Part-time defenders of the Realm: Is the history of the Territorial Army a likely indicator of Future Reserves 2020 success?

being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of

PhD – History in the University of Hull

by

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Abstract

This research investigates whether the Army Reserve (AR), the new name for the Territorial Army, can become a more integrated, more efficient, better trained, and more deployable force, as intimated by the government, than their previous incarnations. The hoped-for better-trained AR is expected to take a far greater role, taking over some Regular Army roles, providing better trained part-time soldiers for overseas operations and filling capability gaps left by the reenforcement of 20,000 Regular soldiers by the year 2020. To investigate whether these aspirations are achievable, and whether it is possible to train volunteer soldiers better than they have been in the past, this research completes an historical analysis of the history of the AR’s antecedents, the Territorial Force and the Territorial Army, their training, kit and equipment, and overseas deployment record. The thesis also explores historical social, economic and cultural issues which have had an impact upon Territorials, such as civilian employers’ attitudes towards the volunteers and their organisation (and a sense of what wider society thought about the Territorials). Furthermore, research into the Territorial’s family issues, support or otherwise also sheds light upon the influence the family unit has upon the volunteer’s decision to join and how long he/she stays in service. Coupled with family support is research into the support the family received from the government when their Territorial was deployed and what happens when the part-timer returns from war, from 1908 to 2012. This historical comparison will help highlight past struggles and failures inherent in the framework for training and making ready the volunteers of the past with today’s AR, which uses the same structure for training, fitting in civilian commitments and family life.
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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Anti-aircraft (detachment[s]/defence/guns)</td>
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<tr>
<td>A2020</td>
<td>Army 2020</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADGB</td>
<td>Air Defence Great Britain</td>
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<td>AFD</td>
<td>Army Form D</td>
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<td>AFF</td>
<td>Army Families Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFO</td>
<td>Army Form O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWOL</td>
<td>Absent without leave</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>Army Welfare Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEF</td>
<td>British Expeditionary Force (Great War and World War Two)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGLC</td>
<td>British Gas Light Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSA</td>
<td>Birmingham Small Arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBI</td>
<td>Confederation of British Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG</td>
<td>Call out Gratuity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Commanding officer (usually Lieutenant Colonel/Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPM</td>
<td>Disruptive pattern material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRM</td>
<td>Defence Relationship Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERYTAA</td>
<td>East Riding of Yorkshire Territorial Army Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>FR2020</td>
<td>Future Reserves 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOC</td>
<td>General Officer Commanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOCinC</td>
<td>General Officer Commanding in Charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPO</td>
<td>General Post Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HASDD</td>
<td>Historic Attention Span Deficit Disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>High explosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HGV</td>
<td>Heavy goods vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>HM</td>
<td>Her Majesty(’s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMSO</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Stationery Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS/ISIL/Daesh</td>
<td>Islamic State Iraq and Syria/Islamic State in the Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITD</td>
<td>Individual Training Directives</td>
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<tr>
<td>KOSB</td>
<td>King’s Own Scottish Borderers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOYLI</td>
<td>King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATTs</td>
<td>Military Annual Training Tests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>Machine gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>Missing in action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTP</td>
<td>Multi-terrain pattern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAO</td>
<td>National Audit Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-commissioned officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEAB</td>
<td>National Employer Advisory Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHS</td>
<td>National Health Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRMS</td>
<td>National Relationship Management Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSL</td>
<td>National Service League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBUA</td>
<td>Operations in built-up areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OC</td>
<td>Officer commanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORBAT</td>
<td>Order of Battle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDT</td>
<td>Pre-deployment training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PITS</td>
<td>Perpetration-Induced Traumatic Stress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOR</td>
<td>Post Office Rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POTL</td>
<td>Post-operational tour leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>Prisoner of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Permanent Staff Instructors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QVR</td>
<td>Queen Victoria's Rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>Royal Artillery Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RE</td>
<td>Royal Engineers Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFA-96</td>
<td>Reserve Forces Act 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGA</td>
<td>Royal Garrison Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHA</td>
<td>Royal Horse Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTMC</td>
<td>Reserves Training and Mobilisation Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUSI</td>
<td>Royal United Services Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWF</td>
<td>Royal Welch Fusiliers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SaBRE</td>
<td>Supporting Britain's Reservists and Employers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDSR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence and Security Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and medium enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNCO</td>
<td>Senior non-commissioned officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSFA</td>
<td>Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSAFA</td>
<td>Soldiers' Sailors' and Airmen's Families Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Territorial Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAA</td>
<td>Territorial Army Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASB</td>
<td>Territorial Army Sports Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCA</td>
<td>Territorial County Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>Territorial Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFA</td>
<td>Territorial Force Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEWTs</td>
<td>Tactical Exercise Without Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAB</td>
<td>Unemployment Assistance Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWT</td>
<td>Unit Welfare Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(V)</td>
<td>Volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>Victoria Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSG</td>
<td>War Service Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTD</td>
<td>Working Time Directive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Glossary of military terminology

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Annual Camp</strong></td>
<td>A continuous eight to fifteen-day training opportunity for a Territorial/Army Reserve unit/regiment/brigade or division to put into practice training they had received during the training year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army Council</strong></td>
<td>Formed in 1904, modelled on the Board of Admiralty – a single collective body to determine Army policy. Worked in conjunction with a professional Army staff. Ended in the mid-1980s when the three separate service staffs centralised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brigade</strong></td>
<td>A term that superseded ‘tertia’ after the English Civil Wars (1642–9). A brigade today is usually made up from three regiments or units, with Headquarters and support from artillery, engineers, signals, mortars and anti-tank. Commanded by a Brigadier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bullring(s)</strong></td>
<td>Military training camps around Etaples during the Great War to get British soldiers sufficiently trained for trench warfare. Usually lasted around two weeks and ran by training staff with yellow armbands – nicknamed ‘canaries’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canaries</strong></td>
<td>Staff at the Bullrings around Etaples to train British soldiers before rotating to trench duty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Close time training</strong></td>
<td>Pre-deployment training during the Great War for Territorial Force soldiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Colour Sergeant</strong></td>
<td>One rank above Sergeant, an infantry soldier’s rank. Today usually a quartermaster in charge of company stores.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combat fitness test</strong></td>
<td>Eight-mile speed march in full marching order and rifle to be completed in under two hours. Kit for infantry soldiers should weigh 25 kg (55 lb) exclusive of rifle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Company</strong></td>
<td>A Company is made up of three troops/platoons and an HQ supported by (in a fighting company) mortars and anti-tank.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corporal</strong></td>
<td>A junior non-commissioned officer and a section (usually eight soldiers) commander. The Corporal wears two stripes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Deploy[ment]  To deploy is to move bodily to the area of operations where needed, be that overseas or at home. It is the final phase after mobilisation pre-deployment training, and before fighting.

Digging in  To dig either a shellscrape (a shallow hole), foxhole (single man), two man trench or a part of a bigger trench or trenches.

Division  A Division consists of between 10-20,000 soldiers in combat and support arms, made up from several brigades or battle-groups, and capable of independent action. A Division is commanded by a Major-General.

Drill hall  A building owned by the local Territorial Association containing a large gymnasium-sized hall in which to train on drill night. The drill hall also contained classrooms, an armoury, offices and a bar. Today, drill halls are called Army Reserve Centres.

Drill night  When the Territorial or Reservist attends one night a week to train, usually three 45-minute periods of instruction or physical training which counts as a quarter of a day to the Territorial’s commitment.

Foreign service  During the Great War, Territorials could initially choose between home Service and foreign Service, the latter meaning deployment overseas.

Home service  Home service meant serving within the British Isles to defend against a possible invasion by Germany during the Great War.

Lance Corporal  A Lance Corporal is in charge of a fire-team within a section (two fire-teams – Delta team and Charlie team – make one section). Wears one stripe.

Maskirovka  Russian term for deniable warfare.

Medic  Military term for medical professionals, from doctors to nurses.

Mobilise  To be called up and to gather at a designated point, such as a drill hall or, today, to attend the mobilisation centre at Chilwell.

Musketry  Old-fashioned term for rifle shooting and range work.
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>A soldier with no rank.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiment/Unit</td>
<td>A military organisation made up from three fighting/support companies supported by HQ and support troops. The Royal Artillery use batteries and the Royal Engineers use squadrons. Armoured units will use armoured vehicles/tanks depending upon their sizes and structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifleman</td>
<td>A soldier in a light infantry or Royal Marines structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSFA</td>
<td>Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association, later the SSAFA (Soldiers', Sailors' and Airmen's Families Association). A charitable institution set up in 1855 to help the families of servicemen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sapper</td>
<td>Equivalent of a private soldier but in the Royal Engineers Corps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>Commands a troop or Platoon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant Major</td>
<td>Sergeant Majors (Warrant Officer 2) are in command of a Company. Warrant Officer 1s are Regimental Sergeant Majors and are the unit or Regiment’s RSM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Battalions</td>
<td>The soldiers raised by Lord Kitchener after the Great War had started. They were also known as the New Army or Kitchener’s Battalions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Sergeant</td>
<td>Equivalent to a Colour Sergeant but for technical arms, such as signallers or engineers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Musketry test</td>
<td>The rifle test taken by soldiers before the Great War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial County Association</td>
<td>The administrative organisation responsible for the training and kitting up of the local Territorial unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop/Platoon</td>
<td>A body of soldiers up to or around thirty, made up from three sections/fire-teams, with an HQ element and commanded by a troop sergeant and troop lieutenant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>Originally Victorian amateur soldiers which became a (V) after the names of Territorial units and now Army Reserve units.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Webbing              | A set of equipment made from web-woven tough fabric to
carry ammunition, rations and kit during time in the field.

**Weekend Warriors**  
Nickname for Territorials. Other nicknames included Saturday Night Soldiers, the Saturday and Sunday men (SAS) and STABS (Stupid TA Bastards).

**Wehrmacht**  
German Army during World War Two.

**Yeomanry**  
The Cavalry branch of the Territorials/Army Reserve.

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Acknowledgements

Thanks for the production of this thesis go to the interviewees that gave their time in helping the research understand how the Territorial/Reservist trains, holds down civilian employment and keeps the family happy (sometimes). Interviews were also held with wives and partners of ex- and serving Reservists and provided perceptive insight into what those left at home experience when their part-time soldier partners are deployed overseas. Thanks also go to Sergeant Neil Busby, who provided the thesis with invaluable information with his correspondence.

Thanks should also go to the archivists used by the research, which are the Hull History Centre, East Riding of Yorkshire Archives, The Flintshire County Archives, The Hampshire County Archives, The Reckitts Benkiser Archives, The National Grid Archives, Warwick University Archives, British Postal Museum and Archive, Research Department Library, Woolwich Royal Artillery, Museum Archive of the King’s Own Scottish Borderers, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders Museum Archive, The Royal Engineers Museum Library and Archives, and the National Archives at Kew.

Lastly, a big thank you to my supervisors, Professor Greg Bankoff and Dr Catherine Baker, for their expertise and for guiding the thesis in the right direction. To Liz at LE Proofreading and, finally, thank you to my wife Susan for enabling me to do this research.

Dedicated to the memory of three friends and comrades:

Warrant Officer Class 2 Michael Smith
29 Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery
Killed by a Rocket Propelled Grenade in Sangin, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
8 March 2007

Sergeant John Henry Manuel
45 Commando, Royal Marines
Killed by a 13 year old suicide bomber in Sangin, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
12 December 2008
Captain Alan Crompton
51 Parachute Squadron (Air Assault), Royal Engineers
Died in a road traffic accident following a tour of Helmand Province
24 September 2011

And to all the untrained Labour Division's TA soldiers who were killed and maimed
in and around Arras during May 1940.
Introduction

This research investigates whether the Army Reserve (AR) can fill the capability gaps left by the defence cuts of 2010, looking at the past training and employment and family issues of the Territorial Force and the Territorial Army (the AR’s antecedents) from 1908 to 2013. Although Reserve forces have been considered an essential part of British national defence in time of war throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, there has been remarkably little academic research on the Territorial organisation itself, and the literature that does exist usually concentrates on their shortcomings and administration. The core reasons for efficiency failures among Territorials – namely, problems arising from combining family life and employment with Territorial service – are mentioned in far less detail. This thesis, in contrast, places these questions at its centre and, by addressing the full range of issues that have confronted Territorials when trying to become efficient soldiers, offers new criteria for understanding and evaluating Territorial soldiers in the future.

The systematic investigation in this thesis of the Territorial organisation as a whole apportions equal weight to their training, employment and family issues before and during the three largest wars in which Territorials were involved: the Great War (1914–1918), World War Two (1939–1945), and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (2001–2014). The triangulation of training, employment and family, which previous studies have not attempted, will help measure how successful the Territorial organisation was in overcoming these three challenges, whilst contributing to wider theoretical, historical and policy debates about the Reservists as a whole.¹ What this thesis terms the Territorial Trinity of Commitments (training, work and family), a novel concept for Strategic Studies and War Studies, highlights the combination of needs that all Reservists, past and present, struggle[d] to balance as perhaps the most important factor determining part-time soldiers’ commitment to service. Beyond its value to Strategic Studies/War Studies, this thesis also explains why, in military history, Territorials have often struggled in large-scale deployments overseas and why their more effective contributions have succeeded. Moreover, its significance is more than academic: in policy terms, the conceptual and empirical findings of this research will also show that, because of the British government’s lack of understanding of

Territorial history and the Territorial Trinity of Commitments, the Future Reserves 2020 (FR2020) strategy (retrenching 20,000 full-time troops and replacing them with 30,000 part-time Army Reservists) is inherently exposed to weakness. Taking the Territorial Trinity of Commitments into account will suggest that if the newly named Army Reserve (the former Territorial Army) is to survive to fight in the future, and not fight to survive, Britain’s policy makers need to become less ignorant of the Territorials’ past.

For more than a century, between 1908 and 2013, the antecedents of the AR, the Territorial Force (TF) and the Territorial Army (TA), had always struggled to train to full efficiency and recruit up to full establishment. Many Territorial soldiers ‘fought’ simply to train regularly due to work and family commitments, struggling to balance the needs of what the research for this thesis has shown to be the Territorial Trinity of Commitments – training, work and family. This affected the Territorial organisation across more than a century of changes in warfare and in the wider society. The Territorials have never been able to train long enough or as thoroughly as they should to become ready for overseas deployment without significant extra training. Moreover, because of the restrictions of work and family inherent to the Territorial Trinity of Commitments, Territorial soldiers always needed extra, full-time training of between three to six months (known as ‘close time’ training during the Great War and ‘pre-deployment training’ [PDT] today) to prepare themselves for overseas service. And yet, the little research that has so far been done on the future AR has already discovered that the same problems suffered by the historic Territorials are affecting their newly named replacements. An FR2020/AR integration and progress study by Sergio Catignani and Victoria Basham has highlighted many areas that historical research would show to be consistent with the problems encountered by earlier Territorials, such as the influence of family and the pressures of civilian employment.²

Indeed, after more than a century, the AR even continues to use the old Territorial Force framework of drill nights, weekends and annual camp. This study builds on the work of Peter Dennis, Ian F. W. Beckett, K. W. Mitchinson, Helen B. McCartney and Wallace Earl Walker, who have all argued that the Territorial organisation from

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1908 onwards has always struggled to reach efficiency and, therefore, effectiveness in some part due to employment and family pressures. This study reiterates that using the AR as a quickly deployable asset as set out by FR2020 with the minimum of PDT has, based on existing literature and the empirical research carried out for this investigation, a high risk of not achieving its stated aims.

The Territorial organisation has, since its formation, also had the added difficulty of a problem with how it is perceived, which has not helped the organisation with funding and recruitment. The Territorial Force officially started life on 1 April 1908 and was formed by the consolidation into one force of the Honourable Artillery Company, Imperial Yeomanry (cavalry) and the Volunteer Force during the Army Reforms of 1906-1907 of the Secretary of State for War Lord Richard Burdon Haldane. The TF comprised fourteen divisions, fourteen mounted brigades, as well as artillery and engineering units for defending posts not covered by other divisions.

Under this new system, the TF, if mobilised, could be sent to any part of the United Kingdom, but could not be ordered overseas. However, provisions for ‘Imperial Service’ existed for those wishing to serve overseas (only 18,000 pre-war Territorials volunteered for Imperial Service out of a force of 248,340 [1913 figures]). A Territorial could volunteer for overseas service, but only with his own unit or with part of his own unit; he could not be drafted as an individual to any other unit except at his own request. If 90 per cent of a TF unit volunteered for overseas service, the words ‘Imperial Service’ were entered into the Army Lists next to the unit. The TF also continued some old customs, such as having subscription-paying units, the ‘Class Battalions’ or ‘Cuff and Collars’. These Cuff and Collar battalions were middle-class units, such as the London Scottish, The Inns of Court Regiment and the Liverpool Scottish. Members paid annual subscriptions of around 10 shillings and entrance fees of £2.00.0, which ensured that only volunteers who could afford these payments and,

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4 The Territorial and Reserve Forces Act, 7, Ed. VII, cap. 9, dated 2 August 1907.


often, payments for uniform items such as kilts, could join. After the Great War and
the reformation of the Territorial Army in 1920, subscription units became a thing of
the past. The way the Territorials operated, however, did not and this framework of
training – drill nights, weekends and annual camp – carries on into the new Army
Reserve.

Nevertheless, despite the existence of Class Battalions and the exclusivity of the
mainly London Cuff and Collar battalions, the perception of the Territorials from
1908 through to 2013 became tainted in numerous ways. The main accusation
levelled at the Territorial organisation (usually by people who had had little contact
with it) was that they were poorly (militarily) trained amateurs. Nevertheless, when
considering the limited historical studies of the Territorials, one could gain the
impression that Territorials are largely ignored and regarded as outsiders by the
British military, carrying as they do a whiff of failure and amateurism about them. For
example, in 2010 and the start of retrenchment of the Regular Army and concomitant
with a greater emphasis on an integral role for Reservists, Con Coughlin wrote:

I am sure there is a lot of dead wood among the TA’s current strength of
around 35,000, the weekend soldiers who like the kudos that goes with
being associated with our professional soldiers without actually being
qualified to make a tangible contribution to the Army’s combat capability.
Many TA regiments have just been a way of keeping ancient county
regiments alive without serving any real purpose.

This poor perception of Territorials dates back to their formative pre-Great War
years, when the TF was expected, by the public and politicians, to be a trained and
ready home defence force in case of invasion by Germany. It also shows a complete
lack of understanding of the training of the Territorials and the necessity for a full-
time, theatre-specific PDT lasting anywhere between three and six months before
deployment to major theatres of war, a topic that has been neglected in much of the
literature pertaining to the history of the British Army.

These issues are not just matters for historians, but have a direct bearing on
current defence policy. The Army 2020 (A2020) element of FR2020 involves cutting

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8 The Liverpool Scottish Museum Trust, ‘Class Battalions’,
http://www.liverpoolscottish.org.uk/-liverpool-themuseum/history-of-the-regiment [Accessed:
14/01/17].
9 Con Coughlin, ‘The Territorial Army has a key role to play in Armed Forces’, The Daily Telegraph,
28 Sept. 2010.
10 Mitchinson, England’s Last Hope, p. 4.
20,000 Regular soldiers and replacing them with 30,000 part-time Reservists, expecting the AR to fill the resultant capability gaps – despite historical evidence showing that relying on part-time troops with a shortened PDT is a risk. Grave concerns over using the AR in this way have already been expressed by the Parliamentary Committee for Defence, which stated in 2014:

We note that the Secretary of State for Defence accepts that Army 2020 was designed to fit a financial envelope. We are concerned that this consideration took primacy over the country’s abilities to respond to the threats, risks and uncertainties contained in the National Security Strategy.¹¹

In mitigation, the British government stated that the AR would train harder and become better equipped, suggesting that they would be made more deployable with less pre-deployment training.¹²

The government’s FR2020 Multi-Brigade Order of Battle (ORBAT) does indeed have the AR as an integral component in all four envisioned states of readiness for overseas deployment: ‘Extended Readiness’, ‘Lower Readiness’, ‘High Readiness’ and ‘Deployed Force’ (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Future Force 2020 Multi-Brigade ORBAT¹³

Potentially, AR soldiers could be used with little or no PDT if an international emergency should arise. However, the history of the Territorials – as demonstrated in this thesis – shows Reservist soldiers are not effective without a full-time, theatre-specific PDT lasting an appropriate timescale to ensure the efficiency needed to work with full-time soldiers. The problem of how relevant part-time troops can be in an ever more professionalised military, and whether their limited training opportunities will permit them to keep pace with what is likely to be the ever-changing character of warfare in the twenty-first century, also overshadows FR2020 in a period in which, as the strategist Emile Simpson contends in *War from the Ground Up*, the information revolution is causing warfare to evolve, not only in strategy and tactics, but also socially and politically. Therefore, the government needs to be careful in its actions and the kinds of troops it deploys when engaged in modern conflict. Can the new AR become flexible enough through its training to engage in multi-polar insurgencies or hybrid warfare situations? Would, say, the killing of AR soldiers in an ambush or a firefight, filmed by an enemy, reflect well on a government using part-time soldiers? Leading strategic analyst, Julian Lindley-French, discussing the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, suggests that Britain’s future armed forces will become (by 2025) an intelligence-led hub. It is envisioned that this hub would have its centre of gravity towards the high end of the conflict spectrum, consisting of a mix of Special Operations Forces and specialised professional forces with a significant surge capability from Reserves. It is, however, questionable whether the new AR can train to the high standard required for these types of operations within its current training framework, or whether it can even raise the numbers and quality of personnel necessary to fulfil the roles it has been assigned under FR2020.

History shows that there is only so much training a part-time volunteer soldier can achieve in advance of deployment. Moreover, the Territorial Trinity of

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History shows that there is only so much training a part-time volunteer soldier can achieve in advance of deployment. Moreover, the Territorial Trinity of Commitments – a concept that emerges from the original research in this thesis in relation to the social and economic situation of Territorials – demands two-thirds of the volunteer’s time, precious time needed to turn the AR into a force capable of supporting a more specialised professional future force. Readiness for overseas deployment, therefore, rests, and has rested, not on peacetime training, but on full and comprehensive PDT that is only undertaken when a soldier is actually going to be deployed. As past historians of the Territorials have already suggested, since 1908, the pre-PDT Territorial (and today the AR soldier) can only ever be a basically trained asset, with employment and often family holding him or her back from being a better prepared soldier. Extending past research into a more in-depth study of how and why employment and family affect training time and quality provides new insights into the Territorial organisation as a military and social collective which explain why the F2020 concept of the AR may need re-evaluation.

This thesis covers the history of the TF and TA’s training and overseas deployment in three periods before and during three very different conflicts: the Great War, World War Two, and the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns. These three periods represent the Territorials’ greatest periods of troop demand covering the years of 1908–1914, 1920–1940 and 2001–2013, respectively. While the Territorials and the rest of the Army also prepared intensively for possible ground operations against the USSR during the Cold War, which would have been on a scale comparable to the periods under study, the effectiveness and limitations of their Cold War training were never tested as the operations never took place, and neither was their PDT. The Cold War experience cannot, therefore, be meaningfully compared with these three wars and cannot provide this thesis with a case study in its own right, even though it would have had some bearing on how the government and Army approached planning for Iraq and Afghanistan.

Continuities in Territorial training, equipment and preparation for war, as Richard Holmes suggests in his foreword to Territorials, describe an always underfunded, never-appreciated organisation, a theme recurring across these time periods. 17 Beckett lists themes such as high annual volunteer wastage rates, poor test

17 Beckett, Territorials, pp. V-VI.
results and pressure from some firms for their Territorial workers not to attend annual camp. These external pressures, augmented by poor funding and often obsolete kit and equipment, have indeed contributed, across the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, to the Territorials being poorly prepared at the outbreak of war.

This study demonstrates that, historically, the TF and TA (1908–2013) only trained for short periods of time pre-war (their longest training periods were annual camps lasting eight to fifteen days) and were not militarily ready to be deployed overseas having received little or no PDT. While the need for PDT and extra training for the TF was understood during the Great War, PDT was skimped upon during World War Two and disaster inevitably followed for those Territorial units involved. Examples from the Territorials’ experiences in the Norwegian and French campaigns in 1940 remain stark reminders of the folly of sending underprepared, part-time soldiers into battle. Despite the lessons of previous campaigns and the damage a lack of useful PDT can inflict, twenty-first-century Territorials were again sent out, this time to Iraq, with inadequate PDT, leading to poor results for some. Territorial training and its framework have changed little in many ways from the TF in 1908 through to the AR today. The drill nights, weekends and annual camp still take the same form and are still the norm.

Training in military history

Training is a much-neglected subject, despite its importance to military formations. and studying it can present a much better assessment of why a military force performed the way it did or why some military units were more effective than others. Historians cannot understand a military formation’s performances in war without knowing how, before they got anywhere near the enemy, they trained and prepared themselves for battle. When regarding military training for both part-timers and Regulars, many books on war do not go into detail, but training is the essential building block that prepares an army for combat, and dictates whether a force will be capable or not. Many books on war or battles often pay lip service to the training of a force and why they were trained the way they were. For example, Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers’s edited collection of essays on the changing character of war,

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18 Ibid., pp. 34-9.
despite covering much ground, speaks of military reform but does not enter into the mechanics of training.\textsuperscript{20} By investigating training more comprehensively, the reader would understand more approaches to conflict, lessons later learned and how training helped or hindered the result of a conflict.

Many other studies of war also only lightly cover training. Geoffrey Wawro’s book on the Franco-Prussian War, for instance, as excellently researched as it is, only mentions training in passing, whilst arguing that the French Army lacked discipline and psychological strength (both attributes gained by good training). Yet, comparing the training offered by the French and Prussians would surely help to explain why the French collapsed so catastrophically in 1870.\textsuperscript{21} Another example of not giving enough credit to how a force was trained and made superior by this training in one of the wars discussed in this thesis comes from World War Two. Max Hastings details in many places that German troops were superior to Allied troops in training and resources and were psychologically stronger, stating that a confrontation against German troops on anything approaching equal terms would likely end in defeat.\textsuperscript{22} Some detail of the German soldiers’ training in comparison to that of the Allied soldiers might explain why this was the case. Such analysis might also provide greater understanding of how the Allies approached combating the superiority of the German ground troops.

It is correct to say that combat readiness is the ultimate aim of armies and a soldier’s job is to wage war against foreign enemies. Therefore, the fighting soldier’s primary task is to kill without being killed whilst securing victory. The remarkably small amount of literature within military history that does discuss training in depth sustains this observation. The historian Yann Le Bohec, for instance, makes the same argument about the Imperial Roman army’s effectiveness as a military force.\textsuperscript{23} Roman statesman, scholar and writer Cicero (106–43 BC) considered training crucial to the performance of the Roman army (especially its infantry) and stated this on the subject: ‘what can I say about the training of legions? … Put an equally brave, but untrained soldier in the front line, and he will look like a woman’.\textsuperscript{24} The main

\textsuperscript{20} Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers (eds), \textit{The Changing Character of War} (Oxford: OUP, 2013).
\textsuperscript{23} Yann Le Bohec, \textit{The Imperial Roman Army} (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 105-6.
strategic aims of the Imperial Roman army (27 BC–AD 393) were to be superior in every way, physically and mentally strong in comparison to the ‘barbarian’ armies they faced. The Romans knew that proper training helped men cope better in battle when wounded and suppressed fear and panic. The daily training undertaken by Roman infantry recruits had similarities to what is conducted today by modern forces. For the Romans there was a large emphasis on physical fitness and recruits frequently ran in full armour, the equivalent of a British Infantry speed march and combat fitness test today. The Roman recruits would also have daily ‘spit and polish’ parades to instil a sense of pride and self-administration.

Contemporary weapon training and realistic battle training drills still follow the Roman example and this framework has stood the British armed forces in good stead in combat. A modern example of high-quality training leading to military success is the Royal Marines’ successful operations against entrenched Argentinean troops after a ‘yomp’ of more than seventy miles during the Falklands War in May–June 1982. The Argentineans (many of them conscripts), in what should have been impregnable mountain positions at Mount Harriet and Two Sisters, had received much poorer training than the Royal Marines Commandos, who had received thirty weeks of basic recruit training at Commando Training Centre, Devon. The Marines won these battles because they had trained harder and more realistically than their Argentine opponents, not because they were naturally better soldiers.

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26 *Ibid.* The Roman army recruit had four phases to his training before he was considered trained. Phase 1 comprised gymnastics, running and jumping, and marching with or without full marching order. Phase 2 was the individual weapon training phase – sword and spear (also the sling and bow). Phase 3 consisted of civil engineering and labouring to help build a muscular body. Finally, Phase 4 was battle simulation training, infantry against infantry or infantry versus cavalry. The achievements of the Roman Army during this time stand in testimony to their thorough training. Moreover, much of the framework of this training, minus the building, is remarkably similar to what is carried out today in modern armies. For example, the modern British Infantry (including Royal Marines and the Parachute Regiment) build up fitness with running, gym work and marching until the recruits are able to march and run in full field equipment and rifle.


30 Matthew Syed, *Bounce: The Myth of Talent and the Power of Practice* (London: Fourth Estate, 2011), 296 pp. Although those joining the Royal Marines have to pass a pre-recruitment course and have to display certain qualities, alongside physical fitness, such as mental toughness.
Indeed, realistic theatre-specific training, rigorously pursued, has been of vital importance to the performance of a body of troops from ancient times to today. It not only ensures a greater chance of victory, but also saves lives. As Hastings states in Armageddon, the better-trained German soldiers of World War Two held a psychological edge over Allied troops due mainly to better equipment and training. Timothy Harrison Place contends that training and doctrine have to be robust and realistic for the theatre and enemy-faced. For example, a sizable chunk of the British armed forces had from Dunkirk to D-Day (1940–1944) to prepare and train, but did not perform tactically as they should have done. Harrison Place blames the British Army’s performance in North West Europe on poor doctrine and unsuitable training and a failure to learn lessons from its previous battles (in Norway, France, Greece and Crete).

A good example of learning to train the right way for the battlefield an army was facing comes from the fight against the Japanese during World War Two. After the setbacks of 1941 in South East Asia, the British and Indian armies set about learning how to fight in the jungle. In early encounters with the Japanese in the jungle, the British and Indian troops repeatedly allowed themselves to be outflanked, assuming that they had lost the battle if the enemy reached their rear. However, after concentrating on promoting the skills of junior leaders and skilful infantry alongside camouflage and fieldcraft, by 1944, the British and Indians understood the jungle and had learned not to panic if surrounded.

Nevertheless, while military training is essential to performances in the field, the social and economic situations in which Territorial soldiers have found themselves throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first centuries show that two other pillars of what this thesis terms the Territorial Trinity of Commitments are just as important as Reservists’ commitment to training: their commitment to employment and their commitment to family life. These, too, must also be understood to assess fully.

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31 The Royal Marines have a strong ethos of excellence in their training and their commando units. For example, when the author passed out (1990), the troop was told that it was their duty to try to become the best Marine in the unit, a quest many took on, which helped maintain the high standards expected of Royal Marines Commandos.
32 Hastings, Armageddon, p. 168.
34 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
whether the AR can carry out what FR2020 will expect of it. These pillars are also, therefore, as central to this thesis as training, with evidence from Britain’s three largest military deployments in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries demonstrating how these two vital components of the Territorial volunteer’s life interact with the commitment of the part-timer to training and efficiency.

**Territorial’s employment and family commitments in the past and present**

The historical support for the Territorials from employers analysed in this research could inform future planning but should be used cautiously. Historically, the Territorials have had supporters in certain large firms, such as Reckitts or the British Gas Light Company (BGLC), and government institutions such as the General Post Office (GPO) or the Civil Service. The GPO, now the Post Office, has been privatised and still supports the AR, as does British Gas (Centrica). However, Reckitts, now Reckitt Benckiser, refused in 2007 to say whether they supported the Reservists, stating that ‘We are a multinational company and we feel it is not appropriate for us to express an opinion on such matters’. This is a position far removed from the support they offered during and after the Great War and World War Two (as a British Company).

Before the Great War, some employers, such as the GPO and the Civil Service, openly encouraged their employees to join the Territorials through patriotism and duty and perhaps due to being government employees. Some private companies also allowed workers to participate in Territorial activities due to patriotism and duty, such as the Rowntree Cocoa Works in York and the BGLC. However, support for the Territorials could also be profitable on occasions. Mitchinson maintains that many members of the Territorial Force and Army’s administration framework the Territorial County Associations (TCAs) were also business owners and used their contacts in the interests of the Territorials. However, potential access to contracts of supply with local Territorial Associations also proved lucrative and not having to pay higher: tax if the Territorials failed and conscription was introduced ensured the support of a fair

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37 Anon, ‘Royal Mail signs up to Armed Forces Covenant to show its support for UK’s armed forces community’, [http://www.royalmail.com/royal-mail-signs-armed-forces-covenant-show-its-support-UK’s-armed-forces-community](http://www.royalmail.com/royal-mail-signs-armed-forces-covenant-show-its-support-UK’s-armed-forces-community) [Accessed: 20/06/16]; and Anne Minto (Human Resources Director, Centrica), ‘Why supporting the TA is the right thing to do’, article in A Proud History; The First Hundred Years, Official Commemorative Publication of the Territorial Army, p. 55.


39 Mitchinson, England’s Last Hope, p. 54.
proportion of big business.\textsuperscript{40} Many firms that supported the Territorials during the first half of the twentieth century also did well from war contracts.

Nevertheless, there were businesses that often could not or would not support the Territorials. For example, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have found it difficult to support or sometimes afford to have a Territorial working for them.\textsuperscript{41} Support historically for the Territorials was also stymied by socialist organisations, such as the Labour Party and, particularly, the trades union movement.\textsuperscript{42} However, support from business today is under threat and the Chair of the National Employer Advisory Board stated in 2011 that ‘since the recession (2008) businesses could no longer afford to sustain a benevolent relationship with Defence’.\textsuperscript{43}

Support for employees’ participation in the Territorials (and other Reservists), without which the concept of part-time troops in Britain would have collapsed, has always been mixed among employers in Britain, from the time of the Victorian Volunteers (antecedents to the Territorials) through to today’s AR. Nevertheless, to an extent greater than the subject of training, this topic has also been neglected, even in the literature that does study the Territorials in depth. While Dennis, Beckett, Mitchinson, and Walker have covered this subject, it has not been to a deep level. However, a more context-based approach is forthcoming from Jill Knight, who grounds her research into the Civil Service Rifles in referring to the support of the Civil Service for their battalion, and Helen McCartney covers social status, including employment statuses, in her study of the Liverpool Scottish and Liverpool Rifles TF battalions.\textsuperscript{44} Nevertheless, there is no dedicated study of employer/Territorial relations between 1908 and the present day at all, a gap which this thesis aims to start to fill.\textsuperscript{45}

Not only employment, but also family life contributed throughout the periods considered in this study to the conflicting set of Reservists’ priorities that this thesis includes in the term ‘Territorial Trinity of Commitments’. Since 1908, when the

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p. 53. Haldane and the British government from the formation of the TF indicated that the part-timers were the only thing standing between conscription and higher taxes to pay for the conscription. Therefore, it was in the interests of big business in particular to see that the Territorials succeeded and supporting their Territorial employees was one way to do this.


\textsuperscript{42} Walker, *Reserve Forces and the British Territorial Army*, p. 25.


\textsuperscript{44} Jill Knight, *The Civil Service Rifles in the Great War: ‘All Bloody Gentlemen’* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2005); McCartney, *Citizen Soldiers*.

\textsuperscript{45} This research can not fully fill the gaps in employer/Territorial relations but the companies used show a continuation of a relationship from 1908 to 2013.
Territorial Force was founded. Territorials’ families have been vital to determining the part-time soldier’s level of commitment, not only for what training the Territorial could attend, but also how long the volunteer served with his/her unit. The more the Territorial, or today the AR, soldier trains, the more time that part-time soldier spends away from his/her partner and family. For civilians who are not used to long periods of separation, a deployment overseas can be hard to cope with, especially when small children are factored into the equation. Sometimes, the fallout from an overseas tour can result in the part-time soldier leaving the service. The research-based literature for family/Territorial relationships, much like that for employer/Territorial relationships, is fragmented however, and often only mentioned in small sections in books relating to allied subjects. Barbara Hately-Broad shows the effects of deployment overseas on families in World War Two through research on allowances for those families and, for the Great War, Sylvia Pankhurst did the same in her book about the home front, but one still has to delve deep to find stories relating to the wives and families of Territorials.\(^{46}\) To help fill this gap in knowledge about how the partners and families of Territorials have coped with a Territorial deployment, this thesis has looked historically at family relations and has interviewed partners of ex- and serving part-time soldiers. This research shows that the family has had a significant impact on the career of Territorials, and continues to have an enormous influence upon their successors.

In addition, much more needs to be done to care for the partners and families of deployed Territorials who are often left by the Army Welfare Service (AWS) and parent units to cope alone. This poor level of care is also true for many part-time soldiers who have returned from wars, particularly when the returned soldier sustained an injury, mental or physical.\(^{47}\) Moreover, with academic study and Ministry of Defence (MoD) mental health summaries suggesting part-time soldiers suffer more from mental illness after a tour overseas, the MoD and government need to study the long-term consequences of Territorial and Army Reserve overseas tours and perhaps set up a Veterans Department to deal with issues that arise in the aftermath of serving in a conflict.


By examining the history of the Territorials from 1908–2013, this thesis shows that the problems related to the Territorial Trinity of Commitments will continue to affect the new AR. Part-time soldiers still need civilian jobs; they still have families; and all within the Reservist soldier’s social circle are affected in some way by an overseas deployment. This research brings together sources from the government, academia, military charities and information gathered from interviews to give a full picture of the real struggles faced by part-time soldiers when they return home to their families and resume their civilian employment with little help from those who sent them overseas.

**Literature Review**

*The Territorials' place in the history of the British Army*

The mainstream historiography and, in particular, traditional military history of the British Army of the twentieth century has largely ignored the Territorials, their contributions to Britain’s conflicts, their training and the reasons for their difficulties in attaining military efficiency. This neglect of the Territorials also includes any in-depth academic research into the role of employment and the part-timers’ families. A more extensive historiography of the Territorials would help address three important issues when discussing their past. Firstly, the AR will find it difficult to achieve all that is laid out in FR2020; it would be easy to discover that the Territorials could only train for so long and often had trouble training all its troops for the minimum twenty-seven days. Secondly, those interested in trying to make the AR more deployable and PDT shorter would discover that to have an effective deployable Reserve requires the requisite amount of PDT. Thirdly, a more thorough historiography would shine a light upon Territorial training’s rivals for time – employment and family. While the three themes of military training, employment and family issues do appear in the academic literature, they only do so in fragmented form. These themes are integral to the history of the Territorials but have not yet been comprehensively brought together.

48 The Territorial Force and Territorial Army’s soldiers had a minimum of twenty-seven days’ service, achieved through drill nights – one night a week training at the local platoon/troop drill hall, counting as a quarter of a day – weekends, usually Friday night, Saturday and Sunday morning, and, finally, annual camp, usually held in summer and between eight to fifteen days under canvas training and testing opportunity.
Yet the evidence shows that the competing sets of priorities of the Territorial Trinity of Commitments mean that Territorial part-timers have always struggled to reconcile their military training and employment and family issues. The Territorial Trinity of Commitments is what the authors of FR2020 (alongside most academic studies and many officials that have been involved with policy/planning for the AR) have failed to understand.

Evidence shows that the Territorials have always struggled in their assignments and it requires a deeper understanding of the Territorial organisation and the Territorial Trinity of Commitments to understand why. Peter Dennis wrote in his study of the Territorials that the organisation “has had a chequered history. Apart from a short period immediately after its establishment, it suffered from periodic indifference and neglect, and occasional hostility, both at the hands of government and from the public”. This quotation could also be true of military historians who may have underrated the Territorials’ other commitments.

Many general histories of the British Army have either tended to avoid any serious analysis of the Territorial formations’ input into Britain’s twentieth-century conflicts or have not analysed them at all. Most of these general histories of the British Army only mention training briefly, if at all, and the majority of the material concerns the Regulars. Timothy Harrison Place argues that not only did the Territorials need to learn their trade of soldiering, but so too did the Regular Army. Although much of his study on military training is about the British Army as a whole, the ‘National Army’ containing both Regulars and Territorials, the work demonstrates how the Army struggled to update their training from doctrine learned in 1916 to a more modern approach. The Territorials started this training (World War Two) at a disadvantage, having been starved of funding and decent kit and equipment.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. F. Green noted in 1938 the shortage of available training time. “confined as it is to an odd hour or two on drill nights during the week, occasional week-ends, and the fortnight’s camp in the summer”. This state of affairs has been the lot of the Territorials ever since. Other than specialist research on the organisation, the travails of the TF and TA are rarely taken into consideration in the many histories concerning the British Army.

49 Dennis, The Territorial Army, p. 1.
50 Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army, 1940–1944.
Examples of Territorials and their training appear infrequently in most general British Army histories. For example, Allan Mallinson, in *The Making of the British Army*, makes only specific mention of the Territorials nine times in 550 pages, despite major contributions from the organisation during two world wars, and in Iraq and Afghanistan.\(^52\) Another example is William Philpott’s history of the Battle of the Somme, which has only four specific mentions of the TF, although he does name all the divisions and corps of the organisation by number when engaged in action. However, they are not identified as Territorial units and one would have to possess knowledge of the Territorial divisional and corps systems to recognised them.\(^53\) The contribution of the Territorials in Britain’s twentieth-century wars is limited in general British Army histories. However, there is some discussion of training and deployment of Territorial units mentioned in some regimental histories, mainly due to the fact that, during the Great War and World War Two, Territorial units became part of the regimental order of battle for use in the field. For example, the *Regimental Records of the Royal Welch Fusiliers* discusses their Territorial unit’s training and deployment on the Western Front 1914–1918 as part of their regimental war history.\(^54\) Mark Lloyd’s *London Scottish* also mentions training before deployment but there is little deep analysis of how ready this unit was before deployment in 1914.\(^55\) A better analysis of Territorials and how they trained for deployment was, on the other hand, addressed in Richard Holmes’s *Dusty Warriors*, which also notes the Regular Army’s acceptance of PDT-trained Territorials being able to work well alongside them on operations.\(^56\) The truth is that, as Holmes wrote, “the regular army could not have fought either world war without a massive influx of non-regulars, with the TA, with all its strengths and weaknesses, taking the strain before the ponderous engine of conscription could cut in”.\(^57\) Although the Territorials played integral roles in both world wars, as well as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, their historical contributions have received scant acknowledgement outside the few specialist Territorial histories.\(^58\)


\(^{57}\) Holmes, *Soldiers*, p. 90.

\(^{58}\) Beckett, *Britain’s Part-Time Soldiers: Beckett, Territorials; Dennis, The Territorial Army; Mitchinson, England’s Last Hope; and Walker, Reserve Forces and the British Territorial Army.*
Studying the Territorial organisation alongside Regular British Army study will help in understanding fully how better integration in the future, with regard to the AR, could be accomplished. However, it is not only Territorial training and contributions to war that have received little coverage in academic literature. The Territorial Trinity of Commitments has two other pillars – employment and family – alongside training; these pillars are indivisible.

To become an efficient soldier, good at working through basic soldiering and possessing the muscle memory and reflexive actions needed, is a process that takes constant purposeful training. Matthew Syed has studied this process and adds to Malcolm Gladwell’s theory of top performers practising for around 1,000 hours per year to become expert in their field. Syed expands the theory further and states that helping make someone truly proficient/expert at a particular activity takes around 10,000 hours of purposeful practice. 29 This rule is true for sport, academia and musicians, to name but three areas. 60 Training is essential if a person or group wishes to become proficient in an activity. Therefore, to understand the performance of the Territorials, one has to know how they were trained, and why they were trained that way.

A serious analysis of Territorial training not only shows the difficulties part-time soldiers faced attending training, but also reveals the reasons the Territorials trained in the way they did. The framework for training – drill nights, weekends and annual camp – that was laid down in 1908 is still used today, and was and is the only way part-time soldiers can train. The compromises with employers and families will always remain, despite government’s insistence that the new AR will train longer and harder. 61 As Territorials could only train for short periods, they only achieved a very basic level of training. Their subsequent struggles in passing military tests ensured that the Territorials then became subject to accusations of amateurism.

Before the Territorials existed (1908), the reputation of the amateur military tradition had always been lampooned, from the militia through to the Territorials’ immediate predecessors the Victorian Volunteer Force (1858–1908). 62 The part-

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60 Ibid., pp. 12-14.
62 Hugh Cunningham, The Volunteer Force: A Social and Political History 1859–1908 (London: Croom Helm, 1975). The Volunteer Force were formed 23 June 1860 and was replaced by the Territorial Force 1 April 1908. Like the TF, their ORBAT contained Infantry and Artillery with its
timers, formed during the 1858 French invasion scares, are described by the Volunteer historian Hugh Cunningham as ‘a rich target for the cartoonist’s pencil and the urchin’s mirth’. Many part-time soldiers found it difficult to achieve efficiency (mainly failing military tests), from Victorian Volunteers through to the Territorial Army. Ian Beckett suggests that the reported military test failings provide a link between the often uneasy relationship between Regulars and their part-time comrades and a lack of understanding by both parties. Beckett states that this lack of mutual respect has only recently slowly eroded, with the closer integration of Territorials being deployed with Regulars to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, the primary reason the TF failed to shake the label of amateurism was twofold. Firstly, there was a national populist campaign of denigration of the force by the pro-conscriptionist National Service League (NSL). Historian K. W. Mitchinson contends that the NSL campaign was aimed ‘not so much at the Territorial Force per se, but rather at the inadequacies of a system which permitted and expected such an under-strength organisation of such dubious efficiency to constitute Britain’s first line of land defence’. Secondly, there was a general perception of Territorial failure and inefficiency brought about by the TF’s annual inability to pass military tests, such as in musketry and artillery, which added to their poor marching discipline made the Territorials look amateurish. Mitchinson is again correct when he states that ‘the force’s popular image of youthful inefficiency meant, that after the outbreak of war, it was easy for the War Office to give precedence to Kitchener’s New Army’. Ian Beckett adds to this debate by maintaining that the image of inefficiency was not entirely the fault of the Territorials, stating that, because the organisation had no apparent liability for overseas service and no proper mobilisation scheme until 1912, Regular commanders questioned the validity of wasting resources on such units. This questioning of the validity of expenditure affected the issue of new Lee Enfield rifles to infantry units and ensured the TF Artillery had to use the obsolete fifteen-pounder guns and five-inch howitzers with

support, such as engineers and signals. The Yeomanry were separate before 1908; however, the Volunteer Force did contain light horse and mounted rifles. pp. 1-2.
63 Ibid., p. 4.
64 Beckett, Territorials, pp. 222-3.
65 Ibid.
66 Mitchinson, England’s Last Hope, p. 1.
67 Ibid., p. 167.
68 Ibid., p. 5.
69 Beckett, Britain’s Part-time Soldiers, p. 219.
limited issued shells to save money.70 A lack of modern kit and equipment had a knock-on effect on training; the TF were eventually issued with Lee Enfield rifles, which replaced the Lee Metford rifles dating from the South African War, and the Territorial Force Artillery had to retrain with modern artillery pieces and shells. Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly argue that it is hard to assess the efficiency and probable effectiveness of the TF before the Great War given the failure of a clearly defined role: whether it was for home defence or as a basis for expansion in the event of Continental war.71 Furthermore, many observers of the time doubted the Territorial home force’s ability to achieve a state of readiness.72 Therefore, an investigation into the musketry, artillery and fieldwork capabilities of the Territorials may prove efficacious in assessing the probable effectiveness of the part-time force in the past, as well as the future.

The reputation the Territorials had for amateurishness lasted throughout the 1920s until the eve of World War Two (1938). Major-General Sir John Kennedy, former General Officer Commanding of the 44th Division (TA), describes the training of the Territorials as ‘largely a veneer – which the rough usage of war destroys almost at once’.73 The thesis reinforces Major-General Kennedy’s statement that Territorial training was inadequate and, in some cases, extremely poor. from 1920 until 1940. However, the larger point remains that when the Territorials have been an inefficient and barely trained force, for example the pre-World War Two Territorials, who was to blame? Was it the part-timers who turned up one night a week and the occasional weekend to train on obsolete kit and equipment in barely suitable training establishments or was it government and Army Council funding and doctrine?

Many politicians and generals, of course, blamed Territorial inefficiency upon the Territorials and their County Associations, but there were many factors that determined whether a part-time soldier became efficient. Timothy Harrison Place discusses British military training during World War Two and makes the point that it was not just a problem confined to Territorials when World War Two started. He also states that the Regular Army also struggled with doctrine, equipment and training issues during this war. These problems were only exacerbated when they impacted

70 Ibid.
72 Mitchinson, Defending Albion, p. 40.
73 Dennis, The Territorial Army, p. 253.
upon a Territorial structure run by Regular soldiers. He states that ‘in the early years of the war the large numbers of conscripts, called-up Reservists and Territorials could not have received the degree of training that they might have got had strategic conditions been more accommodating of the requirements of military preparedness’. In other words, PDT was essential for these non-professional soldiers to survive and succeed in combat. Shelford Bidwell (former World War Two Artillery officer) also agrees that, before World War Two, the TA was regarded as ‘in no way fit for war’. Bidwell states that the ‘TA showed a preference for muddle’, was ‘sensitive to criticism’ and that ‘their officers were not selected for any specifically military aptitudes. It was felt that any chap who had been to public school and had served in the [University] Officer Training Corps was fit to be an officer’. There was much friction between the Territorials and their Regular Army trainers during the full-time training that followed the debacle of France, 1940. However, Bidford contends that, in particular, ‘the TA gunners of the Royal Artillery greatly distinguished themselves, both by their efficiency and their readiness to fight by their guns at close quarters, to the bitter end if necessary.’

The Territorials, despite their poor funding, training and equipment issues, have changed as warfare has changed. The very fact that the Territorial Force and Territorial Army were only basically trained soldiers before PDT may even, on occasions, have helped adaptation to the specifics of a certain theatre. The Territorials have always provided skills that were short in the Regular Army and now the AR provides civilian skills and experience often lacking in a Regular Army unit. This could be a direction the AR could take to ensure a more bespoke and needed service. For example, Richard Holmes highlights how the modern Territorial soldier was used and perceived. He also denotes the changing character of warfare and points to a niche that sometimes only part-time soldiers can fill. During the conflict in Iraq, one Regular infantry officer observed that:

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75 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
77 Ibid., pp. 118-9.
78 Ibid.
The TA with their somewhat different background is capable of deploying some accomplished personnel. These men and women were often able to bring their experience from civilian life into the battle group. This fact was recognised by the battalion [Second in Command] 2ic when he visited their training at Lydd [a training area in Kent]. He made the point that we needed accountants as we were taking over public funds and engineers who could help to rebuild the state and its infrastructure.  

Another example of a needed speciality provided by part-time soldiers are the Royal Army Medical Corps personnel (known as the Territorial Army Medical Services) that provided professionally qualified staff throughout the Afghanistan campaign. These medical professionals not only saved many British and Coalition soldiers’ lives, but also treated and operated upon Afghan civilians and injured Taliban patients.  

Training for the military is vital. The better trained a soldier is, the better able that soldier is to face the brutality of warfare. However, to become better trained and to prepare for the unthinkable, Wallace Earl Walker (former American officer, combat veteran and academic) states that participating and becoming fully efficient is particularly challenging for part-time, voluntary reserve, combat forces. He goes on to say of Territorials that ‘they must not only attend to individual and unit training, they must also build unit cohesion and personal morale. All this activity must take place during periods when most people are resting from the demands of their work-a-day worlds’. However, as mentioned throughout this introduction, the military training completed is only one-third of being a part-time soldier. The next of the Territorial Trinity of Commitments is employment.  

Civilian - Employment  

Evidence shows that employment and the support of employers for the system of part-time soldiering in Great Britain was and is vital for its survival. The importance of

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79 Holmes, Dusty Warriors, pp. 52-3.
81 Walker, Reserve Forces and the British Territorial Army, p. 97.
82 Ibid.
the employer is an underresearched field and, although the importance of employers and their support for the historic Territorials has been covered by Territorial specialists, no previous research has been dedicated to the employer/Territorial nexus in the same way as this thesis, nor has any previous research been systematic enough to discover patterns in what kinds of organisations did or did not support part-time volunteers. Furthermore, if any group is just as influential as spouses and family in whether a potential Reservist joins and stays in Territorial/AR service, it is arguably the Reservist’s employer. Ian Beckett suggests that purely local factors, such as the attitude of employers and local authorities, were as important in the recruitment and retention of Territorials in the past as they are today for the AR.\textsuperscript{84} Beckett states that large employers, such as BSA (Birmingham Small Arms) Motorcycles and the Dunlop Rubber Company, were active supporters of the Territorials (many of the larger supporters were also the recipients of defence contracts).\textsuperscript{85}

However, support has been thin in other sectors of the employment market, a classic example being SMEs which could not easily address losing key workers for days or weeks. Furthermore, there were potential recruits who would not join for ideological reasons. Mitchinson shows examples of this bias against the Territorials from the trades union, including the distribution, as early as April 1908, of “scurrilous anti-Territorial socialist leaflets circulating in Lancashire”.\textsuperscript{86} Dennis underlines the ongoing hostility to the TA and the Army in general from socialist groups by explaining the uncooperative attitude of the Labour Exchange in consistently refusing to handle recruiting material.\textsuperscript{87}

It is, therefore, not surprising that enormous efforts were made to prove to employers the significant advantages attached to part-time soldiering, in, for example, the attitude and managerial skills gained by their employees when they returned to work. Before the TCAs (Territorial County Administration HQs) and their attempts to persuade local employers to support the Territorials, the Victorian Volunteer Force had already developed an argument for recruiting with the employer’s blessing. Hugh Cunningham, in his study of the Volunteers, listed the apparent benefits to society and employers that enlistment in the Volunteers (working-class) had in 1862: “discipline,

\textsuperscript{84} Beckett, \textit{Britain’s Part-time Soldiers}, p. 218.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{86} Mitchinson, \textit{England’s Last Hope}, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{87} Dennis, \textit{The Territorial Army}, p. 197.
cleanliness, order, punctuality, promptitude, and obedience: 

88 Volunteering was also said to make men ‘less idle and dissipated, and more respectful of authority’: 89 The Territorial Associations through to SaBRE (Supporting Britain's Reserves and Employers) have used the same argument: that of Reservists benefiting their employers companies by acquiring transferable skills, such as leadership, self-confidence and initiative. 90 However, these bodies were mostly preaching to the converted.

Indeed, the history of efforts to improve employer support for Territorials demonstrates that Territorials have always inhabited dual identities of being both civilian and soldier. Helen McCartney, in her investigation of the 1/6th and the 1/10th Battalions of the King's Liverpool Regiment during the Great War, explores how the soldiers' perceptions of their civilian selves, their stake in civilian society, their families at home and their relationship with the British Army melded with the support of their employers. McCartney's study highlights again just how vital an employer's support and that of family were to the continued retention and morale (during deployment) of Territorial soldiers. 91 In his study, Walker states that the principal non-military competitors of the Territorial Army are employers and families and that for Territorials, families and jobs must be their first concerns, preceding TA service in priority. 92 Alongside employment, partners and family also have a significant say in a Territorial's career.

**Civilian - Family**

The work undertaken for this thesis combines this research with the Territorials’ battlefront military history to give a fuller account of military readiness generally (often affected by the support or non-support of the part-timer’s partner and family) and Territorial readiness to deploy overseas. The third pillar of the Territorial Trinity of Commitments is a vital prop when regarding the participation of a part-time soldier in the Territorials and is especially relevant concerning morale if deploying overseas. Traditional historical analysis of the ‘Home Front’ has often seen women and children left behind as problems requiring protection or, when filling men’s pre-war

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88 Cunningham, *The Volunteer Force*, p. 28.
89 Ibid.
91 McCartney, *Citizen Soldiers*.
92 Walker, *Reserve Forces and the Territorial Army*, p. 43.
occupations, as ‘interesting but temporary anomalies’. This has now changed somewhat with Gail Braybon and Penny Summerfield’s contribution Out of the Cage and Barbara Hately-Broad’s War and Welfare, which describe strong women often holding families together in hard times. Indeed, the contributions of Braybon, Summerfield and Hately-Broad are works that would benefit researchers of military history and not just social historians. This research subject also argues that women have played a crucially valuable part in supporting Territorial participation and the war effort. During the two world wars, other than taking on the missing men’s vital economic roles, women had the additional task of keeping the morale of their husbands and boyfriends overseas as high as could be expected. It was essential for the government to care for families left at home, as they knew that this practice helped maintain support for the Territorials fighting overseas. In the past, the Separation Allowance during the Great War and the Family Allowance of World War Two were at subsistence level and families struggled, often having to rely on charity and emergency grants. The present allowances are now sufficient for those left at home; however, what is lacking is welfare support (from the AWS) for families, both during a tour and especially after the Territorial returns home.

The importance of supporting families at home was recognised at the very top of government from the Great War onwards. The political parties, even then, understood that the welfare of the soldier’s family at home was vital to the morale of that soldier in the field, even if they were often slow to ensure that families were paid their small rightful allowances on time. Lord Moran, a medical officer on the Western Front, saw that the government needed to ensure the family at home was properly cared for, as ‘those thoughts [of the deployed soldier] that are allowed to fester, a wife or child at home suffering hardship for instance, in the mind would bring defeat’.

However, not everyone in the establishment felt this way, exemplifying Nancy Huston’s suggestions that ‘women are always perceived as dangerously weakening and polluting to masculinity in war’. Barbara Hately-Broad observes that this concern became so high during World War Two that the War Office attempted to monitor soldiers who were too worried about their family back home to fight

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93 Margaret R. Higonnet, June Jenson, Sonya Michel and Margaret Collins Welitz (eds), Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 2.
94 Hately-Broad, War and Welfare, p. 64.
effectively. To combat this worry, the War Office set up a Morale Committee to help gauge deployed soldiers' states of mind.97

Soldiers were also concerned about the amount of allowance their families received when they were serving overseas. For example, Helen McCartney describes a situation in which older, married non-commissioned officers (NCOs) became worried that their life insurance policies would become invalid if they served overseas.98 Sylvia Pankhurst details the anxiety and hardship of families left at home when their allowance payments were delayed due to inefficiency, which directly affected the morale of the menfolk at the front.99 This hardship, states Gail Braybon and Penny Summerfield, was still not addressed sufficiently when World War Two started and forced many wives and dependants to seek work and make up differences in poor or missing allowance payments.100

The support of wives and families was always vital in the twentieth century for Territorial participation but it was not only a matter of finances. This support from the Territorials' families however, was often hard to garner especially in the aftermath of the Great War and the inter-war years. Peter Dennis explains that the poor support of women for the Territorials as an institution during the 1920s and 1930s sometimes stemmed from the fact that many mothers and wives had lost male relatives during the Great War. Also, many women looked upon the drill halls as nothing but drinking dens.101 Furthermore, many Territorial Associations felt that wives discouraged their husbands from joining local units because it took their husbands away from home too often.102 Therefore, a fine balancing act had to be achieved by Territorial units, which undoubtedly had an effect on training. The problem of keeping the family at home happy has always been a challenge to the committed Territorial. In interviews he conducted during the 1990s, Wallace Earl Walker found that family pressure played a vital part in inhibiting volunteers from contributing more.103 Walker argued that TA commanders knew the persuasive powers a wife, girlfriend or family had over many Territorials and, therefore, tried to convince wives and girlfriends that they also

97 Hatley-Broad, War and Welfare, p. 64.
99 Pankhurst, The Home Front, p. 79.
101 Dennis, The Territorial Army, p. 176.
102 Ibid.
103 Walker, Reserve Forces and the British Territorial Army, p. 45.
profited from their husbands or boyfriends’ service. The convincing of Territorials’ ‘better halves’ involved units putting on Christmas parties, children’s parties and open days and, of course, the prompt payment of bounties. The Reservist’s partner and family is a vital pillar of the Territorial Trinity of Commitments and this needs a particular kind of nurturing to enable a steady flow of recruits and to retain soldiers. However, there are sometimes psychological consequences of an overseas tour that have effects on families and Territorials when they returned home, such as during the recent campaigns in Iraq (Operation Telic) and Afghanistan (Operation Herrick).

There is now overwhelming historical and clinical evidence to suggest that ‘war exacts a heavy toll regarding human suffering, not just combatants but also for all military personnel and affected civilians’. Peter Barham, for example, made a significant contribution to the study of servicemen suffering from psychosis or those classified as insane due to war service in Forgotten Lunatics (2005). Although scholars have written much about wartime shell shock, the life of the mentally wounded man after the Armistice of 1918 has been a neglected subject. Barham partly fills this gap when he explores the lingering after-effects of the Great War and concentrates on the treatment of ordinary British servicemen, their subsequent struggles and how they and their families tried to rebuild their lives whilst campaigning for social justice. This research was added to by Fiona Reid, who explored the history of men with shell shock and their struggles to prove their manhood and productivity despite their mental maladies. However, there are also different forms of mental illness that can affect soldiers that focus on the trauma of killing enemies in battle. In 2005, Rachel MacNair introduced the concept of Perpetration-Induced Traumatic Stress (PITS), a form of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) caused not by being a victim of trauma, but by being an active participant.

