Soviet/Vietnam Relations, 1969 to 1978

being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

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May, 1986
The SRV occupy an ambiguous position in relation to the Soviet Union, conforming neither wholly to the status of an eastern bloc state nor to that of a developing country. Furthermore, the dynamics of the relationship ensure that the client patron relationship has often been reversed. This study is structured around a loose methodological framework, in order to accommodate both Marxist-Leninist and international relations aspects of the problem.

A study of Soviet academic writing on Vietnam opens up several areas of inquiry. The course of the Paris Peace Talks, which coincided with detente and improved Soviet/United States relations, illustrates a conflict of interests for the Soviet Union. The war in Vietnam emerged as a lesser priority, in spite of the Vietnamese desire to move to a military conclusion. For the same reasons, Soviet support for Vietnam appeared muted in the period immediately following the cease fire of 1973 and amounted to an acceptance of the status quo for the foreseeable future, priority going towards economic reconstruction in the North rather than military action in the South. A Vietnamese initiative, therefore, led to the unexpected final victory of 1975. The Soviet Union were thus unprepared, immediately, to deal with the problems attendant upon reunification and continued Vietnamese hostilities with Cambodia. The Soviet/Vietnam Treaty of 1978 represents a harmonizing of Soviet and Vietnamese policy goals in which Soviet support for Vietnam in respect of full economic reunification and Cambodia as a sphere of Vietnamese influence was the political consequence.

The substantial power of leverage the Vietnamese have been able to exert at any given time, leads to a re-evaluation of the nature of the relationship and suggests an interpretation in terms of mutual advantage.
SUMMARY

The SRV occupy an ambiguous position in relation to the Soviet Union, conforming neither wholly to the status of an eastern bloc state nor to that of a developing country. Furthermore, the dynamics of the relationship ensure that the client patron relationship has often been reversed. This study is structured around a loose methodological framework, in order to accommodate both Marxist-Leninist and international relations aspects of the problem.

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<td>DRV</td>
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<td>FLPH</td>
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<td>ICP</td>
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank, in particular, the staff of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow, members of the British diplomatic community and all those who helped, in different ways, to make my stay in Moscow so illuminating. I would also like to thank Dr. Christine White, of the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex University, for her support and valuable criticism with regard to the Vietnamese side. Needless to say, none of the above can bear any responsibility for the views expressed in this work. Finally, I would like to thank the staff of the Computer Centre, Hull University, for their help and technical advice in the preparation of this manuscript.
INTRODUCTION

The central argument of this thesis is that the SRV occupy an ambiguous position in relation to the Soviet Union, conforming neither to the status of other Eastern European states nor to that of a developing country. Furthermore, the dynamics of the relationship ensure that the client patron relationship has often been reversed. Thus Soviet/Vietnam relations may provide a paradigm for other emerging African and Asian states.

This study covers the period 1969 to 1978. 1969 marked a reappraisal of Soviet policy in Asia, following the serious border disputes with China and the launching of the Asian Collective Security Plan. It could, of course, be argued that this date carries no particular significance in relation to Soviet/Vietnam relations, although in Vietnamese terms it signalled the ascendency of Le Duan within the party apparatus. Thus, whilst, to some extent, this date is arbitrary, it does allow a sufficient time span for a consideration of the later stages of the war with the United States, whilst avoiding too great a concentration on the origins of United States intervention. Throughout the seventies, the policy options facing the DRV/SRV leadership brought them closer to the Soviet orbit, until, in 1978, Vietnamese membership of the CMEA and the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation consolidated this process and led to the belief that Vietnam had "signed up", so to speak, for membership of the Soviet bloc. For this reason, 1978 has been chosen as the cut off point.

There has been no detailed study of Soviet/Vietnam relations in the sixties and seventies, that places Vietnam in the context of overall Soviet foreign policy. Whilst there have been studies which cover earlier historical periods (McLane, 1966, Duiker, 1975), and deal with Soviet
policy under Lenin or Stalin, most authors have concentrated on Vietnam in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and put the focus clearly on Hanoi. Thus Zagoria (Zagoria, 1967), defined the question in terms of the problems facing Hanoi in relation to Moscow and Peking. Similarly, Scalapino (Scalopino, 1963), is concerned with the response of Asian communist parties to Sino-Soviet rivalry. The essential drawback of viewing Soviet/Vietnam relations from the vantage point of Hanoi, however, is that it tends to screen out and minimise major determining factors in the formulation of Soviet policy and objectives towards Vietnam, such as, for example, Soviet-United States relations during the period of the war, the role of the Eastern European states and long-term Soviet objectives in Asia. Thus there appeared a gap that might be usefully filled.

There were, of course, special problems for Asian communism following the Sino-Soviet dispute, both for ruling parties such as the Vietnam Workers' Party and the Korean Workers' Party, as well as non-ruling parties such as the Japan Communist Party, in terms of the choices confronting individual parties, the pressures for conformity in either direction and the use to be made of the power of leverage the situation presented. Equally, however, the situation posed problems for the Soviet Union with regard to forestalling and managing potential and actual revolt within the Soviet bloc. The World Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, held in Moscow in 1969, for example (Mezhdunarodnoe soveshanie..., 1969), had, as the main item on the agenda, a resolution which, in effect, sought to isolate China and restore Soviet orthodoxy to the eastern bloc. Not surprisingly, most of the Asian parties resolved the dilemma this question presented by failing to attend the conference. The silence of the Asian parties, therefore, in matters relating to public conflict with the Soviet Union and China gave rise to the concept of the neutrality of Asian communism, which, with the work of Zagoria (Zagoria,
1967), Scalopino (Scalopino, 1963), and others (Rupen, Farrell, 1967, Honey, 1963), became received opinion. With this went the assumption that the Soviet Union had failed entirely to isolate China and reassert its own brand of orthodoxy. Nevertheless, following the United States withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 and the closer ties of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam with the Soviet Union, it became increasingly apparent that this conceptualisation was inadequate to explain the course of events in Vietnam. Conversely, the record of Vietnam with regard to nationalism, pragmatism in ideological matters and a fierce independence, did not lend itself easily to a characterization of the new phase of Soviet/Vietnam relations in terms of a weak, client state manipulated by a powerful patron. Thus it seemed necessary to look more closely at the real nature of the problem and the way it may have been perceived and acted upon from the point of view of the Soviet Union.

The obstacles to engaging in such a study should, however, be pointed out. There are, for example, substantial linguistic barriers for the native English speaker attempting to work from primary source material. Strictly speaking, one requires a reading knowledge of Russian, Vietnamese and possibly French, and such an undertaking would, in itself, provide the basis for several years of study. For the student approaching the problem from a social science background, this is not a practical proposition, and the solution, to a large extent, must be an approximation. It should be stressed, however, that the problem of access to original language sources is a general problem that afflicts all social scientists embarking on area studies. It is not a complete rationalisation to argue that what one loses linguistically, one gains in terms of social science background, and vice versa, although this is not a completely satisfactory answer. It is more true to say that a compromise is often the only alternative to not undertaking the study at all. Since the purpose of this work is to set
Soviet/Vietnam relations in the context of Soviet foreign policy, therefore, a study of Russian language sources has been accorded first priority, whilst Vietnamese sources have been used either in the official English translations of the Foreign Languages Publishing House, Hanoi, or of the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Far Eastern Section, monitoring reports.

With regard to transliteration, the British Standard system has been used throughout for the Cyrillic alphabet. This allows for a letter for letter transliteration which is helpful for identifying Russian sources where they appear in the English text, and has the technical advantage of avoiding too frequent use of diacritical marks and combinations of consonants. The Vietnamese language itself uses the Roman alphabet, with the addition of various diacritical marks. Following the usual convention, the appropriate diacritical marks have been omitted from Vietnamese proper names, where they appear in the English text. With regard to the Russian transcription of Vietnamese proper names, helpful in identifying all but the most well known persons and places where they appear in Russian language sources, the reader is referred to the article by Mkhitaryan, "О Russkoи transkriptsii dlya v'etnamskого yazyka" (Mkhitaryan, 1962), and by Miropol'skii, "О transkriptsii v'etnamskikh sobstvennych imen v spravichnike 'V'etnam'", (Miropol'skii, 1970). Finally, with regard to Chinese proper names, in the interests of consistency the Wade-Giles system has been preferred, as most of the material used pre-dates the introduction of Pin Yin.

Whilst these are practical problems that can be overcome, a more important problem is the lack of a precise theoretical framework within which to cast the study. When one seeks to arrive at an understanding of Soviet foreign policy, one is faced with a choice of perspectives from a multiplicity of disciplines - international relations, comparative
politics and communist studies. The choice of discipline determines, to some extent, how one conceptualises the problem and shapes what is left in and what is left out. Is it relevant, for example, that both the Soviet Union and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam are communist states? Is one looking at a bi-lateral relationship between governments or a more complex reaction taking place somewhere that is designated "the international arena"? Before proceeding to an examination of the subject matter, therefore, it is essential to clear a path through the maze of theorizing and conflicting arguments concerning conceptual frameworks.

How does one perceive the international system and is there a workable theory about behaviour between states? What is a communist state, and does it behave any differently to any other state? Are we all talking about the same thing, and according to what theory or perception of the state and international relations do the Soviet Union conduct their relations? In other words, is a discussion of, for example, Soviet-Vietnam policy predicated on a belief that as communist states they share a concern in various issues, such as communist orthodoxy, not applicable in the relationship of, say, the Soviet Union and Japan, or that the interaction between a client state and a superpower takes place in accordance with laws that govern the behaviour of all states? If it is the former case, one must provide a framework relating to the way in which communist states behave and which can take into account the role of other bloc members. However, this removes the behaviour of the Soviet Union and Vietnam from the context of something one might term the "international arena". If it is the latter case, one needs some sort of assumption concerning how states behave in the international arena. But this screens out the specifically communist aspect of such behaviour, and precludes the possibility of relating the behaviour of Vietnam, for example, to that of Romania, which may, as a member of the eastern bloc, be relevant. It
would seem, therefore, that there is some conflict between international relations as a discipline and communist studies. To look at communist foreign policy from an international relations perspective undermines some of the assumptions on which analyses of communist states are built.

The Soviet Union itself claims that relations between Marxist-Leninist states are qualitatively different. Guided by Leninist principles, and underpinned by the concept of socialist internationalism, relations between socialist states are described as "International Relations of a New Type" (Lebedev, 1978). This analysis, like other areas of Soviet theory, has been refined and modified over time, and, as such, is a useful indication of trends in Soviet thinking and policy.

Whilst a study of the literature may provide a useful tool for political analysis, therefore, it does not help in clarifying western conceptualisations of the Soviet bloc.

The problems of theory and conceptualisation raised by western writings have been discussed by several authors. Charles Gati, for example, claims that,

"...the integration of Communist studies with comparative politics has been far more evident in recent years than the integration of Communist studies with international relations."

(Gati, 1975, p.6)

He sees the problem as a conflict between the old and the new in communist studies, between traditional approaches to foreign policy behaviour, such as area studies, on the one hand, and the search for methodological experimentation and innovation on the other. He argues, however, in favour of methodological diversity, and referring to the denigration of the area studies approach by the more socially-scientific minded, says,

"Another way of putting it would be to say that if the subjects of our inquiries are so broad-minded as to speak of different
roads to socialism, we should surely outdo them by insisting on different roads to sound scholarship!"

(Gati, 1975, p.9)

Kanet claims,

"For the most part, studies of the foreign policies of the Communist states (including those of the author) have tended to be historical-descriptive in nature. Little effort has been made by students of Communist foreign policy - at least until quite recently - to bring into their analyses the hypotheses concerning foreign policy behaviour which have been developed in the broader field of international relations."

(Kanet, 1975, p.23)

The discussion moves, in a not always clear direction, back and forth between international relations, comparative politics and communist studies. Rosenau gets to grips with the issue, however, when he states that the barriers that separate those who deal in comparative and national politics, on the one hand, and those who deal in international relations, on the other, are to be found in the way each group structures its data.

"Consequently, far from being jealous of one another, students of national and international politics are essentially disinterested in each other's research and tend to talk past each other when they get together. They are kept apart not by mutual antagonism but by reciprocal boredom. Each group is trapped, as it were, in its own conceptual jail, and, like all prisoners, its members rarely get a glimpse at the life of those incarcerated elsewhere."

(Rosenau, 1969, p.8)

Is one, therefore, to attempt to escape from this conceptual jail, or should one remain imprisoned amidst the comfort of what is at least known
and manageable? Kanet observes,

"Some scholars need to begin linking the study of Communist foreign policy with theoretical advances - however meager and halting - which have been made in general international relations."

(Kanet, 1975, p.26)

Even a cursory glance at the condition of international relations as a discipline, however, shows the difficulties involved in achieving such an integration. Zimmerman, for example, claims that in the west, where international relations scholarship is reasonably advanced, there is uncertainty about the content of the study of international relations.

"One does not find ready-made a well articulated body of principles or hypothesis about the process of international relations against which Soviet international relations perspectives can be measured."

(Zimmerman, 1969, p.17)

He outlines the scope of the discipline, ranging from Hans J. Morgenthau and the realist school, to the opposite pole of Quincy Wright, and quotes Stanley Hoffmann's remark that,

"Theories of international relations are like planes flying at different altitudes and in different directions."

(Zimmerman, 1969, p.19)

If there is disagreement as to how a state behaves, how it should be perceived, or whether it exists at all as a unit of analysis, it is not surprising that this problem is manifest in the field of communist studies. On the other hand, one has to acknowledge that in the realm of foreign policy, a similar confusion afflicts communist studies, and as, Finley claims,

"The literature on Communist foreign policies is more divided in
the matter of interpretation than other subject matters."

(Finley, 1975, p.13)

How, therefore, is one to resolve this problem? There is a school of thought that sees the solution in terms of a search for more and better theory, to be pursued via comparing foreign policies. Kuhlman, for example, says,

"It should be pointed out that what is mandatory for theoretical advances are comparative foreign policies."

(Kuhlman, 1978, p.1)

This urge to compare is taken to extremes by Zimmerman, with his call for what he refers to as "comparative international systems" (Zimmerman, 1969). An over concern with methodology, however, to the detriment of analysis and interpretation, has led Rubinstein to the rather caustic comment that,

"According to Professors Finley, Krisch and Kanet, foreign policy is the last frontier of Communist studies, and the time has come to exploit the terrain. Equipped with theories, methodologies and collections of data, social scientists should venture forth into the labyrinthine by-ways of Communist foreign policy behaviour, bringing order and setting matters into comparative perspective."

(Rubinstein, 1975, p.42)

Clearly, there is a need for something in order to sort out the conceptual confusion, but it is not certain that this is the ruthless pursuit of theoretical advance. If theoretical advances are necessary, one wonders how they are to be pursued as an end in themselves. With respect to the comparative study, for example, does one plunge in, willy nilly, in the hope of discovery, or is the study a method of testing a theoretical hypothesis? Does one test the data against the theory or test the theory
against the data? At this point, one takes off into the realm of philosophy, and in many respects, theorising is a philosophical and not a social scientific past-time, often revealing more about the state of mind and values of the theorist than states, communist or otherwise. Witness, for example, the debate on the significance of models in the analysis of Soviet society (Bell, 1964, Inkeles, 1966, Meyer, 1967), and the argument that the climate of detente required a new way of looking at the Soviet Union to replace that of the totalitarian model (Laqueur, 1973, Lowenthal, 1976).

As an alternative to developing yet more theory, one can attempt a synthesis of the two disciplines. Triska and Finley, for example, (Triska, Finley, 1968), apply a systems approach to the study of Soviet foreign policy. Both Kintner and Klaiber's study (Kintner and Klaiber, 1971) and Triska's work on communist party-states (Triska, 1969) deal with Eastern Europe in terms of international relations. Similar in nature is Kuhlman's study (Kuhlman, 1978) of Eastern Europe. Sei Young Rhee (Sei Young Rhee, 1973), in an unpublished Ph. D. thesis, examines the relationship of the CPSU, the CCP and the JCP with reference to a modified version of Rosenau's linkage theory. Most of these studies, however, whilst interesting, remain experimental in nature, and often succeed only in presenting the same information in an apparently new package.

Yet another approach that attempts to synthesize these conflicting conceptual frameworks, is to look at the problem in terms of perceptual analysis. Exponents of this approach, in relation to both Asia and the Soviet Union, are Sen Gupta (Sen Gupta, 1977) in his work on Soviet-Asian relations, and Zimmerman (Zimmerman, 1969) in his analysis of the Soviet view of international relations. There are drawbacks to this method, however.

Firstly, the problem is to determine the reality, and whether or not
an interpretation is based on a distorted perception of reality, or a series of misassumptions. Bronfenbrenner (Bronfenbrenner, 1961), hypothesized, for example, the existence of a mirror image in Soviet American relations, that is to say, that there was a reciprocal distortion leading both the United States and the Soviet Union to hold remarkably similar views of each other. There is a psychological phenomenon in operation on a grand scale, which leads to a tendency to assimilate new perceptions to conform to previous expectations, and to regress to simple frames of reference, where groups or even whole societies are seen as either "good" or "bad". He also refers to the "Asch phenomenon", whereby one surrenders one's own judgement to that of the majority, and describes how, in a Soviet environment, he too became a victim of this and started evaluating world events from a Soviet point of view. These mechanisms, claims Bronfenbrenner, seriously distort reciprocal images of the Soviet Union and the United States, and this is true for both sides. The potential for misinterpretation makes it difficult to sustain a favourable impression, and the logical conclusion, since the expectation is deceit and trickery, is to see an off course satellite as a nuclear missile.(1) He also makes the extremely valid point that this misperception leads the United States to underestimate the value and appeal of communism to, say, a third world country, as communism is seen as a wholly bad system.

This latter point seems especially relevant to a study of Vietnam. There is still a tendency to see communism as monolithic and Soviet instigated. The United States-China rapprochement has done little to correct this trend, other than divide communists themselves into "good" and "bad", the good being the Chinese, the bad being any country friendly to the Soviet Union. Thus, by extension, attitudes of mistrust and hostility held with regard to the Soviet Union are transferred to Vietnam, which is seen as a Soviet proxy in Asia. The specific economic, social
and political conditions that may have given rise to Marxism-Leninism are disregarded, and the SRV is judged as a society which, for some unspecified motive, has deliberately chosen the path of evil. This almost theological framework is arrived at because of the implicit equation of communism with sin.

This equation was as a marked feature of United States society in the fifties, which was the context in which Bronfenbrenner made his analysis. Similarly, Daniel Bell, in his exposition of American society during this period, claimed,

"And the singular fact about the communist problem is that, on a scale rare in American political life, an ideological issue was equated with a moral issue and the attacks on communism were made with all the compulsive moral fervor which was possible because of the equation of communism with sin."

(Bell, 1964, p. 109)

According to this view, therefore, the Soviet Union, the SRV et al, have "fallen into sin" and must be "saved". If one doubts the driving force of this view, one only has to consider the lack of any concrete threat to the United States with the emergence of communism in Southeast Asia, and the subsequent United States involvement in Vietnam, which had aspects more of a crusade, than, even as opponents would have claimed, a neo-colonial attempt at the expansion of markets.

This attitude, that is, that communism is evil and Soviet inspired, has persisted throughout the sixties and seventies. One cannot deny that in much writing on the Soviet Union from a western stand point, there is still a tendency to portray east-west relations in terms of a millennial struggle between good and evil (Conquest, 1979, Solzhenitzyn, 1980). As Eckhardt and White confirm (Eckhardt, White, 1967), there is a double standard at work in one's judgement of the behaviour of the other, and,
"A psychological interpretation of this mirror-image relationship might include at least the mechanisms of denying and ignoring one's own national faults and the mechanism of projecting these faults upon the enemy."

(Eckhardt, White, 1967, p.331)

Unfortunately, it is hard to extricate oneself from this black and white view, for as Bronfenbrenner himself observes, a favourable view merely evokes the response that one has been duped into believing what the Soviets want one to hear. He also records the remark of western correspondents in the Soviet Union, that one is obliged to report a good story, and hence the appeal of blood, thunder, political machinations and intrigue, as opposed to anything based on human interest, that might portray the Russians in any way as people much like ourselves (Bronfenbrenner, 1961).

Secondly, and as a counterpart to the mirror image hypothesis, one must stress that when working in terms of perceptions, there is little to be gained from measuring a system in terms of its own internal logic. As Rosen and Jones claim, in their work on international relations theory, "Finally, we must say a word about the political implications of perceptual analysis. It has been said that this method tends to be forgiving of sins, to view the behaviour of each actor in the sympathetic light of his own values and experiences. Ultimately, each actor is free of responsibility, each the victim of his respective misperceptions. We concede that an agnostic analysis of positions, giving the internal logic of each side and avoiding absolute and external judgements, may introduce greater moral ambiguities than fixing a single position from which to assess all the alternative views. We believe that these dilemmas of relativism and ambiguity are
inherent in international relations, and that it is necessary to escape the comfort of one's own belief system. Relations between nations are in their very nature a meeting place of divergent perceptions."

(Rosen, Jones, 1977)

There would seem little point in escaping the comfort of one's own belief system, however, in order to take over, wholesale, somebody else's. One finds oneself, therefore, when dealing in terms of perceptual analysis, grappling with rather large questions, such as the nature of reality and the nature of evil. The problem, therefore, becomes that of making a rational comment or observation on the Soviet Union, without appearing to be either a cold war warrior or a fellow traveller.

Finally, one should add the perhaps somewhat obvious point that even though one may not be working from a model or theory, offering an interpretation of Soviet behaviour presupposes a set of values and assumptions, even though these may not be explicit. The historical-descriptive approach, as in the case of Zagoria's analysis of the role of Hanoi in the Sino-Soviet dispute (Zagoria, 1967), cannot escape from confronting many of these problems. The historical approach is based on assumptions that are not always spelt out, for example, that there exists an entity called the nation state, that political activity occurs between governments, and that we all think and act from perceptions of the international environment that are similar.

It may be, therefore, that the differences between the theoretical frameworks of international relations and communist studies cannot be synthesized, and that there will, as a consequence, be a certain methodological fuzziness. Thus, a historical/descriptive approach has been adopted, the assumptions of which are implicit rather than explicit, but which has the advantage of being able to take in the international
relations context of the problem, and, at the same time, deal with Vietnam as a Marxist-Leninist state.

The structure of this study is based on the view that Soviet foreign policy is conducted on a spectrum ranging from diplomacy at one end of the scale to trade and military aid at the other, each facet occupying an important place in the overall scheme. Chapter One, therefore, offers an overview of some of the issues and contradictions of Soviet foreign policy in Asia. Chapter Two outlines Soviet objectives with regard to Vietnam, and, through a study of Soviet published works, raises questions concerning the nature of the relationship. The remaining chapters then go on to explore this relationship with reference to a selection of central themes and issues, namely, relations between parties, the negotiation of the Paris Peace Agreement, post-cease fire relations, military aid, economic aid and trade.
The Marxist-Leninist analysis of Asia stems from Lenin's theory of imperialism, with its stress on the underdeveloped world as the weakest link in the capitalist chain. Lenin argued that imperialism had undergone modifications since Marx's time and that monopoly capitalism had now evolved to its final stage, which was characterised by the export of capital to less developed parts of the world, thus establishing a relationship between capitalism in Europe and colonialism in Asia (Lenin, 1966a, pp.185-304). What, however, was the nature of this relationship?

The result of the export of capital to the third world was the distorted development of capitalism in African and Asian countries, which precluded the emergence of an indigenous capitalist class. The classical Marxist view, however, suggested a three stage revolutionary process, whereby the emergence of a bourgeoisie was a precondition of class struggle and hence socialism. However, the success of the Bolshevik revolution itself had called into question the need to pass through the social democratic phase of the transition to socialism, and thus the theory of the three stage revolution itself, and this doubt, was, to some extent, reinforced by the failure of other revolutions to immediately materialise in Europe. Thus attention was focused on underdeveloped countries as a possible source of revolutionary change.

The first important debate on the problems of revolution in non-European countries took place at the Second Comintern Congress, in 1920. The Congress adopted, after amendment and modification, both Lenin's "Theses on the National and the Colonial Questions", and a complementary set of theses submitted by the Indian delegate, M. N. Roy (Lenin, 1966b, pp.240-245).(1) The theoretical issues, however, had by no means been
resolved and provided a continuing basis for discussion and disagreement.

Schram and Carrère d'Encausse (Schram, Carrère d'Encausse, 1965) give an interesting account of these issues as they arose during the Second Comintern Congress. The strategic plan, they claim, had three proponents, the Eurocentrism of the Italians, led by Serrati, the Asian orientation of Roy, and an intermediate position adopted by Lenin and some other Russian and European delegates. The Eurocentric view was rejected almost unanimously by the Congress and the real debate took place between Roy and Lenin, mostly in the commission. The course of the revolution in Europe, claimed Roy, depended entirely on revolution in Asia. Without the success of the revolution in Asia, the European revolution would count for nothing. Under pressure of opinion, however, Roy accepted modifications to his theses, which transformed it from a belief in Asia as the key to everything, to a simple affirmation that the Asian revolution was important and had a role to play in the world struggle against imperialism.

With regard to the tactical plan, the central problem concerned collaboration with the national bourgeoisie. Once again, the protagonists were Roy and Lenin. Lenin held the view that it was necessary to align with bourgeois-democratic liberation movements, whilst retaining communist party organisation. Nevertheless, implicit in this view was the idea that the national bourgeoisie would retain a prominent place in the movement. Such an attitude was understandable on Lenin's part, given that his task in relation to the Soviet government was to find whatever way possible of undermining colonial power, and thus reduce the threat to the emerging Soviet state in Europe, but it was not possible for an Asian revolutionary such as Roy to agree to submit indefinitely to the bourgeoisie of his own country.

With reference to the tactical plan, Lenin made some concessions to
Roy, for example, replacing the term "bourgeois-democratic" with that of "revolutionary". This did not exclude collaboration with the bourgeoisie, but allowed discrimination between good and bad movements. Roy, for his part, reciprocated by inserting in his complementary theses a reference to the usefulness of cooperating with bourgeois nationalists. However, the accent of the two theses remained different, the stress, in Lenin's case, being on the industrialised countries of Europe, and in Roy's case on the backward and peasant societies of Asia.

Both Roy and Lenin were in agreement, however, on a direct transition to socialism. There were, nevertheless, nuances in their views. With regard to Soviets, for example, Roy envisaged Soviets of workers and peasants, whilst Lenin envisaged Soviets of either "peasants", "toilers" or "the oppressed". One cannot say conclusively, however, that Lenin envisaged a communist party composed exclusively of peasants, but he foresaw the logical development of these ideas. Finally, all parties seemed to envisage a unilinear theory of development, whereby the path to be followed by Asia was identical to that of Europe. Not surprisingly, therefore, there was little place given to the cultural dimension in the deliberations of the Congress.

One could argue that many of the recurring themes of the international communist movement, as they applied to the Asian experience, had emerged during the debates of the Second Comintern Congress. The debate had, indeed, foreshadowed issues that were to surface continuously, in one form or another, in the years to come. With regard to the strategic problem, for example, Roy's view was a forerunner of the Asian orientation of the Chinese. The tactical debate demonstrated the potential for conflict between the foreign policy goals of the emerging Soviet state and the aspirations of the Asian revolutionaries. Whilst in 1920, necessity had not yet dictated the need for formulating the precise
role of communism within a peasant society, the problem had been considered on a theoretical level.

Following the death of Lenin in 1924, the Comintern, under Stalin, gradually emerged as an instrument of Soviet diplomatic goals, and, to this end, the Asian communist parties were invited to undergo several difficult contortions that bore little relationship to the needs of the Asian situation. From 1928, and in the aftermath of the defeat of the Chinese communists at the hands of the nationalists, the broad alliance with the national bourgeoisie was dropped in favour of a narrow, isolationist stance. The periods from 1935 to 1939 saw the era of the United Fronts, both in Europe and in Asia, but this phase, in turn, was ended by the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939. In practice, however, for most of the Asian parties, the Comintern had ceased to be of any theoretical or practical guidance long before it was disbanded in 1943, and they were left to their own devices.

In essence, therefore, revolution in Asia was subordinated to the requirements of revolution in Europe, and the relationship was heavily weighted in favour of the European dimension. It was not until the post war period, and the emergence of Marxist-Leninist regimes in China, North Korea and North Vietnam, that Asia acquired a significance in its own right and the balance swung, once more, eastwards. However, from the late fifties, the single most important factor colouring the entire communist movement, was the breakdown in orthodoxy precipitated, initially, by the Yugoslav rupture with the Soviet Union, but, more importantly, the emergence of communist China and the subsequent Sino-Soviet dispute.

The Soviet rift with China can conveniently be traced from the process of de-Stalinisation initiated by Khrushchev, and the period following his secret speech delivered to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956. The dispute progressed from more and more open party
attacks, to a complete rupture of state to state relations in 1969, and although state to state relations were subsequently restored, the breach between the two parties appears irrevocable.

Arguments that seek to explain the nature of the dispute are various, as are classifications of the main areas of contention. Griffith, for example, claims that,

"The primary cause of the Sino-Soviet rift has been the determination of Mao and his associates that China should become a superpower and the determination of the Soviet leadership to prevent it."

(Griffith, 1967, p.4)

Brzezinski, (Brzezinski, 1977), however, suggests that the Chinese challenged the Russians on the domestic pace of the transition to communism and efforts for the attainment of a world-wide communist victory. The dispute has variously been portrayed as a struggle between superpowers, an ideological quarrel and an economic dispute between the have's and have nots. Different lists of issues can be drawn up, depending on one's focus in analysing the dispute. Thus Griffith, for example (Griffith, 1967), cited, as matters for contention, the fundamental nature of the present epoch, the qualitative change in the nature and destructiveness of thermonuclear war, peaceful co-existence, clashes of state interest, the transition to socialism and national liberation in underdeveloped countries, Khrushchev versus Mao, and the leading role of the CPSU and the CCP in international communism. Zagoria (Zagoria, 1962), on the other hand, classified the issues as, destalinisation and intra-bloc relations, communes and the road to communism, the dispute over global strategy, detente, the national liberation movement, and Khrushchev's attack on Albania at the Twenty Second Congress of the CPSU. Brzezinski, (Brzezinski, 1977), for his
part, listed disagreement on, the nature of imperialism, the meaning of our epoch, the inevitability of war, the relationship of local wars to total ones, the meaning of co-existence, relations with the national bourgeoisie, the national liberation struggle, the stages of building communism and socialism, Soviet foreign policy and accountability to the bloc, and Soviet tolerance of revisionism.

There would seem, therefore, to be two main aspects to the dispute. One, the ideological aspect, usually cast in terms of revisionism versus dogmatism, with its implications for the legitimacy of the state and the leadership role of the CPSU within the international communist movement. Two, a clash of interests between two neighbouring states. Regardless of one's approach, however, the complexities of the dispute extended to more than simply a consideration of relations between the Soviet Union and China.

As has been pointed out (Heldman, 1970), an attack on ideological grounds is an attack on legitimacy, and a method by which the protagonists attempt to undermine each other's domestic and political legitimacy. Because issues, ranging from peaceful co-existence, to communes and the road to Communism, are argued out within an ideological framework, they have implications for the legitimacy of all ideologically motivated states. Hence internal and external issues became inter-related and acquired a more far-reaching relevance than a superficial reading of causes would indicate. Thus, for example, the DRV's choice of strategy for conducting a war of national liberation had implications for Sino-Soviet relations, since it centred around differing theories of national liberation and the role of the peasantry, and could not simply be assessed on whether or not it was appropriate to the Vietnamese situation. Many instances of internal organisation, for example, the professionalisation of the army and the rejection of Maoist guerilla strategy, have been seen
as a "pro-Soviet" orientation on the part of the DRV, rather than a choice of policy applicable to the nature of the war that was being fought. Similarly, it was difficult for the DRV to accept peaceful coexistence or détente as a principle of foreign policy, whilst fighting a war against the United States, thus causing them to appear "pro-Chinese". A shared yet disputed ideological framework had the further consequence of drawing the Eastern European states into the debacle, leading to a complex web of inter-relationships between east and west.

It is also true to say that different contenders entered into the fray, or withdrew, for different motives. Ionescu claims, for example, (Ionescu, 1965), that the Soviet need and desire to accommodate the Yugoslav path to socialism, following Khrushchev's rapprochement with Tito in 1956, fuelled the flame of the dispute with China, and led to further allegations of Soviet revisionism, and displacement attacks by the Chinese, on Yugoslavia. This in turn provided Albania with an opportunity for venting her historical antagonism for Yugoslavia by siding with the Chinese. The mounting ideological debate and invective, therefore, masked a series of other issues, and in some cases provided a rationale for their resolution. The virtual expulsion of Albania from the Soviet bloc at the Twenty Second Congress of the CPSU further incensed the Chinese, who showed their displeasure by abruptly walking out, stopping, rather pointedly, to lay a wreath on Stalin's new tomb beneath the Kremlin wall, before proceeding home.

Meanwhile, in spite of the stand taken by the remainder of the Eastern European states in defence of Yugoslavia and in favour of the Moscow line, it had not escaped the attention of the Eastern European parties that regardless of one's position in the ideological debate on revisionism versus dogmatism, the very fact of the dispute left considerable room for manoeuvre. Albania, indeed, had succeeded in
escaping from the Soviet orbit. The Asian flank of the Soviet bloc, therefore, became inextricably linked with events in Europe, and vice versa, and for none of the reasons that the Marxist-Leninist analysis presupposes. This, therefore, was the context within which the Democratic Republic of Vietnam found itself, from the mid-sixties onwards.

Much has been said concerning the neutrality of the Asian communist parties with regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute. Scalopino, for example, (Scalopino, 1963), referring to the early sixties, suggests that when the Soviet Union's attempt to isolate Albania failed, a neutralist position emerged within the communist bloc. With reference to the period in question, he categorized this as a recognition that the Soviet Union and the CPSU were the vanguard of the movement, qualified by the view that Khrushchev may not necessarily be the best leader; equal space to be given to both the Soviet Union and China, with some veneration accruing to the Soviet Union on account of age; all communist states and parties, with the exception of Yugoslavia, to be praised in public, and a belief that decision making between parties must be by consensus, whilst stressing the unity of the twelve bloc states. The reason for this stand, he claims, was that the Asian leaders were antagonised by Khrushchev's attack on Albania, which they saw as great power chauvinism. De-Stalinisation was taken as another example of unilateralism, and, therefore, harmful to the movement. The Asian parties, therefore, chose not to line up with either side, but advanced a commonwealth theory of bloc relations, where decision-making was to be based on consensus, unanimity and consultation, and each party had the right to determine its own tactics and policies, based upon the needs of its society. Neutralism, he concluded, lessened the possibility of splits within the parties, whilst giving them greater room for manoeuvre between both the Soviet Union and China, and providing the chance to pursue nationalist and independent goals. This neutral
stance, therefore, was not simply a matter of ideological preference, but, certainly, for the Vietnamese, based on a shrewd appraisal of the advantages that accrued and the benefits to be gained from the dispute, and, hence, the undesirability of committing oneself irrevocably to one side or the other.

That this position became more apparent than real, will be discussed in Chapter Three. It was, however, a tactic that was paralleled in Europe by the attitude of the Romanian Workers's Party. The Romanian party continued to cultivate Chinese friendship, whilst acknowledging Moscow's authority on other matters, and, for example, following their successful stand on the issue of East European economic integration among the member countries of the CMEA, used their new found freedom of manoeuver to pursue an increasingly independent line on foreign policy (Farlow, 1978, King, 1974, 1972, Jowitt, 1970, Socianu, 1978).

Furthermore, as was the case in Europe, the Sino-Soviet dispute did not leave the non-ruling parties without their difficulties. Neutrality applied not only to ruling Asian parties, such as the Vietnam Workers' Party and the Korean Workers' Party, but non-ruling parties, such as the Japan Communist Party. The Japan Communist Party, for example, although internally affected by the dispute, found that it gave them greater flexibility within the context of Japanese politics (Sei Young Rhee, 1973).

The corollary to the attitude of the Asian parties vis à vis the dispute, was, of course, Sino-Soviet rivalry, both for greater influence in relation to individual parties and within the communist movement as a whole. The conflict between the Soviet Union and China, therefore, was also manifested, by, for example, Sino-Soviet rivalry for Vietnam, which became an ideological battleground as the war escalated. Vietnam, however, was not to be the occasion for restoring communist unity, but, on
the contrary, it merely demonstrated that the two large communist powers were incapable of uniting in a joint offensive against the west.

It is suggested (Tai Sung An, 1965), that conflict over Vietnam between the Soviet Union and China stemmed both from a dispute over the strategy and tactics to be used against the United States, and a traditional contest for spheres of influences. During the sixties, the central issue was argued out around peaceful coexistence versus wars of national liberation. Zagoria (Zagoria, 1962), maintained, that since 1960, Soviet policy in Vietnam had been motivated by two factors, firstly, a desire for detente with the United States, and, secondly, a need to maintain Russian influence in the international communist movement vis-à-vis China. Rupen (Rupen, 1967) cited an assortment of factors as contributing to the disadvantage of the Vietnam situation for the Soviet Union. These included a threat to Soviet leadership of the world communist movement, a threat to the Soviet line of peaceful co-existence, an exposing of military and economic weaknesses, a heightening of the danger of a third world war, and a drain on economic resources. It also drew the Soviet Union into a war not of its own choosing with no guarantee of a political pay-off. Against this, he goes on to say, one must balance the fact that it gave the opportunity to diminish the power of the United States, the opportunity to accede to the role of an Asian power, to prove superiority over China and to counteract Chinese influence, to rally recalcitrant communists around the USSR and to demonstrate the dependence of socialists on the might of the Soviet Union.

What these interpretations have in common is that they all relate the problems posed by Vietnam to the Soviet dispute with China. Furthermore, as Zagoria also claimed (Zagoria, 1967), Vietnam was important because it reflected the dilemmas of the Soviet Union and the difficulty of pursuing both detente with the United States and supporting a fraternal, socialist
ally at war with the United States, thus raising the problem to a global dimension. The United States rapprochement with China and the Nixon visit of 1971 exacerbated this situation and made its resolution all the more urgent.

With regard to Vietnam, the basis of the Chinese position was the theory that Vietnam had to be seen in the context of the world revolutionary movement, which meant no compromise with either revisionism or imperialism. It is suggested (Jay Tao, 1968), that Mao's aim was to create a new, Peking orientated communist movement, and a China orientated political structure in Asia. He goes on to say,

"As long as the danger of a clash with the U.S. could be avoided, Mao saw important advantages in the continuation of the conflict in Vietnam. It served to undermine U.S. USSR. peaceful coexistence, it created internal and external contradictions for the U.S., it aroused revolutionary and anti-U.S. fervor in China and abroad, and it served as a model and an inspiration for other wars of 'national liberation'."

(Jay Tao, 1968, p.424)

China, for her part, was well aware of the dilemma that faced the Soviet Union, and used the necessity of routing Soviet supplies and personnel bound for Vietnam through China to aggravate the situation. In late January, early February, 1967, for example, during the period of the siege of the Soviet embassy in Peking, it was reported that the Chinese tried to lynch nine Russians travelling home from Vietnam (New York Times, February 5th, 1967). Izvestia further charged that the Chinese were hampering and endangering Soviet planes flying personnel to North Vietnam when they stopped to refuel in Peking, where incidents included the harassment by Red Guards, shouting anti-Soviet slogans (Izvestia, February 3rd, 1967). In a protest note concerning the embassy siege, handed to the
Chinese Embassy in Moscow by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 9th, 1967, it was claimed, with reference to the fact that the Soviet diplomatic corps were virtually prisoners in their own embassy, that the Chinese were obstructing the Soviet mission in the exercise of their functions, which included the rendering of military and economic assistance to the Vietnamese people (Pravda, February 10th, 1967).

China also contiously rejected the Soviet proposal for joint action over Vietnam. The Central Committee of the CPSU, for example, was reported, on February 14th, 1966, to have sent a letter to the other communist parties of Eastern Europe, on its relations with the Chinese party. What was believed to be an authoritative copy was published in Die Welt, on March 22nd. The letter gave details of the Soviet proposal for cooperation with China and of Soviet aid to the DRV. It went on to say,

"The CPSU has proposed to the Chinese leaders more than once that joint action to support Vietnam be organised, but the Chinese leadership opposed such action... Our party has proposed twice that the representatives of the three parties - the Vietnamese Party of Labour, the C.P.S.U., and the C.P.C. - meet at the highest level to achieve agreement on co-ordinated action for aid to the D.R.V. These proposals, which were received by the Politbureau of the Vietnamese Party of Labour with approval, were not accepted by the Chinese leaders. At the same time, the C.P.C. leadership hindered the implementation of the agreement of the Government of the U.S.S.R. with the Government of the D.R.V. on an immediate increase in military aid for the D.R.V. The C.P.C. leaders did not permit Soviet transport planes with weapons to fly over C.P.R. territory. Chinese personalities also placed obstacles in the way of the transportation of war material to Vietnam by rail..."
From all this it becomes clear that the Chinese leaders need a lengthy Vietnamese war to maintain international tensions, to represent China as a 'besieged fortress'. There is every reason to assert that it is one of the goals of the policy of the Chinese leadership on the Vietnam question to originate a military conflict between the U.S.S.R. and the United States...so that they may, as they say themselves, 'sit on the mountains and watch the fight of the tigers'. New facts constantly prove the readiness of the Chinese leadership to sacrifice the interests of the national liberation movement to their chauvinist big-power plans..."

(Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1965-66, 21633)

Throughout the sixties therefore, and into the seventies, the breakdown in communist orthodoxy meant that Vietnam was increasingly used as an issue in Soviet-Chinese relations, with repercussions for the remainder of the Soviet bloc. Put another way round, Vietnam, time and again, provided the excuse for both the Soviet Union and China to argue out contentious issues, ranging from the conduct of foreign policy to matters of internal organisation, each side staking its leadership and authority on the outcome.

Possibly partly as an attempt to counteract the influence of Maoism in Asia, and the repercussions of the Sino-Soviet dispute both in Asia and the developing world, the seventies saw the updating and refinement of Leninist theory and a spate of theoretical writings on the theme of non-capitalist development. This, in turn, was part of a larger attempt to take account of changing circumstances, and, with reference to the Soviet Union itself, gave rise to the theory of developed socialism.

Both the theory of developed socialism and the theory of non-capitalist development purport to be economic analyses. This is extremely
difficult to justify when measured against objective criteria. There seem, for example, to be no objective, economic criteria for defining a country of "socialist orientation", as the list of states defined as such fluctuates with events and varies with different authors (Popov, 1977, p. 157, Solodovnikov, Bogoslovsky, 1975, p. 97, Ushakova, 1980, p. 3), thus leading one to conclude that socialist orientation is a purely arbitrary designation. Similarly, it is hard to see why the Soviet Union should be considered more developed than Eastern Europe, when one compares the low efficiency and poor performance of the Soviet economy with the successful economies of East Germany and Hungary. The inconsistencies between theory and reality, however, should not lead to the theory being dismissed or rejected out of hand. Its value lies in defining shifts and nuances in relations between the Soviet Union and other Soviet bloc and developing countries, at any given time, and on this basis, warrants some detailed consideration.

Alfred Evans (Evans, 1977) argues that since 1967, the Brezhnev leadership achieved explicit revisions in the framework of official ideology, leading to the theory of developed socialism. The distinguishing characteristics of developed socialism, he says, are that primary weight is given to economic criteria and a more balanced allocation of resources, and that the achievement of the goal of full communism has been postponed. On the one hand, this implied a slower growth rate, whilst on the other, it suggests that social differentiation will remain for some time, as the achievement of the classless society has been postponed, and, therefore, the stress is on unity and concepts such as the "whole peoples' state", a Khrushchev formulation.

A Soviet review article (Kas'yanenko, 1980) gathers together the main body of Soviet literature on this concept. In essence, the theory of developed socialism is a detailed exposition of the transitional period
from socialism to communism. This is placed within the context of existing Leninist theory, which presupposes a progressive development from capitalism to socialism to communism.

The post capitalist period, it is claimed (Butenko, 1972) envisages two phases on the road to communism, that of achieving socialism and that of the transition from socialism to communism. The first phase, in turn involves several stages, following the revolutionary seizure of power. These are, a transitional period, in which the foundations of socialism are achieved, the construction of developed socialist society, and the stage of the foundation of the material-technical base of communism. In Butenko's words, these stages are characterized as,

"A transitional period, completing the foundation of the basis of socialism, the victory of socialist production relations; the development of socialism on its own basis, on the principles of socialist production relations, securing the construction of a developed socialist society; the stage of the foundation of the material-technical base of communism, which presupposes the utilisation of the full potential of developed socialism, signifying a process of gradual development from socialism to communism."

(Butenko, 1972, pp. 52-53)

It is further claimed, in listing the implications of this development, that,

"Thirdly, experience shows not only the Soviet Union, but other countries already having completed the transitional period, having constructed the basis of socialism, that further development has as its immediate task the construction of developed socialist society."

(Butenko, 1972, p. 52)
It follows, therefore, that if one can extrapolate general, scientific principles of socialist construction, and different states are in different periods of development, the theory of developed socialism can be used to define ideological relations between bloc states, so that, for example, the Soviet Union has a higher level of socialism than Eastern Europe, who must emulate it.

With regard, therefore, to other Soviet bloc countries, Evans (Evans, 1977), suggests that whilst the Soviet Union itself is in the stage of developed socialism, most Eastern European states are described as belonging to the preceding stage of having constructed the foundations of socialism, and, therefore, have yet to move into the stage of developed socialism. He goes on to say that while party congresses in Bulgaria, East Germany and Czechoslovakia have announced the intention of building a developed socialist society, and Hungary, Romania and Poland have endorsed this as a goal, there is some qualification in the response of both Romania and Poland.(3) With regard to the Marxist-Leninist analysis of the Asian situation, however, one must also take into account Marxist-Leninist development theory, with its stress on the non-capitalist path to socialism, or socialist orientation.

Developing countries, it is claimed (Ulyanovsky, 1974) are confronted with a choice of paths to socio-economic progress, capitalist or non-capitalist. A number of countries, including, for example, Burma, have opted for the non-capitalist path to development. These countries share characteristics which include pre-bourgeois, initial or under-developed capitalist relations, and, since there are a number of different ways and forms for the transition to socialism, such countries can by-pass capitalism altogether. This is made possible by what are described as revolutionary democratic elements and takes place in the context of a period in which the transition to socialism is seen as occurring on a
The starting point for non-capitalist development is the victory of the national liberation movement, together with the establishment of a revolutionary democratic dictatorship, consisting of an alliance of the national bourgeoisie, workers and peasants, under the leadership of the working class. This initiates the national-democratic stage of the revolution, during which period the state is re-structured in political, social and economic spheres, and socialist transformation takes place. In essence, therefore, the theoretical position would seem to be that pre-capitalist structures are transformed on a socialist, or, if one prefers, a collective basis, the Soviet bloc themselves occupying the role of the revolutionary class.

Ulyanovsky goes on to distinguish between non-capitalist and socialist development. He says,

"The non-capitalist and socialist paths of development have the same goals and share a general trend of socio-economic development. However, the non-capitalist path, and particularly at the very outset, is, of course, not the same as the stage of all-out socialist construction. That is the stage of socio-economic development of the newly free countries during which the vital prerequisite for the transition to socialist construction will be provided by non-capitalist methods.

