Implications for the Selection and Training of Hostage Negotiators, through an analysis of Hostage Negotiation Data

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by

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Chapter One: Introduction

Background of the Study

There are few specialist areas within law enforcement, states Greenstone (2005), that provide officers with such a demanding, high-risk and stressful role as that of the hostage/crisis negotiator. Crisis negotiation, observes Charles (2008), is the law enforcement practice of talking to hostage takers and other barricaded individuals. Police hostage negotiators are deployed in a variety of fast moving, emotionally charged and life threatening situations. Each deployment is unique, because individuals are driven, or find themselves driven, to crisis due to a variety of external and internal stimuli. Therefore, any training provision must be effective within a wide range of operational incidents.

Police negotiators, notes McMain and Mullins (2001), are deployed on incidents ranging from suicide interventions to barricaded sieges. Furthermore, Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008) suggest that negotiators will be employed on future terrorist kidnaps and sieges. Therefore the skills, methods and personnel employed must be capable of withstanding extended deployment on demanding and complex incidents. This is a challenging training specification. However, both the service and the public expect that the training is fit for purpose, providing officers with the necessary skills to be successful and save lives. The primary objective for negotiators, states Veness (1999), is the preservation of life, and all other facets of the police operation such as the arrest of the offender(s) is of secondary importance. Hostage negotiators were originally developed for use in terrorist incidents. However, increasingly
their skills have been utilised to resolve a range of incidents and they are now an established and effective non-violent tactical option.

**The National Picture**

There are currently 43 Police Forces in England and Wales and each of those Forces are unique due to their geography and infrastructure. This uniqueness is also reflected in the diversity and complexity of their communities. Each Force has its own Hostage and Crisis Negotiation Cadre. These cadres vary in size as there is no national minimum standard or policy in relation to cadre numbers. Therefore, cadre composition remains at the discretion of individual Chief Officers. Hostage Negotiation Cadres consist of officers from a variety of ranks and operational backgrounds. Most cadres operate some form of on-call system, with a predetermined number of officers identified to respond to developing incidents. However, other deployment systems do exist. At this time national best practice is that a minimum of two trained officers attend and that one of those should have attended the National Course at Hendon.

Nationally there is a two-tier training system for negotiators. Firstly, there are a number of Regional (Basic) training courses, to which most Forces subscribe. However, this course is not a pre-requisite for attendance on the National (Advanced) Course. This situation is currently under review. There is some anecdotal evidence of a growing ground swell of opinion that all
negotiators should attend a regional course in the first instance and then progress to the national course. Successful completion of the regional course authorises the officer for ‘routine’ negotiation duties, such as suicide intervention and barricaded incidents. These ‘routine’ deployments are considered anecdotally to be the bulk of operational negotiator deployments. However, paradoxically although these deployments are considered ‘routine’ they still exhibit, and often in reality have, considerable inherent risks attached to their resolution. Lives are still at stake and yet often officers with limited training are being deployed to resolve them safely. This regime appears to be difficult to defend, though in fairness many Forces have acknowledged this risk and are attempting to mitigate against it by deploying at least one nationally trained officer to mentor, supervise and/or deal on every deployment.

The National Course is two weeks in duration. Not all the participating students have any negotiation experience or insight. Therefore, the first week re-visits many of the basic skills provided on the regional course. The second week incrementally builds towards the strategies and tactics used in the resolution of terrorist incidents. The deployment, continuous professional development and operational effectiveness of police negotiators are the responsibility of the relevant Force Area Co-ordinators. Currently and irregularly embryonic training is provided to equip co-ordinators with appropriate skills. This programme is not
accredited. There are no national role requirements, or core personal or technical competencies identified for either the negotiator or co-ordinator roles. Some co-ordinators are appointed on the basis of experience, others by rank and others because they expressed an interest. In all major incidents the co-ordinator is employed to provide both strategic and tactical advice and guidance to the incident commander in all aspects of negotiator use.

An Overview of Crisis Negotiation
Hostage taking is not a recent phenomenon: it has a long, albeit uneven, history that may be traced from antiquity to the present day. Human history, observes Griffith (2003), has often been shaped by the taking of hostages. Seizing a hostage as a leverage, observes Strentz (2006), is used by a perpetrator to compel another to comply with a demand. Schlossberg (1974) and Tappenden (1978) note that hostage and crisis negotiation within law enforcement is a relatively new innovation and can be traced to the violent politically motivated terrorist upheavals of the early 1970s. Historically, policing methods were tactically orientated. The police, state McMains and Mullins (2001), effectively demanded surrender, set a deadline for compliance and then assaulted. Initially, negotiators were subservient to the tactical option and would, according to Carlson (1977) and Plowman (1977), buy time allowing tactical commanders time to plan and prepare a dynamic intervention. However, a number of terrorist outrages and hostage takings, such as the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre and the Iranian Embassy Siege, argue McMains and
Mullins (2001), provided law enforcement with the vexing problem of finding a non-violent tactical solution without conceding to perpetrators' demands. Initially law enforcement's response to hostage taking was uneven, states Wilkinson (1977), and at worst unco-ordinated. In order to meet these challenges, comment Schlossberg and Freeman (1974), the New York Police Department created a specialist negotiation unit. Initially, this unit consisted of both armed tactical elements and negotiators. Negotiators in the United States, notes Schlossberg (1974), were trained to use psychology to reduce tension and influence behavioural change. In effect the negotiator, argues Charles (2008), seeks to understand the situation from the perpetrator's perspective in order to build rapport, trust and compliance. This policing innovation was soon adopted in this country. Interestingly, Vaness (1999) suggests that technological advances in communication allowed officers to be dispatched more quickly to incidents and therefore presented the problem of criminals being caught in the commission of crimes. These criminals often resorted to seizing hostages in an effort to evade arrest.

Although initially conceived to combat terrorist hostage taking, negotiators have become assimilated into the policing response to critical incidents and commanders utilise negotiators to resolve incidents peacefully. Indeed, "Containment and negotiation," comments Hare (1997), "has been one of the most effective, inexpensive and lifesaving innovations in modern police work" (p.152). Close judicial and public scrutiny will always follow the deprivation of a life by law enforcement and Jermyn (1999) argues that crisis negotiation, as a non-lethal police tactic, should be
utilised within high-risk incidents. With the incorporation of human rights legislation into English law, particularly Article 2: the right to life, Kennett (2003) noted that negotiation has become the tactical option of choice for many commanders. Negotiation methodologies have evolved, observes Ainsworth (2002), and now these techniques were also employed in both suicide intervention and incidents involving mentally disturbed individuals. However, because police negotiators were historically used as a primary response to terrorist situations, their existence, training and deployment particularly in this country is still shrouded in some secrecy.

Reasons for the Research

This study has an ethical dimension as the findings and recommendations will be provided to key National stakeholders in order to improve and develop this covert specialism. The critical incidents that are the daily routine of a crisis negotiator demand strategic leaders within the service to create policies that ensure the best officers are selected and provided with effective training. This enquiry provides an excellent opportunity to advance the practice of hostage and crisis negotiation. Hopefully, this research will provide defendable and evidenced recommendations that will require others to listen. The rationale behind this academic endeavour is not purely to advance understanding; there is an underlying, more altruistic reason. The researcher is committed to making a difference and hopefully by this study a human life will be saved.
Research Objectives and Questions

This study is primarily an exploration into the perceptions of senior police officers in relation to the selection and training of hostage negotiators. The over-arching aim of this study is to identify improvements for the selection and training of hostage negotiators, through an analysis of hostage negotiation data. This investigation into a specialist area of policing has been guided firstly by my own knowledge and experience in the field; secondly by the limited national and international academic research into this field, and finally by anecdotal views and comments by other practitioners. This combination of personal knowledge, research and expert advice has provided the over-arching research question:

"Is national police hostage negotiation training fit for purpose?"

In order to address this question sub-questions were identified as follows:

1. Are current selection procedures fit for purpose?
2. Do individual negotiation cadres reflect the community they serve and, if not, does this fundamentally undermine their operational effectiveness?
3. When deployment data is analysed, does it support the current national training course content?
4. Do trained skills fade and, if so, does this dilute operational effectiveness?
5. Does the nature of the role affect retention rates?
6. Is there a need for refresher courses and/or other opportunities to exploit continuous professional development and accreditation of police negotiators?

The study is intended to influence strategic thinking and policies both
nationally and globally and thereby make a positive contribution to frontline delivery. Law enforcement agencies have been approached for data on deployment for two reasons. Firstly, to generate baseline material from a variety of sources. Secondly, any subsequent themes detected within that data might present the possibility of generalising the findings world-wide. The following law enforcement agencies have either provided deployment data and/or literature on their respective organisations:

- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States
- Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
- South Australian Police (SAP)
- Manitoba Police Canada
- BundersKriminalamt (BKA) (Germany)
- Scotland
- The Metropolitan Police
- 'Westshire' Police

The research phase will encompass both quantitative and qualitative data. The qualitative research provides evidence on themes and issues through interviewing individuals ranging from police leaders, i.e. Association of Chief Officer level (ACPO) to the front line providers, i.e. negotiators. It is hoped that a thematic subjective enquiry will provide insight and clarity of understanding into the subject area. Interview schedules were based on the literature review and on areas highlighted by analysis of the baseline quantitative data. There are many ACPO officers nationally (most Forces have at least four ACPO Officers) and a random selection of two were interviewed (n = 2). There are nine Regional co-ordinators operating in the United Kingdom of whom two
were interviewed (n = 2 or 18%). There are eighteen negotiators active in 'Westshire', and of that number nine are Nationally trained. Of those nine 'Westshire' nationally qualified negotiators five were interviewed (n = 5, or 45%). Additionally one other Nationally trained officer external to 'Westshire' was interviewed to provide additional balance to the findings.

An Overview of the Thesis

This thesis relates the empirical research to a broad background of globalisation and national policy relevant to this topic. It centres on identifying the implications for the selection and training of hostage negotiators and it seeks to achieve this by analysing deployment data and by exploring the experiences and perceptions of senior police officers involved in this field.

This thesis consists of seven chapters in all. The first chapter provides a brief introduction to the background of the research and places the subject into context. Furthermore, it signals the significance of this unique empirical study and its desired effect on current national policy. It raises the core questions with which this research will engage and finally describes the whole thesis.

The literature review is divided into two chapters. Chapter Two examines the literature relevant to this study. It will argue that there are many features of globalisation and some of these may be closely linked to modern terrorism. Initially, it seeks to orientate the reader to the various genres of terrorism; then various strands of globalisation will be
discussed.

Chapter Three is also a literature review and tensions surrounding the various strands of globalisation are considered as potential catalysts for terrorism. This literature review will also consider the current policies that shape police educational provision and, in particular, the selection and training of police hostage negotiators.

The fourth chapter examines research methodologies, using both the quantitative and qualitative paradigms, and seeks to justify the rationale for the choice of research methods employed within this study. Also it illuminates issues pertinent to this research; in particular the difficulties faced by the researcher investigating subjects within the police environment and hostage negotiation in particular. Moreover, the key issues of gaining access to the service, ethical issues surrounding this research, collecting data and referencing policy within a sensitive environment will be examined.

Both the fifth and sixth chapters not only analyse but also present the research data - the fifth chapter presents the quantitative data and provides an analysis of this and the sixth chapter analyses qualitative data gathered nationally, exploring the experiences and views of senior police officers involved within this field.
Chapter Seven provides a review of the research questions and the data analysed. It will then provide conclusions on the research questions. Thereafter, it will present a series of recommendations for the improvement of the selection and training of hostage and crisis negotiators. Furthermore, it will consider the limitations of the study and finally it will suggest avenues for further investigation within the field.
Chapter Two: Globalisation, Terrorism and Hostage Negotiation.

An Introduction

A brief introduction to this research was provided in Chapter One. The chapter described the context, significance, objectives and the research questions of the study. In this and the following chapter, literature relevant to this study will be examined.

The literature review is divided into two chapters. This chapter seeks to argue that there are many features of globalisation and these may be closely linked to modern manifestations of terrorism. Then chapter three examines both international and national policy and literature in respect of the selection and training of hostage negotiators.

Initially, this chapter seeks to orientate the reader to the various genres of terrorism. It then briefly both describes the origins of globalisation and then briefly defines it. Subsequently, tensions surrounding the various strands of globalisation are considered as potential catalysts for terrorist organisations. The final sub-section considers whether globalisation is a driver for good.

An Introduction to Terrorism

Terrorism, observe Bolz, Dudonis and Schulz (2001), is a term deriving from the Latin word ‘terrere’ meaning to frighten. The expression became popular in the French revolution and is difficult to define precisely.
Horgan (2005) argues that academic debate has focused on defining either the terrorist or the act, when importantly the precursors for the behaviour have been overlooked. This is an important point as this thesis seeks to argue that some of the causation factors for modern terrorists are rooted within the tensions surrounding the processes of globalisation.

"Terrorism upsets people," observes Townsend (2002), "it does so deliberately" (p.1). Therefore, because of its emotive nature, terrorism is difficult to define in a value-free way. One pragmatic definition of terrorism suggests Jenkins (2003) is: "violence or the threat of violence calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm - in a word, to terrify and thereby bring about some social or political change" (p.16). The elusive nature of terrorism is highlighted by Cooper (2001) who observes that: "much scholarly labour of the most catholic, multi-disciplinary kind has been expended over the years in trying to develop some common ground over the matter" (p.54). Perhaps a universally agreed definition will remain elusive, for as Kegley (2003) observes "Terrorism seems destined to remain a highly subjective, sensational and emotional phenomenon, surrounded by polemics, double standards, and hypocrisy" (p.7).

Terrorism presents itself as a continuum of aggression; ranging from verbalised threats to the atrocity of substantial and indiscriminate murder. Terrorism as a tactic notes Griffith (2003) has a considerable lineage. However, current world events appear to evidence that disaffected groups
are increasingly using terrorism as the tool of choice to instigate change. Historically terrorism, remark Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008), has been aligned to the desire to instigate political change. Indeed, “The perfect deed of the good terrorist” argues Townsend (2002), “is assassination. Classical tyrannicide was valorised because it could remove the oppressor with the minimum of force” (p. 21). However, currently a range of disenfranchised groups have now resorted to terrorism that targets the populace, as a vehicle to progress their particular struggle, grievance or demand. The line between freedom fighter and terrorist appears blurred. For example Nelson Mandela the respected elder world statesman was once considered to be a terrorist by the South African Government. It would seem that terrorism, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. Furthermore, those who label individuals and groups as ‘terrorist’ are often nation states, and as Townsend (2002) succinctly observes, “Terrorism as a distinctive political concept got its name (and much of its unattractive reputation) from the actions of the holders of state power....” (p. 23).

Terrorism, notes Griffith (2003), continues to be employed by individuals and groups because historically, albeit unevenly, it achieves results. Traditionally, argues Hess (2003), terrorism has been described as a ‘triptych’; Repressive, insurrectional and social-revolutionary. Repressive terrorists, such as right wing groups (e.g. the Ku Klux Clan), use violence to deny non-privileged groups access to political and economic rights. These terrorists often have considerable governmental influence. Insurrectional terrorists are ethnic, nationalist or separatist in nature.
Examples include the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLO) and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. Social-revolutionary groups are normally associated with Marxist political cells and are often considered the 'classical form' of terrorism. Interestingly, Hess (2003) further delineates terrorist types, when he examines the significance of psychiatric motivators. This view that mentally ill individuals populate terrorist groups is not universally accepted. Indeed, Sageman (2004) remains unconvinced. Initially he concedes that, "the mental illness thesis provides a quick and comforting explanation for terrorism" (p.81). However, he ultimately concludes that "On a logical basis, although antisocial people might become "individual" terrorists, they would not do well in a terrorist "organisation". Because of their personalities, they would not get along with the others or fit in well in an organisation...." (p. 81).

State sponsored terrorism, argue Cline and Alexander (1986), adds another dimension to the debate. According to Townsend (2002) "governments have been on any quantitative measure the most prolific users of terrorist violence" (p.23). Conventional interstate warfare, argues Klare (2003), is expensive and the outcomes are not assured, whereas the use of unconventional tactics, such as terrorism, provide both cross-border reach and low costs. This type of 'irregular warfare' is extremely difficult to frustrate and "the greatest surprise", suggests Saul (2005), "is the difficulty Western Military institutions are having adjusting to this new but obvious normalisation of the irregular" (p.260). The employment of irregular forces, proffers Jenkins (2003), is problematical as, "It puts more resources in the hands of the terrorists: money, sanctuary, sophisticated
munitions, intelligence and technical expertise" (p. 25). Today's terrorist comrade may be tomorrow's foe; this truth was evidenced on September 11\textsuperscript{th} for the Americans, as Al-Qa'eda terrorists trained to fight in Afghanistan by the CIA turned their training and knowledge against their old sponsors.

In summation, these descriptions provide a degree of useful orientation, even if they fail to completely capture the myriad roads that a disenfranchised person can take to become a terrorist. In the next section globalisation will be explored; once described, linkages between this concept and the potential motivators for modern terrorists will be explored.

The Origins of Globalisation

Global influences are not new, even if modern technological advances have ensured that globalisation processes have developed at an unprecedented pace. Much academic literature such as Rifkin (1995), Stiglitz (2002) and Ritzer (2004) concentrates on the economic aspects of globalisation and, in particular, the pervasiveness of capitalism. However, globalisation is multi-faceted and complex with economic factors being but one of its aspects. Tensions are undoubtedly created in the wake of the globalisation process. Indeed, Rifkin (1995) focuses on economic tensions in these terms, "Trans-national corporations are blazing a path across national boundaries, transforming and disrupting the lives of billions of people in their search for global markets" (p.286). Tensions created by the different manifestations of globalisation may provide the fertile
seedbeds for the creation of terrorists and their ideologies. It therefore seems sensible for hostage negotiators to attempt to understand the multi-faceted nature of globalisation and, thereafter, utilise operationally this knowledge effectively.

Globalisation Defined

Maccionis and Plummer (2002) observe that “Sociology's basic insight is that where we are placed in society profoundly affects individual experiences. The position of a society in the larger world system affects everyone” (p.32). Therefore, critical analysis and understanding of global issues can provide policy makers with both strategic and tactical clarity. Globalisation has many definitions: Bottery (2004) notes, “Globalisation as a term hides a variety of possible meanings which do not always fit together to produce one neat picture” (p.33). Ritzer (2004) describes globalisation as, “the world wide diffusion of practices, expansion of relations across continents, organisation of social life on a global scale, and growth of a shared global consciousness” (p.71). Findlay (1999:vii) suggests another view: “It means modernisation and the marketing of predominant consumerist value”. There is an element of truth in this observation, with its pragmatic acknowledgement of values.

In summation, literature suggests the existence of globalisation, though its exact meaning remains elusive and open to interpretation. Globalisation matters; it is a major and profound process shaping world events. In the next section, the potential linkages between globalisation and the motivational factors for modern terrorists will be made. For, as Laquer
Globalisation and its Links to Terrorism

It is acknowledged that opinions differ on the exact nature of globalisation. However, for the purposes of this review Bottery's (2004) argument that globalisation may be divided into descriptive and prescriptive forms will be used as the basis for the discussion. It is noted, however, that his thesis fails to identify terrorism as a globalisation process. In broad terms he suggests that descriptive forms of globalisation are fashioned by "natural" influencers such as environmental change, whereas prescriptive forms are man-made and aligned to political and economic ideologies. Bottery (2004: 34) develops his argument by suggesting that there are three descriptive forms of globalisation, namely "environmental", "cultural" and "demographic." Each of these will now be examined and links to terrorism will be explored.

Environmental

This form of globalisation is highly topical; attracting both considerable research and societal concern. Deforestation, burning fossil fuels and global warming are cited by Bottery (2004) as potent tangible symbols of environmental globalisation. The instant access to unfolding natural catastrophes and the increased awareness, provided by global media, of environmental issues has heightened public concern. Furthermore, Homer-Dixon (2007) argues that 'nature's capital' is nearing exhaustion and the stressed eco-systems are liable to sudden collapse (p.147). Within this
environment of competing demands and diminishing resources radical individuals and groups are resorting to both non-violent and increasingly violent methods (Arnold 1997). Eco-terrorists, observes Arnold (1997), such as the American Ted Kaczynski the ‘Unabomer,’ consider their priority to be the destruction of the world-wide industrial system; the major cause as they see it of such problems. Moreover, this destruction will be achieved by violently resisting environmental exploitation.

As global resources shrink, both non-violent and violent environmentalists are likely to be increasingly drawn into conflict with both multi-national corporations and ultimately with states. According to Arnold (1997), increasing numbers of individuals are prepared both to orchestrate and participate in ‘Eco-terror’ in order to protect natural environments. Indeed, observes Watson (2004), both the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) are now involved in an escalating conflict with industrialists and governments (p.283). These conflicts, remarks Best (2004), will become increasingly violent as environmental radicals embrace the concept of using ‘any means necessary’ to save the planet and its species (p301). This disconcerting view is shared by Gower (2005), who also concludes that environmental groups are becoming increasingly involved in criminal direct action. Finally, Gurrett (2004) charts the increased criminality of these groups. He notes that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States estimate that the Animal Liberation Front has committed more than 600 crimes in the United States since 1996 resulting in damage valued in excess of $43 million. In summation, this literature suggests that both individuals and groups
are using direct action on environmental issues. It therefore appears likely that there will be an increased potential for police negotiators to be deployed on incidents involving radical environmentalists. Environmental issues, argues Arnold (1997), are highly emotive. Therefore, negotiators may require advanced training in both diffusion techniques and influencing skills.

Cultural and Religious

"The term culture", observes Stapley (2006), "is used to refer to the overall way of life of a people. It involves values, norms, institutions and modes of thinking to which successive generations in a given society have attached primary importance" (p.112). Cultural issues are significant, and Huntington (1996) argues that "culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration and conflict in the post Cold-War world" (p.20). Ritzer (2004), when analysing the effect of culture, comments on the way in which some cultural nuances blend together as 'homogeneity.' Furthermore, he expresses concerns that global standardisation has the potential to create tensions. This is an important point; cultural uniqueness is highly prized by many ethnic groups. This uniqueness is for many fundamental to their very existence, and as such tribal and ethnic conflicts tend to be associated with the extreme violence of 'ethnic cleansing' (Huntington 1996). There is, argue both Saul (2005) and Stapley (2006), a resurgence of nationalism globally. Arguably, tensions surrounding cultural issues will increase as homogenising globalisation processes attempt to diffuse commonality across the globe. Tension
would undoubtedly surface as global processes adversely react with factions or communities attempting to assert their national, cultural or religious uniqueness. Therefore, the clash of globalisation and those attempting to assert their cultural uniqueness may provide the impetus for extremism. Laqueur (1999) provides support for this argument, noting that “The real innovation in the late twentieth Century is the appearance of radical religious (or quasi-religious) nationalist groups adopting terrorism as their main form of struggle” (p.80). Within this challenging environment western neo-imperialistic foreign policy will need to remain both responsive and sensitive to a myriad of competing cultural, ethnic and religious demands. Failure to rise to these challenges may prove disastrous. Indeed “the avoidance of a global war of civilizations” suggests Huntington (1996), “depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multi-civilizational character of global politics” (p.21).

Some writers (Laqueur 1999, Esposito 2002 and Berger 2005), when discussing religion, detect a distinct polarisation and radicalisation of belief rather than a globalisation of compromise. “The world today” explains Berger (2005), “with some exceptions is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever” (p.2). Huntington (1996) adds, “The late twentieth century has seen a global resurgence of religions around the world. That resurgence has involved the intensification of religious consciousness and the rise of fundamentalist movements” (p.64). For many, Islamic fundamentalism is the most potent symbol of religious extremism (Eposito 2002 and Laqueur 2004). The
tactic of martyrdom terrorism appears to be increasingly the province of extreme Islamic factions. Merari (1998), when considering suicide terrorists, suggests that there are 4 key influencing factors: cultural, indoctrination, situational factors and finally the individual’s personality (p. 196). He further argues that cultural influences assist to set the ‘cultural norms’ of acceptability, and also delineate the method of committing the act. However, the global rise of religious violence is not the province of one faith alone; to have God’s mandate for their actions, suggests Juergensmeyer (2001), is one claimed by many extremists. A growing phenomenon in the United States, notes Doherty (2001), is the escalating number of New Religious Movements (NRM). Laqueur (1999) suggests that many of these faith groups are close-knit, small and radical, which makes them difficult to infiltrate and monitor. In Doherty’s (2001) study of Waco and the Branch Davidian Sect, she illustrates the difficulties encountered by all the actors, and in particular the negotiators, when attempting to resolve a crisis situation when “the parties bring their Gods to the negotiation table” (p.225). The difficulties of negotiating ‘across the cultural divide’ (Rogan et al 1997) or across a ‘religious chasm’ may not be insurmountable; however current training provision will need to be critically reviewed to ensure that negotiators frame responses and dialogue aware of both their own value system and its potential effects on others.

The speed of globalisation tends to be disorienting and in extreme cases threatening. “The pace of global integration matters” argues Stiglitz (2002), “a more gradual process means that traditional institutions and norms, rather than being overwhelmed, can adapt and respond to the
new challenges” (p.36). However, both the speed and pervasive nature of globalisation appears to conspire against mitigating its effects.

This literature suggests that in the challenging current climate of world unrest negotiators will need to be both well informed and educated in a variety of religious and/or cultural nuances. Such educational programs would hopefully prevent negotiators from inadvertently violating a fundamental belief or custom. The provision of adequate, sensitive training appears to be a priority for the service.

**Demography**

There now exists, state Haralambos and Holborn (2004), a ‘demographic time bomb’, caused both by populations living longer, and the declining fertility in western nations. Therefore, for western governments future tax revenues are likely to fall unless the retirement age is increased. With less income from taxation tough decisions will be faced and public health services, and in particular the aging population, could bear the brunt of reduced investment. Slatkin (2003) considers ‘the greying of America’ within the context of hostage and crisis interventions (p.26). He highlights an increasing, unexpected and troubling dimension with his description of the unique problems associated with dealing with crisis incidents involving the elderly, such as depression, alcohol and drug abuse. Demographic issues are not confined to the elderly. There is increasing evidence of a polarisation between age groups, and of the disintegration of the traditional family unit (Haralambos and Holborn 2004). Therefore for many adolescents life stress, peer pressure and societal expectations are
becoming increasingly problematic. For some young people, acknowledges Strentz (2006), besieged by seemingly insurmountable problems and life stressors, their coping mechanisms are overwhelmed, and suicide or confrontation with law enforcement is seen as the only viable option. He insightfully observes:

"Most adolescents live in very turbulent times. They are forced to make lifestyle decisions that they might not be equipped to handle. They are trying to become adults in a complex society that continues to refine the qualifications for adult membership" (p.74).

A final demographic issue is noted by both Huntington (1996) and Bottery (2004) who observe that non-Western states, in particular Africa and the Muslim world, are experiencing a 'baby boom'. Compare this with a less fertile, older, conservative, rich west and the social implications globally are immense. This observation is supported by Laqueur (2004) who states:

"One other factor has contributed to the terrorist potential in the Arab world: uncontrolled demographic growth and the incapacity of the Arab governments to find jobs for young people leaving schools and graduating from universities" (p. 17). He later continues:

"These young people will be found in the coffee houses drinking coffee, smoking water pipes, and not unsurprisingly discussing radical politics, and among them the terrorists will find sympathisers" (p.17).

The world's demographic imbalance, argues Homer-Dixon (2007), coupled with the dramatic increase in the populations of 'mega-cities' such as Mexico City (19 million) and Delhi (14 million) has the potential to be
highly destabilising (p.69). Furthermore, Huntington (1996) argues that an aging population, a low birth rate and social disintegration are clear indications of western decline. If one considers all these the potential for increased demographic tensions are likely. It therefore appears likely that some future terrorist acts may be predicated on demographic tensions. Critical reflection on this aspect of globalisation raises a critical question for this research. It may be summarised in these terms: a primary role for negotiators is the ability to build a rapport, quickly and effectively. In effect, “The negotiator or crisis worker” reflect Furman and Collins (2005), “who cannot understand the mindset of their client has little chance of succeeding” (p.53). Therefore, does the current training provision provide the requisite skills to function effectively with individuals driven by tensions arising from this aspect of the globalization process, or are negotiators doomed to fail because of insufficient training?

**Political**

Bottery (2004) further describes “other forms which are closely linked to the aspirations of particular political ideologies and particular power groups” (p.39). These prescriptive forms of globalisation are: Political, Americanisation and Economic. These views are broadly supported by Stiglitz (2002) and Ritzer (2004). Political globalisation, states Bottery, includes both the “relocation of political power away from the nation state” (p.40), and “the global spread of ideas, and the development of international sets of rules and institutions for political governance” (p. 41). Macionis and Plummer (2002) illustrate this concept with the movement of power away from European states to the European Union. However,
suggests Stiglitz (2002), this is just the tip of an iceberg, with un-elected institutions such as the World Bank wielding vast political power. While elaborating on political issues, Ritzer (2004) highlights "the emergence of isomorphic forms of governance worldwide, and in particular, the global spread of a democratic political system" (p.76). This attempt to spread a westernised political system, argues James (2005), by neo-liberalised governments appears to proliferate tensions worldwide. Ritzer (2004) contrasts isomorphic governance with an alternative political perspective that is localised, ethnic or culturally based such as those practised in some non-western states. He observes that these alternative perspectives tend to be associated with the intensification of nationalism, and therefore are apt to lead to greater political heterogeneity throughout the world. Furthermore, as Juergensmeyer (2001) suggests the fusion of politics, culture and religion has created radicalism; especially in the Middle Eastern cultures many of which are ferociously anti-western. Moreover, Huntington (1996) in his discussions on the 'global politics of civilisations' considers the new political variable of Asia. "The economic changes in Asia" he observes, "particularly East Asia, are one of the most significant developments in the world in the second half of the twentieth century" (p. 218). With its expanding commercial powerbase this region may attempt to force its own political philosophies into the global mix.

Historically, political motivators have been associated both with acts of terrorism (Townsend 2002) and 'state sponsored terrorism' (Cline and Alexander 1986). Therefore, the arrival of potentially yet another political viewpoint may lead to yet more pressures and tensions. Finally, "Terrorist hostage-taking" notes Wilkinson (2006), "presents democratic governments
and law enforcement with acute dilemmas" (p.119). He argues that terrorists are increasingly utilising this tactic as a method of pressurising nation states.

In conclusion, the literature leaves one concerned for the future, as there appears to be good evidence suggesting that political globalisation leads to friction. It seems reasonable that hostage negotiator training should provide some basic awareness of broad political philosophies and issues; currently this is not the case. Training time is valuable, and due to both the complexity of the subject and the shifting nature of politics, it may prove to be challenging to design a suitable programme. Therefore, a cost effective solution may be the provision of special interest seminars. These seminars would be targeted only at officers who would be likely to confront politically motivated terrorists on national or international deployments. This knowledge would enable officers quickly to orientate themselves. Furthermore, it seems both reasonable and desirable that a national cadre of specifically trained negotiators should be available for these incidents.