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104 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
There is increasing evidence to suggest that among returning British servicemen and women, the Territorials are more at risk of displaying behavioural changes and PTSD. Leading the way in this kind of research is King’s College, London. The research project, led by Christopher Dandeker, conducted interviews with soldiers who had returned from Iraq and Afghanistan pre-2011. These interviews showed that proportionally more Territorial returnees displayed greater instances of heavy drinking and risk-taking, which could act as indicators for PTSD in the future.\footnote{T. Browne, A. Iverson, L. Workman, C. Barker, O. Horn, M. Jones, D. Murphy, N. Greenburg, R. Ronà, M. Hotopf, L. Wessely and N. T. Fear, ‘How do experiences in Iraq affect alcohol use among male UK armed forces personnel?’, \textit{Occupational and Environmental Medicine}, Vol. 65, No. 9, (2005).} Further evidence from King’s College also shows that the Territorials were more adversely affected by an overseas tour to Iraq or Afghanistan than their Regular comrades.\footnote{Christopher Dandeker \textit{et al.}, ‘Coming Home’ (2011).} As the government wishes to use and integrate Reservists more than they have been before, research into what happens to a Reservist soldier after an overseas tour is of vital importance in trying to understand the limits of what can be expected from a part-time civilian volunteer, especially if repeatedly called up for service.

The transition from war to civilian life is important for the psychological health of a returned Territorial.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}} Careful management from government and its agents, such as the AWS, and a knowledgeable and sensitive approach from friends and family, can alleviate some of the concerns and frustrations of someone who has witnessed the horrors of war. Research into how returned Territorials behave on returning home only started with the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. However, the strictest caution and research should be undertaken to establish whether it is wise to use Reservists as frequently as has been the case during the ‘War on Terror’ years.

The Territorial Trinity of Commitments – training, employment and family – was vitally important when it governed how the Territorial Force and Territorial Army worked as an organisation. The same sets of principles are equally important today for the newly named Army Reserve. Training is vital for an effective reserve. However, if training impinges upon the volunteer’s work or family, the delicate balance of the Territorial Trinity of Commitments is thrown out of kilter: the part-time civilian volunteer is free to choose between training, annoying an employer or, perhaps worse, annoying his or her family. Training usually loses out in this struggle. As has happened previously, the AR soldier may struggle to meet the government’s
expectations under FR2020. Looking at the historical evidence for successful FR2020 implementation for the AR with a more efficient, quicker-to-deploy force, it seems unlikely that the renamed organisation will succeed in all that is expected of it.

Methodology and research: the Territorial Trinity of Commitments

This research seeks to understand whether the AR can fulfil its new role within FR2020 by investigating Territorial training and PDT from 1908 to 2012. The thesis uses three periods of history in which Territorial troops were most in demand – the Great War, World War Two, and the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.

The thesis analyses the effectiveness of the historical Territorials and the long-term viability of the AR. Therefore, the methodology for the thesis is constructed upon three levels of analysis: use of the sociological approach of methodological triangulation; an analysis of Territorial training and employment and family issues; and collating the relevant data to answer the theoretical perspective contained within the thesis structure. The method of triangulation will base knowledge claims on consequence-orientated, problem-centred and pluralistic grounds to discover how and why the Territorials trained the way they did and assess the results they produced from this training. The methodology also discovers the effects of having to work while training and the influence family had upon part-time soldiers. Therefore, the triangulation used for this research gives effect to the three pillars of the Territorial Trinity of Commitments – training, employment and family – and allows the research to investigate how successful the Territorials were in overcoming their three main challenges and gaining efficiency. This methodology also helps the thesis examine whether past experience might be an indicator in predicting the success of the Future Reserves 2020 project.112 By using this multi-method research technique, the thesis builds an overarching conceptual model of ‘The Territorial Trinity of Commitments’ in which to pursue a deeper research of the Territorials, investigating all the factors that affect service as a part-time soldier alongside the testimony of participants in the organisation and their partners. This is an approach which further research could use when studying who and what affects Reservist training and retention in both the past

and the future. This methodology shows that the Territorial system, to work efficiently, could be likened to a three-legged stool: take one leg away and the stool collapses. The Territorial Trinity of Commitments illustrates this careful balance perfectly. The interdependent pillars of training, employer support and family support are essential in ensuring that part-time soldiering is viable and the Territorial can attend regular training. Each commitment the Territorial tries to balance when he or she joins has equal weight and must be afforded equal attention. This balancing act was difficult to achieve for many throughout the history of the Territorials, as Territorial specialist authors have shown in discussing how much the Territorials could train. It remains difficult today, with Catignani and Basham’s preliminary research into sustaining the AR suggesting that the extra training commitments implemented with FR2020 are affecting the balance between employment and family. Many AR commanding officers report that the extra training is affecting morale and operational readiness, which in turn affects retention.

The structure of the thesis follows the Territorial Trinity of Commitments. By using each of the Territorial Trinity of Commitments as a heading, the factors that affect the part-time soldier in training, employment and family can be investigated in depth, which also enables historic patterns to emerge. When collated in the conclusion, a true, in-depth and multi-faceted picture emerges that fully informs the problems faced by historic Territorials and the legacies inherited by the AR for the future. The first commitment, training, invites an in-depth analysis of Territorial training, kit and equipment and warfare from 1908 to 2013, concentrating on the three largest deployments in which training can be assessed against actual performance in war. This review not only reveals major shortcomings in Territorial training, kit and equipment, but also makes clear that the restrictions on training to become an efficient Territorial heavily relied upon the influence and support of employers and family. The civilian commitments of the Territorial and his or her employment and family are essential. Therefore, the Territorial Trinity of Commitments methodology shows this and demonstrates the three pillars of balance faced by every Territorial from 1908 through to today’s Army Reservist. Each pillar is critical and interlocking, creating a delicate balancing act for the serving Territorial past, present and future. To this end.


\[11^2\] Basham, ‘Sustaining future army reserves’. 
the research questions posed by this thesis interrogate the ability of the AR to fill the capability gaps left by the sacking of 20,000 Regular soldiers as laid down by FR2020.

The research questions for this thesis are, therefore:

1. To what extent can an analysis of the TA’s training and service in the past indicate the likely success of the new role the AR has been designated under FR2020?

2. What role have employers and families played in supporting the Territorials in the past, and are those roles any different today?

This thesis also uses acquired knowledge of the military (see experiential knowledge later in this section), its culture, and the way it thinks, which helped when searching for primary sources. Therefore, a plan of which military archives to use was essential and, once located, what type of primary sources would be of most value, such as training records, test results and war diaries, when investigating training and kit and equipment issue.

The thesis presents the Territorial organisation countrywide, from 1908 to 2013, using archives which held Territorial records in England, Scotland and Wales. All arms of the Territorial Force/Army (infantry, artillery, yeomanry, engineers, signals, and etcetera) were covered. The corps and regimental archive sources were gathered from the Museum of the King’s Own Scottish Borderers, the Royal Artillery Research Department Library Woolwich, and the Royal Engineers Museum Library and Archives. The local regimental archives used are held at the Hull History Centre, the East Riding of Yorkshire Archives, the Hampshire County Archives and the Flintshire County Archives. For Territorial units formed by or with help from their employers, the research used sources from the Reckitt and Benckiser Archive, the National Grid Archives, and the British Postal Museum Archive. There are many Territorial records scattered around the country and, for general military and public Territorial record archives, the National Archives, the Imperial War Museum,

the National Army Museum, Warwick University Archives, and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders Museum were used. The thesis also used traditional empirical archive sources (military and industry), and internal documentation regarding Territorial deployment. The research has also relied on secondary and tertiary sources regarding the Territorials, some written by Territorials in journals, biographies, memoirs and reference books.

A point regarding the availability of archives for the period covering World War Two must be made. While there was an abundance of material for the period 1908–1914 and beyond until the start of World War Two, the material for the training and everyday organisation of the Territorial Army from 1939 onwards was scarce in the regimental archives. This scarcity is mainly due to a selection of what to keep and the destruction of records during the 1960s and 1970s, when many documents were either burned or disposed of in skips. For example, when enquiring about sources with the East Yorkshire Yeomanry Archive, the archivist stated that there were no records because they were burned to create room during the decades mentioned above.\textsuperscript{117} This is an action that typifies the insignificance the British military institutional memory attached to the history of the Territorials by regiments and their regimental archive keepers. Much of the material for the Territorials’ latter periods, therefore, came from regimental journals, regimental histories and memoirs. The more official military and governmental sources came from the National Archives in the form of war diaries, general annual reports, regional military reports and Cabinet papers.

For the battlefield experiences utilised to assess PDT, the research used mainly first-hand accounts corroborated by official histories of the battles and incidents that took place. Caution was exercised for the individual war diaries of units, as commanding officers, when sometimes recording retrospectively, often tended in their narratives to show their units in the best light possible. There can be treacherous currents when negotiating these sources. For example, if mistakes were made, neighbouring units were often blamed. This practice is shown in the war diary of the 7\textsuperscript{th} (Service) Battalion South Staffordshire Regiment – ‘New Army’ (Kitchener’s volunteers) – who criticised the Territorial Force’s 53\textsuperscript{rd} (Welsh) and 54\textsuperscript{th} (East Anglian) Divisions throughout the Suvla Bay (Gallipoli Peninsula) landings starting 6

\footnote{\textsuperscript{117} What is left of the East Yorkshire Yeomanry’s records are kept at the Queen’s Own Yorkshire Yeomanry Museum, York.}
August 1915. The New Army seems to have had a superiority complex when comparing itself to the TF, despite both receiving the same training after 1914. Another example is pointed out by Charles More, when the Commander of the 97th (King’s Yeomanry) Field Regiment accused his fellow Territorials the 1/8th Warwicks (TA) of breaking in the face of a German attack at Comines, France 1940. They did not. It was Regular Ox & Bucks soldiers that broke, a mistake rectified in the War Diary of the Ox & Bucks Regulars (5th Division).

The use of these sources helped the research build a case (using employment and family sources as well) that shows that, historically, the Territorials could never hope to be militarily ready for an overseas deployment without significant P DD lasting months. As the AR uses the same framework of training (drill nights, weekends and annual camp) as its predecessors, the same is likely to be true of the Territorials’ rebranded replacements. Furthermore, taking into account negotiations with employers for time off to train and, just as importantly, keeping a partner and family happy, the AR may find it hard to meet the requirements of FR2020.

The final research method for this thesis was to interview (their identities remain anonymous) serving and ex-Territorials/Army Reservists and their wives and girlfriends. These interviews were hard won after many rejections from AR units, their officers being especially reluctant to speak due to the politicised nature of the reforms. The volunteers that granted interviews did so as a result of a serving acquaintance who asked, on my behalf, for volunteers representing three units. These interviews were conducted using a semi-formal interview approach containing flexible questioning regarding training, deployment overseas, the arrangements Reservists made with their employers, and how families coped when the Reservist deployed. Research interviews, consisting of twelve separate interviews, were conducted and lasted between thirty minutes to around one hour. The interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed immediately after. All interviews were conducted under the guidelines set by the University of Hull Ethics Committee. These interviews

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118 Peter Simkins, Kitchener’s Army: The Raising of the New Armies 1914–1916 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2007). Kitchener’s New Armies were raised from volunteers during 1914–1916, with the vast majority being civilians who had never served before. After 1916, dwindling numbers of volunteers saw conscription introduced.

119 The National Archives (henceforward TNA), TNA WO95/4299, Part III Gallipoli Dardanelles. 33 Infantry Brigade, 7th Battalion, South Staffordshire Regiment War Diaries (1914–15), pp. 35–38.


121 Ibid.
add authentic voices from Britain’s recent conflicts in the Middle East from both the participants’ point of view and that of the partners and family that have ‘skin in the game’ (i.e., are directly affected and/or their closest intimates) regarding these conflicts. It is essential that if the AR is to succeed in FR2020, the voices of those that were directly affected by deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan are heard.

As the author of this research, I add my experiential knowledge of working and deploying overseas as a Royal Marine Commando regular and later as a Territorial soldier, often attached to the Royal Marines when deployed as a TA commando engineer. This experience from the ranks informed the methodology and approach of the research and became the master narrative of the thesis alongside the Territorial Trinity of Commitments, which acts as a vehicle by which this history-from-the-ranks narrative is enabled. As a former Royal Marine and then Territorial, I have a bias towards a stronger military. However, this viewpoint does not mean that the research will be subjective or any the less reliable. My experience of deployment to Northern Ireland, the Middle East and Afghanistan has enabled me to understand the demands of training and how much training a soldier needs to become effective and safe on operations overseas. As an ex-soldier, I know what it is like to stay awake for days in isolated forward operating bases – often under siege conditions. I understand the feelings of soldiers under small arms, mortar and rocket attack, and know what it takes to be trained for these experiences. This history ‘from the ranks’ draws upon the idea of subaltern studies and, although these studies are anchored in the post-colonial theory of the sub-continent, the voices of the colonised in many ways were subsumed by the colonisers.122 The hierarchy of the armed forces also produces a disproportionate narrative of military lives and combat from a ruling body, the officer class (principally from the rank of captain and above; lieutenants largely shared the same privations and dangers as those in the ranks within the troop/platoon structure).

Military history ‘from the ranks’ draws on the author’s own experiential and embodied knowledge, an experience that offers advantages in that the author knows and understands how trained and prepared mentally and physically a soldier needs to be to face combat on a regular basis. This history from the ranks of the British Army and Royal Marines also informs the research on what type of training is most effective.

when deployed and how a soldier should be trained, especially if he or she was a Territorial, on new weapons, kit and equipment.

However, as an ex-Regular, there may be certain drawbacks to this experience, which may lead the author’s point of view to use the yardstick of Royal Marines training to measure a part-timer’s training too vigorously – something that has consciously been worked upon throughout the thesis. For example, throughout this thesis, the research looked for the reasons why the Territorial organisation struggled, be it with kit and equipment, poor military testing results or being unable to attend training. Many Territorials, especially during the TF era, were keen attendees; however, their training and equipment were often poor and only sometimes satisfactory. When looking beyond the results, it is often clear why the part-timers struggled and, in most cases, the soldiers themselves were not to blame.

The academic soldier-historian has a long tradition in academia, with the soldier’s insight and knowledge of training and conflict adding an extra perspective to his or her research. However, most of these perspectives, especially in academic settings, come from officers and, more usually, senior officers. As much of the existing narrative comes predominantly from the officers, it is usually these senior ranks who write the histories of battles and wars, whereas soldiers tend to leave diaries.\(^2\) By reading the memoirs and diaries of soldiers from the ranks, one can better understand how hard the training was and, ultimately, how relevant training for war was when they met the enemy.

As with research-based literature regarding the Territorial organisation, memoirs of Territorial soldiers are not extensive, histories written by part-time soldiers are rarer still and tend to be local regiment histories.\(^3\) However, those found offer both insights into the attitude of the volunteer and some of the training received from the Great War through to World War Two (for Iraq and Afghanistan the interviews with ex- and serving Reservists are used). There are also examples of an officer straddling both history and memoir, and one such book is Professor Charles Carrington’s *Soldier from the Wars Returning*. This book tells his story from recruit

\(^2\) For example, the Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke and Field Marshal Ironside have both had their diaries published and these form a very important place in the narrative surrounding, particularly, the disaster at Dunkirk. Alex Dunchev and Daniel Todman (eds), *War Diaries 1939–1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke* (London: Phoenix Press, 2002); Colonel R. Macleod and Dennis Kelly (eds), *The Ironside Diaries 1937–1940* (London: Constable, 1962).

\(^3\) An example is: Roy Howard, *Beaten Paths are the Safest: From D-Day to the Ardennes, Memories of the 61st Reconnaissance Regiment 50\(^{th}\) (TT) Northumbrian Division* (Studley: Brewin Books, 2004).
training (in the ranks) to his experiences of the battles of the Somme and Passchendaele (as a Lieutenant), giving the reader a true, profound and readable account of the Great War that charted his training and experiences, far removed from the literary novels that fog the non-expert-public’s understanding of that conflict.\textsuperscript{125} Professor Richard Holmes similarly used his long TA service (starting as a 2\textsuperscript{nd} Lieutenant) and understanding of military culture to write many incisive histories of what it was like to be a British soldier serving through many different periods of history.\textsuperscript{126} The history of war and the ranking soldier’s participation in its chaos adds an extra dimension. Whether all true or not, Guy Sajer’s memoirs \textit{The Forgotten Soldier} bring the experience of the brutal combat between Germany and the Soviet Union (1941–1945) to life like no other memoir, from the savage training of German troops to the vicious combat experienced thereafter.\textsuperscript{127} Another classic memoir from George MacDonald Fraser (of Flashman fame) describes in graphic detail the life and death of 19-year-old Private Fraser’s Cumbrian Borderers infantry section, which fought the Japanese in the latter stages of the Burma Campaign (1944–1945). Fraser does not spare the detail of killing and seeing his comrades killed and describes perfectly how the section of soldiers to which he belonged fought as part of a troop.\textsuperscript{128} History from the ranks adds many contexts to how common soldiers experience training and war and complements the many histories written by their officers.

Finally, a modern explanation of why British interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan were the way they were comes from the experiences of ex-TA intelligence officer (Lieutenant) Frank Ledwidge in Iraq and Afghanistan, which enabled him to write a stinging critique of the failed British strategy that relied on obsolete structures, approaches, tactics and an inability to adapt to the changes in both conflicts. The book was a study that could only have been written with such authority by someone who had deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan and witnessed what was happening. Ledwidge, a fluent Pashtun speaker, not only saw the war from the

\textsuperscript{125} Charles Carrington, \textit{Soldier from the Wars Returning} (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2006).
\textsuperscript{127} Guy Sajer, \textit{The Forgotten Soldier} (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1971). There is a debate among military historians that some of the dates and offensives do not quite marry up. However, the general consensus is that much of what Sajer writes is factual and, as World War Two had finished twenty-six years before he wrote the book, memory will have had an impact on precise details.
\textsuperscript{128} George MacDonald Fraser, \textit{Quartered Safe Out Here: A Recollection of the War in Burma, with a new Epilogue 50 Years On} (London: HarperCollins, 2000).
Coalition’s viewpoint, but also saw how the Afghans regarded the conflict. With regular contact, Ledwidge saw how Coalition actions made Afghans think and react, whilst discovering how certain interest groups of Afghans were using the Coalition to fight their internecine battles by labelling their enemies as Taliban, thus making a bad situation worse.¹²⁹

The soldiers on the ground who became historians (all ranks) can offer an extra layer of context to historical research. History from the ranks can add an extra layer of context from their experiences of training and of being at the sharp end in combat, helping to fill the gap in understanding how and why the Territorials trained the way they did and making it possible to investigate how Territorials’ often-neglected civilian commitments to employment and family competed with their military commitments – or with each other.

Research design – Chapters

The three main parts of this thesis – on military commitments, on civilian commitments (to employment and family), and on FR2020 and the Future – draw on evidence from Britain’s three largest conflicts in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries to understand the future threats Britain’s Reserves may face. The three parts cover Territorial training 1908–2013, equipment issue and its effects on training, and the effect of PDT and no PDT to a deployed Territorial force. The employment issues investigate the part-time volunteers of the past regarding employer support and time off work to train. For family issues, the struggles of partners and families when Territorials deployed overseas (including costs to the government) are researched. Furthermore, this thesis investigates the influence of partner and family on a Territorial’s morale and commitment to the organisation, including an investigation of why part-time soldiers are, historically, more prone to conditions such as PTSD and how these illnesses affect part-timers today.¹³⁰ After considering the three parts of the Territorial Trinity of Commitments, the thesis then looks to the future and the

potential threats the Reservists are to face and offers suggestions on how to better engage the future Reservists in the twenty-first century.

**Part One: Military**

Part One has three chapters, which examine the training, kit and equipment of the Territorials during the three periods selected – the Territorial Force 1908–1914, the Territorial Army 1920–1940, and the Territorial Army 2001–2013. Chapter One argues that Territorial training (without PDT) has never prepared part-time soldiers for an overseas deployment. Chapter Two investigates the effects of poor and obsolete kit and equipment issue upon Territorial training. Finally, Chapter Three asks how important PDT is for preparing part-time soldiers for overseas deployment and considers what happens when PDT is shortened or omitted altogether. The chapters add to past research from Beckett, Mitchinson, Dennis, McCartney and Walker, expanding and updating the literature on the training of part-timers up until the FR2020 proposals.

**Part Two: Civilian**

Part Two contains one chapter on employment and one chapter on family. Chapter Four examines important historical business and employer support for the Territorials, and businesses and groups that did not or could not support the Territorials, and their reasons why, from 1908 to the present. This chapter adds to the social history research of part-time British soldiers and the work completed by McCartney and Knight on the Liverpool Territorials and the Civil Service volunteers, respectively. The chapter reveals what employers’ support for their Territorial employees entailed when the latter were called up for deployment overseas.

Chapter Five investigates conditions for the wives, partners and families of Territorials during the Great War, World War Two and ‘The War on Terror’ (sections are split between the influence of the family during 1908 to 2015 and the modern Iraq/Afghan campaigns, 2001–2013). The chapter explores the influence wives and families have on the morale of soldiers overseas, and the role Separation Allowance and welfare support have in this relationship.
Part Three: Future Reserves 2020 and the future

Finally, Chapter Six investigates the threats and challenges facing the UK in the second decade of the twenty-first century and beyond. The FR2020 programme is, therefore, analysed up to 2016 to discover progression. Also investigated is the cost of deploying Reservists overseas to discover the true cost. The chapter then examines whether the AR can sufficiently train and prepare for challenges such as hybrid warfare, home-grown Jihadi terrorism and conventional training. Once the varied threats to Britain’s security are identified, the chapter asks whether it is morally right to ask part-time soldiers to deploy more often with less PDT when research suggests that Reservist soldiers suffer more mental illness after returning from an overseas deployment. Furthermore, when Territorials returned from tours to Iraq and Afghanistan, they were not afforded the welfare care they needed to help readjust to civilian life.

The research in this thesis investigates whether the Army Reserve, under FR2020, can fill the capability gaps left by the defence cuts of 2010, by considering the Territorials’ (TF and TA) past training, employment issues and family issues from 1908–2013. This thesis will, therefore, address all the issues the Territorials faced in trying to become efficient soldiers by conducting a systematic investigation of the Territorial organisation as a whole, giving equal weight to their training, employment and family issues (the Territorial Trinity of Commitments). This thesis argues that, as the Territorials were part of the British Army, they should, in the future, be included more in new British Army histories, including their training, kit and equipment issues. This would give the reader a fuller picture of their particular history and promote pride within Reservist units. Their contemporary role should also be explained to inform future military historians and the wider public about their training and need for PDT when deploying overseas and perhaps also to make politicians think more carefully about using them as an alternative to Regular troops.

This thesis will show, on the basis of conceptual and empirical findings, that the British government’s Future Reserves 2020 strategy for a new Army Reserve with a greater role and responsibility will most likely end in failure because it fails to understand the Territorial Trinity of Commitments. This research is more than a piece of history. It is also an insight into the present and a forewarning for the future.
Part One

Military
Chapter One

Is twenty-seven days sufficient time to make a soldier (1908–2013)?

It must be remembered that to place in the field a soldier who is only partially trained in his duties is to render him not only a danger to himself but also to his comrades. It is obvious, therefore, that we must, of necessity, possess an Army of sufficient strength to be capable of aiding our Allies in the early months of war, to hold on successfully until such time as our Army recruited on the outbreak of hostilities is fully trained and able to take its place abroad.¹

The quote above is just as true for today as it was when first written in 1938. Territorial soldiers and their successors can never train enough to become a quickly deployable force for an overseas deployment with a shortened PDT. An average training year of 27-days can only prepare the part-time soldier to a minimum of effectiveness. Territorial soldiers, from their beginnings in 1908 up until their name change in 2013, earned the reputation of being a poorly trained and equipped force. Therefore, Part One – Military investigates how the Territorial organisation (1908–2013) was trained, including how it was instructed, kitted out, funded, tested and prepared for overseas deployment and fighting to understand the difficulties the new Army Reserve may encounter. Part One - Military and its three chapters on basic training (to differentiate it from PDT), kit and equipment, and pre-deployment training examines where this reputation originated, to what extent it was deserved, who was to blame for any failings, and how the organisation was run.

In view of the reputation of the Territorial organisation this thesis aims to use historical evidence to evaluate the current Army 2020 and Future Reserves 2020 policies arguing in Part One – Military that the AR cannot be a like-for-like replacement for Regular soldiers as proposed in the FR2020 ORBAT, without a full-time, theatre/scenario-based training regime lasting at least two to three months. The first chapter asks whether twenty-seven days is enough time in which to train a

¹ Beith, The Citizen Soldier, p. 79.
soldier, and will be split into Section 1, which argues that the problems the Territorials faced in training limited their effectiveness and ability to deploy overseas without sufficient PDT. The section also argues that the Territorials could not reach efficiency because of the minimal amount of time they spent training, that there were insufficient officers and experienced instructors and, more crucially, that there were problems with funding. Section 2 of the chapter considers the consequences of this amalgamation of issues and reveals that attendance and establishment were affected, which, in turn, contributed to poor test results and produced a force that was in no way ready to deploy overseas quickly without a sustained period of full-time, theatre-specific PDT.

In 2013, the government White Paper – Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued – announced the retrenchment of the Regular Army by 20,000 soldiers, also announcing that these soldiers would be replaced by 30,000 part-time AR troops. Although the Army Reservists are part-time soldiers using the same basic training regime as their antecedents the Territorials (drill nights, weekends and annual camp – around twenty-seven days’ commitment per year), the government insists that the AR will train harder, train longer and be better equipped than their antecedents, which will make them more prepared for overseas deployment in a much quicker timeframe than it took the Territorials. The then Secretary of Defence Philip Hammond MP (2012–2013) stated that, ‘in the future, the AR will be a vital part of an integrated army’, which will see ‘them ready and able to deploy routinely at sub-unit level and in some cases formed units’. Furthermore, because of promises of better and extra training and equipment, the government stated that the AR would require less PDT if needed on operations.

This raises the question: how would the government judge the effectiveness of a part-time unit and its PDT needs? Earl Wallace Walker said of the TA in the 1990s that in ‘measuring the effectiveness of the TA, their ability to go to war and fight successfully is a tricky question’. Walker brought up a relevant point, one that could still affect the AR and their training, rear echelon and infantry units today, that if the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) had, for example, fought the Soviet

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4 MoD, Reserves in the Future Force 2020, p.3.
5 Walker, Reserve Forces and the British Territorial Army, p. 9.
Union during the Cold War (1947–1991), the TA would quickly have been drawn into heavy combat with the Soviet Spetsnaz (commando special forces), who were highly trained to disrupt Allied operations in NATO’s rear areas.\textsuperscript{6} If today a war had to be fought against a first-rate power (Russia or China), rear echelon troops would probably still have to defend themselves and their positions against similar threats. Would they be capable of doing so after twenty-seven days’ training and with shortened PDT? This chapter, therefore, questions the government’s claims that the AR can be better trained and ready to take on roles carried out by Regular Army troops, by investigating historical Territorial training to understand how well part-time soldiers could be prepared for war under their current commitment of twenty-seven days’ pre-PDT training.

Historically, the Territorials were always restricted in how much training they could complete due to the Territorial Trinity of Commitments, whereby military training competes with the worlds of work and family. Peter Dennis states in *The Territorial Army* that even having to attend the minimum training requirements was beyond the reach of many Territorials.\textsuperscript{7} K. W. Mitchinson argues that rural battalions before the Great War, in Scotland and Wales particularly, found it difficult to congregate for musketry (rifle) practice and testing, which often affected test results.\textsuperscript{8} Ian Beckett states that, even today, Reservist units find collective training difficult to achieve while training towards their military tests.\textsuperscript{9} In addition, the AR has much to learn regarding the modern battlefield in very little time (this military knowledge has only increased from the Great War onwards), as the ever-changing character of war keeps evolving, something the old Territorials struggled with as technology moved rapidly from the trenches of the Great War to the open warfare of World War Two and the counterinsurgency (COIN) combat of Iraq and Afghanistan.

This chapter argues that the AR, under FR2020, is unlikely to be able to train long enough or hard enough to be able to fill the capability gaps left by the sacking of 20,000 Regular troops whilst at the same time balancing work and family. Therefore, many units of the AR will not be sufficiently well trained that they could deploy with reduced PDT. This is a point argued by Beckett, who states that for Territorials ‘it was inevitable that additional training would always be required in the event of wartime

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\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., p. 134.
\textsuperscript{7} Dennis, *The Territorial Army*, p. 26.
\textsuperscript{8} Mitchinson, *England’s Last Hope*, p. 109.
mobilisation', adding that ‘Territorials have been essentially reactive forces, frequently poorly equipped and resourced and therefore, unready for war’. This has been proved in all the periods under investigation in this thesis and with the poor recruitment to date of AR personnel looks unlikely to change.

The TF before the Great War, 1908 to 1914, gained a reputation for being a poorly trained and poorly led, inefficient force. A fair measure of that poor reputation was the fault of Lord Richard Burdon Haldane, Secretary of State for War (1905–1912). Haldane originally intended that the TF should act as a fighting reserve to reinforce the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) after around six months of training. However, fearing the defeat of his Territorial and Reserve Forces Bill (many Members of Parliament [MPs] were ex-militia/Yeomanry colonels and there were also Liberal Party concerns), Haldane compromised, insisting that the Territorials’ ‘primary purpose’ was ‘to defend our shores’ – home defence. The Bill passed easily. However, Haldane stated later in his memoirs that the dual home and reinforcement roles of the TF were clearly laid out in his Bill.

Haldane’s “fudge” clouded his true intention for the force. Furthermore, when the Great War started, the ambiguity of the TF’s purpose gave Lord Kitchener just one of many reasons initially to ignore the Territorials as a base upon which to expand Britain’s ‘New Armies’. Haldane continually expounded that the strategic purpose of the TF was home defence; so much so that the majority of the TF believed this to be their raison d’être. Additionally, because of Haldane’s fudge, the TF were awarded the bare minimum of funding for training, kit and equipment (much of the budget going to the BEF) and the inadequate kit and equipment would ensure poor recruitment and retention throughout the Territorials’ history. When the Territorials were reconstituted as the Territorial Army (TA) on 1 February 1920, their funding

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11 Anon, ‘Territorial Force’, *The Manchester Guardian*, 21 Feb. 1912. Viscount Middleton said that the TF was 60,000 short, and its training was defective making it useless as a defensive force in the event of the expeditionary force leaving the country.
12 Beckett, *Britain’s Part-Time Soldiers*. The TF, like the AR, was a money-saving exercise costing the Treasury £2.8 million instead of the £4.4 million paid for the militia, volunteers, and yeomanry, p. 213.
14 *Ibid*.
15 *Ibid*.
post-Great War was affected by the ‘Ten Year Rule’ (under which defence planning proceeded on the basis that no major war was threatened within ten years, which equated to heavy defence cuts with the Territorials at the back of the queue). Moreover, after the Great Depression (1929–1939), funding for the Territorial organisation became even more of an issue. The consequences of Haldane’s fudge would last until the present day, with Territorials having to scrimp on parsimonious budgets throughout their history.

Section 1: Problems (1908–2013)

**Territorial training: too much to learn, so little time**

To become an efficient Territorial a man must be prepared to make many sacrifices, in return for which a grateful nation grudges him even the boots he wears out in preparing himself to protect it.

The training received by the Territorial Force from 1908 to 2013 did not prepare the organisation for war against Britain’s enemies without full-time, theatre-specific PDT (known as ‘close time training’ during the Great War). The training of the Territorials prior to PDT was a twenty-seven-day minimum commitment per training year and only offered the most basic level of soldiering. The Army Council recognised this fact when they first laid down the new Territorial Force’s regulations in 1908, stating that:

In the limited time available for the training of the Territorial Force in peace it is not to be expected that, as a whole, it can be trained up to the standard of the regular troops. The training should, therefore, be directed towards laying the foundation on which more extended training can be based, and should be confined wholly to such elements as are essential to success in war.

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That their training was so basic is corroborated by the research of Ian Beckett, in which he calculated that the average time Territorial first-line units spent preparing for deployment to a front during the Great War (although some of the better, in terms of soldiering, Territorial units did deploy with around one month’s PDT) was just over eight months. For the second-line Territorial formations, it took an average of twenty-seven months to make them ready for front-line service.²⁴ Territorials during the time leading up to the Great War could, of course, claim a greater military knowledge than, for example, the volunteers of Lord Kitchener’s New (volunteer) Army, but even the military knowledge the Territorials claimed to have did not impress Kitchener, who stated he preferred men with no knowledge rather than Territorials with ‘a smattering of the wrong thing’.²⁶ Nevertheless, it was not only Kitchener who distrusted the training and readiness of the TF; many contemporaries felt the same, especially many in the Regular Army.²⁷ A pre-Great War letter (1909) entitled ‘Is the Territorial Force a Sham?’ from the Review of Reviews journal voiced the concerns of certainly many in the military, government and National Service League (a pro-conscription movement 1902–1916) when it addressed the training of the Territorials compared to that of the Regular Army:

Is the Territorial Force, as at present untrained, indeed a sham?
Let us examine the elements of this truly weighty question.
John Brown enlists in the Regular Army and on the same day his brother James enlists in the Territorial Force. At the end of, say five years John Brown is a veteran soldier whose military education has been continuously advancing during 1,826 consecutive days; whereas James has been intermittently under arms, attending drills or in camp, on perhaps 100 days, probably less. If James is equal to John as a fighting man, it is clear that much public money has been wasted upon making the latter a professional soldier; but if, upon the contrary, the military values of the two brothers are approximately proportionate to the time they have respectively devoted to soldiering, then the efficacy of the Territorial Force for defensive or other purposes must appear to leave something to be desired.²⁸

²⁴ Beckett and Simpson (eds), *A Nation in Arms*, p. 131. First-line Territorial units were those soldiers already trained and were the first to take PDT. The second-line units were soldiers who had moved from other units, re-joiners and new volunteers, etcetera. The London Scottish are an example of one of the better TF units sent to Flanders after a month of PDT.
²⁶ Ibd.
²⁷ Mitchinson, *England’s Last Hope*, p. 3.
The training completed by the TF could never make the organisation an immediately deployable asset, notwithstanding many thinking the organisation was for home defence only, a role for which they still had to be trained and ready. The first problem the TF faced in reaching efficiency were the restrictions imposed by the Territorial Trinity of Commitments and the competing demands of employment and their families with training time. The training that was set out for Territorials mirrored that of the Regular Army. The core training the TF completed (and subsequent TA and AR formations) was the regular drill night, which was held at local Territorial Drill Halls. The drill nights counted as quarter days and were usually split into three periods of around forty-five minutes’ instruction.

As already stated, their collective training could never be comprehensive enough or over a long enough timescale to make the Territorial soldiers proficient in anything but the basics. For example, the overall training of a Territorial soldier (1908–1914) was based on an annual cycle, which aimed at training a recruit to trained-rank within two annual cycles. This was a slow-paced and basic approach that enabled the part-timers to fit training in with their employment and family. During an infantry recruit’s first cycle, for example, the soldier was instructed in individual drills, musketry and small unit tactics (troop battle drills). The set periods of attendance for these recruits was fixed at forty drill periods for their first year, augmented by at least eight days of a fifteen-day annual camp. As a trained Territorial soldier, the attendance requirement was set at a minimum twenty drill periods per annual cycle, in which training concentrated upon troop and company drills and improving their individual skills. Again, the cycle was brought to a close with the ending of the annual camp. Many keener units, such as the Royal Engineers, ‘Class Battalions’ and units supported by the Civil Service, for example, sometimes trained multiple nights in the lead up to an annual camp. However, even this keenness could only add a few days to the basic commitment of twenty-seven.

29 Mitchinson, Defending Albion, pp. 8-9.
31 Ibid. Beckett, Territorials, p. 34. For their commitment, the TF soldiers, during their four-year engagements, earned camp pay, boot allowance and discretionary payments of around a shilling a day.
32 Anon, ‘The Territorials’, The Devon and Exeter Daily Gazette, 20 July 1914. ‘Monday: Technical Training, 8 [p.m.]. Tuesday: Lecture, 8 [p.m.]. All NCOs and men are requested to attend. Wednesday: Technical Training, 8 [p.m.].’ The newspaper also gives the training programmes for the RE Exeter Company, Devon (Fortress), 1st Wessex Field Ambulance RAMC, 7th Battalion Devon Regiment (Cyclists), 49th Battalion Devon Regiment HQ Company and the 6th Battalion Devon Regiment.
When the Territorial organisation was reformed after the Great War in 1920 as the Territorial Army, the framework of training part-time troops did not change in any significant way. A ‘drill’ still consisted of forty-five minutes/one hour of actual instruction and any number up to three drills were conducted in one drill night for administration and pay purposes. The drill nights during the 1920s and 1930s, usually indoors, as they had been with the TF before the Great War became an exercise in basic soldiering condensed into three periods. The first principle of training a Territorial, as explained in the *Citizen Soldier*, was to give ‘the individual a thorough knowledge of his duties, and the second to teach him to act in combination with his comrades’. Again, as with the TF recruit, training for the individual was divided into two annual training cycles: the first was based on individual training and the second on collective training. However, despite the rapidly changing character of combat and the ever-increasing possibility in the 1930s of war, the Territorials were still being poorly instructed in largely obsolete tactics and strategy. For example, John Siminson, a Territorial with the Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry before and during World War Two, describes a usual drill night at his local drill hall:

Training was carried out on Thursdays at the Territorial hall. In charge was a full-time regular soldier, a staff sergeant, surnamed Baker. He was married and had the use of the house adjoining the TA hall. Yeomanry at the time rode horses into battle [1937]. We used to parade in the hall, each with a sword and had to stand with our legs apart, as though seated on a horse. Then the order would be ‘right cavalry engage.’ You had to point the sword so it would pierce the throat of a mounted cavalryman coming towards you! On the other hand, it would be ‘left cavalry engage.’ The staff sergeant would come and check you were making a suitable angle with the sword! The whole process seemed the height of absurdity.

If cavalry drills in the context of the times were archaic (see figure 2 on page 47), finances and the shortage of training days for the TA of the 1920s and 1930s

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33 Colonel G. R. Codrington, CB, DSO, OBE, TD, *What is the Territorial Army?* (London: Sifton Praed & Co., 1933), p. 75. *Yeomanry* - Recruits 20 drills, trained men 10 drills, weapon training course, annual training in camp. *Artillery* - Recruits 45 drills, trained men 20 drills, weapon training course, annual training in camp. *Infantry* - Recruits 40 drills, trained men 20 drills, weapon training course, annual training in camp. H.R.O. Queen Victoria’s Rifles (9th Battalion, London Regiment, TA) - Battalion Orders, Jan. 1929. For achieving the correct attendance at camp and drills, WOs, NCOs and enlisted men from March 1927 were eligible for the proficiency grant of 30 shillings annually split into two - 20s for drills and camp and 10s for musketry qualification.

34 Beith, *The Citizen Soldier*, p. 68.


forced many units still to use 0.22 rifles (which did not have the same kick or weight of a Lee Enfield SMLE) on twenty-five- and thirty-yard ranges as their main rifle training asset.\textsuperscript{37} Furthermore, becoming trained on the Boys anti-tank rifle (the only man portable anti-tank weapon available to the infantry) became unlikely, as there were, in the run-up to World War Two, few ranges on which it was safe to fire and too few instructors to instruct in its use.\textsuperscript{38} Training was largely based within the confines of the TA centre using what equipment and time available. An example of a month’s training (1935) with the 5\textsuperscript{th} Battalion King’s Own Scottish Borderers (KOSB) involved lectures on gas warfare, sand table exercises, and rifle training on miniature ranges, with the promise of Lewis and Vickers gun courses shortly.\textsuperscript{39}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure.jpg}
\caption{The Queen’s Own Hussars (TA) carrying out cavalry drills still wearing uniforms from the Great War (1935).\textsuperscript{40}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{37} Siminson, \textit{Saturday Night Soldiers}, pp. 2-3.
\textsuperscript{38} Beith, \textit{Citizen Soldiers}, p. 69. War Office, \textit{Infantry Training: Training and War} (London: HMSO, 1937), p. 9, this training book stated that all ranks would be taught to fire the Boys .55 anti-tank rifle, also the only other anti-tank weapon available to the infantry was the 2 pounder gun, towed behind trucks containing the gun-crew team.
\textsuperscript{39} Museum and Archive of the King’s Own Scottish Borderers (to be known henceforth as MAKOSB), Anon, ‘5\textsuperscript{th} Battalion Notes’, \textit{The Borderers’ Chronicle, Journal of the King’s Own Scottish Borderers}, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 1935), p. 15.
\textsuperscript{40} Anon, ‘The Queen’s Own Hussars’, \textit{New York Times}, 21 March 1935.
ian Beckett suggests that Haldane had set equipment and modern training methods when the TF came into being, but these training methods often became dated as warfare advanced and the Territorials did not. For instance, British Army historian Timothy Harrison Place points out that the 1937 training manual was out of date in the crucial matter of platoon/troop organisation within a year of its publication. Although replaced in 1942 with *The Instructors’ Handbook on Fieldcraft and Battle Drill*, alas, when time was at a premium, this was no help to the Territorials fighting for their lives in the France and Norway campaigns of 1940.  

If the system looked robust on paper, in reality, it was anything but. There were many problems concerning the training of Territorials. Director-General of the Territorial Force, Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Bethune, understood Territorials' other commitments and stated in 1912 that 'The whole system of training the Territorial Force is one of compromise, and we have to evolve the system which will best meet all requirements'. This truism was well recognised by the regional Territorial Associations (administration centres), their officers and permanent training staff, who knew that anything over a certain level of training would disengage the members and dissuade potential recruits. An article on the training and efficiency of the TF insisted that the only way to become truly efficient would be to engage the Territorial soldier with 'constant, increasing, and laborious work on the part of the instructors and [to train] entails sacrifice of time, amusements, and leisure, and too often, pecuniary loss, if not loss of employment, on the part of those who join the ranks'.  

The training provided for the Territorial throughout the first half of the twentieth century did not prepare the part-timer with the necessary skills to survive on the battlefield without full-time, theatre-specific PDT. A tale that sums up the TA's lack of training rigour comes from the 51st (Highland) Division fighting at St. Valery en Caux in 1940. Private Gordon Barber, searching for weapons, found and brought back a box of grenades to show an infantry sergeant. He was told that 'It would have been a good idea to bring the detonators'. Barber's ignorance reflected the poor Territorial military training and preparation he had received. He stated: 'That was

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another balls up! I wasn’t to know. I’d never used a bleeding hand-grenade in my life*. 45

As the twentieth century passed into the twenty-first, the TA were still grappling with the same fundamental problems as their antecedents. Wallace Earl Walker makes an observation that gets to the heart of the problem that has faced the Territorial organisation since its birth in 1908. He observes that ‘the Regular Army sees the TA as a “reserve force”. In military parlance, a “reserve” is a combat force that is not presently in the line but could readily be substituted for a front-line unit on short notice (an aspiration alluded to in FR2020). However, to achieve such a degree of readiness is clearly beyond a part-time force that trains substantially less than the Regulars’. 46 Furthermore, one has to take into account twenty-first-century life and the employment and family pillars of the Territorial Trinity of Commitments still controlling how much time a Reservist can train. Other major social changes have also occurred since the end of World War Two, with women now serving alongside men in the armed forces and now allowed to volunteer as infantry. This, of course, may or may not produce a new set of factors when it comes to training to the level of efficiency promised in FR2020, but until evidence produces statistics this is unknowable at the present time.

The TA of the modern era, as highlighted by the Future Reserves Independent Commission (2011), was underfunded, still trained on weapons and weapon systems that were out of date (as was some of their equipment), for roles for which they would not be used. 47 The Independent Commission also stated that the government and the Army had failed to modernise and update Reservist roles to match the demands of the changing character of war. 48 Instead of doctrinal and organisational flexibility in the face of changing threats, the TA was still essentially structured for large-scale intervention operations. 49 Furthermore, the TA was still below establishment, not helped by the same old unmotivating training as witnessed by their Territorial predecessors and using the same framework of training and attendance as in 1908. All

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45 Ibid.
46 Walker, Reserve Forces and the British Territorial Army, p. 8.
48 Ibid., p. 6.
49 Ibid.
of which imposed limiting factors upon the efficiency and effectiveness of the modern TA.

Perhaps the greatest change from the Territorials of the past to those of the twenty-first century is that, when mobilised, the "War on Terror" (2001-2013) part-timers had to be fit enough to pass their Military Annual Training Tests (MATTs) and a great deal of time was taken up in training towards these standards. The MATTs (see footnote) took up significant amounts of the TA's twenty-seven-day minimum commitment and could not be easily completed on drill nights alone due to the problems of assembling volunteer soldiers in one place at a specified time. Ian Beckett suggests that MATTs training, because of the very nature of the TA, 'occupies a greater part of the training calendar than it would a regular unit. With sub-units often scattered in location, unit collective training can usually only be accomplished at weekends or at camp'.

These tests are, nonetheless, essential if part-time soldiers are to have even a modicum of readiness. Wallace Earl Walker, a soldier himself, states that 'war is both physically and emotionally exhausting'. Therefore, to cope with the demands of deployment, acclimatisation and fighting, sometimes in conditions very different from the British climate, soldiers, Regular or part-time, have to have a high standard of physical fitness. However, for part-time soldiers, who often have full-time jobs, this commitment to attaining the high standard of physical fitness required to become an efficient soldier is demanding. Walker posits that 'few middle-class and working-

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50 British Army, Army Fact Sheet. 'TA Rates of Pay, Bounties, and Expenses - April 2012'. British Army, Army Fact Sheet. 'Army Reserve Rates of Pay, Bounties, and Expenses - April 2014'. A part-Army standard (along with the requisite amount of training days) to earn their bounties, a tax-free cash award starting at £424 in year one rising until year five where the bounty's value became £1,708.
51 British Army, The Reserves Training and Mobilisation Centre: Pre-Deployment Preparation Courses Regular Individual Augmentees, Training Pamphlet RMTC, Ops Cell, Chetwynd Barracks, Chilwell, MATTs are carried out by both the British Regular forces and the Reservists of all three arms; they include MATT 1. Weapon Handling Test and the Annual Personal Weapon Test (APWT) - shooting on the ranges. MATT 2. Part One contains the Personal Fitness Test (PFT), which includes press-ups, sit-ups (Royal Marines include a minimum ten pull-ups), and a squad one-and-a-half-miles, followed by a personal-best one-and-a-half-miles with set time limits according to age. Part Two of MATT 2 is the Combat Fitness Test (CFT), an eight-mile squad speed march carrying full kit, rifle (extra and water extra). Commandos, Paratroopers, and the Infantry carry 25 kilos, technical branches significantly less, and the test is set to finish two hours after the troop sets off. MATT 3. Battlefield Casualty Drills (BCD). MATT 4. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) drills. MATT 5. Map reading and Navigation - theory and practical. All these MATTs have a pass or fail criteria. MATT 6. Values and Standards, an attend or non-attend criteria. Three new MATTs have been added recently and these are MATT 7. Law of Armed Conflict, MATT 8. Survive, Evade, Resist, Extract, and MATT 9. Counter-Improvised Explosive Device.
52 Beckett, Territorials, p. 196.
class people in post-industrial societies meet such standards. Furthermore, many do not welcome the demands that cardiovascular conditioning or muscular strength development impose. The problems of not physically training enough in available spare time are that these part-time soldiers will lack the upper-body strength necessary to carry their bergens (packs), webbing and rifles for extended periods of time. All this effort (and the AR still uses this system), of course, eats into basic military training time, which equates to the part-time soldier needing more PDT rather than less to ensure a comprehensive readiness for overseas service.

The Territorial organisation has faced the same handicaps to ever reaching anything above basic military training. Beckett states that ‘although the training foundation – the level below which the common skill set must not drop – of the TA is not expected to be as high as that of the regular army, more emphasis is now placed in all TA training on physical fitness’. This equates to the sum of the annual training year spent concentrating on passing MATTs and does not incorporate field soldiering save map reading. The Army Reserve is the renamed version of the TA but, just as the pre-World War Two TA had to learn new weapons, tactics and strategy, so does the AR, with an expected additional deployment liability as laid out in Reserves in the Future Force 2020 and all based upon a minimum twenty-seven-day commitment. The AR, like their antecedents, cannot be deployed with a limited PDT; they will need at least two to three months of full-time, theatre-specific training which concentrates on soldiering in the field, patrolling, contact drills and harbour positions (company administration and sleeping areas in the field), etcetera, before they are deployable. This was true for the TF and the TA and is true for the AR.

Nevertheless, the problems the Territorials had while trying to achieve efficiency were not only attributable to training, the twenty-seven-day annual commitment and not having enough time to perfect doctrine and drills. There were many other factors associated with the Territorials needing extensive PDT to prepare them properly for overseas deployment. Problems with not having enough time to train properly bled into not being able to recruit to the full establishment, which crucially led to a shortage of officers and instructors. Having to work and balance family time led to many Territorials missing drill nights, weekends and annual camp; this led to problems with test results (especially in the time leading up to the Great

54 Ibid.
War, which led to morale problems, which, of course, led to the Territorial Associations experiencing difficulties attracting new recruits. All these woes were compounded by poor funding, which equated to poor and obsolete kit and equipment, again leading to a none too dynamic image with which to recruit. The chapter now investigates the officer and instructor problems the Territorials (1908–2013) faced, before discussing the further reasons why Territorials have never been a quickly deployable force without PDT.

Problems with officers and instructors

This section argues that another facet to the Territorials’ struggles with efficiency was not being able to attract and retain officers and that efficiency was further hampered by the level of poor-quality instructors from 1908 to 2013. Furthermore, with little significant change to the way the system of part-time soldiering is pursued (a minimum twenty-seven-day commitment) the AR is likely to have the same problems the Territorials did.

Mitchinson, when discussing TF officers, states that Regulars complained at the time, not of ‘the Territorial officers’ lack of zeal but of their continued lack of military knowledge’.56 He adds that the Territorial officers were often hampered in attending courses due to poor allowances, civilian commitments and, when they did attend, they often had to pay out of their own pockets (for mess fees, cramming courses, etcetera) and were ignored in the mess by Regular officers. Furthermore, there were often no instructors available to teach these officers when they arrived. The government’s solution was the impractical suggestion that they read more books; unfortunately, many books on the reading list were out of print.57

The period after the reformation of the Territorials (1920) saw a continuance of the struggles the organisation had with attracting officers. Peter Dennis argues that the great detriment to the efficiency and effectiveness of the TA during the 1920s and 1930s was caused by not attracting and retaining good officers, stating that the inability of the TA to recruit sufficient officers was one of the organisation’s greatest failures.58 Again, as with the TF, there were financial obstacles that prevented many

56 Mitchinson, England’s Last Hope, p. 166.
57 Ibid., Territorial officers on these courses run by the Regular Army often found themselves doing nothing for the two weeks the course ran.
58 Dennis, The Territorial Army, p. 154.
from applying for commissions, such as the cost of uniforms (there was a small grant but this was whittled away by cuts), travel expenses and mess fees all having to be paid out of their own pockets, all of which was a factor in keeping the TA officer establishment under strength. Even for respected regiments such as the KOSB, the major problem facing them in the 1930s was a shortage of officers. A report from the All-Party Parliamentary Reserve Forces Group in 2007 suggested that a major factor affecting the Territorial Army’s training was the TA’s inability to attract and retain young officers. There were many reasons why officers, especially young officers, were hard to attract and retain in the TA of the 2000s. Perhaps the largest determinant of the numbers of young officers was the time to train afforded by the Territorial Trinity of Commitments. The late military historian Professor Richard Holmes pointed to this as a key factor when he gave evidence to the All-Party Parliamentary Reserve Forces Committee, stating that:

There is a very substantial change in the pressure on young people at the early stages of their careers and most employers do not have the automatic support for Reserves of earlier war experienced generations.

A Territorial officer’s training usually took around two years to complete (not unlike the case in the past), dependent upon the potential officer’s unit budget for man training days and if the individual concerned was able and willing to forfeit holidays. People who would make good officers in the Territorials were hard to find and this has been a historic problem for the organisation. The fact that the Territorials have always had trouble attracting enough trained and knowledgeable officers can only have had a detrimental effect on training their Territorial recruits and soldiers.

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63 Ibid., British Army, ‘Are you ready to become an Army officer?’ (London: MoD, no date). There are five modules to becoming a TA officer (under thirty-five years of age). Modules 1-3 Key Military Skills done at TA Regional Training Centres (RTC), Module 4 leadership training done at Sandhurst Military College. A one-week preparatory course followed by a two-week course, after which the Officer Cadet receives his/her commission. Module 5 is specialist training taking place on weekends at the RCTs. p. 17.
This historic problem was never more apparent than in the technically challenging Royal Artillery, especially before the Great War.

The TF Artillery (formed in 1908) was built from the cast-offs of thirty-three scrapped Regular Royal Artillery batteries (obsolete guns and equipment). The arm then received inadequate funding, limited issue of artillery shells and was expected to learn – on a part-time basis – the technically demanding skill of gunnery. Again, the expectations for the TF were for a basic understanding of the arm, as detailed by the field artillery pamphlet:

The annual training should be carried out on the same principles as have been indicated for the Regular Forces. It is not possible for citizen forces, in the limited time at their disposal, to carry out the whole course. The perfecting of the battery as the fire unit should be the principal object kept in view.

Peter Dennis states that 'while most Territorial Divisional Commanders (regular officers) commended their Territorial officers for their enthusiasm and general intelligence, they noted that the officers were unable to spend sufficient time studying the details of the military profession or attending specialised courses.' Haldane hoped that the secondment of Regular staff would ameliorate gaps in Territorial Force knowledge. However, this did not happen, due to the wide disparity between TF units and differing conditions of service. Furthermore, unhelpfully for the Territorials, Regular Artillery officers considered that time spent on draft with a TF unit was not professionally advantageous. This lack of secondment would not have helped Territorial gunners eager to learn gunnery skills, especially when the few officers they had found it difficult to master the skills necessary to teach them.

When Territorials attended courses held by gunnery schools, they were praised for their effort. For example, a 1909 gunnery report stated that the TF showed eagerness to learn and work hard, but added that 'they do not fully appreciate the fact

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85 Research Department Library Woolwich, Royal Artillery (hereafter RDLWRA), BA2/32, Field Artillery Training 1914 (FAT), 'Training of Special Reserve and Territorial Artillery and of the Artillery of the Overseas Dominions', p. 22.
86 Dennis, The Territorial Army, p. 25.
87 Ibid.
that to do anything well the constant drudgery of repetition is necessary”. 68 When TF officers attended courses alongside Regulars, the problem of not being able to revise enough for the courses was often highlighted. Subsequently, when working alongside Regular officers, ‘it was found that either the former [TF] were unable to keep pace with the latter [Regulars], or the latter had to be kept back to meet the requirements of the former’. 69 The TF Artillery officers found difficulty in giving the theory of gunnery their full focus, and it was mooted that there should have been a separate course for TF officers (which never happened). 70 The report for the Shoeburyness Artillery Course (1910) suggested that ‘many TF officers coming here seem to be under the impression that they would get practical instruction, and have been disappointed to find that such was not the case’. 71 The Shoeburyness report suggests that ‘a school be established ... and money spent on it would be well spent’. 72 However, due to the TFs budget, a TF artillery school was never likely.

The TF Artillery found difficulty in drafting Regular instructors in the numbers needed; a problem manifest from the Territorials’ birth. 73 During the transition from the Militia and Volunteers, the number of appointments and course placements open to regular NCOs on Gunner Staff Courses was reduced to save money. 74 The training situation was made worse by the poor quality of some of the TF gunners who attended gunnery NCO courses. A School of Gunnery Report (1909) stated that ‘the non-commissioned officers of the TF were generally rather below the average standard, and it appears very doubtful whether the best men, who are probably earning good

68 RDLWRA, Annual Report Horse, Field and Heavy Artillery, 1909. The report explains that TF officers ‘are extremely slow when it comes to their turn to carry out the duties of a Battery Commander’ and that TF NCOs have ‘a tendency to learn everything by heart, without fully appreciating the reasons for what is laid down’. 69 RDLWRA, War Office Library, Annual Report of the School of Gunnery for Horse, Field and Heavy Artillery 1910, ‘Shoeburyness Artillery Course, 14 Oct. 1910’ (London: Harrison and Sons, 1910), p. 3. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. On a Siege Artillery and Movable Armament Course (1911), the technical knowledge of this arm was beyond the comprehension of one TF officer. The report stated that the officer was underprepared, and missing huge chunks of knowledge in gunnery. 73 FCA TA/D/4, ‘A meeting of the General Purposes and Finance Committee held at the Queen Hotel Chester on Thursday 8 April 1909’. To save money, the Flintshire TF Association had, during 1908, cut down their permanent military staff to six per battalion from eight per battalion in all branches. However, under instruction from Lord Haldane, the TFA had to increase its regular soldier representation, pp. 11-2. 74 RDLWRA, War Office Library, Annual Report of the School of Gunnery, 1908: Part I – Coast Artillery, Report of the Chief Instructor Garrison and Siege, Shoeburyness 1 – General Remarks (London: Harrison and Sons, 1908), p. 9.

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wages, will be able to get away for a month to attend the course.⁷⁵ Consequently, those who could afford the time to attend senior NCO (SNCO) courses were often not the most desirable candidates – mainly unemployed men eager to earn a month’s pay, who would not have been selected for the promotion courses given a choice.⁷⁶ An annual report relating to TF sergeants recommended a new order regarding their obligatory requalification as instructors after a stated interval as ‘a sound one’.⁷⁷ The report added that ‘these non-commissioned officers, not always the best in the first instance, seem to get rusty very soon. The two batches received last winter (1913) were much below the standard of NCOs attending Regular batteries’.⁷⁸

Time afforded to the art of gunnery from the TF’s higher ranks was also a significant factor in the training of the Artillery arm. Again, this was an area the TF struggled to address. Peter Dennis highlights the Regular Army’s criticism of Territorial officer professionalism TF-wide.⁷⁹ But, with TF officers contending with a lack of time and often having to pay their own expenses to attend the necessary courses for improvement, standards remained low.⁸⁰ Moreover, when serving as an officer in an arm as technical as the Royal Artillery, lapses in professionalism tended to show up much more.

It seemed that the higher the rank, the further behind the Regulars Territorial officers were in the knowledge demanded of their stations. The 1913 Annual Report on Field Gunnery stated that a battery adjutant’s efficiency was crucial to a battery’s performance. Unfortunately, senior TF ranks failed to help themselves improve. The winter 1912–1913 Shoeburyness Adjutants Course on commanding TF Artillery batteries was poorly attended and marked up as such in the Chief Instructor of Horse and Field Gunnery report.⁸¹ As for the more senior ranks of major and colonel, the report questions the practice of senior TF officers attending regular practice camps.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* An example of the wrong sort of TF NCO candidate and TF officer sent on a Heavy Artillery course: ‘One officer in the 1⁰ course, and one Corporal of the TF Artillery in the 2⁰ course failed. Both worked hard the officer, however, had little capacity for picking up subjects of the course and knew very little when he joined. The Corporal had no knowledge of Heavy Artillery, the previous service was with Coastal Artillery, even this service was as a cook; he was extremely dull, and not the class of man to make a good Drill Sergeant’.
⁷⁷ RDLWRA, Annual Report of the School of Gunnery for Horse, Field and Heavy Artillery, 1913, p. 5.
⁷⁹ Dennis, The Territorial Army, p. 25.
⁸¹ RDLWRA, Annual Report of the School of Gunnery for Horse, Field and Heavy Artillery, 1913, p. 3.
The report suggests that these officers were ‘mere onlookers’, and, while they gained some instruction regarding their roles, perhaps the best course of action would be to see captains and subalterns attending observation of fire courses instead of a regular camp. The difficulty of both higher- and lower-ranking officers’ ability to reach the standard required could only have had a detrimental effect upon the men they were supposed to guide and instruct and the School of Gunnery’s reports bear witness to this.

