Comparative Educational Policies Under Two Military Governments:
The Case of Argentina (1976-1983) and Chile (1973-1990)

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by

Manuel Fernando Jiménez Rojas, Lic Ed.

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Maybe one of the hardest tasks before concluding a Ph.D. research is the acknowledgement. Normally we are in debt to so many scholars, whose research has been helpful to develop ours, so many people who show interest in our work, whose comments were so helpful to amend, or to improve our ideas. Taking the risk of omitting many to whom I am in debt, I should present only as an example, some of them, especially the ones who have had high political responsibilities in Argentina.

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Abstract

This PhD. research is devoted to producing a comparative study of educational policies in two Latin American countries, under the military governments of: Argentina [1976-1983] and Chile [1973-1990], and to explain the differences and similarities in their educational policies, based in the following working hypothesis:

Military education and professional expertise have strong similarities in South America. This fact facilitates similar patterns of action in most of their professional activities, but strong differences show up when they rule a country, and seemingly the biggest ones appear to be in the educational field.

This hypothesis is based on the strong pattern of characteristics of armed forces officers, a pattern that marks heavily their life, culture and way to solve problems. Despite the fact that their education is the most successful, in order to obtain its goals, among all educational systems, being able to produce patterns of conduct that last for life. Nevertheless, when they become rulers, they can differ heavily in producing and elaborating ideas that afterwards are transformed into governmental policies for their countries. This fact does not diminish their ability, in the military field, to act in similar professional patterns.

The working hypothesis proved to be wrong, along the development of this research it became evident that similarities in wide scope educational policies were marked by a common set of values. The differences were mainly a product of constitutional, political and cultural issues. Besides, the military had to accommodate, negotiate, or transact their set of values with other social actors due to these differences. The level of these accommodations, transactions or negotiations produced the main differences between both military regimes in relationship to their educational policies.
This research is divided in three parts:

I A characterization of both military regimes by means of using the most relevant theoretical trends and the state of the art in this field. In this stage analysed are: (a) the essential authors used as sources and cited by most scholars in this field, from the point of view of the usefulness of their work to explain Armed Forces governments in the countries under study; (b) The contributions made by a sample of a second generation of researchers, their different trends, and their usefulness to explain similarities and differences in educational policies in these two Armed Forces governments; (c) A general review and characterization of both governments in the fields of economic development, human rights conflicts, and general policy designed for both countries, as a general background of their educational policy; (d) Based in the study of the Armed Forces literature, and the general background a theoretical framework based on military values was developed.

As a result of this first part of the research a profile of the Argentinian and Chilean military was compiled and individualized a set of values that characterize both. It was evident that the most helpful theoretical trends were the ones developed by authors that have become classics in this field: Huntington and Janowitz. Later trends of research have proved of little used for this study, thus raising more questions than answers. As an exception it could be stated that the 'developmentalist school' was helpful in—at least—to produce a balanced an impartial view of the military as rulers.

II The second part is devoted to analysing main educational policies in both governments, from the perspective of the theoretical frame previously developed. Included in this analysis were their political statements, goals, and underlying values, together with the planning, laws, decrees and documents; at the same time, a complete discussion and evaluation of a bibliography is given. From the analysis and
reviews were isolated the intervening factors in the formulation of the educational policies emanating from both Armed Forces governments, their points of contact and of divergence, in agreement with the theoretical framework. The main emphasis was given to explain the marked differences found in the educational field.

The main trends in educational policy developed in the period under study are: (a) Introduction of order into the educational system, perceived as chaotic by the military, using decentralization of management as the main feature; (b) Reinforcement of the sense of nationality, sovereignty, and belonging to their respective nations, by means of education; (c) Reformation of universities, as a tool of economic development by means of training good professionals in quantities relevant to the needs of their countries, and to produce high quality research.

We can assert that: (a) The working hypothesis worked properly in the first part related to their professional expertise and patterns of action; (b) The second assertion proved to be wrong, it was assumed that strong differences would be found when ruling a country, due to their cultural, economic and social settings. On the contrary, we found the existence of strong similarities in the educational policies developed in both countries. These similarities, according to the theoretical framework, were due to a clear set of military values, different from the civilians in degree rather than in kind.

III Two chapters were devoted to discuss different social, economic, human rights and other aspects—not strictly related with education of Argentinian and Chilean society from the point of view of scholars, international institutions and the press. This part of the research aimed to present some distortions about the real work performed by the two governments under review, and to produce some enlightenment concerning the profile of the public and self perception of Argentinian and Chilean military.
Abbreviations

A.A.F.F. Armed Forces

A.N.E.S.E. National Education Officers Association [Asociación Nacional de Empleados de Servicio de la Educación]

BA Bureaucratic Authoritarian

C.F.C. y E. Federal Council of Culture and education [Consejo Federal de Cultura y Educación]

C.F.E. Federal Education Council [Consejo Federal de Educación]

CIDE Centre for Research and Development of Education [Centro de Investigaciones y Desarrollo de la Educación]

CINDA Inter-University Development Centre [Centro Interuniversitario de Desarrollo]

CONADEP National Committee on Peoples Dissapearance [Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas]

CONICET National Council for Science and Technology [Consejo Nacional para la Ciencia y la Tecnología]

CONYCT National Council for Scientific Research and Technology [Comisión Nacional de Investigación Científica y Tecnológica]

CPEIP Centre for Educational Research and Retraining [Centro de Perfeccionamiento e Investigaciones Pedagógicas]

CPU Corporation of University Promotion [Corporación de Promoción Universitaria]

D.P.G.Ch. Chilean Government Declaration of Principles [Declaración de Principios del Gobierno de Chile]

ENU National Unified School [Escuela Nacional Unificada]

ERSA Argentinian Studies of Social Life Reality [Estudios de la Realidad Social Argentina]

F.E.C. Federal Education Council [Consejo Federal de Educación]

GDP Gross Domestic Product

E.M.E.R. Expansion and Improvement of Rural education [Expansión y Mejoramiento de la Enseñanza Rural]

E.M.E.T.A. Education for Expansion and Improvement of Agriculture and Stockbreeding [Expansión y Mejoramiento de la Enseñanza Técnico Agropecuaria]


FLACSO Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences [Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales]

GNP Gross National Product

G.O.U United Officers Group [Grupo de Oficiales Unidos]

I/O Institutional/Occupational theory

JUNJI National Directorate for Kinder Gardens [Junta Nacional de Jardines Infantiles]

L.A. Latin America

MILEX Military Expenditure

MIR Leftist Revolutionary Movement [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario]

NGO Non Government Offices

NSD National Security Doctrine

ODEPLAN National Planning Office [Oficina de Planificación Nacional]


PAA Academic Aptitude Test [Prueba de Aptitud Académica]

P.G.E. Presidential National Guidelines on Education [Directivas Presidenciales sobre Educación]

P.N.I.D. Indicated Development National Planning [Plan Nacional Indicativo de Desarrollo]

P.R.N. National Reorganization Process: Aims and Basic Objectives [Proceso de Reorganización Nacional: Propósitos y Objetivos Básicos]

PS Socialist Party

SIMCE Education Quality Measurement System [Sistema de Medición de Calidad en Educación]

S.U.T.E. Unified Union of Education Workers [Sindicato Unico de trabajadores de la Educación]

VOP Peoples' Organized Vanguard
Warning

In this research the author has used intensively sources in English and in Spanish. All quotations in the latter language are translations provided by the author, unless otherwise indicated.

To produce a difference between quotations in both languages in this work has been used the internationally well known symbols of double inverted commas (") when referred to English, and in his translations from Spanish it has been used single inverted commas ('), instead of explicit statements related to the origin of the translation.

All of the nine chapters of this work are provided with their own conclusions and set of references therefore, each one become a stand alone unity. The bibliography cited on the references has not been included in the general bibliography at the end of this research.

Names of institutions in Spanish has been kept along this work, notwithstanding a translation to English has been provided into square brackets [ ] all the times these seemed necessary.
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CHAPTER I

Concept Building in Military Studies

Limitations of this chapter

This chapter is restricted to studying the stages of concept formation, analysis, and concept revision (Harries-Jenkins, 1990, 117), and attempts to find, or to reconstruct concepts useful in the study the military profession in Argentina and Chile.

At this point, efforts were devoted to analysing a selected group of authors who included Huntington, Janowitz, Finer, Moskos, and Perlmutter. They represent different stages in concept formation and concept analysis, and their most important works are reviewed. Importance, was understood as the frequency they were cited in later scholarly papers.

To establish differences, and similarities in works that are very different in aims and scope, was extremely hard. Many important matters were put aside due to space restrictions.

Professionalism and its skills.

Professionalism, one of the most important concepts related to military theories, is developed from different angles, attributing to it different effects over the political conduct of military in the works under analysis.
Nowadays, the idea that the military is a profession, is widely accepted, and related with this aspect is the starting point of Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*. In his words: "The modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military man a professional men" (Huntington, 1977, 7); he then defined the concept of profession: "A profession is a peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics" (ibid.). Adding that the characteristics of this profession are: expertise, responsibility and corporateness; besides, he stresses the distinctive characteristics that make this profession different than almost all civilian ones, that is the direction, operation, and control of an organization whose aim is the application of violence. Their professional competence is related with the ability to manage large and complex organizations of violence, the larger and more complex, the higher their professional competence (op cit, 8-14). Professionalism, at the height of its perfection has the virtue of removing the military from politics and making them the useful instrument of state, "politically sterile and neutral" (op cit, 84). These assertions are criticized by Finer (Finer 1967, 24-5 onwards), and Perlmutter (Perlmutter, 1977, 4 onwards) For Janowitz, it is a problem to be worried about, due to the increasing military political participation especially in foreign policy formulations. He doubts if it is the military men's fault, or that is due to a vacuum created by "ineffectiveness of civilian institutions and leaders" (Janowitz, 1960, 14).

From his standpoint it is undeniable that the military is a profession with all the characteristics proper of them, even when restricted only to officers. They have everyday higher levels of expertise, specialized knowledge and skill in their own field, and in increasingly related ones, and a distinctive amount of experience acquired in their professional life through constant study at specialized academies or institutes. The pattern of constant study and experience accumulated in each rank, and rotation of positions is backed up by a broad intellectual and cultural back-
ground; all these characteristics are proper of a mature profession. Besides, it is closely related with academic activities through publication of many professional journals in which military research, experiences, and policy development are discussed.

Due to the aim of Finer's work, 'political participation of the military', he does not attempt to explicate the concept of professionalism of this body; he accepts in principle, the main characteristics stated by Huntington, but differs in relation to the consequences of his "essentialist" definition of professionalism, Finer states: "This is the whole weakness of Huntington's thesis. All is made to hang upon a very special definition of professionalism, and by pure deduction from this, of a so called military mind" (Finer, 1967, 25). Following this idea, Finer asserts that professionalism consequences could be a deterrent, or it could also increase military tendency to get involved in politics, and states that professionalism is the first of five factors that form the necessary conditions of Armed Forces [A.A.F.F. onwards] interventions (op cit, 207).

Janowitz starts criticizing the low interest of civil society in the study of the changing characteristics of A.A.F.F. as a profession, and accepts basic characteristics of professionalism given by Huntington (expertise, responsibility, and corporateness). He develops a scheme of changes faced by military professionalism in the last half century. He asserts: "The growth of skill specialization produces professionalization, which in turn, influences social and political perspectives" (Janowitz, 1960, 7). Janowitz in his evaluation of professionalism, is nearer to Finer than to Huntington's.
Janowitz's five working hypotheses, designed to analyse the military profession, deals with changes in society that have affected military professionalism, they are:

1. In most countries developed and underdeveloped, with differences only in degree, these are changes in the organizational authority, from an authoritarian domination to manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus.

"It is in this crucial respect that the military establishment has undergone a slow and continuing change. The technical character of modern warfare requires highly skilled and highly motivated soldiers. In any complex military team an important element of power resides in each member who must make a technical contribution to the success of the undertaking. Therefore, the more mechanized the military formation, the greater the reliance on the concept of organization" (op cit, 9).

These changes are producing a greater reliance on initiative, morale, and expertise of men under his orders (op cit, 8).

2. The once significant difference of skill between the military and civilian elites has been narrowed, and officers have acquired more and more skills and orientations common to civil administrators, and civilian leaders due to the increasing concentration of technical specialists in the military. On the contrary, civilians do not acquire military skills. This fact has produced, as a consequence, a developed interest among officers in managerial matters in order to improve initiative in combat units, and in the co-ordination of high level specialists, to motivate and to explain pursued goals to personnel under their command (op cit 8-9).

3. There are notorious changes in officer recruitment, from a narrow high class to a wider base. This fact responds to the growth of the A.A.F.F. establishment, and the need for an ampler source of specialists (op cit 10-11).

4. Changes in career patterns occur in which "prescribed careers performed with high competence lead entrance into the professional elite. By contrast, entrance into the smaller group—the elite nucleus—where innovating perspectives, discretionary
responsibility, and political skills are required, is assigned to persons with unconventional and adaptive careers." (op cit, 12).

5. The growing importance of the A.A.F.F. establishment, and increasing managerial characteristics acquired by the military, has had a deep effect on their self image and concept of honour. The increased self image being more than a military technician, officers and mostly the ones in leadership position are, clearly aware of their political importance (op cit, 12-6).

Janowitz’s five working hypothesis seem to be quite different, at least in degree, in half or underdeveloped countries; they share some of these characteristics but are far behind developed countries. The existence of a higher level of authoritarianism in direct relationship with their degree of underdevelopment is evident, exactly the same happened with the difference of skills between civilians and military, nevertheless in technical military matters some of them have reached a high level of development.

Officer recruitment does not seem to have been changing too much in these countries either. In some of them as Chile—after independence—the recruitment has been almost always from the middle class, or the military has co-opted lower middle class, and even rank and file of very humble origins [half-breed, native, coloured people], raising their status once they become officers (Vergara, 1993, 179 onwards). Innovation, one of the requirements to enter the elite nucleus in developed countries, seems to be more an impediment than an advantage in Third World countries. In relation to the fifth working hypothesis, military establishment importance, it seems evident that it is changing, but there is not enough evidence if it is a lineal ascendant change or a fluctuating one.
From Janowitz's viewpoint it is evident that there is a shift in the change of skills demanded from the A.A.F.F. profession, due to changes in society at large; among them is noticeable in first place managerial, scientific, technical, and the strain they have produced in military officers. All of these traits have influenced deeply the concept of professionalism, making it an elusive concept, and not a steady one as it seemed to be in Huntington's work.

Perlmutter follows Huntington's main characteristics of the professional soldier: expertise; clientship; corporateness; and he adds ideology as a equivalent of Huntington's professional military ethic (Perlmutter, 1977, 8). He agrees that each one of them is a universal variable in all modern military establishment in developed and half developed societies (op cit, 9). He defines military profession as follows:

"[an] occupation that requires advanced training in a specialized fields. The purpose of long and intensive training is to maintain high levels of achievement and conduct according to standards set either by the rules of the organization or the opinion of peers. The degree of professionalism of a particular occupation is measured by the conduct, method, character, status, and standards of his practitioners. Because its special status, true professionals possess considerable authority in their relation with "clients" (op cit, 1).

Some elements, according to him which have had the deepest influence in military professionalism are related with the ones that rule sciences: a) universal standards; b) specificity of professional expertise; c) affective neutrality; d) judgement of performance in accordance with principles laid down by professional colleagues. Others are more related with professionals in general, and if there is any difference it is only in degree such as; assertion of authority, and finally, client protection.
Perlmutter's assertion of the existence of two qualitative variables of military professionalism: control and skill, are derived from the fusionist theory which "recognizes that bureaucracy and politics, as well as government and administration experts and politicians are symbiotically connected" (op cit, 4). The variable control has a twofold source; a) the first is common to all professions and with an internal feature; the colleagues group that oversees internal cohesion of officer corps, both as a professional and as a social group, observing self-imposed standards of personal behaviour; b) an external source of control and discipline rooted in the hierarchy of authority, in which "Professional methods and conduct are judged by the faithfulness with which the officer follows directives from above" (op cit, 2).

The variable skills are related with one of the most distinctive characteristic of military officers being simultaneously a bureaucrat and a hero. These two characteristics can easily drive to a collision due to the demands they exert on the officer. First, as a bureaucrat he must transform his orientation into a managerial one with all the consequences that concept denotation's involve; second, he faces the demands of a military peer group.

Perlmutter's wide acceptance of the fusionist theory and the diffusiveness of power in advanced societies, introduces another element that reveals the complexity and extension acquired by the A.A.F.F. profession. The symbiotic relationship among policy makers and policy implementers has had, as a consequence, military participation in a field that in the past were completely unthinkable in stable political conditions as the design and formulation of general policy. Perlmutter's conclusions of military professionalism can be conceptualized on the basis of two sets of independent variables. First is the nature of the modern nation-state, and second the general characteristics of modern professionalism (op cit, 32).
The work of Charles Moskos and his Institutional-Occupational theory presents a problem in producing a definition of professionalism in the military. One main idea present in his theory is the existence of a continuum "ranging from a military organization highly divergent from civilian society to one highly convergent with civilian structures" (Moskos, 1988, 15).

From this standpoint, it is possible to produce as many definitions of military profession as the position they occupy in the continuum. We have to recognize that the model's aim is different to the previous work and this makes it difficult to produce a definition of professionalism. Nevertheless, it is possible to extract characteristics that might conduce to a broad definition. Into these characteristics, we find the notion of call, honour, duty, country, discipline, sacrifice, corporateness, most of them related with a set of values that seems to be, not exclusive to the A.A.F.F., but being far more important than in other professions.

Moskos' theory recognises that social organizational changes have had an evident effect over the military profession, involving them in many subjects, among them politics. Technological change has produced a fragmentation in specialities increasing both the reliance on civilian experts, and management principles importance, therefore, diminishing military expertise, "The issue of 'who is military' and 'what the military does' is no longer clear" (Wood, 1988, 30). This fact makes it difficult to define military professionalism; notwithstanding, it has been possible to isolate some characteristics of the changing pattern of military identities, among them we find that in the U.S.A, 40 to 50% of Air Force junior officers reported they viewed themselves as specialists rather than officers, and identification with managerial jobs, when support officers were asked how they viewed themselves (op cit, 32).
To review differences and similitudes of military professionalism concept, in the five works was a hard task, due to the different approaches among them. At the same time they present strong similitudes and differences, and it was also possible to find internal contradictions in some works under analysis.

It is evident that the principal characteristics stated by Huntington are explicitly accepted by all of them, in spite of each one having a different idea of the scope, and different effects of professionalization on the A.A.F.F., these differences lead them to different conclusions than Huntington's. This is the case of all of them but Moskos.

As a starting point for this analysis it is necessary to recognize the importance of an ideal model in order to make comparisons, or to determine or measure the proximity or remoteness to this model within the A.A.F.F. Through the application of a model we would be able to establish differences within a society at different periods or between different societies. From this standpoint it seems to us a very useful definition given by Huntington, nevertheless we agree or disagree with his conclusions of professionalism's influence.

It is far from being a conclusive argument that military professionalization produces a strong tendency to intervene in political affairs. In their exemplification the concept of intervention, it is not clearly defined, does it mean just to give an opinion about a political-military matters?, is it the right to create pressure groups?, or is to supplant a civil government for a military one?, or is the omission to defend a civilian regime?.

From our viewpoint we agree a model, in which the desideratum of professionalism is defence and obedience to a legitimate regime. Therefore A.A.F.F. offi-
cers with all their skills and knowledge provided by science and technology, will be more helpful with their intellectual acquisitions, and not a danger for democracy, because their knowledge will be at the service of the one(s) who rule because he has the right to do so.

All these works fail in making the distinction that something that is legitimate in the origin, as some democratic governments, might turn into illegitimate in the action. In this case, no one can blame a nation's more organized and cohesive group if it chooses to intervene.

Meanwhile, governments keep their legitimacy no one case is provided in the literature of military take over. There is a reasonable doubt if whether military intervention was due to military professionalism, or because the tissues of the society. at large, were sick. When reviewing literature we frequently find omitted the idea expressed by Janowitz that: "Such an assumption overlooks the extent to which the armed forces are a creation of the larger social structure..." (Janowitz, 1960, 4), and the relationship of the A.A.F.F.-society would be more related with that particular society characteristics than A.A.F.F. universal characteristics.

The influence of technology is not so overt among all militaries in different countries. In half developed ones in which a 'giant engineering establishment' (Op cit, 21), does not exist, the influence of weapon technology is not so far distant from advanced countries, due to the co-operation between developed and underdeveloped ones, or the flow of information through military academic journals. It is evident that A.A.F.F. importance in these countries is not so economically relevant, and related to political factors because their budgets are used in most cases to cover salaries and fixed expenses. Therefore, in those countries do not exist a circle of economic interest, or lobbying corps related to the A.A.F.F.'s surrounding political
power. Janowitz recognises that his working hypothesis "must be applied to the military establishment of other major Western industrialised nations as well" (op cit, 8), so it will be unfair to criticize his hypothesis when applied outside that context. The main problem is that hypotheses were not designed to explain cases outside this economic and geographic area, despite the fact many quotations of his working hypothesis are applied to half and under developed countries in academic work. We must accept as a conclusion, that the comprehension of participation of military in politics in half and underdeveloped countries must be based also, in another set of variables.

Janowitz ideas regarding this field are best applied to the situation of developed countries. The most relevant aspects maintained by this author are: access to the professional elite, elite nucleus, managerial abilities, so they can not be easily applied in under-developed countries. The same happened with the expansion of the social strata recruitment, which has brought to officership many people of lower strata. This might clearly be the cases of the U.S.A., Prussia, England, and others—and Janowitz recognizes it—but it is hardly applicable to medium, and low developed countries at least the ones which have not had a revolutionary army. In most of these countries it has been a middle social class strata, especially in Chile in which this class is very wide, or low strata as in Mexico according to Ackroyd (Ackroyd, 1991, 90 & 93).

Finally, among concepts of A.A.F.F. professionalism in these works is the remarkable Perlmutter's definition, and his contradictions between it and his evaluation of the Revolutionary Soldier, when he asserts that: "The Professionalism of the revolutionary soldier may take many forms. It does not have to be the professionalism of the historical military organization" (Perlmutter, 1977, 226). Following his idea, he lists among Revolutionaries, outstanding generals who belong to historical
periods that do not have correspondence with the modern military as Cromwell and Carnot (ibid.). In some historical periods, the military leaders have to emerge because a professional military did not exist as in Independence wars in America, in which the A.A.F.F. profession was a monopoly of the metropolis, or the creation of a state as an agreement of the great powers as Israel. All these cases produced military corps created almost from scratch but they were a far distance off Perlmutter's own definition of A.A.F.F. profession.

Corporatism and its consequences

The concept of corporatism as a narrow circle which have in common the same work as craft corporations, or same studies to become a professional, is spread over the world. The most prestigious social careers exert their influence in order to pass laws that forbid the exercise of that profession without proper studies, they create close defence circles for matters they think can hurt their status or interest. Therefore, the only way to become a physician, a lawyer, or a military officer is university studies for the former, or military academies for the latter.

Everywhere, law protects members corporate rights, even against colleagues that have obtained the same proficiency certification from other countries. So lawyers or physicians can not work professionally in almost any country without validating their certification, this validation can sometimes be harder to obtain than following the normal pattern as undergraduate student.

Corporateness may be the most outstanding characteristic of military men, it produces a sense of "organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart
from laymen" (Huntington, 1977, 10). These characteristics are so remarkable in A.A.F.F., that they are only equalled by religious professions.

Huntington described this characteristic as the one that enforces certain types of conduct, fixes standards of professional competence, and rules the norms of professional responsibility. At the same time he defines the A.A.F.F. as a bureaucratic profession that instead of having a wide independence, and a direct relationship with clients as do lawyers and physicians, has a strong tie with society as a whole, and "tends to develop a more general sense of collective professional responsibility and the proper role of the profession in society" (ibid.). This profession special characteristics, and its functional imperatives of security drives, to the formation of an autonomous social unit, "Entrance into this unit is restricted to those with the requisite education and training and it is usually permitted only at the lowest level of professional competence" (op cit, 16).

Janowitz's work is extremely coincident with Huntington's, especially, in relationship to the idea of unity, group identity, and ties created between military men since they started their training at military academies. The groups slow dispersion permits "acquiring lifetime colleagues and the necessity of accommodating to them" (Janowitz, 1960, 127), all of them with a similar pattern of acting and thinking, and produces a strong network of very close personal contacts. Huntington's idea of isolation, separateness, and its consequences, is taken by Janowitz who describes the military as 'a complete style of life" (op cit, 175), in which the boundaries of private and military life are very thin, and facilitate the appearance of a great sense of group cohesion, professional loyalty, martial spirit. He asserts:

"In good measure, military indoctrination has been effective because of the relatively closed community environment in which the military have lived."
In turn, the style of life of the military community contributes to the self-consciousness and self-assurance of the military elite" (ibid.).

Another relevant aspect in which there exists a close relation between Huntington and Janowitz, is related to the sense of honour derived from the European aristocracy [pointing to USA military, but common to almost all western world], with the characteristics of gentlemanly, fealty, brotherhood, and preservation of traditional glory. In their honour code is included the need to stay above politics, meaning to avoid any attachment to partisan politics, and neutrality in this field.

Both, Huntington and Janowitz present this characteristic as a fact, with no effect, by itself, on the political attitude of A.A.F.F. In Moskos' work it might be understood that this type of military men are nearer the institutional end of the continuum, than in the occupational one (Moskos, 1988, 16).

Finer and Perlmutter, blame military corporateness as an influential element that lead to political participation, and to lost neutrality in this matter. Pointing to corporateness as a dark influence in the A.A.F.F. political conduct, Finer asserts:

"The military is jealous of its corporate status and privileges. Anxiety to preserve its autonomy provides one of the most widespread and powerful of the motives for intervention ... In its more aggressive form it can lead the military demand to be the ultimate judge on all matters affecting the armed forces" (Finer, 1967, 47).

At the beginning of his work Perlmutter asserts that: "The emphasis... will be on the corporate significance of the military's political orientation" (Perlmutter, 1977, 7), and to conclude he states that: "The military is motivated to intervene only when its corporate or bureaucratic roles seem threatened... " (op cit, 281).
Finer provides an abundant set of historical evidence in his attempt to show the correctness of his assertions: as Prussia first and Germany afterwards, Japan, France, Spain, Latin America, Middle East and South East Asia, and Eastern Europe. All examples included societies in accelerate change process and/or to overt general crisis. In them the A.A.F.F. could play an important role, because they were the only ones which have cohesion and decision to direct society, this fact is openly recognized by Finer, when he states:

"the Ludendorf-Hindenburg policy was not so much an aggression against the civilian authorities as an abdication by the latter to the technical claims of the military, now grossly expanded by the exigencies of total war" (Finer, 1967, 49).

The same happened, in a different scale and context, in USA during War World II, in which civilian political power gave a wide participation to the A.A.F.F. in: (1) major decisions in policy and strategy were adopted by the A.A.F.F. (2) Related to policy and strategy, the military ran the war just the way the American people, and statesmen wanted it run. (3) On the domestic front, control over economic mobilization was shared between military, and civilian agencies (Huntington, 1977, 315). This means that there existed a great amount of political and social consensus. The only possible conclusion is to consider this policy as, a desirable and intelligent reaction, and not as a dangerous one.

New roles to be assigned to social institutions during the war is a well known problem, and there is no doubt at all that two phenomena takes place: first, the state grows and includes new responsibilities that previously were in the hands of the industrialist, businessmen and politicians; second, the civilian politicians give voluntarily more power and increase decision power of A.A.F.F.
Finer's approach to French military related to corporate self interest case is not strong enough because these A.A.F.F.:

"as from the time of the Second Empire onwards, the army's viewpoint was a mystique of order, sympathy for authoritarianism and a violent hatred of parliamentary institutions... Yet despite the officers corp's hostility to the Republic and to Parliamentarism, it retained its cult of discipline and legality... The officers did not conspire against the Republic..."(Finer, 1967, 53-4).

Despite these sentiments against the government, and taken for granted that corporate self interest were so powerful, the question is why the French A.A.F.F. did not try to exert open pressure on the government, when they faced problems that affected their interest.

Finer's approximation to Latin American A.A.F.F. does not clearly recognize the rich diversity of this region, too many aspects are left aside, as the important fact that constitutions of these countries—as any country in the world—gave to the A.A.F.F. the monopoly to use weapons. Therefore, any 'state of despair' of presidents (Finer, 1967, 55), were violating constitutional law when creating parallel armies. These constitutions were not dictated by the A.A.F.F., but written by politicians, and approved by the people. Reaction of military men is the same in the whole world, and most civilians know that a parallel army means civil war, and military are not prone to commit suicide accepting parallel armies.

Finer states that individual self interest, and desire of upward social mobility are strong motives for political participation (op cit, 56). Many countries which have experienced military coups or 'pronunciamientos' present at the same time higher funding, and salary increases for the A.A.F.F. This phenomenon have a side not considered by Finer, in a state of siege, internal war, and/or emergency state, the
A.A.F.F. has to face a notorious increase in their responsibilities, and needs of personnel to accomplish them.

Therefore, they call to arms a large number of reserve commissioned and non commissioned officers and privates. They have to fill many civilian positions to rule the country, and to perform everyday military tasks as intensive patrolling, to get rid of resistance, and all these activities are time and money consuming. It is self evident that it makes military budgets grow. These are phenomena that require a great deal of research. Meanwhile, it is very difficult to accept, without hesitation, Finer's assertion of self interest.

If Finer criticizes the corporateness role, Perlmutter deepened this criticism, when he defined corporate professionalism as: "the fusion between the professional and the bureaucrat—a fusion between group exclusivity and managerial responsibility" (Perlmutter, 1977, 4). He strongly emphasizes the links between corporate, bureaucratic roles, and orientations to political intervention,

"as a corporate body the military organization strives for internal control of its profession and for protection from external politic control... Striving to maximise autonomy entails, among other things, excercising influence in politics, both through organizational counterpressures and through political institutions and regimes" (op cit, 2-3).

All professions try to exert control on their field of expertise, the most successful in doing so, are traditional and influential careers such as medicine, and law. Both, in different ways, have influenced political and economic decisions in their own benefit. Lawyers have done it by dominating, with almost no counterweight politics and legislation. This characteristic common to modern professions is by no means A.A.F.F. exclusivity, and it will not produce problems while nobody commits
excesses in this participation. Perlmutter is able to recognize the existence of: "healthy and unhealthy participation"; he asserts;

"Professional corporatism among the military express the relationship between the officer as a professional and the officer as client of the state, or bureaucrat. The problem is one of control and discipline. Who does the military perceive must control its organization, the group itself or the authority or both? When professionals accept the dominance of the authorities then the civil-military relationship are normal and safe and the military potential for intervention is low. A discrepancy between professional orientation and that of the authorities or a relationship in which the military control the state could upset military-civil equilibrium. This imbalance would seem to be the cause célèbre for political intervention by the military" (op cit, 5-6).

Perlmutter recognizes that corporateness is not the only explanation for military intervention; moreover he pointed to such dependent variables as alienation, misperceptions of respective roles, suspicion, and political ambitions (op cit, 6). He fails to recognize as variables, that the A.A.F.F. act to support values—sometimes widely shared by the people—important to them and to the Nation.

The most peculiar aspect of Perlmutter's work must be his evident admiration for the professional revolutionary soldier, in contradiction with his previous definition of military professionalism (op cit, 1). He attributed to them the most relevant characteristics: lack of corporatism, or at least of a quite different kind from the non-revolutionary professional military. A relevant characteristic of this corporatism is the absence of a clear-cut boundary between the politics and the military.

From our point of view most of the revolutionary military, especially the Marxist-oriented ones have only substituted a type of corporatism for one whose source is party's fidelity; all military men unable to show it, are excluded from higher positions regardless of their, ability, and merits. The comradely and non-hierarchical treatment between themselves, that might exist in a moment, change
rapidly to a new hierarchy system based in the political importance of who gives orders.

Another weakness of Perlmutter's analysis related with revolutionary armies' corporateness, is that he describes a transitory situation, and attributes to it the character of permanent. Actually, they move sooner or later to a professional, and corporate pattern, common to all military professionalism. The political supremacy and control is not everlasting, and soon starts to be eroded for an increasing professionalism. General research tends to point to a gradual restoration of professional criteria, especially in officer recruitment in which, education plays an important role, in contrast with the beginning of the revolutionary movement, in which the most relevant factor was political loyalty (Van Doorn, 1969, 23 onwards). In his description of the Israeli army Perlmutter, indirectly recognizes this fact, but refuses to follow the argument to its logical end.

Perlmutter states that the quality of corporate spirit may vary greatly in different societies, and in the lowest point of the continuum:

"Under the influence of the state's encouragement or indulgence, the corporate espirit may be transformed into a jealous tradition of rigid exclusivity, depending not on a commonality of interest and skills for its vitality but on rules of conformity, ceremony and class restriction. The incentive for improvement may be suppressed by a system of advancement based in hierarchy rather on merit and by fear of change that always characterizes a petrified structure. Secrecy and intrigue may take the place of originality and zeal. In general, organic solidarity will no longer treated in terms of performance, flexibility, and innovation, but will be harnessed to the principle of exclusivity" (Perlmutter, 1977, 36).

The main problem of Perlmutter's concept of corporateness is that he places at the positive side of his continuum: group spirit, collective self-confidence, and intragroup competitiveness. Unfortunately, it seems they are useful for him only from the negative side, and corporateness would represent the evil of the A.A.F.F.
Many of Perlmutter's conceptions about specific sectors as such as L.A., are questionable. He asserts that the two fundamental orientations of the A.A.F.F. were; a) their corporate professionalism, and b) the subjective control over them. He states that a war localized in a very specific sector of South America, facing the Pacific, was the starting point in which military functions became exclusively internal, reformist, and supported by institutional, and corporate dogma (op cit 177).

The war of the Pacific (1879-83) did create a conflict, whose consequences last until today, for it demanded from Chile, the winner, to be always prepared to face another conflict with Peru and Bolivia as a retaliation. At the same time, Chile had to be aware of Argentina. All these conflicts actual, and latent were reflected in Brazil, who could not accept Argentina becoming a bigger power than themselves. All these tensions invalidate his assertion to a presumed devotion to internal affairs, even accepting his amendment that the A.A.F.F. participation in colonization and nation building in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Brazil were examples of external functions.

Perlmutter's acceptance of an A.A.F.F. professional subculture, highly correlated with corporatism emerged in L.A., moving the military to stay above politics, and persuaded them to defend the constitution from the barracks (op cit, 178). In fact many L.A. constitutions had given them, until today, the right to defend the constitution and it has not produced a situation at variance with civilian domination.

Chilean examples used by Perlmutter fall behind reality in relation to the Chilean Army, because its professional pride and prestige came from as early as 1820, when it fought for Peru's liberation, and defeated the Spanish A.A.F.F. Afterwards, defeating the Confederation [Peru and Bolivia] in 1837. Therefore, their
'professional pride' was established since the Republic's beginning, a century before being accepted by Perlmutter. Besides, Perlmutter contradicts himself when he states that the Chilean Army had an aristocratic base (op cit, 180), and afterwards stated: "The military elite was recruited from lower-class workers with little education" (op cit, 190). Such a contradiction invalidates most of the credibility on this point, and many others related to, at least, Chile. As Perlmutter has not made direct research in Latin America it is possible to assume that the weakness of his assertions lie in deficient sources making his conclusions dubious.

He ascribes great influence to Comtism in Brazilian, Argentinian, Venezuelan, Colombian, and Chilean corporatism (op cit, 167-80). In almost all L.A. Comtism or positivism acquired great importance into intellectual, and political elites. Especially at universities, due to its exaggerated optimism on the development of hard sciences, and the evident possibility that social sciences acquire a degree of certainty comparable to mathematics or physics. The scientific development in natural and social sciences would bring—necessarily—happiness to mankind (Jimenez, 1987, 55 onwards). Comtism became a far widespread phenomenon in L.A. influencing society at large, instead of being a focalized one into the A.A.F.F. of one or several countries.

**Underlying philosophy**

Even when all works under review belong to the field of military sociology it is possible and necessary to examine their underlying philosophy. From a philosophical standpoint the most influential idea is what is man's nature?, what is his place in the universe?. In this particular case is it the nature of military men?, and their relationship civilian's nature.
Huntington asserts that military men have a pessimistic view of man as the opposite of Rousseau's good savage, spoiled by the society. This is in open contradiction with civilian trends that keep an optimistic view of man as a rational human being, able to reach agreements that permit him to keep universal peace, and therefore, make unnecessary the A.A.F.F., or at least to have them at their minimum level. These opposite views related to the essence of man lead the military to keep strong armies, or to their elimination for Rousseaus' followers.

The Military conception of man as a social being moves them to emphasize group importance, integrated by the average man, as an opposite view of liberal individualistic philosophy. Historical facts have taught them man's survival depends on this former characteristic. These two philosophical approaches acquire the greatest importance among works under review.

Finer does not have clear philosophic statements about the military men's nature, and their counterpart civilian men. He assumes—without hesitation—that military's 'weltanschauung' moves them to intervene in politics. Therefore their motives for intervention are rooted in their conception of individualistic civilians most of the time unable to lead a country, and themselves as a highly cohesioned group able to become leaders in moments of danger.

Janowitz's philosophical approach is not so clearly stated as in Huntington's work. Therefore, we have to search among his work in order to find his idea of military men. Some clues are provided, when he quotes Hanson H. Baldwin, who uses military philosophy in a narrow sense as "the logic of their professional behavior" (Janowitz, 1960, 257). Afterwards, he added that there is no reason to believe military profession has been guided by one unified philosophy (ibid.). Besides, the
development of new weapons has produced deep changes in A.A.F.F. men's Weltanschauung (op cit, 21-38). It is possible to assert that Janowitz hardly goes further than Huntington's philosophical development.

In Perlmutter's work philosophic ideas are scattered, and worst of all, there are plenty of internal contradictions. He presents two conceptions of military men: the good one "revolutionary", and the bad one, the "professional". Besides this problem, it seems hard for him to accept the importance of values into A.A.F.F. Perlmutter rejects the most distinctive characteristic of men—civilian or military—that their weltanschauung is bounded by values.

Moskos' and related works with his I/O theory has in their foundations a strong philosophical foundation, and takes into account the opposition between individualism, and the strong social ties between military men, and the encounter point between them. He supports, as strongly as Huntington does, the idea that the military weltanschauung is strongly based in values.

Military Values

Huntington's, Finer's, Janowitz's, and works based in Moskos' I/O theory are the ones which give more importance to values. This is an interesting tendency because they are the most stable elements to analyse social problems as posited by Ortega y Gasset (Ortega y Gasset, 1961, 315-35), or even to design policies in different fields as stated by Wolf (Wolf, vol 13, 85-91) and Cotton (Cotton, 1988, 40 onwards).
They agree that the values are on the foundations of the military mind, ideology, ethic, and actions. This position reinforces the criticism of Huntington towards writers who have emphasized that military men are less intelligent compared to other professions people (Huntington, 1977, 59).

Many facts contradict, Perlmutter's assertion that the Western military fail to attract the best youth to join them, and that the only exceptions of this rule are revolutionary A.A.F.F. Extremely interesting is the hypothesis that failure to attract middle class, college eligible youth in U.S.A., is a self-fulfilling prophecy because this group was "defined outside the target market, as unlikely to respond to marketplace inducements offered by the all-volunteer recruiting strategy" (Faris, 1988, 66). This hypothesis might be extended to countries in which the all volunteers forces, [AVF onwards] does not exist.

The study of military values as in many other aspects has been strongly biased. Huntington has criticized methods used by many scholars which had faced up to the problem of to determining military values because they are conducive to subjectivism and arbitrariness: methods to determine their values from the abilities, attributes, attitudes, or by source—at most produce only stereotypes of military mind such as bellicosity, authoritarianism, rigidness, rationality and logic, or assign as military values some that are proper to all mankind, and not exclusive to the militar.

Huntington's proposal to solve this problem is founded in the study of daily and the objective performance of professional functions that produce a particular professional weltanschauung. He asserts:

"The military mind, in this sense, consist of values, attitudes, and perspectives which inhere in the performance of the professional military function and which are deducible from the nature of that function... A value or attitude is part of the military ethic if it is implied by or derived from the pe-
cular expertise, responsibility, and organization of the military profession... Any given officer corps will adhere to the ethic only to the extent that is shaped by functional rather societal imperatives" (Huntington, 1977, 61-2).

In this sense loyalty, fealty, obedience, discipline, order, respect, rationality, duty, 'esprit de corps', solidarity, bravery, self abnegation, hierarchy, patriotism, nationalism, glory, and rank, are placed highly in the value system of the military men. The difference between civilian and military values is a matter of degree rather than of kind. These values are systematically and persistently indoctrinated at military academies, in daily life of military men, and permanently reinforced by a life style that integrate them into the A.A.F.F. professional personality, influencing them further than in most civilian professions with, perhaps, the only exception of the church whose pattern of indoctrination priests is similar to the A.A.F.F.

Janowitz's approach to values is not so clearly stated as in Huntington's work, he faces this problem in an indirect mode, lack of precision, and scattered through his work. When he pointed out the main characteristics of A.A.F.F. profession, he stresses that it is a life style, threatened by danger, and for that reason marked by a strong sense of solidarity. Detailed regulations is another of its most outstanding characteristics and it is the source of an enhanced group-cohesion, professional loyalty, and martial spirit (Janowitz, 1960, 175).

Of great interest, is his definition of honour, and values included in this concept, in which the focus is "never to refuse a combat assignment" rooted in a sense of nationalism and national traditions (op cit, 137). Janowitz points that "Honor is the base of its belief system" (op cit, 215), its coercive power is considerable, and functions fairly well because it does not depend on elaborate moralistic justifications. He recognizes this concept is under great pressure by contemporary society, and that it produces great stress to the profession (op cit, 216).

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If we accept that the difference between civilian and the A.A.F.F. values is only a matter of degree, it is necessary to point, even summarily, to a difference in magnitude. For instance, loyalty is not an outstanding value in individualistic and developed societies (Huntington, 1977, 304-5). It might be, somewhat stronger in half and underdeveloped countries whose values are more traditional—old fashioned from the point of view of developed societies—but in all nations loyalty among the A.A.F.F. personnel is one of the most appreciated values, hence individual subordination to the group are conceived as the foundation of existence (op cit, pp. 73-4; 304-5). Finer—without denying it—points to dangers produced by this value when the nation becomes the focus of A.A.F.F. loyalty, and other nations are potential enemies. This trait might tend to induce them to intervene when they think the nation is at risk (Finer, 1967, 33).

Values such as: duty, esprit de corps, obedience, respect, solidarity, patriotism, and nationalism, all of them strongly related, and in themselves highly desirable, receive the same treatment in almost all works under revision. Each one is the product of A.A.F.F. weltanschauung, and ties individuals into a tightly united corps. The difference in appreciating them among authors depends on the focus of each work. The ones related to active political participation such as Finer's and Perlmutter's emphasise the danger of military values. When Finer asserts, several times, the danger of military values (op cit, 10; 12;), he is not criticizing values per se but rather their perversion caused by social and political influences, normally trespassing the field of A.A.F.F.'s 'functional imperatives' (Huntington, 1977, 61-2).

All works under review—Perlmutter's excepted—agree on the importance of values in shaping the military mind and ethic. Perlmutter deny values importance in the first chapter of his work, when he explains military participation in politics:
"Topics such as discipline, cohesion, honor, and hierarchy, although frequently discussed in military sociology, are, in my view, peripheral to any explanation of the military organization as a political actor" (Perlmutter, 1977, 7).

He refers afterwards, to his Chapter Four for the foundations of his assertion. In fact, this chapter can not be used to assert, or to deny values importance because they are not mentioned in it. Contradicting himself repeatedly, Perlmutter does not hesitate to introduce these 'peripheral topics' when in need to strengthen his argument. This is the case when he expounds—as one of the main thesis—that corporatism is one of the two most important elements to explain political interventionism of the military:

"Modern professionalism is corporate; that is, it includes group consciousness and a tendency to form corporate professional associations. Such voluntary, rational, exclusive associations of experts have two purposes: first, to maintain the integrity of the profession's expertise and to protect its norms, standards, and values; and second, to defend its exclusivity principle... To achieve the first purpose, maintaining rational and secular expertise, standards and values are formulated with the approval of an elite that is chosen, ideally, for its integrity and its high standards of professional norms and values..." (op cit, 32) [emphasis added].

This text makes evident values importance when explaining the whole A.A.F.F.'s conduct, and not only corporatism which is deeply rooted in cohesion.

Perlmutter's contradictions continue when he explains the French military's conduct as a confrontation of "travail, famille, and patrie" against "liberté, égalité, and fraternité". The former values characteristic of the military and the latter of Republic (op cit, 67). The same happens when he explains the advantages of the revolutionary military in comparison with Western professional type, and he assigns strong importance to Israeli's military set of values (op cit, 258-75).
It is possible to assert, that such 'topics' include a number of values that must be deduced from the context of his work. The fact that denying their importance, and afterwards, using them intensively, without definition or presuming them well known, is a major defect in his work, making it difficult to comprehend his ideas or to accept his conclusions, particularly when he rejects the importance of "discipline, cohesion, honour and other topics" as being unimportant in explaining the military's political role.

Some works based in Moskos' I/O theory coincide in assigning high importance to military values, and point out the need for a more precise definition of them for practical reasons. In discussing military development, and changing tendencies produced by AVF, especially in U.S.A, Cotton quoting Peters & Waterman's *In Search for Excellence* argues "If you get the values right, then the other things fall into place". He emphasizes the usefulness of values, and perceptions, because they are prior to policies and programme development, and they are paramount in institution building (Cotton, 1988, 53).

**Military Mind**

Another important concept is "Military Mind" or ideology according to Perlmutter and Janowitz. Huntington describes how people develop a characteristic mind:

"people that act in the same way over a long period of time tend to develop distinctive and persistent habits of thought [and] their unique relation to the world gives them a unified perspective on the world and leads them to rationalize their behaviour and role" (Huntington, 1977, 61).
This assertion might be extended to almost all modern professions with differences, only, in degree; stronger in some of them such as the military and churchmen, in whom this phenomenon reaches maximum depth and in comparison, relatively weaker, nowadays, in economists, solicitors, engineers, and other professionals.

The military mind is a product of culture and values incorporated to their professional function, Huntington's definition is: "The military mind, in this sense, consist of values, attitudes, and perspectives which inhere in the performance of the military function and which are deducible from the nature of the function" (Ibid.). Thus to study the nature of that function, is the tool to isolate peculiar characteristics of the military's mind.

In analysing the concept of the military mind in the books under review, we will follow Huntington's definition and then compare it with the other authors.

The military profession is more than an occupation, it is a complete lifestyle. The officer is a member of a community whose claims over his daily existence goes well beyond his official duties. Somewhat less explicit, is the fact that any profession which is continually preoccupied with the threat of danger requires a strong sense of solidarity, if it has to operate effectively. Detailed regulations of the military life style is expected to enhance group cohesion, professional loyalty, and maintain the martial spirit.

Among military functions, are included, the management and use of violence. They are conceived of as unavoidable and universal, and the view of mankind is definitely pessimistic, thus this pessimism is extended to the efforts of world-wide organizations to eradicate war. Competition among nations, and the A.A.F.F.'s duty to
enhance state's security, demands co-operation, organization, discipline, co-ordination, loyalty, and all values related with the group's control over the individual. For this reason, military men are basically corporative and anti-individualistic (Huntington, 1977, 63-4), therefore, their minds and attitudes reflect this belief. At the same time they are prone to believe they are the most cohesive social group, tied by a strong bond of values, interests and abilities; this attitude is reinforced by the profession's characteristics.

Conservatism is another important element of the military mind, strongly associated with 'status quo' and 'laissez faire', these kind of clichés, commonly used in politics, hide the fact that change cannot be avoided. Therefore, conservatism might be better understood when related to the speed of changes, or their direction. The A.A.F.F. due to the profession's nature, tend to be very cautious, at the same time scientific development speed, and its influence over weaponry technology forces them to be informed and interacting with development and change, in their own field and such related ones as: international relations, economics, politics and the like, Janowitz's following quotation, even when it is related with the U.S.A. military, seems universal

"The necessity of adjusting formal conservatism to rapidly altering economic and social setting means considerable flux. In the end military belief system are as concerned with developing new solutions as they are conservative" (Janowitz, 1960, 243).

"Conservative", is a concept that carries strong political connotations, and besides being military, officers are at the same time citizens, and the political side of their conservatism make it a matter of honour to be above politics in domestic affairs (op cit, 233). Their professional concern with politics is the relationship between political goals, and military means, because they affect directly, state security. Conservatism, and state security are the reasons behind the A.A.F.F. attempts
to avoid wars, and they believe that only states which have strong military forces can keep the peace (Huntington, 1977, 68-70). As Finer's work is related to the role of the military in politics, in places which they intended or in fact seize power, we must critically examine his theses:

"Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely ask why they do otherwise. For at first sight the political advantages of the military vis-à-vis other and civilian groupings are overwhelming. The military possess vastly superior organization. And they possess arms" (Finer, 1967, 5).

Finer is suggesting to us the existence of some universal elements which prevent the military seizing power more frequently.

**Nationalism**

Nationalism is another important element in the military mind, Finer states:

"by the very nature of its appointed task i.e. national defence, the military is and indeed has to be indoctrinated with nationalism. This forms its distinctive ideology. Its whole esprit of corps without which it would have no fighting spirit is founded on the supposed national values and virtues" (op cit, 33).

Finer has a pessimistic conception of nationalism because it supposedly inspires negative sentiments of hate to enemies. It is undeniable that in war times it must be so, mostly for civilian consumption. In peace time, it is more a sentiment of love for fatherland, than hate or contempt for other states or possible enemies.

Perlmutter presents several versions of nationalism with different connotations: (a) In the Middle East and North Africa it is regarded as the national revolution against imperialism loaded with a strong feeling of xenophobia, (b) The
ideological link between military praetorians, (c) It became enmeshed with fascism and corporatism in the thirties, (d) Nationalism was mixed with anti-communism and anti-Castroism in the sixties (Political Roles and Military Rulers, Frank Cass, London U.K. and N. Jersey US 1981, p 263) (e) The feeling of being the unifiers of a disgregating nationhood (The Military and Politics in Modern Times, pp., 168) It is evident that the concept was not a refined and analytical but a situational one.

The feelings of an expansionist nationalism is stated by Huntington, associating it to the German society and military. Military officers as von der Goltz and Bernhardy promoted this sentiment. Nevertheless, they did not had the support of the General Staff and army officer corps who rejected the ethic power (The Soldier and the State, 1977, p105-6). Janowitz is still more succint when referring to nationalism relating it to the sense of honour and national traditions, reinforced vigorously by the service academies in relationship with the US military (The professional Soldier, pp 137-8). When referring to partly developed and underdeveloped nations he accepts that there is a strong sense of nationalism and a reinforced national identity together with "pervasive overtones of xenophobia" (the military in the Political Development of New Nations, 1964, U. Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1964, p 63). Besides the military in these countries present a characteristic of national as opposing to tribal identification (ibid.)

It is evident that the concept of nationalism was not completely developed in the works under analysis, and they are of scarce utility when applied to Argentina and Chile. Argentina could not be xenophobic because immigration has been one of her overwhelming characteristics, and racial tensions has never reached the problems suffered by other nations. In Chile it has been a very slow and selective process in which there was not space for strong turbulence. Xenophobic feelings are not part of the culture system in these countries because both of them have been free
from direct imperialism. It is not racial nationalism because of the similarity of their human components.

Military Ethics

The concept of ethics, is not clearly defined by Huntington, and he asserts only that "it is a constant standard by which it is possible to judge the professionalism of any officer corps anywhere any time" (Huntington, 1977, 62). In our analysis we will use ethics as defined in the *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*: "[when] conduct rises from fact to ideal it becomes ethical. In a word, ethics is the organization or criticism of conduct in terms of notions like good, right or welfare" (Seligman, et al, 1930, 602).

In Western democracies one of the most important A.A.F.F. ethical issues is respect for civil supremacy, despite grey zones in which they had intervened, and the extension of their functions in war time, otherwise this respect is almost absolute. It is sometimes less evident in half developed countries and, sometimes, non-existent in underdeveloped countries. In a twilight zone, are the theocratic countries ruled by religious leaders in which all civil, and military life is dominated by religious dogma, therefore, they lack many of the western democracies characteristics.

Nevertheless, respect for civil supremacy is paramount in Western developed and religious ruled countries, especially when the latter developed a civilian like style of government. It seems that it has its roots in the military subculture all over the world and it becomes an important ethical principle of the A.A.F.F. even when, in
fact, they have overthrown a civil government, and installed a direct or indirect military rule. This aspect is clearly stated in all the works under review.

Military men, tend always to act in benefit of the Nation's highest interest and never in their own corporate interest due to their nationalistic indoctrination. Despite this trend, there have been exceptions proving the contrary. But according to our definition, they are deviant cases, in which military ethics has been weakened mostly by civilians. Sooner or later they go back to barracks and there exists a number of cases where this is what has really happened in Chile with Ibañez 1931, Pinochet 1990, and in Argentina with all their military regimes.

A monopoly of weapons and professional management of violence, give the military tools to put pressure on, impose upon or blackmail a government, and not always the weak ones, as stated by Finer (Finer, 1967, 144 onwards). Violating A.A.F.F. ethics, normally justifications are based in matters of national security, non fulfilment of government constitutional duties, or lack of legitimacy. From an ethical standpoint, the A.A.F.F. never should produce a coup, but if the military can break their ethical code, the same might happen with civilian governments that can turn themselves illegitimate, even when their origin could be perfectly legitimate. In these matters not one author provides a case of a civilian government being overthrown when the people believe it legitimate and/or their public support is strong.

Last but not least, an important aspect of military ethics is their readiness to avoid war. The stated differences between armed strength and bellicosity, and military state and warlike state, are well understood by them and hardly understood by civilians.
Previously discussed ethical aspects are far from being all. Nevertheless, we think they are the most important, and that they embodied all values that bound the military mind.

Model usefulness

The peculiar skill of a military officer according to Huntington "is not a craft and neither an art universal in the sense that is essence is not affected by changes in time or location" (Huntington, 1977, 13). He remarks: "in practice, officership is strongest and more effective when it most closely approaches the professional ideal; it is weakest and most defective when it falls short of that ideal (op cit, 11).

The usefulness of models is widely accepted even when a model does not exist in reality, Andreski asserts:

"The result is that nearly all concepts describing structural varieties must be what Max Weber calls ideal types: that is to say, extreme pure types, the logical extremes of possible continuous variations, which are almost never found in reality without some admixture of traits logically belonging to another ideal type" (Andreski, 1968, 119-20).

To study the A.A.F.F. profession the use of models is important, even when they are affected by historical or sociological change, or the introduction of new elements such as female participation (Harries-Jenkins, 1990, 118 onwards). Despite these problems they allow us to measure the degree of deviance in relation with the model, on the contrary we must accept only casuistry, not extensive beyond their own limits, or to establish sometimes useful generalizations.
Conclusions

Huntington's most interesting aspect is to let us obtain a portrait of what the military ought to be, that means a strong foothold to start measuring the degree of deviance from a model. This same virtue is found in Janowitz, improved with his analysis of the impact of scientific and technologic advancement. Moskos Institutional/Occupational Thesis, is useful to place military professionalism in a continuum that ranges from a 'value orientation of Institution and rational calculation of market place" (Moskos; Wood, 1988, 6). Moskos thesis is particularly important from a negative perspective to analyse armed forces in half and underdeveloped countries which have not yet felt the market impact with the same strength of Western developed countries, so it is possible to expect they are nearer the institutional pole than the occupational one.

We consider Finer's work of very restricted use especially when he concluded A.A.F.F. suffer of technical and moral inadequacy as rulers on the grounds of ability to produce modernisation and economic growth (Finer 1967, 14 & 17; 1974, 99 onwards). Quite peculiar is his assertion that military governments do not consist exclusively of military personnel. Governments—democratic or undemocratic—have to depend heavily on existing bureaucracies and technocratic bodies, and it is hard to conceive that it can be otherwise because an entire society depends on them too. Another of Finer's dubious arguments is the inability of the A.A.F.F. governments to bring prosperity to their countries, when precisely military coups have been in half and underdeveloped countries with poor records of economic development under democratic, or military governments. Literature has been reviewing this point, e.g.: Jackman (Jackman, 1976, 1078 onwards), and R.D. Mckinlay & A.S. Cohan's, (Mckinlay & Cohan, 1975, 1-29; 1976, 850 onwards) and a new stream of literature evaluating the Chilean Military Government.
Finer's most interesting concept is "political culture" in which he defines three stages of development: (1) high or mature political culture; (2) developed political culture; (3) and minimal political culture. The difference between the former and the latter is rooted in "the legitimacy of the procedures for transferring political power and the question of who and what should constitute the sovereign authority are both in dispute" (Finer, 1967, 88). Unfortunately the usefulness of this concept is diminished by the fact that political culture fluctuates, at least in the second and third type, and that it has no steady or linear increasing, as Finer himself recognizes his concept as "always provisional" (op cit. 138).

Perlmutter's work became less useful from a theoretical point of view, for he asserts that the main aims of his work are to establish that corporatism and ideology are the most important variables to explain political participation. At the end he has to admit that corporatism has two faces, and therefore, can lead to docility or to intervention. Such a weak conclusion cannot be conceived as progress in this field of research, and the same happens with ideology (Perlmutter, 1977, 281-2).

Beaver & Wenger presented one of two incisive reviews of his work criticising him for lack of conceptual precision, historical misconceptions and the use of biased quotations [see Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 5, No 1, 1978]. they state:

"A theoretical study such as this must also rest on a foundation of accurate research and, at least, a clear expository style. This book is worrysome in both areas. Perlmutter continually cites secondary works as definitive statements of fact to make his points but does not hesitate to disagree with them and to offer his contrasting theories where he deems it appropriate" (Beaver, D.;Wenger, L.: 1978, 133 onwards).

It is possible to agree completely with this criticism and, previously we have pointed to some of Perlmutter's work weaknesses. The problem that arises from the
revision of his work is—how a book with so many deficiencies is cited so much in military sociological papers.

Finer's and Perlmutter's works fail to elaborate the concept of professionalism. Their main weakness is the inability to recognize the distinction between two different roles in government: the executive, and consultancy roles, the former has the decision power provided the best information, and alternatives of action offered by different consultant bodies, among them the military. The influence of these bodies is changing constantly. It is this situation scarcely wanted by the military the one which gives origin to criticism against their supposedly undue influence.

The works of Huntington, Janowitz and Moskos have a more balanced view of the problem of military political intervention, and they recognize something that—sometimes is very hard to perceive for too many scholars—always when things start getting wrong there are two who can be blamed: the one who acts without having the right to do so, and the one who permits these actions. It seems that the wide scope of their hypotheses permit a better understanding of the political behaviour of the military and are better foundations for further research than the more narrow works of Finer's and Perlmutter's.
References


CHAPTER II

NEW TRENDS IN THE ANALYSIS OF ARMED FORCES POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Limitations of this chapter

This chapter will be devoted to studying the utility and applicability of new schools, models, or new theoretical developments, most of them derived from the works of authors studied in previous chapter. One of the main aims of this chapter is to evaluate the usefulness of these trends in order to contribute to the development of a theoretical framework that permit us to understand Argentinian (1976-1983), and Chilean (1973-1990) educational policies, in the second part of this research. Due to the great number of different trends, we have selected—even somewhat arbitrarily—the ones that when they were published awoke a great interest among scholars and presumably might be useful to understand these governments.

New professionalism model

One of the main aspects stressed by Stepan is the influence of the USA government since 1961, when they gave extraordinary importance to the A.A.F.F. role in areas such as: counterinsurgency, civic action, nation building, including them in all their assistance programmes developed in L.A. The effect of this policy was to change the focus of professional military training in Brazil and Perú, from coping with external war to implementing internal security. The curricula in all their
professional schools included subjects related to social, and political conditions of their countries. Special emphasis was placed on the subjects related to the weakest levels of society, and economy, so strongly affected to the point of endanger the existence of those countries. Anti insurgent techniques became relevant to their professional training (Stepan, 1973, 50).

According to this new environment, the gap between politicians, and the A.A.F.F. become narrower in many countries. The military began to consider themselves [and act as] experts in government issues due to their greater technical and professional skills in handling internal security problems. They became in this way, important political actors.

As a consequence, nations with low legitimacy governments, unable to follow a peaceful way to economic and social transformation, encouraged 'new professionals' to intervene and assume government control (Stepan, 1973, 51). Stepan recognises that this is not only a problem of underdeveloped or developing countries. This phenomenon was also evident in France as well as in the USA. He points out that professionalism in Huntington's sense is less meaningful now than in the past (Stepan, 1973, 52-3).

According to Stepan, this 'new professionalism's' influence had a dramatic impact in the curricula of colleges for training high rank officers. Stepan shows how this influence produced changes in the Escuela Superior de Guerra [Brazilian Superior School of War]. This school transformed its organisation in agreement with the new professional trends. Therefore, new departments or divisions were created, among them: (1) political affairs, (2) psychological-social affairs, (3) economic affairs, (4) military affairs, (5) logistical and mobilisation affairs, (6) intelligence and counterintelligence, and (7) doctrine and co-ordination.
At the same time the A.A.F.F.'s relative isolation started to be eroded, and it became quite normal for civilians to be included in the Military Academies courses [lecturers and students]. This generated a link between the military and civilians. Stepan emphasizes that from 1950 until the first years of 1960s, the Brazilian military had developed a distinctive ideology:

"The close interrelationship between national security and national development. The doctrines taught at the college emphasised that modern warfare, either conventional or revolutionary, involved the unity, will, and productive capacity of the entire nation. The low-mobilisation, high-control policies of the military governments since 1964 had their intellectual roots in the ESG's doctrine that an effective policy of national security demands a strong government that can rationally maximise the outputs of the economy and effectively contains manifestations of disunity in the country" (Stepan, 1973, 54-5).

The 'Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exército' [School of Command and Superior Staff of the Army] followed the same trends and by the 1960s they were certain that:

"(1) numerous aspects of the economic and political structures had to be altered if Brazil were to have internal security and rational economic growth and (2) the civilian politicians were either unable or unwilling to make changes" (Stepan, 1973, 57)

It is evident that the Brazilian military were strongly convinced they had developed better doctrines, and that they were superior in knowledge and ability in comparison with politicians. Besides, they had institutional power to impose a solution to Brazilian problems, and the decision to persevere until the goal was achieved (Stepan, 1973, 58). From this point onwards the conclusion is evident: military rule.

The new professionalism's portrait painted by Stepan of Peruvian military, has a great deal of identity with the Brazilian, nevertheless, the outcome was com-
pletely different, mainly because of the differences in historical, economical and social background. This fact leads Stepan to point out "that the new professionalism contributes more to the military's general attitude to political action than to specific policies" (Stepan, 1973, 62).

The new professionalism described by Stepan, emphasizes strongly superior officers' intellectual achievements in Brazilian A.A.F.F., in which a great percentage of the generals had been outstanding students. He mentions that in 1964, almost 40 per cent of the army line generals—in active service—graduated first in their class at one of the three major army service schools. This factor must be taken into consideration when evaluating their actions as a group (Stepan, 1971, 51).

Stepan's "new professionalism' model created great interest, and has been applied to other A.A.F.F.. Ackroyd studied the case of Mexico under such principles. He agrees with the description of new military professionalism model, but Mexican armed forces have developed a completely opposed political conduct, if compared with Brazilians and Peruvians. The Mexican A.A.F.F.'s main characteristic is their obedience to the civil government although their training is founded in conceptions of internal threat, and a doctrine that integrates all aspects of social behaviour, and economic development.

To explain the Mexican A.A.F.F.'s behaviour, Ackroyd suggests the existence of different factors as causes for military intervention. This means that professionalization [i.e., education] may not always lead to military coups. He stressed the necessity to study the existence of factors other than professionalism as causes for intervention, among them their values, discipline, order, and authority; "This implies that if the government and civilians do not act in accordance with these values,
the military, including Mexico's, may intervene to restore them" (Ackroyd, 1991, 91-2).

It is evident that 'new professionalism' might lead to a coup d'état and to a military rule, not only in Brazil and Perú but other countries as well. Stepan recognises that the military must be studied as a subsystem of the complete political system (Stepan, 1971, 4). This fact is somewhat disregarded by other scholars when applying Stepan's model to different countries. Apparently, Stepan's model gives too much importance to new professionalism to the detriment of many other political, social and economical variables pointed out by Ackroyd.

The usefulness of this model, if applied to Argentina or Chile, is dubious. Both countries are far apart from Peru and Brazil. Argentina has a long history of political intervention prior to the existence of the 'National Security Doctrine', [NSD onwards], anti insurgent war techniques, or other distinctive elements quoted by Stepan as new professionalism foundations. Argentinian, as well as Chilean (1924-1931) take over, were a product—most of the time—of politicians' claims who pushed them to act.

