THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

An Exploration of Public Sector Leadership in the Context of
Bangladeshi Public Sector Reforms: The Dilemmas of Public Sector
Leadership

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By

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Abstract

The purpose of the research is to explore the significance and role of the Bangladeshi public sector leadership (PSL) in the context of public sector reforms (PSR). I examine how the adoption of the reforms depends on the interaction between the PSL of the home government and the donor agencies, resulting in reform challenges on the part of the home government. To do this, the research explores how bureaucratic behaviour responds to and matches donor agenda vis-à-vis their dual role of protecting the traditional socio-economic system, cultural and political norms, values and developing the institutional basis when dealing with reforms. Thus, the research emphasises the need for exploring the elite actors’ beliefs about their governmental traditions as they shape PSR.

Taking an interpretive approach, this thesis presents empirical insights in three important areas of public sector management, namely, perceptions and lived experiences of PSL; bureaucratic response to PSR; and traditions in governance and governance intervention by donors. Its contribution is to illuminate the key aspects of PSL roles/practice within the Bangladeshi PSR.

Findings offer an understanding of how public sector leaders construe and respond to reform initiatives. Analysis of the PSL role shows that reform is fundamentally a political and contested process. The current study presents an empirical analysis of the elite actors’ webs of belief about the PSR in the context of normative roots of the Bangladeshi governance traditions and culture vis-à-vis the motives of the aid regimes.

Part of the originality of this research is its attempt to conceptualise governance traditions as adaptable sets of beliefs that stresses the role of agency in PSR in the Bangladeshi context. I also claim my research to be worthwhile as I situate the Bangladeshi governance traditions within a context that goes beyond the typology of traditions advanced by Painter and Peters (2010). Moreover, this research argues for the performative accounts of the governance traditions.
The key argument in this thesis is that public sector leaders’ response towards the public sector reforms is shaped by the wider web of beliefs embedded in a historically inherited tradition and that dilemmas arise when the public sector leaders face new situations uncommon and unfamiliar to them in terms of atypical reform agenda prescribed by international donors. Dilemmas also arise because of the incongruity between the traditional socio-economic, cultural values and donor-prescribed reform initiatives. This study suggests that dilemmas and conflicts – two important constructs illuminating cultures and traditions in public sector management – have an explanatory link to the bureaucratic response towards reforms. Thus, change is the outcome of the dilemma, if not the solution (Bevir & Rhodes, 2010).

Looking from an interpretive lens, I contend that the Bangladeshi governance tradition is postcolonial, combining multiple features directly traceable to colonial institutions and ancient Samaj (village life/society) with post-independence adaptations and innovations based on administrative reform prescriptions by donor agencies, the latter essentially appearing as new ‘layers’ on the original bedrock. Therefore, it can be called a hybrid tradition.
Acknowledgements

The intellectual and personal debts I have accumulated in doing this research are too numerous to permit each to be acknowledged individually. Nonetheless there are individuals and institutions whose support has been too invaluable to forgo mentioning.

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PART 1: SETTING THE RESEARCH

Chapter 1: Research Overview: Setting the Context

Signpost

This chapter provides a context to the PhD research titled *An Exploration of Public Sector Leadership in the Context of Bangladeshi Public Sector Reforms: The Dilemmas of Public Sector Leadership*. It begins with a general up-front description of Bangladeshi context. Then it provides a specific platform where the researcher justifies undertaking such research. The research explores bureaucratic perceptions, behaviour and responses towards PSR embedded in PSL webs of belief. This chapter presents an overview of the public sector leadership in the reform context. It also sets out the problem statement, significance, scope and limitations of the study. Three research questions that served as the vehicle to address the research problem from an interpretive perspective are duly deliberated. The research questions formed the basis for guiding the design of the interview protocol for this exploratory case study research.

1.1 Public Sector Leadership (PSL): The Reform Context

Bangladesh, located in South Asia, is one of the most densely populated countries of the world with, according to the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, a current population of 156,854,863 and a per capita income of $1044 per annum. (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2014; Daily Star, 2013).

Since independence in 1971, Bangladesh has experienced a variety of forms of government, including military rule (World Bank, 2002). A parliamentary system was re-introduced in 1991 with the prime minister as its chief executive and the president as the head of state. In Bangladesh, power alternates between the two major parties, the Bangladesh Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party that has implications for the PSR and the bureaucracy in terms of massive politicisation.

According to the World Bank (2002, iii), “[T]he size of the civil service has doubled since independence while, ……, the quality …. has declined along with purchasing power of the salaries of public officials”. It is true that sustainability of PSR is
predicated on having an honest and competent bureaucracy. Thus, competent and well-motivated public officials are central to achieving Bangladesh’s development objectives (Ibid, 2002).

In this research I hold that PSL is about non-elected public officials (Talbot, 2010). The PSL framework suggested by Talbot (2010) applies to what is commonly known as the ‘core executive’ of government – a concept borrowed from Weller et al. (1997). The research uses the terms public sector leadership, public leadership, public service leadership, bureaucratic leadership and administrative leadership interchangeably (Van Wart, 2003).

According to Wilson (1989), we don’t care about what bureaucrats think, we care what they do. Because ‘situated agency’ can alter their position, as they are able to constantly interpret their position (Bevir and Rhodes (2010, 2). Bevir and Rhodes (2010, 13) also advance that in an interpretive approach, practices as a set of actions, often give us grounds for postulating beliefs. Thus in this research, actions by the PSL towards reform programmes are the products of their belief systems.

The public sector is a very sensitive “subsystem” that operates within a larger “system” (Taylor, 2009), which is commonly referred to as the national context. At the centre of the public sector is the public service, which reflects the pulse of government. Public sector leaders implement government policies and are responsible for their success and failure. A well-functioning public service is driven by the quality of the strategic human resources, i.e., the public sector leaders that the government engages and retains. The roles and perception of the PSL regarding reform programmes are critical as it is the PSLs who participate in shaping the government policy and programmes. In addition, they perform activities that create and provide conditions essential to citizens in their everyday lives, contributing to the overall development of society (Duguit, 1929; cited in Lilić, 2011, 2). Hence, public administration can be understood as a service to citizens, rather than simply a powerful tool of government (Lilić, 2011).

My study aims to explore the belief system, roles and practices of PSL in the reform process. In doing so, along with the dimension of state traditions and dilemmas it also recognises the significant factor of political interplay. All in all, I explore leadership
beliefs and dilemmas emanating from confrontational political governance, clientelist politics, politicisation of bureaucracy and also incongruity with donors’ reform prescriptions, reflecting Bevir and Rhodes’s (2003) contention that elite actors’ beliefs about their governmental traditions shape public sector reform.

In order to deliver the services in an efficient way, there has been a call for reforms in Bangladesh since its independence in 1971. The World Bank reports that Bangladeshi public administration is “undermined by weak policy coordination, a poor incentive structure, inadequate revenues, weak accountability and limited implementation capacity that inevitably lead to underperformance in the delivery of public services” (World Bank, 2010a, 9).

As of now, there are a number of approaches/paradigms like Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), Sector-wide Approaches (SWAPs), New Public Management (NPM), and Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) that have been field-tested in the Bangladeshi public sector by international donors. However, they brought about little changes. Therefore, knowing what reforms are necessary in Bangladesh constitutes a major challenge. Also, perhaps the more difficult challenge is being able to implement the reforms in a meaningful and compatible way based on local truth. I argue that a holistic approach is needed to address the Bangladeshi PSR; PSR issues should not be looked at in isolation, since they are inseparable and inter-related. This demands immersion in the contextual reality based on creative reform suggestions. The Bangladeshi public sector has been confronting new approaches that require a creative, innovative and new paradigm of leadership and management skills. Daft (2005, 8) contrasts old and new paradigms of leadership in the following manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old paradigm</th>
<th>New paradigm</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Change and crisis management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>Collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniformity</td>
<td>Diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-centeredness</td>
<td>Higher ethical purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hero</td>
<td>Humble</td>
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</table>
The evolving situations noted above call for continuous vigilance and dynamic leadership skills to achieve organisational goals in the public sector. In Bangladesh, public sector leaders are challenged not only by striving to meet such changes, but also in defending their own status, because inefficiency, corruption and cronyism in public management feature prominently (Zafarullah & Huque, 2001). Bureaucrats often lack the knowledge and skills relevant to their substantive area of work and are unclear about their duties and responsibilities.

Thus, it is extremely important to strengthen the PSL in terms of implementing reforms. For better governance, there is no alternative to modernisation and reforms. However, for successful reform implementation, a strong PSL role is central, as they are charged with the task of nation-building.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

PSL has been presented as a critical component of good public governance; as hamstrung between multiple conflicting points of view (dilemma), acting in a world rich in context and nuance (OECD, 2001; Atkins, 2008) with a service focus aiming to be responsive and transparent to customers (Van Wart, 2003). Experiences and reform initiatives of countries clearly highlight the prominence of PSL in the implementation of reform.

However, critics argue that “there has been little attention in the theoretical literature on what an integrated model of public sector leadership consists of and what are its attributes” (Van Slyke et al. 2006, 366). This attention to PSL values and roles is important here because the current trend is that government leaders lead by contract and network – a role that marks a significant departure from the roles of centralisation and hierarchism, by which leaders steer followers who are employees of their organizations (ibid, 2006).

The Bangladeshi PSL roles of centralisation, hierarchism, elitism, authoritarianism, formalism (Khan, 1998; Huque, 2010) seem archaic, as the new agenda for change requires public administrators to show strong commitment to better performance, and
better quality services for clients and users (Christensen & Lægreid, 1999) based on fairness and transparency. Moreover, “…. reforms advocate more discretion at the lower administrative levels in the disposition of allotted resources and responsibility …goal achievement” (Wildavsky, 1978; cited in Christensen & Lægreid, 1999, 179). Against this backdrop, Bangladeshi administrative leaders confront recurring dilemmas between the roles of discretion and fairness, and responsiveness and efficiency, in terms of moving from the bureaucratic paradigm to a post-bureaucratic paradigm.

A wide variety of literature has been written on bureaucracy in the West as well as in the East. Nevertheless, bureaucracy as a form of leadership remains a neglected area (Terry, 1995) and has not received much attention (Van Wart, 2003). The Bangladeshi scenario that draws heavily on the Western intellectual paradigm is not much different. Mostly, research has been conducted with a focus on the civil service system, bureaucratic culture and its colonial legacy. There are also studies that highlight the bureaucracy-politics interface and administrative reform and their outcome since the independence (CPD, 2001, 26-30; UNDP, 2007). So far, however, no link has been established between the PSL and the reform.

Also, researching the webs of belief of the PSL in the context of PSR patterned on the Bevir & Rhodes (2010) model of beliefs, traditions, dilemmas and narratives has been really challenging, as no work has been carried out in Bangladesh following this model. In exploring the notion of governance, traditions and dilemmas are focal points for Bevir and Rhodes (2003, 2010). Examining the belief system that shapes the PSR is a highly daunting task, but crucial, given the increasing recognition that the webs of belief individuals hold are the best indicators of the decisions they make during the course of everyday life (Bandura, 1986).

My working experience in the public sector triggered my interest in the concept of PSL; especially, when my department assigned me to work in a reform project – a capacity building project funded by JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency). Thus, I became cognisant of the significance of the PSL in the context of PSR. My reform project based on Japanese TQM (Total Quality Management) philosophy clicked well. We did an excellent job by fusing local traditions and the donor’s policy recommendation. However, elsewhere in the country, at the macro level, many
international donors are imposing reforms that are not compatible with the local context, which may be one explanation of reform stalemate. This is another research problem, as I think that all national bureaucracies are distinct (Painter and Peters, 2010). National bureaucratic organisations have distinctive agency traditions based on their inherited beliefs, professional values and codes, which are couched in the broader traditions of governance (Rhodes et al. 2008, 463).

Since the 1980s, developed countries have been embarking on PSR, and they want the developing countries to follow in their footsteps in terms of reform experience; sometimes they impose reforms on the developing countries. The earlier reform process was based on institutional peculiarities inherited from the colonial period (Economic Commission for Africa, 2003). The subsequent difficulties prompted the search for a new alternative.

Why does PSR remain a failure in Bangladesh? It is time for PSL to craft ways of implementing PSR successfully. Initiating and implementing reforms is a knotty task as it involves dealing with political environments and cultural issues. In the case of Bangladesh, it is particularly important, as it has been experiencing failures with few exceptions (Sarker, 2004). Failure of public administration reforms reflects the inherent weakness of the PSL particularly and the public administration as a whole. Thus, today one of the most important questions related to public administration is how to reform it by contemporary standards (Caiden, 1991). Also, a debate exists regarding the nature of PSL, as conservators of public bureaucracies or as entrepreneurial public managers, as advanced by NPM. Addressing the debate is a challenge for PSL, which no research attempted to address before.

In view of the above, my central research question is - how do public sector leaders cope with their dual role of protecting traditional socio-economic, cultural and political norms and values when dealing with reforms and are public sector reform initiatives imposed by donors incompatible with a certain administrative-cultural tradition?
1.3 Research Questions

- How do public sector leaders of Bangladesh conceive of their leadership roles?
- How do public sector leaders of Bangladesh respond to public sector reform initiatives in relation to contexts?
- How do the public sector reform initiatives prescribed by the donors interact with Bangladeshi administrative-cultural traditions?

1.4 Research Aims

- To examine the leadership elements of the public sector leaders
- To explore the approaches of the public sector leaders regarding the contextual challenges facing reform programmes
- To analyse the donors’ reform prescriptions and their compatibility with the recipient country’s governance tradition and culture
- To scrutinize the reform initiatives undertaken so far

1.5 Significance of the Study

PSL is integral to the governmental task of providing good policy advice and delivering effective public programmes (OECD, 2001; Terry, 1995). It has a pivotal role in delivering government services and goods.

The World Bank (1996) asserts that the success or failure of Bangladeshi PSR, in terms of conceiving, operationalising and implementing them, depends to a significant extent upon support from the civil servants. PSL is highly significant because unlike many traditional leadership theories that still focus on dyadic relationships between leaders
and followers, administrative/executive leadership theories examine leadership at all levels of an organisation in an effort to manage the whole organisation (Van Slyke et al. 2006). Also, there is a growing recognition of the need for leadership if public sector organisations are to be able to respond effectively to the changing scenarios and expectations of the stakeholders in an effective way (Mellors, 1996).

“Although ...leadership in the public sector has been discussed extensively, such as those in policy positions and working in community settings, administrative leadership within organizations has received scant attention and would benefit from a research agenda linking explicit and well-articulated models with concrete data in public sector settings” (Van Wart, 2003, 214). Against the background of Van Wart’s call for further research, it is important to explore the varying roles of the PSL in the public sector reforms.

The main agents for introducing reforms into public sector are supposed to be the PSL – entrepreneurs who have prescribed responsibilities for change processes delegated by political leaders (Naschold, 1996; Rouban, 1995; cited in Christensen and Lægreid, 1999, 171). Any new initiatives, especially reform initiatives, are dependent on them in the sense that they are the workhorses and implementing agents of the government. Their conception of the PSR is crucial. It is the PSL who is primarily responsible for the implementation of the conflicting agenda of reforms in a volatile situation. If anything goes wrong, it is always the public sector leaders who are made the scapegoats. Thus, exploring PSL as it travels through unknown waters of rapid reform agenda is highly significant. Management is now seen as inadequate on its own to address the demands of a changing society. Leadership has become the watchword – even mantra – for public service managers, who must continue to deliver high-quality services while also customising these same services (Pederson & Hartley, 2008). The difficulty is exacerbated by the dynamic, ambiguous and ambivalent expectations from the multiple stakeholders about the role of public services and public managers (Hoggett, 2006). Public service leaders and managers are asked to act for a “divided, uncertain society” (Moore, 1995), with increasing levels of volatility and change (Benington and Moore in press; cited in Pederson & Hartley, 2008, 331) and in the context of declining levels of trust in national and local politicians. Public service is the buttress of government, and thus the people that are in charge of it are expected to ensure an effective governance
framework necessary for delivering goods and services efficiently to people at the grass roots level.

Therefore, the leadership role and behaviour within the public service is crucial. Scholars suggest that real changes can only be brought about by the top bureaucrats (Perrow, 1972). Moreover, Chang (1998) elucidates the role of three institutions in economic development with special reference to Asian countries, placing emphasis on the government bureaucracy, as the central institution that provides state-business links.

Given the global scenario and the role of donors, Bangladesh seems to be following the paradoxical approach of introducing decentralisation through highly centralised mechanisms, deregulation through a highly regulatory mechanism, in an effort to combine traditional, NPM and responsive governance approaches to PSR. It is very important to research why Bangladeshi public leadership is moving in the direction of mixed reform approach.

The empirical data to be gained from conducting this research has the potential to contribute to address the concerns created by a lack of research in the area of public sector leadership in the overall context of reform. The present study will identify the grey areas of public sector leadership by illuminating the contexts.

Findings of the research will add to the knowledge and understanding of the subject of public sector leadership vis-à-vis the reform process.

### 1.6 Limitations of the Study

The study will not cover all Bangladeshi ministries and public offices. It will cover the Ministry of Public Administration and Cabinet Division, which are the focal points for reforms. It will also cover the Economic Relations Division (ERD) under the Ministry of Finance, responsible for interfacing with donors. The Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre (BPATC) – a parent training institute will be studied as well. Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration) Academy has been used as the pilot case. The study not only includes full-time and in-service public officials who are charged with the government’s reform agenda but it also takes account of retired
officials, academics and members of the Reforms Commission. The study explores the PSL in terms of policies related to reforms only. It does not cover other policy issues, unrelated to the reform agenda.

1.7 Scope and Organisation of the Study

I do not intend to prove or disprove a particular theory based on hypothesis testing. Instead, I seek to develop constructs and theoretical perspectives by exploring the complexities of the inter-relationships between the public sector leadership and the reform process in the changing context, because “.....leaders have a tremendous effect on individual organizations and on the performance of those organizations” (Hennessey, 1998, 522). To address this issue, this research provides a comprehensive review of the extant literature on public sector leadership with a focus on Bangladesh. It contributes to the theory of public sector leadership by developing constructs of PSL dilemmas.

The thesis consists of five parts, which are further divided into eleven chapters. The five parts are: Part I: Setting the Research (Chapter 1); Part II: Review of the Literature and Theoretical Framework (Chapter 2 – 4); Part III: The Research Methodology (Chapter 5 and 6); Part IV: The Research Findings (Chapter 7-9); and Part V: Conclusion (Chapter 10 - 11).

1.8 Conclusion

The chapter has introduced the reader to the well-timed topic of public sector leadership. Chapter 1 has outlined why PSL is of current research interest in Bangladesh, and explained why the role of PSL is important in the context of reforms. Accordingly, the problem statement, research questions, aims, significance, limitation and scope of the study have been discussed. In the next ‘part’, I review the literature and theoretical framework of the study.
PART II: REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Part II consists of three chapters that review the literature most relevant to the research questions raised in the study.

It starts with Chapter 2, which focuses on general overview of leadership theories, assumptions and practices that have evolved for over half a century, starting with trait approach of the 1940s. The discussion ends with the latest leadership theories and functions. Then it sheds light on the Bangladeshi PSL context. I thus establish a frame through which to examine the PSL roles in the context of PSR.

Chapter 3 critically examines the implications of the PSR since independence. It reviews a number of reform programmes introduced by the government and the donors. It examines the nature of the bureaucratic response towards the PSR. Also, it illuminates the donor-driven programmes like SAP, NPM, PRS and responsive governance/rights-based programmes. It revisits the reform programmes particularly to find causes of their success/failure, and I contend that PSR initiatives lacked the broader context in as much as they have been divorced from the country-specific traditions.

Thus, in the Chapter 4, I provide justifications for deliberating two critical areas in the field of public sector management – bureaucracy and public sector reforms strategy – in an attempt to reveal how the country-specific forces in terms of modernity, traditions and legacy impact upon and shape the policy environment. I argue that reform is shaped by the traditions. My point is that Bangladeshi governance traditions contain both legacy and modernity leading to hybrid traditions in the sense that different traditions co-exist. The co-existence of indigenous traditions and foreign legacies mixed with modern reforms driven by donors and home-grown community development programmes leads to hybridisation. Tensions between traditions and the modernity have implications for the public sector reforms. Lastly, it provides a theoretical framework for this study after presenting the theories and relevant research that support it.
Chapter 2: Review of Leadership Theories

Signpost

This chapter reviews different leadership theories, functions and assumptions that have developed over the past few decades, with special attention to public sector leadership. It examines the literature discussing the characteristics and approaches of leadership theories. Next, the focus is narrowed down to deliberate on public sector leadership in an attempt to appreciate how public sector leadership can accommodate styles and values from other leadership theories and apply them to the public sector setting. It looks at the evolution of public sector leadership theory. A closer look reveals that public sector leadership is highly related to reform management as it is entrusted with nation-building tasks. I argue that reformist PSL can be both destructive and creative. The discussion takes account of the actors’ belief system embedded in the country-specific traditions. The review then moves on to look at the divide in the literature of public sector leadership theory. It also looks at the development of PSL in the Bangladeshi context. Finally, the review identifies implications for our understanding of PSL in the context of reforms.

2.1 Introduction

There is an expanding literature on leadership covering the classical, traditional and contemporary approaches (Grint, 1997). The intention here is not to provide a full review of the leadership literature. Rather, I aim to review the major leadership theories and approaches with special attention to PSL. The chapter essentially discusses how some leadership theories have or have not lived up to their promise of helping practitioners resolve the challenges and problematics that occur in leadership (Zaccaro et al. 2003) leading to the development of newer leadership theories, especially, the public sector leadership theory. This review argues for the compatibility of PSL in addressing the public sector reforms, because bureaucrats are not only the cogs of the machine but also the leaders (I oppose Max Weber in this respect). Also, authors have questioned the current suitability of Weber’s theories in the present globalised age, characterized by a very different set of economic, social, and technological realities from the time in which Weber’s ideas were born (Greenwood and Lawrence, 2005; Lounsbury and Carberry, 2005; cited in Houghton, 2010, 1). The central objective of this chapter is to conceptualise the PSL theory in a systematic fashion from an interpretive lens in the context of PSR as a social experience embedded in country-specific traditions. The discussion will, however, start off with different leadership theories in order to present a comparable picture vis-à-vis the PSL.
In order to understand how public sector leadership evolved, popular leadership theories will be examined. From this discussion, public sector leadership’s place among these theories will eventually become clear, as these theories move from focusing on the leader to focusing on leading in a public sector setting.

Having addressed that, the review looks at PSL research done so far in the Bangladeshi context, noting that the Bangladeshi PSL in theory and practice draws heavily on the Western perspectives, via its own traditions.

### 2.2 Place of Public Sector Leadership in Leadership Theory and the Contemporary Organisation

Research in leadership theory may be divided into four overlapping paradigms: the trait approach, the style or behavioural approach, the contingency approach and the new leadership approach (Bryman, 1996). It can be depicted in the following manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Key citations</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trait</td>
<td>Stogdill, (1948, 1974)</td>
<td>Influential reviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>McClelland, (1975)</td>
<td>Need for achievement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioural/Style</td>
<td>Likert, (1961)</td>
<td>Linking Pin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stogdill and Coons, (1957)</td>
<td>Consideration, initiating structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency/Situational</td>
<td>Fiedler, (1967)</td>
<td>Least favoured co-worker, situation favourableness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These four main approaches are discussed in turn in the following sections.

## 2.3 Trait Theories

Leadership theories originated with the ‘great man’ concept (Carlyle, 1841, 1). It assumed that great leaders possessed qualities that can be compared with “a flowing light-fountain…of native original insight, of manhood and heroic nobleness; in whose radiance all souls feel that it is well with them” (Carlyle, 1841, 2). Fundamental to this approach is the idea that great leaders are born with leadership qualities (Fry and Kriger, 2009). The Trait Approach developed from the “Great Man” theory as a way of identifying the key features of successful leaders (Bolden et al. 2003, 6). In fact, the early trait theories were called “Great Man” theories because they dealt with identifying the innate qualities and features possessed by leaders (Northhouse, 2012, 2). In his seminal publication, Stogdill (1948, 64) identified 26 behavioural traits which, he distilled into five categories: capacity, achievement, responsibility, participation, and status.
By 1950, scholars started considering the study of leadership traits a failure (Jago, 1982). Additionally, the early trait studies have been critiqued for their reliance on students, supervisors, and lower level managers, as neglecting executives and high level managers (House & Aditya, 1997). However, trait studies reappeared and received considerable attention with Stogdill’s 1974 study in which he modified his earlier opinion and suggested that leaders may have some universal characteristics. With McClelland (1975), came a degree of success, when he emphasised the need for achievement, power, and the need for affiliation.

2.4 Behaviourist Theories

Growing disenchantment with the traits theories (House & Aditya, 1997) due to the inconclusive results of the traits-based studies (Bolden et al, 2003, 7) led to emergence of another approach, called behavioural theories. Principal centres of work in the behavioural approach were the University of Michigan, headed by Likert; and the Ohio State University, under Stogdill and others. In this era, leadership was thus defined as a subset of human behaviour (Hunt and Larson, 1977).

Also, Likert (1961) introduced what he called the “linking pin” as a connection between levels of management. Likert suggests that organisations can be seen as interlocked or interlinked groups and all ‘link pin managers’ have three roles to play in planning. First, they must provide leadership of their own teams. Second, as members of the team, they also must contribute to the processes of the team. Third, in this way, they tie one team to another. Thus, every member acts as a linking pin for the organisation above and below him. In the linking pin arrangement, a group-to-group, as opposed to the traditional man-to-man relationship takes place. This linking pin arrangement has implications for Bangladeshi bureaucracy as government has initiated decentralisation reform; the formation of The Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform (CARR), 1982 is a good example of it. The focus of the CARR was decentralisation. Linking pin also supports decentralisation based on links (Lunenburg, 2010).

According to Bolden et al (2003), behavioural theories may help managers develop particular leadership behaviours but they do not explain what constitutes effective leadership in different situations. Indeed, most researchers today conclude that no one
leadership style is right for every manager under all circumstances. Hence, ‘leadership research was again in crisis, ...contradictory findings relating to the behavioral approaches. .....success of the style of leader behavior enacted was contingent on the situation (Antonakis et al, 2004, 7). Thus, contingency/situational theories were developed to address the vacuum.

### 2.5 Contingency/Situational Theories

The contingency/situational era stands out as a major landmark era in the evolution of leadership theory. In essence, it holds that successful leadership is contingent on one or more of the factors of behaviour, personality, influence, and situation. Contingency approaches focus on how leadership, subordinate characteristics and situational elements influence one another (Yukl, 2006). The contingency movement of leadership is credited to Fiedler (1967, 1971), who stated that leader-member relations, the task structure, and the position power of the leader would determine the effectiveness of the type of leadership exercised. Fiedler's contingency theory advances that there is no single best way for managers to lead. Contingency theory emphasised the need to place leaders in situations most suited to them (Fiedler, 1967).

Fiedler continued to work on his contingency approach despite the criticism of the LPC (Least Preferred Co-worker) scale and of the conceptual reasoning of the theory (Schriesheim & Kerr, 1977). Fiedler and Garcia (1987) developed the Cognitive Resource Theory (CRT) of leadership. They argued that under low stress, intelligence positively contributes to performance while experience negatively contributes to performance. Under low stress, leaders tend to misuse their experience. Fiedler and Garcia (1987) posited that leader intelligence does not contribute to performance when there is a high level of interpersonal stress and uncertainty. However, under high stress, leaders use their experience. This led to the assumption that intelligence and experience interfere with each other (House and Aditya, 1997). Thus, there is a negative correlation between leader experience and performance. Therefore, Fiedler (1996) recommends that leadership selection should involve a two-step process: (1) individuals must be recruited and selected with the required intellectual abilities, experience, and job-relevant knowledge; and (2) leaders must be enabled to work under conditions that allow them to
make effective use of the cognitive resources for which they are hired. \textit{In line with this, our government has already taken a number of reform measures, namely, merit-based recruitment/promotion and performance-based management} (Rahman et al., 1993). Government is aware that politicisation has started at the entry point of civil service recruitment, resulting in the appointment of less qualified persons (Osman, 2010).

However, the contingency/situational school is not without debate. Hersey and Blanchard’s (1969) leadership model has been challenged by a number of scholars, who were unable to validate the impact of subordinate maturity (Bass, 2008; Graffe, 1983). Blake and Mouton (1981, 453) termed the Hersey and Blanchard approach as a ‘myth’.

Such situational theories have implications for the Bangladeshi PSL as they emphasise the need for a particular style to ‘fit’ the managerial context embedded in a country-specific tradition. According to ‘t Hart and Uhr (2008), contextual approaches to understanding public leadership look at the role of situational and temporal factors. Drawing on the ideas of Bevir and Rhodes (2003, 2010); Ezammel and Willmott (2004); Chia and Holt (2006) I advance that public sector leaders not only interact with the wider environment they also seek to make sense of their unique context-specific background through their interpretations of meaning, as reasoning is always local in that it occurs against the backdrop of agents’ existing webs of belief. Bevir and Rhodes (2010, 12) regard context as the wider web of beliefs embedded in a historical tradition. Actors respond to a situation within such a web of beliefs, and not according to generalised behavioural patterns. The behaviour of actors in policy making process is difficult to generalise because the social, cultural, political, historical, and economic situations they confront are varied and complex (Kim, 2008).

According to Bevir and Rhodes (2010, 9), context as structure denotes specific notions of tradition, dilemmas, practice, and unintended consequence. It is important to note that context refers to specific traditions and practices; it is specific to local traditions and their local reasoning. Thus, context refers to the Bangladeshi governance traditions where PSL (situated agency) is embedded. This situated agency has been described as post-colonial (Huque, 2010), having various features influenced by colonial institutions and ancient \textit{samaj} tradition. Also, some traditions are affected by post-independence adaptations and innovations based on the administrative reform prescriptions. The
Bangladeshi PSL has inherited an elitist and centralised tradition (World Bank, 1996; Khan, 1998). The PSL is also biased towards the generalist tradition (Zafarullah & Huque, 2001; Huque, 2010) – unmistakably a colonial manifestation (Hakim, 1991). Bevir and Rhodes (2010, 4) observe that the UK civil service embodies two related sets of administrative traditions – the generalist and specialist traditions. Rhodes (1999) also comments that in Britain, the generalist, in function and by educational background, is admired. This UK tradition of generalism is still followed in Bangladeshi bureaucracy.

The above traditions of bureaucracy, i.e., elitism, centralisation, generalist-specialist conflict, have implications for public sector reforms which are highlighted later in Chapter 4. In Western countries, bureaucratic structure developed within the context of their own socio-economic and cultural heritage based on the industrial revolution and renaissance. In contrast, the administrative system of Bangladesh did not undergo such stages. Rather, the traits of the British colonial legacy still persist in Bangladesh. Thus, because of the transplanted version of colonial bureaucracy, bureaucracy is overdeveloped in relation to political institutions. The strength of the colonial administrative legacy has been observed as being strengthened in post-colonial Bangladesh, which results from the fact that post-colonial ruling elites themselves are the products of colonial education and training (Haque, 1997). The colonial model created an elitist and isolationist bureaucracy. However, the colonial tradition is gradually eroding due to the impact of other traditions including community development programmes and post-independence adaptation. Thus, the challenge of the reform context is to move from a colonial, centralised, isolationist and elitist bureaucracy to a decentralised and citizen-oriented government in which citizens will be treated as owners.

We then notice that the Bangladeshi bureaucratic context is characterised by multiple traditions that make it distinctive. Thus, it calls for the contingency leadership approach, which calls for the appropriate fit between a leader’s behaviour or style and the organizational context (Fry and Kriger, 2009). It does not follow a one-size-fits-all approach, because situational theories indicate that the style to be used is dependent upon such factors as the situation, the people, the task, the organisation, and other environmental factors (Bolden et al. 2003). Situational theories follow contingent notions of traditions, dilemmas and practices.
Such a view is consistent with Mintzberg’s notion of ‘contingency bureaucracy’, which he applied to emergency services organisations such as fire departments (1979, 332). The basic idea of contingency bureaucracy is that organisational effectiveness depends on the contextual factors. Bureaucracy should ‘fit’ these contextual conditions (Scheerens et al, 1989). Mintzberg’s (1979) example of fire departments represents one of the core functions of the government in terms of national safety and defence. In the case of Bangladeshi bureaucratic tradition, these core functions are countless, unlike the developed world, as its public sector is oversized. The World Bank (1996, i) aptly observed that the Bangladeshi government is performing too many commercial functions that others could do better. Therefore, there are too many ‘fire departments’ that Bangladeshi bureaucracy has to attend to from quick responding to natural calamities to wicked policy problems. It can be agreed that Bangladesh should adopt a contingency approach, since it faces extreme poverty, widespread corruption and natural disasters, because bureaucracy also provides ‘emergency services’ (Mintzberg, 1979).

2.6 New Leadership Theories

Recent scholarly additions to the study of leadership (1980s to the present) fall under the label of the new leadership approach (Bryman, 1996). However, I discuss some leadership approaches that have their roots before the 1980s, because they have received new interest and revival in the 1980s and onwards.

Burns (1978), in his book, ‘Leadership’, identified two types of leadership: transformational and transactional. Transformational leadership “elevates the follower’s level of maturity and ideals as well as concerns for the achievement, self-actualization, and the wellbeing of others, ….” (Bass, 1999, 11). Thus transformational leadership is follower-focused. On the other hand, transactional leadership “occurs when one person takes the initiative in making contacts with others for the purpose of an exchange of valued things” (Burns, 1978, 19). The core theory of this leadership is that leaders exchange reward when employees comply, a concept based on bureaucracy (legal-rational authority) and a leader’s legitimacy within an organization (Tracey & Hinkin, 1994; cited in Stone and Patterson, 2005, 6). Transformational leadership can also be applied to bureaucratic organisations. Perrow (1972) advocates that bureaucracies are deliberately designed not to be bureaucratised at the top. He argues that it is at the top of
the bureaucracies where power is centred and that bureaucracy is a means for the dispersal of power at lower levels of organisations. Supporting this line of argument, Ihrke (2004, 256) commented, “[i]f we assume that Perrow (1972) is correct, then the potential does exist for transformational leadership to manifest itself at the top of public organizations”.

The latest interest of leadership research is in the area of Biological and Evolutionary Perspectives. Attention in the new leadership research stream is spreading. A special issue of The Leadership Quarterly (Volume 23, Issue 2, 2012), titled “Biology of Leadership” is indicative of the importance of this new area. According to Day & Antonakis (2012), this perspective, however, is more of a hard-science approach as it focuses on measuring directly observable individual differences (e.g., biological variables or processes) and also considers why certain variables might provide an evolutionary advantage to an organism.

A systematic review of the above leadership theories leads to the discovery of an important leadership discourse: the discourse of change. The aim of leadership is to bring about changes – change from a previous position to the expected position. The ‘discourse of change’ features prominently in the trait, behavioural, contingency and new leadership theories generally and also in the public sector leadership theory specifically. This focus of leadership theories on change (a period of stability follows each leadership theory) is highly conspicuous, from the trait theories to new leadership theories. Kotter (1990) observes that leadership is about coping with change (cited in Dunoon, 2002, 5). Hence, more change always demands more leadership (Ibid, 1990). According to McCauley et al. (1995), this is because every leader either creates change or implements change. According to Meindl et al. (1985), leadership is essentially a term to describe organisational changes that we do not otherwise understand (see Appendix ‘A’ for discussion on how the discourse of change features in trait, behavioural and contingency leadership theories).

New leadership theories also place emphasis on change in terms of serving followers and accomplishing tasks, as the foregoing analysis of the new leadership theories reveals. Inherent in the new leadership theories is an increasing tendency to regard leaders as change agents. For example, transformational leaders are considered as
change agents in that they take responsibility for change. When writing the foreword to ‘Ethics, the Heart of Leadership’, Burns (1998), illuminates that “‘End values’ (such as liberty, equality, justice and community) lie at the heart of transformational leadership, which “seeks fundamental changes in society” [italics added], such as the enhancement of individual liberty and the expansion of justice and of equality of opportunity” (p. x).

“These end values are not only foundational to transforming leadership, but are integral for … a more democratic public service” (Denhardt and Campbell, 2006, 564). These values have implications for the public sector, because of the rapidly changing leadership landscape of public sector organisations.

In the next section, I illuminate the PSL theory in an attempt to demonstrate its relationship and relevance to governance reforms, changes and institutional adaptations. I also take a fresh look at the roles of the PSL in an increasingly complex environment that often presents to it dilemmas in terms of implementation of the reform programme.

2.7 Public Sector Leadership Theory

So far, I have discussed leadership theories which, according to Rhodes (n.d.) are generic theories that claim to cover all organisations. However, these generic leadership theories remotely address the public organisations and practitioners. Thus Van Wart (2003) pointed out, mainstream leadership research faces challenges in generalising beyond small subsets. One set of difficulties has to do with what Brunner calls ‘contextual complexity’ (1997, 219). We can find significant similarities among the generic leadership theories in that leaders have followers and impact on the direction of the groups. However, from a research perspective, the difference among leaders is far greater. For example, the leader of salaried employees and the leader of volunteers have dissimilar jobs (Van Wart, 2003).

The ‘New Leadership’ approach, particularly transactional leadership, transformational leadership, visionary leadership and charismatic leadership (Bryman 1996, 450) came not from mainstream leadership studies, but from political science (Rhodes, 1999). The New Leadership approach is underpinned by a depiction of leaders as managers (ibid,
A variety of leadership theories belong to the new leadership approach, viz., leader-member exchange, transactional, transformational leadership, complexity leadership, biological and evolutionary perspectives of leadership. Of them, only transactional/transformational leadership, relational leadership and complexity leadership resonate moderately with the roles and functions of administrative leadership/public sector leadership (Uhl-Bien et al. 2007; Perrow, 1972; Ihrke, 2004). However, mainstream studies ‘have failed to create a critical mass of scholarly work on public sector leadership’ (Kellerman and Webster 2001, 487). Terry (1995) also lamented the relative neglect of public sector leadership in the public sector literature.

Van Wart (2003) proposes that, operationally, administrative leadership refers to leadership from the frontline supervisor to the non-political head of the organisation. Thus, in this research, PSL is all about executive leadership in the public sector. It is about the non-political executives, i.e. about the bureaucrats.

Van Wart (2003) did a content analysis of the PAR since its inception, using a very loose definition of PSL that included broad management topics on the administrative executives and that part of organisational change literature which has a strong leadership focus. In doing so, Van Wart found 110 articles related to public sector leadership, in 61 years. Later on, using a stricter criterion he found only 25 articles relating to the topic. This led Van Wart (2003, 218) to comment, ‘…the literature on leadership with a public sector focus is a fraction…….’

Research shows that much work in public administration on leadership is derivative, drawn mainly from applied psychology, political science and organisation theory (Rhodes, 1999). Also, in public administration, it is hard to find studies concerning PSL within the executive branch of all levels of government. Terry (1995) building on Doig and Hargrove (1987) offers important reasons for this: a great deal of negative attention has been devoted to studying bureaucratic routines and institutional processes relating to PSL. Accordingly, PSL should not exist as there is a highly instrumental approach towards it within a strong overhead democracy (Van Wart, 2003, 215). Moreover, bureaucracy is guided by powerful forces, i.e. political groups that are beyond the control of individual leaders (Kaufman, 1981). Therefore, scholars seem to study the political leaders rather than the PSL whom they consider puppets. In the eyes of Van
Wart (2003, 216), “many of those interested in the executive leadership may find political leadership more attractive, with its dramatic and accessible policy debates and discussions, rather than administrative leadership.”

Nevertheless, scholars want to analyse the role of leadership in management and organisation theory because PSL deals with sector-specific issues relating to modernisation and national development. Also, “bureaucratic reform movements...have altered the leadership landscape of public sector organizations ...... beyond traditional bureaucracy and further complicating the multiple stakeholders, competing demands, and tools available for public sector leaders ...” (Gordon & Yukl, 2004; cited in Van Slyke et al., 2006, 362). Moreover, politicians cannot actually realize their programmes unless they can rely upon well-trained bureaucrats (ILO, 1998, 33).

Behn (1998, 209) pointed out a good number of reasons for the bureaucratic leadership. For him, leadership is not merely a right of PSL; it is a necessity:

“Leadership from [PSL] is necessary because without leadership public organizations will never mobilize themselves to accomplish their mandated purposes..... Leadership from [PSL] is necessary because the elected chief executive can provide.......leadership for only a few of the many agencies and programs for which he or she is responsible. ...... Leadership from [PSL] is necessary because the citizenry often lacks the knowledge and information (or will) necessary to perform its responsibilities”.

Thus, study of PSL is crucial in the public sector as progress in political leadership is dependent on the bureaucrats who implement government policies. Political executives are temporary, as they come to power for a certain term, whereas civil servants continue to serve until retirement. National development goals and modernisation programmes are implemented under the leadership of the PSL. There is no automatic growth process independent of the bureaucracy. Behn (1998) supports public managers playing a constitutive role so that decision-making failures can be prevented or, if failure occurs, decisions revised. According to Kaboolian (1998), Behn presents an activist image in stark contrast to Terry's call for the “conservator” public manager; Behn’s view is that, public managers have an obligation to remediate the “failures of governance” that stem from the human frailties of politics and inattentive elected officials. Moreover, the administrative responsibility of the PSL has been enshrined in the national constitution.
According to Finer (1941), administrative responsibility assigned by constitutional provisions is no less important than administrative efficiency. Rather, in many cases it contributes to efficiency.

The public sector leadership has its roots in Max Weber's leadership analysis. He identified three kinds of leader/follower relations – traditional, bureaucratic (rational-legal) and charismatic. According to Weber, bureaucracies are goal-oriented organisations that developed on its rational principles. The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organisation has always been its purely technical superiority over any other kind of organisation (Weber, 1966). Max Weber, himself, made one of the critiques of bureaucracy. He regarded it as a threat to parliamentary democracy. The most important criticism, however, came from Bennis (1966, 1993), who argued that bureaucracy as an organizational form is dead because it is incapable of dealing with a rapidly changing environment.

However, Rodgers et al. (2003) describe the increased interest in leadership in the public sector, and the attendant expectations, as constituting ‘a veritable rush to leadership’ (p. 2). This occurs because “[The] most important role of public sector leaders has been to solve the problems and challenges faced in a specific environment…” (OECD, 2001).

Van Wart (2003) commented that articles by Finer (1941) and Leys (1943) contributed to the PSL literature and clarified the administrative discretion debate – how much discretion public administrators should have and under what conditions. Public sectors were researched during the Trait period as well, but no distinctive perspective emerged (Jenkins, 1947). In the 1950s, a number of leadership studies were conducted especially in the public sector setting. Notable among these are Federal executive by Bernstein (1958), Leadership in Administration by Selznick (1957). Empirical research by Golembiewski (1959) focused on the small group’s administrative jobs and leadership behaviour in public sector setting. In 1966, Corson & Shale wrote a book on the senior administrative leaders of the USA.

The introduction of the transformational and charismatic leadership resulted in the revival of more general interest in leadership that was reflected in the administrative
leadership literature (Van Wart, 2003). The notion of the administrative leader as an entrepreneur was introduced by Lewis (1980) and expanded upon by Doig and Hargrove (1987) (ibid, 2003, 219).

Van Wart (2003, 219) observes that as PSL is highly related to reform, and because of the volume and debate over the appropriate types of reform, which occurred throughout the decade, leadership is, at least, indirectly discussed in nearly every issue of the PAR (Public Administration Review) after the 1992. Bellone and Goerl’s (1992) Reconciling Public Entrepreneurship and Democracy and Terry’s (1998) Administrative Leadership, New Managerialism and Public Management Movement can be cited as the good examples. According to Terry (1998), neo-managerialism has a guiding influence on the conceptualization on the administrative leadership. Some empirically sound articles on executive leadership appeared in the PAR in the 1990s (Hennessey, 1998).

Van Wart (2003) divided the public sector leadership theory into three eras. According to him, in the first era (1883-1940), the overarching idea was the dichotomy between the political world and the world of technical decisions and neutral implementation. At that time, PSL made decisions but referred policy decisions to the political superiors.

The second era (1940-1980) was a less idealistic model that recognised the complex interplay of the political and administrative worlds. It placed much importance on administrative responsibility and the modest use of administrative discretion.

The recent era started is the 1990s. It is based on a worldwide government reform agenda and is market-driven. The NPM has been dominant for over 20 years now. This paradigm, popularly called ‘market-based public administration’ and ‘entrepreneurial government’, was prescribed by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and so forth. NPM also became a new paradigm for introducing changes in the third world countries, which had to accept the prescriptions of the international donor agencies to get financial assistance (Turner and Hulme, 1997; Knack, 2001). The NPM model has exerted tremendous influence on the public sector leadership in both the developed and developing countries.
Against this backdrop, Van Wart (2003) offered a set of definitions of new public sector leadership as the process of aligning the organization with its environment, especially the necessary macro level changes and realigning the culture as appropriate. He identified as the key element of leadership its service focus. Although leadership functions and foci vary, the public sector leaders need to be open, responsive, and aware of competing interests, dedicated to the common good, etc., so that they create a sense of public trust for their stewardship roles.

In the light of the definitions of PSL by Van Wart, we can presume that leadership within the public administration framework can accommodate excellent and positive leadership roles. Research showed that good leadership, even transformational leadership, can be accommodated by the bureaucracies (Trottier et al. 2008; Paarlberg and lavigna, 2010). Surveys employing a multi-factor leadership questionnaire among governmental staff revealed how bureaucrats respond positively to transformational leadership behaviour (Trottier et al. 2008). Moreover, transformational leadership has been found compatible with the Bangladeshi bureaucracy. Communication skills, along with a tendency to nurture others, have come to be described as transformational, and these are increasingly evident in the Bangladeshi PSL, especially in the case of female civil servants (Alimo-Metcalfe 1998; konek 1994; Lee 1994; Bass, 1990; cited in Amos-Wilson, 2000, 27).

To remedy complex public problems and achieve the common good, the literature addressing leadership in public sector seems to have settled on an integrated approach (Crosby et al. 2010; Van Wart, 2005; Van Slyke et al., 2006). Morse and Buss (2007, 9) argue that leadership ‘across organizations within government as well as across sectors’ is ‘superseding the traditional image of government as top-down bureaucracy’. Their interest is in integration, collaboration and network governance. The public sector faces major public problems and the challenges facing public sector agencies today are so multifaceted that no single agency can adequately address them. Thus, the core idea is that public problems are solved or public value created primarily through boundary-crossing partnerships (Crosby & Bryson, 2005; Luke, 1998; cited in Morse, 2010, 1). Brookes & Grint (2010) also view collaboration as the key element of the public leadership that appears to be a newly emerging byword in government policy discourses in support of the modernisation programme.
However, in public administration, one must acknowledge the existence of different hierarchical needs. Therefore, questions naturally arise as to what type of leadership is to be expected from the different levels of hierarchy. In this context, Thompson (1967) argues that different types of leadership qualities are compatible with different hierarchical levels in public sector settings. Thompson’s (1967) model of leadership is most likely to be found at various levels within public organisations. It depicts how leadership in public organisations can accommodate different leadership styles. The table below summarises his typology of leadership in public sector organisations (see Appendix ‘B’ for discussion):

**Table 2.2 Typology of leadership in public sector organisations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Organisation</th>
<th>General leadership</th>
<th>Specific leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>Transformational</td>
<td>Credible leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Transactional/Situational</td>
<td>Path-Goal leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical-core</td>
<td>Transactional (supervisors) (employees)</td>
<td>Leader-Member Exchange Informal Leadership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Thompson (1967)

The typology above depicts that PSL can accommodate different types of leadership practices at different levels of hierarchy. Terry (1995) also acknowledges the ‘hierarchy’ in his ‘leader as conservator’ model. Furthermore, he argues that leaders should stay within the bounds of their hierarchically designed positions (Ihrke, 2004). Scholars generally agree that leadership in the public sector is based on hierarchical structure, with public administrators, basically those in mid-level managerial positions, better suited to transactional leadership styles, while transformational leadership is more suitable for the upper echelons of bureaucracy (Ihrke, 2004; Thompson, 1967).

In this research, I examine the PSL in the PSR context. Reform management has never been easy. It becomes more complex if not addressed properly by the value-based leadership. A 1994 study in the context of Canadian public sector reforms showed that the top dozen values espoused by public organizations across Canada were
integrity/ethics, accountability/responsibility, respect, service, fairness/equity, innovation, teamwork, excellence, honesty, commitment/dedication, quality, and openness (Kernaghan, 1994, 620). These public sector values resonate with the post bureaucratic model – a target where the public sector organisations aim to move based on the reforms within the overarching framework of good governance. The values stated above reflect the transformational leadership approach, as they are inextricably linked with higher order values (Burns, 1978, 20). Based on these transformational leadership values, reformers aim to move to a post bureaucratic model where the bureaucracy would be citizen-centred instead of organisation-centred, people-centred instead of organisation-centred, results-oriented instead of process-oriented and decentralised instead of centralised. Also, the post bureaucratic model includes partnerships and empowerment, which are compatible with transformational leadership (Kernaghan, 2000). Post bureaucratic leadership is all about transformations. So, reform leadership is an exercise in ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1943). Reformist public sector leaders should be constructive and destructive at the same time. They build up their case for change, disqualify competing policy alternatives, burn down some bridges to the past (Boin and t’ Hart, 2003, 550) while preserving the base in terms of a historical legacy that can act as the foundation of the reforms. Administrative structures in the present have the ‘genetic DNA code’ of institutions in the past (Olsen and Peters, 1996). Tradition is then ‘encoded’ in the structure of the present (Abbott, 2001, 20). The key argument is that public sector leadership responds to the public sector reforms in the light of a wider web of beliefs they hold embedded in a historically inherited tradition. Hence, dilemmas arise when the public sector leaders face unusual situations in terms of a mismatch between this tradition and the reform agenda prescribed by international donors. Thus, administrative traditions may also inform policymakers how to respond to ‘dilemma’ – a central tenet of the work of Bevir and Rhodes (2003, 2010) on the effects of governmental traditions on public sector reform (cited in Yesilkagit, 2010, 152).

Finally, it has been noted that the field of public sector leadership represents two different streams, directed at two audiences: academics or practitioners (Kellerman and Webster, 2001), although there are authors like Crosby (1999), Gergen (2000) and Greenstein (2000), who seek to cross this divide. These authors are executing the twin tasks of providing evidence for those who wish to read about PSL and instructing those who will exercise leadership. My research concerning the public sector leadership also
aims to cross this divide by unpacking the webs of belief from the real world of executives/practitioners; what Rhodes (2005) called public administration as anthropology.

2.8 Public Sector Leadership Theory in the Bangladeshi Context

Scores of studies exist relating to Bangladeshi public bureaucracy. Particularly, these studies focus on the civil service systems, bureaucratic culture, its historical evolution, recruitment, structure, and management. Khan conducted extensive research on the bureaucracy of Bangladesh. In his (1989) article titled, ‘Resistance to Administrative Reform in Bangladesh, 1972-1987’ Khan vividly narrated how political leadership had to depend upon the bureaucracy to undertake the nation-building tasks. He also described how PSL succeeded in maintaining the status quo by preserving the imperial traditions that continued to mould the bureaucratic ethos. He took the view that reform efforts fell short of expectation, partly because of the civil servants’ preference for the status quo and partly because of the lack of political commitment. One of Khan’s (1998) important books titled, Administrative Reforms in Bangladesh shows that Bangladesh continues to be an administrative state, as reform efforts are influenced by the civil servants to their advantage. Eventually, Khan suggested reforming the bureaucracy itself. However, he did not discuss bureaucracy as a form of leadership.

There are also studies on women in the civil service, addressing how to increase their representation. For example, a study by Jahan (2007) argued for the greater representation of women in the civil service by maintaining the present quota system.

However, it is hard to find studies in the Bangladeshi context that consider bureaucrats as leaders. The foregoing discussion reveals that bureaucracy as a form of leadership has seldom been discussed in the Bangladeshi context and that it is basically a Western concept. Conversely, in Bangladesh, leadership research is found more in the field of political executives. One important factor that contributes to the significant body of political leadership literature is the war of liberation through which the country achieved its independence, in which political leadership played a fundamental role. In the words of Islam (2005), political leadership has special charm for the people of this land, because leadership played an important role in the mobilisation of people and in motivating them to join the war of independence (Islam, 2005; Ahmed, 1983).

The literature review finds that colonial rule also contributed to the rise of political leadership in Bangladesh in terms of anti-colonial struggle. Bengali political leadership also played an instrumental role in other anti-colonial struggles, namely, the Quit India Movement (1942), Indigo Rebellion (1859-1862), Farazi Movement and so on (Kumar, 1999).

However, bureaucratic organisations existed before the British colonial rule. During the Mughal rule, there existed a well-established bureaucracy. According to Islam (1989, 271), the Mughals created an effective system of administration that the British took and modified to suit their need. The Mughal administration was organised in a highly hierarchical manner. Officials were appointed on the basis of merit, and promotions were based on performance (Dwivedi and Mishra, 2010).

Bureaucracy also existed in the ancient polity. For instance, Kautilya (Prime Minister of Chandragupta Maurya, the founder of the Mauryan Empire (322–298 BC) who wrote ‘Arthasastra’, a political treatise (Dwivedi and Mishra, 2010), presented the ruler whom he served with guidelines on how to rule (Raadschelders, 2000, 3). Kautilya emphasised that the king could not run the country alone and therefore needed to establish a bureaucracy to assist him (Sihag, 2007, 268). Kautilya placed emphasis on hierarchy, as
is clearly indicated by the reference to several levels of work – each department has a head, with responsibility for its performance (ibid, 1984). Kautilya also narrated the essential roles of the administrative leaders arguing that intellect should be given precedence over devotion and knowledge over heredity. The ancient statesman underlined the need for honesty in the government service by citing an example: “Just as it is impossible to know when a fish moving in water is drinking it, so it is impossible to find out when government servants in charge of undertakings misappropriate money” (Sihag, 2007, 269).

Since independence, bureaucrats have played a pivotal role in public administration in terms of re-building the war-torn country. Due to their better understanding of the technicalities of policy matters than the ministers (Zafarullah, 1998), bureaucrats exert substantial influence on politicians and take advantage of the weak political control. There exists an overdeveloped bureaucratic system inherited as a colonial legacy (Alavi, 1979).

In post-colonial Bangladesh, “the most characteristic dilemma that senior public administrator..... face is that of having to serve (their political masters, the democratic process, and the ‘citizens as clients’) and being expected to lead (namely big and complex public organisations) at the same time” (‘t Hart and Uhr, 2008, 5), by providing the brains behind the scenes, as their policy-making role is not embedded in the Constitution. Following the Westminster system, only the ‘servant’ aspect of administrative roles has been emphasised in the Constitution. Article 21 of the Constitution states that every person in the service of the Republic has a duty to strive at all times to serve the people. In the margin of this article the term ‘public servant’ is used. However, the realities of modern governance are such that senior department and agency officials cannot help but also be exercising leadership (‘t Hart and Uhr, 2008) along with serving. In Bangladesh, the bureaucracy’s exercising of leadership can be attributed to the old ‘Rules of Business’, framed in 1975, which gave the ‘Secretary’ a role of pre-eminence vis-à-vis the Minister in so far as it relates to administration and management, since the Secretary is empowered to act as the official head of the ministry (Ali, 2004a). In another rule called, ‘Transaction of Business’ a Secretary is declared as the official head of a Ministry or a Division (ibid, 2004). Subsequently, in 1996 two important changes were made in relation to Ministers and Secretaries. First, the
Secretary’s designation as ‘the official head’ was replaced by the phrase ‘administrative head’ Second, it also required that all business allocated to a Ministry/Division under Schedule I of these Rules, shall be disposed of by, or under the general or special directions of the Minister-in-charge (Cabinet Division, 1996).

However, in the real world of government, the modalities prescribed in the Rules of Business reveal a different story. Minister-civil servant roles tend to get blurred. According to Jahan (2006, 14), many civil servants, as well as the government, have started to ignore these rules. Of late, the low capacity of the political executives and the politicisation of bureaucracy have contributed to the increasing policy-making role of the civil servants (Huque and Rahman, 2003; Osman, 2010).

Despite this, bureaucracy as a form of leadership has not been researched in depth in the context of Bangladesh. This is possibly because bureaucracy likes to lead from behind the curtain in terms of steering the less expert Ministers. Also, the conduct rule does not allow bureaucrats to get involved in politics. The Government Servants Conduct Rules (GSCR), 1979 do not permit bureaucracy to engage in any extra-official activity: “No Government servant shall canvass or otherwise interfere or use his influence in connection with or take part in any election to a legislative body, whether in Bangladesh or elsewhere…” Accordingly, instead of playing direct roles, the bureaucracy tends to take advantage of weak political institutions without appearing on the stage, and gradually shifts from a dominant position to forming an alliance with powerful interest group in the system (Huque and Rahman, 2003).

Thus, my review reveals that as a form of leadership, PSL has seldom been conceptualised before. I find only two studies relating to bureaucracy as a kind of leadership theory in the Bangladeshi context. First, Islam (2010) argues for NPM based leadership in Bangladeshi Civil Service. According to him, examples of anticipatory, results-oriented and entrepreneurial leadership are not rare in Bangladeshi bureaucracy (ibid, 2010, 147). He cited an example in favour of his argument: bureaucrats in the Bangladesh Planning Commission develop long term plans such as perspective plans and five year plans. These plans lead to development of important sectoral projects necessary for the country based on future demands rather than current needs. These functions are certainly anticipatory and proactive. Islam (2010) then goes on to evaluate
one Bangladeshi administrative leader’s performance in light of Behn’s eight responsibilities of public agency leaders and found a match between them.

Secondly, another research by Amos-Wilson (2000) undertaken with forty-nine women from the Civil Service of Bangladesh to determine the perceptions of their own leadership behaviour finds that these perceptions lead to the adoption by women civil servants of a predominantly transformational leadership behaviour style. As has been described in Section 2.7, the literature on leadership with a public sector focus is scant even in the West, where the theory originated. The same is the case with Bangladesh. That the civil servants can lead is a proposition that is still at embryonic stage.