(Ulyanovsky, 1974, p.43)

It is not clear, however, at what point the prerequisite has been fulfilled and the transition to socialist construction, the first stage of socialism, achieved.

Certain Soviet bloc countries, for example, the republics of Soviet Central Asia, and Mongolia, North Korea and Vietnam, are seen as having arrived at their present stage of development via the non-capitalist
route. On the other hand, countries such as Afghanistan (4), Burma, South Yemen, Syria and Algeria, to name a few, whilst not described as socialist, are seen as embarking on the first stages of this process and are described as countries of socialist orientation. Ulyanovsky stresses, however, that it is wrong to lose sight of the fact that these states are proceeding along the path of non-capitalist development, when discussing their socialist orientation. Socialist orientation, he claims, is synonymous with non-capitalist development.

There is much argument surrounding the theory of non-capitalist development, and critiques on a theoretical level have been provided by several authors (Thomas, 1978, Gonsalves, 1981). However, the essential point to grasp in connection with this work is not whether the analysis can be supported by reference to objective criteria, but how a state is defined in the eyes of the Soviet Union at any given time. Thus, acceptance of the designation "state of socialist orientation" does seem to be linked with a special relationship with the Soviet Union, often a treaty relationship, as in the case of Ethiopia, Angola and Afghanistan and, increasingly, associate membership of the CMEA,(5) Thus it serves as a guide to Soviet relations with the developing world.

It is also interesting to note that China, remaining, in the Soviet analysis, a socialist state, is not considered to have taken the path of non-capitalist development. Whilst Soviet theorists would argue that this is the consequence of objective circumstances in the historical development of Chinese capitalism, one might well ask in what way these differ from that of Mongolia, North Korea and Vietnam, all states, who, it is claimed, have taken the non-capitalist path to socialism. It would seem that the difference is in the nature of the relationship of the Soviet Union, in the case of China, it being one of hostility.

When dealing with the "socialist countries of Asia", that is,
Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea, the non-capitalist path to socialism is considered to have passed through the transitional national democratic stage of development and to have arrived at the phase of constructing the foundations of socialism. Thus, by logical extension, the theory of non-capitalist development links up with the first stage of the theory of developed socialism. The emphasis throughout is on key words, such as socialist construction, socialist transformation, and so forth, which are not loose phrases, but refer specifically to positions worked out within theoretical writings. Thus, if one interprets the theory of non-capitalist development/developed socialism, as a political, rather than economic analysis, its benefit lies in defining the relationship of any particular state vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Finally, one should add that the theory of non-capitalist development represents a shift from an entirely Eurocentric view, in attempting to define independent criteria of development, specifically for the emerging countries of Asia and Africa.

The foregoing events lead to the conclusion that one must recognize the importance of Marxism-Leninism as a frame of reference within which Soviet Asian relations are conducted. There are uncanny parallels between the issues raised in the course of Lenin's arguments with Roy, such as the tactical debate, and the subsequent conflict between the foreign policy goals of the Soviet Union, China and the DRV. Roy's initial thesis that the course of revolution in Europe was dependent on the outcome of events in Asia, can be paralleled in the Asian orientation of Maoism. Furthermore the Maoist stress on the role of the peasantry, paralleling Roy's argument, was the underlying issue in the policy options that faced the DRV with regard to the nature and method by which to conduct the war against the United States. Thus, one could claim that the fundamental issues raised in 1920 had neither changed nor been resolved, and that the relationship between Europe and Asia remained an open issue. The point to
stress here, however, is that the very fact that the Sino-Soviet dispute was cast in Marxist-Leninist terms drew in the remainder of the Eastern bloc countries. Whilst, undoubtedly, the rhetoric of socialism masked other issues, the dispute produced a complex interaction, whereby, for example the conduct of wars of national liberation in Asia became relevant to events in Europe, and had to be taken into account in the formulation of the Soviet attitude towards Eastern bloc countries. As Ernst Kux succinctly put it,

"Nevertheless, China is the sole Communist country that does not accept the status quo in Eastern Europe and presses for "national liberation" there. Moreover, the existence of the Chinese challenge gives the East Europeans a certain leverage on Moscow. For their support against Beijing, Moscow has to pay a price, especially to refute Chinese accusations of "hegemonism". Thus, the Soviet Union's engagement on its Asian flank affects its position in its East European backyard, and will continue to do so in the future."

(Kux, 1980, p.35)

The year 1969 marked the lowest point in Soviet-Chinese relations, following serious border disputes on both the Ussuri and Sinkiang-Kazakstan borders, which led to speculation that war might be imminent. On April 15th, 1969, Yugoslav sources had reported that at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation on 17th March, the Soviet Union had proposed that Mongolia should be brought into the alliance, thus allowing troops from other member states to be stationed on the Sino-Mongolian border. The proposal was apparently dropped, after Romania and Czechoslovakia had strongly opposed it (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969/1970, 23644). It was also reported from Washington on August 28th, 1969, that information from Soviet sources
indicated that the Soviet government was seriously considering a pre-emptive air strike against China's nuclear installations, and had sounded the other members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, as well as the leaders of other communist parties, on their attitude to such action. It was further suggested that these reports had been passed on to the press by Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, without the consent of the State Department, and that they had been received with scepticism in western diplomatic circles in Moscow (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969/1970, 23644).

Whatever the truth of the matter, the situation was undeniably grave, and was only, to some extent, defused, following Kosygin's unexpected visit to Peking in September, 1969. (6) Unofficial sources in Moscow claimed that Kosygin had put forward a five point peace plan at his meeting with Chou En Lai. This proposed that the two countries should agree to re-open border talks, they should withdraw their troops from the border, troops on each side of the border should be instructed to avoid opening fire on each other, both countries should end attacks on each other in the press and on the radio and they should agree to work towards the restoration of trade and other ties (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969/1970, 23645). Given the troubled background of Soviet-Chinese relations throughout most of 1969, therefore, perhaps it is not coincidental that this year marked the beginning, by the Soviet Union of a reappraisal of their policy towards the non-communist countries of Asia, with the launching, in June, of the Asian Collective Security Plan.

The Asian Collective Security Plan was first broached by Brezhnev at the World Conference of Communist and Workers Parties, held in Moscow in June, 1969. Towards the end of his long, opening address, Brezhnev remarked,

"For us, the burning problems of the present international
situation do not push into the background more long range tasks, especially the creation of a system of collective security in those parts of the world where the threat of the unleashing of a new world war and the unleashing of armed conflicts is centred. Such a system is the best substitute for existing military-political groupings.

The Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe, both the parties in power and those in the continent's capitalist countries, at their Karlovy Vary conference drew up a joint programme of struggle for ensuring security in Europe. The Warsaw Pact member-states have come out with a concrete security programme for the peoples of Europe, the stability of borders and peaceful cooperation among the European states. The CPSU and the Soviet Union will do everything they can to implement that programme.

We think that the course of events also places on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia.

(Pravda, June 8th, 1969)

This statement had been preceded, a few days earlier, by an article in Izvestia by V. V. Matveyev, where the term "collective security", had also been mentioned in the context of the disengagement of western forces from Asian affairs, specifically the American withdrawal from Indochina, and the opportunity thus presented for the spread of Chinese influence. Burma, Cambodia and Singapore were listed among other Asian states to whom these conditions might be applicable (Izvestia, May 29th, 1969).

Following Brezhnev's statement, the matter was then, apparently, laid to rest. Nothing had been conveyed of the substance of the plan, and, apart from Gromyko's statement to the United Nations in 1970, (Pravda, October 23rd, 1970), little more was heard of it until 1972, when, in a series of speeches by Brezhnev continuing into 1973 (Pravda, March 21st,
1972, Pravda, December 22nd, 1972, Pravda, August 16th, 1973, Pravda, October 27th, 1973), it was once again put on the agenda as a matter for serious discussion. From this time onwards, the foreign policy pronouncements of the leadership were increasingly backed up by a series of articles in the Soviet press and party and academic journals (Sergeev, 1975a, Sobakin, 1974, Kudryavtsev, 1973, Zhukov, 1975, Pavlovskii, 1972, Tikhvinski, 1974).

The immediate background to the initial proposal was a flurry of diplomatic activity. It was reported that Asian diplomats had expressed interest in the Soviet Union’s new but unspecified plan for collective security, and that Soviet ambassadors in many Asian countries had been called to Moscow for talks on the proposal (New York Times, June 18th, 1969). It was also reported that Mikhail Kapitsa, chief of the Southeast Asia desk at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had, shortly before Brezhnev's speech, visited Laos, Malaysia, Thailand and Burma, on a trip that was described as "unusual" (Horelick, 1974, p.4).

The initial vagueness of the Soviet proposal gave rise to much speculation on the part of western analysts. Did the Soviet proposal, for example, envisage a multilateral treaty between Asian states, along the lines of the Warsaw Pact, or was it to be a series of bi-lateral treaties? Horelick claimed,

"The USSR's collective security proposal for Asia was a gigantic trial balloon testing the political climate for a Soviet initiative whose ultimate shape, scope and substance would depend almost entirely on events and reactions."

(Horelick, 1974, p.6)

He went on to argue that since there were no instant takers and the response from Asian countries was less than enthusiastic, it could be considered to have fallen flat. Hinton (Hinton, 1976) argued that Moscow
was unlikely to have great success with its collective security plan and saw it as just one aspect of Moscow's rivalry with Peking. Avidgor Haselkorn (Haselkorn, 1975) on the other hand, argued that the Soviet collective security system was in place and functioning and may well be extended in the future. He discussed the direction and types of mutual strategic support between different sectors of the Soviet security system and attempted to prove a strategic link between the Warsaw Pact, the Middle East treaties and the Soviet-Indian treaty.

One cannot, however, confidently measure the success or failure of the Soviet proposal, if one has no clear idea of its objectives. Ian Clark takes the view that,

"To make dogmatic statements as to what the Soviet leadership means by collective security or as to the objectives which they hope to further by their promotion of the idea is to fall prey to epistemological arrogance. The most that the analyst can aspire to is a meaningful reconstruction of the content of declaratory statements and to relate this to the actual performance and requirements of Soviet strategy."

(Ian Clark, 1976, p.165)

He then goes on to suggest that sponsorship of the collective security programme promotes at least three Soviet diplomatic goals. Firstly, in a general sense, collective security is the means by which the Soviet Union serves notice on Asia that security arrangements in that continent depend heavily upon Soviet participation. In this sense, it is a declaration of interest in Asia, he says, and can be likened to the assorted doctrines promulgated by American presidents such as Monroe, Truman and Eisenhower, each of which signified a declaration of concern with a specific geographical area. Secondly, a major theme that has emerged is an attempt to suppress border issues in Asia in general and the Sino-Soviet border
issue in particular, to the extent that there is an identification in Soviet thinking between security in Asia and the territorial status quo. Referring to a Moscow radio broadcast in response to a Japanese newspaper editorial arguing that territorial issues must be settled before such a security system could become operative, and the comment that the editorial was "wrong in its assessment of the sequence of cause and effect", Clark says,

"This may be translated to mean that a freezing of territorial matters, rather than a settlement of them, is the necessary precondition of security in Asia, which, from the Soviet point of view, is no more than a statement of fact."

(Clark, 1976, p.167)

It is in this context that reference to European security and the Helsinki Conference which affirmed the post-war status quo in Europe, becomes relevant. Thirdly, collective security can be used as a political barometer whereby Moscow is able to gauge the climate within Asian capitals. It serves as a system of identification, and, in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, becomes a secular doctrine via which non-communist states can express their sympathy with one side or the other. He goes on to suggest that "collective security" in the seventies is what "peaceful coexistence" was to the fifties,

"A doctrinal rallying point around which to gather the faithful."

(Clark, 1976, p.168)

It may be, therefore, that when considering the Asian Collective Security Plan, a search for an overtly military alliance does not yield very positive results. If, as Haselkorn suggests, (Haselkorn, 1975) it were in place and working well, it would surely have been somewhat easier to observe, and would not therefore have been the cause of continuing
speculation among western commentators. The danger of a strictly military/strategic interpretation of Soviet policy is that often, one fails to note other factors that may be relevant.(7) Thus, with such a narrow frame of reference, one is led to the conclusion that either the Soviet Collective Security Plan does not exist, or that the Soviet Union failed to galvanise the support of the Asian states to whom it was directed. If, however, one considers the possibility that the Asian Collective Security Plan, as suggested by Clark, signifies the enunciation of a broad statement of involvement in Asian affairs, whilst not denying the military/strategic component, one gains a different reading.

A. Sergeev, writing in Mezhdunarodnya zhizn, and referring to Brezhnev's elaboration of the principles of collective security at the Twenty Fifth Soviet Trade Union Congress in 1972, says,

"It is, in its way, a codification of peaceful, neighbourly relations between the countries and peoples of the continent. It consists of the renunciation of the use of force in relations between states, respect for sovereignty and the inviolability of borders, non-interference in internal affairs, the wide development of economic and other cooperation based on the principles of equal rights and mutual benefit."

(Sergeev, 1975a, p.49)

He then goes on to elaborate on these fundamental principles. It soon becomes apparent that in this, and many other Soviet writings on Collective Security, (Sobakin, 1974, Kudryavtsev, 1973, Zhukov, 1975, Pavlovskii, 1972, Tikhvinskiĭ, 1974), certain themes emerge. These can be summarised as follows.

Firstly, Asia is widely defined, ranging from the Middle East to Japan. Countries as diverse and widely separated as India and Iran (Tikhvinskiĭ, 1974), Israel (Zhukov, 1975) and the countries of Indochina
have been dealt with by Soviet authors in the context of collective security.

Secondly, there are frequent references to European security and parallels drawn between security in Europe and security in Asia, with reference to the Helsinki conference. Sobakin (Sobakin, 1974), for example, makes little overt mention of Asia itself, thus suggesting the parallel is understood.

Thirdly, there is a stress on bi-lateral and regional treaties. Kudryavtsev, for example, states that collective security is not a "simultaneous act", meaning, presumably, that is is not a proposed alliance on the lines of NATO or the Warsaw Pact, but consists of bi-lateral and regional treaties (Kudryavtsev, 1973, p.118). Pavlovskiǐ (Pavlovskiǐ, 1972, p.34) cites the Soviet treaties with the United Arab Republic, India and Iraq, as evidence of the implementation of the idea of Collective Security.

During the seventies, the Soviet Union concluded a series of Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation with a number of Asian and African states among them India (Pravda, August 10th, 1971), Iraq (Pravda, April 10th, 1972), Angola (Pravda, October 9th, 1976), Mozambique (Pravda, April 3rd, 1977) and Ethiopia (Pravda, November 21st, 1978), as well as the treaty with the SRV (Pravda, November 4th, 1978). It is in this respect that the principles enumerated in Sergeev's article come into play, as they reflect the spirit of these treaties. Thus, cooperation takes place on a broad spectrum, ranging from economic and cultural exchange to more concrete military/strategic matters. Whilst all of these treaties contain a clause that may be interpreted as referring to military aid in one form or another, the overwhelming emphasis is towards greater economic cooperation and exchange. One should also add that, in the Soviet perspective, there is an acknowledged inter-relationship between economic and political goals.
in international affairs. Cooperation and exchange, therefore, is a multi-faceted operation, and whilst one would presumably give more weight to economic and political matters, even visiting dance troupes serve some useful purpose and must be taken into account when assessing the overall scheme of activities.

There is, however, a further link between collective security and the "zone of peace" concept. This idea finds its echo in Soviet legal writings, where the concept of the "zone of peace", is elaborated on in an article by Melkov, for example, where it is stated that,

"The "zone of peace" notion is related not only to "demilitarization", "neutralization" and "nuclear free zone" notions but includes some of the component parts of these notions."

(Melkov, 1979, p.117)

In this connection, it is noted that Tikvinskií refers to the Pacific Ocean area as a possible nuclear free area (Tikhvinskií, 1974). One should also bear in mind the Soviet proposal adopted with regard to the neutralization of South East Asia and the proposal to declare the Indian Ocean a zone of peace (Pravda, February 22nd, 1981). Thus, there is a possible link between Collective Security, the treaties of Friendship and Cooperation, and Soviet proposals connected with "neutralization" the "zone of peace", and so forth.

One interpretation is to read all this as an overt attempt to build a series of military alliances. One must question, however, the function of such treaties. A suggested function for a series of bilateral treaties would be as a means of supplying the Soviet Union with a basis for acting as a broker in Asian disputes, and providing a legitimate, international role in the area. This possibly explains the inclusion of the Middle East in much of the literature on Collective Security, as it is precisely the
Soviet exclusion from any role in the settlement of the problems of the area that has caused resentment in Moscow.

Not surprisingly, therefore, there is a stress, in the Soviet literature, on the increasing involvement of the Soviet Union in Asian affairs. Tikhvinščič (Tikhvinščič, 1974), for example, gives a long, historical introduction, suggesting continuity with Brezhnev's proposal, and Soviet policy in the immediate, post-revolutionary period. Whilst this may not entirely fit the facts, it is some indication of how the Soviet Union would wish to be seen.

Whilst therefore, at one end of the spectrum, one could make out a case for Soviet military/strategic goals in Asia, linked, for example, to the implementation of the "zone of peace" concept, or the search for naval facilities such as Camh Ranh Bay or Singapore, it is more useful to consider the Soviet Collective Security Proposal as a more subtle programme of influence building, designed to provide, for the Soviet Union, an Asian role amongst capitalist countries.

It seems likely, however, that the biggest obstacle to the Soviet Union achieving an Asian role among Asian states is the problem of China. What, therefore, is the proposed relationship of China to the Soviet Union within the context of Collective Security?

Soviet statements have repeatedly stressed that the Asian Collective Security Plan is not directed against any one country, the unwritten implication being that that country is China. Thus, Pavlovščič, towards the end of his article, quotes Podgorny to the effect that the idea of Collective Security,

"is not directed against any one state. It includes all states working to make Asia a continent of peace and cooperation."

(Pavlovščič, 1972, p.36)
In Tikhvinskii's article, the position of China is more fully spelled out, and, even more authoritatively, he quotes Brezhnev, who claimed, "'As to the Soviet Union, it would welcome the participation of the Chinese Peoples' Republic in measures leading to the strengthening of Asian security.'"

(Tikhvinskii, 1974, p.27)

Whilst, on the face of it, this assertion seems implausible, one should make the following points. Firstly, it cannot serve Soviet interests with regard to influence building among capitalist states to isolate and alienate the Chinese. Many Asian countries, for example, Thailand, Japan, and so forth, have historical and cultural ties with China. Therefore, a realistic policy, must, of its nature, accommodate existing cultural and historical ties with China on the part of other Asian countries.

Secondly, in latter years, the initiative for normalizing relations with the PRC has come from the Soviet side. An agreement on river navigation was concluded in 1977, for example, although a Soviet proposal for the normalization of relations was rejected by China in February, 1978, and border negotiations, which were resumed in May of that year, produced no results (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1982, 31559). Thus, it would seem that some sort of balance is being sought between dealing with the reality of China and galvanizing support from other Asian states for the Soviet position.

Thirdly, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union desire outright hostilities with China. It is in this sense, therefore, that the Soviet Union are anxious to stress the role of China in collective security, that is to say, with a view to the normalization of relations and the prevention of further hostilities, rather than in the more extreme and unlikely sense of drawing China into a strategic/military plan encompassing the whole of Asia.
One should add, however, that the Chinese rapprochement with the United States, was possibly a significant factor in escalating the Soviet Collective Security initiative and that this may have been the reason for the re-emergence of collective security as an issue in Soviet thinking in 1972. In other words, there is a global dimension to Soviet Asian policy which sought, during the period of the Vietnam war, to balance Soviet objectives in Asia against detente with the United States, and, latterly, to fill the power vacuum in Southeast Asia, following the United States withdrawal.

What conclusions, therefore, can one draw for current Soviet policy towards Asia? It is, perhaps, a mistake to work from the assumption that it consists of any one goal or objective, given the wide geographical spread and the variety of problems encompassed. With regard to northwest Asia, for example, and the problems centred around Afghanistan, Soviet concerns are possibly more connected with both the continuing crisis in the Middle East and the defence of its southern borders (Fifth Report From the Select Committee..., 1980). In relation to northeast Asia, on the other hand, one sees again the priority of border issues, with reference to China and Japan, but also, for example, the problem of the future status of Korea. One therefore has to attempt to generalize from a variety of situations requiring quite different solutions.

Firstly, Soviet policy in Asia consists of a search for an international role. This concides with a period in internal policy when resources are being directed eastwards towards opening up Siberia. Witness, for example, the construction of the Baikal-Amur railway and the proposed technological cooperation with Japan (Slovinsky, 1977). The resource famine and energy crisis of the latter part of the twentieth century has made it imperative for the Soviet Union to turn its attention towards these hitherto unexploited regions in order to provide for future
needs. Within this Asian dimension, one should also bear in mind the Muslim states of Soviet Central Asia, and the possible future development of Muslim consciousness. The search for an international role in Asia, therefore, is very much connected with the Soviet desire for recognition as an Asian state, with a role in settling international disputes.

Secondly, in conjunction with the pursuit of an Asian role, the Soviet Union have embarked on a programme of influence building. Hence the drive to promote economic, cultural and other ties with hitherto comparatively neglected countries, for example, the current Soviet policy of conciliation towards the ASEAN states.

Thirdly, Soviet policy strives for a resolution of border issues and a recognition of the territorial status quo in Asia. This is of direct relevance to the Soviet Union itself, with reference to the Soviet-Chinese border issue, and the dispute with Japan over the Kuril Islands. There are, however, numerous other examples of Asian territorial disputes which possibly have some bearing on the situation, for example, the Chinese dispute with Vietnam over the Spratly and Paracel Islands (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1974, 26388/9). Establishing a set of principles to which all states could agree, therefore, would have the effect of freezing border issues.

These policies, however, are largely directed towards the capitalist countries of Asia. On the other hand, one has to consider Soviet relations with the socialist countries of Asia, to which the Soviet Union is to a large extent drawn in as a result of rivalry with China. This leaves the way open for greater demands on the part of a state such as Vietnam, and has the consequence, in terms of bloc relations, of engaging the Eastern European states.

Lastly, Soviet foreign policy, as stated, is global in conception, and one is obliged, time and again, to refer back to this global context.
when considering Soviet policy in Asia. This is especially true with regard to the period of the war in Vietnam, when, increasingly, Soviet actions were conditioned by the needs of detente, which proved to be the overriding priority.
CHAPTER TWO

VIETNAM IN THE SOVIET ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to examine, via a study of specialist writings, the way in which Vietnam is seen by the Soviet Union. The sources for this chapter and the basis for analysis are the publications of the research institutes of the Academy of Sciences, related publications of a more popular nature, emanating, for example, from the "Vcesoyuznie obshestvo znanie" (All-Union Knowledge Society), and the publications of party and state organisations, such as the party theoretical journal "Kommunist".

In order to accept the validity of such sources, however, one must acknowledge certain basic features of the organisation of the Soviet political and academic world. In this connection, there are two points to grasp. Firstly, that there is a link between political and academic personnel, and, secondly, that what is studied is itself often significant and may reflect the direction of policy. Thus, whilst the speeches of the leadership will give the broad outline of policy on any given issue, this is elaborated upon, over a more extended period, by the writings of the academic specialists, and one can often gain fruitful insights by a careful study of such works. Such sources have the further advantage of being more directly accessible.

Relevant to an assessment of the role of specialists in the policy process is the debate concerning the genuine research and policy role of the foreign affairs institutes. This subject has been dealt with by several commentators (Zimmerman, 1968, Mills, 1972, Remnek, 1977, Eran, 1979). Ronald Pope (Pope, 1975), in his interesting study of Soviet foreign affairs specialists, throws some fascinating light on the complex relationship between faction and policy, and suggests that greater
diversity within the ruling elite encouraged each faction to seek authoritative support for its views, and thus enhances the role of the institutes. This was especially true, he claims, in the case of Nikolai Inozemstev, director of the Institut mirovoi ekonomiki mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii (Institute of World Economics and International Relations), known by its abbreviations as IMEMO, and Georgy Arbatov, director of the Institut soedinennikh shvatov Ameriki i Kanady (Institute of the United States of America and Canada). It is suggested that this in part may be because Brezhnev initially did not have access to a foreign affairs apparatus of his own. B. N. Ponomaryov, head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, was most closely associated with M. A. Suslov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in turn, received most of its guidance through Ponomaryov. In order to gain access to a dependable source of information, Brezhnev turned to these two institutes, and thus elevated the importance of their directors. Pope goes on to argue, however, that whilst this may have been true in the case of Arbatov, Inozemstev had long-standing ties with Ponomaryov and Suslov. He may, nevertheless, have been offered increased prestige and influence by being called upon to report directly to Brezhnev, or, on the other hand, Suslov may have turned to Inozemstev in order to counter the academic arguments Brezhnev was being supplied with by Arbatov (Pope, 1975, p.14, f.28).

These views, however, remain speculative. There would, however, appear to be some connection between the apparatus of the Central Committee and the Soviet academic world. Alexis Pravdin (Pravdin, 1974) for example, claims that the career structure of employees of the Central Committee apparatus is such that in many cases, a position as head of an academic institute is seen as a promotion, and a higher degree a hedge against disaster. Seventy two of the heads of academic institutes at the
time of writing, he claims, were former party officials. This situation, not unnaturally, causes dissension among genuine scholars and leads to allegations that there are more party sages than scholars in the Academy of Sciences, and that the field of scholarship is being used as,

"'A bin for Party throw-outs'"

(Pravdin, 1974, p.103)

Granted that there is a strong connection between the party apparatus and the world of scholarship, one should be cautious of going too far in the type of interpretation that attributes all decisions to some arbitrary and sinister directive emanating from the apparat, to the extent that one neglects to consider other quite obvious factors. Zimmerman (Zimmerman, 1969) for example, in his study of the work of IMEMO, attributes the expansion of the work of the institute in the sixties largely to changes in policy following the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956. Whilst, undoubtedly, this period marked a resurgence of Soviet scholarship in all areas, and was accompanied by considerable changes throughout Soviet society as a whole, this view presupposes a conceptualisation in which the problems of international relations remain the same, whilst only the attitude of the Soviet Union changes. As Georgy Arbatov points out,

"One can agree with Mr. Zimmerman in something else too - the points of view of Soviet scholars on individual international questions have not remained unchanged in recent decades. But one must object firmly to the attempt to infer these changes, so to speak 'from within', from shifts taking place in Moscow, while the chief and basic causes ought to be sought in the world arena. Yes, the appraisal of American policy by Soviet scholars was different at the height of the 'cold war' than at the moment when the Treaty on the Partial Banning of the testing of nuclear weapons was concluded. But during this time were there not
changes in American policy as well? Yes, since 1965 Soviet scholars have begun to speak of the intensification of the aggressiveness of American policy. But are changes in Moscow the cause of that, and not the escalation of American aggression in Vietnam, the beginning of the bombing of the DRV (timed, incidentally, for the visit to Hanoi of a high Soviet delegation.)"

(Arbatov, 1970, p.208)

Without going all the way in agreeing with Mr. Arbatov, one is bound to concede that if, for example, there is an increase in Soviet research on, say Vietnam, this is also a response to the growing and more complex problem this state presented in global terms during the sixties and seventies, rather than simply the result of changes in the intellectual climate in the Soviet Union which permitted a freer and wider range of studies, and there is, in the end, no way of telling to what extent the political leadership themselves are responding to advice and suggestions emanating from the specialists.

One can demonstrate, therefore, a link between academic institutes and government. This is not always clear and not always evenly spread. Similarly, the connection is more important in some areas than in others, for example, the role of the USA Institute and its director, Georgy Arbatov, and it would be wrong to conclude from this that all foreign affairs institutes have the ear of the political leadership. As Hill suggests with reference to political science, (Hill, 1980) it is more likely that there is a mutual interaction between scholars and politicians at different levels. Nevertheless, the state of scholarship reflects the state of knowledge. This is especially true in the case of Southeast Asia, where there was no historical tradition of scholarship upon which to draw. Thus, at the very least, one could say that the work of the
institutes provides a basis for research that the policy makers can draw upon when needed.

The organization of Vietnamese studies in the Soviet Union serves to illustrate this conceptualization of the policy process. As suggested, the study of Southeast Asia is one of the youngest branches of Soviet oriental studies, as there was no pre-revolutionary tradition on which to draw. According to a Soviet publication (Sovietskaya istoriografiya Yugo-vostochnoi Azii, 1977), although some work was produced in the twenties, the beginning of a school of Southeast Asian studies in the Soviet Union is attributed to A. A. Guber, whose work on Indonesia, the Phillipines and Indochina was published in the thirties. The creation, in 1956, of a special department of Southeast Asian studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies, played an important part in the development of the study of Southeast Asia in the USSR. Subsequently, fields of study such as economics, history, ethnography and linguistics began to be developed at other institutions of learning such as IMEMO, the Institute of Ethnography, Moscow and Leningrad Universities and the Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The classification of Vietnam as a socialist country sets it somewhat apart from the study of Southeast Asia as a whole. The emergence of the DRV and the establishment of ties with the Soviet Union predated the growth of either Vietnamese or Southeast Asian studies, and, therefore, from the beginning, Vietnam was classified as one of the socialist countries of Asia, and dealt with in conjunction with Mongolia and North Korea, thus rendering it separate in organizational terms from the rest of Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, the growth of Vietnamese studies parallels the development of Southeast Asian studies as whole.

This growth, in turn, reflects the development of the Soviet relationship with Vietnam. Formal diplomatic relations between the Soviet
Union and the DRV had been established in 1950, shortly after recognition of the DRV by the Peoples' Republic of China. Notwithstanding support for the DRV in their war against the French and the Soviet involvement in the Geneva negotiations, culminating in the Geneva Agreement of 1954 (Cameron, 1970), during the Khrushchev period, there was little Soviet interest in Indochina. The exception to this was the Laos Crisis of 1960 to 1962 (Fall, 1969, Dommen, 1971, Mahajani, 1971, McCoy, 1972). It was not until the fall of Khrushchev in 1964, and the initial phase of the collective leadership of Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin, that one can date real Soviet interest in Vietnam. By then, however, one could argue that this was because the situation itself had changed, and, for example, the visit of Kosygin to Hanoi in 1965 took place against the background of the breakdown of the Geneva Agreement of 1954 and increasing American escalation of the war on the one hand, and deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations on the other. Thus Vietnam became the interface between Soviet Asian policy and detente, and came increasingly to highlight the conflicts of Soviet foreign policy goals. The volume and comprehensive nature of subsequent studies on Vietnam are perhaps a measure of the importance accorded to the problem.

The Institut vostokovedeniya Akademii nauk SSSR (The Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR) in Moscow, is the main centre for the study of Vietnam in the Soviet Union. Other centres, such as the Leningrad branch of the institute and the Institut vostochnykh yazıkov pri Moskovskom gosudarstvennom universitete (The Institute of Oriental Languages at Moscow State University), play a lesser yet complementary role, the latter, for example, being concerned with the practical skills necessary to understanding a foreign culture, such as language and literature. Several other institutes of the Academy of Sciences are also engaged in the training of specialists, or research on
Southeast Asia, for example, the Institut ékonomi mirovoi sotsialisticheskoi sistemy (Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System) or IEMSS, and IMEMO. It is the Moscow branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies, however, that provides the coordinating strand in terms of expertise and research.

Within the Institute, the study of Southeast Asia is divided between two sections, the Department of Socialist Countries, and the Southeast Asia Department. The Department of Socialist Countries, as its name suggests, is concerned with the study of the socialist countries of Asia, that is, North Korea and Mongolia, together with Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The Southeast Asia Department deals with the remaining mainland and island countries of Southeast Asia, that is, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, The Philippines and Indonesia. There is, of course, some degree of overlap, in, for example, the production of publications on the region as a whole, and the Institute also contains a section concerned with general problems. (3)

The Institute publishes two periodicals, "Aziya i Afrika segodniya", a monthly publication, and "Narody Azii i Afriki", a bi-monthly publication. The former is an illustrated journal, containing articles, features and travelogues, designed for a wider, popular market, and also published in English and French. The latter is a scholarly journal, aimed at an academic readership, and containing articles by specialists in the field, and covering all branches of oriental studies. In addition to these periodical publications, the Institute maintains a steady output of book literature. (4)

The Institute of World Economics and International Relations, IMEMO, also does some work in the field of Vietnam and Southeast Asia, and maintains its own specialists in these areas. However, their studies are approached from a wider context, and deal with problems of international
relations. (Yukhanov, 1972, 1973, Mirov, 1972a, Mirov, 1972b, Mirov, 1974, Sergeev, 1975a). As well as the expected output of book literature, IMEMO publishes a monthly journal, "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya". Vietnamese specialists also work under the auspices of the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System, for example, M. E. Trigubenko and Ya N. Pivovarov, although strictly speaking, Trigubenko is a Korea specialist (Miliband, 1977, p.555).

The publications of the above institutes of the Academy of Sciences represent the outlets for Soviet research in the relevant areas, and consist, on the whole, of specialists addressing themselves to other specialists. The work of the All-Union Knowledge Society, on the other hand, is directed at a less specialised audience. The society attempts, via public meetings, to increase the awareness of the general public on issues of current affairs, and the flavour and significance of one such typical meeting has been well described in an article (Binyon, 1980). The society is also responsible for the publication of the monthly international relations journal "Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'", also published in English and French, editorial supervision of which is reportedly provided by a special department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Pope, 1975). The society also publishes a substantial body of book literature, produced by the publishing house "Znanie". The specialists, however, contribute, via lectures and publications, to the work of the society.

It should be pointed out that the institutes of the Academy of Sciences are solely research institutes, and, therefore, there is a high degree of specialization in the work of its researchers. Berton and Rubenstein (Berton, Rubenstein, 1967), give a useful outline of the background and training of Soviet oriental scholars. Most specialists receive their training via a higher degree at either Moscow or Leningrad State University, or directly from an institute of the Academy of
Sciences, the latter being considered more prestigious. An extremely important coordinating link, however, is provided by the Moskovskii
gosudarstvennyi institut mezhunarodnykh otnoshenii MID (The Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and the Vysshaya diplomaticheskaya shkola MID (Higher Diplomatic School, Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The former is a teaching institute which prepares people for entry to various ministries and government departments, and therefore gives a practical course with the stress on modern languages.

Whilst it is not intended to suggest that any of the above mentioned institutes have a central role in policy making with regard to Vietnam, it serves to demonstrate the inter-connection between the academic and policy making spheres, most especially with regard to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the specialists in the area. One could of course argue that it is not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that plays the central role in Soviet foreign policy making, but rather, the higher echelons of the party apparatus, such as the International Department. If one approaches the question from the point of view of the specialists, however, rather than any particular publication or institute, an interlocking structure emerges, composed of a variety of state and academic institutions, and involving a comparatively small number of serious scholars.

A chronological survey of the development of Vietnamese studies up to the late sixties, with reference to the main specialists and their areas of study is given by Baksht (Baksht, 1968). Also helpful in this respect is the contribution by the same author to a symposium marking the thirtieth anniversary of the study of the DRV in 1976 (Tridtsatletie obrazovaniya DRV, 1976). Both of these publications provide a useful "Who is Who" in Soviet scholarship on Vietnam.(5)

With regard to periodisation, it is claimed (Yugo-vostochnaya
Aziya v mirovoi istorii, 1977) that there are three stages in the history of Southeast Asia from ancient times to 1945, that is, from ancient times until the coming of European colonialism, the period of colonialism from 1511 to 1917 and the period from 1917 to 1945. The latter two periods are categorized as modern history and contemporary history respectively. The history of the period post 1945 is considered in connection with work on contemporary political, social and ideological problems, as has already been suggested.

On the whole, therefore, one tends to look towards publications of an economic nature for an exposition of contemporary problems and an analysis of political events. A recent publication (Larionova, Formicheva, 1980), contains a summary and short bibliography of the work of Soviet economists on Southeast Asia in the seventies. Economics, it is claimed, developed later than other branches of Southeast Asian studies. The work of Soviet scholars, therefore, falls into two stages, different both qualitatively and quantitatively. The first stage covers the period from the beginning of the twenties to the mid-forties. This period was characterized by the study of, for example, basic problems of economic geography in relation to individual countries. The second stage, from the mid-forties to the present day, can itself be divided into two periods, from the mid-forties to the end of the fifties, and from the beginning of the sixties onwards. Studies of the post-war period were conditioned both by socio-economic development in relation to the countries of Southeast Asia themselves, and a growth in the number of scholars occupied in socio-economic research, together with progress in research methods. One sees, therefore, a preoccupation with problems of the region as a whole, general development, and so forth. The article cited also gives a quantitative breakdown of different types of published works, that is monographs, collective works, articles and dissertations, for the stages specified, a substantial
increase in output appearing in the sixties. Whilst the bibliography includes works on the region as a whole, however, it does not cover Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

Nevertheless, as stated, the growth of Vietnamese studies parallels that of Southeast Asian studies, and therefore, one can discern the same general trends in scholarship. Whilst reference can be made to some work from the thirties onwards, it was not until the fifties that Vietnamese studies emerged as a coherent discipline. A leading theme in the Soviet study of Vietnam, especially in the early phase, was, not unnaturally, the history of the national liberation movement. A pioneer in this area was S. A. Mkhitaryan (Mkhitaryan, 1957, 1960a, 1960b), whose work centred on the late nineteenth to early twentieth century. This theme was continued in the work of Mordvinov and Shiltova (Mordvinov, Shiltova, 1958), which deals with the period up to the August Revolution itself, in 1945. The political history of Vietnam from the beginning of the Second World War to the ending of French colonial rule has been dealt with by Pavrishchev (Pavrishchev, 1960).

The separate development of the North and South from this period gave rise to further specialization. The political development of the DRV, for example, has been considered in the work of Budanov (Budanov, 1958), Mazaev (Mazaev, 1963) and Merzlyakov (Merzlyakov, 1961). One should also mention the article by Budanov and Kim, dealing with the political/legal aspects of the August Revolution (Budanov, Kim, 1965). These authors confine themselves to a consideration of the structure of the state, its development and so forth. For a consideration of material of a more strictly economic nature in relation to the North, one must turn to the work of Zelentsov (Zelentsov, 1965a, 1965b), Avsenev (Avsenev, 1960), Vasil'tsov and Zelentsov (Vasil'tsov, Zelentsov, 1959), Karamyshev (Karamyshev, 1959), Mazaev (Mazaev, 1959) and Rastorguev (Rastorguev,
Similarly, contemporary problems of the South, such as the socio-economic situation and the development of the national liberation movement, have been treated separately in the work of Shchedrov (Shchedrov, 1962), whilst agrarian relations have been analysed in the work of Dudnik (Dudnik, 1963, 1964).

Studies of Vietnamese history prior to the period of colonial rule have been made by Cheshkov (Cheshkov, 1968), who has dealt with the problems of feudalism in Vietnam and the emergence of the bourgeoisie, and Ognetov (Ognetov, 1960), who has dealt with the Tay Son Uprising. The economic history of Vietnam during the period of French colonial rule has been looked at in the work of Dement'ev (Dement'ev, 1958), the articles of Mordvinov (Mordvinov, 1958) and other such as Popovkina (Popovkina, 1960). Problems of land-tenure and land ownership in colonial Vietnam have been considered in the work of Mazaev (Mazaev, 1958). One should also mention studies of ancient and mediaeval history and of the literature of Vietnam, which, increasingly in the sixties and seventies, constituted a large part of the Soviet output on Vietnam. These include the work of Deopik (Deopik, 1958, 1965), in the field of pre-feudal history. Many of the works in the field of literature consist of translations from the Vietnamese, of both classical and contemporary authors, the leading Soviet specialist in the field being Nikulin (Nikulin, 1958, 1964).

Many Soviet publications are of collective authorship. Notable in this respect in bringing together the work of specialists during the sixties, was the publication "Istoriya Vietnama v noveishe vremya" (Istoriya Vietnama v noveishe vremya, 1970), a contemporary history of Vietnam based on the recent research of Soviet scholars. A similar volume "Novaya istoriya Vietnama", dealing with modern history, was published in 1980 (Novaya istoriya Vietnama, 1980). A handbook on Vietnam (Vietnam,
1969), was prepared by a group of Vietnamists of the Academy of Sciences, assisted by specialists on Vietnam from other institutions, and contains general information on the geography, history, economics and culture of Vietnam. This was superceded in 1976 by a similar publication on the SRV (Sotsialisticheskaya respublika V'etnam, 1976).

There is, of course, continuity during the seventies in the work of the specialists, and further work has been done in areas of research already established. This is evident, for example, in the work of Budanov (Budanov, 1975), Baksht and Mkhitaryan (Baksht, Mkhitaryan, 1973), Cheshkov (Cheshkov, 1972), Demen'tev (Dement'ev, 1975a) and Nikulin (Nikulin, 1971, 1973). One also notices the appearance of several new historical works on Chinese-Vietnamese relations (Mashkina, 1978, Murasheva, 1973), ancient history (Pozner, 1980) and work on the South (Mazyrin, 1975a). Compared to work on Southeast Asia as a whole, however, a similar growth in output in the field of economics is not apparent. One must bear in mind, however, the peculiar situation of Vietnam during most of this period, that is to say, divided and at war, circumstances not particularly conducive to such study.

For a comprehensive bibliography of all Soviet publications on Vietnam up to 1970, the reader is referred to the most recent bibliography of Southeast Asia (Bibliografiya stran Yugo-vostochnoi Azii, 1980), which contains a large section on Vietnam. This is the companion volume to "Bibliografiya Yugo-vostochnoi Azii", published in 1960 (Bibliografiya Yugo-Vostochnoi Azii, 1960).

The foregoing has been an outline sketch of the academic sphere, and, it is hoped, will provide a few useful landmarks for an understanding of the organisation and work of Soviet specialists on Vietnam. With regard to the political sphere, special responsibility for Vietnam came under the Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers Parties, headed
throughout most of this period by Konstantin Katushev. Katushev played an active role in Vietnamese affairs, especially during the period of the war. As early as 1969, he had accompanied the delegation, led by Kosygin, to the funeral of Ho Chi Minh (SWB, September 10th, 1969, FE/3173/C/3, VNA in English, September 6th, 1969), and was a member of the delegation, led by Podgorny, that visited the DRV in 1971 (Pravda, October 4th, 1971), and again in 1972 (Pravda, June 20th, 1972). He himself led a delegation to the DRV in April, 1972 (Izvestia, May 1st, 1972). He was also prominent in receiving and liaising with Vietnamese personnel who visited Moscow, for example, he was present at several meetings with Le Duc Tho in 1972 (Pravda, October 15th, 1972, Pravda, December 17th, 1972), and, from time to time, received delegations from the South Vietnamese side (Pravda, February 25th, 1972, Pravda, February 1st, 1973). Katushev appears to have acted in a negotiating role during the period of the Paris Peace Talks, and this, rather than difficulties within the Soviet leadership, would account for his lower profile following the settlement of 1973. However, in the leadership changes that took place in 1977, Katushev was replaced as secretary by K. V. Rusakov, who, prior to this, had acted as Katushev's second in command. Rusakov appeared to "stand-in" for Katushev on several occasions, for example, he was listed as present at the signing of agreements on military and economic aid in 1969, even though Katushev was not (Pravda, October 10th, 1969). Similarly, at the talks on the occasion of Le Duan's official visit to Moscow in 1973, he was listed as being present for the Soviet side (Pravda, July 17th, 1973). Katushev also appears to have worked closely with N. P. Firyubin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who himself made several visits to Hanoi (New York Times, February 17th, 1970, New York Times, March 6th, 1975) as well as having accompanied high level delegations. Firyubin was also a member of the delegation accompanying
Podgorny to Hanoi in 1971, for example (Pravda, October 4th, 1971), and again in 1972 (Pravda, June 20th, 1972). He also accompanied Katushev during his 1972 visit (Izvestia, May 1st, 1972). It is perhaps Firyubin, in his capacity as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who supplies the most obvious link between the politicians and the academic specialists.

Mikhail Kapitsa, for example, who has published on Indochina and Vietnam (Kapitsa, 1970, Kapitsa, 1971, Istoriya mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii...1967, pp.37-42), was head of the Southeast Asia Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the seventies. By training Kapitsa is a China specialist, and is listed as having been a member of the Soviet embassy to China from 1943 to 1946 and again from 1950 to 1952 (Miliband, 1977, p.240). His diplomatic background and connections are shown by his subsequent activities. Kapitsa's name appears, listed as a member of the Soviet delegation, in the communique issued following the visit of Pham Van Dong to Moscow in 1969 (Pravda, October 20th, 1969). Led by Brezhnev and the upper echelons of the Soviet leadership, the delegation also included Rusakov and Firyubin. He is also reported as being included, again with Firyubin, in the Soviet delegation that received the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Korean Peoples' Democratic Republic in February, 1972 (Pravda, February 27th, 1972), indicating his wider area of responsibility for the Socialist Countries of Asia, also apparent from the range of his publications (Istoriya mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii...1967, pp.27-32, pp.32-36, Kapitsa, Ivanenko, 1965).

The editorial board of a publication of documents concerning Soviet-Vietnam relations (Sovetskiï Soyuz-V'etnam, 1982), is listed as being headed by Firyubin, and including Kapitsa, together with E. P. Glazunov, I. A. Rogachev, P. P. Sevastyanov and S. L. Tikvinskiï. I. A. Rogachev was, by 1980, reportedly head of the South East Asia Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SWB, March 28th, 1980, FE/6382/ A2/1, "VOKP")
Phnom Penh, March 26th, 1980), although the exact date he took up this position is unclear. E. P. Glazunov is attached to the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (Murabyan, 1974, p.213), and has published on Vietnam since the late sixties (Glazunov, 1967, Glazunov, Galkin, 1970, Glazunov, 1970, Glazunov, 1974a, Glazunov, 1974b). His works include an edition of the collected speeches and articles of Ho Chi Minh (Kho Shi Min, 1970), which appeared initially in Vietnamese, suggesting that Glazunov is a Vietnamese speaker. S. L. Tikhvinskii has been attached to the Institute of Oriental Studies since 1964, although prior to this he was, for a time, connected with the Institute of the Economics of World Socialist Systems (Miliband, 1977, p.548). He formerly pursued a diplomatic career, having been based in China, Japan and Great Britain, and has taught at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (Miliband, 1977, p.548). He is a China specialist by training, but has published on the wider problems of Asia, specifically, Collective Security (Tikhvinskii, 1974). P. P. Sevastyanov does not appear in the biobibliographical information on Soviet orientalists, nor is there any record of his publications, so this may well indicate that he is part of the administrative organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus it transpires that several prominent writers on Vietnam and Asian affairs have connections with the Moscow Institute of International Relations, and, in this context, are linked with Firyubin. Kapitsa subsequently emerged as a well known figure on the diplomatic scene, but, in the late sixties/early seventies, his background was not so immediately evident, and, as with Tikhvinskii and Glazunov, to the casual observer, appeared to be merely one of numerous writers publishing in the field.

