THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

THE NAVAL POLICY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: FROM THE BEGINNINGS TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Being a Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Hull

by

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2003
To My God, My Nation and My Navy
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Hull, England
2003
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### Abbreviations

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAW</td>
<td>Anti-air Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIP</td>
<td>Air Independent Propulsion</td>
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<tr>
<td>AKL</td>
<td>Cargo Ship</td>
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<td>AMS</td>
<td>American Minesweeper</td>
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<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Fleet Oiler</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>Fleet Logistic Tanker</td>
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<td>ARM</td>
<td>Anti-Radiation Missile</td>
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<td>ARS</td>
<td>Salvage Ship</td>
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<td>ASW</td>
<td>Anti-submarine Warfare</td>
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<td>ATA</td>
<td>Ocean Tug</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
<td>Combined Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>C²</td>
<td>Command Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>C²CM</td>
<td>Command Control Counter Measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C²'I</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communication, Computer and Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGH</td>
<td>Helicopter Cruiser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCFC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Combined Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPIC</td>
<td>Coastal Patrol and Interdiction Craft</td>
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<td>Command Post Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>Aircraft Carrier</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVL</td>
<td>Light Aircraft Carrier</td>
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<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>Destroyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>Guided Missile Destroyer</td>
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<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>Destroyer Escort</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarised Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASI</td>
<td>East Asian Security Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Fast Attack Craft</td>
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<td>FDO</td>
<td>Flexible Deterrence Options</td>
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<td>Extended Economic Zone</td>
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<td>FF/FFL</td>
<td>Frigate</td>
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<td>FMP</td>
<td>Force Module Package</td>
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<td>Supply Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>HDW</td>
<td>Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMS</td>
<td>Her/His Majesty’s Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMS</td>
<td>Japanese Minesweeper</td>
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<td>KAL</td>
<td>Korean Air Line</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>KDX</td>
<td>Korean Destroyer Project</td>
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<td>KFX</td>
<td>Korean Frigate Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNTDS</td>
<td>Korean Naval Tactical Data System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCM</td>
<td>Landing Craft Mechanized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCP</td>
<td>Landing Craft Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCPA</td>
<td>Landing Craft Personnel, Assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCU</td>
<td>Landing Craft Utility</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPH</td>
<td>Amphibious Assault Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSM</td>
<td>Landing Ship Medium</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSSL</td>
<td>Large support Landing Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>Landing Ship Tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSX</td>
<td>Korean Landing Ship Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>Ocean-going Tug</td>
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<td>MCM</td>
<td>Military Committee Meeting</td>
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<td>MHC</td>
<td>Coastal Mine-hunter</td>
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<td>ML</td>
<td>Minelayer</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Coastal Minesweeper</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCW</td>
<td>Network-Centric Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>Naval Doctrine Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>Naval Operational Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOOTW</td>
<td>Naval Operations Other Than War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODND</td>
<td>Office of the Director of National Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operational Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB</td>
<td>Patrol Boat</td>
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<tr>
<td>PG</td>
<td>Patrol Gunboat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGM</td>
<td>Missile Patrol Gunboat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Patrol Craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Patrol Craft Corvette</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCE</td>
<td>Submarine Chaser</td>
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<td>PCS</td>
<td>Large Patrol Craft</td>
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<td>PF</td>
<td>Patrol Frigate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PK</td>
<td>Patrol Killer</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKM</td>
<td>Patrol Killer Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKMM</td>
<td>Missile Patrol Killer Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPBEES</td>
<td>Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Execution, and Evaluation System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Torpedo Boat</td>
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<tr>
<td>R &amp; D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIMPAC</td>
<td>Rim Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>RN</td>
<td>Royal Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROKN</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCM</td>
<td>Security Council Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOC</td>
<td>Sea Line of Communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Submarine</td>
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<td>SSBN</td>
<td>Nuclear Strategic Missile Submarine</td>
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<td>SSK</td>
<td>Patrol Submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>Nuclear Attack Submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TG</td>
<td>Task Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>Time-Phased Forces Deployment Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFL</td>
<td>Ulchi Focus Lens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>United Nations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAMG</td>
<td>United States of America Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS</td>
<td>United States Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHNS</td>
<td>Wartime Host Nation Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAG</td>
<td>Trials Support Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>YO</td>
<td>Harbour Tanker</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Chapter I. Introduction

I. Background Maritime History of Korea

As is true of all countries, Korea's geography is a major factor in shaping its history. Korea is a peninsula, which extends southward from the Eurasian landmass between Russian Siberia and Chinese Manchuria. It is surrounded by the two great land powers (China and Russia) and one great maritime power (Japan). During its history, neighbouring countries have invaded Korea over 900 times, in incursions both great and small, by land and sea. This has been a sad history of victimisation by foreign intruders as the Koreans have virtually no record of aggressive ambition outside their peninsula.

The first recorded maritime activity of Korea relates to King Jun of Ancient Choson. In 193 B.C. Wee Man, a former officer of the Kingdom of the Chinese Yen, took over the throne of Ancient Choson. King Jun moved by sea down to the southwestern part of the Korean Peninsula with his several thousands followers and became the King of Han (not to be confused with the Chinese Han Dynasty) after being victorious in war against the Mahan. Wee Man and his descendents ruled Ancient Choson, the first recorded Korean state, for eighty years before in 108 B.C. the Han Chinese exterminated it and replaced it with four military commands. As far as maritime activity is concerned, the most interesting thing is that the Han Chinese attacked Ancient Choson through both by land and sea. The Chinese had to supply military materials by the sea to support a successful invasion of Korea. The Chinese naval activity involved not only logistical support for their land forces but also joint naval attacks aimed directly towards objectives in Korea. Outside the Chinese dominated areas the Koreans gradually came together into three kingdoms.

The period of the three Kingdoms (Koguryo, Silla, and Paekche), which
waged sporadic warfare with one another, is dated from about the time of Christ to A.D. 668. Firstly, Koguryo was the northern kingdom of the Korean Peninsula and strong enough to repulse the forces of the Soo and Tang dynasties of China from 598 to 647, in spite of the Chinese invasions six times by land and sea. The naval forces of Koguryo accomplished successful counter operations against the Chinese navy. After attempting unsuccessfully four times to invade Koguryo, the Soo dynasty collapsed and was overthrown by the Tang dynasty. 6

Paekche was the western kingdom of the Korean Peninsula and a prosperous and cultured maritime state in the fourth century, trading with both China and Japan by sea and calling upon Japan as an ally against Koguryo. It also transmitted advanced culture to Japan, which was then just beginning its own national development. It even maintained a vast colony on the Chinese mainland. 7

Silla was the eastern kingdom of the Korean Peninsula and at first weak and backward in comparison to the other two. Until the middle of the fifth century, it suffered from Japanese piracy, when Japanese pirates invaded it five times on a large scale. Whenever they attacked they threatened Kyungju, the capital city of Silla. In the mid-sixth century, however, Silla became a strong power and established diplomatic ties with the Tang Dynasty of China through the sea. 8 A Silla-Tang combined naval assault crushed Paekche in 660 and Koguryo in 668. Silla pushed the Chinese out of the territories through the successful joint land and sea operation combined with wise diplomacy towards China. But nevertheless Silla accepted a tributary relationship to China.

Once united by Silla, Korea entered a period of peace lasting nearly three hundred years, during which time a high culture flowered. In the beginning, Unified Silla was very keen on maritime activities and founded a ship’s department in its central
administration. But its naval power waned gradually because of a peaceful relationship with the Tang dynasty of China and decrease of the Japanese piracy caused by their internal problems. Exceptionally, during the period 828 to 846, Bo-go Chang established Silla as a strong maritime state, secured command of the seas in the Northeast Asia and took a leading position in maritime trade between Korea, China and Japan. Unfortunately, after political rivals assassinated him, his naval power vanished abruptly.\(^9\) In the end unified Silla was divided into three kingdoms again: Silla, latter-Paekche and Taebong (Koryo).\(^{10}\)

In 936, Silla was succeeded by the dynasty of Koryo, from which the name Korea was derived. Wangkun, the founder of Koryo Dynasty, was a descendent of a maritime trading family and unified Korea again on the basis of naval power. Wangkun maintained strong naval power to unify Korea and also participated six times in naval warfare against latter-Paekche. Unfortunately, after being unified by Wangun, the maritime activities of Koryo shrunk because the Song dynasty of China prohibited private maritime trade with foreigners\(^{11}\) and the main external threat was constantly coming from the northern land tribes.

Through strong resistance to the invasion by northern tribes, it is said that Koryo established a distinct national identity and homogeneity. During its first century, Koryo successfully repelled the Tungusic Khitan tribe's invasion from the north and then pushed them to the northern frontier, in approximately its present location. In addition, as Manchurian piracy had continued since 1011, Koryo deployed 75 naval ships and defeated it. The climax of external threat was the invasion of the Mongols from 1231.

The Mongols' campaign was very successful on land and they defeated the Koryo army at a single battle in 1231. They, however, could not conquer Koryo because
the naval power of Koryo was strong enough to support and protect the King and the dynasty, relocating the capital to Kangwha Island. The Koryo navy was strong enough to defend not only Kangwha Island but also many outlying islands off the shores of Korea against the Mongols. What is more, when the dynasty made a humiliating peace with the Mongols (the Won dynasty of China), its naval forces rose in revolt against them for three years. Eventually, after 39 long years of struggle against the Mongols, Koryo submitted. The kings of Koryo, with their titles and privileges reduced, were married off to Mongol princesses, and their sons were held hostage at the Mongol court in what is now Beijing. Furthermore, Mongol officials supervised the Korean administration and their culture strongly influenced the ruling class of Koryo. Nonetheless, the Mongols could not conquer Koryo completely and had to settle for an amicable alliance with it. They had been impressed by the strong resistant power of the Koreans, not least at sea.

After the success of war against Koryo, the Mongols prepared for the invasion of Japan. Inevitably they depended on Koryo for the supply of naval power and exploited its resources although it had not recovered yet from their earlier raids. Koryo provided 900 ships with 33,000 troops for the first Mongol expedition. It took seven years to build 900 ships and 35,000 workers were mobilized. After the failure of the first expedition against Japan in 1274, the second expedition was launched in 1282 on a very big scale, organized into two fleets. The Koryo fleet consisted of 900 ships and 40,000 troops and the Mongol fleet consisted of 3,500 ships and 100,000 troops from the Chinese mainland. Unfortunately, these unsuccessful combined invasions against Japan only served to arouse Japanese piracy and attacks on the coastal areas of both countries.

In the century that followed, Japanese piracy was very severe and continued
on a large scale. But the Koryo navy, commanded by Jee Chung, installed newly invented guns and defeated the Japanese pirates successfully. Moreover, Wee Park’s fleet, consisting of over 100 ships, swept the base of the Japanese pirates in the Tsushima Islands in 1389. Overall, it was unfortunate that the considerable maritime potential of Koryo was forced mainly to respond to the invasion of strong northern land powers and was limited by the prohibition on maritime trade by the Song dynasty of China. But the Koryo navy played a very important role to save the dynasty from the full effects of Mongol invasion and Manchurian and Japanese piracy.

Koryo was overthrown in 1392 by the Choson dynasty, which was to remain in power for over 500 years until the rapidly modernizing Japanese occupied Korea in 1905 and annexed it in 1910. Sung-gae Yi, who had fought against the Japanese pirates, established the Choson dynasty. The early kings of Choson understood fully the damage caused by Japanese piracy and recognized the importance of naval forces to eliminate it. They enhanced their naval power. When the Japanese pirates ravaged the shores of Korea severely in 1419, Choson decided to subjugate the Tsushima Islands again, which had once more become the base of the Japanese pirates. Accordingly, Jong-moo Yi conquered the Islands successfully with 227 ships and 17,285 troops.

But the subjugation was the last act of aggression of the Choson dynasty. For, against the Japanese pirates, the preferred policy of Choson was persuasion and appeasement. Furthermore, in 1466, the Choson dynasty established a military strategy based on local defence, so-called Jinkwan system. Henceforth, naval strategy was redefined in accordance with the coastal defence concept, which was focused more on land defence than on the naval warfare. So the naval forces were evenly dispersed and stationed along the shores of Korea because Choson’s decision makers thought that the Japanese were better skilled at sea battle while the Koreans were well prepared for land
In 1592, the Japanese under the command of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who reunified Japan after a century of civil war, embarked on their first Korean campaign under the slogan of "borrowing a bridge" to invade China. It was of great significance as it was a first attempt to alter the regional power balance against China, the historically undisputed dominant power in East Asia. The Japanese were initially victorious because the military system of Choson had languished in peace for 200 years. The Japanese defeated the Korean ground forces successfully and ravaged the Korean Peninsula and its people who had desperately fought against the invaders for seven years.

At sea, however, Admiral Soon-shin Yi progressively attacked the Japanese navy with his excellent naval tactics and strategy, and particularly with a newly designed "Turtle Ship", which was the first "iron clad fighting ship" in the world. Consequently, Admiral Yi's victory at sea saved Choson in cooperation with the Chinese military aid and the Korean civilian army's resistance on a national scale on land. However, unfortunately, the pro-ground defence strategy of Choson could not repel sea intruders at the outbreak of war and soon the Korean Peninsula was ruined and exhausted completely by the invaders. To make matters worse, three decades later in 1627 and 1636-1637, the Manchus (the Ching dynasty of China) invaded Korea from the north. Korea was forced to recognize Manchu sovereignty. The Japanese and Manchu assaults seriously weakened Choson's political and economic structure, which never fully recovered.

From the late 17th century, the East Asian situation was stabilized by the prosperity of the Ching dynasty of China. Accordingly, Choson retreated into national isolation to lick its wounds. Without an external threat until the mid-19th century, it
began to forget the distress of war and decayed in a familiar cycle similar to other dynasties. At that time many scholars of Choson concluded that its extremely indigent situation was caused by the absence of maritime trade to stimulate its internal economy and a deficiency of national roads to deliver goods effectively by land. However, the leaders did not follow up their opinions and kept away from the sea. Such was their cultural disregard for maritime affairs that the mariner was one of the seven lowest social positions. They even put sailing under taboo as a dangerous activity.

In truth, as the above maritime history of Korea demonstrates, the Koreans held sufficient talents to manage maritime enterprises and to command the local sea line of communications as required by Korea's geographical condition as a peninsular state. Regrettably, however, the leaders and policy makers of Choson were unable to exploit the practical maritime talents and potential of the Koreans. As a result, on the eve of the European countries' march to the East, Choson was sleeping deeply in isolationism. Hence Korea did not possess the sea power to protect its sovereignty against sea invaders.

In this situation, from the 16th century, the European imperial countries with their maritime power were sailing and conquering the four corners of the world. Until the 1860s, however, Korea was virtually untouched because it was not perceived as important enough and little was known about it by outsiders. Three French missionaries had been martyred in 1839, and the crew of a US trading ship (the General Sherman) had been killed in 1866 because of a misunderstanding. Both France and the United States sent small punitive naval expeditions in retribution, but their small scale and quick withdrawal left the Koreans with the illusion that they had defeated the West.

Unlike Korea and most Asian countries, only Japan, which itself had been aroused out of a long feudal slumber by Commodore Matthew C. Perry's fleet,
embarked upon a feverish programme of modernization and industrialization in 1853. The Japanese, emulating the Western world, were successful in their twenty years programme. And they began to seek out trade concessions, firstly with neighbouring Korea. A modern dark age was coming to Korea, which had ignored the sea and its importance.

Korea's modern period can be said to begin from the signing of the Japanese treaty for detaching Korea from China and making it a Japanese colony. Just as Commodore Matthew Perry opened up Japan, the Japanese sent a naval force to Korea and concluded Korea's first Western-style treaty in 1876, which was unfavourable to Korea. Against the Japanese incursion, China encouraged Choson to sign treaties with other countries including the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia. All of a sudden, the Korean Peninsula became a stage of competition for the world Powers. Japan aspired to hegemony in Korea for reasons of economics and national pride. China sought to extend traditional political influence to Korea. Russia had designs on both Korea and Manchuria as part of its eastern expansion. Great Britain was interested in preventing any Russian advance. Internally, pro-Chinese, -Japanese and -Russian factions were competing with each other.

Eventually, rivalry amongst reawakening China, modernizing Japan and expanding Russia led to two wars for preponderant influence over Korea. First of all, Japan's quest for control of Korea sparked off the Sino-Japanese war in 1894. Unexpectedly, Japanese naval power decisively defeated the Chinese navy at sea and also Japan's modernized army swept Korea and Manchuria by land. In 1895, the war ended by the Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan's victory. Accordingly, the Japanese established their hegemony over Korea under the guise of full and complete independence for Korea. But Japanese radical efforts to reform Korea caused a conflict,
triggered by the Korean Queen Min, who was an active antagonist of Japanese influence. In 1895, brutally and ruthlessly, the Queen was murdered by the agents of Japan in front of her royal entourage. After this event, the Japanese minister forcibly made the Korean King sign documents appointing certain Japanese supporters to office and agreeing to give the cabinet power to run the government in the future. On the following day an edict, not signed by the king, was issued degrading the murdered queen to the lowest rank. This caused a popular reaction against Japan to set in. The king, who had been a virtual prisoner of the Japanese in his palace, fled to the Russian legation with his prince in Seoul. Consequently, it became only a matter of time for a collision between Russia and Japan in Korea.

Japan recognized that she would have to defeat Russia to fulfill her own ambitions in Korea and Manchuria. For that reason, Japan began to strengthen her military capabilities and sought to obtain outside assistance in the event of a new war against Russia. Japan not only concluded a treaty of alliance with Great Britain, an old competitor of Russia's, but also obtained United States' assurance of benevolence towards her in the event of war. Japan, who was emboldened by the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, initiated the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 with Korea at its centre. In May 1905, Japan delivered the final blow to Russia when the Japanese fleet destroyed the Russian Baltic fleet, which had sailed halfway around the world to the Tsushima Strait. Japan's tremendous naval victory over Russia signalled the rise of a new world power and also Korea's death knell. At last, Korea's future was now being fundamentally affected by the hostile sea power, Japan.

In August of 1905, President Roosevelt successfully made the Japanese and Russians to sign a peace treaty at Portsmouth and received a Nobel peace prize for his role as peacemaker. In the stark realities of international politics, Roosevelt clearly
ignored Korean interests in his concern over the attempts of the European powers to carve out spheres of influence in China. On the other hand, he gave strong support to Japan in opposing Russia's activities and approved Japan's designs on Korea in the hope of implementing the United States "Open Door" policy in Asia. On 29th July 1905, Roosevelt's Secretary of War, William Howard Taft, visited Tokyo and signed a secret agreement with Japan that the United States would agree to the establishment of Japan's suzerainty over Korea in return for Japan's disavowal of aggressive designs on the Philippines. Consequently, Japan became Korea's master with the blessing of the Western powers and annexed Korea as a colony on 22 August 1910.

The Japanese brought modern industry, transportation, communications, and government administration to Korea and improved Korean agricultural productivity. The world was impressed, but the Koreans benefited little from the process. The people resisted Japanese attempts to assimilate them into the Japanese culture because the Koreans thought of themselves as culturally superior. On 1 March 1919, the Koreans rose up in a remarkable nationwide non-violent demonstration for independence. The uprising was followed by the death of the former King and Emperor Kojong (reigned 1863-1907), who had been forced by the Japanese to abdicate, because he sought international support for Korean independence. It was an expression of the deep resentment at Japanese extortion and colonial suppression stimulated by Woodrow Wilson's doctrine of self-determination.

In truth, Korean hostility toward Japan was serious and traditional compared with their attitude towards China. Chinese control was nominal and aimed at perpetuating a form of military alliance and ensuring Korea's allegiance to China. But Japan annexed Korea and relied extensively on force to maintain their control. Also, the memories of the 16th century devastation wreaked by the Japanese were still vivid.
Moreover, during this colonial reign, Korean peasants by the hundreds of thousands were dispossessed to make room for Japan's own rural poor. In the schools of the peninsula even the speaking of Korean was forbidden, and all students were given Japanese names. Korean men were conscripted for forced labour battalions, in the lowest and most dangerous ranks of the Japanese army. Also, thousands of Korean women were kidnapped as forced "comfort women" to serve Japanese troops at the front. In this kind of history is rooted the strong and politically active fear and hatred of Japan felt in many Asian countries but in Korea most of all.

Korea's liberation from Japan remained a dream until Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and American involvement in World War II. The Cairo pledge promised Korea's independence in 1943. The Koreans waited nervously and impatiently for the defeat of the Japanese and their country's liberation. But, both in exile and within the country, Korean nationalists were divided by the influence of two antithetical Western doctrines. The communists received a modicum of external support from the Soviet Union as the non-communists did from Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist China.²⁴

Japan's defeat in World War II ended its control of Korea, but Korean independence was deferred by three years of US and Soviet military occupation because no agreement was reached as to how independence would be arranged. In the end, two independent states, which reflected the political complexion of the occupier, emerged out of the respective occupation zones. The commitment of the two Koreas to reunification by any means was the fundamental cause of the Korean War.

In short, the Koreans delayed their entry into the modern world first by their own policy of isolation, then by Japanese domination. Moreover, after liberation from Japan, they were divided into two sides by external forces. But, paradoxically, a new maritime era was coming to Korea. In this context, the year 1945 is very significant in
the history of Korea, for it meant liberation and independence from Japanese imperial rule, and the beginning of modernization. But it also caused the division into South and North, which was starting point of the tragic Korean War.

Indeed, Korean history since 1945 has demonstrated a remarkable geopolitical difference between the South and the North. North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), which is adjacent to continental Asia, has been following the pro-continental history of old Korea. On the contrary, South Korea (the Republic of Korea) has completely converted to a maritime country because of the barrier to the north. What is the result of this difference between two countries?

North Korea, on the one hand, is suffering with severe economical difficulties, political instability and isolation in the international community due to its closed culture and political despotism. South Korea, on the other hand, has developed into an open and advanced industrial society with its wealth dependant on maritime trade. In particular, South Korea has achieved great economic developments through the sea. The Republic of Korea has the world's first shipbuilding industry and eighth largest shipping business and is the twelfth largest trading power in the world. The sea has been critical factor to South Korea for its survival, security and prosperity.

II. Purpose and Scope

The Republic of Korea Navy was founded in 1945 concurrently with the Liberation of Korea. Viewed from the non-military aspect, today, the ROK is without a doubt a real maritime state. However, considering its naval capability, it is not yet a real naval power. Its naval power is the weakest among countries of similar economic status. Accordingly, the ROK Navy is trying to develop appropriate naval capability
not only for ensuring the security and prosperity of the nation but also for enhancing regional stability and peace.

Historically, as a peninsular state, Korea was very difficult to defend from foreign intruders. Korean national security strategy, therefore, had to consider both land and maritime aspects because Korea had to prevent and defend against invasion from the northern land power as well as from the southern and western maritime power. Although Admiral Soon-Shin Yi defeated the Japanese invasion of the late 16th Century, Korea became a Japanese colony in August 1910 due to the lack of national capability and naval preparedness. During the Korean War, control of the sea and the amphibious assault at Inchon by the UN forces was an essential condition for victory. This rudimentary sketch of the military history of Korea reveals the important contribution made by naval power to the nation’s survival and security.

Furthermore, in East Asia, there are four major military powers at present: China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. They are contesting for a dominant position in the regional balance. The ocean separates China, Japan, and the United States and they can interact only across that ocean. Naval power, therefore, determines the power configuration among the contending powers that will affect the regional security system. In history, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, Russo-Japanese War of 1904, and the US-Japanese Pacific War proved that naval power determines the power balance in East Asia.

During the Cold War, the two Super-Powers and their relationships with China and Japan shaped strategic affairs in the region. The security of the sea guaranteed because it was the role of the US Navy to protect the security of the seas all over the world for its allies. As the Cold War waned, the emerging international order in East Asia is in flux. Specifically, the continued dramatic economic growth of Asia will
bring about a very different power balance in the region.

In addition, from the Kuril Islands in the Northern Pacific to the Spratly Islands in the South, the chances of maritime strife in East Asia are higher than ever due to confrontations among nations in the region over maritime territorial disputes, demarcation of maritime borderlines, sea pollution, fishery disputes, and the exploitation of ocean mineral resources. Moreover, there has already been a great reduction of Russian involvement and power and even some diminution of the US's military presence and influence. Consequently, a new strategic architecture will emerge with the potential for a significant realignment of power in the region.

In this regard, the debate about future East Asian security is dominated by two theories. Realists argue that the end of the Cold War has released indigenous conflicts that were previously suppressed. On the other hand, the liberal view argues that the complex interdependence of the late twentieth century has curtailed military rivalry between industrialized states.26 But the pessimists may be closer to the truth. In Asia, particularly, strong historical antipathies exist alongside ideological, religious, territorial and cultural differences, and a build-up of arms. Asia is not an integral part of Western international society. It has dynamics of its own, which are becoming more prominent and raise serious doubts about the validity of optimistic assumptions of a benign future based on peaceful interdependence.27

Peace is not a given. Peace has to be established and maintained by power. Peaceful stability of the international system is guaranteed only when it is supported by sufficient military power.28 Also the sea, a common heritage of mankind, produced prosperity when peace and freedom prevailed, while it is an arena for disputes and aggression when not. Therefore, it is very important that the East Asian countries make the sea a more peaceful and stable place to ensure for the stability and prosperity of the
Asia-Pacific in the 21st century.

In this situation, Korea will take an important role in the regional balance of power due to its geo-political situation. The recent Inter-Korean summit in June 2000, which was the first-ever official meeting between the South and the North since the division in 1945, is paving the way hopefully not only to Korea's reconciliation and cooperation but also the maintenance of peace and security in Northeast Asia and the world. Therefore, understanding the naval policy of the Republic of Korea from its beginning and into 21st century contributes to the formation of a basis of mutual understanding and cooperation among navies in the region. In addition, despite the establishment of ROK Navy over 57 years ago in November of 1945, no one has tackled this very important subject.

In this context, the purpose of this research is to examine the evolution of the ROK naval policy in the past, at present and in the future, in detail. Accordingly, the aim of this research is not only to reflect on the developing process of the ROK Navy in the past and at present but also to propose a direction for its development in the future. In order to achieve this objective the study will explore the following questions:

(1) How did the ROK Navy develop in the past and how is it developing at present?

(2) Why is the ROK Navy the size and shape it is today? That is, how was it affected by geo-political, economic, technical, and strategic considerations, etc?

(3) Why and how will the ROK Navy grow in the future? Namely, what is the validity and justification of force planning of the ROK Navy for the enhancement of both national security and regional stability and peace?
III. Chapter Outlines

This study consists of eight chapters, including an introduction and conclusion. Chapter one has presented a brief background of the maritime history of Korea and the purpose of the study, its scope and chapter outlines.

Chapter two explains how the Republic of Korea Navy was created and immediately plunged into by the Korean War, which was the most important event in the history of the ROK security policy.

Chapter three examines the naval policy of the ROK in the context of the ROK-US combined defence policy.

Chapter four is devoted to a detailed study of the evolution of an independent ROK naval policy under the first Yulgok Program for self-reliant national defence.

Chapter five explores self-reliant naval development of the ROK focused on the North Korean naval threat in the context of Cold War confrontation.

Chapter six examines the ROK naval development towards a "blue-water navy" to correspond with the drastically changing security situation in the post-Cold War era.

Chapter seven briefly discusses the current issues and debates on force planning of the ROK Navy, and suggests an answer through the examination of the whole process of force planning in the political, strategic, operational, and tactical contexts to provide a clear vision on the future direction of its force development.

Finally, chapter eight gives a conclusion to this thesis.
IV. Sources

A conventional literature review is impossible for this subject. There have been no extended published accounts of ROK naval development in English. There is a very limited Korean literature on the development of the ROK Navy (See bibliography) but this has not related naval development to the wider revolution of ROK defence policy and the general Korean political and strategic context. This work is therefore a ground breaking study. Access to original material has been difficult due to ROK classification procedures but advantage has been taken of the author's connections to carry out a number of interviews and to gain access to unpublished sources that have been released by the ROK government. There are listed in the bibliography.

2. According to Hans J. Morgenthau, the fate of Korea for more than two thousand years has been a function either of the predominance of one nation controlling Korea or of a balance of power between two nations competing for that control. This was a result of Korea’s geographic location. For more details, see Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred a Knopf, 1966), pp.167-177.


4. In the southern part of the Korean Peninsula, the tribal people belonged to three broad groups, Mahan, Chinhan, and Pyonhan in accordance with geography, which had no central authority. At the beginning of the Christian era two Kingdoms arose in the south, that is Silla on the east and Paekjae on the west. For more details, see Naval College of the ROK, *Hankuk Haejeonsa [History of Naval Warfare of Korea]* (Taejon: The ROK Navy, 1999), pp.12-13. About three Han, see M. Frederick Nelson, *op. cit.*., pp.28-33.

5. Han China conquered Ancient Choson by a simultaneous land and sea attack strategy. The naval force of Han Dynasty commanded by Yang Bok was composed of 50,000 men and crossed the West Sea from Shandong peninsula to Pyongyang. The land force of Han Dynasty commanded by Sun Chae was composed of 50,000 men and attacked Pyongyang through the Yodong peninsula from the north. For more details, see Naval College of the ROK, *op. cit.*, pp.13-16.

6. In 581, the Soo Dynasty reunited China after three hundred years of internal division. As in previous periods of Chinese strength, the Soo emperors undertook campaigns to control the northern barbarians and again threatened Korea. About the wars between the two Chinese dynasties and Koguryo, see Kihun Lee, *Junjaeng uro boneun Hankuk Yuksa [Korean History in View of War]* (Seoul: Jisungsa, 1997), pp.60-86; Naval College of the ROK, *op. cit.*, pp.27-44.

7. According to the Chinese record, the colony of Paekche was Jinpyong area in China. For more details, see Naval Headquarters of the ROK, *Haekun Manhwa [Naval Culture]* (Taejon: the ROK Navy, 1998), pp.75-80; Naval College of the ROK, *op. cit.*, pp.24-26.

8. At that time China tried to take advantage of the rivalries among the three Korean kingdoms as they sought allies in their struggles for hegemony.

9. Admiral Chang is called as “the trade prince of the maritime commercial empire”, “fabulous merchant prince” and “powerful Korean merchant prince.” He was a former general of the Chinese Tang dynasty. After returning to Korea he served under King Heungdoc as a commissioner for the seas with sailors and soldiers. He established a major naval base at Wando, the southwestern island of Korea, and an advanced base in the Shantong peninsular of China. Under his control the maritime trade among Korea, China and Japan was well protected and flourished for eighteen years. For more details, see the ROK Navy, *Commissioner Chang Bogo’s Maritime Cominance and Maritime Security Facing the ROK Navy in the 21st Century*, the 8th On-Board Workshop (Taejon: the ROK Navy, 2000); Suknam Choi, *The History of Korean Naval war* (Seoul: Myongyang publishing Company, 1965), pp.53-56; Naval College of the ROK, *op. cit.*, pp.60-64; Naval Headquarters of the ROK, *Naval Culture*, pp.100-106.

10. For more details about latter three Kingdoms, see Kihun Lee, *op. cit.*, pp.106-121.

11. The Chinese policy of farming encouragement but prohibition on trade and industry enforced repeatedly whenever the farming-first principle was threatened from the beginning of its history. See Naval Headquarters of the ROK, *Naval Culture*, pp.75-81.

12. For more details, see Naval College of the ROK, *op. cit.*, pp.72-80; Kihun Lee, *op. cit.*, pp.172-216.

13. Both these expeditions failed because of seasonal typhoons, giving rise to the myth of Kamikaze, or the divine wind. For more details, see M. Frederick Nelson, *op. cit.*, pp.58-67; Naval College of the ROK, *op. cit.*, pp.81-89.

14. For more details, see Naval College of the ROK, *op. cit.*, pp.90-108.

15. Choson Navy left without evicting of the pirates after the surrender of the head of the Tsushima Islands. But Choson incorporated the Islands under Kyungsang Province.

16. For more details about the military defence system of Choson, see Kihun Lee, *op. cit.*, pp.217-255.


18. For more details about naval warfare of Admiral Yi, see Sungdo Cho, *Yi Sun-Shin: A National Hero of
Korea (Chinhae: Choongmoo-Kong Society, 1970).

19 For more details, see Namsun Choi, "Bada rul izeo burin kukmin" [People who forgot the sea], Naval Headquarters of the ROK, Hankuk Haeyangsa [Maritime History of Korea] (Seoul: Naval Headquarters of the ROK, 1954), pp.1-15. Namsun Choi was a leading Korean intellectual during the era of Japanese control. His activities included publishing Korea's first popular modern magazine, pioneering modern poetry in Korean, drafting the Declaration of Independence for the 1919 March First Independence Movement, and publishing numerous articles on Korean culture.


21 For more details about the unequal treaty, see Mangil Kang, Kocheo Sseun Hankuk Kundaesa [Revised Modern History of Korea] (Seoul: Changjakkwa Bipyongsa, 1994), pp.241-261.

22 After that event Choson became pro-Russia and American influence declined.

23 The Anglo-Japanese alliance was decisive in breaking the balance of power between Russia and Japan.


26 According to Samuel P. Huntington's address at Industrial Development Bank of Asia (June 2, 1995), two-Asia are a rising in this region. One is an economic Asia that is bright and the other is a dark Asia characterized by political instability and competition among states. See Chosun Ilbo, June 4, 1995; Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking East Asian Security," Survival, vol.36, no.2 (Summer 1994), pp.3-21; Paul Dibb, Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia, Adelphi Paper, no.295 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).


28 There are many debates on the relationship between arms and war. This opinion is based on the age-old maxim of Roman philosopher Vegetius, "Si vis Pacem, Para bellum" (If you want peace then prepare for war), and the function of military power as an ultimate method for preventing war. For more details and a balanced view of military force, see James L. Payne, Why Nations Arm (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1989), pp.7-16.
Chapter 2 The Establishment of ROK Navy and The Korean War

"Who is the one to save Korea? He is the one making Korea to develop as a maritime power. How can he save Korea? It is to convert Korea as a state based on the sea."
Nam-Sun Choi, Korean Maritime History (1954)

I. Liberation but Division

The Roman philosopher Vegetius said, "if you want peace then prepare for war." Unfortunately Choson, the Hermit Kingdom of Korea, neglected this maxim and withdrew into isolation and sought to maintain a hermit's existence for some two centuries after a series of invasions by powerful neighbours - Mongols in 1231, Japanese in 1592, and Manchus in 1627. Therefore, when the Europeans were sailing and conquering the world with their modern gunboats and technology, Korea was not been prepared to protect itself against them and, indeed, did not recognize the importance of Western science and techniques.

After the door to the outside world had first been opened by the Japanese naval expedition in 18761, Choson realized the truth that peace is not a given but peace has to be established and maintained by power, and the important role of modern naval forces in that power. But a navy requires considerable time, efforts and financial resources. For that reason, Choson first sought maritime defence through reliance on Chinese naval forces against outside imperial countries. Despite concession to the Chinese, the latter rejected urgent Korean requests for maritime support. Choson, therefore, had to attempt to found a modern navy itself.2

To achieve that goal, it sent representatives to both China and Japan to acquire the knowledge of the modern naval ships and cannons, founded a naval academy, and was cheated when buying a modern naval ship from Japan.3 The attempts of Choson to establish its modern navy were unsuccessful because it did not have a
specific and efficient plan, and, more importantly, financial resources for the foundation of a modern navy. After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan disbanded the armed forces of Choson in 1907 and annexed Choson in 1910. At that time, though appeals for help to preserve Korean independence were made to the United States of America, these were not heeded.⁴

In 1943, Allied leaders (U.S.A., Great Britain and China) promised Korean independence at the Cairo Declaration.⁵ In April 1945, however, the Korean Peninsula was put under the influence of the Soviet Union again at the Yalta Conference because the Conference restored the authority of the Soviet Union in Manchuria as it was before 1904, in order to make the Russians engage in the Pacific War against Japan.⁶ This was of great significance because before the Russo-Japanese War, the Korean Peninsula was a buffer zone between Russia and Japan under common control separated by the 39th Parallel according to Lovanov-Yamagata Agreement⁷.

The Soviets considered the Korean Peninsula critical to its national security in the post-War period. Influence in this area was the expected prize for participation in the war against Japan. The USA had given little thought to the price to be paid for the Soviet destruction of Japanese power on the Asian mainland, and the 38th Parallel was chosen without any great consideration as the dividing line between the two powers to ensure the surrender of the Japanese forces in Korea.⁸

Though Korea was liberated on 15th August of 1945, it was again the victim of power politics, because of its lack of national power and its geo-political situation as a small country among great powers. Liberation was given not by Korean but by Allied forces, in accordance with the post-war management process. The fate of Korea after liberation, therefore, completely depended upon the policies of the Americans and the
Soviets in regard to the Korean Peninsula. While the Americans did not consider Korea a major national interest, the Soviets regarded it as their vital national interest.

Consequently, the Soviets were prompt to establish their puppet regime in Korea. Immediately after surrender of the Japanese forces, they started military administration swiftly and successfully by setting up a provisional Communist Korean regime under their control in North Korea. The Americans, on the other hand, arrived in South Korea on 8th September 1945 one month later than the Soviets and instituted the United States of America Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK). Unfortunately, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, the Commander of American occupation forces in South Korea, and his staff were ill equipped both with instructions and with personnel to undertake their assignment of governing South Korea.

Moreover, Koreans could not be expected to assume leadership and to establish a unified nation upon liberation because of the Japanese colonial suppression of the previous thirty-five years. Furthermore, they were suffering from the bad effects of the colonial policy of Japan. First of all, the net effect for the Korean people of the Japanese administration was the thirty-five years intermission in political responsibility and administrative experience. During the colonial period, the Japanese ruled with a strong central regime and an oppressive police system based upon force. Koreans were excluded from important and responsible government and business positions, and had few educational or advanced occupational opportunities. The Japanese also prohibited Koreans from engaging in maritime affairs and joining the Japanese Navy.

Secondly, the economic situation engendered by the division of the country was as devastating as the political split. The division of the Korean Peninsula created serious economic ills because the 38th parallel separated regions with physical differences and long-established economic diversity. During the Japanese colonial
period, Korea had become a part of the developing Japanese empire, the "East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere", and reflected significant economic differences between the industrial north and the agricultural south. Both sides effectively complemented each other to make a more viable and effective unit since each half depended upon the other for its economic livelihood.\textsuperscript{12}

What was worse, in the immediate aftermath of liberation, the Korean Peninsula was severely entangled in an ideological vortex, caused by the struggle between the two global camps of the bipolar adversaries. The Koreans waged ideological campaigns against each other within one nation without full understanding or experiencing of the conflicting ideologies. Consequently, Korea became the stage for ideological conflict. This problem was clearer in South Korea than in the North because the Americans allowed the multi-party system with freedom of press and speech while the Soviets permitted only one-party system with a controlled press and speech. Soviet and Free World ideologies were set opposite to one another very dramatically along the 38\textsuperscript{th} Parallel in Korea.\textsuperscript{13}

With the subsequent development of Soviet-American differences, the 38\textsuperscript{th} Parallel hardened into a political and economic boundary. In addition, the joint Soviet-American Commission, established by a four-power decision at Moscow in December 1945 as an attempt to establish a unified Korea,\textsuperscript{14} had failed by August 1947.\textsuperscript{15} Only then did the Americans present the Korean problem to the United Nations.\textsuperscript{16}

The General Assembly accepted the American call for elections for a Korean National Assembly before March 1948, and for the formation thereafter of a national government, but the Soviet Union abstained.\textsuperscript{17} A UN Temporary Commission on Korea was created to supervise this programme. On 10\textsuperscript{th} May 1948, however, elections for a
National Assembly of Korea could be held only in South Korea because of the refusal by the Soviets to cooperate in North Korea.\textsuperscript{18}

In the end, the Republic of Korea was inaugurated in the south on 15\textsuperscript{th} August 1948 and recognized by UN with Syng-man Rhee, a strong anti-Communist elected as the first President. Meanwhile, on 10\textsuperscript{th} September 1948, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was formed in the north and recognized by USSR. It was led by Premier Il-sung Kim, a puppet of the Soviet Union. Eventually, Korea was divided into two regimes, each claiming jurisdiction over the entire country, and each side was strongly opposed to the other. Moreover, the 38\textsuperscript{th} Parallel in Korea had become a critical frontier of the Cold War between the two worlds into which the globe was dividing.

II. From Nothing to Being: The Birth of the ROK Navy

The Koreans lost their sovereignty, and suffered from Japanese colonial oppression because they forgot the importance of the sea. The Japanese had stopped the Koreans’ advance to the sea during the colonial period, so the maritime spirit of the Koreans was daunted. Therefore, when the Koreans were enjoying the first jubilation of liberation from the Japanese, there were but few people concerned about the maritime security of Korea.

However, just as some historical heroes such as Bo-go Chang and Soon-shin Yi led maritime activities of Korea, another maritime pioneer emerged, called Admiral Won-il Shon, the founder of the ROK Navy. He was aware of the importance of the sea and committed himself to liberation and to the establishment of the Korean Navy with a resolution that “I devote myself for the country and nation.”\textsuperscript{19}
On 21st August 1945, in Seoul, Admiral Shon formed the Maritime Affairs Corps of men who shared his ideas about the maritime defence and development of Korea. He integrated the National Service Corps for Maritime Affairs, which was another maritime organization founded after the liberation, into the Maritime Affairs Corps on 30th September 1945, and renamed it the Maritime Affairs Association. In early November of that year, the director for maritime affairs of the US Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) suggested that Won-il Shon should form a Korean coast guard for the purpose of coastal patrol, anti-smuggling and rescue operations at sea.

Although Admiral Shon agreed to found the Korean Coast Guard first, he named and called it the Maritime Defence Corps because he anticipated that it would be the forerunner of the ROK Navy. It was founded on 11th November 1945. He set up his Command in Chinhae and started official duties. Today the ROK Navy acknowledges the Maritime Defence Corps as the origin of the ROK Navy, and celebrates the 11th November as an anniversary of its foundation. The foundation was the embodiment of the basic philosophy of Admiral Shon on the operation of the ROK Navy. In Chinese characters the 11th November means two gentlemen: he set up the corps on that day because he wanted the Navy to be operated according to the code of a gentleman.

So, the Maritime Defence Corps was founded, but its development was not favoured by circumstance. First of all, it did not possess any ships to accomplish its mission. Furthermore, it could not get any financial support from USAMGIK for several months since it was not a military group founded under the auspices of American military administration. However, when the Americans formed the Office of the Director of National Defence (ODND) for the defence of South Korea in
USAMGIK, the Maritime Defence Corps applied to join the ODND on 14th January 1946, and was approved as a lawful military group under the law 42 of the American military administration.23

In spite of all kinds of difficulties, Admiral Shon and his companions devoted themselves to the formation and construction of the Korean Navy. In particular, Admiral Shon was well cognizant of the importance of education for the future development of the Navy. To cultivate men of skill and ability, he established the Naval Academy on 17th January 1946 two months after the foundation of the Maritime Defence Corps and the Naval Recruit Training Centre on 15th February 1946.24

Also, on 1st February 1946, Admiral Shon founded the Naval Ship Yard in Chinhae.25 In fact, the Ship Yard had been operated by the Japanese but had been abandoned at the end of World War II. And Inchon Naval Base was established on 5th April 1946. Then, on 7th February 1947, the Naval Ship Yard built its first small patrol ship of 300 tons by itself.26 This was very significant to the Koreans not only because it was the first a modern ship to have built by them since the invasion of modern naval powers, but also because they built it despite many financial and technical difficulties. It was called Chungmoogong, which is a pseudonym of Admiral Soon-shin Yi, the great hero of the Japanese invasion of 1592.

Meanwhile, in May 1946, according to the protest of the Soviet representatives in the USA-USSR Joint Commission in relation to the title of the Department of National Defence in USAMGIK, the Americans renamed it the Department of Internal Security. Subsequently, the Maritime Defence Corps also had its title changed to the Korean Coast Guard under Law 86 of American military administration.27
In the process of the development of the Korean Coast Guard, the arrival of a US military advisory group from the US Coast Guard was a turning point. The group was composed of sixteen officers and petty officers headed by Captain McCabe, and started duty on 1st September 1946. With their active assistance, the Korean Coast Guard made much progress in many ways and consolidated the aims and objectives of its foundation.

First of all, the advisory group contributed enormously to education and training for officers and enlisted men of the Korean Coast Guard. When the Korean Coast Guard started its mission at sea from 1st June 1946, its capability was very limited. For instance, on 14th September 1946, although the advisory group had arranged for two LCIs to be transferred from American military forces in Pusan to the Korean Coast Guard, it was not able to operate them and could not move them from Pusan to Chinhae by itself.

Under the circumstances, Captain McCabe's advisory group imparted a great deal of knowledge and skill on navigation and the operation of ships to all members of Korean Coast Guard. Also the members of the Korean Coast Guard devoted themselves to improving their knowledge and skills. As a result, on 17th August 1947, the Korean Coast Guard could carry out the first division exercise of ships at sea near Inchon to celebrate the 2nd Liberation Day with the Chungmoogong as the flagship. After the success of the exercise, the 7th Fleet of the USN transferred the patrol mission of the southern sea area of the 38th Parallel to the Korean Coast Guard on 30th August 1947.

Secondly, Captain McCabe assisted Commandant Shon on moving the headquarters of Korean Coast Guard into the Department of Internal Security in order to promote efficiency within the organization. Commandant Shon, therefore, moved the
headquarters from Chinhae to Seoul on 1st October 1946 and then established a Special Base Command in Chinhae.31

Particularly, the advisory group made a great contribution by arranging the transfer of ships from American service to the Korean Coast Guard. As of the end of 1948, the ship transfer situation was as follows.

