The Foreign Policy of the Greek Socialists (1981-1986):
Forces of Continuity and Change

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### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CMEA</td>
<td>Council of Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
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<td>DECA</td>
<td>Defence and Economic Co-operation Agreement</td>
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<td>EAGGF</td>
<td>European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Co-operation</td>
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<td>ERDF</td>
<td>European Regional Development Fund</td>
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<td>FIR</td>
<td>Flight Information Region</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organization</td>
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<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
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<td>IMP</td>
<td>Integrated Mediterranean Programme</td>
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<td>KKE</td>
<td>Communist Party of Greece</td>
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<td>KKE-Int.</td>
<td>Communist Party of Greece-Interior</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Military Assistance Program</td>
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<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>New Democracy Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOTAM</td>
<td>Notice to Airmen</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWFZ</td>
<td>Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>PAK</td>
<td>Panhellenic Liberation Movement</td>
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<td>PASOK</td>
<td>Panhellenic Socialist Movement</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>SF</td>
<td>Social Fund</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCLOS</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea</td>
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Note: Any quotation from a Greek text was translated by the author.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

A clear pattern can be discerned in the development of international relations theory. From the classical theorists (Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Clausewitz) until the 1950s, the field was governed by "realists", by the exponents of a paradigm based on the concepts of state sovereignty and international anarchy, and embodied in the interrelated theory of balance of power as well as in the subfield of strategic studies. The theoretical "revolution" that started in the 1960s is a - still unresolved - conflict between the realist paradigm and a host of new approaches that could be interpreted as elements of a single new paradigm called "pluralism".

Realism

The writings of many twentieth-century authors had a major impact on the development of realist international relations theory. The names of Reinhold Niebuhr, Nicholas Spykman, George Kennan, Henry Kissinger, Hedley Bull and Raymond Aron are very often quoted in the relevant literature. But, above all, Hans Morgenthau is widely considered as the most influential advocate of the theory, as the man whose work has introduced the basic con-
cepts of the realist approach.

Morgenthau views power as an all-inclusive concept denoting political control. He argues that: "Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man". He equates national interest with the pursuit of state power, contending that statesmen "think and act in terms of interest defined as power" and that historical evidence proves this assumption. Thus, it is clear that Morgenthau understands state behaviour in terms of maximisation of power and explains international politics in terms of an international struggle for power. But, for him, the pursuit of national interests which are not "essential" to national survival contributes to international conflict: the protection of a state's physical, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nation-states is the most crucial, the essential element of its national interest.

Hence, Morgenthau's approach has also a normative character. According to his analysis, a country's national interest should be proportionate to its capabilities; a good diplomat should be a rational diplomat; a state should act not in accordance to universal principles (democracy or socialist solidarity) but in accordance to national interest. In Morgenthau's view, the pursuit of such objectives would promote international stability and strengthen

2. Ibid., p. 5
world peace. According to his analysis, only politics based on power could afford a semblance of global security.

In general, five major premises underlie the bulk of realist thought. The first is the perception of a state-centric international system. In Stessinger's words: "Our world is made up of over one hundred political units called nation-states. There is hardly a place on this planet that is not claimed by a nation-state. (...) The nation-state has become ubiquitous. And everywhere it is the highest secular authority".3 Realists wrote about a world exclusively dominated by states, a system of "billiard-ball" countries in an endless collision.

The second major premise of the school is that geography (position, population, size) is the most significant factor in determining state power. In Morgenthau's words, for example, "the fact that the continental territory of the United States is separated from other continents by bodies of water three thousand miles wide to the east and more than six thousand miles wide to the west is a permanent factor that determines the position of the United States in the world".4 Not unexpectedly, Morgenthau while opposing Washington's intervention in Vietnam, expressed great concern about Soviet influence in Cuba because of its close geographical proximity to the US.5 Another realist author, Spykman

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argued that the potential for conflict increased as the world became more densely populated and nations encroached upon each other.  

The third assumption is that force is the most effective means of wielding power. Garnett, for example, has rejected a series of arguments that with the development of nuclear weapons, among other factors, the rational strategy excludes the use of force. He concluded:

"Anyone cogniscent of the political and social instability which disrupts so many countries of the world cannot doubt the usefulness of military power both for insurgents and those who seek to counter them. (... ) We live in a military age and there are few signs that either our children or grandchildren will experience anything else."

The fourth hypothesis of the realist school, a proposition partly resulting from the former, is that there is a hierarchical agenda of issues in world politics, an agenda dominated by questions of military security, an agenda which is headed not by "low" but by "high" politics, not by economic and social but by strategic and defence affairs.

Finally, realists perceive the behaviour of governments as rational. This is what Graham Allison called "rational actor" as-

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6. Ibid, p. 97
sumptions about foreign policy and foreign policy-making. In Morgenthau's words, the student of international politics should ask "what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose who must meet this problem under these circumstances (presuming always that he acts in a rational manner), and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose". Hence, nation-states are equated with their governments by realist thinkers.

The basic premises of realism had some interesting consequences. The first premise led to the development of foreign policy analysis as an autonomous discipline within international relations. Moreover, the realist premises led to a perception of an anarchical, hostile and dangerous international arena. Consequently, realist writers treated state behaviour from the perspective of that environment concentrating on forces external rather than internal to the state, on the so-called "systemic" variables. However, according to realists, states have developed ways of preserving an element of order in the global system: Bull, for example, has argued that the balance of power is the most important of these 'security' mechanisms. Morgenthau and Kissinger have assigned an important role to diplomacy and bargaining, to the continuous adjustment of conflicting interests by nego-

tiations. Finally, realist theory influenced the behaviour of foreign policy-makers, proving that ideas are not "neutral". For example, American former Secretary of State Dean Acheson has criticised the policies of his successor, John Foster Dulles, arguing that they were conceived on grounds of moralism and emotionalism, that they relied on legal formulas and that they overlooked the realities of power. 10

However, because of the inability of realists to understand developments in the contemporary world (integration, nongovernmental organizations and the emergence of international law), their arguments became more and more prescriptive, as well as more and more directed to macroanalysis in both space and time. One of the best examples of this development is the realist belief that external policies based on expanding military power may undermine the economic bases of that power. 11 For Morgenthau, "scientific analysis has the urgent task of pruning down national objectives to the measure of available resources in order to make their pursuit compatible with national survival". 12 Paul Kennedy, following Morgenthau's reasoning, has argued in a recent book, that states rise to become great powers on top of economic founda-


12. Morgenthau, Hans J., Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the US, The
tions, but the strategic requirements of maintaining great power status tend to undermine their economic strength and contribute to their decline. According to the author, this "over-stretchment" or incompatibility between the economic bases of the state and its military engagements is the reason of the present problems of the US and the USSR. Kennedy urges the American administration to reduce the US military commitments.

Pluralism

In the beginning of the 1960s pluralist thinkers started to dispute the prevalence of the realist school. Partly resulting from the inadequacies of the realist approach and partly stemming from the changes of a world that did not any longer correspond to the global system that realists intended to describe (Morgenthau's research, for example, deals with historical material from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), the pluralist "revolution" challenged the five basic realist premises.

First, pluralists disputed the state-centrism of the international system. They introduced a new set of actors: Supranational actors as the EC Commission, transnational actors as multinational companies and sub-national actors as ethnic


14. See, for example, Mitrany, D., Working Peace System, Chicago: Quadrangle, 1966
groups. For them, the state is not any more the exclusive actor in the international system and thereby foreign policy analysis should not be, as in the past, the focal point of international relations. This led to a perception of a more multicentric world, of an international system characterised by numerous criss-crossing relationships, of a "cobweb".

Secondly, pluralists questioned the importance of geographical factors such as size, natural resources or position in explaining the capabilities of a state. Thus, they argued that technological changes alter the geographical "reality" while perceptions influence its interpretation by decision-makers. According to pluralists, for example, the development of interballistic missiles has reduced the importance of geography. As Herz has put it, "now that power can destroy power from center to center, everything is different".

18. This was the argument of the famous 'geopolitics school' in the beginning of the 20th century. The ideas of Mackinder, the main advocate of the school, had influenced Morgenthau (Mackinder, Sir H., Democratic Ideals and Reality, London: Longman, 1919) For a study on contemporary Greek foreign policy inspired by the geopolitics school see Vidalis, Orestis, The Contemporary Geopolitical Environment and our National Policy, Athens: Evroekhotiki, 1988, [In Greek]
19. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, op. cit., pp. 54-83
Thirdly, pluralist thinkers contested the realist assumption that the use of force is ultimately necessary to guarantee state survival. The role of nuclear weapons as a deterrent of war, the existence of alliances and the important role of economic issues in foreign policy agendas, they argued, contribute to the decline of the significance of security goals in international politics. "Foreign affairs agendas", argued Keohane and Nye, "have become larger and more diverse".\textsuperscript{21} Puchala, focussing on European integration, contended that the new distinctive process of institutionalised bargaining, taking place in an atmosphere dominated by pragmatism and perceptions of interdependence, and characterised by mutual sensitivity and responsiveness, create a picture unique in the post-war world: a "Concordance System".\textsuperscript{22}

Fourthly, pluralist theorists challenged the realist hypothesis that there is a hierarchy of issues in foreign policy agendas headed by security considerations. Kaiser has shown that what political actors perceive as 'high' or 'low' politics depends on specific circumstances, changes over time and in any case may be different from country to country.\textsuperscript{23} The political sphere is not autonomous as Morgenthau has argued, it does not stop to the


\textsuperscript{22} Puchala, Donald J., Of Blind Men, Elephants and European Integration, \textit{Journal of Common Market Studies}, Vol. 10 (3), 1972, pp. 267-284
waters' edge: there is not a clear hierarchy of issues because the issues themselves overlap with each other and the states are not unitary actors which act rationally.

Hence, fifthly, pluralism contested the realist assumption of rational behaviour. Lindblom and Braybrooke, for example, inspired by management science, argued that most political decisions are characterised by "disjointed incrementalism": they are not the result of a rational process but the outcome of the efforts of the various agencies of a government to close political gaps, to bring about gradual change and to avert or control crises. Alger has emphasized the crucial role that interest groups play in the formation of foreign policy, thereby contributing to the fragmented nature of the state. Other pluralist scholars argued that lack of information and time but also other factors as the values that decision-makers hold or the psychic complexes of the leaders undermine the ability of the decision-makers to behave in a purposeful way. Governments acting on behalf of the state were no more treated as "purposeful individuals", as unitary, monolithic actors. Pluralists, in contrast to realists, employed instead of the


26. Ibid, p. 478
White, Brian, Analysing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches, in Michael Clarke and Brian
objective orientation in understanding foreign policy, the subjective one.

Interestingly, pluralists also challenged the realist normative, prescriptive arguments. Morgenthau's premise, for example, that a state's national interest should be proportionate to its capabilities was contested by Davidson and Montville. For them, government leaders cannot risk the chance that adversaries will misperceive reasonableness and thereby be tempted to be even more aggressive.\textsuperscript{27} Haass criticized Kennedy's ideas arguing that although there is a link between economic and both political and military power, the relationship is more complex.\textsuperscript{28} According to the author, Kennedy has underestimated the role of domestic economic mismanagement and the capacity of governments to adapt to changing circumstances. Another pluralist author, Mandel, has questioned the realist assumption that the presence of irrationality inhibits the policy-making process. For him, under certain circumstances, irrationality may be most beneficial in foreign policy-making.\textsuperscript{29}

At the centre of the "pluralist revolution" was "the belief that realists had overstated the role of power in interna-


\textsuperscript{28} Haass, Richard N., The Use (and Mainly Misuse) of History, \textit{Orbis}, Vol. 32 (3), Summer 1988, pp. 411-419
tional politics". Thus, a number of realist concepts like "balance of power" or "national interest" became so vague that they almost disappeared from the pluralist literature. The world-wide nuclear weapons situation, the green revolution, the technological breakthroughs, the expansion of trade and the growth of the number and influence of non-governmental organisations are the developments in international relations that inspired the pluralist school. Pluralists describe a world where non-security issues are appearing on diplomatic agendas, a global system where friendships are diversifying and coalitions are beginning to disintegrate. Their key concept is interdependence.

Although, the term interdependence means different things to different authors, it seems to connote, for pluralists, the ability of one state to influence another in some way. Thus, interdependence does not imply by any means a balanced relationship. It is mutual when each state could damage the other, and itself, by severing the relationship that exists between them. Indeed, the concept of interdependence led to a perception of a world where no actor can be characterised as totally independent. In the words of Mansbach, Ferguson and Lampert, "the high level of transactions among actors and the high degree of interdependence in contem-


30. Little, Richard, Structuralism and Neo-Realism, in Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom, eds, op. cit., p. 82
porary political, social and economic life mean that no actor is fully autonomous." However, pluralists disagreed on whether growing interdependence is a desirable development. Morse, for example, has contended that "with the development of high levels of interdependence, all kinds of catastrophes (...) can become worldwide once a chain of events is begun." Other pluralists, however, as Keohane and Nye, argued that it is impossible to specify a priori whether the costs of interdependence exceed its benefits. Finally, Harold and Margaret Sprout have argued that growing interdependence is desirable since current developments make the nation-state so vulnerable that national policies cannot any more cope with the problems of security, pollution and economic development.

However, most pluralists did not dispute altogether the importance of the nation-state in international relations; their arguments dealt more with its relative weight in global politics. Although the Sprouts have argued that the concept of sovereignty is a total anachronism in the process of discovering solutions for the problems that the world confronts today, the majority of


pluralist writers accepted the view that the state is a very significant actor in the international system. In Keohane and Nye's words: "both [complex interdependence] and the realist portrait are ideal types. Most situations will fall somewhere between these two extremes. Sometimes, realist assumptions will be accurate, or largely accurate, but frequently complex interdependence will provide a better portrayal of reality". Pentland has argued that although international organisations can achieve a measure of autonomy and operate as actors in their own right, they have to be regarded and as instruments of foreign policy: in a sense, they do exist as long as they serve the interests of their member-states. Nevertheless, most exponents of pluralism argued that the role of the state in international relations is in decline because of the rising importance of non-governmental actors, integration and economic interdependence (defined as the sensitivity of economic transactions between countries to changes in economic variables within them). Huntington, for example, focusing on the role of multinational companies, has argued that because "man's capacities for organisation are outrunning the nation-state system", "for the immediate future a central focus of world politics will be on the coexistence of and interaction between transnational organizations and the nation-state". Further,


Keohane and Nye have contested the realist assumption that international organisations are merely instruments of governments and therefore unimportant in their own right. 

Realists, however, rejected the pluralist premise. Modelski and Benedict, for example, used data for 1930-1969 on world GNP, total central governmental expenditures, and total military expenditures and found out that there is nothing to support claims of the demise of the nation-state. On the contrary, their quantitative study shows a world-wide strengthening of its position. Some pluralists tried to incorporate these findings in their analysis. Hanrieder, for example, contended that despite a growth of restraints imposed upon state activity in the international arena, there is a dramatic increase in the role of the state in the domestic one. This development, according to the author, leads to a domestication of international politics and reinforces the continuing vitality of the nation-state. In other words, for Hanrieder, the state's role in international relations has changed in kind mainly and not so much in degree.


41. Hanrieder, Wolfram M., Dissolving International Politics: Reflections of the Nation-
But is pluralism a new paradigm in international relations theory? Several authors argue that the pluralist revolution of the 1960s was falsely regarded as a major advance. It should be seen, they contend, as a change in methods rather than in the much more significant domain of theory. Vasquez, for example, has written that the advocates of paradigm change do not clearly demonstrate the obsolescence of the fundamental assumptions of the field.42 Another author, Gareau, has argued that the paradigm change is a story confined almost exclusively to American academe.43 The "pluralist dominance", he writes, when is not accompanied by the American label, it projects the American situation upon the world, implying that the discipline throughout the globe tends towards pluralism. The author examines the state of international relations theory in nineteen countries. His finding is that they are predominantly realist. Thus, it could be argued that pluralism is an enriched realism, a neo-realism resulting from the inadequacies of realist thought in certain cases.

In this chapter we shall examine the contributions of the two most important approaches of pluralist thought: 1) the "bureaucratic politics" approach and 2) the "psychological" approach. These approaches are not mutually exclusive but they form

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43. Gareau, Frederick H., The Discipline International Relations: A Multi-National Perspec-
two relative coherent groups of theories that provide the observer with different interpretations of decisions and actions. Then, we shall concentrate on analysing the methodology of our thesis and on examining Rosenau's attempt to form a general theory of foreign policy. Further, the literature on small states will be reviewed. Finally, we shall try to enumerate some of the methodological problems that we confronted in writing this thesis. Our analysis will not be by any means exhaustive. It will concentrate on influential texts.

The "bureaucratic politics" approach

The "bureaucratic politics" approach developed in the 1970s by introducing to foreign policy analysis insights and ideas from management science. Allison44 and Halperin45 have proved to be the most influential authors of the new model. Graham Allison attempted in his famous book Essence of Decision to analyse the Cuban missile crisis. He argued that most analysts used the rational actor model to understand foreign policy behaviour.46 Then, Allison proposes two new models: 1. The organizational process


44. Allison, G.T., Essence of Decision, op. cit.
Allison, G.T. and P. Szanton, Remaking Foreign Policy, New York: Basic Books, 1976

model; and 2. the governmental politics model. He does not reject from the beginning, however, the usefulness of the rational actor model. Only in his conclusions he argues, "albeit implicitly, that the two alternative models he proposes are necessary for better explanations". The first alternative model assumes that "government consists of a conglomorate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own". The second alternative model assumes "many actors as players - players who focus not on a single strategic issue, but on many diverse international problems as well; players who act in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, organizational and personal goals; players who make governmental decisions not by a single, rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics". Allison's first alternative model disputed the assumption that governments can be treated as monolithic, unitary foreign policy actors. The second model challenged the classical distinction between the external and domestic milieu by introducing the importance of the domestic politics formation on foreign policy decision-making. Both models, however, presuppose strong

46. Allison, G., op. cit., p. 3
47. Ibid., p. 4
48. Smith, Steve, Perspectives on the Foreign Policy System: Bureaucratic Politics Approaches, in Michael Clarke and Brian White, eds, op. cit., p. 112
49. Allison, G., Essence of Decision, op. cit., p. 67
bureaucratic structures. Thus, Allison's approach was criticised over the extent to which it is applicable to other countries.\textsuperscript{51}

Several authors argued that "Allison's models are of little use in analysing the foreign policy behaviour of developing states"\textsuperscript{52} because the organisational routine of them lacks the necessary stability. I shall adopt this criticism of the 'bureaucratic politics' approach: The application of Allison's conceptual models is not very useful in the case of post-junta Greece. And this because the organizational structures and forms as well as the bargaining processes in the country were not characterized by a strong element of continuity. Consequently, they tended to be rather weak. Thus, one of the first actions of the Greek socialist government was the abolition of the position of the General Directors of the various Ministries (career civil servants).\textsuperscript{53} Furthermore, in July 1982, a Greek presidential decree helped the government to overcome the hierarchy of its diplomatic service by allowing the Greek socialists to assign the position of ambassador to "personalities of public life".

\begin{flushright}
\textbf{50. Ibid, p. 144}

\textbf{51. Smith, S., op. cit., pp. 120-122}

\textbf{52. Ibid}

\textbf{53. Petrolekas, Stavros, Institutional Weakening and Corruption, Epikentre, No 56, December}\end{flushright}
The "psychological" approach

A central part of foreign policy analysis is the 'psychological approach', indicating the multi-disciplinary origins of the subject. This approach was a second challenge to the 'rational actor models' of traditional theorists. Its exponents introduced a new set of useful concepts: first, the distinction between the operational and psychological environment; secondly, the concept of values held by the participants in foreign policy decision-making. Indeed, their approach based on the concept of cognition (understanding a situation) did not only criticise the "billiard-ball" paradigm but also Allison's 'bureaucratic politics' theory. Jervis is widely regarded as the leading theorist in this field. We shall now concentrate on his famous book *The Logic of Images in International Relations* from which we derived many ideas in writing this thesis.

By admitting in the beginning of his book that he "will not give a balanced view of international interaction", Jervis states

1988, p. 26, (In Greek)


56. Smith, S., *op. cit.*, pp. 119-120

that he is attempting to study "how states cheaply project desired images". Then the author develops two concepts: first, the concept of signals and secondly, the concept of indices. "Signals are statements or actions the meanings of which are established by tacit or explicit understandings among the actors." Thus, "both the sender and the perceiver realize that signals can be as easily issued by a deceiver as by an honest actor". On the other hand, indices are statements or actions that carry some inherent evidence that the image projected is correct because they are believed to be inextricably linked to the actor's capabilities or intentions. Another very useful concept for the understanding of the Greek socialists' foreign policy is introduced by Jervis: manipulation. "Manipulation", according to the author, is "the use of indices to project desired images by undermining the observer's assumption that the behavior which is the index either cannot be or is not being consciously controlled by the actor to give an impression the actor wants the observer to have". A final concept introduced in the book, a concept which generates plausible explanations of PASOK government's tactics, is noise: "Noise con-

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reion University Press, 1970

58. *Ibid* p. 15

59. *Ibid* p. 18

60. *Ibid*

61. *Ibid*
sists of all the statements and actions not designed to provide
the listener with information (....) It is the noise and ambiguity
in the signaling system that provide flexibility and protection by
reducing the danger of damage to an actor's reputation when he un-
dertakes probes and initiatives". Jervis ends his book with a
case study where he examines the role of signals and indices in
the Vietnam Conflict. In our thesis' last chapter we shall use
his concepts to explain certain actions of the Greek socialists'
government.

The second impact of the "psychological approach" in foreign
policy analysis was the recognition that governments - like in-
dividuals - hold values. Thus, the ideological orientations and
affinities of a government have an important impact on a foreign
policy system. Indeed, realists urged nations to place reduced
emphasis on ideology as a conditioner of international conduct. In
Morgenthau's words "while all politics is necessarily pursuit of
power, ideologies render involvement in that contest for power
psychologically and morally acceptable to the actors and their
audience". However, some realist authors argued that ideology

62. Ibid, p. 43
63. Ibid, p. 123
64. Ibid, pp. 254-276
65. Pfaltzgraff and Dougherty, op. cit., p. 277 and p. 476
66. Smith, Michael, Comparing Foreign Policy Systems: Problems, Processes and Performance, in
Michael Clarke and Brian White, eds, op. cit., pp. 194-195
could be, under certain circumstances, a desirable element of foreign policy-making. Needler, for example, praised the ideology of the Soviet state claiming that one of its "great strengths is that it stresses the importance of conflict in the world - conflict within capitalist states, conflict among capitalist states, conflict between capitalist states". According to the author, "the Soviet leaders are psychologically prepared for participation in a world of sovereign states in which the law of life is conflict".

In our thesis we treat ideology mainly as a constraint and not as a factor affecting directly foreign policy decision-making: The constraint is what others want the leaders to believe. In a sense we tend to regard Greek decision-makers as rational human beings without values. However, their perception of the importance of various constraints is partly a matter of values.

Other explanatory concepts related with the processes of acquiring knowledge and introduced by psychology theorists, included the concepts of stress, anticipation and surprise, all closely associated with the concept of crisis. These are, however, of little relevance to my research because Greek foreign policy in the examined period did not operate under conditions of crisis. Indeed, the term "crisis" is an essentially contested concept. We

67. Morgenthau, H., Politics Among Nations, op. cit., p. 84
68. Needler, Martin C., Understanding Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 120-121
69. Ibid, p. 122
use it here to connote "a sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but involving the perception of a dangerous high probability of war". 71

Methodology

Our thesis is partly a comparative study. Indeed, "foreign policy analysis is inherently comparative". 72 Nevertheless, our research is not so much comparative in terms of space (comparing the performance of different states) but in terms of time (comparing the performance of different governments in the same state). By defining the term "circumstances" to "summarize the set of demands and problems faced by a foreign policy system", 73 we shall prove that the circumstances that Greek foreign policymakers confronted in the 1974-1986 era were very similar. In that context, although we shall try mainly to explain the objectives and the constraints that the Greek socialist government pursued and confronted in the 1981-1986 period, we shall also concentrate on comparing its foreign policy performance with that of its con-

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72. Smith, Michael, Comparing Foreign Policies: Circumstances, Processes and Performance, in Brian White and Michael Clarke, eds, op. cit., p. 53
servative predecessor. The concepts of continuity and change will be employed.

What accounts for continuity and what determines the occurrence, the scope and the timing of major changes in foreign policy? Many authors have started their analysis by giving operational meaning to the concept of continuity. Goldmann, for example, focussed his analysis on factors blocking, reducing the scope of, or delaying the adaptation to new conditions. 74 He called these factors "stabilizers" of foreign policy, arguing that they can be grouped into administrative, political, cognitive and international categories. It is one of the basic assumptions of our study that the "stabilizers" of Greek foreign policy had a strong influence in post-1974 Greek foreign policy. Another author, Moon has shown that change in foreign policy occurs mainly as a result of governmental change. 75 Thus, he rejects not only the realist argument that foreign policy change is a result of a bargaining process with another state but also the idea that it is a gradual process. This is another hypothesis of our thesis: the changes that the Greek socialists introduced into Greece's foreign policy were not gradual. Indeed, it is this hypothesis that gives operational meaning to the scope of our study: if change in foreign

73. Ibid, p. 56
75. Moon, Bruce E., Consensus or Compliance?: Foreign Policy Change and External Dependence,
policy occurs gradually there is no real academic interest in choosing to study the policies of a particular government. In general, the concepts of continuity and change will be employed at two levels: first, the domestic; secondly, the international.

The role of the domestic milieu in understanding international relations was one of the most important contributions of pluralist thought expressed by both bureaucracy and psychology theorists. Indeed, not all realists explained foreign policy by using exclusively systemic variables. Kissinger, for example, distinguished two system models of international politics: the stable and the revolutionary. For him, the first, in contrast to the second, is not characterised by adventurist foreign policies. But, the belief of pluralist thinkers was that the internal sources of foreign policy had been underestimated by realists. Exponents of externalization theory, contended that national leaders sometimes engage in foreign conflict in order to restore domestic cohesion. One important pluralist thinker, Burton, has claimed that foreign policy could be totally explained by domestic factors. Further, Rosenau’s work with “linkage theory” has dramatised the interdependence of domestic and international environments of nation-states. An extreme is, for Rosenau, a

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76. Pfaltzgraff and Dougherty, op. cit., p. 116

"penetrated system" where national society becomes so permeated by its external environment that the traditional analytical distinction between international and national systems becomes totally imprecise. For Rosenau, no other type of penetrated system can be more encompassing than a post-war occupation (with the last German occupation of France being a notable exception). Hanrieder has examined post-war West Germany as a penetrated political system. Although he employs a rather loose interpretation of Rosenau's "penetrated system" concept, Hanrieder proves that "external events had 'penetrated' the domestic political 'sub-system' of West Germany [in the 1949-1963 period] to a high degree, making for a fusion of national and international systems patterns". Nevertheless, the author admits that the case of West Germany is, in a sense, unique.

For pluralists, the incorporation of domestic and external milieux is the exception rather than the rule. However, as the two environments are in any case not only intimately linked but also closely interacting with each other, they can be separated only for the purpose of analysis. Undoubtedly, this can only be done at the expense of some distortion of reality. For example, Greece's economic situation (a domestic or an external variable?) is influenced by but also influences both the domestic and the international environment of the country. In our thesis, the distinction

between the international milieu (First Part) and the domestic one (Second Part) does not imply a clear-cut dichotomy: all domestic issues that influence Greek foreign policy with the exception of three (The Communists, the PASOK's left-wing and the Army) are examined in the First Part of the thesis.

Rosenau's work is not only significant in the distinction between the external and domestic milieux but it is also one of the few attempts to incorporate realist and pluralist theories into a single theoretical framework, to build a "grand theory".

Rosenau's "Grand Theory"

Rosenau has developed the concept of "essential structures" that he defines as "interaction patterns" of individuals and groups within the state. He distinguishes four essential structures: physical, economic, political and social. According to the author the essential structures are the essential constraints: the degree to which states "cope with and benefit from their international environment" can be defined by the worst performing essential structure. Indeed, the essential structures

79. Ibid, p. 228
81. Ibid, pp. 21-24
82. Rosenau, J.N., Foreign Policy as Adaptive Behaviour, Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, April
vary in performance depending partly on the changes of the international environment. However, only "salient" changes of the environment of the state influence the essential structures. Given that the performance of the essential structures vary and that the environment is constantly changing, Rosenau distinguishes four main types of foreign policy that policy-makers can pursue:

1. A promotive foreign policy when decision-makers choose to be unresponsive to changes in both the environment and the essential structures.
2. A preservative foreign policy when decision-makers are responsive to both of them.
3. An acquiescent foreign policy when decision-makers are only responsive to external factors, and
4. An intransigent foreign policy when decision makers are mainly responsive to the changes of the performance of the essential structures.

The main objective of foreign policy makers in all four types is, for the author, the same: survival. If foreign policies increase the probabilities for survival, they are classified as "adaptive"; otherwise they are characterised as "maladaptive". Then, Rosenau

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1970, pp. 369-370
83. Ibid, pp. 371-372
84. Ibid
85. Rosenau, J.N., The Adaptation of National Societies, op. cit., pp. 3-16
elaborates on the explanatory variables that account for variations in the foreign policy strategies: 1) the type of the actor; 2) four actor attributes (a. the individual characteristics of the leaders, b. its governmental structures and processes, c. its socioeconomic patterns, and d. the types of environment it confronts); 3) the relationship between the actor and the target of its behaviour; and finally 4) the types and rates of environmental change. 87

In general, Rosenau is attempting, as McGowan points out, "to unite within one framework currently disparate islands of theory and to provide a basis for understanding foreign policy behavior at the most general level". 88 What's the relevance then of his highly abstract theory to the study of Greece's foreign policy? Indeed, one of my basic hypotheses is that Greek foreign policy in the post-1974 period was 'preservative'. But this is of little importance. After all, Rosenau appears to recognise that the other three foreign policy models are rather exceptional. 89 We think that it is important to examine Rosenau's explanatory variables which are the conditions within the theory that explain variations within the basic foreign policy models. This will allow us to ex-

86. Rosenau, J.N., Foreign Policy as Adaptive Behaviour, op. cit., pp. 2-3


plain why some actions were not taken or why some other foreign policy objectives were pursued (non-decision and decision). Some of these explanatory variables are to be found in various parts of the thesis but we shall start by defining the type of the actor whose foreign policy we are going to analyse. Rosenau develops three sub-variables that determine the type of the state: 1. size; 2. wealth; and 3. political accountability. He thereby introduces the concept "small state" in the international system.

Small states in international relations

Realist scholars arbitrarily delimited the category "small state" by placing an upper limit on territorial or population size. Nevertheless, this definition was soon proved problematic: in Libya's or in Saudi Arabia's case, for example, big territories coincide with small populations; are these countries small or big? When wealth was added in the definition, the "small state" concept became more ambiguous and more difficult to apply in certain cases: Are Brazil or Nigeria, for example, small countries? The difficulty to compromise size with wealth in defining the small state had some important repercussions: in some cases "size" was proved a better conceptual framework than "wealth". Hoadley, for example, argued that size is a better analytical tool in examining

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89. Rosenau, J.W., Foreign Policy as Adaptive Behaviour, op. cit., p. 371
the performance of small states as aid donors than the relative wealth of the donor.\textsuperscript{91}

Hence, not unexpectedly, pluralist scholars challenged the realist approach and defined the small states in terms of weakness. What matters, they argued, is not only size, population or wealth but also other 'objective' elements of state capability. Thus, human resources and organisational capabilities were included by pluralists in their ranking scales. Vital, for example, has shown that a great power has at its disposal a much larger diplomatic apparatus than a small one.\textsuperscript{92} Nevertheless, this approach was also proved problematic. Handel has disputed Vital's assumption that larger bureaucracies are more influential: "it is the politicization of the bureaucracy, not its size which influences leaders in any given state", he argued.\textsuperscript{93} Even personality politics that according to Vital characterise weak states, cannot be positively correlated to size. Handel states that Henry Kissinger could totally disregard the huge American bureaucracy in pursuing his policies while the Israeli PM can reach no decision without the agreement of the country's military establishment.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{90} Rosenau, J.N., Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy, \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{91} Hoadley, Stephen J., Small States as Aid Donors, \textit{International Organization}, Vol. 34 (1), Winter 1980, pp. 121-137

\textsuperscript{92} Vital, David, \textit{The Inequality of States}, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 22

\textsuperscript{93} Handel, M., \textit{op. cit.}, p. 262
Above all, pluralist authors emphasized that absolute strength, however elaborate the term “strength” is, cannot offer a useful framework for an operational definition. What really is important, they argued, is relative strength: a state is only small in relation to a bigger one. In the words of Bjol, "to be of any analytical use ‘small state’ should be (...) considered shorthand for “a state in its relationships with greater states”.” Yoga, for example, is big in relation to Albania but small in relation to China. Several authors used the concept of relative strength in order to build an operational definition. Handel has argued that the mobilised total power of a state includes its internal power plus the derived potential of its external power. According to this model, the external sources of strength available are far more important for the weak states than is the case for the great powers. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the weak states are powerless: although, the small state’s freedom of action is dependent on the type of the international system, its strategic importance for a great power can increase its bargaining power while the use of international organizations can promote its interests. Even the since the end of the second world war bipolar character of the international system has some positive aspects for the weak states: the conflicts between the United States and Vietnam, France and Algeria, and the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia

94. Ibid, p. 262

95. Bjol, Erling, The Small State in International Politics, in August Schov and Arne Olav
or Afghanistan, confirm the proposition that whenever one superpower is engaged against a lesser state, the other superpower tends to be arrayed on the other side.

In a sense, the argument that weak states tend to derive their strength from their external milieus reinforces the realist premise that forces external rather than internal to a state can provide better explanations of its foreign policy. But this is a weak argument because "penetration" makes the domestic and external environments indistinguishable. Quantitative studies of the external relations of weak countries support this position. Moon, for example, has examined the relations between weak and dominant states. His data provides strong evidence that the dependent relationship permeates and transforms the political system of dependent nations bringing about constrained consensus. 96.

Several authors have argued that the concept of "small state" forms a very broad category with little use for purposes of comparative analysis. 97 Not unexpectedly, research has mainly concentrated on the foreign policies of ministates where a definition could be applied in a less contested way. However, the definition of the category "small state" has recently entered a new phase: instead of examining the independent variable, political scientists attempted to give an operational definition of the term by

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96. Moon, B., op cit.
97. Baehr, P.R., Small States: A Tool for Analysis ?, World Politics, Vol. 27 (3), April
analysing the dependent variable, namely the behaviour of small states. The basic premise of the new approach is that small states are different in kind and not merely in degree; small countries think and act differently. Concentrating on identifying characteristics that differentiate the behaviour of small states from the behaviour of other classes of states, these theorists argue that the dimension of security for a small state will often be far wider than is the case for a great power; that while the interests of a great power are usually multilateral, those of a small state are more narrow; that the small state is far more vulnerable to foreign intervention; and that in order to protect its interests it has to enter alliances. East, for example, has shown that small states minimise the cost of foreign policy by initiating more joint action and by directing influence attempts at joint or multiple actor targets; that they initiate less verbal behaviour than large states and they engage in much more conflictful non-verbal behaviour; and that they emphasise issues related directly to economic growth and development.

Indeed, this detailed conceptual framework complicated even more the problem of definition because the behavioural approach posed the problem of perceptions: states do not act, as the

1975, pp. 456-462


realists have argued, by taking into account their "objective" capabilities but according to perceptions (or misperceptions). As Rothstein has posed the question: "Small Power is not defined by specific qualities it possesses (or lacks) but rather by a position it occupies in its own and other eyes".100

Greece is a small state by any standard one chooses to use. In terms of size it occupies the 89th position in the world ranking101 covering an area of 130,000 km². In terms of population its 9.9 millions account for 0.2% of the earth's inhabitants,102 classifying the country in the 61st position of the respective world ranking103. Its Gross Domestic Product in 1985 reached the amount of 42.8 billion dollars, 1/7 of the GDP of the United Kingdom and 0.7% of the GDP of the United States in the same year.104

Greece could also be considered as a weak state in the international system if examined under a set of variables.105 First, it is a semi-developed country with a relatively big agricultural

25 (4), July 1973, pp. 556-576


103. Kurian, G.T., op. cit.

104. Eurostat, op. cit., p. 39
sector. As Mouzelis has pointed out, in the Greek economy simple commodity production and small family businesses and crafts exist side by side with the dominant capitalist mode of production. As a result, in a total of 150 states, Greece occupies the 37th position in terms of national income per head. Secondly, although it currently enjoys a parliamentary democracy, it has experienced a military dictatorship in its very recent history. For many analysts, post-1974 Greece "can no longer be classified as a praetorian state" since "the democratic structures that have been erected in [the country] have taken root". However, the stability quotient of its post-junta democratic institutions, as the same authors tacitly admit, is not comparable to that of western democracies.

Which are the consequences of these basic characteristics? The answer to this question is a set of essential constraints. First, Greece's limited ability to defend itself. Secondly, Greece's inability to pursue a self-development strategy based on the satisfaction of internal demand without jeopardising its current standard of living. Thirdly, Greece's vulnerability to influence from other states. Indeed, the enumeration can continue endlessly. What matters at this point is that Greece's limited


capabilities have led to this that has been described as "dyadic" foreign policy, meaning that the actor "interacts frequently with only a rather small subset of all the possible targets in the world", a typical characteristic of small states.\textsuperscript{108}

In our thesis we shall concentrate on six areas of Greece's geopolitical milieu: Turkey, the United States and NATO, the Balkans, the Arab world, the Soviet Union and the EC. Our approach is by no means arbitrary. Greek decision-makers perceive in the same way the country's external environment. The organisational structure of the Greek Foreign Ministry\textsuperscript{110} shows it relatively clearly. Its Directorate-General for Political Affairs has ten Directorates. Among them: A2 for Turkey and Cyprus; A3 for western Europe and the Americas; A1 for European socialist countries; A5 for Africa, the Middle East and India; and A6 for NATO. Papandreou's trips abroad in the period November 1981-1986 present, however, a more clear picture of Greek perceptions: 36 visits to west European capitals; 9 to Balkan countries; 6 to Arab states; 5 to countries of eastern Europe; 3 to India; and from one to Canada, Mexico and Cyprus.\textsuperscript{111} Indeed, the six areas of

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109. Even US foreign policy could be characterised as dyadic (McGowan, P., \textit{op. cit.,} p. 33)

Greece's geopolitical milieu do not form by any means autonomous entities. They interact with each other but not always weakly. When their interaction is strong the researcher confronts the same problem that we examined in the distinction between the external and domestic environments: penetration. Again, the distinction between, say, Greek-Turkish and Greek-US relations in our thesis is made only for the purpose of analysis.

Research problems

Which is the main objective of the thesis? Our target is to build a model with strong descriptive and explanatory power. However, we shall not hesitate to make some short-term predictions by identifying a few broad aggregate trends. Undoubtedly, few aggregate trends operate autonomously and remain unaffected by political and economic decisions, and scientific-technological breakthroughs. Thus, we are conscious that even our few predictions are just projections of recent trends into the future and thereby scientifically questionable: we strongly believe that extrapolations is a dangerous method in deriving conclusions.

Further, we shall make every possible effort to reduce the impact of our value judgements. Our main objective is to describe and explain what happened and not to argue about what should happen. Hence, we shall try to avoid 'normative' comments. However, we think that it is impossible to have a comprehensive theory of
foreign policy which does not incorporate some normative aspects. If, for example, the empirical research proves that the result of the actions of a foreign policy decision-maker fall short of his expectations, then something is wrong: either with his expectations or with his actions. Thus, normative questions are in-avoidable. We decided to leave these question "open", without answers. However, it could be argued that decision-makers learn from their mistakes: in that context, decision-making is not a static but a learning, a dynamic process, a mechanism of the "trial-and-error type". This element of decision-making is particularly important for post-1981 Greece, since all but one (the PM) of the members of the PASOK government had no previous ministerial experience.

In general, my approach to the topic derives many ideas from realist and pluralist thought but it is clearly not structuralist. Why not structuralist? Structuralist theories were developed in parallel to pluralist arguments. They focus on economic variables such as modes of production or world contrasts such as the North-South split and understand global politics in terms of the uneven spread of the industrial mode of production as well as the complex character of the socioeconomic systems that are its result. Their key concepts are those of "industry" and "class".

111. Derived from Kostopoulos, Sotiris, PASOK: Five Years, Patra: Ahaikes Ekthoseis, 1986, pp. 53-55, [In Greek]

Kolko, for example, has contended that a dominant elite in the US, an elite virtually synonymous with big business, has been responsible for the definition of America's national interest. For him, the elite's policies were not only responsible for the onset of the cold war but also for the Vietnam conflict. According to Kolko, the latter reflected clearly the elite's definition of its interests in terms of maintaining the dependencies of raw-material-producing countries in the third world.

Although structuralist thought can be traced back to Lenin's imperialism, current theories could be classified in two main schools of thought: 1. the "dependency" and 2. the "centre-periphery". The dependency theory was inspired by the work of the Argentinian economist Raul Prebisch. His work on the Latin American economy was based on the fact that the prices of the primary products that the region is exporting to developed countries in exchange for industrial goods are very unstable. Prebisch argued that because these unequal terms of trade were moving in the long run against the primary products, it is necessary for these countries to promote industrialisation behind tariff barriers.