The Argentinian A.A.F.F. in comparison to the Brazilian A.A.F.F. did not prepare themselves in advance to rule the country. Instead, of providing this knowledge 'a priori', in Military Academies, they learned them in the rough way, which actually meant ruling their country. Faced with this problem, the Argentinian military had, by necessity, to acquire a number of skills they need to rule, to develop, and to manage the country.

All this was before the appearance of some key elements pointed out in the contrasting paradigm of Old Professionalism of External Defence and the New
Professionalism of Internal Security and National Development. The latter, in the Argentinian case, precede the key characteristics of internal security of Stepan's model.

The Chilean military otherwise kept themselves almost completely unaware of this kind of knowledge. In 1928-31, General Ibañez ruled the country without the armed forces participation, according to F. Nun, quoted by Valenzuela and North (Valenzuela, 1978, 20, North, 1966, 35-6).

Furthermore, proper studies of the "new professionalism" in the Chilean Navy were almost unknown. The Navy included National Security in 1974; Political Science and Financial Analysis were incorporated in 1982 in the "Curso Regular de Estado Mayor". From the total amount of 1226 hours of classes, 238 approximately 19.4% of the two years study programme, was devoted to courses that could be—partially—related with government. It included geopolitics, political science, economics, administration and financial analysis (Estado Mayor General de la Armada, 1992). Even at present, some lecturers in economics and administration are civilians, but no civilians are students in these courses.

Carabineros de Chile—police force—share most of the characteristics of the Army, Navy, and Air Force officers. "Instituto Superior de Carabineros" Carabineros' Superior Institute curricula including 2,375 hours of regular classes, excluding optional courses. Carabineros included one course of Geopolitics, one of Political Science, and some administration courses (Carabineros de Chile, 1992).

All this training is a far cry away from making them experts in government. The Chilean Navy, Police, Army, and Air Force, high rank officers became at best, people with a wider culture, and some kind of knowledge that, in comparative terms,
made them as conscious of general problems as many other well-educated Chilean university graduates, and professionals, non specialists in those fields.

The most related training institution to new 'professionalism' style was created in Chile in December 1974 as the former "Academia Superior de Seguridad Nacional" [Superior Academy for National Security]. The remote origin of this Academia was the National Academy of National Defence created in 1947 to serve a very restricted military field. In 1982 the "Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos" [National Academy for Politic Studies and Strategy] was created. This Academy shares with the Brazilian Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exército, the characteristic of having civilian and military lecturers and students. It is evident that their courses are not the most important for career advancement of high rank officers, but its main aim still is to establish a link between civilian and military appointed to government positions (Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos, 3, 1992)

As a conclusion, we are certain of the impossibility of applying to Argentinian, and Chilean A.A.F.F. Stepan's model. The Argentinian became highly politicised prior to NDS existence, Cuban Revolution, the sophistication of Superior War Schools, and other historic situations. It is impossible to blame them on the Argentinian Military tendency to intervene. They have intervened, and learned how to govern by doing so. Besides, their self confidence was reassured by political parties' failure.

Otherwise, the Chilean A.A.F.F. kept a tradition of being highly restricted from the political arena. The 1973 take-over met them with no noticeable theoretical background, or practical knowledge for ruling a country. Both Argentina and Chile, by different ways arrived in the same conditions to become rulers in their countries.
Therefore, it is impossible to apply Stepan's model to them, but it is feasible to find some relationship with this model 'a posteriori' when as a necessity, both governments had to start training officers, and civilians to work together.

As a conclusion of Stepan's model, and following Finer's ideas, we can claim that strong evidence exists that the Argentinian case belongs to "a distinct class of countries where governments have been repeatedly subjected to interference of their armed forces" (Finer 1967, 3). We had stated previously that Chile is a country with a long tradition of an evolving democratic government since 1830, with little military participation.

It is possible to accept without hesitation, that in both countries the A.A.F.F. proved to have "massive political advantages over civilian organisations: [They have] a marked superiority in organisation, a highly emotionalised symbolic status, and a monopoly of the arms" (Finer, 1967, 6). Argentinians exercise this advantage, and Chileans had it latent until 1973.

The scarce utility of Stepan's model and his paradigm of New and Old Professionalism is obvious in the Chilean's case. If used to classify the Chilean A.A.F.F., they belonged clearly to the Old Professionalism paradigm, and Argentinians preceded, in many aspects the New Professionalism, as we stated previously.

Middle Class Coups Theory

The middle class military coup theory developed by José Nun has caused much interest among scholars, and it has been constantly cited. Nun sustains the
argument that military's class situation cannot be explained entirely by its political behaviour. He estimates this relationship as a useful device to restrict the research field, which allows us to evaluate the importance, and partial autonomy of outside factors affecting A.A.F.F. behaviour (Nun, 1967, 73).

Middle class importance is emphasized by Nun, asserting that historically, the liberal model prevailing in the nineteenth century, paid particular interest to officers' social origin. The lack of warfare, helped to strengthen this class association through permanent contact among the civilian and military sphere (Nun, 1967, 74).

Nun's argument is relevant to stress the strong relationship—in backward societies—due to their links to foreign sources of the technical influence, and officers' 'civilianization' as a product of their persistent political activity; both factors denied the military's supposedly isolation from their social context. These facts contribute to diminish the uniqueness of A.A.F.F. attitudes and behaviour (Ibid). Nevertheless, nobody can deny the strong influence of military schools' training, and characteristics of military life as a total institution. Their common class provenance, and military establishment influence, give them a greater cohesion and institutional solidity that is quite uncommon in L.A. middle class (op cit, 75).

These arguments developed by Nun to reassert his model, included external factors, some of them derived from the Cold War, and educational influence from the USA. As a consequence of the Cold War, there was a strategic revolution; which meant an increasing military aid from USA, and a greater influence in internal affairs of these L.A. countries. Counterinsurgency is presented as a critical factor in political events, producing a grey zone between military and political issues, mixing professional activities with political ones (op cit, 109-10).
The main problem with this interpretation is an old fashioned, and exaggerated USA influence. For military personnel of some countries, it has been in existent, or superficial at the most. The debate about the Panamanian "School for the Americas" has confirmed that countries such as Chile, and Argentina, have sent very few people to this school (Staff of Panamanian School, 1970, 49). The political impact of the USA military aid to L.A. is discussed by Fitch, who states that the evidence of this influence is far from conclusive, and on the contrary the countries which receive the higher amounts of aid were slightly more democratic. Therefore disregarding the radical argument that the bigger the USA aid the military became more prone to coups or dictatorship (Fitch, 1979, 362 onwards) The evaluation of this factor produced strong doubts related to the USA's influence on the military take-over in Chile and Argentina.

Another external factor, according to Nun, is the "vulnerability of the Latin American Middle class in the face of the strategies used during the Cold War." (Nun, 1967, 111). He emphasizes the idea of this period, as one in which relationships among middle-class and popular sectors, strong anti-communism feelings, and a rational very closed to their interest, are deeply related (ibid). The weakest point of this argument, is that as much in Argentina as in Chile, the middle class play the leading roles of popular sectors. A required precision to understand the political development in both countries shows that political right, centre, and left have had support from popular sectors. A unified popular sector has never existed, as well as a unified middle-class, as recognized by Nun (op cit, 91).

A final observation in relationship of Nun's theory which place the military as supporters of the middle class, being this situation especially evident at the beginning of this century, in which civilian pressures were exerted in favour of "Military interventionism...[that] tends to represent that [middle] class and
compensate for its inability to establish itself as a well integrated hegemonic group" (op cit, 112). He sustains that it would be erroneous of any interpretation of his analysis as a justification of interventionism, because his aim was to prove middle class inability to help in the development of these countries. Besides, he blames military interventionism for preventing, rather than favouring the middle-class to further their conservative traditional outlooks (Ibid).

The normal evolution of the military regimes according to Nun, is to refrain from electoral processes, due to the upper and middle-class fears of the gradual unity of the progressive groups and their increasing influence in the elections. These regimes tend to freeze the political relationship system, diminishing or eliminating the popular sector influence. Economic consequences would be stagnation, and a strong movement towards the right. This is, according to Nun, unavoidable, even if some fortuitous economic growth may favour compromises with trade unions, or with a reformist outlook (op cit, 112 onwards).

According to several authors one of the great weaknesses of Nun's theory, as stated by himself, is the in existence of a homogeneous middle class to protect, therefore it is impossible to use this segment of society to restrict the research field. It might be useful to obtain some clues about particular military interventions, and military rule, but it is not a useful analytical tool as it was intended by Nun (Markof & Baretta, 1986, 211 / Stepan, 1971, 46 / Cantón, 1969, 262-3).

We can not take for granted the belief that the only possibility of success comes from the fact of being populist, and able to produce a revolution from above as stated by Nun, "the stagnation of the economy, the fears of the propertied classes, and the increased maturity of the urban and rural proletariat all militate against
such a development" (Nun, 1967, 117-8). All these claims have failed and populist military governments have not been successful at all in L.A.

These rather definite statements if applied to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, or Mexico would become obsolete, if a military government produced development for the benefit of the whole country and independent from upper, middle or lower class, without the dubious merit of being populist, in character. This will be proved at the end of this chapter when we analyse the Chilean's case.

Nun's assertions have been proved false in relationship with Chilean reality. The military government, following a very orthodox neo-liberal economic and social policy, produced development and wealth, despite the fears of an over-protected middle class, and industrial sector (Centro Estudios Públicos, 1992, 32 onwards). The Chilean military government was supported by the majority of urban and rural proletariat, who accepted such a policy. As well as this, the democratic government that rules the country nowadays, has continued the same line of development. It seems that all trends of thought that attributed the production of development only to populist and revolutionary movements, has been wrong. It must be taken into account that too many revolutionary movements have not produced development; on the contrary, they have deepened backwardness. The best example we acknowledge is Cuba, where there has been some partial success in restricted fields such as literacy and health. On the opposite side, some military governments have been able to produce development especially when they have had a strong cohesion to impose a system that fits into international economy trends.

This pessimistic approach towards an evaluation of military governments is strongly dubious, at least, in Chilean's case. The A.A.F.F. government was able to produce such strong reforms into the country's economic and social structure.
O'Donnell's Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model

Another model that has aroused deep interest among scholars, is the one developed by the Argentinian social scientist, Guillermo O'Donnell. This model was presented in his well-known book *Modernisation and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*, first published in 1973. In his book he presents his model's basic characteristics: (1) transition from political incorporation to exclusion, (2) modernisation, (3) economic expansion, (4) industrialisation, (5) role of technocracy, (6) levels of threat, and (7) dependency theory (O'Donnell, 1973, 55 onwards).

Even when this book was written, it was founded mainly on the situation of Argentina and Brazil. In later works, the author has made his ideas extend to Chile, Uruguay, Mexico, and some central European countries. His attempts to extend this model to other countries has several weaknesses, making it hard to accept without strong criticism.

Amongst his conclusions we find, the existence of a link among high modernisation processes, and a "strong tendency towards the emergence of a new type of political authoritarianism—"Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism" (O'Donnell, 1973, 196). As a consequence, a new and accentuated pattern of dependence, which leads to mass praetorianism, perturbing, and distorting formally democratic political institutions, and diminishing chances for the emergence of democracy appeared. His key concepts are:

(1) A transition from political incorporation to exclusion.

O'Donnell states that since 1930, due to the World crisis, an accelerated process of industrialisation has given emergence to an urban working class "The increased urbanisation and industrialisation changed the distribution of political
power and provided the base of a broad populist coalition... formed by relatively new sectors" (op cit 56). These new sectors were closely linked to internal [horizontal] industrial development, created to save foreign currency expended in importing goods. This tendency received approval from the Nationalists parties, and the A.A.F.F.

Repression is the most outstanding characteristic of exclusion. It includes different forms of coercion employed by Bureaucratic-Authoritarian [BA onwards] regimes, to deactivate popular sectors, and for subordination of its class organisations, especially unions (op cit, 91 onwards). Collier's comments about deactivation denying that differences between populism and the BA are not so sharp as O'Donnell assumes it to be. Populism is not always a broad coalition internally homogeneous, in fact it is quite the opposite (Collier, 1977-78, 604).

Among, the most important consequences of horizontal development, are the appearance of strong labour unions, that started their participation as important political forces under Perón, and Vargas, who used them to reinforce their capacity to introduce changes into society (O'Donnell, 1973, 55).

(2) Modernisation

O'Donnell following D. Apter, who defines modernisation primarily, as "a derivative process, consisting of the spread into modernising societies of roles and institutions originated in, and around industry in the more industrialised countries" (Apter, 1965, 43 onwards). The advantages of this definition, according to O'Donnell are: a) easiness to operationalize it; b) gives theoretical access to data gathered by the economist on productive structure; c) avoids the use of development, and all the problems of its definition and measurement through indices, or performance standards; d) emphasizes the effects of transplantation of roles and institu-
tions from highly industrialised societies; e) the importance given to the effects of external links and supra-national power relationships (O'Donnell, 1973, 26-9).

(3) Levels of threat

Popular sectors [lower middle-class, and industrial workers] acquired a great electoral importance based on their ability to disrupt economic normality by means of strikes, or demonstrations at urban centres, and finally their potential capability of winning polls. They could be easily persuaded by politicians that their share in economic gains were not fair, and that their duty was to take over the government's leadership. These facts moved other actors, e.g. propertied sectors; industrialists, to accept a political solution that led to the workers' exclusion from the political game (op cit, 58 onwards).

O'Donnell suggests a close relationship between a great level of threat and a higher, widespread, and systematic repression. In addition, he includes a distinctive new characteristic; willingness to continue the application of Bureaucratic-Authoritarian government policies (O'Donnell, 1978, 8).

(4) Industrialisation

Its main characteristic since the 1930s has been its horizontal expansion aimed to satisfy needs for finished consumer goods (light industry and non durable products). This expansion had a high cost, and sometimes low quality. It required high tariffs to protect internal production from imported goods. Increases of production had, as a secondary effect, a strong dependency on imports of intermediate and capital goods. This industrialisation promoted popular sectors as consumers, and permitted the expansion of domestic industry. All this process ended when the easy stage of 'import substitution industry' was exhausted, and the failure of creating an intensive industrialisation and vertical integration of domestic industry, be-
came evident [this phenomenon is better known as Deepening Hypothesis] (O'Donnell, 1973, 55 onwards).

In relation to this issue, Collier points out the non-existence of clear evidence, that governing elites had made some conscious effort to extend benefits to popular sectors as a tool to expand the domestic market. It turns out that at least one case exists in which there was a reduction of workers' income in the early phases of industrialization, due to the expansion of the domestic market (Collier, 1978, 604).

(5) Technocrat's role

In highly modernised countries, this role is correlated to complex social structures, irrespective of the type of political system that is supported by it. As technocratic roles become more important, social problems are considered from a technocratic perspective, heavily influenced by technocrats, not only within their field of expertise, but at the same time influenced by model-roles acquired during their training in developed societies. At this point of his analyses, O'Donnell includes the A.A.F.F. as members of a technocrat elite, placed at the same level as civilian ones. Technocrat roles makes them [civilian and military] act in opposition to their liberal political role-models, and exhibit a strong tendency to authoritarianism, excluding the participation of popular sectors, to facilitate development and performance (O'Donnell, 1973, 79-89).

(6) Dependency theory

In a subtle way, O'Donnell's theoretical approach is permeated by this theory; he is one among several scholars from the 1960's who used structuralism, and Marxist perspectives in their different tendencies, to interpret L.A. political and economical problems. All the outstanding characteristics of his model, previously
stated, agree with this theory, and it is heavily supported by a bibliography of references, and quotations.

Indeed, O'Donnell's model is quite sophisticated, and difficult to summarise in this chapter. This synthesis aims to evaluate its importance and limitations. All BA models, critics agree with its importance, and consider it "initiated a new phase in the debate over the relationship between social change and politics in Latin America" (Remmer & Merckx, 1982, 3). Several revisions and further investigation made by scholars sympathetic to the BA model, have produced as a result, discrepancies on his model's assumptions and his findings.

Criticisms deny the plausibility of the "deepening" hypothesis—one of its most important critics Jose Serra points out:

"I find no basis for considering deepening to be one of the "intimate relationships" between bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, on the one hand, and the structure and transformation of capitalism in these countries [Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Mexico] on the other. Moreover, I think that on the basis of this hypothesis it is difficult to understand the formation, the dynamic, and the contradictions of these regimes" (Serra, 1979, 117).

His arguments are based on historical accounts related to Brazil: (1) a deepening process existed previous to the A.A.F.F. government in Brazil, and was quite advanced in the 1950's; (2) deepening was not a crucial problem for capitalism previous to the BA government; (3) deepening was not an urgent matter for authoritarian regime promoters; it was not even included in the core policy for growth, not least in the first two stages of economic development: stabilisation 1964-67, and recovery 1967-71 (Serra, 1979, 117).

Any relationship between Chile's BA government, and deepening attempts, was according to Serra extraordinarily difficult to observe even at rhetoric level, not
to mention practice. According to him in the 1960s, the political right was not aware of any necessity to limit horizontal expansion and deepening increase. On the contrary, A.A.F.F. regime after 1973:

"seemed to want to carry out a reduction of horizontal expansion, not by means of a greater degree of integration of domestic (or even regional) production, but rather through the elimination of some productive activities and through a greater opening of the economy" (Serra, 1979, 145).

David Collier criticises categories used in O'Donnell's work, which he considers too wide, and of limited utility for comparative analysis. The definitions of his categories involve so many traits that avoid focusing on proper differences and similarities in cases under study. As an example, Collier pointed out that the Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism concept is unable to capture differences and similarities among South American countries, included in O'Donnell's work. Even the core concept of bureaucratic-authoritarian is criticised:

"O'Donnell's use of the expression "bureaucratic-authoritarian" implies, but not demonstrate, that systems so designated differ profoundly from all others in Latin America political history. But governments that have to varying degrees excluded a previously activated popular sector, pursued orthodox economic policies, held some degree of technocratic orientation, actively sought foreign capital, and, at least to some extent, promoted the production of intermediate and capital goods, have appeared at various levels of industrial modernisation" (Collier, 1978, 597).

A key element in O'Donnell's ideas of development is to find an explanation for the appearance of repressive, authoritarian governments in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. He is unable to prove systematically to which extent changes in industry and social structures, constitute sufficient, or necessary condition for political transformations. He does not take into account differences in timing of the BA appearance, and its relationship to industrial and social change, nor provide a systematic analysis of what might be a series of additional necessary conditions for its emergence. He does not take into consideration the possibility of other alterna-
tive explanations, such as the thesis that the roots of the BA might be in a political field more than an economic field (op cit, 1978, 606-7).

The importance of technocratic roles is also under scrutiny by Collier; O'Donnell's first work strongly emphasized the causal importance of the technocratic role. In later works, he emphasized the influence upon the set of norms used by technocrats from the international business and financial community, when they produced developmental policies. This change in evaluating the technocratic role means that they are only intermediaries, or does this new concept involve any explanatory content, or is it just situationally defined in a straight sense? (op cit, 608).

Maybe the most acute problem found by Collier, in O'Donnell's work, is due to the extension of his analysis beyond Argentina and Brazil. This extension demanded further elements to explain situations in new countries, and needed to incorporate these new explanations into his original model. On the contrary, this problem makes his model lack unity (op cit, 609).

K. Remmer & G. Merckx, praising highly O'Donnell's work, agreed with Collier's criticism besides pointing out an evident lack of precision in his conceptualization, for instance the concept of threat (Remmer & Merck, 1982, 3 onwards). Nevertheless, while O'Donnell recognizes this weakness, he asserts that it is still useful to distinguish low and high levels of threat. He recognizes it as a multidimensional concept, that requires multiple indicators, and concludes that the state of art does not let us disaggregate, with sufficient precision, levels of threat among Chile 1973, and Argentina 1976. The same happened with political deactivation, and economic orthodoxy which are far away from being univocal (O'Donnell, 1982, 42 onwards).
It is not worthwhile to continue pointing to criticism of O'Donnell’s model by scholars who had studied it, when he himself had recognised these weaknesses. It is necessary now to present the model’s inability to cope with some aspects of Argentinian, and Chilean political crises not included in the scholarly criticism, reviewed up to now.

In O'Donnell’s and similar models, one of the most surprising aspects is the unsurpassable influence attributed to education, or training in advanced countries. This training supposedly tends to produce technocrats, so strongly influenced by their training, role-models, and social context that they are unable to apply properly their knowledge in their own countries. This idea is strongly evident in O'Donnell’s papers.

These contradict our knowledge of the role of education, in which learning is commonly defined as the ability to transfer some specific knowledge to a new and different situation or problem. Only in that moment, we can accept that learning has existed, technocrats are not only trained to imitate technics or prescriptions from the developed world—on the contrary—they have learned basic principles, and methodologies to adapt or transform them in different situations. O'Donnell recognises this is a problem not too well studied in social sciences, but he uses it to explain, "complex constellation, of which the technical expertise is only one element" (O'Donnell, 1973, 81).

Another aspect not explored by O’Donnell is the different trends of economic, and political thought existing in L.A. countries, which are considered in his work at large, as more homogenous than they really are. In Chile, former graduates from Chicago, Harvard, MIT, Oxford or Cambridge, and other universities work together efficiently, because they have to adapt their knowledge to the reality
of their own country, and have to leave aside all elements, and techniques which are impossible to apply. The training at PhD. level of the most important men of the economic team of Pinochet is variegated: F. Barahona, UCLA; C. Cáceres, Harvard; de Castro Chicago; J. Cauas, Columbia; V. Costa, Tennessee; F. Leniz, UCLA; R. Lüders, Columbia; J Piñera Harvard; H. Rosende, Chicago. Nor even one of the most important man in this team, former Minister Büchi was not a Chicago man.

In relation to economic development O'Donnell implicitly denied the need to accumulate first and then to expend. Therefore, he refuses to accept that the 'optimistic equation' could work and he declares it to be naïve or cynical. The most important issue is:

"the exclusion of the popular sector and its demands would make possible a reconversion of the socio-economic structure that would stimulate economic growth by a general increase in efficiency and by allowing political hegemony and capital accumulation in the more dynamic sectors. Political democracy and wider distribution of wealth and power would then be possible" (op cit, 91-2).

These ideas reflect, in some degree, what happened in Chile 1973-1990. Even when the Chilean Military government output does not agree with O'Donnell's pessimism. Chile worked its path through this 'optimistic equation', and after nineteen years it produced capitalistic development, and afterwards a stable democracy. Besides economic benefits, political ones are evident. Chilean people became citizens again, and avoided in their political life confrontation patterns, which was a main characteristic previous to the A.A.F.F. "Pronunciamiento" (Comisión Verdad y Reconciliación, 1991, 22). The existence of strong differences amongst political parties has been reduced, and extremes have moved to the centre to such an extent, that today it is very hard to explain the difference between Socialists, Christian Democrats, Renovación Nacional, or Unión Democrática Independiente.
O'Donnell's Sketch of the Political Game Under Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Political System, included in Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism attempted to describe a situation in which "using the analogy of a game-situation, political action can be seen as action in a situation [policy issues, types of political system, and rules of competition, and a set of players] that must be taken into account by 'players' trying to achieve goals" (O'Donnell, 1973, 106-9). The elements and situations included have a limited link, or at least a controversial relationship, with the Chilean case. The A.A.F.F. government had strong support from the people in two of the three occasions they went to ballots. The only unsuccessful one was the 1989 plebiscite, when Pinochet was politically defeated by a coalition of political parties with strong support inside, and especially outside the country. The same happened in Argentina with the ousting of Perón, Frondizzi, and Illía, according to O'Donnell (op cit, 153).

The biased set of indicators criticised by O'Donnell were used by the Argentinian and Chilean A.A.F.F. government, but O'Donnell failed to recognise they were only part of a wider set that included health, housing, education, running water, and the like. In Argentina and in Chile, when the "biased set of indicators" started to decline in the first years of government, and after the oil crisis in the 80s, the incumbents of technocratic roles did not promote any ousting of the government, as predicted by O'Donnell (op cit, 106).

As stated previously, the Argentinian and Chilean A.A.F.F. governments received support from not only incumbents of technocratic roles, but also from a strong majority of the people. Firm support for this point exists amongst scholars. It is quite difficult to establish the 'isolation pattern', during the nineteen years of Chilean military government, in many of the remaining social sectors. Modern mass communication media, surveys, newspapers, universities, churches, have their own
channels of providing information from, and to, the rulers in Latin America. This fact is valid for all BA, and modern governments, with the notorious exception of those totalitarian governments that tightly control all mass communication media. Both, in Chile and Argentina, the media kept some degree of autonomy, especially the ones owned by the Catholic Church and international organizations.

In O'Donnell's view narrow options existed, due to the restricted coalition of incumbents of technocratic limited roles; political options are equally limited (Op cit, 107). His assertion does not take into consideration one of the main problems that affects a BA government's inability to maintain a stable political-economic pattern that permits socio-economic development, and the people's right to be efficiently ruled by their governments. Precisely, this characteristics of efficiency and economic stability led the Chilean BA government to be successful in producing economic development, thereby achieving a well-known prestige.

In addition, O'Donnell blames the BA for rigidity (op cit, 9), when in fact, they were able to change some particular aspect of their policies every time it was necessary e.g., when Chilean government rose the U.S.A. parity in the late 1970s, nevertheless they kept the main lines of their policies. Finally, it was evident that Pinochet not only propitiated a satisfactory performance in the set of 'biased indicators' [e.g. increase of the G.D.P., exports, per capita income], but all other social indicators improved clearly as percentage of born alive childs, education, running water at low income sectors, and many others providing wide acquiescence to the A.A.F.F. regime amongst lower income people.

In criticising this model, Collier states the existence of other possible rival explanations for the emergence of BA, not considered by O'Donnell. Political facts for instance lay at the roots of BA rather than economic ones. Political explanations
can be formulated with no relationship or reference to the idea of easy horizontal industrial development (Collier, 1977-8, 607 onwards).

**Strategocratic Model**

One of the best defenders of this model is Jorge Tapia, a former Education Minister in Allende's government. He inserts himself in the research trend that considers the A.A.F.F. as fundamental political actors, and postulates his conviction that "current military doctrines have evolved into a 'new professionalism', the pathological forms of which have not only augmented intervention of the military in politics, but also have given the intervention a highly autonomous character" (Tapia, 1989, 7).

According to this idea, the new militarism has created a somewhat special political system that has redefined civil-military, political power, and legal relationships. The Strategocratic system is defined as: (1) a non-pluralist political system, dominated by militaristic values; (2) the existence of political institutions based on a concept of peace and politics as a form of war; (3) a selective demobilisation of population sectors; (4) a non-representative tutelary A.A.F.F. function, securing its autonomy to define threats to the national core of values, and formulating policies to guarantee their security (op cit, 27).

This author defines this new type of political system as different from democracy, due to its authoritarian, and militaristic components; it differs from authoritarianism due to its ideological nature, and it is not totalitarian due to its liberal-capitalistic nature. The main idea behind this type of government is the prevalence of strategy over the whole political system, not necessarily by direct
military rule. It is based instead on civilian managers who share a belligerent notion of politics, or accept fundamental values and principles defined by strategists under the NSD (op cit, 27).

A second central thesis is the 'security crisis', meaning a pervasive acute sense of threat. This crisis differentiates between: (a) the tendency of power holders to use the crisis as a tool of social control; (b) psycho-sociological conditions under which a crisis can develop within a society. In this context, the A.A.F.F. use this security crisis to demolish politicians control, and use counterinsurgency strategies as political doctrines to manage the crisis, although they are unable to solve it (op cit, 28).

A third major thesis is democracy deepening, this concept is related to a deliberate, quantitative, and qualitative expansion of people's participation, influence in social life, and political decision process. Its main inspiration is a radical view of democratic principles based on sovereignty, self-government, and the majority principle as a mechanism to select preferences (op cit 31).

Tapia's fourth thesis is related with strategocracy's ideology as a response to a political crisis produced by democracy deepening, which evolves into a crisis of security of prevailing world-views, and A.A.F.F. values and corporate interest. The necessary cause of military strategocracy is the acquisition of a theory and a methodology to analyse political, social changes, and the decisive variable related to this ideology (op cit, 32).

Strongly linked to Tapia's set of hypotheses are the concepts of: dependency, political vulnerability, and permanent economic crisis. The latter acquires the
characteristic of normality in Third World Countries, even when using this concept in such a context is illogical.

Tapia founded the selection of change indicators in four work hypotheses:

1. "The administration prior to the military take-over has started or has intensify a process of affirmation of social equality that expresses itself by reallocating the economic surplus in favour of the state programmes and the low income sectors.
2. The political influence of the socio-political groups asking for structural changes and more national autonomy, shows a steady increase in the period between the last regular change of government and the military take-over.
3. Political mobilisation and political protest increase sharply in the period between the last regular change of government and the military take-over.
4. Political violence, and military involvement in the political process increase sharply before the military take-over, and remain high after the coup." (Tapia, 1989, 39).

His theoretical framework sustains NSD as the offspring of a permanent crisis in a self-sustained global war system (op cit, 13). One of the first problems related to his model, is the end of the Cold War, which led first to an 'entente cordiale', and then the dismembering of the USSR, which accordingly lost control over international Communism in the world.

The crisis of Socialist countries lead by the Soviet Union—greatly evident when Tapia was working his model—leave this theory without one of their stronger pillars. Afterwards it became useful only for describing historical events, meanwhile, the author postulates this model to explain and predict the A.A.F.F. future conduct.

In relationship to the first hypothesis, the creation or intensification of the social equality process is evidently an over simplification of the problem. According to Tapia the means to produce this change is the re-allocation of funds in favour of state programmes directed toward low income sectors. This hypothesis is
difficult to accept, because previously Argentina under Perón, Chile under the Popular Front, and later the Christian Democrats, produced these type of changes. Once in power, they had enough political support to continue a process of widening political participation, and favouring low income sectors.

The A.A.F.F. did not intervene decisively in Peron's case until several years, they did not intervene at all in Chile, although in the latter they had a solid and adverse opinion concerning Marxist parties. The author tries to set up the differences of this from a historical point of view, but he is unable to present a strong case. Still worse, he disregards the fact that Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, the most different of governments, have all tried to improve the social-economic conditions of the poorer sectors of their own societies. They have had different levels of success—all indicators point to this fact—percentage of literate people, G.N.P., percentage of born alive babies, and so on. No new government, revolutionary or not, could claim exclusivity in this aspect, and the tables used by the author confirm this assertion (Among others, Cardoso & Hellwege, 1992,25; Hojman, 1993 in general).

In relation to his second hypothesis, some of our previous statements are useful for explaining the author's difficulty in proving his case. The political influence in Chile of left wing parties has been noticeable in the last seventy years, including, for most of the time, a legal Communist party, with several left wing, and left to the centre governments of Radicals and Christian Democrats. So Allende's government had no monopoly of structural or socio-economic changes. Not even left wing or centre to left parties were the ones to promote social changes in Chile. Right wing parties in Chile, also provided advanced social legislation. The Argentinian case does not permit him either to find a solid case based on these hypotheses.
These first two hypotheses attempted to explain the democracy deepening process into the social and political system, as stated previously. Evidently both permit a completely different interpretation, and democracy enlargement in Argentina and Chile have many other causal reasons as important as the ones provided by the author.

In accordance with the third hypothesis, graphics 46 to 57 (op cit, 101-7), show that Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Philippines, Turkey, and Uruguay, had high levels of constant political mobilisation for several years before the coup. Only Greece, Indonesia, and Korea confirm the pattern of increases of mobilization between the last regular government change. Moreover, non strategocratic countries used to test the model, show high levels of political mobilisation without consequences for their democratic governments. Figures 59 to 69 (op cit 110-15), relate political strikes and riots with an extended system of higher education. This relation is misleading because there is a universal tendency to increase student numbers in higher education, both in developed and underdeveloped countries. Figure 58 (op cit, 109) relating to Argentina, shows that this relationship is weak. Between 1955-1960 with almost the same amount of higher education students, it presents different patterns of riots, and political strikes. In Brazil, student numbers are almost constant, but the country had higher levels of riots and political strikes. Chile, between 1948-1962, with lower numbers of higher education students, had more riots and political strikes than between 1962-1972. The same happens in other countries in which the relationship tested by the author is extremely weak or in existent.

The fourth and last hypothesis relates to a high level of political violence, and military involvement in the political process before the coup, and its maintenance afterwards. Main indicators included political assassinations, armed attacks,
death from domestic violence, military expenditures, and total A.A.F.F. and para-
military forces. In this case it will be analyzed only by military expenditures.

According to his definition of strategocracy, on its roots lie the NSD, ideology, and crisis concept. In Chilean's case, the A.A.F.F. involvement started with Allende's political aims to co-opt them as a means to strengthen his weak position. As it is evident on figure 72d (op cit, 122), Allende's government increased the defense budget as a percentage of gross domestic product [G.D.P. onwards]. Military expenditure in Chile 1973, reached the highest level on since 1950s, falling in 1974, and increasing consistently in the following years.

Argentina, after the 1966 coup, increased military expenditure for one year, although later it decreased to levels unknown since 1950. After the 1976 coup, the military expenditure remained constant for a year, and afterwards rose to levels similar to 1950 and 1958. A 'rocketing of military expenses' in Argentina became obvious in 1980, probably as a consequence of a possible war against Chile or, as it really happened, against England in 1982 (op cit, 118).

Brazil presents a steady budget during the pre-coup years of 1956-58. If compared with 1965 after the coup, then we can see a notable decrease in military expenditure as a percentage of G.D.P. during the military rule. Indonesia never reaches military expenditure as high as in the period previous to the military coup in 1960 and 1961; afterwards it is impossible to speak of 'rocketing'. The same happened with slight variations in South Korea, Turkey, and Uruguay. Colombia, and countries used as controls to evaluate the theory, present differences; the former shows that after returning to democracy, military expenses diminish for three years, later for seven consecutive years of democratic government it reaches levels above previous military government. Malaysia presents a similar condition; the only dif-
ference is expenditure increased through longer periods. The most striking case is Venezuela, who once the A.A.F.F. rule ended defence expenditure increased considerably for the two first years and then became stabilised at a higher level than under military rule. The Philippines is the only case that agrees with the hypothesis, and for it presents high spending on defence during military rule (op. cit, 116-40).

It would take too long to analyse all Tapia's indicators, almost all of which present the same weaknesses, especially his scale of dependency. In figures 34 onwards, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, South Korea, Philippines, and Uruguay reached the highest point of export commodity concentration before the coup, afterwards most of them started to lessen the dependency on only one country as buyer of their commodities. Chile becomes extremely biased in Tapia's work, since he uses data from before 1975 when the country was still suffering Allende's government failure, which presented a yearly rate of inflation near a thousand per cent, and a clear bankruptcy condition.

Tapia ended his work in 1989, so it is possible to assert that his data are strongly biased in relation to Chile, especially if we take into consideration that many other—non economic indicators—are updated until 1980. As a conclusion it is possible to assert that table No. 24, (op cit, 145), which presents the degree of his hypothesis verification per country, is highly dubious.

The construction of his 'left-right scale', according to issue-orientation and tactics, might still have some historic justification, but it is of no use for future analysis in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Brazil, because almost all political parties have moved to the right. This is evident in the programmes of the candidates for the Presidency in those countries. In Chile, this is more evident than in any other
country, for apart from the communist party—under a different name now and some old fashioned socialists—the left, as described by Tapia, does not exist in Chile. Exactly the same happens with traditional Peronism under the presidency of Menem.

As a conclusion, it can be argued that the Strategocratic model is a clever piece of research, spoiled by a considerably bias against A.A.F.F. governments as a group due to "normative variables" (op cit 19) accepted by the author in combination with empirical ones. It is evident that most of the bibliography cited in relationship with Chile is the product of people who fled from that country after the coup, and shared completely his bias, with scarce pretension to present both sides of the argument. The same, but on a smaller scale can be said about American and European scholars because, in them exists a more balanced view of problems and theories related to military governments.

The utility of this model in analysing the Argentinian, and Chilean military government is limited due to two main reasons: (1) A model developed for research purposes is by definition, a simpler version of a complex reality, designed for a better understanding of that reality. In this case the 'strategocratic model', instead of being a simpler version of reality is complex, confusing, and allows to reach at the same time opposite conclusions to that which the designer tried to prove. (2) Many of its conceptions and basic facts had lost importance, due to political transformations; the same happened with most of his indicators, as previously stated. These facts limit the usefulness of his model to historical analysis alone, for it is far from useful in predicting and explaining the future of A.A.F.F. involvement in politics.
Developmentalist School

Under this title, we recognise a group of scholars who share some common ideas relating to military political participation. 'Grosso modo' they agree that the A.A.F.F. can have a positive, or at least, not always an evil role when they take over the government. This trend of academic research has been under constant attack from those scholars who see the A.A.F.F. as an evil type of government, with no moral justification, and incapable of doing any good. I.L. Horowitz criticising indirectly scholars who intended to be objective researchers, accusing them of defending mythical benefits, and presuming a non-existent capability for promoting the development of military governments and institution:

"Old myths about military die hard. There is a school of thought which attributes to the military a unique developmental orientation. We were told: if this generation wants to attain a rapid rate of development, social science must stop treating them as pariahs... An empirical look at the data does not drive us to such optimistic prospects of the military rule. They fail to show that the military are especially good at promoting a developmental pattern, at least in Latin America" (Horowitz, 1972, 69).

Quite critical of this school, or of any scholar who asserts that the A.A.F.F. can play a positive role in their countries' development, is S.E. Finer. In his opinion, many military coups in the seventies produced "a host of apologists" who with no support at all, inferred from some supposed military characteristics, or from some statements formulated by new military rulers a great deal of benefits. Finer points directly to L. Pye as representative of this new kind of apologists (Finer, 1974, 20). This is a clear attack on the ideas of many outstanding scholars who are—a cry far away—from being defenders of myths, or being apologists, when they produce research in this field, and try to evaluate objectively, the political, social, and economical output of military rule.
Among some of the most outstanding scholars who we might include in this school are John J. Johnson, Lucien B. Pye, Martin Needler, Eric Nordlinger, S. Huntington's whose contribution can be found in Political Order in Changing Societies, M. Janowitz and others.

According to H. Speir, the fundamental basis of theories of this school is disregarded automatically—as a matter of faith—by many authors who have studied civil-military relations, or military governments. This bias is quite notorious and pertains to a long tradition originating in Comte's, and Spencer's works. Those societies in which the military has had a noticeable political role have been regarded, from a historical perspective, as barbaric (Speir, 1962, v-vi). This bias has hampered a dispassionate study of the military and their political role.

L. McAlister pointed out in the same direction in his often cited paper Recent Military Research and Writings on the Role of the Military in Latin America. He states the existence of a strong normative and prescriptive tone in A.A.F.F. study and research, and agrees with Speir in the persistence of a rationalism inherited from the eighteenth century. This fact has produced an intellectual bias. Experts in L.A. military issues use, implicitly or explicitly, democratic-civilist political system categories in which A.A.F.F. have no political role, and should be under civilian control. MacAlister concludes that traditional literature on L.A. Militarism until the publication of his paper "reveals more about the author's feelings than the morphology of the phenomenon itself" (MacAlister, 1966, 6).

Therefore, it is quite commonplace to find research and papers related to the military that start explicitly, denying any validity to authors who try impartially to point out benefits and problems carried on by military governments. George Philip is a good representative of a somewhat mild criticism of the 'neo realist school' as he
names it. He asserts that even when there exists the possibility that a theory is in some way conceptually inadequate, can yield interesting empirical propositions, although the 'neo realist school' has not been very successful even in the lowest limits of its criteria and it is untenable in general terms (Philip, 1985, 5).

The main ideas shared by scholars included in this 'developmentalist school are: most of them agree that it is impossible to generalise about the A.A.F.F.'s ability to produce development. Some military governments could have been doing well, some others fairly well, and some other quite badly. It is equally possible to find the same phenomena in relationship to democratic civilian governments. This means that the ability to produce development and modernisation is of the same type, but it is not the specific difference between civilian and military governments.

Being unable to produce generalizations, L. Pye split the A.A.F.F. image among (1) the unsuccessful ones, derived mostly from L.A. and the Balkans, and (2) the dynamic and self-sacrificing, and to certain degree, successful military rulers of new countries in Africa, Asia, and other places (Pye, 1962, 69-70). Most scholars included in this school, share—to some extent—this opinion, presenting Turkey, South Korea, Taiwan and even El Salvador, under Rivera's regime, as A.A.F.F.'s most successful governments. Huntington is more specific, he points out that among scholars of every tendency, there is a kind of consensus that Middle East military were typically the promoters of revolutionary change, but that regarding L.A., this kind of consensus simply does not exist (Huntington, 1969, 219-20).

The mere existence of successful military governments anywhere, becomes strong evidence of the possible effectiveness of A.A.F.F. as rulers. According to Huntington, the success degree is in direct relationship with the lower degree of
complexity, and development of the country ruled by the A.A.F.F. (Huntington, 1969, 261-2).

The arguments related to a supposedly constant A.A.F.F. antidemocratic procedure point out that the arguments of many scholars are refuted by the ones belonging to this tendency. They recognise anti-despotic political attitudes in the A.A.F.F., especially when one of their members becomes a dictator, or corrects the excesses of civilian politicians. This happened in Chile in 1924, and in Brazil they have—for many years—played a stabilising role that permitted a speedy transition to industrialisation without damaging its basic political structure (Lieuwen, 1962, 148-9; 1960, 139). Using different wording, Needler states similar ideas relating to the A.A.F.F., who became guardians of the constitution, and cites the cases of Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, Pérez Jiménez in Colombia, and Perón in Argentina (Needler, 1968, a, 66 onwards).

Many scholars included in the developmentalist school, even in a somewhat arbitrary mode—recognise the possibility of some positive benefits from the military rule; in a wider perspective they accept the existence—as Lieuwen states—of a predatory side of militarism, intimately related with a lack of capability of civilian governments to control them. Moreover, in contradiction with their no deliberating role they usually become a highly deliberating body, especially in issues relating to their national budget share, manpower, weapons and so on (Lieuwen 1960, 141 onwards; 1962, 150 onwards).

An issue in which there is no agreement in this school is the one pertaining to USA military influence, and intervention in L.A. Huntington denied a direct or strong relationship between both, and posits the existence of countries that suffered coups after receiving American military assistance "experienced them equally often
before they become beneficiary of the Pentagon Largesse" (Huntington, 1969, 193). Needler agrees with Huntington, and cites Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua cases at the beginning of this century. In these countries, USA trained efficient, disciplined and professional constabulary units, proving that "it was possible to train subordinate officers and the rank and file to obey commands from above, [but] it was not possible to guarantee respect for civilian authority in the commanders of the constabulary" (Needler, 1968, b, 30-1).

Janowitz expressed doubts in relationship to this matter. He recognises that military foreign assistance must have some impact on A.A.F.F. and their political attitudes. In fact, since 1947, American officers have been training Latin American military personnel, but it has been mainly in a technical role. Very slowly, the USA has recognised the value, and the political meaning of these activities, and has taken it into consideration. Notwithstanding, the interest of some officers in modernising, they are oriented to immediate military professional tasks. USA Military personnel have proved not to be a good platform to transmit political ideas to new countries, and are not interested in them. In their view this is a State Department and not a military problem (M. Janowitz, 1964, 94 onwards). In this particular aspect, John J. Johnson disagrees in part with Huntington's assertions related to USA's limited military political influence, and argues that, a hard core of officers trained in the USA, might become a counterweight against those military from the right or left who could produce a coup (Johnson, 1962, 129).

Johnson and Lieuwen agree that deep changes in the A.A.F.F. have taken place since 1930, and have continued since then. We can find the same kind of agreement in relationship with new characteristics of military rule: from paternalistic to institutional, from predatory to national orientation to problem solution, less prone
to use violence and substitute it for manipulation and negotiation, less conservative and able to support middle class leadership.

These changes, even when looked at from a different angle, are confirmed by M. Janowitz. He relates new managerial skills demanded by the A.A.F.F. profession, to civilian enterprise, and to the government. Maybe the most outstanding characteristics are: the shift from military discipline to human relations, morale and initiative (op cit, 120 onwards).

Pye in a similar trend, relates the increasing A.A.F.F. industrial-type characteristic in new countries, and its influence in their political roles. His main argument is related to skills, and functions demanded by specialisation in modern A.A.F.F. These are not so closely related to violence management. This has generated an enormous increase in officers assigned to staff functions and personnel, who have to look outside their society for models and be aware of social changes (Pye, 1966, 176-7). The changing pattern of A.A.F.F. useful skills for ruling, was an idea not shared by Lieuwen. He stated in 1960 that military training was not the proper field to develop management skills to rule a modern state. Everyday, he argued that would be harder for the military to become a statesman (Lieuwen, 1960, 143 onwards).

In relation to industrial development; Johnson states that in most L.A. advanced states, A.A.F.F. are engaged actively in promoting industrialisation, and the main issue for discussion, is the foreign capital role. At the same time, he points out the link between industrialisation and state interventionism. Most of the A.A.F.F. officers do not belong to industrial families, and being bureaucrats, find completely reasonable the state's control of industry. This trend is tinted with na-
It is possible to find other similar ideas related to nationalism and economic development in Janowitz. He asserts that A.A.F.F. in new nations are more prone to collective and governmental enterprises as a proper way to achieve political, social, and economic change. He emphasizes, at the same time, the existence and strong relationship between their nationalism, and national identity instead of tribalism or communalism (Janowitz, 1964, 63-4). It means they will tend to unify countries in which the sense of belonging to a nation is weaker than the one related with tribes or race. From another point of view, the revolution in military technology has increased A.A.F.F. officers awareness in emergent countries of their backwardness, awakening in them the need for substantial changes in their society (Pye, 1966, 178).

Some kind of agreement has, among developmentalist scholars, the idea that civilians politicians have a great responsibility when A.A.F.F. decide to produce a coup and become rulers (Nordlinger, 1977, 194). Needler attempts to make clear civilian responsibility for military coups, and tries to explain it "functionally rather than genetically, in terms of factors external to the military rather than of internal characteristics of the military establishment" (Needler, 1968, b, 63-7). Nevertheless he recognises the existence, and importance of the A.A.F.F. institution dynamics in timing, and directions after the coup.

It is possible to recognise several different stages in Needler's work. In 1968, he conceptualized a legitimacy vacuum in which civilian politicians frequently went beyond the limits of legality, and operated outside them, becoming politics of violence. In these situations, the A.A.F.F. became involved in politics
when violence was expected, or when it actually took place. It is a too frequent attitude of politicians to use the military in these occasions to back up the government by suppressing opposition, as it happened in Venezuela, Guatemala, or other countries (Needler, 1968, a, 76-7).

Nine years later, analyzing military motivations in power seizure, Needler elaborated the institutional-interest hypothesis. It became a notorious shift in relation to his previous papers. This hypothesis supposedly provided the most useful general explanation of military seizures; nevertheless, class influence or national interest is always present in military take overs (Needler, 1975, 67 onwards). This new perspective means a great change in his appreciation of the A.A.F.F.'s role as rulers. The core of the problem shifts the equilibrium between the polity, and interest of military institution, diminishing polity importance, and transferring it to the military. Lieuwen had stated previously the same idea, that covered under the public known reasons to intervene: communism or government ineptitude laid institution self-interest. The A.A.F.F. acted in the first place to prevent civilian groups coming to power that might be against military interests (Lieuwen, 1964, 107 onwards). A very interesting point is stressed by Nordlinger in relation to this issue. He recognises, as a fact, that most men pursue their own interest most of the time; it means that this attitude is not exclusive to the military. It is evident in civilian politicians' attitudes as well, for they act just alike the A.A.F.F. when in power (Nordlinger, 1977, 194).

A matter of common sense is one of Johnson's main conclusions. He sustains the argument that best guarantee against militarism in L.A. is improving civilian practices to govern the countries in the region. His pessimism is evident when he states; "There is little reason to expect that the goal will be finally attained under
the guidance of the increasingly unimaginative leaders of the present generation” (Johnson, 1964, 262).

As a conclusion of developmentalist school findings, it is possible to assert that scholars of this tendency do not deserve the accusations of apologists, producers of myths, or the like. They have been able to analyse both faces of Janus—civilian politicians and military. It is true they do not agree in every aspect relating to military participation. Anyway, there is evidently a tendency to evaluate their participation objectively, and attempt to understand it from a perspective different from most scholars of Western developed democracies.

Among the most noticeable and useful aspects analyzed in this school, we find: the recognition of the responsibility of the polity when democracy is abolished, even when temporarily by the A.A.F.F.. They have demolished a pervasive myth labelling the military as a failure as rulers in every conceivable field in the life of their countries, and—most important—they have tried to find explanations founded on facts, and not on moral or philosophical prejudices.

Conclusions

All reviewed models have given rise to a great deal of interest among different groups of scholars. At the same time, they have been the object of deep scrutiny. Very soon, after the public appearance of these models, journals published criticisms pointing to the weakest points of them. Many of these critiques have been taken into consideration in previous pages. Our main conclusion in this chapter is: that none of them alone, is enough to explain the military participation, and policy development in Argentina and Chile, in the period under study. The most useful
ideas to explain military participation in those countries come from the 'Developmentalist School', for the reasons stated above, especially because they accept the existence of values in the decision to produce a take over, or in the design of their policies.

The Chilean case contradicts Huntington's assertion that the military has a chance to be successful only in low complexity or underdeveloped countries on the grounds of economic development. According to "The Economist" that criticized Pinochet's government in almost every field, throughout the years recognized the economic progress of Chile. The Economist stated that Chile was the economic star of L.A. with growth over 5% in the past two years, and an expected 6% this year in 1988 (Economist, 1988, December 3rd, 143, "Latin America"), the next year stated that Chile and Bolivia are showing that stabilisation schemes and economic reform really work, GDP grew in 10% in the first quarter (Economist, June 10th, 1989, 93), when commenting the 'lost decade' in LA in which no country had growth, Chilean GDP per head rose slightly, all the rest of the LA countries declined (Economist, November 4th, 1989, p 94). Perhaps the most significative comment on the Chilean economic development is the opinion of the would be head of economics in the cabinet of 'Patricio Aylwyn "He does not intend to change the overall strategy" stated The Economist (Economist, June 10th, 1989, 93). Health indicators improved greatly related with life expectancy, infant mortality was reduced from 103 per thousand in 1965 to 20 per thousand in 1987 (Cardoso, E; Helwege, A., 1992, p. 21).
References


CHAPTER III

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Limitations of this chapter.

For a better understanding of this research theoretical framework the present chapter sets out to produce a profile of the Argentinian and Chilean A.A.F.F. This task, based on historical and sociological data, cannot pretend to be a complete, and exhaustive one due to the subject's complexity and space restrictions. It only sets out to be helpful enough to make clear the similarities, and differences of both when they become active participants in their political system. The latter is understood as "any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves, to a significant extent, power, rule, or authority" (Dahl, 1963, 6).

The strength of this theoretical framework itself will depend on the accuracy of this historical and sociological characterization of A.A.F.F. in both nations, and the values that have guided them.

Origins and development of Argentinian and Chilean A.A.F.F.

Some common aspects of Argentinian and Chilean A.A.F.F. are related to the conquest of America by "Capitán de Conquista", whose authority was so great that to ignore his orders implied the crime of rebellion. Nevertheless, this trend lasted only until 1753 (Aldunate, 1991, 16) its influence related to political participation persists until today.
Argentinian A.A.F.F. training and values

Argentinian A.A.F.F. values are intimately linked to their development as a distinctive group, united by common training and clear hierarchy. To acquire them was a slow process after independence; it took several decades to consolidate traditions, expertise, and values.

The first attempt to establish proper A.A.F.F. training after independence was due to José de San Martín who, a few days after he came back from Europe, suggested to the government to give him the task of training a regiment of mounted grenadiers. His success in training the rank and file was displayed on several occasions especially in Mendoza where he prepared the South America emancipator's army (Levene, 1963, 279). Unfortunately his ability in this field was not fruitful in Argentina, and they did not have a A.A.F.F. academy until half a century after this first attempt.

Therefore, Argentinian A.A.F.F. are the product of a late socio-political development of their society in the last century. 'Caudillismo', was one of its main characteristics which lasted for almost half a century of Argentinian independent life. The 'Caudillos' were provincial chieftains who controlled political and military provincial affairs, enjoying a great influence on all segments of society, almost all of them belonged to prominent families and had a cultural development above the mean on their provinces. As leaders they were autocrats who admire constitutional principles but when in need they did what they want (Floria & García, 1992, 435 onwards). Their political and military influence lasted for almost half of the first century of Argentinian independent life. The A.A.F.F., after fighting the Independence War, followed by a successful one against Brazil, [1825-1828] (Levene,
1963, 379-84) were the victims of centrifugal forces, and of Caudillos loyalty instead of a national army.

It was under Mitre's presidency [1862-1868] that the foundations of a professional and national A.A.F.F. institution were laid. In order to enhance A.A.F.F. training, he sent several officers to the French school of Saint Cyr. Nevertheless, he was unable to build a national A.A.F.F. and during the war against Paraguay [1865-1870], provincial Caudillos retained their command over their own provinces' forces. These circumstances did not change until 1870, when Sarmiento founded the military academy [Colegio Militar], and the navy academy (Escuela Naval). The output of these academies was limited.

It was not until General Roca's Presidency that professionalization started to gain importance in the A.A.F.F. In 1900, the Escuela Superior de Guerra [Superior School of War], was created (Whitakker, 1965, 84). Later several institutions to train infantry, cavalry, and specialised units of non-commissioned officers were established. This lack of a well disciplined and national A.A.F.F. stopped them from participating directly in Argentinian political life. Nevertheless, A.A.F.F. freemason like lodges with political aims have been in existence since 1880.

General Roca, twice Argentina's President, must be considered the most influential individual in the professional development of A.A.F.F., and of their use as a political instrument. The improving of railways, transport, and new weaponry, led him to transform provincial governors in President's humble servants, and the presidency itself into the most powerful political position in Argentinian life (Goldwert, 1972, 7-8).
Professionalism shifted promotion from political favouritism to seniority and expertise in the management of modern warfare. Since 1910, Argentinian A.A.F.F. became independent from the President's influence through the creation of Comisión Informativa de Calificación [Promotions Informing Commission], transforming themselves into the first institution in the State to escape from the Presidential influence (Goldwert, 1972, 9).

Afterwards, the tendency towards political participation was encouraged by political parties as a means of using the A.A.F.F. for their own purposes. Several political parties, and leaders devoted a great amount of time and effort to persuading A.A.F.F. to be on their side. The most successful of these support seekers was Yrigoyen and his Unión Cívica Radical [Radical Civic Union], all of which was facilitated by European immigration, the increasing middle class, and urbanization.

During the revolts of 1890, 1893, and 1905, the radical party built—among dismissed officers due to revolutionary activities—strong ties. Radicals promised them support, and when in power, dead and retired officers, defenders of the Radical party, were promoted to enlarge their families or personal pensions. Cantón argues that their number was as small in 1905 as it was in 1916. As well as this, most of the defenders of the Radical Party were re-admitted into the Army (Cantón, 1969, 265 onwards). Active officers received promotions and citations of merit related not to their A.A.F.F. role, but to political ones—that it is to say, support for the Radical party (Goldwert, 1972, 12). There is no doubt that Yrigoyen was able to establish links and obtain some support from A.A.F.F., though his success was not considerable until 1916, because conservatives kept a strong position among senior officers (Rock, 1975, 48 onwards).
The users of A.A.F.F. for political purposes, found in Yrigoyen their best promoter. During his Presidency he intervened twenty times in provincial governments in his first administration alone, surpassing the methods of the Conservatives which the Radical party criticised so much (Rennie, 1945, 213). All these interventions were backed up by the Argentinian A.A.F.F., for democracy's sake. A very special kind of bribery were offered to officers and soldiers. War payments, promotions and decorations, as a by product, produced a deep sense of humiliation among the officer corps due to their use as police force against government's internal enemies. A freemason like Logia [lodge] was established to combat this kind of malady; officers who disagreed with the President, exposed their displeasure in public (Ferns, 1969, 145). Evidently Yrigoyen ignored all A.A.F.F. discipline codes, his intervention preceded A.A.F.F. participation in politics, and the latter was only a reaction to his interference (Smith, 1974, 95).

Despite, its small number of members, the San Martín Logia was influential in the nomination of a War Minister in Alvear's government. The appointment of General Agustín P. Justo in that position, is a clear example of how the political strength of one faction of A.A.F.F., provoked at the same time frictions within the officer corps (Goldwert, 1972, 13). Logia members who received key assignments, and started a campaign against officers who became involved in political activity. They obtained a decree enforcing prohibition in political participation, and ensuing the dismissal of officers who continued violating this prohibition (Potash, 1978, 94).

Yrigoyen, once re-elected repeated his mistakes especially in regard to political favouritism, reincorporating officers discharged for political participation, giving retroactive promotions for retired officers with increases in salary, accrediting seniority and altering the date-of-rank of radical party followers. Yrigoyen involved himself deeply in promotions and personnel management, introducing changes
in lists submitted by the promotion board, and ordering additional promotions in response to personal appeals by individual officers. Probably worst of all was that he prosecuted officers identified with the Logia. Some high ranking officers who were retired from active duty, felt free to declare publicly their dissatisfaction, and to conspire actively (Potash, 1978, 95-6).

When Yrigoyen was deposed, General Uriburu's de facto [1930-1931] government received public support from the most disparate sectors, including the paramilitary Legión Cívica Argentina, the Conservative Party of Buenos Aires, Independent Socialists of the Federal Capital, Democrats of Cordoba, Anti-Personalist Radicals, Progressive Democrats, parts of the Labour Movement, as well as parties that, as Socialists, opposed A.A.F.F. participation (Ciria, 1972, 166 onwards; Potash, 1978, 97). Nevertheless, A.A.F.F. gave him qualified and restricted support. The honeymoon did not last long though, and most of the polity was in opposition very soon. Most politicians who retired their support did it due to the facto President Uriburu's attempt to introduce constitutional changes to avoid Yrigoyen's type of government (Potash, 1978, 98).

General Uriburu's important innovations into A.A.F.F. [1930-1931] were not enough to avoid changes in professional values that became subordinated to political ones, as politics became a normal topic of discussion. Discipline suffered and rivalries among officers increased, especially among Radicals and Revolutionaries. Another damaging characteristic acquired by the officer corps at this time was disaffection and disdain towards politicians whom they considered disloyal to Argentina, despising their role in governing society. At the same time, civilian confidence in the ability of A.A.F.F. as a national institution above politics decreased (Potash, 1978, 99).
At this stage, it became evident that one of the main characteristics of Argentinian A.A.F.F.: was its politicization and lack of cohesion. Two factions became evident in the 1920s: the Integral Nationalists, led by Uriburu—whose main characteristics were a declared hostility towards a free-trading liberal nationalist oligarchy, and against demagogic Radical party politicians, and the other faction, headed by Justo, which had a strong affinity with the Anti Personalist Radicals. This was especially due to the generosity of the Alvear administration towards A.A.F.F., and the liberal oligarchy, and therefore, to traditionalism and conservatism.

This characteristic of political dissension, always present in Argentinian A.A.F.F., has varied in degree only, the work done by the Grupo de Oficiales Unidos, [G.O.U. onwards] is a good case of co-ordination and work group, but this lasted only until they took over the government. The March 1976 coup was supported by the A.A.F.F. structure with a greater internal cohesion than in 1966, which was the last opportunity they had to seize power as a true institution (Munck, 1990, 129). This mean making evident the most distinctive characteristics of the military: cohesion, discipline and values.

General Justo's victory in the ballots, even though rigged, brought him the Presidency of Argentina [1932-1938], and gave rise to a new attempt towards the profesionalization of A.A.F.F., under the guidance of the Minister of War, Manuel A. Rodriguez. Nevertheless, this profesionalization was interpreted by some scholars as a clever manoeuvre to gain A.A.F.F. support to President General Justo's constitutional policies (Ciria, 1972, 172). In fact, the Manuel A. Rodriguez attempts to re-professionalize A.A.F.F. and remove them from active politics, were unsuccessful.
Even though it is difficult to see Justo's government as an archetypal A.A.F.F. government, some lessons can be learnt from his management. According to Ferns and Whittaker, he managed economic affairs with ability and intelligence. He reformed the banking system, created marketing boards to merchandise cereal commodities avoiding hard fluctuations in prices, built cereal storage facilities, produced agreements with England to secure quotas of processed meat exported by Argentinian producers, and improved roads. These industrial developments were among his main initiatives (Ferns, 1969, 165-6; Whittaker, 1965, 90). All these changes were subject to severe criticism and there was disagreement with regard to the merits of his policies. Nevertheless one point was clear, an A.A.F.F. general, even when retired, could produce a good economic administration, as good as any of the previous civilian politicians.

Nationalism is another relevant value for A.A.F.F. men all over the world, and especially for Argentinian ones. It has presented several tendencies. One of the most important has been integral nationalism, closely related with a war economy, in which Argentinian industrialisation and development were intimately linked with a wider defence capacity. Heavy industry and weapons production became, and still are, very important for them.

Under Perón, this A.A.F.F. nationalism included, even when not permanent, new and innovative trends, among them the inclusion of organized labour that gave him popular support, and the possibility of social peace through the union of two forces that seemed not compatible until that moment [1945-1949]. At the same time he attempted a strong move toward the indoctrination of A.A.F.F. in order to steer them into the 'Justicialista' trend (Goldwert, 1972, 82 onwards). Even when links between A.A.F.F. and organized labour lasted only for a couple of years, it proved
that it was possible to produce such a partnership, and that A.A.F.F. were not exclusively the defenders of the oligarchy and middle class parties.

The reaction of A.A.F.F. against the excesses of Peronist's statism and populism, drove them to the opposite pole after Perón was dismissed. Free enterprise, individualism, market economy and opening the nation to foreign capitals were the main aspects of a new A.A.F.F set of values. They tried to narrower the state's participation in the fields of strategic resources which were related closely to defence, i.e. petroleum and steel. Some authors like Goldwert (Goldwert, 1972, 141 onwards) linked these new values to a return of A.A.F.F. to an old partnership with the Argentinian oligarchy, and foreign enterprise. Others feel these interpretation if applied to the period 1976-1983, as "extremely simplistic" (Munck, 1990, 5). From a fresh perspective, it might well be attributed to a political realism in which Argentina, unable to create internal capital, had to collect it abroad as it would be too late to develop herself.

Catholicism is another of the most wider shared values among Argentinian A.A.F.F., even when they have had to face, in some moments, strong criticism from the Catholic church, or when Perón combated its influence ruthlessly. The existing bond between church and A.A.F.F. can suffer erosion from time to time but it is still strong in Argentina.

Two other values that A.A.F.F. men are particularly proud of are order and self-sacrifice. Unfortunately both conspired against their success when they ruled their country. This problem, became evident every time Argentinians had to tighten their belts, as it does not matter if the one who tried to make them to do so, is A.A.F.F. or a civilian government. Aramburu's attempt to follow Prebish recommendations produced violent labour strikes; the same happened with Frondizzi. Illia
avoided unrest only by printing money thereby creating a spiral of inflation (Goldwert, 1972, 153-5).

Even though it may sound paradoxical, most Argentinians, including A.A.F.F., 'Junta de Gobierno' are profoundly fond of democracy. They clearly announce that the aim was to return to it since the beginning of the "Proceso" and their purpose was to reinstate a republican democracy, representative and federal, in agreement with the reality and demands of the Argentinian people (Junta de Gobierno, 1976, 93). Most of their A.A.F.F. rulers believed in it and were considered soft dictators, and not hard rulers. Since 1966 to 1983, from seven generals-Presidents of Argentina, only one is considered a hard liner (Yang, 1989, 123). Although, their attempts to create a viable democracy failed, they expected that sometime they will be able to develop a democratic system and A.A.F.F. attempts, correctly or wrongly, have tended to eliminate elements that, according to them, prevented them reaching that goal.

This was the origin of two factions of A.A.F.F.—legalists and interventionists—both trying to reach the same goal but using different tools and methods (Goldwert, 1972, 142 onwards). Unfortunately Argentinians have been victims of the in-existence of clauses into the constitution that prevents Presidents violate it (Potash, 1969, 202). This fact let alone the military as the only counterweight to President's power, therefore it is not always possible to accuse them of being power hunters as many scholars blame them. The forces that move them to produce a coup, is instead their sense of duty.

Another important element in the characterization of Argentinian A.A.F.F. is their deep distrust of politicians, and of Argentinian political life in the two decades of 1966-1986. The Military Junta coup that promote Onganfa's to the presi-
dency [June 1966-June 1970] aimed once and for all to eradicate the weaknesses that prevented Argentina becoming a developed country and a democracy.