**Table 2-1 Ship Transfer Situation from American Military Forces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Transferred Ships</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>6LCI, 1YO, 6JMS</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>5JMS, 17AMS</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1AMS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6LCI, 1YO, 11JMS, 18AMS</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the above table illustrates, it is clear that the Americans did not give any serious consideration to the development of the ROK Navy. They only provided mostly outdated minesweepers without any combatants. Nevertheless, the Korean Coast Guard demonstrated the usefulness of Korean maritime power through its contribution to the establishment of the ROK government. The UN General Assembly decided to set the elections for the formation of a Korean government in South Korea on 10th May 1948. Spurred by the decision of UN, North Korea incited various kind of unrest by South Korean Communists.

On 3rd April 1948, a gang of Communists rose in revolt in Cheju Island.32 The Department of Internal Security, therefore, ordered the rebellion be put down by a joint operation of the Korean Coast Guard and the Korean Constabulary. During the suppression operations, the Korean Coast Guard successfully accomplished its mission - transportation and supply for the Korean Constabulary forces, and blockade of Cheju
Island - which 18 ships carried out and the operation was rapidly and successfully completed.  

Furthermore, on 20th October 1948 after establishment of the ROK government, a leftist military group in the ROK Army instigated by the Communist North Korea, rose again in rebellion in Yeosu. The ROK Navy detached a special unit composed of eight ships and supported the suppression operations successfully. After completion of the suppression, on 15th April 1949, the ROK Navy founded the Marine Corps comprising members of the Navy, skilled in amphibious combat deployed from the sea based on the lessons learnt during these operations.

The communist North Korea also exerted its subversive influence on the ROK Navy. Firstly, in May 1948, JMS-311 and AMS-517 were forced to cross over the 38th Parallel by Communist rebels. Then a year later, in May 1949, seven communist insurgents aboard JMS-508 rebelled and crossed over the 38th Parallel with the ship into North Korea after killing the Commander of 2nd Coastal Patrol Unit and the Commanding Officer of the ship on board. But other plots were frustrated by the quick reaction of the ships crews.

In the end, those plots incited by the Communist North Koreans in the ROK armed forces caused a series of purge campaigns. In the long run, it was a stroke of wisdom in the midst of misfortune. After the purge, the armed forces of the ROK had removed rebellious elements and were armed with a strong anti-communist spirit. If the Korean War had broken without the purge, the fate of ROK would have been more desperate.

At last, after the Republic of Korea government was established on 15th August 1948, the Korean Coast Guard was transferred to the Korean Armed Forces on 1st September and was renamed as the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) on 5th
September of the year. It would have been impossible to establish the ROK Navy without Admiral Shon’s far-seeing wisdom and his companions’ sacrifices against many intolerable difficulties. From nothing Admiral Shon laid the foundation and prepared the ground for the future development of the ROK Navy.

The newborn ROK government chose unification of the peninsula and reconstruction of industry as national objectives. President Rhee concentrated his effort on strengthening the capability of national security on the basis of anti-Communism as the prime element of national policy. However, the construction of national defence capability was impossible by itself because of the poverty of the national economy and the limitation of national policy. Consequently, the ROK government found it necessary to depend on the assistance of USA for help towards improving both the national economy and defence.

Under the circumstances, Admiral Shon considered that the acquisition of proper combat ships was necessary to accomplish maritime defence against the threat of North Korea. But Admiral Shon’s urgent request to acquire combat ships could not be met due to the financial difficulties of the government. So he started a campaign to raise funds to purchase combat ships. All members of the ROK Navy donated money voluntarily and even their wives helped raise money for the endeavour.

As a result of the fund raising, the ROK Navy collected $60,000. President Rhee was deeply impressed by the enthusiasm of the ROK Navy and supplied another $60,000 from the government budget towards the acquisition of ships. At last, on 17th October 1949, through the Department of State of the USA, Admiral Shon managed to purchase only one PC of 450-tons full load (PC-701) equipped with a 3-inch gun for $60,000 since the Americans did not want to sell Korea any more ships. After making every effort, he managed to obtain three similar PCs (PC-702, 703, 704) from a civilian
sales company for $36,000. In Hawaii on the way to Korea with these three ships, he got the news of the outbreak of the Korean War. He arrived in Chinhae on 16th July 1950. PC-701 had already arrived in Chinhae on 10 April 1950 just two months before the beginning of the Korean War.

On the eve of the Korean War, through the dedication of Admiral Shon and his fellow officers, the ROK Navy was organized as follows: Naval Headquarters (Seoul, five bureaux and eleven offices), seven Naval bases (Mukho, Pohang, Pusan, Chinhae, Mokpo, Kunsan and Inchon), three Coastal Patrol Units (Inchon, Pusan, and Mokpo), two Training Unit (Chinhae, Yeosu), Naval Academy of ROK (Chinhae) and the Naval Ship Yard (Chinhae). It maintained a total of 6,956 personnel and 33 ships including PC-701. As of 24th June 1950, naval forces of the ROK were stationed as the following Table 2-2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Situation of Deployment</th>
<th>Total Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Ships Unit</td>
<td>Inchon</td>
<td>4 AMS, 3 JMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Ships Unit</td>
<td>Pusan</td>
<td>4 AMS, 3 JMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Ships Unit</td>
<td>Mokpo</td>
<td>2 AMS, 4 JMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yeosu</td>
<td>3 AMS, 1 LCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Unit</td>
<td>Chinhae</td>
<td>1 PC, 1 AKL, 1 LST, 2 AMS, 1 JMS, 1 YO, 2 Coastal Patrol Boats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1 PC, 1 AKL, 1 LST, 1 YO, 15 AMS, 11 JMS, 1 LCI, 2 CPB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the above table 2-2 shows, just before the Korean War the ROK Navy had not increased its capability but rather decreased in its total number since the end of 1948. There were only two additional ships transferred, one AKL (an ex-US Army
supply ship/FS) and one LST, on 1st June 1949 and on 1st April 1950 respectively, from the US Navy. Furthermore, the ROK Navy was composed mainly of minesweepers, 26 being about 80% of its total force, which were carrying out coastal patrol missions. For that purpose, they were equipped with a 37mm gun, a heavy machine gun, two light machine guns, and only three pistols and a rifle with limited ammunition due to restricted supplies from the USA.\(^{42}\)

Thus, on the eve of the Korean War, the ROK Navy did not have any major surface ships because the Americans were confident of their nuclear deterrent capabilities against the Communist threat and did not consider Korea as important to their political and strategic interest. Also the Americans were unduly concerned about President Rhee's ambition to march north to unify the Korean Peninsula under the pretext of keeping the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, they were reluctant to provide military aid to South Korea although its military forces were much weaker than those of North Korea. Nevertheless, there was Paekdusan (PC-701), which was purchased by subscription raised among members of the ROK Navy and equipped with Hedgehog an anti-submarine weapon, and a 3.5inch, a 40mm and two 20mm guns.

III. The Korean War and the ROK Navy

1. The Outbreak of the Korean War

After the division of the Korean Peninsula, Communist North Korea was thriving: it had political stability, enjoyed economic improvements and social reform, thanks to the support of the Soviet Union. Around the end of 1946, North Korea was converted into a totalitarian society without revolution or political disorder, strikes and assassinations. South Korea, dissimilarly, was not successful in converting to a stable democratic society due to a lack of leadership by the American Military Government.
The South suffered from political confusion between the left and the right with disastrous economic difficulties, unsuccessful social reforms, and riots by communist guerrillas and mobs.43

This contrasting situation in the Korean Peninsula was the result of the different policies of the Americans and the Soviets concerning Korea.44 On the one hand, the Soviet Union supported North Korea strongly so that the Korean peninsula would not be a base for an attack on the Soviet Union in the future. Hence, they established their puppet regime, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in the north. The armed forces of North Korea were strengthened not only by being equipped with the latest USSR weapons including tanks and fighter aircrafts but also by the repatriation of over 37,000 high skilled Korean military men, who had considerable combat experience in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army during the internal war of China.45

On the other hand, the Americans considered that occupation of South Korea was a troublesome and costly matter in the context of their overall strategic considerations. Having decided not to directly oppose the communisation of China, they decided on a honourable retreat of the US forces in South Korea after establishing a weak anti-communist government under the auspices of the United Nations, in accordance with the policy outlined in National Security Council documents NSC-8 and NSC-48.46 The Americans, however, decided to provide only limited military assistance47 and limited economic assistance48 to the barest minimum required to sustain the ROK government. Furthermore, with strategic miscalculation over Korea and excessive confidence in their nuclear weapons, they excluded South Korea from their defence perimeter in Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson’s infamous National Press Club Speech of 12th January 1950.49
Due to the striking difference in development of South and North Korea after liberation, the balance between two sides was unequal in national powers and war-fighting capabilities. The two hostile governments did not hesitate to call for the accomplishment of unification by armed force. Armed clashes between both sides took place across the 38 Parallel. In this situation, President Rhee of the ROK was aware of a dangerous security situation and asked the Americans for urgent military assistance. However, they rejected the request and gave no American commitment to defend South Korea according to their political and strategic considerations mentioned already in the previous section.

Therefore, it was only a matter of time before North Korea decided to begin a war in the Korean peninsula. As of 24th June 1950, a striking comparison of military capability between two sides was as follows.

**Table 2-3 Comparison of Military Capability**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manpower</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>67,416</td>
<td>Combat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>27,558</td>
<td>Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>94,974</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Vehicle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Tank (T-34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armoured Vehicle</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Armoured Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunnery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-aircraft</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Anti-aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-tank</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>Anti-tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower (Marine Corps)</td>
<td>6,956 (1,241)</td>
<td>Manpower (Marine Corps)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>YAK-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IL-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Il-sung Kim and the Communist leaders in Moscow and Beijing believed that the United States would not support South Korea.\textsuperscript{52} At four o’clock in the morning on Sunday 25\textsuperscript{th} June 1950, therefore, the North Korean Armed Forces commenced their assault across the 38\textsuperscript{th} Parallel into South Korea. They launched the surprise attack by ground forces along the 38\textsuperscript{th} Parallel, and by amphibious landings on the east coast, and by air strikes.\textsuperscript{53}

In the end, war had suddenly erupted in the Korean peninsula, not as a result of any local or long-standing differences between North and South Koreans, but as a result of an ideological struggle being waged between two global camps of adversaries, the democratic West versus the Soviet dominated countries.\textsuperscript{54} As soon as the Korean War broke out, Present Rhee of the ROK asked for military aid from the American Government.\textsuperscript{55} President Truman and his advisers in Washington this time took immediate action to oppose the communist invasion.

On 25\textsuperscript{th} June, Washington time, the United States Government instantly requested a meeting of the United Nations Security Council and the Council passed a resolution on this breach of peace, which called upon the North Korean People's Republic to desist from aggression. On Monday 26\textsuperscript{th} June, President Truman announced the decision to expedite arms aid to South Korea under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. On Tuesday 27\textsuperscript{th}, he ordered naval and air support of the Republic of Korea and neutralized Formosa by the use of the Seventh Fleet. Also, the UN Security Council adopted a second resolution encouraging UN members to come to the armed assistance of the ROK.\textsuperscript{56}

Despite the above rapid US air and naval action, after just three days of the outbreak of the Korean War, Seoul, the capital city of the Republic of Korea had fallen.
The army of North Korea was much stronger than that of South Korea - indeed stronger than anyone had expected. On 29th June, after observing the front line of Korea,\textsuperscript{57} General MacArthur demanded the immediate requirement of the dispatch of the American ground forces to save South Korea, to which President Truman gave his consent.

From 1\textsuperscript{st} of July, the first American ground forces, Lt. Colonel Smith's battalion, entered the war,\textsuperscript{58} but they could not halt the enemy's advance. By early August, North Korean armored and infantry forces had pushed the US Eighth Army and South Korean troops into the small southeastern corner of the Korean peninsula surrounding Pusan.

The fate of South Korea seemed to hang by a thread. The UN naval forces, however, secured command of the sea and air, and successfully assisted UN ground forces to hold the enemy in check and to build the Pusan Perimeter. UN naval forces were even planning to rescue South Korea by an historical amphibious assault at Inchon.

2. Naval Operations During the Korean War

Though the Americans reacted immediately against the Communist invasion at the onset of the war, the salvation of the ROK was up to the South Koreans. In the early morning of 25\textsuperscript{th} June, three North Korean amphibious landings were implemented along the east coast, particularly north of Pohang, to support its ground forces: (1) 1,800 troops at Okgae, (2) 800 troops at Samchuk, and (3) 500 troops at Jukbyun. These surprise operations were carried out successfully because the only ROK warship stationed in the area was AMS-509. AMS-509 sunk a landing boat and captured a
However, in the early morning of 26th June, the ROK Navy defeated an enemy attack at sea. At midnight of 25th June, a North Korean 1,000-ton armed steamer attempted to infiltrate and seize Pusan using the 600 troops on board. Unlike the successful landing of North Korean troops described above, this attempted operation was met by PC-701. After a running fight near Pusan, the ROK vessel sank the enemy ship in the early morning of 26th June.60

This event had significant strategic implications. Strategically, Pusan was the only major port of entry available for the movement of supplies and reinforcements to South Korea. Later, it became the vital place for survival and a base of operations for the UN counter-attack against North Korea. But, at the beginning of the war, Pusan was an almost wholly defenseless place. Therefore, if the attempted landing of North Korean forces had been successful, the result could have been a catastrophe to the ROK. In addition, the victory of PC-701 was very important not only because the ship had been purchased by ROK Navy personnel, but also a victory was gained without any ammunition having to be fired: firing exercise before the engagement had been impossible due to the severely limited financial situation, which also had prevented the purchase of sufficient ammunition.61

But before the arrival of the UN naval forces, the ROK Navy had strengthened the coastal defences immediately to stop the enemy forces landing and to attempt to destroy the North Korean war ships. The Second Coastal Patrol Unit, composed of three AMS and three JMS, started defensive operations near Mukho (37° 25' N) against a possible North Korean attack by sea in the East Sea. Meanwhile, the First Coastal Patrol Unit was carrying out sea defence activities in the Yellow sea. The success of these
deployments was demonstrated, on 26th June, when the First Unit successfully assisted in the evacuation of the 17th Regiment of the ROK Army, who were stranded in Ongjin Bay, by one LST and two JMS.62

Meanwhile, the US decided to provide air and naval assistance, and on 27th June Vice Admiral C.T. Joy in Japan dispatched a South Korea Support Group, TG96.5 composed of one cruiser and four destroyers. Its mission was to patrol Korean coastal waters, to oppose hostile landings, to destroy enemy vessels engaged in aggression, to provide fire support to friendly forces, and to cover shipping engaged in evacuation or in carrying supplies to South Korea.63

Unfortunately, at 0345 on 29th June the very day after the group started its mission in the East Sea, USS Juneau attacked and sank ROK JMS-305 in 37° 25' N through misinformation and misunderstanding.64 After this accident, the mission area at sea between the UN naval forces and the ROK Navy was separated into north of 37°N for the UN naval forces and south of 37°N for the ROK Navy.65 Furthermore, the ROK Navy dispatched liaison officers to every UN naval ship to enhance mutual understanding and to exchange information effectively. It was a great opportunity for naval officers of ROK to learn advanced naval operations, tactics, and skills firsthand during the war.

In addition, according to the decision of UN Security Council for military assistance to the ROK, on 29th June the British Royal Navy dispatched a 13,000-ton light carrier, two six-inch gun cruisers, three destroyers, and four frigates. On 30th June, the Royal Australian Navy took similar action, the Royal Canadian Navy ordered three destroyers to prepare to sail, and the Royal New Zealand Navy promised the early dispatch of two frigates.66
Thus, on 2nd July, the first and last naval battle during the Korean War between the UN naval forces and North Korean Navy broke out. USS Juneau, accompanied by HMS Jamaica and Black Swan, encountered some North Korean warships in the East Sea. Battle ensued, and USS Juneau destroyed three PT, two PGM, and seven armed trawlers of North Korea without suffering any damage itself. Because of this engagement, the UN naval forces completely acquired the command of the sea surrounding the Korean Peninsula.

Then, on 14th July, President Rhee turned over command authority of all land, sea and air forces of the ROK to the Supreme Commander of the UN forces for the duration of the state of hostilities. The decision was to serve not only to combine and enhance their common objective of quelling Communist aggression and stopping the spread of Communist influence in Asia, but also to promote and reaffirm good relations between the two alliance partners. Consequently, the ROK Navy began to operate as a member of the UN naval forces for the rest the war. It also contributed to improving the ability of South Korea to influence American policy through the direct US military command chain.

On the whole, for the three months from the beginning of the War, the main focus of the UN Command was to halt the progress of the enemy advance and to construct the Pusan Perimeter as a stepping-stone for a counter-attack by UN ground forces. To this end, the UN naval forces were heavily involved in accomplishing these objectives during the period. As a result, they greatly contributed to the securing of the Pusan perimeter and to the slowing down of the enemy’s attacks through the following important naval operations: (1) carrier based air strikes and close air support, (2) gunfire support by major UN surface ships, and (3) a landing operation to reinforce the US 1st Cavalry Division.
Firstly, in terms of carrier operations, TF 77 aircraft carrier striking force composed of USS Valley Forge (CV) and HMS Triumph (CVL) started air strike operations from 3rd July in the Yellow sea against North Korea. For two days, twenty-eight USN aircraft and twenty-one RN aircraft attacked Pyongyang, the capital city of North Korea twice. Through the air strike operations, the UN air forces destroyed fourteen North Korean aircraft, air base facilities, and railway targets. As a result, they were able to secure command of the air surrounding the Korean Peninsula. In addition, on 18th and 19th July, TF 77 launched other air strike operations from the East Sea to attack the Wonsan area. Through this mission, it destroyed the biggest North Korean oil refinery, airfields, railways and trains, and bridges in Wonsan, and also neutralized about fifty North Korean aircraft.

Also, from 22nd to 29th July, TF77 conducted close air support operations to assist the UN ground forces from the South and West Sea. However, in the beginning, the operations were not successful because of the lack of mutual understanding between friendly forces in relation to the operational procedures and their capabilities and limitation. After reaching a solution, finally, the operations were successful in achieving good results such as killing over a company of North Korean soldiers, and destroying two tanks, over twenty trucks, several bridges and trains.

Furthermore, in support of the construction of the Pusan Perimeter, several US aircraft carriers reinforced Korean defence: on 1st August the USS Philippine Sea and on 7th August two escort Carriers- USS Sicily and USS Badoeng Strait. With the above reinforcement, from August onwards, all UN carrier aircrafts’ operations concentrated on securing the Pusan Perimeter by close air support and air interdiction operations until the success of Inchon amphibious operation.
Throughout the above operations, the aircraft carriers proved their great value as moving air bases in the Korean War. Firstly, because Korea is a peninsula, aircraft carriers were able to approach directly its military objectives. Therefore, they were able to use the element of surprise to strike military targets, and could extend the duration of flight over the objective area. The aircraft carriers made a great contribution to the UN forces in halting the fierce North Korean attacks and in constructing the Pusan Perimeter.

Secondly, the gunfire support given by UN major surface ships also was very useful to check the enemy’s advance. From the end of June, five UN naval ships (USS Juneau, Mansfield and De Haven, and HMS Jamaica and Black Swan) started gunfire support mission as soon as they arrived in Korea and inflicted enormous blows on the North Korean ground forces. To carry out more effective gunfire support operations, from the end of July, the US Navy took complete responsibility of the East Sea by two Task Elements while Royal Navy took command of the Yellow sea by one combined Royal-Dutch Task Element. 74

Thirdly, the speedy reinforcement of the US First Cavalry Division from Japan to South Korea was critical in holding the Pusan Perimeter. Therefore, on 18th July, the UN naval forces carried out a successful amphibious landing operation at Pohang although the Division lacked amphibious experience. 75 In particular, in the process of planning the Pohang amphibious operation, Inchon had been considered as one of potential landing areas.

Meanwhile, during the above period, the ROK Navy (Task Group 96.7) mainly composed of small craft of shallow draft contributed to the UN naval operations by carrying out sea blockade and gunfire support missions in the west and south coastal areas. 76 In terms of the geographic character of the Korean peninsula, while the east
The coast of Korea is good for naval operations involving large ships due to the very straight and steep coast line, the south and west coasts prohibit the use of major surface ships because of the countless islands and deeply indented bays. Particularly, the southern and western coastal areas provide shelter for local maritime traffic. In this context, the ROK Navy devoted itself to coastal operations against the North, and achieved great success in checking enemy's coastal shipping and retaking islands. For this purpose, on 16th August 1950, the ROK Navy instituted the First Fleet to replace the 1st Coastal Patrol Unit.

Also, in relation to the security of the Pusan Perimeter, the ROK Navy and Marine Corps made a great contribution by protecting the Tongyung area, the flank of Pusan, from the North Korean attack. North Korea occupied the Tongyung area and used it as a base from which to attack the Pusan Perimeter from the flank. To remove this threat, the ROK Navy undertook an independent amphibious landing and the ROK Marine Corps defeated the North Korean forces in the area. Furthermore, to support the Inchon amphibious landing operation, the ROK Navy recaptured two strategic islands (Dukjuk-do and Youngheung-do) located in the sea approaches to Inchon on 16th and 20th August respectively in order to use them as bases for reconnaissance of the enemy's movements.

Thanks to the above success, the US Far East Command was able to dispatch a reconnaissance team, led by Lieutenant Clark of the US Navy and including two South Korean interpreters and some Korean student soldiers, to Youngheung Island because, at the time, accurate intelligence of Inchon and its water approaches were absolutely vital to the success of the amphibious landing at Inchon. The Clark team provided valuable information to the Far East Command. And they repaired the lighthouse of
Palmi Island, which was vital to guide the UN naval forces threading their way through the treacherous approach to Inchon.  

Throughout all of the above efforts of the UN forces, General MacArthur finally succeeded in establishing the Pusan Perimeter. And then he planned a grand counterstroke against the adversary in the form of the historic amphibious landing at Inchon on 15th September 1950. Only he, the veteran commander of numerous littoral operations during the Second World War, could make a glorious one-stroke UN victory under the most unfavorable prevailing conditions. In particular, although there were many objections from high-ranking officers on the selection of Inchon as a landing site due to its geographic and tactical problems, General MacArthur never swayed from his choice of Inchon. He was convinced that not only would the enemy not expect a landing there because of the natural hazards of Inchon, but also that success at Inchon could conclude the war while an attack on Kunsan or another alternative landing site would be indecisive and then cause a brutal winter campaign.

The Joint Task Force 7 for the amphibious landing at Inchon was composed of 261 ships of all shapes and sizes of 8 nations (USA 225, UK 12, Canada 3, Australia 2, New Zealand 2, France 1, Netherlands 1, ROK 15) and 75,000 ground forces. The ships were assigned to the fast carrier, patrol and reconnaissance, logistic and attack task forces, and for gunfire and air support, screening, minesweeping, and miscellaneous other duties. Finally, as General MacArthur expected, the amphibious assault at Inchon proved the value of naval forces in bringing decisive power to bear on enemy nations touched by the sea. As General MacArthur gloriously stated, “the Navy and Marines never shone more brightly than at Inchon.”

The triumphant events at Inchon changed the entire Korean picture. Seoul, the capital city of the ROK, was restored on 28th September 1950 and North Korean
resistance totally collapsed. It seemed that the imminent unification of Korea by the UN forces would be possible. Therefore, the UN authorized further military operations in North Korea in order to destroy the enemy armed forces completely. In this situation, China threatened intervention into the Korean War several times if the UN forces threatened Chinese security near the border between China and North Korea across the 38th Parallel. 83

But General MacArthur disregarded the Chinese warnings, and ordered another amphibious landing at Wonsan, situated in the east coast of North Korea and 115 miles north of Seoul and 95 miles east of Pyongyang. The UN ground forces pushed back the invasion forces to near the Chinese border, and the ROK troops reached the bank of the Yalu on 26th October 1950. The General was optimistic about the imminent ending of the war at that time.

Unfortunately for General MacArthur's expectations, however, North Korean mines delayed the UN forces' amphibious landing at Wonsan for six days. 84 Moreover, all of sudden, massive Chinese Communist armies came into the Korean peninsula on 25th November 1950. The Chinese intervention changed again the aspect and scale of the Korean War. The UN forces were driven back to the 38th Parallel where they became entrenched against the communist Chinese and North Korean armies. 85 Nonetheless, once again, the UN naval forces proved their value through the evacuation operations, and continued to support ground operations by the aircraft carrier strike operations. 86

On the other hand, from 12th September until the end of the Korean War, the TF 95 combined naval forces carried out sea blockade and escort mission around the Korean peninsula. 87 The TF 95 was composed of ten nations - USA, Great Britain,
France, Canada, Australia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Thailand, Columbia, and ROK.  

The organization of TF 95 was as follows.

**Table 2-4 The Organization of TF 95**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Combined Naval Forces</td>
<td>TF 95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Sea Blockade Task Group (the west sea)</td>
<td>TG 95.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Sea Blockade Task Group (the East Sea)</td>
<td>TG 95.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Escort Task Group</td>
<td>TG 95.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Mine-Sweeping Task Group</td>
<td>TG 95.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ROK Navy Task Group</td>
<td>TG 95.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Under the control of TF 95, the ROK Navy (TG 95.7) carried out a series of shallow water operations to destroy the enemy's defence sites along the coast, to prevent North Korean mine laying, and to protect friendly forces in the islands. For, against the UN naval forces, the North Korean Navy concentrated on laying mines and raising coastal defence by the use of shore batteries. In this context, the US Navy transferred thirty ex-US naval ships during the Korean War to support the coastal operations of the ROK Navy. The details of the transfer were as follows.

**Table 2-5 Ships' Transfer from USN during the Korean War**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PF (Patrol Frigate)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF-61, 62*, 63, 65, 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC (Submarine Chaser)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>PC-705, 706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCS (Large Patrol Craft)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PCS-201, 202, 203, 205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT (Fast Attack Craft)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PT-23, 25, 26**, 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST (Tank Landing Ship)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>LST-802, 803***, 805, 806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSSL (Large Support Landing ship)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>LSSL-107, 108, 109, 110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS (Supply Ship)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>FS-901, 902, 903, 904****, 905, 906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT (Oceangoing Tug)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>LT-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Total</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* PF-62 was damaged in collision in May 1952 and returned to USA and sunk as a target in 1963
** PT-26 was destroyed entirely by fire in September 1952
*** LST-803 was wrecked and scrapped in January 1952
**** FS-904 was mined and scrapped in December 1951

As the above table 2-2 shows, force improvement of the ROK Navy during the Korean War was focused on the increase of small combatants and transportation ships for coastal operations. Nonetheless, to accomplish the mission successfully as TG 95.7, the ROK Navy devoted itself and strove to develop its combat capability. Through its efforts, the ROK Navy improved its combat capability remarkably in every way. For instance, on 16\textsuperscript{th} April 1951, though the ROK Apnok (PF-62) was attacked by enemy four YAK aircraft, it repelled them by shooting two aircraft down with only minor damage to itself.\textsuperscript{91} Also the Navy upgraded its mine sweeping capabilities by undergoing training at the US naval base at Sasebo in Japan.\textsuperscript{92} In particular, the ROK Navy improved the First Fleet's strength by the integration of the Second Coastal Patrol Unit on 9\textsuperscript{th} December 1950 and the Third Coastal Patrol Unit on 5\textsuperscript{th} January 1951 respectively.\textsuperscript{93} As a result, by 1\textsuperscript{st} August 1953, the organization of the First Fleet of the ROK Navy developed as follows.

**Table 2-6 The Organization of 1\textsuperscript{st} Fleet**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Squadron for Escort</td>
<td>PF-61, 63, 65, 66</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squadron for Transportation</td>
<td>LST-801, 802, 805, 806</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FS-901, 902, 903, 905, 906</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>YO-106, AO-2/3, LT-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squadron for Minesweeping</td>
<td>AMS-501, 502, 503, 505, 506, 507, 510, 511, 512, 513</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squadron for the East Sea</td>
<td>PC-705, 706</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PCS-201, 202, 203, 205</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LSSL-109, 110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squadron for the West Sea</td>
<td>PC-701, 702, 703</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JMS-303, 304, 309, 310</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AMS-504, 514, 518</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LSSL-107, 108</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PG-313, 315</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squadron for the South Sea</td>
<td>JMS-301, 302, 307, 308</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division for PT</td>
<td>PT-23, 25, 27</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the shallow water operations, despite the vortex of the Korean War, the ROK Navy contrived to protect national maritime interests against Japanese fishing boats, which violated the MacArthur Line. Furthermore, as the MacArthur Line was due to terminate because of the peace treaty between the USA and Japan in 1952, President Rhee on 18th January 1952 promulgated the Peace Line. Accordingly, the ROK Navy had to continue to protect its national coastal fishing grounds. At last, the ROK Navy was being developed as a security force to protect national interest at sea.

In the long run, at 2200 on 27th July 1953, an uneasy armistice settled along the battle-line and fixed the boundaries of the 241-kilometer Demilitarized Zone as the border between North and South Korea.

IV. Conclusion

Since the Choson era, the Hermit Kingdom had retreated into national isolation, forgetting the sea. The maritime spirit of Korean waned severely, and when liberated there were few people who understood the importance of the sea and naval power in the security in Korea. However, Admiral Won-il Shon, a maritime pioneer of Korea, founded the Republic of Korea Navy with the likeminded people soon after the liberation on 11th November 1945.

The ROK Navy devoted itself to the foundation of the Republic of Korea Government by the successful support of the suppression operations against the communist rebels in South Korea. Furthermore, under the imminent threat of North Korean invasion, Admiral Shon arranged for the purchase of four PCs from the USA,
the former US submarine chasers, by subscription involving all members of the Navy because the American did not provide any combatant vessels. As a result, Paekdusan (PC-701) only arrived in Chinhae, South Korea, just before the outbreak of the Korean War, and the rest of them were on the way to Korea.

As the history of Korea illustrated, the Korean War proved again how important maritime power is in the security of Korea. Firstly, when the fate of South Korea seemed to hang by a thread after the surprise attack of North Korea, the ROK Navy played a key role in ensuring the survival of the country by defeating an enemy attack at sea before the UN forces arrived in Korea. It is called “Daehan Haehyup Haejeon [Korean Strait Naval Warfare]” when Paekdusan (PC-701) sunk a North Korea 1,000-ton armed steamer embarked 600 troops attempting to infiltrate and to seize Pusan, which had been an almost wholly defenceless place and was later a critical base of operations for the UN counter-attack against North Korea.

Secondly, the UN naval forces starting with aircraft carriers seized the command of the sea and air around the Korean peninsula, and contributed decisively to return the situation of Korea back where it was before the Korean War. The ROK Navy also performed its mission successfully as a member of the UN naval forces against North Korea, mainly in the coastal area including the protection of national fishing interests at sea.

In particular, the aircraft carrier demonstrated its utility as a moving air base by approaching the military objectives directly from the sea. And gunfire support by UN naval ships also contributed to halting the advance of North Korean ground forces. Outstandingly, the historical amphibious landing at Inchon proved the use of naval forces in bringing decisive power to bear on enemy nations touched by the sea.
Thirdly, sea power secured the sea line of communications, which was critical to save the ROK. For instance, during the Korean War, six out of every seven people who came to Korea came by sea and fifty-four million tons of dry cargo and 22 million tons of petroleum products came to Korea by ship. Also there were 270 tons of trans-Pacific sea freight for every ton of trans-Pacific air freight and four tons of gasoline for aircraft had to be delivered across the Pacific by ship for every ton of air freight. Every soldier landed in Korea was accompanied by five tons of equipment, and it took a further 64 pounds every day to keep him there.

Consequently, it can be said that maritime power was the decisive factor in the Korean War because it prevented the US from being defeated politically and militarily, and because it could guarantee the US victory if there was the US policy and will of ground forces to take the victory to the last. No war exemplified the value of maritime power better than the Korean War. Korea, surrounded by sea on three sides, was a battlefield reliant on command of the sea and naval operations, as the above explanations illustrate.

On the basis of this vision, Admiral Shon and the maritime pioneers of Korea laid the foundation of the ROK Navy for national defense and security, in spite of various adversities. And they devoted themselves to constructing a modern navy, and made every effort to cultivate men of talent and to acquire naval ships. Ironically, through the disastrous Korean War, they made huge progress in growth, and learnt modern naval knowledge, skills, and tactics very quickly.

However, the development of the ROK Navy through the Korean War was in carrying out mainly shallow water naval operations as a part of the UN naval forces in the south and west coasts, which are composed of countless islands and deeply indented bays. Major naval operations were carried out by the assistance of huge friendly naval
forces through the UN, and they secured command of the sea. But it is very hard to expect such enormous assistance like that given during the Korean War in the future event in case of an attack. Also the ROK Navy has to carry out its mission under the strong threat of the neighbouring enemy navy. Therefore, how the ROK Navy should grow after the Korean War raised a big question mark.
End Notes

1 Japan dispatched 8 naval ships embarked 600 troops for this purpose against Choson, and concluded the Kanghawdo Treaty between two countries. Japan imitated the Great Britain-Japan Treaty of 1858, and intended to separate Choson from China and to attain superiority to Choson. For more details, Hyun-hee Rhee, “Woonyangho Sagunkwa Choson Kundae Keundaehwa Sido [The Incident of Woonyangho and the Attempt of Modernization of Choson Armed Forces], Korea Institute For Maritime Strategy, Haeyerang Jaekukui Chimnyakkwa Kundae Chosonui Haeyang Jungchaek [The Invasions of Maritime Imperial Countries and Maritime Policy of Modern Choson] (Seoul: KIMS, 2000), pp. 27-42.

2 Although China understood Korea lies in the heart of the Far East as a passageway between China and Japan, it did not have enough naval forces and was reluctant to assist Korea at that time. So China recommended Korea to restrain Japan and Russia through shaping an international balance of power system in Korea. See Byung-gi An, Kundae Han Joong Kwangaesa Yungu [The Study for the Modern History of Korea-China Relation] (Seoul: Tankuk University Press, 1985), p. 43.


4 Present Theodore Roosevelt allowed Japan to control Korea since strategically the Korean Peninsula was not more than a peripheral area to the Americans. In this context, the Americans continued to make the policy on Korea. For more details about the decision at the time, see M. Frederick Nelson, Korea and the Old orders in Eastern Asia, pp. 244-271.

5 In relation to the phrase “in due course”, Dr Syngman Rhee first President of Republic of Korea was greatly alarmed. And he issued a series of statements condemning this restrictive phrase, and addressed letters to the State Department and to president Roosevelt asking for clarification of its intent, but he received no answers. For more details, see U.S. Department of State, In Quest of Peace and Security: Selected Documents an American Foreign Policy, 1941-1951 (Washington, 1951), p. 10; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, vol. III, p. 1096.


11 The cruel colonial control by Japan was divided into 3 phases: the first period called military control, the second period cultural control, and the third period of control by aggression. The Japanese control deprived completely the privileges of Koreans to prepare the construction of a unified country after liberation. For more details, see Man-kil Kang, Kocheo Sseun Hankuk Hyundaesa [Present History of Korea Rewritten Correctly] (Seoul: Changjakkwa Bipyongsa, 1994), pp. 17-38.

12 The North obtained the lion’s share of industry and resources; 87.6% of nation’s electric power generation facilities were located in the North and only 12.4% in the South. For more details, see Andrew J. Grajdanez, “Korea divided”, Far Eastern Survey, October 10, 1945, pp. 281-283; George M. McCune, “The Essential Unity of Korean Economy”, Korea Economic digest, January, 1946, pp. 3-8; Man-kil Kang, op cit., pp. 120-162; The Institute of Contemporary Korean History, Rethinking Modern Korean History 1, pp. 113-166, 263-321.


Admiral Won-il Shon was born on 5th May 1909 as a son of Jung-do Shon who was a minister and one of the 33 National Representatives of Independence Movement of March 1st, 1919 against the Japanese. He graduated in navigation at National Central University of China. He devoted himself entirely to establish the ROK Navy so he is called the Father of the ROK Navy. He has been a Chief of Naval Operations, a Minister of National Defence, and an Ambassador to West Germany. For more details, see Navy Headquarters of the ROK, Haegun Munhwa [The Culture of Navy], pp. 116-121.


Eun-hae Hong, Woorideuleun Idadaweehae: Shon Wonil jedok hwoekorok [We for the Sea: The Memoir of Admiral Won-il Shon] (Seoul: Kainkiwoek, 1990), p. 132; Eun-hae Hong is the wife of the late Admiral Shon.


Ibid., p. 23.

Ibid., pp. 37-38.


Ibid., pp. 38-39; At the time of transferring the patrol mission from US to Korea, Korean Coast Guard held mainly mine sweeping ship without any proper combat ship.

Ibid., p. 35.


The special squadron was composed of 13 AMS, 4JMS, and 1PG. The squadron transported 7,600 troops with ammunitions and provisions during the operations. For more details, see Navy Headquarters of the ROK, The History of the ROK Navy, Vol.I, pp. 43-46.

The Institute of National Defence and Military History, The Fifty Years History of the ROK Armed Forces, pp. 64-66.

The ROK Marine Corps was founded with 380 troops of the ROK Navy in Chinhae. See ibid., p. 51; the lessons of the operation were the lack of defence and attack armament for the ships, communication problem, and the requirement of troops for ground battle. For more details, see Navy Headquarters of the ROK, The History of the ROK Navy, Vol.I, pp. 51-54.


Eun-hae Hong, opcit., p. 148.

Ibid., pp. 149-150.

PC-701 was a former US submarine chaser and merchant Marine Academy’s training ship, which was 280 tons of standard (450 tons of full load) and was installed with one 3” gun, and one 40mm and two 20mm guns.


For more details, see Young-myung Kim, “Namhanui Jungchijuk Dongtaewa Mikunjung [Political Situation of South Korea and US Military Administration],” and Young-soo Kim, “Bukhanui Jungchijuk Dongtaeawa Sowkunjung [Political Situation of North Korea and Soviet Military Administration],” Hankuk Hyundaesa Jainsik I: Haebang Jungkukkwa Misowkunjung [Rethinking Modern Korean History


For more details, see Ik-jun Jang, Bukhan Inmninkundaesa [The History of DPRK (North Korea) Armed Forces] (Seoul: Seomundang, 1991), 115-140.


The military assistance of US was based on the policy of enabling the Korean armed forces to preserve internal security, to prevent border raids and incursions form north of the 38th Parallel, and as a by product, to deter armed attack or other aggression by the North Korean forces. In accordance with the policy, the basic plan of US military assistance was to provide the necessary equipment for 65,000 troops to the ground forces of the ROK, and some ships and weapons and the necessary maintenance parts for six months to the ROK Navy although President Rhee had asked for the provision of the necessary weapons and equipment for total 400,000 ROK troops against North Korea. For more details, see NSC 8/2, March 22, 1949, FRUS, 1949 Vol. VII, pp. 969-978, 1060-1061; The Institute of National Defence and Military History, opcit., pp. 54-56; "the Mutual Defence Assistance Act," and "Military Assistance to Korea," Committee on Foreign Affairs, Background Information on Korea, pp. 33-40.

For more details about economic assistance, see "The Record of Economic Assistance," Committee on Foreign Affairs, Background Information on Korea, pp. 21-33.

In analysing the Press Club speech, scholars have pointed to Acheson's exclusion of Korea from America's "defensive perimeter" as evidence of the absence of an American commitment to defend South Korea. See Dean G. Acheson, "Crisis in Asia-An Examination of US Policy," Department of State Bulletin, XXII (Jan. 23, 1950), pp. 111-118.


President Rhee dispatched a special envoy to US for the purpose. For more details, see memorandum of Conversation by Secretary of State, July 11, 1949, FRUS, 1949 Vol. VII, pp. 1958-1959.


At that time The Truman Administration was under bitter attack by a large sector of the Republican Party for having lost China to the Communists. So the Truman Administration surely did not wish to be accused by the Republicans of losing South Korea to the Communists. However, for there was no bilateral defence treaty between South Korea and the United States America, President Rhee's public request for aid was very important to President Truman to decide the intervention of the Korean War. However President Truman was sure that only the response by military force would be the best way...


60 For the brief information about US reaction, UN resolution, and the Korean situation, see Committee on Foreign Affairs, Background Information on Korea: Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs pursuant to H. Res. 206 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 1-74.


62 About the reinforcement of US ground forces in the beginning of the Korean War, see The Joint Chiefs of Staff of the ROK, Hankukjunsu [The History of the Korean War] (Seoul, Kyohaksa, 1984), pp. 354-361.

63 Construction of the North Korean Navy was aimed not for naval warfare or gunfire support for ground force but for small amphibious raids landing in step with the movement of ground force. For more details, see Navy Headquarters of the ROK, The History of the ROK Navy: Operation (Vol. 1), p. 20, 39; ROK Naval War College, Naval Warfare History of the ROK, pp. 224-225; The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, War History of Korea, pp. 603-606.

64 It is called “Daehan Haehyup Haejeon [Korean Strait Naval Warfare]”. For more details, see ROK Naval War College, op. cit., pp. 228-234; The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, op. cit., pp. 607-611.

65 ROK Naval War College, op. cit., p. 233.


71 James A. Field, op. cit., p. 61.


75 Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, op. cit., p. 46; James A. Field, op. cit., p. 111.

76 Ibid., p. 119; Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, op. cit., pp. 47-55.

77 Ibid., pp. 56-67.

78 James A. Field, op. cit., p. 57.


80 For more details, see Navy Headquarters of the ROK, The History of the ROK Navy: Operation (Vol. 1), pp. 63-137.


83 Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, op. cit., p. 87-89.


85 The Main opponents were General Omar N. Bradley of the US JCS Chairman, General J. Lawton Collins of Chief of Staff of the US Army, and Admiral Forrest P. Sherman of US Chief of Naval Operations. For more details, see Ibid., p. 76-78.

86 For more details about Amphibious Assault at Inchon, see Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, op. cit., Chapter 3 The Magnificent Gamble: The Amphibious Assault at Inchon; James A. Field, op. cit., Chapter 7 Back to the Parallel; Navy Headquarters of the ROK, The History of the ROK Navy: Operation (Vol. 1), pp. 118-127; The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, op. cit., pp. 667-683; ROK Naval War College, op. cit., p. 298-319.

87 About the threat of Communist China, see Wilkinson to Acheson, No. 508, 556, and September 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. VII, p. 698, pp. 724-725; In relation to the threat of Communist China, Great Britain


87 Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, op. cit., p. 294; James A. field, op. cit., p. 211.


89 The North Korean mines were provided by the USSR and transported mostly from Vladivostok to Wonsan in July 1950 by train. The total number of mines was about 4,000, 3,000 laid at Wonsan alone, the rest of them at Chinnampo, Haeju, Inchon, and Kunsan, etc. See, Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, op. cit., p. 145.

90 The US policy on Korea of Eisenhower Administration was the early end of the Korean War, increase of the ROK armed forces, and the reduction of the US forces in Korea. In accordance with the policy, the ROK Navy acquired additional ships, and was increased manpower to 17,863. For more details, see the Institute of National Defence and Military History, op. cit., pp. 72-75.

91 PF-62 was US former frigate, standard load 1,430 tons, speed 20 knots, and 3x30 gun. It transferred to the ROK Navy in November 1950. However, it was damaged in collision in May 1952, substituted by PF-66 and returned to USA, and sunk as a target in 1963.

92 In the beginning of the War, ROKS mine sweeping ships did not have mine sweeping equipment installed so they were operated with alternative equipments. In October 1950, 6 AMS of the ROK Navy were dispatched to Sasebo in Japan, and were installed equipments with personnel training by the US Navy. For more details, see “Chapter 4 Mine Sweeping Operations,” ROK Navy Headquarters, The History of the ROK Navy: Operation (Vol. I), pp. 138-140.


94 MacArthur Line was the control line for the Japanese fishery during the Administration of Allied Nations (1948-1952). For more details, see Japan Yearbook, 1945-1952 (Tokyo, 1952).

95 The Japanese called the Peace Line as the Rhee Line because President Rhee promulgated the Line. The Peace Line was supported by Sea Defence Zone called Clark Line, which was promulgated on 27th September 1952 by General Clark for the prevention of coastal line of the ROK against infiltration of the Communist secret agents and rebellious elements. For more details, see ROK Navy Headquarters, The History of the ROK Navy: Administration and Operation (Vol. III), pp. 291-294; Chul-keun Ji, pyunghwasun [Peace Line] (Seoul: Bumwoosa, 1979); New York Times, September 25, 1952, p. 2.
Chapter 3 ROK-USA Combined Defence Policy and the ROK Navy

I. Survival But Subordinate: ROK-USA Mutual Defence Treaty

The Korean War lasted for thirty-seven months and two days. What had been gained by this expenditure of blood, time, and resources? It is said that the Korean War confirmed all the worst Western cautions about Stalin's expansionist ambitions, and led the American to boost NSC-68 (National Security Council Document), calling for a vast increase in the US defence expenditure.\(^1\) It was a crucial point at which to enter the peak of the Cold War (1950-1962).\(^2\)

Through the Korean War, the Western countries demonstrated the real value of collective security and notified the Communists that future forays would be met with even greater force. Although it is arguable whether the Korean War represented a victory for the Free World or not\(^3\), the US consistently prevailed over the communists throughout the Cold War confrontations. In the end, the US won the Cold War with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 without Soviet military aggression against NATO and Japan.