The recruiting of Territorial officers proved problematic until the outbreak of the Great War. For example, from the start (1908), the TF were 3,049 below establishment in officers. On a local level, the Warwickshire Yeomanry 1\textsuperscript{st}/1\textsuperscript{st} Battery Royal Horse Artillery (TF) could only fill three of seven officer posts until the start of the Great War. The 1913 Annual School of Gunnery report suggested that ‘There are far too many TF artillery battalions; reduce by one-third and the batteries can have a better pick of officers, men, and horses’. The shortage of knowledgeable officers affected the better training of the part-timers. Having Territorial officers ‘nursed through their tasks’ by Regular instructors whilst on courses did not translate into becoming an instructor who could teach a Territorial soldier with little spare time. When the Chief Instructor of Gunnery saw the standard of training the TF and its officers had achieved, he discovered that ‘a large proportion of the units are only in an elementary stage and their instruction should be run on those lines’. He added: ‘Any attempts to take them to more advanced work has not been a success’. The failure to attract sufficient numbers of officers and officers with the time to take courses again became a struggle for the TA after 1920, with the added burden of having to learn more in the same amount of time as warfare changed strategically, tactically and weapon-wise.

In the period between the World Wars, just as before the Great War, the Territorial officer’s route to becoming a trained and ready-to-train soldier could often be a long and winding one and much of this training was done without contact with actual troops. Historian David French argues that, when recruited, the Territorial

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{82} Ibid., p. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{83} House of Lords Debate, ‘The Territorial Force’, Hansard, Vol. 192 cc1005 18, 16 July 1908.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Philip Spinks, Talk and Transcript, ‘Corporal Harry Fox and the 1st/1st Warwickshire Battery Royal Horse Artillery (TF) Historical Society, Larkhill, 22 October 2008’.
\item \textsuperscript{85} RDLWRA, Annual Report of the School of Gunnery for Horse, Field and Heavy Artillery. 1913, p. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
officer’s training was more theoretical, not as practically grounded as that required of a Regular officer. During the late 1930s, a few Territorial officers attended short courses at the Sandhurst Military Academy. However, many could only spare three to four weekends each year in addition to their evening drill commitment and civilian employment, which limited their experience. From 1920 to 1939, the TA was always playing catch-up regarding modern kit and effectiveness.

The prospective Territorial officers that made it past the initial phases of their training in this period were expected to pass a competency examination within three years of being commissioned. However, the practical part of the examination was set by their unit adjutant, who was also responsible for training them; this became a test rarely failed. Furthermore, future battalion commanders were not required to attend the Senior Officers School before commanding their unit. A training fault noticed by Basil Liddell-Hart of The Times (1938) was that senior TA officers had little understanding of tactics and their implementation. None of these problems boded well for training a body of troops in this necessary soldiering requirement.

During the inter-war years the lack of strategic and tactical experience often affected umpiring (deciding tactical military outcomes on exercise) and leadership in the field. The result of this imbalance was translated into substandard training for the men under their command. In mitigation, however, a retired lieutenant-colonel (TA) replied to criticisms of Territorial training through The Times editor in 1938, stating that the lack of tactical awareness was due to the significant turnover of Territorial personnel. Because of this he argued, around 20 to 25 per cent of the battalion at every annual camp were recruits who needed instruction on basic soldiering. He also stated that the remedy did not lie ‘in taking Territorial battalions out training from 6

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89 Ibid. Yeomanry officers had similar training schedules to adhere to but with the addition of twelve working days attached to a regular unit.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army, 1940–1944. Territorial officers were encouraged to read publications which helped develop a tactical and strategic officer. Publications such as Brigadier Hanbury Paul’s Notes of the Framing of Tactical Exercises for Officers of the Territorial Army (1939); Major A. W. Valentine, More Sand Table Exercises (1941); Street Fighting for Junior Officers (1941); and Major C. R. Ward, Section Training Exercises (1941).
93 Basil Liddell-Hart, ‘Territorials in 1938’, The Times. The only training some TA officers undertook in combined arms operations were Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWTs), hence the severe lack of tactical awareness.
a.m. to 6 p.m. on alternate days during camp. Neither officers as instructors nor men as learners are fit for so many long days of training, and the quality will suffer. 95

Once Territorial officers had passed their competency examination (within three years of being commissioned), there were new skills to master. Firstly, the officer had to learn how to facilitate the training activities of recruits and trained ranks (alongside their full-time permanent staff instructors, usually SNCOs). They had to become effective basic map readers and message writers and master simple verbal orders. Territorial officers also had to master administration and the internal economy of their company (such as running a rifle company or Yeomanry squadron) at the drill station, in camp and in the field, all on a part-time basis. 96 After two years of service, the TA officer should have been trained and was expected to have a theoretical knowledge of the handling of other arms, organising field defences for infantry, and efficiently performing the duties of the next-higher rank. 97 With many of the field tasks, the TA officer had to learn he would have had little practical experience, even counting time at annual camp. Territorial officers trained for field tasks by taking part in a Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT). 98 Unfortunately, TFWTs and lectures were no substitutes for manoeuvring real troops in the field.

A fully armed and kitted-out platoon/troop was a sophisticated tactical instrument. The platoon/troop needed handling with coordination and with knowledge of the roles involved. Unlike the TF before the Great War, who were basically riflemen with the same job, the pre-World War Two platoon/troop was supposed to be equipped with three Bren guns (light machine guns) and a two-inch mortar. The platoon/troop officer had, when attacking, to devise a plan of attack to coordinate either a withdrawal if the platoon/troop was losing the firefight or an attack incorporating the two-inch mortar and Bren guns as fire support. Attacks had to be carried out while using a good knowledge of fieldcraft and personal skills, such as finding suitable fire positions, soldiers’ fire and manoeuvre, and change of position after firing; all to be coordinated by either the platoon/troop officer or the SNCO. Therefore, training Territorial officers in addition to the rank and file to a decent standard was an enormous task and

95 Ibid.
96 Beith, The Citizen Soldier, p. 77.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., The Citizen Soldier, pp. 76-7. Beith in his book stated that it was exceptional to commission an officer without previous service either from his school OTC or from service in the ranks.
a struggle for an underfunded and underresourced TA with men having only limited
time to offer (much like the TF before them).

This situation was not helped, argued Harrison Place in *Military Training in the
British Army*, by many NCOs’ inexperience in the deployment of a section or how a
troop handled its weapons (the British Army still concentrated too much on Parade
soldiering). These age-old problems were not unlike the TF’s problems before the
Great War and still had a great effect upon Territorial efficiency. There was, however,
one welcome change to training the TA during this time, which was that drill (the
marching type) became limited to basic marching, saluting and snapping to
attention. Unfortunately, the training undertaken prior to World War Two followed
1914–1918 tactical lines and London Scottish Major John Vivian complained that
even this outdated training in tactical techniques barely touched his unit.

Funding for the TA began to improve during 1937–1938. However, Peter
Dennis states that the Territorial Army’s pre-1938 instructors were slow to improve to
rapid change. The new recruits, many enlisting after Germany’s *Anschluss* (union)
with Austria in 1938, had legitimate concerns over the training methods and teaching
they received. Numbers of recruits in some parts of the country increased
tenfold. However, while the influx of new recruits solved establishment worries
(Territorial establishments were only full in wartime), the TA did not have the
infrastructure, equipment or instructors in place to train the new recruits adequately
up to even a basic standard. The new influx of middle and professional classes,
many used for the new searchlight and anti-aircraft (AA) regiments, began to force a
change in the old TA, particularly in methods of training and instruction, by

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21 Harrison Place, *Military Training in the British Army*, 1940–1944, p. 40. Boomerang (alias). *Bless ’em all: An analysis of the British Army, its Morale, Efficiency and Leadership* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1942), pp. 26-7. The author says on the constant spit and polish of the wartime army and lack of useful military training that, ‘If it were possible to wipe out Nazism with a boot-brush, then, indeed, we would be well trained to do it. If we were going to fight the Germans with button-sticks then we would be well practised in the weapons of war’. Harrison Place, *Military Training in the British Army*, 1940–1944, p. 46.

107 Dennis, *The Territorial Army*, p. 77.


109 Ian Hay, *Arms and the Men: The Second World War 1939–1945, A Short Military History Series* (London: HMSO, 1950), p. 53. Hay, who is non-critical of government action throughout the 1930s in this book, had to admit the preparation of the Territorials during this period was poor. He states that ‘The position with regard to equipment was lamentable’. The TA before World War Two needed £9,250,000.00 (1937 values) to update and rearm.


105 Dunlop, *Territorial Army Today*, p. 56.

104 Dennis, *The Territorial Army*, p. 164.

demanding better facilities, better equipment and better instruction. The instructors, weapons and equipment were profoundly inadequate after years of neglect and not up to the task of training a force for a modern war. A 1938 War Office memorandum described the Territorials’ poor application of training methods, stating that ‘the system of training throughout the TA seems to be designed to suit the stupidest clan of recruits i.e. the rural ploughman’. The memorandum continued:

The instruction is incompetent. The instructors, almost without exception, lack general intelligence; they have learnt the lessons parrot fashion and can only teach in that fashion; they cannot answer questions which are not in the drill book, and finally their method and speed of instruction is entirely ill-suited to their audience. They take in fact an hour to teach what their hearers can all fully grasp in five minutes.

Men who enlisted in March 1938 were, in their own words, ‘dissatisfied and as citizens alarmed’ by the instruction they had received. For example, one member of an AA unit spent twenty-five hours, the equivalent of three months’ training, on sloping arms, ordering and presenting arms and tying clove hitch knots. Another man in a searchlight unit booked onto a specialist course designed to train NCOs (a thirty-seven-hour course) spent only two hours studying the searchlight and sound apparatus. The remaining thirty-five hours were spent on lectures on the correct placement of latrines. The theory of electricity failed to reach the most elementary level due to the instructor’s ignorance of the subject. The negligence of the TA by the government, in addition to the limitations of time the average Territorial soldier had to deal with regarding the Territorial Trinity of Commitments, ensured that part-time soldiers of this period were only trainable to a very basic level. It is little wonder that Lord Gort, General Officer Commanding of the BEF, said of the TA in France (1940) that ‘The standard of training is low and in my opinion against a first-class

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108 Ibid., p. 215.
109 Ibid., p. 217 and TNA WO32/4610, War Office, ‘Memorandum on the Territorial Army’, to the GOC in Cs (English and Scottish Commands) and ence., 26 June 1938.
110 Dennis, The Territorial Army, pp. 216-7
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
enemy they are as yet fit only for static warfare’. He also found that ‘The TA possessed little more than token equipment’. The problems regarding officers, their selection and their training did not change a great deal in the twenty-first century. Again, much like their antecedents in the TF and pre-World War Two, TA officers, especially good young officers, were difficult to recruit. And, again, a Territorial officer’s training took around two years to complete if the potential officer was willing to forfeit holidays alongside much of his spare time.

It was argued earlier in this chapter that the lack of good officer training was perhaps the greatest weakness in the Territorial Army. However, this argument was still relevant in the modern TA. Furthermore, unlike the TF or the pre-World War Two TA, the modern TA was not predominantly manned by young volunteers; many Territorial officers were over forty years old.

Territorial instruction and training for drill nights, weekends and annual camp were, or the main, organised by the TA unit administration. The TA unit officer commanding (OC) was supported by the Regimental Sergeant Major, Training Major, Adjutant (all usually Territorials) and Permanent Staff Instructors (PSIs). The PSIs took some of the training and specialised training, but, as mentioned earlier, most military-based instruction took a back seat, as much of the training was geared towards the unit’s MATTs tests. Furthermore, as will be discussed shortly, budgets played a large part in what training was possible; a problem since 1908.

All the above factors regarding attracting officers and training them so that they could train others has, throughout the Territorial organisation’s history, been a factor in producing a Territorial force that has not been available quickly for overseas deployment without PDT. Officers should have been an asset to give guidance and provide authority regarding training, but they were not helped by the circumstances in which they found themselves regarding time and, just as importantly, the instructors they relied upon to help train their units. There was, however, an even greater factor than insubstantial officer and trainer numbers that affected Territorial training and organisation from 1908 until 2013, and that was inadequate budgets.

114 TNA CAB 106/260, ‘Copy of a letter from the Commander in Chief, BEF, Lord Gort, to the Secretary of State for War on the state of the Army prior to the German attack’, 31 Dec. 1939/01 Jan 1940.
115 Ibid.
116 Walker, Reserve Forces and the British Territorial Army, p. 102.
**Territorial budgets**

Much of what the Territorial organisation could achieve was predicated upon how much they received in their budgets. Territorial budgets were controlled by the War Department/MoD and, ultimately, by the government. Governments always have to justify expenditure on all parts of the defence structure and Dennis states that ‘It was the misfortune of history that the Territorial Army was born out of a political concern for economy in government spending as much as for any strategic circumstances’ (much like FR2020).\(^{119}\) When the TF was formed in 1908, it cost the government £2.8 million per annum (1908 costs), a contrast to the £4.4 million spent annually upon the Volunteers, Militia and Imperial Yeomanry they replaced.\(^{120}\) From the annual budgets, the regional Territorial Associations had to pay for kit and equipment, as well as items such as boots and uniforms. For the Yeomanry, they had to have tack, brushes and stable kits, and training aids such as wooden horses. The budget also paid for costs such as cycle allowances of 1d per mile for those travelling over three miles to drill nights. The Associations also, among many duties, had to organise and pay for ranges for shooting and the ammunition.\(^{121}\) Money was tight for the Territorial Associations (as will be detailed in Chapter Two – General kit and equipment issues) in the run-up to the Great War, but, when they reformed as the TA in 1920, finances would become much much tighter for the organisation.

After the Great War, the budgets on which the TA survived were parsimonious and they suffered greatly under successive governments’ policy to reduce spending on the military during the 1920s and 1930s which led to this period being labelled the ‘locust years’.\(^{122}\) Dennis, in *The Territorial Army*, describes the Territorials as living ‘a hand to mouth existence in the inter-war years, battling government parsimony on the one hand and public indifference and hostility on the other’.\(^{123}\) Leading to this state of affairs was the imposition of the Ten Year Rule (1919), a policy that directed service departments to plan their budgets on the assumption that there would be no major wars for ten years. The shadow of the Great Depression (1929–1939) then led to tighter budgets and outdated training, which paid little heed to the changing

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\(^{119}\) Dennis, *The Territorial Army*, p. 1.

\(^{120}\) Beckett, *Britain’s Part-Time Soldiers*, p. 213.


\(^{123}\) Dennis, *The Territorial Army*, p. 147.
character of war. There was a willingness to skimp on thorough military training and PDT, which led to disaster when the TA had to fight in 1940.\footnote{John Ferris, ‘Treasury Control: The Ten Year Rule and British Service Policies, 1919–1924’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 30, No. 4 (1987), p. 861. Ferris states that the ‘Ten Year Rule’ phrase did not come into use until formal revocation of the rule. Between 1919–1924, the ‘Ten Year Rule’ was called ‘the decision’. David Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War (London: Penguin Books, 2005), p. 142, states that ‘Sir Basil Liddell-Hart wrote about the constant attacks (Churchill) made on the Tank Corps budget when Churchill was Chancellor’. However, Christopher M. Bell, in ‘Winston Churchill and the Ten Year Rule’, Journal of Military History, Vol. 74, Issue 4 (2010), argues that although Churchill’s propagation of the infamous ‘Ten Year Rule’ has led to charges that he created the deficiencies in Britain’s defences that he denounced during the 1930s, the literature condemning him seems to exaggerate his authority.}

Justifying ever tighter budgets for the Territorials was made easier for the government due to a stand-off between the Territorial Associations and the Secretary of State for War, Winston Churchill, during the inter-war years (1919-1938) over the use of the Territorials in a future war, in a deal known as ‘the Pledge’. Instead of the principal role of home defence, such as the TF, the Defence Manpower Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence established wartime conscription as a fundamental principle in 1923.\footnote{Beckett, Britain’s Part-Time Soldiers, p. 244.} This principle rendered the TA only usable for medium-scale conflicts, which required greater flexibility from Territorials for general service and unit integrity, something the Territorial organisation did not want to do. Ian Beckett argues that ‘anything that rendered Territorials virtually unusable could only result in the War Office regarding them as the most expendable part of the army at a time of considerable financial retrenchment’.\footnote{Ibid.} The TA Associations negotiated survival for the TA but the Pledge ensured ever more restrictive budgets.\footnote{TNA WO32/4527, Copy of minute extracted from file 27/Gen/8769, November 1937, and War Office, General Annual Report on the British Army, 1925, p. 109. Paragraph 17 of TA Regulations protected the TA from the War Office using Territorials for Colonial conflict and the drafting of TA soldiers, making the TA virtually unusable during the 1920s and 1930s. The pledge was eventually abolished in 1938.} The TA Associations negotiated survival for the TA but the Pledge ensured ever more restrictive budgets.

The budget restrictions on the TA during the Ten Year Rule, the Pledge and the effects of the Great Depression hampered the training of the TA greatly. Money was so tight for some units that they had to make up shortfalls in other ways. For example, in 1933, the 243rd (Colwyn Bay) Battery, Royal Artillery (TA) sold advertising space on their gun shed overlooking Colwyn Bay seafront to the Empire Marketing Board.\footnote{FCA TA/D/7, ‘Denbighshire Territorial Army Association Minute Book – 1926-1938’, p. 609.} Finally, from the end of World War Two and the Territorial Army’s reconstitution in 1947, the Territorial organisation has endured many cuts to their
establishment numbers and budgets. Training was affected by parsimonious budgets by way of obsolete kit, out-of-date training methods and too low fitness. For example, Beckett states that, in 2005–2006, when Territorials were being mobilised, many were failing to proceed to PDT because of poor health and fitness levels.\textsuperscript{129} Because of these failures in essential soldiering fitness basics, new fitness procedures were introduced in November 2007.\textsuperscript{130} Furthermore, Territorial training suffered because of course cancellations and a lack of equipment.\textsuperscript{131} Those Territorial soldiers or units that did not find themselves mobilised were invested in even less than would have been normal for a Territorial in the early twenty-first century. The British Army as a whole now (and continues to be) operated in a very restricted financial environment; therefore, it only invested funding in the Territorial units it could use on operations overseas. The process they used was called the ‘Graduated Commitment Mechanism’, and this system left many of the non-deployable TA units with underresourced and unstimulating training.\textsuperscript{132} Unfortunately for the TA, the need to save money went too far in 2009, when Gordon Brown, the Labour Prime Minister, froze Territorial training and pay not related to Afghanistan deployments; a decision quickly reversed, but one that severely dented TA morale, making the organisation feel undervalued and vulnerable.\textsuperscript{133}

The research in this thesis shows that the training commitments for the AR required them to train twenty-seven days a year, as had their antecedents the Territorials. Of course, not all volunteers fulfilled only the twenty-seven-day commitment but many did and some did more. However, unit budgets (and money for man training days) only stretch so far. Therefore, Territorials and their successors can never train enough to become a quickly deployable force for an overseas campaign with shortened PDT. Section 1 of this chapter has highlighted the problems with Territorial training; however, this is not the full picture. There were serious consequences associated with the shortage of training time, insufficient and insufficiently trained officers and instructors and, of course, poor budgets, research that adds to the historiography of the Territorial organisation and the reasons why

\textsuperscript{129} Beckett, Territorials, p. 248.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{132} Independent Commission, Future Reserves 2020, p. 175.
relying on part-time soldiers to cover capability gaps (FR2020) is a risky venture. Section 2 investigates the consequences that stem from the Territorials’ problems.

Section 2: Consequences (1908–2013)

Establishment and attendance

From the start of its activities, the Territorial organisation has always had an establishment deficit.134 This establishment deficit carries forward to today’s Army Reserve. The establishment of the TF in 1908 was set too high and the numbers signing up attest to that (see further down). Therefore, at its birth, the TF struggled to attract recruits and achieve a full establishment (reported on and criticised at the time) and this in its turn dissuaded men from joining up and, ultimately, had an effect on the efficiency and effectiveness of the organisation. However, although low establishment numbers have drawn criticism, the sometimes patchy attendance by its soldiers was, and is, not all because of the organisation’s struggles to reach a full establishment, although it is a factor that affected funding, kit and equipment and the perception of the organisation. Moreover, the establishment and the attendance rates of the Territorial organisation are strongly linked.

As mentioned in Section 1, establishment and attendance also suffered from Territorials often not having sufficient spare time to attend and, when they did, they often received poor training and instruction. For example, both The Times Military Correspondent Basil Liddell Hart and Peter Dennis have highlighted that too much time had to be spent on training new recruits by a limited number of instructors in basic soldiering, thus neglecting trained Territorials, which discouraged many part-timers from signing on again once their time expired.135 Furthermore, very much related to establishment and attendance was the attrition (wastage) rate for the Territorials, which has always been high. The TF suffered a high annual wastage of 12.5 per cent, which again had an effect when having to train the new faces in the

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134 The establishment deficit problem was only changed when Great Britain was either under direct threat, for example, during the late 1930s, or when at war during the Great War and World War Two.

basics, as this also affected promotion rates for experienced longer-serving volunteers.\textsuperscript{136}

By the 1990s, Wallace Earl Walker found that the percentage of soldiers leaving the TA was cumulative and that, on average, only about 25 per cent of those entering as recruits remained after the end of three years. If a part-time soldier stayed longer than three years in the TA, the retention rates improved. Therefore, after around six years of service, about 12 per cent of those starting as recruits were likely to remain.\textsuperscript{137} Walker also found that in most TA regiments of the 1990s the attrition rate translated into a turnover of about 30 per cent of an entire unit each year. Some regimental commanders reported a 50 per cent turnover.\textsuperscript{138} For the Territorials of the ‘War on Terror’ era, wastage was just as high. A Westminster Hall debate on the TA in 2002 revealed that many Territorial units, especially infantry, were always under strength, being only ever three-quarters manned.\textsuperscript{139} What is more, in 2013, when the TA was to be renamed the Army Reserve, manning had not improved and the wastage rate for the TA as reported by the Directorate of Training (TA) was around 50 per cent.\textsuperscript{140} Wastage, as mentioned earlier, affects training, budgets and what can be done with units that have a constant rotation of new recruits. This would have an effect on the quality of the Territorials when they started PDT for Iraq in 2003 (see Chapter Three – PDT). Managing to train all the Territorials to trained soldiers in the organisation was always a problem due to the Territorial Trinity of Commitments. Even when the TA was needed to support the regular armed forces operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, the problem persisted.

After around eight years of campaigning in the Middle East, MoD figures state that, of the TA strength (2011) of around 30,000, only 20,000 were classed as ‘trained’. Of these 20,000 trained ranks, 16,272 were defined as ‘regular attendees’, the MoD describing ‘regular attendees’ as those who ‘have been paid for attending at least one drill night or annual camp within the last six months’.\textsuperscript{141} Nevertheless, of the 16,272 ‘regular attendees’, only one-third, it was claimed in a Telegraph article,

\textsuperscript{136} Beckett, Britain’s Part-Time Soldiers, p. 219.
\textsuperscript{137} Walker, Reserve Forces and the British Territorial Army, p. 86.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140} Colonel Adrian Walton, PDF Report, ‘Directorate of Training (Army) Territorial Army Recruiting, Training and Retention’, 8 March 2013.
around 5,400, were suitable for front-line deployment with the Regular armed forces. Of course, these figures may be hard to prove. The establishment deficiency and attendance of Territorials at training have never been addressed. By the very nature of the Territorial organisation, ensuring all members of a unit, company or division attend all training is not possible, as volunteers are civilians first, with jobs and families, and only soldiers second. Targets and expectations have always been too high and it is difficult to see how this historic problem will change under FR2020.

Originally, Lord Haldane (Secretary of State for War during TF formation, 1 April 1908) aimed to raise 314,094 officers and men, comprising 42 brigades, and set the target establishment too high, as it could only be met if all the militia, Imperial Yeomanry and volunteers the TF were replacing joined – something that did not happen. The building up of the TF started slowly. Haldane offered a one-year enlistment instead of four but, by June 1908, only 144,620 officers and men had signed up. Within a year of its birth, the TF had reached a strength of 9,313 officers and 259,463 other ranks. A year before the Great War, the total strength of the TF on the last day of the training cycle stood at 9,315 officers and 237,644 other ranks. This, of course, played into the hands of the pro-conscriptionist National Service League (NSL), who were to have a negative influence on the establishment of the organisation. Dennis states that the TF was affected in two ways by the NSL. Firstly, the constant denigration of the TF by the NSL cut into recruiting, with the result that the TF began to decline; and secondly, the mere existence of the NSL discouraged enlistment. However, the establishment became lower still when the Territorials were reformed as the Territorial Army in 1920, and reached a nadir in 1935 when the TA establishment stood at 131,017, all ranks.

After World War Two and the reconstitution of the TA, the establishment of the Territorials was on a downward trajectory, from 175,000 in 1947 to 72,823 at the end

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142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
145 Dennis, The Territorial Army, p. 17.
146 The Army Council, General Annual Report on the British Army, p. 114. Establishments were constantly revised, but even when revised significantly downwards the TA never reached full establishment. For example, in 1925, the establishment was set at 7,789 officers and 175,943 other ranks. The actual strength stood at 6,340 officers and 139,344 other ranks.
147 Dennis, The Territorial Army, p. 22.
148 Ibid., p. 282.
of the Cold War (1991). Today, the AR’s establishment is set at 30,000 but, as with their Territorial forebears, they too are struggling to reach anywhere near the numbers required under FR2020. However, apart from numbers, perhaps the largest problem for the TF was full attendance, mainly from men who had jobs and families. The local Territorial Force Associations (TFAs) and units tried to ensure training became accessible to their members, even if some could not always attend a particular night due to work or family commitments. For example, in spring and summer, training was often increased for those regiments who only gained adequate training outdoors, the Royal Horse Artillery (RHA) being a case in point. Another expedient, for example, was the 1st/1 Warwickshire RHA battalion, which ran training throughout the week (Sunday off) for trained ranks and recruits, offering the same training two nights running, before switching to another drill for two nights in several locations to ensure maximum attendance.

Nevertheless, the TF as a whole faced challenges in attracting recruits and retaining men while battling the widespread perception that being a Territorial was a personal financial liability. Mitchinson, in England’s Last Hope, states that ‘it cost the man money because time spent at weekend camps or evening drills meant that he could not be earning overtime’. Furthermore, once a young Territorial was out of his civilian apprenticeship, for example, or possibly married, that man would find it increasingly difficult to attend drill nights. This burden was often made worse by having to pay bus fares to and from the drill hall and sometimes the price of an evening meal. Finally, another impediment to full attendance at annual camp during this period was the government’s refusal to cover lost wages whilst attending camp. Mitchinson argues that this action was one of the principal reasons why the TF remained under establishment. Some employees were refused leave to attend camp (Chapter Four of this thesis discusses the dilemma faced by many smaller businesses in losing key workers for two weeks). Some Territorials used up their holiday entitlements to attend and some would not attend due to loss of earnings without any compensation from the government. There were sanctions for non-attendance at camp prior to the Great War: a soldier could be taken to court for not turning up.

150 Spinks, ‘Corporal Harry Fox and the 1st/1st Warwickshire Battery, 2008.
151 Mitchinson, England’s Last Hope, p. 64.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid., p. 53.
154 Mitchinson, England’s Last Hope, p. 72.
However, getting absentees to court was difficult and became too costly for many Associations.\textsuperscript{155} To save costly court appearances, many Associations attempted to persuade their volunteers to attend camp by promoting the benefits of attending.

Mitchinson states that recruiting posters, unit histories and regimental journal articles extolled the virtues and fun of the annual camp.\textsuperscript{156} However, not all Territorials could attend due to the reasons already mentioned. One Territorial soldier from a London class battalion who did not attend camp stated: 'I only get a fortnight’s holiday in a year and I feel that during the fortnight I require real rest of body and mind'.\textsuperscript{157} Besides, not all Territorial volunteers joined to become efficient soldiers. Eric Hutchings, a Territorial before and during World War Two, admitted that, at least among lower ranks, not many TA soldiers took their soldiering seriously. Many Territorials in Eric's unit had only joined because 'the beer was cheaper than at the local pubs'.\textsuperscript{158} During the 1920s and 1930s, in an atmosphere of wide anti-military sentiment, the Territorial Army was struggling to attract keen part-time soldiers to the organisation.

Beckett maintains that, during the inter-war years, the TA had an undeniable image problem, which lasted until the late 1930s.\textsuperscript{159} In 1935, Lord Raglan pointed to other problems affecting both recruiting and attendance at the drill halls, which, in his opinion, were 'women, trade unions and motor bicycles'.\textsuperscript{160} In order to maintain establishment numbers, and because of the constant need to recruit, the joining requirement standards were relaxed.\textsuperscript{161} During the inter-war years, many men, predominantly the unemployed, joined in the time leading up to an annual camp.\textsuperscript{162} However, once camp was over, numbers attending and joining up fell off - some units stopped training altogether until spring.\textsuperscript{163} The search for recruits was further hindered

\begin{footnotes}
\item[155] ibid., pp. 66-7.
\item[156] ibid., p. 70.
\item[157] ibid., p. 72.
\item[159] ibid.
\item[160] Dennis, \textit{The Territorial Army}, p. 147.
\item[161] ibid. In 1936 a recruiting appeal attracted members of the British Union of Fascists (BUF), a position that could have compromised the TA's standing amongst the working classes from whom most of the TA was drawn. This potential embarrassment was eventually dealt with when the War Office persuaded the BUF's leader Oswald Mosley that joining the TA was 'impracticable and impolitic', pp. 153-4.
\item[162] ibid., p. 151.
\item[163] ibid.
\end{footnotes}
by the appalling medical standards of many of the working-class and mainly unemployed men wishing to join.\textsuperscript{164}

In an attempt to recruit fit and healthy men and keep them in the TA, campaigns to attract keen sportsmen and advertise Territorial drill halls’ leisure facilities were launched in the 1930s. Major-General Beith, Director of Public Relations for the War Office, thought that ‘if drill halls could be made the social centre of their existence the men would not want to leave’.\textsuperscript{165} Director-General of the TA General Sir Walter Kirke added to this, stating ‘We have every intention of developing athletics in the Territorial Army’.\textsuperscript{166} However, this promotion of sport and other leisure activities, such as dances, put a further squeeze on the time dedicated to military training, all going towards making the TA 1920–1940 less effective than it should have been.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{territorial_army_poster.png}
\caption{TA recruiting poster to encourage sportsmen (no date).\textsuperscript{167}}
\end{figure}

Instead of the camp being an opportunity to acquaint officers and men with the administrative conditions to be found in the field, for example, poor food intake, extended periods of marching, digging in (trenches, foxholes or shell scrapes), little sleep and concealing bivouac positions when stopping for the night, annual camps

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{165} Beith, \textit{The Citizen Soldier}, p. 183.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., p. 187.
\textsuperscript{167} National Army Museum, NAM 1989-03-5-1, Image No. 136360. Source of the Territorial Army Sports poster (inter-war), \url{http://www.nam.ac.uk} [Accessed: 25/07/13].
were almost the complete opposite, teaching attendees very little of value for war. Many of the TA’s annual camps were situated at or as near to the seaside as possible to encourage maximum attendance.\textsuperscript{168} To keep attendance and morale up during TA annual camps, the training programmes were a mix of recruit training, tactical sub-unit and unit military training, and a healthy dose of sport and leisure time. Mitchinson explains in \textit{England’s Last Hope} that the sport and physical fitness moves were an innovation based upon improving the performance of Territorials that, prior to the Great War, saw many part-timers struggling to keep up with route marches and manoeuvres in full kit and equipment.\textsuperscript{169} Sport before the Great War in the TF, although not discouraged by Territorial units, was not promoted as it should have been due to concerns from unit commanding officers (COs) about men jeopardising leisure time, thus affecting attendance.\textsuperscript{170}

Before World War Two, the TA organisation thought seriously about sport to help retain its soldiers, attract sport-loving recruits, and increase fitness amongst the ranks throughout the year. John Hay Beith states, in \textit{The Citizen Soldier}, that the Territorials of this period also had ideas about turning local drill halls into social centres so that men would not want to leave the TA.\textsuperscript{171} This type of thinking helped in forming the Territorial Army Sports Board (TASB), founded in 1920, which organised more competitions and attempted to ensure TA units had access to sports grounds.\textsuperscript{172} The Queen Victoria’s Rifles (QVR) regiment embraced the sporting context fully, as it struggled to tempt and then retain recruits by running sports teams for football, billiards, tennis, shooting, swimming, badminton, table tennis, and boxing.\textsuperscript{173} However, even with this choice of sporting activities, the QVR struggled to reach the desired establishment figures.\textsuperscript{174} Sport helped with teamwork and physical development, which are vital tools for the military; however, too much sport at camp (and in TA training in general) detracted from soldiering. Sport may have attracted some volunteers to sign up and would have helped general fitness levels but, as the

\textsuperscript{168} Dennis, \textit{The Territorial Army}; p. 216.
\textsuperscript{169} Mitchinson, \textit{England’s Last Hope}, pp. 142-3.
\textsuperscript{170} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{171} Beith, \textit{The Citizen Soldier}, p. 182.
\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Ibid}.
Territorials have a commitment of only twenty-seven days per annual training cycle, military training becomes less vigorously followed.

From 1908 until 2013, poor attendance at training for the Territorials had been endemic. The 2011 TA Continuous Attitude Survey points to some interesting factors that may account for the continuing falling numbers and attendance that have always limited overall efficiency and effectiveness. The survey was conducted four months after the publication of the Strategic Defence and Security Review, Army 2020 and Future Reserves 2020. Within the survey, dissatisfaction over the quality of training was at 25 per cent among the junior ranks (the most deployable soldiers within the TA). Specifically, the amount of training offered was cited as being unimaginative and repetitive (keeping continuity with their antecedents the TF and pre-World War Two TA). This training was also having an impact on retention.\footnote{MoD, Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey (2011), 20120528 TA CAS Headline Report DAPS-U. Of the 1,639 respondents, 87 per cent were male and 13 per cent female. Ages: 16 per cent under 24 years, 28 per cent aged 25-34, 31 per cent aged 35-44 and 24 per cent aged between 45-64.} Furthermore, the organisation of training attracted complaints (particularly drill nights). Up to 50 per cent of the ranks, from privates through to lieutenant-colonels, identified poor administration as a negative influence upon retention within the TA.\footnote{Ibid., p. 5.}

The Future Reserves Commission found that the overall Territorial proposition had markedly declined for all ranks. The Commission indicated that this was due to: ‘a failure to resource recruiting and good training, especially collective training; to offer career progression; to update operational roles; to permit deployment in formed sub-units and therefore provide command opportunities [for TA officers].’\footnote{Future Reserves 2020: Independent Commission, p. 12.} The Commission added that ‘such factors have become compounded by the imposition of recruitment ceilings and greatly reduced activity and marketing budgets. The net result was a Reserve of declining morale; uncertain as to its role and the fairness of the proposition it was offered’.\footnote{Ibid.} The research contained within this thesis shows that poor and unsatisfactory attendance had ramifications for the efficiency and effectiveness of Territorial personnel from 1908 to 2013, adding a significant strand of understanding Territorial training to previous research. When time was limited for Territorial volunteers to train, any time missed had an effect on results and, when this missed training time was conflated with poor funding, not only did efficiency suffer, but so too did perception, which, of course, led to poor recruitment and retention.
Nowhere was this lack of training felt more than in the TF’s woeful musketry returns (1908-1913). This research argues that the intense scrutiny of the part-time soldiers’ training by the Territorial’s many enemies (at home) made any difficulties in gaining efficiency a major failure. To illustrate this point, the chapter now shows the effects of the problems mentioned by examining the testing of TF musketry results prior to the Great War.

**Testing: musketry**

Oh Sergeant Major Shearer  
Please bring the targets nearer,  
For I cannae see the target,  
It is so far awa.\(^{179}\)

There were many limiting factors to TF effectiveness behind the testing of Territorial musketry (including old worn rifles, discussed in Chapter Two). Furthermore, Territorials’ difficulties with efficient musketry returns during this period highlighted one of many symptoms regarding the struggles of producing an effective part-time Reservist force. Territorial musketry failures reveal the rigidity of the Army musketry testing system versus the demands of the Territorial Trinity of Commitments regarding employment and family. To a soldier (especially infantry), alongside marching, proficiency in using a rifle was (and still is) a primary skill.\(^{180}\) Nevertheless, many Territorial soldiers and recruits failed on what appeared to be a modest test, with Mitchinson describing the quality of the TF’s musketry as ‘unsatisfactory – to say the least’.\(^{181}\)

Territorial recruits had a two-part test to pass: Part One, consisting of instructional practices of thirty rounds fired at targets ranging from 100 yards to 500 yards; and Part Two, which consisted of the recruits’ Standard Test of four different

\(^{180}\) Mitchinson, *England’s Last Hope*, p. 167, p. 144. *Marching*: Mitchinson states that the bulk of the TF were considered ‘miserable’ specimens. A large proportion of men from West Lancashire, East Anglia and the Home Counties and many townsfolk were not capable of carrying their kit. Most Territorials had poor march discipline and dropped out too easily. However, some working-class units, particularly those containing miners and countrymen, proved good marchers. The ‘Class’ battalions, such as the London Rifle Brigade, set the London to Brighton march (fifty-two miles) record in 1914 with a time of fourteen hours twenty-three minutes. McCartney, *Citizen Soldiers*, p. 165. Another ‘Class’ battalion, the Liverpool Scottish, aimed to improve march discipline by issuing a ticket to those falling out of the march which stated ‘— was unable to keep up’, which seemed to be effective.  
shoots of five rounds each (total twenty rounds), from 100 yards to 500 yards.\textsuperscript{182} For
the trained Territorial, Part One consisted of instructional practices firing off thirty
rounds at ranges of 100 yards to 500 yards and Part Two, the Standard Test, required
shooting twenty-three rounds from 100 to 500 yards.\textsuperscript{183} Both tests had to be passed to
qualify as efficient.\textsuperscript{184} The object of the testing was to 'speedily ensure a satisfactory
standard of proficiency in those branches of training which cannot in ordinary
circumstances receive further attention after the outbreak of war'.\textsuperscript{185} However, if the
Standard Test was failed, or if the volunteer could not attend testing, an alternative
test could be taken on a thirty-yard range (outside range), or a miniature range (inside
or outside) with a converted .22 Rimfire rifle.\textsuperscript{186} The shortage of suitable outdoor
(full-size) ranges and a reliance on thirty-yard ranges on which to practise musketry
tests was perhaps one of the biggest factors in low musketry returns.\textsuperscript{187}

From 1908 to 1913, the numbers passing the musketry test made for poor
reading. In 1909, sixteen TF battalions failed to become efficient in musketry and
seven battalions failed even to attempt the Standard Test. The remaining nine failed to
put 50 per cent of their men through the shoots.\textsuperscript{188} Three of these battalions fired no
ammunition; of the rest, the average number of rounds per man varied from five to
fifty-two.\textsuperscript{189} For example, the failure rates from 1909–1910 broke down as 18,453
trained men and 24,640 recruits having to qualify in the secondary test either on a
converted rifle or miniature rifle range.\textsuperscript{190} Similar figures appear for 1911's tests, with
around 15,000 soldiers from the 53,812 failures not even tested (see the following
table).\textsuperscript{191} Nevertheless, during 1913, the failure rate rose again and, when asked for an
explanation, the War Office could not give an answer.\textsuperscript{192}

\textsuperscript{182} Army Council, \textit{Musketry Regulations: Part I, 1909 - Reprinted with amendments, 1914} (London:
Harrison and Sons, 1914), pp. 274-75.
\textsuperscript{183} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 277-8.
\textsuperscript{185} Army Council, \textit{Musketry Regulations}, paragraph 348, p. 139.
\textsuperscript{186} House of Commons Debate, 'Territorial Force Musketry', \textit{Hansard}, Vol. 7 cc530-5, 20 March 1911.
The firer could use an Aiming or Morris Tube with regulation sights and the range had to use landscape
and figure targets.
\textsuperscript{187} House of Commons, 'Territorial Force', 21 March 1910.
\textsuperscript{188} House of Commons Debate, 'Territorial Force', \textit{Hansard}, Vol. 122 cc189-90, 28 Feb. 1911. Colonel
G.P. Ranken, 'The Future of the Territorial Force 1', \textit{The Academy and Literature}, Vol. 2062 (1911),
p. 597.
\textsuperscript{189} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 596-7.
\textsuperscript{190} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 597.
\textsuperscript{191} House of Commons Debate, 'TF Musketry Debate', 20 March 1911.
\textsuperscript{192} House of Commons Debate, 'Territorial Force', \textit{Hansard}, Vol. 51 cc566-7, 3 April 1913.
The musketry results became a stick with which to beat the TF, helped by Haldane admitting to 'slightly' lowering test standards in 1910 to improve results while insisting that the 'TF's marksmanship was still slightly higher than that of the average European conscript'. During one Parliamentary debate over TF musketry returns, on discovering that a TF soldier receives his competence certificate for passing either the open (outside) range or the alternative Standard Test (thirty-yard range), a Mr Hunt MP asked 'Is the Territorial compelled to let off his rifle at all?'. However, there were underlying structural reasons for the TF musketry failure rate, which equated to attendance, poor funding, and lack of and competition for ranges from civilian rifle clubs: cadets, boy scouts, and the police.

**Table 1. TF 'Standard Test' musketry returns 1908–1913**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number taking Annual Musketry Test (TF)</th>
<th>Number of passes (trained and recruits)</th>
<th>Number of failures (trained and recruits)</th>
<th>Percentage of failure (all ranks)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>203,410</td>
<td>106,651</td>
<td>96,768</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>195,585</td>
<td>126,912</td>
<td>68,673</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>177,912</td>
<td>143,408</td>
<td>34,504</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>234,536</td>
<td>180,724</td>
<td>53,812</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>248,888</td>
<td>214,383</td>
<td>34,505</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>233,149</td>
<td>174,703</td>
<td>58,446</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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193 House of Commons Debate, 'Territorial Force', 21 March 1910 and, 20 March 1911. Several arms within the TF did not have to take the Musketry Test, such as the Royal Garrison Artillery and the Royal Army Veterinary and Medical Corps.


195 FCA TA/D/5, Flintshire TFA Minute Book 1911-1913, 'Linogollen Rifle Range', 11 May 1911. OC complaint by the tenant of the range about the right of way for vehicles to and from the range. The tenant, Mr John Williams, would not allow carts etc. to pass through, and would not hand over the keys for the gate as promised. Mitchinson, England's Last Hope, states that ranges were forced to close on occasion due to encroachment by golf clubs. Renewals for leases for TFAs were also often rejected by landowners in favour of more financially beneficial leases paid by golf clubs and shooting clubs, pp. 98, 111 and 114.

The table above shows an uneven but downward trend in TF musketry results. Lord Lucas, Under-Secretary of State for War, answered questions on TF musketry failings, suggesting that 'the Standard Test constituted a useful guide to how the TF were progressing... but nobody should attach too much importance to its results'.

The complacent dismissal probably pointed towards the expectation that the TF would need PDT before mobilisation, although he never made this clear. Lucas also informed the House that there was a lack of ranges available for the TF, which often resulted in high numbers of men waiting to fire on often crowded ranges. He insisted that despite great efforts to acquire additional ranges, particularly thirty-yard ranges, progress was slow due to the difficulties of finding suitable sites and a slow acquisition process.

Overcrowding on ranges undoubtedly had a significant impact on results. Lucas stated that the Standard Test was booked into a certain slot, on a certain day for a unit, and if that unit, or men within, did not shoot in the time slot available, they would be graded as a fail. He added: 'If any man for any reason, is prevented from going to the range to be tested on that day, he has to be returned as inefficient, though he may have gone through the whole of his preliminary musketry and be able to pass the Standard Test easily.'

Other of the impediments to successful musketry included taking the Standard Test in atrocious weather and units on weekend musketry camps unable to fire on a Sunday due to religious objections. Moreover, difficulties manifested themselves for men in large cities [who] found it difficult to do their annual course of musketry. Saturday afternoons were often the only time available. Large numbers of those serving found it difficult, if not impossible, to get away from their work and travel twenty or thirty miles to the rifle ranges.

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198 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
200 Ibid.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
203 Ibid.
The TF's musketry results showed how a lack of training and not taking the volunteers working and family situations into account caused far from satisfactory returns. The musketry returns from 1908 to 1913 also show that the 27-days minimum requirement for training was not enough time to train to an efficiency required for a deployment without additional PDT. The musketry issue was a symptom of a greater problem within the TF: part-time soldiers found it difficult to attend all the training they needed because of two of the Territorial Trinity of Commitments – work and family issues. In addition, the poor funding the Territorials received affected both the acquisition of new rifle ranges and the organisation of usable ranges. It is no surprise the TF struggled to gain efficiency in musketry. These limiting factors in attending and practising musketry were the same problems the TF artillery experienced, but with guns instead of rifles.

**Conclusion**

The Territorial organisation and its part-time soldiers had, from 1908 to 2013, a minimum commitment of twenty-seven days. Within this time frame, they were expected to train towards becoming efficient soldiers and to pass military and physical tests in which they, for most of this period, received a cash bounty. The modern-day Army Reserve still uses the same commitment, that of a drill/training night, weekend and annual camp framework, in which to gain military efficiency. However, what this chapter has demonstrated is that twenty-seven days of training is not enough time in which to train a part-time civilian in the intricacies of whichever branch he or she has joined. To gain even a basic working knowledge of what is required when deploying overseas for humanitarian or warfighting roles, the part-time volunteer has to have an extensive, full-time, theatre-specific pre-deployment training period. Without this period of PDT, this chapter has shown that the Territorial of the past did not and the Army Reservist of the future is unlikely to possess the training and knowledge needed to operate safely alongside Regular troops. The government today, under the auspices of FR2020, has stated that the new AR will be better trained, better equipped and quicker to deploy (with less PDT). This chapter argues that even with a few weeks of extra training (any more would not be feasible for working volunteers, especially if they also have family), AR soldiers would still need extensive PDT to prepare them for deployment. Furthermore, like their antecedents in the Territorials, the AR still
struggle with recruiting up to establishment, which means that all the problems their forebears encountered will more than likely still affect the AR (if they do not drastically change) into the future. With the implementation of FR2020, better weapons, kit and equipment have been promised; whether these materialise may be another matter. However, in the past, kit and equipment issues also played a vital role in how Territorials trained and had an influence on whether a Territorial gained efficiency or not. Chapter Two investigates the effect kit and equipment issues had on the training of the Territorials 1908–2013.

Chapter Two

How did substandard and obsolete kit, equipment and transport affect Territorial training 1908–2013?

This chapter argues that the TF and TA from 1908 to 2013 were not properly equipped to ensure adequate, up-to-date training. The lack of equipment experienced by the Territorial organisation affected not only results in military tests, but also their training as a whole, thus becoming yet another limiting factor upon Territorial efficiency and military effectiveness. Colonel Sir Mark Sykes MP, CO 5th Battalion the Green Howards (TF), a member of the NSL and prolific commentator upon the TF, voiced his concern over the standard of the Territorial Force. Not only was he agitated by the TF’s poor quality and lax recruiting standards, he was also upset by the poor provision of kit and equipment, which had a marked effect upon how Territorials trained. As a result of an amalgam of unsuitable candidates for soldiering, not enough training and inadequate kit and equipment, Sykes wrote of his

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204 Ray Westlake, *British Territorial Units 1914–18* (Oxford: Osprey, 2005). Local and regional TFAs had to equip 56 yeomanry regiments, 11 Royal Horse Artillery Batteries, 14 ‘Heavy’ Royal Garrison Artillery Batteries in defended ports, 14 Royal Engineer divisional formations, 14 Infantry Divisions incorporating eight company infantry battalions to most regiments. Also, 14 Royal Army Service Corps divisional formations, and 14 Royal Army Medical Corps Mounted Brigade Field Ambulances. 42 Divisional Field Ambulances and 23 General hospitals attached to several commands, pp. 4–14.


men as "this rabble that can neither shoot, march, drill, attack nor defend and may at any moment be put to the supreme test".  

The TF Infantry trained with obsolete rifles, webbing cast-offs and limited ammunition, while its Artillery made do with obsolete fifteen-pounder guns (the Regular Artillery had eighteen-pounder guns), limited numbers of shells, and few horses (although the lack of horses did encourage improvisation with mechanisation and pointed a way to an improvement in logistics). Furthermore, as already discussed in Chapter One, the poor provision of kit and equipment was because of the parsimonious budgets doled out by the War Office, the Army Council and the Treasury.

The Territorial organisation suffered from obsolete and inferior kit and equipment and shortages from day one, and Mark Sykes highlighted the paucity of the military basics needed for training an efficient force:

Three-quarters of guns destined for the Territorial Artillery have not been issued: the cavalry are generally unprovided for with horses; the infantry have neither socks, boots, nor shirts. No matter what may be the spirit of the Territorial Army, it is absurd and shameful to rely in case of danger, on the valiant, but hopeless efforts of men who are neither trained, clothed nor armed.

To investigate how the poor provision of kit, equipment and transport (both horse and mechanised) affected the training of the Territorial organisation and their efficiency and effectiveness, this chapter is divided under four sub-headings: rifles and guns, horses and riders, mechanised transport, and general kit and equipment issues, and covers the period from 1908 to 2013. The following chapter describes how shortages and obsolete rifles and guns affected how the Territorial organisation reached efficiency.

**Rifles and guns**

Shortages affected all arms of the TF. Historian Richard Holmes described the infantry as the scaffolding around which the Army was built. Therefore, it was

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essential for a Reserve military force, even a second line, that the correct, up-to-date equipment should be available. However, the TF’s principal weapon, the Lee-Metford bolt-action service rifle (1888), was obsolete. When the TF mobilised for the Great War, most units still paraded with the old ‘long’ Lee-Metford, inherited from the Volunteers; a rifle that was originally manufactured to fire black powder rounds. When the rifle started to fire the new standard cordite rounds (introduced in 1911), the accuracy of the rifle was affected.210 Because cordite burned hotter than black powder, the barrel had problems with the heat and gases when a round was fired through. This meant that the rifling in the Lee-Metford became ‘cord worn’.211 These rifles and their worn barrels, certainly post-1911, probably helped contribute to poor musketry results alongside the other faults with the rifle. One significant complaint included the Lee-Metford’s back sight, which was much complained about regarding accuracy.212 Sir Mark Sykes raised the same concerns stating that the back sight was ‘too delicate’.213

Furthermore, rangefinders, used by the infantry for judging distance and the fall of shot, etcetera, were few in number for the TF and of inferior quality to those possessed by the Regular Army.214 The old kit and equipment theme continued with the Territorials’ webbing. They still wore the 1888 pattern leather webbing (not practical when in prolonged rain or damp conditions) augmented with a sixty-round leather bandolier.215 The TFAs were slowly moving to ordering the new Mills Burrows web-woven waterproof webbing adopted by the Regulars. However, for reasons of economy, the supply was taking a long time.216

The lack of the right equipment also affected the training and test results of Territorial Horse Field and Heavy Artillery during the pre-Great War reporting periods. The majority of the Territorial Artillery force was also criticized for improvement on drills that needed specifically issued equipment. For example, engaging moving targets from behind cover could only be improved by using a

209 Holmes, Tommy, p. 174.
212 Mitchinson, England’s Last Hope, p. 106.
213 Ibid., footnote 3, p. 106.
214 Ibid.
216 Ibid.
panorama sight (or dial sight) – the TF artillery was not issued these.217 To ensure accuracy of a gun on its target, the panorama sight was needed for laying an azimuth on unseen targets (for example, firing by map grid reference - indirect fire). Without this equipment, TF gunners in a battle would have to fire over their sights (direct fire) in view of the enemy, a dangerous proposition.218 The use of a sub-base in measuring the distance of an observing station for TF crews also needed the newly issued director and the few the TF owned were obsolete.219 Finally, to gain a better appreciation of the heights of a burst of shrapnel, the TF needed gratulated binoculars. The TF Artillery was also told that they needed to practise more at night (difficult for most units based in urban areas with a very limited shell supply).220 The kit and equipment issue for the TF was far from satisfactory and was unhelpful regarding progressive training. The equipment and training issues also had a negative effect on morale and future recruitment.221

When the Territorial organisation reformed after the Great War in 1920, the kit, equipment and transport situation for the new Territorial Army did not improve; in fact, it became worse. From the 1920s, the financial climate in Britain dictated that savings had to be found and the TA was an easy target. Some annual camps were cancelled in 1921 and 1926.222 In 1932, all camps were cancelled in view of Britain’s serious economic position.223 There was wide anti-militarism through the inter-war years and the Territorials continued to suffer from their image problem, as well as restricted budgets that equated to less spent on equipment for training.224 The TA became known as the ‘Cinderella Army’ and training and efficiency undoubtedly became affected due to the obsolescence and scarcity of essential kit, equipment and transport.225

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219 RDLWRA, *Annual Report of the School of Gunnery* (1910), p. 4. The sub-base was used to measure distance using trigonometry. A marker was placed at either end of the distance to be calculated. If a distance was required to an inaccessible point, a lateral base was used.
222 FCA TA/D/7, Denbighshire Territorial Army Association Minute Book, 1926-1938, p. 551. The Council of County Territorial Associations delivered a statement on the cancellation of camps stating that it would have a bad effect both on efficiency and recruiting.
Colonel J. K. Dunlop wrote in *The Territorial Army Today* (1939), recognising the changing character of war, that ‘No longer would the emphasis be alone upon the rifle and bayonet; each battalion would have within its organisation Bren light machine guns, anti-tank rifles, two-inch mortars and three-inch mortars’. Dunlop added that the Territorials would also have within their battalions, for example, the Bren carrier platoon. Vickers machine guns and anti-tank capabilities. However, reality did not fully live up to this scenario. Much of the Territorials’ equipment was obsolete and scarce during the 1920s and 1930s; much of it was unserviceable, affecting training and results and overall efficiency and effectiveness. Dennis explains that the London Rifle Brigade trained with wooden Bren guns, the only real Bren gun they possessed kept like an icon in the stores’ tent. In fact, even on the eve of war in 1939, most Territorials’ arms and equipment originated from the Great War. Some weapons, such as Hotchkiss machine guns, were borrowed from museums and, instead of firing blank rounds, a soldier stood behind the gun swirling a rattle around. The kit and equipment shortages were not the foundations needed to provide an efficient and effective Reserve.

There were promises to the Territorial Associations (1937–1938) that the TA would be armed and equipped the same as the Regular Army, with a mortar platoon for each infantry battalion and two light motor trucks per battalion with any shortage of transport to be made up by horses. Sir Thomas Inskip MP, Minister for Coordination of Defence (1936–1937) promised that ‘the time [for the TA] to be fully equipped will happen very soon’. The full equipping of the TA, Inskip said, would ‘encourage recruiting, because they could not very well expect men to give up their time when they felt that they were not being treated properly by politicians in the way

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227 Ibid.
228 TNA CAB/66/3/41, War Cabinet, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, ‘State of Equipment and Maintenance Position for the First Ten Divisions’, November 1939. A couple of months after the Second World War had started there was a pan-Army shortage of 2,400 Bren guns. The Territorials were at 50 per cent below their Bren gun issue scales, and the second line of Territorials was 75 per cent below their issue scales.
of equipment which they needed for training’. However, despite the government deciding to rearm after 1933, the process was glacially slow.

In 1938, modern kit and equipment was still a rarity in the TA (apart from the AA regiments). For example, the Essex Association’s forty Artillery recruits prior to World War Two trained upon a captured German gun presented to an Essex village as a war trophy. Furthermore, both the Regular Artillery and their TA comrades often had to train with flags instead of batteries and the infantry and tank regiments had to hire tradesmen’s vans to stand in for tanks and Bren gun carriers.

General Sir Walter Kirke, Director-General TA, insisted that ‘military efficiency did not depend on any particular kind of light automatic (sub-machine guns). What the TA aimed at doing was to produce soldiers, a body of men animated by high ideals with a strict sense of discipline’. He went on to state that ‘none of these qualities depended on the actual equipment with which it was training’. The Military Correspondent from The Times disagreed with General Kirke, however, pointing out that the government White Paper (1937) had observed ‘the training of the TA is at present severely handicapped by the lack of modern equipment’. The government promised to arm the TA with the same weapons as the Regulars; however, this stretched the truth somewhat, as the full ‘reconditioning’ of the TA (other than AA units) was set for 1940 or ‘until such time as the industrial situation of the country and its capacity for output brought this proposal within the range of actual possibilities’.

By 1937, all Territorial units not attached to Air Defence Great Britain (ADGB) were still equipped to peacetime levels. The ADGB was a priority due to the

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234 Beckett, Britain’s Part-Time Soldiers, p. 254: Daft Cooper pressed for the modernisation of the TA in December 1936. However, Premier Neville Chamberlain was opposed to the provision of training equipment for the TA and consequently would only accept modernisation of four Territorial Divisions by April 1941.
235 Dennis, The Territorial Army, p. 151.
237 Anon, ‘Territorial Equipment’, The Times, 25 April 1938. TTDA, ‘Sir T. Inskip and the TA: ‘Complete Equipment within sight’. The Times, 18 December 1937. Four months before this piece was written, Sir Thomas Inskip MP, War Office, stated that ‘the time to be fully equipped [TA] will happen very soon’. He felt sure that that would encourage recruiting because they could not very well expect men to give up their time when they felt that they were not being treated properly by the politicians in the way of equipment which they needed for training.
240 Dennis, The Territorial Army, p. 220.
perceived heightened threat from aerial bombardment and, therefore, the majority of the rearmament budget for Territorials was spent on anti-aircraft guns and converting some Territorial Divisions to AA gunners.\textsuperscript{241} As a result of the expenditure on AA guns and converting TA Divisions to an ADGB role, the remaining divisions had the bare minimum spent on them.\textsuperscript{242} This, of course, led to a further lack of equipment, which affected training.

The TA of the ‘War on Terror’ conflicts (2001–2013) was a much smaller force than either its TF or TA predecessors. Therefore, the lack of modern rifles and guns affecting training was not the major concern it was in the twentieth century. Nevertheless, there were still problems with the government changing the role of the TA within its Strategic Defence Reviews (SDR) four times, from 1998 through to FR2020 in 2010. For example, the 1998 SDR envisaged the Territorials supporting the Regular Army for large-scale conventional operations.\textsuperscript{243} However, SDR 2003 wanted the TA equipped and set up to support more frequent expeditionary operations.\textsuperscript{244} Their role was changed again in the SDR 2005 to become a support for medium-scale operations.\textsuperscript{245} During the deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, none of this capability was used, as the TA was used principally to fill the gaps in Regular units, rarely deploying as formed TA troops/platoons or companies.\textsuperscript{246} something Beckett argues was almost a reversion to the function of the militia.\textsuperscript{247} Now, with FR2020, the AR is to act in support to an expeditionary multi-brigade system.

What this re-rolling has meant is that the contemporary TA had to train on equipment for a few years for a particular role (when it was eventually issued the kit), then became re-roled and had to train again for another role, sometimes with kit and equipment slightly different for a different role, meaning that previous precious training time was turned into wasted time. However, just because the TA was smaller in the twenty-first century still did not mean that there were no shortages of kit.

\textsuperscript{242} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{246} Beckett,\textit{ Territorials}, p. 241.
\textsuperscript{247} Ibid.
equipment and transport. Training and courses were still cancelled due to lack of equipment.

Training on obsolete rifles, machine guns, artillery pieces and the equipment to use these weapons to their fullest capability has been the Territorial organisation’s necessity since its formation in 1908. As the training chapter showed, much of this part-time force’s struggles were caused by insufficient budgets that were continually cut and reduced. Nevertheless, it was not just weapons and their supporting equipment that became affected by government parsimony; the means of transporting both men and equipment, principally achieved by horses in the twentieth century, were also in short supply and had an impact on the efficiency of the Territorial organisation.

Horses and riders

The British Army had historically relied upon horses to mount its cavalry, pull guns, and transport and mount officers (1908–1914). The TF, due to its part-time status, did not keep many horses in its stables, so relied on hired horses that spent the annual camp season moving from one unit to the next. As a result of this arrangement, most Yeomanry and Artillery batteries (some members brought their own horses) could only train with horses during annual camp. Therefore, the perennial headache of ensuring sufficient mounts became the COs’ lot, using allotted horse allowances/grants to procure fit horses from civilian contractors.\textsuperscript{248} The cost of hiring (pre-Great War) was high, as much as 6/8d a day per horse.\textsuperscript{249} For example, the County of London Association annually needed to hire 4,351 horses, 149 waggons and pairs, and 47 one-horse carts.\textsuperscript{250} The total cost of horse hire for the Warwickshire Association in 1911 was £6,900. Moreover, heavy draught horses, used for pulling guns, cost more to hire, although the grant was identical to that for light draught horses.\textsuperscript{251} There were additional costs for food and forage for the horses.