Chilean A.A.F.F. training and values

Since the conquest of Chile, A.A.F.F. has been strongly present in the Chilean political system, as defined by Dahl. Since the very beginning, 'the sword and head of the government were united as one in the same person, the A.A.F.F. commander; in the nearly 300 years of Spanish domination, political power rested in A.A.F.F. hands 74% of the time' (Molina cited by Aldunate, 1991, 28). From Pedro de Valdivia to President Bulnes in the 1840-50 decade, almost all heads of government belonged to A.A.F.F., and played an important political role as founders of modern Chile.

The early professionalism of Chilean A.A.F.F., whose remote origin was the creation of the first regular army in America to keep the Araucano Indians south of the Bío Bío river, preceded by decades all other American countries, giving Chilean A.A.F.F. many of their special characteristics that have made them so influential in South America.

Diego Portales recreation of O'Higgins' Military Academy, and his foundation of a Nautical Academy, permitted first generations of Chilean officers training, enabling them to take over commanding positions from Argentinians and other foreign officers, avoiding what had happened during the Independence War, and 'Expedición Libertadora del Perú', opportunities in which higher positions were filled by Argentinians, and European officers.
Under Portales' influence since 1831 it was ended that dependency founding a well-structured profession, cutting back on commissions without proper training. The mere fact of establishing specialized training requirement let army officers increase their prestige as well (Jiménez, 1989, Chapter VII).

Chilean A.A.F.F. success increased national territory three times after independence; together with the Brazilian A.A.F.F., the only countries able to enlarge them noticeably due to victory in battlefields. This fact, linked with their professionalism, gave A.A.F.F. great prestige, social and, political influence, even when they used it very rarely, specially in the twentieth century.

During and after Diego Portales key political role [1830-1837], A.A.F.F. deserved an outstanding place in the Chilean society first, enhancing the role of law and order along the country and, maintaining internal order. According to Nunn, this fact avoided the frustration of A.A.F.F. leaders, "for they felt that they were as competent in their A.A.F.F. role as civilian leaders were at managing the government" (Nunn, 1976, 44). Nunn's assertion might be understood in two different ways; firstly, it is valid only in the short term, not over seven years, because the war against Peru-Bolivian Confederation—brought [1837-1839] new glory to Chilean A.A.F.F.—letting them surpass the role of mere controllers of internal order. Afterwards, the Pacific war [1879-1883] ended in another Chilean A.A.F.F. victory, allowing them to keep an outstanding role as promoters of Chiles' enlargement and wealth. Secondly, the distinctive affection Chileans have for order, normality, and competence of their governments, reflects values that have been always highly appreciated and are present among A.A.F.F.

This second aspect, common to all Chileans, is indicative of for the many years of non A.A.F.F. interference in politics. The slow weakening of Presidential
powers that culminated in 1891, and the increasing power of a Parliament because of the right to censure Ministers, and the possibility of votes of no confidence, made the A.A.F.F. more sensitive to political influence. The Congress during the period 1891-1925, formed by weak coalitions, was unable to keep any stable direction in the management of public affairs. Therefore it was not able to solve national problems, let alone A.A.F.F. ones.

The A.A.F.F. shift to become more responsible to Congress than to the President—who was nominally Commander in Chief—became enmeshed in congressional politics in which the prize was desirable assignments, trips abroad, and promotion due to political connections with parliamentary majorities (Nunn, 1976, 92-3). As it often happened in Argentina, politicians involved the A.A.F.F. in the political game, trying to obtain their support for reaching their own goals or—as it sometimes happened—to cover their lack of interest related to the Chilean A.A.F.F.'s destiny.

In addition, due to Congress political interference with the A.A.F.F., Chile at the turning point of the century was plagued by uncertainty, facing a very dark future. Several authors wrote influential books that portrayed those pessimistic feelings. Among the most important were: Francisco Antonio Encina and his "Nuestra Inferioridad Económica" (Our Economic Inferiority); Alejandro Venegas "Sinceridad: Chile Intimo en 1910" (Sincerity: Intimate Chile in 1910); Luis Orrego Luco "Casa Grande" (The Big Mansion) and many others. Chilean society debased itself into a political system that offered no solution. The political class and parliamentarian political system produced a deep feeling of hopelessness. The only chance for change was, at first Alessandri, whose political discourse could be better described as demagoguery; after him only the A.A.F.F. remained as prospective rulers.
The A.A.F.F. also had to play during these decades, even when reluctant, the 'bad guy role'. The government used them to suppress increasing labour unrest from the beginning of the century. The North of Chile became the first scene of violent repression, ordered by the government. That was soon extended to the rest of the country (Nunn, 1976, 118-9). There were thousands of casualties, bringing discredit to the A.A.F.F. due to the politicians' wrong doings. Only A.A.F.F.'s discipline permitted them to have carried out such orders without political consequences or coups attempts.

A.A.F.F. reactions to these problems proved to be more receptive to the situation that affected Chile. The Liga Militar [Military League] in 1912, when deciding to make themselves heard by the government, asked for reforms in: Public education, the judiciary, health system, sanitation, eradication of alcoholism and crime, the developing of manufacture production, and, to fight against luxury excesses in wealthy sectors, the design of an improved electoral system, giving more people the right to vote and defending them from coercion. In connection with foreign affairs they demanded a definitive solution to the Tacna-Arica problem, in which according the Peace Treaty referendum should permit the inhabitants of that cities to decide if they wanted to belong to Chile or Perú.

Even when they stopped their attempted coup [January 1912], (Nunn, 1976, 116) it was crystal clear, at that moment, that there existed an important group of A.A.F.F. men, especially among junior officers, who were more conscious of Chilean social and economical problems than were the politicians. This outstanding characteristic was evident, and was equally present in Alessandri's government, in the 'A.A.F.F. committee' created by low ranking officers who had no political aims other than to solve a wide set of problems that affected all Chileans including A.A.F.F. (Aldunate, 1991, 159-60).
From the second decade of the century, came evidence of another strong characteristic of Chilean A.A.F.F.—their visceral rejection of communism. This characteristic was deeply related with the bitter attacks against the A.A.F.F. from the anarchist, pacifist, socialist, and communist press as a group, not only in Chile (Arriagada, 1986, 84 onwards) but in all Hispanic America (Johnson, 1964, 75). Nevertheless, they professed deep social sensitivity toward the working class.

In addition, A.A.F.F. since the beginning of the century perceived the need for a reconstructed government system, in which the leading figure must be a strong executive, instead of a weak parliamentarian system that since 1891 had proved inefficient. In this particular matter, a large proportion of society agreed with this aim, and constituted a bond between them and the A.A.F.F.

Nevertheless, it is impossible to identify the election Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Ibáñez as the President of Chile, with an A.A.F.F. government, as Nunn states,

"Because of his military background, his government was considered a military dictatorship until recent scholarship demonstrated otherwise... [notwithstanding] Until 1973 the Ibáñez regime was the only Chilean government in which the military assumed a political role equal to, or more important than, that of civilians" (Nunn, 1976, 151).

It is true that A.A.F.F. assumed an important role, but the same happened with groups of civilians. Ibáñez's political and administrative decisions resembled more those of Portales when he dismissed all A.A.F.F. and civilians who could be an obstruction to the implementation of the 1925 Constitution Chart, or reforms the country needed so urgently. Relating to the way in which Ibáñez faced his government problems, he followed the lessons that history had taught Chileans in relationship to nation building, "Elimination of the opposition, if not universally popular, was surely consistent with Chilean history" (Nunn, 1976, 152).
All who could oppose—right wings, left wings, or A.A.F.F. men—were sent away. Navy and Army cohesion were as strong as never before in the twentieth century. At the same time, young civilians, selected on basis of their knowledge, ability, and energy, started taking ministerial positions to produce changes Chile urgently needed. Birth, or belonging to a landed, or wealth aristocracy were not qualifications to help rule the country in positions of government.

At the same time, and at all levels, the efforts of Ibáñez and his Ministry of Defence to produce the retirement of officers from participating in politics, achieved success. Not all the means used in that time were trouble free, but in the end they were efficient. Before the Ibáñez government ended in 1931, only six officers actually held high political positions.

A.A.F.F., two years after the Ibáñez resignation, had to learn a bitter lesson. The erratic political participation of some A.A.F.F., and civilian leaders damaged their prestige for decades, and, made them lose all their well-earned prestige as promoters of reform and progress. Most important of all, they learned that they were to keep themselves out of political matters, but were to be ready to act only when dangers were so evident that nobody else, political parties or civilian groups seemed able to solve Chilean problems. Even more importantly, they learned that any political action of A.A.F.F. must have the greatest cohesion among all branches of the armed services. So the answer to the problems were clear: going back to the barracks, and absolute dedication on professional matters.

Therefore, they went back to barracks and their political participation diminished to a minimum. It is true that between Alessandri's second period as President [1932-1938], and Allende's election [1970], there were some attempts to disrupt democracy in Chile, but they lacked support, both among the A.A.F.F. and
from civilians, most of them were related to salaries, modernisation, and the communists influence (Nunn, 1976, 112 onwards. Humorous press headings reflected, at that time, the limited importance society gave to some of these plots; one of them was named: 'The Pig's Feet Plot' (op. cit., 244).

Allende's triumph at polls and his 'Chilean Path to Socialism', brought—even when not immediately—a great deal of change among A.A.F.F. The first and most noticeable were the clear attempts to co-opt them. As the political situation worsened day after day, President Allende appointed A.A.F.F. personnel in all the fields in which serious problems arose. At last he appointed Commanders in Chief, and high-ranking officers as Ministers of State. Many of Allende's speeches praised the important role of A.A.F.F., and reassured them of the constitutionality of his administration, guaranteed A.A.F.F.'s autonomy under the Marxist regime and assured them of an important role in Chile's development.

A.A.F.F. Ministers, and personnel, accepted this new role. Meanwhile Allende's government was perceived by them as acting within the Constitutional framework. Related to this perception, there appeared discrepancies among some of the officers, especially the Army Commander in Chief, and senior and junior officers. This was a product of Constitutional apparatus representatives, namely House of Deputies (Cámara de Diputados, 1973, 251 onwards), Supreme Court (op cit, 226 onwards), and the Republic General Comptroller who had doubts about the constitutionality of Allende's decrees and laws, specially the abusive use of constitutional breaches [resquicios legales]. The origin and aims of these laws were very different, and at that moment they were used to favour the Unidad Popular projects (Aldunate, 1989, 178 onwards).
In one of the agreements of the House of Deputies, a month previous the coup, it is clearly shown that Allende's government was becoming totalitarian:

'It is a fact that current Republic Government has, from the beginning, committed itself to achieving total power, with the obvious purpose of submitting the entire population to the most rigid economic and political control by the state, thereby establishing a totalitarian system absolutely opposed to representative democracy established by the Constitution' (Cámara de Diputados, 1973, 252).

It was not until then, when there was a wide consensus among the polity, Catholic Church and citizenry at large, that A.A.F.F. decided to intervene. All experience gained through A.A.F.F. history was successfully put into action: cohesion among the branches, minute planning to control all machinery created by Allende's government, control of mass media, and all the requirements to increase the chance to top off the 'Unidad Popular' government without producing a civil war or anarchy.

Evidently, A.A.F.F.'s purpose was to clear up the debacle created by Allende's government, and ensure a rapid return to a Constitutional Government. That first purpose was evidently impossible to obtain due to the deep crisis that permeated all aspects of Chilean life. A.A.F.F., with strong support from the citizenry and some political parties, agreed that the A.A.F.F. government was needed for an extended period of time, the length of which was impossible to foretell at that moment.

The impossibility of an agreement about the time they must retain the government, led after a few years, to the first serious problem among Commanders in Chief, and later to the dismissal of General Leigh, both from the Junta and from the Air Force. General Leigh's support within his branch was striking. Seventeen General Officers, and many colonels followed him voluntarily to retirement. This was a clear proof of loyalty to their Commander in Chief. This fact was, and it is un-
derstood by many scholars to be a cleavage within the A.A.F.F. A better understanding of this problem shows that this case has broken one of 'Estado Mayor' meetings rules. In all of them, participants discuss a point, and present alternative solutions; finally the senior officer chooses one of them, and consequently all members are obliged to follow it until the end. The main problem was that the majority of the Commanders in Chief accepted that it was necessary to continue ruling the country for an extended period. General Leigh wanted a shorter one to extricate A.A.F.F. from government and insisted on it. This was a political problem solved on A.A.F.F. tradition.

After this incident, President Pinochet was able to keep A.A.F.F. support, and had narrow contacts with the rank and file even when direct participation was each time more tenuous. Scholarly works attempt to prove that the cohesion of the A.A.F.F.'s is not strong at all when ruling, and that most of the time they quarrel among themselves, and suffer coups and counter-coups. This fact, evident in some armies that have become political activists, if existed in the Chilean case its importance was not enough to produce major problems, let alone encourage attempt for a counter-coup. Chilean A.A.F.F. were able to avoid this danger, and act in a cohesive and disciplined pattern. This is perhaps the most outstanding of all the characteristics they showed during seventeen years of A.A.F.F. government, and most important, they were able to keep it after they returned power to civilians and political parties.

Argentinian and Chilean A.A.F.F.: Convergence of Values

It is possible to conclude from the description of Argentinian, and Chilean A.A.F.F. that they have many convergent values, most of them proper to, even when
not exclusive to, the A.A.F.F. profession. Among the values they share, are love for order and discipline; these are virtues necessary not only for A.A.F.F. but they understand them as basic to develop their own societies. Most of them have a dislike for politicians, popular movements, and demagogy which has its origin in these values, and which affects deeply their decisions when they become rulers. They tried certainly to impose order and discipline in a society which has different levels of acceptance of these values. The utility of these values as foundations for their policies have produced problems most of the time when they tried to apply them to society at large. It is a well-known fact that the motto of all A.A.F.F. governments in Argentina has been 'law and order' it should be understood as synonymous of order and discipline (Chen, 1988, 149), and the same can be stated of Chilean A.A.F.F.

There is no doubt that these values are shared by A.A.F.F. in both countries, and they have as a correlate a deep respect for discipline and seniority. The degree of acceptance of these values has been changing along time. First, A.A.F.F. political activities in Chile in this century were the product of younger officers that surpassed senior officers, and pushed them to involve themselves or at least neutral. In Argentina younger officers were motivated by politicians to intervene. This fact had a deep influence over discipline and seniority, diminishing both and producing disturbance and, no doubt at all, undermining their professionalism and efficiency. Fortunately, Chilean A.A.F.F. learned previous lessons, and during Pinochet's regime they kept these values in action.

A.A.F.F. hierarchy and seniority were translated to governmental duties and political activity, so to serve Ministerial positions, general officers were appointed, and officers of lower graduation served lower positions. I witnessed this respect for seniority, forcing a Minister to be on the phone to answer the request of a senior general who was only 'Intendente' of a region. He told his secretary, 'wait until the
Minister is on the phone because he is less senior than me', even in minute aspects, seniority in the Chilean army had precedence over political positions.

It is evident that responsibility, and planning, are two outstanding values among A.A.F.F. of both countries. They understand them as an integral part of the main values of order and discipline, or at least as intimately correlated. Responsibility, understood as the fact of being morally accountable for one's actions or being capable of rational conduct, is a common characteristic of A.A.F.F. men, as much on active duty as in private life. Argentinian or Chilean army commissioned officers, or rank and file personnel, can not stay a long time on active duty if they are not able to make this value apparent in his daily activities. Planning as an instrumental value must be evident in the conduct of officers, and rank and file personnel. Officers as good administrators are fond of and experts in it; most of the time any friction between A.A.F.F. and civilians is the product of the lesser ability of the latter to act under detailed planning.

Patriotism, understood as love for the fatherland is a value rooted in the people of both nations and specially in A.A.F.F. At officer training Academies, and rank and file schools, it has a ritual and a set of ceremonies to instil it deeper into the consciousness of A.A.F.F. men. Nationalism, understood as a policy of national independence and development, is another value shared in both countries. This value may have suffered changes in time and present different projects to attain its goals, but as a value it has remained indivisible.

Professionalism, cohesion, and power are also values shared for both: Each one of these values has had a great development. Chile first, and Argentina later created Academies to train officers, providing for many years a pattern of advancement in professional careers, in which seniority and intellectual achievement
are deeply respected. If professionalism is a highly estimated value among both, Argentinian's have been eroded by politicians, specially when they tried to get their support for their political projects. Chilean officers were not tempted or forced to participate in politics for many decades, until Allende's times, when he even forced into retirement General César Ruiz Danyau, Commander in Chief of the Air Force for refusing to serve in the position of Minister 'Obras Públicas' [Public Works] (Mercurio Internacional, 1993, p. 3).

Cohesion, in strict A.A.F.F. matters, means that disparate men from varied socio-economic background are expected to become more than a collection of individuals and form a unit in which individuals will be ready to sacrifice their lives in order to preserve the group. This kind of cohesion is relatively easy to get in a combat situation, and among small groups, but when needed in larger tasks such as ruling a country, when individuals are distant from the normal training of A.A.F.F., it is very hard to keep the minimal amount of cohesion to make their duty workable. This becomes the touchstone of A.A.F.F. cohesion—if obtained—and the road to success. If on the contrary, it is not achieved, failure is unavoidable.

Chilean A.A.F.F. has over time shown a greater ability than the Argentinian A.A.F.F. to incorporate the value of cohesion not only into their professional life but also when ruling the country. Only twice has this value been undermined: at the civil war of 1891, and after the first Ibáñez's regime. During the seventeen years of Pinochet's rule they turned this value into reality. Unfortunately, it is not possible to assert the same for the Argentinian A.A.F.F. Only a couple of times—and they did not last too long—were they able to present a cohesive attitude. This is evidently a case of a value highly appreciated from an intellectual point of view, being lost or not incorporated into the collective mind of Argentinian A.A.F.F.
Solidarity is another value linked to cohesion. In relationship with the Argentinian case, this value was eroded too by politicians, and by the involvement of groups of officers into one or another political party. These facts produced attacks, displacements, and dismissals among officers who backed the losers' side. Since Chileans very seldom suffered lack of solidarity due to their political participation or any other reason, this became one of the most outstanding values among them.

Power as an instrumental value to defend fatherland and constitution, is no doubt one of the most important values for A.A.F.F. They know their privilege, and monopoly of the use of violence. Since the use of weapons carries a heavy moral responsibility, violence should be used only when there is no other alternative. Unfortunately, Argentinian A.A.F.F. has faced too many crises, most of them produced by the lack of capability of constitutional mechanisms to stop the President going too far. There, the only deterrent are A.A.F.F. (Potash, 1969, 202). Since they had to use power with the purpose of restraining constitutional violations, they become involved in coups, and afterwards in A.A.F.F. rule. On the other hand, Chilean A.A.F.F. has been faced with this kind of problem seriously only once in Allende's time. All other state powers agreed that he had surpassed constitutional limits, and the only ones able to refrain him were A.A.F.F. They used power and violence with such an incredible efficiency that they took control almost without opposition. This produced, as a consequence, the romantic idea that Allende's 'vía Chilena al Socialismo' [Chilean Path to Socialism] was a mild adventure or an idyllic political episode, with no serious risk for Chilean democracy.

Religious values, normally identified with the Catholic Church are widely shared by Argentinian and Chileans. Catholic values are the foundations of thinking and acting of the citizenry of both countries. The peculiar characteristics of these religious feelings are present all the time, even in people who declare themselves
atheists. In an interview, the Chilean General Secretary of the Communist party, Volodia Teitelboim, declares himself as being an atheist, 'even when not a recalcitrant one, yet a few lines later declares 'Thanks to God that this country is not a dictatorship anymore' (Commandari, 1992, 32).

The attitude of Chilean A.A.F.F. toward the Catholic Church was of respect and support, even when it took the role of representative and defenders of political opposition. A.A.F.F. government very seldom adopt initiatives to control or suppress this role adopted by Catholic Church, at least not as an Institution.

Another value intimately linked to religious ones, is self sacrifice. This value is inculcated daily at A.A.F.F. academies, schools, barracks and everywhere. It has diverse manifestations from rendering their own lives in accomplishing a mission, to be ready all the time for service, the segregation between work and private life is minimal in the A.A.F.F. profession (Janowitz, 1960, 178). When the A.A.F.F. become rulers, they try to extend this value to all the citizens of their country, consciously or unconsciously.

It may seem contradictory that A.A.F.F. men can have democracy as a highly regarded value. This may be considered absurd, especially when they become a 'de facto' government. Nevertheless, they have always stated that their main goal is to return their country to a fully an improved democratic state and, to return political power to politicians as soon as the crisis is overcome. Videla stated in one of his speeches 'we understand that the road to democracy is the proper channel for the transit of national style of life (Videla, 1977, 26), or as in the Chilean case when the goal of establishing a better democratic system is completed (Junta de Gobierno, Chile 1974, point 6th; Gobierno de Chile, 1980, cap 1, arts. 4 to 7). Very akin to democratic feelings are the A.A.F.F.'s social consciousness. It has been previously
stated that their first political activities in Chile, from 1912 to 1932, responded to a deep concern with and concern for the lower strata of society (Nunn, 1976, 116), and the same situation happened, for some time in Argentina at least under Peron's first government. All attempts to link the A.A.F.F. to upper class interest are now under scholarly criticism and review.

A values based analytical framework

To develop a value based analytical framework, to study comparatively educational policies in two A.A.F.F. governments is no easy task. This is very much so in such a sensitive matter as education. Nevertheless, it is easier to develop a value based framework useful for comparing educational policies among military governments than for civilian ones, because the former have a clearer value pattern and are more reluctant to introduce changes in their characteristic set of values due to political pressure or for tactical gains.

This analytical framework should permit us to isolate the distinctive characteristics of both military government under study in regard to education, that is the similitude's and differences among them. In addition, we have to recognize the impossibility of avoiding comparisons with civilian governments, or with political tendencies in both countries.

There is a kind of agreement that values are important in social research, and this importance is recognized by scientists from the most disparate fields: sociology, philosophy, linguistics, anthropology and logic, among others. From the sociological standpoint, Max Weber argued that values are not only important for research, but are the tool that lets us put order into chaos. They permit us to select and use only a
part of concrete reality that is interesting and significant to us. This stems from a relationship with cultural values with which the researcher approaches reality; "Only certain sides of the infinitely complex concrete phenomenon, namely those to which we attribute a general cultural significance—are therefore worthwhile knowing. They are alone objects of causal explanation" (Weber, 1949, 78).

In addition, he sustains the argument that from a methodological stand point the object and depth of research is guided by a researcher's evaluative ideas and his age, this point of view will let him to construct the conceptual scheme for research, and in the mode of their use, the researcher is linked by the norms of thought used everywhere (Weber, 1949, 84). As we can appreciate Weber not only accepts values as an important aspect of research, moreover he founds on them the existence of social sciences research.

Some scholars such as Ruth Benedict, have overemphasised the importance of understanding human actions based only in values. They do not take into due account the influence of integration on systems of cultural value-orientations and those belonging to social systems. They tend to forget that developed societies live in a system of institutionalised values, to which members adhere in their action. Notwithstanding, members of a society must be able to accept compromises and accommodation that might seem opposed to their values (Parsons, Shils & Olds, 1951, 179).

In relatively stable systems of action, there exists a tendency to build consistent systems of value-orientation. At the same time, there exists the opposite tendency to generate, and tolerate inconsistent subsystems with the consequent production of strain. One or several accommodation mechanisms have to be produced in order to keep harmony between both. From an empirical stand point for research,
value-orientation "is not autonomous except in the sense that it may be treated as an independent variable, interdependent with other variables in a system" (Parsons, Shils, Olds, 1951, 175).

Despite the fact that philosophers' opinions are divided and present diverse tendencies when studying values, they agree in the importance of values to explain human actions. The two extreme positions among them are absolutism and empiricism or relativism. Among the former, the most well known representatives are Scheler, Rickert, and Hartman all of whom are from the German school, together with Ortega y Gasset, a Spaniard, educated as a philosopher in Germany. Ortega y Gasset in his "Introducción a una Estimativa" [Introduction to Value Judgement] goes so far in this tendency as to assert that when people, or a society, are not able to see clearly some particular value it is because they suffer a kind of sickness or blindness (Ortega y Gasset, 1961, 334). This tendency is based on ethical principles, a priori, and beyond any relativity, trying to establish absolute values (Kraft, 1981, 3 onwards).

Empiricism, on the other hand, states that values are created by human beings through valuing. They are simply abstracted from evaluations, and consequently may be investigated empirically, psychologically, sociologically, or anthropologically. An extreme position of this trend is represented by existentialism, in which the highest value for man is freedom and responsibility. Their most important values are: subjectivity, authenticity, creativity, relevance, and involvement, as the foundations to face life (Andres, 1980, 112). Relativism, empiricism and other similar tendencies present—from a philosophical perspective—a great problem in using values as theoretical foundations because it is impossible to predict, except loosely and vaguely, the manner in which men's values are organised.
From another philosophical approach, Kraft sustains the utility of values in developing a theoretical framework. He argues that it is possible to regard values from two vantage points: First, as statements of value judgements and/or value attitudes by single individuals or groups, because they can be considered facts of the same kind of spiritual and mental life. Secondly, at the same time, they can be viewed as valid in the context of the need to recognise directives that permit the adoption of attitudes, which value judgements actually represent.

From the first stand point, factual valuations can be described, ordered, grouped into classes, their origins can be traced; and their cultural, social, and, national dependence can be explained. If they are regarded in relation to their validity, value judgements must conform the logical Law of Contradiction, and as a consequence to determine the logical relationship among them, thus the possibility of constituting a logical system. The limits of logic lies in its ability to establish relations of value judgements among themselves, and arrive to it limits when it reaches supreme value judgements that constitute the ultimate presuppositions (Kraft, 1973, 183-4).

Not only from a philosophical stand point do problems arise in using values to built a theoretical foundation. The concept of 'value' itself is wide enough to become the convergence point related with humanities studies, able to link an experimental psychology of perception to political analysis of ideologies, or economics to aesthetics, and so on. The concept of value itself is not clearly delimited, even within one field of knowledge; there exist the most varied definitions in philosophy, economy, sociology, and social sciences. There exists a kind of agreement in that values only have a relation with normative as opposed to existential propositions (Kluckhohn et al, 1951, 389).
Notwithstanding, there exist strong agreement among philosophers and social scientists, that it does not matter what is their conception of values (relative, objective, eternal, or ephemeral), they recognized them as important in human decisions, attitudes and actions. "Patterns of value orientation have been singled out as the most crucial cultural elements in the organisation of systems of action" (Tolman, 1951, 159).

Linguists have been also attracted to values, and considered them as an important support for research. Karl Aschenbrenner sustains that men have a moral dimension reflected in an special form of language for valuation, and there are no reasons to believe of the existence of an appraisive language without real use for it. Moral practice and realities are determined by the possession of moral concepts and vocabulary. In absence of moral concepts there exist the inability to recognize the corresponding moral phenomenon: "The variety and subtlety of the appraisive vocabulary determines moral sensibility and defines the "moral dimension" of man. That is the reason why the study of value theory must begin with the vast resources [at least in Western languages] of appraisive discourse" (Aschenbrenner, 1971, 21).

It is evident that values might be used, from different scientific perspectives, to produce a theoretical framework to analyse phenomena in a society at large. At the same time its usefulness is more evident when dealing with complete or total institutions such as the clergy or A.A.F.F., who posses a complete set of traditions, symbolism and, values. They differ—in a certain degree—from the ones belonging to civil society. The way the military understand and accept values, permit them to constitute a different social actor with special characteristics, clearly different from the ones applying to civil society, therefore, exist the possibility of a qualitative assessment.
A.A.F.F. men, not only Argentinian and Chilean, are clearly guided by recognizable and objective values. When Shakespeare posits explicitly the dilemma of subjective or objective values in *Troilus and Cressida*, he was in fact representing, centuries in advance, the way in which A.A.F.F. view values:

"Hector. Brother
She is not worth what she doth cost the keeping.

Troilus. What's aught but as 'tis valued?

Hector. But value dwells not in particular will:
It holds his estimate and dignity
As well wherein 'tis precious of itself
As in the prizer..." (Shakespeare, 1982, 160)

There is no doubt that A.A.F.F. men, in general, take for granted that Hector's conception of values is the correct one, and they strongly emphasis the objectivity of values, specially those which they appreciate the most. For this reason they are able to use them as a practical or moral guide for daily activities. This fact allows us to investigate their motivations, and to evaluate their policy statements, and to compare them against their deeds.

In this theoretical framework, special relevance will be given to the values found in the characterization of Argentinian and Chilean A.A.F.F. Their political statements will be analyzed, and values underlying them will be contrasted with high level sectorial policy statements and their administrative implementation as laws and decrees. The logic underlying their government decisions and its internal consistency will be scrutinized and evaluated.

The applying, accommodation or transaction of their values will be studied when playing a political role, and internal or external circumstances make it necessary. Sometimes in order to maintain their face they can deny explicitly the fact of
accepting any transaction when following the call of duty. The attempts of the military to reassert their values, accepting accommodations or transactions very reluctantly could introduce in their political thinking and activities a noticeable amount of rigidity and inflexibility that affects their efficiency as rulers or administrators of society as a whole.

Nevertheless, some A.A.F.F. rulers, normally those who have the spirit of statesmen, are able to surpass their values conceptions, and adapt themselves to the ambiguous game proper of the politicians, or to civilian hedonist values without given up completely their own values. Normally this kind of ruler becomes highly respected as nation builders.

It is possible to reject the possibility of using in this theoretical framework the concept of anti values or values with a negative sign that exist in the literature reviewed (Ortega y Gasset, 1961, 334-335; Najder, 1975, 65). Instead, and more useful for this research, is the concept of the exaggeration of values or virtues proper for A.A.F.F. This problem would be better understood using an old proverb which states that 'vices are virtues that become mad'.

Perhaps the most well known product of this phenomenon, due to the extensive coverage of mass media, are the problems related with human rights. The collision of straightforward values such as: duty, patriotism, law and order, development, and others, with the vague and wider rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is very noticeable. The latter are good philanthropy, and a desirable set of ideals, but no country in the world can transform them into a full reality.

The value of patriotism drives A.A.F.F. almost always into collision with the values related with the individual human being or with some type of international-
ism. Self-sacrifice, a highly appreciated value by A.A.F.F., makes them believe they have the right to demand from civilians the same amount of sacrifice they are prone to accept for themselves. Unfortunately civilians are nearer hedonism than self-sacrifice, even more among Argentinians than Chileans.

Different conceptions of democracy among A.A.F.F. and civilians produce the same effects. Western democracy emphasizes individual rights; the A.A.F.F. give strong importance to the collective duty of nation building. According to Arriagada, the A.A.F.F.'s concept of democracy is related with equality without any differences other than the proper one of hierarchy and institutional discipline. Meanwhile, for civilian's this concept of democracy is related to individual freedom, equality, and participation (Arriagada, 1986, 47). This collision due to different emphasis on values among two wide sectors of society such as A.A.F.F. and civilians, are the foundations of all conflicts, according to the bibliography related with the A.A.F.F. rule.

Special attention is given to the concept of value crisis that applies to a disintegration of a coherent theoretical and/or motivational systems of evaluation, producing as a consequence the destruction of the organizing value-principle caused by a) breakdown of confidence, or b) by the discovery of internal discrepancies within a given scheme of justification (Najder 1975, 73). In our research, the latter will be considered the most important for the evaluation of the political evolution of education in Argentina and Chile.

In the educational field, the core of this research, will study carefully the incidence of general values in the design of such policies as order, discipline, self-sacrifice, hard work, nation, religion, and more utilitarian ones such as the qualification of human resources for development or economic growth. There will be also
special attention paid to the sources of resistance to their policies from universities, political parties and movements, churches, international pressure from governments or NGOs, and the consequent accommodation to solve the problems or to mitigate them.

An operational definition of value is considered necessary for these research purposes. We will understand for value a 'type of judgement within a given system of evaluations or value-principles. They are thoughts which recognize the valuableness of something and might be transformed into principles of action' (Najder, 1975, 65).

As a conclusion, it is necessary to emphasize that it would be easier to recognize the value-principles which serve as foundations of A.A.F.F. design, and the implementation of policies compared civilian governments due to the higher degree of homogeneity and cohesion that are their main characteristics. Although some military men, individually or collectively could be labelled as lacking these values. Nevertheless, if compared with civilian society they are far more cohesive (Oehling, 1977, 226-227).
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Military Governments of Argentina and Chile: a Retrospective View

Limitations and aims of this chapter

The main limitation of this chapter are the enormous amount of scholarly work and research related with both A.A.F.F. governments, making it impossible to provide a complete review of the existent published material. This fact drives us to select some aspects to produce comparisons 'ex post facto'.

This chapter aims to review the assumptions stated in scholarly works with respect to the fate of Argentina [1976-1983], and Chile [1973-1989] under the A.A.F.F. government, and their comparison with the available facts provided by the historical evolution of these governments.

The development of this chapter under the previous stated ideas might not seem fair-minded to the authors under review, because they had to produce their research with uncompleted, controversial, provisory, and sometimes biased information. Nevertheless, it is considered important as an evaluation of the accuracy and quality of their predictions, and at the same time to help in some degree to the refinements of their concepts and methods.

Human rights under A.A.F.F. rule

a) The rhetoric of war
A.A.F.F. training is directed towards the management of violence, defence or attack in case of internal or external war. One of the main characteristics of left wing movements in L.A. were, and still are, their declarations of war against the bourgeoisie and capitalistic society. As much in Chile as in Argentina, the left wing press emphasised this belligerent conception of politics. Very often they appealed to rank and file personnel to rebel against the 'exploits' or to avoid repressing their own 'people', when they attempted to produce violent changes in capitalistic politic structures.

The 'vuas armadas' or 'vfas revolucionarias', meaning the use of violence to gain political power, has been always prominent in leftist parties' rhetoric. Even when they gained power at the polls as in Allende's case, this rhetoric kept a high profile; they were always winning a war against unjust social structures, poverty, capitalism, and so on. The Chilean Socialist Party, [SP] in its XXII Conference in Chillán 1967—only three years before Allende was elected president—stated with unanimity that revolutionary violence was unavoidable and legitimate. Violence had its origin in the repressive and armed character of the state. It was the only way to achieve political and economic power, and the only way to defend it after it was conquered. Only with the destruction of the bureaucratic and A.A.F.F. apparatus of the bourgeoisie, can be found the Socialist revolution (Jobet, 1971, vol. 2, 130). Similar statements were common in Argentinian extremist groups.

This rhetoric no doubt affected the attitude of the A.A.F.F. when ordered, as in Argentinian case, to eliminate guerrillas in 1975, or as in the Chilean when it took over government. The movements they had to face were not just employing a bellicose discourse and armed actions; at the same time, they were facing infiltration, and the loss of their monopoly of weapons, and management of violence. The answer from a A.A.F.F. standpoint was to be under the rules of war. So this situation,
from a A.A.F.F. perspective must not be considered a battle between professional soldiers and civilians, but between regular and irregular soldiers, and the law should be the law of war.

It is apparent that social sciences have failed to perceive this problem from this perspective and, of course, the interpretation of facts has been misleading. The Chilean situation is interesting because the SP and most of the parties belonging to Allende's Popular Unity, have now changed their rhetoric, eliminating their bellicose conception of politics, and Chilean A.A.F.F. seems to have returned to barracks to stay there because one of the worst friction points has been eliminated.

b) A critical view of the human rights defenders

One of the most influential Non Government Organizations [NGO onwards] related with human rights is Amnesty International. Since its creation by Peter Benenson in 1961, it has been working in this field. It has also earned the most prestigious awards: the Nobel Prize in 1977, Special Award of Human Rights from the United Nations [U.N. onwards] in 1978, and many others. It has over a million members, and works in more than 150 countries.

Amnesty International's influence is widely extended, and its reports have become one of the main sources for researchers and, are often cited by scholars. For this reason the accuracy and impartiality—or the lack of it—of their work will be the very foundations of the scholars' judgements related with this subject. The dangers in the use of this enormous influence is great, and this fact is recognised in No 2 a, of Amnesty's statutes. This article states explicitly the need for impartiality with respect to ideologies, political parties, or groups (Amnesty International, 1992, 116-117). We agree with R.J. Vincent that Amnesty's work is based on the liberal tradition of belief in the power of public opinion and, governments' sensitivity to it.
Amnesty's tools are the publication of accurate information about oppressors and oppressed, using the highest quality research, so they keep the idea that opinion must be based on the truth (Vincent, 1991, 98). From the extensive field of Human rights they specialise in freedom of opinion, freedom from torture, the right to a fair trial, and the abolition of the death penalty (Vincent, 1991, 97).

The United Nations [U.N. onwards] is another institution closely related with human rights; unfortunately their activities are subjected to a considerable bias, and this has determined the existence of pariahs within the international community. Chile has been one of these pariahs due to their record of violations of Human Rights. Year after year this has been considered a separate item on the Commission on Human Rights agenda and, it occupied more than the six percent of its time between 1975 and 1985. This attention lies in the political isolation of Chile because during this period it is possible to identify several countries whose records are worse than Chile: Kampuchea, Uganda, Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia, and others at least as bad as Paraguay and Afghanistan, and several other doubtless are no better such as Philippines, Zaire, and Argentina.

Chile and Israel shared most of the individual attention of the Commission work time with 12.5 percent the former and 14.0 percent the latter between 1975-1979 and 2.7 and 11.7 percent respectively between 1980-1985 (Donnelly, 1988, 289-292). It was not the depth of the problem of Human Rights that worried the U.N. The principal criteria for producing the agenda, rather, is the politics of its diplomacy which allows Israel, South Africa or Chile to be criticised and investigated for Human Rights violations. They selected these countries because they are politically cost-free and have became the pariahs of international community. These countries become superviseable, meanwhile many others remain invisible (Vincent, 1991, 100).
The record of the General assembly is still more disappointing. Only political reasons can justify why so many resolutions have been adopted with regard to some countries and not dozens of others with records as bad or worse as El Salvador in 1985. It is particularly noticeable that comparatively repressive Soviet-backed regimes have not been subjected to similar scrutiny, non-aligned countries are still more favoured and their records in human rights are no better than those of Chile (Donnelly, 1988, 295-296).

There are other problems. Besides the biases of the U.N. and NGOs, there exists a restricted conception of human rights, in which the main interests are civil and political rights. These priorities have been adopted by some countries policies, as in the U.S.A foreign assistance legislation. Economic and social rights are not given the same importance (Donnelly, 1982, 581-582). USA, NGOs, and private institutions are unable to recognise any improvement in these other human rights apart from personal and political human rights. Still worse there is no criticism, at least not at the same level of decibels when these other human rights are in danger in any nation.

The effectiveness of the U.N. suffered when they attempt to monitor, let alone to enforce, compliance with international Human Rights standards. The main problem is that their persuasive power is founded on their reputation for impartiality and integrity, so their credibility is considerably reduced (Donnelly, 1988, 296). The same might be applied to Amnesty International.
Human Rights in Argentina

Argentinian's human rights problems are ancient; nevertheless, the internal strife has never been worst than in the last decade and it has reached a degree of virulence unknown, since the days of Juan Manuel de Rosas in the nineteenth century. The escalation of violence and a deep shift in Argentina's political culture seems to have occurred around 1970, marked by the kidnapping and murder of General and former president Pedro Aramburu. It was the armed challenge to the regime from left-wing revolutionary Peronist's 'Montoneros', and the Troskyst-prone 'Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo' which forced the A.A.F.F. to permit Peron to regain the presidency in 1973. Perón and, afterwards, his widow were unable to cope with Argentinian political violence and counter violence. The report 'Nunca Más' from the special commission created by Alfonsin stated there were some 600 instances of abduction before the coup of March 1976 (Conadep, 1986, 10).

Videla's A.A.F.F. government attacked urban terrorism with indiscriminate methods which themselves were all-too-frequent terroristic (Collier, 1981 477-478). Nevertheless, A.A.F.F. have had it very clear in their mind that they did not start this dirty war; besides, they were given clear orders by a constitutional government in 1975 to wipe out subversive elements (Rouquié, 1983, 585). Moreover, there existed clear consciousness of political leaders with respect to terrorism beforehand. Nevertheless, the National Congress with unanimity pardoned 'Montoneros'' and other terrorist groups in 1973. Still worse they ordered the closure of the Federal Chamber of Penal Law, the Court which had condemned them to jail.

After the terrorist attack on the military camp of Azul, Perón, in a speech to the Nation, stated that criminal terrorists must be annihilated and that this was the Argentinians' duty. His widow, and President of Argentina signed a decree ordering
the legal annihilation of guerrilla, that decree was afterwards ratified by interim President Italo Luder extending it to all the National territory (De la Vega, 1989, 53 onwards)

All political parties agreed with that decision. Ricardo Balbin leader of the Radical Party put forward the need to exterminate terrorism. Legislators after 1964 agreed that there was a serious problem, and in 1975 there was almost unanimous support for the rejection of terrorism, and support for the fight of the A.A.F.F. against this social malady. The claims of the legislators are too many to cite, yet the most representative are those of Senators Perette and others, in the Chambers of representatives, Rep. Sánchez Toranzo in the Register of the Legislatuve sessions: Diario de Sesiones H. C. Senadores, 1975, 3421 onwards; Diario sesiones H. C. de Diputados, 1976, 6150 onwards (cited by de la Vega, 1979, 54 onwards). Politicians agreed that terrorism was a disgrace and that there was a need to exterminate terrorists by any means, and that the ones required to do the job were the A.A.F.F.

When evaluating the product of A.A.F.F. governments, a great majority of scholars forget that they are reactive; most of their take-overs are due to the weakness or failure of civilian governments to produce development, to improve economy, to fight the guerrillas or when Presidents trespassing the constitution. As a consequence, civilian governments endanger social life, and the economic development of their countries. They never take over power when civilian government management is efficient.

In Argentina and Uruguay, the guerrilla was a problem for both civilian and A.A.F.F. governments. Sometimes, politicians did not hesitate in praising them, as Perón did, stating that they were a 'magnificent and idealist youth', fighting for their fatherland, and then repudiating them after being elected President, stating
that they were 'immature youth, stupid and mercenaries' (Amnesty International, 1976, 12).

Guerrilla tactics in Argentina have had variations through time, at the beginning they were the good boys and they cultivated the 'Robin Hood' image; they expropriated to the rich to give money to poor people. Meanwhile, they fought the A.A.F.F. government; the rich, and international enterprises were to pay for this image, whilst they built up strength and popular support. Afterwards, and under a democratic elected government, they aimed to provoke repression to play the role of 'victims' in accordance with Carlos Marighela's philosophy (Clutterbuck, 1975, 45 onwards).

The fight against terrorism in Argentina, initiated by the left wing, and then followed from the right wing terrorism, under civilian or A.A.F.F. governments, let the scholars to judge problems of human rights in a more favourable way the Argentinian A.A.F.F. government [1976-83]. They were less judicious when judging the Chilean military government which generated less casualties. The difference between both is that in Chile there was a higher load of anti Marxist ideology. This last characteristic encouraged the left wing government around the world to put a lot of pressure on Chile, particularly from international organizations such as the United Nations.

Amnesty International's judgements about Argentina recognised that due to the problems that arose during the democratic elected Mr. Perón government and afterwards when he died his Vice President Mrs. Peron's Presidency's, the A.A.F.F. inherited the guerrillas problem (Amnesty International, 1975-76, no page number). It is hard to evaluate the scale of this inheritance. It is not enough to state that in November 1974, there were above 3,000 prisoners in jail, and more than 1,500 ca-
suaulties in the following 18 months, many of them killed by death squads, some of them financed by the Ministry of Social Welfare (Amnesty International, 1976, 12). It is certain that A.A.F.F. were blamed for the increase of a previously existent situation, prevalent in Argentina for more than a century, of torture, political violence, political prisoners and casualties.

'Nunca Más' castigated the A.A.F.F., as an institution of gross violation of human rights, including: killing, fabrication of confrontations to cover assassinations, torture, kidnapping, violations, detention in secret [also illegal] centres, repression, robbery, illegal adoption of children, attempts against the health of the detainees, anti semitism, nazism, and the illegal destruction of documentation. In addition they were accused of the existence of selective targets as journalists, and lawyers attempting to silence important social groups to prevent public debate:

"the harshest reprisals fell on lawyers who defended the victims of the state. Arbitrary detention, assault, ill-treatment by the security organisations, disappearance, and death of defence lawyers were everyday events in the early years of the A.A.F.F. regime" (Conadep, 1986, 412).

The judiciary were blamed too for acquiesce with this situation, since instead of protecting citizens against excesses from authority, they permitted all kinds of legal aberrations. Many of them were accused of complicity with abductions and disappearances due to their indifference. Conadep's conclusion is that during the period in which a large number of people disappeared, the judicial process became almost inoperative as a means of appeal (Conadep 1986, 386-387).

It is interesting to point to some criteria used in informing the Commission on Amnesty International headed by Lord Avebury in 1977. Besides the criticism of illegal procedures, tortures and other attempts against Human Rights, there coexisted a criticism of situations that are common to democratic countries; one of them
was the impossibility of physical contact between political prisoners, and their relatives or visitors, due to the use of window panels and microphones to communicate between them (Amnesty International, 1977, 27). This system is used in several democratic countries in the world including the USA and it is widely accepted as a security device.

The estimates of casualties provided by Amnesty International in the first year of A.A.F.F. government listed 1,354 victims of political violence, including 167 policemen, and 391 guerrillas. The Commission asserted quite rightly that crimes committed by the leftist groups cannot be used as a justification of the activities of the Argentinian government to combat them (Amnesty International, 1977, 67).

"Nunca Más" estimated in tens of thousands the number of people illegally deprived of freedom, and at least 8,960 of them have not reappeared to this day (National Commission on Disappeared People, 1986, 10). The yearly average of casualties rose in Argentina to proximately 1,200. It is remarkable that under the previous democratic government the number of casualties were estimated at more than fifty percent of this amount.

Unfortunately, 'Nunca Más' information is far removed from the conciseness and precision of its counterpart in Chile, the "Comisión Verdad y Reconciliación' [Truth and Reconciliation Committee]. The latter's estimates were more precise, and permit not only a better understanding of the phenomena under review, but the possibility of checking figures, and of comparison with new data.
Human rights in Chile

a) United Nations estimates

The *U.N. Annual Yearbooks on Human Rights* confirm Donnelly, Vincent, and others' analyses. In their annual reports Chile appeared highly criticized even when the UN statements were plagued with internal contradictions. Since 1979, several laws have appeared designed to guarantee Human Rights, such as Decree Law No. 2460 which provides penalties for Chilean Investigations officers who perpetrate acts of violence to secure confessions from detainees (*U.N.* 1986, 33). The U.N. approvingly remarked on the progress of building the fundamental bases of the Chilean legal system with the promulgation of the New Political Constitution of the Republic. According to the U.N., it provided the widest and most comprehensive recognition and protection of Human Rights, and went further into the requirements of the Universal Declaration in the areas of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual in all spheres of activity (*U.N.*, 1980, 41). Eight years later, the General Assembly demanded that the Chilean Government should respond to the requests of political sectors for the early, unconditional re-establishment of a pluralist democracy (*U.N.*, 1987, 129). This demand contradicted their previous praising of the Constitution because in its transitory clauses—which U.N. approved as a good legal tool—provided for the election of democratic government in 1989.

The annual reports on Chile, the creation of an 'ad hoc' working group and, the specific and unusual appointment of an *Special Rapporteur* (*Yearbook*, 1979, 312), something very unusual in the life of the U.N., were just another demonstration of the notorious bias against Chile. Year after year they asserted that the situation of Human Rights deteriorated. Facts do not agree with these judgements of the Commission, at least measured in the number of death, whose number was decreasing
year after year as the Commission 'Verdad y Reconciliación' demonstrated (Comisión Chilena de Derechos Humanos/Centro Ideas, 1991).

In 1977 and 1978 the U.N. commenting on the advance by countries, stated that the Chilean Government issued a number of decrees-laws, statutory decrees, and regulations concerning human rights. The U.N. asserted "There is a wealth of legislation on this matter covering virtually all the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (Yearbook, 1977-1978, 26), and reported significant progress in the fields of work, education, and culture as a result of this new legislation (Ibidem). The improvement of political rights such as freedom of assembly, increased political activity, with ample means of dissemination of information (Yearbook, 1983, 32). The 1985 Yearbook however stated the existence of great number of death when in fact they were in a low level (Yearbook, 1985, 139) as it is evident in the table below.

Table 4:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chile: Human Rights</th>
<th>Number of casualties:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>victims:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private citizens</td>
<td>11 17 8 75 49 32 34 20 16 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>killed by terrorist</td>
<td>* 8 5 0 10 13 11 13 4 9 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>groups under political motivations</td>
<td>(Comisión Chilena de Derechos Humanos/Centro Ideas, 1991). Adapted from their data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) Amnesty International estimates

The first report of Amnesty International related to Chile under A.A.F.F. rule, estimated that 'the number of people killed in the coup or in the months following the coup, ranged from 10,000 to 20,000' (Amnesty International, 1973-1974,
One of the main aims of the democratic government, and political parties that ruled Chile after 1990, was to produce an evaluation of the real magnitude of the Human Rights problems under the A.A.F.F. government. To achieve this goal the 'Comisión Verdad y Reconciliación' was created; its members were scholars, lawyers, a former Pinochet's cabinet member, and citizens who could be a guarantee of impartiality for everybody.

Nevertheless, the A.A.F.F. refused to accept the report's validity. The Navy stated that the inadequacy of proceedings, estimations, judgements, and conclusions distorted the process in such a way that the 'conviction' or 'truth', the commission claimed was no more than simple opinions that might be shared or rejected (Chilean Navy, 1991, X). The army stated their apprehensions from the very beginning of the Commission's work. Their main objections were: this enquiry was under the jurisdiction of the Courts of Justice and not of a Commission 'ad hoc', their fear that the product would be used as political propaganda by segments of the population interested in damaging the public image of certain institutions; the Commission's refusal to recognise the legitimate use of force, and the existence of state of war, the omission of history, and the use of selective criteria to establish the truth (Chilean Army, 1991, I-VII). It would be too extensive to state all the reasons provided by the A.A.F.F. to reject the Commission's report conclusions. Air Force, and Carabineros [Chilean Police Force], in briefer presentations stated similar doubts related to the Commission's origin, and the results of the performed.

The 'Comisión Verdad y Reconciliación' known as Comision Rettig, devoted a large amount of effort, and time to determining the real magnitude of human rights violations in Chile between 1973-1990. We will analyse, and use the product of the Commission's report, without judgements, about the criticisms of the A.A.F.F. We will consider it a useful instrument to state the maximum amount of human right's
violations that could have been committed in Chile from 1973 to 1990, measured only through killed people, because it is the only violation in which is impossible to compensate directly the victims.

In this research we have used an abbreviated version of the report, produced by the Chilean Commission of Human Rights and 'Centro Ideas'. This version has a serie of deficiencies in producing an accurate evaluation of what happened in Chile, mainly because the summary's figures do not coincide with the text. For instance, figures provided under the heading of victims of citizens acting by political motivations [90 casualties] in tables of page 92, do not agree with the number provided by the list of names [129 casualties], under the same heading provided by this version of the information. The lists of victims of violations of human rights do not coincide with any of the figures provided in the tables (Comisión Chilena de Derechos Humanos/Centro Ideas, 1991, 92 onwards).

Difference in the figures are not too relevant, and do not affect greatly the total amount of casualties between 1973-1990. In Chile during this period, according to the Commission, 2,279 people died, as well as 641 cases in which they were not certain that they were killed by agents of the A.A.F.F. government, or due to fights among terrorists.

The main problem is to produce some evidence of how Amnesty International could assert in its International Report 1973-1974 that the amount of victims were between ten and twenty thousands people (Amnesty International, 1974, 38). Similar figures were provided by the U.N., other international institutions, diplomats, scholars and journalists. The data provided by the commission 'Verdad y Reconciliación' produced a figure of 1,426 casualties for the first year of A.A.F.F. rule, September 11th 1973 to September 10th 1974; according to the list of names.
provided in the previously cited 'Síntesis', to this figure must be added 32 army, navy, carabineros, and investigation personnel who were killed by terrorists in the same period. It is evident that those estimates were very wrong.

Amnesty International in a report produced in the first year of A.A.F.F. rule stated in the preface that the victims of this coup had no precedent in the recent history of L.A. (Ennals, 1974). This information was the product of a special commission of Amnesty International sent to Chile in November 1973. According to their information to the end of December of that year, 2,000 Chileans were executed after secret A.A.F.F. trials, or went into prisons without even a mock trial (Amnesty International, 1974, 18). This information has proved to be another gross exaggeration. The list provided by the Commission 'Verdad y Reconciliación' gives, Metropolitan Region 382; Tarapacá 32; Antofagasta 69; Atacama 17; Coquimbo 20; Valparaíso 32; Libertador B. O'Higgins 6; Maule 56; Biobío 185; Araucanía 110; Los Lagos 100; Aysén 8; Magallanes 4. This give a total of 1,050 casualties including executed and missing prisoners (Comisión Chilena de Derechos Humanos/Centro Ideas, 1991, 50-57). It is evident that information related to executions, collected by the special commission, was inflated by at least 100 percent.

The information about executions is reiterated later in Amnesty's report. It added that the estimate of deaths oscillated between 5,000 to 30,000 in the first year of A.A.F.F. government. Afterwards, they asserted that to the end of March 1974, the official amount had grown to 3,500. Not only did members of this commission state this high number of deaths, Amnesty International cites a non official informant of the Department of State, U.S.A. estimating there were 10,800 by the end of 1973, and cites the correspondent of Newsweek, John Barnes, that stated that a number of 2,796 corpses were at the forensic clinic in Santiago alone. The official version of the
A.A.F.F. government asserted that the total number of deaths were, during the coup, not far from a thousand (Amnesty International, 1974, 34-35).

The only possible conclusion is that individuals and members of diverse institutions related with human rights, diplomatic personnel, and journalists had to work in a very confused historical moment, with scarce information which was difficult to obtain. Besides, A.A.F.F. government might be blamed for not being open enough to permit an easy access by international organisations to more accurate information. This problem is a remarkable characteristic of A.A.F.F. style all over the world, specially in harsh moments. They dislike and do not trust the press, nor international agencies. Nevertheless, it should be stated that it is hard to understand such gross estimates coming from supposedly highly experienced personnel.

Amnesty's International statements are plagued with small inexactitudes. Many people who they considered to have met a violent death at the hands of the A.A.F.F. are not in the list of 'Verdad y Reconciliación' such as Brazilian Tulio Roberto Cardoso Quintiliano, Uruguayan Alberto Mariano Fontela among the foreigners and many among the Chileans (Amnesty International, 1974, 37) as stated in later reports.

Related to extreme left wing political leaders, information is still worse. In 1975-1976, a report on Argentina, is cited as unconfirmed information that the leader of the MIR [Revolutionary left Movement], Edgardo Enríquez who dissapeared on Buenos Aires on April 10th, 1974 was handed over to the DINA on 29th. The reality is that on April 10th 1976, he was killed in Chile fighting with A.A.F.F. personnel, and was never handed to the DINA by Argentinians.
The wording of most statements, not only Amnesty's in that period, are loaded with moral arguments against torture, killing, and the breach of other human rights, that it is obvious because main aim of their campaigns are against these violations of Human Rights, and even they want it or not their declarations are tinted by emotionality. But scholars were dealing with truth, and now, when truth or part of it, is available, we can see that many scholars were too far away from it. It becomes evident they used a biased set of information to produce their reports, and now it is possible to state that the Chilean A.A.F.F. were nearer the truth than scholars and institutions, although nobody wants to recognise it, even today.

Carefully designed mechanisms used to obtain reliability and credibility failed totally in the first report of Amnesty International. The total amount of deaths was between 7 to 14% of the amount stated by them, depending on using the smallest or the larger of their estimations, and the same can be stated of other institutions and scholars. Nobody can deny that these figures are far off from the real amount of casualties.

c) Scholars who missed the point

Most estimates of scholars were coincident with Amnesty's. Pion-Berlin stated that the organic metaphor that influenced some N.S.D., viewed the uncooperatitive individuals as cancerous cells which must be eliminated. So the Chilean Junta eliminated some 10,000 of Allende's followers in the first year of government (Pion-Berlin, 1989. 413-14). It is interesting that when referring to the Argentinian Government he did not mention the deaths produced in that country, although they were at least double the Chilean's in the first year.

Another, rather peculiar example, of this trend of thinking, is the one adopted by Jorge Nef, who after stating the shock produced by the bloody end of the
Chilean Republican edifice, draws an image of the cold criminality of the Chilean A.A.F.F. in an historical review of intervention and killing. He mentions the deaths in 'El Salvador' [Chile] in 1965, in which no clear legal responsibility was proved, but he asserts that due to the personality of the officers in charge [Viaux and Pinochet] it makes him suspect that they were no accident. In examining another massacre in Santiago 1967, this time he blames the Air Force, and then in Puerto Montt 1970 he blames the 'Grupo Movil', a special branch of anti riot police (Nef, 1974, 60 onwards). All these incidents occurred under civilian democratic governments, when the A.A.F.F. obeyed orders from the 'Ministerio del Interior' [Home Ministry], and the police force depended, at that moment, on that ministry. So it is impossible to blame them for those incidents, and at least these pictures of cold blood murderers can not be taken seriously. This historic account was supposedly done with the sole purpose of making more credible his assertions related to the 'blood bath' of September 1973 (Nef, 1974, 76).

One of the main scientific research requirements is to give account of the sources from which social scientists derive their assertions, but unfortunately, many of them forget, too often, this basic rule Loveman for example states that thousands of death followed the first days of the coup (Loveman, 1979, 350). Sanders who is quite fair in judging other areas when evaluating Pinochet's government, his account of repression is misled enormously as well as many other scholars. Sanders is wrong, in describing facts such as thousands of deaths during the coup, and later even larger numbers were executed without trial in 1973, reaching its peak in September/October. According to him most of these victims were UP activist and foreigners (Sanders, 1981, 301), he was describing facts that did not correspond to reality. Exactly the same happened with Steenland. He asserts that many thousands of foreign exiles who had escaped from their countries found death in Chile (Steenland, 1974, 19). The fact is that in seventeen years of A.A.F.F. ruling accord-
ing to 'Verdad y Reconciliación' were killed 114 foreigners including several with a double nationality, Chilean and foreign.

Among the many papers and books reviewed, it seems that Kyle Steenland is the scholar who exaggerated the deaths product of the coup most heavily. His apocalyptic portrait of the days after the A.A.F.F. coup, proves to be now so far from reality that it is very hard to understand how he could arrive at those figures.

His account of several regiments that rebelled, among them the Buin, infantry regiment in San Felipe and indications of rebellions in Concepción and Valdivia, and in the school of Lower-Ranking Police officers, suggests the existence of a large number of left wing personnel who the A.A.F.F. summarily executed. Citing the head officer of 'Prensa Latina', he stated that 28 officers and 180 lower-ranking officers were killed in the Buin regiment alone. 'Commission Verdad and Reconciliación' only cites eighteen casualties among A.A.F.F. personnel due to disobeying orders, plotting, or killing an officer in command.

It is rather peculiar how these figures were accepted in the most diverse journals, not only the ones related with social sciences but economics too. The Economist Intelligence Unit in its Country Profile of Chile stated in 1987-1988 that 'perhaps' 15,000 people have been killed and at least 10,000 political refugees have left the country (The Economist, 1987-1988, 3). This fact prove the persuasiveness, and the extension of the myths in relation to casualties provoked by the A.A.F.F. government in Chile.

The sheer number of the scholarly papers claiming tens of thousands of deaths, makes it impossible to cite all of them, so the ones that are presented here are mere examples of an almost universal, subjective, and hardly scientific trend.
Scientists were unable to understand the dimension of this problem, even when there were enough information to prove that the previous one was misleading. Later Amnesty's reports did not recognize that they provided inflated figures in their earlier ones.

Some Chilean scholars provided information more in line with reality as A. Varas in 1987, when he asserted the existence of 569 missing prisoners, and an unknown quantity of deaths (Varas, 1987, 190), these figures are far away from the norm and nearer reality, specially when compared to those of foreign scholars.

Chilean deaths were not distant from the average in L.A. political violence. Nordlinger provided a classification of twenty L.A. countries according to the level of A.A.F.F. intervention between 1951 and 1965, and deaths in domestic political clashes. The yearly average of people killed in countries with civilian governments were 71, when the A.A.F.F. played a moderator role 84, and 122 when they controlled the government (Nordlinger, 1977, 198). It is evident that the Chilean A.A.F.F. hold the average when including the first year, that—according to them—was a war, and definitely below the average of civilian governments in L.A. if excluding the first year.

The initial mistaken appreciation of the deaths by Amnesty International was not amended in the following reports and the biased action of the U.N., damage the prestige of these two important and influential institutions. At the same time they produced a deteriorating image of a A.A.F.F. government, no matter what were its degree of legitimacy or popular support but, as with any other government they had the right of a fair treatment from respected world wide institutions.
From the literature reviewed, it seems that the ability of scholars to understand the meaning of logistic problems that arise from their assertions, appears to be very low. Duff and McCamant stated that the A.A.F.F. rounded up hundreds of thousands of left wing supporters, executing many on the spot, and filling two huge stadiums in Santiago with detainees. They state that nobody knows the extent of the bloodshed, but educated guesses range from ten to thirty thousand dead (Duff & McCamant, 1976, 189). The Chilean Catholic Church produced an estimate of 40,000 to 50,000 detainees during the first days of the coup and not hundreds of thousands. To control, to feed, to keep in good health, to process the information about such amount of prisoners, to bury the corpses of the deaths demanded an extensive load of work that no scholar who produced these figures stopped to think about the possibility of being wrong.

Economy under Argentinian and Chilean A.A.F.F. Government

To measure economic development is a hard task, and conclusions are related, specially in times of political strife, with the need to show 'enemies' incompetence, and by contrast, the spectacular growth under new management (Randall, 1976, 137). Randall's assertion related with Argentina is worth consideration when dealing with the evaluation of the evolving economies in L.A. countries.

Besides taking into consideration the existence of politically biased research when evaluating the economic evolution of this sector, we have highlighted some aspects that are important in producing judgements about economic progress or backwardness related to Argentina and Chile.
According to Ffrench-Davis, one of the most documented sources of economic instability in less developed countries is their dependency on one or two raw materials for export, with highly unstable prices. This applies not only to small, less developed countries, but to the large L.A. countries as well, which depended in the fifties and sixties on one basic commodity which generated more than 50% of exports (Ffrench-Davis, 1982, 91). The reduction of this dependency will be taken in this work as a favourable element when evaluating the evolution of economy under the A.A.F.F. regimes of Chile and Argentina.

Another factor which has attracted attention from researchers is the amount of external debt. During the past decade, L.A. debt increased more than seven times, although it only doubled in the 60s. The comprehension of debts dynamics requires a structure that also projects the merchandise balance, relating import requirements to product growth. The advantage of this approach related to the future, that it is more informative and helps to produce a more accurate estimate of the effects of the debt (Fishlow, 1982, 144-154).

Closely related with the previous approach is the promotion of the export industry instead of import-substitution. Countries that opted for the inward-looking strategy have had a poorer evolution than the ones that have protected infant industry by looking outward. The most successful countries in this area have been the ones closer to free trade because a free-trade regime means uniformity of incentive vis-à-vis trading opportunities assuring the attainment of high levels of export achievement (Westphal, 1982, 255-266). Export growth evolution and its relationship with external debt will be used as a key element to evaluate success or failure of Chilean and Argentinian A.A.F.F. regimes in dealing with the external debt.
Another economic issue that has been extensively used to evaluate economic development in less developed countries has been the unequal distribution of wealth. Growing with equality has been a political aim in most of L.A. countries. Some research has proved that inequality grew in early phases of transition from pre-industrial to industrial economies, and the closing of this gap has been slower than expected in a number of L.A. countries. On the contrary, levels of concentration of wealth are reaching higher levels than anticipated (Tokman, 1982, 413-423).

These previous ideas will be useful to evaluate Argentinian and Chilean economic management, at the same time some social indicators will be considered, understanding them as an investment in human resources. The technical difficulties to producing a model for this type of management evaluation goes further than the scope of this research, so a very crude measurement will be employed.

a) A.A.F.F. governments and economic success/failure

There is no doubt that most scholars devoted to study L.A. are sceptical about the ability of the A.A.F.F. regimes to produce economic development (Remmer, 1978, 40). Nevertheless, there exists some research that points to confirm their ability to produce economic development measured in growth of per capita GNP, cost of living, and exports which can be compared favourably with civilian regimes (Mckinlay & Cohan, 1976, 861-2), or at least, as they had stated previously that a sizeable percentage of A.A.F.F. and civilian regimes are alike in terms of performance (MacKinlay & Cohan, 1975, 23). Nordlinger's study discard the idea that A.A.F.F. are necessarily less successful in producing modernisation that civilian regimes (Nordlinger, 1970, 1134).