Once the background of such writers is known, a connection with even the lower echelons of the political leadership is not surprising. A study of the composition of Soviet delegations both to the DRV and receiving
Vietnamese visitors to the Soviet Union, however, can sometimes produce less likely links between the academic and political world. I. A. Ognetov, for example, accompanied Katushev and Firyubin to Hanoi in April, 1972 (SWB, May 2nd, 1972, FE/3978/A2/1, VNA in English, April 25th, 1972). His training was in Vietnamese language, and he has worked on a translation of Le Duan's collected works with Glazunov (Le Zuan, 1971). He has been attached to the Institute of Oriental Studies since 1955, and has been a member of the Institute of Journalists from 1972 (Miliband, 1977, p. 396). He is listed as going by the pseudonym of I. Aleksandrov (Miliband, 1977, p. 396) and under this name has published copiously in Agitator on topics that include the 1969 Conference of Communist and Workers Parties (Aleksandrov, 1969c), and the Paris Peace Talks (Aleksandrov, 1969a, Aleksandrov, 1969b).

Other specialists who have pursued either a journalistic or diplomatic career include Ivan Shchedrov and A. G. Mazaev. Shchedrov, for example, was Pravda correspondent to Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia from 1963 to 1969 (Miliband, 1977, p. 620). He is known for more popular writings on Vietnam (Shchedrov, 1972) and has collaborated with Mazaev (Mazaev, Shchedrov, 1971). Mazaev himself was attached to the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi from 1961 to 1963. He has had connections with both the Institute of Oriental Studies and the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System (Miliband, 1977, p. 323).

Thus it seems reasonable to assume that the publications of the above mentioned specialists will be authentic, given their close connection with the political leadership. Their connections with the relevant academic institutes gives rise to the possibility of an interaction between those one might term the grass roots academics, and those moving in wider political circles. This, in turn, however, creates problems of interpretation and analysis for the western observer. There is debate
amongst Soviet scholars and it is always possible to find discrepancies on any individual issue. The problem in highlighting the significance of such debate, however, is to distinguish between those academics in political positions and those who are researchers. This is not always easy to determine.

The same might be said of the institutes themselves. B. G. Gafurov, for example, former director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, was, prior to taking up this appointment, first secretary of the Tadzhikstan party organisation from 1946 to 1956 (Miliband, 1977, p. 133). Did this mean in personal terms, therefore, his demotion to a little known Moscow institute, or was the institute enhanced as a result of his transfer? Granted that the institute has expanded and developed since 1956, his successor, E. V. Primakov, did not hold a post on the central committee, and the institute cannot compare in political terms with the role of, say, the Institute of the USA and Canada. Primakov, however, was subsequently appointed director of IMEMO, which, in view of the role of Inozemstev, the former director, would indicate an advancement of status for Primakov, and consequent downgrading of the Institute of Oriental Studies. On the other hand, Inozemstev may have owed the enhanced status of his institute simply to his own personal connections within the political leadership, which were not transferable. Since little is known concerning the factors that lead to such appointments, one cannot draw very clear conclusions.

For a western overview of Soviet publications up to the mid-sixties, the reader is referred to Berton and Rubenstein (Berton, Rubenstein, 1967), although this does tend to stress a quantitative analysis of work on Southeast Asia. With regard to language studies, a fundamental prerequisite to any serious inquiry or the pursuit of foreign policy, Anna Allot, in her contribution to the work of Berton and Rubenstein (Berton, Rubenstein, 1967, Chap. 11), gives an excellent outline of the situation in
the Soviet Union. She starts by outlining the general structure and organization of the various centres for the study of Southeast Asian language. There is, for example, a department of Southeast Asian languages within the Institute of Oriental Languages at Moscow State University, which includes a Vietnamese section. The Institute of Oriental Studies contains both a literature and language section, although the literature of Southeast Asia is also studied at the Institute of World Literature of the Academy of Sciences. The work carried out at the institutes of the Academy of Sciences, however, is essentially theoretical, whilst practical language teaching and work on phonetics is carried out at Moscow State University. Similarly, the Moscow Institute of International Relations gives a practical course with the stress on the modern language, especially newspapers, and is given priority in obtaining full-time native speakers. In Leningrad, the study of the languages and literature of Southeast Asia is carried out mostly in the Oriental Faculty of Leningrad State University, and to a lesser extent at the Leningrad Branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies, although here the emphasis is mainly on the nineteenth century and earlier.

Vietnamese, it is claimed (Berton, Rubenstein, 1967, Chap.11), was one of the first Southeast Asian languages to be studied in both Moscow and Leningrad. As early as 1956, Yu. K. Lekomtsev had begun to write on Vietnamese and in 1959, T. T. Mkhitaryan published her book on Vietnamese phonetics. In 1960, an outline description of the Vietnamese language, edited by V. M. Solntsev appeared. Also involved were Mkhitaryan, Lekomtsev and I. I. Glebova, who taught Vietnamese at the Moscow Institute of International Relations. For further information on the work of Soviet linguists in the field of Vietnamese language, however, the reader is referred to the publication "Sovetskoe yazykoznanie za 50 let", (Sovetskoe yazykoznanie za 50 let, 1967).
Anna Allot suggests that the best indication of the degree of importance attached to Soviet relations with any one Southeast Asian country can be judged from the number and quality of dictionaries published, which, in the case of Vietnam, is high. As well as fundamental works such as a Russian-Vietnamese and a Vietnamese-Russian dictionary, these include a dictionary of medical terms and a pocket dictionary, which indicate more than a purely academic interest in the language (Russko-v'etnamskii slovar', 1958, Russko-v'etnamskii slovar', 1960, V'etnamsko-russkii slovar', 1961, Karmannyi russko-v'etnamskii slovar', 1962, Russko-v'etnamskii uchebnii slovar', 1965, Russko-v'etnamskii meditsinski slovar', 1967). It is claimed, for example, (Berton, Rubenstein, 1967, pp. 45,46) that the first Vietnamese-Russian dictionary, published in 1961, was more up to date and contained more North Vietnamese expressions than the Vietnamese-French dictionary of Dao-Von-Tap, published in Saigon, in 1951.

A quantitative analysis reveals that Vietnam is second only to Indonesia in the attention it receives from Soviet scholars, though much of this consists of writings inspired by the war. This process continued into the seventies, and one therefore has to sift one's way through propaganda, reportage and works of a more popular nature. Thus even from a quantitative survey of Soviet publications one can make out a case for a growing Soviet interest in Vietnam from the mid-fifties. However, as previously suggested, there is no simple relationship between the volume of published material and policy decisions emanating from the leadership. That particular areas of study are significant, as, for example, the increase in Soviet works on economic themes during the seventies, may reflect a general trend in fashions and techniques of scholarship rather than anything specifically relevant to Vietnam. All one can claim with any certainty is that the development of Vietnamese studies parallels
the increasing Soviet involvement in Southeast Asia, so that by 1965, the Soviet Union were well placed, in practical terms, for the conduct of policy. This is especially true in areas of direct, practical relevance, such as language studies. The increasing volume of propaganda and publications for a more popular market reflect the period of the war, and represent, in many cases, the need to present and defend Soviet actions in the light of the hostile attitude emanating from China. A quantitative analysis therefore, whilst useful in a comparative sense, can often give a misleading picture and it is essential that one look at both the content of such publications and the political context in which such publications appear.

This rather lengthy introduction is intended to illustrate the basis for the choice of material used in the subsequent analysis. The discussion will now go on to examine questions such as the nature of the state in the Soviet analysis and whether this has changed over time, the Soviet view of the South and the problems posed by reunification, and the place of Vietnam within the Soviet theoretical framework as a whole.

The first part of an article by Glazunov and Galkin, published in 1970 (Glazunov, Galkin, 1970), dates precisely the stages of the Vietnamese revolution. The authors state that Vietnam is significant because of,

"The victory of the August Revolution and the foundation of the first peoples' democratic state in Southeast Asia..."

(Glazunov, Galkin, 1970, p.89)

Thus, initially, the emerging state in the North was not seen as socialist. They go on to say, however, that,

"Beginning in 1954, North Vietnam entered into the stage of socialist revolution."

(Glazunov, Galkin, 1970, p.91)
This precise dating of the stages of the Vietnamese revolution is interesting when one recalls the initial hesitation of the Soviet Union in recognising the DRV. This did not occur until 1950, shortly after recognition by the PRC. This caution, therefore, is reflected in the Soviet analysis of the state. One must also remember, however, that during most of this period, the Vietnamese party was operating underground, and did not re-emerge, reconstituted as the Vietnam Workers' Party, until 1951 (Fall, 1965, pp.16-17).

Glazunov and Galkin sum up the first section of their article by saying that,

"After the victory of the war of liberation, the DRV entered into the transitional period to socialism, whilst South Vietnam was still struggling to complete the tasks of the national-democratic revolution."

(Glazunov, Galkin, 1970, p.95)

In the Soviet view, therefore, the August Revolution initiated the national democratic phase in the North, and, in 1954, with the victory over the French, the North entered into a transitional period on the way to socialism. The South had yet to bring about the national democratic stage.

The same author, writing in 1974, however, states,

"Socialist construction, arising in Vietnam as a result of the August Revolution, and which has fairly withstood the hardest test, demonstrated its great advantage in comparison with capitalism."

(Glazunov, 1974a, p.12)

This, at first sight, appears to be a contradiction of the former assertion that the August Revolution brought about merely a national democratic revolution in the North. To claim that socialist construction
arose as a result of the August Revolution, is, to some extent, a fudging of the issue. Nevertheless, it leaves the way open to argue that this is merely another facet, and the logical extension of, the national democratic stage, regardless of precise dating. Glazunov's subsequent remarks show a similar vagueness with regard to time scale. He does at least attempt an analysis, however, by claiming that,

"The Vietnamese conflict, for a number of reasons, had a sufficiently complex character. It was not only a national liberation war (if one talks of South Vietnam), with its own distinctive features, when the struggle, as is shown by historical experience, is not only against external enemies, the comprador bourgeoisie, feudal and other reactionary circles, trying, with the help of foreign support, to preserve their age old privileges, when the considerable bulk of the national bourgeoisie are drawn towards the revolutionary movement, becoming, although only temporarily, united with the working class and peasantry.

It was also the war of a socialist state - the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, against imperialist aggression. In this connection, it is no longer a question of the struggle against internal enemies, as internal reaction in North Vietnam was already crushed by the beginning of the war against the USA, with the start of agrarian reform and the collectivization of agriculture, with the start of the transformation of privately owned industry and trade. With the result of this transformation, the national bourgeoisie were liquidated as a class, but the former owners remained - to an extent, joint owners of state capitalist enterprises, and, consequently, took an interest in the defence of their own and state property from
the encroachment of foreign aggressors. In this way, during the pre-war years, the necessary political and economic preconditions were founded for the firm union of all sections of the population in the DRV in the struggle against foreign aggression, uniting closely around the Vietnam Workers' Party. This solidarity, this moral and political unity in the conditions of the developing of socialist construction, remained one of the decisive internal factors in securing the victory of the Vietnamese people in their difficult war against imperialist aggression. Thanks to the great organisational work of the VWP, held in great respect by the people, the success of the DRV on all fronts of the war was made possible."

(Glazunov, 1974a, p.12)

This, of course, is a rather sketchy outline compared to later elaborations, and may have more to do with the fact that at this particular juncture, the author is writing in a popular journal and directing his remarks at the informed layman, rather than the scholar or party official. What does emerge, however, is an attempt to describe the war in Vietnam as part of the revolutionary process, and a differentiation of the development of this process in the North and the South.

Leaving aside for a moment the special problems posed by reunification, one finds, by 1979, in a publication under the editorial control of Trigubenko (V'etnam na puti stroitel'stva sotsializma, 1979), an entire chapter on the revolutionary process in Vietnam, which is now divided up into three distinct stages. Thus,

"With the victory of the August Revolution, the second stage of the national peoples' democratic revolution in Vietnam began, in connection with the establishment in North Vietnam of the peoples' democratic stage."
The author continues,

"Right after the victorious conclusion of the anti-French war of resistance, the national peoples' democratic revolution in the DRV developed into a socialist revolution. The course of the transition to socialism, without the capitalist stage of development, was adopted by the Central Committee of the party in September, 1954, that is to say, after the signing of the Geneva Agreement."

He then goes on to say,

"From 1954, the third stage of the Vietnamese revolution began, which continued until May, 1975, that is, up until the complete liberation of South Vietnam."

Thus it would appear that the author puts the foundation of the national democratic revolution in Vietnam even further back in time, contradicting Glazunov's first statement that it began with the August Revolution. Also, terms such as "peoples' democratic stage" and "transitional period" are used interchangeably, as if they were synonymous, leaving the reader at some points in a hopeless confusion. What, therefore, is the significance of the exercise?

Firstly, one has to determine whether a change over time is due to a shift in interpretation of a given event, or a shift in the frame of reference within which it is interpreted. This point is most clearly demonstrated by references to Vietnam in the context of non-capitalist development. Whilst, in the early period, analysis of the North and South was cast in terms of the national democratic phase and so forth, there were few references to the term non-capitalist development until the
seventies. This particular treatment and emphasis of Vietnam, therefore, is related to the overall problem confronting the Soviet Union in Asia and the developing world with regard to providing a counterweight to the theoretical innovations of Maoism with its stress on the peasantry, which became apparent generally during this period. A publication on the theme of the working class and peasantry and the socialist countries of Asia, for example (Kim, Shabshina, 1977), charts the development of Mongolia, North Korea and North Vietnam, with reference to revolutionary theory and its application. The introduction gives a short outline of the non-capitalist path to development, placing all three countries in this context. The Peoples Republic of Mongolia, the Korean Peoples' Democratic Republic and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, it is claimed, benefiting from the experience of the Soviet Union, have set course for socialism. The authors consider one aspect of this process, that is, the alliance between the working class and the peasantry. They continue,

"The revolutionary practice of peoples gave rise to a new role for the worker-peasant alliance (as well as other law-governed processes), linked to the concrete historical conditions, both international and internal and different forms of its manifestation in different spheres of social life. One of the greatest causes of these differences consists of the fact that from this socio-economic formation, the transition to socialism will be completed, from capitalistic or precapitalistic formations, or from underdeveloped capitalism, by-passing its higher forms."

(Kim, Shabshina, 1977, pp.5-6)

This highly specific work, therefore, is representative of the type of publication that was appearing in the late seventies. Whilst it is clear that the non-capitalist path was considered to have been taken by the DRV,
this type of writing would seem to suggest that Vietnam was one of a number of countries that were being more explicitly accommodated within the theoretical framework of non-capitalist development, as the framework itself assumed greater importance. This then became the basis for defining the status of the South, both in relation to the North, and within the overall Soviet schema.

There were, however, special problems in applying this analysis to the SRV, following reunification, owing to the acknowledged discrepancies in development between North and South, and, whereas earlier, differences in development had been cited to support the argument that the North and South were pursuing independent goals, and as a rational for a slower pace towards reunification, the situation became reversed, and the very differences were used to demonstrate a continuity of purpose.

In order to refute the charge that should the United States withdraw, South Vietnam would "fall to communism", Kremenyuk, writing in 1969, had been able to claim that,

"The government of the DRV realize that during the last fifteen years, the North and the South have been developing along different lines. North Vietnam has gone a long way in the development of economics and culture, and in this part of the country, the fundamental preconditions for the further building of socialist society were established. In South Vietnam, bourgeois-democratic development has still to be completed and the destructive effect of the occupation and aggression of the USA on the economy has to be restored. These differences, of course, are not insuperable obstacles on the path to finally resolving the Vietnamese problem, though their removal is possible only in the conditions of the full independence of Vietnam, without foreign interference, as the DRV and the NLF
Kapitsa, writing in 1971, had stated very clearly that the South were not fighting on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, when he asserted,

"Moreover, the South Vietnamese patriots are not conducting their struggle under the banner of Marxism-Leninism - they are struggling to free their country from cruel feudalists and a corrupt army of mercenaries, to turn South Vietnam into a democratic and neutral republic. In the future, North and South Vietnam themselves, without foreign interference, will agree on how and when to unite the country."

(Kapitsa, 1971, p.7)

By 1977, however, Budanov and Mazýrin were able to claim that,

"One of the most important factors allowing the completion of the process of uniting North and South Vietnam into a single, socialist state only a year after the complete liberation of the country, was the successful work of the people and administration of the southern part of Vietnam in liquidating the severe consequences of a war of many years duration, foreign domination and the sway of the puppet regime."

(Budanov, Mazýrin, 1977, p.11)

The point here is that North and South were united into a single, socialist state after only a year. This process is telescoped even further by a later publication which claims,

"Towards the end of 1975, as a result of socio-political transformation in the south of the country and the construction of a united political course under the leadership of the VWP, the preconditions for the reunification of Vietnam were laid down."
The initial position, therefore, had been used to galvanize support for a war of national liberation, and sought to play down the socialist nature of the North. This, presumably, was the theoretical position underpinning policy statements concerning support for the Vietnamese people as a whole that emanated continuously from Moscow throughout the period of the war. How, therefore, was the South to get from the position of a backward, feudal economy, to that of being incorporated as part of a united, socialist state, within the space of a year?

The lack of published material on the subject in 1975 suggests that this eventuality was neither expected nor capable of a speedy resolution. The ambiguous response of the Soviet press to both the final victory of the DRV and its aftermath was perhaps reflected in academic publications. Books and articles on Vietnam, covering a wide variety of topics ranging from the Thieu regime (Mazyrin, 1975b) to Pushkin studies in Vietnam (Nikulin, 1976) continued to appear during the next two years. However, a publication on Soviet/Vietnam relations, under the editorial control of Isaev and Chernyshev (Sovetsko-v'etnamskie otnosheniya, 1975), had little to say on the final victory, apart from the expected congratulatory comments. Granted it was prepared for publication some time before the fall of Saigon, the tone of the work created the impression that the status quo following the Paris Agreement was expected to continue indefinitely. It was noted, for example, that on May 12th, 1975, the Soviet Union had signed an economic agreement with the people of South Vietnam (Sovetsko-v'etnamskie otnosheniya, 1975, p.322). Similarly, an article by Sergeev (Sergeev, 1975b), published on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the formation of the DRV, makes no mention of reunification. It was not until 1977 that material began to appear in any volume and substance, suggesting that whatever had been resolved in this
respect had worked its way through and emerged as a fully fledged theoretical position.

The article referred to earlier by Budanov and Mazýrin (Budanov, Mazýrin, 1977), therefore, described how the South, in this short space of time, had brought about the transition from capitalism to socialism. Prior to the military victory of 1975, it is claimed, the North and South were in different stages of development, the North had already embarked on the path towards constructing a socialist society, whilst capitalism had reached the stage of feudal exploitation in the South. Having analyzed the situation in the country after victory, the Vietnam Workers' Party adopted a course of simultaneously continuing socialist construction in the North, whilst bringing about a national-democratic transformation in the South so that the South could achieve the transition from capitalism to socialism in the shortest possible time.

A similar article (Ognetov, 1977) considers Vietnam in the context of the world revolutionary process. It seeks to demonstrate that the Vietnamese revolution took place with the help of and in the context of the world socialist revolution, and gives a historical outline of this, citing, for example, the role of the Communist Party of Indochina. Commenting on the situation following reunification, however, it cites the decisions of the Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, held in the summer of 1976. These included the decision to pursue a course of socialist construction and socialist transformation in the reunited country, which, in turn, involved the continuation of the construction of socialism and the strengthening of socialist production relations in the North, and simultaneously, directing socialist transformation in the South, Ognetov continues,

"Proposing the central tasks of the transitional period to socialism on a nation-wide scale, the way towards socialist
industrialisation, the advantageous development of the basis of heavy industry, the all round development of agriculture and light industry, the CPV are mobilizing the people towards the construction of the material-technical base of socialism within fifteen to twenty years."
(Ognetov, 1977, p.26)

It would seem, therefore, that what had previously been seen as differences were now emphasised as part of a continuous, law-governed process, leading inevitably to a united, socialist state. This framework also served to define Vietnam clearly in relation to the remainder of the socialist bloc. Thus the reunited country was seen to be "constructing the foundations of socialism".

The method by which the final analysis of the SRV was arrived at cannot be said to be the result of debate among Soviet scholars. It is more likely that it represents a point of view which was arrived at gradually, as necessity and changing circumstances dictated. It reflected, however, the state of affairs in the newly reunited country and allowed for the different stages of development of both North and South. Both the DRV and the SRV, however, are placed below the Eastern European states within the hierarchy of socialist states, in that they are considered to be "constructing the foundations of socialism". This position has been arrived at via the non-capitalist path of development, firstly, in the North. Following the military victory of 1975, the South moved rapidly from a pre-capitalist level of development to the stage of socialist construction throughout the entire country. It may be, therefore, that reunification presented something of a problem in theoretical terms, and the evidence suggests that the decision to reunify immediately was by no means certain. One should also reflect on the possibility that this position was something new within the Soviet experience, requiring
caution. It may be, of course, that the refinements of the Soviet analysis did not emerge until the mid-seventies, and were only, in retrospect, applied to Vietnam. On the other hand, the need to appeal to a larger spectrum of world opinion, together with the reluctance of the DRV, initially, to come out publically in favour of either the Soviet Union or China, ensured that relations between the two parties and the socialist content of the state were minimized.

Possibly for the same reasons, Vietnam tended to be played down in the context of collective security. Publications dealing with this theme either ignored Vietnam completely, or dealt with it in passing as part of a broader area of discussion. Sobakin (Sobakin, 1974), for example, stressed the European component of collective security, whilst Zhukov (Zhukov, 1975), concentrated on the problems of the Middle East. In other publications, Indochina, rather than Vietnam specifically, is cited as demonstrating the need for collective security in Asia. Thus, prior to the Paris Agreement, one finds statements such as,

"In reality, the formation of a system of aggressive alliances in Asia runs counter to the principles of peace and security in that region. For example, in the sphere of the actions of the Seato bloc in arbitrarily breaching the Geneva Agreement on Indochina throughout Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia."

(Pavlovskii, 1972, p.32)

This was subsequently replaced by statements such as,

The agreement on ending the war and establishing peace in Vietnam, the agreement on Laos, the ending of the bombing of Cambodia, were serious steps in the normalization of the Indochina situation, but more needs to be done in order to extinguish the fire of war in Southeast Asia."

(Kudryavtsev, 1973, p.113)
"The signing of the Paris Agreement on ending the war and establishing peace in Vietnam, was a conspicuous victory for the Vietnamese people and all peace loving forces; a great contribution to the work of peace in Asia and to the national liberation movement was brought about by the struggle of the Laotian people, making possible the signing of the Vientiane Agreement on the establishment of peace in Laos."

(Tikhvinskii, 1974, p.18)

Even following the treaty of 1978, this treatment of Vietnam did not substantially change. A chapter entitled "The Ensuring of Peace and Security in Asia, through the Joint Efforts of The Asiatic States", in a publication under the editorial control of Petrov (Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya v aziatsko-tikhookeanskom regione, 1979), although containing passing references to Vietnam, is mainly concerned with discussing the principles of collective security in relation to, for example, Seato, Sento and countries as various as Japan, India and Burma. This leads one to conclude that the Soviet relationship with Vietnam was not critical to the Soviet conception of collective security, or, was, in fact, an alliance that proved an obstacle to presenting the plan in a pan-Asian context.

It would seem that by 1969, therefore, Soviet involvement in Vietnam had been given impetus by the dynamics of the Sino-Soviet dispute, but, on the other hand was restrained by the priority of pursuing a larger Asian policy, with which Vietnam was not entirely compatible. This contradiction was shown, for example, by the often qualified Soviet support given to the Vietnamese war effort in real terms, and the need to play down the role of Vietnam in the context of collective security. This is not to deny the undoubted Soviet contribution to the DRV, both in
military and economic terms, and the interest demonstrated by the increasing volume of publications, reflecting both propaganda aspects of the Vietnamese situation and various spheres of Vietnamese life and culture.

Not surprisingly, therefore, one detects ambiguities in Soviet writings on Vietnam. Whilst North and South were clearly differentiated, official Soviet policy statements tended to treat Vietnam as a whole, referring to the country in the context of the national liberation movement, rather than stressing, for example, party to party relations between the WRP and the CPSU. In other respects, North and South were treated as separate states. Whilst the impression created by Soviet writings is one of consistent and continuous support for Vietnam in both the war with the United States, and, subsequently, reunification and reconstruction, the ambiguities lead one to question the real nature of the relationship. Did the Soviet attitude towards the PRG, for example, in the period following the settlement of 1973, consist of recognition of the status quo for the foreseeable future? Were the Soviet Union satisfied with accepting the reunified state into a closer relationship with the Soviet bloc, or was there some difficulty in accommodating it within the existing framework? To what extent were policy outcomes dictated by the Vietnamese themselves, rather than by Soviet initiatives? The following discussion goes on to examine these questions in more detail.
Since the party is the source of policy, a logical starting point for a consideration of Soviet/Vietnam relations, is the development of relations between the CPSU and the VLD/CPV and an examination of the policy making machinery.

The VWP was the direct descendent of the Communist Party of Indochina, founded by Ho Chi Minh in 1930, to consolidate and unify the nascent revolutionary movements of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Following a period of dissolution from 1945 to 1951, when the party operated underground, it re-emerged, reorganized on a separate basis, and re-named the Vietnam Workers' Party. Several authors have dealt with the early phases of the history of the party, from a variety of perspectives, for example Honey (Honey, 1962, 1963), Hoang Van Chi (Hoang Van Chi, 1964), Rousset (Rousset, 1973), Fall (Fall, 1956, 1965), Pike (Pike, 1966), Buttinger (Buttinger, 1958), as well as the life of Ho Chi Minh, and his role in the establishment of such organizations as the Revolutionary Youth League (Lacouture, 1968, Duiker, 1972). It is therefore not intended to recapitulate on this period, and this discussion will focus on the position of the VWP following the death of Ho Chi Minh and during the ascendency of Le Duan.

The document known as Ho Chi Minh's testament (SWB, September 10th, 1969, FE/3173/C/11,12,13, VNA in English, Hanoi home service, September 9th, 1969), read by Le Duan at Ho Chi Minh's funeral on September 9th, 1969, stated clearly the VWP position with regard to its role in relation to Moscow and Peking. Thus,

"About the world communist movement: Having dedicated my whole life to the cause of the revolution, the more I am proud to see
the growth of the international communist and workers' movement
the more deeply I am grieved at the dissensions that are
dividing the fraternal parties.

I wish that our Party will do its best to contribute effectively
to the restoration of unity among the fraternal parties on the
basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, in a
way consonant with the requirements of heart and reason.

I am sure that the fraternal parties and countries will unite
again."

(SWB, September 10th, 1969, FE/3173/C/12, VNA in English, Hanoi
home service, September 9th, 1969)

The Soviet Union sent a high level delegation, led by Kosygin, to
attend Ho Chi Minh's funeral (SWB, September 10th, 1969, FE/3173/C/3, VNA
in English, September 6th, 1969). However, the first to arrive on the
scene in Hanoi, on September 4th, had been a Chinese delegation, led by
Chou En Lai (SWB, September 5th, 1969, FE/3169/C/5, NCNA in English,
Peking home service, September 4th, 1969). The promptness of the arrival
of the Chinese delegation was matched only by the shortness of their stay
and the haste of their departure, and having offered their condolences,
they left on the evening of September 4th (SWB, September 8th, 1969,
FE/3171/C/1, NCNA in English, Peking home service, VNA in English,
September 5th, 1969). It is suggested that the Chou En Lai delegation
left in order to avoid a meeting with the Russian delegation (New York
Times, September 6th, 1969). The Chinese subsequently sent a lower level
delegation, led by Li Hsien-nien, member of the Politbureau of the CPC
Central Committee and Vice-Premier of the State Council (SWB, September
10th, 1969, FE/3173/C/1, NCNA in English, Peking home service, September
8th, 1969) to attend the funeral itself.

Both the Chinese and Soviet delegations were treated with equal courtesy by the Vietnamese, and neither side was given preferential treatment that might be misconstrued in political terms. When one looks at the VNA reporting of events, for example, the communique issued following the Soviet delegation's visit to Hanoi (SWB, September 12th, 1969, FE/3175/A2/1,2, VNA in English, September 10th, 1969), and the communique issued following the Chinese delegation's visit (SWB, September 12th, 1969, FE/3175/A3/1, VNA in English, September 10th, 1969), one discerns an effort to be impartial, and present both sides as friends of the Vietnamese people. There is no hint of controversy or conflict lying beneath the surface.

On the morning of September 10th, the Soviet delegation left for home. However, upon reaching Dushombe, the capital of Tajikistan, they turned round and flew to Peking, where, at Peking airport, Kosygin had a surprise meeting with Chou En Lai (New York Times, 12th September, 1969). According to Sanzo Nosaka, chairman of the Japan Communist Party, a Soviet proposal for the meeting had been conveyed to China by the DRV, but no reply reached Kosygin until he was in Calcutta on his way home from Hanoi. On 12th September, the Kyodo news agency issued a report to the effect that,

"Nosaka, at the press conference held at the JCP headquarters in Yoyogi said he did not know the details concerning the holding of the China-Soviet summit meeting in Peking. He said, however, that the Soviet side apparently told the Chinese Communist Party through the Vietnam Workers' Party that Kosygin and other members of the Russian delegation wanted to stop at Peking on their way home from Hanoi. It also was believed to have proposed a meeting between Kosygin and Chou in Peking during the
stop-over, Nosaka said. He said no reply to the Soviet proposal was made by the Chinese side before Kosygin and his party left Hanoi Thursday morning."

"The Soviet delegation later stopped at Calcutta, where it received the reply from Peking, Nosaka said. As a result, Kosygin and his party flew to the Chinese capital, he believed."

(SWB, September 13th, 1969, FE/3176/A2/1, Kyodo in English, September 12th, 1969).

Other sources credit the Romanians with arranging the meeting (New York Times, September 12th, 1969), while still others claim that Nosaka himself, through his previous close contacts with the Chinese leaders, brought some weight to bear (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969/1970, 23645). The route taken by Kosygin on his journey back to Moscow, however, suggests that the Chinese agreed to talk only after he had left Hanoi, thus preserving the apparent neutrality of Vietnam, and this would indicate that in some way Hanoi was significant.

Several communist leaders had an interest in seeing a rapprochement between the two sides. The DRV, however, viewed disunity in the socialist bloc as an event that might seriously disrupt their goal of national reunification and, therefore, had a concrete interest in stressing the need for unity. The issue, therefore, was directly related to DRV policy goals.

This even-handed approach, with the stress on the need for unity in the communist bloc, was the position prior to the death of Ho Chi Minh in 1969, and was continued by his successors in their public attitude, long after the underlying reality had begun to shift and the aspirations expressed in Ho Chi Minh's testament were no longer relevant. In 1969, however, the VWP were still very much in the role of arbiter between the Soviet Union and China.
From the Soviet side, Vietnam continued to be stressed in the context of the national liberation movement. References to Vietnam tended to be couched in terms of support by the socialist bloc and "progressive forces", for the fight of the Vietnamese people for independence, rather than in terms of relations between parties. The World Conference of Communist and Workers Parties, which opened in Moscow on June 5th, 1969 (Pravda, June 6th, 1969), is a case in point. Vietnam, together with most of the other Asian parties did not attend the conference, but in spite of this, discussion of the problems of Vietnam took up a considerable portion of the agenda. Brezhnev, referring in his opening speech to the consequences of military action on the part of the west, for example, claimed,

"The most striking example of this is the resistance that has been offered to US aggression in Vietnam. The heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people against the interventionists has merged with the resolute and effective military and economic assistance provided by the USSR and other socialist countries and with the broad popular movement of solidarity with the victims of aggression that has developed in almost every country of the world, including the U.S.A."

(Pravda, June 8th, 1969)

Similarly, the third section of the basic document adopted by the conference contained the passage,

"A primary goal of united action is all-round support for the heroic Vietnamese people. The conference calls on all who cherish peace and national independence to intensify the struggle to compel American imperialism to withdraw its interventionist troops from Vietnam, stop its interference in the internal affairs of that country and respect the right of
the Vietnamese people to solve their problems by themselves. The ultimate victory of the Vietnamese patriots is of fundamental importance for strengthening the positions of the peoples in the struggle against the imperialist policy of diktat and arbitrary rule. Coordinated measures by all states of the socialist system and joint efforts by all the Communist and Workers' Parties, all progressive parties and mass democratic organizations and all freedom-loving and peace-loving forces are needed to bring this victory nearer. The conference welcomes the formation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. It sees this as an important stage in the heroic liberation struggle of the Vietnamese people. The conference calls for a struggle to ensure the success of the Paris talks, which is perfectly possible on the basis of the 10 points proposed by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam."

(Pravda, June 18th, 1969)
The appeal "Independence, Freedom and Peace for Vietnam!", adopted by the conference, was unusual in that it contained a direct reference to the party, and referred to,

"The vanguard of the Vietnamese people, the Vietnam Workers' Party and its Central Committee, the great patriot and internationalist Ho Chi Minh, distinguished figure of the international communist movement."

(Pravda, June 11th, 1969)
It went on to refer to the party as,

"The Vietnam Workers' Party, the inspiring and guiding force in the struggle against the imperialist aggression of the USA, consistently defending national interests, and a forepost of
socialism in Southeast Asia.
(Pravda, June 11th, 1969)

This is not to deny that the DRV, was in the eyes of the Soviet Union, an accepted member of the Soviet bloc. Thus, on all formal occasions, the DRV was accorded its rightful place within the hierarchy. In Podgorny's opening address to the Twenty Fourth Congress of the CPSU, in March 1971, for example, the VLD was welcomed among the parties of the fraternal socialist states, which were, as usual, listed in alphabetical order (XXIV s'ezd, I, 1971, p. 6).(1) In the foreign policy section of the report of the Central Committee of the CPSU, delivered by Brezhnev on the first day of the Congress, a short paragraph on Vietnam appears during a discussion of the economy of the CMEA, where, it is claimed,

"Relations of socialist solidarity and strong, militant friendship link our party and the Soviet people with the Vietnamese Workers' Party and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. (Applause). Following the behests of the great patriot and revolutionary Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese people hold on high the banner of socialism and fearlessly resist the imperialist aggressors. (Applause). The Democratic Republic of Vietnam can be certain that in its armed struggle and in peaceful labour it can continue to count on the fraternal support of the Soviet Union. (Prolonged Applause.)."

(XXIV s'ezd, I, 1971, p.33)

The majority of references to Vietnam, however, were in the tone previously described. Party to party relations were not stressed and the country as a whole was most often mentioned in the context of references to imperialism, United States aggression and the struggle of the Vietnamese people.

The Vietnamese, for their part, remained evenhanded. Le Duan, for
example, in his speech to the Twenty Fourth Party Congress, was careful to praise and thank both the Soviet Union and China, when he claimed,

"Our victories in the struggle against the American aggressors and for the salvation of our homeland are indissolubly connected with the powerful support and enormous assistance of the Soviet Union, China and the other fraternal socialist countries and of the international Communist and workers' movement, the national-liberation movement and progressive and peace-loving forces the world over, including the American people."

(XXIV s'ezd, I, 1971, p.191)

Vietnam, therefore, whilst prepared to give the CPSU and the Soviet Union credit for their support, only did so either in a context where they could pay similar respects to China, or in the context of some broad concept such as proletarian internationalism.

This should be contrasted with Le Duan's speech to the Twenty-Fifth Party Congress in 1976, which reflects the changed nature of the Vietnamese attitude. Unlike his speech to the Twenty Fourth Congress in 1971, this speech was much more explicit in its praise of the CPSU and the Soviet Union, and made no direct mention of China. Describing the Soviet Union as "the mightiest socialist power in the world", Le Duan claimed,

"Dear comrades! More than half a century ago, Comrade Ho Chi Minh, the first Vietnamese Communist, who saw the October Revolution as the only path for the salvation of our people and country, came to the homeland of Lenin and laid the foundation of the great Vietnamese-Soviet friendship. (Applause). This friendship and this solidarity, the development of which is an object of constant concern for the parties and peoples of our two countries, are gaining strength, growing, flowering and bearing fruit every day."
There was no ambiguity, therefore, on the part of Le Duan, regarding his party's connection with the CPSU, and its historical continuity was reinforced by reference to Lenin and Ho Chi Minh.

After expressing thanks to the CPSU, the Soviet government and the Soviet people for their continued support, he went on to say,

"We take this opportunity to express sincere and profound gratitude to the other fraternal socialist countries, Communist and Workers' Parties, national-liberation movements, liberated countries and international democratic organizations that wholeheartedly gave and continue to give support and assistance to the revolutionary cause of the Vietnamese people (Applause)."

Thus, at the point where one might expect to find a balanced reference to the role of China, one finds only a more general reference to other communist and workers' parties. The impression that Vietnam had abandoned its even-handed stance was reinforced by other events that took place in 1976.

The Fourth Congress of the Vietnam Workers' Party opened in Hanoi on 14th December, 1976 (SWB, December 15th, 1976, FE/5390/C/1, VNA in English, December 14th, 1976). Not only was this the first congress to be held following reunification, but it was the first to be held for seventeen years, and, therefore, an event of some significance in the development of the WWP. The Soviet Union sent a high level delegation, led by M. A. Suslov, Secretary, Central Committee of the CPSU, and consisting of Sh. R. Rashidov, a candidate member of the Politbureau, and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, K. F. Katushev, Secretary, Central Committee of the CPSU, and K. V. Rusakov, listed simply as a member of the Central Committee of the
CPSU (Pravda, December 13th, 1976). It had earlier been reported by Kyodo News Agency, that a Chinese Embassy source in Moscow had said, on December 9th, that China would not be sending a delegation, although no specific reason had been given (SWB, December 11th, 1976, FE/5387/1).(2)

Le Duan's opening address to the Congress, delivered on December 14th was wholly given over to an assessment of the historical development of the Vietnamese revolution, its present stage and the future task confronting the party. It was delivered under seven headings, ranging from a general section concerning the course of the Vietnamese revolution to a section on directives for strengthening the role of the party. Section VI, the foreign policy section, however, in contrast with his speech some months previously in Moscow, apparently reverted to the former even-handed approach, making explicit mention of both the Soviet Union, and China. Thus, for example,

"The glorious victory of the Soviet Union and other revolutionary forces in world war two toppled down a big chunk of the imperialist system and marked a period of new, great developments of the world revolution. The great victory of the Chinese revolution tipped the balance of forces in favour of the revolution."

(SWB, December 21st, 1976, FE/5395/C/16, VNA in English, December 16th, 1976) (3)

However, a closer examination of the text of the opening address reveals that whilst overt references to the Soviet Union may have been couched in broad, and even-handed terms, this was not true of the analysis and world view propounded by Le Duan. Thus, for example, he claims, with reference to the post-reunification situation within the country that,

"Dear comrades, the victory of the anti-US national salvation resistance is the victory of two revolutionary strategies which
were carried out (? in the same period) and which were closely combined - namely, the people's national democratic revolution in the South and the socialist revolution in the North."

(SWB, December 16th, 1976, FE/5391/C/8, Hanoi home service, December 14th, 1976)

This statement was made in the context of a discussion of the people's national democratic revolution in the South and its role in assisting the development of socialism in the North. The stress on the people's national democratic aspect of the southern part of the country, however, was in keeping with the Soviet model of non-capitalist development, discussed earlier. It comes as no surprise, therefore, when, a little later in his speech, Le Duan states,

"Obviously, our country, which remains in (?a situation in which the economy is still characterised by small-scale production) is advancing directly towards socialism, by-passing the stage of capitalist development."

(SWB, December 17th, 1976, FE/5392/C/3, Hanoi home service, December 14th, 1976)

And,

"The above-mentioned special characteristics, especially that concerning direct passage from small-scale production to socialism by-passing the stage of capitalist development, require our people to develop greatly the initiative and the creative and self-conscious nature of the socialist revolution."

(SWB, December 17th, 1976, FE/5392/C/4, Hanoi home service, December 14th, 1976)

Interestingly, during his discussion of the international situation and the foreign policy tasks of the party, Le Duan mentions, with reference to the Soviet Union, China and the world socialist system, that,
"All other socialist countries have also made very rapid progress; many of them are stepping up the building of advanced socialism."

(SWB, December 21st, 1976, FE/5395/C/16, VNA in English, December 16th, 1976)

This is rendered in the FLPH version as "socialisme 'développé'" (Parti Communiste du Viet Nam, IVe Congrès National, 1977, p.153) or "developed socialism", the parenthesis suggesting that this refers to a specific term. This is confirmed by the Soviet rendering of the speech (Pravda, December 15th, 1976), which gives "razvitogo sotsialisma" or "of developed socialism". It is interesting, therefore, to see Le Duan's acknowledgement of this term, which is a specifically Soviet innovation. Thus the apparent even-handedness of his speech is compensated for by the content and its conformity with the Soviet theoretical model.

This analysis of Vietnam had been increasingly reflected in the pronouncements of the leadership of the CPV from 1976 onwards. Thus Le Duan, addressing the first session of the National Assembly of the SRV in June, 1976, was able to say,

"Our entire country is in the process of advancing from small production to socialist production without going through the stage of capitalist development."

(SWB, June 28th, 1976, FE/5245/C/4, VNA in English and Hanoi home service, June 25th, 1976)

and,

"Proceeding from the fact that our land is a former colonial and semi-feudal country now advancing directly to socialism without going through the stage of capitalist development, our task is to create a socialist society from the base to the top."

(SWB, June 28th, 1976, FE/5245/C/5, VNA in English and Hanoi
In these two passages, therefore, Le Duan affirms that Vietnam has taken the non-capitalist path to development.

Referring specifically to the South, Le Duan said,

"In the old liberated zones, the social system has a national people's democratic character, but the economy is not yet developed and was heavily ravaged during the war."

(SWB, June 28th, 1976, FE/5245/C/4, VNA in English and Hanoi home service, June 25th, 1976)

The reference to the national people's democratic character of the South should be compared with Ulyanovsky's analysis, and the national-democratic phase of the revolution, which follows the victory of the national liberation movement (Ulyanovsky, 1974). This is precisely the stage in which Le Duan claims that the South now finds itself.

In his summing up, whilst referring to the country as a whole, he says,

"At present, our people have entered a new stage of the revolution, the stage in which the whole country is making socialist revolution, the North continuing to promote socialist construction, while the South actively engages in the socialist transformation of the economy and the building of socialism."

(SWB, June 29th, 1976, FE/5246/C/12, VNA in English, June 25th, 1976)

According to Ulyanovsky, the national democratic phase of the revolution initiates a period of socialist transformation, during which the state is re-structured in the political, social and economic spheres, along socialist lines. This is, of course, the process that Le Duan describes as in progress in the South. The North, on the other hand, was engaged in promoting socialist construction, which conforms to the first step in the
transitional phase to socialism, as outlined by Butenko (Butenko, 1972).

Le Duan's remarks were reinforced in Pham Hung's address to the National Assembly. He claimed, for example, that,

"In South Vietnam, the switch from the people's national democratic revolution to socialist revolution in the present conditions when the political situation remains very complicated and the sequels of a prolonged and devastating war and of the neo-colonialist policy of US imperialism remain very heavy, of course is no easy job.

(SWB, July 3rd, 1976, FE/5250/C/1, VNA in English, June 29th, 1976)

He went on,

"...the South Vietnamese people are fully capable of pushing ahead the course of socialist revolution, while carrying out the remaining tasks of the national democratic revolution, taking the South to socialism at a relatively high tempo and catching up with the North in many fields, in order to make the situation in all fields and both zones soon become homogeneous in socialism."

(SWB, July 3rd, 1976, FE/5250/C/1,2, VNA in English, June 29th, 1976)

By the time of the first National Assembly in the summer of 1976, therefore, the words of Le Duan, Pham Hung and other members of the Vietnamese leadership, had come to reflect a generally applicable Soviet theoretical framework. That this line was not a specifically Vietnamese innovation can be gauged by measuring it against the work of Soviet writers such as Ulyanovsky with which it conforms. Thus, it cannot be argued that the subsequent Soviet analysis of Vietnam is a regurgitation of a Vietnamese theoretical elaboration. It must, at some stage, have
been worked out in conjunction with the Soviet Union.

On December 20th, 1976, the closing day of the Fourth Party Congress, six resolutions were passed (SWB, December 21st, 1976, FE/5395/1). The first five of these resolutions had significance in terms of what one might call the symbolic alignment of the Vietnamese Party with the Soviet model, for whilst, in practice, nothing of substance was altered, these symbolic changes brought the Vietnamese Party into line with Soviet usage. Thus, for example, the first resolution changed the name of the party from the Vietnam Workers' Party to that of the Communist Party of Vietnam. Furthermore, the post of first secretary was re-designated "general secretary".

To sum up, therefore, throughout the period under discussion, Vietnam was, in the eyes of the Soviet Union, consistently defined as a socialist country, and the VLD/CPV was recognised as a communist party on a par with other Soviet bloc parties. Relations between parties, however, were played down, and Vietnam was generally referred to in the context of the national liberation movement. The DRV, for their part, maintained an even-handed approach in relations between the Soviet Union and China. The initial Vietnamese response to the Soviet analysis of non-capitalist development/developed socialism, was cautious and non-committal. During the early seventies, for example, the emphasis was on national liberation and the war against the United States, rather than either a clearly Soviet or Maoist analysis of the Vietnamese state. Following re-unification, however, this position changed, and one finds the adoption, by the Vietnamese leadership, of the essential features of the Soviet theoretical framework and the acceptance, by the CPV, of symbolic measures to bring the Vietnamese party into line with the CPSU.

By 1976, therefore, the Vietnamese leadership had diverged drastically from the aspirations expressed in Ho Chi Minh's testament.
The Fourth Congress of the CPV, however, consolidated, rather than initiated this process. Whilst an examination of formal relations as shown by party congresses can provide, in the wider context, a convenient date for locating such a change of direction, it provides little insight into the causes. One must now go on to look at what lay behind this gradual re-alignment, in terms of the policy choices and issues that confronted the Vietnamese leadership.

In summary, the policy options that faced the DRV in 1969 were not significantly different from those that had confronted it almost a decade earlier, when, in 1960, the Third Party Congress decided to pursue, simultaneously, a policy of socialism in the North and reunification in the South (Third National Congress of the Viet Nam Workers' Party: Documents, 1960, Vol. I).

Elliott (Elliott, 1975), explores the domestic political situation in the DRV since the death of Ho Chi Minh, by focusing on the debate arising from the policy issue of rapid achievement of economic and political development in the North, versus the attainment of revolutionary aims in the South. He points out, however, that these two goals were considered complimentary, rather than mutually exclusive, the debate centering around the allocation of resources at any given time. In other words, agreement on the ultimate objectives was never in doubt. Debate centered around the pace and mode by which to achieve them. With reference to the leadership, he represents these goals in terms of Le Duan's policy of the highest possible support for the war, against Truong Chinh's emphasis on socialist construction in the north. The result, by 1971, was a compromise, when the Nineteenth Plenum of the Central Committee passed a resolution to the effect that reconstruction and construction in the North were to go ahead, but provided for a reconsideration of the matter, if circumstances in the South altered significantly. Thus, claims Elliott, the United States
incursion into Laos, and the Vietnamese belief that this signified a new Indochina strategy on the part of the United States, led to the offensive of 1972. Following the Paris Peace Settlement of 1973, however, resources were again switched to the North. Most signs during the period 1973 to 1974 indicated Hanoi's intention of devoting its energies to reconstruction in the North, and this was the position, even up until January, 1975. However, the collapse of the South Vietnamese army changed the situation and victory was so swift that there was no necessity for a major policy reversal.