Frank, concentrating on Latin America's development problems, added a number of features to the original model and gave the stigma of centre-periphery analysis. For him, there is

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a chain of exploitation linking the advanced capitalist states and
the third world, the centre and the periphery; this chain inhibits
development in the latter. The only way to achieve development in
underdeveloped states is, according to Frank, revolution and a
breaking of links with the developed world. Wallerstein, analysing
the problems of development in Africa, has developed an analysis
similar to that of Frank, by identifying three structural posi-
tions of states within the capitalist world-economy: the core, the
peripheral and the semi-peripheral.¹¹⁶

Both structuralist schools of thought have Marxist roots and
emphasise the unity of the world system at all levels. However,
their arguments are mainly prescriptive. In a sense, any criticism
of structuralist theories is a criticism of Marxism. On the one
hand, structuralist thought has been criticised for grossly over-
simplifying the situation. Warren, for example, has argued that
structuralist analysis is not only based on a "romantic" anti-
capitalism but also on a dangerous nationalism.¹¹⁷ He has con-
tended that structuralists have underestimated the domestic
milieux of third world states by ignoring local economic mis-

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Press, 1971

¹¹⁶ Wallerstein, Immanuel, The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Con-
cepts for Comparative Analysis, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 16 (4),
1974, pp. 387-415
management. On the other hand, the structuralist school moved steadily towards macroanalysis in both space and time, constantly distancing itself from foreign policy analysis and continuously emphasising the unity of the world system. In Wallerstein's words "there are today no socialist systems in the world economy any more than there are feudal systems because there is only one world-system". Interstate politics are treated by structuralists as a merely surface phenomenon, as part of a "superstructure"; changes in the foreign policy of states are not for them so important; the expansion of multinational companies and the uneven terms of trade are the factors that really matter. Thus, structuralist thought has probably provided a useful framework of analysis at the global level but it is undoubtedly a poor guide for foreign policy analysis because it rejects the latter ipso facto: a host of international phenomena cannot be understood by structuralism.

As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff have pointed out, "the concept of 'foreign policy' refers to the formulation, implementation and evaluation of external choices within one country, viewed of the perspective of that country". Thus, the study of international relations is not the same with the study of foreign policy. Our research topic is concerned with foreign policy analysis. Hence,


118. Wallerstein, I., *op. cit.*, p. 415
we shall view the events from the Greek point of view. Of course, as we know from cybernetics, part of the output of a system (here a foreign policy system) returns to it as a new input.\textsuperscript{120} The existence of these positive or negative inputs (or "feedbacks" as systems\textsuperscript{-}theorists prefer to call them) poses some problems to the researcher. For example, actions of the Greek foreign policy decision-makers which are directed to the external environment of the country, produce feedbacks, reactions by other governments that require responses. Thus, the distinction between foreign policy analysis and the study of international relations becomes rather blurred. If someone wants to predict developments he/she has also to examine feedbacks. As a result, although our topic is state\text{-}centric, we shall also examine some aspects of the domestic and external sources of the behaviour of the states that interact more frequently with Greece.

Conclusions

Scholars no longer assume that any single theoretical framework (realism, pluralism or structuralism) can satisfactorily or parsimoniously explain even the main questions in the field of international relations. Research activity, partly disappointed by the results of generalisations, concentrates on identifying vari-

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{op. cit.}, p. 81
ables and offering explanations for limited international phenomena. There is a declining interest in "grand theory". Rosenau, in somewhat of a self-criticism, argued that a process of paradigm deterioration is underway in the study of global affairs. For Rosenau, "authority has been too widely decentralised and societies too thoroughly fragmented to be handled by even our most refined concepts".121

We tried to avoid in this study prematurely selecting a single theoretical approach. First, we argued that the premises of realism cannot satisfactorily explain the current complexity of world politics. Secondly, we claimed that pluralism is a host of approaches and is far from being a single paradigm. Thirdly, we contended that the "bureaucratic politics" approach is not an appropriate tool for the study of Greece's foreign policy. Fourthly, we showed that the use of the concept "small state", partly because of its imprecise definition and partly because of its analytical weaknesses, is not a very useful framework for comparative research.

In that context, we formulated our hypotheses that will guide our analysis of the foreign policy of the Greek socialists (October 1981-1986):

1. Change in Greek foreign policy occurred mainly as a result of governmental change. Thus, it was not gradual.


121. Rosenau, James N., Muddling, Meddling and Modeling: Alternative Approaches to the
2. Because the circumstances that Greek foreign policy-makers confronted in the post-1974 era were very similar, the element of continuity was stronger than the element of change in comparing the performance of the Greek socialists with that of their conservative predecessors (1974-1981) in the international arena.

3. The influence of the international milieu of the country contributed mainly to the element of continuity.

4. Changes of the international environment reinforced the element of change in Greek foreign policy.

5. Change was mainly due to a combination of domestic factors. The roles of the Greek Communist Party, the Greek Socialist Party's left-wingers and the pursuit of new tactics aiming at increasing Greece's freedom to manoeuvre in the international system were the most important.

6. The political role of the Armed Forces was a domestic factor that reinforced the element of continuity.

7. The Greek-Turkish dispute influenced strongly all the other geopolitical areas with which Greece was interacting.

8. The Greek foreign policy agenda was dominated by security considerations.

9. Economic issues were rising in importance in the agenda of Greece's foreign policy objectives.

It is clear that our hypotheses do not reflect a particular paradigm. They incorporate ideas taken from both realism and pluralism. Hypothesis number 8, for example, is typically realist
while hypotheses number 1 and 9 are characteristically pluralist.

In the following chapter we shall examine the Greek polity, explaining why we chose to particular importance on some domestic factors while deciding to discuss in less detail others.

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### Table 1.1
The Foreign Policy of the Greek Socialists
Forces of Continuity and Change

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Chapter 2
The Greek Polity

The collapse of the military dictatorship in July 1974 marked the beginning of a new era in Greek politics. In a paradoxical way, it was an external and not an internal event that compelled the Greek Army's officers to return to the barracks: the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The Cyprus tragedy did not only contribute to the democratisation of Greece but also - and more importantly - aroused the national ego of its population. Resulting from the US rather passive acceptance of the Turkish attack and expressing a bitterness for the White House's initial mild reaction to the establishment and later open support of the Greek junta, a wave of anti-American feelings dominated the psychological milieu of the Greek political system in the post-1974 era. Indeed, the new tendencies of Greek public opinion influenced the performance of the post-junta Greek polity, a polity whose character was considerably different from the pattern that had dominated the country since the Second World War.

The post-1974 Greek political system has operated under a different constitution. The government of "National Unity", headed by Constantine Karamanlis, took the first initiative for the revision of the 1952 Constitution. On June 11, 1975, following the outcome of the first post-junta elections that had brought into power Karamanlis's conservative NDP, the new Constitution came into force. Two were the most important changes that the new constitutional framework brought into Greek politics. The first, fol-
ollowing the settlement of the monarchy issue through a referendum in December 1974, was that Greece was not any longer a "crowned democracy" but a republic. The King was replaced by an elected by the Parliament President whose powers, although far less important than those of the government, were under certain circumstances extensive: according to Article 44, for example, the President could proclaim a referendum "on crucial national issues" or, according to Article 42, the President could send back a bill to Parliament which then should be voted by the absolute majority of the total number of MPs. However, as an analyst writes, "the President (...) could only with difficulty challenge the other two bodies (Government and Parliament) as his basis of legitimacy is (...) shallow": he is elected by the Parliament and not by the electorate.¹ In fact, the Presidents' (Tsatsos and Karamanlis) behaviour in office prove this position: none of them used their allegedly "extensive" powers. The presidency was designed as a political valve, controlling long-term political developments but its impact on decision-making processes was limited. In 1985 Papandreou, wanting to increase his government's freedom for manoeuvre, revised the Constitution: the President's powers were curtailed and transferred into the hands of the PM.²

The second reform introduced by the 1975 Constitution, was the legalisation of the pro-Moscow Greek Communist Party which had

² Ibid, pp. 27-30
been banned since the beginning of the civil war (1947). In general, the 1975 constitutional framework determined the character of the new regime as a "Presidential Parliamentary Democracy" based on the concept of popular sovereignty. Elections were to be held every 4 years (Article 53) while the 300-strong Parliament was given the right to change even the essential provisions of the Constitution (Article 110).

Post-junta Greek political parties were also considerably different from their pre-1967 equivalents. Although both Karamanlis's NDP and Papandreou's socialist PASOK could be regarded as continuities of the pre-junta National Radical Union and Centre Union respectively, they both brought considerable changes in political personnel as well as in political organisation. Karamanlis attempted to give to NDP the image of a modern European conservative party while Papandreou tried to arm PASOK with a strong ideological platform. None of the two parties, however, escaped from the peculiarities of mid-1970s Greece. NDP had to take into account the socialist inclination of Greece's public opinion on certain issues, an inclination due to the swing to the Left following the fall of the junta. Hence, Karamanlis incorporated into the Constitution a clause (Article 17) which foresees expropriation for the "public interest" while the NDP government nationalised many private enterprises (as, for example, Olympic Airways). In a sense, NDP adopted a social-democratic

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For the relationship between the Centre Union and PASOK see Chapter 10
ideology. Not unexpectedly, PASOK, identifying itself with the Left of the Greek political spectrum, was forced to adopt a more radical programme.

In the late 1960s, Keith Legg has analysed the Greek political system by focussing on the clientelistic networks of Greek politicians. Clientelism is generally believed to flourish in states characterised by insecurity and perceived scarcity of resources. Mouzelis, for example, has used the concepts of "early parliamentarism" and "late industrialisation" to explain the emergence of clientelism in Balkan and Latin American societies. 4 Lemarchand and Legg have defined clientelism as "personalized affective relationships between actors or sets of actors commanding unequal resources and involving mutual beneficial transactions beyond the immediate sphere of dyadic relations". 5 According to Legg, there was a constant conflict in the pre-1967 Greek political system between the "polyarchic-persistent" and "personal-fragile" aspects within the significant party structures. 6 The polyarchic component was the result of the patron-client relationships (distribution of favours and spoils) that tied the politicians (local notables or individual deputies) and the voters. Because in pre-junta Greece political parties were loosely organised and their structures did not reach the local


5. Lemarchand, Rene and Keith Legg, Political Clientelism and Development, Comparative Politics, Vol. 4, pp. 151-152

level, their leaders were almost totally depended on the clienteleistic networks of their parties' deputies. According to Legg's analysis, it was the most influential of these individuals that were accorded the cabinet places; as "those who occupied the political offices could buy votes", the Greek deputies were not attracted to a given party by ideological reasons but "by the hope of ministerial portfolios and the opportunities for patronage that these offer(ed)". Hence, the Greek parties were lacking coherence, they were polyarchic; Greek political life was dominated by individuals; and personality politics was the persistent pattern. Indeed, for Legg, the pre-1967 Greek political parties were not entirely based on clienteleistic networks. Apart from the dominant clienteleistic characteristics, there were also the "personal-fragile" aspects of party organisation. This component of party structures included those deputies who had no personal clienteles and owed their nomination as candidates and their subsequent election to the party leader.

One of the most important changes that the post-junta Greek political system brought in relation to its pre-1967 equivalent was the decline of the polyarchic-persistent and the reinforcement of the personal-fragile aspects of Greek party structures. This development was due to several factors. First, the two most significant post-1974 Greek political parties, NDP and PASOK, were the personal creations of their leaders. The founders of these two parties (Karamanlis and Papandreou) acted in a political vacuum:

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7. Ibid, p. 136
the 7-year dictatorship had dislocated the clientelistic networks of the pre-1967 political elite; Karamanlis and Papandreou had considerable freedom for manoeuvre in selecting their party deputies. Secondly, the legalisation of KKE acted as a catalyst. The Greek Communist Party, brought an ideological element in Greek politics and, consequently, contributed to the decline of the polyarchic-persistent element within the significant Greek party structures. Post-1974 political antagonism in Greece had more to do with ideas and programmes than its pre-junta equivalent. Thirdly, growing urbanisation, state expansion, the development of communications and national markets brought the emergence of a nation-wide public opinion which, over and above clientelistic considerations, began to have an important impact on the shaping of political issues.

The post-1974 Greek political parties relied less on clientelistic networks than their pre-junta predecessors: in the new period, the personal element of party organisation was the persistent one while the polyarchic aspect was the fragile one. However, there is a significant amount of continuity between past and present. Although both PASOK and, to a lesser extent, NDP developed extensive mass organisations, they neither developed democratic structures as their West European counterparts nor they succeeded in elaborating a coherent set of policies based on ideological platforms. NDP’s deputies acquired soon (especially after the 1977 elections) personal clienteles and when PASOK rised

8. Mouzelis, Nicos, Continuities and Discontinuities in Greek Politics: From Eleftherios Venizelos to Andreas Papandreou, in K. Featherstone and D.K. Kalsoudas, eds, op. cit., p. 275
to power, even many of its own supporters were surprised by the extensive use of practices of the past.

Although personality politics do not necessarily involve charismatic leaders, both Karamanlis and Papandreou are for academics, politicians and voters alike, charismatic figures. Both of them were "great" men in the sense that they did not only adapt to the expectations of others but they also changed and controlled their surroundings. Indeed, 1974 Greece offered an aspirant for political leadership significant leeway in playing roles likely to bring him success. In a sense, the country, being in a transition period, "needed" a charismatic leader, a symbol of unity: charismatic leaders do create legitimacy for political systems in periods of crisis. As Weber has observed in his famous distinction between "traditional", "legal-rational" and "charismatic" authority, the latter, being characteristically a rather unstable form, is associated with conditions of social and political change. Karamanlis and Papandreou strived within this environment to stimulate a positive response in the Greek public arena. Of course, both of them were already significant public figures. But also both of them displayed important "qualities": they did not only act at the "right" time but they were also the "right"

9. See Chapter 10


12. See infra
Karamanlis has more the image of a prudent politician, of a person who handled the transition to democracy of the Greek state with remarkable calm and determination, of the most important exponent of the pro-modernisation elements of the Greek Right. Karamanlis's personality is widely believed to be authoritarian but its belief system is undoubtedly in favour of western democratic ideals. Not unexpectedly, he regards himself as the Greek de Gaulle. Throughout his life, however, Karamanlis has never been arrogant: "There are no great men, there are only great events; what de Gaulle, Mac, Tito and Churchill would be if their political career was not connected with a war?" he said in 1983.

Karamanlis has never been an orator: his pronunciation is not good and he speaks slowly, searching for the best words. It is exactly in this area were Andreas Papandreou's image was built. PASOK's opponents regard its leader as a demagogue. His followers, however, have a rather different perception: Papandreou's academic qualifications create an image of a person who knows the solutions for Greece's economic problems; his explosive personality fits well to the Greek national character; his aggressive arguments have a strong appeal to the sensitive Greek psyche. In the last chapter of this study we will try to sketch in more detail

13. See Chapter 11


Papandreou's personality. What is important to remember at this point is that both Karamanlis and Papandreou had a significant impact on post-1974 Greek decision-making processes.

Indeed, the two leaders despite their radical different images shared many common features as well. Both of them entered into politics in the pre-1967 period. Karamanlis was Greece's PM in the 1955-1963 period while Papandreou was Deputy Minister in his father's government in the 1964-1965 era. Both Karamanlis's and Papandreou's political belief systems were largely shaped in these periods. Undoubtedly, their post-1974 decisions can be explained to a certain extent by their political experiences. According to an analyst, both leaders tried to avoid in the post-junta Greek polity what they perceived as "mistakes of the past".16 The pre-junta Greek political system, for example, was characterised by a strong involvement into politics by the Armed Forces and the King. The latter's disputes with the PM were not rare in this era. Not unexpectedly, one of the first political initiatives of Karamanlis in the post-1974 period was to remove the throne (referendum in 1974). Furthermore, the leader of NDP attempted to gradually depoliticise the Greek Army's officers corps.17 Andreas Papandreou father's party, the Centre Union, was loose, polyarchic, with strong centrifugal forces that led to its bisection in 1965. On the contrary, Andreas Papandreou founded a party which was solid, with a strong hierarchical organisation, a


17. See Chapter 11
party totally dominated by his charismatic personality.\footnote{18}

PASOK’s success in gaining power was to a certain extent the result of Karamanlis’s decision to abandon NDP’s leadership in April 1980. Karamanlis was elected President of the Republic but his party, deprived of his charismatic leader and headed by a former Minister for Foreign Affairs (George Rallis) who could not match Papandreou’s charisma, lost the 1981 elections. In the following years the Greek polity experienced the cohabitation of a conservative President and a socialist PM. Nevertheless, unlike its French equivalent, the Greek cohabitation was of little importance: in the Greek Republic the role of the President is significant only under conditions of crisis. Furthermore, Karamanlis’s room to manoeuvre was undoubtedly limited since Papandreou’s legitimacy was particularly strong. His party had not only won the 48.1% of the votes in the 1981 elections but it enjoyed wide support in any dispute with “the forces of the ancien régime of the Right”. Karamanlis’s official presence in Greek politics was ended in May 1985 when Papandreou, aiming not only at the satisfaction of the expectations of his left-wing voters but also at increasing his control of the political scene, nominated Christos Sartzetakis, a judge, as PASOK’s candidate for the Presidency. Eventually, Sartzetakis was elected with the help of the votes of the communist deputies.

The fact that PASOK had adopted a radical pre-electoral programme that included the closure of American bases in Greece,
the abandonment of EC and NATO membership and the reinforcement of
the country's ties with the Eastern Block, led many analysts to
predict a probable re-orientation of Greece's foreign policy. Indeed, this study focusses on PASOK's foreign policy performance
and examines only marginally the factors that explain the apparent
incompatibility between PASOK's pre-electoral positions and its
post-electoral actions. Undoubtedly, this incompatibility is not
particular to Greece. Spain's under Gonzalez relations with NATO
compared with the Spanish Socialists' pre-electoral promises shows
that the Greek case is not the exception. Two questions seem
important: 1. Why Papandreou had given these pre-electoral
promises? and 2. Why did he break them? Of course, as this study
does not examine PASOK in general but analyses the performance of
the PASOK government, it is the second question to which we will
try to give answers.

Most analysts relate Papandreou's pre-electoral pledges to
the Greek public opinion's anti-western views. Macrides, for ex-
ample, has argued that Papandreou's "socialism" was just a slogan
aiming at the Greek public's feelings while Lyrintzis has used
the concept of "populism" to describe PASOK's ideological
positions. Indeed, given that the majority of the Greek voters

19. See Chapter 10
21. See Chapter 10
23. Lyrintzis, Christos, Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece, West European Politics.
was against full NATO membership or against keeping US bases in Greece or held a non-favourable view of the US, it is not strange that PASOK had adopted a radical programme favouring a neutral cause for Greece.

Not unexpectedly, many analysts have used the anti-westernism of Greek public opinion to explain not only PASOK's quick rise to power but also the Papandreou's government foreign policy: Loulis, for example, has examined the influence of public's anti-westernism on real decision-making; another author, Dimitras, being the Director of a specialised public opinion organisation in Greece, has argued that PASOK's anti-american or pro-soviet foreign policy positions were totally due to the Greek public's views. Indeed, such an approach is confronted with a number of counter-arguments. First, any study in public opinion faces the problem of partisanship: that is, the extent to which public opinion's views are shaped by political parties' positions. Quantitative studies have shown that partisanship is particularly strong in post-1974 Greece. Probably due to

April 1984, Vol. 7 (2), pp. 99-118


27. See, for example, Dobratz, Betty A., Foreign Policy and Economic Orientations Influencing Party Preferences in the Socialist Nation of Greece, East European Quarterly, Vol. 21 (4),
the weak civic society and the lack of significant non-state institutions, partisanship undoubtedly weakens the argument that public opinion is an important independent variable. Secondly, most foreign policy analysts agree that public opinion's influence on decision-making processes is limited: empirical studies have proved that public opinion is not well informed of foreign policy issues; 28 that its views, based on a simplistic perception of a complex reality, are unstable; 29 and that, because of the former, it is highly manipulated by the political leadership. Thirdly, what actually matters is not the public opinion's real influence on decision-making but how its influence is being perceived by decision-makers: perceptions of influence do create real influence. However, there is no evidence that PASOK's decision-makers paid particular importance to the views of Greece's public opinion. There is only one case in post-1974 Greek foreign policy where public opinion's influence seemed to play a significant role: Greece's withdrawal from NATO's military wing in 1974. However, Karamanlis's decision was taken under exceptional circumstances: first, Greece was at the brink of war with Turkey; and, secondly, the newly formed Greek political system was searching for the first signs of legitimacy.

In this thesis, we examine the role of the Greek Communist

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January 1988, pp. 413-430


Party as a constraint on PASOK's foreign policy (Chapter 9) but we exclude from our analysis the main opposition party, NDP. Our approach is not arbitrary: foreign policy issues were always high in KKE's political agenda while NDP always emphasised economic affairs in its ideological platform. KKE focussed its criticism on PASOK's unfulfilled pre-1981 promises in the area of Greece's external relations while NDP consistently argued that PASOK was continuing its own foreign policy. Indeed, the PASOK government wanted to prove that its foreign policy was considerably different from that followed by its conservative predecessor. Papandreou wanted to show that policies were followed "for the first time". However, PASOK emphasised discontinuity in Greek foreign policy in response to KKE's contentions. For PASOK, NDP's arguments were not embarrassing because they were not "loud": the conservative party kept in the 1981-1986 era a low profile on foreign policy issues.

Closely connected with the role of KKE as a constraint on Papandreou's foreign policy was the role of PASOK's left-wing (Chapter 10). PASOK, having based its ideological platform on foreign policy issues, was trapped when it gained power in a strange game: unable to fulfil its pre-electoral promises because of significant international constraints, it confronted the probability of a strong internal opposition. Papandreou himself, having experienced the bitter bisection of his father's polyarchic party was particularly sensitive to such a development. Thus, the perceived influence of PASOK's left-wing on foreign policy decision-making in the 1981-1986 period was much more important than its real one.
A final constraint on Papandreou's foreign policy was the political role of the Armed Forces (Chapter 11). Although traditionally strong, the Army's involvement in post-1974 Greek politics was undoubtedly limited. However, PASOK's victory in 1981 brought for the first time into power political and social forces which were closely connected with the side that had lost the 1947-1949 civil war. Not unexpectedly, fears of a coup d'état by the pro-western officers corps became again timely. This real or perceived fear influenced decision and non-decision making in the Papandreou era.

Conclusions

The post-1974 Greek political system has its own autonomy. A new psychological milieu, a new constitutional framework, and the emergence and development of new political parties marked the basic discontinuities with pre-junta politics. The persistent pattern of post-junta Greek party structures was that of charismatic leadership. Both Karamanlis (the leader of NDP) and Papandreou (the leader of PASOK) dominated decision-making processes.

The anti-westernism of Greek public opinion is the reason that probably explains PASOK's radical pre-1981 foreign policy pledges. However, it was not an important constraint on PASOK government's foreign policy because it was in the 1981-1986 era a dependent variable. On the contrary, KKE and PASOK's left wing acted as significant constraints on Papandreou's external policies. Both of them had foreign policy issues high in their
political agendas and both of them emphasized the incompatibility between PASOK's pre-electoral promises and post-electoral positions. Finally, perceptions of Army's influence contributed to the limits that the internal milieu imposed on decision-making in the examined era.
Table 2.1
Election results in Greece
1974-1985

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<td>CU</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>11.9 (DC)</td>
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<td>NF</td>
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<td>6.8</td>
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Note: The figures do not total 100 due to the exclusion of minor parties.
First Part

The International Milieu
Chapter 3

The Greek-Turkish Dispute

Although the current crisis in Greek-Turkish relations has deep seated historical roots, significant events which took place in the post-1974 era gave rise to new issues of dispute between the two countries. The current conflict between Greece and Turkey arises over several key issues: the dispute about sovereign rights on the Aegean Sea continental shelf; the question of territorial sea and national air-space limits claimed by each country; a dispute on military and civil air-traffic control zones in the Aegean area; the militarization of the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean; the Cyprus question; and the problem of ethnic minorities.

This chapter has three aims: first, to examine briefly all these issues which have loomed darkly over Greek-Turkish relations and threaten to spark a war in this particularly inflammable and strategically sensitive part of the world; secondly, to identify Papandreou’s positions and to emphasize the divergence of his government’s foreign policy in relation to Turkey from that of the previous (post-1974) governments; thirdly, to analyse the constraints that the current crisis imposes on Greek foreign policy.

I

Background

"continental shelf" is used to describe:  
a) the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or beyond that limit, to where the depth of the adjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas;  
b) the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of the islands  

As the depth of the Aegean Sea ranges from 50 to 500 metres and with modern techniques it can be exploited fully, Greece claims that there is no Turkish continental shelf west of the Greek islands. Although the Geneva Convention was not signed by Turkey, Greece contends that its provisions are binding even upon states that were not parties to it or to the subsequent UNCLOS III (1982) which reiterated that the islands are entitled to a continental shelf, since they both constitute "codification of a customary rule of international law". Turkey, on the other hand,  

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2. Threat in the Aegean, Published by the Journalists' Union of Athens Daily Newspapers, p. 21 (Distributed by the Greek Embassy in London)  
3. Ibid  
5. Threat in the Aegean, op. cit., p. 21  
considers its continental shelf as an extension of the Asia Minor land mass into the sea to the west of certain Greek islands thereby denying that the Greek islands of the Aegean have a continental shelf. Hence, Turkey does not regard the Geneva Convention as "final".

The beginning of the dispute about the continental shelf surrounding the Greek islands can be set in 1973. Hopes of finding large oil deposits in the Aegean prompted the Turkish government to grant exploration rights to the Turkish Petroleum Company in areas which included large parts of the Aegean continental shelf claimed by Greece. (See Map 3.1) After a series of unsuccessful diplomatic contacts, a Turkish vessel was set out on an exploratory voyage in the disputed area in 1976, a voyage which provoked the first serious crisis in Greek-Turkish relations since the invasion of Cyprus. In response and in the same year, Greece appealed to both the International Court of Justice and the United Nations Security Council. Greece's recourse to the Hague Court

276-336, [In Greek]


7. Wilson, A., op. cit., p. 94
8. The discovery of an oil field offshore of the Greek island of Thassos made a small contribution of 1 million tons of crude oil per year. However, even small oil fields were and are important for the economies of both countries. In 1984, for example, Greece imported 90.1% of her oil requirements and Turkey 88.1% of hers (Eurostat: Basic Statistics of the EC, 24th Edition, 1987, p. 193)

9. Sazanithis, Christos, Greek-Turkish Relations, 1973-1978, Thessaloniki, 1979, pp. 65-73, [In Greek]
Rozakis, C., op. cit., pp. 276-277
Wilson, A., op. cit., pp. 94-95

10. Sazanithis, Ibid, pp. 74-79
Rozakis, Ibid, pp. 277-287
was unilateral, although in the first place Turkey had agreed to submit the issue to the latter's adjudication. The Greek appeal to the Security Council led to a recommendation to both parties involved in the dispute to "do everything in their power to reduce the present tension in the area so that the negotiations process [might] be facilitated". Following the Security Council resolution, Greece and Turkey started negotiations for the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf. These led to the signing of an agreement in 1976 in Berne. According to this agreement which became known as the Berne Protocol, the two parties agreed to continue their negotiations by abstaining "from any initiative or act relating to the Continental Shelf of the Aegean which might prejudice" them. As a result, legal experts from Greece and Turkey continued to meet till September 1981. In the meantime, in 1979, the International Court of Justice ruled that it lacked jurisdiction in relation to the Aegean continental shelf delimitation problem.

Although the territorial sea dispute between Greece and Turkey does not have the crucial importance of the dispute about the continental shelf, Turkish fears have arisen that Greece might

11. For the full texts see Sazanithis, Ibid, p. 316
12. Rozakis, op. cit., pp. 286-287
13. For the full text see Sazanithis, op. cit., p. 316
14. Ibid, pp. 85-95
Rozakis, op. cit., pp. 298-301
15. For the full text see Wilson, op. cit., p. 119 and Rozakis, Ibid, pp. 298-299
16. They were interrupted in September
follow most other countries in extending its territorial waters to twelve miles. Although Turkey had extended its territorial waters in the Black Sea and in its south coast to twelve miles, both countries continue to observe a six-mile territorial sea limit in the Aegean (See Map 3.2). If Greece and Turkey extend their territorial waters to twelve miles, the continental shelf dispute will be largely solved in Greece's favour (63.9% of the Aegean would become Greek territorial sea). Furthermore and as a result of such a development, according to the Turks, "the whole Turkish sub-continent would practically be suffocated" from the Mediterranean. Thus, they have declared in several occasions that they would regard an extension of the Greek territorial waters as a casus belli. In January 1982, for example, the - at that time - Turkish Premier Ulusu said:

"We do not like to use the word "war". This matter [extension of Greece's territorial waters] is of vital importance to Turkey. Whoever wishes to understand will understand what we mean. On no account we will accept a 12-mile limit in the Aegean. It is a matter of great interest to Turkey. We are categorically decided not to accept a fait accompli."  

In 1985, Ozal, Turkey's Prime Minister, reiterated his country's position:

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17. Wilson, op. cit., p. 99
18. Ibid, p. 126
"We will not recognise any *faits accomplis*... We will take the necessary actions and if these lead to a hot situation, all right".  

The third aspect of the dispute between Greece and Turkey concerns air-traffic control over the Aegean Sea. Under an agreement reached by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), Flight Information Regions (FIR) limits of its member countries in Europe were drawn up with regional air navigation plans in Paris (1952) and in Geneva (1958). The whole of the Aegean airspace had been placed under the control of the Athens FIR whose eastern extremity coincided with Greece's land and sea frontiers with Turkey. In 1974 Turkey questioned this decision by issuing Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) 714, which required that all flights crossing the Aegean median line to an easterly direction to report to the Turkish air traffic control (Istanbul FIR). Greece refused to accept NOTAM 714 and, a few days later, by issuing NOTAM 1157, declared the Aegean area of the Athens FIR "dangerous because of the threat of conflicting control orders". As a result, all direct international flights in the Aegean were suspended till 1980 when Turkey, confronting problems with its tourism resulting from the Greek reaction, withdrew NOTAM 714.

22. The Times, March 13, 1985
23. Wilson, *op. cil.*, pp. 100-101
24. Threat in the Aegean, *op. cil.*, p. 25
25. Veremis, Th., *op. cil.*, p. 15
However, for the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs this did not mean that Turkey was "abandoning any of its rights in the airspace, the sea and the continental shelf of the Aegean". 27

Turkey has also raised questions involving the use of the Aegean airspace for military exercises and sought the reduction of Greece's airspace from the ten nautical miles established in 1931 to six, the limit of her territorial seas. 28 The first issue concerns the disagreement on the operational control of the Aegean airspace through the establishment of a new NATO headquarters in Larissa. This issue will be examined in the next chapter. The second is particularly important since it is related to the Turkish bargaining tactics. Thus, "whenever the Greeks have stalled in the talks with Turkey about their disputes in the Aegean, the Turks have sent their jets zooming across airspace in the Aegean claimed by Greece to persuade the Greek government to return to the negotiating table". 29 These violations of the Greek airspace have continued uninterruptedly in the period 1975-1986. 30 Since March 1980, Turkish fighters have also started to violate the Athens FIR. 31

26. Threat in the Aegean, op. cit., p. 25

27. Rozakis, C., op. cit., p. 383

28. Clogg, R., op. cit., p. 135

29. The Economist, December 11, 1982, p. 52


31. Ibid
The fourth aspect of the Greek-Turkish dispute has to do with the militarization of the eastern Aegean islands by Greece in the period which followed the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The eastern Aegean islands were ceded to Greece by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) with the exception of the Dodecanese which was ceded to her at the end of World War II (Treaty of Paris, 1947). Greece justified its action of militarization on grounds of national security which it felt that was threatened by the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the formation of the "Army of the Aegean" by Turkey whose reported numbers approached those of the entire Greek Army, (140,000 men according to the Greeks)\(^\text{32}\) and the stationing of a substantial number of landing craft in harbours close to the Greek islands (a fleet of 147 vessels according to the Greek government - the biggest landing naval force in NATO)\(^\text{33}\). The Turkish reactions resulted in conflicting interpretations of the Treaties of Lausanne (1923), Montreux (1936)\(^\text{34}\) and Paris (1947)\(^\text{35}\). A rel-

\(^{32}\) Institute for Political Studies, *Greece's Security Problems*, Athens, p. 3 (Distributed by the Greek Embassy, London)


\(^{33}\) Institute for Political Studies, *Ibid*

\(^{34}\) Clogg (*op. cit.*, pp. 127-128) writes: "It can be argued that the Aegean Army is in fact a training army of a mere two brigades (...). Moreover, seen from the Turkish perspective, the landing craft, which currently appear to menace the Greek islands, would be needed in time of war to reinforce Turkish forces in Eastern Thrace from Anatolia. What is more, Turkey lacks the air superiority that would be the indispensable precondition of any strike against the islands (...)"; Furthermore, official American sources also disagree with the Greek estimates. A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the US Senate (*Turkey, Greece and NATO: The Strained Alliance*, Washington, D.C.: USGPO, March 1980, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 57) claims that the Turkish Aegean Army has just 35,000 men.

\(^{35}\) According to the Greek argument the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne for the Greek Aegean islands were annulled by the Treaty of Montreux (Economides, Constantin P., *La Pretendue de Demilitarisation de l'Ile de Lemnos*, *Revue Hellenique de Droit International*,
tively new development concerns the island of Lemnos whose defence was not included in the scenarios of a series of NATO exercises in the Aegean because of Turkish claims that it could not be militarized. This particular problem which caused considerable tension both at the bilateral as well as at the multilateral level, will be examined in detail in the next chapter.

Another issue which considerably contributed to the deterioration in post-1974 Greek-Turkish relations is the Cyprus question. As a gateway to the Middle East and as an outpost of Greek culture, Cyprus has an economic, political and emotional appeal for Greece. The Cyprus problem has been a source of tension in Greek-Turkish relations for more than thirty years.\(^37\) Its population is composed almost entirely of Greek and Turkish communities (77% Greek-Cypriots and 18% Turkish-Cypriots according to the last reliable census in 1960). The Cyprus question developed through the demand of Greek-Cypriots under British rule for enosis (union) with Greece.\(^38\) However, the unworkability of the island's constitutional machinery - which was established by the Zurich and


38. The Turkish-Cypriot demand for laksim (partition of the island between the 'motherlands') developed mainly as a response
London agreements when Cyprus became independent in 1960 - as well as the Greek-Cypriot aspirations for enosis led to a series of incidents of intercommunal violence. Furthermore, when the military regime in Athens decided to sponsor a coup in July 1974 by the pro-enosist forces, Turkey, fearing for the fate of the Turkish-Cypriot community, intervened: Turkish troops invaded the island in the Kyrenia area. After a first cease-fire fighting was resumed and within three days Turkey occupied almost 40% of the island's territory. Some 200,000 Greek-Cypriots, almost a third of the island's population, became homeless as they fled before the Turkish advance. The Turkish "Federated State of Cyprus" which was proclaimed unilaterally in 1975, claimed to administer about 36% of land area of the island. A United Nations Peace Keeping Force (UNFICYP) still remains in the island and a UN buffer zone was established by dividing the Turkish-Cypriot controlled from the Greek-Cypriot part of the island (Map 3.3). The military presence of the Turkish Army in the North of Cyprus and the Turkish Anatolian immigrants who came to the island after 1974 contributed to the further deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations. Since 1974 intercommunal talks under the aegis of the UN have made little progress towards a solution. In February 1977, the leaders of the two Cypriot communities Makarios and Denktash adopted a set


40. A force of 25,000 men according to the Economist (November 19, 1983, p. 63)

41. Their number is controversial. Greek-Cypriot sources talk of 40,000 to 50,000 immigrants while Turkey rejects the charge by affirming that there has only been an influx of technicians to rebuild the occupied area
of guidelines for a solution of the Cyprus problem. The document defined their efforts as a search for "an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal federal republic" with each community administering its own area. Issues like the freedom of movement and the return of refugees were left open for discussion. In 1979, the new Greek-Cypriot leader, Kyprianou, and Denktash signed a 10-point protocol in which they agreed to resume negotiations. Confronting the talks' deadlock the UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim presented a document called "Guidelines for the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Cyprus" which was accepted by both sides although the Greek-Cypriots did so with some reservations. The reason was that the UN's guidelines embodied the basic Turkish demand: the physical separation of the two ethnic groups.

The last and least important issue in Greek-Turkish relations involves minority questions. There is a Greek-Orthodox minority remaining in Turkey which numbers approximately 10,000 and a Muslim minority in Greece (Western Thrace) which numbers nearly 130,000. In the 1974-1986 period there were allegations of alleged discrimination and persecution by both Greece and Turkey. Greece emphasizes the role of the Turkish government in encouragi-

42. For the full text see The Cyprus Problem: Historical Review and Analysis of Latest Developments, Nicosia, Cyprus: Press and Information Office, Ministry of Interior, p. 27
43. For the full text see Ibid, p. 78
45. Ibid
ing the September 1955 anti-Greek riots in Istanbul which resulted to the emigration of tens of thousands of Greeks as well as the responsibility of the Turkish authorities for discriminatory legislation (confiscation of property and mass expulsions) that violated the minority provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).47 Greece claims that because "reciprocity" (a numerical balance and identical treatment of the minority groups on each side) is established by the Treaty, Turkey has no right to talk about a "suppression" of the rights of the Moslem minority in Western Thrace. The latter's population, they contend, has increased substantially since the 1920s. Nevertheless, the Turks reject this view, arguing that there is a semi-official policy aimed at weakening communal institutions and at inducing the Moslem population to leave Greek territory (confiscation of land and cultural isolation).48 However, the complaints come mainly from the leaders of the local Moslem community; for Turkish diplomacy the issue is of minor importance.

II

Policies

The position of NDP's governments on the Aegean dispute was to seek consistently a peaceful settlement in the context of a

47. For the Greek point of view see Minorities: Facts and Figures, Published by the Institute for Political Studies, Athens

dialogue. This was not by any means "a policy of concessions through negotiations" as an author has argued, but a policy aiming at avoiding situations that might give rise to unilateral acts. This policy was being criticised by Papandreou (the leader of the opposition) who accused the conservatives of negotiating with Turkey on issues which implied the yielding of "national territory". For the leader of PASOK the new socialist government would make clear "both to neighbours and to the Atlantic Alliance that [Greece's] land, sea and air borders as well as the Greek continental shelf limits in the Aegean are not negotiable - they are safeguarded by international agreements and treaties as well as by international practice". In November 1981, presenting the Greek government programme to the Parliament, the socialist PM said that a "dialogue with Turkey could have meaning and could produce results only insofar as it [did] not concern concessions". Thus, Greece posed as a precondition for a dialogue the respect by Turkey of the status quo in the Aegean. Not unexpectedly, Papandreou cancelled all the scheduled bilateral meetings of diplomats. This tactic was not so radically different


51. Coufoudakis, V., *op. cit.*, p. 381

52. *Keeping's Contemporary Archives*, p. 31263

from that of the conservatives: in a sense, the break off of the dialogue was the legitimisation of its impasse. After all, six years of meetings between Greek and Turkish officials had only resulted to "agreements of disagreement". However, former Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tzounis, rejects this view: "Sweden and the USSR were negotiating for twenty years on the delimitation of the Baltic Sea continental shelf. Why not we?". Nevertheless Papandreou's approach was short-lived as Turkish aircraft intensified the violations of air-space claimed by Greece as well as of the Athens FIR. Indeed, Papandreou's decision for the break off of the dialogue was the reason behind the Turkish dramatic response. The Turkish violations urged Papandreou to change his tactics. Thus, in July 1982 - after a Greek initiative - the two states agreed on a moratorium according to which they would abstain from provocative statements and actions for an indeterminate period. The objective of the moratorium was the creation of a climate appropriate for new talks on the issues affecting the two countries. Nevertheless, in October 1982, the Greek government insisted that there was no dispute and saw in the proposal of the Turkish Foreign Minister Turkmen for the definition of a framework for future Greek-Turkish negotiations, "a con-
tinuation of Turkey's revisionist attitude". In addition, the moratorium was suspended in November 1982 when Greece called off a scheduled meeting of the two countries' Foreign Ministers in Brussels protesting against a NATO exercise excluding the defence of the Greek island of Lemnos and the violation of air-space claimed by her. In November 1983, the declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see infra) led Greece to the decision to stop the bilateral negotiations with Turkey on economic and tourist matters which had started in the summer of the same year. For NDP's MEP Tzounis, the initiation of these discussions was a serious mistake since "a dialogue on economic matters is for the benefit of Turkey and should be used by the Greeks as a bargaining chip". For two years the Greek-Turkish relations confronted a serious impasse marked by the almost total absence of bilateral contacts. In 1985, the Greek government "institutionalised, in a sense" the dispute between the two countries by creating a new Ministry of the Aegean. In the meantime, repeated offers of an "olive branch" by the new (since December 1983) Turkish PM, Ozal, were rejected by the Greek socialists. According to Papandreou, Greece "would open a

58. *Keeling's Contemporary Archives*, p. 31263

59. Sazanithis, Chr., Greece-Turkey-NATO, *op. cit.*, p. 34

60. Institute for Political Studies, *op. cit.*

61. Interview in Athens, *op. cit.*


63. *Keeling's Contemporary Archives*, p. 34636
dialogue with Turkey] under two conditions - withdrawal of the Turkish occupation forces from Cyprus and the acknowledgement by Turkey of the status quo in the Aegean". Indeed, Greece's rejection of a dialogue provoked the Turkish reactions: The violations of the Greek 10-mile national air-space limits by Turkish fighters broke any pre-1981 record. As Greek fighters tried to stop them, some analysts, based on scenarios of hot-blooded pilots, talked even of a war by accident: what would happen if, say, a trigger-happy Greek pilot downed a Turkish fighter? Indeed, as the means for direct communication between the two governments under conditions of crisis (i.e. a red phone lines) did not exist, the escalation from an isolated incident to a general war could not be deemed improbable.