Americanisation

America, suggests Bottery (2004), "seems to be in the interesting position of being a form of globalisation, yet challenged by other aspects of it" (p.43). In broad terms he divides Americanisation into two forms: 'hard' power such as military and economy, and 'soft' power such as fashion and films (p.43). When discussing soft Americanisation, Barber (2003) observes that it is not restricted to pop music and films, and proffers
that these are "but pieces of a mesmerizing global mediology that suffuses consciousness everywhere" (p.84). However, Ritzer (2004) holds a different view, considering that "Americanisation is inclusive of all forms of American cultural, institutional, political, and economic imperialism" (p.85). The production of consumer goods aimed at the American market and their subsequent diffusion globally assisted by American media and films has resulted in global 'influence by stealth.' Indeed, Ritzer (2004) alludes to the fact that America is 'everyone's second culture.' This concept is emotive and both Barber (2003) and Ritzer (2004) observe that many societies violently oppose this cultural infiltration. This resistance presents itself in the increased attacks on worldwide American interests. Further, terrorists, observe Reeve (1999) and Scruton (2002), are now exploiting global processes against the West and in particular America itself. The use of global institutions such as banks by terrorists is not a new phenomenon; however recently there has been a subtle methodological shift. Historically, such organisations as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) limited their use of global networks to the facilitation of funds and weapons. However, now terrorist strategists are utilising global processes to attack their enemies across a broad front. These strategies include use of modern technologies (computers and the internet), communications infrastructures, the use of global financial institutions and media manipulation for propaganda. Current American neo-imperialist foreign policies, argues Elshtain (2003), has further alienated many countries globally. An exemplar of this policy is the relationship that America enjoys with Israel, a country whose very existence is the catalyst for immense tensions in the Middle East.
(Elshtain 2003). Furthermore, Klare (2004) and Homer-Dixon (2007) argue that American foreign policy has been fundamentally influenced by its need to have uninhibited access to secure supplies of oil. This dependency, notes Klare (2004), is considered to be a matter of National security. Initially, this caused America to invest economically and then become ultimately embroiled militarily into the complexities of the Persian Gulf region (p.56-73). Recent attempts by America to diversify oil suppliers has achieved limited success, as it has become intrinsically linked with countries that are either dictatorships or profoundly unstable. Klare (2004) foresees challenging times for America, and advocates a blended strategy that firstly separates energy policy from foreign policy, secondly reduces its reliance on external suppliers and finally moderates its domestic petrol consumption. Due the 'special relationship' forged between the United Kingdom and America, this aspect of globalisation appears to have immense implications for the type and frequency of UK negotiator deployments. Current training regimes may need to be re-assessed. Anecdotally, international experience indicates that the identification and use of local leaders as intermediaries is an effective method of dealing with hatred fuelled by the pervasive effects of Americanisation.

**Economic**

The final prescriptive form of globalisation is economic. The critical nature of economic globalisation is acknowledged by Bottery (2004), who states: "There are then profound inter-relationships between the different forms of globalisation, with economic globalisation being the dominant form" (p.46).
The connectivity of the economy to other global influences and its pre-eminence is also acknowledged by Stiglitz (2002) and Ritzer (2004). The momentum of economic globalization, observes Ritzer (2004), is closely aligned to the remorseless march of capitalism. The growth of global markets and the ease of transmitting finances have accelerated the pace of world change. Indeed, "There is no activity more intrinsically globalising than trade" comments Barber (2003), "no ideology less interested in nations than capitalism, no challenge to frontiers more audacious than the market" (p.23).

Critically, the World Bank and other such 'un-elected' institutions, together with multi-national corporations, are able to influence the governmental policies of nation states. This erosion of power by un-elected bodies, observes Huntington (1996), has had a detrimental effect on the powerbase of nations. Furthermore, in an effort to chase the 'global dollar' in an increasingly competitive market, governments are propelled to radically review their public education and/or skills provision. This review is intended to ensure that its citizens are fit to meet the dynamic challenges of the new economically driven world. When discussing developing countries Stiglitz (2002) observes:

"In particular, they believed that if they were to close the income gap between themselves and the more developed countries, they had to close the knowledge and technology gap, so they designed education and investment policies to do that" (p.92).

Yet social engineering is not restricted to developing countries:

"Future global change - characterised by intensified global
The world economy is driven by many factors; not least by the expectations, values and needs of the consumer. Therefore, observes Bottery (2004), innovation and knowledge are now commodities in their own right. He continues, "The new economy, then, is a 'knowledge economy,' and the new capitalism is 'knowledge capitalism'" (p.47). Stiglitz (2002) adds, "Knowledge itself is an important global public good: the fruits of research can be of benefit to anyone, anywhere, at essentially no cost" (p.224). Although Stiglitz's (2002) purist's viewpoint is commendable, mankind's greed will no doubt ensure that there will remain tensions associated with the knowledge economy.

Laqueur (2004) states that there is a persistent belief that poverty and starvation are primary causes of terrorism. He argues,

"The underlying belief that terrorism is generated by poverty is the assumption that in this case it might be relatively easy to remedy this state of affairs by offering much greater support to the poor countries, to have a re-division of wealth, by providing employment and thus restoring hope" (p.18).

This is an interesting viewpoint; however Huntington (1996) disagrees, observing: "The evidence simply does not support the liberal, internationalist assumption that commerce promotes peace" (p.67). Radical anti-capitalist protestors ensure that G8 summits attract protest
and violence. One of the aims of the protestors appears to be inciting civil strife thereby forcing a fundamental review of capitalist economic policies. These events and other conference occasions appear to present numerous opportunities to seize hostages as a leverage, to force both national and international concessions. Indeed, Strentz (2006) considers the seizure of hostages to force concessions to be a 'classical' methodology. Hostage negotiators would rely on bargaining and problem solving strategies to resolve this type of incident. In general terms, negotiators would normally be confident of bringing such incidents to a peaceful conclusion. However, one should not be complacent, for this type of incident may still present a variety of high risk factors. These factors, comment Cooper (2001) and Strentz (2006), would be evidenced by pre-incident planning, preparation, the realistic or non-realistic nature of the demands and, finally, the determination to force compliance regardless of the physical cost to perpetrators and/or victims alike. Negotiators may require enhanced training in advanced influencing and bargaining skills. This type of training does not currently exist within the UK, and this appears to be a skills gap.

In Bottery's (2004) argument (pp.50-54) he considers how globalisation influencers are mediated by both cultural and national nuances. Furthermore, he discusses the methods employed by nation states to both influence and capitalise on globalisation. Mindful of global influencers, these interventions both inform and crystallise government strategies and policies, as they struggle to obtain the best conditions for their citizens. Both Huntington (1996) and Saul (2005) add to this debate,
when they discuss not only the rise in culture and nationalism as mediators but ethnicity as well. The process that is ethnicity enables peoples to band together into historically factual, or invented, social groups (Das 2002). These ethnic groups form alliances across national borders and, Huntington (1996) argues, these alliances are creating a new world order. Furthermore, he explains that, “These shifts in power among civilisations are leading and will lead to the revival and increased cultural assertiveness of non-Western societies and to their increasing rejection of Western culture” (p. 83). In short, with the increased fracturing of the global community along cultural, ethnic and nationalistic lines, coupled with these newly created alliances, one may detect a greater likelihood for global tensions. Supporting this view, Saul (2005) suggests that, “By the end of the twentieth century, nationalism and the nation states were stronger than they had been when Globalisation began” (p.243). Perhaps a new world order formed along ties of culture, ethnicity or nationalism may transpire to be resilient enough to withstand or at least mitigate the pervasive nature of the globalisation process.

Globalisation: A Positive Process?
The effects of globalisation are significant, “Virtually every nation”, states Ritzer (2004), “and the lives of millions of people throughout the world are being transformed, often quite dramatically by globalization” (p.71). Furthermore, Stiglitz (2002) continues;

“Globalisation has reduced the sense of isolation felt in much of the developing world and has given many people in the developing countries access to knowledge well beyond the reach of even the
wealthiest in any country a century ago" (p.4).

The idea that globalisation is a driver for societal good is a fiercely debated topic, as testified by the contrasting arguments of Macionis and Plummer (2002); Stiglitz (2002) and Ritzer (2004). "Globalisation as a process" comments Zekos (2004), "is by now a historical fact, which enriches the interactions of people in a lot of different countries: they meet, swap goods and ideas and borrow or buy resources" (p. 631). Commendable and encouraging as Zekos's views are, they arguably struggle to capture the realities of modern society. Furthermore, they are not universally shared. Stiglitz (2002) offers a contrasting view:

"If, in too many instances, the benefits of globalisation have been less than its advocates claim, the price paid has been greater, as the environment has been destroyed, as political processes have been corrupted, and as the rapid pace of change has not allowed countries time for cultural adaptation" (p.8).

Patently, in his view, globalisation is not without its pitfalls. This is a surprisingly frank commentary from the former President of the World Bank. However, he later qualifies this pessimism by saying: "Globalisation has brought better health, as well as an active global civil society fighting for more democracy and greater social justice. The problem is not with globalisation, but with how it has been managed" (p. 214).

His is an insightful viewpoint; however perhaps globalisation by its connectivity, pervasiveness and speed inhibits any strategic co-ordination by either nations or corporations. Finally, Ritzer (2004) provides this disconcerting dimension:
"Among the defining characteristics of this theory were its orientation to issues that were of central concern in the West, the predominance it accorded to developments there, and the idea that the rest of the world had little choice but to become increasingly like it (more democratic, more capitalistic, and so on)" (p.71).

This hypothesis is surely cause for concern; globalisation by its nature tends to be value-laden, and the association of those values with Western ideology has the potential to alienate a multitude of the world's populations. Indeed, on reflection, the opportunities for division and enmity is obvious as one detects the 'invisible hand of self interest' as two major ideologies, economic and political, both drive the pace and direction of global change. Furthermore, if one considers Huntington's (1996) discourse on the expected decline of Western influence in terms of politics and power, and the tensions this decline is likely to create, the debate then becomes even more disturbing. An unexpected twist to the debate is provided by Savage and Atkinson (2001) when they discuss the manipulation of globalisation for political gain. They highlight the fact that the British Government cite globalisation as the major driver for profound change. Globalisation like so many issues is not beyond 'spin,' and Savage and Atkinson (2001) argue that, "The charge against New Labour is precisely that they present globalisation as if it were a force of nature to which there is only one possible response - their response" (p.9). This view suggests that governments may attempt to usurp the apparently positive aspects of globalisation. Indeed, if Bottery's (2000) and Savage and Atkinson's (2001) viewpoints are to be believed, the common good comes a poor third to the ideological and political
agendas of nations and economical imperatives of multi-national corporations. An economist’s perspective again provides both Bottery (2000) and Savage and Atkinson (2001) with unexpected support when Stiglitz (2002) states, “Not only in trade liberalisation but in every other aspect of globalisation even seemingly well-intentioned efforts have often backfired” (p.8). His insight leaves one disappointed at the opportunity lost and concerned for the future. He does, in finality, offer this hope, “If globalisation is to work, this too must change” (p.274).

Chapter Summary

In this chapter the reader was orientated to the various genres of terrorism. It then briefly both described the origins of globalisation and then briefly defined it. Subsequently, tensions surrounding the various strands of globalisation were considered as potential catalysts for terrorist organisations. The final sub-section considered whether globalisation is a driver for good.

In the next chapter, policing and the evolving nature of crime will be debated in the global context. Finally, it will be argued that globalisation and terrorism are integrally linked.
Chapter Three: The Selection and Training of Hostage Negotiators

An Introduction

This chapter considers the relevant literature and policy currently shaping police educational practices and in particular the selection and training of police negotiators.

Policing in a Global Context

The fundamental historical relationship between state and the police is changing. "The very idea of trans-national policing" states Walker (2000), "might appear incongruous from the state-centred perspective from which, explicitly or otherwise, the history of policing has typically been viewed" (p.83). However, times change and the historical interdependence of state/police relationships is now being threatened by global authorities seeking to exert greater influence and control (Findlay 1999 and Loader and Walker 2001). Furthermore, a disconcerting commentary is given by McCulloch (2001) who, when reviewing the Australian experience, states: "These contemporary shifts in the configuration of the state's coercive capacities manifest in the blurring of the line between the police and military, have coincided with a shift in the national economy towards globalisation" (p.29). If McCulloch's (2001) troubling observation is correct and there is a blurring of responsibilities between the police and military, there appear to be legitimate concerns for the future of civil liberties and human rights; because as Goodwin (2005) notes, the military are ill equipped to meet the challenges of general policing deployments.
The evolving nature of crime is also being exacerbated by global processes (Sheptycki 1998 and Lino 2004). Moreover, "Within a contracting world" observes Findlay (1999), "crime and its traditional boundaries are transforming into predicable and active features of globalisation" (p.1). Indeed, "The paradox of handling future global issues represents one of the law enforcement profession's most challenging endeavours" (p.6). Crime reduction innovations, such as intelligence-led policing and community policing, have quickly transcended national borders (Schafer (2002)). The American experience, suggests Sheptycki (1998), of combining informal interagency assistance on targeted problems might serve as a template for a future global law enforcement authority.

As Findlay (1999) suggests, politically multi-national enforcement action is attractive, as its serves both the particular interests of the state and, importantly, is seen to be supporting the wider world agenda. Criminal intelligence and data exchange, argues Walker (2000), are tangible examples of such a multi-national approach. This interconnectedness and collaboration enable both strong and weak states to work together. However the agenda, observes Smolen (1995), would be financed, and therefore prioritised, by Western preoccupations and morality norms. An example of this is with the West's current preoccupation with terrorism, and this would be well financed. Conversely, 'third-world' state corruption, although undoubtedly problematic for the country and citizens, may be over-looked in return for assistance in pursuing terrorists. Mindful of Ritzer's (2004) view of 'cultural imperialism,' it is likely that some societies would react adversely if a pervasive western-orientated
enforcement agency were to have global authority. The concept of a global police service is discussed by Smolen (1995). He believes that a global police force adhering to worldwide behavioural and cultural norms is unrealistic and, therefore, pragmatically settles for the concept of a policing authority with ‘global reach’. There are attractions to the concept of a global law authority. However, when considered in the light of the difficulties experienced by the deployment, leadership and management of UN Peace Keeping forces, it is unlikely to materialise.

Smolen (1995) and Lino (2004) both argue that greater educational and training provision will improve both social justice and awareness in communities and the police. Furthermore, Lino (2004) suggests in relation to police training that common minimum training standards are required to facilitate cross-border operations and enforcement. This view of a global standardisation within law enforcement training has some support. At a multi-national seminar in Holland, Van der Linde (2005) highlighted the potential to standardise the European training of student officers. However, a ‘one size fits all’ solution has its drawbacks, for in all probability it would not provide the responsiveness demanded by local communities. The global standardisation of police training appears to remain elusive and perhaps undesirable.

Historically, law enforcement has often been considered purely reactive with a limited corpus of knowledge. However, both Sheptycki (1998) and Walsh (1998) suggest that police officers are ‘knowledge workers.’ If one considers this in conjunction with Bottery’s (2004) concept of the knowledge economy, policing would appear to have the ability to capitalise both operationally and strategically on its intimate knowledge of
both criminal networks and crime reduction techniques. The creation of a world law enforcement knowledge bank would appear to be a worthy ultimate goal. However due to the political complexities of such an enterprise this concept may be unattainable.

It is now time to move to the final section and focus on the globalisation of terrorism and its implications for the education and training of negotiators.

**Globalisation and its Linkages to Terrorism**

The roads that lead humans to enter into an act of crisis are myriad. The catalyst of many suicide attempts and hostage takings is ultimately believed to be some form of loss; the identification and the addressing of that loss, it is argued, will potentially resolve the incident (FBI National Course Manual 2003). Negotiators are trained (Greenstone 2005 and Strentz 2006) to use 'active listening' in order to clarify and try and understand the nature of any loss. Indeed, Charles (2008) states, “Negotiators express an interest in understanding the incident from the hostage taker’s perspective” (p.10). Operational incidents are further complicated when dealing with individuals who perceive or in reality are beset with multiple manifestations of loss. The more losses identified in an incident, argues Strentz (2006), the more high-risk that incident is. If one considers the pervasive and emotive nature of the various aspects of globalisation, there are numerous opportunities for individuals or groups to either perceive or, in reality, be affected by multiple forms of loss. Therefore, critical analysis of the emergent themes of globalisation may
provide educationalists with important insights into the training needs of hostage negotiators.

The United States, notes McCullen (2003), with its 'war on terror', has attempted to combat global terrorism. However, arguably, because of this attempted intervention, "the number of terror incidents around the world" notes Shrivastava (2005) “continues to grow in frequency and variety” (p.63). Furthermore, “under the influence of globalisation and Empire building” Hess (2003) explains, “we have been moved from provincial terrorism to terrorism of global reach, from terrorism as a form of political crime to terrorism as criminalized war” (p.345). Klare (2003) highlights the way in which globalisation provides a platform for recruiting terrorists in these terms, “however strongly they may oppose the effects of globalisation, many insurgent and terrorist groups rely on its various manifestations to further their revolutionary or reactionary purposes” (p. 34). Furthermore, even though the rhetoric of some terrorist groups is both anti-technological and anti-Western, notes Stapley (2006), they use computers and global media to both advance their cause and recruit sympathizers. Indeed, when commentating on Al-Qa'eda, this paradox is highlighted by Esposito (2002) who states, “It is trans-national in its identity and recruitment and global in its ideology, strategy, targets, network of organisations, and economic transactions” (p.151). So it seems that globalisation and terrorism are integrally linked.

Terrorist tactics are organic as there is a necessity to revise methodologies continually, as states adapt both defensively and
offensively to thwart attacks. The methods employed are often relatively 'low tech' but have proved highly effective against both conventional military tactics and target hardening. A recent innovation in both criminal and terrorists groups, suggest both Barron (1998) and Griffith (2003), is the increased use of kidnap for ransom and/or the furtherance of a political agenda. Chrabot and Miller (2004) observe that this tactic attracts both considerable media interest and provides law enforcement and negotiators, in particular, with a highly challenging operational environment. Recent high profile kidnappings in Iraq evidence the effectiveness of this method in both media and political terms. However, this phenomenon suggest Clutterbuck (1987) and Barron (1998) is not restricted to acts perpetrated against nation states, but is also highly effective when used against corporate multi-nationals. The extortion of ransoms such as those perpetrated by pirates off the coast of Somalia fuels sub-economies and provides capital for both terrorist and criminal activity. It would appear likely that terrorists will continue to use this criminal activity, for perhaps kidnapping's most insidious trait is the generation of fear, often out of all proportion to the threat presented, and fear is the terrorist's greatest weapon.

Both terrorist and criminal gangs actively educate and train their operatives to exploit the changing global and technical environment. Product contamination, note Bles and Low (1987), is a potentially lucrative criminal enterprise, which requires a perpetrator to extort from companies by threatening and/or actually interfering with commercial products (for example glass in baby food). Arguably, the opportunities
created by globalisation will lead to the increase of such offences. Interestingly, although dated, Clutterbuck's (1987) observation still appears to apply that "product extortion attempts have thus far been carried out by criminals rather than political terrorists, usually operating in small numbers or even alone" (p.59). However, potentially this type of criminal act, although at this time unused by terrorists, might feature in some future campaign.

Education in the terrorist context exerts both positive and negative influences. On a positive note, education allows 'hearts and minds' strategies to be implemented by nation states; providing opportunities for both early interventions and the greater understanding between diverse faiths and cultures. However, when discussing education in the Middle East, an anonymous author (2005) observed that "The educational centres in some of these countries constitute one of the most important foundations of terrorism" (p. 54). This author's view is not universally accepted, for as Scruton (2002) observes, "It teaches piety, consideration, and respect for age; it offers a clear rite of passage into the adult world; it presents the student at every point with certainties rather than doubts, and consolation rather than anxiety" (p. 105). Education as a global mediator for good needs to be acknowledged and strategically supported. High risk counties, communities and even some 'single issue' groups may benefit from sustained educational programmes. This is not a panacea, but, as a strategy, it has the potential to deliver a degree of global stability and save an un-quantifiable number of lives.
The world we knew has changed and with that change fundamental ethical considerations have been globally engaged. As nations grapple to physically and legislatively protect their communities against emergent terrorist threats, the democratic underpinnings of 'westernised' nations are being assailed. McCulloch (2003) discusses these issues at length, noting the scope of proposed and implemented legal measures. Moreover, she raises ethical concerns in relation to the creation of so many new laws and powers, and citing the erosion of civil liberties by highlighting "the creeping militarisation of law enforcement" (p.287). These are heartfelt views, containing more than an element of truth. Terrorism is a real social condition. Society demands protection but there is a fundamental issue here; who 'watches the watchers?' McCulloch (2001: 30). These arguments are expanded on by Wilkinson (2006) in these terms:

"Most democratic states that have experienced prolonged and lethal terrorist campaigns of any scale within their borders have at some stage introduced special anti-terrorist measures aimed at strengthening the normal law in order to deal with a grave terrorist emergency. However, these emergency powers carry risks for the democratic system and it is important to identify them" (p. 79).

Patently, the balancing of civil liberties and defeating terrorism is challenging for any government. Only time will tell if the strategies and policies implemented by western nation states will ultimately prove to be successful. However, as Dolnik and Alexander (2008) acknowledge, the use of police hostage negotiators within the terrorist environment remains a viable option.
This review has utilised Bottery's (2004) argument that there appears be six prominent forms of globalization but has argued that due to its pervasive nature and global reach there is an emergent seventh form, that of terrorism. The identification and understanding of these global influencers will enable the shaping and implementation of strategic educational policy for hostage negotiators. When the literature on globalisation is considered within the terrorist context there appears to be some congruence; with a clear synergy between the primary globalisation categories and fundamental motivators for terrorist groups. Further research into this field may provide the clarity needed for nations and law enforcement authorities to create and adopt considered and managed responses to this high risk area. The implementation of effective educational strategies, curricula and products targeted to inform and assist societies to deal with the fast evolving nature of the globalisation process would no doubt be cost effective in the long term. Exposure to this literature, followed by a period of professional reflection, has implications for the education and training of negotiators at both the strategic and practical level. This critical analysis then provides the focus for the research stage of the project. The research needs to focus on both the suitability of the current educational products and continuous professional development available to negotiators. This literature review signposts potential topic areas that need to be considered in order to make negotiators more operationally resilient. The educational products currently available to negotiators are highly practical; however during the research stage it will be important to explore whether the interviewees consider the programmes to be fit for purpose. Furthermore, analysis may
well illuminate gaps in current training provision. In conclusion there appear to be clear linkages between terrorism and globalisation and this research may provide valuable insights to inform educational and training strategies for negotiators that may ultimately save lives.

In the following major section current policy in police training will be debated. Furthermore, both national and international policy in relation to the selection and training of hostage negotiators will be explored.

The Selection and Training of Hostage Negotiators

An Introduction

In the previous sections, literature in the field of globalisation was explored. Furthermore, the links between terrorism and the tensions created by the processes of globalisation were investigated. It was argued that globalisation and many of the primary motivational factors for current terrorist groups are fundamentally linked. It was suggested that hostage negotiators, who are an integral element of the National counter terrorist response, would benefit from specialist training in the field of globalisation and its effects. This section seeks to review the relevant literature and policies that currently shape both National and International selection and training of police negotiators. This appears to be the first time that International selection and training processes have been synthesised.

The first sub-section seeks to orientate the reader to general issues affecting police educational policies. In the next sub-section current
international and national policy and literature on police negotiator selection will be considered. During this sub-section such areas as application forms, interviews, aptitude tests and role plays will be examined. Subsequently, literature and policy on negotiator training and such areas as scenario training and continuous professional development are reviewed. Finally, the original research questions with be reflected upon and a summary of the chapter will be provided.

This review will argue that nationally there is a dearth of published empirical data in relation to negotiator selection and training and therefore most of the literature comes from other countries and in particular North America. The field of hostage negotiation remains a closely guarded secret in this country. Anecdotally, the rationale for this secrecy is because negotiators are an integral element of the national counter terrorist response. As such, there are only a limited number of national policies in this field and those are all security restricted. The researcher is vetted, and has access to those policies that exist. These policies, limited as they are, have been considered during the course of this review. Patently, this is a difficult area to research due to the sensitivities surrounding the subject. Furthermore, the problems associated with researching sensitive topics will be explored in a separate chapter. At the conclusion of this chapter the research questions guiding this thesis will be revisited and any effect that this literature review has had on them will be debated.
Policy and Learning

'Training' is the traditional word used in the police service; the term 'education' in relation to policing is rarely, if ever, used. Perhaps the view that police officers are trained rather than educated harks back to the origins of the service, which was traditionally both working class and militaristic (HMIC Training Matters 2002). Whether training rather than education is the more appropriate term is surely open to debate. As Managing Learning (1999) noted, the spiraling costs associated with police training combined with a perceived lack of value for money, and a general governmental desire to reform public services, re-focused attention on training in the late 1990s. In 1999 a conservative estimate of costs associated with police training ranged from £151.6 to £391.4 million per annum (Managing Learning 1999). This influential report highlighted numerous shortcomings in national police learning provision. It stated that:

"The absence of a national training strategy, slow progress in the development of common minimum standards, the lack of a national competency framework and poor evaluation processes militate against an efficient and effective training mechanism at both national and local level" (p.8).

This document, together with another HMIC report 'Training Matters' (2002), became the catalyst for strategic change within police training. 'Training Matters,' observed Nicholls et al (2005), also elevated the status of both the Police Skills and Standards Organisation (PSSO) and National Occupational Standards (NOS).
within the service. The use of identified role-specific competencies was considered crucial and these core frameworks were incorporated into both the design and assessment processes of a majority of police training programmes. In an interesting development, ‘Training Matters’ also discussed the use of accreditation; qualification frameworks, links to higher education, and continuous professional development as a way forward for the service. For a traditionally conservative organisation these proposed changes were both radical and disconcerting. For example, higher education within the service, stated Nichols et al (2005), was “effectively in the realms of optional professional enhancement of serving officers” (p.49).

Progress within the service to implement these fundamental strategies appears to be slow. This reticence to embrace and implement the recommendations of ‘Training Matters’ has anecdotally been the source of considerable frustration for some police training practitioners. Furthermore, this apparent failure appears difficult to reconcile when one considers both the cost of provision and the importance of quality training for operational officers. In 2003 a National Learning Strategy for the service was published re-emphasising many of the principles inculcated within those earlier reports, including accreditation, national standards, competencies and continuous professional development. The National Learning strategy prescribed a number of objectives for achievement, such as; “that by April 2006 95% of courses offered nationally, regionally and locally will
be mapped against National Occupational Standards", and "that by April 2007, 95% of staff will be able to be accredited within the qualification framework relevant to their role" (p.2). Recently, there has been a drive to provide a raft of national standards, competencies and accreditation regimes across a range of both generic and specialist roles. However, hostage negotiation courses both regional and national have not been mapped to any National Occupational Standards. At the National Negotiators' Working Group held on 19th October 2006 this was acknowledged as an issue and in need of future consideration. However, accreditation within this specialist field has proved elusive and courses remain neither internally nor externally accredited. In a recent move to provide some degree of standardisation a number of regional courses have agreed to comply with a minimum course content.

Nationally, the Central Police Training and Development Authority (Centrex 2003) promoted the use of training plans to ensure the delivery of appropriate and auditable police training (Managing Learning 1999). There are no agreed national training plans for negotiator training. Furthermore, within this field this review has failed to discover any evidence that training plans are used internationally to focus delivery. Moreover, it is interesting to note that nationally negotiator training has never been the subject of either an HMIC (Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary) or Centrex evaluation. It has proved impossible to ascertain why
this has been the case. Furthermore, no documentary evidence has been found to show that any form of national training needs analysis (TNA) has been undertaken. The use of a five-year training plan for negotiators is advocated by Slatkin (2005), who further suggests that these plans are sub-divided into units encompassing a diversity of subject areas, such as drug/alcohol impairment. His concept, although innovative, appears to lack depth, as he concentrates on 'pure' communication skills such as rapport building and active listening. The importance of constantly refreshing communication skills is undeniable; however today's negotiator also requires complementary skills, such as working at heights, first aid and firearms awareness. These skills would appear suitable for inclusion in training plans. It would appear that comprehensive medium term training programmes, based on an in-depth role analysis, would both increase operational effectiveness and provide the service with a defendable training regime. Traditionally the American experience, observes Regini (2002), is that investment within this specialist sphere has been limited. This lack of investment appears to be replicated in this country as there exists no national training budget and local budgets vary. It is, therefore, unsurprising that investment in training appears to lag behind other specialist roles. It seems clear, then that appropriately funded training is necessary to assist effective delivery.

A perceived lack of strategic direction within negotiator training
has now been acknowledged and in order to remedy this a sub-group of interested regional co-ordinators, from the National Negotiator Working Group, has been created with the remit of reviewing training programmes, accreditation and continuous professional development. This working group is still in its infancy. However, two factors appear fundamentally to impede its ability to radically re-shape training in this field. Firstly, the membership has limited professional knowledge of education and training provision. Secondly, the membership meet infrequently and have only limited informal access to resources to undertake specific work-streams. Therefore, it is perhaps understandable that in reality progress has been slow.

Selection

The selection of the right candidates for negotiation training is of paramount importance. McMains and Mullins (2001) state:

"The selection of negotiators is an important element in developing a negotiation team. Critical incidents require that negotiators have the knowledge, skills and abilities to work together under extremely stressful conditions. This, along with the investment in time and money it takes to develop negotiators, means the department needs to select the best candidates. A formalised screening process is necessary" (p.318).

Unfortunately, the international approach to negotiator selection may be best described as uneven and, as Regini (2002) reports; "Law enforcement agencies strongly believe in the importance of selecting and training well staffed and well equipped tactical teams, but some
departments fail to take the same approach with their CNTs (crisis negotiation teams)” (p.1).

The first stage of any selection process is to clearly identify the role/job description. Plumbley (1991) advocates the need to analyse the role in depth, understand the role's place within the organizational structure, funding, the practicalities associated with it and its connections to other departments (p.11).

Once formulated this job description allows the development of a person/job specification for recruitment purposes. Currently, there is no nationally agreed job description for negotiators. Furthermore, investigations internationally reveal that in many instances there exists only limited job descriptions (Canadian Police College (2004) and the German BKA Bundesland Federal Police (2005)). However, both the South Australian Police (2006) and the Scottish Police (2006) provide some guidance. Perhaps Milner's (2002) observations capture the enormity of the task - she suggests:

“Attempting to capture the role of negotiator in a concise explanation fails to do justice to the range of skills and abilities required of an effective negotiator. In any event, such skills and abilities are typically addressed in only a few lines at most, within articles and books relating to the broader topic of hostage and crisis negotiation” (p. 7).

