishing industry. Under the UNCLOS, the resources being exploited by Japanese fisheries in Russian waters are legally
classified in either of two categories. The first is the set of resources other than salmon found in the Russian EEZ, while the second is the salmon born in the rivers of Russia.

Recently, Russia has begun considering the development of gas and oil fields outside those covered by the Sodeco Agreement. Russian teams have recently discovered oil and gas in the Piltun-Astokhskoye, Lunskoye, Azylmetyevskoye, and Veninskoye fields off the Sakhalin coast. A Russian geologist speculates that oil reserves in the South Kurils are not large, estimating at 5-50 tons per square kilometres, in contrast to a figure of one million and more tons per square kilometres in oil-rich regions. Nonetheless, titanium and sulphur are likely to be present in commercial quantities on the seabed. However, Russia still does not possess the domestic technology for developing the region, and solicited bids for development of the new fields in January 1991, giving Western companies until November 1991 to complete their feasibility studies. In January 1992 Russia signed an agreement with South Korea that allows South Korean fishermen to catch 43,000 tons of fish per year in the waters off the Kurils.

3. Russian and Japanese Approaches
Territorial disputes and clashing claims of sovereignty are connected to the continuing 'state of war' among countries in the subregion. A peace treaty between Japan and Russia is unlikely to be concluded before the two countries can resolve their conflicting claims to the Kuril Islands, a process which in itself faces difficult prospects because of political pressures on both sides. President Yeltsin’s long-awaited visit to Japan in October 1993 did little to resolve the issue, and Russian and Japanese actions and statements before and after the summit meeting may have hardened rather than softened positions. On 15 November 1996 Japan released a $500 million export-import development aid package to Russia. Moscow, furthermore, offered the joint development of disputed islands in the biggest step forward in their ties since the end of the Cold War.

Russian Approach. Normal relations with Japan are of considerable importance to Russia. The economic capability of Japan and the natural and the labour resources of Russia present enormous opportunities to both countries, which cannot be realised until relations are normalised. The territorial dispute must be viewed not only from the impact of bilateral relations between Japan and Russia, but also in the context of Russia's domestic problems and potential international repercussions. Russia's unfavourable domestic conditions — economic, political, social, and also relating to the status of Russia citizens residing in other
countries of the former Soviet Union — require more urgent attention than resolution of the territorial dispute. On 8 December 1992, under his approach to economic reform in the region, Yeltsin declared the Kuril Islands, including the disputed territories, as a special economic zone with the following privileges: (1) all Kurils-based enterprises are in full control of their own operations including exports and earned foreign currency; (2) fishing quotas are decided by the local zone administration; and (3) the zone administration can lease land to foreign investors for up to 99 years.\textsuperscript{100}

Until now, there are two kinds of perspectives regarding the Kurils dispute and its overall impact on relations between Japan and Russia. One is the sense that, in the end, the islands will be returned to Japan in order to resolve relations between the two states, although this remains politically unlikely for the foreseeable future. The alternative view, posited by Russian government officials and parliamentarians, is that the Kurils belong to Russia and their status will never change.\textsuperscript{101} Although Russia claims that Japan is one of the key areas of Russia’s foreign policy, the Kurils are likely to remain an obstacle to improved Russian-Japanese relations.

\textit{Japanese Approach.} In October 1994 Russia and Japan agreed in the Tokyo Declaration to try to solve the territorial dispute in accord with the principle of law and justice. They also agreed to respect all past treaties which include the 1956 joint declaration related to the Russian promise to return two of the four islands after a peace treaty.\textsuperscript{102} Although their economic relations have increased through their efforts to create free-trade zones on the islands, the dispute cannot be avoided simply because it is nettlesome. On the other hand, neither country is likely to alters its stance over the Kurils by the turn of the century.\textsuperscript{103}

The Japanese also consider Russia’s failure to return the Kuril Islands as an obstacle to improved relations. In an address to a national meeting on 7 February 1995, Prime Minister Tomichi Murayama stated that ‘now that half a century is about to pass after the end of the war, it is very regrettable that the Northern Territories, which are an inherent part of our country, have yet to be returned.’\textsuperscript{104} Japan hopes to provide a firm legal basis for mutual trust between the Japanese and Russian peoples by resolving the territorial issue and concluding a peace treaty and drastically improving relations between the two countries. The building of neighbourly and friendly relations, and promoting co-operation without animosity between Japan and Russia not only would meet the interests of both countries, but would also contribute to lasting peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the world. It is likely
that the Kuril Dispute between Moscow and Tokyo cannot be solved purely on a legal basis and requires a qualitatively new approach.

D. The Dispute over the Tok Islands Between Republic of Korea and Japan in the East Sea

1. Geo-Strategic Characteristics and Historical Background

The East Sea of Korea is a classical semi-enclosed sea according to the definition of the term used in the 1982 UNCLOS. It is bounded by Japan on the east and by the Korean Peninsula and the Pacific coast of Russia on the west. It is a nearly elliptical body of water, extending in a northeast-southeast direction for nearly 1,300 miles (see Map 6-5). The sea’s northern limit is considered to be at latitude 51 degrees 45 North degree in the Tatar Strait, through which it connects with the Sea of Okhotsk. There are potential boundary disputes in the East Sea between North Korea and South Korea, and between North Korea and Russia. The boundary of North Korea’s claimed military warning zone and EEZ extends beyond the hypothetical equidistance lines with both neighbours. North Korea’s claimed EEZ even extends beyond a hypothetical equidistance line with Japan based on Japanese ownership of the Tok Islands (Tok-to in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese).

The Tok Islands are a group of volcanic reefs, situated 215 km from the nearest mainland coast of Korea and 200 km northwest of the nearest coast of Japan. These islets are also located 49 miles east of South Korea’s Ulung Island, North Kyongsang province, and 90 miles from the nearest Island of Okinoshima, Japan. The Toks consist of two main islets and 30 odd small rocks encircling them within a square 100 metres long and 100 metres wide.

Historical Background. These islands first became part of Korean territory in 512 A.D. during the three Kingdoms era of the Korean Peninsula. Around 930 Taejo of the Kyryo dynasty had the Wusan state, including present Uling Island, maintained as a subordinate country. This island was also owned by the era of Daehan Empire, Korea, in 1897-1910. In 1910 Japan occupied the entire Korean peninsula as well as its dependent islands including Tok-to, which the Japanese called Takeshima. When Korea was liberated from Japan in 1945, Tok-to was transferred to the US Military government in Korea. In 1948 it was returned to Korea when the Republic of Korea government was established and has remained part of ROK territory ever since.

The dispute first surfaced when Japan’s age-old territorial claims to the two small islands and nine rock reefs were challenged by the Korean fishery zone established in January
1952. South Korea has since controlled the island group, and Japan has not been able to exercise its jurisdiction over them and their surrounding waters. In 1977 Japan tried again to lay claim to the island, touching off protests in Seoul. Since then, Korea has planted trees, dug a well and installed a family there as island residents. Japan has frequently sent patrol craft to the vicinity of the island. Trouble re-surfaced in 1996 when Japan protested at the construction of a harbour facilities by South Korea. During the meeting between South Korean political leader Kim Chong-Pil and Prime Minister Hashimoto on 13 January 1998, they agreed to review a 1965 fisheries pact by shelving the territories dispute. In November 1997 Seoul built berthing facilities, which can manage a 500-ton ship, at a cost of 17.7 billion won. Construction work began in December 1995 and was completed eight months ahead of schedule. After 10 rounds of discussions over a new fisheries pact in the East Sea, Japan unilaterally ended the 1965 fisheries treaty with South Korea on 23 January 1998.

2. Economic and Strategic Value
The island is considered to have great economic value for its abundant species of fish located in about 16,600 square miles of sea and seabed nearby. More than 1,000 fishing boats sail from Korea there every year, catching 20,000 tons of fish. The island is also valued as important for the preservation and use of sea resources because its adjacent waters abound with various species of fish. The adjacent area of the Toks has no pollution, making this the most suitable place for the collection of marine products and ocean culture. The island is also strategically important, especially in terms of sea lines of communication security for the two Koreas and Russia.

3. Korean and Japanese Approaches
Korean Approach. Korea’s position regarding Tok-to is straightforward because the island is its inherent territory. South Korea has exercised practical control over Tok-to for many centuries. It is true that for a certain period during Japanese colonial rule, Korea had to suspend the practical administration of the island, but this should not be construed as making it inherently Japanese territory. In fact, Korea has so far abstained from responding seriously to the issue of Tok-to, perhaps because it occupies the island and because of its concern about its relations with Japan. Nonetheless, it is necessary for Korea to think about an adequate counter strategy against Japan’s schemes for the present as well as for the future, now that the Tok Islands are set to become a hot issue in the midst of negotiations over the EEZ.
Japanese Approach. Japan’s recent claim to Tok-to clearly reveals Japanese political parties’ growing tendency towards nationalism. The Diet members belonging to the Liberal Democratic Party maintain that ‘it is rather questionable if Japan does not file a protest against the Korean government over the issue of Tok-to, while the government is strongly protesting against Russia’s occupation of the four Northern islands.’ This assertive approach on the part of the Japanese government, as well as the party in power, has much in common with the Liberal Democratic Party government’s determination to push ahead with an earlier resumption of normalisation talks with North Korea as a top priority. The so-called ‘pro-Pyongyang Diet members,’ who played the leading role in support of rice aid to North Korea twice in 1995, were somewhat displeased by the act of the South Korean government in frustrating their plan to visit Pyongyang for normalisation talks, and, therefore, they are quite disposed this time to take a robust stance with regard to the Tok-to issue.

At least for the time being, the Japanese government might hope to see Tok-to not included within the starting point of the 200 mile EEZ on the part of Korea, thereby inviting certain discrepancies in the exercise of the right to Tok-to by Korea, so that Tok-to may eventually be recognised internationally as the subject of a territorial dispute. Japan at present is focusing on the matter of the EEZ. On 20 February 1996 the Japanese government decided to declare an overall 200-mile EEZ, virtually including Tok-to on its base line. Although Japan avoided saying expressly that Tok-to would be the base line, the draft declaration confirms this. It is most likely that the Japanese government will include discussion of this policy at the negotiating table with Korea on fishing rights and the median line to be drawn between the overlapping EEZs. It is possible that Japan might accept an alternative to making Tok-to the base line of the EEZ on either side, if this can be agreed upon by both sides. Japan also seems to seek a strategy of setting up a joint administration system over the adjacent waters of Tok-to with a view to gaining various economic advantages.

E. The Senkaku Islands and Seabed Disputes in the East China Sea

1. Geo-Strategic Characteristics and Historical Background
In the East China Sea, the large and wide continental shelf extends 450 kilometres east of Shanghai to the 120-meter bathymetric contour. China, Japan and South Korea recently unilaterally declared their EEZs although no sea between the three countries is wider than 400 nautical miles. The question of delimitation between China and Japan is much more complex than that between China and Korea. The issues include the question of baselines, and the
status to be given to offshore islets, over which there is conflict. There is a three-way claim involving China, Taiwan and Japan over the Senkaku Islands (known in Chinese as either Tiaoyu Tao or Tiao-yu-tai) and hence a conflict of claims over the adjacent shelf (see Map 6-4).

The disputed Senkaku Islands consist of eight uninhabited islets (the largest being just 4 kilometres in length and 1.5 kilometres wide), and three rocks without vegetation, which are situated 120 miles north-east of Taiwan, 200 nautical miles west of Okinawa, and 100 miles north of Ishigaki City (the nearest municipality at the south-west end of the Ryukyu Islands). They are all at the edge of the East China Sea continental shelf, fronting the Okinawa Trough on the south, which plunges to over 200 metres.\textsuperscript{111}

The Historical Background. The Japanese government’s claim to the islands was based on the right of discovery, and effective occupation of the islands since the late nineteenth century. The Chinese government on the other hand claimed its occupation and administration of the islands dating back to the Ming Dynasty in the sixteenth century. Moreover, the Chinese government argued that the islands were part of Taiwan, and ceded to Japan under the terms of the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki signed in 1895. As the post-war Potsdam agreement, to which the Japanese government later pledged its consent, stipulated that Taiwan should be returned to China, the Tiaoyu Tao should be returned as well.\textsuperscript{112} This argument was rejected by the Japanese government, which claimed that the Tiaoyu Tao had never been included in the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

Following Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, the islands remained under US control. The group did not become a focus of active contention until the early 1970s when the US government and administrators of the islands agreed to return them to Japan under the Okinawa Reversion Agreement. This gave rise to protests by the governments of both China and Taiwan, and a movement was launched by overseas Chinese to defend the islands. In September 1970 Japan’s Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi claimed the Senkaku Islands as Japanese territory. This was refuted by the Chinese in December 1970 when they denounced the establishment of the Japan-South Korea-Taiwan Liaison Committee to explore jointly the East China Sea. In June 1971 the islands were formally returned to Japan by the US government.\textsuperscript{113}

In the 1970s Tokyo and Beijing agreed to put the disputed islands issue aside as they normalised diplomatic relations and signed a peace treaty addressing issues stemming from the Second World War. Japanese rightists built a make-shift lighthouse on one of the islets in
1978, but the Japanese government took 12 years before it granted the beacon official status. The Japanese coast guard patrolled near the islands to fend off efforts by fishermen and others from Taiwan asserting claims to the islands. In the spring of 1978 China and Japan were negotiating a treaty of friendship that both sides saw as laying the foundation for mutually profitable co-operation, particularly in the economic sphere. On 12 April 1978 about 100 Chinese fishing boats appeared off the Senkakus, displaying placards saying the islands were Chinese territory.114

In 1990 this dispute resurfaced when Japan and Taiwan clashed over occupation; in 1992 China passed a law claiming sovereignty.115 Trouble re-surfaced in July 1996 when members of a rightist Japanese group sailed to one of the islands. In September 1996 a Japanese Maritime Safety Agency patrol blocked a foreign vessel believed to be Taiwanese from reaching one of the disputed islands. Japan separately lodged an official protest with Beijing after a Chinese vessel intruded into its littoral waters near the islands.116 On 11 November 1997 Japan and China signed a new bilateral fisheries agreement by shelving the territorial dispute over the Senkakus.117 Under the new pact, they agreed on the establishment of a jointly controlled provisional sea zone in the East China Sea, while continuing talks to establish their respective 200-mile EEZs under the UNCLOS.

2. Economic Value
The unresolved question of maritime boundaries in the East China Sea continues to surface from time to time. For example, the 1974 Korean-Japanese Joint Development Agreement for oil exploitation in the northern China Sea drew a stern Chinese warning on more than one occasion.118 The principles and rules governing this question have, however, undergone substantial changes over the last two decades. Such changes emanated essentially from two important developments in the law of the sea: first, the emergence of a new definition of the continental shelf, in particular the distance criterion, through the UNCLOS; second, the establishment of the regime of the 200-mile EEZ which covers the seabed as well as the water column up to this distance. Now that the 200-mile distance is the legal basis of rights to the continental shelf in most cases, geological or geomorphologic factors would have no place in most cases of delimitation. In the East China Sea where the distance between the littoral states does not exceed 400 miles, the geophysical features of the seabed, such as the Okinawa Trough, would not affect the delimitation under current international law. In contrast to the decrease in the importance of geological or geomorphologic considerations, that of the
geographical setting appears to have increased. For instance, the marked difference in the lengths of the coastline between China and Japan should be properly reflected in the delimitation. When coastal states establish an EEZ in future, it is likely that an EEZ boundary and a continental shelf boundary will be the same.

Oil was not the only motive for disputes and agreements in the East China Sea region during the decade. A series of unofficial fisheries agreements had regulated Japanese entry into Chinese offshore waters since the 1950s. After the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan in 1972, moves were made to upgrade the agreement to an official status. After several delays, a three-year renewable agreement was reached in August 1975. In its invitation on 30 June 1992 for oil exploration bids in the hitherto closed East China Sea, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) staked out two areas, the Northern Acreage and the Southern Acreage. At two points, the Northern Acreage encroaches into what has been claimed by South Korea, with the overlaps totalling some 24 square kilometres (over nine square miles). Incidentally, it may be noted with interest what China’s policy has been in its seas with regard to offshore oil development since 1980. It has permitted 50 foreign oil companies from 13 foreign countries to have 17 exploration contracts. The total investment by the foreign operators amounted to US $3,100 million as of 1991. In December 1994 China began to explore for petroleum and establish the considerable potential of the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea that are regarded as highly productive by Texaco and two other companies.

3. Three Countries' Approaches

Japanese Approach. According to Japanese writings, Japan incorporated the eight uninhabited islands into its territory in 1895 and China began to claim them in 1970. As with the other areas, however, Japan would need to establish its jurisdiction over and around the islands if it were to exercise its self-claimed territorial jurisdiction. Japan announced in March 1972 that it would discuss Senkaku only with China, and not Taiwan. Japanese arguments concerning these islands as a baseline for continental shelf delimitation tend to regard the islands in isolation. Reference is made to 'the special geographical conditions' of the Senkaku Islands, notably that 'the islands are situated in an area about 175 kilometres north west and north east of Ishigaki Island belonging to the Ryukyu Islands.'

On 21 October 1990 the Japanese sent planes and ships to drive off two Taiwan boats carrying the Olympic torch, the athletes, Taiwan Area Games organisers, and other Chinese
citizens. The Chinese said that 'the Tiaoyutai Islands are an inalienable part of China and that Japan's action in blocking two Taiwan fishing boats was completely unreasonable.' On the other hand, Japanese Foreign Minister Taizo Watnabe stated that 'Those islands are the territory of Japan. Taiwanese ships have done something which we regretted to see.' The Japanese regard the islands, which were returned to Japan by the United States along with Okinawa in the early 1970s, as important islands because of their economic value regarding fishing rights and potential deep-sea oil. The islands were included in the new law on its territorial waters and contiguous zone of 25 February 1992.

**Chinese Approach.** Since 1951, China has laid frequent and considered claims to the major island groups in the China Seas. In the 1970s it added informal and somewhat vague claims to the mineral and marine resources of the continental shelf. It is expected that the vast reserves of oil which lie under the waters of the China Seas, plus the need for strict conservation of the fishery resources, will eventually compel China to lay specific, formal claims to an offshore exclusive economic zone and then to enforce that claim with naval power. The scramble to divide the East and Yellow Seas into petroleum exploitation zones in 1969-1970 was the result of China's strong claim in December 1970 to pre-eminent rights on the continental shelf. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were all taken aback by the vehemence of China's claim following two years of Chinese silence, and they quickly strengthened their positions. With the establishment of petroleum concession areas in the East China Sea, the Foreign Ministry of China issued a statement opposing the unilateral Japanese and Korean claims to large areas of the continental shelf in the east China Sea. 'The Chinese government holds that the continental shelf is the natural extension of the continent; it stands to reason that the question of how to divide the continental shelf in the East Chain Sea should be decided by China and the other countries concerned through consultations. The making of a unilateral claim is an infringement on China's sovereignty.'

On the Chinese side, Zhou Enali was reported in 1973 to have said that China would permit foreign oil exploration in the East China Sea, but that 'exploitation is different and is absolutely forbidden. If they start drilling, we will intervene and stop them.' China claims the broad adjacent continental shelf, and argues that the shelf ends at the Okinawa Trough — near the Ryukyu (Okinawa) Islands — with water depths of 2,000 metres. China has asked Japan to co-operate in joint studies on exploitation and developments of oil in the East China Sea, and Teihoko Oil Co. is to establish a representative office in Beijing in response to this request.
Since the end of the Cold War, China has been increasing research for oil in its half of the sea’s continental shelf. There are possibilities that China will match its arguments in the East China Sea with those in the South China Sea. China claimed the Senkakus as its own territory in its 1992 domestic legislation and has taken geological research near these islands in the last several years. Over the next century, China will increase jurisdiction over the whole of the East China Sea’s continental shelf including those parts claimed by Taiwan, the two Koreas, and Japan. China has also begun drilling the first well in its new exploration area, Block 33/08 — 250 miles from Southeast of Shanghai — in the East China Sea.

In August 1995 an article entitled ‘Don’t do Anything Foolish, Japan’ in The People’s Daily said that ‘Tokyo’s recent actions toward the Tiaoyu Tao, known as the Senkakus by the Japanese, are a sign of growing militarism in Japan and a cause for alarm.’ It was also said the islands were an inseparable part of Chinese territory. On 10 September 1996 Beijing warned Tokyo that their relations would be seriously damaged if Japanese rightists returned to a group of disputed islands. Taiwanese lawmakers, meanwhile, urged Taipei to send a military force to the area. The spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Shen Guofang, said that ‘the Japanese government must take action to stop these activities.’

Taiwanese Approach. Since the 1958 Quemoy crisis with China, Taiwan has kept garrisons on Quemoy, Matsu, Pratas, the Pescadores (Penghu) Islands, and Itu Aba Island in the Spratly groups. Since then China had not challenged Taiwan’s force in the Spratlys. On the other hand, Taiwan has claimed the uninhabited Senkakus since 1990. Taipei does not consider Okinawa to be a part of Japan. In March 1995, for example, Taiwanese patrol boats sailed in waters around Yonaguni Island off Okinawa. A Taiwanese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that Taiwan will not respond to any Japanese claim on Okinawa. On 6 September 1996 the Foreign Ministry protested at Japan’s use of vessels to force a private Taiwanese ship away from the island chain.

F. The Territorial Dispute Over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea

1. Geo-Strategic Characteristics and Historical Background
The South China Sea is geo-strategically located between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and between the Asian mainland and insular Southeast Asia. The first dispute is a bilateral one
between China and Vietnam over the Paracel Islands, located about 200 miles east of Vietnam and south of China’s Hainan Island. Paracels are a group of 15 islands and several sand banks and reefs. They consist of more than 190 islets, reefs, shoals, and sand banks scattered over a large area — 250,000 square kilometres — in the southern part of the South China Sea, 600 miles southeast of the Chinese Island of Hainan. The second dispute is over the Spratly Archipelago, which stretches for more than 500 miles from north to south. By nearest-point measures, it is less than 100 miles from the Philippines’ Palawan and Malaysian Borneo, about 350 miles east of the southern coast of Vietnam, about 400 miles south of the Paracels, and 160 miles from the southern coast of Brunei.134 In the territorial disputes, China and Vietnam claim all the archipelagos, including the Paracels and Spratlys, in the South China Sea, and Vietnam claims the Paracels ad the entire Spratlys. Nonetheless, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei lay claim to various parts of the Spratlys (see Map 6-3).

**Historical Background.** Some claims over the Spratlys are based on centuries-old evidence of discovery. The Paracel and Spratly Islands were legally incorporated into South Vietnamese territory by its former colonial master, France, between 1933 and 1939. Since then, French or successor Vietnamese troops have controlled most of the islands.135 Nonetheless, sovereignty has been hotly contested only since the end of the Second World War, with the withdrawal of French and Japanese occupation forces. The Chinese government began to set up fishing shelters in the Paracel Islands in late 1955. The first garrison from Taiwan to be established in the Spratly Islands arrived in 1956. Since then, Taiwanese troops have been permanently stationed on the largest island of the archipelago, Itu Aba.136

China was involved in two military clashes in the South China Sea, prior to the Mischief Reef occupation. China’s military confrontation with Vietnam in January 1974 resulted in the annexation of the Paracel Islands, and another clash between the two countries in March 1988 allowed China to secure six islets in the Spratly archipelago. By 1991, the easing of Sino-Vietnamese tensions quietened the South China Sea, but territorial disputes restarted in 1992. China’s NPC passed a territorial sea law in February 1992 stipulating China’s sovereignty over the South China Sea and other areas, and authorising the use of force to keep foreign naval and research vessels away. Taiwan soon drafted its own territorial sea law. It sent 100 legislators to visit the garrison force in the Spratly Islands; Malaysia sent the king to visit some of its claimed islands. Since then, two serious conflicts have taken place in the South China Sea. The first happened in July 1994 when two Chinese warships turned back at least one Vietnamese vessel attempting to re-supply an oil rig in an area claimed by
both countries. Although no shots were fired, the incident was a serious escalation. The other occurred on 8 February 1995 when the Philippines discovered that China had occupied the aptly-named Mischief Reef in the Spratlys, just 200 km from the mainland island of Palawan, the Philippines. In March 1998 China installed a ground satellite station on Woody Island (Yongxing Dao in Chinese) within the Paracel Islands (Xisha Qundao in Chinese) in the South China Sea.\(^\text{137}\) (For the chronology of the current dispute issues, see Annex 6-1). Importantly, the Mischief Reef was the first instance in which China’s military power was extended beyond the Sino-Vietnamese border.

2. Strategic and Economic Value
The strategic location of the Spratlys is important for Northeast Asian countries, although it should be said that these territorial fragments were long ignored and virtually uninhabited except for use by the Japanese as submarine bases during the Pacific War. With the end of the Cold War, the withdrawal of the Russian and US naval bases in Cam Rahn and Subic Bays has created a power vacuum in the region, thereby raising the importance of the South China Sea and Spratlys in the strategic consideration of the East Asian countries. Equally significant, the current strategic environment in the South China Sea is changing, and these changes will be an incentive for China to strengthen its navy and upgrade its maritime presence, especially in the South China Sea. The classic naval rivalry between the United States and Russia in the region has taken a new twist, with both Washington and Moscow deciding to scale down their operations, giving more opportunity for manoeuvre to other powers.

The strategic importance of the islands is summarised by one scholar as follows: ‘The Gulf of Tonkin (remains an) area of tension as the Chinese Island of Hainan flanks the Hanoi-Haiphong complex and both countries vie for oil and natural gas in the region. Strategically, Hanoi is militarily blocked by PLA naval units located in strength on Hainan and the Paracel islands.’\(^\text{138}\) It has been noted that potential strategic uses for the more developed islands in the Spratlys include bases for sea-line interdiction, surveillance, and possible launching points for further attacks. Occupation and control of the Spratlys could influence the flow of traffic from the Straits of Malacca to the Taiwan Strait, from Singapore to southern China and Taiwan. Even the submerged Macclesfield Bank has strategic value, as when the former Soviet Union used it for a time as a mid-sea anchorage for naval vessels in transit to its Far Eastern theatre of operations.\(^\text{139}\) Although the Spratlys cover a wide maritime expanse, mariners have to keep
well within charted areas because this waterway, dubbed the ‘dangerous ground,’ is dotted with numerous shoals and submerged reefs.\textsuperscript{140} One fourth of the world’s maritime trade and about 90 per cent of Japan’s oil pass through the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{141}

In terms of economic interest, survey reports prepared for Asia-Pacific suggested that vast reserves of oil were likely to be found under the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{142} The importance of such a possibility was highlighted by the first international oil crisis in 1973. While the South China Sea may have tremendous potential for oil, some experts suggest that the actual commercial value is ‘modest at best because of the geology and deep-water conditions.’\textsuperscript{143} In October 1997 the Chinese Offshore Oil Nanhai West Corporation made major new discoveries in oil and gas exploration in the waters of the South China Sea. Geologists predict that oil reserves in Wenchang 13-1-1 and 13-2-1 wells will hit 40 million tons.\textsuperscript{144} In the China Sea, furthermore, marine non-fuel resources are known for tin and sand and gravel; and coastal reserves for sea salt, sand and gravel, tin, titanium oxides, and associated minerals such as zircon and monazite. Other resources of coastal and marine minerals in this area include all of the above as well as gold placers, industrial silica sand and magnetic sands.

The increasing probability that the South China Sea’s bed contains major deposits of oil, natural gas, and valuable minerals has greatly increased the likelihood of armed conflict over those resources, despite rhetoric about co-development. The fact that China is now a net importer of oil is another critical factor. At least three significant incidents have occurred that may foreshadow greater violence to come.\textsuperscript{145} Thus, the possibility that there are large oil deposits beneath the South China Sea is a major factor in fuelling that region’s dispute over the ownership of the Spratly Islands, and the rapid growth and modernisation of naval forces in the area.\textsuperscript{146} However, this factor in each claimant country’s calculations should not be overrated. In the final analysis, the area’s economic potential can be maximised only through joint development because of the need to achieve economies of scale and to attract foreign capital and expertise.

3. Related Countries’ Approaches

\textit{Chinese Approach.} In international legal terms, China started its claim to sovereignty in the South China Sea in the 1880s. It lasted until 1939, when the Japanese occupied the islands but stopped during the Chinese Civil War. Since the communists took power in 1947, China has maintained this claim. In June 1974 China published an authoritative map showing the exact extent of its claim in the South China Sea. It was breathtaking, encompassing most of the
South China Sea, extending some 3,000 nautical miles south of Hainan Island, and approaching to within fifty miles of the coasts of Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. China restated its claims after the Vietnamese moved into the islands in 1974 and 1975. In November 1975 Guangming Ribao hinted at the possibility of China eventually seizing the islands: ‘Some of the islands [in the South China Sea]’ still not restored to China must return to the fold of the motherland.\textsuperscript{147} By the end of 1988, the Chinese had occupied six atolls in the Spratly Islands. Naval presence in the Paracels was contemplated as a springboard for further advances towards the southern part of the South China Sea, in particular for a military offensive against the Vietnamese-held islands of the Spratly group.

In China’s approach to the Spratlys dispute since 1988, Beijing has had to balance two contradictory considerations: a limited recovering of sovereignty and the maintaining of China’s peripheral peace. Seeing itself as a net loser in terms of territory and resources, China has been determined that steps should be taken in earnest to strengthen its claims in the Spratlys. Furthermore, to relieve tension and suspicion, Chinese Premier Li Peng pledged to defer the issue of sovereignty and offered peaceful joint development of disputed territories in the South China Sea during a visit to Singapore on 13 August 1990. Indonesia subsequently sponsored informal talks among the claimants in 1991 that resulted in an agreement to avoid unilateral actions in disputed areas and to settle issues peacefully. In addition, at the Bandung conference on the Spratlys in July 1991, China raised specific proposals for co-operation in the areas of the regulation of navigation channels, exchange of meteorological data, sea rescue, and some other projects on oceanographic co-operation.

On 25 February 1992 the Chinese People’s Congress passed a law that listed the Spratlys as sovereign Chinese territory and reserved the right to use force to expel ‘intruders’. The bill, entitled ‘The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,’ was one of sweeping significance, claiming for China the South China Sea and much of the East China Sea. According to Article 2, in particular, ‘The PRC’s territorial waters refer to the island waters contiguous to its territorial land. The PRC’s territorial land includes the mainland and its offshore islands, Taiwan and the various affiliated islands, including Tiaoyu Tao (the Senkaku Islands), the Penghu Islands (The Pescadores), the Dongsha Islands (Pratas Islands), the Xisha Islands (the Paracel Islands), the Nansha Islands (the Spratly archipelago), and other islands that belong to the PRC.\textsuperscript{148} The law, combined with China’s ongoing military modernisation programme, has heightened the concern of many countries in Southeast Asia. On 8 May 1992 the CNOOC and Denver based Crestone Energy
Co. signed an agreement to explore for oil and gas in the 25,155 square kilometres Vanguard Bank area near the Spratlys (referred to as Wanan Bei-21 by the Chinese and Tu. Chinch Bank by the Vietnamese). Chinese officials pledged to use force if necessary to protect the firm's personnel. Less than a month after the territorial sea law's declaration, China continued its expansionist activities in the Spratlys when it occupied Da Lac Reef. Vietnam swiftly protested China's move, demanding that the Chinese remove their forces from the disputed reef. During a Spring 1992 visit to Malaysia, the then US Under-Secretary of Defence for Policy Paul Wolfowitz declared that the parties to the dispute must not resort to military force to try to resolve the issue. In the early 1990s China built a military airstrip capable of accommodating Su-27 fighters, and naval facilities on Woody Island in the Paracels.

On 16 March 1995 China seemed to several its recent activities as Foreign Ministry Spokesman Shen Guofang stated: 'China has all along been in favour of the concept of 'shelving disputes and carrying our joint development' in that region.' In April 1996 another confrontation between Chinese fishing and naval vessels boats took place at Mischief Reef when the latter attempted to block a Philippine naval ship carrying a group of international journalists. Two Chinese frigates were in the area at the time. The Philippines reinforced its forces by sending five F-5 aircraft to its airstrip on Thitu Island. Various other claimants to the Spratly Islands, including Vietnam and Taiwan, were also engaged in incidents in the region. On 25 March 1996 Taiwanese artillery fired on a Vietnamese supply ship close to Ban Than Island where Taiwan had earlier begun construction work, which Vietnam had protested, asking the Taiwanese to leave.

China's claims are focused on four concerns. First, China wants not only to consolidate its modern borders but also to assert control over areas in regards as its own. Second, Beijing strategically wants to exclude hostile regional naval forces such as India and Japan from approaching the South China Sea. Furthermore, China wants to control sea lines of communications and major international shipping lanes through its dominance in this area. Third, there is a growing protein shortage problem on the mainland, and the fish harvest over the contested continental shelf in the South China Sea may become increasingly attractive to Beijing. Finally, China has become dependent on offshore oil supplies. Chinese shortage of oil may be due to rapid economic growth and unbranisation in the southern and coastal provinces, causing China's oil demand to grow from 8.5 per cent in 1991 to 9 per cent in 1992. China became a net oil importer in 1996 for the first time in 20 years; Beijing is
expected to import one million barrels oil per day after the year 2000. The build-up of China’s naval capabilities is a strong indication of a military strategy designed to back up its territorial claims in the South China Sea. It is clearly taking a two-track approach: flexing its muscle through military exercises, and at the same time calling for joint development in the region.

*Southeast Asian Countries’ Approach.* The Southeast Asian countries have their own claims in the South China Sea, and they share concerns over China’s approach. They fear that that (1) the Chinese are expanding their influence based on the development of blue-water navy; (2) Beijing puts strategic value in the islands and the SLOCs around them; (3) the island areas, especially the Spratlys, which include rich fishing grounds and the possibility of oil and phosphate exploitation, will be important for the Chinese economy in the future; and (4) if necessary, China will project its naval power repeating past experiences — naval conflict with the Vietnamese in the Paracels in 1973, a clash with Vietnam in 1988 in the Spratlys, and the control of an atoll claimed by Vietnam in the Spratlys in May 1989.

Vietnam restated its claim to the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands in response to a claim by China that it had found new islets in the Paracels. China occupied the Paracels, south of China’s Hainan Island and east of the central Vietnamese port of Danang, in 1974, driving out forces of the US-backed Saigon regime which was expelled by communist armies the following year. In January 1995, responding to the report on the discovery of three uncharted islets within the boundary waters of the Paracels, a ministry official stated that ‘the Paracel and the Spratlys, which lie further south, were part of Vietnamese territory. Any foreign activity in this area, of any type, which is not agreed by the Vietnamese government is violating the sovereignty of Vietnam.’

Indonesia, which had previously believed that China’s claim in the Spratly Islands area did not include their lucrative gas field near the Natuna Island, became concerned when China declined to confirm that it had no claim to Indonesian resources. The Indonesian-initiated South China Sea workshop process would appear to have been unsuccessful in its attempts to get various governments concerned to address the Spratlys issue at the multilateral ‘second track’ level. The multilateral workshop process has, however, been more successful in setting-up the scientific and technological aspects of a resource management regime, albeit at an unofficial level and informal in nature. Discussion of the opposing claims over offshore territories now takes place at two different though interconnected diplomatic levels. First, a dialogue has begun between Vietnam and ASEAN, especially with the member states most
involved with the Spratlys, namely the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. Second, bilateral talks have commenced between China and the same ASEAN states with a view to resolving the individual disputes between them over the South China Sea following the visit of Jiang Zemin to Hanoi in November 1995. Southeast Asian countries are trying multilaterally to solve the disputes over the Spratlys. Recently, ASEAN claimants have tried not only to explore ways for joint development, putting aside the sovereignty question, but also to minimise the conflict’s importance to their bilateral relations. As part of their multilateral efforts, for example, the Southeast Asian countries and China organised workshops on fishery, and on environmental protection and confidence, in March and November 1997, respectively.