The NDP governments (1974-1981), headed by Karamanlis and Rallis, while expressing strong sympathy for the Greek-Cypriot positions had consistently argued that the solution of the island's problems was essentially a matter for the two communities themselves. Thus, the doctrine of the "National Centre" (Greece's right to dictate Greek-Cypriot policy) was abandoned by the first two post-junta Greek governments for the sake of the policy of "Cyprus decides, Greece supports". However, the Greek involvement in Cyprus, at least intensified, if not re-emerged since

64. The Times, December 20, 1986
65. Sazanithis, Chr., Greece-Turkey-NATO, op cit., pp. 47-55
67. Souter, D., op cit., p. 672
Papandreou gained power in 1981.

For the new Greek PM, the Cyprus question was "primarily one of foreign occupation" and "a vital national issue" for Greece, which had "a legal right and a duty actively to support the Cypriot people's struggle for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, for the safeguarding of free settlement and movement, and for the shaping of a constitutional charter which, while consolidating the unity and independence of the Republic of Cyprus, will give equal rights to all its citizens, to both the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots". Almost immediately after PASOK's victory, President Kyprianou of Cyprus flew to Athens for discussions with the new government, in the course of which "a complete identity of views" on the Cyprus problem was expressed.

In addition, the annual level of Greek economic aid to Cyprus increased from 1,250 to 2,000 million drachmae - to the equivalent of $34,500,000. Papandreou became (February 1982) the first Greek Prime Minister ever to visit Cyprus, where he emphasized that he made an "absolute separation" between the Greek state and Cyprus. "Cyprus is an independent state, a member of the United Nations" said Papandreou in the Cypriot Parliament. "We respect

68. Keeling's Contemporary Archives, p. 31263
69. Ibid
70. Ibid
71. Jansen, Michael, Controversial Visit, Middle East International, No 176, March 17, 1982, pp. 7-8
72. Keeling's Contemporary Archives, p. 31602
this independence", he added, "and we are fighting for it". Referring to the intercommunal talks, the leader of PASOK argued that they "were taking place under unequal conditions" - "in the dynamic military presence of the occupational forces" - and that "the great issue [was] the international aspect" which was characterised "not only by occupation but by a continuing threat". Thus, the Greek PK was understood to remain sceptical of the outcome of the intercommunal talks as long as Turkish troops occupied the northern part of the island, and to favour an "internationalisation" of the Cyprus question. As a result, in the beginning of 1982, the former Chancellor of West Germany, Willy Brandt, was invited to mediate and his proposals were partially accepted by Kyprianou. However, in late spring 1982, it became apparent that differences over diplomatic tactics existed between Athens and Nicosia. The tension increased when it was revealed that the Cypriot President had made, so as to secure his re-election, an electoral alliance with the pro-Soviet Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL) which accused Papandreou of "gross

73. Speech in the Cypriot Parliament, February 29, 1982 (General Secretariat for Press and Information
74. Ibid
75. Ibid, p. 107
76. Souter, D., op. cit., p. 672
77. Ibid
Hudson, H.V., ed., The Annual Register, 1982: A Record of World Events, London, p. 177
interference" in Cypriot affairs. 79

According to this compromise the formula of "internationalisation" (which did not leave any role to the Soviet Union) was abandoned for the sake of the continuation of direct intercommunal talks under the aegis of the UN (where Moscow could exert more influence). 79 Thus, the application of PASOK's foreign policy aspirations in relation to the Cyprus problem was hindered by the reaction of the Cypriot government. However, Kyprianou immediately after the Cypriot elections turned in favour of a vigorous international campaign. 81 In April 1983 he visited Athens. Speaking to reporters, the Greek PM said that there was now an "absolute identity of views" between Greece and Cyprus both in respect of the strategy as well as in respect of tactics, and that there were "new possibilities and new prospects opening up within the UN framework", with "a new mobility to the Cyprus issue". 82 Hence, in May 1983, the UN General Assembly adopted by an overwhelming majority a resolution which demanded the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from the island. 83 Turkish-Cypriots were infuriated. 84 In November, the Turkish-Cypriot leader Denktash called an emergency session of his own Assembly

79. Ibid
80. Dimitras, P., op. cit., p. 123
81. The Annual Register, 1983, op. cit., p. 170
82. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 32295
83. For the full text see The Cyprus Problem, op. cit., pp. 84-87
84. Ibid, p. 37
The Annual Register, 1983, op. cit., p. 170
which declared an independent "Turkish Republic of North Cyprus" (TRNC), a move that provoked an outrage in both Greece and Cyprus.\(^8^6\) Turkey, although taken by surprise, was the first and only state which recognised the TRNC.\(^8^6\) In 1984, the Security Council passed resolution 550 which condemned harshly the Turkish-Cypriot "secessionist actions".\(^8^7\) However, several peace efforts of the Secretary-General of the UN, Javier Perez de Cuellar, led to an impasse.\(^8^5\) In the meantime, faced with strong internal opposition, Kyprianou disbanded its alliance with AKEL.\(^8^8\) In 1985, the culmination of the UN efforts led to a draft accord outlining the structure of a new federal republic.\(^8^9\) According to the draft the central government would have a two-chamber parliament with 50-50 representation in the upper House and 30-70 in favour of the Greek-Cypriots in the lower while the two communities would have a great measure of autonomy to run their own affairs. However, in a high level meeting in New York, Mr Denktash argued that the draft was for signing and Mr Kyprianou (probably following the advice of the Greek government) said that it was for negotiation.\(^9^0\) The

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85. The Cyprus Problem, *Ibid*
The Annual Register, *Ibid*

86. The Annual Register, *Ibid*

87. For the full text see The Cyprus Problem, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-91


89. *Ibid*, p. 182

90. For the full text see Press and Information Office (Ministry of the Interior), *Turkish Policy on Cyprus and Efforts to Solve the Cyprus Problem*, 1986, Nicosia, Cyprus, pp. 85-91


91. The Annual Register, 1985, p. 175
Greek-Cypriot opposition parties blamed Kyprianou for the failure and called on him to resign. By the end of 1986, the gap between the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot positions remained totally unbridged. In general, in the twelve-year intercommunal negotiations, constitutional and territorial issues were discussed with the Greek-Cypriot side favouring a federation where the three freedoms (freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and right to property) would be respected and with the Turkish-Cypriot side insisting on a loose federation, on a confederation.

On the other side, Papandreou never decided to stop to exert influence on the Cyprus government. He tried to link the Aegean dispute to the issues which were related to the Cyprus question and in several occasions he declared that there could be no dialogue with Turkey without the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus. However, the Aegean dispute and the Cyprus problem are so closely connected that it is impossible for any Greek government to follow a separate strategy. No Greek party wishes to see, for example, any increase in the American military aid to Turkey, a fact which — according to the Turks — would have to follow concessions by the Turkish-Cypriots.

III

Constraints

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92. Ibid

93. See, for example, Greece: Background-News-Information, Special Issue, May 24, 1985, Published by the Press and Information Office of the Greek Embassy in London, p. 3

94. The Economist, January 26, 1985, p. 55
Notwithstanding the political change of the ruling party of Greece in 1981 and despite rhetorical differences both the conservative and the socialist governments have chosen policies towards Turkey which resemble much to each other. This resemblance is a result of the constraints that Greek governments think that they have to respect. Thus, the continuous tensions that characterise Greek-Turkish relations since 1973 created a political consensus in Greece about Turkish objectives that cut across ideological lines. The basis of this consensus is that Turkey is pursuing revisionist objectives in both the Aegean and Cyprus and that it presents a vital threat for Greece. For the Greek foreign policymakers, Turkish policies towards Greece are the result of long-term planning. According to Papandreou:

"The expansionist strategy of Turkey contains immediate, short-term and long-term targets. Immediate target is the creation of the preconditions for demands in the context of a dialogue (....) Short-term targets of Turkey are: Demands for joint sovereign rights in the Aegean airspace; for the bisection of the continental shelf; for the joint suverainty of the petroleum; for the demilitarization of the Aegean Sea islands. In parallel, the completion of the cycle of invasion, occupation and of illegal declaration [of the Turkish-Cypriot state] with the de facto bisection of Cyprus. A long-term Turkish target is to dispute territorially an island of the Aegean and part of Western Thrace".**

95. Speech in PASOK's First Congress (1984) (Published by KEMEDIA/PASOK, 1985, p. 12)
Moreover, the Greeks believe that as the Greek-Turkish agenda included a multiplicity of issues, Turkey by showing preference for a "package deal" could show "flexibility" by backing down on some secondary issues and in turn demand similar "flexibility" on the part of Greece.**

The Turkish claims for a demarcation line for the Aegean continental shelf midway between the Greek and the Turkish mainlands is the main source of the Greek fears. Athens see this demarcation line as a direct threat to the security of the Greek islands lying east of it. The Greeks fear that Turkey could then justify the installation of an economic zone which could be followed by a security zone in the seas surrounding the islands.*** The Greeks hold the view that the Aegean Sea is an entity together with the Greek mainland and with increased regional penetration the Turks could interfere with Greek internal sea and air communications.** As a result, the Greeks believe that the acceptance of the Turkish demands in relation to the Aegean continental shelf would in effect isolate most major Greek Aegean islands whose sovereignty would be threatened. The Greek fears about the security of the islands have intensified after "aggressive" statements by Turkish politicians. For example, in 1976, the then Turkish PM, Mr Suleyman Demirel said:

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Interview with Ioannis Varvitsiotis, Athens, March 17, 1988


98. Ibid
"The islands of the Aegean Sea? These islands have been in the possession of Ottomans for more than 600 years. Nobody would want me, in my capacity as a Turk (....) to call the islands of the Aegean Sea "Greek islands"."

A similar statement was made by Turkey's PM Ozal in 1983. In 1986, the former Turkish PM Bulent Ulusu said in the Turkish Parliament:

"If Greece does not accept the reality and continues to put pressure on Turkey in the Aegean, sooner or later we shall be forced to break the suffocating blockade that the islands impose on Turkey (...) Enough of concessions to Greece at the expense of Turkey. The Aegean is Turkey's lung. As a man cannot live without breathing, so Turkey cannot live without the Aegean."

Furthermore, Ozal said in an interview in the same year that Cyprus "had never been Greek" and that "if you want to call the island something it is more Turkish than Greek."

Indeed, what really matters is not so much the 'real' content of these quotations - it could be argued that some of them were directed to Turkish public opinion and did not represent Turkey's foreign policy objectives while others had more to do with bargaining tactics than with strategic targets - but the way in which they were perceived by the Greeks. Papandreou, as his conservative

99. The Economist, July 3, 1982, p. 3

100. Financial Times, December 6, 1983

101. Greece: Background-News-Information, No 10, June 19, 1986 (Distributed by the Greek Embassy in London)

102. International Herald Tribune, June 2, 1986
predecessors, viewed them as evidence of Turkey's "expansionism": "We already have a whole book of statements by leaders and of political parties of Turkey [as well as] a dossier of violations of the sovereignty of our country [during] the last eight years" said the leader of PASOK in 1982 "and on the basis of this data we document the existence of a threat against the Greek nation".  

A key question arises to those who study the Greek-Turkish strained relations: Which are the 'real' Turkish objectives? Is there any rationale in collecting 'aggressive' statements of Turkish politicians as a PASOK's MP told me that he was doing? Are the Turkish demands justified to a certain extent in the eyes of Greek decision-makers? "The distribution of the Aegean continental shelf in strict accordance with the equidistance principle is unfair for Turkey" the former DG of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tzounis, told me. Another prominent figure of NDP shared his view. Even PASOK seemed to recognise - by supporting the submission of the issue to the ICJ's adjudication - that there was the possibility that in a future solution the islands' continental shelf could be taken not in full account.

A certain understanding of Turkish actions existed also in rela-

103. Speech to the Greek Army Offices in Serres, June 13, 1982 (General Secretariat for Press and Information, Speeches..., op. cit., p. 15)
104. Interview with S. Anastassakos, Athens, March 16, 1988
105. Interview in Thessaloniki, op. cit.
106. Interview with I. Varvitsiotis, op. cit.
107. Rozakis, Chr., op. cit., pp. 324-327
tion to the Cyprus question. Although, on the one hand, all Greek politicians considered the Turkish invasion as "totally unjustified", as a "crude violation of international law" and as a "brutal action", they did not stop, on the other hand, to blame the Greek junta for its "stupid coup d'état" that overthrew Makarios and led to the intervention of the Turkish army. Are then the Greek perceptions of a Turkish threat misperceptions? There is no doubt that Turkey is disputing things that Greeks perceive as Greek. So to this extent the Greek perception of a Turkish threat is true. Someone could argue that the Greeks have erroneous and overexaggerated perceptions of the Turkish long-term objectives. There is very limited evidence, however, to dispute these Greek perceptions. Interestingly, the future geopolitics of the region reinforce the Greek fears.

As Greece fears that Turkey is attempting through military and political pressure to change the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean, the question in Greece is how the country could defend its territory more effectively. The build-up in tension between the two states had been reflected in much increased defence expenditures with both sides regarding the Aegean as the most likely area of potential conflict. In the wake of the 1974 crisis, for example, Greece and Turkey registered the highest increases in military expenditures of all the member countries of the NATO alliance. Since then both countries have continued an arms race whose cost is estimated at an average 7% of the GNP for

Greece and 5% of the GNP for Turkey. However, although the Greeks had the edge in sophisticated arms and planes, the Turkish army was NATO's largest in Europe. In 1986, Turkey could array for battle 654,400 conscripts and 1,085,000 reservists while Greece only 209,000 and 404,000 respectively. What worried more the Greek army officers were Turkey's population growth rates. Thus, by the year 2000 Turkey will have a population of 67 million people (1986: 54 million). And this with the precondition that its rate of growth will be reduced from 2.6% in the period 1980-1985 to an estimated 1.9% for the period 1986-2000. On the other side, Greece's population by the year 2000 will remain at the same level (10 million). Turkey used demography as a bargaining chip. Hence, Ozal argued in 1986:

"(...) we have said to the Greeks, we have been very patient and our patience has its limits: we should discuss the problems between us and solve them. In the past Turkey was weak and Greece had confidence in herself. Today Turkey is all-powerful and the Greeks know that, but they have no faith in themselves and reject

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109. Ibid, Various Issues
110. Noyon, J., op. cit., p. 96
By the year 2000 the Turkish army would array 771,000 soldiers and Greece 190,000 (Clark, Susan L., Who will Staff NATO?, Orbis, Fall 1988, p. 523)
114. Ibid
our proposals, because Turkey is becoming very powerful. Greece sees that; there are 52 million Turks and only 9 million of you; we say come and sit down and talk about things, but don’t abuse our patience”.

Greece is a far richer country than Turkey. In 1986, its GDP per head was more than five times higher than the Turkish one. Nevertheless, some Greek politicians pointed out that the economic gap between the two countries was being constantly reduced in the 1981-1986 era: Turkey’s rate of growth of its GDP per head in this period was three times higher than that of Greece.

According to Couloumbis and Wolfe, “the degree of influence that a country wields in regional and global politics is directly related to the degree of national cohesiveness it embodies”. Here Greece has the advantage. In a ranking of 135 world countries by ethnic homogeneity it occupies the 33rd position with 90% of ethnic homogeneity while Turkey the 60th with 75%. Thus, Turkey’s reluctance to recognise officially a population of 6 to 8 million Kurds as a distinct ethnic group living in the eastern provinces of the country considerably weakens the country’s


117. Ibid. p. 42

118. Couloumbis, Theodore and James H. Wolfe, op. cit., p. 49

119. Ibid. pp. 45-46

demographic advantage over Greece. The Kurdish unrest fuelled by the Marxist-Leninist Kurdish Workers' Party has resulted in armed clashes with the Turkish army and has cost hundreds of lives since 1984. 121 Due to the Kurdish unrest, Turkey has to keep a large part of her Armed Forces away from the Greek borders, in her eastern provinces. The Kurdish problem has undoubtedly led Greek politicians to perceive a lesser threat from Turkey.

In general, any solution of the Greek-Turkish dispute seems improbable in the near future. Greece's perception of a "Turkish threat" is so much deep-rooted in the country that it can only be altered by a spectacular change of Turkey's positions. However, given the strong continuity in Turkish foreign policy, 122 any development of that kind could only result from a foreign interference. And this is very unlikely as we will see in the next chapters. However, misperceptions between Greece and Turkey do exist and they are particularly apparent in the cultural sphere. According to a Western journalist "Greeks regard the Turks as bullies and Turks regard the Greeks as cheats". 123 Furthermore, although the Ottoman authorities made the teaching of Turkish compulsory in all minority schools in the empire in 1894, Greek schoolbooks write that underground schools conducted by the Orthodox clergy kept the Greek language and culture alive in all the 400 years of Ottoman rule. 124 Similarly, in the Turkish city of

123. Mackenzie, K., op. cit., p. 3
Izmir, the Turkish citizens argue that the fleeing Greek troops in the 1922 war set fire to half of the city while the truth is that the fire was set by Turkish soldiers.\textsuperscript{125} Although it could be argued that "historical memories affect the substance, direction, quality and intensity of foreign policy"\textsuperscript{126} and that these misperceptions were only drops in an ocean of memories of conflicts, there is no doubt that cultural images play a comparatively insignificant role in the relations between the two countries. After all, the existence of a similar cultural mistrust between the Greeks and the Bulgarians did not hinder a rapprochement between the two countries.\textsuperscript{127}

IV

Conclusion

Greek-Turkish relations in the post-1974 era were strained. According to the Greeks, Turkey was disputing their country's territorial integrity. In fact, in this period, there was a political consensus in Greece that the countering of the Turkish "threat" should be the top priority of her foreign policy. In a sense, there were no Greek-Turkish relations in the post-junta era but only Greek-Turkish problems. The agenda of the dispute between the two countries included a multiplicity of issues. The most impor-

\textsuperscript{124} Clogg, R., \textit{op. cit.}, p. 142

\textsuperscript{125} \textit{The Economist}, A Survey of Turkey, June 18, 1988

\textsuperscript{126} Coulombris, T. and J.H. Wolfe, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 104

\textsuperscript{127} See Chapter 5
tant of them seemed to be the disagreement over exploitation rights of the Aegean continental shelf as well as the Cyprus question. The Greeks believed that the Turkish demands and actions in the Aegean and Cyprus were parts of a long-term plan based on Turkey's fastly growing population and inspired by the theory of "vital space", of a plan aimed at expanding Turkey's borders at the expense of Greece. The consistency of the Turkish demands and the consequent security dilemmas that they imposed on Greek decision-making processes is the main reason behind the dominance of continuity in Greek foreign policy towards this geopolitical milieu in the post-junta era: the governmental change in 1981 did not lead to changes in Greece's foreign policy objectives vis-a-vis Turkey. Even the limited change that the PASOK government brought to Greece's tactics (i.e. break off of the dialogue between the two counties) was due to its different perceptions not of the "Turkish threat" but of the methods to counter it. However, the maintenance of high defence spending by the PASOK government proves that diplomacy was, for Greek decision-makers, a secondary deterrent of Turkish "expansionism".

Since 1974, both Greece and Turkey have been conducting a vigorous political war for the support not only of their NATO allies but also of non-aligned countries and adversaries. But, above all, the Greek-Turkish dispute has influenced the bilateral relations of the two countries with the western superpower. In the next chapter we shall examine the consequences of this triangular relationship for Greece's foreign policy.
Area claimed for exploitation by Turkey on Nov. 1, 1973 and July 18, 1974

Research area claimed for MTA SISMIK 1, Sept. 1-25 1976

Airspace over which jurisdiction is claimed by Turkey
Map 3.2 Present Distribution of Territorial Seas in the Aegean (12 nautical miles)

Source: Wilson, A., op. cit.

Map 3.3 Cyprus Today

Source: Souter, D., op. cit.
Chapter 4

Greece, the United States and NATO

The Greek-Turkish dispute influenced Greece's role in NATO and her relations with the US. Although the Greek-American relations date back to the Greek civil war and the declaration of the Truman doctrine,¹ the scope of this chapter will be confined in the post-1974 era. The same period will apply in the case of Greece's NATO membership although both Greece and Turkey have been members of the alliance since the early 1950s.²

Our purpose in this chapter is twofold: first, to examine briefly the main issues of disagreement in Greek-American relations in the 1974-1986 period; secondly, to analyse the policy towards the US and NATO that was followed by the Greek socialists as well as the external constraints that the Papandreou government believed that it had to respect.

I

Background

¹ Goldblom, Maurice, United States Policy in Post-War Greece, in Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos, eds, Greece under Military Rule, London: Secker and Warburg, 1972, pp. 228-254

2. For the full text of Greece's accession see Valinakis, Yannis, An Introduction to Greek Foreign Policy, 1949-1974, Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 1988, pp., [In Greek]
Greece withdrew from the integrated military command structure of NATO in 1974, in protest against the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and in order to gain full control over its armed forces in the event of an open conflict with Turkey. This was important because NATO obliged Greece to deploy its army so as to face an eventual danger from the North - the communist countries. However, the NDP government found out soon that Greece's withdrawal from NATO's military wing was a serious mistake: Thus, although Greek representatives continued to participate in the Alliance's military and technical committees, Turkey by capitalising on the Greek absence from the Defence Planning Committee limited or even excluded Greek participation at meetings of the former. In 1980, the then Greek PM, George Rallis admitted indirectly that the Greek withdrawal was the wrong move: "We hoped", he said, "that with this move we would touch the world, at least the western world and that it would intervene". Ironically, it was NDP's anxiety over what she perceived as a threat from a NATO ally (Turkey) and not the original raison d'être of NATO (the Soviet threat) which prompted the Greek government in June 1977 to table a proposition for a special military relationship with the Atlantic Alliance.

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5. Greek Parliament Debates, October 22, 1980, [In Greek]
6. Verelis, Th., Greek Security, op. cit., p. 20
The proposition involved the reintegration of the Greek armed forces only in the case of an East-West conflict as well as the establishment in Larissa of a regional NATO headquarters under Greek command. However, deliberations on Greek reintegration moved slowly because of a Turkish veto against the return to the status quo ante (before Greece’s withdrawal) of operational responsibilities in the Aegean air-space. Several “compromise plans” presented either by the former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) General Alexander Haig or his successor, General Bernard Rogers, were rejected by the Greek government. Nevertheless, by the end of 1980, the new military government in Turkey changed its policy: the country’s new Foreign Minister Turkmen declared that Turkey would consider Greece’s reintegration first and then work for the delimitation of the operational boundaries over the Aegean. As a result, the negotiations on Greece’s re-entry into NATO’s military wing were completed in October 1980 when the alliance’s Defence Planning Committee approved the latest proposal which became known as the “Rogers plan”. The plan deferred the question of operational control arrangements for negotiations to be carried out after Greece’s re-entry.

7. Ibid

8. Ibid, p. 311-313

According to Papacosma (Greece and NATO, op. cit., p. 206) this change was due to domestic problems, geopolitical considerations and US pressure.

9. Ibid, p. 314

10. Although the full text of the Rogers Agreement officially remains secret, it has leaked to the Greek Press (The text is published in Valinakis, Yannis G., Foreign Policy and National Defence, 1974-1987: Greece in the East-West System, Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 1987,
sequently, Greece and Turkey had to begin bilateral negotiations for the delimitation of the command and control areas of the new NATO headquarters in Larissa and that of Izmir (Turkey).

The whole issue entered a new era with PASOK's victory in 1981. One of the first acts of Papandreou (who personally retained the Greek Defence Ministry) was to attend a NATO Defence Planning Committee meeting to announce what he described as a "process of disengagement" from the Rogers plan. Papandreou's decision to keep the Defence Ministry was, for most analysts, related to his policy of allaying concerns in the Greek military. However, the importance that the PASOK government attributed to the NATO framework proves that the socialist PM's decision was also related to his effort to take part in NATO meetings with an increased status and thereby attract attention to Greece's problems. Some authors have suggested that Papandreou would like to renegotiate the Rogers agreement. Indeed, NATO would be reluctant to enter into new talks that could tie the alliance's future to the changing domestic politics of its members. As a result, Papandreou's statement of a "partial suspension" of the Rogers plan caused significant embarrassment among Greece's NATO partners. Nevertheless, although the Greek socialists demanded a return to the NATO command structures that prevailed before 1974 and gave Greece complete air control in the Aegean (identical boundaries with these

11. The Economist, December 12, 1981, p. 57
12. See Chapter 11
of the Athens FIR), they continued to recognise as valid the other parts of the Agreement which, among other things, provided for fewer Greek forces under direct NATO command in time of peace.\textsuperscript{14} However, some portions of the Rogers agreement remained unimplemented: Papandreou insisted on the prior recognition of the pre-1974 status quo before the establishment of the new headquarters in Larissa.\textsuperscript{15}

A second issue in Greek-NATO relations concerns the Greek island of Lemnos; Greece has repeatedly insisted that NATO's attack scenarios in the Aegean Sea should include the defence of the island of Lemnos which lies 33 miles southwest of the Dardanelles. Turkey has vetoed the Greek demand in 1981 claiming that Lemnos could not be militarised short of violating international treaties (the Treaty of Lausanne, 1923). Greece, on the other hand, has consistently maintained that:

1. The Treaty of Lausanne has been superseded by the Treaty of Montreux (1936) that enables Greece to militarise the island, and
2. It is inconceivable to exclude part of its territory from the alliance's defence plans.

Given NATO's reluctance to include the defence of Lemnos in its attack scenarios because of Turkish reactions, Greece attempted to exert leverage on the alliance. Thus, since October

\textsuperscript{13} Noyon, Jennifer, Greeks Bearing Rifts, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 97

\textsuperscript{14} Papacosma, V., Legacy of Strife, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 315

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid}

\textsuperscript{16} McDonald, Robert, Greece after PASOK's Victory, \textit{The World Today}, Bol. 47 (7), July 1985, p. 136

Loulis, John, \textit{Greece under Papandreou: NATO's Ambivalent Partner}, Institute for European
1983 and with the support of all the Greek political parties, the PASOK government has boycotted the naval and air exercises by NATO forces in the Aegean area. When, at a NATO Defence Planning Committee meeting (1984), Papandreou attempted to increase pressure on Greece's NATO allies by offering to assign the Greek forces on Lemnos to NATO, Turkey used its power of veto; Greece retaliated by blocking the respective Turkish "country chapter" (NATO's assessment of national forces available to the alliance). As a result, no Greek or Turkish forces were committed to NATO in 1985 as well as in 1986 and Greece did not participate in any NATO exercises. However, because NATO continued to conduct its exercises in the Aegean and thereby Greek forces confronted the prospect of downgrading in the alliance's defence plans, Greece proposed in February 1985 that if NATO held all its manoeuvres in the Ionian Sea and in the Mediterranean which were in contrast to the Aegean areas free of dispute, Greece would feel able to participate. Although NATO rejected the Greek proposal, Greece took part in 1986 - for the first time after two years - in a NATO exercise which was conducted in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean while continuing to refuse to participate in manoeuvres in the

Defence and Strategic Studies, European Security Studies, No 3, 1985, p. 25

   *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, p. 34635

18. Sazanithis, Chr., Greece-Turkey-NATO, *op. cit.*, p. 85
   Valinakis, Y., Foreign Policy and National Defence, *op. cit.*, p. 155

19. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, p. 34635

Aegean. NATO officials have expressed fears that failure to resolve the disagreement over Lemnos could have disturbing consequences for the Alliance's efforts to brace the southern flank.

Another problem in Greek-NATO relations, a problem closely related to the Greek disappointment with the alliance's inability to include the defence of Lemnos in its attack scenarios, occurred in December 1984 when the Greek government announced a change in Greece's defence doctrine. According to this new doctrine, Greece would reorientate its armed forces away from its northern borders to confront the alleged Turkish threat. Although it is not clear what this meant in terms of redeployment of forces, diplomatic sources in Athens said that forces near the Turkish border and the eastern Aegean islands would be modernised more rapidly than other units. The new Greek Defence doctrine aroused some concern among Greece's allies in NATO. West Germany, for example, warned the Greek government that the new doctrine could result in an inhibition from continuing military aid to Greece.

22. Ibid
24. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 34635
25. Ibid
26. McDonald, R., op. cit., p. 136
27. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 34636

Greece was receiving about $70 million per annum in grant aid from West Germany (NATO's Six-
Thus, Greece asserted that in case of war she would fulfil her NATO obligations. 28

A third contentious issue in Greek-American relations has been the US military installations in Greece. In the aftermath of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus the then Greek conservative government had reduced the number of US bases on Greek soil from seven to four and placed them under direct Greek control. 29 Negotiations to update the 1953 treaty which had regulated the status of the American bases in the country begun in 1975 but have never been ratified when it became obvious that the previously negotiated (1976) US-Turkish Defence Co-operation Agreement (DECA) with which the Greek-American DECA was clearly linked, was not going to be ratified by the US Congress. 30 As Greece tried to use the negotiation of a base agreement with the American government as its "most important available bargaining chip" that it could link to the special relationship demanded from NATO and because of the 1980 presidential elections in the US, serious negotiations about the future of the American bases in Greece started in the first months of 1981 between the Rallis government and the Reagan administration prompted by the conclusion of a US-Turkish DECA in late 1980. 31 However, the negotiations were suspended again, beset


29. Couloubis, Th., Defining Greek Foreign Policy Objectives, op. cit., p. 176

30. For the full text see Valinakis, Y., Introduction to Greek Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 176

31. Couloubis, Th., The United States, Greece and Turkey, op. cit., p. 143
by bureaucratic delays and political uncertainty pending the outcome of parliamentary elections in Greece.

The great strategic importance of the American bases in Greece for both US and NATO cannot be denied. The most important of them is the complex at Souda, at the northwestern edge of the island of Crete. The Souda complex is a major support centre for the storage of fuel and ammunitions. The Souda bay deep-water port can accommodate nearly the whole US Sixth Fleet. The complex also includes an excellent airfield and a NATO missile-firing range. At Heraklion, on the northcentral coast of Crete, a centre for electronic surveillance is responsible for monitoring military activities of the Soviet Union in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Hellenikon air-base in Athens is used as a headquarters of but also as a support centre for the US Air Force. Finally, the Nea Makri base, outside Athens, houses a major naval communications centre which is part of the global US Defence Communications System and is directly connected with similar stations in southern Europe. In addition, located in various parts of the mainland and insular Greece are 8 smaller US communications facilities as well as 9 NATO NADGE (early warning) sites. There are also nuclear warheads stored in various parts of the country and designed to serve US and NATO purposes (164 according to reliable unofficial sources in 1985 compared with 489 stored in

32. Ibid
Turkey). In general, the US military installations in Greece occupy 3,500 civilian and military American personnel as well as 6,000 "dependants". They employ 2,500 Greeks and contribute with $70 million per annum to the Greek budget.

II

Policies

One of the first problems that PASOK had to confront after gaining power in October 1981 was the continuation of the negotiations with the Reagan administration on the status of the US bases in Greece. According to Papandreou's foreign policy statement to the Greek Parliament in November 1981, a "firm timetable" for the withdrawal of the American military installations from Greece would be put forward in early 1982. Nevertheless, when the negotiations began, Papandreou appeared to insist on four demands which did not differ from those asked for by the Rallis government in 1981:

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Congress, 2nd Session

34. The Guardian, December 18, 1986


36. Ibid

37. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 31363

38. Dimitras, Panayote, La Grece en Quete d'une Politique Independante, op. cit., p. 120

Veremis, Th., Greek Security, op. cit., p. 22

Couloumbis, Th., The US, Greece and Turkey, op. cit., p. 143

Coufoudakis, Van, Greek-Turkish Relations, 1973-1983, op. cit., p. 209

The Economist, July 3, 1982, p. 8
a) An American guarantee of the Greek eastern borders. However, this demand was dropped in August 1982, just before the beginning of a new round of talks. According to the Economist there where "two possible explanations" for this policy shift:

"Either Papandreou has decided that (...) he will press the Americans to tilt the balance of their arms supplies to Greece and Turkey in Greece's favour - rather than to press for a guarantee against Turkey. Or he still wants such a guarantee but believes it will be easier to achieve by getting Turkey to approve an unobtrusive agreement by NATO that alliance protection of member states against others covers attacks from other NATO members".

The first explanation seems to be more accurate: Papandreou had abandoned his call for a border guarantee by NATO, even of an "unobtrusive" character, in February 1982 during his visit to Bonn, "doubtless influenced by German reminders that such guarantees given to one NATO country against the other would make nonsense of the entire alliance".

b) Control of the operations of the American bases in Greece so as no information would be diverted to Turkey and a promise that the US military installations would not be used against some friendly Arab countries (e.g. for an operation of the Rapid Deployment Force which had been created in 1980 by the Carter Administration).

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Papacosma, Victor, Greece and NATO, op. cit., p. 210 and p. 212
40. The Economist, September 4, 1982, p. 54
tion and whose objective was to deter the control of the gulf by "a foreign power". Furthermore, a recognition of the right of the Greek government to limit or suspend their operation under particular circumstances.

c) A formal commitment by the American side for a quantitative as well as a qualitative balance in the military aid to Greece and Turkey. A 7:10 ratio (in favour of Turkey) was deemed enough by the PASOK government - it had also been perceived as satisfactory by all the post-1974 Greek governments - for the preservation of the balance of power in the Aegean. This formula of military aid had succeeded the 1975 arms embargo which was imposed on Turkey by the US Congress in response to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and lasted for three years. Since then, all Greek governments, facing what they perceived as Turkey's "expansionist" policies, have fought vigorously and successfully to maintain this unofficial American aid ratio. In general, US military aid includes Foreign Military Sales (FMS) which are loans attached to US prime rate for the purchase of American weapons, Military Assistance Program (MAP) grants as well as International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) grants. Consequently, although FMS loans constituted the bulk of the American aid to Greece, the

42. It has to be noted that Turkey had displayed a similar sensitivity when the Turkish-US DECA was being negotiated (Mackenzie, Kenneth, Greece and Turkey, op. cit., p. 10)


44. Institute for Political Studies, Balance of Power in the Aegean, Athens, (Distributed by the Greek Embassy in London)

grants were for her the most desirable form of assistance. What Papandreou meant with his demand for a qualitative balance with Turkey was the change of a situation where the Reagan administration was increasing the grants/loans ratio of US military aid to Turkey while that of Greece remained stable. (Table 4.1) Apart from the military aid, the US also were supplying third countries with economic aid in both loans and grants. Since 1968, as Greece was considered as a semi-developed country, the US economic aid to her was discontinued (between 1969 and 1983 it received American economic assistance - $65 million - in soft loans only in 1976). However, as Turkey was confronting acute economic problems, American economic aid to her started to increase. In the period 1979-1983 Turkey received $403.6 million in loans and $611.1 million in grants.

However, Papandreou's bargaining tactics differed from those of his conservative predecessors. The leader of PASOK tried to increase Greece's leverage on the US. Papandreou hoped that he could gain more concessions from the US if he followed a strategy of unpredictability. Thus, the PASOK government refused to negotiate the DECA within the NATO framework arguing that the US bases served only American interests and so that any agreement should have a purely bilateral character. According to Greek Alternate Foreign Minister Yannis Kapsis, the Greek government "wanted and


achieved the disengagement [from the NATO framework] because otherwise [it] should accept that the bases would stay in [the country as long as Greece remained in NATO. Secondly, the linkage with NATO would weaken [Greece's] demands for economic exchanges". Indeed, Greece's "complete disassociation from the concept that the bases serve[d] the NATO interests, that they [we]re NATO bases, or that they serve[d] mutual defence interests of the two countries" weakened, as former Director of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tzounis, has pointed out, the Greek bargaining position in relation to missions outside the NATO area.

In September 1983, Papandreou signed a five-year renewal agreement with the US comparable to those signed by the Americans with Philippines, Portugal, Spain and Turkey - a point that US officials have repeatedly made. The PASOK government continued to argue when the Agreement became public that, as it had claimed during the negotiations, the bases would be removed after the 5-year period. Indeed, in the Greek text of the 1983 Greek-US DECA, Article XII reads that the Agreement "is terminated" after five years. Nevertheless, the "equally authentic" English text states that the Agreement "is terminable" after 5 years. Logic, as


49. Cited by Valinakis, Y., Foreign Policy and National Defence, op cit., p. 319

50. I Kathimerini, January 1, 1984

51. For the full texts of the Agreement see Valinakis, Y., Foreign Policy and National Defence, op cit.
an author points out, supports the English version because "if a termination date had been set in advance, the agreement would automatically elapse" and the DECA's stipulation that "written notice must be given by either part five months prior to the date upon which the termination is to take effect" "would be unnecessary". However, Papandreou's eagerness to present the Agreement as one "of removal" did not only reflect the influence of domestic radicalising factors but also was the result of his negotiating tactics of "uncertainty". Indeed, the PASOK leader's often repeated intention for the closure of the American military installations by 1988 had been taken seriously by American defense officials who had begun to prepare contingency plans for their relocation.

In general, in the 1983 DECA, the American side did not commit itself to a continuation of the seven to ten ratio in military assistance to Greece and Turkey. However, the Americans gave a vague promise in Article VIII of the Agreement that US Assistance to Greece was to be "guided by the principle" in US law calling for preservation of "the balance of military strength in the region". Furthermore, the Papandreou government failed to ensure that there would be a qualitative rather than mainly a quantita-

52. Greek Parliament Debates
53. Loulis, J., Greece under Papandreou, op. cit., p. 22
54. Financial Times, February 3, 1986
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, pp. 34436-34437
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 34637
tive balance in the aid supplied. Nevertheless, according to the agreement, the Greeks could suspend the operation of the bases if "Greek national interests [were] at stake". Above all, Papandreou succeeded in getting greatly increased American military aid. Thus, Greece in the period 1974-1986 received $500 million in FMS loans per year and $4 million in IMET grants.

However, I believe that it is worth examining here the issue of the security guarantee of Greece's borders mentioned above. In October 1981, Papandreou told ABC television: "What we would, all of us, I think, the Greek people, prefer is (for there) to be a guarantee on our eastern frontiers"

In November 1981, addressing the Greek Parliament, the PASOK leader declared: "(there is) no meaning in our belonging to the military wing of an alliance which does not guarantee our eastern frontiers against any possible threat"

Nevertheless, the demand of an "eastern frontiers guarantee" was not a new one. The US had already given a vaguely worded guarantee to Greece in a letter by Secretary Henry Kissinger to the Greek foreign Minister in 1976: The US had promised that they would not stay neutral if there was any attempt to resolve any of the Greek-Turkish disputes by force. However, this personal

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The Economist, February 23, 1985, p. 50
56. NATO's Sixteen Nations, op. cit., p. 3
57. The Economist, September 4, 1982, p. 63
58. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 31263
59. The complete text is published in Bitsios, Dimitrios, Beyond the Borders, 1974-1977.
communication lacked the force of a binding legal contact. Some years later, the Rallis government (1979-1981) had also tried to obtain a US guarantee of Greece's frontiers with Turkey. Nevertheless, Papandreou initially made this demand an important part of Greece's bilateral relations with the US and the cornerstone of his policy towards NATO: In December 1981, he blocked the issue of a communique at a ministerial meeting of the NATO Defence Planning Committee (the first time that a communique was not issued in NATO's 32-year history) when his demand for a security guarantee was not satisfied when Turkey vetoed the Greek proposal fearing that the acceptance of such a document would imply the existence of a Turkish threat. In the same month, the Greek leader threatened to block the entry of Spain into NATO's military wing in a final but unsuccessful attempt to exert pressure for the acceptance of the Greek demand. Although Papandreou abandoned his demand for a few years, in 1986, in an interview to the Financial Times, he said that Greece might seek an EC guarantee: "The EC could say that the borders of each member country are protected. The phrasing could be very general, without specific reference to Greece. Then the Turkish threat would be over". However, the Greek PM expressed fears that West Germany "which [had] close links with Ankara, would [have been] likely to

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Athens: Hestia, 1982

60. Mackenzie, Kenneth, Greece and Turkey, op. cit., p. 11

61. Coulombris, Th., The United States, Greece and Turkey, op. cit., p. 143

62. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 31456
The Economist, December 12, 1981, p. 57
block such a move".

Finally, some other issues of minor importance where Papandreou differentiated the Greek foreign policy positions from those of Greece's western allies contributed to the deterioration of the her relations with them. These "marginal" issues increased the fears of PASOK's opponents that the Papandreou government would introduce a major shift in Greece's external relations. Although these positions will be examined in more detail in the next chapters it is worth mentioning them here:

a) Greece's refusal to participate in sanctions against the Soviet Union for the imposition of the martial law in Poland
b) Greece's demand for a six-month delay of the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles in Europe
c) Greece's enthusiastic endorsement of the idea of a Balkan nuclear-free zone
d) Greece's eagerness to support the European peace movement as well as Papandreou's "peace initiatives".
e) Greece's refusal to condemn the Soviet Union for the destruction of the South Korean airliner in August 1983.
f) Greece's reluctance to condemn the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
g) Greece's unwillingness to condemn the abuse of human rights in the Eastern Bloc countries.
h) Greece's extreme anti-Israeli stance and hyperbolic support for the PLO, and
i) Greece's unwillingness to co-operate with its western allies in the fight against international terrorism.
III

Constraints

All the NDP governments had evaluated their country's ties with the US and NATO through the prism of Greek-Turkish relations. The priority of the perceived Turkish threat continued to underlie the Greek foreign policy under Papandreou. This was clearly shown by the repeated demands in respect of a security guarantee of Greece's eastern borders. Greece's perceptions of her relations with NATO and the US continued to be based on six very important assumptions:

a) The United States is the country (or one of the few countries) that possesses the requisite leverage (should it wish to apply it) to change the Turkish attitudes in both the Aegean and Cyprus.

b) By remaining in NATO Greece can mobilise western support much more effectively in its efforts to discourage probable Turkish efforts to change the status quo in the Aegean and Cyprus.

c) The more Greece distances itself from the West, the more it risks the possibility that the US and other NATO countries will view Turkey as their more reliable ally. If, for example, the US bases in Greece were closed, the US would relocate its facilities in Turkey and Italy, the former being the more suitable location for the facilities currently maintained at the Souda complex.\footnote{63. \textit{Financial Times}, February 3, 1986}

Furthermore, Greece needs American loans to improve the strength
of its Armed Forces and, in particular, to pursue its plans for the modernisation of its Air Force. Thus, in 1985, the PASOK government ordered 40 F-16s and 40 Mirage 2000s at a cost of $2 bn to equal Turkey's purchase (1983) of 160 F-16s at a cost of $4 bn. The Greek purchase of the F-16s was partly financed by FMS loans. If the American military installations on Greek soil were shut down there would be no justification for these military credits. Moreover, the Greek Armed Forces need a steady flow of spare parts for their US-made weapons. As Dassault's vice-president, Pierre Francois, by presenting the advantages of the French Mirage-2000 for the Greek Air Force, put it:

"Greece needs a plane that is not subject to embargoes on its missiles, spares or ammunitions."