2.9 Conclusion

This chapter provided the rationale for the PSL theory. It began with a brief historical survey of different leadership theories, then turned to the conceptions, roles and values of PSL. The review advanced that within the bounds of their hierarchically-designated positions, PSL can accommodate different types of leadership, i.e. transactional leadership, transformational leadership, integrative and shared leadership. Also, it can embody multiple leadership values. In doing so, the review reflected the debate in public sector literature between the proponents of civil servants as entrepreneurs and supporters of the ‘administrative conservator’. Having presented this debate, the chapter advocated the importance of strengthening of PSL as the solution to national public challenges based on the local contexts, cultures and traditions. While the initial review suggests that there are a number of studies on the Bangladeshi public sector reforms initiated by the government and the donors, there seems to be a lack of in-depth studies on the attitudes, roles, leadership practices and perceptions of the public sector leadership in the context of public sector reforms. Also, bureaucracy as a form of leadership is a less known area in the Bangladeshi context. Thus, this research addresses this void by capturing PSL’s ways of understanding, envisaging and responding in relation to the public sector reforms.
Chapter 3: Understanding the Dynamics of Public Sector Reforms: Recipients, Donors and Elite Actors’ Responses

Signpost

Chapter 3 critically reviews the PSR and its outcomes since independence. It revisits the reform initiatives in a multi-actor setting. Dominating the first part is the argument on how the public choice theory informs the PSR embedded in the classical public administration approach whose voice is still heard in Bangladeshi public sector management. The chapter also discusses how public choice theory is concerned with the political arms of the government in terms of reform management. The review illustrates how the reform programmes undertaken by both the government and donors were influenced by the NPM spirit at first and Responsive Governance/the Rights-based approach later on. It scrutinises the PSR particularly to find causes of the reform stalemate. In doing so, I contend that PSR initiatives lacked the broader context in as much as they have been divorced from the broader socio-economic and socio-cultural contexts. Then I discuss the donor-induced reform programmes, to portray how different types of reform programmes have been field tested in Bangladesh, producing little or no benefit. Integral to this review is the argument that power of purse often leads to conditionality. However, the mere reproduction of a particular strategy imposed by donors leads to ‘local ownership’ problems. This review suggests the significance of the policy autonomy of the recipient country.

3.1 Introduction

The question of reforming the public sector has interested the government for a long time. To address this question, which arose inevitably out of poor public sector performance, the government initiated a number of reform programmes. Donor bodies have also been active in this regard. Firstly, this review highlights the nature and context of the PSR, looking at various approaches to reforms adopted by the reforms commissions/committees. Secondly, it examines how elite actors are grappling with the search for a new synthesis of traditional and modern principles of public administration and management. In doing so, it illustrates how bureaucratic response to public sector reforms tries to strike a balance between different models and schools of public administration and management, namely, classical public administration, public choice theory, new public management and the governance/rights based approach. The elite actors’ belief system is a case in point.
3.2 Nature of Public Sector Reforms in Bangladesh: The Bureaucratic Response

Since independence, Bangladesh has taken several initiatives to reform the public sector. Reform measures were taken by different governments to accommodate the changing needs of the country and their respective political manifestos. So far, as many as seventeen commissions and committees have been constituted with a view to reforming the public sector. More than 20 reports on Public Administration Reform have been prepared by these commissions/committees, some of them at the behest of important development partners, particularly the WB (World Bank), UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), ADB (Asian Development Bank), DFID (Department for International Development) and USAID (US Agency for International Development) (UNDP, 2007; Ali, 2007).

Public sector reforms are considered to be the sine qua non to solving the countless problems of the public sector. Despite the reform initiatives, however, the desired change has not materialised. According to UNDP (2007, 19), “There is general agreement, even within government, that the Bangladesh..... has undergone very few modernizing changes since independence ....most reform actions taken were merely for cosmetic purposes”. 

The following section provides a brief outline of the major PSR attempts undertaken by the government since 1971.

The table below shows the major PSR efforts and their focus and outcomes:
Table 3.1 Major Public Sector Reform initiatives in Bangladesh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Reform Committee/Commission</th>
<th>Main Focus</th>
<th>Out come</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reform Efforts from 1971 to 1991</td>
<td>Civil Administration Restoration Committee (CARC), 1971</td>
<td>Restoration &amp; continuity of the government</td>
<td>Resume previous pattern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Administrative Service Reorganizing Committee (ASRC), 1972</td>
<td>Structural change of bureaucracy</td>
<td>Report shelved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pay and Services Commission (P&amp;SC), 1976</td>
<td>Strengthening of bureaucratic elites, services structure and pay issues</td>
<td>Elite class of bureaucrats created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Martial Law Committee, 1982</td>
<td>Organization and Rationalization of Manpower in the Public Sector Organizations</td>
<td>Limited action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Committee for Administrative Reorganization/ Reform (CARR), 1982</td>
<td>Decentralisation</td>
<td>Central control continued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform Efforts after 1991</td>
<td>Public Administration Reform Committee (PARC), 1997 (2000)</td>
<td>Administrative change and development based on New Public Management</td>
<td>Yet to be completed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table depicts that reform efforts produced little or no change (*See Appendix ‘C’ for the discussion of PSR outcome based on Table 3.1*).

### 3.3 Donor-led Reforms: Traditions and Dilemmas

Bangladeshi government embarked on public sector reforms when international donors raised this issue as part of their SAPs in the 1980s.

However, SAPs came under intense criticism in many countries, including Bangladesh. The impact of SAPs has been deterioration in macro economic performance in Bangladesh, as expressed by Hossain et al., (1998, p. xiii), who note that: several macroeconomic indicators stagnated or worsened, which raised serious concerns about the SA policies.

The imperative needs for the PSR were again expressed by the WB (1996), which highlighted a number of issues, covering the following: (i) Bangladesh as a state apparatus extends beyond the core functions of the state; (ii) its economic environment has almost lost the characteristics of free market economy; (iii) a non-transparent system with weak accountability; (iv) an oversized, and nearly unmanageable bureaucracy; (v) demotivated and underpaid public employees; and (vi) an adversarial relationship between the public and private sectors, contributing to obstacles to private sector growth.

Thus, soon after the SAPs regime, a new model of reforms, called NPM was introduced by the donors. However, it produced little or no result. According to Sarker (2006), the Bangladeshi version of the NPM package remains unimplemented because of numerous factors, namely, weak state capacity, lack of political commitment, clientelism, corruption and poor rule of law. Moreover, there is the issue of ownership required for the effective implementation of reforms.

Concurrently, the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the WB started looking for a new banner of PSR because of the world wide criticism and opposition. In the meantime, ‘ownership’ became a burning issue that raised concern in the international policy.
environment. It has been noted that policy reforms imposed on developing countries through conditionality have greatly weakened the autonomy of recipient countries (Stewart and Wang, 2003). It is in this context that the WB and IMF came up with the new idea called PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper). WB and IMF claim that PRSPs are country-driven and nationally owned:

‘Country ownership is the guiding principle...the process and content [of PRSPs] must be designed nationally to suit local circumstances and capacities, and should be useful to the country, not only external donors’.

(Klugman, 2003; quoted in Stewart and Wang, 2003, 2)

Stewart & Wang (2003) however, expressed doubt whether PRSP really ensured the country ownership and partnership. In the case of Bangladesh, the PRSP process has worked against policy ownership from the beginning, as the policy agenda of the PRSP is pre-empted to a great extent by the WB/IMF-supported medium-term policy framework (Parnini, 2009, Eastwood & Lipton, 2001). Research by Rahman (2011) shows that bureaucrats in Bangladesh are also critical of PRSP as they do not own it. Rahman (2011, 53) lamented, ‘The resultant impact was that the civil servants could not own the PRSP as their own agenda that would be implemented by them’.

Most of these reform recommendations made by the donor bodies were based on the traditions of marketisation. For example, the Public Administration Sector Study by UNDP (1993) suggested integrating planning and budgetary systems, introducing strategic management and results-oriented management systems in all public offices. A Four Secretaries’ Report titled ‘Towards Better Government in Bangladesh, 1993’ sponsored by the British Government, recommended merit-based recruitment and promotion, performance-based management, the improvement of financial management and so forth (Rahman et al., 1993; Sarker, 2006).

All the reports highlighted in great detail the necessity of comprehensive restructuring of the public administration based on the tradition of marketisation; what Lan and Rosenbloom (1992) called market-based public administration, and Osborne and Gaebler (1992) called market-oriented government. The reports warned that the cost of doing nothing would be more dangerous (World Bank, 1996). The World Bank (1996) also made a number of suggestions in the light of market-based public administration in
Bangladesh. It called for redefining the frontiers of the public sector, i.e. greater role of the private sector and non-governmental organisations; and enhancing accountability and responsiveness (ibid, 1996). “Not unexpectedly, the response from the government to donor initiatives has been lukewarm” (Khan, 1998, 139-140). The government recognised the reports but did not act upon them whole-heartedly. The reports became ineffective in the face of resistance from the generalist bureaucrats and indifference displayed by the government (Zafarullah and Khan, 2001, 995).

The power of money, plus some quite definite ideas regarding what sort of reforms are desirable, has led donor agencies to take centre stage in the selection and definition of reform projects (Polidano and Hulme, 1999). Research shows that donors have their own agendas and targets to meet. For example, one of the programmes DFID funds in the area of civil service strengthening is ‘Managing at the Top’ (MATT). The programme aims to create a cadre of committed, reform-minded senior PSL in Bangladesh and focuses on those identified as being likely to move into more senior positions. Consequently, DFID secured an agreement from the government that no civil service project managers trained under the DFID programme would be rotated to take up their promotions, but they would be expected to take up their promotions in their current ministries (House of Commons, 2010, 11)

Clearly, inherent in the donor-induced reform programmes is a shift away from a traditional model of organisation and delivery of public services, based on the principles of bureaucratic hierarchy, to a market-based public administration or “enterprise culture” (Larbi, 1999; Hood, 1991). Therefore, what we see here is a clash of traditions, which can be expressed as follows:

a) the marketisation tradition versus colonial tradition
b) the marketisation tradition versus strong state tradition

This clash presents dilemmas for Bangladeshi bureaucracy, because marketisation as a tradition is a new idea which is against the existing inherited webs of beliefs embedded in the colonial tradition. Colonial traditions represent class division and power inequality in terms of the ‘ruler’ and the ‘ruled’ (Jamil, 2007; Zafarullah and Khan, 2005). Conversely, market-based traditions represent a customer orientation based on
service fairness, whereby the customer/consumer assumes a central role in the modernisation and reform of public services, often implying the creation of markets (Clarke, 2004; Ryan 2001). Also, the colonial traditions of centralisation, aloofness and bureaucratic elitism that continue to exist in the post-colonial context stand in opposition to the market forces, namely, formation of private capital, market-like responsiveness to users of services, and a reduced role for the state in national economic management (Haque, 1997; Ayee, 2005).

Thus, the marketisation tradition versus colonial tradition can also be expressed in terms of the citizen as ‘subject’ versus citizen as ‘customer’. The colonial tradition treats citizens as subjects, who have no choices in policy and are expected to obey the colonial masters. On the contrary, marketisation tradition treats citizens as customers who have freedom of choice and a voice, as it allows the opening up of multiple service providers (Larbi, 1999, 16; Dunleavy and Hood, 1994, 9).

The second clash is concerned with the strong state tradition. As an Asian country, Bangladesh has a statist tradition and a strong collectivist society, in contrast to marketisation, which is basically individualistic. Complex kin, bangsho (family/clan) and caste structures underpin the Bangladeshi society (Wood, 2000). In Bangladesh, the social texture is based on strong family ties and individualist tradition as a social device is barely expected. However, the transformation of citizens into consumers diminishes the collective ethos and practices of the public domain (Clarke, 2004). Experiences in post-colonial Asian countries suggest that the states have a different relationship to society unlike some of the Western countries that have championed NPM (Turner, 2002). These Asian states have been instrumental in their economic development, where the public sector played a central part. Refuting the conventional wisdom that markets are superior to state intervention, these states have demonstrated efficiency in transforming their societies by performing both direct and indirect roles (Cheung and Scott, 2003; Leung, 2003; cited in Sarker, 2006, 195).

This conflict between marketisation and strong state traditions or the individualism versus collectivism, has serious implications for a collectivist society like Bangladesh. In the words of Needham (2003, 8), “[T]his process has profound implications for the relationship between government and citizen. It restricts citizens to a passive
consumption of politics, excluding them from playing a creative and productive role in civic life. An individualised and commodified form of citizenship is taking hold in which communal and discursive elements are lost”. Also, this neo-liberal turn means the subordination of the social to the economic. The tradition of individualistic supplier-customer relationships based on simplistic exchange, whereby trust is eroded, poses a serious question on the ontological nature of the government [Bangladeshi government in this case] (Suleiman, 2003) which is characterised by a highly collectivist ethos. The collectivist ethos has also been manifested in the ‘Comilla Model’ (explained in Chapter 4). Most recently the approval of the ‘Comprehensive Village Development Programme’ (CVDP) by the government points to the strong collectivist tradition of the government (Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development & Co-operatives, 2013).

3.4 The Bureaucratic Response towards Reform: the Bureaucratic Paradigm & Public Choice Theory

The preceding scrutiny of major reforms in the public sector lays bare the concept of bureaucratic resistance. This resistance and utility maximisation point to two different approaches, namely, classical public administration paradigm and the public choice approach.

Selznick (1943) having probed an essay by Weber titled ‘Bürokratie’ described the classical public administration paradigm as characterised by authoritative jurisdiction, hierarchy of office and general abstract rules of procedure. This paradigm is also called bureaucratic paradigm (Barzelay, 1992). Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) defined ‘old public administration’ as neutral, hostile to discretion and to citizen involvement, parochial and narrowly focused on efficiency. The Bangladeshi bureaucratic response to PSR typifies the habits of thought, attributed to classical public administration. For example, in the case of the ASRC (1972) bureaucrats acted in a body to resist the changes, although the recommendations made by the committee were outstanding. The erstwhile civil service of Pakistan (CSP) opposed the ‘wholesale and across-the-board amalgamation’ of different civil services into one, since the implementation of the ASRC’s recommendation would have resulted in the abolition of their privileged
generalist bureaucrats remained entrenched.

A thorough review of the National Pay Commissions (NPC) also reflects the well-
known verdict: bureaucracy acts based on self-interest and represents budget
maximisation (Niskanen, 1994; Tullock, 2006). NPCs are constituted to determine
salaries and benefits for employees in the public service; their objective is to reduce the
disparity between the highest and lowest income groups. However, “the elite group of
bureaucrats have a tendency to view the proposal for equity as an effort to undermine
their standing in the system” (Huque, 2010, 62). The seventh NPC (most recent) also
invited criticisms for increasing the difference of pay between the highest and the
lowest grades (Mondal, 2009). Thus, it was in favour of the elite group of bureaucrats,
who always try to maximise the budget.

The P&SC also met the same fate. Among others, its recommendations included
creation of a new class of technocrats, equal pay for equal status and an appropriate
level of participation in the decision-making structure (GoB, 1977). However, status-
conscious CSP officers did not let that happen, as they continued with the practice of
reservation of posts (Khan, 1998). Moreover, the majority of the P&SC members were
ex-bureaucrats who played an instrumental role in advancing their bureaucratic interests.
The creation of a Senior Service Pool (SSP) following the recommendation of the
P&SC is an example of their bureaucratic empire-building. SSP further strengthened the
generalist civil servants as it allowed their automatic induction into the SSP. According
to Khan (1998), this provision of SSP clearly demonstrated the complete power of the
generalist bureaucrats vis-à-vis other specialist and technical civil servants.

In 2010, the government approved a proposal for an Upazila Parishad (a local
government tier) Bill to make the UNO (Upazila Nirbahi Officer: a local government
bureaucrat appointed by the central government) Parishad’s principal executive officer,
vested with financial powers. Thus, the UNO, who is supposed to be providing a
secretarial service to the Upazila Parishad, now assumes the role of principal executive
officer with more power and authority, leading to strained relations between political
executives and bureaucrats. According to the newly approved Rule 14 of the Upazila
Parishad (Implementation of Activities) Rules 2010, the UNO retains the right to make
his own comments on all files and papers. Such actions by the local government bureaucracy indicate its policy-making role. Lynn (2001) observed that classical public administration theorists and scholars recognized the “policymaking role of civil servants, the inevitability of administrative discretion, the importance of persuading the courts to formally recognize the necessity for administrative discretion, ……” (p. 10).

From what has been set out above it can be concluded that the bureaucrats seemed to advance their career opportunity; responded to the incentives and constraints that they faced; and sought to maximise their utility (Niskanen 1994; Tullock, 2006). Bureaucratic response towards the PSR displays that they are rational individuals making decisions to maximise their own interests based on incentives; they are rigid and unresponsive when attempts are made to cut back their budget, resources and privileges; and seek to retain their privileges even at the cost of the citizens. This bureaucratic behaviour/decision is the result of a calculation of costs and benefits that corresponds to self-interest as observed by Brennan (1996) and Udehn (1996).

The reforms initiated by the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh – CARC (1971), ASRC (1972) P&SC (1976), MLC (1982), CARR (1982), and PARC (1997) – were not successful because of bureaucratic domination over policy decisions, factionalism and micro-bureaucracies, and bureaucratic intemperance and intransigence (Zafarullah, 1995; Huque, 2010). All in all, public sector leaders’ response to reform initiatives seem to be strongly swayed by bureaucratic paradigm and public choice theory. Mostly, reform failure can be attributed to the following reasons:

- politically motivated reforms are geared to partisan or individual interests rather than overall national interest and
- resistance from the civil servants who perceive their interests to be adversely affected as a result of the implementation of the proposed reform.

Khan (1991, pp.3-4)

The above reasons reveal the resistant and self-interested character of bureaucracy, consistent with bureaucratic paradigm and public choice theory.
3.5 The Bureaucratic Response towards Donor Reform: the NPM Paradigm & Responsive Governance/Rights-Based Approach

Literature suggests that limited reform took place based on the reform recommendations by the donors. In line with the donors’ suggestions and inspired by the NPM spirit, the government created quasi-private organisations and special watch dog agencies such as the Privatisation Board, the Deregulation Commission, the Board of Investment, the Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Dhaka Electricity Supply Authority to implement privatization and liberalization policies and to facilitate the introduction of new management practices (Haque 2003; Samaratunge et al. 2008). The creation of these organisations partially transformed the structure of public sector, since some of them enjoy various degrees of operational autonomy in financial and personnel matters (World Bank, 1997; cited in Samaratunge et al. 2008, 38). However, few of them can work independently, in practice, because of the bureaucratic bottleneck and ill-devised laws and procedures. For example, the ‘independent’ Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is still dependent on the government for many of its functions. One of the prerequisites for success of the Anti-Corruption Commission is its financial independence. Parnini (2011) argues that section 30 of the ACC Act, 2004 creates scope for retaining financial control of the ACC in the hands of the Government. The operational independence of the Commission cannot be fully ensured if such legal loopholes remain unaddressed.

One successful NPM reform took place in the water sector. The Dhaka Water and Sanitation Project supported the creation of an autonomous water supply utility called Dhaka WASA (Water Supply and Sewerage Authority), with an independent Board of Directors and a manager recruited on contract terms on the open market. This is seen as the model management system for public service delivery agencies (World Bank, 2002). However, its recent partial failure can be attributed to the public bureaucracy, i.e. the supervising Ministry which has not respected its designated roles vis-à-vis management (ibid). Again, we see here a strange co-existence of classical public administration and results-based management.
Establishment of Pally Bidyut Samity in the power sector is another example of successful NPM reform. It is based on the concept of ‘Samity’ meaning co-operative (collectivism). It is a strong case of layering that depicts ‘managerialism’ intermingled with a strong collectivistic tradition.

While the need for reforming the public sector has been clearly felt and the authorities have already field tested some reform programmes, one of the most difficult questions that remains is: is the country on the right track in terms of appropriateness of reform programmes? And why have the public sector reforms so far undertaken partly succeeded?

Most reform programmes based on whole-sale NPM failed. According to Sarker (2009), the reasons behind the failure of NPM–based reform in Bangladesh are administrative inefficiency; political and administrative corruption; ill-conceived prescriptions of the donor agencies that disregards recipient country’s social and political milieu.

One important reason is that most donor-driven programmes do not completely match the recipient country’s unique socio-economic and cultural need. According to Negandhi and Estafen (1965), the debate around whether management practices and know how is universal or culture-bound is not new. Oberg (1963) acknowledges the importance of cultural differences in the transfer of reforms. From his empirical research he concludes that cultural differences from one country to another are more significant than many authors now appear to recognise. If management principles are to be truly universal they must confront the challenge of other cultures. Such is the case with Bangladesh, which has its own and unique socio-economic reality to address. The NPM must address the contextual reality. Naschold (1995, 215–17) argues that successful reform depends on addressing historical traditions, cultural norms and established practices.

At present, the public sector reform has taken a different dimension with the introduction of a responsive governance and rights-based approach. The World Bank and development partners posit that good governance is to be ensured through public sector reform. The current reforms in public sector are seen as a part of the good governance agenda, in that they focus on the overall management of resources for
human development with special emphasis on accountability and establishing an institutional framework for development (Parnini, 2009). Also, the MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) present a key opportunity to improve realisation of human rights, which necessitated adopting a rights-based approach. In its development strategies, the GoB (Government of Bangladesh) has recognised that democratic governance and human rights are critical to the achievement of the MDGs. The establishment of the National Human Rights Commission and Information Commission were important steps towards achieving this.

In line with this, a number of reforms have been already implemented based on e-governance, including mobile phone based medical advice/telemedicine, online students registration for high school and intermediate level college students, and online student admission by some colleges under the National University, and electronic birth registration system among others (BEI, 2010). These attempts successfully address the rights-based approach to education and health.

However, the government faces severe challenges with respect to human resource readiness for operationalising e-government initiatives (BEI, 2010), which has potential to trigger PSR in terms of ensuring good governance and equitable human development. Again, the attitude and posture of government officials need to be shifted toward a service orientation, recognising the rights of citizens to have access to trouble-free, efficient service. Thus, the fundamental premise underpinning e-government is not technology but the way the public administrators interact with citizens (paraphrased from BEI, 2010).

E-government initiatives depend to a significant extent on the commitment of political executives. However, many developing countries have conservative views regarding the introduction of e-government. As e-governance promotes openness in the flow of ideas and information, its introduction may be resisted where the power is exercised undemocratically or corruptly (Rose, 2005, 1). In Bangladesh, the present Awami League-led government’s priority programme is to digitize the country, so as to achieve “Vision 2021” (Bhuiyan, 2011). The political executives’ attempts to use e-governance to transform the traditional public administration landscape to a transparent and citizen-centred public administration has been much appreciated (Bhuiyan, 2011) nationally.
and internationally (Masud, 2013). This example substantiates Khan’s (1998, 178) assertion that political will must be a driving force behind a reformed public service in Bangladesh.

3.6 The Political Executives: the Reform Game

Politisation is not a new phenomenon in modern democracy. For instance, the United States has over 4,000 political appointments at federal level (Pandey, 2012). However, the spirit and intensity of politicisation varies in the case of Bangladesh, resulting in bad governance. Unlike the developed countries, politicisation of bureaucracy in a descriptive sense does not occur in Bangladesh. Following pejorative politicisation of bureaucracy, ‘party loyalty’ is considered as the basis of politicisation. Politician-driven politicization is the concern here.

The World Bank (2002, xx) suggested that politicisation of the Bangladeshi civil service leads to arbitrary decision-making, inadequate attention to following the rules of business, and not imposing discipline for fear of retaliation from powerful interest groups. Preferential treatment of citizens in service delivery is commonplace. Good governance reforms based on fairness and accountability are thwarted by this politicisation. Also, recruitment, postings and promotions are highly politicised, although there is a merit based recruitment system. According to Osman (2010), this kind of political influence over recruitment is done through politicising the Public Service Commission – the central personnel agency. NORAD (2011), in their Bangladesh country report, comments that the high level of politicisation, together with patronage, prevents any radical reform of the public service. It has left the public sector weakened and destabilized its internal and external accountability mechanisms. The weakened bureaucracy thus suffers from limited reform implementation capacity. NORAD (2011, 13) further comments that the political leadership are only responsive where demands for change do not threaten their patronage system. From these observations, it can be argued that basically politicians’ stance radiates with public choice theory. The appeal of public choice theory to politicians is that “the larger the power of the state, the more opportunities there are for rent seeking and the greater the power enjoyed by politicians ......” (Butler, 2012, 80). In the words of Butler (2012)
again, public choice theory assumes that the self-interest of political parties lies in getting the votes they need to win power and position. In view of this, it can certainly be argued, for example, that Bangladeshi MPs (Members of the Parliament) have exercised enormous power in order to maximise their interest in recent years, because of their pivotal role in determining how the Upazila Parishad should be constituted. The intervention of MPs in the Upazila Parishad has eventually resulted in the conflict between the two elected political executives – Upazila Parishad Chairmen and MPs. Centre-local relations became strained. Local government experts view the intervention of MPs in the local body as thwarting efforts to establish a good decentralized local government. Some allude to what they call the ‘politics of decentralisation’ or the ‘reform game’. Many consider this provision to be unconstitutional and a ‘slap for democracy’ (Kabir, 2009). Public choice literature indicates that motivations facing elected politicians are four types — electoral, partisan, institutional and coalitional (Eaton et al. 2011). The present ruling party, the Bangladesh Awami League and its grand coalition partners are driven by the public choice theory (electoral/vote motive) when it comes to the local government decentralisation. According to Downs (1957), the goal is to gather votes, and get their party elected. The appointment of the local MPs as advisors in the Upazila Parishad is the manifestation of the vote motive, as the 10th parliamentary election is fast approaching, scheduled to be held by January, 2014 at the latest. To pursue the electoral motive, in the words of As-Saber and Rabbi (2009), the present Awami government, having assumed power in 2009, decided to revoke the Upazila Parishad Ordinance 2008. Subsequently, a bill was passed on the 6th of April 2009 that reinstated MPs as advisors of the Parishad, resulting in the complicated scenario of the Parishad’s governance structure. The present ruling party enjoys a two-third majority in Parliament. Thus, it has great advantages: the majority of Upazilas are covered by the MPs of the ruling party-led coalition. It is in this context that the Awami league decided to impose the mandatory advisory role of MPs over the Parishad, in the hope that MPs would be better able to mobilise the voters through state allocated funds and projects. Already, MPs have started working towards that end. “When the Upazila Parishad gets an allocation of annual development programmes, MPs send a list of projects to implement in their constituencies” (Rahman, 2012, 109) in an effort to win the hearts of the local voters. Thus, publicly funded projects promoted by local MPs are used to bring money and jobs to their own constituencies, as a political favour to local
politicians or citizens (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002). The political parties are engaged in a race to capture the state resources, irrespective of the needs of the citizens.

### 3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the debates on the PSR by discussing the roles of the donors and two national actors: the political executives and the bureaucratic executives. In doing so, it reviewed four types of responses: a) classical public administration, b) public choice theory, c) new public management and d) the governance/rights-based approach. It also looked at the various incentives/disincentives determining whether or not a bureaucrat would support and implement reform programmes. It looked at the incentives that the donors face in giving aid. In examining externally-led attempts at reforms, it showed how they mostly failed because they were decontextualised – isolated from the country-specific traditions, leading to ownership problems. Thus, the review serves as the platform for answering the second research question by showing that responses to reforms often emerge from the key actors’ sense-making influenced by their established practices and traditions.
Chapter 4: Traditions in Bangladeshi Public Administration: Hybridisation

Signpost

This thesis argues that national public bureaucracies are distinctive, because of unique country-specific traditions. Thus, PSR takes place within inherited traditions and legacies and as reform often conflicts with the status quo/existing ideas, it tends to create dilemmas. This chapter seeks to cover a wide spectrum of Bangladeshi national traditions of governance and administrative legacies, identifying some path dependencies and dilemmas. I advance that the governmental traditions in Bangladesh are characterised as ‘postcolonial’, basically embedded in Samaj and representing multiple features directly traceable to Mughal rule and colonial institutions, with post-independence adaptations and innovations based on the administrative reform prescriptions by the donor agencies, appearing as new ‘layers’ on the original bedrock of Samaj. This, coexistence of legacy and modernity leads to hybrid traditions. Finally, the chapter outlines the theoretical framework of the study.

4.1 Introduction

A sizable body of literature suggests that traditions have a contributory influence on reform agendas and reform outcomes. Governance traditions are shaped by the larger social and political culture within which they live (Peters, 2001). These traditions shape the public administrators’ webs of belief as to what constitutes appropriate government (Yesilkagit, 2010). In exploring the notion of governance, traditions and dilemmas are focal points for Bevir and Rhodes (2003, 2010). Traditions are particular legacies passed down from generation to generation, and adapted to present-day use; they are an ideational background against which individuals come to adopt an initial web of beliefs (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010, 3, 16). Traditions can change. Also, there can be multiple traditions. Multiple traditions arise out of dilemmas. It is through reference to these dilemmas that changes in traditions can be explained. Yesilkagit (2010, 152) observes that traditions may also inform public administrators how to respond to ‘dilemma’, which is a central tenet of the work of Bevir and Rhodes (2003) on the effects of governmental traditions on public sector reform. It is in this context that Bangladeshi governance traditions will be explored.
4.2 Bevir and Rhodes’s Interpretive Approach: Beliefs and Traditions

Bevir and Rhodes’s interpretive approach focuses on recovering the beliefs of the ‘situated agency’ embodied in their actions. Beliefs are also explained against the background of traditions and dilemmas (Bevir and Rhodes, 2012). There are a number of studies that draw on Bevir and Rhodes’s interpretive approach. For example, in the domain of public policy, good studies were conducted by Stoker (2006), Clark and Gains (2007) and also by Wilkinson (2011). In local and urban politics, the following authors engaged with Bevir and Rhodes framework: Orr (2005, 2009), Orr and Vince (2009), and Gibbs and Krueger (2011) among others. Discussion of Bevir and Rhodes philosophy also includes authors like Finlayson (2004), Hay (2011) and Wagenaar (2011). However, in the Bangladeshi context no research has been conducted before patterned on Bevir and Rhodes’s approach. Here lies the uniqueness of this research.

4.3 Traditions Remembered: Evidence of Layering

Bevir and Rhodes (2003) argue that elite actors’ beliefs about their governmental traditions shape public sector reform. Hence, they stress the centrality of agency. Bangladeshi bureaucracy is no exception, as has been portrayed above. Nothing slips away from the Bangladeshi ‘situated agency’. Bureaucrats’ actions seem deliberate and calculated. They have their own ‘interpretation of interpretation’, done against the inherited tradition, consistent with Bevir and Rhodes’s (2010, 2) view that, ‘civil servants must constantly interpret their position’.

Conceptualising administrative traditions as beliefs and ideas highlights the role of agency in administrative reform (Bevir et al. 2003; Goodin, 1996). The effect of administrative traditions is often singled out as one of many causal factors in the process of administrative reform (Bekke and van der Meer 2001; Brunsson and Olsen 1993, cited in Yesilkagit, 2010, 146-150). Orr and Vince (2009) having researched the UK public sector traditions commented that traditions provide a basis for a reflective learning process for public sector practitioners ‘which not only informs but evokes and ‘awakens’ our sensibilities and awareness to the inherent contradictions, dilemmas and
predicaments of managerial situations’ (Chia, 2005, 1092). Traditions are useful for the public leadership as they provide the appropriate contextual reality – contexts having distinctive historical lineage, including the current time frame as well. Experiences, reflections and written texts of the PSL provide the sources of the traditions. Literature survey reveals that apart from leadership, the outcome of any reform depends on much more complex factors embedded in societal, politics and culture (Chowdhury, 2000).

Bevir and Rhodes (2003, 2010) reject the notion that traditions are un-changing core ideas or sets of ideas. Instead, they offer a non-essentialist conception of tradition (cited in Hall, 2009, 58). Actors are influenced by traditions. Also, ‘situated agency’ has the capacity to change them. Traditions of governance can be revisited and rehabilitated by the actors. Thus, the leadership of the civil service can reinvent its traditions when it confronts dilemmas (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010). ‘A dilemma is any experience or idea that conflicts with someone’s beliefs, and so forces them to alter the beliefs they inherit as a tradition’ (ibid, 16). Therefore, traditions and dilemmas are two focal points for Bevir and Rhodes’ interpretive approach to understanding governance, which rejects reification and formalism in favour of humanism and historicism.

Painter and Peters (2010, 19) grouped families of countries on the basis of some common administrative inheritance into nine traditions. According to their typology of traditions, Bangladesh belongs to the Postcolonial South Asian and African tradition. They lumped together countries in Africa and South Asia mainly for the reason that these countries share a common history of colonisation and postcolonial development. Actually, Bangladeshi governance traditions go beyond that, being rooted in Bengal’s (Bangladesh) ancient Samaj and Mughal historical past, which greatly predates the colonial rule. Some traditions are prominent and therefore stand out from the crowd. They are called layerings. In the case of Bangladesh, I discern four types of layers: Mughal legacy, British colonial legacy, Forces of Community Development Programmes and Post independence reforms. The latter essentially appears as new ‘layers’ on the original bedrock of Samaj.
4.4 Samaj: The Base

Samaj denotes the traditions of ancient village life. It is an indigenous social institution, an embodiment of normative rules through which villagers interact and enact new societal norms and forms. Villagers’ social lives and moral codes are governed by Samaj (Adnan, 1990; Jansen, 1986; Jahangir, 1979). It is based on hierarchical interpersonal relationships, family and kinship loyalty and represents stability (Jamil, 2007). The Samaj includes clientelist politics, which impacts on the reform agenda. Clientelist networks try to put their vested interest and party priorities on the reform agenda. State decision-makers become vulnerable to these clientelist pressures to maintain their support base in the governance structure. These clientelist groups also take advantage of state decision-makers’ weaknesses, according to Sarker (2008), who further comments that the state uses clientelist politics for known purposes including creating a support base for ensuring vote banks and neutralizing opposing forces.

Wood (2000; cited in Sarker, 2008, 1425) identified a number of traditions and social norms in Bangladesh Samaj:

- Rural class relations are based on landholding, and there is a trend of concentrated possession of key resources such as water, forests, fisheries etc.

- Elite control is deep over resources and opportunities distributed by the state and through the imperfect markets of the private sector

- A history of considerable official monopoly over the allocation of resources and their distributional impacts, inviting widespread rent-seeking and corruption: from colonial times; through the Pakistan period into the present, the state has occupied a monopolistic position over public resources

- Complex kin, bangsho and caste structures which underpin a pervasive system of patron-clientelism

- Networks, linkages and interlocked transactions define necessary behavior in terms of deference to arbitrary and non-bureaucratic authority based on personal as well as official position
- Extended families among the richer classes very often are capable of operating in imperfect, non-transparent markets and flouting state policies.

The above findings of Wood (2000) reflect the deep structures of the Bangladeshi Samaj, which underpins a pervasive system of patron-clientelism (Wood, 2000). Bangladeshis society is neo-patrimonial in the sense that rules are applied with partiality and some citizens get preferential treatment (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002).

This complex chain of personal bonds, founded on mutual material advantage, is called patron-client network. As the villagers are mostly poor, they are usually drawn into this network. This initial village concept of clientelism has now pervaded the entire political systems, which impacts on the PSR. Reform measures that tend to go against the patronage system are likely to fail. For example, the objective of MLC, 1982 which was organisation and rationalisation of manpower in the public sector, was marginalised in favour of parochial clientelist interests of the regime in power. The implicit agenda was to counter the urban political opposition (Sarker, 2004). Therefore, in the Bangladesh context, political commitment is circumscribed by clientelist politics, which distracts the political leadership from embarking on comprehensive reform programmes (World Bank, 1996; Sarker, 2004; Sobhan, 2004; cited in Sarker, 2006, 191).

The tradition of bureaucracy is highly influenced by Samaj, which discourages new ideas that may threaten the stability of the system. The same is the case with bureaucracy, which represents stability. Bureaucrats are expected to follow the instructions of their superiors. Juniors have little scope to go beyond the directives of the supervising authority. Creative thinking and innovative practices often result in an uneasy relationship between the superiors and the subordinates, due to the authoritarian attitude of the senior bureaucrats. According to Khan (1998, 37), authoritarianism is part and parcel of the Bengali culture. In the family, the father enjoys the sole authority. Children are taught to respect their elders. According to Jahangir (1979), a strong tie of deference and affection binds father and son, although the relationship is very formal between them. In the bureaucracy as well, junior colleagues are expected to follow the instructions from the senior colleagues who are regarded as the father-figures – essentially a Samaj concept. A similar chain of personal bonds is replicated in the bureaucracy, where seniors are regarded as father-figures. Hence, as Jamil (2007) notes,
in bureaucracy too, superior-subordinate relationships are characterised by deference to seniors and affection towards juniors. Thus, age and seniority have considerable impact on appointment and promotion (Khan, 1998). These *Samajik Bidhi* (social norms) are reproduced in the bureaucracy. When a new recruit joins the bureaucracy he tries to reproduce the *Samajik Bidhi* in the bureaucracy, as he is moulded by the culture of the *Samaj*. Bureaucratic behaviour follows *Samajik* networks and linkages. Those with higher status within the *Samaj* give instructions and those with lower status follow.

Bangladeshi bureaucracy has been portrayed as monolithic, rigid and resistant to changes. According to the Public Administration Reform Commission (PARC, 2000, 7), bureaucracy is “rigid, unresponsive…., pre-occupied with process rather than results, driven by outdated rules”.

Such rigidity and resistance are explained by the continuity of *Samajik Bidhi*, which do not welcome change (Jamil, 2007). *Samaj* represents stability by perpetuating pre-modern values that clash with modern values and seeking to maintain the status quo. An important role in *Samaj*, according to Heginbotham (1975), is played by ‘dharma’, specific duties which one must perform. The social function of dharma is to hold society together based on righteous belief and action, and perpetuate the *Samajik Bidhi*. Although this is the Hindu view of life, many of the societal norms are common to both Hindus and Muslims (Jamil, 2007).

However, *Samaj* explains only one side of the many-sided edifice. There are other factors contributing to success and failure of public sector reforms, which subsequent sections explain.

**4.5 The Mughal Legacy and British Colonial Legacy: The Layering**

The Mughal legacy and British colonial legacy are salient in explaining the elitist and centralised administrative ethos. The formalised and highly centralised administrative structure in Bangladesh (PARC, 2000; Khan, 2005), based upon the British colonial model (Huque, 2010) dates back to the 16th century when the Mughal emperor Akbar
refined and imbued it with the spirit of an imperial service, executing the royal command (World Bank, 1996). The important Mughal legacies are: a) hierarchical structure, b) administrative units structured as provinces (suba) and c) the importance of revenue administration. During the Mughal rule, the civil administration was organised in a highly hierarchical manner. Officials were recruited on the basis of merit and promotions based on performance. The governor of a province, called a subehdar (the term suba is still used in the subcontinent to denote a province), represented the authority of the Mughal Emperor (Dwivedi and Mishra, 2010).

However, it was in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with the imposition of the British colonial administration, following the conquest of Bengal in 1757 that much of the character of today's Civil Service was shaped and the strong British colonial administrative legacy continues to mould the administrative systems in the post-colonial Bangladesh (World Bank, 1996; Khan, 1998).

The elitist and centralised nature of administrative establishment was reinforced in the post-colonial Bangladesh. It is widely acknowledged that the colonial administration was extractive. Therefore, all powers were vested in a select band of civil servants, who were trained to rule and not to serve. This ruling spirit made them elitist. British imperial rule used the bureaucracy as a ruthless machine for mass rule and it was designed to protect the imperial interest only (Zafarullah & Huque, 2001) and aimed at resource extraction (Damodaran, 2007). In postcolonial Bangladesh as well, governance is not centred on responding to stakeholders’ demands, but bureaucratic actions always favour the elites with whom bureaucrats share economic and social backgrounds (Zafarullah, 1995).

The above two layers (Mughal and British colonial legacy), have subsequently been overlain by two newer layers: the forces of community development programmes and post-independence reform programmes. Post-independence reform programmes initiated by both the government and the donor bodies have already been described in chapter 3.
4.6 Community Development Programmes (CDP): The Layering

Community Development Programmes (CDPs) can be grouped into: government and non-government organisations (NGO). They are influenced by a Western, especially American bottom-up approach to change and development (Heginbotham, 1975). CDPs focus on empowering the poor based on rural development. Public sector CDPs are rooted in the V-AID (Village Agricultural and Industrial Development) programme of the 1950s. Its basic precepts derived from the insights of the ‘human relations’ school pioneered by Elton Mayo, which paid special attention to the psychological and social needs of the workers (Heginbotham, 1975). In contrast to the unitary and top-down approach of the British colonial rule, it placed emphasis on team work and spirit (Jamil, 2007). The villagers formed communities to help themselves, through the efforts of a multi-purpose village level worker (bureaucrat) – a catalytic agent (Ahmed, 1985; Khan, 1983; cited in Jamil, 2007, 34). However, this egalitarian approach could not work effectively as it was superimposed on the bureaucratic structure with strong norms of hierarchy (Jamil, 2007, 35). The V-AID programme was replaced in the 1960s by the Comilla model of rural development, in which the Thana (a local government tier) was the basic unit of rural development.

There were co-ordination problems in the bureaucracy. Comilla model of development addressed co-ordination problems by proposing Thana administration as the centre-point of rural development with all the branches of national departments in one building in order to ensure co-ordination between the villagers and the bureaucracy. Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development (BARD) was entrusted with the task of designing and implementing the Comilla Approach. The Comilla Approach consisted of four components (Khan, 1983, 209-210): Thana Training and Development Centre, Rural Works Programme, Thana Irrigation Project and Thana Central Co-operative Association.

The Comilla Model of development was unique in the sense that it followed a group approach in providing micro-credit to the co-operators. This model also aimed to bring
about changes in bureaucracy in terms of planning from below instead of the top-down approach (Jamil, 2007).

The Comilla model appeared to work under the intensive ‘laboratory conditions’ of the Comilla district, and attempts to ‘scale-up’ the model in 1970 as the IRDP (Integrated Rural Development Programme) across the country weakened its innovatory character (World Bank, 1996; cited in Jamil, 2007, 41). Later on, in 1982, IRDP was reconstituted as BRDB (Bangladesh Rural Development Board) as a solution to the conflicts that emerged between the IRDP and other agencies concerning control over the distribution of inputs. BRDB follows a targeted approach to providing credit, focusing on small and marginal farmers, whom it organises into cooperative societies (BRDB, 2013). BRDB has successfully institutionalized microcredit in the public sector (Nath, 2004).

Later, BARD introduced another concept called CVDP (Comprehensive Village Development Programme). Learning from the failure of the Comilla model, BARD aimed to establish the “missing link” of the Comilla Model. To do so, since 1975, BARD has been experimenting with a new idea on rural development, initially known as Total Village Development Programme (TVDP) based on “one village one organization”. Up to 1988, the project was implemented in phases, on a limited scale. The government, based on rigorous evaluation, identified the project as a successful model of rural development and recommended its replication nationwide. It was also adopted in the third five year plan under the name “Comprehensive Village Development Programme”. Major features of the programme are: a) one village, one cooperative and b) self-effort and self-help.

The 1990s saw a revival of the activities of the community based village organisation. The dream of the Comilla model was revived again by the government and was tried out in the Kishoreganj, a district, but faced the same destiny as before. It was a pilot project, funded by the UNDP. The fundamental challenge in such programmes is to overcome the deeply entrenched power structure and hierarchical patron-client nature of social relations typically present in the rural areas (World Bank, 2002). Its failure can also be attributed to the following of a non-targeted approach.
A second category of community development programmes is being pioneered by NGOs, which have been operating in Bangladesh with two major aims of alleviating rural poverty and empowering women (Ahsan Ullah and Routray, 2007).

The traditional philanthropic activities previously undertaken by village elites in times of natural disaster started to take structured shape in response to increasing poverty and pressing socio-economic scenario, leading to the specialised and formal organised structure that can be seen in contemporary NGOs operating in Bangladesh (BFF, 2002; Haider, 2011).

In the post-independence era, NGOs gained momentum. The war of liberation took a heavy toll. NGOs came forward to help the victims of the war by providing relief and rehabilitation. Haider (2011) observed that initially, they were involved in the distribution of clothing, medical service and food items. Subsequently, they extended their operations to sustainable development activities aimed at raising the socio-economic condition of the disadvantaged population (Ahsan Ullah and Routray, 2007).

McMichael’s (1996) term ‘NGOization’ is not untrue for Bangladesh. The reason for ‘NGOization’ can partly be attributed to donors’ increasing attention to the NGOs, whose success in helping the disadvantaged people of the rural areas gave confidence to various donors to use them for development purposes (UNDP, 2005).

NGOs now play an important role and have virtually grown into a movement (Jamil, 2007). According to Tvedt (1995, 1998; cited in Jamil, 2007, 136), in Bangladesh NGOs play important roles in social and political transformation, having become actors within wider socio-political environments. NGOs are spearheading social transformation based on a bottom-up approach. Haider (2011) notes that BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, Nijera Kori, ASA (Association for Social Advancement), Proshika Manobik Unnayan Kendra are some organisations that are in the forefront of this social transformation movement.

NGOs are contributing to community development in an impressive way. BRAC, which is the world’s largest NGO, offered an innovative low-cost solution, called home-made oral rehydration saline (ORS), for diarrhea treatment, leading to a decrease in child
mortality rate (Mahmud et al. 2008). The world renowned Grameen Bank’s micro-credit programme is so successful in alleviating the poverty of rural women that it has been replicated worldwide.

In short, the CDP model has two aspects: indigenous and Western. The indigenous part is rooted in its long tradition of philanthropic activities and also in religious and cultural values, as reflected earlier. The Western part is rooted in the American version of community development (Heginbotham, 1975), pioneered by Mayo and derived from the insights of the Human Relations School (Heginbotham, 1975, 45).

4.7 Post Independence Reforms: The Layering

As described in Chapter 3, a number of public administration reform committees/commissions were formed in independent Bangladesh. The donor bodies also supported essential governance reforms. The reforms that were initiated by the Government – to ensure continuity of government (CARC, 1971), structural change of bureaucracy (ASRC, 1972), strengthen the bureaucratic elite (NPC, 1976), review organization and personnel (MLC, 1982), decentralize administration (CARR, 1982), and make public administration effective and efficient based on NPM (PARC, 1997) have been slow to permeate various layers of resistant bureaucracy (paraphrased from Huque, 2010). Correspondingly, donors also made several attempts. Major donor funded reform reports are as follows:

Table 4.1 Major donor funded reform reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Report</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agency Involved</th>
<th>Main Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration Efficiency Studies</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Secretariat System, Relationship between Ministries, Departments and Corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report on Public Administration Sector Study in Bangladesh</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Public Administration Reform in the Government with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Emphasis on Specific Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards Better Government in Bangladesh (Four Secretaries Report)</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Administrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government That Works: Reforming the Public Sector</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Comprehensive Administrative Reform, Privatization, Reduced Levels of Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government in Bangladesh-An Agenda for Governance</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Local Government Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taming Leviathan- Reforming Governance in Bangladesh</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Governance reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration Reform in Bangladesh</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Civil Service Reform Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building a 21st Century Public Administration in Bangladesh</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Civil Service Reform Issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source: UNDP (2007)**

The above experiences with public sector reforms in Bangladesh have yielded little result. However, according to UNDP (2007), there are some recent developments that are really significant. These newer developments reflect the government’s obligation to poverty alleviation and its subscription to the Millennium Development Goals, which demand a shift in government spending towards the social sectors and hence, better governance. In its development strategies, the GoB has recognised that democratic governance and human rights are critical to the achievement of the MDGs. The setting up of National Human Rights Commission, Anti-Corruption Commission and Information Commission are important steps towards achieving this. Thus, of late, these small islands of excellence have started to impact on the public sector.
4.8 Theoretical Framework

Based on the above discussion, the theoretical framework of the study is depicted by the following diagram:

Figure 4.1 The Integrated Governance Framework

Based on Bevir & Rhodes (2003, 2010)
Theoretical Framework explained: Context refers to a unique country-specific system that absorbs and matches the donor agenda in terms of reality and relevance. Context is composed of external and internal elements. The world has become a global village and business has become global in character. Government organisations are also venturing beyond national boundaries in pursuit of business opportunities. A public leader works in a varied context. He can work well if he is updated with the changing environment. For example, currently, ideas that originated in the US are being designed in Bangladesh and put to practice in China. Winds of globalisation are affecting and being affected by both external and internal contexts.

Following Bevir & Rhodes (2010, 12), context is regarded as the wider web of beliefs embedded in a historical tradition. Actors respond to a situation within a web of beliefs embedded in inherited tradition. Thus, context refers to the public service leadership perspective embedded in the traditions of governance facing cut-throat competition from the diverse national and international interest of the stakeholders, the changing role of leadership in the public service and limited resources.

Four abstract concepts are: 1) traditions of governance 2) webs of belief 3) dilemma and 4) change.

Tradition refers to the country-specific governance tradition in which public sector leadership and public sector reform is embedded. Governance tradition is the overarching concept. Kaufman et al. (1999) described governance as “traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for [the] common good.” The bottom line is that bureaucracy as an institution forms a part of governance for the enhancement of governance quality. In defining the concept of good governance, the World Bank (1994) also termed bureaucracy as a part of governance framework and articulated that bureaucracy should be imbued with a professional ethos. Governance tradition is the combination of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. Painter and Peters (2010) state that traditions act as the foundation for understanding contemporary administrative systems. It is within the broader framework of governance traditions that the PSL and PSR should be viewed.
According to Bevir & Rhodes (2010, 16), “A tradition is the ideational background against which individuals come to adopt an initial web of beliefs”. The concept of ‘traditions’ explores the relationship between beliefs and action (Bevir & Rhodes, 1999, 2003, 2004; Rhodes, 2007; cited in Orr and Vince, 2009, 1). A governmental tradition is a set of inherited beliefs about the institutions and history of government (Bevir & Rhodes, 2003). These traditions help the PSL in their efforts to find different alternatives and solutions to the issues arising out of the ever-increasing complex governance process. These traditions give them a sense of norms, forms and reflexive views of the policy dilemmas. In the words of Orr and Vince (2009, 656):

“They can help build knowledge about which traditions support each other, and which exist in opposition, in ways that can inform the strategic choices of leaders and managers. Bringing together ... traditions for discussion and reflection can create dialectical ideas which can challenge dominant assumptions about the world in ways that unlock new ways of understanding, thinking or acting”.

Multiple traditions can help explain the link between both the similar traditions and the differing ones that in turn clarify and define the roles, relationships and boundaries in the governance process. I seek to explain the PSL and its culture in the light of traditions by reference to historical meanings understood as the beliefs of individual actors, i.e., beliefs of the public sector leaders, because, bureaucrats refer to past precedents and historical notions of governance that enable them better to manage their present-day circumstances (Bevir & Rhodes, 2010). Exploring PSL through historical notions and beliefs is important because bureaucratic behaviour is embedded within its country-specific traditions. Therefore, I place emphasis on interpreting governance actions and institutions to reveal how webs of belief informed by traditions construct them (Rhodes, 2005; Bevir & Rhodes; 2003; Bevir & Rhodes, 2010). Also, traditions are not static. Rather, PSL reinvents its traditions periodically when confronted with new dilemmas, leading to multiple traditions. I consider the ways in which important officials of the bureaucracy, articulate and proselytize about the traditions of bureaucracy (Parris, 1969, cited in Bevir and Rhodes, 2010, 3).

In this research, administrative culture is used synonymously with administrative traditions and cultural tradition. According to Yesilkagit (2010, 145), administrative
tradition is also referred to as ‘administrative culture’, ‘historical legacies’, ‘cultural–institutional context’.

Heginbotham (1975) also used the term ‘cultural tradition’ to denote a broad nexus of attitudes, values, and social institutions (p.10). Thus, administrative culture and administrative traditions both feed each other and can be used synonymously.

Heginbotham (1975) researched the roots of Indian administration between 1967 and 1968, a time, when Bangladesh formed a part of India. His research findings on public administration of Eastern India are applicable to present-day Bangladesh. Bangladesh public administration also evolved according to a hybrid set of traditions of governance that are partly inherited from the ‘Samaj’ (village life/society) (Jamil, 2007) informing administrative culture and partly rooted in British colonial rule (Heginbotham, 1975) that it still bears. Bangladesh’s colonial past has heavily influenced its political culture as well as its bureaucratic and political institutions. It is also partly learnt through administrative reforms by international donors.

*Webs of belief* are formed against the background of tradition (Bevir & Rhodes, 2010). However, traditions can change as situated agency is self-reflective. Traditions are inherited webs of beliefs rather than static concepts; they are evolving. Individuals have the capacity to change traditions when confronted with dilemmas. Actions are explained by reference to the beliefs and desires of actors, i.e., webs of beliefs construct political actions and institutions. In this research, PSL beliefs are important because they are essential data in any analysis of the public service, its traditions, and its reform (ibid, 2010). Because modern governments irrespective of their ideology and mental make-up depend on bureaucracy for initiating and implementing programmes of socio-economic development (Siddiquee, 1999).

The research explores bureaucratic belief systems, practices and attitudes about public sector reforms by examining how they respond to and match the donor agenda vis-à-vis their dual role of protecting traditional socio-economic system, culture and values and developing the institutional basis when handling reforms. It does so by decentering institutions using webs of beliefs as a means of capturing beliefs and practices, and history as a means of explaining such beliefs and practices (Rhodes, 2005). By using the beliefs of PSL, I intend to unpack the ideas that inform the changing actions and
practices of governance. I also plan to explore the beliefs and meanings through which PSL construct their world, including the ways they understand their location, the norms that affect them, and their interests (Bevir et al., 2003).

*The idea of dilemma* is integral to Bevir and Rhodes’ (2003, 2010) interpretive approach. They state that a dilemma arises for an individual or institution when a new idea stands in opposition to his/her existing beliefs and practices that necessitates a reconsideration or alteration to the existing ones. It can be called a ‘new belief’. It points to the fact that dilemmas arise in response to the new development in the big picture. Dilemmas seem to be prevalent in the public service as it is concerned with continuous contestation of public purposes. Also, the complexity of maximising public value emerges within the pluralist societies in which differences of culture, lifestyles and values proliferate. Such pluralism places public organisations at the intersection of conflicting needs and alternative definitions of common good (Hogget, 2006, 176). Dilemmas in the public service are unavoidable as the stakeholders of public service are varied and their interests and demands are conflicting.

The Dilemma of public bureaucracy has also been spelled out by Wildavsky (1988, 755):

Civil servants are faced with conflicting tasks; on one hand they must maintain a separation from society or risk becoming dupes of a particular interest or class; on the other hand, they must still appear to represent society or risk undermining the state as legitimate in the eyes of the public.

Public servants are supposed to uphold the public interest. Yet they do not know what the public interest is, given that there is a scenario of conflicting interests. There are competing interests as there are vested interest groups and lobbyists at work in the society. On the one hand they are supposed to be neutral and on the other, they are supposed to represent. Preserving the integrity of the state and yet to be representative; expecting to be neutral and at the same time required to join the alliance — these classic dilemmas are frequently faced by the Bangladeshi administrative leaders now-a-days.
Not only do the administrative leaders have to deal with the inherent policy tensions noted above but also they have to discharge duties in an increasingly emerging and blurry set of inter-relationships between the state and the stakeholders whose demands are often overlapping. In Bangladesh, bureaucracy is seen as impervious to political rule. It is accused of being unresponsive and not people-oriented. In the case of inexperienced political leadership, bureaucracy plays dominant role in policy-making, although it is supposed to serve the political masters. Therefore, the dilemmas of Bangladeshi bureaucracy is that it is neither trusted by the political leadership nor held in high esteem by the mass people. The elitist nature of present bureaucracy, a direct legacy from the British Raj, is responsible for creating the distance between the mass people and the bureaucracy.

The dilemmas go a long way towards explaining the concerns of the administrative leaders in terms of public administration reforms and the role of donors. In this context, my research dilemmas are how administrative leaders respond to and match the donor agenda vis-à-vis their dual role of protecting traditional socio-economic system, cultural and political norms and values and developing the institutional basis when handling reforms (woven through the thesis). Bevir and Rhodes (2010) also suggest that it is through reference to dilemmas that change in traditions can be understood significantly.

*Change* is the outcome of the dilemmas if not the solution (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010). This change occurs when people confront dilemmas in terms of new situations or events. It is the key to explaining changes in traditions (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010, 2003). Change thus involves a pushing and pulling of a dilemma and a tradition to bring them together (Bevir et al., 2003, 2010). People only embrace change when they face uncertainty with the present situation and find better alternatives. Change and reforms cannot be initiated unless there are incentives. If modernisation programmes are imposed or forced, they cannot be implemented due to the problem of ownership. Public sector reforms are supposed to be initiated by the local PSLs who face the incentives for embracing such programmes. Brunsson and Olsen (1993) also emphasise the role of senior managers in an organisation in shaping the internal culture and values of the organisation/institution and producing change. In this study, only genuine reforms can be defined as change that either produces an improvement in services or a noticeable change in the relationship between institutions of the state and the citizens: hence a reform that changes the way in
which civil servants are paid, that has no impact on services or on the way those civil servants relate to the citizens, would not be counted as a genuine reform (European Commission, 2009, 12).

Also, managing change is essential for reforms to be sustained. In 2007, UNDP conducted a study on reform in the public service of Bangladesh. UNDP (2007) suggested that various changes are essential and desirable in the near future, with a clear focus on managing change. It is also found that countries benefit more from change they are prepared for, than change that is imposed on them.

In view of the above, the change dilemma is then: Does changes have to be organic and rooted in the administrative tradition, or can it be planned and imposed?

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) provided for three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change: mimesis, coercive isomorphism and normative pressures. Because of coercive isomorphism and normative pressures Bangladeshi PSL is facing increasing concern, both internally and externally, regarding embracing more change, as citizen expectations and demands of government keep on increasing. The stakeholders expect effective and efficient service delivery without any failure while their demands are varied and overlapping. It is also equally important for the Bangladeshi government to focus on managing change. If administrative culture, bureaucratic behaviour, and the issues relating to conduct are not much changed, implementing public administration reform would be a futile exercise. External reform attempts would also result in half-hearted efforts.

Taking cognizance of the above accounts, I explore the change dilemmas to see which way Bangladeshi public sector reforms and change are heading. Is it supply-driven (donor-driven) or demand-driven? Or is the Bangladeshi government adopting a mixed approach towards public sector reforms?

Extent of adoption of PSR means the implementation level of the reforms in the light of the public sector environment. The demand for reforms in the public sector and the extent of implementation are clearly reliant on the factors discussed above. Since its independence, a number of public sector reforms have been field-tested in Bangladesh.
In this case, apart from the domestic requirement, developing countries are largely influenced by the developed countries i.e., the donors. Bangladesh is no exception. Whether the adoption of PSR is need-driven or imposed upon by the donors will be examined here. According to Polidano (2001), most reforms in government fail. This is because, once implemented, they yield unsatisfactory outcomes. This is because they never get past the implementation stage at all. They are blocked outright or put into effect only in a tokenistic, half-hearted fashion. Hence, why reforms mostly fail will be addressed.