Turley (Turley, 1980a), deals with the key internal developments since the Fourth Party Congress in 1976. Post 1975, he claims, there were two issues. Firstly, whether priority should be given to strengthening socialist institutions or building the means of production, that is, whether to emphasize socialist construction or socialist transformation. This issue had previously arisen in the debate concerning the priorities of resources to be allocated in the North. A compromise was arrived at, whereby both would be employed simultaneously, however. The second issue concerned how fast and by what means to transform military victory into political and economic integration. A decision was taken in mid-1975 to go ahead with integration by combining construction with transformation, and this was announced at the national conference on reunification in mid-November of the same year.

Thus, Le Duan, speaking at the first session of the National Assembly, in June, 1976, was able to claim,

"THE STRATEGIC TASK of the revolution in our country in the new stage is: TO ACHIEVE THE REUNIFICATION OF OUR HOMELAND, AND TO TAKE THE WHOLE COUNTRY RAPIDLY, VIGOROUSLY AND STEADILY TO SOCIALISM. THE NORTH MUST GIVE A STRONG IMPULSE TO THE BUILDING OF SOCIALISM AND PERFECT THE SOCIALIST PRODUCTION RELATIONS; THE
SOUTH MUST AT THE SAME TIME CARRY OUT SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION AND SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION. Socialist transformation and socialist construction are two closely related aspects of the socialist revolution."

(SWB, June 28th, 1976, FE/5245/C/4, VNA in English and Hanoi home service, June 25th, 1976)

Some months later, elaborating on the theme of the new stage of the socialist revolution, in his political report to the Fourth Party Congress, he said,

"These particulars also (show)that the socialist revolution in our country is a process of comprehensive, continuous, extremely profound and radical revolutionary activity). This is the process of combination of transformation and construction. One transforms to construct and constructs to transform. Transformation includes construction, and construction includes transformation, with construction remaining the essential aspect. This is the process of simultaneously eliminating what is old and constructing what is new, from top to bottom. It is necessary to create new productive forces and new production relations, a new economic infrastructure and a new superstructure, a new material life and a new spiritual and cultural life. This is a process of arduous and complex class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and between the capitalist path and the socialist path. This is a process of carrying out three revolutions – the production relations revolution, the scientific and technical revolution, and the ideological and cultural revolution – with the scientific and technical revolution as the key one."

(SWB, December 17th, 1976, FE/5392/C/4, Hanoi home service,
Socialist transformation, in this context, can be taken to mean that
the South was to be integrated with the political and economic structure
of the North, since the North had, by this time, arrived at the stage of
socialist construction. For the South, therefore, change was to occur
deliberately and at a speedier pace than would have been the case had it
been decided to delay reunification and concentrate resources on
rebuilding the damaged economy of the DRV. The implication, one assumes,
was that this was a process that initially, would slow down the process of
reconstruction in the North.

A recurring theme in the statements of the Vietnamese leadership,
therefore, has been the allocation of resources, whether between
reconstruction in the North or war in the South, and, following
reunification, between socialist construction in the North or socialist
transformation in the South. Casting the debate within the framework of
non-capitalist development, therefore, and in terms of socialist
construction and socialist transformation, is no more than restating the
problem of the allocation of resources between North and South. It is the
consequences of these policy choices, most especially in the period
following reunification, that have had most bearing on the Soviet
relationship with Vietnam, in that the decision to develop the economy on
a unified basis, the stress on new productive forces and the scientific
and technical revolution have required increasing amounts of Soviet aid,
and, hence, a more dependent relationship.

Whilst statements of the leadership can give a broad outline of
policy choices, an examination of factional disputes can often shed more
light on specific issues. At this point, however, one should make the
caveat that the lack of obvious factionalism within the Vietnamese
leadership renders it extremely difficult to engage in this type of
inquiry and to associate policies with personalities. Furthermore, the extent of factionalism within the Vietnamese leadership and whether it exists at all is one of the main areas of contention amongst commentators on Vietnam and especially the view that it is factional differences that have led to the choice between a pro-Moscow or pro-Peking alignment. Elliott (Elliott, 1975) for example, argues that there is no factionalism within the Politbureau in any meaningful sense of the word, and that it is a mistake to talk in terms of a pro-Moscow or pro-Peking line, as do Honey and Fall. There are shifting alignments in decision-making, he claims, that follow no discernable pattern, and generally result in compromise. Gareth Porter (Porter, 1980), also argues against a factional interpretation and for an analysis in terms of the "integrationist" and "independent" tendencies in Vietnamese foreign policy. By integrationist, he means to suggest a world view that places Vietnam on the periphery of the socialist bloc in the clash between socialism and imperialism, thus acknowledging the Soviet Union in a leadership role, whilst the independent tendency sees the Vietnamese struggle as the focal point of the conflict between socialism and imperialism, relegating the Soviet Union to the background rather than the centre of the conflict. He goes on to say,

"An analysis that places the integrationist and independent tendencies at the center of Vietnamese foreign and reunification policies will provide more satisfactory insights into shifts in Vietnamese policy during the 1945-1965 period than will efforts to explain these shifts in terms of either purely "local issues" (i.e., support for armed struggle in South Vietnam versus socialist construction in the North) or of the presumed links between factions within the Party and the Soviet Union or China. Such efforts either neglect the importance in Vietnamese
Communist policy of the Party's understanding of the world situation in relation to Vietnam, or define that understanding too rigidly in terms of Soviet or Chinese viewpoints."

(Porter, 1980, p.227)

Whilst this view provides a rationale for the changing role and importance of the Soviet Union in Vietnamese affairs, it does deal in rather tenuous and abstract terms, and tends to minimise the place of tangible policy issues. Furthermore, it by-passes the question of faction altogether.

Honey (Honey, 1966, Honey, 1969) and others, for example, Zagoria (Zagoria, 1967), on the other hand, argue in favour of a factional interpretation of the leadership, and Honey himself, when discussing the personalities of the Politbureau, has consistently portrayed Vo Nguyen Giap as pro-Moscow and Truong Chinh as pro-Peking.(4)

All of these views, however, leave something to be desired. Elliott and Porter, for example, do not account for the dropping of Hoang Van Hoan from the Politbureau in 1976 (SWB, December 21st, 1976, FE/5395/1), and his subsequent defection to Peking in July, 1979 (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1979, 29876). The sweeping ministerial changes that took place in early 1980 (SWB, January 31st, 1980, FE/6333/1), and the subsequent leadership changes announced at the Fifth Party Congress in 1982 (SWB, April 1st, 1982, FE/6993/C2/2, WNA in English, March 31st, 1982), require a more satisfactory explanation than illness or old age, taking into account the scale of the changes, and the generally aged nature of the leadership in any case. The most important of these changes were the replacement of Vo Nguyen Giap as Minister of Defence by Van Tien Dung, the replacement of Nguyen Duy Trinh as Foreign Minister by Nguyen Co Trach and the replacement of Le Thanh Nghi as Chairman of the State Planning Commission by Nguyen Van Lam (The Times, January 30th, 1980). Nguyen Duy Trinh, Le Thanh Nghi, Nguyen Van Linh, Tran Quoc Hoan and Le Van Luong
were subsequently dropped from the Politbureau (SWB, April 1st, 1982, FE/6953/C2/2, VNA in English, March 31st, 1982). With reference to the Honey formula and the pro-Moscow/pro-Peking orientation of Vo Nguyen Giap and Truong Chinh respectively, a view, incidentally, that dies hard, one would have expected, in the context of a closer association with Moscow, that Truong Chinh would have been removed from the Politbureau, not the reverse case.

In the debate on factionalism within the leadership, therefore, one should consider the following points. There is a complex relationship between policy and faction. Factionalism, of itself, may not necessarily be orientated in either direction, and to dismiss the pro-Moscow or pro-Peking dichotomy as invalid, does not necessarily mean to dismiss the existence of factionalism. Secondly, and by implication, it is not necessary to extrapolate a direct link between a particular member of the leadership and a policy that appears to be either pro-Moscow or pro-Peking in order to characterize a policy as such. The compatibility of views may be the consequence, rather than the cause of a policy decision. In other words, it is the choice of policy that leads to a pro-Moscow orientation, and not a pro-Moscow orientation that dictates policy. Thus one should look more closely at the assumptions underlying a particular interpretation, as well as the data itself.

Underlying Honey's view, for example, is a rather rigid, good/bad dichotomy, in which the world view is seen in terms of communist and anti-communist forces. This leads to a certain inflexibility, and the analysis, therefore, does not allow for events that do not fit into a consistent pattern. Furthermore, the reasons for policy choices are never made explicit, but are portrayed as emanating from an ideological preference, the motives for which are assumed rather than spelt out. If one stresses the ideological perspective, therefore, policy choices are
interpreted as a matter of belief, conforming to a set pattern, rather than expediency that may be reappraised on each individual issue. The Vietnamese Party, however, have always been the least dogmatic of communist parties, shown, for example, by the dissolution of the party in 1945, the handling of the Land Reform Campaign, and numerous other issues, and, therefore, prepared to discard what does not work.(6) It is perhaps this lack of orthodoxy within the Vietnamese Party that makes it difficult to characterise individual leaders as either consistently pro-Moscow or pro-Peking.

Conversely, it has become part of the received wisdom of later commentators, for example, Porter, Elliott and Turley, that there is no factionalism within the Vietnamese leadership. Hence little attention has been paid to changes within the leadership, such as the Politbureau changes of 1976 and 1982 (SWB, December 21st, 1976, FE/5395/1, SWB, April 1st, 1982, FE/6993/C2/2, VNA in English, March 31st, 1982), since it is generally assumed that these have taken place for plausible reasons such as old age and illness. It does seem likely, however, from the available evidence, that there has been increasing disagreement within the Vietnamese Party, and that Le Duan has, during the seventies, emerged as the overall leader. One should, therefore, take cognizance of changes and nuances within the leadership, and attempt to speculate on their significance in the context of policy issues.

One area where this approach might prove fruitful, is the debate between Vo Nguyen Giap and his opponents, with reference to professionalism in the army. This issue had implications for the situation that emerged during the seventies, and considerable significance with regard to the Soviet-Chinese dichotomy. The Maoist concept of guerilla war, for example, as set forth in the works of Giap (Vo Nguyen Giap, 1961) and Truong Chinh (Truong Chinh, 1966), proved less and less
relevant to the Vietnamese experience, in the face of the United States escalation of the war and promises of Soviet logistical support. The sophisticated weaponry offered by the Soviet Union, of necessity, demanded a small, highly trained army, in contradistinction to the Maoist concept of a peoples' army, low on technology but strong on political fervour. At the very least, therefore, one could claim that the final Vietnamese choice of policy was to have repercussions for both the Soviet Union and China, but it did not necessarily stem from a direct link between personalities and either a pro-Moscow or pro-Peking stance.

It is generally supposed that there were no changes within the Politbureau during the period from 1960 to the Fourth Party Congress in 1976. This, of course, is not strictly true, if one considers the premature death of Nguyen Chi Thanh in 1967 and the death of Ho Chi Minh in 1969. Tables I and II give the composition of the Politbureau and Secretariat of the VLD in 1960 and 1969 respectively. If nothing else, these changes left a vacuum in the power structure that had to be filled, but Nguyen Chi Thanh's sudden death, at the height of the dispute with Giap within the army, was, to say the least, fortuitous for his opponents.

Nguyen Chi Thanh, Giap's main opponent in the debate on professionalism within the army, headed the army's General Political Directorate from 1951 (Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes, 1973a, p.25) a body which supervised ideological aspects of military training. The General Political Directorate was subordinate to the Central Committee, not the Defence Ministry, at that time headed by Giap, thus giving Nguyen Chi Thanh the opportunity to advance the theory of Party primacy over professionalism among the leadership. It is claimed (Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes, 1973a, p.25) that the dispute was not resolved until early 1961, when Giap's newly elected supporters in the Central Committee eased Nguyen Chi Thanh out of the General Political Directorate, thus
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<th>Full Members</th>
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<td>Nguyen Chi Thanh</td>
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<td>Hoang Van Hoan</td>
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**TABLE II**

Politbureau and Secretariat of the Vietnam Workers' Party, 1969

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<th>POLITBUREAU</th>
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<td><strong>Full Members</strong></td>
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(Source: SWB, September 5th, 1969, FE/3169/C/3,4, VNA in English, September 4th, 1969)
implying that the debate was brought to a conclusion.

In contradiction to this, Boudarel (Boudarel, 1980), describes Nguyen Chi Thanh in 1962 as the "rising star" of the regime, and Boundarel's analysis of the theoretical background to the debate clearly demonstrates that it was by no means over. In 1964, Nguyen Chi Thanh became head of the Directorate for Southern Vietnam, a position that one cannot in any sense see as a demotion if one considers the successful political careers of its previous and subsequent incumbents, Nguyen Van Linh and Pham Hung.(7)

From 1965 onwards, it is claimed (Bouderel, 1980, p.150), there were serious frictions within the leadership and that some leaders, such as Hoang Minh Chinh, Le Liem, a political officer at the battle of Dien Bien Phu, and Vu Dinh Huynh, chief of protocol, were arrested or pushed aside, whilst strategic questions provoked a debate in which realist tendencies in the army, represented by Giap, lost to Nguyen Chi Thanh. Unfortunately, Boudarel does not cite his sources in this particular instance, although he does go on to analyse the debate in question, with reference to the relevant writings of Giap (Vo Nguyen Giap, 1969). What he also does not mention is the premature death of Nguyen Chi Thanh, in July, 1967. His death is attributed to a variety of causes. It is suggested, for example, that he "reportedly died of pneumonia" (Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes, 1973a), and Thayer claims that, "In mid 1967 General Thanh died (or was killed)..." (Thayer, 1975, p.48). Whether by accident or design, therefore, the demise of Nguyen Chi Thanh left the way open for the victory of Giap's faction and the greater professionalisation of the army.

It is possible, therefore, that the policy debate within the army was by no means resolved as early as 1961, but lasted until at least 1967. If this be so, it was apparently resolved by the death of one of the main protagonists. One cannot say, of course, what connection, if any, this
had with the fluctuations in Giap's rank within the Politbureau. The composition of the State Funeral Committee, announced following the death of Ho Chi Minh in 1969, lists Le Duc Tho as preceding Vo Nguyen Giap (SWB, September 5th, 1969, FE/3169/C/3, VNA in English, September 4th, 1969, South Vietnam Liberation Radio, September 3rd, 1969), a reversal of the order of rank announced at the Third Party Congress.(8) At some point, this position was changed to that of the order of precedence given in Table I, only to be reversed once more at the Fourth Party Congress in 1976. Giap's precedence over Le Duc Tho during this period, however, is generally taken as a recognition of the importance of the military during the period of the war, hence the reversal of rank on its successful conclusion. It may, however, be an indicator of Giap's fluctuating fortunes within the leadership on a personal level, especially if one considers his subsequent removal from the Politbureau in 1982 (SWB, April 1st, 1982, FE/6993/C2/2, VNA in English, March 31st, 1982).

Of interest in assessing Le Duan's role within the leadership and linking policy with personality, is Rogers' work (Rogers, 1976). Rogers attempts, using a technique of thematic content analysis developed by Milton Lodge (Lodge, 1969), to describe and evaluate some of the major foreign policy attitudes of key decision-makers in the DRV, during the period 1954 to 1972. The decision-makers involved are Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap. Rogers identifies, for analytical purposes, three separate categories of decision-making. Firstly, low risk orientation. This, in summary, consists of the view that priority should be given to developing the economy of the North whilst assisting a protracted guerilla conflict in the South, which would lead to eventual victory and reunification. Secondly, mixed risk orientation. This refers to a middle position whereby resources were balanced between the war needs of the South and the internal needs of the
DRV. Thirdly, high risk orientation. This view placed priority on the war in the South. The resources of the North were to be mobilised in order to achieve a speedy military victory and bring about a united, socialist Vietnam. Rogers then analyses the statements of the leaders cited, on five major issues, that is, the 1955 election of Ngo Dinh Diem and his rejection of elections on the issue of reunification, the 1963 buddhist crisis and assassination of Diem, the 1965 entry of United States troops and the bombing of the north and the 1968 Tet offensive and the 1972 offensive.

In answer to those who argue that there are no significant policy differences within the Hanoi leadership, Rogers concludes that they have indeed existed, notably between Le Duan and Truong Chinh. On the other hand, he claims, they seem less sharp than some commentators, such as Honey (Honey, 1963) have suggested. With reference to Rogers’ categories, Le Duan emerges with an overall high risk orientation, whilst Truong Chinh displays a low risk orientation. Pham Van Dong is mixed risk with a high risk secondary view, whilst Vo Nguyen Giap is mixed risk with a strong low risk secondary outlook. The clearest pattern emerging from a comparison of this data with policy outcomes, claims Rogers, is that of the general congruence of Politbureau policy and Le Duan’s views.

It has been suggested that at the Fourth Party Congress, the Politbureau and Central Committee were expanded to include allies and protegés of "hard-liners" like Le Duan (The Times, February 9th, 1980) Table III gives the composition of the Politbureau and Secretariat of the CPV as announced at the Fourth Party Congress. This point of view, of course, reinforces the "revelations" of Hoang Van Hoan, voiced upon his defection to Peking in 1979. Amongst other criticisms of the party and its policies, Hoang Van Hoan launched a virulent, personal attack on Le Duan, claiming that,
### TABLE III

**Politbureau and Secretariat of the Communist Party of Vietnam, 1976**

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<th><strong>POLITBUREAU</strong></th>
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<td><strong>Full Members</strong></td>
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<td>Le Van Luong</td>
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<td>Nguyen Van Linh (Nguyen Van Cuc)</td>
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<td>Vo Chi Cong (Vo Toăn)</td>
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<td>Chu Huy Man</td>
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<th><strong>Alternate Members</strong></th>
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<td>To Huu</td>
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<td>Vo Van Kiet</td>
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(Source: SWB, December 21st, 1976, FE/5395/1)
"However, after 1965, President Ho's health steadily deteriorated. Le Duan, availing himself of the opportunity presented by this, resorted to underhand means to usurp the leadership of the Party, step by step. In particular, after the death of President Ho, he and his associates actually had the Party completely under their control. They used every conceivable means to fill key posts with their kinsfolk and sworn followers."

(SWB, September 3rd, 1979, FE/6209/A3/1, NCNA in English, August 31st, 1979)

The difficulty, however, of inferring any kind of policy shift from changes in the Politbureau alone, is that it is not always easy to tell which posts carry political weight, and which posts are merely a way of ensuring a niche for aged and respected cadres who can no longer serve any useful purpose. In 1976, for example, Le Van Luong was moved from his position in the Secretariat and elevated to full membership of the Politbureau (SWB, December 21st, 1976, FE/5395/i). On the face of it, this would appear to be a promotion. Subsequent events, however, and his dropping from the Politbureau entirely in 1982, suggest that probably the reverse was the case (SWB, April 1st, 1982, FE/6993/C2/2, VNA in English, March 31st, 1982).

Order of precedence within the Central Committee is not always an indicator of political standing. Nguyen Van Linh, Vo Chi Cong and Chu Huy Man, appearing as twentieth, thirty first and forty third respectively in the Central Committee list announced at the Fourth Party Congress were given full membership of the Politbureau, whilst To Huu, appearing as twelfth in the same list, was given alternate membership (SWB, December 24th, 1976, FE/5398/C/3, Hanoi home service, December 20th, 1976, VNA in English, December 22nd, 1976, SWB, December 21st, 1976, FE/5395/i). This
may have had something to do with his post as head of the Propaganda and Education Department of the Secretariat, and the desire of the Party to maintain full control of its security organs. He was reportedly chief censor in the DRV, for example (Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes, 1973a, pp.46-47). He was, however, elevated to full Politbureau membership in 1982, with the removal of Tran Quoc Hoan (SWB, April 1st, 1982, FE/6993/C2/2, VNA in English, March 31st, 1982). On the other hand, Vo Chi Cong, as Chairman of the Peoples' Revolutionary Party and a former officer in the NLF, and Chu Huy Man, a member of the minority peoples of the Vietnamese highlands (Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes, 1973a, pp. 52-53), were probably given Politbureau membership in order to ensure representation of their respective groups, rather than because they carried political weight.

Similarly, little is known of some members of the leadership. Hoang Anh, for example, dropped from the Secretariat in 1976 (SWB, December 21st, 1976, FE/5395/i), retained his place as fourteenth on the Central Committee list (SWB, December 24th, 1976, FE/5398/C/3, Hanoi home service, December 20th, 1976, VNA in English, December 22nd, 1976). Without personal knowledge of the type that can be gleaned from diplomatic observers in Hanoi, therefore, it is difficult to gauge whether or not these changes are a genuine result of illness or old age, or some factional dispute.

On the other hand, changes in the leadership are often accompanied by an obvious policy shift. Van Tien Dung, Chief of Staff of the VPA since 1963, and Tran Quoc Hoan, Minister of Public Security since 1953, were reportedly elevated to full membership of the Politbureau in 1972 (Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes, 1973a, p.36). The year 1972 also saw the launching of the offensive against the South. The most obvious conclusion from these changes is that an increase in military
representation signified an increase in military activity. Tran Quoc Hoan, it should be pointed out, in addition to the police and secret police, was also in charge of the direction of the Peoples' Armed Security Forces, and under the supervision of the Central Party Military Committee (Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes, 1973a, pp.33-34).

It is easier, however, to draw conclusions from the more dramatic case of Hoang Van Hoan. Hoang Van Hoan was simultaneously dropped from the Politbureau and Central Committee at the Fourth Party Congress, when his name failed to appear on the published lists (SWB, December 24th, 1976, FE/5398/C/3, Hanoi home service, December 20th, 1976, VNA in English, December 22nd, 1976, SWB, December 21st, 1976, FE/5395/1). Whilst, at the time, this gave rise to some speculation little more was heard until July, 1979, when, at a stopover in Karachi whilst en route for East Germany, Hoang Van Hoan defected to Peking (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1979, 29876). News of his defection was given in an interview with Xuan Thuy, broadcast by the VNA on 4th August, 1979 (SWB, August 6th, 1979, FE/6186/A3/1, VNA in English, August 4th, 1979). Some days later, in Peking, Hoang Van Hoan was received by Hua Guofeng, and, at a press conference, reported by the NCNA in English, issued a "Message to Vietnamese Compatriots". In this he claimed,

"In fact, under the control of Le Duan and company, Vietnam today is no longer an independent and sovereign country but one subservient to a foreign power economically, politically, militarily and diplomatically."

(SWB, August 10th, 1979, FE/6190/A3/2, NCNA in English, August 9th, 1979)

Commenting on this, the NCNA said,

"The hour-long press conference started at 1540 at the auditorium of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference. With a touch of humour and sometimes with strong emotion, the Vietnamese leader spoke with forceful gestures. He elicited a roar of laughter from the 100 or more Chinese and foreign correspondents present when he answered a question about the "foreign power" he referred to in his message to his compatriots. "Even though I do not identify it, everybody knows who I am referring to", he said.

(SWB, August 10th, 1979, FE/6190/AC/4, NCNA in English, August 9th, 1979)

The war of words between Peking and Hanoi continued in this vein. On the 9th August, for example, the Vietnamese Embassy in Peking issued a communique condemning his actions (SWB, August 11th, 1979, FE/6191/A3/1, VNA in English, August 9th, 1979). A few days later, it was announced by Hanoi radio that on August 14th, the Standing Committee of the National Assembly had discussed the defection of Hoang Van Hoan and described it as "an act of betrayal of the fatherland and the people". The committee decided that he should be tried in the Peoples' Supreme Court on a charge of treason. It was also reported that on 15th August, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPV had decided to expel Hoang Van Hoan from the party (SWB, August 17th, 1979, FE/6196/1).

In a later statement, issued by the NCNA on 31st August, Hoang Van Hoan launched his personal attack on Le Duan and his conduct of party affairs, and gave some indication of the policy disputes that had led to his expulsion (SWB, September 3rd, 1979, FE/6209/A3/1, NCNA in English, August 31st, 1979). Accusing the Vietnamese leaders not merely of opposing Chinese "aggression", their professed intention he alleged, but of attempting to subvert the Chinese leadership, he went on to say,

"To attain this treacherous and fantastic aim, which is in any case quite beyond their power, they had to turn to some external
force for support. They concluded with a foreign power a treaty which is essentially a military alliance so as to carry out their adventurist activities and menace their neighbouring countries. Hardly was the ink of the treaty dry than they embarked on the invasion and occupation of Kampuchea."

(SWB, September 3rd, 1979, FE/6209/A3/2, NCNA in English, August 31st, 1979)

Whilst one must make allowances for the fact that Hoang Van Hoan, the loser in a factional dispute, had a vested interest in portraying his opponents in an unfavourable light, and the Chinese, for their part, seized the opportunity to play up the anti-Soviet nature of his remarks, one does gain some insight from this exchange into the policy debate within the party. He singles out for special mention the treaty with the Soviet Union and the party's reliance on Soviet aid to the disadvantage of China. One of the major policy issues of 1976, the year of his removal from office, was the extent to which priority should be given to a strengthening of socialist institutions as opposed to the means of production, in a reunified Vietnam. The compromise policy to pursue both simultaneously, by implication, demanded heavy reliance on Soviet aid. It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, in view of his expressed views vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and China, that this was the issue which precipitated Hoang Van Hoan's fall from power.

The extent of the disagreement concerning which path to follow after reunification, however, is hard to assess. It is reported, for example, (Turley, 1980a, p. 44, f.3) that, with regard to the same issue, hints of ambiguity were evident in the speeches of both Nguyen Duy Trinh and Truong Chinh. If this be the case, then disagreement was more widespread than has been supposed. It was also reported (Turley, 1980a, p. 55) that at the same time that Hoang Van Hoan was divested of his party posts, four
other former emissaries to the PRC also lost their seats on the Central Committee. They were Ly Ban, Ngo Minh Loan, Ngo Thuyen and Nguyen Trong Vinh. All had been alternate members of the Central Committee since the Third Party Congress, and, therefore, in the middle echelon of the party. It appears likely, therefore, that the fall of Hoang Van Hoan was related closely to that of those associated with him within the Central Committee.

With reference to the pro-Moscow, pro-Peking controversy, however, possibly Boudarel (Bourdarel, 1980) comes closest to a realistic appraisal of the situation, when he claims that is was not, essentially, a pro-Moscow or pro-Peking debate, but that the attempt to find similar solutions to similar problems led to similar conclusions. This was especially apparent, he says, in military strategy, where, in the context of increasing United States involvement, a line stressing armaments, sophisticated weaponry and economy of forces, opposed one that relied on zeal and determination. The former view relied heavily on Soviet assistance, whilst the latter view, although close to that of Mao, diverged from it on several points.

In arguing for a particular policy, such as professionalism within the army or socialist reconstruction and socialist transformation, therefore, the implications of such a choice are clearly greater reliance on Moscow, who were in a position to supply the necessary economic aid, to the detriment of the PRC. This largely utilitarian view on the part of the Vietnamese helps to explain why it has been difficult to characterise any particular leaders as consistently pro-Moscow or pro-Peking, the stance being reappraised over time and over any particular issue of policy, and the over-riding criteria being what is perceived as in the Vietnamese interest. This is not to deny that the Vietnamese relationship with the Soviet Union has been strengthened, during the seventies, at the expense of that with the PRC. It does not follow, however, that this
amounts to a slavish pursuit of the Moscow line, although, in practice, it has meant the adoption of a pro-Moscow stance on issues demanding ideological conformity, for example, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and the Brezhnev Doctrine. The real extent of this conformity, however, can be gauged by measuring concrete Vietnamese goals against Soviet objectives in Asia, with which they sometimes clash.

Turley sums up the current phase of the policy debate succinctly, when he claims, with reference to Nhan Dan editorials inveighing against "opportunists" and "bourgeois nationalists", that,

"'Opportunists' and 'bourgeois nationalists' in the VCP obviously were party members who refused to accept one or a combination of the following: the growing dependence on the Soviet Union, the forcible overthrow of Pol Pot, the confrontation with China, and the alienation of non-Communist neighbours."

(Turley, 1980a, p. 55)

With regard to the policy issues expressed above, whilst they may amount to an anti-Chinese view, it is by no means clear that they amount entirely to a pro-Soviet one, if one looks closely at Soviet aspirations and policy goals in Asia. There are, for example, doubts about the Soviet role with regard to Vietnamese action in Cambodia, and evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union, initially, had been obliged to act as a restraining influence. This possibility will be discussed more fully in Chapter Five.

Direct confrontation with China contrasts strikingly with the Soviet handling of its own border disputes with China during this period, and the anxiety caused in Moscow by the embarrassing spectacle of war between socialist states, for the first time, has been underestimated in the west. The alienation of the non-Communist states of Southeast Asia is directly opposed to Soviet efforts to cultivate friendly relations with the ASEAN

It would seem, therefore, that the pro-Moscow stand which has emerged during the seventies, may diverge on several points, or has, in the past, diverged on several points, from that which Moscow would like to achieve. If this be the case, one must seriously re-appraise a conceptualisation of Vietnam as a weak, puppet state, caught between two communist giants.
The central theme of this chapter concerns conflicting Soviet and Vietnamese attitudes towards a negotiated solution to the Vietnam conflict, and centres around the talks which took place in Paris from 1969 to 1973. Although not a participant to the negotiations, as will be seen, the Soviet Union had an influential role to play in relation to the degree of support they were prepared to give the DRV. Their attitude was further constrained by the need to maintain the developing climate of detente with the United States.

The Soviet Union had played a key role in bringing about the Geneva settlement of 1954 (Cameron, 1970). The Geneva Conference, convened in April, 1954, had been called to resolve the problem of Korea, together with other cold war issues, and had included as participants France, Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and China.(1) The Conference issued two documents relating to Vietnam. The first was an armistice, signed by the French and North Vietnamese representatives, that provided for an exchange of prisoners and the regroupment of both parties to either side of a demilitarized zone set up at the seventeenth parallel. It also provided for the movement of civilian populations between zones within a specified period, and prohibited all future foreign military involvement. The second document, the Final Declaration, elaborated on the political and administrative arrangements for Vietnam. It specified that the demilitarized zone was a temporary military boundary rather than a political or territorial division and that a political settlement was to be made following elections in both zones, to be held in July, 1956.(2)

With the failure to hold elections in 1956, and the solidifying of temporary boundaries, the Geneva Agreements, in spite of their specified
intention, had the consequence of a de facto partitioning of Vietnam into two separate sovereign states.

This situation, therefore, provided the basis for the DRV position with regard to the South and the war with the United States. They were negotiating with the United States from contradictory definitions of sovereignty. The DRV, for example, claimed jurisdiction over the whole of Vietnam, and, therefore, were unable, as a matter of principle, to agree to withdraw their troops from territory they considered their own. Hence, any call, on the part of the United States, for "mutual withdrawal of external forces" was doomed to failure, since the DRV could never regard their troops as external to the South. Similarly, the DRV did not accept that the political question of the South was an internal matter to be settled by the South Vietnamese. This disagreement over sovereignty, the unsettled legacy of Geneva, in which the Soviet Union were implicated, was the issue lying behind the failure of the various peace plans proposed by the NLF to make any headway with the United States negotiators, and vice versa.

With regard to the term "negotiation" itself, certain points must be clarified. Goodman (Goodman, 1975) claims that for both the United States and the DRV negotiation was an extension of warfare and not a means of conflict resolution. Hanoi, for example, came to the conference table with what he terms a "fighting-while-negotiating" strategy. This meant that negotiations were undertaken to facilitate a military victory and a settlement could, true to Maoist thinking, only be based on what had been achieved on the battlefield, not at the conference table. He goes on to say,

"Hanoi chooses its words carefully, "Preliminary talks", refers, with one exception, to the 1964-1968 contacts between the DRV and U.S. representatives, where conditions for the 1968 Paris
meetings - called official conversations - were specified. What took place during these talks and conversations was characterized by the DRV representatives as "discussions." The word negotiation was rarely used by Hanoi though the U.S. and third party representatives used it frequently."

(Goodman, 1975, p.81)

Goodman appends a summary of National Security Study Memorandum No. 1, published in 1969, to his discussion, which indicates that this strategy was known and understood by the United States administration.(3) One should bear the Vietnamese strategy in mind, therefore, when considering the frequently cited "failure" of both the 1968 Tet offensive and the 1972 offensive.(4) This is especially true with reference to the offensive of 1972, which seems inexplicable in conventional military terms. It seems likely that to the Vietnamese way of thinking, neither negotiations nor military action of themselves constituted success or failure, but were both complimentary facets of the same process, to be employed simultaneously in pursuit of the overall goal. Thus, there was no inconsistency, to the DRV way of thinking, in launching an offensive at the height of a negotiation procedure as occurred in 1972, a strategy that carried echoes of Dien Bien Phu.(5)

It has been argued by Kaplan and others (Kaplan, 1973) that a settlement in Paris was reached in 1973 only after Nixon's diplomacy had produced the right international context to make it in the interests of the Soviet Union and China to end the war. Kaplan claims, for example, that, "Four years of successful diplomacy by the Nixon administration created a political climate in which both the Soviet Union and Communist China had strong incentives to bring pressure to bear upon the North Vietnamese to accept a negotiated settlement that
did not destroy the South Vietnamese government or humiliate the United States."

(Kaplan, 1973, p.6)

He goes on to say that fear in Moscow of a United States-China rapprochement encouraged detente and that the Soviet Union had to do something to prevent this from going too far. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks were one of the ways of doing this, as was receiving recognition as a superpower. Thus it was necessary to prevent doing damage to the United States in Vietnam, as they were now needed by the Soviet Union in other ways. Gareth Porter (Porter, 1975), on the other hand, takes the opposing view, and argues that the initial attempt by the United States to use the Soviet Union to secure a settlement was dropped in 1969, after Soviet recognition of the PRG. The evidence does not suggest that the United States ever gave up trying, but that they merely bided their time until the climate was ripe to act. Certainly, many of the events of 1972, when matters came to a head, such as the bombing of Soviet freighters in Haiphong harbour and the December bombing of the North, do not make sense when seen purely from their military aspect. As Professor Warren Nutter, a Nixon appointee, and head of International Security Affairs at the Department of Defense claimed, with reference to the Christmas bombings,

"Bombardment taught them, and maybe the Russians, some lessons. It was a little embarrassing to have B 52's flying in daylight over a city defended by Soviet missiles."

(Towards Peace - Vietnamisation and the Kissinger Concessions, 1977, p.642)

The argument concerning whether or not the Nixon-Kissinger strategy was directed towards forcing the Soviet Union to pressure the North Vietnamese to settle, however, obscures the possibility that the main
weakness in this approach lay with Soviet/Vietnam relations and not in the exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union. On many occasions, for example, it would seem that the actions of the DRV caused as much surprise and dismay in Moscow as they did in Washington, and it is quite possible that the Soviet Union were often as much in the dark concerning Hanoi's intentions.

There is no evidence to suggest, therefore, that the Soviet Union "did a deal", with the United States and agreed to pressure the DRV into a settlement. What one can argue is that it became in the interests of the Soviet Union to settle, as a consequence of the changing relationship with the United States and the priority this was given. The Soviet Union, however, had great difficulty in persuading the DRV that it was also in their interests, and this led to tension between the two allies. It was perhaps a tactical disagreement, but this became obscured by the uncompromising attitude of the DRV and magnified by an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust.

The Paris talks finally opened on January 25th, 1969. The opening had been delayed for some months because of disagreement over procedure, notably, the shape of the conference table (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969/1970, 23549A). The real issue, however, was whether the talks should be two-sided or four-sided, and whether the NLF were part of the northern delegation or a separate one. A compromise was arrived at, which resulted in four negotiating teams, representing, respectively, the DRV, the NLF, the United States and the Republic of South Vietnam.

For the DRV and NLF, the negotiating teams that emerged were as follows: the DRV delegation was led by Xuan Thuy, who had been appointed minister without portfolio. The deputy leader was Colonel Ha Van Lau, who had previously been a member of the Viet Minh delegation to the Geneva Conference. The delegation also included Nguyen Minh Vy, a member of the
National Assembly, Nguyen Thanh Le, a journalist and Phan Hien, head of the American Department at the Foreign Ministry (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1967/1968, 22862,3). The initial North Vietnamese delegation was later joined by Mai Van Bo, the North Vietnamese Delegate-General in France (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969/1970, 23552). The NLF delegation was led by Tran Buu Kiem, with Madame Nguyen Thi Binh as deputy leader. It also included Tran Hoai Nam, head of the NLF mission to Algiers, Nguyen Van Tien, head of the NLF mission to Hanoi, Tran Van Tu, head of the NLF mission to Warsaw, and Dinh Ba Thi, head of the NLF mission to Bucharest (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969/1970, 23552). Le Duc Tho, however, held the role of special negotiator, and was in overall charge of the North Vietnamese side.

Tracing the course of the negotiations, and the support for the various proposals and counter-proposals of both sides is complicated by the fact that from 1969 a series of secret talks between Le Duc Tho and Kissinger had paralleled the official talks in Paris (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1972, 25077), and this was where any real contact between the United States and the DRV took place.(6) Both the official and the secret negotiations made no headway between 1969 and 1971. In 1971, with the announcement of Nixon's China visit however, and the consequent shift in the international balance this represented, the talks began to move.

The year 1972 marks the most important year with regard to the Soviet role in the DRV negotiating procedure, and also the year in which Soviet/Vietnam relations reached their lowest point. One cannot argue that this was because the Soviet position had changed, but merely that the achievement of a settlement, for the Soviet Union, had become more urgent. The Soviet Union, initially, therefore, maintained a cautious attitude toward the talks, publically supporting the various peace plans put
forward by the NLF. One can detect, nevertheless, even at this early stage, differences in the attitude towards negotiations adopted by the Soviet Union and the DRV, and this was shown most clearly by Soviet exchanges with the United States.

On May 6th, 1969, the NLF, in Paris, put forward a ten point peace plan (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969/1970, 23653), the main points of which were a call for immediate and unconditional troop withdrawal on the part of the United States, and the replacement of the Thieu regime with a provisional coalition government. The United States countered with an eight point peace plan, put forward by Nixon in a television broadcast on May 14th. Nixon called for mutual troop withdrawals, that is, that in return for the withdrawal of American troops, the North Vietnamese withdraw from the South, Laos and Cambodia. Also, that the South Vietnamese themselves must determine the status of their regime. It followed, therefore, that military and political issues were to be separated.

When referring to the need for a negotiated solution, Nixon said,

"Another reason stems from debates within the Communist world between those who argue for a policy of confrontation with the United States and those who argue against it. If Hanoi were to succeed in taking over South Vietnam by force - even after the power of the United States had been engaged - it would greatly strengthen those leaders who scorn negotiations, who advocate aggression, who minimize the risks of confrontation. It would bring peace now, but it would enormously increase the danger of a bigger war later."

(Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969/1970, 23653)

It seems likely that "those leaders who scorn negotiations" was a reference to the more belligerent Maoist line, emanating from Peking, in
contrast to what subsequently emerges as a desire on the part of the Soviet Union for a negotiated solution. Nevertheless, on May 14th only hours before he spoke to the nation on television, Izvestia published an article condemning Nixon's Vietnam policy (Izvestia, May 14th, 1969). On May 23rd, they further published an article entitled "This is the Heart of the Matter", evaluating the President's speech in negative terms (Izvestia, May 23rd, 1969).

The Soviet Union, however, were cautious in their public attitude. It should be remembered that the background to this period in Soviet terms was the serious border disputes with China, which had erupted in February, 1969, and which in turn created problems for the Soviet Union with regard to the supply of aid and weapons to North Vietnam. The need, therefore, to continue to provide both aid and public support for the DRV was intensified by the obstructionism and propaganda attacks of the Chinese, thus leaving the Soviet Union in a delicate position with regard to the United States.

On June 10th, 1969, the formation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government was announced (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969/1970, 23501A). Tran Buu Kiem was appointed Minister in the Prime Minister's Office and Nguyen Thi Binh was appointed Foreign Minister, thereby assuming leadership of what had now become the PRG delegation to the Paris Talks. The formation of the PRG was greeted enthusiastically in the Soviet press (Pravda, June 14th, 1969). The ambivalence of the Soviet attitude towards the negotiations, however, was shown by the publication of a joint statement by the Soviet Union and Vietnam following the state visit of Pham Van Dong in mid-October (Pravda, October 20th, 1969). The Soviet Union did not wholly condemn the United States stand at the Paris talks, unlike the Chinese, and did not believe that success on the battlefield was the only road to victory. This would confirm Nixon's reference, in
his speech of May 14th, to divisions within the communist world, concerning tactics to be pursued with reference to Vietnam. It is likely, therefore, that public pronouncements on the part of Moscow concerning support for the DRV and PRG line, were underlined by a sense of unease at Vietnamese tactics, and a desire to pursue a negotiated rather than a military solution.

An unusual exchange occurred at the end of April, 1970. In a television speech on 20th April 1970, in which he announced further troop withdrawals, Nixon stated,

"A political settlement is the heart of the matter. It is what the fighting has been about in Indo-China for thirty years. We have noted with interest the recent statement by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Malik concerning a possible new Geneva conference on Vietnam."

(Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969/1970, 24373)

This was a reference to a press conference, given by Jacob Malik, Soviet permanent representative at the United Nations, on April 16th, 1970, at which Malik had said,

"It appears that only a new Geneva conference could bring about a fresh solution and a relaxation of tensions in the Indo-China peninsula."

(Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969/1970, 23950)

He later qualified this by adding that peace could only come after the withdrawal of United States troops (International Herald Tribune, May 5th, 1970), thereby appearing to withdraw his initial statement. Nevertheless, it was reported, early in May, that in a statement in Paris, Stefan Jedrychowski, Poland's Foreign Minister, claimed that his government would not oppose the reconvening of an enlarged conference, if the majority of other nations supported it (New York Times, May 14th, 1970).
was made more significant by the fact that Tass distributed a report on Jedrychowski's remarks in its international service (New York Times, May 14th, 1970). It should also be mentioned, that this statement followed the visit to Warsaw of Le Duan, who had conferred at length with Gomulka (New York Times, May 14th, 1970).

Moscow's apparent support for the convening of a new Geneva conference is difficult to assess. This proposal had been consistently rejected by both the DRV and the NLF, so cannot be considered to have emanated from Hanoi. The joint declaration of the Indochinese Peoples' Summit Conference, held on 24th and 25th April, 1970, for example, simply called for a defence of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements, and made no demand for the reconvening of the Conference (SWB, April 28th, 1970, FE/3364/A3, 1,2,3,4,5,6, WNA in English, April 27th, 1970).(7) On the other hand it was reported that India had proposed Geneva style talks (The Times, July 6th, 1970). This added to the voice of Burma (The Times, May 6th, 1970) and other Asian states. It was suggested, with regard to a delegation representing Malaysia, Japan and Indonesia, who had visited Moscow in June, 1970 with proposals to reconvene the Geneva Conference and revive the International Control Commission in Cambodia, that the Soviet Union could not afford to snub this important segment of Asian opinion, and, therefore, were equivocal in their response (Funnell, 1978, p.164). Possibly, therefore, to the constraints imposed by the need to maintain relations with the United States on the one hand, whilst supporting the DRV on the other, one must also consider the need of the Soviet Union to placate non-aligned Asian opinion. It is likely, therefore, that support for a new Geneva conference was a tactical move on the part of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the ambivalence surrounding this issue may signal an area of disagreement between Moscow and Hanoi.

At the session of the Paris talks on September 17th, 1970, Madame
Binh put forward a new eight point peace plan on behalf of the PRG (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969/1970, 24273). Although similar to the previous plan, it contained a few modifications, most notably, that if a date and time period were agreed on for United States withdrawal, a cease fire and the position of prisoners of war could be discussed, and that members of the present Saigon administration could be included in the provisional coalition government. This did not represent a concession on the part of the DRV. Possibly, even at this time, the DRV were prepared to accept a southern government with a leader other than Thieu, but United States support for Thieu became the stumbling block.

The Soviet Union heaped great praise on the PRG plan, calling it "an important initiative (Pravda, September 18th, 1970, Izvestia, September 19th, 1970). However, on September 24th, in Paris, Mr. Bruce, now the chief negotiator of the United States delegation, rejected the proposals, particularly objecting to the PRG's insistence of a change of government in Saigon (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969/1970, 24273).

On October 7th, in a television broadcast, President Nixon countered with a new five point peace plan (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969/1970). This called for a cease fire in place, an international conference on Indochina, the negotiation of a timetable for the withdrawal of American troops and insistence that the South Vietnamese themselves determine the type of their future regime, and the immediate release of the POW's. Whilst, it seems, there was some room for manoeuvre concerning military matters on the part of the United States, there was to be no compromise on the question of the political status of the South. On October 8th, Madame Binh and Xuan Thuy criticised the American proposals, without formally rejecting them (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969/1970, 24276). However, in a statement issued on October 14th, the DRV Foreign Ministry officially rejected the plan (SWB, October 16th, 1970,
It was reported that the State Department had, on October 8th, officially urged the Soviet Union to use its influence on the DRV and the PRG to persuade them to accept the new American proposals (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969/1970). The Soviet Union, however, reacted strangely to the American proposals. At first they were condemned outright as a "great fraud" (Pravda, October 10th, 1970). However, it was later reported that although Nixon's proposals had been spurned by the communist side, they were still being paid the compliment of serious discussion, and that Red Star had given an analysis of the Nixon plan. This was interpreted as a sign that although the Nixon proposals were not approved of, a serious area for discussion had been opened up by them (The Times, November 4th, 1970).

It should also be mentioned that on October 28th, 1970, it was reported that President Ceausescu of Romania told Nixon that the stalemate at the talks was likely to end soon, although he is said to have refused a role as mediator (New York Times, October 26th, 1970). This is interesting for several reasons. Nixon himself speaks about the "Romanian channel" and claims that as early as 1969, during the course of his state visit to Romania, he had established a channel of communication with the North Vietnamese via Ceausescu (Nixon, 1978, pp.395-396). The Romanians were on close terms with the North Vietnamese, as shown by their role in the events of 1969, following the death of Ho Chi Minh and the arrangements for the meeting between Chou En Lai and Kosygin. The NLF delegation in Paris included Dinh Ba Thi, head of the NLF mission in Bucharest (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969/1970, 23552). As members of the Soviet bloc, the Romanians, therefore, were well placed to act, if not as
mediators, as a channel of communication, being, as they were, the only group easily in touch with all interested parties. Following the rejection of Nixon's plan in late 1970, there was no apparent progress in Paris until the summer of 1971. Nevertheless, Ceausescu's statement was confirmed by the fact that although the stalemate continued in the official talks, this was when the parallel secret talks started to move. One should stress that the public attitude of the Soviet Union, as shown by policy statements, speeches and contacts between the respective leaderships, contained no hint of disagreement with the DRV during this period, and relations between the two allies remained on a firm footing. Le Duan, for example, headed a delegation to Moscow in 1970, on the occasion of the centenary of Lenin's birth, where he had talks with Brezhnev (Izvestia, April 25th, 1970). Le Duan also headed the VWP delegation to the Twenty Fourth Congress of the CPSU in 1971, when he had a series of meetings with Brezhnev (Pravda, April 15th, 1971, Pravda, May 10th, 1971). The turning point of 1971, however, was the announcement, by Nixon, in a dramatic television broadcast on July 15th, that he had accepted an invitation to visit the Peoples' Republic of China some time before May, 1972, in order to discuss the normalization of United States-China relations (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1971/1972, 24765A)

It is possible that although the North Vietnamese had had their suspicions concerning such a development for some months previously, the Chinese did not inform the DRV in advance of this visit. For the DRV, the news that China, heretofore one of their main allies, was now entering into a dialogue with the United States, must have been received as a devastating betrayal. They reacted unfavourably to the announcement, veiled references appearing in the Vietnamese press to United States efforts to split the socialist camp. A Nhan Dan editorial, for example, commented,
"A very insidious trick adopted by the United States in its plans to sabotage the socialist world is to sow disunity. To divide and rule has been the imperialists' traditional strategem aimed at repressing and annihilating the revolutionary forces. While distorting socialism and communism, the United States has advanced all kinds of sophistic allegations aimed at alienating the socialist system from the nationalist countries and from the peoples of other countries. Paying special attention to capitalising on all manifestations of opportunism, the United States has feverishly tried to separate one country from another in the socialist camp and to disunite one party from another in the communist and workers' movements. The imperialists' theoreticians and secret service ringleaders have gleefully rejoiced at the situations that gave rise to disagreements and discord within the communist and workers' movements, especially among the socialist countries."