On balance, China is gambling that its increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea will not push the other regional powers into some form of collective defiance. Neither the United States nor ASEAN appear willing to confront China. The situation created by the withdrawal of both American and Russian influence in the area has left China free to pursue its expansionist goal: a powerful Pax Sinica to replace a reluctant Pax Americana and an impotent Pax Russiana. However, the recent decision by the United States to normalise relations with Vietnam, together with Vietnam’s entry into ASEAN in July 1995, could affect China’s policy in the South China Sea. This new configuration can be expected to stiffen ASEAN’s posture on contentious issues like the disputed Spratly Islands. It remains to be seen whether China will be able to maintain its bilateral approach to settlement of the Spratly dispute, as opposed to the collective approach being advocated by ASEAN.

IV. Conclusion
Despite the fact that there are many activities to increase transparency and trust, negative factors still remain as obstacles to the realisation of co-operative maritime security. Such obstacles include confrontation between South and North Korea, the territorial disputes over the Northern Islands between Japan and Russia, and that among several countries over the South China Sea. The major challenges to co-operative maritime security abound. The first and most important is maritime territorial and boundary disputes, most notably over the Kuril Islands, Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, and Spratly and Paracel Islands of the South China Sea, through which run key sea lines of communications. These disputes have escalated as a consequence of the rapid growth of regional economies. In particular, maritime economic imperatives — offshore oil and fishery resources — are pushing regional powers in the
direction of declaring vast exclusive economic zones in East Asian waters. Their sea power makes this claim feasible.

The territorial disputes may also be viewed as merely local problems between neighbouring countries but of no great concern to others. Nonetheless, local conflicts and disputes can affect a state’s economics or regional maritime stability. For example, innocent passage through the Malacca Straits is crucial not only to the economies of Northeast Asian countries, but also for trade among countries in Southeast Asia, Europe and North America. In the future, the US and any other naval forces, such as those belonging to Russia, China or Japan, may not have strategic leverage over regional territorial disputes, but they may be equally incapable of avoiding involvement in disputes if their SLOCs are impeded by other countries. These unsolved territorial and boundary disputes will also be a challenge to maintain maritime stability.

The second factor is the naval arms build-up in the last decade in the Asia-Pacific region. This is not yet regarded as a factor creating military tensions, but competition among regional countries can be cited, from a certain point of view, as playing a negative role by instigating regional conflicts. The military threat from Russia has certainly weakened; however, it cannot be totally ruled out that Moscow might try return to its old strategy if an ultra-nationalist faction seized power. Even though the international arms trade is now in decline, numerous reports have pointed with concern to a build-up in the region. The Northeast Asian countries accounted for nearly 65 per cent of the total volume of Asia-Pacific’s arms imports between 1993-95. Not only are the North Pacific countries expanding and modernising their inventories of modern weapons at sea, but they are also reconfiguring their military forces in such a way as not only to enhance their capacity for power projection but also to protect their national interests.

As the Chinese Navy grows stronger, the chances of conflict over the Spratly Islands becomes an increasing possibility. Unless a satisfactory diplomatic solution takes place, it will only further heighten regional concerns, in particular among Southeast Asian states. Already, states such as Malaysia have quietly defined the Chinese Navy as their primary threat, and are adjusting their defence postures accordingly. Into the next century, having secured its territorial waters, China will most likely embark on making its presence felt in other parts of the region. The Chinese will seek to maintain a presence in the Indian Ocean, if only to show New Delhi that they do not regard it as an Indian lake. Chinese and Japanese maritime spheres of influence and operations are likely to overlap. Whether this will be a source of tension, or a
catalyst to Sino-Japanese naval co-operation, will depend on the overall state of the two countries’ relations. But given the increasing misgivings and concerns among military planners of both countries of the other side’s growing armed might, it is more likely to result in tensions that require management between China and Japan. This all adds up to a complex maritime environment fraught with the potential for misunderstanding, competing interests and ultimately conflict. The current economic problems in Asia-Pacific, and their effect in mitigating naval rivalries, might however provide the basis for greater interest in co-operative maritime security as a means of managing these problems.

Changing strategic relations in the last decade have generated an unprecedented opportunity for new thinking about ways of resolving current maritime issues. In Northeast Asia, the main territorial disputes are maritime in nature. Any multilateral co-operation cannot substitute for formal diplomatic/legal negotiations to settle territorial disputes, but MCBMs and maritime co-operation measures may be particularly valuable in minimising the risk of conflict in such circumstances. A co-operative maritime security regime is the best way to contribute maritime peace and stability to the region.

Endnotes


9. For a through and comprehensive analysis of maritime economic interests and the sea lines of communications through the South China Sea, see John H. Noer and David Gregory, Maritime Economic Interests and The Sea Lines of Communication Through the South China Sea: The Value of Trade in Southeast Asia, CAB 96-0005 (Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses, March 1996).


41. Most of the new fighter aircraft and long-range maritime patrol aircraft being introduced to the region are also being fitted with anti-ship missile capabilities. For details of this point, see Desmond Ball, 'Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisition in the Asia-Pacific Region', *International Security*, vol. 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993-94), pp. 100-1.


46 For the historical background of submarine development, see Lt-Cdr Duk-Ki Kim, 'Modernisation of China's Submarine Forces', *The Submarine Review* (January 1997), pp. 53-7.


50 Interviewed Dr. Eric Grove. He got this opinion during his visit to 4th Escort Flotilla Fleet Base in Kure, Japan, in November 1997.


58 Morgan, *Porpoises Among the Whales*, p. 22.


60 This class is mainly equipped with US Harpoon SSMs, ASROC and Italian-design guns, and each frigate carries a Sikorsky S-70CM-1 Thunderhawk helicopter. See J. A. C. Lewis, 'Taiwan's Navy receives Final la Fayette Frigates', *JDW*, 4 February 1998, p. 16.


62 Apart from the two previously commissioned frigates, the Cheng-kung and Cheng-ho, the Taiwan Navy has six additional frigates planes to be completed by the China Shipping Company by 1999. Christie Su, 'Navy commissions Third Frigate', *The Free China Journal* (hereafter FCJ), 10 March 1995, p. 1.

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84. Ibid., Japan returned the plane two months later. Fuji Karniya, 'The Northern Territories: Japanese Talks with Czarist Russia and the Japanese government allowed him to go to the Hokkaido. He requested political asylum in the

83. Marine

82. John

81. on the Law of the Kuril Islands. In the reminder of this research, this study refers to Kuril Islands or Kurils as part of the Kuril chain. For further information on geopolitical characteristics, see Tsueno Akaha, 'Internalising International Law: Japan and the Regime of Navigation in the Pendant of the North Pacific', in Robert L. Friedhelm et al. (eds), Japan and the New Ocean Regime (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984), p. 100.

80. Thirty per cent of the Pacific ocean is part of the 200-mile zones. Ten states own nearly 50 per cent of these areas, and seven border the Pacific. For a more comprehensive analysis of this point, see Hanns J. Buchholz, Law of the Sea Zones in the Pacific Ocean (Pasir Panjang, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), pp. 7-17.


75. For a more comprehensive analysis of this point, see Bernard Oxman, From Co-operation to Conflict: The Soviet Union and the United States at the Third UN Conference on Law of the Sea (Seattle: University of Washington, 1984).


71. For a more comprehensive analysis of this point, see Bernard Oxman, 'Naval Power, the Law of the Sea, and the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace', Marine Policy, vol. 5, no. 3 (July 1981), p. 195.

70. For further elaboration, see Morris M. Hayashi, 'How Japan handled UNCLOS Issues', in Robert L. Friedhelm et al. (eds), Japan and the New Ocean Regime (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984), p. 100.


68. Japan refers to these islands as the Northern Territories; Russia refers to them as the Southern Kuril Islands. In the reminder of this research, this study refers to Kuril Islands or Kurils as part of the Kuril chain. For further information on geopolitical characteristics, see Tsueno Aka, 'Internalising International Law: Japan and the Regime of Navigation Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea', ODIL, vol. 20, no. 2 (1989), p. 130.


The Tok Islands are called Tok-to in Korean and Takeshirna in Japanese. The sea between Korea and Japan has been said and written to be ‘the East Sea’ rather than ‘the Sea of Japan’ from the ancient times. During the Japanese occupation of Korea, their imperialists renamed ‘the East Sea’ as ‘the Sea of Japan.’ However, this study uses the East Sea rather than the Sea of Japan.

For thorough and comprehensive analyses of the historical background of Tok Island, see Tae-Jin Yang, ‘Han-il Tok-to Youngyu Kyung Bunjang Yuku [The History of Territorial Dispute over Tok Islets between Korea and Japan]’, Yuksa Bipyung [Historical Debate], no. 33 (Summer 1996), pp. 134-47 and Chong Il Chee, ‘Legal Status of Tok Island in International Law’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 21, no. 3 (Autumn 1997), pp. 333-72.
144. 'New Oil, Gas deposits Found in South China Sea', *Wen Wei Po* (Hong Kong), 18 October 1997 in *SWB*, 12 November 1997, p. FEW/0512 WG/9 P


152. 'Spokesman on 'indisputable' Sovereignty over Spratly; Philippine Vice-President to visit', *Xinhua News Agency* (Beijing) in *SWB*, 18 March 1995, p. FE/2255 G/1.


158. Under the result of a five-year survey, the Chinese got a scientific basis for the exploitation and management of island resources. See 'Survey discovers Three New Islets in Paracels', *SWB*, 28 January 1995, p. FE/2213 G/5.


163. Tai Ming Cheung, 'Buying British First', *FEER*, 8 June 1989, p. 3.
Table 6-1 Changes in Defence Budgets in Northeast Asia, 1990-1996

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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>297.9</td>
<td>296.7</td>
<td>286.1</td>
<td>283.9</td>
<td>278.9</td>
<td>271.1</td>
<td>265.2</td>
<td>-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia*</td>
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<td>_____</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>97</td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>-50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>32.7</td>
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<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
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<td>15.2</td>
<td>+43</td>
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Notes

o. In billions of dollars. Data do not reflect exchange rate fluctuations.
o. North Korea's defence budget was excluded because the lack of reliable economic data makes it difficult to calculate.


**. Figures from official defence budget figures. Some estimates suggest military-related spending is two to three times the official estimate budget figure.


Table 6-2 Balance of Naval Forces in Northeast Asia

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>SSBN</th>
<th>SSG</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>DD, FF</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>MCM</th>
<th>AMP</th>
<th>SM</th>
<th>Naval Air Force</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>1,861</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>352</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>249</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>___</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>305</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>1,464</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>3,243</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes

DD/FF: Destroyer, Frigate, FFG, FF; PC: Patrol and Coastal Combatants; FAC: Fast Attack Craft; MCM: Mine Countermeasures; AMP: amphibious forces, including LST, LSD, SM; and SM: support and miscellaneous.

Table 6-3  Incidents of Piracy in the Far East, 1991-1996

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China-Hong Kong-Macao</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East China Sea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf of Tonkin Hong Kong</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South China Sea</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladivostok (Russia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kampuchea (Russia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow Sea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6-4  Current Submarine Forces and Acquisition Programmes in Northeast Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nations</th>
<th>Current Ships’ Numbers (Future Acquisition Numbers)</th>
<th>Modernisation Programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>China</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Han-class (SSN)</strong> Nuclear-powered attack submarines. These were commissioned from 1974 to 1991.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 Han-class (SSN)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type 094 SSBN</td>
<td>This class is developing to be delivered by 2000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type 093 SSGN</td>
<td>It will be equipped with JL-2 SLBM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 (2) Song-class</td>
<td>This class is similar to Russian Victor III. It will be delivered by 2002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13 Ming-class</td>
<td>The first of which was launched in May 1994. Two more will be built.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 (1) Kilo-class</td>
<td>Five improved Mings are included.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Those were ordered to Russia in 1993. The first two were Type 877. The third is Type 636.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A fourth is expected to be delivered by 1998.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan</strong></td>
<td>1 (3) Oyashio-class</td>
<td>The first of a new class was commissioned on 16 March 1998. It will be delivered by 2000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 Harushio-class</td>
<td>These were built in 1990-1997.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Uzuzhio-class</td>
<td>Built in March 1978. Being replaced progressively by Yuushio and Harushio vessels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Korea</strong></td>
<td>6 (3) Chang Bogo class</td>
<td>Licensed production from Germany. The first was commissioned in June 1993.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Those of the second class were assembled and built in Korea. A total of nine will be built by 2001.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 KSS-1 Tolgorae class</td>
<td>Midget submarines (175-ton)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 Cosmos class</td>
<td>Midget submarines (83-ton)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Korea</strong></td>
<td>22 Romeo class</td>
<td>The programmes started from 1973 to 1995.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Being replaced progressively by the Sang-O class.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16 (4) Sang-O class</td>
<td>These are mainly used for special force operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48 Yugo-class</td>
<td>(330-ton mini submarines). I will be built by 20.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taiwan</strong></td>
<td>2 Hai Lung-class</td>
<td>Midget submarines (110-ton).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Hai Shih-class</td>
<td>These were commissioned in 1987 and 1988.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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### Table 6-5 Current Major Surface Combatant Forces and Acquisition Programmes in Northeast Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th><strong>Current Ships’ Numbers (Future Acquisition Numbers)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Modernisation Programmes</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2 (1) <em>Luhu</em> (Type 052)-class destroyers (4,200 tons)</td>
<td>The third of the class has been delayed because of difficulties in obtaining more General Electric LM-255 gas turbine engines. It is expected that Ukraine will deliver the engine to build the third one. Ordered in 1997. These will be delivered in 1999 and 2000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 (2) Russian <em>Sovremenny</em>-class destroyer (7,000 tons)</td>
<td>The first of which was commissioned in 1993. One more is likely to be built. The programme started in 1988. The first was commissioned in 1991. Two more of this class are likely to be built.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 (1) Upgrade <em>Luda</em>-class destroyers (3,730 tons)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 (2) <em>Jiangwei</em>-class missile frigates (2,250 tons)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>4 <em>Kongo</em>-class destroyers (7, 200 tons.)</td>
<td>Equipped with <em>Aegis</em> system. The first was commissioned in March 1993. The last of which was commissioned on 20 March 1998. The first and second were commissioned in March 1996 and March 1997. They are likely to be increased to six. The programme is top priority because of the reduction <em>Kongo</em>-class destroyers’ programmes by the cost of <em>Aegis</em> systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 (4) <em>Murasame</em>-class destroyers (5,100 tons)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>0 (3) (?) <em>KDX</em> (3,900 tons)</td>
<td>The first of which will be commissioned in 1998. It is likely to be built up to three by 1999. Built in 1981-1993. Commissioned from 1985 through 1992. Further programmes are uncertain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 (?) <em>Ulsan</em>-class frigates (1,180 tons)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 (?) <em>Po Hang</em>-class corvettes (1,180 tons)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>6 (?) <em>Kang Ding (La Fayette)</em> (Improved version <em>Kwang Hua II</em>) (3,600 tons)</td>
<td>Ordered to France in September 1991. The first two were delivered in 1996. The last one was delivered in January 1998. The seventh will be built in Taiwan under licenced from France. Transferred from the US Navy in 1995. Ordered three more. It is planned to bring the total to nine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 (3) <em>Chin Yang</em> class-frigates (US <em>Knox</em> class)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-6  Key Naval Procurement Programmes in Northeast Asia 1997-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment Sector</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft/ Helo Carriers</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>V</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Submarines (SBN/SSGN)</td>
<td>V</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional Submarines</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>V</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>V</td>
<td></td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corvettes</td>
<td>V</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs)</td>
<td></td>
<td>V</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Warfare Vessels</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>V</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Ships</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>V</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Helicopters</td>
<td></td>
<td>V</td>
<td></td>
<td>V</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA)</td>
<td>V*</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>V</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes

*: China ordered search radar, which will be fitted to Hanzhong Y-8 land-based maritime patrol version, to United Kingdom in 1996.

Table 6-7  Indicative UNLOS Disputes Affecting the Northeast East Asian Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Dispute</th>
<th>Countries Involved</th>
<th>Occupied Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Various Overlapping claims to the Spratly Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Amboyna Cay</td>
<td>China-Vietnam-Taiwan-Malaysia-Philippines</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Commodore Reef</td>
<td>China-Vietnam-Taiwan-Malaysia-Philippines</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Falt Island</td>
<td>China-Vietnam-Taiwan-Malaysia-Philippines</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Itu Aba Island</td>
<td>China-Vietnam-Taiwan-Philippines</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lankiam Cay</td>
<td>China-Vietnam-Taiwan-Philippines</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Loaia /South Island</td>
<td>China-Vietnam-Taiwan-Philippines</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mischief Reef</td>
<td>China-Philippines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Nam Yit Island</td>
<td>China-Vietnam-Taiwan-Philippines</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Nanshan Island</td>
<td>China-Vietnam-Taiwan-Philippines</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Northeast Cay</td>
<td>China-Vietnam-Taiwan-Philippines</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Pearson Reef</td>
<td>China-Vietnam-Taiwan-Philippines</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sand Cay</td>
<td>China-Vietnam-Taiwan-Philippines</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sin Cowe Island</td>
<td>China-Vietnam-Taiwan-Philippines</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Southeast Cay</td>
<td>China-Vietnam-Taiwan-Philippines</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Spratly Island</td>
<td>China-Vietnam-Taiwan-Philippines</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- West York Island</td>
<td>China-Vietnam-Taiwan-Philippines</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Thitu Island</td>
<td>China-Vietnam-Taiwan-Philippines</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Disputed claims over the Paracel Groups</td>
<td>China-Vietnam-Taiwan-Philippines</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Boundary Dispute in the Gulf of Tonkin</td>
<td>China-Vietnam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Disputed claims over the Yellow Sea and East China Sea</td>
<td>China-Taiwan</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Paratas Reef</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Senkaku Islands</td>
<td>China-Taiwan-Japan</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Penghu/Pescadores</td>
<td>China-Taiwan</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Disputed claims over the East Sea</td>
<td>South Korea-Japan</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tok Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. South Kuril Islands</td>
<td>Russia-Japan</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Map 6-1  The Southern Kuril Islands/Northern Territories

The Southern Kuriles (Northern Territories)
Map 6-2  Military and Fishery Zones in the Yellow and East China Seas

Map 6-4 The Senkaku Islands/Tiaoyu Tao

Map 6-5 The Tok Islands in the East Sea
Chapter VII. The Impact of US and Russian Geo-Strategic Goals and Security Concerns On Co-operative Maritime Security in Northeast Asia

The United States as a regional naval balancer has reduced its direct maritime presence in the Asia-Pacific region with the closing of its naval base in Subic Bay and a reduction of force numbers in South Korea and Japan. In February 1995 the White House released *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, promoting co-operative security measures. Co-operative engagement is planned to cover the spectrum of requirements needed for peacetime operations. In February 1995 the US Department of Defense also released its *Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, showing that America's status in the Asia-Pacific region has shifted from the *Pax Americana* to a *Pax Consortis* which envisages burden-sharing with its allies. The US Navy is still required to undertake active operations in support of American strong and valid strategic and political goals in the East Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, repeated reductions in its forces are being made as the defence budget declines. In contrast to the Cold War when the US Navy's role was directly related to addressing Soviet threats, it now has a much broader role. This includes responding to regional disputes and conflicts, sometimes multilaterally. The US attitude towards co-operative maritime security has been changing with her new strategy and policies in the region. On 19 January 1998 Washington signed with Beijing a Maritime Consultative Agreement, aimed at preventing incidents at sea.

Russia first enunciated its concerns about co-operative maritime security in the Far East in Mikhail Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech of 1986. Gorbachev called for the containment of certain categories of naval operations in the Northwest Pacific, the establishment of maritime confidence-building measures (MCBMs) to reduce the threat of accidental war, and the enhancement of the security of sea lines of communications (SLOCs) vital to its trade. This proposal could be realised through arms-reduction measures on the Sino-Russian borders, by introducing bilateral confidence-building measures (CBMs), which would allow the Russian Navy to continue to reduce while minimising the impact of this reduction on Russia's strategic place in the region. The collapse of the Soviet Union, furthermore, changed the wider maritime strategic environment and geo-political structure of Northeast Asia. As Russia's current strategic status in the region will deteriorate further, its long-term maritime security objective is to create a multilateral regional security system that
would allow it to remain involved in regional security at low cost. 3 Today, Russia is much concerned over maritime security in the region, and willingly signed incidents at sea agreements with South Korea and Japan in 1993.

The following discussion will focus respectively on US and Russian policies affecting co-operative maritime security in Northeast Asia. In particular it will address the following questions: (1) where does the Pacific lie in US and Russian geo-strategic priorities? (2) What doctrinal changes seem likely or desirable for US and Russian navies? (3) How do the United States and Russia approach maritime confidence-building measures? and (4) How do the United States and Russia approach maritime co-operation? The geo-strategic relations and goals will be examined first.

I. US Geo-Strategic Relations and Goals in Northeast Asia

During the Cold War era, the geopolitical environment for the United States was clear. The major threat came from the Soviet Union, and NATO was its most important security priority. Security for the Asia-Pacific region had also been dependent on America’s Cold War treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and others. In the post Cold-War era, one of the most important US security matters was the question of how to preserve American hegemony in the Pacific region.

Because of the reduction of US military forces in the region in the last half decade, Washington is adopting a different operational strategy, increasingly dependent on access arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region, and burden sharing — in the form of direct financial payments and military facility support from Japan and South Korea — in the North Pacific. The strategic environment is changing and US economic goals in the region are constantly growing. According to Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, ‘Today, no region in the world is more important for the United States than Asia and the Pacific. Tomorrow, in the 21st century, no region will be as important.... The firmest guarantees of America’s staying power [in the region] are our overriding national interests.’

In line with the new strategic environment, the Clinton administration has adopted a more multilateral approach based on both bilateral security relations and broader regional security dialogues like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The US DoD also stressed the importance of bilateral alliances: ‘US interest in developing layers of multilateral ties in the region will not undermine the significance of our bilateral ties.’ The United States has also tried to solve such specific problems as the Spratly disputes with other countries on a multilateral basis.
US-South Korea-Japanese co-operation has focused on impeding North Korea’s nuclear programme and missile development and Washington joined the peace talks on the Korean peninsula with China and the two Koreas. 

In the last decade, the objectives of US national security strategy have shifted from containing the Soviet Union to maintaining global stability. The shift in emphasis means a change ‘from global commitment against a single threat to global commitment against a number of regional threats.’ US security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region is based on The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, which set the security objectives of the American strategy of engagement and enlargement. It ‘reaffirmed the US commitment to keep a stable forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region, at the existing level of about 100,000 troops, for the foreseeable future.’ According to Joseph S. Nye, Jr., the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the American security strategy for East Asia is focusing on three areas: (1) reinforcing US alliances with South Korea and Japan; (2) maintaining US forward-based presence; and (3) developing multilateral regional institutions, such as Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) and the ARF.

In the last half decade, US military strategy toward Asia has been changed by new strategic concepts. In January 1992 the National Military Strategy of the United States was published by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. This paper was updated and expanded in 1995. It represents strategic concepts, and resources, reflecting dramatic changes in the strategic environment. The US Department of the Navy also revealed such changes in the US Navy White Papers ...From the Sea in September 1992, and Forward ...From the Sea in November 1995. In September 1993 modifications to the military strategy set forth in The Bottom-Up Review (BUR) were announced by the US Department of Defense. On 20 May 1997 the Clinton administration released its long anticipated Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR), setting forth the strategy and force structure to meet US national security objectives in the years ahead. All these documents provide complete assessments of required force levels and capabilities in the context of the strategic environment up to the year 2000. They foresee dangers and challenges, mostly regional, because the global threat disappeared with the end of the Cold War.

Since the early 1990s, the number of American forces forward deployed in Asia has been reduced by 25 per cent — and additional reductions are planned. About 90 per cent of its Asia-Pacific forces are stationed in Northeast Asia, where they continue successfully to deter aggression from an unpredictable North Korea (see Table 7-3). These forces also act as
the underpinning for American formal relations with one of its important allies, Japan. Today, the Northeast Asian allies shoulder a significant share of the maintenance cost of the US military in the region. Both Seoul and Tokyo have repeatedly assured the United States that they intend to continue to help defray the costs of American forces stationed in their countries. Nonetheless, US strategic forces in Hawaii, Alaska, and the West Coast of its main land are unlikely to be reduced further over the next 15 years because of global foreign policy or domestic policy requirements.

The US forward military presence in the Asia-Pacific region has been an important element in US economic strategy toward Asia for nearly a century. Although the specific size of such a presence is affected by US strategy and other countries in the region, it provides the sense of security and stability necessary to convince the American business community that it is safe to invest in the region. US armed forces number around 81,000 throughout the region, with approximately 36,000 based in South Korea, 37,000 in Japan, and one division each in Alaska and Hawaii. There are approximately 22,000 Marines with 50 combat aircraft equipped with F/A-18s and AV-8Bs available in Japan (one division and one wing) and on the US west coast. Air Force combat aircraft are also deployed: 90 aircraft with five air wings of F-15s and F-16s in Japan; 90 aircraft with two air wings of F-16s in South Korea; and the rest in Alaska. Two Pacific fleets operate 100 major combatant ships, including six Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, seven Ohio-class SSBNs, and 30 Aegis guided-missile ships.

Since the end of the Cold War, US economic survival has been also linked to the sea lines of strategic approach to the flourishing Asia-Pacific region whose average economic growth rate is about 2.5 per cent faster than that of the European Union. In particular, 1991 was a watershed year when the Asia-Pacific GNP was greater than that of the European Union. In 1991 the United States invested over $67 billion in the region; two-way trade with the Asia-Pacific region has exceeded that with Europe each year since the early 1990s. In 1994 36 per cent of America’s trade was with the Asia-Pacific region, three times its trade with the European Union. US exports to the Pacific also totalled almost $140 billion, and every billion dollars created about 20,000 new American jobs. Total trade with the Pacific was $330 billion — 50 per cent greater than with the Atlantic. Currently, the Asia-Pacific region accounts for 40 per cent of total US two-way merchandise trade, exceeding its trade with Europe and Latin America combined. By 2000, US trade with Asia will probably be double its European trade. The number of US jobs directly related to exports and investments

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in Asia exceeds three million, and is expected to grow to over six million by the end of the century.

II. US Maritime Strategy and Concern About Co-operative Maritime Security

A. The Rationale of US Maritime Strategy
The US Navy’s strategic roles in the Cold War era were focused on the concepts of ‘sea control’ and ‘power projection.’ According to Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner’s key paper, Missions of the US Navy, the four national objectives which required some form of sea control were ‘to ensure industrial supplies; to reinforce and re-supply military forces engaged overseas; to provide wartime economic/military supplies to allies and to provide safety for naval forces in the projection of power ashore role.’ US naval force structure, however, centred around at least 15 deployed aircraft carrier battle groups, four battleship battle groups, and 100 nuclear attack submarines. By 1989 the US Navy reached a strength of about 570 ships in order to fulfil the concepts contained in the maritime strategy.

On 2 August 1990 President George Bush in his speech, ‘Defense of Defense,’ outlined a new national security strategy which accepted the end of the Cold War and centred on regional threats. In April 1991 the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander of the Marine Corps showed the first public attempt to specify American maritime strategy by stating: ‘Events since the summer of 1989 have brought a fundamental shift in the post-World War II balance of power.... We must reshape naval force structure, strategy, tactics, and operating patterns that are wedded too closely to the concept of an Armageddon at sea with the Soviet Union.’ In the last decade, in response to a declining Russia and greatly reduced defence budget, the functions of the US Navy have moved away from a primarily anti-Soviet focus to contingency actions and limited objectives in regional settings.

The new strategic direction of the US Navy is derived from both the national security strategy and the national military strategy, representing a fundamental shift away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea and toward littoral warfare and joint and combined maritime operations. The Cold War Forward Maritime Strategy which focused on both deterrence, warfighting and crisis response requirements, has been replaced by the US Navy White Paper, ...From the Sea: Preparing for the Naval Service for the 21st Century and its 1994 update Forward ...From the Sea. These latter documents together provide the framework for
US post-Cold War maritime strategy. The first major navy publication of ...From the Sea clearly confirmed that the US Navy has 'shifted from the global struggle under the Cold War maritime strategy — which called for independent blue-water, open ocean naval operations on the flanks of the Soviet Union — to preparation for regional challenges.'

In spite of the brevity of the White Paper (12 pages), it clearly stated the directions of US Navy policy in the post-Soviet era as follows: '... with the demise of the Soviet Union, the free nations of the world claim pre-eminent control of the seas.... As a result, our maritime policies can afford to de-emphasise efforts in some naval warfare areas.'

In March 1993 the Chief of Naval Operations and Commander of the Marine Corps also stated that 'The global naval threat has gone. Instead of preparing for independent blue-water operations to defeat a powerful Soviet Navy, our Navy and Marine Corps will focus on projecting military might in littoral regions of the world.... The Soviet blue-water threat is gone. The United States holds the capability in our Navy to command the seas anywhere in the world.'

The US post-Cold War maritime strategy is based on four pillars of both the national security strategy and the national military strategy — strategic deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and force reconstitution. The official statement, Forward ...From the Sea, further described the change of US maritime strategy since the end of the Cold War. It confirmed the navy's focus on littoral warfare with greater reliance on rapid and effective response to events which menace US interests. The essence of the new white paper focused on forward deployed naval forces, based on the assumption that in a situation short of war, naval forces are best suited 'to be engaged in forward areas, with the objectives of preventing conflicts and controlling crises.'

It stressed the concept of joint operations with the US Air Force and Army.

According to Forward ...From the Sea, US maritime strategy is now focused on addressing regional challenges and opportunities. The White Paper also re-emphasises that the US naval strategy and force structure are fundamentally changing: 'The new (strategic) direction of the Navy and Marine Corps team... represents a fundamental shift away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea toward joint operations conducted from the sea.'

This document, furthermore, makes clear the new direction for Navy-Marine Corps joint operations. It provides for all four components: (1) naval expeditionary forces; (2) shaped for joint operations; (3) operating forward from the sea; and (4) tailored for national needs. It reflects the switch of operational focus to littoral warfare and places great reliance on rapid crisis response and flexible forward presence.
The BUR also commented that ‘... our naval forces in two nearly simultaneously major regional conflicts (MRCs) provide a fairly large and robust force structure.... However, our overseas presence needs can impose requirements for the naval force, especially aircraft carriers, that exceed those needed to win two MRCs.’\(^{32}\) The BUR called for 346 ships, including about 126 surface combatants, a mixture of cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. Navy testimony in 1996 suggested that the navy had adjusted its plans and now intended to maintain a fleet of between 300 and 346 ships. Even though navy testimony in early 1997 did not describe the issue of the total size of naval ships, the programme size of the navy FY98 (346 ships) and FY99 (335 ships) is likely to be in the BUR range.\(^{33}\) Despite the fact that the QDR of US defence policy and programmes made clear its intention to reduce the size of the navy, it did not set up a new figure for its total size. Nevertheless, the navy might maintain a total of 300-346 ships, consisting of 11 aircraft carriers (active), one aircraft carrier (reserve/training), 50 attack submarines, 116 surface combatants and 12 amphibious groups, by FY2003.\(^{34}\) The pillars of the force are: 31 DD-963 Spruance-class destroyers; four DDG-993 Kidd-class guided missile destroyers; 27 CG-47 Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers that are already in service; 22 DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers; and the excess of the surface fleet made up of Oliver Hazard Perry-class (FFG-7) guided missile frigates, by the year 2003 (see Table 7-1).\(^{35}\)

The BUR and QDR concluded that cutbacks in US naval forces should be selective. Naval spending declined from $80.4 billion in FY95 and $76.2 billion in FY97 to $60 billion in FY98.\(^{36}\) The US Navy will keep the present number of carrier task forces because of the flexibility of aircraft carriers to operate effectively with relative independence from shore bases. The US Navy has cut the number of carrier battle groups from 12 active groups to 11 active and one reserve unit. Nonetheless, the overall DoD procurement budget declined approximately 54 per cent from its high in FY90 to its low in FY96. The budget for the navy’s weapons procurement recorded a high in FY88 of $65 billion, and dropped to $14 billion in FY96. It will be increased to spend $20.2 billion FY99 from a total navy budget of $81.8 billion.\(^{37}\)

In FY98-FY2003, the navy is planning to procure on average about 5.2 new ships year ships. Procurement of new ships has been below nine to ten ships per year since FY93 and is programmed under the current Future Years Defence Plan (FYDP) to remain below that rate through FY2003. The plan includes one aircraft carrier, three DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class DDGs, seven LHD-5 amphibious carriers, and four new nuclear attack
submarines.\textsuperscript{38} Given the uncertainty surrounding future naval force plan, in July 1997 the navy and Department of Defence announced a long-range plan to procure a total of 76 to 92 new ships or an average of 6.3 to 7.7 per year during the 12 year period FY2004-2015. This plan includes 23 submarines, two aircraft carriers, 35 surface combatants, 10 amphibious ships, and six to 22 auxiliaries and mine warfare ships.\textsuperscript{39}

The BUR stressed the US commitment to a Pacific forward presence and effective crisis response forces. The US Pacific Command (PACOM), which includes Hawaii and Alaska, has continued to clarify its strategy of ‘co-operative engagement and enlargement’ based on total deployment of about 10 per cent of all manpower in the US military.\textsuperscript{40} According to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), the Pacific Fleet has three pillars to achieve political, strategic and economic goals in the region: (1) forward presence; (2) strong alliance; and (3) crisis response capabilities.\textsuperscript{41}

\textbf{B. Maritime Priorities and Naval Force Structure in the Asia-Pacific Region}

Since the end of the Second World War, a balance of power strategy in Northeast Asia has been pursued, and US forces in the Pacific have played an important role. A major focus of this strategy was the containment of communist expansion. After the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, the expansion of Chinese power and influence to other parts of Asia became the principal concern of US policy and of the US Pacific Command. Hence a new theatre command with responsibility for US forces throughout the Pacific region was established in Hawaii.

Since the birth of the US Pacific Command, it has been structured in a manner that combines the lines of classic unified command with those of a joint task force. Operational command of all forces is exercised by the CINCPAC headquartered in Hawaii, normally through his component service commanders, such as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Force (CINCPACAF) and Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific (USARPAC). They, in turn, exercise operational control through their numbered fleet and air forces. The Third Fleet Commander (COM3FLT) currently covers the Eastern and Central Pacific, Aleutian Islands and the Bering Sea; the fleet is headquartered in San Diego. The 7th Fleet Commander, who is also the Western Pacific Command (COMWESTPAC), is based in Yokosuka, Japan. The Seventh Fleet is an active operational fleet and is normally deployed into the vast area from the west of Hawaii to the east coast of Africa, covering the Western Pacific, Japan, Korean peninsula, Philippines,
ANZUS, and Indian Ocean. The Air Force, under the CINCPACAF, has 290 combat aircraft: the 5th Air Forces in Yokota, Japan, the 7th Air Force in the ROK, and the 11th Air Force in Alaska.

US PACOM, from its headquarters at Camp Smith on the outskirts of Honolulu, is responsible for day-to-day control of a large expanse of ocean. Currently, around 120 major ships are stationed in the Pacific. The most important US forces for the Northwest Pacific are those in the forward Seventh Fleet, especially the carrier battle group and amphibious ready group permanently home-ported in Japan. The specific mission of the Pacific Fleet will vary with the scenario of crises or conflict.

The US naval forward presence, as a key role in the US maritime strategy, is required to practice gunboat diplomacy in crises that threaten its interests in the region. The key to a stabilising US presence is provided by the forward deployed naval forces. The official mission of the Pacific Fleet includes the conduct of operations 'to ensure control of the sea in order to defend the US against attack through the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans, to maintain the security of the Pacific Command and to support operations of adjacent allied and national commanders.'

After the 1991 Gulf War, the US strategy changed with the altered strategic environment and Congressional budget cuts to defence spending, and now focuses on regional contingencies and relies heavily on support from regional countries such as Japan and South Korea. As James Tritten remarked, '... the US cannot plan to respond to a crisis at the strategic- and operational-level of warfare, with only national forces. For such responses, the participation of ad-hoc coalitions, allies and host nation support are assumed.' Public documents, such as BUR and QDR, have had a major impact on US naval forces in the Asia-Pacific region. By the late 1980s, the Pacific Fleet, for example, had about 259 ships to address the challenge of Soviet naval and air forces in the North Pacific. In mid-1997 the Pacific Fleet major forces were reduced by 51 per cent to 124 ships. It is unlikely, however, that the United States will completely withdraw its naval forces from the Western Pacific in the 21st century.