Having explained the framework, I now clarify some similar terms. Scholars use a variety of terms such as public sector, core public sector, and extended public sector so and so forth. It is not uncommon to find literature using public sector reforms (PSR) and Public administration reforms (PAR) interchangeably, because public administration refers to:

The aggregate machinery (policies, rules, procedures, systems, organizational structures, personnel, etc.) funded by the state budget and in charge of the management and direction of the affairs of the executive government, and its interaction with other stakeholders in the state, society and external environment

(UNDP, p.1, n.d.)

However, the scope of PSR is broader, as it includes the PAR. Olson (1996) defines the public sector as an overarching term, encompassing national and local government, different services provided by the public, as well as public utilities and companies. In the same vein, Mansour (2008) posits that the public sector is the entity that is entrusted with the delivery of goods and services by and for the government at the national, regional or local levels. In their PSR matrix, Hemerijck et al. (2002, 24-25) showed how functions of public administration as a component of ‘organisational regime’ fall under the purview of clusters of reform in the public sector. However, in this research both PSR and PAR will be used to denote the same thing — reform programmes in the system of government, because I put within public administration every conceivable part of the public sector (Rosenbloom 1986, cited in Nasrullah, 2005, 197).
4.9 Conclusion

The chapter argued that traditions shape reforms and vice versa. Thus, it provided a non-essentialist view of governance traditions. It concluded that Bangladeshi public administration is a result of the interaction between traditional and modern administrative norms and practices. The ‘traditional’ part consists of the Samaj, the legacy of Mughal and British colonial rule and the ‘modern part’ consists of the public reforms. The incongruities and inconsistency between Samaj and the colonial bureaucratic notion reflects differences in Bangladeshi and Western approaches to organisation. Hence, there are tensions inherent in the governance traditions of Bangladesh – the ancient tradition of Samaj versus colonial rule. Further impact comes from post-independence innovation and adaptation through modernisation programmes aiming to lead the country to new development. Thus, there are strong undercurrents towards hybridisation. The theoretical framework developed in this chapter also depicts the importance of the elite actors’ beliefs embedded in traditions, in the shaping of reforms.
PART III: THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Part three contains two chapters. It starts with Chapter 5, which addresses the paradigmatic issues of the research and knowledge inquiry. Eventually, it narrows down to the discussion of the epistemological and ontological aspects of the research. The research strategies, approaches and methodological choice are also justified in this chapter. Accordingly, Chapter 6 directs us to the discussion of actual conduct of data collection and analysis.
Chapter 5: The Research Methodology: Steps in the Research Process

Signpost

This chapter illustrates the philosophical approach behind the research and the choice of research design adopted in this study. It explains the logical linkage between the ontology, epistemology, theoretical perspective, methodology and methods within the study. Then it goes on to deal with the steps taken in the research process, including the overarching research philosophy, research paradigm and the justification for the choices made. Subsequently, I focus on why I chose case study as a research strategy, covering the methodological aspects of case study research. Finally, this chapter explains the data collection framework, including the methods, techniques and data sources.

5.1 Introduction

This chapter illustrates the research philosophy based on the epistemological and ontological assumptions made in the context of the three research questions and research problem stated in Chapter 1. Epistemological choice and paradigms are determined by the research questions (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; cited in Koro-Ljungberg et al. 2009, 694) and directly inform the research methodology. Therefore, at the outset I constructed my case study research instrument and kept it flexible. Then I conducted a pilot case study in order to finalise my case study protocol, which informed my research questions and case study research design as a whole. I had a loose and broad set of research issues that I shared with the respondents. Discussion with respondents contributed to the narrowing down of the loosely developed issues and gave the investigation a proper shape. The feedback obtained from the pilot case study was helpful in reviewing the appropriateness of my questions, and in re-wording and reframing a number of my questions.

In explaining the philosophical assumptions underpinning this research, this chapter presents an overview of the overall tradition of the research enquiry so as to give an understanding of the chosen paradigm, meta theoretical assumptions, key methodological considerations, research approach, axiological issues and also the data collection strategies of this study, as a basis for understanding the more applied side of the chosen research methodology.
5.2 Steps in the Research Process

5.2.1 Philosophy of Science

In the research process, the philosophical basis is central. It is also true that in research, there are two types of relationship between theory and the research: whether theory guides the research (deductive approach) or whether theory is a result of the research (inductive approach) (Bryman and Bell, 2007). Thus, there are two major approaches to theory development, deductive theory testing and inductive theory building (Bonoma, 1985; Parkhe, 1993; Romano, 1989).

Literature reveals that philosophy of science deals with the nature of truth, knowledge, science, and reality, and informs a range of paradigms. Epistemology, ontology, theoretical perspective, methodology and methods are all logically interlinked. Putting them together without differentiation would lead to weak philosophical foundation. According to Crotty (1998), putting them together without differentiation is a bit like putting tomato sauce, condiments and groceries in one basket. They need to be related to one another, rather than merely set side by side as comparable.

Research philosophy is like the foundation on which entire research rests. If the foundation is weak, research will appear random and uninformed. Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) point out that knowledge of research philosophy helps the researcher to recognize which designs will work and which will not. Embodied within the philosophy of science are beliefs or assumptions regarding ontology, epistemology, axiology, rhetorical structure, and methodology (Creswell, 1998; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; cited in Ponterotto, 2005, 127). In this research, the choice of a particular philosophical perspective has been governed by four factors depicted in the figure: 5.1
Five philosophical assumptions lead to a researcher’s choice of research: ontology, epistemology, axiology, rhetorical and methodological assumptions (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Creswell, 2007; Guba & Lincoln 1994; cited in Ponterotto, 2005, 127). My philosophical assumptions/paradigmatic position are depicted in Figure: 5.2
Figure 5.2 A holistic view of my philosophical assumptions/paradigmatic position

### 5.2.2 Ontology: Beliefs about Physical and Social Reality

The basic ontological divide concerns whether the reality to be investigated is objective, external and singular, and hence independent of the humans who observe it or whether reality is multiple and exists through human cognition, based on sense-making processes. The ontological issue is highly important, “because ontology generates theories about what can be known (epistemology), how knowledge can be produced (methodology), and what research practices can be employed (methods)”, as Raadschelders (2011, 920) observed.

My study is concerned with the lived experience of the public sector leaders or their life world, an approach called phenomenology (van Manen, 1997). A phenomenologist
advocates the need to consider human beings’ interpretations, and their perceptions of the life-worlds in understanding social phenomena. Therefore, the ontological assumptions of interpretive-phenomenology are that social reality is seen by multiple people, who interpret events differently, resulting in multiple perspectives of an incident (Ernest, 1994; Mack, 2010) informed by influences received from societal conventions, history and interaction with others (Talja et al., 2005, 81). In line with Heidegger, Sandberg (2005) comments that in phenomenological research, reality is not only mediated through the lived experience, it is also mediated through the specific culture, historical time, and language in which we are situated. Therefore, there are multiple viewpoints on ‘truth’ based on different culture, historicity and linguistic understanding, which can never be static. The constructivist framework of this study views human experience as framed in terms of descriptions of life experiences because “we live in our stories, not statistics” (Gilbert, 2002, 223). Evoking their experiences in their own words can best access the meaning that is embedded in the experiences of the selected key informants (Tashakori & Teddlie, 1998).

Thus, the ontological assumption is of an intersubjective reality constructed from subjective and objective meaning, represented by the conceptions of actors (Gephart, 1999; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Reality in this research is influenced by the context, namely, the respondent’s lived experience and process of perceiving, the social environment, and the interaction between the respondents and the research (Ponterotto, 2005). These intersubjective realities perfectly match social constructivism (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010) – the chosen ontology. At the ontological level, there is a belief in multiple, socially constructed realities. The researcher seeks to get to the reality by grasping knowledge from multiple view-points of truth (Lincoln & Guba, 2000) in a changing context in ministries, in divisions from junior public leaders to policy level, i.e., in the real life setting. As Bengtsson (1989; cited in Sandberg, 2005, 47) points out, the life-world is the subjects’ experience of reality, at the same time it is objective in the sense that it occurs in an intersubjective world. We share the reality with others (subjects) in order to make sense out of it based on our experiences, leading to the constitution of agreed intersubjective realities. Different individuals have different experiences of reality. Eventually, the joint construction of individual subjects’ realities results in intersubjective reality happening in the objective world. The life-world is objective because it transcends and goes beyond the qualities of the subject, i.e. subjects’
lived experience of it. Sandberg (2005) also reasons that the qualities of life-world are not exclusively attached to the subjects’ lived experience of it. At the same time, however, it is inseparable from the subjects through their experience of it. Sandberg (2005, 48) cited an example to explain this intersubjective reality:

“…most European countries ... have daylight saving and move the clock 1 hour ahead for the period from March to October. Daylight saving thus becomes an objective fact through this intersubjective agreement. Even if some of us try to ignore the agreed daylight saving time, we encounter difficulty in doing so because its consequences extend beyond our subjective experience of clock time”.

Thus, the constructivist ontology is interdependent or co-dependent, representing intersubjective reality. Again, in oriental countries this reality (daylight saving) is different, because their life world goes beyond the subjective lived experience of the Western countries. It all boils down to the fact that social reality is relativist based on intersubjective agreement pointing to multiple truths.

Anti-foundationalism upholds social constructivist ontology. Social constructivism also feeds into anti-foundational analyses of social explanation (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010). The main tenet of social constructivism is that it is through human actions that the social world is made: in turn, human actions also reflect beliefs, concepts, languages, and discourses that themselves are social constructs. So, one is influencing and being influenced by the other. The interaction between the two results in the construction of the reality based on meaning holism i.e., that our concepts are not simply given to us by the world as it is. Rather, we build them in part by drawing on our prior theories in an attempt to categorize, explain, and narrate our experiences (ibid, 2010).

5.2.3 Epistemology: Beliefs about Knowledge

In this research, constructionism is the chosen epistemology. It is worth mentioning that constructionism and social constructionism in this research denote the same meaning and will be used interchangeably. Social constructionism is briefly called constructionism (Sanna et al., 2005). Crotty (1998) is also of the view that constructionism and social constructionism are the same thing and instead he
distinguished between social constructionism and constructivism when he commented: “It would seem important to distinguish accounts of constructionism where this social dimension of meaning is at centre stage from those where it is not. Using ‘constructionism’ for the former and ‘constructivism’ for the latter has echoes in the literature” (Crotty, 1998, 57). Constructivism sees meaning making as more an individual than a social process (Raskin, 2002, 2006). In contrast, (social) constructionism makes relationships, rather than individuals, the locus of study: meaning-making is seen as a collaborative process, not traceable to particular individuals (Burr, 1995; Gergen, 1991; Raskin, 2008). It is not uncommon to find literature using constructionism and constructivism interchangeably because both see human meanings as constructed frameworks rather than direct reflections of the real (Raskin, 2008). Nevertheless, there is a subtle difference between them. The basic contention of the constructionist argument is that reality is socially constructed by and between the persons who experience it (Gergen, 1999). Following Crotty (1998), my knowledge claim is that meanings are constructed by human beings as they engage with the world they are interpreting with the notion of ‘intentionality’, a concept borrowed from the phenomenology and invoked by Brentano (1973, cited in Crotty, 1998, 44). One of the reasons behind the epistemological choice being constructionism is intentionality, because, I intend to become conscious in my efforts to know the true colour of PSL in terms of challenges posed by donors’ reform initiatives. Constructionism mirrors the concept of ‘intentionality’. Intentionality helps to develop the relationship between the conscious subject and the object of the subject’s consciousness. Interaction between the subject and the object forms the basis of knowledge for the researcher (Crotty, 1998). I do not impose meaning on the ‘object’ – that is mere subjectivism. As a constructionist, I bring together the ideas of objective reality and a subjective interpretation of it into a single perspective (Ospina and Sorenson, 2006). Thus, meaning here results from the interplay of subject and object. Therefore, my research draws on intersubjectivity and dialogism in particular moments and particular settings in which meaning emerges in the interaction and struggle of back-and-forth conversation between people (Bakhtin, 1986; Cunliffe, 2011).

As this is a qualitative study, getting close to the participants was my prime concern. Therefore, I conducted the study in the field – where the participants work and live
One of my epistemological assumptions was the importance of reducing the distance between the participants and me as a researcher.

Moreover, as my research deals with public sector leadership, a constructionist view suits best, since a constructionist view holds that our understanding of leadership is socially constructed over time as individuals interact with one another, rather than being something embodied in individuals or possessed by them (Ospina and Sorenson, 2006). It is relatively recently that leadership scholars have held that the phenomenon of leadership emerges from the constructions and actions of people in organisations. This constructionist lens views leadership as a collective achievement and the property of a group (Ospina and Schall, 2001), which resonates with the epistemology of public sector leadership.

A closer look at the purpose and the research questions of the study reveal that ultimately it deals with the leadership role and policies of the government – policies of the governance reforms; policies that are compatible in a unique administrative and cultural context; policies of how to cope with donor-influenced public sector reform agenda. These policies are, in fact, social constructions. According to Schneider et al. (1993), social constructions become embedded in policy as messages that are absorbed by citizens and affect their orientations and participation patterns. Policy sends signals about what government is supposed to do, which citizens deserve.

Furthermore, Raadschelders (2011, 918) commented that “......government in its multiple relationships with society — attracts interest from scholars across the social sciences.” My research, in a broader sense, deals with the government – governance process, including the reforms agenda, the public institutions and machinery of the government in its relationships with multiple stakeholders, i.e., the society as whole. Therefore, epistemologically, I construct knowledge from multiple view-points. The bottom line is my ontological assumptions have profoundly impacted on my epistemological assumptions, i.e., epistemological position is closely bound up with my ontological assumptions.

Interpretive research holds that knowledge of reality is a social construction by human actors. Hence, in investigating that reality, researchers interact with the human subjects
of the enquiry, changing the perceptions of both the parties based on intersubjectivity rather than objectivity (Walsham, 2006). Epistemological assumptions underlying the interpretive tradition are couched in phenomenology, which considers lived experience as the basis of human interaction.

Anti-foundationalism, a doctrine in the philosophy of knowledge, asserts that we cannot provide knowledge with secure foundations in either pure experiences or pure reason (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010). The chosen epistemology is underpinned by this doctrine of anti-foundationalism, which argues that concepts, meanings, and beliefs do not have a one-to-one correspondence with objects in the world, but rather form webs (ibid, 2010). Our past experiences impact on what we experience and it cannot occur in splendid isolation.

This doctrine of anti-foundationalism is perfectly compatible with the constructionist epistemology, as the most obvious implications of anti-foundationalism are perhaps meaning holism and anti-representationalism (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010). My research draws on intersubjectivity and dialogism in particular moments and particular setting, recognising that our prior theories prevent our concepts from directly representing objects.

5.2.4 Research Paradigm/Theoretical Perspective: A Closer Look at Mini Paradigm

It is not uncommon for authors to use the terms ‘paradigm’ and ‘theoretical perspective’ interchangeably. For example, Crotty (1998) prefers to use the term theoretical perspective in place of paradigm. A paradigm or theoretical perspective can be defined as a “set of interrelated assumptions about the social world which provides a philosophical and conceptual framework for the organized study of that world” (Filstead, 1979, 34). The paradigm selected serves as a guide to the researcher in selecting philosophical assumptions about the research and also in selecting tools, instruments, participants, and methods used in the study (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). In research, a researcher faces a basic question while selecting the theoretical perspective: should the research begin with a theory, or should a theory itself result from the research? So a
general paradigm of enquiry underpins two major approaches to theory development: inductive discovery and deductive theory testing (Bonoma, 1985; Parkhe, 1993; Romano, 1989). The difference between the two approaches can be viewed in terms of deductive approach representing the positivist paradigm and the inductive approach representing the phenomenological and interpretive paradigm (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991).

However, “...interpretivism is a rather broad stance that encompasses a number of more specifically defined theoretical perspectives”, as observed Koro-ljungberg et al., (2009, 694). To be more specific the paradigm followed in this research is interpretive-phenomenology. The interpretivist paradigm is profoundly influenced by phenomenology. A phenomenologist advocates the need to consider human beings’ interpretations, and their perceptions of the life-worlds in understanding social phenomena. Phenomenology deals with evidences from life-world. According to Husserl (1970, 126), life-worldly evidence does not merely function as an indispensable but otherwise irrelevant station that we must pass through on the way toward exact knowledge; rather, it is a permanent source of meaning and evidence. The life-world is a construction, an outcome of our response to the stimuli we receive from physical reality (Overgaard and Zahavi, 2009). In other words, phenomenology explicitly attempts to combine both subjectivity and objectivity. Interpretive-phenomenology inquiry insists on understanding sociality in its most fundamental form as intersubjectivity (Zahavi, 2001). It emphasises understanding the social world through an examination of the interpretation of that world by its participants with the focus on sense-making by both participant and researcher (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; Bryman and Bell, 2007).

As an interpretive researcher, I understand that my research action and conducts affect the research objects I am studying. I am also aware that the research objects, in turn, affect me. I as a researcher and the research object are interdependent (Weber et al., 2004). Interpretive studies assume that people create and associate their own subjective and intersubjective meanings as they interact with the world around them (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991). Similarly, in management and organisational study, new organisational theories are often derived from the sense-making process spawned through the researcher’s engagement in conducting an in-depth phenomenological
inquiry in the real setting (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Bryman and Bell, 2007). Here, as a researcher my aim is understanding and reconstruction. Reconstruction “refers to the multiple and evolving mental constructions that constitute the knowledge of individuals and groups, including the constructions of both the researcher and the participants in the research” (Guba & Lincoln 1994, 113). Thus, it involves a two-way communication between the researchers and the participants based on their own understanding, position and role. Moreover, the thematic issue in “Phenomenological approaches to work, life and responsibility” has special implication for my research. Since, it was founded by Husserl (1859-1938), phenomenology believes that truth and knowledge can emerge from people’s lived experiences and Husserl himself articulated the basic ideas for an analysis of lived experience (Fay and Riot, 2007). However, my research does not use ‘bracketing’ advanced by Husserl. Rather, I follow the Heideggerian path, which uses self-reflection. Heidegger articulated that we function within a web of relations with tools to which people assign purposes; we interact with the world as tempered by the past and our own experience with the world, and project what we will do and be in the future; our meanings are not constructed as individual thinkers without relation to other people; our understanding and interpretation of the world is co-constituted and synergistic (Conroy, 2003). The anti-foundationalist doctrine of Bevir and Rhodes (2010) seems to resonate with the Heideggerian approach. According to Bevir and Rhodes (2010), it is through human actions that the social world is made. In turn, human actions also reflect beliefs, concepts, languages, and discourses that themselves are social constructs. Bevir and Rhodes (2010) also assert that we cannot have pure experiences, our concepts and propositions cannot refer to the world in splendid isolation. Heidegger believed that bracketing assumptions of the world is simply impossible, but rather that through authentic reflection individuals can become aware of many assumptions. Heidegger believed that nothing can be encountered without reference to a person’s background understanding (Laverty, 2003). Koch (1995) described this as an indissoluble unity between a person and the world. Meaning is emerged as we are constructed by the world while at the same time we are constructing this world from our own experiences. There is a transaction between the individual and the world as they constitute and are constituted by each other (Munhall, 1989; Laverty, 2003). To Heidegger, human beings are inescapably grounded in ‘historicity’ and ‘facticity’, which underpin the notion that each being can understand the world from where they are, a point which is temporal. Each being is a being in the world and cannot
step out of the world to view something. Consequently, Heidegger moved away from ‘eidetic’ or ‘phenomenological’ reduction. Phenomenology was reinterpreted by Heidegger as interpretive (Ray, 1994).

My interpretive-phenomenological stance follows the Heideggerian tradition. Considering the above, in my research, bracketing assumptions and the experiences are impossible, as bracketing leads to reductionism. I did not enter the field empty-handed. I did not empty myself of my past knowledge in terms of my working in the public sector. I place emphasis on the constructed nature of knowledge and truth. My analysis is based on the quotations from the public sector leaders/senior civil servants to support the argument (Plowden, 1994; Kellner & Crowther-Hunt, 1980; Rhodes, 2005).

It is understood that my research revolves around leadership role and governance reforms that are essentially organisational phenomena reflecting human views, perceptions, visualisations, and exploration based on life-worldly experience which is a permanent source of meaning and evidence (Husserl, 1970, 126). Hence it is compatible, beyond doubt, with the interpretive-phenomenological paradigm (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Collis and Hussey, 2003). Moreover, leadership is relational and systematic, emergent, contextual and socially constructed, which has implications for the constructionist view (Ospina and Sorenson, 2006) and thus for the interpretive-phenomenological paradigm.

Finally, the interpretive-phenomenological paradigm is ideally suited in this case as I research the phenomenon of PSL by obtaining from the leaders’ own experience their perceptions of leadership and leading (Patton, 2002) with self-reflection underpinned by constructionism (Ospina and Sorenson, 2006) in the context of governance reforms. I commenced my ‘purposeful conversations’ (Kahn & Cannel, 1957, 149) with public sector leaders working in the similar offices to the one I work at. Qualitative research approaches recommend researchers to get close to their informants to have a subjective involvement in research processes. However, I perceived that, as Sprague (2005) argued, getting too close to them at times raises the risk of limiting their willingness to disclose unfavourable information. I maintained a suitable closeness based on my judgement, which enabled fair sharing of their lived experiences. This definition given by Wolff (2002) perfectly addresses my phenomenological-interpretive stance: phenomenological
research emphasizes the lived experience of both the research participants and the researchers. For research participants, the lived experience is that of the phenomenon being studied.

5.2.5 Axiology

Axiology concerns the role of the researchers’ values in the scientific process, i.e., the philosophical consideration of value (Ponterotto, 2005; Geach, 1976). The interpretive approach towards the relationship between theory and practice is that the researcher can never assume a value-neutral stance. Researchers’ prior assumptions, beliefs and values always intervene to shape their investigations (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991). In the same vein, Creswell writes, “[A]ll researchers bring values to a study, but qualitative researchers … make explicit those values. This … axiological assumption … characterizes qualitative research” (Creswell, 2007, 18).

Hence, in terms of axiology, my research is value-laden as it is determined by human beliefs and experience (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). My prior beliefs, dilemmas and values greatly shape this research. I assume that I cannot have pure experiences because my experiences are laden with prior values and webs of beliefs formed against the local tradition (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010). In other words, I have ‘a priori’ public sector leadership views, beliefs and working experience regarding the challenge of implementing reform initiatives. I bring with me my own set of prior beliefs and values, based on which I interact with the respondents with the notion of self-reflexivity and intentionality. As my research is based on an interdependent researcher–participant interaction, it is a fallacy to even think that I can eliminate value biases (Ponterotto, 2005).

5.2.6 Rhetorical Assumptions in Qualitative Research

Rhetoric is concerned with the writing style. Rhetorical structure and assumptions are informed by one’s chosen epistemology and the axiological stance. Ponterotto (2005, 132) posited: “[R]hetoric refers to the language used to present the procedures and results of research to one’s intended audience”. I follow the rhetorical assumption that writing needs to be personal and literary (Creswell, 2003, 2009). Like many other
Qualitative researchers, I emphasise the use of “thick description” and generous use of verbatim quotations, that is, the participants’ own words, to illustrate the reality of the natural setting (Fettermann, 1989), which includes my own interpretation as well (Creswell, 2009). Hence, my rhetorical stance is personalised and interactive.

Qualitative methods are known for providing labels and names for their aspects. Language use and labels are vital for qualitative methods (Greckhamer & Koro-Ljungberg 2005; Gubrium & Holstein, 1997). In my research, along with the use of the first person there is ample use of metaphors. Scholars also support literary forms of writing such as the use of metaphors, the use of first-person ‘I’, and a focus on stories (Creswell, 2009; Clandinin and Connelly, 2000). The use of the personal pronoun, ‘I’, also denotes that I take responsibility for my research philosophy and findings.

5.2.7 Research Approach: Reasoning

Obviously, my research approach in this study is inductive. This study is not designed to test any hypothesis. This research employs an exploratory multiple case study approach based on inductive reasoning that is embedded in the interpretive-phenomenological theoretical perspective. It moves from specific to general. Accordingly, case studies are a unique way of looking at the real life world inductively based on contextual generalisation. The interest is in contexts rather than variables.

I explore public sector leadership traditions, dilemmas, values and beliefs where culture forms a key consideration. The interpretive-phenomenological theoretical perspective is perfectly compatible with inductive reasoning. The inductive approach allows research findings to emerge from the significant themes grounded in raw data by reading the transcripts recurrently for possible meaning, without the restraints imposed by structured methodologies; these data are then conceptualised into broad themes after discussion (Jain & Ogden, 1999; Marshall, 1999). In my research, transcripts were read repeatedly to accommodate emerging themes. My intention was to develop themes from the data and categorise them into the major themes to aid an understanding of meaning-construction.
5.3 Research Methodology: Justification of Case Study Research

Three factors determine the best research methodology:

- The types of research questions to be answered
- The extent of control over behavioural events
- The degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events (Yin, 2003, 2009).

My research questions start by addressing the most burning issue of the day – PSL in the changing context of public sector reforms. Issues like leadership are social issues that are complex and in constant change. Therefore, Patton et al (2003) rightly observed that case studies offer the opportunity for a holistic view of a process as opposed to a reductionist-fragmented view. I cannot manipulate it as it is in the real-life setting embedded in change. When the researcher does not have control over events, the use of experiments as a method is ruled out. So, given the combination of ‘how’ questions in my research, a real-life setting, a contemporary focus, and events that are outside my control, an exploratory holistic multiple case study is the preferred research strategy here. Yin articulated that case study is useful when ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are asked within a contemporary context over which the researcher has little or no control (2003, 2009).

However, case study research has limitations. It has been criticised as being time-consuming and longitudinal, requiring proficient interviewers and it is noted that care is a must in drawing general conclusions from a limited number of case studies and in ensuring precise outcomes. Case study is also observed of producing a massive amount of documentation (Karlsson, 2002; Yin, 2003, 2009).

The advantages, on the other hand, are that the findings of case study research can lead to the development of new theory (Yin, 2009). Also, it is a scholarly inquiry whose underlying purpose is to create new knowledge (Herling et al., 2000). Thus, it has the ability to generate theory. Hence, when existing theories are partial, or could only
portray part of the phenomena under the study, case study method would make important contribution (Otley and Berry, 1994). Since I adopted a multiple case study approach, a cross case analysis would generate analytic generalisation (Yin, 2003, 2009).

The present research employs exploratory multiple case study. There are two ways to learn how to build a house. One can study the construction of many houses – perhaps a large subdivision or even hundreds of thousands of houses. Or one can study the construction of a particular house. The first approach is a cross-case method. The second is a within-case method (Gerring, 2007, 1). Multiple case studies give me the freedom to have the advantages of both cross-case analysis and within-case analysis, although this definition draws a dividing line between the cross-case method and the within-case method. A qualitative, inductive and multi-case study seeks to build abstractions across cases (Merriam, 1998) since they allow replication among individual cases.

In my research, obviously the choice of methodology is dependent on the choice of paradigm. Particular use of methodology is something that is linked to theoretical perspective (Crotty, 1998). According to Mingers et al. (1997, 490), “…a methodology will .. embody the philosophical assumptions and principles of the paradigm”. Accordingly, my methodology has been informed by my philosophical assumptions. To ensure that the choice of methodology is justifiable and suitable I have considered the importance of paradigm choice (Creswell, 2003).

Case study is the favoured methodology throughout my research, as it allows for a focus on how individuals make sense of, and understand their environment (Easterby Smith et al. 2002). It is also particularly conducive to the interpretivist orientation in which priority is given to obtaining rich and sensitive data, whilst allowing for both deductive and inductive approaches to theory building (Miles and Huberman, 1994).

This research aims to seek multiple constructed realities from the public sector leaders to gain a rich understanding of their roles in coping with donors’ pressure for reform initiatives in a particular administrative-cultural setting. This case study research facilitates interaction about organisational and social worlds and captures the understanding of the actors from within, thus enabling me to capture multiple
constructed realities (Parker, 2007). Hence, ‘interpretations of interpretations’ underpin the case study method suggesting some absolute reality (Scapens and Roberts, 1993, 2).

Case study research provides for understanding complex social phenomena, allowing the researchers to retain meaningful and holistic characteristics of real-life events (Yin, 2003). This statement by Yin perfectly justifies the approach adopted here, as leadership is a social phenomenon. Case study research strategy is suitable to exploring complex social phenomena that require working with people and appreciating real life experiences and where the researcher seeks to understand research problems by reflecting, probing and revising meanings, structures and issues (Hirschman, 1986; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Accordingly, I adopted the multiple exploratory case study via an inductive approach in an attempt to develop new aspects of the existing theory in the area of public Sector leadership which is embedded in the social system and has a role set for the society.

Case study enables a profound understanding of the subjects, which would not be possible using survey method. This is because of the smaller distance between the researcher and the subject (Kasanen et al, 1993; Parker, 2007). Positivism leads to reductionism, which tends to compartmentalise reality into a structured immobility that no longer remains a genuine reality. Fixing an engine may be best approached in this way, but fine-tuning a harmonium would not be. Further, leadership is a social and psychological process (Parry, 1998). Social issues are emerging and have context-sensitivities that require much broader research strategy than the reductionist-compartmentalised view. Case study is appropriate for context-based research like leadership as Flyvbjerg (2006) comments that case study produces context-dependent knowledge. Yin (2003, 2009) also asserts that one uses the case study because one deliberately wants to cover the contextual conditions highly pertinent to the phenomenon of study, where the context is not divorced from the phenomenon. This is the case here, since public sector leadership role is a contemporary phenomenon within the public administration reforms context. The boundary between the public leadership role and the entire public administration (context) is often difficult to distinguish. Government simply sees it as part of the overall policy-making process with which to make public reforms decision. Moreover, interpretivist epistemologies generally are case-oriented rather than variable oriented (Ragin, 1987, xiii).
5.3.1 Case Study Sampling Strategy: Purposive Sampling, Theoretical Sampling

In qualitative inquiry, all types of sampling may be encompassed under the broad term of ‘purposeful sampling’ (Sandelowski, 1995; Patton, 1990). Thus, in qualitative research a sample is always intentionally selected according to the requirements of the study. In case studies, according to Patton (1990), the logic and power of purposeful sampling lies in selecting information-rich cases for study in depth. From information-rich cases one can discover a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research. In purposive sampling, ‘researchers use … knowledge or expertise … to select subjects who represent this population’ (Berg, 2004, 36). So purposive sampling requires the researcher to be knowledgeable in terms of selecting the knowledgeable members of the population that are typical and representative.

According to Bowen (2008, 140), “an ‘appropriate sample is composed of participants who best represent or have knowledge of the research topic”. During the data gathering, I used my own judgement so that it could contribute to the composition of knowledgeable participants and the purpose and eventually to theoretical framework (Bernard, 2006). I took special care in ascertaining that data are linked to the research purpose, objectives and the questions. Nevertheless, researchers face problems in selecting the sample since it has a risk of being not representative of its population. This problem was noted by Kaplan (1964) in his paradox of sampling. According to this paradox, the sample is useless and irrational if it is not truly representative of its population. However, it is only representative once we know the characteristics of the population. In this research, I know the characteristics of the population as I work in one of the case sites. In view of this, I considered carefully the population’s possible qualities and attributes. I decided to choose my sample with an intention of representing certain qualities and characteristics. I used purposive sampling methods to recruit participants who have experienced the phenomenon under study. Purposive sampling is a sample with the purpose in mind – that is, choosing members of the population who are typical, extreme, and knowledgeable, as the literature suggests. It is a type of non-random sample in which respondents are specifically sought out. Underscoring the importance of purposive sampling Powell (1997, 69) stated that, “at times, it may seem preferable to select a sample based entirely on one’s knowledge of the population and
the objectives of the research”. Purposive sampling is a non-probability sampling technique in which an experienced individual selects the sample based on his or her judgement about some appropriate characteristics required of the sample member (Zikmund, 2003). It is also called judgement sampling.

In sample selection, I was abstractly driven by the theoretical framework which underpinned the research questions from the beginning. Purposive sampling is suitable for my qualitative research, which is informed a priori by an existing body of social theory on which the research questions are based (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Curtis et al. 2000). Moreover, Denzin and Lincoln (2000, 370) observe that: “[M]any qualitative researchers employ…. purposive, and not random sampling methods. They seek out group, settings and individuals where…. the processes being studied are most likely to occur”.

Apart from purposive sampling, I used theoretical sampling, as I was conceptually driven by an evolving theory which was developed inductively from the data as I proceeded; the implications being that theory would drive the selection of these cases, and also that the careful examination of the cases might lead to elaboration or reformulation of theory (Curtis et al., 2000). The argument shows that theoretical sampling is suitable in case study research because it is useful when one is to ground theory on data that is always emerging. According to McCutcheon and Meredith (1993), if we are to ground theory on data then a large and rich amount of primary data is needed, and case studies are a prime source of this. Some authors have called theoretical sampling ‘transferability’ (Guba, 1981), ‘analytical generalization’ (Yin, 2003, 2009), and ‘moderate generalization’ (Williams, 2002). Eisenhardt (1989a, 537) also argues that case research relies on theoretical sampling, whereby cases are chosen for theoretical, not statistical reasons.

Purposive sampling works hand in hand with theoretical sampling, as the former often leads to the latter (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Silverman (2005, 130) articulates that purposive sampling and theoretical sampling are usually treated as synonyms. The only difference between the two applies when the purpose behind the ‘purposive’ sampling is not theoretically defined. The nature of this link and relation between sampling and theory has been observed by Mason (1996, 93-94): theoretical
sampling is selecting groups to study on the basis of their relevance to one’s research question; one’s theoretical position and the explanation or account which one is developing. Theoretical sampling is concerned with constructing a meaningful sample because it builds on certain characteristics that help to develop theory. This statement proves that theoretical sampling is a sampling that is always evolving, flexible and cumulative based on purpose and meaning. This argument shows that theoretical sampling provides a specific and a clearer objective for the general concept of purposive sampling. To sum up, it can be said that purposive sampling serves as the means, while theoretical sampling determines the ultimate purpose of the sampling. Therefore, theoretical sampling is always purposeful and it could be said that some qualitative studies may contain purposeful and theoretical sampling (Coyne, 1997).

As discussed above, I employed purposive and theoretical sampling in identifying the multiple cases for my research because I was motivated by intentional selection/judgement together with the conceptual inspiration of an evolving theory out of emerging data. I decided to purposefully select a sample of four cases in the public sectors with a view to exploring public leadership charged with initiating and implementing reforms within a specific administrative-cultural tradition. My sample is not varied in that cases are all in the public sector. At the same time, it is varied and heterogeneous in that some cases are in training institutes and some cases in the ministries and divisions directly linked to reform implementation under different levels of public sector leadership. I also depended on the conceptual framework developed from prior assumptions based on my work in the public sector. The underlying principle was selecting information rich cases (Perry, 1998; Patton, 1990). Achieving some richness of data for each case was a key consideration. Cases were chosen to provide rich material that can build a solid foundation for theory development. Purposive sampling ensured relevance and that key characteristics to the conceptual framework were covered. Equally, discovery of new aspects of existing theory of PSL in terms of reforms was the focus of this research. In other words, my sampling was theoretical because it was driven by the emergence of new theory; I made decisions about sampling as I gathered my data and became engaged in its analysis. An insightful analysis of a unique administrative – cultural context gave new meaning based on the emerging data.
5.3.2 Selection of Case Studies

A qualitative multiple case study approach has been employed here. The first step in field research is to select a topic for inquiry, which is often influenced by personal and professional interest, as happened to me. My service in the public sector was a major factor in selecting the cases. The next step, i.e. the selection of an appropriate site and gaining access is linked to the research topic, research questions and purpose. Practical considerations, i.e. the nature and purpose of the study, relevance of research questions etc. always influence the choice of setting. Moreover, researchers are concerned about easy access to the site (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1992, 277). Ministry of Public Administration, Economic Relations Division, Cabinet Division and two Public sector Training Institutes (of the two, one was the pilot case) were selected as cases that reflect the pulse of the government’s reform initiatives. They share the processes of administration, modernisation and public sector reforms. The two Public sector Training Institutes selected are- 1) Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre (BPATC), 2) Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration) Training Academy.

Yin (2003, 53) articulated that multiple case projects are preferable because they avoid the risk of putting “all your eggs in one basket”. However, a common and valid question is how many cases should be included in a multiple case study. The literature also does not provide any precise guidance on the number of cases to be included in qualitative research as opposed to that in quantitative enquiry. “The literature recommending the use of case studies rarely specifies how many cases should be developed. This decision is left to the researcher…” (Romano, 1989, 36). This is because qualitative researchers should continue to add cases until they reach a state of ‘theoretical saturation’ (Eisenhardt, 1989a, 545) or “to the point of redundancy” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, 204).

Eisenhardt (1989a, 545) suggests that four to ten useable sites are necessary for case research:

“...while there is no ideal number of cases, a number between 4 and 10 cases usually works well. With fewer than four cases, ... difficult to generate theory .. is likely to be unconvincing.”
Therefore, in postgraduate research, researchers should adopt a number of case studies that allow cross-case analysis to be used for richer theory building (Perry, 1998). A large number of cases, e.g. twelve to fifteen cases, generate a huge amount of qualitative data involving high cost. More than 15 cases make a study unwieldy (Miles and Huberman, 1994).

Thinking along the above lines and taking account of the arguments aforementioned, I selected four cases as the samples of the study in an effort to capture multiple perspectives from the range of public sector leaders involved in PSR. This would enable in-depth analysis across the cases. Creswell (2007) also articulates that one would not employ more than 4 or 5 case studies. This number is able to identify themes of the cases as well as enabling cross-case theme analysis. The process of selecting the four cases for the multiple case study research is discussed below.

5.3.3 Cases for this Study: Selection of Ministries, Divisions and Training Institutes

Although I used a purposive and theoretical sampling strategy, meaning the selection of ministries/divisions/training institutes was based on prior information, I took care to ensure a mixture of homogeneous and heterogeneous samples (Patton, 2002). By mixture, it is meant that the samples studied covered three categories - ministries/divisions/training institutes. The samples chosen also represented different locations, settings, sizes and work environments. This was done in an effort to achieve maximum representation, leading to the better picturing of the administrative traditions regarding PSR.

I employed four cases in this research (see Appendix ‘D’ for justification of the four cases). The cases were selected on the basis of the feedback from the pilot case. All the cases were selected from the public sector, as my research is located within the government. The procedures of case selection began in July 2011 and involved gathering data about Bangladeshi PSL and PSR. Initially, I started studying the relevant literature as well as surfing the websites of GoB to determine which ministries/divisions/training institutes have relevance, convenience, information-richness to my research. I found that a good number of the Bangladeshi public sector
organisations are engaged directly and indirectly with the PSR activities. In an effort to find the appropriate number of cases relevant to my research, I conducted a pilot study. This helped determine the number of case studies to be undertaken by the research, resulting in some modifications of the focus of the research. The process of case selection has been given below:

![Figure 5.3 Selection Process of Case Organisations](Source: Own)

### 5.4 Case Study Data Collection Methods and Techniques

Literature reveals that an underlying principle while collecting data for the case study is that of triangulation, the use and combination of different methods. Case study research has the advantage of using a variety of evidence from different sources. Use of multiple sources of evidence allows four types of triangulation – data triangulation, investigator triangulation, theory triangulation, methodological triangulation (Denzin, 1978), and enhances data credibility.
Taking account of the logic above, I endeavoured to collect as rich and varied a data set as possible. I employed a triangulation of several qualitative data collection activities. Punch (1994) comments that qualitative research covers a spectrum of techniques, but central are observation, interviewing and documentary analysis. Thus, I drew upon the following methods to collect data: one-to-one interviews, focus group interviews and documentary survey. I relied on official policy documents, i.e., administrative minutes, decision-making system in the files and other relevant documents. On a few occasions, although to a limited extent, I also observed and participated in official meetings during the data collection process. Observation was important for me as I could note the participants’ body language, voice-tone, non-verbal behaviour, explicit behaviour and attitudes towards the issue. I observed the actions and interactions of the public sector leaders. The use of multiple sources of data is in line with Yin’s (2003, 2009) advice that any findings of the case study will be credible if it is based on different sources of information, following a ‘corroborative’ model.

5.4.1 Interview: Free-flowing conversation

“….fact of the matter is…we cannot observe anything – feelings, thoughts and intentions; we have to ask people questions about those things”.

(Patton, 2002, 341)

One must talk to people to learn something. People express themselves in direct and indirect languages. I intended to see not only through my own eyes but also through speaking to the interviewees in order to co-construct subtlety of the language used. It is because of this advantage that, the interview has become the favoured digging tool for mining into people’s lives (Rice, 2010). According to Perry (1998, 791), a case study interview should always start with open questions that aim at capturing the experience of the interviewee. The study endeavoured to collect a rich data set based on open questions. Interview data are considered useful if treated as a contextual account and not a reproduction of reality (Green and Thorogood, 2004).

In this study, I chose to conduct face to face personal interviews with informants to hear accounts of lived experiences with respect to implementing public administration reforms representing the dual tasks of complying with donor suggestions and adhering

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1I participated in one faculty meeting, two evaluation meetings and one project review meeting
to the local administrative-cultural tradition. In this study, I treated interview data as a way of accessing various stories and narratives of the PSL through which they made sense of their world. This enabled me to analyse the culturally rich methods through which I could, in concert with the informants, generate meaning of the world (Holstein and Gubrium, 2004; Silverman, 2005). During the interview I was aware that even though a clean theoretical slate is standard, theory-building studies may have predefined concepts (Eisenhardt 1989a; Yin 2003). Concurrently, I was attentive to the need to balance the extremes of possessing a pre-determined theoretical framework (Yin, 1994, 46) on the one hand, and having no theory to test on the other hand (Eisenhardt, 1989a, 536). Data was collected through in-depth interviews with senior, midlevel and entry level public sector leaders working in the public sector. Academics and retired officials/members of the reform commissions were also interviewed. Construction of their knowledge, perception, and the world view was my interest. For this, I engaged the informants in expressing their views and experiences and supported free flowing conversation with prompting as appropriate, using my interview guide as an aide memoire. This unstructured interview gave me more options and freedom to adjust and vary my questions to add extra probes that opened new avenues, accommodating a natural transition from one topic to another. In most interviews, I was open totake new twists and turns into consideration. The interview is a conversation based on interaction – a trajectory of talk through which reality is co-constructed (Rapley, 2004) and jointly constructed in terms of pre-existing roles (Garton and Copland, 2010). During the interview, I tried to make sure the conversation flowed naturally with a purpose (Kahn and Cannell, 1957, 149).

In my research, I myself was the only instrument for the data collection. I valued the relationship between the interviewee and the interviewer. In research projects where research assistants/data collectors are appointed to interview the participants with whom participants do not have prior relationship. This usually leads to the mechanistic exercise. In such interviews, interviewers try to construct their position as ‘neutral’ in the interview. As a result, it does not lead to the interactional experience between the interviewee and the interviewer. Moreover, the neutral interviewer has been critiqued in the literature (Heritage and Greatbatch, 1991; Garton and Copland, 2010). In contrast, my relationship with the interviewees was particularly important in this research as it involved other roles such as colleagues, friends and supervising authority. I, as a
researcher belong to the community that I am researching (Motzafi-Haller, 1997; Panourgia, 1995, cited in Davies, 2007, 182–3). Eventually, I used this prior relationship in the ‘generation’ (Baker, 2004, 163) and construction of interview data.

Moreover, interviewing an ‘elite’ person is a different case. According to Marshall and Rossman (2011, 155), “Elite individuals are considered to be influential, prominent, and/or well-informed in an organization or community; they are selected for interviews on the basis of their expertise in areas relevant to the research”. Working with elites often places great demands on the ability of the interviewer as the interviewer has to be knowledgeable and capable in terms of the proper understanding of the phenomenon. One has to be well-informed for asking thoughtful questions (Ibid).

Taking cognizance of the above-mentioned logic, I did not appoint any research assistant for data collection/interviewing. Moreover, this approach makes the interview more organized and helps reduce interviewer judgement (Tesch, 1990).

5.4.2 The Number of Interviewees

“Turning…… to the number of interviews, our experience and anecdotal evidence suggests............. , and a PhD thesis requires about 35 to 50 interviews”

(Perry, 1998, 794)

Selecting the number of interviewees is a difficult task. Although there is no rule of thumb determining the number of interviewees (Brannen, 2012), a small number of participants is widely supported in qualitative research. Maxwell (2005) advocates that, “[Q]ualitative researchers typically study a relatively small number of individuals... and preserve the individuality of each of these in their analyses......” (p. 22). Adler and Adler (2012) advise graduate students to sample between 12 and 60, with 30 being the mean; and Ragin (2012) suggests that a glib answer is 50 for a Ph.D. dissertation. On the other hand, Gerson and Horowitz (2002, 223) suggest that ‘fewer than 60 interviews cannot support convincing conclusions and more than 150 produce too much material to analyse effectively and expeditiously’. Also, there is the issue of theoretical saturation (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), which guided me to conduct interviews until no new theoretical insights were to be gleaned from the data or no new major information
emerged from the interviews (Patton, 1990). I stopped interviewing when I found the data to be repetitive and no new themes were arising.

Based on the above arguments, I conducted 71 interviews (36 in-depth and 5 focus group interviews consisting of 35 respondents). This number falls within the suggestion by Gerson and Horowitz (2002). My respondents were selected from different hierarchical positions within each case, as advised by Perry (1998), who pointed out that: “….The PhD interviews would ideally involve about three interviews at different hierarchical levels…..” (794).

Thus, I selected informants to see diverse situations, namely, PSL roles, change/reform efforts, donors’ incentives, and the bureaucracy’s own administrative tradition and culture. I selected them because administrative leaders have formal responsibilities for initiating the change processes (Rouban, 1995). The selected informants represented five groups at different levels of hierarchy, facilitating the capturing of multiple realities of the phenomenon under study:

a) Senior Public Sector Leaders: They are the policy level staff who provide brains in the process of policy formulation. They also advise the ministers on different policy issues

b) Midlevel Public Sector Leaders: They are the work horses of the government responsible for the policy implementation. Along with the senior public sector leaders, they also oversee the implementation of the reforms. On many occasions, they are engaged with the reform process as project directors

c) Junior Public Sector Leaders: They are the street level bureaucrats (posted both in ministry and field administration) engaged with the grass roots level and responsible for the efficient public service delivery

Besides, the research includes two more categories of respondents. While conducting a focus group interview, a group of respondents recommended such inclusion to facilitate generating a true picture of the phenomenon. The categories are:
a) Members of the Reforms Commission and the retired administrative leaders

b) Academics, i.e., university teachers with a background in management and public administration

The inclusion of the last two categories is important in the sense that they offer a fine blend of theory and practice.

5.4.3 Focus Group Interview

According to Krueger (1994, 10-11): “The focus group … taps into human tendencies. Attitudes and perceptions relating to concepts, products, services or programs are developed in part by interaction with other people. We are a product of our environment and are influenced by people around us”. Group interaction is the major point for focus groups as the definition expresses. The strength of the focus group lies in the ‘interaction within a group to elicit rich experiential data’ (Asbury, 1995, 414). However, this issue of group interaction does not go hand in hand with the phenomenological research (Webb and Kevern, 2001). Literature suggests that focus group is incompatible with the phenomenological approach (which the study employs), because “…in its most comprehensive sense, it [phenomenological approach] refers to the totality of the lived experiences that belong to a single person” (Giorgi, 1997, 236). A phenomenological approach requires an individual portraying his/her lived experiences. Therefore, a group method of data collection involving interaction between some participants is not well-matched with phenomenological approach (Webb and Kevern, 2001). Thus, some authors discourage the use of focus group in a phenomenological study. Literature also suggests that a phenomenological focus group would be an ‘oxymoron’. However, there is an emerging and significant body of literature suggesting means by which individual lived experience can be preserved within a group context. It persuasively argues that focus groups are compatible with phenomenology. Researchers who used focus group in their phenomenological research include Baldwin (1996) and Sikma (2006). There are also other researchers who have employed focus groups as part of an interpretive or hermeneutic approach (Carr, 2004; Robley et al., 2004; Spence, 2005; cited in Bradbury- Jones et al. 2009, 666).
Researchers highlight the incompatibility between phenomenology and focus groups only on the basis that it is the ‘group’ that creates the methodological tension (Webb & Kevern, 2001; Webb, 2003). Phenomenological focus group does not sound like an ‘oxymoron’ to me, basically for two reasons. First, I follow Heideggerian hermeneutic/interpretive phenomenology where bracketing assumptions and experiences is not necessary, which permits researchers to engage with the respondents for co-construction. To Heidegger, understanding is a reciprocal activity because humans are interpretive. Bradbury-Jones et al. also (2009, 666) challenge the view that focus group interviews are incompatible with interpretive phenomenology. Interpretive phenomenology means that the researcher is engaged in a process of shared interpretation with participants and meanings are jointly constructed. They argue that by its very nature, phenomenology is concerned with interpretation. Second, my research questions are congruent with the group approach (Kooken et al., 2007). In my research, public sector leadership is seen as a group process and not person-centred. Therefore, the research questions basically led me to the focus group interview.

Moreover, focus groups informed by phenomenology allow interviewees to elaborate on and share issues raised (Jasper, 1996). Spiegelberg (1975; cited in Bradbury-Jones et al., 2009, 667) proposes a ‘cooperative phenomenology’ arguing that ‘there is nothing in the nature of the phenomenological approach that confines it to isolated practice’. He describes a process where group discussion is based on the sharing of individual written descriptions from each group member. The thrust of this view is that individual lived experience can be preserved within a group context.

In view of the above, I ran 5 focus groups with 35 senior, midlevel and junior administrative leaders.

I conducted the focus groups in a room free from distraction. The room was spacious enough to accommodate all participants who seated in an oval arrangement so each could maintain eye contact with all others (Krueger, 1994). I also selected knowledgeable facilitators to stimulate group interaction among participants, which resulted in the generation of rich data. The facilitators also carefully avoided the irrelevant issues in order to steer the discussion to a successful end.
At the outset, I shared my research purpose with the respondents and sought their consent. Responses were recorded using a digital voice recorder. I also jotted down field notes. During the focused group interviews, I noticed some behavioural pattern – a few interviewees tended not to exchange ideas in an elaborate manner. The reasons can be attributed to my being a colleague. A few interviewees were of the view that since I am their colleague working in the same bureaucracy, I know all about PSL and PSR.

Also, traditionally the Bangladeshi PSLs appear to operate in an opaque environment. The PSL traditions reflect a culture of secrecy and they are unwilling to disclose any information (World Bank, 1996). Moreover, the Official Secrets Act of 1923 and the Government Servants Conduct Rules (GSCR) of 1979 play their part in binding civil servants to an oath of secrecy (Ibid, 1996). This PSL tradition acted as a hindrance during my focus group interview. However, I used probing questions in these rare cases. Thus, I used the focus group to further extend my knowledge of the phenomenon of PSL traditions and PSR.

5.4.4 Document Analysis

“… documents provide blue prints and evidence on what was planned and intended, …” (Jaradat, 2008, 92).

Document analysis, thus, serves as a means of triangulation. It is used in combination with other methods. In this research, documents were used as a source of data to supplement primary data obtained from the interviews, representing ‘the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon’ (Denzin, 1978, 291). It is unusual for qualitative researchers not to make use of documentary evidence. Document analysis requires that data be examined and interpreted in order to elicit meaning and develop empirical knowledge (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). It is particularly applicable to qualitative case studies – intensive studies producing rich descriptions of a single phenomenon, event, organisation, or programme (Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994).

In view of the above, I undertook document analysis mainly for four reasons. First, to supplement the primary data obtained from the in-depth interviews. Second, I used it as a means of triangulation in an effort to combine it with other data collection strategy.
Third, I analysed documents to elicit meaningful and rich description of the phenomenon under the study. Last but not the least, I intended to unpack the traditions, beliefs, contexts and practices of the PSL by resorting to document analysis. Angers and Machtmes (2005) stated that they analysed documents as part of their case study, which explored the beliefs, context factors, and practices of school teachers.

In my research, research questions relating to the public sector leaders’ beliefs, context, traditions, and public sector reforms and donors were addressed by reviewing the documents relevant to governance traditions in the light of historicity and current debates on PSR strategy. Official discourses formed an important source in identifying the different dilemmas that had been considered critical by the respondents of the selected cases.

Document analysis in my research mainly included official documents such as government bulletins and reports, Perspective Plan and Five Year Plan of the government, Reforms Commission Reports, meeting agendas and minutes of meetings, decision-making process in the files, donors’ study reports, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy and Millennium Development Goals.

5.4.5 Summary of Some Problems Encountered

Recording interviews: Bureaucrats in Bangladesh are usually obsessed with rules and regulations. They seem to be always under the cloak of secrecy. Recording their voices was a difficult issue on a number of occasions, despite my being a colleague. Because of the magnitude and sensitivity of the subject, its politician-bureaucrat nexus, its connection with the preservation of the national interest and the sensitive positions and job nature of certain informants, it was not possible to record 9 interviews, as this would have affected the participants’ willingness to express personal views. Since these 9 interviewees were like the spokespersons of their departments, it was not possible to record them. This also limited my freedom to quote the respondents directly. However, I wrote down field notes during interviews. Thus, assured of no recording, the respondents felt relaxed and responded to my interview questions freely and in an unconstrained manner.
**Interruption problem:** It sometimes happened that during the interview a few participants had to answer important phone calls from colleagues and supervisors. During that time I reviewed my field notes. When the respondents returned, I was able to prompt them by picking up the thread of previous conversation from the notes. However, most of the respondents were considerate enough to ask the callers to call back later on.

5.5 **Research Questions informing Research Methodology**

Epistemological choice and paradigm can be determined by research questions. “……the research questions guide the selection of a theoretical perspective, rather than the theoretical perspective guiding the development of research questions. Regardless of the approach, the development and wording of research questions can illustrate connections among the theoretical perspective, disciplinary framework, and substantive interests” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Hatch, 2002; cited in Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2009, 694). Moreover, the wording of research questions may specifically indicate the researcher’s perspective through distinct rhetorical strategies and markers (Schwandt, 2000), including the possible use of identifiers (i.e., from Habermas’s [1968/1971] knowledge interest framework (cited in Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2009, 694).

Creswell (2003) indicated that a small number of sub-questions should guide the research design and methods should follow the central question. *(See Appendix ‘E’ for discussion on how my three research questions inform my research methodology)*

5.6 **Ethical Considerations**

The final “...issue of working ethically requires more than following a code of conduct; it requires that we examine our motives and scrutinise our actions and our research processes for foreseeable and perhaps unforeseeable consequences that might affect our participants or have even broader repercussions to society” (O’Neill, 1989; O’Neill &
Trickett, 1982; Robson, 2002; quoted in Darlaston-Jones, 2007, 23). While conducting research, I followed the above principles.

Following the Social Research Association Ethical guideline (2003), I, as a researcher have three ethical obligations: 1) obligation to society – researchers must conduct their work responsibly and in light of the moral and legal order of the society in which they practise, because it is in the society that the findings would be disseminated; 2) obligation to funder and employer – since the research is a funded one, and I am an employee-researcher, I have a moral obligation to them and I must strike a good balance between the terms of reference of the funding and the society as a whole; 3) obligation to research subjects – I am cognizant that no harm is caused to the subjects while conducting the research. While collecting data, I was careful that the anonymity and confidentiality would not be breached.

Participants were supplied with informed consent forms. Before the interview, research participants were informed that their names and feedback would not be disclosed elsewhere; their identity in this study would be treated as confidential. This also facilitated the collection of data. Respondents were briefed on the data collection method of the PhD research beforehand. They were free to ask questions at any time before, during, or after their participation in this research. They could withdraw themselves from the data collection at any time.

Ramcharan and Cutcliffe (2001) believe that decision-making about the ethics of qualitative research is problematic where research design is emergent. In this situation, I relied on my own ethical sense based on eternal vigilance, i.e., monitoring of the situation.

I obtained HUBS Research Ethics Committee approval prior to conducting this research.

5.7 Ethical Framework

Ethics lies at the heart of public policy (Boston et al, 2010). Policy-makers have to decide between competing ethics. In this research, I use the framework of traditions and
dilemmas to contextualise any ethical dilemmas (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003, 2010) since ethical dimensions of policy should be viewed as part of a broader country tradition and historical continuity (Gaskarth, 2013). According to Englebert, 2000), state legitimacy depends on some level of historical continuity. Following the works of Bevir and Rhodes (2003, 2010), I assert that ethical dilemmas in policy-making arise when a new idea stands in opposition to longstanding traditions and belief system. In the case of the Bangladeshi PSL, this ethical policy dilemma is evident as they find incongruity between samaj traditions (collectivism) and reform agenda (individualism) imposed by donors that are often incompatible with a certain administrative-cultural tradition.

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter has established that failure to think through philosophical issues can seriously affect the research. Throughout this chapter I asserted that empiricism is not the copyrighted domain of positivism. I claim my research to be empirical as it is grounded in and fed by the ‘thick’ data. This research enjoys empiricism by resorting to conversation analysis in the sense that it took accurate transcription of talks/in-depth interviews as its starting point and followed rigorous, systematic procedures to data analysis for generating empirical results (Psathas, 1995; Bryman and Bell, 2003). Bernard (1994, 2) defined empiricism as ‘[T]he only knowledge that human beings acquire is from sensory experiences’, which can be gained by qualitative research.

To support the empiricism of my research, I have resorted to interpretive-phenomenology as the paradigm, and case study as the research methodology. This chapter also depicted how I benefited from multiple sources of data by employing case study that is well-matched with interpretive-phenomenology. Sampling techniques, selection of cases and the selection of respondents have been discussed in this chapter as well, which has highlighted the data collection process.
Chapter 6: Research Methodology: Data Collection and Analysis

Signpost

Chapter 5 discussed the rationale for adoption of appropriate philosophical perspectives and paradigm, and it also justified the adoption of the relevant research methodology including data collection methods, techniques and sources. The present chapter reports what actually happened in the field. It highlights the process of the collection and analysis of data. This chapter starts by presenting the four phases of data collection, i.e., a) interview protocol, b) scoping interviews c) the pilot study and, d) the in-depth interviews and focus group interviews, with a comprehensive account of the processes that occurred during each phase of data collection. The data collection phase included planning and scheduling of data collection activities in consultation with the data providers. During this phase, I tried to be as close as possible to the respondents, so as to gain personal experiences from them. The chapter then goes on to report how the case study database was assembled, including interview transcripts, field notes and observation notes. It highlights discourse analysis as an influential analytical framework in interpretive research in terms of shaping and broadening our understanding of organisations. Also, discussed in this chapter is the importance of metaphors in organisation analysis, since when unpacked, they can be used as a powerful analytical tool. Issues of reliability and dependability are also explained, to ensure the credibility of this research.