Sloan states that the authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes main characteristic is an elite response to an alleged incapability of democratic regimes to solve policy
problems. In his comparison between democratic and authoritarian regimes, he asserts that in terms of economic growth, the democratic regimes of Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela could not match the high rates of Brazil and Mexico, but performed better than Argentina and Chile. These democratic regimes were able to generate rates of economic growth without experiencing high rates of inflation, and external debts. He concludes that democratic regimes appear to be more flexible than specialised regimes, and as a consequence they are more capable of shifting priorities and achieving moderate progress towards a variety of developmental goals. Of course, they are capable of promoting impressive rates of economic growth, besides, they are able to achieve them without suffering high levels of repression characteristic of bureaucratic-authoritarian rule (Sloan, 1989, 123 onwards).

The main characteristic of some authors is to find everything that a A.A.F.F. government can do is disgraceful. Among them, Alain Rouquié is one of the most pessimistic. There are in his papers, nothing to praise in the Argentinian A.A.F.F. government under study, all actions are mistakes, robbery, violence, attacks against culture, economic and politic failure, cowardice, human right violations and so on (Rouquié, 1983, 577-586). Many of his assertions are not supported by research, and they might be supposedly mere opinion.

b) A.A.F.F. arms investment

One main criticism of A.A.F.F. governments is their high investment in arms. This is a normative consideration because supposedly this investment could produce development if allocated in production or social help.

Some studies show that military expenditure [MILEX onwards] growth rates have fallen at an average rate of -0.7 percent, and MILEX/GNP have declined from 8.0 to 4.9 percent in L.A. between 1963 and 1983. Arms imports have fallen for L.A.
from 12.8 percent in 1973-83 to a 5.5 percent in 1980-83. All of this, despite the number of A.A.F.F. governments increasing as much in L.A., as the rest of the world (Ross, 1987, 566-574)

Figures provided by Brzoska & Ohlson are interesting. Argentina in 1971-1985, was the main importer of major weapons in South America. Defeat in the Malvinas/Falkland war had as a consequence the need to replace weaponry lost in battle, increasing the investment heavily. Chile was located in sixth place behind Perú, Brazil, Venezuela and Cuba. Chile has maintained her expenditure under control in a somewhat high level (Brzoska & Ohlson, 1987, 30).

In another table, these authors ranked the countries in a scale of percentage of total imports of weapons among Third World countries in 1971-75. Argentina with 2.3% ranked 12th, Chile with 1.3 ranked 20th. In 1976-80, being both countries under A.A.F.F. rule; Argentina's expenses fall down to 21st place with an 1.6 per cent, and Chile has disappeared from the list of top 25 major importers since then. Argentina in the following two periods 81-85 with a 3.6, and 71-85 with a 2.5 per cent scores highly, in the former they ranked 7th and in the latter 10th into the top 25th importers of arms (Brzoska & Ohlson, 1987, 7).

Tables of imports for major weapons by the Third World, for 1951-70 [millions of USA $, constant prices 1985] show clearly the civilian governments inability to design a constant and balanced budget for their armies weaponry in South America. For extended periods, many countries appear with zero, or very low investment, and then invest heavily in some years, e.g., Chile in 1951 invested 279 U.S millions, and only two in 1957; 244 US millions in 1960 and two in 1968. Exactly the same happened with Argentina, in 1951 the imports of major weapons were 348 US millions, and only three in 1954 (Brzoska and Ohlson, 1987, 332-333).
It seems evident that civilian governments were unable to produce a long term defence investment policy, and there is no doubt that A.A.F.F. necessarily must have resented this lack of interests from civilian governments. It is evident too that A.A.F.F., at least in Chile and Argentina, were not the main budget beneficiaries in their countries and did not spend so much hard currency in importing weapons in 50-60 and 60-70 decades, accumulating a deficit in this field.

Chile was in a very difficult position between 1970 to 1985. Their two most important neighbours, Argentina and Perú were heavily investing in arms. The former invested 7,215 millions, and Perú 5,432 at US$ 1985 constant prices. With both countries, Chile has had frontier disputes. It seems that scholars when researching on political, economical or social matters tend to forget that A.A.F.F. are professionally concerned with equilibrium of power and their demands of funding are related with demands and satisfaction of them among neighbour's armies needs.

c) A.A.F.F. and economy in Argentina

Argentinian economic diagnoses at the beginning of the 'Proceso' had many general aspects common to Chile and other South American governments. The existent system included sectorial and private business protection, with complex and contradictory regulations. These included a strong load of statism and excess of regulations, as the state invaded the private sector. Expanded public expenses without a due increase in state income, produced a deficit in the national budget that required currency emission to solve payments problems without any correlation with product increase.

The enclosed Argentinian economy produced, as a consequence, an isolation from technological and production innovation into the economic system. From 1945
onwards the main Argentinian aim was to become an autarchic country by means of intensifying industrialisation to substitute imports by local production, without taking into consideration any costs. The main tools to achieve this goal were to provide foreign currency at preferential rates to import substitution industries, to prohibit the export of some commodities, and to ensure lower prices for local markets. Providing at the same time tax facilities and many other mechanisms to facilitate internal industry expansion were also required.

These economic trends lasted for more than forty years. The key concepts during this period were: foreign currency savings, import substitution, industry protection, and so on. Argentinians became the product of a culture in which any attempt to change this economic conception would meet strong resistance from all segments of the society, including the military (Martínez, 1981, 15 onwards).

As a consequence, economic policy had two main foundations: a) a subsidiary state; and b) economic liberalisation. It was suggested that the state would intervene directly only when there was not a private enterprise able or interested to perform an activity. The state would be in charge of global economic guidance by means of economic and financial policies, to promote open competition in internal and external markets, and to alleviate controls and over protection of enterprise (op cit, 30-1).

The Argentinian economic situation in 1976 was in real chaos—a high treasury deficit, a steep decrease in NGP, 900% annual inflation rate, negative figures in the balance of payment, cessation of payments of foreign debts. The Argentinian economic situation meant for a period of time, that the military government could not produce great improvements in this area.
The selection of the economic team to manage Argentinian finances included a group of strong personalities, younger than the norm, and with clear technocratic connotations. The main criticism of them was that they did not know what Argentina really was.

The first steps of Martínez de Hoz was to produce some confidence in the banking system in order to avoid their tendency to accumulate hard currency. This produced at the same time the falling of the USA dollar prices in the parallel market. In addition, Martínez knew that liberalising the exchange market was one of the first steps to achieve positive reactions. The revaluation of the official dollar permitted Argentina to produce a surplus in the trade balance.

Liberalisation was extended to many other fields, such as agriculture which increased production many times, but in Argentina these trends are short lived. The problem's magnitude was colossal, the strategy was gradualism that did not work properly. The avalanche of imported goods made a great portion of the national industry collapse, salaries were frozen, while prices skyrocketed, and the government continued their emission of currency without product increase backing.

Another key element of liberalisation continued almost without change, state enterprises were not privatised, or at least not to a perceptible amount. The inflated number of public servants were reduced only by 20%, this being a small number according to grand totals. The worst enemy of this policy was a predominant statist mind, not even among the military in charge of the large state enterprises was personnel reduction respected.

The banking system collapsed during this period, due to lack of control from the Central Bank, and from a free and high fluctuation interest rate above real mar-
ket value. Banks were not worried to borrow money at high interest, and to lend it still higher, because the state guaranteed savings from bankruptcy (Jordán, 1993, 183 onwards).

After General Videla ended his mandate [1980], the political economy lost its homogeneity and became chaotic, reflecting existent political instability and military factionalism. Viola's new economic team was headed by Lorenzo Sigaut who started to dismantle Martínez de Hoz's policies (Epstein, 1987, 999).

In one field, the Argentinian military government was successful; their economic pragmatism led them, despite of its notorious anti-communism, to maintain commercial links created by Perón to provide the Soviet Union grain and beef. These links provided the Argentinians, with a huge market for their products and some good political dividends; the Soviet Union, and Cuba minimised propaganda against Argentinian A.A.F.F. regime, and secured their votes against motions condemning repression in Argentina in September 1978. The attitude of these countries under the influence of the Soviet Union, contrasted sharply with their attitude towards General Pinochet in Chile (Collier, 1981, 480)

d) A.A.F.F. and economy in Chile

The economic policy of the A.A.F.F. in Chile was provided by several well known Chilean economists, most of them linked to the Chicago School of Economics, who were worried by the country's poor evolution during this century. Their diagnoses pointed to the main problems of the Chilean economy during the last three or four decades: low development, uncontrolled statism, scarcity of productive employment, inflation, agricultural backwardness, and high poverty levels.
These problems had provoked some undesirable consequences: a deficient allocation of productive resources, limited export development, low rate of productive resources development, undue powerful groups influence, fiscal deficit, frequent changes of economic policies, abuse of political power, deficit in the production of food, and others.

They concluded that as a consequence of this discouraging set of problems citizens had moved constantly in the political spectrum, from right to left and from left to right in the last thirty years. Statism placed an enormous power in the hands of politicians and state officers, leaving them to interfere in economic life without any counterweight. These groups linked the excessive politicisation of Chilean society with the influence of the state that pervaded most aspects of national life (Centro Estudios Públicos, 1992, 27 onwards).

This diagnosis of the Chilean situation and corresponding proposals were the starting point for the deepest changes in Chilean economic and social life. Their proposals were against all that Chileans had known, up to the moment, to govern and develop the country. The positive side and support to these controversial ideas was that all the rest had failed once and again. The difficulties of this task were evident, it is hard to find a change of this magnitude in many countries. This evolution was paved with failures, hardship, and finally, success. It was a hard period for a great number of Chileans, specially the humbler ones. The democratic government that rules Chile now, despite the strong criticism when in opposition, has followed that economic model in more substantial aspects.

If in relationship to Human Rights it is possible to find enormous biases at national and international grounds, exactly the same happened with economic development at the beginning. Many papers published during the first years of the
A.A.F.F. government, pointed to an economic débâcle that affected mostly the humbler sectors of the Chilean society.

Lagos & Rufatt produced one of these pieces of analysis related to real wages. Their main assumption was that a real loss of income, and well being were the product of A.A.F.F. regime. This comparison of income among final months of Unidad Popular government [UP] and October 1974 is clearly favourable to the former. According to their data, mid 1973 unemployment was 3 or 4 percent of the labour force, and the aims of the UP were a redistributive policy in order to favour the lowest income sector. The authors concluded that families in the lower income levels lost 75 per cent of their purchasing power compared with the last eight months of UP government; they cited two other studies with similar results (Lagos & Ruffaut, 1975, 140 onwards).

It seems that the scientists in the field of economics are more sensitive in the management of data than sociologists and political scientists, for there soon appeared two papers evaluating the data and conclusions of Lagos-Rufatt's. J Ramos agreed that real wages have declined since A.A.F.F. 'pronunciamiento', but he adds that the Lagos-Rufatt paper overdoes it. In addition, he criticised the Board of Editors of L.A. Research Review for not being cool and dispassionate, taking seriously conclusions and data provided (Ramos, 1977, 173 onwards). Lagos-Rufatt counter-attacked, accusing Ramos of misreading the paper, or not reading it at all, denying Ramos' accusation of being politically inspired sensationalists (Lagos & Rufatt, 1977, 180-81). The public argument between Ramos and Lagos/Ruffat proves that economists are more critical when evaluating the merits of research than other social scientists.
Meller, Cortázar, & Marshall's paper related to the evolution of employment 1974-1978, in which they argue that the labour force's growth had decreased from 2.0 in 1960-1970 to 0.9 in 1974-1978, and they point out several deficiencies of studies done by the University of Chile which produced better results (Meller et al, 1981, 146 onwards). Their conclusions seem correct according to public opinion on unemployment.

The main problem related to analyses such as Lagos-Ruffaut's, and Meller's et al, is they do not discuss the core problem. This was the fact that Allende's government create an artificial world in which improvement of poorest segments of society was related to emission of money [without any relation with increase in productivity], to use all latent productive capacity and great amount of stocks, and a large amount of foreign currency in the Central Bank (Arriagada, 1974, 171). In addition there existed a highly artificial employment in public services. They also intervened in or expropriated enterprises, and prices were artificially kept down. Moreover, the black market made any comparison using current prices senseless. All these elements made it possible to produce highly positive comparisons with Allende's government. At the same time, they were unable to sustain a healthy economy. According to Arriagada, the only aspect of Allende's policies, in which consensus exists, was his unfortunate economic policy (Arriagada, 1974, 102).

The dark omens of scholars were countless, Varas citing Bitar, stated than in 1987 the industrial production and per capita product fell down to 1972 levels, unemployment rose six fold, investment rate decreased to levels known several decades ago, social investment was lower than in 1970, and production had fallen to 14% in 1982, and in 4% in 1983. He concluded that due to the exaggerated managerial freedom, uncontrolled and antidemocratic management of the 'res publica', the Chilean
economy would need decades to recover the levels it had before Pinochet arrived to power (Varas, 1987, 155-157).

Former President Frei recognised the economic damage to Chile under Allende's regime: uncontrolled inflation, valueless currency, black market, falling production in all sectors of economy; in sum economic chaos (Frei, 1974, 16). These are facts that almost all analysts of Chilean economic development under Pinochet's rule forgot or hide, in their attempts to present this regime as a failure in the economic field.

The depth of Allende's failure was covered with a mythology of external and internal boycotts. Facts—according to Frei—were: among exports only copper presented minor problems, France embargoed a ship load worth two million dollars, and released it soon afterwards. Imports from Europe, and USA, were not disrupted, international credits continued being available, and the Club of Paris accepted a favourable agreement. In this sense, their relationship with the International Monetary Found were more than satisfactory.

The only investments that decreased during Allende's period was that of the USA, but it would be simple minded to plan an attack against its influence and properties of American citizens and enterprises, and to plan development with their help. Christian Democrats were blamed for internal boycott. Frei denied this accusation and emphasised his party's support for Allende in Parliament, meanwhile they were convinced of the constitutionality of his work. After they were persuaded that Allende's road to socialism was against the Constitution, support was retired (Frei, 1974, 17 onwards).
The economic, and social debacle was of such depth that any analysis of the Chilean advances or failures after Allende should include that starting point. As an example of problems produced by Allende's social property sector, can be cited that their expenditure exceeded income by 32.8% in 1972, and nearly 44% in 1973. Foxley et al, cited by Thorp, point out that borrowing from the government to finance this sector rose from 13% of the total money supply in December 1970 to 60% in March 1973. Foxley stated that during 1973 about 90% of the currency increase went to finance the public sector deficit, due mainly to nationalised industries, increasing severely the inflation process (Thorp & Whitehead, 1979, 81).

Agriculture development under Pinochet's regime has been scrutinised in common as well almost every other field related with Chilean economy. Using diverse sources, scholars have declared its failure. Cristóbal Kay, one of them, declares that for the period 1973-1983, the average growth in this area was 1.8%, equivalent to the population growth. The production of wheat was in 1976 half of the production of 1971 under Allende's government, and only comparable with the average of crops in the 1920s, when Chile had 60% of the population. Kay's belief was that strict application of a monetarist model could only intensify the production crisis for the internal market. The diminishing of credits for agriculture and its real market interest rates, did not let farmers finance and use modern inputs. As a result, a technological involution due to the diminishing use of fertilisers and pesticides, lowered yields in some crops (Kay, 1985, 317).

Maybe, one of the most interesting conclusions on this field were Horowitz's; he in spite of not being an admirer of A.A.F.F., recognised the possibility of development without democracy, and pointed to Chile as an example. Notwithstanding, the loud criticism of its enemies, the A.A.F.F. had reduced inflation, and absenteeism
and its industrial output was impressive. That according to him, does not mean the existence of a redistribution of power or property (Horowitz, 1981, 39-40).

The A.A.F.F. independence from any other particular class allows them to inform middle sectors of their responsibilities if they expect to keep their rights. Middle sectors had to pay taxes, invest, sharing equitably, and creating a new socio-political environment. According to Horowitz, this position goes away from orthodox Marxism, that is not denying the importance of the economic factor, but rather asserting the existence of an uneven equilibrium between A.A.F.F. and political economic forces (Horowitz, 1981, 43).

Biases of research reviewed

In the roots of scientific research, especially in social sciences, lie the use of an emotionally free language, objectivity and impartiality, even when most scholars seem to accept Weber's ideas related with the link existing between statements of ideals, and evaluations in social sciences, and to be cautious to avoid confusions among both. This acceptance does not seem not to be acknowledged when investigating on the military field—at least not in relationship with Argentinian and Chilean A.A.F.F. Besides, scholarly work requires that in such cases it is necessary to make clear to the readers and to oneself, at which point the scientific researcher gives way to the evaluator, making explicitly clear when the arguments are addressed to analytical understanding, or when referring to feelings (Weber, 1968, 60).

Too many of the bibliographies reviewed for this research have forgotten scientific research and emphasized feelings. Evidently there is an abuse of plain emotional language, concealed as scientific, and the only loser in this game has been objectivity and social sciences. It is out of the question that maturity reached by so-
cial sciences in many fields, is put aside when research is related to the A.A.F.F. as rulers, especially when referring to the Argentinian and Chilean A.A.F.F. Governments.

A good example of how emotional and evaluative matters are mixed with supposedly objective and scientific purposes are the assertions stated in some academic journals. Sometimes the papers' title sounds quite academic, e.g., "Theoretical Issues of the Chilean Experience", written by an Assistant Professor of the University of California, Los Angeles. She started placing the difficulties for a comprehensive Chilean situation theoretical analysis, and adds that the overwhelming scope and brutality of the counterrevolution requires the organisation of a campaign against the A.A.F.F. regime (Chinchilla, 1974, 3). We can only conclude that pamphlets are something quite different from academic journals but, frequently they are produced at universities, by lecturers, and undoubtedly used for students to develop their own theoretical frameworks.

There is no hesitation on the part of scholars to deny the results of polls when they do not agree with their sentiments or bias. Sanders stated, in relationship to a Gallup poll held in January and June 1975 that revealed a favourable attitude towards the Chilean Junta, that it was possible and legitimate to doubt whether the Chileans would give their real opinions due to the climate of fear (Sanders, 1975, 306). It is hard to conceive of a poll whose instruments are designed to measure opinion, which do not have items to balance all kind of bias. Too frequently, we find strong acceptance from scholars when polls confirm their arguments, and denial or rejection when they disagree with them.

To describe A.A.F.F. governments, some scholars use impressionist sources as if they were based on thoughtful and deeply documented research, as K. F.
Johnson does in regard to Chile, when he evaluated the plebiscite of September 1980 to accept a new constitution, and compared it with the results of Uruguay in which the A.A.F.F. government was defeated. The first one was reported by him as a fraud, and in the latter the Uruguayans voters got a honest vote count and defeated the A.A.F.F. (Johnson, 1982, 195). As a conclusion, always when A.A.F.F. are defeated the count of votes are honest, when they win it is forged.

Conclusions

The scholarly literature related to both countries present a peculiar characteristic: Chile doubled at least the Argentinian one. Eduardo Frei, former President of Chile explains persuasively this phenomena. Cuba was losing its revolutionary appeal and influence in the continent, guerrillas and 'focos' had proven a failure and did not have popular support. This is one of the main reasons why the election of Allende was of great importance for the Cuban Revolution and left wing movements. The social problems of the hemisphere were a good ground for the development and success of Marxism-Leninism in L.A.

Another element pointed out by some analysts is the strategic position of Chile over the Pacific and Antarctic, the former as the sea for the future, and the latter being a rich continent. The failure of Chilean's left wing experience, and the loss of this strategic position, was a severe defeat for the prospective influence of the combination Cuba-Chile. This was not the falling down of a common regime, as is usual in L.A., it meant something wider than a A.A.F.F. coup (Frei, 1974, 11-12).

One of the most interesting differences in the way that scholars and international institutions perceived the problem of Human Rights in Chile and Argentina is its origin. In the latter, the victims were the product of the interest of A.A.F.F. gov-
ernment in crushing the guerrillas completely (Needler, 1980, 620). This permitted scholars to use a different and milder language, 'repression' instead of 'ferocious', or 'sanguinary' in the case of the latter, discarding the fact that in Chile the SP, MIR, and other supporters of the UP Government had weapons and had used them in many opportunities before the A.A.F.F. 'pronunciamiento'.

Argentinian discourse was against guerrillas, Chilean against the refusal to accept Marxism; it meant a difference. Many of the international organisations have an important and influential segment that defend left wing ideas and perceive as an enemy anyone who attacks governments guided by similar ideologies.

Evidence always existed that Allende's followers propitiated violence. The SP in their XXI and XXII General Conferences discarded by unanimity any political aim, and stated that revolutionary violence was unavoidable and legitimate. Many other 'Unidad Popular' political parties shared these principles, and when the pacific road to Socialism failed, they used violence from the government (Arriagada, 1974, 73 onwards)

Most of the emotive reaction of politicians and scholars does not take into account, in their evaluations, that L.A. countries are prone to political violence. This means that the reaction of scholars, press and international organisms is loaded with emotionality and unable to take into consideration this 'normal political situation' in a A.A.F.F. government. From this perspective, the Chilean government did not deserve completely all the attacks it received up to the present, because it went slightly further than 'normality' in L.A.

The number of casualties produced in Argentina is well above the L.A. mean. Political victims for the A.A.F.F. rulers according to the average estimated by
Needler, is evidently higher than in the Chilean A.A.F.F. government of Pinochet. It is noticeable that Argentina never receives the same attention of the U.N., the O.E.A. and other non governmental offices as Chile. In this sense, Amnesty International might be an exception, for it was equally worried about the situation of Human Rights in both countries.

It is interesting to notice that the Chilean investigation was concerned with a situation not considered as, and not of itself, a violation of human rights. Nor was it to condemn the Chilean government just for acquiring power through a A.A.F.F. coup. It was therefore a concern brought about by humanitarian concern (Zuijdijk, 1982, 304). The relations between U.N. and the Commission on Human Rights and the Chilean A.A.F.F. government was far from being smooth, the main reason was the Chilean government's belief that the treatment was discriminatory, no matter that it seem to have had support (see Donnelly 1988). At the last moment, the government refused to permit the access of the 'ad hoc' working group in 1975 and maintained its denial until 1978, when the group got into Chile and carried out interviews and visited places of detention. At last, in 1978 it reported to the General Assembly that the Chilean human rights situation had improved since 1973; no new prisoners were held and no new disappearances had been reported. Nevertheless, there was reference to persistent arrests for political reasons, and allegations of torture, while the Commission was given the names of 600 missing persons (Zuijdijk, 1982, 311 onwards). These improvements, are very seldom mentioned by scholars when writing about Chile from 1973-1990.

The positive sides of A.A.F.F. government, as stated by Nordlinger, are the opportunity to mitigate some sores of the body politics: corruption, exaggerated partisanship, turmoil and inordinately coercive rule. Sometimes the praetorians have diminished the power of traditional oligarchies, but only this later kind of
change has certain permanency (Nordlinger, 1977 205). The case of Chile escapes this general description, the changes introduced in Chilean society are of a permanent kind, and the democratic government has continued many of the policies of the A.A.F.F., especially in the economic field.

It is evident that most scholars when analysing the case of Chile and Argentina were not worried at all when evaluating the motivation of the A.A.F.F. and do not go beyond their interpretations which include the actor's self perceptions (Nordlinger, 1977, 195).

Chile's case should be used as a major precedent for an expansion of public monitoring activities; the very features that have made singling out Chile so unfair might be used as a precedent for scrutinising the practices of dozens of countries (Donnelly, 1988, 297). Donnelly's assertions related to the U.N. might be extrapolated to social scientists in their research. They would make them think about their sources and ability to detect their own and their sources bias, taking into account that this problem is less a matter of incorrect information being spread than other information being ignored or suppressed (Donnelly, 1988, 300).

"Finally, to ratify statements made at the beginning, the need for objectivity in dealing with the problem at hand must be appreciated in order to avoid presenting a drama in which A.A.F.F. intervention is always the villain and the civilian government the suffering hero who deserves to triumph in the end. Both should be seen as parts of a historical-social process involving the whole society" (Beltrán, 1968, 337-41)

It seems clear and proven that no international human rights institutions nor scholars have read Virgilio Rafael Beltrán words quoted above. There is no doubt while Beltran's words remain ignored many institutions and social scientists will continue misinterpreting military governments.


7. Chilean Army; *El Ejército. La verdad y la Reconciliación*, Documento el país, Santiago, Chile March 28th 1991.


10. Comisión Chilena de Derechos Humanos / Centro Ideas; *Síntesis del Informe de la Comisión Verdad y Reconciliación*, Eds. M. Bugueño; A. Castillo; A. Delpiano; F. Valverde, Santiago, Chile, 1991


29. Martínez B. Jorge (Admiral); *Posición de la Armada ante el Informe de la Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación*, Documento el país, Santiago, Chile March 28th 1991.


42. Rouquié, Alain; "Argentina: The Departure of the Military—End of a Political Cycle or Just Another Episode" International Affairs, Vol. 59, No4, 1983.


Chapter V

Argentinian and Chilean Primary and Secondary Education Under A.A.F.F. Regimes

Limitations of this chapter

The limitations of this chapter, and the following ones will be set up will be set up by the concept of educational policy adopted and sources reviewed. Besides, it will be required to have in mind the profile of the Argentinian and Chilean military provided in previous chapters, their values, and the social and economic circumstances in which they developed their educational policies.

The concept of educational policy is based on the idea of policy as the major aims, publicly stated by those in power, their political thinking, acting, and laws that they passed. Zanotti limits the field in the study of educational policy as follows:

'is the discipline in the field of educational research, or in political sciences; which analyzes, study, and produce a systematic arrangement of political phenomena, related directly with education, and specially those of the formal education and school systems... These leave outside—with the purpose to obtain conceptual precision—all factual processes of educational and political character' (Zanotti, 1991, 199).

Taking this concept as a starting point, in this chapter we will study the ideas of the rulers through their speeches—when available—the underlying philosophy, their political acts as laws and decrees passed, goals they pretended to achieve by means of these political tools, and especially their relationship—in agreement with our theoretical framework—with the set of A.A.F.F. values stated in
our previous chapter. Examples will be provided but only with the purpose of making clear some aspects of the discussion.

The underlying philosophy

a) Argentina

Both A.A.F.F. governments had: a clear and distinctive philosophy, strongly based on Christian and Western values; a deep concern related to social, political, economic, and moral values that are weakened; feelings of a deep crisis, a dominant demagoguery and subversion, and a sense of frustration, which the political body was unable to solve.

This concern was clearly evident in several seminal documents, which became both the government's action axis, and a central focus to justify political and social change. The Argentinian government founded their policies on Proceso de Reorganización Nacional: Propósitos y Objetivos Básicos (Junta Militar, Argentina (a) 1976) [P.R.N. onwards], March 24th 1976 [National Reorganization Process: Aims and Basic Objectives], and Estatuto: Normas Fundamentales a que se Ajustará el Gobierno de la Nación (Junta Militar, Argentina (b) 1976,), March 31st 1976 [Statute for National Reorganization Process].

The Argentinian P.R.N. 'Purpose' stated clearly the need to restore essential values in government activities, highlighting the need for morality, ability, and efficiency in nation building, it sought to eradicate guerrilla activity and to promote economic development founded on an equal and widespread participation, in order to rebuild a republican, representative, and federal democracy.
P.R.N. basic objectives stated the need to: 1. Rebuild political sovereignty, and to place national interest above sectarianism or personalism. 2. To restore Christian morality values, national tradition, and Argentinian dignity. 3. To reinforce National Security, eradicating guerrilla roots. 4. To restore social and legal order. 5. To develop an economic system able to consolidate national power decision, in which the state would keep under control vital areas related to security and development. To facilitate private initiative, and to open up to national and foreign capital opportunities to participate in rational resources exploitation, avoiding at the same time any chance to interfere with government decisions. 6. To promote the common good by means of fruitful work, equal opportunities, and adequate social justice. 7. To create a good relationship among state, capital, and labour. 8. To create an educational system in agreement with the nation's needs, truly useful to national objectives, able to reinforce values, and the cultural aims of the Argentinian soul. 9. To place Argentina into a Christian Western world, reinforcing and strengthening Argentinian presence among nations, without damaging self determination (Junta Militar, Argentina, (a)1976, 93-4).

The values and aims of the Argentinian Armed Forces government are evident in P.R.N. They are related to the government operational regulations to achieve stated basic objectives; the well known tripartite government style is evident in this document, in which each branch had equal representation in the 'Comisión de Asesoramiento Legislativo' [Legislative Counselling Committee], and in most positions controlled by the government (Junta Militar, Argentina, (b) 1976, 101 onwards). This government style, helped to achieve the cohesion of armed forces and government, but at the same time made legislation, and power decision, extremely slow and out of timing.
b) Chile

Chilean Declaración de Principios del Gobierno de Chile [Chilean Government Declaration of Principles] D.P.G.Ch. onwards, did not appear until several months after the Armed Forces 'Pronunciamiento', this fact makes evident a noticeable difference between Argentinian and Chilean experience. Argentinian Armed Forces have ruled the country for extended periods since 1930, in fact longer periods than civilian governments. They were more experienced, and had well known patterns of action, so they could avoid the trial and error system. Chilean Armed Forces, on the contrary, had almost half a century without any serious political participation. Therefore as an institution they lacked a clear pattern to rule the country, and they had to create one.

This fact was confirmed in their first statements. They did not pretend to be in power for a long time, and their main aim was to provide a proper climate to return to democracy, as Pinochet stated on September 21st, 1973, to an international press meeting at Military School (Pinochet, 1991, 28-31). The depth of Chile's political and social chaos, however, made armed forces reconsider their position of returning to democracy in the near future. The decision was taken afterwards, and this is supposed to be the reason why they delayed formulating their objectives. Only after six months did they made public D.P.G.Ch. At that moment, the Chilean Armed Forces were completely certain Chile needed to rebuild its political and social structure.

The most important Chilean documents besides the Declaración de Principios del Gobierno de Chile D.P.G.Ch., March 11th 1974; are the Objetivo Nacional y Políticas Generales del Gobierno de Chile [O.N.m onwards], December 23rd 1975, [National Objective and Chilean Government General Policies]; the Estrategia Nacional de Desarrollo Regional 1975-1990 [E.N.D.R. onwards], [National Strategy for Regions
Development]; and Estrategia Nacional de Desarrollo Económico y Social: Políticas de Largo Plazo [E.N.D.E.S onwards], [Long Range National Social and Economic Development Strategy]. Most political decisions, as much in Argentina as in Chile, are explicitly related to these documents.

D.P.G.Ch. stated clearly the inexistence of an end date for Armed Forces government, because the task to rebuild morality, institutionality, and the economy demanded an extended period of time. The A.A.F,F. aim was to open a new stage in national destiny, it first required, the creation of new Chilean generations trained in an improved civic values school. Political power should be—at the proper moment—handed to whom so ever the people elected by means of a free, secret, and well informed election system.

The main ideas were similar to Argentina's statement, even though the style was quite different; the former was a list of items, the latter as a piece of good prose. A Christian conception of man is the foundation of both, and the Chilean government stated it quite clearly "Let us make man in our image, in our likeness" [Genesis, 1,26]; therefore he participates in some way of his creator's nature, becoming the foundations of mankind's dignity, and as a consequence: 1. Man's natural rights are above state's, the latter must recognize and regulate them, the state was not giving them graciously. Therefore, it would never be able to deny them. 2. The state should be at man's service, not otherwise, because society or state are only accidental social relationships, man on the contrary is a transcendent being. 3. The state's aim is the common good, understood as 'all social conditions that permit to every Chilean full self achievement'. 4. The Common good demanded respect for the subsidiarity principle because it is the origin of a truly free society, and it meant to accept rights of private property, and free economic initiative (Junta Gobierno, Chile, (a) 1974, II).
The Chilean A.A.F.F. government's main objectives were: 1. To transform Chile into a great nation. 2. To achieve previous objectives a national planning system and a national project should be designed. 3. to create an impersonal, just, authoritarian government. 4. To promote nationalistic style and values founded in a) equality and justice before law, b) to restore work dignity, c) to develop merit and personal effort morality, d) to emphasize ruler's austerity and soberness, e) to abolish political partisanship in public administration.

c) Coincidences in Argentinian and Chilean philosophy

There existed evident coincidences within both A.A.F.F. governments in relation to Christian principles and nation building aims; these characteristics provide them with a definite government style. In Chile's case, there developed a series of complementary documents refining, and making precise political and social aims, providing at the same time elements to process evaluation. In which evidently did not exist coincidence was in the timing of documents; Argentinian's ones were public knowledge within a week, Chileans were scattered along several years, all of them were revisited, corrected, enlarged, evaluated and were able to portrait a clear developmental profile.

An open question arising from both government's documents is: Why two Armed Force governments, strongly rooted in Christian values, could perform, and be accused of severe human rights violations. President Videla stated "for us human rights respect was not born by law mandate or international covenants, on the contrary it is a product of our Christian and deep conception of human dignity as a fundamental value" (Videla, 1977, 10). Some possible answers are: 1. They faced strong guerrilla movements; Argentinians before the 'Pronunciamiento', Chileans afterwards it. 2. Guerrilla movements declared publicly a war against both governments,
and their reaction was proper of armed forces everywhere in a declared or not state of war.

In these documents were the seed of what the people could expect at that moment, from both A.A.F.F. governments. They were made public by the free will of rulers as a commitment to their own country and people. Evaluation related to success or failure of both A.A.F.F. government has been normally related to the political commitment or bias of the evaluators, instead of using A.A.F.F. governments goals and achievements to evaluate their political activities.

Development strategies

Argentina and Chile have suffered throughout their history a common phenomenon—centralism. It has affected both nations' development, because all activities and political decisions are centred in the capital cities. Both countries have some few other important development poles, but as a general rule, Buenos Aires and Santiago have grown up debilitating the rest of the country. As a consequence, both countries present structural weaknesses.

a) Argentina

Argentina's centralism, territorial size, open frontiers in the north and south, territorial disputes with United Kingdom and Chile, the existence of large numbers of foreigners established on the borders and hinterland, produce amongst Argentinian's a strong sensitivity related with their ability to defend or increase their territorial patrimony. President Videla stated this problem, 'provincial governments suffered political, administrative, and economic disorganization, were suffering national government improvisation, and a dominating centralism mocked
the federal system' (Videla, 1977, 32). Therefore, Armed Forces' general planning included devices to reinforce hinterland, frontiers, and to ensure cultural, and economic strengthening.

b) Chile

Chile's centralism has weakened a country in which only the central part is properly inhabited and both extremes of South and North have a scattered population. Most economic activity was concentrated in the capital, especially industry, commerce and finances. Social services were distributed unevenly through the country and the quality of life was better in Santiago than in the rest of Chile. (Odeplan, 1978, 24-5). In the far south there were not even roads to link Chilean towns and villages with the rest of the country, making them dependent on Argentinian roads, commerce, and cultural influence.

c) Common characteristics

These common characteristics led both A.A.F.F. governments to reinforce cultural links, to develop industries, and communications with those sensitive places. The Argentinian government by means of reinforcing federalism, Chilean by strengthening regionalization. Both attempted to diminish decision powers located at capitals. Unfortunately, to move power decision out of capitals means to face the opposition of affected bureaucracies, not only because they lose influence, but at the same time it means unemployment and restlessness for them. The opposition use this dissatisfaction to promote protests against the government.
General background

a) Argentina

The main foundations of the Argentinian educational policy were P.R.N. articles 2.2 and 2.8. The former reasserted the 'validity of Christian moral values, national tradition, and the dignity of Argentinian being', the latter stated the necessity to design an educational system in agreement with Argentinian needs, useful to achieve the nation's objectives, and able to consolidate cultural values and aims of Argentinian being' (Junta Militar, Argentina (a)1976, 93-4).

President Videla's view was: that Argentinian education had been the subject of improvisation, waste of economic and human resources, and sectarianism from diverse ideological groups (Videla. 1977, 33). The main tasks in this area should be the institutional re-ordering of education, taking into due account the reality of the country's culture and socio-economy (op. cit. 39).

Education played an important role related to national security, social, political, and economic changes. Implicit in Argentinian P.R.N. education, was the importance of enhancing human capital to develop the government's aims. Over time, Argentinian Education Ministers reiterated these ideas. The first, Education Minister of the Argentinian A.A.F.F. government, diagnosed and emphasized several Argentinian education weaknesses, among them the need to recover a set of values, because, up to that moment, youths had 'lost not only their main academic aims, but also their sense of destiny and belonging to the nation' (Bruera, (a) 1976, 3). The Minister's mission was to accomplish the purposes and objectives of the National government, among them the need to re-integrate Argentinian schools in the national sense of belonging and duty. From an administrative point of view, two main and urgent tasks should be developed; they had been attempted unsuccessfully in the past,
but they would be promoted again. These were decentralization, and des-bureaucratization, therefore a new educational administration and management style were required (Ibid. p. 5).

It required an educational administration in which anomie had no place, in which teachers were to develop values, and to recover the role of tradition as a source of life ideals, to assume consciously a chosen destiny. The Ministry had to promote transformations needed by Argentinian education, involving teachers as a body, in which creativity, and spontaneity would be the main tools to develop a new educational system (Bruera, (b) 1976, 4 onwards).

Qualitative and quantitative problems should be recognized in Argentinian education, because the school system was paralyzed. Primary education presented a diminished level of expansion, inferior to the number of students demanding it. The drop out rate was above fifty percent in the 1st to 7th grade. To enhance a net of frontier schools to fill the cultural gap existent between Argentinian hinterland and the Metropolis, was another important aspect in the first Argentinian diagnoses of the Minister of education (Bruera, (c) 1976, 1-2).

Not only did a high level of drop outs hurt primary schools, but the disparity of achievement between the provinces and the Federal Capital did so too. Metropolitan areas had a retention rate of over 80 percent, while provinces had dropout rates above seventy percent. In addition, the physical infrastructure was badly damaged, and the existence of 'escuelas rancho' [slum schools] was a shame for Argentina. As long as Metropolitan Area dominated economical and intellectual influence, the provinces would not be able to provide education (Bruera, (d) 1976, 14).
The eternal arguments related to differences among state and private education, the latter linked to the much criticized problem of state subsidy, should be ended at once. Both systems were part of the same national policy; therefore, according to Bruera they were different forms of an identical reality (op cit, 23).

High schools were also dead locked, the decade of the fifties had given Argentina with half a million students, the sixties one million, but the seventies should enrol two million students, including demographic increases. This goal was not going to be achieved, even if registrations level were kept constant, and this had a potential effect of crippling university education, due to a shortage of high school leavers (Bruera, (c) 1976, 2).

Another educational bottle neck, according to Minister Bruera, was the inability of high school's to produce some sub-professional labour qualification, since at that moment it was limited to a common baccalaureate, not linked to labour skills. Business schools which had grown up, served only economic and service areas. Technical schools were growing up, but were directed toward industry only, agricultural and stock breeding high school training was almost non-existent. Moreover, it needed a wider variety of training, relating high school to national economy, and to the provinces' needs. The main aim was to provide high school leavers with a chance to have a more active participation in national economic development (op cit, 5).

The Argentinian high school system had to be re-focused; flexibility should be introduced to help society's evolution, and meet economic needs. This would require in the future recycling people to move them from one type of skilled work to another. That meant to develop permanent education, the main goal in any contemporary educational policy (Bruera, (c) 1976, 11).
A universal process, affecting Argentinian educational and culture systems, produced internal conflicts within society, aggravated by external ideological trends. The Argentinian education system had been criticized for being unable to mitigate them, and for severing nation historical links. The lack of a valid educational policy oriented towards clearly defined national objectives, had led to a distorting process, tending to produce a de-personalized, and fossilized education that pervaded students and teachers. A suffocating ideology attempted—within bureaucratic structures to constrain educational development (op cit, 1 onwards).

Therefore, there were three main tasks, and three ways to face them: firstly, to rearrange the school system; secondly, to design and execute a new model educational system, and; thirdly, to develop progressive transformation and improvement of educational process. Policy guidelines should serve national requirements and needs; the immediate goal should be: the restoration of order, but the search for freedom had a cost—and this was discipline. The desired pedagogy was related to hard work, morality, and responsibility (Ibidem).

To introduce order at home was another important matter from the minister's point of view. According to him, it was necessary to end Ministry centralization, a fruitful ground for bureaucracy. It produced a gigantic Argentinian bureaucratic state, which assumed all initiatives, responsibilities, and problem solving, in which only bureaucrats had decision power (Ibidem).

A successful Argentinian educational system had to be founded in two main pillars. One of them aiming to avoid an oppressing anxiety that seemed to reign in 1976 due to the failure of Peronist government and the guerrilla movement. A general mistrust due to recent past should lead to an authoritarian school which could subdue youngster's personality, this would be as undesirable, as the excessive toler-
ance that drove Argentinian school to give up proper authority. The second one was
the family unity which should become the most important educator, so family unity a
'sine quâ non' condition to the existence of an educational system to allow national
survival. So family participation should be increased (Bruera, 1977, 4).

As a summary of Minister Bruera's diagnose, the Argentinian educational
policy should be understood as a social pedagogy, in which three main aspects can be
considered, a) parents' educational responsibility, b) values pedagogy for teachers,
and c) endeavour pedagogy for students (Bruera, (f) 1976, 11).

Therefore, it is not surprising that one of the first policies implemented in
Argentina was to dismantle Ministry bureaucracy, to transfer primary education to
provinces, to assign high importance to frontier schools, to link high schools with
working life, to promote agricultural and industrial training, and to promote changes
at universities to prepare the human resources needed by Argentina's development.

b) Chile

In different wording, the Chilean government coincided completely with
Minister Bruera's statements. More explicitly, the 'Declaración de Principios del
Gobierno de Chile' [D.P.G.Ch.] stated Chile's problems should be solved by means of
an educational system able to enhance moral and spiritual values proper to Chilean
and Christian tradition, according to man's end. This education should respect edu-
cational freedom, individual conscience, by reinforcing knowledge and love for fa-
therland, its geography, history and people (Junta Gobierno, Chile, (a) 1974, 7).

In addition Chilean E.N.D.E.S. stated human resources development as one of
the 'most important element to contribute growth in a country, especially half devel-
oped and young ones, is human resources improvement. For this reason our develop-
Chilean policies followed similar patterns to the Argentinian one. The main differences were qualitative, for they transferred wider decision power to regions, with a better funding, and a clear set of priorities. The main priorities were the nursery school, primary school, then high school, and at last university training. The reasons for this difference were based on an intense and well-developed research by F. Monckeberg M.D. (Monckeberg, 1968) which related nutrition and social stimulation to the first stages of childhood. Not only government, but a large amount of the population was persuaded that the only way to provide Chilean lower income children with equal opportunities was to take care of them at nurseries.

Chilean education was facing a crisis. For many decades it was a model for many Latin American countries, and many outstanding foreign teachers went there to study at 'Escuelas Normales' to be trained as primary teachers, or were trained as high school teachers at Chilean universities. Unfortunately, the Chilean educational system was troubled in 1973 as the result of social, political, and economic life problems. Allende's minister of education, J. Tapia believed that Chilean education problems were structural because 'school system had a mean of 3.8 years per student in a country with 8 years of mandatory education. This means that education problems were not to be solved from only an educational perspective, this can be performed when the educational policy is perceived as an integral part of socio-economic national planning... A revolutionary change is needed to break down old structures' (Tapia, 1973, 18). It is evident that nobody in Chile believed that education was working properly. The most evident policy of Pinochet's government was to link intimately education to national development planning. This meant that two governments of opposite ideas coincide in the diagnosis.
The 'Objetivo Nacional' [O.N.] included education as a part of the general country's development strategy, in which it played an important role to improve human resources, to eradicate poverty, to enhance culture, and to train labour (Gobierno, Chile, 1981, C, 1;2;3;). A previous document, Plan Nacional Indicativo de Desarrollo 1978-1983 [P.N.I.D. onwards], criticized Chilean social investment as shown by 'Mapa de Extrema Pobreza' [Extreme Poverty Map]. This map proved that people living in an extreme poverty state were mostly independent workers, not included in any social security system, so they could not enjoy child benefits, minimal wages, defence against unemployment, home buying support, and subsidized high schools. In this way, were marginalized twenty percent of the population. In addition, social programs were inefficient because administration costs were disproportionate. State responsibility towards promotion of education, health, and social security was understood as something that should be carried out by the State. As a consequence of this diagnosis, the first priority was given to the educational services, to meeting the needs of low income people by means of creating schools in slums, and to diminish students failures, by providing them with food, textbooks, and re-training for teachers.

Most important was the need to take care of the population's high risk groups, meaning those weak groups who had deficient nourishment, health, and poor education; elements that could produce permanent damage. That meant that educational policy was designed to favour specific sectors of the Chilean population (ODEPLAN, 1978, 16-27).

Chilean education did not behave differently from the Argentinian policy with regard to drop-out rates, and to the uneven distribution of educational opportunities between the capital city and the provinces, specially in rural areas. Illiteracy, low achievements in rural areas, and within manual workers have been a
chronic disease in most Latin American countries. So, the Argentinian and Chilean diagnoses were very alike. By the middle of the 70s, Chile's 'Map of Extreme Poverty', showed that 43% of school children were not receiving education, and that school attendance was only 4.5 years in a country with eight years compulsory education (Matte & Sancho, 1993, 1-2).

Chilean private subsidized schools were not an issue, even Allende's socialist government offered to let them continue managing schools, and to allowed them to keep all rights and duties. To facilitate the development of the new curriculum of 'Escuela Nacional Unificada' [ENU onwards], [National Unified School] project, the State was to let private education use all resources available to state schools (Ministro Educación, Chile, 1973, 13).

Years later, most authors demanded stricter controls over school subsidies because education aimed at social benefits, and not private profit for private schools owners. They even suggested the need to provide incentives to good educational services, or a diminishing subsidy if it was not good enough (Vera, Schiefelbein, 1985, 99).

Most Chilean high schools were of the scientific-humanist type. Therefore, all their training drove students to no alternative but university, even if all of the universities could register only one third of high school leavers. Therefore, many high school leavers moving into the work market lacked proper skills. Among workers, the number of former students of scientific-humanistic high schools doubled the ones who had been trained at technical high schools. The work training of the former was empirical, since they had to acquire needed skills by in service training; this fact was directly linked to a bad distribution of educational resources.
Unfortunately, Chilean technical training has been unable to become a good and socially accepted alternative (ODEPLAN, 1978, 175).

The lack of prestige of Technical High Schools was due mostly to students who were trained in workshops with obsolete machinery at a high cost, providing abilities not related to industry development. They amounted to only one third of the high school system. Attempts were made by Pinochet's government to provide flexibility, and to adapt high school education in its different types to socio-economic needs. The styles adopted to achieve this goal were completely different. Technical high schools should be managed by a direct link with industry, and, therefore, they were handed to producers associations. They were transferred free from cost, and kept the right to perceive government subsidy.

Scientific-humanistic high schools were to change their curriculum to introduce work experience, and to produce diverse alternatives to the university by means of short complementary programs. This education should provide minimal contents of languages, accountancy, economic, law, and Chilean institutionality to enable their leavers to integrate themselves into work market. At the same time, scientific and humanistic knowledge should be improved to guarantee a better performance by students enrolled at universities. High school quality had to be improved throughout the country, not only limited to the capital and few other cities. For those for whom high school was the end of formal studies, this should let them get easily into the labour market, specially in the services sector (ODEPLAN, 1977, 32).

The Chilean Education Ministry was to be decentralized due to their deficient distribution of resources, and their bureaucratic decline. After 1975, a modernization strategy in this sector started, to transfer education power to regions and provinces first. Then in 1980, by transferring primary and high school education to
the city councils, it was possible to dismantle most of the gigantic, bureaucratic structure of the Education Ministry.

The rights of the family to educate their children was one of the main aims of Chilean Armed Forces Government. This was clearly stated in the "Declaración de Principios" as well as the important role assigned to city councils (Junta Gobierno, Chile, (a) 1974, Nos 6 & 9).

Argentinian and Chilean policy strategies

a) The people in charge: Argentina

Shortly after the take-over, Argentinian A.A.F.F. government designed the aims of the 'Proceso de Reorganización Nacional [P.R.N.], and a national strategy to rule the country. Within those wide guidelines was developed a strategy headed by civilians, and based on existing civilian institutions. The A.A.F.F. controlled and supervised, but they depended on a large group of experienced civilians, among whom were former members of political parties, education bureaucrats, and experts in education. At the same time, and especially at the beginning, the A.A.F.F. government had a strong representation on the Federal Council, amounting by nearly one third of the delegates until 1980 as shown in the proceedings from 1976-1980.

Minister Bruera headed the Ministry of Culture and Education. His background included: being a civilian, former provincial minister of education in Santa Fe during a Peronist government, and a well known and experienced educator. His appointment could be recognized as both technical and political. His diagnosis, previously described correspond to that of an educator, and a policy maker. His strategy was to find support for his initiatives in the 'Consejo Federal de Educación' a
body with some tradition in Argentina, headed by himself, which included provinces and capital federal ministers. Bruera's diagnosis was shared by them, and work started soon to solve the most important and urgent problem, namely to produce decentralization and des-bureaucratization. Nevertheless, some emergency decisions were taken at Ministry level the first months of A.A.F.F. government without consultations.

b) The people in charge: Chile

As in Argentina, the first Chilean education Minister was a civilian, Mr. José Navarro, linked to the Chilean Armed Forces through his position as a lecturer at the Military School. The other civilian in this first cabinet was the Justice Minister, Mr. Gonzalo Prieto who was linked to the Navy. Navarro's ministry was short lived. Soon, this ministry went to the Navy and most under-secretaries were Navy officers too. The Minister's twofold dependency, on government and from the Navy was very evident. Civilians also participated in lower positions at this ministry. It was a non-written law that all ministers had to be generals, the only exception was, at the beginning Colonel P. Ewing as Presidency's General Secretary Ministry. It was evident that the Chilean government did act as a A.A.F.F. body in which the support from political parties was very discreet. As time passed by, more and more civilians were integrated at higher levels of decision-making.

It is noticeable, especially at the beginning, that several Argentinian Education Ministers had a better level of expertise than Chilean ones, specially while they were high rank navy officers. When the Navy ceased to appoint Admirals to this position, it could be said that the Chilean Ministers were at the same expertise level as their Argentinian counterparts.
Personnel policies

a) Argentina

A decision adopted very soon after his appointment by the Argentinian Minister of Education was the temporary suspension of 'Estatuto Docente' [teacher's statute]. This decision might have a twofold interpretation; first, as a repressive measure against teachers, and second, it was impossible to introduce order into a chaotic administrative situation of permanent internship affecting most teachers. Minister Bruera asserted, that since its promulgation as a law, the 'Estatuto Docente' had suffered so much patching up, that it was impossible to provide an efficient policy for personnel administration according to regulation 2.8 of the P.R.N. Therefore, it needed an emergency law, permitting him to suspend totally or partially law 20.614, until the end of 1976. In any case, important regulations as requirements of teaching degrees to be appointed, promotions, and seniority for career advance were maintained (Junta Militar, Argentina, (c) 1976, 7-8).

Chronic centralized administrative disorder has prevailed in Argentina for decades. The Education Ministry for example, failed to produce a list of personnel. A temporary appointments system was widespread along the country. Thirty percent of teachers at schools, 69% of teachers for handicapped, 40% of supervisors, heads and deputy heads of schools only had provisory status. For some of them, this situation had lasted for twenty years. The teachers' statute was suspended not to produce insecurity but the contrary (Bruera, (b) 1976, 6-7).

Afterwards, another law was passed suspending some articles of the 'Estatuto Docente'. This new suspension was aimed at producing definitive appointments for most teachers, and to provide modern instruments of personnel selection into the
public educational system. Standardization was needed to permit the transfer of teachers, head teachers, and supervisors.

National security was, of course, involved in this new suspension. Article 2 stated, that to achieve objectives enunciated in the law 'considerandos', the Ministry would appoint directly head teachers and supervisors, in agreement with article 4 of law 21,278, first checking applicants' curriculum vitae and background (Ministro Educación, Argentina, 1976, 1-4).

Not only was part of the 'Estatuto Docente', temporarily suspended, but the members of several councils, among them the National Council for Education, and National Technical Education Council were dismissed and their functions were performed by armed forces officers (Delegado Junta Militar, Argentina, 1976, 10-11).

b) Chile

The Chilean Armed Forces government found a somewhat different situation. Education was politicized, but its administration was efficient if the troublesome Allende's years [1970-1973] were taken out. They did not face chaos in public education, and private education has always been properly administered in Chile. National Security undoubtedly was an issue, but it was not so important as in Argentina. The government did not pass any laws directed at controlling this aspect, even when it was evident that information related with security was handed to whomever made appointments to higher positions in Primary and High Schools. During the first years, members of the centre to left political parties e.g. Christian Democrats, and 'Radicales' were not excluded from high positions in the provinces.

Nevertheless, the Chilean government acted in a similar pattern to the Argentinians due to the same reasons. Traditionally, Chilean teacher's unions have
been partisan, and widely dominated by left-to-centre parties during the first six decades of this century, mostly during free masons influence in the Radical party. Then, some of unions became left, and extreme-left wing, especially during Frei's and Allende's governments. In Allende's government, head officers of S.U.T.E. 'Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Educación' [United Education Labourers Union], became senior officials in the Education Ministry, where they were highly influential, obtaining increasing social and economic benefits for their members (Nuñez, 1986, 225).

It is not surprising that in its first month in power Armed Forces Government froze the 'Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Educación' S.U.T.E. [United Education Labourers] funds (Junta de Gobierno, (Junta Gobierno, Chile, (b), 1974), ceased the 'Consejo Nacional de Educación' [National Education Council], and transferred their authority to the 'Superintendencia de Educación' [Education Superintendent] (Junta Gobierno, Chile, (c) 1974) by means of decree-law No 517, created a committee to review the 'Asociación Nacional de Empleados de Servicio de Educación' A.N.E.S.E. [National Education Officers Association] union and political activities (Junta Gobierno, Chile, (d) 1974). In 1975, the Chilean government took the final decision and abrogated definitely all teachers unions, among them the 'Sociedad Nacional de Profesores' SONAP [National Teachers Association]; 'Sociedad de Escuelas Normales de Chile' [Primary Teachers Training Schools]; 'Union de Profesores' [Teachers Union]; 'Asociación de Educadores de Enseñanza Industrial, Minera y Agrícola' [Industrial, Miner, and Agriculture Teachers Association]; Asociación de Educadores de Enseñanza Técnica Femenina y Comercial' [Technical Feminine and Commercial Education Teachers Association] (Presidente Chile, (a) 1975).
Members of these unions, and Education Ministry Officers were appointed to administer teacher's unions properties and check accounts. They had to pay the union's personnel, and the balances would be assigned by the committee created by Decree-law No 517 (Gobierno, Chile, op. cit.). As a means of abolishing undesirable political influence among teachers and to increase their social prestige, the government decided in 1974, to create the 'Colegio de Profesores de Chile' [National Teachers Association]. This association's objectives were: a) to raise teacher's social status; b) to promote the prestige and rights of teacher's profession, to regulate it, and to prevent partisan political participation; c) to promote research and re-training within the profession; d) to promote national and international educational conferences; e) to support national and international bodies devoted to improving education; f) to promote professional interchanges. This law should include only teachers trained at 'Escuelas Normales' and institutes or schools devoted to training teachers at universities (Junta Gobierno Chile, (e) 1974).

The teacher's statute was drafted and passed as law only in 1978, suffering several modifications over time. It proved to be one of the most complex issues related to Chilean teachers. The main aim of the statute were: a) to stimulate education efficiency at all levels; b) to regulate teacher's careers, providing promotion opportunities; c) to stimulate the spirit of excellence among teachers by means of a salary system which considered merit and seniority.

It is interesting to see that a stringent policy was designed to hire teachers. Among its main conditions were that teachers were to be physically fit, with high levels of civic, moral and teaching abilities. By means of the latter, the Armed Forces Government highlighted professionalism. Requirements to become a teacher were directly linked with a teacher's professional degree awarded by state universities, or ones with official recognition. All teaching personnel, without qualification,
were to take courses laid down in the regulations; only in cases there were no graduate teacher could other personnel be hired on a temporary basis (Presidente, Chile, (a) 1978).

It was not until 1979 that the idea of 'merit' appeared in the statute. The Region's Education Ministry Secretaries were entitled to promote personnel by merit. For teachers who were used to being evaluated by seniority only, this was not a pleasant change (Presidente, Chile, (a) 1979). The troublesome effects of these laws were soon evident, and the problem was more complex to handle than the Ministry officers had imagined. Therefore, after five month, the qualification process was abrogated. It could be restarted in 1980 only as an experiment without any legal force (Presidente, Chile, 1980). Finally, this was a problem not solved during Pinochet's government, and it is still unsettled in Chilean education.

Dismantling bureaucratic centralism

a) Argentina

Among many initiatives to improve Argentinian education, was the dismantling of an all-powerful bureaucracy entrenched at 'Ministerio de Cultura y Educación' [Culture and Education Ministry], natural allies were provincial ministers. At first meeting of F.E.C., Minister Bruera sketched ideas aiming to fulfil this goal.

The most important tools to achieve this goal were a new method to assign the Ministry's budget. Up to that moment, it was produced as a National self contained package, a global amount of class hours, positions, primary school teachers appointments, and the like. This package did not permit investment evaluation, and to solve
this problem, the Ministry planned to assign funding management directly to the provinces, which had the greater expertise to distribute it rationally. Funding was to be increased in provinces which evidenced the greatest need. The Ministry's role would be only to provide general guidelines.

Another device to promote decentralization was to transfer selection and hiring of personnel from Buenos Aires—which took for itself the most qualified personnel—to provinces. Minister Bruera announced this decision at the III Extraordinary Assembly Council meeting (C.F.E., (a)1976, 18-9); afterwards, several laws were passed to achieve this objective.

b) Chile

Chilean educational decentralization, and Education Ministry changes had at the beginning a low profile, intending to be a modification of administrative practices rather than a revolutionary change. During 1973-74, a complete internal Ministry reorganization started, with the redefinition of departments, and a timid attempt to provide more freedom for regions. Decree law No 824 August 16 1974 provides an interesting insight of a highly centralized education administration, L.A. style. This decree law authorized the 'Secretarios Regionales Ministeriales de Educación [Education Regional Secretary-Ministers] to grant leaves without salary, to education personnel, permission to live in a place different than their work, to transfer personnel within the same department, to accept donations, to take decisions related with food rights and use of government housing. All in all, there were 37 administrative regulations that previously depended directly on the Minister, all of them related to minor domestic matters (Junta Gobierno, Chile, (f) 1974).

Decree law 824 was only the beginning. The government continued transferring decision making power, both in administrative and educational matters, to regions and provinces, using existing 'Coordinaciones Regionales' [Region Co-ordinat-
ing Council]. Change did not happen quickly, only in 1975 were regulations provided delimiting their decision making powers. Included in the first roles assigned to them were: 1. to be Education Ministry representatives at regions, and 'Intendente' education advisors; 2. the highest educational office at regions; 3. to be supervisors of regional education systems. To perform their roles, a complete restructuring of the regions' chain of command was needed though that was to be achieved without hiring new personnel.

Nevertheless, policy and regulations would be drafted at the National Ministry and only implementation would be performed at regional level. All department directors in regions and provinces were to channel information and petitions through the command chain. At the same time, the National Ministry forbade any of her staff to address directly education personnel at regions, without the prior knowledge and support of the Regional Secretary-Ministry (Presidente, Chile, (a) 1975).

Year after year, the scope of decisions making power was enlarged at regions and provinces. Thereafter, decree No 415, May 4th 76 provided new decision powers for Region Secretary-Ministers, among them the right to hire teaching and clerical personnel. Afterwards, provinces and high schools got more freedom from national and regions offices (Presidente, Chile, 1976). The region's management education budget was also under the Region's Secretary-Ministry responsibility (Presidente, Chile, (b) 1978). Education subsidies payment came afterwards, under Regions Secretary Ministers in 1987.

Every new responsibility handed to regions were a mortal blow to the capital city education bureaucracy, arousing fierce criticism. It was a painful task but it was successfully accomplished during the Chilean Armed Forces government, and
there are no visible attempts from the democratic government to return it to its original state in accordance with the presidential programs of Aylwin, who did not even mention a return to a centralized Ministry of Education (Aylwin, 1990, and the educational policy of president Frei.

Transferring education: Argentina to provinces, Chile to city councils.

a) Argentina

Argentinian attempts to transfer education services to provinces had failed in the past due to a lack of legal and administrative tools, and clear goals to develop it properly. Province ministers' feelings were that 'only problems are decentralized'. Meanwhile, solutions remain in the Ministry's hands in Buenos Aires.

Minister Bruera's main interest was to produce flexible relationships between the nation and provinces. The centre for agreements, integration, and above all policy, was Federal Education Council, with the ample participation of all provinces (Bruera, g) 1976 37-46). In the proceedings of the third extraordinary conference, the minister's idea was clearly stated, this 'is only the start of F.E.C. works that must become the axis of educational activity and policy transformation' (op cit, 41).

Another 'resolución' passed at the fifth general assembly ordinary meeting provided basic guidelines to coordinate first, and then transfer education to provinces. The main aim was to produce a clear division of work, to determine dependencies, and coordination levels. National head officers of education at provinces, should be appointed by provinces governors, have their cabinets next to him, and be in permanent contact with provinces' education head officers. Their du-
ties include the exchange of information, and suggestions between national government and provinces government, to propose names to the national ministry for positions of coordination at all levels subject to the prior agreement of the provinces.

Also was created, at the same time, an inter-provinces special coordination committee. It included private education, and national ministry representatives. Their function was to coordinate education planning among national, provincial, and private schools; to estimate the needs of schools; to close or relocate them to avoid duplication of services. To harmonize diverse provinces and national laws based on criteria provided by Education Federal Council. To produce common ground regulations for teachers and educational activities, to provide guidelines to manage, and supervise education. In addition, they have to device the strategies to transfer primary education to provinces, to delimit responsibilities before transferring personnel, to create services and a financing system, to design a permanent and systematic evaluation system and to coordinate advancement within provinces.

Transfer, itself, included several stages, the first one was to transfer educational functions to each provincial government's responsibility, the national ministry's role would be to finance the system. The second stage would be to include a programmed transfer of personnel, properties, services, and a financial support system according to a timetable. Finally, a territorial system of educational services should be developed, whose role was to coordinate education among a group of provinces (C.F.E., (b) 1976, 51-55).

Transfer problems were huge, at Federal Council of Education, Sixth Ordinary Conference, March 1977, the National Minister stressed the need to accelerate education transference to provinces. Nevertheless, this goal was postponed to 1978.
and several sub-committees were created to study particular aspects of the problem (C.F.E., 1977, 7).

Education transfer to provinces proved to be a gigantic and troublesome problem. It included: 1. **Social issues**: the existence of a varied social security system, different for each province and from national ones. Social benefits were also different, and this made it necessary to create a federal service to manage them. 2. **Administrative issues**: transfer of national buildings to provinces carried legal problems because, many of them were in different stages, some were in blueprint stage, or being built, some of them were rented; therefore, they required the transfer of the contracts. Buildings donated to national government, should be transferred to provinces. Included in these items were movable property, from furniture to vehicles and machinery. 3. **Personnel transference issues**: most provincial and national personnel had different salary and status for the same job. This required an equivalence scale to introduce some uniformity, and it demanded at least a similar payroll scheme.

A very considerable problem was the magnitude of the strategies needed to promote transfer at several levels. Among them were: 1. teachers must be explained transference benefits, among these were: to develop solutions to their problems at provincial level, to create an unified methodology to educate students, to provide a flexible and decentralized education administration, and most important—to keep intact all teacher's rights. 2. A mass media campaign was required, which would emphasize a clear message to make transference acceptable, not only to education personnel, but to students and citizens as well.

System funding required a clear set of rules and economic resources. The main tool would be a federal tax co-participation system, which should include: 1.
operation and support expenses, 2. an updated and enlarged management system payroll, 3. resources to finance the normal growing of the educational system, promotions, and creation of new positions, 4. resources to bring national and provincial education funding to the same level.

The national constitution permitted the transfer of primary education to the provinces. Nevertheless, some provinces had constitutional rules hindering transference, and they had to introduce constitutional reforms to solve the problem. National and provincial education laws had to be updated to consider changes. Finally, it was evident that there was a need to update transference law, regulatory decrees, and provincial law. The Assembly encouraged the Executive Committee to draft a law taking into account previous considerations.

Decentralization's purpose was stated by the Cordova Minister of Culture and Education, when describing of F.E.C. works: 'the ruling principle has been coordination of norms in all aspects related to educational policy, characterization and minimal contents of educational cycles, pedagogy doctrine and guidelines for teachers work; and, executive decentralization of educational services'. All means to strengthen national identity, among them promoting and reinforcing traditional values that emerge from Christian weltanshauung, having in mind real needs of human beings in society were to be used (Conte, 1983, 112-3).

The transference law was passed in 1978. Within the 'considerandos' it was declared that there was a constitutional mandate [Article 5], to return to the provinces national schools created because the provinces were not able to fund them in a certain historical period. Besides, it being a constitutional mandate the law agreed with modern administration, and therefore, these was a duty to decentralize the execution of policy, despite the National State's right to provide general policy.
It was impossible to continue educating Argentinians by remote control; education had to serve the needs of the provinces.