Then what about the Republic of Korea? Surely, it is said that one of the most important results of the Korean War was the change of the American strategic perception on the Korean peninsula. After World War II and in the early stage of containment, Korean strategic significance was not raised to the US policy-makers. The US neglected the ROK totally both in its military strategy and its political calculation, and withdrew its forces from Korea because of the political concern about (1) an all-out war with the Soviet Union,\(^4\) (2) defence strategy based on nuclear weapons,\(^5\) and (3) a preference for Japan in its security policy.\(^6\)

When the Korean War broke out, however, President Truman responded in an axiomatic way, and regarded the invasion by communist North Korea as not only a link
in the chain of the Soviet Communist expansion policy but also as an attack on the authority of the UN.\(^7\) The Americans intervened in the Korean War for the prevention of further communist invasion of the free world. Upon the outbreak of the Korean War, the ROK was established firmly in the American security perimeter and finally concluded a mutual defence treaty with the USA.

Indeed, the conclusion of the ROK-USA Mutual Defence Treaty was very significant in the relationship between the ROK and the USA, not only because, through the Treaty, the ROK was officially recognized as a frontier and part of the US containment policy, but also because the Treaty has ever since been a cornerstone of the ROK-USA cooperative security relationships. Therefore, to investigate the process of development of the ROK Navy, it is necessary to understand the process and implication of the Treaty first.

Firstly, the progress towards the conclusion of the Treaty was not easy sailing since, in spite of its often-moralistic rhetoric, the USA carried out its foreign policy according to the maxim of the 19th-century British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston.\(^8\) In the face of the ceasefire of the Korean War, the security commitment of the USA was critical to the survival and prosperity of South Korea in the future under the continued threat of the communists in the north. Then, President Rhee, seen by the Americans as an old uncontrollable patriot, requested a defence commitment on South Korea by the United States to uphold the security of the Korean peninsula.\(^9\) But the American rejected to the request\(^10\) and even reappraised the plan to include the removal of President Rhee, called "Operation Everready."\(^11\)

Against the US response, President Rhee took the decisive action not to accept the ceasefire, and reacted strongly in protest against the Eisenhower Administration, which was pursuing the policy of an early ending to the Korean War.\(^12\)
He proclaimed that South Koreans would fight to the last against the communists even if there were no assistance of the US. On 22nd June 1953, furthermore, he decreed independently the release of the 27,000 anti-Communist prisoners in spite of the objections of the US.

By putting pressure on President Rhee, the US agreed the conclusion of Mutual Defence Treaty with the ROK under the condition that South Korea would observe the Armistice Agreement. President Rhee had exploited his potential to undermine the US armistice policy to obtain an American guarantee of future security. On 1st October 1953, finally, representatives of the United States and the ROK signed the Mutual Defence Treaty that went into effect in November 1954 and remains in effect to the present day.

What was the implication of the Treaty in terms of the security of the ROK? From the Korean point of view, first of all, the conclusion of the Treaty was profound in meaning. By the Treaty, South Korea secured the intervention of the US as a deterrent against any new possible invasion by the Communists. Also, the Treaty has contributed in both political and military stability of the Korean Peninsula by protecting South Korea from another all-out war against North Korea and other communist countries. In particular, unlike its long pro-continental history, the ROK embarked upon its first pro-maritime era through alliance with the USA.

The Treaty, however, does not provide a NATO-type guarantee to South Korea. The Americans did not accept the Korean claim of the American automatic commitment in case of an attack during the negotiation of the Treaty. Consequently, the presence of American ground forces in South Korea implies the next best thing: the "trip-wire" nature of the American soldiers in Korea guarantees that the US will respond immediately if an attack across the 38th Parallel occurs. This is why South
Koreans realize that the American presence is a major deterrent against another North Korean invasion, and pay particular attention to any and all indications that US policy may change concerning this presence.

From the American point of view, there were some US interests focused on Korea. Firstly, in the Korean War, the US had applied a strategy of “limited war” for the first time in its history, which underlined the need for conventional as well as nuclear deterrence. The American realized that they had to respond with conventional forces if communist forces should attack with a limited purpose in a local conflict. The American, therefore, considered that the bilateral defence treaty and the presence of US ground troops in South Korea was very significant in demonstrating its seriousness in defending East Asia against the Soviet Union and the Communist China.

Also, strategically, South Korea became important, acting as a buffer territory in US military strategy of the Cold War. The US deterrence strategy based on nuclear weapons needed ground forces and bases in South Korea as a first-level sensory organization to avoid an accidental release of its nuclear arsenal, and as a base to compensate a “missile gap” in the area of intercontinental ballistic missiles with middle-range or short-range missiles of the IRBM-class.

Economically, furthermore, Americans regarded that modernizing and maintaining the indigenous troops of the ROK would be far less expensive for the US than maintaining their troops in South Korea because the ROK Armed Forces could provide a substantial degree of the US conventional defence despite American troop reductions. In these political, strategic, and economic contexts, the US provided appreciable amounts of military aid to the ROK in accordance with its military strategic doctrine.
Nevertheless, US fundamental policy on Korea was totally precautionary and
defensive against the communist threat and equivocal towards South Korea. The
American worried about the aggressive unification policy of President Rhee\textsuperscript{20} and
eliminated any possibility that the unification of Korea could be undertaken with the
assistance of US armed forces. This was demonstrated in the “Understanding”, which
was added when the US Senate ratified the treaty, making clear the obligation of the US
under Article 3 that it should be applied only in the event of an external armed attack
directed against South Korea. Under the terms of the Mutual Defence Treaty, the US
has no obligation to help the ROK when it itself initiates hostilities.

The Americans, moreover, took effective measures to intercept independent
military action by the ROK by taking away operational control authority from its Armed
Forces. The “Minutes of Mutual Agreement between the ROK and the USA” forced
South Korea to carry out military planning in the context of agreement between two
countries. Also, it pointed out clearly that the operational control authority of the ROK
Armed Forces should continue to be handed over to the UN Command, i.e. American
authority.

In short, the Armistice Agreement that divides a hitherto unified country
stopped the roar of cannons, and imperfect peace came to the Korean Peninsula. But the
suspending War, neither victory nor defeat, left lots of problems for the Koreans.
Consequently, after the Korean War, US assistance was essential to secure and
encourage prosperity in the ROK, which had to rehabilitate its economy and prevent
another tragic war.

In this context, through the conclusion of ROK-USA Mutual Defence Treaty,
South Korea had secured US commitment as a trustworthy deterrent against the North,
had become the front line of the US containment policy, and could take considerable
military and economic aid from the US. On the negative side, the ROK sacrificed independent military action in favour of national reconstruction in a truly desperate economic situation, and had to develop its armed forces in the context of the US global military strategy against the threat of the northern communists. Nonetheless, it is said that ROK-USA Mutual Defence Treaty was an achievement of President Rhee’s diplomacy exploiting the internal circumstance of the US, which wished to finish the Korean War as early as possible.

II. Post-War Development of the ROK Navy (1953-1973)

For two decades from the Armistice Agreement to the beginning of the self-reliant national defence program called “Yulgok Project” in 1974, the development of the ROK Navy can be divided into three periods. Firstly, the first period (1953-1957) was a “subordinate naval development” when it improved force capability by the introduction of a considerable number of ships from the US Navy, but within the context of combined naval forces with the US Navy in case of an attack. The second period (1958-1966) was marked by “dependent modernization and force improvement” that took steps to consolidate capability by replacing and modernizing deteriorated ships through military aid from the US Navy. Finally, the third period (1967-1973) was the “development of counterespionage capability” when it started to strengthen its counterespionage potential rapidly.

1. Subordinate Naval Development (1953-1957)

A. Severe Trials for Post-war Reconstruction

The Korean War took a terrible toll: the casualty of ROK Armed Forces was 600,000 and that of the UN Forces was 550,000 while North Korean Armed Forces 800,000 and the Communist China Armed Forces 1,230,000. Civilian casualties were
South Korea 990,000 and North Korea 2,000,000. Moreover, the Korean economy lay totally battered and torn by the time the Armistice Agreement was signed.

The period of the fifties was a dismal era for the Korean economy. Particularly, the years 1954-1957 were very difficult years of rehabilitation. There was political instability, rampant inflation, and an inability to meet most of the basic needs of the people. In addition, the government lacked administrative experience and there was long period of trial and error in its development projects. Consequently, the ROK had to rely on foreign aid, mostly from the US, for its post-war reconstruction.

The ROK Armed Forces increased to 720,000 in 1954 to prevent another invasion by North Korean and Communist China forces in the North. But, in October 1958, as the Chinese forces withdrew unilaterally from the North, the level of strength of the ROK Armed Forces was reduced to 630,000 to soften the financial burden. In December 1953, a ROK-USA Economic Committee was set up to engender economic rehabilitation and stability in South Korea.

In the course of time, North Korea also was forced to concentrate on economic restoration and military reconstruction. Its basic strategy against the South was couched in terms of "peace offensive" and the "formation of underground communist factions" rather than another attempt to spread communism throughout the entire Korean peninsula by armed force. In particular, there was an increase of anti-Communist awareness in South Korea, and of the strength of ROK-USA military cooperation by the Mutual Defence Treaty. Also, Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence policy confirmed the above period as a calm after the storm between the South and the North.
B. Big Augmentation without the Sword

After the Korean War, to prevent another tragic war in the Korean Peninsula, the ROK Navy set itself the goal of post-war construction by building naval forces enough for the defence of territorial waters and the defeat of any invasion by the North Korean Navy. For that purpose, it considered the capability required to be a hundred and eighty-eight naval ships: sixty coastal defence and support ships including CVL and DD, seventy mine-warfare ships (AMS), and fifty-eight amphibious warfare ships (LST, LSM). This force estimation lacked practicality since it was simply calculated based on the operational necessity during the Korean War. Nonetheless, it was very significant that the ROK Navy showed not only how it felt on the importance of naval forces, particularly the role of aircraft carriers for its security but also how its enterprising spirit was looking towards its future development.

Despite its wishful thinking, South Korea had been ruined totally and did not have the capability to build its own naval ships. Consequently, its primary concern had been to focus on the acquisition of naval ships from the US Navy through a military aid programme. However, the strategic circumstances were not auspicious because the Americans followed closely their own strategic considerations. The Americans did not want another war in Korea and President Eisenhower was very reluctant to provide any offensive weapon systems to South Korea because of President Rhee's aggressive unification policy.

Meanwhile, Present Rhee appointed Admiral Shon as a minister of national defence of the ROK in June 1953 and he devoted himself to the maintenance and development of the ROK military forces for three years, a critical period of post-war construction. He was very well aware the situation that post-war construction of the ROK Armed Forces necessarily relied on military aid from the US. He played a critical
role in particular in getting military aid from the Eisenhower Administration in the context of the Geneva Conference. At the Berlin conference in February 1954, the foreign ministers of the US, France, Great Britain, and the USSR agreed to hold a conference in Geneva on 28th April 1954 for the political settlement of the Korean problem. To this conference were invited those nations whose troops had fought in Korea plus the Soviet Union, which officially had not had forces there.

President Rhee, however, initially rejected the invitation and insisted he would not send ROK representatives to the Conference. In spite of President Rhee’s strong antipathy against the conference, Admiral Shon persuaded him to dispatch ROK representatives to the Conference in order to acquire military aid from the Eisenhower administration rather than making the American hostile by South Korea’s absence. Eventually, on condition that South Korea attend to the conference, the US gave the promise of military aid: modernization of twenty divisions of the ROK Army, foundation of ten reserve divisions, aid of twenty-nine naval ships including two DEs, and the foundation of one jet fighter wing.26

Through the successful working-level talks, the ROK Navy acquired thirty-one naval ships from the US Navy over the two years, 1955-1956, under “the ROK-USA agreement for loan of the US naval ships.” The ships were of nine types, and the composition of the loan ships was two frigates (6.2%) as major surface ships, four patrol craft (13%) as small surface combatants, sixteen landing ships (52%) as amphibious warfare vessels, three minesweeping ships (9.6%) as mine warfare vessels, and six auxiliary ships (19.2%). As of the end of 1957, the details of ships transfer from the US Navy to the ROK Navy and the development of the ROK naval forces in accordance with the introduction was as follows in table 3-1 and 3-2.
Table 3-1 Ships Transfer from the US Navy to the ROK Navy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Ship</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Transferred Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surface</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCEC</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1955/3, 1956/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1955/4, 1956/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKL</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3-2 The Development of the ROK Naval Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Acquisition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Surface Ship</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Patrol Combatant</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Warfare Ship</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Warfare Ship</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary Ship</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Deletion 16: 8 JMS, 3 AMS, 3 PCS, 2 PG


As the above tables illustrate, there was some significance in the augmentation of the ROK Navy. Generally, the role of the ROK Navy was determined within the scope of the American perception of its role in the Korean War. Through the above assistance programme, it was clear that the Americans did not want to improve the major combat capability of the ROK Navy. For, during the Korean War, the North Korea Navy was totally destroyed by the UN naval forces, and also at that time, the US Navy was the most powerful navy in the world beyond compare. Strategically, the Americans did not need to consider the development of the ROK Navy as a high
priority. From the American point of view, therefore, the ROK Navy would be adequate as a limited coastal navy as a supplement for the US Navy as it had been during the Korean War. On the contrary, the increase of the ROK Army capability was a much more imperative matter against the real threat of North Korean ground forces to deter another invasion.27

In this context, the US Navy transferred mostly amphibious warfare ships by its one-sided decision to improve the amphibious warfare capability of the ROK Navy aimed at assisting the ROK Marine Corps and future ground operations. Also, six surface ships were transferred in place of five deletions, and six auxiliary ships were complemented to improve logistic support capability. But the Americans supplied only three MSC in place of eleven deletions because it was only the replacement of three ex-US AMS (American Mine Sweeper), not the eight ex-Japanese JMS (Japanese Mine Sweeper).

In addition to the above introduction of ex-US naval ships, immediately after the Korean War, the ROK Navy launched a reformation of its organization to correspond to the development of the Navy by the acquisition of more ships from the US Navy and the change of strategic situation surrounding the Korean peninsula. But the ROK Navy had to carry out its post-war construction on the limited basis of the experiences of the Korean War and using the US naval system as a model. For it did not have any modern naval development process of its own and could not get any other sources and support except the US Navy in relation to its post-War development.

Nonetheless, in terms of the reforms, there were several important changes to be found. Firstly, the ROK Navy established planning offices in all sections of naval headquarters to have charge of its future development. Secondly, it instituted the ROK Fleet in place of the 1st Fleet.28 Thirdly, to cultivate naval personnel of talent, a Naval
War College was established in July 1955 and Naval Training Centre for enlisted men in March 1956 by the integration of the Recruit and General Training Centres. Fourthly, to improve logistic support, it founded Naval Supply Centre in November 1953. Finally, it had established a Naval Installations Centre to construct and maintain its harbour facilities in Chinhae even during the Korean War.29

As of 18th September 1957, the organization of the ROK Navy through the reform was as follows.

Figure 3-1 The Organization of the ROK Navy

The institution of the ROK Fleet on 10th September 1953, instead of the First Fleet of the ROK Navy, was the most significant change because it was the organizational reform, which was the first step of the ROK Navy to take over responsibility of coastal defence of the ROK from the UN Naval Command after the Korean War. With the reform of the ROK Fleet, the UN Naval Command transferred the TG 95 operational command authority of surrounding seas of the Korean Peninsula to the ROK Navy: of the South Sea in September 1954, of the East Sea in January 1955, and of the West Sea in March 1955 respectively.30
With the introduction of planned naval ships from the US Navy, by 18th September 1957, the ROK Fleet developed its organization as two Flotillas, three Squadrons, and a Fleet Training Corps: 1st Flotilla for escort and patrol, 2nd Flotilla for amphibious operations, 31st Squadron for mine-warfare and minesweeping operations, 51st Squadron for supply operations at sea, Fleet Aviation Squadron for air support and Fleet Training Corps for combat readiness. The brief history of the organisation of the ROK Fleet since 1948 was as follows.

Figure 3-2 The Organization of the ROK Fleet

Although the ROK Navy tried to acquire naval ships from the US Navy, it regarded the acquisition of ships from the US Navy as a temporary measure for national
maritime security. It was well aware that in the end the ROK should have its own capability to carry out its missions without military aid from the US. In this regard, the ROK Navy launched several projects to prepare for the future.

The first project was to construct a dry dock of 3,000-ton size for self-repair of the ships. At that time, the ROK Navy was totally dependent for ships’ repairs on civilian shipbuilding companies in South Korea and even Japan, which created a severe financial burden. To seek a fundamental solution of the problem, in 1952, it launched the project using its own budget and technology despite the difficulties caused by the Korean War, and completed its construction on 10th July 1956. In addition, the ROK Navy devoted its best efforts to improvement of its own maintenance and repair capability of the ships. As a result of this determination, in August 1955, it finally succeeded in accomplishing the overhaul of a PF class frigate. Since then, it has been fully equipped with self-reliant maintenance and repair capabilities for all its remaining ships.

The second project was the attempt to construct its own naval shipbuilding site for 3,000-ton size vessels. The ROK Navy considered a national shipbuilding capability critical for self-reliant national defence at sea in the future. In this regard, in 1954, it started to build the naval shipbuilding site in Chinhae and continued until 1958 setting the goal at the completion by 1961. Unfortunately, because of the strong objections of the US Naval Advisory Group in Korea, the project was frustrated in the middle of the construction by not only budget deficiency but also a cut-off in military aid from the US.

This case clearly demonstrated US policy on the ROK naval development. In fact, in the context of ROK-US combined defence policy, the Americans did not need to invest much in ROK naval development. They considered the ROK Navy sufficient to
play a role as a defensive force against the North Korean Navy as a supplementary force of the US Navy under their control. Consequently, the attempt at local construction of warships was destined to be an unattainable desire of the ROK Navy. Nevertheless, the ROK Navy continued to enhance its capability to construct some small auxiliary boats by itself.

The third project of this enterprising spirit was the independent construction of a seaplane for reconnaissance. As the ROK Navy recognized acutely the necessity of naval air forces, it started to construct a seaplane in 1951. Unfortunately, No 1 Seaplane, produced in August 1951, met with an accident. However, it embarked again on construction of No 2 Seaplane in September 1953, and completed it in June 1954 with a successful test flight. Although it was an out of date aircraft with a single wing and a single engine, it was a great achievement of construction under meagre circumstances after the Korean War.

In April 1957, the ROK Navy constructed No 3 Seaplane and the plane was named “Jehae (command of the sea)” by President Rhee. In consequence of the achievement, on 18th September 1957, a Naval Air Squadron was established under the ROK Fleet. The ROK Navy also requested assistance from the US for the development of the ROK Naval Air Squadron but the Americans rejected these requests, quoting financial difficulties. In the end, these difficulties caused the abolition of the Naval Air Squadron after the construction of six seaplanes, in October 1962.

The final project was an attempt to build a submarine. The ROK Navy took steps to carry out research activities and planned the project but it turned out to be fruitless. It seemed that a powerful navy was only for the rich. But, through the project, the ROK Navy acquired the capability to produce electric accumulators later. Furthermore, these efforts demonstrated the highly enterprising spirit of the ROK Navy.
in that it made every effort to develop its capability to protect the maritime security of Korea in spite of all kind of difficulties.

In short, for the above first period, the development of ROK Navy was focused on the acquisition of naval ships from the US Navy due to the ROK’s desperate economic situation after the Korean War. Even though the Korean government wished the Navy to be developed, the destiny of the ROK Navy was determined by the ROK-USA combined defence policy, itself shaped by the Korean War. In the context of the US global strategy, South Korea was considered as a front line of US containment policy against the Communists and as a base of mainly ground forces.

In spite of unfavourable strategic circumstances, the ROK Navy devoted itself to building up a self-reliant capability for maritime security in the future. On the one hand, it failed in the construction of own naval shipbuilding site, the development of a Naval Air Squadron, and the project of building a submarine. But on the other hand, the Koreans were successful in developing the Navy as a competent coastal navy through the introduction of naval ships from the US Navy, and self-reliant in maintenance and repair capability as well as the operational capability of the ships. However, given the situation for the total dependency of acquisition of naval ships, the deterioration of the existing fleet raised new questions.


A. Sailing for the Self-Reliance and Rehabilitation of the ROK

North Korea claimed that it had converted to a socialistic semi-agricultural and semi-industrial nation in 1960, when it completed the First five-Year Plan (1957-1961), one year earlier than the original schedule after successful accomplishment of the
Post-war three Years Rehabilitation Plan (1954-1956). Then, it launched the First seven-Year Plan, which was focused on industrialization through heavy industry and war industry as the central figures. It was very successful with 9.8% average annual GNP growth. In addition, in 1961, it concluded the Mutual Defence Treaty with China and the Soviet Union with a condition of an automatic and immediate commitment on behalf of North Korea, unlike the Mutual Defence Treaty between South Korea and the US.

Furthermore, North Korea kept the communisation of the entire Korean peninsula as its basic goal, and was busily engaged in its revolutionary campaign and in preparations for war with the South. For this purpose, its basic strategy was to consolidate North Korea as a base for revolution in the South, pending the moment when it will create a second front deep inside South Korea with guerrilla forces and launch a decisive thrust across the truce line. Particularly, it planned to execute its military strategy to conquer the entire Korean peninsula through armed force when a favourable opportunity was at hand.

Based on this strategy, North Korea adopted the Four-point Military Guidelines—“(1) arming the entire population, (2) fortifying the entire territory, (3) instilling leadership potential in all military personnel, and (4) modernizing all troops”—in 1962 at the 5th meeting of the 4th session of the Worker’s Party Central Committee and began to expand its military forces rapidly.

After that time, North Korea embarked on an arms build-up ten years ahead of the South and poured massive funds into military spending. The accumulated total of North Korean military outlays by 1970 reached $15.06 billion, $4.3 billion more than South Korea’s. In the period of 1963 to 1974, North Korea used $3.2 billion or 49% of its defence budget for procuring arms and other projects to expand its military strength,
whereas South Korea spent only $800 million or 15% of the total for the same purposes.\textsuperscript{40}

Given the seriousness of the threat offered by the North Korea, the South Koreans knew from experience that in a confrontation with the Communists in the North, superiority in military might was absolutely necessary and national survival was not a matter of choice, but rather of necessity. The maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula required not only sufficient military strength to deter North Korean aggression but also a political system best suited to a maximum mobilization of national efforts for security and economic growth.

However, the ROK suffered from very serious economic, social and political problems. These mainly centred on the Liberal Party regime of President Syng-man Rhee, who was unable to see that he had outlived his usefulness and clung tenaciously to power. In the course of the election of 1960, President Rhee and the Liberal Party used every means at their disposal, legal and illegal, to rig the elections in their favour. Almost at once, demonstrations broke out and the students led the people into a democratic revolution. The old President had no choice but to step down.\textsuperscript{41}

Following the 19\textsuperscript{th} April Student Uprising in 1960, the Second Republic was established by the Democratic Party on 23\textsuperscript{rd} August 1960, and marked the beginning of Myon Chang's Administration. The Democratic Party instituted a parliamentary-cabinet type political system similar to the British system. However, the new government was not able to cope with social, political and economic problems.\textsuperscript{42}

Under the circumstances, a military revolution, called the May 16 revolution, broke out under the leadership of Major General Chung-hee Park on 16\textsuperscript{th} May 1961.\textsuperscript{43} The transfer of government from Myon Chang to the Revolutionary Committee was made within the legal framework of the Constitution. In November of that year, General
Park as the Chief of the Military Revolution Committee visited Japan and the US successfully for summit talks.

Particularly, in 1962 under the leadership of General Park, South Korea launched its first five-year economic development plan (1962-1966) and adopted an outward looking development strategy emphasizing growth of exports. During the 1950s, South Korea depended on grants-in-aid and concessionary public loans mainly from the US, which financed the importation of consumer goods and was useful in the short run. For the long run, it would not have been acceptable for the nation to remain economically dependent on such assistance. In this regard, it was aimed significantly to reduce and ultimately terminate such dependence.

After the launching of the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan, the Korean economy maintained an average GNP growth rate of 9% annually. This rapid growth was accompanied by structural transformation from subsistence agriculture to modern manufacturing. When the presidential election was held in 1963, General Park, by then resigned from the Army, was elected as President and the third Republic was established in a system based upon centralized government.

This period also marked a very significant turning point of the Cold War confrontation between the two Super Powers. After the Berlin crisis of 1958-1961, the US and the Soviet Union got very close to the nuclear brink with the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the height of the Cold War. It scared them into a new relationship and produced the “Limited Test Ban Treaty” that limited atmospheric nuclear tests in 1963 and a “Non-Proliferation Treaty” in 1968. In the aftermath of the Cuban crisis, a gradual détente or relaxation of tensions between them started. Also, prominently, President Park opened the normalization of relations with Japan in June 1965 putting an official
end to the antagonism stemming from Japan’s occupation of Korea from 1910 to 1945.\(^47\)

As the USA became more vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack, it became even clearer that the Americans would not retaliate with nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union early in any crisis. If Communist forces should attack with a limited purpose in the Korean Peninsula or in any similar local conflict, the Americans had to respond first with conventional forces. Under the containment policy for preventing the spread of communism, therefore, the ROK was regarded continually as a critical factor in the US forward conventional defence strategy because the American regarded it as a buffer zone for the defence of US vital interests in Japan and the Western Pacific region on account of Korea’s geo-strategic position in relation to Japan and US bases in the Western Pacific.\(^48\)

Meanwhile, beginning in the 1960s, the ROK’s Military Forces began to consolidate the foundation of a self-reliant capacity. During that decade, it had the opportunity to participate in the Vietnam War by sending an expeditionary force. This experience of a successful campaign abroad gave the Armed Forces a sense of confidence as a fighting force, and gave them a chance to get more US military aid. With the assistance of the US, the Korean people made a determined effort to achieve the goal of a self-reliant defence because dependence on others runs counter to their national pride. The modernization of military hardware went with rigorous training under combat conditions, rising morale, and the development of military doctrines adapted to the Korean national traits, geopolitical conditions and culture.

The supreme mission of the ROK Armed Forces at this time was to establish and maintain an everlasting and solid peace on the Korean Peninsula. With remarkable economic growth and continued political stability, the ROK was able to make much
progress in this respect. But the achievement of a self-reliant defence capability would take a considerable number of years because of the lack of adequate defence resources of South Korea's own. The imperative of national survival determined the Republic of Korea's temporary dependence on the US.49

B. Naval Force Improvement By Assistance

During the first period (1953-1957), the ROK Navy endeavoured to strengthen its independent naval capability while at the same time consolidating its cooperation with the US Navy. The ROK Navy suffered very much with breakdowns of ships and the problems of maintaining old ships. To build its own dry dock to reduce the financial burden, therefore, was an issue as big as the acquisition of repair parts from the US navy. Despite great effort and a strong desire for the construction of its own naval shipbuilding site, it failed because of the lack of its own capabilities and the objections of the US.50 But it continued to have success with the maintenance of the organization and the improvement of self-repair and operation capability of the ships.

In the late 1950s, the ROK Navy was confronted by the deterioration of its ships as a primary concern and the lack of a proper domestic shipbuilding capability. To settle the problem, the ROK Navy, dependant completely on military aid from the US Navy, had to obtain alternative naval ships from the US Navy. Therefore, its development in the second period (1958-1966) had to rely on ships transferred from the US Navy for replacing the deteriorated ships and coping with the change of strategic situation.51 The substitution of ships was well balanced in the proportion of deletion to acquisition. The deletion totalled twenty-eight ships, while they acquired thirty ships. As of the end of 1966, the results were as follows.
Table 3-3 The Change of the ROK Naval Forces (1958–1966)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Deletion</th>
<th>Acquisition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>2LST, 3AKL</td>
<td>3LST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2LST, 3PC, 2MSC</td>
<td>1LST, 1APD, 3MSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2LSSL, 1ATA</td>
<td>2PC, 1LSMR, 1LCU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4PCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1LSM, 1PC, 2LSSL, 1MSC</td>
<td>2ATA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1LSM, 1MSC, 1PCS, 2PT</td>
<td>1DD, 1DE, 1PCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1PT</td>
<td>1PC, 2MSC, 4FB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1LSM, 1MSC</td>
<td>2APD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total 28</td>
<td>Total 30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3-4 The Alteration of Composition of the ROK Naval Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1966</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Surface Ship</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11(+5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Patrol Combatant</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20(+4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Warfare Ship</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10(-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Warfare Ship</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20(-4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary Ship</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12(-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>73(+2)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the above tables show, generally, surface combat ships had increased in number but mine and amphibious ships had been decreased by the deletion of deteriorated vessels. In the introduction of substitution ships for the second period, what we should not fail to notice were the introduction of four PCE in 1961, one DD in 1963 and four FB in 1964.

Firstly, among the increase of major surface ships (one DD, one DE and three APD), one destroyer was very significant because it was the result of continuous efforts to acquire such a vessel for the ROK Navy. The ROK Navy duly recognized how
important is the security of sea lines of communications and sea control surrounding the Korean Peninsula in national security and prosperity. In this context, it regarded the destroyer capable of anti-surface, anti-submarine, anti-air, and fire support to the ground forces as the critical factor for the purpose. After a long-cherished desire, in 1963, it finally acquired one “Fletcher” type destroyer from the US Navy.52

Secondly, the ROK Navy considered the submarine as the most dangerous threat against its sea defence, because the powerful Soviet and Chinese submarine forces were located in a very short distance from the Korean peninsula. In particular, from the late 1950s, the North Korea Navy attempted to introduce the Soviet submarines and in the end it acquired two ex-Soviet coastal submarines in 1960. To cope with the North Korean submarine threat, the ROK Navy introduced four PCE, submarine chasers, in 1961 and also acquired an assistance programme from the US Navy to improve the anti-submarine warfare capability of the ROK naval ships.53

As North Korea acquired the submarines, the ROK Navy started to take a serious view of anti-submarine warfare because up to the time it gave much more weight to amphibious and mine sweeping measures in the light of the combat experience in the Korean War. Through the efforts to improve anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operational capability, the ROK Navy proved its high quality of ASW operations when ROKS Choong Nam (DE-73) encountered a Soviet submarine on 3rd October 1964. The ship had an unknown submarine contact in the East Sea and after 7 hours of successful tracking, classified it as a Soviet submarine by making the target emerge on the surface.54

Thirdly, the introduction of four FB was intended to confront the infiltration of North Korean armed spy ships. For, from the late 1950s, North Korea increased infiltration of its armed espionage agents by sea as part of its revolutionary campaign in
the South to communise the entire Korean peninsula with its unification policy by military means. North Korea’s continuing challenge to national survival inevitably conditioned the policy response of the ROK, pursuing its fundamental policy to attain the unification through peaceful means and to prevent a recurrence of the tragic fratricidal war of 1950-1953. In this context, the above development of the ROK Navy also was the process of confrontation against a series of trials and challenges offered by the North Korea Armed Forces since its very inception.

Meanwhile, the US was increasingly involved in Vietnam’s civil war to prevent the spread of communism elsewhere. Finally, in March 1965, President Johnson’s decision to commit combat troops to the Vietnam War was symbolized by the landing of US Marines on the beaches at Da Nang. By the request of the US and Vietnam, on 21st May 1964, the ROK decided to dispatch its Armed Forces to Vietnam in order to not only assist the US but also acquire more US military aid for the modernization of its Armed Forces. In this context, starting with sending of a medical team composed of forty-four officers and ninety-six enlisted men, by October 1966, the ROK Expeditionary Forces in Vietnam amounted to a corps of 45,000 personnel. Consequently, the American military aid to South Korea was increased during the Vietnam War, from $120 million in 1965, to $263 million in 1968 and $346 million in 1971.

To support the ROK Expeditionary Forces in Vietnam, the ROK Navy deployed the Transportation Unit called “Baekku” composed of three LST and two LSM under the Command of the ROK Armed Forces in Vietnam. For 1965-1973, the Unit successfully carried out 462 transportation missions of total 562,011 tons and 284,992 sailing miles. Also, a brigade of ROK Marine Corps called the “Chungyong” gained valuable results and fame as a formidable striking force.
In short, during the second period, the ROK Navy modernized its naval forces by substitution of deteriorated ex-US naval ships through the introduction of thirty additional ships from the US Navy instead of twenty-eight deletions. As a result, the ROK Navy overall maintained its fleet strength as similar as that of the first period. But, force development of the ROK navy focused on the increase of its surface combatants against the North Korean submarine and armed guerrilla infiltration threat. In addition, through the entry into the Vietnam War of the ROK Armed Forces, the ROK Navy and Marine Corps demonstrated their high level of combat capability.


A. Challenge for Self-reliant Defence

The third period was very significant in national defence of the ROK vis-à-vis threat of North Korea. On 19th January 1967, North Korea shore batteries opened the fire at ROKS Tang-po (PCE-56), which was carrying out fishery protection operations near coastal area of the truce line in the East Sea. As the result of that surprise attack, the ship was sunk, and thirty-nine died and forty were injured. Shortly afterwards, North Korea kidnapped fishing boats and even a naval auxiliary ship (I-2) implementing fishery protection, and significantly increased infiltration of communist guerrillas.

Then, North Korea designated 1968 as the year of war preparation and started to take direct military action to seize guerrilla bases in South Korea following the example of the Vietnam War. In particular, from 1968, it launched the large-scale infiltration of armed communist guerrillas into the South. In this context, on 21st January 1968, a North Korean commando team composed of thirty-one armed soldiers attempted to make a surprise attack to "Chong Wa Dae," the Presidential residence in
Seoul. The plot was frustrated by the military and the police with eighty-two casualties.61

Furthermore, on 23rd January only two days after the “Chong Wa Dae” attack, the USS Pueblo was kidnapped by North Korea in the East Sea near Wonsan by four patrol boats and two MIG fighter airplanes. The US held a secret meeting with North Korea from 2nd February to negotiate only for the ship, not considering the event of “Chong Wa Dae.” The US was obliged to sign a statement admitting a violation of the territorial waters of North Korea in order to secure the safe return of the crew of the ship.62

The Americans disregarded the strong desire of South Korea to take appropriate action against North Korea to prevent other provocations like the attempted assassination of President Park by surprise commando attack. As the US took an attitude of appeasement towards North Korea, President Park and the South Koreans made a strong protest to the US. As a result of the protest, President Lyndon B. Johnson decided to provide additional military aid of a hundred million dollars to assist the enhancement of ROK defence capability against North Korea threat, and reaffirmed its commitment to take action following the ROK-US Mutual Defence Treaty if similar provocation by North Korea happened in the future. Also, to enhance mutual defence cooperation, the ROK and the USA agreed to hold ROK-USA annual conferences between the Ministers of National Defence from 1968.63

In this situation, on 30th October 1968, one hundred and twenty North Korean communist guerrillas infiltrated into the area of Samchok and Uljin, the middle of the eastern side of the South, and went on a campaign of murder against those who refused to cooperate regardless of whether it was an adult or child. It took two months hard struggle to subdue the outrage by joint operations of the military, the police and the
local reserve forces with one hundred and forty casualties. In 1969, additionally, North Korea shot down an EC-121 US reconnaissance plane. These serious threats by North Korea pressed South Korea to increase armaments and combat capability against them.

Against these serious threats by North Korea, in January 1968, President Park proclaimed a new direction of defence policy to secure self-protection against severe provocation by North Korea. The new concept of national defence of the ROK was to convert the UN centred defence posture to an independent defence posture, to equip 2,500,000 local reserve forces with arms, and to build a factory for the production of weapons by the end of the year.

With this in mind, on 26th March 1968, the Homeland Reserve Forces of the ROK were established all over the country. It developed as the second ROK Armed Forces because the existing South Korean army was limited to intercepting North Korean armed espionage agents under the auspices of carrying out missions of readiness for regular warfare against massive forward deployment armed forces of North Korea at the same time. By the end of 1970s, the Homeland Reserve Forces reached 2,400,000 personnel.

Furthermore, at last, South Korea was awakened to the reality that her defence was primarily her own concern and that dependence on allied support without self-reliant efforts spelt certain disaster. The whole nation was thus committed to the defence of the country, which in modern warfare involves the totality of the nation's abilities and resources, not merely the capabilities of its armed forces. This measure constituted the creation of an all-out defence preparedness encompassing the armed forces, government officials, and the civilian populace. It greatly contributed toward enhancing the general awareness for a self-reliant national defence and the national consensus vis-
à-vis North Korea. But it caused the development of the ROK Navy to be fettered by mainly concentrating on the anti-infiltration operations along the coastline.

What was worse, according to the "Nixon Doctrine," President Nixon withdrew the US 7th Division in Korea by 1971. It was part of his reduction policy of US forces abroad in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and subsequent trend of détente.67 This one-sided US reduction policy enormously frightened the South Korean because they regarded the presence of American forces in Korea as a major "tripwire" deterrent and the best guarantee against North Korea, which was guaranteed by the automatic and immediate commitment of China and the Soviet Union. Also, in the early 1970s, there were unmistakable indications of an eventual collapse in Vietnam.

Under the prevailing difficult situation, in December 1971, President Park proclaimed a "state of national emergency." The withdrawal of the 7th Division was seen as the beginning of an eventual withdrawal of all US forces in Korea although in compensation for the withdrawal of the 7th Division, the US offered to assist the modernization programme of the ROK Armed Forces (1971-1975).68 And the ROK Government resolved to develop the defence industry for the domestic production of military equipment so that it could stand alone if necessary. For that purpose, in 1973, South Korea legislated the Law on Military Supplies, under which various measures were taken to foster and support defence industries. The steps included the creation and operation of a support fund, provision of subsidies, taxation privileges, contractual favours and a defence-fund raising drive.

Unlike the strained internal situation of the ROK in the early 1970s, there was a new regional power configuration, the quadrilateral balance among the USA, the Soviet Union, Communist China, and Japan in East Asia, according to the trend of détente. It dramatically improved the external environment of the Korean Unification
problem. Upon the shifting balance and relations among the great regional powers, President Park initiated the first formal inter-Korean dialogue. As a result, the Red Cross societies of the two Koreas began to meet in September 1971, and political contacts were started in May 1972. Furthermore, on 4th July 1972, South and North Korea agreed to work for peaceful reunification in the historic South-North Joint communiqué. In particular, in June 1973, a bold change in South Korea’s foreign policy was announced: it opened its doors to all non-hostile countries regardless of differences in ideology, and social and political system.

Internally, President Park strengthened the central government to more adequately meet the challenges facing the nation. The Constitution was amended by popular referendum in November 1972, ushering in the Fourth Republic. It was called the “Yusin,” or “Revitalizing Reforms Constitution” aimed at not only insuring political stability through a Koreanized democracy but also completing the historic task of national revival through socio-economic progress under strong presidential leadership.

B. Counterespionage Operations Capability Improvement

From the second half of the 1960s, the threat of North Korea had been enormous. In particular, North Korea increased the number of infiltrations of armed espionage ships by enhancing their capabilities: enlarging their size from 10-ton to 40–50-ton, increasing their speed from 12 knots to over 35 knots, and equipping them with heavy arms instead of light arms. Furthermore, after having adopted the “Four Major Military Guidelines” to concentrate on military build-up in 1962, North Korea declared “our war preparations are now completed” in November 1970 at the Fifth Workers (Communist) Party Congress.
In the face of the serious North Korean infiltration threat, the ROK Navy was required to take urgent measures to meet the situation. For the purpose, firstly, it could not help relying on the US assistance to acquire appropriate means. Therefore, in 1967 in close cooperation with the US Navy, it introduced nine FB of 70 tons full load, which were newly constructed in the US by Stewart as “Coastal Patrol and Interdiction Craft.” And nine PB of 98 tons full load, the former US Coast Guard patrol craft supplemented them in 1968. Also, by the end of 1973, it acquired additional twelve ex-US small craft. Consequently, the ROK Navy was quite successful to improve its anti-infiltration capability through the US assistance.72

On the other hand, the ROK Navy devoted itself to develop its own measures. In this regard, for the early detection of infiltration, it created “radar sites” at major islands and coastal areas. Also, on 1st November 1967, the ROK Navy newly established the Sixth Coastal Patrol Flotilla under the ROK Fleet to carry out effective anti-infiltration operations.73 Furthermore, it changed its operational concept to focus on the successful accomplishment of coastal defence mission from a primary “northern limited line patrol operations” to “sector patrol operations.” In this context, in 1973, it established five Sea Sector Commands at Mukho, Pusan, Mokpo, Inchon and Cheju in place of the former five Naval Base Commands. In particular, it made great efforts to develop air and sea joint operations with the ROK Air Force and exclusively developed its own unique “operational doctrine for anti-infiltration.”74

In addition to the above infiltration threat, by the end of 1973, the North Korean Navy increased its Fleet strength to one hundred and eight-five ships in total starting with four ex-Soviet W-class submarines, ten Komar-class and eight Osa-class Styx-missile Fast Attack Craft, ninety Torpedo Fast Attack Craft, fifty-four Gun Fast Attack Craft, and nineteen Corvettes. Therefore, although the urgent anti-infiltration
measures were distracting the ROK Navy, it could not neglect to monitor and attempt to
match the rapidly increasing North Korean submarines and missile fast attack craft. In
this context, the ROK Navy acquired four ex-US DDs and three ex-US APDs instead of
four deletions of ex-US PFs. On the whole, the ROK Navy improved its Fleet strength
to ninety-eight naval ships by the end of 1973. The comparison of naval forces between
two Koreas was as follows in 1973.

Table 3-5 Comparison of naval forces between the South and the North

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Submarines</td>
<td>5 Destroyers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 Corvettes</td>
<td>3 Frigates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>162 Fast Attack Crafts</td>
<td>6 Escort Transports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(18 Missile, 90 Torpedo and 54 Gun)</td>
<td>43 Patrol Vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total 185</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


During that period, the ROK Navy acquired additional forty-two ex-US naval
ships while it had to delete twenty ex-US naval ships because of deterioration, including
four PF, two PCS and one PCE. As of the end of 1973, the alteration of composition of
the ROK naval forces was as below.

Table 3-6 The Alteration of Composition of the ROK Naval Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1973</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Surface Ship</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6(+2)</td>
<td>11(+5)</td>
<td>14(+3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Patrol Combatant</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16(-1)</td>
<td>20(+4)</td>
<td>44(+24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Warfare Ship</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10(-6)</td>
<td>10(0)</td>
<td>10(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Warfare Ship</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24(+16)</td>
<td>20(-4)</td>
<td>19(-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary Ship</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15(+6)</td>
<td>12(-3)</td>
<td>11(-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>71(+15)</td>
<td>73(+2)</td>
<td>98(+25)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Acquisition (45): 4DD, 3APD, 1PCEC, 1PGM, 3PK, 17FB, 9PB, 4SB, 1MSC, 1AKL, 1AO
  Deletion (20): 4PF, 2PCS, 1PCE, 3PC, 1PB, 4SB, 1AKL, 1AO, 1YO, 1MSB, 1LCU

As above tables illustrate, however, the development of the ROK Navy between 1967-1973 was mainly focused on the increase of small combatants for counterespionage operations, thirty-five out of forty-five in total. Nonetheless, the ROK strove to improve its major surface combat capability by the introduction of ex-US naval ships against the rapidly increasing North Korean submarine and missile attack craft threat. Therefore, other combat ships and logistic support ship numbers continued to decrease slightly.

On the other hand, it was extremely significant that the ROK Navy was successful in construction of Korean design two “Fast Patrol Craft”, which became the standard model of later Fast Patrol Craft (PK and PKM) produced domestically.\textsuperscript{75} Noteworthily, they were built by patriotic subscription of all students over the country. It is why they were called as “Haksaeng-1 and -2” which means “Student-1 and -2.”

Due to the great necessity of broad maritime patrol against the North Korean infiltration, on 1\textsuperscript{st} May 1973, the ROK Navy founded an ROK Fleet Air Unit again by the introduction of some helicopters from the ROK Army and Air Force.\textsuperscript{76} Moreover, on 10\textsuperscript{th} October 1973, the ROK Navy integrated the ROK Marine Corps as a part of defence policy for establishment of self-reliant national defence posture and economical military management. Consequently, the ROK Marine Corps was assimilated into analogous organization of the ROK Navy.

III. Conclusion.

The ROK-USA Mutual Defence Treaty was extremely significant in modern history of Korea and development of ROK Armed Forces. For the Treaty secured the intervention of the US in case of an attack and also contributed in political-military stability of the Korean Peninsula by protecting South Korea from another all-out war.
against the Northern Communists. Through the Treaty, the ROK could receive considerable economic and military aid from the US to rehabilitate its economy and strengthen its military capability. Furthermore, the Americans recognized Korea officially as a part of its containment policy, and both countries developed various cooperative relationships to enhance security and stability of the Korean Peninsula.

However, the Treaty did not provide an automatic commitment like North Korea had in the Mutual Defence Treaty with China and the Soviet Union. In particular, it prohibited independent military action of the ROK as the US continued to take operational control authority over the ROK Armed Forces after the Korean War. Consequently, it was natural that the development of the ROK Armed Forces under the US military aid and operational control was dominated by the context of the US global strategy through ROK-USA combined defence policy. Therefore, understanding the Treaty is a prerequisite to any study of the development of the ROK Navy after the Korean War.

Under that situation, for the two decades (1953-1973) from the Armistice Agreement to the start of the ROK self-reliant national defence programme in 1974, the development of the ROK Navy was totally dependent on US assistance and is classified in the following three stages: firstly subordinate naval development (1953-1957), secondly dependent modernization and force improvement (1958-1966), and thirdly development for counterespionage operations capability (1967-1973).