6.1 Introduction

I highlight in this chapter the process of establishing and maintaining field relationships and the complexities (Glesne, 2011) of doing field work. I describe a number of interrelated activities involved in collecting data in the field. According to Creswell (2007), these activities are locating site(s), gaining access, making rapport, collecting data, recording information and storing data. The actual field reality and complexities constitute the heart of the chapter. During the data collection, I took special care in crafting my data collection strategy in order to be in line with my chosen interpretive stance, employing in-depth-interviewing, documentary analysis and focus group interviews, as discussed earlier in Chapter 5.
6.2 Data Collection Process

Effective data collection for case study research requires careful planning of both the case participants, and the researcher's time (Cavaye, 1996). The inspiration for this research came from my work-experience in the bureaucracy that helped my planning process. Thus, I had a fair understanding of the administrative traditions, work-cultures and state machinery. I knew where to start my interview field work. Furthermore, I used the interview protocol to guide me through the data collection phases. As depicted in the following figure, data collection covered four phases: a) interview protocol, b) scoping interviews c) the pilot study and, d) in-depth interviews and focus group interviews.

![Figure 6.1 Phases of Data Collection Process](image-url)

**Figure 6.1 Phases of Data Collection Process**
6.2.1 Preparation of Interview Protocol

In a case study research, planning a protocol, prior to the data collection process, is essential. The case study protocol for the current research comprised the following elements:

- An outline of the case study research (objectives, relevant readings, topics being investigated)
- Field procedures (gaining access to sites, general sources of information, appointment and timetable of data collection activities)
- Crafting instruments and protocols using multiple data collection methods
- Case study questions needed in collecting data for answering each research question
- Analysing the data both within case and across cases
- A guide for the case study report (outline, format for the narrative)

(Yin, 2003, 2009; Eisenhardt, 1989a)

I started preparing the protocol as soon as I completed my upgrade seminar, in July, 2011, and finalised it just before the commencement of the actual interview sessions at the end of August, 2011. The protocol benefited from the scoping interviews and subsequently from the pilot case study as well. Feedback from the analytic literature review also enriched the protocol.

6.2.2 Scoping Interviews

Scoping interviews assisted me a great deal in terms of ice-breaking between me as a researcher and the PSL as the respondents. I did not transcribe those interviews. Rather, I listened to the respondents carefully, looking for themes and tracking debates around the key areas. I conducted the scoping interviews with the aim of generating some thoughts around the topic area. My aim was to obtain some insights into the administrative leaders’ thinking and views regarding their role in the PSR, and their behaviour towards the donors’ reform agenda at the junior, middle and senior/policy levels.
While analysing the feedback received from the respondents, I found different frames of mind on the PSL: they looked rather paradoxical and revealed dilemmas. Common themes that arose were: a) the blame game, i.e., political leaders blaming the bureaucracy and the vice versa; b) bad equilibrium between the donor and the local truth; c) on the one hand, reform is identified as a priority task for the overhauling of the system; while on the other hand, reform is not being carried out committedly.

These findings from the scoping interviews provided food for thought and helped me in narrowing down my research questions, leading me to use two types of questions - broad questions and probing questions, which I fed into my interview protocol.

6.2.3 The Pilot Case: Bangladesh Civil Service Administration Academy (BCSAA)

The findings from the scoping interviews led me to choose Bangladesh Civil Service Administration Academy (BCSAA) as the pilot case (See Appendix ‘F’ for discussion). BCSAA was chosen basically for four reasons. First, its role is highly related to reforms as it acts as the incubator for the BCS (Administration) Cadre – a generalist cadre entrusted with the tasks of reform implementation. Secondly, its vision is to become a national hub of excellence for competent and pro-active professional civil servants that requires constant alignment with the environment. Third, the BCS (Administration) cadre is the largest generalist cadre in Bangladesh, holding key posts across the bureaucracy and having considerable influence on the overall public administration. Fourth, this cadre is directly responsible for reform project formulation and execution. Other civil service officials accuse this particular cadre of enjoying special privilege in terms of promotion, power and status, leading to generalist–specialist conflict. This aspect of bureaucracy is a different story and uncovers different dimensions, as the pilot study confirmed, and as explained in the findings part.

6.2.4 The Commencement of Interview Sessions

A metaphor can be used to show the relationship between the pilot case study and the final case study interview sessions. According to the metaphor, while attempting to cross an uncharted river, an experienced explorer goes a short way into the river but remains within a safe distance from the river bank to test the current before making the
final crossing. If (s)he does not feel comfortable after testing the current, (s)he will reconsider the situation and may even decide not to cross the river (Pal et al. 2008). Likewise, the pilot study gives us the essence of what will transpire in the actual study. The pilot study feedback was very influential in my selection of case sites and interviewees, and also refocusing of the research questions. I proceeded to conduct the case study research (crossing the river) after obtaining positive signal from the pilot case study.

Prior to the collection of data, the study was reviewed and approved by the Hull University Business Research Ethics Committee, which also approved the informed consent form. All the informants were briefed on the purpose of the research, what would be expected of them, and any risk to their anonymity and confidentiality, as discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Data obtained from the respondents were stored securely in a lockable cabinet. Electronic files such as transcripts were password-protected on secure networks.

Gaining access to the PSL was a smooth process, especially when I drew their attention to the previously held scoping interviews. Nevertheless, I began by first telephoning and then meeting with senior PSL to obtain their support. They assured me of their full cooperation and provided me with relevant information and strategies.

All the interviews were conducted in the natural setting, i.e., interviewees’ own offices. Most interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. Two interviews lasted for more than 2 hours. Most interviews were recorded using a digital voice recorder, with the permission of the respondents. In the rare cases where permission was not granted, I took field notes. I used the interview guide to engage informants in talking about their beliefs, practices, leadership styles, and decision-making process, with particular focus on reforms and modernisation programmes.

Eventually, I interviewed 71 respondents, details of whom were given in Chapter 5. During one focus group interview, I was fortunate enough to converse with a former public administration reforms commission member who happened to be there by chance.
6.3 Data Management and Analysis

A vast amount of data was generated from the multiple methods used for data collection. I started collecting my interview data with my hand-written field notes made on the interview guide during the interviews. What counts as data in this research is the “mutual elaboration of tape and transcript” (Ashmore and Reed, 2000) complemented by limited-scale overt observation and documentary analysis. While organising the field-notes, I was aware of the use of three types of notes – ‘observational notes’, ‘theoretical notes’ and ‘methodological notes’ (Schatzman and Strauss, 1973). As soon as each interview was conducted, I devoted myself to producing comprehensive notes in my journal. I strongly adhered to the verbatim transcription of the interviews, which I performed myself because hiring people for transcription would evoke ethical issues. I also translated the transcripts. Although most of the administrative leaders had been educated in the Western universities, and who had no difficulties with the use of English, they preferred to speak Bengali during the interviews. I also encouraged them to speak in Bengali as that would facilitate unbounded exchange of views and information. I read each transcript while I listened to the recorded interview. Audio recording and transcribing is a mutual process. In the words of Ashmore and Reed (2000), this process is an “epistemo-phenomenological” process, as the tape and the transcript are mutually elaborative analytic objects. They further define ‘Tape as Realist and the Transcript as Constructivist’. This process allowed me to hear the voices of each informant interviewed, while giving me the opportunity to grasp the emerging common themes and discourses. I could identify early patterns of themes across the interview data representing the practices, beliefs and traditions of governance with regard to the PSR. It took me nearly five months to complete the transcription and translation. For me, data collection and analysis became a concurrent process – a multi-tasking job that I enjoyed.

Data analysis in qualitative research consists of organising the data into meaningful segments, contexts, metaphors, patterned regularities and reducing the data into themes through a process of coding (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Wolcott, 1994; Creswell, 2007). I drew first upon methods from Miles and Huberman (1994, 10) who proposed three concurrent flows of activity regarding data analysis: data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing verification. Accordingly, I reduced the data into themes and
displayed them (data display- matching the reduced data into plausibly understandable shapes based on cross-case and within case analysis) through a process of coding.

I started coding the data interpretively after observing and reading data time and again, according to the categories and types of situation observed; perspectives and views of subjects and objects; processes, activities, behavioural actions or events of the people interviewed, strategies, and methods observed; and social relationships (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Bogdan and Biklen, 2007).

Creswell (2007, 151) stated that coding “represents the heart of data analysis”. Hence, during the coding process, I looked for core categories of emerging themes in terms of contexts, perspectives, styles and behaviours of the bureaucratic leaders that ultimately formed the basis of my data analysis. It became a process of naming and locating the data while dividing and subdividing key categories. Consequently, I allocated labels for each of the themes. In so doing, I was able to display relationships between the data and the research questions/purpose (Gibbs, 2007; Glesne, 2011). I also started my own code book where I assigned each major code its number and page. Major codes had their sub codes as well.

My code book led me to identify the following major themes:

1. Leadership dilemmas in Bureaucracy
2. Power relations in governance
3. Debates on the approaches of Public Sector Reforms
4. Traditions in governance
6.4 An Interpretive Approach to Data Analysis

6.4.1 Understanding Organisational Life through Discourse Analysis and Narratives

“To claim that the researcher somehow explores the real world directly, without mediation of language, and then represents, mirrors, or translates that world into a precise word picture is today unthinkable”

(Van Maanen, 1996, 378).

Indeed, language is a powerful medium for exploring reality. Facts of organisational life can be precisely illustrated by the mediation of language. The Aristotelian belief is also that language and linguistic categories are fully capable of describing the reality (Chia, 2000). Phillips and Hardy (1997) however, note that the idea that language has a role in the constitution of reality has gained currency. Bureaucrats as organisational actors also construct the meaning of their world through the mediation of language. In fact, the impact of their professions on the culture of the society is observed based on the power of their impact on language. One of the basic political players is bureaucracy that as a profession has a very delicate position and sensitive role in political system (Pourezzat, 2008, 351). Bureaucrats are influential actors on the political scene because of the specific professional language they use (Pourezzat, 2008, 382). The dominance of bureaucratic language can be termed ‘linguacracy’ (Nargesian & Esfahani, 2010, 532).

In order to understand the ‘linguacracy’ and the language of other relevant dominant actors, it is essential to interpret the variety of languages used by them, because language not only represents but also constructs reality. The sources of language, thoughts and facts are written and verbal evidences such as interview transcripts, rules and regulations (Casey, 1995), narrative modes based on ‘facts-as-experience’ (Gabriel, 1995), and other documents. Grant and Hardy (2004, 6) define these materials as ‘discourse’. Chia (2000) further comments that discourse acts through material inscriptions or utterances that form the basis of language. The importance of language in ‘discourse analysis as organisational analysis’ lies in the fact that language itself is a form of discourse that enables us to appreciate the fundamental character of the organisation by examining the workings of language itself.
Discourse in this research includes both linguistic and non-linguistic material. Non-linguistic observations such as facial expressions, eye contact/body language and background descriptions, were also noted down. Poland and Pederson (1998) argue that what is not said is just as important as what is said. In my case, discourse also refers to the historically specific systems of meaning of events and following Fischer (2003), it starts from the assumption that all actions, objects and practices are socially meaningful and these meanings are shaped by political and social struggles in specific historical contexts, through historical events, interviews and ideas. Clearly, here, discourse is more than just talking and linguistic form.

Thus, discourse analysis is inherently interpretive because a discourse perspective enables the researcher to show how actions and objects are interpretively constructed and what they mean for social and political interaction, as played out through organizations and institutional practices (4th International Conference in Interpretive Policy Analysis, 2009).

Narratives play an important role in this research. In trying to explore the ambience of the PSL, the study resorts to narrative analysis, since as Parry (1998, 85) claims, “…leadership can be conceptualized as a social influence process”, and social process can best be investigated by narrative inquiry. Narrative is chosen as a core method as it is the means through which people make sense of and understand their experience, including their experience of leadership (Schall et al. 2004).

Positivists offer causal explanations based on reductionism. I also provide causal explanations. However, my causal explanations are in the form of narratives based on holism (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010). According to Bevir and Rhodes (2010, 15), ‘narrative is a form of explanation that works by relating actions to the beliefs and desires that produce them’.

For my research, I employed a qualitative narrative analysis, using as primary data the text of in-depth interviews. In this case, narratives of PSL experience is influenced by phenomenology’s emphasis on understanding lived experiences and perceptions of experiences (Patton, 2002) by looking at personal narratives and life histories.
6.4.2 Understanding Bureaucratic leadership and Public Sector Reforms through Metaphors

“But the greatest thing by far is to have a command of metaphor. This alone cannot be imparted by another; it is the mark of genius…”

(Aristotle, Poetics, cited in Oberlechner and Mayer-Schoenberger, 2002)

Use of metaphor in leadership research is pervasive. It is through the mediation of the metaphors that leaders exert influence and choose to act. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999), one of the most important characteristics of metaphor is its ubiquity not only in language but also in thought. Metaphor transcends the ornamentation of the language. Language needs metaphors to solidify itself in its effort to represent reality. Aspin (1984) asserts that there is no language without metaphor.

Metaphors can serve as underlying organizing structures of leadership thinking and experience (Oberlechner and Mayer-Schoenberger, 2002). Thus, metaphors are essential to understanding the concept of PSL in that they have the ability to reveal the dormant faces of the bureaucracy. The scope of metaphor is so widespread in language, thought, and discourse that the study of human behaviour (in my case PSL behaviour) cannot avoid its relevance (Inns, 2002). As such, it is increasingly used as a crucial tool in management and organisation studies.

An interpretive-phenomenological study is basically concerned with human beings’ sense-making, interpretations and their perceptions of the life-worlds in understanding social phenomena. Similarly, “…subject that aims to study how individuals make sense of reality and act accordingly must therefore acknowledge the importance of understanding the role of metaphor…” (Inns, 2002, 306).

According to Lakoff and Turner (1989, 112), “metaphors are mappings from one conceptual domain to another”. Thus, metaphors act as ‘perceptual windows’ (Morgan, 1986) through which to view and analyse organisational behaviours. In my research, metaphors and images were cut out from the interview transcripts, then they were unpacked to function as a conceptual framework and problem solving tool. Verbatim
quotations of the metaphors and figurative comments were analysed based on my understanding and interaction with the respondents.

Thus, metaphors perfectly match my thoroughly ‘constructionist’ research as individuals construct meaning and interpret and ‘see’ the world through the conceptual framework of metaphor (Inns, 2002, 320).

In this study, some metaphors clearly depicted the power relations in the bureaucracy. Others were used to depict the PSL role in the reform scenario of the country. During the metaphoric analysis, I was cognizant that using inappropriate metaphors can have serious consequences, distorting or limiting the field of enquiry.

### 6.5 Quality in Qualitative Research

> “Deciding to do qualitative research is not a soft option. Such research demands theoretical sophistication and methodological rigour”
> (Silverman, 2013, 279)

Therefore, the issues of validity and reliability are not the exclusive domain of quantitative/positivist research. The issues of quality in terms of validity, reliability and methodological rigour are important in qualitative research. However, they are dealt with differently in qualitative research. Each paradigm, i.e., quantitative or qualitative, has its own criteria for judging quality. Healy and Perry (2000) emphasise that the quality of a study in each paradigm should be judged on that paradigm's own terms.

#### 6.5.1 Reliability and Validity

In this phenomenological research, numerous perspectives describe the concepts of validity and reliability, which result in some quality rules quite different from the positivist way of looking at it. The common quality rules in qualitative research are credibility, accuracy and consistency (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Creswell, 2007). In this research, I ensured accuracy, trustworthiness and credibility by complying with processes like pilot study, interview protocol and also some other measures that are discussed in the following sections.
6.5.2 Reliability

Reliability in qualitative research is not concerned with testing and retesting. Literature suggests that consistency and coherence is essential in ensuring reliability in qualitative research. It is also true that dependability ensures the quality of a qualitative research. For Lincoln and Guba (1985, 300) “dependability” in qualitative research is almost synonymous to the term “reliability” in quantitative research. They further emphasise “inquiry audit” (ibid, 317) as one means by which to enhance the dependability of qualitative research. Correspondingly, authors like Clont (1992) and Seale (1999) associate the concept of dependability with the concept of consistency or reliability in qualitative research (cited in Golafshani, 2003, 601).

In qualitative research, especially in the phenomenological paradigm, replication of research will probably not produce the same result, because human behaviour is always changing, and, “this does not discredit the results of any particular study” (Merriam, 2002, 27). As discussed above, the issue of dependability and internal consistency was given high priority in this research. Hence, I was careful to ensure that the result is consistent with the data as advocated by Merriam (2002, 27), “.whether the results are consistent with the data collected”. To ensure the internal consistency of the data I applied the concept of data triangulation. As discussed in section 5.4, data triangulation is one significant method of ensuring reliability. Eventually, the combination of the multiple data collection techniques gave me a comprehensive basis for the findings.

6.5.3 Validity

Perspectives viewing qualitative validation in terms of quantitative equivalents are often misleading. Instead of using the term ‘validation’, Eisner (1991, 10) discussed the term credibility in qualitative research. According to him, “[W]e seek a confluence of evidence that breeds credibility that allows us to feel confident about our observations, interpretations, and conclusions”.

Case study is the preferred methodology in this research. It is widely understood that the generalisations that case studies provide are achieved through a rigorous analytic process. In order to remove threats to validity and check the accuracy of my research, I
used a case study protocol. I also resorted to a pilot case study. I used techniques like pattern matching logic, congruence and contextual sensitivity, and also cross-case synthesis (Yin, 2003, 2009; Whittemore et al. 2001). Moreover, I adhered to the principle of illuminating the context (Yin, 2003, 2009) in which the study is situated, in an effort to enhance the credibility of the study. Divorcing a phenomenon from its context was never considered in this research. The study was conducted within its real life context, i.e., in the natural environment (a setting where bureaucracy works) to address how bureaucratic behaviour responds to PSR.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the field relationship in terms of the actual process of data collection. I highlighted each and every phase of my data collection process. I also described the data management techniques and analysis procedures. I explained how I looked for core categories of emerging themes based on pattern matching logic. My interpretive approach to data analysis in terms of discourse analysis, metaphors and narratives was highlighted. Finally, the quality issues in qualitative research representing trustworthiness and credibility were clarified.
PART IV: RESEARCH FINDINGS

INTRODUCTION TO PART IV

Part IV consists of three chapters. Chapter 7 presents the findings from the study’s first research question that deals with exploring the public sector leaders’ perspectives on the leadership conceptions. This is done by looking at the leadership practices, roles and assumptions of the public sector leadership at work.

Discussion on the behavioural pattern and response of the PSL to the reform initiatives is dealt with by Chapter 8. This chapter unpacks various reform perspectives held by the PSL. It explores what they do and why they do relating to reform programmes.

Chapter 9 addresses the third research question that portrays the perceptions of the PSL regarding the donor involvement in the reform process and explores whether or not donor viewpoints converge with the home country’s unique traditions and culture.
Chapter 7: Answering Research Question No. 1

Public Sector Leaders: Perceptions and Lived Experiences

You can’t create experience, you must undergo it

Albert Camus (cited in Stone, 2010)

Signpost

This chapter presents the findings related to the first research question which concerns the PSL perspectives on the necessary leadership conceptions and roles in public administration. This is done by looking at the personal characteristics and reflections of the individuals involved. In doing so, I paid special attention to the attitudes, leadership practices and perceptions, and assumptions of the PSL at work. In order to explore the essence of the human experiences about a phenomenon, I adopted phenomenology via discourse analysis. During the interviews, I paid particular attention to assumptions about the lived experiences of the PSL i.e., leadership practices and contexts, and also to the traditions and dilemmas of leaders at play in these contexts. What emerged from the interview data as the salient dilemmas of PSL are: creativity versus rule-based practice, vision versus implementation, puppet versus donors, commitment versus service to multiple stakeholders, public interest versus vested interest, motivating aspects versus performance, domestic reform strategy versus donor reform strategy, accountability versus good governance, integrity versus corruption, results-orientation versus citizen service and hierarchism versus mentoring. The findings suggest conflicting and changing patterns of leadership behaviour which are to a significant extent also reminiscent of the British colonial practices. Many features of bureaucratic life, i.e., rules, regulations, authority, formalism, centralised and personalised decision-making and uncoordinated public management have remained unchanged over the years. Another important feature suggests that PSL practices are shaped by the interplay between the bureaucrats and the political executives. An elitist bureaucratic ethos has also been revealed.
7.1 Introduction

Remenyi et al. (1998) stated that “whatever research paradigm is chosen, the ability to develop a convincing argument in support of the research findings is of paramount importance.” In this chapter, I examine public sector leaders’ lived experiences, perceptions of their duties, roles and responsibilities. Personal experiences are priceless assets for any research. According to t’Hart and Uhr (2008, 10), leadership is thus explained by looking at the personal characteristics and life histories of the individuals involved.

In Bangladesh, as the private sector is not properly developed, PSL has a duty to create an enabling environment for development and social change. Apart from performing functions of a traditional nature (regulatory, corrective, and fiscal), the bureaucracy is called upon to undertake nation-building activities, implement policies towards economic and social progress, and manage development (Zafarullah, 1998). Therefore, the attitudes, posture and perceptions of the PSL are significant. Kouzes and Posner (2002) having conducted a research on the perceptions of leaders over five years using a sample of 10,000 managers concluded that honesty, competence, being forward-looking, inspiration, and credibility are the major characteristics of leadership.

Accordingly, I listened to PSL experiences, roles and responsibilities. I took note of the important elements that public leaders wanted to use frequently while discharging their duties. The PSL experience revealed dilemmatic leadership behavior.

A point that I intend to raise here is that PSL can consist of several time-tested important values and roles. Although the environment is ever-changing, some characteristics of PSL remain constant like a guiding star: vision, authenticity, legal binding, creativity, knowledge and pro-people attitude. Effective bureaucracy that delivers goods and services; maintains security, law and order and ensures access, fairness and justice, depends on the characteristics, attributes and behaviours of the public service leaders (Ali, 2004b).

People matter in governance, and some people matter a lot more than others. Perhaps because of this, the bulk of studies of public leadership are essentially studies of the
lives and/or particular characteristics and behaviours of individuals occupying high public offices (‘t Hart & Uhr, 2008).

I discuss these aspects of PSL at work, referring to the narratives of public sector leaders in subsequent sections of this chapter. The subtitle of each section indicates a relevant theme that I developed from the narratives of public sector leaders.

7.2 Analytical Framework

7.2.1 Interviews

Information regarding the dilemmas of PSL was obtained from interviews in an approach referred to by Patton (2002) as triangulation of qualitative data sources. Another goal was to elicit first-person reports of the respondent’s experience, practices and perceptions and meaning of PSL. During the interview, which was unstructured, I paid particular attention to leadership beliefs, practices and to the traditions and dilemmas at play in these contexts. Information was sought from one-to-one interviews and focus group interviews. My interview protocol was used as a guideline during these interviews. Analysis of the interview transcripts focused on the ‘discovery of regularities’, ‘discerning of patterns’ (Tesch, 1990) and also the ‘pattern matching logic’ (Yin, 2009).

7.2.2 Text and Official Discourses

Information regarding the dilemmas of PSL was also collected from documentary review. Sources included government reports viz. PRSPs, Five Year Plan document, parliamentary papers, state acts/enactments, Rules of Business, Bangladesh Constitution, World Bank reports, administrative agenda and minutes and computerised records.

As there is a huge amount of official documentation, I paid particular attention to data reduction during the official discourse analysis. My respondents also helped in locating the appropriate material for me, such as administrative minutes, project papers and computerised records.
7.2.3 Theoretical Construct

Theoretical construct was used in this research based on the pattern-matching logic (Yin, 2003, 2009) to organise the themes by fitting them into a theoretical framework. As I analysed the data, appropriate theories in the literature were used to make sense of the research themes (Auerbach, 2003).

7.3 Findings from the Dilemmas of Public Sector leadership

This section explores, unpacks and critically discusses the interview data. It sets out the discursive themes that emerged from the interview regarding the dilemmas of PSL. By dilemmas of PSL, I denote how public sector leaders choose among different alternatives while making decisions in a difficult situation. Leaders are often faced with dilemmas where a choice has to be made between two or more alternatives. They need to make high quality decisions in difficult situations. According to Rickards and Murray (2006, 18), ‘the term, dilemma, originally referred to a philosophical position that defeats logical attempts to resolve it. One of two outcomes has to be accepted, yet each contradicts previously held beliefs and their logical consequences’. In brief, dilemmas are uncertainties.

Turning to Bevir & Rhodes (2003), I learnt that dilemmas and conflicts arise when a new idea stands in opposition to existing beliefs and practices, which necessitates their modification. Changes in traditions and practices can be explained therefore, by referring to the relevant dilemmas. In our bureaucracy, administrative leaders also face such dilemmas, which are largely uncertainties concealed in the environment. Exploring the dilemmas faced by the PSL is important as they point to a new direction based on the uncertainty. Leadership dilemmas are also significant in that the institutional fabric of government depends on the bureaucrats, more specifically on the particular approaches and characteristics by which they devise, deliberate, interpret, challenge and change the institutional rules and practices of government and governance (‘t Hart & Uhr, 2008; Rhodes, 1997). These PSL dilemmas reveal detailed current and important historical ideas about Bangladeshi leaders and leadership and their views on the PSR.
This section discusses the findings concerning the study’s first research question - How do public sector leaders of Bangladesh conceive of their leadership roles? Two broad sub-questions regarding the dilemmas of PSL were asked:

Could you please describe what approaches of public sector leadership you use more in your work? Why do you choose that example?

How do you see yourself as a public sector leader? Could you please cite examples of what makes a good public sector leader and a poor public sector leader?

What emerged from the interview data were the dilemmas of creativity versus rule-based practice, vision versus implementation, puppet versus donors, commitment versus service to multiple stakeholders, public interest versus vested interest, motivating aspects versus performance, domestic reform strategy versus donor reform strategy, accountability versus good governance, integrity versus corruption, results-orientation versus citizen service and hierarchism versus mentoring.

Data revealed that leaders made decisions based on previous experience and investigation/examination of the dilemmas for leadership challenges embedded in specific and unique contexts, drawing on personal mapping processes.

When asked to elucidate and justify the characteristics in the context of Bangladeshi PSL, the respondents shared the following meanings for each of the dilemmas:

**Dilemma 1: Creativity versus Rule-based Practice**

The key dilemma is between the rule-based administrative structure and creativity – actor and institutional structure. Institutions as a set of rules limit the creative roles of the actors, converting them ‘inmates’ in the metaphorical prison.

Data revealed that creativity refers to originality, new ideas and out-of-the-box thinking without which leadership in the twenty-first century can hardly survive. During the interview one junior PSL opined:
“The study clearly portrays what I execute and deliver. I try to innovate in everything I do. I believe creativity, new ideas (based on cross-fertilisation of ideas) and innovation are like the life blood of the organisation. The world of the public sector is always changing and moving towards a knowledge economy that focuses more on creativity and out-of-the box thinking. If I don’t keep pace with the changes taking place around me I would be obsolete and outdated. My skill-matches would fall short of the expectation, resulting in the loss of productivity.”

(RC: 3: MOP: AS)

The respondent raised three important abstract issues. First, he placed emphasis on the issue of creativity in the case of public sector organisations working in a less stable context, thus requiring constant finding of new solutions and alternatives. Unlike the private sector, the public sector deals with multiple diverse stakeholders who have varied needs, requiring the public sector to adopt new and novel ways of providing services. Boyne (2002) holds that the public sector often faces complexity in dealing with a variety of stakeholders, each of whom places demands and constraints that are likely to be conflicting. Stakeholders in private organisations are more specific and less conflicting.

Second, the respondent held that the outcome of creativity should lead to better functionality by ensuring skill-match. The respondent related skill-match to functionality (physical and basic), as its absence would lead to loss of productivity. Skill-match is a functional and basic organisational concern. Organisations, without a proper skill-match, cannot survive long. The respondent viewed creativity as the broader perspective and skill-match its by-product: skill-match should also vary from time to time according to creative suggestions. The participant cited the example of a mobile engineer and argued that mobile engineers with outdated knowledge and skills would not cope with the newer knowledge and skills unless they could learn new skills and expertise. Similarly, public sector managers with obsolete management know-how cannot survive in a fast-changing world. According to Ryan & Sinning (2010), skill mismatches may create high costs, resulting in a loss of productivity associated with wasted skills. In Bangladeshi bureaucracy, this problem of skill-match looms large. According to Majeed (2011, 5), “[B]ecause of the government’s poor strategic planning, civil servants often held positions that did not match their skills or experience”. For
example, doctors have been recruited to serve as police officers and engineers as magistrates. Thus, the absence of a sound policy on matching jobs with skills is a major reason for the declining professionalism in Bangladesh (World Bank, 1996, 124).

Third, embedded in the above extract is also the notion of change. The respondent asserted that unless the changes that are taking place and impacting on the public administration are addressed, PSL is unlikely to see the big picture. This change is towards knowledge management that focuses on creativity. Bevir and Rhodes also discussed at length the notion of change in the context of dilemmas. According to them, resolving dilemmas is a creative process. The most important thing about change is that it involves a pushing and pulling of dilemma and a tradition, to bring them together (Bevir et al. 2003). In Bangladesh the creative process is slowed down by bureaucratic red tape. Tension arises when a change is felt and the boss is on the horns of a dilemma to accommodate the change based on creative ideas. As the respondent remarked: ‘If I don’t keep pace with the changes taking place around me I would be obsolete and outdated’.

Another senior PSL maintained:

“I admit that creativity has its part to play. But in the context of rule-based bureaucracy, creativity has little to do as the legal framework would not accommodate any changes based on creative suggestions. Under my leadership, we all worked hard to have ISO certification. Subsequently, my office was awarded ISO certification. When I got transferred the new boss took over and opted out of the ISO certification. The new boss thought that government offices should not require any ISO brand as they would not compete with the private sector. Moreover, the new boss was of the view that ISO certification was not covered by the government rule”.

(RC: 1: BPA: JS)

The respondent’s expressions reveal that creativity does not work in isolation. It is interactive and needs motivation and encouragement from colleagues. He criticised the rule-based administrative structure, and expressed his belief that public service should be made an ideal place for creativity. He showed how bureaucrats’ response to ISO was marked by deep ambivalence – on the one hand, ISO was implemented fervently and on the other hand, a few years later it was revoked indifferently.
A number of respondents similarly articulated that bureaucracy hinders creativity. They thought that, as government has diverse stakeholders and stakeholders have varied interests and demands, there should be a provision for high-level cognitive skills in the bureaucracy to tackle these varied issues. According to a report by the National Institute for Governance (2003), as governments focus increasingly on difficult, ‘wicked’ policy problems that demand creative solutions, there is a growing need for very high-level cognitive skills in the bureaucracy. Both policy capacity and strategic thinking (in the form of planning and anticipation, innovation, and seeing the bigger picture) are in high demand in this environment.

**Dilemma 2: Vision versus Implementation**

Dilemmas arise because of the low-capacity of the PSL needed for the implementation of the vision. Absence of proper implementation procedure with a focus on PSL capacity building creates the dilemmas.

Interview data revealed that all the respondents attached importance to the implementation of the ‘Vision 2021’. They shared that instead of high-sounding political rhetoric it is high time to transform the country into a middle income country. The target year 2021 marks fifty years of independence. The respondents were of the view that the framing of the vision represents recognition of the long-term challenges the government has been facing.

From the interview data, it emerged that in the case of Bangladeshi public administration, vision means a framework of the future that reflects the aspirations of the citizens towards an efficient, accountable and transparent system of governance that can facilitate growth and better service to the citizens. Interviewees also articulated that implementation capacity and positive political interventions are important factors for the vision to be meaningful.

All the public administrators interviewed described this vision as a bare necessity and attributed its importance largely to the ability to scan the environment. A midlevel PSL went beyond the simple ‘scanning the environment’ and emphasised:
“A vision is good only when it is translated into practice. An organisation having a good vision with bad implementation policies ends up doing futile exercise. What is required is a fine balance between vision and implementation..... ability to stick to the vision is also important”.

(RC: 2: CA: DS)

Here this respondent is listing the deficiencies resulting from an isolated view of the vision. A vision without roadmap for proper implementation leads nowhere. Mere emphasis on the visualisation of the future, without an implementation mechanism, is like looking at public administration from the wrong end of the telescope. The weak implementation capacity and pockets of inefficiencies in the public sector are common causes of non-implementation of the vision. His concern is to have a proper implementation procedure in place for the vision to be successful. Data also showed that junior bureaucrats were aware of the benefits of the vision:

“In public administration it is easier to devise clear cut short term goals than long-term goals i.e., ten or twenty year vision. Because no one knows what the future will hold. Bureaucracy is a routine job and does not change much over a long period of time. But time has come to rethink bureaucracy in new way. Bangladesh faces challenges of good governance, poverty reduction, leadership capacity building and also challenge of globalisation. In order to address these challenges we need to envision a set of programmes detailing where we want to go”.

(RC: 3: MOP: SAS)

Apart from acknowledging the importance of vision, the above quotation presents a dilemma of the bureaucratic vision – short-term planning vs. long-term planning. Bureaucracy resists changes as the respondent articulated that ‘[B]ureaucracy is a routine job and does not change much over a long period of time’. Public bureaucracy resists adopting newer concepts and adapting to the environmental realities. Thus, bureaucrats circumvent long-term planning. The respondent also shared that embracing uncertainties is somewhat difficult for the bureaucracy as it is not yet considered to be an instrument of change. When asked why it is not considered that way, he replied, ‘we are not empowered’. The degree of discretion a PSL enjoys in making decision is limited because of vertical hierarchy, rules and regulations. Therefore, when it comes to long-term planning, administrative leaders face an awkward situation.
The respondent also raised the significant discourse of governance reforms and globalisation. In order to face the challenges these pose, the respondent placed emphasis on public administration capacity-building, including much-needed leadership capacity-building for the implementation of vision. If leaders are not capacitated, governance reforms cannot be implemented. Official discourses also recognise that without fundamental reforms of core institutions and improvement in public administration capacity, implementation of Vision 2021 will be difficult. The government also recognises that there are long-term challenges that require long-term coordinated efforts (GoB, 2011a). PSL should be able to look to the future and see current strengths, weakness, opportunities, threats and linkages that others may struggle to see. Sir Richard Wilson, the person responsible for the UK public service, identified five major issues in his report, of which the first one was the strengthening of the leadership, which must be visionary and embody the values of the modern public service (Cabinet Office, 1999). Visionary leaders are able to make dreams come true by inspiring people. The alignment of the Government’s Sixth Five Year Plan, the timelines for achievement of the MDGs and efforts to become a middle income country by 2021 indicate that public administration is trying to be responsive to the implication of the vision.

**Dilemma 3: Puppet versus Donors**

It concerns the dilemma between the wrong networking and right networking. The key dilemma that Bangladesh faces as a recipient country is how to uphold national prestige by diminishing the use of hegemonic foreign aid network.

Respondents described that good teamwork and networking is important in terms of concerted action, collaborative behaviours and good information exchange, resulting in the effective public service delivery. Almost all the PSLs I interviewed, expressed positive opinions about the importance of team work and networking in the public sector setting. One junior PSL who once worked in the Zilla Administration (district administration) stated:

“I worked in Barguna district where super-cyclone ‘Sidr’ struck. I had never ever experienced such a cyclone in my lifetime. However, we responded to this catastrophe in a timely way representing an effective teamwork between the government and the donor agencies. An integrated
approach was adopted to address the recovery and rehabilitation. The Armed Forces were deployed to provide food, medicine, and relief supplies for the worst-affected areas”.

(RC: 3: ER: AS)

In arguing his point about the merits of teamwork, this respondent argues that good teamwork is a combination of defined roles and responsibilities, and accountability underpinned by integrative/network leadership. By saying this, he rejects the idea that all aspects of the leadership role within a team are embodied in a single individual. He is of the view that in public bureaucracy, leadership is not a one-person act but collective and collaborative when it comes to service delivery. The long-standing conceptualization of leadership is that it is a leader-centric or individual level phenomenon (Friedrich et al. 2009). However, in public sector, multi-sector collaboration has gained currency because of the complex nature of policy problems that, according to Boone and Hendricks (2009), demand collaborative behaviours, effective information exchange, and decision making decentralization within top management teams in relation to the functional diversity of the team. The respondent’s comment supported the discourse of integrative/network leadership when he explained that ‘an integrated approach was adopted to address the recovery and rehabilitation’. He opposed the view of hierarchical leadership typically found in bureaucracy. Hierarchical leadership is not dynamic and is unable to tackle unconventional problems. As super-cyclone ‘Sidr’ was an unforeseen catastrophe, a single agency approach would not have been able to mitigate it. It was a case of national emergency management that demanded a multi-actor approach. Leadership in the public sector is leadership in multi-actor settings.

The challenges facing public sector organisations today are so complex and multifaceted that no single agency can effectively address them. Now, more than ever, solving public problems or otherwise creating public value occurs primarily through boundary-crossing partnerships (Crosby & Bryson, 2005); hence the necessity of network leadership in public sector setting.
Although one senior PSL acknowledged the importance of networking during the ‘Sidr’, he seemed somewhat frustrated with the role of an anonymous donor, whose donation was the single largest ever made by an individual. He stated:

“One individual donor from a Middle-Eastern country donated over $100 million for the ‘Sidr’ struck people. But he imposed some conditions that required some of the money to be disbursed through a certain bank. I did not agree with him. Bypassing me, he convinced my boss. I was at a loss. My boss compromised with him ultimately.”

This extract raises the question of policy autonomy of the government. On many occasions, government is forced to comply with wishes of the donor agencies, as in the above case. This individual donor pressurised the government to create a network with a certain bank. There are occasions when choosing a wrong network can be ideologically detrimental. Citizens do not expect a wrong image of the government. A joint secretary expressed candidly (Rahman, 2011):

“PRSP is conditionality from the WB-IMF. Some people are doing business with it. This is bogus and is not our plan. Leadership in policy development is important…..”

The above comment unequivocally reflects the negative perceptions of the PSL regarding the PRSP and it bears testimony to the fact that it is a World Bank-imposed document. One important expression that is remarkable in the above quotation is conditionality. It actually calls into question whether or not the government is able to exercise policy autonomy. PSL lost its self-esteem and leadership role in this case.

Again, government has limited options that challenge the assumption of in-house incapacity. Another senior PSL working at the Economic Relations Division cited an example of this:

“Constant pressure from the IMF and the World Bank compelled the government to prepare PRSP. But the government had limited intellectual capacity to prepare the PRSP on its own. The government contacted some national think tanks to do this. Now, the donor-driven PRSP and MDGs
have literally replaced the national PLAN DOCUMENT of the government.”

(RC: 1: ER: JS)

I asked the respondent, ‘why does the government comply?’ He elaborated that:

“We don’t have a range of choices. We cannot go beyond the donor-network. We have no other alternatives than to fall back on the policy conditions of same old donor agencies, in spite of knowing the fact that they are an aid industry. Foreign aid has become a good business. ….. donor agencies are benefiting as the recipient countries must appoint donor-chosen consultants, shipments blah blah…… nearly 20-25% of the foreign aid received goes back to the donor country”.

The above two quotations represent the discourse of ventriloquism – powerful donors seem to have the recipient country dancing to their invisible tune. This exactly happens when recipient countries prepare and present their MDGs and PRSPs according to the requirements and strategies that the donors insist on in order for the recipients to receive funds. Although the current aid approach is based on the so-called country ownership, as enunciated in the 2005 Paris Declaration and the World Bank’s (2010a) Country Assistance Strategy, this concept no longer works, for two main reasons. First, the concept of ownership has become an interesting art of ventriloquism, supplanting the government’s perspective plan. Second, the donor-driven PRSP, having hardly any indigenous roots, has made the country’s central planning mechanism almost redundant. In fact, it is the PRSP that should follow the national plan document. Subversion of this principle is reflected in the PSL’s bitter assertion that ‘now, the donor-driven PRSP and MDGs have literally replaced the national PLAN DOCUMENT of the government’. The ultimate question now is, who owns policy, the donors or recipient countries? Ironically, the ownership has passed to the donors, as donors exercise policy design, leaving little or no room for the recipient countries. Noting such discrepancies, another PSL shared:

“If you give a person fish, you can only feed him for a day. Once you teach him how to fish, you can feed him for a lifetime. Donors will not teach us how to catch fish, instead they want to make us perpetually dependent on them. It is a new form of colonialism.”

(RC: 1: CA: JS)

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One important phrase stands out: ‘It is a new form of colonialism’. This form of colonialism has been created by the international networks of the donors. In the case of Bangladesh, the legacy is grounded unquestionably in the British colonial set up, which has been perpetuated till now. Colonialism has many faces. This indirect form of colonialism is aimed at making countries dependent on the donor-network – a way for the West to get countries to adopt economic and political systems that look like their own. Since political independence, formerly colonised countries have been striving to achieve economic freedom but few have been able to achieve it. It is not surprising that these newly independent countries rely heavily on the international financial institutions to implement their development agenda. These international financial institutions are the outcome of a network controlled by the former colonial powers, albeit expressed in a new form.

**Dilemma 4: Commitment versus Service to Multiple Stakeholders**

This dilemma arises due to difficulties in identifying the true customers out of diverse stakeholders that have multiple demands. On the one hand, customers demand commitment from the PSL and on the other hand, PSL struggles to adhere to the commitment because of the varying needs of the multiple customers.

Interviewees recounted that in bureaucracy, commitment is important for delivering citizen service. If they are not committed to citizen service and remain in their own bubble, then they will pay for it. During the interview, when asked why commitment is necessary and how commitment is implemented in bureaucracy, one mid-level PSL said:

“People hardly follow a leader who has a clear lack of commitment. When I joined the civil service, I had a long-cherished dream to do something for our elderly people, especially belonging to the low income group. Now, I am a policy-level officer capable of doing something for the elderly people. In consultation with my colleagues, I took an initiative for improving the delivery system of the old-age allowance scheme under the Social Safety Net Programme of the Government. Our project got okayed from the Ministry and finally started in the FY 2008-2009. We were all committed to our efforts and ultimately could lower the age limit for women beneficiaries from 65 years to 62 years.”

(RC: 2: CA: DS)
The above account reveals how commitment to a cause could contribute to the social inclusion approach of the government. In other words, it reflects the role of the state in limiting the social risks for citizens. Another senior PSL, however, had opposing views. According to him, increasing benefit level is not the panacea in the public sector, as the customers and stakeholders of the government are diverse. Deciding which citizens to include or exclude is a difficult task, as their demands may be overlapping. He cited an example:

“About a couple of years back, the government, out of its commitment for better electricity service to the Dhaka city dwellers, attempted to implement an electricity distribution policy, which required the closure of commercial shopping centres after a specified hour at night in order to facilitate enough electricity supply to dwellers of the residential part of Dhaka. It caused much frustration in one group of people, leading to two opposite divisions. Business owners protested against the plan, while city residents welcomed it.”

The above example raises the significant discourse of citizens as customers. The dilemmas faced by the government is, who are the customers? Whom does the government consider as customers? Which customer(s) should be preferred? Furthermore, the government faces another dilemma of ‘citizens as customers’ versus ‘citizens as owners’. Frederickson (1997) argues that a government has no customers as citizens cannot be treated as customers. Citizens are the owners of the services. Customers are offered various services but citizens decide what services should be offered by the government. Also, “the constitution vests rights and responsibilities in citizens, not consumers…” (Dobel, 2001, 170).

The interesting debate as to whether citizens are ‘customers’ or ‘owners’ continued when one senior PSL referred to the famous case of the ‘BIKALPA’ project. BIKALPA is considered as a customer-oriented approach towards establishing the value of labour and promoting self-employment opportunity of fresh university graduates (Islam, 2010). BIKALPA (Bishwabidyalaya Karma Sangsthan Prakalpa), meaning University Employment Generation Project provided financial loans to university graduates to buy mini buses that enabled them to start transportation businesses. Sonali Bank funded the project. Its managing director took a special interest in BIKALPA as it was his brainchild. Because of his commitment, this project started off efficiently and capably.
It operated without much difficulty so long as the initiating managing director was there. However, the BIKALPA project fell victim to circumstances when new managing director took over.

Although it was driven by a customer-approach, the project BIKALPA did not meet with success. One of the major reasons for its failure was its inability to identify the genuine customers. Instead of giving loans to unemployed ‘recent university graduates’ (the main goal of BIKALPA), the authority sanctioned loans to student leaders of various political parties. Also, the managing director’s commitment was not shared by all. Hence, the project came to an end when the managing director was removed. This demonstrates that proper identification of the clients and addressing the true needs of the true customers are the key to success. According to Islam (2010, 153), “it [BIKALPA] failed to formulate a mechanism for identifying the appropriate clients…..”

Dilemma 5: Public Interest versus Vested Interest

Bureaucrats often are faced with conflicting scenarios. On one hand, they must serve a particular ruling party interest and on the other hand, they must represent society and uphold the public interest. Also, it gets more dilemmatic with the introduction of confrontational politics.

Interview data revealed that there is always a risk-factor involved in leadership. PSL must have the courage to take any risks in public interest. One senior PSL who was popularly called the ‘Last of the Mohicans’ for taking risks in his fight against the corruption stated that:

“I think risk-taking is more a common phenomenon with the officers working in the administrative department than others. As a Director of the Anti-Corruption Bureau (now reconstituted as Anti-Corruption Commission) I had to deal with anti-corruption cases involving VIPs, which included the cases of ministers and senior bureaucrats. One such case was against a top civil servant of the country. The case posed a serious problem because he still held an important position in the government. That official first requested me to withdraw the corruption charge against him. Having failed in his efforts, he then threatened me with serious consequences. But ignoring his threat I decided to continue the case. The
result was that I had to pay a high price for this. I was deprived of my due promotion, despite having all the potentials.”

(RC: 1: CA: JS)

This extract revealed three important issues. First, there is the issue of public interest and vested interest. The respondent upheld the public interest at the cost of his career. He reminded us of the fact that a handful of civil servants tend to forget the oath they take, during their passing out ceremony, not to do anything against the national interest.

Secondly, this conversation once again made known the existence of informal governance, i.e. patron-client relationship, which always breeds corruption. Officials become powerful when their patron regime comes to power. According to NORAD (2011), the politicisation of administration has left the Bangladeshi public sector divided and weakened.

The third issue raised is the depraved side of power politics. Malicious power politics is a common scenario in the third world countries. Bangladesh is no exception to it. Its overall administrative culture is fragmented. Another junior PSL rightly pointed out:

“In our service, there is the fish culture........ Big fish eats small fish – powerful bureaucrats make circumstances while powerless bureaucrats adjust to them. They are just the clients to the circumstances”.

(RC: 3: CA: AS)

The respondent raised the issue of confrontational politics. This is different from that of the usual one, where the ruling party monopolises the state machinery leaving little scope for the opposition party to contribute to the governance system. On the contrary, this confrontational politics exists within the bureaucracy, where a particular group of PSL becomes influential because of their personalised and ideological relationship with the ruling party leaders. Consequently, this influential group of PSL becomes so powerful that other non-partisan administrative leaders are deprived of good postings, promotion, foreign training and foreign postings. Clearly, there are two opposing ideological divisions in the bureaucracy. The partisan group promotes the narrow party interest and the neutral group tries to uphold the national interest. In this situation,
“…the party rewards a loyal civil servant by quicker promotion, profitable postings and important positions…… or cabinet positions after his/her retirement….” (Islam, 2004, 9).

Confrontational politics in bureaucracy has its roots in politicisation. The phrase: ‘big fish eats small fish’ clearly indicates the conflict and confrontation in the bureaucracy, recalling the regime-dominant model of Carino (1991), where political leadership controls the public service, resulting in the ideological divisions of bureaucracy. Regime changes leave the bureaucracy in a vulnerable position. One considered a ‘big fish’ in one regime may find him/herself in a vulnerable position in another regime.

**Dilemma 6: Motivating Aspects versus Performance**

The dilemma evoked here is which motivation should be recognised – intrinsic or extrinsic motivation.

Reflections and discussion with the respondents reveal that by ‘motivating aspects’ they indicate public service motivation. It is a constitutional obligation on the part of PSL to serve the citizens. Therefore, the respondents asserted that they should always perform in the public interest. When asked to elaborate how public sector leaders view motivation while discharging their duties, one junior PSL had these accounts to share:

“Constitutional obligation provides us with intrinsic motivation to do good for the common people. In our service, we have adequate scope to serve the people as the role of the government is pervasive, with the central government responsible for most public service delivery. Again, as we are overburdened, we need extrinsic motivation apart from the intrinsic motivation”.

(RC: 3; BPA: AS)

There are two important discourses raised by this respondent. First, is the discourse of public service motivation, the purview of which should be extended in terms of incentives, monetary rewards, and also an increase in the salary – otherwise, bright graduates would not join the civil service. Although the respondent recognises the intrinsic motivation (patriotism/constitution), he seems to draw a line between paper motivation and actual motivation in terms of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. He is of the view that motivation does not always lead to increased performance unless
supported by universal motivators, e.g. financial incentives. Niskanen (1971) similarly argued that bureaucrats respond to incentives. The respondent adumbrates that since the salary structure in the public service is lower than that of the private sector, the government’s talent hunting efforts fail to attract brilliant graduates. And, without high quality human resources government performance will be affected. Salary and monetary rewards are the apparent reasons behind this. One study shows that if civil service salary benefits were made equal to those of the private sector, then 60% of prospective candidates would apply for civil service jobs (Jahan, 2006). Thus, there is a need for balancing the dilemmas between the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.

Second, ingrained above is the discourse of overstaffing and understaffing, as the respondent indicates that ‘we are overburdened’. There are two aspects of it: a) ‘overburdened’ because the public sector is centralised and performing too many functions; b) overburdened because the bureaucracy is understaffed. Previous research also endorses the claim that the government is performing too many commercial functions that others i.e., NGOs, PPP (public-private partnerships) could do better (World Bank, 1996, 2010a). It is too overloaded to perform efficiently (Zafarullah and Huque, 2001).

**Dilemma 7: Domestic Reform Strategy versus Donor Reform Strategy**

This dilemma arises when the government’s policy freedom is transgressed as a result of donor intrusion.

Interview data revealed various clusters of meaning about reform strategies. A number of respondents were of the view that in the case of reform management, strategic ability is the long term planning ability. Another cluster of meaning is that it is an ability to adjust the direction of the public service in response to a changing environment, based on external and internal demands. I asked one midlevel PSL about the nature of strategic ability. He responded in the following manner:

“Leaders having strategic ability can be called strategic leaders. They strategize as they know the dictum, ‘the wearer best knows where the shoe pinches’. I know one of my senior colleagues who is gifted with such strategic ability. He has been credited with introducing the concept of a
The above discussion points to the important discourse of home-grown reform initiatives versus the donor-imposed reform agenda. The citizen charter, which was an innovative idea of a senior PSL, depicts how home-grown reform succeeds as it is context-based and demand-driven. In 2008-2009, a team of senior officers chalked out a strategy aimed at better service delivery at a city development office called Rajshahi Development Authority. They developed a number of monitoring tools that ensured time-bound case disposal (specific service for specific citizens) for each customer. It has been replicated successfully in other city development authorities as well under the Ministry of Housing and Public Works. Consequently, the concept of a citizen charter took proper shape from this practice and was introduced across the government offices under executive orders from the Chief Advisor’s Office (now, Prime Minister’s Office). Now, all the government offices have their own citizen charters.

This discourse of home-grown reform initiatives versus the donor-imposed reform agenda is significant as it indicates the tension between imposition and policy choice. Anything that is imposed externally, with a tight control mechanism, might make the recipient governments lose the feeling of ownership. Any idea that is drafted (in a decontextualised manner), packaged and sent out to any recipient country is most likely to prompt an ownership crisis. PSR strategies should respond to real domestic concerns. Simplification of citizens’ lives and business conduct demands different reform strategies for different countries. Therefore, the respondent used a metaphor, *the wearer best knows where the shoe pinches*. Foreign prescriptions cannot cure all the bureau pathology and administrative dysfunctions. Localized truth should be given due importance. According to OECD (2005), reforms usually fail because modernisation efforts must be tailored to each individual country’s context, needs and circumstances. Official discourses also suggest that donors have a tendency to adopt a non-discriminatory cookie-cutter approach. Reform projects that are prepared exclusively by the donors are devoid of ground reality. Projects of these kinds mostly fail and can even
be counter-productive. The case of PEDP (Primary Education Development Programme) II is most relevant. According to the donor’s “inclusion” agenda in the SWAP for PEDP II, there is a provision to promote mainstreaming school enrolment for children with disability or special needs with other children. However, the ministry officials do not consider it as a socially acceptable idea in Bangladesh, due to a number of practical problems related to lack of infrastructure suitable for physically handicapped children and the extra demand on teaching. Moreover, a research conducted in 2009 shows that under same-school enrolment, children with disability are found to drop out frequently because of teasing and bullying (Parnini, 2009; Mahmud, 2006).

Dilemma 8: Accountability versus Good Governance

Although bureaucrats are accountable which is a pillar of good governance, the patron-client relationship often creates dilemmas for the PSL in terms of ensuring good governance. Moreover, there is the dilemma between the donor-version of good governance and local version of good governance.

Respondents revealed that by accountability they meant two types of accountability – a) administrative accountability and b) public accountability. When asked to shed light on that differentiation, one Joint Secretary posited:

“As civil servants, we are accountable in two ways primarily. First, administrative accountability is established through internal vertical structure based on supervisor-subordinate relationship that results in the ‘Annual Confidential Report’ approved by the supervisors on the performance of the subordinates. The Rules of Business is another way of ensuring the accountability of the public administrators. We also call it ‘accountability to administrative hierarchy’. The second type is public accountability. It is a mechanism though which public managers are held accountable to the citizens through parliamentary committees. That means we are accountable both to our colleagues and citizens. But, these are only good guidelines that can be violated in many ways. Supposing there is an unholy alliance between a bureaucrat and a minister and they become partners in corruption, then none dares to hold them accountable. বেড়া যদি ফসল খায় তাহলে ফসল রক্ষা করবে কে? (Who will protect the harvest when the fence itself eats it?)”

(RC: 1: CA: JS)
The above discussion points to the inadequacy of the accountability mechanism in the public administration. As a rule, a PSL has to give account for the attainment of targets to his/her supervising authority – it is a chain of command based on vertical structure. According to Metcalf (1998), bureaucratic accountability corresponds to hierarchical authority. However, dilemmas arise when this bureaucratic chain of command is broken because of patron-client relationship, as observed by the respondent above, who highlights the difficulty of challenging an ‘unholy alliance between a bureaucrat and a minister’. PSL blessed with a personal relationship with the minister bypass their supervising authorities in discharging their duties and tend to throw about rules that usually affect the quality of governance. The consequences have been grave for the grass roots level people in terms of service delivery, causing serious concern for the good governance. As one mid-level public administrator aptly remarked:

“They don’t respond to the needs of the people, they respond to the needs of the ministers. They no longer remain accountable to the system as they enjoy blanket immunity.”

(RC: 2; MOP: DS)

Naturally, a question arises as to why a section of PSL is more prone to this practice. A former minister explains it in the following way (quoted in Osman, 2010, 317):

“..... lucrative posts are distributed among the party loyalists. They are made the Ambassadors, Advisers or the Chairmen of Banks and Constitutional Bodies. At the mid-level, tender, businesses are given to the supporters. At the local level, elderly peoples’ allowance, Vulnerable Group Development (VGD) and Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) cards are mostly distributed to the party supporters.”

The above quotation indicates that there seems to be only one criterion upon which these selections are made – party loyalty. This is an extremely negative form of patron-client relationship. Meritocracy, seniority and experience are not reflected in such cases. According to government rules, VGD and VGF programmes are directed towards poorest of the society. In practice, however, people living below the poverty line are seldom benefited by these programmes as party loyalists (although they are solvent) demand this benefit. Ultimately, this leads to unaccountable governance. It has grave
consequences for the overall governance of the country. Regarding the Bangladeshi bureaucracy, a World Bank Report (2002, vii) commented: large organizations are made up of a pyramid of ‘nested’ patron-client relationships spanning the hierarchy from peon to boss.

Another PSL, noticing the lack of accountability, which is a must for good governance, opined:

“We are not against good governance. But we object to the donors’ way of using the term ‘governance’. In my view, the donors should use it strictly in the realm of economic management. They must respect the recipient country’s systems and governance traditions”.

(RC: 3: ER: AS)

First, the respondent adumbrates that lack of accountability can be equated with bad governance. Campbell (cited in Chapman, 2000, 185) asserts that public officials who are employed in complex government departments have to be accountable to their immediate superiors, the political leadership and the stakeholders at large. It is necessary because accountability prevents the abuse of power.

Secondly, although the respondent accepted accountability as a pillar of good governance, he pointed to the difference between the donor version of good governance and the local version of good governance. The comment by the respondent – [B]ut we object to the donors’ way of using the term ‘governance’ – highlights the challenge of maintaining distinctive cultural, political and administrative environments in which governance is embedded. The challenges include long-standing role conflicts of PSL as they navigate between the obligations of their administrative traditions and donor-prescribed agenda.

Dilemma 9: Integrity versus Corruption

Integrity without proper knowledge creates conflicting scenario for the PSL. Because only well-educated officials have the ability to discern the subtle moral differences.
Conversation with the PSL exposed that ‘integrity’ is a core value of leadership. A number of PSLs seemed to associate the meaning of integrity with that of honesty. The opposing views expressed that integrity and honesty are two separate virtues. One junior PSL has these views to share:

“Integrity and honesty are inseparable. To me, the values of integrity are as same as the values of honesty. I don’t find any difference. At the core of them lies the ‘substance’ and who does not know that a leader without a substance is a hollow man? Integrity is highly important as the administrative leaders have much access to classified government files and documents. They are the custodians of confidential government documents”.

(RC: 3; BPA: AS)

Another junior PSL differed from the above observations:

“If you talk about integrity in public service then I think it is a ‘golden deer’ now. People having ‘integrity’ are difficult to find in public service. People having both integrity and honesty are more difficult to find. I think integrity and honesty are two separate terms. Honesty does not always lead to integrity, although there is no integrity without honesty. An honest person who is well-educated is more likely to have integrity than an honest person who is less-educated. Only an honest and well-educated person has the ability to discern the subtle moral differences”.

(RC: 3; CA: AS)

Two senior public sector leaders working in the public sector training institute seemed to agree with above respondent’s idea. According to their view:

“An honest person with cognisance and good education/knowledge is more likely to have integrity than an honest person with average education/knowledge. A frog that lives in a well cannot have the perspectives of a frog that lives in a river. To the frog living in a well, the well is the entire world. It was raised from birth in a community of frogs that established in him the fact that there is no world beyond the well, without ever really considering that probably this deeply held view is wrong. Undoubtedly, the frog is honest when it preaches that there is nothing beyond this well. But its honesty does not add up to integrity. Here
comes the necessity of integrity training for the human frogs, through which their perspectives can be fruitfully developed”.

