Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to deepen our understanding about the ways in which the Balkan Slavs were perceived and represented in Britain between 1856 and 1914 by concentrating on religious, military, commercial and satirical discourses. These specific areas have not received enough detailed analysis in the existing secondary literature. This thesis has three aims: first, to investigate the ways and the extent to which British domestic and imperial concerns connected to and were explained through Balkan questions; second, to examine the effects of perceptions and prejudices on decision-making; and third, to analyze the levels of accuracy of perceptions and the concrete consequences of possible misconceptions. In terms of source material, previous studies have mostly relied on travel-writing and literature. This study widens the scope by examining a variety of textual and visual materials, ranging from diplomatic and military writing to religious treatises and cartoons. The main conclusions include that British domestic and imperial concerns coincided and were discussed through Balkan questions on a very concrete level, of which the Anglican-Orthodox reunion debate, the Bulgarian atrocities agitation campaign, issues related to domestic and imperial defence, social problems as well as representations of commercial potential of the Balkans, were among the most visible ones. The attention that the region attracted in Britain was also more nuanced than has been argued in the current literature. Preconceptions and prejudices had an effect on military and business decision-making more often than on religious positions which remained largely unaltered. In many cases, representations of the Balkans were at least partly accurate, although grave misunderstandings and misinterpretations also occurred. These views had concrete relevance most visibly in connection with newly-established British firms, whose misconceptions about the commercial potential of the Balkans partly contributed to their business failures in the region.
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### ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>BCB</td>
<td>Bulgarian Commercial Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>Bulgarian Insurance Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNB</td>
<td>Bulgarian National Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMS</td>
<td>Church Missionary Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTS</td>
<td>Catholic Truth Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Eastern Churches Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>NITCE</td>
<td>National Investment Trust Corporation of England</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPCK</td>
<td>Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to deepen our understanding about the ways in which the Balkan Slavs were perceived and represented in Britain before 1914 by concentrating on four specific discourses – religious, military, commercial and satirical – that have so far attracted little detailed attention in the secondary literature. The most important theoretical aim is to examine the extent to which perceptions and attitudes influenced concrete actions and decision-making processes. This introduction will analyse major trends and currents in the recent historiography, situate the present study in this framework, and outline the most important primary source materials that have been used in this thesis.

Previous Research

The study of Western imaginings of the Balkans became popular in the 1990s mainly as a result of the reintroduction of the ‘Balkan question’ into the European political agenda after the violent break-up of the former Yugoslavia. The body of literature that considers the ways in which the Balkans has been perceived in the West arose largely as a response to studies that attempted to explain the disintegration of Yugoslavia by ‘ancient hatreds’ and by arguing that the Balkan peoples had somehow a higher propensity to violent behaviour than the people in the West.\footnote{See for example, T. Judah, \textit{The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia} (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1997); R. Kaplan, \textit{Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History} (London: Papermac, 1993); W. Johnsen, \textit{Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy} (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995).} From the mid-1990s onwards, historians have been eager to find out whether there is something special about the Balkans in these respects or if negative views towards the region have emerged mainly as a result of the West’s own prejudices and preconceptions about it. The publication of Edward Said’s \textit{Orientalism} (1978), now an essential, much-acclaimed but also much-criticised text for anyone interested in western (imperial) images of the outside world, did not have an immediate effect on Balkan studies. After the reintroduction of the ‘Balkan question’, however, and especially
after the influx of ‘new Balkanist’ discourses by western journalists and political commentators during the wars of the 1990s, Said’s concepts began to be increasingly applied in studies of western perceptions of the Balkans.

Although Stevan Pavlowitch’s brief article on British travellers’ images of early nineteenth-century Serbia was one of the first to appear in this field, Maria Todorova’s *Imagining the Balkans* (1997) has been the most influential study. Todorova’s aim is to illustrate how outside images of the Balkans have crystallised in the region itself, to examine reductionist stereotyping of the Balkans, and to analyse how a geographical appellation turned into a derogatory designation. Her major theoretical argument is that ‘Balkanism’ and ‘Orientalism’ are different categories and that the former is not the ‘subspecies’ of the latter but a completely different type of discourse. This conceptual debate has been one of the most visible ones in the existing literature and its different sides will be discussed in further detail below. Other studies, such as those by Vesna Goldsworthy and David Norris, have approached the issue from similar perspectives. Goldsworthy’s general aim has been to examine representations of the Balkans in English literature while Norris has explored questions of identity and modernity in the context of Balkan and non-Balkan cultures. Furthermore, Norris aims at investigating the development and implications of the ‘Balkan myth’ both in the Balkans and outside the region. Balkan identity and its representation is also the topic of *Balkans as a Metaphor* (2002), an edited volume which contains an impressive array of diverse approaches to what it means to be from the Balkans and how that experience has been portrayed both in the East and West.

The relationship between Balkan studies and Orientalism – especially the type discussed by Said – has been the most eagerly-debated theoretical issue in the

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literature and most historians have agreed that Balkanism and Orientalism are different categories. Said believed that nineteenth-century Western Orientalism had two functions: it made distinctions between Orient and Occident and it facilitated the control of the Orient. In his view, the relationship between the Occident and the Orient was one of power, domination and hegemony of the former over the latter which culminated in the ideas of ‘European superiority over Oriental backwardness’.7

According to Todorova, there are several factors which make Balkanism and Orientalism different types of discourses. First, Balkanism developed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and became a distinct discourse during the Balkan Wars (1912-3) and the First World War – much later than was the case with Orientalist discourse.8 Second, the Balkans is historically and geographically concrete while Said’s ‘Orient’ is an imaginary category that was invented in the West. Third, while the Orient has been mostly associated with the feminine, the Balkans has always evoked perceptions of masculinity in Western discourses.9 Katherine Fleming has also argued that it is difficult to apply Said’s Orientalism in the Balkan setting because of the fundamental historical differences between the Balkans and the regions that have been associated with Said’s Orient, principally, the present-day Islamic Middle East. Fleming argues that political developments in the Balkans, especially the role played by external powers, were shaped differently than was the case in the Orient. As Todorova, Fleming argues that unlike the Balkans, Said’s Orient was seen and portrayed as a complete opposite of the West.10 (Historians’ views about representations of the Balkans as ‘other’ will be discussed in further detail below.)

Although it is true that the Middle East was politically and economically more important to the Western imperial powers than the Balkans, it must also be borne in mind that both regions were under the control of the Ottoman Empire for centuries. This study argues that the Ottoman imperial connection produced similarities in

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7 Ibid., pp. 2-3, 5, 7.
9 Todorova, Imagining, pp. 11-5.
historical development which at times influenced the ways in which connections between ‘Said’s Orient’ and the Balkans were drawn in Western discourses. For example, as Donald Quataert has shown, small farms were the prevalent form of land-holding in Serbia and the Lebanon, and in fact, throughout the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century. This study shows that these types of concrete historical similarities sometimes produced associations between the Balkans and the Middle East in the British discourses before 1914, in this case, about social structures, which were then perceived as factors that produced certain types of societies.

Fleming also argues that Said’s Orientalism differs from Balkanism because there has been no tradition of western academic writing about the Balkans in a similar way as there had been in the case of the Orient, and therefore, while the interest in the West towards the Orient manifested itself as vigorous studies of Oriental languages, Sanskrit, Arabic and Aramaic, the Balkanist discourse was produced mostly by journalists, travellers and political strategists during times of war and crises rather than by academics. As we have seen above, Todorova also believes this to be the case.

Of course, all of the above is true. However, the major reason for the lack of similar academic study of the Balkans has been that Balkan languages have been regarded by Western academics as Indo-European languages, and, hence, they have not received similar levels of attention as ‘Eastern languages’. However, Slavic languages were also closely examined and classified by a number of highly-regarded and well-known contemporary philologists such as Friedrich Max Müller (1823-1900) and Robert Latham (1812-88) as well as by dedicated Slavophil enthusiasts such as Richard Morfill (1834-1909), whose works included *Dawn of European Literature: Slavonic Literature* (1883). Morfill also published grammars of Polish (1884), Serbian (1887), and Russian (1889) as well as those of Bulgarian (1897) and Czech (1899). Russian became a degree subject at Oxford in 1904 largely as a result

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of Morfill’s activities.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, although Eastern languages received more visible attention in the West, it is not entirely justified to suggest that Balkan languages were not subjected to similar philological investigations, because they were. Furthermore, socio-linguistic arguments were used in conjunction with other elements of scientific classification in order to construct cultural hierarchies within the Slavic world. For example, the Bulgarians were often cut off from other South Slavs because they were perceived linguistically and racially as more Oriental than their neighbours.

The idea that the Balkans was different from the Orient because it was seen as a borderland, not as a complete opposite of the West, has also been at the core of the argument of most historians and scholars. According to Todorova, the Orient was seen by westerners as the complete opposite of the West while the Balkans has been perceived as a bridge between Europe and Asia and between different stages of civilisation, and has thus induced images such as semi-developed, semi-colonial, semi-civilised and semi-Oriental.\textsuperscript{16} Goldsworthy also adheres to this belief and argues that the Balkan identity has most persistently been described by ‘outsiders’ as being between European and Oriental, and that the idea of the borderland has manifested itself in Western images of the Balkans mainly because the region is situated on the boundary between the eastern and western Roman Empires, Orthodox and Catholic Churches, Islamic and Christian worlds, as well as between capitalist and Communist systems.\textsuperscript{17} Norris also believes that, as a cultural sign, ‘the Balkans’ denotes a ‘borderland of transition from Europe to Asia, the site of Eurasia’ which is illustrated by the existence of a mixed Muslim-Christian population, and by economic, political and cultural backwardness.\textsuperscript{18} According to him, this image of the Balkans was constructed during romanticism when the region was represented by Westerners as the ‘distant and exotic world on the borders of the Orient’, and this belief led to the

\textsuperscript{16} Todorova, \textit{Imagining}, pp. 16-7.
\textsuperscript{17} Goldsworthy, \textit{Inventing}, pp. 2, 6-7.
\textsuperscript{18} Norris, \textit{Balkan Myth}, pp. 11-2.
development of a view which saw the Balkans as neither part of the West nor the East but as a ‘bastard borderland’ that evoked images of ‘extreme negativity’.  

Mark Mazower also argues that the Balkans ‘occupied an intermediate cultural zone between Europe and Asia’ and that the region was regarded as being ‘in Europe but not of it’. He illustrates this point by referring to Western conceptions of Balkan cities which, by the end of the nineteenth century, were perceived by Western travellers as ‘having a European façade’ behind which was concealed a dirty, smelly, wooden and unplanned Oriental reality. Norris, too, argues that Balkan cities such as Belgrade were seen in the West as meeting places between the East and the West and that this was one of the ways in which the ‘Balkan myth’ manifested itself. In this context, the myth reminded both the Serbs and the Westerners that the ‘Oriental past’ had only recently been left behind and that ‘transition into a new order was but a fragile step’. Thus, many scholars believe that the Balkans have been represented in western discourse not as the complete ‘other’, as was the case with the Orient, but as a bridge – an ‘incomplete self’ of the West. 

However, some writers believe that the concept of ‘otherness’ can be fruitfully applied in the Balkan settings as well. On a very basic level, otherness can be used as a term that ‘helps us to think about the ways in which groups and individuals distance themselves from each other’. The concept is also helpful in evaluating the ways in which one cultural entity projects qualities that it most fears within itself onto another cultural entity. The essential feature of the concept is the way in which a dominant culture portrays other cultures that it deems inferior as a complete and lower-grade opposite of itself. Goldsworthy makes one of the more

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19 Ibid., pp. 22, 5.
21 Norris, Balkan Myth, p. 100.
22 Todorova, Imagining, p. 18.
sweeping attempts to show how the Balkans was represented as ‘other’ in British literary culture. According to her view, British fiction writers especially have constructed an imaginary Europe in which Britishness and Balkanness have been the two polarities furthest apart from each other and in which the ‘north-west represents the highest and the south-east the lowest symbolic value’. She also believes that this model can be regarded more widely as an illustration of the ‘particularly British orientalising rhetoric’ which identifies ‘all lands across the English channel as [a] corrupt and undisciplined Other’, and that British fictional images of the Balkans have been among the most powerful expressions of this sentiment.

Fleming disputes this belief by arguing that “‘Orientalist’ cannot simply be a catchall category that denotes something along the lines of ‘making gross and vaguely depreciating generalizations about other (especially non-Western) cultures and peoples’.” The present study agrees with Fleming’s interpretation.

Furthermore, Goldsworthy argues that independence and autonomy of the Balkan provinces marked a very specific turning point in western imaginings of the region because, prior to their formal or de facto independence in the late 1870s, the Balkan Slavs were regarded as ‘enslaved Europeans’ but, as the provinces became independent, they began increasingly to be seen as the ‘potentially virulent, threatening Other’. Norris also believes that the concept of otherness captures well some dimensions of the western views of the Balkans and argues that the ‘myth of Balkanization is a product of the West’s fears of the cultural Other’, and an extension of colonial discourse because Balkanization ‘compacts a culturally varied territory into a threatening unity’. According to Norris, this kind of reductionism has arisen from the West’s attempt to justify great-power colonialism and to liberate itself from the responsibility for the origins of the First World War, and presumably, to accuse

25 Goldsworthy, Inventing, p. 9
28 Goldsworthy, Inventing, pp. 11-3.
29 Norris, Balkan Myth, p. 11. The term ‘Balkanization’ has been used as a way of describing a development in which a region is divided into small and mutually hostile units. See Todorova,
Serbian nationalism instead. Both Norris and Goldsworthy’s view has to be seen in the context of the violent break-up of Yugoslavia. Both writers emphasise the potential threat that the Balkans could have, and have had, to the established order in Europe, and they see this aspect as the most important way in which the rhetoric of otherness manifested itself in Western discourses about the Balkans.

Mazower and other historians such as Todorova have made the point that unlike the Balkans, the Orient was seen as the complete opposite of the West – ‘the mysterious, spiritual alternative to Western rationalism’.30 This study shows that Anglican commentators often used these kinds of arguments to comment on Orthodox Christianity which, in this respect, was represented as mysterious and illogical – that is, as the complete opposite of rational and ‘business-like’ western Christianity.31 This aspect becomes even more significant because representations of Orthodoxy’s theological difference occurred in very definable contexts, for example, during the Lambeth conferences in the 1880s and again after 1900 in which the possibilities of a reunion of the Orthodox and Anglican churches were discussed. British commercial encounters in the Balkans provided another practical and specific context in which perceptions and representations of otherness surfaced. Serbs and Bulgarians were portrayed in Britain, especially in diplomatic accounts, as corrupt and dishonest, as direct opposites of honest and law-abiding British – a dichotomy between legitimate (British) and illegitimate (Balkan) business emerged.

The second larger theoretical issue that has been discussed in the literature is the extent and the ways in which postcolonial methodologies can be applied in the context of Western images of the Balkans. Todorova has been the most vocal critic of the use of postcolonial methodology in the Balkan context, and, although she believes that colonialism can be seen as being synonymous with notions such as dominance

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and subordination, and that it is precisely this equation that has made Orientalism an
attractive tool in Balkan studies, she hesitates to combine ‘historically defined, time-
specific, and finite categories’ of colonialism and imperialism with historically
indefinable notions of power and subordination.  

Todorova argues that the Balkans cannot be discussed in the framework of subaltern and postcolonial studies, nor by using categories of Said’s Orientalism, because the Balkans were a formation of ‘free states’ and because Europe cannot be ‘provincialized’, that is, there existed no formal dependency status and because, unlike most of the former formal colonies, the Balkans are in Europe. Thus, for Todorova, labelling a region as ‘semi-colonial’ is ‘meaningless’. This also means that while Orientalism, for instance, is ‘a discourse of imputed opposition’, Balkanism is a ‘discourse about imputed ambiguity’, that is, the Balkans was not constructed in the West as other but ‘as incomplete self’.  

Todorova’s view is thus quite consistent with the notion of ‘formal imperialism’ which implies official institutional and political control of an area by an external power. Therefore, according to her logic, the absence of this kind of Western, that is, British or French imperial control of any part of the mainland Balkans makes the examination of the region in the postcolonial context automatically unconvincing. The notion that studying formal manifestations of imperialism is the only ‘proper way’ of interpreting imperial history had been challenged by Gallagher and Robinson as early as 1953 when they argued that in order to achieve the best understanding of imperialism, both, formal and informal aspects need to be taken into account. They maintained that imperialism should not

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32 Todorova, Imagining, p. 16.
33 Ibid., pp. 17-8.
34 Austria controlled the provinces of Bosnia and the Herzegovina from 1878, and annexed them in 1909. A possible comparative approach that I might take on in future would be to examine Austrian discourses about Bosnia-Herzegovina and to compare them with British views about India or French attitudes to Morocco, perhaps under the idea of Orientalism. In addition, France controlled Dalmatia, Istria, much of Croatian military border and most of Slovenia, the so-called ‘Illyrian provinces’ during the Napoleonic Wars and annexed these regions between 1809 and 1813 after which they were again ruled by the Habsburgs.
be regarded ‘as an organism with its own laws of growth’ which exists outside other historical developments, and that the examination of informal imperialism – the process by which less developed regions are made economically or politically dependent by more developed regions without imposing formal institutional controls – is as important as formal means of imperial control because ‘refusals to annex are no proofs of reluctance to control’.36

Gallagher and Robinson also argued that Britain controlled less developed countries politically by imposing free-trade and co-operation treaties, such as those with Persia (1836, 1857) and Japan (1858), and more significantly for the purposes of this thesis, with the Ottoman Empire in 1838 and 186137 which also affected Balkan provinces, because after these treaties, the Ottoman markets became more open to foreign products and simultaneously more raw materials began to flow from the Ottoman lands into Western Europe. This development occurred largely during the Tanzimat (Reordering) period when, in addition to the increasing influx of European goods into the Ottoman markets, the Empire’s governmental structures were modernised, a reform which in effect eliminated domestic rivals of the Ottoman state, such as guilds and provincial notables.38

Although Todorova’s view that it is difficult to examine the Balkans directly in the postcolonial framework is accepted to an extent by most historians, there exists a body of literature within Balkan studies in which this postcolonial perspective is

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37 Ibid., p. 11.
38 Quataert, ‘Age of Reforms’, p. 762-3. In general, Ottoman economic policy in the nineteenth century can be divided into four distinct phases. The period from 1750 to 1826 was marked by restrictive economic policies with an emphasis on the domestic use of raw materials. Between the mid-1820s and 1860 Ottoman markets were opened to foreign merchants. This period was characterised by free-trade liberalism not only within the Ottoman Empire, but also elsewhere in the world. From around 1860 onwards, the tendency in the Ottoman Empire was to raise import duties in order to protect local manufacturers. From 1908 until the beginning of the First World War, free-trade ideals suffered a final blow in Ottoman economic thought when proponents of a protected national economy triumphed.
adopted. This literature argues that Balkanism and Orientalism are very close to each other, that concepts such as subordination and power are useful in both cases, and both discourses can thus be labelled as ‘colonial’. Before examining this strand of Balkan studies it is necessary to establish what is meant by the notion of ‘colonial discourse’. According to Homi Bhabha, one of the most respected authorities of subaltern studies, colonial discourses depend on the notion of ‘fixity’ and thus representations that are created are static and repetitive practices of racial and cultural hierarchization.39 Structurally, colonial discourse resembles reality, and its purpose is to represent the colonised populations in a negative light, as ‘degenerate types’, in order to justify conquest and to establish institutional domination.40 As we have seen, this view closely resembles Todorova’s position.

Cristofer Scarboro has studied attitudes expressed towards the Balkans in The Times, The Fortnightly Review, and The Contemporary Review and has argued that Balkanism and Orientalism are both discourses that have emerged to depict unequal power relations which ‘grant the power to name and create narratives to Western Europeans’.41 In addition, he believes that both discourses must be seen as colonial because the Balkans and the Orient were both conceived of as timeless spaces where ‘colonial fantasies could be acted out’. He believes that colonial order had two main pillars: the will to destroy native systems and the voyeuristic desire to make contact with the ‘exotic, sexually dangerous, and alluring timeless other’.42 Thus, according to Scarboro, the British middle classes regarded the Balkans as some kind of a dreamland in which the ‘bounds of dreary England’ no longer troubled them. The case was the same with formal colonies and, therefore, British attitudes to the Balkans and, for example, towards India, can both be observed and investigated by

40 Bhabha, Location of Culture, pp. 70-1.
42 Ibid.
using identical theoretical assumptions about power relations between the ‘coloniser’ and the ‘colonised’.\textsuperscript{43}

Norris similarly believes in the concept of ‘cultural colonialism’ which, in his view, manifested itself mainly in connection with the emergence of new small nation states in the nineteenth century which were regarded by the great powers as ‘children with no right to exercise their own voice’.\textsuperscript{44} Andrew Hammond also believes that Balkanist writing reveals ‘similarities in style and effect’ with typical colonialist discourse, but states that Victorian Balkanism (unlike Orientalism) was not a ‘systemised discourse’.\textsuperscript{45} According to Hammond, imperialism had divided the world into nations destined to rule and regions predetermined to be ruled and the views of Victorian travellers showed that the Balkans belonged firmly to the latter group because there was rarely any doubt that the Balkans required governing by an external power. Thus, Hammond believes that British travel accounts showed that ‘advocacy of colonial rule...was the dominant political thread running through Victorian and Edwardian texts’.\textsuperscript{46}

Although Norris agrees with most scholars that the Balkans was not perceived as the ‘complete other’ in the West, as was the case with the Orient, he also believes that many of Said’s formulations about the Orient can be directly substituted into Balkan settings. He bases his argument on two factors: first, although the Balkans is in Europe they have been ‘written out as part of its culture’; and second, Balkan countries were subjected to economic and political sanctions in the same way as the regions of the Islamic Middle East.\textsuperscript{47} Norris does not specify what he means by these sanctions, but, if he refers to those placed upon Serbia and Montenegro in the

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} Norris, \textit{Balkan Myth}, pp. 28-9.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., pp. 603-5.
\textsuperscript{47} Norris, \textit{Balkan Myth}, pp. 12-3. See also, E. Adamovsky, ‘Euro-Orientalism and the Making of the Concept of Eastern Europe in France, 1810-1880’, \textit{The Journal of Modern History}, 77 (2005), pp. 591-628. Adamovsky argues that many western notions of Eastern Europe resemble those made about the Orient so closely that he has come up with the concept of ‘Euro-Orientalism’ to describe this mode of representation.
aftermath of the war in Kosovo in the late 1990s, his example is rather anachronistic and unconvincing as a way of illustrating that Western imperial countries exercised similar political control over the Balkans as they did over their formal colonies before 1914.

Goldsworthy also belongs to that group of scholars who use methods of postcolonial studies in the Balkan context. According to her view, the concept of ‘narrative’ or ‘imaginative’ colonisation is a useful tool in the examination of British literary representations of the Balkans because the region ‘offers a mirror image to the more traditional fields of post-colonial enquiry’. She argues that both postcolonial studies and studies of ‘imaginative colonisation’ deal with textual practises that were associated with the ‘physical exploitation of an area by a Western power’. Goldsworthy defines the process of imaginative colonisation as follows:

A cultural great power seizes and exploits the resources of an area, while imposing new frontiers on its mind-map and creating ideas which, reflect back, [and] have the ability to shape reality.

Thus, just as the imperial powers exploited natural resources in their colonies, they also exploited cultural resources of the Balkans and created persistent stereotypes, such as those that are still evoked about Romania by Bram Stoker’s 1897 masterpiece Dracula. According to Goldsworthy, images created by narrative colonisation can have an effect on decision-making, including decisions that determine the ‘extent of foreign loans and investment, the level of military and humanitarian aid, and the speed at which individual Balkan countries are allowed to join “Europe”, NATO or any other international organisation or club’. Goldsworthy does not, however, explore these points in any detail. This thesis suggests that there is a need to be very specific, even careful, about making generalising assumptions about the influence of cultural preconceptions on decisions-making because, before 1914, for example, there were significant differences in the views of diplomats and businessmen towards the

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48 Goldsworthy, Inventing, p. x.
49 Ibid., p. 2.
50 Ibid.
Balkans: the former were much more influenced in their decisions by cultural prejudices than the latter, which means that simply labelling an opinion as ‘British’ or ‘French’ or ‘German’ or indeed ‘Western European’ does not give the whole picture of how the Balkans, or any other extra-European region for that matter, was perceived in the West. This point will be discussed in further detail below.

Attention has also been devoted in the secondary literature to the practices of naming the Balkans in western accounts. Todorova dates the first use of the term ‘Balkan’ to 1794 when British traveller John Morritt scribbled the word ‘Bal.kan’ in his notebook to denote the mountain range in southern Bulgaria that had up to this point been known by its Roman name Haemus, but it was not until the 1820s that ‘Balkan’ became the favoured term to signify that mountain range. Later, in the 1820s, the term was first used by a British traveller to signify the whole peninsula. The term ‘Balkan Peninsula’ was first used by the German geographer August Zeune in 1808, but it was only in the mid-nineteenth century that the term ‘Balkans’ began to be used more widely to describe the whole peninsula, and until 1878 ‘Turkey-in-Europe’ and ‘European Turkey’ were the preferred terms. Todorova argues that the change in the ways in which the region was perceived occurred as a result of a variety of factors such as developments in communications, technological change, the growth of trade, the spread of Enlightenment ideas, advances in education and the increased political activities of the Balkan populations.51 Similarly, Mazower points out that throughout the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries ‘Turkey in Europe’ was the ‘favoured geographical coin’ and that the change in this respect did not occur until the 1880s when the majority of the Balkan provinces had gained autonomy or independence from the Ottoman Empire. As a term, ‘the Balkans’ became more widely used by the time of the First Balkan War in 1912. Mazower also argues that the term was burdened by negative associations from the start, especially images of savagery, violence and primitivism.52

In conclusion, two closely-connected theoretical considerations have been discussed in the existing literature: first, the relationship between discourses of Balkanism and Orientalism, and, second, the position of the Balkans in the

51 Todorova, Imagining, pp. 22-7, 62.
52 Mazower, Balkans, pp. 3-4.
postcolonial world and postcolonial scholarship. Balkanism and Orientalism are seen as different types of discourse by historians such as Todorova and Fleming because the former developed into a systemised discourse much later than the latter and because ‘the Balkans’ are historically and geographically concrete, while ‘the Orient’ was invented by western scholars, linguists, and colonial administrators. Furthermore, while the Balkans has always evoked masculine associations in the West, the Orient has been represented principally as feminine. Differences in political developments and the view that there has not been a tradition of western academic writing about the Balkans in the way that there has been about the Orient, have also been used to explain the innate dissimilarity of the Western discourse about the two regions.