The first period was an extremely hard stage for the ROK because of transition necessary for the economic and social reconstruction. There was political instability, rampant inflation, and an inability to meet most of the basic needs of people. Therefore, it was necessary for President Rhee to conclude the ROK-USA Mutual Defence Treaty to ensure national survival and rehabilitation through US assistance but
he had to sacrifice the freedom of independent military action of the ROK Armed Forces.

Therefore, the US decided the development of the ROK Armed forces according to its own strategic considerations. In the context of US coalition strategy, the ROK provided huge ground forces against the enormous continental communist threat. As a matter of course, however, the ROK Navy was destined for a limited coastal defence navy under the control of the US Navy as it had been during the Korean War. In particular, because the North Korean Navy was totally destroyed during the Korean War, the Americans did not give priority to the improvement of ROK surface combat capability but mainly to the supplement of its amphibious capability in support of the ROK Marine Corps and ground operations.

In the face of every adversity, nonetheless, the ROK Navy regarded the maritime security of Korea as its own business in the future. In this context, with courage and a progressive spirit, it launched some ambitious projects to develop as an independent navy in spite of unfruitful result: projects for (1) the construction of a 3,000-ton size own shipbuilding site, (2) the independent development of submarines, and (3) the production of maritime seaplanes. Nonetheless, by the construction of a 3,000-ton size dry dock for ship’s repair, it was successful in equipping its own management and repair capability of the ships. Also, it developed its organization on the base of the experiences of the Korean War and using the system of the US Navy as a model. Through the above efforts, it took the responsibility of ROK coastal defence from the UN Naval Command.

The second period was a turning point for the successful economic development of the ROK. After the military revolution in 1961, General Chung-hee Park launched the first economic development plan and was elected President. Under
his leadership, South Korea became stable and started to make good economic progress from 1962. On the other hand, North Korea was much more successful in its economic rehabilitation than South Korea immediately after the Korean War, and started to expand its self-sufficient military capability. In this context, the North Korean Navy started to improve its fleet strength by the acquisition of submarines from the Soviet Union.

During that period, the ROK Navy overall maintained its force level as similar to that of the first period by US assistance for the replacement of twenty-eight ex-US deteriorated naval ships. However, against the rising North Korean submarine threat, the ROK Navy made every effort to enhance its ASW capability by the increase of ex-US major surface ships and modernization of ASW weapon systems with the support of US Navy. Also, as the North Korean infiltration threat increased, the ROK Navy introduced four FBs for the purpose. Consequently, other combat capability had to slightly decrease by deletion.

The third period was very significant in the security of the ROK because of the changing US policy on Korea under the rapidly increasing North Korean military threat. In particular, North Korea launched a series of armed provocation against the South and the USA and engendered enormous infiltration of commando forces into the South to carry out guerrilla warfare. Under the situation, in the aftermath of failure of the Vietnam War, the Americans withdrew the US 7th Division from Korea. That was enough to alarm the South Koreans into launching a self-reliant national defence and all-out national security measures. However, as compensation for its participation in the Vietnam War and the withdrawal of US 7th Division, the ROK got US support for a limited modernization programme of the ROK Armed Forces. Also, it laid the
foundation of a local defence, industry starting with the construction of an M-16 rifle factory.

During that period, the ROK Navy had to focus on the interdiction of North Korean armed commando attacks from the sea. Consequently, its development was totally dominated by the introduction of ex-US small surface combatants. Given the situation, construction of two fast attack craft was of paramount importance in the history of ROK Navy because it had been the starting point of its independent naval development and became the standard model of later PK and PKM. In particular, they were independently constructed by the patriotic subscription of all students over the country with a domestic technical team. In addition, the ROK Navy founded a Fleet Air Unit again for carrying out broad maritime patrol mission, and integrated the ROK Marine Corps to improve operational efficiency and economical military management.

In short, under the desperate situation after the Korean War, South Korea had to rely on the US for its security and prosperity. Through the US commitment and aid, the ROK could carry out economic rehabilitation and strengthen military capability against the northern communist threats. However, the freedom of their independent military action has been the scapegoat for survival. Therefore, under the ROK-USA combined defence policy, the ROK Navy was destined to develop only as a limited coastal navy under the control of the US Navy as it was during the Korean War. In particular, as North Korea launched ruthless and serious armed commando attack from the sea, anti-infiltration mission started to dominate the development of the ROK Navy.
President Truman resisted NSC-68 up to the outbreak of the Korean War because of being beset by budget problems. For more details about NSC-68, see Ernest R. May, ed., American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC-68 (New York: Bedford Books of St. Martin’s Press, 1993)

2 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. classifies the early stage of the Cold War into three phases, namely, the gradual onset (1947-1949), the declaration of the Cold War (1947-1949), and the height of the Cold War (1950-1962). For more details, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts (New York: Longman, 1997), pp. 98-132.

3 In the political view, it is said that the Korean War represented a victory for the West. For more details, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., op. cit., p.108.

4 Indeed, many Americans believed that “the Soviet leaders, like themselves, thought only in terms of all-out war.” see John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 85; American policymakers assumed that should a global war occur, the outcome would be decided not in Korea, not even in the Pacific area, but most likely in Europe. For more details, see Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1956), p. 333.

5 The US military strategy focused on nuclear weapons to get out of the dilemma that the US conventional capability was far inferior to that of the Soviet Union. With this regard, during the Eisenhower Administration (1953-1960), the American adopted a new military doctrine known as the “deterrence through massive retaliation.” Also, the “flexible response” was chosen as the military strategy of the US for the Kennedy and Johnson Administration (1961-1968).


7 President Truman remembered Hitler moving into the Rhineland and recalled the axiom that aggression must be resisted everywhere. See, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., op. cit., p.108.

8 Lord Palmerston said that “Her Majesty’s Government has neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies but only permanent interests.”


10 The US showed a lukewarm and unfriendly attitude to President Rhee’s request. The alternative proposal of the US was the declaration for sanctions adopted by the UN participation countries in the Korean War. For more details, see Bae-ho Han, “Mikukui Daehanjungchaek [the US policy on the ROK]”, Mikukkwa Dongbuka [the United States of America and North-east Asia] (Seoul: Seoul University Press, 1982).


12 General Clark, Commander-in-Chief of United Nations Command, reported his opinion on President Rhee to JCS as follows: “Rhee was utterly unreasonable and gave no ground whatsoever.” See, Clark to JCS, June. 7, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, XV, pp. 1149-1151.

13 There were no proper means for bargaining with the US for President Rhee of a poor and weak country. Therefore, President Rhee used independent marching north policy and observance of the Armistice Agreement as means for negotiation against the US. The US accepted the old President’s threat and exaggeration of hardship under the estimation that it would be better making a defence treaty with South Korea to block the future communist’s invasion than carrying out another war. For more details, see Yong-Pyo Hong, “Jeonjaeng Jeongae Kwajungesoo Hanmikanui Galdeung [Disagreement between the ROK and the US in the process of the Korean War]”, Talnaengsun Sidae Hankuk Jeonjaengui Jajomyung [Reappraisal of the Korean War in the Post-Cold War Era] (Seoul: Baiksanseodang Publishing, 2000), pp.209-228.

14 The Preamble manifests collective defence efforts by declaration of common determination to defend them against external armed attack. And Article 3 provides a basis of common defence and military alliance by agreement that an armed attack in the pacific on either of their territories under their respective administrative control “would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” Also, Article 1 supports the United Nations Charter of peaceful settlement of any international disputes and refrain from the threat or use of force.

End Notes
In the Treaty, “In accordance with its constitutional processes” means that if such a war should occur in Korea, the US government would decide what measures to take on the basis of American perceived national interests in consultation with the Congress.

Furthermore, later several cases of Indochina, Cuba, Berlin and others illustrated that the US was not able to retaliate with nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union.

In this context, to remove one of the inherent problems of deterrence, the American concluded bilateral agreements with the ROK, Taiwan, and Japan, and initiated a regional alliance in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization for demonstration of its seriousness in defending the East Asia against the Soviet Union and the Communist China.

The American was needed to detect whether there was a genuine attack or a mere false alarm. For more detail, see Morton A. Kaplan, the Strategy of Limited Retaliation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 6-7; Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: Wiley, 1963), p. 117; In accordance with recently released US National Security Archive, operational notes of US CINCPAC, and operational notes of US 8th Tactical Wing in Korea, it is revealed that the US Forces in Korea kept tactical nuclear weapons launched by field artillery (AFAP) and aircraft (B61) since 1958-60 in 1970, 150 in 81, and over 100 in 1991. But, by President Roh’s proclaim on non-nuclearization in the ROK on 19th December 1991, the US withdrew all tactical nuclear weapons from the Korea. For more details, see, Hankuk Ilbo, 07th October 1999, p. 11, Kukmin Ilbo, 04th November 1998, p. 2, Kuonghyang Shinmun, 04th November 1998, p. 8, Chosun Ilbo, 04th November 1998, p. 1, Kuonghyang Shinmun 19th December 1991, p. 3, and Hanggeorae, 19th December 1991, p. 3.

President Rhee kept continuing with an offensive anti-Communist policy not only because of his personal confidence but also because of to secure his political power. For more details, see Yong-Pyo Hong, State Security and Regime Security: President Syngman Rhee and the Dilemma in South Korea (London: Macmillan, 2000).

The Institute of National Defence and Military History, The Fifty Years History of the ROK Armed Forces, p. 143.

During the summit talk with President Eisenhower in 1954, President Rhee stressed that there are additional a million communist China forces in North Korea besides North Korea Armed Forces and requested its military expansion as a military spearhead against the China. For more details, see US Department of State, Foreign Relation of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. XVI, pp. 1845-1846.


Sun-hae Hong, We for the Sea: The Memoir of Admiral Won-il Shon, pp. 175-183.

In the context of US containment policy against Communist expansion at that time, increase of the ROK ground forces had been primary concern in US post-war policy on Korea since the threat of Communist ground forces was real and massive. The ROK armed forces expanded totally 720,000 personnel in 1954, mainly the Army of 5 corps and 20 divisions. See, The Institute of National Defence and Military History, The Fifty Years History of the ROK Armed Forces, pp. 130-134.


32 Ibid., p. 49.
33 Ibid., p. 29-30.
34 The outline of Jehae was width 13.8m, length 17.6m, height 2.8m, high-speed 34km/h, 2 machine guns, and 6 rockets. For more details, see ROK Navy headquarters, *The History of the ROK Navy: Administration and Operations, Vol. 3*, p. 51-53, 123-125.
37 For more details, see, The Board of National Unification, *Nambukhan Chongryuk Chusae Bigyo [Comparison of Total Strength Trend between South Korean and North Korea]* (Seoul: the Board of National Unification, 1979), pp. 218-219.
38 The mutual defence pact between North Korea and China/ the Soviet Union clearly indicated that "Should either of the contracting parties suffer armed attack by any state or coalition of states, and thus find itself in a state of war, the other contracting party shall immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal. See, People's Republic of China, *Collection of Friendship Treaties* (Peking, 1965), p. 45; Ministry of National Defence, *Defence Treaties Vol. 1*, 1981, pp. 943-946.
42 As late as 1961, South Korea was a country suffering from almost all the difficulties facing any typical developing country. South Korea’s GNP per capita in current prices in that year was a meagre $82. The country, already overpopulated, was experiencing an annual population growth rate of 3%, and there was widespread unemployment and underemployment. For more details, see, The Institute of Contemporary Korean History in the Academy of Korean Studies, ed., *Rethinking Modern Korean History 5: The Transitional Situation of 1960s and Chang Myon’s Regime* (Seoul: ORUEM Publishing House, 1998).
43 The Military Revolution Committee proclaimed a six-point pledge- strong anti-communism, respect for the UN Charter closer relations with the US and other free nations, eradication of corruption, establishment of a self-supporting economy, efforts for national reunification, and transfer of the government to civilian rule as soon as the revolutionary missions were accomplished. See, The Institute of National Defence and Military History, *The Changing History of National Defence Policy of the ROK 1945-1994*, pp. 125-127.
44 Given the limited size of the domestic market, the Korean planners found it necessary to adopt the strategy of export-oriented industrialization. Per capita GNP zoomed from a mere $87 in 1962 to $1,503 in 1980 and exports rose by 32.8% a year from $56.7million in 1962 to 17.5 billion in 1980. For more details, see Yang-teak Lim, "A historical perspective on the Korean economic development," *Current Politics and Economics of Asian*, vol. 9, No 3, 2000, pp. 211-216.
45 For a biography about President Park, see Gap-jae Cho, *Naemudeome Chimeul Baetura: Keundae-hwa Hyukmyungga Parkchungheenu Saenggae(1-5) [Spit to My Tomb: Biography of a revolutionist Chung-Hee Park (1-5)]* (Seoul: Chokwang Printing Company, 1999).
47 For a detail process about establishment of normal relations between the ROK and Japan, see Gap-jae Cho, *Spit to My Tomb: Biography of a revolutionist Chung-Hee Park (4)*, pp. 246-249.
49 Until 1960, the defence budget of the ROK was approximately 6.1% of the GNP and 50.7% of the Government budget, which was composed of 34.7% by foreign funds and 65.3% by own funds. But
composition of the defence budget was 77.2% on personnel management, 17.2% on unit operations, and only 2.3% on force improvement programmes and 2.6% on equipment maintenance. See, The Institute of National Defence and Military History, The Changing History of National Defence Policy of the ROK 1945-1994, p. 148.

50 Until the 1960s, South Korea's shipbuilding industry was involved mostly in the production of inner coastal fishing boats and other small vessels for domestic use. It was not until the Hyundai Shipyard, one of the largest shipbuilding companies in the world, was completed in 1974, that any substantial shipbuilding was undertaken.

51 Until the 1960s, South Korea channelled a relatively small amount, 4% of the GNP, into military outlays. Under the circumstances, South Korea could not afford much investment for national defence and had to depend on the US for a considerable part of the maintenance cost of its armed forces. The share of US military aid in the total defence outlays was 99.8% in 1961 and about 70% in 1968. For more details, see The Board of National Unification, Nambukhan Kukryuk Chusae Bigyoayungu [Comparison Study of National Strength Trend between South Korea and North Korea] (Seoul: the Board of National Unification, 1993), pp. 197-226.

52 ROK Navy Headquarters, To the Sea, To the World: Fifty Years History of the ROK Navy with Photography, p. 87.

53 The assistance programme for improving ASW operation capability was replacement of ASW weapon (MK32 Torpedo) into new type (MK44 Torpedo).

54 ROK Navy Headquarters, To the Sea, To the World: Fifty Years History of the ROK Navy with Photography, p. 115.

55 In the beginning, the infiltration of North Korea was carried out mainly into the coastal area near the 38th Parallel and checked by the ROK Navy 12 times during 1958-1966. Ibid., pp. 121-123.


58 ROK Navy Headquarters, To the Sea, To the World: Fifty Years History of the ROK Navy with Photography, pp. 130-143.

59 ROK Navy Headquarters, To the Sea, To the World: Fifty Years History of the ROK Navy with Photography, p. 164.

60 Ibid., p. 155.

61 For more details, see The Institute of National Defence and Military History, The Fifty Years History of the ROK Armed Forces, pp. 224-227.

62 Ibid., pp. 227-228.

63 Ibid., pp. 230-234.

64 Ibid., pp. 228-229.

65 Korea started to build a rifle factory in April 1971 with the assistance of the US and completed its construction in 1972. It was a quickening of defence industry of the ROK. Also, the Korean Institute for Defence Analyses was established under the Ministry of National Defence by order of President Park on 6th August 1970. For more details, see The Institute of National Defence and Military History, The Changing History of National Defence Policy of the ROK 1945-1994, pp. 200-201.

66 Only for a year in 1968, North Korea sent out its armed espionage agents in the South over 300 times total over 1,000 people through the land and the sea. For more details, See, The Institute of National Defence and Military History, The Fifty Years History of the ROK Armed Forces, pp. 234-238.

67 As the Nixon Administration reduced the US troop level in Korea by about one-third, from 63,000 to 43,000 in 1971, the US 7th Division withdrew from Korea. The Division came into Korea first the very after the Liberation of Korea and retreated to Japan in 1948. But it entered again to Korea for the historical Inchon Amphibious Operations on 15th September 1951. Since that time, it contributed enormously to the security of the ROK for 23years and 10 months. Therefore, President Rhee presented "Arirang"- a typical Korean folk song-, which had been the song of the Division, to the Division with presidential citation. See The Institute of National Defence and Military History, The Fifty Years History of the ROK Armed Forces, pp. 245-251.

68 The US assistance for the programme was total 1.5 billion dollars special military aid include 150 million dollars additional military aid, 27 million dollars funds for construction of M-16 rifle factory, 100 million dollars funds for surplus equipments, and etc. See Ibid., 248.
The Nixon administration used détente as a means to pursue the goals of containment. For more details, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts*, pp. 114-116.

Considering that Korea is the only place in the world where the four major powers come intimately into contact, it is no wonder that the shifting balance and changing pattern of relations among them had a significant impact on the Korean issue. For more details, see Ministry of Culture and Information, *A Handbook of Korea*, pp. 385-391.


The ROK technical team constructed the PK with the patriotic subscription of 8,000,000 students and 200,000 their teachers in South Korea. See, ROK Navy Headquarters, *To the Sea, To the World: Fifty Years History of the ROK Navy with Photography*, p. 146.

Chapter 4 Towards Independent Naval Development

I. Starting a Self-Reliant National Defence of the ROK

In 1973, President Chung-Hee Park ordered the development of a self-reliant national defence capability. Thereupon, the Ministry of National Defence of the ROK devised a self-reliant force improvement programme and launched it under the leadership of President Park in 1974. It was called the “Yulgok Project”. The planners named it “Yulgok,” borrowing the pen name of Yee Yi of the Choson Dynasty, who had advocated a build-up of 100,000 military forces against the Japanese threat ten-years before the Japanese invasion of 1592.

The Yulgok Project for self-reliant national defence was of paramount importance for the security of the ROK because by the Project, force improvement in the ROK Armed Forces could be removed from dependence on US military aid. After 1974, also, the ROK Navy pursued force development in the context of the Yulgok Project and then by the defence planning and management system (PPBEE) as the Yulgok Project was integrated into the five-Year Defence Programme. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the Yulgok Project first, in order to examine ROK naval development.

What motivated the ROK to launch the Yulgok Project? Primarily, the changing US policy on Korea prompted the Koreans to start the Yulgok Project. As long as the Americans regarded Korea as of vital national interest in the context of the containment policy, the security of the ROK was firm and secure, and the ROK was able to devote itself entirely to post-war reconstruction and economic rehabilitation. But there were certain alterations of US national interests in Asia during the détente period (1963-1978) due to the opening of US diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) which created a three-way balance of power in Asia rather than polarising the Soviets and the Chinese together against the Americans.\(^4\)

The sudden turnabout of US relations with the PRC downgraded the importance of countries situated along the periphery of the PRC in US security policy because if the PRC was no longer hostile to the USA and Japan, it would not appear to be essential for the Americans to maintain armed forces in the region.\(^5\) In this context, in 1971 President Richard Nixon withdrew the US 7th Division in Korea as part of the diminution in forward deployment associated with the “Vietnamisation” of the Indo-China War.

To understand thoroughly the above changing situation between the ROK and the USA, it is necessary to understand the concept of US national interests and the position of Korea in them. Generally, the unchanging and enduring US national interests are classified as follows: the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation; the continuance of a healthy and growing economy that provides opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for its national endeavours; the maintenance of vigorous alliance relationships that bolster forward defence of the United States, secure its allies, and collectively maintain peace with freedom in the world.\(^6\)

Also, with regard to US national interests, it is very important to grasp the relative importance of different kinds of national interests at this time. According to William O. Staudenmaier, the intensity of US national interests was classified from high to low: (1) “vital”, (2) “significant”, (3) “important”, and (4) “of interest”.\(^7\) Firstly, “vital interest” meant to have a direct bearing on the attainment of basic national security objectives and meant that the nation would risk escalation to general nuclear war to protect a vital interest. Secondly, “significant interest” implied that it was so
important that the US would be willing to use military force to protect it, short of risking escalation to nuclear war. Thirdly, “important interest” was less than “vital” or “significant”, but important enough to use limited air, naval and logistic support with ground forces only used in an advisory role. Finally, “of interest” suggested lesser and more indirect importance than “important interest,” and the US would probably take actions short of war, including supporting the indigenous forces with only possible commitment of the US.

In relation to the ROK, therefore, the critical question was “of what intensity is Korea in the US national interests?” Indeed, it is said that Korea was not of any interest to the USA before the outbreak of the Korean War. However, with the Korean War, the ROK had been one of the significant interests of the USA in the process of Cold War confrontation. Nonetheless, it was not enough to be considered as a vital interest of the USA as the Americans did not escalate the Korean War up to nuclear war.

Also in terms of intensity, it is very significant to understand the fact that the ROK had been classified as the US national interest indirectly in connection with the defence of Japan. In East Asia and the Pacific, the USA had been constantly considered the alliance with Japan as a centrepiece of their security policy and an important anchor of stability of the region. Furthermore, US foreign policy firmly depended on American public opinion, congressional support, and the priority assigned by the executive branch. This explains why the US policy on Korea had fluctuated in accordance with the changes in strategic circumstance and US domestic politics, particularly in relation to the withdrawal of US forces in Korea.

In the end, the Americans frightened the South Koreans by the sudden withdrawal of the US 7th Division from Korea. Furthermore, at this time the ROK identified that the military power of South Korea was no more than 50.8% of that of
North Korea⁹ although the Americans were providing a modernization programme for the ROK Armed Forces (1971-1975) as the price of South Korean participation in the Vietnam War and the withdrawal of the American 7th Division from Korea. Consequently, the combination of the North Korean threat and the US withdrawal policy raised the urgent necessity for a self-reliant national defence for the ROK.

After starting the Yulgok Project, some additional events accelerated the Project. Firstly, at the commemorative exercises to celebrate 29th Liberation Day on 15th August 1974, Sae-Kwang Moon, who was a secret agent of North Korea resident in Japan attempted an unsuccessful plot to assassinate President Park with a pistol, but instead killed Mrs. Park, the first lady of the ROK. Also, on 15th November 1974, the ROK Army discovered a North Korean underground tunnel one km south from the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), which was being constructed by the North Korean Army to move large-scale armed forces secretly into the rear of the front line of South Korea. Also a second and a third underground tunnel were discovered in 1975 and 1978 respectively and details are as follows.¹⁰

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>No. 1 Tunnel</th>
<th>No. 2 Tunnel</th>
<th>No. 3 Tunnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discovery</td>
<td>15th November 1974</td>
<td>19th March 1975</td>
<td>17th October 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size (Height/ Width)</td>
<td>1.2m/ 0.9m</td>
<td>2m/ 2m</td>
<td>2m/ 2m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length</td>
<td>3,500m</td>
<td>3,500m</td>
<td>1,635m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infiltration Length</td>
<td>1,000m</td>
<td>1,100m</td>
<td>435m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability (passing)</td>
<td>7,200 men/hour</td>
<td>30,000 men/hour</td>
<td>30,000 men/hour</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, the communist victory in Vietnam in April 1975 accelerated all the more the sense of self-reliant national defence of the ROK. Upon the communist victory in Vietnam, the ROK, to stimulate the Yulgok Project, introduced a Defence Tax Law, which by 1976 was 2% of GNP. In addition, on 18th August 1976, an incident occurred at Panmunjeom caused by the North Korean Army, resulting in eleven casualties among UN forces, who were cutting branches of a poplar in the DMZ of the South to improve lookout conditions.

Notwithstanding the continual aggression of North Korea, President Jimmy Carter announced the withdrawal plan of the US 2nd Infantry Division from Korea the very day after his inauguration in 1977. It put the Koreans in an awkward situation because President Carter was not willing to provide appropriate compensating measures as President Nixon had done at the time of the withdrawal of the US 7th Division.

Suddenly, the ROK realized the truth that no two nations have precisely the same objectives and in a given set of circumstances each will react according to its needs. In this reality, President Park launched a self-reliant national defence policy of the ROK in 1974 against the rapidly increasing North Korean military threat and changing US policy on Korea. At last, the ROK started to come out of hibernation of total dependency and implemented the Yulgok Project for a self-reliant national defence as follows: the first Yulgok Project (1974-1981); the second Yulgok Project (1982-1986); the third Yulgok Project and Force Improvement Programmes (1987-date). The aim of this chapter is to examine the evolution of ROK naval policy during the first Yulgok Project period (1974-1981).
II. Lagging behind in Priority

The defence of the ROK was highly dependent on US military aid before the Yulgok Project. There was no independent defence planning carried out by of the ROK, and only since 1966 had there been any annual statement of the "basic policy" by the Ministry of National Defence. Therefore, with the launch of the Yulgok Project for self-reliant national defence, the first defence policy document was produced as the "eight-year Defence Plan" (the First Yulgok Project). Under the First Yulgok Project, however, the situation was not favourable to the development of the ROK Navy because as Table 4-2 shows, the ROK Navy was allocated the smallest portion of budget among the Services.

Table 4-2 The Details of Budget for the First Yulgok Project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Total Amount</th>
<th>Repayment of the Loan</th>
<th>Actual Amount Invested</th>
<th>Ratio to Defence Budgets (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Treasury</td>
<td>FMS Loan</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1974-1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st FIP (1974-1981)</td>
<td>2,770.2</td>
<td>837.4</td>
<td>3,607.6</td>
<td>467.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


What caused these results? To answer the question, it is necessary to understand the gist of force planning first. According to a study of the US Naval War College, force planning is defined as "the process of establishing military requirements based on an appraisal of security needs of the nation, and selecting military forces to meet those requirements within fiscal limitations." In the study, Richmond M. Lloyd
suggests a rational and comprehensive framework for force planning to identify relevant factors and their relationships, as shown in figure 4-1.

The above force planning framework is composed of two sections, namely strategic choices and force choices. Strategic choices involve the identification of national interests, national objectives, the national strategy, and a supporting national military strategy. Force choices involve an assessment of the national military strategy, available forces, and the threats, in order to identify deficiencies that result when specific fiscal constraints are applied to the acquisition of defence forces. Each of these two basic choices has a major feedback loop that is depicted by the heavy lines in Figure 4-1.

The above process of force planning is very logical in theory. Force planners first identify national interests and the objectives necessary to achieve those interests.
Then they assess the ability of adversaries to threaten those interests or to interfere with the achievement of national objectives. Finally they forge a strategy for countering the threats to interests, develop the force structure necessary to implement the strategy at acceptable risk, and then budget the money to acquire the forces. In this context, the function of force planners is to translate the ends of defence policy into means, that is, to create the future military capability needed to ensure the nation’s objectives are met with its desired strategy.

Therefore, force planners constantly assess the nation’s place in the world, and derive appropriate national security policies, objectives, and strategies from national interests not only to deal with threats but also to pursue opportunity, with greater stress on the military dimension. Particularly in the iterative and evolutionary force planning process, it is important to understand that force planners carry out their work through a clear sense of objectives (what does the nation want to achieve?) and strategy (how does it plan to get there?).

The allocation of budget for the First Yulgok Project was guided by the objectives and strategy of the ROK at the time, and we need to examine them. In relation to the objectives, the ROK established the national objectives first in 1970 and revised them in 1973 finally as “to safeguard the nation under the free democracy, to preserve permanent independence through the peaceful unification of the fatherland, to realize a welfare state by guaranteeing Koreans’ freedom and basic rights and improving their living standards, and to enhance national prestige and contribute to world peace by improving their international status.” It can be summarised as: national security, political democracy, peaceful unification, economic prosperity, and contribution to world peace.
On 29th December 1972 for the success of the force modernization programme (1971-1975) provided by the USA, the ROK established its defence objectives to support the accomplishment of its national objectives. The defence objectives were set up as follows: "to safeguard the territory and nation, and to support peaceful unification through strengthening defence capability; to maintain appropriate military forces and to foster them as elite armed forces; to establish a self-reliant defence system by fostering defence industry."

To achieve the above national and defence objectives, what was the strategy of the ROK? In terms of strategy, the most important aspect was that President Park pursued an economic and defence parallel development strategy unlike North Korea's totally military-centred self-reliant preference policy. A self-reliant national defence did not mean the pursuit of a unilateral independent national defence. But it signified a more self-reliant national defence by bearing the brunt of expenditure it self, and trying to develop its own weapon systems within the limits of possibility, while still maintaining a combined defence posture with the USA. Consequently, the Yulgok Project was based continually on a continued ROK-USA combined defence strategy.

President Carter's withdrawal policy provided an opportunity to produce a new ROK-USA military command structure, that is, the establishment of the ROK-USA Combined Force Command (CFC). To supplement President Carter's withdrawal policy, the two allies agreed to create the CFC at the Tenth Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in July 1977, and finally established it in November 1978. Since its birth, the CFC has been in charge of the practical operation of the ROK-USA Combined Defence System.

The foremost mission of the CFC is to exert concerted efforts to deter hostile external provocation and, if deterrence fails, to protect the ROK from armed aggression.
A USA four-star general is the Commander-in-Chief of CFC (CINCCFC) and a ROK four-star general has the position of deputy CINCCFC. In order to manage the integrated forces of two nations and prevent any asymmetrical decision-making by either side, the CFC is composed of equal numbers of staff members from each nation.

The significant thing about the establishment of the CFC was that the Koreans were involved in execution of the operational control authority of the ROK Armed Forces. Also, the ROK-USA military relationship had been changed from a vertical unilateral relationship to a horizontal cooperative one. But the ROK-USA combined defence policy kept the ROK-USA Mutual Defence Treaty as the basic framework and legal foundation of the ROK-USA security cooperation system. Also, the operational control authority over the ROK Armed Forces was transferred from the American Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command (UNC) to that of the CFC. The organization of the CFC as of 1990 was as follows.

Figure 4-2 The Organization of ROK-USA Combined Forces Command

Consequently, in spite of the launch of a self-reliant national defence policy, the ROK-USA combined defence strategy continued to exercise its influence over the force planning of the ROK. The Yulgok Project relied for its deterrent capability mostly on US support, and concentrated on developing the defence capability of the ROK Armed Forces preferentially against North Korea. In this situation, the immense threat of North Korean ground forces affected the direction of the Yulgok Project. Since 1962, North Korea had already been converted into one gigantic military society through the “Four-point Military Guidelines” and had improved markedly its independent capability of the initiation of war when the crucial moment arrived.\textsuperscript{26} In particular, the military strategy of North Korea was set up as a short-term blitzkrieg by implementing simultaneously regular and special warfare to communise the South.\textsuperscript{27}

Therefore, the withdrawal policy of the US ground forces in Korea made the Koreans very anxious and made force improvement of the ROK ground forces the most urgent matter to substitute the withdrawal. Also, the reduction of US ground forces in Korea did not mean that the US would abandon Korea in the context of the ROK-USA combined defence policy. It meant only a change of strategic concept on Korea that the ROK would take complete charge of ground operations but the USA would provide reinforcements, especially the augmentation of the US Navy and Air Force in accordance with the concept of the US total forces.\textsuperscript{28}

Also, against the blitzkrieg strategy of North Korea, air cover and close air support by the ROK Air Force was desperately needed by the ROK ground forces. Accordingly, the Korean defence planners considered the threat of the North Korean air force as being more serious than that of the North Korean Navy. Furthermore, although the ROK had been, at the time, making the fastest economic growth in the world since 1961, national capability was not enough to boost naval development of the ROK. Strict
priorities had, therefore, to be laid down. These were: firstly improvement of the Army capability (particularly anti-air and anti-tank capabilities); secondly, improvement of the Air Force capability, thirdly improvement of the Navy capability, and lastly the armament of reserve forces. 29

Despite all the dark clouds for the ROK naval development, there was a gleam of success because President Park enthusiastically established a defence industry. He believed that its development was essential to a self-reliant national defence and a self-supportive economy. In particular, he devoted himself to developing the defence industry 30 on the basis of and in conjunction with a series of national economic developments, especially the heavy and chemical industries' development, utilizing fully the civil industrial facilities within the country. 31 As a result, in 1974 the Hyundai Shipyard, one of the largest shipbuilding companies in the world, was brought into existence. 32

III. The Turning-Point in the Development of the ROK Navy

Although US naval augmentation would be expected in the event of another war according to the ROK-USA combined defence strategy, the rapid development of the North Korean Navy in number and combat capability seriously threatened the maritime security of the ROK. At that time, the North Korean Navy was devoting itself to improving offensive capability to support its military strategy, a short-term blitzkrieg, after emphasising self-support and defensive capability during the 1960s.

As a result, the North Korean Navy strengthened enormously its submarine, fast attack craft, and amphibious forces. Thus, North Korean submarines became the most dangerous threat to the maritime security of the ROK, and North Korean
amphibious units composed of fast amphibious craft and fast attack craft (missile, gun and torpedo) were a newly rising threat capable of infiltrating into the flank and rear of the South by surprise attack through the sea. For 1974-1981, the North Korean naval development was as follows.

Table 4-3 Naval Development of North Korea (1974-1981)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>+19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>+12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corvettes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast Attack Craft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>+87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>+67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Craft</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Craft</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>+94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>+294</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition to the above threats, North Korea was attempting to infiltrate guerrilla forces by armed fast espionage boats, but the ROK Navy found it very hard to confront them effectively. In particular, the ex-US destroyers were already too old, equipped with obsolete weapon systems and out-of-date first generation electronic equipment, and less capable steam-turbine engines. Even ex-US FB and PB acquired for anti-infiltration operations were not adequate due to their small size and low speed.

Under this situation, the ROK Navy was surrounded by every disadvantage of strategic, financial, and technical support. Furthermore, it was faced with a serious problem at the time, namely, the replacement of ex-US superannuated ships. During the period, it deleted two obsolete DE and seven PCE, but as of 1980 the average age of the ROK naval ships was already over thirty-four years for destroyers, over thirty-six years
for frigates, over thirty-eight years for corvettes, over thirty-five years for amphibious ships, and over twenty years for minesweeping vessels.36

The self-reliant defence policy led to the ROK Navy attempting to change this situation from the ROK’s own shipbuilding resources. An unsuccessful attempt to construct a naval shipbuilding site for vessels up to 3,000 tons had been made in 1954. Despite this failure and adversities, the ROK Navy maintained its shipbuilding ambitions. The ROK Navy continually arranged for overseas study by naval officers so that they could acquire advanced shipbuilding techniques and knowledge to prepare for future construction of the Navy’s own ships. Through this programme, Commodore Do-Jae Eom, one of these trained naval officers, contributed decisively to the development of a Korean-design naval shipbuilding enterprise. He led the first Korean-design naval shipbuilding project, the Haksaeng (Student)-class fast gunboats, after returning from his studies overseas in the USA in 1970.

Originally, due to lack of domestic shipbuilding capacity, Korean defence planners were planning to continue to purchase American designed vessels for coastal patrol work. In this context, a larger American Patrol Gunboat (PG) was acquired, initially on loan, in 1972. Also, the ROK force planners attempted to purchase a fast attack craft from a foreign country by subscription of students all over the country. Then, the ROK Navy argued that it could build two fast attack craft of its own design for the cost of one foreign craft. As a result, in 1972 two 23.6 metre 75-ton (full load) 41 knot Haksaeng-Ho were built at the Korean Shipbuilding Company in Pusan under the supervision of Commodore Eom.37

At the same time, two 140-ton PKM (Patrol Killer Medium) designed by KIST (Korea Institute of Science and Technology) had been built by ROK Naval Ship Yard in 1971-2.38 In 1974, after a detailed review of capability, construction cost and period,
and maintenance cost between PKM of 140-ton and PK of 80-ton, the ROK Navy decided to mass-produce the PK. So successful were these vessels that a further twenty-nine were built as the 80-ton 41 knots Chebi-class (PK) between 1974 and 1978. After making the decision to mass-produce the PK, plans to acquire six similarly sized (71.25-ton) but slightly faster US designed CPIC (Coastal Patrol and Interdiction Craft) were abandoned, and the American built prototype delivered in 1975 was returned later.

Furthermore, in 1979, the ROK Navy started to construct a larger PKM (Patrol Killer Medium) 33 metres in length and almost 150-ton full load displacement to improve open sea capability. Both the PK and PKM proved their utility in anti-infiltration and -incursion operations against North Korean armed espionage boats and amphibious units. They were armed with combinations of 40mm or 30mm and 20mm weapons (including Korean Vulcan guns), and 12.7mm machine guns. The fast patrol vessels proved formidable opponents for the DPRK.

American technology continued to be relied upon for larger PG type vessels, three 268-ton Asheville based “Paek-ku (Seagull)” type multi mission patrol ships being built in the USA in 1975-6 and five more Korean-built by Tacoma South Korea in 1976-1978. The first PG was just delivered equipped with guns but the ROK Navy regarded the acquisition of a missile capability as an urgent matter against the threat of North Korean fast attack missile craft, twelve such “Osa” class vessels having been transferred from the USSR in 1968. The ROK Navy attempted to acquire anti-ship missiles from the USA and the Americans provided Standard anti-radar missiles for the Asheville type PGs in 1975. Also, in order to obtain anti-ship missile proper, the ROK Navy purchased Exocet from France for installation in the two 140-ton 1971-2 built PKM. On 7th August and 7th November 1975, the ROK Navy carried out missile firing exercises for both Exocet and Standard ARM and these were accomplished
successfully. After these faits accomplis, the American opposition to the sale of Harpoon diminished and the USA decided to sell the missiles to the Koreans in 1978 after it entered in service in 1977.

In July 1975, President Park enquired about the possibility of domestic construction of a frigate for the ROK Navy. A foreign designed vessel was too expensive at around ten million dollars. Building a major combat ship was difficult without foreign help but Commodore Eom led an effective team that overcame every adversity despite a lack of US support. The programme was known as the KFX. The first frigate, Ulsan, named after the city in which she was built, was launched in April 1980 and was commissioned on the first day of 1981. It was a considerable achievement for the ROK to build the frigate without any assistance from other more advanced navies although, due to the lack of the ROK's economic and technical capabilities, the ship lacked certain modern features such as a combat data system or helicopter facilities.

The Korean frigate was distinctive in its features. When the ROK Navy designed the FF, the most important aspect to be considered was its maximum speed of 35 knots to oppose effectively North Korean fast attack craft and armed espionage boats. To achieve the desired speed, it was decided to give the 1,800-ton ship, two gas turbines of 50,000-horse power. The FF emphasised anti-surface warfare capability with a heavy gun armament of three 76mm guns and four twin 30mm guns for use against Korean fast attack craft and infiltration boats. The bow 76mm gun was installed on the O-1 deck to reduce the blind angle of the armament against close small targets.

The Korean Frigate provided several advantages for the ROK Navy. It improved combat capability by adopting a modern fire control system such as Signaal WM-28. It only required a complement of 150, about a half that of an ex-US destroyer,
because of modern equipment and systems. Also, it improved fast manoeuvrability with two gas turbines as the main power source in use against rapid infiltration attempts from North Korea. Furthermore, through the introduction of the CODOG system, it provided economical mobility by using two diesels.

Despite the emphasis on anti-surface warfare, the ROK Navy regarded the threat of North Korean submarines very seriously because these posed a vital threat to the maritime security of the ROK. Therefore, the ROK naval planners made continual efforts to improve anti-submarine warfare capability against the North Korean submarine threat. In this context, they did their best to acquire submarines from the US Navy because the ROK Navy regarded the submarine as the best counter-measure against the enemy’s submarine threat. But the effort to acquire submarines was not successful due to rejection of requests by the Americans.47

Furthermore, the ROK Navy could not afford to purchase any capable modern ASW platform due to budget limitations. Therefore, as a desperate measure, it purchased five retired and obsolete US Gearing-class destroyers (two in 1977, one in 1979 and two in 1981).48 All of them were already over thirty years old, with old-fashioned ASW equipment, but the ROK Navy made the best of them by the greatest attention to maintenance and repair.

At the same time, as the requirement for the broad maritime patrol mission was increasing because of the threat of North Korean submarines and armed espionage boats, the ROK Navy developed a fleet air force to implement the mission. In 1976, the ROK Navy took over seven S-2A/F maritime aeroplanes from the ROK Air Force. It also introduced additional S-2Es from the USA in 1976, twelve ALOUETTE-III Helicopters from France and ten MD-500 Helicopters from the USA in 1977, and UH-1H Helicopters from the USA in 1978. With this augmentation, the ROK Navy
established the Fleet Air Wing in 1977 instead of the Fleet Air Squadron. Through the above development of a naval air force, the ROK Navy dramatically enhanced its maritime patrol capability and particularly improved its anti-submarine warfare capability by fitting the Gearing and Allen M. Sumner class destroyers with ALOUETTE-III helicopters.\(^{49}\)

In addition, the ROK Navy constructed seven of Korean built LCU and introduced ten LCM from the US Navy to improve amphibious capability. Through the first Yulgok Project, the ROK Navy increased to a total of thirty-nine ships. The augmentation was led by the increase of destroyers, fast attack craft, and amphibious ships, although corvette, minesweeper, and auxiliary ships were reduced continually because of the deterioration of ex-US ships. Force development of the ROK Navy during the First Yulgok Project was as follows.

**Table 4-4 Force Development of the ROK Navy (1974-1981)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>48,500</td>
<td>49,000</td>
<td>Include Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corvette</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast Attack Missile</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>+11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast Attack Craft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>+18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Ship</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>+17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping Ship</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary Ship</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>+39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


On the other hand, the ROK Navy developed the shipbuilding organization to successfully implement all these shipbuilding projects. Since the first establishment of a naval shipbuilding office under the Bureau of Naval Ships in the ROK Navy
Headquarters in 1970, the ROK Navy added a ship-design office and Deputy Director for Shipbuilding in the Bureau in 1977 after the successful construction of Haksaeng-Ho and the PK. In 1978, in particular, the Navy instituted a Special Project Office for the Korean Frigate (KFX Project) separately under its Department of Logistics. Then with the success of building the Korean frigate, on 10th March 1981 it founded the Bureau of Naval Shipbuilding to carry out major shipbuilding projects (see next chapter).  

During the First Yulgok Project, on the basis of the above success, the ROK Navy made every possible effort to take appropriate measures against the North in spite of every kind of difficulty and the limited budget that was allocated. Considerable force improvement had been carried out by 1981 to reduce inferiority against the North Korean Armed Forces.  

Overall, the First Yulgok Project displayed two distinctive characteristics. Firstly, the ROK Navy showed a continued inclination to lean on the USA for its force development: the purchase of five Gearing-class ex-US destroyers, construction of eight PGM by technical cooperation with the Americans, the introduction of US missiles and ASW aircraft, and unsuccessful attempts to acquire submarines under the auspices of the USA. This demonstrated clearly that the ROK Navy could still only achieve its goal of force improvement through the assistance of the US Navy.  

However, the Americans were supportive only within the limits of necessity of the ROK Navy as a subordinate force of the US Navy under the ROK-USA combined defence strategy. They did not want to provide the ROK Navy with submarines and technical assistance for the construction of Korean-design Frigate although North Korea was seriously threatening the maritime security of the ROK with the introduction of submarines and fast attack missile craft from the Soviet Union. As a result, the Koreans
were able to attempt to counter the North Korean maritime threat effectively only with the assistance of the Americans.

Therefore, the second approach arose when the ROK Navy started to explore an alternative way to effectively oppose the increasing North Korean naval threat. At that time, the ROK Navy was surrounded by every kind of difficulty: deterioration of most of the ex-US naval ships, the smallest budget allocation among the Services, and the extremely rapid force improvement of the North Korean Navy. Nonetheless, the descendents of maritime pioneers made history again by the success of independent Korean-design naval shipbuilding projects.

These achievements of the ROK Navy during the First Yulgok Project were exceptionally great in its history because it created a turning point in force development by changing the direction of naval development from total dependency on US military aid to independent Korean-design naval shipbuilding. Furthermore, at last, it was able to oppose the North Korean Navy independently by its own naval shipbuilding.

IV. Conclusion

In spite of extremely poor economic conditions after the disastrous Korean War, the ROK was very fortune to be able to maintain a considerable coastal defence capability by means of US military aid. Under the auspices of the US Navy, the ROK Navy could improve naval combat capability and develop maintenance and repair capability on the various ex-US naval ships. But there were no appropriate modernization programmes for the ROK Navy before the launch of the ROK's self-reliant national defence policy in 1974.
As a result, the Fleet of the ROK Navy was behind the times, and was mostly composed of too old ex-US naval ships, which were built during World War II. Also, because of the period of total dependence on US military aid for two decades (1953-1973), it seemed that the enterprising spirit of ROK’s maritime pioneers was likely to disappear in the ROK Navy. Furthermore, despite starting a self-reliant national defence programme, there was little chance of making a difference in ROK naval development because the ROK-USA combined defence strategy assumed huge reinforcements by the US Navy and Air Force in case of war.

At the time, the ROK Navy was indeed surrounded by every kind of disadvantage—strategic, financial, and technical. Consequently, under the ROK-USA combined defence system, it was lagging far behind on priority in the self-reliant national defence programme (First Yulgok Project) due to the imminent North Korean blitzkrieg strategy with huge offensive ground forces, and the withdrawal policy of the US ground forces in Korea.