(SWB, August 4th, 1971, FE/3752/A3/3, Hanoi home service, August 1st, 1971)

This tone of commentary continued throughout August. A Hoc Tap editorial, on the anniversary of the August Revolution, claimed,

"As for the socialist camp, the Nixon doctrine advocates administering the insidious scheme of carrying out provocations against and sowing disunity among the socialist countries, putting one component of the socialist camp against another and, depending on the real situation prevailing in each area and in each period of time, carrying out subversive measures through violence or adopting the "peaceful evolution" measure in order to restore capitalism."

(SWB, August 17th, 1971, FE/3763/A3/4, Hanoi for South Vietnam,
Further Nhan Dan commentaries were broadcast both in English and in Chinese to Southeast Asia, alleging, for example, that,

"To weaken the offensive posture of the revolutionary trends, alongside the thorough mobilisation of counter-revolutionary forces, Nixon seeks by all means to divide the revolutionary forces. A very perfidious move of his is to spray the toxic gas of chauvinism into opportunist heads in a bid to play up socialist countries against one another and sow schism among the communist and workers' parties."

(SWB, August 31st, 1971, FE/377VA1/1, VNA in English, August 22nd, 1971)

Although these commentaries were directed against the Chinese the significance and possible parallel was not lost on the Soviet Union, especially in view of the impending Nixon visit to Moscow. That there was a link was confirmed by the fact that this line of attack appeared to subside, when, on August 30th, the VNA and Liberation Radio of South Vietnam carried a DRV foreign ministry communique which announced that Podgorny would visit North Vietnam early in October, 1971, at the head of a Soviet party and government delegation, at the invitation of the party and government of the DRV (SWB, August 31st, 1971, FE/3774/A1/1).

Shortly after the announcement of the Podgorny visit, in an article entitled "Together with the Heroes of Vietnam", and signed by I. Arkhimov, Pravda published an historical survey and detailed outline of Soviet economic, military and technical aid to the DRV, together with details of aid agreements (Pravda, September 2nd, 1971). This was an event unusual in itself, as the Soviet Union rarely elaborated on such aid. It seemed, therefore, an attempt to set the record straight with regard to Soviet support for Vietnam, in the face of the propaganda attacks emanating from
the DRV. Furthermore, the Podgorny visit to Hanoi was to be the first visit of a high level Soviet delegation since Ho Chi Minh's funeral. It had been Firyubin, prior to this, who had acted on behalf of the Soviet leadership, visiting both Hanoi and other Asian capitals (New York Times, February 17th, 1970, Hindi, July 12th, July 14th, 1970).

Podgorny arrived in Hanoi on 3rd October, 1971. The delegation accompanying him included K. T. Mazurov, First Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers, K. F. Katushev, Secretary, Central Committee of the CPSU, V. I. Novikov, Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers, S. A. Skachkov, Chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, General S. L. Sokolov, First Deputy Minister of Defence, Firyubin and I. T. Grishin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade (Pravda, October 4th, 1971). The composition of the delegation, including as it did Skachkov, General Sokolov and Grishin, reflected the possible nature of the mission with regard to demonstrating continued Soviet economic and military support for the DRV.

On the same day, Podgorny met with Vietnamese leaders, and later attended a banquet. The tone of the visit contained none of the acrimony that had been apparent from the Vietnamese side in the preceding weeks. In several speeches, Podgorny once more pledged support for the latest peace proposal of the PRG (SWB, October 5th, 1971, FE/3804/A2/9, VNA in English, October 4th, 1971). Much emphasis was placed on the friendly nature of the visit, and as well as talks and official receptions, Podgorny, for example, visited a dyke repair site and an exhibition of art, whilst Mazurov and Katushev visited the Hanoi polytechnic (SWB, October 9th, 1971, FE/3808/A2/6,7, VNA in English, Hanoi home service, October 8th, 1971, Tass in English, October 7th, 1971). At a rally, held in Hanoi on October 4th, Le Duan, in his speech, possibly alluding to the underlying issue, said,
"The Vietnam Workers' Party and the Vietnamese people will exert all their energy to consolidate and strengthen their militant solidarity and their relations of fraternal cooperation with the Soviet Union, China and the other socialist countries so as to help restore and strengthen the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism."

(SWB, October 7th, 1971, FE/3806/A2/5, VNA in English, October 5th, 1971)

At a later speech, at a banquet given by the Soviet delegation on October 7th, he further claimed, whilst referring to the Vietnamese military response to United States actions in Laos and Cambodia, that,

"This is a severe warning to the US imperialist aggressors, who should bear in mind that the Vietnamese people are strong with not only the inexhaustible people's war but also the greater assistance from the socialist countries and the international communist and workers' movement, and the stronger and stronger sympathy and support of the whole progressive mankind."

(SWB, October 11th, 1971, FE/3809/A2/3, VNA in English, Hanoi home service, Tass in English, Moscow home service, October 8th, 1971).

This was the only overt reference of this nature throughout the reporting of the proceedings of the Podgorny visit. If the visit had been an attempt to reassure the DRV of continuing Soviet support, therefore, it apparently succeeded in its objective.

The Soviet delegation departed on October 8th. It was not until Podgorny had returned to Moscow, his travels having included India, Burma and Iran, that news of Nixon's Moscow visit was announced (Pravda, October 13th, 1971). As the North Vietnamese press did not respond to this news
with the type of attack that had accompanied the announcement of the Nixon China visit, one assumes that they had been informed, in advance, by the Soviet side, during the course of Podgorny's visit.

On January 25th, 1972, Nixon revealed in a television broadcast, that from 1969, a series of secret meetings had taken place between Kissinger, Xuan Thuy and Le Duc Tho (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1971/1972, 25077). He disclosed details of these meetings, which had taken place on May 31st, June 26th, July 12th, August 16th and September 13th. He also revealed the terms of the United States peace plan presented secretly the previous October. These meetings, were, of course, the forum for any real contact between the United States and the DRV. By this time, however, the United States government had become exasperated. They were under attack at home, for failure to make headway in a settlement of the war, and under public attack from the North Vietnamese for the same reason. In order to counteract this criticism, therefore, it had been decided to reveal the steps that had been taken secretly.

There was no immediate official North Vietnamese reaction to the President's peace plan, but on January 26th, the North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris talks issued a statement that constituted a rejection of these proposals (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1971/1972, 25077). The first official reaction from the Soviet Union, however, came on February 11th, when the Soviet government issued a statement that rejected the United States plan in the same terms as Hanoi and the PRG (Pravda, February 12th, 1972).

The talks, by this time, were in trouble from both sides, and the underlying tensions and dissatisfactions began to intrude. In early February, the talks were indefinitely postponed when the United States refused to agree to a date for the next session, as a protest against the World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Indochinese Peoples, then
taking place in Versailles (New York Times, February 11th, 1972).(9) The United States view was that the sessions were only being used for propaganda and as such were of more benefit to Hanoi (New York Times, February 13th, 1972). The February 17th session in Paris was seen as unlikely, and it was reported that United States strategy was to agree to meetings from time to time, as a way of assessing any possible changes in North Vietnamese tactics (New York Times, February 13th, 1972). In spite of a resumption, the DRV delegation indicated on February 17th, that they did not approve of Nixon's visit to China (New York Times, February 17th, 1972), and on February 25th, walked out in protest at the United States bombing of the North (New York Times, February 25th, 1972). This was the first time that one side had walked out on the other. On March 23rd, the talks were indefinitely suspended by the United States and the North Vietnamese side were informed that there would be no further meetings until they showed a willingness for serious discussion on concrete issues defined in advance (New York Times, March 24th, 1972). Meanwhile, on March 30th, North Vietnamese troops crossed the DMZ, signalling the opening of the 1972 spring offensive (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1971/1972, 25336A).

The United States had continually ignored intelligence reports of preparations for a large scale offensive on the part of the DRV, and were, reportedly, taken by surprise (New York Times, April 5th, 1972).(10) On February 25th, President Thieu was reported to have said that the Soviet Union urged Hanoi to open a military offensive, in order to disrupt efforts to end the war during Nixon's China visit. He claimed that Hanoi was determined to prove that the key to any solution lay with the Soviet Union, not China. Nothing came of this offensive, he went on to say, but they would try later in the year (New York Times, February 25th, 1972). This analysis of the origins of the offensive was either wishful thinking.
on the part of Thieu or disinformation designed to obscure the real situation. It is more likely that the decision for the offensive came from Hanoi and that the Soviet Union were unable to exert influence on the course of events thereafter. Certainly, a number of Soviet officials had visited Hanoi in the weeks immediately prior to the offensive. During the first two weeks of March, for example, Soviet shipping minister, Guzhenko, visited North Vietnamese port facilities (Christian Science Monitor, London Edition, April 28th, 1972), whilst Marshall Pavel Batitsky, responsible for air defence, visited Hanoi with a delegation of senior Soviet military officers (The Times, March 29th, 1972). It is suggested (International Herald Tribune, April 12th, 1972) that the Soviet Union knew of the offensive from the delivery of equipment, but tried to steer the DRV towards a more peaceful course. A meeting between Kosygin and the DRV ambassador on February 11th, for example, was described as "frank discussions" (Pravda, February 12th, 1972) a term usually taken to signal disagreement. It is difficult to assess the background to these events, but it would seem that the evidence increasingly points to signs of fractiousness and disagreement between the Soviet Union and the DRV. The initial Soviet response to the offensive was to maintain a diplomatic silence.

On April 17th, United States planes bombed Haiphong harbour, damaging a Soviet freighter. This led to a formal, oral protest by A. G. Kovalev, Deputy Minister, to the United States ambassador, J. D. Beam (New York Times, April 7th, 1972). He warned that the expansion of the air war could aggravate not only the situation in Indochina, but the international situation, an allusion to the impending Nixon visit. He omitted mentioning, however, the incident concerning the Soviet ship. The first Soviet reaction to the air raids, therefore, was rather restrained. However, on April 18th, the Soviet Union delivered a note to Ambassador
Beam, accusing the United States of having damaged four Soviet merchant ships in Haiphong harbour, and demanding that the United States adopt "strict measures to prevent similar provocations in the future" (New York Times, April 18th, 1972).

Official indications in Washington were that Nixon had chosen to stage a deliberate confrontation with the Soviet Union in order to force it to limit its supply of arms to the North Vietnamese army, or to restrain that army altogether. It was acknowledged that the raid on Haiphong was a calculated warning to the Soviet Union, and prior notice to the Soviet Union concerning the raid was suggested as a possibility (New York Times, April 16th, 1972). Officials also reported that the mining or blockading of Haiphong had been ruled out for fear of upsetting the Nixon visit to Moscow (New York Times, April 16th, 1972). Nevertheless, the status of the Nixon visit was now giving cause for anxiety, and it was at this point on April 20th, that Kissinger went secretly to Moscow (New York Times, April 26th, 1972).

Kissinger claims, in his memoirs, that the primary purpose of his visit was to remove Vietnam as an obstacle to the impending summit, a view that he communicated to Gromyko shortly after his arrival on April 20th (Kissinger, 1979, p.1126). Kissinger met with Brezhnev on the morning of April 21st and then again on April 22nd, and, by his own account, at both of these meetings, Vietnam was discussed. He claims that in an attempt to break the deadlock on plenary and private meetings he suggested the United States would agree to a plenary session on April 27th, if Hanoi agreed in advance to a private meeting on May 2nd. He outlined the proposals he would make to Le Duc Tho on May 2nd, which, by his own admission, did not constitute a substantial concession.(11) These consisted of a demand for the withdrawal of units that had crossed to the South since March 29th, respect for the DMZ, an immediate exchange of prisoners and agreement
within a specified time period. In spite of two days of Kissinger's verbal onslaughts on the subject of Vietnam and a background of the recent bombing of the Soviet freighters, Brezhnev, Kissinger claims, remained good-humoured. He agreed to submit these proposals to Hanoi, and dispatched Katushev as a messenger. Kissinger saw this as an indication that the Soviet Union would go some way before they were prepared to let Vietnam jeopardise the Nixon summit and felt he had succeeded in involving the Soviet Union in the manner he had hoped (Kissinger, 1979, pp.1144-1148). One cannot, of course, corroborate the content of these discussions, but Kissinger's visit to Moscow was followed shortly by the resumption of the talks and the dispatch of a Soviet delegation, led by Katushev, to Hanoi.

The precise sequence of events remains unclear. The New York Times reported on April 21st, that the communist representatives at the Paris talks had formally proposed resuming the talks on April 27th, whether the bombing had stopped or not (New York Times, April 21st, 1972). On April 26th, it was reported that the United States were ready to resume the talks on April 27th (New York Times, April 26th, 1972) whilst on April 25th, the VNA issued a communique stating that,

"In execution of an agreement reached previously, a Soviet delegation made an unofficial friendship visit to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from 26th to 29th April, 1972".

(SWB, May 2nd, 1972, FE/3978/A2/1, VNA in English, April 25th, 1972)

The delegation had included K. F. Katushev, Secretary, Central Committee of the CPSU, N. P. Firyubin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and I. A. Cugetov, listed as a "leading cadre of an organ beside the Central Committee of the CPSU" (SWB, May 2nd, 1972, FE/3978/A2/1, VNA in English, April 25th, 1972).
Prior to this, the DRV had resumed their propaganda attacks of the previous year, alleging that the United States were attempting to separate the DRV from her allies. A subsequent broadcast of an April 20th Nhan Dan commentary suggested that,

"Regardless of all perfidious tricks adopted by the US imperialists, the militant solidarity between Vietnam and the fraternal socialist countries, and these countries, support for and assistance to the Vietnamese people, have developed more and more satisfactorily."

(SWB, April 22nd, 1972, FE/3970/A3/3, Hanoi home service, April 20th, 1972)

This was an interesting comment, in view of the fact that on that day, Kissinger was meeting in Moscow with Brezhnev. Furthermore, on April 23rd, a similar broadcast claimed, with reference to attacks on Haiphong,

"The above-mentioned attitude of the US clearly shows that after suffering ever more bitter failures in both zones of Vietnam the Nixon Administration, by means of war provocation and threats, is trying to prevent the socialist countries from assisting the Vietnamese people's patriotic fight."

The commentator went on,

"The US attack on Soviet and GDR cargo ships at Haiphong port on 16th April and the threats uttered afterwards by the Nixon Administration are aimed at separating the Vietnamese people from their socialist brothers and checking the latter's assistance to Vietnam. This, however, is but a foolish calculation. How could Nixon separate the Vietnamese people from their brother socialist countries since they all are fighting for the same noble ideal - socialism and communism - and against the same enemy - US-led imperialism?"
The report went on in this vein, concluding,

"The US imperialists had in the past resorted to base manoeuvres to sow discord between the Vietnamese people and the peoples of other socialist countries, but they had failed bitterly. The leaders of the other socialist countries have more than once pointed out that to support and assist Vietnam is their noble international obligation...."

(SWB, April 25th, 1972, FE/3972/A3/8, VNA, in English, April 23rd, 1972)

That the DRV were displeased with the course of events was reinforced by their decision to release their version of the 1968 "understanding". At a press conference, held in Paris on April 20th, Xuan Thuy refuted the allegation that the DRV had violated this understanding. Disagreement between the United States and the DRV concerned to what extent the bombing pause, negotiated in 1968, had been unconditional, the DRV claiming that it had been so. Describing meetings held between Le Duc Tho, Averall Harriman and himself during this period, Xuan Thuy stated,

"During the second period of private meetings (20th September to 30th October 1968), the USA ceased insisting on the aforesaid 'circumstances'. It, however called for 'serious talks'. At last, the USA and the DRV agreed that the USA completely and unconditionally ceased (as received) its bombing of North Vietnam and that a four delegation conference on Vietnam was convened with the participation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, the United States and the Saigon Administration, to find a political solution to the Vietnam problem."

(SWB, April 24th, 1972, FE/3971/A3/4, VNA in English, April 21st, 1972)
Two documents were also issued at the press conference, one a communique of the DRV delegation to the Paris talks, concerning the understanding and the bombing pause of 1968, and the other an appendix giving the DRV version of how this understanding came about (SWB, April 24th, 1972, FE/3571/A3/4, VNA in English, April 21st, 1972).

It was reported, on April 22nd, that the United States had decided not to release their version of the 1968 understanding, a decision that was seen, by administration officials, as motivated by a desire not to embarrass the Soviet Union (New York Times, April 22nd, 1972).

The 1968 agreement had, on previous occasions, become something of an issue. In December, 1971, for example, commentaries in the Soviet press accused the United States of reneging on the 1968 commitment to halt the bombing of North Vietnam (Pravda, December 28th, 1972). During one such exchange, in November, 1970, (Pravda, November 23rd, 1970), in which a Soviet diplomat denied knowledge of a "tacit understanding", between the United States and the DRV on the subject of United States reconnaissance flights, it was reported that Valerian Zorin, Soviet Ambassador to Paris since 1965, had played an important role in the negotiations (The Guardian, November 26th, 1970). It was further reported that, for the first time, sources in Washington affirmed that the 1968 agreement had come about as the result of unnamed Soviet diplomats, acting as mediators between Hanoi and Washington (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969/1970, 23549 A).

Since the content of the agreement had never been declared publicly, until the DRV released their version in April, 1972, it was hard to prove one way or another, what actually had been violated. It is likely, however that it was not so much the content of the agreement, but the background to its implementation, that constituted the bone of contention to the DRV. That the events of 1968 paralleled those of April, 1972, in
the eyes of both the United States and the DRV was shown by Nixon's speech of April 26th, when he claimed,

"I have flatly rejected the proposal that we stop the bombing of North Vietnam as a condition for returning to the negotiating table. They sold that package to the United States once before, in 1968 and we are not going to buy it again in 1972."

(Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1972, 25339)

If the DRV had, in Nixon's words "sold that package", the brokers had been the Soviet Union. The 1968 understanding, therefore, constituted not only a symbol of betrayal for both sides, but, given the Soviet role in bringing it about, was synonymous with United States-Soviet cooperation, once more highly relevant to the DRV in the context of Kissinger's Moscow visit and the impending summit. Hence the significance to the DRV of raising the matter at this time. Both attacks in the Vietnamese press, therefore, and allusions to the 1968 understanding, provided a means for the DRV to signal their displeasure to the Soviet Union.

From April 26th to April 29th, the Katushev delegation visited Hanoi. The brief communique already cited, and issued by the VNA on 25th April was the only DRV coverage of the visit (SWB, May 2nd, 1972, FE/3978/A2/1, VNA in English, April 25th, 1972). That the visit produced results, however, was shown by the fact that in an interview on Paris radio, spokesmen for the DRV and PRG delegations said that they would take part in the session of the talks to be held on April 27th (SWB, April 27th, 1972, FE/8974/1).

On April 29th, Le Duc Tho passed through Moscow en route for Paris, where he met with Soviet leaders (Pravda, April 30th, 1972). On May 2nd, in Paris, he met secretly with Kissinger (New York Times, May 6th, 1972), their first meeting since September, 1971. Two official sessions and a private meeting between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, however, did not succeed
in producing a breakthrough, and the talks were again suspended by the United States, on May 4th (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1972, 25369). Texts were issued by both sides with reference to the suspension (New York Times, May 5th, 1972).

It was privately hinted by United States officials that they had been deceived by the Russians when asked to resume the talks (New York Times, May 5th, 1972). What is more likely is that the United States mistakenly attributed far more power of leverage to the Soviet Union over the DRV than they did, in fact, possess. The March offensive, for example, far from being instigated by the Soviet Union, illustrated a desire, on the part of Hanoi, to demonstrate that they set their own terms, and possibly caused as much embarrassment in Moscow as it did in Washington. During March, 1972, for example, there was speculation in Paris that Hanoi wished the cancellation of the Nixon visit to Moscow, because they feared a deal with the Russians in which they would be by-passed (New York Times, March 30th, 1972). A complex, three-cornered game was now in progress, and it is within the context of the United States attempt to pressure Moscow into bringing the DRV back to the negotiating table, that the next move on the part of the United States should be understood.

On May 8th, the United States announced their intention to resume the bombing of the North and mine the port of Haiphong. When Nixon broadcast to the nation on May 8th, therefore, it was with full knowledge of the possible consequences to Soviet-United States relations, and, addressing himself specifically to the Soviet Union, he urged them not to,

"...permit Hanoi's intransigence to blot out the prospects we have together so patiently prepared."

(New York Times, May 9th, 1972)

Kissinger, at a news conference on May 9th, recognised that the mining of the ports posed some risks, and went on to say that he thought it would be
a day or two before Soviet leaders made a decision as to whether or not to postpone the Nixon visit (New York Times, May 10th, 1972).

The Soviet press reported Nixon's speech on the mining of DRV ports (Pravda, May 10th, 1972, Izvestia, May 11th, 1972), but gave no indication as to whether this would mean the cancellation of the summit, whilst it was reported that the White House team at the United States embassy in Moscow still planned to hold its first meeting concerning the trip with the Soviet officials involved, on May 10th, (New York Times, May 10th, 1972). Amidst speculation, in western sources, with regard to the possible cancellation of the summit, it was also noted that the initial response of the Soviet press to Nixon's announcement had been mild (New York Times, May 10th, 1972, New York Times, May 11th, 1972). It was not until May 11th, for example, that the Soviet Union issued a statement demanding that the United States immediately end the blockade (Pravda, May 12th, 1972). It was suggested by western diplomats, however, that the delay in the Soviet reaction to the mining indicated that the Soviet leaders were having difficulty in coping with the move (New York Times, May 11th, 1972). It was also claimed that the Soviet leadership had considered tough action, including a convoy to run the blockade. Some elements of the Politbureau reportedly leant towards sending a convoy into Haiphong and sweeping up the United States mines with minesweepers or cancelling the Nixon visit. The delayed Soviet response in calling for an end to the blockade was interpreted by both western and communist diplomats as an indication of substantial differences within the leadership on how to react (New York Times, May 14th, 1972).

Possibly the answer to this puzzle lies within the Soviet leadership itself. The first indication of this occurred when it was announced, on May 21st, that Pyotr Yefimovich Shelest had been appointed Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers, an indication of a fall from political favour.
in view of his Politbureau membership and position as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party organisation (Pravda, May 21st, 1972). This was confirmed when, a few days later, it was announced that Shelest had been relieved of his duties as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party organisation and his Politbureau membership (Pravda, May 26th, 1972). It seems likely that Shelest represented the hardline within the Politbureau and would brook no compromise with the United States over Vietnam, the implication being that his expulsion from the Politbureau cleared the way to arrive at a decision to proceed with the Nixon visit.(12) What certainly is true is that on May 15th, the Soviet press indicated obliquely that preparations for the Nixon visit were going ahead, by reporting the opening of a conference at Camp David where the Nixon trip was to be discussed (Pravda, May 15th, 1972). It also circulated a report of the May 12th press conference in Paris between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, in which reference was made to the fact that the DRV preferred a negotiated solution to victory on the battlefield (Pravda, May 16th, 1972). In a later comment on the Nixon visit, an article in Pravda, signed by Yu. Chernov, admitted that this had gone forward "despite obstructionist actions by rightist and leftist foes of relaxation" (Pravda, June 15th, 1972). It is likely, therefore, that between the initial Nixon announcement of May 8th, and May 15th, there had been quite a substantial disagreement within the Soviet leadership, and that whatever transpired, paved the way for a more compromising attitude on Vietnam.

The furore surrounding the Nixon speech had coincided with the arrival of Xuan Thuy in Moscow, en route home from Paris, and on May 11th, he had had talks with Kosygin (Pravda, May 12th, 1972). Unfortunately, one can gain no obvious indication of the nature of these exchanges from the Vietnamese side. It was not until the Nixon visit itself was underway that the DRV launched into their by now familiar propaganda attacks,
alleging that the United States were attempting to separate the Soviet Union from her allies (SWB, May 23rd, 1972, FE/3996/A3/1,2,3, Hanoi home service, May 21st, 1972). What these events do show, however, is that by now detente was more important to the Soviet Union than the conduct of the war in Vietnam, and that the DRV were aware of this.

The Moscow summit, therefore, went ahead as scheduled, against a background of hostility from the DRV. On May 22nd, Nixon, accompanied by Kissinger and an entourage of aides, arrived in Moscow for four days of talks with the Soviet leadership (New York Times, May 23rd, 1972). The main purpose of the visit was to conclude the negotiation and take part in the signing of the SALT agreement.

Vietnam, claims Kissinger, was relegated to a subsidiary issue by the Soviet leaders (Kissinger, 1979, p.1228). Kissinger cited only two occasions on which Vietnam was discussed. One, at which he was present, consisted of a three hour tirade by Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny, that contained little of substance (Kissinger, 1979, pp.1225-1228). There was a subsequent meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev, in which, it is claimed, Brezhnev asked for a modification of the proposal of January 25th, by having Thieu resign two months instead of one month before a new election (Kissinger, 1979, p.1228).

Nixon, in his memoirs, whilst also referring to the meeting with Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgory, claims that the greatest surprise of the summit came during his last meeting with Brezhnev, when he went to his office for what was supposed to be a half hour courtesy call. The result was a two hour discussion on Vietnam. He records that,

"After some initial skirmishing, he said, 'Would you like to have one of our highest Soviet officials go to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the interests of peace?' I replied that such a visit might make a major contribution to
ending the war, and I said that I would suspend bombing during the period the Soviet official was in Hanoi."

(Nixon, 1978, p.617)

Tad Szulc, on the other hand, suggests that Vietnam was discussed four times at the summit (Szulc, 1974, p.41). The net effect of the discussions, he claims, was that the United States made it clear that their private negotiating position was much more flexible than their public stand. The outcome was that it was agreed that Podgorny should go to Hanoi to convey the United States view to the North Vietnamese (Szulc, 1974, p.43).

The joint Soviet-American communique, issued following the summit, and signed on May 29th, claimed, with reference to Indochina, that,

"The Soviet side stressed its solidarity with the just struggle of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia for their freedom, independence and social progress. Firmly supporting the proposals of the DRV and the Republic of South Vietnam which provide a realistic and constructive basis for settling the Vietnam problem, the Soviet Union stands for a cessation of bombings of the DRV, for a complete and unconditional withdrawal of the troops of the United States and its allies from South Vietnam, so that the peoples of Indochina would have the possibility to determine for themselves their fate without any outside interference."

(Pravda, May 31st, 1972)

This statement of the Soviet position, however, contributed little understanding of the real state of affairs between the Soviet Union and the DRV.

Almost a month following the summit, a delegation led by Podgorny, and including Katushev and Firyubin, visited Hanoi from the 15th to 18th
June, 1972, on what was described as a "friendly, unofficial visit" (Pravda, June 20th, 1972).(14) There was a news blackout for the duration of the Podgorny visit. Nevertheless, the attacks that had emanated from the DRV press during the course of the summit were temporarily dropped, indicating some relaxation of tension. Following the visit, a communique was issued, pledging continued Soviet support for the war in Vietnam and the peace proposals of the DRV and the PRG (Pravda, June 20th, 1972). It had earlier been reported that a dispatch by V. Louis, in the London Evening News, claimed that Podgorny's visit to Hanoi was "aimed at stopping hostilities on all fronts so that new negotiations can get under way." (New York Times, June 17th, 1972). Furthermore, at a news conference in Calcutta on June 18th, on his way home from Hanoi, Podgorny was reported as predicting that the Paris talks would resume soon and that the Soviet Union would work to ensure their success (New York Times, June 19th, 1972). A statement on the visit to Hanoi, omitting only the final paragraph on the Soviet leaders's return home, led Hanoi home service's main evening news bulletin on June 19th (SWE, June 20th, 1972, FE/4019/1). Shortly after Podgorny's return to Moscow, the DRV and PRG delegates in Paris indicated, on June 30th, that they were prepared to return to the talks (New York Times, July 1st, 1972).

The plenary sessions in Paris resumed on July 13th, whilst further secret meetings took place between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho on July 19th, August 1st, September 15th, September 25th and September 26th (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1973, 25741).(15) At the secret meeting in Paris, on October 8th, Le Duc Tho presented Kissinger with a draft peace document, stipulating that it must be signed by October 31st (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1973, 25741A). The draft peace document made a number of concessions to the United States position. The major concession was abandoning the demand for a simultaneous political and military
solution and agreeing to a settlement in two stages (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1973, 25743/4). The DRV further stipulated that negotiations must be completed by October 31st, 1972 (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1973, 25742).

It seems plausible to hypothesize that the production of a draft peace document was precipitated by Podgorny's June visit. There seems to have been no other major incident that could have produced what amounted to a volte face on the part of the DRV in the intervening months, either on the battlefield or at the conference table. Furthermore, from July onwards, Le Duc Tho had been meeting regularly with various members of the Soviet leadership. On July 15th, for example, he had talks in Moscow with Katushev (Pravda, July 16th, 1972), and on August 17th he met with A. P. Kirilenko, Secretary, CPSU Central Committee, and Katushev, whilst en route home from Paris (Pravda, August 18th, 1972). On September 10th, he met with K. T. Mazarov (Pravda, September 11th, 1972).(16) Meanwhile, the DRV ambassador to Moscow, Vo Thuc Dong, was received by Kosygin on September 25th (Pravda, September 26th, 1972) and by Podgorny on September 26th (Pravda, September 27th, 1972), signalling that an important development was in the offing. Le Duc Tho, however, was not the only visitor to Moscow during this period, and from September 10th to September 13th, Kissinger again went secretly to Moscow for talks with the Soviet leadership (New York Times, September 10th, 1972). It seems likely, therefore, that Kissinger was kept in touch with developments through his contacts with the Soviet leadership, but one should not go so far as to suggest from this that they were acting on his behalf.

Following the issue of the draft document, Le Duc Tho, on his way home via Moscow, was received by Suslov and Katushev (Pravda, October 15th, 1972). Since this appears to be the first time that Le Duc Tho met personally with Suslov, it would confirm the importance of whatever Le Duc
Tho had communicated to Kissinger in Paris. Kissinger himself launched a tight negotiating schedule, involving Hanoi, Saigon and Washington, the unforeseen weakness of which was the failure to gain the agreement of President Thieu to the proposed draft.

It would seem that the timing of the negotiations, and the stipulation of Le Duc Tho that the agreement be signed by October 31st, were dictated by the impending United States presidential elections, which thus became a determining factor. Gareth Porter argues (Porter, 1975), that it was Nixon himself, rather than Thieu, who provided the main stumbling block. The position of Nixon is unclear, but it seems that he did not share Kissinger's view of the necessity to settle prior to the election (Nixon, 1978). In this he appeared to take the same view as the Soviet leadership. It is ironic to speculate, therefore, that it was probably Kissinger and the DRV leadership who wished immediate signature of the document, whilst Nixon and the Soviet leadership were prepared to bide their time. In any event, the DRV believed that the difficulties with Thieu had been manufactured. In response to the failure to get Thieu's agreement, and in order to precipitate events, the DRV did as Kissinger feared they would and "went public", publishing the proposals of the draft agreement and suggesting that its acceptance had been forestalled by obstacles erected by Washington (SWB, October 27th, 1972, FE/4129/A3/12,13,14,15,16,17, VNA in English, October 26th, 1972, Hanoi home service, October 26th, 1972).

Moscow's immediate response to the DRV publication of the draft peace agreement was to publish it verbatim, without comment (Pravda, October 27th, 1972), suggesting that they were unprepared for the eventuality, and had not yet formulated a considered response. On October 27th, both Vo Toan, temporary charge d'affaires of the DRV and Kao Van Hong, of the PRG met with Kosygin (Pravda, October 28th, 1972). Following this, on October
28th, it was reported that Hanoi and Moscow differed in their attitude towards negotiations. Moscow, it was claimed, wished them to continue, whilst Hanoi demanded that the agreement must be signed right away. Kosygin's remarks of October 27th (Pravda, October 28th, 1972), whilst receiving envoys of the DRV and PRG, expressing the hope that negotiations would continue, were cited (Christian Science Monitor, October 28th, 1972). However, a few days later it was reported that the Soviet line was hardening, and that mention of the hope for further talks had been dropped from Soviet statements (Christian Science Monitor, November 1st, 1972).

Did Moscow, therefore, have prior warning that the DRV would "go public"? This seems unlikely, as they would have been better prepared had they had such warning. Also, the respective envoys were called in after the event, and not before. Furthermore, it seems likely that the Soviet Union disagreed with the DRV view that the document should be signed right away. The Soviet Union were in no particular hurry to settle before the United States elections, whereas the DRV were. It is possible, therefore, that Moscow counselled caution and further negotiation, and that the DRV went ahead and released the document anyway. In essence, this was a disagreement about tactics, but it took place in an atmosphere of extreme suspicion on the part of the DRV, both towards the United States and the Soviet Union.

The publication of the draft document put the United States in a difficult position vis-à-vis public opinion, implying as it did, that the President had reneged on a peace settlement only two weeks before the election. In order to dampen criticism, therefore, Kissinger gave a press conference on October 26th, in which he made his ill-fated "peace is at hand" statement, suggesting that a settlement was in sight and that the issues remaining for negotiation were minor (New York Times, October 27th, 1972).(17) Although negotiations were subsequently resumed, both sides
were by now severely mistrustful of each other. As a consequence of this mistrust, therefore, rather than any disagreement on substance, the possibilities for a settlement began to recede.

On December 3rd, Kissinger arrived in Paris for a further round of talks with Le Duc Tho (New York Times, December 4th, 1972). Although the talks were resumed on December 4th (New York Times, December 5th, 1972), the meeting scheduled for December 5th was suddenly cancelled, but resumed after twenty four hours on December 6th (New York Times, December 7th, 1972). It was reported that the mood surrounding the secret talks swung from the optimism of almost immediate agreement, to deep pessimism, when it became apparent that the talks had failed to produce anything decisive. At the formal session of the peace talks, running concurrently, delegates talked of "impasse" and "deadlock" in efforts to negotiate a settlement (New York Times, December 8th, 1972). Le Duc Tho continued to meet secretly with Kissinger until December 13th, however, when Kissinger returned home (New York Times, December 14th, 1972). At a press conference on December 16th, Kissinger admitted that the secret talks had failed to reach an agreement (New York Times, December 17th, 1972), and this was followed by the announcement by the Nixon administration, on December 18th, of the resumption of the full scale bombing of the North (New York Times, December 19th, 1972). Meanwhile, Le Duc Tho had flown to Moscow from Paris on December 15th (New York Times, December 16th, 1972), where, on December 16th, he met with Kirilenko and Katushev (Pravda, December 17th, 1972).

The response of the Soviet press to the resumption of the bombing was immediate, unlike the mining of Haiphong and previous escalations, Pravda publishing a continuous stream of protest from December 15th onwards, for example, and citing world opinion and international protests to reinforce the point (Pravda, December 19th, 1972, Pravda, December 20th, 1972,
Pravda, December 23rd, 1972). On December 19th, Tass had issued a statement that included the passage,

"The peoples of the Soviet Union indignantly condemn these new acts of brigandage by the American military and demand their immediate cessation and the speediest signing of the agreement on ending the war and establishing peace in Vietnam."

(Pravda, December 20th, 1972)

In spite of the protests and hostile invective, this would appear to have been a call for the resumption of the negotiations.

On December 19th, in Paris, Xuan Thuy gave a press conference in which he refuted allegations that the difficulties in the negotiations were caused by Hanoi and placed the onus on Washington (New York Times, December 20th, 1972). His remarks, however, were considered surprisingly moderate, and there was speculation that this reflected Moscow's hopes for a settlement (New York Times, December 20th, 1972). The official reason for the resumed United States bombing of North the was to forestall the possibility of a renewed DRV offensive, but administration officials admitted that the objective was to force Hanoi into a more conciliatory stand at the Paris talks (New York Times, December 19th, 1972). It was suggested, however, as the bombing continued and the official explanation became less and less plausible, that Saigon had caused the impasse in the negotiations by insisting on sovereignty over all of the South (New York Times, December 27th, 1972). One must also consider the further possibility of lack of cohesion within the Hanoi Politbureau as a contributory factor to the breakdown of the negotiations. Given that the Soviet leadership seemed concerned to resume the search for a negotiated settlement, it may have been that they were dealing with a somewhat divided DRV leadership.

It was reported, for example, that United States intelligence
officials in Saigon, had, on December 23rd, denied knowledge of a report that Vo Nguyen Giap had been killed in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. This report, by the Saigon intelligence services, had claimed that Giap had been assassinated by rival factions or blown up by a delayed bomb blast while on an inspection tour of bomb damage in a Haiphong arms plant (New York Times, December 24th, 1972). Hanoi saw fit to issue a denial of this report. This consisted of an unscheduled news bulletin concerning a visit by Vo Nguyen Giap to missile units in the Hanoi area on 22nd December. It was further reported that no direct reference to his subsequent whereabouts or to the report of his death had been monitored from North Vietnamese radio or agency reports, but that the DRV delegation to the Paris talks was quoted by Paris radio on December 23rd as denying the report of Giap's death (SWB, December 28th, 1972, FE/4179/1). The rumoured death of Giap may, of course, have been disinformation put out by the Saigon government with a view to undermining confidence in the decision making process of the DRV. It seems unusual, however, that rumours concerning Vo Nguyen Giap should circulate at this particular time, given that it was Giap who, in the past, had figured prominently in disputes within the armed forces concerning the conduct of the war. It is also unusual that the rumour warranted denial on the part of the DRV.

The Christmas bombings coincided with the preparations in Moscow for the celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet Union, thus providing an opportunity for a gathering of many Soviet bloc leaders. Among the foreign visitors to address a joint ceremonial session of the Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet on December 21st, was Truong Chinh, who led the DRV delegation (Pravda, December 22nd, 1972). Truong Chinh, it should be noted, was considered to have been Vo Nguyen Giap's opponent in military strategy, with his advocacy of "peoples' war" (Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes, 1973a, pp.23-26), and was also reported
to have played a large role in launching the 1972 offensive (Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes, 1973a, pp. 14-18). Also present as a member of the delegation was Hoang Van Hoan, who later emerged as a vociferous opponent of Le Duan's policies with reference to too great a reliance on the Soviet Union. Whilst it is, of course, very difficult to assess factional differences within the Vietnamese leadership, this does seem rather an unusual combination of personnel to be visiting Moscow at this particular juncture, and it is odd that their departure from Hanoi should be coincident with the rumoured death of Vo Nguyen Giap.

Truong Chinh's speech to the joint session of the Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet and the Soviet of the Russian Republic, whilst eulogising the Soviet Union as a source of inspiration to the Vietnamese people, was far more uncompromising and hostile than Brezhnev's remarks to the same meeting. He makes no mention, for example, of resuming the talks, and urges the United States to stop the bombing and sign the October agreement (Pravda, December 22nd, 1972). Brezhnev, on the other hand, whilst expressing a desire to see an end to the war, goes on to say, "Therefore, we are actively rendering assistance to our Vietnamese friends in their efforts to achieve a just and peaceful solution" (Pravda, December 22nd, 1972)

Brezhnev's remarks, therefore, would seem to be a call for more dialogue between the DRV and the United States, in contrast to the less compromising views of the DRV leadership expressed by Truong Chinh.

When the celebrations ended, Truong Chinh stayed on in Moscow for a series of meetings with the Soviet leadership. On December 29th, he met with Suslov and D. F. Ustinov, the latter at that time listed as Secretary, CPSU Central Committee, and a candidate member of the Politbureau (Pravda, December 30th, 1972). It has been suggested that the
meeting with Ustinov, indicated that possible assistance to further strengthen North Vietnam's defences had been discussed (New York Times, December 30th, 1972). In retrospect, and in view of the fact that the resumption of the talks was announced the following day, the reverse seems likely, and this meeting may, in fact, have been used, by the Soviet Union, to communicate exactly the opposite view. It was rumoured, for example, that when the bombing stopped on December 30th, the DRV had only two days supply of SAM missiles left (Szulc, 1974, p.62). On the same day Kosygin met with the DRV ambassador, Vo Thuc Dong, for the second time within a week (Pravda, December 30th, 1972), a meeting, which, on past experience, indicated that there was an important announcement in the air. It is possible, therefore, that Truong Chinh, ranking second to Le Duan in the VWP hierarchy, was dispatched to Moscow to communicate the views of the Vietnamese leadership with regard to continuing resistance, and was told, in no uncertain terms, that further aid would not be forthcoming. As a result, the DRV were forced to resume the negotiations. Alternatively, he may have been dispatched to Moscow, along with Hoang Van Hoan, in order that the remaining members of the Politbureau in Hanoi could arrive at a compromise decision in their absence.

The resumption of the talks was announced on December 30th (New York Times, December 31st, 1972), and the bombing was stopped on the same day. Events moved with remarkable speed. The Paris meetings were resumed on January 8th, 1973 and the negotiations were concluded on January 13th. On January 23rd, the final document was initialled by Kissinger and Le Duc Tho in Paris, and signed by the foreign ministers of the United States, North and South Vietnam and the PRG on January 27th (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1973, 25781A).

The provisions of the Paris Agreement provided for a cease fire from January 28th, the withdrawal of United States forces and the release of
United States prisoners within sixty days, and the formation of a four-party joint military commission to enforce these provisions, the establishment of an International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS), the formation of a council to organise elections, to be called the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, and the holding of an international conference on Vietnam within thirty days of the signing of the agreement (Agreement on Ending The War...1973). The agreement also included four protocols, dealing with the cease fire, the ICCS, the return of prisoners and the destruction of mines in North Vietnamese waters (Agreement On Ending The War ...1973).

For the DRV, the settlement achieved in 1973 was a not altogether satisfactory compromise, to which circumstances had forced them to accede. Several of the provisions, for example, those dealing with the ICCS and the holding of elections, appeared to be a re-run of the settlement achieved in 1954 and must have looked, to the DRV, little more than the continued acceptance of de facto partition for the foreseeable future, and a return to the status quo ante.

There is no evidence to suggest, however, that acceptance of the settlement of 1973 was any more than a tactical move on the part of the Soviet Union, to be rectified when circumstances proved more favourable. A major factor conditioning the Soviet position was that the Soviet Union were acting within a global foreign policy, of which detente with the United States was of prime importance. It therefore made little sense to play an active role in urging the DRV to escalate the war and push ahead for an outright military victory, and thereby further antagonize the United States. The constraints imposed by the necessity of detente, therefore, meant that the Soviet Union could not share the view of the DRV leadership on the priority of reunification over all other goals. Thus, the possibility that, for the Soviet Union, detente was more important
than the outcome of the war in Vietnam led to friction between the two allies and suspicions of collusion on the part of the DRV. This period marks the lowest point of Soviet/Vietnam relations. The DRV, for their part, could not be sure how far into the future, if at all, reunification had been projected, and this uncertainty led to suspicion and hostility. Furthermore, they could not be sure that the United States, having once withdrawn, would not return at some later date.

That the United States may have used the Soviet Union to put pressure on the DRV to settle becomes a somewhat academic argument therefore. Pressure, whether overt or implied, existed by the very nature of the policy dilemma confronting the Soviet Union. The same applies to the discussion as to whether or not the Soviet Union did bend to such demands. The evidence seems to demonstrate, over and over again, that they had great difficulty in persuading the DRV to any course of action that deviated from the perceived priority of reunification. Thus a fundamental conflict of priorities underlay the friction in Soviet/Vietnam relations caused by the negotiations to achieve the settlement of 1973. That this was resolved came about as much because of a realignment of the international climate as any other factor.
Soviet policy during the period of the war had been increasingly dictated by the overall international context. Following Nixon's China visit, for example, one can no longer argue in terms of the priorities of detente over Soviet Asian policy, since both facets became linked. The containment of China involved, directly, the maintenance of detente with the United States, in order to forestall the possibility of a United States alliance with China that excluded the Soviet Union. From 1973 onwards, however, Vietnam assumed a decreasing significance in the international dimension, and, as a consequence, ceased to impinge to the same extent on Soviet-United States relations. Furthermore, the internal political crisis in the United States and the fall of Nixon, meant that the overall strategy of Nixon, of which Vietnam was a part, lost continuity. Although Kissinger continued to implement policy under the Ford administration, the vision was lost, and United States foreign policy in the area became little more than a holding action.

It has been suggested that the Soviet Union acted to fill the vacuum left in Southeast Asia by American disengagement (Schneider, 1977). This is, perhaps, an oversimplified view. Soviet behaviour in the period initially following the agreement, however, appears cautious and would seem to suggest that the expectation was an acceptance of the status quo with regard to two Vietnams for the foreseeable future. By 1974, however, this position had begun to change, until following the final victory of 1975, there gradually emerged a coincidence of Soviet and Vietnamese policy goals. This chapter explores the process by which this shift in alignment came about.

Initially, there seemed to be some uncertainty in Soviet/Vietnam
relations following the Paris Agreement. The Soviet response to the settlement had been somewhat muted. This lack of enthusiasm, and the fact that with the exception of the Kremlin reception of January 30th, 1973 (Pravda, January 31st, 1973), Brezhnev did not meet with any of the Vietnamese leadership until some months after the signing of the accords, indicated that the tension generated by the previous year's events had not yet been dissipated. This lack of contact may have been because Brezhnev rarely intervened publicly in the conduct of Soviet/Vietnam policy during the period of the war. He had received Vo Thuc Dong, DRV ambassador to the Soviet Union on April 12th, 1972 (Pravda, April 13th, 1972), and his previous meeting with Le Duan had been in May, 1971 (Pravda, May 10th, 1971). Therefore, a considerable amount of time had elapsed in any case, notwithstanding the lack of contact in the early part of 1973. It is interesting to note, however, that Brezhnev himself never visited Hanoi, in spite of rumours of a proposed visit (Financial Times, November 16th, 1973).

Certainly, from 1973 until 1975, no high level Soviet delegation visited the DRV, the movement being all in the opposite direction. This, however, may represent the fact that there were no serious policy disagreements that required immediate resolution. Previous delegations, for example, the Podgorny visit of 1972 and Katushev's visit of 1972, had been sent specifically to resolve particular issues.