Regini (2002) and Milner (2002) suggest that negotiators should possess a number of desirable personality traits. In Fuslier's (1981b: 14 - 15) view, these are the essential traits:

- Emotional maturity
• Good listener
• Able to establish credibility with others easily
• Able to use logical arguments and convince others that his viewpoint is rational
• Communicate across socio-economic classes
• Possess practical intelligence and street wise commonsense
• Willing to accept uncertainty and able to accept responsibility with no authority
• Total commitment
• To understand that if negotiations are not progressing and lives are threatened he will have to assist in planning an assault to rescue hostages

This view is generally supported by McMains and Mullins (2001), Regini (2002) and Slatkin (2005). In Milner’s (2002 p16) exploratory study of desired personal characteristics for negotiators, she clusters the traits into 12 key areas, namely:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adaptability</th>
<th>Dynamic Thinking</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Calmness</td>
<td>Effective Communicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caring</td>
<td>Humility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>Professional Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detachment</td>
<td>Resilience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discernment</td>
<td>Self Assuredness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 1 Milner’s Desired personal characteristics)

In considering her findings, it would appear that the subjective nature of these characteristics would make their use in any subsequent selection procedure challenging. There is no current national policy on suggested personality characteristics, and internationally this appears to be the
exception rather than the rule. All Scottish Police Forces adhere to
criteria published by the Scottish Police College (2006). These traits
again follow many of the Fuslier (1981b) recommendations. However
there are some interesting additions such as, "they should have a sense
of humour" also, "that an officer has a vocation for Police work whose
enthusiasm is undimmed by awkward hours and adverse working
conditions" and finally, "they are not likely to take foolhardy risks, which
would jeopardise his/her own and others' safety" (Scottish Police College
document 2006: 2). These again appear to be subjective in nature and
may be difficult to judge reliably.

Canadian and South Australian policies require that potential candidates
are volunteers (The Canadian Police College 2004 and the South
note, policing today’s society is a stressful occupation and arguably the
working environment of a negotiator is axiomatically more so. "We should
bear in mind" notes Ainsworth (2002), "that hostage situations are, by
their very nature, tense and dangerous events and all those involved are
at risk" (p.162). Negotiators, observes Bohl (1997), are exposed to both
physical and psychological harm. She further describes the potentially
debilitating effects of stress on negotiators. However, some stress has a
positive effect on individual actors (Bohl 1997 and Rosenbluh 2005). But
as Rosenbluh (2005) notes, if stress remains uncontrolled physical and
mental problems and 'adaptation' diseases such as drug and alcohol
abuse may emerge. Internationally, the use of volunteers in this role
appears to be common, as undoubtedly it would be difficult for senior
managers to order officers to undertake such a dangerous, demanding and stressful role. Finally, it is noteworthy that this research has been unable to discover any national policy requiring mandatory mental health screening prior to appointment or indeed regular checks throughout the negotiator's career. This appears to be a fundamental policy deficiency and worthy of investigation within the remit of this research.

National selection procedures remain uneven (Kennett 2003). Some forces utilise processes that are multi-faceted, with supervisory comment on a candidate's ability, interviews and role-plays. For other forces officers are directly approached by existing team members to join the cadre and no selection procedure is used. Any selection process, state Tyson and York (2000), should be both reliable and valid. To date, no UK selection policy has been discovered.

The Ontario Provincial selection policy appears to be the most comprehensive of the international selection procedures reviewed. Research reveals that in 1999 a major Royal Canadian Mounted Police review recommended that "the Task Force should establish selection criteria that are defensible in court for negotiators" (p. 25). The current Ontario Provincial selection process suggests that this recommendation has been implemented. It both details desirable negotiator traits and clearly delineates a selection policy. The potential candidate's supervisors are required to judge suitability, then there is an interview process and practical assessment phase. Furthermore, the candidate undergoes a 'voluntary' psychological assessment. Eventually, a selection committee
reviews all the data collected on the candidate. The policy then describes a development process for the candidates. Initially they are 'apprenticed,' i.e. observing and providing minor non-negotiation assistance. Thereafter, if successful on the basic course, they will undertake non-primary negotiator duties. Eventually, officers are authorised by the negotiator co-ordinator to undertake a primary/lead role (Ontario Provincial Police Operations Manual for Negotiators 2004).

**Application Forms**

There appears to be a variety of different methods used internationally to select negotiators. Many selection procedures require the submission of an application form (Ontario Police 2004 and Greenstone 2005). The use of this document provides candidates the first opportunity to evidence key skill areas. Plumbley (1991) regards application forms as important. He observes that, "Well constructed application forms are one of the best selection tools. This is because they compare like to like; they are factual; and the selector is unbiased by the presence of the person" (p.94). Mindful of Plumbley's (1991) observations, it may be argued that an assessment of an application form would indeed provide a degree of reliability. However, historically within the policing context 'blind' assessments of an application form are unusual as anecdotally there is a tendency to consider external factors within the decision-making process. Assessors often balance previous knowledge of both the candidate and the supporting supervisor in addition to the evidence presented within the application form. Arguably, therefore, these variables affect the reliability of this process. Conversely, it could be argued that considering the
application form in this way achieves a degree of triangulation. However, within the policing context concerns surrounding the potential lack of transparency make the process's fairness difficult to guarantee. Greenstone (2005) recommends that existing team members should vote on the candidate's suitability. This 'democratic' process may enable a candidate's quick integration into the team. However, the reliability of this process again appears questionable on two counts. Firstly, openness and fairness cannot be guaranteed. Secondly, there appears to be an increased risk of recruitment being based on a 'halo' effect, with the potential results that the team may become both 'one dimensional' and less operationally effective.

Finally, application forms are normally routed via a supervisor for endorsement. This process is intended to ensure the independent verification of evidence. Whilst there is no empirical evidence to support this, anecdotally many police supervisors for a variety of reasons do not comment frankly on the candidate's suitability. This failure may ultimately undermine the validity of the process. This is clearly an area for further research.

**Interviews**

The use of an interview remains a popular selection instrument; Plumbley (1991), BundersKriminalamt (BKA) (2005) and Scottish Police College (2006). Interviews provide candidates with an excellent opportunity to evidence the essential skill area of communication. Furthermore, arguably the interview process replicates some of the stresses and pressures
experienced by a negotiator when deployed. However, due to potential assessor bias, the interview process may be unreliable. The Scottish selection policy (2006) has attempted to address the challenging issue of interview reliability by creating policy that prescribes the structure of the interview process. This policy states that the Scottish Police College (2006) was created in order to be fair and equitable to candidates. The interview has also been designed to examine a candidate's ability to memorise information under pressure. This policy attempts to instil a degree of reliability that appears to be absent in other international policies. Cooper (1981) argues for the innovation of using a panel consisting of both internal and external experts in the interview process. The use of such a panel has the potential to bring a fresh perspective that, perhaps, a panel consisting exclusively of police officers would not be likely to achieve. This idea appears ripe for improvement if it were synthesised with an innovation contained within The HMIC report 'Training Matters' (2002). This report strongly recommended the use of community representatives in the selection of new recruits for the service. This recommendation has been adopted for new recruits and is well received both internally and externally. Some perceived benefits of this policy are greater inclusion, accountability and transparency in the selection procedures. Therefore, it would seem feasible to develop Cooper's (1981) suggestion by using the community in the negotiator selection process. These 'lay assessors' would probably not need an in depth knowledge of the subject of hostage negotiation; they would need only to have an ability to assess potential based on a role specification. There appears to be no evidence of the use of external experts, or members of the
community, on selection panels either internationally or nationally. This literature review appears to support the further investigation of this area during the research stage.

Aptitude Tests

The use of validated aptitude tests to assess the potential of candidates has historically proved to be another popular selection instrument (Tyson and York (2000)). Validated tests may provide a pool of suitable candidates for training, thereby making substantial savings in both training costs and time. "One of the most important features of a negotiation selection instrument" state Poland and Crystal (1999), "is to identify undesirable characteristics of a candidate for the position of negotiator" (p. 65). The use of aptitude tests to select officers with identified characteristics for specialist roles, such as firearms, has become increasingly popular within policing. There does not appear to be any UK policy in relation to the use of aptitude tests for negotiator selection.

McMains and Mullins 2001 emphasises the use of psychological testing in negotiator selection. "Although selection can be done effectively without this step" argues Greenstone (2005), "psychological testing provides an important dimension that may not become apparent to the team except after much involvement with selected individuals" (p.2).

In their commentary on negotiator selection, Poland and McCrystle (1999) examine the psychologically based Miron and Goldstein (1979) seven-stage battery test. These series of tests comprehensively evaluate the candidate in a number of identified key areas such as their value system, emotional stability and rigidity surrounding specific issues and/or
beliefs. They indicate that this test has been widely used in the United States (p.65). Although it is noted that the Canadian Police College recommends students to volunteer for psychological testing, it does not appear to include any form of aptitude testing. The inclusion of an aptitude assessment within a selection process, on critical reflection, appears to have some merit, because it potentially provides further evidence on a candidate's suitability to handle the demands and pressures of the role.

Another area that appears worthy of inclusion within the selection process is that of the candidate's physical fitness to perform the role. The fact that negotiators should be fit is well documented in literature (McMains and Mullins (2001) and Greenstone (2005)). Furthermore, both the Canadian Police College (2004) and the Scottish Police College (2006) advocate that the negotiator should be in excellent physical health. However, neither of these organisations require candidates to pass any physical tests or reach and maintain a defined standard of fitness. There is no UK requirement for officers to be physically fit, or to undertake regular physical assessment and/or health checks. This lack of policy appears to make the organisation vulnerable in two areas. Firstly, there is a health and safety implication in exposing an officer with potential problems such as blood pressure or heart problems to high-risk, stressful incidents. Secondly, there are implications for the service if during the course of a public enquiry or a coroner's court it was discovered, for example, that an officer's hearing was impaired. The service's credibility and reputation would undoubtedly be tarnished. This facet of the literature
review appears to provide another avenue for research. Negotiators deal with perpetrators and victims across a vast range of socio-economic backgrounds (McMains and Mullins (2001)). “In selecting negotiators” notes Thompson (2001), “it is very useful to have an array of personnel available” (p.39). The primary role for negotiators, suggests Strentz (2005), is to communicate in potentially highly charged emotional situations. If one considers, states Ostermann (2002), the tensions surrounding linguistic difficulties in the negotiation process within the context of a cross-cultural incident, value differences and cultural variations would provide many challenges. Cross-cultural issues are discussed at length by Hammer (1997), who highlights the critical risks to law enforcement in these terms:

“Incidents that involve significant cultural differences in values, communication style and beliefs offer an increasingly difficult and often uncertain negotiation situation in which the more common negotiation principles and rules used in previous situations may be insufficient” (p.105).

Indeed Strentz (2005) reinforces the need both to be vigilant for ambiguity and to maintain high levels of concentration when involved in cross-cultural negotiations. Interestingly, various authors such as Hammer (1997), Ostermann (2002) and Furman and Collins (2005) confine diversity issues to areas of culture, ethnicity and race. There appears to be a dearth of literature on gender, age and disability and this signposts another area for future research. Mindful of the many issues associated with negotiating within a cross-cultural environment, it seems both logical and invaluable to ensure that selection processes embrace the
opportunity to select individuals that reflect local populations. Canadian policy appears to be the only instance in which cross-cultural issues are pro-actively addressed, and this manifests itself as an insistence that negotiators are bi-lingual (Canadian Police College (2006)). Nationally forces are required to produce and comply with both equal opportunity and diversity policies. The lack of any national policy that pro-actively encourages forces to select officers that reflect local communities appears to be a fundamental gap and it will be interesting to discover whether interviewees both strategically and tactically also perceive this as an organisational threat.

Role-plays
The final assessment tool to be discussed is the use of assessed role-plays. Role-playing, state Van Hasselt, Romaro and Vecchi (2008), has been a mainstay of behavioural assessment for decades. The use of such a methodology within negotiation selection is well documented (Slatkin (2001) and Greenstone (2005)). They variously suggest using a simple face to face, or telephone, negotiation as a suitable framework for an assessment exercise. Greenstone (2005) justifies the use of role-plays in the assessment process in these terms: “Although the team should not expect the candidate to know all about negotiations, their reaction to the simulation will tell you much about how they might function once trained” (p.2). It may be argued that there is validity in using role-plays, provided that they are based on actual incidents; however ensuring the reliability of the process may prove to be challenging. Internationally, role-play scenarios are used within many selection processes, for example with the
Ontario Police (2004) and Scottish Police College (2006). In summation there appears to be a frailty in this process, as literature suggests that there are concerns surrounding validity and reliability. These concerns may be minimised if role-plays were based on actual incidents and if actors were closely scripted. It is noteworthy that internationally there is no apparent use of computer-simulation to test candidates. This was an unexpected discovery for, arguably, computer programmes would reliably replicate a simulation for all the candidates under assessment.

Clearly the service has various tools available to assist in the selection of potential candidates. Poland and Crystal (1999) conclude their analysis with this advice: “three proven techniques are offered to the police administrator in selecting effective hostage negotiators: psychological testing, panel reviews and role-playing” (p.67). Perhaps these tools provide our best options. However as Slatkin (2005) insightfully observes; “Most negotiators self select before they even face a selection committee of their peers. Typically a notice is placed on the bulletin board announcing openings on the Hostage Negotiating Team (HNT) - some officers look at the board without interest while others jump on it” (p.6).

Negotiator Training

Hostage negotiation within the policing context evolved from the need to provide a non-tactical alternative to resolve terrorist incidents. Over time these skills and methodologies were increasingly used in other high-risk deployments such as siege and suicide intervention (Mains and Mullins...
2001). Initially originating in the United States, negotiator training programmes have now proliferated around the world. Students are required to assimilate knowledge, procedures and skills across a range of subjects such as law, tactics and psychology. Perhaps uniquely within law enforcement, the number of lives saved tangibly measures the effectiveness of the training provision. Hostage negotiation training programmes, observes Hare (1997), are continually evolving, but;

"Many agencies continue to use outdated crisis negotiation techniques that are based on principles which more progressive practitioners are continually revising to better account for a more comprehensive range of crisis situations encountered by law enforcement" (p.151).

When discussing training, Poland and Crystal (1999) comment that:

"Successful training is accomplished by developing negotiator skills that are performed naturally with the minimum of conscious, physical or mental effort" (p.67). This is a demanding expectation and one that requires negotiator training to be of the highest standard.

Documentation from a variety of International courses has been investigated and that analysis has revealed that there is some synergy in training delivery. In order to place this study into context, it appears necessary to describe the basic format of these programmes. Nationally there exist a number of one-week Regional (basic) courses and a two-week National (advanced) course. A similar programme exists in Canada, Ontario Police (2004). In the United States some individual police departments provide bespoke negotiator courses. However, the norm is
for 'associations' (regions) to provide the training courses. Furthermore, some of these students progress to the FBI (National) Quantico course. All FBI negotiators only attend the National course (FBI Course Manual (2003)). Both the South Australians and the Germans (BKA) have designed lengthier training programmes. The BKA provide basic training spread over one year. The programme initially requires officers to attend a two-week knowledge and theory course and then a two-week stress prevention and conflict management course. Additionally, they receive a one-week programme on communication and negotiations and separate seminars on counselling and personality diagnostics. These courses are further supplemented by other units of specialist training. Successful candidates are attached on a one-year 'probation' (Friedrich (2005)). In South Australia, subsequent to the successful completion of a two-week basic course, officers are required to complete a two-year development programme. This programme consists of both a workplace training phase and an assessment phase. The assessment phase consists of 100 hours in simulated conditions, where knowledge and skills are assessed and developmental feedback is provided. At the conclusion of the assessment phase written evidence of competency is required for accreditation (South Australian Basic Course Manual (2006)). The analysis of course documentation suggests that the training regimes of the BKA and the South Australian police appear internationally to be the most comprehensive and robust. Furthermore, this analysis indicates that the current UK training provision is in need of a fundamental review. It will be interesting to discover in the research phase whether either strategists or practitioners identify this area as an area of concern.
It appears that internationally courses contain a didactic phase encompassing law, techniques and theory. Furthermore, the programmes have both course and lesson aims and objectives. It is noteworthy that scenario role-plays are prevalent in every course. The documentation provided only allowed a limited insight of the nature of the scenarios; however having participated in both the British national and the FBI courses it is known that considerable training time is spent on siege incidents and their resolution. However, as Regini (2002) notes, suicide intervention appears to be the most common deployment faced by negotiators. Currently there is no national database on incident types. The creation of a national database would appear worthy of consideration as this would provide valuable information to assist in training design. This research raises fundamental questions surrounding the validity of concentrating on 'set-piece' siege scenarios within the training environment. It is hoped that this research will validate (or otherwise) this apparent preoccupation with set-piece siege training.

Scenario Training

The use of practical scenarios may be traced back to the creation of negotiator training programmes in the 1970s. Their continued use is still considered to be an effective training medium (Kobetz and Cooper 1979). Indeed, "The use of role-play to train crisis and hostage negotiators is universal" views Slatkin (2001), "as there are almost no other ways to do it" (p.74). However, Slatkin (2001) later concedes that: "Apart from a feel good experience, role-play scenarios may fail to deliver real skills
practice" (p. 74). This observation appears to raise fundamental concerns about the validity of international training programmes with their apparent over-reliance on this specific training tool. Kobetz and Cooper (1979) add to these concerns, commenting, "Out of this need has evolved a unique series of constantly changing field exercises that have, on occasions, surprised their authors nearly as much as those who have participated in them" (p. 24). Poland and Crystal (1999) discuss the use of scenarios in the training environment and make two recommendations; firstly, that the scenarios are based on actual incidents, thereby increasing the validity of the experience and, secondly, that they remain controlled and focused. This control would assist in replication and reliability of the learning experience. "Challenging, yet real-world scripted, practical exercises" observe Van Hasselt, Romaro and Vecchi (2008), "not only reinforce negotiation concepts, strategies and techniques, but also significantly enhance the trainees confidence levels" (p.261). The reliability of practical scenarios is further discussed by Littlejohn-Shinder (2001). She advocates the use of defined learning objectives, planning, realism and, importantly, the careful choice and direction of actors to achieve greater reliability. Both Littlejohn-Shinder (2001) and Slatkin (2005) note that actors are almost exclusively police officers. In Littlejohn-Shinder's (2001) view, police officers fail to make good actors as "they have difficulty switching off the police persona" (p.23). Furthermore, suggests Slatkin (2001), police actors often play roles that are outside their sphere of knowledge, therefore; "The characterisation may be based on myth and caricature, and may reinforce unrealistic expectations" (p.74). The use of structured role-plays, suggests Slatkin (2005), would provide students with the
opportunity to concentrate on key skills, such as rapport building or use of technical equipment. Furthermore, he suggests that these ‘micro-skills’ could be assessed and student focused development plans could be created. In Mirabella and Trudeau’s (1981) investigation, they discovered that negotiators described the use of role-plays as acceptable but not ideal. Furthermore, they noted that many police departments were “now using tape recording and transcripts of actual incidents to provide highly realistic training for negotiators” (p.46). Although this research is dated, the use of tape recordings and transcripts in this country remains the exception rather than the rule.

In summation, the use of role-plays and scenarios to provide the bulk of the training experience appears to be very common. Trainers have a range of teaching tools available such as discussion groups and interactive technologies; however there appears to be no desire to incorporate their use into modern negotiator training. Arguably, this appears to be an opportunity lost, and it will be interesting to discover whether this narrowness of learning methods is identified during the course of the research phase.

**Continuous Professional Development**

Finally, literature and national training policy suggests that continuous learning opportunities and professional development are important (National Learning Strategy (2003) and Greenstone (2005)). When discussing negotiator training Hare (1997) observes that; “As professionals, we must continue to improve our skills and advance our
current knowledge base where it proves inadequate” (p. 160). Mirabella and Trudeau (1981) advocate the use of seminars to promulgate best practice and experience between adjoining police departments. Currently, policy in South Australia, Canada and Germany requires officers to attend a designated number of yearly seminars. There is no such policy in this country; however it is noted that some regions do stage seminars on an ad-hoc basis. Recently there has been a move to expand this limited form of continuous professional development nationally by providing negotiators with academic courses on topics of operational relevance (Groves 2006). The concept is based on an existing programme delivered by Charles Sturt University, Australia. This new national programme will be accredited through Liverpool Universities Continuous Professional Development (CPD) Scheme. Crego (2006) states that the potential topics for the programme consist of negotiation principles, people and problem solving, and understanding offenders. This modular programme, Crego (2006) posits, would “allow participants to work towards different levels of qualification (e.g., post-graduate diploma, Msc)” (p.1). This is potentially an exciting development and, if successful, may provide the catalyst for a fundamental improvement in operational effectiveness.

Rationale for both the Research and the Research Questions

It would seem that the selection, training and professional development of negotiators has failed to keep pace with developments in other areas of the service. The review of both the academic literature and policy internationally indicates that the educational products available to negotiators are highly practical; however, questions surrounding their
validity and reliability have been raised. Selection processes appear to be reasonably consistent internationally. However, the literature questions whether the right calibre of candidates are being identified, and furthermore is the diversity of the community reflected within negotiator cadres? It seems clear then that the research questions outlined earlier on page eight are not substantially changed by this literature review, but it has further informed them.

Chapter Summary
These reviews of literature have reinforced the need for this academic research. There appear to be policy deficiencies and training gaps that present high risks for the organisation. Furthermore, this analysis suggests that tensions surrounding globalisation may create, influence and motivate terrorist groups and, if this is the case, future hostage negotiation training programmes may need to be designed in a way which is mindful of these issues. These literature reviews appear to have indicated gaps in both academic and professional knowledge which it is hoped this research will help bridge.

The next chapter describes the research methodology used in this investigation. Firstly, it will seek to justify the research methods and tools used for this study. Secondly, it will discuss issues pertinent to researching in the police environment and in particular issues surrounding gaining access to the service, ethics, collecting data and referencing policy within a sensitive environment.
Chapter Four: Methodology

Introduction

The first literature review chapter explored globalisation, terrorism and hostage negotiators. Subsequently, literature shaping police educational policy and in particular the selection and training for police negotiators was also reviewed.

This chapter has two main aims: firstly it seeks to describe and justify the rationale for the choice of research methodologies employed within this study. Therefore, it initially describes the two main approaches to the collection of data; qualitative and quantitative. Thereafter, the respective strengths and weaknesses of these methodologies will be considered. Then a mixed method approach will be described and discussed. Finally, the research questions will be restated, and the justification for using semi-structured interviews as the primary investigative method will be made.

The chapter also needs to discuss issues pertinent to this research. In particular the difficulties faced by the researcher within the police environment will be discussed. Initially, the specifics of this study are introduced. Then issues surrounding gaining access will be discussed. Thereafter, such challenges as covert or overt research methods, sensitivity, ethics, data security, confidentiality and discipline implications will be explored. Subsequent to that section interviews are considered. Finally, a summary of the chapter is provided.
A Brief Description of the Paradigms

Within the context of social investigation, states Bryman (1998), there are two competing research paradigms. Each of these paradigms, quantitative and qualitative, have their own and at times divergent defining features. The epistemological considerations, observes Bryman (2004), are important as they define the knowledge foundations, scope and validity of the knowledge. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1996) note that a basic assumption of a quantitative or positivistic approach is that nature is orderly and this approach seeks to measure, analyse and evaluate reality within an objective paradigm. Furthermore, Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000) observe that quantitative enquiry has an established pedigree within educational research. However, qualitative methods are now challenging this dominance (Flick 2002). The qualitative or interpretive paradigm according to Bryman (2004) is predicated on the view that researching within social science is fundamentally different from researching nature. Denscombe (2003) compares these contrasting paradigms and initially observes that quantitative is specific in focus, whereas qualitative is holistic, and then that quantitative researchers are detached, whereas qualitative researchers are immersed (p.233).

Quantitative Research: Strengths and Weaknesses

In this section the strengths and weaknesses of quantitative research will be discussed, and in particular causality, generalisation, validity and reliability will be considered. Deductive theory according to Bryman (2004) represents the commonest view "of the relationship between theory and social science" (p. 8). He continues that embedded hypotheses require
the researcher to translate them into researchable entities. Thereafter, the empirical data collected enables the testing of theories in an effort to understand reality. Quantitative enquiry measures key observables, thereby ensuring that phenomena are actually present and not imaginary. The nature and characteristics of positivism are discussed by Bryman (1998: 14-15), which he considers to have five key traits. Firstly, the transition of 'hard' scientific methods of enquiry into social research, and an assumption about its "appropriateness" even though the subject, people, is both diverse and unique. This principle is termed 'methodological monism or methodological naturalism'. Secondly is that of observable phenomena, hard facts, referred to as the doctrine of phenomenalism or empiricism (p.15). Thirdly, the doctrine of inductivism, which is "a compendium of empirically established facts". Fourthly, he considers the "deductive" process, theory making, and hypotheses in the construction of laws. Finally, arguing for a positivistic stance on values and in particular researcher objectivity.

The concept of causality, note Black (1999), Creswell (2003) and Neuman (2003), is the subject of considerable debated. "Quantitative research" notes Bryman (1998), "is often highly preoccupied with establishing the causal relationships between concepts" (p.30). Moreover, "Whatever the form of research" observes Pole and Lampard (2002), "causality is usually inferred rather than clearly demonstrated, and statements relating to causality reflect a process of theorising as much as they reflect data" (p.94). This is an important point, and highlights the potential for mistake, and/or unreliability of causation identification.

potential problems associated with researcher values and objectivity. They argue that even the most ethical and self critical may unwittingly suppress data at variance to their own preconceptions. Therefore, it is vital to design rigorous and effective processes to identify variables during data capture. However, "Identifying meaningful potential variables" observes Black (1999), "that fit in sensible causal chains in the social sciences and education can be a difficult task" (p.13). Finally, "All in all, it simply is very difficult to see what is causing what" concludes Gomm (2004), "or which among past events are among the causes of some current state of affairs" (p.3).

Pole and Lampard (2002) and Gomm (2004) suggest that it is important to generalise findings into the wider corpus of knowledge. Generalisation, observes Bryman (2004), is "A concern with the "external validity" of research finding" (p.540). Positivism's strength, argues Pole and Lampard (2002), is its concern with the integrity of the conclusions generated from its use. Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000) suggest that a survey, for example, when used as a research tool has much to commend itself as "typically it is used to scan a wide field of issues, populations, and programmes in order to measure or describe any generalised features" (p.171). External validity, suggests Black (1999: 49), may be adversely affected by the design process. However, he subsequently provides guidance to ensure that findings may be applied generally. This guidance may be paraphrased as:

- The sample must be representative and stable
- Unaffected by time or outside influence
• Independent variables are an observed trait (such as gender), not one that can be manipulated. Furthermore, if one specifies characteristics (a construct validity) they must be representative of the samples
• In experimental studies, if exposed to an experience, that experience is realistic
• Measuring instruments should work equally, for example that the language/words mean the same to all regardless of cultural differences.

Sample size and its correlation to representation is important: “The larger the numbers involved” notes Denscombe (2003), “the more the results are likely to be generalisable and reliable statistically speaking; size matters” (p.232). The strength of quantitative research is its ability to gather accurate, valid and potentially variable free empirical data. Gomm (2004) suggests that statistically representative samples are obtained utilising two basic methods, namely “probability sampling and quota sampling” (p.76).

He then explores these methods further, interestingly noting that capturing representative minority sub-group data, and their subsequent extrapolation and generalisation, by using positivistic methods may be potentially problematic. This is an important issue within the context of this study, as diversity issues and cadre composition will feature. These concerns are supported by Mertens (1998), who extols the need for care in using generalisations in relation to minority group data.

Arguably, replication within the context of social science research is problematic. However, quantitative objectivity appears to offer an
opportunity for clear, rigorous enquiry. Replication is a central tenet of quantitative research. "If the most distinctive feature of science is its empirical nature" consider Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000), "the next most important characteristic is its set of procedures which show not only how findings have been arrived at, but are sufficiently clear for fellow-scientists to repeat them" (p.15). Therefore, the ability to replicate research provides positivist methods with an ethical dimension. "It ensures honesty" observes Neuman (2003), "because it repeatedly tests explanations against hard, objective fact" (p.74). Honesty and objectivity alludes to the fallibility of the researcher. "Few quantitative researchers subscribe to the view that research can be value-free" notes Bryman (1998), "therefore, replication can act as a check on any excesses" (p.37). The researcher must remain cognisant of the need for a transparency in the process, to allow review and replication, suggests Bryman (2004); whether any confirmatory work is instigated is irrelevant.

Finally, individualism is discussed by Bryman (1998) who notes that individuals are "discrete objects of enquiry" (p.39). However, he then suggests that "Their responses are then aggregated to form overall measures for the sample" (p.39). This is an important point, because impact factors described by Balnaves and Caputi (2001) such as social, cultural, power, femininity and masculinity have the potential to distort findings. Undoubtedly, qualitative research is likewise affected; however in this paradigm such variables may be overlooked due to the scale of many studies. The objectiveness of this paradigm is both a strength and a weakness. This study is primarily concerned with the experience and
views of senior police officers which will be undoubtedly multi-layered and complex. Therefore the use of exclusively positivistic methods could be argued to be limiting.

Qualitative Research: Strengths and Weaknesses

The subjective nature of this medium contrasts with the espoused value free tenets of the positivistic approach. This subjectivity allows "an approach to the study of the social world" according to Bryman (1998), "which seeks to describe and analyse the culture and behaviour of humans and their groups from the point of view of those being studied" (p.46). Strauss and Corbin (1998) and Denscombe (2003) consider that the rich descriptive findings revealed by this method are appealing and arguably better acknowledge the distinctiveness of humanity. The interpretive paradigm espouses societal explanation and illumination from the perspective of myriad actor interactions. Interpretive researchers are encouraged to immerse themselves within subject areas. However, argues Bryman (1998), a consequence of this process might be emotional overload and/or sensory saturation for the researcher, which would affect data capture.

The perceived strengths of positivism are clinical objectivity, generalisation and replication and these contrast with the interpretive nature of this paradigm. However, qualitative methods also require attention to detail, observes Bryman (1998), in order to describe clearly the circumstances and conditions prevalent at the time of the data capture which later assist in accurate interpretation and illumination. However, "qualitative
researchers" according to Bryman (1998) "invariably seek to go beyond pure description and to provide analyses of the environments they examine" (p.63). Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that any 'researcher footprint' needs to be reduced or else, perhaps inadvertently, data will be fundamentally flawed or altered.