C. US Concern About Co-operative Maritime Security

US policies affecting co-operative maritime security in Northeast Asia will be analysed by examining the historical context of US disarmament and arms control policy, unilateral reduction of naval forces, bilateral naval arms control proposals, maritime confidence-
building measures and maritime co-operation measures which cover humanitarian operations, including anti-piracy and search and rescue operations as well as co-operation in the extraction of marine resources. First to be addressed is naval disarmament and arms control policy, based on structural and operational naval arms control measures.

### 1. Disarmament and Arms Control Policy

#### a) The Historical Context of Disarmament and Arms Control Policy

US naval arms control policy has its roots in history, perceptions of political and economic goals, concerns about the law of the sea, and maritime strategy. The US government and its navy have a long history of naval arms control from the 1817 Rush-Bagot Treaty with Great Britain, which demilitarised the Great Lakes, to the current US-Russian START discussion on deep cuts in nuclear arsenals. Washington gained important experience with naval arms control in the years following the First World War and before the outbreak of the Second World War. This experience came in a period when the world was eager to avoid future wars and the burdens of heavy defence spending. During the early 1920s, the United States engaged in a series of negotiations beginning with the Washington Naval Conference that limited naval forces structurally.

During the Cold War, naval arms control was anathema to the US government and its navy. Washington cited the failure of the inter-war naval arms control agreements to prevent or even diminish the Second World War, and it emphasised that maritime superiority was required for the United States as an island nation, while the Soviet Union was a continental nation. However, the United States refused to engage in naval arms control with the Soviets and adopted an attitude of 'Just Say No to Naval Arms Control.' At the December 1989 Malta Summit, for example, when President Gorbachev proposed negotiations on the limitation of all tactical nuclear weapons on US and Soviet surface ships, President Bush rejected the proposals, arguing that naval arms control was of very little interest to the United States.

Historically, it is clear that there was a considerable reluctance to enter into naval arms control in the United States, because one tended to regard the navy as a primary instrument of peace-time foreign policy. This attitude was demonstrated in US Secretary of Defence Frank Carlucci’s August 1988 speech to the Voroshilov Military Academy, Russia, when he stated: ‘Asking the United States to cut back its naval capabilities would be similar to
asking the USSR to tear up its road system and railways: given our geopolitical circumstances, neither of us could afford to cut these vital lifelines.\textsuperscript{50}

The United States is furthermore highly sensitive to any negotiations which might limit freedom of the seas. Admiral R. Larson summed up the American traditional view as follows: ‘I don’t think our country will ever consider it in its best interest, regardless of whether people trust Gorbachev or not, to enter into naval arms control negotiations.’\textsuperscript{51} This position is based on the belief that control of sea lines of communication using its naval forces is a vital American interest.

\textbf{b) Disarmament and Arms Control Policy}

\textbf{(1) Disarmament Policy}

The Reduction of US Military Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region. The history of the US withdrawal of military forces in the region goes back the ‘Nixon Doctrine’ in 1969. At that time, the Vietnam War was a watershed for the United States to formulate a new policy in East Asia. After that war, the United States withdrew its forces from South Vietnam and Thai bases in 1975 and terminated the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1977. Thus, the ‘Nixon Doctrine’ severely limited American participation in future Asian conflicts. Thereafter, the Carter administration opened discussion on the gradual withdrawal of troops from South Korea. By the end of 1991, 15,600 of the 137,000 US military personnel deployed in East Asia had been withdrawn: 4,800 from Japan; 7,000 from South Korea; and 3,800 from the Philippines (see Table 7-3).\textsuperscript{52}

In the post-Cold War era, under the 1992 original \textit{East Asian Strategic Initiatives} (EASI), the United States planned to reduce its troops according to two successive phased reductions in 1990-92 and 1992-95. About 25 per cent of US forces in the region reduced during the first phase of EASI;\textsuperscript{53} as shown in Table 7-3, this reduction brought US forces in the Asia-Pacific region down to less than 100,000.\textsuperscript{54} Nonetheless, America recognised that the role of forces in Japan would extend beyond the defence of Japan and the East Asia Pacific region to a wide range of local and regional contingencies.\textsuperscript{55} The long-term US security role remains uncertain, and the United States is not only trying to reduce the number of forces deployed in Northeast Asia, but also requesting burden-sharing by its allies. EASI was replaced by the \textit{East Asia Strategic Review} (EASR) in 1995.\textsuperscript{56}

Recent reductions in US forces have had a direct influence on the arms build-up in Asia-Pacific countries, such as South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, and ASEAN.\textsuperscript{57} The

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latter are enhancing their own defence capabilities because they feel that they must rely on themselves to deal with potential regional conflicts, such as the Korean Peninsula, the South China Sea and Taiwan straits, as well as routine patrol and early warning operations. In March 1995, in a significant policy shift, the US government announced a halt to further troop withdrawals from the Asia-Pacific region.\(^{58}\) Thus, about 100,000 troops will be kept forward deployed for the foreseeable future. Currently, US forward deployed forces are approximately 73,000 troops in Northeast Asia and 46,000 in Hawaii.

Even though many Pacific countries continue to believe that regional stability will be kept by the US military presence, Washington may not be able to resist pressure to withdraw more of its military forces from the region. Asia Pacific countries including ASEAN countries, however, are speculating on who will occupy this power vacuum, and are concerned that an American withdrawal might stimulate a regional naval arms race. In any event, the Seventh Fleet will be reduced in strength; whether it is enough to support US goals in the increasingly insecure Asia-Pacific region remains to be seen.\(^{59}\) In the context of this reduction, it is anticipated that the United States will encourage the diplomatic settlement of the most prominent regional security disputes, and will promote security dialogue and defence co-operation, and advocate arms control and confidence building initiatives.

Unilateral Reductions. The United States is facing economic difficulties, which will not be conducive to promotion of its naval build-up programmes. In addition, improved relations between the United States and Russia have influenced its unilateral actions. It has already undertaken measures of self-restraint, including significant reductions in naval force structure, exercise activity and deployment patterns.\(^{60}\) A decade ago, the ‘600-ship navy’ was an organising impulse and an achievable goal. Recently, the navy is going through one of the most dramatic reductions in its history. This process began on 1 August 1990 when President Bush announced a new five year plan to downsize US forces according to a ‘base force’ concept developed in late 1989.\(^{61}\) In 1990 the new Bush-Cheney Defence Plan envisioned a ‘Base Force Navy’ of about 450 ships, a reduction of 25 per cent.\(^{62}\) In February 1991 the US announced a ‘New Base Force Plan’ which reaffirmed 25 per cent broad cuts over the six-year fiscal planning period.\(^{63}\)

On 28 January 1992 President Bush announced unilateral actions beyond the limitation of forces under START negotiations. It included cancelling plans for a new warhead for SLBMs as part of the base force cutbacks. On 29 January 1992 Defence Secretary Dick Cheney announced that the development of the Trident II SLBMs W-88
warhead would be stopped. In his 1992 State of the Union Address, Bush emphasised that the United States would reduce its SLBMs warheads by one third.64 This trend was confirmed by the withdrawal of seven Poseidon submarines from service in 1993.65 Nuclear weapons were removed from all units except the remaining SSBNs.

This reduction process was carried further by the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, which, despite its name, was conditioned more by financial pressures than anything else. The review called for a navy consisting of 346 ships at the turn of the century. For this reason, during 1994 the navy decommissioned 76 ships. The down-sizing of fleet forces will continue to the level of the 1997 QDR for the 21st century.66 In December 1994 the US Department of Defence decided to put more resources into keeping its current forces at a high-state of readiness, rather than spending on modernisation. Several big weapon systems under development were substantially cut; the Triservice Stand-Off Attack Missile was cancelled.67

In 1995 Secretary of Defence William J. Perry announced a plan to delete procurement of two of the 18 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (DDG-51) planned over the next six years and a one-year delay on the third generation nuclear powered attack submarine.68 This has created real concerns. As the US Navy stated that year:

Projected naval force structure is inadequate for today's level of operations: contingency operations cannot be funded by greater reductions in that force structure. The Navy will work diligently to identify resources to arrest the continued reduction in force structure resulting from early decommissionings.69

The US Navy has been decommissioning ships at an accelerated pace and had approximately 350 ships by 1997. The Clinton administration's FYDP outlines a navy of just over 300 ships at the end of the century.70

Considering the overall unilateral approaches being taken by the US government to down-size nuclear weapons at sea, fleet forces, and naval air forces, they have exceeded the enthusiastic expectations of the most ardent naval arms control proponents since the end of the Cold War. Some scholars have also suggested that the United States should consider using naval arms control as a device to delay or derail reductions resulting from the defence 'free fall.'71 The net result of these unilateral reductions is that the United States cannot plan to respond to a crisis at the strategic- and operational-levels of warfare with only national forces. For such responses, the participation of ad-hoc coalitions, allies and host nation support are assumed.

The recent naval defence budget cuts are deeper than those of the past. In early 1997, for example, the Department of Defence Planning called for a drop from 194 deployable
surface combatants in FY88 to 116 in the early 21st century, with some suggestions of a still lower total by the end of the decade. Since 1990, the navy has been cut by more than 200 ships. According to the BUR, naval force levels called for a drop from 528 deployed battle force ships in FY91 to 330-346 in FY2000. According to the QDR, the navy plans not only to cut around 12 Spruance-class destroyers — reducing surface warships from 128 to 116 — and 23 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) — reducing SSNs from 73 to 50, but also to retire the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates. By this means, the navy’s fleet strength will be reduced to about 300 ships in the 21st century.

(2) Naval Arms Control Policy
During the Cold War, America rejected Soviet proposals for naval reductions as a bilateral approach because it felt that they were designed to be a direct attack on US maritime power. This attitude was reflected by the Chief of Naval Operations: 'Despite the seeming sincerity, love of peace, and desire for friendship radiating from these Soviet initiatives for naval arms control, the real motive is to reduce an area of disadvantage at little cost to themselves.... If the Soviets accomplish even one of the goals of their present campaign for naval arms control, our diplomacy will have suffered disaster.' Several subjects have, however, been discussed on a bilateral basis by the United States and Russia and other countries since the end of the Cold War.

The first area of bilateral negotiations is the reduction of both navies’ strategic offensive forces. US forces have been reduced by the forward START treaty with Russia to a level consisting of 18 Trident submarines with C-4 and D-5 missiles. A second area of bilateral reductions concerned cuts in non-strategic nuclear weapons. In the autumn of 1991 the mutual unilateral reductions announced by President Bush and Gorbachev included the removal of all non-strategic nuclear weapons at sea, including all nuclear-armed SLCMs. The last area of bilateral negotiations concerned operational naval arms control measures to reduce the risk of accidents and incidents at sea. Despite the reluctance to sign formal INCSEA because of the apparent concession of parity, Washington signed a maritime consultative agreement, which is rather similar provisions to its 1972 treaty, with the PRC on 19 January 1998.

The US post-Cold War attitude on multilateral operational naval arms control measures, such as nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ), appeared in US State Department Nicholas Burns’ statement: ‘The zone arrangement should not seek to impose restrictions on the exercise of rights that are recognised by international law — particularly the high seas
freedom of navigation and over flight, the right of innocent passage of territorial and archipalegic seas, the right of transit passage of international straits, and the right of archipalegic sea-lanes passage of archipalegic waters. Although the United States eventually signed the Treaty of Rarotonga, which declares the South Pacific region a nuclear-free zone on 25 March 1996, it opposed to the South-East Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone agreed on 15 December 1995. The US’s basic attitude towards the NWFZ’s provision of innocent passage of warships in Northeast and Southeast Asian waters has not changed.

2. Maritime Confidence-Building Measures

Despite US Navy’s attempts to enhance confidence by reciprocal port visits and exchange of high-level officers with Russia and China, it generally sees formal MCBMs as detrimental because more specific CBMs proposals, including advance notification of naval activities, could place restraints on naval manoeuvres and naval exercises. This attitude was classically expressed by the then Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Vice Admiral Charles Larson: ‘CSBMs at sea would be unacceptably intrusive, set a bad precedent, impinge on the doctrine of freedom of the seas, inhibit the navy’s missions outside the European theatre, possibly violate international law, and weaken the West’s deterrent posture and consequently decrease Western security.’ US approaches to maritime confidence-building measures, can be divided into five headings:

Reciprocal Ships’ Visits to Build Confidence. Like other countries, US ships’ visits are a major element of transparency measures of MCBMs. They are focused on China and Russia in Northeast Asia because US forces stay in Japan and South Korea under bilateral security treaties. During the 1980s, US ships visited China’s ports, such as Qingdao (1986) and Shanghai (1989). In addition to being high-level agreement events, Pacific Fleet and Seventh Fleet Commanders also participated. Mutual ship visits between the two countries involved discussions about systems and procedures. Because the PLAN had expressed interest in gas turbine technology and the HH2 Foxtrot Seasprite helicopter, for example, those systems were included in the 1986 three ships’ visit to Qingdao. Nevertheless, the functional exchange pillar of US-China co-operation was interrupted by the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989.

In the last half decade, US ships’ visits to China have resumed. On 22 March 1995 the USS Bunker Hill docked in the northern Chinese port of Qingdo for the first visit by a US
warship since the 1989 Tianamen Square Incident. On 31 January 1996 the *Fort McHenry* sailed into the port of China’s largest industrial city, Shanghai.

**Increasing Military-to-Military Contacts and Exchanges.** The United States is increasing the military-to-military contact to improve military ties. Recently, it might increase a more equal information exchange with the Chinese military. On 12 May 1997, for example, the US Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, visited China to improve protocols for communications between maritime forces to avoid unexpected encounters. He was the first senior US military officer to visit since 1983. During his speech at the PLA National Defence University in Beijing, Shalikashvili suggested the following CBMs: (1) development of confidence-building measures to reduce further the possibility of miscalculations; (2) exchange of military academics and functional experts; (3) PLA participation in multilateral military activities; and (4) a regular dialogue between senior military leaders.

During US Defence Secretary William Cohen’s visit to China on 17-19 January 1998, he signed the Military Maritime Consultation Agreement, aimed at preventing incidents at sea. But Cohen did not discuss military technology transfers. His visit was the first by an American Secretary of Defence since 1994. Even though the United States has recently improved its military relations with China, Washington is unwilling to talk to Beijing about the transfer of military technology or an easing of a 9-year-old ban on arms sales to China.

**Multilateral Conferences and Dialogues.** In the last decade, the United States has enlarged its involvement in MCBM activities. Washington has annual and bi-annual meetings and multiple-meeting workshops and conferences in order not only to build confidence but also to promote communication between nations in the Asia-Pacific region. Examples of such biennial and annual meetings are ‘first track’ activities, such as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and the ARF, and ‘second track’ activities such as the Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). For eight weeks from May to July 1995, the Pacific Fleet dedicated several ships and aircraft to an inaugural ‘Co-operation Afloat Readiness and Training,’ which changed the US exercise programme with ASEAN nations into a more efficient, consistent, and predictable annual event. Examples of multiple-meeting workshops and conferences, which are based on first and second track activities, are the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) Conference, the Asia-Dialogues on Maritime Security, and Northeast Asian Co-operation Dialogue.
Combined Exercises to Increase Transparency. The US Navy plays an integral role in the execution of the US strategy of 'co-operative engagement and enlargement' as it seeks to fulfil the national security goals of enlarging the community of regional stability through combined exercises. The navy has combined exercises with South Korea and Japan under bilateral security treaties. In February 1996, for example, US and South Korean naval forces began a 10-day 'Valiant Usher 96-2K' in the Yellow Sea. This exercise was centred on the USS Independence aircraft carrier battle group with 10 to 20 South Korean naval ships and a range of sophisticated fighter aircraft.

Washington also has combined exercises with other Asia-Pacific navies. In May 1996, for example, the US Navy's Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate USS George Philip (FFG-12), USS Maholn S. Tisdale (FFG-27), Whidbey Island-class amphibious ship USS Germantown (LSD-42) and Los Angeles-class USS La Jolla (SSN-701) conducted a 21-day joint exercise in the Philippines. Another example was a US-Thai bilateral military exercise, Cobra Gold, which brought together some 20,000 their troops, opened in the southern Thai providence of Songkla in early May 1996. This was one of the largest exercises involving US forces in the Pacific: 10,000 US Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force personnel along with 10,000 of their Thai counterparts.85

Joint Publications and Workshops as Communications Measures. The US Navy has organised workshops and command post exercises (CPX). The PACFLT staff designed an exercise, which was briefed at the July 1993 workshop, to test the interoperability of the 17-member WPNS, which now includes Vietnam and Cambodia as new members, and Russia as an observer. It was agreed that a communication check through telephone facsimiles to conduct navy-to-navy communications was the preferred option for the CPX. In the 3rd WPNS in November 1992 the PACFLT briefed a Tactical Signal Manual (TSM) in order to obtain a simple TSM for use by all WPNS members. The PACFLT staff, furthermore, revised an unclassified version of the Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-1 and all WPNS members accepted this publication.

3. Maritime Co-operation Measures
The United States contributes to maritime co-operation in the region through combined search and rescue exercises, disaster and humanitarian relief operations and naval exercises. The idea of joint exercises for humanitarian relief was first raised during US Secretary Perry’s visit to China in October 1994. During the meeting between US Under-Secretary of Defence for
Policy Walter Slocombe and Chinese Deputy Chief of the General Staff for the PLA Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai on 12 December 1997, they discussed joint military exercises based on humanitarian relief missions and search and rescue operations. The two navies are expected to have joint exercises focused on MCMs issues. The US record on maritime co-operation measures and security co-operation to Northeast Asia can be summarised under two categories: (1) humanitarian relief operations based on combined search and rescue exercises, and (2) co-operation for the development of marine resources.

**Humanitarian Operations: Joint Search and Rescue and Anti-Piracy Operations.**

US naval forces in the region are forward deployed as flexible and self-sustaining naval forces in the event of threats to its interests and regional security, natural disasters and other humanitarian crises. Even though the US Navy is down-sizing the Pacific Fleet in the post-Cold War era, it is encouraging maritime co-operation among other naval forces in the region not only to promote understanding and confidence-building, but also to lay the foundation for future co-operative efforts in peacekeeping and responding to search and rescue needs.

The United States has conducted combined exercises with Russia for search and rescue (SAR) operations in various areas of the region. On 20 March 1994 the US Navy conducted an SAR exercise with Russian Pacific Fleet in the East China Sea. US maritime patrol aircraft (P-3Cs) and the destroyer *Vinogradov* of the Russian Pacific Fleet participated in this exercise. Another exercise was conducted by the US Pacific Fleet, Marine Corps, and Russian Pacific Fleet whereby it was assumed that a large scale disaster had happened in Vladivostok. On 14-16 August 1996 Russian and US naval ships held a joint exercise in the East Sea which aimed to aid the victims of natural disasters.

The US Pacific Fleet, furthermore, has held an active series of bilateral training exercises with Japan, South Korea, and Australia; it holds fewer, but significantly, bilateral exercises with Canada, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, as well as small exercises with the Philippines and Brunei. The US Pacific Command is also trying to move in the direction of multilateral fora for addressing security issues. In particular, US-Russian naval co-operation is increasing through the two navies’ exchanges.

**Co-operation for Pollution Problems and Joint Development of Marine Resources.**

The United States is trying to resolve pollution problems in the region. Despite strained relations, the United States and China embarked on a programme of environmental co-operation on dealing with rapid urbanisation, pollution from energy consumption and the changing agriculture patterns of a growing population in April 1996. Washington is also
participating in joint development of marine resources, such as oil and gas, with China in the South China Sea. It allowed the US oil company, Crestone, to join the development offshore oil and gas with the Chinese Government for oil exploitation in the Spratly Islands.

The United States has recently suggested a more drastic measure to regulate fishing activities in the Northwest Pacific as uncontrolled fishing by drift nets has resulted in severe ecological destruction in the North Pacific. Washington has proposed to the United Nations more radical measures which include the overall prohibition of fishing by drift nets. National conflicts over these issues may increase without an institutional mechanism in this region.

III. Russian Geo-strategic Relations and Goals in Northeast Asia

The early stages of the Gorbachev years brought a dramatic transformation of most aspects of Soviet foreign policy in Northeast Asia. The new political situation reflected Soviet domestic economic problems which created increasing difficulties for Soviet military programmes. In particular, Gorbachev’s Vladivostok speech in 1986 responded to two of Beijing’s three demands through a promise to withdraw a substantial part of Soviet troops in Mongolia and six regiments from Afghanistan. The evidence of Moscow’s success in handling relations with the Chinese, however, was both clear and impressive. In 1989 the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan and began to reduce its forces in Mongolia and along the Chinese frontier. Hence, it satisfied some of the preconditions made by China for a normalisation of relations. After that, tension was reduced and a railway between Urumqi and the Soviet frontier at Druzhba completed. Gorbachev announced a unilateral reduction in Soviet military forces in the Far East in May 1989.

At the end of 1991, the Russian Federation was born in the wake of the Soviet disintegration. The new Russia shared Gorbachev’s desire for further co-operation in Northeast Asia. A concern for the security of Russia’s Far Eastern territories made it imperative to consider closer relations with other Northeast Asian countries. Nonetheless, Northeast Asia was viewed largely in terms of bilateral relationships in which Japan, for reasons related to its economic strength, loomed large. Only recently has Russia attempted to form a multilateral framework for the region, putting those bilateral relationships into a wider strategic context. An important reason for this change was the failure of the Yeltsin government’s policy towards Japan, as demonstrated by the cancellation of the President’s visit to that country in September 1992.
The Russian relationship with the United States is very important to its approaches to co-operative maritime security in Northeast Asia. In Spring 1992 Presidents Yeltsin and Bush signed the Washington Charter that codified the new state of relations between Russia and the United States. This charter stated that ‘Russia and the United States do not regard each other as adversaries and are developing a relationship of partnership and friendship.’ They also considered the following elements: (1) expanded political dialogue at all levels; (2) co-operation in multilateral institutions; (3) regional co-operation; (4) co-operation in non-proliferation; and (5) co-operation on measures to counter terrorism and drug problems. Hence, maritime co-operation could form part of this process. In spring 1993 Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton also signed the Vancouver Declaration which included a comprehensive strategy of co-operation to promote democracy, security and peace. They stressed that ‘through their joint effort, both countries managed to form a new quality in the Russian-American relations.’

Currently Moscow wants to keep its strategic relations with Beijing in order not only to strengthen co-operation but also to pursue broad common interests, including arms sales with the transfer of military technology. During the second visit to Beijing on 24-27 April 1996, President Yeltsin signed a Sino-Russian Joint Statement, including the development of a 'strategic partnership,' which was re-asserted in his third visit in May 1997.

A Sino-Russian Joint Commission on Shipping on Border Rivers first met from 31 March to 5 April 1995. It agreed on issues relating to navigation and water transport co-operation on the Russo-Chinese rivers of Amur, Usuri and Argun. In February 1995, on the other hand, local Russians opposed the 1991 Russo-Chinese Border Agreement eastern border under which China was to get part of the eastern border. The Chairman of the Territorial Duma, Igor Lebedlinets, described the Russian stance as follows: ‘It is impossible to surrender to China even an inch of Russian land.’ During President Boris Yeltsin’s visit to China on 10 November 1997, the two countries signed a joint declaration related to the demarcation of the eastern section of the Russian-Chinese border. During the 40th regular meeting of the joint commission of the two countries from 6 March to 5 April 1998, the two countries agreed to strengthen shipping co-operation along border rivers, one of the most significant steps in lessening of military tension in Northeast Asia through the agreement on the principle of mutual reductions of military forces in the border areas.

As with its policy towards the West, Russia’s relations with Japan have improved since early 1992. With security concerns on both sides reduced in the last decade, the
requirement for political dialogue remains high for both sides and the necessity for increased Russo-Japanese direct contact is increasing. Although a Russian spokesman claimed that the Northern Territories disputes had become simply one of many aspects of Russia’s relationship with Japan, but one which they were working on, the resolution of the dispute is still the major obstacle to improved relations between the two states. In November 1992 Yeltsin made it clear that as far as the Kurils were concerned, the ball was now squarely in the Japanese court. Progress would be possible, he asserted, only when the Japanese came forth with a suitably softened position on the hand-over of the islands. The Japanese specialist, Konstantin Sarskisov of the Oriental Institute, argued that ‘a settlement of the territorial issue with Japan on the basis of international law would strengthen Russia’s moral case against other claimants by demonstrating a commitment to legality.’ That view finds few echoes in Moscow, given the greater nationalism in the Russian political debate to which the Yeltsin administration has had to respond. Recently, both countries’ strategic relations have been improving since the summit in Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk on 2 November 1997 between President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Hashimoto. On 22 January 1998 Russia and Japan agreed to establish a joint commission aimed at assuring a bilateral peace treaty by the year 2000.

The recent reduction of Russian military forces led to a complete rethink of military doctrine by the new Federation. On 2 November 1993 Yeltsin adopted a new military doctrine by decree, *The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.* Russia does not regard any country to be its adversary; the most realistic military threat is caused by existing and potential wombs of local warfare and armed conflicts near its borders. The new doctrine, furthermore, lacks the emphasis on large-scale strategic offensive operations so characteristic of Soviet armed forces. It gives priority to nuclear deterrence — indeed emphasises the option of first use in certain circumstances — and the development of mobile forces. In spite of the fact that General Pavel S. Grachev has more recently spoken of a level of 2.1 million troops being capable of conducting ‘local and regional wars’ along Russia’s border, Moscow adopted a plan of gradual reduction of the armed forces to a level of 1.5 million troops by the end of the decade. At the same time, the Russian military is repatriating its troops from abroad and it is restructuring and reducing its forces at home.

From the strategic point of view, Russia is seeking a defensive military posture in Northeast Asia by reducing military forces and maintaining more effective weapons. Russia’s
current economic problems allow it to place sufficient priority on multilateral maritime co-operation in the region. In the regional context, Russian economic relations with Northeast Asian countries are very important not only to accomplish its economic goal but also to stimulate multilateral maritime co-operation in the region. Most of the oil and gas production in Russia is concentrated in West Siberia and the onshore oil and gas fields in Sakhalin are depleting rapidly. Thus the Russian Far East, such as Khabarovsk, maritime territories, and Sakhalin region, will experience serious shortages of oil and electricity if proper offshore development of energy sources are not promoted. Hence, Russia initiated the so-called Vostok Programme to construct a gas pipeline system from Sakhalin and Yakutsk, through Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, North Korea, South Korea to offshore Japan, which runs a distance of 6,280 kilometres.¹⁰⁹

Russian economic goals in Northeast Asia in the next decade will be linked to a joint development relating to major Russian economic projects in the Far East, such as oil and gas. Like the Siberian summit between President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Hashimoto in 1997, both countries’ economic co-operation is likely to be better in the 21st century. Russia, for the time being, would do better to concentrate on the promotion of commercial and economic relations with South Korea and China for the purpose of integrating its Far East into the international division of labour in Northeast Asia.

IV. Russian Maritime Strategy and Concern About Co-operative Maritime Security

A. The Rationale of Russian Maritime Strategy

The new Russian military doctrine includes an expanded mission for the military. Colonel-General Igor N. Rodionov, Chief of the Russian General Staff Academy, stated that ‘Russia’s vital interests extend from the Atlantic to the Pacific and require free access to the Baltic seaports, free exists to the Baltic and Black Seas and free navigation of the World Ocean.’¹¹⁰

The new doctrine includes the following possible sources of future conflicts: (1) the aspiration of states (or coalitions of states) for world or regional hegemony; (2) the stationing of powerful armed formations near Russia’s borders to secure a military-strategic advantage; (3) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (4) political or economic pressure on, or blackmail of Russia; and (5) violation of the rights of Russian citizens in the former Republics of the USSR.¹¹¹ According to the new military doctrine, naval nuclear deterrence capabilities are important to Russian security.
Within the next decade, Russia will not continuously build-up its naval forces as it did previously in the Cold War era, as confirmed by Deputy Defence Minister A. Kokoshin. In a White Paper entitled *What Should The Russian Defence Doctrine Be?*, he stated that 'A totally new concept is needed also for Russia’s and the CIS’s navy. Moderate and non-aggressive foreign policy goals of Russia... do not require such a large high seas navy which began to be built after N. S. Khrushchev’s overthrow and which for many years had been connected to the name of Admiral P. S. [sic] Gorshkov.'

The new missions of the Pacific Fleet have to be viewed in the context of supporting Russian naval objectives. Over the previous three decades, the navy had been transformed from a basically coastal defence force into an ocean-going fleet. The new navy could not only extend its presence but also perform most of the traditional functions of the navy in waters distant from Russia. According to the new military doctrine, Russian emphasis on homeland defence and strategic stability implies more stress once more on missions close to shore for the navy. From these and other observations and from a review of Russian construction, deployment, naval writings, and naval activities, the Pacific Fleet’s missions can be summarised as encompassing four major roles: (1) strategic strike and deterrence; (2) sea control operations in the support of ballistic missile submarine force; (3) the protection of sea-lanes of communication; and (4) a peacetime instrument of foreign policy.

Russia has been unable to maintain its previously strong naval position in the Asia-Pacific region. Several factors will have an impact on the posture and capabilities of the future Pacific Fleet as follows: (1) the Russian assessment of geostrategic threats in Northeast Asia and the need for a military response; (2) economic constraints at the national level; (3) the Russian desire to ensure the security of the Pacific components of their sea-based strategic forces; and (4) foreign policy interests and resources in the region for the next century. These factors can be summarised as follows.

Russia’s posture will be influenced by the Russian assessment of the geostrategic threat in Northeast Asia and the need for a military response because of the combination of the obsolescence of ships built in the Gorshkov era and the onset of the Russian economic crisis. Despite President Yeltsin’s claim that defence spending would amount to 3.5 per cent of GDP in February 1998, Russia’s state Duma approved a 1998 defence budget of $15.6 billion which did not exceed 2.88 per cent of GDP. According to Russian figures, 91 submarines and 122 surface ships were scrapped in 1992 alone. According to Aviation
Major-General N. A. Rogov, First Deputy Commander of Naval Air Forces, naval aircraft were to be cut by 20 per cent and personnel by 30 per cent by 1992.117

The effect of this situation has been to produce a strategically rapid rundown in the number of the Pacific Fleet’s largest surface warships. On 1 January 1990 the fleet had sixteen such units;118 headed by the Minsk and Novorossiisk, classified by the Russian Navy as ‘heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers’.119 Between then and mid-1992 six cruisers were scrapped. Minsk and Novorossiisk, both overdue for refits, had to be taken out of service120 and one of two Kara-class cruisers was sent for repairs in the Ukraine; the other Tashkent was scrapped. Thus, within three years, nine of the sixteen largest ships in the Pacific Fleet, including its most powerful units, had been taken out of service.

There are severe limitations on new ship building programmes.121 A few Russian submarines and major surface ships were commissioned from 1991 to 1997: two Delta IV-class SSBNs; one Sierra II-class SSN; eight Akula II-class SSNs; six Oscar II-class SSGNs; two-three Kilo-class submarines a year for export; 4th Slava-class cruiser Admiral Lobov; two Udaloy-class destroyers; four Sveremenny-class destroyers; and two Neustrashimy-class frigates.122 New classes have continued to be commissioned under Yeltsin, but in smaller numbers than those of older ships being scrapped. Construction and refits are repeatedly halted, or progress at snail’s pace. This will result in a general decrease both in ship numbers and displacement.

Russian foreign policy interests and resources in the region for the next century will influence the fleet level.123 The naval lobby still insists on the Pacific Fleet not only to stress the key role in Russian defence, but also to support the strengthening of conventional submarine and naval aviation forces.124 The aim is to guarantee Russian naval dominance in the Seas of Barents, Kara, Okhotsk, and Japan. But Russian economic problems also mean fewer resources for the navy and it will be difficult for the Pacific Fleet to maintain even minimal strength. Its original flagship Kiro-class cruiser Pyotr Velikiy was commissioned at Severomorsk on 18 April 1998 and started its service in the Northern Fleet.125

B. Maritime Priorities and Naval Force Structure in Northeast Asia
The Russian Pacific Fleet has declined since the collapse of the communist regime (see Table 7-4).126 In September 1985, for example, the Pacific Fleet had 572 ships, 500 naval aircraft, and 134,000 personnel, while the Northern Fleet had 442 ships, 435 naval aircraft, and 119,000 men.127 By 1997 these had been reduced to 11 SSBNs of the Navaga-class (Yankee-
I) and Kal'mar-class (Delta-III) with 16 ballistic missiles each and Murena-class (Delta-I) with 12 missiles each. The general purpose forces of the fleet had in their order of battle 28 submarines (eight of them diesel), approximately 39 major surface ships comprising seven cruisers, six destroyers, 26 large anti-submarine ships, and approximately 180 naval aviation aircraft. 124

Future Pacific Fleet force levels are rather unclear. Even though President Yeltsin promised to cut Russia’s Baltic forces, including land and naval units, by 40 per cent, in December 1997 the Far Eastern forces will probably not be drastically reduced. 129 In reality in the 21st century, the Russian Navy will be dramatically smaller in the number of commissioned ships than it is today. Rear Admiral Valery Aleksin, Russian Navy, estimates that if Moscow cannot restore current economic problems, in the 21st century the Russian Navy as a whole will have no more than one aircraft carrier, two or three guided-missile cruisers, 7-10 guided-missile destroyers, 10-12 guided-missile frigates, 30 mine sweepers and 30-40 guided-missile boats. In the submarine forces, about 20-25 relatively modern multipurpose SSNs and 10 conventional submarines will be operational. 130 The Pacific Fleet is unlikely to be expanded in the 21st century to match its Cold War structure.

C. Russian Concern About Co-operative Maritime Security
In the last decade, the Russian attitude towards co-operative maritime security has changed with the emergent internal and external security environment. This section will focus on Russian policies affecting co-operative maritime security in Northeast Asia through an analysis of the historical context of Russian disarmament and arms control policy, Russia’s unilateral reduction of naval forces, and its approaches to bilateral naval arms control, maritime confidence-building measures, and maritime co-operation measures.

1. Disarmament and Arms Control Policy
   a) The Historical Context of Disarmament and Arms Control Policy.
   Russia first started to discuss naval disarmament and arms control with the United States in 1972. In the INCSEA agreement, Russian agreed to avoid and reduce the number of dangerous incidents that stemmed from the regular contact between the two navies by setting up a system of rules of the seas and regular meetings to work out details. In the 1972 SALT-I and 1979 SALT-II, Moscow agreed to limit SSBNs and SLBMs and signed a protocol
extending INCSEA to non-military ships in 1973 and, in 1989, the agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (PDMA) which includes naval activities.

In the late 1980s, as CFE got under way, the Soviets wanted naval concessions to counter their concessions on land. In the light of force asymmetries with the US Navy, the Soviets tried to diminish Western maritime advantages through a variety of initiatives, such as the limitations of naval forces based on quantitative measures, qualitative measures and geographical operational constraints. The Soviet Union advanced proposals for almost every conceivable arms control constraint on naval forces and operations.

Soviet naval arms control initiatives in the Cold War era were divided into four broad objectives. First, Moscow tried to neutralise the US maritime strategy. Basically, the Soviet Union felt threatened by what was ‘seen as the offensive nature of the US Navy and its forward strategy.’ The greater the effective distance the Soviets could put between the littoral areas of the Soviet Union and Western naval forces, the more they were able to neutralise the Western strategy for the use of the seas.

Second, since the INF Treaty removing US Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles from European territory, the Soviets recognised not only the presence of nuclear-armed US naval forces capable of striking Soviet territory, but also the relative importance of sea-based nuclear weapons, such as land-attack cruise missiles and carrier-based nuclear capable aircraft. Thus, it seemed likely that ship-launched land-attack weapon systems were the first priority of the Soviet Union. Finally, through naval arms control they tried not only to compensate or neutralise the effects of the technological advantages enjoyed by the US Navy, but also to eliminate the imbalance of naval forces.