The text of the law ensured educational continuity, avoiding any damage to personnel salaries, work stability, and social insurance. Transference itself should not be understood as a nation deserting its duties toward primary and pre-primary education under provinces responsibility. According, to the Constitution [Article 67, paragraph 16], the nation's right to provide guidelines for general primary, and pre-primary education in the whole country, and to judge the due accomplishment of provinces duty, was intact.

The main problem of the transference law was the lack of a clear system to increase school funding in pace with inflation, and normal increase of the educational system. 'National debts with provinces, related to schools transferred, would be paid in the next 180 days after agreement transference signature'. Another article however stated 'any expense originating after January 1st 1978, will be paid by the provinces'. The nation would pay for them, until provinces became able to do so. All education funding costs were to be reimbursed to the National Treasury by means of taking them out of the coparticipation national taxes system (Presidente, Argentina, 1978, 1-3).

Primary adult education was the subject of a different law in 1980. 'Considerandos' and the wording of the articles of the law included almost all ideas present at law 21,809, including the same failure to define the economic support to be provided by the national Ministry (Ministro Educación, Argentina, 1981).

By 1979 transferences were concluded, pending only minor details to ensure their perfection. Minister Llerena Amadeo stated 'Delays and troubles are proper in
complex matters', and the Ministry was ready to overcome them (Llerena, 1979, 44). Schools transferred to provinces numbered in the region of 6,500 throughout the country (Catalán, 1978, 90).

Non-defining clearly the economic support, which the nation should give to provinces, was the first step towards the repetition of past mistakes and transferences failures. The Onganía's government did transfer education to provinces, and even critics of his government shared the need to transfer education though they did not agree with the minimal administrative, and economic support provided to accomplish the goal. Only three provinces ratified the transferences and this became a failure for the rest of the country (Martínez, 1978, 198).

Argentinian general policy was based on several assumptions, one of the most influential of which attributed to historical reasons the existence of a state which enlarged too much its field of responsibilities, especially in the area of productive enterprise. Closely related, was an evident State inefficiency, and the low quality of its services. Improvement after 1976 in relationship to rationalization, privatization, investment management, efficiency, and improved service quality was great—but not—enough. So, as a conclusion, the government decided that education, health, social security, and certain services could be partially transferred or administered under shared management.

Government policy included all services transference to provinces—not only education. Existing criticism was taken into account in law 22,451 'Considerandos' 'National services transference policy', launched in 1977 and furthered in the following years, made it necessary to consider the Nation as an entity, to avoid any mistaken evaluation. Special care had to be taken with regard to hospitals and schools transference; it looked as though the state was providing smaller amounts of
resources, if national administration were taken into consideration. In fact, the state is providing more resources, and they are used more efficiently due to decision power being nearer the source of the problem... In relation to health and education, it should be taken into account that this service is shared with private enterprise, in contrast with defence. The State is also funding education through a private non-profit subsidized education system, able to teach for a fraction of the cost in comparison to state system. In addition, there existed a great number of non-subsidized schools, and private universities that cost nothing to the state. This low cost private sector, and diminished state funding importance, could therefore provide more education at a smaller cost, thereby increasing the private education system (Ministro Economía, Argentina, 1981, 1653-9).

The same principles were stated in a law. The state oriented its activity under the subsidiarity principle. Therefore, the national state should not perform anything that can be carried out by provinces and city councils, or by private enterprise. Contrariwise, the state had some functions that it was not possible to transfer. On this basis, the state should promote and strengthen private initiatives pursuing the common good by means of coordinating the activities and functions of state officials with private enterprise (Ministro Economía, Argentina, (b) 1981, 1633-4).

Despite severe attempts to decentralize education, the old habit of excessive control was always present in many Ministry decisions. This control ranged from the settlement of tariffs for all incorporated private schools to the control of official education (Secretarios Estado Comercio y de Educación, Argentina 1979, 21), including institutions that provide training to take university examinations. In this case, the aim was to avoid excessive charges, and to provide information about the quality of training provided by these institutions (Ministro Educación, Argentina, 1979).
b) Chile

The Chilean case did not present, at the beginning a very clear action or decision pattern. The 'Declaración de Principios del Gobierno de Chile' [D.P.G.Ch.] stated the importance of social political power, and emphasized the role of city councils in the service of the family and the neighbourhood. It was explicitly stated that the support from the government to transform them was the most important element in developing a new type of society (Junta Gobierno, Chile, (a)1974, article 6a).

The Education Ministry was aware of the difficulties in solving the education problems of an organization which had more than a hundred thousand teachers, twenty five thousand clerical and services personnel, and over three million students. This 'problem magnitude' demanded therefore, a long range policy, providing, first, wide guidelines, and then objectives to be achieved in stages over time. It is evident from Políticas Educacionales del Gobierno de Chile (Junta Gobierno, Chile (g) 1974, 2.3.5) [Chilean Government Educational Policies] that the government aimed to improve the existing system, but not to turn it upside down—as it would happen subsequently. Revolutionary changes introduced by A.A.F.F. Government, were the product of several years of planning and development of ideas.

It was not until 1977, that the need to transfer education administration to intermediate society organizations, e.g., city councils, development, industrialists associations, and the like was stated. The Ministry was to provide guidelines and supervise educational activities. The State it was argued should administer education only when intermediate associations were unable so to do, e.g. frontier schools areas of extreme poverty, small villages, and so on. To finance education administered by intermediate associations, tuition would be paid on a 'per capita' basis. These payments could be different in regard to such variables as geographic position or poverty levels. Technical and professional teaching should be transferred to in-
dustrialists and to business associations in each segment of the economy. Finally, the main idea was decentralization by means of using existing Education Secretariats in the Regions (ODEPLAN, 1977, 36-37). This is evident in Ley Orgánica de Municipalidades [Organic City Councils Law] 1975, in which the only duty with regard to education was the promotion of literacy and training according to Article 3, B 4 (Presidente, Chile, (c)1975).

In the six-years national planning, 1978-1983, the main aim was the administrative decentralization. This included pre-primary, primary, special, and secondary education. In 1978 it was proposed to incorporate all Provincial Education Directorates in a Provincial Public Education Service in areas of high population density, or to put together two or more provinces if they have low population. These officials were to enjoy administrative and legal autonomy, the Ministry in agreement with the 'Secretarios Regionales Ministeriales' [Regional Secretary-Ministers] would provide guidelines and supervise their accomplishment. Throughout 1979 an education financing system it would be fully developed on a 'per capita' tuition fees basis instead of the traditional funding system. In 1981, 80% of education costs were to be financed by this new system (ODEPLAN, 1978, 503-5).

These aims were restated in March 1979, in "Directiva Presidencial Sobre la Educación Nacional" [Presidential Guidelines on National Education] which emphasized again decentralization founded on provincial services. These would administer human and physical resources, but by no means should it increase bureaucracy. Regional Secretary-Ministers nor National Ministry would have operational functions. Every measure would be provided to avoid the duplication of functions, or to increase bureaucracy. All these guidelines were to be integrated into a plan, and put into action in the third quarter of 1979 (Presidente, Chile, (b), 1979, 1.1).
Real change occurred with the promulgation of new the 'Ley de Financiamiento Municipal' [City Councils Funding Law], which makes the real difference from a teaching state to a subsidiary state. This change was merely insinuated, but it lacked a definite direction. It is hard to find a clear explanation for it, since a government whose main characteristic had been to act cautiously, planning every step, suddenly produced such a change, not only in education, but in all the country's political life and administration.

In this field, the author believes it was clear in the government's mind that the traditional Chilean way to perform political, and administrative life, was exhausted, and needed to be revamped completely. Nevertheless, this does not explain why, from an important role assigned to intermediate associations as city councils, was transformed into a definitive one. 'Interior' Minister (cabinet's head), stated this new role was due to subsidiarity principle, in which the state's duty is to perform only the activities which people, family, and private organizations are not able to perform.

Is possible to apply the subsidiarity principle to all public offices dependent on the central government, department offices, and city councils. Work division between the government, and the city councils is at the core of freedom, efficiency, and justice in Chilean society. Government 'transference' had a threefold engagement; first, to provide funding to city councils to enable them to solve expenses; second, provide legal tools to Mayors to perform these new duties; and third, to reform laws and provide general legislation for city councils (Fernández, 1980, 9-12).

The City Councils new funding law provided them with enough economic resources, taking them out of from a permanent bankruptcy state into wealthiness. Article 38th, Law No 3.063, 1979, provided an income that, at least, doubled the
previous year. This article stated that from 'Impuesto Territorial' [real estate] taxes, 45% would be appropriated to each City Council, the remaining 55% would become a City Council Common Fund to be distributed among them according to a scale in which 25% was related to the number of inhabitants of the City Council, 25% to property which was exempt from taxes, leaving 50% to be shared in an inverse relation to City Council income, some other taxes were included as direct property of the City Council. The same procedure was adopted to share state support, this device excluded five cities because they were provided with extra funds by special laws or they were extremely wealthy (Gobierno, Chile, (c) 1979).

City Councils were provided by this law with flexible tools to manage education, including the different legal procedures needed to create legal entities, as to transfer education administration to charities, or trustees (op cit, art. 12). This law provided real power for the City Councils to manage locally, not only education, but health and many other services, universities being excepted.

It was evident that such in depth change could not be achieved without a certain amount of problems, the main one of which one was the need for appointed Mayors to use properly the management freedom provided by the City Councils Organic Law. Restructuring them was not enough, for it required some skills that not all Mayors and City Councils personnel had. Previously, they were in a quite comfortable position in which they could do very few things but all of them without any risk to break the law. Suddenly, they were taken away from a comfortable position, to a more complicated and risky environment in which uncertainty was greater as well as the chances of colliding with legal regulations.
Conclusions

Both A.A.F.F. governments shared a common and distinctive philosophy founded on Christian and Western values. At the same time, they shared a similar diagnosis of societies' problems, especially in the weakening of national and spiritual values. Both are linked by their values which are strongly based on nationalism on one side, and in Catholic weltanschauung on the other. The Catholic church was preoccupied, too, by values being disregarded, marginalized, and even destroyed (L.A. Bishops; 1980, 44).

Policies designed to reinforce these values were clearly in line with military training as managers, and their set of values. As managers, they used, as foundations, the subsidiarity principle, and consequently the decentralization of public administration. Both were intimately related to the need to build a barrier against abuse from governments which sought to indoctrinate youth, or to impose a particular political philosophy on Argentina or Chile. Prior populist governments attempted to use education as a way of indoctrination in Argentina, or Marxist prone government in Chile. These facts made evident the need to eradicate definitely this risk, and the best barrier was seen to be the dispersion of political power—education in this particular case—and abundant use of private initiative. Both were conscious of the dangers of centralized states with power to subjugate their own citizens.

Evidently in both military governments’ seminal documents is a displayed interest in National Security as a value problem, not only as a tool to manage or to develop a country. Both military government aim to build a permanent political life style for both countries because they had clear in mind that sooner or later the government should be returned to civilians but hopefully, all social, moral and economic problems improved or vanished. It was evident that practical experience in
ruling the country gave an initial advantage to the Argentinian A.A.F.F. government, for their basic documents were made public almost at the same moment of the take over. The Chilean A.A.F.F. had to draft them 'a posteriori'. The Argentinian head start as rulers, became eventually compensated by a stronger cohesion among Chilean A.A.F.F., and a good, long range, planning policy.

Both shared a common strategy to combat centralism, a dead weight in these countries' political administration. Centralism was blamed for weakening the national spirit, increasing both bureaucratization, and underdevelopment. Therefore, most political decisions were designed to diminished the influence and power which emanated from Buenos Aires and Santiago.

Human resources development was another important element for both military governments. This element is clearly related to military values, for the potential of a country, as well their A.A.F.F., is based on their human potential; therefore, it should be strengthened by means of education, and linked to the countries development.

A military administrative management style was evident in both governments. the Argentinian Education Ministry was evidently chaotic; the Chilean one, had a more orderly tradition, but both shared an over dimensioned, expensive, and politicized structure; with a complicated bureaucratic and slow machinery that needed to be reduced to a reasonable size. Especially evident, was the problem of personnel management, and the need to reduce command units to a reasonable size in keeping with a military style. Main differences between both were in rhythm to proceed to changes. Argentina started to produce changes almost immediately, and Chile had a very slow beginning, after several years it started producing changes and in the long range they were a great deal further than Argentina's.
The mechanism devised to introduce changes were different, despite the fact that the ends were the same, in that both had strong support from civilian bureaucracy and technicians. They did recognize clearly the difference between managing a military unit and a civilian office, and acted consequently. Style was different, but they did produce a more civilian-like government than a proper military type.

The concern for family participation and educational freedom was strongly influenced by Catholic doctrine: "The family is primarily responsible for education. All educational work must equip the family so that it can excersise this mission" and "The Church proclaims the freedom of education, not to foster privileges or private profit, but as a right to the truth belonging to persons and communities (L.A. Bishops, 1980, 166-7) Both statements were dutifully followed by Argentinian and Chilean governments, and in addition they agree with most of the educational precepts of Vatican the Second, and Puebla, to such an extent that not many civilian government headed by Christian political parties can be matched.

Finally, only military governments attempted to correct the long standing and complex educational problems of Argentina and Chile. Onganía's government attempted to transfer education to provinces, as stated by the Argentinian Constitution, but his attempt failed and the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional [PRN] produced a new one. Problems were considerable, especially funding, but this time the transference has survived civilian governments.

Chilean transference is still working as the military government designed it, and after fifteen years, city councils' education administration is quite well settled in and has not faced too many changes after five years of democratic government. The main reasons could be: that the system has proved to be more efficient that a centralized education or that it agrees with Chilean tradition of a school system
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Values and Geopolitical Aims

Education; goals and objectives

The aims of this chapter are to present in first place the educational policies in which military values are more evident, even when they are not necessarily the most general and inclusive in scope. Then the analysis of policies in which military values are more subtle but still unequivocal follows, especially when they are linked with religion or culture.

Reinforcement of moral and civic values

a) Argentina

The Argentinian A.A.F.F. government's Catholic and nationalistic tendencies were strong and evident, and they were present in Minister Bruera's diagnoses. They influenced a series of 'resoluciones' to reinforce Christian moral values, national tradition, Argentinian's dignity, and geopolitics. The first one was the Estudios de la Realidad Social Argentina 'ERSA' project onwards [Argentinian social reality courses], to be taught in high schools.

'ERSA' guidelines included the basic contents of this course, among them: first, man's needs, activities, and the relationship with environment; second, life ideal in each historical period; third political, religious, social, economic, and cultural institutions. High schools would include them in history and geography
classes; at tertiary level they would be related only to the most significative aspects of Argentinian history.

The Education Ministry drafted main lines of this course, then ordered high schools to select and organise its contents in two weeks time. Head masters should present the course for consideration by Ministry supervisors. Afterwards, the Education Undersecretary should review contents, analyse and use them to develop the courses' final version. ERSA was to start being taught in 1976 (Ministro Educación, Argentina, (a) 1976, 16-7).

The ERSA project was soon replaced by 'Formación Cívica' [civic education]. The programme aimed to promote such civic virtues as: awareness and active participation in public affairs, by means of awakening interest in their environment. 'Real' public spirit was understood as a deep feeling of nationhood. Therefore, Argentinian education should promote nationality and value awareness among students. Nevertheless, this feeling must be placed into a wider context with fellow citizens of America and the world. Finally, value development meant an increase of a free and creative responsibility, without ideological partisanship, providing a clear understanding of traditional culture as the foundations of a dynamic and harmonious future society.

As in ERSA, the contents of this new course were integrated into history and geography courses. Contrary, to ERSA this entire course was designed by Ministry top level officers. Training was to be provided for all teachers involved in lecturing on these courses. The National Directorate for Research, Experimentation, and Education Training was to edit guides to help teachers' work. Social science departments at high schools should coordinate curriculum development. Finally, Head
Masters should give their approval, and store all documents produced in this course, ready to present them if required by Ministry supervisors.

Bruera developed the main foundations of civic education in a speech delivered to heads of teachers training institutes. He pointed to several obstacles to student's moral development: scepticism, didacticism, and drilling exercises. Minister Bruera's definition of these concepts are: Scepticism that considered morality a kind of ritualistic celebration of death values, its starting point was teachers and students reciprocal mistrust and to believe only in ruling, confounding discipline with moral. Didacticism, was a way to teach morality through methods and formalisms, unable to change students conduct. Drilling, as a set of defined sanctions or procedures to obtain desirable students' conduct, but making impossible the perception of the moral act and the moral value itself.

To avoid these barriers, the programme should be related to the ability of courses to make apparent moral judgements, and moral acts. Courses and teachers could only help students to develop responsibility, and ability to choose by themselves. Nevertheless, he recognized it was impossible to form automatically virtuous youngsters, if they did not want to be so, because freedom is at the foundations of morality (Bruera, 1976, 25 onwards).

This was a recurring issue for all ministers of education, either individually or with the Federal Education Council. An agreement relating to the contents of civic education was reached at the VII Extraordinary Meeting in December 1978. This course was at the core of some other initiatives tending to reinforce nationality feelings, territorial ownership and geopolitics. It was very often the subject of new Ministry resolutions.
In 1979 an official status was given a new programme of minimal contents for moral, civic, and history training for students, in the basic first grade high school cycle. This programme included all students at private and state schools. The course of moral and civic training, included five sections related to: 1. the Christian conception of man and life; 2. family; 3. man and his cultural relationship; 4. man and his economic achievements; 5. man and his political conduct.

The first section related to the Christian conception of mankind, was devoted to explain man as an individual, his mind, identity, responsibility, and freedom, ethical duties, and rights. Human beings as society members, as historic beings, and as individuals whose aim is perfection reached in family, society, cultural, political, and religious life. The religious dimension was based on the idea of men being made in the image and resemblance of God, their greatness and limitations, vocation and ends of the individual, personal relationship to God, to re-create men in agreement to Christian message and to restore individuals and the world within a Christian order.

The second section related to the family, as the nucleus of society presented a marked emphasis on: paternal authority and members responsibility; family ethical-religious, and permanent values. The third section related with culture, had a strong basis of religious values, spiritual needs, and a conception of culture as a spiritual man's activity. Foundations of the Argentinian culture lie in Greek, Roman, and Biblical tradition, life as ideals of Christendom. The fourth section related to man and his economic development, material needs, emphasizing strongly a Christian conception of economy, and Catholic Church social doctrine.

Fifth and last, man and his political development, started stressing the relationship among the community and society, from family to national community, their spiritual ties, relationship among individuals, family, and civic responsibility. It
emphasized primary political institutions such as city councils, describing their functions, citizens' participation, rights and duties. The Federal political organization was founded in the autonomy of provinces as foundation of a federal state, that was democratic and representative. The links between nation, provinces, and national constitution were to be studied.

Evidently this course was permeated with a Christian spirit, and the Catholic Church's influence. The methodological approach, classroom activities, and contents of 'Educación Moral y Cívica' [Civic and Moral education] underline the philosophy that prevails throughout the basic cycle of High School. It prescribed that teachers should start from actual problems faced by students. So they could develop a philosophical understanding of moral, civic and national history (Ministro Educación, (a) Argentina, 1979, 2-5).

Minimal history contents were marked by the same spirit. The three first chapters included: concept of history, social sciences, and their relationship. It started from prehistory; first civilizations, Mediterranean civilization, Crete, Greece, Rome. After ending them, the course studied Christianism which pervaded all the rest of the course (op cit, 6-7).

The Education Ministry ordered a trial period to evaluate the minimal contents project in the basic high school cycle, both state owned and private. Sixteen schools were sampled for this test through the country. The National Directorate for High Schools and Tertiary Education, and the National Superintendent for Private Education, were appointed to perform the evaluation. As soon as the 1979 school year was over, both were to submit an in-depth evaluation (Ministro Educación, Argentina, (b) 1979, 10-11).
Minister R. Llerena ensured the course's importance 'Our country is an integral part of the Christian Western civilization. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure a systematic development of Christian conception of mankind and life. Our constitution should be studied in depth. To study it, is to understand, and to explore what constituents wanted in 1853, and for generations Argentinians have swear to respect, and to enforce it. Constitution study means, not only to learn by heart the introduction, but to teach students why constituents in 1853 invoke God, and why Argentinians along 169 years have performed the same invocation' (Llerena, 1979, 15).

Despite a heavy load of Christian belief and of Catholic Church influence, President Videla and Minister Llerena Amadeo denied that there was any attempt to transform this course into a confessional one. President Videla stated 'I am deeply catholic, but I am clear in my mind that we cannot impose a confessional sense on a course in a nation with no religious state dependant schools, so we cannot trespass these basic principles of choice of creed' (Videla, 1979, 28).

F.E.C. passed a new resolution related to this subject in March 1982. Civic Training II was included at high school in the fifth grade. The main aim of this new course was to reinforce students Civic training; they were to study the constitutional regime, political parties organization, last decades of Argentinian political history, political rights, and to increase habits of tolerance in citizens life.

Contents included: a) moral awareness, in order to avoid a dichotomy between thought and private conduct, and in social and political activities, b) to increase a coherent integration and participation, avoiding ideological radicalism and indifference, c) to increase understanding of other people doctrines, and, d) to develop apti-
tudes and behaviour that favour social coexistence founded on the highest values of nationality (C. F.C. y E., (a) 1983, 26).

A new law was passed modifying the previous one; in its 'considerandos' it stated that in the government's political principles were included: the integral education of human being, and the existence of individual and communitarian ethics founded on natural law, therefore, it was the government's duty to promote it through the educational system, training citizens to guide their life through clear moral principles. The aim was to produce responsible citizens, permeated by constitutional republican principles and tradition, enabling them to improve the common good (Presidente Argentina, 1980, 7).

b) Chile

A perception of a global crisis, influenced decisively the Chilean A.A.F.F. government's aims and goals. They assigned education an essential role to eliminate—or at least—minimize its contaminating effects. D.P.G.Ch. stated 'A consistent approach to overcome this problem should have, as its foundations, an education able to increase the moral and spiritual values scale, proper to Chilean Christian tradition (Junta de Gobierno, Chile, (a) 1974, No7). Therefore, there existed a strong link in this field between Argentinian and Chilean A.A.F.F. governments.

The Chilean A.A.F.F. government designed an educational policy whose theoretical framework was essentially founded on values, and the main goal was to enhance them. Moreover, it was intended to provide a hierarchical set of values, related to man's ultimate end aiming to correct the deep moral and economic crisis of the West, in which Chile was involved (Jiménez et al, (a) 1981, 10).
In agreement with the conception of man, education had the role of supporting
a social model, by means of transferring Christianity, and a nationalistic perception
of society as a source of inspiration. An appropriated values scale, and a set of
norms for thinking and acting, aimed to provide cultural support to state institu-
tionalism, were present in 'Objetivo Nacional' [O.N.] Achievement of this value scale
had been declared compulsory in this document (op. cit., 17).

Accordingly, in its first attempt to develop an educational policy in 1974,
the Education Ministry put forward these ideas: Importance of man as spiritual be-
ing, able to better himself, 2. a complete rejection of class struggle, 3. country's
spiritual integration would become the foundations of justice, progress, and peace.

'To regain our national spirit, it requires to follow a path whose origin lay in
the past and makes our collective conduct meaningful, it becomes the starting
point to project ourselves into the future. Chileans' adequate perception of
geography and history, is what we call nationalism. To achieve the aims of
awakening or increased patriotic feelings, education must be understood as
our heritage and a task concerning the nation. Education's aim should be to
train each human being to enjoy a responsible freedom and high goals. In
this sense education's responsibility should be shared by parents, teachers,
local authorities, and government' (Junta Gobierno, Chile, (a) 1974, 1.3).

Apart from direct educational aims, a series of values were stated, and edu-
cation was supposed to have a duty to select and insert them into school curricula.
Among them were: individual creativity, a moral of individual effort, and personal
excellence at work or in class (ODEPLAN, 1978, 37). Spiritual values were linked to
children's rights since conception rejecting the ideas of some groups that accept
them only after birth. The Government stated 'a great portion of the population could
lost sense of responsibility, and take life and death decisions related to human be-
ings in the gestation stage, this could degrade the Christian meaning of life' Therefore, it needed a permanent educational campaign at schools and universities,
to teach children and youngsters the parenthood spirit, before becoming a couple or
pregnant. The Government criticized education, because it provided teaching and work experience, but for the 'profession' of parenthood there was no training at all (op. cit. 102).

The rejection of abortion, within a moral frame, became paramount as part of a nation cultural inheritance. The idea of killing an unborn child in any gestation period, became morally accepted, all cultural or philosophical barriers, or moral principles to eliminate human beings in the future, become a serious issue which could lead to make human life disposable.

Therefore, government national planning stated 'It will be necessary to re-assert as much as possible the meaningful act of human procreation. The significance it is not only a physical creation of a human being, because it carries the transmission of moral, cultural, and spiritual values, the highest and transcendent family mission (op cit, 102-5).

The Proyecto Nacional Indicativo de Desarrollo 1978-1983, [National Indicative Project of Development] P.N.I.D onwards proposed a programme of curriculum development including a compulsory course in 'Human Development'. Accordingly, when students ended high school, it was expected that all of them had assimilated principles, knowledge, and motivation relating to human reproduction. Teachers' training at universities should include this subject, to enable them to teach it afterwards in their courses. In addition, all sexual education programmes should consider the transcendental meaning of human being conception (op cit 115-6).

The initiative to use education as a main tool to protect life of unborn children in the early stage of gestation are proper and important when considered the
The Catholic Church was tasked with drafting class programmes, which would be related only to Catholic teaching. Nevertheless, parents could demand from the Education Ministry, the teaching of a different religion at state schools, but permission would be given only in the cases in which that religion had trained personnel, and courses enrolment had to be at least twenty students. Courses contents should be proposed by authorized representatives of that religion.

Different precautions were taken to avoid opposition from lay segments or religions different from the Catholic one. Students could not decide if they wanted religion classes but their parents, marks were not to be considered to promote students from one course to the following one. Catholic religion is the prevailing one so it would not be an easy task to find 20 students from other religion whose parents wanted them to be taught in it. Teachers' salaries were to be included in the Ministry budget (Gobierno, Chile, 1978). These Administrative regulations avoided...
most problems, and the government did not face open resistance from the powerful lay and other religious institutions.

The inclusion of religion studies at schools agreed with the religious values of the Chilean military. They intended not only to arouse religious values in the students but in helping to reinforce family ties and national cohesion. In addition, it was a powerful tool to defeat Marxism with its load of materialism and atheism. All this aspects were included in the 'Declaración de Principios' and put into practice through this initiative.

National consciousness and geopolitical aims

a) Argentina

The main aims of the public spirit courses were to enhance the sense of belonging, and understanding of Argentinian fabric. Courses tending to reinforce students geopolitical national territory knowledge were devised. The widest scope among them was in Frontier schools. This was not an original initiative, nevertheless, it acquired great importance due to national security demands.

Until 1976 only sixty five frontier schools existed, all of them suffering a precarious existence. The main problems were: inadequate funding; teachers and supervisors without proper training; and laws restricting the province's decision powers.

The 'Consejo Federal de Educación' [Federal Education Council] F.E.C. onwards advised the Minister to request law changes from the national government. Among them were two new objectives: First, to educate and train students in knowledge.
value, and use of resources in their territories as a mean of integrating them, and to facilitate their participation in territory and national re-development. Secondly, to integrate students into the Argentinian way of life, enhancing cultural values that enrich the national soul.

Meanwhile, as those changes occurred, F.E.C. suggested to developing a series of administrative actions to improve frontier schools. Among them were conducting proper enquires before appointing one of them, 'frontier school'. Improving existing schools by means of providing resources to achieve their objectives; increase bonuses, and full time salaries for teachers, and providing housing for school's personnel. Other aims were to design training programmes in agreement with territory characteristics, to develop students and people's skill needed in areas served by these schools, to avoid migration to urban centres, to improve communication, include roads, radio, and T.V. networks; to eliminate foreign influence from mass media messages, and to develop cultural and educational programmes. Finally, the F.E.C. demanded an enhancement of health, nutrition, family, and children support programmes (F.E.C., (a) 1976, 65-8).

It was evident that there was not enough information available to take decisions related to Frontier schools. In August 1977, a special committee was created to provide in thirty days—up to date information on this issue. The Education Under Secretary ordered delegates from top offices at the Ministry to gather information, and state the main tasks: 1. to collect all laws and resolutions related to the subject; 2. to present information on the search; 3. to collect prior planning or projects; 4. to summarize all problems on the issue; 5. to design an adequate methodology to afford the problem (Subsecretario Educación, Argentina, 1977, 8).
Frontier school's project was very dear for the Argentinian military and F.E.C., mirrored this interest very closely, for this reason insisted in 1978 on the Frontier schools project. They approved executive Committee work, and emphasized the importance and urgency of providing a strong and clear frontier educational policy, and thereby ensure secure frontier areas. This policy had to be designed with the participation of provinces, and the only way to strengthen this national value project had to be by proper funding (F.E.C., 1978, 55).

Later, in 1982, a new definition of Frontier schools was adopted. They were the ones adjacent to international boundaries settled by law. Provinces were to determine the strip of land adjacent to borders which required a reinforced cultural and educational link with the country. The Defence Ministry had an important advisory role in drafting frontier educational policy in relationship with national security; this included the ban on foreign citizens teaching in these schools. Naturalized Argentinians could not teach in borderlines zones next to their former country. This education was assigned first priority, and would receive extra funding. In addition, the private sector or charities should contribute to this task (C.F.C. y E., (a) 1982, 55-6).

The Argentinian Education Minister, Mr Burundarena, proposed that the F.E.C should develop education and culture in a project called 'Patagonia Prioridad Uno' [Patagonia first priority]. The underlying philosophy was to reinstate the importance of culture over material goods, turning upside down the tendency to place materialist conceptions of life first. The project itself presented two general objectives: 1. to provide 'Patagonia' territory with strong educational and cultural support, due to its exceptional geopolitical importance in relationship to national sovereignty 2. to ensure Patagonian inhabitants had equal opportunities to enjoy education and culture, improving the quality of their life.
Educational support included a series of objectives, the most important were: to provide, and widen opportunities for human resources training, to ensure an adequate curriculum for Patagonia needs, to provide secondary and tertiary education in agreement with the requirements of the territory, to establish adequate and harmonize legal instruments among Patagonian provinces, and to involve inhabitants in its territory development (C.F.C. y E., (b) 1982, 163 onwards).

Some previous initiatives existed in this field, pointing to similar objectives. One of them attempted to enhance knowledge of Antarctic region, to improve sovereignty ownership feelings; to increase the understanding of economic importance of its natural resources, and to increase the entire nation defence potential. Therefore, the main aim was to strengthen the rights and duties related to that sector. Educational activities included a week devoted to the Antarctic, Malvinas Islands, and Southern Territory. Contents include the history of Antarctic discovering, exploration, and occupation, Argentinian sovereignty rights and international covenants (Ministro Educación, Argentina, (b) 1976, 13-4).

In March 1978, new devices to strengthen Argentinian Students' territory awareness were developed. They were practical works at primary schools, papers would be related to 'National Sovereignty Defence'; 'Integral and National Security. Frontier Zones and Areas'. In 'civic spirit' courses at high schools, teachers were to explain, and analyse frontier and sovereignty zones in South Atlantic legislation. At geography courses, teachers were to lecture on South Atlantic geopolitical problems. Relating to Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Chile, they should highlight the Argentinian rights over the Beagle Channel and South Atlantic islands. Student assignments included papers delimiting Argentinian sovereignty in the South Atlantic (Subsecretario Educación, Argentina, (a) 1978, 4-5). At training teachers institutes
courses should take place courses related to 'South Atlantic Argentinian Sovereignty' (Ibidem).

Contributions on this subject were provided by the Antarctic National Directorate by means of several courses to retrain, first primary, and then high school teachers to teach citizens and students the 'real legal facts... to have a real understanding of problems that will emerge in the next decades'. The main reason for these re-training was the lack of any bibliography on this subject. Moreover, existing ones ignored or diminished Argentinian participation. The Education Under Secretary decide to support these courses (Subsecretario Educación, Argentina, (b) 78, 6-7). It was offered again the following year; surprisingly, registration was limited to sixty teachers (Subsecretario Educación, Argentina, 1979, 4-5). It is supposed that the previous one did not have a higher enrolment.

The Education Ministry's activities related to sovereignty and defence included the participation of two representatives in an inter-ministry task force, in which participated the Foreign Relations, and Presidency of the Republic Information Secretary. Their goal was to develop a media campaign related to the Southern border conflict in order to awake youth consciousness about territorial sovereignty (Ministro Educación, Argentina, (c) 1979, 10-11).

The Falkland-Malvinas war produced an educational by-product. In several declarations from the F.E.C. the Education Under Secretary suggested that the F.E.C. Council should adopt as theirs, or modify, the Executive Committee commendation dated May 13th, to incorporate into the national education system the Malvinas territory. The document once agreed, and signed by all provinces' Ministers of Education, was sent to the General, Mario Benjamín Menéndez, and to his education secretary, Navy Captain Barry Huessey.
The Council President proposed then to read a government decree appointing Mr Luis Vernet as Malvinas Island military Governor. In his opinion, this decree was of great importance because it was not only related to the islands, but to Cape Horn too, besides the document reassured Argentinian rights in the South Atlantic, and islands lawsuit with Chile (C.F.C. y E. (b) 1983, 58).

This subject became 'Resolución' 3/82. In one of its paragraphs was stated the need to incorporate the Malvinas Military Government into the Argentinian education system to strengthen sovereignty, national unity, and reconquered territorial development (C.F. C. y E., (c) 1983, 82). Finally, the F.E.C. passed a statement in which they recognized education's responsibilities towards national identity, and integral development. They claimed that the heroic decision to reconquer Malvinas Islands was supported in Argentinian teachers, family, and people. Nevertheless, an appeal was necessary to the educational community, teachers, parents, students, state, and institutions, and to reinforce activities to consolidate this historical fact. All means should be used to promote the integration of land and seas, and to reinforce in new generations the patriotic and unbreakable will to keep patrimony and republic grandeur (C.F.C.y E., (d)1983, 84-5).

When the Falkland-Malvinas war ended, the Education Ministry had to reformulate the educational discourse related to the islands. The Ministry 'resolución' No 749, 1982, stated the need to highlight heroic values over victory, to emphasize the symbolic importance of reassuring rights and justice, the heroism of sacrifice and the highlighting of national unity values (Licciardo, 1983, 20). All these concepts were to be emphasized, in order to explain and make defeat acceptable.
'Argentinian interests' was one of the last courses aiming to awake interest among Argentinian youth in understanding the nation's social, political, economical, and cultural problems. The project suggested that this course should be included at all levels, especially at institutes to train teachers. In order to carry out the program successfully, it recommended to training teachers properly (C.F.C. y E., (e) 1983, 26). At the third F.E.C. Extraordinary Meeting, members agreed to order the permanent committee to study, and draft a project to be considered at next meeting (C.F.C. y E., (f) 1983, 36).

The draft was criticized by San Juan's province representatives. They argued that the draft's last paragraph did not solve the problem. The main point for them was to include Argentinian interests into the educational system. The draft's wording left open to provinces the choice to teach or not teach this course, a fact that could endanger the Argentinian educational structure, instead of conciliating province's interests and introducing order into education, the main goal of F.E.C. Finally put to the vote, the majority decided it was to be compulsory (C.F.C. y E., (g) 1983, 79-80).

Another strategy to improve the national awareness was the 'Liceos Militares', military high schools. The Navy was the most active in this field, for they created at least three of these 'Liceos': 'Almirante Guillermo Brown', 'Almirante Storni', and one devoted to women's training 'Doctor Francisco Gurruchaga'. Their aims were to contribute to national security and the nation's development, by means of training youngsters in a clear style, founded on: solid knowledge, morality, physical strength, and professional abilities. Their training provide them with qualifications as primary school teachers, or as high school physical education teachers. In addition they become navy reserve officers (Ministro Defensa, Argentina, 1979, 6).
b) Chile

The Chilean government showed special interest in frontier education. It established prior to the A.A.F.F. government, several programmes tending to facilitate education access to inhabitants, from as far as Easter Island, Juan Fernández Island, and isolated villages in the 11th Region. The Education Ministry's first policies aimed to reduce marginality, especially the geographical ones. To achieve this goal, the school system had to be improved. The development of the frontier areas required an equal access to educational services (Junta de Gobierno, Chile, (b)1974, pto 2).

After 1975, the Education Ministry developed specific projects directed towards the preservation of indigenous cultures; at least two of them were devoted to isolated or frontier places: Easter Island and Aymará (Presidente, Chile, 1976, 442). Mapuche's project started in 1977 and attempted to integrate the largest Chilean native minority, many of them living at Los Andes Mountains, on the border with Argentina (Presidente, Chile, 1977, 522).

Not only was regular education to be provided by the government; frontier programmes demanded a special educational system, in which national values were to be highlighted, thereby increasing national awareness. In this way, national integrity and sovereignty would be reinforced. Therefore, a complete programme, to develop a frontier schools network, providing students with board and room accommodation, was to be introduced.

This education aimed to provide equal opportunities for pupils to use educational services, and give them easy access to the main country's cultural centres. Teacher training should incorporate a study of the special knowledge and personal attributes demanded by this education. Frontier schools children would enjoy spe-
cial assistance to continue studying, once the possibilities offered in their villages or regions were exhausted (ODEPLAN, 1978, 499-500).

Shortly afterwards, the Education Ministry achieved a 100% school attendance for children and adults in Easter Island. Native language teaching, and labour training were included from 1st to 6th grade, to preserve their culture (Presidente, Chile, 1980, 506).

Chile gave frontier schools a great importance. The Education Ministry stated in 1974 the need to rationalize these schools infrastructure, by means of relocating them, transferring the teachers, and developing an 'ad hoc' curriculum, transforming these schools in the heart of communitarian development (Junta de Gobierno, (b) 1974, 23). The wording of this statement did not have any geopolitical connotation. In 1975 the Ministry informed of its interest, to give special support to these schools (Presidente, Chile, 1975, 396).

It was not until 1977 that ODEPLAN included in their national planning, frontier education as a distinctive one. They were to provide equal opportunities to their students in comparison with other places in the country, and they should be providing access to the main national cultural centres. Children living in frontier places should be provided with a reinforced national values education.

The frontier educational policy would have common guidelines at all levels, including increased assistance programmes, to solve isolation problems. Finally, ODEPLAN stated the need to provide economic support for frontier school students to continue their training in places with better educational facilities (ODEPLAN, 1977, 34-5). Later P.N.I.D. 1978-1983, reasserted this policy with no change (ODEPLAN, 1978, 499-500). Pinochet’s "Directiva Presidencial sobre la Educación" stated
Plainly the 'frontier schools plan will be continued and completed' (Pinochet, 1979, 4.2.8), and he did not add any nationalistic or geopolitical remark about this issue.

Existant grants for isolated places [Laws Nos 17,551 and 18,681] for students to continue studies in other regions were continued by the A.A.F.F. government. They included board and room or travel expenses only. This special programme was due to the isolated conditions of Eastern and Juan Fernández Islands and XI Region, in which most communications and services depended on Argentina. Only in 1988 were Easter and Juan Fernández islands included. Travel and lodging expenses to 165 students were also provided in 1989 (Presidente, Chile, 1989, 204).

Maybe the most interesting, original, and symbolic initiative from the Chilean government, was to create a school in the Antarctic. This school was the by-product of a government initiative to settle the issue of sovereignty in the continent, by means of appointing personnel and providing opportunities to carry with them their families. Also, children have been born at Chilean bases, and they required education. A natural step was to create 'Escuela Villa Las Estrellas' [Village School of the Stars] in the Chilean Antarctic Province (Presidente, Chile, 1986, 196).

It is evident that the Chilean military government did not create an educational system from scratch, many of the laws that founded existing system were used by them, others were their own creation. The main difference between military government and prior civilian governments from left, centre or right of the political spectrum lay in the emphasis given to these programs related to provide facilities for study to the inhabitants of parts of the country, increasing the sense of belonging and national identity.
Authority Concept

One of the highest values for A.A.F.F. all over the world is authority. All their structure is heavily dependent on this value. For L.A. civilians on the contrary this is a dull concept. The importance given to this concept is clearly evident in the decision to assert it by means of the curriculum and other documents in both governments.

a) Argentina

The Argentinian education Ministry in 1979 decided to highlight authority concept, and to infuse it into citizens' lives. School was used as a tool to attain this goal due to its duty going beyond strictly intellectual issues. Argentina had suffered for a long time authority crises. Therefore, school should develop activities to make this concept meaningful, because it is at the root of orderly societies. Students should learn how to live in a free, and orderly environment, reinforced by the presence of real and not merely formal authority. It would facilitate respectful, and responsible attitudes toward authority.

With this purpose a nation wide competition for schools was promoted. Their main goals were: 1. to elucidate the concept, and scope of authority, 2. to prove, using historic and daily life examples, the essential qualities of authority, 3. to link freedom, authority, and responsibility, 4. to provide students with opportunities to appreciate the responsible use of authority in society, 5. to facilitate within the students a positive attitudes toward whom have positions of authority. Head teachers and teachers were charged to promote comprehension of the authority concept (Secretario Educación, Argentina, (a) 1979, 1-2).
The competition itself was the object of another resolution, in which different approaches were used to motivate all the primary and secondary education students, from private and public schools, including physical and intellectually handicapped students. The competition was titled "Autoridad Auténtica y Responsable" [Authentic and Responsible Authority]. Guide lines were provided to enable the competition to a better understanding of the authority concept. Among them, the link between authority and ethics, authority as a function and as a quality, authority undertaken by will, development of authority consciousness and symbolic representations, authority domains and relationship with family, school, work place, city council, state and others.

National heroes, and outstanding human characters should be used as authority prototypes, in the search for representatives of moral authority in daily life. Prizes for winners would be decorations, objects provided by schools or given to them. The presentation of works should be publicly promoted (Secretario Educación, Argentina, (b) 1979, 8-10).

Evidently morality was one of the most important issues for the Argentinian government. Therefore, it was not surprising that this ethic were discussed first, and then became an object of a 'recomendación' from F.E.C. (C.F.C. y E., (i) 1983, 38).

The F.E.C. recommendation asserted: that since ethics is an essential structure of conduct, it should therefore become the entire curriculum guideline, as much in theory as in practice. All subject issues included in the curriculum should be a useful tool for moral development, and for improving the ability to create individual and social ethics. The main tools for developing ethic, should be historic and modern data, to make youngsters aware of the moral norm, the need to incorporate it into their personality as an ideal, and foundations of acts (C.F.C. y
b) Chile

The Chilean A.A.F.F. government in their 'Declaración de Principios' D.P.G.Ch., gave great importance to authority, within Portales' tradition, of authority as a principle and not embodied in persons (Junta Gobierno, Chile, (a) 1974, 5.3). In this sense, Chile has had a longer tradition of respect for authority than most of its neighbours, allowing Chile to develop a democracy, well in advance of most other L.A. countries. The reinforcement of the authority principle was stated again in the Objetivo Nacional [O.N.] When related to the Presidential authority, respect for hierarchy was added to this concept (Gobierno, Chile, 1981, 2.b).

Despite the Chilean government's inspiration which was founded in the Christian conception of man and in the Christian a nationalistic conception of society, the latter were scarcely evident in educational legislation and projects. Even when some of them pointed to this aim. 'Ethics' was endangered as a subject due to decree 300, which suppressed philosophy in all grades at high school but the 12th. In the latter there existed three class hours a week, but since at that level there existed a 76% drop-out rate, only a very restricted minority would have the opportunity to study ethics (Jiménez et ál, (a) 1981, 112). The public demand for not reducing the study of philosophy was so great that in December 1982, the Ministry included it again in the 11th grade (Ministro Educación, Chile, 1982).
Education: doctrinal principles

a) Argentina

The 'Consejo Federal de Educación' [Federal Education Council, F.E.C.] activities were visible very soon through the production of several 'Resoluciones' related to Argentinian Education doctrinaire principles, as means to develop education goals and ends.

The main goals were, to develop an integral and permanent educational system, which would enable Argentinians to control their behaviour and put it at the service of their transcendental destiny; to play the lead by means of their creativity, able to use criticism as a tool for development and able to transform their society, to enhance common good, in agreement with traditional Christian moral values, and Argentina's dignity.

General objectives were directed to the student's achievement of religious, aesthetics, to perform right and duties, and family values. To develop intellectual abilities as creativity, critical judgement, research and technological aptitudes, and permanent education. To develop self esteem and an adequate personality, and body and mental care. Five objectives were directed towards the promotion of national development: 1. reinforcing national institutions and culture, 2. security, 3. law and order defence, 4. national interest defence, and 5, to increase international relations with other nations.

The most important elements to achieve these goals were: the family's duty and natural right to educate their children, and to choose educational institutions that fit their interest: the state as a promoter of common good had the duty and right
to insure citizens education. Spiritual education belonged to the Roman Apostolic Catholic Church, and other religions with official status.

A strategy was developed to facilitate relations between schools and the students' home. Schools were to establish a communication link with parents to answer all questions related to the school and the students' activities. They were to organize parents' visits during class hours, to develop extra curriculum activities that would increase parents support, among them a welcome reception for first years students, to prepare meetings with parents as soon as the first work month had ended, to inform them about regulations and the marking system, to present objectives of different courses, and all activities able to promote a close link between schools, students, parents, and teachers (Ministro Educación, Argentina, (c) 1979, 15-16).

The Church and all kind of institutions could perform activities tending to achieve educational goals in agreement with their aims, to participate in educational planning guide by the state, to create and administer all kind of schools, and to receive a share of national education budget. The State had as its mission the need to design, and control educational policy, to promote institutions and individual educational rights, and to support and enhance family, and community participation in the educational process.

The state had the exclusive right to manage all aspects related with patriotic and civic education, and to create institutions to educate people in charge of custody, defence of sovereignty, and national integrity. Even when not directly related with education but intimately linked to military style, the Argentinian state recognizes itself as belonging to a Christian culture, therefore it should reject any activity, especially by the mass media, that attempts to be against: national foundations, insti-
tutions, peace, order, national emblems, morality, and family integrity (F.E.C., (a)1976, 47-50).

All these educational goals and objectives were included in the 'Objetivos Pedagógicos del Nivel Primario y del Nivel Medio' [Primary and High School Objectives]. They added, in relationship to high schools only, two administrative divisions: a basic or puberty cycle, and an adolescent or superior cycle (F.E.C., 1977, 42 onwards).

Minister Bruera defined the elaboration of these goals and objectives as 'a significant step towards an ancient national aim, an education system able to answer demands, problems, and requirements of each province without loosing an unified educational policy' (Bruera, (a) 1977, 80).

Afterwards, a plan was developed to transform high school, this was "Programa: Hacia una Renovación de la Escuela Media". Its main aim was succinctly described as 'to inspire students to learn how to study and to love knowledge; evaluation should consider students as a whole, to support their efforts and desire of improvement; high school should help students vocational decisions, and strengthen links between the students home and the school' (Ministro Educación Argentina, (d) 1979, 15-6).

Problems demanding solution were: a) learning difficulties, and low student achievements; b) inefficient teaching techniques; c) lack of communication between the school and students' parents; d) lack of knowledge and attitudes to working life and to continue studies at tertiary and university level (Ministro Educación, Argentina, (e) 1979, 1-2).
To solve the problems previously stated, it required teachers re-training to make them prone to produce in their students attitude changes, to develop guided intellectual abilities, to use research and group dynamics in their classes. By improving these fields, students should increase their knowledge and understanding of class contents.

As a solution to these deficiencies, three projects were designed: first, guided study and research should be incorporated permanently into the learning-teaching process, this experience would be based on, literature, history, mathematics, and biology. The main reason for this selection was, that they demanded different learning styles, and were at the same time foundations for other studies. Second, evaluation and standardizing. Education demands permanent learning and evaluation as functions of clear and shared objectives, a cooperative evaluation should be carried out including teachers, students, and parents. It included, evaluation diagnoses to detect and reinforce weak learning, and to reinforce strong points. Standardizing activities were to be performed using prior evaluations, two reinforcement periods were to be scheduled, one at half term and another at the end. Third, a vocational counselling project was not described and existed no evidence of being into action in the period under study (Ministro Educación, Argentina, (d) 1979, 1-5). Soon 29 high schools were appointed along the country to be centres for experimentation and research for this trial (Ministro Educación, Argentina, (e) 79, 5-6).

Primary schools were the object of similar interest, F.E.C. proposed a set of guidelines to evaluate achievements and to provide unity to the education system, they included: 1. to select and rank primary schools objectives which would be valid for the whole country; 2. to design an integral and permanent evaluation system to guarantee well organized information related with students objectives and goals achievement; 3 to design proper methodologies and strategies to use evaluation in-
struments; 4. to use evaluation data as foundations for planning, study programmes design, and teachers re-training; 5 to create evaluation teams at education ministries in the provinces, and to use their findings as feedback for high school changes (C.F.C. y E., (j) 1983, 49-51).

b) Chile

Education general objectives for Chile were stated by the Junta de Gobierno. To accomplish them they needed a continuing renovation and adaptation to changes demanded by the Nation. Changes should be planned, with a wide participation from different social groups in order to include their interests and needs. The planning should be founded in realistic assumptions that permit the achievement of pursued goals. Systematic experimentation should be an important stage in policy development; no innovation should be introduced without prior experimental trial, and permanent in-depth evaluation, of objectives should be performed in order to improve outputs.

Under the subsidiarity principle, pluralism should become one of the distinctive characteristics of education development. The state should support educational activities of society at large, keeping just enough control to secure public interest. When evaluating different alternatives it would take into account the role of family, church, unions, and enterprise. Continuing education—understood as a life long activity—was included in A.A.F.F. government goals.

Among the most important Chilean educational goals were: a) to produce a balance between the educational system's structure, and the country and peoples need, b) to improve the learning process at all levels, c) to improve the educational environment.
The achievement of an equilibrium between the state and people needed to increase the educational offer to achieve a 100% student attendance to school, and, most important, to keep them there until they completed the eight years of compulsory education. To achieve this goal, it was necessary to consider the problems of three types of underprivileged people: socio-economic, geographic, and cultural outsiders. The first group should be helped by grants directed towards the poor; the second by developing and improving a frontier area net of schools; the third group including all ethnic minorities, by means of a new cultural programme directed at them.

The aims of these changes were to produce a flexible type of education that enabled the recipients change smoothly from one level to a higher one. Vocational education should be integrated into employment, providing work skills in short periods of time either at the moment the student started to work, or immediately after actually working. This improvement would have two main trends; a) refreshing skills needed at work, and b) general cultural development.

Curricula development in primary and secondary schools should include: a) specific intellectual training to facilitate the students becoming integrated into their environment, and to be useful as the foundations of more practical abilities in the future, b) specific vocational training to allow the students to become integrated into productive life. Both aspects were complementary and the former should be at the beginning, in order to let the students experiment and find their own way through life.

The degree of knowledge improvement should be provided by a flexible education, well adapted to the individual. Curricula design should include a variety of patterns that permitted experimentation for both, teachers and students. These in-
clude the use of new evaluation methods that permit students' to use their own learning rhythm. All these innovations should be researched to evaluate methodologies, and teaching material.

All these changes would place the student in a completely new environment, one of its main characteristics should be to increase students' responsibility in the use of new opportunities. To support them, a complete counselling system should be provided, allowing them to use their responsibility with a better foundation. At primary school, counselling would include parents, to help them show how to improve their children's learning. Adult education and drop outs should receive an educational package better adapted to their needs and experience.

Nursery schools presented a more complex situation in which it was hard to make a distinction between health, poverty, cultural environment, and other problems affecting education. Therefore, not one form of educational planning could solve all of them at once. Despite this fact, the government would increase formal training at nurseries, providing special care for a lower income population. Nevertheless, the following step was to improve child care within the family environment by means of education provided for pregnant women, and for parents whose living standards put their children at risk.

Handicapped students were subject to attention in educational policies. Fundamental change in this policy was an attempt to place the students, as far as possible, in regular schools by means of special groups within them, retraining teachers to work with these type of students, and providing a more flexible system of evaluation and promotion. These new style aims was to avoid the social, educational, and psychological margination of handicapped students (Junta Gobierno, Chile (b) 1974, 2-13).
Culture Management

a) Argentina

The F.E.C. presented a law project to reunite two bodies: the Education Council and the Culture Coordination Council (C.F.C. y E., (a) 1980, 37). The main reasons for creating this new body was the Culture Coordination Council's failure to work properly in the domain of its responsibility. From 1973 to 1976 it had only one meeting, whereas the Education Council had periodical meetings and seemed to be an efficient institution. In addition, President Videla and the A.A.F.F. Commander in Chief agreed to emphasize the strengthening of federal culture (C.F.C. y E., (e) 1983, 23).

The feeling of an endangered national unity—a very sensitive issue for A.A.F.F.—made them react. They decided to reunite culture and education into the same Federal Council. The main goals should be: to plan, coordinate, advise, and agree national cultural policy. Council missions were: to draft cultural policies including law changes, settle priorities, and propose them to the government. To coordinate, and provide guidelines to transform plans into action, and to evaluate cultural activities, finally to use culture and education to consolidate natural institutions: family, city councils, provinces, and nation (Gobierno, Argentina, 1980, 7-9).

In November 1979, the new Federal Council drafted a list of themes to be studied at the Council's permanent committees. Priorities should be set up by the executive committee. Themes were transformed into six different programmes, all of them included one or more sub-programs. The first one was cultural research, to study Argentinian cultural reality in order to find her national spirit. It had three sub programmes a) cultural enquiry, b) mass media's influence on urban, and frontier population, and c) a joint research programme with the Foreign Affairs Ministry.
to study the influence and projection of the Argentinian culture in Spanish America, and a national cultural policy for the region. The second programme, was related to the preservation and protection of cultural patrimony. It included: to draft a cultural patrimony defence law, to maintain and restore art and historic heritage, and the defence of archaeological sites. The third programme, was related to cultural promotion. It included competitions, courses for cultural leadership, technical support, the creation of centres for cultural developing, grants, creation of popular libraries, subsidies, a national craftsmanship market, and a national fund to develop art. The fourth programme, included cultural development by means of presentations of national artistic groups, cultural tourism, international cultural exchange. The fifth, and sixth programmes, included cultural cooperation among the state and private institutions and improvement of cultural services (C.F.C. y E., (b) 1980, 63-68).

It seems that urgency existed for action. This new Federal Council afterwards had to deal with something that normally is the first step in any project, to set down objectives. Only in December 1980, were they stated, and they followed closely work scheduled for the previous year. They included the need to reinforce the Christian and Western life style, ethical values, tradition, and historic heritage; to contribute to the Argentinian's people integration founded on traditional values and identity; to strengthen the subsidiarity principle in cultural issues founded in the relationship of culture, freedom, and the common good (C.F.C. y E., 1981, 65).

In 1981 the cultural policy was redefined once again as: 'a global strategy to reinforce, consolidate, and protect nation's cultural patrimony, as an efficient tool for survival from external expansionist cultures affecting the authentic Argentinian way of life'. The cultural defence required a clear definition, drafted by provinces
of areas included in this concept and to design objectives to strengthen the national culture.

The cultural objectives included were: to reinforce the Argentinian cultural awareness; to promote culture in borderline zones; to promote the defence of the national heritage; to reinforce the sense of belonging to a national, territorial, and provincial culture; to reinforce the mass media as tools to develop national culture; and finally, to strengthen reading habits (C.F.C. y E., (a) 1982, 55-60).

In December 1981, the F.E.C. drafted the most complete frontier analysis since they started debates on this problem. They re-defined again the frontier concept, this time with higher accuracy, 'it is a transition zone between nations, under mixed cultural influences, and socio-politic pressures of border countries'. Its main characteristic was the circulation of people, goods and services across borders. The Argentinian vast hinterland, almost inhabited, had become peripheral not only in a geographical sense, but in a real one. These zones were also breaking their links with, or had a weak integration within the country. Even in areas of high population and development, where cities existed, there was a weak link with the country as a whole due to the tremendous influence of neighbour countries, as in Misiones, next to the Brazilian border.

People's rootless and lack of national identity were considered a cultural problem, for in frontier areas there exists a cultural no mans land. Integration was understood as a life style that included: tradition, values, history, religion, language, habits, and folklore. If all these elements are missing or weakened, national identity is endangered. Therefore, sovereignty was endangered too.
Symptoms of cultural disintegration worried the Argentinian government, confirming their belief that this problem was closely tied to national defence. The number of foreigners living in some Argentinian provinces were larger than the native citizens, if we include first generation foreigner's children. Cultural assimilation had been hard to achieve, evidently due to low naturalization numbers (C.F.C. y E (c) 1982, 121).

The foreign mass media also contributed to these of no mans land feelings, diminishing the ability to assimilate local or national set of values. The Argentinian laws proved to be inefficient in providing an integral cultural policy for border areas. The F.E.C. stated a set of objectives and responsibilities that did not differ greatly from previous ones (op cit, 117-23).

All attempts to produce a workable and efficient cultural policy failed, and soon this responsibility was taken out of the F.E.C.'s hands. A new law separated culture from education at ministerial level. Culture would depend directly on the Argentinian President, due to: 'the need to reassert the importance of cultural factors, rescuing P.R.O. fundamental objectives of consolidating values and cultural aims of the Argentinian being'. The Education Ministry's power of decision-making was severely limited by this law. Not only had it lost Culture, but Science and Technology as well. At the same time, it had to share planning Ministry objectives, policy drafts, plan performing, programmes, and projects, with a Planning Minister without portfolio (Gobierno, Argentina, 1981, 4367-76).

The Culture Minister, without portfolio, Dr. Julio Cesar Gancedo, was invited to the F.E.C. to explain the reasons for this split. His main arguments were: National Academies demanded that the Planning Ministry should create a separate Ministry to manage cultural affairs. The government refuse to create it because, it did not want
another bureaucratic office. Instead, the government found a different way to enhance culture by means of creating the post of a Minister without Portfolio 'Secretaría de Cultura de la Presidencia de la Nación' (C.F.C. y E., (e) 1983, 22-24).

b) Chile

The Chilean cultural policy was not directly mentioned in the 'Declaración de Principios del Gobierno de Chile' [D.P.G.Ch.], although cultural change was one of the main aims of the A.A.F.F. government, and pervaded the whole document. Culture was in the charge of the Education Ministry, but in its 1974 educational policies draft, it assigned only 19 lines to this subject in a 24 page single line document. It simply stated that education was the best tool to produce cultural transformation (Junta Gobierno, Chile, (b) 1974, 1.5).

It was not until 1975, that a special task force created by the government, began to draft plans for cultural development. The Education Ministry, and Junta de Gobierno Cultural Council were to design projects to create, improve, and stimulate the Nation's cultural activities.

Besides, any specific duty imposed by the Education Ministry, and Cultural Council, this task force should: design cultural policies to be performed through education; 2. to suggest the best means to expand cultural communications; 3. to study educational plans and subject matters and to produce suggestions how to reinvigorate its cultural contents; 4. to draft guidelines to ensure coordination and fostering all Nation's cultural activities, specially the ones supported by state offices; 5. to draft short and medium range projects to improve teacher training related with cultural issues; 6. to propose devices to enable mass media to develop activities compatible with government cultural aims (Gobierno, Chile, 1975).
Cultural policy started to move more in line with the A.A.F.F. government only in 1977, when E.N.D.E.S. defined culture as: 'a state of mind that drives people in a nation to organize their lives in agreement to a values scale, promoting an original way of thinking, behaviour, and living, making the difference in face to other people. Culture makes the difference between a nation from the others'.

The main objectives were: 1. to define the essence and what the nation ought to be; 2. to instil in Chilean people the most noble national spirit; 3. to promote in society the most diverse cultural elements; 4. to increase Chilean self awareness, promoting the blooming of their own values; 5. to open wide the country to external constructive cultural influences coincident with desired values.

As specific objectives to promote culture throughout the country were stated: to support art, to enhance people's knowledge of 'Declaración de Principios', to sketch a clear picture of the Chilean future and its peoples' role, to promote state understanding, to enhance the knowledge of Chilean history and geography. To improve knowledge of Chilean resources, and love for the place in which they live, were another important part of the cultural policy.

Useful tools to develop these ideas included the creation of several institutions designed to promote and decentralize culture such as the Teacher's Cultural Institute, National Restoration Institute, and travelling art exhibitions. Support to students and labour unions for their cultural activities, the promotion of craftsmanship, a wide use of the mass media to enhance people's knowledge of their own country were also included. The main administrative policy was to transform the Education Ministry into an Education and Culture Ministry, and to promote international interchange (ODEPLAN, 1977, 39-41).
A clear concept of culture as an important defence tool, was clearly stated in national planning, when referring to practice of sports. 'Basically at the roots of the national moral strength, and its expansion power, lies people's basic culture society's self defence spirit is directly linked to their own values, in which they believe... this is why a country should develop an esprit de corps and be ready to defend their land and values' (ODEPLAN, 1978, 112).

ODEPLAN's only document devoted entirely to cultural policy, including many features of documents previously quoted. Among new aspects, were the link between the family and cultural progress, and support to low income families to incorporate them in the country's main cultural trends. Culture and mental health links were considered in this document; at the roots of this problem was a socio-cultural deprivation in the first years of life, and as a consequence the state was to help that segments of population by all means, especially by early stimulation programmes. As diagnoses stated, the first years of childhood are the most vulnerable, and educational resources should be relocated favouring those social groups. Therefore, most of the investment should be allocated into pre-primary and primary education, in the first two grades, that means children up to eight years old.

The main policies stated in this document were directly related to school activities. Curricula changes should be introduced to reinforce values and student's spiritual needs, through a flexible curriculum, and development of artistic abilities among students. Minority cultures should be protected, and their members integrated into national culture (ODEPLAN, 1979).

A supplementary document stated the main goals that link culture to education. It reasserted some basic principles as: 'Without a clear ideal it is impossible to build a society able to generate a process to bound transcendent values to the hu-
man being... The main, distinctive values, that characterize our national being are Christian life values, such as solidarity, freedom, and respect for the transcendent nature of the human being... the strength and awareness of these cultural values, will determine social cohesion degree, the sense of belonging to a community, and fatherland roots. These values are the backbone of the country's freedom, national security, and Chilean's life quality... [moreover] the country should promote a cultural development whose objective is to achieve solidarity that guides individuals self fulfilment as a partnership in building a transcendent task' (ODEPLAN, 1979, 6).

Further refinements to cultural policy were developed in P.D.E.Ch. 1983-1989, among them, the conferment of national decorations and prizes on artists, thinkers, and teachers, together with national art competitions awards. At school should be promoted student's artistic abilities, and finally public libraries should be opened throughout the country (ODEPLAN, 1982, 43-4).

Conclusions

Moral and civic values were at the root of the formal stated educational policy designed by both military governments. They were aware of the need to strengthen the links among the people and the nation, and to create a new 'modus vivendi'. The characteristics of this new way of life was permeated by religious feelings as foundations of morality, and by a conscious civic participation that let them avoid the risks of excessive partisanship that had plagued both Argentina for many years, and Chile prior to, and during Allende's government.

These two characteristics are sometimes shared by some civilians governments, but in the case under study, they are clearly highlighted, and went beyond
what is normal in civilian ones. They become a quantitative, as well as a qualitative, change in educational philosophy and policies. Both military governments, aimed to change an ideological education to one founded on a distinctive philosophy, especially in the case of Chile (Jiménez et al., (b) 1981, 234-238).

National spirit, and national unity, were another couple of values which the military tried to instil, by means of their educational policies. These values included geopolitics, in which the understanding of the vast Argentinian hinterland was endangered due to the inhabitants lack of sense of belonging to the nation. The same feeling was held by the Chilean government but to a lesser degree.

The concept of National Unity was strongly tied to society's basic cell, 'the family'. Its reinforcement had a twofold root. On one side, a religious foundation linked to Christian values, was evident in Chilean attempts to defend life, since conception is in the most pure Christian Catholic tradition. On the other side, was its social character, which could prevent all the social diseases that affected both countries. Both military governments promoted religious beliefs, more vocal were the Argentinians than Chileans. Despite this, the latter was able to reintroduce religion classes at schools after more than half a century of their elimination in Chile. Only Islamic Fundamentalist countries have been able to do so in these times. This fact identified both governments with a style that neither Conservative nor Christian political parties have dared to imitate, providing in this way, strong support for the existence of a value based military policy.

The attempts to reinforce national unity by means of education, had its highest point in 'Frontier Education' policies developed in the period under study. There was considerable evidence of their attempts to reinforce the links with their
territories, some of them thousands of miles apart as the Chilean Easter Island, or the Argentinian immense Patagonia.