Hiring horses for camp, and only occasionally training with horses on weekends and drill nights, naturally affected the skills and efficiency of the Yeomanry and TF Field Artillery units. The Territorials’ horse-reliant units were often handicapped by a lack of experience around horses by many of their gunners and troopers. Most recruits

\textsuperscript{249} Mitchinson, \textit{England’s Last Hope}, p. 75.
\textsuperscript{250} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{251} \textit{Ibid.}
undertaking their first annual camps had never ridden before and much time was
taken teaching novices to ride unfamiliar horses. All of which took away
opportunities for trained ranks to progress with their training due to a lack of
instructors. Moreover, unfamiliar horses and inexperienced/partially trained drivers
and riders made for nervous and dangerous starts to camp and this, coupled with a
lack of officers and many recruits, mostly without an elementary knowledge of
horses, did not always make for fulfilling training. An article written after the Great
War by Lieutenant-Colonel Heindryk CO 59th (4th West Lancashire) Medium Brigade
RA (TF) explained the chaos and danger of taking control of horses they had never
seen before from the transport trains, fitting them into harnesses and saddles, and then
into teams, stating that:

After harnessing, the batteries march to camp. Scenes of incredible
confusion take place, resulting in kicks, galls and what is more serious
accidents to the men. (I know of one case in 1907, in which eleven men,
from one battery alone, went to hospital on the first day).

Heindryk added that a traumatic start to camp is a "severe task, even for the
experienced and fully trained regular driver, and it is one which no partially trained
driver should ever be asked to undertake". Hiring horses from civilian contractors
was an expensive necessity for the Yeomanry and Artillery. However, there were also
delays in training caused by having to reject horses for various reasons, such as
lameness or illness picked up from previous camps that year, the wrong type/draught

252 Bowman and Connelly, The Edwardian Army, p. 108.
254 Ventham and Fletcher, Moving the Guns, p. 105.
hired horses to the Denbighshire Hussars Yeomanry would not hire out their horses to go to Salisbury
Plain if that was where the annual camp was, p. 81.
of horse, and some failing to meet the remount or inspecting officer's standards.\footnote{Mitchinson, *England's Last Hope*, p. 76.}

Figure 4. 'Our “Mounted” Forces', *Punch or the London Charivari*, 26 May 1909.

Enquiring Trooper (new to the ways of the Territorial Army). “Now what becomes o' these horses when we break up camp?”

Horse Contractor. “Why, bless yer, they’ve got to go and ‘oss four or five camps after this!”

Trooper. “Then I suppose in time of war ‘bout six of us would ‘ave to ride one ‘orse?”

Heindryk explained that when the ‘Board casts [rejects] a number of horses, there was usually one or two days before these horses could be replaced”.\footnote{Ventham and Fletcher, *Moving the Guns*, p. 105.}
Difficulties regarding TF training increased with training horses hired for annual camp (including limber horses: a limber being a two-wheeled transport supporting an artillery piece) when they were needed as gun teams. During 1908–1914, training troop horses for a Regular Royal Horse Artillery battery would have taken between one to three months, depending upon the horses’ use before enlistment.\textsuperscript{258} The gun team horses (six per gun) had to be certain sizes and temperaments. Guns and limbers had no brakes and the horses worked in three pairs. The ‘leaders’ had to be bigger and faster than the rest; they set the pace. The two ‘centres’ provided stability and kept the gun team balanced, and the two ‘wheelers’ had to be smaller and stronger, being responsible for stopping the gun and slowing the entire team.\textsuperscript{259} To run a safe and efficient gun team needed the right well-trained horses and trained, experienced drivers. The TF was short on both. Therefore, the evidence points to training failing to realise expectations, affecting the TF Artillery when it came to testing their mobile artillery prowess.

The difficult task of having the correct amount of horses became a major inhibiting factor to reaching full efficiency and effectiveness for units requiring horses. Short of buying the number of horses needed and stabling them (like the Regular Cavalry) with the staff required (too costly to contemplate), the hiring of horses was the only option. In 1912, the War Office and its departments only owned fourteen of the 20,817 horses working in TF camps that year.\textsuperscript{260} Even after hiring, the TF Artillery’s shortages for 1912 equated to only 102 Horse and Field batteries having their full complement and twenty-nine batteries short of horses.

The Yeomanry suffered similarly; for example, the London Yeomanry relied on the Associated Omnibus Company to provide 750 draught horses to help train their troopers.\textsuperscript{261} However, in 1912, the omnibus company was in the process of becoming motorised and very few horses could then be procured for the London Yeomanry’s camps or for mobilisation if needed.\textsuperscript{262} Many horse units had similar problems. For example, a Staffordshire TF Infantry brigade (1909) had to manoeuvre with no


\textsuperscript{259} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{261} Bowman and Connelly, \textit{The Edwardian Army}, p. 134.

\textsuperscript{262} Ibid.
cavalry support, as the horses were being used by another regiment and, during 1908, a weekend camp had over 100 Yeomanry troopers falling in on bicycles.263

Those TF Horse and Field batteries lacking horses modified (shortened) their annual artillery tests. The 1st London Division Artillery completed a modified course at Shoeburyness during the summer on Saturday afternoons.264 If it were not for many officers and men bringing their own horses to camp, the cost would have been much higher.265 Furthermore, the cost to the TF Associations for the hiring of horses for camp in 1912 was estimated at around £3,200,000 (1912 values), which is the equivalent of £339,953,379.20 today (2017).266

With the reincarnation of the Territorials as the TA after 1920, there was still the perennial problem of hiring sufficient numbers of suitable horses for the variety of military roles required of them.267 This problem became particularly acute in the run-up to camp. Finding horses had become much harder during the 1930s due to the popularity of motorised vehicles, which contributed to the scarcity of ‘light van’ horses.268 Horses were still essential in an army that was slow to mechanise.269 It is at this point that self-mechanisation started to become almost an unofficial policy for units struggling to procure the mounts they needed in order to train. The Territorials had to become resourceful and tractors became utilised as well as any horses they could hire. Again, this was at the COs’ discretion, and not official policy.270 Finally, the facilitation of the Territorials’ semi-official mechanisation was helped by two ex-Artillery officers, who set up the Artillery Transport Company based in York.271 Mechanisation had become a necessity for the Territorials of this period as the shortage of horses was affecting training and any possibility for efficiency.

265 Spinks, ‘Corporal Harry Fox and the 1/1st Warwickshire Battery RHA (TF)’.
269 L. F. W. Beckett and J. Gooch (eds), *Politics and Defence: Studies in the Formulation of British Defence Policy 1845-1970* (Manchester: MUP, 1981), chapter, Brian Bond, ‘Leslie Hore-Belisha at the War Office’, p. 114. States that in 1937, the Army was ordered to cut expenditure by £82 million (1937) over the next two years (£5,318,612,414.00, 2016 values). For these two years, the BEF’s Continental commitment option was placed at the bottom of the Army’s priorities, which put the TA even further to the end of the waiting list for restructuring and rearmament.
270 Ventham and Fletcher, *Moving the Guns*, p. 105.
Motorised transport

Occasionally, a lack of equipment led to improvements in prime movers for the artillery and transport for soldiers. As a result of the constant shortages of horses, local TFAs were forced, even before the Great War, to improvise by raising their own funding to try to improve their training by procuring motorised vehicles.272 In July 1914, a TF Artillery battery towed Ehrhardt guns behind Sheffield-Simplex cars on their annual camp.273 The Regular Artillery Adjutant attached to the battery recorded the following after the Great War: 'I am convinced that had this experiment been tried earlier, great alterations in traction for guns of all kinds would have been made before and during the early part of the War'.274 The experiment became major news, reaching the other side of the world, for the Simplex’s speed of around twenty-two miles per hour over the eighty miles between Sheffield and Grimsby towing the thirty-eight-pounder guns.275 Another example of improvisation, again using their own funds, was the machine gun (MG) section of the 25th London (Cyclists) Battalion, who bought private vehicles, equipping and mounting a MG to the rear.276

The same set of circumstances met the TA during the 1920s and 1930s. In a letter to The Times (1937), a TA Artillery Major (Mayer) relayed a familiar theme concerning a lack of vehicles when preparing for annual camp, something that the major insisted hindered the training of the Artillery brigade. Major Mayer’s battery did not have enough gun-towing vehicles available; they had only half the number of battery staff vehicles and only three-quarters of the vehicles needed to tow his guns.277 To ensure equipment arrived at camp, civilian tractors often had to be hired at a cost to the training budget organised by the local Association.278 Through this procurement of towing vehicles for the Artillery, a Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) article

273 Ventham and Fletcher, Moving the Guns, p. 104.
274 Ibid.
277 Major Mayer, ‘Territorial Army Equipment – Letter to the Editor’, The Times, 31 July 1937. The Major went on to say that the TA gunner practice camp his battery was trying to attend was the culminating point of training – generally of two to three years. Suggesting that ‘training in camp is all too short in any case, but with lack of equipment, it will be far more difficult’.
278 FCA TA/D/7, Denbighshire Territorial Army Association Minute Book 1926-1938, ‘Tractors’, 23 March 1928, p. 464. ‘Tractors for Camp’, for this particular camp for the Denbighshire Royal Artillery Regiment TA, a contract had been arranged with Messrs Blake & Company, Liverpool, for the hire of eight Fordson Tractors at a cost of £40 each, with the owners insuring against all risk.
claimed that mechanisation had helped improve the average technical standard of the TA gunners as a consequence of time saved. However, the article warned that ‘the provision of transport for battery staffs, on a sufficient scale for them to be able to function over normal country in all weathers, is becoming a question of some urgency’.

Some units within the TA had the means to improve their situation (not unlike TF Artillery units using tractors instead of horses), training and possible effectiveness amid the government parsimony during the ‘locust years’. The Inns of Court Squadron (London Division), down to a platoon in the early 1930s, unofficially converted part of the ‘squadron’ into a machine-gun company (B Company) and CO Colonel Francis and Major Potter ordered four .303 Vickers GS guns. The Inns of Court, having no gun limbers to carry their machine guns, borrowed horsed limbers and drivers from the Coldstream Guards, The Blues and Royals and the Suffolk Regiment (1st Battalion) for their camps in 1930 to 1932. When training for several weekends with the Suffolks, an experimental mechanised brigade, during 1932, the Inns of Court saw the future and decided it would become mechanised. To this end, Major Potter bought (from private funds) and customised five bull-nosed Morris cars with trailers (made by the unit) for their unofficial Vickers machine guns. Of course, not all TA units could afford to equip themselves to this degree, and the majority had to wait and hope. Mechanisation and sufficient transport improved as World War Two progressed, as the Territorial Army became a full-time force under conscription. However, during peacetime conditions and the inevitable cuts, equipment shortages still affected even the smaller modern TA of the twenty-first century.

Unfortunately, due to the level of funding and the many reorganisations of modern times, the TA (2001–2013) on the whole still had equipment shortages but, conversely, some units had too much of the wrong kit for their roles. Apart from the Royal Engineers, who were structured very much like their Regular counterparts, the Yeomanry (armoured) in particular had more support in mechanisation than part-time.

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281 Ibid.
282 Ibid.
soldiers. The situation for the majority of TA units was to make do with the limited kit, equipment and transport they had and what they could realistically afford from £280 million in cuts from 2007 to 2011. Furthermore, funding of the TA, both before and during their Iraq and Afghanistan deployments, was labelled as inadequate to run the organisation effectively and efficiently. Future Reserves 2020 promises to end the shortages of kit, equipment and transport. Fulfilling this promise remains to be seen in the fullness of time.

**General kit and equipment issues**

The lack of up-to-date and relevant kit, equipment and transport/mechanisation undoubtedly affected how well the Territorials could train. Examples of insufficient and poor kit and equipment issues would later manifest themselves, not only affecting training, but also having an impact on the mobilisation process. For example, a basic requirement for soldiers who would need to march to and from a battlefield was the correct footwear. However, in 1914, the 1/5th Royal Scottish Fusiliers did not own the correct type of boots, which delayed their mobilisation. Furthermore, after mobilisation, when undertaking PDT, many soldiers of the 1/15th Wessex (Hertfordshire) Royal Garrison Artillery had never fired or seen a live shell fired, and, after two days of firing practice, were heavily criticised and threatened with being kept back for extra training. The fact that Woolwich Depot had issued the wrong-sized fuses for the 1/14th's shells did not help.

When World War Two started the Territorials had no tanks, very few mortars, and no fully functioning mechanised transport or respirators (gas masks). The TA Associations during the 1930s did not even own enough of the tentage essential for annual camp, having to lease the extra equipment from the Regular Army.

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284 Future Reserves Independent Commission, p. 41.
286 TNA WO95/4520, War Diary, 155th Brigade, 1/5th Royal Scottish Fusiliers, August 1914. The 1/5th RSF could not mobilise fully due to an insufficient supply of boots. The TF before the war had a boot allowance which was not always used to purchase the correct military boots.
Furthermore, the lack of kit and equipment left many Territorials having to wear uniforms and kit and equipment from the Great War. The uniform issue led The Times (1936) to comment that 'Some of the khaki suits issued to TAs would lower the self-esteem of a tramp'. The poor provision of Territorials’ uniforms was further exacerbated by the government cutting the majority of the workforce at the Royal Army Clothing Factory in 1933.

It was the same story for the TA of the early twenty-first century. Even when engaged in deploying Territorial soldiers to Iraq and Afghanistan, the kit and equipment with which many of the part-timers trained was not of the highest quality and much of the early training they completed was often inadequate (see Chapter Three on pre-deployment training).

Conclusion

The obsolete and poorly conditioned kit, equipment and transport/mechanisation often hampered the quality of training the Territorial received from 1908 to 2013. The Lee-Metford .303 rifle with which the TF trained, for example, was a relic first issued to the Regular Army in 1888. The rifle itself had a number of issues, including a back sight that interfered with accuracy and it still fired black powder rounds. When the hotter burning cordite round was introduced in 1911, the Lee-Metford then suffered cord-worn barrels that further affected accuracy and diminished the Territorials’ efficiency when many failed musketry tests. The TF Artillery also suffered in their efficiency due to being issued obsolete fifteen-pounder guns when the Regular Royal Artillery used eighteen-pounder guns. This in itself was only of slight detriment to the Territorials, but the limited ammunition and lack of essential equipment, such as panorama sights, few and obsolete directors, and a lack of gratulated binoculars, retarded any progress possible in achieving accuracy with their guns. However, getting their guns to the ranges was another challenge that affected the training of the Artillery due to a lack of horses in general and the correct type of horses needed to

292 The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders Museum Archive (henceforth TASHMA). Project, ‘Pull up a Sandbag’, Sergeant Kevin Pedder interview about his Operation Telic 2004 states that his kit was cobbled together from many different items of kit he had managed to procure. He, himself, along with the vast majority of the Territorials with whom he deployed, bought their own webbing and kit.
pull guns in particular. The Yeomanry also suffered in their training through a lack of mounts, with reports of some Yeomanry squadrons having to use bicycles instead of horses – not the best preparation for a cavalry trooper. The lack of availability of horses became so dire for some Territorial units that they raised their own funds and self-converted to mechanisation.

During the inter-war years of the 1920s and 1930s, the ‘locust years’, kit, equipment and transport became even worse as budgets were cut to the bone and training was affected more than for the TF before them. For example, artillery pieces for certain TA Associations were rare, with Artillerymen training with flags instead of batteries and vans standing in for tanks and Bren gun carriers – there was a 50 per cent shortfall in TA Bren gun issues. The TA during this period was not even issued sufficient blank rounds with which to conduct exercises. The cuts and shortages of everything from sufficient tentage to weapons severely affected how the TA trained and helped to produce a Reserve Force, without prolonged full-time PDT, that was ineffective when pitted against the German forces at the start of World War Two (see Chapter Three).

The historic lessons from the Territorial organisation’s history regarding training and kit and equipment shortages and how this affected training went unheeded. Even in the twenty-first century, when Territorial soldiers were being deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, kit and equipment shortages alongside, on occasions, poor training led to issues for deploying Territorials. Undoubtedly, obsolete and poor kit, equipment and transport/mechanisation affected the quality of Territorial training. Without the full issue of equipment, it is hard to improvise, especially in such technical arms as the Royal Artillery. The government has promised more and better up-to-date kit and equipment for the AR on a par with the Regular Army. It remains to be seen whether this promise is kept.

From 1908 to 2013, the Territorial organisation needed, as well as the correct scales of kit and equipment, full-time theatre-specific PDT lasting as long as it took to bring the Territorial soldiers up to or as near the standards of Regular soldiers as possible before deployment. For the TF, this was largely achieved and this force went on to play a major role in keeping Britain fighting in the Great War and then helped gain victory. However, some Divisions of the unfortunate pre-World War Two Territorials were sent completely unprepared to theatres in Europe to face the very well-trained and well-equipped German Army, with disastrous consequences. As
mentioned in the introduction, the modern TA also encountered problems both with their PDT and whilst out in the theatre. However, kit and equipment became much improved. In Chapter Three, the research investigates the value of PDT by comparing three Territorial deployments, the Great War, World War Two, and the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns of the twenty-first century and considers how well-trained the part-timers were and in particular how effective their PDT made them for the particular challenges they faced. As evidenced so far by this research, because the training commitments had a 27-day minimum, PDT would have to be of a quantity and quality that would properly prepare part-time soldiers' for the ultimate test of war.
Chapter Three

The lessons of history: Why was pre-deployment training so important in the preparation of Territorials for overseas service?

Territorial training is largely a veneer – which the rough usage of war destroys almost at once – unless it is carefully preserved until war experience gradually produces the real fighting soldier, a man who reacts instinctively to any situation and is not dismayed by the unexpected. 293

The British government’s paper Reserves in the Future Force 2020 mentions reducing PDT for the AR, citing that this will be possible because the AR will be trained longer (more field exercises and courses) and better armed. 294 As this research has shown, this is unlikely to be the case. The same problems of training time, shortages of officers and instructors, establishment and attendance, passing military tests and problems with kit and equipment still affected the TA of the 21st century and the new AR today. This chapter analyses and argues for the necessity and value of full-time PDT for the part-time volunteer soldier based on the historical experience. The changing character of war demands that soldiers, both full- and part-time, become ever more militarily educated and technically trained to keep pace with military changes. Therefore, the concept of all-encompassing PDT becomes even more essential, as there is always more to learn. Indeed, as far back as 1990, this point was made by Wallace Earl Walker in his study of the Territorial Army. Walker states that ‘It is a paradoxical fact of life that the increased complexity of tactics and weapons argues for more time, just when the increased tempo of life at work and at home means that less time is available’ 295 Under FR2020, the British government is expecting more from the AR than the Territorials had ever been able to deliver. Therefore, full-time theatre-based PDT that lasts at least three months should never

294 MoD, Reserves in the Future Force 2020, p. 3. The Paper detailing the changes for FR2020 makes reference to the shortened PDT but gives no details. Despite searching, no further details have been found to date (2016).
295 Walker, Reserve Forces and the British Territorial Army, p. 119.
become shortened, even if the AR does train longer and harder. This chapter shows that that a full PDT is vital to ensure that reservist soldiers are ready for war.²⁹⁶

High-quality, theatre-specific PDT saves lives and underpins the preparation of the part-time soldier for the rigours of combat against determined enemies. However, this programme of training, rightly, takes time. Therefore, it is essential that the armed services have sufficient forces to fight while the Reserve trains, as well as enough trained trainers to instruct the Reservists. This chapter uses examples from the study’s three periods of the Great War, World War Two, and the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns to discover what happened to Territorial units (in an operational sense) who received little or no PDT and what occurred with those Territorial units that did receive PDT. The chapter also argues that there is a recurring pattern of unsatisfactory preparedness historically (by the War Office/MoD) in the correct amount of administration or structure to train mobilised Territorials to the correct levels of military readiness.

To argue that full PDT is necessary, the chapter investigates the PDT provision of the Territorials from the Great War and World War Two and asks three questions: 1. How did PDT prepare Territorials for overseas deployments during the world wars? 2. Did Territorial effectiveness improve with PDT? and 3. Why did some units not undergo PDT and what were the results for those units?

The second part of the chapter investigates the much smaller deployments of Territorials to Iraq and Afghanistan and asks the following question: How did PDT prepare the TA for early deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan and how was this improved upon? The PDT preparation part of this chapter also highlights the MoD’s short institutional memory and analyses the inadequate training modern TAs were given during the early stages of the Iraq War and the problems this caused in the theatre. The chapter finishes by suggesting that FR2020 can learn from the historical examples put forward in this research to understand that the well-resourced extra training that PDT is essential for combating modern conflict and war in the future.

²⁹⁶ British Army, ‘High Readiness Reserve’, http://www.army.mod.uk/signals/26006.aspx [Accessed: 03/08/16]. The AR has a High Readiness Reserve. The soldiers sign an additional agreement undertaking to be available within a given response time in support of UK OPs only with 12 to 24 hours’ notice. They receive a tailored training package and train an additional six days a year.
How did PDT prepare the Territorials for overseas deployment during the two world wars?

PDT has always been an essential requirement for the mobilised Territorial but has sometimes been skimped upon or bypassed, either because of the intense pressure of war or to save money. This approach always ends in more dead soldiers. Unfortunately, PDT was only paid lip service to and, in some cases, omitted altogether for the TA, especially during the early phases of World War Two.\textsuperscript{297} Disasters, particularly in Norway and France in 1940, revealed the crystallisation of problems with the whole British Army during the early years of World War Two, a force which suffered flaws in doctrine and training.\textsuperscript{298} Despite this, some TA units managed to organise their own PDT whilst in France during the 'Phoney War' phase at the start of World War Two.

This chapter uses and compares examples of Territorial units that did not receive sufficient PDT from the Great War through to World War Two with Territorial units that did receive good-quality PDT. In doing so, the chapter shows that not only is PDT vital in preparing and saving Territorials' lives, but the AR today should also never be deployed immediately into combat without full-time, theatre-specific PDT.

\textit{Great War PDT (close time training)}

The Great War saw the battlefield balance of power shift from the Infantry to the Artillery. This was foretold by the Russo–Japanese War (1904–1905), with evidence pointing to the futility of frontal Infantry attacks on entrenched positions despite strong morale, courage and offensive spirit.\textsuperscript{299} Therefore, not unlike the Russo-Japanese War, the greatest killer of soldiers in the Great War was artillery fire, in what Sheldford Bidwell and Dominick Graham described as siege warfare on a grand scale.\textsuperscript{300} The British Army was on a learning curve in its use of Artillery and Infantry, how to survive its impacts and how to combine the two arms as a battle-winning

\textsuperscript{298} Harrison Place, \textit{Military Training in the British Army, 1940–1944}, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{299} Murray and Sinnreich, \textit{The Past as Prologue}, Chapter, Jonathan B. A. Bailey, 'Military history and the pathology of lessons learned: The Russo-Japanese War, a case study', pp. 176-7.
\textsuperscript{300} Bidwell and Graham, \textit{Fire-Power}, pp. 22-23.
attacking force.\textsuperscript{301} A large part of surviving concentrated artillery fire was down to luck. However, a trained and experienced soldier increased his luck against both artillery and small arms fire, with PDT and ongoing training which helped survival greatly. Training was ongoing for soldiers during the Great War, even if many just wanted to rest after their rotation from the front-line trenches.

Despite the chaos of the opening stages of the Great War, the need for trained soldiers to replace the losses to the BEF in France and Flanders was acute. Territorial units started to train and organise themselves as soon as they were mobilised. For example, the London Scottish started their training with squad drill and the deployment of troops at section level.\textsuperscript{302} On 21 August 1914, a new six-month syllabus for training men of the TF and New Army (Kitchener’s battalions) infantry, Artillery and Engineers commenced. When it started, the training was sometimes chaotic and disruptive due to lack of instructors, inclement weather, a lack of kit and scattered training locations, making it hard to concentrate men for brigade and divisional exercises.\textsuperscript{303} For example, the 1/1\textsuperscript{st} Wessex Royal Garrison Artillery (RGA), after forming up at Cosham and Fareham (August 1914), finally settled down to ‘hard – systematic training’ at Fort Wallington.\textsuperscript{304}

However, not all Territorials trained for long or in depots at home. As the BEF needed reinforcements to ‘fill the gap’ to replace BEF losses, Territorial units were deployed.\textsuperscript{305} When first sent to France and Flanders, TF units often acted as lines of communication troops engaged in the movement of stores, etcetera. This released Regulars until eventually the TF were brought into the fighting through desperation.\textsuperscript{306} Territorials also travelled to Empire Stations, such as India and Egypt, to relieve Regulars and then train while in garrison. An example of this was the 2/5\textsuperscript{th} Battalion, Hampshire Regiment, which deployed to Bombay, India before travelling to Secunderabad for training in India routine (preparing for local challenges and routines) led by detachments from the Royal Sussex and Yorkshire regiments (including a fourteen-day camp at Samiapett). After their training, they received good


\textsuperscript{302} Lloyd, \textit{The London Scottish in the Great War}, p. 28.

\textsuperscript{303} Mitchinson, \textit{Defending Albion}, p. 77.

\textsuperscript{304} \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{305} Beckett, \textit{Territorials}, p. 55.

reports, passing their first ‘Kitchener Test’ and staying in India until 1917 before deployment to Palestine and then demobilisation in 1919.\(^{307}\)

The PDT received was also carried out at relatively safe overseas garrisons. For example, those Territorial units sent to relieve Regular garrisons in stations such as India, Gibraltar and Egypt trained as the professional soldiers did while carrying out their duties.\(^{308}\) The first TF division deployed to carry out this duty was the 42\(^{nd}\) (East Lancashire) Division, which embarked for Cairo, Egypt on 9 September 1914.\(^{309}\)

Upon arrival, the 42\(^{nd}\) Division relieved the regular 1\(^{st}\) Worcesters and the 2\(^{nd}\) Gordon Highlanders and, after vaccinations, commenced training (alongside garrison duties) under the instruction of Regular Army sergeants.\(^{310}\) The Territorials in the division (now full-time soldiers) used the Mokattam Hills rifle ranges, route marched in the desert surrounding Cairo and learned how to dig trenches.\(^{311}\) However, training was often hard on the troops and Bill Kennedy, a Territorial undergoing this training, complained that ‘we suffered badly from the heat and the dust and we felt that these marches were repeated too often to be an effective form of training’.\(^{312}\) For the Territorial 42\(^{nd}\) Division, training and garrison duties continued until April 1915, after which the division was deployed to the Suez Canal for a fortnight to stop an expected Ottoman (Turkish) assault. No assault materialised and, by the end of April, the division deployed to the Dardanelles as a trained body and gave sterling service.\(^{313}\)

Other Territorial units had similar experiences at home. For example, the 1/4\(^{th}\) and 1/5\(^{th}\) KOSB completed ten months of PDT around the Dumfries area before they were deployed to Gallipoli.\(^{314}\) The 1\(^{st}\) Battalion the Civil Service Rifles, 56\(^{th}\) (London) Division had until 17 March 1915 to train around Hertfordshire and Salisbury Plain.


\(^{308}\) Mitchinson, *Defending Albion*, p. 59.


\(^{310}\) Bill Kennedy MM (Sue Richardson ed.), *Egypt, Gallipoli, France and Flanders with the 42\(^{nd}\) (East Lancashire) Division in the Great War, 1914–1919* (Manchester: Neil Richardson, 1990), pp. 7-9.


before being sent to France. The Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, 52nd (Lowland) Division, alongside their training, spent time digging trenches and erecting barbed-wire entanglements around Skegness, Lincolnshire. As the larger military training camps, such as Kinmel Park (Wales), became operational, men of the Fife and Forfars were sent on courses to top up their PDT. The Fife and Forfar Yeomanry Squadron was finally deployed to the Dardanelles on 5 September 1915. The men of the 1st South Midland Mounted Brigade followed a similar pattern to the Fife and Forfars of fortifying and patrolling the Norfolk coast, training between duties, and even taking part as stretcher bearers in an early Zeppelin raid on King’s Lynn. All these units gained valuable full-time soldiering skills that would ready them for combat and, more importantly, help prepare most for the mental strain of modern industrial warfare.

**Ongoing training overseas**

From 1915 until 1917, over one million officers and men arriving in France, from leave or training for a battle, received two weeks more of intensive training in the colloquially termed ‘Bullrings’ – training depots situated around Le Havre to Etaples. The Bullrings were run by the ‘Canaries’, permanent staff identified by their yellow armbands, who trained their students hard. One graduate declared that ‘On the fourteenth day we were pronounced soldiers in the making. At that stage, I could have felled an ox with my rifle butt’. Training was a continual experience for all men of the British Forces. The British Army trained the Territorials as thoroughly as they could to fight well when they met the enemy.

A good example of this commitment was the full-time training received by those Territorial units sent directly to fighting fronts, the training was continual and progressive (unless in a fighting or supporting trench) such as the Royal Welch Fusiliers (RWF) 4th Battalion, 53rd (Welsh) Division. This unit gained around three months’ full-time training before embarking for France on 5 November 1914. The

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315 Knight, *Civil Service Rifles*, pp. 33-8.
battalion moved to Heuringhem for one month’s training in trench digging and attack. The 4th RWF was also, while training in France, reorganised along Regular Army lines and, on 3 December, was sent to a quiet sector at Bailleul for three weeks. Similarly, the 5th and 6th RWF had around ten months after mobilisation for training before being deployed on the Dardanelles campaign (14 July 1915). Lord Silsoe, an officer in the 5th RWF, saw the value of the training and said the best training he received was under Regular officers in Egypt after Gallipoli. This full-time and progressive training was replicated for much of the TF and undoubtedly saved many lives.

Pre-war training only needed to be basic, as full-time training in the event of war was ensured often after a delay to organise the training, training areas instructors and equipment. However, it was a very different story when the UK again went to war in 1939. If any force needed full-time, progressive PDT, it was the TA of this period. The TA units deployed to France were given no centralised training plan to use and so many of these units took it upon themselves to formulate their own. Those TA units that did train while waiting for the German attack fared well in the fall of France in 1940. Those units that did little or no training fared badly.

320 Ward, Regimental Records of the Royal Welch Fusiliers, pp. 106 and 112.
321 Ibid., p. 30, and Silsoe, Sixty Years a Welsh Territorial, p. 18.
322 Ibid., p. 20.
Territorial Army PDT 1939–1940

In stark contrast with the TF of the Great War for many Territorial soldiers mobilised to France during 1939, much of their training was attempted between bouts of digging in and fortifying the Franco–Belgian border. There was an understanding within much of the BEF field force that after they had finished digging in, training could commence and, more crucially, areas in which to carry out all arms training (armour, artillery, RAF etcetera) would be available.324 According to Field-Marshal Montgomery, this never happened.325 Moreover, the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the BEF did not conduct any exercises, either with or without troops, from the time they landed in France until 10 May 1940 when Germany attacked.326 Montgomery stated that the reason there were no exercises was that GHQ said they needed to

322 Royal Engineers Museum, Library and Archive (to be henceforward known as REMLA), Source: A Personal Record of Colonel J. D. Riddick CBE, DSO, TD, JP, DL (Late RE – ex CRE 42 Div. Engineers 1918), attached to 42nd Div. (East Lancs).
323 More, The Road to Dunkirk, p. 5.
325 Ibid.
maintain radio silence, but this was a poor excuse from a staff that, in the words of Montgomery, lacked ‘any common policy or tactical doctrine throughout the BEF. There was no firm grip from the top’.\(^\text{327}\) There was to be no coordinated progressive training for those troops who needed it most, and it was left to individual brigades and units to train on lower formation drills, with the level of training depending upon the quality of the officers and NCOs.

A good example of a Territorial unit taking a training initiative was the 1/5\(^{\text{th}}\) Gloucestershire (Infantry – TA) Battalion. 48\(^{\text{th}}\) Division, which initially concentrated at Marlborough (England) to make up its strength during the winter of 1939. While at Marlborough, new officers arrived to incorporate a training regime after Christmas leave.\(^\text{328}\) Initially, sport was played to try to encourage an _esprit de corps_ among the many new faces, before training in Bren, grenade and anti-tank weapons. Their PDT lasted around three months until deployment to France manning the Maginot Line (March 1940).\(^\text{329}\)

Similarly prepared were the 1/7\(^{\text{th}}\) Royal Warwickshire Regiment (TA). 48\(^{\text{th}}\) Division, deploying to France in January 1940. Employing a proactive, progressive training schedule, the Warwicks practised fighting patrols and small attack schemes, assaulting houses and imaginary pillboxes.\(^\text{330}\) In February 1940, the battalion procured a range on which to fire mortars and work on attack schemes for their Bren carriers, even carrying out drills in assault boats.\(^\text{331}\) Attached to the 1/7\(^{\text{th}}\) Warwicks’ training was their engineer support, the 245\(^{\text{th}}\) Field Company Royal Engineers (TA). When the two units were in combat together during the Battle of the Ypres–Comines Canal (1940), due to their PDT, they stood out as excellent troops in reports on performances in battle.\(^\text{332}\)

The often ad hoc training carried out by individual units and their support perhaps suggests that, when trained full time and given sufficient PDT, Territorials could perform as well as some Regulars (as during the Great War) but, of course, it often took a long time to reach this stage. Fortunately for the 1/7\(^{\text{th}}\) Warwicks and their

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\(^{327}\) _Ibid_. Montgomery indicated that the BEF staff and their French counterparts were amateurish. An example of this amateurism was that the British and French staffs used landlines for communications. When the German Army cut the telephone lines, communications descended into chaos, p. 57.


\(^{329}\) _Ibid_. pp. 22-31.

\(^{330}\) _More, The Road to Dunkirk_, p. 6.

\(^{331}\) _Ibid_.

\(^{332}\) _Ibid_. pp. 190-1.
Territorial RE combat support, they had the 'Phoney War' period of training, using the time well. Leadership was obviously high within the 1/7th Warwicks, leading to a higher motivation to train. Moreover, the good results and better performances from Territorials who had received PDT were across the board during the Great War and in the Battle for France in 1940. The chapter now examines the experiences of Territorial units that did not train adequately before engaging the enemy, starting with the Great War.

*Why did some units not undergo PDT and what were the results for those units?*

**The Territorial Force 1914**

On the whole, the Territorial Force during the Great War was given adequate PDT, which usually lasted long enough for the part-time soldiers (now full-time) to reach a level at which they could work alongside trained Regulars without endangering themselves or those around them. For some, however, a training programme lasting a few months was not achievable. The 1/14th London Regiment (London Scottish) TF Infantry had much less time to train before deployment, despite having a scheduled progressive training programme in place. However, this regiment (a subscription-paying ‘class battalion’) was regarded as one of the better, more dedicated Territorial units and managed around one month of full-time training before deploying to France around 15–16 September 1914. By the time the London Scottish had reached France in September, the BEF was in a life and death struggle against German forces on the Ypres Salient. The British Army in the field had lost many soldiers in open warfare before reaching Flanders and was desperately in need of reinforcements to enable it to hold off the German attacks.

In Britain, the London Scottish were in training, before they were hurriedly deployed, which consisted mainly of route marching in 60 lbs full marching order and carrying a rifle, drilling, small unit deployment and bivouacking in the field.

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Nevertheless, flaws in their short PDT showed in the most unfortunate of circumstances on 31 October 1914, while fighting on Messines Ridge (Ypres sector).

Before deployment, the London Scottish was issued Lee-Enfield Mark 1 rifles, replacing the Lee-Metford rifles they had trained on since 1908 (as Territorials). With the Lee-Enfield Mark 1 rifle, the regiment was also issued Mark VII ammunition magazines. The London Scottish entrained for deployment without having a chance to practise its musketry or personally zero the rifles due to the unavailability of suitable ranges.336 The chance of further training, including musketry, did not materialise, as, when the regiment arrived on the European mainland, their eight companies were scattered throughout Northern France on lines of communication duties. However, they were soon needed as fighting reinforcements. On 25 October 1914, the London Scottish gathered in St Omer (France) and marched to the town’s outskirts to be met by forty-five London buses. Still no extra training had been carried out; their rifles still had not been test fired or zeroed for accuracy.337

The regiment consolidated a gap in the line on Messines Ridge, alongside the 4th Dragoon Guards (Carabineers), holding the right centre of the 4th Cavalry Brigade’s line (31 October 1914).338 The Territorials started firing at the advancing 6th Bavarian Division and soon discovered that their rounds were not feeding into their rifles properly. Musketry practice, if carried out, would have revealed that their newly issued Mark VII ammunition magazine springs were too weak to feed a round into the Mark 1 rifle’s chamber, causing jamming.339 The London Scottish soldiers had to load their rifles one round at a time, all the while under heavy attack and only desperate bayonet charges saved their line.340 Addressing this essential problem with more PDT would have ensured a greater volume of firepower available to the regiment during the battle, and may have prevented many of the 321 battle casualties that night.341

On the whole, the TF received PDT (close time training) during the Great War that brought the overall standard up to something approaching Regular soldiers’ efficiency. World War Two and PDT was very different story. Field Marshal

536 Lindsay, London Scottish, p. 20.  
Montgomery laid the blame for military failure in France 1940 squarely on the staff at GHQ, alongside the government, who should have taken full responsibility for not providing at least some training for the untrained Territorials they sent out for fortifying and lines of communication work.\textsuperscript{342} As for the five Territorial battalions used as an invasion force for Norway, they had neither PDT nor Arctic warfare training, and should have been used as a reserve of last resort. However, through mischance and muddle, they took the brunt of heavy German aerial and ground attacks they were not trained to withstand. The lack of full-time progressive PDT for many Territorials used in France and Norway and the dreadful results show how vital this training was and still is for part-time troops.

\textit{Territorial Army 1939-1940}

It must be said to our shame that we sent our Army into that most modern war with weapons and equipment which were quite inadequate and we only had ourselves to blame for the disasters which early overtook us in the field when fighting began in 1940.\textsuperscript{343}

There were a number of reasons why many Territorials of 1939–1940 were given inadequate PDT, or no training at all, and these longstanding problems were made worse immediately prior to the start of World War Two. The Territorials had been greatly expanded, numerically, in the months before the war started, which Charles Carrington argues ‘upset the mobilisation of the expeditionary force, robbing it of officers and NCOs’.\textsuperscript{344} The chaos started with the call-up of conscripts, ‘the militia’ which was created by the 27 April 1939 Military Training Act (250,000 males aged 20–21 years).\textsuperscript{345} After hamstring the BEF with the training and equipping of the conscripts, the War Secretary Leslie Hore-Belisha then doubled the size of the TA (‘doubling up’) to 340,000 men, without entering into any consultation with the Army Council.\textsuperscript{346} Carrington contends that this raising of extra recruits was nothing but a political publicity stunt, ensuring ‘that on the day of war neither first nor second line was fit to fight’.\textsuperscript{347} The disruption caused by Hore-Belisha’s changes ensured that as

\textsuperscript{342} Montgomery, \textit{The Memoirs}, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{343} \textit{ibid}.
\textsuperscript{344} Carrington, \textit{Soldier from the Wars Returning}, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{346} Minney, \textit{The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha}, p. 187.
\textsuperscript{347} Carrington, \textit{Soldier from the Wars Returning}, p. 44.
well as not being able to test kit and weapons as they should, the Territorials never got to grips with learning essential divisional standard operating procedures (SOPs) or training together as units, vital when facing an enemy as well trained as the German Wehrmacht. Chaos certainly ensued within the Territorial organisation as sparse kit and equipment became ever sparser and stretched Territorial training staff to breaking point. The historian Charles More has also expressed scepticism over the effectiveness of Territorial training 1939–40, doubting whether the weaknesses suffered due to ‘doubling up’ were fully eradicated during this period. 238 However, there were discernable differences in training (mainly due to circumstance and commanding officers) between TA units during the opening stages of the war for the campaigns in Norway and France 1939–1940.

Because of the chaos of 1939 (brought on by ‘doubling up’), including the poor training, kit and equipment, there were significant differences in the performance of TA troops during the opening stages of World War Two. Those Territorial troops lucky enough to receive some smaller unit and brigade theatre-specific PDT before fighting in May 1940 have already been mentioned above. However, those Territorial units and divisions who received little to no PDT suffered greatly during the campaigns in Norway and France. The contrast is quite stark.

The Territorial at the start of World War Two needed to have an understanding of where he fitted in. The British Army of the 1930s and 1940s broke down their battalions/units into three fighting companies, then three platoons/troops; each platoon/troop was broken down into three ten-man sections. 239 These platoons/troops and sections were supported by a large signals section. Bren carrier platoons (motorised vehicles), a machine-gun battalion, anti-tank troops and attached artillery. 240 The organisation of a fighting formation had a lot of moving parts and needed good coordination to ensure efficiency. For example, Territorial Infantry needed to know and understand the battle groups' SOPs, incorporating communication signals, reconnaissance and patrolling procedures. The individual sections also needed to understand the SOPs for hand-signals, actions on receiving enemy fire, and reacting while informing, through the chain of command, their situation. Individually, the soldiers required knowledge on how to prepare their

238 More, The Road to Dunkirk, p. 4.
240 Ibid.
personal weapons and equipment for battle, react to enemy fire, locate the enemy, win the firefight, assault under covering fire and reorganise the section after fighting through the enemy’s position. All this had to be done with the support and coordination of their flanking sections or fighting company/regiment, plus supporting arms. However, the Territorials preparing for Norway and the lines of communication Territorial troops in France had never trained together or with any of the Regular Army’s supporting arms. This lack of training and soldiersing experience became evident when they had their first contact with Regular German troops.

There were many TA Divisions deployed with little or no training after standing guard upon installations in Britain. They stood little chance of learning any divisional SOPs and were certainly not ready to take on, at the time, the best-trained army in the world – the German Army. The make-up of these soldiers was a mix of existing Territorials, the militia of the Military Training Act and new recruits. Many were used initially as lines of communication troops (mainly labouring) when deployed overseas. They were promised full training when they had finished fortifying positions in France, but they were also a political gesture sent to prove to France that Britain was supporting the French with troops; despite their lack of training.351 This poor preparation was noticed by Lord Alanbrooke on a visit to the 1/4th Gordons’ Machine Gun Battalion, TA (26 November 1939). He noted in his diary that the battalion was ‘totally unfit for war in every respect and will take at least 2 months to render it fit. It would be a sheer massacre to commit it to action in its present state in addition to endangering the lives of others’.352 He went on to add (aiming this comment at Hore-Belisha) ‘that it is a very grave fault by those concerned in sending it out to this country in such a state’.353

On the declaration of war (3 September 1939), the TA became full time. A sizeable proportion of the force were either mobilised as anti-aircraft batteries or deployed UK-wide to guard its infrastructure and key military installations.354 Despite

351 Danchev and Todman (eds), War Diaries: Alanbrooke, p. 20. In his diary, Alanbrooke states that Hore-Belisha asked him whether it would not be advisable to push units and formations out here to complete their training (mainly with the object of impressing people with the numbers he was dispatching). Alanbrooke told him that he considered that such a procedure was neither fair to the units, the BEF, or our allies the French.
352 Ibid.
353 Ibid.
354 Macleod and Kelly (eds), Ironside Diaries, p. 46. General Sir Edmund Ironside stated in 1938 that ‘the Cabinet had decided behind closed doors that the TA was required to keep the peace in England and restore law and order in air raids. They daren’t give this out because it would be unpopular and
the importance of ensuring the UK’s infrastructure remained operational, those guarding it were not being militarily trained for when they were needed in the future. Many of the TA’s newer recruits were sent to guard these installations, some without even the basic knowledge required to use the rifle they carried.\textsuperscript{355} For example, Ralph Wild, a new TA who joined in spring 1939, stated: ‘I had no military training whatsoever, though I could stand to attention and knew how to salute from my experience in the Boys Brigade’.\textsuperscript{356} Nevertheless, there was a necessity to guard these installations, not only from the threat of German attack, but also because the Irish Republican Army (IRA) had commenced its ‘S-plan’ campaign before the war, and had started targeting commercial premises, electrical supplies, and railway stations.\textsuperscript{357} However, no worthwhile military training was conducted between duties.

The two examples of insufficient PDT come from the Norwegian campaign and the Battle of France, 1940. Both these examples show why progressive PDT of sufficient length is essential to back up the very basic Territorial pre-war training the TA of the inter-war period received.

\textit{Norway 1940}

On 9 April 1940, the German Armed Forces attacked Norway. What followed from the British and the French became a byword for ineptitude, as the British government daily shifted policy in response to the German campaign they were opposing. The campaign was planned in a rushed response to the German attack. The expeditionary force itself was cobbled together quickly with the forces available at the time, which included a Territorial element that was totally unfitted for the task at hand.\textsuperscript{358} Unfortunately for the Territorials used in the expedition, the command arrangements for the force were put in place after the troops had been committed to action. The Territorials, and much of the remaining force, were unlucky because the supply

\begin{itemize}
\item would result in the Terriers fading away. \textsuperscript{1} This strategy gave way when the war started and the TA became initially used as guards for Britain’s vital installations.
\item \textsuperscript{355} Ralph W. Wild, \textit{Dunkirk: A Personal Memoir} (Cardiff: Merton Priory Press, 2004), p. 15.
\item \textsuperscript{357} Simon Shaw, ‘Not forgotten: The 1939 IRA bomb attack’, \texttt{http://www.historiccoventry.co.uk} \textsuperscript{[Accessed: 05/08/13]}. During the IRA’s campaign, telephone kiosks, public lavatories, and mailboxes also became targets. The general public was not on the target list; however, a bomb targeted at a shop in Coventry did kill five and injured ninety-six people.
\item \textsuperscript{358} Graham Rhys-Jones, \textit{Churchill and the Norway Campaign} (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2008), p. 198.
\end{itemize}
situation for the campaign was ad hoc at best. The Territorials fought at two places in Norway, Namsos (146th Infantry Brigade (TA)) and Trondheim (148th Infantry Brigade (TA)).

When the Allies mooted a pre-emptive invasion of Norway in February 1940, three TA divisions (the 42nd, 44th and the 49th) were placed on standby. The Territorials became a lead element in the campaign due to the BEF being fully committed, principally in France. However, the first division to land, the 49th, had received no Arctic training or kit and equipment; they had not fired their rifles on the ranges before deployment and, due to the doubling-up process, had never worked together as formed bodies. The essential training the Territorials needed just as much as being able to test and zero their personal weapons (accuracy grouping on targets to ensure the rifle firer hits the target), learning divisional SOPs and training together as a unit, simply did not happen.

The expeditionary force’s largely Territorial 49th Division was divided into two brigades which were the 146th Brigade and the 24th Guards group which contained within it the Territorial 148th – 1/5th Leicestershire Battalion, 1/8th Sherwood Foresters and the 2nd South Wales Borderers (regular troops who landed independently at Håkvik). It was these battle groups that would lead the assault on Trondheim. Norway. Again, like many TA units, they had predominantly carried out only guard duty on Britain’s vital installations and infrastructure. Plans started to go awry early on and the 148th Territorial Battalion were diverted to Lillehammer, were the soldiers were to support the Norwegian Army’s eastern flank. These Territorial reinforcements were confronted with deep snow with no skis or snowshoes, to compliment their lack of Arctic training. They also had no high-explosive (HE) mortar rounds and no supporting artillery or air cover either. When the confrontation happened, it was over fairly quickly. German Artillery shelled the Territorials’ positions and German ski troops quickly outflanked the unprepared British. The woefully unprepared Territorials could only reply with smoke rounds (their stores had

359 Ibid. The 146th Infantry Brigade (TA), containing the 1/4th Royal Lincolnshire Regiment, 1/4th (Hallamshire Battalion) of the York and Lancaster Regiment and the 1/4th King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (KOYLI), fought at Namsos and, after a brave fight, retreated after air and ground attack. However, the 148th Infantry Brigade (TA), containing the 1/5th Leicestershire Regiment, 1/8th Sherwood Foresters and the 2nd South Wales Borderers (a Regular regiment used separately at Håkvik). The Territorial Brigades fared very badly and were essentially destroyed as a force at Trondheim.

360 Rhys-Jones, *Churchill and the Norway Campaign*, p. 5.

361 Ibid., p. 92.

not been unloaded) from their mortars.\textsuperscript{363} Somehow managing to break contact and retreat, the remnants of the 148\textsuperscript{th} were eventually caught at Tretten and destroyed with Panzers.\textsuperscript{364}

**France 1940**

War was declared on Germany on 3 September 1939 by Britain and France. By 4 September 1939, lead elements of the BEF were deploying to France, with major deployments starting on 10 and 12 September. By 10 May 1940, when the German Armed Forces attacked the Allies and Belgium and the Netherlands and France (Fall Gelb – Case Yellow), the BEF had been waiting for around eight-and-a-half months for a German invasion. During this period (the ‘Phoney War’, as stated earlier), the training of troops centrally by GHQ and the General Staff had been minimal to non-existent. Some Territorial units deployed in 1939 and early 1940 had undertaken their own post-deployment training to reinforce the training they had when deployed and were as ready for combat as they could be. However, there were three Territorial divisions that were sent less than three months before the Germans launched Fall Gelb. Unfortunately, these newly arrived TA divisions did not receive any real preparation for combat, although they were promised training, and would take major casualties when they came in contact with German troops.

These unlucky and ill-prepared TA forces consisted of around 18,000 lines of communication troops of the TA second-line labour divisions: the 12\textsuperscript{th}, 23\textsuperscript{rd} and the 46\textsuperscript{th}. Again, the divisions reached full establishment and incorporated conscripted militiamen and new Territorial recruits. These units were then sent to guard infrastructure, training occasionally when permitted, but nothing resembling progressive PDT.\textsuperscript{365} The TF during the Great War were much luckier, on the whole, many receiving very comprehensive PDT supplemented with training near the front and augmented with time in quiet sectors before being committed to an active fire trench. The TA of 1939–1940 were not as lucky, as circumstances and poor planning and leadership ensured that only those who could organise their own training when

\textsuperscript{363} Rhys-Jones, *Churchill and the Norway Campaign*, p. 92.
\textsuperscript{364} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{365} Tim Lynch, *Dunkirk 1940 ‘Whereabouts Unknown’: How Untrained Troops of the Labour Divisions were Sacrificed to an Army* (Stroud: Spellmount, 2010), pp. 52-3.
deployed (in France) would improve their chances of surviving the German onslaught when it came.

For many Territorials in France, PDT was promised but never delivered. The Phoney War period before 10 May 1940 was a perfect opportunity to ensure that deployed Territorials were brought to a level of efficiency in which they could operate safely. This extra training, especially for the Territorial labour divisions, may not have helped the Allies stop the German Blitzkrieg, but it would have saved more lives. The results of those TA troops with limited and no PDT were plain to see after the Battles around Arras (1940). In the counter offensive against German armour in the Arras area, containing the majority of the lines of communication Territorials, losses were high. Accurate figures of Territorial Army casualties and captured are difficult to ascertain and are mostly estimated. Regiment by regiment, the Territorials of the 7th Royal Sussex reported 631 missing from 701 men. The 6th West Kents had 503 men missing (the 6th were overrun at Doullens and the 7th were overrun at Albert). The Buffs (East Kents) posted 525 missing in action. 366 The Tyneside Scottish lost over 100 men and 50 attached 10th Durham Light Infantry soldiers. The Royal Army Ordnance Corps lost around 450 men. As larger formations, the 12th (BarONY's) 35th Infantry Brigade lost 1,234 men from 2,400 effectives and the 23rd Division lost a full brigade from the two it had — half its force. Finally, the 46th Division was rendered ineffective and became scattered across France as many of its soldiers fled. 367

It is plain that the TA of 1939 were not capable of deploying overseas effectively without thorough full-time PDT. This was also noted at the time, and Major-General Sir John Kennedy, former General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the 44th Division (1A), wrote of the 1A that ‘it should be recognised that territorial troops at the beginning of a war can only be asked to perform simple manoeuvres and if it is possible to give them purely [a] defensive role’. 368 That may have been the plan but, when the pressure was on, the ill-equipped and poorly trained Territorials were used as a force to slow down the German advance. Without the relevant training to deal with an armoured column, many of the soldiers stood little chance.

367 Lynch, Dunkirk 1940, p. 121.
368 Dennis, The Territorial Army, p. 253.
Conclusion

The PDT and close time training received by the TF and TA during the Great War and World War Two were very different. The training the majority of the Great War Territorials received, at home and in and around the Empire, prepared the part-timers for the fighting they needed to undertake. The PDT they received was essential in turning inexperienced part-timers into soldiers with the dual experience of actual war soldiering and training.

The first two years of the Great War saw the destruction of the old BEF in France and Ypres, Belgium. The TF were desperately needed as a stopgap and filler to bolster the BEF and give the New Armies time to train. The provision for the further training significantly improved the quality of the majority of the Territorials as reinforcements. It is credit to Lord Kitchener and the Committee of Imperial General Staff that training camps were set up to facilitate this, not only for Territorials, but also the huge volunteer armies called for by Kitchener. If the TF had not had full-time PDT, either at home, in the Empire Stations or in France (made possible by the BEF fighting in France and Flanders), it is possible that the German armies would have broken through in Flanders and possibly won the war. It was an essential feature of the Territorial idea that, after call-up, training was necessary before the Territorial could be regarded as fit and ready to meet a highly trained and organised enemy.

For World War Two Territorial Army soldiers who were fortunate enough to have good-quality, full-time training programmes whilst waiting to be deployed, such as the 1/5th Gloucesters. The time they spent undertaking PDT was vital. While manning the Maginot Line, they endured probing and deliberate attacks from the Wehrmacht during 3-14 April 1940, holding defensive positions around Grindoff until relieved. The training the Gloucesters received before deployment had a positive effect on the early challenges they faced.

Similarly, the training in infantry roles and standard operating procedures (SOPs) used by the division to which the 1/7th Warwicks were attached engendered confidence in the troops and undoubtedly also increased morale within the unit. As a result, the Warwicks and their engineer support (the 245th Royal Engineers [RE] TA) fought more cohesively and better as a unit on the Ypres–Comines Canal in 1940.

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568 Neillands, The Old Contemptibles, p. 326.
570 Ibid., pp. 22-31.
with each soldier understanding his responsibilities to his comrades, his section, platoon/troop and company.\textsuperscript{371} This comradeship and trust in battle was also built-up in Britain, and can be witnessed in the 65\textsuperscript{th} Field Regiment Royal Artillery (TA) of the 44\textsuperscript{th} Division.

The TA Artillery, full-time soldiers at the outbreak of war, would see many of its soldiers complete courses through a network of newly formed training regiments. The Artillery had no fewer than twelve training regiments, covering field, anti-tank, signals and survey.\textsuperscript{372} The 65\textsuperscript{th} Field Regiment trained their gunners in the grounds of Ravensbourne School, Bromley in Kent from October 1939, moving to the Frampton training area in February 1940 before deploying to France on 18 May 1940.\textsuperscript{373} The PDT this Artillery regiment received, much like the Warwicks and their engineer support, instilled trust in each other, their commanding officers and their batteries. They did not panic during a chaotic retreat that had them constantly on the defensive, as evidenced in the combats undertaken during their fighting retreat, managing to reach Dunkirk and escape in good order.\textsuperscript{374} This regiment also managed to retain its guns until reaching Dunkirk (29 May 1940), despite an order to take out their guns' breach blocks and abandon them during the Battle of Escaut (21 May 1940).\textsuperscript{375} The training carried out before this unit deployed to France paid dividends and produced a tight, cohesive body that used their training to stay together as a regiment and hit back at the pursuing enemy.

On the whole, the majority of the TF during the Great War did receive adequate training to prepare them for the fighting they would experience on the Western Front and in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Those TA units that received adequate PDT and those who trained themselves during the 'Phoney War' performed with distinction in the campaign to save France. The provision of PDT was essential in the increased effectiveness of those TA units who were trained full time. However, those units during World War Two who received little or no PDT were not so fortunate. By investigating what happens if PDT is missed or skimped upon, this chapter demonstrates the need for full-time, theatre-specific PDT that lasts three or more

\textsuperscript{371} More, \textit{The Road to Dunkirk}, pp. 190-1.
\textsuperscript{373} RDLWRA, Field Branch 20/4071, 1939/1943 War Diaries, 65\textsuperscript{th} Field Regt. RA (44\textsuperscript{th} Div.).
\textsuperscript{374} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{375} \textit{Ibid.}
months; this was essential in the past and was especially so in Iraq and Afghanistan (2001-2013), and is still needed today for the AR.

**Did PDT prepare the TA for early deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan and how was this improved?**

**Aim:** The aim of the Pre-Deployment Training is to ensure that all ranks deploy on OP HERRICK 5 appropriately trained, prepared and equipped at individual and team level, for a demanding operational tour in Afghanistan.\(^{376}\)

The PDT afforded to the TA during the early years of the so-called 'War on Terror' largely failed to prepare the mobilised Territorial sufficiently. Therefore, this part of the chapter investigates why this was the case and examines how the training gradually improved to become a very good package of instruction that did prepare deploying Territorials to a standard expected. As discussed above, without sufficient PDT, the Territorial is at a great disadvantage when thrust into combat situations. Although the modern Territorials found themselves in a different type of combat compared with their forebears, the asymmetrical and COIN (counter-insurgency) fighting in which modern Territorials participated was sometimes up close and personal and sometimes at the point of a bayonet. The demands of asymmetrical warfare are also frustrating and mentally demanding, especially when regarding the improvised explosive device (IED) threat. Therefore, these Territorials needed good-quality PDT that would prepare them, in some degree, for the type of combat expected in the theatre to which they were deployed. Furthermore, good-quality training, as proved with the Great War and World War Two examples, prepares the soldier psychologically for what are stressful experiences completely removed from normal civilian life. Nevertheless, kit and equipment for Iraq and Afghanistan, especially in the early years of the 'War on Terror', were not of the highest quality, alongside much of the training, which was often inadequate.\(^{377}\)


\(^{377}\) TASHMA, ‘Pull up a Sandbag’, Sergeant Kevin Peddler interview about his Operation Telic 2004 states that his kit was cobbled together from many different items of equipment he managed to procure.
After Operation Telic (Iraq) and Britain's subsequent withdrawal (from 2009 onwards), post-operative reports on the performance of the TA and other Reservist arms blamed deficiencies in their performance on their PDT and in-theatre management. The National Audit Office (NAO), the collator of post-operative reports relating to Operation Telic, stressed that although there was 'much relevant and high-quality training available to reservists significant challenges remained to ensure that all reservists became adequately trained for operational deployments'. The NAO report found that there were problems regarding the selection of suitable part-time soldiers to deploy, alongside difficulties with the mobilisation process, including a previous problem with integration among the Regular troops with whom they were to serve on operations. According to a recent Continuous Attitude Survey 2014 (an annual survey of life in the Army and Reserves), issues with integration still arose. Despite the Territorials serving alongside Regulars for over ten years in the Middle East, 65 per cent of the Regular Army personnel who participated in the survey believed Regular and Reserve forces are not well integrated. Just as alarming for FR2020 was the opinion of the Regular Army respondents who thought that the professionalism and value of the TA/AR had declined since 2011.

Institutional memory is short in the British military (and the political establishment). The past is rarely consulted when it comes to training Territorials for new conflicts. Historian Christopher Andrew has labeled this problem Historical Attention Span Deficit Disorder (HASDD). Unfortunately, HASDD struck many times during the build-up to the war in Iraq (2003), when significant training errors were documented with TA weapons training despite a long build-up to war. Perhaps a lack of institutional memory and complacency regarding the readiness of part-time troops contributed to this poor preparation. Of course, when the training of a part-time force is not properly implemented then accidents will happen. The London Scottish Regimental Gazette (2004) claimed that the court-martial of a TA soldier involved in

He, along with the vast majority of the Territorials with whom he deployed, bought their own personally purchased webbing and kit.

379 Ibid.
380 Ibid.
381 Ibid.
382 Ibid.
384 Ibid.
a fatal shooting happened because an estimated 2,000 TA soldiers were sent to Iraq without adequate weapons training. Furthermore, the *Gazette* claimed that the weapon instructors were not even qualified to teach. Oral interviews with members of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders mention that their PDT only lasted a few short weeks (2005), as opposed to the three to six months they should have received. Although not facing the same implacable enemies as those encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan, Territorials who deployed to Bosnia on Operation Palatine (1998) had similar problems concerning the rigorous approach to PDT. A Senior NCO interviewed for this research stated that, when he deployed, their PDT consisted of form filling and basic tactical soldiering.

Another example of inadequate PDT for Territorials comes from Sergeant Neil Busby (a Sapper in 2003) on Operation Telic 1 with 350 Field Squadron Royal Engineers (V), and provides a good illustration of poor preparation and training. Busby received his mobilisation papers, unexpectedly, on 8 February 2003, and reported to Chilwell Reserves Training and Mobilisation Centre (RTMC) (21 February 2003) for mobilisation to Iraq. Of the mobilised soldiers, Busby states that one man ‘had not attended for over a year’, and another Territorial ‘had signed his discharge papers over eighteen months previously but had not been processed’ by the time of the call-up. Furthermore, the Adjutant of Busby’s unit admitted that he knew nothing about the mobilisation and was trying to find information about it. The Adjutant had found nothing out before these Territorials presented themselves at Chilwell to start mobilisation.