After Gorbachev became General Secretary in March 1985, the Soviet Union proposed initiatives relating to security and arms control in East Asia. These began with Gorbachev’s July 1986 Vladivostock speech to ‘lessen tension in the Asian and Pacific regions.’ Soviet proposals proceeded from the new thinking which guided its foreign policy, and included a range of issues: (1) instituting CBMs to reduce the threat of accidental war; limiting specific forms of naval activities in the North Pacific; (2) establishing mutual co-operation to resolve regional conflicts; (3) enhancing the security of SLOCs vital to its trade; (4) initiating reciprocal US and Soviet withdrawal from existing naval bases; and (5) calling for a new and comprehensive security regime in Asia similar to the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
b) Disarmament and Arms Control Policy

(1) Disarmament Policy

Gorbachev’s new policy based on perestroika and glasnost truly gave unprecedented opportunities for radical reduction and limitation of nuclear arsenals and conventional forces, and profound revision of confrontational relations between Russia and the West. Gorbachev's new policy based on perestroika and glasnost truly gave unprecedented opportunities for radical reduction and limitation of nuclear arsenals and conventional forces, and profound revision of confrontational relations between Russia and the West. Soviet naval presence in the Pacific also declined noticeably after 1986. Under the doctrine of ‘reasonable sufficiency,’ Gorbachev cut ground forces stationed east of the Urals and reduced the scope of operations and the size of the Pacific Fleet.

By the year 1988, for example, Soviet naval activities in the Pacific were estimated to be down 50 per cent compared to 1986. They declined by another 30 per cent between 1988 and the end of 1989. On 7 December 1988 the Soviet Union announced a two-year plan to cut 260,000 men from the Soviet armed forces in Asia. The cuts were in tacit response to unilateral moves by China to withdraw many of its troops from areas close to the Sino-Soviet frontier, and then to cut the size of the Chinese armed forces by one million men between 1985 and 1987. Accordingly, Sino-Russian relationship improved with the decrease in the military confrontation which resulted from changes in other political and economic dimensions. The Soviet air and naval presence in the South China Sea had been, furthermore, reduced to a few long-range naval reconnaissance aircraft by early 1990. By late 1990, apart from its ocean-going submarines, the Soviet navy had largely withdrawn from the blue-water operations, placing its emphasis instead on training in home-waters and port.

In the wake of the demise of the old Soviet regime and the deteriorating state of the economy, the Russian Navy shrank considerably, as described above. In May 1996 the Defence Minister, General Grachev, told the Head of Japan’s Defence Agency that Russia had cut 150,000 troops from its Far Eastern deployment since January 1995, adding that the Pacific Fleet had been reduced by 50 per cent since 1985. The Russian Navy intended to further reduce the number of its ships by approximately 38 per cent by the year 2000. In view of the Russian analyst Andrei Kortunov, furthermore, the political and economic pressure for reducing the Russian military force has led to ‘a strategic decoupling, a breakdown of the cumbersome bilateral structures of negotiated arms control.’

(2) Arms Control Policy

During the 1980s, bilateral disarmament and arms control proposals regarding naval forces in the Asia-Pacific region were not serious. In February 1989 Marshal Sergei E. Akhромеев
declared that the Soviet Union would exchange 100 submarines for five or seven US aircraft carriers. The United States did not seriously consider his proposals because most US analysts recognised that many Soviet submarines would be old, obsolete ships waiting to be scrapped.  

During the Gorbachev era, the General Secretary and his top advisers offered a plethora of proposals for bilateral and multilateral naval arms control approaches. These were divided into three categories. First, geographical naval arms control, which included: establishing sanctuaries for ballistic missile submarines in the Baltic, North, Norwegian and Greenland Seas and the Pacific and Indian Oceans, where they could patrol without being hunted; dismantling both the Soviet naval facility at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam and the US naval base at Subic Bay in the Philippines; and withdrawing US and the Soviet forces from the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Second, structural naval arms control included: (1) decommissioning 100 Soviet submarines in exchange for the removal of five to seven US aircraft carriers from service and (2) limiting the number of nuclear-armed submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) with a range in excess of 600 kilometres to 400. Finally, Russian operational naval arms control proposals included: (1) limiting the navigation of nuclear-armed ships so that 'the coast of any side' would not be in range of nuclear weapons and (2) banning naval activities in international straits and major shipping lanes. Furthermore, opposition to nuclear weapons and the desirability of nuclear-free zones were key proposals in Russian elements for a Pacific security regime.

On 29 January 1992 President Yeltsin's Statement on Russian policy in the field of arms limitation and reduction was released. The Russian Parliament ratified the START-I Treaty on 4 November 1992. And after intense negotiations, the START-II Treaty was signed by the two Presidents in Moscow on 2 January 1993. START II sets a limit of 2,160 nuclear warheads on SLBMs for each side to be reached by the interim term of seven years after enforcement of START-I. This agreement phase I limit equates to approximately 51 per cent of the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal at sea, and substantially more than the approximately 29 per cent that will be at sea when START I limits have been achieved. If START II is ratified by Russia, START II-Phase II reductions include between 1,700 and 1,750 SLBM warheads by the year 2007. Counting only the third generation SSBNs and SLBMs, Russia currently has 1,840 warheads, consisting of 720 on Typhoon classes and 1,120 on Delta classes. According to a senior Russian legislator, the Lower House of Parliament, or State Duma is unlikely to ratify the START II because of widespread
opposition from communists and nationalists.\textsuperscript{152} Even if no details for the reduction in numbers of SLBMs and SSBNs are released, future trends of the development of a part of the Russian Pacific Fleet would be heavily influenced by the START II agreement. For the time being, Russian nuclear forces will be retained at START I levels until the Russian Parliament ratifies START II.

2. Maritime Confidence-Building Measures

Gorbachev proposed a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Asia (CSCA) as an OSCE model in Vladivostok in 1986. Even though his proposal was premature, in 1992-93 Russia sought to give substance to OSCE with discussions of a co-operative security zone encompassing the northern Hemisphere from Vladivostok to Vancouver, which was to take in East Asia and the North Pacific as well.\textsuperscript{153} But no serious momentum developed behind this idea either. Russia has also maintained a favourable attitude toward multilateral dialogue in Northeast Asia, in the belief that the stability of the region and co-operation among its countries would contribute to Russia's political and economic stability. In fact, Russia appears to have inherited the policy maintained by the former Soviet Union regarding the idea of promoting multilateral security dialogues among Northeast Asian countries, and has on various occasions expressed its willingness to join security dialogues, such as the APEC, in the Asia-Pacific region.

During Yeltsin's three-day state visit to Seoul in mid-November 1992, he proposed a multilateral security regime among countries in Northeast Asia in order to build confidence in the region.\textsuperscript{154} His proposals regarding Asia-Pacific security can be summarised into three areas. First, he proposed that steps be taken to start building the mechanism of multilateral negotiations in both the regional and sub-regional contexts as soon as possible. The first step in this direction could be by arranging multilateral expert consultations on security and nuclear non-proliferation in Northeast Asia. Second, a crisis settlement framework should be elaborated, preventing the growth of military tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. For this purpose, Russia proposed to organise, together with other concerned countries, a centre to resolve conflict situations in the Asian-Pacific region. The third proposal was to begin building a regional centre for strategic studies that would analyse data on defence budgets, military doctrines and deployment of armed forces of Asian-Pacific countries. Russia would be prepared to supply such a centre with relevant data on so far-classified materials, as a transparency measure.
Russian forward naval deployments in the Sea of Okhotsk are likely to be continuously diminished according to both the new international situation and the reduced size of the navy. Currently, reciprocal ships' visits are common between the Russian and Northeast Asian navies. These will probably grow from their present modest beginning in the region into a regular process of mutual confidence-building. Nonetheless, the effect of Russian efforts depends mainly on political confidence-building between Russia, the United States and Japan.

In the last decade, Russia has tried to negotiate measures similar to those agreed in the European confidence-building negotiations, including prior notification of troop manoeuvres and exchange of observers when military exercises take place. Moscow has also suggested that MCBMs should focus on the constraints of naval activities which influence on international straits and SLOCs in the Asia-Pacific region. Current Russian efforts to increase trust and confidence in the region can be explained as follows.

*Joining Multilateral Fora and International Regimes.* Russia has continued to make various proposals on CBMs through multilateral fora in the Asia-Pacific region. Among the efficient functions of ASEAN, an outstanding role has been played by the 6+5+x enlarged Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC), the ASEAN 6 + the Pacific 5 — Untied States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand — + EC and ROK. In July 1992 for the first time Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev with his counterparts from China, Vietnam and Laos were associated participants in the enlarged Manila ASEAN PMC.

At the annual ARF in Manila in 1993, after citing reductions in the Russian Pacific Fleet, Kozyrev proposed talks on CBMs in Asia, the Pacific and Indian Ocean. These would apparently include limits on the scale of naval exercises and a ban on them in international straits or areas of intensive navigation or fishing. He also proposed measures to provide freedom of navigation for naval forces as well as talks on the US and Russian bases in the region. Canada and Australia showed their interest in the Moscow initiative during recent APEC Sessions. In addition, the very existence of Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC), whose members are ASEAN countries, the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and ROK, shows the great interest of all nations in this region in having multilateral talks to solve regional problems. During President Yeltsin’s visit to China in December 1992, he signed the joint declaration calling for reducing troops along the border to a minimum level and for increased contact between Chinese and Russian military personnel.
Currently, Russia participates in international regimes, such as UN Arms Register, to increase trust and confidence as transparency measures. During the Vienna meeting in December 1997, Russia agreed with other nations of the Wassenaar Arrangement (33 weapons-producing nations, established in July 1996), about new measures to promote more transparency in arms sales and technology transfers.\(^{158}\)

**Reciprocal Ships' Visits to Build Confidence.** In the post-Cold War, the Russian Navy pursued a vigorous policy of co-operation with East Asian navies. It is presently engaged in reciprocal port visits and exchange of high-level officers with other neighbouring countries. Admittedly, reciprocal port visits are important transparency measures for the Russian Navy. Port visits have been increased since 1993: Boston (US), Pusan (South Korea), Qing Dao (China), and Cam Ranh Bay (Vietnam). On 20-27 June 1997 the 7,500-ton Russian cruiser Admiral Vinogradov visited Tokyo, the first to Japan by a Russian warship since the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War. During the visit, the ship took part in an exercise with Japanese ships, not only to exchange signals with the aim of preventing incidents at sea but also to joint manoeuvres. The courtesy port visit is perhaps the most visible sign of the warming relations between the two countries.

**Increasing Military-to-Military Contacts.** The exchange of high-level officers is also an important part of Russian confidence building measures. During Commander of the Russian Navy Admiral Feliks N. Gromov’s visit to Beijing in late 1994, he signed agreements on naval co-operation, including naval exercises. In July 1994, furthermore, the Russian Defence Minister, General Grachev, and his Chinese counterpart, General Chi Haotian, agreed on military co-operation measures, such as preventing accidental missile launches, ending the electronic jamming of communications and establishing signals to warn aircraft and ships in danger of violating the other side’s border, to reduce the danger of inadvertent escalation. During his meeting with Chi, Grachev suggested that Russian observers should attend Chinese military exercises.\(^{159}\)

Russia is also increasing the exchange of high-level officers with South Korea and Japan. Russian and South Korean Defence Ministers signed a defence protocol on 20 November 1992, calling for regular exchanges of visits by defence officials and military observers, as well as naval ship visits.\(^{160}\) The Russian Defence Minister, Igor Rodionov, visited Japan in May 1997 with a desire to discuss a wide range of maritime co-operation measures, including a programme of joint naval exercises and exchanges.\(^{161}\)
Russia has already begun exchanges of top military officials with Japan, and engaged in policy planning talks with Japan from 1992. During the talks, Russia and Japan signed an INCSEA agreement in 1993. At the Russo-Japanese military meeting in early 1994, the Russian delegation called for a European OSCE and CBM model in the region. Major General Anatoly Lukyanov stated that Russia wanted multilateral collective security everywhere. This review was mirrored by the Academy of Science in Moscow, where V. N. Bunin stated: 'The US-Japanese alliance must no longer be directed against any countries in the region.' In May 1997 President Yeltsin suggested an annual meeting between the leaders of the two countries, saying, 'we have good relations with Japan now.' During the Siberia Summit on 2 November 1997, Yeltsin and Hashimoto agreed not only to set up a their own hot line, but also to start a regular exchange of visits of high-level military officers. Moscow has similar hot lines with China and South Korea.

*Increasing Confidence Building Through the Reduction of Tension Along the Border.* Unlike the United States, Russia has maritime and boundary disputes with China and Japan. CBMs have been initiated with the border agreement and the reduced deployment of military forces in the disputed areas. Such measures have contributed positively to confidence building with other countries. In May 1997 Russian Defence Minister Rodionov visited Japan and handed over a document, saying Moscow had reduced the troops on the South Kurils to 3,500 by 1995. Russia is recently planning to reduce its military presence on the four islands of the Kuril chain situated a few miles north-east of Hokkaido, Japan. Russian military deployment on the islands remains an obstacle to improving relations between the two countries. As a first step, Russia has promised to withdraw its forces — two military units of unknown strength — from Kunashiri Island, one of four islands in the Kurils, in June 1997. Currently, Russia is considering the return of the four disputed southern Kurils to Japan by the early 21st century with negotiations on an overall bilateral peace treaty to start in January 1998.

Russia is also increasing confidence building along its 7,500 kilometre border with China. During Yeltsin's visit to Beijing, he signed an agreement which called for troops along the border to be reduced to a minimal level. During the summit between Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin on 10 November 1997, the two countries signed a border demarcation agreement, which ended three centuries of dispute. Even though it shows that the two countries have formally demarcated the 4,300 kilometre frontier common to Russia and China, the problem of the three islands in the Amur River that sparked armed collision in 1969 is still unresolved.
However, during the 40th regular meeting of the Sino-Russian Joint Commission on Shipping on Border Rivers from 6 March and 5 April 1998, the two countries reached an agreement with a desire to strengthen shipping co-operation on the three rivers — Amur, Usuri and Argun. 168

**3. Maritime Co-operation Measures**

In the last half decade, Russian attitude towards maritime co-operation measures has been changing. The Russian efforts at MCMs include combined search and rescue exercise, co-operation on sea pollution and joint development marine resources. First to be addressed are humanitarian operations.

*Humanitarian Operations: Joint Search and Rescue and Anti-Piracy Operations.* Periodic exercises are held with the other navies to increase the capability for humanitarian operations. These have included a joint US-Russian amphibious exercise to practice disaster relief techniques and search and rescue (SAR) operations to establish a regional capability. On 20 March 1994 the Pacific Fleet conducted a SAR exercise with the US Pacific Fleet in the East China Sea. On 14 September, the Russian Navy conducted a SAR exercise with the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency. In August 1995 it sent three ships and naval infantry to Hawaii for ‘Co-operation from the Sea ’95.’ This was the first naval exercise conducted in US waters and training areas ashore. On 14-16 August 1996 Russian and US naval forces conducted a joint exercise in the Sea of Japan which aimed to aid the victims of natural disasters. 169 During the Siberian summit in November 1997, Russia and Japan agreed to hold joint naval exercises, based on humanitarian operations, from 1998. 170

*Joint Developments/Ventures for Marine Resources.* Joint developments for onshore and offshore marine resources would contribute to Russian and regional economies, as well as to regional security. The foreign economic ties of the Russian Far East extend to 13 countries in the Pacific basin. Joint venture (JV) projects are continuing with regional countries. In the case of Japan, it is estimated that 55-60 per cent of all Russian-Japanese development ventures are located in the Russian Far East onshore and offshore. Japanese companies are involved in major development projects in the Far East, such as the Sakhalin offshore oil and gas development ($10-12 billion), Sakhalin paper and pulp factories ($0.7 billion), and the port of Vanino reconstruction project ($0.5 billion). 171 Fourteen Russian-Korean JVs — a total investment of $20 million — are currently registered in Russia. Three JVs include the
production of tin and gold in the Khabarovsk Territory, the Magadan and Amur regions, of oil and gas as well as coal mining in Sakhalin, and of sulphur fields in the Kuril Islands.\textsuperscript{172}

Overall, oil production in Russia is declining. Unless marine resources can be developed, the economy will suffer severely. Although offshore oil currently accounts for only 1.5 to 2.0 per cent of total oil production in Russia, this percentage will be increased because offshore oil exploration will likely be more attractive than continental production by regional investors. Russia's maritime interests are also becoming more focused on coastal waters. Most of the Soviet fishing fleet has remained in Russia but is not as active as before, largely because of the domestic economic crisis. Russian fishing operations in coastal waters have also been increasing since the mid-1980s, when most countries extended their fisheries' jurisdictions to 200 miles.\textsuperscript{173}

Russia has signed an agreement with Seoul that allows South Korean fishermen to fish the waters off the Kurils. Japan's Foreign Minister officially expressed displeasure with the agreement, stating that it would seriously impair negotiations on the Northern Territories issue.\textsuperscript{174} In March 1992 a Japanese Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs told the South Korean ambassador to Tokyo that South Korea should consider rejecting the fishing agreement. Russia needs maritime co-operation with Japan not only to increase joint development for marine resources, including fishery, but also to reduce illegal fishing.

\textit{The Control of Sea Pollution.} Sea pollution is an important consideration for Russia, along with other regional countries. The two Koreas and Japan are worried about the Russian nuclear disposal in the Sea of Okhotsk, the East Sea and an area south-east of Kamchatka. In spite of the fact that a new environmental policy is evolving, Moscow lacks a solution for disposing of nuclear propulsion reactors.\textsuperscript{175} This has created a growing environmental need to determine the extent of the problem facing the Pacific Fleet and its dumping and disposal practices. The issue of what to do with decommissioned nuclear submarines remains unresolved. By early 1995, Russian authorities had admitted to having retired some 85 submarines with their reactors on board and moored in various bases. The dumping might be a problem solving sea pollution, unless other countries can help the decommission of Russian nuclear submarines. Sea pollution related to Russian dumping might be resolved by maritime co-operation efforts.
V. Conclusion

In the past decade, the United States has shown that the major principles of its Asia-Pacific strategy include forward deployment, overseas bases and bilateral security arrangements not only to keep regional stability but also to preserve its interests. Even though US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region has been reduced, Washington will keep its forces in the region for the 21st century and maintain its bilateral relations with Japan and South Korea, which are capable of sharing the burden of the expense of maintaining US forces in their territories. Despite the fact that the Clinton administration has made multilateralism one of its policy pillars, the United States is not clear how much work is necessary to make the policy effective. However, US multilateral approaches to regional maritime security will need to develop distinct and relevant long-term security mechanisms and arrangements for the Asia-Pacific region. At present, US security concerns over the Asia-Pacific region are mixed with elements of co-operative security and selective enlargement as well as engagement.

Budgetary pressures and force reductions will influence US forward operations in the region for the 21st century. By the year 2000, the US Navy will possess 300 warships, including 12 aircraft carriers (including one reserve/training), down from its previous 600 warships plan in 1988, and will have gone through qualitative improvements in its combat capability focusing on combined, joint and littoral operations.

US recent participation in MCBMs and MCMs in Northeast Asia has been firmly established since the post-Cold War era through engaging in reciprocal port visits, exchange of high-level officials, and multilateral fora with the major powers in Northeast Asia. The US Pacific Fleet is, furthermore, trying to move in the direction of multilateral fora for security issues. In particular, US-Russian naval co-operation is increasing through exchange programmes, such as ship and officer delegation visits. The recent US policy on combined operations between regional allies, such as South Korea and Japan, is improving. Generally, the United States believes that a co-operative mechanisms might be better for dealing with non-traditional threats, such as refugee problems, sea pollution and other maritime concerns. Although the United States signed the proposals made by the 5th Western Pacific Naval Symposium, it appears unlikely that Washington will significantly change its basic attitude on structural naval arms control measures or serious operational constraints.

During the meeting between US Defence Secretary Cohen and Chinese Defence Minister General Haotian on 19 January 1998, the two countries signed a Maritime Consultative Agreement aimed at preventing incidents at sea, involving their navies.
Nevertheless, the United States regards constraints on naval operations, e.g. geographically by establishing closed or de-militarised seas around the Asia-Pacific, such as the Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk and East China Sea, as a way of undermining its forward maritime strategy. In the past, it has demonstrated its willingness to fight to preserve freedom of navigation on the high seas. Moreover, Washington is reluctant to accede to any accord which would limit or constrain freedom of the sea, an American foreign policy objective that dates from the founding of the United States and has a strong support in international law. The US approach to operational naval arms control is focused on the prevention of naval incidents at sea, rather than geographical constraint measures.

US approaches to maritime confidence building measures are also focused on transparency and communication measures, such as joining the UN Arms Register, exchange of high-level officers and reciprocal port visits, with other countries. In maritime co-operation measures, Washington emphasises combined efforts not only to prevent regional conflicts but also protect SLOCs. Multilateral maritime co-operation for the defence of SLOCs and humanitarian operations, to include China, Russia, Japan, Korea, and the US, is now widely supported in East Asia.

Russia, with the adoption of its new military doctrine and given its economic and internal difficulties, will not be able to fulfil a number of the missions for which the Soviet navy in this region was built and trained. Russia’s recent shrinking naval presence in its Far East shows a further loss of credible political power, and has weakened the country’s geostrategic position in Northeast Asia relative to its neighbours, which could affect the implementation of its regional maritime security policy. But Russia remains one of two nuclear superpowers, and has one of the largest armies in the region. Moscow is reforming its naval forces into a new group, including logistics and command systems. The creation of a qualitatively new and more modern navy is the final aim of this reform. For the 21st century, the navy might remain capable of defending Russia’s national interests on the high seas within the limits of defence sufficiency and despite considerable reductions to relieve the nation’s economic burden. The changed strategic environment and the economic position of Moscow have reversed the previous trend toward increasing the forces of the Pacific Fleet as one of its most powerful. Naval force-projection capabilities will also continue to decline in number of ships and combat readiness.

With the end of the Cold War, Russia has improved its naval relationship with China, Japan and South Korea. It has also been trying to encourage greater stability in the North
Pacific through co-operative activities. In October 1991, for example, Russian Foreign
Minister Boris Pankin and Japanese Foreign Minister Nakayama Taro agreed that the two
countries should have security talks to prevent accidents at sea between naval vessels. In 1993
the two navies signed the INCSEA agreement, and in September 1992 Japanese and Russian
policy-makers for the first time discussed 'an agreement on rescue operations at sea and co-
operation measures in outer space.' Recently, Russian priorities in the region seem not only
to balance its regional trade and security relations, but also to increase arms sales in the
region, particularly to China. Russia will continue to wish to play an active political role in
the region, but its capability to become a strong and independent actor relative to most states
in Asia will remain limited. On 18 November 1992 Russia and South Korea signed a bilateral
agreement aimed at promoting stability in the Pacific region. Russian and US measures for
relaxation of tensions in Northeast Asia are being pursued with some vigour.

Although some Russian proposals are relatively insignificant, they may prove useful
in building confidence in the region. For example, the exchange of naval staffs and ships
between Russia and other Northeast Asian countries could have a confidence building impact.
These exchanges have helped not only to reinforce a new spirit of co-operation but also to
contribute to subsequent negotiations. Even if the attempt to limit deployments runs up
against the entrenched interests of some countries, most governments will find it hard to
oppose building confidence through the regular exchange of observers. Prior notification of
exercises and perhaps even challenge inspections could best be negotiated on a bilateral basis
and gradually extended to multilateral arrangements which focus on the vital Northeast Asian
region. By their own example and without interfering in other countries' affairs, Moscow and
Washington could provide the lead in drawing new partners into the discussion of multilateral
maritime co-operation and other forms of co-operation. This would assist in building a
mechanism of regional co-operation among all countries of Northeast Asia.

In the last decade, the Russian government built confidence through its apparent shift
towards a defensive military doctrine and strategy by openly disclosing in a white paper why
it needed a fleet, how it would be employed in peacetime and war, and what size and type
forces it would have. Within a Russian approach towards co-operative maritime security, the
Soviet traditional approach should be entirely discarded. The Russian multilateral approach is
designed not only to minimise the possibilities of naval actions detrimental to the interests and
security of others, but also to seek the collective use of navies in developing co-operative
security. This trend appears in Rear Admiral Aleksin's in *US Naval Institute Proceedings*.
The opened doors and people-to-people policies will bring our two peoples together, strengthen confidence between our two governments, and make the world more reliable and stable. He also proposed a number of measures, such as mutual consultation on prevention of shipping accidents, and enhancing naval understanding and co-operation.

In tandem with the US concern regarding co-operative maritime security, Russia has recently shown interest in a new agenda on co-operative maritime security in the region. Instead of the concentration on naval arms control during the Cold War, Russia is likely to try a multilateral maritime co-operation approach in Northeast Asia. Even if past Soviet policy sought to neutralise American forward maritime strategy and regional operation, the Russian Navy will, in contrast, seek a wider role for its participation in multilateral responses to regional disputes and conflicts. In addition to a stable and jointly managed strategic relationship with Russia, regional countries need Moscow's co-operation on many other issues, such as non-proliferation, conflict resolution, peace-keeping, economic co-operation and sea pollution, all of which are deeply intertwined.

Endnotes


8. Chalmers Johnson and E. B. Keebn, 'The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy', Foreign Affairs (hereafter FA), Vol. 74, No. 4 (July-August 1995), p. 103. During President Clinton's official visit to South Korea and Japan in April 1996, he declared that US forces, including 100,000 troops based mainly in Japan and South Korea, would stay in the region to help maintain peace and stability. See Michael Richardson, 'Military Role for Japan worries Asian Leaders', The International Herald Tribune (hereafter IHT), 14 May 1996, p. 4.


12. Department of the Navy, Forward ...From the Sea (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1995).
armed about the future of the navy'.


25. ... from the sea', p. 2.

27. Forward ...From the Sea, p. 1.
28. For a thorough and comprehensive analysis of this point, see Capt. Scott A. Fedorchak, USN, 'It must be Joint', UNIP, vol. 119, no. 6 (June 1993), pp. 64-5; Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare, pp. 24-5; and Lt-Cdr Thomas C. Baus, USN, Forward ...From the Sea: Intelligence Support to Naval Expeditionary Forces (US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, April 1996) at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/baus.html.
29. Forward ...From the Sea, p. 1.
30. ...From the Sea, p. 2.
31. For further elaboration, see RADM Joseph C. Strasser, USN, 'President's Notes', NWCR, vol. 66, no. 3 (Summer 1993), p. 5; Lt. General John H. Cushman, US Army (Ret.), 'Manoeuvre...From the Sea', UNIP, vol. 119, no. 4 (April 1993), p. 47; ...From the Sea, pp. 2-5; and Admiral Frank B. Kelso, USN and General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC, 'The Naval Service is Joint', UNIP, vol. 119, no. 5 (May 1993), pp. 45-6.
44. C. E. Myers, Jr., 'Not So Fast', UNIP, vol. 121, no. 6 (June 1995), p. 31.
47. The opinions expressed in personal interviews of retired Capt. James A. Barber, US Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, United States, 3 September 1995 and James J. Tritten, US Naval Doctrine Command, Virginia, United States, 15 September 1995.
In 1991, the Conventional Arms Control Cell of the Navy's Strategic Concept Group (OP603) informally used the following phrase: 'Just Say No to Naval Arms Control!' Quoted in Charles A. Meconi and Boris N. Makeev, *New Opportunities for US-Russian Naval Co-operation* (Seattle, Wash.: Institute for Global Security Studies, 1995), pp. 16-17 (see footnote 19).

Quoted in 'Naval Arms Control: Where do We go from Here?', *NF*, vol. 10, no. 4 (1989), p. 59.


In 1992, for example, the United States also suggested that its forces in Korea and Japan will be reduced to about 45,000 by the mid-1990s. For further elaboration, see Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asia-Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 1990) and *A Strategic Framework for the Asia Pacific Rim: Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 1992).

Ibid., p. 29.


On the other hand, Captain Roger Barnett argued that the level of violence of future crises be less predictable because advanced weapons can play a stabilizing role. For details of his point, see 'US Strategy. Freedom of the Sea and Crisis Management SR', *SR*, vol. 20, no. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 32-41.


The new Base Force plan called for the US to not only reduce defence spending by approximately 20 per cent by FY1995, but to reduce its force levels by 20-25 per cent. For example, military manpower were reduced from 2.0 million to 1.63 million to 360,000 between 1991 and 1997. It also called for naval combat ships to be cut from 536 to 448. This plan also requested for defence spending drop to only about 18 per cent of federal spending by FY97, and to only 3.6 per cent of the GNP.


These submarines were retired to not only save money but also comply with the START-I Treaty. See ‘Notebook’, UNIP, vol. 122, no. 12 (December 1993), p. 111.


The US Navy plans to procure 30 new attack submarines as follows: (1) the first submarine in 1998; (2) the second in 2000; and (3) the third in 2001. For a useful and manageable description of this point, see Norman Polmar, ‘Will There Be a Sea Change?’, UNIP, vol. 121, no. 2 (February 1995), p. 89.


For an example of this opinion, see Commander James McCoy, RN, ‘Ante Up’, UNIP, vol. 116, no. 9 (September 1990), pp. 34-9.


Even though the US Department of Defense promotes the bilateral security relationship with China, its Congressional and public object to the transfer of military technologies. For a thorough and comprehensive analysis, see Barbara Opall, ‘DoD wants More Reciprocal From China’, DN, 25-31 August 1997, p. 14 and ‘China waiver can wait’, DN, 26 January-1 February 1998, p. 18.


This meeting is organised by the Institute on Global Conflict and Co-operation at the University of California in order to examine possibilities for building trust and co-operation among six countries in the region, such as Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and US.


100. For a comprehensive analysis for an agreement to reduce troop levels, see The Arms Control Reporter (1994), pp. 850 A.1-2; Meconis and Makeev, New Opportunities for US-Russian Naval Cooperation, p. 57 and Geory I. Mamrykin, 'Problems of the USSR with Asia and the Pacific Region Countries', in Kap-Yong Jeong (ed.), Co-operations Between Korea and Russia (Seoul: Institute of East-West Studies, Yonsei University, 1995), p. 72.
101. From north to south: Etorofu (Iturup), Kunashiri (Kunashir), Shikotan (Shikotan or Ostrov Shpanberg) and the islets group Habomai (Ploskoe Ostrova). For more comprehensive analysis of the dispute, see Alexi Arbatov, 'Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives', International Security (hereafter IS), vol. 18, no. 2 (Autumn 1993), p. 24; Ralph Cossa; Atsumasa Yamamoto and Margo Cooper, The Japan-US Alliance and Security Regimes in East Asia, A Workshop Report (Tokyo:


112. Quoted in Smith, ‘What ...From the Sea Didn’t say’, p. 21. In particular, P. S. Gorshkov, which are used by the author, is wrong, and the correct initials are S. G.

...


150. During the Helsinki Summit on 21 March 1997, President Clinton and President Yeltsin expressed the importance of further reductions in strategic offensive arms to strengthen strategic stability and international security. Nevertheless, they delayed the phase period for START II from 2003 to 2007.


157. Henry I. Mamrykin, 'Problems of the USSR Relations with Asia and the Pacific Region Countries', in Jeong (ed.), *Co-operations Between Korea and Russia*, p. 83.


161. Mark Galetti, 'Decline and Fall: Russia looks East.' *Jane's Intelligence Review*, vol. 9, no. 7 (July 1997), p. 293.


165. Before the withdrawal of its own forces, Russia had 3,500 troops, down from 7,000 in 1992.


168. 'Russia, China set to finalise Border Talks', *JDW*, 5 November 1997 and 'China, Russia resolve Nearly All Land Disputes', *JDW*, 19 November 1997, p. 13.


170. 'Navies Practise Relief Effort', *JDW*, 14 August 1996, p. 10.


173. Russia established its EEZs on 9 April 1977, which barred the Japanese fishing industry from the its EEZs. For further elaboration of fishery disputes with the EEZ issues around the Kurils, see Giulio Pontecorvo, ‘Fisheries of the Northwest Pacific: A Statistical Overview’, James B. Marsh (ed.), *Resources and Environment in Asia’s Marine Sector* (Washington, DC: Taylor and Francis, 1992), pp. 27-8.


176. Even though they signed the agreement during the symposium in November 1996, this was not a mandatory agreement. The agreement included operational and strategic level MCBMs, such as notification of naval activities, exchange of fleet programmes, naval exercise observation and presentation of naval activities. For more details, see Vice Admiral Hirotarou Hayashi, JMSDF (Ret.), ‘History of WPNS’, a paper presented for *11th International Conference on the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) Studies*, Tokyo, 17-18 November 1997.


179. Rear Admiral Valery Aleksin, Russian Navy, ‘We are Ready when You are’, *UNIP*, vol. 119, no. 3 (March 1993), p. 57.
## Table 7-1 Changing US Naval Forces, 1988-21st Century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Type</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1988</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>BUR</th>
<th>QDR</th>
<th>Decrease (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Submarines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-SSN</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>45-55</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-SSBN</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Aircraft Carriers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-CV/N*</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-V/STOL</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LHA/LHD/LPN)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Surface Combatants**</td>
<td></td>
<td>194</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes

* It includes one reserve aircraft carrier.
** It includes cruisers, destroyers and frigates

Table 7-2  Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs) Force Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic /Force</th>
<th>Win one major regional conflict</th>
<th>Win one major regional conflict with hold in second</th>
<th>Win in two near simultaneous major regional conflicts (\text{(Pentagon's selected options)})</th>
<th>Win in two near simultaneous regional conflicts plus additional duties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>8 Active Divisions</td>
<td>10 Active Divisions</td>
<td>10 Active Divisions</td>
<td>12 Active Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Reserve Divisions equivalents</td>
<td>6 Reserve Division equivalents</td>
<td>15 Reserve Enhanced equivalents</td>
<td>8 Reserve Division equivalents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>8 Carrier Battlegroups</td>
<td>10 Carrier Battlegroups</td>
<td>11 Carrier Battlegroups</td>
<td>12 Carrier Battlegroups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>5 Active Brigades</td>
<td>5 Active Brigades</td>
<td>5 Active Brigades</td>
<td>5 Active Brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Reserve Division</td>
<td>1 Reserve Division</td>
<td>1 Reserve Division</td>
<td>1 Reserve Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>10 Active Fighter Wings</td>
<td>13 Active Fighter Wings</td>
<td>13 Active Fighter Wings</td>
<td>14 Reserve Fighter Wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Reserve Fighter Wings</td>
<td>7 Reserve Fighter Wings</td>
<td>7 Reserve Fighter Wings Force Enhancement</td>
<td>10 Reserve Fighter Wings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7-3 The Phases of US Force Reductions in the Asia-Pacific Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Personnel</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1,978</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1,530</td>
<td>36,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy shore-based</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>6,498</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>3,489</td>
<td>21,511</td>
<td></td>
<td>14,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>15,440</td>
<td></td>
<td>14,400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Billets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Korea</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Personnel</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>27,260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Shore-Based</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>1,987</td>
<td>9,513</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,513</td>
<td>8,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philippines</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Personnel</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td>relocated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Shore-based</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>4,328</td>
<td></td>
<td>elsewhere</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>900</td>
<td></td>
<td>900</td>
<td></td>
<td>in region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>8,700</td>
<td>2,818</td>
<td>5,882</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Total</td>
<td>109,200</td>
<td>15,250</td>
<td>11,310</td>
<td>83,640</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>72,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Australia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Singapore</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>109,440</td>
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Notes

a. Korean troop reduction deferred in light of North Korean threat

Table 7-4  Reductions of Russian Naval Forces in the Pacific Fleet, 1990-1997

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Notes

1. Submarines:
   SSBN: Nuclear-fuelled SSB, SSGN: SSN with dedicated non-ballistic missile launchers,
   SSN: Nuclear-fuelled submarine, SS: conventional submarine  SSG: SS with non-ballistic
   missile launchers
2. Major surface ships:
   CV: Aircraft Carrier, CC: Cruiser, DD: Destroyer, FF: Frigate

Chapter VIII. Chinese and Japanese Perspectives on Co-operative Maritime Security in Northeast Asia

China has recently taken enormous steps towards providing the financial and material backing necessary for viable naval power projection in the Asia-Pacific region. Acquisition of advanced arms from Russia has accelerated this process, highlighted in 1995 by delivery of the first of four Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines, and in January 1997 the finalising of a contract for two Sovremenny-class guided-missile destroyers, which will be delivered in 1999-2000. Taking together the China’s currently existing weapons, such as their nuclear attack (SSNs) and ballistic submarines (SSBNs), China has become a major naval player in the Pacific. The expanding capabilities of the Chinese Navy all seen as evidence that China is seeking to establish hegemony over the region. In response to this trend, some countries have reacted by upgrading their own military capabilities, leading security analysts to raise the alarm about an arms race in the Pacific.