National security was another characteristic of both governments. In this case it was based on the clear awareness of a weakened social fabric, which could endanger the nation's existence. This characteristic illustrated the great difference with civilian governments in Argentina and Chile, which traditionally have showed little interest in this problem. National security values in the Argentinian and Chilean style became one of the most notable military government characteristics that distinguished them from their civilian counterparts. Their nationalistic tendencies, were far removed from the chauvinistic and expansionist ones that had emerged in Europe, and other places in the first decades of this century. Argentinian and Chilean style nationalism is related more to love for the fatherland in a sentimental fashion, rather than in an expansionist one.

The unity of the educational system was another noticeable characteristic of both governments. It differed only in style—more military like in Argentina—in which there is evidence of an attempt to produce uniformity throughout the country. The Chilean style differed because it was believed that unity should be provided in a controlled diversity model with a great deal of freedom allowed for public, and private education.

Culture was understood by both as the best tool to introduce permanent changes into their societies. Unfortunately, aims did not become reality, probably due to the complexities of producing cultural change that surpassed their ability to introduce changes in this field.
Illiteracy in both countries was not an important issue because the rates of school enrolment, and permanency at school were high in both countries; nevertheless they started public campaigns against it due to three main reasons. The first one was founded on national pride, for the military was shocked that two countries with a solid cultural tradition could suffer such a 'disease'. The second one was related to human resources improvement. This saw illiterates as a dead weight in modern societies, since their usefulness to contribute to the country's economic development, or to the armed defence are low. The third one was military. They were persuaded that ignorance is the most fruitful ground for demagoguery, and body politics were not safe, if a mass of uneducated people existed.

Even when it would sound contradictory, but consistent with findings of the previous chapters, the idea of creating a stronger democracy was present in most of the policies designed in this period. Wide participation of parents, teachers and students was clearly stated in promulgated laws, official statements, and discourses, as much in Argentina and Chile. All of them noted the need for civic participation, reinforcement of constitutional rights, and political awareness.

Once again, it is necessary to emphasize that differences in policies among civilian governments and military ones are a matter of degree, but that there exists strong evidence of a reinforced set of values dear to the military.
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Chapter VII

Sectorial policies

Argentinian Federal Education law, Chilean Organic Constitutional Law

a) Argentina

An interesting Argentinian project that did not become a fact, was the attempt to draft a Federal Education Law. Minister Llerena Amadeo stated this law was an old national aim, delayed too long. At the root of this law should be: freedom to teach and to learn; parent's right to educate their children, therefore the right to choose a school for them; co-ordination among family, associations and minor civil groups; and the collaboration of various religious communities, especially the Catholic Church, due to their high importance into Argentinian social fabric.

This would be an organic federal law. Federal because it would rule nation, province and city councils. The proper place to draft and agree this law should be the Federal Education Council, F.E.C. onwards. It should be organic, because it would place into one legal tool all mixed and scattered pieces of educational legislation. It would regulate only the important matters from pre-primary school to universities, and would become an important source for education co-ordination (Llerena, 1980, 3 onwards).

An enquiry was carried out before the law was drafted, and more than three hundred personalities and institutions answered it. The F.E.C. analyzed data, and
planned to open public consultation, through the mass media. A special department would receive and process people's enquiries or provide information when required.

Education goals should be the integral, harmonic, and permanent development of each individual, in agreement with their essential values, vocation, and common good. State education should guarantee prevailing rights, and accomplishment of duties stated by the law. This means: to provide an educational service in agreement with students' needs; to guarantee the free cost of primary compulsory education; to provide social and economic assistance to poor people. The State's should supervise the educational system output and should guarantee the accomplishment of goals.

The Argentinian national government should have the monopoly of: patriotic and civic education, custody and defence of national sovereignty; general planning of public education; the management of state education offices, and the supervision of private education.

Organization guidelines included: (a) To built an efficient, and effective educational system founded on law. A national planning system should co-ordinate, and would perform policies accepted by the national executive power in agreement with the Federal co-ordination regime. (b) General curriculum should be designed at three levels; national, provincial and institutional [school]. National executive power should be responsible for national educational curriculum foundations. Each province should design their own bases for the curriculum by means of developing, adequating, and widening national ones, and the same process should be performed at each school. The University curriculum should be designed by universities and approved by the Executive power. (b) Educational guidelines included the identifications of the basics that should be included in any curriculum. They were
related to due respect for students personality, equilibrium, and integrality of their education.

Federal Law was expected to provide great benefits, among them: system unity and integrality, to ease relationships between nation, provinces, and educational institutions. It should ensure the system's flexibility, because as a general law it would permit the avoidance of excessive regulations, one of the worst characteristics of the Argentinian bureaucratic system. It would also provide education versatility in responding to socio-cultural changes (Llerena, 1981, 1-9).

b) Chile

Chile, as a unitary country, did not need to pass a national education law; instead, the government included in the 1980 Constitution the 'Leyes Orgánicas Constitucionales' [Constitutional Organic Laws] on certain specific matters, among them education. This law would permit the state to regulate minimum requirements and norms for primary, secondary and high school education, and for official recognition of educational institutions at all levels (Presidente, Chile (a) 1980).

An Organic Constitutional law, according to the Chilean Constitution, is a special kind of law that according to the Constitutional Tribunal verdict in 1981 is inferior only to the Constitution but is superior to ordinary laws (Squella 1989, 14).

The main characteristics of this kind of law are: 1. The Chilean Constitution stated which subjects should be regulated by law; moreover, some specific subjects, due to their importance, should be regulated by a special type of law, the Organic Constitutional law. 2. The Chilean Constitution stated that this Law could be passed, modified, or abolished with the agreement of three-fifths of the members of Parliament in both chambers (Presidente, Chile (a) 1980, art 63). Later this was
modified to five-sevenths majority. 3. The Constitutional Tribunal would declare constitutional or unconstitutional an Organic Constitutional Law before it was passed according its article 82, No1. 4. The Chilean President could not be allowed by Parliament to pass decrees with the force of law on subjects that were in the field of law when dealing with matters that are proper to an Organic Constitutional Law (op. cit.) according article 61, 2nd paragraph.

By means of this law, the A.A.F.F. government aimed to state some permanent rules of the game for education, and to settle some principles important for them. Among others these included: a) the minimum requirements to be achieved at primary, and secondary schools and the state's duty to care for their achievements; b) to establish firmly the principle that parents have the right and duty to educate their children, and the state should guarantee this right, in addition to having the duty to support and develop education.; c) the Chilean state should protect educational freedom; d) the state has the duty to improve scientific and technological research, and to increase the nation's cultural heritance.

The minimal requirements for primary and secondary education to be achieved by students included several values highly appreciated by the A.A.F.F. such as: a) to develop patriotic feelings; b) to have a good knowledge and be sympathetic to historic development, values and national traditions; c) to be creative, rigorous, and able in original thinking, and to adopt initiatives; d) to ensure the ability to build a life project founded on an adequate spiritual, moral, and civic education in agreement with Chilean culture; e) to participate in community life aware of their rights and duties and be prepared to become citizens.

Perhaps, one of the most interesting aspects of this Organic law is the task assigned to the Education Ministry, to design a periodic system of evaluation for
primary and secondary education, and to measure the achievement of fundamental objectives and minimal contents designed for both levels.

In regard to tertiary education, another interesting aspect was the creation of the 'Consejo de Educación Superior' [Education Superior Council], a pluralist body headed by the Education Ministry and including representatives of the Supreme Court, universities, professional institutes, a scholar appointed by the Commanders in Chief and the General Director of Carabineros. Among their rights were to create accreditation systems for new universities, and to suggest sanctions for institutions in the accreditation process to be executed by the Ministry.

As in the Argentinian case, included in university and other tertiary institutions' statutes, were a ban on students and clerical staff participating at high administration levels, and the right to vote in the elections of collegiate or personal authorities.

A special emphasis was added to the exclusion of politics from all education levels. All schools and other educational institutions recognized by the state, were forbidden to show any partisan political tendency.

Higher level training carried out by the military, including the 'Academias de Guerra' [War Academies], 'Academias Politécnicas Militares y Navales' [Military, and Navy Polytechnic Academies], the 'Escuela Técnica de la Dirección General de Aeronáutica' [Directorate of Civil Aeronautical Technical School], and the 'Instituto Superior de Ciencias Policiales' [Police Sciences Superior Institute], were to be assimilated to university training. In addition, they could award professional and academic degrees, included Masters and PhDs. in their fields of expertise. Lower level military and police schools and institutes, could award technicians diplomas.
and other tertiary level certification in their own fields of expertise (Presidente, Chile, 1990).

The spirit of this law pretended to reinforce some characteristic principles of Chilean A.A.F.F. government, aiming to provide permanent values and administrative regulations. Due to the high quorum required to amend an Organic Constitutional Law, they sought to make changes in it very difficult. Past experiences in Allende's times made them very sensitive to political indoctrination, considering it dangerous for a peaceful democratic life under the civilian governments.

The Constitutional precept guaranteeing parents rights to educate their children followed the same tendency, and agreed completely with Catholic Church principles. These right were heavily endangered during 1970-1973, under the 'Escuela Nacional Unificada' [Unified National School] ENU project. For this reason, among others it was included in the 1980 Constitution and reinforced in this Organic Constitutional Law.

Educational statistics

a) Argentina

Evidently Argentina did not have the necessary tools to evaluate their educational process. One of the F.E.C. committees should have attempted to make compatible national and provincial educational statistics. The aim of their work was to provide quantitative information as a source for making decisions. Therefore, they accepted a basic tabulation draft for pre-primary, primary, and handicapped education proposed by the committee, and recommended that the provincial governments,
should demand from head teachers, statistical information in a short span of time, sanctioning the ones who did not provide it on time.

The Nation and Provinces would jointly plan the work and data required, and then produce manuals with tabulation plans, basic language, form design, and methods of data manipulation. Data to be collected included, among others: enrolment statistics and variation of enrolment, type of school, desertion, students failures, and several items useful to produce quantitative evaluations, and to make decisions. National Schools statistics should be collected by national personnel, Provinces by their own staff, and as soon as national schools were transferred, the Provinces should carried out all statistical work (F.E.C., (a) 1978, 41-53).

The aims of manual design were: to facilitate comparisons among provinces, to portray problems and provide improvements, to produce international comparisons, to produce historical data and information related with system peculiarities, to give basic elements for concerted planning and evaluation, and finally to interpret and project educational needs in the short, medium and long term (C.F.C. y E, (a) 1980, 11).

A previous lack of compatibility among national and provincial statistics was evident, because at the same time that they designed forms, they had to produce a thesaurus to train personnel to fill them properly (op cit. 28 onwards).

b) Chile

The official Chilean statistics have been traditionally well developed, and have played an important role in the government's planning and decisions. Therefore, instead of developing a new system, the A.A.F.F. Government tried to improve it as much as possible. From 1973 to 1989, there were several improvements
to the statistics system such as centralized information about human, and economic resources, investment decisions, a complete teacher census in 1985, and finally statistical analysis by correlating data to provide a view of the education performance [see Memorias Presidenciales, 1974-1978].

Teachers-students Profiles

a) Argentina

One of the main characteristics of Argentinian education in the period under study, was the importance given to students and teachers profiles. These profiles were ideal portraits of both, and training should match students and teachers to this profile.

An ideal teacher should have definite characteristics. These can be summarized as: teaching is a vocation not just an ordinary job; a teacher should be the embodiment of Christian ethic and social involvement; a teacher should show superior intellect, able to master general scientific principles of education, and the special field they teach; a teacher should evidence emotional balance, and be physically and mentally healthy.

Professional training demands agreed with this profile. Its goals were high, and included: the study of philosophy, psychology, sociology, and biological foundations of education; the attainment of a good level of expertise in one's own area of teaching, interdisciplinary understanding; expertise in child, youngster, and adult development and psychology; expertise in curriculum design, evaluation, educational planning and research; a knowledge of education legal frame; ability to understand
social, economical, cultural and natural phenomenon related to education, and the like (C.F.C. y E., (b) 1980, 63-67).

F.E.C. recommended the training of teachers at tertiary level. The curriculum devised agreed completely with the professional profile, and the Argentinian government's main educational aims. For both, pre-primary and primary school teachers, training should be two years long, in a 1,400 hours work programme, this including one hundred devoted to practical works and classes observation. The curriculum was divided in two parts, 30% or 40% devoted to theoretical foundations, and 60% or 70% to technical professional matters. The minimal requirements for enrolment at teacher training institutions would be: high school licence, students from education baccalaureate could start classes immediately, students from other baccalaureates should be registered in special courses to standardize their knowledge. Maximum age for registration was 24 years old (C.F.C. y E. (a) 1983, 59-80).

It would seem evident that 1,400 hours of course were not enough to complete, nor acquire a good level of contents expertise in agreement with course descriptions. Theoretical and philosophical foundations were too extensive to be accomplished in 390 to 520 class-hours, unless the training became superficial. The same criticism can be made in relation to professional and technical aspects.

Nevertheless, the F.E.C. set up a basic criteria to evaluate the teachers training curriculum, based on a research design: problem statement, method, information collection, analysis and data evaluation.

In summary, curriculum evaluation should be reshaped if research results demanded it, a single criterion would be provided to co-ordinate training, and to de-
sign minimal guidelines. Each territory or province would produce, on that basis, their own curriculum (C.F.C. y E., (b)1983, 48-9).

b) Chile

The Chilean Education Ministry did not work out a proper profile, but nevertheless, it provided some clues about its philosophy and intentions. One of them was to improve teacher training, transferring all of them from 'Escuelas Normales' primary school teachers training centres, to universities (Junta Gobierno, Chile, (a) 1974, 14).

There were other guidelines related to this profile, a law was soon passed which included vocation to help others to enrich their personal development (Junta Gobierno, Chile, (b) 1974). In 1986 the Education Ministry provided other ideas relating this with permanent education and retraining, by means of the creation of a grant system for teachers working for the Education Ministry or city councils (Presidente, Chile, 1986). These bare statements could not be considered a 'proper profile', instead it meant that, apart from political partisanism that traditionally has divided Chilean teachers, their training had been satisfactory; therefore this was not an issue.

Teacher's Retraining and Salaries

a) Argentina

Retraining has been a tradition in L.A., and all governments have devised projects for teachers retraining to improve education. Argentinians did so; the F.E.C. opinion was that training and retraining were two tightly linked parts of pro-
fessional improvement. In service retraining, it should be a wide scope activity, able
to increase teachers' doctrine, human, and professional aspects.

The F.E.C. recommended in 1976, the creation of a national in-service-re-
training system in which should be included all institutions and offices, both public
and private, involved in education. To co-ordinate nation, territory, provinces, and
universities retraining efforts, demanded that nation and provinces should set pri-
orities and action schemes. The main teacher characteristics to be developed would
be: universality, ability for self improvement, and the joining of theory to daily work
(C.F.E., (a) 1976, 62-4.)

After two years of discussions related to in service retraining, the F.E.C.
produced one criteria change, due to a fear of over-bureaucratization and red tape.
Instead of creating a purpose built institution, the Federal Council declared that the
best way to achieve the goals of in service retraining was the proper use of existing
institutions (C.F.E. (b) 1978, 39-40).

The importance of in-service retraining had a twofold origin: first, was the
need to improve educational policies efficiency. Many attempts at curriculum and
evaluation innovation failed because teachers were not prepared to manage changes
in their daily work (Llerena, 1979, 15). Secondly, there was the need to introduce
teachers into military government aims and philosophy, as stated in teacher profiles.

All means were used to develop an in-service teacher retraining system, in-
cluding the support of international organizations. An agreement was reached be-
tween Argentina and United Nations development Special Fund to establish and im-
prove a National System for in-service retraining teachers (Ministro Educación,
Argentina, (a) 1979, 2-3).
Salaries, together with in-service retraining, have been one of the major reasons for teacher complaints. The Argentinian government tried to provide a solution to both, even when salary problems was undertaken only during the A.A.F.F. Government's last two years. The Ministers of Education in December 1982, took into consideration the need to equalize teachers salaries, and in March 1983 F.E.C. ordered the Permanent Committee to study the salaries system and set up guidelines for the implementation of change.

The Eighth Ordinary Assembly of F.E.C. agreed that decisions related to teacher's salaries should be made by the Council. They proposed to create a Permanent Committee, taking into account the urgent need to equalize salaries among the same positions in different provinces and territories (C.F.C. y E., (b) 1983, 55).

In order to construct a general pay roll scale, it was necessary to supplement a year's service bonus. Unfavourable conditions work meant that salaries were to be equalized by means of a value index scale, called 'Complemento Compatibilizador no Bonificable' [compatibility complement non subject to bonus]. The basic criteria were that the salaries of teachers with up to nineteen years services would be raised up to the Buenos Aires City Council level. The salary of teachers with over twenty years service would be raised to the level of the Province of Buenos Aires, the nation's highest. In addition, all seniority bonuses were raised by a 120% after twenty-four years work (Licciardo, 1983, 1-7). At the beginning, this was carried out at the national level; then the Ministry invited provinces, and city councils to follow this example, whereby basic salaries should be equivalent to Buenos Aires City Council.

All this meant a high salary increase for teachers belonging to the national system, at the same time it became a heavy load for provinces, which had received all
primary schools and their personnel, and which had to afford salary increases without proper support from the national government.

Salaries in education are intimately linked to contracts. Argentina and Chile have had a rather peculiar contract system, especially in high schools, in which teachers are hired by the class hour, normally dividing their work between different schools. Time to attend to the parents, or students, was scarce, making it difficult for out of class contacts, and imposing a heavy load on teachers.

Attempts to provide complete full time work at one school was recognized as an ideal scheme, able to ease teachers work load, and to improve qualitative and quantitative output. An attempt was made to change the contract regime in the Formosa Province. F.E.C. was delighted by the results of the experiment, the main benefits of which were: higher community participation, better educational management, improved attention to students, and a better use of students' extra class work.

Thanks to this system, a new school organization could be developed, in which extra class activities could reach 30% of the normal work load, teachers would be appointed for modules of 36, 30, 24, 18 and 12 week class hours, each of 40 minutes (C.F.E., 1979, 55-61). This system required new specialist support at high schools, they were: counselling advisors, educational psychologists, educational advisors, and assistant teachers. By 1980, there were 200 high schools included in this scheme.

b) Chile

Chilean teachers' salaries have always lagged behind other university graduates. The different governments have not been able to solve this problem in the past, and the future is not promising in this field. Among the first initiatives of the A.A.F.F. Government, was the attempt to establish a minimum salary for teachers in
private schools of 75% of the equivalent position in state owned schools (Junta Gobierno, Chile, (c) 1974).

In 1975, the government decided to reorganise the pay roll scale, shortening the payments range for high school teachers in a scale from 23 to 20 at the bottom end, and from 13 to 12 in the upper end. For primary school teachers from 26 to 23, and from 17 to 15 (Presidente, Chile, (a) 1975). This decree-law improved teachers salaries noticeably, but did not break the gap between them and other university graduates.

An attempt to reorganise the professional teachers career in 1987 was made, when the 'Carrera Docente' law was passed [teaching career law]. By means of this law teachers had a definite pattern to start their career, for promotions, salaries, bonuses, weekly work load, yearly qualification, general rights and duties. One of the most important articles for teachers stated that salaries could not be lower in the scale than the one before 'Carrera Docente' started (Presidente, Chile, (a) 1978).

The launching of 'Carrera Docente' was a major magnitude problem, for it was necessary to relocate in a new scale structure, all 90,000 Chilean teachers working for the government. The law presented some weak points that had to be adjusted, the 'Colegio de Profesores' [Teachers Association] participated in a special committee to improve the law. The whole project cost was estimated at 100 million U.S.A. Dollars a year (Presidente, Chile, (a) 1979, 450). Not only did teachers improve their salaries, but nearly 5,000 education clerical staff were promoted, and had salaries increases (Presidente, Chile, (b) 1980, 493).

This problem was not completely solved under the A.A.F.F. Government, for education transference to city councils changed the rules of the game once again.
The Government began to re-design the teachers career, but this task was left unfin-
ished under A.A.F.F. Government (Presidente, Chile, (a) 1989, 184).

The Chilean retraining policy was stated at the very beginning of the A.A.F.F.
Government. To transform the educational system qualitatively and quantitatively
required a better trained teacher. Main teachers' abilities would be related to major
national problems and national values. Their professional knowledge should be re-
spected and considered when planning educational activities (Junta Gobierno, Chile,
(a) 1974, 14 & 23).

ODEPLAN included teachers' retraining as the State's duty to provide perma-
nent retraining as a tool to improving education quality. The Education Ministry
should co-ordinate retraining activities with Universities, and both should motivate
teachers to participate in them. At the same time, it was stated that both initiatives
would become useless without an adequate salary policy. It was anticipated that the
final solution for teachers salaries should include the transfer of the educational
system administration from the government to intermediate societies. These change
would increase better employment and salaries for teachers (ODEPLAN 1977, 37).

Teacher retraining was a matter of consensus, therefore, the Education
Ministry immediately started retraining teachers at primary schools and high
schools. In 1974 there were 30,396 teachers retrained in different programmes, in
1975, 76, and 77, they were 61,539, 101,009, and 50,519 respectively (Presidente,
Chile, (b) 1978, 452). Year after year retraining activities were kept at high levels,
over tens of thousands of teachers yearly in the most varied programmes, specially
in TV, and non-resident courses. ODEPLAN in many other of their documents
related to education, stated once and again the importance of retraining. The
Presidential National Guidelines on Education [P.G.E.], highlighted retraining as the
best way to raise teachers' status, and stated the need to develop a grant programme at universities in Chile and abroad to retrain teachers, in addition to courses provided by CPEIP [Centre for Educational Research and Retraining].

Legislation recognized teachers rights to retraining. Law No 18,602 stated that city councils or educational corporations created by them, should provide all means to facilitate their teachers' participation in retraining activities or courses. In addition, city councils and its corporations should develop these activities in agreement with their possibilities and needs (Junta Gobierno, Chile, (a) 1987).

Another important retraining activity was to give teachers without a proper degree twelve years in which to obtain it. The end date was 1986. After this date there still remained some teachers without a degree. Many of them were to apply for retirement, and others for relocation (Presidente, Chile, 1987, 188-9). Since then, 100% of teachers at Chilean schools have gained their teaching degree. That meant several years of intensive study for most of them.

Adult Education

a) Argentina

In Argentina, the VII F.E.C. Ordinary Assembly recommended to demand from the Executive Power a gradual transference of adult education to provinces. The F.E.C. recognized adult education as completely different from young students' education. Therefore, it required a different teacher training.

The specific objectives of this education were: to train workers for jobs that fit local needs; to train people to adapt themselves to changes produced at their work
positions; to motivate adults to continuous learning, and to train them to understand general subjects. Other objectives were related to general moral values and to the National goals in education.

The adult education project was to be developed jointly by national and provincial governments in order to achieve a unified national education system. All complementary activities should be performed by public services and the private sector, both providing technical and economic support, with a clear division of responsibilities. The adult education system should be characterized by curriculum flexibility (F.E.C., (c) 1978, 59-66).

Afterwards, the F.E.C. suggested the need to institutionalize gradually teachers and personnel training for adult education. The starting point should be teachers at adult schools, and then the retraining of teachers from normal schools. Adult education training should start in universities' education schools, by means of postgraduate courses. Adult education teacher and personnel profile did not differ evidently from the other profiles previously described (C.F.C. y E., (c) 1980, 135-143).

The style of adult schools should range, from that of normal schools, to the informality of the ones working with scattered groups in such different places as factories, clubs, councils, churches halls, and others. Technical support was considered as important as social and health services, and psycho-educational, counselling, research, and retraining support were considered. The Curriculum organization was based on by units, with precise objectives oriented toward solution of the life problems, and with no fixed end term. This education was to be open to people older than the stated age for normal education (C.F.C. y E., (d) 1980, 79-84).
b) Chile

Chilean adult education's main policy was aimed at improving human resources, including the retraining of the labour force, to improve productive skills (Gobierno, Chile, 1981, 22). This included commerce, industry, agriculture, and mining. According to this policy a great number of different programmes were developed as 'Educación Fundamental de Capacitación Técnico-Profesional' [fundamental technical-professional training], 'Educación Fundamental de Capacitación Silvoagropecuaria' [fundamental training for farming-forestry productivity], and 'Educación Técnica Elemental de Adultos' [technical elemental adult training]. All of them were free courses to fit adults for their working life.

The main aims of these courses were to promote socio-economic development in agreement with local characteristics, to improve sanitary conditions at home and communities, to spread widely basic knowledge to enable inhabitants to assimilate scientific, technical, and social progress, and finally to contribute to the increase of habits, ideals, attitudes that help them to keep fit, use natural resources, develop new productivity techniques, improve family life, strengthen civic life, make good use of free time, and raise living standards.

Clients of this education should be people lacking primary education or for first level adult education, be older than 15 years of age, people without basic training, unable to use or improve elementary productive techniques and those wishing to raise their living standard. The curriculum included between 200 to 2,560, 45 minutes classes. They were divided in a common area which included general knowledge as basics of history and geography of Chile, social, ethics, family life, Spanish language and notions of mathematics. A technical area linked to productivity in their neighbourhood and aiming to help the individual to earn their life. A complementary area aiming to the cultural development of the individual, facili-
tating their ability to participate in local organizations related with art, sports and recreational activities.

The most interesting characteristics of these courses was that curriculum development was to be planned by institutions which provide training and adapt it to local needs, so they presented unlimited opportunities to train workers. The Education Ministry only studied the projects feasibility and accepted or rejected proposals (Presidente, Chile, (b) 1989).

Education of the handicapped

a) Argentina

The education of the handicapped was another important subject for F.E.C. In December 1978, the assembly agreed that 'enseñanza diferenciada' [differential education] had social negative connotations, suggesting to change it for 'educación especial' [special education]. Among the F.E.C.'s recommendations were: that the government should pass a law protecting handicapped students; that special education should be defined as that devoted to training children, youngster or adults whose personal characteristics demand either permanently or transitorily a special curriculum and support, different from ordinary schools, and a multi-specialist teaching approach.

Clients of this type of education would be people: who were physically, mentally, or socially handicapped; and, talented boys troubled by the slow pace of education within the regular system. These schools should enable students to face social and working life as independent human beings.
The Nation should provide special education services, supervise private special schools, promote teacher training, and provide regulations enhancing handicapped rights. Besides this, regulations should provide for professional services, salaries and social support for personnel (C.F.E., 1980 41-5). The F.E.C. VIII ordinary and I extraordinary meetings provided a Handicapped Thesaurus and an ideal pay roll for personnel.

Schools for handicapped individuals were to be divided into two categories: physical and social handicapped. The former, included sensorial and motor handicapped children who required the supervision of specialists within a normal or special school. Socially handicapped education included trainable and re-trainable. The former sub category meant children with normal or near normal IQ which presented a disturbed social behaviour without being a danger to society, they would receive training in normal schools belonging to institution with an open doors regime. The retrainable sub category included children and youngster whose social conduct became a danger to society. Therefore, they should be trained in compulsory reclusion (C.F.C. y E..(f) 1980, 86-104).

b) Chile

The Chilean aims related to special education, were rooted in the idea of equal opportunities and the improvement of human resources. Therefore, it was necessary, to integrate children with learning problems as much as possible in normal schools, providing teachers with specialized support and diagnoses. (Junta Gobierno, Chile, (a) 1974, 13). The strategy demanded an early detection of learning problems at schools, then specialized diagnoses at Diagnoses Centres. There, they would recommend alternatives as: standardize their abilities with the rest of the students in the class, or to transfer them to special schools for medical-educational treatment, this required at the same time training for special education teachers (op cit, 22).
The Education Ministry acted promptly, for since the beginning of Chilean A.A.F.F. government, special education had been given high priority. From a median enrolment of 5,967 students in 1970-73, it jumped to 32,838 in 1989 (Presidente, Chile, (a) 1989, 186). As important as the rises in the number, was the increase of different services provided in this form of education. Prior to 1973, there existed only 73 special education schools and 3 centres for labour training. After 1974, the creation of diagnoses and micro-diagnoses centres, technical cabinets, and special education groups increased dramatically, as much as in the state as the private sector (Presidente, Chile, (a)1979, 462).

ODEPLAN planning included this policy, without changes in 1977. The only new concept was to train handicapped students in labour skills (ODEPLAN, 1977, 33-4). In P.N.I.D. 1978-1983, the creation of diagnostic centres, whose role would be to determine the qualitative and quantitative aspects of treatment should be increased (ODEPLAN, 1978, 490). In 1979, the President's National Directive, aimed at a 100% enrolment of children not able to complete primary education due to learning difficulties, or the ones who slow down classes due to their problems, by means of creating differential work groups (Presidente, Chile, (b) 1979, 4.2.6).

The State would provide a special allowances system, the amount of which would be related to the higher cost of special education and would be provided to low income families. Children with minor learning problems would receive supplementary allowance added to normal subsidies for primary education, permitting them to enrol into special education. In addition, special education programmes were to include labour training to enable these children to work (Gobierno, Chile, 1982, 31).
**Pre-primary school**

a) **Argentina**

This education was defined by the Argentinian Education Ministry as not compulsory, two years in length, devoted to teaching children from 4 to 5 years old at independent kindergartens, or as primary school sections. A speech by Minister Bruera highlighted the problems of an inadequate pre-primary education, which were damaging the education when it began (Bruera 1976, 35).

Due to the pre-primary education's importance a Committee to draft a National Directorate for pre-primary education was created. The 'considerandos' recognized the importance of pre-primary education to provide good education, and equal opportunities for children. This draft was to include: main objectives and aims, boundaries of authority, relationship with the Education Undersecretary, the number of pre-primary schools originating from this Directorate, its internal structure, legal tools required by this creation, and devices to transfer personnel, properties, and funding (Subsecretario Educación, Argentina (a) 1977, 15-6). Finally this Directorate was not created and became a part of Primary School Education.

Unfortunately, the Ministry and the F.E.C. did not devote too much time to pre-primary education, despite its importance. In 1982 it enrolled 570,000 students, a half of existing registrations in primary schools (Van Gelderen, 1989, 292).

b) **Chile**

On the contrary, the Chilean government from the very beginning committed itself to promote pre-primary schools as one spearhead of educational policy. This importance went further than any statement; the number of children enrolling in-
creased more than in any other type of education, growing up in the period from 74.096, average for the period 1970-73 (Presidente, Chile, 1984, 188) to 332.268 in 1989, including state and private institutions (Presidente, Chile, (a) 1989, 186 & 205).

The educational policy, drafted in 1974, which stated the need to give educational support to a great number of marginal people, argued that the most efficient way to reduce their number was to provide feeding, and social stimulation support from early childhood. This education should include, not only a child enrolled in a kindergarten, but also their parents (Junta Gobierno, Chile (a) 1974, 13).

A high risk population concept was developed in 1971, when an educational strategy was developed to care for these children from the early stages of childhood (ODEPLAN, 1978, 24). The main aim was to support a human resources development policy, especially for those affected by extreme poverty. Their children required state support, and to achieve this objective, state and private institutions should coordinate their efforts. The Education Ministry stated in their first draft of educational policies, that families should be provided with training in the care of their children at home. So as to provide equal opportunities from the start, children should be nourished, provided with health care, and education all at the same time (ODEPLAN, 1977, 31).

The 'Directivas Presidenciales sobre Educación' [Presidential guidelines on education] emphasized this policy, declaring pre-primary education to be a high priority, which was placed under Pre-Primary Education Presidential Consultative Council control. This policy aimed at extending it to extreme poverty rural and urban population segments, where it should become an open opportunity for all children at least one year before starting primary school. In the pre-primary education
stage devices to detect any behavioural or IQ problem should be developed (Presidente, Chile, (b) 1979, 3.1-3.5).

Afterwards, it added to these policies only one extra element in national planning. Primary and pre-primary education should receive full subsidy for children in extreme poverty. The state would stimulate pre-primary school building in all areas of extreme poverty (Gobierno, Chile 1982, 30). As a consequence, it developed an extensive nourishment and health support programme for pre-primary education. Quality as well as quantity was a strong priority for this sector. *Junta Nacional de Jardines Infantiles* [JUNJI], [national corporation for pre-primary school] provided in 1989, in its different programmes, food for 65,424 children throughout 11 months (Presidente, Chile, (a) 1989, 205).

**Technical Education**

a) **Argentina**

One of the most important attempts to develop Argentinian technical education was the E.M.E.T.A. project [Farming Education Expansion and Improvement]. With support from the Interamerican Development Bank, its monetary share was 78.5 U.S millions plus 54.9 U.S. from national funding in a four year term. E.M.E.T.A attempted to solve one of the most notorious Argentinian education problems—despite being a great producer of grains and stock—farming and stockbreeding training was extremely weak.

This project aimed to provide material improvement in buildings, equipment, machinery, school and office furniture, books, and didactic material. Besides economic and material support, it included retraining farming schools’ teachers, travel
to advanced farming centres for directors and supervisors, and expert visiting lecturers to teach curriculum development techniques, organization, supervision, ecology, and the like.

A grant system for 5,000 low income rural students was to be provided. Training for rural skilled and unskilled labourers would be raised from 1,600 to 50,000 people a year. In addition an increase of 100% in farming school enrolments [from 20,000 to 40,000], and also a real improvement in school learning and retention was expected (Llerena, 1980, IX2-IX5). This project was not developed during the military government because the Interamerican Bank approved the loan on June 1st 1983, a few months before the government was returned to civilians (C.F.C. y E., (b) 1983, 38). Minister C. Licciardo in 1983, at F.E.C., stated that due to funding problems, this project should be postponed (C.F.C. y E., (c) 1983, 30).

Most technical education projects were directed towards agricultural, and industrial development. Another important one was 'Expansión y Mejoramiento de la Educación Rural [E.M.E.R.] [Expansion and improvement of rural education]. The Provinces included in this programme had national not-reimbursable funding for a package of: enlargement, improvement, or new building construction, full equipment, and technical support for curriculum development, labour orientation, retraining teachers, and community promotion.

This project had the strong economic support of 50 million U.S dollars from the Interamerican Development Bank, the same amount from the Argentinian government, besides some funding provided by the Culture and Education Ministry. An executive organization was devised—in agreement with the contract—to manage the project (Ministro Educación, Argentina, (b) 1979, 16-7). The project's main objectives were to expand, and improve rural primary education. Provinces were included on
the basis of their high rates of rural population, high rural school drop-out rates, illiteracy, and percentage of provincial budget financed by the National Treasury. The criteria to allocate schools were: easy access of rural population to schools, to serve real educational needs, to benefit low income people, and the compatibility with other economic and social projects.

The project importance was evident: in that there were 287 new school buildings, the enlargement of 349 existing ones, and the modernization of 52 buildings. All schools were to receive full equipment, including furniture, laboratories, tools, agricultural machinery, and buses. By mid 1983, 99 buildings were ready, having built 552, and only 37 had not yet been started yet (C.F.C. y E., (b) 1983, 31-6). Nevertheless, this project suffered funding shortages and the National government did not honour its share. Minister Licciardo recognized that only one province had paid all expenses, and the rest should keep paying them for a while (C.F.C. E., (c) 1983, 30).

The rural education policy included, too, high school training. The first step was a study ordered by the National Director for High Schools, the aims of which were: a) to check the output of farming education; b) labour market needs; c) chances of the graduates to work at their family farms; d) to show possibilities to diversify educational offer; e) to develop permanent education in this sector; f) to demonstrate possibilities to combine farming education with other education levels, g) to develop non conventional solutions to the heavy investment demanded by farming education, and finally e) to promote and increase farming education enrolment (Subsecretario Educación, Argentina, (b) 1977, 16-7).

Another attempt to develop technical training was 'Plan Dual', which was to be a joint project between the Ministry and private enterprise. In 1979, the National
Council for Technical education designed, and started this project. It was a combination of study, and work experience at modern factories, linking theory and work experience.

The main purposes were to provide middle rank technicians, required by business and industry, and to provide employment for students who were not able to continue tertiary studies. Compared with the E.M.E.R. and the E.M.E.T.A., this was a minor plan. In 1983, there were 86 participating enterprises and 1,469 students (Ministro Educación, Argentina, 1983, 29). This could not be considered a great achievement bearing in mind the Argentinian need for middle rank personnel in industry and business.

Attempts were made to initiate the early start of technology teaching at schools. The Education Ministry accepted an experimental project to introduce technology into primary and high school curriculum. Fourteen private schools were included in this programme (Ministro Educación, Argentina, (a) 1977, 3-5). Another similar project, at the national high schools, included six hours a week of optional activities, directed at teaching students, commerce, science, art, craftsmanship, technical skills, and the like. The main project aim was to facilitate students' exploration in different fields to discover their own interests and abilities (Ministro Educación Argentina, (b) 1977, 13-15).

From the decisions taken it was evident that the educational offer did not match the Argentinian demand. Several attempts made to reverse this situation, were related to research, experimental curriculum changes, and internationally sponsored projects. The National Technical Education Council, was officially appointed to study technical education links with labour and non technical high schools. The Technical Education Council was to provide an extensive study related to the
educational offer, curriculum, and to design new integration alternatives within high school system. This required the redefinition of existing criteria related to technological training such as: future labour market, training modalities and length of courses. The study was to provide new alternatives related to: 1. designing a technical training basic cycle at non technical high schools; 2. propositions to suppress, add or changes in technical education curriculum; 3. to provide an open ended technical training, permitting students retraining after gaining work experience; 4. a general review of the technical training system to simplify, and co-ordinate different courses; 5. to review training for adult people to adapt it to demand. This study should be handed to the ministry March 1st 1978 (Subsecretario Educación, Argentina, (c) 1977, 18-19).

Many other minor projects to improve the relationship between school, high school, and work abilities, or the retraining of adult people, were planned or implemented during the A.A.F.F. government, such as the six year on trial technical baccalaureate.

b) Chile

The Chilean basic policy principles related to technical education were more general in character, for the main idea was to relate education in general to a future working life. A criticism of curriculum, developed up to 1974, was their limited utility for high school leavers. The policy principles recognized the impossibility of providing a definitive education for the whole of working life, and the need to develop vocational training programmes giving importance to work. The training programmes should be short, provided immediately before taking up a work position or just after being hired. Afterwards, permanent retraining, should be by means of increasing abilities on the work site, or by increasing general cultural knowledge.
Any study programme should include at least three facets: 1. general intellectual training, through affective and cognitive development; 2. specific intellectual training, to enable students to integrate themselves into a pre-determined environment, and which could be the foundation of abilities afterwards; through vocational studies to let the students integrate themselves to working life; 3. the close contact between classes and curriculum and real life work. Whenever possible such courses could be held outside school. All decisions relating to curriculum matters should be taken with a realistic view of the future labour market, and the student's relations with daily life (Junta Gobierno, Chile, (a) 1974, 9-12).

One main goal relating to students from 14 to 19 years of age, was to transform technical high schools into becoming the main tool to train qualified technicians needed for Chilean development. To achieve this goal, requirements of industry, agriculture, and commerce to match requirements and needs should be reviewed. Special attention would be provided to 'sea schools' to train students in the rational exploitation of sea resources, and agricultural schools to train farmers. For people older than 25, a technical training system geared towards sea, agriculture, and industry would be developed (op cit, 19-22).

Odeplan included technical training in 1977. Education efforts were to be directed to meeting the demand for technicians in the productive sector, linking with real needs. To achieve this goal required a strong co-ordination system between education and productive sectors, it was considered that the best way to built this link was to put industrial associations in charge of this training. At the same time, due to the high costs of technical training, a selection programme was to be devised to choose the best candidates, increasing the prestige of this training and avoiding students drop-out due to failures (ODEPLAN, 1977, 32-3).
In different wording, and using a different arguments, ODEPLAN later stated that the failure of technical education was due to a defective training, condemning its leavers to lower work positions. This produce, as a consequence, a lack of prestige for this form of education. In addition, it had been unable to lessen pressure on university enrolment because too many of its leavers applied to universities, in order to raise their social and economic status.

Normal weaknesses of technical education were augmented by the weak relationship between training and the local and regional labour market, there being a lack of equilibrium in relation to local development and the type of qualified personnel produced at technical schools (ODEPLAN, 1978, 488-9).

Prior to any law being passed to transfer technical schools' administration, several agreements were signed between the Education Ministry and the National Private Corporation of Social Development. The management and administration of three technical schools located in Santiago, and four agriculture schools, were transferred to the Social Development Corporation of the Rural Sector.

The Presidential Guidelines on Education stated the need to accelerate transfer of technical schools to private enterprise related to the training provided in them. The State should keep under its control only those experimental technical schools aimed at being the pilot experience, or those which reflected strategic or national security reasons. At the same time incentives would be provided to create technical schools in the major industrial enterprises to train the personnel they required. The main goal was to provide technical schools with autonomy from the state, who should provide a grant system for their students. The State's main role in this field would be to supervise the education of students (Presidente, Chile, (b) 1979, 4.4.1.1. to 4.4.6.)
This policy, started in 1980 by means of giving permission to the Education Ministry to transfer state owned technical schools to the private sector or institutions without profits aims. The transfer included, buildings, furniture, personnel, and, if needed, the Education Ministry could transfer income support to an amount equal to Ministry annual investment in 1980 in the school when it was maintained by the state. Academic supervision however would be under the Education Ministry's control (Junta de Gobierno, Chile, (a) 1980).

Chilean technical training was traditionally divided into four great branches, Industrial, Commerce, Technical, and Agriculture. In 1981-2, in agreement with decree law No 3,166, seven technical schools were transferred to various institutions, and several agreements were drawn up. Institutions like the 'Corporación Educacional de la Industria' [Corporation of Industry Education], 'Instituto de Estudios Bancarios' [Institute for Banking Studies], 'Cámara de Comercio de Santiago' [Santiago Chamber of Commerce], and the 'Corporación de Desarrollo Social del Sector Rural' [Social Development Corporation of the Rural Sector], among others, took the responsibility for the management of these schools. By 1987, all technical schools had been transferred, and many other institutions were participating in technical training.

Sports

a) Argentina

Argentinian education included sports among its educational values, understood in the old Greek tradition in which equilibrium of body and mind was a high ideal. The Ministry passed a 'resolución', aimed at promoting sports in students activities. This decision was founded on a threefold argument: the supremacy of spirit over body, the aim of health care, and the promotion of citizens' physical fitness to
be called to arms. To obtain these aims, were considered important the support of mass media and public opinion. A noticeable emphasis was placed on the ethical base of this decision.

The general and specific objectives were aimed at designing a structure which would permit the promotion of sports in pre-primary, primary, and high schools, and to increase the training of physical education teachers and trainers, and would expand public consciousness related to sports (Subsecretario Educación, (d) 1977, 8-9). President Bignone stated 'We will promote sports development as a proper tool for the physical and moral education of human being; as a cultural element useful to strengthen national unity, and as a tool to improve Argentinian image abroad (Bignone, 1982, 9).

b) Chile

The Chilean A.A.F.F. government passed a decree to promote sports, responding to a Navy interest to promote the theory and practice of yachting and building sail boats. A Committee was created under the Education Undersecretary, to develop this project taken into account Chilean's water resources. The main objectives of this Committee were to promote a knowledge of river, lakes, and sea, to teach how to build sail boats, and to prepare guidebooks providing basic yachting knowledge (Presidente, Chile, (b) 1975). After promoting for eleven years nautical sports and boat building, the government declared that the objectives were fulfilled and ended the Committee's mandate (Presidente, Chile, 1988).

It was only in 1977, when E.N.D.E.S included sports into national planning, it was stated that 'Sports and recreation are a fundamental part in people's integral development, which is as much as physical as psychological. For this reason, it was planned to incorporate a large part of the population in sport practices through the
diverse existing channels, especially workers, universities and the A.A.F.F. (ODEPLAN, 1977, 23). PNID 1978-1983, and N.O. 1981, made on identical assertion though, it is noticeable that all these documents do not mention primary or secondary education as a basis to develop sports activities, despite sports being practised mostly by high and primary school students.

E.N.D.R 1975-1990, provided a better insight into the role of sports in society. Its findings were that too many different institutions, public and private, took decisions in this field, especially in the use of facilities, due to problems in planning and the inefficient use of human and infrastructure resources. This document spelt out the need to create an umbrella institution to co-ordinate public and private sports, both activities and planning. The non-existence of this umbrella had been an obstacle to the adoption of a well co-ordinated plan to develop and increase sports and leisure. The main recommendation was to create a national system, in which public and private institutions shared responsibility. This new central organization should be divided into three levels: nation, region, and city councils. The medium range policy was to increase the percentage of active sport participants.

As a consequence, all regions were to give priority to basic sports such as volleyball, gymnastics, swimming, basketball, handball, and such like. Special importance should be given to nautical and water, sightseeing and mountain sports according to the natural conditions of the regions. A campaign to provide an adequate sport infrastructure, mainly in rainy zones should be promoted, and city councils should provide sites to build sports and recreation facilities (ODEPLAN, 1975, 59).

It was in 1977, that the Education Ministry started to give attention to their responsibility in this field. In May 1977, an extra-school education department took over from school sports department the responsibility for developing sports
(Presidente, Chile, 1977, 506). In following years, sporadic reports about sports showed that this policy was not implemented at high levels as policy demanded. Nevertheless, 85% of primary and high schools, as stated by Schiefelbein, had sports activities, though he criticized both: the scarcity of personnel in charge of extra-school activities, and the lack of training to administer them (Schiefelbein, 1982, 94).

Nevertheless, as a political aim, sports promotion continued to have high priority. P.D.E.Ch. 1983-1989, in a lengthy entry, described its aims: 1. to incorporate a large percentage of inhabitants in sport practice as a way to increase physical, intellectual and moral values, and as a contribution to diminish alcoholism, mortality, work absenteeism, and truancy. 2. to improve the performance of Chilean athletes at international competitions. 3. to include a greater percentages of people in practising sports. 4. to support and widen the training of human resources demanded by this policy. 5. to promote sports among humbler population segments to improve family cohesion. 6. to improve social integration by promoting sports values. The Chilean state should promote, through the school curriculum, enhanced sports offering to students, making them fit for biological, socio-economic, and geographical conditions, and meeting their need for total development (Gobierno, Chile, 1982, 42-3).

It is evident that the government aims were not developed properly by the Ministry of Education through the curricula. Decree 300, 1981, article 3 included only two hours a week for physical education (Ministro Educación, Chile, 1981, article 3), not more than in the past, and far from being enough to achieve this policy. The relationship between sports and defence was clearly evident in P.D.E.Ch. 1983-1989 (op cit, 72), in which 'Dirección de Deportes y Recreación' [Directorate
for Sports and Leisure] is linked to the Defence Ministry, and this is evident in the fact that most of their 'Directores' were generals.

Buildings and school maps

a) Argentina

The State's education systems are currently one of the biggest property owners among public services, demanding great amounts of funding to build and maintain school buildings. Therefore, the Argentinian F.E.C. promoted the creation of a National Planning Service for Primary School Buildings. The service aims were to be: 1. to facilitate conservation, enlargement, buildings construction, and to assign priorities. 2. to find out children without enrolment at school and register them. 3. to improve use of existing property, and human resources, and 4. to include equipment planning to building schemes.

To achieve these goals needed a decentralized and energized federal activity, designed to avoid duplications in or inter provinces and territories, and to devise a proper infrastructure to facilitate the optimal use of resources.

As in many projects, the F.E.C. wanted a national decentralized organization, including Federal and province services. The federal service was to play a coordinating and planning role. This task group should enforce educational policies and strategies, draft project's objectives and goals, design work methodologies, and develop instruments to collect and process information. Additionally, it would be in charge of funding distribution according to provinces' and territories' needs, draft and evaluate the national plan for educational building, supervise execution, counsel provinces to train human resources and methodologies, provide technical documents,
draft guidelines for technical building, and, finally, propose economic management guidelines. Provincial services were to play a similar role at provincial level. This organization was to be located at the national Ministry, and the task force would be directed by the Ministry of Culture and Education's General Undersecretary (C.F.E., (b) 1976, 69-73).

The Argentinian Federal Educational Council described it as a useful tool for describing variables under analysis, evaluating system reality in relationship with optimal parameters, planning the reorganization, and expansion of educational services, and offering information and, problem solving to decision makers.

Educational maps main objectives were: to design a rational distribution of schools; to set down different types of educational demand; to provide adequate buildings, equipment, and human resources, to support services required (C.F.C. y E., (g) 1980, 76-85). Both, the Federal Planning System for Building Schools, and the Schools map did not go past the planning stage. The transference of schools to provinces left this task to each individual province, under its own responsibility (C.F.C. y E., (b) 1983, 87-9).

The Educational maps were promoted in Latin America by international institutions. Argentina and Chile become involved in this work, the latter at the beginning of the seventies, and the former a little later. The schools map was devised as an educational planning tool.

b) Chile

Planning of infrastructure needs and the schools map have been in the Chilean education planning for many years. The former was performed mostly by 'Sociedad Constructora de Establecimientos Educacionales' [School Building Society]
in charge of building all Education Ministry schools except universities; repairing state schools as much as the ones belonging to the Society, approving private schools building projects, and any other building work ordered by the Ministry (Presidente, Chile, 1974, 283). For many years this society performed efficiently so the Ministry decided to keep it working and extend its influence at Director level (Junta Gobierno, Chile (a) 1974, 24).

The main policy of the A.A.F.F. government was to increase the number of rural, and boarding schools in the countryside as a means to eradicate illiteracy (ODEPLAN 1977, 30). Afterwards, PNID 1978-1983, stated that the public investment priority of a six year plan would focus on school building in areas of extreme poverty, and in rural and frontier areas, and by repairing the existent infrastructure (ODEPLAN, 1978, 506). Consequently, the P.G.E. stated that the Education Ministry would determine a building programme with sector funding. The Ministry, jointly with Regional Education Secretaries, would determine the school building programme with regional funding, and the Ministry would set technical regulations for it. The Education Ministry should not involve itself in building or in the approval of blue prints (Presidente, Chile, (b) 1979, 1.2). Finally, the Education Ministry was to develop a precise regulation manual for schools buildings, and other educational aspects (Gobierno, Chile, 1982, 89).

The schools building shortfall in 1974 was estimated at 1.5 million square metres deficit which would to be transformed in a six year plan. This ambitious goal was not achieved. From 1975 to 1981, the building society could provide only 576,146 square metres. In the following years until 1987, 489,33 square metres were built to make a grand total of 1,065,333 square meters of schools. The main A.A.F.F. government policy was to increase the number of schools and boarding schools in rural areas as a means to eradicate illiteracy (ODEPLAN, 1977, 30).
Afterwards, the centralized school building programme ended due to the end of the legal term for which the 'Sociedad Constructora de Establecimientos Educacionales' was created. Since then the city council has had to pay for all repairing and building schools.

Despite this interest in privatizing the programme the Education Ministry always kept control over school buildings in private areas. Article 3, decree law 3,476 stated, that school buildings should comply with regulations relating to capacity and hygiene according, to enrolment, type of teaching and didactic material (Junta Gobierno, Chile, (b)1980; & (b) 1987).

In 1988, another decree added detailed precision to school building regulations. These included safety, spaces, dependencies, illumination, and hygiene. Different rules applied to pre-primary, primary, high schools, technical or agricultural schools (Presidente Chile, (c) 1989). These, and previous regulations raise costs, especially for private education, and consequently school owners oppose them (Magendzo et al; 1988, 139-41).

The Chilean school map was to be perfected in all regions. This meant an in depth demographic, geographic and cartographic study, to point precisely to places in need of education facilities. Priority would be given to filling school gaps showed by the map (Junta Gobierno, Chile, (a) 1974, 14). By 1976, the school map would be the most important element in micro-planning in a range that covered locality, city council, province and region. Variables included, were the physical infrastructure and human resources, and founded on this information there would be developed a national planning system (Presidente, Chile, 1976, 443). Until the end of A.A.F.F. Government, the school map was a useful tool for planning, funding, linking the
school system to the city council development, and producing information related to education needs.

Censorship

a) Argentina

Most military governments are accused of practising an acute books and artwork censorship. Actually the Argentinian government did forbid only six books during their eight years in power. The reasons for censorship were: that books contradicted Argentinian values, or that they included material that disagreed with history, or conflict with official or legal statements relating to Argentinian boundaries.

Among the forbidden books were: Juan A. Bustinza and Gabriela A. Ribas "Las Edades Moderna y Contemporánea", [Ed Kapeluz] due to its wording and illustrations, which contradicted educational objectives, with its ideological connotations. The book was not to be recommended to students, and was excluded from school libraries. (Ministro Educación, Argentina, 1978, 1-2). Books against family values such as "La Muerte de la Familia" by David Cooper [Ed. Paidos], were censored due to their nihilist focusing on the family, God, the human being, and society. Besides, this book's contents described revolutionary strategies to undermine society. The decree stated: 'This kind of contents become an attempt to undermine the cultural foundations of Argentinian society' (Presidente, Argentina, 1979, 6). Two reference books edited by Spanish enterprise Salvat, "Enciclopedia Salvat - Diccionario" and "Universitas - Gran Enciclopedia del Saber" were excluded too. It was asserted that: 'both books used a clear Marxist, and distorting language. They pretended to promote a class-struggle, which founded the terrorist ideology which Argentina faced in the near
past (Presidente, Argentina, (a) 1980, 1-2). A third example of censorship was due to cartographic problems. The A.A.F.F. 'Instituto de Geografía' [Geography Institute] demanded corrections that were not carried out by editors. Therefore, Executive Power was used to ban these books (Presidente Argentina, (b) 1980, 1-2). The Ministry of Education did not pass any decree to censor books at universities, but this does not mean that individual 'Rectores' might have recommended not to use some of them. This, however, was internal, and not government political decision.

Movies have been always the object of greater control from L.A. governments. Argentina did not act differently, and they ordered that any school which was offered movies from international organisations, cultural associations, or embassies, should ask formal ministry permission to show them (Secretario Educación, 1977, 3).

b) Chile

The Ministry of Education had been in charge of the censorship of films, and T.V. programmes before and during the seventeen years of the A.A.F.F. government. In directly educational matters, censorship did not have a high profile, for there were no decrees forbidding school texts or reference books. The only exception was left wing pamphlets. The most serious research work produced by 'leftist' scholars were kept at in university libraries. It was possible to study these works, besides they were also available in book shops. Outstanding Marxists writers such as Pablo Neruda, or prone leftists as Nicanor Parra, or Vicente Huidobro, well known poets, were included in texts and programmes for primary (Ministro Educación, Chile, 1980 22-4) and secondary schools (Ministro Educación, Chile, 1985, 22 & 99). This shows clearly that military censorship in Chile and in Argentina was different from the popular belief on military mythology.
Chilean censorship was harsher with the daily press, or weekly magazines. Every time the government suspected the limits of the law had been trespassed, they were taken to court.

Conclusions

Two main values for the A.A.F.F., are order and unity in all human activities, and especially in ruling a country, for that means administrative order, and the improve of the national spirit. Argentinian education before, during the 'Proceso', and up to date, seems too complex and hard to manage. In search of order, administrative in this case, and to reinforce national unity, policy makers explored the possibility of passing a Federal Education Law. This law has been pending since the Argentinian Constitution was promulgated, and it seems evident that it will continue pending for a long time because:

'after one hundred and thirty five years of our Constitution being promulgated, we are still waiting, for an Education Organic Constitutional Law as stated by article 67, paragraph 16' (Bravo, 1989, 121).

During the 'Proceso', values relating to unity and order, highly appreciated by the military were present. The search for efficiency, co-ordination, and levels of responsibility was clearly stated. The problems they wanted to overcome by means of the Federal law were evident: rigidness, centralism, and excessive bureaucracy.

The Chilean Education Constitutional Organic Law was included in the 1980 Constitution. Its main aims were to secure some values very dear to the military, and to avoid the dangers which Chile had suffered in the past. Among the values they sought to reinforce, were the family's right to educate their children—that meant freedom from state intrusion—the minimum requirements to be achieved in primary
and secondary education to ensure a basic educational foundation for all Chileans, enabling them to share their cultural inheritance.

From the administrative side, the requirement of periodical evaluations at primary and secondary school reflected another value dear to the military—to evaluate performance. This type of evaluation has been proclaimed by international educational institutions as an urgent need, not only in education, but it was very seldom practised under civilian governments. Tertiary education diversification could be included among military appreciated values as well, they had a clear understanding of the need to have a wider base of educated people with different but complementary skills as much to produce development as for internal security.

Academic achievement could be understood as an emerging value for the Chilean military, strong enough to include the award of higher academic degrees at their academies and Institutes.

The search for order and efficiency, in both governments, induced them to state that their aim was to gather the highest quality information that it was possible to identify at that moment in both countries. For this reason they developed statistic information, school maps, and other elements necessary to take decisions. Professional and student profiles were developed, especially in Argentina, in order to determine the type of personnel and students they should train. Teacher training and retraining, was especially important for them. Training improvements resembled in some way the permanent training in the military, in which to perform the duties in a higher rank demanded an 'ad hoc' training.

As important as training, was teachers' salaries. Unfortunately this is a problem solved neither by civilian nor by military governments. The Argentinian
'Proceso' at least tried to introduce justice into payment policies, levelling teachers' salaries throughout the country, and providing full time jobs for teachers in one school, and not scattered hours as it used to be.

Teachers' salaries could not be improved noticeably in both countries. Several attempts were made, even if they were not too successful. Instead other benefits were devised as to concentrate class hours mainly in one school in order to avoid 'taxi teachers' who teach a couple of hours per day in different schools to complete a legal 44 hours a week work, spending more time running from school to school than actually teaching.

Retraining had strong importance under the Chilean military government, understood both as a professional need, and as a way to improve efficiency. Administrative decisions designed to have 100% of teachers with a proper degree were adopted in this period, solving a problem that had lasted for more than a century. Argentinian government devised several strategies to retraining teachers but they could not achieve the goal of having all teachers with a proper degree.

Adult education was a matter of great importance in both governments under review, as a means to help people to improve their living standards, as well as to enable them to perform their duties as parents.

Special education became important, too, in the period under study in both countries, providing facilities for these children to improve the quality of their life. Pre-primary school was considered important too, which was better developed in Chile than in Argentina, as a mean to promote an early start and equality of opportunities for children.
Technical education was another field in which both governments attempted to overcome long standing problems of the lack of trained personnel to produce economic development. Training included all branches in the productive sector from agriculture to industry. Some projects were not actually developed in Argentina. In Chile, thanks to a longer time of the military rule in the country, many initiatives were concluded, and are still being used to train personnel today.

Retraining school teachers, adult education, special education, pre-primary school, and sports development policies, can be interpreted from the perspective of military values. Understood as investment in human resources, trying to enrich their countries by means of better citizens, avoiding damage in the first stages of childhood, and helping handicapped people to achieve a better life, were in sum the best possible programmes for people in these countries.

Sports promotion was clearly evident, as both military governments wanted to improve it at two levels: a) high performance athletes able to participate at world tournaments in search of national prestige, and b) children and adults as a means to keep them fit for any contingency, or in need to defend their fatherland. This aspect has been always present in barracks, and as rulers the military developed policies to extend it to the whole country.

Finally, it is interesting to note the role of society custodian adopted by the military in both countries. They assumed the right to interpret what could be noxious the for national interest, and the inhabitants. Fortunately this role was taken in moderation, and censorship was rare.
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CHAPTER VIII

Two Stages of university policy in Argentina and Chile

In the period under study, it is possible to establish two clear separate stages for Argentina and Chile, both presenting differences and similitudes. The first stage is one of emergency, in which the main tasks were to eradicate political partisanship, and to re-introduce administrative, and academic order. The second one was to consolidate universities, providing them with permanent legal foundations, and to diversify the tertiary education system. The National Universities Law became the turning point between stages. This border line is used only for analytical purposes, because evidently it was a continuing process of educational transformation with advances, drawbacks, and attempts to produce some permanent legal foundations in the first stage.

I Emergency Stage

A common ground: political partisanship

The strong influence and commitment in political activities at universities, and other tertiary studies institutions, is a remarkable characteristic of L.A. political life. This participation reaches, sometimes, a high level of partisanship, and the use and abuse of violence. Atcon's study of Latin American university, despite being thirty three years old, was still valid in 1973 if applied to Chile and Argentina. According to Atcon:
"politics is the mainstay of all student activities, not campus politics but national politics... Though they are always vociferous in defending a somewhat nebulous university independence, they are the real exponents of their university's political participation in everything and anything... Students elections are won by those stock-in-trade are revolutionary and anti-American slogans. A dozen or so leaders are entitled to speak in the name of thousands of students, in the name of their university and even in the name of the whole country... As an institution, the university floats rudderless on the high seas of social circumstance. Into this power vacuum the students have stepped as heroes or martyrs and acquired the right to interfere with anything that happens to catch the fancy of a few hotheads... This power has led to the peculiar situation where students no longer consider the university a place to study but a mere place to be. They are not at the university to acquire knowledge, to receive discipline and be educated academically, scientifically and civically. They are the ones who now decide exactly how the institution should be run, they who determine what they learn and by whom they are to be taught" (Atcon, 1962, 30-1).

An article which appeared in the Argentinian newspaper 'La Nación' 1976, confirms Atcon's description as still valid, for it stated that national universities had suffered a policization process never seen previously in Argentina, nor in any other university in the world. Former guerrilla men or their supporters were in charge of academic administration at universities and faculties; students acquired a strong influence in the hiring or dismissal of lecturers and staff (La Nación, 1976).

In Chile, by 1973, all universities had been extremely politicized, and like Argentina's universities, the most radical political movements were born in them. They became later terrorist, and subversive groups, namely 'Montoneros' in Argentina, and 'Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario' [Leftist Revolutionary Movement], MIR onwards in Chile.

A related view, in respect of Europe was presented by Gould. His analysis of these problems as a concerted attack from radical groups directed at obtaining the dominion of universities despite being minorities, shows they had been very successful in Germany, France, and Italy (Gould, 1977, 44-47). If for some European scholars or students, some of Gould's assertions are weak or not trustworthy, to any
person with an average knowledge of Argentinian, Chilean, and other L.A. universities in the seventies and eighties, his assertions closely mirrors reality.

The attempts to eradicate political partisanism

a) Argentina

The Argentinian government considered that at the roots of universities problems, were political partisanism, specially left wing. Accordingly, the first step was to forbid all activities related to political doctrinairism, propaganda, proselytizing, or agitation among students, and lecturers (Junta Militar, Argentina (a) 1976, 6). The fight against these activities became a leitmotif in the Ministers' speeches. In 1979, Minister Llerena Amadeo giving clues about a new university law stated that they were studying the proper means to avoid partisan political activity. One way was to declare it was incompatible to have a position at a university and an office in a political party. At the same time, Dr. Llerena Amadeo, stated that they were looking for activities that would permit university students to participate in national, and university life without becoming politicized (Llerena, 1979,15).

More precise clues related to Argentina, were obtained from the Ministers' of Education speeches. The first one, Ricardo P. Bruera in his diagnoses of universities' problems, included a strong criticism of the university's pretension to be the builders of the national future (Bruera, (a) 1976, 1-2). The need to restore order, understood as turning back to normal scholarly work, reflected a need to re-establish equilibrium among students-lecturers relationship. He explicitly and carefully argued that order itself was not an end; it should become an instrument to rescue universities from chaos in the search for a new tertiary educational system (Bruera, (b) 76, 12). Ministro Bruera blamed directly Marxist infiltration as
responsible for this chaos, because the categories of analysis used at universities were all dependent on that ideology. Finally, he pointed to a well coordinated activism among students, with a clear strategy that should be carefully evaluated when the moment to take decisions arrives (op cit, 10-11). His diagnostic analysis was completely coincidental with Atcon's description of Latin American universities previously cited, proving that this was and old problem still awaiting solution. Even when Minister Bruera did not point out directly the lecturer's responsibility, that idea is implicit because he blamed a biased bibliography, and that was the lecturer's responsibility.

Five days after the Argentinian Junta proclaimed their goals and objectives, they passed law No 21.276 providing the Minister of Education with the right to manage Argentinian universities in close relationship with 'Rectores', deans, and directors appointed by the Ministry. The corporate bodies in charge of developing universities' general policies were replaced by the Minister, who from that moment onwards, would undertake this task. Article seven of this law, banned from all of the campuses political activities, political doctrinairism, partisan propagation of political ideas, party proselytizing, and promotion of political disturbances, among lecturers, students and staff. The wide scope of the Minister's decisional power was increased by article four, which empowered him to resolve any situation not included in this law (Junta Militar, Argentina (a), 1976, 6).

On May 1976, the Under Secretary of University affairs passed a resolution ordering the 'Interventores' to produce—in the next ten days—regulations to promote a high degree of discipline among students, including a scale of sanctions for transgressions according to their seriousness. These regulations should include activities performed outside universities, if the offender was a danger to society or to national security. In addition, any student prosecuted, or at the disposal of the
Executive Power, should be suspended from their universities (Subsecretario Asuntos Universitarios, Argentina, 1976, 5).