This example shows the ad hoc and totally unsuitable PDT afforded to mobilised Territorials in the early stages of the invasion of Iraq (2003). Territorials of 350 Field Squadron RE after completing mobilisation at Chilwell spent five days at Grantham going through their Individual Training Directive (ITD) tests run by a

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385 Ibid.
387 Interview with Territorial Soldier MAR/TA 05 sent via email January 2015.
388 Sergeant Busby has given permission for his name and units to be used in this research.
389 Neil Busby, Correspondence sent to the author regarding mobilisation to Op Telic 1, 2003, correspondence written 26/09/13.
390 Ibid.
391 Ibid. At Chilwell in one-and-a-half frantic days along hundreds of TA and Regular Reservists (RR), Busby was given his medical, completed his paperwork, and was issued with an LSW (Light Support Weapon) he had never seen or fired before. He sorted out his pay, was given a £400 mobilisation bounty and moved on to Grantham RLC barracks. Of the fifteen Territorials mobilised from his squadron, only five or six passed this phase as fit to deploy.
Regular Light Infantry company. This was all the structured training the squadron did. Examples of other training carried out during the three-and-a-half weeks wait consisted of a one-day weapons revision course, one day putting up Harrier hides (camouflage for the jets), an afternoon of sport, a demonstration on minefield extraction, and voluntary exercise sessions. The two pubs local to the camp, in the meantime, did very good business. The mobilised TAs were then sent to Waterbeach Camp (near Cambridge), split into troops and waited around for a further three-and-a-half weeks, again completing very little structured training and knowing little of what was going on in regard to their future deployment. They were eventually issued desert kit from the leftovers from the Regulars’ stores, but still not a full issue. Finally, the ‘inmates’ of Waterbeach Camp were deployed with very little prior notice after the visit of a General and were flown to the Kuwaiti border to join 39 Royal Engineer Regiment the day after the invasion of Iraq had begun (23 March 2003). With the small amount of PDT 350 Field Squadron had carried out Sergeant Busby and his comrades were lucky that they were supporting the combat arms by working on water supply rather than in a combat role.

Territorial PDT during the early stages of the Iraq War seemed to be a somewhat unstructured affair for other units too. When 131 Independent Commando Squadron RE (V) were called up for the start of the war, their PDT was poorly run, ‘nobody knew what was going on’ said one - and there was little direction from the Army. A TA from the same unit stated in an interview: ‘I don’t think we were really prepared enough. It was a bit of a shock when we got out there [Iraq].’ The unit was used immediately, clearing the Al Faw Peninsula beaches of anti-personnel mines before the main landing under heavy fire.

An interview with a Sergeant, an ex-Regular and TA of ten years standing, who had served in Iraq (Regular service), Afghanistan and Cyprus (TA service) was asked

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392 Harrier Hides consist of building a frame for the Harrier aircraft then camouflage-netting it.
393 Busby, Correspondence, Op Telic 1.
394 Ibid.
395 Ibid.
396 Ibid. When Sgt. Busby, who is a civilian electrical engineer, was required for jobs in different locations, he and an escort drove around in two Land Rovers (un-armoured) and given only ten rounds of ammunition each - about one minute’s worth of rounds if firing aimed steady shots. All the Territorials and their Regular comrades from HQ Troop, 32 Armoured Engineer Regiment had handed their ammunition into the Quarter Master, and he did not want to issue more than he had to because the rounds had been taped together in clips of ten rounds.
397 Ibid.
398 Interview with a Territorial soldier. MAR/TA 03. 15 June 2014.
399 Interview with a Territorial soldier. MAR/TA 04. 19 June 2014.
whether PDT training with the TA prepared him thoroughly for an operational overseas tour. He stated: ‘in my case. I would say that yes it did’. ‘However’, he added, ‘mainly because I had plenty of recent Regular experience and the whole thing was fairly "normal". If I had lacked this experience, then I feel the pre-deployment training was lacking somewhat’. The correct amount and content of PDT is essential. Inadequate PDT, as detailed in the World War Two section, increases the likelihood of serious injury or death when a Territorial soldier is not thoroughly prepared.

The provision of PDT when it was first run was poor for Iraq in 2003. Evidence suggests that not much thought went into preparing part-time soldiers for the rigours of a six-month tour. With the MoD suffering from a severe bout of HASDD in the opening stages of the ‘War on Terror’, it was recognised that changes would have to be made or the effectiveness of deploying Territorials would be negligible. Improvements were incrementally made as the realisation that Territorials’ inadequate PDT was too short occurred in 2003. An NAO Report on Reserve Forces recommended longer and better training before deployment in 2006. The pre-Telic PDT had, by 2006, become better in its integration and training with Regulars and more relevant for the deploying TA soldiers. By the closing stages of Telic, many TAs were undertaking high-quality training. Nevertheless, there were still courses being cancelled and equipment shortages affecting deploying Territorials. Most, but not all, Territorials who were called up to perform roles did receive relevant training by the start of serious fighting in Afghanistan (Operation Herrick), 2006. Furthermore, the MoD recognised that PDT was essential for Territorials, and increased the length of the mobilisation process (2006/2007) with a longer PDT programme included. In part, these improvements were made after the MoD reviewed the standards the Territorial soldiers were required to achieve at the RTMC. The MoD also revised the training period applicable to PDT, increasing it to enable

400 Interview with a Territorial soldier, MAR/TA 06, 24 January 2015.
403 NAO, Reserve Forces (2006), p. 3.
404 Ibid., 131 Commando RE after their mobilisation trained for around three months using their own PSI’s and personnel from the regular 59 Commando RE and the permanent staff from the Royal Marines Reserves.
more ready and capable support for the Regular troops Territorials worked with on operations.\footnote{405}

Those TA soldiers that took PDT training for both Iraq and Afghanistan noticed large differences in the structure and content of the PDT as it improved over three years (Iraq 2003–Afghanistan 2006). All those interviewed for this study agreed that the PDT they received before deployment to Afghanistan was of sufficient quality, stating, for example, that \textit{‘the PDT sort of got you in the right frame of mind for Afghanistan’}.\footnote{406} Another interviewee, when asked whether PDT had improved for Operation Herrick, responded enthusiastically, stating: \textit{‘I thought definitely, for Afghanistan, and I think it was a lot more structured, a lot more prepared for it. Whereas for Iraq it was the first time the TA unit (131 Commando) went out as a one [sic]. but Afghanistan I thought was fairly well run’}.\footnote{407} Another TA, who had had experiences of both pre-Telic and Herrick PDT, reported that the pre-Herrick training he had \textit{‘was second to none really. I don’t think I could have gone out there any more prepared really’}.\footnote{408}

To improve further on performances for operations with Regulars, some Territorial regiments took the initiative in offering good-quality in-house pre-PDT to prepare their soldiers for mobilisation. The London Regiment, deployed in 2012 alongside the Scots Guards on Operation Herrick 17, held a two-week pre-PDT exercise named Afghan Tiger.\footnote{409} Carried out on the Cumbrian training area of Wathgill, the exercise covered 65 essential training objectives.\footnote{410} Lieutenant Matt Jones explained the exercise’s \textit{‘exact purpose was to close any gap between the regulars and reserves’,} adding that \textit{‘there’s no reason why TA soldiers can’t work to the same level’}.\footnote{411}

During the early years of the \textit{‘War on Terror’} (2001-2006), PDT for mobilising TA soldiers was not all it could have been, which can be put down to two problems with the British Army system and funding. The first was an unwillingness to spend money training and equipping Territorials correctly, a longstanding historical

\footnotesize{\textit{\footnote{405} Ibid.\footnote{406} Interview with a Territorial soldier MAR/TA 01, 15 May 2014.\footnote{407} Interview with a Territorial soldier, MAR/TA 03, 15 June 2014.\footnote{408} Interview with a Territorial soldier, MAR/TA 04, 19 June 2014.\footnote{409} MoD, ‘TA soldiers get operational training boost’, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-defence [Accessed: 11/09/14].\footnote{410} Ibid.\footnote{411} Ibid.}}
problem. Secondly, the MoD planned poorly while suffering from HASDD. Plans for PDT, and re-tooling the Territorials for the different types of conflict faced during different periods of history, have, as far as this research has discovered, never been made. There was a definite lag between the correct training for Territorials and the changing character of war. Nevertheless, in mitigation, progress in the training of TA soldiers improved by degrees for Iraq and Afghanistan, and by the time the Afghanistan conflict started to increase in violence (around 2006), TA soldiers who deployed had a relatively comprehensive package of training to enable fuller participation when fighting alongside their Regular soldier comrades.

**Territorial performance after PDT 2001–2013**

The many Reservists who deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan 2001–2013 (some completing more than one tour) did so either as individual replacements for Regular Army troops/platoons or as vital medical practitioners to field hospitals. Overall, the Territorials (and other Reserves) made a considerable contribution to operations during the first decade of the twenty-first century, supplying over 30,000 deployments.\(^{412}\) At the height of the invasion of Iraq, the TA and other Reservists deployed 8,284 personnel.\(^{413}\) However, the initial poor PDT provision during the early phases of the Iraq deployments affected some Territorials’ performances. The importance of comprehensive PDT for Territorials was pointed out in a 2006 NAO report on the Territorials (and other Reservists) in Iraq that stated:

The general impression created is that the majority of the Reservists who have been deployed on Operation Telic made a valuable contribution. However, there are examples of their limitations in 43 percent of post-operational reports which apply to Reserve Forces. For example, some commanders in the field noted that a number of Reservists were less physically and mentally prepared than they needed to be for the demanding operational and climatic environment that they faced. In a number of reports, commanders noted that some Reservists had been evacuated to the United Kingdom.\(^{414}\)

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Furthermore, the report’s writers thought that to ensure that the proper management of Territorials occurred, Regular officers and NCOs aware of the cultural differences (i.e., differing approaches to soldiering) between Regulars and Territorials should have a presence in theatre providing the information required. This cultural awareness would ensure that the TA soldier would have the most productive tour he or she could.\textsuperscript{415} This ensured deployed TA soldiers were ‘managed properly’.\textsuperscript{416} The report also stated that after interviews with a number of commanders in the field, there appeared to be widespread agreement that TA officers had performed very well in a headquarters scenario. However, it was also noted that they sometimes lacked the experience to command soldiers in the field as effectively as their Regular colleagues.\textsuperscript{417} This lack of experience was perhaps not surprising and reflected the Territorials’ historically limited opportunities to gain worthwhile command experience. The NAO report summed this part of the report up by stating that, ‘In many cases, these and other limitations were greater at the beginning than at the end of an operational tour as the officers gained experience’.\textsuperscript{418}

After the campaign in Iraq and its subsequent phases, a survey was commissioned asking questions about Reservists’ experience of their mobilisation, training and deployment. The survey, linked to post-operational reports, discovered that some Reservists had not received relevant training to perform fully the roles required of them on operations.\textsuperscript{419} Furthermore, it only became clear after they had arrived in the theatre that many Territorials were only capable of operating at a lower level or not on the equipment present.\textsuperscript{420} Of the Territorials deployed on Operation Telic, 26 per cent were dissatisfied with their PDT.\textsuperscript{421} The Army claims it is continuing to improve its training structures and facilities as the government remains committed to its FR2020 plans.\textsuperscript{422}

\textit{Conclusions}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{415} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{416} Ibid., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{417} Ibid., p. 13.
\textsuperscript{418} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{419} Ibid., p. 16.
\textsuperscript{420} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{421} Ibid.
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This chapter demonstrates that there has always been a need for full-time, progressive and theatre-specific PDT of a determined length of time – usually two to three months – to prepare part-time troops for deployment. The Territorials’ drill nights, weekends and annual camp have never been enough to prepare this force for duties overseas. The examples of using PDT effectively, especially during the Great War, paid dividends in the TF and their being prepared enough to ‘plug the gap’ as Kitchener’s volunteers were being trained back in the UK. During the fight for France in the summer of 1940, those Territorial units that undertook PDT during the ‘Phoney War’ ensured, on the whole, that they were able to fight and defend themselves enough to make it to Dunkirk as units to fight another day. During the ‘War on Terror’, PDT started almost as an afterthought for training many Territorials early in those conflicts. Poor reports and accidents ensured that a proper framework of training was put in place to prepare those part-timers fully for the dangers of COIN warfare. However, lessons from past conflicts about the virtues and necessity of PDT have never been carried forward to the next conflict. During the opening stages of World War Two, the use of PDT often came down to having a CO qualified enough and prepared to undertake the task.

This chapter shows what the effects of insufficient or no PDT can do to a Territorial unit if that PDT is too short. However, this lack of extra training before a battle can cause a much more profound disaster for ill-prepared soldiers, especially when faced with well-trained and well-equipped troops. The British government used Territorial Army soldiers who had no PDT, no Arctic training and no Arctic kit when they landed, as lead elements during the Norwegian Campaign (1940) to try and stop the German invasion. They fought against Panzers and Alpine troops unsupported by artillery or sufficient air cover. The fact that these Territorials, who a couple of weeks earlier had been guarding infrastructure in the UK, had received inadequate to no PDT shows complete incompetence and a failure to learn lessons from the Great War. To compound this HASDD, the War Office and GHQ in France still did not train their untrained Territorial divisions labouring on defences in France. These non-PDT Territorials were effectively destroyed as a force.

Although the three conflicts covered in this research are very different wars, they are comparable. They are comparable in the fact that a part-time soldier needs a period of full-time, progressive, theatre-specific training to enable him or her to take whatever conflict he/she has to face effectively. If sufficient PDT is ignored.
deploying part-time soldiers risk becoming casualties. Not only could a part-timer's life be in more danger should he or she not have sufficient training, those around him or her will be in increased danger. The full amount of PDT is essential for the Reserve system to work to the best of its ability.

The TA [new Army Reserve] has moved away from being a strategic reserve to a tactical resource, able to plug gaps and extend the capacity of the Regular Army.423 This continues to be the remit of the AR but, if the government does shorten PDT, because it insists that the AR will be better equipped and trained, the lessons of PDT past will, unfortunately for the soldiers and their families, come back to haunt it. Furthermore, PDT needs to be current and robust; any weakening of this vital extra training also clouds perceptions of the part-timers in the eyes of Regular soldiers as seen in the NAO Army 2020 Report (p.114).

The Territorials have always been civilians first and soldiers second and to be able to use this force the government has to be aware of the disruption to employment and families. The thesis will now investigate the problems associated with using the AR more in the future, as discussed in FR2020, by examining employment issues associated with deploying Territorials.

Part Two

Civilian
Chapter Four

Employment history: The viability of employer support 1908–2015

Figure 6. British Gas Light Company employees, 1940.

The TA are giving up valuable weekend pub time to defend us all!
Bless you all! There is no greater sacrifice.¹

The Territorials have always struggled to reach full establishment in peacetime and this has much to do with Territorial soldiers' civilian employment. It is argued by Hugh Cunningham (the Victorian Volunteers historian) that, by the turn of the century (nineteenth to twentieth), the employer was recognised as being the key figure whose

¹ Al Murray (comedian), ‘What the Territorial Army means to all of us’, A Proud History p. 80.
support must be won if enrolment was to increase.⁵ Therefore, one could argue that the key to whether FR2020 will become a success and whether recruits will volunteer to join relies heavily upon the employers of Army Reservists who may or may not allow their employees to participate in more time spent training and deployment overseas. This chapter argues that, despite modern working practices, the historic employment pillar of the Territorial Trinity of Commitments in some ways is similar to the conditions faced by the new Army Reservist today, but with many large companies in the UK now multi-national, the support for today’s part-time volunteers in this sector at least is now lower.

The framework of operation regarding time off required for training and deployment has not changed significantly since 1908 and the AR face the same historic problems their antecedents faced – high turnover of volunteers and difficulty convincing civilian employers and potential recruits alike to subscribe to Reservist life. Furthermore, the type of businesses that once supported the Territorial organisation in the past – big businesses and institutions such as Reckitts, the British Gas Light Company (BGLC) and the General Post Office (GPO) – are still the same kinds of businesses that support the Reservists today – the Post Office, Centrica and the National Health Service (NHS) (Reckitt Benckiser are not as supportive today).⁵ This problem, and dealings with globalised multinational companies, also points to a change in the relationship between the state and business when it comes to military recruitment and crucially highlights whether there will be sufficient availability of workers for military service when there is a national emergency? The support of activity in Britain shows a historical pattern of employer support for Territorials from government/Civil Service departments and big business. At the root of this support was the realisation that if the Territorial Force failed and conscription became a matter of legislation, large firms would pay considerably more of their profits into a costly national scheme for conscription.⁴

Research into historic support for the Territorials has also revealed that many SMEs often found it difficult to support the organisation due to an inability to cover work should a vital member of staff be lost, for example, to annual camp. There was also a lack of support during the twentieth century among socialist political groups.

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⁵ Cunningham, The Volunteer Force, p. 76.
⁴ Dominic White, ‘Five firms refuse backing for reservists pledge’, The Telegraph, 6 June 2007. The five firms are Iceland, Reckitt Benckiser, Travelodge Hotels, phone operator O2 and Network Rail. A Reckitts spokesperson said that, “We are a multinational company and we feel it is not appropriate for us to express an opinion on such matters”.
⁵ Mitchinson, England’s Last Hope, p. 55.
which, it can be argued, may have had some impact on recruiting potential Territorials from the trades union. Moreover, trade union activists and some members throughout the twentieth century did not help promote or join the military (in peacetime), looking upon the Army and its auxiliaries as capitalist strike breakers.\(^5\) These anti-militarist beliefs were also promoted by the League of Nations Union, a pacifist/anti-war and anti-armaments popular movement during the 1920s and 1930s, beliefs that continued to be held officially by the trades union and the Labour Party up until the 1980s.\(^6\) Finally, there were small religious groups that also opposed the Armed Forces, something of a phenomenon in today’s Britain as the MoD struggles to recruit many religious and ethnic minorities to either the Regular Army or the AR.\(^7\)

To help promote part-time volunteering to employers and convince them Territorial employees would benefit their companies, the TFA (1908 to 1919), or Territorial Army Associations (TAA - 1920 to 1986), worked hard on a local level but were not fully successful (the Territorials were always under establishment).\(^8\) In an attempt to convince employers, the old Territorial Associations pushed the idea that Territorial employees gained new skills that would benefit their employer in the civilian workplace. In post-Cold War Britain, the MoD-run SaBRE (from 2002 until 2015) also had the task of promoting Reservist volunteering to British business on a national level, using the argument of the benefits gained from employees training with the Territorials, but the idea did not fully convince some employers.\(^9\) Similarly the AR themselves are struggling to recruit anywhere near enough new recruits or ex-professional soldiers to the ranks since FR2020.\(^10\) Therefore, this chapter also argues that the AR is hampered by their past, recording the same results as the TCAs did during their search for recruits.

Citizen-soldier volunteers, in fact, have always had hard choices to make regarding

\(^5\) Norman MacKenzie, *Socialism: A Short History* (London: Hutchinson & Company, 1966). In the years preceding the Great War, socialism had become a considerable force in British politics and was nominally committed to the doctrine of the unity of all workers, in all lands against capitalism and war, pp. 130-33.


\(^7\) Euan MacAskill, ‘British army aims to recruit more Muslims after worries over small numbers’, *The Guardian*, 6 Feb. 2015.

\(^8\) Mitchinson, England’s Last Hope, Territorial County Associations, led by the Lord Lieutenant of the county, contained committees to deal with employment issues and persuading business to release workers for training. Committees were made up from the military and local trade and industry leaders, p. 3.


\(^10\) MoD, ‘UK Armed Forces Quarterly Personnel Report’, pp. 9 and 22 and National Audit Office, ‘Army 2020 Report Summary’, p. 4. From 1 October 2013 to 1 January 2014, AR numbers fell from 25,880 to 24,880. Furthermore, only 1,975 Reservists were recruited in 2013-2014 against a requirement of 6,000.
their careers within the Territorials. Throughout the periods examined in this thesis, only when Territorials have had supportive employers have they been able to attend the necessary courses and camps that progress their individual and collective military efficiency. This basic tenet was one that was understood by the old Territorial Associations, who knew that the success of the force depended upon the full cooperation of employers. In December 1913, E. C. Bethune, Director-General of the Territorial Force, interviewed hundreds of COs about their units’ attendance at annual camp and employment issues. The majority of the COs stated that, ‘if we can overcome the business difficulties which are raised by employers and foremen we should get more men to stay for the full fifteen days’. \(^{11}\) The Territorials’ civilian employment was arguably a large determinant (alongside family) in how much time training with the Territorials was viable.

The 2011 Green Paper reviewing the new structure of Britain’s Reserves pointed out some of the difficulties FR2020 would face when people had to negotiate careers and volunteering. The review noted that, ‘The workforce has more graduates and fewer in manufacturing and more people are electing for a portfolio career, rather than staying with a single employer throughout their working life’. \(^{12}\) Moreover, when the AR are called up in the future, modern work patterns may have to involve more complicated deals and compensation packages for those deployed overseas. Peter Dennis stated that, until recently, the Territorials’ costs were almost negligible, as much of the Territorials’ activities were voluntary and mostly unpaid. \(^{13}\) Helen McCartney, questioning why men would choose the Territorials in which to spend their spare time, stated that, although many working-class men joined the TF (pre-Great War) for the social side and the annual camp, compulsory attendance at camp became an obstacle for many due to some companies making it difficult for its Territorial employees to attend. \(^{14}\)

This chapter demonstrates the importance of employers and employer support to the Territorial organisation from 1908 to 2013. The employment pillar of the Territorial Trinity of Commitments held and still holds as much importance to the pursuit of Territorial soldiering as training and family and it is fair to say that, without employer support, the concept of part-time soldiering would likely cease to exist. Therefore, this chapter adds to the work already done by historians who have covered the Territorial organisation and explores in more depth the vital connection employers and

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\(^{11}\) Cunningham, *The Volunteer Force*, p. 77.
\(^{12}\) Future Reserves, Independent Commission Green Paper, p. 10
\(^{13}\) Dennis, *The Territorial Army*, pp. 86-7.
\(^{14}\) McCartney, *Citizen Soldiers*, footnote 68, p. 22.
employment have with the Territorial soldiers and Associations, thus filling the gap in the historiography of this part of the Territorials’ past and moreover, also providing the link between the Territorials two other commitments of training and family.

This chapter consists of three parts. The first part investigates which types of employer have historically supported the TF and TA and why. The second part asks what kinds of businesses and organisations did not support the Territorials and their reasons for this. Finally, the third part analyses how successful the work of the Territorial Associations and their modern equivalent, the MoD’s SaBRE, was and have been in persuading businesses to let their workers train with the Territorials. Interviews used in this chapter with ex-Territorials and serving AR volunteers have been made anonymous. This research will show the vital importance of the support of the Territorial/Army Reserve employer to the functioning of the Reservist organisation.

Section 1

What types of businesses supported the Territorial organisation from 1908 to 2013 and why?

London, last night. The dinner was for employees at the London offices of the Shell company who are serving in the auxiliary forces. ...work of committees that fostered the ‘Territorial spirit’, and said they had now between 400 and 450 members who were giving their spare time to the volunteer defence forces of the country.

This chapter will discover the types of businesses that supported the Territorial organisation from the three periods of investigation. 1908-1914, 1920-1940 and 2001-2013, and will start from the formation of the Territorial Force. In 1908, there were, after the TF’s establishment, over 700 firms in the City of London alone that expressed support for the organisation. Many of the larger supportive firms paid their Territorials a week’s wages and expected their workers to take the second week as a holiday while away at annual camp. This deal was one of many and there were inevitably slight variations. For example, many municipal, borough, district and urban councils paid

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15 Anon. ‘Territorial Army Equipment’, The Times. 27 Nov. 1937.
16 Mitchinson, England’s Last Hope, p. 53.
17 Bowman and Connelly, The Edwardian Army, p. 127.
wages for the full fifteen-day camp, whereas other councils reduced the wages they paid by the amount the Army paid the Territorial for attendance and some paid nothing but did grant leave. There were some businesses who were ultra-supportive towards the Territorials: the Alliance Assurance (Insurance) Company stands out (1909), insisting that, as a condition of employment, men joining the company must also join the Territorial Force; a move initially supported by Lord Haldane. In the past, employers saw this as part of their corporate social responsibility, motivated by patriotism, or perhaps (for private businesses) preferential treatment in tendering contracts for supplying the Territorial County Associations (TCA) with needed kit, equipment, etcetera.

There are many examples of businesses benefiting with supplying goods (often locally) to the Territorials in peacetime and then, when either the Great or Second World War started, being able to become suppliers to the wider armed forces on the basis of their peacetime contracts with the reserves. For some businesses, beneficial business was conducted between themselves and the Territorial Associations, with the possibility or a promise of contracts with the local TCAs. On a larger scale, employers such as BSA and the Enfield Cycle Company, who permitted their workers to join the local Territorials before the Great War, had their bicycles used by Territorial cycling regiments and British and Empire troops during the war itself. Hull firm Reckitt and Sons benefited directly and indirectly, from supporting the Territorials by winning non-weapon contracts (the family were Quakers) to supplying the British Army with cleaning fluids, respirators and petrol cans during the Great War. Another Hull firm,
the Needler’s sweet factory, supplied the British Army with ‘Military Mints’. Businesses that also benefited and ensured commercial survival from supporting the Territorials included the King’s Norton Metal Works. This firm won ammunition contracts for the supply of detonators, acetone (for explosives), rifle and revolver ammunition, cartridge clips and cartridge cases for field guns during the Great War. During World War Two, the Metal Works made aluminium, radiator tubing, ammunition, aircraft components and developed uranium fabrication techniques. Furthermore, the advents of both world wars helped the company out of two major post-war manufacturing slumps. However, there were also other ways that companies benefited from supporting the Territorials.

The other approaches to gaining influence with Territorial Associations, the government and the War Office brought professional guidance, expertise and contacts in subjects ranging from mobilisation and deployment through to finance for the Territorial Associations. Businesses such as the removal firm Pickfords, Vickers, Maxim and Company and bankers from the City of London were elected to the boards of Territorial Associations in a professional advisory capacity. For Civil Service institutions, there were benefits to supporting the Territorials. For example, in the 20th and 21st century NHS employees gained vital experience and training through the years. For postal workers, this experience was in communications technology, while medical professionals learnt training and experience in battlefield surgery techniques which were then transferable to dealing with civilian shootings, stabbings and explosive injuries.

There were advantages to supporting the Territorials for large businesses to be sure, but business support was also given for patriotic reasons.

For many businesses and firms, allowing (sometimes insisting) your workers train with the Territorials was regarded as patriotic and a duty. After all, it was the State that offered businesses security and stable conditions in which to trade. Joseph Rowntree (Rowntree Cocoa Works, York), although a Quaker, did not object to his workers belonging to the Territorial Force (193 TF Reservists [1914 numbers]) but they had to

26 Ibid.
27 Mitchinson, England’s Last Hope, p. 10.
28 Jo Stephenson, ‘The Military Doctor’, BMJ Careers, http://www.careers.bmj.com/careers/advice/view-article.html?id=20000644 [Accessed: 18/08/16]. One Reservist doctor stated that the reason he volunteered was that ‘A lot of the work is damage control on seriously ill people. It is the work you don’t do in the NHS. You wouldn’t see as much trauma in any other circumstances’.
train in their own time.  

Patriotism and duty were motives for supporting the TF within the Civil Service (London) too (a pre-war mood Lord Haldane tried to tap into when he formed the TF in 1908).  Recruiting posters were always prominently displayed pre-Great War in government buildings and membership of the Civil Service Rifles was openly encouraged.  The journal of the Civil Service – Red Tape – supported the policy of promoting the TF, suggesting that it was the duty of Civil Servants to join.  Circulars from the Treasury also encouraged volunteering for the TA after reconstitution in 1920.  The circulars explained that ‘every encouragement should be given to Civil Servants who wish to join the Territorial Army’ and that ‘consent should not be withheld except in the case of those individuals who would be vitally essential to their Department in the event of a great national emergency.’

The patriotic and duty reasons for supporting the Territorials also occurred in businesses that had nothing to gain (in trade or favours).  A good example of this support came from the BGLC, which had, since 1899, supported the Territorials’ antecedents the Volunteers and Yeomanry during the Second South African War.  Links were quickly established with the TF and training was supported.  Thereafter, the BGLC made efforts to see that their workers were compensated for service in the later TA.

Existing records, only extant for the period of World War Two, show a strong commitment to supporting local Reservists, and correspondence within the BGLC illustrates this support.  In a letter (1936) to the Company Secretary, the Engineer and Manager of the Hull branch of the BGLC asked about the company’s policy regarding workers joining the Territorials.  The reply stated that ‘permission had always been freely given to any member of staff and weekly wage earners who wished to join the

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31 Knight, The Civil Service Rifles in the Great War, p. 21.

32 Ibid., p. 22.


35 This connection with the gas industry carries on today with support from Centrica (see footnote 3).

TA. Many weekly wage earners and workmen were members of the TA and had negotiated how they would fit their annual camp in with their commitments to the BGLC. It was the accepted practice by the company to allow either a weekly wage earner or a workman half-pay while attending the whole or any portion of the annual training. In actual practice, the weekly wage earner or workman tried to arrange (which invariably occurred) his annual holiday to coincide with the annual period of training, for which he would receive a week’s holiday pay. This deal ensured that if the worker took his leave at the same time as the annual training, he would receive full wages for the whole period.

The GPO was also a patriotic (government-owned) employer and recruitment was encouraged originally for the Post Office Rifles (POR). Relieved of Army postal duties in the 1908 reorganisation from Volunteers to Territorials, the POR continued its association with the GPO by recruiting postal workers under generous public employee terms. Even when the Great War started, generous terms were promised to postal workers who joined the POR to form a third line (see the recruiting poster below).

During the 1930s, the GPO’s commitment to encouraging its staff to volunteer appeared in the GPO Manual, the Head Postmaster stating

that every encouragement should be given to Post Office servants to join the Territorial Army, the Signal or Postal Sections of the Supplementary Reserve... permission to join any unit should not be withheld unless it is anticipated that serious difficulty will be experienced in providing properly for the performance of the officer’s Post Office duties during attendance at training or on mobilisation.

Local government support for the Territorials was also given by some city councils, such as Hull. The support for the TF resembled that of government departments, a commitment reaffirmed following the reformation of the Territorial Army in 1920, promising full pay during the first week of camp and that the volunteer would not find himself out of pocket due to service with the TA.

37 NGA NE/HUB/C/A/3/HHH, Reply to letter from A. J. Munford to C. R. Armitage, 23 June 1936. No members of staff were yet TAs. However, some weekly wage earners were and permission was also freely given to the workmen.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
42 Beckett, Territorials, Beckett puts some of the non-supportive councils attitudes down to socialist hostility, p. 100.
Moreover, it was not just the Civil Service or government that offered generous terms for their employees should they wish to join the Territorial Force/Army; large industrial concerns also provided support. For example, in the run up to both World Wars, the factories of Reckitts Limited (countrywide), a model employer who looked after their workers well, also supported the Territorials.44


4 RBA, ‘Ours’: The Magazine of Reckitts (Reckitts workers’ magazine) ‘Xmas 1917’, has many articles about the benefits workers enjoyed, such as clubs and sport for employees and families including an
Before the Great War, there were sixty-three Reckitts employees (Hull) enlisted with the local Volunteer forces (the majority TF). The volunteers trained during evenings and weekends (outside work hours) with the full permission of the company. Some TF soldiers from Reckitts were specialists, electricians and engineers who gravitated towards the Royal Engineers (Electric Light Company), East Riding (Fortress) Battalion (TF). They presumably faced no opposition to their attendance at annual camp, appearing in the Reckitts Company Ours magazine with the story of their fifteen-day camp at Southsea (1910). The majority of the TF contingent at Reckitts served with the 1/4th Battalion the East Yorkshire Regiment (Hull), an infantry battalion which coincidentally contained many German immigrants who were arrested and interned at the start of the Great War. The benevolent stance shown by Reckitts during the Great War continued during World War Two, with the Kingston Works (Hull) having a small squadron of electrician Royal Engineers serving with the East Riding (Fortress) Battalion. This unit was used initially to repair local sea defence forts, such as Haile Sand (Anti-Aircraft) Fort at Kilnsea village (the mouth of the Humber), and made Great War forts habitable for the AA gunners stationed there.

Despite much support from big business and the Civil Service, there were particular groups from which the TF Associations were forbidden (by the War Office) to recruit, such as workers from the dockyards and GPO telephonists, due to the importance of their work. There was also reluctance from the GPO to allow its Irish employees to join the TA in 1920, due to difficulties in arranging training and the volatile political situation at that time in Ireland. However, the support available for the Territorials during the first half of the twentieth century looked impressive with regard to governmental and big business support. Nevertheless, employer support was
mixed and there were many big companies, and some SMEs in particular, that would not and could not support the Territorial organisation and its part-time soldiers.

Section 2

What types of businesses did not support the Territorial organisation and why?

There were many large businesses, firms and SMEs that would not or could not support the Territorial organisation during the twentieth century. Reasons for this were many and varied. For example, Mitchinson lists reasons why some employers and, in particular, some SMEs did not or could not support the Territorial organisation, such as: many employers thought that their workers would be used on overseas military adventures; they were apprehensive over what would happen whilst their employees were at their annual camp; and there were worries over the financial liabilities the business would incur whilst their workers were training with the Territorials.  

Furthermore, prominent businesses employing many workers from particular towns or cities were non-supportive due to a perceived loss of productivity. There was also a substantial Northern-based opposition from mills and spinning manufacturers.  

Many textile employers in the West Riding of Yorkshire were completely indifferent to Territorial recruiting difficulties and these mill bosses’ indifference was such that the local Associations thought them unapproachable for recruiting purposes.  

Workers in some large factories were in danger of the sack if they joined the Territorials or took time off from work to train. For example, Territorials from Derbyshire (1924) and West Lancashire (1922) discovered that, after attending annual camp, they had no jobs to go back to when the camp had finished. Furthermore, the refusal of leave to attend annual

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51 Mitchinson, *England’s Last Hope*, pp. 55-67. Many shopkeepers had a half-day closing during the working week and refused to let men off for Saturday drill. Mitchinson claims that some SMEs that supported the TF lost between one-third and one-half of their workforce during camp and those workers that remained were far from happy.


camp was widespread in much of Leicestershire during 1924. In addition, there was some Northern hostility to Territorial activity present within the North Eastern Railway Company and City Corporations such as Bradford (perhaps due to many Northern industrial towns being Labour voting, see below).

Further antagonism or indifference to participation with the Territorials came from the Labour Party and the trades union, which, for ideological reasons, had often refused any association with a force that could be used to suppress the working classes. The Trades Union Congress in 1909 had discussed the question of defence and the government’s new Development Bill, which included economic development within towns and cities. They declared on the issue of the TF that ‘employers who endeavour to enlist their workers in that force are accused of introducing the principle of conscription “in a subtle form”’. The Times saw the situation differently and said of the trades union and the Labour Party that ‘No corresponding obligation is, it seems, to be admitted the working class, even though the State must feed it or find it work... Labour recognises that the individual who claims everything from the State must be ready in return to defend the State! Trade Unions do not believe this’. However, there was no give from the unions. For instance, union recalcitrance affected the Norfolk Territorial Association, which, desperate for new recruits, asked to address the Norwich and District Trades and Labour Council (March 1914). Unsurprisingly, the Norwich

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Weeks, Michael Mellish, Linda Dickens and John Lloyd, *Industrial Relations and the Limits of Law: The Industrial Effects of the Industrial Relations Act 1971* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 4. Workers had very little redress to being sacked by their employers. Unemployment was high and it would have been a convenient way of shedding workers for struggling industries which were becoming ever more damaged by Winston Churchill’s tying the British currency to the gold standard, making British exports more expensive. TNA ‘The Cabinet Papers – 1915–1986’, [http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk](http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk) [Accessed: 19/02/15].

55 *Ibid.* and TNA CAB/24/166, ‘Memorandum from the Home Secretary’, The Factories Bill 1924, p. 6. The Bill states, in Clause 44, ‘that every person employed in a factory shall be given a holiday on full pay of at least six consecutive days for every twelve months continuous service with the same employer’. With regard to the new law, the refusal of leave to attend camp for TA personnel in Leicestershire was legal. The camps for Territorials lasted from eight to fifteen days, thereby exceeding the number of days holiday permitted to workers.


57 B. R. Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics 1750–1975* (New York: Facts on File, 1981), pp. 185-90. British unions and their affiliated workers were increasingly in dispute with employers. In 1908 at the birth of the TF, there were 399 industrial disputes, involving 296,000 workers causing 10,834 lost days. The most disruption to British industry came in the years 1919 and 1920. During 1919, there were 1,352 industrial disputes involving over 2.5 million workers, which lost 34,969 days. In 1920, there were 1,607 industrial disputes incorporating over 1.9 million workers, losing 26,568 days. During the 1930s, 1931 was a particularly bad year with 420 industrial disputes, 490,000 workers involved and 6,983 days lost. Even on the eve of war, industrial disputes remained constant, rising during the war years.


Territorial Association received the stock socialist answer, with the Norwich Trades and Labour Council stating that they would not support capitalist strike breakers.60

The socialist organisations' suspicion of the State and its potential to use troops (TF) to break strikes was, however, given credence when Churchill attempted to use the Territorial organisation for 'emergency situations' in strikes and later used Territorial drill halls to raise a Defence Force (containing Territorial volunteers) following the Great War.61 During the General Strike of 1926, the briefly-in-print Churchill-run state paper The British Gazette denied the use of British troops to break strikes.62 Furthermore, so did the Cabinet, insisting that there was no intention of breaking strikes using military force, stating they recognised the distinction between labour disputes and true emergency situations. Nevertheless, the raising of a Defence Force, containing Territorials and using Territorial Association property, not only heightened tensions but may also have had an effect on the TA's Achilles heel -- recruiting.63 The Defence Force was disbanded when the General Strike ended and never saw service. However, while the Defence Force was active and because Territorial officers transferred wholesale, the TA's subsequent activities were severely curtailed and recruiting was also affected.64

The Territorials (the enlisted men), who were predominantly working class (sans the mainly London 'class' battalions), existed between the tensions of the unions, socialist ideology and the establishment, which can only have added to the problems the Territorials had with recruitment and retention from its target recruiting group.65 This anti-militarism endured until the late 1930s and Britain's tardy military build-up as Germany became more threatening. Despite Britain enduring high unemployment, there was still a pointed refusal to advertise or handle recruiting paraphernalia at employment exchanges. Furthermore, any government attempts to introduce conscription to fill the TA's ranks would have had Labour and the unions creating much disruption to British industry.66 Despite the Left's thinking on the Territorials and participation therein, some

60 Mitchinson, England's Last Hope, p. 62.
62 Anon, 'Facts about the Army: official denial of rumours', The British Gazette (no. 4), 8 May 1926.
63 Ibid., p. 712. A Civil Guard administered by the Home Office named the Defence Force was raised from 9 April 1920, ending nine days later when the General Strike ended. About half of the 70,000 men raised contained Territorial volunteers who, although they had to resign from the TA to join, did not lose any service time and were readmitted automatically upon leaving. Furthermore, the Defence Force was raised and administered from buildings owned by the TA, pp. 708-15.
64 Dennis, The Territorial Army, p. 75.
65 Dennis, The Territorial Army, p. 16. Warwick University Archives (henceforward WUA), WUA/MSS 625, 'Jack Jones' Box 40, Socialist Youth Camp. The trade unions had their version of the Territorials' summer camp that they supported - the Socialist Youth Camp.
66 Dennis, The Territorial Army, p. 197.
members of the trades union did join, perhaps the most famous being Jack Jones, General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union (1968–1978). 67

There was a final group that felt aggrieved by Territorials receiving ‘extra’ leave to attend camp, and they were fellow employees. Often, even when the management supported the Territorial Force/Army and participation, foremen and supervisors resented the leave and other privileges given to Territorial men, especially when these workers had their pay supplemented. 68 A good example is the case of a cooper (barrel maker) employed in May 1937 on a temporary contract by the BGLC in Hull. Although not entitled to holidays that year, the cooper was allowed, after consultation with the board, to attend camp the following month with full pay (at plain rates). 69 A further source of irritation for some workers and staff at the BGLC may have been the ‘special training’ carried out by Territorial employees during the build-up to World War Two. As pre-war tensions increased, the ever-growing TA had to introduce more training. Memorandums circulated the BGLC’s workplaces nationwide (May 1939) asking if four weeks ‘special training’ (11 June–11 July) for Territorial employees should be allowed and be paid, as per annual camp? 70 All the company’s Territorials attended and were remunerated without losing leave. 71

Finally, even when the Territorial organisation was successful in persuading a whole business concern to participate in the movement, there were objections from perhaps the members of the public most affected regarding the Territorials themselves. Lord Silasoe stated that his Welsh Fusilier Territorials from Holyhead and Anglesey nearly all worked for London and North Western Railways, with the majority working at the sub-unit Holyhead terminal (during the 1920s and 1930s). 72 He went on to state that, rather than the employers being reticent over allowing their employees time to train, it was ‘a number of fathers, mothers and wives who were antagonistic’. 73 To try and overcome the more indifferent or even hostile attitudes of some employers and

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67 WUA, Jack Jones Box 40, Military Service, WUA/MSS.625. Perhaps the most famous (in later life) trade unionist serving was Bombardier Jack (James Larkin) Jones, a past TUC leader who had served with the TA Royal Artillery from 1934 until 1936 before the Spanish Civil War took him away to fight fascism.

68 Dennis, Territorial Army, p. 173.


71 NGA NE/HUB/C/A/3/MM, Memo from the Cashier BGLC stating the company policy on Territorial training, annual camp, specialised training or mobilisation, 23 May 1939.

72 Silasoe, Sixty Years a Welsh Territorial, p. 121.

73 Ibid.
socialist movements towards the Territorial organisation, the local Territorial
Associations had to work hard to persuade those who would listen of the benefits of
being a Territorial. Nevertheless, the pattern had been set for those businesses and
groups who supported the Territorials and those who did not or could not. This historic
pattern has changed little.

**Twenty-first-century Territorials encountering the same challenges**

Being a Territorial during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries was just as
challenging regarding balancing employment as it was for the Territorials before the
Great War and in the inter-war years. Interviews with self-employed volunteers
especially highlight the difficulties and flexibility needed with volunteering and running
a business. Those Territorials and today’s AR who are committed long term to the
organisation tend to fit Reservist commitments around their working commitments. A
combination of supportive employers, using up holiday leave and understanding
families helps this group to contribute more than most volunteers. When asking how the
interviewees balanced their Territorial Trinity of Commitments regarding employment,
those who worked for companies reported that they negotiated time for their Reservist
activities. For example, two still-active AR members, Territorial A and Territorial B, are
lorry drivers and work Monday to Friday, thereby enabling them to participate in
weekend activities.⁷⁴ Of the two lorry-driving Reservists, Territorial A’s previous
company allowed an extra two weeks’ leave for his annual camp but, since he moved
jobs, he has had to take the fifteen days needed for camp from his holiday entitlement.⁷⁵
His current employer has intimated that he is fine to carry on serving in the AR as long
as this commitment does not interfere with his employment. However, there is a chance
of friction if he did deploy again in the future.⁷⁶ The second lorry driver, Territorial B,
when he first asked for time off for Reservist training, said his employers were not too
happy until he said that he would take the time unpaid.⁷⁷ All the interviewees working
for civilian companies have had to compromise between work commitments and time
off to train, also giving up family holiday time to enable them to perform Reservist
training and duties. Territorial A explained a situation common to many volunteer
soldiers when they have to make a choice between training, annual camp or work: ‘I
struggled sometimes because I had to give up some of my holiday time with the family.

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⁷⁴ Interview with Territorial Soldier, MAR/TA 03, 15 June 2014, and MAR/TA 05.
⁷⁵ Interview MAR/TA 03.
⁷⁷ Interview MAR/TA 05.
When I was coming to do [annual fifteen-day] camps, I'd never really done many because I couldn't get the time off work.  

The self-employed Territorial/AR volunteer also has difficulties and challenges with his/her work. Self-employed part-time soldier Territorial C had a successful horticulture and tree surgery business. The interviewee used the TA as extra income for winter when he was not as busy with gardening. When called up to deploy to Afghanistan in 2006, he had to employ two workers to keep his business going, with his wife completing administration on top of her full-time job. Territorial C had built up good personal relationships with his customers and they liked him and the work he carried out, but being away for the better part of a year affected the bond he had built up between himself and his customers. When the interviewee returned from his tour of Afghanistan, he found many customers had gone elsewhere: 'When I came back from Afghanistan I had to build up my business again which took a bit of time. Most of my customers had to get someone else in while I was away. That's one of the reasons I left because it became too much hassle'.

However, being a volunteer soldier and self-employed can work to an individual's advantage. Interviewee Territorial D has two businesses he runs from his home - photography and a small-scale manufacturing parachuting clothing, hat and vehicle canopy (campervan) company. The interviewee spends a large part of his year on Reservist work. In one year, he deployed (non-combat) to the Falklands for three weeks, the United States for three weeks and Kenya for seven weeks as a Royal Engineer Plant Operator. However, despite his flexibility, when deployed to Afghanistan, his small businesses suffered, much like self-employed Reserve Territorial C's business. One business was practically closed down as Territorial D was the manufacturer. The business did get a temporary worker (paid for by the Army) and started to train a woman in the manufacture techniques. However, several days before the interviewee's deployment, the temporary worker said she was emigrating, thereby leaving the business without a clothing manufacturer to facilitate orders. When asked what help the Army provided and whether the tour was financially viable, Territorial D's wife

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78 Interview with a Territorial soldier, MAR/TA 04, 19 June 2014.
79 Interview with a Territorial soldier, MAR/TA 01, 15 May 2014.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Interview with a Territorial soldier, MAR/TA 02, 04 June 2014.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Interview with Territorial wife or girlfriend, FWG/TA 01, 04 June 2014.
86 Ibid.
admitted that ‘when we analysed what we had got then we didn’t benefit in any way’. Adding that ‘I think the documentation, etcetera was very complicated for what money you could and couldn’t get, and it caused quite a few problems trying to sort it out’.  

As an extreme example of attendance and dedication, Territorial E, also self-employed, found the flexibility of being self-employed made it a little easier to attend and, as he stated, he spends ‘more time with the Reserves than would be normal’. 

Having a good working relationship with employers, whether local, national or multinational, has been essential to the viability of the Territorials from their inception in 1908 through to the AR of the FR2020 plans. The numbers have always struggled to reach full establishment for the Territorials of the past and continue to do so for the AR. To try and tempt recruits and ensure crucial business support, the organisation has always tried to foster a good working relationship with business and has always tried to convince these businesses of the benefits to both employees and themselves of allowing a worker to join and train with the Territorials. In the past, it was the job of the local and county Territorial Associations, SaBRE and now Defence Relationship Management (DRM). But how successful were they?

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87 Interview FWG/TA 01.
88 Interview with Territorial soldier. MAR/TA 06, 15 Jan. 2015.
89 Beckett, *Territorials*, p. 161 and Gov.UK, ‘Defence Relationship Management’, [http://www.gov.uk/government/groups/defence-relationship-management](http://www.gov.uk/government/groups/defence-relationship-management) [Accessed: 22/08/16]. The Territorial Associations still liaised and worked with their local business communities until 1986. The replacement for local knowledge was the National Employer Advisory Board, which became responsible to the Secretary of State for Defence through the MoD for advising on employment issues relating to Reservists. This responsibility was taken over by SaBRE in 2002. SaBRE was, in its turn, absorbed by the new Defence Relationship Management organisation in February 2016.
Section 3

How successful was the work of the Territorial County Associations and SaBRE in persuading employers of the value of Reservist volunteering?

Ian Beckett states that the Territorials and their predecessors (the Volunteers) ‘have frequently emphasised the value of auxiliaries as employees’ and that ‘little changes in the essential nature of this appeal’. 90 A quote summarising this claim, one that could be used for the whole Territorial period, comes from a 1923 Director-General of the TA memorandum to the Chair of the Essex Territorial Association. Essentially, it was the same argument formulated by the Victorian Volunteer Force, and one still used by SaBRE (was an MoD sponsored organisation to promote the employment of Territorial soldiers) until 2015-2016, which stated that ‘Not only would employers be contributing to a national insurance scheme for peace at a very low premium, but they would find that the Territorial Army had an immediate impact upon their employees: the tired worker’s health and strength, thereby increasing his productive capacity’. 91 However, was this argument enough to convince employers to support the Territorials? This section investigates the role of the Territorial Associations and SaBRE to understand the best approach to recruiting and actively engaging business support. This section also analyses employer engagement with the Territorials to understand what worked and what did not when Territorial Associations and SaBRE networked with business in the past and asks whether these agencies were merely preaching to the converted.

When the TF were first formed, the newly enfranchised TCAs spent much time trying to gain the support of local employers. In Lancashire (1908), two weeks after the TF were officially active, meetings with employers produced mixed results regarding recruitment for the Lancashire Regiments. Some employers dealt liberally with their men in regard to time for training, while the heads of other firms discouraged engagement in the TF and refused any participation. 92 For example, for some Lancastrian employees, it was possible for them to join and attend earlier annual camps held at Whit'suntide (the seventh Sunday after Easter), when large works were closed for

91 Dennis, *The Territorial Army*, p. 171.

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the holiday. However, many potential recruits hesitated to join due to widespread hostility from the many mill owners in the region.\textsuperscript{93} Local TCAs tried very hard to persuade local business to cooperate and held public meetings at Town Halls in which speakers from the local Territorial Associations appealed for cooperation with employers.\textsuperscript{94} Furthermore, in an attempt to maintain recruitment and negate the high turnover in personnel, TCAs formed local liaison committees to work with businesses in their county areas of responsibility.\textsuperscript{95}

An example of a good relationship with business was the East Riding of Yorkshire Territorial Army Association (ERYTAA) under Lord Lieutenant Middleton, incorporating the local East Yorkshire Regiment and the BGLC during the 1930s.\textsuperscript{96} The transcribed meetings and correspondences of the Hull Corporation also show many interactions with the ERYTAA, and communication between the parties helped with allowance payments for mobilised Territorials during the Great War, a necessary consideration for the men and the families of the mobilised.\textsuperscript{97} Furthermore, the Territorial Association’s practice countrywide of appointing mayors and councillors as representative members, alongside prominent local businessmen, contributed to a mutually beneficial arrangement with business.\textsuperscript{98} Regionally, recruitment meetings with local employers were a regular feature. For example, at Hull’s Guildhall, recruitment posters were handed out for local companies to display within their works.\textsuperscript{99} One such recipient, the BGLC, took up the offer of showing recruitment posters and fully supported the local TA after meetings with the Board of Directors and the Special

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{94} Anon, ‘The Territorial Army: Appeal to Lancashire Employers’, \textit{The Manchester Guardian}, 9 Feb. 1921. A resolution was passed requesting the Lord Mayor of Manchester to invite all employers of labour in the district to prepare statements indicating the proposition of men to whom they will grant leave, with a guarantee of reinstatement, for the purpose of attending the annual training in camp, and the proportion of whom they are prepared to offer an allowance towards making up the difference between the army pay for those enlisting and their regular wages’.
\textsuperscript{95} NGA NE/HUB/C/A/3/EEE, ‘Letter to the Manager, BGLC. A thank you letter to the BGLC. Hull from Major Johnson of the East Riding of Yorkshire Territorial Army Association (ERYTAA), 1937. ‘I thank you for your letter of the 7th April 1937, enclosing copy of poster, which is being exhibited at your works and office. From Major Johnson, Secretary, ERYTAA’’, 12 April 1937.
\textsuperscript{96} NGA NE/HUB/C/A/3/GGG, Letter regarding Lord Middleton thanking the Directors of BGLC for concessions made to workers volunteering with the TA, 1 May 1937.
\textsuperscript{97} HHC TCCM/3, Letter from William J. McCombe – Tramway Manager to Town Clerk, 20 August 1914. Allowance payments for the families of the deployed, paid by the Council, were able to be made promptly by obtaining particulars of military payment from the local office of the ERYTAA.
\textsuperscript{98} Mitchinson, \textit{England’s Last Hope}, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{99} NGA NE/HUB/C/A/DDD, Letter to BGLC Hull Branch Secretary from H. C. Johnson, Major, Secretary, ERTAA (East Riding Territorial Army Association), thanking BGLC for its cooperation in helping obtain recruits, thanking BGLC for its willingness to display recruiting posters and apologising for the Lord Lieutenant’s absence at the Guildhall recruiting meeting, Jan. 1937.
Purposes Committee of the North of England Gas Managers Association in Newcastle.\(^{100}\)

Support of the Territorials from predominantly the same businesses continued after the Great War. When the Territorials were reconstituted in 1920 as the Territorial Army, the local Territorial Associations again went about their ‘networking’ liaison committees with local business to tempt men to join again after the Great War, gain new recruits and make the new TA viable. However, the situation was as it had been before the Great War and the Associations were preaching to the converted: some of the bigger British businesses supported the Territorials, while many small and medium concerns did not. As detailed already, the BGLC declared its support after hard work from the Lord Lieutenants and local Territorial Associations. In the 1920s, City Councils, such as the Hull Corporation, also reaffirmed cooperation and its ‘sympathy and support’ for its employees to join the reconstituted TA.\(^{101}\) Nevertheless, when hard economic times hit Britain at the end of the 1920s, the risk of losing employment deterred men from risking their jobs by joining the organisation and some firms actively encouraged their employees not to attend annual camp.\(^{102}\) The Territorial Associations had little joy with many socialist corporations, who often remained unsupportive of the Territorials and firm in their anti-militarist beliefs. Not surprisingly, recruitment continued to struggle.\(^{103}\)

The recruitment issue had been a problem with the Territorials since they formed and remains one into the twenty-first century. In the encouragement of potential recruits, the government has had a history of producing schemes to help TCAs by suggesting legislation to attract recruits, One scheme, very similar to the ‘Kite-Mark’ scheme proposed in the FR2020 Green Paper, was the ‘Blue Ensign’ scheme. The scheme, first suggested in 1909, awarded the Blue Ensign to employers of Territorials, other Reservists and ex-military. The Blue Ensign scheme aimed to reward the patriotic soldier, the shopkeeper/business employer and his/her patriotic customers, claiming that it would end recruitment difficulties. The scheme explained that, after serving the

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\(^{100}\) NGA NE/HUB/C/A/DDD, letter regarding recruiting poster from C. R. Armitage, Engineer Manager to A. J. Mumford Esq. Secretary, 25 Feb. 1937.

\(^{101}\) HHCC Kingston upon Hull Municipal Corporation and Urban Sanitary Authority, Minutes of proceedings of the Council 1919-1920 (XXXIII Town Clerk Hull), 5 August 1920, pp. 213-4. The Council stated that ‘with the consent of the Treasury, special facilities were extended to all Civil Servants who joined the TA as follows: ‘One week’s special leave on full pay will be allowed to those who attend the Annual Training in Camp for at least a fortnight, the second week being reckoned as ordinary unpaid leave. In the case of those who do not attend camp for a full fortnight, the period of attendance will be reckoned as ordinary leave or as special leave without civil pay. In no case will deductions from salary be made in respect of military pay and allowances’.


\(^{103}\) ibid., p. 100.
country, the ex-soldier would be employed by grateful employers upon leaving the forces. This proposal was never initiated and neither was the Territorial employer badge (to be displayed in a shop window, for example) due to objections from the Ministry of Labour in the 1930s. The objections by the Ministry were that the promise of a badge may cause some firms to pressurise their employees to join the Territorials as a condition of employment.

Another idea from a 1912 Parliamentary debate suggested that a bounty should be paid to the employers of TF soldiers, while another wished to fine those who refused to employ Territorials. The Milne Committee (1919) wanted to oblige employers legally to grant privileges to Territorials for annual camp attendance, but this legislation was never implemented as it would have caused great difficulty for smaller businesses. There was also a suggestion that a ‘King’s Roll’ of cooperative employers, which favoured firms with preferential government contracts, should be created. However, due to impracticalities of administering the companies, this scheme was also never implemented.

There were many schemes thought up by politicians, Territorial Associations and military analysts of the day, all concerned by the failure of the Territorials to reach full establishment. However, due to impracticalities in setting up and then running these schemes, a lack of real interest by many businesses and the government wishing to avoid charges of indirect compulsion, these ideas came to nothing. To quote Peter Dennis, ‘The Territorials had to fend for themselves’.

Despite a lack of any real help from the government, the TCAs boasted a mixed record in persuading employers of the benefits of their workers becoming active members of the Territorial organisation. Most of the recruitment fairs/meetings held during the first half of the twentieth century were attended predominantly by the larger firms already supporting the Territorials. Furthermore, those businesses who replied to circulars and recruitment paraphernalia were mostly already supporters of the organisation. However, despite the constant need for new recruits, the TCAs had many other duties to perform to keep the Territorial show on the road. Not least of these was

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105 Dennis, The Territorial Army, p. 176.
106 Cunningham, The Volunteer Force, p. 77.
108 Ibid. Dennis, The Territorial Army, p. 174. A similar ‘Employers “Roll of Honour”’ was attempted by the Cambridgeshire Territorial Association but only received 40 replies to over 160 sent out to local employers.
109 Ibid., p. 176.
110 Mitchinson, England’s Last Hope, p. 56.
keeping those it already had in the organisation and, of course, keeping friendly employers supportive. The persuasion of employers and employees alike of the benefits of supporting and participating as volunteer soldiers continues today. Despite the new AR only needing to persuade 30,000 part-time soldiers to join and stay, the struggle to attract workers and convince employers to allow them to join seems to be just as hard a job, if not a little more challenging.

*Modern TA/AR supporters and the business point of view - 2001 to present*

The UK has a well-established honours and awards system to recognise exceptional public service. But in addition to this, Defence must recognise the contribution that employers make to support their reservist employees if we are to develop and sustain the employment environment required. Our recognition scheme will be scalable in order to acknowledge the specific level of contribution provided.

Although it may have been easier for a big company or government agency to employ Territorials, this was not always the case for SMEs. The smaller the business, the more it could potentially suffer if a key worker were called up for deployment. A survey (2013) carried out by the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) had around 36 per cent of SMEs stating that they would not employ a Territorial or Reservist. The FSB survey also reported that many of its participants felt that the proposed changes under the FR2020 mantle would, if they went ahead, have an adverse impact on their businesses.

The British government has fully recognised that if the continued support of some employers and their businesses was not forthcoming, there could only be an Auxiliary/Territorial organisation if conscription became law. Therefore, within the government’s White Paper *Reserves in the Future Force 2020*, the then Secretary of State for Defence Philip Hammond (2011–2014) offered business the chance to sign the Corporate

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112 NGA NE/HUBCA/1/11/00, Letter to W. T. Purcell, Gas Sales Manager, BGLC from Chief Engineer and Manager (name indecipherable), BGLC, 23 May 1939, shows that as the build-up to World War Two gathered pace, Territorials were not just attending annual camp and the occasional weekend, but were called up more frequently for ‘special training’ for one month at a time. The BGLC stated that ‘each member of the staff, weekly wage earner or employee is to receive the difference between the amount he receives from the War Office in pay and allowances and the amount of the plain ties rate of pay he would have received from the company’.
Covenant voluntarily to encourage corporate social responsibility.\textsuperscript{114} The Covenant, a corporate statement of support for the Armed Forces, stated that it would ensure the military community (all arms – full-time and part-time) faced no disadvantage in its engagement with business.\textsuperscript{115} In relation to the AR and other Reserves, the Charter "set out the basic behaviours required from Defence and reservists and what we will ask from employers in order to provide and enable a supportive employment environment".\textsuperscript{116} To ensure that the plans proceeded for expanding the AR to replace the retrenched Regulars, the government, through the White Paper, tabled a raft of measures to entice employers to engage more AR and to make employing AR personnel more palatable to business needs. This incentive is mainly cash-based, and will become available when an AR soldier deploys. (The financial implications attached to deploying an AR soldier are discussed in Chapter Six.)

Being a part-time soldier is no longer a weekend or annual camp hobby, as deployments of TAs started to escalate during 2001–12. Employer cooperation has always been vital, if the newly proposed, more integrated, better trained and supposedly more deployable AR is to prosper then employer engagement needs to continue. This was a task with which SaBRE was struggling; perhaps the new Employer Recognition Scheme will realise a closer partnership with British industry. They will have their work cut out. For instance, a meeting with the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and the Chair of the National Employer Advisory Board (NEAB) in October 2011 stated that "since the recession (2008), UK businesses could no longer afford to sustain a benevolent relationship with Defence; the bottom line and headcount are now the key drivers for business".\textsuperscript{117} This, of course, was before any uncertainty caused by the Brexit vote in 2016.