China’s past record in using force in territorial disputes in the South China Sea is not reassuring, and its attitude as to whether future territorial conflict can be solved multilaterally is ambiguous. Even though China takes part in regional fora organised by ASEAN, Beijing refuses to agree to seek a solution on a multilateral basis. China’s regional maritime policy is based on bilateral negotiations. Nevertheless, Beijing stresses the importance of joint developments for offshore resources as maritime co-operation measures. As confidence-building measures, China first published a White Paper, entitled China: Arms Control and Disarmament in December 1995. Today China is much more concerned over regional maritime security and has signed with the United States a Maritime Consultative Agreement, aimed at preventing incidents at sea, on 19 January 1998.1

Japan has a modernised and highly sophisticated Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF), although it is constitutionally restricted to operating only in a defensive role. It is likely that Japan will emerge as a military superpower in Northeast Asia in the 21st century, when its enormous economic potential is taken into account. The grave concerns of the Asia-Pacific region are now focused on what effect the Japanese military build-up will bring about in the post-Cold War situation in the region.2 The steady expansion of its military capabilities and an increased emphasis on forward defence have raised concern in the rest of the region regarding Japan’s future role in the Asian strategic order. Tokyo has expanded its sea lanes
defence perimeter to 1,000 nautical miles, and defence spending has exceeded the self-imposed one per cent GNP ceiling.

Japan insists that now, with the reduction of the US naval presence, Japan’s sea routes must be protected by its own capability. The growth of Chinese naval forces also provides Japan with a pretext to strengthen its naval power. According to the New Defence Programme Outline in November 1995, Japan adopts a clearly neo-realist approach to East Asian security by maintaining a strong defensive capability. The new guideline for US-Japan defence co-operation, which was released in June 1997, allows the Japan’s Self-Defence Forces (SDFs) not only to play a greater role but also to work more closely with the United States. Tokyo is also concerned about co-operative maritime security, focusing on military and non-military threats, such as sea pollution, piracy and the protection of sea lines of communications (SLOCs). In this context, Japan hosted the 11th International SLOC conference in November 1997.

The following discussion will focus successively on Chinese and Japanese policies toward co-operative maritime security in Northeast Asia: their geo-strategic goals and relations, maritime strategies, commitments in the region and naval missions. Finally, it will offer conclusions as to the possible implications for approaches to co-operative maritime security in the region. Where relevant, attention is placed on trends as well as on the present-day situation. The discussion begins with an analysis of China’s geo-strategic relations and goals.

I. Chinese Geo-strategic Goals and Relations
The collapse of the Soviet Union caused Chinese leaders to re-examine and adjust their foreign policy in the 1990s. China moved quickly to establish ties with the former Soviet republics and Asian countries such as Vietnam and India. The traditionally wary bilateral relations between China and Japan as well as South Korea have taken more positive turns in recent years as well. Sino-Japanese relations were given a boost in November 1992, when the Japanese Emperor visited China for the first time in history. In May 1993 China and Japan agreed to initiate a bilateral security dialogue. In supporting this move, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, said that it was premature to begin building regional security institutions. South Korea and China established diplomatic relations in August 1992, and the two countries’ relationship has blossomed, particularly in the economic sphere. In 1993, as
result of their improved relationship, China and South Korea held bilateral talks to reach understandings and approaches on the increasingly tense situation on the Korean peninsula.\(^5\)

China hopes to build a good relationship with the United States. As President Jiang Zemin stated, ‘a good relationship with the United States is not only in the immediate interests of the two nations, but is also aimed at the world’s overall situation and its future.’\(^6\) Furthermore, the Chinese state that Sino-US ties should be based on equality, and as two great nations, China and the United States should carry major responsibility in safeguarding world peace, stability and development. There was, however, considerable distress at the Bush administration’s decision to sell F-16 jet fighters to Taiwan, even though that decision was probably a reaction to the Chinese purchases of Su-27 fighters from the Russians. Hence, the Chinese have tried not only to persuade the Americans and their allies to furnish military hardware on favourable terms but also to influence the West not to sell arms to Taiwan.

China’s relations with the United States are likely to be relatively stable, but will from time to time be significantly affected by a number of variables. The most important of these are likely to be (1) domestic economic and political stability in China, the means used to preserve it, and the potential for unrest within China to produce large outflows of refugees to other countries in the region or the US; (2) Chinese restraint in transferring nuclear or missile weapons or related technology to third countries, (3) Chinese policy toward the Korean Peninsula; (4) Chinese policies toward Taiwan; (5) developments in Hong Kong under Chinese sovereignty, and (6) trade and investment policies, including trade disputes over intellectual property rights.\(^7\) During the official visit of President Zemin in October 1997, China and the United States pledged to work together to guarantee peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region for the 21st century.

In the early 1990s Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and support for a solution in Cambodia enabled China to improve relations. Since then, Sino-Russian relations have markedly improved, building upon Mikhail Gorbachev’s ground-breaking visit in May 1989 and the April 1990 decision by the two former antagonists to work towards the reduction of troops along their common border. In 1993 similar bilateral agreements were signed with antagonists in Asia, Vietnam and India.\(^8\) Since then, the Sino-Russian relationship has achieved a number of bilateral commitments, including efforts to establish a demilitarised zone extending 100 km on either side of their border, closer military-to-military ties, a five-year agreement governing military visits and the exchange of force level and doctrinal information, and an agreement in 1994 to reduce the likelihood of military conflict between
the two countries. Much of this process came in the wake of President Boris Yeltin’s visit to China in December 1992. At that time, the two sides cemented friendly relations with the signing of over 20 documents on co-operation, including agreements not to take part in alliances aimed against one another, on military and technological co-operation, on space exploration, on nuclear power generation, and on trade and economic co-operation. China and Russia also signed an agreement to govern the reduction of military forces on the Sino-Russian border to strictly defensive levels by 2000. In November 1993, during a visit to Beijing by the Russian Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev, the two sides agreed to boost their number and level of military exchanges and communication channels and to inform one another about military doctrine and manoeuvres. Following his visit, Grachev said that the two sides had ‘agreed [that] security in the Asia-Pacific region will be more durable, if [their] bilateral relations are strong.’

China has resolved all but two or three border issues with Russia. During the official visit of President Yeltin on 24-27 April 1996, Russia signed a historic security Agreement on Enhancing Trust in Military Arena of Border Areas setting up a 600,000-square mile demilitarised zone along the border of China, Russia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Taijkistan. The two presidents also signed a Sino-Russian Joint Statement on 25 April, declaring a ‘strategic partnership.’ In December 1996 China concluded border pacts with those countries. The multilateral pact includes a non-aggression clause and requires signatory nations to notify each other of any significant military activities taking place within 100 km of the border. In April 1997 China signed the troop reduction Agreement on Reciprocal Disarmament in Border Areas with Russia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Taijkistan. Sino-Russian relations have improved dramatically and fundamentally in the last few years. The two nations now share a mutual interest in promoting co-operation and stability in their border areas, resolving territorial disputes, and reducing their substantial military deployments in the region. With Russia’s internal problems and the low readiness of its military establishment, Beijing does not currently perceive it as a military danger. Instead, both countries are co-operating in joint economic development and commercial opportunities. Most significantly, China is acquiring military technology and arms from Russia at a pace that is alarming to East Asian countries.

Sino-Japanese relations are seen by both sides as stable and pragmatic. No major strains or contentious issues except for the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands are at the forefront today, and the Chinese even appear to have tempered their concerns about
Japanese participation in international peacekeeping operations. As a result, at the official level, relations are good and improving. Yet the relationship still rests on a fragile base, given the level of mistrust that lies just below the surface on both sides. While the growing level of economic co-operation and integration helps promote future regional stability, some economic competition is inevitable and, as previously argued, could be potentially destabilising. In the military aspect, the Chinese no longer have a self-evident interest in encouraging the expansion of Japanese military power and are beginning to share Russia’s long standing concern over the prospects of a greater Japanese role in the Pacific military balance.

From the strategic point of view, China changed from preparing for a major war with the Soviet Union to that of limited wars and potential conflicts on its periphery. In the spring of 1985 the CMC of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ordered the PLA to draft a new defence strategy, to re-focus its strategy away from a major nuclear war towards ‘local and limited conventional wars,’ concentrated around China’s borders. A new strategy has been, however, evolving since 1985 to replace the doctrine of ‘people’s war.’ During the mid-1980s, China commenced revising its defence strategy from preparations for a defensive land war to a configuration for rapid deployment and intensive response to conflicts around its periphery. As a result, from 1985 to 1988 the PLA decreased its forces by one million personnel from 4.2 and 3.2 million and the number of military regions from eleven to seven. Beijing’s current military philosophy appears in the strategist Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War*: ‘The highest realisation of warfare is to attack the enemy’s plans; next is to attack their alliances; next to attack their army; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities.’ To put it more simply, the best war is to be fought by attacking the strategy of an adversary.

Given the change in strategic doctrine and the impact technology had on the outcome of the Gulf War, the Chinese government began strongly emphasising the development of high-technology weapons as the policy of active defence (*jiji fangyu*). Like China’s economy as a whole, a new military is under construction. Compared with the west, most of China’s current inventory of equipment and weapons systems is remarkably obsolete.

While the Russian threat has been eliminated and the United States is reducing its forces in the region, China will probably intensify efforts to build a more powerful military. It will do so to support nationalistic foreign policy objectives and to guard against US dominance as the sole superpower in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, the 14th CCP Congress in the Autumn of 1992 and the 8th National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 1993 handed a victory to the advocates of modernisation. Admiral Liu Huaqing, a former
Navy Commander known for his strong advocacy of modernisation, was named a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. He and Zhang Zhen, another advocate of modernisation, were appointed Vice-Chairmen of the Party Military Commission. Both leaders strongly demanded increased funding for modernising equipment and professionalising the services. The military won a 13.5 per cent budget increase during the NPC sessions. At the CCP Congress in September 1997, President Zemin announced the reduction of 500,000 troops within three years to pursue qualitative advantages throughout military modernisation programmes.

The modernisation of China's naval and air forces has much wider purposes and implications than the rivalry with Taiwan. It is clear China and Taiwan are acquiring new weapons systems because of a mutually perceived threat, despite apparently improving relations in cross-straits dialogue. While the old Kuomintang commitment to retake the mainland has been forsworn and is obviously unrealistic, a Chinese naval and air blockade of Taiwan in the event of a formal declaration of independence is all too likely. Consequently, it appears that a classic action-reaction arms race spiral is already occurring between China and Taiwan with regard to air and naval forces. As China modernises its submarine force with nuclear attack submarines and Russian Kilo-class conventional submarines, Taiwan is acquiring modern anti-submarine warfare surface ships and attempting to acquire (thus far without success) new conventional submarines. In response to China's acquisition of third generation Russian Su-27s, Taiwan is obtaining F-16s from the US and Mirage 2000s from France.

Over the last decade, the PLA has been modernising its naval forces and reducing its force structure from about four to three million. China's military modernisation covers all fronts, including such basic items as tanks (see Table 8-1). Overall force modernisation has emphasised: (1) increasing unit mobility and training in combined arms operations; (2) improving logistics, combat support and command and control; (3) introducing imported weapons systems, such as Russian-built Su-27 aircraft and SA-10 air defence systems; (4) developing surface ships, such as Luhu-class frigates, building Song-class submarines; and (5) developing a multi-role fighter aircraft (see Table 8-2). China has also recently acquired in-flight refuelling technology to extend the range of its fighter and fighter-bomber forces. It is not clear which country supplied the technology; sources variously refer to Russia, Israel and Iran. China is already believed to have reconfigured a couple of bombers to serve as tankers,
and it is working on training its pilots so that by the year 2000 it will have a significant fleet of fighter planes and bombers that can be refuelled in mid-air.

China has been especially active in the past several years in building up its military capabilities, as evidenced by steadily increasing military budgets and a stepped-up programme of weapon and weapon technology acquisition from abroad, especially from Russia. Between 1990 and 1996, the official Chinese military budget grew by nearly 40 per cent. However, while this may give some indication as to overall trends of military spending, it reveals nothing about vast ‘off-budget’ revenues which augment military spending. More importantly, no reliable figures are available on the investments generated by arms sales or by the armed forces’ increasingly lucrative civilian sector in China and abroad. These funds allow the PLA to purchase advanced weaponry and weapon technology from abroad to enhance its military capabilities significantly.

Chinese wariness of Japan’s long-term strategic intentions remains high. Beijing is particularly concerned at Japan’s potential quickly to rearm and particularly to adapt its domesticated technological capabilities to both nuclear and conventional weapons. China is also concerned over the new Guidelines on US-Japanese Co-operation in 1997, which allow the JSDF to play a greater role for peace and stability in the region. Beijing is assuming that Tokyo is aiming to become a regional military power. One assessment asserts: ‘Japan’s goal is to build its self-defence forces into well-trained crack troops equipped with the world’s advanced weapons and to become a military force not to be ignored. Observers have predicted that in the near future, Japan will become a regional military power.’

From the economic point of view, the growth of China’s military expenditure over the past few years has been one of the main arguments of the ‘theory of military threat from China.’ Although reliable data on China’s military outlays are difficult to acquire, available reports suggest that such spending declined slightly in the mid-1980s. Since China introduced reform programmes in the late 1970s, for example, its defence spending had dropped from 4.7 per cent of GNP in 1978 to 1.6 in 1988. After the army won the leadership’s gratitude in 1989 for crushing the Tiananmen democracy movement, Deng Xiaoping agreed to a significant increase in the military budget. Premier Li Peng justified the increase by saying that the Chinese military should ‘make further efforts to become a revolutionary, modern and regular army with increased combat effectiveness and defence capabilities.’ During the 1990s, China’s defence spending has been rising steadily every year. The budget rose 15 per cent in 1991, 12 per cent in 1992, 12.4 per cent in 1993, and 12.7 per cent in 1997 (see Table
China's official defence budget was set at $7.49 billion FY95 and $9.6 billion FY97. Nevertheless, many military experts suspect that the actual defence spending is two or three times higher than the official figure.

The Chinese, by not being more transparent in their official budget, have contributed to regional concerns about their military intentions. Beijing places much of its military spending off the official budget. This includes profits from defence exports, the commercial activities of more than 10,000 business run by PLA units, and funds spent on some major weapon acquisition, R&D, and pensions. International arms sales, in particular, involvement of military units in a wide variety of enterprise and trading activities, and, possibly, even in smuggling and informal 'piracy', are among the ways in which military units make up gaps in budgets and have proven difficult for central authorities to control completely, despite repeated 'shake-ups' in command assignments. Hence, there are different estimates of China's actual military spending. For example, the US General Accounting Office says that China's defence spending is three times higher than its official defence budget. The IISS estimated that China's military spending was over $28 billion in 1994 — nearly four times the official figure. The RAND Corporation's estimates for the real PLA budget in 1994 range from a low of some $76 billion to a high of about $140 billion.

II. Chinese Maritime Strategy and Perspective on Co-operative Maritime Security

A. The Main Context of Chinese Maritime Strategy

1. Maritime Strategic Concept

Naval doctrine and strategy were in transition between the 1950s and 1960s. Despite the shift in its perception of maritime threats, Chinese naval strategy changed very little during the decade of the 1960s, and naval doctrine was no more than an extension of the Maoist 'people's war' at sea. Primarily defensive in nature, the navy's main mission was to support the army in defending the land and sea approaches. The narrow 'coastal defence strategy' began to be tentatively revised with the improvements in naval capabilities, in particular, from the early 1970s, as a sizeable number of warships and submarines entered service. In spite of the fact that Mao Zedong authorised a major naval expansion programme in 1975, the radicals blocked it on the grounds that China was a 'continental' power, making a large navy unnecessary. With the death of Mao in 1976 and the resultant purge of the radical faction he protected, naval strategic thought was liberated and allowed to proceed beyond coastal defence.
Although military professionals discussed and put forward their own ideas, naval thinkers also began to seriously and personally tackle the formulation of naval strategy. 'People’s war at sea' was quietly replaced with more sophisticated concepts. In particular, the ambitious 'offensive defence' doctrine was developed by Admiral Liu Huaqing, who first appeared in the early 1980s as part of Deng’s campaign to modernise China’s armed forces. Mao’s emphasis on revolutionary ‘people’s war’ in the country-side has been also replaced by a set of much more modern ideas to push China’s ‘defensive perimeter’ far out to sea. By 1983, Chinese naval strategy was still undeveloped, but it did contain elements of sea denial, sea control, projection of power ashore, presence and strategic deterrence. The continuing coastal defence mission had been redefined in terms of modern naval warfare on the high seas rather than guerrilla warfare on the beaches.

During the 1980s, the Chinese gave up the Maoist doctrine of ‘people’s war,’ which relied on ill-equipped manpower against any invading enemy. In June 1985 the Chinese changed their military strategy from ‘people’s war’ to ‘people’s war under modern conditions,’ focusing on from general war to ‘local and limited wars’ around their strategic borders. Chinese military officials argued that ‘wars for the remainder of the century would be small and intensive, would increase due to the growing military strength of regional power and would be located around China’s periphery.’ China has not only used violence to support its claims and national interests but also made clear that it will pursue them. Since 1987, China’s military strategy has focused on five types of limited wars, two of which are important: (1) small-scale conflicts restricted to contested border territory and (2) conflict over territorial sea and islands. In 1995 China made more clear commitments to apply the UNCLOS to the South China, but this was done while asserting that the UNCLOS terms would be applied only on the basis of Chinese assertions of sovereignty. China has, however, claimed sovereignty over all islands, sandbars, banks, and islets in the South China Sea. During the NPC meeting in March 1993, military representatives expressed concern over the characteristics of modern warfare and the lessons of Gulf War. Since then the CMC accepted ‘limited local wars under high-tech conditions’ as PLA military strategy.

Under the new military strategic concept, the Chinese have been trying to build up the navy and airforce based on high-technology and quick-strike forces. Furthermore, Beijing seems to be trying to acquire an aircraft carrier. In their history of China’s nuclear navy, John Lewis and Xue Litai describe the shift in doctrine emphasis:

Since the late 1980s, navy planners have called for changing from a coastal defence (jinhai fangyu) strategy to an offshore defence (jinyang fangyu) strategy,
which would extend the defence perimeter to between 200nm and 400nm from the coast, and even more in the case of the South China Sea islands. The navy hopes to have a so-called offshore navy on patrol by the year 2000 and a blue-water navy (yuanyang haijun) operating by 2050.46

Realising the importance of a revolution in military affairs (RMA) and information warfare, the Chinese concept is currently changing from Deng Xiaoping’s military strategy, ‘the people’s war under modern conditions,’ to Jiang Zemin’s, ‘a future war under high-tech conditions’ to win local and limited war.47 In the Jiang Zemin era, China’s new military strategic concept combines active defence with the deployment of its military forces beyond the country’s borders. Concomitantly, the navy has developed a new ‘offshore active defence’ doctrine,48 intended to ‘effectively control territorial waters extending to the boundaries of its 200 mile EEZs, although it stretches to more than 1,000 km in the South China Sea if the Spratlys are included.’49 This requires the PLAN’s forward presence to achieve an ocean-going force in the 21st century.

Naval Missions and Roles. The Chinese Navy consists of three large fleets: (1) the Northern; (2) the Eastern; and (3) the Central-Southern. The Northern District encompasses the Liaodong peninsula and the Bohai Gulf; the Eastern extends from Shandong south through the Taiwan Strait; and the Central-Southern goes from Xiamen to the Vietnam border, including Hainan Island. The North Sea Fleet has its headquarters in Qingdao and its jurisdiction extends from the Yalu River (the Korean border) to south of Lianyungang (the Shandong-Jiangsu provincial boundary). The East Sea Fleet’s headquarters is in Shanghai and has authority over the area from the Shandong-Jiangsu line south to Dongshan Island (the Fujian-Guangdong provincial boundary). The South Sea Fleet is in Zhangjiang and its area of responsibility extends from Fujian-Guandong to the Vietnam border, including the Paracel and Spratly Islands.50 Recently, this fleet has acquired a ‘rapid combat group’ of surface warships and marine forces intended for the needs of sea battle beyond the mainland’s coastal waters. China is constructing a number of deep-water ports at Dalian on the Yellow Sea and Zhanjiang in southern Guangdong.51

Chinese Navy personnel number about 280,000, including 29,000 coastal regional defence, 27,000 naval air force and 5,000 marines. Naval forces are separately deployed to the three fleets. Currently, the PLAN’s major surface and sub-surface ships and fixed and rotary aircraft are: 1 SSBN; 5 SSNs; 54 conventional submarines; 18 destroyers; 36 frigates; 800 patrol and coastal combatants; 150 torpedo craft; 500 patrol craft; and 140 armed helicopters, including 25 ASW helicopters.52
While deficient in sophisticated hardware compared to the Russian or US navies, the navy is already strong enough to undertake a variety of missions in support of China’s national interests and objectives. During sessions of the NPC in March 1992, CMC Vice Chairman Liu Huaqing defined the PLAN’s mission:

Protect the socialist system, earnestly fulfil its duty; defend national territory, sovereignty, and maritime rights; safeguard the unity of the motherland and social stability; create a safe stable environment for economic construction, reform, and opening up; and guarantee the country’s lasting peace and stability. 53

Currently, the Chinese consider the PLAN as a major element for protecting their sea channels and assuming greater significance for national security and economy. In addition, the development of naval power, which Chinese analysts considered a weakness in China’s defence, is being given priority compared to land and airforce power, not only to keep the Spratly Islands, which are coveted by other Southeast Asian countries, but also to protect their natural resources. The navy’s missions can be divided into three areas: (1) sea denial and control; (2) the protection of SLOCs; and (3) projection of power as a peacetime instrument of foreign policy. In a major war or peacetime, the navy will be heavily engaged in the performance of three overlapping missions.

The major mission of the navy is sea denial and control to defend the country’s territorial waters, ostensibly defined by the continental shelf or a 200-mile exclusive economic zone, whichever is further from the coast. However, China’s sea control extends more than a thousand kilometres into the South China Sea with the inclusion of the Spratlys. 54 Central to this strategy is the need effectively to control territorial waters, which are being increasingly encroached upon by other countries. In the event of a crisis with Taiwan, the Chinese Navy’s most probable mission at the outset would be to organise a blockade of the island. Its blockade capabilities include a sizeable submarine force and mine-warfare units. 55

Offshore sea denial and control mission parallels the trend in the formation of military strategy for border defence. 56 The arguments for a strong forward-deployed naval strategy are, moreover, aimed at correcting the dominance of land defence in Chinese military thinking. This mission aims to turn adjacent seas into core bastions of Chinese naval supremacy. As Admiral Zhang Lianzhong points out, ‘in order to effectively defend China against attack from the sea, it is necessary to extend the depth of defence into the oceans and to have a naval capability of interesting and destroying the enemy.’ 57 While in peacetime this is aimed at preventing economic encroachment, in wartime it serves to provide protection not only for the coastal regions but also for China’s underwater nuclear deterrent. 58 This is particularly
important in the early days of the development of China’s SSBN force, which is limited in numbers (i.e. a single SSBN) and endurance.

The second mission is to protect SLOCs. In February 1992 China promulgated a law claiming the Spratlys and Senkakus, including the airspace and seabed, as sovereign Chinese territory; it also reserved the right not only to prevent any violation of its waters but also to protect SLOCs. For example, Chinese military officers talk airily of the need to secure the Malacca Straits.\(^{59}\) Despite the fact that in the past several decades the navy has been building ships for surface warfare, the weakness of the PLAN is its limited ASW capabilities.\(^{60}\) With the continued success of its modernisation and internal stability critically dependent upon expanding commerce and trade with foreign countries, the ocean has assumed a new priority in China’s security policy. In particular, the security of shipping lanes through the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca is an increasingly important consideration in China’s military strategy.

The last mission is to project China’s military might in the region as a central peacetime instrument in efforts not only to enhance its diplomatic influence but also to safeguard its access to marine resources, notably in the South China Sea. Her reach is still further extended, however, with naval bases and facilities on Hanggyi Island in the Bassein River and the ports of Akyab and Kyaukpyu, Myunmar. The Chinese have also set up a monitoring station on Great Coco Island in Burmese waters just north of India’s Andaman Island.\(^{61}\) In February 1998 China set up a satellite station on Tarawa Island, Kiribati, in the South Pacific Ocean.\(^{62}\) Nonetheless, the navy’s power projection capabilities over the next decade will be constrained by the modest number of modern, multipurpose combatants as well as the limited anti-air defence and ASW capabilities. The new Luhu destroyer is a capable and versatile platform compared with the naval vessels of most Southeast Asia countries, but there are only two such ships in the PLAN’s inventory today.

By 2010, the Chinese Navy, combined with air force and missile capabilities, under all but the most adverse scenarios for Chinese unity and integrity will be able to resist challenge from regional navies in the areas within China’s territorial seas or in neighbouring waters. Furthermore, Naval Commander Zhang Lianzhong has said that “the Navy has changed fundamentally improved its equipment and tactics. The strategy of coastal defence has been transformed into a strategy of oceanic offensive; and the substance of the past tactics of relying on small mobile warships has been changed in a qualitative way.”\(^{63}\) In the future, its force projection capabilities will continue to be limited but will grow. China will have a
capability through the modernisation of submarines, destroyer and land-based air and missile forces to make the operation of US naval forces in areas adjacent to China difficult and potentially dangerous.

2. Modernisation Programmes
In the late 1970s Deng Xiaoping’s leadership began to take an interest in naval matters. This was no doubt helped by an emerging generation of senior dedicated naval officers. Before that time, most top naval commanders were army officers assigned to the fledging navy. Deng, who had personally overseen the Paracel Islands disputes, felt they demonstrated the importance of territorial disputes in justifying the naval build-up. The need for naval modernisation was further strengthened with the decision at the Third Session of the Communist Party’s 11th Central Committee in December 1978 to end China’s international isolation and seek economic assistance from the West for the country’s development.

Since 1989, the PLA has been pushing to acquire more up-to-date weaponry. The Chinese realised that with an accelerated force modernisation programme, they would be the only ones to fill the power vacuum which now exists in Southeast Asia as a result of the end of the Cold War. During the 1980s, three incidents helped speed up the PLA’s doctrinal change to one designed for ‘local, limited or peripheral wars’ in the south involving the use of combined-arms forces offensively. The first two were heightened tensions along the Sino-Indian border in the spring of 1987 and Sino-Vietnamese border tensions the same year. The third was more serious, when Chinese and Vietnamese warships clashed in the Spratly Islands area in the South China Sea on 8 February 1988. On 14 March, another naval engagement took place in which 120 Vietnamese sailors were killed. Since then, the priority of the navy’s development has been on upgrading technological levels rather than increasing warship numbers.

In February 1992 the CPC passed ‘The Declaration of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,’ defining China’s maritime boundaries, which reasserted its claims to the Spratlys and Paracel Islands, as well as the Senkaku Islands (Tiaoyu Tao in Chinese). The new law is represented by China’s neighbours as evidence of aggressive expansionism and as an attempt to draw a ‘line in the water’ in response to developments like the angry Taiwanese and Japanese exchanges over the Senkaku Islands in 1991 and growing charges of piracy and disorder in the East China Sea. In April 1992 a Chinese Navy Deputy Commander was quoted as saying that it was high time China
readjusted its maritime strategy and made more efforts to recover the oil and gas resources in the South China Sea.  

At the fourth session of the 7th NPC, which was held in March 1991, proposals for the advancement of military modernisation were raised in successive speeches by military representatives elected to the congress. This trend was influenced by appropriate lessons from the defeat of Iraq's Chinese-style army by the West's superior technology in the Gulf War. During 1991, the first warship-borne helicopter force began operations as a formal detachment of the navy. In addition, at an expanded session of the military Commission held in December 1992, it was announced that military defence expenditures would rise at an annual rate of at least 10 per cent over the next years. Such a rise in spending, although considerable, would not be sufficient to modernise an organisation like the PLA, which at the time had over 3 million men.

There is no doubt that, as a result of the Spratlys' situation, the PLAN figures prominently in China's military modernisation. But even more significantly, the PLAN's capability to protect the SLOCs and its power projection capability will make the navy a key element in its future military strategy. The navy will be assisted by the rapprochement taking place along China's land frontiers, in particular with the accelerating moves to reduce forces along the Sino-Soviet border. The Spratly disputes serve to highlight the navy's lack of force projection capabilities. Naval planners today refer to these historical events to underscore their call for a strong navy.

The real naval modernisation was initiated as early as the 1990s, when the navy's 'ocean-going naval plan' was endorsed by Deng Xiaoping. Since then, a number of new guided missile destroyers and frigates have entered service, and the Chinese have been building missile-equipped destroyers and conventional submarines. Chinese modernisation efforts include the development of its Jiangwei-class guided missile frigates, Luhu-class guided missile destroyers, an upgrade of the Luda-class destroyers with surface to air missiles and electronic warfare capabilities, Han-class SSNs and Ming-class SSKs. The navy is also trying to get improved radar and missile-guidance systems. China appears committed to improving its naval force not only to prosecute its territorial claims in the South China Sea, but also to support its other interests. The PLAN currently possesses only coastal (or near-coastal) capabilities, but relaxation of tensions with Moscow has allowed it to build toward a blue-water navy. The aim, according to PLAN leaders, is that 'in order to defend China
against attack from the sea of the naval modernisation, it is necessary to extend the depth of
defence into the oceans and to have capability of intercepting and destroying the enemy.  

From 1990 to 1997, China built one Han-class SSN, eight conventional submarines
(seven Mings and one Song), two Luhu-class destroyers, two Luda II-class destroyers, one
Luda III-class destroyer, and four Jiangwei-class frigates. Nicholas Kristof of the New York
Times expressed his personal view of the Chinese naval modernisation programmes: ‘The new
Jiangwei-class of frigates, the Luhu-class of destroyers, and the newly upgraded version of
the older Luda-class destroyers are all formidable vessels, especially in the context of other
powers in the region. A Jiangwei frigate might not intimidate an American sailor, but it looks
pretty unnerving to a Vietnamese.’

China is currently realising the importance of the revolution in military affairs (RMA)
and information warfare based on high-tech military capabilities. The current naval
modernisation programme is based on building new ships and obtaining high technology.
China’s naval build-up programmes are boosted by the purchase of Russian ships. In 1993,
for example, China ordered four Kilo-class submarines. The first two were Type 877; the
third, which was delivered in January 1998, is Type 636; the last one is expected to be
delivered in late 1998. During Chinese Premier Li Peng’s visit to Moscow in January 1997,
Russia agreed to deliver two Sovremenny-class destroyers which will give the Chinese Navy
improved surface strike capabilities. There are some indications that the force projection
improvements gained from developing an aircraft carrier programme and a new generation of
submarines may be put off. Even though Chinese previous efforts to get aircraft carriers
failed, experts caution that Beijing could have an aircraft carrier by the year 2010.

B. Chinese Perspective on Co-operative Maritime Security
From the early 1990s, China has shown a greater concern over non-proliferation and arms
control efforts, both at multilateral and bilateral levels. The Chinese have participated in
official, multilateral fora on regional security. The navy already started ships’ visits beyond
its coastal areas, and will focus on approaches to co-operative maritime security in the region.
It includes both arms control policy, maritime confidence-building measures and maritime co-
operation measures.

1. Naval Disarmament and Arms Control Policy
   a) The Historical Context of Disarmament and Arms Control Policy

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Chinese participation in UN disarmament conferences has become more frequent and more constructive. The Chinese have not only signed the Outer Space Treaty but also joined IAEA, as well as endorsed the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty (SPNFZT). By advancing a more specific position, China indicated a greater desire to become a participant in the global arms control process, if only by attempting to convince others that its approach is a pragmatic one. For example, while China's nuclear forces are certainly modest by superpower standards, they do endow Beijing with a strategic capability unmatched by any other regional power — a capability that China appears very reluctant to give up, as indicated by its historical antipathy to nuclear arms control efforts.\(^{80}\)

In the context of arms export and control policy, the attitude of China, which adheres to few guidelines with regard to weapons exports, drew considerable criticism. Chinese naval assistance programmes became extremely active in the early 1970s. Almost 70 naval craft were transferred to other countries between 1971 and 1976.\(^{81}\) Naval transfers after that time dropped to lower levels in terms of the numbers of countries and vessels involved, but assistance programmes generally involved larger and more sophisticated vessels in the older period. An example was the transfer of four Romeo-class submarines to North Korea in 1973-74, and thereafter China helped North Korea to embark on its own Romeo-class submarine construction programme. It seemed likely that many, perhaps most, of the components for the submarines were shipped from China. North Korea had a total of 13 Romeo-class boats by 1981. Six Hainan-class submarine chaser were also provided to North Korea between 1975 and 1978, adding significantly to North Korean naval firepower and anti-submarine capabilities.

Within the Asia-Pacific region, Chinese arms sales have helped prop up the Burmese regime, where in 1991 Chinese sales of fighter aircraft, landing craft, anti-tank missiles, and machine guns amounted to $1.2 billion.\(^{82}\) Chinese total arms export fell from nearly $3 billion in 1987 to $550 million in 1991, a decrease likely to be accelerated by the inferior performance of Chinese armour in the Gulf War and a surplus of advanced technology weaponry in the global arms market.\(^{83}\) Thailand has largely abandoned China as a supplier and has turned mainly toward the United States.\(^{84}\)

b) Disarmament and Naval Arms Control Policy
In the past decades, China's attitude toward arms control has changed. At the enlarged meeting of the CMC in late May and early June 1985, China's leaders announced the strategic
decision to reduce the armed forces by one million. According to the IISS, Chinese military manpower had been cut 750,000 — from 3.95 million in 1978 to 3.2 million in 1987. This reduction offered some useful clues into Chinese thinking on disarmament. According to CMC General Secretary Yang Shangkun, this reduction was “based on a scientific analysis of the current situation at home and abroad and on a realistic assessment of our armed forces.”

During the 15th National Congress of the CCP on 12 September 1997, Jiang Zemin also announced that China would downsize its armed forces by another 500,000 troops in the next three years on the basis of a one-million cut in the 1980s.

At the turn of the century, the strength of the PLA will be only marginally less than the current level of approximately 2.5 million. The reasons for this appear to be (1) difficulty in finding alternative employment for further hundreds of thousands and the possibility of their playing a disturbing role within society without such assurances, (2) a perceived need for reserve security forces for domestic stabilisation purposes since 1989, and (3) the border agreement between China and Russia in 1997. Observers believe that, whatever the size of the cuts, most will come from military units in northern China adjacent to the Russian border. As it is, the PLA is being reduced by 500,000 to 2.4 million. The cuts being made allow China to focus on economic development instead of a military build-up.

In spite of the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States were very sceptical about arms control during the Cold War, Beijing under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership had become more involved. In February 1987, for example, China signed the two protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, promising to respect the status of the zone and not to use or threaten to use or test nuclear weapons in the region. In the post-Cold War era, China also took a major step toward international arms control when it signed the NPT on 29 December 1991 and ratified it on 11 March 1992.

In recent years the Chinese government has set out a set of improved arms control policies, i.e., arms control and non-proliferation must be dealt with on a fair, reasonable, comprehensive and balanced basis. Beijing believes that disarmament and arms control as an integral part of nuclear and conventional disarmament should be tackled immediately. It shows that naval nuclear weapons belong to the scope of nuclear disarmament while naval non-nuclear weapons belong to conventional disarmament. With regard to naval arms control, Beijing insists that Washington and Moscow first drastically reduce their forces to levels commensurate with those of China and other navies in the region. In particular, China is
unlikely to concern about naval arms control because Beijing believes that US and Russian
naval forces can be used in ways hostile to the PRC.