The interpretive approach seeks to illuminate reality from the perspective of the individual and paradoxically, by nature of their humanity, the researcher brings the greatest variable to the investigative process. Understanding others' experiences, views and beliefs may be arguably beyond our subjective capabilities. Furthermore, due to the context of this enquiry another factor may affect subjectivity. Crisis negotiation, states Strentz (2006), is a facet of human reality and experience that harbours extreme emotionality. The stresses and fluidity of operational reality will undoubtedly distort participant perceptions. Therefore, Flick (2002) advocates that data distortion requires a control mechanism that triangulates perspectives (p.24). However, as Neuman (2003) posits "People possess an internally experienced sense of reality" (p.77). Therefore, conceivably both participant and researcher reality would not be congruent thereby jeopardising the validity of findings. Finally, "What has proved disquieting to some commentators" considers Bryman (1998) "is whether researchers really can provide accounts from the perspectives of those they study and how we can evaluate the validity of their interpretations of those perspectives" (p.74).

Study duration and timings are two key issues for the interpretive
paradigm. Therefore, the 'moment' of any investigation matters. The need to factor a longitudinal element, suggests Bryman (1998), is important to ensure that reality is reflected. Additionally, he suggests that firstly, a period of contextual orientation prior to the investigation and secondly, ensuring that the study has a longitudinal element is factored into the process will assist interpretation and prevent critical data being overlooked or misinterpreted. The researcher acknowledged this concern and factored a longitudinal element into the study by capturing quantitative international data over a three year period. However, due to the researcher's immersion in the field no further period of contextual orientation was considered necessary. Qualitative data is affected by a multiplicity of micro and macro influencers, which therefore raises concerns over the consistency and reliability of findings (Silverman 2000 and Flick 2002). "There are grounds," counsels Bryman (1998), "for disquiet in that the representativeness or generality of these fragments is rarely addressed" (p.77). The small numbers normally associated with this paradigm normally conspire against its ability both to be representative and generalised. In order to attempt to address these concerns Bryman (1998) suggests the use of respondent validation as a triangulation. This appears to be a reasonable method to validate meanings, expressions and terminology used by the actor. However, conversely this would also appear to provide an opportunity for subjects to sanitise or 'politically' re-engineer their original thoughts, thereby manipulating the data. Therefore, the researcher decided to use the interviews, gathered from a sample of participants from throughout the UK, as the triangulation method to validate the findings.
Mixed Methods

The complementary use of both positivistic and interpretive paradigms is debated by Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000). Indeed, "The existence of two distinct paradigms" considers Brannon (1992), "suggests something about researchers' allegiances if not their practice" (p.10). Arguably this observation cuts to the heart of the debate, as perhaps insight is not the exclusive domain of either paradigm. The expansion of combined strategies is validated by Creswell (2003), who states, "Recognising that all methods have limitations, researchers felt that biases inherent in any single method could neutralise or cancel the biases of other methods" (p.15). Perhaps the 'bottom line' is that the method used must be fit for purpose.

Both Brannon (1992) and Mason (2002) suggest that any integration of the paradigms would be assisted by using triangulation techniques such as multiple observers, investigators and sites. However, on a less positive note Mason (2002: 35-36) discusses her disquiet about combining data gleaned from divergent approaches, which she considers would lead to confusion and potentially flawed findings. Furthermore, Silverman (2000) notes that problems such as loss of focus and data overload will arise from using combined methods. However, Mertens (1998) and Creswell (2003) present a compelling argument for combining methods. They contend that combined methods provide greater insight into diversity issues such as gender, sexual orientation and disabilities. Therefore, it may be argued that deeper insights, explanation and understanding may be gained by using a mixture of positivistic and interpretive methods.
In summation "Positivist and interpretive paradigms" note Cohen Manion and Morrison (2000), "are essentially concerned with understanding phenomena through two different lenses" (p.27). Positivism’s strengths are replication, generalisation and objectivity. However, interpretive methods provide a richness of data from which to explain and illuminate perceived realities.

**Research Context and Questions**

The over-arching aim of this study is to develop an understanding of this specialism both through an analysis of hostage negotiation data and by exploring the experiences and views of a range of senior police officers and operational negotiators. It is hoped that the findings will signpost clear recommendations for the improvement of selection and training both Internationally and Nationally. To recap, this investigation has been guided firstly by the author’s own knowledge and experience in the field, secondly by the limited national academic research into this field and finally by views and comments of other experts. This combination of personal knowledge, research and expert advice are the bases for the evidence informing replies to the over-arching research question: "Is national police hostage negotiation training fit for purpose?"

In order to address this question sub-questions were identified which are:

1. Are current selection procedures fit for purpose?
2. Do individual negotiation cadres reflect the community they serve and, if not, does this fundamentally undermine their operational effectiveness?
3. When deployment data is analysed, does it support the current
4. Do trained skills fade and, if so, does this dilute operational effectiveness?

5. Does the nature of the role affect retention rates?

6. Is there need for refresher courses and/or other opportunities to exploit continuous professional development and accreditation of police negotiators?

International and National law enforcement agencies have been approached for quantitative negotiator deployment data for two reasons. Firstly, to generate baseline material from a variety of sources. Secondly, so that any subsequent themes detected within that data would present the possibility of generalising the findings worldwide.

The research design will capture themes and issues through interviewing individuals ranging from police leaders, i.e. Association of Chief Officer level (ACPO) to the front line providers, i.e. negotiators. This thematic subjective enquiry will it is hoped provide insight and clarity of understanding into the subject of selecting and training police hostage and crisis negotiators.

This is a complex study area, and therefore the research questions will be used to maintain focus and structure. It is acknowledged that there are problems associated with the use of qualitative research generally, as previously outlined. However, cognisant of those shortcomings, the strengths of a qualitative enquiry in terms of richness and depth of data
would appear to more than make up any for these problems. In order to provide a degree of reliability the same interview schedule will be used for all participants. There are a number of different interview types, state Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000), such as structured, semi-structured and open-ended, and each method has both opportunities and challenges associated with their use. After consideration, semi-structured interviews seem to offer the best opportunity for successfully obtaining insight and understanding. This method provides a degree of reliability while not stifling either the flow of the interview or the opportunity to pursue unexpected leads. The specifics associated with this enquiry will now be discussed.

The Methodology of the Study

This study relates to the use of police hostage and crisis negotiators. This is a specialist field set within a police service which has its own sub-cultures, bespoke language and a hierarchical command structure, all of which offer a challenging research environment.

The following sections will concentrate on issues pertinent to research within the police environment. Furthermore, it will explain the rationale for my decision making. In broad terms, the mechanics of this research and the key issues of gaining access, ethical and sensitivity considerations will be discussed.
Gaining Access

Policing is a multifaceted and complex action orientated occupation that operates within an environment of high risk and public scrutiny. Traditionally, and perhaps surprisingly, the police service in this county has not been subject to academic enquiry. The reason for this has proved elusive. Arguably, the conservative nature of police leadership prevented or at least passively resisted external enquiry into the service. Whatever the reason, "The sociological study of the police" observe Fox and Lundman (1974) "is a recent phenomenon" (p.52). A potential catalyst for increased academic interest, suggests Reiner (2000), has been the changing nature of society, in particular a growing public disquiet and questioning of authority. Furthermore, he considers that policing itself has become increasingly visible, controversial and politicised.

Studying the police presents researchers with a challenging environment. Indeed:

"The resulting problems of access and trust" suggests Reiner (2000), "are shared with much other social research that has the potential to uncover dangerous knowledge, but the extent of the difficulty is particularly severe in studying policing because of the highly charged nature of its secrets" (p.218).

This is an important observation, particularly when one considers the various sensitivities surrounding this enquiry. Firstly, negotiators are an integral part of the National terrorist response. Secondly, there are real concerns that 'day to day' tactics will be compromised. Therefore, failure to clearly identify and manage the risks associated with this study has
the potential to render sensitive tactics unusable. It was therefore identified from the outset that a fundamental objective was to protect operational effectiveness. Failure to protect negotiation techniques was considered unacceptable by senior management, participants and the author. Therefore, early assurances on such matters was given in order to obtain the service's co-operation. To reiterate, this research will reflect the over-arching objective of keeping specific tactics and methodologies secure.

There appears to be general agreement, argue Van Maanen (1973) and Punch (1998), that academic enquiry within the policing environment presents many challenges for the researcher. When discussing police corruption, "The researcher's task" observed Punch (1998), "then becomes how to circumvent the minefield of defences that protect the concealed reality of police work" (p.178). However, the problems he confronted were due to the specifics of the study rather than with the general process of gaining access to the police and initially there appeared little synergy between his observations and this research. Nevertheless, reflecting on Punch's (1998) observation provided the inspiration to develop for this study a method of systematically identifying areas of concern and risk. A framework of risks was developed indicating the specific risk, impact and the measures/actions necessary to mitigate those risks. This matrix enabled the development of strategies and arguments to allay senior management concerns. This framework proved invaluable in the process of obtaining service approval for the study. A strategy was developed that relied on the clear identification of the risks/issues, transparency,
pragmatic engagement and problem solving.

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<th>Over-arching issue</th>
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<th>Action / risk reduction measures</th>
<th>Subjective assessment of risk</th>
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<td>Organisational Reputation</td>
<td>International Complaints</td>
<td>Involving/briefing National ACPO lead</td>
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<td>Agree to provide participating countries with recommendations</td>
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<td>National Complaints</td>
<td>Involving/briefing National ACPO lead</td>
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<td>National Training Sub-group briefed and any recommendations provided</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Westshire Complaints</td>
<td>ACPO sponsor sought, engaged and briefed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gain Access</td>
<td>International, National</td>
<td>National ACPO lead aware/ support gained</td>
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<td>International access gained by utilising personal network</td>
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<td>Constant monitoring to ensure continued support and remedial action as necessary</td>
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<td>Westshire</td>
<td>ACPO sponsor supportive Investment in ‘buy in’</td>
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<td>Briefing/support of peer retired ‘advisors’</td>
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<td>Overt Research methods</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>International network overtly supplying non-personal data</td>
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<td>National</td>
<td>ACPO advice overt methods</td>
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<td>Interviews therefore overtly recorded</td>
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<td>Restricted access to recommendations</td>
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<td>Westshire</td>
<td>Peer advice/‘buy in’ sought</td>
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<td>Overt methods more easily achieved</td>
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<td>Peer advisors strongly against covert methods</td>
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<td>Participant ‘buy in’ on overt methods</td>
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<td>Non-personal data only supplied</td>
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<td>Agreement to confidentiality within discipline/police regs</td>
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<td>ACPO sponsor to be the point of contact on any breaches</td>
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<td>Participants' data sanitised</td>
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<td>Participants' details and data kept separately</td>
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<td>Due to numbers of potential participants it is considered unlikely that any form of compromise will take place</td>
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<td>Interview tape recorded</td>
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<td>Participants would be allowed to review transcripts</td>
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<td>Participants’ details and data kept separately</td>
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<td>Due to numbers involved more likely for compromise</td>
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<td>National Policy</td>
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<td>Due to security classification no restricted policy or documentation used</td>
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<td>To sanitise sensitive methods if any disclosed in interviews</td>
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<td>Participants to be reminded prior to interview that specific sensitive methodologies are not to be disclosed during the interview</td>
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<td>Provided assurances on this matter to ACPO Sponsor</td>
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<td>Peer advisors briefed on this action</td>
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<td>Peer advisors to be consulted in all occasions of doubt for guidance</td>
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<td>Security of data</td>
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<td>Copies of data to be kept separately under lock and key</td>
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<td>Identities kept separate from interview data</td>
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<td>Medium</td>
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<td>Only non-personal quantitative data obtained</td>
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<td>Security of thesis</td>
<td>Agreement sought that access to document would be restricted. Academic supervisor to act as 'gatekeeper' for document. Physical security the responsibility of University. Author unable to judge standard of security, hence risk grading</td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium - High</td>
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<tr>
<td>Physical security of participants</td>
<td>All information sanitised and due to methods employed (personal data/interviews separated) unlikely that interviewees will be identified</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical security of persons involved in future crisis or siege incidents</td>
<td>All sensitive methodologies not to be included in thesis. That any recommendations are provided to International and National leads in order to improve policy and practice</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical security of researcher</td>
<td>The research field is physically a safe environment</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 2: Risk matrix for this study)
Gaining access to the police, suggest Fox and Lundman (1974) and Reiner (2000), requires the engagement of 'gatekeepers'. This term is typically used to describe an individual who is in a position to facilitate researchers access to an organisation. "The first gate is manned by the top level administrators of the organisation" state Fox and Lundman (1974), "where the second gate is controlled by the aggregate group of the proposed subjects of one study. Access is successful when each 'gatekeeper' approves the study" (p. 53).

This 'gatekeeper' process, notes Oliver (2003), is not restricted to research conducted within the police and may be observed in various organisations. Also, he notes that there is the potential for conflict within the 'gate keeper'-researcher relationship. He suggests that highlighting the potential mutual benefits of the investigation may prove to be a useful method to gain co-operation. This pragmatic advice was incorporated into this researcher's strategy.

The sensitivities associated with this research might have been considered by others as overly restrictive. This is a reasonable observation because as Sieber (1993) acknowledges, "In a number of important respects what is studied can be constrained in significant ways by the sensitive character of the topic" (p.27). However, three factors unique to this study proved indispensable in gaining organisational support. Firstly, 'Westshire' has considerable experience in working with both academic organisations generally and with employee researchers in particular. Secondly, this researcher is 'Westshire's' Head of Profession in this field. Finally, the researcher had previously conducted academic
research without any adverse organisational effect. Arguably, these factors
coupled with the fact that the researcher is a member of the National
Working Group may have provided the service with the confidence
needed to authorise the co-operation. The process of gaining access at
both an International and National level transpired to be a relatively
uncomplicated matter.

The uniqueness of both the research and the researcher's access is
probably the investigation's greatest strength and its weakness. The
problem simply stated is research replication. As Bryman (2004) notes
the ability for others to replicate research is an important issue. It is
difficult to envisage so many unique factors such as subject interest,
security vetting, a personal network of key International and National
stakeholders and importantly Chief Officer confidence coinciding in the
immediate future. Therefore, it appears unlikely that the findings of this
research will be easily replicated. Additionally, at the study's conclusion it
is anticipated that any findings and recommendations will become the
catalyst for national change. Therefore, the national landscape for the
selection and training of negotiators will be fundamentally changed.

Accessing the 'second gate' (Fox and Lundman 1974) proved less straight
forward. Police officers, observes Van Maanen (1973) consider themselves
apart from society, "performing society's dirty work" (p.66). Elaborating on
this view further Van Maanen (1973) describes policing as a distinct
subculture (p.66) that views all others with a degree of suspicion. This
suspicion had the potential both to limit the access to the individual
participants and affect the data. The need to obtain 'bottom up' consent for any enquiry is important (Rentzetti and Lee 1993 and Silverman 2005). In order to gain sufficient access to individual actors there was a need to obtain a degree of 'buy in' both to the aims of the study and its processes. Considerable time was invested into this stage of the project, as it was identified to be fundamental to success. This type of consultative process, as advocated by Brewer (1993), was time well spent as the participants appeared both highly motivated and enthusiastic.

The selection of the interviewees for this study was a time consuming process. Sample selection was identified as a critical issue for the study in order to provide validity to the findings. The researcher wished to capture data from a wide range of participants involved within the field. The researcher decided that the study would be enhanced by the inclusion of ACPO level strategic senior administrators. Therefore, it was decided to interview two ACPO Officers (Gold). One of these officers has had a long and established involvement within the field. The other ACPO officer is an extremely experienced firearms commander, a discipline that works closely with negotiators. Further, this officer has a portfolio with direct responsibility for a Force negotiation cadre. The researcher decided that the inclusion of ACPO representation and sponsorship is a vital element of the study and would later assist the implementation any recommendations. It was decided to include two Regional Co-ordinators because the role is an influential one. There are 9 Regional Co-ordinators within the UK each responsible for strategic issues, such as inter-force co-operation and policy agreements within their region. Further,
all Regional Co-ordinators are members of the National Negotiators Working Group (NNWG). Their perceptions was considered vital, in order to both inform the debate and to later disseminate any recommendations regionally. Finally, six operational negotiators were approached to provide a current, 'street level' view. In order to give the study some reliability, it was decided not to restricted the research to one geographical area of the UK. Therefore participants were selected from the South, East, Midlands, London and the North West. The potential participants were selected from the researcher's network of personal contacts. The sample selected for this research has allowed the capture of data from the strategic to the operational and emergent themes will be triangulated by using the interviews themselves.

Covert or Overt Research Methods?

When considering the nature of the research phase both 'overt' and 'covert' research methods were both briefly considered. In general terms, Silverman (2005) considers overt research to be conducted with the subject's knowledge, whereas covert research is without the subject's knowledge. When considering the use of covert methods a number of problems were identified. Firstly, the opinions and views of individual actors appear critical to the success of this study. Secondly, the service's co-operation relied on the use of overt and transparent methods. One may argue that unrehearsed or spontaneous evidence may have provided original insight. However, these potential gains needed to be carefully balanced against the likely negative effect that these covert methods would generate. Finally, the researcher is a police officer, and the use of
unauthorised covert research methods would expose him to disciplinary action. In summation, the use of covert research methods within the policing environment has historically (Holdaway 1982 cited by Brewer 1993) provided original insight but is high risk. Therefore, for these reasons the use of covert research methods was discounted at an early stage.

Overt research methods were considered to be the tools of choice. However, it was recognised that the use of these tools might be problematic. Data reliability observe Brewer (1993) and Sieber (1993) caused by divergent gate-keeper agendas may be difficult to manage. In particular, Sieber (1993) extols the researcher to be careful, and ensure that the gatekeeper agenda is clearly understood. In the context of this research there are ample opportunities for gatekeepers to influence the investigation. In an effort to address this problem it was decided to personally brief interested parties on the potential benefits of allowing an 'open' investigation. Finally, Brewer (1993) highlights the need for researchers to resist the pressures of the gatekeeper. He considers this to be of paramount importance, and his primary resistance strategy is "the integrity of the researcher" (p.130). The police service is unlike any other prominent public body and would have a vested interest in preserving its reputation. Therefore, one must be watchful, but hopefully not inhibited by pressures being exerted to change potentially sensitive findings.

In order to facilitate this research key peers were consulted and their
support and guidance was sought. This was considered to be an important part of the design phase, as the police service values the visible support of 'street credible' personalities. The use of 'street credible' practitioners proved to be an effective strategy for 'opening doors.' Indeed, it was better than Chief Officer endorsement. The decision to use overt research methods was strongly endorsed by these peer practitioners. Once again who the researcher was appeared to be critical in gaining second level gatekeeper endorsement. The importance of the personality and practical knowledge of the researcher is summarised by Reiner (2000) in these terms, "Clearly the material researchers can obtain from the police will be affected by who they are, and their relationship to the force" (p. 220). In relation to this study the author is a practitioner of considerable experience whose credibility was not unduly questioned. Moreover, as the regional trainer for the field the potential to improve current educational practice was identified by both peers and chief officers as a tangible outcome to the research.

Sensitivity, Confidentiality and Ethics

The identification of sensitive issues is, according to Lee and Renzetti (1993), an important aspect of any research. They suggest (p. 5) that the sensitivities surrounding a topic are emergent, often influenced by the social context in which the study takes place. "A sensitive topic" they offer "is one that potentially poses for those involved a substantial threat, the emergence of which renders problematic for the researcher and/or the researched the collection, holding and/or dissemination of research data" (p.5).
Clearly significant areas of this research appear to conform to this definition, particularly in terms of the nature of the subject, data collection/storage, access to sensitive reference material and importantly the dissemination of findings. "Textbooks on research methods" observes Brewer (1993), "rarely mention the problems that arise when undertaking research on controversial topics or conducting it in sensitive locations" (p.125). Indeed, Lee and Renzetti (1993) suggest that issues surrounding sensitivity have been used to justify covert research methods. The limited literature available indicates that undertaking a sensitive investigation is a daunting enterprise. However, on a constructive note, although problematic a transparent process that both identified salient issues and instigated a management process was designed. Once again the researcher's background was significant, as he was highly vetted and had handled highly sensitive material. The secure handling and retention of all data was of paramount importance, and security measures were applied from the inception of the project.

Interviewing operational officers had the potential to expose both day to day and counter terrorist operational tactics. Both are highly sensitive and there is a potential for sensitive disclosures to be made. In Brewer's (1993) debate on sensitivity he focuses on two key areas: firstly the personal security of the researcher and the participants and secondly, those in relation to contextual problems (p.127). He defines contextual problems as those associated with the social, political and economic conditions prevalent within the research setting. He suggests that the more sensitive the issues the more problematic it is to address them.
"They become a prominent feature of the research design and fieldwork," he observes, "having to be continually borne in mind by the researcher at all stages of the research rather than just contemplated as a vague possibility or a theoretical truism once fieldwork is completed" (p.127).

Within the context of this study the risks associated with the researcher's personal security are considered to be negligible. However, the potential to cause unnecessary risks to third parties, such as future siege hostage/victims and/or suicidal subjects, remains. In order to manage and/or negate these risks steps were taken to ensure that any inadvertent disclosure of covert policing techniques was minimised. This area was a primary concern for both the organisation and peer group 'gatekeepers'. The measures taken to reassure both parties included insuring confidentiality, security of data and an agreement with the University to restrict access to this manuscript. These measures are currently believed to be sufficient to mitigate the risks, but will be the subject of periodic review.

In general terms, confidentiality and anonymity are key aspects of any research project (Oliver 2003 and Smyth and Williamson 2004). Furthermore, and closely aligned to these issues, Bryman (2004) highlights the need for informed consent. Confidentiality issues, notes Bell (1999), have the potential to impact on both the student/supervisor and researcher/participant relationships. In relation to the student/supervisor relationship confidentiality was sought from the outset of the study programme. This was particularly important for the researcher, as the ability to discuss topics frankly and openly was considered crucial to the
For the non-police researcher the guaranteeing of participant confidentiality and anonymity appears to be a straight-forward, an almost automatic part of the process. However as Bell (1999) observes; "Confidentiality and/or anonymity is usually promised, but before you promise either, decide what that means" (p.129). This is a significant observation for the police researcher. It should be borne in mind that when investigating the police there is the potential to discover both disciplinary and criminal issues. Police regulations are clear and lawfully binding on all officers. In effect any disciplinary or criminal issue disclosed or discovered by a police officer researcher during the course of an academic study cannot be ignored. The researcher and all the participants are serving police officers bound by those regulations. This is a weighty issue and has the potential to fundamentally affect both the data and the researcher in two ways. Firstly, the data collected may be flawed as participants, realising that they are in either disciplinary or criminal jeopardy, attempt to change facts. Secondly, the researcher may be inadvertently exposed to information that will place him in an ethically and legally difficult position. Perhaps Punch (1993) best summarises these concerns in these terms:

"The primary insight that I gained then was that there exists a wide disparity between the public presentation of police work - as sober, legal, competent, professional and even 'sacred' - and the backstage reality" (p.179).

The sobering reality of Punch's (1993) insight raised a critical ethical dilemma. Indeed, "Most investigators of sensitive problems" observes
Sieber (1993), "have had occasion to worry that their honest efforts to investigate human characteristics would result in misunderstanding, social backlash, or bad public policy" (p.21). It was therefore necessary to assess the risks associated with this study. In broad terms the key issues identified were:

- Confidentially/security/publication of the data
- Sensitivity of some written sources
- Confidentiality/anonymity of participants
- An ethical procedure to address any criminality/malpractice/disciplinary issues discovered

**Security of Data, Thesis and Sources**

It was identified at an early stage that the security of the thesis itself could not be absolutely assured. The academic supervisor was consulted and an assurance was obtained that access to the document would be restricted, and that he would act as a gate-keeper. Furthermore, as document security would undoubtedly remain an issue, secret or highly confidential sources were not referenced within the thesis. Both these issues were discussed and agreed with the Chief Officer sponsor. Additionally, the Chief Officer insisted that only non-personal quantitative data would be used in order to address data protection concerns. Interestingly academia's approach to data protection issues is not as prescriptive as that of the police service. In order to expand this argument it seems prudent to briefly revisit the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998. It requires consideration of a range of issues that could be inadvertently transgressed such as computer security, storage of
interview recordings and filing systems. In relation to the use and storage of 'personal data' Hands (2002) provides a clarification in these terms namely that if the data provided was not capable of enabling the identification of an individual, the data stored would not be subject to the Act. If during the data collection phase personal information was obtained, it would need to be sanitised to enable usage.

**Confidentiality and Ethical / Discipline Procedures**

During the design phase it was necessary to design a robust and ethical process that addressed the issues of confidentiality, anonymity and informed participant consent. Indeed, "The scope of the confidentiality of the data provided," suggests Oliver (2003), "and the anonymity of the respondents, particularly in any final research report, should be clarified with the participants" (p.15). It was acknowledged that these fundamental issues needed an early resolution. The 'Ethical Procedures' Documentation (Hull University 2004) appeared to provide a solid basis for the project. Furthermore, Oliver (2003) and Bryman (2004) observe that informed consent is a vital ingredient of ethical social research. Oliver (2003) weighs the need to give participants all the information necessary to enable them to make an informed decision against the constraints placed in terms of time and achievability. He concludes that "the researcher inevitably has to be selective" (p.30). This pragmatic advice was adopted, but in order to allay concerns, participants were provided with both written information and personal briefings. Informal discussions surrounding consent issues were held with both a practitioner peer and the research supervisor. It was decided to follow Hull
University's guidance and use both an 'adapted' participant consent form and an explanatory letter. Additionally, prior to any interview the participant would be reminded of the limitation associated with confidentiality and anonymity if any disclosures breached criminal or discipline codes. This was a delicate balancing act, as it was necessary to ensure that the participants' views and insights were neither inhibited or guarded, whilst ensuring that ethical and discipline considerations were not transgressed. In order to protect the researcher it was agreed that any criminal or discipline issues discovered during the course of this investigation would be handled ethically. Therefore, it was decided that any such matters would be brought to the attention of the Chief Officer sponsor. However, prudent as this measure arguably is, it must be stressed that it was not anticipated that any such issues would be discovered during the course of this study.

Finally, as Oliver (2003) observes, "There may be difficulties with informed consent in situations where participants are part of a hierarchical work structure" (p.29). He further notes (p.29-30) that these organisations may prove problematic to investigate because participants are concerned that their views would be fed back to managers. Due to the hierarchical nature of the police service, it was anticipated that some individuals might be concerned that senior management would have unrestricted access to the data collected. To allay those concerns it was decided that the text of both the introductory letter and the consent form should reassure participants that they would not be identified to senior management. It was acknowledged from the outset that the validity of the
data gathered could be affected by variables such as career aspirations and/or organisational loyalty. It is hoped that by assuring confidentiality within specified limits, these negative variables were managed. Qualitative data generated from Gold and Regional co-ordinators would be difficult to attribute to identified individuals as there are many potential sources. However, the 'Westshire' participants would be more difficult to disguise. This was a thorny issue, as using these officers would assist in managing both expenditure and time-scales. It was therefore necessary to instigate additional measures in an effort to give 'Westshire' participants the confidence to fully engage. To this end Bell (1999) suggests additional guarantees such as allowing the interviewees "the opportunity to verify statements when the research is in draft form" and furthermore "Participants will receive a copy of the final report" (p.41). The adoption of these simple measures would give participants confidence that their views had not been misrepresented. The peer advisor was consulted and this additional guarantee, together with the sanitisation of personal details, were considered adequate safe-guards.

**Interviews**

The design of suitable interview guides was an integral aspect of the investigative process. Reflecting on my research diary assisted the creation of these schedules. The decision to use a research diary was taken at an early stage. Murray (2002: 177-183) both discusses and advocates the use of research diaries and journals. For the purposes of this research Silverman's (2005) advice on the composition of the document was followed. It was decided that the primary purposes of the
diary were:

- To show the development of my thinking
- As an aid to reflection
- To help improve my time management
- To provide ideas for the future direction of my work
- To use in the methodology chapter of this thesis

In a variety of ways this document proved to be a useful tool that aided the production of the interview schedules. The diary enabled both reflection and the creation of original thoughts and concepts. Additionally, the interview guide was also shaped by the review of both literature and policy in the field. As a result of this literature review key areas such as globalisation, selection procedures and training were quickly identified as worthy of investigation and were grouped under three over-arching headings. As previously discussed it was decided to use semi-structured interviews. It was hoped that this research tool would provide the balance between deeper insight and data manageability. The concept of creating an interview guide is advocated by Bryman (2004). He suggests that this document is both flexible and stimulates participants to think deeper. Furthermore, he provides a practical method of formulating questions, (p.326) which may be summarised as:

- General research area
- Specific research questions
- Interview topics
- Formulate interview questions
- Review/revise interview questions
- Pilot guide
• Identify novel issues
• Revise interview questions
• Finalise guide

He also suggests that there is a logical order and flow to the topic areas and questions (p.324). This process proved to be an effective, straight-forward and sensible framework. The initial stage of the process was achieved in a reasonable timeframe. However, the revision and pilot stages proved to be both vital and time consuming. A problem emerged due to the researcher’s immersion in the highly specific literature. As a result the researcher initially appeared to be affected by a degree of ‘specialist myopia’. In short, the researcher had become too close to the subject matter and failed to see linkages between the specific subject area and the wider policing educational environment. Following Bryman’s (2004) guidance, an initial review of the interview questions was conducted using a peer practitioner. A number of opportunities or gaps, such as the lack of inclusion within the NCPE (National Centre for Policing Excellence), were identified and new questioning was designed to encompass these issues. The interview schedule was gradually refined. Finally, a pilot interview document was circulated to two ‘retired’ negotiators to ensure that the questions were firstly unambiguous and secondly made sense within the organisational context.

As all the participants are either middle or senior management making sufficient time for the interviews proved to be problematic. It was decided to follow Oliver’s (2003) suggestion in that, “it has become almost the norm nowadays that unstructured or semi-structured interviews are tape
The use of tape recording provided flexibility, as the interview could take place anywhere. Furthermore, it allowed both the researcher and the participant to concentrate on the interview process as it unfolded rather than being distracted by having to capture data by long-hand. An added advantage was that the conversations became more natural. In order to both focus the participant's mind and utilise the time effectively the interview guide was provided to the participants prior to the meeting. Furthermore, it was anticipated that by providing the questions early the transparency of the process would allay any fears.

Research bias as highlighted by Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1996) and Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000), and its potential effects on research validity, was also identified as another area of risk. There are various ways in which bias affects research findings. "The sources of bias" suggest Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000), "are the characteristics of the interviewer, the characteristics of the respondent, and the substantive content of the questions" (p.121). They continued by highlighting the effects that race, gender, social class and age may have on the data collection process. The author's knowledge of the field was initially considered advantageous for the work. However, conversely it could be a disadvantage, as the participants are, perhaps inadvertently, manipulated by the researcher's own agenda. Special relations, notes Sieber (1993), including that of friendship, have the potential to influence views and behaviour. This is a key issue as the researcher is gathering data from a network of friends and professional colleagues. Bias appears to be a perpetual problem. Mindful of this, it is vital to address this
issue positively to ensure that research validity and reliability are not compromised. Arguably, one often finds exactly what one wishes to find because one has already, perhaps sub-consciously, formulated a route to it. Control mechanisms to increase validity and reliability were needed. The interview guide was therefore piloted with retired negotiator peers in an effort to identify any overt bias. The questions were open in their style and therefore, arguably, the effects of bias were reduced. Also, the researcher consciously reflected on each interview post-event in an effort to identify any evidence of 'bias creep'.