The issue over the postcolonial status of the Balkans is therefore also split in two opposing positions. The first view, advocated principally by Todorova, corresponds closely with the concept of formal imperialism and maintains that because of the lack of formal dependency status of any of the Balkan countries of western European imperial powers and the fact that the Balkans, unlike most formal colonies, are located geographically in Europe, it is difficult to discuss the region under the same theoretical framework as the formal British or French colonies. On the other hand, historians and scholars such as Norris, Goldsworthy, Hammond and Scarboro argue that formal colonies and the Balkans can be viewed in the same postcolonial context – which mostly refers to representations of unequal power relations – because both the Balkans and the colonies were regarded as lesser regions by Western observers, and because, although the Balkans are geographically situated in Europe, they had been ‘written out’ of the European cultural heritage, mostly by the Enlightenment. For these reasons, these latter scholars also believe that the connection between Balkanism and Orientalism is closer than what is suggested by Todorova and Fleming. These differences of view aside, there exists a widespread consensus that while the Orient was conveyed of as the complete opposite to the West, the Balkans has mostly been conceived as a developmental, geographical, historical, religious, cultural and economic borderland.

In sum, most studies of Western images of the Balkans can be divided into two opposing, but often overlapping approaches: ‘legalistic-geographical’ and ‘cultural-colonialist’. According to the first, the Balkans cannot be examined
effectively within the framework of subaltern studies and Orientalism because of the lack of a formal western colonial legacy and because the Balkans are not an extra-European region. According to the second, the widespread cultural power of imperialist thought forms a backdrop against which all non-Western regions and cultures were evaluated, thus claiming that the Balkans were just one of those ‘inferior’ regions that can be examined in a postcolonial framework which is basically mainly to do with investigating unequal power relations between the ‘rulers’ and the ‘ruled’.

**Research Agenda**

This thesis has three aims: first, to investigate the ways and the extent to which British domestic and imperial concerns connected to and were explained through Balkan questions; second, to examine the effects of perceptions and prejudices on decision-making; and third, to analyze the levels of accuracy of perceptions and the concrete consequences of possible misconceptions. Throughout, the value of postcolonial methodologies and British colonial ideas as analytical tools in Balkan studies, and in the studies of other non-colonial regions will also be investigated. All of these will be examined in the concrete historical frameworks of Anglican-Orthodox ecumenism, British military policy and military thought, and Anglo-Balkan commercial relations. A chapter is dedicated to each of these three areas. The final chapter is a case study in British middle-class attitudes to the Balkans which is conducted through a detailed study of visual representations of the region in *Punch* cartoons, a magazine, which after its early radicalism, became one of the most visible and vocal transmitters of middle-class attitudes in Britain, largely as a result of financial necessities.

The absence of studies that examine the link between cultural imagery (broadly defined) and practical decision-making in concrete historical circumstances is generally one of the most significant weaknesses in the existing literature, with only the works by Patrick Finney and Katherine Fleming exploring these types of questions. Finney examines the influence of Balkanist perceptions on British foreign-policy making in the 1920s while Fleming’s focus is on the relationship of
Orientalism and great-power diplomacy in the early nineteenth century, her main aim being ‘to demonstrate that cultural and diplomatic history are not mutually exclusive’. The present study proceeds along similar lines and under similar assumptions. The broad aim here is to study the development and applications of cultural perceptions in concrete historical circumstances – to move from the textual and symbolic towards the practical and concrete, and to examine the extent to which it is possible to combine the two approaches. Thus, the aim is to show that cultural history is not incompatible with business, religious or military history either.

The examination of the connections of British domestic and imperial concerns to Balkan issues has also attracted only a limited amount of detailed and nuanced analysis. In the Balkan framework, British colonialism has been considered only in its cultural form mainly for the reasons outlined above. Goldsworthy has argued that ‘Britain had few direct interests in the Balkans’ and that the region was only regarded as significant in the context of Anglo-Russian rivalry, and that it was only the struggle of the Balkan provinces against Ottoman rule that ‘inspired British writers to pose questions about Britain’s own colonial empire’. She also argues that the British-Balkan connection manifested itself in the form of fictitious Balkan monarchs being represented in literary texts as imaginary ‘substitute English gentlemen’ who embodied ‘“English” notions of chivalry and fair play’. Goldsworthy also points out that Bram Stoker’s Dracula appeared ‘as a result of Tractarian movement’ and the Roman Catholic revival at the time when the doctrine of transubstantiation was ‘treated with renewed seriousness in Britain’, and concludes that Dracula and Tractarianism were ‘key manifestations of Victorian revival’. She also maintains that the position of small nations in European politics was seen as corresponding with the position of women in British society and that the suffrage movement ‘may have made

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56 Tractarianism and the Oxford movement will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 1.
British women writers sympathetic towards the Balkan desire to be heard’.\textsuperscript{57} However, Goldsworthy presents very little tangible evidence that these connections were actually there or that they were in fact being made by the contemporaries. Todorova also suggests that domestic issues were discussed through developments in the Balkans:

 Uneasiness about Ireland was translated into uneasiness about Macedonia; the vogue of the poor was transformed into vogue for suppressed nationalities; the feminist movement focused on life in the harems; the remorse about India or the Boer war was translated at the turn of the century into guilt about Turkish atrocities.\textsuperscript{58}

However, like Goldsworthy, Todorova does not delve in these issues in any significant detail and presents very little concrete evidence for her interpretations, which are based mainly on travel writers’ views, and on the assumption that because many of the famous British Balkan-travellers were women,\textsuperscript{59} they must have had sympathy towards Balkan Christians in the same way as they had with the women’s suffrage movement in Britain. Todorova and Goldsworthy, therefore, agree on this issue to a large extent.

Furthermore, some of the evidence Todorova does present, comes from the 1940s which is much later than the period under consideration here. These ‘limitations’, of course, are present mainly due to the fact that Todorova’s aims have been different from those of this study. She successfully laid the groundwork for further studies of Western perceptions of the Balkans, and because her geographical spread and time-span are so wide, she (probably) has not sought to, or been able to, study any one specific British topic or issue in as much detail as this study aims to do. The emphasis of this thesis will not be on those specific issues raised above by Todorova – that is, Ireland and women’s suffrage; however, the problem of the poor,

\textsuperscript{58} Todorova, \textit{Imagining}, p. 100.
\textsuperscript{59} These women travellers included Adelina Irby, Georgina Muir-Mackenzie, Mary Durham and Maude Holbach among others.
and the alarm raised about declining national health in the aftermath of the South African War (1899-1902) – and especially, how these questions were discussed in Britain through Balkan issues – will be examined in some detail in Chapters 2 and 4.

On the whole, the purpose of this study is to go much further than previous studies in the examinations of how British domestic and colonial issues were concretely connected to and examined through Balkan questions. Therefore, the aim here is to examine concrete and pragmatic British domestic and imperial connections to Balkan questions in the form, for example, of Anglican worries about secularization that were presented through Orthodox Christianity’s perceived closer connection to the primitive church in the framework of the Anglican-Orthodox reunion debate, and in British officers’ concerns about the physical health of the nation which was highlighted by detailed classifications of Balkan soldiers which led to specific policy recommendations. Other debates that are investigated include the future of the Ottoman Empire, religious aspects of the Bulgarian atrocities agitation campaign as well as imperial defence and the defence of Britain itself. Thus, rather than making elusive statements about possible connections between British domestic and colonial concerns to Balkan issues, the aim of the thesis is to present concrete evidence for these connections by examining specific debates and by analysing how prejudices and preconceptions figured in these debates from a pragmatic viewpoint.

The first chapter of this study examines Anglican attitudes to Orthodox Christianity. Considerable scholarly attention has been paid to the ways in which the British perceived religious practices in the colonies and the implications these perceptions had in terms of imperialism, but cross-cultural religious aspects in this sense have received comparatively little detailed attention in the field of Balkan studies. Anglican attitudes to Eastern Orthodoxy are investigated in the framework of

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‘comparative religion’ which in this study is seen in the widest possible sense, as a systematic, academically-styled study of religious principles, practices and institutions, and more specifically, the ways in which these aspects were used by contemporary religious commentators as a method of measuring the relationship of different religions to each other. The discipline emerged directly from the Darwinian-Spencerian theory of evolution and was largely comparable with the way in which languages, races and plants had been classified since the late eighteenth-century.\textsuperscript{61}

Scientific classification had been an important aspect of intellectual life since the late 1700s, but its importance and popularity grew gradually reaching its peak in the 1870s and 1880s. The cataloguing of the human race was initially based on the ideas of the Swedish naturalist Carl Linnaeus (1707-78) who first began to classify plants, but later, in his \textit{Systema Naturae} (1758), also divided humans into four categories: the fair, industrious and law-abiding European; the copper-coloured and tradition-driven (native) American; the opinion-driven, envious and desirous Asiatic; and, the black, indolent African, whose actions were determined by impulse rather than reason. It was also in the late eighteenth century that race increasingly began to replace nation, stock and tribe as an idiom to denote groups of people who shared similar physical and cultural characteristics.\textsuperscript{62} Linnaeus’s categories evidently influenced all later classifications and contributed to the development of a racialist world-view which emphasised the superiority of the white European race.

In Britain, the most influential classification system was that introduced by Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-95) in 1870. Huxley identified five races: Australian,

African, white European, dark European, and Mongoloid. Even though the Balkan Slavs were principally regarded as belonging to either ‘white’ or ‘dark’ European race, there were also some differing interpretations, mainly, in the case of the Bulgarians, who were at times portrayed – in terms of racial origin – either as ‘Mongoloid’ or ‘Turanian’, and therefore, grouped with peoples of Asia, Polynesia, and the native populations of the Americas, rather than with Europeans. For example, in 1876, the influential archaeologist Arthur Evans (1851-1941) argued that the Bulgarians ‘are not Sclavonic’, but ‘Mongolian’. This mode of representation and its significance will be discussed in further detail in Chapters 1 and 2.

British and other western scholars (and imperial administrators) also used, or were influenced by, comparative religion as a method of examining Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam, often attempting to prove the superiority of Christianity over the eastern religions. To some degree, British studies of Orthodox Christianity can also be regarded in this context: as academic or scientific investigations of human activity which aimed at hierarchy-construction, that is, proving the superiority of Western Christianity – mostly Protestantism but also Roman Catholicism – to Eastern Orthodoxy. There were numerous similarities in the ways in which eastern religions and Orthodox Christianity were perceived in Britain, the imagery of ‘Oriental mysticism’ being one of the most significant points of contact. Other important similarities included the general condescending attitude towards religious doctrines and rituals that differed from Anglican practices, and the method of binary-construction that was used to highlight these differences.

However, despite these similarities there were also important differentiating factors which need to be taken into account. The fact that Judaeo-Christian religions had been systematically studied in Britain at least from the seventeenth century onwards while studies of eastern religions – with the increase of imperial ambitions

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and interest in the Oriental languages\textsuperscript{65} – surfaced only in the nineteenth century is one of the most important of such factors. Furthermore, one of the aims of studying the character of religion in the colonies was to mould institutional forms of imperial control,\textsuperscript{66} a factor that was absent in Anglican opinion – which was by no means a homogenous one – of Orthodox Christianity. Thus, the concept of comparative religion – the study of other religions in comparison to Christianity – is replaced here with the concept of ‘comparative Christianity’ which refers to distinctions made within Christianity.

These types of aspects and perspectives have, so far, received only a very limited amount of detailed analysis in the existing literature. Todorova pays little attention to religious aspects when discussing Western imaginings of the region, stating merely that the old rivalry between Greek Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism was one of the ways in which East-West dichotomy manifested itself; that it was ‘Catholicism and not…Western Christianity in general that [was] part of the dichotomy’; and that the conflict was caused mainly by the political and ideological rivalry between Rome and Constantinople, and thus the ‘notion of a general Western Christianity as opposed to a putative Eastern Orthodox entity is not a theological construct but a relatively late cultural and recent political science category’. She also argues that Eastern Orthodoxy was not regarded as a transitory faith to Islam in Catholic discourse, but instead that the main division was seen as being between Christianity and Islam.\textsuperscript{67} Influenced by the views of a Bulgarian scholar, Tsvetana Georgieva, Todorova therefore argues that the Balkans is a region in which the ‘well-known phenomenon of symbiosis between Christianity and Islam’ can be seen especially well, but that the region is not a transitory zone from Christianity to Islam, but rather a region in which these two religions co-exist and that this has created a peculiar set of circumstances.\textsuperscript{68} On the other hand, Milica Bakic-Hayden and Robert Hayden have argued that on a very basic level, European religious symbolic


\textsuperscript{66} Embree, ‘Bengal’, p. 103.

\textsuperscript{67} Todorova, \textit{Imagining}, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 59.
geography distinguishes between Eastern churches and Western churches.\textsuperscript{69} Like Todorova and Goldsworthy, however, the above writers do not investigate this point in any detail.

Todorova writes nothing about religious attitudes in her chapter ‘Patterns of Perception Until 1900’ which mainly considers British attitudes to the Balkans, and her only reference to Protestant perceptions of Eastern Orthodoxy is to the seventeenth century when Orthodox Christianity was seen to be closer to the evangelical tradition and when there were several attempts to endorse closer Protestant-Orthodox ties.\textsuperscript{70} However, she does not explore this aspect in any detail and fails to mention that very similar processes were at work between the 1850s and 1914 when influential figures within the Church of England establishment, and even the Church itself as an institution, actively sought intercommunion with the Orthodox Church.

Todorova’s final analysis of religious aspects comes in the form of two generic notions about Orthodox Christianity in the context of the ‘Ottoman legacy’ in the Balkans. She argues that the first interpretation regards the Orthodox Church as the ‘only genuine institution’ for the conquered Christians in the Ottoman Empire and that the Church was the ‘preserver of religion, language, and local conditions’. This view was in a particular vogue in nineteenth-century European accounts. According to the second view, the Orthodox Church was ‘quintessentially Ottoman’ and it therefore benefited from the imperial dimension of the Ottoman state, which meant that the ecumenical character and policies of the Orthodox Church were understandable only in the Ottoman framework, and that the political and economic secession of the Balkan provinces from the Empire was accompanied by the religious separation from the Patriarch of Constantinople.\textsuperscript{71}

Goldsworthy’s emphasis is also only marginally on religious issues, to which she also refers primarily in the context of the division of Christendom into Orthodox Byzantine (Eastern) and Roman Catholic (Western) creeds. She approaches the issue


\textsuperscript{70} Todorova, \textit{Imagining}, p. 66.

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 162, 164.
from a very topical and political perspective, stating that “Byzantine” and “Oriental” are still regurgitated as metaphorical synonyms. In her view, this is illustrated, for instance, by the way in which the Belgian politician Willy Claes described the ‘mental map’ of Europe on the eve of taking the post as the Secretary General of NATO in 1994. He placed Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia in the ‘Byzantine’ section and argued that these countries had an ‘Oriental’ outlook, and were thus more inclined towards communism than countries such as Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia and the Baltic states.  

Goldsworthy argues that Balkan Orthodox Christians were depicted in British literary discourse – in R. G. D. Laffan’s The Serbs: Guardians of the Gate (1918) and Rebecca West’s Black Lamb and Grey Falcon (1941) among other works – as ‘Eastern’ in relation to Western Europe, but as European in comparison to the ‘Islamic world’ and, in this context, the Orthodox were seen as the ‘upholders of the Christian European identity’ in much the same way as identified in the first of Todorova’s interpretations of the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans. Goldsworthy’s only references to British perceptions of Orthodox Christianity in nineteenth century literature were to Lord Byron, who did not differentiate between Orthodox Christians and Muslims. She also examines the 1898 Sidney Grier novel, A Crowned Queen, which depicted Eastern Orthodoxy as primitive and barbaric.

The second chapter examines British representations and inventions of ‘Balkan militarism’ by using the contemporary concept of the ‘martial races’ as a loosely-applied framework. Historians have interpreted the ‘martial races’ idea as being an essentially British phenomenon that was closely linked to specific colonial recruitment difficulties, and to problems that were encountered in the organisation of colonial administration units. The concept was also associated with specific political problems facing the British Empire, such as Indian nationalism. The interaction of these factors led to detailed ethnographic classifications and to the labelling of some

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72 Goldsworthy, Inventing, p. 5.
73 Ibid., p. 8.
74 Ibid., pp. 26, 52, 59.
subject races as ‘masculine’ and ‘martial’ and to the branding of others as ‘effeminate’ and ‘unwarlike’.

This study examines the extent and the ways in which the categories and ideas of the ‘martial races’ theory can be used in the examination of British professional and popular perceptions of ‘Balkan militarism’. It argues that the concept is indeed a very valuable tool, because as with Britain’s own ‘martial races’, Balkan ethnic soldiers were evaluated in terms of their warlike traditions, physical and mental qualities, and social organisation which led to classifications such as the heroic and ‘warlike Serb’ and the Oriental and ‘unwarlike Bulgarian’. In addition, as was the case with colonial martial mapping, the classifications of Balkan ethnic soldiers were formed under specific political circumstances that at times overlapped with British imperial and domestic concerns. One such political context was the threat of Russian expansionism. This threat meant that martial classifications of the Balkan populations were also made with practical policy aims in mind, and that they were not merely romantic idolisations of the exotic, a viewpoint taken by scholars such as Goldsworthy and Norris. This study therefore examines the relationship between cultural representations of Balkan militarism, which led to imagery of Montenegrin or Serbian Christian heroism that was comparable to depictions of Scottish highlanders, to more practical opinions that were put forward by British army officers and diplomats in definable historical and political contexts.

The purpose of the third chapter is to investigate the interaction between economic activity and cultural categorisation. The chapter shows that the Balkans was represented in Britain as a region of considerable business opportunities and that this perception led to the founding of dozens of ‘Anglo-Balkan’ companies that mostly aimed at exploiting natural resources in the region. The increasing interest in Balkan markets from the 1880s onwards must be seen in the context of the problems


76 Goldsworthy, Inventing, pp. 23, 34, 58; Norris, Balkan Myth, pp. 25-7, 32-5.
that British industry was facing as competition from German and American manufacturers intensified in the export markets that had traditionally been dominated by British companies. This aspect was important in compelling British businessmen to contemplate expanding into regions, such as the Balkans, which had traditionally not been regarded as very attractive or interesting in Britain from a commercial perspective.

However, the majority of prospective British business enterprises in the Balkans failed. The chapter investigates reasons for the failure of British enterprise and argues that, in addition to purely financial obstacles, such as the inability of British firms to attract sufficient amounts of capital, cultural and political factors played a role in contributing to business failure. The study does not attempt to explain economic developments purely from cultural or non-economic perspectives, in the manner, for example, of Martin Wiener, who believes that the relative industrial decline in Britain from the mid-nineteenth century onwards was caused primarily by the decline of an ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ among British businessmen.77

‘Decline of the industrial spirit’ on its own is not, however, a sufficient explanation for industrial decay – other factors, including the lack of diversification into new industries, slow development of staple industries after 1870 and comparatively small size of the domestic market in the UK, also need to be taken into account when assessing reasons for industrial decline. Similarly, it is not enough to explain British business failures in the Balkans purely in terms of differences in business cultures or by the presence of ‘Balkanist’ preconceptions, but other factors (including those referred to above) also need to be addressed. On the other hand, cultural factors also need to be given due notice, because it is not very plausible to argue, for example, that businessmen and bankers could have somehow existed and operated completely outside society’s cultural norms. A more convincing connection between economic and cultural activity than that made by Wiener has been put forward by Anna-Maria Misra who has argued that the decline of British managing agency houses in India in comparison to domestic Indian businesses such as Tata,

was caused primarily by differences in business cultures, namely with regard to attitudes to investment, ideology and business organisation.\textsuperscript{78}

The chapter, therefore, rather than explaining economic performance purely through culture, aims to bring practical decision-making processes and cross-cultural commercial relations into the realm of the field that examines Western European, and more precisely, British cultural images of the Balkans. At the same time, the purpose is to map out activities of British companies that operated in the Balkans more fully than has been done so far in the existing secondary literature.

The chapter also distinguishes between diplomatic and business attitudes towards conducting commercial transactions in the Balkan countries. Existing literature, namely the works by Michael Palairet, John Lampe and Marvin Jackson, has tended to repeat diplomatic perceptions which often emphasised the unfavourable operating climate in Serbia and Bulgaria for foreign companies, namely xenophobia and corruption.\textsuperscript{79} None of these authors have looked at the views of those British merchants and businessmen who actually did business in the Balkans, and their concentration has also been unevenly biased towards examining various types of investments rather than on the conduct of day-to-day commodity trade. This is a significant gap in the literature, with only the interesting article by Basil Gounaris examining broadly the kinds of questions that are investigated in this thesis.\textsuperscript{80}

The point is that diplomats and bankers, who were culturally closer to each other, tended to repeat all kinds of stereotypes – partly inherited from decades of travel writing – more frequently than the more ‘practically-minded’ merchants (permitting this sweeping generalisation) which could partly explain the comparative reluctance of British bankers to get involved, for example, in Balkan state loans, a factor which was often quoted by British merchants and companies as one of the most


important reasons for the lack of opportunities for them to compete for lucrative public contracts and concessions, especially because this was the way in which those contracts were mostly financed. The chapter thus shows that it is important to distinguish between all actors – from prospective businessmen and established merchants to bankers and diplomats – because their views about conducting business in the Balkans differed greatly.

Differences in the ways in which preconceptions influenced decision-making, might to a degree explain, on the one hand, the comparative lack of British commercial involvement in the region, and, on the other, why British companies continued to trade with Balkan customers despite being faced with numerous difficulties with customs authorities and government agencies in the region. One explanation for the unwillingness of British firms to abandon their operations was, that many of them had worked hard to enter the Balkan markets and were thus reluctant to give up easily, even when problems occurred, as illustrated by the statement of Edmund Salaman, the export manager of the Lever Brothers Ltd in 1906: ‘we have spent a great deal of money…in regard to advertising in newspapers, printing, billposting, [and] distributing of samples’.  

Thus, Salaman clearly believed that Lever Brothers were so deeply committed to their Bulgarian operations that the cost of disengaging from them would have been too great, and thus, he felt that it was better to maintain things as they were, even when the company was faced with serious difficulties with, for example, customs officials and trademark legislation.

The final chapter examines visual representations of the Balkan Slavs in *Punch* cartoons. This chapter is a case study in middle-class attitudes to the Balkans. Although the magazine has already been widely used as a historical source, its views on the Balkans have not been studied so far in detail.  

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81 Foreign Office, FO 368/11, E. Salaman to Comptroller General, Commercial Department, Board of Trade, Cheshire, 11 Aug. 1906.

Slavs in *Punch* before 1914 was primarily the work of four artists: John Tenniel (1820-1914), Edward Linley Sambourne (1844-1910), Bernard Partridge (1861-1945) and Leonard Raven-Hill (1876-1942). Tenniel and Linley Sambourne were responsible for drawing the majority of the cartoons during the decade beginning in 1876, whereas Partridge and Raven-Hill drew most of the illustrations between 1908 and 1914. *Punch*’s representations of the Balkan Slavs concentrated around four periods: especially 1875-78 and 1912-14, but also 1885-86 and 1908-09. The first period was marked by the uprisings in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1875, in Bulgaria in 1876, and by the Serbian-Turkish War of 1876 which eventually led to the war between Turkey and Russia (1877-78). The period also witnessed the popular outcry in Britain against the Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria, which increasingly brought the plight of the Balkan Christian population into the British public domain. The second period, between 1885 and 1886, saw the outbreak of the Serbian-Bulgarian War which also had the potential danger of developing into a major European conflict. This was also the case during the Bosnian crisis (1908-09), when Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed by Austria, causing a great deal of anxiety in Serbia and in Montenegro. The crisis was eventually resolved when Serbia recognised Austria’s annexation in 1909, after Russia had abandoned Serbia because of the pressure from Germany. Between 1912 and 1914, two Balkan Wars and the outbreak of the First World War occupied the imagination of the *Punch* artists.

*Punch*’s coverage of Balkan issues can be divided into three categories: representations of power relations, constructions of group identities, and depictions of ‘intra-Balkan’ antagonisms. *Punch*’s views matched very closely the attitudes that were conveyed in travel writing and other popular literary forms. In general terms, *Punch* cartoonists seemed to believe that everything that was wrong with British society could be demonstrated by caricaturing the Balkans, which meant that issues such as juvenile delinquency and poverty in Britain were portrayed thorough imaginary Balkan characters.

The chapter considers only those cartoons that featured Balkan characters. The bulk of *Punch*’s coverage considered the implications of the Balkan conflicts for British domestic politics, especially during the Eastern Crises, when the criticisms of the Liberal opposition in regard to the Conservative government’s Eastern policy
were illustrated principally through the personal antagonism between the Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli, and the leader of the opposition, William Gladstone. Disraeli also received a considerable amount of individual attention – most of it negative – during the period. The magazine also commented widely on the frictions within the Conservative cabinet, its inability to deal with the Eastern Crisis effectively, and on the roles of Disraeli and Lord Salisbury in the Congress of Berlin in 1878.