Thus, aiming at reducing the US leverage on her, Greece announced in 1986 that the purchase of the American F-16s would be undertaken directly with the manufacturers rather as a bilateral deal between the two governments as was usual in cases like that. Thus, whereas that it is a quite unlikely contingency that Greece's military capabilities will become self-sufficient in the next decade or two (90% of its aircraft fighters, 85% of its tanks and almost all of its heavy battleships are US-made) and

64. Loulis, J., Greece under Papandreou, op. cit., p. 21

65. McDonald, R., op. cit., p. 136

66. The Economist, February 19, 1983, p. 60

67. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 34637

68. Couloumbis, Th., The United States, Greece and Turkey, op. cit., p. 213fn

that a considerable part of its Armed Forces officers has been trained in the US in the use of modern weapons and are well versed in the American tactical doctrine\(^70\), Greece must avoid situations where the American aid and sales programme will affect the Greek-Turkish balance negatively.

d) A pursuit of a non-aligned option by Greece would discourage foreign investment in the country. According to an economist\(^71\) "it is conceivable that (...) the absence of [United States] investment in Greece would undermine the stability of the economy and lead to crisis". Furthermore, it would make it all the more difficult, under a severe economic crisis, to secure loans from western banks and restore business confidence. In the words of the Athens correspondent of the London's *Times:*

"A clean break with the West (...) could panic the business community at home (...) and provoke a massive flight of capital and people".\(^72\)

e) If Greece chose a non-aligned option Turkey would probably harden its positions in both Cyprus and the Aegean. In the words of PASOK's MEP Gazis, "Greece's withdrawal from NATO led to the creation of a new issue of dispute: of the problem of operational responsibilities in the Aegean".\(^73\)

f) It is very likely that a withdrawal from NATO and/or a closure

\(^{70}\) Loulis, J., *Greece under Papandreou*, *op. cit.*, p. 22


\(^{72}\) The *Times*, June 15, 1983

\(^{73}\) Alexandris, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 197
of the American military installations on Greek soil would make Greece much more vulnerable to probable external pressures (e.g. terrorism) and perhaps increase the Soviet threat posed through its northern neighbours.

By recognising all these assumptions both the conservative and socialist governments in post-junta Greece have followed a policy towards NATO and the US that can be summarised in two main points:
a) In sharp contrast to the "patron-client" period, Greece's commitment to western defence arrangements should not be taken for granted nor should it be expected to continue regardless of the costs to Greece's security. Part of this policy, whose objective was to develop Greece's freedom to manoeuvre, is mirrored in the NDP's decision to withdraw Greece from the military wing of NATO as well as in the "independent" attitude that Papandreou adopted within the NATO framework. The latter was described by NATO diplomats as "the foreign policy of the asterisks" because Greece, frequently joined by Denmark, expressed minority views in NATO communiques, views that were marked by an asterisk in the main text. Thus, Greece "reserved its position" on NATO's perception of Soviet "expansionism" expressed in declarations on Poland and Afghanistan, on dual-track decision for the modernisation of Intermediate Nuclear Forces in Europe, on NATO's views on security

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73. Interview in Varkiza, August 27, 1987


75. Coufoudakis, Van, Greek Foreign Policy, 1945-1985: Seeking Independence in an Interdependent World - Problems and Prospects, in Kevin Featherstone and Dimitrios K. Katsoudas, eds,
aspects of east-west trade and on the Alliance's positions on nuclear and space matters. Moreover, Greece's willingness to improve bilateral relations with the USSR, to strengthen cooperation with its Balkan neighbours and to cultivate closer economic ties with the Arab world indicated the attempt by both the NDP and PASOK governments to make the Greek foreign policy more flexible. Furthermore, Greece's entry into the European Community can be regarded in the same context. As a study mission report of February 1974 for the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs had commented rather prophetically:

"It would be highly unrealistic to think that the United States will ever be able to return to the comfortable patron-client relationship it enjoyed once in Greece."

b) Papandreou, like his conservative predecessors, adopted policies of modernisation of the Greek Armed Forces and tried to diversify Greece's sources of military supply. (See Table 4.2) The Greek armed forces' dependence on the US for military hardware was perceived to increase Washington's influence on the country's foreign policy. Thereby, Greece signed bilateral agreements for the co-operation in the field of armaments with France, Great Britain, Italy and Spain. Furthermore, the improvement of the domestic

Political Change in Greece: Before and after the Colonels, London: Croom Helm, 1987, p. 245

76. For the full texts of the communiques and declarations see Text of Final Communiques, Volume III. Issued by Ministerial Sessions of the North Atlantic Council, the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, 1981-1985, Brussels: NATO Information Office Texts of Communiques and Declarations, Issued after meetings held at Ministerial level during 1986, Brussels: NATO Information Office

arms industry and maintenance facilities (mainly the Hellenic Aerospace Industry) underlined the pursuit of policies which would reduce the reliance on a single provider of military equipment. In 1983, a Greek expert could argue proudly that "the Greek defence industry may be considered as similar to that of Turkey even though Turkish efforts started well before the Greek development programme". Furthermore, the Greek government expected that the infusion of technology and offsets resulting from the purchase of 40 F-16s would help the country's largely state-run arms industry that was running at a loss.

The US and NATO, forced into the role of intermediary in the Greek-Turkish dispute, were criticised sharply by the PASOK government for their alleged favouritism towards Turkey. Papandreou differentiated Greece's foreign policy positions from those of the US and of Greece's allies in NATO on a number of "marginal issues". Although the Greek socialists used these positions in order to satisfy domestic constraints, Papandreou aimed also at attracting foreign attention to Greece's problems. The PASOK government used these positions to make the Greek behaviour unpredictable and so to increase the leverage in her relations with the West. This was the main change that PASOK introduced in post-1974 Greek foreign policy towards the western superpower.

Furthermore Greece's attempt to preserve or reinforce its

78. To Vima, October 2, 1988, [In Greek]

79. NATO's Sixteen Nations, op. cit., pp. 142-162

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relations with other geopolitical areas influenced - usually negatively - its relations with the US. Thus, in July 1984, when the Greek government released - despite western intelligence reports - a Jordanian who had been arrested on suspicion of attempting to plant bombs on US and Israeli airlines travelling via Athens airport, the Reagan Administration threatened to block the sale of 16 secondhand ex-Norwegian F5 aircraft to Greece and divert them instead to Turkey. Although this was a political gesture since these airplanes were of little military or economic significance, it was one of the first signs that the US government was beginning to react with less restraint and more irritation to PASOK's foreign policy positions by thus abandoning the policy of "low profile image of Americans in Greece". As former Greece's supporters in the US Congress started to question the maintenance of the 7:10 ratio of American military aid for the benefit of "such a querulous ally", Papandreou decided to moderate his anti-American and often pro-soviet rhetoric. In an interview in the US in early 1985, for example, he said that the problems of the Greek-American relations were "a quarrel between

82. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 34637
83. The Annual Register, 1984, p. 175
Loulis, J., Greece under Papandreou, op. cit., p. 7
SIPRI Yearbook, 1985, op. cit., p. 366
The Economist, July 14, 1984, p. 58
84. US Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, op. cit., p. 37
85. SIPRI Yearbook, Ibid
friends (...) a quarrel in the context of western bloc". Following the Greek elections of June 1985, the PASOK's leader said in the Greek Parliament that his country's "allies could expect calmer seas" although "on fundamental questions that require[d] solution they would find [that Greece's] position remained unchanged". However, serious friction arose between Greece and the US a few days later, when the hijacking of the Athens to Rome TWA flight by Lebanese Shia Moslems led the US Administration to impose a tourist embargo, advising American citizens to avoid Athens airport for security reasons. Although the advisory notice was withdrawn a week later following a low-profile Greek official protest but also the improvement of the security of the airport, a mass cancellation of holidays in Greece by American tourists during 1986 cost the country about $ 300 million in foreign exchange. (Table 4.3) The American economic leverage reinforced by the serious economic problems that the Greek economy was confronting in its external accounts contributed to the de-

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Papers, No 229, Spring 1988, p. 83

87. Loulis, John, Where PASOK is Heading To ?, Epikentra, September-October 1985, p. 35

88. Greek Parliament Debates, June 22, 1985

89. EC Foreign Ministers criticised Greece on the same grounds (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 34637)
The Economist, June 29, 1985, pp. 59-60

90. The Economist, Ibid "It was as Mr Reagan had never spoken"

91. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 34637
Hatzis, S., op. cit.
Another analyst (Arkin, William M., Greece's Balancing Act, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1987, p. 11) writes that "some observers estimate that Greece lost $ 500 million in tourism revenues"
radicalisation of PASOK's foreign policy.

In the rest of 1985 and in 1986, Papandreou's anti-western rhetoric considerably declined. In July 1985, the US offered to Papandreou a "diplomatic sop" when Mr Robert Keeley, the new American Ambassador-designate to Athens, said in a Senate committee that US and Greece should get away from the "patron-client" relationship of the era after the second world war. Furthermore, Greek-American relations improved remarkably as many high level American officials visited Athens including Secretary of State Schultz in March 1986 while the two states signed important agreements on defence industrial co-operation and exchanges of information. As a result of the latter which committed both sides to protect military material and military information against leakage to unauthorised parties, the US Secretary of Defense granted approval for the Greek purchase of 40 F-16 fighter planes, an approval which had been delayed almost a year by US concerns that Greece might not keep a tight lid on secrets of the aircraft advanced technology. Finally, in 1986, a new American forward base was established in western Greece (Preveza) for the operation of the WE-3A US aircraft (AWACS).

However, the improvement of Greek-American relations did not

92. See Chapter 7
94. *Time*, April 7, 1986, pp. 18-19
*Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, p. 34637
96. *Ibid*
hinder the PASOK government from condemning the US air raid in Libya and Papandreou from refusing any concrete commitment on the continuation of the presence of the US bases on Greek soil after the elapse of the 1983 DECA in 1988. According to the Agreement, the US would have "a period of seventeen months commencing on the effective date of termination within which to carry out the withdrawal of United States personnel, property and equipment from Greece". Thus, the deradicalisation of Papandreou's foreign policy in relation to the US was only "marginal". The PASOK leader continued his tactics of uncertainty and unpredictability aiming at the increase of Greece's leverage towards the western superpower.

In general, US policy with regard to the Greek-Turkish dispute was based on the principle of "equal distance". Washington did not want to be perceived as favouring either the Greek or the Turkish views since both countries were valuable for serving its strategic interests in the region. In the words of a Report prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the US House of Representatives, "while encouraging any bilateral moves between Ankara and Athens to discuss their differences, the United States has not attempted to take a more active role as a mediator, nor did it try to take public positions on various bilateral disputes". Thus, in May 1982, during his visit to Ankara, the

97. US Military Installations in NATO's Southern Region, op. cit., p. 34
98. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 34638
99. Ibid, p. 34637
US Military Installations..., op. cit., p. 39
US Military Installations in NATO's Southern Region, op. cit., p. 39
US Secretary of State Alexander Haig said that his country had "no interest in mediating between Greece and Turkey". Three years later, during his visit to Turkey, the American Deputy Secretary of State, Michael Armacost, reiterated the US position: "We are decided", he argued, "to maintain our co-operation with both equally valuable allies. We do not want to interfere in the disputes between the two countries, though this has not been asked and we do not want to favour none of the two countries in their bilateral disputes".

However, two factors influenced US policy towards Greece and Turkey. The first was the growing importance that NATO strategists attributed to the defence of the southern flank of the alliance which started to be regarded as NATO's ulcerous underbelly. This perception that led to the conclusion that "the most likely threat of a Soviet initiative short of general war [was] (...) in the southern region" was based on eight significant developments:

1. The reinforcement of the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean

100. US Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, op. cit., p. 33
101. Borowiec, Andrew, op. cit., p. 139
102. To Vies, November 3, 1985

2. The revolution in Iran in 1978 and the more general growth of Islamic fundamentalism in Middle Eastern and North African countries.

3. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979

4. The Iran-Iraq war in 1980

5. The civil war in Lebanon and the Israeli invasion of the country in 1982

6. The US-Libyan confrontation in the Mediterranean

7. The death of Tito of Yugoslavia in 1980, and indeed

8. The Greek-Turkish dispute which had eroded the strength of NATO in the Mediterranean.

These regional developments were accompanied by a new administration in the US which was determined to strengthen the defence of the West and with the Greek elections of October 1981 which brought to power a party which had promised the closure of the American bases in the country. Thus, what was perceived by US analysts as a need for a strategic readjustment actually meant the shift of the centre of gravity of the defence of the southeastern flank towards Turkey because of her geographical proximity to the Middle East crisis. Internal developments in Turkey influenced positively this development: the revival of democracy and the market-oriented economic reforms in Turkey in 1983 added momentum to the already improving Turkish-US relations. According to an analyst, by mid-1980s "US enthusiasm for Turkey's military value [had] never been greater". In 1983, a Report prepared for the


US Congress argued that the main feature of the Reagan Administration's policy in the eastern Mediterranean was the development of "closer military ties with Turkey". Two years later, Richard Perle, the Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy, was stating:

"Turkey represents an important outpost of stability and security in an increasingly volatile region. Continued instability in Lebanon, the Iran/Iraq War, Radical Islamic Movements, insurgencies and terrorism with outside support and a growing Soviet presence are as much a security threat to the US and NATO as anything we face"

These developments influenced Greek-American relations. Since 1984, the Reagan administration started to propose (although unsuccessfully because of Congress reactions) increased military aid for Turkey arguing that the 7:10 ratio did "not reflect the two nations' relative military strength, size or contribution to NATO". Furthermore, in 1982, the two states concluded an Agreement for the upgrading of the American military installations on Turkish soil.

The growing strategic importance of Turkey for the US posed

106. US Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, op. cit., p. 37
108. Several factors explain the US Congress's attitude: first, the influence of the strong Greek-American lobby; secondly, the American legislative's concerns over democratic reform in Turkey; and, thirdly, the traditional antagonism of the institution with the White House
the most significant challenge for the triangular relationship: it threatened to upset what the Greek government perceived as balance of power in the Aegean. Consequently, Greek foreign policy-makers were left with two options:

1. Emphasize the military interdependence of the strategic value of Greece and Turkey. According to the Greek Alternate Defence Minister, Antonios Drosoyannis: "Greece is the link between Turkey and Europe. If one loses Turkey, then only one nation is lost. But if Greece is lost, then two nations are lost — both Greece and Turkey. Turkey would be isolated". The Greek argument was not only supported by American strategists but also by many US Congressmen who criticised Reagan's policy fearing "overreliance on the military component in relations with Turkey".

2. Reduce the points of friction between Greece and the US. The increased reliability of the former as a loyal NATO ally could bring back the lost confidence and reinfore her relative strategic value. This was the objective of Papandreou's "calmer seas" in Greek-American relations.

Indeed, as Couloumbis points out, "detente (...) works to diminish perceptions of the strategic importance of Greece and Turkey in both superpowers". Thus, Greece had an active interest in detente in US-Soviet relations. Papandreou's pursuit of a Balkan nuclear weapons-free zone or Greece's proposal for a six-

110. McDonald, Robert, Alliance Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean, op. cit., p. 36
111. Cited by Kourvetaris, Y., op. cit., p. 443
112. US Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, op. cit., p. 37
month delay of the deployment of the Pershing II missiles in Europe reflected clearly this Greek foreign policy objective. However, as these actions were considered by the US as reflecting the Soviet perception of detente, they damaged Greek-American relations.

In the interviews that we conducted in Athens we found out that there was a consensus in the Greek political community that detente in East-West relations increases the room for manoeuvre of the Greek policy-makers. However, it is arguable whether this perception is true. According to an analyst, for example, "periods of detente between the superpowers often release local conflicts independent from the logic of the two pacts". Furthermore, as another author argues, "a welcome reduction in tension (...) on the Central Front might not be matched by a similar reduction in tension in the Mediterranean, the Middle East or East Asia". Thus, detente in East-West relations does not necessarily mean detente everywhere. Hence, it is probable that a future period of detente could lead Turkey to bring new issues of dispute with Greece. The latter, being on a disadvantageous position, would have only one option: to lean to the US.

IV

Conclusions

113. Couloumbis, Th., The US, Greece and Turkey, _op. cit._, p. 188


Since 1974, the Turkish factor has dominated the course of US-Greek relations. The security guarantee demanded from NATO, the request of a 7:10 balance in US military assistance towards Greece and Turkey, and the refusal to participate in NATO's military manoeuvres in the Aegean prove this position. Continuity was not only the central element of Greek-Turkish relations in this period but also the most significant feature of Greek foreign policy towards the western superpower. Consequently, security considerations played the most significant role in the agendas of both NDP's and PASOK's governments. Change in Greek tactics vis-a-vis the US was the result of both governmental change as well as of change in the international environment. PASOK's government attempted to increase the element of uncertainty and thereby to reinforce the Greek leverage in the country's relations with Washington. For Papandreou, Greece's membership of NATO should not be taken for granted irrespective of the costs for its security. Thus, the Greek socialists differentiated Greece's foreign policy positions on a number of issues including refusals to condemn the USSR for the downing of the South Korean airliner and the imposition of martial law in Poland as well as a proposal for a six-month delay of the deployment of the Euro-missiles. However, the American reactions to these anti-American and often pro-soviet positions forced the leader of PASOK to moderate Greece's foreign policy positions in the 1985-1986 period.

In general, in the short-term, it is very unlikely that Greek-American relations will escape from the current pattern of
the triangular relationship (Greece-Turkey-US). The Greek governments will continue to reject not only the old "patron-client" pattern but also the radical one (closure of American bases, withdrawal from NATO) proposed by the country's pro-Moscow Communist party. They will continue to "search for a balance" which while consolidating the country's security and not endangering its economic development, will also reduce Greece's dependence on the western superpower.
### Table 4.1
US Military Aid to Greece and Turkey 1979-1983
(In Million $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants/Total</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>145.1</td>
<td>202.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/T</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>176.5</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/T</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/T</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983 (a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>112.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/T</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a): There are Administration supplementary loan requests pending congressional approval for $65 million military aid to Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1974-1978</th>
<th>1979-1983</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1100 (64.7%)</td>
<td>900 (45.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>110 (6.4%)</td>
<td>300 (15.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>380 (17.6%)</td>
<td>60 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>50 (2.9%)</td>
<td>110 (5.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>80 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>60 (3.5%)</td>
<td>535 (26.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1700</strong></td>
<td><strong>1985</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Arrivals of US Tourists to Greece (Thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Based on data derived from Zaharatos, G.A., *The Problems and Prospects of Greek Tourism*, in II. Katsoulis et al., eds, op. cit., p. 288

**Note:** The US bombing of Libya, the terrorist attacks on US citizens and the Chernobyl accident have resulted in at least 1,000,000 Americans cancelling their plans to visit Europe. Undoubtedly, this has also affected the Greek tourist industry in 1986. (Kourvetaris, Y. and B. Dobratz, *Greece: In Search of Identity*, op. cit., p. 140)
NATO NADGE EARLY WARNING SITES IN GREECE
SELECTED MAJOR UNITED STATES MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES IN GREECE

Mediterranean Sea

In the post-war period, Karasavlis, faced with Turkish 'penetration', was faced to look for allies. For he realized that the improvement of Greece's relations with her northern neighbours was the key principles of his foreign policy. In May 1947 he visited Romania in June of the same year. He was pleased with the visit to Yugoslav and he hoped to repeat in Greece.
Chapter 5

Greece and the Balkans

The Balkans - which for the purpose of this Chapter are defined as including the states of Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia - form an important aspect of Greece's geopolitical position. In the post-junta period, Greece's attempts for a multi-dimensional foreign policy highlighted both the opportunities as well as the constraints for a greater rapprochement of the Balkan states. Although the Balkan aspect of the post-1974 Greek foreign policy had a secondary character (it was rather determined by than it determined other variables), it was a development which reflected the new orientations of both the conservative and socialist Greek foreign policy-makers and showed the dominant role of the Greek-Turkish dispute in NDP's and PASOK's foreign policy decisions.

I

Background

In the post-junta period, Karamanlis, faced with Turkey's "expansionism", was forced to look for allies. Not unexpectedly, he made the improvement of Greece's relations with her northern neighbours one of the main principles of his foreign policy. In May 1975 he visited Romania; in June of the same year he paid an official visit to Yugoslavia; and in July he arrived in Sofia - the first visit to Bulgaria by a Greek PM in the post-war era.1
All these visits were returned in spring 1976 by the leaders of these countries. The official communiques in all instances expressed a desire for improved relations between and among the Balkan states. Following a Greek initiative (1975), the first of a series of inter-Balkan conferences was held in Athens in early 1976. The Balkan states in the Conference discussed ways to increase co-operation and agreed that future meetings would be held at the level of technocrats. Thus, the second inter-Balkan Conference in Ankara (1979) had an absolutely defined agenda: transports and communications. However, although the first meeting in Athens produced few and modest concrete results, it was one of the most important initiatives undertaken in the Balkans for decades. In spite of the absence of Albania which refused to take part in the Conference, Greek-Albanian relations improved steadily at both the economic as well as at the cultural level. Moreover,

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2. See, for example, the text of the Declaration that Greece and Romania signed in 1975 (Catsiapis, Jean, La Grece Dixieve Membre des Communautes Europeennes, Notes et Etudes Documentaires, No 4593-4, 21 Novembre 1980, pp. 112-113
5. Ibid, p. 400
7. Veremis, Th., Greek Security, op. cit., pp. 8-9
Greek–Bulgarian co-operation was cultivated constantly while Greece and Yugoslavia agreed to relieve their mutual borders of a concentration of troops and redeployed them in other areas more important for their respective national defences.

Karamanlis's initiatives in the Balkan peninsula were largely due to six interrelated factors. To:

1. An attempt to isolate Turkey. In particular, Yugoslavia's influence on the non-aligned movement was considered useful by the Greek foreign policy-makers in relation to the Aegean dispute and the Cyprus question. However, with respect to the Greek expectations, the results were not encouraging: most Balkan leaders took care not to offend Turkey and even Yugoslavia was very careful in any of its responses to the Greek–Turkish dispute. In addition to that 'positive' foreign policy objective, there was also a 'negative' one: As "in most instances the Turks had been there before the Greeks and essentially for the same reasons", the Greek Balkan initiatives were, to a certain extent, reactions to a Turkish rapprochement with the Balkan states.

2. A move to counterbalance traditional ties with the US.

8. However, the problem of the exploitation of the waters of river Nestos created some difficulties (Kathimerini, 12/13 August 1980, [In Greek])

9. Verenis, Th., Greek Security, op. cit., p. 8
Aleifantis, St., op. cit., p. 384

10. Verenis, Th., Ibid, p. 8


12. Ibid

13. Ibid
Karamanlis' initiatives aimed at the achievement of his 'grand design' for a "multi-dimensional foreign policy" so as to reduce the US leverage in Greek-American relations. Furthermore, this approach reflected, as Couloumbis has put it, the political will for a move from "dependence to interdependence" and expressed the belief that "cohesiveness among the nation-states of the region reduces the potential for great power influence". The little but "positive" interest that the US showed in relation to bilateral and multilateral co-operation among the Balkan states acted for NDP government in Greece as a further motive for improving the country's relations with her neighbours.

3. An attempt to weaken the perceived threat posed by Greece's northern neighbours. This threat was considered by the Greek conservative government as one of a military nature posed by the Warsaw Pact as well as one of an irredentist nature as Greece claimed that the Yugoslav remarks about the existence of a minority in Greece described as of "Macedonian ethnicity" were disputing indirectly the sovereignty of at least part of northern Greece. The Greek argument was that Macedonia is only a geographical entity which is populated by Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians.


15. Couloumbis, Theodore, The United States, Greece and Turkey, op. cit., p. 189


17. Valinakis, Yannis, Foreign Policy and National Defence, op. cit., pp. 40-45

18. For the Greek point of view see Macedonia and the Macedonian Question: A Brief Survey, Society for Macedonian Studies, Thessaloniki: Centre of Macedonians Abroad, 1983, (Distributed by the Greek Embassy in London); Kofos, Evangelos, The Macedonian Question: The
Although the first years of the Greek attempt for a Balkan rapprochement reflected the urgent need for the weakening of the tension in the country's northern borders so it could defend its eastern ones from a probable attack by Turkey in the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis, later this "crisis management" objective moved to the background as other foreign policy objectives grew in importance in Greek foreign policy decision-making. As a result, in fall 1979, the ND's Minister for Defence stated in the Greek Parliament that Greece was in no way threatened by its northern neighbours.

4. An effort to cultivate closer economic ties. The construction of a gas pipeline from the Aegean to Yugoslavia, the improvement of economic co-operation with Bulgaria (i.e. the signing of an agreement for export of electricity to Greece) as well as with Romania and the expansion of Greek-Albanian trade indicated the Greek attempts to increase trade and economic co-operation among countries which belong to the same region and are in a similar stage of economic development.

5. A necessary adjustment in an era of detente. On the one hand, the initiatives of Karamanlis in the Balkans which attempted to capitalise on Greece's geographical position were facilitated by the end of the cold war era in Europe. The declaration of the Nixon doctrine which marked a new era in US-Soviet relations and

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Politics of Mutation, Balkan Studies, Vol. 27 (1), 1986, pp. 157-172
19. Aleifantis, St., op. cit., pp. 375-376
20. Papacosma, V., Greece and NATO, op. cit., p. 209
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) which took place in Helsinki in 1975 gave the first impetus to inter-Balkan co-operation. Hence, it was not accidental that the deliberations among the Balkan states started in the margins of the Helsinki Conference. 22 On the other hand, the Balkan rapprochement reflected an overdue response to a developing east-west co-operation. 23 This overdue response was a necessary adjustment which had to follow Greece's unresponsive policies of the 1960s and the early 1970s. To quote an apt comment "neither the new trends in United States foreign policy nor the emergence of "national communism" (Yugoslav and Romanian style) were taken seriously by Greek policy-makers before July 1974"24. Finally, the Greek foreign policy objectives aimed at strengthening détente in the Balkans. The continuing stability of the big neighbour in the North, Yugoslavia, which was entering in the post-Tito era was very important for Greece. After all, the Balkans had been "Europe's powderkeg" and a country's instability could - according to history - easily become a regional instability or even spread further if the Soviet Union tried to satisfy its ambitions in this European sub-system. 25

6. The existence of a Greek minority in Albania. Although the NDP

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Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia, New York: Praeger, 1982
22. Aleifantis, St., op. cit., p. 390
23. Veretis, Th., Greek Security, op. cit., p. 8
Bekich, Darko, Soviet Goals in Yugoslavia and the Balkans, Annals of the American Academy of
government did not stop to accuse the Albanian government for the violation of the human rights of the Greek minority in southern Albania. Karamanlis seemed to believe that a policy of economic and cultural co-operation would result to an amelioration of the situation of the Greek Orthodox population in the latter.

II

Policies

The PASOK government continued the policy of Karamanlis in the Balkans for the same reasons. However, it introduced a new element: in his foreign policy statement in the Greek Parliament in November 1981, Papandreou said that a main objective of PASOK's policy in the Balkans was the creation of a nuclear-free "zone of peace" outside the sphere of any political or military alliance. Furthermore, the Greek PM declared that Greece would be the first state to implement the withdrawal of nuclear weapons "after the necessary consultations". Thus, Papandreou's revival of this old Romanian plan included also a promise for a unilateral removal of all the tactical nuclear weapons which were deployed on Greek soil. These weapons had been deployed in the early 1960s and in-

Political and Social Science, Vol. 481, September 1985, pp. 81-91

26. According to Albanian statistics, the minority is about 50,000-strong while Greek conservative circles claim that it numbers 400,000 including, however, Albanians of the Greek Orthodox persuasion (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, RAE Background, Report 152, 3 September 1987)

27. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 31264

28. Ibid
cluded the missiles Honest John and Nike-Hercules as well as aircraft with nuclear capability (F-4 and F-104), nuclear mines and artillery. Similar weapons were deployed in Turkey. In 1983, the NATO countries agreed (Montebello resolution) to reduce the number of the Alliance's old nuclear warheads in Europe. Furthermore, in the late 1970s the Honest John missile had been replaced in most NATO armies by the newer Lance missile while the Nike-Hercules one was being replaced by a conventional missile of the Patriot type. In 1985 it seemed that some nuclear warheads and bombs were being withdrawn from the Greek soil. Nevertheless, Papandreou's initiative for a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFR) in the Balkans seemed as a unilateral disarmament proposal since there were no nuclear weapons in Bulgaria and Romania. However, some weapon systems deployed in these two Warsaw Pact states were of dual capability (nuclear-conventional) as, for example, the FROG and SCUD missiles.

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29. The Stoica Plan (1957)
Interview with a NATO official, Brussels, 14.1.1987
31. Klick, D., Ibid, p. 115
32. Valinakis, Y., Foreign Policy and National Defence, op. cit., p. 169
33. Valinakis, Y., Balkan Security, op. cit., p. 175
34. Valinakis, Y., Foreign Policy and National Defence, op. cit., p. 216
According to Arkin (Greece's Balancing Act, 1987, op. cit., p. 11) 96 obsolete warheads had been withdrawn since Papandreou took office while the United States still maintained 68 warheads on Greek soil.
Despite the very reserved attitude of Turkey, Papandreou succeeded in convening an inter-Balkan conference in Athens in the beginning of 1984. Nevertheless, the question of the NWFZ was postponed, at the request of Turkey, at the preliminary meeting of the Conference and when the five countries resumed discussions in February 1984, the issue was placed relatively low in the agenda.

Papandreou’s demand for a NWFZ can be explained at both the domestic as well as at the international context. At the international level it represented a part of the policy for a more independent attitude within the western community, an attitude whose objective was to reinforce Greece’s leverage in relation to the US. Secondly, it reflected PASOK’s active policy for the reinforcement of detente in East-West relations since, according to the Greek socialists, “the establishment of such a zone (...) has the potential for a chain-reaction effect, which eventually may contribute to turning the entire Mediterranean area into a zone of security and peace”. Thirdly, the demand for nuclear-free Balkans reflected the Greek political will for a rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe where

35. Valinakis, Y., Balkan Security, op. cit., p. 176
36. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, p. 32773
37. Aleifantis, St., op. cit., pp. 421-427
38. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, p. 32773
39. See the views of Nikos Andrikos (advisor to the Greek Premier on defence issues till 1986) in op. cit., pp. 29-31 and in Andrikos, N., A Zone without Nuclear Weapons in the
the idea of nuclear-free regions was keenly endorsed. Fourthly, it was an attempt to give an impetus to multilateral co-operation in the Balkans by bringing in a clearly political issue in a period during which multilateralism in the region was confronting an impasse. In the words of the representative of the Greek government in the 1984 Athens Conference:

"The endeavour and initiative of the Greek government has proved that we can get together and discuss not only technicoeconomic issues but also issues having a political dimension and repercussions on security".

Fifthly, and more importantly, the Greek initiative aimed at isolating Turkey from the processes of multilateral co-operation in the Balkans as this country, following the official NATO position, was against the creation of NFZs at a regional level. Furthermore, there was a Greek fear that Turkey was attempting to build nuclear weapons in co-operation with Pakistan. Hence, the Greek initiative had a double objective: on the one hand, to explore the Turkish attitude in relation to this issue and on the other hand, to "reveal" the alleged Turkish objectives to the international community. In 1986, during his visit to New Delhi, 

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Balkans, in Y. Valinakis and P. Kitsos, eds, op. cit., pp., [In Greek]


42. See Papandreou’s Speech to the Socialist Group of the European Parliament (The Guardian, September 9, 1982)

For the alleged nuclear weapons’ programme of Turkey see Ath. Platias, Turkey’s Nuclear Programme, in Y. Valinakis and P. Kitsos, eds, op. cit., pp. 197-247

Turkey had developed close military relations with Pakistan in the context of CENTO
Papandreou stated:

"If someone start from Greece and arrive to India, he will see this strange thread which is the link between Turkey and Pakistan and especially in what relates to the development of nuclear weapons, something that we must not forget. And we do not forget it (...) because we are pushing forward the initiative (...) of nuclear-free Balkans."

Nevertheless, the pursuit of a NWFZ in the Balkans involved a certain political cost for Greece since it antagonised the official NATO view and ignored some strategic realities (mainly the East-West balance of conventional forces in the region). Furthermore, the idea itself was somewhat vague since the superpowers' fleets in eastern Mediterranean carried nuclear weapons. Last but not least, any attempt for the realization of a Balkan NWFZ would confront serious problems of verification. Above all, the Greek initiative failed to succeed as the Balkan states failed to agree. The Boucourest Conference (1986) in which the problem of a chemical weapons-free zone was also discussed was not marked by any important development: although Greece and Bulgaria unreservedly endorsed the idea, Romania believed that it


44. Platias, Ath., Turkey's Nuclear Programme, *op. cit.*, p. 235

45. Klick, D., *op. cit.*, pp. 114-115

Platias, Ath., The Nuclear Problem... , *op. cit.*, pp. 163-164


48. Aleifantis, St, *op. cit.*, pp. 425-427
would not gain from it if Turkey was excluded, Yugoslavia kept a rather reserved attitude fearing for her future security and Turkey rejected the proposal arguing that Balkan nuclear disarmament should not be viewed in isolation from a general NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiation. Even in Greece there was not a consensus for the benefits of a NWFZ. According to Mitsotakis, leader of ND, the denuclearization of the Balkans would not benefit the security of Greece because the withdrawal of nuclear weapons "would constitute a unilateral action".

At the economic, commercial and cultural level, the bilateral relations between Greece and the other Balkan states improved constantly but not spectacularly. The most important event in the post-1981 Greek-Balkan relations occurred in 1986 when Greece and Bulgaria signed a "Declaration of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Co-operation" in which they emphasized their common support for a Balkan nuclear and chemical-weapons free zone. According to Article 2 of the Declaration, the two states undertake the obligation not to encourage or to recourse to acts directed against one another or to permit use of their territory for such acts. This Article "infuriated" NATO officials at the Brussels headquarters.

49. Royal United Services Institute, News Brief, October 1985, p. 1
50. Aleifantis, St., op. cit., p. 425
51. Ibid. p. 425
not forgotten to add that the Declaration's content did "not violate the rights and obligations stemming from international agreements and treaties to which Bulgaria and Greece [were] parties". According to another clause, Article 10 of the Declaration, in the event of a threat of Greek or Bulgarian security the two countries would immediately consult with a view to diverting the danger. Although the value of this Declaration should not be overestimated, it has to be regarded as a development in the triangular relationship among Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey. In particular, the initiation of an assimilation campaign against the Turkish minority in Bulgaria in late 1984 led to the deterioration of Bulgarian-Turkish relations as Turkey condemned Bulgaria for her programme of "enforced" Bulgarisation. Thus, it could be argued that the Greek-Bulgarian rapprochement was circumstantial and opportunistic and that it was a "classic piece of Balkan power-brokering between two mutually antagonistic states against another with whom both had a greater quarrel" and not a creation of a "front" against a perceived Turkish "expansionism". Indeed, the rapprochement was facilitated by international detente and provoked some Turkish criticism about an alleged "violation of Greece's NATO

53. For the full text of the Declaration see To Pontiki, 12.9.1987, (In Greek)


55. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 34538

56. Ibid
Alefantis, St., op. cit., p. 409

57. Estimates of the Turkish in Bulgaria vary between 300,000 and 1,000,000 (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 33670)
obligations". Interestingly, however, the Greek-Bulgarian 1986 Declaration was very similar with another one signed by Turkey and the USSR in 1978.

In 1985, the Greek government announced that it was going to put an end to the state of war which had existed from the judicial point of view since 1940, when Italian forces launched an attack on Greece from Albania. The PASOK government's policy aimed at bringing Albania out of its isolation, an isolation which existed since its break with China in 1978, an isolation which had left Albania out of all the inter-Balkan Conferences. PASOK government's policy towards Albania can be divided into two periods: in the first, the Greek Socialists avoided to condemn (at least publicly) Albania for the suppression of the Greek minority; in the second (1984-1986) and under the pressure of Greek conservative circles and the Church, Papandreou publicly recognised that Tirana did not "treat equally" the Greek Albanians with the other Albanians. Still, however, Papandreou avoided to use Greece's further co-operation with Albania as a leverage for the "protection" of the Greek minority in the latter. In January 1985 and during the visit of Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias in Tirana, economic and cultural co-operation between Greece and Albania improved with the signing of a new convention.

58. Ibid, pp. 34509-34510


60. Το Ροντίκι, 19.9.1987, [In Greek]

61. Keessen's Contemporary Archives, p. 34249

62. Greek Parliament Debates, March 1, 1982
At the bilateral level Greek-Yugoslav relations in the post-1981 era were marked by the Macedonian issue. In 1983, the remarks of the Yugoslavian PM Milka Planinc during her official visit to Athens about the existence of an alleged "Macedonian ethnicity" in Greece caused considerable disquiet in the Greek capital. Although Yugoslavia continued to be an ardent supporter of the Greek views on the Cyprus question, its allegations for the existence of a "Macedonian minority" in Greece influenced negatively her relations with the latter. As the main dispute about "Macedonia" was not between Greece and Yugoslavia but between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the Greek-Bulgarian rapprochement acted as a motive for a Turkish-Yugoslav one. In January 1986, Papandreou visited Yugoslavia in an apparent attempt to bring bilateral relations to their formal level.

Greek-Romanian relations continued to improve. In May 1982, the Romanian leader, Ceausescu, visited Athens and in November of the same year Papandreou visited Bucharest. In Bucharest, the Greek and the Romanian leader signed a "Common Declaration" on the prospects of co-operation between their countries.

III

Constraints

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63. Aleifantis, St., op. cit., p. 413
64. Catsiapis, Jean, La Grece en 1985-1986, op. cit., pp. 223-224
65. The Annual Register, 1983, op. cit., p. 168
What are the constraints for Greece's foreign policy in the Balkans? The first thing that should be noted here is that the Balkan aspect in Greek foreign policy was and will be—at least in the short term—one of a complementary nature. Both the Greek conservative and socialist policy-makers seemed to recognise that unless there was a dramatic change in the Balkan constellations, a 'Balkan option' which would bring the states of the region closer together into a Balkan framework did not represent a realistic alternative to Greece's ties with the West. For the Greek leaders, as long as Greece and Turkey continued to be members of NATO, Bulgaria and Romania belonged to the Warsaw Pact, Yugoslavia pursued a non-aligned foreign policy and Albania stayed in almost complete isolation, any co-operation in the region could mainly be achieved at the level of low politics.

Secondly, there is the problem of minorities in the Balkans, a problem cutting across the borders of states and political-military alliances, a problem posing questions of national sovereignty and hindering multilateral and bilateral co-operation in the region. Thus, as a result of the rebellion of two million-strong Albanian minority in southern Yugoslavia (Kosovo), Albanian-Yugoslavian relations deteriorated. In some

66. Aleifantis, St., op. cit., p. 420
67. Ibid, p. 418
68. The Economist, April 20, 1985, p. 12
69. Periodic disturbances culminated to bloody crisis in 1981. Since then the situation has remained tense.
See Artisien, P.R., A Note on Kosovo and the Future of Yugoslav-Albanian relations: A Balkan Perspective, Soviet Studies, Vol. 36 (2), April 1984, pp. 267-276; Baskin, Mark, Crisis in
cases, the existence of a minority question reinforced the East-West division in the region (dispute between Bulgaria and Turkey). In other cases, it weakened it (Greek-Bulgarian rapprochement). The issue of minorities and the dispute in NATO's southern flank between Greece and Turkey led the Greek Foreign Minister, Papoulias, to state to the Deputy Foreign Minister of the US, Michael Armacost, in October 1985:

"(....) in the hypothetical event of a Balkan war, I would not know to tell you the fronts. Nobody knows who would be the ally of whom. The situation in the Balkans is very delicate".

"Pessimism comes easily to those who study the Balkans" wrote a well-known analyst of the peninsula. There is a lot of uncertainty over the future of the Balkans. The consequence of the crisis of the Yugoslavian economy and the future management of the federal system by the rotating post-Tito leadership will be of great importance for the stability in the region. The future relations of Gorbachev's Soviet Union with her two local allies will influence the Greek foreign policy options. Finally, the existence of significant gaps between the birth rates of minorities and majorities may upset in the long term the balance of power in the Balkan peninsula.

In general, it would be erroneous to expect any progress towards regional integration in the sphere of high politics in the region. Furthermore, it would also be a "remote dream" to expect


70. To Pontiki, 7.8.1987, [In Greek]
any promotion of the idea of a customs union in this southeastern part of Europe in the near future. After all, trade remains at a very low level. By 1985, for example, only 4.9% of Greek exports was directed to the Balkans; in the same year just 2.2% of the total was imported from the states of the region (See Appendices). In all the five year period starting from 1981 the situation in trade remained stable.