Nonetheless, the descendents of the Korean maritime pioneers created new history in the ROK naval development during the First Yulgok Project. They did not forget the dream that the founders of the ROK Navy, led by Admiral Won-II Shon, had that is, being an independent naval power capable of supporting to accomplish maritime security and national prosperity of Korea through the sea. They made the most of the little opportunity to mould ROK’s fortune for the future.

In this context, when the ROK Navy was allocated a small budget for purchasing a fast craft from a foreign country, they persuaded the decision makers to change the plan so that two of their own design fast craft were constructed domestically instead of being purchased from a foreign country. In the end, they were successful in laying the foundation of independent Korean-design naval shipbuilding history by the
success of the construction of two own design fast craft. Moreover, the ROK Navy attained the ambition of a long and earnest desire—building a Korean Frigate themselves. They strived enthusiastically to build an own design Frigate domestically within the limits of financial support, because at the time, the ROK could not afford to purchase a modern combat ship from foreign countries as a substitution for the superannuated ex-US destroyers.

In truth, although it is impossible to build a modern combat ship without any support of advanced navies, the ROK Navy had its dream fulfilled by the devotion of excellent naval shipbuilding officers under the leadership of Commodore Do-Jae Eom. At last, on 26th January 1981, ROKS Ulsan—the first ever frigate built by Korea in its 5,000 years of history—appeared in Chinhae, the base of the ROK Fleet.

When the Yulgok Project had been launched in 1974, the ROK Navy was requested to take appropriate measures immediately as the North Korean Navy enhanced its offensive capability by augmenting its submarine, fast attack, and fast amphibious forces. But it was very difficult to meet the requirements only with the support of the US Navy and the very limited financial support of the ROK Government. Furthermore, at the time the ROK Armed Forces were using World War II vintage M-1 rifles, superannuated naval ships, and other obsolete equipment donated by the Americans.

Therefore, the ROK Navy strove to seek an alternative way to effectively counter the increasing North Korean naval threat. As a result, through the success of its own naval shipbuilding projects, it could start to improve combat capability independently by own design fast attack craft (over thirty PKM and PK) and the first-ever Korean-built Frigate. On the other hand, during the First Yulgok Project, it continued to get US assistance for constructing PGM and acquiring five old ex-US
destroyers and ten LCM as well. But the ROK Navy did not lose a golden opportunity to be an independent naval power and completely changed the direction of its force development for the future.

In short, it is not too much to say that the success of the ROK's own naval shipbuilding projects were monumental and it is appropriate to call them the second foundation of the ROK Navy. Finally, the ROK Navy began to metamorphose through independent naval development.
End Notes


2 Yee Yi (1536-1584) was a representative Confucian scholar of the Choson Dynasty. He was famous for his integrity, deep scholarship, and sacrifice to the nation.


9 It was the reason why North Korea already started its self-reliant force improvement programme in 1962, twelve years earlier than that of South Korea. For more details, see The Institute of National Defence and Military History, The Fifty Years History of the ROK Armed Forces, pp. 303-305.

10 One more Tunnel (No.4 Tunnel) was found on 3rd March 1990. For more details, see The Institute of National Defence and Military History, The Fifty Years History of the ROK Armed Forces, pp. 275-282.

11 Defence Tax was valid from June 1975 to December 1980 firstly, but was extended twice and abolished on 31 December 1990. For further details, see The Institute of National Defence and Military History, The Changing History of National Defence Policy of the ROK 1945-1994, pp. 265-268.

12 North Korean soldiers killed 2 US officers with axes and wounded 9-US and South Korean soldiers. In opposition to the aggression, the ROK-USA combined forces executed a military operation to cut the poplar tree called “Paul Bunyan” under the cover of US air and naval forces. For more details, see The Institute of National Defence and Military History, The Fifty Years History of the ROK Armed Forces, pp. 282-283.

13 In May 1977, President Carter sent Presidential Decision 12 to the Department of State and Defence, ordering them to implement his planned withdrawal. For more details, see US Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, US Troop Withdrawal from the Republic of Korea, a report by Senators Hubert H. Humphrey and John Glenn, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 9th January 1978, p. 20.


15 The Ministry of National Defence of the ROK renamed the Yulgo Project as “Force Improvement Programme” in 1995 and does not use the name Yulgo Project.


The Carter Administration removed less than one combat battalion from Korea. Various American intelligence agencies conducted a reassessment in 1978 and presented their results to the Congress in June 1979. Furthermore, by strong opposition of the US Congress, President Carter announced that he was holding his plan in abeyance until after the 1980 election, and the new President Ronald Reagan cancelled the plan. For further details, see US Congress, House Committee of Armed Forces, The Impact of Intelligence Reassessment on the Withdrawal of US Troops from Korea: Hearings Before the Investigations Subcommittee, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 21st June and 17th July 1979, p. 3.


After establishment of the CFC, the UNC conducts only the mission relevant to the maintenance of the Armistice Agreement. For further details, see The Institute of National Defence and Military History, The Changing History of National Defence Policy of the ROK 1945-1994, pp. 276-278; The Institute of National Defence and Military History, The Fifty Years History of the ROK Armed Forces, pp. 316-318.

A crucial moment means when a politically and militarily favourable atmosphere is created by social disorder in South Korea or the withdrawal of the USFK, etc.

A short-term blitzkrieg means to launch surprise attacks in the forward and rear areas of the ROK with tanks, mechanized troops, armoured vehicles, self-propelled artillery, and special operation forces under the support of aircraft and naval forces to sweep across the entire South before the US reinforcements arrive. For more details about North Korea defence policy and military strategy, see The Institute of National Defence and Military History, The Fifty Years History of the ROK Armed Forces, pp. 269-273.


In 1973, President Park made an announcement to foster heavy and chemical industries. There were two reasons. Firstly, there was fear that the US would pull out the troops from Korea particularly as Americans and Chinese had made better political relations at the time, and so it was necessary to build an industrial base for an independent defence structure. Secondly, from the economic point of view, the deepening of the industrial structure was a necessary reason to increase productivity in order to offset rising Korean wages and to meet the global competitive challenges. For more details, see yang-Taek Lim, “A Historical Perspective on the Korean Economic Development”, Current Politics and Economics of Asia, Vol. 9, no. 3, 2000, pp. 216-218.

It was not until the Hyundai Shipyard, one of the largest shipbuilding companies in the world, was completed in 1974 that any substantial shipbuilding was undertaken in South Korea. For more details, see
33 The North Korean Navy was developed in the context of its military development in the following phases: firstly, post-war reconstruction period (1953-1961); Secondly, self-support and defence emphasis period (1962-1969); thirdly, offensive military capability emphasis period (1970-1979); finally, offensive military posture development period (1980-present). For more details, see Institute for International Affairs, Bangwee Yongam [Defence Yearbook 1995-1996] (Seoul: Institute for International Affairs, 1995), pp. 168-169.

34 The ex-US destroyers had to spend at least 40 minutes preparation time for running at maximum speed of 32 knots because of the characteristic of their steam engines.

35 As of 1974, the ROK Navy operated 7 ex-US destroyers: 2 Gearing-class, 2 Sumner-class and 3 Fletcher-class. Ex-US PB was 98 tons full load displacement with maximum 20 knots, and ex-US FB was 33 tons full load displacement with maximum 25 knots. See Jane’s Fighting Ships 1973-1974, pp. 208-211; Stephen Chumbley ed., Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships 1947-1995, p. 249.


37 Commodore Eom’s reminiscence notes in response of author’s request.

38 PKM of 140-ton is not built by Korea Tacoma. See Commodore Eom’s notes and Jane’s Fighting ship 1987-8, p. 336.

39 Commodore Eom’s notes.


41 Commodore Eom’s notes.


43 See, ROK Navy Headquarters, To the Sea, To the World: Fifty Years History of the ROK Navy with Photography, p. 228.


45 Commodore Eom’s notes; ROK Navy Headquarters, To the Sea, To the World: Fifty Years History of the ROK Navy with Photography, p. 192; Jane’s Fighting Ship 1987-8, p. 335.

46 Generally, all navies install a combat ship’s main gun on its main deck.

47 Under the ROK-USA combined defence strategy, the Americans did not want to provide submarine-the strategic and offensive platform- to the Koreans because they regarded the ROK Navy as a supplementary force for the US Navy as like that of the Korean War.

48 The ROK Navy purchased the five retired and old-fashioned ex-US destroyers under the condition of “where it is, as it is.” Because it carried out its force improvement under the limited budget allocated and dependency on the US Navy. See Stephen Chumbley ed., Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships 1947-1995, p. 245.

49 See, ROK Navy Headquarters, To the Sea, To the World: Fifty Years History of the ROK Navy with Photography, p. 185, 201; Military Balance, 1974-1985.

50 ROK Navy Headquarters, To the Sea, To the World: Fifty Years History of the ROK Navy with Photography, p. 201.

Chapter 5 Catching Up With the North

I. Consolidating Self Reliance

The period 1982-1992 was extremely critical to the ROK’s security and prosperity under the continuing significant military threat from North Korea. In particular, the South and North Korean leaders were always well aware of the reality that South Korea’s dramatic economic development would decisively help to shift the military balance in the Korean peninsula, in South Korea’s favour. Also, there were two big events in the South, that is, the Asian Games in 1986 and the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988, where success provided great momentum for the national prosperity of the ROK.

Therefore, the greatest security concern of the ROK during the above period was that North Korea might be tempted to launch limited military provocations to cripple the South’s economy. In addition North Korea might contemplate an all-out assault aimed at reunifying the peninsula before it was too late, calculating that time was running out for the use of force for accomplishment of the North Korean purposes. In this context, with the practical experiences of the Korean War, the continuous threat of another North Korean invasion made South Korean’s consider that war was a matter of vital importance to the nation- a matter of life or death and the way either to survival or to ruin.

In this situation, two consecutive Presidents who had previously been ROK Army Generals ruled over South Korea after President Park’s assassination in 1979. They played a significant role in the continued economic and political development of the ROK. Also, under their leadership, the ROK exerted itself to improve a self-reliant national defence capability without interruption. Making preparations for potential war against the North, however, was not an easy or simple matter to the ROK.
For the first phase of the Yulgok Project, the matter of efficient management of defence resources was raised in the ROK as an important issue. In this context, the Ministry of National Defence launched full-scale research for the development of a defence planning and a resource management system. Finally, in 1979, a national defence planning and management system was introduced called the “PPBS (Planning, Programming and Budgeting System),” which had its origins in the USA. The PPBS came into operation in January 1980 and in July 1983, after 3 years of application, the Ministry of National Defence of the ROK added the execution and budget processes to the PPBS in order to improve the feedback function of a total defence planning and management system.³

In the end, the ROK developed its national defence planning and management system as “PPBEES,” which consists of five closely related phases—planning, programming, budgeting, execution, and evaluation—to achieve autonomous control of defence management. The “planning phase” is the starting point of defence management, where long-term policy for national defence is presented. National defence objectives are established according to an evaluation of the threat from potential enemies. Defence policies and military strategies are formulated to achieve objectives effectively. Then military strategy and capability requirements for the implementation of defence policy are proposed.

The “programming phase” is the point at which the Mid-term National Defence Plan is established, according to the capability requirements proposed at the planning phase and possible within available resources. The plan incorporates all national defence programmes by year and by project for the ensuing 5 years, including force modernization and operational maintenance. At the “budgeting phase,” the budget is approved so as to implement projects for the Mid-term National Defence Plan. This
phase includes the process of formulating and acquiring budgets based on the proposals by each service branch and each organization.

The “execution phase” is the carrying out of planned projects within allocated budgets. Finally the “evaluation phase” is to analyse and evaluate all the phases from planning to execution. As for the projects already underway, problems are identified and solved. Upon completion, a project will be reviewed and analysed, and the results will be reflected in future planning. This phase contributes to the evaluation and the feasibility of a project and the decision-making associated with its execution.

The PPBEES dramatically improved systematic force development within the ROK based upon a goal-oriented approach. In particular, in 1983 through the PPBEES, the Ministry of National Defence of the ROK issued the first-ever “Long-term Joint Military Strategic Plan,” which presented a general and long-term defence policy, a concept of military strategy and a direction for military build-up. Also, in 1984, it published the first “Long-term Defence Policy” directing the best distribution of defence resources on long-term force development and maintenance. By these two documents, the ROK called the first blueprint of its defence planning into existence.

Furthermore, in relation to the force improvement of the ROK, the most important thing was that in 1985 the Yulgok Project had been integrated into a process of PPBEES called “Mid-Term (five years) National Defence Plan.” Before the integration, the Ministry of National Defence of the ROK carried out only maintenance duties for the ROK Armed Forces while the Joint Chief of Staff of the ROK took complete charge of force improvement. The integration of the Yulgok Project into the Ministry of National Defence of the ROK enhanced the practicality and efficiency of force improvement of the ROK enormously.
Furthermore, in 1989, the ROK added a computer-based national defence management accounting system to the existing system to provide information on resource usage to assist evaluation and decision-making. The management accounting system integrated all defence resources and strengthened the capacity for mutual feedback and circulation among the processes of the PPBEES by the computation of management data based on the feedback from resource management activities. As a result, finally the PPBEES became fundamental for the development of the ROK military forces and made a great contribution to strengthening its self-reliant national defence capability. The schematic of the ROK defence planning and management system is shown in Figure 5-1.

**Figure 5-1 The ROK Defence Planning and Management System**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Assessment of Enemy threat</td>
<td>MND: Establishment of Mid- and Long-term Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JCS: Establishment of Military Strategy/ Coordination and Control of requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Services: Initiation of Military Capability Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of defence objectives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of defence policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of military strategy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initiation of military capability requirements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programming</td>
<td>Initiation of requirements of Each project and its adjustment</td>
<td>Services: Requirements of Mid-term National Defence Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of the Mid-term National Defence Plan (Finance, projects and yearly programme)</td>
<td>MND: Establishment of Mid-term National Defence Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgeting</td>
<td>Compilation of yearly budget (Budget draft, deliberation, adjustment and approval)</td>
<td>JCS, Services: Budget Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MND: Compilation of Yearly Budget</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execution</td>
<td>Acquisition and maintenance (Allocation of budget, contract, procurement and maintenance and settlement of account)</td>
<td>MND: Budget Reallocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Services: Budget Execution and Operation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Recognition of problems and their improvement (Prior analysis, evaluation and analysis, and audit)</td>
<td>Services: Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MND: Prior and Post-mortem analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the above development of the defence planning and management system, the ROK strove to develop a defence industry, and associated research and development (R & D) facilities to improve the self-reliant national defence capability. This was because the gist of a self-reliant national defence was the development and maintenance of the ROK's military power by its own efforts. In particular, President Park believed the development of the defence industry was essential to a self-reliant defence and a self-supportive economy. In the first phase of the project, the defence industry developed thus: the preparation phase (1971-1973); the construction phase for the foundation of basic weapon (1973-1976); the completion phase for the foundation of the basic weapon (1977-1981); the construction phase for the foundation of high technology weapons systems (1982- present).

As a result, by the mid-1980s, the ROK was domestically able to produce most conventional weapons and became an arms exporting country. But it was necessary to purchase state-of-the-art weapon systems from foreign countries and the ROK adopted the "military offset" system because it did not have a vast resources for defence to purchase military equipment. The ROK thus developed a multilateral technical cooperation system with other countries in addition to the USA, such as the United Kingdom and Italy, to establish a foundation for the domestic development of advanced weapons systems. From the late 1980s, to enhance its deterrent capability, the ROK particularly began to focus the direction of its force development on the improvement of its core military capabilities and the acquisition of advanced weapons systems. This was a precaution against an agreement on South and North arms reductions. In this context, the ROK set up a policy direction of long-term development of R & D in cooperation with industry, academia and research circles as follows:
1. Ground Arms - development of the next generation of equipment to suit Korean terrain and improvement of a variety of small arms and ammunition;

2. Warships - building all kinds of naval ships through domestic research and development including submarines instead of focusing on developing warships for coastal patrol duty;

3. Aircraft - development of domestic production of training aircraft and next-generation aircraft in linkage to the nation's aerospace industry development projects;

4. Guided-Weapon Systems - development of own weapon systems suitable for use in Korea, taking into consideration North Korean capabilities;

5. Electronic, Communications and Optical Equipment - acquisition of automation technology for a localized-for-Korea C'I system.

The other important thing to strengthen a self-reliant national defence capability of the ROK during the 1980s was the following self-awakening of the nation: the necessity for (1) the establishment of an independent military strategy corresponding with the unique circumstances of the Korean peninsula, (2) force improvement according to the military strategy, and (3) the improvement of its military structure to act to the best of its ability. With the development of an independent defence planning capability, the Koreans realized that they had accustomed themselves to depend too much on the Americans for their national security and defence, without the establishment of an independent military strategy to guide force improvement. Also they recognized that they had been concentrating only on defensive strategy.

In fact, through the over three decades since the Korean War, American strategic thought was directly implanted into the ROK military society under the US operational control authority over the ROK Armed Force. In particular, in terms of the two different types of deterrent strategy - threat of punishment and denial of an adversary's objectives - the American forced the ROK to concentrate on the latter while they provided the former by their commitment of US forces in Korea that included huge augmentation of US naval and air forces in case of war. Consequently, ROK military
strategy had been established as a purely defensive one without any room for offensive or pre-emptive action against the North despite the particular circumstances of South Korea under the imminent and formidable military threat of North Korea.¹⁴

Under the situation, several North Korean provocations severely alarmed South Koreans. In particular, the Rangoon bombing on 9th October 1983 when North Korea attempted unsuccessfully to assassinate President Do-Whan Chun but killed four South Korean Cabinet Ministers and fifteen others in the President’s party. In addition to this, the shooting down of a South Korean airliner (KAL-858) on 29th November 1987 had a similar effect.¹⁵ These blatant provocations caused South Koreans to seek more appropriate measures to meet any kind of provocation from the North.¹⁶

As a result, in military circles in the ROK, there was serious reconsideration concerning the ROK-USA combined defence strategy. In particular, there were huge demands for correcting its totally defensive and dependent military strategy.¹⁷ In this context, during the 1980s, the ROK force planners devoted themselves to examine its military strategy, and established an independent military strategy as a “self-reliant deterrence and prompt counterattack” against North Korea. The strategy meant that the ROK would build appropriate military forces against North Korea to deter both war and limited provocation in peacetime. In case of war it would promptly react against the invasion in the present front line and even counterattack to the North to accomplish unification of Korea by the South.¹⁸

Furthermore, the ROK seriously sought to improve its force structure in order to promote its integrated battle strength against the North.¹⁹ For this purpose, the Ministry of National Defence of the ROK established the “Military Structure Committee” in October 1980. It was partly successful in integrating the organization
and functions among the services and improving force structure by reorganizing according to its mission during the early 1980s.\textsuperscript{20}

Nonetheless, the ROK was having a fundamental problem in relation to its Joint Chiefs of Staff. After the establishment of the ROK-USA Combined Force Command in 1978, the ROK exercised operational control authority of the ROK Armed Force through the ROK-USA Military Committee Meeting (MCM) under the ROK-USA Security Consultative Meeting (SCM).\textsuperscript{21} But the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not able to implement the duty appropriately since they did not hold operational control authority over the ROK Armed Forces but only assistance duty: the JCS were also short of staff support. Despite the ROK JCS’s continuous efforts to seek a proper solution after 1981, this was not achieved until the successful completion of “a research on direction for development of long-term defence posture of the ROK” called ‘818 Plan’ in the early 1990s.

II. Defence Policy of the ROK in the Last Stage of Cold War Confrontation

North Korean strategy for the communisation of the South, during 1982-1992, remained basically unchanged and kept open both peaceful and non-peaceful means of reunification. In accordance with North Korean perceptions, reunification did not mean a simple process toward territorial and national unity, but the fall of the South to communism through internal class struggle. Also, North Korea regarded that a peaceful and non-peaceful reunification would only be possible as follows:\textsuperscript{22}

1. Possibility of a peaceful reunification
   - When the South accepts the North’s unification formula;
   - When a pro-communist entity takes power in the South;
   - When a communist government is established in the South through revolution
2. Possibility of non-peaceful reunification
   - If another war breaks out on the Korean peninsula;
   - When a revolutionary force within the South asks Pyongyang for assistance;
   - When the South’s defence posture comes into disarray due to a global war

On the basis of the above strategy for the communisation of the South, North Korea adopted “Four-point Military Guidelines” and the “Guidelines for the Strengthening of the Three Revolutionary Forces” in the 1960s and an accelerated military build-up in 1970s. In the late 1970s, however, North Korea fully realized that its military hard line policy against the South during the 1970s only led to a stiffening of the South’s anti-communist stance and defence posture. On reflection, North Korea learned from the Cuban, Vietnamese and Iranian Revolutions and adopted some tactical changes in its strategy against the South while keeping its basic objectives intact.

The revised North Korean strategy against the South was to attain a two-to-one revolutionary edge over the South through what is called “Five Besieging Offensives” - political peace offensive, ideological offensive, espionage offensive, external offensive, and finally military offensive. The briefs of the five besieging offensives are as follows:

1. The political peace offensive aimed to instigate anti-American and anti-government movements on a national scale in the South by diluting the South’s vigilance against communism, splitting the South’s national opinion through fuelling ideological division, reinforcing the leftist elements present in the South, and accusing the American presence in the South of being the biggest stumbling block to peaceful reunification.

2. The ideological offensive was directed toward creating social confusion in the South through instigating an anti-American struggle by appealing to Korean nationalism, fuelling labour disputes by playing up the gap in wealth between rich and poor, and encouraging the activities of anti-establishment forces including university activists.

3. The espionage offensive aimed to indirect infiltration into the South by third country routes with the mission of establishing underground connections with radical leftist elements in the South to create social confusion and instigate anti-government and anti-establishment protests.
4. The external offensive was directed to isolate the South from the rest of the world by stepping up North Korea’s diplomatic activities toward the ‘non-aligned’ countries and establishing an extensive network of pro-Pyongyang campaigns with 1,600 organizations in 119 countries.

5. The military offensive, the core of the five types of ‘besieging offensives,’ was to engage in frantic war preparations while keeping its eyes open for the arrival of a ‘decisive moment’ for a full-scale invasion. North Korea clearly had an offensive strategy, and focused on securing the ability to launch a surprise attack. With formidable blitzkrieg attacks, North Korea planned to occupy major strategic centres or the Seoul area in the early stages of a war.

Under the above changed strategy, the South largely identified North Korea’s provocations as two types, that is, a “full-scale invasion” when a decisive moment arrives and “low intensity military provocations,” which included localized armed provocation, espionage infiltration, and terror in order to create a decisive moment.26

Against the above threats, on 28th November 1981, the ROK amended its defence objectives to exert all possible efforts towards the completion of a self-reliant national defence posture to support more appropriately the accomplishment of national objectives.27 Through revision, the ROK prescribed the military threat continually as North Korea, but enlarged the role of its armed forces to make a contribution for regional stability and peace. The revised defence objectives were as follows.

**Table 5-1 The Change of Defence Objectives of the ROK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Before Revision</th>
<th>After Revision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To safeguard the territory and nation, and to support peaceful unification through strengthening defence capability</td>
<td>1. To safeguard the state against armed aggression by our adversary,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To maintain appropriate military forces and to foster them as elite armed forces</td>
<td>2. To facilitate peaceful reunification of the nation,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To establish a self-reliant national defence system by fostering defence industry</td>
<td>3. To contribute to regional stability and peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To attain the defence objectives during the above period, the ROK pursued its defence policy as follows: completeness of combat readiness posture; establishment of self-reliant national defence posture; strength of all-out defence capability; and the maintenance of the ROK-USA combined defence system. The ROK clarified the combat readiness of the ROK Armed Forces directly to oppose North Korea as long as North Korea’s strategy of forceful communisation of the entire Korean peninsula and its military threat remained unabated.

In this context, the ROK stressed the need to establish a substantial self-reliant national defence and an all-out defence capability to deter and defend against another North Korean military attack, and made every effort to complete its military defence posture against the North. Toward this end, the ROK Armed Forces developed highly sophisticated early warning and vigilance systems, established a quick response posture against North Korea’s blitzkrieg war plans and an integrated capital defence system, and expanded its total defence posture to the rear area against North Korea’s special warfare.

Also, despite the development of a self-reliant national defence capability, the ROK kept its alliance with the USA as one of the highest priorities in its defence policy and stressed the continued importance of the ROK-USA combined defence system continually. This was to secure deterrence credibility against the Northern communists both in the North and its allies, the PRC and the Soviet Union.

In addition, there was a significant requirement to enhance the ROK-USA combined combat readiness posture to secure deterrent credibility against North Korea for the successful accomplishment of the two big events in South Korea- the Asian Games in 1986 and the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988. In this context, the ROK adopted an US air-land battle doctrine and made every effort to develop the ROK-USA
CFC operational concept to enhance combined war-fighting capability against the North as follows: further forward defence, prompt counter-attack, and strong retaliation and punishment.\textsuperscript{31}

As a result, in accordance with the ROK-USA CFC Operation Plan 5027 (OPLAN 5027) revealed in 1992, a concrete plan of the conduct of war against North Korea was composed of five scenarios: (1) deploying rapid deterrent forces to deter war; (2) holding back enemy forces north of Seoul by destroying North Korean strategic targets; (3) destroying major enemy forces and implementing large-scale amphibious assault operations; (4) isolating Pyong-yang, the capital city of North Korea, and starting military administration on occupied areas; and (5) unifying the Korean peninsula led by the ROK after the end of war.\textsuperscript{32}

The vital part of OPLAN 5027 was the step-by-step deployment of USA augmentation forces, which comprised army divisions, carrier battle groups with highly advanced air groups, tactical fighter wings, and marine expeditionary forces. Also, in order to deter war and enhance combined operational readiness, the ROK through the CFC planned and regularly conducted a number of ROK-USA combined exercises and training events: “Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL)” exercise, a annual comprehensive command post exercise (CPX) held since 1976; “Foal Eagle” exercise, an annual combined field manoeuvre exercise conducted since 1961; and “Team Spirit” exercise, an annual combined field exercise held since 1976.\textsuperscript{33}

Therefore, the ROK-USA combined defence strategy under the US coalition strategy, continued to guide the force development of the ROK during the above period.\textsuperscript{34} In this context, the Koreans carried out a force improvement programme for 1982-1992. In spite of the success of the First Yulgok Project, the ROK had only been
able to reduce its inferiority of forces with North Korea from 50.8% in 1973 to 54.2% in 1981.\textsuperscript{35}

Consequently, the Second Yulgok Project (1982-1986) aimed to improve the ROK defensive military capability as a continuation of the 1\textsuperscript{st} Yulgok Project. The Second Yulgok Project was facilitated by the development of the ROK national defence planning and management system (PPBEES) and its integration into the “Mid-term Defence Plan” in the PPBEES. Through the Project, the ROK developed its self-reliant military capability remarkably and improved its force ratio against North Korea up to 60.4% in 1986.\textsuperscript{36} Also, it was able to produce independently most conventional weapons by imitative and import technology-orientated production.

The third phase of the Yulgok Project for 1987-1992 focused initially on the rapid improvement of ROK defensive capability against the North but later started to put stress on a longer-term military build-up according to the dramatic transformation of world politics and security environment with the end of the Cold War. The rapidly changing regional and world strategic circumstances forced the ROK to alter the direction of its force improvement to meet new security requirements. There had, however, only been limited policy changes to the ROK’s strategic situation owing to the unchanging North Korean military threat. By 1992, through the three phases of the project, the ROK was able to improve its force ratio against the North up to 71% in a process aided by its continuing successful economic development.\textsuperscript{37}

In this context during 1982-1992, the ROK Navy acquired an increased budget for its force improvement from 15.8% in the first Yulgok Project to 21%. It was, however, as before, the smallest portion and the lowest priority among the Services. The ROK’s strategic circumstances had not changed enough to alter the priority in favour of naval development. Despite the pro-maritime development of the nation, the naval
development of the ROK was not regarded as a high priority among the Services because of the huge and imminent threat of surprise attack from North Korea and the US commitment on the augmentation of naval and air force in that event. The details of the budget on the Yulgok Project during 1982-1992 were as follows.

Table 5-2 The Details of Budget for the Yulgok Project (1982-1992)

(Unit: Billion won)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Total Amount</th>
<th>Repayment of the Loan</th>
<th>Actual Amount</th>
<th>Ratio to Defence Budgets (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Treasury</td>
<td>FMS Loan</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Yulgok (1982-1986)</td>
<td>5,308.8</td>
<td>1,035.0</td>
<td>6,343.8</td>
<td>116.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yulgok (1987-1992)</td>
<td>14,174.1</td>
<td>173.8</td>
<td>14,347.9</td>
<td>560.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Unified Project</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amount (%)</td>
<td>2,647.1</td>
<td>1,065.8</td>
<td>1,338.9</td>
<td>276.1</td>
<td>5,328.0 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1986</td>
<td>(49.7%)</td>
<td>(20.2%)</td>
<td>(24.9%)</td>
<td>(5.2%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount (%)</td>
<td>6,650.6</td>
<td>2,897.1</td>
<td>3,188.2</td>
<td>1,051.3</td>
<td>13,787.2 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-1992</td>
<td>(48%)</td>
<td>(21%)</td>
<td>(23%)</td>
<td>(7%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


During the above period, the ROK made remarkable force improvements. It contributed to the victory of the USA against the Soviet Union by the successful containment of the northern communists. However, it was necessary for the ROK to equip its defence capability against North Korea’s air-land blitzkrieg war plans. The naval development of the ROK therefore continually lagged behind that of the other Services.

III. Mass Production Against North Korea

Despite the limited support for naval development of the ROK at the beginning of the 1980s, the ROK Navy encountered a new maritime challenge, the serious perceived shift of the naval power balance in North-East Asia between the USA and the USSR. The Soviets had started to expedite naval development under the
leadership of Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov since the early 1960s. As a result, the Soviet Navy was getting ahead in the number of submarines and surface ships from 1974 and was clearly the world’s second most powerful navy. Also, the strength of the US Navy was reduced dramatically by the retirement of a lot of ships through the 1960s and 1970s without the appropriate construction of replacements.38

In 1979, the Soviets added the aircraft carriers cruiser “Minsk” to their Pacific Fleet. The advent of a powerful Soviet navy in North-East Asia was enough to cause great concern among the South Koreans because, unlike alignments during the Korean War, North Korea would get assistance from the Soviet Navy in the event of another war, by the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance concluded in 1961. By the end of 1981, the comparison between the US and the Soviet Navy was as follows.

Table 5-3 The Comparison of the US- the Soviet Navy (1981)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>The US Navy</th>
<th>The Soviet Navy</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>528,000</td>
<td>443,000</td>
<td>1.2: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Carrier</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4*</td>
<td>3.25: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruiser</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1: 1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1: 1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1: 2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Ship</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1: 1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>1: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replenishment Ship</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>1: 1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary Ship</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1,743</td>
<td>1: 24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ship-borne aircraft</td>
<td>1,620**</td>
<td>106**</td>
<td>15.3: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-based aircraft</td>
<td>792**</td>
<td>1,334**</td>
<td>1: 1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>Ship 514 (6.5 million tons)</td>
<td>2,437 (5.7 million tons)</td>
<td>1: 4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aircraft</strong></td>
<td>2,412</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>1.7: 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Including two ships under construction; ** Including helicopters

Furthermore, North Korea continued its large augmentation of the navy during the period. North Korea keenly felt the necessity of naval power through its experiences during the Korean War. During that conflict, a major factor preventing North Korea
from communising the entire Korean peninsula was its lack of command of the sea and air.\textsuperscript{39} Therefore, North Korea did not intend to repeat the same failure, and accelerated the development of the Navy.

During the 1982-1992, the North Korean navy made big augmentations in submarine, missile fast attack craft, and amphibious craft. These augmentations were significant because North Korea achieved this force improvement independently. First of all, after 1976, the North Korean Navy produced a submarine every fourteen months at Sinpo and Mayangdo shipyards through the introduction of technology from the PRC. And it was revealed that North Korea built considerable numbers of coastal submarines and midget submarines at the Sinpo and Yukdaesori shipyards respectively.\textsuperscript{40} As a result, the huge DPRK submarine force had the capability to destroy the sea lines of communication of the ROK and to lay mines at the entrances to the major ports of the South.

Secondly, the North Korean Navy independently increased its missile fast attack craft force since the beginning of the 1980s. It produced the “Sohung-class” missile-FAC, a North Korean copy of the “Komar-class” transformed from the USSR, and the “Soju-class” missile-FAC, a North Korean enlarged version of the Soviet “Osa-class.”\textsuperscript{41} It was clear that the development of a missile FAC force was intended to neutralize the ROK fleet, which was composed mainly of large ships.

The third remarkable force improvement was in amphibious forces, which increased by 240\% during this time. The North Korean Navy built a total of 30 LSM and LCM independently. Furthermore, it markedly increased high-speed landing craft-the “Kongbang-class” LCPA (50-knots) and “Nampo-class” LCP (40-knots), which were able to carry commandos.\textsuperscript{42} This force improvement greatly enhanced North
Korean amphibious operational capability and threatened the flank and rear of the South by sea.

The above force development of the North Korean Navy demonstrates well that the naval strategy of North Korea focused on the support of its military strategy against the ROK, a short-term blitzkrieg.\textsuperscript{43} As of 1992, the naval development of North Korea was as follows in Table 5-4.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Classification} & \textbf{1981} & \textbf{1992} & \textbf{Remarks} \\
\hline
Personnel & 31,000 & 46,000 & +19,000 \\
\hline
Submarines (patrol) & 16 & 25 & +9 \\
\hline
Submarines (Midgets) & Unknown & 48 & +48 \\
\hline
Frigates & 3 & 3 & - \\
\hline
Corvettes & 5 & 5 & - \\
\hline
Fast Attack Craft & & & \\
Missile & 18 & 39 & +21 \\
Gun/Torpedo & 318 & 304 & -14 \\
\hline
Patrol Craft & 25 & 42 & +17 \\
Mine & Unknown & 29 & +29 \\
Amphibious Craft & 94 & 201 & +107 \\
Auxiliary & Unknown & 9 & +9 \\
\hline
Total & 479 & 705 & +226 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Force Improvement of North Korea Navy (1982-1992)}
\end{table}


Under the above challenging situation, the ROK Navy strove to improve its capability to meet these threats. Above all, the most important thing was that the ROK Navy established its objectives, being a “maritime safeguard of the ROK that supports national interests by maintaining and strengthening naval forces, and securing command of the sea.” This was first set out publicly through a basic policy document in 1980. In 1983, this statement was revised as: “the ROK Navy- a maritime force for national security- deters war by constructing an independent naval force, ensures a victory of war by securing control of the sea, promotes national interests by protecting sea resources, and promotes the national prestige by presence of naval power.”\textsuperscript{44}
Through these stated policy objectives, the ROK Navy showed clearly that it was seeking the development of a sea control navy. Indeed, the ROK Navy kept firmly in mind the truth of the importance of maritime power in national survival and prosperity, as the history of Korea proved. In this context, the ROK Navy was devoted to develop its capability to accomplish its objectives against the threat of the North Korean navy. However, the force development of the ROK Navy was not smooth during 1982-1992 because the following reasons.

Firstly, the imminent threat of North Korea's surprise attack made the ROK give first priority continually to ground forces particularly because of the geo-strategic vulnerability of the capital city of Seoul, which is located only 40 km from the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) and the political, economic, military, social, cultural, and educational nerve centre of the nation. The ROK had to seriously consider North Korea's blitzkrieg war plan with huge commando forces to incapacitate an organised response by the South. In this context, the ROK regarded the first three to seven days of the early stage of a future war as the critical time deciding its success.45

Secondly, the ROK continued to rely on the ROK-USA combined military capability to deter war at that time. The gist of the combined defence strategy was first to confront the enemy attack by the ROK Armed Forces and then, with the arrival of US reinforcements, to execute counterattacks to defeat the North. The concept of combined defence strategy assumed reinforcements by US naval and air forces. Therefore, the ROK military forces would take primary responsibility in the early stages of war against North Korean armed provocation.

Thirdly, the economic capability of the ROK was not enough to support a costly naval development. At the time, the ROK was implementing the economy-defence parallel development policy that defence policy should be carried out within
limits that did not threaten its economic development. The ROK invested in its defence budget temperately as table 5-5 shows, although its military capability was much less than that of North Korea. With the success of its economic development, however, the South spent more on defence than North Korea for the first time in 1975 and the defence budget in 1992 reached about 6 times that of the North’s. The two Koreas’ defence budgets were as follows.

Table 5-5 South/ North Korea Defence Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Defence Budget (US Million $)</th>
<th>Defence Budget to Government Budget (%)</th>
<th>Defence Budget to GNP (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>104.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>121.9</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the result of the above circumstances, the budget for the Yulgok Project was mostly focused on the improvement of a ground combat capability, and the ROK Navy had to implement its force improvement programme within a very limited budget boundary. During the period 1982-1992, the ROK invested on average 33.7% of its defence budget on its overall force improvement programme. In the 1st Yulgok Project, the ROK Navy was allotted the smallest amount of the budget among the Services.
during the period of 1982-1992: the Army 48.6%, the Air Force 23.6%, the Navy 20.7%, and the integrated projects 6.1%. The budget for naval force improvement increased a little in the 2nd Yulgok Project, but the ROK Navy was unable to match the development of the North Korean Navy in quantity, despite its superiority in quality.

Under the difficult financial situation, the ROK Navy had to scrap a large number of old ex-US ships, in total forty-six ships; four destroyers, seven frigates, three corvettes, four amphibious ships, one minesweeper, one tanker, two tugs, three transport ships, and twenty-one fast attack craft. To replace these units, the ROK Navy considered its priority to be to increase forces to match the increased threat of the North Korean Navy, which was small in physical size but great in number. Also, with ROK budget limitations, it decided its basic direction for force improvement was on high-low mix and quality-quantity mix concepts to be the best solution at the time. As of 1992, the result of the force development of the ROK Navy was as follows.

Table 5-6 Force Development of the ROK Navy (1982-1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>49,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>Include Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine (Midget)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corvette</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>+24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast Attack Craft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>+55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Ship</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping Ship</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary Ship</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>+76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


( ): The ROK independent naval shipbuilding, < >: Ex-US naval ships

As the above Table shows, between 1982 and 1992, the ROK Navy strengthened its capability by the domestic construction of over a hundred and ten naval
vessels. It had already equipped its own independent naval shipbuilding capability through the 1st Yulgok Project. The ROK Navy continued to make huge progress in its shipbuilding projects. A noteworthy feature of this process was the increase in the ratio of ROK built ships in the ROK Fleet, from 34% in 1981 to 75% in 1992.

Development, however, still focused on the increase of small surface combatants rather than major combat ships because of the strategic and financial considerations discussed above. Accordingly, the force improvement of the ROK Navy was led by the construction of about eighty PKM. This demonstrated that the major role of the ROK Navy was to defeat a surprise attack by North Korea’s high-speed infiltration forces, which were anticipated to occur in the early stages of war. Also, the ROK Navy constructed twenty-four Corvettes (‘Po-hang’ and ‘Dong-hae’ class PCC), which were control ships of PKMs to intercept North Korea’s surprise attack effectively.

Korean corvettes could be operated as anti-submarine warfare ships to counter the DPRK’s growing submarine flotilla. To improve ASW capability further, six more Ulsan class frigates were launched in 1984-1988 and two more in 1992. In addition, 12 Lynx ASW helicopters were procured from the UK during this period. On 6th January 1987, the ROK Navy started to fulfil its long-held ambition to acquire submarines against the North Korean submarine threat. For this purpose, it established a “Special Project Team for Korean Submarines” in the ROK Navy Headquarters to build submarines domestically through the introduction of technology from a foreign country.

Immediately after the Korean War, the ROK Navy had struggled to acquire submarines. But this proved impossible because of the lack of financial and technical capability, as well as the strategic objection of the USA. However, through Korea’s
increased desire to acquire an independent deterrent capability against North Korea, the project was driven forward strongly and it was decided to obtain submarines from Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft (HDW) AG in Kiel of Germany. In late 1987 the ROK Navy ordered its first-ever submarines - one built at Kiel by HDW and two assembled at Okpo by Daewoo in Korea. The total programme aimed to build nine “Type-209” class submarines.

Also, in line with the substitution for superannuated ex-US naval ships, the ROK Navy constructed to its own design three MHC from 1986 and one AOR in 1990, to improve respectively mine-warfare and replenishment at sea capability. For this purpose, in 1986, the ROK Navy established a separate special project team for a logistic support ship (AOR) in addition to the establishment of a project team for MHC in 1981. Moreover, in 1986, the ROK Navy even started to launch special projects for domestic construction of a Korean-design destroyer (KDX) and amphibious ship (LSX) to support its objectives in the future.

In addition to the above naval force improvements, the ROK Navy carried out reforms in its force organization. Firstly, on 1st February 1986, it established the ROK Naval Operational Command (NOC) instead of the ROK Fleet Command. The ROK NOC was composed of three Fleets, which were situated in the east, west, and south of the ROK respectively with subordinate naval ships and supporting facilities. This reorganization aimed at improving the prompt response capability of the ROK Navy against any kind of provocations from North Korea in the front line at sea. The reformed ROK Navy command structure successfully provided maritime security for the Asian Games in 1986 and the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988.

Secondly, on 1st February 1986, the ROK Navy established its Logistics Command in Chinhae to improve the fleet’s logistic support system. Thirdly, on 1st
November 1987, the ROK Navy re-established the ROK Marine Corps Command to improve the combat capability of the Marine Corps. And a ROK-USA Combined Marine Corps Command was established on 1st December 1992 under the ROK-USA CFC. Lastly, on 1st January 1991, the ROK Navy integrated all its organizations related to independent naval shipbuilding and created the Centre for Naval Shipbuilding Project of the ROK Navy to improve the efficiency of all shipbuilding projects mentioned above.56

Also, by 31st January 1985, the ROK Naval Shipyards were equipped with independent maintenance and repair capabilities for the newly constructed Korean-designed naval ships through the technical innovation and modernization of systems and equipment. Furthermore, the ROK Navy for the first time participated in the 12th RIMPAC combined naval exercise in 1990, which resulted in an improved combined naval operational and cooperation capability with the Allied navies in the Pacific area. This participation has been repeated at two yearly intervals ever since.

Another significant aspect of the development of the ROK Navy in this period was that it launched several special research programmes on “maritime power and direction for the future development of the ROK Navy.” Firstly, during 1982-1988, the ROK Naval Command and Staff College carried out a domestic “Sea Power Seminar” in relation to the general subject of “sea power.”

Secondly, in 1989, the ROK Navy Headquarters held its first ever “International Sea Power Symposium” on the subject of “the ROK Navy and maritime security of the region.” Lastly, the ROK Navy carried out “On-board Workshop” once a year inviting domestic scholars to study more specific subject- “the direction of the ROK future naval development.” At last, through the above academic activities, the
ROK Navy embarked on seeking an appropriate direction for its future development to secure maritime security and the prosperity of the nation in the future.

The ROK Navy thus initiated independent "sea control" type naval development to support the accomplishment of its national interests and objectives. The strategic circumstances remained unfavourable to ROK naval development due to the ROK-USA combined defence structure and the enormous military threat of a North Korean surprise attack. As a result, the ROK Navy found it necessary to continue to create a force structure primarily oriented to counter North Korea's massive amphibious assault and submarine forces.

IV. Conclusion

At the beginning of the 1980s, the hostility between the two Superpowers re-emerged because of the increasing Soviet defence build-up, the Soviet interventions in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan, and a rightward trend in US domestic politics. In this situation, the ROK-USA alliance became stronger again against the northern communists. Nonetheless, through the self-awakening of the Koreans to a self-reliant national defence policy in the 1970s, the ROK continued to develop its self-reliant national defence capability during 1982-1992.

The Koreans improved their independent national defence capability through the development of its "defence planning and management system," "defence industry and R&D," and its "independent military strategy and force structure." Consolidating the ROK-USA combined defence posture continued, however, to be necessary to deter a reckless North Korean limited or all-out military attack, a danger that caused serious concern with the widening economic gap between the North and South.
In particular, the successful accomplishment of the Asian Games in 1986 and the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988 was critical in providing momentum and a turning point in the ROK’s national prosperity and development for the future. Therefore, to deter and defend against any kind of North Korean provocation, the force improvement of the ROK during the above period had to focus on improving its defence capability against North Korea’s blitzkrieg war plan, particularly in the early stage of war given the geographic and strategic vulnerability of the capital city of Seoul. Also, it was necessary for the ROK to depend primarily on its deterrent and counter attack capability and on the US commitment for the augmentation of its own naval and air forces. Therefore, the ROK did not give the highest priority to naval development against the other Services.

Consequently, ROK naval development was guided by the ROK-USA combined defence structure, the development of a self-reliant national defence of the ROK, the geo-strategic consideration against North Korea’s huge ground forces, and its budget limitations. In particular, under the ROK-USA combined defence posture, the primary task of the ROK Navy was to check attempts by North Korea’s amphibious assault force to infiltrate the flanks of the South by a surprise attack from the sea and to counter the submarine force threatening the sea lines of communication of the South around the Korean peninsula.

In this context, on the one hand, the ROK Navy had to increase small combatants (PCC, PKM) to oppose North Korea’s largely and rapidly increasing high-speed amphibious assault force. On the other hand, it developed an ASW capability to meet North Korea’s huge submarine threat through the domestic construction of eight FF and by the foreign purchase of ASW helicopters. Through these developments towards an independent naval force, the ROK Navy successfully carried out its mission
to secure maritime security against the North. This was only possible on the basis of the success of its independent naval shipbuilding project, established during the first Yulgok Project.