To conclude, the main aim of this thesis is to examine the practical relevance of cultural and other perceptions and representations in definable historical circumstances, and thus to move forward from the mere investigation of textual practices towards more concrete concerns. Furthermore, the purpose is to deepen the examination of British-Balkan connections by analysing areas which hitherto have received little detailed consideration, mainly due to the widely-held view that the region was not of any significance to Britain other than as a repository of material for literary and other strictly cultural productions. The main conclusions are that perceptions did indeed have some effect on concrete decision-making, but that there were significant variations in this respect, mostly due to class differences and to the connection that a given person who transmitted views had with the Balkans.

The region also attracted wider and especially deeper interest in Britain than has so far been conveyed in the secondary literature. Diplomats, businessmen, army officers, nurses, the clergy and so forth showed real interest towards the Balkans.

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their considerations were often linked to specific debates and circumstances. Hence, Anglican approaches towards the Orthodox arose largely as a result of the declining importance of the Church of England, a situation in which a section of the Anglican clergy, the Anglo-Catholics, looked towards the Orthodox in search of new partners.

Businessmen also felt real interest towards the region, and as pointed out above, this increase in attention must be seen, at least partly, in the context of the decline of British export performance, which compelled many high-profile existing companies to look to the Balkans for new markets. In addition, the level of British commercial involvement in the Balkans has been underestimated on many occasions, a view which is not entirely justified either. For example, in the early twentieth-century, British insurance companies dominated the market, in comparison to French, Italian and Austrian firms, in the Southern Balkans, namely in and around Salonica (now Thessaloniki), a factor which has not received any significant amount of attention in the existing literature.

Army officers were also compelled, by profession, to make level-headed judgements, and their views often differed from those expressed in travel writing. By examining the connection between cultural imagery and defence policy-making, this study aims to uncover new approaches to how British policy was formulated and to the ways in which professional perceptions differed from popular ones.

Sources

This study differs from most previous research in that it is based principally on unpublished archival material and on published materials that have so far been largely ignored or not exploited to the full extent. The neglect of unpublished and ‘official’ primary source material has been mainly due to the lack of concentrated research on the four specific areas that are examined in this study. With regard to source materials, all major contributions to the strand of Balkan studies that deals with western images of the region have relied extensively on published fiction and travel writing. For example, the overwhelming majority of the nineteenth- and early twentieth century primary sources used by Todorova in *Imagining the Balkans* are
travelogues, while Goldsworthy and Norris rely predominantly on literary source materials.

The concentration on travel writing has arisen partly as a consequence of the genre being recognised as a ‘legitimate’ historical source. Todorova, for example, has stated that scholars previously regarded travelogues as unreliable because they only served to ‘illustrate national prejudices’, but that this has been rectified, and today travel accounts are perceived by historians as important materials that are well-suited, for example, to the study of otherness and other cultural attitudes.\(^86\) However, this development has led to a situation in which only ‘national prejudices’ are perceived to be interesting. The works by Todorova, Goldsworthy and Norris have also, of course, approached the matter from a different perspective than the present study, which largely ‘justifies’ the use of different source materials. For example, Goldsworthy attempts to examine ‘imaginary and near-imaginary landscapes of the British concepts of the Balkans’ and thus avoids historical and geographical precision.\(^87\) In contrast, this thesis emphasises historical, political and geographical accuracy and argues that cultural perceptions and attitudes should not be examined outside the context in which they were expressed. In this study, the primary sources that are used can be regarded as quite unconventional if viewed in the framework of interdisciplinary and post-modern historical writing. Therefore, the aim here is to read diplomatic, commercial, religious and other types of sources from a cultural perspective without losing sight of the context in which, or the purpose for which, they were written.

This study sets off from the assumption that differences in the reasons for visiting a region or having an interest towards a region, as well as different circumstances more generally must produce different kinds of perceptions. Thus, a businessman who is trying to form overseas commercial contacts must have different motives and attitudes than, for instance, a person who visits a region purely as a tourist. Earlier in the nineteenth century, these aims often coincided, but from the middle of the century, tourism generally became more separated from other reasons for travel, such as business. The literature has hitherto been unevenly biased towards

\(^{86}\) Todorova, *Imagining*, p. 64.

\(^{87}\) Goldsworthy, *Inventing*, p. 3.
perceptions and views that were transmitted by tourists. Therefore, there needs to be a considerable widening of the perspective with regard to the types of source materials that are used to study British and other western attitudes towards the Balkans. This thesis concentrates on the views expressed by British businessmen, merchants, clergy, army officers, diplomats, philologists, ecclesiastical historians, nurses, missionaries and so forth: it examines images of the Balkans by using the types of source material that have been used to investigate British perceptions of other regions, for instance, India and other former colonies.

The bulk of the chapter on commerce and cultural imagery is reconstructed by using unpublished Foreign Office and Board of Trade materials that are held at the National Archives in Kew. These range from records of dissolved British companies that were established under the 1844 and 1856 Company Acts, to the correspondence of the Foreign Office’s consular and sanitary departments, and to the business correspondence of British firms. In this latter case, FO 368 which contains commercial correspondence between 1906 and 1920, has been one of the most interesting, fruitful and, it seems, unexploited sources for primary material. The study also uses records of some of the most important British companies that are held at the Guildhall Library in London – namely records of the London committee of the Anglo-French Imperial Ottoman Bank and those of the Sun Insurance Company.\(^{88}\)

Previous studies of the images and constructions of Balkan militarism in Britain have also relied mainly on ideas expressed in travel writing and literature. This study takes a different approach to the issue by making use of the rich War- and Foreign Office materials, also held at Kew, which contain reports, memoranda, correspondence, and papers of the British military personnel and diplomats who were sent to monitor Balkan armies during wars and military manoeuvres. Important views were also expressed in British officers’ reports on the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian armies which both had significant numbers of South Slav soldiers.\(^{89}\)

\(^{88}\) For example, The National Archives, Kew, Board of Trade (BT) 31 and 41; Foreign Office (FO) 78, 105 and 368; The Guildhall Library, London, Imperial Ottoman Bank (IOB) Ms 23967; Sun Insurance Office Ltd Ms 31522.

\(^{89}\) War Office (WO) 33, 106; FO 78.
The majority of the primary sources used in the chapter on religious perceptions are held at the York Minster Library. These are mainly published sources, but they have not been exploited in the existing literature nearly sufficiently enough, at least not in the same way as they are in this study. During the time-period under consideration here, British academics and clerics wrote dozens of books, pamphlets and articles about the Orthodox Church and Eastern Christianity, but previous studies, even those that have examined religious issues, have not used the material presented here to any significant extent. Previous studies have also largely omitted some fairly obvious authors, such as Arthur Stanley (1815-81) and Malcolm MacColl (1839-1907), from their analyses of British attitudes to Orthodox Christianity. As shown above, religious attitudes have mostly been investigated by examining popular literature and travel-writing.

In terms of primary sources, this study widens the scope by examining a variety of materials, not just travel books or literature, in order to arrive at a more nuanced and fuller picture of what the British thought about the Balkans. Of course, travel-writing and literature are important in the examination of cultural attitudes and beliefs in any context, and these genres are, therefore, by no means neglected here. But, the aim of this study is to investigate other types of sources as well – those that have not been used so much in recent historiography. Thus, religious, diplomatic, business and military documents can (and should) also be read from the cultural perspective, and, in terms of sources, this is precisely the goal of this thesis. This way of reading ‘official’ sources becomes even more significant, when cultural attitudes that were expressed in those documents are investigated in pragmatic frameworks – that is, when the weight of cultural attitudes in religious, business, diplomatic and military decision-making is considered. This is the main analytical purpose of this study.
Chapter 1

ANGLICAN IMAGES OF EASTERN ORTHODOXY:
THE BALKAN CASE IN A WIDER RELIGIOUS CONTEXT

The broad aim of this chapter is to examine Anglican attitudes to Orthodox Christianity. Its emphasis is on the practices of religious classification and on the examination of Anglican representations of, and attitudes to, Orthodox doctrines and rituals. In this context, ‘doctrine’ refers to religious principles and ‘ritual’ to the execution of those principles. According to Ninian Smart, doctrines are an ‘attempt to give system, clarity and intellectual power to what is revealed through the mythological and symbolic language of religious faith and ritual’.90 ‘Ritual’ can more specifically be defined as a hierarchy of organised skills and processes which include repetitive behaviour and large-scale ceremonies.91 The first section of the chapter investigates the types of classifications that were formed and the purposes of religious classification, while the second section analyses the discursive accentuations of Anglican-Orthodox doctrinal differences, and how constructions of theological otherness were used as tools in ecumenical debates. The third section extends this discussion to Anglican representations of Orthodox rituals.

1.1. ‘For Clearness’ Sake’: Classifying Eastern Orthodoxy

The classification of religions – in the sense of the systematic study of religious principles, practices and institutions – began in the earnest during the nineteenth century when all forms of human activity began increasingly to be understood in the light of science. Thus, the enthusiasm with which religions were classified must be situated within this more general intellectual and scholarly trend that sought to schematise various aspects of human existence (such as languages, the family as well

as legal and economic institutions) from an evolutionary perspective. The basic idea was to identify laws of development.  

The tendency to form classifications was also evident in British writing on Eastern Christianity. Most classifications were conducted from an academic perspective with the aim of increasing knowledge about Eastern Orthodoxy in Britain, but political considerations were also often behind religious categorisations. For example, Arthur Stanley (1815-81), the Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Oxford, stated that he was keen to study the subject because of his long-standing personal interest and because previous studies had not been general enough. Furthermore, he believed that his efforts were important because many of the epochs in the history of the Eastern Church had ‘never been thoroughly described by any English historian’, and due to his professional engagement, considered it to be his duty. Stanley’s book Lectures on the History of the Eastern Church (1861) was already in its fifth edition in 1876, and it became one of the most significant works on the subject. Stanley was one of the most famous of the so-called Liberal churchmen of the Broad Church, but although he had liberal political leanings, he denounced William Gladstone’s use of religion in political debate during the Bulgarian atrocities agitation campaign in 1876, an action that was in line with the deep personal respect that he felt towards Benjamin Disraeli.

Later classifications were also mostly conducted on academic grounds. Reverend Arthur Headlam (1862-1947), the Principal of King’s College, London, offered detailed descriptions of Eastern Christians because they were ‘almost unknown to the majority’ of the English people and because they were important ‘for their numbers and for their historical position’. Reverend F. G. Cole, vicar of Bilton-in-Holderness, East Yorkshire, argued that it was important to study Orthodox

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Christianity because ‘she represents...a stage through which the Western Church has passed’ and would therefore ‘give us an insight into the origins of many church customs’. As the Eastern Church was mostly responsible for ‘formulating our Christian Creed’, it was important to study Eastern liturgies and doctrines so that they could be understood in the West.  

Classifications were also constructed with more explicitly political aims in mind. The traveller and diplomat William Palgrave (1826-88) intended to disperse myths about ‘the phrase “Eastern Christians”’ and, according to his view, most English people had ‘a tolerably precise idea of what they themselves mean by the name “Eastern Christians”’, but many ‘might be very much puzzled to define them with anything like accuracy’. Palgrave interestingly summarised a view which he believed to be an accurate expression of the overall sentiment about Eastern Christians in Britain:

Something on Mahometan ground, but antagonistic to Mahometanism and Mahometan traditions, something sympathetic with the West, an element of progress, a germ of civilisation, a beam of day-dawn, a promise of better things.

Although Palgrave’s main aim was to establish through a detailed study of the various groups of Eastern Christians whether this perception was a correct one, he was also determined to verify whether Europe should be sympathetic towards them. To achieve his aims, Palgrave turned to the popular Victorian pseudo-scientific method, arguing that ‘we must...classify and sub-classify a little for clearness’ sake’. Historian Edward Freeman’s (1823-92) main aim was also ‘to contemplate the Orthodox Church in its political and national, rather than in its strictly theological

100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
aspects’, and thus mainly discussed how the Orthodox Church in the Balkans and elsewhere had become so closely associated with nation and nationality. Freeman was a very controversial figure and he has been described by Ian Sellers as an ‘Anglican hardliner’, while another authority, Richard Shannon, argues that he was the ‘mildest of High Churchmen’. The purpose of religious classification was thus primarily to increase knowledge in Britain about Orthodox Christianity. It was also used as a tool in political debates.

Even though there were differences in the terminological approaches to classification, and in the number of evaluative statements that were made to illustrate a variety of views, the Orthodox Christian world was commonly divided into four groups: Nestorians (eastern Syria, Malabar Christians in south-west India), Monophysites (Copts of Egypt, western Syrians, Abyssinian Church, Syrian Jacobites, and Armenian Church), Orthodox (Greco-Slavic) and Uniates, who were distinguished from other groups because they recognised the supremacy of Rome, but had kept many of their traditional Orthodox practices, for example, the right of clergy to marry.

The accepted view in the existing literature is that Westerners did not differentiate between the Greek and the Slav before the late nineteenth century and that, as Mazower states, ‘it took time for ethnographic and political distinctions between various Orthodox populations to emerge’. This might be the conclusion if only travel accounts are examined, but as the following will show the Orthodox world was in fact subjected to detailed classifications that fused ethnographical, linguistic, religious and other aspects much earlier than the 1880s that Mazower and other scholars have suggested.

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In this framework, the Greek Church and the Greeks attracted the most commentary, and the question of whether the modern Greeks were to be regarded as descendants of ancient Hellas or Byzantium was the most eagerly-debated issue. This debate had strong links to the contemporary ideology of Philhellenism, which emphasised the superiority of Greek literature, art, philosophy, and science, but the discussions also reflected ideas of Byzantinism, a term which was coined in the nineteenth century in an attempt to describe ‘a “true essence” of Byzantine civilisation’, and which was regarded as a catchphrase for caesaropapism (intimate church-state relation) and a particular political ideology. Furthermore, Anglican writers’ views were also in conformity with a common western European nineteenth-century interpretation of the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans, which regarded the Orthodox Church as the only authentic pre-Ottoman institution, the defender of language, religion and culture that had survived under the Ottoman rule.

Stanley argued that the Greek Church, although institutionally corrupt and degraded, was nevertheless the only representative of ancient Greece, because modern Greeks were the racial and spiritual descendants of Hellas, as shown especially by the way in which the Greek Church had kept Christian traditions and culture alive during Ottoman rule. Stanley also argued that the Greek Church was essentially Byzantine in character because it had originally been the church of the first Christian empire. Stanley thus believed that the Greek Church was at the same time the only ‘living representative of the Hellenic race’ and the ‘only living voice...from the apostolic age’. This latter view was also shared and emphasised by many other Anglican writers. George Croly (1780-1860), author and onetime

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rector of St Stephen Wallbrook in London, wrote in 1856 that the Orthodox Church was the ‘mother of all churches’ and the ‘church of the first Christian empire’, while Reverend Henry Tozer (1829-1916), a tutor at Exeter College, Oxford, argued that the Eastern Church was ‘the most lineal representative of the primitive church’ – the ‘parent of [Christian] theology’. Furthermore, Sir Charles Eliot (1862-1931), diplomat and university administrator who had served in Russia, the Balkans, the United States and Africa thought that the Orthodox Church was ‘closer, not perhaps to Christ, but to the Christianity of 400AD, than either Rome or Canterbury’. The Greek Church was thus perceived to have been influenced by three forces – Hellenic, Byzantine, and Ottoman – all of which had had an effect on its development. The influence of these three civilisations was perceived in both negative and positive terms.

Palgrave saw the modern Greeks in a much more negative light than any of the above writers. He argued that ‘these “Greeks” [were] mixed descendants of Asiatic tribes converted to Christianity’ and that their Hellenism was a ‘recent and superficial varnish, a political banneret, and no more’. Palgrave questioned whether the Greeks were ‘entirely worth the sympathy and encouragement bestowed on them by their Western brethren’, and believed that the sympathy expressed for the Greeks in the West could lead to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire or even to the break-up of ‘Europe itself’. These examples showed that the Greek Church was perceived as the descendant of Hellenic, Byzantine, and Ottoman civilisations and that although religious classifications mostly stemmed from academic desire to increase knowledge, they were also used as a vehicle for political views. This latter point, discussed in further detail below, suggests that supposedly ‘religious classifications’ had very little to do with religion itself.

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114 Ibid., pp. 12-3.
Armenian Orthodoxy also received attention in religious classifications and attitudes to Armenia were generally much more positive. Palgrave argued that ‘one feels that one is here among the inheritors of something like an ancient civilisation and a true history’ and that, unlike the Greeks, the Armenians were interested in literature, history as well as religion. Furthermore, the Armenians had a ‘deeper religious feeling’ than the Greeks, which meant that they were less bigoted and that their creed was not ‘so constantly subservient to political ends’. Palgrave also commented on Protestant missionary activities among the Armenians and stated that there had been more conversions to Protestantism among them than among any other group of Eastern Christians because the Armenians had a ‘greater zeal for education’. He concluded that the Armenians were ‘those on whom European sympathy would, if given, be perhaps least thrown away’. Stanley argued that Armenians were ‘by far the most powerful’ of the so-called heretical churches and he saw them as ‘a race, a church, of merchant princes’ who were comparable to Quakers and Jews ‘in quietness, in wealth, [and] in steadiness’. He agreed with Palgrave’s interpretation because he thought that the Armenians had the closest ties with the West because Catholic and Protestant missionaries had ‘won from them the most numerous converts’.

Armenians were thus generally perceived as more religious and ‘civilised’ than the Greeks because they were more easily influenced by Protestant and Catholic missionaries, and because Armenian civilisation was regarded as more ancient than that of the (modern) Greeks who were influenced not only by Hellenic, but more significantly by Byzantine and Ottoman civilisations. Thus, the Armenians were subjected to more traditional ‘Philhellenist’ interpretations in religious classifications than the Greeks because their culture was regarded, unlike that of the Greeks, as being ‘unpolluted’ by Islamic and Byzantine influences. This perception of religious and cultural purity was also illustrated by James Bryce’s account of 1877, according to which the Armenians had been ‘profoundly attached to their own form of Christianity’ because they had been ‘cut off from the general body of the Eastern

\[\text{115} \text{ Ibid., pp. 15, 18.}\]
\[\text{116} \text{ Ibid., p. 19.}\]
\[\text{117} \text{ Stanley, Lectures, pp. 6-7.}\]
Church’ when they refused to accept the decrees of Chalcedon in 451. Bryce also echoed Palgrave’s sentiment that if the West sympathised more with the Armenians ‘they may develop into something much greater than their recent history has shown’. In sum, religious classifications were in these instances used as a way of constructing hierarchies within the Orthodox Christian world in order to increase knowledge about them and as a way of demonstrating political viewpoints and positions. It is also possible to see the above classifications as comparable to risk assessments made by bankers about potential customers. In this scenario, ‘Western sympathy’ can be seen as analogous with ‘Western capital,’ and without careful consideration, both could be ‘misspent’ if invested in the wrong sort of people.

The views expressed about Armenia by the writers above did not bring anything new to the ways in which the country had been conceived in the West at least for the past two centuries or even longer. Two seventeenth-century English travellers, John Cartwright and John Freyer represented the Armenians as family-oriented and exceptionally entrepreneurial and as custodians of both ancient Christian civilisation and the Hebraic past, while historian Edward Gibbon noted the eminence of the first century BC Armenian Empire under King Tigran I in his *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776). In addition, Armenia became the first nation to adopt Christianity as the official religion, a factor which also contributed to the perceptions of purity that were held about the country in the Christian west. Significantly, Geoffrey Chaucer (1343-1400), the famous English medieval poet, made references to Armenia in *The Canterbury Tales* (1387-1400) and in his other works which ensured Armenia’s place as part of the English imagination. Many other prominent European and American cultural figures from Lord Byron to Walt Whitman (1819-92) situated ancient Armenia in the same ‘geocultural realm’ as (ancient) Greece, Syria and Egypt. In the case of Armenia, religious classifications

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were primarily based on earlier cultural stereotypes about the country, rather than on any theological assessments about the character of Armenian Christianity itself.

Egyptian Copts were treated by Palgrave as an ancient tribal-like clan whose Christianity was ‘more ancient than Syrians, Maronites, and Armenians’ and who had existed since the time of the ‘first rational records of the inhabited world’. Palgrave continued to apply anthropological methods in his religious map of Eastern Christianity and his argument also had a strong connection to the racialist views of the late 1860s. He argued that the ‘Copt is to all intents and purposes…a whiter and more intelligent negro’.\(^{120}\) For Stanley, the Copts also represented the ‘most remarkable monument of Christian antiquity’ and he thought that they were the most civilised of the so-called ‘heretical’ Eastern Christians, because the ‘intelligences of Egypt still lingers in the Coptic scribes’ who had been used as clerks in the Ottoman administration for this reason.\(^{121}\) American Professor Dyneley Prince also had similar views and argued that the Copts represented the ‘most direct descendants of the ancient Egyptians’ because they had ‘practically abstained from intermarriage with all alien elements’ for ‘religious reasons’.\(^{122}\) Thus, while the identity of the Greek Church was constructed by references to its Hellenic, Byzantine and Ottoman heritages, and that of the Armenians by portraying them as an unpolluted ancient civilisation that was at the same time receptive of western influences, the character of Egyptian Copts was mainly seen in a continuum from ancient Egypt.

The Slavic portion of the Orthodox Christian world also attracted attention in religious classifications. Stanley labelled it the ‘northern tribes’. Excluding Russia, to which he afforded five chapters, this group received the smallest amount of attention from him although he recognised the ‘ecclesiastical as well as the political importance’ of the group which was caused mainly by their position ‘on the frontier land of the West and East’. According to Stanley’s view, the ‘only fruitful epochs’ in


\(^{121}\) Stanley, Lectures, pp. 8-9.

the ecclesiastical history of this group were the ‘more stirring moments of Servian history and the conversion of Bulgaria’.

In general terms, the Slavic Balkans attracted mostly ethnologically-influenced interpretations, even in connection with religious issues. The racial and linguistic separation of the Bulgarians from other Slavs was widely-used in pseudo-scientific classification, and this perceived division also informed British commentaries about the possible reasons for religious differences. William M. Ramsay (1851-1939), the renowned classical scholar, archaeologist and theologian, argued that friction within the Orthodox Slav community was essentially the result of ‘a difference of ecclesiastical organisation’ which was caused by the collision of two different races that had ‘different systems of civilisation and thought and ideals’; he believed that the creation of the independent Bulgarian church in 1870 was the most illustrative example of this schism. To Walter Adeney, the Principal of the Lancashire College, Manchester, the schismatic Church of Bulgaria was also the most interesting part of the Orthodox world, and he similarly believed that the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate, when it broke with Constantinople, had occurred largely as a consequence of ‘racial distinction’ – because Bulgarians, unlike other Slavs or Greeks, were ‘a Turanian race, akin to the Finns and the Tartars’. Other commentators, such as Edward Freeman, also used similar devices in the racial classification of Bulgarians. Freeman argued that Bulgarians, unlike the Serbs, were assimilated Slavs who had been ‘brought into close ethnical connexion with the Turanian’.

The term ‘Turanian’ was widely applied as a signifier of non-Aryan and non-Semitic languages, but, as the above examples illustrated, it was also used as an ethno-cultural or ethno-religious category to denote a willingness to seek religious independence on racial grounds, and to indicate purity of racial origin. The term was

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123 Stanley, Lectures, pp. 16-7.
125 Ibid., p. 148.
first used by Jean Baptiste Julien d’Omalius d’Halloy (1783-1875), the Belgian ethnologist, to describe the Tartars of Touran,\(^\text{128}\) but it acquired gradually a very negative connotation, mostly because it began to be used in the academic discourse as a term which implied racial descent which was neither ‘Aryan’ nor ‘Semitic’, but rather ‘Asiatic’, an idea first popularised by Friedrich Max Müller. Later, these categories were increasingly used in academic and in popular treatises to construct dichotomies between ‘Asiatic stagnation’ and ‘Western progress’. It was precisely for these reasons that Frederic Farrar (1831-1903) challenged the use of the term already in 1866 – because of its vagueness and ‘the wide extension of meaning it had received’.\(^\text{129}\) But, how accurate were these interpretations about differences of racial origin of the Bulgarians in comparison to other South Slavs, and can it be argued, that this difference was the main influence – or even among the most important ones – as a driving force behind the Bulgarian desire to form independent church organisation in 1869-70?

The independent Bulgarian Exarchate emerged in 1870 largely as a consequence of political and nationalist considerations, rather than as a result of any ancient racial differences between ‘Slavs’ and ‘Bulgars’.\(^\text{130}\) The Ottoman Sultan had allowed the Bulgarians to establish their own church organisation largely in order to prevent any strong Christian coalitions from developing in the Balkans. The then Patriarch of Constantinople, Anthimus VI (1790-1878), did not, however, allow the creation of this independent organisation, and, as a consequence, the Bulgarian Church was excommunicated, an act which was not approved by other Orthodox Churches. The council members of the Constantinople Ecumenical Patriarchate proclaimed the Bulgarian Church as schismatic in 1872, and all its members as heretics. Victor Roudometof has argued that the ‘surrender of Orthodoxy to ethnic nationalism’ was the council’s main argument for the proclamation.\(^\text{131}\) This

\(^{128}\) ‘Turan’ is the ancient Persian name of Central Asia.


\(^{130}\) This distinction will be discussed in further detail below.

ecclesiastical self-government encouraged the Bulgarians to look for political independence as well, and partly inspired the revolts in 1875-6, which were brutally suppressed by Turkish irregular troops, an event which caused a massive public uproar in Britain.\footnote{N. Zernov, Eastern Christendom: A Study of the Origin and Development of the Eastern Orthodox Church (London: Weidenfeld \& Nicolson, 1961), pp. 193-4.}

Thus, the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate had nothing to do with racial differences between Slavs and Bulgars, but everything to do with politics, with the deteriorating power of the Ottoman Empire over the Balkans, and with Bulgarian national awakening. Why did the above Victorian scholars look for racial explanations? They were, of course, very heavily influenced by the academic traditions of their time. However, Slavs and Bulgars were, indeed, different tribes that had made their way into the Balkans around the fifth century – the former from the north and the latter from the east. The ‘Bulgar homeland’ was in the Volga region which even in the eighteenth century was often referred to as ‘Great Bulgaria’. These originally Turkic tribes mixed closely with Slavic tribes and had by the 1050s lost most of their nomadic traits.\footnote{R. King, The Black Sea: A History (Oxford: OUP, 2004), pp. 77-8. See also K. Setton, ‘The Bulgars in the Balkans and the Occupation of Corinth in the Seventh Century’, Speculum, 25 (1950), pp. 502-43 for detailed discussion of the various terms that have been used to describe Bulgars and Huns, and so forth, and the kinds of etymological and historical arguments have been used to illustrate a variety of viewpoints.} Thus, modern science has shown that it was quite outlandish to suggest that these kinds of ancient differences between Slavs and Bulgars could have any concrete bearing on political or any other developments in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.