Because of the strong divisions in the Balkan region and because of the uncertainty over its future, bilateralism can work better than multilateralism. This fact was not and could not be ignored by Greek foreign policy-makers. As bilateralism is winning the battle, security considerations are rising again in importance in Greek foreign policy. However, undoubtedly the first and foremost Greek foreign policy objective in the region in the post-1974 era had to do with security considerations. PASOK’s MEP Gezis, a man who played a significant role in the shaping of Greece’s foreign policy, answered to my question "What was the main Greek foreign policy objective in the Balkans?" monolectically: "Detente". Some time later, NDP’s MEP Tzounis, former DG of the Greek Foreign Ministry, gave me the same answer with regard to NDP’s government policy. Continuity has charac-

71. Brown, J., The Balkans..., op. cit., p. 251


The Greek-Turkish dispute is the dominant factor in Greece's policies vis-à-vis the Balkans in the post-1974 era. Despite the governmental change in October 1981, the basic foreign policy objective of Greece in the region, namely the pursuit of detente, remained unchanged. Faced with the Turkish demands and aiming at gaining allies in the dispute with Turkey, both the Greek conservative and socialist policy-makers attempted to reinforce political, economic, and cultural ties with their northern neighbours. The only real change that Papandreou brought in Greece's policies towards the states of the region was his proposal for nuclear-free Balkans. However, this initiative was not a major policy shift but only a new tactic aiming at weakening Turkey. Indeed, the fact that the Balkan peninsula is not a politically homogeneous entity posed significant constraints on Greek foreign policy options. The different political-economic systems that the states of the region espouse as well as the existence of ethnic minorities that are becoming or can become sources of tension within or between states, hinder multilateral relations and undoubtedly restrict cooperation at the level of low-politics.

75. Interview in Varkiza, op. cit.

76. Interview in Thessaloniki, op. cit.
Table 5.1
Greek Foreign Trade by Balkan Country
1981-1986 in million $
Chapter 6
Greece and the Arab World

The Arab world forms the fourth aspect of Greece's geopolitical milieu. Greek foreign policy vis-a-vis the Arab countries in the post-1974 era was strongly influenced by the Greek-Turkish dispute since both states sought for the support of the governments of the region.

I
Background

Greek-Arab ties are traditionally strong. Greece was the only European state to vote against the partition of Palestine in the UN General Assembly in 1947 and since then she has consistently backed the Arab cause. Even the leaders of the pro-American military dictatorship (1967-1974) had refused to grant the US over-flight or ground facilities to supply Israel with arms during the 1973 war, while allowing the Soviet planes to pass through the Greek airspace for the air-lift of military supplies to Egypt. As a result, Greece was excluded from the Arab oil boycott. In paral-


2. Tsakaloyannis, *ibid*
Dimitras, Panayote, *La Grece en Quete d' une Politique Independante, op. cit.*, p. 125
lel, Greece had established very good economic relations with the Arab states and when the energy crisis occurred, the NDP's foreign policy-makers were forced to put the improvement and strengthening of Greece's ties with the Middle East relatively high in their agenda. Nevertheless, the NDP's governments tried to keep a low profile in the Arab world. Thus, although they supported all the UN resolutions for an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, they refrained from officially recognising the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). As the Karamanlis and Rallis governments were paying attention to Greece's negotiations with the EC, "Greece took no initiatives [in relation to the Arab world] which might have displeased some of her strong supporters in the EC". However, Greece reinforced in this era her traditionally friendly relations with Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Algeria while her links with the Gulf states and Libya improved.

II
Policies

Papandreou continued the policy of his predecessors with regard to the Arab world. Nevertheless, he introduced two new elements: first, he granted the PLO a diplomatic status equal to

For the Greek voting behaviour in the UN General Assembly see Heila, Eirini, The International Crises in the UN (1974-1984) and the Position of Greece, International Law and International Politics, Vol. 12, [In Greek]

4. Tsakaloyannis, Ibid, p. 110
5. Ibid, p. 109
that maintained by Israel in Athens and he expressed a firm support "for the struggle of Palestinians for self-determination"; secondly, he showed a strong interest in the improvement of Greece's already good relations with the so-called "radical" Arab regimes - with Algeria, Iraq, Libya and Syria. However, PASOK's policy with regard to the Arab countries, as the NDP's one, reflected four inter-related foreign policy objectives. It was:

1. An attempt to gain support in the dispute with Turkey. On the one hand, Greece's attempts for the reinforcement of her ties with the Arab world were a reaction to the Turkish rapprochement with the Arabs. Hence, Papandreou's decision to raise the status of the Athens Information Office of the PLO to the same diplomatic level as Israel's representation in Greece (October 1981) has to be regarded as a response to Turkey's 1978 decision to accord a similar diplomatic recognition to Arafat's representatives in Ankara. Moreover, Ozal's efforts to cultivate closer economic ties with Turkey's Arab neighbours by exploiting his country's membership of the Islamic Conference urged the Papandreou government to move more vigorously towards the same direction. Nevertheless, the Arab market remained far more important for the Turkish


7. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, p. 31264


economy than for the Greek one: in 1985, for example, Turkey directed 42.8% of its total exports to Arab countries, a percentage three times higher than the respective Greek one. On the other hand, the Greek efforts did not only aim to counterbalance the Turkish moves but also and more ambitiously to outrun them by seeking a pro-Greek stance by the Arabs in both the Aegean dispute and the Cyprus question. Thus, the PASOK government's rapprochement with "radical" Arab regimes aimed, in the words of Greek Foreign Minister Papoulias, at "detaching them from the influence of Turkey". Furthermore, the diplomatic recognition of the PLO was based "on the similarities between the Palestinian and the Cyprus tragedy". However and in spite of some pro-Greek but ambiguous by Yassir Arafat, most Arab leaders were careful to avoid the Aegean issue and limited their statements to expressions of support for existing UN resolutions in relation to Cyprus while supporting from the backdoor the Turkish-Cypriot economy. The Greeks did not try to hide their dissatisfaction with the Arab attitude in relation to the Greek-Turkish dispute.

2. An attempt to strengthen Greece's economic ties with the Arab countries so as to secure oil supplies, gain new markets and at-

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11. Interview, O Dikonomitos, November 26, 1987, p. 8
13. The Times, December 17, 1981
14. Tsakaloyannis, P., Greece, op. cit., p. 117
15. The Times, June 11, 1983
tract foreign investment. In this context, Greece’s good relations with the "radical" Arab states reflected the fact that the country was importing a large part of her oil requirements from them. Moreover, Greece had established very good economic relations with Syria and, since 1979, the two countries have set up a ferry link which "attracted a very large share of West European-Middle Eastern traffic". Apart from that, Greek companies were playing a prominent role in the Arab world where they were executing construction projects. These companies provided employment overseas for more than 2,000 Greek personnel and benefitted the Greek economy with about $400 million annually in foreign exchange. Furthermore, the Arab markets offered opportunities for the export of Greece’s agricultural products. Hence, although the Greek-Arab trade constantly declined in the 1981-1985 period, the Arab world continued to be the second-largest export market for Greece (after the EC). The PASOK government had hoped that a more pro-Arab policy could attract Arab petrodollars for the financing of investment projects in Greece. Nevertheless and despite the fact that Greece had particularly profited from the Lebanon war as "many Middle East banks and trading concerns moved from Beirut to Athens", Papandreou’s pro-Arab policies produced few concrete

16. See Tables 6.1 & 6.2
17. Tsakaloyannis, P., Greece: Old Problems..., op.cit., p. 129
18. Catsiapis, J., La Grece Dixieme Membre..., op.cit., p. 114
20. O Dikonomikos, November 26, 1987, p. 7, [In Greek]
economic benefits: although Greece became the first non-Arab country to receive economic aid from the Arab League (February 1982), the Greek government showed clearly its disappointment during Mr Chadli Klibi's - the Secretary-General of the Arab League - visit to Athens in December 1982. However, the decline of the oil prices and in consequence of the Arab revenues made the Greek hopes for Arab investments even fainter: Egypt's break-away from the Arab front and the resulting political splits, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, the decline in the demand of OPEC oil and the depreciation of the dollar led the economies of the Arab states to a deep crisis. As at the same time the Greek economy was in constant decline, the Greek-Arab trade links were considerably weakened in the 1981-1985 period. Although Greece's imports from the Arab states remained stable (25.6% of the total in 1985 compared with 22.5% of the total in 1985), Greece's exports shrunk from 23.9% of the total in 1981 to 13.2% of the total in 1985. As there is nothing to indicate that the causes of the decline of the economies of the Arab states will be eliminated, it can be argued that Greek-Arab economic ties will continue to loosen. It is important to note here that the bilateral economic agreements that Papandreou signed with some "radical" Arab regimes influenced as Tables 6.1 & 6.2 show the structure of Greece's im-

21. Noyon, Jennifer, Greeks Bearing Rifts, op. cit., p. 95
22. Tsakaloyannis, P., Greece, op. cit., p. 116
23. The Times, June 11, 1983
ports from the Arab world without influencing the structure of Greece's exports to the region.

3. An attempt to increase Greece's leverage in relation to her western allies by acting as an intermediary between them and the Arab world. This foreign policy objective was manifested in several occasions as, for example, in the case of the meeting between Mitterrand and Quaddafi in relation to the Chadian dispute.26 This meeting which was organized on the request of Tripoli by the Greek government took place in November of 1984 and followed a personal intervention by Papandreou in 1983 which resulted to the release of 37 French hostages held in Libya27. Furthermore, President Assad of Syria visited Greece in May 1986 - the first trip by the Syrian leader to a NATO country within 8 years - to express his alleged innocence about the western accusations against his country for supporting terrorist actions.28 It has to be noted here that during the Rallis government, Greece was the only member of the Community to receive a personal message from President Assad on the Lebanon crisis in summer 1981.29 Nevertheless, the attempts of the Greek foreign policy-makers to make Greece "a bridge between the Arabs and Europe" as Arafat put it in October 1981 during his visit to Athens,30 did not


29. The Times, May 28, 1986

30. Tsakaloyannis, P., Greece: Old Problems..., op. cit., p. 129
materialise fully because of the stagnation of the Euro-Arab dialogue.

4. An attempt to reduce terrorist acts on Greek soil. Hence, after a number of attacks by Middle Eastern terrorist groups on Greek territory in 1984 and 1985, the Greek government called the Arab ambassadors as well as the PLO representative in Athens and by reminding them its continuing support for the Arab cause, it expressed Greece's desire for close co-operation in combatting terrorism. Nevertheless and despite a security co-operation agreement that was signed with the PLO, Greece was forced to conform to the EC's decision for sanctions against Libya and in July 1986 the PASOK government confirmed that the staff of the Libyan embassy in Athens was being reduced (Libya had till then the largest foreign mission in Athens!)

III

Constraints

The Greek foreign policy with regard to the Arab world in the post-1974 era was one of a complementary nature: there was a consensus in Greece that the Arab aspect of her foreign policy

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30. The Times, December 15, 1981

31. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 34638

32. Ibid, p. 34639

33. Ibid

34. The Times, July 9, 1986
could antagonise neither the main external orientations of the country nor her security commitments. The Arab world was not an option for Greece, it instead complemented the country's position as a member of the western world by adding another dimension to the country's membership of NATO and of the EC. In parallel, Greece seemed ready to protect her close ties with the Arab states and the PLO to the detriment of her relations with the West. Thus, the pro-Arab clause of the DECA that Greece had signed with the US in 1983 indicated the political will of the Greek socialists to continue their pro-Arab foreign policy despite the disagreement of the US. By stating this clause in September 1983 the Greek government rejected an American request that the airfields on the island of Crete be used in shipping military hardware and equipment to the American forces in Lebanon. Furthermore Greece's resistance of EC pressures to grant full diplomatic recognition to Israel showed the importance that the PASOK government attributed to the Arab dimension of Greece's foreign policy. In contrast, the previous NDP government which was led by Rallis was preparing the de jure recognition of the Israeli state while the present leader of the party, Mitsotakis, promised that a future conservative government would grant the Israeli representatives in Athens a full diplomatic status. The NDP's foreign policy-makers seemed

35. The Times, April 23, 1986
36. See Chapter 4
37. US Military Installations in NATO's Southern Region, op. cit., p. 40
38. The Times, November 9, 1983
Catsiapis, J., La Grece en 1983, op. cit., p. 231
to believe that such an act would open the way for a co-operation between the Greek and the Jewish lobby in the US Congress. It is interesting to note, however, that the Papandreou government, disappointed with the low levels of Arab investment in Greece, started to seek in 1986 closer Greek-Israeli economic and technological co-operation.

The first and most important constraint that Greece faced in her relations with the Arab states has to do with the deep divisions in the Arab world between the "radical" and the "moderate" regimes, the pro-palestinian and the less pro-palestinian states and over the existence of various multilateral and bilateral disputes. In short, the non-existence of an Arab world showed that any coherent approach by the Greeks would confront serious difficulties. The NDP's governments had managed to solve the problem by maintaining a rather "low political prophile" in the region but Papandreou's extreme pro-palestinian stance - especially during his first year in office - embarrassed some Arab governments and, in particular, complicated the Greek-Syrian relations. As

40. Loulis, J., Greece under Papandreou, op. cit., p. 217
41. Interview with Ioannis Varvitsiotis, Athens, March 17, 1988
42. Middle East International, op. cit., p. 13
a result, in 1983, Papandreou failed to condemn the elimination of Yassir Arafat's organisation by the Syrians. To quote an apt comment from the London's Times: "Greece is the only Arab country to have helped the Palestinians". As the disintegration of the Arab system, a disintegration which leads to the growing inability of the Arab group to mobilise support in the UN, is likely to continue, the ability of Greece to formulate a "pan-Arab" foreign policy will be restricted in the future.

The second constraint that Greek foreign policy-makers confronted in relation to Greece's policies towards the Middle East is western reactions. In general, Greece's allies seemed to encourage her mediating role between the West and the Arabs. However, although the Venice Declaration (1980) had already brought the EC's position on the Palestinian issue closer to that of Greece and despite that the EC's reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon satisfied the Greeks, the Papandreou government strongly disagreed with the dispatch of a European peacekeeping force to Sinai in November 1981 and the Greek approach on Libyan

43. The Times, July 12, 1982
44. Costa, H.D., op.cit., p. 115
45. Loulis, J., Greece under Papandreou, op.cit., p. 28
46. The Times, June 23, 1982
49. Tsakaloyannis, P., Greece, op.cit., p. 114
terrorism in 1986 angered the Europeans and the Americans. Moreover, in July 1983, the PASOK government let free a Jordanian who, according to US intelligence reports, was planning to put a bomb on an Athens-Tel Aviv passenger flight. The American reactions to these decisions showed clearly the limits in the Greek-Arab rapprochement. In general, it seems that in the future Greece shall find it easier to develop good relations with the moderate and pro-western Arab regimes.

The third constraint that prevented Greece from playing a more influential role in the Arab world was the lack of sophisticated technology that the country could supply to the states of the region, especially in terms of modern weapons. Hence, when in 1985 Greece announced that she was going to sell to Libya military equipment worth $500 million, western diplomats in Athens expressed doubts that the Greek defense industry could handle an order of such a size. However, the reaction of Egypt to that sale demonstrated clearly the major constraint on Greek foreign policy-making with regard to the Arab world: the latter's divisions and ruptures are reducing the potential for a closer rapprochement by the Greeks.

Above all, however, the future of Turkish-Arab relations will determine the future directions of Greek foreign policy in the region. Two factors will be of paramount importance. First,

51. Tsakaloyannis, P., Greece, op. cit., p. 114
52. Ibid, p. 113
the growing influence of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey. In the words of an analyst "never since 1923 has Islam met with such broad recognition" in the country of Kemal Ataturk. Undoubtedly, Islamic fundamentalism influences Turkey's foreign policy options. Secondly, Turkey's future relations with Europe. A disappointment with the results of the European connection, for example, may lead Ankara back to explore the Middle East as it did in the past. In general, a Turkish rapprochement with the region will provoke a Greek response.

Although there are strong arguments to believe that Greek-Arab economic ties will continue to weaken, there is no ground to argue for a future downgrading of the economic element in the Greek foreign policy agenda. After all, the PASOK government's attitude produces evidence to the contrary.

A future recognition of Israel will not necessarily act as a constraint for a further rapprochement with the Arabs. As a Greek diplomat told us: "Even the PLO is thinking of recognising Israel. Why not we?".

53. Loulis, J., Papandreou's Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 375
54. The Times, January 17, 1985
55. Ibid
For an interesting study on the political role of religion in Turkey see Saint-Blanquat, Eline de, Religion et Politique en Turquie, Defense Nationale, Juin 1988, pp. 101-112
58. Interview in Athens, March 3, 1988
The element of continuity was stronger than the element of change in post-junta Greek foreign policy towards the Arab world. Indeed, the main source of continuity of Greece's policies vis-a-vis the Arab region was the countering of Turkey's "expansionism". To the extent that there was some change, this was due to the importance that the Papandreou government attributed to the element of economics, mainly to the prospects of Arab investments in Greece. Hence, change in Greece's policies towards this geopolitical area occurred as a result of governmental change. Further, the importance of economic issues in Greece's foreign policy agenda increased. However, PASOK's decision to upgrade the status of PLO's representatives in Athens as well as the improvement of Greece's relations with the so-called "radical" Arab regimes in the 1981-1986 era did not reflect a change of objectives but a change of tactics. The PASOK government did not change the rationale of Greece's approach towards the states of the region. Thus, this case study has not only confirmed our original hypotheses about the sources of foreign policy change but also has proved that post-1974 Greek foreign policy was characterised more by continuity than by change. Further, we showed once more that the main source of continuity was a security consideration: Turkey. Finally, we examined how the lack of unity of the Arab world, western reactions to Greece's rapprochement with the states of the region, and the semi-developed nature of the Greek economy posed significant constraints on the development of Greek-Arab relations.
Table 6.1
Greek Foreign Trade by Arab Country
1977-1981 in billion $

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Imports</th>
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<td>Iraq</td>
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<td>Kuwait</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
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<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>U.A. Emirates</td>
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Table 6.2
Greek Foreign Trade by Arab Country
1982-1986 in billion $

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
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Source: Ibid, September 1987, p. 74
Chapter 7

Greece and the Soviet Union

Greek-Soviet relations show the dominance of the Greek-Turkish dispute in post-1974 Greek foreign policy. Further, the Soviet Union is a geopolitical milieu for Greece with its own dynamics.

I

Background

In the post-1974 era Greek-Soviet relations entered a new phase. In 1979 Karamanlis became the first Greek PM ever to visit the USSR and Papandreou followed his steps in 1985. These visits reflected the political will of the Greek foreign policy-makers to see an improvement of Greece's relations with the Eastern bloc. This political will that was expressed by both the NDP government and, to a larger extent, by its socialist successor, can be attributed to six interlinked factors:

a) The growing interest of the Greek shipowners during the last twenty years in expanding their activities in the CMEA countries. As the prolonged slump in world shipping was continuing and Greek shipowners were "under strong pressure from their western bankers because of loan default", Greece (Europe's leading shipping na-


2. The Times, February 2, 1985
tion – see Table 7.1) was forced to search for new markets. The considerable significance of shipping for the Greek economy could not be ignored by any Greek government. In the words of an analyst "no economic strategy in Greece (....) [could] hope to solve the problem of development unless it also [found] a way of integrating this still dynamic component". Thus, although Greek flag shipping provided $1,313 million worth of receipts for the Greek economy in 1984 compared with $1,820 million in 1981, it was the major source of foreign exchange for Greece till 1985, when the tourist industry became more important. The 1979 energy crisis and the world shipping slump which started in 1981 hit hard the Greek shipowners. Most Greek-owned ships were mortgaged in foreign banks and both their number and tonnage were constantly reducing in the post-1980 era. The existence of a significant shipbuilding and shiprepair industry in Greece, as well as the capacity for political influence of the Greek shipowners, a capacity enhanced by their ability to bring their ships under a foreign flag when pressed hard by the Greek authorities, contributed considerably

5. Dept. of Trade and Industry, op. cit.
7. Ibid, pp. 299-301
to Greece's rapprochement with the USSR. In 1982, for example, the Greek government consented to a renewal of an agreement (which had been originally concluded in 1979 but it was cancelled by the NDP government following protests from NATO and the US) between the Soviet Union and the Neorion shipyard on the island of Syros for the repair and maintenance of Soviet commercial and naval supply ships. In 1985, Mr Katsifaras, the then Greek Merchant Marine Minister, made an appeal to the Soviet Union to help the Greek shipowners, "the victims of international capitalism" as he said, by reminding his Soviet counterpart that they were the first to break the blockade of Cuba. As a result, Greece and the USSR signed an agreement on co-operation in the field of shipbuilding and shiprepair as well as a memorandum on basic guidelines for co-operation in the field of commercial navigation.

b) The reinforcement of the traditionally strong commercial links of Greece with the Warsaw Pact countries. Although Greek exports were dwarfed by Soviet sales to Greece, Greece did relatively more trade with the Soviet Union and its allies than any other EC country and Eastern bloc states were an important market for

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9. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 31430
Tsardanidis, Haralambos, The Policy of the Soviet Union in the Balkans, in Chr. Yallourithis and St. Aleifantis, eds, op. cit., p. 288, [In Greek]
Italy had rejected a similar Soviet request after consulting NATO headquarters (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Ibid)
For the American reaction to the Agreement see US Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, op. cit., p. 25

10. The Times, February 2, 1985

Greece's annoying surpluses of citrus fruit: in 1984, for example, the Soviet Union alone absorbed 42% (in tons) of the Greek citrus fruit production. Moreover, talks started on the supply of Soviet natural gas to Greece through a pipeline crossing Bulgaria. However and in spite of the various economic agreements that Greece signed with CMEA countries, the Greek trade with the countries of eastern Europe and the Soviet Union constantly declined in the post-1981 era: In 1981 the value of Greek exports reached $427.6 million; in 1986 the value fell to $191.6 million; similar was the development of Greece's imports from these countries - from $755.3 million in 1981 to $431 million in 1986. The decline of Greek exports was mainly due to the general decline of East-West trade which started in the early 1980s and reinforced the competition among western exporters and showed the weaknesses of the Greek economy. If the economies of the CMEA countries continue to be in crisis - something very likely to happen - and the Greek economy to decline, then the trade links of Greece with the Communist world will continue to weaken.

13. *Ibid*
15. *Keeling's Contemporary Archives*, p. 34638
17. *Oikonomikos*, May 12, 1988, p. 4
18. *Ibid*, p. 6
c) An attempt to attract investment. In particular, the signing (1985) of an economic agreement with the Soviet Union for the exploitation of the Greek bauxite reserves (the richest in Europe) has been described as "the sort of co-operation deal that dreams are made of."\(^{20}\) This is the largest foreign investment ever to be made in Greece\(^{21}\) and its terms are so beneficial to her that the Economist has tried to explain the Soviet "largesse": "Russia wants to build up its aluminium stocks, and Greece's bauxite reserves are bigger than those of the entire Soviet block. Russia may also be saying a few political thank-yous."\(^{22}\) Nevertheless and whatever the reason(s) for the Soviet generosity were, the Greek socialists seemed to realize some tangible advantages in their anti-western rhetoric. After all, the support that Greece could offer the Soviet Union was restricted to the political arena because of lack of sophisticated technology and advanced industrial goods.

d) An endeavour to gain support in the dispute with Turkey over the Aegean and Cyprus. Although the Greek attempt for a rapprochement with the Soviet Union can be partly explained as a reaction aimed to balance the improvement of Soviet-Turkish relations, it also reflected the Greek foreign policy makers' hopes for a change of the Soviet Union's neutral attitude on the Greek-Turkish dis-

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20. The Economist, July 14, 1984, p. 66
pute in Greece’s favour. Although the Soviet-Turkish rapprochement had started in 1963-1964, the “flexible interpretation” by Turkey of the Montreux Convention (1936), of the Convention that governed the passage through the Straits, was the turning point in the relations between the two countries. 23 Hence, since July 1976, the Turkish governments have allowed the transit of ships (such as the soviet “Kiev” aircraft carriers) by clearly contravening the Convention’s clauses. 24 The Greeks reacted quickly to the Turkish-USSR improving relations: Karamanlis’s visit to Moscow was a response to Ecevit’s trip one year earlier (in 1978) 25 and the signing of several important trade deals during the visit of Papandreou to Moscow (February 1985) 26 aimed to balance the significant economic agreements signed between the USSR and Turkey in December 1984 27. On the other hand, Papandreou’s readiness to denounce strongly Turkey in Moscow 28 reflected the Greek attempts to bring the Soviets into the Aegean dispute and the Cyprus question. The result was the following statement included in the Soviet-Greek communique:

"The USSR and Greece favor strict observance of the provisions of

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22. The Economist, July 14, 1984, p. 66


24. Ibid

25. Alenik, V., Soviet-Turkish Ties Today, International Affairs, Moscow, April 1979, pp. 18-19

26. Soviet-Greek Communique, op. cit., pp. 9-10

27. Turkey was the sole NATO country to receive soviet economic aid. The Agreements amounted to $6 billion till 1990 (The Times, February 12, 1985). For the Soviet-Turkish economic relations see Oikonomikos, August 27, 1987, pp. 28-32, [in Greek]
the new UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the participation in it of all states. The settlement of emerging questions, included those involving the Aegean Sea should be effected by peaceful means in accordance with the norms of international law. The Greek government seemed satisfied with this Soviet approach in relation to the Aegean dispute. After all, the USSR had signed both the UNCLOS I and III Conventions. Nevertheless, a closer look at the communique shows that the Soviets had avoided any remark which might have been understood as clearly favouring the Greek position as, for example, political support for the submission of the Aegean continental shelf dispute to the International Court of Justice's adjudication. Indeed, the unwillingness of the USSR to change its "neutral approach" was not only due to its policy of not offending the power which controlled the Straits from where the Soviet Navy had to pass to enter into the Mediterranean, but also to its fear that if Greece extended its territorial waters to twelve miles it would lose the five important anchorages that its Navy had in the Aegean international waters in a period during which it was confronting a lack of bases in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the establishment of a 12-mile rule in the Aegean Sea might also disturb the movement of Soviet ships whose passage would depend on special authorization since it would be impossible for a ship coming from the Straits to enter the Mediterranean.

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28. Soviet-Greek Communique, op. cit., p. 10
29. Soviet-Greek Communique, op. cit., p. 10
31. Valinakis, Yannis, The Strategic Importance of Greece, in Y. Valinakis and P. Kitsos,
without passing either through Greek or Turkish territorial waters. With regard to Cyprus, the Soviet position was in favour of a UN formula. In January 1986, the Soviet Union reiterated a proposal (firstly made in late 1974) for the solution of the Cyprus problem. The proposal suggested the convening of a "representative international conference under the aegis of the UN". According to the USSR, the government of Cyprus, representatives of the Turkish-Cypriot community, Greece, Turkey, the members of the Security Council or even other states like non-aligned countries should take part in it. For the Soviets, the conference should achieve in:

1) Delimitarizing the island
2) Giving guarantees for its independence
3) Ensuring its unity and territorial integrity
4) Forging respect for its non-aligned status

Although the Greeks and the Greek-Cypriots agreed with this kind of 'internationalisation' of the Cyprus question, the Turkish-Cypriots - and, of course, the Turks - rejected it.

e) A necessary adjustment in an era of detente. The Greek-Soviet rapprochement as the Greek-Balkan one, reflected the need for harmonisation of Greece's foreign policy with that of its western allies. This objective was reflected in Karamanlis's description of his visit to the Soviet Union as "filling a vacuum in Greek

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eds, op. cit., p. 34

32. Vaner, Semih, Turkey between... op. cit., p. 69
foreign policy". Furthermore, the improvement of Greek-Soviet relations complemented and facilitated the amelioration of inter-Balkan co-operation. According to PASOK’s MEP Gazis, "it would be impossible to achieve improvement of Greece’s relations with its Balkan neighbours without contacting the power which ‘controlled’ two of them."

f) An attempt to increase Greece’s leverage with regard to the United States. Papandreou’s neutralist and often pro-soviet attitude on many international issues was not only due to important domestic factors but also represented Greece’s political will for a more independent stance in relation to the United States. The Soviets did everything to encourage Greece’s anti-western rhetoric and actions. Thus, during the negotiations between Greece and the USA about the future of American bases on Greek soil (1982), the Soviet Union confirmed that it had issued a warning to the effect that if the Turks tried to stir up trouble in the Aegean, the USSR would not "remain indifferent". Greece welcomed this statement as a useful contribution to its bargaining power. Favourable was also the coverage of Papandreou’s foreign policy in the soviet press. According to Pravda, "while in power, PASOK has not forgotten the anti-imperialist and antimonopoly slogans that continue to be popular among the masses".

34. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, p. 30269
35. Interview in Varkiza, op. cit.
36. The Economist, May 22, 1982, p. 79
37. Ibid
the newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union "has spoken and is speaking in its own voice". During his visit to Athens in 1983, Mr Tikhonov, the Soviet Union's Prime Minister, expressed Moscow's content with Greek foreign policy: "The talks that have begun tell us that the positions of the USSR and Greece on basic questions of the development of bilateral relations and on a number of international questions indicate the possibility of co-operation in the interests of strengthening peace and achieving disarmament".

As a result, two years later, during Papandreou's official visit to Moscow, a "Protocol on consultations" was signed. This protocol provided, inter alia, for consultation between Greece and the USSR in the event of situations "which would constitute a threat to peace, a violation of the principles of peaceful coexistence or would cause international tension or entail dangerous international complications".

II

Policies

In general, the PASOK government's pro-Soviet stance could be divided into two categories. The first could be described as

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39. Ibid
41. Greece: A Profile, op. cit.
'negative pro-Sovietism'. What matters in this category is Papandreou's unwillingness to condemn the USSR or the countries of eastern Europe. Hence, PASOK avoided condemning the Polish military and the Soviet Union for the declaration of martial law in Poland or the Russian leaders for the war in Afghanistan and for the destruction of the South Korean airliner. The second category could be described as 'positive pro-Sovietism'. Here Papandreou willingly supported Communist positions. Typical examples of this approach were the proposal for a six-month delay of the deployment of the US missiles in Europe, the initiative for a Balkan nuclear weapons-free zone and the 'initiative of the five continents'. The 'negative pro-Sovietism' expressed the PASOK government's will that what had been 'achieved' should remain not endangered. What was perceived as 'achieved'? Detente and good economic relations. Thus, following western reactions for Greece's positions, Papandreou stated that Greece's 'refusal of the cold war does not give the right to tax (.....) [her] with pro-sovietism'. On the other hand, 'positive pro-sovietism' was not mainly aimed at improving Greek-Soviet relations at the level of high politics but it was designed to help Greece's case in the West by increasing the country's leverage or by weakening other countries' leverage on her. Indeed, Greece's anti-westernism influenced positively the Greek-Soviet relations.

There is a strong element of continuity in Greek foreign

42. Ibid
43. Le Monde, 23 Novembre 1983
policy towards the Communist world in the period which followed the collapse of the military dictatorship in the country. Thus, the ten-year economic pact signed by Greece and the USSR in 1983 was "guided by the principles and provisions" of the 1979 agreement on economic and technical co-operation between the two countries. Similarly was also the importance that both Karamanlis and Papandreou attributed to Soviet support for the Greek positions in relation to the Cyprus problem. The perceived Turkish "expansionism" was the main reason for the Greek rapprochement with the Communist world in both the NDP and PASOK era. There is no doubt that unless the Greek governments change their perceptions about Turkey, Greece's main driving force of its approach in the Warsaw Pact region will remain the same.

III

Constraints

Relations between the superpowers largely determine the limits of the Greek-Soviet rapprochement. Hence, the Helsinki Conference and the beginning of a detente period influenced positively the decision of the Greek leaders to improve their country's relations with the Communist world. Undoubtedly, the revival of the cold war in the late 1970s had the opposite effect. Western reactions to Greece's relations with eastern bloc states

44. See Chapters 4 & 8
46. Compare the joint communiques signed in Moscow in 1979 (The Current Digest of the Soviet
is a good example. A climate of detente in East-West relations would help the Greeks as western reactions to a growing rapprochement between Greece and the USSR would be minimized. Here lie some questions related to perceptions of western reactions. Would a NDP government, for instance, purchase military auxiliary equipment from the Soviet Union worth $ 43 million \(^{47}\) (the first such Soviet sale to a member of NATO \(^{48}\) ) as PASOK did in 1984? Or would a NDP government appeal to both the USSR and the US not to conduct any nuclear tests before the next Soviet-American summit as Papandreou did in 1986? \(^{49}\) If we take into account that NDP's leadership attacked both actions the answer to both questions is undoubtedly no.

Thus, Greece's membership of NATO and of the EC restricts its foreign policy options by limiting co-operation with the USSR in the field of low politics. Further, the semi-developed nature of the Greek economy poses significant problems for increased economic exchanges: Greece does not export the technologically advanced products that the Soviet Union needs. Indeed, changes in the domestic milieux of the two countries are not of minor importance. The first significant development is the changing role in the international arena of Gorbachev's Soviet Union. If, for example, eastern European countries started to enjoy a less depen-

\(^{47}\) SIPRI Yearbook 1985, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 366
\(^{48}\) \textit{Military Technology} (Vol. 8 (10), 1984, p. 188) says worth $ 45 million
\(^{49}\) For the letter the five leaders sent to Gorbachev see \textit{The Current Digest of the Soviet Press}, Vol. 38 (11), 1986, p. 9. For Gorbachev's answer see \textit{Ibid}, Vol. 38 (18), 1985, pp. 20-
dent on the USSR status, then the freedom for manoeuvre of Greek foreign policy-makers would probably increase. The second is the future role of the Communist Party of Greece, a factor which will be discussed in detail in the respective chapter.

IV
Conclusions

It was proved that the basic objective of Greece's foreign policy vis-a-vis the USSR in the post-junta period was the countering of the Turkish "threat". Papandreou did not challenge this basic Greek foreign policy objective in the region. Thus, our hypothesis that the pattern of continuity in Greece's external policies was the dominant one was again confirmed. Consequently, although Papandreou attempted to upgrade economic issues in the Greek-Soviet agenda, security considerations gave the stigma of Greek foreign policy towards the USSR in the post-1974 era. Further, we showed that governmental change was the main source of foreign policy change. The latter was marked by a change in tactics: PASOK tried to reinforce Greek-Soviet ties by supporting pro-Soviet and anti-western positions in international fora. The revival of the cold war in the late 1970s increased western reactions to PASOK's positions. In general, the development of Greek-Soviet relations was not perceived by Greek leaders as a real alternative to Greece's membership of the western community.

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50. See the interesting study Dawisha, Karen, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform: The Great Challenge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988
51. Chapter 9
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Source: The Economist, April 11, 1987, p. 72 (Lloyd's Register)
Chapter 8

Greece and the European Community

Greece joined the European Community (EC) as its first associate member in 1962 having first examined the possibility to join EFTA. The Association Agreement was unique in the sense that it envisaged the full accession of Greece into the Common Market within 22 years. A few months after the Greek military coup of April 21, 1967 and in response to it, the Community limited the application of the Agreement to its "current administration". As a result, the discussions between Greece and the EC on agricultural harmonisation were stopped and the financial protocol which had accompanied the Agreement was frozen. Nevertheless, the process of tariff dismantlement continued uninterruptedly for all the seven years of the Greek junta.

In 1975, the new democratic government of Greece headed by Karamanlis (also Prime Minister in the 1956-1963 period) tabled a

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2. See Article 72. Although Turkey's Association Agreement with the EC contained the same mention (Article 28) there was not a timetable which could ensure the Turkish accession into the Community


4. This, however, has lost its meaning following the agreement on wines (1970) and the negotiations for the territorial extension of the Association Agreement (1974)

5. The Association Agreement was reactivated in December 1974
proposition for the full entry of Greece into the EC. In this Chapter I shall examine the objectives of Greece’s application; the process of the negotiations for her accession; the NDPS’s and PASOK’s policies in both the EC and EPC spheres as well as the long term opportunities and constraints that Greek decision-makers believe that they can exploit or have to confront.

I

Background

Greece’s application for full membership of the EC came partly as a “natural” event, as a consequence of the Association Agreement. On the one hand, any unilateral renunciation of the Association Treaty by Greece would have catastrophic consequences for the country’s economy given the importance of the Community markets for the Greek agricultural and industrial products: 6 By 1968 Greek exports had completely duty free access to the EC while by 1977 two thirds of Greece’s imports from the EC were also duty free. 7 Furthermore, when Karamanlis demanded full membership, Greece had adopted most of EC policies towards third countries. 8 However, any disengagement was perceived as irrational by the Greek decision-makers as the consequences of the application of

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6. The share of Greek exports directed to the EC markets increased from 36% in 1962 to 42% in 1971 whereas the share of Greek imports from the Community countries increased from 43% to 44% over the same period (Yannopoulos, 6, Greece and the EEC, op. cit., p. 21)


8. Ibid
the Association Agreement were deemed positive. On the other hand, full membership of the Community offered two major economic advantages. First, access to the EC's Funds, especially EAGGF. Secondly, as the development of the Mediterranean policy of the EC in the early 1970s was threatening the comparative advantage of the Greek products in Europe's markets, full membership of the Community seemed as the only way to protect the competitiveness of the country's economy. As a result, the decision of the Greek foreign policy-makers to opt for full membership was to certain extent a "natural" adjustment of a key orientation which was embodied in the Association Treaty.

The accession to the EC became the number one priority of Greek foreign policy in the post-junta era. According to Karamanlis "the main objective of the Greek foreign policy is Europe to which we feel that we belong organically". In the words of the Greek PM "beyond the economic reasons, the as soon as possible entry into the European Community is imposed by political reasons, reasons literally national". Thus, apart from the economic factors which were closely related to the constraints posed by the


10. Verney, S., op. cit., p. 258

11. Interview to Tanyug Agency (June 4, 1975) (Cited in Bilsios, D., op. cit., p. 120)

Association Treaty, four political factors played an important role in Greece's decision to join the EC:

a) The strengthening of its democratic institutions. In contrast to the Association Agreement which was perceived by the then Greek government as a way to defuse an alleged Communist threat, Greece's application for full membership was seen as a way to decrease the possibilities of a new intervention by the Army. As Karamanlis put it: "(...)

b) The attempt to counterbalance traditional ties with the United States. The initiation of the EPC in the early 1970s and the more independent stance that the Community had started to develop vis-à-vis the United States contributed to the belief of the Greek foreign policy-makers that the EC was gradually becoming a new autonomous political entity, a new superpower. In such a context, the Community was perceived as an alternative to the country's dependence on the US. As Karamanlis confessed to his

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13. Verney, S., op. cit., p. 255


15. Verney, S., op. cit., p. 259
Foreign minister, Bitsios: "I tried to free Greece from the protectors. Because of its geographical position Greece is historically compelled to lean on a superpower. As a member of the United Europe she will be unassailable".

c) The endeavour to improve the country's bargaining position in relation to Turkey. An analyst\(^1\)\(^7\) distinguishes two periods in the Greek expectations. The first, preceding the Commission's Opinion on Greek Application for membership is the period of high expectations, the era during which the Greek foreign policy-makers regarded the EC as the future guarantor of the country's frontiers and as the supporter of the Greek interests in Cyprus. The second is the period of disillusionment. The references of the Commission's Opinion to the Greek-Turkish dispute\(^1\)\(^8\) and the steps that the Nine were taking towards Turkey so as to preserve the political balance in the region after Greece's accession dampened "earlier Greek hopes that Community membership would improve their political stance vis-à-vis the Turks"\(^1\)\(^9\). However, despite the low profile of the Greek-Turkish dispute that the Greek government was forced to keep in the negotiations for entry into the EC,\(^2\)\(^0\) the

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belief that full membership would increase Greece’s leverage in relation to Turkey was reinforced by both the Turkish reactions to Greece’s application\(^2\) and the expressed will of the Turkish foreign policy-makers for a future entry of their country into the Community\(^2\).

d) The participation of Greece in an important centre of decision making. Karamanlis’ objectives did not only include the end of Greece’s perceived isolation, the end of her "eternal solitude" in his own words, but also the improvement of the international position of the country through its "equitable participation" in the processes of European integration. According to the Greek PM "the idea of Union - of any Union - is almost identified with the idea of power\(^2\). As the "European Union" "with its authority and power will influence decisively the international developments"\(^2\) Greece should not be absent from the processes which would lead to it.

The negotiations for Greece’s entry into the EC dealt mainly with the nature and length of the transitional period which would follow her accession. Greece appeared so anxious to join the Community that it decided not to raise some questions which might have delayed the negotiations. Three important political factors can explain the Greek decision to hasten the negotiations’ process,

\(^{21}\) Stephanou, K., *op. cit.* p. 67
Tsakaloyannis, P., The EC and the Greek-Turkish Dispute, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-48

\(^{22}\) Stephanou, K., *Ibid.,* p. 71

\(^{23}\) Speech in Aachen’s Town Hall (May 5, 1978) (Quoted in Kartakis, E., *op. cit.*, p. 113)

\(^{24}\) Karamanlis’s Speech after the signing of the Treaty of Accession into the EC (May 28, 1979) (Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 115)
a decision which led to the resignation of the leaders of the Greek negotiating team in January 1977:

a) The disengagement of the Greek candidature from the applications for full membership of the Iberian states. The 'threat' for the 'globalisation' of the negotiations was posed in mid-1977 with the applications of Portugal and Spain to join as full members the EC. Nevertheless, the Greek foreign policy-makers were successful in keeping away their country's application from the candidature of the Iberian countries by using as an argument the advanced stage of the Greek-EC negotiations.

b) The rise of the anti-EC PASOK as the main opposition party in the national elections of 1977. As the Karamanlis government was well aware of the fact that the balance sheet of the first few years of membership would be particularly important in establishing a favourable opinion on it, it made efforts to secure more resources from the Community for the transitional period than it could hope to receive later. This, combined with the facts that the next national elections were due in 1981 and that PASOK had promised a referendum on Greek membership if it gained power added another incentive for the hastening of the negotiations' process.