At this point, I asked the respondent a supplementary question: Who will be your prospective participants? He replied, “First, I shall aim at public agencies overseeing public integrity, transparency and accountability (e.g. anti-corruption commission, Office of Tax Ombudsman, Comptroller and Auditor General Office), then other public offices”. His answer provides me with a data triangulation point, as another respondent endorsed this stance on the accountability versus good governance dilemma by saying, ‘বেড়া যদি ফসল খায় তাহলে ফসল রক্ষা করবে কে’? Anti-corruption Commission, Office of Tax Ombudsman are the watch dog agencies for ensuring integrity and accountability. What emerged from the respondent’s discussion are the notions of authentic leadership. The respondent placed emphasis on integrity, accountability, transparency and ethical behaviour. According to Avolio et al. (2009), authentic leadership is concerned with transparent and ethical leader behaviour that encourages openness in decision-making.

One mid-level public sector leader articulated:

“We are entrusted with the responsibility for delivering quality service to the citizens with fairness. In return, we must not accept anything from the citizens. This is the spirit of public integrity. Once, I worked in the Department of Immigration and Passports – a public office that had earlier earned a bad name for widespread corruption. Of different vested interest groups, brokers (go-betweens) were mostly responsible for passport corruption. For facilitating a delivery of passport, they usually took Tk. 1000-1500 from each applicant. Brokers could exploit this situation by collecting application forms and selling them to the applicants, although they are actually free and not for sale. On a number of occasions the free applications forms were made unavailable - a fake crisis caused by brokers. Besides, to get gold of an application form, one needs to enter the office. They have police guarding the entrances that ask the visitors too many questions, with unwelcoming attitude. Poor and ignorant villagers usually dared not enter the passport office to avoid the hassle of interrogation. They resorted to the brokers ultimately. Delivery of a passport depends upon the satisfactory clearance from the police, called police verification. The brokers then bribed the police to get the police verification. It was a vicious circle of corruption. To minimise the suffering, we talked to the stakeholders and received their feedback. Based on the feedback we decided to decentralise. And, it clicked”.

(RC: 2: BPA: DS)
The above quotation points to the discourse of decentralisation in public administration, showing how decentralisation successfully breaks the corruption cycle. The passport service has been effectively delegated to several tiers of government. It no longer remains a monopoly function of one single department. Citizens can turn to another department for the passport service if they are not satisfied with one department. The poor people now have this service at their door step, with little trouble. However, one senior PSL urged caution over extreme decentralisation. He argued that:

“Administrative decentralisation without institutional capacity is like putting the cart before the horse. There is a need to carefully consider all the pros and cons before deciding for decentralisation”.

(RC: 1: BPA: JS)

The respondent underscores the need for strengthening institutional capacity to facilitate decentralisation. He also used the metaphor, ‘putting the cart before the horse’ to indicate a possible mismatch. Weak institutional capacity at decentralised levels may result in services being delivered less efficiently and effectively. Capacity building programmes should be introduced first.

All the comments above represent different patterns of meaning among the public leaders – different ways of looking at things. Some distinguished between honesty and integrity and some equated integrity with honesty. In fact, the concept of integrity is still developing. The concept of integrity is vague and ill-defined and often used interchangeably with the words such as conscientiousness and honesty (Becker, 1998; Parry and Proctor-Thomas, 2002). Integrity is like consistent behaviour. It is linked to manifestation of behaviour. According to Kolthoff et al (2007), integrity is acting in agreement with the appropriate ethical values, standards, norms and rules.

However, convergence occurred as well, when the informants recognised the importance of integrity in the public service. Public integrity is vital as ‘we are entrusted … responsibility for delivering quality service to the citizens with fairness’, as asserted in the quotation relating to passport service.


Dilemma 10: Results-Orientation versus Citizen Service

The dilemma is that on the one hand, government still remains interventionist in an attempt to demonstrate that it wants to be results-oriented and on the other hand, citizen services are slowed down because of the rule-oriented control mechanism of the government.

One midlevel PSL shared that so far, bureaucrats had paid much attention to the legal framework, rules and regulations, and control mechanisms at the expense of delivering effective citizen services. However, the time has now come to rethink differently on this aspect. Simultaneously, he also expressed that it is obligatory for the bureaucracy to follow the rules and legal provisions recognised by the constitution of the country. This exposes the apparent incompatibility between being rule-oriented and results-oriented.

deLeon and Denhardt (2000) viewed a proactive and results-oriented image of public leadership as dangerous to democratic governance because results-oriented public leaders can provoke a tendency to break rules and take unnecessary risks, contradictory to democratic values. However, Bevir & Rhodes (2003) consider bureaucracy as the efficient provider of public service. They concede that ‘bureaucracy remains the prime example of hierarchy or coordination by administrative order. ......, it is still a major way of delivering services in British government’ (p.8). This observation is also true for Bangladeshi bureaucracy, in terms of service delivery. Interview data revealed that the Bangladeshi bureaucrats are trying to strike a balance between the two poles i.e. being results-oriented and rule-oriented, concurrently. When asked about this, one midlevel manager expressed:

“We don’t possess the resources we manage. We are only custodians of public resources. We operate in a legal framework. We cannot misuse public money in the name of results-orientation. Also, we have to meet the targets of citizens service. To me, one can achieve result-orientation by being customer-orientated. Moreover, PARC recommendations also show us how to be results-oriented within the legal framework. We are implementing the PARC recommendation, such as ‘One Stop Utility Bill Payment System’. In the public sector, BARI, BRRI DAE, are customer-oriented. Leadership of these public agencies is not only results-oriented but also rule-oriented”.

(RC: 2: CA: DS)
The quotation summarises debates around the need for a balance between results-orientation and rule-orientation and maintains that one cannot, in the name of results-orientation, break the rule. The respondent also reflected that in some public organisations, the result-orientation is better as there is a lesser degree of bureaucratic bottleneck. Reading between the lines reveals that “bureaucratic experience” contributes to inertia and apathy in many contexts (Alkadry, 2003) as reflected in the case of DAE, BARI and BRRI that are controlled by technical cadres rather than the elitist–generalist cadre.

Raised in the above quotation is also the state-centred model of service delivery, which focuses on a ‘One Stop Utility Bill Payment System’. However, alongside the government-owned enterprises, the private sector should also be allowed to participate in service delivery, as the government’s present approach is market-based. According to Jahan (2006), the government’s interventionist role has not changed much, although during the early 1990s it shifted from a state-centred to a more market-led approach. Dilemma is that on the one hand, government is doing too many functions to be results-oriented and on the other hand, citizen services are hampered because of the over-extended nature of the government.

Another respondent asserted that:

“Our government should free itself of some of the duties and responsibility for better results-orientation. I think, ICT as an ‘enabler’ for change can go a long way in this respect. The ‘Digital Bangladesh’ programme acts as an umbrella concept here, contributing to e-governance. Some people already consider it a ‘magic wand’. Railway ticketing, e-tendering and electronic birth registration systems are a few achievements so far”.

(RC: 2: CA: DS)

The above account raises two pertinent discourses. The first is e-Governance. As is evident, e-governance symbolises the sense of renaissance powered by ICT. It has the capacity to overcome traditional barriers, enabling the nation’s socio-economic transformation. People seem awakened to the call of digital technologies as a key modality of governance. Indeed, e-governance can act as a change agent, since it can reach the remotest part of the country, connecting citizens to the public service delivery as the respondent above shared, ‘...ICT, as an ‘enabler’ for change can go a long way in
this respect’. The government of Bangladesh has already implemented some governance projects under the ‘Digital Bangladesh’ programme. These citizen e-services include mobile phone based medical advice/telemedicine, online registration for SSC/HSC students, online student admission by some colleges under the National University and electronic birth registration, among others (BEI, 2010).

Second, the respondent raises the discourse of privatisation, making a link between e-governance and privatisation as he commented, ‘our government should free itself of some of the duties and responsibility.....’. The apparent reason behind this is better results-orientation and the increase in the e-citizen service. Given the overextended nature of the government, efficient delivery of citizen service is not always possible. The tremendous potential of NGOs can be exploited. According to BEI (2010), an e-governance project in the private sector is likely to be maintained and executed faster, since the private sector rewards and incentivizes efficiencies.

Another PSL replied:

“There are instances of results-orientation and achievement lately in the public administration. By results-orientation, I mean quality service to the citizens. Adherence to the citizen charter unquestionably leads to proper and timely citizen-oriented service delivery”.

(RC: 1: BPA: JS)

One mid-level public administrator, however, did not fully agree with this view. He seemed rather particular and argued that the Citizen Charter should itself be updated. He explained:

“For better results-orientation, the Citizen Charter should be updated from time to time responding to the changing context and also on the basis of feedback from the diverse stakeholders”.

(RC: 2: PA: DS)

It is apparent from the above two quotations that the citizen charter occupies a central role in quality service delivery. Also, the second view seems to resonate with the
Gramsci’s (1971) discourse of ‘Organicity’, as the respondent refers to responding to changing contexts – change towards accommodating the demands of multiple stakeholders based on their feedback. Following Gramsci (1971), this respondent articulates that the ‘organic’ is responsive, critical and engaging, which can lead reformist PSL and theorists to tinker less and overhaul more. The need to be inclusive is also important when considering the need to be responsive to citizens. It is true that change management is necessary for administrative reforms.

**Dilemma 11: Hierarchism versus Mentoring**

This dilemma arises because of the incongruity between social norms and bureaucratic hierarchism based on depersonalisation.

Interviews with managers revealed that hierarchism has reached a most unpleasant stage. The interviewees, for example, mentioned that gestures/practices like rising from one’s seat when the boss enters the room, entertainment of the supervisor during official visits and deployment of class III and class IV employees by the boss for personal works have been the common features in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Moreover, the countless addressing of the boss as ‘sir’ has taken on an extreme form. Data revealed that hierarchism is deep-rooted in the bureaucracy. One junior PSL commented that:

“My boss never comes to my office. Instead, his PA phones me to go to the boss’s room. So I need to take the files and carry them to my boss’s room. There were occasions when I had to go to my boss’s room countless times over trifle matters that could have been resolved over the phone. Maybe, bosses find it degrading or beneath their honour to walk down to a subordinate’s room.”

(RC: 3: CA: AS)

The above lines of expression connote a vertical relationship based on hierarchies, which demonstrates a high degree of power distance. This type of relationship can make the system closed, with little or no interaction with the environment. These practices are a legacy of the colonial administration, in which bureaucrats demanded vile subservience.
One senior PSL reminisced about his past days when he first joined the civil service:

“I don’t see any harm when a senior acts like a mentor, takes care of the junior officers and trains them to become good civil servants. Mentoring is all about providing guidance and protection. When I was a junior, I was also treated like that. My superiors were like father-figures”.

(RC: 1: MOP: JS)

The respondent raises the image of bureaucracy as a family, where interpersonal relationship is personalised based on family relationship rather than contract. Superiors act like father figures and groom young officers to become efficient public administrators. In return, the junior officers show devotion and deference to their superiors. Consequently, there exist fellow feeling, cohesiveness and group belongingness in the bureaucracy.

Abedin (1973, 61) argued: “the authoritarian and paternal social values.... partly account for the authoritarian and paternal behaviour and attitudes of the bureaucracy ..... the bureaucratic authority”. It then becomes clear how paternal values (father lays down the rules in the family and looks after the family) are replicated in the bureaucracy.

Another senior PSL sarcastically drew attention to a special type of mentor, whom he saw as highly important in the bureaucratic context. When asked to elaborate he shared:

“We face the most characteristic dilemma from the political executives. We are never ideal to them. In sync, we need to carry out two jobs - serving them and leading the state machinery”.

(RC: 1: ER: JS)

This extract brings to the fore different types of relationship between the bureaucracy and the ministers, from serving to leading. This respondent was also reflecting that ministers are the principals and bureaucrats are the agents who serve them. In doing so, the respondent raised the principal-agent theory, a variant of public choice theory. Thus, the bureaucrat is the subordinate ‘expert advisor and policy executor’, whose major concern is efficiency (‘t Hart & Wille, 2006) based on self-interest (Niskanen, 1971).
The ‘expert advisor’ and ‘policy executor’ acts on the informational advantage and tries to gain advantages from the principal in running the ‘state machinery’. From another perspective, the respondent’s use of the words, *serving them and leading the state machinery*, connotes various aspects of role conceptions and the power relationship in the government, which can also include other types of relationship such as the bureaucracy’s political role or bureaucratic polices, based on a bargaining process or dependency relationship between the ministers and the bureaucrats. The following clusters of meanings were revealed from the discussion with the respondents on the bureaucracy/politics interface.

### 7.4 Dilemmatic Power Relationship in the System of Government: The Bureaucracy/Politics Interface

Various aspects of relationship were identified by the respondents in the governmental system. They asserted that evolving patterns of power, conflict, and cooperation are noticeable in the government. Respondents also indicated that the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats has profound effects on the PSR. In identifying the power relations, the respondents mainly highlighted the dilemmas of power between the two parties: politicians and bureaucrats. In other words, they articulated that there may be politicisation of bureaucracy and bureaucratisation of politics or both at the same time, or even alliance between the two, depending on the regime-character. When asked to elaborate, one retired PSL offered this argument:

“I am not sure who rules whom. Mainly there are two periods - ‘the BAKSAL’ (Bangladesh Krishak Shramik Awami League) period and the period after ‘BAKSAL’. During the BAKSAL period, we have seen the rise of political leadership under the charismatic leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The BAKSAL period had the government service highly politicised. Moreover, losing one’s job was a common fear in the bureaucracy. After Sheikh’s assassination we have seen an old dominant position of bureaucracy, it inherited from the colonial model”.

(RC: 4: RT: PS)

Firstly, the respondent’s account alludes to a power discourse that resembles a game of musical chairs, where the power is contextual and transitory. In the ‘musical chairs’ the
number of chairs is one less than the number of people playing in the game, one unlucky person is removed. The ‘chair’ is the symbol of power in this case. The player left without a chair is eliminated. Bureaucracy and political leadership – both target the sought-after chair. Sometimes, bureaucracy becomes politicised and sometimes, political leadership faces an open revolt of the bureaucracy as the democracy is still in the nascent stage. Bureaucracy became highly politicised immediately after independence when the Awami League that led the independence movement came to power. It was initially democratic in character but subsequently developed authoritative trends as it banned all opposition political parties and replaced the system by a one party rule called BAKSAL. The real holders of power were the political elites as is also evidenced by the respondent: ‘During the BAKSAL period, we have seen the rise of political leadership’. Even civil servants were recruited in such a way that they could be a ‘loyal force’ of the ruling party. The first batch of civil service recruited in 1973 is popularly known as the ‘Tofael Bahini’ (Tofael Cadre) since the recruitment was based on the special criterion – active participation in the liberation war set by Tofael, the political secretary to the then Prime Minister (Osman, 2010). However, this situation was short-lived as the respondent commented, ‘After Sheikh’s assassination…’. The bureaucracy gained its old dominant position following the regime change.

Secondly, the above account echoes with the ‘expression of the power-over’ indicating power as a domination model (Machiavelli, 1961; Bourdieu, 1994; Karlberg, 2005), because the power exercised in the BAKSAL period followed a repressive model (Foucault, 1980) representing adversarial power relations. In the BAKSAL period, there was a ‘power over’ relationship, where power was distributed unequally (one party rule and banning of all other political parties) so that one could dominate the other harshly in the absence of ‘balance of power’. The respondent also endorsed this when he commented, ‘losing one’s job was a common fear’. PSL could not discharge its duty because of low administrative autonomy that had negative consequences for the governance process.

Another senior PSL remarked:

“Although multi-party democracy is taking stronger roots, bureaucracy maintains its own privileged position since the colonial rule, when the
notion of serving under the political leadership was completely unfamiliar. The most remarkable conception of the bureaucracy is the esprit de corps. Continued political conflict paves the way for the bureaucratic dominance. This conflict leads to never-ending confrontational politics. The political leadership is also accused of low capacity, which creates the possibility that bureaucrats will usurp the role of politicians in the policymaking processes”.

(RC: 1: CA: JS)

Firstly, the above narrative depicts the discourse of ‘image IV’ described by Aberbach et al. (1981), where civil servants have an increasing tendency to take up political roles. As civil service ‘lifers’ they spend their entire career in the bureaucracy. Consequently, bureaucratic institutions develop a monopoly of policy expertise and technical knowledge. Whereas the political executives serve for a period of five years, it is the bureaucracy that sticks around. Especially, in Bangladesh, they guide the political leadership towards certain goals and lead their political masters by providing the brains behind the scenes as shared by the respondent: ‘the political leadership is also accused of low capacity, which creates the possibility……’

Secondly, the narrative raises the assumption of opportunism as bureaucracy takes advantage of the political rivalry. The respondent above also had this to say: ‘[C]ontinued political conflict paves way for the bureaucratic dominance’. Bureaucracy is a disciplined and united institution marked by ‘esprit de corps’. Merton (1940) also posits that bureaucratic structure tends to produce esprit de corps, which protects the bureaucracy to defend its interests and entrenched position. Assault on one is considered an assault on the entire civil service. Once the politicians’ legitimacy is in question, they express themselves in a body. When the political confrontation between the position and opposition parties becomes intense, leading to seemingly unending political stalemate, the dominant role in governance is passed into the hands of bureaucrats (Choudhury, 1994).

Thirdly, the respondent also raised the interesting discourse of prisoners and escapees – the political parties in the country seem to operate within a demarcated boundary representing a fragmented political culture of confrontation, from where they are unable to escape. As the respondent observed: ‘[T]his conflict leads to never-ending
confrontational politics’. It appears that PSLs have no option but to get engrossed with confrontational politics that takes place mainly between two powerful political parties. This politics of confrontation is different from what I analysed in ‘dilemma five’. Confrontational politics here refers to the unhealthy competition between the ruling party and the losing party, where the ruling party after winning the election monopolises major state institutions, offering little room for the opposition party to take part in the governance process. The opposition party, in turn, finding no governance role to play, resorts to violence and ‘hartal’ (mass protest involving shutdown of workplaces and shops), leaving the country in a state of paralysis. The respondent reflects that the political institutions are under-performing and problematic, resulting in a ‘prisoner’ problem, whereby the political parties have become prisoners of their own system. This situation cannot be reformed by themselves or their inmates, as they have vested interests. At this point, I asked the respondent, ‘what interventions do you think are necessary to escape from this zero-sum politics between the two major political parties?’ He had this account to share:

“This time the confrontation started back in 2009 over the issue of sitting arrangements when the opposition party wanted seven frontbench seats in the national assembly instead of the five it had been allocated to. Consequently, the opposition party boycotted the parliament. The situation worsened when the ruling party, by introducing a fifteenth amendment to the Constitution, abolished the neutral caretaker administration used to conduct the general elections. The opposition party has now given an ultimatum to the ruling party to reinstate the caretaker system or face the music. So, there is a danger of a full-blown political crisis. National initiatives taken to resolve it have faced repeated failures. Only one alternative is left now. Supranational assistance is required to get rid of this situation”.

The above quote portrays the discourse of local versus international initiatives in resolving the political deadlock. These types of initiatives are not uncommon in the present global village. Earlier, such initiatives were taken in Bangladesh to resolve the political stalemate by Commonwealth and also other international donor agencies. Thus, according to Wood (2000), to pursue the ‘escape’ metaphor, assistance from outside is required. Donors and other external well-wishers can provide that.
A senior administrative leader, who is now on contract with the government, shared with me how ‘high and mighty’ he feels about bureaucracy when it regains its ‘old dominant’ position. In exploring the reasons for the dominant bureaucracy I asked him, ‘What are the underlying causes that make the bureaucracy stronger, despite all the reform initiatives?’ He replied:

“Bureaucracy has its own life – full of dynamism and changes. But it seems that its changes come to a standstill when its prerogatives are challenged. It has developed immunity to any such reforms. The immunity is largely attributed to the military–bureaucratic oligarchy. Out of 41 years since independence, Bangladesh has been ruled by military–bureaucratic oligarchy and other forms of oligarchy for about 20 years. Political systems and civil society had very little scope for their contribution. Traditionally, bureaucracy is overdeveloped in relation to political institutions. ‘Janatar Mancha’ (people’s platform) – a movement led by civil servants in 1996 is a burning example. Politicians depend on the knowledgeable bureaucrats for policy advice.”

(RC: 5: CT: PS)

Echoing the ‘positionality’ theory (Kejar, 2000), the respondent first brings to light the dilemmas of power – it is static and dynamic at the same time, depending on the representation. Bureaucracy does not accommodate change and remains static when its share of power seems ‘unfair’ to it. It remains immune to any reforms that may possibly call into question its continued dominance. The respondent’s ‘military–bureaucratic oligarchy’ accounts perfectly reflect the power relations espoused by ‘positionality theory’. Power relations can change and result in the alliance between the civil and military bureaucracy in times of political crisis.

Secondly, reflecting the positionality theory, the respondent also assumes that power relations can be affected by historical change. The respondent’s comment radiates with this as he shares: ‘….., bureaucracy is overdeveloped in relation to political institutions’. The Bangladeshi bureaucracy is unique in the sense that it fought a war of independence in 1971 along with the political leadership. The bureaucracy has played a central role throughout the history of Bangladesh and to date it continues to play an influential role. Thus, Huque and Rahman (2003, 405) commented: “Starting with the war of liberation
in which several leading bureaucrats participated actively, this group was critical in
rebuilding the war ravaged country after independence”.

Thirdly, embedded in the discourse is the incapacity of the political leadership, which
gave rise to the ‘Janatar Mancha’ (people’s platform) led by the public servants that
eventually dislodged the then ruling party. ‘Janatar Mancha’ served to redefine the
political frontiers. This civil disobedience was led by senior bureaucrats of the
government. It was actually a successful signal of the incapacity of the erring political
leadership.

Another PSL disagreed with the above PSL and commented that it is very difficult to
say for sure who is dependent on whom, i.e., who is more vulnerable. When asked to
clarify, he offered this argument:

“I don’t like the word dependency. Rather, [we] call it a symbiotic
relationship underpinned by the mutual benefit – both politicians and
bureaucrats benefiting from one other. The bumblebee and the flower can
be a suitable example. The bumblebee needs the flower to live to tell the
tale and the flower needs the bumblebee to survive”.

(RC: 2; CA: DS)

Expressions such as ‘bumblebee’, ‘flower’, ‘tale’ are not generally used in power
politics, nor are they commonly used in the organisation and management theory.
‘Bumblebee’ and ‘flower’ are terms used to describe species in biology. According to
the law of biology, a symbiotic relationship exists between the bumblebee (bureaucracy)
and the flower (political leadership). The bumblebee extracts nectar from flowers.
Flowers also need the bumblebee for pollination. Both actors benefit from one another,
and neither becomes dominant. The survival of one depends on the survival of the other.
One actor may not survive if the other becomes dominant. In the case of Bangladesh,
this symbiotic relationship, i.e. the alliance between bureaucracy and political
leadership, was first evident in 1975 when out of 61 posts of district governors (the post
of governor is political), 14 were allotted to senior bureaucrats (Jahan, 1980, 117). Moreover, according to Morshed (1997, 209), the bureaucracy, by extending its support
to the autocratic Ershad Regime, developed a symbiotic alliance during the nineties.
One retired senior PSL seemed to agree with the above respondent. He was of the view that this interdependency of ministers and bureaucrats has significance for the PSR. When asked to shed more light on this, he referred to this example:

The relationship between the ministers and the bureaucrats can be described as husband-wife relationship. The husband (minister) is the master of the house but cannot make independent decisions without consultation with the wife (bureaucrats). He has to get support from his wife for decision-making. All the reform commissions so far, thus, have been headed/constituted by the bureaucrats.

(Ali, 2004, 259)

The above quotation reflects, firstly, the mutual dependence of the political leaders and the bureaucrats, pointing to the discourse of ‘complementarity’, based on the presupposition that politicians and administrators are highly dependent upon each other for getting their respective jobs done (Svara, 2001). This discourse is underpinned by mutual dependence and support.

Secondly, this leads us to the proposition that mutual dependence of the political leaders and the bureaucrats has adverse implications for the PSR, when used negatively, because, if the bureaucracy is reactionary and averse to trying new things, they will find excuses why foreign practices cannot work in their circumstances (Caiden, 1994). Especially in Bangladesh, a professional bureaucracy is always able to persuade the less knowledgeable ministers not to introduce any new administrative practices that might go against their vested interest. Caiden’s (1994) opinion that bureaucracy is basically political, is equally applicable in Bangladesh. It is possible for the bureaucracy to play political games, as Zafarullah (1998) commented, the ministers are not knowledgeable or informed enough to understand the technicalities of policy matters. Using ‘complementarity’ to varying degrees, the bureaucracy has been observed leaving a heritage of change-without-change policies, which suits the motivations of the large part of bureaucracy that has grown remarkably skilled in adapting to and imposing its views on political executives (UNDP, 2007).

However, another senior administrative leader completely disagreed with the previous PSL and put forward:
“Merely appointing bureaucrats as heads of reform commissions does not mean that ministers always act on the advice by bureaucracy and that they are highly dependent on the bureaucrats. Rather, I think clever leaders roll out a carpet on which bureaucrats are persuaded to walk. If anything goes wrong, bureaucrats can easily be made scapegoats for the policy failure. My view is that we as public servants are directed by our Constitution and Rules of Business in dealing with the politicians”.

Embedded in the above comment are two notable discourses. First, it signifies clearly the discourse of political-bureaucratic dichotomy based on an ‘us and them’ relationship – the classical dichotomy. The clear distinction of labour between politicians and bureaucrats represents the functions of politicians as sovereign representatives of political values and interests and the bureaucrat as the subordinate expert advisor and policy executor representing efficiency (‘t Hart & Wille, 2006). The respondent’s view that ‘bureaucrats can easily be made scapegoats for the policy failure’ indicates the distinction between policy formulation and policy execution. The respondent indicates that since every reform commission was headed/constituted by bureaucrats it is easier for the ministers to lay blame on the bureaucrats for reform failure. This dichotomy idea has a tendency to serve the interests of elected officials who can pass responsibility for unpopular decisions to administrators (Peters 1995, 177–178).

Secondly, the respondent conjures up the image of bureaucracy as a set of rules based on the constitution in dealing with the ministers, as he asserted: ‘…public servants are directed by our Constitution and Rules of Business ….’ Bureaucracy is a formal institution representing a set of rules where sets of actors interact (Ostrom, 1986). In a post-colonial developing country like Bangladesh, it is natural for the bureaucracy to be obsessed with rules and regulations. From this legacy perspective, the relationship between officials and ministers is shaped by a tradition of rules and codes of conduct that have evolved over time from Northcote-Trevelyan (1854) to Haldane (1918) (Richards and Smith, 2004) rooted in the colonial past. Public service in Bangladesh is governed by certain rules and regulations. Of these, Rules of Business and The Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1979 are important. Rules of Business define the transaction of business in the government and deal with the relationship between the ministers and the bureaucrats. Bureaucrats’ job as defined by the Rules of Business is to
assist the ministers in: a) policy formulation; b) planning and evaluation of execution of plans; c) legislative measures; and d) personnel management among others (Ali, 2007). The other is The Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1979 which regulates the conduct and behaviour of a government servant, during the execution of his duties. His private life is also regulated by these rules.

Based on the above discussion of politics-administration relationship, the following model can be applied to Bangladeshi scenario:

![Politics-Administration Relationship Diagram](image)

**Figure 7.1 Politics-Administration Relationship**


In Bangladesh, the relationship between the politicians and the civil servants fits in either or a combination of both the typologies described above in the model, depending on the regime character. At present, however, the tendency is more towards the typology of complemetarity/village life, located in the largest space, which will be discussed now (see Appendix ‘G’ for discussion of other quadrants).

The largest space, which is in the middle of the quadrant, represents the situation of politico-administrative complementarity, where both political control and administrative independence are high. In this model, Svara depicts two dimensions: ‘political control’
and ‘professional independence’. The ‘control dimension’ refers to the capacity of politicians in terms of setting and shaping policy environment, while the ‘bureaucratic independence’ represents its technical expertise and professional capacity in helping policy formulation and implementation (Carboni, 2010). According to Svara (2001), a high degree of political control may actually co-exist with a high level of bureaucratic independence. It is a condition in which both political executives and civil servants are dominant because they are interdependent and have mutual respect: political executives have respect for the expertise and knowledge of the top officials and these officials, in return, have respect for political executives. Both politicians and bureaucrats are supportive of each other in the common pursuit of governance. This can also be termed as ‘village life’ (Heclo and Wildavsky, 1974), because according to ‘village life’, top officials and political executives are not in conflict. The village life model and the complementarity model are similar in the sense that the politico-administrative interaction is based on mutual interest for good cooperation and the best policy outcomes. In both the models, civil servants and politicians are seen as having similar values and goals for smooth functioning of governance (Peters, 1987).

The Bangladeshi governance scenario tends to be more in line with this above complementarity/village life model. There is an interdependent relationship between the politicians and bureaucrats, underpinned by mutual benefit.

### 7.5 Conclusion

The above discussion illustrates how the PSL demonstrated conflicting and changing patterns of leadership behaviour when faced with uncertain situations. Emphasis was placed upon the lived experiences of the PSL by illuminating the context. Lived experiences revealed that in most cases, PSL roles are context-based, embedded in contextual dilemmas. Dilemmas provide a powerful lens for exploring PSL roles and values. In presenting their views on the important roles, public sector leaders were found trapped in the dilemmas while discharging their duties because of profound disagreement over political ideology, multiple demands from multiple stakeholders, politicisation of bureaucracy and also mode of governance, as affected by the donors. However, the PSL recognised the importance of such dilemmas because of its influence
in moulding the PSL behaviour. However, apart from the colonial legacy, the Webarian bureaucracy based on the rational-legal structure also shaped their mental-make up. It indicated a complex web of narratives through which they made sense.

The bureaucracy—politics interface and their aspects of power relationship are marked by traditions based firstly on the colonial hangover. Secondly, another broad approach that emerges is a constitutional approach that explains the roles and relationship between the bureaucrats and the ministers. Thirdly, the minister-bureaucrat relationship is also governed by the public choice theory, based on the self-interest. Fourthly, ‘Image IV’ has also been revealed where civil servants have increasing tendency to take up political roles. Fifthly, politico-administrative complementarity is increasingly evident in the Bangladeshi polity, where both the actors are mutually dependent.

Lived experiences of the public sector leaders found matches with these: a) the colonial paradigm in terms of elitist ethos, power distance; b) the classical public administration paradigm in terms of resistance to change, formalism, hierarchism; c) the public choice approach in terms of the utility-maximisation; d) a variant of NPM approach in terms of market-based reforms and; e) a hesitant attempt at good governance approach in terms of response towards citizens’ basic needs and service delivery.
Chapter 8: Answering Research Question No. 2

Bureaucratic Response to Public Sector Reforms: The On-the-Ground Reality

We really don’t care about what bureaucrats think, we care what they do. (Wilson, 1989)

Signpost

The chapter provides a deliberation on how PSLs respond to the reform process, unpacking various reform perspectives held by them towards the overall reform agenda. Respondents discussed their perspectives and approaches relating to reform programmes. Data revealed some convergences and divergences in their belief system, interaction and behaviours towards PSR. Feedback regarding the responses of the PSL to the PSR also discovered contextual and pertinent issues. The data fall under four approaches: the Classical Public Administration Approach, Public Choice Theory, the NPM Approach, and the Responsive Governance Approach/Rights-based Approach.

8.1 Introduction

In Bangladesh, the public sector is still considered to be the main facilitator of solutions to countless problems. Moreover, historically bureaucracy is dominant as it reflects the colonial legacy. Regarding the pervasive role of the Bangladeshi bureaucracy, Siddiquee (1999) stated that the power of bureaucracy is compounded by its virtual monopoly of technical expertise, which puts it at the forefront of public policy-making. It is in the context that administrative leaders’ responses and approaches to the PSR are relevant.

Bureaucratic approaches or perspectives to reform programmes reflect various theories and approaches. In this chapter, I examine the bureaucratic responses to the reform programmes that match specific paradigms/theories. I explore how the public sector leaders respond to the modernisation programmes based on inherited webs of beliefs. By illuminating the “smaller pictures”, i.e., the daily acts, experiences, processes, and procedures of policy making related to public sector reforms (Jain, 2011) and also by
interviewing the PSLs, I find out how reform programmes are responded to by the PSLs in terms of both internal and external pressures that they again weigh up against their belief system. Unlocking their behavioural codes or adhered-to ideas (Ellison, 2011) towards PSR was of particular importance to me.

The term ‘bureaucratic response’ refers to the behavioural pattern (Simon, 1976, cited in Morshed, 1997, 13) and attitudinal approach towards any policies of the government (McFarland, 1970). Basically, ‘response’ is a psychological term used to reflect a behavioural pattern produced by a stimulus. The terms, ‘stimulus’ and ‘response’ are the bread and butter terms in the experimental psychology. Hence, I think that exploring the administrative leaders’ responses and behaviour towards the PSR would enable us to open the ‘black box’ of the PSR.

8.2 Analytical Framework

Data regarding bureaucratic responses to reforms were solicited from one-to-one interviews, focus group interviews and official documents. I resorted to overt observation as well by participating in the meetings. An interpretive approach via discourse analysis has been employed to uncover the PSL belief system and practices towards the reforms. As explained in the Methodology Chapter, the interpretive approach seeks to explain phenomena by reference to the beliefs of individual actors. In adopting this approach, I ascribe beliefs to people only in interpreting their actions (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010), because in the words of Bevir and Rhodes (2010, 1) again, ‘[I]nterpretive approaches …… to understand actions, practices and institutions, we need to grasp the relevant meanings, the beliefs and preferences of the people involved’. Thus, in this research, responses by the PSL towards reform programmes are the outcome and products of their belief systems.

The interviews were unstructured so as to facilitate unbounded exchange of information. The patterns of questions followed the flow of the discussions. These unstructured interviews gave flexibility to vary my questions and to probe for further information on the basis of the interviewee’s previous responses. Examples of probing questions are given below:
How do public sector leaders respond to reform initiatives? Which incentives/disincentives determine whether or not a bureaucrat will support and implement reform programmes?

What have been the workable approaches in dealing with internal and external pressures for reform programmes?

How do you deal with reform programmes prescribed by donors, especially the ones that do not go in line with your own template, given the local contexts and administrative culture?

### 8.3 Findings from Bureaucratic Responses to Public Sector Reforms: Classical Public Administration Approach

I do not rule Russia; ten thousand clerks do
-Nicholas I (quoted in Tullock, 1965)

Discussion with PSL and official texts suggest that the Classical Public Administration approach continues to be the major reform approach. Respondents are of the view that they follow rules and bureaucratic norms; they discharge their duty according to the ‘Rules of Business’ and ‘Secretariat Instructions’; they operate in a power structure that is top-down and hierarchical. There is no doubt that these are the symptoms of the Classical Public Administration approach. Thus Lynn Jr. (2001, 153) argues that the voice of classical public administration still continues to be heard. Regarding time-consuming bureaucratic practice, one junior PSL shared:

“We have too many decision-making layers (hierarchy). A file has to travel up to five stages or more before it reaches the minister (ministerial consent is not always required though). Then it will come back down the line with approval/disapproval following the same process.”

(RC: 3; BPA: AS)
The above narrative reflects four assumptions. The first is the risk-aversion attitude of the officials. Although officials are authorised to take decisions, they tend to push files to the next higher official for decisions. Officials do not make decisions even on trivial matters. The respondent indicates that even routine matters that do not need a minister’s approval are often left for him.

Secondly, this practice reveals a culture of low trust in the bureaucracy. Office-holders seldom expose themselves to decision-making situations, for fear that they would be blamed if the policy goes wrong. According to Zafarullah (1998), the decision-making process is further aggravated by superiors’ lack of trust in subordinates’ ability.

Thirdly, it conjures up the hierarchical image of the bureaucracy, as the respondent referred to the existence of unnecessary layers in the decision-making process. The concept of hierarchism is rooted in the classical public administration model. The bureaucracy’s response is hierarchical, as if they believe in the effectiveness of the time-delay procedure; as if the practice of time-delay would detect or resolve any problem. According to a World Public Sector Report (2005, 7), in the classical public administration paradigm, the governance mechanism is based on hierarchism. In Bangladesh, the classical public administration approach derives its theoretical foundation from the Northcote-Trevelyman Report of 1854 in the United Kingdom. The poor performance of the public administrative system has been due to structural-procedural convolution originating in the traditional model of organising and managing the public sector, based on Northcote-Trevelyman Report (Zafarullah & Huque, 2001, 1388).

Fourthly, the quotation, by pointing to the existence of multiple decision-making layers, symbolises the bureaucratic incapacity in terms of decision-making. Indeed, Bangladeshi administrative efficiency has been eroded due to multiple layers (PAES, 1989). The situation is exacerbated when inadequate and politically motivated recruitment process result incompetent officials in important positions. Moreover, the Bangladeshi civil service is basically a closed entry system. As a consequence, the civil service remains a closed shop, where people start their career at the bottom of the hierarchy (career-based), leaving little opportunity to enter laterally at the mid or top level. This practice prevents the civil service from utilising the professional knowledge
and expertise of outside professionals and contributes to a culture of compliance and mediocrity within (UNDP, 2005). The closed entry system and culture of compliance instead of efficiency and outcome are characteristic of the classical public administration paradigm (World Public Sector Report, 2005, 7). Consequently, the poor quality of decision-making delays the implementation of development projects and reform programmes in Bangladesh (World Bank, 1996).

Another junior PSL endorsed the above view and reflected that the PSL response to any modernisation programmes is in a top-down manner based on hierarchies. According to him, this approach leads senior bureaucrats to have nominal trust in the competences of junior PSL. He further stated:

“It is a bitter pill for us to swallow. We need to restore ‘trust’ by training and by overhauling the rules and processes. Simplification of the system is what we want. Those who are down the ladder must be relied on”.

(RC: 3: CA: AS)

Embedded in the above comment are three important assumptions. First, the PSL places emphasis on the theme of in-service training as a capacity building intervention. Training is essential when it comes to performance. The approval of the Public Administration Training Policy (PATP) is indicative of the significance of the civil service training system in Bangladesh. Government recognised ‘training as one of the major instruments for human resources development’ (PATP, 2003, 7368). The metaphor of a ‘bitter pill’ signifies the lack of recognition of the junior PSLs’ expertise by their senior colleagues, although juniors are properly trained. Despite having all the capabilities of a good public administrator, the junior PSLs need to refer back to the senior PSLs all the time, even for minor decisions.

Secondly, the lack of recognition leads to a low-trust work environment. This is because the senior PSLs have little trust in the capabilities of junior PSLs. Thus, junior administrative leaders’ morale is always low. This low morale has implications for low trust, which again leads to trust taxes – the hidden costs of low trust or absence of trust. Hence, Sydow (1998, 31) comments that: ‘… trust is … a more appropriate mechanism for … organizational life …’. Without trust organisational life falls apart. But in the
bureaucratic paradigm trust was never an issue. As Grey and Garsten (2001, 233) argued, ‘[I]n ideal-type Weberian organizations, trust does not figure explicitly’. Clearly, trust is an issue that separates the bureaucratic paradigm from the post-bureaucratic paradigm in Bangladesh. Post-bureaucratic organisations, by freeing individuals from the shackles of bureaucracy, emerge as fine soils for growing trust-based cultures (Adler, 2001; Maravelias, 2003). However, in the case of the Bangladeshi administrative superstructure, the issue of ‘trust’ is rooted in the colonial heritage. In this regard, Heginbotham (1975, 34) stressed that colonial administration was dependent in its day-to-day operation on native subordinates but the trust accorded to them was minimal. Thus, the absence of trust became a ritual of the colonial administration that still exists today in the present day bureaucracy.

Thirdly, the respondent raised the assumption of a top-down approach in bureaucracy. He seemed to take the top-down approach for granted and compared it with a ‘ladder’. He thought along that line because he believed he would also go up the ladder to hold a top post. At the same time, the respondent insisted on attaching due importance to those who are lower down the ladder, so bureaucratic targets (reform targets in this case) can be fulfilled. According to Zafarullah (1998), status distinctions are very conspicuous in the Bangladeshi administrative system. Those who are at the top enjoy prerogatives.

Another midlevel PSL in the same vein exemplified that:

“When I tried to introduce ‘5S’ in my office I confronted resistance from my senior colleagues. They questioned its legitimacy as it is a Japanese TQM concept. So, I had to get it approved by the appropriate authority. Even then, some of my senior colleagues raised the question of its utility and claimed that the old system had been better”.

(RC: 2; BPA: DS)

The respondent raised the classical image of bureaucracy – resistance to change, legitimacy and legality. The respondent brought to the surface the discourse of a paradigm-shift that called for looking at management problems in a creative way, as opposed to merely adopting the cook-book (rules of business, government servant conduct rules) approach. He reflected how the old system might want to maintain more
formal patterns within public bureaucracy by upholding the status quo. Drucker (1995) also observes that the reason largely given for this embarrassment of non-results is resistance by the bureaucracy. Max Weber (1968) regards stability as the primary objective of bureaucracy. Also, we can hardly deny that the set of formal rules and the multi-layered hierarchies tend to stifle public innovation (Halvorsen et al., 2005, cited in Sørensen & Torfing, 2012, 2) such as 5 S.

Secondly, the respondent pointed to the mighty image of centralised, rule-oriented bureaucracy as he described, ‘I had to get it approved by the appropriate authority’. He conveyed that it is often difficult to alter the design of the bureau – the same old top-down approach is in charge everywhere. In the classical model, the organisation of the public sector is generally assumed to be based on centralised command and control – one of the Webarian principles. Weber placed emphasis on control from top to bottom in the form of a monocratic hierarchy, that is, “a system of control in which policy is set at the top and carried out through a series of offices, with each manager and worker reporting to one superior and held to account by that person” (Pfiffner, 2004, 1). In the above interview quotation, bureaucracy seems to be laced with disinterestedness. Disinterestedness, in this case, refers to bureaucratic inertia (in the name of impartiality) towards new concepts like 5s. Bureaucratic impartiality – a principle of classical public administration (World Public Sector Report, 2005, 7) – can be personalised by bureau holders in the way they want, which is evident in the implementation process of the ‘5 S’.

Thirdly, the comment reflected that a particular (specialist) bureaucrat’s preference for embracing a donor-prescribed management philosophy (5S) was not supported because of factionalism in the bureaucracy. The conflict, though feeble, between the specialist cadres and the generalists of the BCS (administration) cadre often leads to reform failure, even if the reform idea is applicable to the local context. A study conducted by Rahman (2007) on local governance reforms revealed how an overwhelming majority of senior generalist bureaucrats acknowledged that most Upazila Parishads (a local government tier) could not perform, mainly due to the reluctance and reservations of the generalist bureaucrats.
One midlevel PSL articulated that since independence, every reform initiative had to face ‘bureaucratic self-preservation’. When asked to exemplify, he shared:

“Let us take the case of ASRC. It was not imposed by the donors. It was home-grown and constituted to respond to the national demand – an attempt to lay the foundation of a modern public bureaucracy to help build a war-torn country. Despite this, its recommendations were shelved. It was like the mountain giving birth to a mouse. It is a typical case of bureaucratic imperialism”.

(RC: 2: CA: DS)

The respondent talked about the interventionist character of the bureaucracy. They can even get in the way of the policies for national development, if the mechanism for doing so goes against them. Clearly, this raises the discourse of bureaucratic imperialism based on administrative empire building. This administrative empire building is concerned with the ‘politics of allocation’ (Holden Jr. 1966). According to Tullock, bureaucratic imperialism is a process whereby “all bureaucrats, whether successful or not, thoroughly approve of an expansion of the whole bureaucracy” (1987, 136). Holden Jr. (1966) defined bureaucratic imperialism as inter-agency conflict in which agencies try to assert permanent control over the same jurisdiction. In the case of ASRC, as the respondent observed, it was because of bureaucratic self-preservation that its recommendations were shelved. The bureaucracy sought to take over another agency. For example, the bureaucracy, especially the erstwhile Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) group, strongly opposed the idea of turning the bureaucracy into a single, classless, unified grading structure from a bureaucracy that was divided into too many distinct entities with artificial walls built around them and that was excessively class and rank-oriented (ASRC, 1973; Zafarullah & Khan, 2005). The senior generalist civil servants, i.e. the CSP officers, demanded a big share of certain posts in different specialised services, in the field administration and also in the ministries. Although ASRC had a grandiose vision guided by a new social philosophy, it had to be shelved due to bureaucratic self-preservation. Hence, the respondent used a metaphor: it was like the mountain giving birth to a mouse. By this he meant a small outcome was yielded by impressive and extraordinary initiative.
Picking up on the thread of previous conversation relating to bureaucratic imperialism, another midlevel administrative leader offered some food for thought:

“Such bureaucratic imperialism is also widespread in the relationship between bureaucrats and the citizens. Citizens get treatment from the bureau depending on the degree of their obedience. While distributing the resources of the publicly funded projects to the citizens, bureaucrats exercise their authority in a preferential manner”.

(RC: 2: CA: DS)

The above comment raises the chameleon-like image of the classical public administration paradigm. In Bangladesh, this paradigm has a propensity to change colour depending on the public signalling in response to contexts. The respondent observed that citizens get treatment from the bureau depending on the degree of their obedience. This is very much in line with classical public administration, where the citizen-state relationship is characterised by ‘obedience’ (WPSR, 2005). This is not personal obedience to the bureaucrats. Ideally, this obedience is to the constitution. However, this ‘obedience’ is re-interpreted in ways bureaucrats prefer when it comes to distributing state resources to the citizens. Bureaucrats seem to know better than the citizens about their needs and priorities. They consider themselves as the preservers of the hapless citizens. On the other hand, bureaucrats always favour the elite citizens with whom they share common backgrounds (social, educational) (Zafarullah, 1995). Moreover, bureaucrats are indoctrinated to have as little direct contact with the masses as possible (Khan, 1998, 41) on the ground of impartiality – a key attribute of classical public administration (WPSR, 2005) and also reflecting the colonial legacy of treating citizens as minors/children (Khan, 1998).

That the bureaucracy tends to transcend the politics-administration dichotomy wall is apparent as the respondent noted, while distributing the resources of the publicly funded projects to the citizens, bureaucrats exercise their authority in a preferential manner. The comment denotes discretionary power on the part of the civil servants. Regarding the allocation of benefits to the citizens, a foreign expert working on a deep tube well project in Northern Bangladesh observed how the administrative discretion was used (Hartman and Boyce, 1990, 257): “I no longer even ask who is getting the well. 100%
of these wells are going to the big boys. ........... First priority goes to those with …clout: the judges, the magistrates. The members of parliament…..”

Zafarullah (1995) also noted the bureaucratic domination over policy decisions. Ideally, the classical public administration paradigm holds that: a) bureaucracy is the neutral expert and should not get involved in shaping politics b) political executives should not get involved in administration (Svara, 1998). However, in Bangladesh, oftentimes this politics-administration dichotomy seems to get blurred. Aberbach et al. (1981) observed the growing involvement of civil servants in what had traditionally been described as ‘political’ roles. Lynn Jr. (2001, 151) also found “in the habits of thought characteristic of classical public administration recognition of the policymaking role of civil servants........... the inevitability of administrative discretion.....”. Thus the Bangladeshi bureaucrats are increasingly enjoying administrative discretion in delivering citizen service. Paraphrasing from Montjoy and Watson (1995) it can be said that in Bangladesh, bureaucrats prefer to have a one-way dichotomy that keeps political executives out of administration but allows bureaucrats to be active in policy-making.

8.4 Findings from Bureaucratic Responses to Public Sector Reforms: Public Choice Approach

Interview data revealed different clusters of meaning about PSL response and behaviour towards reforms. A number of respondents were of the view that apart from their official position, they have their personal life: they are concerned about their rank, power and kudos; they seek to advance their career opportunity; they also think about the pay, incentives and entitlements with which to support their families. The bottom line is that they respond to reform programmes in terms of their concerns, constraints, incentives and interests based on personal as well as official factors. Thus, interview data found a match with the Public Choice School (Niskanen, 1971, 1975; Tullock, 2006; Buchanon and Tullock, 1962): bureaucrats rationally respond to the incentives and constraints that they face. From this perspective, bureaucrats are perceived as rational individuals making decisions to maximise their self-interest based on incentives. They may also work against public welfare in an effort to maximise their budgets and are prone to policy-making tasks.
When asked about the ways of dealing with reform programmes prescribed by donors, one midlevel administrative leader shared:

“We are not angels. We are human beings, we have our preferences and choices to make for our sustenance. We try to implement modernisation programmes that contribute to national development. We also try to save our skin. When our interest is at stake, we act in a body. Bureaucracy is like a chain. The strength of bureaucracy lies in its unity. We have also our professional association”.

(RC: 2: PA: DS)

At this point, I asked him, ‘how do you make your choices?’ He answered:

“We make our choices based on the wealth of information and data that we have at our disposal. Ministers are transient. When the new ruling party assumes office they seek information from us. Eventually, we analyse and interpret the data for them in a bureaucratic spirit. For example, regarding the e-Government strategy, our choices for creating an e-Government Focal Point in every ministry won.”

Firstly, the above respondent in his first quotation rejected the machine metaphor of the bureaucracy by describing, ‘we are human beings, we have our preferences…’. Bureaucracy cannot be programmed like a machine, say, a computer that can only take data input within given categories corresponding to its programming. Rather, bureaucrats act purposefully to maximise the interest of the bureau. They respond to situations based on their promotion, career advancement and utility maximisation. They are not passive and unselfish. According to Bension (1995), bureaucrats are people who have their own concerns, their own interests, and their own views of what is right and wrong.

Secondly, the respondent brought the notion of ‘self-interest’ to the fore in dealing with modernisation and reform programmes prescribed by donors, revealing the PSLs’ utility-maximisation character. The respondent seemed to draw a line between their own interest and the public interest, especially when their interest is at stake. In the same vein, Niskanenian analysis asserts that without a carefully designed incentive structure, public bureaucracies usually act in their short-term self-interest and may work against
public welfare in seeking to inflate the budgets of their bureaus (Niskanen, 1971). According to this approach, public servants are prone to act for themselves rather than for citizens (Brennan, 1996; Udehn, 1996). Therefore, a large body of literature suggests that the incentive structure must be sponsored in such a way that the bureaucracy’s interest can act in ways consistent with the public interest. Again, getting the incentives right is also difficult for a resource-constrained country like Bangladesh.

Thirdly, using the *chain* metaphor, the respondent raised the discourse of ‘esprit de corps’ (esprit de corps has also been discussed in section 7.4, hence a data triangulation point) - a ‘sense of camaraderie’ what Meier (1993, cited in Golden, 2000, 185) calls cohesion. Bureaucracy in Bangladesh is highly cohesive and organised. In fact, this ‘esprit de corps’ is instilled in their ethos during the Foundation Training Course – a basic and compulsory career training that all the civil servants are required to undergo. One of the salient objectives of the Foundation Training Course is to foster esprit de corps.

The above respondent, in his second quotation highlighted the usage of information and data as leverage as he pointed to a *wealth of information and data*. As the political executives take office for a fixed term, they turn to the bureau for data and interpretation of data for policy-making. The bureau holders, as the keeper of records have the propensity to present the data in an opportunistic manner to their sponsors. The bureau is in an advantageous position because it knows what works best in which position, based on the data and information. Information asymmetry exists, as the bureaucracy possesses relevant information that the sponsor does not have. This situation of asymmetrical information (for sponsors) allows the bureau to behave in ways that enhances opportunism and budget-maximisation (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Niskanen 1994). This budget-maximisation effort of the bureaucracy was exemplified by the respondent when he cited the case of the e-Government strategy. The e-Government strategy was sponsored by several international donors, such as UNDP, CIDA, and DFID among others. The administrative leaders were very enthusiastic about the implementation of this programme as they could perceive the incentive structure associated with it, despite the fact that traditionally, they have inertia to the use of computers as they are not technically skilled. A study by Rokon-Ul-Hasan (2011) reveals that the orientation of ICT and technical skill level of the public officials is quite low. However, given the
budget maximisation prospect, they seemed to really take an interest in the e-
Government strategy. They successfully bargained for a higher budget and further
resource allocation, which resulted in the establishment of many technical projects and
offices. For example, monetary incentives were provided by setting aside 5% of the
ADP (Annual Development Programme) allocation of each ministry for ICT and e-
Government projects. It is true that extracting a higher budget than the bureau needs for
providing the public services and goods is a salient feature of the public choice theory
(Ostrom and Ostrom, 1971; Niskanen, 1971).

Another junior PSL seemed dissatisfied with the label of self-interest. According to him:

“People have values. We also have our values. This does not mean that we
are selfish. Competition between competing values is not unlikely”.

(RC: 3: PA: AS)

The junior PSL raises the discourse of value pluralism (Berlin, 2002). In doing so, he
rejects the existence of any superordinate value. He appears to support the proposition
that values cannot be inviduated. However, at the same time, he opines that we have our
own values. He supports the competition among the values, which has implications for
the public choice theory. Values held by other interest groups are also no less important
than the bureaucratic values. Genuine values are many and can come into conflict with
one another. The evaluative differences between the competing values make the case
stronger. What matters in conflict resolution is how the values relate to one another in
the context of choice-making, in terms of weighing the same against one other. The
respondent recognises the co-existence of competing values, including the bureaucratic
value preferences, in that different combinations of many values would constitute
valuable ways of citizen life because bureaucratic values do not always get priority.
Thus, the respondent makes the case that bureaucracy cannot be called a selfish entity.
Like other entities, bureaucracy has self-interests. However, that is not tantamount to
selfishness. According to Ostrom and Ostrom (1971, 205), the word “self-interest” is
not equivalent to “selfish”.

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8.5 Findings from Bureaucratic Responses to Public Sector Reforms: NPM Approach

Findings from the respondents reveal that there is a significant presence of NPM overtones in the bureaucratic response towards the reform programmes. Respondents disclosed that on a number of occasions they acted in the spirit of NPM (Hood, 1991; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Ferlie et al. 1996; Pollitt, 2001) towards the modernisation programmes. All the respondents indicated that they responded favourably to these reforms: decentralisation, contractualism, privatisation and entrepreneurship, deregulation, performance management, public-private partnership, downsizing and the citizen charter. However, they shared that some of the NPM-based reforms could not be successful because of the country’s system and context and also its poor economic conditions.

Acknowledging the NPM spirit, one PSL who once served as a chief executive of a zilla parishad (district council, a tier in the local government) reflected:

The performance appraisal system (Annual Confidential Report) in the civil service is a one-way traffic. It is an antiquated process in which supervisors alone can rate the subordinates. Actually it should be like a mirror where an employee can see his/her performance reflection. I held a meeting with my colleagues regarding multi-source feedback. They at first seemed tight-lipped. As I raised points for a new system they looked convinced that the method would provide a complete perspective of employee performance by utilising feedback from all stakeholders with whom employees interact. My boss also agreed with me. He signed the office order to introduce the new system. Now, we have a bi-monthly performance appraisal system instead of an annual system, based on multi-source feedback. Initially, it was initiated in the training wing only. Later on, it was replicated in all other units”.

(RC: 2: BPA: DS)

The respondent drew upon a notion of a 360 degree appraisal system and new demands and how new demands for different roles emerged. These different roles require involvement of the employees as the helpers of colleagues, in terms of peer feedback
regarding their performance. He rejected the idea of depending on the superiors acting as the sole judges of the subordinates. Besides, supervisors may be biased towards employees, leading to the incorrect reflection of the subordinate’s performance. By pointing out the subjective biasness of the earlier system, the respondent advocated the 360 degree appraisal. In doing so, he used a metaphor to compare performance appraisal with a mirror: a mirror where an employee can see his/her performance reflected. The mirror (360 degree appraisal report) can tell where one stands in terms of performance. If there is a wrong reflection in the mirror, feedback from peers will motivate the employee in question.

Two senior public sector leaders shared that the multi-source feedback is a simple case and it constitutes a small part of the PSR. Other PSR issues like liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation are equally important. At this point I asked one of them, ‘are you not using the language of the donors?’ The senior public sector leader, who once worked in the Ministry of Agriculture, stated his view:

“I am the last person to do that. Believe me, in the agriculture sector, Bangladesh was an anti-market country. There is one single factor that expedited Bangladesh to embrace market-based reforms. That is the famine of 1974. The market-based reform worked well. Donors helped us with technology. The whole sector was once dominated by BADC (Bangladesh Agriculture Development Corporation). But it was not doing justice to its name. Farmers faced difficulty in procuring fertilisers, seeds and irrigation equipment in a timely manner. Crop production is a season-sensitive issue. One has to make hay while the sun shines. This perceived crisis led the government to introduce reforms in the agriculture sector. Subsequently, two rounds of reforms took place. The success of the first wave of reforms led to the second wave of reforms. These two waves of reforms included mostly privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation”.

The respondent, firstly, portrayed how the government responded successfully to pressure both from internal and external stakeholders by adopting market-based reforms. Since independence in 1971, Bangladesh has been struggling due to a chronic shortage of food and poor infrastructure, caused by devastating war. The famine of 1974 aggravated the situation. Simultaneously, donors also prescribed the introduction of
Agricultural reforms. A DFID funded study conducted by Cabral et al. (2006) singled out two forces that propelled reforms – one was pressure from the main aid donors, above all USAID and the World Bank, and the other was domestic concern. The respondent was also of the view that the government introduced the market-based reforms, moving away from the controlled approach to liberalisation, as a logical response both to the donors and the perceived crisis in the agriculture sector in terms of ever-decreasing agricultural production caused by the failure of the BADC-controlled distribution network for the agricultural inputs. At that juncture, local needs and donors’ pressure for agricultural reforms seemed to converge perfectly. It was a perfect example of donor-recipient harmonisation and co-ordination.

Secondly, this respondent illustrated how a protectionist government turned to a liberalised one in respect of the agricultural reforms. In addressing the discourse of liberalisation versus protectionism the respondent extolled the government’s policy of opening up the agriculture market. Indeed, the government’s liberalisation policy led to successful institutional changes resulting in the increased agricultural production. Consequently, Bangladesh became self-reliant in food grains within a short time through phased implementation of reforms (Palit, 2006; Cabral et al. 2006). Because of the government’s earlier protectionist policy, there was a ban on private imports of agricultural inputs like fertiliser, seeds, pesticides and irrigation equipments. BADC was solely responsible for the import and wholesaling of all agricultural inputs, and administered price controls and licensing for their retail distribution (Cabral et al. 2006). The absence of any competitor in the market made the BADC over-confident because peasants had no choice but to depend on them. Its poor service delivery added to the misery of the peasants. In this context, the government in 1976 started the process of market reform (Harriss & Crow, 1992) based on liberalisation of imports of inputs and private trading in grain market. It has been calculated that by 1992 Bangladesh was producing between 20% and 32% more rice than it would have done had the reforms not taken place (Ahmed, 1995; Cabral et al. 2006).