The question over the original Slavonic tongue was closely related to the above issue, and it had been debated in academia since 1843, when two of the most important sources, \textit{Vita Constantinii} and \textit{Vita Methodii}, were uncovered. These sources chronicled the missionary activities of two Greek brothers Cyril (826-69) and Methodius (815-85) – the inventors of written Slavic language.\footnote{H. Lunt, ‘The Beginning of Written Slavic Language’, Slavic Review, 23 (1964), p. 212.} This question also provoked controversy among British and European linguists and other human scientists. According to Max Müller, the oldest documented source was the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{133} R. King, The Black Sea: A History (Oxford: OUP, 2004), pp. 77-8. See also K. Setton, ‘The Bulgars in the Balkans and the Occupation of Corinth in the Seventh Century’, Speculum, 25 (1950), pp. 502-43 for detailed discussion of the various terms that have been used to describe Bulgars and Huns, and so forth, and the kinds of etymological and historical arguments have been used to illustrate a variety of viewpoints.
\end{itemize}
translation of the Bible into Ecclesiastical Slavonic, that is, to the ancient Bulgarian tongue, in the middle of the ninth century.\textsuperscript{135} Peter Giles (1860-1935), reader of Comparative Philology at Cambridge, similarly argued that Old Bulgarian was the language into which the Bible had been translated in the ninth century.\textsuperscript{136} The linguist Robert Latham (1812-88), on the other hand, argued that the ‘alphabet of Servian and Russian’ was that of the ‘Old Slavonic translation of the Scriptures’. Latham was not, however, able to give a definitive answer about the original Slavonic tongue, and argued that on geographical grounds, Bulgarian had the ‘best claim’, but, as the chief Bulgarian characters were missing from Old Slavonic, then, on the grounds of grammar, Serbian or Russian had the closest claim to be the original Slavonic tongue.\textsuperscript{137} Tucker agreed with Latham, and he argued that Old Bulgarian was not the correct term to describe Church Slavonic because this language was spoken much more widely, and not just in the regions inhabited by Bulgarians.\textsuperscript{138}

How much truth was there in the analyses of the above Victorian academics? Modern-day scholarship has shown that, in terms of timing, Müller and Giles were correct, because the Bible was indeed translated into Slavonic language in the middle of the ninth-century by Cyril and Methodius. This period was marked by intense Byzantine missionary activity, aimed at converting pagan Slavs in the regions of present-day Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Serbia and Russia. It has been more difficult to arrive at any definitive conclusion about which of the modern-day Slavic languages is closest to the original Church Slavonic. Kallistos Ware argues that as Cyril and Methodius were fluent in the Slavic dialect that was spoken in the Salonica region because they had spent much of their youth in the area, ‘the dialect of the Macedonian Slavs became Church Slavonic’.\textsuperscript{139} Nicolas Zernov has offered similar conclusions, and argues furthermore, that Slav-speaking Christians of the Greek rite were persecuted in Latinized Central Europe, and after the middle of the ninth-

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{135} Müller, }\textit{Science of Language}, p. 220.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{136} P. Giles, }\textit{A Short Manual of Comparative Philology for Classical Students} (London: Macmillan, 1901), p. 21.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{137} R. Latham, }\textit{Elements of Comparative Philology} (London: Walton & Maberly, 1862), pp. 8-10.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{138} Tucker, }\textit{Introduction}, p. 224.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{139} K. Ware, }\textit{The Orthodox Church} (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975 [1969]), pp. 82-3.
century, Tsar Boris (852-89) of Bulgaria offered them protection by letting them settle into the area of his ‘jurisdiction’. In this manner, the ‘Cyrillic’ alphabet, invented by Cyril and Methodius, arrived into the area of present-day Bulgaria, gradually facilitating the birth of Slavonic literature in Bulgaria and later in Serbia.\textsuperscript{140}

From a strictly linguistic viewpoint, the issue becomes more complex. Horace Lunt has argued that it is fairly difficult to map out the exact movements of Cyril and Methodius because of the lack of reliable contemporary sources due to ‘distortions, omissions, reinterpretations and interpolation’.\textsuperscript{141} It seems, however, that Müller and Giles’s view, that the Bulgarian language was the closest to the original written Slavonic, was closest to modern interpretations, because ‘the language…of Cyril and Methodius were the basis for the flowering of the Byzantinoslavic culture of Bulgaria in the ninth century’.\textsuperscript{142}

In conclusion, the purpose of classification was primarily to increase knowledge in Britain about Orthodox Christianity – to categorise the unknown – but religious classifications were also used as tools in political debates that considered the future of the Ottoman Empire. Divisions were constructed primarily on the grounds of geographical position, language, and history as well as racial origin, and they reflected a Victorian tendency to formulate cultural hierarchies. Classifications had very rarely much to do with religion itself – that is, with religious principles (doctrine) and practices (ritual). These aspects were mostly assessed in the context of the ecumenical debates which will be discussed in the following section of this chapter.

The Armenian, Greek and Bulgarian churches received the largest amount of attention in religious classifications. Armenia was perceived to be intellectually closer to the west, and especially to Protestantism, than other Orthodox Churches because of missionary successes there. Furthermore, Armenia was portrayed as a representative of an ancient civilisation where, unlike in other Orthodox countries, literature, history and religion were respected and studied. These perspectives closely

\textsuperscript{140} Zernov, \textit{Eastern Christendom}, pp. 91-2.
\textsuperscript{141} Lunt, ‘Written Slavic’. p. 212.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., p. 218.
matched prevalent British and American cultural beliefs about the country that had been powerful ever since the Middle Ages.

The Greek Church also featured significantly in religious classifications, especially in the 1860s and 1870s. Most commentators emphasised that the contemporary Greek identity was a mixture of Hellenic, Byzantine and Ottoman influences. Bulgarian Orthodoxy received more individual attention in religious classifications than other South Slav Orthodox churches, the main reason for this being the separation of the Bulgarian church from the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1870 which was seen as arising primarily from racial and cultural differences from other South Slav populations. As shown above, in the light of modern science, this explanation is not very convincing as it was mainly domestic Ottoman and international politics as well as the increase of the Bulgarian national feeling – not ancient racial differences – that led to the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate.

Paradoxically – regardless of these kinds of detailed classifications that highlighted racial, linguistic and cultural differences between various Orthodox branches – the general view among British ecclesiastical writers was that there were no practical differences of religious principles and practices within the Greco-Slavic Orthodox world. This sentiment was widely expressed from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, but it seemed to be especially strong during the Lambeth Conference of 1908. Arthur Headlam argued that Orthodox Christians were ‘almost absolutely identical’ in creed, rites and discipline, while Walter Adeney maintained that, although the Orthodox churches of Montenegro, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia as well as the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were organised on national basis, they had all retained their ‘doctrinal orthodoxy’. William Ramsay argued before the Congress of Historical Sciences in Berlin in 1908 that Slavs and Greeks had ‘practically no difference of creed or ritual’, while F. G.

143 The significance of Lambeth Conferences and other ecumenical discussion forums will be discussed in further detail in the next section. See, A. Stephenson, Anglicanism and the Lambeth Conferences (London: SPCK, 1978).

144 Headlam, History, p. 149.

145 Adeney, Eastern Churches, p. 348.

146 Ramsay, ‘Orthodox Church’, p. 147.
Cole wrote in 1908 that there was ‘no question at issue between the various components of the Eastern Church on any matters of doctrine or discipline’. Similarly, Margaret Dampier stated that all the autocephalous national churches were in ‘fullest intercommunion’ with the exception of Bulgaria and Constantinople, and that this dispute was a ‘matter of jurisdiction – not [of] doctrine’. Edward Freeman’s account was a representative of overall attitudes:

The Orthodox Church contains peoples, nations, and languages, of various origins, under various governments, and in various stages of civilisation. Greeks, Roumans, Slaves, Georgians, are bound together by the tie of common faith and worship, not by common subjection to any one central power.

Anglican authors thus regarded the Greco-Slavic Eastern Orthodox world as a unified community in terms of doctrine which meant that distinctions between Russian, Serbian, Bulgarian or Macedonian Orthodoxy were made very rarely. This sentiment was in sharp contrast with those views that constructed differences between the various sections of the Orthodox world by highlighting racial, historical and cultural factors. Cole attempted to make the unity of Orthodoxy more comprehensible to the English: ‘they all bear the same filial feeling to Constantinople as our colonial Churches bear to the see of Canterbury’.

1.2. ‘Our Church Does Not Sanction It’: Doctrinal Otherness and the Anglican-Orthodox Reunion Debate

As shown above, religious classifications of Eastern Orthodoxy had in fact little to do with religion itself, if ‘religion’ is defined as a combination of religious principles (doctrine) and religious practices (ceremony). These received more commentary in

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connection with ecumenical discussions which broadly aimed at achieving an Anglican-Orthodox understanding of doctrinal matters which, it was hoped, would ultimately lead to intercommunion or reunion between these churches.

Ecumenical discussions were held throughout the nineteenth century and they continued before and after the First World War. Attempts to attain Anglican-Orthodox intercommunion went far further back, however, at least to the early eighteenth century, when the Nonjurors, a group of Church of England clergymen, unsuccessfully proposed it to the representatives of the Greek clergy, who maintained that Anglicans should submit completely to Orthodoxy, a request which the Nonjurors rejected. Orthodox and Church of England relations go back even further than that, to the seventeenth century when George Abbott (1562-1633), the Archbishop of Canterbury, corresponded with Cyril Lukaris (1572-1637), the Greek prelate and theologian who later became the Patriarch of Constantinople as Cyril I. Furthermore, Metrophanes Kritopoulos (1589-1639), a Macedonian priest who later became the Patriarch of Alexandria, studied at Oxford between 1617 and 1625, and there was also an attempt to establish a Greek College at that university around 1694.

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153 More widely, Protestant-Orthodox contacts began in 1573 when a delegation of Lutheran scholars from Tübingen travelled to Constantinople. Their aim was to instigate a Reformation movement among the Greeks. In order to do that, the German scholars brought a Greek translation of the Augsburg Confession (1530) with them. The Patriarch of Constantinople, Jeremias II, showed no interest in Protestantism, a view which he detailed in his ‘Answers’ to Tübingen theologians in 1576, 1579 and 1581.

154 K. Ware, *The Orthodox Church* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975 [1963]), pp. 108-9. The first Orthodox church was founded in London in 1677, but it was closed only five years later after Henry Compton, the Bishop of London, had forbade all icons, demanded that all prayers for saints were omitted, that the Council of Jerusalem (1672) was denounced, and that the doctrine of
Doctrinal issues were increasingly discussed again from the mid-nineteenth century onwards when Anglican interest in Orthodox Christianity increased, largely as a result of the activities of the Oxford movement. In 1863, the Lower House of Canterbury appointed a committee to study the possibilities for intercommunion with the Orthodox Church, but differences of view about the doctrines of infallibility, baptism, the procession of the Holy Spirit, and the invocation of the Blessed Virgin and the Saints stood in the way of the establishment of closer ties. The Bonn Conferences of 1874 and 1875 were arranged by the Old Catholic German theologian Dr. Johan von Döllinger (1799-1890), and the purpose of these gatherings was to produce a reviewed common confession between Orthodox and Anglican churches which would then ultimately lead to intercommunion between the two churches. Some understanding was indeed achieved. A contemporary account from W. Stevens Perry, the future Bishop of Iowa, who attended the 1875 conference, conveyed the importance that was attached to this gathering and also illustrated some general attitudes to Eastern Orthodoxy and the Balkans as well as those towards Russia:

On either side of the Archbishop sat two Roumanian prelates, Gennadius, Bishop of Argesu, and Melchisedek, Bishop of Dunareide-jom; forming in their Episcopal habits and with their Oriental features, a singularly picturesque grouping, quite striking to Western eyes. With them were three Archimandrites, Sabbas, from Belgrade, Anastasiades and Bryennios, from Constantinople, deputed to represent the Patriarch; the Archpriest Janyschew; a Doctor in Theology from Macedonia; Professors from Dalmatia, Athens, the

Transubstantiation was disclaimed. The second Orthodox church opened in London only in 1838 when all the above restrictions were lifted.

155 The Oxford movement was especially influential in the first half of the nineteenth century. The movement was instigated by John Keble (1792-1866) and led by other influential Anglican scholars such as J. H. Newman, R. H. Froude (1803-36) and Edward Pusey (1800-82). The Oxford movement denied the Protestant element in Anglicanism and emphasized pre-Reformation Catholic traditions.

Shores of the Euxine, Kiew, and St. Petersburgh, together with several laymen of rank and theological attainments. Thus notable was the Eastern representation at this Second Reunion Conference.\textsuperscript{157}

This account illustrate many attitudes that will be discussed later, such as the Oriental picturesque-ness of Orthodox priests and the use of classical language, in this case reference to the Black Sea as ‘Euxine’ (\textit{Pontus Euxinus} in Latin), a term that has evoked ‘poetical connotations’ in western literature for centuries.\textsuperscript{158} Representatives from the Anglican side included: Canon Henry Parry Liddon (1829-90), one of the most respected Anglican theologians; the clergyman Malcolm MacColl; Reverend F. S. May, the editor of the \textit{Colonial Church Chronicle}; and Reverend Lewis M. Hogg, a leading member of the Anglo-Continental Society. There were also numerous other Church of England clergymen, and some representatives from Scotland, from the Church of Ireland, and from the United States, as well as clerics from Italian and French Protestant churches.\textsuperscript{159} The Lambeth Conference of 1888 was the first outward attempt by Anglican Bishops at reunion with the Orthodox while the consecutive conferences of 1897, 1908 and 1914 aimed at achieving the same goal.\textsuperscript{160} Cultural ties did indeed become closer. During the war, many displaced Serbian Orthodox students studied in English universities and Russian Orthodoxy also became better known in Britain as a consequence of the arrival of Russian émigrés into the country. In the post-war era, attempts at promoting Christian unity increased, with the main aim being to prevent war between Christians from happening again.\textsuperscript{161}

The Anglican enthusiasm for improving relations with the Orthodox Church did not extend to Nonconformists and, in fact, there existed a vast theological and ecclesiastical gulf between English Nonconformity and Orthodox Christianity. According to Richard Shannon there were ‘no crotchets, no reunion debates, no


\textsuperscript{158} King, \textit{Black Sea}, p. ix.

\textsuperscript{159} Perry, ‘Reunion Conference’, pp. 2-3.

\textsuperscript{160} Monks, ‘Anglicans and Orthodox’, pp. 411-6.

\textsuperscript{161} Geffert, ‘Anglican Orders’, p. 271.
jealousies, no rivalries’ between Eastern Orthodoxy and English Nonconformity. However, during the Bulgarian atrocities agitation campaign in 1876, Nonconformists made up perhaps the largest group of pro-Bulgarian agitators, with Wesleyan Methodists, Congregationalists and Baptists forming the three most active protesting denominations. Nonconformists were comfortable in giving their support to the Bulgarians, not because of any feeling of theological or religious affiliation that went beyond recognising the Orthodox as ‘Christians pure and simple’, but because the Bulgarians and other Eastern Christians that were under Ottoman rule were perceived as experiencing similar state-led religious suppression as the Nonconformists in Britain at the time. The clearest illustration of this sentiment was the connection that was made in Nonconformist treatises between the struggle over the Burial Bill in England and the difficulties over burials faced by Orthodox Christians under Ottoman rule. During the agitation campaign, the relationship between Gladstone and English Nonconformity which had previously been rather cold became closer. The common denominator was the moral outrage felt towards Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria as well as opposition to the Conservative government’s pro-Turkish foreign policy. Even after the agitation campaign had died down, the Gladstone-Nonconformist relationship can be described as that of ‘mutual appreciation’.

This section examines reunion debates from the Anglican perspective and investigates whether perceptions of the ‘doctrinal otherness’ of Eastern Orthodoxy, which were very visible in most views expressed in connection with these debates, had any influence in determining attitudes towards reunion. ‘Doctrinal otherness’ refers to a mode of representation which portrayed Orthodox doctrines as completely opposite and inferior to Western doctrines, especially Anglican ones. The doctrinal differences mentioned above received the largest amount of commentary, the differing opinion about the procession of the Holy Spirit (the so-called Filioque controversy) being by far the most eagerly-debated issue in all ecumenical discussions, and also in the British writing on Eastern Orthodoxy in general. The view of Reverend John Mason Neale (1818-66), warden of Sackville College, East

\[162\] Shannon, Gladstone, pp. 160-71.
Grinstead, and one of the most influential British scholars of Eastern Orthodoxy, demonstrated the general attitude. In the early 1870s, he wrote that the incompatible approach to the procession of the Holy Spirit was the ‘only important doctrinal difference which separates the Eastern from the Western Church’.  

But why was this difference deemed so important in both the East and the West? In Western theology (both Roman Catholic and Protestant) the Holy Spirit proceeds both from ‘the Father and the Son’ whereas in the Orthodox tradition it only proceeds from the Father, but through the Son. Orthodox Christians object to the addition of ‘et Filio’ to the confession of faith on two grounds: they argue that it goes against the decisions of the Seven Ecumenical Councils which prohibited any changes to be made to the Creed, and because the adding of the Filioque clause is theologically fallacious because it destroys the balance between the three persons of the Godhead which is the basis of Trinitarian theology. This dispute had originated in the sixth and the seventh centuries when the addition of ‘et Filio’ was used in Spain as a safeguard against local Arianism which was a Christian heresy that denied the Divinity of God, and it was interpolated by the Spanish Church in the Third Council of Toledo in 589, whence it gradually made its way into other parts of Catholic Europe.

Anglican ecclesiastical writers reacted to this issue in a number of ways, but most shared the belief that the adding of the Filioque clause had been included in the Roman Catholic and Protestant traditions for such a long time that it had become an integral part of Western forms of Christianity. Edward Freeman, for example, argued that ‘from an Anglican or Lutheran point of view’, the denial of double procession was one of the two principal errors of Orthodox theology, the other being the doctrine of the invocation of saints, which he believed was totally unnecessary and had ‘degenerated into a superstitious reverence to likenesses’. These types of views were also expressed in connection with ecumenical debates. In the aftermath of the

165 Ware, *Orthodox Church*, p. 59.
166 *Ibid*.
167 Freeman, ‘Eastern Church’, p. 323.
Bonn conference of 1875, Edward Pusey (1800-82), the Anglican theologian and one of the leaders of the revivalist Oxford movement, argued that the procession of the Spirit ‘from the Father and the Son’ had been the mode in which the Western Church had ‘uniformly confessed its faith’ since the fourth century, and that ‘the Greeks could not…ask us to abandon’ it, believing that the doctrine of the Holy Trinity was one of the bases of Western Christianity, and essential to the ‘untheological English mind’. Deacon William Palmer, fellow of St Mary Magdalen, Oxford, argued in 1883 that the Orthodox Church was characterised by a general immobility which was best manifested by ‘her denial of the “Double Procession”’ and believed that this rejection showed that the Orthodox Church was ‘against the doctrine of positive development’ of the Christian faith.

Another slightly different approach admitted that in all theological strictness, the adding of ‘et Filio’ was incorrect and that this error had been acknowledged by the representatives of the Western churches at the Bonn Conference of 1875. This standpoint was adopted, for example, by Arthur Headlam, who at the same time argued that it was not appropriate for Eastern theologians to try to ‘condemn the West for heresy’ for using the addition. This insistence on the part of the Orthodox Church was, according to Headlam, a good indication of the workings of the ‘Eastern mind’, not being ‘content with that confession, but to feel it a duty to condemn’. Headlam believed that the ‘uncompromising character of oriental theology’ was also revealed by the insistence of Eastern theologians that their interpretation of the primitive, undivided church and the Scripture was ‘absolutely correct’ and needed not be reinvestigated, emphasising at the same time that the Anglican Church had always been more investigative and analytical. Therefore, to Headlam, the Orthodox Church was stagnant because it had ‘never had to investigate, it always has defended and

asserted’. Fortescue similarly argued that the ‘Filioque in the creed’ was the ‘greatest stumbling-block’ for Anglican-Orthodox relations, and that other doctrinal differences such as the Orthodox view of Purgatory, meant that ‘as a force’ the Orthodox Church was ‘dead’. Both of these writers therefore shared the belief that the insistence on the part of Orthodox theologians on the complete abandonment of the Filioque, and that this was the only way through which reunion could be achieved, was not appropriate, and some commentators thought that the insistence on it was a sign of Orthodox Christianity’s ‘Oriental rigidity’. These Anglican writers therefore believed that Eastern Christianity’s unwillingness to accept the Filioque clause made its doctrines erroneous, immobile and rigid.

There was, however, a third approach – one which recognised that attitudes to the procession of the Holy Spirit were different in the East and in the West, but which considered that this was not a significant theological discrepancy because Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox churches were all still Trinitarian, that is, they all recognised the Holy Trinity as the very basis of the Christian faith. For example, F. G. Cole agreed with Headlam on the point that the Orthodox Church ‘rightly resented’ the addition of the Filioque, but saw the different interpretation of the Holy Spirit in the East and the West as essentially a linguistic disparity: the Greeks refer to the Holy Spirit as ‘hypostasis’ and the Latins as ‘persona’. Although Cole had a certain amount of ‘sympathy with the Oriental mind’ for resisting the addition, he thought that there was no ‘real difference on the subject of the Trinity’ between the two parts of Christendom. Walter Adeney recognised that both Eastern and Western forms of Christianity were Trinitarian, but also saw the Filioque clause as the most important difference between the two, believing it to be an ‘irony of history’ that such a small doctrinal difference had become the largest disparity.

Praying for the departed and the administration of the Eucharist were also widely-discussed doctrinal differences. The former was condemned by most Anglican writers as being theologically erroneous or an antiquarian convention that had no

171 Ibid., pp. 163, 168-70.
172 Fortescue, Eastern Churches, p. 23.
173 Cole, Mother of All Churches, pp. 39.
174 Adeney, Greek and Eastern Churches, p. 237.
bearing on the modern world, while others believed that prayers for the departed had been an integral part of the doctrine of the primitive undivided or universal (Catholic) church, and therefore should not be denounced. George Croly and Henry Brailsford’s (1873-1958) views represented the standpoint of those who believed that praying for the departed was unnecessary or even that such prayers were wrong or un-Christian. Croly argued that ‘praying for the dead goes far beyond the Scripture’, that is, beyond the writings of Old and New Testament, whereas Brailsford believed that it was a ‘prehistoric ritual’ that was more deeply rooted in the heart of the Balkan peasant than the ‘Orthodox Church itself’.  

The official line of the Church of England was strictly against prayers for the dead. The Church of England clergyman and religious controversialist Malcolm MacColl (who as noted above, was one of the Anglican dignitaries attending the Bonn Conference of 1875) claimed that the Archbishop of Canterbury had explicitly stated that ‘our Church does not sanction such prayers’. MacColl, however, did not oppose them because, after examining the evolution of the English Book of Prayer, he had come to the conclusion that the Church of England had never officially refused to sanction prayers for the dead. Furthermore, he claimed that such prayers had been an integral part of the Christian Church from the beginning, and that the doctrine was inherited from Judaism. The Church of England, as an institution, was also very reluctant to involve itself in the Bulgarian atrocities agitation campaign in 1876 because the feeling was that, as a state establishment, it needed to support the pro-Turkish policy of Disraeli’s Conservative government, a sentiment which partly stemmed from traditional conservatism of the Anglican clergy as a class. However, even though the Church of England did not officially involve itself in the campaign, most of its clergymen agitated enthusiastically as individuals, as shown by the fact that out of 137 religious leaders who participated in the Eastern Question Association’s conference in the spring of 1878, no fewer than 80 were Church of England clergymen, including Pusey and Liddon. Liddon in fact criticised the

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175 Croly, ‘Greek Church’, p. 308.
Church of England’s silence about the Eastern Question in 1878 in a letter to another agitator, Edward Freeman:

We of the Church of England...are too afraid about Education, the Burials Bill, or Disestablishment, to do justice, as a body, to the plain moral aspects of the Eastern Question.\(^\text{179}\)

MacColl, Liddon and Freeman were all very active in the atrocities agitation campaign and in the movement to end Turkish rule in Europe more generally, and, although devout Anglicans, they went completely against the wishes of the Church of England in connection with the Eastern Question. The agitation campaign, and especially the fact that the Church of England was reluctant to support it, had a long-lasting influence on Freeman, who ended up supporting disestablishment.\(^\text{180}\)

In addition to praying for the dead, the practice of baptism and the administration of the Eucharist also received critical attention in Britain. Criticisms were often based on the interpretations that had been applied to other doctrines, that is, they were regarded as essentially different from Anglican practices and therefore inferior. Arthur Stanley argued that the sacramental doctrines in the East were ‘stiff’, ‘magical’ and ‘antiquarian’ because people were still baptised according to the original form, in which they were ‘immersed in the deep baptismal waters’, a practice which had been replaced in the West with the application of a few drops of water. He also criticised the Orthodox tradition of continuing to administer the Eucharist to infants.\(^\text{181}\)

In terms of doctrine, therefore, Eastern Orthodoxy was seen in Britain as essentially different from Western Christianity.