26. For the attempts towards the 'globalisation' of the negotiations but also for the disengagement of the Greek application see Kontogeorgis, Georgios, Greece in Europe, Athens: Pagosios Ekhotikos Organismos, 1985, pp. 94-118, [In Greek]

27. See, for example, the letter Karamanlis' letter to the nine leaders of the EC countries (April 26, 1977) (Published in Ibid, pp. 102-106

The fear of interminable negotiations. "In a negotiation like that", writes former Prime Minister Rallis (1980-1981), "one of the most difficult problems is the assessment by the country-candidate of when it has reached the maximum possible level of its demands (...)." 29 "I feared", had said Karamanlis to his Foreign Minister, Bitsios, "that if we did not hasten, our accession might have been delayed or have not even taken place". 30 Thus, according to the NDP government, the acceleration of the negotiations' process secured the success of Greece's application.

Karamanlis hoped for the negotiations to be completed in 1978 and accession to take place in 1980. 31 Nevertheless, because of disagreements concerning Greece's contribution to the EC budget 32 April 3, 1979 marked the successful conclusion of accession negotiations. The Treaty of Accession provided for a five-year transitional period (1981-1985) aimed at the Greek adaptation to Community membership with the exception of a seven-year transitional period for two agricultural products (tomatoes and peaches) and for free movement of labour between Greece and the other member states. 33 On January 1, 1981, ten months before PASOK's electoral victory, Greece became the tenth full member of the EC.


30. Quoted by Bitsios, D., op. cit., p. 126

31. Kontogeorgis, G., op. cit., p. 121

32. Ibid, pp. 196-201

In August 1981, the NDP government faced with a dramatic increase of the deficit of Greece’s trade balance submitted a Memorandum to the Commission of the EC asking for increased protection for the Mediterranean agricultural products and for the incomes of the farmers of the poor regions; the strengthening of the regional policy of the Community through the increase of the budgets of the Regional Development Fund and of the Guidance sector of the EAGGF; and the restructure of the former with greater EC expenditure on countries with national income below the EC average. The Memorandum was based on Protocol 7 of the Accession Treaty which envisaged the possibility of taking complementary measures by the Community for the development of the Greek economy. On the same protocol the PASOK government based its own Memorandum a few months later.

II

Policies

A. The EC

In his foreign policy statement to the Greek Parliament on November 22, 1981, Papandreou criticised the terms of Greek access-


35. For the full text see Rallis, G., *op. cit.*, pp. 44-47

sion into the European Communities by arguing that they exacerbated many of Greece's economic problems and created new ones. According to the Greek Prime Minister, PASOK favoured a referendum on Greek membership of the EC. "We note", said Papandreou, "that the decision to conduct a referendum rests with the President of the Republic as his prerogative". Thus, from the very outset, the new government abandoned the idea of a referendum as the Presidential office was held since May 1980 by Constantine Karamanlis, the pro-European former Prime Minister. However, since the "referendum on vital national issues" was "a presidential right and not, under any circumstances a true privilege of the President of the Republic" as Papandreou argued in the Parliament, "the President could not refuse a referendum if the Prime Minister asked for one". Thus, Papandreou's primary concern was not constitutional although it was linked with the role of the President in the sense that the government wanted to avoid a rupture with him by taking a resolution within the Parliament.

Nevertheless, the Greek Socialists did not really want the renunciation of full membership. Hence, although Papandreou stated in the Greek Parliament that PASOK was in favour of a special

37. General Secretariat for Press and Information, Greek Government Programme, Presented by the PM Andreas G. Papandreou, Athens 1981, p. 16
40. Stephanou, op. cit.
relationship with the European Communities, a few days later, at
the opening meeting of the European Council, he outlined his
government’s policy by saying that Greece would seek a special
status within the Community41. However, Papandreou said to the
other European leaders that he could not be sure that it would be
possible to take the necessary measures within the Communities so
as to secure the special status which he sought.42 Hence, the
Greek leader tried to use a possible Greek withdrawal from the EC
as a diplomatic atout, as a negotiating leverage, as a bargaining
chip.43 In London Papandreou posed it very clearly, "The main ad-
vantage that I have", he said, "is that I am not obliged and there
is no need to explain what I mean with this term".44 In the mean-
time, till the fulfilment of the Greek demands, the Greek govern-
ment would follow, according to the Greek Prime Minister, two
basic policies:

1. Active participation in the Community’s institutions. In
Papandreou’s words the Greek government would "give battle within
the organs of the European Communities to defend the interests of
the Greek people"45.

2. Pursuit of deviations from Community regulations and directives
when these would be deemed necessary "for the protection of

41. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives
42. Ibid
43. Interview with Basil Mathiopoulos, Athens, 30.3.1988
44. To Vima, November 24, 1981, [In Greek]
45. General Secretariat for Press and Information, op. cit., p. 18
(Greece's) workers and producers and for the development of the country"\textsuperscript{46}. According to Papandreou, the Greek Socialists would not only "exhaust the escape clauses and every margin allowed by the Treaty of Rome or the accession treaty" but they would also take measures "independently of Community obligations".\textsuperscript{47}

In March 1982, the Greek government submitted to the European Commission a Memorandum\textsuperscript{48} whose logic was very similar to that submitted by the Rallis government in 1981. In the Memorandum, the Greek Socialists presented their demands by stressing "the special nature of the Greek economy". This was due to "structural weaknesses, inequalities and imbalances within the economy, but the severity of its problems stemmed to some degree from the international crisis and the consequences of accession". According to Papandreou government, "the special features of the Greek economy hamper(ed) its smooth functioning within the Community framework" because "the Community rules and mechanisms continue(d) to be shaped and to operate to suit the central and developed economies". By arguing that the "special features" of the Greek economy were ignored by the treaty of accession, the Greeks asked for a special status in an unchanged Community which would involve reduced obligations by "the recognition by Community bodies, for a sufficiently long period, of the need for derogation from Com-

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid

munity competition rules". In addition, the Greek government demanded "increased Community support for specific projects for the development of sectors, branches and regions".

The other aspect of the Greek argument dealt with the negotiation of the "Mandate of 30th May" and the more general discussion for a reform of Community policies. The Memorandum stressed clearly the Greek perception that the main problem of the Community was "the widening of economic imbalances between the more and less developed members" and that there was the need of "an absolute priority" for a fundamental reform of Community policies towards the goal of convergence, of cohesion.

The main differences between the PASOK's Memorandum and the ND's one were first, the crucial importance that the PASOK government attributed to it: its demands constituted "the minimum possible for creating conditions for Greek membership of the European Communities which will not be in conflict with basic Greek national interests"; and secondly, the absence of a demand for derogations from Community competition rules in the ND's Memorandum. This was partly due to the economic philosophy of the two parties, with ND giving more importance to the positive aspects of free competition and with PASOK attributing more significance to the benefits of protectionism as its economic policy was aiming at the development of the Greek economy through the reinforcement of domestic demand.49

49. Commission of the EC, ibid, p. 93

50. Interview with Stephanos Manos, Athens, 2.3.1988
One year after the Greek government presented its Memorandum, the Commission responded by rejecting the Greek demand for a special status: "The idea that Greece might apply the rules of the Treaties or the Act of Accession in its own way or only in part was ruled out from the beginning". However, by indicating its general agreement with the description of the Greek economic situation given in the Memorandum, the Commission suggested that in relation to the call for greater re-distribution, the Greek needs could partly be met in the context of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs). The Commission proposed that Greece should receive 2,542 million ECU's under the IMPs between 1985 and 1991. On the other hand, the Commission promised to take a "flexible approach" with regard to competition rules and envisaged some "temporary derogations" inspired by Protocol No 7 to the Act of Accession and allowed by the escape clauses of the Treaty of Rome. Thus, the introduction of VAT was postponed for three years while minor taxes and levies that were imposed on imported goods were incorporated into a unified regulatory tax which will be faced out by January 1989.

The Commission's response was received favourably by the Greek government which stated that although the proposals of the Commission were "somewhat vague", they "were positive in many

52. The IMPs had been under discussion since 1978
53. Commission of the EC, No 16, op. cit., points 1.4.1-1.4.2
54. British Overseas Trade Board, op. cit., p. 1
respects" and they "fully appreciated the problems facing Greece and the need for a decisive action to resolve them". Thus, although the Greeks argued that the Commission's response "was not so favourable in relation to the protection of industry and especially of the sectors" that Greece wanted to develop "for her" participation to the new wave of technological change" for the first time the PASOK government announced its intention to keep Greece into the EC: Although Papandreou continued to argue that Greece should never have entered the Community in the first place, he declared in the Greek Parliament that a withdrawal from the Community would be a similar mistake, since the potential benefits of withdrawal were outweighed by its costs.

Nevertheless, in December 1984, during the last day of the Dublin summit, Papandreou threatened to veto the Community negotiations for the accession of Spain and Portugal if the IMFs were not financed at the levels agreed in 1983. The Greek move was successful: In 1985 and 1986 Greece absorbed 319 million from the IMFs budget. However, despite this approach in the Dublin summit, the Greek Socialists were not in principle against the entry of the Iberian countries into the EC. According to

55. Commission of the EC, No 16, op. cit., point 1.4.13
56. Ibid, point 1.4.2
57. Greek Parliament Debated, 7.12.1984, [In Greek]
58. The Times, December 1, 1983
59. Time, December 17, 1984, pp. 28-29
Agence Europe, December 6, 1984
60. British Overseas Trade Board, op. cit., p. 2
Papandreou, Greece supported the accession of Spain and Portugal "not because their products (were) not competitive (with the Greek ones), but because (Greece) need(ed) to forge the front of the poor".81.

This perception of a conflict between the North and the South of the EC - where the term "South" included Ireland62 - underlived also the "pro-European philosophy" of NPD63. In that context, the goal of "economic and social cohesion" became the cornerstone of the approach of the Greek Socialists towards the EC. For Papandreou, "it is unthinkable to talk of European integration without working to remove disparities".64 According to the Greek government, if the Community was a customs union then Greece would have no reason to participate".65 As a result, the Greek Socialists argued in favour of the increase of the Community's own resources and against the curtailment of the expenditures of the structural funds.66 The Greek government believed that the increase of EC's own resources was the "essential condition" so as to attain the objective of cohesion.67

61. Speech in Larissa, April 1, 1984 (General Secretariat of Press and Information, Speeches of the PM Andrea G. Papandreou in 1985, op. cit., pp. 118-119)

62. Ibid

63. Interview with I. Varvitsiotis, Athens, op. cit.

64. Agence Europe, June 23, 1983


66. Speech in Larissa, op. cit.

67. Agence Europe, May 15, 1986
Interview of Andreas Papandreou to Andre Deliyannis, Europe, October 1983, No 10, p. 3
In general, the important role of the big agricultural sector of the Greek economy determined to a large extent the PASOK's policy towards the Community. Here lay the basic conflict of interest between Greece and the developed European economies, the "Directorate" as Papandreou liked to call them. Hence, the attempts for a "rationalisation" of the Common Agricultural Policy aiming at the reduction of the labour force in agriculture, confronted the opposition of the Greek foreign policy makers. They believed that the speed of the introduction of reforms and the attempted reduction of the sources devoted to the Community price-support system were threatening "vital national interests".

This reinforced their strong belief that the power of veto was a conditio sine qua non for the effective defence of Greek national interests within the Community framework. Hence, during the discussions for the "Schröder Declaration on European Union" draft by the Stuttgart European Council, in June 1983, Greece insisted that particular reference should be made to the Luxembourg conclusions. Furthermore, in the European Parliament, during the discussions for the "Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union", PASOK's MEP Plaskovitis criticised the Spinelli initiative by arguing that "unanimity on matters affecting national interests cannot be abandoned because it constitutes a last resort, the ul-

68. 28.9% of the Greek active population is employed in agriculture. The respective number for EC-10 is 7.2% and for the EC-12 (Eurostat, Basic Statistics of the Community, 24th Edition, p. 119)

69. See, for example, EC (Com) (1985), 333, 2.8.1985, Perspectives of the Common Agricultural Policy, (Green Bible)

70. Agence Europe, June 16, 1983
timate means of overturning unfavourable decisions which are harm-
ful to the interests of the small countries in the Community". 71

But what is "harmful to the interests" of Greece? What is a positive and what a negative economic repercussion? The PASOK government distinguished two main types of economic repercussions due to Greece's membership of the EC. 72 The first was financial and dealt with the income transfers through the Community Funds (EAGGF, SF, ERDF, IMPS) (See Table 8.1). The second concerned the Greek balance of payments where the results of Community membership were deemed as "quite negative". This basic perception of the Greek foreign policy decision makers determined their policy towards the Community:

"Whatever the subject under discussion, whether it be removing barriers to trade or implementing farm policies, the presence of Greek negotiators is regarded with some trepidation: they are expected either to demand an exemption from Community rules, or to insist on more money" 73

Indeed, this tactic had a diplomatic cost. According to a British MEP, there were "many people in the Berlaymont head-
quarters of the Brussels Commission whose patience (was) rapidly becoming exhausted with a country where the government (....) con-

71. European Parliament Debates, September 13, 1983

72. Statement of the Greek Minister for National Economy, Gerasimos Arsenis (Agence Europe, November 5, 1983)


73. Financial Times, February 3, 1986
sistently demonstrated a paper-thin adherence to the spirit and principles of the Treaty of Rome.\textsuperscript{74}

However, both the principles and consequences of this approach are controversial. First, EC membership is just one of a number of variables that determine the Greek balance of payments. Thus, the international recession contributed to the decline of Greece's competitiveness while domestic policies (eg. nationalisations) influenced the performance of the Greek economy. Secondly, EC membership has a wide variety of repercussions for the Greek economy whose influence can be compared with the two types mentioned above (eg. foreign investment). Thirdly, and more importantly, the efforts of the Greek government "to isolate a large section of the domestic economy from competitive market pressures" was considered by some analysts\textsuperscript{75} as "one of the most regrettable aspects" of Greece's economic policy decision making because "the intensification of price and quality competition creates the much-needed pressures to increase domestic productivity".

Nevertheless, this latter criticism based on the neoconservative economics was unacceptable for the Greek government since its economic policy was based on the Keynesian economics of protectionism.\textsuperscript{76} In that context 1985 marks a turning point in

\textsuperscript{74} Cotrell, Richard, (MEP), Greece and the European Community, \textit{Contemporary Review}, Vol. 247, November 1985, p. 236


Greece's relations with the EC. In that year, the Greek economy confronted serious imbalances in its domestic and external accounts. Although the inflation rate had moderated since 1981, it continued to be substantially above the EC average. Consumer price rises at around 18% had been due to a continuous strong monetary growth stemming partly from a burgeoning public sector deficit (18% of GNP) as well as to the reintroduction of full wage indexation in 1984. The persistently large current account deficit on the balance of payments and the disturbing increase of the country's foreign debt (12,318 million $ in 1984) led the Greek economic policy decision makers to announce an austerity programme in October 1985. The "stabilisation measures" that were adopted included a 15% devaluation of the drachma; a two-year wage freeze together with plans for a radical alteration of the existing index-linked wages system; direct measures to limit imports; retail price controls; public spending cuts and stricter penalties for tax evasion. In parallel, Greece negotiated with the Commission the provision of an ECU 1.75 billion six-year loan from the

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77. Interview with P. Avgerinos, op. cit.
Featherstone, Kevin, Socialist Parties and European Integration, Manchester University Press, 1988, pp. 183-184
Financial Times, February 3, 1986


EC for balance of payments support.\textsuperscript{10} Being based on Articles 108-109 of the Rome Treaty, the facility was agreed to be available in two tranches (1986 and 1987) and was subject to quite strict economic measures most of which were included in the October austerity measures and the 1986 budget.

The negative developments in the Greek economy and the austerity programme that was adopted influenced the relations between Greece and the Community. First, the stabilisation measures as well as the change in the economic philosophy of the Greek government in favour of the private sector and the foreign capital as levers of economic growth brought the Greek economic policy in line with that of the other member countries (convergence of economic policies). Secondly, as the Commission used the provision of the loan as a leverage in exchange for the adaptation of the Greek market in the acquis communautaire,\textsuperscript{11} it facilitated the procedure of the gradual integration of Greece into the Community. Thirdly, the loan contributed to the positive perception of the Community in Greece since it substituted the politically unacceptable alternative of the International Monetary Fund. Thus, the phrase of an analyst, written in 1981, that "the fact that EC entry coincided with growing economic and social difficulties will encourage those already critical of EC membership to blame the Community for every negative development"\textsuperscript{12} became completely

\textsuperscript{81} EEC: An Economic Report, Published by National Westminster Bank, December 1985
\textit{Financial Times,} February 3, 1985

\textsuperscript{82} D.J. 85/543, Decision of the Council (December 9, 1985) (L 341/18/19.12.1985)

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid
outdated: By the end of 1985, the more the Greek economy was declining, the more the importance of the EC for its development was being reinforced. However, for Kostas Simitis, the then Minister of National Economy, the IMPs and the Single European Act contributed much more than the stabilisation programme to the creation of positive perceptions about the EC in the Greek government.84

In the first five years of Greek accession the interdependence between the Greek economy and the economies of the other member countries was strengthened. Greek exports towards the EC increased from 47.6% of the total in 1980 to 53.3% in 1985.85 Similarly, Greek imports from the EC grew from 39.7% of the total in 1980 to 46.7% in 1985.86 The PASOK government had never considered seriously Greece’s withdrawal from the Community. Nevertheless, the growing interdependence between Greece and the other nine and later eleven member states ensured that the "love-hate relationship" was becoming a "love relationship".87

b. The EPC Framework

With regard to the European Political Co-operation (EPC), Greece expressed minority opinions in a number of issues.

84. Kohler, B., op. cit., p. 150
87. Ibid
In March 1982, she disagreed with her EPC partners over the imposition of economic sanctions on Poland and the USSR as a response to the declaration of martial law in the former (December 1980) and did not participate in them. Apart from domestic reasons, the Greek position was due to:

1. An attempt of not endangering the strong economic links that the country had with the states of Eastern Europe.

2. The strong belief of the Greek foreign policy-makers that the reinforcement of tensions in the East-West relations was reducing the freedom for manoeuvre of small states like Greece. According to Papandreou, Greece was against the imposition of sanctions because "the biggest problem that Europe is confronting today is the conflict between East and West. And everything that stirs up this conflict is dangerous for our survival".

3. The perception of the PASOK government that the EC countries should resist US pressures and start gradually to develop their own independent approach in international relations. As the deputy Foreign Minister for European Affairs, Pagalos had put it: "We deeply believe that the autonomy of Europe from the influence of the United States will create not only new frontiers for the national development but it will also positively contribute to the

88. *Financial Times*, February 3, 1986

89. Rozakis, Christos, *Greek Foreign Policy and the European Communities*, Athens: Idryma Mesogeiaikon Meloton, 1987, pp. 67-69 and 101-102, [In Greek]

90. See Chapter 6

91. See the speech of Foreign Minister Yannis Haralambopoulos in the European Parliament (July 5, 1983) (The First Greek Presidency in the EC, *op. cit.*, p. 9)

pursuit of detente and international peace". Indeed, this perception was largely a misperception since Europe was already a rather autonomous actor in the international arena.

Nevertheless, the whole issue moved into the background when in December 1983 and after the lifting of the martial law in Poland (July 1983), the EC lifted her sanctions. However, the same reasons led Greece to differentiate her position in relation to her nine partners when in September 1983 a civilian South Korean Boeing was shot down by Soviet military airplanes. Greece and France were the only EC countries which did not take part in the consequent 15-day boycott of civilian flights towards the USSR and the Greek government forced the Ten to agree on the lowest common denominator of their positions in the final communique.

With regard to Middle East issues both the WDP and PASOK's positions in the EPC machinery reflected the more pro-Arab orientation in relation to the other member states of Greek foreign policy. Thus, in relation to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Greek government proposed the inclusion of a phrase in the final communique mentioning the possibility of economic sanctions against Israel. Moreover, in 1986, and despite its willingness to condemn terrorism "in general", the Greek government

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94. Rozakis, *op. cit.*, p. 69

95. *Agence Europe*, September 14, 1983 ("If partners fail to agree, it is better not to sign such banalites") Rozakis, *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73 and 102-103

96. Ifestos, Panayiotis, *European Political Co-operation: Towards a Framework of Suprana-
refused to condemn Syria for the Hindawi affair. Indeed, it should be noted that Greece is the only European country which does not have full diplomatic relations with Israel since Spain established full diplomatic relations with this country in early 1986.

In general, in the period 1981-1986, Greece showed very little willingness to make concessions in order to bring her positions more into line with those of her European partners. Indeed, the basic reason for this policy was Greece's strong ties with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Arab world. Moreover, the Greek socialists, having accepted that Greece's membership of the EC was an irreversible fact, were ideologically unprepared: they did not have a European conscience while their programme did not include a vision of European unity. Hence, Greece under Papandreou contributed to the "intergovernmental spirit" of the EPC machinery. Nevertheless, the EPC offered new opportunities for the Greek foreign policy-makers. Thus, in August 1983, when Greece was holding the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, the Greek Foreign Minister sent a letter to his nine colleagues, suggesting that the Ten should work out a common text so as to achieve a six month postponement of the deployment of Euromissiles in order to facilitate the Geneva talks between the superpowers. The Greek

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97. The Times, October 29, 1986
Agence Europe, October 29, 1986

98. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 34178

99. Rozakis, op.cit., p.104
initiative reflected both the PASOK's government policy for the pursuit of detente in East-West relations and its attempts to satisfy domestic considerations. Although it was rejected by the other EC governments, it demonstrated the usefulness of the EPC forum for the promotion of Greece's interests. This became clear in both 1985 and 1986, when the Greek government used the violation of human rights and the lack of democratic freedom in Turkey to show that the road that the latter should follow to enter into the Community passed through Athens. Furthermore, Greece used the EPC machinery to promote the Greek positions in relation to the Cyprus problem by trying to challenge the already established EC view that it was merely an inter-communal dispute and by trying to project the "international dimensions of the issue". In addition, Greece used its Presidency for the revival of the Euro-Arab dialogue where the PASOK government believed that Greece could play a central role in bridging the differences between Europe and the Arab world.

Nevertheless, the Greek membership of the EPC had also some negative impacts for the freedom of manoeuvre of the Greek foreign policy-makers. These constraints were reinforced by the existence of conservative governments in two main European countries: West

For the full text see The First Greek Presidency in the European Community, op.cit., p. 167

100. Sir Geoffrey Howe, for example, rejected angrily the Greek idea as "the wrong proposal, in the wrong forum, at the wrong time" (The Economist, September 17, 1983, p. 50)

101. See, for example, Papandreou's speech in the European Council of Hague (Rozakis, op.cit., p. 112)

102. See, for example, the Greek positions in the Copenhagen summit (December 1982) (Financial Times, December 22, 1982)
Germany and the United Kingdom. Even the Socialist France was following a pro-Atlanticist foreign policy. Indeed, the fact that Greece was a small state was enough to ensure the labels of "anti-European" and/or of "individualist" for every time that she demurred from the commonly agreed line. As a result, in September 1982, Lord Bethell, the then political affairs spokesman of the European Democratic Group, probably expressing the posture of wider European circles, gave to the Socialist government of Greece "a stiff warning that its reluctance to cooperate politically with other EEC governments would affect adversely its economic negotiations with the Community". Growing reactions from Greece's EC partners over PASOK government's positions in the EPC framework forced the Greek Foreign Minister, Haralambopoulos, to an apologetic statement in his speech to the European Parliament in July 5, 1983:

"My country is not only the last in chronological order member of the Community but also acceded into it when the procedures of political cooperation and the Community's positions in many international problems had already developed. Consequently, the acceptance of the acquis communautaire on its whole entails for us a higher political cost which in some cases we cannot afford to pay".

For the leader of New Democracy, Constantine Mitsotakis,

103. Speech by Haralambopoulos, op. cit., p. 8
104. Ifestos, P., op. cit., p. 502
105. The Times, September 8, 1982
Greece's participation in the EPC forced the PASOK government to adopt a more moderate foreign policy. However, there is very little evidence that Greece showed any willingness to "Europeanise" her positions or that the PASOK government bowed to EC pressures. Nevertheless, two cases confirm the allegation of the Greek leader of the opposition. The first has to do with the South Korean airliner affair where the Greek government initially refused to condemn the Soviet Union. A few days after the respective EPC meeting, in a television interview, the German Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, accused Greece for its posture by saying that she caused a "confidence crisis" in the Community. The total isolation of Greece but also the confirmation of Soviet responsibility led the Greek Presidency to alter its position: Greek Foreign Minister Yannis Haralambopoulos, speaking for the EC in the UN General Assembly, blamed the Soviet action, by thus uncovering a behind the scenes "compromise". The second has to do with terrorism in relation to which Papandreou acknowledged that Greece had been pressed by Britain (and the US) "to develop a very hard common policy". Thus, on January 27

106. Speech by Haralambopoulos, op. cit., p. 8
108. Agence Europe, September 14, 1983
109. Even the European Parliament condemned the Soviet action with an overwhelming majority (128 for and 19 against)
110. Rozakis, op. cit., p. 73
For the text of the speech see The First Greek Presidency of the European Community, op. cit., p. 46
1986, Greece (and Spain) opposed any reference to Libya included in an EC declaration condemning states supporting terrorism. \(^{112}\) On April 22, a few days after the American raid on Tripoli, an EPC meeting agreed to reduce the number of Libyan diplomats "to the absolute minimum" and that any Libyan expelled from one EC country would be banned from all twelve. \(^{112}\) However, some days later, Greece announced that it would delay sanctions until presented with "tangible evidence" of Libyan complicity in terrorist acts. \(^{114}\) In early June, NDP alleged that two Libyan diplomats in Athens had been expelled earlier by another European state. \(^{115}\) Following accusations by the American State Department that Greece was undermining the Western anti-terrorist efforts, the PASOK government reduced the Libyan diplomatic mission in Athens, thereby complying with the measures taken by the other European countries in mid-May. \(^{116}\) Nevertheless, the Greek Socialists showed again clearly their unwillingness to consent to the pursuit of policies that "affect radically" \(^{117}\) Greece's diplomatic relations with her neighbours. Hence, although during the course of the negotiations for Greece's entry into the Community, the NDP government had promised to bring its voting in the UN more into line

\(^{111}\) The Guardian, December 19, 1986

\(^{112}\) Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 34455

\(^{113}\) Ibid, p. 34459


\(^{115}\) Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 34638

\(^{116}\) Ibid, p. 34638 and 34459
with those of its partners\textsuperscript{118}, both the NDP and PASOK governments found it difficult to put a Community consensus above what they perceived as Greek national interest.\textsuperscript{119}

However, the "points of friction" between Greece and its EPC partners will be reduced in the near future. And this for two reasons: First, because of the gradual improvement of the relations between the superpowers. Thus, the two summits of the leaders of the two superpowers in Geneva (November 1985) and in Reykjavik (October 1986) and the positive prospects in the negotiations for nuclear disarmament showed that a new era of detente was emerging.\textsuperscript{120} Secondly, because of the gradual de-radicalisation of Greek foreign policy, a process partly due to the economic decline of the country.

\section*{III}

\textbf{Constraints}

In relation to European integration, the PASOK government was "not opposed to the idea of a United Europe"\textsuperscript{121}. Nevertheless, it posed two major preconditions. First, that economic integration should precede integration in the foreign policy sphere.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{117} The Guardian, \textit{op. cit.}
  \item \textsuperscript{118} Tsakaloyannis, Panos, Greece: Old Problems, New Prospects, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 133
  \item \textsuperscript{119} Heila, Eirini, European Political Co-operation in the UN General Assembly and the Position of Greece, in K. Stephanou and P. Kazakos, eds, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 348-366
  \item \textsuperscript{120} Valinakis, Yannis, \textit{An Introduction to Nuclear Strategy}, Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, pp. 82-89, [In Greek]
\end{itemize}
the road that was leading to economic integration passed, according to the Greek Socialists, through the gradual elimination of the existing "acute social and economic inconsistencies and disparities among the member states but also among the various regions of the Common Market". In Deputy Foreign Minister's, Pagalos, words: "There is not a procedure of integration which was not based in a procedure of economic convergence. Within a democratic framework, those whose economic development and economic level is damaged will refuse to consent." At the July 1985 EC summit in Milan, the Greek government tried to block the calling of an intergovernmental conference, fearing the predominance of a "neo-conservative" perception of European integration, of a perception giving more importance to the completion of the internal market than to the reduction of the economic inequalities among the member states. Furthermore, Greece (as Britain and Denmark which joined her) was anxious about the extent to which majority voting would be introduced. However, the other EC states decided to convoke the intergovernmental conference (decision of the Council of Ministers in Luxembourg on December 1-2, 1985) and Greece (and Denmark) announced that they would join. In February 1986, Papandreou signed the Single

121. Speech by Plaskovitis, op. cit.
123. Ibid
125. Ibid, p. 411
European Act and the Greek government expressed its satisfaction for the result of the negotiations. First, in relation to the institutional revision of the Rome Treaty and the decision for majority voting on matters of the internal market, Papandreou argued that "there is anyway - and there is going to be - the possibility of a negative minority". Secondly, in relation to the revision of the third part of the Treaty of Rome and the inclusion of a Community commitment for the reinforcement of its "economic and social cohesion", the Greek Socialists presented it domestically as a "victory". Nevertheless, the goal of "financial discipline" was apparent in the revised treaty: there was not any concrete commitment for the increase of the Community's own resources. The whole issue of the increase of the economic resources of the EC will be of crucial importance for PASOK's and ND's perceptions of EC membership. Although in the short-term, as noted earlier, the decline of the Greek economy reinforces the positive image of the EC in Greece, in the long-term the gradual completion of the internal market will reinforce the negative one. As the Greek foreign policy-makers perceive the impacts of EC membership on the Greek balance of payments as mainly negative, the gradual elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers will become intolerable for the Greeks if it will not be accompanied with a considerable increase of EC funds. Of course, this will be true

126. Ibid, p. 412

under the condition that Greek perceptions of EC economic repercussions will remain the same.

Secondly, in the sphere of foreign policy integration, Greece would like to see a Europe "acquiring a voice of its own at some juncture and not be confined to going along with the decisions of the United States on all international problems, and particularly on the problem of peace, detente and disarmament (...)". Here, Karamanlis's original hopes for a greater independence vis-a-vis the US continued to underlie the perceptions of the Greek foreign policy makers under the PASOK government. According to Pagalos, "all the political principles which are included in the Genscher-Colombo plan are interpreted by us as an attempt of shaping an independent from the influence of the US identity of Europe which will not only create new limits for the development of the national identity of each European country but which will also contribute to the pursuit of detente and international peace". Indeed, the political principles is one thing and the political reality another. Thus, when Greece had signed the Solemn Declaration on European Union, a statement was included in the minutes where she argued that "nothing may restrain her right to determine its foreign policy in accordance with its national interests".

One more non-economic factor contributed to the positive perception of EC membership for Greece: Turkey. In 1986 the Greek

128. Cited by Iffestos, P., op. cit., p. 350
130. Speech by Plaskovitis, op. cit.
131. Greek Parliament Debates, December 7, 1984
Socialists attached two conditions to Greece's consent for the release of EC financial aid to Turkey in the context of the re-activation of the Turkish-EC Association Treaty which was frozen since the military coup in Turkey in 1980\textsuperscript{133}: First, the recindation of legislation dating back to the early 1960s but reissued in 1985 blocking the assets of Greek citizens in Istanbul\textsuperscript{134} and secondly, the exemption for security reasons from any future requirement for EC member states to allow free entry of Turkish labour\textsuperscript{135}. Furthermore, Greece argue against the normalisation of EC relations with Turkey while Turkish troops continued to occupy the northern part of Cyprus and while there had not been sufficient progress on the protection of human rights and on the democratisation of the political system in Turkey (despite the general elections of November 1983, the army continued to play a significant role in Turkish politics). In June 1986, in the Hague summit, Papandreou expressed clearly the Greek positions: "it would not be intentional the more general policy of the Community vis-a-vis Turkey to ignore the present situation of the Greek-Turkish relations and to disregard the serious problems that a member-state confronts (...)".\textsuperscript{136} In October, the Turkish PM,

\begin{itemize}
  \item 133. \textit{Keosing's Contemporary Archives}, pp. 34636-34637
  \item Nicholson and East, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 205
  \item Perrakis, Stelios, EEC-Turkish Relations and the Greek Position, \textit{Epitheorisi ton Evropsikon Koinotiton}, Vol. 5 (1), 1988, pp. 9-40, [in Greek]
  \item 134. Some $300 million worth of property belonging to some 12,000 individuals (McDonald, R., Greece: The Search for a Balance, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 101; Perrakis, S., \textit{Ibid}, pp. 17-20)
  \item 135. \textit{Keosing's Contemporary Archives}, p. 34637
  \item Perrakis, S., \textit{Ibid}, pp. 31-34
\end{itemize}
Ozal, stated that "the first aim of Ankara (was) for Turkey to become a fully fledged member of the EC". Two months later Ozal told the Turkish Parliament that Turkey would apply for full Community membership in 1987. Thus, the importance of EC membership as a leverage in Greece's bilateral relations with Turkey will increase in the near future.

For both economic and political reasons a withdrawal of Greece from the EC is "inconceivable" (this is a word that a PASOK MEP used) in the near future. Nevertheless, the next years will be of determinant significance for the continuation of the country's EC membership. It is very probable that questions of economic repercussions will revive. And these questions can bring the issue of withdrawal from the EC into the Greek political scene. The Greek government signed the Single European Act without examining its repercussions. One can predict surprises for the Greek foreign policy-makers. The question is related to their response: they will react with new policies (e.g. differentiation of diplomatic tactics - coalition building) or they will change their perceptions of economic repercussions? If the first is true then everything is depended on the international constraints: on the ability of the EC to satisfy the Greek demands. The second, however, seems less probable. The gradual completion of the inter-

136. Eleftherotypia, June 27, 1986, [In Greek]
137. Agence Europe, October 8, 1986
139. Interview with Nikolaos Gazis, op. cit.
nal market will entail a very high political cost for the Greek government because it will contribute to economic stagnation and increase unemployment in the short term.\textsuperscript{141} If we accept the Commission's approach, then the initially difficult period will be followed by a period of economic development, of a development resulting from the improved competition, from the economies of scale etc.\textsuperscript{142} Nevertheless the "transitional" period will be particularly difficult for Greece: The relative underdevelopment of its economy and the non-economic allocation of the productive factors in the country\textsuperscript{143} will contribute positively to the cost of adjustment to the integrated internal market. Consequently, the Greek foreign policy-makers will find it difficult to change perceptions under strong domestic pressure. Even a NDP government would confront serious constraints: it would be a test of survival not only for the party's faint-hearted neo-liberalism but also for its pro-European political philosophy.

Nevertheless, if the rates of growth of the economies of Italy, Spain, Portugal and of Ireland continue to be substantially above the respective rates of the Greek economy,\textsuperscript{144} the possibilities for coalition building will be reduced. If we take into account the size of the Spanish and of the Italian economy, Table

\textsuperscript{140} I Kathimerini, May 8, 1988, [In Greek]

\textsuperscript{141} Europe without Frontiers - Completing the Internal Market, Periodical 3/1988, European Documentation, p. 24

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid

\textsuperscript{143} For a brief analysis of the Greek economy see Kourvetaris, Yorgos A. and Betty A. Dobratz, A Profile of Modern Greece, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 119-146

\textsuperscript{144} Survey of Spain, \textit{The Economist}, March 1, 1986

\textit{O Ekonomikos}, June 27, 1985, [In Greek]
8.2 presents clearly this prospect. Hence, the Greek decision-makers will be left with just one option: Reinforcement of the current "defensive" policy aiming at minimising these that are perceived as negative economic repercussions of EC membership. This policy may include the pursuit of derogations from Community regulations, a new demand for an extended transitional period and even the re-introduction of a threat of withdrawal.

IV

Conclusions

Greece's application for full membership of the EC was made for political reasons. The dominant factor behind Karamanlis's decision was Turkish "expansionism". NDP's foreign policy-makers believed that the EC could become the most important deterrent of Turkish objectives. After a short period of negotiations Greece joined the EC in January 1981. Papandreou, despite his pre-1981 promises, did not want to withdraw his country from the Community. On the contrary, he used the threat of withdrawal to achieve greater economic concessions from Greece's EC partners. PASOK, having a strong ideological commitment in favour of protectionist economic policies, viewed the EC with mistrust and suspicion. Hence, the Greek socialists refused to harmonise Greece's foreign policy positions with those of the other nine member states and accepted reluctantly a revision of the Rome Treaty. Unlike his conservative predecessors, Papandreou viewed the EC as mainly an economic entity and not as a political one. For PASOK, integration
into low politics should precede integration into high politics. According to the Greek socialists, the basic conflict of interests was not between Brussels and the member states or between big and small states, but between the states of the North and those of the South. Thus, the PASOK government argued in favour of the increase of the EC's own resources. In a paradoxical way, this objective was perceived to mean more autonomy for Greece.

The views of NDP were not essentially different: the conservatives had similar with the socialists views on the negative effects of the completion of the internal market for the Greek economy and on the importance of multilateral diplomacy for the interests of small states like Greece. There was a consensus in Greece that the increase of the resources of the structural funds was the essential precondition for the continuation of the positive results of Greece's EC membership. The only change that PASOK brought in Greek foreign policy towards the EC was its unwillingness to agree with its nine partners on some issues that were perceived to damage Greece's relations with the Communist countries and the Arab world or endanger the detente in East-West relations. But even these positions were of minor importance. Soon, the Greek socialists found out that they could use Greece's EC membership as a leverage in their country's bilateral relations with Turkey: they began to recognise publicly that integration into high politics does not always contravene the Greek interests.
Table 8.1 (a)
Net EC Transfers and Trade Balance

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<tr>
<td>2. Trade Balance with the EC</td>
<td>-3093</td>
<td>-3153</td>
<td>-2809</td>
<td>-2644</td>
<td>-2344</td>
<td>-2909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Total Trade Balance</td>
<td>-5697</td>
<td>-5927</td>
<td>-5386</td>
<td>-5351</td>
<td>-6251</td>
<td>-5587</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a): Data derived from OECD, Economic Surveys, Greece 1986/1987, Paris: OECD, July 1987 (Table 7, p. 21; Table K, p. 70)
(b): Provisional data
Table 8.2
General Indices of Industrial Production
1980-100

Second Part

*The Domestic Milieu*
Chapter 9

The Communists

As it was shown in the first part of the thesis, the element of change in Greek foreign policy in the 1974-1986 era cannot be satisfactorily explained without reference to the domestic milieu of the country. One of the most important internal factors that influenced Greek foreign policy under Papandreou was the role of the Greek Communist Party (KKE). In a paradoxical way, KKE's influence on PASOK was important because the Greek Communists' foreign policy positions did not differ from PASOK's pre-1981 pledges. The incompatibility between PASOK's pre-1981 foreign policy promises and its post-1981 policies explains why PASOK accommodated the Communist demands. Having based its ideological platform on a radical re-orientation of Greece's foreign policy, the Greek Communist Party focussed its criticism of the PASOK government on the latter's external policies.

I

Background

Outlawed since 1947 - after an attempt to seize power by force - KKE was legalised again in 1974 by the ND government headed by Karamanlis. The total dependence of KKE on the Soviet

1. See Chapter 10
Union but also its authoritative structures based on Stalinist practices had already led the Greek Communists to a split in 1968: the orthodox KKE and the eurocommunist KKE-interior. Although the two parties avoided open confrontation in the first post-junta elections, a decisive period of rivalry till the elections of 1977 determined the total predominance of the pro-Moscow party in the Greek political scene: it gained 9.36% of the vote and elected 11 MPs while an electoral alliance of KKE-interior with four other political groupings gained 2.72% of the vote and elected 2 MPs. The meagre electoral results of KKE-interior in all the local, national and European elections since 1974 but also its weak presence in the interest groups and particularly the trade unions led us to the decision to exclude any reference to this party in this chapter. We could further justify this decision by taking into account that foreign policy issues were rather low in the KKE-interior’s political agenda in the examined period.

KKE does not release figures for its membership and estimates vary considerably: in the post-1981 era, for example, analysts give figures ranging from 27,500 to 90,000. According to

2. There is a vast bibliography on KKE. For a detailed catalogue (about 1,700 entries) see Richter, H.A., Greece and Cyprus since 1920: Bibliography of Contemporary History, Heidelberg: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Nea Hellas, 1987


one source PASOK had 40,000 members and KKE 73,000. However and whatever the real figures of membership were, there is no doubt that KKE could exert considerably more influence on Greek politics than its vote suggested:

1) It employed 1,500 professional cadres, "a formidable number by any standards"

2) It had a large budget compared to its electoral strength. In 1985, for example, an election year, according to data released by the parties, KKE presented a budget of 3.62m approx. and PASOK a budget of 4.76m approx. Some reports contend that the Greek Communists were receiving financial support from the Soviet Union and from other countries of the Warsaw Pact.

3) The party’s views were not only reported in the official publications (the daily *Rizospastis* and the monthly theoretical review *Kommounistiki Epitheorisi*) but they also received extensive coverage in the papers *I Proti* (published since April 1986), *To Pontiki*, *To Ethnos* (there are reports that this Athens daily was financed by the KGB’s), *Ta Nea* and *I Eleftherotypia*. It is in-

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Kapetanyannis (The Communists, *op. cit.*, p. 166) writes that KKE’s membership is estimated to be between 100,000 and 120,000 including nearly 30,000 of the party’s youth organisation (of 15-26 year olds).

Kohler (*op. cit.*, p. 135) gives a figure of 15,000 and (probably) a further 5,000 to its youth organisation (in 1980). The same year and according to its own figures PASOK had 75,000 members (Ibid, p. 130)

9. The Financing of KKE from Abroad, *Proti Grami*, January 1988, pp. 6-7 [In Greek]
teresting to note that the last three were also leading pro-PASOK papers.