Thirdly, the respondent raised the discourse of ‘logical incrementalism’ in respect of reform strategy and pointed to the fact that logical incrementalism as a strategy was successfully applied in the agriculture sector. The respondent stated: ‘…..The success of first wave of reforms led to the second wave of reforms …’. These two rounds of
Reforms are incremental as they followed step-by-step liberalisation of markets for agricultural inputs that allowed for learning, monitoring and adjustment to developments in the markets (Ahmed 1995; Cabral et al. 2006). In Bangladesh, the incrementalist approach proved successful as its capacity is limited compared with the developed world (Cabral et al. 2006). A growing body of literature also suggests that ‘logical incrementalism’ that is evolutionary and intuitive best suits developing countries with limited capacity (Quinn, 1978; Jefferson and Rawski 1995).

Fourthly, embedded in the above quotation is the discourse of national interest. According to the respondent, national interest should be the basis for interaction with the donors. Reform is implemented faster when it is linked to safeguarding national interest. The respondent provided a concrete example of the famine of 1974, when food security was at stake. The magnitude of this food crisis prompted the government to introduce agricultural reforms that happened to find a match with the donors’ market reform agenda. However, the government applied the agricultural reform agenda with adaptation to fit its own context.

One academic who also was a member of a reform commission held:

“The agricultural reform programmes were a huge success. One can easily tell the difference by looking at the production of rice before and after the reforms. Previously, we had one cropping. After the second wave of reforms, we had double cropping with the winter cultivation of the Boro crop”.

(RC: 6: AC: RM)

The above quotation raised the necessity of modern agricultural technology, which contributed to multiple cropping. Winter is a dry season in Bangladesh, when rain fall is minimal and the water level drops. The introduction of modern irrigation equipments and HYV seed positively sensitive to the winter season led to crop-diversification, resulting in the increased production of rice. The World Bank (1982) also emphasised the use of technology in terms of irrigation equipments and HYV seed.

In the same vein, another PSL who once worked in the Food Ministry stated:
“We are reaping the benefits of the reforms. As of today, we are self-sufficient in rice. Our godowns are full of food grains. We are planning to construct more storage for preservation of food grains”.

(RC: 2: MOP: DS)

His line of argument radiates with the notion of reform benefits. This, in turn raises the discourse of food sovereignty. Essentially a political concept (Windfuhr and Jonsen, 2005), food sovereignty refers to people’s right to control their basic food systems based on cultural diversity (Via Campesina, 1996; cited in Lee, 2007, 5-6). Rice is the staple food in Bangladesh. In line with its own food culture, Bangladesh has emerged as a food sovereign country by applying agricultural reforms in a phased manner. The respondent is of the view that the country is producing crops based on its own food habits and not according to the choice of the donors.

One policy level PSL working in the Ministry of Public Administration held:

“In fact, in our case a variant of NPM suited to our need was applied. My view is that privatisation (private investment) would generate competition in the market. It also leads to social development by supplying life-blood to the economy in terms of generating new jobs”.

(RC: 1: MOP: JS)

Along the same line, another junior PSL working in the Ministry of Public Administration drew attention to successful reforms carried out in different Ministries/Divisions and parastatals and referred to some reform accomplishments:

“Borrowing best practices from the private sector has multiple benefits. In a developing country like ours, the main concern is resource mobilisation. The public sector requires resources to be injected for delivering public good and services. We have a resource gap. Through partnership between private sector and public sector we can easily address the gap. We have provided incentives, i.e. tax-free import for the private organisations. The result is not unsatisfactory. For example, the success of the BOO model in the power and energy sector is a case in point”.

(RC: 3: MOP: AS)
The above two quotations raise three issues. The first quote firstly denies the wholesale application of NPM approach; rather, the respondent’s account indicated the tailor-made application of NPM depending on the country context (context-based privatisation). In doing so, he raised the discourse of comparative public administration, whereby some concepts are applicable worldwide with little adaptation to local contexts; they should be adapted as public policies with reference to the specific cultural contexts in which they unfold. While commenting on the perspectives of comparative public administration, Jreisat (2011, 834) asserted, “with little adaptation to fit the context, these concepts are applicable to public administration in any country, ……”.

Secondly, the first quotation also raised the issue of social development triggered by privatisation. The respondent adumbrated, ‘[I]t also leads to social development by supplying life-blood … in terms of generating new jobs’. The research findings by Islam and Farazmand (2008) also confirmed the positive effects of privatisation on social development in Bangladesh. The positive effects of privatisation traced by this research on social development included improvement of the standard of living, better education of the children of private employees, and reduction of social unrest and violence.

Thirdly, the second quotation raised the assumption of public-private partnership (PPP) as the respondent referred to the BOO (build-own-operate) model in the power and energy sector. According to a study by BEI (2010), PPPs have been introduced since the 1990s and eventually have become a popular means to finance large projects. Around 50 initiatives in telecommunication, power plants, land port and other physical infrastructure projects have been successfully implemented so far. Especially in the power sector, the BOO model has become very popular under the public-private partnership. At present, Independent Power Producers (IPP) are operating under the BOO model in Bangladesh. This model has become popular because, since the private sector invests in the infrastructure development, there is no need for the government to take loans and pay interest (Ministry of Finance, 2009).
8.6 Findings from Bureaucratic Responses to Public Sector Reforms: Responsive Governance Approach/Rights-based Approach

Data from the respondents opened the line of discourse that the World Bank and international donors consider reform in the Bangladeshi public sector under the overarching framework of good governance reforms. Data also revealed that the rights-based approach (RBA) is promoted by UN agencies through the Millennium Development Goals. The good governance reforms and RBA continue to animate the present reform scenario. Data from the respondents also revealed that good governance reform promotes the concepts of participation, transparency, accountability, promoting rule of law and ensuring the basic rights of the citizens. A majority of the respondents identified corruption as the villain that hinders the governance process. In this regard, one retired PSL commented that a transparent public financial management system should be in place to curb corruption. When asked to elaborate, he had this account to share:

“I mean every financial transaction should be audited. There should be a computerised accounting system. Also, a third party evaluation is necessary to prevent corruption. Public procurement is prone to corruption. RIBEC, where I worked did an excellent job by providing a computerised budgeting and accounting system”.

(RC: 4: RT: PS)

The above quotation raises two assumptions. The first is the assumption of anti-corruption strategies that can ensure responsive governance. The respondent favours the introduction of a computerised accounting system and third party evaluation as an anti-corruption strategy, because he thinks that corruption tends to breed in the absence of a proper check and balance system. An environment of unrestricted power and monopoly is conducive to the growth of corruption. According to the respondent, electronic discovery can identify any questionable financial transaction based on false invoices/vouchers and thus is able to prevent any procurement fraud. Moreover, he considers that first and second party evaluation is not enough. A certification from third
party evaluation is essential. By third party evaluation, the respondent seems to denote the involvement of donor evaluation, since the money comes from them.

Secondly, the respondent raised the discourse of good governance in the financial sector. He cited the example of a DFID-funded financial reform project called RIBEC (Reforms in Budgeting and Expenditure Control). The respondent described how the government benefitted from the RIBEC project. This project succeeded as it attempted to build on existing systems, rather than creating new ones (World Bank, 2002). When the RIBEC started, the overall scenario of the public financial management was repetitive and mostly manual. According to the World Bank (2002), the Bangladesh government lacked adequate timely information on public expenditure. The scenario started to change with RIBEC’s introduction. Though it met some failure at the initial stage, it quickly made a remarkable come-back based on an evolutionary approach and learning from the failure. One of the reasons behind its success was its adoption of a team-based approach to implementation, with GoB staff in the driving role, as the literature suggests. Another reason for its success was that it fine-tuned its strategy when it reached the second stage matching the needs of the second stage. The main outcome so far includes computerised budgeting and accounting system, supporting economic analysis and budget forecasting, training of over 500 accounts staff, reporting and presentation of government accounts and updated financial rules (World Bank, 2002; World Bank, 1996). In Bangladesh, public procurement accounts for 70 percent of the national development budget, and hence is a key area for good governance (Ellmers, 2011). RIBEC did an excellent job in this regard.

An observation from a junior PSL depicted how inappropriately framed regulations lead to public suffering:

“Donors often paint Bangladesh as the land of over-regulation. I think the problem is not with over-regulation. The problem is ill-regulated regulations. When I worked on deputation at the Regulatory Reforms Commission (RRC), my job was to classify the centuries-old rules for necessary updating. For example, Article 4 of the Post Office Act, 1898 introduced during the colonial rule was withdrawn only in 2008, to give legal identity to the courier service”.

(RC: 3: BPA: AS)
In praising the government initiatives, the respondent highlighted three important governance discourses. First, the respondent raised the discourse of regulatory governance reforms to infuse dynamism into governance. The respondent was of the view that rules that are archaic and out-moded often lead to public suffering and their updating would lead to better governance. World Bank (1996, 73) also comments that the Bangladeshi experience is not regulation but strangulation, as it is replete with ‘archaeological pile’. Revoking or updating obsolete rules has positive consequences for good governance. Several studies (Kauffman et al, 2002; World Bank, 2010b) have found that the quality of regulation and governance is correlated to better economic outcomes.

Secondly, the respondent raised the discourse of the regulatory state. Unlike the interventionist state, the regulatory state gave legal identity to the courier service by providing a lawful basis for their business. According to Majone (2012), the regulatory state is a clear departure from the interventionist state because it emphasises the need for delegation, as opposed to centralised decision-making. Earlier, the Bangladesh Post Office had a monopoly of postal services sector, with the exclusive right to collect, transport and distribute mail. Meanwhile, a number of private courier service companies have started operating in the country and become very popular as they offer fast, reliable and customised service based on modern technology. Ultimately, the government withdrew the impractical parts of the Post Office Acts to make room for the courier services’ operation in the private sector. This move by the government can also be seen as giving weight to high-quality regulation, which again is reinforced by the transition of growth strategies from state-led to market-led (World Bank, 2010b). In fact, crafting appropriate and time-sensitive regulations that can serve the public interest encompassing a wide variety of stakeholders, i.e., investors and consumers, is a very daunting task facing the Bangladeshi policy-makers. Balancing such extremes necessitates proper regulatory reforms in Bangladesh.

Thirdly, the respondent’s expressions revealed that the establishment of the RRC was a right step towards responsive governance, as it is entrusted with the task of harmonising the fit between stakeholders and the regulations, because the existence of too many rules of the wrong kind (Rajan and Zingales, 2004) is an issue that can be addressed by the
RRC. It is also noteworthy that liberalisation in the absence of appropriate regulatory structures leads to significant policy failures (World Bank, 2010b).

Another PSL working in the Economic Relations Division under the Ministry of Finance shared:

“We are no longer wrapped in centuries-old administrative practices. Our government has started amending the necessary rules in response to the stakeholders. Newly framed policies have started yielding results on most social indicators such as eliminating gender parity in education. We are moving in the right direction to achieve the MDG targets by 2015. We have outperformed other developing countries, including neighbouring countries, on a range of social indicators”.

(RC: 2: ER: DS)

The above quotation highlights two assumptions. First, it demonstrates that public leaders are aware of the need for framing new rules for delivering services to the citizens. The government has started doing away with the old system. The respondent is of the view that the new system has been geared towards achieving the MDG targets. For example, gender parity in primary and secondary school enrolment has already been achieved based on new measures taken for female students. The related MDG target was achieved in 2005. The ratio of girl to boy students rose significantly both at the primary and secondary level (GoB, 2011b). This has been achieved because of reforms introduced in the education sector, making education free for girls up to secondary level. The government has taken measures both to ensure access to education for girls and to prevent their dropout rates, based on laws and incentives. The Parliament has passed a number of laws that facilitate girls’ education (GoB, 2011b).

Secondly, the respondent raises the discourse of the rights-based approach when he describes the improved social indicators achieved by the country, which are the important goals of the MDGs. The government realises that poverty is a violation of human rights. Also, a critical concept of the Millennium Declaration (UNGA, 2000) is the right to development, which is instrumental now in the government’s policy strategy. Thus, encouraging respects for human rights and fundamental freedoms forms the foundation of the Millennium Declaration. Consequently, human rights now are the key
consideration in every government programme (UNICEF, 2003). How the key components of the human rights-based approach can be achieved is a serious issue in the government. The government has already received important feedback from multiple stakeholders by holding a series of ‘inception meetings’ and workshops across the country (GoB, 2005). The national strategy lists ten major areas for governance reform, of which human rights constitutes an important part (World Bank, 2010a). The role of government institutions in protecting rights and freedoms has thus become more important in the light of the Millennium Development Goals. Furthermore, the Millennium Declaration states that people have the right to live their lives and raise their children in dignity, free from hunger and from the fear of violence, oppression or injustice (UN General Assembly, 2000).

Also, NSAPR II (2008) of the government notes that rights can best be protected through adequate legislation. The government recently approved the National Human Rights Commission Ordinance 2007 and set up the long-awaited National Human Rights Commission (NHRC).

Echoing the above spirit of social development, a number of respondents suggested that Bangladesh’s remarkable progress in the social and human development indicators is a puzzle, as the country faces poverty and poor governance. In this context one senior PSL opined:

““It is a paradoxical situation. Poor governance and improved social indicators exist simultaneously. Part of the reason can be attributed to the effective service by NGOs. They have greatly contributed to the education and the health sectors. Also, the micro-credit programme has a positive impact on the marginalised female”.

(RC: 1: CA: JS)

However, the above respondent was contradicted by two of his colleagues:

“We don’t think a paradoxical situation exists. Since 1991, our country has been enjoying the fruits of parliamentary democracy. Our economy remained stable despite the global recession of 2008-2009. In the governance sphere, the independent Anti-corruption Commission, Right
to Information Act, 2009 etc. have been achievements by government that are funded by the donors as well”.

The first quotation represented three discourses. The respondent first, raised the discourse of political governance, describing it as ‘poor’. This poor governance emanated from the under-developed capitalism in Bangladesh, where peoples’ interest is not closely associated with the capitalist sector. According to Khan (2000a), developing countries have a larger informal economy, which includes widespread non-market accumulation processes (often described as primitive accumulation), and the use of state power to create a large range of rents that directly benefit the factions in power. Consequently, underdeveloped capitalism leads to the absence of a common class interest, where only the interests of the political factions are represented. Due to poor governance, transparent and impersonal redistributive political activities have not been developed to address the needs of the mass of people (Khan, 2005; Osman, 2010). On the other hand, in developed countries, because of good governance, the capitalist sector encourages the representation of generalized economic and class interests, since the peoples’ interest is closely tied to the capitalist sector (Osman, 2010). Good governance leads to impersonal redistributive political activity there. Considering this, the respondent called the Bangladeshi situation as ‘paradoxical’ as poor governance and improved social indicators do not normally go hand in hand. Quoting Devarajan (2005) and Mahmud et al. (2008), Mahmud (2008, 80) observed, “[B]angladesh’s achievements in….social development indicators may appear as a ‘development surprise’, with the country’s …. poor record in governance adversely affecting the quality of public service delivery.”

Secondly, the respondent pointed to the non-state approach, i.e. the NGOs that came forward to fill the void created by the political faction in terms of providing basic human needs. The country’s improved social indicators are due to the NGOs’ contribution. A growing body of literature suggests that Bangladesh was a laggard in respect of social development before the involvement of the NGOs. The success of the NGOs in delivering basic services to poor people in rural areas prompted donors to use them for channelling foreign aid and humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh, a trend that started in the 1980s but accelerated in the 1990s (UNDP, 2005).
Thirdly, implicit in the above quotation was the donors’ range of choices that they seem to enjoy, given the assumption that aid-effectiveness is better with NGOs than the government. As Haider (2011) observes, if one compares the grant component of ODA (Official Development Assistance) from the donors with NGO finance, one finds that from 2001 to 2002 NGO funding as a percentage of ODA grant was 6.2%. By the year 2003-2004, it had increased to 11% and by 2007-2008 it had risen to 16.7%.

The second quotation conjures up the image of the government as the main driver of change towards good governance. The respondent emphasises that since poor governance adds to the costs of the government, it is imperative that government responds to minimise unnecessary costs by reforming the grey areas. It was as a result of the necessary governance reforms, the respondent believed, that the Bangladeshi economy showed considerable resilience, even in the wake of the global recession, which virtually brought the global economy to a standstill in 2008-2009.

Secondly, the respondent indicates a significant issue, that even the donors recognise that the country is better now than it has been in decades. This recognition is manifested in the continued aid disbursement, policy support and technical assistance being offered by the donors. It is widely accepted that donors would not have provided this support if they were dissatisfied with the governance record.

The thread of discussion then turned to the involvement of donors in the governance structure of Bangladesh. In this respect, one junior administrative leader who once worked in the Upazila administration commented:

“Bangladesh is not now an aid-dependent country. It is coming out of aid-dependency. We can only accept conditions that do not go against our citizens. The recent tug of war between the government and the World Bank over the co-financing of PADMA bridge construction is an example. The World Bank cancelled the loan on allegations of corruption. The government did not accept such allegations”.

(RC: 3: BPA: AS)
The above quote reflects two discourses. First, the respondent raised the discourse of power, pointing to power inequality between the donors and the recipient. Although aid dependence in Bangladesh has waned significantly, it does not affect the leverage of the donor community, partly because donors belong to the ‘states of exception’ (Agamben, 2005) and partly because of global power politics. Schmitt (1985) defines sovereignty as one ‘who decides on the state of exception (quoted in Banarjee, 2008, 1544). Thus, drawing on Schmitt’s view of sovereignty, Agamben (1998, 17) argues that by virtue of the state of exception, the sovereign ‘creates and guarantees the situation that the law needs for its own validity’. Moreover, globally, the donor-recipient relationship has been asymmetric, involving a strong and a weak party, where political and economic structures of domination and exploitation provide little space for the latter to choose (Khatun, 2009). As in the case of the Padma Bridge, in the first instance, the government expressed strong discontentment of the World Bank’s cancellation of the Padma bridge loan over corruption allegations, officially announcing that government would not accept any blame for something it had not done. Later on, government agreed to comply with all the conditions set forth by World Bank, although the investigation by the Anti-corruption Commission could not substantiate the allegation of corruption in appointing the contractor of the proposed Padma Bridge project based on the documents handed over to it by the World Bank (World Bank, 2012; The Daily Star, 2012a). It is a point to ponder that as of now, World Bank has not disbursed any single farthing on this mega bridge project, yet it has raised the allegation of corruption. The Padma Bridge project was supposed to be co-financed by the Asian Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank and Japan International Cooperation Agency. Of all the co-financiers, only World Bank raised the issue of corruption. Subsequently, the government withdrew its request for the World Bank’s Padma bridge loan. Now, the government plans to get funding from other sources.

Secondly, the respondent’s account seemed to resonate with the discourse of necrocapitalism. Necrocapitalist practices deny people access to resources that are essential to their livelihoods, and dispossess communities (Banerjee, 2008). Bangladesh seems to have no other alternative but to meet the governance terms of the powerful donors. There are many instances where Afro-Asian countries that did not comply with World Bank-IMF governance conditions faced subjugation in terms of forced change of government. Literature survey suggests that World Bank has its own ways of reward
and punishment, including coercion and surveillance, which are essential World Bank-IMF policies (Banerjee & Linstead, 2001, 689). In South Africa, during 2002–2003, more than 100,000 people were infected with cholera after the South African government, following World Bank recommendations, denied water and sanitation services to thousands of citizens in KwaZulu-Natal province who were too poor to pay their water bills (Barlow and Clarke, 2002).

Being inspired by the above issue of corruption, one junior PSL asserted:

“World Bank is advocating anti-corruption strategies and good governance reforms based on transparency and accountability. I fully agree with them. My question is, one must stop eating sweets before one preaches to others not to eat sweets”.

(RC: 3: BPA: AS)

The respondent seems to indicate that the donors are also not free from the purview of reforms. Every entity should undergo reforms in order to keep pace with the rapidly changing scenario. The respondent’s use of the ‘sweets’ metaphor implies that one must practise the virtues before one advises others to do so. Leslie Lean-Robert Pean, once a manager in the World Bank’s Africa operations, was fired for accepting bribes from a consulting firm. Two important environmental projects, the $26 million Sustainable Environmental Project (SEMP) funded by UNDP in Bangladesh, and the Sundarbans Biodiversity Conservation Project (SBCP), a $77.5 million project funded by Asian Development Bank in Bangladesh were accused of major corruption (Zulfiquer, 2007; Parnini, 2010).

A number of PSLs opined that donors had introduced a great many public sector reforms since independence. Now, donors should come forward with comprehensive pay reforms package as it can curb corruption. One public sector leader commented:

“The issue of salary is central in reforms. Government servants are under-paid. The government should introduce market-based salary packages. Otherwise, there can be dangers of moonlighting, low motivation and corruption”.

(RC: 1: CA: JS)
The above quotation invokes two important discourses. First, the PSL places emphasis on the discourse of pay reforms. He indicated that the poor pay package in the public sector is a hindrance to the implementation of governance reforms. Research suggests that low salary results in low productivity, alternative employment and rent-seeking. Thus, the reform of civil service pay is vital for realizing improvements in capacity and the delivery of public goods and services. According to the World Bank (1996, 116): “[M]any of the problems of Bangladesh’s dysfunctional bureaucracy can be linked with poor pay....”

Secondly, inherent in the above quotation is the correlation between corruption and poor pay. Public sector officials usually expect a surcharge from applicants for delivering petty services such as issuing a driving licence, trade licence, land tax certificate, birth certificate etc. Apart from the government pay structure, there are three categories of the salary structure – private sector, NGO sector and the international sector. All the three categories of pay structure are much more lucrative than the government sector. Co-existence of these three pay scales contributes to the bad equilibrium. The highest ranking official, i.e., the secretary is not handsomely paid in comparison with his pay in the 1960s. “In 1969, one day salary of a secretary was equivalent to 100 kgs of rice, 25 kgs of beef and 40 kgs of fish” (World Bank, 1996, 119). Today, his one day salary is equivalent to 22 kgs of rice, 4 kgs of beef and 4 kgs of fish approximately. This poor pay in the public sector has far-reaching implications for the rent-seeking behaviour of the officials. Research also affirms that government servants may willingly forgo opportunities for corruption provided proper pay is provided (Yellen and Akerlof 1990). On the other hand, low wages invite corruption in the public sector (Tanzi et al. 1994) resulting in the non-implementation of the responsive governance.
8.7 Conclusion

This examination of bureaucratic response towards reforms reflects the incentives and resistance faced by them. Their responses and actions match a number of approaches namely, the Classical Public Administration Approach, the Public Choice Theory, the NPM Approach, and the Responsive Governance /the Rights-based Approach.

As has been found, the Classical Public Administration Approach reveals the bureaucrats’ inclination for the status quo and preference for rule-based behaviour. Mostly, senior bureaucrats’ behaviour reflects this approach as they prefer hierarchism and formalism. The study supported the old maxim that generally bureaucrats are resistant to change. However, midlevel and junior administrative leaders are least affected by this approach. They spoke out against this approach, but at the same time they had to accept this because of the deep structures inherited from the colonial legacy. Interestingly, another eye-opener in this approach is the co-existence of a low-trust culture with the bureaucratic paradigm; again, this applied because the low trust is rooted in the colonial heritage.

Public Choice Theory demonstrates that bureaucrats are exactly the same as others when it comes to the notion of self-interest. The study reveals that bureaucracy always tends to draw a line between self-interest and the public interest when there is a modernisation programme. Moreover, in case of a clash between the two types of interests, bureaucracy skilfully persuades the regime to align the public interest with their own interest. The study exhibits the self-survival strategy of the bureaucrats in relation to the reform programmes.

The study finds that bureaucrats act towards the reform programmes in a manner that best resembles a variant of the NPM. Tailor-made application of NPM depending on the country context was the bureaucratic response towards the reform programmes. The study also shows that bureaucrats sometimes positively respond to the donors’ reform agenda based on the NPM, provided the prescriptions were compatible with their administrative culture. However, the wholesale application of the NPM was not supported in the study.
The Responsive Governance/Rights-based approach demonstrates that the bureaucracy is trying hard to respond to reforms based on transparency/accountability. To this end, they have set up institutional mechanisms for updating the old rules and harmonising the fit between the stakeholders and the regulations, as the quality of rules and good governance is co-related. Inspired by the Rights-based Approach, both the public and private sector, especially the NGOs, are working in partnership to promote social development.
Chapter 9: Answering Research Question No. 3

Traditions in Governance and Governance Interventions: Local or International

Can several traditions exist at the same time in history? Or do traditions emerge and fade away sequentially? (Yesilkagit, 2010, 149)

Signpost

The chapter portrays the perceptions of the PSLs regarding donor involvement in the reform management and explores whether or not donor viewpoints converge with the home country’s unique traditions and culture. Respondents also talked at length about several layers of traditions that now co-exist. Data revealed some significant characteristics about the normative roots of the governance traditions and culture and also the motives of the aid regimes. In short, what emerged from the data are the following: existence of hybrid traditions with legacy effects (British colonialism looms large) in terms of transplanted and borrowed structures amalgamated with Samaj; elements of both traditional and modern forces impacting on the governance traditions; evidence of an uneasy relationship with the donors; and problems of country ownership. The findings point to complex patterns in the formation of governance traditions. It is also found that conditional and tied aid often runs counter to the national interest and the recipient country gains little benefits from them.

9.1 Introduction

It is true that each country is like an island, separated and bounded by its traditions, own identity and unique cultural context, even in this age of the globalised village. There is no denying the fact that a developing country like Bangladesh needs to improve its public administration system. However, improvement should be needs-based; needs arising out of the country in question. A one-size-fits-all template would not address the needs of a particular country, as different countries have distinctive governance traditions and implementation capacity. Foreign aid design often supports the global template. It is in this context that Jreisat (2011, 836) argued, “[D]eveloping countries have not often performed as instructed by international consultants or in accordance with foreign aid blueprints’, because foreign aid blueprints often fail to spot the
importance of country traditions, cultures and contexts. Thus, Painter & Peters (2010, 4) supported the role of traditions as a foundation for understanding contemporary administrative systems. It is because of traditions that some countries belong to the Anglo-Saxon tradition, some to the Continental tradition, and some to a hybrid tradition (ibid, 2010). Therefore, similar reform programmes are likely to have different meanings and different prospects for success and failure when applied in countries with different governance traditions. The values and understandings embedded within state traditions are among the principal influences shaping how the state and its component parts function (Immergut, 1993; Painter and Peters, 2010). Having said that, I argue, traditions are not static. ‘Situated agency’ can change the traditions using their reason when faced with dilemmas. Changes in traditions can be explained, therefore, by referring to relevant dilemmas. The key characteristics of the Bangladeshi governance traditions stem from the dilemmas posed when its traditions bump into one another, when beliefs collide (paraphrased from Bevir and Rhodes 2003, 2006) producing ‘new traditions’. Thus, Bangladeshi traditions can be called ‘hybrid’ traditions.

9.2 Analytical Framework

Unstructured interviews were the main research instrument in this research. I resorted to focus group interviews and document analysis as well. Narratives were gathered through one-to-one in-depth interviews, which in turn were triangulated with the texts from the official documents to see their significance, trustworthiness and relevance. Factual descriptions based on the face-to-face knowledge of the PSL were cross-checked for representativeness with evidence from official texts and publications. In short, comparing and contrasting the data was the basis. Construction of the respondents’ knowledge, perceptions, and world views were my interest. Employing a constructionist and interpretivist approach, I designed my interview questions to explore Bangladeshi PSL in terms of challenges posed by donors’ reform initiatives in a particular cultural context that addressed the reforms agenda and machinery of the government in its relationships with multiple stakeholders, i.e., the society as whole. Therefore, I constructed knowledge from multiple view-points. In analysing the data, I am aware that social reality (perceptions, belief system, traditions and reform agenda in this case)
is seen by multiple people (administrative leaders, stakeholders) and these multiple people interpret events in multiple ways. That is the essence of interpretivism.

Respondents were asked two sub-questions, namely:

a) Could you describe the major aspects of governance traditions and cultures?

b) How do you portray the donors’ reform agenda in the light of our traditions?

9.3 Governance Traditions and Culture: Continuity or Change

Interview data revealed that the evolution of the Bangladeshi public administration represents a mix of governance traditions that is partly rooted in the ancient ‘Samaj’ and partly inherited from the Mughal and British colonial administration. It is also to some degree learnt through governance reforms prescribed by international donors and to a certain extent informed by forces of community development programmes that can be called ‘new traditions’. Therefore, the tradition of Bangladeshi public administration is an account of the interaction between traditional and modern administrative norms and practices. Data also reveal that the ‘traditional’ part consists of the Samaj (foundation), Mughal rule (legacy/layering) and the British colonial rule (legacy/layering) while the ‘modern’ part consists of the forces of community development programmes (layering) and public sector reforms (layering) initiated by both donors and the government. One senior PSL was of the view that the incongruities and inconsistency between Samaj and colonial bureaucratic notions reflects differences in Bangladeshi and Western approaches to organisation. When asked to elaborate, he had this account to share:

“On the one hand, influenced by colonial tradition we tend to take for granted the complete separation of politics and administration, on the other hand, we as civil servants are biased towards a certain political ideology. Separation of bureaucracy from political institution remains far off”.

(RC: 1: CA: JS)

The above quotation reflects tensions inherent in the governance traditions – tension between ancient traditions of indigenous administration and colonial legacy. On the one
hand, bureaucracy represents features directly rooted in *Samaj* and on the other hand, it is also affected by the colonial past. The colonial manifestation of bureaucratic separation from politics (Anglo-Saxon tradition) seems to erode with the politicisation of bureaucracy as the respondent expressed, ‘we as civil servants are biased towards a certain political ideology’. This happens because of the patronage system rooted in the hierarchical *Samaj*. Different political parties, when in power, tend to patronise different modernisation programmes that they believe would suit them best in terms of securing their power base. This politics of survival on the part of the political parties leads to the use of the administrative machinery.

Regarding the make-up and ethos of the administrative machinery, one senior PSL maintained that it is necessary to explore the roots of the administration first. He also pointed to the fact that there are strong undercurrents towards hybridisation. He stated the following:

“The ancient Bengal, due to its wealth, was invaded by many foreign powers. These invasions left their imprints. Over the centuries Bengal was exposed to a host of foreign cultures. Now it is a mix of legacies – the indigenous ones and the foreign ones. In the postcolonial Bangladesh, the governance and market-based reform programmes prescribed by the international donors introduced newer types of administrative ethos”.

(RC: 1: MOP: JS)

The above account raises three important concepts. First, it indicates the input of the legacies in the shaping of the governance tradition. Complex interplay between the legacies seems to shape the present administrative ethos. For example, the British legacy of elitism still co-exists despite the governance reforms that preach a gradual shift towards the public service ethos.

Second, it also denotes the continuation of transplanted traditions as a result of colonialism– the layering process. Colonial administrative structures, ethos, rules and regulations and jurisdictions are therefore accepted as the model, leading to the layering process, i.e. traditions overlying each other. This may occur because Oakeshott (1982,
noted, traditions can grow stale and die or struggle and sometimes need a “transfusion of ideals, rules and principles”.

Third, it indicates hybrid traditions in the sense that different traditions coexist. The mix of ancient domestic legacies–foreign legacies and modern reforms leads to hybridisation. According to Painter and Peters (2010, 13), hybrid traditions having legacy effects offer a puzzle: “whether or not, over time, a tradition changes and evolves in such a way that different traditions coexist …, within the same administrative time and place, with distinctive ‘legacy effects’”.

Another senior PSL referred to the ‘invisible hand of the past’ in shaping the governance traditions. Referring to the ancient Bengal, he further asserted:

“Kautilya’s ‘Arthasastra’ still inspires us. Islam as a complete code of life also motivates us as we are a predominantly Muslim state”.

The account firstly connotes the discourse of state legitimacy in terms of inherited traditions. It adumbrates that traditions constitute a source of legitimacy. The governance traditions of modern Bangladesh are the local creations that connect back to ancient Bengal. A non-indigenous state lacks legitimacy. To be legitimate, a state has to have historical continuity with its institutions. According to Englebert (2000, 173), “a state is legitimate when its structures have evolved endogenously to its own society and there is some level of historical continuity to its institutions”.

Secondly, the respondent also indicates the continuity link between the local history and modern administrative ethos. The ancient Bengal has a rich cultural tradition and heritage that dates back 20,000 years. According to Sarker (2008), humans walked on Bengal’s soil 20,000 years ago. Those traditions are still at work in Bangladeshi polity. For example, the district is still the basic unit for administrative purposes, a concept that had its root in the Mauryan Empire (322–298 BC). During the period of King Chandragupta Maurya (Kautilya, his prime minister, wrote the Arthasastra, contemporary with Plato’s Republic) the kingdom was divided into provinces, and
further into districts (Dwivedi and Mishra, 2010). It was the Mauriyan Empire that laid down the basis of Bangladeshi administration, based on the principle of consultation and clear division of duties and responsibilities. The Mughals carried forward the use of districts as the basic revenue collection unit.

Thirdly, the quotation indicates the synthesis of Hinduism and Islam. The Muslim rulers converted the majority Hindu population to Islam and assimilated the religious texts of Ramayana and Mahabharata (sacred Hindu texts). Akbar the great, the famous Mughal emperor introduced a new religious doctrine ‘Din-i-ilahi’ (religion of God) attempting a fusion of Islam and Hinduism. Together, these religious traditions continue to influence the administrative ethos. According to Kochanek (1993, 35), the conversion of the mass of the Hindu peasantry was carried out by Sufi mystics. Since then, Islam has tended to make its impact much more far-reaching than most of other religious systems in terms of social, political and cultural behaviour, i.e. all aspects of Bangladeshi life.

Another midlevel PSL somewhat disagreed with the previous respondent and articulated:

“Not that all traditions are good and time-tested. Some traditions lose their appeal and usage, requiring a complete overhaul. The obligation for reforms arises from social, economic and technological advancement fuelled by the forces of globalisation. Although the administrative mindset and culture are largely dependent on the local histories, past experiences and precedents, these get interwoven with the contemporary forces that transcend local boundaries”.

(RC: 2: BPA: DS)

At this point, I asked him to give an example of how traditions or past experiences are replaced with new ones. He cited an historical example:

“Many of the precedents and administrative issues practised in the Mughal Empire were no longer in use in the British raj. The British East India Company replaced the Mughal theocratic judiciary based on Islamic laws with the English legal tradition. The colonial model was rule-oriented and centralised, which facilitated resource extraction. The zamindari system is one example”.
Embodied in the above two quotations are two discourses based on the role of traditions in governance. First, nearly 2,500 years of dialogue about the subcontinental governance as a tradition of discourse invokes an image of traditions as a ‘paradigm’. The respondent’s observation regarding the tradition is akin to the image of a paradigm when he describes: ‘Some traditions lose their appeal and usage, requiring a complete overhaul’. As we know, in order to be established as such, a paradigm should be able to offer “an apparently permanent solution to a group of outstanding problems” (Kuhn, 1970, 44). When the existing paradigm fails to do so, new paradigms take over, creating a paradigm shift. Likewise, new traditions of governance displace old ones, because new traditions arise from a dialogue with reality and the process of adapting answers to new challenges (Friedrich, 1972). Like paradigms, traditions spawn schools that provide alternative ways to think about problems or develop solutions (Dobel, 2001), as the respondent clearly asserts: ‘[T]he British East India … replaced the Mughal theocratic judiciary … with the English legal tradition’. According to Dwivedi and Mishra (2010, 44), the colonial regime introduced the Anglo-Saxon rule of law in line with the British tradition. Thus, that can be called the ‘colonial paradigm’. Under this paradigm they developed the zamindari system in Bengal.

Secondly, the second quotation reflects the discourse of ‘extractive administration’ as the respondent states, ‘…colonial model …facilitated resource extraction’. Damodaran (2007) commented, Bengal’s ability to generate surplus that could be easily turned into cash was as attractive to the Mughal Empire as to the British. However, the systematic looting of the revenue collections by local English nabobs (a derogatory term for nawab), all drained the coffers of the province. The respondent also adumbrated that the ruler did not even facilitate the peasants in producing more in order to extract more. It is common knowledge that revenue should be collected in times of plenty and reduced in times of paucity. However, the colonial ruler did not follow this principle. As a result of indiscriminate extraction of revenue and the eternal search for profit, Bengal experienced a number of famines. They turned the province of Bengal, once called the granary of India, into a famine land (Damodaran, 2007). The Famine Commission reported that in a period of 90 years, from 1765 when the British East India Company took over the ‘diwani’ (right to collect tax) of Bengal to 1858, Bengal experienced 12 famines (Damodaran, 2007). Extractive policies of the colonial regime involved cutting off the thumbs of master weavers in Bengal (Banerjee, 2008) in the hope that weavers
would turn to cultivating indigo once they were rendered unable to weave muslin with the cut-off thumbs. Even during times of famine the peasants were forced to cultivate indigo, which eventually resulted in Indigo Revolt. The painful scenario was reflected by a famous Bengali playwright called Dinabandhu Mitra in his masterpiece, ‘Neel Darpan’ (Indigo Mirror).

Echoing the same point, another senior PSL opined:

“The zamindary system was an attempt by the colonial regime to make our system look like their own. This permanent settlement (zamindary system) served the dual purpose of extracting revenue and implanting metropolitan’s tradition”.

(RC: 1: ER: DS)

The above quotation was supported by another academic, who shared:

“At 1858, the British crown took over from the East India Company. This was a changed context as many of us started considering that we had become the subjects of the British Crown, as were the cases of England, Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland”.

(RC: 6: AC: RM)

The above two quotations reveal the existence of a transplanted version of tradition as a result of colonialism (Painter & Peters, 2010) basically for two reasons. First, the colonial regime further developed the zamindary system in Bengal as “a frank attempt to apply the English Whig philosophy of government” (Stokes, 1959, 5). A growing body of postcolonial literature also supports that the developing south pays high prices for the modernisation programmes as the northern elites always demand that the former copy them – an obsession with ‘similar-to-me-effects’. Otherwise, the performance appraisal is going to be poor for the developing countries.

Secondly, the zamindary system based on Whig principles was introduced with the expectation that government’s role was solely “to disregard all conditions of persons”, assuming that British institutions like the rule of law, private property, and minimal
government could transform Bengal’s society into a model of Britain. This was because the intellectual foundation of the Permanent Settlement (zamindary system) viewed subcontinental people as fundamentally similar to the British (Wilson, 2011).

This complex role of traditions as a foundation for understanding contemporary administrative systems (Painter & Peters, 2010), here Bangladeshi governance traditions, emerged as one popular issue among the respondents, based on the legacy of the past, social norms, historical path continuity, religion and administrative cultures. Administrative cultures were explored in light of the indigenous social life imbued in the village ethic. As one midlevel PSL leader asserted:

“Our bureaucracy is undividable from the ethos of social life; its culture derives from the village ethic. For example, in the village the important authority is that of tradition. The authority of individuals plays a less important role. Age and seniority are of importance. In bureaucracy as well, age and seniority play a significant role”.

(RC: 2: BPA: DS)

The above quotation reflects the discourse of hierarchy in the interpersonal relationship in society. Again this provides data triangulation for the study, as it has been endorsed by another respondent in Chapter 7 under dilemma 11. In a hierarchic system, role conceptions and duties are pre-defined. According to Jansen (1990, 26), the principle of hierarchy in interpersonal relationships is and for hundreds of years has been accepted as necessary and morally right in the villages of Bangladesh. Bangladeshi people behave according to age and seniority. This ethos of social life has tremendously impacted upon the administrative culture. According to Khan (1998, 37), there is still significant emphasis on age and seniority in appointment and seniority. Those who are at the top of the hierarchy are regarded as the father-figures. Junior colleagues accept their authority without questioning its basis. The Seniority Rules in Bangladesh Government Service also take into account the issue of age in the ascription of seniority. For example, if two officers join the service on the same day and if their merit position is also the same, then their seniority will be ascribed according to their date of birth – the older one will be given the seniority.
Agreeing with the above, another PSL shared:

“Characteristics of patrimonial social structure are reflected in the bureaucracy. In our society, people rely on the patrons (god fathers) for protection. In the bureaucracy as well, bureaucrat-patrons look after the junior colleagues in terms of good posting and promotion”.

(RC: 1; ER: JS)

The above quotation raised the discourse of patrimonial bureaucratic structure. This patrimonial bureaucratic structure is heavily influenced by the ‘patrimonial social structure’, as reflected by the respondent. It is very interesting to notice the co-existence of rational-legal bureaucracy and the patrimonial structure – a paradoxical situation in the case of Bangladeshi bureaucratic culture. Although it is regarded as a rational-legal bureaucracy, the cultural practice of the bureaucracy contributes insignificantly to the Weberian rational-legal model because rules and regulations are easily bent in a patrimonial manner based on kinship. It is accepted that Max Weber’s rational bureaucracy calls on public officers to be devoted and loyal to their offices and the ‘impersonal and functional purposes’, rather than to patrons. Literature survey suggests that many developing countries, including Bangladesh, have set up a superstructure of rational-legal administration, which nevertheless continues to rest on a deep foundation of patrimonial rule. In Bangladesh, for example, every government policy becomes riddled with exceptions and exemptions (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002). This flows from the intricate network of primordial connections based on personal lobbying for individual favours and benefits (Kochanek, 1993). This again proves the existence of informal systems. The informal systems, by contrast, are based on implicit and unwritten understandings (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002). They reflect socio-cultural norms and cultural homogeneity, underlying patterns of interactions among socio-economic classes and conflicting values resulting from the patrimonial character of the Bangladeshi society (Kochanek, 1993; Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002). The rise of the patrimonial bureaucratic structure in Bangladesh, however, can be attributed to Hinduism. Kumar (2004) argued that during the pre-Mughal Muslim rule, the concept of patrimonial bureaucratic structure might be observed in the rise of the Hindu Kayastha sub-caste as a class or status group of scribes in Bengal, who received huge favour from their patrons. Muslim rulers in Bengal utilised castes of scribes in opposition to the Brahmins (high caste).
That the informal governance system based on associational interests paved the way for the culture of ‘tadbir’ described above has also been revealed by the following quotation:

“The higher you are placed in the bureaucracy, the more probable that you will face a larger number of complex and difficult tadbirs”.

(Siddiqui, 1996)

The above quotation reflects the notion of informal governance in the bureaucracy. In Bangladesh, people with power and positions are burdened with tadbirs. Tadbir is a personal lobbying for individual favours; a mechanism to manage a decision taken or to be taken by bending norms/rules (Kochanek, 1993). Tadbir has become so entrenched in the administrative culture that nothing gets going without it. Influential bureaucrats who are approached by their kith and kins, friends and colleagues feel proud because only they have the power to resolve the issue in question. This discretionary power makes them elitist.

One midlevel PSL commented:

“This elitism makes us closer only to our inner circle but creates aloofness between us and the citizens. Generally we want to command the people, a legacy from the British Raj. This elitist attitude prevents us from serving the common people. We should move from a ‘Who are you?’ to a ‘how can I help you?’ culture. The MATT is doing an excellent job”.

(RC: 2: ER: DS)

At this point I asked, “Who do you consider ‘elite’ in the civil service?” He shared:

“Now you raise the generalist-specialist conflict in the bureaucracy. Civil servants belonging to specialist cadres consider themselves less privileged in terms of promotion, power and entitlements.”

The first quotation lays bare an undercurrent of aversion to elitism in the section of bureaucracy. The respondent despised the harsh colonial way of handling the colonised, as he shared, ‘[G]enerally we want to command the people, ....’. The British Raj used the bureaucracy as a tool for mass rule and it was designed to protect the imperial
interest only (Haque, 1995; Zafarullah & Huque, 2001). In postcolonial Bangladesh as well, the governance is not centred on responding to stakeholders’ demands. Consequently, the bureaucracy’s image is in question. According to the Global Competitiveness Report (WEF, 2013), the country’s bureaucracy has been ranked the fourth most problematic factor for doing business. The Government has long been aware of the deterioration in the quality and reach of basic public services (World Bank, 1996) and is now moving, albeit slowly, towards good governance based on equal rights.

Secondly, the respondent acknowledges the role played by MATT (Managing at The Top) in terms of minimising the gap between the citizens and the civil servants. MATT has so far trained the most senior civil servants of Bangladesh. Majeed (2011) noted that MATT placed emphasis on the combination of home-grown reform ideas, on-the-job training, professional development, peer pressure and observation in order to boost morale among civil servants. MATT’s greatest success, according to the respondent, lies in its effort to engage the civil servants based on country ownership, as participants of the MATT are required to design their own reform projects based on a genuine national problem. In doing so, MATT aims to reduce the distance between the citizens and the bureaucrats.

The second quotation brings to light the deep-seated factionalism that now engulfs the entire bureaucracy. This discourse of bureaucratic factionalism takes many shapes. These are generalist versus specialist; freedom-fighters versus non freedom-fighters; lateral entrants versus recruits through competitive examinations. However, the generalist-specialist conflict looms large in the bureaucracy, as the respondent asserted. According to Zafarullah and Khan (2005), the holding of important positions by the generalist civil servants has been strongly resented by the specialist civil servants. Technocrats within the civil service demand that key positions in the public agencies like the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, and parastatals performing functions of a purely technical nature should be staffed and headed by technical civil servants only. An alliance called ‘prakrichi’ (a coalition between engineers, physicians and agriculturists) was formed to protect the rights of technical cadres. Subsequently, based on the recommendation of the PARC (2000), government allowed the posts of the deputy secretaries and onwards to be filled from all cadres, based on a quota system. Nevertheless, the promotion policy is still heavily tilted towards the generalist
administration cadre of the civil service. According to the World Bank (2002, 73), this is a cause for long standing dissention within the public service, which remains to be settled. Besides, quota reservations cannot draw the best available to the key policy-making posts in the Ministries.

Observing the debate regarding the factionalism in the bureaucracy, one PSL ascribed it to the parent system in which it is embedded. He further shared:

“The social system is the parent system that breeds such factionalism. The bureaucratic factions that are divided along the lines of different networks and norms are actually embedded in the societal structure that reflects the true colour of the society. The colours are ‘Bangsho’, ‘kin’, ‘caste structures’”.

(RC: 1: ER: JS)

The respondent raised the assumption of exploitation by the powerful factions of the society that is again reflected in the bureaucracy. Bureaucrats from powerful ‘Bangsho’ exercise much leverage in the bureaucratic politics. Bureaucrats belonging to the common network of Bangsho based on cult, identical belief patterns, common birthplaces and ideology exert influence on the civil service recruitment process in an effort to recruit like-minded people. Marxist literature also explains how the underlying class conflicts between the zamindars (landlords) and the krishaks (peasants) or between the capitalists and the workers are elevated to full-blown class struggle. Thus, factionalism embedded in the deep structures of samaj is replicated in bureaucratic factionalism. A body of literature (Wood, 1981; Toufique, 1998; Jansen, 1986) suggests that rural class relations based on landholding and possession of other sets of key natural resources such as water, fisheries, forests and orchards are essentially reflected in the bureaucratic culture and also in the political economy of Bangladesh. In this context, Chatterjee (1982) and Goswami (1982; cited in Khan, 2000b, 22) put forward how a particular class from a particular region in Bengal controlled the state bureaucracy. According to them, “[R]ich peasants in East Bengal ... enjoyed a period of prosperity based on commercial agriculture ....and provided political leaders for the contest over the state apparatus. The prize was the control over state sector jobs and resources... ” (ibid, 2000, 22).
Another midlevel PSL further fuelled the debate by commenting:

“Unlike other developing countries, patrons of our patron-client network are unfair and not rational. This gives rise to the alternative forces to the development. The NGOs have already distinguished themselves by their innovative programmes based on local needs”.

(RC: 2: BPA: DS)

The respondent raised two discourses. First, the respondent reflected the interesting discourse of benign patrimonialism versus destructive patrimonialism (Crook, 2010) and seemed to lay blame on destructive patrimonialist practices. In the case of Bangladesh, destructive patrimonialism is in evidence, as state-approach redistribution tends to result in factions with a class context. Development of one district does not lead to automatic development of the entire country. Let us compare the entire country with a human body, where excessive development of one limb will not automatically lead to the development of other limbs of the body. A body (developed country) can be called healthy only when all the limbs are developed and are proportionate to each other. Excessive development of one group of people deprives other groups of their rights, resulting in inequality. In Bangladesh, a variation of destructive patrimonialism called “pork barrel” is in fashion. This slang expression refers to state-funded projects promoted by local MPs to bring money and jobs to their own constituents as a political favour to citizens (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002). In the case Bangladesh, examples include monopolising state distributed resources like irrigation pumps or ‘Food for Works’ contracts, distribution of VGF (Vulnerable Group Feeding) Cards or construction of bridges in geographically targeted areas (Jamil, 2007).

Secondly, the respondent’s comment conveys that he is looking for alternatives. His alternatives seemed to resonate with the non-state approach as he talked about alternative forces to the development, which is another data triangulation point (Section 8.6, Chapter 8).

Non-governmental organisations that are a part of the CDP (Jamil, 2007) engage in activities, which have traditionally been in the domain of the public sectors; the limited capacity and performance of the latter led to the growth of the NGOs (Zaman, 2003).
NGOs now cover all the 64 districts of the country. NGOs are playing a significant role in terms of poverty reduction through innovative approaches such as micro-credit. The credit goes to Grameen Bank for the innovative application of micro-credit, where loans are made without any kind of collateral (Hassan and Renteria-Guerrero, 1997). NGO interventions have also expanded into areas like health services, education, rural development, agriculture, human rights, legal aids and environmental protection (Jamil, 2007; Haider, 2011).

So the traditions of Bangladeshi governance can be regarded as the hybrid tradition in that elements of traditional and modern forces coexist representing both Bangladeshi and Western tradition. I discern four types of forces that impact on the governance tradition.

Based on the foregoing discussion, the four faces of Bangladeshi governance traditions can be explained by the following framework (see Appendix ‘H’ for discussion):

![Figure 9.1 Four Faces of Governance Traditions](image)

Based on Heginbotham (1975), Jamil (2007)
9.4 Donors versus Public Sector Leaders: Unpacking the Uneasy Relationship

Data reveal that there are different views on the relevance and benefits of donor agendas. Two themes arose from the discussion with the participants: foreign aid practices and governance tradition. One midlevel public leader shared:

“It is difficult to believe that donors ‘know’ how much, when and in what locations recipients need foreign aid. PRSP is the most burning example. Although they lack the local knowledge, they always try to set the policy”.

(RC: 2: ER: DS)

First, the above account raises the assumption of interventionism. This illustrates that foreign aid is used as an instrument for intervening in an economy in the guise of benign helpers. Although developing countries need external assistance to support their economic development, over time it becomes clear that donors pay the recipient to do something it would otherwise not do. They try to set policies towards their preferences, causing the problems of donor intrusion. “Although they lack the local knowledge, they … set the policy” – the respondent’s comment blames the donors for their interventionist policy. The donors have incentives for doing this. As Williamson (2010) commented, vested interest groups like producers/suppliers in donor countries are interested in securing rights to supply aid-allocated resources in recipient countries. Donor governments give way to these interest groups to appease politically important domestic producers. In Bangladesh, the most recent change in aid ideas is focused on poverty reduction. In the name of poverty reduction, donors tend to directly impose their own version of poverty reduction strategy (PRS). The donor-driven PRS alludes to this fact that donors have their own poverty reduction agenda. Moreover, poverty is a multi-dimensional concept that requires attention to multiple dimensions. Donors seem to fund the same old projects, namely, those directly targeted to the poor. Adaptive research for increasing crop yields has the potential to benefit the poor much more than many direct poverty reduction programmes possibly can. Incidentally, agricultural research is one of the most under-funded budgetary heads in Bangladesh (Mahmud, 2003). Literature reveals that in Bangladesh, neo-liberal governance reforms prescribed by the World Bank resulted in the closure of a number of profit-making nationalised
industries. As a result, around 7 thousand big and medium sized industries closed down and about 2 million people lost their jobs (Khan, 2004). According to Kotz (2002), in much of the Third World, the US has been successful in dictating neoliberal policies, acting partly through the IMF and World Bank and partly through direct pressure.

Secondly, the above quotation also underscores the classic problem of ‘country ownership’, because ‘interventionism’ never allows for ownership on the part of the recipients. According to Mahmud (2006), donor agencies being directed by their headquarters tend to push the aid agenda that reflect their incentives only or apply global templates in designing projects without adequate feedback about local cultural traditions and institutional characteristics. This country ownership problem is another data triangulation point, which is supplemented by ‘dilemma 3’ and ‘dilemma 7’ in Chapter 7.

Another senior PSL shared that the problem of country ownership lies at the heart of the uneasy relationship between the donors and the recipients. He goes on to raise some questions:

“This is it because of the lesser bargaining power of our country in aid negotiations? Do the donors have incentives in undermining the country ownership? Why cannot we take the lead?”

(RC: 1: MOP: JS)

Such questions are not uncommon in this once acutely aid-dependent country. These questions point to the discourse of the ‘benign dollars hypothesis’ and the ‘destructive dollars hypothesis’. What the respondent is trying to assert is that foreign aid is not a simple gift. Rather, it is an outcome of complex and multiple layers of interaction and bargaining among a number of actors where each actor has his/her incentives. The respondent also shared that tied aid runs counter to the interest of the recipient countries. Asked how, he referred to this example (cited in Action Aid, n.d.):

“A few years back, maybe in 2002, we signed an aid contract with Denmark to repair ferries. The Danish grant was tied. Conditions were: the repair work was to be carried out in Denmark and sent back to Bangladesh; subsequent rehabilitation works could be undertaken in Bangladesh, but
with equipment and capital goods imported from Denmark. The bidding price was also four times higher than if all the work had been undertaken and sourced from Bangladesh. In view of this hard conditionality, the then Bangladeshi Minister for Shipping requested to increase local supplies to reduce the price. Denmark cancelled the US$45million aid contract”.

At this point, one junior public leader raised his hands and shared:

“Denmark is a single case. But what about the United Nations that is supposed to represent the interest of each and every country? Certainly, the United Nations have major incentives in the formulation of the MDGs. Everywhere, people are chanting slogans of MDG as if it is a mantra, uttering of which would cure all the development ills”.

(RC: 3: BPA: AS)

Embedded in the first of the above quotations is the interesting discourse of donor incentives. Donors have their own incentives and motivations based on their national interest. Donors face their own incentives when designing foreign aid policy that ranges from special interest groups, bureaucrats, and government strategic interests (Williamson, 2010) working back in their countries. As evident from the quotation, conditionalities were attached to the Danish aid that were much higher than the international market price. Moreover, the accessories and capital goods had to be purchased from the donor country. Complying with such conditionality would be damaging for Bangladesh. Literature also suggests that foreign aid is ineffective and possibly damaging to recipient countries (Bauer, 2000). Evidently, the Danish grant was intended to serve the Danish interest best and not the interest of Bangladesh.

Thus, the process of giving aid involves a good number of incentives on the part of donors. Donors give aid because of the stronger incentives they face in their countries. The motivation of donor bodies is not altruistic. Literature on aid allocation asserts that the political, economic and strategic interests of donors, rather than development objectives, play a dominant role in their aid allocation decisions (McKinlay and Little, 1977; Svensson, 1999; Neumayer, 2003). For Bangladesh, this public choice approach is more evident in case of technical assistance aid that requires technicians to be hired from the donor country. In Bangladesh, “[W]hen aid is involved, the prices go up. A…
reason is the high wages of consultants – and donors’ conditions to employ them whether they are needed or not” (Ellmers, 2011, 11).

The second quotation interestingly connotes a notion of incentives faced by the United Nations (UN). The respondent seems critical of the role of the UN in the formulation of MDGs, because, he believes donors are using the UN as a cover or smoke screen in order to spread neo-liberalism. Eventually, Bangladesh now feels the heat of MDGs as the respondent compares it with a ‘mantra’. The respondent also questioned the incentives of the UN in endorsing the MDGs. The UN’s role in the MDG has been pointed out by Williamson (2010), the United Nations is the largest sponsor of the MDGs, the blueprint of foreign aid today. MDG literature also suggests that the UN faced incentives for sponsoring the MDGs. In doing so, the UN has revealed its budget maximising character. Easterly (2006) asserts that the UN role in endorsing MDGs not only helps the poor countries but is also a way of helping itself. That the MDGs can help the UN was also evident in its Secretary-General’s comments on the MDGs at the UN World Summit in 2005, “it is also a chance to revitalize the United Nations itself”. Eventually, Williamson (2010, 22) argued, “[T]he UN … as a budget maximizing bureaucracy calling for increases in foreign aid in order to increase its own budget … increase its agency”.

A careful examination of the donor-recipient interaction reveals the contradiction between two traditions – individualism and collectivism. In giving aid donors are inspired both by the public choice theory and NPM that represent basically the traditions of individualism. Authors like Buchanon (1984) and Weschler (1982) hold that public choice theory is methodologically individualistic. In public choice, individual values are assumed to be prior to group values. According to Maesschalck (2004), NPM philosophy is aimed at cost-cutting and the introduction of the individualist interaction in government. Borins (1999, 286) also talked about many individualist elements of NPM (competition, public entrepreneurship, encouraging heroism).

Donors’ aid philosophy is embedded in the individualistic traditions that produces dilemma for the Bangladeshi side that is characterised by high collectivistic traditions. This collectivistic traditions of Bangladeshi society has been analysed particularly in Chapter 3 and also woven through the thesis.
This debate between individualism and collectivism was steered to another dimension when one junior PSL commented that with the end of the cold war the donors needed some labels like good governance:

> It is a term applied to the recipient countries, invented by the World Bank to judge the aid effectiveness. They preach that ensuring good governance will reduce poverty. Why should they consider Bangladesh as the laboratory?"