During the early part of 1973, therefore, the top level contacts took place between Le Duc Tho and Nguyen Duy Trinh, with Suslov, Kirilenko and Katushev. Le Duc Tho was guest of honour at the Kremlin banquet on 30th January, 1973 (Pravda, January 31st, 1973). On January 31st, Nguyen Duy Trinh met with Suslov, Katushev and Gromyko, when Vo Thuc Dong and Dong Quong Minh, Ambassador to the Republic of South Vietnam were also present (Pravda, February 1st, 1973). Nguyen Duy Trinh then returned to Moscow
for talks with Kirilenko on March 9th (Pravda, March 10th, 1973). There
seems to have been nothing unusual about these visits, however, since all
the main negotiators at the Paris Talks visited Moscow at some time during
the first part of 1973. Le Duc Tho met with Kirilenko on May 14th
(Pravda, 15th May, 1973) and was again in Moscow in June, following a
meeting in Paris with Kissinger, when he was received by Kirilenko and
Katushev (Pravda, June 19th, 1973). Xuan Thuy visited Moscow at the
invitation of the Central Committee, and met with Suslov and Katushev on
April 11th (Pravda, April 12th, 1973), whilst Madame Binh arrived in
Moscow for an official visit of several days duration, on March 26th
(Pravda, March 26th, 1973). The central feature of 1973, however, was the
official visit to Moscow of a delegation led by Le Duan, in July.

On July 9th, 1973, Le Duan, accompanied by Pham Van Dong, arrived in
Moscow for an eight day state visit (Pravda, July 10th, 1973). The
delation also included Le Thanh Nghi, the Deputy Chairman of the State
Planning Committee, Nguyen Van Ca, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Nguyen Co Thach and the Deputy Minister of Trade, Chai Sham (Pravda, July
17th, 1973).

The delegation engaged in the usual round of talks, factory visits
and public appearances. It was reported, however (New York Times, 17th
July, 1973), that the public statements of the two leaders revealed
discrepancies in their attitudes concerning the immediate problems that
confronted Vietnam. This is borne out by the speeches delivered at a
Kremlin breakfast held in honour of the DRV delegation on July 10th
(Pravda, July 11th, 1973). Brezhnev's tone, for example, stressed peace
in general terms and included references to the situation in Vietnam in
the context of a wide ranging discussion on peace throughout the world and
peaceful coexistence (Pravda, July 11th, 1973). Le Duan, on the other
hand, was much more specific, especially in his references to the PRG,
citing, for example, their six point proposal for implementing the Paris Agreement and criticizing the United States (Pravda, July 11th, 1973). It was, in effect, the contrast in tone between the two speeches, rather than any identifiable discrepancies in content, that created the impression of disagreement.(1)

On July 16th, at the conclusion of the visit, a joint statement was issued by the two sides (Pravda, July 17th, 1973). In effect, this was a general foreign policy statement, again couched in very broad terms, with references to peaceful coexistence, and appearing more to reflect the main outlines of Soviet foreign policy. It also contained assurances of further Soviet aid and reconstruction aid to the DRV. Whatever differences of opinion may earlier have appeared between the two sides, therefore, were not apparent in the final statement, although it is likely that a compromise was reached in order to produce the final document.

The DRV delegation subsequently left for a tour of Eastern Europe. Although he had not yet returned home, Le Duan was not present at the meeting of Soviet bloc leaders that took place in the Crimea towards the end of July (Pravda, August 1st, 1973). He did, however, have a separate meeting with Brezhnev in the Crimea a few days later (Pravda, August 5th, 1973). A brief press announcement stated that the two leaders had discussed the further strengthening of relations in the light of the joint statement of July 17th. Mention was also made of the role of the other Soviet bloc countries and the recent gathering of Soviet bloc leaders (Pravda, August 5th, 1973).

It seems probable, at this juncture, that the Soviet Union were primarily interested in strengthening economic ties with the DRV, rather than financing any further large scale military activity, or supporting any DRV initiative to do so. The composition of the delegation that accompanied Le Duan on his state visit would seem to confirm this, as it
lacked any specifically military representative. The visit of Le Duan to the Crimea, a summer ritual of the Brezhnev administration for all Soviet bloc leaders, whilst not appearing significant at the time, seems to have coincided with the start of the closer integration of the DRV economy with that of the CMEA countries. It was also during this period, in June 1973, that the Soviet Union appointed A. I. Yelizavetin as ambassador to the PRG (Pravda, June 5th, 1973), suggesting support for the status quo with regard to the two Vietnams for the foreseeable future.

This view is reinforced by subsequent meetings. In August, 1973, Pham Van Dong, in Moscow en route for Hanoi, met with Kosygin (Pravda, August 14th, 1973). The importance of the former meeting of Soviet bloc countries in the Crimea was stressed in the report of this meeting. On August 14th, Pham Van Dong and Kosygin signed an agreement on cooperation and trade for the period 1974 to 1975 (Pravda, August 15th, 1973). On November 3rd, 1973, Pham Van Dong and Nguyen Duy Trinh met with Kosygin, Katushev and V. I. Novikov, a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, who was frequently present when economic matters were under consideration between Soviet and Vietnamese delegations (Pravda, November 4th, 1973). In late December, 1973, Le Due Tho met in Moscow with Ponomarov, Suslov and Katushev (Pravda, December 30th, 1973). The fact that Ponomarov, head of the International Department, and in overall charge of liaison between non-ruling communist parties and the CPSU, would indicate that the South was discussed at this meeting.

The next high level contact between Soviet and Vietnamese leaders was Pham Van Dong's meeting in Moscow with Kosygin in March, 1974. It was reported that among other issues under discussion, Pham Van Dong had reported on the decisions of the Twenty Second Plenum of the WWP (Pravda, March 21st, 1973).

As usual with the Vietnamese Party during this period, it is
extremely difficult to arrive at a direct account of what had, in fact, been decided at this plenum, and even the date on which it took place remains uncertain. It was reported in Truong Chinh's speech to the National Assembly on February 4th, 1974, that,

"Our National Assembly is holding this session at a time when the Vietnam Workers' Party is precisely 44 years old, and immediately after the Party Central Committee held its 22nd plenary session to approve the resolution on the tasks and guidelines concerning the economic restoration and development in the northern part of our country in 1974 and 1975".

(SWB, February 6th, 1974, FE/4519/B/3, Hanoi home service, February 5th, 1974)

There seems to have been no direct report of this plenum. However, it was reported that the National Assembly Standing Committee held a meeting on the 26th and 29th January, under the chairmanship of Truong Chinh (SWB, February 1st, 1974, FE/4515/B/2, Hanoi home service, January 30th, 1974). Some days later, Le Thanh Nghĩ delivered a report on the economy to the session of the National Assembly, the content of which stressed economic reconstruction in the North, and included the phrase "proceed to the peaceful reunification of our country". (SWB, February 6th, 1974, FE/4519/B/4, VNA in English, February 5th, 1974).

It would appear, therefore, that the plenum took place some time in late January, 1974, and, given the content of the speeches to the National Assembly, that the decisions of the plenum concerned economic matters and planning for reconstruction. If this be the case, it would appear that the DRV had come round to the Soviet point of view, and hence the importance of acknowledging that Moscow had been informed of the decisions of the twenty second plenum.(2). Somewhere towards the end of 1974, however, for reasons that are not entirely clear, this position changed
It seems unlikely that the immediate cause of this change in policy was generated by a qualitative change in Soviet/Vietnam relations. Nothing appeared to disturb the harmonizing of objectives that had become apparent during mid to late 1973, and, for example, Le Thanh Nghi headed the DRV delegation to the first session of the Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation in July (Pravda, July 24th, 1974). It seems more likely, therefore, that a change in policy was brought about by a change in the international context in which Soviet-Vietnam relations were conducted, rather than a serious conflict between the two partners.

Up until 1974, the Soviet attitude towards Vietnam appears to have been conditioned by the need to maintain equilibrium in Soviet-United States relations, and when this position started to deteriorate, one senses a change in Soviet behaviour. Possibly several factors contributed to this changed position. The military aid budget submitted by Nixon for the financial year July, 1974 to June, 1975, for example, was substantially reduced by Congress. It was stated at the time, by a South Vietnamese military spokesman, that to conserve fuel, only vital military flights were allowed, and restrictions put on those that were not essential (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1974, 26810). This decision, in effect, lessened the possibility of further effective United States involvement, and, therefore, the military sanction implicit in the implementation of the agreement. The demise of Nixon and the subsequent presidency of Ford produced a hiatus in the overall strategy of detente, such that the positive gains for the Soviet Union appeared to diminish. This was manifest specifically by the Jackson amendment.

The Jackson amendment, or, more correctly, the Jackson-Vanik amendment (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1975, 27197), was incorporated in a major foreign trade bill passed by the United States Congress in late
December, 1974 (New York Times, December 21st, 1974), and sought to make the "most favoured nation" status of the Soviet Union in regard to Soviet-United States trade relations, dependent on the level of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. This attempt at linkage was viewed unfavourably by Moscow. By late 1974, therefore, with the threat of American intervention in Vietnam removed, and little to be lost in terms of Soviet-United States relations, Soviet military aid to Vietnam was on the increase.

It is entirely possible that the offensive of 1975 was not expected to succeed in military terms, but, in keeping with the North Vietnamese strategy of pursuing, simultaneously, political and military goals, was intended to strengthen the position of the North in relation to the South. Van Tien Dung describes in his memoirs that it only gradually became clear that the offensive was leading into the final victory, as the southern forces collapsed in the face of the northern onslaught (Spragens, 1975). Even reliable western sources, giving a military analysis of the position after the cease-fire, suggested that while some bloodshed was inevitable, all out war was unlikely (Conflicts, 1974, pp.87-88). Nevertheless, the fact that the offensive occurred at all, regardless of whether or not it was expected to succeed, indicated that the DRV continued to pursue the same strategy, and would not submit indefinitely to the status quo established by the ceasefire. Furthermore, the evidence does not suggest that the Soviet Union master-minded this campaign, that it emanated from a Soviet initiative or that a speedy or imminent victory was envisaged. It is more likely that the Soviet Union had agreed to supply military aid to what was seen as an offensive on the lines of the 1972 action, designed to harass and weaken the southern forces.

The aid agreement signed on December 8th, 1974, therefore, is likely to have included a component of military aid, more especially as it was an
additional agreement, designed to supplement that already in force for the
current year (Pravda, December 9th, 1974). It is also likely that some
time between late December, 1974 and early January, 1975, the Twenty Third
Plenum of the WFP took place.(3)

The offensive was launched on March 1st, and quickly turned into a
rout of the South Vietnamese forces. By April, the North Vietnamese army
had encircled Saigon and the remaining United States personnel had
belatedly begun a hasty withdrawal. Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese
forces on April 30th (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1975, 27197).**(4)

The Soviet press response, in the weeks leading up to the fall of
Saigon, was extremely restrained, consisting of, for example, sporadic
reports on the progress of the fighting on the inside pages of Pravda. On
March 6th, however, it had been reported that Firyubin had visited Hanoi
(New York Times, March 6th, 1975). There was, apparently, no mention of
this visit in the Soviet press, neither was it reported by Vietnamese
sources. However, Pathet Lao radio announced that on 5th March, Firyubin
had arrived in Vientiane on a friendly visit to Laos (SWB, March 8th,
1975, FE/4849/A2/2, Pathet Lao radio, March 6th, 1975). The fact that
Firyubin's visit was not given wide coverage suggests that it may also
have provided the opportunity for some contact between the Soviet and
Vietnamese sides.

Soviet reporting of the final victory was also remarkably subdued,
and, far from being incorporated in the May Day festivities, appears to
have been overwhelmed by them. A report of the fall of Saigon appeared
with the international news on an inside page (Pravda, May 1st, 1975). On
May 2nd, however, a congratulatory telegram addressed to the PRG appeared
on the front page of Pravda, signed by Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin
(Pravda, May 2nd, 1975). This response is hard to explain, if, as has
been suggested, Soviet/Vietnam relations were no longer constrained by the
A further difficulty in assessing the Soviet role in the final offensive is the controversy surrounding the possibility of the Soviet role in a negotiated solution. Porter argues vehemently that the United States missed the chance for a negotiated peace in 1975 (Porter, 1975, p.275). This, it is claimed, stemmed from a proposal put forward by Hanoi in April, 1975, and conveyed to the United States by the Soviet Union. Snepp, on the other hand, argues that the initial proposal was put forward by Jacques Chirac, to Tran Van Don, the South Vietnamese Defence Minister designate, suggesting that Saigon should surrender to Hanoi, and that the great powers were in agreement over this and that the French should mediate (Snepp, 1980, p.249). The French efforts, and the Soviet view supporting this, published in Pravda, on April 5th, he goes on to say, were reinforced by views disseminated by the Polish and Hungarian delegations to the ICCS (Snepp, 1980, p.254). At no time, however, he claims, were these rumours ever confirmed by Hanoi, and, therefore, either the Soviet Union were deliberately deceiving the west or were, in their turn, being deceived by Hanoi. The Pravda report that Snepp refers to, was, in fact, a verbatim publication of the ten point programme of the PRG, together with a back-up article by Yuri Zhukov (Pravda, April 5th, 1975). Interestingly, however, the date of publication does coincide with Firyubin's reported visit to Hanoi. It is possible, therefore, that some sort of proposal was conveyed by Hanoi to Moscow, and emerged via this channel.

The real course of events is too convoluted to unravel with any degree of certainty. Snepp claims, for example, that Malcolm Browne, reporter on the New York Times, was being fed information by the head of the Saigon CIA station, an emigre Hungarian by origin, who in turn was being duped by the Hungarian ICCS delegation. If this were the case, it
would undermine Porter's argument. Porter himself cites the New York Times as his source for claiming that the PRG offered to negotiate on April 1st and April 2nd (Porter, 1975, p.274), and then goes on to say that according to United States sources, on April 19th an ultimatum was passed to the United States via the Hungarian and Polish ICCS delegations, demanding that Thieu resign within forty eight hours and that a new government be formed, with which the PRG could negotiate a political settlement (Porter, 1975, p.276).

It may be that the entire controversy is based upon rumour generated by the chaotic conditions pertaining in Saigon during April, 1975, given the bitterness generated by the mode of the United States withdrawal and the recriminations this was to cause within the United States administration for many years to come. On the other hand it is possible that the Soviet Union, though willing to provide the means for military action, were reluctant to become too heavily implicated in an outright DRV victory, and attempted to negotiate a more orderly United States retreat. Caution on the part of the Soviet Union and fear of upsetting further the deteriorating climate of detente, therefore, could account for the subdued reporting of events. One should also bear in mind, however, the speed with which the final victory was brought about, and the impossibility of negotiating anything in circumstances that were changing rapidly from day to day. It is unlikely that Moscow had the ability to influence the course of events. Whilst the offensive took place with Soviet acquiescence, therefore, it is possible that they were surprised and embarrassed when it succeeded, and unprepared for an immediate response.

On October 27th, 1975, Le Duan arrived in Moscow for an official visit (Pravda, October 28th, 1975). The delegation accompanying him included Le Thanh Nghi, Chairman, State Planning Commision, Nguyen Co Thach, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nguyen Van Kha, Deputy Head,
Planning-Economic Department, Le Khak, Deputy Chairman, Gosplan, DRV, and Nguyen Van Dao, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade (Pravda, October 28th, 1975).

Whilst the tone of the Soviet and Vietnamese leaders' statements was not in such marked contrast as had been the case in 1973, there were, nevertheless, suggestions of disagreement in two particular areas, that of reunification and that of Cambodia. In a speech at a Kremlin breakfast on October 28th, for example, Brezhnev claimed, referring to the situation that now pertained in Vietnam, that,

"The Vietnam Workers' Party has set a high goal for the people - creating a unified, democratic and prosperous Vietnam, a country that has a developed industry and agriculture and is built on socialist principles."

(Pravda, October 29th, 1975)

Thus, for Brezhnev, reunification was a goal, rather than an event that had already been achieved. Le Duan, on the other hand, in his reply, claimed that,

"As a result of their complete victory in the struggle of resistance against American aggression and for national salvation, the Vietnamese people, 45,000,000 strong, have entered a new epoch - an epoch in which the entire country, having become fully independent and unified, is taking the path to socialism."

(Pravda, October 29th, 1975)

Le Duan creates the impression, therefore, that the military victory itself had achieved reunification.

The joint declaration, issued following the visit, however, appeared to have arrived at a compromise, and claimed merely that,

"This victory has opened a new era - an era of the construction
of a peaceful, independent, united, socialist Vietnam."

(Pravda, October 31st, 1975)

Era, presumably, was a sufficiently elastic designation to blur the distinction between what had come to pass and what remained to be done.

The theme of reunification was prefigured during a speech by Solomentsev, Chairman, RSFSR Council of Ministers, who had led a delegation on an official visit to the DRV in August, 1975. During a congratulatory speech on the opening of the Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum, he had referred to the tasks that confronted Vietnam as,

"The full liberation of your country and the Cambodian people. The completion of the formation of the organs of peoples' power in Laos."

(Pravda, August 30th, 1975) (5)

Given the short space of time that had elapsed since the DRV victory, it is perhaps not surprising that these tasks were expressed in terms of incompleted action. Two points, however, emerge from this statement. Firstly, that the process of liberation was incomplete, and, secondly, that this situation also applied to Cambodia. It would seem to hint that something, with regard to the southern part of Vietnam and Cambodia, had not yet been resolved and would possibly require further military action. This implication, it is noted, is lacking in the reference to Laos.

Bearing this in mind, it is also interesting to note the slight discrepancies that had begun to emerge in the Soviet and Vietnamese attitude towards Cambodia at the time of Le Duan's visit to Moscow. At the same speech at the Kremlin breakfast, for example, Le Duan made no mention of either Cambodia or Laos, but referred only in passing, in the course of discussing the aid provided by the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc, to,

"The unshakable militant solidarity of the people of Indochina."
In contrast, Brezhnev's remarks appear expansive, when he claimed,

"We believe that the cessation of foreign interference in the affairs of the peoples of Indochina, the victory of Vietnam and the victories of the patriots of Laos and Cambodia, which we warmly welcome, will help to improve the political atmosphere and to create the foundations of lasting peace on the entire Asian continent, something to which the Soviet Union attaches considerable importance."

Again, the joint declaration appeared to have produced a compromise, with the statement that,

"The Soviet and Vietnamese sides declare their solidarity with the Cambodian people, who have won a remarkable victory in their struggle against the imperialists and the forces of domestic reaction and have begun the construction of a new life in their country - the creation of an independent, peaceful, democratic and prosperous Cambodia."

The status of Cambodia, and the pace and method of full reunification were linked in the sense that both had implications for the future role of Vietnam in Southeast Asia. This in turn was the fundamental issue underlying Soviet/Vietnam relations from 1975 onwards. Once more, the problem of the allocation of resources was to reemerge, that is, whether to concentrate resources on consolidating economic and political power in the North, or to slow the pace of growth whilst extending the organization of the northern state to the South. As will be seen from Chapter Six, the Soviet Union favoured consolidating the existing situation. This was reflected in the composition of the delegation that accompanied Le Duan on
his official visit in 1975, and the statements that emerged. The SRV, however, appeared anxious to assert their control over the South as quickly as possible, and to retain what they viewed as their legitimate influence over both Laos and Cambodia.

Eberhard Schneider has argued that from 1975 there was a coincidence of Soviet and Vietnamese policy goals, and that the Vietnamese desire to build a power base in Southeast Asia was compatible with Soviet policy towards the region (Schneider, 1977). Certainly, there had been a drastic realignment of policy goals from the all time low of the summer of 1972, since the main cause of friction had been removed with the fall of Saigon. It may be, however, that in the immediate aftermath of the military victory, the Soviet Union were more restrained and cautious than the Vietnamese, and, in several instances, were forced to respond to Vietnamese initiatives. It is not clear, for example, the extent to which the Soviet Union initially supported and encouraged further Vietnamese military activity in Cambodia.

There had, prior to the Khmer Rouge victory of 1975, been discrepancies in the Soviet and Vietnamese attitudes towards Cambodia. Following the coup in March, 1970, for example, the Soviet Union had withdrawn their support from Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the former head of state. Sihanouk had then sought refuge in Peking, where he proclaimed the formation of a Government of National Union, many of whose members, such as Khieu Samphan, were later to emerge as prominent in the government of Democratic Cambodia (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969/1970, 24027). Although Sihanouk had apparently aligned himself with the left and the forces of national liberation, as opposed to the right, albeit republican regime of General Lon Nol, the choice for the Soviet Union was not so clear cut and represented something of a conflict of interests, since continued support for Sihanouk had the effect of putting the war for
national liberation in Cambodia in the hands of the Chinese.

In mid 1970, therefore, it was reported that Soviet diplomats had indicated to the United States that the North Vietnamese were now heavily over-extended in their attempt to conduct the war in both Laos and Cambodia, as well as Vietnam, and to have argued in Hanoi that it would be better to seek a negotiated solution with the United States than to enter into long term involvement with the Chinese (Sunday Times, June 7th, 1970). In Soviet terms, one consequence of escalating the war in this way was to force the DRV into too great a reliance on the Chinese to the detriment of the Soviet position. Whilst the Soviet Union, therefore, continued to maintain links with the Lon Nol regime, the DRV supported the government in exile in Peking. In early 1972, following Sihanouk's visit to Hanoi, the DRV issued a statement that claimed,

"Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, Head of State, is the respository of the legality, the legitimacy and the continuity of the Cambodian State. The Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia with Samdech Penn Nouth as Prime Minister and Mr. Khieu Samphan as Vice-Premier is the only and authentic legal and legitimate Government of Cambodia."

(SWB, March 7th, 1972, FE/3933/A3/4, VNA in English, March 5th, 1972, NCNA in English, Peking home service, March 6th, 1972)

It may be that this statement, issued in 1972, was intended as a deliberate provocation to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union continued to maintain a diplomatic presence in Phnom Penh. By the end of the war, therefore, for all practical purposes, the Soviet Union and the DRV would appear to have been supporting opposing sides. With the Khmer Rouge victory of 1975, and the fall of Phnom Penh on April 17th, 1975 (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1975, 27153/4,) and, as the new Cambodian regime consolidated its hold, they appeared to exchange
On January 5th, 1975, the Cambodian government adopted a new constitution, under the provisions of which the official name of the country became "Democratic Cambodia". Following elections to a Peoples' Representative Assembly on March 30th, 1975, Sihanouk resigned as head of state, along with the former government of Penn Nouth, and Khieu Samphan was elected president of a government headed by Pol Pot (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1975, 27757). By late 1976, therefore, one starts to find references in Soviet statements, to Democratic Cambodia.

The Cambodian party did not send a delegation to the Fourth Party Congress of the VLD. However, Suslov, who headed the Soviet delegation, made reference to Cambodia in his speech to the Congress, when he claimed, "We also welcome the birth of Democratic Cambodia and wish it success in the cause of peaceful construction and social transformation."

(SWB, December 17th, 1976, FE/5392/C/13, VNA in English, December 15th, 1976)

This echoed Brezhnev's speech to the October plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, when he had made reference to the fact that, "The way is cleared for the independent development of Democratic Cambodia"

(Pravda, October 26th, 1976)

It contrasts, however, with Le Duan's remarks to the Congress concerning Cambodia, which appear somewhat ill-defined in comparison. He refers on several occasions, for example, to the peoples of Laos and Cambodia, and, in the foreign policy section of his speech, appears not to differentiate between the two. Thus, 

"To endeavour to preserve and develop the special relation between the Vietnamese people and the peoples of Laos and
Cambodia, strengthen the militant solidarity, mutual trust, long-term co-operation and mutual assistance in all fields between our country and fraternal Laos and Cambodia in accordance with the principle of complete equality, respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and respect for each other's legitimate interests, so that the three countries which have been associated with one another in the struggle for national liberation will be for ever associated with one another in the building and defence of their respective countries, for the sake of each country's independence and prosperity."

(SWB, December 21st, 1976, FE/5395/C/19, VNA in English, December 16th, 1976, Hanoi home service, December 14th, 1976)

This lack of differentiation itself conflicted with the Soviet point of view. The Soviet Union had never recognised the Cambodian party as a communist party, seeing it, rather, as a national liberation movement in the same category as the NLF. This had also been true of the Laotian party until 1976. At the Twenty Fifth congress of the CPSU, however, the Peoples' Revolutionary Party of Laos appeared to "move up one", so to speak, and was from then on included along with other non-ruling parties such as the PCF and the CPGB (Pravda, March 25th, 1975). In effect, this accorded Laos status as a member of the Soviet bloc. It would seem, therefore, that the Soviet Union was prepared to differentiate between Democratic Cambodia and the status of Laos. This contrasts with the view emanating from the Vietnamese side, with its suggestion of an Indochina dimension.

Relations between the SRV and the Pol Pot regime had never been good. It subsequently emerged that there had been continual skirmishing on the Vietnamese-Cambodian border since 1975. The break in relations, however,
can be dated from December 31st, 1977, when Democratic Cambodia severed diplomatic relations with the SRV and expelled all diplomats and embassy personnel from Phnom Penh (SWB, January 3rd, 1978, FE/5703/A3/1, Phnom Penh home service, December 31st, 1977).

A statement by the Cambodian government prior to this set forth the reasons for the decision. This consisted of a detailed list of allegations of encroachment on Cambodian territory by the SRV, citing incidents ranging from border skirmishes to a large scale attack in September, 1977, with several divisions of infantry, with tanks and artillery with air support (SWB, January 3rd, 1978, FE/5703/A3/2, Phnom Penh home service, December 30th, 1977). The statement went on to say,

"But the fundamental cause is that the SRV has for a long time harboured a strategic desire to make Cambodia a member of the Vietnam-dominated Indochinese federation."


The SRV denied any expansionist goals, claiming that their actions were a defensive measure, and replied with counter allegations of border encroachment by Cambodia from as early as May, 1975. It was also alleged that from April, 1977, Cambodia had fielded a force of many divisions against the SRV. (SWB, January 3rd, 1978, FE/5703/A3/8, VNA in English, December 31st, 1977). The SRV statement concluded with a call for a negotiated solution to the problem (SWB, January 3rd, 1978, FE/5703/A3/10, VNA in English, December 31st, 1977).

This was the nature of the polemic that occupied the two sides throughout the course of 1978, and came, increasingly, to involve both the Soviet Union and China. The Cambodian government statement of 30th December, 1977, had referred to some "foreign nationals" who had acted as advisers, experts and commanders in artillery regiments and tank
squadrons, which they had given to the Vietnamese forces (SWB, January 3rd, 1976, FE/5703/A3/5, Phnom Penh home service, December 30th, 1977). This can only have been a reference to the Soviet Union. A further broadcast by Phnom Penh radio some days later calling for third world unity against limited sovereignty, claimed,

"In spite of this, the imperialists and the expansionist great powers of all stripes, which have suffered successive setbacks in Asia, Africa and Latin America, have obstinately continued to carry out multiple pernicious designs in various parts of the world in an attempt to obstruct and neutralize the impetus of the people's just struggle movement. They have conspired with each other in aggressively and insolently implementing in various parts of the world their most reactionary theories, which they call the theory of "inter-dependence" and the theory of "limited sovereignty". The actual, concrete aim of these detestable theories is to enable them to commit savage expansionist aggression against small countries and make small countries the satellites of the great powers, the large countries. It is within the framework of the implementation of this theory that the annexationist Vietnamese have conducted successive heinous activities for years in order to coerce Cambodia into joining a Vietnam-controlled Indochina federation and to swallow Cambodia up within a specific period of time."


The theory of limited sovereignty was a clear reference to Eastern Europe, specifically the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the Brezhnev Doctrine which provided its theoretical justification. The
intended parallel of the Czechoslovak situation with the satellite status of Cambodia vis à vis Vietnam was a recurring theme of such broadcasts.

By late July, the Chinese were openly attacking Vietnamese action in Cambodia as Soviet inspired, and, for example, an article in the journal "Red Flag", by the Chinese Minister of National Defence, alleged, among other things, that the Soviet Union had encouraged the SRV to pursue regional hegemonism in Southeast Asia (SWB, August 3rd, 1978, FE/5881/C1, NCNA in Chinese, July 30th, 1978). Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and other Soviet bloc countries continued to pledge support for Vietnam (SWB, August 26th, 1978, FE/5901/1). Once more, therefore, a complex inter-relationship of loyalties was beginning to emerge, this time with Vietnam at the centre, rather than at the periphery of the dispute.

It is possible, however that prior to the breakdown in diplomatic relations with Cambodia, the SRV had requested Soviet support for a military solution to the problem. It is interesting to note, for example, that two high level Vietnamese delegations had visited Moscow in 1977, coinciding with the period in which relations with Cambodia had badly deteriorated. In March, 1977, Vo Nguyen Giap had led a military delegation on an official visit to the Soviet Union from March 10th to March 20th, at the invitation of Defence Minister Dimitri Ustinov (Pravda, March 22nd, 1977). The delegation had included Lt. Gen. Le Trong Tan of the Vietnam Peoples' Armed Forces and Lt. Gen. Le Quang Hoa, Deputy Director of the General Political Department, Vietnam Peoples' Armed Forces (SWB, March 9th, 1977, FE/5458/A2/1, VNA in English, March 8th, 1977). Giap's trip had also included a visit to the GDR, Hungary and Poland (SWB, May 9th, 1977, FE/5507/A3/1, VNA in English, May 7th, 1977), but he had returned to Moscow in May for talks with Brezhnev (Pravda, May 4th, 1977). Ustinov had also taken part in these talks.

A communique issued in Hanoi on 29th July, 1977, stated that a
delegation of the National Assembly, led by Truong Chinh, was shortly to pay an official friendship visit to the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Mongolia. The delegation was to include Pham Van Dong (SWB, August 1st, 1977, FE/5577/A2/1, VNA in English, July 29th, 1977). On August 11th, whilst in Moscow, Truong Chinh had met with Kirilenko (Pravda, August 12th, 1977).

Nothing in the communiques issued following either of these visits indicated that the problems of Vietnam with regard to Cambodia had been under discussion. Nevertheless, this does not preclude the possibility that the SRV sought the backing and military assistance of the Soviet Union at this time, given that this was the period during which the difficulties with Cambodia had come to a head. If this were the case, they seem to have been unlucky.

It can also not have been coincidental that on 29th January, 1978, a Soviet military delegation, led by General I. G. Pavlovskiy, Deputy Defence Minister and Commander in Chief of Soviet ground forces had arrived in Vientiane for an official friendly visit (SWB, January 31st, 1978, FE/5727/i). It was further reported that General Pavlovskiy had visited Paksee and Champassak - both in southern Laos (SWB, February 4th, 1978, FE/5731/i).

Soviet concern at the deterioriating political and military situation was further demonstrated by the arrival in Hanoi on 16th February, 1978, of a Soviet delegation led by Grigori Romanov, First Secretary, Leningrad Oblast Party Committee. It was reported, with regard to Cambodia, that the Soviet party and government support for the SRV government statements of 31st January and 5th February was reaffirmed (SWB, February 18th, 1978, FE/5743/A2/1, VNA in English, February 16th, 1978). It was also reported that the Soviet Union welcomed the constructive steps taken by the SRV to settle its relations with Cambodia via negotiations (SWB, February 18th,
Whether the die was cast for Cambodia at this point is difficult to assess. There were continued calls from the SRV for a negotiated solution and this was backed up by Soviet statements. One should bear in mind, however, the Vietnamese war time strategy of "fighting whilst negotiating", pursued throughout the course of the Paris Peace Talks, and culminating in an offensive at exactly the point at which the talks appeared to be approaching a negotiated solution. Thus, for the Vietnamese, negotiations did not preclude the possibility of military activity. On the other hand, this may not have been the Soviet point of view.

Interestingly, in this connection, two separate Romanian delegations visited Vietnam in the first half of the year. In late February, a Romanian Assembly delegation, led by Nicolae Giosan, arrived in Hanoi. In a speech at a banquet on 27th February, Giosan expressed regret at the conflict between the SRV and Cambodia, and said Romania favoured a negotiated political settlement (SWB, March 3rd, 1978, FE/5754/A2/1, VNA in English, February 28th, 1978). Later, at the end of May, President Ceausescu, on a far eastern tour that had included North Korea and China, arrived in Vietnam (SWB, May 25th, 1978, FE/5822/A/5, VNA in English, May 23rd, 1978). Ceausescu and Le Duan held talks on the 24th May (SWB, May 26th, 1978, FE/5823/A2/1, Agerpřés in English, May 24th, 1978). Also on the 24th May, the CPV Central Committee and the Hanoi Peoples' Committee, held a meeting to welcome the delegation (SWB, May 27th, 1978, FE/5824/A2/1, VNA in English, May 25th, 1978). In his speech, Ceausescu spoke of Romanian support for Vietnam during the war against the United States. After reviewing Romania's foreign policy he went on to express his "deep sorrow" at what Le Duan had told him about relations between Vietnam and Cambodia. He expressed the hope that the problems which had
arisen would be solved by direct negotiations and that solidarity and friendship would be re-established between the two countries (SWB, May 27th, 1978, FE/5824/A2/1, Agerprès in English, May 25th, 1978). A joint Romanian-Vietnamese statement, issued in the course of the visit, claimed, "The two sides hold that the problems of Vietnam-Kampuchea relations must be settled through peaceful negotiations on the basis of respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit" (SWB, May 31st, 1978, FE/5826/A2/1, VNA in English, May 26th, 1978)


What is unusual about this particular visit, is that in both the speeches and statements issued, neither side referred directly to Vietnam. Pol Pot, for example, in his speech at a banquet held on 28th May, refers to the fact that Cambodia is united in trying to combat acts of invasion and aggression (SWB, May 31st, 1978, FE/5826/A2/6, Phnom Penh home service, May 29th, 1978). Ceausescu, in reply, stated that, "We are worried about recent conflicts and tensions in various parts of the world which have brought some peoples to armed conflict, endangering general security. The long imperialist
and colonialist domination brought various problems and has left unsolved a series of issues of dispute among states. Nevertheless, the course of peace and progress requires that all such problems be solved not by strength, but by direct negotiations in the spirit of mutual understanding."


These indirect references to Vietnam-Cambodia relations stand in contrast to the clear statements made by Ceausescu in Hanoi, and may represent a compromise, acceptable in the context of the visit, both to the Cambodians and their Romanian guests. The significance of the visit, however, lies in the possible negotiating role played by Ceausescu. It will be recalled that Romania had, in the past, acted as an intermediary in resolving disputes within the Soviet bloc, and had, on occasions, even acted as a channel of communication for the United States. Such a role, therefore, would have been nothing new. Whilst the extent to which this may have been a Romanian initiative is not clear, there are precedents for suggesting that the Soviet Union used this channel to urge restraint on the Vietnamese, and to intercede for a genuine negotiated solution. If this were the case, the statements emanating from Phnom Penh would indicate that the initiative failed, since there was no change of line on the part of Pol Pot.

Border clashes and allegations of encroachment by both sides, therefore, continued. In late May, 1978, the Hoa people, Vietnamese residents of Chinese origin, had become an issue between China and Vietnam. This led to deteriorating relations between the two states and increasingly frequent border incidents (SWB, May 31st, 1978, FE/5826/A3/1,2, NCNA in English, May 29th, 1978, SWB, May 31st, 1978, FE/5826/A3/2,3, NCNA in Chinese, May 29th, 1978), which continued
throughout June. (9)

It is unlikely that the Soviet Union wished to be involved in an armed confrontation with China. Since the serious border clashes of 1969, the argument had taken the form of ideological debate and competition for influence. The rhetoric masked the fact that there had been agreement in areas of practical benefit to both sides. One must bear this broader strategy in mind, therefore, when assessing the relative weight of Soviet and Vietnamese objectives. In the conventions that governed the war of words, however, Cambodia had come to be synonymous with China, in the same way that Yugoslavia had been the butt of displacement attacks by both sides during the fifties. It may be that the direct entry of China into the arena, therefore, proved the turning point that precipitated the decision to take more drastic action.

Soviet publications during this period, however, continued to refer to Democratic Cambodia. The Soviet Union had consistently published on Cambodia, though many articles were of a scholarly and erudite nature (Shuiskii, 1972, Dement'ev, 1975b, Spektorov, 1975, Spektorov, 1976). However, an article published in 1977 on the theme of solidarity between the people of Vietnam and Africa found it necessary to emphasise the distinction between Cambodia and Democratic Cambodia, when it was claimed, "In 1976, Vietnam at last became one country, and the year before, the people of Laos and Cambodia (Democratic Cambodia) had achieved victory."

(Tarelin, 1977, p.126)

This curious use of parenthesis can hardly be intended as clarification for an uninformed readership, given that it was published in Narodi Azii i Afriki. It possibly, therefore, indicates a somewhat equivocal attitude beginning to emerge. This view is reinforced by a work prepared for publication in late 1978 (Mezhdunarodnõe otnosheniya..., 1979), shortly
before the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. The authors give a brief history of Cambodia from 1954 onwards. Referring to conditions within Democratic Cambodia itself, however, the reporting becomes indirect, as for example, in the final paragraph, which quotes from an article in Quan Doi Nhan Dan, the organ of the Vietnam Peoples' Army, in order to convey the course of internal developments in Cambodia since 1975 (Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya...1979, p.184). This indirect reporting is frequently a sign of uncertainty on the part of the Soviet Union and indicates that a firm decision has not yet been arrived at. The line adopted, however, coincides with the subsequent Vietnamese version of events, which dates the dispute with Cambodia from 1977 (Dossier Kampuchea II, 1978, p.109, The Vietnam-Kampuchea Conflict, 1979, p.21), and suggests that prior to this, analysis of Cambodia in terms of national liberation, and so forth, presented no problem.

A survey of the official slogans published bi-annually in the Soviet press, for May Day and the anniversary of the October Revolution, confirms this point of view. Reference to Cambodia was dropped from the slogans published for the anniversary of the October Revolution in 1976 (Pravda, October 16th, 1976). Prior to this, Cambodia had figured in a composite slogan, referring to the people of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (Pravda, April 15th, 1976, Pravda, October 11th, 1975). Separate slogans then appeared for Vietnam and Laos for the next two years (Pravda, October 16th, 1976, Pravda, April 17th, 1977, Pravda, October 16th, 1977, Pravda, October 14th, 1978). The exception to this pattern were the slogans for May Day, 1978, which contained no reference at all to Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia (Pravda, April 16th, 1978). By May Day, 1979, however, a new pattern had emerged, with separate slogans for all three countries, slogan fifty one, for Cambodia, stating,

"Fraternal greetings to the Kampuchean people, who have embarked
on the path of democratic transformations!
May the People's Republic of Kampuchea grow stronger and
develop!"
(Pravda, April 14th, 1979)
The dropping of Cambodia from the May Day and October slogans coincided
with the difficulties with the Pol Pot regime and uncertainty over the
direction Cambodia was taking. Perhaps more interesting, however, was the
absence of any reference to Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia in the May Day
slogans of 1978. This is hardly coincidental, given the troubled
background to the period. Neither can it be coincidental that reference
to Cambodia re-emerged in the May Day slogans of 1979, following the
defeat of Pol Pot and the establishment of the Heng Samrin government.

Le Duan's official visit to Moscow in November, 1978, was dominated
by the announcement of the signing of the Soviet/Vietnam Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation on 3rd November (Pravda, November 4th, 1978).
This will be discussed more fully in the subsequent chapter. Referring to
this treaty at a Kremlin dinner in honour of the SRV delegation, however,
Brezhnev found it necessary to state that,

"The Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty has been concluded between two
egal, independent and peace loving states. There is not a
single line in it that dictates someone else's will to anyone at
all, or that effects the interests of any third country."
(Pravda, November 4th, 1978).
The tone of both speeches was defensive in regard to the treaty, although
Le Duan was probably more warlike in asserting the rights of the SRV to
defend its territorial integrity (Pravda, November 4th, 1978). The
implications for Cambodia, however, became clear, when, shortly following
the ratification of the treaty at a meeting of the National Assembly
Standing committee in late November, (SWB, December 2nd, 1978,
FE/5984/C/1, Hanoi home service, November 30th), the formation of the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation was announced (SWB, December 5th, 1978, FE/5986/A3/1-8, Cambodian National United Front News Agency (SPK) in French, December 3rd, 1978).

Hanoi radio reported on the same day that a conference had recently been held in a "liberated zone" of Cambodia to set up a Cambodian United Front for National Salvation (SWB, December 4th, 1978, FE/5985/1). This conference had elected a fourteen member central committee with Heng Samrin, a former member of the Eastern Region's party organisation and political commissar and commander of the Fourth Division, as president. The front had decided to set up a news agency "Saporamean Kampuchea" and a radio station, "The Voice of the Kampuchean People". The report went on to say that the conference,

"Unanimously adopted the front's 11-point statement on the tasks and goals of the Kampuchean revolution and called on the entire Kampuchean people to rise up to struggle for the overthrow of the nepotist Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique and to build a peaceful, independent, democratic, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea in an advance to socialism."

(SWB, December 4th, 1978, FE/5985/1)

News of the formation of the front was greeted favourably by the Soviet Union (Pravda, December 10th, 1978), and a series of articles commenting on the importance of the programme of UFNSK began to appear (Izvestia, December 10th, 1978, Pravda, December 19th, 1978). An article by Shchedrov suggesting that the machinations of Peking lay behind the Pol Pot regime appeared later in the month (Pravda, December, 31st, 1978).

The first response of Democratic Cambodia was a letter sent by Khieu Samphan to heads of state and governments, appealing for support against Vietnam. It was claimed by Democratic Cambodia that,
"As your government has been fully aware of, Vietnam has for a long time fostered the ambition aiming at forcing Kampuchea to join the "Indochina federation" under the domination of Vietnam in order to swallow Kampuchea in a definite period of time. At the same time, Vietnam wants to take Kampuchea as a spring board in order to sate its regional ambition in South-East Asia. This Vietnamese regional ambition squares with the world expansionist ambition of the Soviet Union. That is why the Vietnamese acts of aggression do not affect only Kampuchea, but they also directly threaten the security, peace and stability of South-East Asia, in Asia and in the world. These threats have worsened since the signing of the "friendship and co-operation treaty" between Vietnam and the Soviet Union. This treaty has placed Vietnam entirely in the Soviet Union's bloc, and it has also conferred on Vietnam the status of the Soviet outpost and pawn in South-East Asia serving the ambition and policy of this big power in the region and in the whole Asia. With this status, Vietnam has become more arrogant and has further intensified its acts of aggression and annexation against independent, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea."


It has been thought relevant to quote this passage in full because it illustrates what was to become received opinion on Soviet/Vietnam relations. Typically, however, this analysis is simplistic, in that it confuses two issues, and assumes them to be the same, that is, the aspirations of Vietnam with regard to Cambodia on the one hand, and the aspirations of the Soviet Union with regard to Cambodia on the other.
Whilst it seems clear that the Vietnamese desired to extend their influence throughout the countries of what had formerly been Indochina, it is not clear that, initially, the Soviet Union actively encouraged and supported this objective. If so, it may be that the relationship was once more reversed, the Soviet Union obliged to follow where the SRV led.

It would seem, therefore, that from 1975, there continued to be discrepancies between the Soviet Union and Vietnam on the issue of Cambodia. The rift was more apparent from the Vietnamese side. Initial Vietnamese support for the Sihanouk led faction dramatically waned, leading to an overt break with the Pol Pot regime. The Soviet Union appeared slower to concede the problem and did so in such a way as to remain equivocal, that is to say, dealing with Cambodia in an indirect way, or failing to mention it at all. Whether this amounts to a difference of opinion between the two sides or lack of desire on the part of the Soviet Union to be associated with further action in Cambodia, whilst giving tacit acceptance to a Vietnamese initiative is not certain (10). By this time, however, any uncertainty there may have been with regard to the pace and method by which reunification was to proceed had been resolved, and this left the way open for dealing with the outstanding problem of Cambodia, which, for the SRV, by 1977 had substantially worsened. By 1978, therefore, objectives in this regard had apparently harmonized.

Also of relevance in connection with the overall harmonizing of policy goals was the position the SRV was to adopt in relation to the ASEAN states. The situation with regard to ASEAN, however, is much clearer to understand. As has been suggested, the Soviet Union wished to maintain friendly relations with the non-communist states of Asia. The Vietnamese, on the other hand, were hostile to the concept of ASEAN, and to specific member states, such as Thailand, who had had a large role to
play in the war against the United States. In June, 1975, however, Nhan Dan published an article suggesting that the defeat of the United States had opened up a new prospect for Southeast Asia, and concluded with the statement that,

"South-East Asia belongs to the South-East Asians; the imperialists must stop interfering in the region. With their natural riches and with friendly co-operation among themselves, the nations in this region will surely succeed in building a plentiful and happy life."

(SWB, June 13th, 1975, FEE/4926/A3/5, VNA in English, June 12th, 1975)

In keeping with this more conciliatory tone, the Vietnamese then embarked on a series of visits to ASEAN countries. The new Vietnamese attitude was backed up by the Soviet Union, and, for example, an article published in 1976 attempted to argue that the emergence of the SRV did not threaten the ASEAN states (Grevenshchikov, 1976).

All of these measures had the effect of paving the way for the SRV to play a strong and active role in Southeast Asia. Whilst this may have coincided with ultimate Soviet objectives, it seems likely that to a large extent, the pace was forced by the SRV themselves, and that the Soviet Union would, initially, have been prepared to hold back and let developments take a slower course. If this were the case, it may be that there was a certain element of bargaining in the process and the possibility that, for example, the Soviet Union had been obliged to give in to Vietnamese demands over Cambodia raises the question of what might have been received in return. The following chapter goes on to examine more closely the economic realities, in terms of aid and military aid, that lay behind the events under discussion, before attempting to answer this question.
CHAPTER SIX
AID AND TRADE

It could be argued that the economic reconstruction of Vietnam was a process that commenced with the foundation of the state and was itself part of the debate concerning whether resources should be allocated to continuing military action in the South or strengthening the economy of the DRV. In the event, both courses were pursued simultaneously. For this reason, it is difficult to draw a clear dividing line between military and economic aid, unlike the distinction that can be made between aid and conventional trade. The extent to which guns are of any use without butter is debatable. Military aid, therefore, was always backed up by economic assistance, and this was reflected in the type of agreements signed by the Soviet Union and the DRV during the period of the war. Thus, the report of an agreement signed on 15th October, 1969, stated,

"In connection with the agreement the Soviet Union will supply to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam considerable quantities of food products, petroleum products, transport equipment, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, cotton and fabrics, medicines and medical equipment, chemical fertilizers, arms, ammunition and other supplies and materials, necessary for the strengthening of the defence capacity of the DRV and the restoration and development of its economy."

(Pravda, October 16th, 1969)

The term aid, therefore, indicated a combination of military and economic assistance. It should also be mentioned that during the period of the war, conventional trade, for the DRV, was negligible, and aid, from both the Soviet Union and China, constituted the mainstay of the DRV economy.

Whilst it may be difficult to separate strictly the economic and
military components of aid, it is helpful to divide the discussion into two main periods. Firstly, aid during the period of the war, and secondly, economic aid and reconstruction. This in turn provides the background to the events of 1978, that is, the SRV membership of the CMEA and the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. This chapter, however, is primarily concerned with the political issues generated by Soviet aid and trade, rather than a detailed economic analysis, and it is to this end that an attempt will be made to assess volume and content.

In order to give a comprehensive picture of the pattern of Soviet aid, Appendix B lists aid agreements between the Soviet Union and Vietnam from 1969 to 1978. Agreements were negotiated and signed at the level of state personnel, even on the occasions in 1975 and 1978 when Le Duan himself headed the Vietnamese delegation to the Soviet Union. Until 1973, agreements were renewed on an annual basis, with supplementary agreements provided when necessary. From 1974, they became longer term, and from 1976 one sees some coordination in planning. This trend culminated in 1978 in the SRV membership of Comecon, announced on June 30th, 1978 and the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed later in the same year.