4) Above all, KKE was particularly strong in many influential Greek interest groups and particularly in the trade unions and the students' unions.\textsuperscript{12}

The semi-industrial nature of the Greek economy and the strong government intervention in industrial relations has led to a situation which has been described as "unbalanced trade union growth"\textsuperscript{13}. According to this model, trade unionism in Greece is characterised by two different faces: First, the labour unions as a whole and, particularly, their official spokesman, GSEE (The General Confederation of Greek Workers) which has 800,000 members.\textsuperscript{14} GSEE negotiates the annual national wage agreement with the employers' organisations, an agreement which has to be ratified by the Minister of Labour. Secondly, trade unions in public enterprises, banks, schools, the civil service etc. The "unbalanced" character of Greek trade unionism has led to a considerable difference of effectiveness between the two types. The weak GSEE is particularly vulnerable to government intervention while the trade unions of the public sector are much more effec-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} Yannakakis, Illis, La Grece de Papandreou, \textit{L'Express}, Avril 13, 1984, pp. 74-79
\item \textsuperscript{11} Kapetanynannis, Vassilis, The Communists, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 166
\item \textsuperscript{12} Fakiolas, Rosselos, Interest Groups - An Overview, in K. Featherstone and D.K. Katsoudas, eds, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 174-188
\item \textsuperscript{13} Katsanevas, Theodore, Trade Unions in Greece, \textit{Relations Industrielles}, Vol. 40 (1), 1985, pp. 99-114
tive in exerting pressure to the government by using their strong organisational cohesion. However, the lack of financial resources as well as the constraints of the legal regulations and of their application reduce the bargaining power of the Greek trade unions. Nevertheless, the point that should be emphasized here is their party political structure.

There are four major associations of trade union officials belonging to a particular political party: the Panhellenic Militant Syndicalist Movement (PASKE) associated with PASOK; the United Syndicalist Anti-Dictatorial movement (ESAK) associated with KKE; the Anti-Dictatorial Workers' Front (AEN) associated with KKE-Int.; and various groups (ADISK, DIKI, etc.) associated with the Right. A new law (1264/82) made compulsory the system of "simple proportional representation" in the trade union elections by thus ending a period of undemocratic manipulation. In the 22nd Congress of the GSEE (December 1983), the first under the new law, and the "more representative ever to be made" in Greece, PASKE elected 26 members of the Confederation's 45-strong administration, ESAK 17 and AEM 2 (the associations of the Right refused to participate in the elections).

It is important here to examine in more detail the events in

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Yannitsis and P. Kazakos, eds, op. cit., [In Greek], pp. 150-159


17. Ibid, p. 93
the Greek trade union movement because they determine to a great extent the PASOK-KKE relations. In March 1982 a strike of the workers in the banks gave to the PASOK government a first impression of the bargaining power of the public sector unions. One year later the Greek socialists reacted with a law which made strikes in the public sector illegal unless they were approved by an absolute majority of union members in a secret ballot. The new law provoked a crisis in the GSEE: Its president (AEM) resigned (the GSEE leadership had been appointed by court at that time) and the trade unionists of ESAK left the administration. The whole situation led to the 22nd Congress mentioned above. Although the PASOK government had devalued the drachma in January 1983 by 15.5% while at the end of 1982 a 12-month wage freeze had been announced, the ESAK's reaction to government's policies could be described as weak in relation to its potential one. Of course, this has to be attributed to the more general policy of KKE towards PASOK described as policy of "critical support"; Harilaos Florakis, the General Secretary of the Greek Communist Party, had characterised in a mild way these austerity measures as the government's "effort to confront the crisis of our country's

18. Ibid, p. 90
19. Ibid, p. 94
20. Ibid, pp. 103-105
21. Ibid, pp. 100-103
22. Ibid, pp. 102-103
capitalist economy".26

For KKE, PASOK was a "progressive force", a "distinctive social-reformist party" based on "petty-bourgeois elements".27 But its policies were perceived by the Greek Communists as being "restricted to modernisations and reforms that (did not) affect the decisive foundations of monopoly domination or Greece's dependence on the United States and NATO".28 Thus, for KKE, the governmental change of 1981 has brought only a "limited independence in government policies in relation to the past".29 Nevertheless, the Greek Communists had "rejected the tactic of frontal attack on PASOK" because "it would deadlock developments and make it easier for the more conservative forces to carry on their counter-offensive".30 The basic policy of KKE was the demand for a coalition government with PASOK. According to the Political Decision of the 11th Congress of the party, "the touch-stone for the stance of PASOK on real change will be the problem of its co-operation with KKE".31 Indeed, this participation in a newly-formed government should also include a new government programme towards the goal of "real change".32


27. Ibid

28. Florakis, Harilaos, Statement of the Central Committee to KKE's 11th Congress, 11th Congress of KKE, Documents, Published by KKE's Central Committee, pp. 57-58

29. Florakis, Harilaos, For a Peaceful..., op. cit., p. 56
But how KKB perceived "real change"? One point that should be emphasized here is the dominant role that foreign policy issues played in KKE's political agenda. Indeed, the party was "on the side of the USSR and the other socialist countries on the basis of proletarian internationalism". In that context the Greek Communists supported:

1. A Balkan and a Mediterranean nuclear-free zone
2. A Europe of detente and co-operation
3. A world more secure in which military armaments and the tension would be constantly reduced

In relation to Greece's foreign policy the starting point for KKE's analysis was "NATO's responsibility for the seven-year dictatorship", "for the Cyprus tragedy" and for the "Turkish threat against the Greek territorial integrity". A degree of autonomy, however, with regard to the Turkish demands was attributed to Ankara's "chauvinists". For the Greek Communists, the quest for a peaceful solution of the Greek-Turkish dispute could only be done with a "radical reorientation outside the triangle Washington-Ankara-Athens". Thus, KKE argued that "the main

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30. 11th Congress of KKE, Documents, op. cit., p. 133
31. 11th Congress of KKE, Documents, op. cit., p. 27
32. 11th Congress of KKE, Documents, Ibid, p. 17
33. Ibid, p. 14
Florakis, H., For a Peaceful..., op. cit., p. 52
34. Florakis, H., Ibid, p. 59
35. See, for example, the Communique of the Presidency of the Plenum of KKE's Central Committee on November 11, 1983, From the 11th to the 12th Congress of KKE, Published by KKE's
reason" for the impasse in the Cyprus problem was its "isolation, particularly by the Greek governments, including the PASOK government, within the limits of western initiatives". In the same context, although KKE was in favour of the modernisation of the Greek Armed Forces, it campaigned against the purchase of 80 fighters by the Greek Air Force because it claimed that "it served NATO's interests" and not "Greek defence needs". However, the attainment of the objective of "national independence" did not only presuppose for the Greek Communists the withdrawal of Greece from NATO and the closure of the American bases in the country, but also the abandonment of EC's membership:

"The withdrawal from the EEC is the precondition for the application of an independent foreign and economic policy, a policy of peace, friendship and mutually beneficial co-operation with all countries".

Although KKE blamed PASOK for not taking "real steps" for the termination of "US-NATO presence" in the country and for the withdrawal of Greece from the EC - all these were PASOK's pre-1981 electoral promises - , it recognised that the Papandreou government had taken a "positive stand on some international problems". The Greek Communists supported:

1. PASOK's initiative aiming at making the Balkans a nuclear-free

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Central Committee, pp. 84-85

36. 11th Congress of KKE, Documents, op.cit., p. 61

37. Ibid
Communique of the Central Committee of KKE, July 20, 1983, From the 11th till the 12th..., op.cit., pp. 163-165

38. Communiqué of the Press Office of the Central Committee of KKE, October 4, 1984, From the
2. Papandreou's proposal in the EPC framework for a six-month delay of the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles in Europe

3. The socialist government's "positive approach" on Middle Eastern issues, in particular on the Palestinian question

4. PASOK's refusal to condemn the Soviet Union for the imposition of a martial law in Poland and for the destruction of the South Korean airliner

5. The various "peace initiatives" of the Papandreou government

II

Policies

Many prominent members of NDP believed that all these positions reflected KKE's influence on PASOK (together with the influence of the left-wing PASOK members on the government). The Communists claimed that it was the "influence of the mass movement (not only KKE) which forced PASOK to support them". But is there

11th till the 12th..., op.cit., pp. 163-165
39. 11th Congress of KKE, Documents, op.cit., p. 60
40. Florakis, H., For a Peaceful..., op.cit., p. 52
41. Ibid
42. Ibid
43. Communique of the Presidency of the Plenum of KKE's Central Committee, September 17, 1983, From the 11th till the 12th..., op.cit., pp. 66-67
44. Ibid
any real evidence that all these undoubtedly pro-Russian stances were "a form of protection paid to the Greek Communist party" by the Socialists as the Economist argued? Our argument here is that these positions of the Papandreou government were partly due to an attempt of "neutralisation" of KKE since they also reflected the willingness of the Greek foreign policy-makers to introduce an element of unpredictability in Greece's relations with the West. The evidence for the former is impressive. First, there was a number of interesting "coincidences". Thus, 24 hours before the announcement of the economic austerity measures in 1983, Papandreou unreservedly endorsed the offer of the Warsaw Pact for a "non-aggression" treaty with the West. Furthermore, Greece's refusal to condemn the USSR for the downing of the South Korean airliner occurred in a period during which the government was confronting heavy criticism from the Communists for the signing of a new Defense and Co-operation Agreement with the US. Secondly, in relation to the latter there is more concrete evidence about KKE's influence on PASOK's foreign policy: during the process of the negotiations concerning the future of the American military installations in Greece and when an agreement seemed near in June 1983, Papandreou refused to sign it and gave to the Americans a new set of demands when his party advisers "told him the deal would be at-


46. Interview with B. Efraimidis, Athens, 4.4.1988

47. The Economist, September 17, 1983, p. 50

48. Papandreou and the Communists, op. cit.
tacked by the left wing of the party and the Communists. Moreover, in late 1986, Papandreou refused to give to the Americans a commitment to keep their military bases in Greece beyond the end of the decade by arguing that his party faced a crucial test of popularity in the local elections of October. Thirdly, the Papandreou government employed a "radical language", an anti-western rhetoric aiming at neutralising both KKE and the left-wing of PASOK. This tactic will be examined in detail in the next chapter.

III

Constraints

KKE's policy towards PASOK was influenced by three important but contradictory factors:

1) By the Soviet Union which was in favour of the maintenance of PASOK in power. This was based on the "Ponomarev formula", the policy which favoured the co-operation between Socialist and Communist parties. In the words of the Economist, Papandreou's "build-in advantage over Communists (was) that he enjoyed the Soviet Union's grace and favour".

For KKE's reaction to the Agreement see the Statement of the Politburo of KKE's Central Committee, From the 11th to 12th..., op. cit., pp. 64-65

50. The Economist, July 7, 1983, p. 54

51. The Times, November 18, 1986

2) By the Communist trade unions which pressurized the party to reinforce the "critical" element of the policy of "critical support". October 1985 marked a turning point in the developments in GSEE. After the announcement of the government's austerity measures, seven members of the executive committee of GSEE, all well known PASOK trade unionists, criticised the government for its economic policy. "As PASOK reacted by expelling them from the party, they asked for the resignation of the confederation's leadership which was now in a minority position. The General Secretary of the Confederation rejected the demands and after an intervention of the courts a new pro-PASOK leadership organised a national congress."" For the first time the trade unionists of ESAK disagreed with KKE officials: Despite the "moderate" views of the party, the representatives of ESAK refused to participate in the congress.""

3) By a certain section of KKE which favoured a stronger opposition to PASOK. Hence, Florakis's mild reaction following the signing of the agreement concerning the US bases in Greece, "prompted a

Kousoulas, D.S., 1984, op. cit., p. 482

53. Boris N. Ponomarev was a Soviet Politburo candidate member and secretary in charge of relations with non-ruling communist parties

54. The Economist, January 1, 1985, p. 53

55. Koukoules and Tzannelakos, op. cit., p. 114

Lyrintzis, Ibid

mini-crisis within the party". The existence of different views over KKE's policies within the party had already led 467 of its members to resign in 1980, protesting against its total subervience to Moscow.

Many observers argued that the local elections of October 1986 marked a change in KKE's policy towards PASOK: in the second round of the elections, the Greek Communists "disengage(d)" their "friends and supporters in Athens" and asked them to "express their opposition" to the government's "right-wing policies". But why KKE changed its tactics? The first reason is PASOK's refusal to change the electoral system from the existing reinforced proportional representation to the simple proportional representation. Indeed, the Greek Communists' demand was connected to their objective to win enough seats to the legislature to deprive PASOK of a self-sufficient majority. Nevertheless, Papandreou, despite his pre-1981 promises, had already rejected any form of a coalition government with KKE: "these premises of electoral co-operation", he said in the 14th Assembly of the Central Committee of PASOK in 1982, "do not take into account the international (....) experience". In January 1985, the PASOK

58. Koukoules, Ibid, p. 135
Communique of the Politburo of the Central Committee of KKE, March 12, 1986, From the 11th till the 12th.... op. cit., pp. 283-284

61. Decision of KKE's Central Committee, October 14, 1986, From the 11th till the 12th..., op. cit., pp. 320-323
Zorzovilis, Zenon, A Powerful Blow to the Bipolar System, World Marxist Review, Vol. 30 (1),
government introduced a new form of reinforced proportional representation to the great disappointment of KKE. The second reason that explains KKE's change of policy has to do with its disappointing electoral results: 10.93% and 9.89% in the national elections of 1981 and 1985; 12.84% and 11.64% in the Euroelections of 1981 and 1984. This factor reinforced the influence of the opponents of the "critical support" approach within KKE. The government's interference in trade union issues acted as a catalyst. When, in March 1986, Papandreou, trying to cope with a wave of strikes, proposed a "dialogue" with KKE, the Communists refused by posing two preconditions: First, the introduction of simple proportional representation; secondly, the lifting of the constraints for a "democratic congress of GSEE". In the same year a socialist country with strong economic interests in Greece attempted to "persuade" the Greek "comrades" to moderate their criticism against PASOK: the move was unsuccessful.

However, KKE's change of tactics was also due to international developments. The Greek Communists were very anxious for the process of reforms in the European Community. The PASOK government's "declarations for a multidimensional foreign policy are revoked in practice with the signing of the Genscher-Colombo

January 1987, p. 54


63. KEMEDIA/PASOK, 14nth Session of the Central Committee, pp. 20-21, [In Greek]

64. Communiqué of the Presidency of the Politburo of KKE's Central Committee, January 11, 1985, From the 11nth till the 12th..., op. cit., p. 180

65. Communiqué of the Presidency of the Plenum of KKE's Central Committee, March 22, 1986,
plan which is putting forward the political-military integration of the EEC" said a member of KKE's Central Committee in 1984. KKE attacked also harshly the decisions of the European Council of Milan by claiming that they would lead to the "submission of (Greece's) politics to the single domestic and military policies of Brussels".

Last but not least, the gradual "de-radicalisation" of PASOK's foreign policy "radicalised" KKE's policies towards PASOK: for the Greek Communists, the "calmer seas" in Greek-American relations that Papandreou promised in the Parliament in 1985 were nothing more than a "deterioration of the current regime of dependence on the American-NATOic imperialism". PASOK, confronting the hardening of KKE's opposition, was forced to demand a "dialogue" between the two parties.

Domestic and international developments played a central role in determining KKE's changing perceptions of PASOK. In the short term, the decline of the Greek economy will reinforce the influence of the Greek Communists. On the other hand, however, the deterioration of the economic conditions in Greece will also reinforce the proponents of the radical option within the party, the option which favours a total break of its relations with PASOK. A central problem will be KKE's relations with the USSR. There is no

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Ibid, pp. 287-288
Response of KKE's Central Committee to PASOK's Executive Bureau, March 29, 1986, Ibid, pp. 289-292


doubt that Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union will influence the party's policies and image in Greece. Although the reforms will not challenge in the short term the popular perception that KKE is a foreign-controlled party, they may add to an improved, more moderate and flexible image which could increase rapidly its influence in Greece. How, for example, a probable recognition of the EC by the CMEA countries will influence KKE's perceptions of the Community? A crucial question is the pace with which the Greek Communist party could introduce reforms. The current perception of the "holly USSR" indicates a difficult period of adaptation for KKE. Although the party is not as monolithic as it looks (according to "democratic centralism" internal debates are covered by secrecy), in the Soviet Union Khruchev criticised Stalin in 1956 and in Athens, 30 years later, young supporters of the Greek Communist party were marching shouting that "Stalin you are alive. You are leading us".

More important for our study however, are PASOK's future perceptions of KKE. It would be naive to presume that PASOK will increase and reinforce its "radical" foreign policy positions in order to satisfy the growing demands of KKE. After all, the evidence till now is to the contrary: KKE's growing influence was going hand by hand with a constantly moderating foreign policy. The first thing that should be emphasised here is PASOK's ability to control the Communist hard-core, ESAK, by coercive means, the intervention in GSEB's affairs in April 1986 being a classical example. The growing use of the courts by the executive against "illegal" strikes indicated a new tactic of "neutralising" KKE.
"We can not leave these people free to surround the parliament and to stop the road traffic. We have to do something" told us a PASOK's MP. It is very probable that these "indirect" methods of interference in the trade union movement will be reinforced in the future.

Another tactic that PASOK used in the elections of 1985 and will probably use extensively in the future is the fear of the return of the Right. Aiming at putting KKE to a dilemma of the type "support us or New Democracy will return", this tactic will rather be unable to "protect" PASOK from KKE's strong opposition for long. In 1985, Florakis, trapped by PASOK's argument, declared that "the Right (was) not a bug-bear". One year later, in the local elections in Athens, Communist voters contributed to the success of the right-wing candidate. The change in NDP's leadership in Autumn 1984 which led to the election of a moderate leader, Mitsotakis, in the position of the "tough" Averof influenced negatively PASOK's argument. There are, in consequence, some limits in PASOK's tactics, limits that are already apparent.

Above all, the influence of KKE on foreign policy decision making was and will continue to be - at least in the short-term - in decline. PASOK, in a sense, had "legitimized" KKE in the Greek political life through its pre-1981 positions. Interestingly

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Greek

68. Communiqué of the Politburo of the Central Committee of KKE, July 2, 1985, op. cit., pp. 223-225

69. Plenum of the Central Committee of KKE, From the 11th till the 12th..., op. cit., pp. 244-246

70. Interview with V. Agorastis, Athens, 15.3.1988
enough and after a period of coexistence with PASOK, KKE is again isolated. But this time and if KKE show the necessary flexibility it could exploit a crisis of legitimacy of the Greek political system, a crisis possibly due to deteriorating economic conditions and increasing corruption, and appear as the "good alternative force".

Conclusions

KKE posed significant constraints on PASOK's foreign policy. Being particularly strong in the trade unions, the Greek Communist Party could exert strong pressure on the socialist government. Foreign policy issues were dominant in KKE's political agenda: the Greek Communists believed that Greece's withdrawal from NATO and the EC as well as the closure of the American bases in the country were essential preconditions for the country's economic development. KKE, aiming at a coalition government with PASOK, followed a "critical support" policy vis-a-vis the socialist government. Papandreou's refusal to change the electoral system, the gradual moderation of PASOK's foreign policy and the meagre electotal results of the Communist Party reinforced the pressures within KKE for an open confrontation with PASOK. In the examined period, many of Papandreou's foreign policy positions, as the demand for nuclear-free Balkans, were clearly designed to "neutralise" KKE. Thus, the Greek Communists were a source of change in post-1974 Greek foreign policy. Undoubtedly, the element of change was weak since the PASOK government only marginally differentiated Greece's
external policies in order to satisfy demands from the left of the Greek political spectrum.

In the next chapter we shall examine another domestic factor whose role is closely related to that of the Communists: the PASOK's left-wing.

71. See *The Economist*, May 25, 1985, pp. 13-14
Chapter 10
The PASOK's Left-Wing

PASOK was founded in September 1974 by Andreas Papandreou. The party's political personnel was new to Greek politics having previously taken part in political activities only through resistance organisations formed to oppose the military dictatorship (mainly the Panhellenic Liberation Movement - PAK - which was led by Papandreou, an organisation which was in favour of an armed struggle against the Colonels but whose impact in Greece itself was little) and/or as members of the pre-1967 Centre Union Party which was headed by Andreas Papandreou's father, George.

I
Background

The "3rd of September (1974) Declaration" gave the ideological stigma of PASOK which insisted that was not only a mere party but a "movement". The fundamental principles of the Declaration constituted the first exposition of the three main objectives of the party: national independence, popular sovereignty and social liberation. As in the case of KKE, foreign policy issues played a

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3. PASOK, 3rd of September Declaration, Series A, Publication No 1, Athens: International Relations Committee, pp. 4-5 (In Greek)
dominant role in PASOK's political agenda. According to the Declaration, national independence was the necessary precondition for the attainment of the other two objectives:

"The struggle of the Panhellenic movement (...) relies on the principle that our national independence constitutes a condition for the realization of the sovereignty of the people, that the sovereignty of the people constitutes a condition for the realization of social liberation; that social liberation constitutes a condition for the realization of political democracy".

For PASOK, Pentagon and NATO should be blamed for the Cyprus tragedy and for the establishment of the military dictatorship in Greece but also for the economic underdevelopment of the country. Thus, the creation of "a socialist and democratic Greece", a Greece which would "belong to the Greeks" required the withdrawal of the country from both the military and political wing of NATO and the nullification of "all bilateral agreements that have allowed Pentagon to turn Greece into an outpost of its expansionist policies".

In general, the "3rd of September Declaration" reflected PASOK's adoption of dependence theory. Thus, Greece's "recent disasters" were interpreted by the "movement" as being rooted to the country's position as a peripheral appendage of Western monopoly capitalism with her economy being the object of plunder by the

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4. Ibid, p. 7
5. Ibid, p. 5
multinationals of the "centre". Consequently, as "behind NATO, behind the American bases [we]re the multinational monopolies and their domestic agents", the total break of Greece’s relations with the West was the conditio sine qua non for a policy of "self-reliance". However, as an author has argued, "dependence theories while informing the Greek socialist perspective, were inadequate and insufficient as a guide for policy". The “3rd of September Declaration” was by no means a party programme.

In the 1974 elections PASOK came third after NDP (54%) and the traditional centre (21%), acquiring a 14% share of the vote. In the post-1974 years it started to take shape as a party marked by the following characteristics:

1. Paternalism. Papandreou’s charismatic personality clearly dominated the “movement” from its very beginning. Thus, 50 of the 75 members of PASOK’s provisional (in theory) first Central Committee established in October 1974 were appointed by Andreas Papandreou himself. His dominance within PASOK was confirmed following his victory in an internal party debate in 1975 about whether subordinate to the Central Committee organs should be appointed or elected. Papandreou’s view that they should be appointed provoked a crisis within PASOK which led to several expulsions but also to thousands of defections. The effect of these

7. 3rd of September Declaration, op. cit., p. 5
9. Clogg, Richard, Parties and Elections in Greece, op. cit., p. 130
10. Spourdalakis, Michalis, PASOK: Structure, Internal Party Crises and Concentration of
actions", as an author points out, "was to put Papandreou's authority beyond any doubt". 11

In 1976, PASOK acquired a provisional constitution which stated that the four central organs of the party were the Congress, the President, the Central Committee and the Executive Bureau. However, although the provisional constitution stated that the party's Congress was to be convened every two years with the possibility of postponement for a year, a full party Congress was not convened until May 1984.

Following the 1977 elections, Papandreou placed the PASOK members of the Parliament under the formal control of the party, thereby securing "his control over his own parliamentary party". 12 In general, PASOK's authoritarian structures reinforced Papandreou's dominance within the party. After all, PASOK was his personal creation, the "3rd of September Declaration" was drafted by himself, 13 and the "movement" could hardly be distinguished in public eyes from the personality of Andreas Papandreou.

2. A strong party machinery. PASOK's membership grew rapidly in the post-1974 era: 50,000 members in 1977; 75,000 in 1980; 110,000 in 1981; 200,000 in 1983; 220,000 in 1984. 14 Its members were organised by mid-1980 in 1000 local associations, 500 sector or-

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Power, Athens: Exandas, 1988, pp. 121-164 (In Greek)

11. Featherstone, Kevin, PASOK and the Left, in Kevin Featherstone and D.K. Katsoudas, eds, op. cit., p. 121

12. Kohler, Beate, op. cit., p. 130

13. Clogg, Richard, Parties and Elections in Greece, op. cit., p. 128

14. Spourdalakis, Michalis, op. cit., p. 363

Clogg (Parties and Elections in Greece, op. cit., p. 133) says that PASOK had 27,000 members.
ganizations and 700 organizational nuclei (groups that were too small to form a constituency party). It was, as an analyst points out, "the first time outside the Greek left" that a political party in Greece has had such a mass membership and such a nationwide organization. The use of technocratic methods of organization instead of traditional networks based on patron-client relationships contributed to a large extent to PASOK's quick rise to power: in the 1977 elections the Greek socialists vote doubled to 25% and the "movement" became the main opposition party in the country.

3. A "flexible" ideological stance. Especially since 1976 PASOK's ideology and third-world rhetoric have undergone a considerable de-radicalisation process. By 1977, Marxism disappeared from the party's vocabulary while Papandreou argued in favour of a gradual process for the removal of American military installations. As the 1981 elections approached, the PASOK's leader stated that his intention to abandon NATO membership was a "long-term" objective. PASOK's de-radicalisation process was particularly important with regard to its positions on Greece's EC membership. Thus, Papandreou's strong opposition to Greece's membership that led PASOK to a boycott of the parliamentary debate in 1977

15. Kohler, Beate, op. cit., p. 130
17. Loulis, John, Greece under Papandreou: NATO's Ambivalent Partner, op. cit., p. 11
18. Loulis, John, Papandreou's Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 379
on the ratification of the treaty of accession in 1979 and to a promise that if it gained power it would hold a referendum, was abandoned in early 1981: the PASOK leader argued that if PASOK gained power in the next elections, it would ask for "a renegotiation of the terms of the Accession Treaty". 20

According to an author, this form of revisionism was due to Papandreou's attempt "to allow himself freedom of manoeuvre over issues such as continued membership of NATO, the EC and the future of the American bases should he succeed in gaining power". 21 Other analysts 22 have argued that PASOK's "gradual shift to moderation came in clear response to Greek public opinion" since Papandreou needed the voters of the liberal centre in order to win the 1981 elections. However, the former explanation seems much more plausible: PASOK's ideological revisionism was particularly important in the party's foreign policy positions; these were exactly the issues of the Greek political agenda that interested less the Greek voters; 23 finally, the voters who regarded these issues as important did not belong to the liberal centre but to the left of the Greek political spectrum. 24

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20. Ibid, p. 39


22. Loulis, John, Papandreou's Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 379
Loulis, John, Greece under Papandreou: NATO's Ambivalent Partner, op. cit., p. 12

23. According to an opinion poll conducted by the Centre for Political Research and Information shortly before the 1981 elections, only 6.3% of the electorate had regarded national security or foreign policy issues as the most important problem (Voters, Parties and Issues, Epitrita, September-October 1981)
PASOK, exceeding all expectations, rose triumphantly to power in October 1981. Whether the defeat of the NDP was a "natural" event, or the result of deteriorating economic conditions (especially high inflation rates), or the outcome of a successful electoral strategy, is out of the scope of this chapter. As a PM, Papandreou confronted two problems that limited the ability to control his own party but also his freedom of manoeuvre in policy-making:

1. The revival of patron-client relationships. Thus, as an author writes, in the post-1981 era PASOK’s sector organizations "became the guardians of their party's interests in their sectors, controlling appointments and advancing the interests of the loyal party members". Indeed, patron-client relationships have characterised the Greek political system for a long period. However, the shift from the old pattern where the local political baron (usually the XP) was the patron to a new one, where the role has been undertaken by the professional organizations of the ruling party, by the "green guards" as their members became known in the country, marked a change in Greek politics. In the words of an


28. Ibid, p. 681

29. Legg, Keith, Politics in Modern Greece, *op. cit.*

analyst, in "the first 2-3 years of PASOK's governments, the Greek state perhaps confronted the most extensive and massive clientelist appointments in its history": 32 1/3 of the Greek public servants in 1988 had been appointed in the 1981-1987 period. The distribution of favours and spoils to party devotees made PASOK's membership quite attractive: according to an estimate 70% of PASOK's members in 1986 had entered the party in the post-1981 period. Interestingly, 89% of them were working in the public sector. As the so-called "Pasokisation" of the state machine was undermining the socialist government's plans for the modernisation of the public sector of the economy, Papandreou indirectly renounced this revival of patron-client relationships by calling in several of his party speeches for a clear separation between the state and the party.

2. The PASOK's pre-electoral positions. "Having promised everything to everybody", as an author writes, "PASOK was caught in its own trap". The PASOK leaders found out soon after gaining power

30. Spourdalakis, Michalis, op. cit., p. 308
31. Clogg, Richard, PASOK in Power: Rendezvous with History or with Reality, op. cit., p. 441
32. Spourdalakis, Michalis, op. cit., p. 314
35. Ibid
36. Robinson, Robert, Polemic and Drama in Greece: The 1985 General Election, op. cit., p. 91
37. See, for example, Papandreou's speech to the Tenth Session of PASOK's Central Committee (Institutional Changes and Socialist Transformation, Athens: KEMEDIA/PASOK, 1983, pp. 46-49)
that a relaxed income policy in a country which was confronting serious economic difficulties was wishful thinking; that significant international constraints limited the possibilities of spectacular changes in the sphere of foreign policy; and that the bargaining power of some influential interest groups like the Church posed significant obstacles to some of the intended social reforms. Indeed, the socialist government's performance disappointed many of the party members. In August 1982, for example, Stathis Panagoulis, an Alternate Minister in the Ministry of the Interior and a member of PASOK's Central Committee, resigned, arguing that the government was daily distancing itself from the principles of the "3rd of September Declaration." In 1983, another member of the "movement's" Central Committee accused the government that "it followed the road of incorporation into the system, (...) a road without return which was followed by the socialist governments of western Europe." Undoubtedly, the spirit of the "3rd of September Declaration" was still alive for many of PASOK's members.

II

Policies

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(In Greek)


39. A typical example is the Church's reaction to the introduction of civil marriage that compelled the socialist government to moderate its original position. Schlegel, Dietrich, Papandreou - A Gain in Predictability, op. cit., p. 400

40. Clogg, Richard, Parties and Elections in Greece, op. cit., p. 128; Keeling's Contemporary
Indeed, Papandreou needed a policy to reconcile the ideological demands of his party activists with the PASOK government's policies, since the strength and unity of the party's machinery was a \textit{conditio sine qua non} for a new electoral victory. Papandreou's fears of an internal opposition, of a criticism of the government from its own supporters, were probably overexaggerated. As we saw in Chapter 2, Papandreou's belief system was largely shaped in the mid-1960s: it seems that his experience with his father's polyarchic party was responsible for his strong interest in maintaining a tight control over PASOK's members. In his first term in office, the Greek socialist PM used a policy that aimed at neutralising his party's left-wingers and can be summarised in three points:

1. A radical leftist language. This language was mainly used in the presentation of foreign policy issues. Examples can be easily found in "the tightly controlled and heavily doctored state television broadcasts" on which "most Greeks depended for their daily news".42 According to the Greek TV's foreign coverage:

"Israel (...) can do nothing right; the PLO nothing wrong. Socialists are sweeping to power in every European country except in Britain and Germany where there are almost daily protests against the conservative governments. Spain before Gonzalez lived in constant danger of coup but now the economic ills are over and even the political problems will be solved"43

\begin{quotation}
\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textit{Archives}, p. 32586
\item 41. Spourdalakis, Michalis, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 318
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
\end{quotation}
Or in the words of an observer, "in a typical example, the State-controlled television company referred in a broadcast to the elected president of El Salvador, Napoleon Duarte, as "the dictator Duarte", and to General Jaruzelski as "the leader of Poland"."\(^4\)

But the core of Papandreou's radical language was used in his speeches to PASOK's members. The leader of the Greek socialists wanted to show to his party members that PASOK had not abandoned its ideological commitments, to prove that there was continuity between the party's pre-1981 pledges and its post-1981 policies. For example, according to the Greek PM's speech in the 10th Session of PASOK's Central Committee, the world system was characterised by the revival of the cold war which was "the reflection of the economic crisis" of the capitalist system.\(^5\) For Papandreou, "when capitalism is in economic crisis always prepares the ground for a war conflict".\(^6\) During PASOK's Congress, the Greek PM elaborated the argument: The US, he said, was "the metropolis of imperialism", while the Soviet Union was not an imperialist power because "imperialism is the quintessence of capitalism's monopolistic phase".\(^7\)

Indeed, Papandreou's anti-western rhetoric was coupled by an attempt to emphasize the element of change that the PASOK government

42. *The Economist*, April 6, 1985, p. 53
44. Loulis, John, *Greece under Papandreou: NATO's Ambivalent Partner*, *op. cit.*, p. 34
45. *Institutional Changes and Socialist Transformation, op. cit.*, p. 8
had introduced in Greece's foreign policy, to point out that policies were being followed "for the first time". Hence, the leader of PASOK was at pains to show in his party speeches the importance of his government's "peace initiatives". "We reject the logic that divides the world into spheres of influence" he said in 1982. "And we believe", he continued, "that (...) we should contribute to the world cause for the diminution of the nuclear and conventional armaments". By developing this argument, Papandreou was able to overemphasize the importance of the Greek proposal for a six-month delay of the deployment of the Pershing II and Cruise missiles in Europe, of his government's attempts for the creation of a Balkan nuclear weapons-free zone, or of the "Initiative of the Six" for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Hence, the Greek PM was successful in claiming that his government's foreign policy was different from that of his conservative predecessors. As change in Greece's external policies was expected when PASOK rose to power, this tactic was necessary for controlling internal opposition. Simultaneously, Papandreou could inflate the national ego of the Greek psyche: Greece was not anymore insignificant; it was playing an important international role; Andreas Papandreou was a fighter of peace with an international appeal; the only EC leader who was resisting American pressures. It is interesting, for example, that in 1983, in his speech to PASOK's Central Committee, the Greek PM devoted three pages to the Pershing II issue

46. Ibid

47. The Annual Register, 1984, p. 175
but only one to the Agreement that was signed the same year on the American bases or to Greece's membership of NATO.

The negotiations for the future of the American bases in Greece is another example of this tactic. Thus, "whenever the negotiations were interrupted, Athens cried "crisis", even though five of the six breaks were scheduled in advance because of holidays". 49 As the text of the Agreement was withheld by the government for two months, 50 Papandreou succeeded in scoring a public relations triumph: He claimed that it was an Agreement for the removal of the installations, a "step towards the abolition of dependence". The streets of Athens were flooded by PASOK's supporters shouting the slogan: "The struggle is now vindicated".

However, while criticising "the policies of subservience to the West" that had allegedly characterised the pre-PASOK era, Papandreou was stating that PASOK had not forgotten the "3rd of September Declaration": "We are not bargaining our strategic aims" he declared in 1982. 51 "In the famous Declaration (...) which remains the compass for our visions and our march, we talked and we talk for national independence as a precondition for social liberation" the PASOK leader said in 1983. 52 But for Papandreou, the goal of national independence could not be approached "lineally but dialectically": 53 The five-year Agreement on the

49. Ibid
50. Dimitras, Panayote E., Greece: A New Danger, Foreign Policy, No 58, Spring 1985, p. 147
51. Ibid
52. People-PASOK in the Road to Change, op. cit., p. 10
American bases was "a step on the march for securing our national independence (...). A step on the chessboard". "It is necessary", the PASOK's President told the party cadres, to abandon "the habit to refer to only our strategic objectives without simultaneously recognising the international and Greek social reality (...)".

2. The use of despotic methods. Indeed, PASOK was not a fragile party. On the contrary, it was an authoritarian organisation dominated by its leader. Then, why was Papandreou so careful in maintaining tight party discipline, so reluctant to accept even an embryonic criticism of his views and/or policies? The answer is related to Papandreou's personality. The leader of PASOK seemed to believe that a democratic political party is inescapably a loose, polyarchic and, consequently, weak organisation. Hence, in several cases he expelled party dissidents who had dared to criticise his government's policies. In most cases no reference was being made to the party's disciplinary procedures. The leader's definition of party discipline was so rigid that led an author to the conclusion that PASOK can "claim to be one of the most monolithic and personalist parties in Europe, East or West". For example, in a typical case, in July 1982, the Greek PM expelled from PASOK Mr George Petsos (a former junior Defence Minister) by simply stating that with one of his speeches where he

53. Institutional Changes and Socialist Transformation, op. cit., p. 19

54. Ibid

55. Ibid
had criticised the government, he "placed himself outside our movement". Papandreou reacted in the same way when two PASOK MPs objected to the government's plans to abolish the electoral law under which the voters could choose between candidates from the same party. Indeed, the absence of democratic procedures in selecting a party list resulted to the reinforcement of Papandreou's power because the effect of the new law was that "only those faithful to the leader could be selected as MPs". Criticism of the government's policies within the party increased in late October 1985 when the government announced an austerity economic programme. Papandreou reacted by reshuffling PASOK's Executive Bureau in an apparent attempt to undermine the positions of left-wing critics. A few days later, 8 of PASOK's leading trade unionists "placed themselves outside the movement" when they consented to a 24-hour general strike against the government's economic measures. Papandreou was confident that his despotic policies would not confront serious reactions from within his party. He knew that his charismatic personality ensured that, in public eyes, PASOK could not exist without him.

56. People-PASOK in the Road to Change, *op. cit.*
57. Petras, James, *The Contradictions of Greek Socialism*, *op. cit.*, p. 20
58. Featherstone, Kevin, *The Greek Socialists in Power*, *op. cit.*, p. 239 (The author wrongly writes that the expulsion took place in 1981)
59. *Ibid*
61. See the chapter on Greece and the EC
62. Featherstone, Kevin, *PASOK and the Left*, *op. cit.*, p. 122
3. The foreign policy positions. Papandreou tried to maintain PASOK's image of a radical "movement", of a party very distinct from its northern European counterparts. According to the Greek socialists' pre-1981 positions social democrats were the "traitors" of socialism. Indeed, this position reflected PASOK's adoption of 'centre-periphery' theory. Not unexpectedly, Papandreou tried to show that his government was not less radical or more "social-democratic" than PASOK's members had expected. Hence, the Greek socialists never applied for membership of the Socialist International. "Social democracy is in crisis" the Greek PM said in a speech to PASOK's Central Committee in 1983. But "in the South", he continued, the socialist governments "seek for radical solutions", for "outlet from the system". The list of the guests in PASOK's Congress present a very clear picture of the image that Papandreou wanted PASOK to maintain. Among those who attended were Yassir Arafat, Hortensia Allende (the widow of Salvador), representatives of the Polisario Front of Western Sahara and of the Sandinistas of Nicaragua as well as Markos Vafeiadis, the commander of the communist army during the Greek civil war (1946-1949). Interestingly, "the foreign representatives greeted most warmly by the [2,400] delegates were not European Socialists but representatives of Socialist governments and Marxist national

Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 34440

63. Ibid

64. Institutional Changes and Socialist Transformation, op. cit., p. 6

65. Ibid, p. 7
liberation movements from the third world".

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that these tactical moves could not be credible as long as they were not accompanied by some tangible policies. How Papandreou could persuade his left-wing supporters that his government had not betrayed the "3rd of September Declaration"? Indeed, rhetoric was not enough. The PASOK leader needed some evidence that he had not forgotten the "movement's" "strategic objectives". Greece's positions on the declaration of martial law in Poland, on the destruction of the South Korean airliner and on the deployment of the Euro-missiles served well this purpose. Papandreou's demand for a Balkan nuclear weapons-free zone, his support for the PLO (some of the PAK's militants that had opposed the Greek junta were trained in PLO's camps) and for the "radical" regimes of the Arab world were undoubtedly but not exclusively moves aimed at neutralising the PASOK's left-wingers.

III

Constraints

However, the latter argument does not imply that the repercussions of Papandreou's radical leftist language in his party speeches were insignificant for Greece's foreign policy. On the contrary, as an author points out, radical rhetoric fostered legitimacy for KKE's foreign policy positions while simultaneously

66. The Annual Register, 1984, op. cit., p. 175
Clogg, Richard, Parties and Elections in Greece, op. cit., p. 142
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 33301
influencing Greece's image in other states. Hence, when, for example, Papandreou was speaking in the PASOK's Congress, his anti-western rhetoric was not only heard by his party cadres alone but also by the West itself. In the words of the *Economist:* Papandreou's "distaste for clarity confuse[d] businessmen (...) and risk[ed] creating misunderstandings with even the most patient of Greece's creditors and NATO allies." Indeed, the latter was done deliberately because as we saw in the first part of the thesis, Papandreou wanted to increase the element of unpredictability in Greece's relations with the West. He believed that uncertainty about Greece's foreign policy options increased his country's bargaining power.

Indeed, as noted above, PASOK's foreign policy positions in its early stages resembled much to KKE's in the mid-1980s. Thus, Papandreou's attempt to neutralise his left-wing critics within his party, critics still inspired by PASOK's pre-1981 declarations, did not actually differ from his tactics aiming at inactivating the Greek Communists that we described in the previous chapter. Thus, Papandreou's ability to control his party was, in a sense, closely connected to his ability to keep the Communists silent.

The decline of the Greek economy in the mid-1980s and the "stabilisation programme" that the PASOK government, faced with a probable economic bankruptcy of the country, was forced to intro-

67. Loulis, John, Greece under Papandreou: NATO's Ambivalent Partner, *op. cit.*, p. 16
duce in October 1985, undoubtedly reinforced the position of left-wing circles within the socialist party. Some observers believed that Papandreou might "be tempted to divert the attention of disgruntled left-wingers with a piece of foreign-policy theatre". Nevertheless, the Greek PM, facing strong American reactions to his government's foreign policy positions, had very little freedom of manoeuvre. Nevertheless, the influence of left-wing activists within PASOK had considerably weakened since the late 1970s. Three factors explain this development.