Moreover, businesses were worried that proposed changes to the Reservist training programme would result in more absence from work. There were also ‘concerns that reservists would have to use annual leave to cover training weekends and annual camp’.\textsuperscript{118} This scenario led to further legitimate concerns from businesses that if employees used up their annual leave entitlement for Reservist business, they would not have received ‘the proper benefit from annual leave and therefore would not be properly

\textsuperscript{114} White Paper, Reserves in the Future Force 2020, ‘Armed Forces Covenant’, an idea that links with the Armed Forces Covenant and the newly thought up Community Covenant, p. 40.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., p. 22.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} Corry, ‘How can Defence best work with Employers?’ SaBRE Blog.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
rested'.\textsuperscript{119} In other responses to questions about the significance to a business of proposed changes to training, one respondent in five highlighted the impact the extra training would have regarding the loss of key personnel and experienced staff. Other factors having an impact on business included the financial implications when the Reservist was deployed and disruption to the workplace, including the impact on other staff that needed to be taken into account.\textsuperscript{120} The proposed changes to the extra training were flagged as a particular issue for SMEs and the uniformed public sector (Police, Fire Brigade and Ambulance) that would require ‘more flexibility in the way they are mandated to attend training, to avoid peak stretch periods’.\textsuperscript{121}

Another tranche of legislation that can only have a negative effect on recruitment of Reservists are the employment laws. When it came to employing Reserves under the existing legislation (MoD, Government Department, UK and the European Union), employers (25 per cent) stated that this may hinder proactive employment.\textsuperscript{122} Furthermore, within the qualitative submissions to the Consultation, many companies found the systems in place which related to employing Reservists to be a burden.\textsuperscript{123} Some respondents made comments relating to the Working Time Directive (WTD), as some employers stated that they had a problem with employees accruing leave for the duration of their employment contract even while deployed.\textsuperscript{124} This clause in the WTD led some employers dismissing and then reengaging Reservists so that their employment contract started from year zero when they return from their deployments. The WTD is currently a grey area in employment law which needs to be addressed.\textsuperscript{125}

In an attempt to stop companies discriminating against Army Reservists in the workplace, the government is looking at legislation to make it easier for Reservists to take time off work. The then Defence Secretary, Philip Hammond, called in 2012 for ‘a fresh start in the relationship between the Armed Forces and businesses that employ

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., p. 23.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid. WTD is the right to minimum holiday entitlement per annum, rest breaks and rest of at least 11 hours in a 24-hour period, and to work no more than 48 hours per week, p. 24. 
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., p. 23. Citizens Advice Bureau. Adviceguide, ‘Holiday Entitlement’, states that ‘if your contract does not allow for layoffs or short time working, you can not claim redundancy. However you may have other options, for example, you may be able to claim constructive unfair dismissal’ [Accessed: 20/02/15]. On its portal, SaBre states that ‘An employer does not have to allow a Reservist to accrue leave while mobilised. Some companies do choose leave on a pro-rata basis from the point in the year when your Reservist returns’. ‘Employment Leave’, [Accessed: 20/02/15]. Reserves in Future Force 2020. Furthermore, the White Paper states that the legal framework already exists to protect Reservists from being dismissed solely or mainly on account of any duties or liabilities a Reservist has to undertake, p. 53.
Therefore, when the findings of the Consultation were perused regarding the issue of the potential value and benefits that members of the Reserve forces could bring to their employers and businesses, the public sector was more enthusiastic about the perceived benefits than the private sector. Some employers and Reservists felt that the skills gained by Reservists from their military training were not relevant or of benefit to employers as they were not transferable. Most of the respondents who thought the skills gained by a Reservist were not relevant were more concerned about absences from work. Some of the respondents also stated that SaBRE and the Reserves overstated their qualities, efficiency and desirability, 'and that the costs of employing a reservist outweigh the benefits'.

Conversely, some employers did feel that there were benefits; however, these benefits were not being 'sold' to them by either the Reservist or SaBRE. For instance, some employers mentioned that Reservists did possess 'beneficial' soft skills in aspects of team working and problem-solving. There were also particular sectors that benefited more from Reservist skills than others. These being defence contractors and the NHS, whose employees bring back valuable deployment experience in care and trauma medicine.

During the consultation period on FR2020, large employers were asked whether a National Relationship Management Scheme (NRMS) should be created to provide better communication between the MoD and business regarding employees wanting to join or active serving part-time soldiers. Of those asked, 69 per cent thought it may be useful. However, 13 per cent of respondents thought that an NRMS may create more red tape and such an organisation should be local rather than national. SaBRE was supposed to be doing what the proposed NRMS would do. Nevertheless, the NRMS proposal prompted the question of whether SaBRE was doing all it could to promote the cause of the Army Reserve (TA) and other Reserves to business.

The evidence of a struggling SaBRE was evident when considering the results of a Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) survey. When RUSI surveyed over 200 corporate members of their organisation (March 2011), it was discovered by the

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126 Nick Hopkins, ‘Firms that discriminate against Territorial Army reserves may be sued’, The Guardian, 8 Nov. 2012.
127 Future Reserves 2020: Consultation, p. 27.
128 Ibid., p. 28.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid., p. 25.
Federation of Small Businesses and Northern Defence Industries that 73 per cent of respondents who had experienced employing Reservists and mobilisations did not know of either SaBRE or its campaign (started in 2002) to enhance the employer/Reservist relationship and their remit to support employers of Reservists. From those over 200 businesses surveyed, only 23 per cent had heard of SaBRE and its campaign, while two-thirds found SaBRE’s campaign ‘helpful’, although not ‘very helpful’. The remaining third found it neither helpful nor unhelpful. When tasked with educating SMEs of the benefits of employing a Territorial, it seems SaBRE’s influence was limited.

A particular issue about which SaBRE should have been particularly worried was that the government consultation on FR2020 also revealed that 46 per cent of the Reservist respondents reported that they had experienced disadvantages in the workplace as a result of their Reserve service. Cases occurred despite Reservists being covered by the Reserve Forces (Safeguarding Employment) Act 1985. For example, banker Edward Leveratt was sacked by Barclays after a tour in Helmand Province during 2008. This sacking came after being given assurances that he would still be employed by the company after deployment. He won his tribunal case after Barclays stated that they had sacked him because he had been ‘identified as a disruptive influence’. The case took three years to reach its conclusion. Leveratt lost a separate claim as a ‘victim of discrimination’ because the law on discrimination only protects specified groups – including ethnic minorities and homosexuals – but not members of the Armed Forces. Clearly, if the drive to recruit more Army Reservist personnel with the cooperation of business is to succeed, the new Defence Relationship Management – DRM - organisation (replacing SaBRE) will have to become much more proactive than SaBRE, with precise targets to engage in more meaningful participation with business.

It is also interesting that, after the failure of the schemes to help promote the Territorials of the past, the government and the DRM in 2016 instituted an Employer Recognition Scheme, awarding Bronze, Silver and Gold recognition awards to employers, much like that mooted with the ‘King’s Roll’ of cooperative employers (1920s). However, such

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135 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
140 The East Midlands RFCA, ‘Employer Recognition Scheme’.
http://www.eastmidlandrfca.co.uk/employers/employer-recognitionscheme/ [Accessed: 22/08/16]. Those
is the lack of interest shown in the military by the British public in the twenty-first century, that there is, as yet, no public discourse over its merits or otherwise.

Finally, the new FR2020 plans, as detailed in the White Paper, explain how serving in the AR may help an unemployed person gain experience and employment skills.\textsuperscript{141} To gain recruits from among the unemployed, the White Paper states that volunteers will not lose their benefit entitlement, but any earnings related to AR training are deducted from their Universal Credit.\textsuperscript{142} The White Paper declares that this policy will ensure that work always pays. Nevertheless, with poor recruiting figures for 2014–2015, the likelihood of thousands of the unemployed joining up appears small.\textsuperscript{143} There are significant structural improvements which need attention if the government is to make the newly proposed FR2020 changes more palatable to employers in today’s rapidly changing business world.

\textit{Conclusion}

The Territorial organisation and its antecedents have always been civilians first and part-time soldiers second. For many, their commitment to training, attending annual camp and courses has always relied upon their civilian employer’s cooperation. Historically, there has been strong support for service in the Territorials from big business and public service. Throughout the history of the Territorials, its main supporters were large employers and government sectors that enabled their employees to participate in Territorial service. However, there have always been businesses and groups refusing, for ideological reasons or because they are too small to lose key workers, to support the Territorial organisation. However, now with the growth of multi-national companies and globalisation in the UK, it seems that there is now a waning of the traditional support offered by big business to part-time soldiering. For over 100 years, the TCAs and their successors up to the SaBRE organisation have expended vast amounts of energy in trying to ensure a constant pool of recruits. These efforts have mostly come up short, as they were preaching to the converted as regards employers allowing their employees to participate in volunteer soldiering. Can the new DRM organisation do any better in a more globalised economy? Time will tell.

\textsuperscript{141} White Paper, \textit{Reserves in the Future Force 2020}, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{142} \textit{Hbid.}, p. 37.
However, it is not, of course, just employers that have a large say in the career of a part-time soldier. The third pillar of the Territorial Trinity of Commitments – the family – is still very influential and may ultimately have the final say on whether a volunteer joins up in the first place.
Chapter Five

The influence of family on the Territorial soldier

Figure 8. Sergeant Major Johnny Cofe, Royal Engineers(TA) with family during ‘Families Day’ at Irvine annual camp, 1926.\textsuperscript{144}

The commitment that is being made by your family member is appreciated and it is acknowledged that their absence may lead to some hardship and feelings of grief, which are normal during separation.\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{144} REMLA, Photograph album of Johnny Cofe (1929).
As the Great War raged overseas, it seemed that the government only handed out Separation Allowances begrudgingly. World War Two saw a change in government attitudes and the right to allowances was much improved. During the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts allowances were good and helped with the massive inconvenience of having a partner or family member deploy overseas. However, during the modern Middle East conflicts, unlike the Great War and World War Two, the emotional welfare of the family left at home has become as important as the financial welfare of that family. This chapter shows how the struggles of Reservists’ families left at home after the deployment of their spouses, sons or daughters were made worse when they were not awarded the correct amount of financial or emotional support expected, either from the government, charities or military welfare.¹⁴⁶ These financial oversights often left families struggling at home and sometimes affected the morale of the soldier in the field overseas. Therefore, the chapter also investigates the different emphases upon financial and emotional welfare throughout the study periods and their effects. For example, financial support during the Great War was seen as the best way of supporting a soldier’s family at home (although this was not a right), as evidenced by the 1915 report by J. M. Hogge, MP and T. H. Garside on war pensions and allowances, but any emotional and extra financial support at home for struggling families was not seen as a government role and had to be provided by charities such as the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Family Association (SSFA) or individuals such as Sylvia Pankhurst (daughter of Suffrage campaigner Emmeline Pankhurst).¹⁴⁷ During World War Two, there developed a greater understanding regarding keeping families at home happy as a means to ensuring good morale at the front and providing financial assistance for dependants at home as a right. Barbara Hately-Broad covers much of this in War and Welfare; this thesis adds the Territorials’ experiences, particularly regarding twenty-first-century Territorials and their families, to this knowledge.¹⁴⁸

Evidence of emotional support from the government or the Army is rare, probably due to this aspect of looking after families not being seen as a major priority until the

¹⁴⁶ Hately-Broad, War and Welfare, pp. 41-2. The advisory committee to the Minister of Pensions, the Military Service (Special Allowances) Advisory Committee dealt with financial problems that had arisen following the introduction of conscription. Acknowledging that Army pay could not meet existing financial arrangements, based on civilian wages, such as hire purchase agreements, insurance or education payments made it possible for families to apply to the Committee for up to £2 per week to meet their commitments before the call-up started.
¹⁴⁸ Hately-Broad, War and Welfare.
twenty-first century. Perhaps this also points to communities in the first half of the Twentieth century being much more resilient and tighter socially (see following page). However, this research has uncovered (World War Two, 1941) a rare mention of a unit welfare officer appearing in an article in *The Spectator*. However, this welfare officer was stationed at a barracks working only with soldiers and definitely not with families.¹⁴⁰ Family welfare is a relatively new concept, although finance was very important in all the study periods. Evidence of welfare provided by the government and the army during the Great War and World War Two is very rare. However, there is much more evidence of emotional welfare support for families from the 21st century Territorials, therefore, much of the discussion for emotional welfare will be discussed in Section 2. When regarding modern Territorials (2001–2013), this research has found that there needed to be more emotional support for isolated Territorial partners and families (finances were usually adequate), who were predominantly ignored by most Army Welfare Service (AWS) staff. Reports from the Army Families Federation (AFF) and interviews carried out for this research show this also.¹⁴¹

The lack of family welfare support points to a genuine system failure or perhaps a touch of old-fashioned Regular Army bias against Territorials. More fundamentally, perhaps, the isolation experienced by dependants and families of Territorials may show that modern Britain is losing/has lost its greater sense of community and social cohesion, especially in its towns and cities. Robert Putnam, in *Bowling Alone* (about American society and cohesion), stated that, at the conclusion of the twentieth century, ordinary Americans shared a sense of civic malaise. Putnam cites a statistic of 77 per cent of Americans (1987) who thought that the nation was worse off because of ‘less involvement in community activities’.¹⁵¹ There is evidence too that British society today alienates many returning soldiers (discussed in the final chapter). Recent research carried out by Sebastian Junger in *Tribe* shows that people who are forced to share their time and resources (much like many wartime communities) live in closer, more socialised communities.¹⁵² Junger also suggests that the struggle for survival, be it in a disaster such as an earthquake, a hurricane, a besieged or bombed city, equalises people and brings societies together.¹⁵³ Angus Calder and Sonya Rose dispute this thesis,

¹⁴⁰ Anon, ‘The Army Welfare Officer’, *The Spectator*, 11 Dec, 1941, p. 14. The article indicates that Unit Welfare Officers were not widespread during this time. At the end of the article, the author states: ‘And so I urge upon the authorities my belief in the appointment of a Welfare Officer within every unit’.
¹⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 43-5.
however, when regarding certain classes of society and their contributions to hard-hit communities. Calder maintains the Blitz spirit did not always exist, arguing that rationing could be avoided if you had money, that the ‘upper-middle class’ often took the least of the burden and the wealthy did not think they needed to contribute to anything. Moreover, Rose argued much the same as Calder whilst stating that identity politics was alive and well in World War Two Britain.

However, Britain currently is not in an existential struggle for survival against an outside aggressor. Therefore, any consideration of family welfare and well-being during the twenty-first century, as evidenced by interviews carried out for this research and surveys carried out by the AFF, has shown that this approach to looking after Reservists and other armed forces should be a cornerstone of any welfare plan when soldiers are deployed. Moreover, Reservists should perhaps have extra contingencies and help planned for them due to the isolated (non-Army camp) situation in which many partners and families find themselves during Territorial deployments, especially the recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Many Territorial partners and families whose loved ones deployed overseas, according to evidence gathered in reports and interviews conducted for this research, found the separation enforced by an overseas tour hard. Therefore, this chapter investigates the hardships faced by partners and families and the effects wives’ and girlfriends’ experiences had on serving Territorials from the Great War through to today’s Reservist families.

When researching the financial support issued to dependants of mobilised and deployed Territorials, there is ample official evidence from all the periods considered for the thesis. However, as pointed out by Barbara Hately-Broad in War and Welfare, studies from British literature and academic study relating to the concerns of Service families, both Regular and Territorial, when their family member was serving overseas, are very rare. Part 3 of this chapter will, therefore, add to the small source base interviews with ex-Territorial and serving Army Reserve wives and girlfriends conducted for this research. The interviews convey how they felt when their husbands and boyfriends were deployed overseas, and cover the emotional welfare they received from the Army. The chapter overall shows the impact on the family unit when a

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155 Ibid.

156 Anon, ‘Army Welfare Officer’, The Spectator, p. 3.
Territorial is mobilised and deployed overseas, an impact felt by families in all three historic study periods for this research.

There are three guiding questions for this chapter, divided into three parts: 1. How were Territorial families supported by the authorities during the Great War and World War Two? 2. How were families supported during Britain’s conflicts in the twenty-first century? And 3. What effects did home front problems have on partners, families and part-time soldiers when they served overseas?

The family pillar of the Territorial Trinity of Commitments is just as important as training and employment to the continuance of a Reservist soldier within the organisation. This family pillar was as true for the Great War and World War Two Territorials as it has been for the War on Terror. The family unit is a large determining factor in a part-time soldier’s career and a major part of the Territorial Trinity of Commitments regarding all the periods of history covered in the thesis.

Section 1

How were Territorial families supported by the authorities during the Great War and World War Two?

A man living near us in Ford Road had the order from his firm: ‘Enlist or go!’ He joined the Territorials, and went into training at the barracks in Tredgar Road close by. His employers had promised him five shillings a week when he went to the Front, but during his training, they gave him nothing. No money had come from the War Office. 157

The Great War

From 1914 to 1915, the British government badly failed many needy dependants of soldiers fighting around the world. Speedy and accurate allowances for the dependants of men on active service would seem to be one of the first actions of a government that had committed a nation to war. However, in 1914, the only official organisation for administering such an undertaking was the Commissioners of the Royal Hospital for Soldiers at Chelsea, working with allowance rates that had not changed since the

157 Pankhurst, Home Front, p. 25.
Second South African War (1899–1902). The task of administering the allowance system was huge and supplementation of this task had to come from charities such as the SSFA and the National Relief Fund. It was not until October 1914 that the rate of Separation Allowance was raised but, even with this rise in allowance, there were outrageously long delays before payments were made, causing much suffering. The outcry against the egregious allowance muddle and mismanagement forced the government to act and, after the deliberations of a government select committee, the Naval and Military War Pensions Act came into being in November 1915. Even following this Act, many still had to endure hardships. For example, a letter sent to Sylvia Pankhurst from a Welsh soldier’s wife shows that her husband, in France, had to send what money he had left back home, as his wife had been five weeks without Separation Allowance. When she appealed to a relief committee, she was turned away with nothing, her predicament blamed on her husband. In some respects, the wives and families of many mobilised Territorials were luckier.

The wives and families of TF soldiers became, upon their husband’s mobilisation, the responsibility of local county TFAs. The TFAs became tasked with ensuring the wives and families of mobilised Territorials received their Separation Allowance. Separation Allowance was originally only for the Regular Army and soldiers who married ‘on the strength’ (a de facto marriage officially recognised by the Army). Nevertheless, in 1912, married Territorials also started to receive Separation Allowance after attendance of the full fifteen days’ annual camp. For the mobilised Territorial during 1914 and beyond, the rules on receiving Separation Allowance were changed to the same status as those serving in the Regular Army. The official stance on Separation Allowance issued was:

160 Pankhurst, Home Front, p. 79.
161 Hogge and Garside, War Pensions and Allowances, printed version of the Special Report of the Select Committee on Naval and Military Services published as a White Paper, p. 31. Territorials mobilised for home or overseas service could claim their allowances and became classed as separated by the exigencies of public service. Beckett, Britain’s Part-Time Soldiers: by 1916 there were increasing amounts of Separation Allowance for local TFAs to pay. For example, Worcestershire supported 14,550 wives and children, East Lancashire some 60,000 and London helped over 78,000 women and children, p. 235.
162 Horace Wyndham, Following the Drum (Montana: Kessinger, 2008), originally published by Andrew Melrose, 1912, p. 50. Beckett, Britain’s Part-Time Soldiers, p. 218. During the following year, men in camp did not have to pay their or their employer’s National Insurance contributions following the National Insurance Act of 1911.
to the wives and children of soldiers, and to a woman who has been dependent upon a soldier for her maintenance and regularly supported by him upon a permanent domestic basis, and also children of his household permanently maintained by him, when separated from him for reasons of public service.\(^{163}\)

The term ‘public service’ meant mobilisation in any capacity (home service or overseas), meaning the Territorial’s wife, common-law wife or dependant[s] could claim Separation Allowance.\(^{164}\) The rules also stated that when married men mobilised they would automatically be issued with the allowance.\(^{165}\) Nevertheless, the Territorial or his wife needed proof of marriage and children’s birth certificates to claim the allowance.\(^{166}\) The rules for children and the amount of allowance awarded depended on the age of the children who were dependent upon the soldier. Separation Allowance was reduced for male children fourteen years of age or over (presumably because children over fourteen were eligible for work) and sixteen years of age for girls.\(^{167}\) Separation Allowances also followed a sliding scale on rank. Therefore, the example given in the regulations (enacted from 1 March 1915) was thus:

If there are five children in a family, two 14 years of age and over, and three under 14 years of age, the two elder children will receive allowances on the old scale [twopence a day].\(^{168}\) The practice is to issue increased allowance to the third child as if that child was the eldest, to the fourth child as if it was the second, and the fifth child as if it was the third. The eldest child then becomes the fourth and the next fifth. Consequently, the two elder children receive allowances on the old scale applicable to the fourth and fifth children.\(^{169}\)

In addition to Separation Allowance were the financial allotments for families at home taken from the mobilised soldier’s wages. When the volunteer soldier enlisted or mobilised during the Great War, every man, whether married or unmarried, had to state whether he wished to make any allotment from his pay to his family or dependants. In the case of a married man who had been living with his family immediately before his enlistment, the allotment was compulsory and allowance was automatically issued. If


\(^{164}\) *Ibid.*, p. 40. Furthermore, if the soldier’s wife and children resided in London, they were entitled to claim an additional 3/6d. per week (London weighting).

\(^{165}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{166}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{167}\) House of Commons Debate, ‘Education Bill’. *Hansard*, Vol. 104 cc335-447, 13 March 1918. In 1918 H. A. L. Fisher, the President of the Board of Education, brought in reforms which raised the schooling age from twelve to fourteen years old before leaving. However, up until this time, many children started work at fourteen and most apprenticeships started at fifteen years of age. Pankhurst, *Home Front*, p. 24.

\(^{168}\) *Ibid.* Old allowance value brackets from Pankhurst.

the married man had been living apart from his wife, the fact had to be stated upon an AFD (Army Form D).418a, which was completed upon attestation. In the case of a married man, provisional payment of the Separation Allowance with the allotment of pay was at once issuable. Unmarried men had to fill in an AFO.1838, which was handed to them by the Attestation Officer.170 During September 1914, a compulsory allotment of a mobilised soldier's pay was added to allowances. However, in October 1914, to complicate matters for those dealing with the deluge of claims, compulsory allotments were made voluntary. This administrative move went on to affect many dependants, as soldiers forgot, accidentally or wilfully, to fill out the necessary paperwork.171

Separation Allowance increased from 1915, from a very low starting point of eleven shillings and sixpence (11s 6d) to 12s 6d per week. A wife with one child received 15s compared with 12s 10d under the old scale; with two children, 17s 6d against 14s 7d; with three children, 20s against 16s 4d; and four children, 22s against 17s 6d. The special allowance for London of 3s 6d remained unaltered (see Figure 9).172 Nevertheless, no account was taken of the rise in the cost of living as the war dragged on.173 The allowance was supposed to be issued to dependants of mobilised Territorials within five days of the mobilisation of their soldier.174 If not issued after four weeks, and after no notification of rejection, the wife then had to inquire as to its whereabouts by making an appointment with the Secretary of the Territorial Association.175

The demand for Separation Allowances was significant around the UK and extra clerical and administrative staff had to be employed.176 However, government unpreparedness was extraordinary, leading to long delays in allocating the Separation Allowances, which, in turn, resulted in much frustration and suffering.

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170 Ibid., p. 32.
171 Mitchinson, England's Last Hope, p. 225.
172 Hogge and Garside, War Pensions and Allowances, p. 32. Rates applied to all Territorials with the exception of Civil Servants (except postal employees attached to the Royal Engineers). The amount of the increase then became deducted from the proportion of the pay they received from the Paymaster-General supplementary to the flat-rate Separation Allowance: 'given by one hand and taken away by the other.' Anon. 'Prime Minister's Statement', Derbyshire Times, 19 Sept. 1914.
173 Mitchinson, Home Front, p. 81.
174 Hogge and Garside, War Pensions and Allowances, p. 32.
175 Ibid. and Pankhurst, Home Front, p. 27. Many women had to prove their eligibility by showing marriage and birth certificates for children, when demanded, often struggling to afford copies as the prices of the certificates rose from 3d to 7d in the opening months of the war. Sometimes these certificates were lost by the authorities and had to be purchased again.
176 Mitchinson, England's Last Hope, p. 225.
Figure 9. Separation Allowance poster, 1915. Source: Imperial War Museum, IWM PST 5160.
Fortunately for many Territorial families, the regional TFAs had experience of issuing allowances due to dealing with annual camps.\textsuperscript{177}

Dealing with the initial rush, most of the TFAs managed to learn the system of allowances on the job, with the clerks of the City of London TFA spending time at the Paymaster's Office.\textsuperscript{178} The TF fared well with payments of allowances, which, for the first two months of the war, were paid monthly in advance. A further change in October 1914 meant that allowances were increased and paid weekly along with the allotment being made voluntary.\textsuperscript{179}

The numbers of soldiers the TFAs processed was huge (725,842 foreign and home service men by December 1915, before the Military Service Act 1916).\textsuperscript{180} For Army families as a whole, including the Territorials, Susan Pedersen states that the allowance system which eventually took shape during the Great War became a remarkable achievement and its scale was massive, costing the government nearly half a billion pounds (almost as much as that spent on the troops).\textsuperscript{181} By the end of the war, allowances accounted for some £120 million per year (1914–1919 prices). At the height of the Army's strength, 1.5 million wives and several million children were receiving Separation Allowance at subsistence rates. There was also the provision of smaller amounts for hardship, which were more stringently doled out to a further 1.5 million dependent relatives.\textsuperscript{182}

The clerical work carried out by TFAs was a great administrative success, and was completed alongside their other administrative duties (such as kit and equipment issue) and training second- and third-line TF units for mobilisation and replacement.\textsuperscript{183} The county TFAs did, however, struggle initially to cope with the deluge of allowance requests due to a lack of competent clerical staff and, to help in the processing of claims, additional staff had to be employed.\textsuperscript{184} Clerical staff wages rose exponentially due to supply and demand regarding the need for efficient clerks. For example, some clerks were paid the maximum £500 per annum plus bonuses for 'zeal and care', while

\textsuperscript{177} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid. The North Riding TFA was suspicious about the number of children submitted by its volunteers for allowance and asked the county's Education Committee to assist in checking with their attendance officers the lists of married families. However, a less suspicious GOC of a Territorial Division insisted that a man's word was good enough when it came to claims.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{180} Beckett, Territorials, p. 58.
\textsuperscript{181} Pedersen, 'Gender, Welfare and Citizenship'.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., p. 985.
\textsuperscript{183} Beckett, Britain's Part-time Soldiers, p. 230.
\textsuperscript{184} Mitchinson, Defending Albion, p. 48 and pp. 52–75.
the average London clerk’s salary in 1914 was set at £238.9 per annum.\textsuperscript{183} In 1918, questions about the pay of TFA clerks being excessive were raised in the House; however, it was decided that this was a matter for the local TFAs, not Parliament.\textsuperscript{186}

When the Great War commenced, there was a lack of a coherent state policy towards the welfare of a soldier’s family upon mobilisation. Furthermore, Separation Allowances were issued at the discretion of the Army Council. During the Great War, the issuance of an allowance was not a right and one had to follow certain ‘worthiness’ rules.\textsuperscript{187} Claiming Separation Allowance was not made easy; the person was means tested – the wife or dependant completing a statement of her/his income from all sources other than Separation Allowance and allotment. The means-tested Separation Allowance application was then considered by the War Office.\textsuperscript{188} Sylvia Pankhurst campaigned vigorously alongside the Labour Party, demanding ‘adequate separation allowances for dependants of the men who went to war, to be paid as a right, as wages which had been earned’.\textsuperscript{189}

Many claimants of allowances had unique economic and social circumstances. For example, Territorials who were agricultural workers required a different approach to their allowance claims, which were separate from those of city-dwelling claimants.

When these agrarian-employed Territorial soldiers were called up in 1914, agricultural employers stopped paying their weekly wages immediately.\textsuperscript{190} Due to, in some cases, initial delays in receiving Separation Allowances, the stopped wages not only affected the wife and children at home financially, but also had a financial effect on the farmer, as he was not allowed to evict the wives or widowed mothers of serving soldiers from their farm cottages.\textsuperscript{191}

While they were waiting for their allowance, wives, children, mothers and dependants often subsisted on a voluntary allotment from their deployed husband/relative, which, in turn, often became delayed in the early days due to pay arrears and clerical hold-ups.\textsuperscript{192} Voluntary allotment became compulsory in 1915, and the

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid. and Mitchinson, England’s Last Hope, p. 225. Many TF clerks were former soldiers who knew their way around the many complex and bureaucratic processes of official Army paperwork, p. 17.


\textsuperscript{188} Hogge and Garside, War Pensions and Allowances, p. 32.

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., p. 46.

\textsuperscript{189} Pankhurst, Home Front, p. 28.


\textsuperscript{191} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{192} Pankhurst, The Home Front, p. 79.
mobilised soldier had to put aside sums equating to the recommended 10d a day for soldiers above the rank of Sergeant and 6d a day for those below Sergeant, under Sections 138 and 145 of the Army Act. Allotments for children did not have any compulsion attached. No funds coming into the household meant the family had to appeal to the Soldiers’ Sailors’ Families Association (SSFA), public assistance, Poor Law authorities or private charities for help, which then put their Separation Allowances in jeopardy. For dependants of armed forces personnel to claim their rightful allowance successfully, there were hurdles that had to be cleared.

The administration of the Separation Allowance

When the Great War started, like many agencies at the outset of this conflict, the SSFA became overwhelmed with cases, resulting in an expansion from 7,000 volunteers to 50,000. The payment or otherwise of Separation Allowance to the wife of a mobilised Territorial during the Great War depended on multi-agency decision-making processes and whether the applicant was, in the eyes of the SSFA volunteers, deemed worthy enough, morally and financially, to receive the allowance. The SSFA volunteers played a prominent part in this decision-making process (see Figure 10).

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194 Ibid.
195 Ibid.
196 Derek Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State: A History of Social Policy since the Industrial Revolution (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 173. This was perhaps a hangover from the Poor Law system and some in the establishment that firmly believed that those seeking relief should first suffer the loss of personal reputation (the stigma of pauperism); secondly, the loss of personal freedom i.e., incarceration within the workhouse; thirdly, the pauper should suffer disenfranchisement. These were actions still preached by the head of the Poor Law administration in 1909.
Form 7.—For the Wife, Widow, or Child of a Soldier or Sailor.

THE SOLDIERS’ AND SAILORS’ FAMILIES ASSOCIATION.

County or District

Christian and Surname of Applicant

Full postal address

of

(Relation—
ship.) (Official No.) (Rank or Rating.) (Full Christian Names.) (Regiment, Corps, or Ship.)

Exact date of his enlistment

If still serving, where?

Do. do. discharge to the Reserve, or pension

Do. do. rejoining the Navy or Army from the Reserve

Do. do. discharge from the Reserve, or on termination of engagement

War Service, Medals, &c.

If dead, exact date, and cause of death

Exact date and place of Marriage. (Certificate not to be forwarded.)

If married while serving, state whether on, or not on, ‘the strength’

Number of Children

(For detailed particulars see overleaf.)

State average weekly income derived from:

(1) Husband’s Pay or Pension
(2) Husband’s Civil Employment, giving nature of the same
(3) Applicant’s own earnings (stating source)
(4) Applicant’s Pension (stating source)
(5) Relatives or friends
(6) Parish relief
(7) Any other source

If Applicant has previously been assisted by this or any other Fund or Charity, state when, where, and to what extent help was received in each instance

Date of Applicant’s Birth

Religious denomination

Previous occupation

Name and Address of last Employer or other Reference

Employment now desired

It unable to work the reason must be given, supported by medical testimony

Amount of weekly rent

If Applicant is a total orphan give date of Mother’s death

Figure 10. SSFA Form 7, 1914 (page 2 can be seen on the following page), which had to be filled in by claimants to receive allowances.107

PARTICULARS OF CHILDREN.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full Christian Names</th>
<th>Exact Date of Birth</th>
<th>State how each Child is employed or provided for</th>
</tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

REMARKS.

Please state here (a) exact cause of present distress, (b) any special circumstances respecting the case, (c) in what way, and to what extent help is recommended.

I have seen the Marriage Certificate, and I believe that all the foregoing particulars are correct, and fully disclose the Applicant's position. The case is one which I can conscientiously recommend for assistance.

Signature of an Officer of the Army or Navy.

Magistrate, or Clergyman

Date

Rank, &c.

Full postal address

This Form, when completed to be forwarded to
The SSFA volunteers (many of them middle-class) saw themselves as moral guardians. For example, if an applicant for relief funding was found to have gone to her local pub unsupervised, she was seen as morally suspect and may have been denied funding (see further down). Unsurprisingly, the SSFA came to be hugely resented by working-class women.198

Perhaps a factor in the SSFA’s stringent conditions for awarding needed monies was the fact that the organisation was officially responsible for adding something to the government’s allowances from a government pot.199 However, the government generally failed to issue monies it had promised the organisation for charitable purposes, with the result that the SSFA was less than generous in offering their financial assistance.200 Pankhurst claimed that The Prince of Wales Fund (the National Relief Fund), which was collected for civilian distress, was often used shamelessly by the government to make up the differences in the shortfall of Separation Allowance payments.201 Moreover, so difficult did the SSFA make the means testing to receive Separation Allowance, that women were forced to become more ‘patriotic’, having to move into one room, selling pianos, gramophones and furniture before they could claim.202 Nevertheless, the SSFA could be swayed to assist more quickly and kindly if persuaded to do so by persons of influence. Colonel Sir Mark Sykes MP interceded on behalf of a soldier’s widow during 1916 and ensured that a recently widowed Colour Sergeant’s wife (K Company, 5th Battalion, Yorkshire Regiment TF), a Mrs George with four children aged from seven to ten years old, received her deserved benefits after a swift SSFA visit.203 As the government slowly started to gain a firmer grip on its administration, the SSFA lost its central role in doling out allowances and was eventually replaced as a distributor of allowances by the Ministry of Pensions in 1916.204 Nevertheless, despite managing to alienate many working-class needy families

198 Pankhurst, The Home Front, p. 25.
199 Graham Wootton, The Politics of Influence: British Ex-Serviceamen, Cabinet Decisions and Cultural Change, 1917–37 (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 17. Immediately after the Great War broke out, the Prince of Wales organised a fund relief to help relieve distress alongside Queen Alexandra’s appeal on behalf of the SSFA. The two appeals fused with the objective of reducing all hardships caused by the war, such as casualties, unemployment from the dislocation of trade and wives and relatives of serving soldiers. Over the first eight months of the war, the charities collected around £5 million (1914 values).
200 Pankhurst, The Home Front, p. 25.
201 ibid.
202 ibid.
203 HHC UDDSY2/1/30/198, Letter from Miss M. E. Still representing the SSFA, Brixton Division to Colonel Sir Mark Sykes, 5 April 1916. Colonel Sykes had made aware the situation of a recently widowed TF Colour Sergeant’s wife to the SSFA, which elicited an immediate visit. Having visited the wife and children, it was stated that the widow was ‘a very deserving case’.
204 General War Pensions Rules and Regulations, paragraph 1003.
with some of its more moralising volunteers, the SSFA did take on the Church and Government to lobby for unmarried partners and this group’s right for Separation Allowance during 1914 and won.205

It was known and documented at the time that many soldiers’ wives and dependants who were still waiting for their allowances suffered ‘acute distresses from the lack of money due to them from the authorities’.206 However, the Territorials’ families were temporarily better provisioned for on this occasion, as each mobilised Territorial received five pounds sterling upon mobilisation.207 Of course, as already alluded to, the prompt payment of allowances was not realised for many, including Territorials, and assurances were made by the Army Pay Department, insisting that ‘nothing [was] left undone to overtake arrears’.208 The Army Pay Department then shifted responsibility, stating that ‘the blame rested with the local, not the central authorities’.209 However, the wife of a deployed soldier, after handing in her marriage and birth certificates and proving that she was desperate for the Separation Allowance, could still be denied the payments or even have them taken away if her moral behaviour was suspected of being questionable.210

During the Great War, it became a police task to keep an eye on the behaviour of ‘unsupervised’ soldiers’ wives who may take the opportunity to drink to excess or contract ‘Khaki Fever’ (sleeping with other soldiers while ‘unsupervised’).211 Pankhurst explained that the State was ‘determined to establish effective control over the conduct of soldiers’ wives, a control lacking from the government in many other areas of the war effort’.212 Many observers stated that there was a noticeable increase in drinking among women in local pubs, a fact vouched for by moral dignitaries from the Church and social workers.213 On 20 October 1914, an Army Council Memorandum — ‘Cessation of Allowances and Allotments to the Unworthy’ — and a Home Office letter to all Chief Constables effectively placed all women receiving Separation Allowance under police surveillance: if they transgressed, their allowances were stopped.214 Historians Gail

205 SSAFA, SSAFA’s Official Guide to World War I, p. 17.
207 Ibid.
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.
212 Pankhurst, Home Front, p. 99.
214 Pankhurst, Home Front, p. 99. Hogge and Garside, War Pensions and Allowances, p. 39. The issue of Separation Allowances to wives or dependants was often stopped due to misconduct. The allowance for
Braybon and Penny Summerfield regard the memorandum as part of a deep mistrust of working-class women, who were in need of moral education and who, ‘like servants needed watching’. Therefore, as the majority of the Territorial Army’s lower ranks were predominantly working-class, Territorial wives would have felt the unwelcome glare of the authorities while their husbands defended their country’s system. Subsequently, protests in many parts of the country erupted when the details of the memorandum came out into the public sphere. Despite the protests over police surveillance, the Army Council issued another memorandum, sending it to the Board of Education, suggesting that local authorities should now keep an eye on the children of persons drawing Army Separation Allowance and report to the War Office any cases of neglect. This Army Council memorandum in effect expanded the spying and added to information gathered on wives, providing a more complete picture of the lives of soldiers’ families. The police realised that the surveillance of wives made them unpopular and backpedalled, stating to The Times that they had decided not to send the lists of soldiers’ wives in receipt of allowances to district police stations. The police spokesperson added that instructions were widely circulated as to how to deal with women showing misconduct in a kindly helpful way. The article finished by stating that, ‘far from harassing anyone, the circular was one of the kindest documents ever seen from a Government department’.

The allowance system contained many other reasons for the withdrawal or non-payment of allowances to wives and families. Examples of disqualification were if a child, wife, or dependant became an inmate of a rate-aided institution, such as, for a child, a reformatory or an industrial school (other than a day industrial school). For a wife or dependant, allowances would stop if that person became an inmate of an inebriate reformatory (clinic for alcoholics). Payments were also stopped if the recipient became an inmate of the workhouse, a hospital or a psychiatric institute. Furthermore, if a child became a case for the Poor Law authority and if the child was under sixteen years of age, boarded out or maintained within an institution, the Separation Allowance was often then issued to the authority carrying out the

the children was to be continued at ordinary rates if they remained in the charge of the mother, or the motherless rate (see Separation Allowances poster) if placed in the charge of another person.

Braybon and Summerfield, Out of the Cage, p. 107.

Anon, ‘The soldier’s wife!’ The Times, 1914.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

maintenance of the child. During the Great War, more than 16,000 married women had their Separation Allowances stopped, mainly for supposedly immoral behaviour.

**Killed or missing**

For soldiers discharged through injury and who were ‘no longer physically fit for War service’, Separation Allowance and allotments were continued for a fortnight after the date of discharge. If, however, husbands died while in military service, the Separation Allowance was stopped forthwith, with charges taken off that weekly allowance for sickbed expenses and funeral costs; the balance of what was left went to the family. When a soldier was missing in action (MIA), and no official information was available on his whereabouts, four weeks from the date the soldier went MIA his dependant(s) received the allowance and the allotment was paid for a further twenty-six weeks. Altogether, thirty weekly payments were made, starting on the date on which official notification of an MIA commenced. If, however, the soldier’s death was proved, the twenty-six weekly payments began from the date of the official notification.

Finally, for those soldiers executed by the British Army for cowardice, including ten Territorials of the 306 British and Commonwealth soldiers shot, allowances stopped immediately. Furthermore, the widow was denied a war widow’s pension. For example, the widow of Private Harry Farr, West Yorkshire Regiment, executed for cowardice, received a rather blunt letter from the War Office, stating that ‘Owing to the death of your husband – owing to the way he died – you and your daughter are not eligible for the pension’ (war widow’s pension). With no income, these women and children had to throw themselves upon the mercy of organisations such as the soldiers’ and sailors’ orphanages and often lost their accommodation due to being unable to afford their rent.

For the most part, the Territorial’s wife and family during the Great War were treated the same as the wife and family of a Regular soldier. However, there were small advantages enjoyed by many Territorials’ families, such as receiving payments

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221 Ibid., p. 39.
222 van Emden, The Quick and the Dead, p. 45.
223 Ibid., p. 47.
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid., p. 47.
226 Ibid., p. 48.
and allowances from their local TFAs. For example, during the first two months of the war, allowances were paid a month in advance, until the payments began to be paid weekly in October 1914. Another advantage enjoyed by Territorials’ wives was that Separation Allowance was paid throughout the war by their local TFA, equating to better ‘local’ help with problems regarding these allowances. When World War Two started, the TA was integrated into a national army and much of the administration affecting them and their families became centralised.

World War Two

Family Allowances and War Service Grants

The allowances issued by the government to the deployed soldiers were codified into a White Paper. ‘Allowances for Families and Dependants of Men Serving in HM Forces during the Present War’, in November 1939.\(^{229}\) Given the long inevitable build-up to the war, the chaos and complete lack of readiness regarding the Separation Allowance during the early phases of World War Two should have been avoided. For example, only publishing the White Paper on allowances after the war started suggests, perhaps, that the government in 1939 had not learned the lessons of 1914. As the Great War progressed, allowances and their provision improved for their recipients. However, institutional amnesia or lack of duty of care is, it seems, a theme with those charged with preparing Britain’s Armed Forces and families for war, be it training, equipping or, just as importantly, ensuring the correct welfare provision for families left at home. The government had many opportunities to prepare welfare for families and the long build-up to war should have ensured this. As far back as 1924, the Soldiers’, Sailors’ and Airmen’s Families Association (SSAFA) drew attention to potential problems which might arise if the Armed Forces allowance systems were not updated, but the War Office and the Treasury did not think there were any need to update.\(^{230}\) Nevertheless, despite the Establishment’s short-sightedness, progress occurred, with the government of the day recognising the fundamental right of the dependants of deployed soldiers (Regular and Territorial) to allowances. Furthermore, the moral probity of recipients


\(^{230}\) Hately-Broad, War and Welfare, p. 243. The War Office and Treasury did not take into account other dependants, such as parents, common-law wives and children out of wedlock.
never again became questioned to the same degree as during the Great War.\footnote{House of Commons Debate, ‘Separation Allowances’, \textit{Hansard}, Vol. 352 cols662-6, 17 October 1939. During this debate on Separation Allowance, the rights of soldiers' dependants to receive the allowance was accepted. However, there were still questions based on the morality of issuing allowances to unmarried women, principally from Viscountess Astor. Hoare-Belisha answered this by stating that the unmarried woman would receive the allowance after six months' cohabitation.} However, wives and families still suffered delays and financial hardship through a cumbersome Byzantine bureaucracy, further hindered by shoddy clerical work concerning Family Allowances.

There was a realisation at the time that, for soldiers overseas to fight well, the soldiers’ family and dependants should be supported financially by the government. This idea of supporting the family started, as seen in the last section, with the government increasing the rate of Separation Allowance during the Great War. However, the Ministry of Pensions, which granted allowances during World War Two, was, as with the Great War, insensitive in its dealings with families.\footnote{House of Commons Debate, ‘Separation Allowances’, 17 October 1939.} A discussion on this issue held in Parliament (1939) centred on the imperfect machinery of issuing what were now called Family Allowances to wives and dependants. Soldiers’ wives/ common-law wives and dependants had to complete many forms to receive allowances and needed to provide much evidence backing up the claims they made. These allowance forms, it was claimed, were difficult for ordinary citizens to comprehend and complete, often resulting in incorrectly filled-in forms and the rejection of 10,642 out of 39,144 claims between the start of the war and 21 October 1939.\footnote{House of Commons Debate, ‘Dependants and Special Allowances’, \textit{Hansard}, Vol. 353 cols 3-8, 7 November 1939.} Many of the rejections, claimed the government, were due to soldiers not correctly reading the information (issued with the allowance forms handed out at the soldier’s mobilisation medical). However, at the start of the war, there was no advice or support offered to help complete the allowance forms, despite claims from the British Legion and SSAFA that they would have helped if asked.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}} However, to have an organisation help complete the form required contact with the relevant agency and there was no advice on how to approach them. Later in the war, the SSAFA even set up an office in Cairo (later expanded across the Middle East, 1943) so that men could discuss the concerns they had for their families.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}} Nevertheless, when the war started, Hately-Broad suggests that, for soldiers busying themselves in preparation for leaving home indefinitely, finding extra time to contact and arrange for help may not have been

\footnote{Hately-Broad, \textit{War and Welfare}, p. 46.}
feasible. This lack of fore-thought or time by busy soldiers no doubt contributed to the backlog of incorrectly completed forms. Hately-Broad also suggests that many of the applicants had poor literacy and numeracy skills, which may have precluded these claimants from reading any information included with the allowance form.²³⁸

During the Two World Wars the Territorial soldier who was lucky enough to have his pay made up by his civilian firm earned much more money than those who were not supported by their firms, and definitely much more than Regular soldiers and those conscripted thereafter. Territorial soldiers and families were not the responsibility of their local TA Associations when World War Two started, unlike the situation in the Great War. At the start of World War Two, they were subsumed into Army administration and became administered centrally, which included their allowances. The Allotment, Family Allowance and War Service Grant scheme had been a recurrent theme of parliamentary debate since before war was declared, and underwent a series of piecemeal revisions during the war.²³⁹ As during the Great War, the gap between the new Services’ Family Allowance and Army pay compared to what a civilian manual worker earned in 1939–40 was quite large, which added to the cost of mobilising some Territorial soldiers.²⁴⁰ For example, one Territorial soldier with the East Yorkshire Regiment, a Mr J. Neal, earned a weekly 60s 5d as a gas worker with the BGLC.²⁴¹ However, when Mr Neal mobilised, his Army pay had to be substantially made up. The Army paid Mr Neal 15s 9d per week. The government then topped this wage up with allowances totalling 32s 6d (for a wife and one child); the wage make-up was then topped up further to his original civilian wage by the BGLC with 12s 2d.²⁴² Therefore, in some instances, it paid to be a Territorial when mobilised on the advent of war. As John Verney stated in Going to the Wars (TA Yeomanry memoir), it paid to make a small sacrifice (in 1936) and get in ‘on the ground floor of an expanding racket’.²⁴³ The allowances claimed, like the allowances from the Great War, were on a sliding scale.

²³⁸ Hately-Broad, War and Welfare, p. 46.
²⁴⁰ As with Great War Territorials, many large firms, the Civil Service, local councils, etc. paid the balance between civilian wages and the poor Army rates. However, not every Territorial soldier could count on this and often struggled on Army pay and allowances.
²⁴¹ NGA NE/HUB/C/A/2/AA, “Hull Station Allowances to Dependents of Men Serving with the Armed and Civil Defence Forces”, 22 Jan. 1940.
²⁴² NGA NE/HUB/C/A/2/W, Memorandum to A. J. Mumford, Secretary from Engineer and Manager, Hull, “War Service Allowances J. Neal Reg’d No. 618”, 31 January 1940.
The amount of allowance claimable depended upon the size of the family and the rank of the soldier (see Table 2).

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<th>Date</th>
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<td>32s 0d</td>
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<td>29s 0d</td>
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<td>45s 0d</td>
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<td>47s 6d</td>
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Table 2. Changes in Service Family Allowances (private soldiers) 1939–48

The officers from the Territorials were, when mobilised, also issued allowances on top of their annual pay for their dependants on a sliding scale according to rank. There were different categories of allowance dependent upon age and rank and where the officer happened to be stationed. Furthermore, officers could claim allowances for field conditions and for meeting the extra costs of serving abroad. If the officer was below the age of thirty and married, he was entitled to an allowance in respect of his family. The officer’s allowance was issued at the following daily rates: for a wife only 3s 0d, wife and one child 4s 6d, wife and two or more children 5s 6d, for one child only 4s 6d, and two or more children 5s 6d. However, as already mentioned, a number of allowances for many families were very slow in materialising for those desperately needing funds. For the truly desperate, there was an emergency route to receiving

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244 The table is taken from Hately-Broad, *War and Welfare*, p. 62, source TNA/T162/692/45396/01. Once the claim had been processed through the Regimental Paymaster, a book of the weekly draft was sent to a nominated Post Office. The next step was the sending of a confirmation form to the soldier’s wife. This form was taken to the Post Office, signed and witnessed before the book of the draft was handed over for drawing the allowances. Note: Rates per week. Allowances before February 1942 include the relevant minimum allotment from soldier’s pay. Allowances after that date include the standard reduced allotment of 3½d per week.

245 Anon, ‘Pay and Allowances in War Medical Services - RAMC’, *Supplement to the British Medical Journal*, 16 March 1940, p. 35. The rates for Royal Army Medical Corps officers stripped of allowances were: Lieutenant £362 p.a., Captain £447 p.a., Major £621 – specialists earned an extra 4s 6d a day.


financial help but, in a similar way to the issuance of family welfare, payments of War Service Grants were notoriously slow to process.

**War Service Grants**

The largest shift in allowances thinking came when the age at which Family (marriage) Allowance could be issued to soldiers was lowered. In 1936, the Chancellor, Duff Cooper, in an attempt to modernise the Territorials, reduced the age threshold from twenty-six to twenty-three (also restoring the Territorial bounty to the 1920 level, increasing the proficiency grant and increasing allowances for weapons training and extra drills). This age bar was lowered further to twenty in May 1939 to take account of the many militia conscripts (Military Training Act) called up to the Army. However, despite these payments, wartime families still found it hard (as in the Great War years) to afford essentials due to the rise in the cost of living during wartime (food, rent, fuel, etcetera), which had increased by 30 per cent in 1942. Compounding the cost of living rise was the delay in the efficient payment of allowances, which caused suffering and widespread discontent for those affected.

There were, however, some reasonable excuses for some of the delays that affected the efficient payment of due allowances, such as problems with soldiers deploying overseas who had not completed their allowance forms correctly or had not completed one at all. These soldiers then often became uncontactable, which caused more delay. The system of mobilised Territorials and conscripts having to complete their allowance and allotment forms during their medicals changed in December 1939 to handing out forms at recruiting centres. This was an attempt to avoid the uncompleted form problem and to speed up the processing of the request. However, delays in receiving payments or an inability to survive solely on allowances and allotments often

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26 House of Commons Debates, "Service Pay and Allowances", *Hansard*, Vol. 383, cols. 332-495, 10 Sept. 1942. Those families left at home at the start of the war had to contend with rapidly rising costs of essentials, such as light and fuel, both increasing by 20 per cent and an increase in clothing of 100 per cent.
275 Ibid. and House of Commons Debate, ‘Separation Allowances’, 17 Oct. 1939. The rapid increase in rents witnessed during the Great War was not such a problem in World War Two due to the passing of the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restriction Act 1939. However, some Territorial (and other service) wives and families still found it difficult to meet all their financial commitments.
276 Hately-Broad, *War and Welfare*, p. 43. For Family Allowance, the form was submitted by the serviceman, then processed by the Regimental Paymaster. Once the claim was processed, a book containing weekly drafts was sent to a nominated post office and a confirmatory form was issued with the book of drafts in which a wife may draw weekly allowances.
277 Ibid.
forced dependants to apply for temporary unemployment assistance under a government scheme for the prevention and relief of distress arising from the war.\textsuperscript{254} For this, there were two choices: dependants could either apply for public assistance or apply to the War Service Grant (WSG) Committee.

The WSG was a supplementary, non-charity, means-tested government payment. It was related to pre-service maintenance for supporting a wife and family and took account of the available means of the family or fixed commitments such as rent and the minimum needs of the family. The complexity of claiming for the Family Allowances, when late, often caused delays and hardships. Because of the problems with the processing of Family Allowances and the need for emergency funding, the administration of the WSG applications channels quickly became clogged with over 15,000 claims per week.\textsuperscript{255}

There were problems that beset the payment of the WSG due to its intricate and convoluted system of approval. The WSG was payable to families or dependants of both enlisted men and officers and could provide up to a maximum of £3 a week, with the aim of bringing household income, including allowances, up to at least 18s per adult per week.\textsuperscript{256} However, as with allowances and allotments, there were problems and delays with WSG applications and payments, which began when the Post Office refused to handle WSG applications (1939) due to their complicated nature. This led to the Unemployment Assistance Board (UAB) stepping in giving them the opportunity to conduct investigations into circumstances and means testing. However, even if the applicant passed the means testing, there was another obstacle to clear before the application could be processed. This final approval lay with the Pensions Ministry using the information furnished by the UAB, which sidelined the WSG Advisory Committee, who were originally picked to supervise the grants.\textsuperscript{257} MPs rightly attacked the delays in allowances and emergency WSGs. The convoluted procedure of the WSG was perfectly described by Colonel Medlicott MP:

\ldots the application form... starts off, perhaps in the home of the wife, if the serving man is overseas. It goes to the regimental paymaster, then on to the [Advisory] committee, then to the Assistance Board, then back to the committee, and then it may even have to go back to the regimental paymaster if some change has taken place in the man's circumstances since

\textsuperscript{254} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{255} Hately-Broad, \textit{War and Welfare}, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{256} Sir John Anderson, 'War Service Grant', \textit{The Times}, 27 Nov. 1942.
the application was first made... Applications are referred back chiefly to
avoid any risk of overpayment of Treasury money.\(^{258}\)

These Byzantine systems for allowances, allotments and WSGs often led to long
delays in payment, undoubtedly causing much suffering to families whose Territorial
soldier was, for example, self-employed before the war and, therefore, not having
meagre Army wages made up. As a rule of thumb, processing usually took a week
before the form was handed into the regimental paymaster; from here, six weeks passed,
after which the form probably travelled many miles and sat on many desks before the
first allowance payment was made.\(^{259}\) For the WSG, the delay in paying this emergency
fund for the truly desperate was estimated at five weeks.\(^{260}\)

**Death in service**

Not unlike the Great War, if a soldier died in service during World War Two,
allowances stopped soon after. Payments of allowances during World War Two ceased
after thirteen weeks if the soldier was killed in action. If the soldier was missing in
action (MIA), payments continued for seventeen weeks, after which a war widow’s
pension started.\(^{261}\) The pension was of a much lower value than the Family Allowance
and soldiers fighting overseas knew this.\(^{262}\) A member of the Territorials writing on this
matter commented that men often used to leave their dog tags off when they went into
battle. If they were killed, they would be reported ‘missing’ and their families would
receive allowances for a few weeks longer before this was reduced to a war pension.\(^{263}\)
Other causes of the cessation of allowances occurred if the widow of a soldier
remarried, if a soldier got into debt or if he was sent as a prisoner to a military gaol.\(^{264}\)
Finally, if a soldier was captured by enemy forces and made a prisoner of war (POW),
the soldier’s dependants were issued with a reduced allowance, compounding the
misery and financial uncertainty of, by the end of the war, around 150,000 families.\(^{265}\)

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\(^{259}\) Ibid.

\(^{260}\) Ibid.

\(^{261}\) Ibid.


Conclusion

The families at home and their well-being have always been an emotional crutch for soldiers overseas. The family forms an indivisible pillar, alongside training and employment, in the Territorial Trinity of Commitments. Historically, however, despite the Territorial’s family and their welfare being crucial to a soldier’s performance overseas, Separation Allowances and welfare during the Great War through to World War Two were often inadequate in the face of rising war prices. Furthermore, the qualification that many women had to prove their ‘worthiness’ when their husbands were putting their lives at risk for their country was shameful. Nevertheless, incremental progress was made during World War Two as the right to family welfare for wives and mothers was not contested. However, the amounts were still inadequate and forced many women into the armaments factories. The situation has changed completely for the partners and families of modern late-twentieth and early-twenty-first-century Territorials, with allowances being adequate. Nevertheless, there are still problems to be overcome with the system of support for emotional welfare and the fact that the partners of Territorials during the War on Terror campaigns were, in many cases, left to their own devices, rarely receiving news or updates from the regiments or Army Welfare of their Territorial partners or family members.

Small-scale deployments post-World War Two until the Reserve Forces Allowance 1980 used existing allowance procedures. However, when the TA was again used extensively during the War on Terror years invoking Reserve Forces Act 1996 (RFA-96), the financial packages improved again, increasing the cost of deploying part-timers significantly. Financial support now covers all that the Territorial may lose by deploying overseas. However, it is emotional welfare support from the Army Welfare Service, that now needs to go hand-in-hand with the finance, that let the Territorials and their families down during the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns of 2001–13. This situation is discussed next.
Section 2

How were families supported during Britain’s conflicts in the twenty-first century?

During operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 2001–2013, the modern Territorial partner did not, in most cases, have the financial worries many did during the Great War and World War Two. However, the emotional support expected by the modern Territorial partner to be provided by the Army Welfare Service (AWS), for both the family and also the returned Territorial, was not up to standard. The AWS was set up to provide support for soldiers and their families and is seen as a vital part of maintaining the morale of the troops on the front line in order to ensure that they are fit and able to undertake operations. However, this is not always the case, especially when referring to Territorial families during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, reports and interviews have spoken of the AWS rarely visiting families or those part-time soldiers coping with the aftermath of a challenging operational tour. This is in contrast with the service afforded to Regular soldiers and families. The AWS’s failings regarding Territorials and their families (Iraq and Afghanistan 2001–2013) may be due to partners and families of Territorials requiring different needs to the partners and immediate relatives of those serving in the Regular Army. If this is true, training should be examined to accommodate Reservist families when a more integrated future AR deploys soldiers more frequently, as per FR2020.

During the War on Terror phase of overseas operations (2001–2013), Territorials’ pay was made up to their civilian wage levels and full demobilisation occurred after the correct amount of paid post-operational tour leave (POTL). Territorials were advised not to resume work immediately after returning home (around thirty days). After POTL, the returned Territorials were given time to readjust to civilian life and resume their civilian careers. This section argues that when Territorials become mobilised as full-time soldiers, they should be treated the same as Regular soldiers. However, many Territorials and their families received little interaction with the AWS both during the tour and after. Much work has to be done to improve the AWS’s service when the AR

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266 British Army, ‘Army Welfare Officer, TQ education and training’, Pamphlet, J. R. Martin, Army Secretariat, Army Sec- & Group, email received 30/08/16. The AWS in its current form was set up in 1996.

267 Post operational tour leave or POTL (pronounced ‘pot-lee’), on top of the thirty days, may include any leave accrued. The last day of POTL is known as the last day of whole-time service. After this, the MoD stops paying the Territorial Regular Army wages and the part-time soldier returns to his/her TA unit’s administration. ‘Conditions of Service for Territorial Army and Regular Reserve’, p. 16.
starts to contribute to a higher percentage of deployed troops in the future. Emotional support for families and support for returning Territorials was a factor in a part-time soldier's deployment. Nevertheless, it could be argued that perhaps the most important aspect of mobilising a part-time soldier today is, as in the past, ensuring that finances are correct and that those left at home do not become inconvenienced by deployment.

For the modern contribution, this chapter uses interviews with ex-Territorials' and serving AR soldiers' wives whose husbands have served in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Bosnia Herzegovina (1998). The wives' identities, as with the rest of the interviewees in this research, are anonymous. These contributions of this research will add to an understanding of how the support (or poor support) of the government and MoD affected those left at home when their Territorial partners or family members deployed overseas.

**Modern families: welfare at home, 2001–2013**

Reservists and their families make little or no use of Defence welfare services until they are deployed as they live in the civilian community. The Department has addressed some of the issues surrounding welfare support to deployed Reservists but acknowledges that more needs to be done and plans to address this.268

The financial packages afforded to those left at home while the Territorial soldier deployed 2001–2013 were very generous but made Territorials more expensive than Regular soldiers to deploy. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that the partners and families of deployed Territorials who served in Iraq and Afghanistan had less welfare support contact than Regular Army families. This lack of contact often left Territorial families on their own, with no support and feeling let down by the whole experience which was not good for retention.