(RC: 3: ER: SAS)

The above quotation lays bare two pertinent discourses. Firstly, the respondent raises the discourse of the World Bank version of good governance that is preached by the developed North. It is influenced by North-derived standards. The governance swings have been quicker in developing countries (Bangladesh) because external agents have often had their hands on the pendulum, so to speak, and the rhythm has not always been that of slowly changing local circumstances (Bately et al., 2012, 132). Adjusting the rhythm of governance reforms in accordance with the recipient country is the most daunting task if the reform is to succeed. A landmark World Bank publication cleared the air with the candid admission that ‘the lending cum (policy) conditionality process works well only when local polities have decided, largely on their own . . . to address their reform needs . . . Successful reform depends primarily on a country’s institutional and political characteristics’ (World Bank, 1998; cited in Bately et al., 2012, 133). Good governance is everywhere like the indispensable ‘salt’ used in cooking. It is aid conditionality; a MDG-associated issue and also an agenda for reducing poverty. Although good governance has been identified as the key to poverty reduction strategies (Grindle, 2004) and has a strong nexus with it that is manifested in the PRSP conditionality, the poverty scenario is not improving. According to the 6th Five Year Plan (2011), poverty still remains at a high level and the number of people living below the poverty line remains almost the same as it was in 1991–92 (about 56 million). World Bank’s perception of good governance has neither improved the governance nor reduced poverty in Bangladesh (Parnini, 2009). In the Bangladeshi case, it should be pro-poor governance based on her local needs instead of pro-donor governance. Construction of intervention-oriented ‘good governance’ is evident (Doornbos, 2001, 99) in the Bangladeshi case. In this respect, Doornbos states, if donor-conceptualized
standards of good governance were more fully elaborated and insisted upon, it would almost certainly imply an insistence that Western-derived standards of conduct be adopted in non-Western politico-cultural contexts (2003, 8).

Secondly, the respondent makes a case for understanding good governance as a tool of hegemonic power when he states ‘…they consider Bangladesh as the laboratory?’. In Bangladesh so many neo-liberal discourses and World Bank ideas i.e., SAPs, NPM, SWAPs and PRSP have been applied experimentally with little or no result. The newest one is the good governance reforms. However, good governance programmes by donors rarely match Bangladeshi local needs (Parnini, 2009). The perfect solution is yet to be found. von Benda-Beckmann argues especially referring to the governance mismatch in the Asian countries that not only do efforts by the donors to promote good governance often have the opposite effect, but what in one context (e.g. economic growth) is good governance, is clearly bad governance in other contexts, such as labour conditions, democratic content of government, and civil liberties (1994, 63). Good governance as political conditionality has become ‘a flexible tool in the hands of global hegemonies to undermine the sovereignty of the third world nations and ‘the people are no longer the agency of change but rather the victims of “bad governance” … by the donor-community’ (Shivji, 2003; cited in Gisselquist, 2012, 13).

How this global hegemonic behaviour is impacting on the governance traditions was illustrated by one senior PSL:

“Previously, in framing policies we had to take into account the politicians, bureaucrats and the societal interest groups. But now there is another player on the scene and the power of that player is stronger than the combined power of the rest”.

(RC: 1: CA: JS)

The above extract indicates the mighty image of the donors. New administrative institutions are being formed in line with the donors’ prescription. This mighty image of donors is a data triangulation point here, as this was woven through Dilemma 3. Parnini (2009) argues that the mighty donors have directly contributed to the weakness of the Bangladeshi government. For example, Canada gave Bangladesh $97 million US dollars in foreign aid while collecting $22 million US dollars in tariff revenue on Bangladeshi imports (Parnini, 2009). Sobhan defines aid dependence as “a state of mind,
where aid recipients lose their capacity to think for themselves and thereby relinquish control” (1996, 122).

9.5 Conclusion

This chapter answered the third research question, which concerned how bureaucrats cope with the reform initiatives prescribed by the donors in terms of indigenous administrative-cultural tradition. This study advances that traditions have an influence on the ways in which reform is designed and implemented. This was ascertained by exploring the normative roots of the governance traditions and the culture, suggesting four areas: a) Samaj b) forces of community development programmes c) legacy effects d) post-independence reforms.

To summarise the findings, the following points may be suggested as the result of the discussion. First, ancient Samaj has been revealed as the bedrock of governance traditions.

Secondly, two legacies, namely British colonial rule and Mughal rule were considered most important by the respondents, in terms of their effect on bureaucracy. These two historical forces still impact on the bureaucratic tradition in terms of Western approach and Mughal approach. While the colonial model was based on ‘divide and rule’, the Mughal rule was based on integration.

This research presents that Bangladeshi governance tradition is a hybrid consisting of multiple layers embedded in the Samaj.

Finally, the study depicts that there are tensions in the donor-recipient relationship in terms of ownership and intervention. Intervention and ownership problems surface because of the incentives faced by the donors in their home countries.
PART V: CONCLUSION

Chapter 10: Discussion of Findings

Signpost

The purpose of this chapter is to present the study’s conclusions to three research questions. This study explored roles of the PSL by looking at its attitudes, practices and assumptions. It also examined how public sector leaders respond to the PSR. In doing so, particular attention was paid to the lived experiences of their webs of belief and contexts, and also to the traditions and dilemmas of PSL at play. Apart from the tension between donors and recipient country, one key argument that transcends all the research questions outlined in Chapter 1 is that implementation of reform agenda is a political and contested process. The research revealed that the public sector leaders’ perspectives on the necessary conceptions and roles of leadership in public administration were context-based; important roles of PSL also found trapped in the dilemmas caused by strong presence of the colonial legacy, which clashes with the Samaj tradition. Thus, as many as 11 illustrative PSL dilemmas were suggested. In relation to this, the study demonstrated that, because of the political nature of PSR, dilemmas and conflicts are the two contributing factors that elucidate cultures and traditions in the bureaucracy. Moreover, a variant of politics-bureaucracy dichotomy has been noticed. ‘Image IV’ was revealed where civil servants increasingly tended to take up a political role. PSL response to the reform process suggested various reform perspectives. The study showed how public sector leaders’ reform behaviour can vary depending on the nature of reforms, contexts and governance tradition. Reform programmes are also responded to by the PSL in terms of both internal and external pressures and opportunities that they again weigh up against their belief system. Eventually, the study illustrated four approaches of reform behaviour/response: the Classical Public Administration Approach, the Public Choice Theory, the NPM Approach, and the Responsive Governance Approach/Rights-based Approach. Bureaucratic behaviour towards reform agenda is also conditioned by the traditions. The research revealed the co-existence of several layers of administrative traditions; existence of hybrid traditions with legacy effects in terms of elements of both traditional forces and modern forces. The findings point to non-linear and complex patterns in the formation of governance traditions. It is also found that the donor-driven reform agenda sometimes runs counter to the national tradition and interest.
10.1 Introduction

This study has been designed to portray a substantive description of the phenomena of PSL in the context of the reforms as perceived by practitioners of the Bangladeshi bureaucracy. This study takes an interpretive-phenomenological approach to understanding the research phenomena. My interview protocol was framed and guided through three research questions that generate rich and thick data. This chapter presents the result emerged from the thick data gleaned from the selected cases and literature review to bear on the three research questions and the research problem. The research questions were:

- How do public sector leaders of Bangladesh conceive of their leadership roles?

- How do public sector leaders of Bangladesh respond to public sector reform initiatives in relation to contexts?

- How do the public sector reform initiatives prescribed by the donors interact with Bangladeshi administrative-cultural traditions?

10.2 Conclusions to Research Questions

Research Question 1

How do public sector leaders of Bangladesh conceive of their leadership roles?

10.2.1 Interpreting Lived Experiences: The PSL Dilemmas
Finding No. 1

10.2.1.1 Interpreting the Public sector Leadership Roles: Using Dilemmas as a Tool

The study constructed 11 illustrative dilemmas while examining the roles of leadership in the context of the reforms. The research revealed that PSL decisions were made in the light of the legal framework, previous experiences and official investigation/examination of the given context. The PSL dilemmas arose when there was a new context that went against their existing beliefs and experience. The finding of dilemmas is also consistent with the ‘dilemma’ advanced by Bevir and Rhodes (2003, 2010) that a dilemma arises when a new idea clashes with existing beliefs and practices and so forces a reconsideration of these existing beliefs and traditions. These 11 dilemmas can be categorised into 5 major groups of dilemmas: the Colonial Dilemmas (hierarchism versus mentoring), the Classical Public Administration Dilemmas (creativity versus rule-based practice), the Public Choice Dilemmas (public interest versus vested interest, motivating aspects versus performance), the NPM Dilemmas (commitment versus service to multiple stakeholders, results-orientation versus citizen service), and the Good Governance Dilemmas (vision versus implementation, puppet versus donors, domestic reform strategy versus donor reform strategy, accountability versus good governance, and integrity versus corruption).

Dilemmas are a useful concept for exploring situated leadership practices. It is through dilemmas that a leader’s decision-making can be revealed. Civil servants are seen to be continually reinventing the traditions as they confront new dilemmas (Bevir & Rhodes, 2010). The continuity and discontinuity of traditions depend on the resolution of dilemmas. Therefore, using ‘dilemmas’ as a lens helps us explore the context of PSL, and how context interacts with practice. A review of relevant literature suggests that dilemmas and tensions can be powerful source of finding fresh solutions and innovations. Therefore, managing dilemmas lead to innovative ways of managing organisations. Public sector managers can use dilemmas as a powerful concept to question their current practice and update their traditional practices or legacies. With the help of dilemmas public sector leaders can always reinvent themselves when faced with critical situations. Dilemmas are a testing ground for exploring the leadership capacity.
of the PSL, because dilemmas are not simple problems. Resolving dilemmas expose the PSL to the core of their being. It goes beyond the issue of simple problem solution technique. With some level of thinking and consciousness, problems can be fixed with a single, discrete solution, but dilemmas have no quick fix. Dilemmas do not present a clear solution and in most cases are unable to be solved, but have to be managed over time towards a resolution (Government of New Zealand, 2013). Dilemmas are inextricably linked with webs of belief, which is a cognitive process. Resolving dilemmas lays bare the mental make-up of the PSL. Exploring dilemmas thus leads us to the unveiling of the interplay of conduct and context.

Finding No. 2

10.2.1.2 The Public Sector Leadership: The Colonial Dilemmas

‘The Public Sector Leadership: the Colonial Dilemma’ dwells on the following conception: hierarchism versus mentoring.

The findings revealed that colonial legacy effects led to PSL dilemmas in terms of leadership practices and roles. The research found that the colonial legacy is at odds with the Samaj tradition, resulting in a dilemmatic and conflicting situation. Incongruity between the Samaj and the colonial legacy leads to PSL dilemmas. While the Samaj tradition is based on interpersonal relationships, family and kinship loyalty, the colonial legacy reflects power distance and depersonalisation.

According to Samaj, bureaucracy is akin to the patriarchal family. Senior bureaucrats are regarded as the father figures in the bureaucracy. In Bangladesh, bureaucracy is regarded as a family where interpersonal relationships are akin to family relationships rather than based on contract. Superiors act like mentors. They also defend the young officers against odd situations in terms of advice and guidance. In return, the junior officers show courtesies and respect to the superior officers. This practice leads to group belongingness and esprit de corps in the bureaucracy. The superior-subordinate relationship in the bureaucracy has been aptly illustrated by Ronald & Sinha (cited in Sinha & Sinha, 1994, 167):
“Juniors would offer their seat to a senior in a crowded bus…. stand up when he comes in the office, open the door for him, refrain from smoking in his presence even in social occasion…….speak humbly….withdraw from a situation which is likely to force a confrontation”.

In contrast, according to the colonial legacy, bureaucracy is depersonalised and based on abstract rules. There exists a low trust in the bureau. According to Heginbotham (1975, 34), colonial administration was dependent in its day-to-day operation on native subordinates but the trust accorded to them was minimal. Thus, the absence of trust became a ritual of the colonial administration that still exists today in the present day bureaucracy.

All in all, the colonial legacy based on elitism, depersonalisation of bureaucracy and low trust culture is in conflict with both the governance reforms and the Samaj. The dilemmas for the PSL are to rework the colonial legacy – the decolonisation of the mind that is being filtered by the governance reforms and the Samaj. This is an important task in the current context because a high-trust culture is essential for the success of governance reforms. PSLs work in a legal framework. Therefore, citizens trust them. Also, the governance reforms require the PSLs to restore the trust of the citizens. Delivering public service with neutrality, trust and fairness leads to improving citizen trust and confidence, which is a major objective of the PSR. The alienation between the citizens and the bureaucrats rooted in colonialism can be eliminated by restoring citizen trust. This will change the pre-established colonial image of the PSL as ‘master’ to the new image of PSL as ‘serving the people’.

Finding No. 3

10.2.1.3 The Public Sector Leadership: Classical Public Administration Dilemmas

‘The Public Sector Leadership: the Classical Public Administration Dilemmas’ deals with the following: creativity versus rule-based Practice.

Weberian theory of bureaucracy (based on laws or administrative regulations, principles of hierarchy) separated bureaucracy from the people because of their technical knowledge, expertise and machine-like behaviour. Classical public administration is
rule-based, where the people are seen largely as clients to be served by public administrators, or, even less than that, as a mere abstraction — a faceless public paired with a faceless bureaucracy (Bryer, 2003). However, bureaucracy must have a human face with a service ethos. The study uncovered that incongruity between newer demands and existing rules/regulations caused dilemmas for the PSL. Wicked policy problems that demanded creative solutions on the part of the PSL led to a dilemmatic situation that was again reinforced by typical bureaucratic behaviour that resonated with classical public administration, as crafting creative solutions often was not covered by law. Rule-bending is against the bureaucratic code of conduct. While executing their duties, PSLs were unable to apply creativity – a leadership role, because they had to operate within a legal framework. Creativity was hindered because of obsolete rules. This dilemma reveals that the government tends to lay emphasis on rules and regulations that inhibits innovation. PSL has a clear lack of flexibility as the bureaucratic environment is dominated by a plethora of old rules. PSL follows laws while executing its duties; at the same time PSL expects incompatible laws to be replaced by compatible, updated and attuned ones. An interview quotation also suggested tensions in Dilemma 1: ‘…legal framework would not accommodate any changes based on creative suggestions.’ This resulted in a dilemma as administrative leaders were unable/less able to apply the welfare aspect using the creative faculty of mind while executing their duty because some rules framed in the colonial age needed updating and revision.

Finding No. 4

10.2.1.4 The Public Sector Leadership: Public Choice Dilemmas

‘The Public Sector Leadership: Public Choice Dilemmas’ consists of the following: public interest versus vested interest, motivating aspects versus performance.

Public choice theory is a useful framework for exploring PSL roles in terms of explaining bureaucratic reform behaviour. Public choice theory’s assumptions of self-interest and utility-maximisation by bureaucrats is widely employed to explain bureaucratic behaviour and as a theoretical foundation for public sector reforms (Niskanen, 1971; cited in Carnis, 2009, 62; Butler, 2012; Gregory, 2012).
Findings on the dilemma of public interest versus vested interest reveal the risk-taking roles of one section of bureaucracy, which tries its best to uphold the national interest at its own cost, i.e. sacrificing leaders’ career prospects. Findings also suggest how a group of bureaucrats tends to display narrowly self-interested behaviour that is equivalent to rent-seeking. Gregory (2012) comments that rent-seeking behaviour abounds in public organisations, and that it must be strongly curtailed. Public interest is sacrificed at the altar of self-serving bureaucratic policies because of some bureaucrats’ clandestine alliance with some powerful political groups. In Bangladesh, public choice theory takes a different form because of politicisation of the bureaucracy. A section of bureaucrats forms a coalition with the political executives to maximise their personal agenda and interests. The findings also show how one section of bureaucrats is victimised by another (blessed with the ruling party’s support). In Bangladesh, bureaucrats played a vital role in dislodging a democratically elected government by forming an alliance with the opposition political party through ‘Janatar Mancha’ – a movement led by some senior civil servants in 1996. The goal was to install a government favourable to a particular section of bureaucracy. The new government offered profitable postings to the party-loyal bureaucrats and punished the non-loyal (neutral) bureaucrats through bad postings and through making them ‘Officers-on-Special Duty, i.e. civil servants without posts (Osman, 2010).

Findings from the dilemma of motivating aspects versus performance show that public leaders seek incentives, rewards, benefits and motivation. Better performance is associated with greater incentives. Bureaucrats look for power and authority, status, comfort, different types of security and other incentives by maximising their budgets (Niskanen, 1997; Butler, 2012). Bangladeshi bureaucracy also responds to monetary rewards and benefits. Since they work closely with the ministers they are able to design and promote different incentive structure. The government’s ‘Digital Bangladesh’ programme and other e-governance initiatives show how civil servants are utilising these programmes for creating new budgets, new offices and posts. Civil servants seem to really take an interest in e-governance strategy because of the budget maximisation prospect. The dilemma is that, instead of devoting time to serving the people through e-governance, PSLs appear to be keen on serving their own purpose of budget maximisation. Although most Bangladeshi PSLs do not possess computer competences/skills (computer competence for public servants is the most crucial factor
for development and implementation of the e-governance strategy, Vrabie, 2008), they support the e-Governance strategy just because of the greater incentives associated with it.

Finding No. 5

10.2.1.5 The Public Sector Leadership: NPM Dilemmas

‘The Public Sector Leadership: NPM Dilemmas’ concerns the following roles: commitment versus service to multiple stakeholders, results-orientation versus citizen service.

Findings show that adherence to commitment as a leadership role is central to the PSL in terms of service delivery. The NPM approach advances that public agency leadership should be customer-oriented, anticipatory, proactive, and innovative in order to achieve agency goals (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). In this regard, the Bangladeshi PSL seemed rather hesitant and uncertain as they had difficulty prioritising the varying demands of the multiple stakeholders. For example, the electricity distribution issue between the two groups of Dhaka city dwellers at different hours of the day (The dilemma of commitment versus service to multiple stakeholders) created a dilemmatic situation for the government. Although the civil servants are committed and customer-oriented, they looked confused in terms of prioritising the demands of the multiple customers. The dilemmas they face are: who are the genuine customers? Who should be served first? Which customer(s) should be preferred by the government? Their dilemmas are further worsened by the constitutional and legal views which states that responsibilities and duties of public administrators are determined by the constitutional provisions, not by customers (Moe, 1982; Rohr, 1986).

Findings also reveal how the NPM-based leadership first faced dilemmas and then failed miserably in implementing the BIKALPA project. Although PSL followed NPM-styled leadership, the project failed primarily because it could not identify its genuine customers. Instead of giving loans to unemployed ‘recent university graduates’ (the main goal of BIKALPA), the authority sanctioned loans to student leaders.
Findings from the dilemma of results-orientation versus citizen service suggest that there seems to be a mismatch between the results orientation and citizen service, basically because of situated agency’s preference for the bureaucratic paradigm. When it comes to the conception of results-orientation, PSL seems to be faced with a choice between two alternatives – red tape or results reflecting a dilemma of juxtaposition between the bureaucratic paradigm and post bureaucratic paradigm, i.e. NPM paradigm. Water Supply and Sewerage Authority (WASA) is a successful example of NPM-based reforms. It is also an example of NPM dilemma. In 1996, the government approved an ordinance creating an independent board for Dhaka-WASA, allowing for the international and open recruitment of a managing director. In line with World Bank advice, WASA contracted out the revenue billing and collection. This is seen as the model management system for public service delivery agencies (World Bank, 2002). This contracting out led to significant improvements in revenue collection (Khan, 2001; Bos and Schuurmans, 2002). However, its recent partial failure can be attributed to the narrow traditional public administration approach, i.e. the supervising Ministry which has not respected its designated roles vis-à-vis that of management (ibid). We notice here that there is a strange co-existence of classical public administration and results-based management – a dilemma for NPM, not a wholesale NPM approach.

Finding No. 6

10.2.1.6 The Public Sector Leadership: Good Governance Dilemmas

‘The Public Sector Leadership: Good Governance Dilemmas’ consists of the following roles: vision versus implementation, puppet versus donors, domestic reform strategy versus donor reform strategy, accountability versus good governance and integrity versus corruption.

The findings supported ‘vision’ as a PSL role that is needed for ensuring good governance. The dilemma is that PSL cannot proceed towards achieving the vision required for governance reforms unless they are ready for embracing changes in terms of inadequate capacity. Rather, PSL has been found to resist change as they are not capacitated to deal with the changes. According to the World Bank (2002, 70), ‘the majority of [Bangladeshi] civil servants do not feel they have sufficient authority to carry out their responsibilities properly’. Also, new changes might put them in a
disadvantaged position. On the one hand, bureaucrats are not empowered to carry out the vision and on the other hand, they are required to implement the governance reforms that are dependent upon some freedom and discretion – a dilemmatic scenario. Furthermore, there is the dilemma of the bureaucratic vision – short-term planning versus long-term planning. The interview quotation in dilemma 2 put forward that ‘bureaucracy is a routine job and does not change much over a long period of time’. Because of its routinised nature, bureaucracy prefers to go for short term planning as this does not involve much change or much forecasting. Therefore, when it comes to long-term planning, administrative leaders feel ill at ease because of the uncertainty of the distant future and lack of precise forecasting ability. The dilemma of short term versus long term planning can be attributed to the lack of capacity. PSL needs capacity-building, including the much-needed leadership capacity-building for the implementation of vision. Official discourses also recognise that without fundamental reforms of core institutions and improvement in public administration capacity, implementation of Vision 2021 will be difficult. The government also recognises that there are long-term challenges that require long-term coordinated efforts if vision 2021 is to be achieved (GoB, 2011a).

The dilemma of puppet versus donors identifies teamwork and networking as an important PSL role. Again, this creates dilemmas as the donors, in the guise of benign helpers, limit the policy autonomy of the government when implementing reforms. Recipient countries are puppets to the donor-networks. Today’s ‘puppets’ were the ‘subjects’ in the colonial days when ‘donors’ were the ‘masters’. Influenced by the spirit of teamwork and boundary-crossing partnerships, PSL opts for networking to create public value. However, because of donors’ pressure this role sometimes leads the PSL to go for creating a network with a certain entity which often runs counter to the national administrative culture and traditions, as was seen in the ‘Sidr’ case and formulation of PRSP. The dilemma is that choosing a wrong network may create a wrong image for the government, which does not contribute to good governance.

Findings from the dilemma of domestic reform strategy versus donor reform strategy demonstrate the tension between home grown reform initiatives and the donor-imposed reform agenda. Donors believe that they can make a difference in the overall reform scenario in the recipient country. On the contrary, PSL with strategic ability is usually
informed by local knowledge and contextualities that the donors do not possess. Donors, inspired by successful governance models tested elsewhere, tend to favour applying the same in other countries. Thus, donors have a tendency to advocate a non-discriminatory cookie-cutter approach. They do not appear to take into account the local knowledge and expertise. An interview quotation related to this dilemma stated that, ‘The wearer best knows where the shoe pinches’. Localised truth should be given importance in order to address the local administrative dysfunctions in the light of the country’s unique culture and traditions. Thus, there is a tension between home grown reforms initiatives and the donor-imposed reforms agenda in terms of freedom of policy choice.

The dilemma of accountability versus good governance reveals the centrality of accountability in good governance. Findings suggest that accountability is ensured by two mechanisms – a) internal accountability (annual confidential report, rules of business, secretariat instructions) and b) public accountability (parliamentary committee). However, the dilemmas are that this guideline is good only on paper. In fact, the guideline is often violated by politicising the bureaucracy. So, partisan PSL acts in the interest of the ruling party, which sometimes conflicts with the greater interest. At the local level, state-controlled welfare allowances and benefits i.e., VGF, VDF, elderly people’s allowances are mostly distributed to the ruling party supporters – the inevitable clientelism. This clientelism is causing dilemmas for the bureaucrats in terms of whose interest would be served by the PSL – national interest or patron interest.

According to Armstrong (2005), accountability of public administrations is a prerequisite to and underpins public trust, as a keystone of good governance. Although accountability and good governance are mutually dependent, the difference between the donor version of good governance and the local version of good governance leads to a dilemmatic situation basically for two reasons: political reasons and donors’ lack of knowledge of different governance contexts and traditions. Donors’ good governance agenda has been stretched from the economic agenda to the political realm, which recipient countries do not like. An interview quotation in this dilemma asserted: ‘……, donors should use it strictly in the realm of economic management’. For example, for the World Bank, reforming the systems of governance is a politically sensitive endeavour that has traditionally been considered outside its core mandate. Also, the Bank’s founding charter prohibits it from taking into account political considerations
when designing aid programmes (Santiso, 2001). However, in reality, the activities of World Bank are synonymous with necropolitics. Banerjee (2008, 1544, 1558) explains how imperialism is operationalised through different kinds of powers and agencies such as the IMF, WTO, and the World Bank. Furthermore, most donor agencies have neither expertise nor experience to dabble in an area where many developing countries, including Bangladesh, have a tradition going back thousands of years. According to Ellmers (2011, 12), in Bangladesh the donor version of good governance creates governance dilemmas because donors, so far, are not aligned to Bangladesh’s own national development strategies and country systems. An interview quotation in Dilemma: 8 also stressed: ‘[T]hey (donors) must respect the recipient country systems and governance traditions’. Ignoring local context, thus, leads to a dilemmatic situation.

Corruption causes the dilemma of integrity versus corruption. Findings suggest that integrity is a core value of the PSL. Data also revealed the following: ‘বেড়া যদি ফসল খায় তাহলে ফসল রক্ষা করবে কে?’ (Who will protect the harvest when the fence itself eats it?), meaning people tasked with national development and maintaining the rule of law should not engage in improper use of their powers. More directly, it conveys that law makers should not be law breakers. The governance reform also requires that Bangladesh should move from an extensive structure of regulatory controls that is vague and discretionary, unaccountable and unresponsive to improving service delivery and increasing responsiveness to taxpayers (World Bank, 1996, 3). However, the dilemmas are that people who are in charge of good governance tend to cause bad governance, as corruption and rent-seeking are widespread. In order to curb corruption, the findings suggest integrity training for the officials that can develop values of authentic leadership in them. They also suggest that decentralisation can go a long way in curbing corruption, as exemplified in the decentralisation of the Passport Office.
10.2.2 Interpreting Dilemmatic Power Relationship between the Politician and the Bureaucrat

Finding No. 7

10.2.2.1 The Dilemmas of Politicisation of the Bureaucracy or the Bureaucratisation of Politics

A conceptualisation of the power relationship between the ministers and the bureaucrats helps to explain why officials, despite considerable resources, accept the authority of ministers. Conversely, it also explains why ministers, who have great authority, do not always achieve their goals (Richards and Smith, 2004, 783). The findings suggest that politicisation of bureaucracy and bureaucratisation of politics is contributing to this dilemma. The discretionary power accumulated by some senior bureaucrats contributes to the fragmentation of government (Svara, 2001, 181) in Bangladesh, which is shown in the analysis of ‘Janatar Mancha’, a movement led by civil servants in 1996 (explained in section 7.4) that eventually led to the disintegration of the government. This is so because ‘one of the outstanding features of bureaucracy is that it tends to engulf and dominate an increasing number of social, economic and political activities’ (Nachmias and Rosenbloom, 1980, 23). Weber coined the term ‘universal bureaucratization’ to describe this process (Khan, 1998, 29). Also, historically, our bureaucracy is overdeveloped in relation to political institutions because of the colonial legacy. In the post-independence era, frequent political changes and instability contributed to the centralisation of bureaucratic authority. The reason for bureaucratisation can be explained in the words of Huque (2011, 66): ‘the bureaucracy is … dominant … in governing Bangladesh as political leaders have scant experience in governance …’. Also, subsequent politicisation of the bureaucracy had adverse effects on the recruitment, posting and promotion.

Bangladesh has witnessed massive politicisation since independence but it was not to gain efficiency and increase effectiveness. Rather, the primary emphasis was placed on recruiting “party-men bureaucrats” irrespective of their qualifications (Jahan, 2006). Osman (2010) conducted research on the politicisation of the bureaucracy in which she showed how massive politicisation took place in the case of promotion between 2001
and 2006. Explaining the process, a bureaucrat said, ‘People having green signal in the software were promoted while those with red signals … were dropped’ (quoted in Osman, 2010, 321).

The findings suggest that depending on the regime character, the process of bureaucratisation and politicisation starts. An interview quotation supports that: ‘[C]ontinued political conflict paves the way for the bureaucratic dominance’, meaning the bureaucracy takes advantage of political rivalry. Also, the political leadership exploits the bureaucratic faction. Ultimately, the findings suggest the existence of ‘image IV’ (Aberbach et al. 1981) in Bangladeshi public administration, where civil servants have an increasing tendency to take up political roles. Narratives from the respondents suggest that bureaucracy has its own way of accumulating power even in the highly politicised situation as an interview quotation put forward: ‘[T]he political leadership .. low capacity that creates the possibility that bureaucrats will usurp the role of politicians in policymaking processes’. The growing involvement of civil servants in what has traditionally been described as ‘political’ roles is evident, especially when we look at the military regimes of Zia and Ershad. Huque and Rahman (2003, 410) thus observed that under the military regimes of Zia and Ershad, top civil servants could sometimes even override the decisions of the Ministers.

**Finding No.8**

**10.2.2.2 A Journey towards Reinterpreted Dichotomy: The Complementarity**

In Bangladesh, the relationship between the politicians and the civil servants matches the complementarity model (Svara, 2001). Politico-administrative complementarity is increasingly noticeable, where both political control and administrative independence are high. According to Svara (2001), a high degree of political control may actually co-exist with a high level of bureaucratic independence. It is a condition in which both political executives and civil servants are dominant because they are interdependent and have mutual respect for one another in terms of expertise and knowledge.

Findings reveal the symbiotic relationship between the politicians and bureaucrats (bumblebee and flower metaphor) underpinned by mutual benefit. Findings also suggest that the relationship between the ministers and the administrative leaders can be
described as a husband-wife relationship. The husband (minister) is the master of the house but cannot make independent decisions without consultation with the wife (bureaucrats) (Ali, 2004a). Montjoy and Watson (1995, 231) term this relationship as “reinterpreted dichotomy”, which permits a policymaking role for the manager but still helps managers resist the forces of particularism. This reinterpreted dichotomy or complementarity of politics and administration stresses interdependence along with distinct roles; compliance along with independence; respect for political control along with a commitment to shape and implement policy in ways that promote the public interest (Svara, 2001). The Bangladeshi experience of this complementarity is evident as Ahmed (1995, 56) commented, in the case of Bangladesh, the political and bureaucratic roles can be seen as reinforcing each other in a number of ways. Such reinforcement is mostly governed by the ‘mutuality of interests’.

10.3 Research Question 2

How do public sector leaders of Bangladesh respond to public sector reform initiatives in relation to contexts?

10.3.1 Interpreting Bureaucratic Responses to Public Sector Reforms: The Old Public Administration

Finding No. 9

10.3.1.1 The Bureaucratic Paradigm: Junior PSL versus Senior PSL

The findings of the research suggest that civil servants, especially senior civil servants, respond to PSR in a manner that resonates with the bureaucratic paradigm, which belongs to the classical public administration school. Selznick (1943) drawing on Marx, describes classical public administration as authoritative jurisdiction, hierarchy of office and general abstract rules of procedure, permanence and stability. The old public administration represents centralisation and involves a top-down management approach. Reflections and narratives from the respondents, particularly the senior bureaucrats, indicated that their response to any modernisation programmes was in a top-down
manner based on hierarchies and rules. Also, discussion with a number of junior and midlevel PSL (in charge of PSR) corroborates this senior PSL stance. Junior and midlevel PSL shared that there are too many decision-making layers and their use of the metaphor ‘ladder’ conjures up the top-down and hierarchical image of the bureaucracy. They also asserted that those (junior PSL) who are lower down the ladder must be relied on. It also emerged from the findings that despite their potential, efficiency and sufficient training, junior civil servants’ entrepreneurial reform attitudes are dampened by the interventionist and resistant approach of the senior PSL. One midlevel PSL exemplified how his ‘5S’ reform initiative was initially resisted by a senior civil servant, although it later succeeded. Hence, the evidence of this study is that senior PSL is heavily influenced by the classical public administration paradigm when dealing with reforms. Thus, there are two camps in the Bangladeshi civil service – a) junior and midlevel PSL who are not in favour of classical public administration and b) senior PSL who seem to respond to reform initiatives based on classical public administration.

Finding No. 10

10.3.1.2 Senior PSL & Junior PSL: Statist Tradition versus Marketisation Tradition

Findings suggest that senior bureaucrats prefer a stronger role for the state while dealing with PSR, the reason being that they believe in the discourse of bureaucratic imperialism based on administrative empire building. This administrative empire building is concerned with the ‘politics of allocation’ (Holden Jr. 1966). Because of its interventionist roles, the state is performing many functions that others, i.e. private sectors could do better. Humphrey (1990) argued that bureaucratic obstructionism and red tape had been the key reasons for the failure of a number of privatisation programmes in Bangladesh. As an Asian country, Bangladesh has a strong statist tradition and a collectivist society, characteristics that stand in opposition to marketisation of the state. As members of a collective society, senior bureaucrats try to replicate their societal ethos in the bureaucracy and as such they have an aversion to the marketisation tradition, which is based on individualism. Basically, the issue is between individualism and collectivism. Senior bureaucrats are imbued with the collectivist ethos of the whole social system. This implies that “the [Bangladeshi] society is characterized by high group values and high grid values. Individuals identify strongly
with groups in society and these groups aid to organize a great deal of day-to-day life in the country” (Rahman, 2005, 5).

Conversely, as most of them were educated in Western universities, junior administrative leaders and some mid-level administrative leaders tend to move away from the collectivist ethos. This trend of individualism can be attributed to the fact that mostly they are all members of the middle classes or above. Recent research has shown that the middle classes of Bangladeshi society are increasingly motivated by a feeling of personal achievement. They have growing tendency to treat themselves primarily as individuals (Wood, 2000). Thus, the next generation Bangladeshi mandarins have a propensity to respect the individual differences and needs. Problems arise when senior mandarins ‘…exercise their authority in a preferential manner’ – the interview quotation (section 8.3) suggested. Preferential manner means public service is driven according to bureaucrats’ preference, ignoring the citizens’ choice in most cases. The senior bureaucrats purport to know the needs of citizens better than the citizen themselves, and decide what services the citizens are entitled to. Senior civil servants appear to enjoy discretionary powers while distributing resources which Lynn (2001) called ‘the inevitability of administrative discretion’ – a feature of classical public administration. However, the junior mandarins believe people have different choices and people can buy different services suited to their individual needs as they have sovereignty over public goods by virtue of paying taxes. Findings suggest that junior civil servants favour TQM-styled reforms or privatisation reforms, because such reforms respect the individual needs and services.

**Finding No. 11**

10.3.1.3 Citizen-State Relationship: The Features of Obedience

Findings reveal that instead of entitlement/empowerment, the citizen-state relationship is based on ‘obedience’, which is a feature of classical public administration (WPSR, 2005). An interview quotation in Chapter 8 also suggested: ‘[C]itizens get treatment from the bureau depending on the degree of their obedience’. Bureaucracy treats citizens as children when it comes to public service delivery, as the fieldwork suggested. They consider themselves as the guardians of the hapless citizens, who are mostly poor and uneducated. Interestingly, PSLs speak for the elite citizens with whom they share
common backgrounds. However, mostly citizens are treated according to their level. Therefore, there is a relationship marked by domination and subordination between the state and the citizens because of greater knowledge and power of the PSL acting on behalf of the state. The increasing dependence of the citizens on the state is continuing in a negative way as citizens are not conscious of their rights, due to their lack of education. Moreover, Bangladeshi bureaucrats are indoctrinated to have as little direct contact with the masses as possible (Khan, 1998, 41) on the ground of impartiality – a key attribute of classical public administration (WPSR, 2005). The citizen-state relationship is based on ranks and rules. Public service delivery is highly rule-oriented and hierarchical. Respondents also suggested regulatory reforms so old rules can be overhauled. This rule-orientation is a feature of old public administration. Considering the rules and rank-oriented attitude of the administrative leaders, NGOs are coming forward to make the citizens aware of their rights. “In Bangladesh, large-scale NGOs have taken over many functions of the state. These NGOs, beyond delivering services, .. contribute to the formation of a sense of citizenship for its members….. . This sense of citizenship will be crucial in constructing stronger relationships between citizens and the state, … in Bangladesh” (DFID, 2010, 43).

Finding No. 12

10.3.1.4 Classical Public Administration Paradigm versus One-sided Dichotomy

Findings suggest that although there is a clear distinction of roles between the bureaucrats and the ministers as enshrined in the Rules of Business of 1996, Government Servants Conduct Rules (GSCR) of 1979 and also in the National Constitution, this classical dichotomy has long been challenged. The Bangladeshi public administration system that is based on a Webarian legal-rational framework and has been in effect since the British colonial period (Huque, 2011, 62), has for a long time been facing a new music that can be conceptualised as ‘one-sided dichotomy’. As per Article 65(1) of the Constitution, Parliament enacts laws that give the legal basis for functioning of the civil service. Part IX (Articles 133 to 141) of the Constitution deals with civil service management. The ministerial roles and the bureaucratic roles (division of labour) have been clearly spelled out in the above mentioned documents. Nevertheless, the roles are getting blurred. Thus, the finding is that a dichotomy exists
on paper but in the real world of business, it has been turned to a one-way dichotomy in favour of the bureaucracy. As Jahan & Shahan (2008) commented, the politics–administration relationship, therefore, depends on the nature of the bureaucracy and the extent of democratisation. However, the extent of democratisation is seriously affected by the informal governance system in Bangladesh, in terms politicisation. This politicisation has recently started at the entry point of civil service recruitment with the politicisation of the Public Service Commission (PSC) – the central recruiting agency (Osman, 2012, 320). Consequently, the politicised civil servants play a key role in policy-making (Islam, 2004). Inspired by such politicisation, it has been revealed, Bangladeshi bureaucracy tends to transcend the politics-administration dichotomy while distributing the resources of publicly-funded projects to the citizens (using discretion) leading to a one-sided dichotomy. An interview quotation in section 7.4 has suggested that this creates ‘….old dominant position of bureaucracy...’ It is one-sided dichotomy since bureaucrats do not like ministers to interfere with their execution of duties. Bureaucracy prefers erection of walls that are likely to prevent ministers from interfering in the bureaucracy, but destruction of walls that are intended to prevent them from taking up political roles. They prefer to have demarcated responsibilities outside the oversight of the minister. On the one hand, bureaucracy tends to get involved increasingly in political roles, on the other hand, it does not want the ministers to interfere in management responsibilities, i.e. influencing policy execution. Therefore, we can say that politicisation of bureaucracy leads to a one-sided dichotomy, i.e. the policy-making role of the bureaucracy.

10.3.2 Interpreting Bureaucratic Responses to Public Sector Reforms: The Making of Public Choice

Finding No. 13

10.3.2.1 Bureaucratic Behaviour: Self-interest versus Public Interest

Findings suggest that public sector leaders are after all human beings motivated by self-interest; they try to save their skin when their interest is at stake. Findings also point to the fact that reform programmes are more ardently responded to by the administrative leaders when they can recognise the incentive structure (budget/new posts) associated with it. Khan observed that creation of new posts is nothing new. Senior civil servants
who were members of the National Implementation Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform (NICARR) utilised its meeting for the creation of 39 posts at the upazila level (1987, 60). In *Inside Bureaucracy* (1967) Downy advanced the theory of bureaucratic growth based on salary increase and creation of new offices. He also observed that bureaucrats saw to it that their office became as large as possible.

An interesting finding is that when there is a clash between the public interest and the bureaucratic self-interest, the bureaucrats tend to act for themselves, although they may try to dress up their demands in ‘public interest’ language. Hence, for public sector reforms to be successful, the incentive structure must be designed in such a way that the bureaucracy’s interest is aligned with the public interest. All in all, the findings suggest a delicate balance between the bureaucratic self-interest and the public interest. In this context, Niskanen (1971) argued, it is likely that bureaucracy may work against public welfare in seeking to inflate the budgets of their bureaus.

Finding No. 14

10.3.2.2 Public Choice Theory: Bangladeshi Logrolling and Its Implication for Non-Partisan PSL

Findings suggest the existence of a variant of logrolling that is prevalent between a section of bureaucracy and the political groups. In public choice language, it is called ‘implicit logrolling’ (Tullock, 1998), which symbolises a trading of favour between the bureaucracy and political executives. Findings reveal that bureaucracy trades its support to present authentic and valuable information to politicians in exchange for politicians’ support for good postings and promotion. Bureaucracy gives valuable information and data to the ruling party regarding the ideological differences and degree of loyalty that prevail within the bureaucracy at different levels. Based on such information, “…ruling party separates the chaff from the grain in giving promotion to a bureaucrat” (Osman, 2010, 321). Thus, the ruling party, in turn, supports a particular group of bureaucrats by offering promotion. Osman (2010, 320) also cited the narration of a civil servant that showed how a loyal official was singled out and promoted for the support and contribution he had made to the ruling party when it was in opposition: “[T]o promote a politically chosen official to the post of the Deputy Commissioner (Head of district
administration), a gazette was published incorporating new rules and regulations suiting his qualification and after his joining, the gazette was reverted to the previous form’.

Findings also show how this logrolling takes a different form for civil servants who cannot be branded as ‘party loyal’. Non-partisan administrative leaders are punished by the political government by depriving them of their due promotion and postings. Thus, Osman (2010, 322) commented, “[O]fficials disloyal to the party in power are usually punished through bad postings, ….. and facilities”. Carino’s (1991) regime-dominant model and bureaucratic coprimacy model seem to co-exist in Bangladesh where political leadership controls the public service, resulting in ideological divisions of bureaucracy on the one hand and a domination by bureaucracy due to its “…expertise, permanence and institutionalization” (Carino 1991, 736) on the other hand.

Lastly, findings reveal that this logrolling can sometimes be beneficial for the reform programmes in terms of mutuality of interest – a reciprocal relationship between politics and the bureaucracy, i.e. based on accurate information provided by the bureau, political leaders can embark successfully on the public sector reforms, as has been the case of the ‘Digital Bangladesh’ programme and the A2I (Access to Information) programme. The latter is a good example of the mutuality of interest, where both bureaucracy and elected politicians are found striving hard to achieve the targets. The administrative leaders provide a wealth of information and based on it politicians give new policy directions that are welcomed by the bureaucracy, as the policies are not against the bureaucratic interest.

10.3.3 Interpreting Bureaucratic Responses to Public Sector Reforms: The NPM Paradigm

Finding No. 15

10.3.3.1 New Wave of Reforms: Acknowledging the NPM Spirit

Findings suggest that administrative leaders are opposed to any wholesale application of the NPM approach; rather they favoured a tailor-made application of NPM philosophy depending on the country context. Findings show how officials, inspired by NPM spirit, tend to apply the concept of Results-Based Management (RBM), i.e. the introduction of
the 360 degree performance appraisal and other performance assessment tools in the
government offices. It appears that the Bangladeshi PSL perceived NPM reform as a
performance-oriented improvement of the traditional system of public administration,
but not as a total replacement of the traditional system.

Tailor-made NPM-based reforms were successful in agriculture sector, which is the
mainstay of the economy. The government did not adopt complete NPM-styled
transformation. In the first round of reforms, it introduced limited liberalisation, slowly
moving from the protectionist stance. Based on the success of the first round of reforms,
government introduced major liberalisation in the second round of reforms in 1990s. In
the words of Ahmed et al. (2009), by 1992 the ban on private sector import of fertilizer
was removed and the deregulation of fertilizer marketing was completed.

Finding No. 16

10.3.3.2 The Moment of Truth: Safeguarding the National Interest

Findings suggest that reform gets implemented properly and faster when it is linked to
the national interest. Just after independence, the Bangladesh government embraced
market-based reforms in the agricultural sector, at a time when the term NPM was
unfamiliar to everyone. Without any external intervention, it adopted market-based
reforms in the agricultural sector in order to address the famine of 1974. The
government responded to the domestic crisis by liberalising the agricultural sector in a
phased manner. It was a demand-led reform programme arising out of a national crisis.
However, the government was not aware that the reform introduced in the agriculture
sector resembled the NPM paradigm. Later on, it further liberalised by withdrawing the
ban on agricultural input import, moving away from the earlier protectionist stance.
According to Cabral et al. (2006), the Bangladeshi government’s liberalisation of
markets for agricultural inputs led to the falling prices and increased use of these inputs.
Use of modern irrigation technology allowed a major expansion of winter rice (‘boro’)
production, leading to increases in domestic supply of rice that outstripped population
growth and thereby drove down the price of rice. Simultaneously, donors came forward
to address the domestic concern. The success of first wave of reforms in late 1970s led
to the second wave of reforms in early 1990s that was also approached in a NPM way.
Donors, especially, USAID and the World Bank, helped the government in its market-based reforms.

The key lesson emerging from the findings is that the national crisis (famine, recession) acted as a catalyst for reforms. The severity of the crisis of 1974 provided an impetus for structural reforms in the agriculture sector aimed at liberalisation of the agricultural market. Crises presented opportunities for reform. According to the OECD (2012, 29), “reforms have been more frequent in countries that have been more severely affected by the crisis”.

**10.3.4 Interpreting Bureaucratic Responses to Public Sector Reforms: The Governance/Rights-based Approach**

**Finding No. 17**

**10.3.4.1 Public Sector Reforms: The Overarching Framework of Good Governance**

Findings suggest that the agenda of good governance has emerged as the new aid-conditionality attached by the development partners. Donors, especially the World Bank, place public sector reform within the overarching framework of ‘good governance’, which hinges on some critical dimensions viz. accountability, transparency and building civil society (World Bank, 2002). The World Bank’s stance is that good governance should be the target of the public sector reforms. RIBEC is a good example of a donor-supported financial reform programme for ensuring better transparency in the public financial management system. Bangladeshi PSL responded positively to RIBEC. According to development partners, especially with the World Bank, good governance is to be ensured through public sector reform in order to achieve development goals (Parnini, 2009). Regarding the importance of ensuring good governance through PSR a World Bank Report (2002) put forward that if Bangladeshi citizens are to benefit from the public service, accountable government is a must. Greater transparency is also needed. Public accountability is seriously handicapped by the outdated government practice of classifying all government business into *Top Secret, Secret, Confidential and Restricted*. 237
Finding No. 18

10.3.4.2 Foreign Donors: 'States of Exception' and the 'Necro Capitalism'

Findings suggest that although Bangladesh can no longer be called an aid-dependent country (foreign assistance accounts for no more than 2 percent of GDP in Bangladesh, Parnini, 2009), this does not affect the leverage of the donor community, partly because donors belong to the ‘states of exception’ (Agamben, 2005) and partly because they resort to the necrocapitalist practices. Imperialism and the legacies of colonialism inform the theoretical development of necrocapitalism (Banerjee, 2008). Necrocapitalist practices are newer forms of organisational accumulation that involve dispossession and the subjugation of life to the power of death (ibid, 2008). This perfectly applies to donors, especially the World Bank. This indirect form of neo-colonialism is aimed at making countries dependent on the donor-network. Since political independence, formerly colonised countries have been striving to achieve economic freedom but few have achieved it. The ex-colonial powers, who now constitute the donor-network, still seek to exercise the past sovereignty over the newly independent nations. In so doing, they tend to trespass on the sovereignty of the recipient countries by transgression of freedom in policy choice, as seen in the case of the multimillion dollar PADMA bridge construction project. This case is a unique example of the necrocapitalist practice of the donor agencies. The lead donor, i.e. the World Bank, cancelled the Padma bridge loan, and other co-financiers, namely JICA and ADB, followed suit. Consequently, all the donors left the scene led by the World Bank. Plank (1993, 408-409, 429-430) sharply commented that: ‘increasingly overt and extensive intrusions by outside agencies into what had been viewed as the extensive purview of sovereign governments…[had]…thoroughly discredited traditional notions of sovereignty in many parts…The most likely successor to postcolonial sovereignty will be neo-colonial vassalage.’

States of exception occur in favour of the donors as they can exercise their sovereignty over the recipient countries’. Sovereign rights of the recipient country are sacrificed at the altar of the donors’ policy preferences. Agamben (1998, 17) argues that by virtue of the state of exception, the sovereign (donors in this case) ‘creates and guarantees the situation that the law needs for its own validity’. So, donors enjoy blanket immunity. The situation, then can be expressed as donor prescription versus recipient sovereignty –
a situation in which the latter is undermined. While transgressions of sovereignty were widespread in the British colonial era, when Bangladesh as a colony marked a permanent state of exception, there are different levels of sovereignties in today’s neoliberal political economy, for example, economic states of exception. The state of exception thus creates a zone where the application of law is suspended but the law remains in force in favour of the donors (paraphrased from Banerjee, 2008). The comment by one of the respondents in section 8.6 is noteworthy here, *…one must stop eating sweets before one preaches to others not to eat sweets* – meaning law and practice should be on an equal footing for both parties. Ultimately, both parties need reforms. The World Bank itself is also in urgent need of reforms. Addressing the 67th UN General Assembly, the Bangladeshi Prime Minister emphasised, “I join the vast majority of the UN members in re-emphasising the urgent need to reform the …, the Bretton Woods institutions and other global financial bodies, as their structure and decision-making process reflect the 60-year-old power equations” (The Daily Star, 2012b). But donors seem to enjoy ‘states of exception’ despite all these efforts.

**Finding No. 19**

**10.3.4.3 Pay Reforms as an Anti-Corruption Strategy: Ensuring Good Governance**

Findings suggest that public sector leaders, as human beings, like everybody else, have to meet their basic needs. Doing so becomes more difficult especially when the salary is low. The situation is further compounded by the increasing price rises and inflation (general inflation has risen to 11.41 per cent in FY 2011-12 from 1.94 per cent in FY 2000-2001). Low salaries tempt underpaid public officials to develop a wide range of coping strategies to top up their incomes, leading to petty and grand corruption.

Research suggests that higher salaries for officials induce a lower level of corruption (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001; Ul Haque and Sahay, 1996). Furthermore, research also shows that better government salaries attract more talented employees and prevent qualified government workers from taking jobs in the private sector, thus improving the government’s ability to control corruption. Conversely, low salaries in the public service attract only incompetent persons, which results in an inefficient and non-transparent corrupt administration (Ul Haque and Sahay, 1996).
Although the Bangladeshi government has constituted several pay commissions to address the compensation issue, it is clear that government salaries, at different levels, have fallen far out of line with those in the private sector (World Bank, 1996). Thus, in this context, World Bank (1996, 68) further comments: “[T]he erosion of compensation packages … , has increased temptations … to supplement their incomes illegally”. Hence, an anti-corruption strategy should include among others a handsome salary package. For this, the current pay structure needs to be reformed. Findings reveal that a comprehensive pay reform is urgently needed that can minimise the gap between the public sector and private sector. Salary should be commensurate with the level of skills, education and professionalism. According to the World Bank (1996), in the Bangladeshi public sector, the salary compensation structure does not allow for differences in professional skills, educational level, or the nature of the job. So doctors, engineers, or revenue officers entering Class I positions will all receive the same salary.

10.4 Research Question 3

How do the public sector reform initiatives prescribed by the donors interact with Bangladeshi administrative-cultural traditions?

10.4.1 Interpreting Nature of Governance Traditions: A New Historicist Analysis

Finding No. 20

10.4.1.1 Donors’ Role in the Governance Tradition: Making the Iceberg Visible

Findings support that donors are still important players with considerable influence on policies, strategies and programmes. Donors are influenced by the incentives they face in their home countries (public choice). They start intervening in the recipient’s economy in the guise of benign helpers based on self-interest. Eventually, they start to play a domineering role in the domestic policy-making process. Findings reveal that this tradition of command and control is rooted in colonialism, when force was applied for the extraction of revenue. Today, this force is applied in an indirect and sophisticated way with the aim of making the recipient country perpetually dependent on the donors.
The colonial practice still continues, but in different shapes and forms. Some donors are unable to forget that they were once the rulers of the recipient countries. The ‘colonial iceberg’, instead of melting, tends to solidify in the post-colonial era in a new form. For example, as one representative from the donor group working in Bangladesh put it: “We come with our money and say here is our rule – follow it” (cited in Ellmers, 2011, 15).

An interview quotation also asserted, ‘[A]lthough they lack the local knowledge they always try to set the policy’. The governance tradition of Bangladesh is highly affected by the colonial iceberg. Mudimbe (1988) highlights three characteristics of colonialism: a) the domination of physical space b) reformation of the natives’ minds (particularly in terms of knowledge systems and culture), and c) incorporation of local economic histories into a western perspective. In Bangladesh, the last two characteristics of neo-colonial practice are impacting on the public sector reforms.

Bangladesh needs pro-poor governance based on her local needs instead of pro-donor governance. However, construction of intervention-oriented ‘good governance’ is evident (Doornbos, 2001, 99) in the Bangladeshi case. Good governance as a tool of hegemonic power is being used by the donors as a respondent commented in paragraph 9.4, ‘they consider Bangladesh as the laboratory’. According to European Commission (2008), in aid-dependent countries, donors themselves exercise considerable influence – for better or worse – on the governance of the sectors they support.

Finding No. 21

10.4.1.2 Clash of Governance Traditions: Samaj Traditions versus Individualist Tradition

Findings suggest that the cultural landscape of Bangladeshi Samaj is based on collectivism, patron-client relationship and hierarchism. An interview quotation in section 9.3 also maintained: our bureaucracy is undividable from the ethos of social life; its culture derives from a village ethic. The traditions of Samaj are reproduced in the bureaucracy and key political institutions. As a result, bureaucracy contains the features of the Samaj. Patrimonialism hinders all-round development. Publicly-funded projects promoted by local MPs do not have redistributive benefits as they are confined to the group of clients. Rahman (2005, 2) posits that the consequences of hierarchical culture on Bangladesh society and the body politic are live and have shaped the functioning of
main political institutions as well as the behaviour of the bureaucrats, with far-reaching implications for the governance tradition. Bangladeshi Samaj is highly collectivistic, where the social texture is closely-knit based on strong family ties. Findings point to the fact that Bangladeshi Samaj breeds a high level of patronage. Thus, following Wei (2002), it can be said that the governance tradition is essentially the projection of what is perceived and expected by the society and the culture. The World Bank also (2002) noticed that the hierarchical patron-client nature of social relations is typically present in the Bangladeshi rural areas. This hierarchical and patron-client nature of social relationship has been replicated in the bureaucracy (Jamil, 2007).

Conversely, public sector reforms that are based on the marketisation tradition represent individualism. Thus, the findings suggest an inherent tension that exists between the collectivism and individualism. Any reform initiatives that diminish the collective ethos are strongly resisted. Bangladeshi people believe that the state has a strong role to play in the governance process. Citizens believe that the market is not superior to the state, because markets are not developed in Bangladesh, and thus an imperfect market condition based on patronage cannot offer an environment of fair play in terms of service delivery to the mass people. Therefore, government needs to come forward as both a referee and an intervener.

Finding No. 22

10.4.1.3 Governance Traditions: The Hybridisation

Findings support that co-existence of different traditions has led to the construction of a hybrid tradition in the Bangladeshi governance. Webarian rational-legal administration founded on the deep structure of Samaj tradition is constantly impacted on by the modernisation programmes and reform initiatives (internal and external) in terms of both legacy (Mughal and colonial legacy) and modernity. Thus, Bangladeshi governance traditions can be branded as hybrid representing domestic legacies founded on the Samaj intermingled with foreign legacies that again are impacted by modern reforms. Huque (2010) observes that subsequently, a degree of layering became evident as new values and practices became superimposed on the old.
The findings of the study concur with Bevir and Rhodes (2010, 4-5) who advance that civil services evolve according to a hybrid set of traditions of governance. Civil service traditions represent a plurality of inherited beliefs – sometimes separate and distinct, sometimes coexisting but also competing. Bangladeshi governance traditions also represent a plurality of beliefs embedded in both indigenous and non-Bangladeshi aspects. The study also supported the claims made by Bevir and Rhodes (2010) that civil servants can reinvent traditions when confronted with dilemmas posed by managerialism. For example, the colonial tradition of ‘elitism’ is gradually eroding because of the training and awareness programme initiated by the government based on the feedback of the civil service itself. MATT 2 training is succeeding in developing a service-oriented ethos (reinventing traditions) in all the three levels of the bureaucracy. Also, the formulation of the Citizen Charter for every department indicates the service-oriented ethos on the part of the civil service, meaning thereby a gradual erosion of elitism in terms of minimising the gap between the citizens and the civil service. Therefore, there is a plurality of belief systems in the Bangladeshi governance tradition, as it is invented and re-invented continually. It is evolving, bridging the past, present and the future. Modern values are affecting the pre-modern values. The strong state traditions are influenced by marketisation traditions. While the traditional part symbolises both indigenous and non-Bangladeshi (Samaj, Mughal and colonial legacy), the modern part signifies a mix of Bangladeshi and Western traditions and practices (community development programmes and public sector reforms).

Findings reveal that the above layerings are characterised by internal tension in relation to the broader environment. The Samaj traditions evolved for centuries, thus acting as the foundation of the social, cultural, political and economic life of Bangladesh. The Mughal and colonial legacies were the outcome of the Mughal and British conquest of the subcontinent. The community development programme was both induced internally and externally initiated in the 50’s; the co-operative movement began in the 60’s; the NGO movement started in the late 80’s. Similarly, public sector reform programmes began in the 70’s and 80’s under successive governments and donors, and are still ongoing. Together, these layerings lead to the hybridisation of traditions.
Chapter 11: Conclusions

Signpost

This chapter is rounded up by presenting the implications for theory; methodological contributions; and implications for policies and practices. Finally, the chapter concludes by suggesting topics for further research.

11.1 Introduction

Using ‘traditions’ as a lens, I analyse how administrative leaders as the ‘living traditions’ articulate the traditions of governance by drawing on past precedents and understandings to understand the present reform programmes. In doing so, my research findings point to the dilemmas confronted by the PSL, especially when donor-prescribed reform programmes do not match the PSL webs of belief. My research is also significant in terms of research methodology. I have contributed to the interpretive-phenomenology by supporting the fact that phenomenological focus group is not incompatible. Group method of data collection has not been a problem here. Thus, my research claims significance in two main areas: a) traditions and dilemmas of the PSL, and b) research methodology.

11.2 Implications for Theory

Most theories of leadership are largely context free and positivist. However, qualitative research on leadership is beginning to look bright (Bryman, 2004). This places emphasis on the high sensitivity to context as it is a social phenomenon (Ospina, 2004). The discussion of the theoretical implications of my research will be based on the basic understanding of an empirical theory as a set of interrelated constructs or propositions that interprets an event (behaviour of which cannot be manipulated) embedded in a particular real-life context (Kerlinger 1986, 9; Judge et al. 1998; Yin, 2009). My theoretical framework is embedded in a unique country-specific context, which has been explained in Chapter 4. Also, my theoretical framework explains the practical phenomenon (Kerlinger, 1986) of public sector leadership. Therefore, my research leans
towards ‘mode 2’ knowledge production, because its findings are problem-focused and it applies a broad set of skills and experiences, traditions and cultures in order to tackle a shared problem (Bryman and Bell, 2007). This is because, knowledge of PSL results from a convergence and interaction of specialised knowledge sources in the unique context of a defined problem i.e. public services where new sets of roles, relationships, forms and reforms have been examined (Osborne and McLaughlin, 2002; Aram et al., 2003).