First, many of Papandreou's opponents, disappointed with the lack of internal party democracy, had chosen either co-operation with the Communists (as Mr Panagoulis) or an autonomous political course (as many of PASOK's leading trade unionists and Mr Arsenis, former Minister of Finance and National Economy, who had been expelled from PASOK in 1986 after criticizing the economic policy of the government). A handful of expelled MPs had chosen the conservative opposition (as Mr Hondoarkoukis and Mr Bouloukos).

Secondly, the revival of clientelist practices had undermined PASOK's ideological "purity" as the "Pasokisation" of the state machine had not hindered the "nationalisation" of the party: the privileges and the security of a state job became for many party members much more important than Greece's "socialist transformation".

69. Loulis, John, Greece under Papandreou: NATO's Ambivalent Partner op. cit., p. 32
70. June 8, 1985, p. 57
71. The Economist, June 8, 1985, p. 54
Thirdly, PASOK's electoral triumph in June 1985, had clearly weakened the position of the party's left-wing: after all, if PASOK had betrayed "the dreams of the Greek people for a third road to socialism", distinct not only from the western social democratic option but also from the Eastern European version, why it had lost only 2% of its electoral strength within four years? Hence, although Papandreou's "parliamentary majority was slightly reduced (in the post-1985 era), his real political power has increased".72

In general, the influence of PASOK's left-wing circles was in decline. In mid-1980s Papandreou was stronger than ever. His authority within PASOK was indisputable. The abandonment of anti-western rhetoric in 1985 and 1986 was partly a result of this process. Indeed, some members of the "movement's" Central Committee, as Mr Avgerinos, wanted the party to have a greater say in government affairs.73 Nevertheless, this was a low-profile demand: in the context of PASOK's paternalistic character, it was more a grievance than a challenge to Papandreou's leadership.

IV

Conclusions

PASOK had based its ideological platform on a radical re-orientation of Greece's foreign policy. Greece's withdrawal from

72. See Chapter 4

73. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p.34440

74. Legg, Keith, Greek Foreign Policy: The Illusion of Change, A.F.I. Foreign Policy and Review, Vol. 6 (2), 1986, p. 7

75. Interview in Athens, August 25, 1987
NATO and the EC as well as the closure of the US military installations in the country were central parts of its pre-1981 pledges. Having founded a well-organised party with mass membership, Andreas Papandreou feared an internal opposition when serious international constraints (mainly the Turkish "threat") made the fulfilment of his promises by the newly elected socialist government dangerous for the country's perceived interests. Hence, the leader of the Greek socialists followed a tactic aiming at neutralising his government's left-wing critics, a tactic that included the use of a radical leftist language in presenting foreign policy issues, the use of despotic methods in maintaining tight party discipline, and the support of some anti-western positions in international fora as, for example, for the proposal for a Balkan NWFZ. Thus, the role of PASOK's left-wingers was a major factor that reinforced the element of change in post-1974 Greek foreign policy. However, the PASOK's left-wing was not only a constraint on Papandreou's foreign policy options but also an opportunity: the Greek socialists' policy of unpredictability in their country's relations with the West could not be as credible as it had been if Papandreou did not use a radical leftist language favouring Greece's withdrawal from international fora as NATO and the EC.
Chapter 11

The Army

The Armed Forces' involvement in politics is an important feature of the Greek political system in the twentieth century. Overt (coupes and countercoupes) and covert military intervention in Greece throughout the last 80 years has classified the country among the so-called in the academic literature "praetorian states". According to this model, "praetorian states" are societies where the imbalance between popular demands and political institutions, an imbalance which results to mass-supported political violence, is checked by elite-sponsored or elite-tolerated military intervention.¹

I

Background

There are three schools of thought that offer different but not mutually exclusive explanations of the military's engagement in Greek politics. The first, inspired by the praetorian model, attributes it to several political, economic and social factors. The second, argues that it is a result of foreign intervention. The third, treats the Greek Army's officers' corps as a professional organisation and examines the Army's involvement in civilian affairs under the prism of the pursuit of professional

¹ Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968
interests.

The three schools of thought offer different explanations of the most recent coup d'état of April 1967. According to an exponent of the first model, the military was used by the "ruling class" to impede change.² For him, the 1967 coup was the activation of the "bourgeois emergency regime". For another author, however, the coup of the Greek colonels was not a result of internal, but of external factors. In conformity with this model, "the US had attempted to stabilise their influence in Greece by controlling the Greek Armed Forces".³ Thus, the 1967 overthrow of democracy was due to the policies of the western superpower. Finally, according to the third group of analysts, the 1967 military intervention was due to an attempt of the Armed Forces' officers to protect their corporate interests. The Army, expecting a decline in defence expenditures and fearing political instability, felt threatened and overthrew the civilian regime.⁴

One of the most important characteristics of the Greek Armed Forces officers' corps is its ideology. Indeed, nationalism is a common element of the military's belief system in most countries of the world. However, the Greek Armed Forces' ideology also included a strong pro-Americanism. Partly due to the American military aid that flowed through the Truman doctrine in response to the Greek civil war and contributed to the professionalisation

2. Haralanbis, Dimitris, The Military and Political Authority, Athens: Exantas, 1985 [In Greek]
3. Roubatis, Yannis, Wooden Horse, Athens: Odysseas, 1987, [In Greek]
of the Greek military, this pro-American ideology had a decisive impact on the foreign policy of the Greek colonels.

The key factor in the Greek Armed Forces' decision to reinstate the civilian politicians was the Cyprus issue. Failing to win legitimacy after holding office for more than seven years, the Greek military, now dominated by the more hard-line elements within the junta, attempted an ill-fated coup against Archbishop Makarios and the Cyprus government in the hope of uniting Cyprus with Greece. Turkey launched an invasion on the island and after a totally unsuccessful general mobilization in Greece, the Greek military's leaders decided to return permanently to their prescribed role, the barracks.

II

Policies

The post-junta governments inherited a demoralised military. This, however, does not mean that the transition to and consolidation of democratic politics in Greece was an easy process. Thus, although the junta leaders were convicted and given the death penalty, later commuted by the new democratic government to life imprisonment, Karamanlis was careful to assure the officers that their careers "shall be judged by their future behaviour and not the past". The failure of a serious coup attempt in February


1975 ended the transition period in Greek civil-military relations. Although the government stated that "few unrepenting officers" were involved in the plot, a major purge of some 500 officers took place while another 600-800 were transferred to other assignments. Interestingly, the February conspiracy was the fourth such attempt since the July 1974 withdrawal. However, as Danopoulos writes, "unlike the successful April 1967 coup, the 1974-1975 conspiracies failed due to lack of support from within the military". 

The NDP governments maintained a carrot and stick approach in their handling of the military. On the one hand, the dramatic increase of the Greek defence budget in the wake of the dispute with Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean reinforced the loyalty of the officers' corps and stabilised the civilian regime. On the other hand, the Karamanlis governments tried to diversify the sources of military supply of the Greek Armed Forces and did not hesitate to withdraw Greece from NATO by clearly provoking the pro-American feelings of the military.

Andreas Papandreou was aware of the constraints that the role of the military was imposing on his political objectives.


8. Ibid


10. Ibid, p. 88
The de-radicalisation process of PASOK's foreign policy positions in the 1975-1981 era that we described in the previous chapter, was partly a result of this perception. In April 1981, for example, the PASOK's leader was stating that "in determining the time-span in which" Greece's withdrawal from NATO "will be realised, PASOK will take into consideration the needs of the Greek Armed Forces for weaponry (...)".  

Papandreou's actions as PM regarding the military resemble the carrot and stick policies of his predecessors. In addressing the PASOK's Parliamentary Group in November 1981, he argued that the "Armed Forces will not interfere in the policies of the PASOK government" because PASOK had "reconciled the military and the people". A few days earlier, speaking to high-ranking officers of all three services, the Greek PM had stated emphatically that "every Greek citizen has the right to his personal political opinion, but it is dangerous and impermissible for politics to intrude into the armed forces who have only one mission, the sacred task of defending the nation".

Indeed, Papandreou knew that rhetoric was not enough. Thus, in an apparent effort to allay concerns in the military, he decided to assume till May 1986 the crucial portfolio of Minister of Defence. In parallel, he appointed two navy officers consecutively to the sensitive post of Chairman of the General Staff of...

11. Cited by Loulis, John, Greece under Papandreou, op. cit., p. 14
13. Cited by Danopoulos, C., From Balconies to Tanks, op. cit., p. 91
National Defence, a post traditionally being the exclusive domain of army generals: this move was a result of the navy's reluctance to co-operate with the military regime but also an attempt to divide the professional interests of the three services. Finally, the new Greek leader decided almost immediately after gaining power to increase the fringe benefits of the officers' corps.

However, PASOK's foreign policy was clearly influenced by the fear of a military intervention. Papandreou's nationalistic and uncompromising tactics vis-à-vis Turkey and his strong interest in the Cyprus problem were partly moves designed to touch the sensitive nationalistic attitudes that the Greek military espoused. The leader of PASOK did not also hesitate to present a false picture of his foreign policy tactics in order to satisfy these nationalistic feelings. Hence, in a speech to Armed Forces' officers in August 1982, he denied that he was seeking "guarantees" of Greece's territorial integrity in the NATO framework or in the negotiations of the new Greek-American DECA. "If we really want a guarantee, this is the ability of the Greek Armed Forces to prevent war", he argued.

Indeed, PASOK's efforts to allay concerns in the military has affected not only Papandreou's decisions in foreign policy but also his non-decisions. Hence, although the Greek PM started to talk about a change in the deployment of military forces since he

14. Ibid. p. 93

gained power, he waited till December 1984 to announce that the government would henceforth deploy military forces according to the doctrine that the main threat to Greece came from Turkey and not the Soviet bloc.

III
Constraints

Were Papandreou's policies successful in keeping the military out of politics? Three reported disturbances or abortive countercoups provide evidence that at least certain elements of the Greek Armed Forces' officers were still interested in civilian affairs. The first took place in May 1982; the second in February 1983; and the fourth in November 1984. The second seemed to be the most important: on February 26, 1983 the Greek security forces were placed on limited alert while the PASOK and the KKE party organisations were mobilised following rumours of an attempted coup. Although the rumours were repeatedly denied by the government, 15 generals were retired two days later. However, it is interesting to note that, according to a high-ranking officer, these rumours were intentionally spread by the government which wanted to remove the generals by minimising the danger of a coup.

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16. Greek Government Programme, op. cit., p. 8
17. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, pp. 34535-34536
18. Ibid. p. 94
Brown, J., From Military to Civilian Rule, op. cit., p. 187
19. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 32587
Couloumbis and Yannis argue that Greece can no longer be classified as a praetorian state. More than a decade of uninterrupted civilian rule, they write, have created "a working civil-military relationship unparalleled in contemporary Greek history in peace time". However, as another author writes and as previous analysts implicitly admit, "although the military has withdrawn from active participation in Greece's government today, the coals of intervention have not yet cooled". Thus, the non-intervention of the Armed Forces in post-junta Greece is mainly a result of a situation that serves the corporate interests of the military. In a paradoxical way, the high defence expenditures that Greece is forced to maintain because of her dispute with Turkey contribute to democratic politics in the former. Furthermore, the country enjoyed in the post-junta era a rather stable economy. Finally, the post-1974 Greek political system was characterised by a consensus that did not basically dispute the dogma "Greece belongs to the West". How would the Army react if these conditions changed? Indeed, it is improbable that the defence expenditures will be reduced in the future. But the Greek economy is declining and thereby the political system is threatened. Greece is a member of the EC and an intervention of the Armed Forces would almost certainly result to an expulsion from the Community. Hence, a probable future coup could take place under conditions that question the benefits of EC membership. And as we saw in the respec-

20. Interview in Larissa, May 1, 1988


22. Danopoulos, C.P., Warriors and Politicians in Modern Greece, op. cit., p. 166
tive Chapter, this is not an improbable development.

IV

Conclusions

The Greek Armed forces have intervened several times in the twentieth century in Greek covilian affairs. The 1967 coup is the most recent example. Post-1974 governments have successfully maintained a carrot and stick approach vis-a-vis the officers’ corps. Hence, Papandreou tried to avoid decisions that could be interpreted as threatening the military’s corporate interests. Further, his nationalistic tactics towards Turkey were aimed at satisfying the military’s feelings of national pride. The pro-American ideology of the Greek Armed forces posed significant constraints on the Greek socialists’ foreign policy options. Papandreou knew that his policy of unpredictability towards the West could embarrass the Armed Forces. Thus, the role of the military reinforced the element of continuity in post-1981 Greek foreign policy.
Chapter 12

Conclusions

The conduct of foreign policy is not a democratic process.¹ There is no country in the world where official diplomatic archives do not remain secret for a certain period of time. In Greece, where foreign policy issues have always been "sensitive", the archives of the Foreign Ministry remain secret for 50 years.² However, this does not mean that by the year 2031 one shall know what happened in the country's foreign policy in 1981. And this because it is arguable whether diplomatic archives are properly kept.³

This thesis was an attempt to study contemporary Greek foreign policy in the knowledge that the sources of information on the subject are limited. Information which was not verifiable was omitted. Thus, for example, according to the Reader's Digest, Andreas Papandreou had received $4 million from Libya's Quaddafi in 1981 for PASOK's pre-electoral campaign and that since then the Greek socialists have received about $20 million from the Arab radical Colonel. This information may well explain Papandreou's eagerness to support Libya in the EPC framework. But it is ques-

1. See Waltz, Kenneth, Foreign Policy and Democratic Process, Boston: Little Brown, 1967

2. Commission of the EC, Guide to the Archives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the EC and of the EPC, Luxembourg, 1988

3. Interview with Virginia Tsouderou, Athens, August 27, 1987

tionable whether the report is true: although the author of the article writes that it is based on data of the American secret services, the then Military Attache in the Greek Embassy in Libya told me that he does not believe these reports: "Libya had important financial problems. They did not have money for such moves. After all they did not need Greece's support".

The period covered by this thesis stops on December 31, 1986. The PASOK government lost power in June 1989. Then why to stop in 1986? First, because the October 1981-1986 era has its own autonomy. The crisis in the Aegean in March 1987 had its own dynamics. It led to the Davos summit and the Greek-Turkish rapprochement. Secondly, because the detente in East-West relations had considerably altered the external environment of Greece.

The nine hypotheses on which the whole thesis was based have been confirmed:

1. It was proved that change in Greek foreign policy was mainly the result of governmental change. The quest for a Balkan WVZ, the recognition of the PLO and, finally, the Memorandum that Greece submitted to the EC show that change in Greece's external policies was not gradual in the 1981-1986 period but abrupt: the most important changes in Greek foreign policy occurred in the first few months of Papandreou government. Indeed, this conclusion contests the realist assumption that the sources of foreign policy change are rather related to the international milieu of the states than to the domestic.

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5. Interview in Larissa, June 14, 1989
2. Despite the changes that PASOK introduced to Greece's foreign policy, the element of continuity is undoubtedly dominant in a comparative study between the external policies of NDP and those of the socialists. In April 1986, Papandreou, for the first time, publicly accepted this argument. "And despite the distinctions that are being made between the 7 years of New Democracy and of our days", he said in the Greek Parliament, "it is my belief that all this period is a course for the securing and the formation of our national independence". The NDP's politicians shared his view. The central factor behind continuity was the perceived Turkish "expansionism". Because there was a consensus in Greece that Turkey was disputing its territorial integrity, both the conservatives and the socialists attempted to counter the Turkish "threat". Thereby, a security consideration became the priority of Greece's foreign policy in the 1974-1986 era, the underlying principle of the most important Greek initiatives and objectives: Greece's quest for closer ties with the Arab World reflected its will to look for allies in its dispute with Turkey; Greece's rapprochement with its Balkan neighbours showed that the country wanted to relieve its northern borders from a concentration of forces and, thereby, concentrate its attention on the eastern front; finally, Karamanlis's decision to join the EC but also Papandreou's acceptance of Greece's membership indicated that the main objective of Greece's foreign policy in the 1974-1986 era was

6. Greek Parliament Debates, April 24, 1986

7. Interviews in Athens
the countering of the Turkish threat. Indeed, this conclusion con­firms the realist premise that high politics dominate in foreign policy agendas.

3. Security and economic considerations were the key international constraints that contributed to the element of continuity. The fact that the country had a weak economy and a security problem in its eastern borders influenced negatively the "change effects" of governmental change in October 1981. It was shown that the Greek socialists, as their conservative predecessors, believed that the costs for Greece's security and economy resulting from a removal of the US military installations or from a withdrawal from NATO and the EC would be incredibly high. Indeed, Papandreou's perceptions about the outcome of a radical reorientation of the country's foreign policy acted as significant constraints and contributed to the element of continuity.

4. The changing international milieu required new responses by Greek foreign policy decision-makers. In that context, it was proved that the external environment was a source of change. "Feedbacks" were taken into account by the Greek leaders. Greece's foreign policy de-radicalisation process described in Chapter 4 was a result of this development: external events increased the relative strategic importance of Turkey and a cold war climate made the State Department increasingly irritated at Papandreou's foreign policy positions; as a result, the Greek socialists were forced to moderate their anti-western rhetoric. Thus, it was proved that the Papandreou's foreign policy was not static but dynamic, not unresponsive to external and internal changes but
responsive. In that context, there was not one foreign policy in the 1981-1986 period but many.

5. It was analysed in Chapters 9 and 10 how the influence of the Greek Communists and of the left-wing of PASOK contributed to the element of change that Papandreou introduced in Greek foreign policy. We proved that KKE's influence on the trade unions and the incompatibility between PASOK's pre-1981 promises and post-1981 foreign policy positions acted as significant constraints on Papandreou's freedom for manoeuvre. These two factors explain to a certain extent the PASOK leader's radical language (presentation of foreign policy) as well as the Greek socialists' anti-western moves (formulation of foreign policy). In accordance with the pluralist argument, it was shown that perceptions do matter in foreign policy analysis. The changes that PASOK brought in Greece's foreign policy were due to a change of perceptions. As we showed, unpredictability was a central feature of Papandreou's tactics. Further, lack of information, value judgements and the use of signals and indices explain the foreign policy of the Greek socialists. US-Greek relations under Papandreou is the most striking example. As it was argued in the respective chapter, miscalculations based on misperceptions led to a serious crisis that belied the Greek expectations.

6. Being strongly pro-American and having a tradition of involvement in civilian affairs, the Greek Armed forces were a significant constraint on Greek foreign policy options in the post-1974 era. Fearing the reactions of the Army's officers' corps Papandreou was forced to cancel or delay foreign policy decisions.
Further, PASOK's nationalistic policies vis-a-vis Turkey were partly designed to allay concerns in the military. The Army was a domestic factor that reinforced the element of continuity in Greek foreign policy.

7. It was proved that the two big Greek political parties had a similar view of their country's external milieux. Table 12.1 presents this consensus. It examines how PASOK and NDP perceived the influence of the interactions between Greece's geopolitical environments on the country's interests in the 1980s. There was not only a consensus on the influence (strong, medium, weak) of the interactions but also on their short-term prospects. The most important bilateral relations for Greece's foreign policy decision-makers was between Turkey and the US. Turkey's relations with the Arab World, the Balkans and the EC had a considerable impact on Greece's foreign policy options: as we proved, Turkey's attempts for a rapprochement with a sub-system of states provoked a Greek response. An interesting feature of the consensus is the prospects of the EC's role in international affairs. Both the conservatives and the socialists believed that the EC will become more and more important for Greece's foreign policy. Thus, the two big Greek political parties expected an increasing role for multilateral, for "parliamentary" diplomacy. In their value systems this is a "positive" development: Greece, a small country, can exert more influence in the context of an international forum than it could hope to achieve in her bilateral contacts with a superpower. Indeed, this perception characterises many small states which interpret their participation in the EC not as a loss of
sovereignty but as an enhancement of their international role."

9. Finally, it was shown that economic issues were upgraded in the Greek foreign policy agenda in the 1981-1986 era. A typical example is the importance that Papandreou attributed to the prospects of Arab investment in Greece. Indeed, this confirms the pluralist premise that economic issues play an increasingly important role in foreign policy agendas.

Decision-Making

In the beginning of this thesis it was argued that the "bureaucratic politics" approach is not a useful tool in analysing Greek foreign policy. This, however, does not mean that an analysis of contemporary Greek foreign policy decision-making processes is of little use. The lack of strong organisational structures in the Greek administration simply tends to reinforce the importance of the individual characteristics of the leader.

As we saw in Chapter 2, the over-concentration on decision-making power in the PASOK government's period in office was not a new development in Greek politics. Karamanlis's charismatic personality had dominated the NDP governments decision-making processes to a comparable extent. In the Greek Parliament debate on the country's EC membership in 1979, for example, Karamanlis reaffirmed his highly personal role on Greece's decision-making


9. Interview with A. Kannelopoulos, Athens, March 2, 1988
processes: "I had contacts", he said, "with prime ministers. Some were looking for an excuse to exclude us. Do not force me to say more... And I know more than you do on that matter... Only I know the efforts that I made for two full years to achieve what I did".\textsuperscript{10} Two factors, however, reinforced Papandreou's power in decision-making. The first was the downgrading of the role of the Greek diplomatic service.

In an interview in December 1981, the Greek PM launched an attack against the diplomatic service of his country: "I believe (...)", he said, "that our Diplomatic Service has not functioned well. It is not only the people, it is the structures. And it will need a lot of effort to function well".\textsuperscript{11} Papandreou seemed to believe that the Greek Diplomatic Service was dominated by conservative and blindly pro-American public servants and that his efforts to introduce a change in Greece's foreign policy would be boycotted by them.\textsuperscript{12} Thus, according to a new law introduced in 1982, in the Office of the Prime Minister was added a "Diplomatic Office" whose competence was "the study of current issues of the competence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of issues of foreign policy that the PM entrusts to it".\textsuperscript{13} Interestingly, the "Diplomatic Office" became so powerful that some analysts argued


\textsuperscript{11} Speeches of the Prime Minister Andreas G. Papandreou, 1981-1982, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 58

\textsuperscript{12} Interviews with two Greek diplomats, Athens, March 3, 1988

\textsuperscript{13} Law 1299/82, Article 4, Paragraph 3
that it was a centre of decision-making whose power was comparable
to that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁴

The downgrading of the role of the Greek Diplomatic Service
was not without cost. Hence, when Papandreou appointed Mr Yannis
Kapsis, the Alternate Minister for Foreign Affairs, head of the
Greek negotiating team for the future of the American bases in the
country, the Greek side lost its ad referendum privilege.¹⁵ According
to this a diplomat may agree to an arrangement under the
precondition that his superiors will consent. Kapsis, however, an
inexperienced negotiator, was speaking for the Greek government.
Nevertheless, a comparative study of the 1983 Agreement on the US
installations and the previous one which had been initialled in
1977 is impossible because the text of the latter has not seen the
public eyes while the 1981 negotiations were inconclusive.

The second factor was Papandreou's absolute dominance of the
governmental machine. By making a government reshuffle every six
months, Papandreou was able to remain the indisputable leader
of the socialist government. The Greek cabinet has rarely operated as
a collective body. Even KYSEMA (Government Council for National
Defence), a sub-cabinet where the Foreign Minister allegedly
played a dominant role, was used simply to ratify decisions that
had already been taken by the PM and his Diplomatic Office. Al-
though the leadership of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs
changed only once (in July 1985 from Haralambopoulos to

[In Greek]
Papoulias), the leader of PASOK exercised a stiff control over it. In 1982, for example, the Greek PM dismissed Mr Asimakis Fotilas, the Alternate Foreign Minister, when the latter consented on an EC resolution which condemned the declaration of martial law in Poland.\^\textsuperscript{16}

**Papandreou’s operational code**

Papandreou’s dominance of Greek decision-making undoubtedly means that the analysis of his personality is particularly important for the study of Greece’s foreign policy, especially of those decisions that we attributed to perceptions. Thus, the application of the operational code analysis, of a technique widely used by foreign policy analysts, should offer useful insights on the understanding of the foreign policy of the Greek socialists. Operational code analysis is a psychological technique. It seeks to lay bare the general philosophical architecture of a decision-maker’s belief system. Indeed, one of the main weaknesses of the technique is that it "tends to be limited to those individuals who have extensively committed their thoughts to paper"\^\textsuperscript{17}.

Andreas Papandreou is one of these individuals. Born in Chios in 1919, he studied at the Universities of Athens and Harvard. After obtaining American citizenship and serving in the US Navy, he taught economic theory in various American universities

\^\textsuperscript{16} Schlegel, Dietrich, Papandreou - A Gain in Predictability, *op. cit.*, p. 403

\^\textsuperscript{17} Vogler, John, Perspectives on the Foreign Policy System: Psychological Approaches, *op. cit.*, p. 140
(he finally became Chairman of Economics at the University of California in Berkeley). During these years he became affiliated with the American Democratic Party and helped Adlai’s Stevenson 1952 presidential campaign. In the early 1960s he returned to Greece and joined his father’s Centre Union Government. He held Ministerial posts and became the leader of the left-wing faction of the party. Essentially, however, Andreas Papandreou’s belief system was during this period liberal. 18

Papandreou was put in detention by the Greek colonels in April 1967 and released in December of the same year after a personal intervention of the US President Lyndon Johnson. In the 1968-1974 era he taught at the Universities of Stockholm and York, Canada. Simultaneously, he founded the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK), an organisation which reflected his adoption of the radical leftist and third world-oriented philosophy of economists like Samir Amin and Andre Gunder Frank. 19

Papandreou’s book Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front, published in 1970, offers useful information about the factors that led him to move from liberal reformism to leftist radicalism. The most important seems to be the US involvement in Greek politics in the mid-1960s. He writes that the CIA chief of station in Athens had told him: “Go tell your father that in Greece we get our way. We can do what we want - and stop at nothing”. 20 The un-

democratic manipulations of the King as well as his father's disagreement with President Johnson on the Cyprus issue also contributed to Papandreou's bitterness. The American support for the Greek junta was the final blow for his liberalism. In *Paternalistic Capitalism*, published in 1972, he attempts to find an answer. He examines the role of small states in a world of superpowers. He argues in favour of multipolarity, of a world system that would redress the inferiority of the South.\(^2^1\)

According to an analyst, this vision of Papandreou is consistent with his post-1981 policies. Greece's participation in the initiative of six world leaders which campaigned for measures to control the nuclear spectre,\(^2^2\) he argues, is a good example.\(^2^3\) Other authors, however, write that Papandreou is a political opportunist who was changing positions throughout his career.\(^2^4\) They cite the words of his former American wife: "Andreas has to be Prime Minister of the world to be happy".\(^2^5\) If we accept the view of "a ruthlessly ambitious" Papandreou quite different interpretations of the "Initiative of the Six" occur: "He just wants to win

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23. Melakopides, Constantine, Papandreou's Foreign Policy, *op. cit.*, p. 572
25. *Ibid*, p. 74
the Nobel prize for Peace" a NDP's MP and a colleague of Papandreou in the pre-junta Centre Union government says. Is then operational code analysis fundamentally flawed? The answer is no. The problem is that in Papandreou's case there is not enough information to judge. His particular interest on the Cyprus issue, for example, can be explained by his pre-1967 personal experiences. But this is a questionable argument because Papandreou as PM has not considerably altered Greece's policies with regard to Cyprus. The most indisputable element of the PASOK leader's belief system was the problem of Greece's dependence on the US.

Unpredictability

Papandreou's quest for a method that would increase the autonomy of Greece in a world dominated by "immoral" superpowers seems to be the most important element of his operational code. His solution is simple: the tactics of uncertainty. According to a nonadmirer who has had a close relationship with the Greek PM: "He calls it 'tightrope walking' himself and is proud of it as a way of conducting government. For Papandreou, the quintessence of diplomacy is unpredictability. He believes that it is the only way for a small country". This is the most important change that

26. Interview with Athanasios Kanellopoulos, op. cit.


PASOK introduced in post-1974 Greek foreign policy. As an analyst writes, "the pro-western reliability shown by Karamanlis constitutes probably his weakness in making his Eastern moves credible or using them as diplomatic leverage to defend his country's interests in the Aegean and Cyprus". Papandreou, in contrast to his conservative predecessors, was careful not to reiterate Karamanlis's dogma that "Greece belongs to the West". He claimed that the American military installations will be removed in 1990, he argued in favour of the Soviet Union in the BPC meetings and he retained close contacts with the "radical" Arab regimes. He irritated Greece's western allies in an apparent attempt to increase his country's leverage. However, his strategy confronted two serious constraints. First, it had a diplomatic cost.

According to a Euro-diplomat who was at the closed door session of the EPC meetings in 1983 presided by the Greek Foreign Minister, Haralambopoulos: "The Greeks kept pushing the pro-Soviet view on almost everything - Poland, the jambo, Euromissiles, the lot. It was like having Czechoslovakia in the chair". Papandreou was well aware of this constraint. In a speech to the 9th Session of PASOK's Central Committee, for example, he argued that Greece's "position [on the Polish issue in the EPC framework] was not without cost and dangers". But for the Greek PM the benefits

Magazine, April 7, 1985, pp. 17-18


30. Cited in The Times, September 26, 1983
outstripped the costs. "The advanced and daring exploitation of the varied oppositions and gaps [within the western alliance] in the context of a multidynamic and multidimensional foreign policy", he claimed in 1983, "is the only viable, radical and realistic solution".\footnote{32} Thus, following the signature of the US bases agreement, Papandreou said to his ministers - according to the letter of resignation of the Greek Alternate Foreign Minister, Mr Asimakis Fotilas - that "if [Greece] had not insisted so much on the character of the timetable, as being one for the removal rather than the maintenance of the US bases, [it] might possibly have obtained greater concessions from the United States, particularly in the area of economic assistance".\footnote{33}

The second constraint on Papandreou's tactics of uncertainty was the lack of credibility of his rhetorical anti-western "threats". Indeed, Greece is a small country with a weak and open economy which perceives herself threatened by a powerful neighbour, Turkey. Thus, if it chose a neutral course her security would be endangered. After all, Papandreou himself rejected any alliance with the "bureaucracies" of eastern Europe. He did not argue in favour of Greece's withdrawal from the EC since he gained power, he started to negotiate for the future of the American bases in 1982 and he did not withdraw Greece from NATO. Nevertheless, the Greek leader followed carefully a strategy of uncertainty: If Greece did not obtain a "special status" within

\begin{footnotes}
\item[31.] People-PASOK in the Road to Change, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 14
\item[32.] Institutional Changes and Socialist Transformation, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 18
\end{footnotes}
the EC it will re-examine her relationship with the latter; the US bases will be removed after the 5-year agreement; his government was against Greece’s membership of NATO. In Jervis’s language Papandreou’s "threats" were not perceived as indices but as signals. Papandreou was not for Greece’s western allies a "honest actor" but a "deceiver" who was sending "ambiguous signals in a noisy environment". According to Jervis this tactic "allows an actor to keep several paths open simultaneously and to initiate conversations without seriously endangering an image contradictory to the message sent and which the actor will want preserved if the other side’s reaction is not favourable". "Thereby", Jervis argues, it "enables the actor to gain control over the images others have of him". Probably for the first few months of PASOK’s government, Papandreou’s declarations worked as indices. Undoubtedly, however, it was easy, for Greece’s allies to check his government’s goals, to check if his rhetoric was linked to his intentions. As General Bernard Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, stated before the US Senate Armed Services Committee in February 1985: "[Papandreou] was elected in a campaign which included rhetoric on withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Greece; that has not yet occurred. (...) He has said he is going to withdraw from NATO; that has not occurred. From time to time he has to look to his left flank and placate those who supported him with some kind of language that lets them believe he may yet do what we would consider would be inappropriate for Greece".

Time worked against Papandreou's tactics of uncertainty. He could not bluff forever. Above all, however, the results of his strategy became more and more questionable. Although, it could be argued that his unpredictability attracted foreign attention to Greece's problems, it is impossible to know the counterfactual "non-Papandreou" situation, the so-called anti-monde. His tactics of unpredictability provoked the reactions of Greece's allies, especially of the US. As we saw in Chapter 4, the rising reactions of the US Administration provoked the de-radicalisation process of Greece's foreign policy positions in the context of the PASOK leader's "calmer seas" policy.

A mechanism of the trial-and-error type

The foreign policy of the Greek socialists showed an interesting adaptability. The inexperienced negotiators of the PASOK government, for example, learned not to abuse the Greek power of veto in the EPC framework. Thus, the logic of the PK's phrase that he could "not accept any decision that damages the Greek interests" was soon abandoned. The Greek decision-makers learned to build alliances and they soon outstripped their anti-EC suspicions and abandoned their pro-third world "sensitivities". The latter was not without cost. Thus, the PASOK government's support for Argentina in the Falklands crisis - although it had initially adopted a hesitant pro-British stance - damaged the Greek

34. Jervis, Robert, The Logic of Images in International Relations, op cit., p. 125
interests since the case of the Falklands exhibited striking similarities with the Cyprus one: it was a question of invasion that was contravening international law. A unique opportunity was lost. On the other hand, lack of experience made some unreparable damage to Greece's international reputation. Hence, when Greece was holding the chair of the EPC meetings in 1983, Mr Haralambopoulos, the country's Foreign Minister, revealed that the Ten had discussed the deployment of American missiles in Germany. "He thereby", writes the former Vice-President of the EC Commission Christopher Tugendhat, "simultaneously embarrassed the German minister because of the sensitivity of the subject at that time in the Federal Republic, the Irish minister because of Irish public opinion perennial worry that membership of the Community might conflict with their policy of neutrality and the Danish minister because of Danish public opinion's hostility to anything happening in a Community context that falls outside the strict confines of the Treaty of Rome". Indeed, the "learning process" that characterised Greek foreign policy in the PASOK era tended to minimise the element of change that the party introduced in post-junta Greek foreign policy.

The International Environment

In comparing the performance of different governments in


37. Ibid, pp. 322-323
different periods but in the same state, the researcher confronts a serious problem: To what extent did the circumstances that the governments had to cope with differ? One of the basic hypotheses of this thesis is that the international circumstances that the NDP government confronted in the 1974-1981 period and those that the PASOK government faced in the October 1981-1986 era were very similar. There was, first, a security problem: Turkey. A problem that underlied all of Greece's foreign policy objectives. Secondly, an economic problem: How Greece could raise the standard of living of its citizens through the improvement of her international contacts.

The first and most important difference between Greece's international position in the PASOK era and in the NDP's one is the country's membership of the EC. As we saw in Chapter 8 Greece's entry in the EC was the number one objective of the state's foreign policy in the 1975-1979 period. Undoubtedly, this influenced negatively the country's efforts for a "multidimensional" foreign policy since membership of the EC had almost totally absorbed the minds of the Greek leaders.

The second difference between the external environments that the two governments confronted was the revival of the cold war in the beginning of the 1980s. There was a consensus in the Greek political community that this was a negative development for the country's interests. And this because the strategic value of Turkey for the West increased. According to the Greeks, the balance of power in the Aegean was threatened. Interestingly, this
process reinforced the element of continuity in Greek foreign policy since the constraints on the PASOK government's options strengthened.

The third difference has to do with Greece's perceptions of her external environment. Papandreou is an economist. He inherited an economy in decline. Not unexpectedly economic issues were upgraded in the Greek foreign policy agenda since he gained power. In contrast to his predecessors he opened a dialogue with Turkey on economic issues; his demands during the negotiations on the US bases in Greece were mainly economic; and he argued that economic integration at the European level should precede political integration.

The Economy

The state of the economy is an important factor in determining the constraints and the opportunities that the foreign policy of a country has to respect and can exploit in the pursuit of what it perceives as "national interest". The Greek economy is of the semi-industrialised type. It was characterised by fast growth and considerable structural changes in the 1950-1979 era. In this period it grew at an annual average rate of 6%, one of the highest in the world, while the composition of her GDP changed completely in favour of manufacturing and services.** Services (shipping and tourism) where Greece had a strong comparative advantage con-


tributed in 1979 to more than 50% of her GDP. The second oil crisis hit hard the Greek economy. In the 1980s it started to confront strong inflationary pressures and disturbing external imbalances. When PASOK gained power the world shipping slump was reducing the remittances that were helping Greece to support her perpetual trade deficit. However, PASOK's economic policies did not help the Greek economy. Sharp increases of unit labour costs decreased the cost-competitiveness of Greek producers. Further, the deterioration of business climate reduced investment. Despite the EC funds ($2,116 million in the 1981-1985 period) and the fall of oil prices, the deficit of the Greek balance of payments reached a record in 1985: 9.8% of the GDP. The government was forced to introduce a "stabilisation programme" in October 1985. In 1986 the OECD considered the results of PASOK's austerity programme "very encouraging". However, its Report on Greece writes that "large macroeconomic imbalances and the problem of over-consumption still remain, calling for continued corrective action".

Some comparisons between the state of the Greek economy in 1981 and her position in 1986 are useful: inflation differentials between Greece and the other members of the OECD widened from 2:1 in 1981 to 5:1 in 1986; Greece's GDP per head was the 58.04% of London: Europa Publications Limited, 1988, p. 241

40. Ibid
42. Ibid, pp. 20-23
43. Ibid, p. 51
that of Europe-12 in 1981 and in 1986 it was the 48.9%; finally, its total external debt more than doubled from $7,876 million in 1981 to $17.127 million in 1986.

Which are the repercussions of the deterioration of Greece's international economic position in the 1980s? First, other countries' economic leverage on Greece increased. The effect of Reagan's advice to American tourists to avoid the Hellenikon airport examined in Chapter 4 is a classical example. Secondly, it seriously restricts Greece's room for manoeuvre in the international arena. The Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) of the Greek economy is a good example. It is one of the key factors behind the large domestic and external imbalances. It rose from 14.8% of the GNP in 1981 to 18% in 1985. Although the stabilisation programme succeeded in reducing it to 13% of the GDP in 1986, it remains one of the highest in the OECD area. The high PSBR has some interesting consequences: first, it increases the social costs of maintaining a large army. Thus, it threatens the consensus that exists in Greece about military expenditures. Secondly, it endangers Greece's relations with the EC. We saw in Chapter 8 how the Greek politicians perceive the economic repercussions of their country's EC membership. In that model the EC funds play a dominant and positive role. The high PSBR makes increasingly difficult for Greece to absorb these funds because they are additional to national funds. In an ironic way, Greece's participation in the Single Market will be difficult because her economy will not be in the position to absorb the funds that are necessary to reduce the political cost of restructuring.
Interestingly, the state of the economy has affected the internal constraints on Greek foreign policy in the PASOK era. We showed that the influence of the Greek Communists and of the left-wing of PASOK contributed to the element of change in post-junta Greek foreign policy. The decline of the economy of the country has some conflicting repercussions for the dynamics of the domestic constraints. First, a radicalising one. Thus, it poses questions of legitimacy in the post-1974 Greek political system and increases KKE's power. Secondly, a de-radicalising one. We saw in Chapter 11 how the influence of Greece's pro-american Armed Forces contributed to the element of continuity in Greek foreign policy in the 1974-1986 era. Thus, the crisis of legitimacy of the Greek political system will probably increase the de-radicalising influence of the Army since the latter will have more motives to get involved in politics.

Nevertheless, in the examined period, the internal constraints' influence on PASOK's foreign policy seemed to be in decline. Papandreou's consolidation in power meant that he gradually gained control of the left-wing of his party and ensured legitimacy within the Army. Simultaneously, the leader of PASOK was successful in controlling the Communist trade unionists. It was only in late 1985 that KKE started to distance itself from PASOK by abandoning its policy of "critical support".

The foreign policy of the Greek socialists

Three factors of predominant importance explain why the
Greek socialists continued the foreign policy of their predecessors. First, Greece's security problem, the Turkish "threat". Secondly, the country's weak economic international position. Thirdly, the role of the Army. On the other side, four factors explain the change that PASOK introduced in Greece's external policies. First, the role of the party, of PASOK's left-wing activists. Secondly, the role of the Greek Communist Party. Thirdly, the new views that Papandreou's government held in relation to the best pursuit of Greece's interests in the international arena. Fourthly, the different international environment that Greece confronted in the 1981-1986 period. However, this milieu was not significantly different from that of the 1974-1981 era. These four factors created what has been called "illusion of change" in the foreign policy of Greece.
Table 12.1
Greece's View of the World
How relations between Greece's geopolitical milieux are perceived to influence her foreign policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>EC</th>
<th>Arab World</th>
<th>Balkans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>USA</strong></td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EC</strong></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arab World</strong></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Balkans</strong></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USSR</strong></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prospects: 0 Unchanged
- Stronger
- Weaker
Appendices
Greek Imports by Geopolitical Area
1981

European Community-9
49.7%

Balkans 1.6%
Arab World 25.6%
5.1% United States

Others 12.3%

5.7% Eastern Europe

1985

European Community-9
46.7%

Balkans 2.2%
Arab World 22.5%

6.8% Eastern Europe

3.1% United States

18.7% Others

Source: Ibid
Greek Exports by Geopolitical Area

**1981**

- European Community-9: 42.3%
- Balkans: 5.4%
- Arab World: 23.9%
- Eastern Europe: 5.0%
- Others: 13.7%
- United States: 9.7%

**1985**

- European Community-9: 53.5%
- Balkans: 4.9%
- Arab World: 13.2%
- Eastern Europe: 5.2%
- Others: 15.1%
- United States: 8.1%

Data derived from Bank of Greece, Monthly Bulletin, September 1987, p. 74
Greece's Total External Debt
Billion US $

GDP at Market Prices per Head
Purchasing Power Parities

Consumer Price Index
1980=100

Source: Ibid, p. 90
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