In addition to the above developments, the ROK Navy did not neglect to lay the foundation of a real independent naval power capable of supporting maritime prosperity and the security of the nation in the future. Towards this end, it produced its own AOR and MHC by domestic construction to replace the old ex-US assets. Furthermore, it launched various independent special projects for submarines, destroyers (KDX), and amphibious ships (LSX). These efforts demonstrated how firmly the ROK Navy grasped the truth that naval power was essential to the survival and prosperity of Korea, which had maritime borders on three sides with the world’s great powers.

In 1992, President George Bush proclaimed that ‘by the Grace of God, America won the Cold War,’ Suddenly, the post-Cold War era came upon the Koreans with a lot of challenges and changes in world and regional politics and in the security environment.
End Notes

1 The economy of North Korea overtook the South in the late 1950s and held an advantage until the mid-1970s. But the South performed the most dramatic economic achievement under the leadership of President Park from 1963 and had drawn away strongly from the North since the mid-1970s. North Korea had continued to struggle since then, in part as a result of major structural problems, a lack of advanced technology and high defence spending. For more details, see Peter Polomka, “The Two Koreas: Catalyst for Conflict in East Asia?” ADELPHI Papers 208, summer 1986, pp. 3-17.

2 In fact, the political development of the ROK was not easy under the quasi-civilianised military regime over 30 years from 1961 to 1992 although it was successful in the end. For more on the political situation of the ROK, see Korean Overseas Information Service, A Handbook of Korea, pp. 289-292; Donald Stone Macdonald, The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 113-156.

3 The Americans had already developed PPBS into PPBES, and added the execution process in 1980. See, The Institute of National Defence and Military History, The Fifty Years History of the ROK Armed Forces, pp. 337-338


9 It is said that the defence industry has developed on the basis of and in conjunction with a series of national economic developments, particularly the heavy and chemical industries' development utilizing fully the civil industrial facilities within the country. For further details, see Ministry of Culture and Information, A Handbook of Korea (1993), pp.338-339; The Ministry of National Defence of the ROK, The Past, Present and Future of Yulgok Project, pp. 116-129.


14 Generally, the American had eschewed aggression in accordance with a philosophy inherent in the Preamble to the Constitution of the USA, and pre-emptive war has not been a practicable strategic option for the US national planners. Therefore, it is said that the modern US strategies have been so often defensive and threat-oriented rather than offensive and opportunity-centred. Because the overriding geopolitical goals of the US national strategy have been to deter an attack on the US homeland and to prevent the domination of the Eurasian landmass by a single power or coalition of powers. William O. Staudenmaier, “strategic Concepts for the 1980s,” The Force Planning Faculty of Naval War College ed., Fundamentals of Force Planning, Vol. 1: Concepts, p. 128.

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sufficient to deter North Korea's various provocations without any proper punishment or retaliation although it was successful in deterring another war in Korea by that time. For detailed study about deterrence of the ROK against North Korea's various provocations, see Byung-Moo Hwang, "Eokjae Jeonryakmit Kuhyunusdan Yeongu [Deterrent Strategy and Study for Accomplishing Measures]," The ROK National Defence College Policy Research Report 91-7, no. 187, December 1991.


At that time, the ROK Armed Force was organized not by mission and function but by Services and Branches. For more details, see The Institute of National Defence and Military History, The Fifty Years History of the ROK Armed Forces, p. 366.

The integration of similar functions and organizations of the ROK Armed Force was carried out mainly in the Headquarters of each Services and the establishment of Joint Medical Organization. For more details, see The Institute of National Defence and Military History, The Fifty Years History of the ROK Armed Forces, p. 367.

The ROK-USA Military Committee (MC) is co-hosted by the Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff of the ROK and the USA. As the body above the ROK-USA CFC, the MC, in turn, notifies CFC Headquarters of strategic directives and operational guidelines. The plenary meeting of the MC takes place prior to the SCM, and the results of the MCM are reported to the SCM. For more details, see The Ministry of National Defence, Defence White Paper 1988-1992, every chapter in relation to the ROK-USA Combined Defence Posture.

For more details, see the Ministry of National Defence of the ROK, Defence White Paper 1988, p. 66.

The Four-point Military Guidelines means (1) Arming the entire population, (2) Fortifying the entire territory, (3) Instilling leadership potential in all military personnel, and (4) Modernizing all troops. The three revolutionary forces include internal, the South, and the international ones. For more details, see The Ministry of National Defence of the ROK, Defence White Paper 1988, pp. 66-74.


It included calls for tripartite talks involving the two Koreas and the US (1st January 1984), the de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula (23rd June 1986) with the aim of driving the American forces out of the South, proposals for arms control talks (23rd June 1987), political consultative conference of political parties, social organizations and leading personalities of the two Koreas (January 1988 and 1989), and arms control talks (31st May 1990).


The first-ever defence white paper of the ROK explained this matter clearly. For more details, see The Ministry of National Defence of the ROK, Defence White Paper 1988/1989, each chapter's about the basic directions of national defence policy.


For more detailed study on this topic, see Chung-min Lee, The Emerging Strategic Balance in Northeast Asia: Implications for Korea's Defence Strategy and Planning for the 1990s (Seoul: Research Centre for Peace and Unification of Korea, 1989)

OPLAN 5027 was the concrete plan of the ROK-USA CFC for the conduct of war against North Korea. For more details, see Chosun Ilbo, 8th February 1994, p. 5.


Against the Soviet Union, the Americans adopted a coalition strategy with regard to the relationship with their allied countries because they were not self-sufficient in all mission areas to handle the Soviet threat, in spite of their great national strength. For more details, see Henry C. Bartlett and G. Paul Holman, Jr., "Strategy as a guide to Force Planning," The Force Planning Faculty of Naval War College ed., Fundamentals of Force Planning, Vol. 1: Concepts, pp. 401-410.

North Korea had started its force improvement programme in 1962 twelve years earlier than the ROK self-reliant national defence programme. See The Institute of National Defence and Military History, The


44 See, ROK Navy Headquarters, To the Sea, To the World: Fifty Years History of the ROK Navy with Photography, pp. 180-181.

45 To confront against North Korea's blitzkrieg operations, President Doo-Hwan Chun mentioned the first three days as the critical time in the future war and Minister of National Defence of the ROK five to seven days. For more details, see Larry A. Niksch, “The Military Balance on the Korean peninsula,” Korean and World Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer 1986), pp. 267-271.


53 See, ROK Navy Headquarters, To the Sea, To the World: Fifty Years History of the ROK Navy with Photography, p. 197.


56 ROK Navy Headquarters, To the Sea, To the World: Fifty Years History of the ROK Navy with Photography, pp. 188, 212, 244-248.
Chapter 6 Towards a “Blue-water Navy”

I. Koreanization of National Defence of the ROK

The end of the Cold War dramatically reduced large-scale world tension and the threat between the East and West by the elimination of Superpower competition. It, however, caused a fundamental transformation of the global and regional strategic circumstances and put the international political system into a state of flux. Furthermore, it released major elements of conflict, which included exclusive nationalism, religious and territorial friction, cultural heterogeneity, and the threat of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

As a result, in the post-Cold War era, the Asia Pacific regional security environment became much more complex and uncertain than it had been during the Cold War. In particular, the Korean peninsula remained the last vestige of the Cold War confrontation. Under the new situation, the withdrawal of US forces in Korea came up again. In 1990, the United States issued its “East Asian Security Initiative (EASI)”, which scheduled a major reduction in forward deployed forces. The ROK agreed to a gradual and partial reduction of US troops in Korea, and to a readjustment of ROK-USA security relations for the 1990s.1

In terms of the security of Korea, the 1990 Pentagon publication - “A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Looking toward the 21st Century” - described the border between the two Koreas as one of the world’s potential military flashpoints and set forth three ROK-USA bilateral security objectives. The first was to deter North Korean aggression or defeat this aggression if it occurs. The second was to reduce political and military tensions on the peninsula and to encourage the initiation of confidence building measures. The third was to begin the transition of US forces in the ROK from a leading to a supporting role.2 In accordance with the phase-one timetable
of the EASI, by the end of 1992 the United States withdrew 6,987 Army and Air Force personnel. But any further reductions scheduled in Phase-two and -three of the EASI was postponed due to North Korea’s unresolved nuclear issue.³

To the US withdrawal policy, the South Korean response was less vitriolic than it had been during the Nixon and Carter reductions not only because of the increased Korean confidence in a self-reliant national defence capability but also because of an appreciation of the changes in the threat environment. Furthermore, in August 1988, the Ministry of National Defence of the ROK launched a special research project on the “direction for development of a long-term defence posture of the ROK (the 818 Plan)” for the “Koreanization of the national defence of Korea.” The goals of the “818 Plan” to establish independent national defence posture of the ROK were as follows.⁴

1. Establishing a strategy best suited to the unique circumstances in Korea;
2. Building a military capability that would enable the country to develop and implement an independent military strategy;
3. Improving the structure of the armed forces to realize an integrated combat capability.

Through this research, the ROK reached the following conclusions on the future direction of its defence policy. The first was that the military strategy of the ROK should be “deterrence” by retaining both appropriate defence and flexible retaliation capabilities. Also, if deterrence failed, the ROK Armed Forces would have to be able to mount an “immediate counterattack” against the North Korean invasion. The second was that the direction of ROK force improvement should be to accomplish its military strategy through the development of independent defence and deterrence capabilities against the North. The third, in terms of the structure of the ROK Armed Forces, was that the ROK should adopt a joint-force system on the basis of the civilian control
principle in order to enhance integrated war-fighting capabilities and to contribute to the efficient utilization of defence resources.5

The most remarkable result of the “818 Plan” was the reform of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff system. In 1990, the ROK adopted a new “control-style” Joint Chiefs of Staff system instead of the “advisory” JCS system. Through this reform, under the control of the Minister of National Defence, the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff was entrusted to exercise “command authority” over the ROK Armed Forces while “military administration” continued to be exercised through the Chief of each Service. To correspond with the reform of JCS, on 1st October 1990, the ROK Navy took steps to adjust the organization of its headquarters: the integration of the department of intelligence and operations, and the department of policy and management.6 By March 1991, the organization of JCS was established as follows:

Figure 6-1 The Organization of ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff

As a result of the reform of JCS, the ROK made enormous progress in the improvement of the integrated battle strength of the ROK Armed Forces. In particular, the function of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff exercising the strategic direction and
operational control over the ROK-USA Combined Forces Command in the ROK-USA Military Committee was greatly enhanced. Furthermore, the ROK was now ready to take operational control authority over the ROK Armed Forces from the United States without any delay, if required.

In the end, with the above success of the 818 Plan, “the Koreanization of national defence of Korea” started to make good progress. Firstly, in March 1991, the United Nations Command appointed a major general of the ROK Army as Chief Delegate at the Military Armistice Commission of Korea in place of an American. Secondly, in December 1992, a general of the ROK Army took the post of Ground Component Commander of the ROK-USA CFC in lieu of Commander-in-Chief of the ROK-USA Combined Force Command. Then on 1st December 1994, the peacetime operational control authority over the ROK Armed Forces, having been in the hands of the USA since 1950, was restored to Korea.

After fifty years of dependency on the USA, the ROK started to take the initiative in ensuring the security of the Korean peninsula. It did, however, want to maintain the deterrent value of the US forces by keeping an American officer as Commander-in-Chief of the ROK-USA Combined Force Command and maintaining US wartime operational control authority over the ROK Armed Forces. Consequently, in the post-Cold War era, the ROK-USA security relationship remained strong and continued to serve the interests of two countries as well as the peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

In addition to the strong alliance with the United States, the ROK decided to develop friendly relations with neighbouring and foreign countries to create an international environment conducive not only to the peace and stability of the region surrounding the Korean peninsula, but also to smooth the way for the eventual peaceful
unification of the two Koreas. In this context, in 1988, the ROK implemented "Northern Diplomacy" under the leadership of President Tae-Woo Roh. ⁹ As a result, by August 1991, the ROK normalized diplomatic relations with all of the nations of Eastern Europe, and restored full diplomatic relations with the USSR in September 1990 and the People's Republic of China in August 1992. Through the success of the Northern Diplomacy, in September 1991, South and North Korea successfully joined the United Nations simultaneously. ¹⁰

Furthermore, in the 1990s, the ROK continually pursued balanced military exchanges and cooperation policies with China, Japan and Russia on the basis of a strong ROK-USA combined defence system on the one hand. Through these efforts, the ROK significantly developed cooperative military relations with neighbouring countries. The ROK held the first "Defence Ministers Talks" with Japan and Russia in 1994, with China in 1999, and with four neighbouring countries - USA, Japan, China and Russia - in 2000. ¹¹ ROK military diplomacy with its neighbouring countries promoted the "Koreanization of national defence of Korea" by establishing confidence and providing increased influence for the deterrence of war in the Korean peninsula as well as regional stability and peace.

The ROK also tried to improve direct relations with North Korea and to reduce the North's isolation by encouraging the incorporation of North Korea into the international political and economic systems. As a result, in December 1991, the ROK laid foundations with the North for peaceful coexistence, that is, the conclusion of "The South-North Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation (hereafter, the Basic Agreement) and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula (hereafter, the Denuclearisation Declaration)." ¹² These historic events planted the seeds of peace on the Korean
peninsula and in Northeast Asia, and represented a strong first step toward the peaceful unification of the divided nation.

The Basic Agreement went into effect on 19th February 1992. The most significant thing about the Basic Agreement was that both sides agreed to work together toward replacing the existing armistice with a formal agreement. If both the Basic Agreement and the Denuclearisation Declaration were successfully implemented, they would substantially contribute to the firm institutionalisation of peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas. Since 1992, however, the nuclear issue of North Korea stalled the Korean peninsula peace process.

In particular, North Korea performed a political brinkmanship strategy in order to find a way out of its economic and political difficulties. For, since the collapse of the economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and the socialist states in Eastern Europe, North Korea suffered from grave economic problems, international isolation, and system crisis. In this situation, North Korea continually accentuated the military first policy to ensure the survival of the regime by taking advantage of the nuclear issue, its accumulated conventional forces, and the development of WMD. 13

As a result, the South-North Basic Agreement and the Denuclearisation Declaration could not be implemented. The issue of North Korea’s suspected nuclear arms development programme became a key obstacle not only to the peace process on the Korean peninsula but also to the implementation timetable proposed by EASI for US troop reduction in Korea. 14

In short, with the dramatic change of the world political system and the strategic situation caused by the demise of the Cold-War confrontation between the two Superpowers, the ROK launched the “Koreanization of the National Defence of Korea.” In cooperation with the United States, the ROK made progress in taking the leading role
in its national defence, and enormously improved friendly military relations with neighbouring countries. However, the nuclear problem and the development of WMD capabilities of North Korea hindered this process.

II. Defence Policy of the ROK in the Post-Cold War Era

Since the 1960s, North Korea has sacrificed its civilian economy to build up its armed forces and it is now on the verge of collapse. The two Koreas present a striking economic contrast. In 1999, the South was superior to the North by some twenty-six times in GNP, twelve times in GNP per capita, a hundred and seventy-eight times in total trade volume, and over twice in total population.

Nonetheless, under both Il-sung Kim and his son Jung-il Kim, North Korea continued to emphasize its traditional military priority. Also, it kept its military policy and strategy foremost: the communisation of the entire Korean peninsula, by a rapid blitzkrieg. For this purpose, in spite of its serious economic difficulties, North Korea has put great efforts into maintaining military superiority against the South by providing an excessive military investment, 26.3 - 37.9 percent of GNP per year since 1992. Furthermore, it busily engaged in its “revolutionary campaign” to communise the entire Korean peninsula by “peaceful” or “violent method.”

In the post-Cold War era, North Korea changed the characteristics of its force development: a decrease in conventional weapons but an increased emphasis on mass-destruction asymmetric weapons, a nuclear weapons program, chemical and biological capabilities, and ballistic missile development and deployment. As of 2000, North Korea was estimated to be capable of assembling and producing one or two crude nuclear weapons. Also it was estimated to have produced between 2,500-5,000 tons of
chemical weapons since 1961 and was suspected of producing biological weapons since the 1980s. The North possesses various vehicles and equipment for launching chemical munitions—mortars, field artillery, multiple rocket launchers, FROG rockets, Rodong missiles, fighters, bombers, and AN-2. In addition, North Korea developed various ballistic missiles as shown in the following table.

Table 6-1 Specifications of North Korea’s Ballistic Missiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Scud-B</th>
<th>Scud-C</th>
<th>Rodong-1</th>
<th>Taepodong-1</th>
<th>Taepodong-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Range (km)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>Estimated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warhead weight (kg)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000(est)</td>
<td>(6,700km)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The combination of ballistic missiles and nuclear, chemical and biological warheads allows North Korea to use them as bargaining chips to ensure the survival of the regime. Also these weapons could carry out decisive tactical and operational roles in an attack on the South. In using these weapons to simultaneously attack major cities and strategic targets in the South, the North could enhance the effect of its traditional military blitzkrieg strategy.

Therefore, in the post-Cold War era, Korea is still suffering from the legacy of the Cold War. It remains divided, and is haunted by the possibility of war. Consequently, whether North Korea will initiate another war against the South remains as a critical question to the Koreans. Moreover, the Asia-Pacific region is in the process of a profound transformation of its security architecture, especially in the balance of power system in Northeast Asia. To correspond with the above changing situation, it was necessary for the ROK to revise its defence objectives in March 1994.

The important changes in ROK defence objectives were based on the nature of the military threat and the roles of the Armed Forces to meet the changing strategic
situation. Firstly, the ROK enlarged the concept of future threat from simply North Korea to any kind of possible external military threat. Secondly, it changed the scope of its military role from "regional stability and peace" to "regional stability and world peace" in accordance with the improvement of the ROK's national status and power. The details are as shown in Table 6-2.

Table 6-2 The Change of Defence Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Before Revision</th>
<th>After Revision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To safeguard the state against armed aggression by our adversary,</td>
<td>1. To defend the nation from external military threats and invasion,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To facilitate peaceful reunification of the nation,</td>
<td>2. To uphold peaceful unification,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. And to contribute to regional stability and peace</td>
<td>3. And to contribute to regional stability and world peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In relation to the above changes, the Ministry of National Defence of the ROK explained as follows.

1. Defending the nation from external military threats and invasion means protecting it from any possible external military threat as well as the immediate threats from North Korea, which, as the nation's main enemy, could endanger national survival.

2. Upholding peaceful unification means that the nation helps to unify divided Korea by deterring war on the peninsula, defusing military tension, and maintaining peace and stability.

3. Contributing to regional stability and world peace demonstrates our willingness to contribute to and enhance a cooperative military relationship with neighbouring countries based on our national status and security capabilities. Furthermore, this objective reflects our desire enthusiastically to join the UN in its efforts to maintain world peace. We are living up to our responsibilities and obligations as a member of the world organization.24

To achieve the above defence objectives in the post-Cold War era, the defence policy of the ROK has shown two characteristics: (1) continuation and (2) transition. The continuation is found in the ROK-USA combined defence system. The North Korean nuclear threat, with immense conventional military capability, forced the ROK
to maintain the ROK-USA combined defence system for its national security. Against
the North Korean threat, in 1991, the ROK concluded a new "Wartime Host Nation
Support (WHNS) Agreement" with the USA to improve the combined defence posture
by ensuring the reception, onward movement, and war-fighting sustainability of the US
forces on the Korean peninsula.25

In addition, in October 1992, the twenty-fourth ROK-USA Security
Consultative Meeting agreed to add "Flexible Deterrence Option (FDO)" to "the ROK-
USA CFC OPLAN 5027."26 Consequently, according to the ROK Defence White Paper
of 2000, the contingency plans for the deployment of US forces now included three
types of US augmentation capability - "Flexible Deterrence Options (FDOs)", "Force
Module Packages (FMPs)", and "Time-Phased Forces Deployment Data (TPFDD)."27

The "FDOs" are ready to be implemented when war is imminent. They
comprise 150 different options classified into political, economic, diplomatic, and
military options. The "FMPs" are combat or combat support augmentation forces
including carrier battle groups to be deployed in the early phase of the war when
deterrence efforts through the FDOs had failed. The "TPFDD" covers three types of key
forces planned ahead of time to be deployed in case of an outbreak of war: (1) in-place
forces, currently deployed in the Korean peninsula; (2) pre-planned forces for time-
phased deployment in a contingency; and (3) on-call forces which could be deployed if
needed. During the 1990s, the TPFDD increased from 480,000 personnel to 630,000. As
of 2000, it covered a deployment plan of 690,000 personnel, 160 vessels, and 1,600
aircraft including a capability to respond to weapons of mass destruction.

However, from 1991, the ROK had to contribute towards the costs of the US
forces in Korea due to the demise of the Soviet Union. The ROK firstly paid a hundred
and fifty million dollars in 1991. This increased gradually in parallel with the ROK's
nominal GDP growth rate and reached three hundred and ninety-nine million dollars in 1998.\(^{28}\)

The transition of ROK defence policy was founded on an ROK force improvement programme. The Ministry of National Defence of the ROK directed its acquisition policy to investigate core combat capabilities in order to improve the independent deterrent capability against both North Korea and other potential external threats. Furthermore, it decided to achieve a technology-oriented force structure through not only the acquisition of advanced defence technology as soon as possible but also the domestic production of major weapon systems.

In particular, the Gulf War had a great influence in changing the direction of the force development of the ROK. That conflict emphasised the importance of state-of-the-art weapon systems, and demonstrated key aspects of future warfare. Backed on these observations, the ROK decided to turn the direction of its force development into acquiring future-oriented military capability.\(^{29}\)

Until the mid-1990s, however, it was necessary for the ROK to continue to focus its force improvement towards completing its defence capability against the imminent military threat of North Korea. Since the mid-1990s, therefore, the ROK has been able to gradually develop future-oriented defence capabilities. It aimed to equip an advanced and high-quality national defence structure able to protect the ROK’s national interests and to contribute to the peace and stability of the region. For the successful accomplishment of the above goals, the ROK embarked on a series of national defence reforms to meet the demands of the changing global and regional strategic circumstances.\(^{30}\)

In the end, according to the ROK Defence White Paper 2000, the ROK set up mid- and long-term defence development objectives as shown in Table 6-3.
Table 6-3 Defence Development Objectives of the ROK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mid-term (Five Years)</th>
<th>Long-term (Fifteen Years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Strong, highly-motivated, and disciplined elite forces</td>
<td>1. Small, elite standing force with advanced defence capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Proud professionals filled with a sense of duty</td>
<td>2. Scientific, information-age forces armed with high-tech weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Efficient forces operated through management reform and defence digitisation</td>
<td>3. Economical forces operated rationally and efficiently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Armed forces loved and trusted by the people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In particular, the Ministry of National Defence of the ROK made great efforts towards digitisation of the ROK Armed Forces. The ultimate goals of ROK defence digitisation were first to support command and control and bring about a quick victory in war by providing real-time battlefield intelligence, and second to guarantee the economical operation of the military via efficient defence resource management. To fulfil these goals, the Ministry of National Defence of the ROK selected five core areas of concentration and fifteen main projects, and classified them into stages as a part of the digitisation policy of the ROK Armed Forces. In particular, it is focusing on constructing a C4I system and the defence resource maintenance system to lay the foundations for digitisation by building an ultra-high speed defence information communication network by 2005.31

In this context, the ROK military is in the process of constructing an integrated defence C4I system, joint and combined C4I systems, and a tactical C4I system for each service. In terms of the ROK Navy, it was announced in the 2000 Defence White Paper that the Korean Naval Tactical Data System (KNTDS) was already fully operational in certain operational theatres.32
Overall, during the period 1993-2001, the ROK invested its force development budget on the basis of the above defence policy as follows.

**Table 6-4 The Details of the Budget for Defence Investment (1993-2001)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Unified Project</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>12,866.0</td>
<td>7,417.5</td>
<td>8,824.7</td>
<td>6,297.4</td>
<td>35,405.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent (%)</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inc./Dec.</td>
<td>-11.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+1.9</td>
<td>+9.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the above Table shows, a similar proportion of the budget was allocated to the ROK Navy during the period 1982-1992. It illustrates that the circumstances for the naval development of the ROK did not improve even in the post-Cold War era. But a significant change was an increase in the budget for unified projects while the budget for the Army decreased considerably. This reflected the efforts of the digitisation of the ROK Armed Forces.

In short, in the post-Cold War era, the defence policy of the ROK took a new path towards the future-oriented force development of its Armed Forces in light of the lessons of the Gulf War and the dramatically changing world political system. Force development was aimed at small but strong future ROK military forces to confront both North Korea and potential future external threats. In this context, there was a remarkable change in the force improvement programme of the ROK. However, the continuing and developing North Korean threat caused the ROK to keep a strong ROK-USA combined defence system based on US augmentation, including the major deployment of US naval forces.
III. Towards a “Blue-water Navy”

A century ago the American Secretary of State John Hay prophetically stated, “the Mediterranean is the ocean of the past, the Atlantic is the ocean of the present, but the Pacific is the ocean of the future.” In the late Twentieth Century, the Asia-Pacific region experienced unprecedented economic growth. In particular, the Asia-Pacific region is inherently of a maritime nature and tied to the seas more than any other region in the world. The people of Asia and the Pacific rely upon the seas not just for their prosperity but also for their very livelihood. Eighty percent of Asia’s population lives within five hundred miles of the ocean.

Also, there are seas in the Asia-Pacific region that are filled with navigation choke points and strategic sea lines of communication, the arteries that carry the lifeblood of this region, which needs to trade, to exploit its resources, and to survive. In the post-Cold War era, however, the sea became a potential disputed area with problems concerning the demarcation of maritime borderlines, sea pollution, fishing, and the exploitation of ocean mineral sources. As a result, the ROK Navy has had to counter neighbouring maritime powers that have been competing for its maritime interests.

In this situation, the ROK Navy has had to continue to regard North Korean naval forces as its major threat, due to the unchanging North Korean military policy to communise the South by armed force. Despite economic difficulties, the North Korean Navy has continually improved its offensive capability. During 1993-2001, it added fourteen Sang-O class coastal submarines and sixty-five Kongbang-class high-speed air cushion landing craft. In 1991, construction of the Sang-O class started to help the North Korean Navy engaging in both infiltration operations and operations against sea lines of communication in case of war. The Kongbang-class was first reported in 1987,
and building continued until 1996. They were capable of supporting special forces and full scale landing operations against the ROK.\textsuperscript{33}

However, the North Korean Navy was forced to take out of service fifty-seven torpedo and gun fast attack craft, and three missile fast attack craft due to deterioration. Also, the North Korean Navy is mostly equipped with obsolete weapon systems, much of which is old and decrepit.\textsuperscript{34} The details of North Korean naval development are shown in Table 6-5.

Table 6-5 The Naval Development of North Korea (1993-2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>46,000</td>
<td>46,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines (patrol)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines (Midgets)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>+14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corvettes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast Attack Craft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun/Torpedo</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>-57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Craft</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>+177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Ship</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Craft</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>+65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>+188</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As table 6-5 shows, despite the serious economic difficulty, the North Korean Navy continued to develop its offensive capabilities by building coastal submarines and high speed landing craft. This was more than enough to be regarded as a critical threat to the ROK Navy.

However, in the post-Cold War era, the role of the ROK Navy was not simply to counter balance the threat posed by the North. It had to consider its force
development to meet the rapidly changing strategic situation against both North Korea and other regional countries. Therefore, to understand the changing ROK naval policy in the 1990s, it is necessary to analyse the comparative capability of the ROK Navy against both the North Korean Navy and other navies in the region.

By 1993, the ROK Navy was ahead of the North in fleet strength in tons by 1.1:1, although it was inferior to the North in the ratio of total numbers by 1:3.2. The details are as shown in Table 6-6.

Table 6-6 Comparison of Fleet Strength in Tons (1993)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>Ratio (NK: SK)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Total Tons</td>
<td>Aver. Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>50,070</td>
<td>634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Combatants(^1)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4,845</td>
<td>1,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Combatants(^3)</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>40,869</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Warfare</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>17,835</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliaries</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18,090</td>
<td>2,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>132,969</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1993, pp. 376-391.
1) Surface ships/ full load, submarines/ dived; 2) Destroyers and Frigates; 3) Corvettes and under

As the above Table shows, the majority of the North Korean naval forces - six hundreds and twenty naval ships in total - were composed of small vessels. In total and average tonnage, the ROK Navy left the North behind in all the component forces except submarines. In particular, the ROK Navy surpassed the North in both major and minor combatants in physical size and combat capability with modernized command and control systems and automated weapon control system. Therefore, despite the increasing threat of North Korean submarines, the above Table demonstrates that ROK
naval development during the first and second Yulgok Project was quite successful against the North Korean naval threat.

On the other hand, the ROK Navy was not in a favourable situation vis-à-vis the regional powers. It was estimated that the ROK was a far inferior fleet in strength compared with those of neighbouring countries. The details are as shown in Table 6-7.

Table 6-7 Comparison of Fleet Strength of Major Combat Ships (1993)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>5/ 1,985</td>
<td>37/ 90,717</td>
<td>17/ 42,790</td>
<td>241/ 1,546,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Carriers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4/ 189,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24/ 267,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>9/ 30,930</td>
<td>16/ 58,720</td>
<td>46/ 162,135</td>
<td>36/ 249,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>9/ 19,800</td>
<td>39/ 70,180</td>
<td>21/ 36,410</td>
<td>141/ 143,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23/ 52,715</td>
<td>92/ 219,617</td>
<td>84/ 241,335</td>
<td>446/ 2,395,496</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As Table 6-7 shows, the ROK Navy was the weakest naval power in the region. In accordance with a comparison of major combat ships in total tons, the ROK Navy had the least capacity, that is, a ratio of 1: 4.2 less than China, 1: 4.6 against Japan, and even 1: 45.4 against Russia although it would be 1: 12.7 against the Russian Pacific Fleet. Moreover, Japan’s Maritime Self Defence Force had already built a state-of-the-art combat ship, a 9,485-ton full load Aegis Destroyer called “Kongo.” Also, China introduced new classes of destroyers and frigates as well as further modifications to the older types in the 1990s.

Despite the above unfavourable situation, the ROK Navy was requested to support national maritime security interests as well as to contribute to regional stability.
and peace against the great naval powers in the region. The ROK Navy, therefore, had
to make every effort for its successful force development to meet new challenges and
opportunities. In this context, it was necessary for the ROK Navy to change the
direction of its force improvement from catching up with the North in numbers to the
development of core combat capability against any potential external threat in the
future.

In particular, Korean history has demonstrated that when peace and freedom
has prevailed at sea, the sea has brought Korea prosperity, but when not, it has brought
disaster. Furthermore, in East Asia in the past, naval power determined the power
configuration of the region, as in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904, and the US-Japanese War of 1941-1945. The ROK Navy, therefore, had
always been anxious not to repeat the tragedies of modern history in Korea caused by a
lack of naval power. With this in mind, the ROK Navy took a major step towards
adjusting its direction of force development to meet the changing strategic requirements.
This change is called the development of the ROK Navy towards a “Blue-water Navy.”

In accordance with an official definition of the ROK Navy, the “Blue-water
Navy” means the Navy - “equipped with high endurance operational capability suitable
for used at long range in blue waters to protect national interests and to support the
accomplishment of national policy.”35 In this context, the ROK Navy has directed its
force development to build up appropriate deterrent capability as a naval power of an
independent nation, to play the role of a balancer to enhance regional peace and
stability, and to provide an operational capability other than war in concert with its
national power.

In the process of turning the direction of force development of the ROK Navy,
biennial RIMPAC (Rim Pacific) combined naval exercises have assisted the ROK
Navy. Its first participation in RIMPAC in 1990 showed the ROK Navy “how inferior and small its ships were in comparison with those of the other participants such as the USA, the UK, Japan, Australia, Canada and Chile.” And it vividly realized “how important advanced technology and weapon systems are in naval warfare.” In addition, the biennial “International Sea Power Symposium” since 1989 and the annual “On-board Workshop” since 1992, hosted by the ROK Navy contributed to guiding the future of naval development of the ROK. In particular, ROK naval development was boosted by the changes of ROK defence policy discussed in first part of this chapter, especially the return of peacetime operational control authority over the ROK Armed Forces from the USA in 1994. Consequently, during the above period, the ROK Navy was able to turn the direction of its force development from a pro-quantitative to a pro-qualitative one.

Therefore, during this period, the fleet strength of the ROK Navy was reduced in total number but its combat capability improved. The ROK Navy deleted twenty-one old ex-US units, that is, four DD, one FAC (missile), two LST, six LSM, two ARS, two ATA, and four AO. Also, the ROK Navy removed twenty-nine PK (including the twelve PK transferred to the Philippines) and five PGM. On the other hand, the ROK Navy supplemented its fleet strength by its independent shipbuilding programme, thirty-seven naval ships in total: nine Changbogo-class and seven midget submarines; three Okpo-class destroyers; two Ulsan-class frigates; one Pohang-class corvette; four Alligator-class LST and one Solgae-class LCF; three Swallow-class MHC; one Yangyang-class MSC; one Wonsan-class ML; one Chunghaejin-class ASR; and three Chunjee-class AOR. Also two salvage ships (ARS/ATS) were obtained from the USA.
From 1993 to 2001, under a "Blue-water Navy" policy, the ROK Navy developed as follows.

### Table 6-8 Naval Development of the ROK During 1993-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Submarine</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midget</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Destroyer</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frigate</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corvette</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fast Attack</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Missile</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gun</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amphibious Warfare</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mine Warfare Ship</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Auxiliary Ship</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Total</strong></td>
<td>53</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>218</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the above development, the most important thing was that the ROK Navy ceased building Korean design frigates, corvettes, and fast attack craft after commissioning two Ulsan-class FF, one Pohang-class PCC, and several PKM by 1993. Instead, it decided to build Korean-designed destroyers called KDX-class. However, the change in direction was not easy to accomplish. The ROK Navy first launched the KDX-class project in 1986. The first Okpo-class KDX-1 destroyer was to have been laid down at Daewoo Heavy Industry in late 1992 for completion in 1996 but the programme was delayed for two years because of extended definition studies. Finally,
the ROK Navy built three KDX-1 destroyers during 1998-2000, one each year. The KDX-1 destroyers had greatly improved combat capability as shown in Table 6-9.38

Table 6-9 Comparison of Combat Capability Between FF and KDX-1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>FF</th>
<th>KDX-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Displacement (full load)</td>
<td>2180 tons</td>
<td>3855 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimensions (metres)</td>
<td>102×11.5×3.5</td>
<td>135.4×14.2×4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSM</td>
<td>Harpoon (70NM)</td>
<td>Harpoon (70NM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Mk 48 Mod 2 VLS (8NM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns</td>
<td>2×76mm (12km), 4×30mm or 40mm</td>
<td>1×127mm (23km), 2×30mm (Goalkeeper)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>2×Mk 32 (Triple), 12× D/C, PHS-32</td>
<td>2×Mk 32 (Triple) DSQS-21BZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Data Systems</td>
<td>Link 11: three out of nine</td>
<td>Link 11, SATCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1 Super Lynx</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The above improvement in combat capability was very significant to the ROK navy because of the critical weaknesses of the Ulsan-class frigates, which were: (1) the lack of anti-air warfare capability and (2) the incapacity to embark helicopters. To counteract these shortcomings, the KDX-1 class destroyers were equipped with Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missiles and a Super Lynx helicopter. In addition, in terms of sea-air cooperative anti-submarine warfare operations, the KDX-1 made a great contribution because it compensated the ROK Navy for the deletion of the ex-US destroyers. In fact, the ROK Navy regards the remaining ex-US old destroyers as being very important because of their capability for the embarkation of an ASW helicopter. That is the reason why, until 2003, the ROK Navy still maintains five old and out-of-date ex-US destroyers, which were first commissioned in 1945.

Despite of the enhanced combat capability of KDX-1 class destroyers, they are inferior to the major combatants of other neighbouring naval powers in physical size and modernized weapon systems. Therefore, recently, the ROK Navy intends to build
three 4,800 tons full load KDX-II class destroyers, a larger version of the Okpo, for completion during 2004-2006, one each year. Furthermore, in accordance with an official announcement of the Ministry of National Defence of the ROK in 2002, the ROK Navy is going to acquire the first Aegis-class KDX-III destroyer in 2008. The above KDX-I, II, and III programmes demonstrate how the ROK Navy has revised the direction of its force improvement for the future.

The second obvious change is that the ROK Navy has succeeded in building submarines domestically by importing technology from Germany. Acquiring submarines was a long-held desire of the ROK Navy since its very beginning. But due to the strong objection of the USA and to its deficiency of economic and technical strength, it was not able to fulfil this desire until the late 1980s. At last, the “818 Plan” strongly supported the ROK Navy in acquiring submarines, as it called for the ability to implement a more independent military strategy and improve its independent deterrent capability against North Korea and other potential external threats. In this context, in 1987, the ROK Navy successfully launched a project for submarines.

For this purpose, the ROK Navy cooperated with the German Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft (HDW) Shipbuilding Company. One submarine was built at Kiel in Germany by HDW, two submarines were assembled at Daewoo Shipbuilding Company in Korea, and Daewoo built six more submarines. Finally, the first Korean submarine, 1,285 dived tons Chang-Bogo (Type-209 class) was commissioned in 1993. As of 2002 a total of nine Chang-Bogo class submarines were operating for the ROK Navy.

In addition, the ROK Navy is planning to acquire three 1,860 dived tons Type-214 class Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarines. They are to be built by Hyundai heavy Industries in Korea for delivery in 2007, 2008 and 2009, with the German Submarine Corporation led by HDW, providing construction plans, materials
and other equipment. Because of the above programmes, the ROK Navy has been successful in acquiring a domestic submarine building capability.

With the acquisition of these submarines, the ROK Navy established a Submarine Flotilla in 1993 and developed it enthusiastically by posting its most talented personnel and supporting it with the highest priority. As a result, the submarine force has developed as a very significant component in the ROK Navy, being able to provide a competent deterrent capability for national maritime security. It has demonstrated the excellent talent of Korea for developing a maritime enterprise within such a short period without any tragic submarine accidents.

A third important aspect is that the ROK Navy decided to develop other operational capabilities through independent construction of substitute ships for old ex-US naval ships. In the 1990s, it improved its amphibious warfare capability by building four Korean-designed 4,278 tons full load Alligator-class LSTs as substitutes for superannuated ex-US LSTs commissioned in the early 1940s. They have improved amphibious warfare capability by stern ramp for underway launching of LVTs, a helicopter deck, and a lengthened bow ramp. Also, it is said that in due course three more ships may be added, and in October 2002, the Ministry of National Defence of the ROK officially launched a domestic shipbuilding project for a 13,000-ton Korean design LPX amphibious transport dock.

Also, the ROK Navy developed its mine warfare capability independently by building six GRP hulled Swallow-class MHC and one Yangyang-class MSC by Kangnam Corporation, and one Wonsan-class ML by Hyundai Heavy Industry. In addition, it considerably improved fleet support capability at sea by the domestic building of three Chunjee-class AOR equipped with underway replenishment stations.
on both sides, one Chunghaejin-class ASR (a multipurpose salvage and rescue ship), and one trials support ship (YAG).46

Through the above developments, the ROK Navy did its best to improve its fleet strength, although it was not able to reduce inferiority to neighbouring great naval powers. As of 2001, its total tonnage of major combat ships was only 23% of that of Japan, 19% of China, and 6% of Russia. The details are shown in Table 6-10.

Table 6-10 Comparison of Fleet Strength in 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>DPRK</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major Combat ships</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>20/12,662</td>
<td>84/51,422</td>
<td>65/155,094</td>
<td>17/45,950</td>
<td>63/601,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1/58,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-/98,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>8/28,915</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21/89,860</td>
<td>42/199,440</td>
<td>14/109,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>9/19820</td>
<td>3/4,640</td>
<td>41/76,091</td>
<td>10/21,870</td>
<td>54/101,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Total</strong></td>
<td>37/61,377</td>
<td>87/36,062</td>
<td>127/321,045</td>
<td>69/267,260</td>
<td>139/2,395,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2001</strong></td>
<td>23/52,715</td>
<td>80/54,915</td>
<td>92/219,617</td>
<td>84/241,335</td>
<td>446/970,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1992</strong></td>
<td>+14/8,662</td>
<td>+7/1,147</td>
<td>+35/1,0428</td>
<td>-15/25,925</td>
<td>-307/-1425455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Small Combatants</strong></td>
<td>116/47,208</td>
<td>502/36,950</td>
<td>338/89,101</td>
<td>3/150</td>
<td>132/33,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Warfare</td>
<td>16/10,340</td>
<td>24/1,440</td>
<td>95/31,422</td>
<td>27/23,505</td>
<td>62/27,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Warfare</td>
<td>31/49,052</td>
<td>266/23,775</td>
<td>109/124,177</td>
<td>21/24,005</td>
<td>50/127,641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliaries</td>
<td>7/32,978</td>
<td>9/18,090</td>
<td>92/294,208</td>
<td>55/105,751</td>
<td>149/871,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (Average Tons)</strong></td>
<td>207/234,539</td>
<td>893/139,567</td>
<td>761/859,953</td>
<td>175/420,671</td>
<td>582/1,955,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the above table shows, China improved its major combat capability in both number and tons by an increase of five modern destroyers (one Luhai-class DDG, two Sovremenny-class DDG and two Luhu-class DDG) and some submarines including four Kilo-class patrol submarines introduced from Russia.47 Also, Japan increased the total tonnage of major combat ships in spite of a reduction to four destroyers and eleven frigates in total. It demonstrates that Japan has focused the development of its major combat ships on the improvement of a modernized total combat capability with large
physical size rather than quantity.\textsuperscript{48} Russia, however, due to its economic difficulties, reduced its fleet strength dramatically. Nevertheless, it remained a great naval power. For example, its Pacific Fleet kept strong combat capability, totally 296,384-ton including 5 SSBN, 4 SSGN, 5 SSN, 4 SSK, 1 CG, 5 DDG, 8 FFG, 6 FF/FFL, and 18 Corvettes, 56 ships in total.\textsuperscript{49}

Also, during the above period, the ROK Navy improved maritime air capability in both ship-borne and land-based aircraft. First of all, the ROK Navy introduced eight Lockheed P-3Cs Orion Update III aircraft between 1995 and 1996. These made a significant contribution to enhancing its broad maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare capabilities. However, another plan for introducing eight other P-3Cs stalled because of funding constraints after the ROK financial crisis in 1997. Consequently, the ROK Navy has been maintaining eight old S-2A/F maritime patrol aircraft, which were introduced in the mid 1970s and the early 1980s from the USA and which will be substituted by new aircraft in the future.\textsuperscript{50} Secondly, during the above period, the ROK Navy acquired nineteen “Westland Super Lynx (Mk 99/100)” from the UK. They improved anti-submarine warfare capability against North Korea’s enormous submarine threat.

On the whole, the above development of the ROK Navy was very significant because it covered a transitional period converting from quantitative naval development to qualitative. The ROK Navy changed the direction of its force development to meet the future requirements for the national maritime security and prosperity in an uncertain world and regional strategic situation. As a result, the ROK Navy was becoming a highly competent three-dimensional coastal defence navy led by Okpo-class (KDX-1) destroyers, Changbogo-class submarines and P-3C and Super Lynx maritime aircraft.
In particular, with the above development, the ROK Navy made a considerable contribution to enhance friendly relationship with neighbouring countries by traditional "showing the flag." As a signal of the restoration of friendly military relations, two frigates of the ROK Navy visited Russia in September 1993, and two frigates accompanied by one logistic support ship (AOR) visited Japan in December 1994. In 1994, in addition, the ROK and Russia concluded the Agreement on the prevention of Incidents at Seas beyond Territorial Waters. In 1999, a combined search-and-rescue exercise was conducted for the first time by naval ships and aircraft between the ROK Navy and JMSDF on the high seas southeast of Cheju Island of the ROK. Furthermore, in 2000, the ROK and China agreed to mutual visits by naval ships in the Defence Ministers Talks, and the ROK and Russia agreed to conduct purely peace-oriented combined search-and-rescue naval exercises between the two navies.

IV. Conclusion

From the beginning, the ROK Navy had the objective of becoming a competent sea-control navy contributing to the deterrence and victory in war against its enemies, and the promotion of national maritime interests and national prestige. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, it was necessary for the ROK Navy to concentrate its efforts on the surrounding area of the Korean peninsula and the North Korean naval threat as a subordinate force to the US Navy under the continuous ROK-USA combined defence system.

All of sudden, however, the end of Cold War dramatically changed this situation to a rapidly changing world and more diverse regional security environment. As a result, the ROK needed to develop its defence capabilities to meet both the
imminent North Korean military threat and potential external threats in the uncertain
and complex post-Cold War era. In particular, it was required to protect disputed
maritime security and interests directly against neighbouring great naval powers.

Under the changing strategic situation, the defence policy of the ROK for the
"Koreanization of national defence of Korea" supported the change of direction of force
development of the ROK Navy from "catching up with the North" to contribution to the
achievement of maritime security and interests with neighbouring countries. In this
course, the post-Cold War period saw the ROK turned the direction of its force
development towards a "Blue-water Navy."

Through the transition, the ROK Navy developed as a highly competent three-
dimensional coastal defence navy starting with Okpo-class Korean destroyers, Type-
209 class submarines and P-3C maritime patrol aircraft although, as before, it was
allotted the smallest portion of the ROK force improvement budget. As of 2003, the
ROK Navy had completely turned the direction of its force development towards a
"Blue-water Navy."