In sum, under the rational leadership of Jiang Zemin, China’s attitude towards arms
control has become more positive and flexible, but it remains extremely cautious on naval
arms control issues. Furthermore, China takes into careful consideration a number of general
facts and principles when deciding whether to participate in arms control or agreements.
Chinese Navy Commander Admiral Lianzhong’s words show this trend: ‘We will never forget
that China was invaded several times by imperialist troops from sea. The nation’s suffering
from lack of sea defence (haiwufang) still remains fresh in our mind; and the history should
not repeat itself.’ Nevertheless, China is concerned over operational naval arms control,
 focusing on the prevention of naval incidents through the signing of the agreement on 19
January 1998. On 15 December 1995 the Southeast Asian countries concluded the region as a
nuclear weapons-free zones (the South-east Asian Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone or
SEANWFZ). Although China signed the Treaty of Rarotonga, which declares the South
Pacific region a nuclear-free zone, it opposed the SEANWFZ. China’s attitude towards the
NWFZ concept with the provision of innocent passage of warships in Northeast and Southeast
Asian waters has not changed. Furthermore, China is likely to be very reluctant to participate
in any naval disarmament and arms control as structural measures that may limit its naval
building programme.

2. Maritime Confidence-Building Measures

China may deal with maritime disputes with its neighbours differently from disputes over land
and borders. The lack of any diplomatic initiatives to solve the Spratlys dispute in the South
China Sea and the outstanding sovereignty dispute between Beijing and Tokyo over the
Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea contrasts with China’s willingness to negotiate its land
boundary with Russia and India. However, Beijing might also be aware of the fact that
existing bilateral relations may not function efficiently enough to guarantee peace and stability
in the region in the post-Cold War structure. Under these conditions, Beijing’s policy will be
to favour the realisation of multilateral dialogues. Such a position was once expressed by
Foreign Minister Qichen during his visit to Japan in May 1993, when he said that ‘the security
problem in Asia must be discussed at various levels and though various channels, and China
support the idea of holding security dialogues in the annual ASEAN Post-Ministerial
Conference.’ China’s approach toward MCBMs can be divided into the following areas: (1)
unilateral measures for MCBMs; (2) reciprocal ships’ port visits; (3) participating or organising multilateral or bilateral conferences and dialogues; and (4) exchange of high level military officers, including naval staff officers.

Increasing MCBMs. China has long supported ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’ presented by Zhou Enlai at the Bandung Conference: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. While there has been no explicit Chinese thinking on naval arms control, the PRC will probably prefer to concentrate on bilateral MCBMs. One of the most important measures by China related to military transparency is the 34-page white paper issued in November 1995 entitled China: Arms Control and Disarmament, which stressed nuclear arms control. During the third set of bilateral security talks between China and Japan in January 1996, the Chinese delegate reported the country’s intention to publish the first defence white paper on the PLA. It was recently reported that academic specialists in China’s PLA have begun drafting a new defence white paper in 1996, planned for publication by the end of 1997, as a transparency measure, but has not appeared until now. If the paper is published, it would constitute China’s response to appeals from Asia-Pacific countries for transparency regarding Beijing’s military planning and security strategy.

Organising Multilateral or Bilateral Conferences and Dialogues. At the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in August 1995, China agreed not only to discuss the South China Sea disputes in a multilateral forum but also to settle matters according to the Law of the Sea. In November 1995 China hosted the ‘95 Beijing International Conference, which discussed trade and investment co-operation, and ‘The Development and Co-operation of the Northeast Asian Region geared to the 21st Century.’ At the conference, the Northeast Asian Region included China, Japan, the Korean peninsula, Siberia, and the Far East of Russia and Mongolia. Nonetheless, it is difficult to judge what these statements meant in reality, although the tendency was enough to lead many ASEAN states to argue that China had made concessions and recognised that it could not do whatever it wanted in the region. On 8 May 1996, during the meeting of Foreign Ministries and defence officials in Tokyo, China, Japan, the United States and 16 other Asian countries made an accord that would lead to advance notification of war games and an exchange of observers at manoeuvres. Beijing also stated that it would provide more information about its arms acquisition and increase exchanges of defence personnel with other countries in the region.
Reciprocal Ships' Port Visits to Build Confidence. As with many other countries, ships' visits are a major element of transparency measures. China has a precise policy on its strict prohibitions on foreign nuclear forces and ships in its territory. For example, China refused to allow a visit by US naval ships to visit in May 1985 because of the presence of nuclear weapons aboard US ships. Washington had originally proposed a visit by an aircraft carrier battle-group led by the Midway, but finally settled for a visit to Shanghai by nuclear-capable Spruance-class destroyers. In October 1986, nonetheless, the United States and China agreed on some kind of joint statement, which would allow the US Navy to visit Chinese ports without concern over the 'neither confirm nor deny' (NCND) policy. For the first time since 1949, in November 1986 three US Navy ships, including a cruiser, destroyer and a frigate, visited Qingdao, China.96 A China’s Defence Attaché in Canberra clarified that ‘China welcomes visits by foreign ships but with the understanding that they do not carry nuclear weapons.’97

The Chinese Navy has already demonstrated its naval reach through ships’ visits to distant ports. For example, the training ship Zhenghe — the only PLA Navy’s vessel ever to visit the United States — sailed into Pearl Harbour in April 1989 two months before the violent crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators. Other Chinese ships have made friendly port visits to Vladivostok, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Through military-to-military contacts between China and Russia, the North Fleet ships visited Vladivostok in May 1994 with the exchange of local commanders of each other’s military districts. In July 1996 the PLAN Luda-class destroyers — Harbin and Xining — visited the North Korean port of Nampo on the Yellow Sea to celebrate the 35th anniversary of a mutual-aid treaty from the Cold-War era. This Chinese port call was the first by foreign warships to North Korea since 1985.98 In March 1997, the destroyers Harbin and Zuhai and the oiler Nancang visited Pearl Harbour, Hawaii. For the first time, the vessels traversed the Pacific on a 98 day voyage visiting Mexico, Peru and Chile after a port call in San Diego in order to enable naval officers to evaluate the equality of the crews and to enhance military relations with the visited countries.99 In April-May 1998 a destroyer, training ships and supply ship visited Southeast Asian and the South Pacific ports, including New Zealand, Australia and the Philippines.

This trans-Pacific deployment is believed to be one of the longest missions undertaken by China’s naval combat ships and is a step toward developing a blue-water navy capable of plying the open ocean, beyond coastal defence. Beyond symbolic port calls, furthermore, more functional ties between the Chinese and other regional navies will grow in the future.
Increasing Military-to-Military Contacts and Exchanges at High Levels. Military-to-military contacts between senior naval commanders, as communication measures of MCMs, are already taking place, and the next logical steps are for joint naval exercises, intelligence sharing, and joint defence planning. Beijing is building up close military relationships with Asian countries, and has agreed with Malaysia to expand military co-operation, including an officer exchange programme in November 1995. In July 1994 the Chinese Defence Minister, General Chi Haotian, and the Russian Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev, agreed on CBMs to reduce the danger of inadvertent incidents. In December 1994 the Chinese and the Russian navies agreed on military co-operation, including joint naval exercises. During the summit between President Jiang Zemin and the US President, Bill Clinton, in Washington on 29 October 1997, they agreed to set up a their own hot line, to improve military-to-military ties, such as more exchange of military officers at senior and lower levels, and to increase transparency in military planning and other confidence-building measures.

In 1997 China hosted more than 150 military delegates from 67 countries and dispatched more than 100 of its own high-level delegates to 70 nations with a desire to establish co-operative relations. About 40 of the China's delegates visited Asia-Pacific countries. On 4-6 February 1998 the Chinese Defence Minister, General Chi, visited Japan, the first official visit to Japan by a Chinese defence minister. General Chi and his Japanese counterpart, Director-General Fumio Kyuma, agreed to increase MCBMs, including port calls by the two navies. During his visit, he visited the JMSDF’s Yokosuka base and boarded the 4,400-ton destroyer Harusame.

3. Maritime Co-operation Measures
Chinese trade, transported principally by sea, has increased dramatically in importance and has made SLOCs important strategic interests. Marine resources, from non-living resources such as oil and gas to living resources such as fishing stocks are also becoming increasingly important. It is estimated that the output of marine exploitation will be more than two per cent of the China’s GNP. Thus, China will deal with the increased importance of co-operation measures of maritime security in the region. Its approach to maritime co-operation measures can be broadly divided into four categories: (1) protection against sea pollution; (2) coastal economic co-operation; (3) joint development of offshore resources, such as oil, gas and
fishery resources; and (4) marine co-operation for scientific research and transfers of technology.

Protection Against Sea Pollution. Over the past decade, Chinese industrialisation has increased a number of marine environmental problems. Air and water pollution, industrial, domestic hazardous and toxic wastes, and greenhouse gases and ozone-depleting substance emissions that are polluting the environment and contributing to acid rain and global warming raise serious international as well as domestic issues. There has also been an increase in marine transport pollution as China’s exports have risen dramatically. Indeed, the faster China’s economy grows, the greater the pollution. This will affect conditions not only within China itself, but also in Northeast Asia, such as the Yellow and the East China Seas. A major pollution concern, in so far as the ocean is concerned, is the Chinese development of huge oil contracts along and off its coastline in joint ventures with foreign oil companies.

Recently, China has experienced alarming cases of pollution of coastal areas such as the Yangzi River estuary and Hangzhou Bay. Pollution from organic chemicals and heavy metals also has been found in Bohai Bay and at the mouth of the Zhu (Pearl) River, although the situation in these areas was reportedly stabilising in 1992. Oil concentrations above fisheries standards have been found in coastal waters, especially in southern areas such as Haikou Bay and Beibu Bay, and are increasing. In order to cope with Shanghai’s horrific wastewater problem, the municipal government and the World Bank are funding a giant underground flow pipe in an attempt to flush the sewage out of the city into the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea. Red tides, which refer to sea water discoloured by certain types of maritime plankton that feed on pollution and are fatal to many forms of marine life, have been also on the increase along China’s coastline; they occurred 12 times in 1989, 34 times in 1990, 38 times in 1991, and 52 times in 1992.

In September 1991 the Standing Committee of the Seventh NPC approved a motion to adopt the Basel Convention on Controlling Trans-boundary Dangerous Wastes and their Disposal. While laws and regulations are now being put into place, it could be some time before they actually take hold. Apparently, most people in China believe that pollution is a significant problem, but the official message that pollution results from increased industrialisation and that increased industrialisation means more jobs and a higher standard of living comes through loud and clear in the tone of the survey. China’s environmental problems cannot be solved solely through price reform or regulatory policies. China, however, is increasing multilateral co-operation for protection against sea pollution. In December 1995 it
signed an agreement, 'The Memorandum of the Understanding of Economic Zones in Tumen River Area and North-East Asian Environment' with North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and China.

In April 1996, despite their strained relations, China and the United States embarked on a programme of environmental co-operation on dealing with rapid urbanisation, pollution from energy consumption and the changing agriculture patterns of a growing population. On 13 November 1997 China and Japan signed an agreement on co-operation in environmental protection for the 21st century. On 21 November 1997 Beijing organised the '97 China Environmental Forum, sponsored by Chinese Society for Environmental Sciences and the Institute of Human Ecology. In an address to the closing secession, Vice-Premier Zou Jiahua stressed that China is willing to co-operate with other countries in the field of environmental protection.

*Marine Co-operation for Scientific Research and Transfers of Technology.* China is increasingly concerned over marine co-operation in the matter of scientific research to exchange related technology. Beijing has stated that all countries should exchange marine environment preservation and marine research techniques. There should be active transfer of technology to developing countries without any conditions.... The question of marine research and the transfer of technology should be reasonably resolved only on the basis of respect of national sovereignty and equally of all countries.... The Chinese approach is in line with the provisions of Article 266 (1) of the UNCLOS which provides the freedom of scientific research and transfer of technology.

China has not only participated in scientific activities through international academic exchanges and training courses, but also held international conference. In governmental and non-governmental aspects, Beijing has signed bilateral agreements with the United States, Russia, the two Koreas, and Japan to exchange marine science and technology: (1) Sino-American Science and Technology Co-operative Agreement in 1979; (2) China-Japan Joint Kuroshio Study (1986); (3) the Memorandum of Understanding of PRC-ROK on Marine Science and Technology Co-operation (October 1994); and (4) Bilateral Technology Co-operative Agreement between PRC and DPRK (1957). Through such bilateral activities, China has done much to help marine development and scientific co-operation in the region. In 1995, for example, the China-Japan Joint Kuroshio Study started a four-year programme, 'Co-operation Investigation and Research of Subtropics Circulation.' Beijing and Seoul established the Joint Ocean Research Centre in Qingdao in May 1995. In May 1996 the PRC-
Joint Investigation of Kinetics of Yellow Sea's Circulation, a three-year programme, was started.

Joint Development of Oil and Gas Resources. China, as a net oil importer since 1996, has opened to foreign participation not only onshore oil fields (notably the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang) and oil-refining, but also offshore potential oil fields in the South China Sea. The law, 'Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum Resources in Co-operation with Foreign Enterprises,' passed in 1982, establishes a broad framework of principles and guidelines aimed at speeding up the exploitation and exploration of offshore petroleum resources with the assistance of foreign investment and technology.111

On 8 May 1992 China signed an oil exploration contract with a US company, Crestone, to explore offshore oil in areas, covering 9,700 square miles in the South China Sea near Spratly Island, also claimed by Vietnam.112 On 30 June 1992 the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) invited foreign oil interests to bid for exportation in two specified seabed areas in the East China Sea, namely the Northern Acreage and the Southern Acreage. Unlike the Bohai Bay, the Yellow Sea and the South China Sea, the East China Sea had been closed to foreign participation. At two points, however, the Northern Acreage encroaches into what has been claimed by South Korea, with overlaps totalling some 24 square kilometres. Ultimately, what matters is not the physical size of the overlap but the oil that may lie underneath. The overlap and its vicinity have been reported to be promising sources of oil and gas. On 16 May 1996 CNOOC and Chevron Overseas Petroleum Inc. signed an exploration contract for acreage located in Hainan province in the South China Sea.113

China is currently co-operating with Southeast Asian countries to develop oil and gas and marine environmental protection in the South China Sea. Experts' workshops, which are based on fishery, environmental protection and confidence-building, bringing together experts from China and Southeast Asian countries, have held conferences: one in Beijing in March 1997 and the other in Manila in November.114 Recently, marine resources, from oil and minerals to fishing stocks, are also becoming increasingly important to China. It is estimated that by the year 2000, the output value of marine exploitation will be more than two per cent of the China's GDP. Beijing is expected to import one million barrels of oil per day from key crude oil suppliers — Iran, Oman and Yemen — by the turn of the century.115 (For more details, see Figure 8-1).
Joint Development of Offshore Fishery Resources. Chinese distant-water fisheries through fishing agreements and technological co-operation with other countries began to be developed from the late 1970s. In 1979 China and the US signed a Protocol on Scientific and Technological Co-operation in the Fields of Oceanography and Fisheries. During the early 1980s, several Japanese companies negotiated technological co-operation agreements to assist China's modernisation of its fishery industry. In 1984, fisheries joint venture agreements were signed with Japan, and with the United States in 1985. Current Sino-Japanese fishery relations are governed by the 1975 Fishery Agreement, which in general follows the non-governmental agreements signed earlier but voices more concern about conservation of living marine resources, within the agreed upon zone in the Yellow and East China Seas.

Currently, fishery resources provide an excellent and relatively inexpensive means to meet China's economic goal, and Beijing is profitably able to expand its fisheries. China's current bilateral fisheries agreements with Northeast Asian countries, which were agreed prior to the adoption of the UNCLOS, require drastic revision to meet the UNCLOS standards. China recently agreed with Japan, Russia and South Korea to establish a regional committee, not only to protect the fishery resources in the East Sea of Korea but also to ensure joint development of offshore fishery resources.116

III. Japan's Geo-strategic Relations and Goals
Japan, as an economic rather than a military superpower, is expected to contribute to regional prosperity, political development and a new security arrangement within the scope of the US-Japan security framework. Japan's political role in the region continues to evolve within the context of the Japan-US bilateral alliance or broader-based multilateral activities that build upon the alliance. Japan has the capacity to pursue two objectives. First, in reference to its contribution to regional prosperity as the 'economic locomotive' for Asia and the Pacific, Japan could be an obvious leader for its economic success. The second role for Japan in the region involves regional security.117

Many Asian countries hope that Japan will play a regional security role within the scope of the US-Japan security framework, in which the United States acts as a regional balancing power. Accordingly, Japan's security role lies in supporting continuing US military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, thereby constantly providing a collective good for regional stability. Article Nine of Japan's constitution bans war and arms sales. However, this
did not prevent Japan from building its small, but powerful Self-Defence Force (SDF) or from investing billions in it. Nevertheless, Japan’s attitude has been evolving, since the Diet passed the Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO) Law on Co-operation in UN PKO in 1992. During the Gulf conflict, for example, Japan dispatched MSDF minesweepers to UN peacekeeping operations. Since then, Tokyo has been engaged in important international activities as UN PKO roles, deploying forces to Cambodia, Mozambique, and Rwanda.

The Japanese regard the US-Japan security relationship as a means to maintain peace and prosperity in the region. The Foreign Minister, Yukihiko Ikeda, said that ‘Japan’s security alliance with the United States bears significance not only for bilateral co-operation but also for the maintenance of peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.’ During President Clinton’s three-day visit to Tokyo in April 1996, Japan and the United States improved their long standing security co-operation, broadening the scope of Japan’s defence-related activities. New directions for the SDF proposed in Japan’s New Defence Policy, which was published in April 1996 by the Japan Defence Agency (JDA), include activities like counter-terrorism and disaster-relief, together with a formal role for Tokyo in promoting nuclear disarmament. The Tokyo Declaration in 1997, signed by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto, pledges greater co-operation on intelligence, transfer of defence-related technology and other issues, including a ground breaking commitment by Japan to supply US forces with ammunition and other material in peacetime and for UN peacekeeping purposes. During the visit of the US Defence Secretary, William Cohen, to Tokyo on 20 January 1998, Japan and United States set up a comprehensive planning mechanism to put into force the new Guidelines for US-Japanese Defence Co-operation adopted in September 1997, calling for an enlarged defence role for Japan. The two countries also launched a bilateral planning committee, which will conduct bilateral defence planning and mutual co-operation planning. The Japan-US security alliance has also been the most effective vehicle to date for maintaining US military presence in the region and for increasing Japanese responsibility-sharing.

Relations between Japan and Russia are likely to remain ambivalent unless and until the issue of the Northern Territories is resolved. The islands are of marginal military and economic significance to either side, but they have become pawns in a zero-sum game of national pride and political prestige. Since the end of the Cold War, the Japanese government has protested several of the agreements planned with foreign companies which involved the leasing of land located on the disputed territories. Japan forced South Korea, just before
Yeltsin's visit to Seoul on 18-20 November 1992, to agree that Korean companies would not take part in any joint venture on the Kuril Islands and that the South Korean-Russian fishery agreement would not touch the disputed territories and their surrounding waters. In October 1992 a Hong Kong company bowed to Japanese pressure and cancelled a planned lease on land on Shikotan. The two countries' leaders pledged to improve good relations during a Siberian summit on 2 November 1997. After the summit, Japan agreed with Russia to set up a peace treaty commission aimed at securing a bilateral treaty by the year 2000. Japan regards bilateral relations with Russia as more important than solving the territorial dispute.

Recent Japanese relations with China have been characterised by frankness tempered by subtlety, both in confronting past Japanese aggression in China and in current concerns with the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. China has flown warplanes near the islands and sent fishing vessels to protest Japan's occupation of the islands. There has, however, been increased interaction between high-level Japanese and Chinese officials. On 25 January 1996, for example, Foreign Minister Ikeda and Chinese Ambassador to Japan Xu Dunxin agreed on the need to further promote the bilateral relationship. Ikeda also gave assurances that Tokyo will continue to support Beijing's economic reform and open-door policy, noting China's growth is vital for the development and prosperity of other countries in the region.

From the strategic point of view, during the Cold War Japan saw the Soviet military build-up in the Far East as the main threat to its security. Consequently, Japan's defence policy was based on the Japan-US Security Treaty which is also widely credited with restraining the growth of Japanese militarism. Japan's defence policy was based on The Basic Policy for National Defence (BPND) approved by the National Defence Council (NDC) in 1957. The National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO), adopted in 1976, served as the basic guideline for Japan's defence policy, military strategy and SDF build-up for 20 years. On 5 November 1976 the NDC and the Cabinet Meeting decided that 'annual defence expenditure to be appointed for achieving the outline would not exceed one per cent of the GNP of the corresponding fiscal year, establishing the 'one per cent ceiling on defence spending' rule.' The NDPO was based on the following three major assumptions:

Japan's basic policy is to possess an adequate defence capability of its own while establishing a posture for the most effective operation of that capability to prevent aggression. Should indirect aggression—or any unlawful military activity which might lead to aggression against this nation occur, Japan will take immediate responsive action in order to settle the situation at an early stage.
The NDPO called for the build-up of defence functions necessary to a modern nation. It did not indicate a specific threat, but placed priority on responding in co-operation with the United States to the growing Soviet threat. The basic concept of NDPO signified the beginning of the third phase and included Mid-Term Defence Programmes (MTDP). The most recent MTDP (1991-1995), adopted in December 1990, achieved the force structure level specified in the original NDPO, and there are still on-going efforts to rationalise and modernise the JSDF.  

With the change in the international strategic environment accompanying the end of the Cold War, JDA released the new NDPO, which is called the New National Defence Programme Outline in December 1995. It replaced the previous NDPO, drafted in 1976. (For more detailed comparisons of SDF forces between the NDPO in 1976 and the new NDPO in 1995, see Table 8-3). The limits of Japanese military build-up and modernisation are embodied by the concept of 'a basic and standard defence capability.' This concept presupposes that major military attacks on Japan are to be deterred by the Japan-US security system and that Japan must prepare against limited and small-scale aggression.

Recently, military build-up and modernisation, which are based on the MTDP 1996-2000, have centred around advanced defence technologies in the following areas: (1) increasing ASW capabilities; (2) introducing Aegis-equipped destroyers; (3) air-borne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft; (4) large helicopter carrying destroyers; (5) new Patriot missiles; and (6) P-3C anti-submarine aircraft. Even though the JMSDF wants an aircraft carrier, which could be used to provide limited air cover for its fleet, the continuing slowdown in fleet modernisation and anti-military feeling only allow the building of carrier-type assault ships, such as the Osumi-class 'LST'.

Japan's strategic relations with the United States are based on the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1960, which legalised the presence of US-forces in the country. The treaty allowed Washington to use military facilities throughout Japan and to station up to 47,000 troops there; 24,000, or 60 per cent, of which are for historical reasons on the Island of Okinawa. Under the new US-Japanese Defence Guidelines released by both countries on 7 June 1997, Japan's military role in the region is likely to be increased within a decade. Tokyo has cooperated with Washington to extend support for US forces in Japan and to supply military technology. In recent years, its expenditures for support of US forces stationed in Japan account for more than $5 billion, which makes Tokyo the most generous supporter of US forces abroad.
Even though Japan does not regard Russia as a direct threat, Tokyo is still concerned about instability in the Russian Far East. Due to dramatic changes in the security environment, Japanese threat perception has shifted from Russia to North Korea and China. Japan, as the strongest of China’s neighbours, has taken the lead in defining a more robust strategy in response to China’s military modernisation programme. Tokyo is also wary of China’s successful pursuit of its two major foreign policy objectives: rapid economic growth and the development of its armed forces to ensure China’s security against external threats. In a Defence White Paper 1997, Japan expressed concern over Beijing’s growing air and blue-water maritime capabilities and heightened tension with Taiwan. The Japanese have also vigorously expressed concerns over China’s expanded naval capability and its increased activity in the South China Sea. In particular, Tokyo is worried about the security of SLOCs in the South China Sea, with possible conflicts over the Spratlys being the main focus of attention. Tokyo is especially worried about increasing Chinese maritime aggressiveness in the interest of securing oil, underwater mineral rights and fishing rights, which challenges the maritime security of Japan and other Asian countries.

From the economic point of view, Japan has significantly reduced its defence spending since 1993, reflecting the change of Japan’s security environment. Japan’s defence budget in 1993 registered $39.71 billion, ranking second only after the US $277.19 billion. In 1993 Japan exceeded the defence budget of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom as FY94 totalled $48.5 billion, up to 1.2 per cent from the previous year. Japan’s coalition cabinet approved a defence budget of $47.2 billion for FY95 but the procurement was reduced by 6.5 per cent. The increase of 0.9 per cent was the lowest in over three decades. In July 1995 Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama said that the FY96 defence budget reflected the world trend towards disarmament and arms reduction, with the exception of more equipment for disaster relief operations. In August 1995 the JDA requested a 4.1 per cent rise in FY96 defence budget, citing higher personnel costs and inflationary pressures on the price of provisions, fuel and training. In August 1996 the JDA requested $45.9 billion, including a record-high 3.6 per cent funding share for research and development; for FY97 defence budget a 2.88 per cent increase from the FY96. In June 1997 Japan decided to cut $8.62 billion from its defence budget over the three years (FY98-FY2000) beginning in FY98. On 25 December 1997 the Japanese Cabinet set the 1998 defence budget at 4.9 trillion yen, which shows a 0.3 per cent decrease from 1997’s 4.94 trillion yen. Furthermore, the JDA allotted
a total of 127.7 billion yen ($990 million) for military research and development in 1998, which is 22.5 percent lower than 174.1 billion yen in 1997.\textsuperscript{144}

IV. Japanese Maritime Strategy and Perspective on Co-operative Maritime Security

A. The Main Context of Japanese Maritime Strategy

1. Maritime Strategy

The JMSDF has the primary mission 'to defend Japan against sea borne invasions and to secure the safety of sea lanes in the waters surrounding Japan.'\textsuperscript{145} By the early 1970s, support for the development of such SLOC responsibility became more apparent both inside and outside the JDA. In 1971, the respected Japanese defence commentator, Hideo Sekino, declared in the US Naval Institute Proceedings that Japan's defence priorities should be re-ordered: 'The protection of the sea communications of Japan should be given first priority in the national defence of Japan, and the prevention of direct invasion of Japan should be made the secondary function of the maritime defence force of Japan.'\textsuperscript{146} Furthermore, he confirmed that 'Japan must at least secure the sea communications north of Indonesia on her own.'\textsuperscript{147} Sekino also said that such a task was already being emphasised by the MSDF, but had not publicly voiced by the JDA until 1977. In November 1971 Asao Mihara, Director General of the JDA, explicitly stated that the future of the MSDF would include the defence of key sea transport routes within 1,000 miles of Japan's coasts.\textsuperscript{148}

Prior to the 1980s, the JMSDF assumed an essentially secondary and passive role in maintaining sea-control around its territorial waters. In May 1982 Japanese Prime Minster Zenko Suzuki visited the United States and participated in talks with President Ronald Reagan. The joint communiqué issued by the two leaders confirmed 'the desirability of an appropriate division of roles between Japan and the United States as a means of insuring peace and stability in the region.'\textsuperscript{149} Even though the communiqué made no specific mention of the 1,000-mile defence, in response to a question at the National Press Club, Suzuki stated that the 1,000-mile SLOC defence responsibility was indeed a part of Japanese national defence policy. This statement was significant in that it introduced the 1,000-mile SLOC concept as official Japanese policy for the first time. When Suzuki's successor, Yasuhiro Nakasone, visited the United States on 18 January 1983, he re-affirmed Suzuki's commitment to the 1,000-mile defence.\textsuperscript{150} In an interview with The Washington Post, Nakasone stated, 'For the ocean, our defence should extend several hundred miles, and if we are to establish sea
lanes, then our desire would be to defend the sea lanes between Guam and Tokyo and between
the Straits of Taiwan and Osaka. Thus, the policy of sea lane defence within a thousand
miles became official in 1983. A Defence White Paper 1983 included an explanation of this
policy and its requirements, and white papers thereafter simply listed 1,000-mile SLOC
defence as one of several roles of the SDF.

**Naval Missions and Roles.** According to the establishment law of 1954, the primary
mission of the SDF is 'to defend the nation against direct and indirect aggression.' For most
of the post-war period, the navy has concentrated on two central roles: anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) and mine countermeasures. Most of its principal surface combatants are optimised for
ASW or are ASW capable. Virtually all of its combat aircraft (primarily the Kawasaki
licence-produced P-3C Orions and helicopters) and most of its submarines are mainly ASW
platforms. The majority of the remaining combat ships focus on MCM operations. According
to the NDPO, it assumes that large-scale aggression can be deterred due to the superpower
balance, and thus the navy is designed to deal with 'limited and small scale aggression.'

From these and other observations, a review of JMSDF construction, deployment,
naval writings, and naval activities, the navy's missions for both war time and peace time can
be categorised as follows: (1) the protection of SLOC and escort operations; (2) containment
of Russian forces; and (3) acting as peace time instrument of foreign policy. Undoubtedly,
mission priorities will shift if the Russian threat continues to fade.

The first mission is to protect Japan's SLOCs, a task that primarily entails co­
operating with the US Navy in protecting merchant ships, with a focus on ASW operations as
well as MCM in coastal waters. Japan relies heavily on foreign countries for most of its
natural resources, energy and food. To maintain its existence and prosperity, it is essential for
Japan to secure SLOCs. This mission has grown in prominence since Japan's official
agreement in 1981 to take primary responsibility for the defence of its SLOC from its major
ports out to 1,000 miles (approximately from Tokyo to Guam and the Philippines).

The navy has also been asked to aid in the safe passage of merchant shipping in
distant waters and has itself suggested that it could help to police the pirate-ridden Straits of
Malacca. The new Aegis destroyers will not only increase its effectiveness in anti-air and anti-
submarine warfare, but also enable it to operate outside the range of land-based aircraft in
defence of merchant shipping. The navy also conducts joint operations with GSDF and ASDF
to increase escort capabilities.
The second mission is to deny Russian naval forces based at Vladivostok, Vlad Olga, and Stovetsky Gavan access and transit through the three straits around Japan (Soya between Sakhalin and Hokkaido, Tsugaru between Hokkaido and Honshu and Tshushima between Japan and Korea). The major responsibility, however, might well fall on the Japanese Navy, since the US seventh Fleet is likely to be preoccupied with other open ocean missions.

The third, and final, mission is to support national interests, as a role of foreign policy, such as humanitarian and peace keeping missions under the UN. In June 1992 the Diet enacted the UN PKO Co-operation Law, which makes possible the overseas dispatch of SDF personnel to participate in peacekeeping operations led by the UN. A recent and increasing example of this mission is based on maintaining a flotilla of minesweepers. The MSDF commissioned a 8,900-ton Osumi-class amphibious landing ship, designed to carry two air-cushion vehicles, a project that will be carried out over a few years, to overcome the notional limits of the service's missions and roles. In April 1991, almost immediately after the termination of hostilities in Iraq and Kuwait, the Japanese government sent four minesweepers, a support ship and a replenishment oiler to the Persian Gulf to assist in cleaning-up operations, the first operational deployment to other countries since the Korean War.

2. Current Force and Modernisation Programmes.

JMSDF personnel level is about 42,500, including some 12,000 naval air force and 1,800 women. The ocean-going escort force is organised into four escort flotillas, each composed of one DDH, two DDGs and five DDs and eight ASW helicopters to carry out the primary SLOC protection mission. There are two submarine flotillas, two mine warfare flotillas and supporting base commands of mostly older DD/DE types and amphibious and support craft. One escort flotilla is based in Yokosuka; one at Kure; and the others in Sasebo and Maizuru. The naval air combat forces are organised into 10 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) squadrons, consisting of eight units equipped with Lockheed/Kawasaki P-3 Orions and two units equipped with the ageing P-2J Neptune capable of escorting ships. There are six patrol helicopter squadrons and one MCM unit composed of 10 MH-53E.

Currently, the MSDF's major surface and sub-surface units are: 58 destroyers and frigates of 181,000 tons; 16 diesel submarines of 37,000 tons; six patrol combatants; 35 mine warfare ships of 24,000 tons, 10 landing ships totalling 13,000 tons and 31 auxiliaries of
The JMSDF also has 99 anti-submarine patrol aircraft — P-3Cs —, and 100 anti-submarine helicopters (49 land-based HSS-2A/B and 51 ship-borne SH-60J).¹⁵⁷

The JMSDF is a growing force which has improved greatly not only in numbers but in modernity over the last ten years. To prepare the MSDF for its expanded task in the post-Cold War era, it is currently undergoing the second phase of its modernisation programme. Recently, the modernisation programmes have been based on two basic defence-related reports — the new NDPO, released in late 1995, and the Mid-Term Defence Build-up Plan (MTDBP). The current NDPO sets forth Japanese security-related goals and guidelines for the next decade; the Build-up Plan lays down how the Outline is to be implemented, and establishes the pace of military modernisation through 2000. A third, and supporting, planning document, Japan’s 1997 Defence White Paper, stresses revolutionary military high technology. For instance, the MSDF’s major acquisition and procurement plans from 1 April 1997, based on the Defence White Paper, are two 4,400-ton destroyers, one 2,700-ton submarine, and one 2,400 training support ship (see Table 8-4).

The JMSDF has a highly modern, if limited, naval capability centred primarily around destroyers (although an Aegis destroyer is similar in size to cruiser), frigates, and minesweepers. The Asian Defence Journal assessed the MSDF destroyer fleet as ‘one of the most modern in the world,’¹⁵⁸ although its command and control sophistication should not be over-estimated.

The navy seems to possess sufficient P-3Cs for wide-area surveillance and patrol missions. Most major surface combatants are equipped with anti-ship missiles (mostly Harpoons) and SAM as well as CIWS. These forces, together with a modern surface fleet, a submarine fleet of diesel submarines and a very modern if small group of amphibious ships, give Japan a strong capability to defend the sea lanes throughout the Northeast Asian area for which it is responsible under its security arrangements with the United States. The extension of the JSMDF’s security responsibilities in the early 1980s to 1,000 miles from the Japanese coast is motivated both by Japan’s dependence on critical raw material imports and US pressure for Tokyo to assume a greater burden-sharing role in region security. Tokyo has stressed that the strengthening of the JSMDF presents no threat to the rest of Asia.

Nevertheless, there are some problems in the MSDF’s modernisation. Budgetary constraints, for instance, are becoming major issues in modernisation. At 4.6 trillion yen, the defence budget for 1993 rose by 1.95 per cent on 1992, the lowest increase in 33 years (and well below the increases of five to six per cent in the 1980s). The MSDF got $10.26 billion
(about 27 per cent) of the total budget, $38.5 billion (compared with 26 per cent for the ASDF and 42 per cent of the GSDF) in 1996. There will be not only fewer new naval acquisitions but also fewer planned upgrades. Modernisation of the P-3C Orions will slow down and be of a lower category than earlier planned. Recruiting could also remain difficult, leaving ships under-manned. In short, for the foreseeable future, the main thrust of Japan’s maritime defence efforts is likely to continue to remain directed at the creation of an effective protection of shipping and defence of the homeland capability. Therefore, Tokyo might be very interested in co-operative maritime security with its neighbours rather than expanding its MSDF into a more powerful force projection organisation.

Within a decade, Japan is unlikely to alter essential elements of its constitution relating to deploying and using military forces. Interpretation of the scope of the constitution, however, will probably continue to evolve incrementally, as in the past, to give Japan more leeway to play a more active role in global affairs, including international peacekeeping. This may involve limited procurement of ships and aircraft that provide greater capability to support force projection at long range and some adjustments in the balance of JSDF. This process will be politically sensitive both in Japan and with Asian states. The steady decline in the demographic pool from which Japan draws its defence personnel — by nearly a third over the coming decade — will also place a major political and economic limit on the level of increase in the total size of the SDF.

B. Japanese Perspective on Co-operative Maritime Security
In the post-Cold War era, Japan’s primary maritime security concerns are as follows: (1) China’s naval expansion and the strengthening of maritime presence in areas of territorial disputes; (2) SLOC security, especially in areas of territorial disputes and political uncertainty; (3) the still large Russian maritime forces in the Far East area; (4) marine resource disputes; and (5) naval build-up in the region. This section will discuss Japan’s perspective on co-operative maritime security, focusing on naval disarmament and arms control policy, maritime confidence-building and maritime co-operation measures, including the control of marine pollution and the co-operation for marine resources.

1. Disarmament and Arms Control Policy
Japan went through the historical experience of naval disarmament and arms control in the years following the First World War and before the outbreak of the Second World War. After 1918, Tokyo entered into a series of treaties in support of the Washington Naval Conference that involved structural naval arms limitations. But Japan brought down the Washington 'system' in the 1930s.