Finally, post-data collection issues were considered. Coding frames were designed to interpret the data gleaned from the interviews. However, once again reliability and researcher bias were considered to be a potential threat. This was difficult to address, and the method employed was conscious reflection and personal re-checking. Although as previously discussed participants would be allowed to view/comment on the accuracy of the transcripts, it was decided to follow Oliver's (2003) advice that allowing others to revisit the coding would be time consuming and prolong the interpretive stage. Secondly, due to the sensitivities surrounding the data, the author felt that it was prudent to restrict its circulation. Again the nature of the thesis ensured that only the researcher would undertake the coding process. Eventually, the disposal of the raw data was considered (Oliver 2003 and Silverman 2005). Due to the nature of the subject, special attention was given to disposal issues. The impending retirement of the researcher from the police service prevented research material and the raw data being kept at
home indefinitely. Therefore, the timing of the 'destruction' of the data was pertinent. This was a difficult decision for once the material was either 'handed back' or destroyed there would be no retrieval possible. Therefore, it was decided to destroy the data post viva.

Chapter Summary

In conclusion, this chapter has sought to justify the rationale for the choice of research methodologies employed within this study. Initially it argued that there are two divergent paradigms, qualitative and quantitative. These contrasting approaches were then briefly described. Thereafter, the respective strengths and weaknesses of those paradigms were considered. Finally, justification for the use of semi-structured interviews was provided and the guiding research questions were restated.

Additionally, this chapter discussed specific issues pertinent to this research. In particular, the challenges faced in investigating subjects within the police environment were considered. In broad terms the mechanics of this study, and the author's decision making rationale, were considered. In particular the key issues such as gaining access, ethics, collecting data and referencing policy within a sensitive environment were debated. In the next chapter, quantitative findings will be presented using appropriate graphs and tables and utilising relevant topic headings and material from the literature review.
Chapter Five: Quantitative Data Results and Analysis

Introduction

This chapter concentrates on the analysis of quantitative empirical data collected from both international and national law enforcement agencies. In Chapter 6 the qualitative data gathered from a series of semi-structured interviews with senior police officers will be explored. This chapter initially discusses the strategies and methods utilised to examine and interpret the quantitative data. Then quantitative deployment data will be examined. The specific research questions addressed within this chapter by the quantitative data analysis are:

Sub-question 3: When deployment data is analysed, does it support the current national training course content? and then,

Sub-question 5: Does the nature of the role affect retention rates?

During the course of this analysis both unexpected themes and significant findings have emerged from the analysis of the data. This analysis of international empirical data illuminates fundamental issues for the UK in particular. Finally, a summary of the chapter will be provided.

The Strategy and Methodology of this Quantitative Inquiry

Chapter 4 argued that by harvesting quantitative deployment data, a baseline of empirical data would be obtained. This chapter considers the quantitative data which not only provides an insight in its own right, but also informs the qualitative stage of the research process.

The analysis of data, note Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000), is central
to the research process. Indeed, detailed data analysis, observe Pole and Lampard (2002), is crucial, having expended considerable time and effort collecting it. Furthermore, they believe that any adopted analytical processes should be complementary to the nature, characteristics and style of the enquiry and of the research tools used. Both Bryman 2004 and Blaxter et al (2006) note that a variety of strategies can be utilised to analyse data originating from both the positivistic and interpretive paradigms.

As previously mentioned within this work there is a dearth of national empirical hostage negotiation data. Moreover, there is currently no national UK database. It was decided to use an inductive approach; this approach relies on firstly conducting observations or obtaining research findings, followed by reflection and then theorising. "Some researchers" Bryman (2004) suggests, "With an inductive stance, consider theory is the 'outcome' of research" (p.9). However, as Ezzy (2002) observes simplistic, naïve forms of inductive theorising would offer a researcher with limited knowledge of the field too much latitude (p10). This is an important point, because Chapter Four argued that a strength of this investigation is the depth of knowledge of the researcher. This knowledge base assisted the researcher to remain mindful of research bias when analysing the data. The analytical strategy employed was iterative in nature. The researcher employed a process where he constantly returned to the gathered data and systematically reviewed and reflected on it in order to recognise emergent themes. Strauss and Corbin (1998) encourage this interplay between the researcher and the data, followed
by a period of critical reflection and refinement. They advocate the use of procedures that:

1. Build rather than test
2. Provide researchers with analytic tools for handling masses of raw data
3. Are both systematic and creative simultaneously
4. Identify, develop and relate the concepts that are the building blocks of the theory (p.13).

To this extent then, elements of a grounded research approach were utilised in this project. Finally, the production of any empirical data, a rare commodity internationally within this field, would provide both signposts and baseline data for other future academic forays into the specialism.

The process of research, notes Blaxter et al (2007), harvests large amounts of data from a variety of sources. In this case the amount of quantitative data was not insubstantial. Therefore, an important early decision was to instigate a process whereby data was immediately assessed on its arrival. A primary aim of this 'rough' analysis was to identify unexpected trends or themes not identified earlier within the study. The quantitative data gathered provided some interesting insights that complemented the analysis of the qualitative data. The presentation of this quantitative data has utilised tables and graphs. These methods were chosen in an attempt to assist and enable the reader quickly to understand the findings.
Analysis of Quantitative Deployment Data

An Introduction

Although this study is primarily an exploration into the experiences and views of senior police officers in relation to the selection and training of hostage negotiators, it was hoped that by analysing quantitative data gathered internationally typical operational scenarios would be identified. This analysis uniquely attempts to provide both a view of an archetypal operational negotiation incident and the duration of incidents in order to inform both selection and training. This inquiry attempts to provide an insight into the operational reality that the training needs to address.

The researcher originally approached the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) United States; South Australian Police (SAPOL); Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP); Scotland; The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and Westshire for data. The collection and analysis of deployment data was significant in order to illuminate typical operational deployments and, once identified, this insight will allow training to be designed to reflect the operational reality. Also, the duration of the deployments was analysed in order to investigate whether protracted deployments might have a negative effect on negotiator retention. The researcher requested anonymous data. The rationale for this is threefold. Firstly, it allayed the Chief Officer sponsor's concerns about violating Data Protection protocols. Secondly, the transmission of personal data via the internet was identified as high risk. Finally, some of the international participant's own protocols prevented the provision of personal information.
Disappointingly, the initial enthusiasm to supply quantitative data quickly dissipated and capturing the data became a major and persistent problem. This affected timeliness and was a source of considerable frustration. Moreover, the data collection stage was beset by other more technical difficulties. For example, when analysing the data it was noticed, with the exception of the FBI and South Australian data, that it was surprisingly sparse. Initial analysis quickly concluded that the quantitative data was of limited value. Indeed, some organisations were unable to provide even the most basic deployment information. This was completely unexpected, and arguably significant in its own right as perhaps one might conclude that internationally negotiation is not valued enough to gather detailed management information on. This lack of substantial data caused a re-evaluation of the study and at an early stage it was decided to concentrate on collecting data that was common to all. Another impediment to the research process was the participants' own internal security policies. This prevented the researcher from gaining unfettered access to original source material. As a result much of the data was supplied in the form of cumulative reports or edited printouts.

It was decided to limit the scope of the study to a three year period (2005, 2006 and 2007). There were two reasons for this. Firstly, the data was recent and would provide currency to the findings. Secondly, this would restrict, to a more manageable amount, the sample size. In order to facilitate the comparison of data participating organisations were asked to supply only the total number, type and duration of incidents. As alluded to earlier, this simple requirement was difficult to achieve for
some of the organisations. The data albeit difficult to collect remained substantial and allowed the identification of significant trends. Although the time frames for this study are short, this international 'snap-shot' has validity and provides both limited resources of empirical data for future studies and findings that could be generalised.

Study replication has been debated earlier within this work and remains a significant issue. Even with the access and networks available to this researcher progress was extremely slow and problematic and, therefore, it is highly unlikely that this work could be easily replicated. Initial analysis of the data identified that the terms suicide, siege/barricade and hostage taking were relatively constant descriptors. Therefore, it was decided to fragment the data using these key terms.

The findings in this study show that quantitative data is surprisingly sparse, which accords with Giebels' (1999) observations. Further, it is acknowledged that direct examination of the data would have been the preferred option, but it was not possible to arrange this. These findings have provided an international 'snap-shot,' gathered within an environment of competing demands such as time constraints, work/life pressures and importantly a shrinking pool of enthusiastic data donors.

**General Analytical Findings**

The FBI Crisis Negotiation Unit (CNU) at Quantico provided 25 years of data from its Hostage Barricade Statistics (HoBas) database. Preliminary analysis suggested that the data was extremely comprehensive as it
contained a vast range of bespoke data groupings such as: substance abuse history; mental health problems; location type; negotiator tactics; incident precursors and perpetrator/victim descriptions. When compared to other international data supplied for this inquiry the FBI HoBas material is both impressive and significant. It is a valuable source of empirical data; however, concerns about data reliability gradually emerged. The database was established in 1998, but it was noticed that the oldest record dated from 1983. Immediately, this provoked concerns about quality control measures adopted in this back-record conversion process. It proved impossible to ascertain what measures, if any, were utilised in the back-record conversion process. Historically, concerns have been raised about the quality and reliability of the HoBas data. "Relying on HOBAS (Hostage Barricade Statistics (HoBas) database)" commented Lipetsker (2004), "as 'empirical support' may be premature" (p.4). She continued by highlighting concerns that the data was not representative of the true crisis incident population. This study shares those concerns because analysis indicated that only 5,369 pan-American incidents had been recorded in a 25 year period. This was less than anticipated, especially when one considers the size of the American population and the challenging environments present within some of its large socio-economically deprived conurbations. Enquiries with the FBI revealed that although HoBas is a national repository 'owned' by the Federal Authorities not all US law enforcement organisations contribute to the database. There is no national US mandate requiring agencies to contribute. Therefore, as a database it is flawed as it provides only a partial view of the American experience. Finally, and importantly, although
the FBI were contacted on numerous occasions, they were unable to supply figures only pertaining to the three year time frame of this study. As a result of this researcher’s persistence it was discovered that the database had a significant design fault as it had not been created with ‘time-period’ filters. As a result the FBI could only provide the entire 25 years of data with no ability to identify recent trends. Therefore, there is a difficulty in observing trends or features that would inform training.

The data although flawed remains impressive and has been used in this study to provide a longitudinal comparison to the other data. The database has a significant range of bespoke data groupings such as: substance abuse; mental health problems; location type; negotiator tactics; incident precursors and perpetrator/victim descriptions. When compared to the other data supplied internationally the FBI HoBas material is singularly impressive and significant. If reliability issues were addressed it would provide a powerful tool to enable the generation, testing and adjustment of negotiation theories and of identifying significant situational and behavioural factors. A recommendation of this study would be for the United Kingdom to develop an improved system in order to provide a national empirical data repository. Current UK systems are at best disparate and often non-existent. A UK HoBas system could provide an effective tool to inform occupational training needs analysis.

In terms of other countries’ documentation the South Australian Police (SAPol) data was supplied by their co-ordinator. This person has been in post over the relevant period of the study. It was not possible to cross-
check the reliability of the data because the researcher did not have access to the original source material. Initially, Canadian authorities appeared to be enthusiastic participants, but significant difficulties arose in securing the data which seriously threatened this research. At the outset of this research considerable documentation on negotiator selection and training was provided by the Canadian Police College. However, access had been facilitated by a personal contact and that person moved on and the information flow stopped. Concerted attempts to re-establish contact was made, but they ultimately failed. However, by chance a new contact within the Province of Manitoba was established and data specific for that province was obtained. This data had been collated by one person over the relevant time-period. Unexpectedly, obtaining data from the Scottish Police Forces proved to be the most difficult. Data in Scotland is collated centrally and an approach was made to the senior officer responsible. It was agreed to provide non-personal deployment data. However, for reasons that have never been fully understood, no data arrived and a lengthy process had to be undertaken to secure it. This has seriously impacted on the timescales of this study. Indeed, the researcher seriously considered the need to remove the Scottish dimension from the study. Eventually, the data was captured but analysis found it to be very limited. Although re-contacted they were unable to provide any further information for this study.

Within England and Wales there is a national form to capture deployment data. Surprisingly, it was discovered that both the MPS and Westshire have developed bespoke documentation and the worth of the data
captured varied when compared. Unfortunately, for the purposes of this study, it is not possible to replicate the national deployment form because it is a restricted document. The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) data is collated by one officer who has sole responsibility for pan-London issues. Interestingly, analysis shows a decreasing number of requests for assistance/deployments of negotiators. In 2002 there were 243 requests for assistance and of those negotiators were deployed on 58 incidents. A downward trend was identified until 2006 when requests for assistance were down by 129 and negotiators were deployed only 37 times. Analysis shows that over the time period of 2002 to 2006 there was a 47% decrease in workload. It is difficult to reconcile this apparent decrease in activity, particularly when considered against a backdrop of a capital city with a growing population. The MPS Hostage and Crisis Negotiation Unit (HCNU) suggest that this decrease is a result of various factors, notably a lack of awareness surrounding the use of negotiators; a failure to identify the complementary use of negotiators by commanders; the introduction of Taser (a non-lethal electric 'stun' device) and controversially pressure being exerted on commanders to resolve incidents quickly. The HCNU are now delivering a series of awareness programmes for MPS commanders. Analysis of this data raises a final and disturbing issue. There are 60 MPS negotiators who operate an on-call system, therefore some officers are likely be suffering from a lack of exposure to operational incidents. Therefore, it is likely that many negotiators are suffering from skills fade. Refresher training is a national issue, but due to the numbers of negotiators in the MPS and the dramatic decrease in deployments this issue would appear to be
particularly acute for them.

Historically, the responsibility for compiling the Westshire negotiator deployment data has been on a voluntary basis. However, for the purposes of this research it was supplied and quality assured by the deputy force co-ordinator. This data has been triangulated by cross-referencing the negotiator records with those recorded on Westshire’s centralised command and control resourcing systems. Analysis revealed that Westshire, a medium sized county force, attended a comparable number of calls to the MPS. Indeed, in both 2006 and 2007 Westshire deployed on more occasions than the MPS. By comparing the policies and practices in the MPS with those of Westshire a number of differences were observed which may help explain this disparity. Firstly, the Westshire negotiators have embarked upon a prolonged and extensive series of awareness lectures across a range of officers, from first line tactical supervisors (sergeants) to senior commanders. Secondly, all student officers joining Westshire are provided with both an insight into negotiator capabilities and limited first responder, ‘negotiating first aid’, training. Thirdly, unlike the MPS, all emergency (999) calls in Westshire are handled centrally. Westshire negotiators have ensured that at this initial incident handling stage ‘drop-down tactical menus’ prompt the 999 dispatchers to consider negotiators at an early stage. Fourthly, in contrast to the MPS, Westshire have limited officers trained in the use of Taser. Finally, there is no anecdotal evidence to suggest that the ‘action imperative’ (Fuselier 1981b and Vecchi 2002) to tactically resolve incidents quickly is prevalent. Whatever the rationale is for this apparent
lack of use of the MPS negotiators, this is a significant finding especially when considered against the backdrop of today's litigious society. Increased use of negotiators, an established and effective non-lethal option, may appease public opinion and reduce the need to for the MPS to defend its tactics in both the coroners and civil courts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westshire</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Metropolitan</td>
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<td>37</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>400</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI 1983 to 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,369</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 3: Deployment Data sample sizes and time period.)

Incident Classification

Although it was difficult to secure empirical data a considerable amount of data was still generated. This is considered to be a positive aspect of the study because, as Denscombe (2003) notes, gathering larger data samples tends to render findings both more statistically reliable and capable of being generalised (p.232). There is a dearth of UK National empirical data on negotiator deployments. However, Giebels (1999) analysed 747 incidents from 10 countries, over a one year period. She
produced an inventory of seven typical incident types, namely:

- Barricaded Subjects
- Criminal Kidnaps
- Political Kidnaps
- Criminal High Risk Arrest Situations
- Suicide Attempts
- Domestic Situations
- Prison Riots

In general terms this inventory is largely congruent with the findings of this study in that this study also observed suicide, siege/barricade and high risk arrest warrants. However, there were some important variances.

**Classification of Incident 2005 - 2007**

*Table 4: Incident Classification*

**Prison Deployments**

This research reveals that there were no deployments into a prison environment in South Australia, Manitoba, Germany, Scotland, MPS or
Westshire. Indeed, only the FBI indicated 27 deployments associated with prisons or jails. This was an interesting finding and was further investigated. It transpired that US prison deployments resulted from specific jurisdictional issues. In America offences within prisons and correctional facilities are contrary to Federal Law. Therefore, the FBI as the federal law enforcement agency is responsible for the resolution and investigation of such incidents. In contrast, Her Majesty's Prison Service (HMPS) has operational primacy within UK prisons and has trained and utilised specialist prison negotiators.

Kidnap and Extortion

Giebels' (1999) study identified that 149.4 (20%) of the 747 incidents involved criminal and political kidnap and extortion cases. Data supplied to this study revealed that there were no such incidents in the 25 years of the FBI data. This finding was surprising and was investigated. It was discovered that kidnap and extortion data is stored separately and was not provided. Interestingly, anecdotal evidence suggests that kidnapping is not considered to be a major criminal trend in North America. The South Australian data evidences 5 abduction and extortion deployments in the three year period. The Canadian data evidenced no such crimes. The researcher is aware that the MPS deal with numerous kidnap, abduction and extortion offences yearly, but because of current policy they were unable to provide statistics for this study. At this stage it is worth noting that the policing response to kidnap and other such crimes within the UK is entirely covert in nature. Indeed, the majority of police officers are unaware of the methods utilised in its investigation. Therefore, one can
understand the service's reluctance to provide any information. It was therefore wholly unexpected that Westshire provided some limited data on this issue. Over the three year time period 10 (11% of total deployments) were kidnaps or abductions. Furthermore, analysis showed that 40 negotiators were used and 341 negotiator man hours were deployed on them. This is a significant investment in both time and finances especially when one remembers that this is not the negotiator's primary role. UK kidnap data is designated restricted, but anecdotally this crime is increasing, often fuelled by drug debts owed within criminal vendettas. For the foreseeable future in would seem that UK negotiators will continue to be deployed on increasing numbers of these crimes.

**High Risk Arrests / Warrants**

Negotiator deployments on high risk arrests feature on 90 occasions (12%) of Giebels' (1999) study. Unfortunately, Giebels fails to define this term. Within the UK a high risk arrest or the execution of a high risk warrant is usually associated with, but not exclusively restricted to, the arrest of person(s) who are believed to have immediate access to firearms. Undoubtedly, all arrest scenarios have an inherent risk. However, if supported by intelligence sources, pre-planned arrests or warrants may be deemed to be high risk from the outset. Analysis shows that the FBI, MPS, Scotland and Westshire do not appear to use negotiators on these incident types. It is possible that negotiators were deployed on such incidents but due to local coding preferences/interpretation they cannot be identified. However, analysis shows that both Manitoba Province and the South Australian Police deployed negotiators
on such incidents. In the three year period of this study the Australians deployed on 180 occasions and Manitoba Province on 18. This is an important finding which has a significant implication for the UK. The Australian Police argue that negotiators reduce the potential for violence for all concerned. Currently, there is no UK national policy on the use of negotiators on pre-planned operations, although some UK forces do use them on \textit{ad hoc} occasions. This practice of using negotiators appears to be wholly congruent with current human rights legislation because of Article 2 and the right of all to life. Moreover, having a negotiator immediately available would save vital time and this may save lives. This analysis provides empirical data that signposts an important opportunity for the service to drastically reduce risks and mitigate against potential litigation.

\textbf{Barricade / Siege and Hostage Incidents}

In general terms, barricade incidents are normally used to describe a situation where perpetrators barricade themselves within a stronghold and refuse to surrender. The perpetrator, suggests Greenstone (2005), is often suffering from some pre-existing form of mental illness. A siege incident is normally defined as one where there is someone else with the perpetrator within the stronghold. These people typically just 'happen to be present' at the instigation of the incident and are unable to escape prior to police involvement. A good example would be a partner/spouse. A hostage incident is defined by Mains and Mullins (2001) as "\textit{one in which people are held by another person(s) against their will, usually by force or coercion, and demands are being made by the hostage taker.}"

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Hostages are used to gain compliance or attention in several incidents". Hostage and in particular barricade situations, suggested Feldmann (2001) are common occurrences (p.3). However, Giebels' (1999) analysis of the 747 incidents from 10 countries did not support this view. Although she found that negotiators were used to deal with barricade/sieges on 268 (36%) occasions she did not identify any hostage-taking incidents.

Empirical data evaluated in this study evidences that, over the three year period, 480 (41.1%) deployments involved barricade/siege incidents and that 18 incidents (1.5%) involved hostages. The FBI longitudinal data show that 3,144 (58.5%) incidents were barricade/siege and only 224 (4.2%) involved hostages. These findings indicate that a large percentage of deployments are barricade/siege but that only a small percentage of incidents involve hostages. These findings are interesting on a number of levels. Firstly, these findings validate Feldmann's (2001) observation that barricade/siege incidents are common deployments. Secondly, internationally the majority of negotiation teams are referred to as Hostage and Crisis Negotiators. Clearly, the emphasis on 'hostage' appears to be a misnomer and presents a false image of the type of work undertaken by the teams. Thirdly, it is perhaps understandable that police commanders fail to utilise negotiators in 'domestic barricade/sieges' if the impression given by the unit's name suggests that a hostage needs to be involved. Finally, as discussed in Chapter 2, a large percentage of the UK national course, in particular the second week, is focused on dealing with hostage scenarios, and this training regime appears to be replicated internationally. These findings suggest that the
typical incident deployment both within the UK and internationally is barricade/siege. This finding is important and should dramatically alter training programmes nationally and internationally. It appears to be clear that barricade/siege incidents should receive greater attention in training than hostage incidents.

**Suicide Intervention**

Strentz (2006) observes that suicide appears to be on the increase. Feldmann (2001) reports within his study of three US police departments that nearly 60% of the 144 incidents analysed were suicide interventions and of those 20.83% committed suicide. There is limited empirical data on police suicide interventions. However, Kennedy (2007) did undertake a UK survey of suicide intervention conducted by negotiators. He acknowledges that the findings were based on data gathered from a limited response. He analysed 405 incidents reported over a period from 01/04/06 to 31/03/07. He discovered that 76% were male subjects, and that the two peak key age groups were 20 to 24 and 40 to 44. Giebels' (1999) study revealed that 231 (31%) European negotiator deployments were suicide interventions.

This international study found that 408 (34.9%) were suicide interventions. The FBI data shows that there were 1,899 (35.3%) suicide interventions of which 373 (6.9%) were unsuccessful. Importantly, the data from the other participant organisations reported no suicides subsequent to negotiator deployment. The reason for this is not clear; perhaps negotiations were successful, or failures were not recorded. The findings
of this study are similar to Giebels' (1999). Furthermore, analysis appears to validate the use of negotiators within suicide intervention incidents. Finally, police negotiators appear to be successful even when dealing with determined individuals, because 255 (63%) of UK interventions were at height (Kennedy 2007). This research suggests that the current national course needs to be revisited because, of the combined UK participant totals of 220 incidents, 114 (over 50%) were suicide interventions. At this time only one day of the two week UK National course is devoted to the theory and practical application of suicide intervention techniques.

Incident Duration
International deployment duration data have been analysed in an attempt to identify any obvious trends that would impact on the retention of negotiators in the role. In particular, this researcher knows that some deployments are either protracted and/or intense interfaces with people in crisis. This aspect of this research is explorative and seeks to identify any obvious trends and collect some baseline empirical data for future research in respect of deployment durations. The data will be examined to see whether the common perception is true that the length of the deployment, in addition to the pressure, is the key issue in relation to retention rates. In the next chapter perceptions from senior officers explore this area more deeply.

Policing as an occupation, comments Brown (1995), is prone to considerable stresses. Moreover, as Greenstone (2005) observes police
negotiators are arguably exposed to even greater stresses than those encountered by front line officers. Indeed, as Rogan (1997) observes "One could even argue that crisis negotiation is an entirely emotion-laden event that is created through the interaction of the parties involved" (p.26). Officers would benefit from some form of de-briefing or peer officer support, observes Greenstone (2005), but this often fails to happen.

All the participant organisations were approached for deployment duration data. Surprisingly, there was a lack of international data available and once again there was considerable difficulty in securing it. Unfortunately, both Scotland and South Australia were unable to provide usable information. Analysis of Westshire data showed that deployment peak times were between 2130 hours and 2330 hours with another peak between 0100 hours and 0200 in 2007. Analysis indicated that the majority of deployments in the two UK police forces were between 1 and 4 hours in duration. However, weather conditions and the emotive nature of the incident cannot be deduced from data provided and these factors could have a negative effect on the negotiators. Interestingly, this analysis tends to dispel the anecdotally held policing views that negotiation deployments are long and that the use of negotiators dramatically prolongs the timeframe of the incident resolution. Interestingly, the Manitoba data revealed that 4 to 8 hour deployments were the norm. The reason for this is not clear; however, perhaps the distances that the negotiator has to travel to scene may be a factor. There is no supporting data for this view, but it would be an interesting future area for research.
The FBI once again provided the most comprehensive data, but of course this was over a 25 year period. Analysis revealed that 3,622 (67.4%) of negotiator deployments were of four hours or less. Interestingly, the FBI data questions the belief that negotiators are deployed mostly late at night. This data clearly shows that 2,735 (50.9%) of incidents start between 0600 hours and 1800 hours with 2,634 (49.1%) 1800 hours to 0600.

A number of variables within the deployment data have been identified that may impact on negotiator retention. Firstly, some of the participant organisations have limited negotiator resources. For example Westshire has only 8 nationally and 10 regionally trained officers to provide a 24/7 response. Therefore, although the numbers of incidents may be small the overall impact may be disproportionate due to the limited resources.
Secondly, internationally, negotiators tend to be volunteers, perhaps with a demanding ‘day job’, and as will be seen in the next chapter they often feel undervalued. Thirdly, adverse weather conditions coupled with a lack of personal equipment may be a factor. Finally, because of these factors negotiator ‘burn out’ or emotional overload may impact. This research has suffered from a lack of available data and should be considered exploratory in nature. Even so, mature reflection signposts a raft of areas for further academic research such as:

- Is there a relationship between months/seasons and call numbers variations?
- Is there a relationship between the night-time economy and calls?
- Is there a relationship between the speed of deployment and the speed of resolution?

Chapter Summary

The international lack of in-depth data has disappointedly restricted these findings. In particular, it was hoped to identify incident frequency and duration relationships in an attempt to identify negative factors affecting retention levels. On a positive note this research signposts further useful lines of enquiry. A clear and strong recommendation emerging from this study is the designing and adoption of a valid and reliable data capturing process such as a UK HoBas. This database would be a cornerstone for future research. Current data collection practices lack a cohesive approach and, if addressed, deployment statistics and analysis would provide UK law enforcement with a powerful tool for formulating and testing theories and providing defendable operational training needs.
The collection and analysis of deployment data was designed to evidence whether or not officers are insufficiently trained in core day-to-day skills such as suicide intervention techniques. This research argues that both nationally and internationally training programmes need reviewing, because currently there is a pre-occupation with hostage incidents within training events, when in reality barricade/sieges and suicide are the most common incidents.

It was hoped that this quantitative data would provide evidence of the potential effects that these deployments might have on negotiator retention. It has been difficult to discern any relationship from this data between the number and duration of deployments and their effect on negotiator retention. On a final note, this study has perhaps identified another and problematic issue for data reliability in the future. Current collection processes rely on the subjectivity of the officers completing the deployment return forms. This is an important and fundamental issue because these officers have never been trained on how to do this. Therefore, all subsequent analysis would have problems attached to it.

In the next chapter empirical data gathered from a series of semi-structured interviews conducted nationally with senior police officers will be explored. This analysis will illuminate perspectives over a wide range of subjects. The next enquiry is both important and unique.
Chapter Six: Qualitative Data Results and Analysis

Introduction

Chapter Five concentrated on the analysis of both International and National quantitative data. This chapter builds on Chapter Five and concentrates on the analysis of qualitative data. The data were gathered nationally using a number of semi-structured interviews conducted with senior police officers. It must be acknowledged that these officers gave their personal perceptions and were not commenting on behalf of the service. In order to provide participants with complete confidentiality the gender negative expression 'he/she' will used throughout this chapter.

This chapter is divided into 5 key sections. The first key section investigates perceptions on current terrorist influencers, causation factors and future threats. The second key section initially investigates the evolution of negotiators within this country. Then the development of this specialism is analysed. Then the fiscal support for negotiation teams is examined. The final aspect of this section discusses perceptions on the importance of negotiators to the service. The third key section initially explores the perceived effects of government policy on negotiations and then considers the national policy formulation for police negotiation. The over-arching theme of the fourth key section is the selection of negotiators, which includes such topics as desired character traits, competency frameworks, lay assessors, mental and medical testing and cadre composition. The final key section of this chapter investigates a variety of training related issues such as a national training plan, the
current two-tier training structure, training provision, an HMIC Inspection into the field, skills fade and refresher training, retention and finally future challenges.

This study has had unique national access to senior officers ranging from the strategic to the operational. The sample selection has allowed the analysis, emergence and triangulation of themes from different perspectives. Perhaps unsurprisingly, some discord has been detected between the perceptions of strategic leaders within the service and the operational reality faced by the tactical negotiator. The need to maintain confidentiality has always been identified as a goal for this study and was conditional on being allowed access to the participants. Therefore, throughout this chapter the term he/she will be used. Finally, a summary of the chapter will be provided.

Terrorism: Perceptions on Influencers, Causation and Future Threats

Terrorist influencers

In this section participant perceptions on current global influences and their impact on hostage negotiation in this county are analysed. Currently, Al-Qa'eda and its associated terrorist networks are considered to be the clearest threat to the security of this country. Police negotiators, suggest McMains and Mullins (2001), are used prior to any tactical stage of an operation. However, in the event of a 'suicide bomber' whose explosive charge has failed to initiate the police may be faced with seeking a negotiated settlement in order to resolve the crisis. But, as Negotiator 5 notes: "I don't think we are ready for a failed
suicide bomber". This observation was also endorsed by Negotiator 6. Clearly, both Negotiators 5 and 6 consider that this is a challenge for negotiator training. Conversely, Gold 2 was more positive about the use of negotiators within counter terrorist incidents: "I don't think the current international terrorist threat will go away in our lifetimes. Despite what people might think there will be cases when negotiators and negotiating skills will be required". This is interesting, as it evidences that strategically negotiation is still considered a viable option even within the high risk environment of terrorist incidents.