It will also be noted that between 1970 and 1972, there was a fall off in the level at which formal agreements were concluded. The exception to this pattern was the series of agreements signed during the course of Podgorny's visit to Hanoi in October, 1971 (Pravda, October 9th, 1971). It seems likely, however, that this provided the opportunity, rather than created the occasion, for the renewal of aid agreements. Whilst the agreement of October 15th, 1969, was signed by Kosygin and Pham Van Dong (Pravda, October 16th, 1969), that of October 22nd, 1970, was negotiated and signed by N. A. Tikhonov, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Nguyen Con, Vice-Premier of the DRV and Chairman of the State Planning
Committee (Pravda, October 24th, 1970). The agreements of February 9th, 1971 and December 9th, 1972 were signed and negotiated respectively by Vladimir Novikov, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Le Thanh Nghi, who had, by this time, replaced Nguyen Con as Chairman of the State Planning Committee (Pravda, February 13th, 1971, Pravda, December 10th, 1972). The agreement of August 14th, 1973, however, was again signed by Kosygin and Pham Van Dong (Pravda, August 15th, 1973). It should also be mentioned that on some occasions, the name of the negotiators was not revealed at all. Thus, for example, the report of the supplementary aid agreement of late December, 1971, merely stated that an agreement had been signed on additional, non-repayable Soviet assistance, to strengthen the defence capability of the DRV (Pravda, December 31st, 1971). It seems likely, therefore, that during the period of the Paris Peace Talks, the negotiation and signing of agreements between the Soviet Union and the DRV was kept deliberately low key. Following this period, whilst negotiations themselves continued to be conducted discreetly, the signing of agreements often took place in the context of the visit of a high level delegation. This was the case for the long term agreement of 1975 (Pravda, November 1st, 1975) and the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1978 (Pravda, November 4th, 1978).

Political considerations continually governed the supply of Soviet war aid to the DRV and obstacles placed by both China and the United States generated difficulties for Soviet/Vietnam relations. Soviet war aid to the DRV, for example, was channelled via three main routes, by sea from the ports of Odessa and Vladivostok, overland, via China, and by air. Each route posed problems, and the logistics of supplying the DRV war effort became increasingly entangled in political difficulties, especially with regard to the fluctuations in Sino-Soviet relations. The shipping routes from Odessa and Vladivostok were the only "direct routes" available
to the Soviet Union, direct in the sense that they did not pose problems of negotiating the crossing of national boundaries. The voyage, however, especially that from Odessa, was long and slow, for, as S. A. Lukyanchenko, Deputy Minister of the Merchant Marine, and Vice-Chairman of the Central Board of the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Society stated in an interview with Pravda correspondent A. Krushinsky,

"Vladivostok and Haiphong are separated by about 3,000 nautical miles, or, as sailors say, by a ten-day voyage. In sailing to Haiphong from Odessa, ships have to circumnavigate Africa because the Suez Canal has been closed as a result of Israeli aggression. This takes 45 days or 14,139 nautical miles (26,000 kilometres). As you see, a return trip is equal to a round-the-world voyage."

(Soviet News, February 20th, 1973)

Clearly, one could not rely on this route for emergency supplies, and for this reason it was imperative that the Soviet Union seek other options. This, however, did not always prove easy.

During the course of the same interview, S. A. Lukyanchenko made the comment that,

"...Unfortunately, owing to reasons beyond our control, insufficient use was made of railway transport in carrying freight to Vietnam."

(Soviet News, February 20th, 1973)

This, of course, was a reference to the overland route through China, which, on several occasions, had been closed to Soviet supply trains. After the March, 1969 clashes on the Ussuri, for example, it was reported that China had closed her borders at all railway crossing points to Soviet supply shipments for the DRV (The Times, March 15th, 1969). This led the Soviet Union to search for other routes. It was rumoured, for example,

A similar situation in relation to the Chinese arose during the United States blockade of North Vietnamese ports in 1972, when there was some reluctance to allow Soviet ships to off-load their cargoes at Chinese ports. It was reported, for example, that China had refused to allow Soviet merchant ships unrestricted use of her ports for the discharge of war supplies for the DRV (Daily Telegraph, May 31st, 1972). A few days previously, what was described as "an unusually well-informed diplomatic source", reporting from Peking, claimed that three Polish ships bound for North Vietnam with freight, had unloaded their special cargoes at a Chinese port instead, under an agreement between the Chinese and Polish governments (New York Times, May 30th, 1972). It was further reported that shipping sources in Hong Kong claimed that two East German freighters loaded with supplies for the DRV had left for the Chinese port of Whampoa to unload their cargo (New York Times, May 31st, 1972). Chinese restrictions, therefore, did not apply to the Eastern European states, and for this and other reasons, much Soviet aid was channelled via Eastern bloc countries.

The tensions generated in Soviet/Vietnam relations with respect to the supply of military aid were nowhere more evident than in the events centering around the offensive of 1972. In this particular case, the
difficulties surrounding the United States mining of the North Vietnamese ports were added to the obstacles placed by the Chinese with regard to alternative facilities. The view that the United States would not blockade Haiphong because an informal agreement with the Soviet Union to the effect that they would use their influence to bring about a settlement, had emerged during an earlier stage in the war (Christian Science Monitor, May 22nd, 1970). By early 1972, however, the situation had changed, and the United States felt bound by no such restraints. Not only was the overland rail connection being denied by China, therefore, but the Soviet shipping supply route was being obstructed by the United States.

In late April, it was reported that two Soviet minesweepers had sailed from Vladivostok, the speculation being that this was in anticipation of the possible mining of Haiphong by the United States (New York Times, April 29th, 1972). Later in May it was reported that four Soviet missile-firing submarines had been located close to a small Soviet naval flotilla some three hundred miles off the Vietnamese coast. The light vessel flotilla had been formed soon after the United States mining of Haiphong (The Times, May 27th, 1972). It may be, therefore, that some kind of action against the United States blockade had been contemplated, possibly connected with the disagreements within the Politbureau already cited. Alternatively, the dispatch of the minesweepers was merely a show of strength on the part of the Soviet Union. In any event, it seems clear that the DRV were displeased with the Soviet response to the United States blockade, and these events coincided with resumed attacks in the DRV press, alleging, by implication, that the Soviet Union were colluding with the United States in allowing the blockade to continue (SWB, May 23rd, 1972, FE/3990/A3/1, Hanoi home service, May 21st, 1972).

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, it appeared, were negotiating with China
for increased use of the overland route. It was reported from Peking that Chinese and Soviet officials were engaged in a series of logistical planning sessions with North Vietnamese and Mongolian representatives in an effort to beat the United States blockade (International Herald Tribune, May 21st, 1972). In late June, it was reported that the Soviet Union had, without explanation, banned all travel by foreign diplomats and correspondents to areas east of the Volga (International Herald Tribune, June 30th, 1972). One possible explanation for this was that the Soviet Union had started making major shipments of military supplies to the DRV along the trans-Siberian railway. By July, it was being suggested that Soviet and East European diplomats, who, previously had complained that China was not doing enough to tranship supplies to the DRV, were now envisaging increased Chinese cooperation (Financial Times, July 11th, 1972). This was subsequently borne out by intelligence reports, based on aerial reconnaissance, that showed a major build-up of Soviet war equipment, mainly tanks, lorries and planes, at Chinese depots and airstrips (Daily Telegraph, October 16th, 1972). It was also reported that on July 22nd, a Soviet delegation of navigation and sea transport officials had arrived in the DRV and had immediately started work with North Vietnamese transportation officials, presumably in an attempt to solve the supply problems (The Japan Times, August 3rd, 1972) and that during the course of the summer, Soviet cargo flights into Hanoi were stepped up (The Japan Times, September 5th, 1972).

Thus, for the Soviet Union, the logistics of supplying war aid posed substantial political problems. Within the constraints imposed upon them, that is, the difficulties presented by United States actions such as the blockade of Haiphong, on the one hand, and the obstacles placed by China, on the other, they attempted to keep the supply lines open, and thereby match their actions to the continuous statements of support emanating from
Moscow. What, however, was the volume and significance of such aid?

There is no accurate method of calculating the cost to the Soviet Union of the Vietnamese war effort and one has to fall back on speculation and assessments. Soviet trade figures, for example, do not contain details of defence equipment. An important anomaly in foreign trade figures has been pointed out by Nove (Nove, 1977, p.351), however, whereby Soviet arms sales, listed as going to no country, are dumped statistically in the residual of exports to developing countries. In the case of Vietnam, the difference between the overall total for Soviet exports and the total for individual commodities provides this figure.

Table IV shows Soviet export residuals to Vietnam for the years 1969 to 1978, giving a comparison with the overall total of exports for each year. It can be seen that in 1972, for example, there was a substantial drop in the residual. Exports, however, also went down. Since the residual for the previous three years was relatively stable, this casts some doubt on the idea that the Soviet Union financed the 1972 offensive. Possibly this drop reflects the state of Soviet/Vietnam relations in 1972, therefore. The year 1974 saw a significant rise in the residual figure. As it is here one would look for aid figures for the 1975 offensive, this suggests Soviet backing and support. From 1976, one notices a significant rise in exports, while the residual appears to stabilize. It is possible that the slight increase in 1977 reflects the build-up to hostilities with Cambodia, but this was not sustained through 1978.

Whilst this method may produce a rough guide, it is by no means accurate. Much war equipment was probably included within individual commodities, and one cannot, in the end, tell whether an item listed as "machine parts" is destined for a tank or a tractor. One must approach the figures, therefore, with certain qualifications.

In this connection, similar problems beset the United States
TABLE IV

SOVIET EXPORT RESIDUALS TO VIETNAM 1969-1978

(figures in millions of roubles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>OVERALL EXPORT TOTAL</th>
<th>COMMODITY TOTAL</th>
<th>RESIDUAL</th>
<th>RESIDUAL AS % OF EXPORTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>170,400</td>
<td>295,203</td>
<td>124,803</td>
<td>73.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>166,500</td>
<td>268,019</td>
<td>101,519</td>
<td>60.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>139,300</td>
<td>247,593</td>
<td>108,293</td>
<td>77.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>94,200</td>
<td>168,769</td>
<td>74,569</td>
<td>79.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>142,900</td>
<td>213,876</td>
<td>70,976</td>
<td>49.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>192,300</td>
<td>280,332</td>
<td>88,032</td>
<td>45.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>158,700</td>
<td>210,481</td>
<td>51,781</td>
<td>32.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>232,500</td>
<td>308,404</td>
<td>75,904</td>
<td>32.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>305,500</td>
<td>382,055</td>
<td>76,555</td>
<td>25.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: data derived from Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR, 1969 to 1978)
administration in their attempts to estimate Soviet war aid to the DRV, but the sources for the United States figures are obscure, and the figures often reveal more about the difficulties, both statistical and political, of arriving at an estimate. It has been pointed out, for example, that it is necessary to distinguish between incremental military costs, that is, costs specifically incurred as a result of the war, and the usual peacetime expenditure on military supplies and equipment. The problem in this respect, with regard to both the DRV and the South, however, was that the war had been going on for so long that it was impossible to assess "normal conditions" (The Costs of the Vietnam War, 1972, pp.48-51). There was, furthermore, often disagreement between various branches of the United States administration with regard to the true figures for estimates. Early in 1972, for example, Soviet arms supplies to the DRV became a major issue. During April, several hints were dropped by the United States administration indicating American displeasure with the situation. In a television interview, Secretary of Defense, Laird, said that Russia was a major contributor to the continuing war, by not restraining the North Vietnamese in their use of Russian equipment. He also raised the question of the 1968 "understanding" (New York Times, April 8th, 1972). A few days later, Nixon himself, during an April 11th State Department ceremony concerning the signing of a United States convention, said that the big powers had a responsibility to discourage others from mounting attacks on their neighbours (New York Times, April 11th, 1972). This was taken as a reference to Soviet military aid to Vietnam. A further indirect criticism of Soviet behaviour was given by Nixon in a speech to the Canadian Parliament (New York Times, April 15th, 1972). United States motives at this time were alluded to by Laird, in a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when he claimed that the United States put restraints on their aid to the South, whilst the Soviet Union put no restraints
whatsoever on their aid to the North (April 19th, 1972).

The basis in fact for this sort of pronouncement was contradicted by United States intelligence sources, who claimed that Soviet aid to North Vietnam was now actually far smaller than earlier in the war (New York Times, April 13th, 1972). It was suggested, therefore, that United States criticisms of the Soviet Union over this issue were a matter of choice, the implication being that they constituted part of an attempt to pressure the Soviet Union into exerting a restraining influence on the DRV. Again, in 1975, it was reported that an intelligence study giving details of Soviet and Chinese aid was not completely accepted by the Defense Department (New York Times, March 28th, 1975). It seems likely, therefore, that one has to take into account the propaganda element in United States estimates of Soviet military aid to the DRV, and the fact that military intelligence estimates were usually lower, suggests that the figures were manipulated by successive administrations, to gain political advantage.

There are, of course, other factors to consider when estimating aid figures. Even allowing for the discrepancy between different United States estimates, the overall figure for American aid to the South remained larger than the combined total of Soviet and Chinese aid to the DRV (The Costs of the Vietnam War, 1972, p.49), and this was partly due to the nature of the war the United States were conducting. Milton Leitenberg (Leitenberg, 1972), for example, discusses the extent to which the new technology and new military tactics were used by the United States in their conduct of the war. He claims that,

"So much new technology was introduced, that comments of the following type were common in the semi-official military literature: 'Vietnam has become a test-bed for the proof-testing and de-bugging of new hardware, new tactical concepts, new
logistics systems', and 'Vietnam also provided a testing ground for new ordnance and electronics, to be reflected in avionics for years to come'.

(Leitenberg, 1972, p.269)

With the increase of the new technology, therefore, the cost of the war to the United States was increased, and the aid figures reflect this fact.

Similar difficulties arise in estimating the content of Soviet war aid. The Soviet Union only once revealed details of aid, reportedly to quell Vietnamese anxieties with regard to the proposed Nixon visit to Moscow (International Herald Tribune, September 14th, 1971). Although on this occasion, no breakdown was given for military aid, it was stated, for example, with reference to the situation since 1965, that,

"During this same period, approximately 3,000 Vietnamese citizens have received practice and training in Soviet enterprises, construction sites, and vocational and technical schools. In addition, 4,000 DRV specialists have been trained in Soviet higher and secondary education establishments, and are already working in various sectors of their country's national economy.

Approximately 10,000 Vietnamese citizens are at present undergoing training and production practice in the Soviet Union."

(Pravda, September 2nd, 1971)

Whilst this may have constituted a more detailed statement than was usual, and presumably, the figures for training would include military personnel, it is still too general to be of much use. One is obliged to fall back, therefore, on what can be corroborated from western sources. When, in early 1973, for example, in order, it was suggested, to counteract suspicion that Moscow and Washington had been in collusion since the Nixon
visit (Daily Telegraph, January 29th, 1973), much space was devoted to aid in the Soviet press, a Pravda editorial claimed that,

"When the imperialist aggressors started bombing, the Soviet Union did its utmost to supply the Vietnamese Peoples' Army quickly with the latest weapons, anti-aircraft missiles, guns and fighter planes."

(Pravda, January 28th, 1973)

This, to some extent, appears to have been true, since United States military intelligence sources reported on December 17th, 1972, that three Komar-class boats, each carrying two styx missiles, were spotted near islands off the North Vietnamese port of Hon Gai (New York Times, January 6th, 1973). Nevertheless, given the subsequent destruction of these missile-carrying boats (New York Times, January 6th, 1973), it is possible that the Soviet Union refused to resupply the DRV. It was rumoured in 1972, for example, that the DRV had only two days supply of anti-aircraft missiles left when the Christmas bombing stopped (Szulc, 1974, p.62).

Even at the height of the war, in 1971, it was reported that the Soviet built T-54 tank seen in Laos indicated that the vehicle being used by the DRV was not the latest model, the T-54 having, in fact, first been produced in 1947 (New York Times, March 8th, 1971). As journalist J. Reston claimed, during the controversy on aid sparked by the 1972 offensive, "Somebody in Moscow must be putting some restraints on the supplies to N. Vietnam", since Hanoi did not bomb the United States carriers that sent the planes to bomb the North (New York Times, April 19th, 1972). One cannot escape the conclusion that even when confronted with all the sophistication that the United States defence industry could muster, the DRV themselves were not fighting a high technology war, and their weapons remained relatively unsophisticated. In this respect, it seems possible that the Soviet Union exercised a certain amount of
selectivity in what they were prepared to supply to the DRV, and that it may have been the content, rather than the overall volume of aid that provided cause for disagreement.

The extent of Soviet military aid for the 1975 offensive is unclear. It was reported in early December, 1974, that at the conclusion of talks in Moscow between economic delegations of the Soviet Union and the DRV, agreements on the rendering of technical and economic assistance to the DRV had been signed (Pravda, December 9th, 1974). The signing of the agreements had been proceeded by talks between Kosygin and Nguyen Duy Trinh on December 4th (Pravda, December 5th, 1974). The need for a supplementary agreement at this juncture seems unusual, in view of the long term agreement for 1974 to 1975, on economic and technical cooperation, and it is therefore quite probable it concerned additional aid for the offensive. The residual figures for 1974 would confirm this.

It should also be noted that talks, on this occasion, took place between Kosygin and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, rather than the Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Le Thanh Nghi, suggesting that something rather more than economic matters were under consideration. Given that the Soviet Union did provide military aid for the 1975 offensive, it would be wrong to assume that the offensive was expected to succeed in military terms. Indeed, for the Soviet Union, it is possible that its very success opened up even more problems in relation to reconstruction aid and the economic position of the South.

Soviet war aid to the DRV, therefore, may not, in fact, have been as great as was supposed, especially if one takes into account a qualitative evaluation. This possibility has been obscured by the attention focused on the political difficulties of supply and delivery and the way in which propaganda concerning aid was used manipulatively by all sides. For the Soviet Union, from 1973, and possibly earlier, it
seems likely that the real interest in relation to the DRV was long term aid and economic reconstruction, rather than continuing military action and a drive towards reunification. This becomes clearer if one examines Soviet/Vietnam relations within the structure and aims of the CMEA.

The Thirty Second Session of the CMEA, held in Sofia from 27th to 29th June, 1978, admitted the SRV to full membership status. The communique stated,

"The session considered the application of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for membership of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. The participants at the session warmly greeted the announcement of Comrade Le Thanh Nghi, member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Deputy Prime Minister of the Government of the SRV on this question. The session unanimously agreed with the decision to accept the SRV for membership of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance."

(Pravda. June 30th, 1978)

Table V shows CMEA membership for both full members and observers at this date. With the exception of Mongolia, a long term member, the SRV was the only other Asian state to have gained full membership. (1)

The decision to admit the SRV to full membership of the CMEA was described in the western press as "unexpected", and it was suggested that most of the East European delegations were taken by surprise, as, allegedly, none had been informed beforehand (The Times, June 30th, 1978). This was also reported by the NCNA, on June 30th (SWB, July 4th, 1978, FE/5855/A3/1, NCNA in English, June 30th, 1978). In the light of the events of the preceding few years, however, it is difficult to see what was surprising about this decision. It is, however, necessary, to give some background to the work and aims of the CMEA in order to understand.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEMBERSHIP STATUS</th>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>OBSERVER STATUS</th>
<th>FROM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1956,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sources: Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Pravda)
the role of Vietnam within the organisation.

For a full outline of the institutional structures of the CMEA, the reader is referred to Brabant (Brabant, 1973), Schiavone (Schiavone, 1981), and Szawlowski (Szawlowski, 1976). Useful with regard to an understanding of the history and development of the CMEA are a number of authors, for example, Schiavone (Schiavone, 1981), Faddeev (Faddeev, 1974), Kaser (Kaser, 1967), Lavigne (Lavigne, 1973) and Brabant (Brabant, 1980). Brabant suggests that a periodisation of the development of intra-CMEA affairs is bound to include some rather arbitrary divisions. Whilst he gives his own detailed breakdown (Brabant, 1980, pp.173-175), he cites several east European views which prefer a four tier division. This consists of the gradual development of multilateral cooperation from 1949 to 1958, the deepening of production cooperation from 1958 to 1962, the acceptance of plan coordination from 1962 to 1969 and the development of socialist integration, the current phase. This systematisation is by no means accepted by all observers, and corresponds with what one might term the Soviet perspective. Nevertheless, it provides a more manageable background and several useful landmarks, against which to measure the role of Vietnam in relation to the CMEA.

The DRV had, in fact, been an associate member of the CMEA since 1958. The CMEA charter, adopted in 1960 and amended in 1962 and 1974, gave institutional form to what had grown gradually from a paper organisation of the Stalin era into an economic and political alliance.(2) A previous stipulation that full membership was open only to European states was dropped with the introduction of the charter, but of the Asian states, only Mongolia sought to join at this time. Initial membership, therefore, had coincided with membership of the Warsaw Pact.

Political considerations had shaped the comings and goings of several participants. Yugoslavia, for example, was admitted to observer status in
1956, but ceased to receive invitations to meetings in 1958. The session of 1961 offered Yugoslavia full membership, but refused her observer status. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia was readmitted as an observer in 1965. It has been claimed that Yugoslavia's request to be readmitted as an observer in 1959 was refused with the excuse that she lacked "proper" planning instruments (Brabant, 1980, p.177). This, of course, raises the point of the criteria that are adopted in accepting or rejecting membership, and to what extent they can be said to be objective economic criteria and to what extent they are political.

Brabant further points out that whilst legally, as stipulated by the Charter, there are only members and non-members, from a more pragmatic point of view, there are four separate degrees of attachment to the CMEA open to individual countries, which suggest a descending degree of involvement of the non-members. He identifies these as full membership, limited participation, coopérant and observer status (Brabant, 1980, p.177). Thus, a study of the institutional structures of the CMEA is of little help in determining actual status. With reference to observer status, for example, the statutes claim that,

"The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance may invite countries which are not members of the Council to take part in the work of the organs of the Council, or realize co-operation with them in other forms. The conditions under which the countries which are not members of the Council may participate in the work of the organs of the Council, or under which they may cooperate with the Council in other forms, shall be determined by the Council in agreement with the countries concerned, as a rule by means of concluding agreements."

(Szawlowski, 1976, p.187)
This vague statement, therefore, provided the basis for Vietnam's association with the CMEA for twenty years. In practice, as shall be seen, the nature of the association varied considerably over this period of time.

The increased participation of Vietnam in the organisations of the CMEA coincided with the current phase of development of socialist integration, the principles of which were set forth in the Comprehensive Programme (Kompleksnaya programma...1971), and incorporated in the 1974 amendment to the CMEA Charter. The debate that this raised among member countries is possibly more relevant to small states such as Romania, anxious with regard to the loss of economic independence inherent in a move towards comprehensive integration (Schiavone, 1981, p.3). Nevertheless, one must appreciate the significance of key terms, such as socialist integration, socialist division of labour and mutual assistance, in order to fully understand the position of Vietnam within the CMEA.

As early as October, 1971, a joint statement, following Podgorny's visit to Hanoi, had expressed the view that the creation of a Soviet-Vietnamese Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation would strengthen ties in the economic field (Pravda, October 9th, 1971). Following talks held in Moscow in the later part of 1972, therefore, between delegations headed by Novikov and Le Thanh Nghi respectively, an agreement was signed on the formation of a permanent Soviet-Vietnamese Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation (Izvestia, December 10th, 1972). This particular type of standing commission was among those cited by Brabant, (Brabant, 1980), as holding an important place in the organisation of the CMEA. Whether or not the DRV was envisaged as gaining full membership of the CMEA at this stage, therefore, it would appear that the organizational machinery was being put into place.(3)
At the first session of the new commission, held in Moscow from July 22nd to July 24th, 1974, it was reported that agreement had been reached on cooperation between the planning agencies of the DRV and the Soviet Union (Pravda, July 25th, 1974). In 1975, an agreement on trade turnover and payments between the Soviet Union and the DRV for 1976 to 1980 was signed in Moscow on October 31st (Pravda, November 1st, 1975). On December 18th, a further agreement was signed concerning economic and technical assistance to the DRV for the construction of industrial enterprises and other facilities during the period 1976 to 1980 (Izvestia, December 20th, 1975).

It is interesting to note that, with regard to the time scale, these dates coincide with the planning objectives of the CMEA during this period. The communique following the Twenty Eighth Session of the CMEA, held in Sofia from June 18th to June 21st, 1974, for example, called for co-ordination of the 1976 to 1980 plans, and the framing of a common five year plan (Pravda, June 22nd, 1974). Thus it seems likely that the realignment of the DRV's economic performance was taking place within a much larger framework than that of a bi-lateral relationship between the DRV and the Soviet Union.

In 1975, following the official visit by a DRV delegation, led by Le Duan, to the Soviet Union, matters were sufficiently advanced to allow for the signing of a protocol on the coordination of the two countries' economic plans (Pravda, November 1st, 1975). The following year, a delegation, headed by Le Thanh Nghi, attended the Thirtieth Session of the CMEA, held in Berlin from July 7th to July 9th, 1976, where, amongst other issues, the need for the further extension of economic integration and the coordination of planning was discussed (Pravda, July 10th, 1976).

References to Vietnam began to appear more frequently in the communiques issued by the organs of the CMEA. The communique issued by the
Eightieth Session of the CMEA Executive Committee, held in Moscow from April 12th to April 14th, 1977, in a passage concerning increased economic and technical cooperation between socialist and developing countries not members of the CMEA, mentioned specifically Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. (Pravda, April 16th, 1977). Further, the communique of the Thirty First Session of the CMEA, held in Warsaw from June 21st to June 23rd of the same year contained a paragraph relating to Vietnam and aid from member countries, and an announcement that the SRV had been accepted as members of the International Bank for Economic Cooperation and the International Investment Bank (Pravda, June 25th, 1977). The SRV had aligned itself, therefore, with the financial organisations of the CMEA.

Shortly before their admission to full membership of the CMEA, the SRV were sending representatives to meetings of an increasing number of the standing committees. The SRV, for example, was represented at the meeting of the standing committee on foreign trade, held in Moscow from June 7th to June 9th, (Izvestia, June 11th, 1978). They were also represented at a meeting of the standing committee on the coal industry, held in Moscow from June 6th to June 10th (Izvestia, June 11th, 1978).

All the signs, therefore, pointed to the closer economic integration of Vietnam within the Soviet bloc.

Thus observer status of the CMEA, in the case of Vietnam, came to mean closer and closer economic cooperation. This should be contrasted with the positions of North Korea, Laos and Angola, which, in theory, held the same status, but, in practice, occupied vastly different positions. Full membership of the CMEA for Vietnam, therefore, would seem to have been neither a surprise, nor unexpected, but the logical consequence and culmination of the trend of Soviet/Vietnam relations over the preceding few years. It was possibly the timing that was unexpected and this may have been precipitated by immediate and unexpected political events.
It may also have been the case that the economic performance of Vietnam gave cause for concern to other members of the Soviet bloc. Table VI gives a comparison of trade turnover between the Soviet Union and other member states of the CMEA during the first year of SRV membership, together with figures for Vietnam prior to this date.

**TABLE VI**

**TRADE TURNOVER BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND COUNTRIES OF THE CMEA**

*(figures in millions of roubles)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1816</td>
<td>4466</td>
<td>5153</td>
<td>6142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1480</td>
<td>3492</td>
<td>4826</td>
<td>4826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>....</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>3295</td>
<td>5997</td>
<td>6728</td>
<td>7693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1045</td>
<td>2872</td>
<td>3452</td>
<td>4169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2350</td>
<td>5235</td>
<td>6068</td>
<td>7050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>2025</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>2193</td>
<td>4543</td>
<td>5117</td>
<td>6061</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR, 1970 to 1978)

It can be seen that the contribution of the SRV to the overall trade of the CMEA at this point was negligible, the nearest comparison possible being that with the position of Mongolia. Thus the Eastern European
countries, were, in effect, being asked to carry the burden of the SRV economy. (4)

One has to conclude that Vietnamese full membership of the CMEA, was largely a political act, the mutual economic assistance being somewhat one way. On the other hand, whilst this may have been true for the Soviet Union, the motive, for the SRV, in applying for membership, may have been primarily economic. As has been suggested, there was some disaffection amongst the Vietnamese party leadership with regard to too great a reliance on Soviet assistance. By 1978, however, this seems to have been the only available option.

The traditionally pragmatic Vietnamese approach with regard to ideological matters ensured that there were no strictures on the direction from which aid was to be sought, that is, whether it was socialist or capitalist. On September 15th, 1976, the Executive Board of the IMF agreed, with the United States director dissenting, that the SRV be accepted as successor member to South Vietnam (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1976, 28004B). In spite of the willingness of the SRV to seek aid wherever it might be found, relations between the United States and the SRV were not normalized, and continued to deteriorate. Several unresolved problems hindered the negotiations, upon which hung the promise of war reparations and aid for economic reconstruction, specifically, the issue of United States servicemen missing in action. It seems likely, therefore, that the failure to normalize relations between the SRV and the United States contributed to a situation in which the Vietnamese, from economic necessity, were forced to rely entirely on the Soviet bloc.

The simultaneous failure of the SRV relationship with China exacerbated this process. Shortly after the announcement of SRV membership of the CMEA, the NCNA reported that China had stopped all aid to Vietnam, and was recalling all engineers and technical personnel still working
there (SWB, July 4th, 1978, FE/5855/A3/2, NCNA in English, July 3rd, 1978). One should point out, however, the vastly different positions of the United States and China in this regard, and that to the Chinese, the ending of aid to Vietnam signified relief from a difficult financial burden, as much as a tactic of negotiation or a purely political act. This is not to suggest that there were no political differences between Vietnam and China. On the contrary, subsequent events, such as the defection of Hoang Van Hoan indicated that these had been incubating for some time prior to the outbreak of hostilities between the SRV and the PRC in 1978.(5) One could argue, therefore, that the economic needs of the SRV, together with the failure of the relationship with both China and the United States had the effect of strengthening the Vietnamese relationship with the Soviet Union. This trend perhaps saw its culmination in the signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, an event which appeared to institutionalize the SRV's alignment with Moscow.

During the seventies, the Soviet Union concluded a series of Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation with a number of African and Asian states. These included, amongst the African states, Somalia (Pravda, July 13th, 1974), Angola (Pravda, October 9th, 1975), Mozambique (Pravda, April 3rd, 1977), and Ethiopia (Pravda, November 21st, 1978), among the Middle Eastern states, The United Arab Republic (Pravda, May 28th, 1971), Iraq (Pravda, April 10th, 1972) and South Yemen Pravda, October 26th, 1979), and amongst the South Asian states, Afghanistan (Pravda, December 6th, 1978) and India (Pravda, August 10th, 1971).(6) The Soviet Union also had an existing series of treaties with the states of Eastern Europe, which go by the name of Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, "mutual assistance", in this connection, being a phrase which signifies some sort of reciprocal military alliance. There may, therefore, be a relationship between full membership of the CMEA and the type of bi-
lateral treaty arrangements with the Soviet Union.

All members and observers of the CMEA, for example, have some type of bi-lateral treaty with the Soviet Union. This is shown in Table VII. The exception to the pattern, is, of course, Cuba, which, in spite of strong economic links with the Soviet Union and membership of the CMEA, has no bi-lateral treaty arrangement. Does one, therefore, consider the Soviet/Vietnam treaty in the context of the Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation concluded in the seventies, or in the context of the Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance more usual to a full member of the CMEA?

When discussing treaties, one is moving into an extremely legalistic area, where attention to detail is all important, and assumptions cannot be made lightly. As Grenville points out (Grenville, 1974), there is some difficulty in defining the area of study. The obligations and rights contained within a treaty must be studied in order to assess its significance, not the form or name by which it goes. Some of the more common types of treaty are headed Convention, Acte Final, Pact, Agreement, Protocol, Exchange of Notes, Modus Vivendi or Understanding, as well as Treaty. Until the contents are examined, it cannot be assumed that any legal rights or duties do arise, so a treaty may not be a treaty despite appearances. According to this definition, therefore, both the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA can be seen to be treaties.(7)

Bearing this in mind, one can discern a pattern in Soviet treaty arrangements, both multilateral and bilateral. It is useful to visualise this as a wheel within a wheel, the centre being Moscow. The inner circle consists of the membership of the Warsaw Pact, and the larger, outer circle, of the members and observers of the CMEA. Radiating from the centre, in the nature of spokes, are a series of bi-lateral treaties, linking all parties directly to Moscow. Another series of bi-lateral
### TABLE VII

**TYPE OF SOVIET BI-LATERAL TREATY WITH MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS OF THE CMEA, as of DECEMBER, 1978**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance</th>
<th>Friendship and Cooperation</th>
<th>No Treaty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sources: United Nations Treaty Series, Pravda)
treaties link the parties to each other. This model, of course, is not without exceptions and discrepancies, but it is precisely the exceptions, discrepancies and omissions that serve to illuminate the overall pattern. In order to assess the real content of the Soviet/Vietnam treaty, therefore, it is useful to compare the bi-lateral treaty arrangements between the Soviet Union and the SRV with those of other CMEA members and observers.

The treaties of the Soviet bloc states follow a pattern that reflects the principles of the correct relationship between socialist states, based on the foreign policy programme of the CPSU. Whilst there are individual differences with reference to matters specifically relevant to each state, for example, in the case of the GDR, a clause referring to the position of West Berlin, such treaties, overwhelmingly, contain a common content. The preamble, for example, will make some reference to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism as a foundation for friendship and cooperation between the states concerned. This will be followed by a clause referring to the further strengthening of the friendship of the parties concerned in accordance with the principles of socialist internationalism, and on the basis of mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty and national independence, equal rights and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. This, in turn, will be followed by an economic clause, a clause concerning cooperation in the fields of science, education, literature, art and so forth, a clause concerning cooperation between socialist states in order to further the interests of world socialism, a foreign policy clause, a military clause, and a clause stating that both parties will consult with each other on questions of international importance. The document will then be rounded off with clauses specifying the provisions for ratification, and so forth.

With reference to the Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
with the SRV, one immediately notices that the similarities of language
and sentiment expressed are more in keeping with those usually associated
with a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. Thus, the
preamble states,

"Guided by the principles and aims of socialist foreign policy,
striving to secure more favourable international conditions for
the building of socialism and communism."

(Pravda, November 4th, 1978)

The same can be said for the form in which the treaty is cast and the
sequence of clauses. Article One, for example, refers to the basis of the
treaty and the principle of socialist internationalism, Article Two is an
economic clause, and so forth. This is not always the case, however, with
reference to the content. Article Two, the economic clause, for example,
reads as follows,

"The High Contracting Parties will join forces for the
strengthening and broadening of mutually beneficial economic and
scientific-technical cooperation, with the aim of speeding-up
socialist and communist construction and achieving a steady rise
in the material and cultural standard of living of the people of
both countries. The parties will continue the long term
coordination of their national economic plans, to coordinate
long term measures for greater development in the economic,
scientific and technical fields, and to exchange knowledge and
experience accumulated in the course of socialist and communist
construction."

(Pravda, November 4th, 1978)

Whilst this is in keeping with the aims of the CMEA, as spelt out by the
Charter, the economic clause, in the cases of the Romanian (Pravda, July
8th, 1970), GDR (Pravda, October 8th, 1975) and Czechoslovak (Pravda, May
7th, 1970) treaties also concluded in the early seventies, contains a reference to cooperation within the framework of the CMEA, whereas in the SRV treaty, this phrase is omitted, and the CMEA is not specifically named. Furthermore, the SRV treaty makes no mention of that ubiquitous phrase, "the international socialist division of labour", which can be taken to mean fuller economic integration. In view of the fact that only some few months previously, the SRV had been admitted to full membership of the CMEA, these omissions seem something of a discrepancy, and the contrast with the intentions expressed and the lack of any specific reference to the CMEA, leaves one with a sense of ambivalence concerning the extent to which the SRV is or is not an integrated member of the Soviet bloc.(8)

Article Six, commonly cited as the military clause, deviates from this pattern in that it telescopes both reference to assistance in the event of aggression and consultation on issues of international importance. In all other cases, these matters are dealt with separately.

Article Six states,

"The High Contracting Parties shall consult with one another on all important international questions affecting the interests of both countries. In the event that one of the Parties becomes the object of attack or threat of attack, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations, with the aim of eliminating such a threat and taking the appropriate effective measures for ensuring the peace and security of their countries."

(Pravda, November 4th, 1978)

Measured against the substance of the Soviet treaties with the Eastern bloc states, this does not amount to a military clause, whilst, at the same time, it is much stronger than the references to military assistance
contained in the Soviet treaties with developing countries. It seems, rather, to be a deliberately ambiguous statement, that can, when necessary, be backed up by offers of Soviet assistance. Thus Andrei Gromyko's speech when presenting the treaty for ratification to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in December, 1978, singled out Article Six for specific mention, in what appeared to be an attempt to underline its relevance to the situation then pertaining between Vietnam and China (Pravda, December, 14th, 1978). When examining the Soviet treaty with Vietnam, therefore, one discovers that both in military and economic terms, the SRV occupies a point mid-way between a developing country and membership of the Soviet bloc. With reference to the alleged military clause, either it was not thought politic to include a more definite statement, and thus it follows a pattern more in keeping with a developing country, or, alternatively, it was deliberately made vague and ambiguous, and, in the same way that it can be reinforced by statements by the Soviet leadership, it could, conceivably, be toned down, should the need arise.

There would appear, then to be great similarities between the SRV treaty and those of other Soviet bloc states, but also, there would appear to be important differences. Given that this is the case, what is the position of the SRV treaty with reference to those countries with observer status within the CMEA?

At the June, 1978 Session of the CMEA, also present as observers were Yugoslavia, North Korea, Angola, Laos and Ethiopia (Pravda, June 30th, 1978). The peculiar position of Yugoslavia has already been touched upon. Of the remaining states, North Korea had an existing Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, dating from July 6th, 1961, Angola had concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on 8th October, 1976, and Ethiopia was shortly to do so. To date, there is no Soviet treaty with Laos.
The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and the Korean Peoples' Democratic Republic is almost entirely a military document, with a weak economic clause, Article Four, inserted. It is also extremely brief, consisting of only six clauses, follows no discernable pattern, and whilst in tone it makes some reference to socialist internationalism and fraternal assistance, this is not given great weight. Bearing in mind that it was concluded in 1961, before the institutional growth of the CMEA, and given the twists and turns of the Soviet relationship with North Korea, perhaps it is not surprising to find a treaty relating simply to the defence requirements of both states. Article One, for example, provides that,

The contracting Parties declare that they will continue to participate in all international actions having the aim of ensuring peace and security in the Far East and in the whole world, and will make their contribution in order to fulfill this great task.

In the event of an armed attack on one of the Contracting Parties by any state or coalition of states, leading to a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately afford it military and other assistance, with all the means at its disposal."

(Pravda, July 7th, 1961)

Article Five, however, recognises that the re-unification of Korea must be brought about by peaceful means.

This treaty is perhaps best seen in its historical context, and, in this connection, it is interesting to note that it was not concluded between heads of state, that is, High Contracting Parties, but between governments, that is, Contracting Parties, the signatories N. S. Khrushchev and Kim Il Soong being mentioned in the text. Initially, it
was concluded for a period of only ten years, which is also somewhat unusual.

When discussing the treaties between the Soviet Union and both Angola and Ethiopia, one is moving into an entirely different area of Soviet foreign policy, that of the relations between the Soviet Union and the developing countries. This is immediately evident in the language, where the preamble, for example, will contain references to the "struggle against imperialism, colonialism and racism in all its forms", and "the unity of all progressive forces in the struggle for peace, freedom, independence and social progress." Such treaties are based on a litany of principles common to all Soviet treaties, that is to say, sovereignty, national independence, equal rights and non-intervention in each other's internal affairs. There then follows a sequence of clauses outlining the agreed cooperation in economic, cultural, foreign policy and other spheres, the foreign policy clauses tailored to the concerns of the developing world and the national liberation movement. There is also usually a short clause pledging cooperation in the military field.

With reference to the Angolan treaty, Article One, for example, states,

"The High Contracting Parties declare that between both countries and their people, there exists an unshakable Friendship, and shall develop all round cooperation in the political, economic, commercial, scientific-technical, cultural and other fields on the basis of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention in each other's internal affairs and equal rights."

(Pravda, October 9th, 1976)

One notices that the clause is entirely free from any reference to mutual assistance, fraternal help or any kind of internationalism. Article Two,
the economic clause, states,

"The High Contracting Parties declare that they shall cooperate closely in all ways in order to ensure the conditions for the preservation and further development of the socio-economic achievements of their peoples and respect for the sovereignty of each over their natural resources."

(Pravda, October 9th, 1976)

This should be contrasted with the similar clause in the SRV treaty, which, in spite of its deficiencies with reference to the CMEA, or lack of it, does contain a promise of substantial economic interaction between the SRV and the Soviet Union.

Article Ten consists of the following statement,

"In the interests of strengthening their defensive capacity, the High Contracting Parties shall continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of the appropriate agreement concluded between them."

(Pravda, October 9th, 1976)

This perhaps refers to military aid. A more valid comparison with Article Six of the Vietnamese treaty, however, is Article Seven, which reads,

"In the event of the emergence of a situation arising from a threat to peace or a violation of peace, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into contact with each other with the aim of agreeing on their position in the interests of eliminating the emerging threat or restoring peace."

(Pravda, October 9th, 1976)

This article does not refer specifically, as does the SRV treaty, to a threat affecting either of the two parties, but is couched in broader terms. The longer Article Six, which might be said to do so, and similarly deals with foreign policy and the international situation, lists
a variety of situations for regular consultations between Angola and the Soviet Union, but has, as its aim, simply that,

"(The High Contracting Parties)...shall regularly exchange opinions with each other on important international questions and also questions of bi-lateral affairs."

(Pravda, October 9th, 1976)

While there are many points of interest in the Soviet-Angolan treaty, that perhaps serve to highlight the position of Angola in relation to other African states, the point at issue here is how it compares with the Vietnamese treaty in the context of the CMEA.

The Soviet-Ethiopian treaty follows largely the same pattern, but is interesting, in that for an agreement that purports to have been concluded between the Soviet Union and Socialist Ethiopia, it contains no mention of socialism in any guise, and hence, one suspects, no recognition on the part of the Soviet Union of Ethiopian pretensions to such status. Article One, for example, contains the now familiar phrases,

"The High Contracting Parties shall develop and deepen relations of unshakable friendship and all round cooperation in the political, economic, commercial, scientific-technical, cultural and other fields on the basis of equal rights, non-intervention in internal affairs, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of frontiers."

(Pravda, November 21st, 1978)

Whilst reference to the inviolability of frontiers is an acknowledgement of the situation existing between Ethiopia and Somalia, the rest is standard. As a matter of interest, a comparison of the Angolan and Ethiopian treaties shows that the links between Angola and the Soviet Union with reference to the type of cooperation planned, and agreement in spheres of foreign policy, are, in fact, much closer than those between
the Soviet Union and Ethiopia. One would have supposed the reverse to be
the case. If one compares the SRV treaty with both that of Angola and
Ethiopia, however, one finds substantial deviation, in the case of the
SRV, from the usual pattern of a Soviet Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation, both in the tone and form adopted, as well as the content.

It would seem, therefore, that a bi-lateral treaty with the Soviet
Union is the general pattern for both members and observers of the CMEA.
This is by no means a hard and fast rule, as shown, for example, by the
case of Cuba, on the one hand, who, for reasons peculiar to her
geopolitical position has no such treaty, and by the positions of
Yugoslavia and Laos, on the other. Furthermore, the reverse position of
the SRV and North Korea, with reference to membership status and the type
of treaty concluded is somewhat misleading, the expectation being that it
would be the SRV, as a full member, who had concluded the Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.

It may be, that upon examining the contents of the Vietnamese treaty,
one could argue that this has, in fact, been the case. One finds that it
has more features in common with the type of treaty relating to a Soviet
bloc state than to the usual pattern adopted by a Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation. One has to qualify this by saying that in some areas,
notably, the military sphere, the provisions remain vague and ambiguous
and that, in relationship to the CMEA, the economic relationship is rather
one way, and that, in return for a political alignment, the SRV receives
the economic support of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc. (9)

In relation specifically to the SRV within the Soviet treaty system,
one is left, to a certain extent, with an impression of ambiguity, as if
to suggest that the SRV were neither wholly a socialist state nor wholly a
developing country. Whilst in tone and form, relations appear to conform
to those of the eastern bloc states, there may not be a similar substance
to uphold the intentions expressed.

From the early seventies onwards, therefore, one can trace the gradual development of closer economic links between the Soviet Union and the DRV. This process culminated in the SRV membership of the CMEA and was consolidated, in political terms, by the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. In spite of this, Soviet/Vietnam relations conform neither wholly to those of the pattern of Soviet relations with Eastern bloc states, nor those of Soviet relations with the developing countries of Africa and Asia.
Before proceeding to a general conclusion, several points of detail need to be clarified.

Firstly, referring back to the questions raised in Chapter Two, did the Soviet attitude towards the PRG following the cease fire of 1973, constitute a recognition of the status quo for the foreseeable future? Certain Soviet actions, for example, the appointment of an ambassador to the PRG, whilst, simultaneously, taking measures to ensure the closer economic integration of the DRV, would seem to confirm this view. Had this situation continued for a number of years, the consequence would have been to produce an even greater disparity in modes of development between North and South, making it difficult to justify the argument that the North were merely assisting the South in a war of national liberation, and producing even greater obstacles to full reunification. Possibly, therefore, the Soviet Union envisaged a scenario in which the post-Geneva settlement was to continue until divisions solidified and the North emerged as a viable economic and political unit. The obvious model for this is North Korea. On the other hand, one must bear in mind that detente, with which the war in Vietnam interfered, was the priority in Soviet policy at this time. The intention, therefore, may have been to relegate Vietnam to a subsidiary issue, whilst leaving the options open for possible future change.

Secondly, were the Soviet Union satisfied with accepting the reunified state into a closer alliance with the Soviet bloc, or were there some difficulties with regard to accommodating it within the existing framework? It may have been, initially, that plans for closer economic integration included only the DRV. If one accepts the hypothesis that the status quo following the cease fire was to continue for an indefinite
number of years, therefore, the unexpected nature of the final victory
must have been followed by a period of re-thinking on the part of the
Soviet Union. This would be confirmed by the muted Soviet response to the
victory of 1975, the discrepancy in definitions of unity that emerged in
the speeches of the Soviet and Vietnamese leadership, and the ambiguous
nature of Soviet publications on Vietnam up to 1976. By the first meeting
of the National Assembly in 1976, however, some kind of compromise
appeared to have been arrived at, and the application of the Soviet
analysis, in terms of socialist construction and socialist transformation,
signified a move towards the political and economic integration of both
halves of the country.

In the light of this, could SRV membership of the CMEA be described
as unexpected? This hardly seems likely, given the events of the
preceding few years, such as the increased participation of Vietnam within
the institutional structure of the CMEA, the coordination of economic
plans, and so forth. In retrospect, the signposts seem to point in this
direction, though one must qualify this by saying that these measures did
not necessarily require formal membership of the CMEA on the part of the
SRV. It may, however, have been the timing of membership that was
precipitated by external events. If this be the case, it seems plausible
to suppose that the event in question was the issue of Cambodia.