Despite the fact that the Japanese were pleased to see the reductions in Russian naval forces during the Cold War era, Japan showed little interest in Mikhail Gorbachev's Vladiivostok speech in 1986 calling for the containment of certain categories of naval operations in the Northwest Pacific and the establishment of confidence-building measures to reduce the threat of accidental war. Although Russia tried to find ways in which it could strike a comprise with Japan over the disputed Northern Territories, there were no signs of dealing with naval disarmament and arms control as well as MCBMs.

Japan's armed forces are now reducing in numbers. According to the New NDPO, ground troops will be reduced from 180,000 to 145,000 active duty personnel; the 1,200 main battle tank force will be cut back to 900; and 100 artillery pieces will be withdrawn from the 1000-piece force. The 13 divisions in the GSDF will become eight. In the JMSDF, major surface combatants will be reduced from 60 to 50, and land-based antisubmarine squadrons from 16 to 13. Naval aircraft forces, including P-3Cs anti-submarine planes, will be reduced from 220 to 170. The 16-submarine strength will not be affected. In the ASDF, operational fighters will be reduced from 430 to 400, and radar surveillance and warning groups downsized by more than 30 per cent. Japan's defence budget is expected to be frozen at the 1997 equivalent, approximately $41 billion, by 2000. Furthermore, JDA is launching a broad scale-down plan for acquisition programmes starting in 1998. This may well increase interest in co-operation security initiatives.

Japan could even become interested in operational naval arms control focusing on constraints on naval operations, such as ASW free zones and a zone of peace, in the Northwest Pacific in the near future. First, Japan is an island nation with long coasts to defend. Second, Japan's survival and economic prosperity depend heavily on the use of the seas. Japan imports fuel, foodstuffs, wood, coal and raw materials, and exports machinery, motor vehicles, electric and electronic devices. Practically all of these goods, imported or exported, are transported by ships. Third, the eastern part of Russia is situated close to Japan. The distance between Vladivostock and the Noto peninsula on Honshu is 420 miles, and that between southern Sakhalin and northern Hokkaido 43 miles. Kunashiri Island of the Northern
Territories, which is occupied by Russian forces, is located only 21 miles east of Hokkaido. As an operational measure of naval arms control, Japan agreed with Russia on an INCSEA agreement in 1993. Both countries have announced meetings to explore the state of enforcement.\textsuperscript{160}

2. Maritime Confidence-Building Measures

During the Cold War, Japan held back on MCBMs with the Soviet Union to a certain extent, using them as leverage to encourage Moscow to be more flexible over the Northern Territories issue. In more recent years Japanese attitudes toward MCBMs have changed. Japan’s approaches to MCBMs can be largely divided into three areas, which are based on transparency and communication measures: (1) ship visits; (2) mutual exchange of naval staff and naval officers; and (3) participation in conferences and dialogue.

_Organising and Participating Multilateral or Bilateral Conferences and Dialogues._ Since 1991, Japan has been vocally supporting institutional dialogue. This trend appeared in Foreign Minister Nakayama’s statement in July 1991: ‘It would be meaningful and timely to use the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference as a process of political discussions designed to improve the sense of security among us.’\textsuperscript{161} In July 1992 Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa told the National Press Club in Washington that he favoured a ‘two-track approach’ involving a dialogue on specific sub-regional disputes (e.g. Northern Territories dispute with Russia) among the parties directly involved and an Asia-Pacific-wide dialogue on broader political and security issues.\textsuperscript{162}

Although Japan in the past regarded China and Russia as potential threats, it has gone on to favour increased security dialogue with China, Russia, South Korea, and the Southeast Asian nations. In October 1992 the Japanese Defence Minister offered to participate in confidence-building measures through exchanging military observers and researchers with South Korea. In May 1993 Japan and China agreed to begin a working level meeting on defence and security issues to permit greater transparency and cohesion. Japan expects the ASEAN PMC not only to help manage the South China Sea disputes, but also to formulate a collective approach to regional security in which Japan can play a central role. With regard to multilateral security issues, Japan favoured continued participation in PKO and regional multilateral fora, but it stated that a NATO-style multilateral organisation for Asia would be inappropriate.
Japan has also organised a variety of seminars and workshops. In December 1994 the National Institute for Defence Studies hosted the first Asia-Pacific security seminar for invited commander and lieutenant-class military personnel from Asia-Pacific countries. This seminar aimed at explaining each country's national defence policy. In March 1996 the National Defence Academy held an international seminar on defence science, aimed at promoting an understanding Japan's security policy and mutual confidence buildings. Captain and commander-class instructors from military academies from Asia-Pacific countries attended. The MSDF hosted for the first time the fifth Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Tokyo in December 1996. It contributed to promote opinion exchange regarding MCBMs, focusing on mutual ships' visits and exchange of high-ranking officers and staff.

Reciprocal Ships' Visits and the Fleet Review to Build Confidence. A 4,059-ton JMSDF training ship, the *Kashima*, and her escort vessel, the *Sawayuki*, including Rear Admiral Michio Yamada and 73 Japanese naval cadets and officers, visited Pusan, South Korea, on 2-7 September 1996. This port call, at the end of a five-week Pacific training voyage, was in line with an agreement reached between Japan and South Korea in April 1994. It was the first such exchange with South Korea since 1945 undertaken in order to increase mutual understanding. Sending MSDF ships outside the waters immediately surrounding Japan also provides a basis for new roles — humanitarian and peacekeeping missions under UN auspices, and for the MSDF in particular, the defence of sea lanes out to one thousand miles and mine-sweeping in foreign waters. On 28 July 1996 JMSDF despatched the destroyer *Kurama* to the Russian Navy's 300th Commemorative Naval Review off Vladivostok; she was the first ship visit by a JMSDF warship to a Russian naval base. During the visit, the ship took part in an exercise with Russian vessels, not only to exchange signals with the aim of preventing incidents at sea but also to joint manoeuvres. The courtesy port visit is perhaps the most visible sign of the warming relations between the two countries. In early November 1997 the MSDF invited high-level naval officers from other regional countries during the Fleet Review at Sagami Bay, in which a total of 46 ships from the MSDF and 48 aircraft from ASDF participated.

Increasing Military-to-Military Contacts and High-Level Exchanges, including Naval Staff Officers. The Japanese are eager vigorously to promote military exchanges with China, Russia and South Korea. On 6 November 1994 Japan and the ROK agreed to conduct military exchanges, such as the establishment of direct telephone lines between the two countries’ military units and regular meetings of high-ranking officers. They also agreed to

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allow a training ship of the ROK Naval Academy to stop over at a Japanese port in the end of 1994. Tatsuya Nishimoto, Chairman of the Joint Staff Council of the SDF, asserted that ‘deepening mutual understanding between the SDF and the armed forces of China and South Korea through defence exchanges will contribute to creating a peaceful and stable international climate.’ The Japanese Defence Minister, Naoki Murata, visited China on 23-28 August 1996, the first high-level contact between defence officials since Defence Agency Chief Yuko Kurihara visited Beijing in mid-1987. Subsequently, contacts ended following the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. Japanese Defence Agency Director-General Fumio Kyuma visited South Korea on 4-16 January 1997 in order to discuss military and security issues. This was first such trip by a Japanese defence chief since September 1994. The MSDF also seeks to build confidence through exchanges of students, such as a naval staff college programme with the ROK Navy.

During the Siberia summit meeting on 2 November 1997, Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Yeltsin agreed to set up a their own hot line and to start a regular exchange of high-level military officers’ visits. Japan has also begun exchanges of top defence officials with Russia. On 24-29 January 1998, as an initial step, Masahiro Akiyama, First Deputy Director-general of the JDA, visited Moscow. During his visit, Masahiro Akiyama and the Russian Defence Minister, Igor Sergeyev, agreed to improve military co-operation, including joint military exercises in search and rescue operations. Furthermore, bilateral military contacts have been taken between the Japanese and Russian navies.

3. Maritime Co-operation Measures
Beginning in 1990, Japan began seriously to discuss building stronger co-operative relationships in the seas around Japan, involving Russia, China, South Korea, and North Korea. This is a region where geographic separation is measured only by hundreds of miles. Some proposals called for the formation of an ‘East China Sea economic block’ with preferential tariff treatment. Most of the proposals related to the East Sea were somewhat fanciful, including a UN Development Programme for creating extensive new port and transportation facilities in the area of the Tumen River (which runs along the border of China, Russia and North Korea). In the post-Cold War era, East Asian countries have begun to work closely with Japan to ‘secure a continued US military presence, offset the growth of China and prevent Japan from rearming for unilateral military action in a region that suffered heavily under
Japanese occupation before and during the World War II. Japan’s MCMs in the Cold War decades have been influenced by several factors: (1) the nation’s heavy dependence on ocean space and resources for its economic survival and prosperity; (2) the historical context of the nation’s post-war political life; (3) the need to balance the nation’s domestic policy priorities and international policy needs; (4) the need to co-ordinate its developmental needs and environmental concerns; and (5) the policy-making structure and process. Hence Japanese approaches to maritime co-operation measures in the region can be largely divided into three areas: (1) joint exercises, including search and rescue as well as humanitarian operations; (2) protection against maritime pollution; and (3) joint development of natural marine resources.

**Joint Exercises**

**Piracy, Search and Rescue Operations, and SLOC Protection.** The Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Co-operation, adopted in 1978, provide a basic framework for maritime co-operation between the two countries. Thereby, Japan undertakes to defend important commercial ships, while US naval forces conduct offensive operations in support of Japanese operations. To give substance to this framework, Prime Minister Suzuki stated in 1981 that Japan will have the capability to close off the three international straits along its own islands and defend its 1,000-mile sea-lanes southward. Since then, Japan’s joint naval manoeuvres increased from three a year in the late 1970s to eight by 1984.

Joint exercises, like RIMPAC between individual and joint military services, showed the greater integration of the combined forces. The JMSDF had joint exercises with the South Korean and US navies in the East Sea from 21 October to 10 November 1996. Recently, the ongoing Japan-Russia military-to-military contact programme serves as an example of their greater co-operation. During the Siberia summit meeting on 2 November 1997, Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Yeltsin agreed to conduct joint naval exercises based on humanitarian and disaster-relief operations.

**Protection Against Marine Pollution.** Japan, as a maritime state with one of the world’s largest national shipping fleets and engaged in fishing on a large scale, has actively worked to solve pollution problems in concert with international efforts. In the post-Cold War era, one of the most urgent problems requiring Japanese collaboration is the study of the environmental impact of Russian dumping of solid and liquid nuclear waste in the East Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, and an area south-east of Kamchatka. Japan is also considering maritime co-operation in environmental protection with South Korea, including protection against sea pollution. The two countries are expected to sign a bilateral agreement which will promote policy co-operation, technology and information exchange, and joint research. This kind of co-
operation will seek to prevent air, water, quality, marine, and soil pollution, and global warming. Japan and the United States agreed in January 1992 to co-operate on joint environmental projects in developing countries. Under the three-year environmental co-operation plan, which was agreed on 13 November 1997, Japan will assist China to improve 100 information networks on environmental protection between 1998 and 2000.

Joint Development of Marine Resources: Oil, Gas and Fishery. Japan has overlapping seabed claims with China and South Korea in the East China Sea. As to this overlap of claims, Japan and South Korea agreed in principle in 1972 to developing jointly the seabed resources of the continental shelf adjoining their two countries, and signed an agreement in February 1973. The Joint Development Zone covered an area of 100,000 square kilometres lying south-east of the Korean Peninsula and west of Kyushu — the southernmost of the main islands of Japan — the area in question being divided into nine sub-zones, each of which would be exploited by concessionaires of both parties. The agreement is to remain in force for twenty years and the natural resources to be exploited and explored were defined as petroleum, natural gas, and other underground materials.

In November 1970 a non-governmental Japan-South Korea-Taiwan Liaison Committee was established by business people from the three countries for research into and development of resources in the East China Sea. Diplomatic relations had been established between Tokyo and Beijing in September 1972, effectively cutting Taiwan out of the negotiations. In January 1974 the governments of Japan and South Korea signed an agreement on joint development of the continental shelf in the East China Sea covering an area of about 82,000 square kilometres south of Cheju Island. In June 1978 the agreement came into effect with exchange of ratification, to be in force for fifty years. In their unilateral shelf claims, the Japanese sought to apply the equidistance approach in delimiting the joint development zone. During the Siberia summit on 3 November 1997 Japan agreed to help with a project to develop oil and natural gas in the Far Eastern Russian Islands of Sakhalin.

Japan’s major policy for marine resources is the regulation of imports from major distant water fishing countries, such as South Korea and Taiwan. In March 1988 there were 182 Japanese fisheries joint ventures in 43 countries, with over half in the Asia-Oceanic region; of these, 74 were for fishing, 39 for aquaculture, and 69 for cold storage and fish product processing. During the meeting between Prime Minister Hashimoto and Prime Minister Li Peng in Tokyo on 11 November 1997, the two leaders oversaw the signing of a fishing accord that put aside the East China Sea dispute.
With the recently solved issue of Japanese fishing around the South Kuril Islands via the bilateral fisheries agreement between Russia and Japan on 21 February 1998, the Japanese government agreed to provide 240 million yen in technical assistance to the Russian Far East in 1998. Japanese fishing organisations also agreed to provide 10 million yen for preservation of marine resources, along with 15 million yen worth of fishing gear. Under the new pact, up to 25 Japanese fishing vessels were allowed to catch 1,200 tons of fish in 1998 around the Southern Kurils. Russia has repeatedly called for Japanese economic co-operation in the development of marine resources around the Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands since the Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeniy Primakov, raised the idea during a visit to Japan in November 1996. During their talks at Kawana resort in Japan on 18-19 April 1998, President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Hashimoto agreed a joint investment in the Russian Far East. President Yeltsin also proposed joint projects on the Kuril Islands, in particular fishing ventures.

V. Conclusion
In an evolving multipolar world, China strives to be a major power that can influence the new world order and the Asia-Pacific countries to its benefit. In this process, Beijing has begun to understand the importance of sea power for the defence not only of its territory but also of its foreign trade routes, and for the exploration of offshore marine resources. The Chinese power elite is now openly emphasising the importance of a blue water strategy. Although the navy is still essentially a coastal fleet, its maritime strategy is transforming from a coastal defence force into an offshore fleet capable of defending China's ocean approaches. In relation to this strategy, China wants not only to get aircraft carriers but also to develop a new Type 093 SSGN based on the Russian Victor III and a Type 094 SSBN. To project naval capabilities beyond its coastal waters, China uses its forward naval bases in the South China Sea and Myanmar.

Although China does not have all the classic elements of sea power stated by Alfred T. Mahan, the Chinese leadership have agreed to develop a blue-water navy by 2050. In particular, economic development has made security considerations increasingly regional, with the need to defend vital sea lanes and offshore assets. With the modernisation of the navy, the country's force projection capabilities are steadily growing. And with the relaxation of Sino-Russian hostilities, the focus in Chinese security planning today is on local rather than major conflicts, especially along the southern land and maritime frontiers. Over the next decade,
China will continue try to improve its surface fleet by building more modern destroyers, frigates, and missile patrol boats to replace older vessels. It will also seek to upgrade its obsolete submarine force by improving the capabilities of its Ming-class submarines and perfecting the follow-on Song-class. As a parallel initiative, China has already purchased four Kilo-class submarines and obtained the construction licence from Russia. By the early years of the next century, the PLAN will be qualitatively improved, although the quantity of major surface warships will probably remain constant or perhaps even decline as obsolete vessels are decommissioned. Nevertheless, progress in developing a navy with a significant blue water capability continues to be slow and the pace will continue to be deliberate. Clearly, the PLA Navy will play the key role in its future power-projection plans.

China’s maritime security can be regarded as a major component of its national security strategy, which aims to maintain world peace and create a peaceful international environment for its current national modernisation drive. In particular, China’s maritime economic co-operation, an integral facet of its economic development, has long been actively explored, especially in some areas in which economic co-operation with foreign countries is considered ‘highly complementary.’ As far as maritime security is concerned, Beijing is now concentrating more of its efforts on accelerating maritime economic development and safeguarding interests with the joint development of offshore marine resources with other countries.

China, in achieving its strategic goals, is pursuing active and creative diplomacy, strengthening its economic and commercial links with other countries as well as employing its traditional expertise in the art of political manoeuvre. Thus, the maintenance and strengthening of co-operative ties with its Northeast Asian countries remains a major component of China’s foreign policy. In particular, in reviving friendly relations with Russia, China’s main strategic concern has shifted from its borders to the open ocean, including outlying islands now in dispute. As the world’s most populous nation, with one of the world’s largest militaries and the fastest growing economy, China will play a major role in defining the Northeast Asian security environment for the 21st century.

With its strategy and naval force development, China has little interest in naval arms control and disarmament. China’s approach to co-operative maritime security will be largely influenced by political considerations regarding its view of the regional order and its position in global politics. Qin Huasum, Director of the Department of International Organisations and Conferences, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, stated, ‘Regional CBMs, security
and disarmament issues cannot exist alone.... CBMs or security and disarmament arrangements can hardly achieve real progress.\textsuperscript{187} Furthermore, China did not assert the necessity of naval arms control in its \textit{Arms Control and Disarmament White Paper}. Nonetheless, China signed a Maritime Consultative Agreement with the United States aimed at preventing incidents at sea as an operational naval arms control measure, on 19 January 1998.

China's approach to co-operative maritime security is currently determined by two conflicting factors. The first is the effect of naval arms control on its security and, here, the old attitude of 'Realpolitik' still prevails. China will support arms control agreements that will enhance its own security but will oppose measures that constrain its forces, especially if the development of these forces forms a central component of the country's strategic planning. Beijing has shown an unwillingness to constrain its arms export policies which are designed both to generate revenue and to serve as an instrument of its foreign and security policy. A second factor is the effect on China's standing in the world. Beijing increasingly wants to be seen as a responsible major power. It is especially concerned to promote this image in the developing world. A prerequisite is that China is economically successful and militarily strong; but at the same time, Beijing cannot afford to be seen as an obstacle to world peace, either by obstructing international arms control or proliferating weapons of mass destruction. China views arms reduction as the responsibility of Russia and the United States, and only when the arsenals of these countries have been reduced to very low levels would China consider getting involved in this process. This precludes Chinese participation in strategic arms control until well into the next century, however. At the same time, Beijing supports and demands strategic arms reductions by Russia and the United States.

In the maritime confidence context, China prefers a bilateral approach. Beijing appears to view MCBMs as a political symbol, rather than a technical process. As regards transparency measures, China participates in the United Nations register of conventional arms. Recently, it has increased its naval visits to the Indian Ocean and made more frequent port calls in the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, Beijing in general is not increasing the transparency of its military budgets, inventory and strategy in order to ease its neighbours' concerns.

China is also concerned with maritime co-operation measures, based on protection against sea pollution and joint developments of marine resources. With its economy rapidly increasing, China, as a net oil importer since 1996, needs to strengthen maritime co-operation
measures both to exploit offshore marine resources and to protect the marine ecological system with other regional countries. In governmental and non-governmental aspects, Beijing has bilateral agreements with the United States, Russia, the two Koreas, and Japan to exchange marine science and technology for sea pollution and marine resources. Even though the dumping of waste at sea is strictly controlled by the 1985 State Oceanic Administration, China needs to increase co-operative activities with the two Koreas, Japan and Taiwan, as the direct victims of such pollution.

Japan seeks to retain a security relationship with the United States; promote dynamic economic growth in Asia; participate more actively in expanding global, regional and bilateral security discussions; and pursue these goals primarily through non-military means. The problem is that these policies may not be sufficient to preserve Japan’s maritime security interests regarding such problems as nuclear proliferation in Korea and the Russian Federation, threats to its vital sea lanes from the naval advance of China or other regional actors, or waning US interests in Asia. With the new NDPO, Japan’s naval forces will be reduced and acquisition programmes revised due to defence budget constraints.

Today, the JSMDF is a reasonably efficient self-defence force. Although widely expected to be a key player and natural successor to the United States maritime role, the navy is likely to remain a relatively low-key regional asset in the medium term. Although Japan’s overseas power projection is not among its current missions or capabilities, this may be changed under the new US-Japan security treaty. The navy possesses some excellent ships, submarines and ASW aircraft. Front line equipment is generally first rate, and the introduction of Aegis brings the JSMDF a substantial AAW potential, albeit limited by command and control deficiencies. Current force levels of escort vessels may not be adequate to carry out the accepted wartime mission of ocean escort of shipping in a 1,000 mile radius. Nevertheless, the navy is making progress in overcoming these problems. Still, it cannot move faster than Japanese public opinion will permit. Procurement trends are likely to continue very much along current lines into the end of the 1990s, after which some declines can be expected due to defence budget constraints. Much of Japan’s weapons equipment is outstanding: advanced jet fighters, AWACS aircraft, and Aegis-class destroyers. Tokyo sent its SDF to Cambodia as part of the UN peace keeping operation. These deployments make Asian minds uneasy, given the experience of the 1930s and 1940s.

Japanese attitudes on co-operative maritime security have changed in the last half decade. Japan also needs to co-operate with Moscow on the subject of MCBMs and naval
arms control, including the reduction of naval arms around Northern Territories, which would benefit both countries by alleviating mistrust and tensions and increasing trust and confidence. Like China, Japan is little interested in structural arms control. Nevertheless, Tokyo signed an INCSEA agreement with Russia in 1993 through the Japan-Russian Policy Planning Talks, in which views on security policies will be exchanged by the two countries’ diplomatic and defence officials. It is expected that Japan will probably be interested for geo-strategic reasons in operational naval arms control focusing on constraints on naval operations, such as ASW free zones and a zone of peace, in the Northwest Pacific in the near future.

Japan’s attitude towards maritime confidence-building measures has also changed in the last half decade. Japan is increasing MCBMs activities such as reciprocal ships’ visits, high-level military-to-military contacts, hosting and organising conferences and dialogues. The most industrialised nation in Northeast Asia, Japan has also begun to revise its position as regards environmental maritime co-operation measures. As it becomes increasingly clear that the global concern with the environment is not a fad but a mounting concern, Japan has moved closer to the environmentalists, pledging the largest amount of money at the Rio Conference in 1992. Japan lives near and off the resources of the ocean. The government has taken some of the necessary steps to begin dealing with pollution domestically. Tokyo, in part due to the changing times and in part to the changing status of the LDP, seems to have taken some real notice of the international nature of marine pollution. Japan now openly advocates the international call for pollution reform, which was suggested at the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992, and is also trying to solve the sea pollution problems in Northeast Asia with regional countries, such as Russia, China and the two Koreas. For the foreseeable future, in short, the main thrust of Japan’s maritime defence effort is likely to continue to remain directed at the creation of an effective protection of shipping. Therefore, Japan has some interest in cooperative maritime security with other neighbours.

Endnotes

3. By early 1992 the two countries agreed on measures to ensure peace and tranquillity along the line of actual control of the border. Meetings were held annually in June and October at the eastern and western sectors of the border, and regular communications links between the meeting places of the


10. an agreement reached during the Yeltsin’s visit to China, see FBIS-SOV-93-243, 7 December 1992, pp. 16-19 and FBIS-SOV-92-244, 18 December 1992, pp. 6-9.


16. The phrase Limited and Regional Wars was used in a speech by Deng Xiaoping on 4 June 1985 and reported in Reiminh Rinbao (People’s Daily) on 12 June 1985.


PLA’s modernisation programme is divided into four categories as follows: (1) a modernised military doctrine; (2) the modernisation of weapons and equipment; (3) a wide range of internal reforms; and (4) civil-military relations. For further elaboration, see Gerald Segal, ‘As China grows Strong’, International Affairs, vol. 64, no. 2 (Spring 1988), pp. 217-32.


27. On 10 March 1995, Qian Qichen, Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister, said that ‘China’s defence expenditure is much smaller than that of the United States, while the number of China’s troops is much larger than that of the United States.’ Qian Qichen News Conference with Foreign Reporters live on Chinese Central TV’, Chinese Central Television (Beijing) in SWB, 11 March 1995, p. FE/2249 G/4.


36. This trend was influenced by the Soviet threat. On 14-21 April 1975, for example, the Soviet Navy conducted a massive world-wide naval exercise known in the West as Okean 75. The exercise included operating in the Western Pacific that the Chinese could well have interpreted as portending the threat to the PRC. Only two weeks after the end of the Ocean 75, Mao convened the enlarged meeting of the Party’s Ministry Commission and announced that it was necessary to build up the navy and to ‘make it dreadful to the enemy.’ New China News Agency, 15 September 1977 in FBIS-China, 16 September 1977, p. E17.

37. At the end of 1985, the Naval Military Academic Research Institute was established to coordinate and provide research and analysis for the formulation of naval strategy, operations, and
tactics. Among its output is a guideline for navy building to the year 2000, which is the basis for planning the navy’s development. Liberation Army Daily, 21 September 1989, p. 3.


49. Quoted in Kim, ‘Modernisation of China’s Submarine Forces’, p. 52.


58. Chinese defence strategy is based on a major ‘in-depth three-in-one defence strategy’ which combines space, sea, and land. The Chinese stress that the way to prevent enemy attack should be integrated resistance of the enemy from ‘outer space, the deep sea, and the land in modern warfare.’ ‘Military expert calls New Defence Strategy to meet Challenge of Hi-Tech Warfare’, *SWB*, 3 November 1994, p. FE/2212 G/19.
63. 'Lien Ho Pao' reports military meeting to discuss plans to attack Taiwan'. SWB, 3 November 1994. p. FE 2203 G/18.
77. The Chinese Navy has been developed by four development phases: (1) assembling phase (1950s); (2) copying phase (early-late 1960s); (3) designing and building experiment phase (late 1960s-early 1980s); and (4) scientific research and building phase: new ships' building and developing new technology (mid 1980s- ). For a full discussion of the development phases. see Lt Cdr. Duk-Ki Kim. 'Liu Huaqing Jaedok Haeyang Sasang and Zhong Haegun Hyundachwa [Admiral Liu Huaqing's Maritime Strategic Thought and His Influence for the Modernisation of the Chinese Navy]'. Haeyang Junyak [Maritime Strategy] (Spring 1996). pp. 16-19.
SAC-200 Journal Power, 85.

- it could provide them at a low price. In Reference Edition.


Minister Chi Haotian visits Japanese Naval Base.

Xinhua New Agency (Beijing), 13 November 1997.


For more details, see "Chinese Agency reports Agreement Signed on Environmental Protection", Xinhua News Agency (Beijing), 13 November 1997 in SWB, 15 November 1997, p. FE/3077 E/3-4.


The Korea Herald, 2 June 1993, p. 2.

During the academic seminar hosted by the UN Arms Reduction Bureau in Shanghai on 17 August 1992, Chinese Foreign Minister Quian Qichen re-stressed this concept at his opening address. UN, Disarmament and Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region, Disarmament Topical Paper No. 11 (New York: UN, 1992), pp. 9-14.


Details of the main pillars of the basic policy, see Toshiyuki Shikata, ‘Japan’s Grand Strategy in the Dispute over the Kurils. The Russian side believes that Japan will try to achieve territorial concessions run counter to the sprit of the Siberian summit accords in 1997. Nevertheless, Moscow is keen to maintain the law. see Greenfield, China’s Practice in the Law of the Sea, pp. 244-9 (appendix 6).


Donald R. Rothwell, ‘Marine Environmental Protection in the EEZ’, paper presented for the Conference on Management of Regional Seas: Co-operation and Dialogue, organised by the Centre for Maritime Policy at Wollongong University and the Northeast Asia Programme at the Australian National University, Canberra, 12 December 1997, p. 24.


140. ‘Japan split on Budget Rise’, JDW, 5 August 1995, p. 3.


147. Ibid., p. 109.


‘Japan displays Naval Strength at Sagami Bay’, *JDW*, 12 November 1997, p. 25.


Robert Karniol, ‘Japan’s New Missions to involve Russian Forces’, *JDW*, 12 November 1997, p. 27.

*Asahi Shimbun*, 10 May 1993, p. 3.


## Table 8-1  China’s Changing Naval Forces, 1990-1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Naval Forces</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Manpower*</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Submarines</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- SSBN</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- SSNs</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- SSG</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- SS**</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Principal Surface</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Destroyers</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Frigates</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Patrol and Coastal</td>
<td>915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mine Warfare Forces</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Naval Aircraft</td>
<td>824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Shore-based Combat</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Armed Helicopters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note

* In thousands of personnel.

** Submarine numbers include one Golf-class submarine and exclude about fifty non-operational Romeo-class submarines from 1992.

Sources: The Military Balance 1990-98.
Table 8-2 Chinese Arms Orders and Deliveries, 1995-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Supplier</th>
<th>Order Date</th>
<th>Delivery Date</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-continental Ballistic Missile</td>
<td>DF-31/41</td>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Development begun 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine-launched Ballistic missile</td>
<td>JL-2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime patrol aircraft</td>
<td>Radar</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
<td>Searchwater to be fitted to Y-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne early warning aircraft</td>
<td>IL-76</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter, ground-attack</td>
<td>F-10</td>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Development; requirement for 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Su-27</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Licensed production for further 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training aircraft</td>
<td>K-8</td>
<td></td>
<td>Collab.</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td></td>
<td>With Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main battle tank</td>
<td>Type-90-II</td>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Development of Type 851 IIM; trials 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armoured personnel carrier</td>
<td>Type-90</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Family of 12 armoured fighting vehicles 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>delivered 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing platform helicopter(LPH)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer with area surface-to-air missile *</td>
<td>Sovremenny</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence mobilisation ship</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>Luhu-class</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>The second was delivered in 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>Song-class</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ming-class</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kilo 877/636</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>The last one was delivered in 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine</td>
<td>Type 094</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Development; to carry JL-2 SLBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear-powered submarine with dedicated non-ballistic missile launchers</td>
<td>Type 093</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Similar to Russian Victor III</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note
*: In March 1998 China agreed to get 12 Ka-28s in a Sovremenny package.

Table 8-3 The Changing Japanese MSDF, 1990-1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Naval Forces</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Manpower *</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Submarine</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tactical Submarines</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Training Submarines</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Principal Surface Combatants</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Destroyers</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Frigates</td>
<td>58a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Patrol and Coastal Combatants</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Maine Warfare</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Naval Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Combat Aircraft</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Armed Helicopters</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes
* In thousands of personnel
a: frigate numbers include six training ships.
b and d: frigate numbers include five training ships
c: training submarine numbers include three training and one trial ships
e: frigate numbers include two training ships.

Sources: Military Balance 1990-98.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>New NDPO</th>
<th>Old NDPO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ground Self-Defence Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organised Strength</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular personnel</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ready Reserve personnel</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionally Deployed Units</td>
<td>8 Divisions</td>
<td>12 Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Brigades</td>
<td>2 Combat Brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Operation Units</td>
<td>1 Artillery Brigade</td>
<td>1 Airborne Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Airborne Brigade</td>
<td>1 Airborne Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 Helicopter Brigade</td>
<td>1 Helicopter Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground-to-Air Missile Units</td>
<td>8 Anti-craft Artillery Groups</td>
<td>8 Anti-aircraft Artillery Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Equipment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle Tanks</td>
<td>Apx. 900</td>
<td>Apx. 1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Artilleries</td>
<td>Apx. 900</td>
<td>Apx. 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maritime Self-Defence Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer Units (for mobile operations)</td>
<td>4 Flotillas</td>
<td>4 Flotillas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer Units (Regional District Units)</td>
<td>7 Divisions</td>
<td>10 Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine Units</td>
<td>6 Divisions</td>
<td>6 Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping Units</td>
<td>1 Flotilla</td>
<td>2 Flotilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-Based Patrol Aircraft Units</td>
<td>13 Squadrons</td>
<td>16 Squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Equipment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>Apx. 50</td>
<td>Apx. 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Aircraft</td>
<td>Apx. 170</td>
<td>Apx. 220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Self-Defence Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Control and Warning Units</td>
<td>8 Groups</td>
<td>28 Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 Groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Squadron (AEW)</td>
<td>1 Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interceptor Units</td>
<td>9 Squadrons</td>
<td>10 Squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Flight Units</td>
<td>3 Squadrons</td>
<td>3 Squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Reconnaissance Units</td>
<td>1 Squadron</td>
<td>1 Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transport Units</td>
<td>3 Squadrons</td>
<td>3 Squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground-to-Air Missile Units</td>
<td>6 Groups</td>
<td>6 Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Equipment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Aircraft</td>
<td>Apx. 400</td>
<td>Apx. 430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter (Included in Combat Aircraft)</td>
<td>Apx. 300</td>
<td>Apx. 350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter, ground-attack</td>
<td>F-2</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training aircraft</td>
<td>T-4</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and rescue aircraft</td>
<td>U-125</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter</td>
<td>S70</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-air missile</td>
<td>Patriot</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter</td>
<td>OH-1</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter</td>
<td>CH-47J</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main battle tank</td>
<td>Type-90</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple launch rocket system</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>FH-70</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer with surface-to-air missile</td>
<td>Kongo-class</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer with surface-to-air missile</td>
<td>DD-01</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing platform, dock</td>
<td>Osumi</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine countermeasures ship</td>
<td>Hatsushima</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>Oyashio-class</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Crude Oil Balance
(In thousands of bbls/day)

Petroleum Products Balance
(In thousands of bbls/day)

Source: Michael Studeman, "Calculating China's Advances in the South China Sea: Identifying the Triggers of "Expansionism"", *US Naval War College Review*, vol. 51, no. 2 (Spring 1998), p. 71
Figure 8-2 Deployment of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force

Note
*: Indicates sites of Escort Flotilla Headquarters
Chapter IX. Conclusion

This study suggests possible co-operative maritime security structure which might help stabilise the Northeast Asian maritime security environment. On the basis of the review of general maritime security theories, it analysed the origins, process, objectives, outcomes and impacts of the three co-operative maritime security frameworks: naval arms control and disarmament measures, both structural measures and operational; maritime confidence-building measures and maritime co-operation measures. The last part examined the maritime strategic environment and the major regional powers' perspectives from the mid-1980s up to the bilateral shipping co-operation agreement between Russia and China in April 1998.

What remains is design policy options to tackle the problems identified in the previous chapters. Resolving the maritime problems of the countries in Northeast Asia is not an easy task, nor is there any panacea to solve them. Indeed, Northeast Asian countries need co-operative approaches to solve the problems from bilateral, regional or international levels. Thus, this study will list policy options that seem to be more relevant and specific to the questions that have been brought to light in the first chapter.

During the last decade, Northeast Asian countries have been trying to improve their relations; there is no new common threat, nor do they pose any direct and imminent threat to one another. Northeast Asia currently has an important opportunity to build a framework for stability in the Asia-Pacific region through a dialogue on peace and security. These countries have taken small steps towards official dialogue on maritime co-operation but little progress has been made in the way of substantial co-operative security measures beyond US-Russian ships' visits and some further INCSEA agreements between Russia and South Korea (1993) as well as Japan (1993) and a related agreement on maritime consultation between the United States and China (1998).

Nonetheless, recent efforts to increase mutual confidence between Northeast Asian countries show the possibility of the application of maritime confidence-building measures, maritime co-operation measures and naval arms control based on operational measures. Lately, these countries have grown to worry more about each other in the maritime context. This fear and realisation that there is an increased chance of conflict has led them to give greater consideration to the possibility of gaining mutual security through co-operative maritime security. The role of co-operative maritime security within Northeast Asia could be
relatively significant because these countries have reasons to fear possible conflict with past potential adversaries. The danger of conflict is much greater than between European countries because of the tensions surrounding maritime boundary and territorial disputes. A benign mutual environment and the absence of major conflicts with neighbours through maritime confidence-building may be necessary conditions for the survival of peace in the region.

There is now a need to look towards developing a dialogue on regional maritime cooperation based on maritime confidence-building measures, co-operation measures and arms control. It has been proposed that the optimum co-operative maritime security measures for Northeast Asia would be those which take into account the regional maritime situation and existing security proposals. In order to provide a co-operative maritime security model to Northeast Asia, this study suggests that the following steps are useful: stage 1: promotion of maritime confidence-building measures; stage 2: development of maritime co-operation measures, and stage 3: development of naval arms control measures.