Other global influences on this country were also identified by the interviewees. Gold 1 said: "I suppose the principal global influencer is the migration of people, and the cultural influencers that those people bring with them". Gold 1 continued, "So the assumptions that we would normally make about how you would negotiate with people are based very much on our British, white, Euro-centric, Christian kind of approach to things". This appears to be an important insight, because historically politically motivated terrorism has been the norm. Gold 1's view receives support from Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008) who observe that recently some terrorist outrages, such as the Beslan school siege, are motivated by both cultural and nationalistic drivers.

Environmental extremism was also identified as another global influencer for terrorism. "The greater game will become extremists around environmental protests" suggested Negotiator 2. He/she continued, "We all know that animal welfare has been a massive issue and
that bound up in the issue of environmental concern, as people go
beyond the animal welfare for the particular animal to the animal welfare
in terms of the environment in which the animal lived in or lives in".
This concept received endorsement from Gold 2: "But I can absolutely
see that political change and environmental change will bring much
greater potential for protest in the future. We don't tend to use
negotiators in that but we could and might". It was interesting, that in
general terms an increasing number of aspects of globalisation, such as
cultural, demographic, environmental and political (Bottery 2004) were
identified by the interviewees as potential influencers for terrorist
movements.

Causation Factors for Terrorists

Academic opinion is divided on the primary causation factors for
terrorists. Indeed, "The diversity of motivation and purpose across the
groups" states Horgan (2005) "who employ terrorist tactics can be
overwhelming and confusing, especially when we engage in attempts at
categorisation" (p.30). Uniquely this study adds to the debate by
analysing the perceptions of serving police officers. Gold 2 said:

"An entirely personal view, not a 'police spokesperson said.' I think
a lot grow out of injustice, perceived unfairness, genuine people deciding
that this is the way to achieve a genuine political act". Then when
considering terrorist organisations he/she added:

"They play towards people's very basic human nature in wanting to
be involved, wanting to be included, wanting to be part of the family,
wanting to do something, achieve something, leave a legacy and play
towards these frailties in exactly the same way as cults and other groups can do”.

People turn toward terrorism, argued Negotiators 3 and 5, because of dissatisfaction and disaffection. Terrorism provides their grievances with ‘a voice’ and, importantly, a means of advancing their agenda. The debate was added to by Negotiator 4 who observed:

“I think it's understanding, in my view. I think a lot of it stems out of inequality, people believe that they are not accepted in a society. Youngsters still feeling that they are prejudiced against and they become susceptible to it, to the influences of religious leaders that guide towards this terrorist act”.

Perhaps contentiously, Co-ordinator 1 considered that terrorism was an extension of the negotiation process, noting:

“It's a personal view, I suppose the fundamental cause almost remains the same, irrespective of the reasons within it is cloaked, and it (Terrorism), is a ‘further’ to convince someone that your belief is the right belief compared to their own”.

This insight is disturbing, for it suggests that any cause, motive, belief or wish could ultimately transform and escalate into a new terrorist cause. However, Co-ordinator 2 stated, “Normally it is, well you could get really esoteric and say it is man’s’ inhumanity to man. Or, it is the apparent injustice of powerful nations that can give rise to terrorism”. Again, this is an interesting perspective arguably resonating with Klare’s (2003) concerns surrounding America’s allegedly imperialist foreign policies.

Surprisingly, only Negotiator 2 explored the concept of psychological motivators. This was unexpected as traditionally crisis negotiators have
been encouraged to use psychological typologies within the terrorist environment (McCaffery 1994). However, eventually Negotiator 2 conceded that psychological influencers were unlikely to be instrumental in creating a terrorist, concluding: “I think the biggest driver for terrorism is that it’s effective in terms of influencing debate and policy”.

In summary, these officers believed that ethical and political concepts such as fairness, justice and ‘voice’ were the primary causation factors for converting individuals and groups to terrorism. Furthermore, they believed that terrorism was seen by perpetrators as a strategy for influencing/instigating change.

**Terrorism: Future Challenges**

The service, perhaps because of its conservative nature, often fails to identify emerging threats. This failure tends to prevent suitable training being designed early to address those challenges. Anecdotally, this is the case with negotiation training, and therefore training courses tend to be reactive. This is a missed opportunity, because as Reece and Walker (2003) note educational programmes are more effective if ‘future proofed’.

This study sought opinion on future terrorist challenges in order to provide those creating negotiation programmes with further insight and assistance.

Al-Qa’eda and their associates were considered, by the participants, to be the highest risk for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, negotiators were concerned that with the increased tactical use of ‘suicide bombing’, negotiators may not have the opportunity of engaging the perpetrators.
"The biggest threat in the short term" commented Negotiator 2 "is a no negotiation, no warning threat. Which means your likelihood of engagement with them is slim". However, although acknowledging this type of scenario, Negotiator 6 offered a different perspective: "I think it is more likely to be people who are acting independently or in a small group, not well financed or well connected, but just with very extreme views and acting locally". Therefore, they argued that 'micro-terrorist cells', or an extremist operating alone, would be the challenge of the future. Such 'micro-cells' or individuals would undoubtedly hold extreme views and therefore future negotiators would require specific training in both advanced empathy building and persuasion techniques.

Terrorism in the domestic theatre would be largely, according to Co-ordinator 1, Co-ordinator 2, Negotiators 1, 2, 3 and 5, motivated by animal rights and environmental issues. Negotiator 1 suggested that the potential use of kidnap by such extremists will increase. This officer's prediction, if it transpired, would be a fundamental change in direction for animal rights and environmentalist organisations who do not utilise kidnapping at this time. Interestingly, Clutterbuck (1987) notes, such groups have intermittently contaminated products, such as soaps, in previous campaigns. However, Gold 1 had a different view:

"The other domestic extremists around animal extremism or religious extremism don't seem to have the commitment to raise their act to hostage taking; and if they were caught in a situation where they were presented with hostages, I think they would be amenable to negotiation. But I can't see that they would engage in criminality at a level where they find themselves in negotiations".
Finally, Co-ordinator 2 considered other challenges: “So, I think that terrorism is going to evolve. I think it is going to evolve from big spectacles to a great range of events and activities. I think there will be a greater use of assassinations. I think there will be political kidnappings”. This suggests that terrorists are learning organisations, consciously evolving tactically to respond to governmental attempts to ‘target harden’ key infrastructures and utilities. Assassination, observes Townsend (2002), is a traditional tactic for terrorist organisations, and for Co-ordinator 2 this method may become increasingly prevalent. Recently, the numbers of political assassinations has reduced, as have political kidnappings, having reached their zenith in the 70s (Bles and Low 1987 and Griffiths 2003). However, recent assassinations in Pakistan and Kenya, Hussain and Page (The Times 2007) and Crilly (The Times 2008), suggest that this method may again be in vogue.

In summary, kidnap negotiation training, particularly within the political context, may need to be reviewed to ensure that it remains fit for purpose.

Negotiators: Evolution, Specialism Development, Funding and Perceived Importance

The Evolution of Negotiation in this Country

In the first part of the interview, the participants were asked whether they had ever been an operational hostage negotiator. It transpired that one of the Gold participants had never been a police negotiator. All of the other participants either were or had been operational negotiators.
Initially, perceptions on the evolution of the role within this country were analysed. Interestingly Gold 1, an experienced critical incident and firearms commander, suggested:

"I suppose over a period of time, it kind of became a craft, where people tended to do it all the time and they were recognised as being good at doing it, and that kind of evolved into the position that we are, where we identified them as a cadre".

Gold 2's view was:

"I think it has evolved but less than many other area of policing. I think actually the core elements, the core skills, the kind of things that get people into situations that they need to be negotiating with, don't change. We have become marginally more professional and certainly more organised in those 20 something years. But it hasn't changed as much as others".

Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008) suggest that from its genesis in counter terrorism the role of the police negotiator has evolved into that of a complementary non-lethal option for commanders in a range of incidents. The role had developed without strategic direction, evolving as Coordinator 1 suggests: 

"...through the determination of the individuals themselves as opposed to any organisational desire to professionalise the role". This observation suggests that the service has missed an opportunity to develop inter-disciplinary, cohesive tactics. However, others were more positive. In Co-ordinator 2's view negotiation was no longer "...a fringe discipline". This positive message was supported by Negotiator 2: "I think the role has developed through the level of professionalisation that's being expected of public services across the
board but specifically around policing, command, leadership and crisis intervention as part of that basket”. However, for Negotiator 5 evolution was slow and failing to keep pace with other operational arenas.

Analysing this data illuminated many contrasting views. For many there was a tangible sense of pride about the journey the discipline had taken and the achievements so far gained. However, that pride appeared tinged with a sense of regret that for want of a strategic vision and corporative support, so much more could be achieved. Finally, for one negotiator the future seemed to hold genuine concerns. “Whether it is just now that I am just understanding the responsibilities”, said Negotiator 4, “or whether it is the way that the organisation is going nationally, but the responsibility on a hostage negotiator is massive”. This insight may signal future challenges for the service as increased accountability and responsibility dissuade future volunteers from joining cadres. The data suggests that strategic clarity would enhance this specialism.

Specialism Development

The police service typically utilises two tools to drive common standards. Firstly, national manuals describing processes, methods, tactics and training are produced. For example, there is the National Manual of Guidance on the Police Use of Firearms, developed and owned by ACPO Police Use of Firearms (PUF) and the National Murder Investigation Manual developed and owned by ACPO (Crime). The second method is the use of an inspection regime conducted by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) to test compliance. This
research specifically asked questions on this issue to gauge participants' opinions on the worth of a national manual and an inspection regime within the specialism of negotiation. This research generated both divergent and emotional responses from the participants.

The production of a manual, suggested both of the Gold participants, would be a sensible step towards the professionalisation of negotiation within the policing context. However, Gold 1 had some reservations, considering that such a document was not as important as other more pressing issues such as selection. He/she considered the production of a manual as a long-term goal. This was at variance to Co-ordinator 1 who considered its production as an "imperative evolution". Controversially Co-ordinator 2 considered it would provide "a benchmark for forces to work from and in the event of any external examination of a negotiator incident, it could form the basis, and the protection for, the negotiators and the other people involved". The use of a national manual to both protect and criticise the policing response is not a new one and is well documented in many public enquiries such as the de Menezes (Stockwell tube station) Shooting. The Independent Police Complaint Commission (IPCC) when investigating police shooting utilises the National Firearms Manual to validate authorities, procedures, tactics and training regimes. Some operational negotiators, perhaps understandably, considered the production of a manual as a potential threat providing an opportunity for others to exploit in litigation. These concerns were summarised by Negotiator 2 who observed: "Then we are into litigation, muddying the water and the whole world gaining access to a manual to hit us over
the head with it". Undoubtedly, analysis of this data indicates a disparity in opinion on this issue. However, there appeared to be more support than opposition to the concept. As the national policy creation body for UK negotiation, the National Negotiator Working Group would be the obvious owners of a manual. However, as already discussed, it is doubtful that this group has the capacity to quickly produce a manual in the short term.

The concept of an HMIC inspection on negotiation engendered a lively debate. Gold 2 stated: "Probably not at the moment, it would be rather disastrous I think at the moment". Although supportive of the concept, Co-ordinator 1 had doubts that the HMIC were best placed to deliver the inspection. The inspection was necessary but, the "badge" conducting it was of less importance. Co-ordinator 2 was very supportive, observing:

"God that would be interesting. Yes I think it would be, yes I think it would. It's back to that old thing if it gets measured it gets done and I think forces would be required to exercise their mind towards negotiating".

However, Co-ordinator 2 did envision some national resistance to such an inspection regime. Generally, the operational negotiators counselled against an inspection within the short term. Pragmatically, they questioned whether the HMIC could access the knowledge and expertise to effectively evaluate negotiation and its structures. "Because" suggested Negotiator 5, "we could quite easily, unless they have got good knowledge, we could easily confuse them into thinking we were a slickly oiled machine". Gold 1 captured the key issues, saying:
“The only thing that’s going to make them (the service) do it any better is the process of going through the code and the manual and the inspection along those lines”. However, later he/she added:

“It would at least be a starting point. I think there would be some benefit. I am not sure there would be a huge amount of benefit because I guess lots of forces who don’t do it well, pretty much deliberately don’t do it well. So having it from the HMIC, that they are not doing it well, if you are not competent being told you are not competent doesn’t help”.

Analysis of this issue suggests that there was no general consensus, but one sensed a general ‘ground swell’ that there would be some benefit. The journey might be painful in the short term, but the participants considered that this was a clear opportunity to ‘take stock’ and at the least identify significant national weaknesses and strengths.

**Funding**

Police Negotiating teams, like all other aspects of the police service, operate within a climate of decreasing budgets. Cost reductions, negative growth budgets and tight fiscal constraints understandably exercised all the senior officers interviewed during this study.

Interestingly, the strategic participants conceded that funding was “patchy” (Gold 2). Others were more outspoken; when questioned whether they believed current funding was suitable Co-ordinator 1 commented “Of course not, and it is not just the world of negotiating it is the world of commerce, with recognition goes reward. Therefore, ergo a lack of
recognition means a lack of reward". Co-ordinator 2 had some sympathy with this view but widened the debate:

"I also think that funding is very hit and miss across the country, some are very well off forces and some less well off in terms of their negotiator budget, with no real clarity or justification for any of the figures. They just seem to be plucked out of the air historically and just remain that way for ever".

Furthermore, they highlighted that there was no specific national hostage negotiation budget. "I think there should be a national office for negotiating" he/she continued, "a national co-ordinator with a small support team to co-ordinate all activities throughout the country. I think that is necessary and to do things like devise the manual and co-ordinate policy etc".

Commenting on a local situation, Negotiator 6 said,"There is no proper structure to the finances, no budgetary plans. So we cannot now think, in five years time that that equipment is going to need to be replaced." This is an important point, because equipment degradation and technical innovation are key issues to ensure that the negotiation teams remain effective. Therefore, these responses suggest that without medium term financial planning negotiator teams will always be 'playing catch up.' In some cases, noted Negotiator 5, local budgets for negotiators had become "woefully inadequate". Perhaps the most critical point was made by Negotiator 2, who highlighted significant dangers and health and safety issues as a result of a lack of funding. He/she said:

"Like kit, we had to wait 12 months to get body armour after a siege when one of the critical incident inspectors for the force said:"
"Why are you lot deploying out along side firearms officers who have got shields, goggles, helmets and the best rated ballistic armour - in fleeces?"

The analysis of these interviews then suggests that both at the national and local level there is a 'crisis' in negotiator funding. There was a general acceptance that this role was but one of a number of worthy cases of increased funding. Indeed, "There is always the danger", admitted Negotiator 1, "that you can say that we need more money". They suggested that Chief Officers needed to be convinced of the worth of negotiators in order to increase funding. Finally, some suggested publicising the team's success and deployment data in order to persuade Chief Officers to increase financial support, Negotiator 3 observed: "you save a couple of jobs (lives) and then they think it's worth paying for these guys".

Are Negotiators Important to the Service?

Negotiators, suggests Noesner (1999), are critical to law enforcement's ability to manage high risk operational incidents. However the American experience, observes Vecchi (2002), is that there is conflict between the various specialist law enforcement response units. He suggests that conflicts result from the competing paradigms held by each specialist team on the best way in which to handle the situation. Charles (2008) in her examination of the Jefferson High School siege observed that some of the tactical units instigated moments of high tension as they were 'caught' by the perpetrator attempting to gain better assault positions. In short, the tactical units were working independently pursuing a more
confrontational agenda while the negotiators, unaware of this, were pursuing a slower non-confrontational route to restore rationality and safely resolve the incident. This apparently unco-ordinated approach has been the anecdotal experience of the author. It was therefore decided to examine negotiator perceptions from the UK perspective.

The realities of negotiator deployment for Gold 1 were:

"We recognise that there is a tactical option that we need to deploy around negotiating with people in a range of circumstances and that in those circumstances there isn’t actually a good alternative. For some sets of circumstances it really is negotiation or nothing and then the argument is how well you do it".

This observation links to the fundamental principles of both the criminal law and human rights legislation. These Acts are clear in respect of the use of coercive, and at times deadly, force. The Human Rights Act 1998, note Wadham and Mountfield (2003), attempts to balance the rights of the individual against other public interests. Perhaps the most fundamental right is the right to life under Article 2 of the Act. Historically, this has and undoubtedly will provide the impetus for a number of legal challenges to the service. Commanders should be constantly mindful of both Acts as they rationalise decisions at critical incidents. Importantly, these fundamental laws will soon be supplemented by the creation of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2008. This Act will make commanders personally accountable and liable for their actions and decisions. Infringement could lead to imprisonment and an unlimited fine on the service. In America, notes
Vecchi (2002), there has been a long standing public and executive expectation that commanders instigate violent interventions at an early stage. This is known as the ‘action imperative’ (p.536). In this country cultural and legislative differences have limited the frequency of violent intervention. However, with the increase in non-lethal options, such as Taser, commanders will potentially be tempted to authorise an early resolution rather than awaiting a negotiated outcome. Legal challenges, suggest Co-ordinator 1, is a primary motivator for the use of negotiators:

"My view is that the police service does not actually value the role and the importance of negotiators. They just recognise that in order to stop themselves getting sued they must have tried to have used negotiators. They actually haven't got a clue what negotiators can or can't do for them and I'm not sure they are interested, providing that they can tick the box to say that I have called negotiators".

This controversial view did find support from others: "Police Forces want to say yes, we have got negotiators" said Negotiator 6, "Sometimes it's more of a tick in the box thing than really appreciating what they can do". However, the concept that negotiators were there merely to reduce the risk of litigation was not universal. "Probably I am a lone voice here" commented Gold 2, "Yes I do think that it (negotiation) is important. But I do think it is misunderstood, people think it is important but they think that other people are doing it and getting on with it and it will be all right". Also Co-ordinator 2 was positive, commenting:

"I think it is considered a more important area of business than it was 10 years ago. But I think it still has a long way to go to achieve the importance that it deserves, and the reason why I think it hasn't
achieved that importance is because it's a little bit of a Cinderella discipline”.

The expression ‘Cinderella discipline’ was also used by others, notably Negotiator 1. In examining the data one observes that for the majority there is a genuine belief that the use of negotiators has not been fully embraced by the service. Analysing this data caused one to reflect on why this was the case. Negotiator 2 observed:

“No, because it’s esoteric by its nature, because we are fish that swim often in a lateral direction if not in an opposite direction to the personality type of most coppers. I know that we fall into a lot of the same as our peers, but we are different. Which therefore means that you are always going to be a sub-set of policing”.

This is interesting on a number of different levels. Firstly, it alludes to multiple sub-cultures existing within policing, which is itself a sub-culture of the community at large. Furthermore, this observation suggests that by becoming negotiators police officers may be increasingly isolated from the mainstream policing culture. Thirdly, it suggests that police officers conform to a certain personality type and that those personality types are different, perhaps more dynamic than those needed by negotiators. Therefore, perhaps police officers are not the best group from which to select negotiators. Finally, the ‘softer’ less tactical characteristics of a negotiator may perhaps, inadvertently, create barriers within the police response units. Indeed, the sharp contrast between the action-driven tactical imperative and the paced moderated negotiator of the American experience may in fact be prevalent or a growing facet of the UK policing experience.
This research signposts fundamental issues that would be worthy of further investigation. There was a general sense among the participants that negotiators are not an important aspect of the police service. Negotiator 2 suggests that cultural issues within the service may significantly influence the service's view of police negotiators. Therefore, they have difficulty understanding or appreciating the cultural nuances, skills or the rationale for negotiation. It could quite simply be 'I don't understand it, or they don't think like me, therefore I will ignore it'. Although the evidence is limited to a single participant, it has the potential to explain a great detail. Negotiation, due to its covert nature, 'just happens' (Gold 2), and perhaps this is the reason why the discipline has not been incorporated within main-stream policing with adequate investment in funding, national inspection regimes and ACPO support structures. However, perhaps this analysis is too deep. It could be much simpler, as Negotiator 3 remarked, "I don't think we market ourselves particularly well". In summary, negotiators do not believe that the service thinks their work to be of importance. Why this should be the case is not clear and this investigation signposts further exploration.

Policy and Negotiators

Government Policy and the Negotiator

The use of police negotiators within the terrorist arena cannot exist in a political vacuum. Undoubtedly, in this country, politicians would take an active interest in any terrorist siege because, as Wilkinson (1977) highlights, ultimately democratically elected governments are responsible for anti-terrorist and security policy.
All participants believed that governmental policy would have a tangible effect on any negotiation strategy. "There is the historic government stance of no substantial concessions to terrorists" commented Negotiator 5, "So that's the bottom line in terms of international terrorism". The target profile of the UK, suggested Negotiator 1, is significant due to the close relationship of the UK and US and their often congruent foreign policies. "We may not be such a desirable target" suggested Negotiator 1, "but geographically it is a lot easier to get to us than elsewhere".

The strategic participants recognised the pressures that governments can exert on 'independent' Chief Constables. "Yes I do think it will have an impact on negotiation strategy" said Co-ordinator 2, "So yes I think it will have an impact. That impact is more likely to be negative than positive". Problems surrounding inconsistency were an issue for Gold 1:

"Because the way that the government knee jerks to events I think makes it very difficult for Chief Constables and police forces to negotiate". Later he/she continued, "I think generally that government involvement makes life more difficult, because the government is much more likely to be inconsistent in their approach".

Conversely, Gold 2 was more positive:

"Definitely will affect negotiations. The easy answer is to say mainly negative but I don't think that is necessarily right at all". Later he/she said:

"One of the good things in general about government policy is that it is quite well known, quite well debated and quite well understood. People might have different views about it, but at least you are dealing with something that is coherent and consistent generally speaking. Which
makes negotiating on much firmer ground, much firmer stance than it does for other countries".

An important factor in international hostage-taking and kidnapping is the variances in international governmental policy. "This may make it very difficult for us to negotiate a satisfactory outcome" said Gold 2, "compared to the French or other European governments who seem quite comfortable with paying ransoms and getting their citizens back".

This inconsistency in European policy creates considerable difficulties for UK negotiators operating on the international stage. Furthermore, current domestic governmental policies, notes Gold 1, have the potential to cause problems for negotiators in relation to domestic terrorism. This observation received some support:

"So let's take, if a government doesn't do enough to curb the impact of the aviation industry on global warming and climate change" suggested Negotiator 2, "then that would have an effect on the speed or level of which protest and eventually terrorism takes off, for want of a pun".

Another interviewee considered that changing drug strategy in Afghanistan, had the potential to dramatically affect negotiator 'business' in the UK. Negotiator 6 envisioned that:

"If action were to be taken, the drugs market would change dramatically here. At the moment we have an awful lot of kidnappings and negotiation work that is to do with drug debts, money owed and people's reputations that they need to preserve. So a change in drugs strategy could easily cause an effect to the number of debts that are owed and kidnaps that they are having to re-enforce those debts. Again
negotiators will have their part in that”.

This data suggests that government policy, across a range of business areas, has the potential to cause problems for the police negotiators. The interviewees believed that the prevailing government policy could influence negotiation within the terrorist context.

National Policy Formulation: The Negotiator Context

Nationally, there is limited policy in relation to the use, selection and training of police negotiators. The little existing policy tends to be security classified. Interestingly, some of the participants are not sufficiently vetted to be completely aware of all the existing policy. Therefore it was decided to discuss generic policy formulation rather than to probe specific policy issues.

The strategic policy making body for negotiators is the National Negotiator Working Group (NNWG). The chair of that body represents negotiators within the ACPO TAM (Terrorism and Associated Matters) portfolio. The National Working Group consists of all the regional coordinators from across the UK. This structure is designed to ensure that every region has both equal say and representation. Therefore, any agreed policy should be implemented nationally by a process of cascading to the county or force level.

Generally, the participants suggest that there remain fundamental problems with the current structure for policy formulation.

“No, it’s very embryonic” considered Gold 2, “I think we have
come quite a long way in quite a short time considering. But no, clearly we have had many discussions about the part time nature, enthusiastic amateurs doing their best is not sufficient". Clearly, they believed that the problems associated with policy formulation, dissemination and standardisation were due to the 'part-time' nature of the members' role on the working group. Members' commitment and enthusiasm was not in doubt. However, "The circumstances are that I can't think of another discipline" said Co-ordinator 1, "which is so critical to resolving critical incidents where the individuals are not performing their roles full time". Currently, the working group has no full time secretariat, or support structure. Furthermore, the national group has difficulty commissioning vital research work because the members are only part-time and it has no bespoke budget. Although acknowledging some of the problems Co-ordinator 2 was more upbeat:

"Although I think it is good, I don't think it's fit for purpose. I think what we have is a strategic group and a working group at the same time, and I think there are difficulties due to the day jobs of the people on the group. I think there is difficulty actually getting the work progressed. But as a structure itself I think it is better than the vast majority of the disciplines within the police service. It is the only group I can think off where there is a UK wide cascading of responsibility and accountability".

The situation, suggested Negotiator 2, would only improve when there was a national police force, with a national director of negotiation. In general, the operational interviewees were not fully aware of how policy is formulated. Furthermore, policy communication is considered ineffective.
Organisationally, these are fundamental concerns and this data suggests that negotiators may be unaware of vital guidance and policy. Therefore, policy dissemination appears to be in need of urgent attention and this lack of structure provides significant risks to the organisation. Finally, Negotiator 5 raised concerns about the speed of the policy formation. Having recently attended the National Negotiators' Working Group they noted: “No, it's not fit for purpose, is there a structure? If that was the structure that I saw then it was not a structure, no not at all".

These findings highlights fundamental issues for the service on this topic. Firstly, there is the issue that the NNWG lacks a secretariat. Secondly, its members have ‘full-time’ jobs and that inhibits research and commitment to tasks/actions. Thirdly, there is the problem that the current structure to cascade policy nationally appears not to be working. Finally, there was concern that selection and training policy is intrinsically linked to the National Negotiators' Working Group. All of these issues will be returned to in the next chapter.

Negotiator Selection and Cadre Composition

Introduction

This section will analyse the interviewees' perceptions on current selection procedures. Initially, preferred character traits are explored. Then, competency frameworks will be considered. Thirdly, existing and future selection procedures will be investigated. Fourthly, the potential use of lay assessors within the selection process will be analysed. Finally, diversity and cadre composition will be examined.
Both Regini (2002) and Greenstone (2005) highlight the importance of selecting the right person from the outset. Law Enforcement's approach to negotiator selection, suggests Regini (2002), tends be uneven and not as refined as in other disciplines. Selection processes in this country are also uneven (Kennett 2003). This research now develops these issues.

Character Traits
Desirable personality traits have been identified for negotiators (McMains and Mullins 2001 and Milner 2002). Important traits such as emotional maturity, listening skills and an ability to communicate across different socio-economic classes are espoused abilities and characteristics. There is, however, a dearth of data on this issue in the UK and this research seeks to redress that balance. Although never having been a negotiator Gold 1 remarked:

"What I tend to associate with negotiators are people who can clearly talk. Who can generate empathy and who can engage with people in difficult circumstances. Who can manage their own feelings, their own moods, their own temper to maintain an equilibrium in the face of quite difficult circumstances".

Gold 2 offered:

"Character traits, calmness, resilience, ability to communicate in all its manifestations, ability to think quickly and learn under pressure. Ability to leave both the ego and the uniform at the door, quite difficult for some people".

It was interesting to note that Gold 2 highlighted 'leaving the uniform at the door'. Police officers, observes Van Maanen (1973), consider
themselves to be separate from society and Gold 2's view appears to suggest that for some aspirant negotiators the ability to 'divorce' themselves from colleagues is challenging. Anecdotally, many aspirants have 10 years service and more, by which time many character traits associated with policing are well established. This appears to be a fundamental issue, for arguably police officers may be less suited to this role than others. This concept is further examined later in this chapter. Honesty, openness and the acceptance of feedback were key traits for Co-ordinator 1. Whilst Co-ordinator 2 succinctly observed: "Patience; a good listener and an agile thinker, that will do", operational negotiators suggested a basket of traits for future practitioners. These were: good communications skills, attitude, an extreme tolerance of ambiguity, listening skills, being non-judgemental, resilience and compassion. These 'soft interpersonal skills' were leitmotifs running through all the responses, and have resonance with Nosner and Webster (1997) and McMains' and Mullins' (2001) central skills sets for successful conflict and crisis resolution. Finally, these responses appear to validate and build on Milner's (2002) and Kennett's (2003) explorative studies into the field. This topic appears to be ripe for further exploration.

**Competency Frameworks and Negotiators**

Role analysis, observes Plumbley (1991), provides the key to successful selection processes. There needs to be a clarity in both the functionality of the role and the skills that individuals need to be effective in it. The current lack of a national competency framework provided Gold 1 with genuine concerns:
“What’s lacking is a critical evaluation. Let’s actually get a
behavioural scientist to observe what they do and the outcome, and see
if these are the best placed people to deliver that outcome”. He/she then
suggested, “it tends to be a bit of a self fulfilling prophecy because once
we have a kind of person, or a type of person, as a negotiator then it’s
self selecting. We tended to pick people who then fit into that
archetype”.

However, Gold 2 held a contrasting view:

“I think the competency approach in policing has been deeply
stifling. I think it is mechanistic. I think it leads to massive bureaucracy
and cuts out so much of what we are actually looking for such as
creativity, innovation, inspiration, leadership”.

Both Co-ordinators 1 and 2 considered that frameworks would be useful
and interesting. Moreover, Co-ordinator 2 believed that the service would
soon have such a document. The concept, design and introduction of a
competency framework was considered helpful by Negotiators 1, 2, 5 and
6. However, Negotiator 3 remained uncertain, while Negotiator 4 was not
in favour of such a move. Evidencing their stance, Negotiator 4
suggested that if the applicants were aware of the competences prior to
assessment the process would be invalidated as they would ‘play to the
framework’. However, an overall analysis suggests that on balance the
majority of the participants believed that the creation of a competency
framework would be both useful and helpful in the selection of potential
negotiators.
Selection Process Perspectives

A rigorous and incremental system is advocated by Greenstone (2005), which conveys the aspirant negotiator through an application process, assessment centre, psychological evaluation and eventually deployment on a unit.

All the interviewees believed that there should be some form of selection process. However, Co-ordinator 1 considered that a selection process was dependent on the vision of the service:

"If they just want a sausage factory that turns out individuals that wear a certain badge, so that a certain box can be ticked, it doesn't really matter if they are really, really good or not. Then we can continue as we are doing".

All the officers considered that a locally held selection process would be best practice, held against a nationally agreed criteria. This national parity was important for Negotiators 3 and 5, as "we are so few in numbers," said Negotiator 3, "and because of the need for mutual aid".