Despite the above successful achievement, there were certain obstacles to the
ROK Navy in its process of development towards a "Blue-water Navy." Firstly, the
North Korean nuclear problem continued to force the ROK to lean to the ROK-USA
combined defence system, especially the significant deployment of US naval forces to
counter the development of North Korea's asymmetric WMD systems with the
enormous conventional military capability.

Secondly, the ROK Navy unexpectedly encountered twice North Korean naval
provocations in the Yellow Sea called "Yonpyong Naval Warfare" in 1999 and 2002. In
particular, the first Yonpyong Naval clash caught world attention because it was the
first regular battle between the two Koreas since the Armistice Agreement. During the
first Yonpyong naval clash, the ROK Navy defeated the North with some minor damage by sinking one North Korean Torpedo Fast Attack Craft and destroying five other small combatants. For the second “Yonpyong naval clash,” however, the North Korean Navy sank a PKM of the South by sudden fires at close range, but the small combatant of the North was also heavily damaged with considerable casualties due to fierce return fire from the PKM.51

In addition to the above two events, in the 1990s North Korea committed several other major provocations at sea against the South: a submarine infiltration in September 1996, an infiltration by a Yugo-class midget submarine which ran aground near Sokcho city on 22nd June 1998, and semi-submersible vessel infiltration in August 1997 and December 1998.52 These above North Korean provocations proved the fact that the possibility of another war in the Korean peninsula did not decrease, and that the sea had become a more critical factor in the security of the two Koreas.

In this context, there are still strong persistent forces to support the force development of the ROK Navy against the “North Korean threat” under the strong ROK-USA combined defence system. This is the major hindrance to the current blue-water naval development of the ROK. Particular concern is that the time for the replacement of the ROK first-generation combat ships - FF, PCC and PKM - is coming. The decision as to whether the ROK Navy will continue to direct its efforts towards the “Blue-water Navy” or return to construction against the North will be a very important one in the maritime security and prosperity of the ROK in the future.

The naval development of a nation is a long-term project because of the 8-11 years of acquisition time for major naval ships, 20-30 years of ships’ life and 10-15 years possible extension by modernization. Due to the above characteristics, the change of a naval fleet is a very slow and gradual process. Under the uncertain security
situation, the current decisions for the future naval development of the ROK will critically influence its future national security and prosperity. This is the reason why the prophetic wisdom and insight on the future naval development of the ROK is desperately required by the Koreans.
End Notes

1 Under the Bush administration, the USA adopted the so-called ‘Base Force’ strategy for downsizing and reconfiguring its overall military strength while retaining a modest forward deployed force presence in both Europe and the Asia-Pacific. The US Defence Department implemented this posture in the region through the East Asia Strategy Initiative (EASI), first introduced in April 1990. A force strength reduction of approximately 32,000 personnel was scheduled for implementation between 1990 and 1995, bringing US forces down from 135,000 to 102,000-103,000 personnel. For more details, see the Statement by Admiral Charles R. Larson, Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Command before the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, Foreign Affairs Committee, US House of Representatives, Implications of the US Withdrawal From Clark and Subic Bases, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 5 March 1992, p. 4.


7 Prior to that time, an American flag officer filled this position. North Korea refused to accept his credentials arguing that the ROK representative was illegible to fill this position since it did not sign the Armistice Agreement at the end of the Korean War. See, Far Eastern Economic Review, 4th April 1991, p. 11.


9 President Tae-Woo Roh launched ‘Northern Diplomacy’ after his inauguration in 1988. Northern Diplomacy meant the normalization of relations with the former and current socialist states located mostly to the north of the Korean peninsula. For further details, see Korean Overseas Information Services, A Handbook of Korea (Seoul: Samhwa Printing co., 1993), pp. 301-392.


17 Since the death of Il-sung Kim on 8th July 1994, Jung-il Kim has ruled North Korea according to his father's last injunctions without official power succession.


26 On 7th- 8th October 1992 at the 24th SCM, the ROK and the USA agreed FDO to be used at the point of war. Flexible deterrence means a strategic concept that enables rapid deployment of combat forces, here centring on the US Air Forces and Navy to be dispatched if signs of a North attack are detected. For more details about the result, see Korea Herald, 9th October 1992.


31 The Ministry of National Defence of the ROK defined the defence digitisation as "the process of transforming the overall defence structure into an information and knowledge-based one using the latest information technology consisting of computers and high-tech communications equipment." For more details, see The Ministry of National Defence of the ROK, Defence White Paper 2000, pp. 166-176.


33 For more details, see Jane's Fighting Ships 2000-2001, pp. 400-405.


35 For more details on the 'blue-water navy' development and the ROK Navy, see the ROK Navy Internet site http://www.navy.go.kr/main-1.html.

36 See, the ROK Navy Headquarters, To the Sea, To the World: Fifty Years History of the ROK Navy with Photography, pp. 326-327.


43 ROK Navy Headquarters, To the Sea, To the World: Fifty Years History of the ROK Navy with Photography, p. 188, 197.


47 Jane's Fighting Ships 2001-2002, pp. 112-123.


50 In 28th June 2001, the Ministry of National Defence of the ROK decided to introduce additional 8 P-3C in due time. See Kukmin Ilbo, 29th June 2001, p. 4.


Chapter 7 Force Planning for the Future

I. Current Issues and Debates on the Naval Development of the ROK

Korea stands at the crossroads of its own destiny because of North Korea’s severe economic difficulties, political instability, and international isolation. In accordance with research using the “Delphi Technique” on the unification of the Korean peninsula, eighty-percent of ROK and US respondents out of forty expected unification between 2005 and 2010. Whether it will come true or not, the ultimate unification of the Korean peninsula will clearly constitute a critical turning point in the history of Korea as well as in the region’s history.

As it stands in 2003, the ROK is a wealthy maritime country, with the sea a critical factor to its national security and prosperity. Nonetheless, it is not yet equipped with an appropriate level of naval power to ensure its national interests and objectives. Also, in East Asia, the regional strategic situation remains complex, unsettled, and insecure. Furthermore, the allied relationship between the ROK and the United States is in a transition process and will be fundamentally changed upon the unification of the Korean peninsula.

In this context, from the middle of the 1990s, the ROK Navy started to change its direction of force development towards a “Blue-water Navy” to meet new challenges and opportunities. To support the change, the ROK Navy has launched a series of academic debates such as biennial “International Seapower Symposium” since 1989 and annual “On-board Workshop” since 1992. In particular, through the seven “International Seapower Symposia,” a number of distinguished scholars and high-ranking officers have been invited from twelve countries including the ROK, the USA, China, Russia, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Canada, the UK and Germany to discuss maritime security in East Asia and the future of the ROK Navy. These events
greatly contributed to the awakening of South Koreans to the importance of the sea and maritime power in the security and prosperity of both Korea and East Asia.

The main subjects of the Symposia were as follows in Table 7-1.

**Table 7-1 The Subjects of International Seapower Symposia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Main Subjects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: The 1st-7th International Seapower Symposium materials.
As the above Table shows, the Symposia focused on the broad issues of East Asian maritime security in the strategic context of the future development of the ROK Navy. Also, the annual “On-board Workshop” has been held with similar strategic issues and subjects discussed. As a result, the ROK Navy was successful in getting consonance with the necessity of its “blue-water” development turned in this direction in 1993.\(^3\) However, as of 2003, there is still considerable dissonance about “how to develop the future of the ROK Navy” because of a lack of deep understanding and experience on naval force planning.

In truth, from the beginning, the ROK Navy was not able to carry out force planning properly as a whole because it was established and developed mostly through American military aid. The Americans decided the force requirements of the ROK Navy according to their strategic considerations as a subordinate coastal defence navy in support of US naval forces in circumstances of a second Korean war. In 1974, despite the launch of the ROK self-reliant national defence programme, it was only possible to concentrate against the infiltrations of North Korean armed forces from the sea. In the early 1980s, the ROK Navy barely succeeded in developing independent anti-submarine platforms against the increasing North Korean submarine threat.

Therefore, during the Cold War, there was no comprehensive force planning in the ROK Navy. As a result, the ROK Navy had to meet the post-Cold War era with a fleet that lacked balance and capability when compared with other regional maritime powers. In particular, the current ROK Navy is in a dilemma because it has to make preparations to meet maritime threats from both North Korea and regional powers at the same time. As a result, the ROK force planners have to build the most effective naval forces to meet national security requirements against this dual maritime threat.
Consequently, in the post-Cold War era, there are various views in the circle of the ROK Navy on its future development.

First of all, there is a view on the ROK naval development for a balanced fleet, having anti-air, anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare capability. Dr. (Captain) In-soo Lim, a leader of this view, regards the aircraft carriers as a matter of course for the fleet, and suggests the size of the future ROK Navy as follows, seventy-two to seventy-four naval ships in total: two aircraft carriers (middle or small), six large surface combatants, thirty destroyers or frigates (over 2,000 tons), fifteen submarines (diesel and nuclear), two large and four to five middle amphibious ships, seven to eight mine warfare ships, and six logistic support ships.

Secondly, Dr. Il-sang Kim, a professor of the ROK Naval Command and Staff College, advocates the naval development of the ROK as a regional navy carrying out sea control against North Korea and sea denial against the other regional countries. For this purpose, he suggests two task forces composed of two ASW helicopter cruisers (CGH) or amphibious assault ships (LPH) instead of two aircraft carriers and sixteen destroyers. Also he recommends sixteen frigates, thirty-two corvettes and twenty-four fast attack craft for coastal defence, sixteen submarines, two large and middle amphibious ships, sixteen mine warfare ships, and twenty logistic support ships.

Thirdly, Rear Admiral (ret.) Young-O Kang recently argued the naval development of the ROK should be to adopt “a peninsula naval strategy” harmonizing maritime naval strategy and continental naval strategy so that the ROK Navy should carry out decisive battles and blockades against North Korea, and fleet-in-being and sea denial against other regional countries. For this purpose, he suggests the size of the ROK Navy as follows, one hundred and thirty-four naval ships in total: two small aircraft carriers, four Aegis destroyers, six destroyers, twenty frigates, fifty missile fast
attack craft, six nuclear submarines, eighteen diesel submarines, two large and eight middle amphibious ships, six mine helicopters, and twelve mine warfare ships.⁶

Fourthly, the view of Vice Admiral (ret.) Duk-dong Kang puts special emphasis on deterrence, capability, balancing between under-water, surface and air forces. For the purpose, he particularly suggests three Aegis destroyers, three strategic nuclear submarines, and twenty P-3C maritime aircraft. However, he objects to the acquisition of an aircraft carrier because of budget limitation, its vulnerability, Korea’s geographical characteristic, and its possible futility caused by modern technological innovation. Also, Dr. (Captain) Ho-sup Jung stands with Vice Admiral Kang on the aircraft carrier of ROK Navy.⁷

Finally, not a few people support submarine centred naval development as an asymmetric strategy against powerful regional powers. Shortly, in relation to the above various views on the naval development of the ROK Navy, the key issues are summarized as the following three categories: debates on (1) the necessity of Aircraft Carrier, (2) the development of small combatant in parallel with major surface ships, and (3) naval development centred on submarine forces. However, each claim has certain degrees of validity and justification but has considerable limitations as well because its advocates did not consider the whole process of force planning.

But, in accordance with a special contribution of the Chief of Naval Operations of the ROK Navy, the “blue-water” naval development includes two directions, one for a Task Fleet and the other for three Sea-sector Fleets. The Task Fleet will be formed by a certain number of task force battle groups, which would be composed of new destroyers, submarines and logistic support ships. The Sea-sector Fleets would consist of destroyers, frigates, and fast attack craft like the current
composition of ROK Fleets but improved in size and combat capability in comparison with that of the current forces.

Although the ROK Navy is developing a Task Fleet to carry out defensive sea control missions, the above direction for the future seems to focus continually on sea defence (sea denial) similar to the Cold War period. However, in the post-Cold War era, there was a fundamental regional political and strategic alteration. Therefore, the answer on the future development of the ROK Navy must be brought from the comprehensive process of force planning to meet new strategic requirements.

In this context, it is necessary for the ROK Navy to have a comprehensive understanding of the process of force planning (See Figure 4-1) in order to identify the many relevant factors and relationships among them. In general, force planning is the process of establishing military requirements based on an appraisal of the security needs of the nation, and selecting military forces to meet those requirements within fiscal limitations. And the key variables of force planning are objectives, strategy, forces, threat, and risk. 8

In particular, the overall purpose of force planning is to ensure that ends, means, strategy, and risk are consistent with the nation's desires. The US Naval War College’s standard text explains it as follows:

The nation's interests and objectives are the ends that the nation wishes to achieve. The elements of national power, including its economic, political and military capabilities, are the means. The nation’s strategy provides a plan of action on how these means will be used to achieve the nation’s objectives in the face of the threat. The military capabilities required to support the military component of the strategy are determined, and alternative force choices are evaluated. Since the nation rarely has overwhelming means or a perfect strategy, it is important that we assess overall risks before our final choices are made. 9

In the above context, the fundamental standard question of force planning is “do the military forces support the strategy such that national objectives are achieved at acceptable risk in face of the threat?” In this regard, the ultimate aim of naval force
planning is to build appropriate naval forces corresponding to national strategic requirements for the future. Therefore, the core of naval force planning is to identify and explain the various factors affecting future force requirements and capabilities. This is the process of strategic planning, which answers the fundamental question: “How shall a Navy plan to prepare for the long-term future?”

Since naval planning for the future is not easy job, the US naval force planning method is useful to analyse the confusion over the future ROK naval development. According to the US Naval Doctrine Publication 5 Naval Planning, as force planning is associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities, it must be performed both sequentially and simultaneously at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It means that the ROK Navy has to be able to support ensuring national interests and objectives, to carry out appropriate role and missions for the purpose, and to equip itself with sufficient war-fighting capabilities under the unique conditions of the maritime environment and trends of naval warfare. In addition, due to the special alliance with the US, the ROK Navy must consider the political context in its future development. Therefore, to develop correct naval forces, it is necessary for the ROK Navy to produce a force concept and capability through a comprehensive examination of the political, strategic, operational, and tactical contexts as a whole.

The aim of this chapter is to answer the following fundamental question for the ROK Navy: “Why and how will the ROK Navy grow in the future?” What is the validity and justification of the force planning of the ROK Navy in the political, strategic, operational, and tactical context for the enhancement of national security, regional stability, and world peace?
II. The Strategic Role of the ROK Navy

In the past development of the ROK Navy, its political and strategic influence was limited because of the alliance with the US and the effects of the quasi-civilian governments led by former ROK Army Generals over 31 years since 1961. With the alliance with the USA, the ROK Navy was restricted to that of an adjunct to the US naval forces. Also, despite the launch of a self-reliant national defence programme (the Yulgok Project) since 1974, the ROK Navy lagged behind on funding priority due to the pro-continental military strategy.

In particular, against the North Korean military threat, the ROK Army and the US Navy took the leading part in the defence of Korea according to the ROK-USA coalition strategy. In this regard, the strategic role of ROK Navy was to assist the US Navy in the case of another war in Korea. Consequently, during the Cold War period, the ROK Navy carried out mainly coastal defence missions to deny the possibility of a surprise attack by North Korean armed forces from the sea into the flank and rear of ROK ground forces. Furthermore, it did not need to concern itself too much with the regional maritime threat. Therefore, the ROK Navy tended to neglect major combat missions such as sea control and power projection, by depending on US naval reinforcement including aircraft carrier battle groups.

However, this limited role was acceptable to the ROK Navy during the Cold War period because not only did the ROK and the USA have common security objectives against the northern communist threat but also the ROK-USA combined defence strategy provided a reasonable guarantee for the security of the ROK against both North Korea and other regional powers.

The strategic situation of the ROK during the Cold War period is summarized in Table 7-2.
Table 7-2 The ROK Strategic Matrix in the Cold War Context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Force Planning Implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Contain North Korea</td>
<td>Coalition with the</td>
<td>• Dominance of the US guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Grand)</td>
<td></td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>• Focus only on the North Korean threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Deter and defeat North Korea attack</td>
<td>Combined defence</td>
<td>• Greater need for ground forces of the ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Depending deeply on the US deterrent capability and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>naval/air augmentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Forward defence</td>
<td>• Great need for defence capability along the 38th Parallel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Flexible response</td>
<td>• Capability for war throughout spectrum of conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(infiltration to general war)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Great need for reserve forces and US commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Great need for coastal defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Confidence building measures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the post-Cold War era, however, the political and strategic situation has been totally changed. In the political context, the most important thing is the fundamental change of the characteristics of the ROK-USA combined defence policy. In particular, it changed the value the two powers put on the DMZ. It is no more a frontier line of US containment policy but a national division line within Korea. As a result, the ROK-USA combined defence system is now only relevant against North Korea. Therefore, although the US remains as a regional balancer and stabilizer, there is scope for the ROK to pursue its national interests in the region on a more independent basis.

No ally commits itself out of pure altruism. US policy is always based on "US national interests" not on "ROK national interests," but includes desirably for mutual benefit. In this context, it is natural for the ROK to make appropriate alterations in its
strategy to correspond with political change. In the post-Cold War era, the regional strategic structure has become very complex and uncertain due to the demise of the Soviet Union. The Korean strategic situation is complicated by the mixture of continuity and change in the Cold War legacy. Therefore, it is necessary for the ROK to think more strategically (balancing of ends and means) to ensure national interests in the dramatically changing world and regional situation in which it finds itself.

In this regard, it is very important that the ROK must seriously consider its geo-political fate surrounded by regional great powers. In truth, by geography or geographical configuration, nations determine how they will face the world. Although the world and regional security systems change, threats wax and wane, and alliances emerge and deteriorate, the facts of geography are permanent. Therefore, geography is the most fundamental factor in the foreign policy of the ROK and the wellspring of national strategy.

In particular, Korea is very important for regional stability and peace as the buffer zone in the region. In regional history, whenever Korea was too weak to stand against hostile hegemony, Northeast Asia was engulfed by disaster. Once again, since the demise of the Soviet Union, the regional power system is undergoing change. Therefore, the ROK must establish national objectives and a strategy on the basis of geopolitical reality. Considering the power constellation in Northeast Asia, the objectives of ROK and unified Korea must be a “balance of power” to preclude hostile hegemony in the region. In this regard, the ROK national strategy should one of “alliance” to foster stability. Also, ROK military strategy must focus on “collective defence” and “cooperative security.”

The post-Cold War strategic considerations of the ROK are as follows in Table 7-3.
Table 7-3 The ROK Strategic Matrix in the Post-Cold War Era

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Force Planning Implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Balance of Power (Preclude hostile hegemony in the region)</td>
<td>Alliances to foster stability</td>
<td>• Limited US contribution to the ROK against regional powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Grand)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Multiplying threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Great need for flexible and open relationship with the regional powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Deter attack on the ROK &amp; allies</td>
<td>Collective defence &amp; Cooperative security</td>
<td>• Great necessity for the balanced development of the ROK military forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Greater need for improving own deterrent capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Greater need for improving mutual relationship with regional powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward defence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Greater need for the contributions of the ROK Navy against regional powers and North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Continual defensive deployment along the 38th Parallel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexible defence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Capability for war throughout spectrum of conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Great need for independent deterrent capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Reduced need for reserve forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Confidence Building Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Intrusive Verification</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the above Table illustrates, the ROK must give proper heed to the importance of the sea and maritime strategy. For, as Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery proclaimed, “from the days when humans first began to use the seas, the great lesson of history is that the enemy who is confined to a land strategy is in the end defeated.” Furthermore, in the post-Cold War era, the responsibility of the ROK Navy is enormously increased. Not only must it deter North Korea as long as it remains, it must also promote and defend national interests against regional powers. In addition, the ROK must consider the fact that naval force development is an expensive and long-
term business involving a prediction of ten to forty-five year futures to meet the changing strategic situation and future security challenges in the region.  

Under the above political and strategic situation, the ROK Navy must be able to answer the following questions: (1) why does the ROK need a navy, and (2) why shall the ROK Navy grow in the future? First of all, “why does the ROK need a navy?” The answer flows from national interests that are the most important, basic, and nonnegotiable wants and needs of a nation. The overall national interests are normally expressed in terms of national survival and well-being. In order to advance, support or defend its national interests, a nation should spell out what a country is trying to do, its national objectives. In accordance with the ROK Defence White Paper, its national objectives are national security, economic prosperity, peaceful unification and permanent independence, and national prestige and world peace. 

In this context, the ROK needs a navy as a military means to support the accomplishment of its national interests and objectives at sea.

As of 2003, sea and maritime power are vital elements in ROK national interests. In general, the vastness of the sea covering two-thirds of the earth’s surface and the freedom to manoeuvre at sea allows nations to use it for obtaining political, economic, and military benefits. In particular, the sea is important to nations “(1) for the passage of goods and people, (2) for the passage of military force for diplomatic purposes, or for use against targets on land or at sea, and (3) for the exploitation of resources in or under the sea.”

In relation to the above use of the sea, firstly, the ROK depends on the sea heavily for a means of transportation. Sea-borne trade is ninety-nine percent of the whole foreign trade of the tenth largest trading state in the world. At present, the sea is the only possible way for the ROK to trade with other countries all over the world. In
particular, the ROK is totally dependent on the sea for the importation of strategic materials such as oil and grain. The use of the sea for transportation is vital to the economic prosperity of ROK and would become even more so upon the unification of Korea. Unification will restore the geo-strategic significance of the Korean peninsula as the strategic centre of the regional trade network incorporating the sea and land.\textsuperscript{18}

Secondly, the sea as a means of resources is generally becoming more important as a source of possible substitutes for land resources, which already show signs of diminution. The sea supplies various valuable resources to the ROK. In 2001, ocean industries took twelve percent of the GNP and are expected to increase gradually in the future. Also, the ROK will extract manganese from fifteen thousand km\textsuperscript{2} of Clarion-Clipperton zone in the central Pacific in the early 21\textsuperscript{st} century as it obtained the seventh digging right in 1994. At the same time, the usefulness of the sea related to resources increases the possibility of conflict at sea in the region. In this context, the ROK has unsolved maritime boundary disputes on the EEZ with both Japan and China.

Thirdly, the use of the sea as a means of power projection is directly related to the national security of the ROK. In East Asia, the sea can be effectively used as the medium of military purposes because of the region's ocean-centred geographical characteristics. For example, Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Brunei are island countries. Most of the regional countries have long coastlines and have direct access to the sea. Also, almost all of the large cities in the region are located along the coast or close to it. Furthermore, in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, the sea has been more crucial to all the regional countries as a trading route, a source of economic resources, and a potential conflict area related to the maritime boundary and territorial disputes.

The ROK continues to be threatened by North Korea. In this regard, the sea can be a way of invasion as well as a barrier for defence or a medium for power
projection. In particular, in the post-Cold War Era, the ROK needs directly to promote and defend national interests against the regional great naval powers such as Russia, China and Japan surrounding the Korean peninsula. Also, the ROK has a serious territorial dispute with Japan over Tok-do (or Takeshima) in the East Sea. In this context, the sea is becoming more important to the ROK in relation to national security. This means that a navy is absolutely necessary for the ROK to protect and secure the use of the sea for its own purposes as a means of transportation; resources, and power projection.

Then, the next question is "why will the ROK Navy grow in the future?" It is simply because the ROK Navy currently does not have the appropriate independent capability to ensure the use of the sea to promote and defend national interests. After the Korean War, the ROK was deeply indebted to US naval power to protect its security and economic development. But, in the post-Cold War era, the ROK is not able to rely its maritime security completely on the favour of the US Navy because of fundamental change of the political and strategic situation in the region.

On the way to the unification of Korea and even after unification, the strategic role of the US Navy will still be very important. However, naval development in the ROK must meet the future political and strategic requirements of Korea to promote national interests and regional stability. The ROK must give deep consideration to the credibility of the US commitment on reinforcing Korea. Superficially, there is no problem at all because the ROK-USA combined war plan (OPLAN 5027) continues to assume enormous US naval augmentation in case of another war in Korea.

However, in practice, the ROK must consider the enormous reduction of the US naval ships in total number in the post-Cold War era: 534 in 1989, 386 in 1994, and 296 in 1999. Some argue that while the US Navy is declining in size, it is actually
increasing in capability by reduction of older less capable ships and increasing number of ships with Aegis defence, VLS cells, and Tomahawk cruise missiles. 20

Many in the ROK, however, find such arguments unpersuasive given the truth: "no matter how capable a warship is, it can only be in one place at one time." For example, if a major crisis erupts in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere against the American interests, the planned US naval deployment would be unable to augment for the simultaneous event on Korea. Also, the second concern is the very high value of individual US naval ships in limited numbers. The US may be unlikely to commit valuable naval assets to risky scenarios of diminishing national interest. 21

In addition, although the US argues that it is a Pacific state and will continue to vigorously engage in the Asia-Pacific region, the US cannot help disengaging its commitment gradually in the region as the reduction of their military size demonstrates. Furthermore, the catastrophe of September 11th caused the US to devote its great efforts to their homeland defence, the anti-terrorism campaign and the Middle East. In this regard, China and Japan are improving their naval capability in answer to the above concerns.

Therefore, the ROK Navy must escape from the partial and subordinate function to the US naval forces and restore its independent function to protect and secure the use of the sea. Also, as a democratic state, ROK military forces must provide the potential for the application of force to ensure national security, the freedom of its people, and promotion of its national interests. Consequently, the ROK Navy ought to contribute in support of the accomplishment of national interests and the maintenance of regional stability.

Summing up, the role of the ROK Navy 22 can be defined as "to promote and defend the national interests by maintaining appropriate maritime superiority,
contributing to regional stability, and if necessary, conducting operations on and from the sea.” For the purpose, the objectives of the ROK Navy are identified to contribute to the following purposes: (1) deterrence of war, (2) crisis management, (3) maintaining regional stability, (4) securing sea lines of communication, (5) protection of maritime resources, and (6) guaranteeing victory in war if necessary.

III. What and How to Do: Missions and Force Concept of the ROK Navy

Because of the political and strategic context, it is obvious that in the post-Cold War era the ROK Navy is essential to the security and prosperity of Korea and must be equipped with appropriate capability to ensure the accomplishment of national interests against both North Korea and other regional powers. The next task is to establish answers to the following questions: (1) how will the ROK Navy accomplish its strategic role and objectives; and (2) what kind of forces must the ROK Navy develop for the purposes? The questions are directly related to “what to do (missions)” and “how to do (force concept).” The answer to the above questions will provide an understanding on the missions and force concept of the ROK Navy and the current issues and debates related to its future development.

Firstly, how will the ROK Navy accomplish its strategic role and objectives? This question is directly related to the operational context of force planning. And the operational context is dominated by naval missions since missions of navies focus on operational ends and objectives. According to US Admiral Stansfield Turner, the utility of navy missions is explained as follows.

1. To provide output of a navy as an effective explanation to sceptical taxpayers;
2. To help tactical commanders to keep objectives in mind;
3. To establish priorities for allocating resources;
4. To assist in selecting the best among several competing systems and;
5. To ensure that members of the organization focus on the whole rather than on one of its parts.24

As Admiral Turner explains, it is necessary for any navy, including the ROK to identify and establish its missions clearly in order to develop its future naval forces efficiently and competently. In the past, however, the missions of the ROK Navy were distorted by the defence policy makers mostly composed of army officers under the combined defence strategy with the USA. In particular, because of lack of understanding on naval warfare and operations, they regarded the ROK naval forces as the mere means to protect the flanks and rear of the ground forces. Consequently, in the past, the ROK Navy has tended to concentrate mainly on sea denial as part of a coast defence strategy, and supporting and enabling the US Navy to assert sea control.

In this regard, before searching for the missions of the ROK Navy, it is necessary to explain briefly the fundamental differences between land warfare and naval warfare. Naval warfare is completely different from land warfare because of the uniqueness of the sea. At sea, there is nothing like roads or obstacles to determine the limits and direction of the enemy's possible movements. Therefore, in locating an enemy and determining his movements, the chance of missing him is much greater at sea than on land. In particular, land warfare holds that control of territory has an influence upon the destiny of a nation and its people. Permanent garrisons may command territory on land. Consequently, land warfare's operational objectives are directly related to the seizure and occupation of the territory. But it is impossible to occupy the sea in the way one could the land. In general, the operational objectives of naval forces are controlling communications at sea. Furthermore, naval forces make contributions that affect events on land for the accomplishing of military purposes.
because mankind lives on the land, and what happens on land is the major purpose of war. 

Then, what will missions of the ROK Navy be concerned in the post-Cold War era? Overall, the purpose of navies is to promote and secure the use of the sea in peace and war. In this context, missions of navies are directly related to secure, dispute, and exercise of the use of the sea. However, navy missions are based on naval theory, which is generic. Therefore, the missions of the ROK Navy must be drawn from well-established naval theories.

In this regard, first of all, British Maritime Doctrine (BR1806) classifies the Royal Navy’s missions as (1) military, (2) constabulary, and (3) benign. Since the UK does not have a separate Coast Guard, the Royal Navy includes the constabulary roles in its missions. But US Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, focuses mainly on combat missions in war and peace because the US Coast Guard carries out the constabulary role. Therefore, the US Navy missions can be considered as much same as the military role of BR1806. But, in the post-Cold War era, the US Navy focuses more on power projection, and includes several constabulary and benign roles known as Naval Operations Other Than War (NOOTW) to support the Coast Guard and to promote national interests in abroad. Without the NOOTW, it does not seem to be very different from the Admiral Turner’s outline of the missions of the US Navy - strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, and naval presence.

In addition to the BR 1806 and US NDP 1, according to the views of S. G. Gorshkov, Eric J. Grove, Geoffrey Till, and K. Booth, missions of the ROK Navy are classified as peacetime and wartime missions. The dominant factor in ROK force planning must, however, be the combat mission in wartime, although peacetime missions affect the process of naval force planning.
The missions of the ROK Navy are classified as follows in Table 7-4.

Table 7-4 Missions of the ROK Navy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Peace</th>
<th>War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>● Deterrence</td>
<td>● Sea Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Naval Presence</td>
<td>● Power Projection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-combat</td>
<td>● Non-combat Support Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In peacetime, the purpose of the ROK Navy is (1) to check and to deter external threats against its national interests, (2) to protect national sovereignty and interests at sea, and (3) to support foreign policy and to improve national prestige. Therefore, the peacetime missions of the ROK Navy should be based on the need for (1) deterrence, (2) naval presence, and (3) non-combat support operations.

Firstly, in terms of the deterrence mission, this is an obvious need to deter aggression from a practically imminent attack by North Korea and other potentially hostile regional powers. This is vital for the survival of the ROK. "Deterrence," however, is the state of mind brought about by a credible threat of retaliation, a conviction that the action being contemplated cannot succeed, or a belief that the costs of action will exceed any possible gain. In this regard, the presence of naval forces or their movements to a crisis area are two of the strongest deterrent signals that nations can send. 30

However, in the past, the ROK Navy was hardly able to contribute to such deterrence because of its lack of combat capability. Consequently, the ROK depended for its "deterrence" power primarily on the US Navy and only carried out deterrent roles itself by denial of accomplishment of the North Korean naval objectives. Therefore, in the post-Cold War era, it is necessary for the ROK Navy to equip an appropriate
"conventional deterrent" capability although it continues to rely on the alliance with the US for "strategic deterrence."

Secondly, "naval presence" signifies "naval diplomacy" in support of the accomplishment of national political objectives in peacetime and short of war. Naval forces can be used for the purpose symbolically, preventively, and reactively. According to BR 1806, the effectiveness of naval presence is dependent on the following naval combat capabilities: (1) amphibious assault, (2) air attack, (3) bombardment, (4) blockade, and (5) exposure through reconnaissance. In the past, the ROK Navy was not effective in this way because it focused on the coastal area and along the Northern Limit Line to repel the North Korean maritime threat.

Thirdly, in terms of "non-combat support operations," although the ROK maritime police carry out the constabulary role, it is necessary for the ROK Navy to carry out this mission in relation to the 200-mile EEZ, anti-piracy, counter-maritime terrorism, disaster relief, and peacekeeping missions.

On the whole, the above three peacetime missions are underpinned by the effective and credible combat capability of the ROK Navy. Furthermore, in the post-Cold War era, the ROK Navy cannot guarantee maritime security by a coastal defence strategy against regional powers or even against North Korea. Therefore, the ROK Navy has to establish combat missions in wartime as "sea control" and "power projection." Without these capabilities, the ROK Navy is unable to protect and promote national interests, and to escape from an inappropriate force structure.

"Sea control" is the limited form of command of the sea, described as the freedom to use the sea for one's own purposes and to deny its use to the enemy. It is the most important naval mission because it is the foremost condition for the successful accomplishment of other naval operations. It is not a sufficient condition to achieve
ends but a necessary one. Also it is the process necessary to create a required situation
to allow the use of the sea for further purpose of “exercising command,” notably in the
form of “power projection” to affect events ashore. On the other hand, “power
projection” is the application of maritime power from the sea to influence events on
land directly. Maritime power projection is a key factor to win a war by paralysing an
enemy’s war fighting capability through strike-operations on strategic targets, and
making the enemy convert from offensive to defensive in its force employment.

However, sea control and power projection are not mutually exclusive. Without a certain degree of sea control in order that an opponent is not able to frustrate
one’s military or commercial operations, power projection cannot be carried out.
However, power projection assists sea control by dealing with land-based threats to sea
use. Therefore, the two combat missions must be balanced by each other because, at the
highest level, maritime power is after all about influencing events on land in time of
crisis or war.

In particular, according to BR 1806, the method of acquiring sea control is
categorized in two ways: (1) offensive operations against enemy forces and (2)
defensive protection of shipping. Operations against enemy forces can be accomplished
through (1) decisive battle, (2) blockade, and (3) fleet-in-being. Protection of maritime
trade is carried out through (1) accompanying, (2) escorting, and (3) convoys. Also
there are five levels of sea control, which are (1) absolute control, (2) working control,
(3) disputed control, (4) enemy working control, and (5) enemy absolute control.

Furthermore, Admiral Turner suggests the four tactical approaches to achieve
sea control objectives as (1) sortie control, (2) chokepoint control, (3) open area
operation, and (4) local engagement. For these purposes, the following weapons
systems are generally utilised.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Submarines</th>
<th>ASW Aircraft</th>
<th>Fighter Aircraft</th>
<th>Surveillance Systems</th>
<th>Attack Aircraft</th>
<th>Mines</th>
<th>Escort Ships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sortie Control</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chokepoint Control</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Area Control</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Engagement</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to Admiral Stansfield Turner, power projection covers a broad spectrum from nuclear attack to preventive naval presence. The core part of US power projection is composed of (1) amphibious assault, (2) naval bombardment, and (3) tactical air support. The concept of power projection is, however, not an exclusive term for maritime superpowers but is also relevant to the ROK Navy, albeit on a lesser scale.

In this regard, power projection for the ROK Navy can be categorized as follows.

1. Naval fires against the shore
2. Limited tactical air support against the land
3. Fully capable transport and protection of augmentation forces and logistic support
4. Disembarkation, embarkation and evacuation of military forces ashore

In general, in the past, the ROK Navy was limited in its development of sea control and power projection capabilities. As a result, it became a fleet unsuitable for deterrence, gunboat diplomacy, and victory in war. It is not even able to carry out independent amphibious operations for the elite ROK Marine Corps although this is desperately necessary to deter North Korea and to contribute to the victory of war. Therefore, the ROK must be developed as a competent sea control navy with the
appropriate power projection capability. However, a fully offensive power projection capability against North Korea could damage deterrence and stability in relation to the regional powers. Therefore, the ROK Navy should approach power projection with the limited purpose of deterring and defending against any act of aggression that threatens its territory or vital interests.

The above understanding of sea control and power projection is the foundation of the current issues and debates on the future development of the ROK Navy. In terms of the debates on the necessity of acquiring, utilising and maintaining an aircraft carrier, the concept of sea control gives the answer. Since sea control contains control of the surface, sub-surface and the air above the surface, the control of airspace is an important dimension. In this regard, the minimum requirement for a successful naval operation is a favourable air situation to avoid an unacceptable threat to one’s own forces although air superiority is highly desirable.

As the ROK Navy carries out the sea control mission, the aircraft carrier is the most desirable platform because it provides broad area sea control capability, a 200-mile radius sector in the US navy’s case. If the ROK Navy acquires one or two aircraft carriers, it would gain naval superiority over the North Koreans and also contribute to the balance of power in the region. In relation to choice of the aircraft carrier, the ROK Navy must consider (1) reach, (2) type of mission, (3) level of threat, and (4) balance of power.

In terms of reach, when the ROK considers the protection of vital sea lines of communication to far distant areas, the ROK Navy might only need to acquire a small sea control aircraft carrier. But, if the ROK stresses more offensive sea control and power projection missions, it would require a medium or large aircraft carrier. Also, in relation to the level of threat, for the deterrence and victory of war against the North
Korea and the balance of power with the regional powers, medium-class aircraft carriers are most desirable to the ROK Navy. Overall, considering the current and potential strategic requirements of Korea, it is necessary for the ROK Navy to acquire one or two medium-class aircraft carriers equipped with strong sea control capability but limited power projection capability.

The second issue is the debate on the future construction of small patrol craft (missile armed or not) in parallel with major surface ships. Proponents of small patrol craft emphasize the necessity for combat capability against numerous North Korean surface combatants and harmony between sea control and sea denial as a peninsula country. But this view is fallacious because it assumes mainly surface-to-surface engagement against the North. During the Gulf War, it was proved that Lynx helicopters with SEA SKUA missiles were ideal against Iraq’s small fast maritime force. Therefore, the ROK Navy ought to develop operational plans against the North Korean surface combatants to include air-to-surface attack using its own air strike assets and surface combatant-borne helicopters equipped with missiles.

Also, the supporters of small craft are likely to overestimate North Korean surface capabilities. The North Korean submarine forces are indisputably a dangerous maritime threat to the ROK. But the North Korean surface forces are mainly for sea denial and limited surprise landing operations, and very vulnerable in defence. Therefore, even if they succeed in seizing a limited area of the South temporarily, after a while they would have to retreat to their bases because of their operational limitations, especially logistics and weather condition at sea. Moreover, it seems that the ROK Navy will be able to defeat them by using existing anti-surface forces (PCC, PGM, PKMM, and PKM) and the modernized ROK maritime police forces.
In relation to their theory on the harmony of sea control and sea denial, it must be by the Admiral Turner's method, that is, (1) denying an enemy the right to use some seas at some times, and (2) asserting one's own right to use some seas at some times.\textsuperscript{40} In this context, the ROK Navy must focus on "assertion of sea control" to the area of surrounding the Korean peninsula or even further, but "denial of sea control" must be directed at the enemy's sea line of communication or coast. In this context, the further construction of sea denial small combatants of the ROK Navy is a most unsuitable and inefficient project.

The third issue, the debate on submarine-oriented naval development for an asymmetric strategy against regional powers, also reflects a biased view. In particular, as Eric Grove points out, peacetime use of naval forces is an ever-increasing mission of navies.\textsuperscript{41} But submarines are not an appropriate platform for this purpose. They are a platform mainly for sea denial and deterrence as well as their contributions to sea control operations. The necessity for the ROK is not sea denial but the balance between denial of sea control and assertion of sea control.\textsuperscript{42} In this regard, submarines are very important to the ROK Navy for deterrence, denial of sea control, and assistance of sea control.

The next consideration is about what kind of forces the ROK Navy should develop, that is, the force concept in the tactical context. The important of tactical level in force planning can be explained by Wayne P. Hughes' parable of the huntsman and his dog: "the hunter is master, but he won't catch foxes if he has not bought and trained a birddog."\textsuperscript{43} Also Karl Von Clausewitz warns force planners to consider "whether all strategic planning rests on tactical battle or not, because everything turns on tactical results."\textsuperscript{44} In this context, it is extremely important for the ROK Navy to ensure its force planning to accommodate tactical trends. For, if it develops naval forces based on old-
fashioned and wrong concepts, the result would be critical failures in battles of the future. That is why the ROK naval force planning needs to consider the tactical context.

The tactical context is directly related to decide the "force concept" of the ROK Navy, and to ensure the concept to fulfil strategic requirements and coincide with trends of naval warfare. It is indeed the most complicated but important task in the process of force planning. Resources of a nation are always limited and strategic requirements generally have durability. Consequently, the most important thing in naval force planning becomes to concentrate on maximizing the capability of systems installed on an appropriate platform.

In relation to the force concept of ROK Navy, there are two fundamentally different force options: the concept of (1) "battle forces" and (2) "strike forces." The concept of battle forces means to hold both defensive and offensive capability against enemies. Aircraft carrier battle groups or surface action groups are examples of battle forces. These forces are the means of sea control and exercising naval influence. The sustaining of a distant operational capability make them able to acquire sea control of broad area and then to accomplish further purposes at sea and ashore. Therefore, nations requiring the broad use of the sea choose a fleet composed of major surface ships.45

On the contrary, the concept of strike forces means to focus on creating a method of attack using speed, stealth and surprise, but to retain little defensive capability. Submarines, attack aircraft, and guided missile patrol craft are all examples of strike forces. These forces are practically applied as the means of denial and destruction. They are able to deny an enemy's capability to use the sea and to attack targets in the coastal area with powerful firepower. Consequently, strike forces are compatible with the interest of nations whose aim is sea denial.
The decision between these two force concepts will be extremely important to the ROK Navy because the direction of force planning will be dominated by the concept. However, it flows from the strategic and operational context, that is, strategic requirements and the combat missions of the ROK Navy. As the previous sections show, they can be summarized as follows.

1. Because of geo-strategic characteristics, the use of the sea is vital to the survival and prosperity of the ROK and a future unified Korea as it has been proved to be throughout the history of Korea.
2. In the post-Cold War era, the focus of major conflicts in the region is shifting from the land to the sea.
3. Therefore, it is absolutely vital for the ROK Navy to promote and defend national interests through its missions - deterrence, naval presence, non-combat support operations, sea control, and power projection.
4. Furthermore, the ROK or unified Korea must play a more positive and active role lest Northeast Asia should repeat its past aggressive control in the future.
5. In this context, the ROK Navy must improve its combat capability to deter and defend against aggression and to preclude hostile hegemony in the region.

Bearing these requirements in mind, it is clear that the force concept of ROK Navy must be the “battle forces” to gain control of the sea and to exercise limited power projection around the Korean peninsula. For Korea is a peninsular state, influenced decisively by the sea, and it is not able to ensure national interests by sea denial alone.

The next thing to do in the tactical context is to identify the required capability of “battle forces” of the ROK Navy. It means the ROK Navy has to accommodate trends of naval warfare in the development of its naval forces. In this regard, Bernard Brodie’s perception that tactical theories relevant to a specific situation decide not only the attributes of a fleet, but also the purpose of individual ships. This must be the foundation of tactical thought for the ROK Navy. In this context, Wayne P. Hughes Junior once again suggests a way forward: “the key to fruitful study of tactics is an
appreciation of how battles transpire in time and space.\textsuperscript{47} Also, Charles D. Allen stresses that to analyse how forces interact with each other in combat is very important in order to identify various links necessary for the developments of the capability of new systems.\textsuperscript{48} Therefore, it is necessary for the ROK Navy to understand the key elements of naval warfare and the basic process of naval engagement, that is, a tactical model of naval warfare, in order to build more capable future naval forces.

Wayne P. Hughes Junior classifies the key functioning elements of naval forces called tactical process into the following six categories: (1) firepower, (2) counterforce, (3) scouts, (4) anti-scouts, (5) command and control (C\textsuperscript{2}), and (6) C\textsuperscript{2} counter measures (C\textsuperscript{2}CM). These elements provide a clear picture on the functional network of naval forces.\textsuperscript{49}

The first element is "firepower," the capacity to destroy the enemy's ability to apply force. While armies historically are led and armed by men, navies are supported by weapons and manned with people to operate them. In particular, naval warfare centres on attrition, which comes from the successful delivery of firepower. Therefore, it is said that the tactical task of navies is the destroying and incapacitating the enemy's warships. In this regard, firepower is the first element of the processes of combat. Wayne P. Hughes Junior stresses the great naval maxim of tactics - "Attack effectively first" - for success in naval combat.

The second is "scouting," which is to locate the enemy sufficiently accurately to be able to deliver effective firepower. This is a crucial and integral process of tactics. In relation to scouting, land warfare has a lot of geographical limitations, but the sea has very little. The uniformity of the surface of sea allows naval commanders a lot of opportunities in the way of force employment. Therefore, Scouts are regarded as crucial in gathering and delivering tactical information about the enemy's position, movements,
vulnerabilities, strengths, and intentions by any and all means. The third element is "command and control," which enables naval forces to integrate their force capabilities in achieving the objectives. "Command" means to decide what is needed from forces, and "control" means to transform the need into action.

In fact, naval combat consists of dual activities against the enemy, called a force-on-force process. Therefore, to achieve victory, one side must attack effectively first. In this regard, actions against the enemy's firepower, scouting and C^2 are also fundamentally important processes of combat. These defensive actions are "Counterforce," "anti-scouts" and "C^2CM." "Counterforce" means the capacity to reduce the effect of the enemy's firepower. "Anti-scouts" are to destroy, disrupt, or slow enemy scouts. "C^2CM" are steps to limit the enemy's ability to decide (command) and disseminate decisions (control).