The adage of 'happy wife, happy soldier' has been recognised by those in authority for a long time. Psychology is vitally important to a soldier deployed overseas. As mentioned above, if a soldier's wife, partner or family is suffering at home due to late welfare payments, etcetera, the soldier worries about these problems at home, which takes the soldier's mind off the soldiering job needing to be carried out on deployment. This, of course, can not only be dangerous for the soldier, but also for those around him/her. However, when Territorials started to be deployed in 2001–2013

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to Iraq and Afghanistan, the emotional welfare support of the families left at home (financially there was little problem) was weak from the Army. This poor welfare support is evidenced in the majority of interviews and charity reports that touch upon the subject and there were many reasons for this poor service. For example, Territorials attached to Regular units were considered outside the ‘regimental bubble’ (attached ranks are not regarded as part of the Regimental Family; classed as ‘others’, they are often ignored by the unit’s welfare team, which concentrates on the Regular regiment they serve).269 There is also evidence that Territorial soldiers and their family members were rarely contacted to attend the pre-tour welfare briefings held by the Regular units to which Territorials were attached for operations. One Territorial’s wife reported that her husband was only invited to participate in a unit briefing after she had contacted the Army Families Federation (AFF) charity.270 Another wife complained that ‘My husband’s unit [attached to a Regular unit] couldn’t give two hoots about me because he was TA’.271 Of course, there can be geographical reasons for this neglect when an attached Territorial lives in another part of the country, but there can be little excuse for not telephoning attached ranks and dependants or sending information and contact details.

A good level of face-to-face welfare is necessary for the partners and families of Territorials left at home. As AR soldiers have been told that they will be used more frequently on operations home and overseas, welfare provision for the part-timers and their families needs to improve. The family pillar of the Territorial Trinity of Commitments needs just as much care and attention as the training and employment pillars if the Reservist proposition under FR2020 is to succeed. Unlike the Great War and World War Two, in which there were likely to have been stronger communities due to the existential threat from Germany and more families experienced family members serving, modern conflicts have concerned only a tiny minority of the population. The huge numbers involved in manning Britain’s forces during the global conflicts of the first half of the twentieth century also meant that charities had to see to the welfare needs of the majority of families involved.272 The Army, for example, during the Great War and World War Two, generally only looked after their soldiers’ welfare and morale to ensure better fighting units. Today’s needs are much removed for Reservists’ dependants and families and the isolation of many during the Iraq and Afghan

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270 ibid., p. 34.
271 ibid., p. 38.
272 SSAFA, The Great War 1914–18, p. 17.
campaigns was avoidable. Furthermore, if the level of welfare experienced by those whose partners and family members deployed 2001–2013 is repeated, this could add further difficulty to recruitment in the future and may, indeed, already be a factor behind present recruitment shortfalls. For civilians with little or no experience of the Armed Services, the thought of their partner or family member deploying to a war zone can be worrying and upsetting. Regular soldiers’ partners, although still worried, usually live on the unit’s base and are better able to socialise with other partners of deployed soldiers and receive relevant, up-to-date news of the tour provided by the parent regiment or the regiment’s AWS.

Support for the families and dependants of Territorials deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan should have been no different from that offered to Regular personnel. However, unfortunately, it was. A 2006 National Audit Office report on the Armed Forces Reserve found that while the mobilisation process for Territorials had improved after a poor start, the experience of the partners and dependants of those mobilised was often far from satisfactory. It was found that some units did not have a dedicated full-time staff member to support the families of deployed Reservists, failing to recognise that the Regular unit with which Territorials deployed should have been the main centre for those requiring support. The information for welfare provision for Territorials deployed to Iraq during 2003 (Operation Telic 1) was inadequate. This research argues that the situation did not improve.

The problems with providing adequate regular emotional welfare started with the literature issued by the AWS. When reviewing welfare packs provided by the AWS, the NAO found the information offered was, on the whole, poor in quality and was not written in plain English. A pledge to Reservists and their families in the FR2020 White Paper insisted that the MoD would work hard on the ‘provision of welfare officers in Army Reserve units to deliver a higher, more consistent and more accessible level of direct welfare support for reservists and their families’. This pledge indicates that the AWS is still struggling to provide the appropriate amount of welfare needed by Reservist families. A good example of difficult access for the dependants and families of Territorials was the welfare packs issued to partners and families (2006/2007). After the mobilisation process had started, welfare packs were issued that contained leaflets, information and telephone numbers. However, the information

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272 NAO, Reserve Forces, pp. 18 and 38.
273 Ibid.
274 Ibid.
within the AWS leaflet only offered its Headquarters telephone numbers in Salisbury and Rheindahlen (Germany). The pack then informed readers that local AWS numbers could be obtained in the Garrison Families Guide – clearly, the packs were not tailored towards the needs of Territorials and their families.\(^{277}\) Also within the welfare pack were details of the Reserves Training and Mobilisation Centre (RTMC) Welfare Officer, asking the reader to ring any time they (partners and dependants) wished. However, the next sentence states: ‘Please be aware that should there be no activity at RMTC after working hours and on weekends, then my office may not necessarily be manned’.\(^{278}\) After welfare packs had been issued, the AWS was not heard from again for the duration of the deployment by the families or, when the soldiers returned home, by any of the Territorials or their partners who took part in interviews for this research.\(^{279}\) For families experiencing the separation of an overseas tour for the first time, this lack of contact, reassurance and emotional support was disconcerting. For instance, the wives of soldiers deployed to forward operating bases in Helmand in Afghanistan often would not receive telephone calls for weeks at a time. Wife D stated that she used to think ‘What was he doing?’ The news reports only made her feel worse, adding it ‘made me imagine all sorts’.\(^{280}\)

To complement the service by the AWS, Territorial units organised welfare talks pre-deployment and appointed unit welfare liaison officers with mixed results, certainly regarding the interviews conducted for this research. For example, for 131 Commando Royal Engineers deployments to Iraq 2003 and Afghanistan 2006/7, the unit organised its pre-deployment briefings independently of the Regular forces with whom they were deploying to Helmand. On the whole, the liaison provided by 131 Commando, especially for Afghanistan, was good in some respects, but some aspects did break down. When 131 Commando RE deployed to Afghanistan on Operation Herrick 5 (2006–2007), the tour was managed in two tranches, roughly three-and-a-half months away for the Territorials each, with some members electing to do the full tour. The first tranche came predominantly from Birmingham’s 301 Troop (131 Commando) with two TA soldiers from Hull deploying alongside. The Birmingham-centric nature of unit welfare in the first tranche affected those not from Birmingham, with one wife from Hull having no contact whatsoever with either the AWS or 301 Troop’s liaison


\(^{278}\) Major S. L. Biles, RTMC letter supporting the families’ welfare pack (2006).

\(^{279}\) Interviews with serving and ex-Reserve Territorial soldiers and their partners. Interviews carried out by the author between June and November 2014.

\(^{280}\) Interview 5, FWG/TA 02, 15 June 2014.
The second tranche was mainly made up of Territorials from Hull’s 299 Troop (131 Commando), who provided a liaison officer to meet occasionally with the wives and girlfriends of the Territorials for social outings.\(^{281}\)

The Unit Welfare Team of 131 Commando (131 UWT) had a remit to check that the wives and girlfriends of the deployed soldiers did not become unduly worried or inconvenienced by the deployment. The unit’s process of welfare commenced by issuing a unit welfare guide containing contact details, posting newsletters and telephoning the partners and families of the deployed to find out how those individuals were coping with the deployment.\(^{282}\) This system worked for some families; however, for others, it did not work at all, due to (according to the interviewees) incomplete contact details and this information not being updated while the tour was under way.\(^{283}\)

On occasions, the welfare from 131 Commando RE (not including the better face-to-face service provided by 299 Troop, 131 Commando RE) failed completely for some members of the unit’s community, while a few wives and partners found it was adequate.\(^{284}\)

There are two main points to be made regarding the welfare service received for the 131 Commando wives and partners: 1. that neither the AWS nor the local Unit Welfare Team (UWT) provided any communication for the families of the deployed Territorials; and 2. there was a lack of attention to detail regarding the process of making sure all dependants and family members were receiving the information they needed. For two of the wives whose husbands served on Tranche One and Two, the welfare was far from satisfactory. For the group of wives and girlfriends as a whole, there was an uneven distribution of information. Communication with the dependants and families on many occasions was poor, with some wives receiving information and some nothing at all. For example, during the whole tour, Wife A did not receive a single telephone call, e-mail or unit newsletter, and Wife B only received the occasional phone call from the 131 UWT.\(^{285}\) The situation in which Wife A found herself was one of complete isolation from both the AWS and the 131 UWT. She stated: ‘I had hardly any contact at all; support was extremely poor. I didn’t even receive the newsletters, and

\(^{281}\) Interview 5, FWG/TA 02, 15 June 2014.

\(^{282}\) Interview 5, FWG/TA 01, 04 June 2014.


\(^{284}\) Interview 8 and Interview 5, FWG/TA 03 and 04.

\(^{285}\) No evidence gathered to suggest that 391 Troop did something similar to 299 Troop during this tour.

\(^{286}\) Interview 5, FWG/TA 02, 15 June 2014; and Interview 8, FWG/TA 04, 1 Nov. 2014.
had to find out from another wife about the return date/time. 287 However, despite the silence emanating from the respective welfare teams, Wife A was part of the unofficial wives group who used to meet occasionally for spa weekends and meals out. 288

When Wife B’s husband deployed to Afghanistan (Operation Herrick 5, 2006–2007), she did not receive any local unit support (Hull) as her husband had deployed with the 301 (Birmingham) Troop. Wife B did receive the occasional phone call from the 131 UWT but, unlike the 299 Troop partners, there was no informal wives group to join. The Birmingham Troop (301) incidentally made no effort whatsoever to contact her or provide any information as to how the tour was proceeding. 289 The same happened to Wife C, who lived in Leeds, 118 miles away from the deploying Birmingham unit. She stated that she received no communication from the AWS, the 131 UWT or 301 Troop liaisons for the whole tour. 290 Nevertheless, Wives D and E did receive updates by e-mail and telephone and stated that they were satisfied with the level of communication from the 131 UWT. 291 Furthermore, praise for 299 Troop’s liaison was fulsome, with one wife saying that the Liaison Officer ‘did a fine job’. 292

Although welfare mistakes were made during 131 Commando’s deployment to Afghanistan on Operation Herrick 5, the local welfare team dealing with 131 soldiers did a reasonable job. However, as the testimony of the wives and girlfriends earlier shows, those who received no communication did not have a good experience of Army welfare. Furthermore, there was an easily correctable lack of attention to detail regarding those who did not receive updates. Contact details were available with the deployed Territorial’s details and would have been updated on Next of Kin forms from mobilisation. Therefore, how the partner or family member/dependent of a Territorial coped depended upon how isolated and alone that person felt, which could, in turn, be attributed to how much interaction he/she had with the welfare services of the Armed Forces.

The partner of a Territorial experiencing him/her being mobilised for the first time does not know what to expect. This is where the AWS and UWTs should be promoting their availability and taking away the unknown for the partner or family left at home.

287 Interview 8, FWG/TA 04.
288 Ibid.
289 Interview 5, FWG/TA 02.
290 Interview 9, FWG/TA 05, 15 Jan. 2015.
291 Interview 3, FWG/TA 01, 4 June 2014; and Interview 7 FWG/TA 03, 19 June 2014.
292 Interview 3, FWG/TA 01. The Liaison Officer was Lieutenant Alan Crompton 131 Commando RE (V), who later joined the Regular Royal Engineers where he reached the rank of Captain. However, he tragically died in a road traffic accident 24 September 2011 aged 27. Greatly missed by the Territorials who served with him and the wives and girlfriends he liaised with during Operation Herrick 5.
The partner or family left at home would also experience a variety of feelings; however, the dominant feelings upon hearing of a partner's mobilisation, especially to Afghanistan, were upset and worry (most times). One of the wives interviewed, Wife A, had, in 2006 (Operation Herrick 5), two young children, one aged five years and the other six months, and a full-time job. Wife A reported that she was upset about the mobilisation. Another wife, Wife B, stated that the same week her husband's Afghanistan mobilisation papers arrived, she discovered she was pregnant. However, Wife D said that she felt quite excited for her husband when he was mobilised and looked forward to six months of freedom. The caveat was, however, that she did not think deploying with a TA sub-unit he would be as safe as he would with a Regular unit. Wife C also admitted to being anxious about the IEDs which were being used more frequently in Helmand Province, as was often reported on news broadcasts. All the wives tried to avoid the news or, if they saw stories about Helmand Province, tried not to believe all they saw, as these stories only added to their feelings of anxiety. Perhaps the best summation of how a Territorial wife felt during the War on Terror campaigns was given by Wife E, who said she was 'Worried, unhappy and apprehensive'.

Adding to the time away for Territorials and their families to cope with was PDT. All Territorial and Reservist deployments overseas, especially towards the latter years of the Afghanistan conflict, included PDT packages undertaken by the Territorials, usually lasting two to three months. The PDT added to the time away from employment and family. Wife A, in particular, struggled and felt the impact of mobilisation as soon as the PDT started. Having recently moved to a remote area in the countryside, not only had she just moved house, she also had no family or friends easily at hand to help cope with the absence of her mobilised husband. The PDT also affected Wife B, who, while her husband was away, experienced problems with her pregnancy, having to attend hospital to have an amniocentesis test (a test for deformity in an unborn child) without her partner.

For Wife C, the primary challenge she faced was that her husband was self-employed and she could only complete certain tasks related to his work. Consequently,
the business had to close virtually for the duration of the PDT and tour. However, Wife C stated that the fact she did not have any children made her life much simpler.\footnote{Interview 3, FWG/TA 01.} The process of beginning to cope with the separation demanded by an overseas tour affected Wife D differently: she was not yet married to her deployed Territorial. This partner also had the complication of getting to know her new friend’s mother and father to gain information about the tour.\footnote{Interview 7, FWG/TA 03.} However, at least during PDT the Territorials were given leave occasionally and were allowed to phone home whenever they had a chance. However, once a tour begins, communication with the family at home is minimal and the impact of a tour upon the wives of Reservists can become hard.

A contemporary military mobilisation is unlike the overseas deployments of the past in the sense that the Iraq and Afghan deployments were constantly on the news with most of the details discussed. This instant news coverage meant that reported casualties in theatre increased worry at home, feeding the rumour mill until the name of the soldier involved was known. To counter this as far as possible, when there was a fatality in Iraq or Helmand Province, the British Forces in theatre observed Operation Minimise. This operation equated to British soldiers not telephoning, sending e-mails or e-blueys (blueys are letters sent from theatre to home and vice versa with no postage cost incurred by writing BFPO [British ForcesPosted Overseas] on the address) home until the family of the deceased was informed. Despite the literature issued to families stressing that one must not presume the casualty is their family member, these occasions were still worrying for families left at home, especially for those with no support.\footnote{131 Commando Welfare Guide, p. 7.} The constant worry was articulated by Wife D, when she stated of her Territorial’s family and herself that:

\begin{quote}
There was a news report that a couple of soldiers had been killed. Everyone was really worried, and I think it’s because soldiers were killed all the phones had been switched off and nobody was allowed to ring for a couple of days. So that was quite scary. It was just a case of no-one to talk to: no-one knew the answers, quite scary really.\footnote{Interview 7, FWG/TA 03.}
\end{quote}

Another worrying episode for Wife D was when her Territorial husband was stung by a scorpion while putting on his trousers. She states that someone had been in touch with his parents and informed them that their son had been stung by a scorpion and left it at that. It was many hours later that the news got back to the family that the scorpion
was not poisonous and the soldier in question was all right, and would always now shake his trousers before putting them on again.\footnote{Ibid.}

**Conclusion**

During Britain's most recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, some separation payments were generous and money was, often, not the issue facing those left at home. For those partners of Territorials during Operations Telic and Herrick, the problem was a lack of contact and support from the AWS. The AWS made little effort to support or even contact regimentally attached Territorial ranks. Those Territorials who deployed as sub-units were luckier, as their Territorial units provided welfare, although only patchily on most occasions. The impact of PDT and overseas deployment on civilian families not used to having their Territorial partners absent for many months was a huge disruption to their lives. The upheavals witnessed led to some Territorials leaving the Service after their tours. If the government wishes to use the AR more in the future, as stated in FR2020, the welfare of those left at home must become more of a priority, if deploying the AR is to become a viable option.

Warfare is changing, producing more challenges to liberal states. There is a chance that the AR could, potentially, be frequently used operationally as the century progresses. To ensure good numbers of deployable AR soldiers, the Army and the AWS have to work much harder. Partners and dependants of Territorials have always had a large say in a Territorial's career. This influence is also true when it comes to the morale of Territorials when they are serving overseas.
Section 3

What effects did home front problems have on partners, families and part-time soldiers when they served overseas?

This section argues that the mobilisation of Territorial soldiers has, throughout the organisation's history, always disrupted the lives of part-time soldiers' families as well as the part-time soldiers themselves. The disruption caused by an overseas tour could last a lifetime for the family if a Territorial was injured or killed during the deployment. However, there were many other factors that helped to make an overseas tour for a Territorial hard to complete and affected the soldier's morale to a considerable degree, especially when families back home are suffering. For example, worry for those back home sapped the fighting morale of German troops in the latter stages of the Great War as the Allied blockade brought starving German civilians to their knees, news of which was known by German troops. These German soldiers were said to have two hearts: one heart at the front and another at home with their wives and children. Geoffrey Field, in a paper on the working class in World War Two Britain, discovered a different kind of angst and wrote about perhaps one of the worst pieces of news a soldier away on campaign could hear: that of their spouses being unfaithful 'wives who should presumably be a source of comfort were in many cases the reverse'. Field went on, quoting from an official British Army report, to state that 'wives who are not equal to the test of prolonged separation do more damage than any other single factor to undermine the soldier's morale'. Gail Braybon and Penny Summerfield, in Out of the Cage, pointed out other drains on morale for soldiers serving at the front (during the Great War and World War Two) receiving letters from home concerning problems with food shortages, high rent and bad housing. Therefore, it has always been and still remains a top priority to ensure that those left at home are cared for adequately, whether financially or emotionally: a task, despite many modern wars, the War Office and the MoD has never got completely right.

307 Ibid., p. 42.
309 Ibid.
310 Braybon and Summerfield, Out of the Cage, p. 102.
When discussing the Army, it is important to understand that this organisation is also a social institution. This social aspect was/is crucial regarding the Territorials/Reservists when in the UK and socialising using their unit centre as a hub. However, as a survey by the Army Families Federation underlines, when a Reservist soldier deploys overseas, those left at home often have little contact with the Reservist’s unit or the Regular Army and can feel isolated. Many partners may not be ready to be suddenly left at home with the sole responsibility of dealing with the running of that home, often while working full time. This sudden sole responsibility is sometimes in stark contrast to many families of Regular soldiers who live[d] in camp. Historically too, as suggested by Annabel Venning in *Following the Drum*, the wives of Regular soldiers are often a much more socially tight and cohesive group, who share their experiences when their partners deploy together.

There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, as some ‘Regular’ wives or girlfriends prefer to pursue their careers at home or in a town/city close to the barracks. Those wives who choose to live in a camp in Service houses today may, unlike many in the past, also have jobs and careers other than being Army wives. However, when their husband’s regiment deploys, they are in a position to provide each other with a more social and emotional type of support, as all are in the same situation. The wives who live in the same military community are also better placed to receive emotional welfare support from the camp’s resident AWS team and probably have a better understanding of how an overseas tour works. The point is that, unless they choose to live an isolated existence away from the regimental base, the wives of Regular soldiers are there for each other and have probably experienced deployment many times, knowing what to expect. Nevertheless, being away often produces strain even upon those used to being left to run the home alone. A recent Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey 2014 on how Regular Armed Forces employees view their employment stated that the main reason they wish to leave is the impact of the Service on their families and personal lives. The percentages for the top reasons for leaving

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314 The author’s wife stayed at home and pursued a professional career. Many Royal Marines’ wives lived in local towns or cities close to barracks due to Royal Marines sometimes being able to stay in the same unit longer than soldiers in Army units, who usually moved around every two years.
were the impact of Service life on family at 59 per cent;\textsuperscript{310} and the second-highest reason for leaving the Armed Forces was their spouse’s/partner’s career at 48 per cent.\textsuperscript{317}

**Morale**

The home front, it could be argued, had a direct bearing on the belligerent’s ability to wage war. It is safe to assume that sufficient State care for the family at home acted as a morale prop to the Territorial in the field. Helen McCartney, in *Citizen Soldiers*, states that, during the Great War, ‘The memory of home made life more bearable and the fighting more meaningful for the Territorials in the trenches’.\textsuperscript{318} Therefore, expected government support was a major factor for the morale of any soldier who has ever deployed overseas to war. Lord Moran (a Medical Officer on the Western Front, later Churchill’s personal doctor) contended that ‘thoughts about family and home that are allowed to fester in the mind would bring defeat.’\textsuperscript{319} Therefore, during Britain’s major wars, there was great concern from the government about fighting men’s morale. The effects of deployed soldiers’ worry over family back home concerned Britain’s World War Two government to such an extent that the War Office set up a Morale Committee to gauge soldiers’ state of mind.\textsuperscript{320} The Morale Committee feared that ‘fickle’ women would convince men not to volunteer for overseas service; they would instead persuade their men to go AWOL (Absent Without Leave) while burdening their husbands with financial worries and the strain of separation.\textsuperscript{321}

During the Great War, Lord Derby suggested that employed, married Territorials (and other volunteers) would quite reasonably only volunteer for overseas service if their wives and children were adequately cared for by the State and not by a charity when they became mobilised overseas.\textsuperscript{322} Helen McCartney detailed other financial considerations for Territorials of the Great War, such as older, married men worrying about whether their life insurance policies would become invalid if they campaigned overseas.\textsuperscript{323} Shortly after the Great War had started, in part to assuage growing concerns

\textsuperscript{310} ibid.
\textsuperscript{318} McCartney, *Citizen Soldiers*, p. 90.
\textsuperscript{319} Moran, *The Anatomy of Courage*, pp. 119-20. Moran quotes Thomas Hardy, who said, on the business of thinking too much and apprehension, ‘More life may trickle out of men through thought than through a gaping wound’.
\textsuperscript{320} Hately-Broad, *War and Welfare*, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{321} ibid., pp. 64-5.
\textsuperscript{322} Lord Derby, ‘Keep the Home Going’, *The Times*, 10 Sept. 1914
\textsuperscript{323} McCartney, *Citizen Soldiers*, p. 125. Lord Derby took the question to the government and this was but one of the many demands that needed clarification before the Army could have its volunteers.
over family finances, but principally to encourage more volunteering. Prime Minister Herbert Asquith (1908–1916) announced on 18 September 1914 that Separation Allowance would become a right for all wives and dependants of serving soldiers and sailors from 1 October 1914.\footnote{House of Commons Debate. ‘Separation Allowance’ HANSARD, Vol. 65, c2261 10 Aug. 1914. Herbert Asquith PM, ‘Separation Allowance’, The Times, 18 Sept. 1914. Separation Allowance was a set amount paid to the wife and family of a deployed soldier (see the earlier separation allowances sub-chapter).}

If the allowance process ran smoothly, the Territorial’s wife, children or dependants received an allowance commensurate with the size of the family and the soldier’s rank. However, significant delays in paying allowances to some Territorials alongside Regular soldiers’ wives were experienced, especially during the opening months of the Great War, as vast numbers of men mobilised with little or no administrative preparation. The early arrears in payments of allowances during both the Great War and World War Two had, in many cases, immediate and negative impacts on the soldiers’ families, adding to the worries of the soldiers overseas. When wives and families did receive their allowances during the two World Wars, they were often not enough to live on, never keeping pace with the Wholesale Price Index or the cost of living.\footnote{D. Butler and G. Butler, British Political Facts, 1900–1994 (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 383.}

Life, however, could be made easier if a Territorial soldier worked pre-war for a civilian company which believed in public responsibility. Paltry Army wages made up to civilian pay scales by an employer helped the family back home. However, this did not always happen. The struggles faced are expressed in rare letters from a Territorial soldier during the Great War to his wife. For example, the Worcester Territorial (Charles Crowther), who died after fighting at Gallipoli, gives a sense of the struggles his wife faced at home looking after their five children. Although the Crowthers before the Great War had been middle-class, as the war embraced all in its maw, many citizens started to struggle. Charles’s wife Kate, aside from saying that the children were missing their father, also said that ‘the prices of everything were awful’ and that she ‘was struggling to clothe and boot their growing children with prices doubling’ (1915).\footnote{Ann Crowther, 'Yours Ever Charlie': A Worcestershire Soldier's Journey to Gallipoli (Stroud: The History Press, 2010), p. 72. van Enden, The Quick and the Dead, p. 43. There are few letters from wives to soldiers extant, mainly due to the impracticalities of storing correspondence in the field and the need for toilet paper.}

Kate also experienced a common problem referred to by the modern partner interviewees (see later in this part) when she complained that ‘I shall be very glad for
you to be home again to help me with them [the children] you don’t get much help off relations’. 327

Receiving mail or parcels and contact with home is essential for soldiers in the field. These deliveries contained either good news or bad, which of course affected morale one way or the other. It is fair to say that receiving parcels containing treats, soap, magazines, etcetera is always welcome, but this was not always so. John Verney (TA) wrote in Going to the Wars (World War Two) that he was not a fan of mail, stating that ‘Mail were bad – most corruptive of all influences on morale’. He went on to comment that ‘Letters from home, when they came, were full of the bombing and of understandable envy for soldiers idling in Palestine’ (Verney’s Yeomanry regiment were stationed in Palestine during the early stages of the war). 328 Perhaps the worst letter to receive when stationed overseas was a ‘Dear John’ (a letter in which a wife/girlfriend says she has met someone else because she was lonely, etcetera). Verney gives an example of one such letter sent to one of his Sergeant-Majors: ‘a letter came from Voiles’s wife, she announced in the same sentence that she had had all her teeth out and that she was hoping to marry a Pole’. 329

The Home Front was completely different between the three periods under investigation. The families of the Territorials who deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan did not have to face food shortages or aerial bombardment. For the ‘War on Terror’ conflicts any problems experienced by families during these tours for those at home were helped with the return of the Territorial. Another interesting point to note is that when the tour had finished, all the wives interviewed had conversations regarding their husbands leaving the Territorials or at least promising never to go on tour again.

The ripple effect from the overseas tour was disruption to the everyday routine of the partner of the deployed Territorial soldier and this also affected children. For instance, this was the response of Wife A when asked what impact the overseas tour had upon day-to-day life:

My partner was the main carer for our small children and the tour coincided with my return to full-time work following maternity leave. Our youngest child was only six months old when the tour started and only a few weeks old when pre-deployment training started. Additionally, I had hardly any letters or phone calls from my partner during the tour as he was out in the field mostly. 330

327 ibid., p. 73.
328 Verney, Going to the Wars, p. 78.
329 ibid.
330 Interview 8, FWG/TA 04.
Wife B experienced a similar impact upon her day-to-day life. Of this, she said:

*It was just horrendous for three months, I mean; I was pregnant so I was very emotional anyway ... I was still working as well, and it was a lot of pressure. I was forever waiting for the phone to ring. Would I miss a call? What was he doing? And what with the news as well it makes you worse cos [sic] you imagine all sorts.*

The 131 Commando Welfare Guide was correct for the majority of those left at home when it stated: ‘those left behind may feel abandoned, empty, and lonely’.

The families of Regulars are, in many respects, luckier than the families of Reserves in that they are part of a community and afforded much more support from their regimental ‘family’ and the AWS. The experiences of Territorial wives from the interviews and those interviewed by the AFF provide good examples of what those left at home had to cope with while a tour was under way. Furthermore, perhaps it is no surprise that conversations were held between partners about whether to stay with the organisation. Most responses were similar when those who stayed at home were asked how they coped with the Territorial deployment. One wife from the AFF survey stated: ‘I made it very clear I could not cope with him going away again’.

Of the six wives interviewed for this research, conversations with their partners took place about leaving the organisation. Of the six conversations discussing leaving the TA, three soldiers left the Territorials after Operation Herrick 5, with two of the three subsequently signing back on, one for a short period before leaving again. Wife A commented that, after the deployment,

*I wanted him to leave as I couldn’t cope with another tour being alone, and it adversely affected our two very young children.*

Moreover, the children of all ages that are left behind suffer too. Those used to a stable home life with two parents can lose their sense of security when a parent leaves and behaviour can sometimes be affected. Changes in behaviour were recorded by the AFF in their survey after Operation Herrick 12 (2010). The AFF asked what effect the

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331 Interview 5, FWG/TA 02.
334 Interviews 3, 5, 7 and 8 FWG/TA, June–November 2014.
335 Interview 8, FWG/TA 04.
deployment of their soldier parent had upon the children left at home with regard to behaviour. Those who responded stated, for example, that "[o]ur oldest child became quiet and insular, whilst our youngest became extremely emotional, having outbursts at home and school".\footnote{AFF, Op Herrick 12, Survey of Families, p. 31.} In addition, the same child started bedwetting, not sleeping, and became very angry when the soldier came home.\footnote{\textit{Ibid}} Another respondent said of her children that "Both children became easily upset and have a lot of aggression in them which they didn’t have prior to the tour".\footnote{\textit{Ibid}} The AFF survey ended with the suggestion that further research needs to be considered with a view to (or "intending to") offer guidance on techniques to help children cope.\footnote{\textit{Ibid}}

\textbf{Conclusion}

The research contained within this chapter adds the experiences of Territorial wives, partners and families to the narrative of the home front in Britain. This chapter adds the experiences at home of the Great War and World War Two but also adds and contributes to the narrative of the experiences of those left at home during the recent Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns from 2001–2013.

Territorial Force/Army families, alongside the families of Regulars, have struggled when (usually) their husbands and boyfriends were sent overseas to fight. During the Great War, the government realised that it had financial responsibilities to the dependants of the men it sent to fight and struggled to keep up with demand, which led to much suffering when allowances were late. Charities such as the SSFA, let down by not receiving all the money promised by the government to address shortfalls in Separation Allowances, as documented by Sylvia Pankhurst in \textit{The Home Front}, became increasingly unpopular with the working class as means testing of families led to parsimonious awards. This inefficiency and parsimony led to allowances becoming codified by Hogge and Garside with the publication of \textit{War Pensions and Allowances}, setting the rules for who could and should not receive the small Separation Allowance. As World War Two got under way, the government was, again, not prepared for the scale of the now-named Family Allowance that needed to be issued. Barbara Hately-Broad details the difficulties involved and faced in receiving the allowances and emergency WSGs, but there was a significant change in the attitude of the authorities regarding the issuance of allowances during this war.

\footnotesize\footnote{AFF, Op Herrick 12, Survey of Families, p. 31.} \footnotesize\footnote{\textit{Ibid}} \footnotesize\footnote{\textit{Ibid}} \footnotesize\footnote{\textit{Ibid}} \footnotesize\footnote{\textit{Ibid}}
During the Great War, it seemed that the government begrudged handing out Separation Allowance. However, during World War Two, the right to allowances was rarely questioned. During the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, the right of the Territorial and his/her dependants and families not to be inconvenienced by an overseas tour was an accepted part of mobilising part-time soldiers. However, unlike the Great War and World War Two, the emotional welfare of the family at home has become just as important as the financial well-being of that family. The authorities in both the Great War and World War Two realised that if the family at home was adequately cared for by the State, the soldier fighting overseas would have one less thing to worry about. Lord Moran, in *The Anatomy of Courage*, stated that the morale of the soldier was the key factor in this thinking. However, in the twenty-first century, as communities are less cohesive than they were and with no existential threat forcing communities together for the greater good, the partners of serving soldiers, especially part-time soldiers, need more emotional support. Evidence from AFF reports and interviews carried out for this research show that the AWS and, to a certain extent, local Territorial Unit Welfare Teams failed to keep Territorial partners and families in the ‘bubble’ of care. Reports of Territorial partners being ignored and receiving little or no communication of what is happening on a tour are many. Planning, without a doubt, needs to be much better in the future.

There is a chance that the Army Reserve could, potentially, frequently be used in the coming decades. However, whether they will they become sufficiently prepared militarily or be more fully integrated, as per Future Reserves 2020, is up for debate. Furthermore, evidence for Territorials returned from conflict will show that after care leaves much to be desired. The next chapter investigates this area after considering the future threats and challenges facing the UK and how the AR will struggle to meet these threats. The chapter also reveals how much it costs to deploy part-time troops overseas, before considering the mental and physical cost to a volunteer soldier deploying to a war zone.
Part Three

Future Reserves 2020 and the Future
Chapter Six

FR2020 and the future: Will the AR be ready for the challenges?

The last chapter in this research concentrates mainly on the challenges ahead for the new Army Reserve. This chapter investigates the progression of the AR under FR2020, the cost of deploying Reservists, potential problems with using Reservists more overseas, conceivable threats and challenges to the UK and the future challenges that await the Army Reserve up to 2020 and beyond. The scope and scale of the threats faced by the UK is changing and the AR will have to train sufficiently to take on threats ranging from conventional forces to terrorist and cyber attacks. The newly named Army Reserve will also have to keep pace with the changing character of warfare, which needs to enable the AR to deploy against any and all threats identified by Britain’s government, intelligence agencies and security forces.

The chapter also investigates how much it costs to use Reservists and the actual costs of deploying a part-time volunteer force to counter threats or to fight overseas. The chapter challenges the assumption that the AR will be value for money on overseas deployments and investigates costings of the TA’s overseas tours during their deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, if the AR is trained to expectations and is integrated more on overseas combat operations, would it be morally right to use these part-time troops, especially if there were heavy fighting? Combat is the ultimate test of military training, physical fitness and mental strength. A soldier has to become fully prepared for its rigours. However, there is a body of evidence which claims that part-time soldiers have greater susceptibility to PTSD, pointing to growing problems from the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan (2001–2014).\textsuperscript{341} If the government is willing to send part-time soldiers to fight in a war, it should be prepared to care for them when they return home.

This chapter is divided into four parts to answer these questions: Part 1 - How is the AR progressing with FR2020 and integration with the Regular Army? Part 2 - What are the costs of deploying part-time troops overseas? Part 3 - Why are part-time troops more prone to PTSD and other mental illnesses than Regular soldiers after an overseas

tour? And Part 4 – What are the future threats to the UK and can the AR keep pace with the changing character of war?

Section 1

How is the Army Reserve progressing with FR2020 and integration with the Regular Army?

As a consequence of the needs of the Territorial Trinity of Commitments, the newly branded AR has not had an auspicious start to FR2020. Recruitment has been poor: from 1 October 2013 to 1 January 2014, AR numbers fell from 25,380 to 24,880, including trained personnel of 19,150.\(^{342}\) As with the TF and the TA, recruiting up to full establishment is a struggle and will likely remain a problem (as their history testifies). The MoD’s recruitment partner Capita only managed to recruit 1,975 Reservists during 2013–2014, against a requirement for that period of 6,000.\(^{343}\)

Furthermore, the situation concerning the poor recruitment and retainment of AR personnel numbers reached a new low recently, revealing that AR recruiting figures, despite heavy advertising and expenditure, only rose by twenty extra part-time soldiers overall.\(^{344}\) Capita is contracted to be paid £44 million annually to assist the MoD in recruitment, equating to each new net recruit costing British taxpayers around £2.5 million.\(^{345}\) This figure does not, of course, include millions spent online, on Facebook, Twitter and other advertising campaigns (a sum that stood at £300 million in 2014 as revealed by the Scottish Nationalist Party’s Angus Robertson [Moray] during a Commons debate on the AR).\(^{346}\) However, by 1 January 2015 figures have improved slowly. The MoD’s Armed Forces Quarterly statistics show an intake of 3,600 joiners and re-joiners (reserves on full time reserve service reverting to part-time status are included), and a trained strength up from 2014 to 23,920 troops.\(^{347}\)

The figures are, however, unsatisfactory and the magazine *Private Eye* reported that Julian Brazier, Minister for Reserves, was summoned to the Commons (2014) to be

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\(^{347}\) MoD, UK Armed Forces Quarterly Personnel Report, 1 January 2015, p. 32. Full Time Reserve Service involves reservists joining a Regular unit for a fixed time of between 6 months and a year with options for an extension.
questioned on the AR’s inadequate progress. Brazier insisted that the government’s plan to increase the Reserves to 30,000 or 35,000 (he used both figures) is a five-year programme and asserted: ‘We are making steady progress’. Mr Brazier continued and stated that there had been ‘a number of technical challenges’ (Capita and the MoD’s debacle with recruitment ICT).\(^{348}\) In the interim, the Army, not Capita, is incurring increased costs associated with ongoing recruitment of £1 million per month.\(^{349}\) Furthermore, the likely costs, so far, of the recruiting software’s ‘technical troubles’ were estimated at £25 million; costs that did not include having to use additional soldiers to support interim recruitment arrangements.\(^{350}\) Mr Brazier also assured the House that ‘improved financial incentives’ had been introduced.\(^{351}\)

The financial incentives for joining the AR are, not counting the £320 million spent on redundancy packages for sacked Regulars, £10,000 for ex-Regulars to join the AR, £300 for civilians that make the commitment and £500 to the employee-Reservist per calendar month, and pension liabilities.\(^{352}\) Despite this, the NAO Report on how Army 2020 (incorporating FR2020) is progressing stated that ‘There are significant risks to value for money which is currently not well understood by the Department or the army’. Pointing out successful Reservist recruitment, Brazier reported that Vladimir Putin had announced ‘a very large expansion to Russian part-time forces’. Private Eye commented that the only hope for failure of this Russian venture is if Moscow decides to appoint Capita to run its recruitment campaign.\(^{353}\)

The whole premise of Army 2020 and FR2020 rests upon recruiting and training an Army Reserve at full establishment to help fill the capability gaps left after sacking 20,000 Regular soldiers. History shows that the TF and TA have never achieved full establishment during peacetime. Therefore, due to ignoring the history of the Territorials, the FR2020 project is not performing as promised and looks to be repeating what went before. The National Audit Commission has stated that ‘the MoD may not hit its target until 2025, six years behind schedule’.\(^{354}\) Perhaps in a bid to aid recruitment.

\(^{350}\) Ibid.
\(^{351}\) Gavel Basher, ‘Called to Order’, p. 9.
\(^{352}\) Ibid. Interview 2, MAW/1A 02, 04 June 2014. An example of regular recruiting to the AR at 299 Para RE (V) is an ex-Regular Staff Sergeant who was offered £10,000 if he joined. He did not have to complete his MATTs testing for two years, still qualified for his tax-free bounty, and only had to do fourteen days a year while retaining his rank.
\(^{353}\) Gavel Basher, ‘Called to Order’, p. 9.
\(^{354}\) Ben Farmer, ‘Shocking recruitment figures show Army Reserve barely growing’, Telegraph, 13 Nov. 2014.
candidates over fifty years old are now allowed to apply to join the AR. However, despite the millions of pounds spent on advertising, Capita’s ‘expertise’ in recruiting and increasing the age range for new joiners, the FR2020 project is struggling. The Major Projects Authority’s Annual Report for 2015 stated that the FR2020 scheme was a major project given a ‘red’ rating, previously amber/red, which means the project is in danger of failing. If FR2020 cannot recruit and train the numbers of Army Reservists needed to support the much-reduced Regular Army, the nation’s defences will keep the significant capability gaps that were opened with the sacking of Regular soldiers. If these gaps are left unfilled until 2025, as stated by the National Audit Commission, the capability gaps have the potential to invite enemies to create mischief or worse against Great Britain and her interests. The world is an increasingly dangerous place and a future AR trained as they currently are may not be sufficient to face the future’s potential threats. Furthermore, there is another potential problem with using more Army Reservists in the place of Regular soldiers and that is the cost to the government, which is increasing as FR2020 continues to evolve.

Section 2

What are the costs of deploying part-time troops overseas?

The increased reliance on the Reserves means that we need greater assurance that reservists are at the training levels needed and are available when required. This means that new relationships need to be developed with Society, Reservists and their families and Employers.

To mobilise and deploy a Territorial soldier during the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts was expensive. Although the TA (and now Army Reserve) was/is touted by the government as a much cheaper version of the Regular soldiers, this is not always the case, as recently admitted to the House of Commons Defence Committee, who stated:

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355 Johnson, ‘Army Reserve opens its doors to over 50s in recruit drive’, The Guardian.
We note the Reservists are cheaper to employ so long as they are not called up. This will only be a cost saving so long as future governments are not required to undertake operations. It would be unacceptable if the UK decided not to take part in any action because of the cost-effectiveness of, and value for money achieved by its plans.358

The Territorial, when embodied and mobilised, received his/her full Army pay at the rank at which he/she served. However, as Territorials were civilians and, as a rule, often earned much more money in their civilian careers than that paid to Regular soldiers, the difference had to be made up. The issue of making up and receiving the difference in pay has always been a worry to deploying Territorial soldiers, from the Great War through to Afghanistan.359 However, certain benefits paid to make up the salaries of some members of the TA recently (Iraq and Afghanistan) can be viewed as too high. Some allowances and wages for a tour to the Middle East have reached £225,000 for medical doctors. Other examples are of one junior officer being paid £135,000, and eight Territorials called up during 2012 who earned more than £100,000 for their six-month tour to Afghanistan.360 Cases like this and the amount of money needed to pay for Reservists’ overseas tours raise questions over the efficacy and long-term financial sustainability of FR2020.

When a Territorial volunteer mobilised for the Great War or World War Two, the cut in wages from civilian to Army pay was often significant. For example, as the Great War started, an unskilled/semi-skilled workman could earn a civilian wage of around 30s per week. If that man became mobilised, his weekly pay would drastically reduce to 7s 13½d for a private soldier (1s 2½d per day, not including stoppages for kit and food).361 If the Territorial soldier had a wife and children to support, such a drop in income would make life at home tough (although this was partly compensated for by the Separation Allowance). By World War Two, soldiers’ wages had risen and there were different pay scales depending on the military role of the soldier. However, the average soldier’s wage was around 2s per day (not including stoppages). An example of pay differentials comes from private soldier J. Prew, who, since his call-up (1940), earned 10s 6d a week with the Army. Before the war, Mr Prew had earned 43s 1d a

359 For example, HHC, L. [UCCM10-9], Records of Meetings of Hull Corporation, 1914–1940, Meeting of Chairs of Committees – Guildhall, Hull, Tuesday 25 August 1914, The committee alloyed fears held by many workers of being severely out of pocket should they as Territorials be called up for active service with a motion to make up wages, less the allowances paid by the military or naval authorities.
361 HHC TCCM/6, City and County of Kingston upon Hull, ‘Tabulated Statement as to Corporation Employees on Active Service showing particulars of their positions, wages, dependants, &c., 1914’.
week with the BGLC, a considerable drop in income.362 There were firms, usually large
enterprises, which generously contributed money to their employees' families to make
up for the drop in wages, taking into account Separation Allowances. For many
households, this made the difference between a hard war at home and a very hard war,
in which children were sometimes sent to a family member or day nursery, at times
even away, so the mother could work to live.363

There were many large firms and Civil Service jobs, such as the Post Office and
government departments, that looked after their Territorial employees financially when
the latter deployed overseas (as mentioned in the chapter on employment).364 For
example, when the Rowntree Factory Territorials were embodied and sent to fight
during the Great War, the company continued to offer generous assistance. This
generous support included extra welfare provision to top up the insubstantial Army pay
of around 1½ a day for an Infantry Private (1½ 2d for a Cavalry Trooper), to relieve
workers of the worry over their wives and children left at home.365 This company
support was also valid for Territorials called up for the Great War who worked for
Reckitts.366 Reckitts also made a promise to keep jobs open for all employees who had
served in the Great War and those disabled during service (eighty-six men – 6.75 per
cent of the Reckitts workforce).367

When the Great War started, many large employers, firms, businesses and
councils needed to discover how many workers had been called up by the TF and how
they should proceed with wage payments. Nothing on the scale of the call-up for the
Great War had ever happened before and many local authorities looked to their

362 NGA NE/HUB/C/A/3/A/L, Letter, 'War Service Allowances' to A. J. Mumford, Secretary BGLC, from
the Engineer and Manager C. R. Armitage, 24 Jan. 1940.
363 Braybon and Summerfield, Out of the Cage, p. 100 and pp. 236-7.
364 All of the Territorial-supporting firms researched for this thesis ensured that Army wages were topped
up or ensured families were helped. However, there may have been others that gave little or no help and
would be a good subject for more research.
365 Fitzgerald, Rowntree, p. 247. The generous treatment afforded the employees at Rowntrees was further
instituted in the hope that the cocoa workers would return after the war.
366 The Editor, 'Service Pay and Gifts', 'Ours' Remembrance (1919), no page number; 'Disabled Men',
no page number.
367 Ibid, 'Special Constables and Volunteers Hall'. After the Great War the Directors of Reckitts invited
600 demobilised soldiers and sailors (all Reckitts employees) to a tea party in the Francis Reckitt Institute
on 8 January 1920. At the tea party, Reckitts handed over £8,000 (1920 value) to ex-service men. Reckitts
also sent Christmas parcels, gifts throughout the war (mainly food packages) and set up a Peace Memorial
Fund to assist employees and others who had suffered in the war, spending a total of £86,666 (1920
values) made up from voluntary weekly deductions from fellow workers (no page number). Reckitts also
opened a funded hospital (Danson Lane – Hull) run by Voluntary Aid Detachments (VADs) in
November 1914, containing 45 beds treating around thirty-five patients a week. During the war, 2,910
patients passed through the hospital staffed by members of the Reckitts Nursing Division, assisted by the
Hull St. John Ambulance Division (no page number).
colleagues across the country for a procedure. After a tabulated report on the employees of Hull Corporation who were called up for the TF and other Reserves, it was decided to proceed as follows: 'the wages of any employee of the Corporation called out on active service less such sum as will be paid to him or his wife or children by the military or Naval Authorities'. This action was followed by all the large firms investigated for this research. Hull Corporation also promised the mobilised men that their jobs would remain open when the war ended. This promise by Hull Corporation was again made when the TA reconstituted (1920) under set guidelines that applied to all Civil Servants nationwide as follows:

One week's special leave on full civil pay will be allowed to those who attend the Annual Training Camp for at least a fortnight, the second week being reckoned as ordinary leave without pay. In the case of those who do not attend camp for the full fortnight, the period of attendance will be reckoned as ordinary leave without civil pay. In no case will deductions from salary be made in respect of military pay and allowances.

The very poor level of pay received by mobilised Territorial soldiers during World War Two had not much improved from the Great War and was inadequate to support the mobilised man's family or dependants while he was away from home or overseas. Barbara Hately-Broad has stated that during World War Two mobilisation became a great cause of worry for the married family of a Territorial. To ease worries and ensure the Territorial came back to the firm when the war ended, many large businesses made up the Territorial's Army pay, excluding Separation Allowance/Family Allowance, to the level he had enjoyed as a worker.

For example, in September 1939, the Federation of Gas Employers made a commitment to help its mobilised Territorials. The Federation became concerned about its married mobilised employees finding they were financially worse off by

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368 HHC C TCCM/1-9, Records of Meetings of Hull Corporation, 1914-1920, Meeting of Chairs of Committees, Guildhall, Hull, 25 August 1914.
369 Ibid.
370 HHC TCCM/3, Letter from William H. Smith - City Accountant to Hull Corporation Town Clerk, 18 Aug. 1914
373 NGA NE/HUB/C/A/3/D, Letter circulated to all members of the Federation of Gas Employers from A. J. Mumford, Secretary, 'Employers serving with His Majesty's Force or, with the concurrence of the Directors, undertaking full-time Civil Defence Duties', 21 Sept. 1939.
reason of the fact they were a member of the Forces. In a nationwide circular, the Directors of the Federation of Gas Employers stated that Gas Undertakers should grant to their employees, being married men who have joined the Forces, such an allowance as would, together with their Service pay and Service allowances, equal their normal wages less 11/-1d [army wages] per week. As far as single men were concerned, it was suggested that the previous recommendations were to stand of no allowance and cases of hardship to be treated on an individual case basis, "treated on its own merits".

The Federation continued to monitor its top-up payments and during December 1939 realised that the deduction of 11s 1d was giving rise to hardship for those men on lower pay within the company. To this end, the company issued the following statement:

The deduction of 11s.1d. a week is not to be made when the employee's normal earnings are 50s.0d. a week or less, and in the case of an employee whose normal earnings are more than 50s.0d. but less than 61s.1d. a week, only the difference between his normal earnings and 50s.0d. is to be deducted.

Increases in pay were also passed on to the mobilised Territorial and added to normal earnings. If the Territorial took promotion within the Army and his pay was increased, the company decreased its contribution to reflect this (see below for Mr F. Frankish, who had been promoted to Sergeant, substantiated from 15 January 1940):

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374 NGA NE/HUB/C/A/3/C, Circular letter from Joint Manager Mr Ogilvie of the Federation of Gas Employers to all members of the Federation of Gas Employers, 'Men Serving with the Forces', 22 Sept. 1939.
375 Ibid.
376 Ibid.
377 NGA NE/HUB/C/A/3/R, Circular letter from the BGLC Limited, Westminster office, to its regional offices. This letter was received at the Hull HQ from A. J. Mumford, 'Allowances to Dependants of Men Serving with the Armed and Civil Defence Forces', 20 Dec. 1939.
378 Ibid.
From 20/11/39 | From 15/1/40
-------------|-------------
Money per month | Money per month
£.  s.  d. | £.  s.  d.
---|---
Service pay less deduction for separation allowance. | 3.  0.  10. | 4.  11.  3.
Government separation allowance. | 7.  16.  0. | 9.  6.  4.
Allowance from the company. | 7.  7.  4. | 4.  6.  7.

Total amount. | £18.  4.  2. | £18.  4.  2.

In many respects, those Territorials who worked for large firms displaying a corporate responsibility and those Territorials who worked for the Civil Service and the GPO were much luckier, regarding allowances and finance, than workers who were called up (for both world wars) or were conscripted without their employer’s support financially. The research for this thesis has found that many city corporations, Civil Service departments and big British businesses helped their employees when they were mobilised, partly from a sense of corporate responsibility and partly because, after the war, these organisations and businesses needed their trained and skilled workers back. Academic research on how many benefited from company financial make-up pay is minimal and numbers are not known, and more research is needed for a complete picture. For everyone else who had been mobilised or conscripted, Barbara Hatley-Broad argues that “the perceived motivation for joining the services became patriotism [many had no choice] and a wish to serve one’s country and in light of this to cavil at existing rates of pay might be regarded as disloyal”. 381 This unlucky group of workers would have to make do with Army pay and allowances issued by the government. 382

Many men who were called up had skills that were vital to the national effort in Britain, such as gas engineers, and these men were often, after appeals to the Board of Trade, sent back to carry out their reserved occupations. 383 For the Territorials of the

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380 NGA NE/HUB/C/A/3/V, Letter from the Chief Clerk A. A. Howard to Engineer and Manager, Hull, to A. L. Higham, 24 Jan. 1940.
382 Ibid. There was no structure that existed to ensure that the families of servicemen overseas had sufficient allowances for an adequate standard of living, even after Family Allowance rose for these families in 1940 by £7 million (1940 values) per annum, pp. 61-2.
383 NGA NE/HUB/C/A/3/II, Letter from the Industries and Manufactures Department, Board of Trade, London to the BGLC HQ, London, regarding the raising of the ages of reservation for occupations, 24th Dec. 1940.
early twenty-first century, there were no reserved occupation roles that needed to be filled when they were called up for overseas deployment. Furthermore, the system of pay, top-up pay and allowances was very different from what happened during the two world wars. Another major difference with the mobilised Territorials of the Great War and World War Two was the extra costs associated with using part-time troops on deployment, which have the potential to rise further should the AR deploy to wars of the future.

Modern mobilisation, choice and expense

If a medium-to-large-scale conflict threatened Britain, the Army Reserves would have to mobilise as part of a national army. However, if the war is a war of choice, such as Iraq or Afghanistan, there are ‘get out’ clauses when mobilised for the part-time soldier. Therefore, the process of declining the opportunity to serve overseas is discussed here. The costs of using Territorials during the War on Terror is also examined to discover how expensive it was to use Territorials. This section argues that using so-called ‘cheaper’ part-timers costs more than using Regular soldiers. To support the evidence regarding the use of Territorials overseas, interviews with ex-Territorials and serving AR members are used (all anonymous).

To make employing an Army Reserve today a fairer proposition to both the employee and the employer, the FR2020 White Paper has offered businesses a financial assistance package for when their employee finds him/herself mobilised. adding significantly to the cost of the AR. These are financial measures meant to cover any additional costs the Reservist’s workplace may find it suffers when a member of staff is called up (2016), set at a maximum of £110 per day paid for every working day that a Reservist is mobilised (£40,000 per annum). An employer can also claim for certain one-off costs, including agency and advertising fees for sourcing a temporary replacement, financial assistance for retraining and pension contributions (all uncapped).384

Payments for mobilisation started as soon as the Territorial passed his/her MATTs and medicals. This passing of initial mobilisation testing ensured that the deploying Territorial received a Call-Out Gratuity (COG) of £509 (COG was £458 until April 2011).385 During this stage of the call-up process held at the Reserves and Territorial

Mobilisation Centre, Nottinghamshire, the Territorials brought in civilian wage slips, banking details and evidence of expenses that needed paying whilst he/she was deployed, such as childcare costs, so that the MoD could make up Army pay to civilian pay levels and ensure all other costs were paid. Abiding by the rules set by Reserve Forces (Call-out and Recall Financial Assistance) Regulations 2005, Statutory Instrument 2005 N. 859, Reservists can claim for loss of earnings equivalent to their civilian salaries up to the cap of £548 per day (£822 per day for medical care, life insurance, costs of civilian accommodation, and company cars up to £325 per month) and without financial limit certain allowable expenses, which includes private school fees, that could be claimed. In effect, this means that a Territorial Private with a capped claim could also earn up to £3,000 per week when deployed compared with a Regular Private who was paid (2014 rates) £304.78 per week, almost ten times more.

To illustrate the differences in the cost of deploying a hypothetical AR troop compared with the same number of basic Regular soldiers, a table of mobilisation and deployment costs (without extra benefits such as childcare, car repayments, etcetera) has been constructed. The table uses the real jobs and ranks of a Territorial Troop, 131 Commando Royal Engineers 4 Troop, who served in the second tranche of Operation Herrick 5, Helmand, Afghanistan, 2006–2007. The table uses the Regular six-month tour of duty. There were twenty-two members deployed by 131 Commando (infantry platoons/troops are usually around thirty strong). All members were employed. Therefore, the table uses a conservative median wage for their profession or trade at 2014 civilian salaries (those median wages where there is no information will use the national average wage of £26,500). The Territorials are compared directly with the

381 Ibid.
382 Ibid. And British Army, ‘Soldier Rates of Pay’, [Accessed: 30/07/14].
383 The 131 ORBAT is from the deployment list attached to Operational Training and Advisory Group (OPTAG), Op Herrick Pre-Deployment Training (PDT) – Individual Reinforcement (IR) Course 13–16 Nov; 6: Joining Instructions, 2 Oct. 2006.
ranks of their Army equivalents using the British Army’s ‘Soldier Rates of Pay – April 2014’ and ‘Army Officer Rates of Pay – April 2014’ forms. This information illustrates the cost differentials in the make-up pay it may cost the MoD and Treasury to deploy future AR volunteers (see Table 3 below).

The extra costs shown in Table 3 are high; however, the costs of running the AR are set to rise further. A look through the MoD White Paper Reserves in Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued shows the trail of money the new AR has used up since FR2020. Desperate to attract recruits, the government now pays pensions for the first time to Reservist personnel based on accrual of time spent training and on operations. From April 2015, AR soldiers can also earn one day’s paid leave for every ten days they train. Furthermore, the government has pledged to pay 80 per cent of college fees so that AR personnel can train in a relevant civilian skill. Moreover, potential AR officers will be awarded an Early Commitment Bonus with a taxable payment of £2,000 for completion of initial officer training, followed by a further three staged annual payments of £1,000 on completion of the annual training commitment. Additional bonuses become available to Regular soldiers who leave the Regulars to join the AR, amounting to £5,000, with a limited training commitment and no mobilisation for three years. In addition to these personal payments, extra spends are £200 million for equipment and £240 million for training, which becomes added to £70 million handed over to Capita for recruitment. The costings to establish the new AR are very high, adding to the already high cost of mobilising part-time soldiers in non-specialist roles overseas. It is an area that should be afforded much more scrutiny.


391 MoD, British Army, ‘Soldier Rates of Pay – April 2014’, and ‘Army Officer Rates of Pay – April 2014’, http://www.army.mod.uk/jobs [Accessed: 23/02/15]. For the Sappers (private soldiers), as in keeping with the age profile of the AR and old TA, many of 4 Troop were over thirty years of age. Therefore, the majority of these Sappers received level 4 pay, the highest awarded to private soldiers. The table shows the pay scale level the Sapper was receiving, which was either level 1 or level 4.

393 ibid.
394 ibid., p. 20.
395 ibid., p. 9.
Table 3. Cost comparison between civilian wages (median) and Army wages when deployed overseas (extra costs in the last column)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilian employment/occupations</th>
<th>Civilian wages per annum</th>
<th>Civilian wages for a six-month tour</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Army equivalent wage to civilian wage per annum</th>
<th>Army equivalent wage to civilian wage for six months</th>
<th>Difference in wages between civilian pay scales and military pay scales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Engineer</td>
<td>£62,500.00</td>
<td>£31,250.00</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>£38,847.00</td>
<td>£19,423.50</td>
<td>£11,827.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Engineer</td>
<td>£62,500.00</td>
<td>£31,250.00</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>£38,847.00</td>
<td>£19,423.50</td>
<td>£11,827.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Manager</td>
<td>£21,220.00</td>
<td>£10,610.00</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>£30,314.00</td>
<td>£15,157.00</td>
<td>£4,547.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Engineer</td>
<td>£28,246.00</td>
<td>£14,123.00</td>
<td>Staff Sergeant</td>
<td>£34,039.00</td>
<td>£17,019.50</td>
<td>£2,896.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Builder</td>
<td>£20,637.00</td>
<td>£10,318.50</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>£30,750.00</td>
<td>£15,375.00</td>
<td>£5,057.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Engineer</td>
<td>£30,029.00</td>
<td>£15,014.50</td>
<td>Corporal (CPL)</td>
<td>£27,053.00</td>
<td>£13,526.50</td>
<td>£1,488.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salesperson (Direct Sales)</td>
<td>£41,490.00</td>
<td>£20,745.00</td>
<td>CPL</td>
<td>£27,053.00</td>
<td>£13,526.50</td>
<td>£7,219.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Employed Plumber</td>
<td>£26,500.00</td>
<td>£13,250.00</td>
<td>Lance Corporal (LCPL)</td>
<td>£21,599.00</td>
<td>£10,799.50</td>
<td>£2,451.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Goods Vehicle Driver</td>
<td>£25,000.00</td>
<td>£12,500.00</td>
<td>LCPL</td>
<td>£21,599.00</td>
<td>£10,799.50</td>
<td>£1,701.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Planner</td>
<td>£26,003.00</td>
<td>£13,001.50</td>
<td>LCPL</td>
<td>£21,599.00</td>
<td>£10,799.50</td>
<td>£2,202.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taxi Driver</td>
<td>£18,580.00</td>
<td>£9,290.00</td>
<td>LCPL</td>
<td>£21,599.00</td>
<td>£10,799.50</td>
<td>£1,509.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tour Guide (London)</td>
<td>£26,500.00</td>
<td>£13,250.00</td>
<td>LCPL</td>
<td>£21,599.00</td>
<td>£10,799.50</td>
<td>£2,451.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilian employment/occupations</th>
<th>Civilian wages per annum</th>
<th>Civilian wages for a six-month tour</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Army equivalent wage to civilian wage per annum</th>
<th>Army equivalent wage to civilian wage for six months</th>
<th>Difference in wages between civilian pay scales and military pay scales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aerospace Engineer</td>
<td>£30,472.00</td>
<td>£15,236.00</td>
<td>LCPL</td>
<td>£21,599.00</td>
<td>£10,799.50</td>
<td>+£4,437.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Mechanic</td>
<td>£18,304.00</td>
<td>£9,152.00</td>
<td>Sapper Level 1 (SL1)</td>
<td>£17,945.00</td>
<td>£8,972.50</td>
<td>+£180.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>£51,623.00</td>
<td>£25,811.50</td>
<td>SL1</td>
<td>£17,945.00</td>
<td>£8,972.50</td>
<td>+£16,839.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Lottery Worker</td>
<td>£26,500.00</td>
<td>£13,250.00</td>
<td>SL1</td>
<td>£17,945.00</td>
<td>£8,972.50</td>
<td>+£4,278.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Mechanic</td>
<td>£18,304.00</td>
<td>£9,152.00</td>
<td>Sapper Level 4 (SL4)</td>
<td>£20,521.00</td>
<td>£10,260.50</td>
<td>-£1,108.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxury Yacht Skipper (Senior Master)</td>
<td>£159,600.00</td>
<td>£79,800.00</td>
<td>SL4</td>
<td>£20,521.00</td>
<td>£10,260.50</td>
<td>+£69,539.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welder</td>
<td>£21,218.00</td>
<td>£10,609.00</td>
<td>SL4</td>
<td>£20,521.00</td>
<td>£10,260.50</td>
<td>+£349.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horticulturalist</td>
<td>£25,000.00</td>
<td>£12,500.00</td>
<td>SL4</td>
<td>£20,521.00</td>
<td>£10,260.50</td>
<td>+£2,240.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Contractor (Middle East)</td>
<td>£49,207.00</td>
<td>£24,653.50</td>
<td>SL4</td>
<td>£20,521.00</td>
<td>£10,260.50</td>
<td>+£14,393.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Employed Clothing Manufacturer</td>
<td>£26,500.00</td>
<td>£13,250.00</td>
<td>SL4</td>
<td>£20,521.00</td>
<td>£10,260.50</td>
<td>+£2,099.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional overall cost to the MoD: £141,512.50
The costings have been challenged, but not vigorously enough, with many still thinking the AR is a cheap alternative. For example, Labour MP and former Paratrooper Officer Dan Jarvis stated that ‘ultimately this decision [cutting the Regular Army and replacing many with Army Reservists] is not underpinned by a rigorous analysis of the strategic environment. It is about doing defence, security and strategy on the cheap’. There is no argument with the fact that the TA (until 2012 and until the new legislation becomes fully operational) costs less than Regular soldiers while stationed in the UK (not deployed). However, the new legislation contained within FR2020, including pensions, paid leave, promised extra training and overseas exercises, changes the ‘cheapness argument’ to a much more expensive force. With greater integration of the AR promised and potentially more overseas deployment, extra costs can be added. The terms of Territorial (and AR) deployment during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries are very generous. However, despite the generosity of the financial packages available for overseas deployment, Reservists did not have to deploy and employers did not have to release their employers if they had a reason not to do so.