This disparity was often illustrated by constructing binary oppositions: Western Christianity was described by adjectives such as logical, lawful, practical, civilised, investigative and analytical, while Eastern doctrines were interpreted as philosophical, rhetorical, speculative, simple, metaphysical, barbarian, conservative and assertive. Stanley, for example, argued that in the West theology was logical in

\(^{179}\) H. P. Liddon to E. Freeman, 26 Feb. 1878. Cited in, Shannon, p. 175.  
\(^{180}\) Shannon, Gladstone, p. 172.  
\(^{181}\) Stanley, Lectures, pp. 29-31; Cole, Mother of All Churches, pp. 28-9.
form and based on law, whereas in the East it was rhetorical in form and based on philosophy.\textsuperscript{182} Similarly, Tozer argued that the contrast between the East and the West was largely determined ‘by the character of the dominant races’, Eastern theology being, ‘like the Greek mind’, speculative whereas Western theology, ‘like the Roman intellect’, was practical.\textsuperscript{183} F. G. Cole’s dichotomy was similar to those of Stanley and Tozer: he argued that the East was metaphysical whereas the West was practical.\textsuperscript{184}

The above examples showed that Anglican discourse represented Orthodox doctrines as complete opposites to those of Western Christianity, which suggests that, in this connection, the concept of ‘doctrinal otherness’ is a useful analytical tool. These attitudes also revealed that practices of East-West binary-construction were perhaps more evident in the religious framework than in any other context examined in this thesis – that is, military, commercial or satirical. Anglican attitudes towards Orthodoxy were also visibly influenced by Enlightenment perceptions of Byzantium when it was regarded as the direct opposite of the ideals of rationality. The Byzantine Empire was often associated with political authoritarianism, with a culture that overemphasised the role of religion, and with a society that opposed any kind of reform.\textsuperscript{185} These three Enlightenment assessments of Byzantine culture still importantly informed the thinking of British observers of religious affairs in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. The denunciation of the mystical element in Christianity derived from the Reformation period, with Martin Luther, in particular, being a staunch critic of mysticism,\textsuperscript{186} whereas the mystical element remains an important part of Orthodox Christian tradition.

Two basic approaches were offered as explanations for doctrinal otherness; both of them were inherently linked with historical circumstances in the Balkans and

\textsuperscript{182} Stanley, \textit{Lectures}, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{183} Tozer, \textit{Church and the Eastern Empire}, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{184} Cole, \textit{Mother of All Churches}, p. 27.
other Orthodox areas that had been under Ottoman control. First, Orthodox Christianity was represented as different from Western Christianity because of its close historical connection to Islam, which meant that it had remained stagnant and barbarian and had not progressed towards freedom and civilisation.\textsuperscript{187} The second interpretation also emphasised Orthodoxy’s connection to Islam, but not so directly as the first. According to the second view, centuries of Turkish rule had made it impossible for the Orthodox Church to move forward; this manifested itself, for example, in the fact that there had been no major heresies in the Orthodox world since the fifteenth century.\textsuperscript{188}

The historical connection between Orthodoxy and Islam was also regarded as one of the most important factors contributing to the in-between character of Balkan Christians and Muslims. Arnold Van Gennep’s concept of ‘liminality’ is useful as a framework for examining British perceptions of the in-betweenness of the Balkan religious communities. Van Gennep’s model consists of three phases of development: separation (preliminal), transition (liminal) and incorporation (postliminal).\textsuperscript{189} In the first phase, an individual is removed from a previous state and proceeds to the next; during the next the individual is in between the two stages of development, being neither one thing nor the other; and in the final phase, the individual returns to community, but in a new state. Todorova has argued that Orthodox Christianity was not represented in Western (mainly Roman Catholic) discourses as a transitional faith to Islam because, within such discourses, the main division was perceived to be between Christianity and Islam rather than between Eastern and Western Christianity; she therefore seems to suggest that liminality is not a very useful theoretical concept in this context. However, Fleming argues that ‘liminality…is the single most provocative and promising theoretical terrain for the Southeast Europeanist’, because it refers to something that is in ‘between (and overlapping) two (or more) domains’.

\textsuperscript{187} Stanley, Lectures, p. 28; Adeney, Greek and Eastern Churches, p. 161; Headlam, History, pp. 189-90.

\textsuperscript{188} H. Brailsford, Macedonia, p. 66.

and, in her view, the Balkans fits the description in both geographical and cultural respects. The present study agrees with the latter interpretation.

The following pages will attempt to show that a ‘liminal phase’ is among the most useful category in examining British attitudes towards religion in the Balkans, because Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim Slavs were often seen as being neither ‘real Christians’ nor ‘real Muslims’. This view was especially evident in travel accounts and, also to a lesser extent, in ecclesiastical scholarship. The traveller George Arbuthnot argued that because the Balkan Christians lived on the boundaries of two civilisations, their Christianity did not contain those ‘humanising principles’, which should have distinguished it from Islam. He went on to explain that ‘the Greeks and the Catholics’ alike combined elements of ‘Western cunning’ and ‘Oriental apathy’ because they had inherited the ‘sins of each, without the virtues of either the one or the other’. Georgina Muir-Mackenzie and Adelina Irby also emphasised that Slav Muslims prayed in Arabic which they neither normally spoke nor understood. The views of these two Victorian women travellers were extremely influential in popularising perceptions about the Balkans in Britain, and Todorova has argued that they ‘discovered the South Slavs for the English public’. Stanley argued that Orthodox Christianity and Islam sprang from the ‘same Oriental soil and climate’ and claimed that Islam was, in fact, a heretical form of Eastern Christianity. Eastern Christians, according to his view, were in between two civilisations and two stages of development: they were drawn to the East by their habits and to the West by their religion.

A similar argument was put forward by Muir-Mackenzie and Irby. They argued that many Bosnian beys, who were high-ranking military commanders or Muslim estate owners, still called for a priest to pray for them when they were ill, and

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190 Todorova, Imagining, p. 18; Fleming, ‘Orientalism’, p. 1232.
193 Todorova, Imagining, p. 98.
194 Stanley, Lectures, p. 50.
some of them had kept ‘the name of their patron family’. Similar views were expressed about the Bulgarian Muslims, the Pomaks:

They still celebrate some Christian holidays; they will attend the consecration of a Christian sanctuary; they will sometimes…invite the prayers of a Christian priest in cases of illness.

In both of these cases, the description seems to refer to the phenomenon ‘crypto-Christianity’, which is used as a way of explaining a situation in which individuals or groups publicly profess Islam while adhering to Christianity in private. This phenomenon was neither unique to the Balkans nor to Christianity. The American Congregationalist missionary Henry Dwight also believed that Orthodox Christianity and Islam were both deeply influenced by one another, because many Muslim customs were evident in the every-day practices of Christians and vice versa. He explained that in the Greek Orthodox villages in Anatolia, for instance, the women were veiled and that their contact with non-kin males was restricted. Furthermore, Dwight suggested that the use of Sunday as a market day by Christians was a Muslim custom. On the other hand, a Red Cross nurse, Mildred Gibbs, who worked in Bulgaria during the Balkan Wars, wrote to her father that Bulgarian ‘restaurant keepers…hate working on Sunday’. Dwight also argued that the religious terminology was used in the ‘Oriental Church’ was deeply influenced by Islam because, for example, obedience to God had nothing to do with morality, but consisted instead of ‘observance of rites and ceremonies’, which in his view were

filled with ‘gold and glitters’ and by the ‘chanting of liturgy in the sonorous and unintelligible phrases of the ancients’.

To conclude, the Orthodox world, especially its Greco-Slavic portion, was perceived essentially as a unified body in terms of doctrines and rituals in the Anglican discourses. Many accounts, however, emphasised Anglican-Orthodox doctrinal differences. These differences were mainly highlighted, debated and constructed in the context of ecumenical discussions, such as during the Bonn Conferences of 1874 and 1875 as well as the Lambeth Conferences of 1888, 1897 and 1908. The possibility of Anglican-Orthodox reunion provided the overall framework for doctrinal discussions between and within both churches.

Many Orthodox doctrines were therefore represented as fundamentally different from Anglican doctrines, and on many occasions, these differences were highlighted by constructions of binary oppositions between the logical, lawful and analytical west and the philosophical, rhetorical and speculative east. Doctrinal differences were interpreted as arising mainly from Orthodoxy’s close historical, intellectual and political connection with Islam and with the Ottoman Empire which had prevented, for example, the development of the heresies which many Anglican commentators perceived as positive and modernising processes in the development of any religion. All of this falls within the basic view of the West (broadly defined) about itself which had been inherited from the Enlightenment and which emphasises the Apollonian instead of the Dionysian features of its own culture: that is, the practical rather than the poetical, the rational instead of the irrational and the civilised rather than the uncivilised. Richard King has argued that these dichotomies have been evident in western religious and other constructions of the Far Orient, but, as we have seen above, similar theoretical frameworks can also be used when Anglican representations of Eastern Orthodoxy are examined.

But did these mostly negative and condescending views about Orthodox theology have any concrete bearing on the attitudes of these writers to the issue of reunion and the formation of closer contacts more generally? Usually, they did not. During the Eastern Crisis, the religious aspects often mixed heavily with domestic

\[200\text{ Dwight, Constantinople, pp. 149.}\]
\[201\text{ King, Orientalism, pp. 3-4.}\]
(anti-Conservative) and international (anti-Turkish) politics in Britain. Freeman, for example, wanted the Russians to take Constantinople in 1878 so that the city would have again been controlled by Christians, and he was very disappointed when that did not materialise. He had written to Liddon already in 1876 that ‘when St Sophia is cleared out…make a pactia with the Orthodox’.  

Liddon similarly informed the Metropolitan of Moscow that many English clergymen waited for the day when ‘Sancta Sophia [was] again in the hands of Ecumenical Patriarch’.  

The Lambeth Conference’s Resolution 17 of 1888 hoped that ‘the barriers to fuller intercommunion may be…removed by further intercourse and extended enlightenment’. Similarly, Resolution 36 from 1897 requested that the Archbishops of Canterbury and York as well as the Bishop of London would ‘act as a committee’ that would negotiate with the various Eastern Churches ‘with a view to consider the possibility of securing a clearer understanding and of establishing closer relations between the Churches of the East and the Anglican Communion’. This was to be done through translations of religious literature and other ecclesiastical documents as well as forms of service and catechisms that set out the positions of the Anglican and Eastern Churches. Resolutions 61, 62 and 63 of 1908 also increasingly urged the development of closer ties with the ‘Churches of the Orthodox East’. These included the possibility of baptizing Orthodox children in Anglican churches and allowing any member of Orthodox Churches to ‘communicate in our churches’. Thus, Anglican bishops and other members of the clergy were extremely keen on establishing closer links with the Orthodox Churches.  

Other individual treatises also transmitted similar views towards the establishment of closer ties with the Orthodox. Headlam, for example, stated in connection with the Lambeth Conference of 1908 that it was clear that the ‘English

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Church’ desired closer friendship with the Orthodox, but that as long as differences of doctrine existed on both sides, ‘concerns for reunion will be quite unavailing’. He was, however, more concerned about the ‘deep-reaching dissimilarity of temperament and character’ and regarded them as ‘the greatest hindrance to reunion’, and not any theological disputes between the two. F. G. Cole was slightly more upbeat about prospects of reunion, hoping that ‘friendship…may grow up between us and this sister Communion…eventually bringing nearer the day when there shall be one flock and one flock-master’. He concluded that the Anglican and Orthodox churches had much in common and it was hence only ‘natural that they should turn their attention to each other with the view of intercommunion’. Bishop Wordsworth’s (1807-85) address to the Upper House of the Convocation at Canterbury in 1876 also showed that Anglicans, although referring to Orthodox doctrines as ‘corruptions’ or ‘errors’, were, in fact, also quite sympathetic towards Eastern Christianity:

I am perfectly aware that there are persons who take the pleasure in dwelling on the corruptions of the Eastern Church. Now, I do not by any means ignore those errors and corruptions, but I would rather adopt the words of Archbishop Howley [who] in the true apostolic spirit…said [that] “I know it, but I also know perfectly well that we owe the tenderest commiseration to… the members of the Eastern Church, who have been in a state of bondage for many centuries.”

Thus, in these, and many other instances, disapproving perceptions and articulations of doctrinal differences did not seem to have had a negative effect on how the proposals for reunion were regarded; instead, Anglican-Orthodox intercommunion was warmly recommended, because it was perceived as a natural step forward. Closer ties with Orthodoxy were also sought possibly with the aim of reversing the trend which saw an increasing number of English communicants leave the Church of

205 Headlam, History, pp. 163-7, 182.
206 Cole, Mother of All Churches, pp. 6, 219.
England in favour of one of the dissenting Nonconformist Protestant denominations. (This aspect will be discussed in further detail at the end of the following section.)

1.3. ‘The Yoke of Ceremonialism’: Attitudes towards Orthodox Rituals

Anglican attitudes to Orthodox doctrines were therefore mostly negative, but – although they can be seen as illustrations of ‘doctrinal otherness’ – these negative and condescending views did not significantly influence how the question of reunion was approached. Attitudes towards Orthodox rituals were marked by similar sentiments: they were not only perceived as inferior to Anglican ceremonies, but also to Muslim ones. The latter sentiment was evident especially in popular periodical literature and travel accounts, but was by no means a dominant tendency. For example, the journalist James Bourchier approached the matter from a comparative perspective, claiming that the service he had witnessed in a mosque in Bulgaria was a ‘simple and impressive act of devotion’ and that it ‘contrasted favourably with the tedious ceremonies... in the Orthodox Churches’, which he further described as ‘absurdities’.208 Another observer similarly wrote that the ‘Greek levity and gossiping in Church, and during prayers, contrasts strangely with the respectful propriety of Turks and Arabs in their mosques’.209 Orthodox rituals were portrayed mainly as stationary, ceremonial, Oriental and superstitious.

Anglican discourses often represented the Orthodox Church as static in terms of social adaptability, administrative reform and intellectual development, which was perceived as having a strong influence on the way in which Orthodox Christians practiced religion. Reverend Henry Tozer argued that the Eastern Church had changed only slightly since the eighth century, a factor, which, he thought, was ‘in striking contrast to its more flexible Western sister’. He thought that the stationary character of the Eastern Church was best manifested in the ‘antiquarian’ nature of its religious services which had not been adapted to the ‘needs of any age or any people’. Thus, to him, the services remained too long, the church’s territorial divisions had not


been altered, and the ‘ordinance of preaching [had] been almost wholly neglected’ which meant that formalism had ‘overspread the spiritual life of the Eastern Communion’. Tozer thought that the lack of spirituality in the East was largely attributable to external factors. He argued that because the Eastern Churches had always been in close contact with despotic Byzantine and Ottoman state structures, the church had not been able to become independent and to develop intellectually and administratively. He also believed that the depression of most of the Orthodox Christians derived from the Eastern Church’s historical struggle with Islam, and because of its centuries-long isolation from the rest of Christendom had significantly contributed to the lack of spirituality and general progress in the East.²¹⁰

Palmer agreed with Tozer and stated that the ‘modern Greeks, the Russians, Servians and Bulgarians…all have their worship and church books in dialects either absolutely unintelligible or only partially intelligible to the people’, which, in his view, was as a good illustration of the stagnant character of Orthodox Christianity, because only the Romanian Orthodox, the Greek Orthodox in Turkey, and the Arabic Orthodox in Syria had adopted the language of the people in their church services.²¹¹ In sum, Orthodox Christianity was perceived as static because there had not been developments in the practices of worship and preaching as there had been in the west, and because the Orthodox Church had not been able to adapt to the social changes that had occurred around it. Both aspects were essentially seen as arising from external factors – namely the Orthodox Church’s close connection and almost symbiotic co-existence with Islam, as well as with the Ottoman and Byzantine states. However, the perception was that Balkan Christians had at least the possibility to progress, which was not the case with Muslims in the region or, indeed, more generally.²¹²

²¹¹ W. Palmer, ‘Remarks on the Present State of Particular Controversies Between the “Orthodox” and the “Roman Catholic” Churches’ in his *Dissertations*, p. 137.
Ceremonialism was another factor which was often used as a way of illustrating Orthodox Christianity’s inferiority to the Western forms of Christianity and, as was the case with perceptions of stagnation, this aspect was also regarded as being especially evident in connection with religious practices. Stanley criticised the custom of standing in prayer which, in his view, was a ‘primitive posture’; he also argued that the priests made ‘mystical gestures’ and that the whole ceremony of the Orthodox Church was a ‘union of barbaric rudeness and elaborate ceremonialism’. The ceremonialism of the Orthodox service was also criticised by George Croly, who argued that ‘Christ came to redeem mankind, not only from the yoke of sin, but the yoke of ceremonial’. F. G. Cole’s interpretation of the differences in the ritualistic aspects of Eastern and Western religious practices followed a familiar line of binary construction, and he believed that this difference manifested itself in liturgies and in rites as well as in ceremonies: ‘Instead of the short terse collects of the business-like church of the West, the Eastern services are diffuse poetical rhapsodies interspersed with prayer’. Palmer also constructed similar oppositions when he compared the ritual (and doctrine) of the East and the West: he equated the former with ‘coldness’, ‘conservatism’, ‘antiquarianism’, and ‘formalism’ and the latter with ‘life and energy’.

Others also criticised the ceremonialism of Orthodox Christianity because they were unable to see a connection between practices of ceremony and expressions of faith. According to Eliot, religious sermons were ‘meaningless to the people’ and they were seen by the Balkan peasant as ‘simply practical operations’, while Brailsford argued that ceremonies were an integral part of Macedonian peasant life, although the Macedonians were the most ‘scandalously irreverent’ people. Similar views were expressed about the religious rituals of Balkan Muslims, but not with the same attention to detail as was the case with Orthodoxy. Perceptions were formed by

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213 Stanley, Lectures, pp. 28, 32.
215 Cole, Mother of All Churches, p. 27.
217 Eliot, Turkey in Europe, p. 264.
218 Brailsford, Macedonia, p. 70.
comparing and contrasting Muslim ritual with that of Western Christianity. Descriptions were often on a very basic level, the ritual of praying five times a day being depicted (like Orthodox ceremony) as a repetition of ‘a magic formula’, which was empty of any spiritual or intellectual dimension.219

Orthodox rituals were therefore represented as fundamentally different from Anglican ones: they were perceived as stagnant and antiquarian, formal, ceremonial and conservative. Anglican commentators believed that these characteristics existed throughout the Orthodox world; because the ceremonies had not changed since the eighth century, they remained too long, the practice of preaching was neglected and, more generally, the Orthodox Church had not been able to adapt to social change. Furthermore, Anglican observers argued that Orthodox rituals and services were elaborate and mystical, and lacked in spiritual and intellectual bearing. Again, differences between Anglican and Orthodox rituals were highlighted by constructing binary oppositions: the business-like and energetic rituals of the West were contrasted with the poetical but formal rituals of the East.

Some commentators also believed that Orthodox ceremonies were not just fundamentally Oriental, but also specifically Jewish in character. This view was evident in different types of texts, ranging from travel accounts to arguments advanced by respected ecclesiastical scholars and Anglican clerics. Representations of Eastern Orthodoxy’s Oriental attributes can be divided into those that derived from the visual characteristics of its worship and to those that emerged in connection with theological considerations. J. H. Tremenheere claimed that Orthodox ceremonies were ‘a mixture of Oriental splendour and Jewish symbolism’,220 while the journalist Philip Gibb found them to be ‘angelic’ because ‘Oriental half-tones’ had a ‘strange and haunting effect upon [the] senses’.221 The Anglican layman, Athelstan Riley (1858-1945), chairman of the Eastern Churches Association, also believed that ‘much of the worship and ceremonies of the Eastern Church are borrowed from the Jewish ritual’, and explained that the Orthodox rituals were ‘probably very similar to those of

219 Arbuthnot, Herzegovina, p. 134.
the early Christian converts from Judaism.\textsuperscript{222} After witnessing a church ceremony in Belgrade, the influential Church of England clergyman William Denton (1815-88), had also concluded that Eastern Orthodox ceremonies were in effect Jewish and Oriental:

The whole ceremonial…appeared to me essentially Jewish. It was as if the unvarying East had retained so much of the services of the elder Church as could be made applicable to Christian worship, and had thus restored to them their full and spiritual meaning.\textsuperscript{223}

Denton’s Biblical fantasy of the old Orient was fulfilled as he witnessed the entrance of an Orthodox priest:

I seemed to be standing within that older temple at Jerusalem and listening to the music which, at least from the time of David, has been the sacred heritage of God’s church. This illusion was complete when I saw before me the tall form of the priests, clothed in flowing Oriental garments, full bearded, and with heads as guiltless of the razor as the Nazarites of old.\textsuperscript{224}

Denton was one of the most prolific and influential students of Eastern Orthodoxy in Britain. In 1864, he founded the Eastern Churches Association\textsuperscript{225} – an organisation whose purpose was to give information about Orthodox Christianity to the British public; to inform Eastern Christians about the doctrines and principles of the Anglican Church; to improve Anglican-Orthodox relations in order to achieve

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{222} A. Riley, \textit{Athos, Or the Mountain of the Monks} (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1887), p. 57.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{223} W. Denton, \textit{Servia and the Servians} (London: Bell & Daldy, 1862), p. 96.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{224} \textit{Ibid}.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{225} M. Foyas, \textit{Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism and Anglicanism} (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 39.}
\end{footnotes}
intercommunion; and to assist Eastern bishops in their attempts at promoting the
’spiritual welfare and education of their flocks’. 226

Orthodox rituals were therefore seen by British ecclesiastical commentators as
primitive, Biblical, mystical as well as Oriental, and this belief was often linked to
assessments of the origins of Anglicanism and Christianity more generally, as well as
to the development of Western civilisation and even political rhetoric. Adeney
thought that Christianity was ‘an Eastern religion’ and gave an illustrative account of
the Eastern origins of Christianity and Western civilisation in general: ‘In the present
day, not only our theology, our sermons, our prayers and hymns, but our literature
and political oratory are steeped in Biblical Orientalism’. 227 Reverend Edward Cutts
(1824-1901) argued that, although the English Church had been in closer contact with
the Western Church since medieval times, the ‘ancient British church derived its
Christianity from the East’, and that contemporary English Christianity had ‘retained
traces of that Eastern origin’. 228

Headlam also firmly believed that the Eastern Church had ‘helped
undoubtedly in the creation of our Anglican theology’ because early Anglican
theologians had been well-acquainted with the history and principles of Orthodoxy. 229
Eastern Orthodoxy’s Oriental qualities were therefore seen as arising from visual and
auditory factors such as the magnificent clothing of Orthodox priests and the
mysticism of their religious chanting. Orthodoxy was also connected to the ‘Biblical
East’ in theological terms, in that it was perceived to be closer to the ideals of the
early Christian church, a view which was primarily connected to the fullness and
completeness of Orthodox Christian spirituality which derived from the originality
and uncorrupted nature of Orthodox Christian theology.

It was also believed, however, especially in connection with religious
ceremonies, that Balkan Orthodox Christians had formed their own perceptions of
Christianity, which was a peculiar mix of pagan and Christian traditions. In what

226 Dampier, Organisation, p. 34; M. Hughes, ‘The English Slavophile: W. J. Birkbeck and Russia’,
227 Adeney, Greek and Eastern Churches, p. 2-3.
228 E. Cutts, Christians under the Crescent in Asia (London: SPCK, 1877), p. 343.
229 Headlam, History, p. 151.
ways were the idea of ‘nominal Christianity’ conveyed in Anglican discourse on Orthodox religious practices? The Reverend John Mason Neale (1818-66) wrote in 1861 that ‘nowhere is more implicit belief given to tales of vampires’ than in Dalmatia, and that whole villages could be disturbed by a ‘supposed apparition of Vukozlak’ – the vampire. According to Tremenheere too, the ‘fair humanities of old religion still linger amidst the wood-crowned hills of Servia’, because fire-worship was still used ‘in the commemoration of St John and this spirit seems to be embodied in many of the rites of the Church’. 

Henry Brailsford’s account of the Macedonian peasants’ conceptions of God, which, according to him, came across in their daily phraseology, was a telling example of prevailing British attitudes. The following account demonstrates that, first, Orthodox Christianity was still believed to be strongly influenced by paganism, and, second, that Eastern Christian religious customs were almost as heavily ‘burdened’ by the traditions of Islamic civilisation:

The God behind these phrases is, I suspect, simply the characterless natural force of Eastern Fatalism, endowed with no very definable moral attributes, and enduring into no very noteworthy or intimate relation with the human spirit. But the belief in His presence, and in glorious legion of saints…not very distinguishable from the traditional Slavonic fairies, is completely sincere, and…untouched by Western influences.

William Palgrave’s 1869 assessment of Eastern Orthodoxy followed a similar pattern as he argued that ‘the Greek’ religion was ‘deeply superstitious’ and therefore had ‘a

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232 One example given by Brailsford was that if someone was ill, the people in Macedonia would say “God will save her” . This type of phraseology, however, seemed to have been more cultural than strictly religious in origin. Perhaps Brailsford was reminded too much about in sa’ Allah, ‘if God will’.
233 Brailsford, Macedonia, p. 71.
painful resemblance to fetish-worshipping atheists’. The writer Edward Jenkins argued that although Serbian peasants had many good qualities such as thriftiness and love of freedom, they were only religious by heredity, which meant that they had no real religious convictions, that they were not troubled by rites or dogmas, and that only the traditional customary feasts and holidays reminded the Serbian peasants of the existence of religion. Cole believed that the superstitious aspects of Eastern Orthodoxy were ‘due to the ignorance of the people’ rather than being the ‘fault of the Eastern Church’. He recognised a fundamental difference between the East and the West and evoked us-versus-them rhetoric: ‘We cannot judge the uneducated by our own standards’. Palmer, on the other hand, argued that superstition ‘not only existed abundantly’ and that it was tolerated, and also ‘adopted and maintained’ by the Eastern Church.