There are, suggest McMains and Mullins (2002) and Greenstone (2005), a variety of potential selection procedures available. These options range from psychological testing and structured interviews to role-play scenarios. In general, the interviewees considered an assessed role-play to be a necessary aspect of any selection process. However, Gold 1 described a radical pathway which took the aspirant through selection, exposure, training, assessment and evaluation. In brief, this pathway was initiated by written expression of interest. At an early stage, the aspirant negotiator would be given some exposure, thereby ensuring that they had
a meaningful insight into the future role and organisational expectations. Subsequently, a process of training, role-play and shadowing would be undertaken. At every point Gold 1 believed that there should be an opportunity to evaluate, develop and/or fail officers. The overall aim would be to achieve "competence consistently in the field". He/she concluded:

"We don't have a lot of disasters, but we do take a bit of a risk I think. So you could say, well the risk is acceptable, or you could say it would be better if we made it a bit more of a process".

Conversely, Gold 2 suggested a simpler process. Although not entirely convinced of the need to be prescriptive nationally, he/she considered some sort of application process, followed by an interview and a practical exercise, to be a suitable selection process. Co-ordinator 2 suggested two assessed 10 minute practical exercises, followed by an interview to assess motivation and supporting experience. Although supporting the general areas already discussed, Negotiator 1 highlighted the need to ensure that officers were both motivated and committed. The creation of a profiling tool was considered by Negotiator 2 to be an essential and as yet un-designed component of any process. Negotiators 3, 4 and 6 added nothing substantially new to the general ideas advocated by others. Interestingly, Negotiator 5 supported Gold 1's protracted selection process, suggesting "a 6 month - one year, operational assessment". They also suggested that aspirants should be assessed for commitment, attitude and ability.

In summary, analysis suggests that future selection processes could feature:
• An application form / expression of interest
• Some exposure to a realistic role-play exercise to test core skills
• An interview to test supporting evidence, commitment and motivation
• A 'probationary' or 'apprenticeship' period to evaluate suitability, continued commitment, motivation and ability

It was interesting that none of the participants at this stage considered that any form of medical assessment was necessary in the selection process. Later in the interview, the concept of physical and mental assessments was tabled and this provoked some controversy.

**Lay Assessors**

For negotiators, Cooper (1981) argued generally for an interview panel to consist of both internal and external experts. It was decided, for the purposes of this study, to build on this concept and attempt to introduce the concept of an independent element of a lay assessor.

This idea was seized on by Gold 2 who was extremely supportive.

However, Gold 1 was unconvinced:

“No I don't think so. Funny I don't usually say no so quickly. I think in the training process it would be interesting. I'm really not attracted to that in the selection process, and I don't know why I'm just uncomfortable with it”.

Although initially uncomfortable Co-ordinator 1 eventually offered that they could be persuaded. Co-ordinator 2 considered it to be a positive move:

“They will merely be judging the event on the basis of, do they come across well and do they get a warm feeling about them. Which is
probably as important as anything more scientific”. However, both Negotiators 1 and 2 were strongly against the concept, with Negotiator 2 pointing out: “Then there is just the fact that they are representative of a tiny facet of the greater community”. However, Negotiator 3 believed that the credibility of the process would be increased by the inclusion of a lay assessor. Negotiator 4 believed that this would add a community perspective. Finally, Negotiator 6 remained unconvinced, believing that it would merely ‘tick a box’ and provide limited transparency to the process.

Arguably, the analysis provides more insight into the inward looking, insular nature and culture of the police service than it does regarding the use of lay assessors in the selection process. The interviewees did provide supporting arguments for their positions. However, this interviewer sensed that it just ‘didn’t feel right’ to them. Anecdotally, these opinions appeared to reflect the general feelings within the service when lay assessors were introduced into the initial trainee officer recruitment process. However, since its introduction Training Matters (2002) suggests it to be a useful innovation. In such a high-risk area as negotiation, one might have expected the service to grasp an opportunity to gain public support and endorsement for candidates. However, this research clearly shows a reticence within existing practitioners to such an inclusion.

Medical and Mental Health Assessments and Selection
The role of a police negotiator, according to Bohl (1997) and Ainsworth (2002), is both physically demanding and mentally stressful. Currently,
there is no national policy in relation to testing aspirant negotiators for fitness to undertake the role.

After some consideration, Gold 1 decided to support the medical and mental assessment of applicants. Initially, Gold 2 compared negotiation to other high-risk roles such as firearms and considered that it was not as pressurised as other areas such as undercover work. However, they did concede that it still presented high risks. They concluded that some form of physical and mental assessment during the selection process would reassure both the individual and the organisation. Co-ordinator 1 considered that it would be difficult to justify physical checks and therefore unnecessary. However, in relation to psychological tests Co-ordinator 1 was very supportive. Co-ordinator 2 was undecided about physical testing and preferred not to comment. Furthermore, Co-ordinator 2 did not support the concept of psychological assessment at this time. Both assessments were supported by Negotiator 1, highlighting firstly the associated un-social hours call outs and secondly that even simple tests such as hearing were not currently available and this was unsatisfactory. Conversely, Negotiator 2 did not believe that negotiators needed specific physical tests, explaining, "No, there are no more or less demands than holding the office of constable". Negotiator 2 believed that psychological assessment would be of some use, but suggested that an effective post-incident psychological debriefing may be more useful in the long term. Such tests were supported by Negotiator 3 stating that it was important to understand the 'baggage' that new negotiators brought with them. Furthermore, Negotiator 3 suggested that such a move would also
provide a ‘bench-mark,’ against which deterioration could be measured and this would reduce risks for both the individual and the organisation. Psychological assessments were supported by Negotiator 4, but not physical tests. Psychological testing, suggested Negotiator 5, would be of little worth as applicants would “avoid telling the truth during the interview and paint themselves in the best light”. Moreover, he/she did not support medical testing. Finally, Negotiator 6 believed that the nature of the role demanded both tests: “If we are asking people to be professional about a National competency, then part of that should be people that are physically and mentally up for the role”.

The research suggests that this topic is divisive. Analysis reveals that eight out of ten current negotiators support the introduction of psychological assessment for aspirant negotiators. Conversely, agreement on medical testing was not as conclusive, with five supporting, four against and one undecided. Interestingly, this group of participants believed that if such a test was instigated for new negotiators, fairness dictated that current negotiators should also be tested. The literature clearly suggests that the role requires officers that are both mentally and physically fit (Bohl (1997) and Greenstone (2006)). However, this study suggests that UK practitioners are not convinced about the merits of such tests.

**Cadre Composition**

Milner (2002) notes that negotiators communicate with individuals in crisis from a range of socio-economic backgrounds. Furthermore, Hammer
(1997) and Ostermann (2002) evidence the difficulties faced when communicating with individuals with differing value systems and cultural nuances. There is limited literature on cross cultural negotiations within the policing context. This research seeks to explore participants' views on firstly, whether negotiation cadres reflect the diversity of the community they serve and secondly, whether such representative cadres would be operationally more effective. Once again, the results proved to be controversial and revealed some interesting insights.

Firstly, admitting deficiencies in current cadre compositions, Gold 2 was supportive of the concept, commenting: "It is all about local reflection". Having a greater diversity brought benefits for Gold 1: "...because there is then a diversity of opinion and a diversity of background which will be reflected in the conversation and the general atmosphere of the group". Co-ordinator 1 considered cadre composition was problematic, and he/she highlighted the fact that the service was still struggling with minority group recruitment into specialist units generally. He/she considered that a degree of affirmative recruitment may be necessary to redress this issue, concluding: "I don't think there is any blame to be added to that, it is just the way it is at the moment and we need to do something about it". However, Co-ordinator 2 proffered a unique and informed dimension to the debate. He/she referred to the limited research into British police suicide interventions. This research concluded that 88% of the incidents involved white individuals and of those 75% were male. Furthermore, in terms of demography the individuals involved were either in their late teens/early 20s or early 40s.
“So I think” observed Co-ordinator 2, “we need to understand our target audience and equip our negotiators to deal with those people rather than comparing them with society. I think you would get a very false perspective if you compare them with society, because society is not replicated with the people we deal with”.

This was an unexpected, pragmatic and reasoned argument which suggests that the current anecdotal team composition of white, male officers in the mid 30 to mid 40 age range may perhaps ‘accidentally’ mirror the profile of individuals to which negotiators are deployed. All of the operational negotiators conceded that currently cadres do not reflect a range of visible and non-visible minority groups. However, opinions were mixed on the merits of such a representative unit. The cultural background, gender and ethnicity of the negotiator, believed Negotiators 1 and 2, were of less importance than the ability to listen and help.

Indeed, Negotiator 2 believed that increasing the representative nature of the teams would remain tokenistic while the selection ‘pot’ remained limited by Force sizes. Both Negotiators 2 and 3 believed that, firstly, having a representative cadre would only assist in potentially breaking down one barrier. Secondly, that having officers mirroring the individuals’ diversity would only provide limited insight and understanding, because every crisis incident is unique. The key for both Negotiators 3 and 6 was increased cultural awareness training, rather than drawing more minority officers onto the negotiation teams. The lack of representation in relation to gender was highlighted by Negotiator 5, who stated that until recently only one of the sixteen members of their team was female.

Moreover, Negotiator 5 uniquely highlighted another issue, that of class
divisions. They stated: "I was born and bought up in a working class environment, but I have been out of a true working class environment for some time and I don't understand 'street talk.' This insight was unexpected, interesting and perhaps a uniquely British perspective. Negotiating across the 'cultural divide' has been the subject of limited academic study. The concept of negotiating across a 'class divide,' particularly relevant for this country, appears to hold genuine and distinct challenges. Historically, the service has been drawn from the working class and has been considered to be 'blue collar' employment. However, the service now increasingly recruits from the middle/upper middle classes and it therefore seems important to conduct research on the effects this may have on future negotiator selection and training.

Analysis of this data is inconclusive. There is a general agreement that cadres do not currently reflect local communities. However, the interviewees remained generally unconvinced of the merits of altering the current compositions in order to better reflect the communities that they serve. Generally, bespoke cultural/diversity awareness training for negotiators and the ability to quickly gain access to interpreters and cultural advice were considered more practical operational options.

Training and Negotiators

Introduction

This section analyses perceptions in relation to training and other associated matters. Firstly, the concept of creating a national training plan is investigated. Then, the current two-tier training structure is considered.
Thirdly, the fitness of current training and potential improvements are explored. Fourthly, inspection regimes are examined. Finally, perceptions on skills fade and refresher training are analysed.

**Negotiation and National Training Plans**

Recently, police educational provision has been radically reviewed and redesigned (Managing Learning 1999 and Training Matters 2002). These reports advocated that training plans were needed to orchestrate educational provision across both generic and specialist roles. The aim was to ensure common minimum standards, value for money and effective evaluation. Currently, no national training plans exist for negotiation training. Furthermore, the National Negotiation Sub-group has not commissioned their creation. Therefore, this research asked the participants whether they believed that such a plan should exist and whether it would be organisationally beneficial.

There was overwhelming support for the creation of a medium term training plan. However Gold 2, although supportive, believed that there would be difficulties in getting national ‘buy in’. Although Gold 2 did not elaborate on the point, it does highlight a historical problem for the service; that of obtaining national consensus. On various issues this has often proved elusive as a result of the command independence of Chief Constables. It follows, therefore, that any decision to pursue a national training plan would require ratification at ACPO cabinet. Co-ordinator 1 believed that such a move would be imperative to improving standards. However, Co-ordinator 2 believed that a skeleton plan, albeit unwritten,
existed but conceded that a formalised plan would provide the basis for better succession planning and budgeting. Future planning, highlighted Negotiator 2, on issues such as terrorism trends and substance misuse should be researched pro-actively and recommendations incorporated into the national training programmes. There was a need, considered Negotiator 4, for national training to change and that an effective plan would identify key areas. Interestingly, none of the participants were able to shed light on how negotiator training had slipped 'through the net' and not conformed to the national drive to produce training plans. This research suggests evidence of a desire to create such a plan in the short term.

**Perceptions on the Current Two-Tier Training System**

As described in Chapter 1 there exists a two-tier system for training negotiators. Forces have available to them the one week Regional (Basic) Course and the two week National (Advanced) Course. There has been considerable national debate on the merits of this two-tier structure. Indeed, some forces for a variety of reasons decline to support regional courses. Furthermore, there is some concern about the lack of common standards and trainer skills on these regional (basic) courses.

The current two-tier model was disliked by Gold 1, who said:

"Clearly not, it provides a model which meets the basic needs. I don't even know if it meets the minimum needs. The fundamental problem for me on this is the notion here that we send someone on a week long course and they are QED competent".
Gold 2 harboured concerns in relation to regional courses. However, he/she admitted that over time the benefits were becoming more evident. Furthermore, he/she believed that the primary rationale for the growth of regional courses was associated with the incapacity to deliver sufficient national courses. Capacity is an issue. Currently the national courses are delivered by the New Scotland Yard Hostage and Crisis Negotiation Unit. This unit also has primacy for international kidnap and hostage taking. It is impossible to foresee the frequency of international deployments and therefore would be difficult to increase the number of courses per year. If capacity issues could be resolved while maintaining a corporate product, it may be possible to meet national requirements. However, at this time for a variety of reasons only 4 courses per year can be delivered. This research, suggested Gold 2, would promote the need to change current training provision, and he/she expressed the wish that the best should not be lost in the process. Co-ordinator 1 strongly supported a review and re-design of training provision. Conversely, Co-ordinator 2 considered current provision suitable, arguing:

"Yes I do think it does, because it is incremental experiential learning. It also provides the necessary operational ability for forces with both highly trained negotiators and officers who can support them".

Co-ordinator 2 believed that regionally trained officers merely support nationally trained officers. However, this perception is not representative of the current national picture. Typically many forces use regionally trained officers to provide the core and at times the only response to incidents. Another concern was highlighted by Negotiator 1, who suggested that some officers attending the national course (advanced)
were disadvantaged because they had not attended regional training (basic) and were therefore ‘playing catch up.’ Furthermore, national training staff are attempting to provide a training package that caters for the needs of a range of student ability. Also, Negotiator 1 questioned the number of places allocated on the national course to overseas students because, “actually they are taking up slots that British bobbies need and that’s a hard thing to sometimes swallow”.

The prior attendance, observed Negotiator 2, on a regional course did not necessarily result in a higher final standard, as some people were just ‘naturals’. Negotiators 3, 4 and 6 all believed that the current model was appropriate. However, Negotiator 5 believed that the current model was in need of re-designing, proffering the concept of a modular system. He/she envisioned a foundation/core module of crisis intervention: “our bread and butter work”. Thereafter, the programme could progress to modules on sieges and crimes in action (kidnap and extortion). Further, as the student progressed from module to module, their operational performance would be monitored by the Force Co-ordinator who could either slow the progression and consolidate the learning or even prevent that officer continuing further along the programme. Finally, if appropriate the student would progress to the International Cadre and Co-ordinator modules. This is an interesting concept that could address many concerns as it is incremental, focused and assessed.

Analysis suggests that in general officers believe that the current two-tier system needs review. Perhaps Gold 1 best captures the views of the participants, observing: “I think what we’ve got, is what we’ve got, I don’t
think its suitable or sufficient. It's certainly better than nothing but it is nowhere good enough”.

Current Training: Fit for Purpose; Improvements

Crisis interventions and hostage incidents often take place in the glare of both media and public scrutiny. Beadle (1993) observes that when these incidents are managed correctly they provide an excellent platform for the service to display both technical competence and professionalism. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the practitioners are fit for purpose having been provided with the knowledge and skills required to be effective in the role. This section examines the perceptions of officers on current training and provides them with the opportunity to comment on areas they believe need improvement.

In general terms, there was some congruence that the current training was producing officers fit for purpose. Indeed, Gold 1 observed, “Strangely, clearly there is a level of fitness because we can be quite successful”. Regional courses were particularly well received, although in fairness the majority of the operational officers had over different times attended the same regional course. Encouragingly, the interviewees highlighted the realism of the role-play training. “I think the fact that when people go out” said Gold 2, “they say time and time and time again it’s just like the training, it’s so real”. This observation was further endorsed by Negotiator 3:

“I was absolutely gob smacked when I did my regional course that the first time I was deployed how prepared I was”. They later continued,
"Then I thought, well hang on a minute if that was like training school then the quality of our training is excellent because it prepared me for what I had just been exposed to".

However, Negotiator 4 was disappointed about the standard of the national course and questioned its ability to deliver appropriately trained officers. Their personal experience left them unconvinced that a number of their fellow students were fit at the conclusion of the course for deployment and they believed that this was both unfair to the individual and, importantly, left both the individual and the service exposed to risk. These were deeply held views, although at variance with the majority, but interestingly no-one has ever failed the national course. This may raise potentially serious concerns about the national course both in terms of worth and its assessment criteria and processes.

This element of the research then sought perceptions on potential areas for improvement in national training. A more 'blended' approach to training and operational evaluation was advocated by Gold 1. For him/her, the current training programme appeared to work as a result of a series of informal controls and measures and this made them anxious. He/she envisioned a more professionalised process, but admitted, ".... It's the paradoxical side of wanting to professionalise the service, 'if it ain't broke why fix it,' and it does work". Updating the course was Gold 2's primary concern: "I certainly think some of it could do with modernising". Furthermore, Gold 2 had other concerns, "For a few people I don't think the training is comfortable. If your face fits it's fine, if you are a bit different.....". This is an interesting point because anecdotally the course
has a reputation for being a 'gentleman's club.' Also the training hours are long, normally 0800hrs to 2200hrs (the hours have been recently reduced to this), and this may unintentionally discriminate against officers wishing to attend with child care, faith or family dependency issues. The training would be improved, according to Co-ordinator 2, if in the first instance all the students attended a regional course thereby allowing the national course to build from that platform. Generally, negotiation is not a full time role of officers and Co-ordinator 1 considered this to be a major issue because it hampered professionalising the discipline. The national course was considered to be of a good standard by Negotiator 1 but he/she suggested the greater use of case studies which, in their view, were both highly effective and impactive. According to Negotiator 2 the course appeared to be attempting to over-complicate the relatively common-sense process of negotiation. He/she believed that the programme needed a period of consolidation as it has become prone to constant change on almost a course by course basis. Training staff being deployed overseas at short notice, commented Negotiator 6, had a detrimental effect on the delivery of the course. He/she exampled their own course experience, which had been extensively re-written and due to a deployment the remaining trainers were unable to teach the programme described in the timetable. Research shows that no lesson plans exist for the national course. Therefore, it seems reasonable that in the short term the course should be written in an auditable format. Other areas of concern were expressed by Negotiator 4:

"I think the national course is, now I have to be polite, old; a little bit worn. The scenarios are very good but the inputs aren't, some are
perhaps not relevant. So I think there is a need for the national course to up their 'ante' a little bit". They added, "Then there needs to be a structure after that, a structured follow up".

Both observations merit some consideration, but there appears to be some merit in evaluating performance in the workplace, allowing the currently trained negotiation methodologies to be formally evaluated to ensure operational effectiveness. Secondly, student performance and development within the operational environment could be assessed. This idea might be difficult to achieve as the costs may be prohibitive. However, perhaps a system that utilises the national directing staff to evaluate pan-London deployments and Force co-ordinators to conduct county evaluations could be achievable.

In summary, there appears to be some congruence of opinion among the interviewees that current training regimes are producing officers fit for purpose. In particular the interviewees believe that a great strength of current training is its use of realistic role-plays. However, there are concerns. Firstly, the course needs continuous review to maintain quality. Secondly, they felt that some officers may find the 'atmosphere' and long hours prohibitive and thereby a degree of unintentional discrimination may exist. Finally, it was argued that a workplace student assessment/evaluation structure needs to be created. In conclusion Co-ordinator 1 suggested: "...It's not formalised well enough, it's not validated well enough, checked, examined and tested well enough. All the things that the best disciplines have got it hasn't got and it should have".
Negotiation and the HMIC (Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary)

This section considers the potential use of HMIC to inspect the field of negotiation. The remit of the HMI is to challenge practice, gather best practice, instil common minimum standards and instigate improvement. There has never been any inspection into this field, a fact possibly unique in the field of policing. The interviewees were questioned on the subject and their responses were illuminating and raise fundamental questions for the service.

An HMIC inspection, suggested Gold 1, appeared to offer limited benefits for the service and may indeed prove to be counter-productive. He/she observed:

"I guess lots of forces who don't do it well, pretty much deliberately don't do it well. So having it from the HMIC that they are not doing it well, if you are not competent being told you are not competent doesn't help".

An inspection at this time, according to Gold 2, would be disastrous as nationally the picture was uneven. Also Gold 2 queried whether the HMIC would have the professional competence and knowledge in-house to conduct such a review. The second point found some support from Co-ordinator 1, who supported the concept of a review but insisted that the 'right people' needed to be involved in order to provide any inspection; a "badge of credibility". He/she continued, "it could be NPIA (National Police Improvement Agency), it could be HMIC, it's just a badge of credibility but it needs to be the right people doing it". Many of the negotiators also stated that the right people needed to be
identified that knew the business. Although supporting the concept
Negotiator 1 highlighted that currently there are no minimum standards;
therefore they would have nothing to inspect against. He/she suggested
that there needed to be a two-stage process. Firstly, a general 'fact-
finding' Inspection was needed in order to understand the current national
picture. Secondly, a National Manual could be produced which could be
then used to inspect against those minimum standards. A more 'scientific'
process was advocated by Negotiator 2, whereby negotiator numbers in
conjunction with call-outs, force populations ratios and force socio-
demographic populations were considered. However, he/she conceded that
such data would probably indicate negotiator staffing numbers in excess
of those that the service would able to afford or wish to have. Financial
issues concerned Negotiator 3, who considered that the costs of
implementing any recommendations would be prohibitive, therefore: "I
don't think it will be worth the paper it's written on". Conversely,
Negotiator 4 considered that an inspection by HMIC would be an
effective method of holding ACPO to account, and providing some
impetus for change. Perhaps unsurprisingly, in general terms the strategic
interviewees appeared to have reservations about an HMIC inspection.
Undeniably, an HMIC inspection could provide the service with problems.
Firstly, in the current financial climate any recommendations that would
cost to implement would not be welcomed by the service. Secondly, an
HMIC inspection holds a nominated individual ACPO officer in each force
responsible for implementing any recommendations. For a service that
appears to have allowed this discipline to meander this might be a
challenging task for any ACPO officer. For Co-ordinator 2 the concept
had not occurred to them prior to the interview. They acknowledged that there would be resistance in some quarters but:

"It's back to that old thing - if it gets measured it gets done and I think forces would be required to exercise their mind towards negotiating. It would focus their attention for a little while at least".

Refresher Training and Skills Fade

The Police National Learning Strategy (2003) advocates that officers need to constantly refresh both their operational skills and knowledge. Furthermore, Greenstone (2005) advises that negotiators also need to maintain their ability by constant refresher training. The current lack of refresher training was recognised as a strategic threat by Gold 2 who stated:

"... the ongoing development of accreditation or refreshment has never been particularly coherent. It's very good in some regions but not so good in others. People being kept up to the mark, that they are match fit and the new developments are put out in such a way that people can understand and keep up with".

This viewpoint was endorsed by Co-ordinator 2, who also highlighted gaps around refresher training. The need to continually improve the service and offer advice to tactical commanders by negotiators was seen by Negotiator 2 as being an appropriate area for refresher training. This is an interesting point, because many negotiators were trained some years ago. Therefore, they would be unaware of recent innovations in the field of incident assessment. The advice negotiators provide to commanders, felt Negotiator 2, should be "based on the literature and
our experience and our training”.

For Negotiator 3, refresher days should be more than just scenarios and role plays. Refresher programmes should include subjects on terrorist trends, cultures and beliefs. Furthermore, he/she suggested that first aid training should be included. This view has some merit, because the negotiator is often a primary responder and therefore may need to render first aid. Finally, and perhaps most contentiously, he/she believed that refresher training should be compulsory. Historically, the service tends to resist making refresher training compulsory. However, a number of critical incident responders such as firearms and public order officers all have associated bespoke refresher packages. Refresher training in kidnap negotiations, according to Negotiator 4, was needed. He/she stressed that although kidnaps are relatively uncommon the associated risks are often greater. He/she stated:

“It could be 6 months since we have done one and we get called out at 2 o’clock in the morning, to one that could be a major crime in action. That was quite impactive on everyone involved and there was a lot at stake, and we are there to deal with it. We do, everyone comes through and everyone does pull together I accept that. But I sometimes think that is just how we get by. So in that respect pressures on red centres [kidnap negotiators] and increased accountability are quite harrowing”.

He/she also suggested prescribing the number of days that officers must attend. Finally, he/she said:

“It’s good to do training (the regional/national courses), but over the months your skills do go, and your confidence. A lot of negotiation is
having the confidence to do it, because people will be testing you all the
time to see if you are supporting them, and that you are confident in
what you are saying’.

Analysis suggests that the officers considered that core skills are
perishable and in need of regular refreshment. Furthermore, this
investigation suggests that a cohesive national strategy on refresher
training would be well received.

**Negotiator Stress and Retention**

Policing in general, state Brown and Cambell (1995), and the role of
police negotiators in particular (Bohl 1997), are highly stressful
occupations. Currently, only volunteers are used within Britain. During the
course of this research participants commented on the stress levels and
those views are now discussed.

Both Golds 1 and 2 acknowledged the highly stressful nature of the role.
Indeed Gold 1 noted: “.. they are actually taking on some of the burden
of the person who they are talking to. Are they actually putting
themselves under stress?” The role of negotiator, claimed Co-ordinator 1,
was certainly considered secondary to their ‘day job’ and that situation
creates its own stresses. Currently, there exists no national policy in
relation to requesting a break from negotiation cadres and for Negotiator
1 this was a missed opportunity. For him/her, having the ability to “step
away” without repercussion or organisational slight was vitally important.
Indeed, Negotiator 6 added that the service should aspire to some form
of “regular MOT checks as it were, without having to self refer”.

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Negotiator ‘burn out’ was a real issue for Negotiator 2 who offered this insight: "... a number who leave the panel, for whatever their given reason, the real reason is often that they have filled up their bucket of stuff they can cope with and they don’t want to put anything else in it". Some of the accounts were painful and personal. This insight was given by Negotiator 4:

"I never ever thought of it, I thought it didn’t affect me at all. But, probably about 5 weeks after my Dad had died we got called to a negotiation where I was talking to a chap who I had spent 5 or 7 hours talking with him before" they continued. "It was on a cliff ...... and I didn’t think that would affect me. I thought I would be able to say no, no that’s gone finished, I’ve dealt with that, I can deal with this, but you can’t. After 7 hours of sitting there you get angry and you have got to work through that, and I think you have to have an understanding of that".

This powerful disclosure describes some of the problems associated with both negotiator stressors and retention. This officer had not self-referred, but had pressed on without support. He/she never stepped away from this voluntary role but perhaps by their actions they placed the person in crisis, the negotiator and the organisation in a vulnerable position. Finally, Negotiator 3 commented:

"Because of the very nature of our job we get called to the most extreme circumstances and we see things that no-one else sees. We get exposed to things that no-one else gets exposed to on a regular basis and I think that it takes its toll".

This particular aspect of research was fascinating, and deeply moving.
The service spends considerable amounts of both time and money selecting and training negotiators. However, the interviewees appear to believe that this valuable resource is not well supported. There are pockets of best practice nationally where local force policies address welfare and support issues, but perhaps these practices should be extended and used to inform a cohesive national policy.

This research is at best exploratory and seems to signal another area for future research. This analysis suggests that both the role and the lack of support mechanisms affect negotiators and further research would be necessary to determine if these stresses were having an adverse influence on negotiator retention rates.

Future Challenges

In this final sub-section firstly, the exclusive use of only warranted police officers in this role is investigated and secondly, future challenges for police negotiators are analysed.

Police negotiators are an expensive resource, and arguably the intrinsic inter-personal skills necessary to be an effective negotiator might be found at a reduced cost outside the police service. Currently, both internationally and nationally, serving police officers are exclusively used in this role. There were tangible benefits for Gold 1 in using police officers as they generally had a wealth of experience in dealing with challenging people. However, the interviewee was attracted to the idea and cited the use of a teacher with a background in dealing with
difficult children being particularly effective. He/she felt that personally, they were comfortable with the concept, but believed that the service would have real anxieties around such a move. Both the Co-ordinators were sympathetic to having non-police negotiators. “Now what that place is” commented Co-ordinator 1, “and I have my views, I think should be debated. I think the principle that there is a place should be accepted and at the moment it is not”. Co-ordinator 2 suggested that at times they may need police powers of arrest and considered that they should be “hybrid police staff with police powers”. Generally, the operational negotiators believed that non-police officers could be used. Concerns were raised by Negotiators 1, 2, 3 and 6 in respect of knowledge around procedures, insurance and understanding of police operations, but these were not considered insurmountable. However, Negotiator 4 was extremely positive, highlighting two issues. Firstly, he/she felt that considerable skills and experience are lost when negotiators retire from the service. Secondly, he/she suggested that negotiators are “not enforcing the law” and

“If we are negotiating with someone who asks a specific question, 9 times out of 10 it's not the law you're answering. It's the moral right and wrong situation, 'you know that's wrong and you can't do that'. You're not actually working from the stance of a law enforcement officer, you're working from almost a moral background, an understanding of right and wrong, and I don't see that you have to be warranted to do that”.

Historically, within the service there has been a contention that contact with the public was an officer’s prerogative. However, recently with the
rise of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) and civilianisation the
'status quo' has been challenged. This research suggests that it may be
time to reassess current practice and debate the issue nationally.

All the officers engaged on this research were asked to look forward and
comment on future challenges in this field. Gold 1 would like to see
improvements in training, "Something about being aware of cultural
differences, around understanding what negotiations mean for people who
are motivated from extremely different positions". In the short term,
greater scrutiny and accountability were significant issues for Gold 2. In
order to address these issues, they wished to see a stronger national
structure and a national commitment to professionalism and consistency.
Interestingly, Negotiator 5 also identified national structure as an area to
be addressed. Finally, Gold 2 also recognised that non-lethal options
such as Taser may provide commanders with the confidence to intervene
tactically at an earlier stage, thereby reducing the need for a negotiated
resolution. Professionalising the role was supported by Co-ordinator 1
who suggested that the role would also benefit from being attached to
an academic programme. Furthermore, he/she hoped that negotiators
would receive greater recognition by the service. Interestingly, Co-
ordinator 2 was less upbeat, stating:

"Strategically, I see no change because I don't think there is an
appetite for change, because of the reasons we have discussed before
and because it doesn't appear in organisational charts. We don't have a
door with hostage negotiator on. I think that we will continue just exactly
as we are".
Perhaps understandably, the operational negotiators identified tactical challenges. Due to security issues some of these concerns cannot be reported within the context of this study as they are operationally sensitive. Negotiating over the internet, observed Negotiator 1, is challenging because of the difficulty of building empathy without some form of personal inter-face. He/she highlighted the example of "Cyber-suicide bids" (when a subject states their intention to kill themselves on a web-site), and questioned whether current training equipped negotiators for these deployments. New genres of terrorism were highlighted by Negotiator 2, who foresaw a myriad of complexities associated with negotiating with them. Again, he/she hoped that environmental scanning would enable suitable training programmes to be designed to combat these threats. The continuing interest in hostage negotiation by the media gave Negotiator 3 genuine concerns for the future. He/she said:

"We are trying to keep one step ahead but in all honesty we only have one tool box, and you can forget all the frills that go with it, the tool box is us. You can put as much technical in as possible, but it's just the person at the other end of the phone or standing talking to someone and that's as simple as it gets".