Previously, Law No 21,260 (Junta Militar, Argentina (b), 1976, 8) had been promulgated which permitted the discharge, for security reasons, of any permanent or temporary employee belonging to the national administration, National Congress, decentralized services, self-governed services, state enterprises, and any department dependent on the Executive, linked to subversive or anti-social activities. As a complement to this law, Resolución No 152 was passed which ordered, as a mean of increasing the grip over Argentinian universities, national, and private, the provision of lists with staff identification (Delegado Militar, Subsecretaría Asuntos Universitarios, 1976, 5).

Later, law No 21,274 was passed which permitted the discharge of personnel from public administration or public departments previously mentioned. The main difference was the latter permitted discharged personnel to obtain compensation for losing their positions (Junta Militar Argentina (c), 1976, 8-9), and they were not stigmatized by any relationship related to extremist political behaviour. Instead it meant they were discharged because they were members of an overcrowded public administration so they had better chances to find a new job, in private enterprises; or after five years, they could re-apply to the public administration. This was not possible in the case of extremists.

More precise clauses were added by Resolution No 634—to enforce the discharge of dangerous political personnel. Article five ordered that it should be acknowledged by 'Interventores', and proper steps should be taken to avoid the transgression of laws 21,260, and 21,274. The repetition of laws and resolutions urging political sacking, made it clear that they had not been effective, so this forced the
Minister of Education to take action. Law 21,381 empowered the Minister of Education, and to the 'Delegado Militar del Area', until the end of December 1976, to declare unfit to work in private education establishments, including universities, with or without the government's acknowledgement any person discharged due to law 21,260. This law included any person involved in subversive activities, or the ones who openly, or covertly, propagated that kind of activities. Article five included the penalties of losing the accreditation or any benefits provided by the state in private universities and schools that hired personnel affected by law 21,260 (Presidente, Argentina, (a) 1976, 2).

The hope that at the end of 1976 the problem of personnel affected by law 21,260 in the private education system would be solved, proved to be wrong. Minister Bruera had to apply for an extension of Law 21,381 until December 1977. The extension was agreed by the President of Argentina, and passed as law N° 21,490 (Presidente, Argentina, (b) 1976, 3). Political accountability problems seemed very hard to solve. Again in June 1977, by Resolution No 995, the Minister of 'Interior' [Home Secretary in UK] and the interim head of Culture and Education, ordered personnel directors general, to announce the names of all the people made redundant under these laws, to Secretaries and Undersecretaries belonging to the Ministry of Culture and Education in accordance with laws 21,274 and 21,381. This information had to be communicated to all officials, educational or clerical, in universities both national and private, and each of them had to disseminate this information for their field of responsibility. All heads of service had to check this information. Any people discharged by laws 21,274 and 21,381 were to be dismissed immediately, and if people in charge did not have enough authority to do so, otherwise they were to communicate this fact to their direct superior (Ministro Interior, Argentina, 1977, 2).
A prohibition on hiring people made redundant for political reasons, was prorogued yearly by laws 21,490, 21,744 and 21,936. In fact, another law to re-establish law 21,381 until 31st December 1980 was needed. In a note accompanying the projected law, the Minister stated that law 21,269 was still necessary. This law forbade any teacher or lecturer previously linked to subversion working in the private educational sector. The President of Argentina agreed and promulgated law 22,194, extending until 1980 this prohibition (Presidente, Argentina, (a) 1980, 906-7).

All these laws meant the Argentinian government was aware that it had to be alert so as to hinder—by means of the law—any chance of the resurgence of political partisanship, instead of being concerned with actual dangers for the government.

b) Chile

The approach to political sacking in Chile differed strongly from the Argentinian one, for there were no laws passed ordering any political sacking. Instead, each university had to produce its own, under the responsibility of their 'Rectores". The most prominent political activists among lecturers, students and clerical staff were dismissed during the first months of the Pronunciamiento. This fact made all this process lack coherence and homogeneity, for the criteria to evaluate political activism differed even within the same universities according to areas or faculties.

There is no doubt that the task of political sacking was recommended to 'Rectores' personally by President Pinochet at the moment of their appointment, or afterwards through the Education Minister and Council of Rectores. The Rectores-Delegados proceeded to remove the most publicly prominent left wing partisan political leaders and activists. This first effort of political sacking declined very
soon, and most Rectores felt that the goal was accomplished. The first public
symptom that something was going wrong at universities was the 1979 'Directiva
Presidencial Sobre Educación'. Paragraphs 1.3.4. and 1.3.10 stated several goals for
the Committee created to study a National General University Law. The former para-
graph was to include provisions to avoid political distortions of polls at the uni-
versities, or any activity that could impair their specific aims. The latter stated the
need for a legal device to permit the use of police forces to re-open any university
property occupied without order from the Rector (Presidente, Chile, 1979, 18).
These two paragraphs showed that the Argentinian government was more realistic in
appreciating the influence of political partisanism, and the need of laws to help
Rectors, and at the same time enforce them to eradicate it.

As a consequence Decree-Law No 1 article 6, 7, and 8th, stated that the uni-
versity's autonomy did not permit them to protect, or promote activities contrary le-
gal order, nor activities tending to propagate political tendencies. Lecturers' auton-
omy was understood as a privilege. It excluded political indoctrination, though it
permitted the dissemination of objective information, and reasonable discussion
pointing to the advantages and disadvantages of the most well known political sys-
tems, or doctrines. Campuses should not be utilized for political propaganda or ac-
tivities that disturbed normal work. University authorities had the duty to imple-
ment this law and to provide all necessary regulations in order to avoid distur-
bances. Article 8 ordered that the statutes of universities should include these
principles (Presidente, Chile, (a) 1981).

In 1980, the government started publishing as laws, universities' statutes.
All of them included the ideas pointed to in articles 6 to 8 of the Decree-Law No 1,
many of them in a milder way however than expressed in this decree. Most of them
pointed out that lecturers had autonomy to express freely their opinions within the
limits of their positions, and stressed that activities against the law would be forbidden. Internal regulations framed in the spirit of an enlarged autonomy were useless. The Courts denied the Rectores any chance to use 'manu militari' or violate their own internal regulations. Therefore, an effective political sacking was not carried out completely in Chile, nor in Argentina.

In fact, the University Rectores were not able to control their campuses, and the law was not carried out. Chilean universities became a stronghold of political opposition to the A.A.F.F. Government as happened in Argentina. As soon as the military went back to the barracks, political parties regained part of their share of power at universities, political activity became important again, and many members of student unions and lecturers used the universities as a platform for their political careers.

Different interpretations of the high priority assigned to depoliticization in both governments under revision exist. One of them is the attempt to separate the citizen's role from the roles of lecturers, and university students. The former role with its attributes of political participation including to elect, and be elected for public offices; the latter related to research, lecturing, and objective intellectual work, distant from political activities. This search for isolating both roles is one of the outstanding features of educational policy in the Argentinian and Chilean Armed Forces governments.

Therefore, it is not strange that the process of political sacking entrusted to Chilean Rectores-Delegados became a failure, as was stated in an unpublished paper by Professor R. Conejeros in 1978. He asserted that the urgent mission of political sacking was halfway though at that time due to three main reasons: a) the criteria to produce political dismissals was not clear, b) it was impossible to dismiss some
academic personnel due to their real or supposedly outstanding knowledge or international prestige, c) many lecturers and researchers discharged from one university found a position in another, due to the lack of co-ordination among the Rectores-Delegados (Conejeros, 1978, 4 onwards). Professor Conejeros' criticism is well founded. It is impossible to find any public or semi-public document to prove such an interest in getting rid of political activists at universities.

Later in 1979, Rector Reyes Tastets from Universidad Técnica del Estado, in a speech made some direct remarks relating to this problem, when he invited President Pinochet to inaugurate a new library building. He asserted that at his university, political dismissals were completed, and academic activities were back to normality (Reyes, 1979, no page number). It is noticeable that Reyes and J Sweet were the only 'Rectores' able to comment of this problem, and argue that it was all over.

Decree-law 3,541 made it evident that the problems of carrying out political persisted at universities in 1980, even when they might be, at that moment, less political and more administrative in nature. Pinochet had to pass this decree-law, which enabled himself to produce deep structural changes in all Chilean universities, including new statutes and procedures to regulate the functioning of these institutions.

"Directivas Presidenciales sobre Educación" [Presidential Guidelines on Education]. PGE stated the need for a national university law. A Committee chaired by the Minister of Education, the Minister of Government, the Minister who was Chief of Advisors to the Junta de Gobierno, and two renowned lawyers were to study a university law. Pointing to some characteristics of this law, article number 1.3.4 stated that universities' statutes must include devices to avoid politicization when electing governing bodies at universities, since it might distort their aims. Point
1.3.10 considered, due to students strikes, the occupation of buildings and the like, the need for the law to include a legal device that allowed police to reopen all university property unduly occupied.

At the core of these problems, lies the concepts of autonomy. In a proper sense, it should be understood as the right of an university to teach, to research, and to govern itself. At L.A. universities, this concept was enlarged after the reform movements to include the rejection of the right the police forces to stay, or enter into campuses. Autonomy was transformed into a virtual sovereignty, by which the university enjoyed a status similar to embassies. It meant extra territoriality. Sovereignty is a Nation's attribute, because it is the only organization which enjoyed complete and perfect autonomy, and is therefore able to set its own goals, and to provide the main goals for other institutions. The autonomy of other institutions, such as universities, is only functional, involving the idea of freedom but, at the same time, including the concept of subordination to the Nation. 'Freedom' is within a frame of dependency, and can be seen as a minor concept included within a major one. Therefore, the university enjoys autonomy exclusively in its academic, administrative and economic activities, but this excludes cultural, political, legal, and territorial autonomy. A university is unable to set norms for society at large (Conejeros, 1979 12).

This enlarged concept of autonomy provide a 'Sancta Santorum' for university students and personnel in Latin America, who could do what they wanted at minimal risk. Universities could suffer shootings, robbery, and crime on campuses. At the University of Concepción, the bank branch on the campus had been robbed several times with complete impunity. The same happened at the 'Universidad Catolica de Chile'. All these armed robberies were under a military government, because the idea of extra territoriality was still respected even when there was no law granting
the university such a privilege. The Police felt itself to be inhibited from entering onto campuses even when bank robbery or any other kind of criminal activities was taking place.

Argentina and Chile attempts of political dismissals compared.

There are some noticeable differences between the Argentinian and Chilean governments:

a) the payment of compensations to discharged personnel. While, university personnel declared 'non grata' by their political activism were dismissed without compensation in Argentina, Chilean laws permitted almost everyone to receive compensation; b) Argentina understood the need to enforce political by means of specific laws, renewed when necessary, and reinforced by ministerial orders. The Chilean government used instead, direct instructions from the President, and the Education Ministry to the 'Rectores'. Sometimes due to their rank in the Armed Forces, some rectores were senior officers than Navy Admirals when appointed Education Ministers. In addition most of the time they belonged to different branches of the A.A.F.F. weakening the dependency link among them. When appointed civilians ministers of education some Army Generals 'Rectores' as the 'Universidad de Chile' had more political influence, so all of the Rectores did not depend entirely on the Minister because they could bypass him quite easily.

Chilean compensation for dismissal were laid down in decree law No 139. Despite this decree, it was agreed the right to pay compensation only to the 'Rectores Delegados' of four universities: 'Concepción', 'Técnica Fedérico Santa María', 'Austral de Chile', and 'del Norte' (Junta Gobierno, Chile (a) 1973). Five months later, both Catholic universities were granted this permission by decree law No 421.
and later Decree-Law 762 permitted the 'Rectores Delegados' of all universities to pay compensation to redundant personnel (Junta Gobierno; Chile, (a) 1974). Again in 1976 by decree-law No 1,321 (Presidente, Chile, (a) 1976) the authority to discharge personnel and to paid compensations was extended. All these succession of decrees-law meant that political and administrative at Chilean universities was not complete after three years of military government

Evidently the goal of both military governments—by means of different strategies, and legal procedures—to eradicate universities political activists among lecturers, students and employees was not successful due to the traditional involvement in partisan politics that had become a kind of 'normal abnormality' in tertiary education, as much as in Argentina as in Chile. Nevertheless, they could ensure a more normal political activity, in which extremists were eradicated, and political violence became sporadic and softened.

Universities: a low priority at the beginning

a) Argentina

It seems that the university did not have a high priority in the plans of both military governments. In the public speeches of Argentinian Presidents, and Chilean one, the university is not an important issue, and if mentioned there were only general remarks. General Videla, May 24, 1976 criticizing education up to that moment asserted that its main characteristic was improvised planning, economical waste, and political partisanism. Later in the same speech, he pointed to the solution of these problems; schools and universities should take into account and adapt themselves to the cultural and socio-economic reality of Argentina. Academic freedom at universities was to be respected, due to the universality of knowledge, and
openness to cultural and scientific renovation. The government would propitiate equal opportunities for pre and post-graduate studies; nevertheless, by no means, would the government permit disorder, demagoguery, ideological preaching, or the wasting of human and material resources (Videla (a), 1977, 33 & 39). Later, in Tucumán, he mentioned political ideological corruption as permeating universities, colleges, cultural and scientific centres, attempting to abuse education, the search for truth, and creativity, in order to obtain political power. Cultural freedom had been the first victim of this struggle. He asserted that the government was not afraid of the rigorous analysis, and proper criticism of intellectual work, because they were looking for unity, not uniformity (Videla (b), 1977, 83).

Unfortunately, the speeches of military Presidents are not available at the Library of Congress in Argentina, or at the National Library in Chile, nor even in specialized libraries belonging to the armed forces in both countries. The only exception is one edited book with the speeches of J R Videla in his first year in the government. This means that researchers in the future will have to rely on press transcriptions, with no certainty of accuracy. This leads us to use only passed laws, decree-laws, decrees, ministerial resolutions, and Education Ministers speeches when available as main sources to study educational policies in that period.

b) Chile

Pinochet’s educational speeches were partially collected by the ‘Corporación de Estudios Nacionales’ using selected paragraphs belonging to the decade 1973 to 1983 as a sample of his main ideas relating to different topics. In this collection, for the first stage, he mentioned education as a genre, once in 1973, and again in 1974. Both speeches emphasized the idea of eradicating political partisanism to encourage the great values of nationality, and the common good. After 1980 he mentioned education more often (Pinochet, 1985, 201 onwards).
Another useful source is the Chilean Annual Presidential Messages, which are a traditional review of the nation's administration, and include a chapter for each ministry, sketching advances and main policy goals. In the first one, corresponding to September 11th 1973 to September 11th 1974, the existence of chaos in academic, administrative, and human relations at universities was mentioned. The situation in most of them sometimes bordered on criminality, in which the use of firearms, equipment robberies, and fraud were frequent. Many lecturers used their positions to propagate and promote their political parties and movements (Presidente Chile, 1974, 285-7).

In 1977, one Message devoted to education presented a resumé covering 1973 to 1977, in which it was stated that due to the politicization and partisanship at universities was necessary to appoint Rectores-Delegados as the only mean of eradication (Presidente, Chile, 1977, 528). Neither PGE nor the [National Objective and General Policies of Chilean Government], National Objective onwards, do not even mention universities, and only in 1975 is it possible to find some statements relating to universities, even when they do not mention the problems of political partisanship at them (ODEPLAN, 1975, 56).

National security

a) Argentina

National Security was another important subject related to the educational policy at the Argentinian Ministry of Culture and Education. The main task was to eradicate the infiltration of ideas opposed to the national spirit. So the ministry organized a security department directly linked to the Security Secretariat of State (Bruera, (b) 1976, 4).
b) Chile

Instead of emphasizing National Security, A.A.F.F. government declared itself anti-Marxist because the conception of man and society forbid neutrality in this matter, and anti-Marxism involved freedom, and mankind's dignity (Junta Gobierno, Chile, (b) 1974, 13). It is interesting to note that the Chilean government do not mention National Security as the basis of their political decisions in official documents, until the promulgation of the 1980 Constitution.

Rectores' Appointment

a) Argentina

The first emergency decision in both countries was the appointment of 'Rectores-Delegados' at Chilean universities in 1973, and 'Interventores' and 'Rectores' at Argentinian ones in 1976 to carry on government policies. The first task of this 'Rectores' was to enforce administrative and political order to the universities.

The Argentinian universities had already been politically cleansed under Isabel Perón's government. In most of them after six months of military 'interventores' rule, civilian 'Rectores' were appointed. Many among them have had a life long career at the university in which they became 'Rectores'. Many had been expelled or prosecuted in 1973 by the 'Montoneros' but Peronist's Education Ministers Ivanisevich and Arrighi had been given back their chairs. This fact produced a natural selection in which right intellectual wing and nationalists were a majority.
It seems evident that the first stage of 'Interventores', from the three branches of Argentinian A.A.F.F.—who were influenced by academic personnel, and forged information that ended in the unfair of academics, students, and clerical staff. This plot was called 'Operativo Alborada'. This 'Operativo' was mainly a witch hunt because the political at universities was carried out, almost completely, under Isabel Peron's government.

When appointed 'Rectores' the majority of them were highly experienced academic personnel, with decades of service at universities, or were members of powerful professional associations. Once appointed, most of them choose experienced lecturers and staff to help them to manage their universities. They had to suffer, besides the internal pressure groups, claims from security branches of the A.A.F.F. who together with extreme right wing lecturers, started many witch hunts. Worst of all, some brigade commanders took over a few universities, arguing that the presence of groups endangered national security. Despite these problems, Argentinian universities could recover normality in a very short time.

One element that helped to return universities to normality was the abrogation of law 20,536, art. 56 passed by Minister Taiana, under Campora's presidency, which declared all lecturers' contracts to be provisional, so that all senates were provisory and could not adopt important decisions. Minister Bruera proposed a law that was accepted by the President, and published as No 21,536, 1977. By means of this law, all lecturers' posts that had been appointed by means of a public competition in any government, were confirmed as definite appointments.

By this law, all university senates could start working again and adopt decisions with a certain independence. It is interesting to notice that the many laws passed to prevent suspected extremists—inside or outside universities—promoting
their activities, should be understood as a reflection of their past deeds rather than any real danger. This fact, no doubt, was related with internal quarrels between pressure groups, which despite having political affinities are more passionate enemies among themselves than with their ideological adversaries. Unfortunately these groups are quite abundant in L.A. universities.

b) Chile

'Rectores Delegados' were not appointed immediately after the military take over. In two cases at least: the 'Rectores' of the University of Concepción, and the University of Chile, freely elected at the polls, prior to the military 'Pronunciamiento,' were kept in their positions for several months, before being replaced. The reason for their dismissal was the procedures to produce political redundancies in universities.

Very soon, the Chilean government passed Decree-Law No 50, appointing 'Rectores-Delegados' in all Chilean Universities (Junta Gobierno, Chile (b), 1973), then Decrees-Law Nos 111, (Junta Gobierno, Chile, (c) 1973) and 112 October 29th (Junta Gobierno, Chile (d), 1973), empowered the 'Rectores' of: Universities of Chile, Católica of Chile, and Católica of Valparaíso to: a) suppress collective decision-making-bodies, and assume their legal authority, b) to appoint personnel in strategic positions, and keep them in power while they had confidence in them, and c) to dismiss, and to hire personnel. Therefore, they had enough legal tools to create a new set of regulations to manage universities.

The only difference between public universities, and both 'Católicas' laid in the 2nd article of Decree-Law 112. It stated that it should take into account the "Santa Sede", the 'Conferencia del Episcopado Chileno" [Chilean Episcopate Conference], and 'Grandes Cancilleres' [Great Chancellors] would keep all their au-
authority as stated in the Basic Statutes and regulations. In less than a month, all Rectores-Delegados had nearly the same range of power to manage the reorganization of Chilean universities.

Until 1980, most of these Rectores-Delegados were Armed Forces officers, on duty or retired. Nevertheless, apart from appointing some clerical staff, all higher academic positions were served by experienced career academic personnel from the universities in which they were appointed, most of them members of influential groups into their own universities.

One of the few Chilean Rectores who had a deep knowledge of the university in which he had been appointed, was the 'Rector' of the University of Concepción. He was a former navy officer, who had been for many years, a high rank administrative officer at that university. He offered all higher positions to scholars with a life long career and were highly respected by the university scholars.

Continuity was one of the main characteristics of Chilean universities, despite the existence of Rectores Delegados. Again, the University of Concepción is a good example, the last elected civilian Rector was appointed a couple of years after being 'Vice-Rector', and later 'Rector'. This continuity depended mostly on the homogeneity of influential groups, and the depth of their internal disturbances.

The most noticeable case of continuity among 'Rectores-Delegados' was J Sweet, a retired Navy Admiral appointed at the 'Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile'. He managed the university with the support of the strongest internal influential group, and with minimal, in the circumstances, redundancies of personnel, or academic disturbances. In his own words he;
"tried to keep continuity with the existing work group and with the authorities in charge at the moment, with the only exception of people belonging to the Marxist groups... The internal political redundancies consisted in the closure of two highly politicized "Centros" and to cancel the contract to a little over fifty lecturers" (Sweet, 1975, 8-10).

This approach was followed by many Rectores-Delegados, and Interventores in both countries. The better the judgement to choose among the most experienced lecturers, and clerical personnel from the staff of their own university, the greater the chance to establish a good administration. This was the main difference between successful and unsuccessful Rectores. When the right to appoint 'Rectores' was returned to the Catholic Church, J Sweet was confirmed in his position for a second period, and at the end of it he was acknowledged publicly as a great Rector by the Catholic Church, government, lecturers, staff, and students.

The University which suffered the most for lack of continuity and which became a permanent source of problems for the Chilean A.A.F.F. government was the 'Universidad de Chile', in which their political, and administrative problems were not solved even in 1987. That year the government had to pass Law No 18,663, suspending once again corporate bodies, and transferring their rights to the Rector, permitting him to discharge personnel without prior notice (Presidente, Chile, 1987). Again in November 1988, the government had to pass a new law extending for another year the Rector's power to manage the university without consulting the opinion of the 'Junta Directiva' (Presidente, Chile, 1988). It seems that problems at the Universidad de Chile, were never really solved under the military government, because they had to pass a new law permitting President Pinochet to change the statutes in November 1989, when he was ending his mandate.
B) Introducing Administrative Order into the Tertiary Education

a) Argentina

The diagnosis of the Argentinian Minister of Education, Ricardo P. Bruera of universities pointed to problems that have affected tertiary education for decades. The worst of them was the existence of an inverted pyramid in the Argentinian educational system, main characteristics of which were: a) the existence of a gigantic university system, growing up faster than primary school, with an enrolment rate of 21/1000, higher than in many developed countries, b) university service to society was not answering the country's needs, or at least not completely, producing more professionals than the market's demand, c) inefficient productivity, only ten percent of university students complete their studies and get their professional title or a degree (Bruera, (c) 1976, 6 onwards).

These characteristics made universities cost inefficient institutions, providing free university for all, regardless of their ability to pay. According to Minister Bruera a medium range policy had to be developed towards a fully costed university, where student's paid by providing loans to worthy students not able to finance their studies. (ibid.). In other public speeches, Minister Bruera pointed again, and again to these matters which were, and still are, one of the biggest Argentinian concerns.

In May 1976, Minister Bruera signed the first resolution to induce universities to become an instrument of the Nation's development. This was designed to avoid duplication of specialisms taught at universities by means of centralizing the permission to start new ones at the ministry. To obtain permission, it was necessary to show: a) the need for new university specialisms, b) how the specialisms would serve regional or national priorities?, c) research needs, d) the field open to these new specialisms, and, d) any special reason for this creation. In addition to satisfying
these basic conditions, universities were to provide information related to the curriculum, length of studies, number of lecturers, and administrative support personnel, a description of the infrastructure, and budget (Ministro Educación, Argentina, (a) 1976, 15).

b) Chile

The Chilean military government did not pass a law or decree on this matter, and there were only general remarks in different documents pointing to this goal, dated several years after the 'Pronunciamiento', most of them related to National Planning projects. Estrategia Nacional de Desarrollo Regional: 1975-1990. [National Development Strategy for Regions] emphasized the need to use the universities to produce qualified human resources demanded by national development. The most important aims were, a) to motivate researchers and students at universities sited in the regions to study fields related to the region's development, b) to move the administration of universities and branches of universities first into the regions, and then in the medium and long term to provide in the regions a rational system of autonomous university branches (ODEPLAN, 1975, 56). Another official document dated in 1977 pointed to the need to relate tertiary education to the market of human resources needed by the country, avoiding a surplus of university graduates not needed at the moment (ODEPLAN, 1977, 498).

It is possible to detect some clues toward this goal in Chilean Annual Presidential Messages, in the chapter on education. In 1974's message, it was stated that a rationalization of specialisms taking out all unnecessary subjects has been carried out. Some specialisms were discontinued, most of them created in past decades due more to political pressure than Nation's needs, and the creation of new and more necessary ones. Order had been introduced into the academic career, and
regulations to get a lecturers' positions had been devised (Presidente, Chile, 1974, 285-6).

The 1976 Presidential message presented as a novelty, the discussions related to a new funding system, a law project concerning to regionalization, and information about methods to evaluate lecturers, and to transfer students between universities (Presidente, Chile, 1976, 459). It is evident from the 1977 Message, that most work at the Rectores Council were only 'projects' because the same items appeared year after year. It seems they were at a lower stage of development than could be understood from previous Messages. Until 1980, Presidential Messages made evident the existence of meagre progress, relating uncompleted tasks, many of them pursuing prestige such as publishing collections of scientific books, monographs, and the like. Studies related to the needs of human resources, optimal size of universities, students enrolment processes, libraries co-ordination had been carried out (Presidente, Chile, 1980, 526-7). All these initiatives were far away from placing universities as an efficient tool for development.

Chilean universities developed themselves by inertia. The Catholic University of Chile was the best prepared to afford this period, because left wing political pressures helped to reinvigorate a strong centre-to-right group among lecturers, students and staff able to head it under new political conditions. The first wave of political discharges at universities affected the Pontifical Catholic University less than other Chilean universities.

Many of their senior staff emigrate temporarily or permanently to government positions, first as consultants, then as top executive staff, and later some of them undertook ministerial positions. From their positions they kept their links, and supported strongly the Catholic university. If Chilean tertiary education had to be
evaluated by the image and prestige of Catholic University, it would be possible to assert that the Chilean university system was solid and efficient, but unfortunately the rest of the universities lagged far behind. Besides, this university was the only one able to keep their students union active, while the rest were banned for many years.

The chances of obtaining the goal of placing universities as promoters of development, clearly stated by the Argentinian, and not so explicitly by the Chilean governments, were scarce. The answer to national needs of human resources, technology, and research is one of the hardest problems at universities worldwide, and this task demands a high degree of co-ordination among universities. In addition, what was required was a deep and certain knowledge of the country's socio-economic future. This is a problem not solved in any place in the world, not even in the centralized economies of the socialist-Marxist countries or by military governments—not to speak of the free market system countries.

Dependency and Relationships: Ministries of Education-Universities

a) Argentina

An evident purpose in subordinating universities to the Ministry, and to national development was clear from the beginning. Law 21.276 provided the legal frame to produce an effective co-ordination at universities, stating as urgent tasks: a) the creation of an effective management system, b) the creation of administrative regulations to permit a centralized evaluation of budgetary matters and to assign priority to projects. Article 3 stated that the Ministry of Culture and Education, Rectores, Presidentes, Deans or Directors of Department would be responsible for
universities' management, and administration (Junta Militar, Argentina, (a) 1976, 6).

The subordination of Rectores to the Argentinian Minister of Education was still more evident in the Council of Rectores' regulations provided by decree No 391. In its 1st article, it appears as an advisory body to the Ministry of Culture and Education. This ministry would be responsible to link, co-ordinate, and provide administrative support to the Council through the under secretary of universities affairs (Presidente, Argentina, 1977, 13).

The provisions of regulations for the enrolment of university students was another field in which the Argentinian Ministry of Education and Culture had control over universities (Ministro Educación, Argentina, (b) 1976, 9). It was empowered to appoint co-ordinators throughout the country, to control enrolment, and co-ordination among high schools and universities (Subsecretario Educación, Argentina 1976, 9). In addition, the Ministry had to give permission to universities for hiring lecturers to teach admission courses to universities, and to employ non-traditional systems of lecturing. Appendix 1 stated the ratio of lecturer-students, salaries, mileage rates if they live far from the schools, and the minutiae of administrative matters, showing the strong dependency of universities on the ministry (Presidente, Argentina, 1978, 17).

The Council of Rectores created as a body to assist the Ministry of Education and Culture, emphasized dependency and control over 'Rectores'. The Ministry, by means of the 'Subsecretaría de Asuntos Universitarios' [Under Secretary of Universities Affairs], was to co-ordinate and provide administrative help to that Council. The article 6 which lists the functions of the Council, shows clearly than six from eleven items are of advisory character (letters b, c, d, f, g, i), two are re-
lated to inter-university co-ordination (a, and h), and only one related to the provision of their own regulations to let universities act with some independence (Presidente de Argentina, 1977, 12-13).

The Culture and Education Ministry in an attempt to stop the anarchic growing up of the university system forbade the creation of new specialisms, faculties, or academic units without prior permission from the Ministry (Ministro Educación, Argentina; (a) 1976, 10). Again, the Ministry suspended for six months the creation of new specialisms, and academic departments at national, provincial, and private universities, while studies to co-ordinate the tertiary system were completed (Ministro Educación, Argentina, (a) 1978, 18).

The Argentinian Military Government's efforts to control universities were put into action, and at least one university was summoned for disobeying ministry orders. The University of Belgrano had created new specialisms without prior permission. In addition, the time limit to amend this breach of regulations had ended, constituting a serious offence according to the Ministry. The university did put forward any admissible evidence in its defence for law 8,472, article 14th, stated the right to put forward a defence could only be exercised after the breach have been corrected. Finally, the university of Belgrano was given ten days to amend their decisions, or all their activities would be closed down (Subsecretario Asuntos Universitarios, Argentina, (a) 1978, 9-10).

As part of these co-ordination efforts several 'Comisiones Intersectoriales Regionales' [Inter-Sectorial Regions Committees] under the supervision of 'Secretaría de Ciencia y Tecnología' [Secretary for Science and Technology] were created in 1978. The reason to create this body was the amount of scientific equipment, and capital goods dispersed among production and government sectors, some of them under-used.
Experimental work was performed successfully by a West-Centre Committee. This experience promoted the extension of these Committees to the whole country divided in regions. Those Committees had as main goals: a) to promote dialogue among production centres, private, state owned, and universities, b) to produce an inventory of the regions' scientific potential, c) to set up research priorities, d) to propose research, and technological development in agreement with regional needs, e) evaluation of research programmes, f) to suggest the creation of new groups of researchers, g) to facilitate the transference of research knowledge, h) to suggest devices to give strength to regional scientific-technological development, i) to participate in the design of the scientific-technological national policy, j) to extend the product of science, and technology to the region, and to the nation (Ministros Educación, Cultura y del Interior, 1978, 6-7).

Several attempts to create a body aiming to administrate tertiary education arose: First, the 'Dirección Nacional de Educación Superior' [National Directorate for Tertiary Education], was especially, created to provide alternatives to the university by means of shorter specialists courses. The origin of this office was a special Committee devoted to design an inclusive project to manage, and co-ordinate both: tertiary education, and high schools. This National Directorate was to have a relative autonomy and sufficient powers to control the operation and annual planning of these areas (Subsecretario Educación, Argentina 1977, 7-8). Secondly, in 1978, a new attempt to improve the situation of non university tertiary education moved the ministry to create a new Committee to design a pre-project of regulations for a special body in charge of this area.

By mid 1978, Minister J J Catalán made a new attempt to regulate nationals universities. In the foundations of his Resolution he mentioned the need to re-adapt, re-size, and re-ordering universities, emphasizing the need to provide clear guide-
lines for academic organization at National Universities. This was to take into account the disparity of criteria evident through differences among universities courses, groupings of specialisms, departmental and unit sizes, and the wide differences relating to the degree of independence from the Rector.

This varied structure of universities led to a search for a standard structure which would ensure optimal efficiency. Universities demanded a rational academic and administrative organization, adequate funding, and resources. The new academic organization required a great degree of flexibility to permit their development. At the same time, Minister Catalán pointed out the need for a shared criterion to facilitate the creation of an orderly system adapted to national, and regional planning.

The guidelines for the academic organization of national universities were founded on the principle of epistemological affinity, task description, and structure. The university was to be responsible for the professional training of its students by means of different specialists courses. Faculties should be responsible for the administration of groups of specialisms tied by common foundations, whilst departments should be responsible for a discipline or groups of them, related technology, and research. Schools should constitute academic areas, and participate in curriculum design, and the development of one or more professional specialists courses. The academic area should bring together related subjects, a specialism should be understood as a curricular unit for professional training. Finally, the ministry defined the institutes as research units where disciplines are of such complexity that they are outside the infrastructure of a department or school.

In relation to the structure, the resolution divided university academic activity into several faculties: Basic and Natural Sciences, Engineering, Agro-Sciences, Medical sciences, Law, Social and Economic Sciences, Humanities and Arts, Natural
and Biology Sciences, Architecture, Engineering and Exact Sciences, Law and Social Sciences [when it was necessary to separate economics from law], Economic Sciences. All of them had their own minimum of specialists courses, included several different combinations which could be followed.

Following the criterion of epistemological affinity, universities should select a model for grouping departments and schools into a Faculty. The criterion for universities which choose a departmental structure within a faculty, should follow these guidelines: each department should be at the service of the whole university, the universities might divide a department into areas, but not duplicate them, faculties should organize curricula by co-ordinating the subjects lectured in the different departments.

Universities which grouped their faculties into schools specialisms, should organize them into lecture and research academic areas avoiding duplicating efforts. The Institutes should gather human and equipment specialized resources from one or more departments to develop a common field of study (Ministro Educación, Argentina (b) 1978, 1-4).

The attempts to produce some uniformity at universities was evident in this period. In a fortnight the structure was ready with its faculties and specialisms at the National University of Mar del Plata. The Ministry of Education and Culture accepted it because it 'agrees completely with the guidelines provided', (Ministro Educación, Argentina (c) 1978, 8-9), even when some of them did not have two terminal basic careers as Architecture, and Law as demanded by the guidelines.

In addition of all devices to introduce order at universities it was used the specialisms incumbency system which permitted the Minister of Education and
Culture a great amount of control over private universities. This consisted of a detailed description of the student knowledge and abilities required to carry out professional activity. All professional studies in Argentina were to be controlled by this system (Subsecretario Asuntos Universitarios, (b) 1978, 10).

b) Chile

It was not until 1979 that the Committee created for the study of National University Law put forward the idea that it was the universities' duty to look at the development of specialisms with the potential to serve culture and society. There existed consensus in sub-Committee No 1 relating to the need for a stronger coordination system, and a reinforced link between them and the State (Pumpin, 1979, 2). At the same time administrative disorder, miss-management, and the inorganic growth of specialisms, were attacked by several laws empowering the 'Rectores' with a wide authority.

In this field the Chilean government clearly lagged behind the Argentinian one, for it was not only until January 1985 that they passed decree-law No 2, creating statutes for the Council of Rectores. Until that year, Rectores Council were very loosely co-ordinated with weak links with the Ministry. The Minister of Education became the Chairman of the Council, a body of 24 universities, and professional institutes. This Council was responsible for evaluating national needs for trained professionals and technicians. It might consult professional associations, the government or private experts to elaborate these requirements [art. 11, b). As the set of articles was designed to preserve the universities' autonomy, their findings were only recommendations, not compulsory for any of the members.

In fact this meant that the Chilean government could not impose any plan on universities designed, to promote a concerted line of work leading the use of uni-
versities in the task of nation development. Each time a Rector-Delegado disagreed with the goals, or the participation of his university in a project, the only solution was to dismiss him, or as it happened, quite often impose sanctions by tightening the budget of his university. Moreover, it was the regions' universities duty to advise the Region Development Council, only if the 'Intendente' required their help, and only in that case could they have access to information and the Council's meetings (Junta de Gobierno, (c) 1974). This law made evident the backward role assigned to universities by the military government as a reaction to their undue, and exaggerated political influence in the previous decade.

Miscellaneous Problems in Argentina

Foreign students had been a recurrent problem for the Argentinian University. Parents from neighbouring countries noticed that it was cheaper to send their children to study in Argentina, due to a low cost of living, and free enrolment and tuition at universities. Such a situation forced the Armed Forces government, from the very beginning, to devise some indirect administrative regulations. They consisted in examinations for all students prior to enrolment, and at the same time they made it harder for foreigners to get registration. Some other administrative restrictions were developed in order to lower the numbers of foreign students at Argentinian universities, restricting their enrolment on universities' entrance examinations courses. A stringent criterion was the evaluation of complementary courses to determine their equivalence with high school courses taught in Argentina (Ministro Educación, Argentina, 1977, 12).

Attempts to restrict the registration of foreigners at Argentinian universities produced diplomatic reactions. Ambassadors of neighbouring countries, un-
doubtedly, put pressure on the government because this ministerial resolution mentioned that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded a solution to this problem. As a consequence, in 1978 the Ministry had to extend the period of enrolment for foreign students; the reason was that high schools in neighbouring countries ended their terms later than Argentina. Therefore, the certifications of these high schools leavers could not be produced on time to apply to Argentinian universities (Ministro Educación, Argentina (d) 1978, 4).

Finally, the Under Secretary for universities, consulting the Ministry for External Affairs, and universities, agreed to provide a quota for foreigners, taking into consideration the problems that occurred in 1977 and 1978. Moreover, the Education Minister ordered that all National Universities should reserve a quota for foreign students, and that the Ministry should communicate it to the Foreign Relations Ministry. This ministry had to assign quotas to countries interested in them; the selection of students should be carried out in their own countries, and the applicants list was to be sent to the Argentinian Foreign Relations Ministry, who would proceed to communicate this to the Education Ministry. The foreign students would be admitted without taking examinations, and were not required to validate their high school certificate.

The system was rigid, complex, and designed to discourage foreign students. Once accepted, they could not move to another university, and had to complete the specialism of their first choice, by, at the latest one year after its normal length. No university should accept, or register any foreign student without having gone through all this 'modus operandi'. Foreign students applying to private universities had to meet all demands from the immigration office (Subsecretario Asuntos Universitarios, Argentina, (c) 1978, 22-3).
In 1979, the Ministry of Education, in an attempt to restore in part normality at universities, proposed to modify laws 21,276 and 21,533 which permitted the President to appoint, and remove rectores, deans, directors of academic units, and their substitutes. A decree was presented for the consideration of the President to appoint Rectores of universities for a fixed period of three years, providing continuity in the managing of those institutions. This would not affect the President's power to remove from office a Rector if necessary, before the three years term was ended, according to law 21,533 (Presidente, Argentina, 1979, 24-25). The Chilean Government on the contrary, never stated a fixed term for 'Rectores'; they were in their position as long the President kept confidence in them. This characteristic, no doubt, provided a degree of uncertainty in their positions and it should have affected the design of long range policies.

One of the most interesting tendencies in Argentinian university education, was the inclusion of courses of theology from 1979 until 1980 in many private universities and Institutes for training teachers, such as the Institute 'Niño Jesús', 'Nuestra Señora del Perpetuo Socorro', 'Nuestra Señora de la Merced', 'Ciudad de Mercedes', 'Nuestra Señora del Calvario' and others, all of them belonging to the Catholic Church.

II The second stage: Institutionalization of the Tertiary System

A) Different Philosophical Educational Approaches

a) Argentina
Differences in philosophical approaches underlying policies explain most of the diversity between the Argentinian and Chileans tertiary educational systems. The most important was the state's role. Argentinian policies never attempted seriously to diminish the state's importance. The best they could do was to create a decentralized system, but they were never able to take the decision to promote a system as free from state dependency as possible. They only produced declarations related to the need to diversify the educational tertiary system, moving to a system in which the university should not be the only pathway for high school leavers.

b) Chile

Contrariwise, the Chilean system was developed on the 1980s constitution, chapter III, article 19, No 11, where it laid down the 'freedom to teach, include the right to open, organize, and maintain educational establishments, with no other limitations than morality and the requirements for good habits, public order and national security. A constitutional organic law was to provide the minimal primary and secondary education requirements. At the same time, it would provide general and objective norms that enabled the state to make their accomplishment compulsory. This law was to provide the bases to give official status to educational establishments at any level (Presidente, Chile, (b) 1981).

This starting point produced as a consequence as strong educational diversification, decentralization, and the creation of private institutions in the Chilean tertiary education system, enlarging the offer of places at universities, Professional Institutes, and Centers for Technical Education. It promoted a strong competition in quality and prices, among state financed universities, and professional institutes in a new environment in which they had to compete for better students, to improve their research, and services. The university monopoly was broken, for the eight traditional universities, state and private—all of them financed by the state. They had to
face the competition of new ones derived from their former regional branches, and the appearance of new private ones. Competition included opening up by of lines of study that traditionally had been taught at universities. At the same time professional institutes had to face competition from centres for technical training.

Universities' funding changed from direct contribution from the state to a mixed system in which an important role was assigned to competition. This system started with a special premium for universities which captured the greatest share of the best top 20,000 students, measured through the national academic aptitude test. An important objective was to change direct funding to a mixed one based on quality improvement; at the end of this stage, direct state contribution should be reduced to a fifty percent, and the other fifty percent was to be indirectly distributed by means of different devices. Among them was 'Crédito Fiscal', a loan system with reduced rates of interest for students who were not able to finance their studies. From 1981 to 1989, the state funding system was modified, and refined, but the principle was sustained.

B) National Universities Law

In countries, fond of formal legal systems, written law is at the foundations of social and political life, and it is easier to find the turning point of big changes in society and institutions. The Argentina and Chile are not the exception. Both countries passed their University laws in 1980, the former in April and the latter in December. The Argentinians were able to pass their university law after four years in office, Chileans after seven, taking almost twice as long to pass such a law.
a) Argentina

Both laws were the product of 'ad hoc' Committees, the Argentinian one was constituted by Rectores of the most important state universities, appointed by the Rectores' Council. The initiative started at the Under Secretary of University Affairs office in November 78. The Under Secretary asked them to study a law to institutionalize universities. In December the Ministry officers insisted twice on this need and demanded from the Rectores' Council the creation of a Committee.

Simultaneously, the Argentinian Ministry of Culture and Education requested from the Presidential General Planning Office, data and alternatives for the new law. At the same time, the Under Secretary of Universities Affairs demanded from each national university, studies related to this matter. In addition, the Minister, Under Secretary for Universities Affairs, armed forces representatives, and cabinet members, made visits to universities. At universities' meetings, these officers consulted the opinion of academic staff and used this information, or part of it, to draft the new university law.

The Argentinian Minister's note attached to the law project, recognized that this law was somewhat provisional but satisfactory. It is noticeable that besides the Ministry note, another one appeared criticising it; its author was an outstanding Argentinian scholar, B Montejano (Jr). His main criticisms were: a) its excessive specification, making it more like a statute than a general law, b) the assignment to the university an alien objective, not related with its nature or with a positive norm, 'to preserve, propagate, and disseminate democratic principles'. This used an ambiguous word, not included in the Constitution which refers only to the republican form of government, c) last but not least, according to him, this law violated the subsidiarity principle, and, by extension university autonomy. He deplored this last aspect because it was, according to him, the right moment to free universities
from daily political life vicissitudes, so as to ensure research, and lecture continuity (Montejano, 1980, 1015).

**b) Chile**

The Chilean committee's origin was the 'Directiva Presidencial Sobre Educación' [Presidential Guideline on Education]. Members of this Committee were the Education ministry as president, Council of the Junta, and government ministries, and two outstanding lawyers not linked to universities. Nevertheless, preliminary work was performed by several sub-committees created to study this problem from different points of view: Definition of university, autonomy, state responsibility, private and state universities, university careers, inter-universities relations, and relationship with the state, creation of new universities, regionalization of them, maximum size of universities, and many others. In these sub-committees, participated a great number of academic staff from private and state universities.

The Argentinian and Chilean laws coincided completely in several points: a) the need to control political partisanship among lecturers and students, b) to put an end to free tuition at universities, and the creation of a grants and loans system, c) to improve academic research, lecturing, and extension studies, d) to create a monopoly for the use of the name 'university', conferment of degrees, and post graduate degrees, d) a strong similarity relating to ends and goals of universities, e) redesign of structure, financing, and academic autonomy, f) prohibition on the right to vote, for students in collective bodies that govern the universities, g) a re-definition of universities including their complete subservience to law.

The main differences between these laws are:

a) Argentinian university law did not innovate a relationship with private universities, which were affected only by three articles, the 2nd related with aims and
goals, 3rd related to mainly general tasks, and 4th to prohibitions. Apart from these articles, private universities were to be regulated by the previous laws of this sector Nos 17,604 from 1967, and 17,778 from 1968, both passed under Onganfa's government. Chilean law covered private and national universities alike.

b) Chilean law reserved as a university monopoly only twelve professional specialisms, in addition to the conferment of academic degrees: licenciado, magister, and doctor. All other specialisms could be taught at institutions other than universities. It meant Chilean government opened by law a multi-entry tertiary system including, Professional Institutes, and Training Centres for technicians. Chilean tertiary education acquired a great deal of flexibility, and freedom. The Argentinian university law did produce this kind of division, but their attempts to create a binary or multi-entry tertiary system were not so clear cut.

c) Argentinian universities forbid public political participation by lecturers and university officers, declaring university status incompatible with positions in political parties or unions. The Chilean law did not prohibit them because it would be an attempt against citizens rights, in which existed or could exist, legal political parties, to which citizens had the right to affiliate.

d) One of the main differences between both is the degree of freedom and autonomy. The Independence of Chilean universities from the government is bigger than the Argentinian one. Among the elements providing this margin of freedom were Directors Councils, which represented the government, the academic body, and outstanding external personalities representing community interests. Each of them had one third of the decision making power. This body has a wide set of rights, among them: a) to propose to the government a list with three names of candidates to be appointed as Rector by the republic's President; b) a wide set of rights related to economic matters; c) the ability to evaluate the Rector's management; c) to become a higher court to resolve for disciplinary appeals. Despite the right of this body to present short lists of candidates to 'rectorfia', this legal disposition was restricted
by article 13th included in the transitory regulations of the constitution, which stated that this short list would be provided only when demanded by the President, by means of a supreme decree. This never happened during Pinochet's presidential period.

e) The existence at Chilean universities of a 'comptroller officer' in charge to verify the legality of: first, the management and orders of the rector, clerical officers, deans, and directors of departments; second, the control of the monetary resources; and third, other duties assigned by the Rector. This new office provided a great deal of flexibility in the management of universities. All this internal control was without detriment to the duties of the Chilean 'Contraloría General de la República', [Republic General Comptroller] office attributions.

f) Argentinian law placed universities under the control of the government with strict economic dependency on the government, and control; including quarterly revision from the 'Tribunal de Cuentas de la Nación' [National Tribunal for Accountancy]. In addition, universities could not modify the number of positions assigned to them, in the basic legal regime for public bodies. The Chilean university enjoyed complete autonomy in relation with its economic management, including the right to hire and dismiss academic, clerical, and service personnel.

The two bodies previously cited [d, e], provided greater freedom and autonomy for the Chilean university compared to the Argentinian university in which the Rector was appointed by the executive power, and the deans were appointed by the government by means of a Rector's proposition. At the Superior Council, the only members not appointed by the government, were the elected academic personnel. Faculties council members were elected with less interference from the government.

The shared characteristics of these laws were due to the previous experiences of both A.A.F.F. governments, experiences hard to understand—especially by re-
searchers lacking direct experience of the politicization and violence at universities. Too frequently, scholars express judgements based on their own values, rather than on the objective findings of their research. Montejano (Jr.) considered the ban at universities on politics to be correct. Based on Argentinian experience, he pointed out that to proselytize, or use a professorship to promote political aspirations or as a device to start a political career—in or outside a party—was against the loyalty, and respect due to students. In relation to doctrinism, he understood this prohibition as proper, only if it was considered an attempt to impose on the students certain mental attitudes. If, understood in a Socratic mode, not as an imposition, but as a lesson in how to think, it would be correct (Montejano, op. cit. 1006 & 1013).

The same judgements could be applied to both national university laws, and for a better understanding of similarities and differences, a comparative study of statutes is needed as much within a country as between countries.

This excessive tendency to minute regulation was not present in Chilean university law. This had only 27 permanent articles, all of them of wide general scope, and only four chapters. The difference is very evident when compared to Argentinian's 75 permanent articles and six chapters. So, Chilean university law left universities a wider margin of making decision which they used to create their own statutes, all of them different, despite being included in the same legal framework. The Law for Argentinian universities permitted a narrower margin of freedom (Presidente Argentina, (b) 1980, 997-1023) as Montejano was afraid of.

The Chilean government was successful in its attempt to rationalize the size of universities. Among the commendations of the Committee to study the new university law, was the need to reduce the size of universities. As a result of their suggestions, Decree-Law No2 was passed, which ordered the Rectores to present a programme within 90 days to rationalize their universities. The only article of this
Decree-Law stated that all the projects should avoid massive number of students, if necessary the Rectores had to propose the partition of universities to meet this demand (Presidente Chile, 1981, (c) 14-15). These orders were taken into consideration by all universities except the 'Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile', which refused to lose their regional branches.

This Decree-Law made the number of universities and professional Institutes went up, from eight to twenty four. Most of them had as their origin, the regional branches of the two big state universities, University of Chile, and State's Technical University.

C) University Statutes

Space restrictions move us to compare and analyse only a couple of university statutes per country, among them, the main Argentinian and Chilean state universities. Similarities were stated when comparing the National University Laws of both countries, so the analysis of the statutes will be devoted to stating the main differences in the regulations to manage universities.

Argentina's other unique objective was the goal of service, fitting universities to the needs of the nation (Presidente, Argentina, 1982, 2550-2552). This was stressed to a noticeable higher degree than in Chile whose luke warm, statements were no more than a line and a half in a four inch column.

At the same time, Chilean statutes created, as a device to avoid politicization a consultation mechanism to appoint top academic officers at universities. It was based on an inquiry team which scrutinized lecturers preferences, but many uni-
versities preferred direct appointments by a joint decision of the Rector and Directive Council. All tertiary systems avoided any appeal to ballots in the election of directors of department, deans, and rectores. Many universities followed the American style of searching for the right man for any top position through the employment of 'head-hunters' as a consultants.

The most outstanding difference did not lie on administrative, but in moral grounds. The Argentinian statutes assigned a great importance to morality, for them 'moral integrity and university straightforwardness could not be replaced by intellectual merit only' (Presidente, Argentina, 1981, 53), as stated in the Buenos Aires University statutes. This morality should direct personal academic behaviour even outside university campuses. Anybody convicted of a crime, or intellectual dishonesty was to be removed from his position (op cit, 63). The Argentinian statutes emphasized the need to imbue students, and graduates with a sense of responsibility and duty to the motherland.

In relation to the hiring of academic personnel, Argentinians, following an extended Latin American tradition, had a wide open public recruitment. Chilean statutes dealt with this problem in separate regulations and were not enthusiastic at all in regard to this type of recruitment.

D) Attempts to Create a Non-University Tertiary System

The Argentinian government made some attempts in this direction, unfortunately they were not clearly designed, and in the end they kept in being some institutions from past governments instead of creating new ones. Contrariwise, included in the package of Chilean university law were several devices to achieve this goal.
They were: the creation of Professional Institutes, academies mostly concerned with training teachers, and Technology Training Centres.

Professional Institutes, this new element of the tertiary sector, were created to train students in a post secondary system. They served mid, and short range professional careers, providing applied training for high school leavers in the skills needed by the productive sector. All kinds of professional studies could be included, except the twelve professional specialisms selected as the university monopoly. This exception was due to the legal prohibition on awarding the academic degrees of 'Licenciado', 'Magister', and 'Doctor'.

These Institutes were developed as teaching only institutions. The first article of this law stated they were to train professionals to a high level of expertise in their field, and it omitted carefully the words 'research' and 'extension'. To bypass this low prestige characteristic, many Institutes included them in their statutes, changing the wording but keeping the idea. Instead of research, or extension, one of them used 'promote research, the creation, preservation and transmission of universal knowledge and the promotion of art, letters and sciences' These subtle changes were accepted by the government, even when against the spirit of the law.

The 'Centros de Formación Técnica' [Centres for post high school technological training], aimed to provide alternatives to professional studies at universities and institutes. Their goal was to turn out the technicians needed by industry, commerce, and services. They started developing thanks to the demand for their training services and due to the straightforward and non-bureaucratic strategies created by the law, which facilitated their opening by people interested in setting one up. Any individual, or legal society could create one, by means of presenting their statutes to the Ministry, which had to approve or disapprove of them within ninety days. If the
Ministry did not reject this statutes in that time they were automatically approved. The curriculum was to be approved by the Ministry, which was to supervise and control them. They could, at the same time, offer courses of a lower level than of the Technicians without Ministry permission.

The Chilean government failed to evaluate the cultural influence and prestige which the university conveyed. People in cities in which there had been located a university branch, but which had been transformed into 'Institutos Profesionales', felt they were assigned a second class educational status. Claims were strong and the government was perceptive enough to agree to changes. So very soon from the original 11 Professional Institutes, 8 became universities, or were integrated into existing universities. At the same time, using the devices created by the government, many private Professional Institutes were created, compensating the diminishing number whose origin was a state university.

Conclusions

The special characteristics of the L.A. university, in which there exists a substantial amount of political violence, rioting, permanent opposition to all governments, untidiness, as political propaganda is always infecting walls with painted slogans, contrast with a normal image of a 'sancta santorum' of science and scholarly knowledge. Not only is their physical appearance awkward, and different from society, but the university seems to be disconnected with the 'real' country in that it is not related with the nation's development. Especially shocking for the military and citizenry at large, was the pretension of politicized sectors at university to become the 'conciencia crítica' [critical conscience] of society, demanding the right to impose their societal model on others. This phenomenon reached its highest point in
Argentina (Bruera (a) 1976, 1 onwards; Llerena 1981, 4 onwards) and Chile at the end of the sixties [see Annex II].

This image of the university, collided forcefully with Argentinian and Chilean military values. Therefore, for both it was important to change this situation, at the beginning in the most obvious aspects, to eradicate politicization and its sequels of terrorism, and immunity to produce it, at universities. Despite this image, the great majority of students and lecturers at universities were, and still are quite normal people, not involved in partisanship or terrorism. Unfortunately, these images are not produced by the majority but by strongly cohesive minorities that play the role of leaders.

The previously described situation collided with the military values of order, duty, service to the nation, and hierarchy. These values were at the roots of a violent, at the beginning, political dismissals at campuses, and subsequently of all legislation that aimed to keep them apart from those maladies. Therefore, most laws passed in that period insisted on the eradication of partisanship, service to the nation's development, a clear structure in which lecturers have a higher position in the hierarchy than students.

The source of most disagreement between students and the military governments, was the special concept of the universities' autonomy. This sought an extra territoriality, tacitly accepted by the civilian governments in which according to political activists, police forces were forbidden to intervene. Military governments refused to recognize these kind of privileges for a segment of society. It is barely worth emphasizing that the law does not grant these kind of privileges to any citizen in L.A. countries.
In relation to politicization at universities, the differences between civilian and military governments are not only a problem of degree but a problem of principles. This fact became evident in all the legislation passed in the period under study and in the statements justifying it.

The universal principles that guide the university were acknowledged by both military governments—the maintenance of autonomy, a search for scientific advances including hard sciences and social sciences, and the role of universities in the nation's development. The root of the problems was not in the principles, but in how to achieve them.

It is important to note that emergencies demand extraordinary decisions and the latter were adopted by the governments under study. Therefore, in accordance with it their style and values, that they appointed 'Interventores', 'Rectores Delegados', and provided them with all kind of powers that are not normally in the repertory of the heads of universities.

Administrative order was to be introduced in the university system in both countries, and the reduction in size of the main universities in Argentina and Chile, was a clear demonstration of another military value, neatness in the structure and the creation of units of a manageable size. Therefore, all gigantic universities like the 'Universidad de Chile' with more than fifty thousand students scattered along the country, and the 'Universidad de Buenos Aires', with four times that amount, were to be reduced in size.

The attempts to introduce universities into the task of the nation's development was another clear example of military values. Society invested heavily in universities, but the product was not clearly related to outputs. Many laws, and admin-
istrative attempts to put it at the service of the nation's development were performed, either in actuality or at least at project level. In both cases, under study the more clear attempts in this trend were the Argentinian's in the short term and then the Chilean's. Co-ordination among universities was clearly attempted, as much to determine the professionals needed by both countries, as to ensure the creation of new specialisms demanded by the national development. The attempts to co-ordinate the universities work by means of existing bodies, or by creating new ones, were also evident in this period. The results were not too outstanding, but they meant a progress in comparison with previous governments, the tools used for this purpose were in Argentina the Ministry control power to co-ordinate the university system, in Chile was the management of the university funding..

Included in the attempts to help the nation's development was the diversification of the tertiary education system. The models used by both military governments were very far apart. Argentina, attempted to achieve their goals by means of the improvement of existing institutions; it meant a tertiary education, which included state and private universities and professional institutes, created by previous administrations. The Chilean government created a new, and almost completely different system. In the apex of it, were the universities which had a monopoly of twelve specialisms, and the award of academic degrees of licenciate, master, and Ph.Ds. The Professional Institutes could provide training for any specialism, other than the ones that belonged exclusively to universities. This new system provided Chile with a very wide framework in which to train the human resources needed by the country.

The attempts to re-establish a hierarchy at universities was carried out at all levels. In Argentina, it was achieved by providing the Education Ministry with legal tools to control universities in a very vertical, and military fashion. In Chile, by
means of the governments' confidence in 'Rectores-Delegados' who depended, in the end, on the President of Chile. These attempts to enforce discipline shocked a very lax system traditionally not used to firm control.

Finally, both governments used a completely different philosophy to effect the development of education in general, and especially in the tertiary sector. Argentinians attempted to maintain a highly centralized control of education, in which the main role was performed by the Ministry. Chileans attempted to provide freedom for the system by means of diminishing the state's power, and increasing private participation. At this point, we can recognize the existence of two methods to solve a problem, that is a strategy problem. The Chilean government wanted to disseminate power, because experience up to 1973, made evident the dangers of a powerful centralized government. Therefore, they decided not to permit it happening again. No Chilean government in the future could attempt to establish an ideological control over the tertiary education system, because the power is scattered among many places, including the existence of a strong private tertiary education sector.
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Limitations of this chapter

The aims of this chapter is to present and evaluate the major tendencies of the criticism that both governments had to face in the educational field in the period under study. The wide publicity given to their findings, and the relative inability of both governments to counteract these works. This chapter also aims to underline the bias of the research produced by the political and scholarly opposition to both A.A.F.F. governments.

Due to space limitations, this chapter will include only aspects of educational policies that permit comparisons among both countries. Even in this way, many interesting political features have to be put aside for further research.

General Remarks

The most striking difference in the literature reviewed was the existence, and activities of many important private research institutions in Chile which enjoyed great amounts of financial support—mainly from foreign origin and the parallel scarcity of them in Argentina (Sanders, 1981, 14). Most of this research institutions were tightly linked to Chilean political opposition.
Research developed in Chile had a strong political bias, as much from the left wing, as from centre-to-left wing. The opposition widely promoted their politically-based criticism as well as their scholarly one. Right wing movements or Corporations had their own bias, but were less active in performing and promoting their research findings. Most of their work were related to economic and administrative changes in education. The Argentinian researchers criticized the government in their work's conclusions, but they lacked the acrimony found in too many Chilean researchers.

Previously stated facts make it difficult to produce comparisons between research papers in both the A.A.F.F. governments. For instance several researches leading to a PhD have been carried out relating to education in Chile under Pinochet's regime, but none related to the Argentinian 'Proceso'.

Chile is one of the strange cases in which non-government educational research has not only been able to survive, but increase under the A.A.F.F. regime, and generate alternative propositions. The amount of research produced, though small in the first two years, increased consistently linked, to the appearance of opposition movements in the political arena. Their research trends were clearly different from state related agencies, for the latter confined themselves to micro problems, while the non-government agencies devoted themselves to macroscopic ones. Non-government agencies researched widely in non-formal education, using qualitative as well as quantitative methods. Perhaps, their most interesting trend was the change from a neutral ideological research at the beginning—due to their need to survive—to a more politically engaged research:

"During the 1974-1984 period the non-government agencies have progressively developed a type of educational research with critical ideological intentionality towards the official educational policy" (Barra-Zuman, 1987, 156)
In contrast to what should be normally expected in an A.A.F.F. regime, the Chilean government agencies presented a neutral ideological research; meanwhile, non-government agencies as stated by Barra-Zuman emphasized their denunciation of government policies (op. cit., 157 onwards).

The main differences stated by Barra-Zuman between government and opposition research was the high level of expertise of researchers of non-government institutions compared to the ones at universities or government agencies. Unfortunately her judgement does not take into account: a) all private institution researchers were full-time, while academic staff at universities shared research with lectures, b) non-government agencies enjoyed an amount of funding from external agencies estimated at seven million dollars a year for social sciences research, an amount that universities have never been able to invest in this field in their entire history.

Their political bias, despite the expertise, and fairness of many researchers, was reflected in their work, because international institutions, which provided funding, would not give their support to an entirely neutral or merely technical research.

As in many other fields, during the A.A.F.F. governments in Argentina and Chile, it is hard to find objectivity or, at least efforts to achieve it. Especially in Chile, it was possible to find two types of research groups: a) the ones who rejected every policy provided by this governments as a matter of principle, and b) the ones who defended almost everything performed by them. Some of the former were next to a kind of intellectual terrorism, predicting all kind of catastrophes and malicious aims. They were very keen to explain everything as malicious A.A.F.F. conspiracies.
Two interesting phenomena occurred in Chile; firstly, several years before the military government ended its rule, scholars and politicians became more cautious in their assertions, previewing difficulties when they would become a government, and afraid of not being able to provide a solution to all the shortcomings they had criticized up to that moment. In Argentina, an opposite phenomenon took place at the end of 'El Proceso'—harsh criticism showed up. Secondly, a great deal of moderation existed when outstanding educational representatives from opposition and government gathered together to discuss Chile's education problems, as evident in several conferences proceedings (Cáceres, 1984; Cox, 1985, others).

Researcher's emphasis: authoritarianism and national security

There are peculiar characteristics in this field. Many authors related with the 'Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales' [FLACSO onwards], presented similar headings for their works, in each country under study; Tedesco et al in Argentina titled one of their works "El Proyecto Educativo Autoritario" [Authoritarian Educational Project], and in Chile Brunner's "El Diseño Autoritario de la Educación" [Authoritarian Educational Design].

A difference between Tedesco's work, and most Chilean researchers linked to opposition movements lies, in the emphasis given to National Security in the latter, and the more pure educational approach in the former. Both have in common a strong tendency to reinforce their view points by using related and crossed references with similar groups, using very rarely sources that contradict or present a different view of the problems under analysis. This bias is less evident among researchers of tertiary education in the Chilean case, in which the 'Corporación de Promoción Universitaria [CPU onwards] was more prone to a plural point of view.
Tedesco's 'Authoritarian Educational Project' recognizes explicitly the existence of several projects, associated with different Ministers instead of one A.A.F.F. institutional project. Many of them differed noticeably, e.g. Bruera's Ministry was based on institutional pedagogy, and personalization. His educational discourse was based on freedom, creativity and participation, including order and discipline as a means of achieving these purposes. Llerena Amadeo imposed a more traditional Catholicism in which the re-establishment of a hierarchy was a core policy. His policy was founded in: 1) mistrust in the state whilst revaluing the family as an educational agent, and 2) positing educational goals and ends as ethical-political issues (Tedesco, 1983, 28 onwards).

Nevertheless, ethical religious values received different emphases among Argentinian provinces. In Buenos Aires' curriculum religious values were not even mentioned, whilst in Santiago del Estero, religious teaching was adopted at schools (op cit, 56). The family's role was emphasized in the 'Proceso'. This trend is understood by Tedesco to be directly linked with the rise of the hierarchical role of authority in line with a family structure conceived within ideological traditionalism (op cit, 57).

Unfortunately, Tedesco did not characterize other Ministers' work because noticeable differences existed between Burundarena, Licciardo and Catalán so that it is impossible to speak of a project, 'strictu sensu', or even to speak so of authoritarianism.

In addition, as is recognized by Tedesco, many curriculum trends based on participation and criticism were restricted before 1976. Isabel Peron's government adopted harsh decisions to negate chaos, along the lines of an ideological traditionalism. (op cit, 26). Braslavski, on her side, recognizes too that not always is there a
coincidence of models and educational styles with government changes. It is necessary to consider when researching on educational policies its connection with society at large, taking into account education's relative independence from political events (Braslavski, 1983, 78).