In addition to the above six key elements, there is a unique element in the roll-call of processes of combat - "manoeuvre." In the process of combat, through manoeuvre the various elements of a force get into position over time. When all elements are in a position to execute their assigned functions, it is said that the best chance of victory is established. Historically, manoeuvre has been used for the following three purposes: (1) advantageously concentrating offensive or defensive force, (2) striking more quickly, and (3) protection by evasion of weapons. Therefore, the ROK Navy needs to examine its role vis-à-vis manoeuvrability.

In addition to the above seven individual elements, naval force planners need to understand the flow of engagement through the development of a tactical model related to every combat mission which arranges the actions in the series of logical events. For instance, in relation to the sea control mission, the following figure illustrates an engagement time line. Although the example covers only one event and

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direction carried out only one set of forces, it is useful because it helps visualize a tactical engagement of naval forces. The diagram of an engagement time line is as follows in Figure 7-1.

Figure 7-1 An Engagement Time Line

As the above basic model shows, firstly, scouts and anti-scouts operate between “A” and “B.” During this phase, naval forces take actions to detect, track, and target the enemy forces while they concentrate to interfere with the actions to the enemy. Secondly, C² and C²CM emerge between “B” and “C.” In this phase, information supplied by scouting must be filtered through the circulating process of assessment, decision and direction. Also, after a series of engagements in this phase, it must be evaluated whether the targets are eradicated or not. Lastly, firepower and counterforce come between “C” and “D.” The effectiveness of firepower is decided by the range, speed, accuracy, and lethality of the weapons. Defence against firepower depends on the defensive capability and resilience of naval forces.

The objective of the model is to arrive the point “D” earlier than the enemy. The importance of the above model is to provide enlightenment on various possible methods in improving the capability of one’s own forces in order to achieve their
objective. It is most important to develop more effective ways to neutralize the enemy: including the development of (1) longer-range scout and firepower systems, (2) faster processing C\textsuperscript{2} system, (3) integrated systems combining more than two phases, and (4) a system extending enemy’s engagement time line through the use of anti-scouts, C\textsuperscript{2}CM and counterforce.

One can learn lessons from the above tactical model in relation to ROK force planning. First of all, in terms of firepower, the ROK Navy used to focus on guns despite the modern missile age because of political objection (from the US), financial constraints, and military reasons (interdiction operations against North Korea). Since the late 1970s, however, the ROK Navy has succeeded in a limited way in improving its surface-to-surface missile capability, mostly through the introduction of Harpoon missile from the US Navy. However, in relation to the sea control mission, the ROK Navy desperately needs to improve its anti-submarine and anti-air weapon systems. Also, to carry out the projection of force mission, it is necessary to develop appropriate land-attack missile systems, modernized and more effective gunnery systems, and a tactical air capability.

Also, because of the high cost of state-of-the-art quality weapon systems and their relatively short of a half-life, the ROK Navy must consider the matter of “quality versus quantity” in its acquisition policy for weapons systems. Furthermore, the ROK Navy must pay attention to the growth in weapon range and lethality because not only it has led to an increase in land-sea interactions, but also naval battles increasingly include forces based ashore.

Secondly, counterforce, in the matter of defence, is a weak element in the ROK Navy. Traditionally, counterforce is related to the survivability through armour, compartmentation, bulk, and damage control, but at present it is more focused toward
defensive force-cover (e.g. stealth), deception (e.g. jamming or decoys), and dispersion. In fact, the ROK Navy sacrificed survivability because of speed and budget limitation in the past, but it must improve staying power, and the ability to absorb hits in future naval shipbuilding. Also, it needs to improve its defensive capability by acquiring area air defence systems.

Particularly, it is worthy of notice to an observation of Wayne P. Hughes Junior’s on dispersion that “if a commander’s fleet comprises large ships with strong defences he masses and fights the enemy off, but if he has small ships or weak defences he must disperse to complicate enemy targeting.” Furthermore, it is critical to note that the vulnerability of ships in port is growing. In truth, the strategy of fleet-in-being has relied on the traditional assumption that ports are havens for navies superior and inferior. However, as the security of ports has diminished, the ROK Navy must reconsider the applicability, feasibility, and acceptability of fleet-in-being as a weaker power strategy because currently ships are often safer outside the homeport than in.

Thirdly, the importance of scouts and anti-scouts are increasing in response to the great strides in modern weapon capability in range, lethality and accuracy. Scouts comprise three areas - control (targeting data), influence (tracking), and interest (detection). Although the ROK Navy started make improvement in scouting capability by the introduction of P-3C maritime patrol aircraft, it needs to enhance this capability through modernized technology such as satellites and to improve the operation capability of passive sensors. In particular, it is necessary for the ROK Navy to develop active anti-scouts in terms of electronic warfare and the means to destroy or neutralize the enemy’s reconnaissance aircraft.

Fourthly, the ROK Navy has improved C^2 capability through the Korean Naval Tactical Data System (KNTDS). The next aim will be to improve directional
capability including security and accuracy under the enemy’s counteraction. C²CM is achieved by incapacitating enemy forces so they cannot operate effectively. Fifth, in terms of manoeuvre, the ROK Navy once stressed speed as the highest priority of naval shipbuilding for interdiction operations against North Korea. The important trend in manoeuvring is that the emphasis has shifted from speed of platform to speed of weapon. Considering the importance of anti-submarine operations, the ROK Navy must focus more on quietness at the expense of speed.\textsuperscript{55}

Finally, an attempt to integrate engagement phases is proceeding, that is what the US call “network-centric warfare (NCW). NCW is broader than C² and information warfare. It integrates three lateral grids: (1) a sensor grid to correlate acquired information, (2) a C² grid in which all units exchange operation plans, tactical tasks, orders, and changes to them, and (3) a shooter grid assigning targets and coordinating fire. In relation to NCW, the ROK military is in the process of constructing an integrated defence C⁴I system, joint and combined C⁴I system, and a tactical C⁴I system for each service of the military.\textsuperscript{56}

Overall, the above tactical context provides the foundation to understand the debates within the ROK Navy surrounding the vulnerability of the aircraft carrier and value of larger combatants. In the tactical context, the aircraft carrier is the safest platform not only because of its own strong capability but also the integrating power provided by its accompanying forces. Also the size of naval ships is very significant in tactical considerations. For larger ships hold more capabilities and are less expensive to build to provide similar armament on a ton-for-ton basis. In addition, larger ships are more durable, give lower stress at sea, are more survivable in face of battle damage, and are more reliable against threats.
In particular, in this rapidly changing world situation, larger ships are not only more adaptable in the face of radical technological change because they are easier to modify but also much easier to adapt to new roles. In this regard, Norman Friedman’s analysis provides a good explanation of this subject.

According to Friedman’s analysis, most US World War II warships were substantially larger than their British counterparts and at the tune were criticized as being uneconomical. However, suddenly, naval missions and technology changed dramatically. Consequently, size bought valuable flexibility as larger US warships are more easily modified to accommodate new weapons such as guided missiles and jet aircraft so were not scrapped until the 1960s or even the 1970s. But with the neatly and economically built British ships this versatility was not possible. Also European NATO frigates built just before the Cold War ended were mostly focused on anti-submarine warfare against Soviet submarines. As a result, their balance of capabilities became less optimal when the world changed radically.57

Norman Friedman’s analyses are easily applied to the ROK Navy. In fact, during the Cold War, the ROK Navy built just such economical and tight naval ships with very limited combat capability, mostly for the specific mission of anti-infiltration against the North. As a result, in the post-Cold War era, they all became obsolete when pitted against the region’s great maritime powers, although they are still more or less useful against North Korea. On the other hand, five ex-US Gearing (FRAM I) class destroyers are still able to operate successfully because of modernisation although they were all built in the 1940s.

A ship’s useful lifetime depends on the possibility of continual upgrade to accomplish her designed mission as well as the continuing relevance of mission itself. As ships become more expensive, the ROK Navy is restricted in building ships. And the
Korean peninsula is now progressing towards unification. The ROK Navy must be ready for any sudden change and be able to adapt to new roles. This is why the ROK Navy must carry out current force planning governed by long-term perspectives and be prepared to increase the size of individual units to be able to accommodate the development of technology and mission requirements in changing political situations. Therefore, the force planning of the ROK Navy must give proper consideration to the size of ships in order to make them capable of extending a ship's effective lifetime by modernization.

Finally, Wayne P. Hughes Junior estimates that the great transitions in naval warfare will take longer than expected, not only because of the time required to perfect a new instrument of war and build it in numbers, but also because a shakeout of tactics takes time. This is the matter of "doctrine" and "education and training" of navies. In this regard, the ROK Navy also must make continual good progress in its doctrine and education and training of all members.

IV. Conclusion

Naval force planning is one of the most complicated, comprehensive and important but repeating tasks. Therefore it is necessary for the ROK naval force planners to have comprehensive understanding on the whole process of force planning. It is not just about current "PPBEES" focusing on budget. It is the process of appraising national security needs and selecting the best military forces to meet those strategic requirements within fiscal limitations. For this purpose, naval force planning in the ROK must consider all the key variables of force planning in the political, strategic, operational, and tactical contexts.
In this context, this study examined force planning in the ROK Navy in the above four key contexts. In the political context, naval development of the ROK was hindered by the fundamental limitation of the ROK-USA combined defence policy. This combined defence policy predetermined the development of the ROK Navy as a subsidiary force of the US Navy. Furthermore, under the control of the quasi-civil military government over 31 years, pro-continental strategy dominated the military society of the ROK. Defence policy makers of the ROK, composed of mostly ROK Army officers, did not give priority to the ROK Navy. Thus, as strategy established priorities in the process of force planning, the ROK Navy lagged behind among the Services.

However, in the post-Cold War era, the ROK Navy started to escape from the long period of restriction because of the dramatically changing political and strategic situation. In 2003, the ROK is a wealthy maritime country heavily dependent for its security and prosperity on the sea and even a unified Korea will be a more maritime country through the restoration of its strategic characteristic as a bridge between the sea and land. Nonetheless, the ROK Navy does not yet correspond to the strategic requirements in the post-Cold War era because of its lack of capability. This is the reason why the ROK Navy is currently striving to turn its direction of future development toward a "blue-water navy."

Despite its current success in moving towards a blue-water navy, the ROK Navy has not been successful in integrating the efforts of all of its members as a unity because of a lack of clear guidance on its strategic role, missions, and force concept and capability to accommodate rapidly increasing strategic requirements and tactical trends. Through this study, it is concluded that the ROK Navy must restore its independent strategic role to ensure national interests in the post-Cold War era. For the purpose,
missions of the ROK Navy should be “deterrence,” “naval presence,” “non-combat support operations,” “sea control,” and “power projection.”

In this context, the ROK Navy will have to develop as a strong “sea control” navy with appropriate “power projection” capability to contribute to the peaceful unification of Korea and even more to regional stability and peace. Therefore, the force concept of the ROK Navy has to be that of a “battle fleet.” And the fleet must be composed of multi-purpose major surface ships to accommodate sudden strategic and tactical changes. Finally, the overall size of the ROK Fleet is wholly dependent on its missions. If the ROK Navy stressed offensive sea control and power projection, its defensive as well as offensive capability would increase accordingly.
End Notes

1 Respondents to the questionnaire comprised 20 American and 20 Korean (academy, research institute, government, and the press). For more details, see Tae-hwan Ok and Su-am Kim. Tongil Hankukui Weesang [Status of the Unified Korea], Institute for Korea Unification, research paper 97-07, 1997, pp. 3-5, 120-122.

2 Improving the unreasonable ROK-USA relationship (The Mutual Defence Treaty, US Operational Control Authority over the ROK Armed Forces in wartime, and SOFA) is currently a rising issue between the two countries. In the 34th ROK-USA Security Council Meeting in December 2002, both sides agreed to cooperatively develop blueprint of US forces in Korea. See Saegae Ilbo, 17th January 2003, p. 9; Elected President No mentioned to prepare 5, 10, and 15-year plan for reduction of US forces in Korea. See Chosun Ilbo, 31st December 2002, p. 4; Recent research for future development of the ROK-USA relations, see Centre for Strategic and International Studies, “a blue print for US policy toward a Unified Korea,” a working group report of the CSIS International Security Program; August 2002 (internet site http://www.csis.org).


6 For more details, see Rear Admiral (ret.) Young-O Kang and Sok-hee Lee, Kyoonyung Haekun Junryakron [A Balanced Naval Strategy] (Seoul: Eventline, 1999).


11 The examples include the Won-Koryo combined expedition to Japan in 1279, the Japanese invasion to Chosun in 1592, and the turbulent modern age since the late 19th Century. For more details, see Chapter 1.


14 Naval force planning generally expects at least 10 years construction including programme process, 20-30 years ship’s life, and 10-15 years life extension by modernization.

15 They also are categorized as: (1) defence of the homeland; (2) economic well-being; (3) favourable regional and world order; and (4) promotion of its values.

16 National objectives of the ROK are officially defined as follows: “First, Korea will uphold its nationhood, seek peaceful unification, and ensure lasting independence under the ideologies of free democracy; Second, Korea will protect the freedom and rights of its citizens and create a social welfare system that achieves equality in their standard of living; Three, Korea will work to improve its status in the international community in order to put forth dignity as a nation and contribute to world peace.” See, the Ministry of National Defence of the ROK, Defence White Paper 2000, p. 65.


18 See Tae-hwan Ok and Su-am Kim. Tongil Hankukui Weesang [Status of the Unified Korea], p. 19-23.2


Age Leadership: A "functions" although they often are used interchangeably. According to the Publication 1: Naval Doctrine, "roles" in particular, it is important to make the distinctions of terms between "roles," "missions," and "functions" as they are often used interchangeably. According to the US Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Doctrine, "roles" are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services were established in law. "Missions" are the tasks assigned by the National Command Authorities to the combatant commanders. "Functions" are specific responsibilities assigned by the National Command Authorities to enable the Services to fulfill their legally established roles. Thus, the primary function of the Services is to provide forces organized, trained, and equipped to perform a role to be employed by a combatant commander in the accomplishment of a mission.


28 According to the US NDPI, it is effective means of deterrence that a fully combat-ready naval force stands poised to protect the national interests of a nation and that an additional augmentation forces will be forthcoming. Naval forces with a power projection capability are a key factors in deterrence. See, the US Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 1 Naval Warfare, Chapter 2.


31 For more details, see The Royal Navy, British Maritime Doctrine BR 1806, pp. 54-55 and Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age (London: Macmillan, 1982), Chapter IV and V.


35 During the Cold War period, the US Aircraft Carrier Battle Group was composed of total 17-18 ships: 1 CV, 4 UNREP, 1-2 Aegis CG or DDG, 6 CG, 1 SSN, and 4 FFG. But in the post-Cold War era, it decreased to total 7ships: 1 CV, 2 Aegis missile cruisers, 4 other surface combatants (missile destroyers, destroyers, and sometimes frigates). For more details, Robert P. Haffa Jr., Prudent Choices: Planning US Forces (Fort Lesley: National Defence University Press, 1988), p. 68 and Norman Friedman, Seapower as Strategy: Navies and National Interests (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), p. 278.


Sea denial is exercised when a nation denies another the ability to control a maritime area without either wishing or being able to control that area himself. Traditional means of sea denial are laying mines and deploying submarines to threaten enemy surface forces, and a recent method is to mount surface-to-surface missile batteries along the coast to pose an unacceptable level of risk to enemy surface forces. At the strategic level, the use of sea denial is a guerre de course, and the operational and tactical levels are part of the outer defence of a force or area, or a way of containing enemy forces. See, The Royal Navy, *BR 1806 British Maritime Doctrine: Second Edition* (London: The Stationery Office, 1999), p. 35.


Sea control means to control the surface, sub-surface, and air above the surface in specific area for particular periods of time. Surface ships are the only unit in navies capable to fulfil sea control persistently.


It includes reconnaissance, surveillance, cryptanalysis, and other forms of what some call information operations.

In fact, a seapower or maritime strategy bases its dominant manoeuvre on the sea, because it is far easier to move anything heavy by sea than by land or air. The terms of "Manoeuvre" and "mobility" are sometimes used interchangeably. However, Wayne P. Hughes Junior regards mobility as an element of strategy, operational art, or grand tactics. See, Wayne P. Hughes Junior, *Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, Second Edition*, p. 178.

Cover means secrecy, camouflage, or concealment to avoid attack, for example, submergence. Deception means deliberate misrepresentation of reality to gain an advantage.


The ROK Navy is likely to adopt this trend as it shows KDX-class shipbuilding. KDX-I is 30kts, and KDX-II 29kts while FF is 34kts. See, *Jane's Fighting ships 2001-2002*, pp. 412-414.


Chapter 8 Conclusion

As of 2003, the ROK Navy has been in existence for over 57 years old but, until now, nobody has tackled the important subject - "the naval policy of the ROK." The purpose of this research was to examine in detail the evolution of ROK naval policy in the past, present and future. For this purpose, the objective of this study has been not only to reflect on the developing process of the ROK Navy in the past and at present but also to propose its direction of development in the future. In order to achieve its objective, the study has explored the following questions.

1. How did the ROK Navy develop in the past and how is it developing at present?
2. Why is the ROK Navy the size and shape it is today? That is, how it was affected by geo-political, economic, technical, and strategic considerations, etc.
3. Why and how will the ROK Navy grow in the future? Specifically, what is the validity and justification of force planning of the ROK Navy for the enhancement of both national security and regional stability and peace?

In fact, the birth of the modern ROK Navy was unique in comparison with the history other navies of the world. It was founded not by its government but by an individual called Admiral Won-il Shon with like-minded people, and was integrated later into the ROK Armed Forces with the establishment of the ROK Government. A brief background of the maritime history of Korea is therefore needed to understand the development of the ROK Navy.

Traditionally, although Korea is a peninsular country like Italy, the Koreans disregarded maritime activities and even put them under taboo in their socio-political culture. Furthermore, Korean governments did not exploit the geographical opportunity
offered by the sea nor did they exert the potential maritime talents of the Koreans. Consequently, the maritime history of Korea has but few landmarks, individual figures like Bo-go Chang in the unified Kingdom of Shilla, Ji Chung and Wee Park in the Koryo Dynasty, and Chong-moo Yi and Soon-shin Yi in the Choson Dynasty. Korean naval history thus lacked consistency and there was no general recognition in Korean culture of the importance of the use of the sea for national security and prosperity.

Hence, immediately after the Liberation of Korea in August 1945, it was natural that there were few people in Korea concerned about the maritime security of the nation. Furthermore, Korea, which had forgotten the sea and neglected to develop its naval power, had been a colony of Japan from 1910 to 1945 and the Japanese prevented the Koreans from developing any maritime activities. Only a very few Koreans served in the imperial Japanese Navy. Therefore, it was a significant moment with this unfavourable background, on 11th November 1945, when maritime pioneers led by Admiral Won-il Shon laid the foundations of the ROK Navy and devoted themselves to its development.

Since its birth, the development of the ROK Navy could be seen falling into four major phases: (1) establishment and development through the Korean War (1945-1953); (2) development dominated by ROK-USA combined defence policy (1953-1973); (3) independent development focused on the North Korean threat (1974-1992); and (4) development towards “a blue-water” navy (1993-present).

The first phase (1945-1953) was the period of laying the cornerstone of the development of the ROK Navy. Despite every kind of adversity, Admiral Won-il Shon and the maritime pioneers of Korea established the ROK Navy even before the establishment of the ROK Government. Indeed they made a great contribution to the advent of the ROK Government through naval operations against the serious communist
subversion in the South. During the Korean War, the ROK Navy contributed to victory as a member of the UN naval forces and increased its fleet to fifty-six ships in total with the assistance of the US Navy.

The above development was the most significant thing in the history of the ROK Navy because it was a process of birth, from nothing into being. Given the serious apathy of Koreans about maritime affairs at that time, the birth of the ROK Navy was only possible through the self-sacrifice and far-sighted wisdom of the maritime pioneers of the ROK led by Admiral Shon. They devoted themselves to laying the foundations and made every effort to develop the ROK Navy. In particular, through their efforts, they implanted the enterprising spiritual tradition of the ROK Navy as a national institution, based on the finest world naval traditions to ensure the maritime security of Korea in the future.

However, due to the lack of national capability, the Navy's development was heavily affected by US policy on Korea at the time. Before the Korean War, the Americans did not regard Korea as of a major national interest in the post-War political and strategic context. They treated Korea only as a matter of obligation in the chain of the post-War management process. Thus, after establishing a weak anti-communist ROK Government through the UN, they withdrew from Korea in 1949.

In this situation, although Admiral Shon strove to acquire naval ships from the US Navy, with the support of US Captain McCabe's Coast Guard Advisory Group, the Americans did not provide any combatants but mainly ex-US and -Japanese minesweepers for very limited coastal defence against the North. To solve this problem, in spite of great financial and technical difficulties, the Koreans built a 300-ton small patrol ship, the first modern naval ship of the ROK, in February 1947 at the Naval Ship
Yard in Chinhae. That is the reason why the ship was called “Choongmoogong”, the pen name of Admiral Soon-shin Yi, a great hero against the Japanese invasion in 1592.

Then, as invasion by the North Koreans was imminent after the US withdrawal from Korea, Admiral Shon launched a campaign and purchased four small combatants from the USA (ex-US PC, 450-ton full load) by subscription from all members of the ROK Navy. Fortunately, one of them arrived in Korea just before the outbreak of the Korean War, and saved the Pusan Perimeter, the vital place for survival and later a base of operations for the UN counter-attack, by sinking a 1,000-ton enemy armed steamer with 600 troops on board on 26th June 1950 - the second day of the Korean War.

All of sudden, the Korean War changed the US policy towards Korea because the Americans interpreted the North Korean invasion as part of the Soviet communist expansion policy as well as an attack on the authority of the UN. Consequently, they returned to Korea under the name of the UN and, as it is said that no war exemplified the value of maritime power better than the Korean War, the UN naval forces played a decisive role in returning the situation of Korea back to where it was before the Korean War. During the Korean War, the US Navy transferred a total thirty naval ships, including five PF, to the ROK Navy.

During the Korean War, the ROK Navy was able to make considerable progress in size, and rapidly acquired modern naval knowledge, skill, and tactics as a member of the UN naval forces. Also, Admiral Shon made every effort to cultivate men of talent for the future. As a result, the ROK Navy developed as a limited coastal defence navy to carry out mainly shallow water operations in support of UN naval forces to secure control of the sea surrounding the Korean peninsula with the assistance of the US Navy. In fact, major naval operations were carried out by the UN naval forces. Therefore, with the Armistice of 1953, it was absolutely necessary for the ROK
Navy to develop as a competent coastal defence navy to ensure maritime security around the Korean peninsula against the increasing communist threat from the north.

The second phase (1953-1973) of the development of the ROK Navy was the period of total dependency on the military aid of the USA. In 1955-1956, the ROK Navy introduced thirty-one ex-US naval ships including two DE and improved its fleet strength to seventy-one vessels. Until the late 1960s, it maintained similar fleet strength through the substitution of old ex-US naval ships provided by the US Navy. However, from 1968, the ROK Navy rapidly increased its numbers of ex-US small patrol craft and had improved its fleet strength to ninety-eight by 1973.

In terms of the above development of the ROK Navy, the most important factor was the conclusion of the ROK-USA Mutual Defence Treaty. Because of the Korean War, the Americans boosted their containment policy against the increasing threat of the Soviet Union and concluded a mutual defence treaty with the ROK in October 1953. The Treaty secured the intervention of the US in case of an attack and contributed to the political-military stability of the Korean Peninsula by protecting South Korea from another all-out war against the Northern Communists. Furthermore, as a part of the US containment policy, the ROK could receive considerable economic and military aid from the US, and develop various cooperative relationships for enhancing the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula. In this context, the ROK Navy was able to get military assistance from the US Navy and thus strengthened its fleet during this period.

However, the ROK-USA combined defence strategy according to the Mutual Defence Treaty fundamentally determined the direction of the development of the ROK Navy. For, as the price of the conclusion of the Mutual Defence Treaty with the USA, the ROK had to sacrifice its independent military action by handing over operational
control authority over the ROK Armed Forces continually to the USA. Consequently, it was natural that the development of the ROK Armed Forces was dominated by the US global strategic considerations. The US coalition strategy allowed the ROK Army to expand hugely against the northern communists threat, but the ROK Navy to develop only as a limited coastal defence navy, subsidiary to the US Navy.

In particular, after the Korean War, the Americans were very concerned about President Rhee's "marching north unification policy," and were therefore very reluctant to improve the combat capability of the ROK Navy. In this situation, Admiral Shon played a mediating role as a ROK Minister of National Defence at that time, and was able to use the support of the United States to develop the ROK Navy as a competent coastal defence navy against the North.

Despite the above dependent situation of the ROK on the USA, the maritime pioneers of the ROK looked towards a situation when the maritime security of Korea would be its own business in the future. In this regard, they worked out the requirement of future ROK naval forces to be one hundred and eighty-eight naval ships including one light aircraft carrier. Although the plan was impractical in the dire economic situation of the ROK after the Korean War, it clearly demonstrated the extent of ROK ambitions for the future naval development of the ROK.

In this context, the ROK launched several ambitious projects to aid development as an independent naval power: projects for (1) the construction of a 3,000-ton size naval shipbuilding site, (2) the independent development of submarines, and (3) the production of maritime aircraft. But they were fruitless because of the objections of USA and a lack of national capability. Nonetheless, by the successful construction of a 3,000-ton size dry dock for ship repairs, the ROK Navy equipped itself with its own management and repair capability for ships. Also, it developed its
organization on the basis of the experiences of the Korean War and taking the system of the US Navy as a model. As a result, in March 1955, the ROK Navy was able to take complete responsibility of the coastal defence mission for the surrounding Korean peninsula from the UN Naval Command.

Overall, during the second phase, the aim of the ROK Navy was to develop its fleet strength and combat capability to guarantee maritime security of South Korea independently against the North. To this end, the assistance of the US Navy was vital because the ROK Navy was only able to carry out force development through American military aid. In this situation, immediately after the Korean War, the North Korean Navy could not challenge the ROK Navy because it had been completely destroyed by the UN naval forces. However, after 1962 when North Korea launched its self-sufficient military first development policy after the success of post-War reconstruction, the North Korean Navy started to strengthen its fleet by acquiring submarines, fast attack missile craft, and various small attack craft from the Soviet Navy.

In this context, with the assistance of the US Navy, the ROK Navy strengthened its force capability to focus on firstly amphibious warfare (1953-1957), secondly anti-submarine warfare (1958-1966), and thirdly anti-infiltration warfare capability (1967-1973). It also improved its operational capability in every side through the ROK-USA combined naval exercise. In particular, from the early 1960s against the increasing North Korean submarine threat, it strove to develop ASW capability with support of the US Navy.

From the late 1960s, however, the increasing North Korean infiltration threat greatly affected the development of the ROK Navy. From 1968, North Korea started to launch the infiltration of its countless armed guerrilla forces by land and sea into the South as part of the policy of communising the whole Korean peninsula. This caused
the ROK to spur the improvement of an all-out defence capability and to launch a self-reliant national defence against the threat. Consequently, the ROK Navy had to turn its force development to focus mainly on the increase of small combatants, through the introduction of ex-US naval ships, to defeat North Korean infiltration.

In addition, in the early 1970s, the Americans suddenly changed their policy on Korea and withdrew a US division from Korea although the North Korean military threat was greatly increasing at that time. Therefore, the South Koreans under President Park started to develop self-reliant national defence capability against the North. Especially, upon the self-reliant national defence movement from the early 1970s, the ROK Navy took its first step towards fulfilling its long-cherished dream, independent naval development, by the construction of two domestically designed fast attack craft called “Student-1 and 2” paid by patriotic subscription of students all over the country in 1972.

The third phase (1974-1992) was the transitional period of the ROK Navy, during which it converted its force development from total dependence on the US Navy to independent naval development. In the 1970s, on the one hand, the ROK Navy continually introduced ex-US destroyers, missile fast attack craft (PGM), and small patrol craft, and acquired surface-to-surface missiles from the US Navy. Because of the success of own design naval shipbuilding projects in 1972, the ROK Navy developed various Korean design naval ships, increased its fleet strength to two hundred and sixteen naval ships in total by 1992, and emerged as independently competent coastal defence navy against the North.

The above development was mostly affected by the ROK self-reliant national defence programme called the “Yulgok Project.” In 1972, President Nixon suddenly withdrew the US 7th Division from Korea due to the aftermath of the Vietnam War and
the opening of the diplomatic relationship with China. Upon this change in US policy towards Korea, the ROK realized that no two nations have precisely the same objectives and in a given set of circumstances each will react according to its needs. In that situation, against the increasing North Korean military threat, President Park launched the Yulgok Project in 1974. Through the Yulgok project, force development of the ROK Armed Forces finally could escape from dependence on US military aid and carry out independent defence planning. In this context, the ROK Navy pursued force development in accordance with the Yulgok Project. But the Yulgok Project was integrated into the Five-year Defence Programme in 1985.

The ROK Navy did not forget the dream that the founders of the ROK Navy had had, of being an independent naval power for the maritime security of Korea. The ROK Navy made the most of any opportunity to mould its fortunes for the future. By the patriotic subscription of students, Commodore Do-jae Eom led the domestic construction of two Korean design small fast attack craft of 41 knots. Through this success, the ROK Navy built various own design naval ships during the period: PK in 1974, PKM in 1979, FF in 1981, PCC in 1982, MHC in 1987, and AOE in 1990. As a result, the ROK Navy greatly improved its fleet strength against the North, and increased the ratio of ROK built naval ships in its Fleet to 75% by 1992.

However, during the period, the ROK naval development was only carried out within the limits established by the ROK-USA combined defence policy. Although President Carter’s withdrawal policy boosted the Yulgok Project during the second half of the 1970s, the ROK-USA combined defence strategy came to be strengthened by the establishment of the ROK-USA Combined Forces Command in 1979 under American operational control because of the imminent military threat of North Korea and the limitation of national capability of the ROK.
In this regard, the Yulgok Project put top priority on the improvement of ROK ground forces’ capability against the North Korean blitzkrieg military strategy. As a result, with the strong commitment of US huge naval reinforcements in case of war in Korea, the ROK Navy was lagging behind on priority and was allocated the smallest portion of budget for the force improvement among the Services - 15.8% for 1974-1981 and 21% for 1982-1992.

In this situation, against the rapidly increasing North Korean naval threat of submarine, missile attack craft, and fast attack landing craft, the ROK Navy had first to improve its small combatant capability to interdict the North Korean surprise attack through the sea and additionally to develop its anti-submarine warfare capability. Consequently, the ROK Navy during the above period was still limited to develop as a coastal defence navy, comprised mostly one hundred and forty-four small combatants, against the North.

But the ROK Navy greatly improved its fleet strength and combat capability by the construction of modernized Korean combat ships domestically against the North. As a result, it was able to support successfully to great important events – the Asian Games in 1986 and the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988 – and continual national development through the sea. In this context, the success of independent naval shipbuilding projects was a paramount achievement of the ROK Navy and a dramatic turning point in ROK naval development. Therefore, it is appropriate to call this the second foundation of the ROK Navy.

The fourth phase (1993-present) was the period that the ROK Navy turned the direction of its force development towards a “blue-water navy” to meet strategic requirements in the post-Cold War era against both North Korea and other regional countries. The ROK Navy stopped building inferior naval combatants - FF, PCC and
PKM - in the early 1990s. And it started to build modernized Korean destroyers (KDX-I, II and III) and amphibious ships (LST and LPX), and continued to construct Korean mine warfare ships and fleet support ships. In particular, the ROK Navy acquired 209-class diesel submarines and is pursuing to build 214-class submarines domestically with the technical support of Germany. In addition, it introduced maritime patrol aircraft, P-3C, from the USA and additional Lynx helicopters from the UK. As a result, the ROK Navy has become a competent three-dimensional coastal defence navy and is converting to a blue-water navy although it is still far inferior to other regional naval powers.

The above development of the ROK Navy was driven by the sudden change of the world political situation due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War era, the USA planned again to withdraw the US forces in Korea through the East Asia Strategy Initiative (EASI). With the changing US policy on Korea, the ROK took a serious consideration of the “Koreanization of defence of Korea” and launched the “818 Plan” to improve its independent national defence posture. As a result, the ROK improved the integrated battle strength of its Armed Forces through the reformation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff system in 1991, and started to take a leading role in defence of Korea by the restoration of peacetime operational control authority over the ROK Armed Forces from the USA.

In addition, the ROK normalized diplomatic relations with all the nations of Eastern Europe, Russia (the USSR), and China by 1992, and developed cooperative military relations with neighbouring countries. In particular, the ROK improved direct relations with North Korea by the conclusion of the “South-North Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation” in December 1991 as well as the first-ever inter-Korean Summit in June 2000. However, the North Korean nuclear and WMD threat stalled the peace process within the Korean peninsula,
deferred the withdrawal plan of the US forces in Korea, and forced the ROK to strengthen the ROK-USA combined defence strategy through the ROK-USA Combined Forces Command.

In the above context, the ROK Navy pursued its force development during the period. In terms of the ROK defence policy of "Koreanization of the defence of Korea," the ROK Navy made changes of the direction of force development towards a blue-water navy to meet new strategic requirements against both North Korea and other regional countries. In particular, in the post-Cold War era, the ROK-USA combined strategy could not guarantee the ROK maritime security and interests any more directly against regional countries, but only against North Korea. In this context, the ROK Navy had to improve its capability to ensure maritime security and interests against other regional countries.

However, the strength of the ROK-USA combined defence strategy due to the North Korean WMD threat continued to limit the development of the ROK Navy towards becoming a blue-water navy. Under the strong commitment of US naval reinforcement through the ROK-USA combined war plan (OPLAN 5027), the ROK Navy was still allotted only 21% of the budget for the ROK force improvement, the same and the smallest portion among the Services as before. As a result, the fleet strength of the ROK Navy decreased in number under the limited financial support although it increased in combat capability because of the production of larger but fewer and more modernized Korean design naval ships during the period.

Nonetheless, naval development of the ROK during the fourth phase showed several significant features. The first was the acquisition of 209-class submarines from Germany. In the past, despite its great efforts to improve ASW capability, the ROK Navy remained very limited in capability. It depended totally on the assistance of US
submarines for its ASW exercises and it could not exploit the proven utility of subsurface platforms in the ASW role. The 209-class submarines have greatly contributed to improve the ASW capability of the ROK Navy in both defensive and offensive operations.

The second is the acquisition of P-3C maritime patrol aircraft from the US. The aircraft improved broad maritime patrol capability of the ROK Navy, which is vital to modern naval operations. They also greatly contributed further to enhance the ASW capability of the ROK Navy in cooperation with Lynx ASW helicopters and ASW surface ships. The new Korean destroyers (KDX) are also key to the naval development of the ROK. The ships are equipped with modernized three-dimensional combat capability, particularly with anti-air missile systems. Finally, the ROK Navy is pursuing modernisation programmes for mine warfare, amphibious warfare, and logistic support forces with domestic shipbuilding projects.

In this situation, the continuing North Korean naval provocations - two Yonpyong naval clashes and the infiltration of North Korean armed guerrilla forces by midget submarine and semi-submersible vessels - made the ROK Navy focus on the North Korean naval threat. This is the major hindrance to future blue-water naval development of the ROK, especially as the time is approaching for the replacement of its first-generation combatant ships - FFs, PCCs and PKMs.

As of 2003, in terms of the future development of the ROK Navy, there are various views and debates in the circle of the Navy. The majority advocate the need for an aircraft carrier for sea control missions without presenting sufficient validation. Others reject this, mostly in connection with question of vulnerability and cost, given rapidly changing modern technology. Some people claim that the ROK Navy should develop a capable small combatant force in parallel with major surface ships to
harmonize sea control and sea denial because of Korea's geo-strategic situation as a peninsular country. Nor a few people support submarine centred naval development as an asymmetric strategy against powerful regional powers.

On the other hand, in accordance with the programme of the ROK Navy on its force development, ROK blue-water naval development comprises two concepts, that is, a Task Force Fleet and three Sea-sector Fleets. The Task Force Fleet protects its sea line of communication and maritime interests to distant areas against the potential regional maritime threat (defensive sea control). And the three Sea-sector Fleets are continually focusing sea defence mission (sea denial) by the new programmes of improving the combat capability of the first-generation combatants (FF, PCC and PKM).

However, to develop as a maritime force ensuring national interests of the ROK and eventually the unified Korea in the uncertain post-Cold War era, the future development of the ROK Navy must emerge from a comprehensive process of force planning. In general, force planning is the process of establishing military requirements based on an appraisal of the security needs of the nation, and selecting military forces to meet those requirements within fiscal limitation. In terms of naval force planning, therefore, the ROK Navy must produce its force concept and capability through a comprehensive examination of the political, strategic, operational and tactical contexts as a whole in accordance with the US NDP 5 and bearing in mind its special political relationship with the USA.

In the political context, the alliance with the USA is very important to the ROK in the process of the peaceful unification of Korea and for regional stability both now and after the unification. However, the force planners of the ROK must remember the truth that US policy on Korea is based on American national interests and the past history of the alliance with USA. For instance, despite the rapidly increasing numbers of
North Korean submarines, missile craft and fast attack landing craft, the ROK Navy was able to acquire missile capability from the US Navy, but could not get any assistance for the development of the Ulsan-class Korean frigate, and was delayed in acquiring submarines until the early 1990s because of the objections of the USA.

In the post-Cold War era, the ROK-USA combined defence policy does not guarantee the ROK national maritime interests directly related to other regional countries, but only against North Korea. Also, in the changing post-Cold War era, the ROK must give the most consideration to the regional power constellation as the history of the Northeast Asia demonstrates. In this context, in the 21st Century Asia-Pacific maritime era, the ROK Navy must develop as an appropriate naval power against other regional countries as well as North Korea to ensure ROK national interests and objectives, and to improve regional stability and peace.

In this strategic context, the first thing to consider is the geo-strategic situation of the Korea as a peninsular country because the facts of geography are permanent and the wellspring of national strategy. Under the ROK-USA combined defence strategy, the ROK did not give proper concern to its maritime strategy although it has become a heavily sea dependent maritime nation. As of 2003, the sea is vital to the national security and prosperity of the ROK as the means of transportation, source of resources and medium for military purposes. The unified Korea will be an even more maritime oriented country by the restoration of its strategic characteristic as a bridge between the sea and land. Therefore, from now on, the ROK must maintain a balance between the continental and maritime strategy in national military strategy.

Furthermore, as the world's twelfth largest trading power in 2003, the ROK has to restore the independent strategic role by the constructive development of the alliance with the USA. In this context, in the post-Cold War era, the ROK national
objectives must be the balance of power of the region and its military strategy should be concerned with collective defence and cooperative security. Therefore, although the ROK had to depend for its national security mostly on US military capability under the ROK-USA combined defence strategy, the ROK must equip itself with appropriate independent defence capabilities to make sure the peaceful unification of Korea and to contribute to the regional stability.

In this regard, to ensure continual national development and security through the sea, the ROK Navy should be a competent independent naval power to meet regional strategic requirements in accordance with the rapidly increasing maritime capability of the regional powers and the likelihood of the reduction of US military capability in the region. However, the ROK Navy lacks the capability for these purposes. Therefore, the force planners of the ROK Navy must escape from a subsidiary and partial role to the US Navy, and carry out force planning for the navy of an independent nation that must temporarily rely on the US naval reinforcement to deter war in Korea.

Overall, in the post-Cold War era, the strategic role of the ROK Navy must be established as to promote and defend the national interests by maintaining appropriate maritime superiority, contributing to regional stability, and if necessary, conducting operations on and from the sea. For the purpose, the objectives of the ROK Navy have to be re-defined to contribute to deterrence of war, crisis management, maintaining regional stability, securing sea lines of communication, protection of maritime resources, and guaranteeing victory in war if necessary.

In the operational context, to accomplish the above strategic role and objectives, it is not enough for the ROK Navy to be a sea defence (sea denial) naval power. It has to be a strong sea control navy in the surrounding area of the Korean
peninsula and further if necessary with limited power projection capability. For, against the North Korean threat, the ROK Navy should be able to contribute to the deterrence of the North and should deterrence fail, to the victory of war through an appropriate combat capability. Also against other regional countries, the ROK Navy must contribute to the balance of power in the region not only to ensure national interests but also to improve regional stability and peace. In this context, in the post-Cold War era, the ROK Navy must be able to carry out the following missions: deterrence, naval presence, non-combat support operations, sea control, and power projection.

Finally, in the tactical context, the force concept of the ROK Navy has to be that of “battle fleet” to carry out “sea control” and “power projection” missions. For this purpose, the battle fleet of the ROK Navy must be composed of multi-purpose major surface ships. It must give sufficient flexibility in the size of future naval ships to accommodate sudden strategic and tactical changes. But, the overall size of the ROK Fleet is wholly depended on its missions and whether it becomes more offensive or defensive.

For the above future development of the ROK Navy, it is necessary for the ROK Navy to examine the principal conditions affecting the sea power of Korea. In accordance with Mahan’s theory, the elements of sea power are composed of (1) geographical position, (2) physical conformation, (3) extent of territory, (4) number of population, (5) character of the people, and (6) character of the government. In terms of the maritime history of Korea, Mahan’s deterministic assertion that “the shrewdness and foresight of governments had been less important in determining the history of seaboard nations than certain natural conditions that shaped their development” went wrong. In fact, the “character of the people and government” of Korea has been the decisive factors in the development of Korean sea power in the past.
However, since the division of the Korean peninsula in 1945, the national character of the ROK has greatly changed. For example, before the division of the Korean peninsula, the Koreans called travel to foreign countries “Weakuk Yeohaeng (travelling foreign countries),” which meant a journey by an overland route through continental regions. After the division, the term has been changed as “Haewea Yeohaeng (overseas travel),” which means a travel through the sea. The forced division of Korea by two Superpowers ironically released South Koreans from the long historic confinement of continental tradition.

In particular, as rapid and extensive ROK national development through the sea clearly illustrates, South Koreans exhibited great potential in the maritime affairs since the Korean War. As of 2003, maritime South Korea has totally converted to being a wealthy, democratic and industrialized country while the continental North Korea is now on the verge of collapse due to its devastating economic difficulties, diplomatic isolation, and political instability. The striking fifty-eight year history of the two Koreas since 1945 is vividly teaching the Koreans how important the sea is in its security and prosperity.

Also, in terms of character of government, after the over 31 years of Presidential administration by Army generals until 1993, the civilian government finally established the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries in 1994. And a former Minister of Fishery and Trade became the current President of the ROK on 25th February 2003. The ROK government is developing the policy, system and leadership of its maritime affairs in order to make more contribution to national development through the sea in the 21st century Asia-Pacific maritime era.

On the other hand, Dr Eric Grove’s principal conditions affecting the modern maritime military power are most relevant to the ROK Navy because the naval
development of the ROK in the past was determined by mostly his first order- economic strength, technical strength and socio-political culture. Under US military aid, due to the gloomy economic situation, the development of the ROK Navy was determined by US political considerations through the ROK-USA combined defence policy. And the ROK fleet strength was represented by the various ex-US old naval ships, which were mostly built in the mid-1940s. However, with the ROK self-reliant national defence movement and successful economic and technical development, the ROK Navy was able to develop as a competent independent coastal defence navy against the North and fleet strength was represented by the Korean design naval ships including Ulsan-class FF.

In the post-Cold War era, although the ROK Navy was successful to turn the direction of its force development towards a blue-water navy, it is currently far inferior to the naval capability of neighbouring countries in the region because of the lack of financial support for development. However, in terms of Grove’s principal conditions, as of 2002, the ROK has the world’s first shipbuilding industry and eighth largest shipping business, and is the twelfth largest trading power in the world. Also, the economic strength of the ROK has increased over 300 times in GDP and over 700 times in the trade volume in comparison with that of 1953, and its merchant marine has the capability of 1,304 vessels of 19,959,955 tons gross.

Therefore, it is clear that the future development of the ROK Navy towards a blue-water navy is a matter not only of the support of South Koreans but also of government policy and perception. For this purpose, it is necessary for the ROK Navy to provide a clear vision and blueprint of the future development, with sufficient validity and justification. The descendents of the maritime pioneers of Korea once again must make a successful move towards a blue-water navy to ensure national security and
prosperity in the future against North Korea and other potential regional maritime threats. This is the reason why the study of the ROK naval policy is desperately necessary.

Winston Churchill gave a warning that “a nation that forgets its past has no future.” Indeed, naval power of the ROK directly reflects its national capability and prestige. In the late 19th century, Korea neglected the development of its naval forces and did not integrate appropriately into the power constellation dominated by the maritime powers. In the 21st century, Northeast Asia is rising as a critical part of world politics and economy. The region comprises a fifth of the world economy in 2002 and the sea is vital for the economic development of the regional countries. In particular, the regional countries in East Asia are mostly devoting themselves to developing naval capabilities to secure their national interests in the uncertain and changing post-Cold War era.

In this situation, what shall the ROK do to ensure future national security and prosperity? It is clear that the Koreans must develop the ROK Navy as a competent independent naval power equipped with strong sea control but limited power projection capability for the peaceful unification of Korea and the maintenance of regional stability. In particular, the force planners of the ROK must consider seriously that the security of the ROK and the reunification of Korea is ultimately the responsibility of Koreans, although it can be aided by the alliance with the USA. In this context, the ROK, a wealthy maritime nation 55 years old, must escape from the chronic dependency on US military capability to develop constructive relations with the USA on the basis of independent national military power, of which a strong multipurpose navy must be a key component.
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