It should be noted that SRV membership of the CMEA and the signing
and ratification of the Soviet/Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation were quickly followed by Soviet support for SRV intervention
in Cambodia and the setting up of the Heng Samrin government. It seems
likely that the Soviet Union were reluctant to give their support to such
a venture without first committing the SRV to a closer alliance. If one
does make this connection, however, it raises the further question of what
particular "trade off" might have been given or received. To suggest that
in return for Soviet support in Cambodia, the SRV agreed to membership of the CMEA and the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation would imply that the SRV were reluctant to take these steps. Given the hints of policy disagreements that emerged within the SRV leadership from 1976 onwards, it is possible that the SRV leadership were divided on the need to formalize the Soviet alliance.

Thirdly, and related to the foregoing point, one should ask to what extent policy decisions were dictated by the Vietnamese themselves, rather than by Soviet initiatives? The events of 1972, such as the launching of the March offensive, the propaganda attacks on the Soviet Union and the release of the draft peace agreement, demonstrate the willingness of the Vietnamese to challenge the Soviet Union and set their own priorities and timing, even when these clashed with Soviet policy objectives. This is also evident, to some extent, in the offensive of 1975 and the early phase of Vietnamese hostilities with Cambodia.

With regard to 1972, the challenge was not successful, and the DRV were obliged to abandon their goal of a reunified state in favour of the settlement achieved in Paris. Can the same be said of the events surrounding the final victory of 1975, however, and Vietnamese hostilities with Cambodia? Following the final victory of 1975, for example, the Soviet Union, did, initially, appear reluctant to support the Vietnamese desire to press ahead with the economic and political integration of the two halves of Vietnam, and it seems likely that this goal was a Vietnamese initiative. A similar situation pertained with regard to Vietnamese hostilities with Cambodia, where apparent Soviet disinterestedness was abruptly replaced by support for the Vietnamese position. The evidence on these last two points, however, is by no means as conclusive as that for 1972. How, therefore, is one to evaluate these events?

One should, perhaps, consider the relative weight of each issue
before making an assessment. To claim that the DRV failed in 1972, becomes irrelevant in the light of the final victory of 1975 and the greater long term gains of both reunification and Cambodia as a sphere of Vietnamese influence. The outstanding characteristic of the Vietnamese leadership is persistence, even when the desired objectives conflict with Soviet policy goals. That such challenges were not always successful, therefore, should be seen in the context of long term gains. From this perspective, the Vietnamese emerge with substantial independence and power of leverage in their relationship to the Soviet Union, and this should be taken into account when assessing the balance within the Soviet/Vietnam alliance.

To sum up, therefore, Soviet/Vietnam relations evolved gradually, throughout the seventies. This development was patchy and uneven. The consolidation of ideological positions shown by the Fourth Congress of the VLD/CPV reflected the closer integration of Vietnam with the Soviet bloc. The outcome, for example, the Soviet/Vietnam treaty and membership of the CMEA was by no means a foregone conclusion, although, in retrospect, it may appear to have its own internal logic. Many factors contributed to this outcome, for example, the changing international situation, the post-cease fire economic situation, the internal politics of the DRV and the choices of its leadership.

The Soviet relationship with Vietnam has not always run smoothly. This was most apparent in 1972, when several incidents, for example, the events of May, which almost precipitated the cancellation of the Nixon Moscow visit, and the negotiations of October surrounding the draft agreement, led to serious differences of policy. It is interesting to note that the proposed Brezhnev visit to Hanoi in 1973 did not materialize. It seems likely that, initially, similar disagreements arose with regard to post cease fire policy choices.
Vietnam occupies an ambiguous position in relation to the Soviet Union, conforming neither wholly to the position of an integrated member of the Soviet bloc nor to that of a developing country. This is most clearly demonstrated by both the actualities of membership of the CMEA and the terms of the Soviet/Vietnam treaty.

Perhaps the most important factor for Vietnam in the changing international situation was the United States rapprochement with China. In 1969, the DRV had not yet emerged from its position of cautious neutrality between the Soviet Union and China. The announcement of the Nixon visit in 1971, however, without prior warning being given to the North Vietnamese by the PRC, seriously undermined confidence in Chinese motives. By 1976, it would appear that the newly emerged SRV had abandoned any pretence to evenhandedness in its relations with the Soviet Union and China. Whilst there was some conflict between the DRV and the Soviet Union as a result of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of detente and the priority this accorded to Vietnam in Soviet foreign policy, disagreements did not have the same long-term impact on Soviet/Vietnam relations as did disagreements with China.

Following the cease-fire of 1973, the DRV again pursued the simultaneous strategy of reconstruction in the North whilst seeking the opportunity for further military gains in the South. The final victory of 1975, followed by the decision to press ahead with reunification in 1976, however, gave added impetus to the need for reconstruction aid. It was precisely at this point that Chinese aid was cut off entirely and the prospect of normalization of relations with the United States and the possibility of war reparations consequent upon this, retreated into the distance. At this critical period, therefore, the SRV had no option but to turn to the Soviet bloc.

This, however, should be seen in terms of policy choices, rather
than an ideological or political preference for a pro-Moscow or pro-Peking orientation. This latter framework implies that the SRV have, in some way, been manipulated into their present situation by a more powerful ally, for motives that are unclear. Whilst ideological and political conformity may have been the price the SRV paid for Soviet aid and support, one should proceed from an understanding of the policy choices that confronted the Vietnamese leadership, in order to shed some light on their motives. Phrasing the question in terms of policy, therefore, concedes a more active role to the Vietnamese than would otherwise be possible. Thus, from 1976 onwards, the Soviet Union was the only source of the aid necessary to finance the work of reunification and reconstruction, the prime goal of the SRV leadership. Since the Vietnamese, for their part, demonstrated a willingness to seek aid wherever it might be found, one has to consider the possibility that the failure of the west, especially the United States, to provide the necessary reconstruction aid, contributed to cementing the Soviet/Vietnam alliance. To this one must add the ability of the Soviet Union to foresee and grasp opportunities, wherever they may arise.

With regard to Vietnam and China, one discerns a straightforward clash of interests over the issue of Cambodia as a Vietnamese sphere of influence, and, in this respect, the Soviet Union proved a useful ally. It was, however, a policy choice that led to the breakdown of SRV relations with China, not a preference for one or other mode of development.

The Le Duan leadership has been characterized by a willingness to take risks, compared to the even-handed approach of the Ho Chi Minh period with regard to the Soviet Union and China. To this one must add, however, the fact that the situation in which they were operating had changed. Theories of communist leadership however, cannot adequately explain the
importance that should be accorded to individual members of the leadership in assessing the overall policy process. Undoubtedly, there were divisions within the Vietnamese politbureau with regard to the direction the SRV was taking in relation to the Soviet Union, the most visible and highly publicized being that of Hong Van Hoan. There seems to have been more consensus than opposition, however, pragmatism and the need to take advantage of the concrete assistance the Soviet Union could provide, winning out over other considerations. Nevertheless, the work of, for example, Rogers (Rogers, 1976) shows that techniques developed in the mainstream of Soviet Studies, such as content analysis and elite studies, might usefully be applied to the SRV leadership in order to shed some light on this grey area.

The main finding of this research, however, is the need to seriously re-evaluate the relationship between a client state, such as Vietnam, and a patron, such as the Soviet Union. On the one hand, one needs a less simplistic analysis of Soviet policy than that provided by the expansionist or encroachment school of thought. One must not overlook the obvious point that a clear understanding of Soviet objectives in Asia is a prerequisite to any statement that the Vietnamese are implementing Soviet policy in Southeast Asia. One has to explain, for example, why the Soviet Union should pursue a policy with regard to Vietnam which causes great anxiety to ASEAN states such as Thailand, whilst, at the same time attempting to court the favour of the non-capitalist states of Asia with the Asian Collective Security Plan. Furthermore, one should ask whether prolonged hostilities between the SRV and the PRC are in the long-term Soviet interest with regard to China, before attributing support for such hostilities to the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, one needs a more realistic assessment of Vietnamese capabilities vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The evidence suggests
that on several occasions the DRV were in direct conflict with the Soviet Union, and did not prove pliable to manipulation. One could argue that on some occasions, the dynamics of the relationship appeared to function the other way around, the actions of the DRV seriously threatening Soviet policy towards the United States, and that Vietnam had, in fact, been able to exert substantial leverage on the Soviet Union. It may be that the Soviet Union were urged, by the United States, to pressure the DRV to settle in 1973. The argument concerning this matter has generally ranged around whether or not this was the case, and assumed that the Soviet Union lacked only the political will. This may be a mistaken assumption, based on a serious underestimation of the Vietnamese, and one should not overlook the possibility that the Soviet Union lacked that degree of influence.

Finally, one should query the assumption underlying the view that Vietnam is a weak, puppet state being manipulated by a powerful Soviet ally. Implicit in this view is the assumption that the leadership of third world states are incapable of managing their own affairs. In the case of the Vietnamese leadership, who appear wide awake to the policy choices confronting them, this is certainly not the case.

On a theoretical level, this study raises the question of whether Vietnam is best seen as a Marxist-Leninist state or a developing country. A study of the Soviet Union in the Asian sphere requires a theoretical framework that does not arrive ready made. Is one, for example, dealing with problems of development, problems of international relations or problems specifically relevant to Marxist-Leninist states? Furthermore, a major problem in any two country study involving the Soviet Union is that Soviet foreign policy is global in conception. One therefore needs a framework that can take into account factors such as the relationship of the Soviet Union with the United States, of particular relevance in the
case of Vietnam. Unfortunately, the global nature of Soviet foreign policy means that one is obliged to cast the net very wide in order to focus on a particular issue and place it in perspective, and one often finds oneself discussing the entire world before getting down to the matter in hand. One could further argue that it has been something of an oversight not to focus more directly on what could be called the Southeast Asia dimension. This, however, would be to delineate the problem in narrow geographical terms, a delineation from which, to some extent, this study is seeking to extricate itself. Part of the work of this thesis, therefore, has consisted of exploring frames of reference. To this end, a multi-dimensional approach has been adopted.

If the SRV is seen in Marxist-Leninist terms, one tends to think in terms of the paradigm of Eastern Europe, with which the Vietnamese situation is not entirely compatible. What precisely is the Soviet model, however, and is Vietnam simply a variant of this, both with regard to internal organization and relations with other Soviet bloc states?

As outlined in the introduction, there are different interpretations of this. Nevertheless, attempting an analysis at a political level does imply certain general suppositions. These include, for example, the belief that there are problems specific to the functioning of communist parties and their relationship to the Soviet Union, and that it is, in any case, valid to compare communist parties and their structure and organization. The choice of material itself presupposes a framework, even though this may not be explicit. Thus any attempt to study party is dominated by the presuppositions of the totalitarian model, that is to say, that political decision-making is the basis for the total organization of society. This is as true for the present study, as it is for the work of Zagoria (Zagoria, 1967), Scalopino (Scalopino, 1963), Elliott (Elliott, 1975), Turley (Turley, 1980) et al. Unwritten
assumptions, therefore, shown by selectivity in choice of material, lie behind much of the work on Vietnam.

This is not to suggest that such assumptions are invalid. That the totalitarian model still dominates thinking in this sphere, in spite of efforts to re-evaluate it, is perhaps a measure of its usefulness. It does at least allow for a political analysis, and allows one to focus on decision-making rather than policy implications. Its weakness, however, is in failing to provide any explanation of motivation, other than in terms of an ill-defined concept of power. What, furthermore, is the basis for applying this model to any given state, and what list of characteristics can one identify and systematize in order to draw up a typology?

There is considerable disagreement on this issue and the method by which communist states should be defined and categorized. Is one, for example, to draw up a list of objective economic criteria? This is a relatively simple exercise when seeking a basis to apply western theories of development, but says very little concerning political organization. Should one, therefore, identify features and characteristics of political organization, and does the fact that a state may describe itself as "socialist" or "communist" carry any weight? This latter point has caused considerable confusion in attempting an analysis of many emerging African states, as for example, in the case of Ethiopia, often with unfortunate results. One finds oneself drawn into a discussion concerning the real nature of socialism, and what such a society might look like, could it be said to truly exist. For this reason, Marxist-Leninist has been preferred to either socialist or communist, as a descriptive term, the other terms implying a more coloured political standpoint on the part of the observer.

To enter into a discussion concerning the nature of socialism, therefore, is, perhaps, a different type of exercise, valid for the
historian or sociologist, but of little relevance to the political realities of Soviet foreign policy. If one can accept this viewpoint, and abandon the search for objective criteria, it removes the major obstacle to applying the Soviet typology, and defining as Marxist-Leinist, or of socialist orientation, any state so defined by the Soviet Union, thus at least providing some systematic basis for comparing states.

Table VIII, therefore, gives a shortened version of Ulyanovsky's typology (Ulyanovsky, 1974), showing Vietnam in relation to other states defined by the Soviet Union as socialist or of socialist orientation. Whilst this provides no unusual results, it does serve to illustrate some possible basis for comparison. As can be seen, there is a fundamental differentiation within the Soviet schema, between capitalist and non-capitalist development. It may not be valid, therefore, to look for a strict comparison between Vietnam and the relationship of the Eastern European states to the Soviet Union, since both groups lie on opposite sides of the division between capitalist and non-capitalist development. Vietnam more properly belongs with a consideration of Mongolia and North Korea. This cannot be explained by the fact that they are all Asian states, if one considers the possible place of China within the schema.

China, it should be remembered, is deemed to have taken the capitalist path to development, having, presumably, gone astray somewhere in the lower reaches of the revolutionary divide. The SRV, therefore, lies on the continuum that includes the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

The drawback to relying completely on the Soviet typology, however, is that it is a closed system, and, in this instance, provides no framework for considering the problems of Vietnam in relation to other states not included within the Soviet frame of reference. It is at this point, therefore, that the international relations perspective becomes helpful.
TABLE VIII

SOVIET CLASSIFICATION OF MARXIST-LENINIST STATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT</th>
<th>NON-CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT</th>
</tr>
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STAGE II

Soviet Union

STAGE I

**Second Phase**

Eastern Europe

**First Phase**

SRV

North Korea

Mongolia

---revolution---

SOCIALIST ORIENTATION

Angola

Ethiopia

(Source: derived from Ulyanovsky (Ulyanovsky, 1974))
Once again, the assumptions employed are implicit rather than explicit, and are based on somewhat fundamental constructs, which, at the very least, accept the state as the unit of analysis. Even within international relations as a discipline, however, theorists are in disagreement as to how, and at what level, relations between states are conducted. What emerges from this study, however, is a divergence in the method by which relations are conducted between Marxist-Leninist and western states, and, therefore, one is dealing with two dissimilar commodities. Within the Marxist-Leninist state, for example, relations occur at one level only, a political level, and even cultural exchange is incorporated within a political framework. The Soviet-Vietnam Friendship Society would be an example of this. Thus whilst an event such as the meeting in Versailles timed to coincide with the Paris Peace Talks, cited in Chapter Four, if looked at from the American side, might provide evidence in support of linkage theory and the role of pressure groups in international relations, the Soviet involvement signified no such thing, but was rather the result of a direct decision at a leadership level. Whilst, therefore, it is conceivably possible to examine the SRV in the light, of say, Rosenau's linkage theory (Rosenau, 1969), one should be aware of the limitations of such theories when applied to a Marxist-Leninist state. Vietnam, it seems, does not fit easily into any category.

Does the SRV, therefore constitute a new model or paradigm for relations with the Soviet Union? This question is best answered by examining the special features of the relationship of the Soviet Union and the SRV. These can be listed as follows:

1. War of national liberation
2. Communist party pre-dates the formation of the state
3. Marxist-Leninist state achieved without Soviet intervention
4. Similar economic status but different treaty arrangement to other
eastern bloc states

A war of national liberation is a characteristic of many third world states. The special feature of Vietnam is that this was carried out by the communist party, therefore it is different to countries such as Angola and Ethiopia. That the party pre-dates the state shows more similarities with North Korea. This parallel falls down when one considers the third characteristic, that of a Marxist-Leninist state achieved without Soviet intervention. In this respect, the SRV has more in common with post-war Yugoslavia. Finally, one could argue that the economic status together with the different treaty arrangement parallels the status of Cuba, if one takes the different treaty arrangement in this case to mean no treaty at all. To claim that the SRV constitutes an emerging model for bloc relations, therefore, does not really stand up to closer examination. Vietnam would only seem to constitute a paradigm of Vietnam.

On the other hand, one must recognize the diversity in Soviet foreign policy. Plurality in Eastern Europe is well documented, especially in the area of foreign policy, an example of this being Romania, therefore, plurality, in itself, is nothing new. The key differences for Vietnam are the relative unimportance of military might and Vietnam's geopolitical situation. Further, theories of communist states usually interpret foreign relations in terms of military considerations, that is, the Soviet bloc is held together by force.

Vietnam diverges from the Eastern European model of bloc relations in that it is not constrained by geopolitical considerations or military might. Therefore, the bond must be supplied by something else. Possible suggestions would include the appeal of Marxism-Leninism to a third world state wishing to industrialize rapidly, on the one hand, and the willingness of the Soviet Union to provide aid, on the other. This does not negate the possibility that the Soviet motivation may be
military/strategic, but one must see the relationship as based on mutual advantage, not the power of the jack boot. One is thus brought round full circle to question fundamental western conceptualizations of the Soviet Union, and the underlying assumption that the Soviet system contains such overwhelmingly negative features that no state, unless inherently evil or hopelessly misguided, could possibly choose such an alliance willingly. This, perhaps, is an area for further exploration and discussion, rather than a question to which any definitive answer can be provided.

This in turn leads on to a consideration of the implications of such a study. Can one usefully compare the relationship of the Soviet Union and the SRV with that of the other "socialist countries of Asia", that is, Mongolia and North Korea, or is it of more relevance to "countries of socialist orientation" that is, Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua and so forth? Whilst providing no complete answer, the fact that the SRV does not conform entirely to the position of other Soviet bloc states raises the possibility, at least, of discarding the implicit assumptions of the Eastern European model of bloc relations when considering the Soviet relationship with the emerging Asian, African and Latin American states, and attempting to look more closely at the individual features of each situation.
APPENDIX A

Biographical Details of the Vietnamese Leadership

CHU HUY MAN
b. 1920. A Colonel General in the Vietnamese People's Army and by race, a member of the minority peoples of the Vietnamese Highlands. Long been a member of the Central Committee. Elevated to full membership of the Politbureau, 1976, though lacks weight in leadership and appointment probably designed to please minority peoples.

DO MUOI

HOANG ANH
Elected to Central Committee and became member of the Secretariat, 1951. Has wide-ranging political, military and managerial experience. Chairman, Central Agricultural Commission and Vice-Premier.

HOANG VAN HOAN
b. 1905. Membership of Central Committee since 1951 and of the Politbureau for most of this time. Vice-Chairman, National Assembly Standing Committee. Has travelled widely. Was ambassador to Mongolia and North Korea in fifties, one of Pham Van Dong's assistants at Geneva Conference. Has led numerous delegations to Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China during sixties. Has held various posts in party and state organisation.

LE DUAN
b. 1908. Probably an early member of the ICP. Up until the early fifties, active in the South. Recalled to North about 1953, given Politbureau
member since 1957. Ho turned to him for assistance in running party following Land Reform. Visited Moscow with Ho Chi Minh as early as 1957. It is claimed that during this period he won Moscow's confidence, which he has retained ever since. No evidence to suggest that he was the architect of the 1972 offensive, as there is of his role in 1959–60, 1963–64, 1967–68. Working relationship with Pham Van Dong reported to be excellent, but not possible to say with reference to Giap or Truong Chinh. Said to have clashed with Le Duc Tho over unspecified policy issues in early fifties.

b. 1910. Has long been a key figure in the party. Politbureau membership dates from 1951. Has headed Organization Department since some time before Third Congress. Former head of first Directorate in early fifties. In 1968 named "Special Adviser" to the DRV delegation to the Paris Peace Talks.

Biographical details unknown

b. 1911. Official records date his Politbureau membership from 1960. Also vice-premier since 1960. Career has followed an economic course. DRV's principal aid negotiator and has headed many trade delegations since 1959

b. 1910. Elevated to Politbureau, December, 1976. Was, however, founder member of the party, member of Central Committee and government minister until 1956, when forced to resign as a result of his association with the Land Reform Campaign. Returned to Central
Committee 1960 and worked as a party secretary. Possibly least important member, and elevation symbolic in order to show his complete rehabilitation. Dropped from Politbureau March, 1982.

Headed the Army's General Political Directorate from 1951, a body which supervised the ideological aspects of military training. The GPD was subordinate to the Central Committee, not the Defence Ministry, headed by Giap. Thus Nguyen Chi Thanh was able to advance the theory of party primacy over professionalism. In this he clashed with Giap. The dispute was not resolved until early 1961, when Giap's newly elected supporters in the Central Committee eased him out of the GPD.


Full member of Central Committee since 1960. Appointed to the Secretariat, 1967. Vice-Premier and Chairman of State Planning Commission, but has held positions in both party and state apparatus.


b. 1922. Has managerial rather than political talent. Vice-Chairman of the State Planning Commission, with
NGUYEN VAN CUC

_aliases Nguyen Van Linh_. b. 1913. Member of the Central Committee and active in revolutionary activities in the South for many years, but did not hold office in NLF or PRG. Became Deputy Secretary of the People's Revolutionary Party and Deputy Secretary of the VWP's southern branch.

NGUYEN VAN TRAN

b. 1916. Principal post since 1968 as Secretary, Hanoi City Party Committee. One of the few leaders who had some education in France. Elected to Central Committee 1951. Held various state posts but from 1967 head of Education Bureau of Propaganda and Training Department of Central Committee and member of Secretariat.

PHAM HUNG


PHAM VAN DONG

b. 1906. Prime Minister of DRV since 1955. Elected to Central Committee and Politbureau, 1951. Is the key man in the state apparatus. Headed several delegations to both Russia and China and said to enjoy confidence of leaders of both sides.

SONG HAO

Biographical details unknown

TO HUU

b. 1920. Elected alternate member of Politbureau, 1976 at Fourth Party Congress. Elevated to full membership, March, 1982 at Fifth Party Congress or
possibly earlier than this. The Central Committee's propagandist. Has been alternate member of Central Committee since 1951. Became full member, 1954. Held various positions in the state apparatus, and is currently head of Propaganda and Education Department of Secretariat, a post held since 1961. Is reportedly chief censor in SRV and disliked by intellectuals, in spite of his acknowledged talent as a poet.

b. 1910. Member of Central Committee since 1951, alternate member of Politbureau since 1960. Elevated to full membership 1972 or 1973. Minister of Public Security since 1953. In addition to police and secret police, the Public Security Ministry directs the Peoples' Armed Security Forces, and hence it is under the supervision of the Central Party Military Committee. Has been a member of the National Defence Council since 1960.

b. 1908. Second in rank in leadership and Chairman, National Assembly Standing Committee. Founder member of ICP. Secretary General of Party until 1956, when he resigned as a result of Land Reform, for which he was accorded most of the blame. Within a few years was back in Party favour, and in July 1960, elected to present post and September, 1960, re-elected to Politbureau. Possibly played a large role in launching 1972 offensive.

b. 1917. Military commander in charge of campaign in South. Elevated to Politbureau, 1972/73. Chief of Staff of VPA since 1953. Elected to Central Committee

(alias Vo Chi Cong). b. 1912. A southerner, active in the revolutionary movement since the thirties. Held high office in the NLF and became Chairman of the Peoples' Revolutionary Party. Became full member of the Politbureau in 1976.

Biographical details unknown

b. 1912. Elected to Central Committee about 1958 and subsequently to Secretariat. Held various state posts, including Foreign Minister from 1963 to 1965. Came to the fore in 1968, when he was appointed chief of DRV delegation to Paris Peace Talks. Was given ministerial rank.

(Sources: Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. Data valid up to Fifth Party Congress, 1982)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>AGREEMENT</th>
</tr>
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| 1969 | Agreement on air services, June 20th  
Agreement on military and economic aid, October 14th/15th |
| 1970 | Agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation, May 29th  
Agreement on additional economic and military assistance, June 11th  
Agreement on exchanges of specialists, September 8th  
Agreement on economic and military assistance, credits, October 22nd |
| 1971 | Agreement on economic and military aid, February 9th  
"additional aid" agreement (announced Pravda, August 19th, no specific date given)  
A series of agreements on long-term trade, cultural, scientific and technical ties, October 9th  
Agreement on additional military aid (reported Pravda, December 31st) |
| 1972 | Agreement on economic and military aid, December 9th  
Agreement on the formation of a Soviet-Vietnamese Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, December 9th  
Agreement on electrical and postal links, March 16th |
Agreement on the training of specialists, July 25th
Agreement on economic and technical cooperation and trade for the period 1974-1975, August 14th

Agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation, November 11th
Agreement on technical and economic assistance, December 8th
Agreement on radio and television, December 10th

Agreement on economic assistance, May 12th
Agreement on trade turnover and payments, 1976-1980, protocol on trade turnover, 1976, October 31st
Technical and economic assistance agreement, December 18th

Agreement on economic aid and a protocol on the co-ordination of economic plans, October 30th

SRV join International Bank for Economic Cooperation, International Investment Bank (reported Pravda, June 25th)

CMEA session admits SRV (reported Pravda, June 30th)
Consular convention, September 29th
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, November 3rd
Agreement on the development of economic, scientific and technical cooperation, November 3rd
Agreement on Soviet assistance in developing the Hanoi-Ho Chi Minh City railway, November 3rd
Agreement on technical assistance in building a bridge over the Red River, enlarging the Hanoi railway junction and
widening the gauge of the Hanoi-Haiphong railway, November 3rd
Agreement on cooperation in the training of Vietnamese specialists, November 3rd
Agreement on cooperation in establishing plantations of medicinal herbs, November 3rd
Agreement on the construction of a ground space communication station in the SRV, November 3rd

(Sources: Pravda, Izvestia)
FOOTNOTES

Introduction

1. The Korean Airlines passenger jet, shot down over the Sea of Japan by a Soviet fighter pilot in 1983, is perhaps an example of this (The Times, September 2nd, 1983). Whilst neither side claims it was confused with a missile, it was certainly seen as a threat.

Chapter One

1. It is claimed (Schram, Carrière d'Encausse, 1965), that usually only the theses of Lenin are referred to, since it was Roy's original version, and not the version adopted by the Congress after debate and modification in the commission, that was inserted in the German and Russian stenographic report. This mistake was not uncovered until 1934, consequently, little serious attention was paid to what appeared to be Roy's sectarian and Asian-orientated view. See op. cit. pp. 200-205, 212-215, respectively, for annotated texts, showing the modifications to the two sets of complementary theses subsequently adopted.

2. With reference specifically to Vietnam, the history of this period is well documented (Duiker, 1975, Trager, 1960, McLane, 1966).

3. In this connection, it would be interesting to examine the content of the Romanian claim to be a "socialist developing country" (King, 1978). This was part of the Romanian attempt, during the seventies, to gain status as a developing country, in order to thereby qualify for greater economic concessions in relation to her CMEA partners.

4. Up until at least the early nineteen eighties, Afghanistan was categorized as a "state of socialist orientation" (Ushakova, 1980). This was subsequently re-adjusted to "building socialism". Whilst this upgrading is related to political events, it did not follow immediately upon the installation of the Barbrak Kemal regime, and there was a period during which the analysis appeared somewhat fudged.

5. See table V, Chapter Six.

6. For the background to these events, see Hinton (Hinton, 1971), and Duevel, (Duevel, 1969).

7. It has been argued, for example, that western dissatisfaction over the course of detente and a feeling of having been put at a disadvantage with regard to relations with third world states, stems more from a misreading, by the west, of Soviet intentions, which, all along, had been quite explicit on this point (Laqueur, 1973, Lowenthal, 1976).

8. The Soviet muted response to the Vietnam/China war in 1979, for example, would seem to confirm this view - see Chapter V.

9. For the background to Japan-Soviet relations and the "Northern Territories" question, see Kimura (Kimura, 1980).

Chapter Two

1. In spite of this, one can experience considerable difficulties with regard to access to information when studying in the Soviet Union - see
Byrnes "Moscow Revisited" for an interesting account of some of the problems (Byrnes, 1977-1978). Mr. Byrnes' experience is not uncommon.

2. The early history of oriental studies in the Soviet Union and the period following the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956 is covered by Luba A. Holowaty (Holowaty, 1970) in her work on the countries of the African Horn. This is because up until 1959, African studies were dealt with within the Institute of Oriental Studies. Following this date, it was re-named the Institute of the Peoples of Asia and a new, independent African Institute created. See also Laqueur (Laqueur, 1960).

3. The Southeast Asia Section was established by V. A. Zharov in 1956. The initial director of the Institute, B. G. Gafurov, was succeeded by Evgeny Primakov sometime in the early seventies. Under Primakov's direction, there was perhaps a trend towards work with a more economic slant, as his position as former Pravda correspondent would indicate. Gafurov was an orientalist, from Azerbaijan. During this period, several changes were made within the administrative structure of the institute. Gennadi Chufrin, formerly of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was appointed head of the Southeast Asia Section, I. S. Kasekevich, a Korea specialist, was appointed head of the Department of Socialist Countries, and G. F. Kim, formerly head of the Department of Socialist Countries and also a Korea specialist, was put in charge of general problems.

4. It has been suggested (Pope, 1975, pp.15-16), that each institute maintains a house journal for closed circulation. This is quite probable, given the fact that Soviet scholars are often better informed than their publications would suggest. Pope further claims, however, that the difference is one of factual content, and that the quality of analysis and interpretation in both open and closed publications remains the same.

5. Interestingly, during the seventies, there were several Soviet publications on western orientalists (Saryichev, 1978, Isaev, 1978). A publication on the contemporary historiography of the Far East contains a chapter which charts the history of the development of oriental studies in the United States (Kleinman, 1977).

6. A reference to the April 13th meeting during Pham Van Dong's March/April, 1974 visit to Moscow, lists the Soviet side as including "S.S. Nemchina, Head, Southeast Asian Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs" (Pravda, April 14th, 1974). A previous reference to "S. S. Nemchin" as head of the Southeast Asia Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, lists him/her as being present during talks between Kosygin and Le Thanh Nghi on February 10th, 1971 (Pravda, February 11th, 1971). No such person appears in the biobibliographical information, nor is there any record of publications. This last point is unusual.

7. I. A. Rogachev does not appear in the biobibliographical information on Soviet orientalists. There is, however, an entry for an A. P. Rogachev, a specialist in Chinese language (Miliband, 1977, p.475). A. P. Rogachev, born 1900, was, for a time, connected with the Higher Diplomatic School of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as having taught at the Institute of Oriental Languages, MGY. It is interesting to speculate as to whether I. A. Rogachev might not be his son, for, as stated, the diplomatic/academic community is relatively small and is inter-related often, in a literal sense.
8. Gafurov is also listed as Deputy Chairman, Committee of Solidarity of African and Asian Countries (Miliband, 1977, p.133). This is an interesting connection. The Soviet-Vietnam Friendship Society comes under the umbrella of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee (Power, 1967). See also "Sovetsko-"v'etnamskaya dryzhba i sotrydnichestvo" in "Vietnam v bor'be (Vietnam v bor'be, 1981, Chap. VI). A founder member of the society, Nguyen Khanh Toan, was reportedly a language teacher in the Soviet Union in the twenties and thirties (Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes, 1973a, p.77), and has published in Soviet journals (Nguyen Khanh Toan, 1974, Nguyen Kh Khan Toan, 1977). Nguyen Van Kinh, a former Chairman of the society, was a member of the Central Committee of the VWP (SWB, October 7th, 1971, FE/3606/A2/2, Tass in English, October 5th, 1971). In 1980, he was replaced by Xuan Thuy and the society acquired new statutes (SWB, April 22nd, 1980, FE/6401/A2/1, VNA in English, April 11th, 1980). Certainly, from the Vietnamese side, therefore, the society developed increasingly overt links with the party organisation.

Chapter Three

1. Following the list of delegations from communist parties of capitalist and third world countries, were listed a group of parties described as "friendly parties with which the CPSU maintains and is developing fruitful ties" (XXIV s'ezd., 1, 1971, p.10). This list was headed by a delegation from the NLF and also included a delegation from the Patriotic Front of Laos.

2. A message of fraternal greeting from the Central Committee of the CCP, however, was read to the congress on December 16th (SWB, December 17th, 1976, FE/5392/1). This message had earlier been broadcast by the NCNA (SWB, December 14th, 1976, FE/5389/1). The text, however, was merely appropriate to the occasion, congratulating the Vietnamese on their victory and the successes of the Party, and expressing support for the continuing friendship of the two parties and the two peoples (SWB, December 15th, 1976, FE/5390/C/3, 4, NCNA in English, December 13th, 1976).

3. The FLPH version of this includes the sentence, "A series of new democracies came into being", which is inserted prior to that beginning, "The great victory of the Chinese revolution..." (Parti Communiste Du Viet Nam, IVe Congres National, 1977, p. 152).

4. There has been some controversy over the work of Honey (Porter, 1980, p.256, Porter, 1973). Nevertheless, Honey was, during the sixties, one of the few writers on Vietnamese affairs. Whether because of Honey's analysis or for other reasons, the view that there is a simple pro-Moscow, pro-Peking split within the DRV gained such currency, and even now represents a view so widely held, that it warrants arguing against.

5. These changes may have been precipitated by a policy disagreement concerning hostilities with China. If one subscribes to the hypothesis that Moscow were not in favour of war with China, this makes the issue more complicated than a simple pro-Moscow/pro Peking dichotomy.

6. Truong Chinh was removed from his post as First Secretary following the unsuccessful Land Reform Campaign of 1956. Most histories of North Vietnam contain an account of this period. See also Porter (Porter, 1972) for a more controversial view.

7. Nguyen Van Linh, alias Nguyen Van Cuc, was elevated to the

8. It was reported from Thailand, following Ho Chi Minh's death, that "Premier Thanom Kittikachen forecasts power struggle between four top leaders, especially Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap" (SWB, September 11th, 1969, Bangkok home service, September 4th, 1969). This may have been no more than wishful thinking on the part of the Thai government, rather than the informed statement of those "in the know". However, in the context of the above, it does seem something of a coincidence that Giap should be mentioned by name.

9. Brezhnev's speech to the Fifth Congress of the Polish Party (Pravda, November 13th, 1968), justifying Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, gave rise to the doctrine of limited sovereignty, dubbed the "Brezhnev Doctrine" in the west. This amounted to the view that socialist states had a right to intervene in each others' internal affairs, if the interests of all were threatened.

Chapter Four


3. The sheer volume of publications on Vietnam emanating from the Nixon-Kissinger administration is no indication of merit however. John P. Leacacos, for example, in his discussion of the "Kissinger apparat", claims that,

"The options mystique has even inspired some critics to accuse Kissinger of cynically circumventing the bureaucracy by hogtieing it to meaningless NSC studies while he and his staff focus on the essential issues."

(Leacacos, 1971-72, p.23)

Between January, 1969 and October, 1971, for example, no less than fifteen National Security Study Memoranda were published, dealing variously with Vietnam, Indochina and Southeast Asia.

4. For an interesting account of the Tet offensive, giving both the official United States view, and the experience of eye-witnesses on the spot, see Frances FitzGerald, "Fire in the Lake" (FitzGerald, 1973, Chap. 15). For political comment and analysis see also Oberdorfer, "Tet" (Oberdorfer, 1971) and Pike, "War, Peace and the Viet Cong" (Pike, 1969).

6. Nixon claims, with reference to Kissinger's secret meetings that, "The story of Kissinger's secret meetings with the North Vietnamese, which began on August 4, 1969, and extended over the next three years, is an extraordinary one, full of classic cloak-and-dagger episodes, with Kissinger riding slouched down in the back seats of speeding Citroëns, eluding inquisitive reporters and putting curious embassy officials off the scent." (Nixon, 1978, p.396)

By 1972, however, the meetings had, in fact, become an open secret, and were reported in the press as a matter of course, leading one to suspect that another set of even more secret meetings might not have been taking place elsewhere.

7. The conference was reported to have been held "in the locality of the Lao-Vietnam-China border areas" (SWB, April 28th, 1970, FE/3364/i). The joint declaration was signed by Pham Van Dong for the DRV, Norodom Sihanouk for Cambodia, Prince Souphanouvong, President of the Lao Patriotic Front, for Laos and Nguyen Huu Tho, for the PRG (SWB, April 28th, 1970, FE/3364/A3/6, VNA in English, April 27th, 1970).

8. It was reported that Le Duan made a six week stay in the Soviet Union in 1971. The original purpose of his visit had been to attend the Twenty Fourth Congress of the CPSU. Much of the visit was shrouded in secrecy, but the commentator suggests that Le Duan, in failing health, had come for medical treatment. Of its nature, the situation had to be kept secret (Radio Free Europe Research, May 11th, 1971).

9. This was a conference of assorted left groups, which included some eight hundred delegates from seventy five countries, and which received Soviet approval in the form of a message of greeting from Brezhnev to the opening session of the conference (New York Times, February 12th, 1972). The conference repeatedly denounced United States policy in Vietnam (The Times, February 12th, 1972). It was suggested that the increasingly sour attitude of the United States towards the talks was exacerbated by the tolerant attitude of France towards gatherings hostile to United States policy (New York Times, February 13th, 1972). In any event, it must have been galling to the United States negotiators to have this sort of thing going on virtually down the road.

10. It was reported, for example, that although United States intelligence analysts had proved correct in their prediction of the offensive, they were not certain about the date, and their reports had not been persuasive enough to prevent Ellsworth Bunker, the United States Ambassador in Saigon, from going on holiday (New York Times, April 5th, 1972).

11. Kissinger claims that this proposal was the "subject of some fiction" and cites Szulc's article (Szulc, 1974), among others, by way of illustration. Szulc had claimed that a cease fire in place that dropped the demand for mutual troop withdrawals constituted "the first major turning point in the history of the Vietnam negotiations (Szulc, 1974, p.36) but Kissinger denies this, and claims that there was less to the proposal than met the eye (Kissinger, 1979, p.1147).

12. See Kevin Klose's article in the Washington Post (Washington Post, January 9th, 1979), drawing parallels with Politbureau decision making over this issue and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. This anecdotal account of a mid-May Politbureau meeting, picked up from
unofficial sources in Moscow, has Shelest claiming, with reference to Nixon, that "I won't shake a hand bloodied in Vietnam", and receiving short shrift from Brezhnev.

13. It is by no means clear which of these three accounts represents an accurate record, participation in the discussions not necessarily being an indication of this. Whilst full of gossipy tit bits, Kissinger's version seems inconclusive, and it is likely that he omitted much of substance, as Podgorny's subsequent visit to Hanoi must have been inspired by something more concrete than rhetoric and bombast. Other sources claim that Szulc's account of Kissinger's secret diplomacy won the approval of Kissinger himself as being "substantially correct" (Towards Peace - Vietnamisation and the Kissinger concessions, 1977, p.641).

14. In spite of the fact that Kissinger was not explicit concerning the discussions on Vietnam at the summit, he records the following conversation with Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States, on June 8th, 1972,

"On June 8 I had asked Dobrynin what had happened to Podgorny's mission to Hanoi, of which we had been told in Moscow. He said the Soviets were still waiting for an official invitation - an explanation that, given my knowledge of the Kremlin's prickly and obstreperous clients, was clearly plausible." (Kissinger, 1979, p.1303)

If this be the case, it would confirm the growing rift between Moscow and Hanoi. It would also explain the delay between the conclusion of the summit and the Podgorny trip, as previous Soviet delegations had been dispatched with great speed when there was something important to communicate.

15. Kissinger must have had one more "secret meeting" before July 19th, if, as he claims, he had suggested a secret meeting prior to the plenary session of July 13th. He hints at this, when he reveals that Nixon mistakenly thought he had met with the North Vietnamese only fifteen times, and says, in a note, that, "Actually, it has been my sixteenth secret meeting with the North Vietnamese (Kissinger, 1979, p.1319).

16. It seems unusual that Le Due Tho should have met with Mazurov rather than Katushev or Kirilenko. One possibility is to read it as a sign of disfavour, indicating tension in Soviet/Vietnam relations. It may, however, be more relevant to the situation within the Soviet leadership itself. It is possible that Mazurov sided with Shelest in the Politbureau dispute over Vietnam, and was used to convey the views of the Soviet leadership to Le Duc Tho because of his former opposition.

17. Don Luce describes how he was in a village forty miles from Hanoi. The village radio was playing and Kissinger's "peace is at hand" speech was being translated. He noticed several villagers digging their bunkers deeper as they listened and when he asked why, was told by an old man "Whenever we hear speeches like that, we get bombed." (Spragens, 1977, p. 272).

Chapter Five

1. It should be remembered that in late June, 1973, Brezhnev had paid an official visit to the United States. This may account for the emphasis, in his speeches, on peaceful coexistence. See the joint Soviet/American communique issued following the visit for the position on Vietnam (Pravda,

2. The composition of the delegation accompanying Pham Van Dong, including, as it did, Nghien Xuan Yem, Vice-Chairman of the Central Commission for Agriculture and Tran Quynh, Vice-Chairman of the State Commission for Science and Technology, would strengthen this point of view (SWB, March 20th, 1974, FE/4555/A1/1,2, VNA in English, Hanoi home service, March 18th, 1974)

3. Van Tien Dung claims in his memoirs that the Politbureau met in Hanoi from December 18th, 1974 to January 8th, 1975 (Spragens, 1977, p.21).

4. An interesting account of the last days of Saigon is given by Snepp (Snepp, 1980), a CIA officer stationed there at the time. Snepp gives an eye-witness account of the confusion that overtook the United States administration in the face of the final offensive. Snepp's book was subsequently the subject of litigation, brought by the United States Department of Justice, and further publication was suppressed. One assumes, therefore, that his revelations were something of an embarrassment to the United States intelligence services.

5. One wonders why Solomentsev, a candidate member of the Politbureau at this time, had been delegated for the task, the first visit by a Soviet leader since the fall of Saigon, and the first since Podgorny's visit of June, 1972. It would seem to be something of a drop in status for the DRV. That he had some connection with Vietnamese affairs was demonstrated as early as 1971, when he was recorded as having received the DRV ambassador (Pravda, November 17th, 1971).

6. For the background to the Lon Nol coup, see Gordon and Young, "The Khmer Republic: That Was The Cambodia That Was" (Gordon, Young, 1971). For a more jaundiced view, see also the memoirs of Prince Norodom Sihanouk (Sihanouk, 1974).

7. François Ponchaud, a catholic missionary, in Phnom Penh at the time of the Khmer Rouge takeover, who, along with other foreigners was forced to seek refuge in the French embassy, describes the following:
   "In the afternoon of Saturday the 19th had a little comic relief: four fair-haired men and three women were ushered into the embassy with their hands tied behind their backs and the barrels of the Khmer Rouge guns trained upon them. They were the diplomats of the Soviet Union and East Germany. The Soviets had put up big posters in French on the doors of their near-by embassy, reading: 'We are communists, we are your brothers. Come forward with a French-speaking interpreter'. The young Khmers Rouges had looked at the posters, presumably without understanding a word, and then, by a supreme irony of fate, forced open the doors using Soviet B-40's!"
   (Ponchaud, 1978, p.29)

8. For the background to this in terms of Soviet involvement, the reader is referred to Joseph Kun (Kun, 1976) and Eugene Shilyaeff (Shilyaeff, 1976).

9. There had, however, been a border incidents between the Soviet Union and China in 1978. See, for example, the Chinese statement on the Sino-Soviet border incident, which had involved an armed incursion by Soviet troops on 9th May, in which several Chinese were wounded. In reply to the
Soviet note of 12th May, the Chinese rejected the Soviet explanation of "inadvertent trespass" (SWB, May 18th, 1978, FE/5816/A2/1,2, NCNA in English, May 17th, 1978). If this incursion was an accident, it certainly occurred at a most unpropitious time. Whatever the reason, it should be seen more as an expression of the deteriorating situation with regard to China, than anything that materially contributed to it.

10. Interestingly, subsequent broadcasts emanating from the Voice of Democratic Cambodia seemed anxious to quash the idea that the Soviet Union and Vietnam were in disagreement. Thus,

"...The Soviet Union and Vietnam need each other like mother and child. Their need for each other is a strategic need. They need each other badly, since one of them is the international expansionist master and the other is the regional expansionist lackey. Do these two expansionists have any quarrel with each other? Should there be any quarrel, it would just be a quarrel between mother and child or among bandits of the same gang. For example, the Soviet Union does not have any quarrel with Vietnam concerning the Vietnamese special war of genocide against Kampuchea... The Soviet Union also has no dispute with Vietnam concerning the Vietnamese regional expansionist strategy in the South-East Asian region... Therefore, the Soviet Union's claim that it is dissatisfied with Vietnam on this or that matter and Vietnam's claim that it has quarrelled with the Soviet Union over this or that are only common manoeuvres planned among fellow bandits to deceive and turn the world to look at the West while they are coming in to plunder from the East..." (SWB, April 10th, 1980, FE/6391/A2/3, "VODK", April 7th, 1980).

This obscure piece of propaganda appears to rely, for its message, on conveying the belief that the Soviet Union and Vietnam were not in disagreement over Cambodia.

Chapter Six

1. Ethiopia attended as an observer for the first time at the Thirty Second Session, held in Bucharest from June 27th to June 29th, 1978 (Pravda, June 30th, 1978).


3. It would be interesting to compare this situation with that of other observer states, such as Angola or Ethiopia.

4. Schiavone, in a footnote (Schiavone, 1981, p.10), claims that there is competition among less developed members of the CMEA to get a larger share of much needed aid. Thus, he relates, at a meeting of the CMEA Executive Committee in Ulan Bator in September, 1978, Mongolia's appeals for help apparently received a half-hearted response, while the SRV was being promised, both bi-laterally and multilaterally, substantial aid to make up for the loss of Chinese assistance.

5. For the Vietnam/China war, see Buszynski (Buszynski, 1980), Donnell (Donnell, 1980), Gurtov (Gurtov, 1979), and Hung (Hung, 1979).

6. The treaties with the United Arab Republic and Somalia were subsequently abrogated by the states concerned, in March, 1976 and
November, 1972, respectively.

7. See Grenville (Grenville, 1974), for the early history of the Soviet post-war alliances.

8. Of interest in this connection is Schiavone's argument (Schiavone, 1981). Schiavone claims that the legal and institutional aspects of economic cooperation among Soviet bloc states have not been closely studied in the west. When the CMEA Charter was amended in 1974, for example, explicit mention was made of the principle of socialist internationalism in Paragraph Two of Article I. This, however, was balanced by the introduction of the principles of independence and non-interference in internal affairs (Schiavone, 1981, p.3). He goes on to say that until 1977, socialist internationalism retained a prominent place in the communiques issued at the end of CMEA sessions. From that date, it seems to decline in prominence and is replaced by a doctrine taking into account national interests (Schiavone, 1981, pp.7-8). If this be the case, it is interesting to find reference to socialist internationalism in the Soviet/Vietnam treaty, but none to the socialist division of labour.

9. It would be interesting to explore the Treaty relations of the SRV to the other members and observers of the CMEA. Following reunification, for example, the SRV concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the GDR on December 4th, 1977 (SWB, December 7th, 1977, FE/5686/A2/1,2,3, VNA in English, December 5th, 1977), and a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Laotion Democratic Peoples' Republic on July 18th, 1977 (SWB, July 20th, 1977, FE/5567/A3/9,10,11, Hanoi home service, July 19th, 1977).
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