Criticisms of National Security Doctrine [N.S.D. onwards], are rare among Argentinian researchers, for many of them are inclined to blame society at large and not only the A.A.F.F. regimes when dealing with educational matters. Storni stated, 'in our country the experience of our last A.A.F.F. regime so prone to intervene in all aspects related with education, has not been apparently rejected by our democrats, for, they feel the temptation to control education from university to primary school'. He described this situation as an internal contradiction due to ideological conditioning being stronger than democratic persuasion. Statism has dissuaded families from facing their duties in relationship to their children's education (Storni, 1989, 51). Salonia, one of the most prolific commentators on Argentinian education, asserted that Argentina has never suffered the harsh effects of educational totalitarianism (Salonia, 1981, 126 onwards). He does not even mention National Security in his column in "El Clarín" or other papers.

The quality problem faced by education

Many researchers criticized in their papers, the quality problems faced by education. At the same time, they recognized the virtual inexistence of research in this field. Nevertheless, some of them are ready to declare that quality deteriorated under, and after 'El Proceso' (Agudo, 1990, 179; Tedesco, 1983, 70).
The same phenomena occurred in Chile. Numerous researchers blame Pinochet's regime for the deterioration of quality in education, among others Nuñez (Nuñez, 1989, 15-7), but the first attempts to measure quality were made by Himmel, at the request from the Education Ministry in 1981 (Himmel, 1981, 148-50). Afterwards, the Education Ministry by means of the SIMCE project (Ministry of Education, 1988) [Education Quality Measurement System], produced periodical measurements of quality in schools.

One element has been constant in the short life of quality measurement in Chile. There exists three groups of schools, in which the best performers are private education, followed by state subventioned private schools, and at the bottom, the City Councils schools. It is noticeable that improvement in quality has been achieved between 1988 to 1992. Tables in annex I, show an improvement in the primary 4th grade from 1988 to 1992 (Matte; Sancho, 1985, 17-8). Students tested were enrolled at first grade in 1984 for the former group and in 1988 for the latter, period covered by the A.A.F.F. government.

Therefore, statements of educational quality before this period are highly subjective. The norm, as much in Argentina as in Chile, has been a surplus of quantitative research and an almost non existent measurement of educational quality, though in the Chilean case it started under Pinochet's regime in 1981.

Education from pre-primary to high school

Most researchers on Chilean education, agreed with Brunner's statement that 'At first, during the take-over, a repressive attitude created the need to control the education system from top to bottom'. According to him, the A.A.F.F. government
closed all means of social participation by using a 'war strategy'. This was evident in a circular from the Command of Military Institutes, providing orders that all school heads should channel through pertinent A.A.F.F. authorities, all matters related with schools' security or with administrative aspects that could become a problem. Later, he cites an order to report irregularities among teachers, students and parents associations (Brunner, microfiche no date, 34 onwards). Similar accusations were made by other researchers, based on the reading of these type of documents which originated just after the Chilean A.A.F.F. 'Pronunciamiento' (Pujadas, 1988, 18 onwards; and 1989, 3 onwards; Briones 1984, 477 onwards.)

This Orwellian scenery, was based on documents originated by the A.A.F.F. which were widely used to discredit them, especially when taken out of their original context and published for foreign consumption. These kind of regulations provided after an A.A.F.F. take-over, were products of a political crisis that ended in what was defined as a civil war. Most of them were common for all public services, but they were not strictly enforced due to two main reasons: a) the A.A.F.F. intelligence branches and personnel were not able to produce such a control over several million students, over a hundred thousand teachers, not to speak of millions of parents; and b) because Chilean tradition does not permit a strict external control in the classroom, in which teachers have a wide space to manoeuvre, hard to control, especially by headmasters (Jiménez, 1977). Therefore, this accusation has to be taken into account as characteristic of the A.A.F.F. style which was unable to modify tradition at schools or exert a tight control over them.
Decentralization of education

Argentina and Chile were equally subject to deep decentralization changes. Argentina transferred all national primary schools to provinces, Chile produced a complete transfer to the regions, including primary and secondary education. Afterwards Chilean education was transferred from Education Ministry at regions to the City Councils. Argentinians had witnessed several attempts to decentralize education, and most of them agreed that it was necessary to carry out it. Most criticism centered on insufficient funding provided to the provinces and on the need to improve the educational system (Salonia, 1981, 28) but some insinuations linked these decisions to ideological tendencies.

The Chilean regionalization, and later transference to City Councils in 1980, was interpreted as a complete move towards the political control of education. The basic argument was that Mayors were appointed by the government, and that they would comply dutifully and strictly with government orders. It would be different if Mayors were elected and represented their communities (Mensaje, 1981, 303-4). This widely utilized argument was based on an strong homogeneity of Mayors that never existed in the period under study.

Ideological Indoctrination accusations

Some Argentinian A.A.F.F. government educational initiatives included the provision of courses with a conflict tradition as Moral and Civic training. These courses had as a precedent 'Citizen Culture', originated in the first Peronist government. Afterwards in 1956 a 'Democratic Education' course was developed as a coun-
terbalance to the previous ideological position. Afterwards, in the last Peronist government the 'Study of Argentinian Social Reality' was established.

It is evident that all these courses originated in different political circumstances, and with a clear indoctrinating purpose. The new course 'Moral and Civic Training' was the object of mild criticism in which the main worry was related to its effect on the compulsory teaching of the Catholic faith. Despite this the Minister denied such a problem of pluralism existed, and argued that it aimed to provide knowledge of the Christian conception of life. This course was blamed for mixing different doctrines. One thing was identifying the ethical-religious education which was proper for the church and the family. A completely different matter was civic education as an introduction to the patterns of conduct in a democratic republic, highly necessary in Argentina (Criterio; 1979, 299 onwards).

Sidicaro is apparently one of the few exceptions to this trend when he cites a document emanating from the Education Ministry titled "Subversión en el Ambito Educativo" providing instructions on how to combat Marxism (Sidicaro, 1989, 9). Unfortunately for him, this example is an exception to the rule, because Argentina became an important commercial partner of the Soviet Union, and treating each other very politely.

In most research papers, journals, and newspapers, it is evident that critics were not afraid of the government attempting to produce an indoctrination campaign or ideological control. This situation contrasted clearly with Chile. Ideological control at primary and secondary school in Chile was not apparent, and changes in curriculum did not include evident ideological matters, nor exclusions. Prominent poets and writers such as Pablo Neruda, and Vicente Huidobro, both Communists, the former with an outstanding political participation were included in curricula in
primary and secondary schools, as were many others strong critics of the A.A.F.F. government.

Education Ministry curricula did not pretend to establish an ideological control. On the contrary, it was stated that 'in this context, the study programme is conceived as a reference frame that should permit the teacher to plan and organize the teaching process' (Education Ministry, 1985, 11). A standardization of the A.A.F.F. values, or values in general were not evident, on the contrary a wide dispersion of them existed in schools (Jiménez, 1983, 64-7).

Nevertheless, a Pastoral letter published in 'Mensaje' the Chilean Catholic Church claimed that an ideological message existed, stating that in primary schools, the curriculum omitted a direct reference to 'democracy' (Mensaje, 1981, 366-70). That was a fact. Instead of using the word 'democracy' emphasis was placed on the Greek city state, the Athenian political evolution; the French Revolution, and many other political topics (Ministry of Education, 1980, 88 onwards). These subjects made it compulsory to include democracy in the teaching of students.

Arguments that a tight control by City Councils would produce fear and self censorship, are not credible. Control did not affect teachers' prestige, because not all of them were cowards, frightened, or subjugated, as asserted by many opposition authors, and press articles. Another weakness of the accusation that the A.A.F.F. was promoting an 'Orwellian' ideological control, lies in the large segment of private education, which enjoyed a wider independence than the state's education system. Many schools were created by left wing groups, and the Catholic Church's schools net was used as a sanctuary for political dissidents. Consequently, a large segment of education in Chile enjoyed a level of independence ignored by scholarly criticism from the opposition. There is no doubt that the same happened in Argentina. Private
and Catholic schools which were not under absolute control, being able to provide a wide support to people who were afraid of the government.

It is impossible to review all criticism of Argentinian and Chilean education under the A.A.F.F. government, but it is worth mentioning that every aspect of education was scrutinized, from economic shortages, to a minimized social assistance to students, and from an excessive state control to an attempt to privatize the entire educational system.

Most economic and social criticism used as a comparison, Chile's 1970-1973 period. In it, under a socialist economic model, there was almost no restrictions on social investment financed by uncontrolled expansion of the currency. Therefore, comparisons are far from being objective and fair. Criticism related to Argentina faced the same problem, for populist governments are very generous when ruling and not too much aware of the consequences of mortgaging the future.

Tertiary Education: Universities' Funding

University funding share shortages

The Chilean state from 1960-1964 provided strong economic support for universities that rose up from 0.51 to 0.92% of the GNP. From 1965-1970, it grew up to a median of 1.13%, and from 1970-1973 it went further to a median of 1.87% of the GNP. These increases enabled universities to face the augmented demand from high school leavers generated by previous educational reforms. From 1974-1980, under the same rules of the game, the share of the university system fell to 1.36%, and this decline went further during the period 1981-1988 reaching 1.14% in 1981 and 0.6%
GNP in 1988 (Lehmann, 1990. 32-6). Brunner, citing Sanfuentes and Arriagada, summarize this problem: between 1960-1980, state funding to universities had two main trends, from 1965-1970 it was nearly 1% of GNP tending upwards in the last two years. During the impact of University Reform, it reached 2% of GNP in 1974, from 1975-1979 it started to decline reaching 1.1% GNP in the latter year, and from then on it dipped to a low of 0.6 in 1986 (Brunner, 1986, 112-3). It is evident that authors from different schools of thought coincided in their views on the existence of diminished state funding to universities.

The Argentinian university’s share of the national budget suffered too, important reductions. The Universities’ budget had to agree with long check-lists to provide rationality for their expenditure, despite every year receiving the same lump-sum, even when their cost per unit doubtless increased. Most of their income was linked to salaries and fixed costs. (Sánchez, 1978, 663); therefore, their ability to maneuver was very limited.

According to data provided by Bertoni & Cano, the Argentinian share of GNP, devoted to universities during the Peronist government 73-75, had a median value of 0.816. From 1976 to 1983 under the ‘Proceso’ its value went down to 0.568, varying greatly if shorter periods are used as a basis of calculation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976-1977</td>
<td>0.435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-1979</td>
<td>0.585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1981</td>
<td>0.665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>0.510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>0.690</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1983, the last year of 'El Proceso' it reached 0.69, bigger than any of the four years of Alfonsín government that reached only 0.655 of GNP (Bertoni; Cano 1990, 21). Accordingly, it is hard in the Argentinian A.A.F.F. government’s case to
sustain a conspiracy theory to run universities out of funding for control purposes: One two-year period [1980-1981] and the final year funding is higher than in the following democratic government. In addition, variations coincided with the general ups and downs of the national economy rather than with any deliberate aim of subduing the universities.

Researchers analysing investment in universities in Argentina and Chile, limited themselves mainly to stating the amount of GNP provided to universities. All judgements of decline/improvement are linked to this indicator, but not one of them related it to a bigger/smaller GNP. Both countries had GNP up and downs, before, during, and after the A.A.F.F. governments. It does make a difference when evaluating university funding.

Both A.A.F.F. governments originated in a political and economic crisis, facing inflation rates bordering 1000% yearly at takeover. Emergency and stringent economic decisions were to be made, cutting expenditure at all levels, including education. GNP in Argentina felt in the first quarter of 1976 by 5.2%, compared with the same period in 1975; afterwards it grew during the rest of the year, but next year it felt again in the first semester to 8%. The first two years results were not the ones expected, and Argentinian growth could be considered nil. The following years were called the 'Plata Dulce' [sweet money], and the 'tablita' periodical decrease table of USA dollar. Yet an artificial boom was produced, in which there were plenty of money to spend (Jordán, 1993, 204 onwards). Therefore, not only universities increased their share from the national budget. Previously stated facts explain by themselves, variations in funding, not only at universities, but for the Argentinian economy as a whole. The same conclusion can be applied to Chile, at least until 1980.
After 1975, the Chilean government started steering the country towards a new economic model, in which the dominating idea was efficiency and subsidiarity. Universities were not considered efficient, and funding was considered an important way to introduce efficiency. The funding system changed over time as much in amount as in the way to assign it. Many critics of the government's university policy accuse it of having been changed too often, with no clear purpose in mind. It was particularly believed to have produced too many unexpected effects (Brunner, 1986, 70 onwards; Atria, 1990, 16) which made it necessary to readjust the whole system over and over again.

Argentinian universities were not considered efficient either. The country boasted completely free admission to universities, although together with a large number of enrolment, there existed high drop out rates, and worst of all, very small rates of graduation, less than 10% of students got a degree—and for most of them, it had taken two more years than is normal in other countries (Pérez, 1985, 212-4).

**Paid tuition at universities**

At the centre of public debate, was one of the most sensitive problems for both countries, 'paid' university. L. A. tradition was based in a free-from-fees university for undergraduate students, in which all tuition expenses were provided by the state, and in which existed very limited accountability to governments. In addition, Argentinians were used to having open access to university for all high-school leavers. For Chile, Levy incorrectly criticizes the A.A.F.F. Government for imposing stringent aptitude tests, in which probably exacerbated differential access possibilities based on socio-economic status. This, it is argued, meant only wealthier students are generally able to go to university (Levy, 1980, 9). In reality, Chile had
imposed barriers since 1931, first the 'bachillerato' [baccalaureate], then a 'Licencia de Enseñanza Media', [high school license], and since 1967, the nation wide 'Prueba de Aptitud Académica' [PAA onwards], [Academic aptitude test] (Deaz, 1990, p. 307-9). In fact, the only modification to PAA during Pinochet's regime introduced in 1985, was a special test on Chilean history and geography (op cit, 329-30).

Entrance tests at argentinian universities were interpreted by some scholars as an attempt to keep or to reduce the size of National Universities, producing as an effect, the accumulation of social demands (Bertoni, op. cit. 20). Other authors did not reject entrance tests completely, instead they pointed out the need to open new alternatives for those rejected by universities (Sanchez, (a), 1977, 208-9).

In this field as, in many others, both A.A.F.F. governments present similarities and differences. Both governments introduced tuition fees, the difference was their depth and permanence. The first Argentinian democratic government abolished them, despite their amount being only symbolical.

Fees at Chilean universities arrived, to stay seemingly for ever, after being transformed by the A.A.F.F. government from 1981 onwards into a substantial part of universities' finances. Decree Law No 4 gave birth to the 'Crédito Fiscal Universitario' [students state loans], to cover tuition to all who were unable to afford it, to be repaid over a long term and at a subsidized interest rate. Between 1981 and 1987, fees paid by students went up from 15% to 25.5% of university income (Lehman, 1990, 56).

Considerable criticism of these charges came from all segments of society used to have university tuition for free, or at merely nominal charges. P. Vera, President of the University of Concepción Academic Association, claimed that paid
tuition was an attack on low income people, and demanded deep modifications to the university funding system (Vera, 1989, 105-6). Ruiz Tagle pointed out that among the problems that charges for tuition would produce were: students having to mortgage their future, and universities becoming more elitist. To complete this dark picture, he pointed out that the exponents of high tuition payments sought to neutralize the opposition of students by making them afraid of having their registration cancelled thereby loosing all the money and time invested (Ruiz Tagle, 1981, 81-2).

The concept of university fees as a tool to neutralize students, or to produce an elitist bias is not supported by research. Briones, author of one work in this field, in one of his tables, compares student's median PAA scores in relation to their father's work status. His data are not conclusive because farm workers and non-qualified workers gained .2 between 1976 to 1981; skilled farm workers and urban qualified workers kept the same percentage, government, technicians and clerical employees went down from 67.6 to 63.6 being the only segment to loose ground, and finally, managers and top executives gained 3.8 (Briones, 1981, 43).

Some authors recognized indirectly an 'elitist' process. Nevertheless, the majority of students have middle income parents, with complete or incomplete high school education, or incomplete university studies. Even the most selective Chilean university, the Pontifical Catholic University has 50% students with parents earning a middle to low income (Brunner, 1986, 110). Most of these studies do not consider important social changes in society at large, such as the always decreasing number of people, without or incomplete primary schooling, or the development of entrepreneurial social segments. Finally, 'years of schooling' or 'parents professional level' although, being a good indicators are not enough to declare a system to be elitist.
Political parties changed their view of this problem over time; the Christian Democrats for example did not reject tuition fees. Their basic assumption was that a free-from-charge university had no justification from the standpoints of justice or efficiency, because university students are privileged members of society. Students able to pay should do so; a funding system similar to state credit—without its problems—should be provided for low and middle income students, and personal taxation, levied on all who graduated before 1981, should be estimated on the basis of covering their teaching costs (Cox, 1989, 202-3).

Patricio Aylwin—as presidential candidate—in his government programme stated the need to increase state loans for students, providing in that moment a clear clue about the permanence of paid tuition at universities (Aylwin, no date, 1989?, 41). Afterwards, as acting President facing claims to cancel university loans debts, he stated clearly he should not provide a 'perdonazo' [to cancel debts].

One of the Socialist Party factions (Nuñez) stated 'probably the solution for this problem is a formula in-between free from charge, self financing, and paid tuition. From this standpoint it is possible to conceive of universities and a technological sector, without funding for those able to pay, and another segment with public funding almost free from charge (Cox, 1989, 226). The Communist party insisted that funding should be provided basically by the state (op cit, 233).

Different cultural associations publicly expressed their view about this problem. The Andrés Bello Association recognized that state funding should be supplemented by students payments, coexistent with a grant system, including opportunity costs for low income students (op cit, 253). The intellectual left maintained that meanwhile, pre-university education should be free from charges, uni-
versity education fees should be paid, including a positive discrimination towards low income students (op cit, 388).

Students attitudes changed over time. At the beginning, their motto was 'down with charges' a motto written on the most popular boards at Latin American universities—the walls of campuses, but it soon changed to 'increase state loans'. Today very few, and only when election time arrives, use this issue as a main plank in their manifestos.

The Argentinian attempt to impose tuition fees at universities cannot be described as a 'brave one'. There exists a certain kind of consensus that fees were only another means to help universities funding. Sanchez Martínez, stated in a paper that he could preview at least three alternatives for funding university education: a) to charge fees at universities, in all courses and all students alike, not matter what was their socio-economic status. Together, with these fees scholarships should exist and honour loans to low income students should to be re-paid once they had completed their studies and started working; b) the levy on education tax to all who had received free-from-fees education; and, c) to promote, and develop, private and non subsidized education in order to gather resources for state education to provide tuition to those unable to pay.

Stronger arguments were that free-from-fees education favoured only medium and high income students, since low income students were a minority because they dropped out before ending high school. Therefore, low income taxpayers were helping to finance state education for higher economic social groups in Argentinian society (Sánchez, (b) 1977, 142)
'Criterio', commenting on fee charges, stated that the Education Minister had announced repeatedly these charges, but their aim was not clear. Only one point was clear; they could not be used to increase lecturers and staff salaries. The idea itself was considered unquestionable. State university courses were costly, paid for by all taxpayers, and it seemed fair that beneficiaries should return at least part of these expenses.

Unfortunately, in Argentina declarations are one thing, and facts another completely different. Free-from-fees university education has had a century long tradition, and has been closely related to social mobility. The project aimed to depart from it, not in a real but symbolic way, because the cost per student was equivalent to a lunch, or a cinema ticket. Administrative costs to collect fees from 400,000 students would be presumably high, so, would it be advisable to apply this charge? The 1969 student revolts started by a minor problem so would it be advisable to create one simply for U.S. $20,000,000, a sum unable to solve many problems in the university system ('Criterio, 1980, 559). As in Chile, the issue of tuition fees was a major part of the claims of students, who defended a traditional free-from-fees university.

In 1983, at the end of the A.A.F.F. government, the free-from-fees university movement gained momentum. The will to study was a 'good' that should be used, so access to university was to be open absolutely to all high school leavers. Argentina should be back to the traditional free from charges university that was a part of national pride, and considered a main contributor to social mobility (Nino, 1983, 445-6).

It is evident that the Argentinian A.A.F.F. government created a problem unjustified by the benefits it provided. Charges were too low, and lacked a real eco-
nomic significance. Among scholars and students a strong tendency to protest existed, in which principles counted for more than prosaic realities, and funding meant nothing when individuals had the will to do something (Jordán, 1993, 177; Sánchez, 1978, 663; Salonia, 1980). In any event, Argentinian universities designed or increased a scholarship system derived from the income from fees. The University of Buenos Aires raised the number of scholarship from 337 to 1300 [700 full amount, and 600 partial amount], and provided salaries to students with academic responsibilities, however these benefits were meagre, good only to conceal scarce government funding (Salonia, (a), 1981) and they were insignificant due to the number of students registered at the university.

Conspiracy theories.

The followers of the conspiracy theory, assigned a special significance to funding reductions. This group was everywhere but were to be found especially in the 'Asociaciones de Académicos' [Lecturers Associations], one of them stated:

'The failure, up to date, to chain politically university communities, and facing their dignity and ability to resist, facing economic stringency, there is no other way than to fire lecturers and clerical staff, in order to reduce the size and influence of the university system upon society, making them to subsist with the scarce state funding' (Federación Gremial de Académicos, 1987, 7).

Generally speaking, most of their statements followed a similar pattern, Pedro Vera, President of the Academics Association of the University of Concepción, accused the government of having assigned too much importance to the economic criteria, producing an exaggerate increase of time devoted to lectures, and diminishing research. The government—he accused has imposed their ideological assumptions founded on N.S.D and Neo-Liberal doctrine on universities (Vera, 1989, 105).
Enrique Kirberg went further in accusing the Chilean government:

"The A.A.F.F. Junta has reduced the governmental contributions to the universities. As a result, tuition fees have been raised to such extent that people with low incomes cannot afford university education" (Kirberg, 1979, 19).

This criticism was widespread in scholarly papers. In this sample we can observe three different trends of the conspiracy theory: first, the government seeks to control universities by means of economic stringency; Secondly, the N.S.D, allied with the neo-liberals attempts to control the university and, Thirdly, it is all a class based conspiracy.

The reviewed literature presents a very interesting bias. Most critics of both governments under study blame the N.S.D for most of the 'ill fated education' in their countries. Unfortunately, not one of them cites which version of this doctrine is used by these governments, and assumes, wrongly, that is a point so well known that it does not require further precise analysis. It seems a wrong starting point when producing research (Criterio, 1978, 187-190).

It is certain that NSD is nebulous, as recognized by the L.A. Catholic Church, which in Puebla Documents states "In recent years the so-called Doctrine of National Security has taken a firm hold on our continent. In reality it is more an ideology than a doctrine" (L.A. Bishops, 1980, 114). Tapia, is one of the few Chilean authors who tried to produce an in-depth study of this 'Doctrine'. He agrees that it is an ambiguous concept as much in the symbolic as in the political field (Tapia, 1986, 51 onwards). The author developed this problem and attempted to answer most questions to which it gives rise, but no one cites him. A couple more researchers referred to NSD very superficially (Magendzo, 1985, 70 onwards; Brunner, microfiche, no date, 34 onwards).
Some Argentinian authors saw N.S.D as a strong influence during the 'Proceso'. According to Jordán, this was the easiest and most attractive way to present the problem, because it had brought up the issue of conflict between individual freedom, and the demands of a totalitarian system. In Argentina, the A.A.F.F. did not even mention national security, instead they mentioned the existence of a 'dirty war' in defence of all and each Argentinian (Jordán, 1993, 87). In Chile, the concept of N.S.D. was used more often, but it seems that it was not further developed by the A.A.F.F., at least not in A.A.F.F. style—clear cut, and easy to follow as an instrument guidance.

Attempts to eradicate politics from universities

The facts that help to explain the university 'Reforma' in Chile as a sensitive matter lie in the fact that the students promoted this reform with a great amount of conflict and political violence, using methods that were not a normal part of university life. After the Popular Unity victory in 1970 their political influence was considerably increased at universities and in society (Brunner, 1986, 31-2).

Political interference has been almost always present in Chilean universities, it increased markedly in the years before and during Allende's government, when the political importance of elections at universities made Allende intervene directly in the election at the University of Chile, hunting for a 'good' candidate. He told the chairmen of Popular Unity political parties in a major meeting at 'El Arrayán' that 'we cannot continue being defeated at polls. Polls at the University of Chile are more important than a complementary election... I am going to announce to you a name to win it' [Felipe Herrera, former president of BID] (Ercilla, 1972). In fact, Popular
Unity lost in the elections both at the University of Chile, and at the University of Concepcion, the birth place of the MIR [Left Revolutionary Movement].

It was not only Popular Unity who intervened directly in the affairs of the universities. The 'Christian Democrats' Community Council of 'Las Condes' applied for permission to sue Fernando Castillo in the party Discipline Tribunal, for his activities as Rector of the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile (Ercilla, 1972). These kind of political interventions were of daily occurrence in Chile from 1967 to 1973, and included students, lecturers, and staff.

Open political intervention at universities was the element that—no doubt—made the A.A.F.F. Government promote the eradication of partisan activities by any means. The first step was to cleanse the university, not only from left wing activists that were a great number. In addition, the curriculum had to be reconstructed to permit the elimination of 'concientización' courses [indoctrination courses, see sample in annex II]. This decision had the support of all lecturers, especially from those who belonged to parties that were against Popular Unity.

Both A.A.F.F. governments were active in their attempts to depoliticize universities, though, as in other areas, their deeds were magnified, or misunderstood. According to Pérez, in Argentina, not only A.A.F.F. governments initiated political cleansing and made lecturers redundant at their campuses. Ideological intolerance has been constant. In 1956, hundreds of lecturers were fired and books were burnt; redundancies and exclusions existed in 1966 and 1973. In 1975, university centres were closed, lecturers, and clerical staff were jailed, and some killed. Between 1976-1983, thousands of lecturers were made redundant. Perez concluded that memories should not be short for it was necessary to recognize that for three decades Argentinians had lived with different types of exclusions, and intolerance (Pérez,
1985, 198; Socolow, 1973, 376 onwards). Not only the A.A.F.F. Governments implemented this type of activities on campuses and in society at large.

Prior to Pinochet's government started in 1973, political prosecutions took place at Chilean universities, especially in the social sciences. Many lecturers suspected to be prone to conservative, or right wing tendencies, suffered prosecutions, students' pressure, or were displaced. At the University of Chile, many humanities scholars found shelter at the Physics and Mathematics Sciences faculty. Thereafter, a Centre for Humanistic Studies was created, their scholars crossing all political spectrum from the near-Marxist left to the right wing. All of them agreed that the University could not be subordinated to orders from political parties, but only to intellect (Vial, 1987, 8) Or as mildly stated by Sanders when evaluating Popular Unity deeds, "Though in theory pluralism continued, some conservative professors felt intimidated and left the country" (Sanders, 1981, 8).

In fact, neutral or conservative prone lecturers who stayed suffered all kind of prosecutions, and physical violence. Others suffered stressing experiences as happened at the University of Concepción in which a sociology and a history lecturer, were sent to work, 'temporarily', at a lunatic asylum.

After the first political cleansing—produced by Pinochet's government—at universities, a large group of members of political parties, or people who fought against Allende's Unidad Popular, acceded to prominent positions. Many Christian Democrats, National Party, PIR [Left Radical Party] and other political parties' members, eased their way into academic positions. In addition, a great number of members or followers of these parties, who had in 1973 academic positions, maintained them and gained seniority, especially those who kept a low political profile. They had a strong influence, and for several years they collaborated with the A.A.F.F. gov-
ernment. So, it was not surprising that when democracy arrived many political leaders who kept positions at the universities, became 'Rectores', Deans, and top administrative officers.

A stereotype of Rectores delegados existed. All of them were A.A.F.F. officers who had a double responsibility to the Education Minister and to the Commander in Chief of his branch (Levy, 1980, 15). Most analysts tend to forget that all of them, except the Rector of the University of Chile were retired officers well before their appointment. Many of them had developed careers at universities and in private enterprises, and were far away from being 'humble followers' of their branches Commander in Chief. For instance, at the University of Concepción, Chile, a retired Navy Captain was appointed, who had been for many years Head of Students Accommodation Office, and for several periods the President of the Personnel Association, democratically elected. All top positions at this university were offered by him to scholars that had devoted all their working life at the University of Concepción. The same happened in most universities. In many respects this is similar to what happen in many other countries where retired officers were offered major administrative and political appointments.

Research reviews show up only gross estimates of sacked personnel at universities, as much in Argentina as in Chile, and no proper research exist (Levy, 1980, 12 onwards). It is possible to assert that in both countries prior to the takeover, political attempts to dominate universities included control of decision making offices. Among them were Superior Councils, Senates, faculty and department councils.

Dismissals at universities as much in Argentina and Chile presented another peculiar characteristic. The top directive positions were filled by elections.
Therefore, a main strategy was developed to hire a critical mass of electors prone to dominant political tendencies. Public calls for appointments were manipulated to hire lecturers of the correct political tendency. Another means at smaller units, was to have a disproportionate number of part-time personnel. Both full and part-time staff could control decision making power at departments in which part and full time staff had the same right to vote. For instance, in March 1973, the Education Department at the University of Chile at Valparaíso, had approximately 40-50 full time lecturers, and more than 200 part timers. In 1974, the same department could work properly with 30 full-time lecturers, all in all with a similar amount of students. If this particular case were the rule in both countries, it is not surprising that thousands of lecturers were dismissed, because departments had an inflated personnel payroll due to political reasons. Estimates considered only the gross amount of academic staff and not the full time equivalent personnel. But meanwhile, no proper research in this field exists, it is advisable to suspend judgement or be more cautious than researchers have been up to this moment.

Students' political role

The beginning of the A.A.F.F. Governments in Argentina and Chile are similar, for both countries universities had been the guerrillas' cradle. 'Montoneros' and 'Miristas' had their origin in the upper middle class, as much at the Universidad de Buenos Aires in Argentina, as at the Universidad de Concepción in Chile.

These groups became well organized minorities able to take control of important segments of universities, especially the social sciences, as well as medicine in Chile. The danger they represented to society was obvious, and they clashed with political parties supported by them, once they got in power. This produced a strong
reaction from the Peronist government which ordered the A.A.F.F. to neutralize and to annihilate the terrorist menace (Jordán, 1993, 65-6).

In Chile, Allende did not clash with the revolutionary left so openly. Only the 'VOP' [peoples' organized vanguard], a small group not founded at universities, was annihilated during his period. Relationship between university-guerrilla or revolutionary parties, and the traditional students' participation in politics moved the A.A.F.F., in both countries to adopt a serie of administrative decisions so as to eliminate student unions, and to freeze all students' political movements at universities. The shorter life of the Argentinian 'Proceso' did not allow students to become strong political actors. In Chile—on the contrary—the political parties' incompetence in mobilising the support of the people allowed students and worker's unions to become main political actors. Therefore, the front pages of the press were filled with declarations, and news of these 'political actors', strongly supported by political parties, which provided financial and intellectual support. Anybody who went to a university campus in Chile could not avoid noticing the wealth of wall painting, brochures, sophisticated loud-speakers, vehicles, all of them costly, out of a student's economic reach. The importance of these political actors can be measured by means of the press space devoted to them. The weekly magazine 'Hoy' related to Christian Democrats published, for instance, in 1980 nine articles related to the political activity of students. In 1981, 3; 1982, 5; 1983, 7; 1984, 20; 1985, 9; 1986, 24 articles. Newspapers and magazines plagued front pages with photograph of and news from these political actors. In the following years the space devoted to them increased, and only at the end of 1988, and 1989, did political parties reappeared as protagonists of the political debate.

The failure to eradicate politicized student's unions was evident in both countries. The most they could achieve was to neutralize them for a couple of gen-
erations. In the long term, they returned again, because they were an integral part of the political game in both countries, and a socially accepted role, even when the benefits for society were doubtful. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that university branches of political parties as in a society in general, are well organized minorities that provide participation channels to citizenry. It is significant that after the ending of the 'Proceso', when the right of Argentinian university students to political participation was recognized, they reorganized themselves without producing too much disturbance of academic activities. Violence had been put aside, and the importance of revolutionary trends had diminished, giving place to the tamed Radical party university branch 'Franja Morada' (Jordán, 1993, 398).

In Chile, students could rebuild their political power before Pinochet's regime ended. In universities was created a parallel branch of the 'Asamblea de la Civilidad', [Civilian Assembly] opposition front to Pinochet. It did not mean that all opposition factions worked together smoothly, for evident internal quarrels existed among segments of the left wing and Christian Democrats, presenting sometimes parallel candidacies for the Union's positions.

Diversification of tertiary education

One of the main tasks developed by the Argentinian and Chilean A.A.F.F. governments aimed at diversifying higher education, trying to put an end to the role of the university as the only goal for high school leavers. This was an obvious and a necessary step for the military in both nations, that many democratic and non democratic governments have attempted (Allard, 1986, 14 onwards), most of the time—unsuccessfully. Criticism abound of the results achieved. The 'bad guys' in the A.A.F.F. regimes, assert some researchers, were their technocratic counsellors,
and the "good ones" the democrats. One of the most important arguments in this field is that the A.A.F.F. governments tended to ignore the fact that the process to create an educational structure is more important than its formal design (Atria, 1990, 19-20). Cox describes this situation as a period of in depth change in a series of institutions far less manageable than the school system, he suggest that each decision was followed by unexpected effects that moved the government to design again, new initiatives, so that change became the norm (Cox, 1989, 163).

The Argentinian 'Proceso' government was far less creative than the Chilean one. In general, they followed a tendency inherited from previous civilian and A.A.F.F. governments, increasing the numbers of institutions of non-university tertiary education from the 512 with 68,047 enrolled students which they found in 1976 to 758 in 1983 with 164,055 students (Bertoni, 1990, 11 onwards).

After 1980, the Chilean government started to produce changes at tertiary education level, aiming to diversify it. Besides Universities, they promoted the creation of Professional Institutes and Technicians Training Centres. The former were to be the head of this group, and would become the cradle of science, with a monopoly of academic degrees, and of providing twelve university specialisms. The second would train professionals, from those careers, not included in the twelve reserved for universities. The third was declared to be higher education training to prepare highly qualified technicians (Cox, 1989, 166 onwards).

The Government produced legislation to facilitate the creation of new state funded universities from former branches of the two state universities, and from private universities. Therefore, the state funded university system jumped up from 8 in 1980, to 22 in 1989, and private universities without state funding went up

Many researchers agreed on the need to stop the growth of a disproportionate university system. According to them, such new creations as Professional Institutes belonged to a domain of structural changes that went beyond the perspective of a A.A.F.F. regime ideology. Decisions taken in 1981 tended to put a barrier to university gigantism (Cox, 1990, 210; and others).

The main problem was that the Chilean tradition assigns a high prestige to universities. There is a tendency for many Professional Institutes to become a university, especially those created from former branches of universities which enjoyed state funding. In 1983, seven of them existed and in 1989 only two remained—while private Institutes aimed at becoming universities, and some Centres established to train technicians were aiming to become Institutes. In addition, state's responsibility has moved to acceptance of the greater influence of private sector, and from quantity to quality of tertiary training (Muga, 1990, 60 onwards).

Widespread criticism came from some researchers who were clearly not on the side of political control over the tertiary system. For others the problem was to produce some kind of coordination from inside the system. Lemaitre and Lavados stated the need of equilibrium, using planning as tools for ensuring coordination, integration, and respect for the proper autonomy of the tertiary education system (Lemaitre & Lavados 1986, 131).

The Argentinian criticism was similar. An open question which was formulated, related to the possibility of conciliating freedom and independence within a certain amount of university planning, thereby making it possible to achieve na-
tional priorities, to guarantee academic hierarchy, to avoid unnecessary overlaps, and ensure the efficient use of resources. One of the greatest dangers would be the temptation to use planning as an unilateral imposition of objectives, guidelines, prescriptions and controls restricting the margin for experimentation and creativity (Sanchez, 1979, 303). It has been a constant problem and governments and universities have tried to find a solution without success. Nevertheless, it has proven to be an elusive one.

Cultural stagnation

One of the most frequent accusations of the A.A.F.F. governments is that they produce culture stagnation. Many people, such as scholars and lay men take it for granted, and do not give it a second thought. The Argentinian and Chilean A.A.F.F. Governments could not be the exception, and there is plenty of criticism in this field, especially related to the scientific decline.

A clear example of this trend are assertions after the Argentinian takeover in 1976, that ideological terrorism affected more than 100,000 academic, intellectuals, scientists, students, and society at large. One author citing Alberto Taquini argues that 'at the moment there is no scientists exodus because a scientific community does not exist anymore. Exodus has stopped because the scientific community is so small...'. Afterwards, he cites another well known attempt against culture: the Cordova Minister of Education who demanded a discussion on the modern mathematics 'subversive character'. In addition Saint Exupery's 'The Little Prince', and "Martín Fierro" were supposedly banned. It was also widely publicised the serious attempts to suppress a great number of educational, and new scientific ideas (Pérez,
1985, 179-80). All these kind of accusations are part of the A.A.F.F. governments' universal folklore.

From the political side, the 'Multipartidaria's' diagnoses pointed to several aspects: lack of participation, censorship and auto-censorship, lack of definite cultural policies, and popular culture marginalization (Junta Política Multipartidaria Nacional, 1982, 138-9). Most of these accusations are correct, although they have been an almost permanent issue in Argentina, and not a 'Proceso's' product. Political parties avoided recognizing this, and their main propositions were not too different from the ones stated by the government.

It is true, that amongst narrow minded people, the supposed perversion of modern mathematics was publicly discussed. At the same time most people forgot that the Education Ministry did not accept those claims and froze the issue (Jordán, 1993, 131). Most prejudiced individuals in developed countries should have enjoyed to hear that Argentinian Junta had banned Exupery's 'The Little Prince', in fact what happened, according to certain stories was that 'some' Exupery's texts were not adequate to be used at High Schools, and even this version was declared false by the Education Ministry. Jordan states 'facing such picturesque news which journalist would resist the temptation to publish it?' Who would be so scrupulous to confirm that news before sending it to their agencies? Nowadays, this kind of cheating is not noticeable and get lost in the anonymity of international news agencies (op cit. p. 95).

Afterwards, when time lets people examine problems with some distance the evaluation of these issues will be different, or data provided by critics will permit an interpretation that contradicts their assertions. Jordan asserts that the ones who claim that all cultural productivity during 'El Proceso' was mediocre, reflect their
own mediocrity for they are unable to go further than their own sectarianism. Good films, tv programmes, books and theatre existed, newspapers were interesting and youngsters did not need to abandon their studies. According to Jordán it is clear that without so many restrictions imposed by the government, performances could have been better (op. cit, 78-9).

Statistics used, show a downturn in almost every aspect related to culture: from 119 million journal copies to 82 million; from 3 million essays to less than 300,000; fiction books from more than 5 million to 1.3 million. If compared with 1975 there is evidence of a retreat, but compared with any other years, results are not bad at all, for instance: a) there is no difference in the number of books published during Illia's democratic government and 'Proceso's', even when photocopying did not affect editorials in the former; b) the amount of new journal's titles and books registered increased during this period, showing that any reduction in numbers were the product of economic restrictions; c) the 'tablita' facilitated book imports only in 1980, where it reached 61 million copies—more than the product of the national book press in all its history. Argentinian playwrights produced 49 plays in 1979, and the same happened with film production. It is true that some works such as Vargas Llosa's "La Tía Julia y el Escribidor" were forbidden, and people existed who practiced self censorship. All this phenomena showed a reduction in cultural activity, hard to evaluate properly (op. cit, 79-82), but at the same time far away from cultural stagnation.

The problems related with scientific development, were criticized not only by the government's opposition. The Minister of Public Health and Environment publicly stated that there existed resource wastefulness, structural anarchy, and a complete lack of definitions and priorities. The Sciences and Technology Undersecretary had to answer to his colleague, even when they agreed in some
aspects and disagreed in as many. They agreed that scientific research was not integrated with national needs, that private enterprise was not integrated with science productivity, but they disagreed in some of the reasons why this happened.

To eradicate these problems, a system of tax benefits, shared investments risks between government and private enterprise was instituted, while legislation allowed to sell services and to advice private enterprises was promoted, and finally an end was put to state's monopoly of research (Salonia, (b), 1981).

Data provided by strong critics of the 'Proceso', stated that in a comparison with 1971, from 1976 to 1981, researcher numbers increased evidently at CONICET [National Council for Science and Technology Research] from 490 to 752 at the beginning of 'El Proceso' to 1287 in 1981 (Pérez, 1985, 244) This meant that in this sector, the A.A.F.F. Government increased science potential even when showing limited ability to modify the structural problems, and to increase the link between science and Argentinian productivity.

Chilean cultural scenery was the subject of dark portraits too, mainly at the mass communication level, which changed from a rich pre-Pinochet's regime, to an unified system of propaganda in which:

'varied activities, organizations, and devices, which people used to find in their history, and provide meaning to their living together, had been silenced'. Despite, the existence of some dissident channels, their importance is not great compared with TV, newspapers, and radios which were uniformly pro-government' (Brunner; García-Huidobro, 1981, 492-3).

According to Rodríguez, Chilean culture changed after 1973. Important characteristics of this change were: a) its disciplinary character reflected social hierarchy; b) an increasingly private character, separating state from polity; c) a perpet-
uation of social differences; d) it increasingly impoverished cultural life; and fin-
ally its anti-liberal character (Rodríguez, 1978, 798 onwards). Both authors were 
close to Orwell’s "1984", Pinochet playing the role of the "Big Brother". Pessimism 
was predominant. As well as in Argentina there are too many half truths involved in 
cultural development evaluations in Chile.

Perez de Arce’s evaluation of the control of mass media by government pre-
sents interesting trends. He recognizes widely the government's influence, but at 
the same time points out that all governments have used it widely, as did the 
Christian Democrats, and Popular Unity under their governments. Nevertheless, op-
position to the A.A.F.F. government was able to send its messages through varied 
means, such as soap operas, in which they criticized the model of society promoted 
by the government, more successfully than politicians. University TV channels 
started in 1987 as political forums with representatives of the opposition members. 
Broadcast and newspaper suffered through the government’s influence, but this was 
far away from being as great as people used to believe.

A great difference between opposition and government prone media was the 
former’s degree of partisanship. Pro-government media were quite neutral, because it 
was aimed at the general audience, not only the people against, or in favour of, the government. This is especially important in evaluating the role of the press. The 
press favourable to government had 1,474,300 readers, compared with the opposi-
tion’s 173,800, according to ACHAP [Publicity Agencies National Association] 
[classification among pro-government and opposition provided by the author]. In 
fact, the opposition had slightly more than 50% of nationwide broadcasters, and in 
the capital city the weekly magazines had 12.25% in favour of the government, and 
10.84 the opposition [see tables annex III] (Pérez de Arce, 1988, 44-52).
Much more cautious were evaluations related to scientific and social research. Even Mensaje, most of the time harsh critics of the government, published a survey related with brain drain. The Chilean scientific researchers' main reasons for resignation were economic rather than political. Economic problems counted for 59% of the desertions in engineering and technology against 14.7 for political reasons; sciences 44.7 and 6.9; medicine 45.5 against 9%; agriculture's 58% did not state political reasons. Social sciences present the highest number of resignations related to political problems at 21.4%, even when 50% were due to economic reasons.

This picture has as a complement the fact that 66.6% of researchers stayed in Chile and 33.4% found positions in foreign countries (Real, 1975, 380-1). The President of CONYCIT [National Council for Scientific Research and Technology] recognized early in the A.A.F.F. government these problems in a letter to the Minister of 'Hacienda'; 'the salaries table for state employees has produced the migration of researchers toward productive enterprises, or to foreign universities. Even before this table was implemented, 20% of researchers presented their resignations (Pinochet, 1974).

Funding problems and the economic transformation of the Chilean national economic structure attempted by Pinochet's regime, deeply affected scientific community. Everybody agreed, from the very beginning, that scientific research was essential for national development. It has been stated before that university funding was reduced at Chilean universities, and that this affected their quasi-monopoly of scientific research (Brunner, 1986, 125).

The most important changes related to scientific research were: a) competition for grants at national and international levels; b) private and public research contracts; c) strong diminution of international funding. All these elements pro-
duced uncertainty in the development and research funding (Lavados, 1987, 25 onwards).

The evident diminution of Chilean universities research funding is seen in the fall from 47\% in 1973, to 37\% in 1974, recovering until 1980 a year in which it reaches 57\% and then another decline that got down to 32.5\% of research national expenses. These ups and downs produced a positive effect and improvement in efficiency in the use of scarce resources, and an increasing investment of internal funding in some universities (Hachette, 1990, 229).

Conclusions

The evaluation and comments of many researchers and opinion leaders related to the Argentinian and Chilean military, had two main trends: the followers of a conspiracy theory, and the ones who attempted to provide more balanced views of educational transformation in the period under study.

Both groups failed in analysing the military's government educational decisions from the point of view of military values or the military 'mind'. Most of them adopted the liberal point of view in analysing a situation alien to that context. That is the reason why some of them fell down completely in an 'Orwellian' world, unable to comprehend, that they were facing attempts at a complete restoration of both societies. Once they performed the restoration, military governments would return to the barracks. In other words, too many researchers view a transitory problem as a permanent one, affecting deeply their theoretical frameworks, and their conclusions.
Most research's failure related to Chile, and less to Argentina, was because they were strongly tainted with political motivations. The sources of funding, strongly and emotionally engaged to fight 'cruel dictatorships' were not prone to fund purely objective research, or in cases, when the research was objective, the chosen field were devoted to studying selected aspects of the educational policy to present the worst possible side. In this area, it is possible to find all the accusations against an ill defined evil—NDS, authoritarianism, and conspiracy theories; ghosts were seen everywhere, and black and white were the only colours used to draw the political scenery.

The decline of the quality of education was one of the researcher's leit motiv: unfortunately their starting point was extremely weak, since previous quality measurement were almost non-existent. Decentralization of education was perceived differently for Argentinians, who recognized it as an urgent need, while for many Chilean researchers it was perceived as a conspiracy to achieve political ideological control.

Indoctrination was perceived differently too by Argentinian and Chilean scholars. Many Argentinian courses related to civic training, were perceived as a need and not as a real danger of political indoctrination. In Chilean primary, and secondary education, there were no symptoms of indoctrination; nevertheless the Catholic Church and researchers perceived many attempts to exclude democracy from schools.

Tertiary education was one of the favourite fields for research, and everything was scrutinized—structure, funding, administration, and so on. In this field it was possible to find a lot more objectivity than in primary and secondary education. Nevertheless, it is possible to find a great amount of change over time in the Chilean
case, in which many authors who presented a darkened scenery at the beginning, were mixing it afterwards with some grey colours. In the end, many of them, when the change of government was perceived to be not so far away, became more cautious in their appreciations and judgements in order not to be asked to accomplish them when they won power at the ballots, especially in connection with universities' funding.

One of the most controversial subjects in the university public debate, was fees. Conspiracy theory followers declared it to be an attempt to keep lower segments of society outside universities. Many scholars, especially foreigners such as Levy, misunderstood completely many problems, and became immersed in the conspiracy theory. Again, Argentinian researchers or leaders of public opinion, were quite mild in their evaluation of the impact of fees, Chilean were not so balanced and many of them rejected it as an elitist project, or as a tool to avoid student's political demonstrations.

Depoliticization measures were understood differently again by Argentinians and Chileans. The former, recognized that intolerance at universities was constant in Argentina; the latter did only accept, that in Chile intolerance was short lived and did not last for more than five years before the military government. Research related to academic, students, and clerical staff dismissals is scarce and not complete, therefore all assertions of 'thousands of dismissals' among staff have to be researched properly before accepting them.

The influence of Rectores in both countries was undoubtedly exaggerated. Most of them managed their universities with the support of groups of academic personnel belonging to the same university, or with a small group of advisors. The responsibility of these internal groups, which in some universities were very strong.
should be an object of research. It seems evident that most of them continued being deans, department directors, some of them even became appointed 'Rectores' by means of elections.

The importance of the students' political role is another phenomenon scarcely studied. Argentinian students had a very minor role in comparison with Chilean ones. Chilean political parties' prestige was quite low after 1973; therefore, to keep alive their possibilities, they had to look for support from unions and universities' students, providing in exchange, funding and intellectual support. Besides many of the political leaders had started political career there.

Changes in tertiary education were understood as a need in Argentina, and criticism was for doing too little in this field. On the contrary in Chile, criticism was for changing the system too much, and too often. Maybe the most shocking cultural fact for researchers and public opinion leaders was the depth to which the subsidiarity principle was employed in both countries. The Chilean A.A.F.F. founded the social structure on this principle, but Argentinians meanwhile did not go too far in it, keeping a powerful state influence. To these countries' people, so much used to state influence, even a little bit of subsidiarity is dangerous, not to speak of when Chile used it to reconstruct the society.

Finally, cultural development was a field in which both military governments were blamed alike. These accusations are not supported by research either; they become most of the time, part of the accusations produced in search of political benefits.

It is necessary to comment on two main aspects of previous research and the work of public opinion leaders. Researchers failed mostly in one field that is impor-
tant in scientific research—prediction. Most policies developed in both countries continued what had existed under civilian governments, and all criticism of them have disappeared from later papers. Public opinion leaders however have adopted, since the return to democracy, a very cautious position, and start to feel very uncomfortable when people remind them of their opinions in the recent past.
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Final conclusions

This research has three different objectives: The first one [from chapters one to three] was to produce a profile of the Argentinian and Chilean military, and the theoretical framework. The second one was the application of this theoretical framework to analyze their educational policies [chapters five to eight] in order to find the roots of similarities and differences among both governments in this field. The third one was devoted to analyse the public opinion and the scholarly view related with general problems associated with their government and those related with educational policies [chapters four and nine].

The military profile

In the search of Argentinian and Chilean military profile, a group of authors that could be considered essential in military sociology, were selected in the first chapter, notwithstanding, their main works were related to the developed military world. The most useful for this research were the ones who present their findings from a panoramic and universal point of view [Huntington and Janowitz]. Of great interest was Mosko's works, but their usefulness was restricted only to the Institutional side of his Institutional/Organizational Thesis. This phenomenon was due to the fact that Argentinian and Chilean military have not evolved to all volunteer forces as it happened in the developed countries of Europe and the United States, besides the market forces are not relevant in relation to Latin American military.

The utility of Finer's and Perlmutter's works was very restricted due to their unilateral perspective, in which the military are portraited only from the
negative side, and focused as a dead weight on the shoulders of their countries, and a danger for their development and democracy.

Then under review, there were a few other authors thus a serie of new trends. Some of them had achieved great interest from the scholarly world and the general public, it was evident that they have not been able to face the test of time and their weaknesses have been pointed by scholars who studied them [Stepan, Nun, O'Donnell, Tapia]. Their research work proved, not accountable for military participation, and military political decisions in the governments under review as the main purposes of the authors.

For this research the only ones, apart from Janowitz and Huntington, that present a reasonable degree of usefulness was the 'developmentalist school'. Despite of the deep criticism this school normally faces from other scholars, their utility lie on their attempts to portrait the military in all their rich variety, and not in the dark and gloomy characteristics that too many scholars present.

The theoretical framework

This theoretical framework was made up from: (a) History, development and tradition of the Argentinian and Chilean military. (b) Universal characteristics of the military men presented by Janowitz and Huntington. (c) The developmentalist school that presents a set of varied military characteristics. From these sources derived the theoretical framework, which main feature is: Values that military have both as professionals and in their everyday activities, including those accidental in character.
This theoretical framework presents a noticeable characteristic; the recognizability and strength of their values, and their ability to use them as foundations of action. This does not mean the use of a rigid and immutable set of values, because they had in many opportunities to transact, accommodate and negotiate them with political actors, and their society at large. The pattern of these transactions, accommodations and negotiations are included in the graphic at the end of these conclusions.

When applying the value-based theoretical framework, one of the most relevant characteristics of both military governments is the strong load of nationalism, Christianism and Western values, and a similar diagnosis of their societies' problems.

Educational policies

Therefore, most of their educational policies were marked by attempts to reinforce the values of: family, nationality, morality, religion, culture, an improved democracy, order, legality, progress, health and economic development.

The most evident value in their educational policies was order, both military governments perceived the whole educational system as chaotic and inefficient, in which the values of order, efficient administration and plannification were almost in existent. Besides, and worst of all, the educational system was suffering an extreme administrative centralization, producing as consequence the impoverishment of the country, except the capital cities, Buenos Aires and Santiago respectively. Therefore, in both countries we found strong similarities in their attempts to decentralize the educational system from kinder-garden to universities.
The differences between both military governments lie in the accommodations, transactions, or negotiations due to the administrative traditions and culture in both countries under study.

It was evident that the components of the educational system presented different levels of resistance to change, the ones that presented a low profile of resistance were primary and secondary education in all their forms. Both governments attempted to decentralize them, to introduce administrative order and efficiency.

Among the different educational levels, universities were the most resilient. This phenomenon it is quite understandable due to the political influence of universities in Latin America, and the system they created to defend themselves. Among the devices created for this defense was an extended conception of university autonomy, the inviolability of their campus and the attempt—in certain historical moments—to become the critical consciousness of society. Therefore, having the right to promote a particular view of society and government.

Both military governments tried to change this political role of the university system, by means of: de-politicization and eradication of political partisanship, both among lecturers and students. Not being enough to neutralize political activism they attempted to transform universities to help national development, by producing better professionals, research and improvement of national culture.

A noticeable difference between the two governments was the degree of freedom from the Ministry of Education that Argentinian and Chilean universities
enjoyed. The Argentinian was more dependent from the Ministry than the Chilean universities. It is this field where transaction, accommodation and negotiation of values were more evident due to the political importance, tradition and problems of control that are characteristic in this educational level.

The best way to improve the educational system at all levels was to locate the decision power in the areas where it was actually required. Thus, diminishing the importance of the bureaucratic machinery attached to the Education Ministries. Therefore, both military governments transfer most of the decision making power in Primary and Secondary education to provinces in Argentina and Regions in Chile, and then to city councils as it happened in Chile. At universities the military governments limited the decision making power at Senates and increased vice-chancellors authority.

In a higher level of values, both governments understood the necessity to promote spiritual values especially religious ones. Regarding this tendency it was evident their attempts to achieve this goal through the educational system with strong support from the family.

Changes in the curriculum to reinforce values were evident in both governments. Therefore, they introduced especial courses of moral, civic, national unity and security, and sovereignty values. These changes in the curriculum aimed to solve several dangers, from the point of view of the military. Argentinians were deeply concerned with the weakness of the sense of belonging to a family, and especially to the nation, among the people who lived in the hinterland. The Argentinian territorial disputes with U.K and Chile made this point a very sensitive one, affecting national security and sovereignty. Chileans were less worried about this matter because many of their territorial problems were settled down in the past
or during the military government. Therefore, the need to reinforce the sense of belonging to the nation was less evident.

In both governments nationalism was different in nature and scope from the stereotype created during the first and second world war, it lacked the characteristics of chauvinism and expansionism which were the main characteristics of the former.

Administration of the educational system present noticeable differences in the form in which both governments carried out their policies. For the Argentinians unity aimed to produce educational uniformity throughout the country, Chileans pursued it through a controlled diversity with a great amount of freedom for public and private education.

Efforts to reinforce order in countries in which legal form is extremely important, took the form of two important laws 'Federal Education Law' for the Argentinians, and 'Organic Constitutional Law' for the Chileans. Both laws were permeated by military values, in the Argentinian case it was present as a search for order, efficiency, co-ordination and levels of responsibility clearly delimited. The Chilean law put emphasis in the rights of the family to educate their children, and a subsidiary role of the state to achieved this right. The minimal achievement by students in order to secure their participation in an enriched cultural inheritance were clearly stated.

Despite Argentinian Federal Law was not passed in Argentina in the period in study, its aims were clearly into the set of military values. In the case of Chile it became an Organic Law, which have special constitutional rank. This law was included a permanent evaluation of the educational system performance.
Both governments attempted to solve one of the most perdurable educational problem in the history of both countries—teachers salaries. The advances in this field were not too great, some administrative decisions helped to make their professional life easier, as the concentration of their teaching work in one or at most two different schools. In Chile almost all teachers without certificates were awarded accreditation through government planned retraining.

Illiteracy was faced by both governments as a serious problem, despite that it has more the character of a symbol than a real problem, the subjacent values in their campaigns against it were founded in their national pride which was deeply hurt due to a long educational tradition. Besides, from the point of view of economic development, illiterates were visualized as a dead weight, and finally from a perspective of national security; ignorance was the proper ground in which political demagoguery succeed.

Democracy was another value promoted by both military governments, even when this idea is rejected in great part of the reviewed bibliography related with the military. The curriculum at primary and secondary schools has noticeable characteristics: the participation of parents and students, civic education, understanding of different trends of political thinking, and respect for the opinions of their fellow students and citizens. All this aspects are present in the legislation passed during this period, which include administrative procedures to avoid the use of schools for political indoctrination.
Social and scholarly opinion

This research included the viewpoint of society, social scientists, and political rivals of the military in power. Special interest has the image of cruelty and violations of human rights in opposition to the self-perception of the military as saviours of their countries.

Military and civilian value perceptions often collided mainly because of difference on emphasis rather than the presence of different values. This difference had strong impact in the social and political arena. It is interesting to notice that human rights became the central focus of criticism of both military regimes under review. It is worth noting that civilian values were not at all uniform, and the degree of acceptance of them proposed by the military enjoyed different degrees of support, while they ruled their countries, from quasi-universal acceptance at the beginning to a weaker acceptance at the end.

It is evident that in the Chilean case human rights violations were greatly magnified, especially by the press and scholars. The Argentinian military were not so castigated because they faced a long and cruel guerrilla war before they became rulers. Objectivity became one of the victims in the scholarly work and the press in both countries, especially in relation to human rights.

The Chilean military felt deeply that they were suffering discrimination from the international community represented by the United Nations, and non-governmental institutions as Amnesty International. They have the same feeling related to social scientists and scholarly research.

In other areas economy, the situation was variegated in both countries.
the economy suffered up and downs. Notwithstanding, in the long term Chilean military performance in the economic field was remarkable.

In the educational field scholarly research and opinion leaders had two major trends: (a) Some that thought everything was a military conspiracy to keep themselves in power or to eliminate focus of opposition; (b) The ones who tried to reach a degree of objectivity in their research.

Both groups failed in analysing both militaries' government from the point of view of their values or mind. This fact move the followers of the conspiracy theory to portrait an Orwellian educational system. The main problem was that most research works were tainted with political motivations and many authors clearly stated their political point of view in their work.

Many researchers accused both governments of undervaluing the quality of education. Formal evaluation of the quality of education started during the military government of Pinochet in Chile, especially in primary education.

Accusations of indoctrination were almost non-existent in Argentina, in Chile researchers claimed the existence of a deliberate purpose to indoctrinate students at schools especially in relationship to an exclusion of democracy from schools.

In both countries tertiary education was focused with great interest, every government policy was under severe criticism. Nevertheless, in this field, and especially in Chile there was a greater degree of objectivity, when civilian government was imminent and thus, criticism from the opposition softened. This fact was due to avoid a high levels of demand—when opposition became government—if
they were not able to improve the educational system in accordance to their criticism to the military government.

Two main issues were object of public debate: fees and political cleansing. Fees became only nominal at the Argentinian universities, and in Chile they become one of the axis of the university transformation. The level of criticism related to fees was low in Argentina, and strong in Chile. The followers of the conspiracy theory declared that was an attempt to marginalize lower income segments of society, and a form to put pressure on students to avoid political demonstrations. Political cleansing was evaluated differently by many scholars, in the Argentinian case they considered that intolerance had existed under governments. In Chile they agreed that intolerance existed prior to the military government but it had been very short lived. In this field it was impossible to find well documented research for dismissals of lecturers and students at universities. There is no doubt that they existed, especially at the beginning of both military governments, but their real amount is quite imprecise, and probably they were less severe than those stated by the followers of the conspiracy theory. The main global criticism at tertiary education, condemned the Argentinian government for doing too little, and the Chilean's for doing too much. Main global criticism at tertiary education blamed the Argentinian government for doing too little in this field, and to the Chilean for doing too much.
Value process in military governments

Set of Military values (history & sub-culture) → Statements of values → Adoption of directives for action (decision of take over)

Accommodation of values to the role of rulers (arbiter) → Reformulation of values including accommodation

Transaction of values to the role of rulers (arbiter) → Reformulation of values including transaction

New directives for action
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Criterio: Numbers 1731 to 1913, 1976-1983

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Ercilla; from 1970 to 1990

Hay: from 1980 to 1990


Ministerio de Cultura y Educación Argentino; Boletín de Comunicaciones, from 1976 to 1983.
Annex I

Quality Measurements

Table No 1

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Table No 3

Improvement in SIMCE measurements 1988 - 1990 - 1992

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Table No 4

Improvement in SIMCE measurements 1988 - 1990 - 1992

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Este conjunto de documentos, han sido reproducidos para uso interno y exclusivo de los alumnos de la Escuela de Educación de la Universidad de Concepción: por el Depto. de Problemas de la Educación y de Circulación restringida.

Ciudad Universitaria, Mayo 1970
Esta primera colección de Documentos para el curso de Teoría de la Educación del Departamento de Problemas de la Educación de la Universidad de Concepción, obedece a varias razones. En primer lugar, a la imperiosa necesidad, constatada a lo largo de varios años de experiencia universitaria en la Escuela de Educación, de proporcionar a los estudiantes de esta Escuela un volumen de textos sobre los principales problemas comprendidos en el programa de Teoría de la Educación —antiguamente Problemas de la Educación— documentación generalmente escasa y de alto costo para los estudiantes.

En segundo lugar, está destinada a crear en el estudiante universitario el interés por el conocimiento y la comprensión de la temática sobre los fundamentos en que descansa toda la superestructura educacional. Estimamos que debe terminarse con los "apuntes de clases", conformistas y limitantes, propendiendo en cambio, al desarrollo de una nueva atmósfera de trabajo grupal, al desenvolvimiento de la capacidad creadora y crítica del universitario, estrechamente vinculado con el medio social y educativo, comprometido con su vasta problemática y dispuesto a luchar responsablemente por el cambio de la estructura económico-social dependiente y subdesarrollado.

En tercer lugar, el Departamento asume el compromiso con los grandes postulados que orientan la reforma universitaria, en el sentido de colocar a la Universidad al servicio real de las grandes mayorías nacionales: de contribuir científicamente a la comprensión de la realidad chilena, latinoamericana y mundial y de ayudar a la creación de una sociedad más justa y más humana. En este sentido, el Departamento defenderá el proceso irreversible de la Reforma Universitaria, laborando incansablemente por su completa realización.

Ahora bien. La educación es un proceso tan necesario para la supervivencia de la humanidad como los instrumentos materiales de la producción. Pero así, como los instrumentos materiales están en manos de las capas más altas de la sociedad para satisfacer sus particulares necesidades e intereses acontece lo mismo con la superestructura educacional. La educación en nuestro país no está al servicio de las grandes mayorías, toda vez que la infraestructura condiciona y perpetúa una situación injusta y oprobiosa. En consecuencia, para quienes trabajamos en la formación de profesores, resulta vital saber que objetivo capital se persigue con nuestra tarea: servir a las mayorías nacionales, es decir la clase trabajadora, o seguir perpetuando un sistema excluyente, selectivo.
Visualizando así el problema, comienza a surgir un nuevo tipo de profesional docente, es decir el docente nuevo, que rompiendo las viejas ataduras de la ideología burguesa logra superar las limitaciones que tradicionalmente le ha impuesto el sistema, se rebela y proscribe la moral burguesa y todas sus formas de explotación de clases. En estas circunstancias nace el crítico social.

El profesional y el intelectual se convierten en una persona cuya preocupación básica es identificar, analizar y criticar todos los factores que impiden un orden social mejor, más justo y más digno. Su tarea lo llevar a develar la falsa ideología de la clase dominante y la incapacidad del sistema para resolver los grandes problemas de la comunidad nacional, latinoamericana y de todos los países del mundo subdesarrollado.

El crítico social puede convertirse en agente del cambio social, cuando su labor de crítica y esclarecimiento lo convierte en "conciencia de la sociedad" como señala Paul Barán, en un vocero de las fuerzas progresistas, en un "creador de problemas", en una molestia para la clase dirigente que procura mantener y perpetuar el status quo. El agente de cambio social que la Escuela Unica de Educación se propone formar, debe resistir a todas las presiones de los intereses creados; debe decir siempre la verdad con mucha valentía; no puede en ningún instante ni en ninguna circunstancia soslayar la crítica despiadada a lo existente; no puede amedrentarse ni asustarse. En suma, debe afrontar todos los peligros que amenazan su bienestar individual para servir a la noble causa de crear una nueva sociedad: la sociedad socialista.

Coscientes de esta responsabilidad entregamos este volumen al nuevo estudiante de la Escuela de Educación.

Ciudad Universitaria, Marzo de 1970

Nota: El Departamento acepta toda clase de sugerencias por escrito que permitan mejorar la presente Antología.
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Annex three

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Metropolitan Broadcast Nets

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Testmerc survey, September-October 1987. Division between pro-anti government made by Perez de Arce.
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Survey PUBLIAR/BBDO, October 1987. Division between pro-anti government made by Perez de Arce