Orthodox rituals were thus perceived to be a mixture of Oriental grandeur and Jewish imagery as well as of traditionalist and superstitious paganism. Furthermore, Orthodox Christians were perceived as uneducated and ignorant mostly because their religion had not come into contact with Reformation and the Enlightenment. In fact, the over-riding perception was that Orthodox rituals were everything that Anglican rituals were not, that they contained qualities from which the Anglican Church had deliberately sought to move away, and which the Church of England considered to be particularly undesirable – such as ceremonialism. Orthodox rituals were perceived to be influenced by paganism because of the persistence of superstitious beliefs, for example, the veneration and fear shown to vampires and fairies. Orthodox Christianity was thus represented as a mixed bag of Christianity and old pagan traditionalism and, as was the case with doctrinal differences, discrepancies between Anglican and Orthodox rituals were explained primarily by Orthodoxy’s close political connection to the Ottoman Empire, and by its struggle against Islam which it had been forced to conduct largely in isolation from the rest of Christendom.

236 Cole, Mother of All Churches, p. 197.
Paradoxically, at the same time, many Anglican authors admired the purity and unpolluted nature of Orthodox doctrine and ritual.

How accurate were these representations? In terms of the Orthodox Church’s intellectual development, the centuries under Ottoman control can be seen as having both negative and positive effects. The Orthodox Church was on the defensive under the Ottomans which resulted in conservatism because the main aim was to ensure survival. This meant that there were often no opportunities to develop doctrinal and other theological positions. On the other hand, conservative attitudes also ensured that the Orthodox tradition remained virtually unchanged, which can be seen as a positive outcome because tradition was, and continues to be, one of the most important religious and cultural aspects for Orthodox Christians.\(^{238}\) Thus, Anglican perceptions of Orthodoxy as stagnant and conservative were, in many respects, largely accurate. However, the correlation drawn by Anglican commentators between stagnation and inferiority ultimately missed the core principle of Orthodox Christianity: the preservation of Orthodox tradition as unchanged as possible for future generations.

However, the view that represented Orthodox Christianity as wholly untouched by western ideas or religious developments, including the Reformation, was not entirely accurate. Although the Reformation and Counter Reformation did not directly affect Eastern Orthodoxy, it was nevertheless influenced by both developments because of the educational links with the West and by the activities of Protestant missionaries. Furthermore, western embassies also played religious roles, and diplomatic representatives were often to spread their ‘reformed’ religious ideas in the Orthodox world. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for example, many of the leading Orthodox scholars, especially Greek ones, had been trained in the West under Roman Catholic and Protestant teachers, a factor which, from the

\(^{238}\) Ware, *Orthodox*, pp. 100-1; Zernov, *Eastern Christendom*, pp. 173-4. The concept of tradition in Orthodox Christianity entails the books of the Bible, the Creed, decrees of the Seven Ecumenical Councils, the writings of the Fathers, the Canons, the Service Books and the Holy Icons. Ware explains the issue well: ‘The Orthodox Christian today sees himself as heir and guardian to a great inheritance received from the past, and he believes that it is his duty to transmit this inheritance unimpaired to the future.’, p. 204.
Orthodox viewpoint, could have and to a degree did result in the loss of the traditional ‘Orthodox mentality’, with regard to terminology and to the way in which theological arguments were formulated. Kallistos Ware has argued that Orthodox thinkers in the Turkish period can thus be divided into ‘Latinizers’ and ‘Protestantizers’. However, Ware also reminds us that the westernization of Orthodox Christianity during this period in this manner must not be overemphasised because the substance of religious thought remained ‘fundamentally Orthodox’.  

Furthermore, contrary to the claims of many British ecclesiastical commentators, the Balkans did not remain entirely untouched by the ideas of the Enlightenment either. The first Balkan peoples who were likely to have had some contact with the Enlightenment were Serbs who had emigrated to Austria-Hungary at the end of the seventeenth century, as well as the Greek merchants who had founded commercial colonies along the trade routes from Constantinople and Salonica to Trieste, Budapest, Vienna and Leipzig. However, Enlightenment ideas manifested themselves differently in the Balkans than in Western Europe because of differences in intellectual, social and political conditions and traditions. In the Balkans, the clergy, who were the principle intellectual elite, did not promulgate negative views towards the past as was the case, for example, with French Enlightenment intellectuals. Balkan Orthodox priests generally viewed the Middle Ages in positive terms, because that era was perceived as a highpoint of national independence which was then destroyed by the Ottoman conquest. This situation led to the Orthodox clergy becoming ‘mythmakers’ who glorified the national, pre-Ottoman past and the position of the clergy in it, which was one of the factors that led to the close association of the church with the nation. This connection was also strengthened by the existence of the millet system in the Ottoman Empire in which no distinction between politics and religion was made. Within the system, the Orthodox Church

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239 Ware, Orthodox, pp. 101-3.


241 Turczynski, ‘Orthodox Church’, p. 432.
became a civil as well as a religious institution, the backbone of the *Rum Millet* or Roman Nation, in which ecclesiastical organisation was taken as the model for secular administration.  

1.4. Conclusion

The core of the British perception of Eastern Christianity was captured by John Mason Neale, a staunch admirer of Orthodox Church, as early as 1850:

> Everywhere is the cry against her, that her Priests are sunk in ignorance, her people enslaved to bigotry; that she exists only because she has so long existed, and acts with the mechanism of an automaton; that her want of missionary zeal proves her deficiency in vital energy, and that her hour of peril will crush her, like a hollow image, to dust.  

Although Anglican observers generally regarded the Greco-Slavic Orthodox world as fundamentally unified in theological terms, a detailed mapping of racial, linguistic, and historical developments was also conducted, especially between the 1850s and 1880s, and again in the early years of the twentieth century. Classifications were constructed primarily in order to increase knowledge about Orthodox Christianity among Anglicans and other Protestants, but also as a way of considering whether Anglican-Orthodox links should be tightened, and as a tool in political debates about the future of the Ottoman Empire, as well as in connection with Anglican-Orthodox ecumenism.

These classification processes arose fundamentally from the desire to develop cultural hierarchies – one of the most important characteristics of Victorian intellectual life, and one which had its roots in the Enlightenment. Within this

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framework, the Armenian, Bulgarian and Greek churches received the largest amount of attention. Armenian Christianity was portrayed in a positive light because it was regarded as a representative of ancient civilisation whereas modern Greece was mostly perceived as a bearer of the Byzantine and Ottoman rather than the Hellenic legacy. These types of representations had very little to do with strictly religious aspects. They derived mostly from cultural stereotypes that had remained largely unchanged from the medieval period onwards. Furthermore, the Bulgarian Exarchate was perceived to be one of the most interesting divisions of the Orthodox world and there was a strong belief among Anglican clerics that the Bulgarian campaign towards ecclesiastical independence in the late 1860s had been driven primarily by racial and cultural differences from the other Orthodox Christians.

Orthodox Christianity was perceived in Anglican discourse as stagnant, ‘other’, liminal and Oriental. In terms of doctrine, it was argued that its stagnant character was displayed by the denial of the double procession, which Anglican views translated to mean that Eastern Christians were unwilling to develop Christianity. This meant, furthermore, that Orthodoxy was uncompromising because it refused to accept any theological positions other than its own. In addition, the absence of any heresies or significant religious controversies in the East was also regarded as an illustration of its static character, while many Orthodox rituals were portrayed as being out of touch with the modern world.

Previous studies have argued that the Balkans was represented in the West mainly as a borderland rather than its complete opposite, as was the case with the Orient. However, many Anglican representations of Eastern Orthodoxy can be seen as classic cases of the discourse of otherness, in that the latter was perceived and portrayed as being in complete opposition to the former. In this framework, and in connection with both doctrine and ritual, Orthodoxy was represented as speculative and philosophical, while Anglicanism was depicted as logical and practical. Generally, this mode of representation bore a close resemblance to Enlightenment thinking, and especially to the way in which the Byzantine Empire was depicted by Enlightenment thinkers as rigid, authoritarian and traditionalist – that is, as the complete ‘other’ to the forward-moving and progressive ideas of the Enlightenment.
These views were especially evident in strictly theological treatises which were often presented in connection with the reunion debate.

However, these negative views did not seem to have any significant consequences for the ways in which the intercommunion issue was approached, because almost all writers were still in favour of reunion or at least desired to form closer contacts with the Orthodox world. Although there were differences between the two, the feeling was that similarities over-ruled differences and thus reunion was perceived as a natural step forward. The situation was similar during the Bulgarian atrocities agitation and the Eastern Crisis more generally. Then, calls for closer contacts with Orthodoxy were used by radical Liberals, Nonconformists and Anglo-Catholic clergy as weapons in political debate, which sought to undermine Conservative pro-Ottoman foreign policy. Even though the broad defining line was between conservative sympathy for the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire and the liberal demand for South Slav independence, a view often driven by religious and historical arguments, there were also some Liberals who were not interested in making the Eastern Question – and especially the powerful public debate that followed the Bulgarian atrocities – a religious issue. Sir Mountstuart Grant Duff (1829-1906), Liberal MP for Elgin, wrote in 1876 that the English people ‘must identify…with good government and justice between man and man, irrespective of religious creed’. This group of liberals agreed with positivist intellectuals such as Walter Bagehot (1826-77), the one-time editor of *The Economist*, and the scientist T. H. Huxley, who believed that religious motivation in politics was wrong, and that British people should be mainly concerned with legalism. Thus, Bagehot, in particular, denounced the religious emotionalism of the atrocities agitation.

Furthermore, Orthodox Christianity was considered to be the root of Christianity which was still in touch with the ‘near-original’ forms of early religion. The Orthodox Church was credited with creating many church customs and with formulating the Christian Creed. In addition, the view was that Orthodox rituals and religious music resembled those of early Christianity. These characteristics were


regarded by Anglicans as very desirable in a constantly-secularising world, in which the dominant position of the Church of England was under increasing pressure from dissenting denominations, not to mention developments such as the disestablishment of the Irish Church in 1869 and similar developments in Wales just before the First World War. Anglicans arguably were looking for ‘new’ associates in a world that seemed to be increasingly opposed to their beliefs and their supremacy. Thus, allusions by Anglican clerics and laymen as well as other religious commentators to Orthodox Christianity’s closer connection with the primitive church and doctrine, as well as references to Orthodox societies’ generally higher levels of religious feeling, can also be seen in the context of the secularisation of British and other Western European societies in the latter half of the nineteenth century, a process which has been masterfully analysed by Owen Chadwick. Secularisation – the drop in churchgoing and serious challenges to Anglican and Church of England authority – manifested itself on various levels. There were the intellectual challenges from Darwin and Huxley, habitual changes in Sunday activities, and the increased weight of the middle classes in comparison to the Anglican and aristocratic establishment.

Orthodox Christians were also portrayed as Oriental, a perception which arose mainly from the association that was made between the Orient and, for example, the picturesque clothing of Orthodox priests as well as the mysticism of their religious liturgies. This view was connected to other standpoints according to which the Balkan Christians and Muslims were closely influenced by each other’s cultural customs. The belief was that in Christianity, the Balkan Christians had a western religion, but, at the same time, many of their every-day habits were influenced by aspects of Islamic culture. The reverse argument was put forward in the case of Balkan Muslims; their religion was distinctly eastern, but they had retained some aspects of their pre-conversion Christian culture. This kind of symbiotic existence and the mingling of cultural heritages led to the development of ideas, especially in western travel literature, that neither the Balkan Christians nor Balkan Muslims were true and full representatives of their respective religions. This implied that their whole existence was somehow incomplete because they lived in a cultural and...

geographical state of liminality. Perceptions of in-betweenness also extended beyond
the Muslim-Christian perspective, which meant that Orthodox Christians were also
perceived as still being influenced by pagan traditions, as shown when Christian
holidays were celebrated through the medium of pagan customs.
Chapter 2
CONSTRUCTING MARTIAL IDENTITIES

This chapter’s concern is with portrayals of the Balkan Slavs in popular and professional military writing in Britain. The main aims are to examine the extent and the ways in which the ‘martial races’ theory was used by British officers and diplomats to evaluate Balkan soldiers and armies, and to investigate how Balkan military issues were connected with concerns about the defence of the British Empire, and also with anxieties about defending Britain itself when fears of European-wide war heightened from the 1880s onwards. In addition, the goal is to examine popular representations of Balkan militarism and to investigate their purposes and characteristics in comparison to professional portrayals. The chapter also examines the nature of ‘Balkan stereotypes’ and argues that they were not necessarily fixed and that events often played a considerable role in shaping British views about the region.

2.1. The Balkans: A Buffer against Russian Expansionism

British military observers became increasingly interested in the strategic potential of the Balkans in the late eighteenth century when Russian expansionism began to be viewed with increasing suspicion in London. The growth of centrifugal tendencies in the Ottoman Empire and the numerous wars waged against Russia had begun to weaken the Ottomans and had subsequently led to an increase in Russian influence in the Caspian- and Black Sea regions in the late 1820s. British nervousness about Russian aims in Central Asia led to the outbreak of the First Afghan War (1839-42) and the period between the late 1830s and the early 1840s was also one of the peaks in Anglo-Russian rivalry in Southeast Europe. Russian influence in Central Asia increased further in the mid-1860s, and in 1873, the last independent Central Asian

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state succumbed to Russian control. There were also considerable fears about the prospect of Russian invasion of Constantinople during the Eastern Crisis (1875-8) which would have had grave consequences for British political and commercial interests.  

Because of the strategic importance of the Balkan Peninsula, the Balkan provinces at times featured in British strategic plans. For example, in 1833, Lord Palmerston (1784-1865) considered turning the Principality of Serbia – then ruled by Miloš Obrenović – into a defensive bulwark against Russian expansionism.  

William Gladstone (1809-98) similarly supported Romanian independence in 1858 and hoped that other independent states could also be set up in the Balkans to check ‘Russia in the interests of Europe’. In a similar fashion, Stanislas St Clair, the British consul in Varna, argued in 1865 that although Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bulgarians were not ‘naturally disposed in a friendly way towards Turkey’, they nevertheless could form a ‘defence to the Ottoman Empire’. Palmerton, Gladstone and St Clair all believed that the desire for independence and the national zealosity of the Balkan Christian peasant populations were the best assurances against Russian expansionism towards Constantinople. These views were not linked in any way with the assumption that the Balkan provinces could act as an effective defensive bulwark because the Bulgarians, Montenegrins and Serbs were somehow militaristic, but stemmed from the belief that these provinces would ultimately desire to be independent. If this was agreed upon by the great powers, it would ensure that the Balkan provinces, despite their historical, cultural and religious connections to Russia, would not turn to it for support.

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248 Ibid.
251 FO 78/1883, S. St Clair to Earl Russell, Aix-la-Chapelle, 24 Sept. 1865.
2.2. ‘Every Male Is Practically A Soldier’: Applications of the ‘Martial Races’ Theory

Most historians and scholars believe that the ‘martial races’ theory was essentially a British phenomenon that was closely linked to specific colonial recruitment difficulties, to problems of organising colonial administration units, and to explicit imperial political complications such as Indian nationalism. Martial classifications were also heavily influenced by contemporary anthropological and ethnological theories. The interaction of these factors led to the development of detailed ethnographic classifications, and to the consequent labelling of some colonial subject races as ‘masculine’ and ‘martial’, and to the cataloguing of others as ‘effeminate’ and ‘unwarlike’. These classifications were then used as a basis for recruitment into colonial armies.²⁵²

Martial classifications were based on various criteria which often included hierarchical evaluations about race, religion, social structure, cultural traditions and historical developments, thus bearing a close resemblance to more conventional ethnological and anthropological categorising. The difference was that martial mapping was used as a tool in recruitment policy while the direct connections to policy concerns were not as evident in the more general classification processes. For

example, colonial recruiters believed that Malawian Yao warriors and certain northern Indian ethnic groups made excellent soldiers because of their warlike character and loyalty and both were thus excessively recruited to colonial armies.\textsuperscript{253}

The British Empire was not the only colonial power that used subject races for defensive purposes, and in fact, Britain was one of the last empires to use ethnic border troops in imperial defence. In case of Britain, this method was not effectively employed before the latter half of the nineteenth century – after Lord Roberts’s (1832-1914) reform of the Indian army of which he was the Commander-in-Chief from 1885 to 1893. In contrast, the Habsburg army had been very successful in using ethnic troops in imperial defence since the sixteenth century. Habsburg imperial defence was designed around the idea of a military border that was inhabited primarily by Slavs who had settled there as a consequence of the Ottoman expansion into the Balkans from the late fourteenth century onwards. The military frontier itself was created in 1522 to secure the southern border of the Habsburg Empire against Ottoman invasion. From the outset until its dissolution in 1881 the frontier region was directly controlled from Vienna, although it was not until the rule of Empress Maria Theresa between 1740 and 1780 that the border was brought under effective control of the Habsburg central government. The military border was then organised into eighteen regiments, of which eleven were in Croatia-Slavonia.\textsuperscript{254} Before its dissolution, the border regiments were composed primarily of Roman Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs, as well as German and Romanian settlers in the Banat region which is situated in the present-day Romania and remains one of the most ethnically-diverse areas in Europe.\textsuperscript{255} The Habsburg Slav border soldiers had initially pledged


\textsuperscript{254} The shift in European geopolitical situation, in addition to the rising nationalist sentiments in the border region itself since 1848, and the increased cost associated with the maintenance of the Austrian military border were important factors which led to its dissolution in 1881-2.

their allegiance to the Austrian throne partly as a result of the resentment they felt towards the Turkish irregulars who had for centuries plundered the area.\textsuperscript{256} Interestingly, an account from an Austrian officer from 1848 shows that the language used by the Habsburg army to evaluate their border regiments was almost identical to British ‘martial races’ theorising:

Here dwell the most uncouth, but the bravest, the hardiest, and at the same time well disciplined soldiers of the…border-regiments…The frame of such a borderer seems to be nothing but sinew and muscle…he endures hardships and fatigue to which, we seasoned soldiers, are scarcely equal [and he] will march on untired alike in the most scorching heat and the most furious snow storm, and desires no other couch than what the bare ground, no other roof than what the sky, afford him…he is a master in the use of arms.\textsuperscript{257}

British officers and diplomats also evaluated Balkan ethnic imperial soldiers by using categories drawn from the ‘martial races’ theory. In the Balkan context, cultural traditions, historical developments and social structures were categories applied most often. As with Yao warriors, for example, British officers and diplomats assessed the Croat and Bosniak border troops in the Habsburg and Ottoman armies by examining their combat traditions and the effects that centuries of uninterrupted warfare had had on their cultural traditions and military bearing. In 1857, the long-serving diplomat Sir Robert Morier (1826-93) argued in his extensive report on the Austrian military frontier that Croatian highland troops were effective imperial soldiers because centuries of continuous warfare against Bosnian tribes, as well as their cultural isolation, had ensured that Croatian border soldiers had ‘retained the

customs and manners’ and the ‘virtues and vices of another age’, including ‘rudeness’, ‘chivalry’ and ‘fierceness’. Morier furthermore stated that Croatian border troops had ‘for centuries [been] the “poste perdu”’ – the remote outpost – of ‘Christendom against the power of the Turk’ and, although they had been neglected by successive Austrian governors, they had always been ready to fight when ‘a Turkish invasion impeded’. Morier thus linked combat traditions and cultural isolation to military excellence and loyalty and concluded that these factors contributed to the fact that Croatian ethnic border troops were a valuable asset for the Habsburg Empire’s defence strategy.

British officials also praised the militaristic qualities of the Ottoman Bosniak troops for the same reasons. Sir Henry Elliot (1817-1907), the British ambassador to Constantinople, wrote during the peasant uprising in Herzegovina in 1875 that the province of Bosnia supplied a ‘considerable number of the best troops in the imperial service’, and believed that militarism was embedded deep in the Christian and Muslim cultures in Bosnia, as shown, for example, by the fact that in ‘accordance with the ordinary habits’ of the province, the return of Christian refugees from Montenegro was greeted by a ‘discharge of firearms’. Similarly, Colonel Herbert Chermside (1850-1929) thought that the ‘Slav Moslems of European Turkey’ had been the ‘most excellent fighting men’ in the past and argued that the Ottoman military organisers subsequently regarded them as the ‘best and most trustworthy and resolute troops of the Empire, whose doggedness could inspire other corps of a mixed force’.

Other Ottoman troops – Turkish, Kurd, Slav, Albanian, and Caucasian – were also described and assessed in a similar manner, as for example, the Nepalese Gurkas. In all cases, British officers’ evaluations emphasised qualities such as patience.

259 FO 881/2764, H. Elliot to Earl of Derby, Therapia, 8 Sept. 1875.
260 Chermside was very familiar with the Ottoman army, because he had been employed as a military attaché to the Turkish forces between 1876 and 1879 after which he was appointed as the military vice-consul to Anatolia. He also served in Kurdistan, and was finally appointed as the Governor of Queensland in 1901. [The Times, 26 Sept. 1929].
loyalty, courage, resolution, fierceness and bravery, all of which were considered to be essential traits of effective ethnic imperial soldiers.\textsuperscript{262} Chermside’s evaluation of Albanian soldiers in the Ottoman forces was a classic case of how the martial-races theory was used by a British officer, who was, at the time of writing, the British military attaché in Constantinople, to assess ethnic troops of other imperial armies, and how martial classifications fused anthropological comparisons and historical perceptions in constructions of militaristic qualities:

The Albanians are a warlike race who enjoy a great prestige for courage and impetuosity; they are more fiery and excitable than the Turk, less amenable to discipline and control, but animated by a great pride of race, and by national tradition. They are exceedingly sensitive to blame or disgrace, vindictive, and usually cruel. They are good individual and independent fighters, and their patient resistance at Silistria in 1854, and many another historical episodes, shows of what a stern brave fighting race they come.\textsuperscript{263}

Albanians were also subjected to similar representations in anthropological treatises. Professor Lionel Lyde, for example, argued that the Albanians were ‘pure Highlanders – careless of want and danger, rapid climbers, and “dead” shots’, their family feuds ‘being of “Corsican” intensity.’\textsuperscript{264} Despite these types of references in the more popular forums, applications of the ‘martial races’ theory ‘proper’ were especially evident when British diplomats and officers were evaluating militaristic qualities of ethnic soldiers of other colonial armies. British officials thus constructed martial identities for Balkan imperial ethnic troops by emphasising their traditions of frontline action, their militaristic culture, and by claiming that their value systems had

\textsuperscript{262} Ibid., pp. 74-5.
\textsuperscript{263} Ibid., p. 75. Silistria is located on the Danube, about 100 kilometres northwest of Varna. Chermside referred to the defence of the fortress of Silistria by the Ottoman army between 19 and 22 May in 1854, in which many Albanian and other ethnic soldiers were involved.
not been affected or ‘spoilt’ by modernism which helped ensure that these troops continued to be effective imperial soldiers for the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires.

The Austrian military border was also used as an example or a backdrop against which British Empire’s own, similar, border defence systems were evaluated. Morier, for example, argued that the ‘Colonial Government’ should consider ‘how far these conditions of success [evident in the Austrian military border] are respectively fulfilled by any of the native tribes at the Cape of Good Hope’. 265 Similarly, a contributor in The Pall Mall Gazette wrote to the paper’s editor about the Austrian military frontier, saying that ‘surely we in England may borrow a lesson from it…and have such a line of defence at the Cape or in New Zealand’. In his view, the system in which land rather than a pension was given to colonial soldiers after they had completed the service, as was the case in the Austrian border, would make colonial service much more popular and at the same time ‘provide an economical defence for the colonies and strengthen the connection between them and the mother country’. 266

The Austrian military frontier, largely composed of Slav soldiers, was therefore used in British commentaries as a blueprint through which the effectiveness of such systems was examined, as a feasible solution that could be introduced – even copied directly – in the more unstable regions of the British Empire, such as southern Africa and New Zealand, and as a potential way of guaranteeing closer imperial unity and stability. In the context in which British officers and diplomats evaluated ethnic troops in other colonial armies, the ‘martial races’ theory therefore served as an effective analytical tool in the examination of attitudes to Balkan militarism. The language and concepts that were applied closely matched those used about Britain’s own ethnic imperial soldiers – the ‘martial races’. This sentiment was illustrated well in one of Morier’s conclusions from 1857: the absolute success of the frontier system ‘affords abundant proof that the institution is one capable of being advantageously introduced amongst semi-barbarous tribes’. 267

Balkan issues were also directly connected to concerns regarding the British Empire during the Eastern Crisis. Lieutenant-Colonel R. Home argued during the

266 The Pall Mall Gazette, 17 Sept. 1869.
Russian-Serbian War in 1876 that India should be ‘called on to contribute to the cost of war undertaken on her benefit’, and his proposed solution was to send Muslim troops from India to fight in the Balkans alongside the Ottoman army. In addition to increasing the troop strength, Home thought that Islam would act as a unifying force between Ottoman and Indian troops which would make them fight more efficiently.\(^{268}\) Major-General Sir Garnet Wolseley (1833-1913),\(^{269}\) the Ashanti War (1873-4) hero and a firm advocate of the ‘imperial school’ in British strategic planning, also recommended using Muslim troops against Russia. Writing in 1876 – before the outbreak of the Second Afghan War – his estimates of the willingness of Afghan and other Central Asian tribes to fight alongside the British were perhaps overly optimistic, but, nevertheless, he thought that these tribes would be useful for the British because they were ‘fanatical Mahommetans…the greatest villains in the world’. He was very specific about the power of Islam as a way of selling the British cause to the Central Asian tribal leaders and argued that ‘all the followers of the Prophet’ should be made aware of the military situation in Europe, and encouraged ‘to arm against His enemy the Czar’. England, he thought, should be presented as a ‘staunch ally of the Turks’.\(^{270}\)

Indian troops were never sent to the Balkans, but they were used in numerous other conflicts – in the China wars (1840-2 and 1857-60), in the Abyssinian campaigns (1868), in Malta (1878), Egypt (1882) and the Sudan (1896).\(^{271}\) Therefore, Home and Wolseley’s recommendations were not perhaps as radical as they might have seemed. Their views also showed that Balkan issues were debated in connection with concrete British imperial concerns, and illustrated that cultural perceptions and attitudes to Islam affected high-level military policy initiatives.