Both Negotiators 4 and 6 believed that kidnap offences would continue to grow both internationally and nationally. They envisaged a variety of challenges in this field but in particular the greater use of technology by perpetrators. They also highlighted the increased accountability associated with these incidents, the public expectation for the police to remain successful and the need to constantly refine training.
In summation, senior officers ranging from the strategic to the operational have identified a raft of potential future challenges for the service. Interestingly, and perhaps surprisingly, the participants did not identify any unexpected or previously unidentified topics. In general, the interviewees' perceptions centered on the key issues of National policy, structure and training. Therefore, it would appear that the credibility of this study has been reinforced as it has explored areas relevant to the service.

Chapter Summary

In conclusion this chapter has analysed the qualitative data gathered from a range of participants. It has explored a broad range of topics that affect both the selection and training of police negotiators. This wide ranging and unique study has illuminated areas that appear to be relevant to the service. In the following chapter, conclusions will be drawn from this analysis. Finally, recommendations will be provided that it is hoped will provide solutions for the benefit of future negotiators, the service and the public.
Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Recommendations

Introduction

Chapter 5 concentrated on the analysis of the international and national quantitative deployment data. The perceptions of senior police officers were then analysed in Chapter 6. This final chapter will initially summarise the research and then present a number of answers to the research questions and the findings together with a number of international and national recommendations. The limitations of the study and potential future areas for academic study will then be signposted. Finally, it will conclude with the author’s personal observations of the research journey.

Research Summary

This research has been both exploratory and unique in nature. It has investigated a stressful, high risk and specialised aspect of law enforcement. It has investigated current selection and training provision and explored whether or not it is fit for purpose. The operational reality of hostage and crisis negotiators is diverse and critical to the policing response. Therefore the skills, methods and personnel employed must be capable of withstanding extended deployment on complex incidents. The training specifications are challenging and both the service and the public have an expectation that lives will be saved.

This study is primarily an exploration into the perceptions of senior police officers in relation to the selection and training of hostage negotiators,
informed by quantitative international data on negotiator deployments. The over-arching aim of this study was to identify improvements for the selection and training of hostage negotiators, through an analysis of hostage negotiation data. The over-arching research question was: “Is national police hostage negotiation training fit for purpose?”

In order to address this question sub-questions were identified which are:

1. Are current selection procedures fit for purpose?
2. Do individual negotiation cadres reflect the community they serve and, if not, does this fundamentally undermine their operational effectiveness?
3. When deployment data is analysed, does it support the current national training course content?
4. Do trained skills fade and, if so, does this dilute operational effectiveness?
5. Does the nature of the role affect retention rates?
6. Is there need for refresher courses and/or other opportunities to exploit continuous professional development and accreditation of police negotiators?

This study was intended to influence strategic thinking and policies globally within law enforcement agencies, and thereby make a positive contribution to both training and frontline delivery.

The quantitative research paradigm was used to explore negotiator deployment data. Firstly, this analysis of international data sought to discover what type of incident negotiators are typically deployed on. This was to ensure that officers are being trained for the operational reality of
deployment. Secondly, the data was examined to illuminate any relationships between the length of deployments and negotiator retention. The sample accessed random data from the United States; Canada; South Australia; Scotland; The Metropolitan Police and Westshire, a county force. The investigation was hampered by a lack of in-depth international deployment data. This study argued the validity of the data sample but concerns about its reliability, in particular from the FBI were raised. Gaining access to the data, even with both ACPO endorsement and the researcher's unique access, proved to be challenging. However, the analysis generated findings that appear both capable of international generalisation and importantly provide baseline empirical data.

The qualitative research paradigm explored a range of perceptions from senior police officers. Firstly, this study investigated perceptions on current terrorist influencers, causation factors and future threats. Secondly, it examined the evolution of negotiators, its development, funding and whether negotiators are perceived to be important to the service. Thirdly, this investigation explored the effects of government policy and UK policy formulation. The over-arching theme of the fourth section was the selection of negotiators, and this included topics such as desired character traits, competency frameworks, lay assessors, mental and medical testing and cadre composition. Finally, views were explored on a national training plan, the two-tier training structure, training provision, an HMIC Inspection into the field, skills fade, refresher training, retention and future challenges.
The sample encompassed views ranging from the strategic to the tactical. Semi-structured interviews were the research tools of choice and the content once transcribed was analysed and coded. The service is arguably considered to be conservative in nature; however the participants' views were both frank and at times controversial.

**Research Findings and Recommendations**

The next section has been divided into two main sections. Firstly, the study's findings will be discussed. It will be noted that findings applicable to the research sub-questions are presented. The second sub-section will present a series of recommendations.

**Quantitative Findings**

The data was analysed and a number of key findings have been identified. The first finding is that the FBI HoBas Database needed to be re-designed in order to allow it to be fragmented into time periods (p.126). Remedial work is now under way in the US to redress this. Secondly, there is a dearth of current empirical UK data (p.120). This has been drawn to the attention of the ACPO lead. Thirdly, it was discovered that within the London area there had been a 47% decrease of deployments between 2002 and 2006 (p.128). This finding has been drawn to the MPS HCNU and as a direct result a series of training seminars for initial scene commanders has been designed and delivered. This appears to be having a positive effect and currently negotiator deployments are once again increasing. The use by South Australian and Manitoba police of negotiators on high risk warrants has been included.
When deployment data is analysed, does it support the current national training course content?

Analysis of the quantitative data gathered in this study enables us to provide an answer to sub-section 3. This study indicates that both siege/barricade and suicide interventions are the most typical incidents for negotiators to be deployed on (p.134-137). This is an important finding because currently both international and UK training programmes concentrate on hostage based deployments. These findings signal that the operational needs are different from current training provision. Therefore, both the didactic and practical training exercises within international negotiator training programmes need to be revisited in light of this study. This finding has already proved to be the catalyst for a review of the UK national training programme.

Qualitative Findings

Terrorist Motivators and Causation Factors

This enquiry produced a series of unique strategic and tactical insights into challenges facing negotiators. The perceptions captured from participants on terrorist motivators were congruent to Bottery's (2004) descriptions of globalising processes (p.143 -145). In particular cultural, demographic, environmental and political aspects were identified as primary motivators for terrorist groups. Furthermore, the participants also considered ethical and political concepts such as fairness, justice and providing a 'voice' to be important factors (p.145-147). Moreover, the
participants considered terrorism to be a concerted strategy to influence and/or instigate change. These observations were a fascinating insight into the current mindset of senior police officers. An unexpected consequence of this investigation has been that some of the participants reported that they have given these issues much consideration and this has enabled them to crystallise their own response if confronted with such a deployment.

**Negotiators and their Value to the Service**

An unexpected and disturbing finding was the depth of feeling on how the service values negotiators (p.156-160). Findings revealed a pervasive view that their work is undervalued and that the role is not considered an important aspect of modern policing. Indeed, the term 'Cinderella discipline' was used by more than one participant (p.159). In particular one participant considered that negotiators are intrinsically different from the rest of policing. Perhaps negotiators do have different motivations, and for this reason they form a distinct sub-culture within the service (p.158-159). This was a fascinating and unexpected finding which appears to be worthy of further investigation.

**Governmental Policy**

This study found that participants believed that government policy has a tangible effect on negotiators (p.160-163). UK national policy is clear, stating that there will be no substantive concessions to terrorism, and this was understood by the participants (p.160-161). Indeed, one strategic interviewee believed that this unambiguous stance was vital to national
security as it provided clarity (p.161). However, another strategic participant believed that any government by nature was inconsistent and therefore this would be problematic (p.161). Finally, the participants believed that governmental policies could influence negotiation (p.163).

Are current selection procedures fit for purpose?
Currently, there does not exist a nationally identified role description and accompanying competency frameworks. This study initially found negotiators unsure of the benefits of introducing them (p.167-168). However, on balance the findings indicated that the majority of the participants believed that the creation of a competency framework would be both useful and helpful in the selection of potential negotiators.

The study found that the interviewees believed that there should be some form of selection process (p.169). The participants held a range of views about the shape of the process. However, one of the Gold participants envisioned a radical pathway which propelled the applicant through selection, exposure, training, assessment and evaluation in order to achieve "competence consistently in the field" (p.169-170). The findings suggest that a national standard and process should be designed and implemented.

Arguably, the most divisive, fascinating and controversial findings concerned the areas of mental and physical testing; cadre composition and the use of external 'lay visitors' in selection (p.171-177). A review of literature suggests (Bohl (1997) and Greenstone (2006)) that some form
of mental and/or physical testing of applicants prior to appointment would be useful. However, this study's findings proved inconclusive (p.172-174). Clearly, UK practitioners were not convinced about the merit of such tests for existing negotiators. Interestingly, and paradoxically, there was a view that if such a test was instigated for new negotiators, fairness dictated that current negotiators should also be tested (p.174).

The use of 'lay assessors' within the selection process engendered an interesting debate (p. 171-172). Some participants, Gold 2 in particular, seized on the concept (p.171). Others however remained unconvinced. The rationale provided by some participants to justify their views appeared to reflect arguments that were rehearsed within the service when lay assessors were introduced in student officer recruitment. For example, one participant said: "Then there is just the fact that they are representative of a tiny facet of the greater community" (p.172). It was anticipated that the participants would seize on the opportunity of involving the public in the selection process. However, findings were inconclusive which perhaps provides more insight into the insular nature of the service than it sheds light onto the idea. The selection of non-police officers as negotiators was also examined. The service is often considered to be conservative in its views; however the participants were very receptive and supportive of this concept (p.192-194). There were some concerns about applicants' knowledge of law and procedure, but retired ex-police negotiators were seen as a viable option (p.194).
Do individual negotiation cadres reflect the community they serve and, if not, does this fundamentally undermine their operational effectiveness?

This study has produced a unique insight into the views of officers on the representativeness of cadre compositions and whether failure to represent minority groups undermines operational effectiveness (p.174-177). Negotiating across the 'cultural divide' has been the subject of limited academic enquiry and this study sought to redress this. The findings reveal that there was a general agreement that cadres do not currently reflect local communities (p.177). However, the interviewees remained generally unconvinced of the merits of altering the current cadre compositions (p.177). Indeed, one interviewee suggested that the 'client base' in relation to suicide interventions did not support the need to have more diverse negotiation units attending (p.175-176). In summary many negotiators believed that empathy, personality and the understanding of the individual's beliefs, culture and ethnicity may be more useful in successfully resolving the incident (p.177). Finally, a fascinating and uniquely British perspective was discovered. One participant highlighted that Britain is historically divided by a 'class' system (p.176-177). The concept of negotiating across a 'class divide' is a finding unique to this study and signposts an area for further academic enquiry.
Do trained skills fade and, if so, does this dilute operational effectiveness?

There is an acknowledgement within The National Police Training Strategy (2003) that skills fade and a degree of refreshment is necessary. Therefore, perceptions were sought on this issue and the findings were insightful. Gold 2 stated: “...the ongoing development of accreditation or refreshment has never been particularly coherent” (p.188).

An organisational risk was highlighted by one participant in relation to skills fade around kidnap negotiation and its potential effects on high risk fast moving crimes (p.189). Furthermore, they considered: “It's good to do training (the regional/national courses), but over the months your skills do go, and your confidence. A lot of negotiation is having the confidence to do it......” (p.190). The findings suggest that interviewees consider that core skills are perishable and fade.

Does the nature of the role affect retention rates?

Arguably, the strength of this study is the researcher's immersion in the field. The participants had confidence in the researcher and his ability to empathise with them and this personal relationship facilitated moving disclosures. Findings indicate that from the strategic to the operational the role is viewed as highly stressful (p.192). Currently, there is no national policy in relation to 'breaks' from negotiation cadres, and for the participants this was an opportunity lost (p.190). Indeed, the ability to "step away" (p.190) was considered by some vital. One participant suggested the instigation of “regular MOT checks as it were, without having to self refer” (p.190). Negotiator burn out was acknowledged as a
real issue and in particular one interviewee recounted a moving story of the death of his/her father and its effect on him/her at the scene of a suicide intervention (p.191). Finally as one interviewee insightfully observed: "We get exposed to things that no-one else gets exposed to on a regular basis and I think that it takes its toll" (p.191). Although the quantitative data was unable to illuminate this area effectively, the interviews did. Findings suggest that negotiating with people in crisis affects the police negotiator. Were one to couple these findings with the sense that the service does not value them, it would be understandable if retention rates are affected, but this is an area for further investigation.

Is there need for refresher courses and/or other opportunities to exploit continuous professional development and accreditation of police negotiators?

The study found that interviewees were concerned about skill erosion and were supportive of refresher courses (p.188). They were generally supportive of training plans that would encompass both refresher courses and continuous professional development (CPD). However, Gold 2 believed it would be difficult to get national buy in (p.178). In general, the creation of a national manual which included educational matters was supported. However, it would be right to acknowledge that for some this document provided an opportunity for ".... litigation, muddying the water..." (p.152). The concept of an HMIC inspection into negotiation engendered lively debate (p.186-188). Such an inspection could include national educational provision. The findings were inconclusive but one sensed a general 'ground swell' that an inspection would be beneficial.
National policy creation and dissemination by the National Negotiators' Working Group (NNWG) was generally considered to be ineffective (p.163-165). Further, training policy is intrinsically linked to a group that was seen by the interviewees as failing to deliver (p.165). Future challenges were explored within the interviews. Some of the issues identified such as 'cyber-suicide,' changing terrorist threats and kidnap methodologies all appear worthy of bespoke training/CPD events and programmes (p.195).

"Is national police hostage negotiation training fit for purpose?"
This is the over-arching research question for the study. All the sub-questions support this question which served as the catalyst for the study.

This study found that the current two-tier system used within the UK had evolved over a period of time to address capacity issues associated with the national course (p.179). Most interviewees had concerns about this system, but one of the regional co-ordinators considered the current system suitable (p.180). Interviewees raised concerns about the capacity of the national course to meet the UK need when a number of places were given to foreign students (p.181). One participant noted that not all students attending the national course had previously attended the regional (basic) course. Therefore, the national course was attempting to cater for a range of student knowledge (p.181).
In general the interviewees believed that the current training was producing officers fit for purpose. As an interviewee commented, "Strangely, clearly there is a level of fitness because we can be quite successful" (p.182). The regional (basic) training was well received, but one should remember that all the operational negotiators had attended the same programme albeit at different times (p.182). The interviewees were very positive in their assessment of the reality of the national training and in particular the role play scenarios, which were considered true to life (p.183). This study finds that there was a wish for the national course to adopt a more blended training approach such as greater use of case studies (p.183). However, there was a general acknowledgement that the programme needed to be refreshed and modernised (p.184-185). Furthermore, findings noted a desire to ensure that the learning transferred into the workplace (p.185). Finally, one participant suggested a modular approach to training that mirrored current Australian practice (p.181).

This study finds that there is a congruence of opinion among the interviewees that current training regimes are producing officers fit for purpose.

Recommendations

This section presents recommendations based on the findings of this study, which are applicable to the UK. Some recommendations appear to be suitable for adoption internationally. Internationally, negotiation data lacks depth and reliability. Although flawed, the FBI HoBas database was impressive. Within the UK the National Negotiators' Working Group is
able to dictate both policy and practice. Therefore the creation and adoption of a database would be feasible.

**Recommendation 1**

That the UK consider creating and adopting a national database similar to the FBI HoBas

Manitoba and South Australia use negotiators within high-risk arrests and warrant execution. This appears to be an approach wholly congruent with the provisions of the Human Rights Act and the Corporate Manslaughter Act.

**Recommendation 2**

That national UK and international policy is reviewed with a view to utilising negotiators during the execution of high-risk warrants and arrests.

The analysis of the quantitative data was examined to discover typical negotiator deployments. This study finds that internationally siege/barricade and suicide intervention are typical deployments. Internationally, training programmes concentrate on hostage incidents; this appears to be in need of review.

**Recommendation 3**

That international training programs, and in particular the UK National course, are reviewed to ensure that training prepares the student for the operational reality.
The findings of this study show that participants believe that police negotiation lacks strategic vision. They considered that negotiation is a ‘fringe’ or ‘Cinderella Discipline’. They consider that its development is failing to keep pace with other policing specialisms.

**Recommendation 4**

That a clear strategic vision for the UK is developed

The participants also identified that the creation of a NNWG secretariat to assist in the creation, cascading and development of national policy was of vital importance.

**Recommendation 5**

That a secretariat is created to support the National Negotiators’ Working Group

The police service should use the two tools to drive common service standards within this discipline. Firstly, best practice and policy manuals are produced and secondly, inspections by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) measure compliance and conformity.

**Recommendation 6**

That a National Manual of Negotiation best practice and policy is created
**Recommendation 7**

That ACPO request Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary to conduct a National review into police negotiation

This study finds that current national and local funding provision is at best uneven. The findings suggest that there is a crisis in funding, with officers' lives and safety being placed in jeopardy.

**Recommendation 8**

That both Nationally and Locally there is a review of funding for negotiation

Findings show on balance the majority of the participants believed that the creation of a competency framework would be both useful and helpful in the selection of potential negotiators. Further, that selection processes should be standardised.

**Recommendation 9**

That a national selection procedure, perhaps based on a competency framework, be adopted

Findings suggest that there was a desire to produce a national negotiation training plan.
Recommendation 10
That a national training plan for hostage and crisis negotiation is created

This study finds that the current two-tier system of national training needed to be re-visited. Further, that all courses are in need of constant evaluation in order to maintain their quality.

Recommendation 11
That the current two tier training system is reviewed and that all courses delivered nationally are evaluated

Concerns were raised in relation to the 'culture' of long hours on the UK National Course and that these hours may be unintentionally discriminatory, preventing some students with pressing personal commitments from undertaking the course.

Recommendation 12
That hours worked by students on the National Course are reviewed

This study's findings suggest that a post-course workplace student assessment/evaluation structure needs to be created to assist the transference of learning into the operational environment.

Recommendation 13
That a post-course student assessment model is created to ensure that learning is transferred into the workplace
The findings show that the participants are concerned about skills fade. The interviewees highlighted that core skills were perishable and that a national structure of refresher training was needed. Without a cohesive programme of refreshment the organisation places itself at risk.

**Recommendation 14**

That a national refresher course and programme is designed and delivered

This study's findings in relation to the problems associated with negotiator retention proved inconclusive. Arguably, factors may include the perceived lack of valuing and support provided by the service. Whatever the underlying reason is, this is a problem for the service. Firstly, the selection and training of negotiators is expensive and secondly there is a duty of care for the service.

**Recommendation 15**

That research into negotiator retention rates is conducted

**Study Limitations, Future Opportunities and the Personal Journey**

This final section consists of three sub-sections. Firstly the limitations of the study will be discussed. Secondly, future areas for academic study will be signposted. Finally, the personal journey of the researcher will be considered.
Study Limitations

This is an original study that investigated a covert area of policing. The research was driven by a review of the literature, advice from peers and personal knowledge. It was anticipated that due to the researcher's access this study would deliver on a range of fronts.

The quantitative enquiry was important as it aspired to collect both empirical data in their own right and provide insights in their own right. Acquiring the quantitative data proved to be both difficult and frustrating. This phase of the process seriously impacted on the timeliness of the whole project. Furthermore, when data arrived it transpired to be flawed and limited in nature. This analysis would have benefited from an international consistency of data. However, on a more positive note it did provide an insight into international incident types and duration.

Undoubtedly, the study suffered from a lack of quantitative data. However, this was unexpected, because the police routinely capture large amounts of management information on key activities such as arrest rates, complaints, response times and crimes detected. Arguably, the difficulty of obtaining negotiation data is a reflection of the worth placed on it by the service. Finally, although the sample was random, it was gathered from entirely western law enforcement organisations. Therefore, this bias may render findings only capable of being generalised within the UK and possibly within western law enforcement. This study fails to provide any insight into the non-western experience.
Time and professional pressures have impacted on this study and it was impractical to gather data throughout the UK. However, a strength is that it has captured perceptions from key strategists and operational tacticians. Moreover, and importantly, those opinions reflect a reasonable geographic spread. Patently, if more time and money had been available a larger sample pool would have been approached. The methods used appear to have produced valid and reliable findings. Because of the unique nature of this enquiry and the researcher's access and vetting it was always difficult to envisage any other researcher replicating this study. Finally, this study was intended to be a catalyst for change and therefore the research environment will hopefully change.

Future Research Opportunities

This research appears to have signposted a number of avenues for further academic research. One of the most exciting aspects concerns the potential links between globalisation and potential motivators for terrorists. There appears to be congruence from the participants that cultural, demographic and political drivers are primary influencers on terrorists. This study arguably provides a platform for other investigations.

Findings suggest that negotiators feel undervalued, set apart from the wider policing community. Again, it would be interesting to understand this more and discover whether or not this perception is held internationally.

The composition of negotiation cadres and the need, or otherwise, to
reflect the community they serve appeared to be one of the most divisive and controversial aspects of this study. This study has considered negotiating across cultural differences and uniquely it discovered the concept of negotiating across a 'class divide'. This appears to be a fascinating line of enquiry which has the potential to have profound effects on both current selection and training practices within UK police negotiating.

**The Personal Journey**

The main thrust of this research has been to explore the perceptions of senior police officers. This research has illuminated topics that have been at times both controversial and fascinating. The findings have drawn into sharp relief genuine concerns about the selection and training of negotiators. When the initial proposal for this study was conceived it was hoped that any findings would provide the foundation for National change. This has transpired to be the case and this study has provided both a baseline of understanding and an impetus for National debate. Importantly, this study has received support strategically and its recommendations will provide a catalyst for National change. I have also discussed with European colleagues the concept of creating a European HoBas system. National training now reflects the concept of utilising negotiators on high risk warrants. Further, I have driven a review of the National course and it now better reflects the reality of operational deployments. Also, the course is now routinely evaluated. A National Manual for Negotiators is now in production. The culture of long training hours on the National course has been reviewed and, although it is still
punishing, hours have been reduced. Finally, I have designed and delivered both a National co-ordinator course and a refresher course.

This work has prompted the National Negotiators' Working Group to discuss a secretariat function and options are being tabled. The concept of an inspection regime, although controversial, is attracting some support. Also, nationally innovative funding streams are being considered, such as training private and public organisations in communications skills and utilising the revenue generated to support the operational negotiators. However, without doubt the topic attracting the greatest interest is that of the physical and mental fitness of the negotiator and the selection procedures used to identify them. A draft of this study instigated debate and there appears to be a growing ground swell of support for the introduction of suitable regimes.

This has been a fascinating voyage of discovery during the course of which I have learned an immense amount about both the subject area and importantly myself. I have theorised that terrorism itself is both a pervasive and globalising process in its own right and that terrorism is motivated and perhaps even symbiotic to other global processes. I have been able to fundamentally assist in taking this specialism forward within the UK and internationally. The concept that negotiation is the 'Cinderella discipline of the service' is being challenged and with that process National selection and training will be transformed. However, challenges still exist. The 'action imperative' culture of the service still needs to be re-visited and there remains much to do.
Finally, this journey has reminded me why I joined the service. I joined the service over 30 years ago to save life and uphold the law of this country. I have increasingly dedicated myself to saving lives through my skills in negotiation. I have saved many lives, but this study has provided me with a depth of understanding that has proved invaluable. I can state that as a direct result of using the knowledge gathered in this study I have saved two lives that before this journey I would have probably failed to do. In particular, I recall one young man on a ledge high above the ground. We talked and I realised that he had determined, that this was the end. As we talked I remembered Strentz (2006) and focused on regret; because by taking his life all other options, opportunities, and experiences would be removed. My research saved his life. For me undertaking this rigorous academic work has proved to be a worthy enterprise, for lives have been and will continue to be saved as a result of it.
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Appendix 1: Pre-interview Letter

May 2007

Re:

A Doctoral Study entitled "An analysis of hostage negotiation data: implications for the selection and training of hostage negotiators."

Dear Colleague,

As you are aware, I am currently undertaking a study into selection and training issues associated with the specialist policing field of hostage negotiation. This appears to be a unique study that it is hoped will provide the service with recommendations for improving current selection procedures and training methods and curriculum.

I would be very interested in hearing your views on these matters. The purpose of this letter is to invite you to take part in a short interview as part of this investigation.

For some of you the experience that you have had of training is slightly dated, for others the experience is still fresh. This is not a problem, as it is your professional views and ideas that I wish to capture. Although you are involved in the field of hostage negotiation your participation is not obligatory. I have invited you because I believe you have a passion for the field and that your views will assist my research.

About the interview

The interview will take between half an hour and an hour and will take place at your workplace, or another place if it is more suitable to you. Furthermore I appreciate that your diary is very busy therefore I would be happy to accommodate any time that is best for you.
The questions will be about selection procedures and training. The interviewer will be using a tape recorder to make sure that your views are properly recorded. After the interview it will be typed up and kept electronically. Your name will be kept separately to the transcripts. Only I will know which tape relates to which participant. Your name and place of work not appear in any reports. Furthermore, I will provide you a transcript of the interview, which you may amend, or delete as you feel appropriate. I wish to ensure that the transcripts accurately reflect your views on the subject. For the purposes of my findings if your views are quoted it would appear in this format; “Negotiator 1 from Westshire said…….or Regional Co-ordinator 1 said…..”

Who are the Sponsors for this study

The lead officer ACPO has been briefed on this study. Also a Chief Officer Sponsor for ‘Westshire Police’ has been fully consulted in the preparation of this research. Additionally the Training and Selection Sub-group of the National Negotiators Working Group has been consulted and a copy of any recommendations will be provided to them for their information and to assist in their work.

Confidentiality

I will not use your name in any feedback or any written reports. Senior management will not get any information about you or your views. All the information will be kept private and confidential as outlined in the process. However it is right to draw to your attention that as a serving warranted police officer this guarantee of confidentiality cannot be extended to include any criminal or discipline issues that are discovered within the context of this study. I have attached a copy of the questions for your information. I hope that you will see that the questions posed are unlikely to adversely impact in this way.

What to do next

If you are happy to take part in the interview please would you complete the attached consent form and return it to me. Once you have returned your consent form I will contact you to organise a convenient time and place for the interview.

Thank you for helping

By taking part in the interview you will be making a positive contribution towards helping to improve the selection and training of crisis and hostage negotiators. In a very real sense your views will shape national thinking in this field, and thereby it is hoped save lives.

If you would like to discuss any aspect of this project, please feel free to contact me on mobile 07980 683388 or e mail on rob.kennett@kent.pnn.police.uk

I would like to take this opportunity of offering my sincere thanks to you for firstly
reading this letter and hopefully agreeing to participate in this unique research study

Rob Kennett

Consent Form

A study on the selection and training of crisis and hostage negotiators

I (please write your name here)

Position (ie. Gold, Regional Co-ordinator, or negotiator)

Agree/ Do not Agree to be a participant in a research study to be undertaken by Rob Kennett

And I understand that the aim of the research is to find out my views on selection procedures and training for Crisis and Hostage Negotiators

I acknowledge that:

1. The aim, methods, benefits and possible risks/hazards of the study have all been explained to me.
2. I voluntarily and freely give my consent to my participation in this research study.
3. The collected results will be used for research purposes and may be reported to the Selection and Training Sub-group of the National Negotiator Working Group.
4. My individual results will not be given to any person except at my request and on my authorisation.
5. That any information that contravene or appear to contravene criminal or disciplinary issues will be the exception to (4) above.
6. I am free to withdraw my consent at any time during the study, in which event I will no longer take part in the study and any information I have given will not be used.
Appendix 2: Interview Schedule for all the Participants.

Interview plan

1. General introduction of self
2. Explanation of the purpose of the research
3. Assurances in respect of confidentiality
4. Request to tape record interview
5. A copy of transcript if desired

Opening Questions

• What is your current role please?
• Have you ever been an operational hostage negotiator, if so how has the role evolved in your view?

Strategic

• What if any global influences do you believe will impact on hostage negotiation in this county?
• What in your view are the primary causation factors for terrorist movements?

• In your view which terrorist groups or organisations do you believe negotiators in this country will be most likely to engage with?

• In your opinion do you believe that governmental policy will affect negotiation strategy, and if so what particular aspects of government policy?

• If you do believe governmental policy has an effect do you believe this will have a negative or beneficial impact on negotiations?

• In your view, do you believe that hostage negotiation is considered within the police service to be an important area of policing business and if so why?

• Do you believe that the national structure to formulate policy and drive innovation in this field is fit for purpose. Would you give your rationale?

• You are no doubt aware that the National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE) is currently developing a variety of operational products. In your view is there a need to produce a manual (similar to firearms) that clearly describes educational and/or tactical products. Please justify your view.

• Do you believe that hostage negotiation is sufficiently funded at a national and local level?

• What do you believe to be the future challenges for hostage negotiators in this country?

SELECTION CRITERA
• What do you believe to be the most important character traits for a police hostage negotiator and why?
• Do you believe there should be a national competency framework for the role of negotiator. If so / if not why?
• Do you believe there should be national selection procedure for negotiators. If so/ if not why?
• If there were to be a national selection procedure, what form should it take in your opinion?
• Do you believe it would be beneficial to have lay/community assessors involved in the selection process. Please expand your answer
• Do you believe that officers should be given a psychological assessment prior to appointment as a negotiator? if so / if not why?
• Do you feel that officers undertaking this role should be medically tested before appointment? if so / if not why?
• In relation to medical and mental health checks for negotiators, should this be a requirement for existing negotiators?
• The service is required to negotiate with individuals from a range of socio-economic backgrounds, and from both visible and non-visible diverse groups. In your view do negotiation cadres currently reflect our communities diversity?
• Do you believe there is any benefit for negotiation cadres reflecting the diversity of the society they serve? if so what?
• Do you believe that negotiators need to be serving police officers? please provide reasons for your answer?
TRAINING ISSUES

• Do you believe that the formulation of a medium term (3-5 yrs) national negotiation training plan would be beneficial and if so why?

• Do you believe the current national training structure (regional and national courses) provides the best model? if so why?

• Do you believe that an inspection by HMIC (Her Majesties Inspectorate of Constabulary) in to this field would be beneficial?

• Do you believe that current training programmes provide officers fit for purpose? please explain your views?

• Do you believe that improvements are required to the national training provision? if so what?

• Are there any other areas in relation to selection and training of negotiators that you wish to comment on?

Thank you for taking the time to allow me to interview you in respect of these matters.