During the Great War, Territorial soldiers had to volunteer to become mobilised for foreign service (until the 1916 Conscription Act). Therefore, they could conceivably choose Home Service instead of Imperial Service. When World War Two started, the TA had little choice with regard to volunteering and was mobilised en masse into a National Army. Today’s Reservists have different procedures from past mobilisations. When the compulsory call-out packs were sent to TA/AR Reservists (Iraq and Afghanistan), they included guidance for the TA on withdrawing effectively from a proposed deployment. The ‘Revocation and Deferral of Call Out Guidance for Reservists’ pamphlet informed the Reservist that it allowed an application to defer or even revoke an order to deploy within seven days of the Territorial being served with the call-out notice. The appeal to avoid mobilisation had a wide remit for deferral or revocation. For example, to revoke a call-up, the appellant had to be either caring for a person who was unable to care for him/herself, be engaged in education, self-employed,  

268 Mitchinson, Defending Alton, pp. 62-3.
269 NGA NE/HUB/C/A/3/1, Letter from the Industries and Manufactures Department, Board of Trade to the BGLC, 24 December 1940, reminding the company to file the correct paperwork (Form N. S. 160) to defer the mobilisation of key workers.
270 MoD, ‘Revocation and Deferral of Call Out: Guide for Reservists’, Pamphlet, p. 1. The deferral or revocation application has to be started by phoning, faxing or e-mailing the Adjudication Officer (MoD official or serving officer) within seven days of receiving the call-up.

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working in a family business, have compassionate grounds or had just started a new job.\textsuperscript{401}

The employer of a Territorial soldier also had the right to apply for a revocation or deferral if the Territorial’s absence could have a severe impact on the business or undertaking concerned.\textsuperscript{402} Again, as with a personal appeal, the employer had to start the process of revocation or deferral within seven days of the TA employee receiving call-up papers, providing reasons why the employee should not be mobilised.\textsuperscript{403} If unsuccessful, the employee or employer could appeal the decision, which was made using a set of criteria and Service needs. For instance, if the Service needs are simply for personnel, an application revocation may be successful. However, if the Service need was for Reservists with a particular skill set, the application for revocation may fail (particularly if the skills required had been gained through Service courses).\textsuperscript{404}

This process has radically shifted in favour of the business and the worker since World War Two, when the employer had to furnish the War Office and the Board of Trade with evidence that the employee they were losing was holding up work of vital national importance.\textsuperscript{405} There was also a reserve age of twenty-three, whereby anyone older and deemed to be in a reserved occupation could not be called up. However, this was often a long process and deferment was not often easily won.\textsuperscript{406} For example, two Gas Inspectors (TA volunteers), both forty years of age, were called up in 1941 and had to enlist despite their ages and trade. They were eventually released months later when the paperwork caught up.\textsuperscript{407}

The contemporary process of revocation or deferral may discourage some businesses from employing a Reservist and are highlighted in a 2005 article in \textit{Accountancy Age}. The article states that ‘some reservists fear that they are being

\textsuperscript{401} Ibid., Annex A: Grounds on which to apply, p. A-1.

\textsuperscript{402} Statutory Instrument no. 859 of 2005 (S1859/2005). The Regulations specifically mention 1. The serious loss of sales, markets, reputation, goodwill or other financial harm. 2. The severe impairment of the ability to produce goods or provide services. 3. Demonstrable harm to research and development of new products, services or processes, provided that the harm could not be prevented by the employer being given financial assistance.

\textsuperscript{403} SaBRE, A Guide for Employers, Booklet. Employers are urged to provide as much information as possible to support their appeal. Information should include personal details, such as payroll number. National insurance number, information about the business they are employed within, the role they perform, the effect that their absence will have should they be deployed and the grounds for an exemption regarding serious harm to the business.

\textsuperscript{404} Revocation or Deferral Call-out pamphlet, p. 1. The appeal of a decision with which an employer disagrees in an appeal for a hearing by an independent Reserve Forces Appeal Tribunal through the Tribunals Secretary and must be lodged within five days.

\textsuperscript{405} NGA, NE/HUB/C/A/3/HH, Letter from the industries and Manufactures Department, Board of Trade to the Engineer and Manager BGLC, Sculcoates – Hull, 16 June 1941.

\textsuperscript{406} NGA, NE/HUB/C/A/3/DD, Letter from Engineer and Manager BGLC Hull to J. F. Ronca, Director of Gas Administration, Industries and Manufacture Department, Board of Trade, 21 July 1941.

\textsuperscript{407} Ibid. Letter from the Board of Trade, London, to the Manager BGLC, Hull, 1 October 1941.
discriminated against by potential employers because of the real risk of being called-up. A case involving a successful revocation of mobilisation of a firm’s project manager said of his firm: ‘They kicked up quite a fuss. They’d probably not say it, but I don’t think they’d employ TA members in the future because frankly, they don’t need the hassle’.

One of the Territorial interviewees for this research, Territorial F (an HGV driver), reported that when he was applying for a job or was in an interview situation, he never mentioned being an active TA. He stated that ‘most civil [civvy] employers don’t really think much of the TA’. However, even if the AR does find the time to fit in the extra training needed to combat the challenges of the new 21st century, should they be used so much in combat roles? What are the effects on part-time soldiers when deployed overseas on the ‘two-way range’?

Section 3

Why are part-time troops more prone to PTSD and other mental illnesses than Regular soldiers after an overseas tour?

[Afater the Great War] His civilian life confined him to a much smaller orbit, which proved a source of partial frustration and sometimes had a bad influence on domestic life.

This section asks what happened after demobilisation when the Territorial returned to his/ her employment and family. It also asks how a future, more integrated AR soldier could be affected more by mental illness by being used further on overseas deployments that may include fighting. The section also asks what can the MoD and government do to help part-timers when they return from their deployments? By using official documents relating to overseas deployment, reports and interviews conducted with ex-Territorials and serving Army Reservists, this section discovers how a modern part-time

409 Ibid.
410 Interview with Territorial Soldier MAR/TA 05. Online interview, Jan. 2015.
412 Books dealing with the end of wars and the soldiers’ and society’s reaction are detailed well in Richard van Emden’s The Quick and the Dead; Julie Summers, Stranger in the House; Gail Braybon and Penny Summerfield’s Out of the Cage; and fictional works such as D. H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover (London: Wordsworth Classics, 2005), 268 pp.
soldier copes with the demobilisation process and the abrupt transition to civilian life. There is now recognition that some post-tour Territorial soldiers find it difficult to readjust to routine civilian life, and are more likely to suffer mental health issues compared with Regular soldiers. A King’s College, London study (2011) found that some returned Territorials turned to heavy drinking (a coping mechanism) more frequently than their Regular colleagues after an overseas tour. Regular soldiers have also seen how Territorials serving alongside them in Iraq and Afghanistan had been ‘used and thrown away’, receiving little or no after-service care upon returning home. This section, therefore, discusses the welfare provision the Territorial soldier receives when he/she returned home, and why psychological conditions may adversely affect a Territorial more than a Regular soldier.

The Territorials fought in all theatres in the Great War, World War Two, and the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns and insurgencies. This final section looks principally at what processes occurred when the Territorial soldier from the War on Terror (2001–2012) phase of deployments came home, adding modern warfare to the discourse on soldier homecomings.

There have been Territorial soldiers, from the Great War through to Afghanistan, who returned home after their service and found difficulty assimilating and readjusting to their civilian roles after the freedom and excitement of serving in a war zone (that is, if they came through unscathed). They often cannot, if they have witnessed trauma or death, articulate what they have experienced to their partners or civilian colleagues and sometimes keeping these experiences to oneself can be too much to bear. Historian Juliet Nicolson sums up a fighting soldier’s feelings on returning, on this occasion from the Great War, in that many soldiers who had seen combat and death felt the absence of noise and used this time for reflection and contemplation. Nevertheless, there are those who see this silence as ‘a silence of isolation and fear, of a failure and the terror of attempting to articulate misery’.

It is important to emphasise when discussing either mental breakdown or difficulty in coping on returning home that most soldiers during the Great War.

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413 Dandekar et al., ‘Social Functioning and the Mental Health of UK Reservists on Return from Deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan’, Annals of Epidemiology, pp. 666-672.
414 Beckett, Territorials, p. 245.
417 Ibid.
War Two and the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns coped well with the stresses of combat.\textsuperscript{418} Furthermore, although, for example, the Great War spawned the first reported cases of ‘shell shock’, this response to warfare has a long history and there are cases of men disturbed by battle experiences recorded in 1685 by the Royal Hospital Chelsea.\textsuperscript{419} It is also worth noting that those soldiers suffering today have often had a delayed response to PTSD and that some veterans only start to display symptoms when they retire.\textsuperscript{420} Therefore, those presenting with mental injuries due to war today are but the beginning of potentially thousands of soldiers who might need help going forwards.

After an overseas tour, especially a busy kinetic tour and a ‘black and white’ existence of eating, sleeping, sentry duty, patrolling and fighting, coming home to civilian life is a strange experience.\textsuperscript{421} Most soldiers miss the day-to-day challenges of a demanding ever-changing job, and, although it is nice to be home, it is also a case of being back to the everyday civilian reality routine of life. After the Great War, many veterans felt the same, as indeed World War Two and other conflict veterans did too, struggling with avoir le cafard. The phrase avoir le cafard was a post-Great War saying (literally, to have the cockroach), to be in the dumps and have a lingering dissatisfaction with life and the life to which a veteran had returned, with many soldiers feeling this way.\textsuperscript{422} A modern example of returning home to dissatisfaction and juxtaposition was given by Lance Corporal Johnson Beharry VC when he talked about his war experiences (2009), stating that ‘I find it difficult to talk to normal civilians’. He added, ‘You spend six months on the battlefield and you have to defend yourself every day and then you come back to normal life and go to Tesco’.\textsuperscript{423}

The returned Territorial has to cope and work with civilians who have little concept of the trials faced on an overseas deployment. Furthermore, the inane questions asked by work colleagues or family members, such as ‘How many did you kill?’ and ‘Did any of your mates die?’, do not help in the rehabilitation back into ‘normal’ life.\textsuperscript{424} Territorials who returned from Iraq and Afghanistan often did not have the chance to talk through their sometimes traumatic experiences of fighting in these

\textsuperscript{418} Reid, Broken Men, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{419} Edger Jones \textit{et al.}, ‘War Pensions (1900–1945)’, \textit{The British Journal of Psychiatry}, p. 374.
\textsuperscript{420} MacNair, \textit{Perpetration-Induced Traumatic Stress}, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{421} After returning home from Afghanistan 2007, the author had a feeling of emptiness and dissatisfaction with all he did and this lasted for a few months.
\textsuperscript{422} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 123.
\textsuperscript{423} Reid, Broken Men, pp. 3–4.
\textsuperscript{424} These are genuine questions all returning soldiers are asked (I’ve been asked these questions many times) even by family members. However, Territorials face much more of this inane questioning than Regular soldiers due to their civilian jobs. Another irritant to returning soldiers is civilians who think they are experts on the current conflict, who always end their pontifications with ‘It’s a waste of time being out there anyway’.}

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conflicts with colleagues who have experienced similar scenarios. This opportunity to talk through experiences was unlike the case for Regular soldiers, who are surrounded by comrades in their units and can share their stories and decompress (adapting to the home environment in a graduated way, with the aim of reducing the potential for maladaptive psychological adjustment), supported by friends with similar experiences. Furthermore, the theory of decompression derives from combat motivation and the morale and effectiveness of any individual are dependent on his/her membership of a tight-knit group and the quality of training he/she has undertaken. Therefore, it is important that, for a soldier to decompress fully, he/she should do so within the group to which the combat experiences happened. A recent Armed Forces Mental Health Report stated that those units that are more tight-knit and more thoroughly trained, the Royal Marines are used as the exemplar model, are less prone to PTSD. The Territorials, by their very nature, could never hope to become as tight-knit as the homogenous Royal Marines due to undertaking less training and not living together in barracks. Furthermore, when Territorial soldiers returned home after an initial debriefing and decompression carried out by the Regular unit with which they had deployed, there was minimum contact afterwards. Most of the time, there was no contact at all with the AWS. The post-tour Territorial received thanks for his/her contribution and that was it; there was no follow-up or contact. The adverse effects suffered by some part-time soldiers after serving in Iraq and Afghanistan have to be afforded much more severe scrutiny from the MoD and politicians who wish to use a greater proportion of Reservists for service in future conflicts. Of course, the majority of Territorial personnel never suffered in any way after their tours. However, enough did (as will be detailed below) and the AWS did little to help these Territorials once they had demobilised.

426 Ibid., p. 535.
429 When the author passed out of training as a Royal Marines Commando, we (newly trained Marines) were told that every Marine should aim to be the best Marine in his unit. As young, keen-to-impress Marines, we tried to do just this, which led to competition in everything we did, made us better soldiers, and brought unit members closer together, maintaining the Royal Marines elite tag.
Post-operational welfare and the Territorial soldier 2001–2012

During Operation Telic (Iraq), a 2006 report by the NAO concerning Britain’s Reserve Forces and their performance during operations revealed that the Armed Forces welfare services were a little-used and poorly functioning service, with regard to Reservists.\(^{430}\) The NAO report recommended that Territorial units should have dedicated welfare support with a view to improving the welfare available to families of deployed Reservists who lived far from the Reserve unit with which they trained.\(^{431}\) In the White Paper detailing FR2020 (2013) and the changes the paper wished to implement, welfare provided by the AWS was criticised, the report stating that ‘the delivery of welfare to reservists was not being applied uniformly and was often determined by resources and outdated perceptions of entitlement’.\(^{432}\) This lack of proactive welfare provision by the Army also had another consequence when Territorials returned to civilian life.

There has always been and still is a significant turnover in Territorial/AR personnel. During the War on Terror, reports cited one of the main reasons for leaving the organisation as inadequate support, principally from the military.\(^{433}\) A King’s College report on Reservists’ social functioning after deployment reaffirms that Territorial soldiers felt that they were poorly supported by the military when they arrived home. The survey stated that 205 Territorials (43.6 per cent) out of 503 Reservists conveyed this opinion.\(^{434}\) It is now known that many Territorials found the transition between their military tour and the civilian life to which they were returning difficult to adjust to instantly. Consequences of the transition of alternating between two different social settings and social identities often manifest themselves in feelings of being unsupported, misunderstood and having a poor integration between the military and civilian social networks they inhabit.\(^{435}\)

The British Military has a procedure that all soldiers (Regular and part-time) complete when they are demobilised from an overseas tour. However, the process is brief and it is here that a disconnect from the Regular Army bubble and the AWS starts to manifest itself. The demobilisation process begins, during decompression, with a questionnaire about the soldier’s mental health, a self-diagnosis, after which specialist mental health professionals talk to the soldiers assembled.\(^{436}\) For the Territorials of 131

\(^{177}\) NAO, Reserve Forces, p. 5.
\(^{431}\) Ibid.
\(^{435}\) NAO, Reserve Forces, p. 2.
\(^{437}\) Dandekar et al., ‘Social Functioning and the Mental Health of UK Reservists’, p. 669.
\(^{435}\) Ibid., p. 670.
\(^{438}\) NAO, Reserve Forces, p. 41.
Independent Commando Squadron RE post-Operation Herrick 5, the demobilisation process happened in Cyprus (Camp Bloodhound), a day-and-a-half of decompression before they flew home.\textsuperscript{437} The latter example of demobilisation was an improvement on their previous deployment to Operation Telic 1 (the invasion of Iraq in 2003) when the returning Territorial soldiers received one lecture on dealing with traumatic experiences, after which they flew back to London to unpack equipment before demobilising at Chilwell and then home.\textsuperscript{438}

All the interviewees for this research said that once they had finished their tours and decompression, that was the last they heard from anyone representing the Regular Army and the AWS.\textsuperscript{439} Sergeant Busby (350 Field Squadron RE and 131 Commando RE, permission given to use his name) stated that "Once we had left Chilwell and demobilised, we were left entirely in the hands of our TA units with no further contact with the Regular Army".\textsuperscript{440}

However, not all Territorials were demobilised immediately upon finishing their tour. Those Territorials who came home with an ailment or injury suffered in the theatre were given remedial care which was excellent, either carried out at Chilwell for the less severe injuries, or Headley Court if the injuries were more serious for as long as it took.\textsuperscript{441} For example, interviewee Territorial D presented with a minor injury to his back while demobilising at Chilwell and felt the care he received after that was "fantastic". He was not signed off by the Army until his injury had fully healed.\textsuperscript{442} There was also a case of one of the Territorials presenting with the very obvious signs of PTSD during the decompression phase (Cyprus) of demobilising. This Territorial again received excellent treatment, this time being treated through the NHS.\textsuperscript{443} Nevertheless, if a Territorial slipped through this net once he/she had signed off from the Regular Army, telephone numbers were handed out to the Territorials should they need help and then no further contact or monitoring was received, leaving many Territorials feeling that they were poorly supported post-tour. The MoD and government should question

\textsuperscript{438} Interview, MAR/TA 04-19 June 2014.
\textsuperscript{439} Interviews, MAR/TA 01, MAR/TA 02, MAR/TA 03, MAR/TA 04, Sergeant N. Busby ‘Telic Mobilisation’.
\textsuperscript{440} Sergeant Busby, ‘Telic Mobilisation’.
\textsuperscript{442} Interview, MAR/TA 03. The Territorial in question was kept at Chilwell, where he received an MRI scan and was appointed a physiotherapist and remedial therapy until well enough to sign off.
\textsuperscript{443} Interview, MAR/TA 01.
greater use of the AR in the future when they tend to suffer more mental illness when deployed, or at the very least afford much greater post-tour care.

The legacies of a hard deployment

... when the emotional soul receives a wounding shock, which does not kill the body, the soul seems to recover as the body recovers. But this is only appearance. It is really only the mechanism of the resumed habit. Slowly, slowly the wound to the soul begins to make itself felt, like a bruise, which only slowly deepens its terrible ache, till it fills all the psyche. And when we think we have recovered and forgotten, it is then that the terrible after-effects have to be encountered at their worst.

Fighting in, witnessing and being part of a conflict can affect the many different characters involved in myriad ways. Conflict affects Regular soldiers and Territorial soldiers alike and its aftermath can tear some soldiers and their families’ lives apart. When the Great War ended, there was a fear that trained killers brutalised upon the field of battle, inured to violence, would slide easily into violent crime when they returned home. However, the crime statistics for England and Wales immediately before, and immediately after, the Great War did not record any significant difference for the types of offences that may have been expected from brutalised soldiers. However, although the soldiers who had fought in and won the Great War were rightly recognised as heroes, a few displayed some or all of the problems associated with PTSD, a condition not recognised until the Vietnam War and only officially recognised in 1980. For those wives and families that had to cope with drunkenness, violence, anxiety and financial disaster at home from men who found it impossible to articulate what they had experienced, help was at hand, not from the government that had sent their husbands to fight, but self-help. The Ex-Services Welfare Society (now Combat Stress) was established by women in 1919 who were concerned by the lack of psychiatric support available for their husbands, many of whom had been committed to asylums. Many veterans from the ranks became marginal or forgotten figures, often treated with disdain.

444 Lawrence, Lady Chatterley’s Lover, p. 41.
446 Ibid., p. 179.
447 US Department of Veterans Affairs, ‘PTSD History and Overview’. In 1980, the American Psychiatric Association added PTSD to the third edition of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders nosologic classification scheme, http://www ptsd va gov/professional/ptsd-overview ptasd-overview asp [Accessed: 02/12/14].
448 Summers, Stranger in the House, p. 67.
and stigmatised. However, if one could afford to pay for treatment, as was the case with many of those in the officer class, the stigma label was not attached. 

Nevertheless, work helping war veterans with their psychological problems proceeded up to, and beyond, World War Two and was then undertaken by the renamed Ex-Services Mental Welfare Society. What is now named Combat Stress deals with the veterans from Britain’s recent wars in Iraq (960 patients) and Afghanistan (662 patients), who are part of the over 5,600 veterans from nineteen to ninety-seven years of age who are receiving treatment for psychological conditions caused by combat. It is stated by Combat Stress that ‘it is seldom appreciated that the number of psychiatric casualties of war far exceeds those who are killed or physically disabled’. Recent reports have discovered that Territorials and Reservists are currently becoming more affected by psychological conditions than those who have served in the Regular forces.

Throughout the UK Armed Forces history, alcohol has been a socially acceptable device to enable bonding and comradeship. However, it has been discovered that personal drinking levels within the Armed Forces, including the Territorials, rose significantly after the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. A King’s College report into alcohol consumption by UK troops after deployment to Iraq found that out of those the report questioned (10,272 participants), Territorial soldiers who had deployed to Iraq were heavier drinkers than the Regular soldiers (18.5 per cent versus 11.5 per cent). Territorials were also found to be greater risk takers (in driving, dangerous sports, etcetera) when they arrived home. The heavier drinking and greater risk taking of some Territorials were linked to family issues and civilian employment careers, both during and after overseas deployments. Heavy drinking and problems relating to combat experience and/or PTSD are also major contributors to suicide, which often kills soldiers decades after their wars are over. The British government does not record suicide rates among ex-soldiers, but in 2012 (Afghan winter tour), for example, twenty-

449 Barham, Forgotten Lunatics, p. 6.
450 Ibid., p. 40.
451 Summers, Stranger in the House, p. 67.
453 Ibid.
455 T. Browne et al., ‘Iraq alcohol use among male UK armed forces’, p. 628.
456 Ibid., p. 629.
457 Ibid.
one serving soldiers committed suicide and twenty-nine veteran soldiers took their lives in Britain. During that same year (summer tour), the death toll in Afghanistan among British soldiers was forty-four, with forty being killed in combat. In the USA, which does record suicide by veterans, the suicide rate eclipses the UK, with 6,500 veterans committing suicide in 2012. During 2013 in the USA, it has been claimed that an average of more than twenty-two veterans were killing themselves per day. The poor support given by the AWS experienced by many Territorials conflated with the inability of many veterans to fully articulate their feelings has, in some cases, led to problems with their mental well-being. The report on social functioning referred to above stated in its conclusion that data from both the USA and the UK suggested that the Reservists’ homecoming experiences may be a determinant of their increased risk of PTSD.

The charity Combat Stress states that, on average, it takes thirteen years after discharge before a veteran suffering mental disorders seeks help, by which time their condition can be highly complex. The reasons for this reticence usually originate from the shame of admitting that they are having problems. The 2014 UK Armed Forces Mental Health report revealed that the rate of mental disorder amongst all branches of UK Armed Forces personnel between the years 2007 and 2014 had increased by 74 per cent. Interestingly, and relevant for Territorials/AR (see the following table), the rate amongst those Service personnel aged between thirty and forty-four (Reservists tend to be much older than Regular soldiers), increased by over 100 per cent. The service which recorded the highest rate of mental disorders was the Army (33.4 per 1,000 strength) and the report found that the rate of mental health problems in females in 2013/14 was almost double the figures for males (62.2 per 1,000 strength). The report also states that, for each separate deployment, there is an increased risk of PTSD of 140 per cent for those previously deployed to Iraq and

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461 Ibid.
466 Ibid.
467 MoD, UK Armed Forces Mental Health: Annual Summary and Trends Over Time, p. 18.
468 Ibid., pp. 10-13.
469 Ibid., p. 10.
220 per cent for those soldiers previously deployed to Afghanistan. The approximate figures for Territorials/AR who presented themselves for assessment after their tours are listed in Table 4 below.

Table 4: Calls received by the Reserves Mental Health Programme, 2008/09 to 2013/14 numbers.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total calls received</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-referral</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>GP referral</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cases assessed</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>No mental disorder</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>~</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mental disorder non-combat related</td>
<td>~</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mental disorder combat related</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cases awaiting assessment at end date</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Appointments cancelled</td>
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<td>~</td>
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<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Did not attend</td>
<td>0</td>
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Note: Data presented as '−' have been suppressed in accordance with Defence Statistics' rounding policy.

When presenting with mental disorders, Reservists are referred to the Reserves Mental Health Programme, which is open to any current or former member (demobilised since 1 January 2003) of the UK Volunteer and Regular Reserves following an overseas operational deployment. While mobilised, the Reservists receive the same healthcare as their Regular comrades and, if they present with a mental health condition during that deployment, they receive medical treatment from the Defence Medical Services. However, once demobilised, Reservists would be referred to their local GP liaising with the Chilwell Mobilisation Centre. If the Reservist became diagnosed with a combat-related mental health condition, he/she would be treated at one of the MoD’s fifteen Departments of Community Mental Health. More acute cases of mental illness, including PTSD, are treated by NHS inpatient care.
From the ex- and current TA/AR personnel interviewed for this research, one of the interviewees, Territorial E, found it difficult to readjust to civilian life after returning from his tour in Afghanistan (2006–2007). After six years of increasingly angry behaviour, it was the intervention of his wife that ensured he saw a mental health practitioner and received the help he needed. The signs of adjustment problems appeared early. Territorial E stated that when he had finished his post-operational tour leave, he felt as if he did not have a care in the world. He also struggled to get back into his routine and, if anything went wrong at work, he was not bothered; he also frequently argued with his employer. His ‘don’t care’ attitude would last a few months and then he would return to his hardworking self for around a year before repeating the behaviour. As the years went by, Territorial E realised that he was starting to lose his temper more often and reported that ‘daft little things would put me in a mood. I’d just go off at the slightest little thing’. His wife, family and friends saw the changes in his behaviour, prompting his wife to contact his old TA unit who, thankfully, arranged help through the NHS.

With the government wishing to use the AR more in the future, integrated into the Regular Army and deployed overseas in potentially hostile scenarios, incidences of mental illness have the potential to grow. The government and the MoD have a duty of care to the AR, who the research indicates are more vulnerable to PTSD than Regulars. Furthermore, the AWS should afford greater resources of care to returning Reservists when they arrive back home from war zones. The AWS has failed so far in this endeavour and must realise that, if the AR is used more often for combat, their support services must not just concentrate on the Regulars within barracks. Furthermore, the AWS should endeavour to provide an outreach service to the sometimes isolated volunteer soldiers, which will add an extra cost to using the new AR.

The possibility of the AR being used much more is very real. The world of the early twenty-first century is a volatile place, with many threats emanating from a variety of hotspots. Part 4 analyses the threats and possible deployment venues of a future AR.

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474 Interview 6, MAR/TA 04.
475 Ibid.
476 Ibid
477 Ibid. The treatment was on the NHS and TA 04 attended one session a week for six months.
Section 4

What are the future threats to the UK and can the AR keep pace with the changing character of war?

Leading strategic analyst Julian Lindley-French suggests that the first half of the twenty-first century will consist of a struggle between liberal states and growing illiberal power - both state and non-state.\(^{478}\) Britain's recent military cuts have left the Army less powerful and therefore, by extension, less able to face or contain these future threats. There is an estimate that the cuts imposed from 2010 have made British military combat effectiveness 20-30 per cent less than it was before retrenchment.\(^{479}\) The questions are now: Are the threats Britain may have to face in the future 20-30 per cent less threatening; and: Will an Army Reserve of 30,000 be able to fill the capability gaps left by the retrenchment of 20,000 Regular troops?

There will be numerous state, terror, energy security, climate change and refugee/migrant challenges in the future for Great Britain, including many that do not affect Britain directly but do so strategically. Therefore, there will be scenarios that the AR will, potentially, have to train towards combating. The military build-ups and actions of Russia and China are concerns for the regions neighbouring these states. For example, in the East China Sea, China has caused consternation with neighbours Japan, concerning the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, and the Philippines, over the Spratly Islands under whose waters lie between 100 and 160 billion barrels of oil.\(^{480}\) China has also been exerting pressure upon Vietnam as they wrangle about oil and gas surveying on the Vietnam coast.\(^{481}\) Nevertheless, it is Taiwan that may be a most likely future flashpoint between China and the USA.\(^{482}\) Lindley-French contends that there would be little Britain could do to influence a potential war in the Far East. Yet, Britain could financially become severely damaged by a conflict in this region.\(^{483}\) In South and Central Asia, Ahmed Rashid claims that if Pakistan and Afghanistan continue upon their current chaotic paths, these two countries may have a greater impact on the

\(^{478}\) Lindley-French, *Little Britain?* p. 25.


\(^{480}\) Lindley-French, *Little Britain*, pp. 74-5.

\(^{481}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{482}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{483}\) *Ibid.*
world’s stability than any other place on earth. To counter these potential threats and catastrophes, Britain must prepare and this starts with strong Armed Forces that are deployable as part of a NATO force and a supporting AR that has adequately trained for conventional, counter-insurgency and hybrid warfare.

It is impossible to predict the future; one can only give pointers regarding what may happen based on past empirical evidence. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, in his book *The Black Swan* (‘black swans’ here are unpredictable events), argues that even when presented with evidence, it is impossible to predict the future. The world and the actions of its players, especially state and non-state actors who are sometimes unpredictable, mean that ‘black swans’ often appear with no foretelling. For example, the attack on the Twin Towers in New York in 2001, the Mumbai terrorist attack (2008), the Russian Federation annexing the Crimea (2014), Islamic State Iraq and Syria/Islamic State in the Levant’s (ISIS/ISIL/Daesh) actions in Syria and Iraq (2014–2016) or recent terrorist outrages upon British holiday-makers in Tunisia (March and June 2015), attacks upon the cartoonists of Charlie Hebdo and the Jewish Supermarket in Paris (January 2015), and on the Paris Bataclan (November 2015) are all black swans and point to a new fluid style of attack. The latest terrorist threats emanating from ISIS/ISIL/Daesh also have a new agenda, which will need to be engaged as recently disclosed documents from the Salafist fundamentalists state that they wish to radicalise the ‘moderate Western Muslim’ demographic in Europe. Philosopher Slavoj Žižek postulates that this desire for the radicalisation of Europe’s Muslim population will, ISIS/ISIL/Daesh hopes, create conditions for open civil war, a wish reciprocated by some ‘nativist’ anti-Muslim groups within Europe. The radicalisation of some Muslims in Europe conflated with increasing Islamic radicalisation in South and Central Asia has not helped calm many Europeans’ fears over personal security, economic worries and a clash between two seemingly incompatible cultures. These concerns have been fuelled further by the mass movement of refugees and economic migrants attempting to relocate to Northern Europe.

The British military, including the AR, will face an ever more sophisticated threat in the future from terrorism. Former US intelligence analyst Matthew Burrows predicts

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487 Ibid.
488 Rashid, *Pakistan on the Brink*, p. 16.
that the next fifteen to twenty years will see terrorist groups able to use precision-strike weapons and cyber and bioterror weaponry which will cause much more damage than previously.\textsuperscript{489} As the Regular Army shrinks and police budgets tighten, how can an AR constrained by the Territorial Trinity of Commitments find time to train for anti-terror operations, alongside conventional training, on the streets of Britain? The training of soldiers to fight in an urban environment, ‘Operations in Built-Up Areas’, is an intensive and demanding commitment which would make a considerable demand on part-time soldiers’ precious training time. If ISIS/ISIL/\textit{Daesh}-inspired terrorists continue with their urban attacks, historic lessons from Uruguay in the 1960s and 1970s and their battles against the \textit{Tupamaros} may have to be studied, although this struggle involved negotiation to end the violence.\textsuperscript{490} However, modern terrorists, from the murderous \textit{Baader-Meinhof} Group (Red Army Faction), their allies the Palestine Liberation Organisation, through to Al Qaeda and ISIS/ISIL/\textit{Daesh}, ideologically did not and will not negotiate.\textsuperscript{491} Furthermore, with today’s Jihadi Salafist-inspired terrorists, AR soldiers would have to be prepared to kill if used for conflict of this nature.\textsuperscript{492}

During the early twenty-first century, the conflicts the West fought were multipolar. Confederation struggles with no traditional model of victory to decide the outcome militarily or politically. The messy counter-insurgency style conflict fought in Iraq and Afghanistan has now evolved into hybrid/unconventional or deniable warfare. Hybrid warfare (\textit{Maskirovka}), used currently in Ukraine by the Russian Federation, is a traditional form of Russian warfare which has been updated and now uses cyber attacks in conjunction with deniable guerrilla fighters, militias, criminal organisations, terror tactics, economic war and traditional warfare.\textsuperscript{493} This type of warfare negates, to a certain extent, the West’s technological edge.\textsuperscript{494}

The House of Commons Defence Committee in their report ‘Re-thinking defence’ stated that, as a response to \textit{Maskirovka} in Ukraine,

\textsuperscript{489} Mark Urban, \textit{The Edge: Is the Military Dominance of the West Coming to an End?} (London: Little Brown, 2015), p. 60.
\textsuperscript{490} Pablo Brum, \textit{The Robin Hood Guerrillas: The Epic Journey of Uruguay’s Tupamaros} (USA: Create Space, 2014), 402 pp.
\textsuperscript{492} Roxanne L. Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, \textit{Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden} (Princeton: PUP, 2009), pp. 3, 19 and 303. Salafism is a movement that aims to take the Islamic ideal back to how it was when the Prophet Mohammed was alive.
\textsuperscript{493} House of Commons Defence Committee, ‘Towards the next Defence and Security Review, 2014-15’, pp. 21-9. The report states that NATO has not considered Russia as an adversary for twenty years. However, cyber attacks on Estonia during 2007, the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the recent Russian-sponsored events in Ukraine have started to alert NATO to her deficiencies and preparedness.
the MoD had to re-establish maritime surveillance, increase Royal Navy manpower, enhance divisional manoeuvre and armoured capacity. This response would include the repositioning of British troops in continental Europe, working more closely with academics and the private sector to better combat asymmetric subversion, and finalise its doctrine on cyberwarfare.495

This list presents both challenges and opportunities for the AR. The challenges may be that, if the Regular Army were to be strategically repositioned, the AR could have more traditional defence responsibilities in Britain as a more widespread and local military force. More opportunities for the AR lie in specialisations that may be the key to a better way of using a part-time force, such as their potential speciality in cyber warfare using existing signals and telecommunications experts, and the use and expansion of their Royal Engineer regiments and squadrons. In 2006, it was realised that the then TA would have to be organised differently to take on future challenges. In the report ‘Future Territorial Structures’, rebalancing was announced which would contain a new general medical support regiment, a new national transport regiment, a new general support regiment, a new Army Air Corps support regiment, a new military intelligence battalion and a new military provost service company under the Adjutant General’s Corps.496

If the above structure or similar is adopted, the AR could potentially save money and limit the government’s use of loosely regulated private military companies, such as G4S, Aegis Defence Services, Control Risks and Olive Group, a group of external contracting companies the UK spends more on than any other EU member spends on external contractors.497 Recent figures show that spending on contracts with private UK security companies rose from £12.6 million in 2003 to £48.9 million in 2012.498 This has since increased to £58.3 million, according to figures recently released (2016) by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.499 Which is still small in comparison to the entire defence budget, however, these financial costs rise: the more dangerous the

contract, the higher the insurance premiums. The AR, as set up now, cannot be trained to meet both conventional and hybrid threats (including terrorism); they simply do not have the time to train due to the Territorial Trinity of Commitments and having to incorporate employment and family commitments. Therefore, if the AR is to survive as a viable part of the Army, specialisation seems to be the way forward.

Tied in with the threats of a potential Maskirovka and the changing character of war is Britain’s vulnerability to ensuring reliable energy security, especially in regard to Russia and its gas. A report from Exxon Mobil, ‘2020 The Outlook for Energy: A View to 2040’, estimates that global energy demand could be 25 per cent higher in 2040, with a world population of around 9 billion. Growing affluence in non-OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, states the Exxon Mobil report, will raise fuel demands and thus competition for resources, which has the potential for international friction.

Harald Welzer claims in Climate Wars that another very real possibility for future violence and war may be directly or indirectly connected to climate change and the shortage of water and, by extension, food, which could lead to mass migration and violence. Finally, Mark Urban, in his book on whether the ‘West’ is losing its technological edge through retrenchment and the erosion of its will to fight, posits the nightmare scenario of ISIS/ISIL/Daesh shifting its attention to the religiously divided Lebanon, one of the Middle East’s most stable states and Western ally Jordan or the petro-rich Saudi Arabia – which would cause a major fuel crisis for the West. Questions for further research, therefore, should examine British Armed Forces’ training to discover whether it could prepare soldiers, especially the AR, for these different scenarios and how they should coordinate their efforts with non-military uniformed services. However, to carry out their future strategic positioning and training to meet the threats they may face, the AR has to make FR2020 a success and fully integrate with their Regular comrades. A task that is taking some time to bed in.

502 Ibid.
504 Urban, The Edge, p. 141.
Conclusion

This chapter closes the themes discussed in this research. The AR struggles to attract and retain recruits and is finding it hard to fulfil the requirements of FR2020. The struggle the AR is experiencing is the same as that undergone by their antecedents the Territorials. One new and unwelcome trend, however, is that the cost to the government of deploying a part-time soldier overseas has become more expensive and continues to be so.

Nevertheless, again, much like their antecedents, judging by evidence collected by this research, the AR need to be able to train and keep themselves up to date with the changing character of war. They must also be able to master standard operating procedures and training in the different kit and equipment required for different scenarios. However, a commitment of around twenty-seven days can never be enough to train part-time troops in all the necessary skills needed to incorporate all the skills and knowledge needed to work on a par with Regular soldiers without substantial extra training. The government claims that the AR will be trained longer and harder with more kit and equipment, but this is a non sequitur; even a few weeks of extra training is not sufficient. As already argued, an AR soldier, like his/her Territorial equivalent in the past, needs extensive, theatre-specific, full-time PDT before deployment.

However, is it wise to use the AR more in the future, even with an extensive PDT? Evidence used in this chapter shows that part-time soldiers are more prone to suffering from PTSD and other combat-related mental illnesses. Therefore, the facts regarding the higher rates of combat-related illnesses should set an alarm ringing for the government to investigate this phenomenon and perhaps reassess using the AR more as stated in FR2020. This chapter concludes that it is not wise to heap ever more reliance on part-time soldiers to fill in for a retrenched Regular Army.

This chapter shows that the AR is a long way from achieving the requirements laid down in FR2020. Moreover, if the ‘red-flagged’ AR project fails to meet its stated aims, the AR2020 and FR2020 ‘restructuring’ may also fail. This impending failure may leave British security with many capability gaps, exposed by the retrenchment of the professional British Army and in a perilous position with limited means of plugging those gaps. Many regions of the world are in flux, with rising illiberal powers re-arming in a bid to compete for future resources, the Middle East is in chaos and a Europe politically and militarily weak is struggling to manage a refugee/migrant crisis from Africa and the Middle East. It is, therefore, essential that Britain has a credible twenty-first-century security plan in which her Armed Forces can face the challenges from the
growing threats of Russia and Jihadist terror. However, the AR, with its organisational framework still based upon the Territorial Force framework of operation, will find it increasingly difficult to train for all the scenarios the twenty-first century presents. Due to the ties of the Territorial Trinity of Commitments, the Reservist of the future will have the same difficulties in finding enough time to train for conventional war, hybrid war, insurgency and possible action against terrorists, both homegrown and foreign. Therefore, as FR2020 begins to falter, it is time for a rethink on the role of Reservists. The world has changed radically since the end of the Cold War, as has warfare. Therefore, the time has come for the AR to exploit its soldiers' civilian skills and concentrate on becoming a specialist back-up to the Regular Army. In the future, intelligence, communication, cyber, engineering and supply skills should complement the excellent work of the Medical Reserves to ensure that the Regular Army can operate safely in the knowledge they have professional technical back-up helping them do their job.

However, achieving the balance required to ensure that the AR not only delivers a trained and capable soldier, but perhaps one that has the specialist skills needed by the Army at large, may cost even more money that it does now. This chapter has demonstrated that to deploy a Territorial overseas during the Iraq and Afghan campaigns cost significantly more than it did to deploy a Regular soldier. These costs can, arguably, only rise for the AR soldiers in the future, as it is predicted in FR2020 that they will be used more frequently as a greater proportion of a much smaller Army. However, once used, these part-time volunteers were, after Iraq and Afghanistan, left to continue their civilian lives with very little transition preparation from war zone to civilian workplace. This fact could affect recruitment in the future. The Army should convince potential joiners that they will be looked after to the same standard as Regular soldiers, both in the field and when the Reservist returns home, if it wants more recruits. Recent poor service from the AWS let down many Territorials who suffered from mental illness after being deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. There has to be a more professional AWS, which should concentrate many more resources into visiting ex- and currently serving Territorials/AR at their homes (alongside their families) if necessary to help with any problems they have after serving overseas. Finally, the statistics suggest that Reservist soldiers are more prone to mental illness after a tour abroad. The government and the MoD should, therefore, investigate whether it is morally right to use the future AR more on overseas deployments and, if they do, they should commit to caring for those who return with mental illness for as long as it takes. The British
military face and ever more sophisticated threat from many opponents and an AR that can only train for so many weeks a year, due to the restrictions of the Territorial Trinity of Commitments, will find it more and more difficult to train for and become efficient for the variety of challenges of the future. To keep costs down, recruitment steady and the AR relevant and efficient a new approach in how to use the part-timers has to be found.
Conclusions

This thesis has, through the research undertaken, added to the literature and historiography and conceptually expands the way Territorial soldiers have been understood and judged by addressing the issues the Territorials faced while trying to achieve efficient soldier status. By conducting a systematic investigation of the Territorial organisation as a whole, this research has apportioned equal weight to their training, employment and family issues. The research undertaken triangulated the Territorials’ training, employment and family circumstances to measure fully how successfully the organisation and its volunteers navigated their challenges to efficiency, and found that the same core challenges faced by historic part-time soldiers have not changed for the Army Reservists of today. Unfortunately, a lack of understanding of both the Territorial Trinity of Commitments and Territorial history has ensured that the modern Army Reserve is struggling with the same challenges their antecedents faced.

In looking back to the Army Reserves’ antecedents to discover whether the AR can fulfil its new role within FR2020, the research undertaken for this thesis suggests that Reservist part-time troops cannot be a substitute for full-time Regular soldiers as suggested in the proposed FR2020 ORBAT. The government stated that 30,000 Reservists would be capable of filling the capability gap left by the sacking of 20,000 veteran Regular soldiers, while insisting that Reservists are much cheaper than Regular soldiers. This ‘cheapness’, however, is only true if the Reservists never deploy. As shown in Chapter Five, after all the allowances and benefits handed out to the soldier, his/her family and the soldier’s employer, the costs are very much higher. Furthermore, the Territorials could never train to the standards of Regular soldiers due to their limited training. Therefore, to be of use in the field, the part-time soldier always needed and still needs a PDT course of at least three months. The PDT needed by Reservists should be adhered to and never truncated as per the government’s argument of the AR receiving more training (which at best only equates to extra weeks) and better equipment. This extra training argument has never worked historically within the Territorial structure and, because the framework of training (drill nights, weekends and annual camp) for the AR has altered little since 1908, it would be hard to see it working now.

Essentially, how long and how hard a part-time soldier can train depends on the Territorial Trinity of Commitments – which involves work and family commitments. This research argues that the newly named AR will be likely to suffer from the same issues and limitations as its predecessors regarding their civilian commitments. The
government needs to address the fact that despite tinkering with the volunteer soldier concept, a more radical reform is required for the UK’s part-time force. The government also needs to stop reassuring the country that the AR will eventually become a success. Professor Stephen Walt (International Affairs, Harvard) has stated that, ‘If you keep describing difficult situations in misleading or inaccurate ways, plenty of people will draw the wrong conclusions about them and will continue to support policies that don’t make a lot of sense’.  

The research of Territorial historical training has demonstrated that the Territorials could only be as good as the training, kit and equipment they received, which have often not been of the highest standard. For example, pre-Great War Territorial Force musketry failures became an excellent tool with which to beat the part-timers, but they failed because of limited time, lack of ranges, inadequate ammunition supply and, perhaps more crucially, obsolete rifles that were susceptible to becoming cord worn when the British Army switched from black powder to cordite in 1911. Examples are many, from the musketry and gunnery failures pre-Great War, to the very poor training and funding received by the pre-World War Two Territorials and the inadequate preparation of Territorial soldiers during the initial stages of the Second Iraq War. This research insists these difficulties were the symptoms of a far greater malady within the structure of Territorial training and preparing Territorials for combat. The Territorials were inevitably blamed for these failings, camouflaging the real culprits with regard to inefficiencies, namely, the government, War Office (MoD) and the Army Council (see Chapter One). The pre-Great War TF that suffered in their training and their reputation from the camouflage of blame by those in power, but the research in this thesis has found that this type of distraction technique has been a constant throughout Territorial history.

The research conducted in this thesis on the training of the Territorial organisation from 1908 to 2013 argues that the lion’s share of the blame for inadequately trained part-time troops should be directed towards the governments of the time, for failures in investment in training and equipment, and the Regular Army, who were responsible for training the Territorial organisation. To this end, the research also argues that the poor perception from which the Territorials have suffered accrued from their formation in 1908 up until today and should be reassessed; in particular, taking into account the

National Service League’s pro-conscription propaganda, which laid the platform for future anti-Territorial bias.

Good-quality training is the key to an efficient, robust force and as Territorial soldiers were only able to train for short periods of time (around twenty-seven days, roughly the same as the AR) they always needed PDT to ensure that they could operate alongside Regular troops without endangering themselves or the Regulars after mobilisation. It is illuminating that, after receiving their full PDT, most formations in the historical periods investigated proved to be competent and efficient soldiers.

Comparisons between Territorials who received adequate PDT and those that deployed against the enemy receiving little or no PDT have no better example than the 1/7th Royal Warwickshire Regiment TA, Belgium and France 1939/40 compared with the 148th Brigade of the 49th Division (1/5th Leicestershire Battalion and the 1/5th Sherwood Foresters) TA, Norway 1940. During the Phoney War period before the German attack on 10 May 1940, the 1/7th Warwicks trained at every opportunity alongside their Engineer support, 245th Field Company RE. This training led to higher motivation, functional fitness, a belief in battle drills, standard operating procedures and faith in the regimental command structure. After combat on the Ypres-Comines Canal (Belgium) and on the retreat to Dunkirk, the regiment and its support fought well and made it back to Britain almost intact. However, it was a very different picture for the luckless 148th Brigade during the Norwegian Campaign, 1940. Until the 148th Brigade received their orders to lead the assault on Trondheim, the Territorials that made up the brigade were deployed on static guard duty in Britain. They had had little military training, certainly no Arctic training, possessed no skis or snowshoes and only had smoke for their mortars; many had not even fired their rifles either for zeroing or during range days. When faced by elite German ski troops and Armour, the brigade was badly mauled.

The Territorial organisation and now the AR are what they are: part-time soldiers who need extra training to be able to deploy safely. Therefore, to be able to do this there has to be Regular Army critical mass (enough soldiers to fight an enemy and enough trainers to train the Reservists at home) to conduct operations until their part-time PDT-trained reinforcements can take the field. The conditions of FR2020 and the sacking of 20,000 Regular troops have hollowed out the Army regarding critical mass and trainers and has made the difficult task of preparing Reservists more difficult.

Nevertheless, to get the Territorials and now the AR to a basic standard of soldiering, part-time soldiers had and have to attend drill nights, weekends, annual camp and courses. To attend training, the Territorials and today’s AR had and have many
obstacles to hurdle. Employers' consent was essential historically and remains essential today, not only for allowing the part-time soldier to attend annual camp and training courses, but such support has always been critical for deployment. This support was needed for the Territorials who volunteered for service during the Great War through to the Territorials of World War Two, who had jobs held open for when they returned. Those mobilised during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan also needed their employers' support when their employee could often be away from work for almost a year. Today, with the quickening pace of globalisation and the multi-national nature of most international businesses, it is indeed more difficult today for the part-time soldier to count on the support of his or her employer when an extended period of training needs to be carried out.

This research has revealed that there is a historical pattern of support for the Territorial organisation from big business and government institutions; support that may be essential to nurture and continue to help the new AR succeed. However, despite the support of many in big business and the Civil Service for the Territorials, this research has found that opposition or an inability to support the Territorials throughout their time came from socialist groups, such as the Trades Union and the Labour Party (now an objection from the past), and SMEs who cannot afford to lose employees to mobilisation. In a Britain after the recession (2008) and the historic Brexit vote, it may be harder than ever to keep the support of SMEs and perhaps some of the big businesses that offered support in the past.

Nevertheless, with recruitment for the AR faltering and the FR2020 project in danger of failing, this research has found that support from multinational business is also not as strong as it was, even before the recession and Brexit. In the past, Britain's largest capital firms, such as Reckitts and the BGLC, actively supported the Territorial organisation for a variety of reasons, which included keeping conscription at bay and the beneficial symbiotic relationships incorporating supply to Territorial Associations. However, as the world becomes ever more globalised, allegiances become much looser. When the Chair of the National Employer Advisory Board states that since the recession business can no longer afford to sustain a benevolent relationship with Defence, it is time to sit up and take notice. Add this shrinking support to modern sedentary lifestyles and an ever-increasing and extensive choice of leisure pursuits for the potential recruiting groups, it is easy to see why the AR is struggling to recruit, as the Territorials struggled before them.

505 Corry, "How can Defence best work with Employers?" SaBRE Official Blog.
A well-coordinated and relentless approach to tempting potential recruits is needed to start addressing these problems. However, this research has discovered that the organisation responsible for promoting the Armed Forces Reservists, SaBRE, was struggling to make an impact. For example, 73 per cent of business members (of over 200 organisations) surveyed by RUSI on the work of SaBRE, who had experienced employing Reservists on mobilisations, claim never to have heard of SaBRE or its campaign to enhance the employer/Reservist relationship.\textsuperscript{507} SaBRE had to become more active to aid those Reservists who suffered discrimination in the workplace for being a Reservist. The government consultation for FR2020 revealed that 46 per cent of the Reservist respondents became disadvantaged in their places of work due to being a Reservist. SaBRE was replaced/absorbed by the Defence Relationship Management organisation (2015-16), possibly as a reflection of SaBRE struggling to fulfil its mandate adequately. It is, therefore, essential for the healthy future of the AR that businesses, no matter what size, support Reservists from all arms (Army Reserve, Royal Marines Reserves, Royal Navy Reserve, Royal Air Force Reserves) and to do this the DRM needs to become much more proactive than its previous incarnation.

In the past, the County Territorial Associations were on the front line of employer/Territorial relationships. The Associations, networking liaison committees and local businesses worked hard to keep recruits coming in what was a high annual turnover for the organisation. Perhaps lessons can be learned from the old Associations. However, as with SaBRE and now the DRM Scheme, the Associations were preaching mainly to the converted. Recruitment and retention, unfortunately, is a weakness inherent within the organisation of Reservist troops in the UK. The Territorial Trinity of Commitments' rules are iron hard as to how much time can be spared from his or her work and family commitments. Nevertheless, with a much-reduced professional Army, if FR2020 fails, Britain's security is at risk. Any shortfall in the military could put AR soldiers in the front line sooner than planned, which, by extension, will affect the AR soldier's family, an influence that is as powerful as employer support for the healthy future of the AR.

This research has found that, from 1908 through to today, a Territorial soldier's family was vital to the commitment of the part-time volunteer. The wife, husband, girlfriend, boyfriend or family not only influenced how much training a soldier attended, but also how long a volunteer served with his/her unit. The traditional narrative of the 'Home Front' often described the role of women and children left

\textsuperscript{507} Philips, 'The Future of the UK's Reserve Forces', \textit{RUSI}, p. 68.
behind during war as problems requiring protection. But women (and, today, men left at home) and families as a whole have a far greater role to play in the support of Territorials that were mobilised overseas. During the twentieth century, support by wives and families not only depended upon receiving financial compensation when the part-time soldiers were away at summer camp, but also whether the mothers or wives had lost a male relative during the Great War. This attitude mainly affected numbers joining the TA during the 1920s and 1930s. Furthermore, during this period, many women looked upon Territorial drill halls as drinking dens and many women discouraged participation with the Territorial Army because it took their husbands away from home too often.598 Another problem the wife and family at home faced during the wars of the twentieth century was finance. If the family at home was suffering financially due to delayed allowances, the soldier fighting overseas could be affected by his family's suffering. It was a worry for the government and the War Office, who realised that a happy wife meant a better soldier at the Front. Welfare for families did slowly improve by degrees from woeful beginnings and today it is not always financial matters that affect the family at home when the Territorial deploys. The problems of keeping a happy family during the absence of an active Territorial at camp or mobilised has always been a challenge to both the Territorial unit and the Territorial soldier. Wallace Earl Walker, in his 1990s study of the Territorial Army, states that family pressure played a vital role by inhibiting volunteers from contributing more. Interviews for this research show that after deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan wives wanted their husbands to leave the Territorials altogether, due to difficulties they faced with minimum or no help from the AWS and their husband's units.

The partner and family are as equal a pillar in the Territorial Trinity of Commitments as training and employment. A delicate balance has to be struck and generous moral support (today the financial assistance is adequate) needs to be in place in the future for those left at home, which of course will add to the costs of running the reserves. The research carried out for this thesis discovered that the AWS was far from satisfactory when it came to supporting the partners and families of Territorial soldiers during the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns (2001–2013). In all the interviews carried out for this research, the AWS never once contacted the wives and families of the deployed Territorials and, on some occasions, the parent Territorial unit's contact was minimal. If, as the government states in FR2020, the AR will be used more in the future, including extra training, the welfare of those left at home has to become a high

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598 Dennis, The Territorial Army, p. 176.
priority. However, it was not only Territorial families that had little contact with the AWS; it was also the Territorial soldiers who, once the overseas tour had finished, were thanked and then forgotten.

Recent research from King’s College, London shows that Territorials who have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan are more prone to mental disorders than their Regular Army comrades. The research revealed that Territorials who had returned from Iraq and Afghanistan were proportionally more likely to drink heavily and take greater risks, for instance when driving. Furthermore, the abrupt transition from front-line soldier to civilian work often affected some returning Territorial soldiers’ mental health. As the Territorial usually returned home separately from the Regulars he/she had served alongside, research has shown that being apart from the group with whom the Territorial had shared the dangers of battle isolates the part-timer and sometimes mentally affects him/her. Most returning soldiers come home with a lingering sense of dissatisfaction with what they return to in modern-day Britain. Regular soldiers, conversely, decompresse together and can share their stories and concerns with each other in a graduated way, thus reducing the potential for maladaptive psychological episodes. It must also be noted that the importance of long, hard, realistic training helps reduce the chances of war-induced mental illness. It is no mistake or quirk that the tight-knit, more thoroughly trained Royal Marines are less prone to PTSD than all other British Armed Forces.

It is important to state that the majority of soldiers, both Regular and Territorial, will never suffer from mental illness such as PTSD. However, this research cautions against using part-time soldiers too much in conflict without the proper and continuous support needed to combat the sudden transition back into civilian life. Without the close support of troops who have shared similar war experiences, some part-time soldiers, unlike Regular Army soldiers, can experience adjustment problems and sometimes PTSD. If the government wishes to use Army Reservists more in future conflicts, as intimated in FR2020, the AWS needs to increase its support for the often-forgotten Reservist soldiers and their families significantly.

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509 T. Browne et al., ‘How do experiences in Iraq affect alcohol use among male UK armed forces personnel?’ *Occupational and Environmental Medicine*.
510 C. Dandeka et al., ‘Coming Home’, *Annals of Epidemiology*.
Future Reserves 2020: future threats and the changing character of war

The cuts and retrenchment of the British Armed Forces under FR2020 are set against the context of a world that is currently out of equilibrium. By sacking 20,000 Regular soldiers and hoping to replace them with 30,000 Army Reservists, it could be argued that the government is taking a risk with Britain’s security. The threats stacking against Britain and the West as a whole are many, as detailed in Chapter Six. To help combat these threats, the Army Reserve needs to be at full strength, trained enough to be able to transition to full theatre-specific PDT, whilst encompassing the support of employers and family.

The AR as it is currently structured cannot possibly find the time to train for either conventional or hybrid warfare (including terrorism). However, as detailed in the government’s plans for FR2020, the AR is to become part of a multi-brigade ORBAT, incorporating different levels of readiness, under FR2020. Despite this, the AR is still only trained in conventional warfare, but many of the looming threats to the stability of the world are not conventional in nature. For example, the AR needs to be trained to confront the Maskirovka currently being used in the low-intensity war in Ukraine and, if Russian threats escalate, it may be needed in the Baltic States. Currently, there is a heightened threat of Islamic terrorism from protagonists linked predominantly to ISIS/ISIL/Daesh. If there is an incident in a British city, the local AR unit closest to an incident may have to respond to take on terrorist gunmen. Warfare and terrorism are changing rapidly, and the AR will have to change quickly to help meet these changes.

This research argues that, for the future, the AR should use the changing character of war to make its volunteers’ roles more specialised. For example, with the development of cyber warfare, AR specialists (when recruited) could be ideally situated to form an auxiliary arm to supplement current British cyber doctrine. Moreover, this research argues that the AR should withdraw its commitment to infantry and tank battalions and repurpose the AR to just support. War is becoming more sophisticated, and fighting troops need an increasing amount of training to stay relevant to what they will face in the future, and the AR needs to specialise more in the support of front-line troops. The part-time arm of the British Army already has excellent Royal Engineer Reserves, and these squadrons and battalions should be developed alongside existing signals, telecommunications and intelligence. The AR and the government should start to utilise the specialist civilian skills that Britain has to offer.
To help in recruitment, recognition of the achievements of the Territorials during the Great War, World War Two and in Iraq and Afghanistan may garner some pride in the Reserves (who, as a rule, do not celebrate their unit histories). The smashing of the myth that the Territorials were inherently useless since the TF was formed in 1908 should also begin. If sent to fight with little or no PDT, Territorials did not perform well; however, after PDT and a few months in the field, they did become useful formations that helped to win wars. Finally, if the new AR is to become an accepted and vital part of the Army as a whole, perhaps more social incentives could become part of their remit. These part-time soldiers are local men and women and their use more often in helping communities in disasters such as flooding will help local units to bond more in the community and may provide a source of recruitment in the future.

The research in this thesis fills a conceptual and historiographical gap in the study of the British part-time volunteer soldier (1908–2013). The research conceptually expands the way Territorial soldiers are understood by addressing the issues and struggles that daily confronted the part-timer in his/her quest for efficiency. This study also demonstrates that historically the Territorial volunteer soldier could only train for short periods of time. The pre-war, pre-deployment Territorials whose longest training periods were annual camps lasting eight to fifteen days were not militarily capable of overseas deployment until they had had a substantial PDT. Moreover, the research offered in this thesis argues that the struggles of the Territorial Force and Territorial Army from 1908 to 2013 share many similar characteristics to what the Army Reserve faces today. The Territorial Trinity of Commitments has an iron grip on the time an individual Reservist can commit to the organisation after the demands of work and family. This time commitment in turn in the past determined how the Territorials fared in tests and what kit and equipment they had to use, which was often obsolete. The reforms under FR2020 have not changed the AR into anything other than a rebranded Territorial Army, with more money spent for the same results. The modern AR now receive pensions and paid leave but fundamentally the framework for training – drill nights, weekends and annual camp – has not altered since 1908. Without radical change, the Army Reserve will struggle as its antecedents did and may not survive long into this century if it does not adapt to modern realities. If the newly named Army Reserve is to survive to fight in the future, and not fight to survive, Britain’s policy makers need to become less ignorant of the Territorials’ past.
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