\(^{268}\) WO 33/29, R. Home to Inspector-General of Fortifications, Constantinople, 15 Nov. 1876.

\(^{269}\) Wolseley had fought in the Crimean War which probably gave him a higher level of expertise in the Balkan military issues. He commanded British forces in the Ashanti War (1873-4), in the later stages of the Zulu War (1879-80) as well as in the Egyptian campaigns in the 1880s. Wolseley was the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces from 1895 to 1899.


Montenegrin militaristic traditions also attracted attention in Britain and the discourse was equally close to that used in connection with Britain’s martial races and in the evaluations of ethnic soldiers of other imperial armies. However, there also were important differences in the ways in which the Montenegrins were perceived and represented in comparison to the Habsburg and Ottoman ‘martial races’. These variations will be discussed in further detail below. Official Britain was mostly interested in the cultural aspects of Montenegro’s militarism while popular accounts mainly emphasised Montenegro’s epic struggle against the Turks, and compared the country to other stereotypically martial societies that evoked romantic reactions in Britain. R. J. Kennedy, the British Charge d’Affaires in Montenegro, argued that Montenegrin soldiers were effective in defending their country, because they were ‘accustomed from early youth to the use of fire-arms’.\footnote{FO 881/6652, R. Kennedy, ‘Montenegro: Past and Present Military Organization’ (1895), pp. 4-5.} Similarly, the almost ‘universal carrying of military rifles’ and the ‘martial looking dress of the priests’ were seen by Arden Hulme-Beaman (1857-1929), who had served in the British legation in St Petersburg, as defining features of the scene he had witnessed in a Montenegrin village.\footnote{A. Hulme-Beaman, ‘The Black Mountain’, \textit{The Fortnightly Review}, 53 (1890), pp. 129-33.} Thus, these British current or former diplomatic officials believed that most Montenegrins were soldiers, and that militaristic values had penetrated deep into Montenegrin culture. The same sentiment was also expressed in popular pseudo-scientific accounts which often emphasised Montenegro’s primitiveness, the high regard that was given to ‘personal valour’ and ‘warlike prowess’ in the country, as well as the fact that soldiers were ‘accustomed to confront[ing] danger from infancy’.\footnote{A. J. G., ‘The Bible in the Balkans’, \textit{The Bible in the World}, 8 (1912), p. 362; Anon, ‘Montenegro’, \textit{The Church Quarterly Review}, 3 (1876-7), p. 173; Lyde, \textit{Man in Many Lands}, p. 176.}

Montenegro’s militarism was also constructed in other ways, namely by highlighting the country’s heroic character, as shown by references to their centuries-long struggle against the Ottoman forces that had not been able to invade the country. This approach was mainly evident in historical and popular scientific accounts during the Eastern Crisis and to a lesser extent during the Balkan Wars. Edward Freeman, the renowned Gladstonian historian who was a keen observer of Balkan affairs,
emphasised the ‘border character of whole land and its people’ and argued that the independent spirit of Orthodox Slavs in Southeast Europe was being upheld by Montenegro – the ‘gallant outpost of Christendom’. In a similar vein, the army physician Humphry Sandwith (1822-81) wrote in 1877, that the Montenegrins were ‘splendid warriors’ who had kept their ‘mountain range free from the pollution of the Turk’ for hundreds of years. Poet-Laureate Alfred Tennyson’s (1809-92) enthusiasm towards Montenegrin heroic militarism was evident in the much-quoted passage of his sonnet ‘Montenegro’ from 1877:

They kept their faith, their freedom, on the height, Chaste, frugal savage, arm’d by day and night against the Turk…warriors beating back the swarm of the Turkish Islam for five hundred years.

Comparable views were also expressed during the Balkan Wars although not as widely as in the earlier period. For example, in 1913, one anonymous commentator in The Church Quarterly Review showed admiration for the fact that the Montenegrins had been able to preserve ‘their religion, their traditions and independence’ and that their heroism had been demonstrated by the ‘courage with which they [had] resisted…Turkish domination’. This issue was also highlighted in diplomatic discourse by utilising a popular Victorian anthropological method of cultural comparison. Sir Henry Bulwer (1801-72), the then British ambassador extraordinaire to the Ottoman government, wrote in 1862 that if the unruly situation in Serbia, caused by the bombardment of Belgrade by the Turkish army, was to escalate into a war, ‘the Servians would probably be more easily subdued than the Montenegrins’. Using similar discourse, Count John Francis de Salis (1864-1939), the British minister to Montenegro, argued in 1911 that the Montenegrin ability to resist the Turkish rule to which other Balkan populations

279 FO 421/16, H. Bulwer to Earl Russell, Constantinople, 6 Aug. 1862.
had surrendered showed that the Montenegrins were the most heroic of the South Slav populations. He argued that Montenegrins were conscious of their ‘superiority in having resisted the domination of the Turk to which the Servian succumbed’. ‘The Montenegrin’, continued de Salis, ‘feels for the Servian all the contempt which the man of the mountains shows towards the man of the plains’. 280 Brian Hodgson (1801-94), diplomat and Nepalese scholar, had expressed strikingly similar views about the Nepalese Gurkas in a paper ‘On the Classification of the Military Tribes in Nepal’, which he delivered to the Bengal Asiatic Society in January 1833. He thought that the Gurkas were ‘by far the best soldiers in Asia’, because of ‘their gallant spirit [and] emphatic hate of Madhesias (people of the plains)’. 281

Montenegro was also compared in popular British accounts to more well-known militaristic societies. In addition to being an important aspect of the process by which the Montenegrins were accorded martial identities in public discourse in Britain, this trend can also be interpreted as an expression of the values of British upper-class historical culture which on a very basic level refers to the ‘totality of the various representations of history’ in a given society. 282 In this case, the classical education was the most important part of middle-class historical culture, which influence was visibly present in many accounts, especially in those about Montenegro. Henry Howorth’s (1842-1923) article, the second part in the series on the history of the Slavs which was published in the Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland between 1878 and 1882, was a classic piece of Victorian historical anthropology. 283 Howorth thought that the Montenegrin history

was unusually ‘heroic, and that probably no community of modern times so well represents the virtues and prowess of ancient Sparta as that which lives in the Black Mountains’. Freeman also argued that the Montenegrins were ‘born-fighters’, and that, ‘in the modern world’, it was only in Montenegro that the very model of a ‘warrior tribe’ could still be encountered.

Comparisons were also drawn with Scottish Highlanders. One observer argued that the Montenegrins ‘resemble…the Highlanders of a century ago, and their military array and accoutrements carry us back to the days of Prince Charles Edward’. The analogy between Montenegrins and Scottish Highlanders had been made in English travel accounts since the 1840s on the basis of a struggle against a larger enemy: the former against the Turks and the latter against the English. Both were also portrayed as ‘noble savages’, a concept which was first coined by the traveller and author Martin Martin (d. 1718) in 1703, and the trend of representing the Scottish highlands as a ‘backdrop for a brave race doing brave deeds’ was present in most eighteenth-century travel accounts. Sir Walter Scott (1771-1832) was the most important writer to bring the image of the idyllic, but violent clan society of the Scottish highlands into the British and European mainstream imagination, and his most famous works including *Waverley* (1814) and *Rob Roy* (1818), had a heroic highlander as the central character. Scott’s medievalism corresponded with classic eighteenth century attitudes to the medieval period, which was often preferred to the classical era because man was perceived to have been closer to nature in medieval times.

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284 H. Howorth, ‘Spread of the Slaves, Part II’, p. 79.
However, the Montenegrin militaristic ‘tradition’ was at least partly invented, as were aspects of the traditions of the Scottish Highlanders. As will be shown later in the chapter, many professional military observers in Britain questioned Montenegrin military qualities in a regular war which suggests that much of their militarism was not entirely based on truthful observation, but instead on beliefs more influenced by perceptions and cultural representations of the Montenegrin past. One clear-minded contemporary observer, Kurt Hassert, captured the essence of the counter-argument in an article which appeared in *The Geographical Journal* in 1894:

The alleged invincibility of the Montenegrins is…unsupported by facts. Their individual bravery is acknowledged by everybody, but their independence is chiefly due to the inaccessibility and desert mountain ranges of western Montenegro, which render it impossible for an invading army to remain there long enough to subjugate the country.⁹⁸⁹

According to Goldsworthy’s definition, the concept of the ‘martial races’ was applied in Britain to Indian, Scottish and Balkan mountaineers, who were regarded as more ‘poetic subjects’ than the people of the lowlands who ‘ineptly aped the West’.⁹⁹⁰ However, this view captures the real meaning of the concept only if it is regarded as a loose cultural construction that was widely and actively used by travellers and other commentators. Attitudes towards Montenegrin militarism, however, differed from those towards ethnic border troops in the Austrian and Ottoman armies because the Montenegrin epic struggle against the Ottomans was not used as a model when solutions to British Empire’s defence problems were sought. Thus, although the Montenegrins were portrayed as a picturesque mountaineer warrior tribe with inherited militaristic qualities, they were not necessarily perceived as a ‘martial race’ in the same way as were the Croat, Bosniak and other ethnic border troops.

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Therefore, the concept of the ‘martial races’ is only truly applicable in the Balkan context if contemporaries directly connected it with British colonial defence concerns, as in the cases discussed above.

Portrayals of Montenegrins, Albanians and Croats in the manner described above were also closely connected to an anthropological ideal type – the ‘Dinaric race’. This categorisation was coined by the French naturalist and anthropologist Joseph Deniker (1862-1918), the chief librarian of the Museum of Natural History in Paris, who argued that Bosnians, Dalmatians and Croatians formed the core group of the Dinaric race, but that similar physical characteristics were also found in Serbs, Albanians, Romanians, Slovenes, Venetians, and in the inhabitants of Tyrol. Deniker felt that the defining characteristic of the Dinaric race was their ‘lofty stature’.\(^{291}\) Henry Howorth’s description of the Montenegrins also illustrated how this classification was applied:

> In stature they are much above middle height, some are very tall and they are well proportioned. Their voices are powerful and they can converse long distances. The moral and physical qualities which distinguish them so clearly from the other Southern Slaves, seem to point to their blood not being so ununited as their language.\(^{292}\)

The renowned American economist and racial theorist William Ripley (1867-1941) also argued that the Slavs of the western part of the Balkan Peninsula were anthropologically comparable with the inhabitants of the Alpine highlands of Tyrol, therefore being fundamentally ‘Alpine in racial type’. More specifically, Serbs, Montenegrins, Croats and Albanians were ‘physically a unit’ and composed the


\(^{292}\) Howorth, ‘Spread of the Slaves, Part II’, p. 80.
Dinaric race. These views were based largely on Deniker’s observations which he had already published in the late 1890s.

References to Montenegro’s epic struggle against a much larger enemy, and comparisons to stereotypically militaristic societies, can also be seen as examples of how history was used symbolically to further particular, often political, aims. According to Karl-Georg Faber, who has examined uses of history in German parliamentary debates, symbolic uses of the past are often marked by the use of provocative language which occurs as a result of the oversimplification of complex historical processes. This tendency was also evident in the views of Freeman, Sandwith and Tennyson, whose allusions to Montenegro as the brave Christian settlement that had fought against Muslim invaders for hundreds of years certainly oversimplified complex historical developments and used provocative and deterministic language. This type of discourse was used primarily by radical Liberals who forcefully attacked the Conservative government’s pro-Turkish foreign policy during the Eastern Crisis. Freeman, for example, attempted to demonstrate that Turkish rule in the Balkans was ‘unnatural’ by utilising the militaristic and independent spirit of Montenegro as a symbol which, in his view, proved that other Slav provinces should also be freed from Ottoman control. Richard Shannon has argued that Freeman believed that Turkey was the ‘last great blot on the face of Europe’ which outrageously challenged everything that ‘nineteenth-century civilisation stood for’. Freeman’s attitudes to Turkey perfectly illustrated radical Liberal sentiments in general. Thus, these examples show that Montenegro’s militaristic and heroic history, and their successful struggle against the Ottomans, was used by radical Liberals as a tool in political debate and as a way of influencing public opinion against the government’s policy.

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It is thus evident that many South Slav communities were represented in professional and popular military writing as inherently militaristic, and that martial traditions and historical developments were used as examples to illustrate the point. Ottoman and Habsburg ethnic imperial soldiers were represented as militaristic because they had been unaffected by modernism and because they had experience of front-line action in the defence of their respective empires, while Montenegrin militarism was primarily constructed through making references to the country’s militaristic cultural values, by emphasising their epic struggle against the Turks, and by equating Montenegro with other more well-known and stereotypically militaristic societies. It is important, however, to differentiate conceptions about Montenegro from perceptions of the ethnic troops in the Ottoman and Habsburg armies. The latter were perceived as loyal imperial soldiers while the former was portrayed as too independently-minded for the same purpose which explains those numerous comparisons that were made between Montenegro and other rebellious, self-governing and militaristic societies.

The British also evaluated other societies by examining their social structures. In the Balkan context, the extended family unit, the *zadruga*, attracted particular attention. *Zadrugas* were made up of at least two families that were closely related either by blood or adoption. Within this unit, everything from the ownership of the means of production to the regulation of property and labour were dealt with communally.\textsuperscript{298} The *zadruga* was the primary family form in Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, and northwest Macedonia. Similar structures were also found in northern Greece and Croatia-Slavonia. The extended family in these regions had retained many of the functions that elsewhere in Europe had been gradually transferred to the church, the state, and to feudal lords. For example, in sixteenth-century Central and Western Europe, the parish church developed into the most important territorial unit during the Reformation and Counter Reformation, and assumed an important role in terms of elementary education, and as a disciplinary instrument of the church. These developments were largely absent in the Balkans,

where the extended family performed most disciplinary, educational and organisational functions.  

The term *zadruga* was invented by the Serbian ethnologist and philologist Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic (1787-1846), and the concept generated interest, especially from the 1850s onwards, not only among western anthropologists and ethnologists, but also among South Slav intellectuals. The 1859 work by Ognjeslav Utjesenovic (1817-90), was the first monograph on the subject published by a South Slav author. To Utjesenovic, the *zadruga* was essentially a social structure of the Austrian military frontier. His father had served as a sergeant in the border region and Utjesenovic’s information was based mostly on his personal observations. He placed the extended family in importance among the major European agrarian models – probably English and French feudalism as well as Russian serfdom – and recommended it to western nations as an ideal to be adopted in the face of growing individualisation of societies. In addition to Utjesenovic, most South Slav intellectuals, such as Valtazar Bogisic (1834-1908) and Ivan Strohal (1871-1917), thought that the *zadruga* was a ‘manifestation of the “South Slav popular spirit”’, felt that its existence was a good thing, and believed that it needed to be preserved. There were also those Balkan intellectuals, such as Ljubiza Rakitsch (b. 1884), who wished to see the end of the *zadruga*, because to her ‘everything Serbian was connected with pre-modern archaic primitiveness’, whereas all that came from the West signified development, culture and civilisation.

At times, parallels between the Indian caste system, the clan structure of the Scottish Highlands, and the South Slav extended family were drawn in British popular as well as diplomatic accounts. Diplomat Ralph Dalyell maintained that the *zadruga* was comparable in its organisation to the village communities of India.

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302 Ibid.
303 FO 881/1075, R. Dalyell, ‘Report upon the Principality of Servia’ (1860), p. 4; fn., p. 3.
while the distinguished jurist and scholar Henry Maine (1822-88) argued that the ‘Joint Family of the Hindoos’ was ‘point for point the House Community of the South Slavonians’. Maine believed that this association was especially effective when the populations of Lower Bengal were compared to Croatians, Dalmatians, Montenegrins, Serbs, and the ‘now Slavonised Bulgarians’.

Social structure was also used as a category in evaluations of the martial qualities of prospective ethnic soldiers in British colonies in Asia and Africa. This trend was apparent in other imperial societies as well. For instance, the perceived patriarchal nature of certain African societies, and the alleged influence of this type of social structure on military discipline, was one of the most important reasons why so many West African soldiers were recruited to the French army during the First World War. In the case of the Balkans, the patriarchal nature of the extended family unit was also often linked to military aspects, and examples were sought from the Austrian military border and from Montenegro.

In this connection Robert Morier was especially impressed by the military ability of Croatian border soldiers, and he argued that they were not only the most numerous of the Slav nationalities, but also the ‘most military of all the races’ that served in the frontier regiments. According to Morier, the sense of discipline was among the most important characteristics of the Croat border troops, and it manifested itself in the blind obedience that they showed to the regional military governors, who, in many cases were not Austrians, but fellow-Slavs. Morier argued that the disciplined nature of Croat troops had come about as a consequence of complicated historical circumstances which had resulted in the development of a unique social organisation. This discipline rested on the complete ‘absorption of the individual into a social mechanism’ that relied on strict individual subordination to the ‘well-being of the whole’. This ‘communistic-patriarchal’ cultural milieu which

305 Ibid.
produced obedient soldiers was seen by Morier as the glue which had held the Austrian military border together and made it so effective.\textsuperscript{307}

Social structures and ancient family ties were also regarded by Colonel Wilbraham Lennox (1830-97), the permanent British military attaché to the Ottoman Empire, as important aspects when he assessed the fighting capabilities of the Montenegrin army in 1877, at the height of the Russian-Turkish War. He believed that even if twelve additional battalions could be formed out of refugees from Herzegovina, they would not be as effective as the Montenegrin battalions that were ‘composed of families and tribes under their own natural Chiefs’.\textsuperscript{308} Maine, after emphasising the utmost respect which the South Slavs showed to their elders, also connected the \textit{zadruga} with military organisation, and evoked the imagery of Aryan warriordom in which military authority, instead of age, was the foundation on which hierarchical and disciplinary structures rested:

All this is exactly in harmony with what we know about the beginnings of Aristocracy throughout the Aryan world; but it should always be remembered that if the association were habitually militant, both the old men and the youths would probably fall into the background, and the authority in council would belong to the mature warrior who is foremost in arms.\textsuperscript{309}

Journalistic accounts also represented the \textit{zadruga} as a curious relic of the past which had survived especially among the Serbs. James Bourchier wrote in 1889 that the extended family was a system of practical socialism, one which had been found effective in taxation and in the military in Serbia. He also referred to the patriarchal nature of Serbian society: ‘It is interesting as we stand on the threshold of the twentieth century, to follow the life and manners of these last survivors of a patriarchal age’.\textsuperscript{310} The writer Edward Jenkins argued that Serbia was ‘purely

\begin{footnotes}
\item[308] WO 106/1, Lennox to Jocelyn, Shumla, 17 April 1877.
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democratic’ and that perfect equality was guaranteed by the existence of patriarchal social structures. Jenkins also argued that, ‘to us, accustomed to the complicated systems of more civilised nations, there is something refreshingly curious in this primitive state of things’.  

Similarly, Herbert Vivian thought that the Serbian *zadruga* was an autocratic and ‘antiquated institution’ and emphasised that it was not only the lower classes who were in favour of the *zadruga*, but that it was still popular in Serbian society as a whole.

How accurate were these views about the significance of the *zadruga* in modern Balkan societies? British evaluations of the patriarchal nature of the *zadruga* were in most part quite accurate. Male dominance was visible in many familial rituals, which extended also to spiritual and religious matters. For example, the most important religious event of each year was the celebration of the familial patron saint, which occurred on a particular date, but the date differed from family to family. The commemoration of the dead was also strictly family-oriented. The rituals of these celebrations were only performed by males and the tradition was handed down from father to son. This tradition produced a network of ‘patrilineal familial clans’, especially in Montenegro and Albania, where a network of families that composed a clan often shared the same patron saint.

However, the *zadruga* had by early 1830s lost much of its importance as a social organisation in rural Serbia. By then, three-thirds of Serbian peasants lived outside extended families in small villages which had become territorial communities. However, although there was a class of notables which included village and district leaders, merchants, and civil servants, most of the Serbs still remained peasants who were closely attached to the soil. Family-owned small peasant holdings which were arranged into larger estates had, therefore, become the primary form of land-tenure in Serbia from the early nineteenth century onwards. Thus,

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British views were partly accurate, but also based on misguided information. The cultural traditions of the *zadruga* probably survived longer, and as *zadrugas* had also served defence functions, British diplomatic and military views about the effectiveness of this type of a social structure with regard to efficiency of military units, were probably, at least to some extent, quite close to reality.

2.3. ‘Far From Courageous’: The Power of Events and Shifting Attitudes to Bulgarian Militarism

One of the main aims of martial classification was to determine whether a given subject race was ‘warlike’ or not. When the same test was applied in the Balkan context, it was the Bulgarians who were most often represented as characteristically less warlike and less violent than other South Slavs. This view was expressed in professional military accounts mainly in 1876, during the Serbian-Turkish War and the ‘Bulgarian atrocities’, and more generally during the Eastern Crisis period, but it had been evident in numerous popular texts from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. The division between the Bulgarians and other South Slavs has often been ignored in the literature that considers British views of the Balkans.

Representations of the Bulgarians as an unwarlike people were often influenced by racial theories, comparative evaluations of folk traditions, and by personal experiences. William White (1824-1900), the British Consul-General in Serbia, claimed in 1876 that even though there had been considerable insurrectionary activity throughout the province of Bulgaria, the Bulgarians, as a consequence of their submissive nature, were unlikely to commit to large scale operations against the Ottomans without assistance. He also thought that the Bulgarians, unlike the Herzegovinians, did not have the ‘native Heyducks…able to lead them to successful ambuscades and encounters, and back by devious paths into mountain recesses’, and were hence unlikely to commit themselves to grandiose military operations against the Ottoman army.  

Walter Baring, one of the secretaries at the British legation in Constantinople, held similar views. In his extensive report on the origins of the Bulgarian revolt in 1876, he argued that Bulgarians were not initially receptive to

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315 FO 881/2914, W. White to H. Elliot, Belgrade, 24 May 1876.
revolutionary ideas because they were a ‘peaceful race’ and he thought that, although
the Bulgarians were ‘conservative, hard working, [and] thrifty’, they at the same time
were ‘somewhat apathetic, and far from courageous’, and therefore ‘as a rule’ not
‘made of the stuff that produces a revolutionist’. 316

Consul Charles Brophy’s personal account in the aftermath of Turkish
irregulars’ visit to a Bulgarian village in 1876 was a telling example of the types of
circumstances which led many British diplomats and military men to think that, as a
‘race’, Bulgarians were submissive, gentle and unwarlike:

When we arrived at the spot the chief men of the village went out to
meet [the Turkish commander Chefket Pasha] and threw themselves at
his feet, protesting that they had no bad feelings against the
Government…Chefket Pasha then asked if they would give up their
arms, and the deputation replied in the affirmative, saying that they
would return to the village and collect them…as soon as they were
within the village…a general massacre commenced, [the] Bulgarians
offering no resistance, and allowing themselves…to be slaughtered
like sheep. 317

Likewise, Captain Chapman, who had toured in the Balkans in order to present
evaluations of Balkan armies, also expressed similar views in the Pall Mall Gazette in
1877: ‘the Bulgarians are no more fit to take their own part against a fighting race
like the Mussulman than a goat is fit to face a lion’. 318 ‘Thus, the perception was that
because Bulgarians were unwarlike they had been unwilling to revolt against the
Turkish rule and they had therefore been more exploited by the Ottoman
administrators than other South Slav populations. Furthermore, many accounts stated
that the Bulgarians’ ‘pacific’ qualities were evident because the bandit tradition,
portrayed as one of the essential cultural components of other South Slav societies,
had not played a significant role in shaping Bulgarian cultural and military traditions.

316 FO 881/2964, ‘Report by Mr. Baring on the Bulgarian Insurrection of 1876’.
317 FO 881/2964, C. Brophy to H. Elliot, Burgas, 14 June 1876.
318 The Pall Mall Gazette, 2 April 1877.
Similar arguments were also expressed in popular science. E. G. Ravenstein (1834-1913), the distinguished cartographer and geographer, argued in 1877 that even though Bulgarians were ‘frugal and industrious’ and mechanically skilful, they were ‘averse to war – very unlike their neighbours, the Servians’. He explained that because of their ‘submissive’ and ‘gentle’ nature, the Bulgarians had been subjected to violations on the part of Turkish administrators, and Greek as well as Armenian tax farmers, more than ‘any other race in Turkey’.319 Similarly, James Baker wrote in 1877 that the long subjugation to Phanariote exploitation had ‘obliterated the warlike spirit of the Bulgarian people’.320 Andrew Payton’s account from the early 1860s was perhaps the clearest illustration of these widely-held beliefs:

They are a most unwarlike race, and [as] submissive to the Turks as sheep to a colley dog. Their habits are pastoral and agricultural, having neither the soldier spirit and gigantic stature of the Serb, nor the mercantile enterprise of the Greek.321

As was the case with other representations of the Balkans, there was nothing specifically British about representing Bulgarians in this manner. Interestingly, an article ‘Bulgarialaiset’ in the Finnish newspaper Ilmarinen, published in Wyborg, transmitted very similar views: ‘Kansa on rauhallista, sen huomaa jo heti heidän kaswoiltaan, joista kuwastuu enemmän hyväntahtoisuutta kuin urhoutta ja woimaa’.322

320 J. Baker, Turkey in Europe (London, Paris & New York: Cassell, Petter & Galpin, 1877), p. 30. Phanariotes were Greek notables who were scattered all around the Ottoman Empire and often took part in Ottoman administrative duties in the provinces.
322 Ilmarinen, 1 Aug. 1877. Translation by Mika Suonpää: ‘[Bulgarian] people are peaceful…you can see this on their faces which reflect kindness rather than bravery or strength’.
If measured by the extent of rural unrest, however, perceptions of Bulgarian racial timidity were, in fact, mostly inaccurate. Rural unrest was as widespread in the Bulgarian lands in 1839-50, 1867-8, and 1876, as it had been in the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1858-9 and 1875 or in Serbia in 1804-30. What were the realities of rural conditions in Ottoman Bulgaria, and which factors contributed to outbreaks of peasant revolts? Bulgarian peasants owned their own houses and some land, but it often was not enough to earn an income and they were therefore compelled to lease extra land from the Muslim estate owners. Muslim lords became the real owners of the land in the eighteenth century, and seized the control of local administration, thus becoming a class of landlords which took over all state lands. Landlords were harsher in the Bulgarian lands than in many other regions of the Ottoman Balkans, because they collected certain extra taxes, and fiercely resisted the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms, which, between 1839 and 1850, had aimed at stabilising the peasants’ possession of land by increasing the number of peasant family members that were eligible to inherit it. These harsh conditions caused a peasant revolt in 1850. In its aftermath, the Porte offered to sell the state lands to the peasants, who by now sought to obtain the land without payment. These discontents culminated in other revolts in 1875-6, which in effect brought Bulgaria independence in 1878. Muslim landowners began to withdraw from Bulgaria in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the land was then transferred to the peasants.