As mentioned in Chapter 5, the research adopted an inductive and interpretive-phenomenological stance following the Heideggerian tradition in which empirical reality was observed by making references from particular locus (Collis and Hussey, 2003; Snape and Spencer, 2003). It is also needless to say that situating models within theories and theories within a framework helps identify commonalities in otherwise isolated phenomena so that we can make sense of experience (Piaget, 1950). Judge et al. (1998, 2) advanced that theories can be models and theoretical frameworks or new perspectives derived from empirical observation.

My research has been designed so that data are collected first, and then a theory is derived from those data. This approach is more compatible with case study research that is employed here. According to Glaser (1978), this approach to theory development is more applicable to case studies.

### 11.3 Elevation to Formal Theory

Theory of the PSL process is applicable only to the substantive area from which it has been induced; it cannot be generalised beyond the substantive context. In contrast, formal theories enjoy broader application beyond the boundaries of a single area of inquiry and hence encompass a much higher level of generality and applicability than the substantive theories (Krigerik, 2002). For example, Maslow’s (1970) ‘Hierarchy of Needs’ theory made the following generalisation: people at work seek to satisfy sequentially five levels of needs arranged in a prepotency hierarchy. According to this theory, one can expect to find a similar pattern of behaviour in a variety of work sites where no statistics have been generated. That is, theory enables one to predict what
should be observable where no data are available (Lunenburg et al. 2011). So this is a formal theory that is applicable beyond the boundaries of a single context; in contrast, PSL is applicable to the substantive context only where it is conducted. However, as Glaser (1978, 153) put forward, substantive theories can act as the building blocks for a wider formal theory.

In the present research, one possibility of formalising the enquiry is to extend it beyond the PSL substantive context. Thus, studies could be conducted in settings with different areas of specialism within the public bureaucracy – with the professionals and technocrats, or in other types of bureaucracies, i.e. smaller and less complex bureaucratic organisations. Conducting research in other types of public bureaucracies can lead to comparisons between the different substantive studies, which can generate wider formal theory of the leadership process in public bureaucracies (Kriflik, 2002). However, a major disadvantage of such a comparison process is the loss of intensiveness in favour of the extensiveness. Extensive further replications and judgments with similar theories from diverse contexts lead to the loss of intensiveness in favour of extensiveness of theorising (Glaser, 1978). Therefore, extensive theorising runs the risk of making the theory too general to be of practical use.

11.4 Contributions to Research on the Nature of Public Sector Leadership

A number of theoretical observations came to the fore, while exploring belief systems, practices, perceptions and assumptions of the PSL. In understanding how Bangladeshi public sector leaders behave, the research has established that important leadership events occurred based on ‘dilemmas’, because in a stable environment remarkable leadership events do not take place as it represents the continuity of the past. The pace of change has accelerated the business environment in the last five years as the fieldwork suggested. A systematic literature review of leadership theories (Chapter 2) leads us to the discourse of change. The aim of leadership is to bring about change – change from a previous position to the expected position. These changes pose dilemmas for the PSL. However, although initially PSL seemed stuck and trapped by the force of the dilemmas, later on PSL recognised the usefulness of these dilemmas (when it was
able to resolve them) in terms of change towards new direction. Bevir and Rhodes (2003) also discussed at length the notion of change in the context of dilemmas. According to them, resolving dilemmas is a creative process. The 11 dilemmas in terms of PSL conceptions and roles also demanded change in the Bangladeshi public bureaucracy. In particular, the research added a new dimension to the exemplary works of Bevir and Rhodes (2003, 2010) in terms of the intersubjective dilemmas confronted by the situated agency. The research has established that reasoning should be local in that it occurs against the backdrop of agents’ existing webs of belief and that it can change when confronted with dilemmas (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010).

Dilemmas are like pathfinders. They occur because of the existence of unfamiliar and new situations that demand unique solutions. Therefore in the bureaucracy, PSLs were put to the test when they faced the challenge of resolving dilemmas. The Bangladeshi PSL roles solidified the existence of dilemmas, especially when the administrative leaders make decisions in a difficult and novel situation that stood in opposition to their webs of beliefs.

It is difficult to explain why too little attention has been given by the trait theory, behavioural theory and situational theory to the cultural context within which leadership is practised (Trompenaars, 2002), given that clash of culture results in dilemmas. Nevertheless, the dilemmas that leaders are facing in the current world are hardly even considered by these leadership frameworks and theories (ibid, 2002). My research addresses this gap by illuminating the role of dilemmas. Following Bevir and Rhodes (2003, 2010) and Trompenaars (2002) this study has shown explicitly how dilemmas influence and shape the PSL roles and behaviour. In this context Trompenaars (2002) asserts that a new theory of leadership is needed to tackle the way in which leaders deal with ‘value dilemmas’. Therefore, the competence of leaders to reconcile dilemmas is an important PSL role. Dilemma is a new robust framework through which to explain the Public Sector Leadership in the 21st Century.
11.5 Contributions to Research on the Nature of Bureaucratic Responses to the Public Sector Reforms

This research presents empirical evidence that PSL responses to the reform programmes are characterised by different perspectives, as their belief system represents not only the understanding of themselves but also the environment in which they live (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975, 131). The theoretical framework in Chapter 4 also explains this. There are several clusters of theoretical implications about PSL response towards reforms. The study shows that the factors underpinning the PSL responses to reforms cannot be fully grasped from a single theoretical lens, because of the hierarchical bureaucratic response towards reforms and contextual factors. Senior PSLs in particular, respond to PSR in a manner that resonate with the bureaucratic paradigm, which belongs to the classical public administration school based on authoritative jurisdiction, hierarchy of office and general abstract rules of procedure, permanence and stability (Selznick, 1943). Concurrently, the research demonstrates that mid-level and junior PSLs’ approach towards reforms is more in line with NPM and the Governance/Rights-based approach. Moreover, every PSL, regardless of his position, i.e. senior, junior or midlevel, adheres to the public choice approach because they respond to reform programmes in terms of their concerns, constraints, incentives and interests based on personal as well as official factors. As different approaches to public sector reforms are contingent upon actors’ interpretation and webs of belief, attributable, in part, to the influence of the contextual and situational factors, the paradigms of different reforms, it is not possible to single out the best reform approach. Accordingly, the study systematically identified the patterns of reforms carried out in the public sector – the dominant trends in the reform process. In doing so, the research explored the key actors’ webs of beliefs and inherited traditions in which they work. The living traditions shape reforms, as reforms shape them (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010). The living traditions are not static. They reflect and respond to the reforms in terms of multiple viewpoints. In an interpretive and phenomenological approach, administrative leaders’ multiple viewpoints are based on intersubjectivity in terms of specific culture, historicity and facticity.
Therefore, actors’ responses to the reforms naturally reflect the different historical moments and colours in which they work, which in turn results in different reform approaches and paradigms. The traditional public administration paradigm, for example, is the chosen reform paradigm in its own right that takes shape in a unique situation. Similarly, arguments on the adoption of the NPM paradigm also offered fresh insights that enrich the existing organisational theory in terms of how country-specific traditions shape NPM-based reform programmes. As has been argued in the research, a variant of NPM has been introduced in the Bangladeshi public sector that has been conditioned and tailored to its own needs. This research showed that the wholesale application of NPM has not met with success. For example, the Bangladeshi government adapted marketisation of the agricultural sector to fit its own context.

The study presented an empirical observation on the choices of reforms and reform behaviour on the part of the PSL within the debate of the traditions and cultures. The research has shown how public sector reforms emerge with the administrative leaders’ sense-making within their traditions and cultures. The study contributes to the idea that the role of traditions is a foundation for understanding contemporary reform management as actors adopt a web of beliefs against the ideational background of traditions and that traditions ‘live’ through the thoughts and actions of contemporary actors (Painter and Peters, 2010, 4, 6; Bevir and Rhodes, 2010).

11.6 Contributions to Research on Relationship between Public Sector Reforms and Traditions

The research findings on the interplay between public sector reforms and traditions suggest a strong relationship between them. It is accepted that the success of reform can vary with national traditions and models (Meer et al., 2008). The effect of administrative traditions is often singled out as one of many causal factors in the process of reform (Yesilkagit, 2010). This is because of the role of traditions that different countries give different priorities to the same reform agenda. Hence, the same reform agenda can produce different results in different countries.
The research presents an interpretive theory of governance as it explores different beliefs held by the actors formed against the background of competing traditions, which has implications for PSR. Bevir (2011) maintains that people are intentional agents capable of acting for reasons. Many interpretive theorists conclude that explanations of social phenomenon (reforms in my case) necessarily involve recovering beliefs and locating them in the context of the wider webs of meaning of which they are a part. Thus, I focused on actors’ stories about how they might act in responding to reforms. In doing so, I stress the interpretation of actions and institutions to reveal how webs of belief informed by traditions construct them (Rhodes, 1999, 352). These actors (internal/external) work in a certain context that has its unique path dependency and governance traditions. Like any government, the Bangladeshi government is also affected by the international governance system and concurrently embedded in the deep structures of ‘domestic’ state-society relations. However, the internal and external environments are linked together though distinct, and exogenous forces tend to shape the endogenous conditions (Chan, 1990, 132). The complex interplay between the actions of external and internal actors and the invisible hands of traditions produce tension and dilemmas. This happens because as Giddens (1984, 25) observes that the state has to maintain legitimacy by attempting to control “the conditions governing the continuity or transmutation of structures and, therefore, the reproduction of social systems.” Rhodes (1999) asserts that difference in traditions explains the different interpretations of reforms and these competing interpretations produce dilemmas for the reforms. Thus, tradition is a critical dimension in facilitating or constraining the ability of a government to implement reforms. For example, pay reforms such as ‘pay for performance’ appear well-matched with the values of individualistic countries such as the United States (Girvin, 1989). However, such reforms would be less compatible with Bangladesh, which has a collectivist ethos (Wood, 2000; Rahman, 2005).

Traditions are selective legacies passed down from generation to generation (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010). The research has shown how the legacies of the past, i.e. legacy of the Mauriyian empire, the Mughal empire, the British colonial rule and the ancient Samaj, contributed to the shaping of public sector reforms in a diverse way. Also, the research presents empirical evidence that governance traditions are not independent of Samaj but are a product of underlying social forces and structures. For example, as argued in the literature review, the Bangladeshi Samaj is characterised by a collectivist ethos which
conflicts with the marketisation tradition based on individualism, and this ultimately led to the rejection of the whole-sale application of the NPM. The collectivist tradition is affecting the PSR. The governance tradition of Bangladesh is embedded in the ancient ‘samaj’, which again impacts and is impacted on by post-independence reform initiatives (Jamil, 2007). The governance tradition has been greatly influenced by the legacy of Mughal and British rule, in terms of structure and ethos. Thus, the co-existence of multiple traditions leads to hybridisation in Bangladesh, where I discerned four types of layers: Mughal legacy, British colonial legacy, Forces of Community Development Programmes and Post-independence reforms, which essentially appear as new ‘layers’ (new traditions) on the original bedrock of samaj.

The research also added new dimensions to the exemplary works of Bevir and Rhodes (2003, 2010) whose ‘interpretive third way’ laid the foundation for the study that relates the response of PSL to the reforms embedded in inherited traditions. Particularly, this research extended the works of Bevir and Rhodes (2003, 2010) by offering the term ‘new tradition’, indicating that traditions need not be lengthy, stretching back into the mists of time (Hobsbawm, 2012). In the Bangladeshi public sector, these new traditions have been invented and grafted on the old ones. These new traditions can also be called ‘layerings’. Post-independence reform initiatives led to such layerings. Establishment of the Rural Electrification Board (REB) is a prime example of such layering. REB is based on the concept of ‘Samity’, meaning co-operative. It is run on the co-operative principles (Pally Bidyut Samity) of collective ownership by the consumers. Thus, it is a strong case of new tradition/layering that depicts a supplier-customer relationship based on a strong collectivistic tradition, which has also applied the managerialist concept of decentralisation, particularly ‘area-based decentralization’ (World Bank, 1996, 37). Layering of marketisation reform on the collectivist tradition is evident in the case of REB. According to a World Bank study (1996), “[T]he laudable success of the PBSs [Pally Bidyut Samity] may be attributed to … , particularly area-based decentralization. ….freedom of operation, … an effective control system and ensures accountability. Another positive organizational feature … is … performance-based accountability principles…based on performance, and incentives for improved performance”.
11.7 Contributions to Research on the Nature of Donors’ Role in the Public Sector Reforms

The empirical study undertaken to explore the PSL in the context of reforms produced a significant body of knowledge on the nature of donors’ role in the PSR. Firstly, the research extended the previous works on public sector reform strategy by identifying newer types of reform strategy adopted by international donors, hence enriching another important area in the governance reform theory. In particular, the study added a new dimension to the reform strategy, which is the ‘good governance’ strategy undertaken by the donors (Sobhan, 2003; Parnini, 2009), especially by the World Bank.

In an interpretive and constructionist approach, four different kinds of reform strategies/approaches have been outlined in the study, which demonstrated how these strategies were shaped by contextual dimensions, especially by the donors that applied small state ideology. The latest reform strategy adopted by the donors is preached by the developed North. This good governance agenda has now been manifested in the form of the Poverty Reduction Strategy, Millennium Development Goals, and World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy. All the donor bodies, bilateral/multilateral, World Bank/the UN agencies, recognise the importance of the good governance reforms in the public sector (Parnini, 2009; Rahman, 2001, 150-151).

The research established that the governance strategy of the donors does not match the ‘slow changing local circumstances’ (Bately et al., 2012) of the recipient country. Adjusting the tempo of governance reforms in accordance with the Bangladeshi context is the most daunting task if the reform is to succeed. Donor-conceptualised standards of good governance are being imposed on the country. The cancellation of the Padma Bridge construction loan is a prime example of donors’ policy conditionality. Donors have their own agendas that drive them towards aid-giving. When these agendas are not fulfilled, donors impose different types of embargo, as manifested in the cancellation of the Padma Bridge. World Bank has its own ways of reward and punishment that involve coercion and surveillance, which are essential World Bank-IMF policies (Banerjee & Linstead, 2001, 689). Thus, the study has established the understanding of good governance as a tool of hegemonic power. Donors’ good governance strategy rarely
matches local needs to improve governance systems in developing countries such as Bangladesh (Parnini, 2009).

11.8 Methodological Contribution

Qualitative studies are comparatively rare in leadership research. I employed an interpretive-phenomenological stance in order to remain true to the evolving and the complex nature of PSL process (in terms of multiple levels of phenomena, interconnectedness, competing webs of beliefs and traditions) to allow more response from the contextual factors to emerge, rather than being imposed on the PSL process. Explaining contextual and emerging issues requires micro levels of analysis. The ‘micro turn’ in the study of the PSL calls for the unpacking of inter-connected relationships between various stakeholders: various forces; webs of individual beliefs and notions. My research has not dealt with closed systems, i.e. systems that are considered to be isolated from their environment. My research dwells on living organisms (organisations), which are open systems that maintain themselves in a continuous inflow and outflow, always in a flux and in constant contact with their environment (Patton and Appelbaum, 2003). I do not intend to compartmentalise reality into structured immobility, as doing so does not lead to a genuine reality. Thus, I reject reductionism, as it distorts reality. The wholeness of reality becomes mislaid. Fixing some engines may be best approached in this way, but fine-tuning a harmonium would not be. Thus, the current research made a contribution to knowledge by offering fresh insiders’ perspectives through the phenomenological and inductive approach, via multiple case studies. Such an emic approach has given me the opportunity to research the multiple levels of phenomena in an inter-connected system. According to Morris et al. (1999), the emic approach is useful to research an issue that is an interconnected whole or system embedded in culture and traditions. Moreover, as the qualitative approach uses a naturalistic approach, seeking to understand phenomena in context-specific settings, it has given me the opportunity to explore and interact with the phenomenon being researched to explain contextual complexities within the real-life setting without manipulating the events.
I have contributed to interpretive-phenomenology by demonstrating that phenomenological focus group is not an oxymoron. I reject the proposition that the phenomenological approach involves only individuals’ description of their lived experiences. The study illustrated how a group method of data collection involving interaction among several participants served the purpose of my phenomenological research. My research successfully demonstrated that individual lived experience can be preserved within a group context. The ‘group’ never created methodological tension in my research. Rather, groups helped me in terms of data triangulation during the focus group interview and signposted specific materials for my research.

‘Phenomenological focus group’ does not sound like an ‘oxymoron’ to me, basically for the reason that I follow Heideggerian hermeneutic/interpretive phenomenology, where bracketing assumptions and experiences is not necessary, which allowed me to engage with the respondents for co-construction. To Heidegger, understanding is a reciprocal activity because humans are interpretive. In my research, the issue of public sector leadership is seen as a group process and not a person-centred view. Also, the research questions basically led me to the focus group interview.

This research also enhanced the interpretive framework by contributing to a non-essentialist, contingent approach to traditions, in which situated agents can alter the content of traditions when confronted with dilemmas. Context, agency, tradition and dilemmas laid the foundation of this research. I illustrated how the practices and assumptions of the PSL were embedded in long-standing traditions, path-dependencies and legacies while dealing with modernisation programmes. In understanding the reform trajectory, the concept of dilemmas has been used to reflect the inter-subjective understandings, beliefs and ideas of actors.

11.9 Implications for Policy and Practices

Glaser (1978) suggests that the conclusions of the interpretive research should discuss how that research has implications for practitioners. My research has implications for policy and practices in the substantive area of the research because it emerges from the lived experiences and webs of beliefs of the PSL within that area. The research has
added new dimensions to the practices, assumptions and behaviour of the PSLs in the context of reforms. Much of the influential literature on the PSL left the PSL bereft of guidelines on how to think or respond strategically in the light of governance traditions and in the greater interest of the nation. In particular, the research findings offer practical leadership tools for dealing with the endogenous and exogenous forces. The governance tradition framework developed in the study can serve as a valuable guideline for the PSL in dealing with PSR. By explaining the convergences and divergences of governance traditions, this framework provides a useful multi-lens perspective (Samaj tradition, Community Development Programmes, Mughal and British Legacies, Post-Independence Reforms) in terms of prioritising the competing reform agenda. It provides practical guidelines for the PSL in designing various reform policies based on domestic needs. It also serves as a roadmap to strike a balance between the donor reform strategy and the domestic reform strategy. The framework is important in that it can provide ideas to the PSL on the extent of engagement they can embark upon in the light of their contexts.

The study provides useful knowledge which is drawn from real experiences of the PSL on various approaches to PSR. It shows how different kinds of reform approaches take shape based on the interplay between PSL roles embedded in the tradition and donor prescription. Deliberation on public sector leaders’ way of approaching reforms – from an ardent orientation towards change and transformation that produces transformational nature of change, to the maintaining-the-status quo mentality that evokes the image of PSL as conservators – provides practical tools that PSL can use in choosing suitable approaches vis-à-vis multiple contexts.

11.10 Areas for Future Research

According to Glaser (1978, 1998), an interpretive research usually concludes with the details of its implications for future research. From the outset, I had a premeditated strategy of keeping the study ‘component bound’ in order to concentrate on achieving the purpose of the study, namely to generate a theory of the PSL process within the substantive setting of the study in which it has been induced. My intention was not to go beyond the boundary of the study. However, the limitations of time and resources
played its part in restricting the research within a particular area of public sector leadership instead of site-spreading theoretical sampling across the entire bureaucracy, i.e. all the cadres of the civil service. Further research can be conducted to pursue wider theoretical sampling, which was not possible in this study. My research was conducted in the specific context of the public sector bureaucracy, and explored the PSL role in the context of the reforms. The contextual reality is that PSL practices and assumptions are heavily embedded in traditions and legacies. This reality of traditions is a critical dimension in facilitating and limiting the ability of the PSL to implement reforms. In this context, training can greatly enhance the ability of the PSL in terms of reform implementation. This could act as a moderating variable in this research. Because of the limitations on the spread of wider theoretical sampling, this was not tried in this research significantly but could be a natural lead for future researchers to follow up.

The research seeks to understand the PSL role/behaviour by giving attention to their accounts and narratives, which represent the beliefs that shape their actions. In so doing, the study, however, does not cover the aspect of evaluating the various reform strategies, approaches and processes. The research deliberately excluded these areas in order to focus more on identifying the reform strategies and approaches adopted by the PSL in an attempt to explore their webs of beliefs that shape their actions. As those excluded areas also constitute important sub-components of the public sector management, further researches can be conducted in those areas.
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Appendix ‘A’

Discourse of change in trait, behavioural and contingency leadership theories

Coming back to trait theories we find that they actually advocate change. For example, the main leadership traits and skills identified by Stogdill (cited in Bolden et al. 2003, 7) are highly related to change. The traits recognised by Stogdill are as follows: adaptable to situations, alert to social environment and creative (ibid).

The behaviour leadership studies i.e., the Ohio State and Michigan Studies (task accomplishment and consideration) are also change-oriented. For instance, research by Hennigar and Taylor (1980, cited in Bass, 1990, 474) revealed that the assessed receptivity to change of 80 middle management administrators of public schools was high if the administrators were either highly concerned for people or highly concerned for task accomplishment. Also, literature shows how behavioural theorists developed training programmes for the leaders to change their behaviour and assumed that the best styles of leadership could be learned. The University of Michigan and Ohio State Leadership Studies adopted this approach (Horner, 1997).

The leadership discourse of change also concerned the contingency/situational theory. The contingency/situational theory focuses on change discourse in that leadership style itself can be changed. According to Hersey & Blanchard’s (1969) situational leadership, leaders can no longer rely on one static style; instead they can learn to change their behaviours based on their followers’ needs. The level of leader task and relationship behaviour should change to match the level of follower readiness for change (Cairns et al. 1998).
Appendix ‘B’

Thompson’s (1967) Typology of Leadership in Public Sector Organisations

Thompson (1967) argues that at the executive level, leaders need to provide vision, mission and strategic planning to organisations. Moreover, at this level they deal with uncertainties and external challenges. Thus, leadership at the top of public organisations is transformational. However, Ihrke (2004) contends that transformational leadership in public organisations has the potential to threaten constitutional principles, as change may not always conform to existing laws. PSL always faces the regulatory dilemmas. However, Perrow (1972) opposes this view and asserts that it is at the upper echelon of bureaucracy where power is centred and bureaucracy is a means for dispersal of power at the lower levels. He also goes so far as to suggest that transformational changes can only be brought about at the top of bureaucracy.

The managerial level at the public organisations acts as a link between the top level and the technical core. This level transforms the top level’s vision and mission and also deals with the day-to-day needs of the technical core. In meeting the day-to-day needs of the employees in the technical core, a relationship based on exchange develops between the managers and the technical core that is akin to Path-goal leadership, a form of transactional leadership (Ihrke, 2004).

The technical core level, because of the nature of work demanded of it, exhibits two types of leadership: transactional leadership as demonstrated by the supervisors and informal leadership by the employees of the technical core (Ihrke, 2004).
Appendix ‘C’

Major Public Sector Reform initiatives in Bangladesh

Civil Administration Restoration Committee (CARC), 1971

Just after independence, CARC was formed in order to fix priorities and ways for restoration of the field administration system devastated during the war of liberation (Khan, 1998; Huque, 2010). Its recommendation also led to the functioning of the constitutional bodies like the Supreme Court, Public Service Commission, Election Commission and the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General. The CARC recommendations included a secretariat with 20 ministries and the re-establishment of field administration. According to Huque (2010, 61), it was patterned after the Pakistani model. It was nothing innovative.

Administrative Service Reorganizing Committee (ASRC), 1972

The ASRC, in preparing its reform plan, was guided by the ‘new social philosophy of the state that focused on nationalism, secularism, democracy and socialism’ (Khan & Zafarullah, 2005, 54). The ASRC recommended introducing pro-people civil service system by creating a single, classless unified grading structure which would consist of appropriate number of different pay scales corresponding to different skills and responsibilities. However, ASRC’s recommendation for a modern, professional and citizen-oriented civil service was shelved. The senior generalist civil servants opposed the recommendations of the ASRC. Also, the country was facing political opposition, near-famine situation and a breakdown in law and order by the time the report was submitted (Khan, 1998, Huque, 2010). Inevitably, the regime chose to maintain the status quo by compromising its earlier stance vis-à-vis the bureaucracy, especially the generalist corps (Zafarullah & Huque, 2001, 1385). Huque (2010, 62) also asserted that ASRC recommendations were shelved, and the elitist bureaucrats remained entrenched.
National Pay Commission (NPC)

Pay Commissions are appointed to review the pay structure of the public servants to determine salaries and benefits for employees in the public service in terms of inflation and cost of living. According to Huque (2010), it is interesting to note that measures aimed at revising (basically increasing) pay and perks of the civil servants could be implemented without much difficulty. Since independence, seven pay commissions have been appointed to review the pay structure. The first NPC (1972) recommended ten scales of pay to suit the ten service grades. A large segment of public servants went to court to challenge the NPC’s recommendation (Khan, 1998). Eventually, it was partly implemented. The second NPC (1976) recommended 52 scales of pay but the government reduced them to 20. The third (1984), fourth (1986), fifth (1989) and sixth (2004) NPCs retained the number of scales at 20, with considerable difference between the highest and lowest grades (Huque, 2010). The new features of the seventh NPC (2008) which is the latest, included: (i) a separate pay scale for the judicial service for the first time ii) commitment to a separate pay scale for the education sector next time. The seventh NPC invited criticisms in terms of increasing the difference of pay between the public servants at the highest and the lowest levels. Thus it was in favour of the elite group of bureaucrats.

Pay and Services Commission (P&SC), 1976

The P&SC examined the existing pay and service structure of the civil service, method of recruitment, training and deployment. The Commission was also entrusted with devising rational and simple principles for the amalgamation of the civil servants of the erstwhile Pakistani central and East Pakistani provincial governments, who performed similar duties and functions (GoB, 1977, 7). The Commission recommended replacing systems of patronage with merit-based appointment through competitive civil service examination. Creation of a Senior Service Pool (SSP) following the recommendation of the Commission was a significant bureaucratic development as it further strengthened the generalist civil servants. This was quite in line with the expectation of the senior administrative figures who dreamed of assuming authority and prestige like that of the colonial rule (Azizuddin, 2011).
Martial Law Committee (MLC), 1982

A second military regime that ruled the country from 1982 to 1990 appointed a Martial Law Committee for examining organisational set-up of Ministries/Divisions/Directorates and other organisations. The primary tasks of the Committee were: to review the charter of duties of the various public offices; to scrutinise the existing and sanctioned manpower; and to rationalise the organisations and functions of the Ministries/Divisions/Directorates and other Organisations (Khan, 1991; Khan, 1998). A few limited changes took place based on its recommendation: reduction of the number of ministries from 36 to 19 and that of departments/directorates and subordinate offices from 243 to 181 (Khan, 1998). During this regime, no initiatives were taken in terms of addressing the basic problems of bureaucracy apart from the above quantitative reductions. According to Huque (2010), the attention of the government shifted and there was no progress in this respect.

Committee for Administrative Reform/Reorganization (CARR), 1982

The military regime also looked at the local government. They constituted the CARR with a view to recommending ‘an appropriate, sound and effective administrative system based on the spirit of devolution and the objective of taking the administration nearer to the people’ (GoB, 1982, 1). The CARR was appointed for administrative reorganisation and institutionalization of the local government system in the country (Azizuddin, 2011). It was related to the democratisation of the governance system at the local and sub national level (Khan, 1998). The recommendations of CARR resulted in a programme of decentralisation under which an elected local government was installed at the upazila level (a local government tier). For the first time, democratic governance, although limited in scope, was introduced at the upazila level (Rahman, 1994; cited in Sarker, 2004, 271). However, this decentralisation reforms backfired as it was not properly conceived. Thus, “rather than leading to more local power or participation in order to overturn the tradition of centralised administration, it resulted in the extension of the central government bureaucracy through a new layer of administrative agencies at the sub district level” (Huque, 2010, 63).
Public Administration Reform Committee (PARC), 1997

PARC suggested reforms in line with the New Public Management (NPM), i.e. market-based public administration. In Bangladesh, a variant of NPM has been applied (World Bank, 1996; Sarker, 2006). The reforms started with macro-economic management affecting the budgetary process and expenditure control. The PARC report indicated that previous reform efforts had changed little of the colonial tradition, in spite of several attempts made over the years (Huque, 2010). Privatisation of public enterprises, public-private partnership, finalisation of citizen charters, meritocracy in the public service, results-oriented management, devolution, e-governance and combating corruption are some of the recommendations that reflect market-based tradition (PARC, 2000). PARC generated some novel and innovative ideas influenced by market-based public administration, and submitted 70 short-term and 37 long-term recommendations (ibid, 2000). Based on the PARC’s recommendations, the government slowly started shifting from a state-centred model to a more market-led approach. However, most of the recommendations are yet to be implemented and in reality, things stand more or less where they started (Huque, 2010; Jahan, 2006).
Appendix ‘D’

CASE 1: Ministry of Public Administration (MOPA)

The Ministry of Public Administration (MOPA) is regulatory in nature. MOPA is the lead government agency entrusted with formulating public policies on recruitment and regulation of service conditions for civil service management. In other words, it deals with all matters relating to recruitment rules for all services and posts under the Republic. It covers issues from reforms, administrative research and management for better and economic execution of government business to securing to all government servants the rights and privileges conferred on them by or under the Constitution or any other law in force.

MOPA has been selected as a case because it plays a leading role in spearheading the modernisation of the human resources management system in terms of improving the inadequate personnel policies, taking judicious measures for the over-centralised management and ensuring better co-ordination between the ministries and the local government thereby ensuring the better service delivery to grass roots level customers. In the words of Zafarullah (1998), all the above functions give MOPA the authority of a central personnel agency.

Secondly, it plays a critical role in implementing the governance reforms in terms of attracting and developing an innovative and competent human resources support system. Moreover, MOPA envisions becoming a key provider of high quality organisational, functional and human resource support to Bangladesh public service with a view to ensuring efficient, professional, transparent and responsive public service delivery (MOPA, 2013). A study carried out by UNDP (2007, 13) shows how MOPA can develop innovative ways to improve its service delivery standards and increase their organisational performance levels, including support in the use of a managing change strategy and technical expertise for redesigning work processes.
CASE 2: Cabinet Division (CD)

In the governance system of Bangladesh, the Cabinet Division plays a crucial role in terms of administrative/modernisation reforms/reorganisation and inter-ministerial co-ordination. The Cabinet Division was established in 1972 as part of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs. Subsequently, it went through several changes until in 1991 it became a self-governing body, in line with the parliamentary democracy, called Cabinet Division. It reports to the Prime Minister directly. Although the Cabinet Division is not a Ministry, it is highly important in that it serves as the Inter-Ministerial Co-ordination Body. It acts as the ‘linking pin’ between the ministries. It is particularly important for my research as it is tasked with a significant part of modernisation reforms. The Cabinet Division oversees the administrative reforms through a committee called National Implementation Committee for Administrative Reforms/Reorganisation (NICAR). Moreover, it looks after the general administration in Upazilas (sub-district), Districts and Divisions. Therefore, it is tasked with an important share of public administration.

CASE 3: Economic Relations Division (ERD)

The Economic Relations Division (ERD) is a division of the Ministry of Finance responsible for mobilising for external resources for the development of the country. ERD acts as the official focal point for interfacing with the donor bodies in terms of co-ordinating the external assistance inflows into the country. Assessment, mobilisation, negotiation and allocation of all multilateral and bilateral economic aid for implementation of development projects under Annual Development Plan and Five Year Plan is one of the important functions of ERD (Rules of Business, 1996, 2000). In brief, it is the authorised window of the Bangladesh government entrusted with negotiation with donors.

The selection of ERD as a case is important because it acts as the point of contact between the government and the development partners. It co-ordinates, reviews and monitors the utilisation of foreign aid. Liaising and maintaining economic relations with the donors is its primary function. Maintaining the national interest while negotiating with the donors has given it a central role in the government. Therefore, PSLs working in the ERD face the most characteristic dilemmas while working with the donors.
CASE 4: Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre (BPATC)

The Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre (BPATC) is the main government training institute responsible for imparting training to the civil servants of the Bangladesh Government. The major functions of BPATC among others are to: a) equip the officials with the requisite knowledge and skills of managing organisations so that they can play a dynamic role in developing society; b) impart in-service training to the public servants in the service of republic; c) provide Foundation Training to the new recruits of various cadres of Bangladesh Civil Service; d) conduct research on public administration and development; e) provide consultancy advice to government on important national matters; f) carry out such other activities as required by the ordinance (Kabir & Baniamin, 2012).

The selection of BPATC as a case is highly important. BPATC imparts foundation training to all the new entrants of 27 cadres of the Bangladesh civil service. It also trains other key officials of the government, i.e. deputy secretaries, joint secretaries and additional secretaries of the government. Of late, it has started offering training to the permanent secretaries as well. I selected BPATC basically, for three reasons.

Firstly, training institutes present the best scenarios for examining cognitive and behavioural changes of the PSL behaviour (Kabir & Baniamin, 2012) as my research is concerned with exploring the public sector leaders’ views, perceptions and mind-sets on what have been the elements they perceive as important to the leadership roles and practices. BPATC offers me a unique opportunity in terms of looking into the assumptions of the PSL regarding their roles and also their reform behaviour. Also, civil servants are less formal when exposed to training situation. Communication is effective with them in the training scenario.

Secondly, BPATC is the ideal place for bringing about a mind-set change in the bureaucracy. In fact it can be used as ‘incubator’ if properly planned. Two of the objectives of the foundation training course among others are: a) internalize the real problems of the backward section of the society and b) take initiatives for solution; recognize the role of civil servant as a leader to manage organizational challenges in a changing national and global environment (BPATC, 2012). These two objectives
furnished me with plenty of food for thought and conjecture. The first objective essentially highlights the role of the administrative leaders in enhancing the socio-economic development of the country. The second objective acknowledges the idea that administrative leaders are the real change agents of the country. BPATC is entrusted with the responsibility to create a corps of skilled, proactive and well-groomed civil servants committed to the welfare and development of the people in an ever-changing global context. If bureaucrats are not competent enough, efficient bureaucratic discharge of duties is not possible. It would be like ministers pulling the ‘lever’ for change but the ‘wire’ feels slack and nothing happens at the other end, as the literature suggests.

Thirdly, BPATC provides me with a ‘known sponsor’ approach (Patton, 1990) in terms of gaining access, as I work there. Gaining access is highly important as the researcher’s success will have a significant effect on the nature and quality of the data collected and ultimately, on the trustworthiness of the findings (Shenton, 2004).
Appendix ‘E’

Research Questions Informing my Research Methodology

My research questions start with ‘how’ questions. Case study is useful when ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are asked within a contemporary context over which the researcher has little or no control (Yin, 2003). The first RQ is: how do public sector leaders of Bangladesh conceive of their leadership roles? Through Case study, I seek to identify participants’ congruence with the PSL roles. The values underpinning PSL profile and whether that values match potential leaders (from frontline managers to policy level) will be explored through open-ended interviews (Gillham, 2000). This method helps participants to share their perspectives based on their own knowledge and experience about the topics under investigation (Denzin, 2002). The nature of the first research question necessitates that the study be a constructionist one. “Constructionism asserts that leadership is about meaning-making in communities of practice and is thus an emergent reality” (Drath, 2001; Drath and Palus, 2004; cited in Ospina and Sorenson, 2006, 193). And, qualitative case studies are well matched with the constructionist paradigm (Stake, 2005, 2006; cited in Lauckner, Paterson and Krupa, 2012, 5) The second RQ is: how do public sector leaders of Bangladesh respond to public sector reform initiatives in relation to contexts? Case study is well-positioned to answer this contextual reality. Case study is highly pertinent for exploring contextual knowledge. As Dooley (2002) stated, case studies emphasise the contextual analysis of a selected number of events or conditions and their relationships. Moreover, case study is appropriate for context-based research such as leadership. Flyvbjerg (2006) also comments, case study produces context-dependent knowledge. To answer it, case study employed in-depth interview. A qualitative interviewing approach is consistent with interpretive research, as it focuses on gathering rich and thick data in the form of stories, examples and accounts of how people understand their lived experiences, which can be used to understand a social phenomenon (Rubin and Rubin 1995). The third RQ is: how do the public sector reform initiatives prescribed by the donors interact with Bangladeshi administrative-cultural traditions? Reforms and the implementation of reform measures are basically about inducing changes in power relations between state and society, between politicians and bureaucrats, and between government organizations (Caiden, 1991, 66) and also between donors and the recipient countries.
Relevant literature suggests that, in general, attempts at reform address either directly or indirectly, the question of administrative culture. Reform is a complex social process (Šević, Vukašinović, 1997). Case study is appropriate when it is employed to explore a complex social phenomenon (Yin, 2003, 2009). To answer this question, case study employed in-depth interviews, focus group interviews and document analysis to elicit data from the respondents’ lived experiences. A closer look at research questions reveals that all the RQs are of exploratory nature leading to qualitative methodology. It is not going to measure anything.
Appendix ‘F’

The Pilot Case: Bangladesh Civil Service Administration Academy (BCSAA)

Established in 1987, Bangladesh Civil Service Administration Academy (BCSAA) is attached to the Ministry of Public Administration. It has collaboration with Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), Yamaguchi University of Japan and some other international organizations in the field of good governance reforms (BCSAA, 2013).

The pilot case study was conducted between the start of August and end of August, 2011. As many as six respondents namely, 1 director, 2 deputy directors and three assistant directors took part in the pilot case interviews. Each interview session lasted between 45 minutes and 60 minutes. The interviews were transcribed and analysed.

Pilot studies play an important role in research as they allow for testing and then developing more sophisticated and research-centred questions (Sapsford and Jupp, 1996). The pilot study was conducted with a view to informing the main study and facilitating the design of the research instruments. It guided me in selecting the appropriate case sites for the case studies and it determined the structural approach. It also helped me in collecting relevant documentary data from the ministries, divisions and training institutes and also conducting interviews.

The pilot study also helped confirm some of the priority reform areas particularly prescribed by the World Bank’s country assistance strategy for Bangladesh, such as governance reforms and civil service reforms through gradual and incremental change. The pilot study confirmed the significant role of training institutes in the reform process that is also supported by a UNDP (2007) study on Bangladesh. In sum, in the words of Glesne (2011), I achieved a different frame of mind after conducting the pilot case study.

BCSAA trains civil servants belonging to the administration cadre only. Officials belonging to the administration cadre are important in this research as they can serve across the entire bureaucracy in different generalist positions and are usually charged with reform implementation. They also used to act as the chief of the Roads and
Highways Department (an engineering department) not so long ago, although they are not engineers. The role of this cadre is pervasive in the Bangladeshi bureaucracy. Therefore, along with BPATC, BCSAA plays important part in shaping the approach and mental make-up in terms of moving from ‘red tape to results’.

The lessons learnt from the pilot case contributed to my conducting of final cases and field procedures (Yin, 2003, 2009). The data obtained from the pilot case led me to modify my earlier research questions and provided insights into the main study. Noting the importance of a pilot case study, Yin (2003, 79) commented that the pilot site could assume the role of a “laboratory” for the investigators, allowing them to observe different phenomena from many different angles or to try different approaches on a trial basis. The pilot case helped confirm the types of documents to be studied, the interview guide and the selection of appropriate respondents. Interestingly, the pilot case also contributed to my learning how to ask probing questions. I started to understand when to ask probing questions, and what form they should take? It sharpened my field note taking ability. On the basis of the findings of the pilot case and also literature survey, I determined the number of the case studies.
Appendix ‘G’

Politics-Administration Relationship

The political dominance (upper-left corner of the quadrant) that results from high politicisation and political control and low administrative independence is the condition that has been criticised by reformers because of their concern for loss of administrative competence and the potential for political corruption (Svara, 2001).

In Bangladesh, high political control is the outcome of high politicisation, leading to low administrative autonomy. Findings also suggest how bureaucracy was subdued during the Mujib regime when a one party rule called BAKSAL was introduced. High politicisation also affected the recruitment process in terms of lowering of educational standards. Thus, the efficiency of the Bangladeshi administrative system was impaired by the deterioration in the quality of the Civil Service (World Bank, 1996, 104) because of politicisation. The lowering of educational standards in the Bangladeshi Civil Service (World Bank, 2002, iii) has serious consequences for the public sector reforms.

Bureaucratic autonomy/bureaucratic coprimacy is feared by critics of the administrative state, who argue that administrators advance their own interests rather than the public interest and that bureaucracy has the potential to dominate the democracy due to its expertise, permanence and institutionalization (Svara, 2001; Carino 1991, 736). In both situations, i.e. politicisation/high political control and bureaucratic autonomy/coprimacy, either the level of control or independence is extreme, and the key reciprocating value is not present; politicians do not respect administrators, or administrators are outwardly deferential towards ministers but prepared to defend the status quo and not committed to accountability (Svara, 2001). One conceptual possibility is the combination of low control and low independence. A situation of low political control and low bureaucratic independency is called ‘laissez-faire’ or ‘political stalemate’ (upper-right corner). The distance between the two sets of officials (political executives and bureaucratic executives) does not contribute to real control or real independence, but to coexistence. In some circumstances, the limited ability to influence other officials could result in stalemate (Svara, 2001). This stalemate will be discussed later on.
Bureaucratic autonomy/bureaucratic coprimacy in a developing nation like Bangladesh with a colonial heritage is not a new phenomenon. Interview data in section 7.4 reflected how ‘high and mighty’ bureaucrats feel whenever they regain ‘old dominant’ position. Between the post-Mujib era and the end of the military and quasi-military rule in 1990 – a period marked by assassination of leaders, coups and counter-coups – the bureaucracy was quick to reclaim its position. An alliance developed between the civil and military bureaucracy due to the apparent failure of the politicians in developing viable institutions (Huque and Rahman, 2003) and also because of the political void caused by the assassination of the prominent leaders.

A variant of Svara’s stalemate, i.e. the Bangladeshi version of stalemate, takes place when the bureaucratic prerogatives are challenged. Fieldwork suggests that when the governance reform challenges the privileges of the bureaucracy, it remains unresponsive to such reforms and finds ways to frustrate the reform initiatives. The bureaucracy builds a strong alliance with other interest groups to thwart reform initiatives, leading to a stalemate of the reform. For example, in 1984 during the implementation of upazila decentralisation reform, the government decision to place the services of all upazila level officers at the disposal of the upazila parishad evoked sharp reactions from the three specialist services – medical, engineering and agriculture. These services formed the Central Coordination Committee and submitted a memorandum to the President containing 9 point demands. A political stalemate arose because of confrontation. Eventually, the government took a “live and let live” approach (Svara, 2001) vis-à-vis the Central Coordination Committee as it was not considered wise to open too many pockets of resistance. The government agreed to revoke the decision of placing doctors, engineers and agriculturalists at the disposal of Upazila Nirbhahi Officer. Thus, the government preferred peaceful co-existence.
Appendix ‘H’

Framework of Governance Traditions explained

The Bangladeshi governance tradition is embedded in the ancient ‘samaj’ (village life) (Jamil, 2007) which is the foundation. Samaj is again impacted on by two legacies: Mughal and British colonial rule. Samaj is also affected by the waves of public sector reforms including the ‘global megatrends’ in public administration, centred around the principles of NPM in the 1980s and ’90s (Massey, 1997) and also by the community development programmes (Jamil, 2007). Following Heginbotham (1975), Jamil (2007) and Huque (2010), I argue that the governance traditions in Bangladesh are characterised as ‘postcolonial’, combining multiple features directly traceable to Mughal legacy, colonial institutions with post-independence adaptations and innovations based on the community development programmes and administrative reform prescriptions by the donor agencies, the latter essentially appearing as new ‘layers’ on the original bedrock called samaj. Therefore, it can be called a hybrid tradition.

Samaj: The Foundation

Samaj is important. It is like a vessel where state institutions are stored. Samaj greatly influences the bureaucratic culture, which is part of a larger attitudinal matrix, containing values, practices, and orientations toward the informal social system and the relations (Dwivedi et. al. 1999). Here comes the issue of Samaj. Forces of Samaj reinforce and change the bureaucratic culture.

Bureaucracy in Bangladesh is largely typified by centralisation of authority, patronage, authoritarian rule and hierarchism that has its roots in the Samaj tradition. For example, in the village, the important authority is that of tradition. The authority of individuals plays a less important role. Age and seniority are of importance. Children are taught to accept the authority of the elders with unquestioning obedience and deference. Thus, the discourse of hierarchy prevails in interpersonal relationships at the social level. This ethos of social life has tremendously impacted upon the administrative culture. In
bureaucracy as well, age and seniority play a significant role. Literature (Jamil, 2007; Abedin, 1973, 61) shows that in Samaj, those who are lower in rank, are treated as children, with limited freedom of choice. These authoritarian and paternal social values partly account for the paternalistic behaviour of the bureaucracy.

The Samaj approach to bureaucracy reflects a set of social and cultural norms and values that stem from the ethos of village life evolved over the centuries, greatly pre-dating the British colonial rule. Samaj here refers not only to the traditions, beliefs and set of norms practised in a particular society but also incorporates social values that shape interpersonal relations.

**Mughal Legacy: The Layering**

One can trace many of the bureaucracy’s legacies rooted in the Mughal historical past pre-dating the colonial rule, which can be called older legacies. For example, the concept of the district as an administrative unit, which still applies in Bangladesh, had its root in ancient past (322–298 BC) (Dwivedi and Mishra, 2010). The Mughals carried forward the use of districts as the basic revenue collection unit. Reforms of the revenue administration was initiated and implemented under Emperor Akbar, which is remembered even today for its uniqueness. He categorised the land according to fertility. He developed a system which drew a balance between the demands of the state and needs of the subjects, in that revenue was collected in proportion to yield. To ensure justice in land revenue, he classified the land according to produce and cultivability into four categories: a) Polaj- always in cultivation b) parauti – that had to be left fallow for one or two years to recoup the fertility c) chachar – which had to be left out of cultivation for three or four years to get back the fertility d) banjaar – barren land that had to be left fallow for five years or more (Sundaram, 2007; Jayapalan, 2008). Based on this pattern, the present land revenue in Bangladesh has been further updated.

During the Mughal period, the character of administration was in the form of ‘a centralized autarchy’. Loyalty to the throne guided administrative philosophy (Dwivedi and Mishra, 2010). Administration was hierarchic and centralised. The Emperor seldom delegated authority and kept a careful watch upon the activities of his subordinates (Rathore, 1993, 36–37).
British Colonial legacy: The Layering

Specifically, there are four salient legacies of British colonial civil service that are passed down to Bangladeshi public administration. These four salient legacies are: a) the secretariat system and the dominant role of secretaries b) preference for generalists c) the cadre system d) the district as the basic unit of administration and the importance of office of the Deputy Commissioner (DC) (Kennedy, 1987; Dwivedi and Mishra, 2010). Actually, the district has its origins in the ancient past. The British colonial administration modified it. DC still is a highly powerful post in Bangladesh, as it was in the British colonial administration. It is a post that executes three functions concurrently. As a district collector, DC is responsible for collecting land revenue, while as a deputy commissioner, DC controls, directs and coordinates all administrative and development activities. The third function of DC is to act as district magistrate.

The colonial administrative tradition seemed to be inspired much by the Mughal administrative pattern especially in terms of the functions of the deputy commissioner. According to Mishra (1984, 11), the revenue, police, magisterial and judicial functions were vested with the District Collector or Deputy Commissioner, echoing the unified territorial system of the Mughal period. The British colonial administration inherited the concept of district from the Mughals and further developed it as an administrative unit. Subramaniam (2001, 85) posits that the district administration system, thus, is a sub-continental template adapted for subsequent re-export to Malaysia, Uganda, Hong Kong and elsewhere by the British.

Forces of Community Development Programmes: The Layering

Community development programmes consist of two strands – domestic and western. The domestic part in turn also has two strands – government and non-government (NGO) organisations (Jamil, 2007). NGOs are now being treated as the alternative to the public sector in terms of the development force of the country. The history of NGO is traceable to the British colonial period (Haider, 2011) and beyond that. Among the NGOs still functioning in Bangladesh, the Baptist Missionary Society is reportedly the oldest of British origin and has been working since 1794 (Sanyal, 1980; Haider, 2011). Research also shows that Bangladesh has had its tradition of voluntary work, rooted in
its social, religious and economic conditions (Batkin, 1992). These traditional philanthropic activities and the concept of voluntarism started to take structured shape leading to a specialised and formal organised structure now known as NGOs operating in Bangladesh (Huda, 1990; Haider, 2011). In independent Bangladesh, NGOs are now in almost every sector such as agriculture, fisheries, livestock, cooperatives, health and family planning, adult education, vocational training (Ahsan Ullah and Routray, 2007, Haider, 2011). Because of the pervasive role of NGOs, on many occasions their performance is judged against the performance of the bureaucracy (Jamil, 2007). Because of their participatory approach, NGOs are popular in the rural community. In many cases, they are credited with introducing new types of social transformations in terms of a bottom-up approach that are now taking place in Bangladesh (Haider, 2011).

The government version of the community development programme is known as the Comilla model. The Comilla model is the outcome of the V-AID programme, which is ideologically influenced by Western thoughts and perspectives. As an ideology it has been highly affected by the American approach in terms of change and development. It is also characterised by a bottom-up approach to change and development (Heginbotham, 1975, 44; Jamil, 2007). It emphasises team work and spirit, in contrast to the unitary and top-down approach of the British colonial rule. The primary concern of this approach is to inspire people to change their social and economic lives (Jamil, 2007). The V-AID programme promoted village councils and communities and also cottage industries. However, the programme was discontinued in the late 50s as it failed to keep the acute food shortage in check in the earlier part of the decade (Khan, 1983, 29).

The Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development is situated in Comilla (a district). It was responsible for the implementation of the Comilla Model to find new ways of rural development. The Comilla Model came into being as a response to the co-ordination problems that used to plague the ‘Thana’ (lowest administrative unit at that time) level bureaucracy. The co-ordination problem of the bureaucracy in the Thana level, made it difficult to address the local problems such as repairing of roads, drainage and irrigation. Thus, according to Jamil (2007), the main aim of the Comilla model was institution-building through better co-ordination with the bureaucracy, and between bureaucracy and citizens through training of both villagers and bureaucrats.
However, the success of the Comilla model could not be replicated in the nationwide community development programme, although it received extensive support from the government and the donors. However, the bureaucracy was of the view that building institutions, training people and developing leadership was a total waste of time (Jamil, 2007). The “bureaucrats knew the solutions and that is to carry out central directives and circular rather than to innovate at the local level” (Khan, 1983, 185). Later on, there have been other community development models that have been discussed in Chapter 4.

Post-Independence Reforms: The Layering

Public sector reforms represent two essential views – indigenous and external/donor involvement. The PSR agenda consists of changes based on decentralisation and delineation of governance role (World Bank, 1996) that aims at creating a creative, responsive, stakeholder-oriented and transparent public administration (UNDP, 2007).

The major reforms that were initiated by the Government side are: CARC (1971), ASRC (1972) P&SC (1976), MLC (1982), CARR (1982), and PARC (1997). International donor reform activities labelled under SAPs, SWAPs, NPM, and PRS have been introduced in Bangladesh since the 1980s (Parnini, 2007; Sarker, 2006). The present buzzword is good governance reforms. The change, although slow to stimulate and permeate various layers of resistant bureaucracy, mainly addressed administrative capacity building, institutional reforms, transparency and decentralization.

These reform initiatives (internal and external), though, had limited success (Parnini, 2007; Sarker, 2006) left some imprints. For example, with the re-introduction of upazila system of administration (local government decentralisation) signs are already visible that local government bureaucracy has taken a back seat. The upazila system has brought bureaucracy under the complete control of an elected functionary (Ahmed et al., 2011). Bureaucratic dominance is now eroded to a significant extent. Bureaucrats’ roles have changed from one of issuing directives in British colonial rule to one of negotiation and bargaining as is evident in upazila administration (Jamil, 2007). It has revolutionised the politico-administrative relationship at the local level in terms of empowering the elected upazila chairman to exercise control over and coordinate the work of the upazila-based central government officials (Ahmed et al., 2011.)
Hybrid Tradition

A hybrid tradition is increasingly noticeable because of the layerings founded on the Samaj. It is a hybrid tradition in the sense that different traditions coexist. Merit-based recruitment and promotion are in place, yet public servants are promoted on the basis of patronage. The general rule followed for the promotion of civil servants is seniority and then merit (Ali, 2004a). Theoretically, civil service recruitment is done on the basis of competitive examinations. But in reality, things are a little different. Osman (2010, 12) observed, “..., political choice gets preference in viva voce. So, there is a strange co-existence of modernity and legacy in the public administration – a mixture of patrimonial and democratic principles, i.e. democratic rule, versus dynastic rule, merit versus patronage, competency versus ‘tadbir’ (personal lobbying) (Huque, 2010; Jamil and Haque, 2007). Thus, the Bangladeshi governance system can be regarded as a hybrid tradition as it represents a good number of features founded on the ancient samaj with layers of: a) colonial legacy b) Mughal legacy c) community development programmes and d) post-independence adaptations and innovations based on the administrative reform prescriptions by the donor agencies. Therefore, it can be called hybrid traditions.
Appendix ‘I’

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Introduction
I am interested in learning more about leadership practices, attitudes and assumptions of the PSL at work that shape their approaches to public sector reforms in the context of donor involvement and exploring whether or not donor viewpoints converge with the home country’s unique traditions and culture.

Background on Participant

Occupation: ______________________________________________________

Number of years in service: ______________________

Place of Posting: ______________________________

Personal Experience in reform implementation: _________________________

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Question 1</th>
<th>Dimensions to be investigated</th>
<th>Primary Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Proposed Interview Questions

1. Opening question
   - Could you please describe what approaches of public sector leadership you use more in your work? Why do you choose that example?

2. Follow-up question
   - How do you see yourself as a public sector leader? Could you please cite examples of what makes a good public sector leader and poor public sector leader?

Question Focus

To explore the web of belief held by the PSL regarding the leadership roles

To solicit the views of the PSL on the roles of the PSL
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Question 2</th>
<th>Dimensions to be investigated</th>
<th>Primary Sources</th>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposed Interview Questions</th>
<th>Question Focus</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Opening question</td>
<td>To illuminate the context-based pictures in an attempt to find out the preferences, choices and propensity of the PSL reform response</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- How does public sector leadership respond to reform initiatives?</td>
<td>Exploring the behavioural codes of the PSL vis-à-vis the reform programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Which incentives/disincentives determine whether or not a bureaucrat will support and implement reforms programmes?</td>
<td>To highlight how reform programmes are responded to by the administrative leaders in terms of both internal and external pressures that they weigh up against their own traditions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research Question 3</td>
<td>Dimensions to be investigated</td>
<td>Primary Sources</td>
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**Proposed Interview Questions**

**Question Focus**

1. Opening question
   - Could you describe the major aspects of administrative traditions and cultures?

2. Follow-up questions
   - How do you portray the donors’ reform agenda in light of our traditions?

**Focus Group Questions**

**Dimensions to be investigated**

Briefly explain your roles as a PSL in the reform implementation by citing real life experiences

Exploring the personal reflections and perceptions about leadership roles in the reform process

What have been the consequences of your roles in the reform programmes

Examining the extent of links and relationships between the PSL role and reform implementation

What are the major challenges facing the reform programmes

Reviewing the reform responses of the PSLs when confronted with contextual challenges
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Response Area</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are the ways and approaches followed by you in dealing with internal and external agendas for reform programmes?</td>
<td>Exploring the response process of the PSL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are your views on the externally-initiated reforms?</td>
<td>Investigating the donor-recipient interface</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do you think the success of the reforms depends on the convergence between local administrative traditions and cultures and donors’ view-points</td>
<td>Looking at how traditions reshape reforms as reforms shape traditions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highlighting the importance of the donor-recipient harmonisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do you find any tension between imposition and policy choice in terms of country-led approach and donor-led approach</td>
<td>Inquiring into the issue of ownership for effective implementation of reforms</td>
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Appendix ‘J’

TRANSLATION

Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre
Savar, Dhaka-1343
Website: www.bpatc.org.bd

Fax: 7745029

D.O. No. BPATC -05.01.2672.241.25.011.12 Dated 22 July 2011

Subject: Research interview request letter for Mr. Mehedi Masud

Dear Colleague

With above reference and subject, I am pleased to inform you that Mr Mehedi Masud, Evaluation Officer, Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre (BPATC), has been pursuing a PhD (Management) at the University of Hull, UK.

Mr Masud is required to undertake a research titled ‘An Exploration of Public Sector Leadership in the context of Bangladeshi Public Sector Reforms: The Dilemmas of Public Sector Leadership’ for the award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The goal is to understand the administrative leadership in the context of reforms. As part of his PhD research, he would like to interview officers from your Ministry/Division.

BPATC would highly appreciate if you could render assistance required by Mr Masud in conducting his research interviews.

Yours sincerely,

Md. Shafi-Ul-Alam
MDS (Project)
& Project Director
Strengthening of Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre (Phase III) Project
BPATC, Savar, Dhaka
Appendix ‘K’

Sample of Data Analysis/Coding Process

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<tr>
<th>Case Study 4 (BPA)</th>
<th>Matching themes and categories against the Research Questions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RC: 2: BPA: DS</td>
<td>- New Public Management (NPM)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Good Governance (GoG)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We are entrusted with the responsibilities of delivering quality service to the citizens with fairness. In return, we must not accept anything from the citizens. This is the spirit of public integrity. Once, I worked in the Department of Immigration and Passports – a public office earlier earned a bad name for widespread corruption. Of different vested interest groups, brokers (go-between) were mostly responsible for passport corruption. For facilitating a delivery of passport, they usually took Tk. 1000-1500 from each applicant. Brokers could exploit this situation by collecting application forms and selling them to the applicants which are actually free and not for sale. On a number of occasions the free applications forms were made unavailable - a fake crisis caused by brokers. Besides, to get gold of an application form one needs to enter the office. They have police guarding the entrances that ask the visitors too many questions with unwelcoming attitude. Poor and ignorant villagers usually dared not enter the passport office to avoid the hassle of interrogation. They resorted to the brokers. Delivery of a passport depends upon the satisfactory clearance from the police, called police verification. The brokers then bribed the police to get the police verification. It was a vicious circle of corruption. To minimise the sufferings, we talked to the stakeholders and received their feedback. Based on the feedback we decided to decentralise. And, it clicked.

Coding for main themes
- Quality service/Delivery (QuL. DL.)
- Public integrity/Fairness (PuB. Fa.)
- Decentralise (De)

Findings from Case Study 4
RQ 1: How do public sector leaders of Bangladesh conceive of their leadership role?
RQ 2: How do public sector leaders of Bangladesh respond to public sector reform initiatives in relation to contexts?

Inter Case studies Matrix and Cross Case Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Questions</th>
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<th>CA</th>
<th>ERD</th>
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<td>Leadership Role</td>
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References


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