Maritime confidence-building measures have advantages because they do not include the reduction and constraint of naval force structure, combat readiness of existing naval forces, and naval modernisation programmes in the region. At the same time, they could enhance stability and predictability at sea, eliminate mutual misunderstanding, and reduce accidental or inadvertent conflicts at sea by a misperception of each side’s activities and operations and an inadequate or wrong reaction towards such activities. Multilateral confidence building measures will help to mitigate the tensions caused by existing maritime boundary and territorial disputes and thus contribute to Northeast Asian maritime security.

Misunderstanding is caused by the lack of any common threat perception throughout the region as well as by the absence of transparency. The growth and modernisation of Northeast Asian naval forces is proceeding with a considerable degree of uncertainty and suspicion, and that could eventually stimulate an arms race with destabilising consequences. China, for example, is more concerned about Japan’s PKO roles and mine-sweeping operations after the Gulf War, while some neighbours are concerned about the increasing Chinese naval development and its advance in the South China Sea. Among the CBMs, the most promising activities involve building on and modifying existing agreements to prevent incidents at sea and dangerous military activities, and establishing or expanding measures of transparency, such as compliance with and improving the UN, or an eventual arms register and the regular issue of truthful official Defence White Papers. In the current context of strategic uncertainty and maritime force development in Northeast Asia, three kinds of
possible MCBMs can be applied to Northeast Asia: information exchange measures; communication measures; and observation and inspection measures.

Information exchange measures may be the most valuable MCBMs, applicable region-wide. There are many ways of achieving transparency, some requiring more cooperation with other countries. Northeast Asian countries, for example, are already reporting their arms to the UN Arms Register, which requires participating countries to report annually on numbers of weapons imported and exported in seven categories during the previous calendar year, and publishing Defence White Papers—except for China and North Korea—and similar documents that provide information about acquisition programmes and force structure in a way that links them to a reassuring strategic analysis. Only North Korea does not report. Taiwan was not invited to submit data for the UN register because it is neither a UN member nor a recognised observer state. In 1997 the UN and the United States tried to include Taiwan in the register, but China protested. A common proposal for enhancing region-wide transparency is for states to build on the UN Arms Register by agreeing to report to one another information that is more comprehensive and more relevant to the regional context.

Northeast Asian countries can make use of many unofficial sources, such as *Jane's Fighting Ships, Jane's Navy International, Naval Forces, Strategic Appraisal* (RAND), *Military Balance* (IISS), *Strategic Survey* (IISS), *US Naval Institute Proceedings, US Naval War College Review, Royal United Services Institute, US Naval Institute* publications and numerous other books. Such information is not enough, however, for them to both understand and trust each other. First and most important, Northeast Asian countries need to formalise and regularise their open exchanges of naval information with other nations. Although the information provided openly might not be entirely comprehensive, this would help build confidence and lead to additional contact. This study suggests that a publication of a maritime information directory or regional arms register through a 'first track' approach is a possible way to exchange more useful information in Northeast Asia. This directory could include three possible areas of naval information. The first category of the directory could include defence budgets, weapons holdings and procurements as well as force organisation. The second category would include security perceptions, threat assessments, defence doctrines, strategic and operational concepts. The last category would include military training, exercises, operations and deployments. This would enhance the understanding of how regional navies go about their maritime business and provide a directory of key personnel for informal
discussion of mutual interest. Common minimum standards/outlines for Defence White Papers would also be helpful.

The second possible area of MCBMs to be applied to Northeast Asian is communication measures. Military exchanges, such as reciprocal port visits, fall somewhere in between dialogue and defence co-operation. Their purpose is to improve goodwill and to increase mutual understanding through personal contact. Mutual port visits by warships have a long tradition and a recognised maritime confidence-building value. At an operational level, the exchange of ship visits is an important step in building mutual confidence. Furthermore, military-to-military contact can increase transparency for Northeast Asian navies. In April 1994, for example, the first South Korean Defence Minister ever to visit Japan arrived to finalise naval goodwill visits there. Other naval goodwill visits have taken place with two Korean destroyers calling at Vladivostock in September 1993. This visit reciprocated an earlier South Korean invitation for a Russian fleet visit to Pusan in August 1993. On 6-8 July 1994 high level military ties between America and China resumed after a five year break with the visit of Admiral Charles Larson, Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Command, to Beijing. US and Chinese officials have suggested measures to reduce suspicion between the two countries, including limited joint military exercises, intelligence sharing and regular high level military exchanges. In the North Pacific there is also growing contact, although still at low levels. Mutual ships’ visits between China-South Korea, China-Japan, and Japan-Russia should be encouraged to increase maritime transparency.

Increasing exchange of senior officers’ professional education programmes at national defence university and naval command college levels is one of the communication measures. Education has a strong influence on the way professionals think. Consequently, an academic forum would provide unique opportunities for transparency through open discussion of policies and practices that would be impossible in a more official setting. This kind of forum, by providing an opportunity for national defence officials to meet and discuss regional security, offers a valuable means for increasing confidence building among countries in the region and, it is hoped, could become an important impetus to confidence building at a multilateral level in the future. Furthermore, professional education at naval command and staff college and other military institutes, such as national defence universities and academies, can also provide important but less tangible benefits such as inter-military relations at policy-making level. Even though there are several education programmes at command and staff college levels in Northeast Asia, these are insufficient to contribute CBMs. The current
professional education exchange programmes are: ROK-Japan and Taiwan; US-Japan and ROK; and Russia-ROK. In the future, professional education at a national defence university level should be developed to increase transparency and understanding the other parties' force structure and strategy. An example of such measures is Japan's acceptance of Indonesian military officers at its National Defence Academy, beginning in April 1998.

Strengthening the 'first-track' and 'second track' processes in Northeast Asian countries is necessary to increase confidence and transparency. The first-track process, in particular, needs to include discussion of maritime security issues involving maritime strategy, doctrine and readiness. The Western Naval Symposium (WPNS), which was first held in 1988, for example, brings together naval leaders from the Western Pacific navies to discuss issues of regional interest. Nonetheless, the WPNS cannot promote multilateral maritime cooperation in areas, such as maritime strategy and doctrine, which could be considered too sensitive. Even though at their 5th Meeting on 26-29 November 1996 WPNS member navies agreed to provide each other with information about forces, doctrine and where appropriate, regional warships movements, it will be take some time before full success is achieved. WPNS is not comprehensive, as Taiwan and North Korea are exempted, but symposia like WPNS, which include the United Sates, Russia, China, Taiwan, and the Two Koreas at senior level, plus other fora such as APEC, the ARF (on track one), and the SLOC conference, CSCAP and the CSCAP Working Group on Maritime Co-operation (on track two), are directly or indirectly contributing to increased trust-building through some useful discussions.

Observation measures are also useful MCBMs. As far as observation of naval exercises is concerned, the right of free passage on the high seas already offers states an opportunity independently to observe naval activities by national technical means. Exchange of observers can regularise the information provided and serve as a gesture of good will as well as provide access to those that lack national contacting and searching techniques. In tandem with the above mutual benefits, the following practical difficulties need to be considered by allowing on-board observers in a large scale naval exercise in Northeast Asian navies. To what extent do they explain their own command and control to other countries who may be potential enemies? Simply being aboard a foreign vessel engaged in an exercise may not build transparency and confidence. As a first step, however, Northeast Asian navies could agree to exchange exercise calendars, with a definition of what is to be included within their planned activities. In early November 1997, as an example of the fleet review, the JMSDF
invited high-level naval officers from other regional countries to the Fleet Review at Sagami Bay.

Developing maritime co-operation measures, as the second stage, can offer a number of benefits. The main goals of MCMs are cost reduction through shared development efforts or by serial joint operations for humanitarian purposes, joint development of marine resources, the protection of SLOCs and the prevention of sea pollution. MCMs can also reduce tension and build confidence. MCMs show that neighbouring countries can work together to look after certain problems at the regional or sub-regional level. This can help to deter potential adversaries and assure extra-regional countries that they will not face any direct threat for their sea-borne trade. With functional and operational measures, MCMs cover search and rescue operations and actions to counter marine pollution, illegal activities, including drug smuggling, piracy and fisheries infringement.

The United States and Russia have begun combined exercises for search and rescue operations. For example, US Navy and Marine Corps forces participated in the maritime disaster relief exercise with units of the Russian Federation Navy and Naval Infantry from 27 to 31 August 1993 at the Marine Corps Base in Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. Another such exercise was conducted in the East China Sea on 20 March 1994 by the Destroyer Vinogradov of the Russian Pacific Fleet and maritime patrol aircraft (P-3C) of the US Navy. It established communication network searching of surface targets, and exchange of information. Russia has already proposed similar combined maritime rescue exercises with the ROK Navy and the JMSDF. Nonetheless, Northeast Asian navies do not have their own formal bilateral and multilateral naval patrols for search and rescue. However, this study suggests that Northeast Asia need a new form of multilateral naval exercises, including Russian and Chinese navies, focusing on humanitarian operations, such as search and rescue operations, counter-piracy and drug-trafficking in order not only to eliminate distrust but also to exchange research and rescue techniques.

There are many kinds of multilateral organisations, which aim not only to develop marine resources through scientific research but also to protect against sea pollution. Examples of such organisations on a governmental basis are the North-Pacific Scientific Organisation (NOPSO), the North-West Pacific Action Plan (NOWPAP), and the Yellow Sea Large Marine Ecosystem (YSLME). The roles of these organisations are: data and information exchange; common assessment methodology for marine pollution; marine pollution monitoring technologies on land-based sources of pollution, fluxes and their impacts.
on the marine environment, cross-boundary containment from the Northwest Pacific to the open ocean; and development of environmental criteria and standards. The CSCAP Working Group on Maritime Co-operation has discussed such initiatives as co-operation in scientific research. Nonetheless, such activities do not preclude the development of well co-ordinated co-operative baseline studies and co-ordination in the joint development of marine resources. This study suggests that the establishment of a co-operative maritime scientific research regime, which is suitable for Northeast Asia, is necessary both to develop marine resources in Northeast Asia and to build general habits of co-operation within littoral states.

On the basis of MCBMs and MCMs, naval arms control measures, as the last stage, might be considered to search for peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The current emergent maritime security environment shows that the formal naval arms control agreements focusing on a reduction in ship numbers are problematical and not on any agenda today. Even though naval arms control may have been not ‘sellable’ to the Americans under the old international geostrategic environment, it is time to consider this subject again for the purpose of enhancing strategic stability and peace in the North Pacific. According to the current economic problems, budgetary pressure for the reduction of the levels of armed forces, including naval forces, is rising in all countries in the North Pacific region. Naval arms cuts can be made in two basic areas: ship and weapon procurement and operations and maintenance. Cuts in ship and weapons procurement may be of an absolute nature, involving the elimination of certain projects from the programme, or they may involve delaying or extending projects. Nonetheless, their effect is not immediate and they may have little impact on the order of battle in the short term.

Even if it were possible to find categories for structural naval arms control, Northeast Asian countries are not ready for full-scale negotiations on the limitation and reduction of their naval forces. Thus, it is necessary to find a stage-by-stage approach to the final goal of negotiations, starting with the simplest confidence-building measures at sea, wherein elements of mutual understanding exist. In the field of naval arms control, Northeast Asian countries have every reason to avoid the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. As the major regional powers in Northeast Asia will continue to deploy their fleets on the Pacific Ocean, some interaction between their vessels will be inevitable and they will retain an interest in regulating such encounters. Thus, naval arms control agreements, which create new rules for naval encounters and procedures for handling incidents, are necessary for them to protect their national interests.
The first area of naval arms control to be considered is constraints on naval operations as operational naval arms control measures. With the expansion of naval forces in Northeast Asia more prone to accident and miscalculation, one could make a case for the negotiation of more INCSEA agreements, particularly on a bilateral basis. Five such agreements already exist in the North Pacific: Canada-Russia, US-Russia, Japan-Russia as well as South Korea-Russia and US-China.

Multilateral agreements on the prevention of incidents at sea could also be a useful step forward. Developing and reaching agreement on rules of behaviour to manage the interaction of the regional forces will become increasingly important. There are Cold War precedents for such an agreement in the 1972 US-Soviet INCSEA and the 1989 US-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities. The INCSEA has clearly shown its effectiveness in the last two and half decades. The practice of negotiating such agreements should be retained in the future. The current INCSEA is extended every three years and its effectiveness is reviewed annually at a consultative meeting of naval experts. The main idea behind this agreement is to regulate the activities of ships and aircraft between the two sides, including the prohibition of some activities. Of great importance was the establishment of permanent communications between the two naval staffs and a mechanism to examine mutual concerns. Nonetheless, the agreement did not include limits on submarine operations. However, this study suggests that existing regional bilateral INCSEA agreements would require considerable adjustment to include special codes of conduct for submarines and ASW forces (because the INCSEA is largely based on the transmission of visible signals) and also should be developed as a multilateral agreement.

In tandem with transparency MCBMs, constraints on naval operations start from the assumption that the naval presence when protecting a civilian activity, such as fishing, is a source of tension. Such constraints include limiting proposals, such as equal numbers in certain areas or actual exclusion zones, as well as limitations on the frequency, location, and duration of exercises and manoeuvres, and partial limitations on naval presence in designated water areas. A set of rules aimed at exercising restraints to prevent unnecessary confrontation could be considered. Recently, disputes originating from overlapping claims over the exploitation of mineral and marine resources have given rise to the possibility of confrontation between the concerned countries' navies in Northeast Asia. This is particularly true when disputed areas involve oil drilling rights or competing claims over fisheries. The Northeast Asian countries should adopt a set of rules aimed at exercising restraint to prevent
unnecessary confrontations. In order to prevent forceful affirmation of maritime claims pending a final agreement with the adjacent or opposite state, for instance, the coastal state should not exploit its continental shelf beyond its territorial sea limit, unless a median line can be drawn. The other areas — the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and a zone of peace — of operations naval arms control measures could be considered, but are problematical because the Russian, Chinese and US navies have SSBNs and different geo-strategic priorities.

The second area of naval arms control to be considered is structural arms control measures. Structural measures consist of quantitative and qualitative approaches. Despite the new maritime environment, including improvements in the major regional powers’ relations and the imperative of budget reduction due to economic problems in Northeast Asia, a structural naval arms control agreement remains problematical. Several factors mitigate against structural naval arms control, including the difficulty in dealing with the geo-strategic asymmetries of the major powers’ navies — the United States and Russia — in Northeast Asia. These asymmetries have raised important questions which need careful consideration for structural naval arms control. How can essential capability be evaluated? How effectively can equal measuring standards be set that are acceptable to the countries concerned? (For more details, see the case study of the Washington Naval Treaty in chapter three). Additionally, the increasingly significant role of naval forces in both the major power strategic equation and in conventional regional crises and confrontations argues against efforts to place constraints on numbers and types of naval forces. It has proved very difficult to measure fairly many variables related to ships’ capabilities because naval forces have increasingly diverse natures.

Although Northeast Asian countries have been rearming their naval forces faster than any other region in the world, this might be characterised not as an arms race but as an arms dynamic. In the emergent geo-strategic maritime environment of the region, limited areas of constraints on operational naval arms control measures, such as INCSEA agreement, have greater potential than structural naval arms control measures because of the above problems. But the system will only work if its members want it to. History can illustrate what structural measures can achieve and more generally, how arms control can fit into a temporarily stabilised Northeast Asian strategic maritime environment.

In the last decade, the United States and Russia have been forced to change their defence policies, trim their budgets, curtail operations overseas, and re-evaluate their
fundamental purposes. Nonetheless, the medium powers, such as China and Japan, continue to build and deploy naval weapons and vessels that others find threatening. Unless they reconsider their positions toward co-operative maritime security, they will miss a critical opportunity to bring stability to the high seas. In Northeast Asia the main boundary and territorial disputes are maritime in nature, e.g. Russia-Japan (the South Kuril Islands/Northern Territories), Korea-Japan (the Tok Island), China-Japan (the Senkaku Island), as well as Taiwan and, in the South China Sea, the Paracel (Vietnam-China) and the Spratly Islands (China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, Philippines, and Brunei). Multilateral security activities cannot replace formal diplomatic/legal negotiations to settle maritime boundary and territorial disputes, but co-operative maritime security measures may be particularly valuable in minimising the risk of conflict in such circumstances.

It is necessary, in conclusion, to stress that the development of co-operative maritime security measures to the point where they become a significant aspect of the regional maritime security framework in Northeast Asia will not be easy. It is a diverse region, where there are different security perceptions and maritime territorial and legitimacy conflicts which require resolution. There is little tradition of security co-operation, at least on a multilateral basis. The maritime issues themselves are generally complicated, and the practical and operational factors involved in the establishment of effective co-operative maritime security regimes are extremely demanding. Confidence-building measures offer the greatest potential, as an initial step. Thereafter maritime co-operation measures and naval arms control measures could be followed. The important question is whether the application of co-operative security models can be brought to the point where they can enable the effective management of the increasing complexities and uncertainties which characterise the emerging maritime environment in Northeast Asia. Current fiscal constraints might provide an opportunity for Northeast Asian countries to consider more closely their threat perceptions and to pursue regional co-operative maritime arrangements which rely more on mutual understanding and less on a naval arms build-up.
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Annex 6-1  A Chronology of the South China Sea Dispute, 1970-98

1. In the 1970s
   • In 1971, the Philippines occupied and garrisoned six of the Spratly Islands.
   • On 6 September 1973, Vietnam included the Spratly (the Truong Sa) archipelago in the commune of Phuoc Hai, Dat Do District, Phuoc Tuy province.
   • In January 1974, during the violence between China and South Vietnam, the Chinese forcefully seized the Paracel Islands from Vietnam without US response, and the South Vietnamese garrisoned three of the Spratlys.
   • In April 1975, the Vietnamese communists sent troops to occupy six of the Spratlys that were occupied by the South Vietnamese forces. Since then, they expanded their presence.
   • On 11 June 1978, the Philippines established an EEZ which includes the Spratlys.

2. In the 1980s
   • On 25 April 1980, Malaysia declared an EEZ, which includes the Spratly Islands.
   • On 28 December 1982, Vietnam detached the district of the Spratlys (Truong Sa) from Dong Nai province and incorporated them into Phu Khanh province.
   • In May 1983, Chinese long-distance training ships, including supply vessel and a transport ship, made a symbolic trip to the James Shoal of the Spratlys.
   • In 1986, Malaysia landed its troops on reefs and islets it claimed in the Spratlys.
   • In late 1987, Beijing set up 167 observation stations in various parts of the Spratlys. The Paracels and Spratlys were subsequently incorporated into the new province of Hainan.
   • In January 1988, the Chinese Navy carried out strategic naval operations in the South China Sea. The East China Sea Fleet executed a major 120-day exercise based on a 5,700 mile-strategic manoeuvring.
   • In February 1988, Chinese and Vietnamese frigates clashed in the Spratlys.
   • On 14 March 1988, a significant but limited clash between Beijing and Hanoi, which Chinese forces drove away the Vietnamese, occurred on Johnson Reef and Chian took over six islets in the the Spratlys.
   • In 1988, China clashed with Vietnam around a group of small islands, the Paracel-Xisha (Hoang Sa), where a Chinese force repelled Vietnamese forces in 1982. Chinese warships sank several Vietnamese ships in the Spratly Islands-Mansha (Truong Sa), and then China took hold of 10 Vietnamese islets and atolls in the Spratlys.

3. In the 1990s
   • In May 1991, China declared that it would not only increase the number of combat exercises in the Spratly Islands but also improve its naval infantry and fleet emergency response capabilities.
   • In late 1991, China began not only to modernise but also to expand its naval air force in the South China Sea.
On 8 May 1992, China leased an undersea section to a US oil exploration firm in an area that is geographically separate from the Spratly Islands and on Vietnam's continental shelf.

In 1992, the Philippines urged peaceful resolution of the Spratly disputes by China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei.

In May 1993, China sent a seismic survey vessel into Vietnam's Block 5-2, which was under lease to British Petroleum and Statoil at the time.

In January 1995, Chinese troops removed Filipino fishermen's shelter from Mischief Reef, which lies within the EEZ of the Philippines. China warned Vietnam to stop conducting geological surveys in their disputed area.

The Philippines Navy investigated a clash between its gunboat and an unidentified vessel off Capones Island, 75 miles Northwest of Manila.

On 8 February 1995, when the Philippines discovered that China had occupied the aptly-named Mischief Reef in the Spratlys, just over 200 km from the mainland island of Palawan, the Philippines dispatched five fighter jets, four Italian made S-211 jet trainers, two Huey helicopters, and one more Philippines Navy patrol fast craft to the Panganiban Reef in the Kalayaan Islands. The Philippines formally protested Chinese military deployment on Mischief Reef in the South China Sea, which violated the 1992 Manila Declaration. President Ramos ordered reinforcement military outposts in Spratlys.

On 15 February 1995, the Philippine government ordered the military to fortify naval presence at Panganiban Reef.

On 19 March 1995, the Philippine Navy detained four Chinese fishing boats and 62 fishermen near Alicia Annie Reef.

On 24 March 1995, China warned oil companies working in Vietnam not to become involved in the Sino-Vietnamese territorial disputes.


Taiwan's Navy opened fire on a Vietnamese boat which had strayed into a unilaterally declared security zone near the Taiping (Itu Aba) occupied by Taiwan. Ships of all nationalities are not allowed into this security zone. But Vietnam had protested, asking the Taiwanese to leave.

On 31 March 1995, Taiwan sent three patrol boats to the Pratas and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea to protect its fishing fleet.

On 25 April 1995, President Le Duc Anh reasserted Vietnam's sovereignty over the Spratlys.

In April 1995, Taiwan sent three police boats to the Taiping Island, which is the largest of the Spratly Islands, to erect a stone tablet there.


On 11 April 1996, the American oil company Conoco signed an exploration and production agreement with Petro Vietnam for Blocks 133 and 134, which overlay with Chinese block.

On 15 May 1996, China declared the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China over a Territorial Sea and EEZ on the baseline of which was drawn in such a way as to include the Spratly Islands. Beijing officially ratified acceding to the UNCLOS.
In January 1997, the Philippines opened a 1,300 metres airstrip on Kalayan Island, the largest of its holdings in disputed Spratly Island Chain. It can accommodate aircraft up to the size of a C-130 transport.

In late April 1997, China dispatched three frigates to an area of the Spratly Islands claimed by both countries. This presence caused an uproar in Manila.

On 20 May 1997, the Philippine Navy’s patrol ships arrested 21 Chinese fishermen near Scarborough Shoal, about 130 miles off Zambales Providence, the Philippines, in the South China Sea.

On 20 June 1997, Philippine troops stationed in disputed island in the Spratlys in the South China Sea fired warning shots at a Chinese fishing vessel after a Chinese fishing vessel anchored near Kota Island, occupied by the Philippines. The incident was the fourth between the two countries in a few weeks.

In March 1998, China installed a ground satellite station on Woody Island (Yongxing Dao) within the Paracel Islands (XishaQuandao) in the South China Sea for the first time to help the communication problem in the South China Sea.
Annex 6-2  A Chronology of Naval Incidents, Territorial Disputes, and the Proliferation of Naval Arms in Northeast Asia, 1991-98

1. 1991

- **On 23 January,** JMSDF’s third *Abukuma*-class frigate, *Ohyodo,* was commissioned.
- **On 31 January,** JMSDF’s first *Hibiki*-class AOS was commissioned.
- **On 12 March,** JMSDF’s eighth *Asagiri*-class destroyer, *Umigiri,* was commissioned.
- **On 15 March,** JMSDF’s fourth *Abukuma*-class frigate, *Sendai,* was commissioned.
- **On 20 March,** JMSDF’s second *Harushio*-class submarine, *Natsushio,* was commissioned.
- **In May,** South Korea’s second *Swallow*-class MHC, *Kang Jin,* was commissioned.
- **In November,** South Korea’s third *Swallow*-class MHC, *Ko Ryeong,* was commissioned.
- **In December,** PLAN’s first *Jiangwei*-class frigate, *Anoing,* was commissioned.

2. 1992

- **On 10 March,** JMSDF’s second *Hibiki*-class AOS, *Harima,* was commissioned.
- **On 25 March,** JMSDF’s third *Harushio*-class submarine, *Hayashio,* was commissioned.
- **In December,** PLAN’s second *Jiangwei*-class frigate, *Huainan,* was commissioned.

3. 1993

- **On 1 January,** South Korea’s eighth *Ulasn*-class frigate, *Busan,* was commissioned.
- **On 24 March,** JMSDF’s fifth *Abukuma*-class frigate, *Chikuma,* was commissioned.
- **On 16 March,** Japan’s first *Yaeyama*-class minehunter/sweeper-ocean (MSO) was commissioned.
- **On 17 March,** JMSDF’s fourth *Harushio*-class submarine, *Arashio,* was commissioned.
  
  JMSDF’s *Uwajima*-class MSC, *Ieshima,* was commissioned.
- **On 23 March,** JMSDF’s second *Yaeyama*-class MSO, *Tsushima,* was commissioned.
- **On 25 March,** JMSDF’s first *Kongou*-class destroyer, equipped with the *Aegis* system, was commissioned.
- **In March,** the USS Grayling SSN collided with a Russian *Delta*-class SSBN.
- **On 16 April,** the German-built *Chang Bogo*-class submarine (Type 209) was delivered to South Korea.
- **In April,** South Korea’s fourth *Swallow*-class MHC, *Kim Po,* was commissioned.
- **In May,** Taiwanese Navy’s third *Kwang Hwa I* program, which involved building at least eight improved *Perry*-class frigates (4,100 tons) with the possibility of a further eight, was launched. The ships are equipped with the *Hsiung Feng II* ASM, Italian 76 mm OTM Melara Compact guns (range 11 km), and Bofors (range 8 km) and Phalanx CIWS.
- **On 1 June,** South Korea’s ninth *Ulasn*-class frigate, *Chung-Ju,* was commissioned.
• In June, China ordered the new Russian Kilo-class (Type 636) conventional submarine with three Type 877 Kilo-class submarines. The two Type 877s were delivered to China, and the latest one will be delivered in late 1998.

South Korea’s first Chang Bogo-class submarine was commissioned.

• On 25 August, The United States introduced economic sanctions on China and Pakistan, arguing that both countries, by transferring advanced missile technology, had violated the 1987 MTCR Guidelines.

• In August, PLAN’s third Jiangwei-class frigate, Huaibei, was commissioned

• In October, South Korea’s fifth Swallow-class MHC, Ko Chang, was commissioned.

• On 15 December, Japan’s Uwajima-class MSC, Deajima, was commissioned.

4. 1994

• On 30 April, South Korea’s second Chang Bogo-class submarine, Yi Chon, was commissioned.

• In April, a Taiwanese fishing boat was seized by the US Coast Guard 1,448 km off the coast of San Diego to prevent its passengers from coming ashore. Aboard were 111 suspected illegal immigrants from China. Once such immigrants land on US soil, they may remain in the country legally for years while their asylum request is proceeded

South Korea’s sixth Swallow-class MHC, Kum Wha, was commissioned.

• On 1 March, the fifth JMSDF’s Harushio-class submarine, Wakashio, was commissioned.

• On 24 March, the third Japan’s Yaeyama-class MSO, Machijou, was commissioned.

• On 4 June, a Russian ship fired warning shots at six Japanese fishing vessels in the Kunashiri Straits, near the disputed Kuril Islands. The action was part of a campaign against illegal fishing in Russian waters in the Far East. The area has been the focus of territorial dispute between Moscow and Tokyo since World War II.

• In July, PLAN’s first Luhu-class destroyer, Haribing, was commissioned.

• On 2 September, Russian border troops shot dead two crewmen on a Chinese fishing boat in the Southern Kuril Islands.

• On 27-29 October, a confrontation occurred in the Yellow Sea between a China’s Han-class nuclear attack submarine and the US aircraft Carrier Kitty Hawks, battle group.

• In October, PLAN’s third Jiangwei-class frigate, Tongling, was commissioned.

• On 23 November, Taiwan’s Chi Kuang frigate was struck by an torpedo or collided with an unidentified submarine during a test voyage off southern Taiwan.

• On 12 December, Japan’s Uwajima-class MSC, Jumejima, and Hatsushima-class MSC, Makishima, were commissioned.

• On 16 December, A Chinese submarine and an American aircraft, the USS Kitty Hawke, which was sent to the Yellow Sea in a show of strength aimed at persuading North Korea of US resolve during the crisis over the North Korean nuclear programme, came close to a clash in the South China Sea. At that time Chinese were believed to have scrambled fighters in the direction of the Kitty Hawke.
5. 1995

- On 25 February, South Korea's third Chang Bogo-class submarine, Choi Muson, was commissioned.
- On 7 March, JMSDF's sixth Harushio-class submarine, Fuyushio, was commissioned.
- On 10 March, Japan's Hatsushima-class MSC, Tobishima, was commissioned.
- On 16 March, the Malaysian Navy arrested a fishing vessel with a crew of sixteen persons belonging to China for illegal fishing, resisting arrest and causing damage to a naval patrol boat.
  
  Japan's second Kongo-class destroyer equipped with the Aegis system, Kirishima, was commissioned.
- On 22 March, the Japan's Asuka-class ASE/AGS was commissioned.
- In early May, China conducted a nuclear test at Beijing’s Lop Nor facility.
  
  Two Japanese shipping vessels, fishing in the US fishing zone around the Northern Marina Islands were seized by the US Coast Guard.
- On 17 May, South Korea launched its fifth submarine and announced plans to build four by 2000.
- On 21 May, Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev visited China and South Korea and agreed to co-operate on research and development of military supplies.
- On 15-23 August, China fired naval missiles, such as air-to-air, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles during a scheduled exercise.
- On 26 October, Taiwan bought Mistral surface-to-air missiles from France.

6. 1996

- In February, under the increased tensions between South Korea and Japan over sovereignty of the Tok Islands, Seoul announced it would begin military exercises around the barren islands.
  
  South Korea's fourth Chang Bogo-class submarine, Pakui, was commissioned.
- On 12 March, Japan's first Murasame-class destroyer was commissioned.
- On 14 March, Japan's third Kongo-class destroyer equipped with the Aegis system, Myoko, was commissioned.
- In March, PLAN's second Luhu-class destroyer, Qingdao, was commissioned.
- In May, South Korea planned to produce the KDX-2 destroyer, a larger and more capable version of the KDX frigate.
- In August, Japanese rightists sailed to the islands and repaired the aluminium lighthouse, which had been damaged by a typhoon.
- In September, the rightist of Japan Youth Federation erected a lighthouse and a war memorial on the islands to bolster Tokyo's sovereignty claim.
- In October, South Korea's fifth Chang Bogo-class submarine, Lee Jongmu, was commissioned.
- In November, the Japanese Navy launched the new amphibious assault ship (LPD) Osumi.
- In December, China decided to buy two Sovremenny-class (7,000 tons) destroyers equipped with cruise missiles.
  
  JMSDF's minehunter Nagashima (MSC-680) was commissioned, the last of a class of eighteen built since the late 1970s.
In January, Taiwan commissioned the Tze Yi, the fifth of its own built Cheng Kung-class frigates. Two more of the class will be built in 1998. It is equipped with US MK-13 missiles and Taiwanese Hsiung Feng II anti-ship missiles.

A Russian tanker, Nakodka, sank and broke up during storms in the Sea of Japan. This incident involved in large-area oil spillage — 300 kilometres Northwest of Tokyo — and threatened to wipe out the port of Mikuni’s annual fishing income on 12 November 1997.

In March, JMSDF’s seventh Harushio-class submarine, the Asashio, was commissioned. Japan’s second Murasame-class destroyer, the Harusame, was commissioned.

The Taiwanese own built Cheng Kung-class frigate, Pan Chao (1108), was commissioned.

In May, the Chinese Navy’s latest Song-class submarine test-fired a submarine-launched version of the locally-developed CY-I anti-submarine missile for the first time.

Taiwan decided to reduce its forces from 4453,000 personnel to 400,000 in three stages under a programme which will be completed by June 2001. Two of the three ex-US Navy Newport-class landing ships tanks (LST) were leased to Taiwan by the United States under a 1994 agreement.

On 6 May, a Japanese legislator travelled the Senkaku Islands. The visit provoked the anger of the governments in Beijing and Taipei.

On 24 June, Japan seized Korean fishing boats in disputed waters around the Tok Islands.

On 30 June, the fifth Taiwanese Cheng Kung-class guided missile frigate Tsu Yi was christened.

On 3 July, the sixth Taiwanese Cheng Kung-class guided missile frigate Pan Chaoon was christened.

In July, the Taiwanese Navy announced to build a new class of fast attack craft/missile to replace its ageing Hai Ou-class patrol boats. Currently, the navy has 50 boats which are based on Israel’s Dvora-class.

Taiwan decided that Taipei would lease two additional Knox-class frigates from the United States, to bring the total to eight. The Taiwanese Navy commissioned the last of Cheng Kung-class guided missile frigate, the Chang Chien (1109).

In August, the Taiwanese Navy took delivery of the fourth of six La Fayette frigates ordered from France in 1991. This vessel was named It Hua.

On 2-3 August, about 9,500 gallons of diesel fuel oil spilled from a US aircraft carrier moored at Yokosuka base.

On 11 August, a Russian helicopter dropped a Strontium-90 highly radioactive battery, weighing 2.3 metric tons into 20 meters of water from about 150 meters off the northern Sakhalin Island.

In August, the US Navy carrier USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63) replaced the USS Independence (CV-62) as part of a planned rotation of the forces stationed in Japan. The Independence returned to the West Coast, where she is being decommissioned.

On 23 September, the United States and Japan expanded new security alliance calling for greater role for Japanese forces in support of US troops in the region.
• In October, South Korea launched its second 3,900 ton KDX-1 frigate, the Ulchimundokham.

• On 12 November, a Chinese vessel, Chuhai, collided with a Panamanian ships, Asian Hibiscus, in the Kammon Strait, western Japan. Some 50 tons of heavy oil leaked from the Chinese ship.

• In early November, JMSDF conducted a one-week joint exercise with the US Pacific Fleet in the Pacific Ocean region near Japan. It brought together 120 ships, 180 aircraft and 34,000 personnel.

• Others in 1997: Russia and China signed a $200 million contract for the delivery of two Russian 626 Kilo-class diesel-powered submarines which was built in Nizny Novgorod in the Baltic Sea. This represents the first-ever sale of ‘Project 636’ model submarines.

5. 1998

• On 13, January, after the 10 rounds of discussions over a new fisheries pact in the East Sea until January 1998, Japan unilaterally ended the 1965 fisheries treaty with South Korea.

• On 20 January, a South Korean fishing trawler and its crew were seized by Japanese off Nagasaki Prefecture, south-western Japan.

• On 23 January, Japan unilaterally announced the end of 1965 fishery agreement with South Korea.

• On 25 January, eight South Korean fishing vessels entered Japanese-claimed waters off northern Hokkaido Island to protest against Tokyo’s unilateral decision to discard a 1965 fishing pact between the two countries.

• On 11 February, US Los Angeles-class La Jolla (SSN 701) collided with a South Korean fishing boat 11 kilometres off the coast of Korea. The fishing boat sank, and all five crewmen were rescued.

• On 11 March, the JMSDF commissioned a new 8,900-ton Osumi-class amphibious landing ship dock (LPD), enough to handle two CH-47J helicopters and two air-cushioned landing craft.

• On 12 March, a South Korean fishing vessel was collided with a Japanese Maritime Safety Agency patrol boat off Tsushima Islands, Nagasaki prefecture.

• On 16 March, the JMSDF commissioned the first of Oyashio-class submarines equipping with large flank sonar arrays.

• On 19 March, the Taiwanese Navy commissioned the last and sixth of La Fayette-class frigate.

• On 20 March, the JMSDF commissioned the last of its four Aegis destroyers, the Chokai (DD-176).

• On 31 March, the US Naval forces in Japan replaced two naval ships. USS Cushing, homeported at Pearl Harbour, Hawaii, replaced USS Fife. USS Vandegrift, California, replaced the USS Rodney M Davis.

• In March, China agreed to buy 12 Russian Kamov Ka-28 ASW helicopters in order to boost ASW capabilities.

• On 2 June, USS Chancellorsville replaced USS Bunker Hill of US Naval Forces in Japan.

* This annex excluded a chronology of the South China Sea dispute.