In addition, the hajduk tradition was also as much alive in Bulgaria as it was elsewhere in the Balkans, and some historians, such as Eric Hobsbawm, have argued that the bandit tradition was actually born in Bulgaria in the fifteenth century, and that one of the most infamous of the Balkan bandits, Panayot Hitov (1820-1918), the leader of the national uprising in the late 1860s, was from Bulgaria. It is thus quite clear that British perceptions of the Bulgarians’ unwillingness to revolt were almost completely untrue.

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325 E. Hobsbawm, Bandits (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972 [1969])
The image of unwarlike and passive Bulgarians did indeed change after the Serb-Bulgarian War. This was a significant development because it showed that Balkan stereotypes were not necessarily fixed and that contemporary events often played a considerable role in shaping views about the Balkan Slavs in Britain. After the 1885-6 war there were no traces of references to ‘unwarlike’ or ‘suffering’ Bulgarians in official or popular accounts and, in fact, Bulgarians were now portrayed as more militaristic than the Serbs. Major Watson, for example, argued that ‘the quality of the Bulgarian soldier was severely tested in the late war with Servia, in which it surpassed the highest expectations’ and that ‘the Servian army when attacked, were in no case able to withstand the superior weight and resolution of the Bulgarians’.

The shift in opinions was also evident in journalistic texts. James Bourchier, a journalist with The Times, who also contributed to many other contemporary journals, wrote in 1889 that even though the Serbs had many good martial qualities, they were nevertheless ‘inferior to the Bulgarians in physique and military bearing’ while another journalist and author Henry Brailsford argued that the Bulgarians were the ‘most enduring’ of all races, and they seemed ‘insensible to pain’.

Francis Urquhart wrote in 1914 that during the Balkan Wars ‘the Bulgarians showed great military efficiency and were unexpectedly successful’.

Other treatises communicated similar sentiments. During the Eastern Crisis, Montenegro had been perceived and represented in Britain as the champion of Christian values in Southeast Europe in the struggle against the Ottoman Empire, but, during the First Balkan War, Bulgaria increasingly acquired this position and the country was subsequently portrayed as that Balkan nation which in the end would drive the ‘Turk out of Europe’. The Times waxed lyrical about this struggle in the aftermath of the battle in Kirk Kilisse in October 1912 in an article entitled ‘The Verdict of the Sword’ which evoked strong medievalist connotations:

327 Bourchier, ‘Servian Festival’, p. 223.
328 Brailsford, Macedonia, p. 36.
The echoes of a great conflict still reverberate but the verdict is unmistakable. The Bulgarians set the Turks upon the run at Kirk Kilisse, and with brief intervals they have kept them running ever since.  

Changing perceptions of Bulgarian military qualities were also at times evident in the discourses of contemporary stage productions. Bernard Shaw’s (1856-1950) play ‘Arms and the Man’ (1894) was set in Bulgaria during the Serbian-Bulgarian War, and one of its central characters, Catherine Petkoff, described her fellow-countrymen’s efforts in the Battle of Slivnitza in 1885 in language analogous to, for instance, Tennyson’s earlier depictions of the Montenegrins:

Our gallant splendid Bulgarians with their swords and eyes flashing, thundering down like an avalanche and scattering the wretched Serbs and their dandified Austrian officers like chaff.  

Thus, Shaw’s attitude to Bulgaria can also be read in this manner, as an example of changed British attitudes to Bulgarian militarism, and not only as an illustration of the sentiment according to which Bulgarians hovered ‘uneasily between the luxurious Orient and cheap, imitative “Westernness”’.  

The process also worked in the other direction. Although the Montenegrins were widely portrayed as the heroic defenders of Christian values against Ottoman Islam during the Eastern Crisis, it was also believed, especially in professional military circles, that performances in specific battles could easily change views. For example, Edmund Monson (1834-1909), who had been sent to the Balkans to serve as a special envoy of the British government during the Eastern Crisis, was astonished by the lack of military organisation displayed by the Montenegrin army in a retreat which had been described by those military observers who had witnessed it as a mixture of ‘confusion, panic, and disorder’. Monson thought that the Montenegrin

330 The Times, 2 Nov. 1912.
332 Goldsworthy, Inventing, p. 115.
soldiers were ‘not deficient in personal valour’ because they had fought ‘courageously enough’ in the Duga Pass, but ‘their prestige has suffered damage’ and that it would take ‘many an act of vigour and of bravery’ to repair it. This was therefore another illustration of how events could shape and change stereotypical views.

Similar shift in opinions about militaristic and non-militaristic qualities had occurred in British India in the mid-1850s, when the Sepoy mutiny (1857) marked an important point of change in the ways in which Indian soldiers were seen by British colonial recruiters and officers, and also in how they were portrayed in the Victorian culture more generally. Before the rebellion, northern Indian high-caste Hindus were regarded by the British military as excellent soldiers because of their suitable physical and mental qualities, but after their prominent role in the rebellion, British officers quickly started to view the Brahmins as ‘cowardly, feminine and racially unfit’ for military service. Instead, recruiters began increasingly to conscript Gurkas, Sikhs and other Punjabi border groups because they were regarded as more loyal and therefore better suited to the defence of the British Empire. The implications of changed attitudes to Bulgaria for British policy will be discussed in further detail below.

Although perceptions of the Bulgarians’ unwarlike and submissive character were mostly inaccurate, and even though this view changed dramatically in the mid-1880s, the Bulgarians were also separated from other South Slavs in two further ways: first, by reference to the Bulgarians’ Asiatic racial origin, and second, by emphasising differences between the Bulgarian language and other South Slav tongues. These differences were expressed fairly widely in diplomatic, historical, anthropological, geographical, archaeological and ethnological treatises throughout

333 FO 881/2964, Monson to Earl Derby, Ragusa, 28 Jul. 1876.
334 Edward Armitage’s (1817-96) painting ‘Retribution’ (1858), held at Leeds Art Gallery, was one of the most illustrative examples of this. The painting shows Pallas Athena, the military goddess in the Greek mythology that was often used to portray Britain, taking on the Bengali tiger. The foreground of the painting shows murdered British women and children. This was the way in which the Sepoy mutiny was often represented in Britain.
the period. For example, Edward Freeman believed that Bulgarians were ‘assimilated’ Slavs and ‘definitely non-Aryan’ while the renowned archaeologist Arthur Evans (1851-1941) argued that their ‘strangely Asiatic physiognomy’ distinguished Bulgarians from other Slavs and proved that they were not of Slav, but of ‘Mongolian’ origin. Bulgarians were also subjected to classic racialist classifications in which they were distinguished from other South Slavs in terms of skull type and stature. John Beddoe (1826-1911) argued that in general, the South Slavic head-form resembled that of the northern Slavs because it was broad and elliptical ‘or even oblong’, and it had ‘a tendency to squareness’. This was the case with all of the southern Slavs, except the Bulgarians, whose skull type differed significantly from ‘the Slavonic type’. He explained that the Bulgarians resembled ‘neither the ordinary Finnish type nor, still more certainly, the ordinary Turkish type’. After examining the works of the Polish scientist Isadore Kopernicki and the prominent German anatomist Rudolf Virchow, Beddoe argued that ‘there are points in which some of these skulls remind one…of Negro or rather perhaps of Australian skulls; for some of them have a degree of prognathousness unknown in Europe’ and that the cast had ‘something of the savage’ because of the prominence of the upper

337 The Oxford and Göttingen educated Evans was one of the most prominent British Balkan-experts, a factor which gave his views even more resonance. His expertise was often judged against his eight-year residence in Dubrovnik, and his contributions to Hellenic studies. Later in life, Evans served as the president of the British Association (1916-19), which was a good indication of the prestigious position which he enjoyed within the British scientific and academic community. [The Times, 12 Jul. 1941]
338 Evans, Through Bosnia, pp. 29-31.
339 Beddoe was a significant figure within the field of human sciences in Britain. He also had hands-on experience of working in the Balkans and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. During the Crimean War, he had served on the medical staff of a civil hospital before travelling to Vienna to complete his medical training. During his travels through Europe, he conducted an enormous amount of anthropological and ethnological research, compiling a large amount of data. He was a founding member of the Ethnological Society (est. 1857) and the president of the Anthropological Society (1869-70). He was also the president of the Royal Anthropological Institute (1889-91), and served on the council of the British Association (1870-75). [The Times, 20 July 1911; A. Richardson, ‘Beddoe, John (1826-1911), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004)].
The renowned American economist and racial theorist William Ripley (1867-1941) argued that the Bulgarians were considerably shorter than other South Slavs because on average they were ‘less than five feet five inches in height, considerably shorter than the Turks, and diminutive beside Bosnians’. He argued that Serbs, Croats and Albanians were among the tallest people in the world and that they compared ‘favourably with the Scotch in this respect’.

After conducting extensive research on the origins of different Slav peoples, Henry Howorth concluded that the peculiarities of the Bulgarians were ‘traceable to their partially non-Aryan descent’, and that they were a ‘mixed race of Slaves and Turco-Ugrians’. In a similar fashion, the ethnologist Alfred Haddon (1855-1940) argued in 1909 that the Bulgarians were of Ugrian rather than European origin. Ravenstein also argued that the Bulgarians were ‘Fins by blood’, while in 1914, Professor Lionel Lyde argued that both the Hungarians and the Bulgarians were of ‘Asiatic origin’. He went on to argue that the Bulgarians had had the most difficult struggle under the Ottoman administration, but because they had pursued their ‘national aims with Mongolian tenacity’ they had been able to free themselves from Turkish rule. Another of Lyde’s account was a good illustration of these widespread sentiments:

Bulgarians, descendants of a ‘Yellow’ race who centuries ago adopted the language, customs, and creed of the Slav ‘White’ races whom they conquered, and who now may be regarded as Slavs; but south of the Balkans a typical Bulgarian might still be easily mistaken for a Finn, and the temperament of the people still has an undercurrent of the

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340 University of Bristol (UB), Special Collections, DM 2, J. Beddoe, ‘On the Bulgarians’ [1878]. See also his ‘On the Ottoman Turks’ [1879].
343 Haddon, *Races of Man*, p. 68.
‘Yellow’ element – even in such an insignificant detail as ‘Chinese’ aptitude for gardening.346

Thus, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, various accounts emphasised the Ugrian or Central Asian origin of the Bulgarian population, which in turn led to the development of a view that the Bulgarians were more ‘eastern’ than other South Slavs who were represented as Indo-Europeans because they had arrived in the Balkans from Central Europe. This perception lasted well into the twentieth century in Western European academic traditions. Fernand Braudel, for example, wrote in his majestic The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in 1949 that ‘Asia seems to have left no corner of Bulgaria untouched’ and that ‘to this day, there are still traces in Bulgaria of its impregnation by an exotic, perfumed civilisation of the East’.347

Other border societies were also subjected to similar evaluations in Western European academic discourse. For example, the ‘Mongolian explanation’, which classified Finns as yellow-skinned, dark- and straight-haired and short, dominated accounts of Finnish racial type and origin well into the twentieth century while the Swedish-speaking Finns were represented as belonging to a different, ‘Germanic race’. This view also manifested itself in practical circumstances. For example, nineteenth-century Finnish immigrants to the United States were compelled to provide certificates that they belonged to the white race before they could enter the country.348 It is highly likely that Bulgarian immigrants were subjected to similar categorisations.349

Throughout the period, renowned British-based philologists also distinguished Bulgarians from other South Slavs in terms of language. For example, Max Müller, Robert Latham and others argued that the grammatical form of the Bulgarian language differed from other South Slavonic dialects, and that it was more influenced by the non-Slavonic neighbouring tongues, including Turkish, Greek, Albanian and Romanian, than were the other South Slav languages. These philologists had largely misunderstood the issue because, as later scholarship has shown ‘Serbo-Croatian, especially in its southeastern dialects [is] in many respects closely connected with [the] Bulgarian and Macedonian’ languages. As shown in Chapter 1, racial arguments, such as those outlined above, were also very weak in illustrating any significant differences between Bulgarians and other Slavs.

2.4. The ‘National Efficiency’ Debate: Images of Balkan Peasant Militarism

Individual Balkan peasant soldiers received much positive commentary from British military observers. Balkan peasants were often considered to be effective soldiers mainly because of their excellent physical condition, which was itself attributed to both social and genetic factors in line with the ‘martial races’ theorising.

From the mid-1880s onwards, more War Office and Foreign Office reports were written on the condition and development of the Bulgarian army than on those of any other Balkan nation. A possible explanation for the increase in interest within the British military was the post-1886 unification of Eastern Rumelia and Bulgaria which had significantly altered the composition and size of the Bulgarian army. Major Watson, for example, believed that the unification was important because the ‘admixture of the Turkish element’ from the Eastern Rumelian militias added to the ‘efficiency of the army’ as a whole, the size of which on a war footing in 1887 was over a hundred thousand men.

350 Müller, Lectures, pp. 219-22; Latham, Elements pp. 627-8; Tucker, Introduction, pp. 184-224.
Watson regarded the rural background of the troops as one of the most important aspects of the newly-united Bulgarian forces and argued that the ‘physique of both Bulgarian and Turkish peasantry is excellent’ and that the soldiers were of ‘fair average height, large boned, muscular, and hardy’. In addition, he noted that the proportion of conscripts disqualified from service on account of physical defects was very small. These qualities were also praised by Herbert Chermside who argued that the ‘Bulgarian soldier’ was of ‘good physique’, and his powers of endurance were illustrated by the fact that he was an excellent marcher and could ‘subsist on bread or biscuit for several days’. Similarly, after acknowledging that officers and men alike were exclusively recruited from the peasant class, George Buchanan (1854-1924), the British ambassador to Bulgaria, argued that the ‘robust physique of her regimental officers and men’ was one of the ‘most valuable assets’ of the country.

In 1909, Colonel Napier, who then served as the British military attaché in Bulgaria, reported to the British minister in Sofia, that he had been impressed by the effective mobilisation of the eighth division of the Bulgarian army. According to Napier, successful mobilisation was achieved because it occurred in January, when most of the peasant soldiers were at home, and because of the ‘hardness of the Bulgarian soldier, which enables him to stand severe cold with comparative comfort’. The British minister concluded that the ‘real wealth of Bulgaria is her population of hardy, industrious, and thrifty peasants’. A secret War Office report similarly claimed that recruitment ‘from a hardy peasant class’ which was ‘accustomed to severe manual labour and life in the open air’ ensured that the ‘raw material’ of the Bulgarian army was outstanding.

However, different views about the ability of Bulgarian soldiers to function in challenging weather conditions were also expressed. A British surgeon, R. Lake, who

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had witnessed many of the battles during the Serbian-Bulgarian War and been in charge of one of the Red Cross’s field hospitals in the war zone in northwest Bulgaria, wrote in 1886 that Bulgarian ‘troops who were on the mountains were mostly without great coats and hundreds perished from cold’. He continued that the Bulgarian soldiers ‘suffered terribly from the cold, and the number of frostbites was enormous’. Red Cross nurses themselves were often working under difficult circumstances as this rather sympathetic account from Mildred Gibbs in 1912 illustrates:

Our room has no furniture of any kind but sacks of straw for mattresses…Our window is broken but it is not so cold as you would think. We are very uncomfortable but happy and I am learning a lot.

Nonetheless, it was mainly the physical prowess and endurance of the Bulgarian and Turkish peasant soldiers that was highlighted in British official accounts and this aspect was regarded as the best asset not only of the Bulgarian army but also that of the country as a whole. When negative views were being voiced, they were mostly criticisms of insufficient equipment rather than of the ability or military characteristics of Bulgarian soldiers.

Similar views were expressed about other Balkan armies. The mid-1890s War Office reports praised the ‘marching powers’ and ‘endurance’ of Serbian soldiers ‘during the great heat’ and even when ‘it rained hard’ only ‘very few men went sick’. Looking back to the Serbian military campaign in western Macedonia during the Second Balkan War, Ralph Paget, the British minister to Serbia, praised the martial qualities of Serbian soldiers and argued that even though the Serbian army as a whole compared unfavourably with European armies, its ‘raw material’ was outstanding because the army consisted of ‘peasants whose powers of endurance are

359 GL Ms 11022A, M. Gibbs to A. Gibbs, Kirk Kilisse, 28 Nov. 1912.
extraordinary’. Similar views were held about Romanian soldiers. Their ‘good physique’ ‘excellent marching powers’ and capacity to endure ‘any amount of fatigue’ ensured the excellence of the ‘material’ of the Romanian army. The desire to return to frontline action was seen by Major Dawson, the British military attaché in Bucharest, as one of the defining features of Romanian soldiers. ‘Their courage is undeniable’, argued Dawson, because, when ‘in action’, the officers had found it difficult ‘to retain them’. De Salis’s account of Montenegrin soldiers was another telling example:

Throughout the army the material is excellent. The men are of fine physique, and can endure hardships, march long distances, and do heavy fatigue work without losing condition. Their courage in action has been amply proven during the war, and the fine spirit of the men has been shown by the patient endurance of the wounded and their anxiety to return to the front at the earliest possible opportunity.

It was therefore evident that the qualities of individual Balkan peasant soldiers – Bulgarian, Turkish, Serbian, Romanian and Montenegrin – were widely regarded and represented by British officers and diplomats as being extremely valuable, and that the existence of these martial characteristics was a result of a mixture of genetic and social qualities, ranging from favourable bone-structure to stamina. According to British officials, these characteristics ensured that Balkan peasant soldiers were excellent marchers that they were insensible to pain and adapted well to severe manual labour. Furthermore, their courage was displayed by the desire to return to the front after injury. Taken together, these aspects ensured that the armies of the Balkan states were forces to be reckoned with.

The image of the ‘tough Balkan peasant soldier’ was one of the most persistently-held views within the British military, manifesting itself especially from

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the 1880s onwards, thus, coinciding with concerns and debates about British ‘national efficiency’ which were salient between the late 1880s and 1914. The continued agricultural and industrial depression, rural depopulation, increased commercial and imperial competition from the United States and Germany, emigration and poor working-class conditions were often cited as reasons for the decline of national efficiency in Britain.\footnote{R. Soloway, ‘Counting the Degenerates: The Statistics of Race Deterioration in Edwardian England’, \textit{The Journal of Contemporary History}, 17 (1982), pp. 137-8.} It was largely true that there had been a sharp decline in the proportion of agriculture in British national income since the mid-nineteenth century. In 1851, approximately 20 per cent of the British national income had derived from agriculture while, in 1901 the corresponding figure was only 7 per cent. Nonetheless, mining, building and manufacturing industries had remained strong, and still accounted for 40 per cent of national income in 1901. However, this meant that 47 per cent of national income in 1901 came from agriculture and manufacturing, and thus sectors such as trade, transport and services had begun to erode the importance of the more manual industries.\footnote{P. Mathias, \textit{The First Industrial Nation: An Economic History of Britain, 1700-1914} (London: Methuen, 1969), p. 478.} In comparison, in 1905, almost 88 per cent of Serbs worked in the agricultural sector.\footnote{G. Diouritch, ‘A Survey of the Development of the Serbian (Southern Slav) Nation: An Economic and Statistical Survey’, \textit{The Journal of the Royal Statistical Society}, 82 (1919), p. 299.}

Thus, it was not surprising that some commentators in Britain emphasised that social problems British society was facing, such as deteriorating physical condition, were not evident in the Balkans and other continental European countries. Detailed comparative and statistical analyses in terms of the amount of conscripts and recruits that were deemed unfit for service on physical grounds were conducted. In 1890, the writer Walter Montague Gattie, for example, noted the decrease of rural and manufacturing populations in England, and believed that this aspect had a detrimental effect on the British army, and on ‘England’s position among nations’ which, he argued, had been achieved through ‘high courage’ and ‘bodily soundness’ which had guaranteed the ‘superiority of the breed’. He argued that the deterioration of the British race was illustrated by statistical facts about army recruits: in 1845 only 105
recruits per thousand were less than 5’6” tall while the corresponding figure in 1887 was 528. Concerns about the deterioration of the physical condition of British soldiers became more apparent during the South African War (1899-1902) and statistics again seemed to point in a similar direction: out of 11,000 volunteers in Manchester, 8,000 were deemed unfit for service on physical grounds. Similar evaluations were also made in connection with Balkan armies. In 1908, a special correspondent of The Times stated that each year approximately 25,000 Serbs were to begin their national service out of which 18,000 remained available for conscription.

Bernard Porter argues that there was a significant change in the ways in which social problems were discussed in Britain around the turn of the century. In the 1870s and 1880s poverty and other social problems were referred to simply as ‘social problems’ while after this, they were seen as ‘national problems’ which, according to Porter, had a different connotation: ‘a society is commonly conceived of in terms of its internal relationships; a nation only has meaning and significance in apposition to other nations’. Porter contends that the shift in the way in which social problems (or lack of them) were discussed as difficulties in relation to those of other nations that were increasingly on a par militarily and commercially with Britain, related more to British fears about military defeat in Europe than to any concerns about the possible decline of the British empire overseas and the loss of colonial territory to European rivals, and that the problems during the South African War, for example,

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370 The Times, 14 Sept. 1908.

371 B. Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain (Oxford: OUP, 2004), p. 287. Porter argues generally that empire had less of an impact on domestic politics, society and culture in Britain than has been argued by advocates of ‘new imperial history’ approach such as John Mackenzie in Popular Imperialism and the Military (1992). Andrew S. Thompson also argues in his Imperial Britain (2000) that imperial questions had a close connection to domestic politics and political culture.
pointed precisely in the former direction. Germany and Japan were often regarded as model societies for ‘national efficiency’, and, because of increased Anglo-German rivalry, the perceived decrease of national efficiency in Britain felt even more alarming.

The expectation of a European conflict, and especially the significant possibility that Britain would not necessarily succeed were it to occur, was also the context in which British officers were sent to the Balkans to evaluate Balkan armies – their strengths and weaknesses, possible alliances and courses of action. This context was evident because on many occasions Balkan militaries were assessed in comparison to other European armies. For example, a War Office report from 1896 argued that the cavalry of the Romanian army did not ‘compare favourably with other European cavalries’ whereas an earlier account had stated that Romanian infantry soldiers, if properly officered, ‘would make nearly the best in Europe’. Views about possible courses of action by Balkan states were expressed in another War Office report in 1912 which argued that since Bulgarians were mostly peasants with no aristocracy they were ‘not likely to entertain ideas of territorial aggrandisement’, nor be tempted ‘by Chauvinistic ideas which are sometimes prevalent in the ruling classes of other nations’.

Similar views about Bulgaria were expressed also more widely, for example, by British journalists. Edward Dicey (1832-1911), the Cambridge-educated author and special war and foreign affairs correspondent for The Daily News, who was especially interested in the affairs of Egypt, but also keenly observed those of the Balkans, argued in 1894 that Bulgarians were ‘brave soldiers’, but this did not mean that the country was a ‘military nation’. He believed that a small, peasant state, ‘as a community’, could never be motivated by a ‘blind desire of conquest’, and

372 Porter, Absent-Minded Imperialists, p. 287.
373 Searle, National Efficiency, pp. 60-7.
375 War Office, ‘Military Resources of Bulgaria’, p. 18; Chermside, ‘Bulgarian Army’, p. 20. British views about the nonexistence of the aristocratic class in the Balkans will be discussed in further detail below.
376 The Times, 8 June 1911.
argued that the lack of a ‘great past’, ‘grand literature’ and ‘large colonies’, which he believed were markers of a ruling race, meant that the Bulgarians could not govern ‘foreign countries and alien races’. Bulgarian ambitions were, according to Dicey’s assessment, confined to the preservation of their independence.\(^{377}\) On the contrary, the British minister to Serbia regarded expansionism as a defining characteristic of the country: he claimed that ‘every patriotic Servian’ looked forward ‘to the eventual creation of a Greater Servia’.\(^{378}\)

Although the physical merits of individual peasant soldiers were held in high regard in Britain, and the enthusiasm with which the Balkan countries went to war was often emphasised,\(^{379}\) it was precisely the fact that the Balkan armies had to rely exclusively on conscripts from the peasant class, that was sometimes regarded in Britain as a major contribution to the ineffectiveness of these armies in actual warfare, especially against well-trained and well-equipped troops. This view was expressed during the Eastern Crisis, after the Serbian-Bulgarian War, in the 1890s, and during the Balkan Wars, again coinciding largely with concerns about a European conflict.

For example, William White, the British special envoy in the Balkans, who frequently reported on the martial spirit of the Serbian army, stated in September 1875 that the peasantry was a numerous and influential class in Serbia, but it was not ‘as warlike as it pretended to be’.\(^{380}\) A year later, when the war against Turkey had been raging for three months, he argued that the recent weeks had proven that, even though the Serbian peasantry ‘in appearance’ presented ‘excellent material for

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\(^{379}\) Describing the situation in Serbia on the eve of the Serbian-Turkish War, Humphry Sandwith stated that the military spirit was high in Belgrade and the ‘women waved handkerchiefs and threw garlands of flowers to the heroes departing for the frontier’. He argued that the ‘noble self-sacrificing frenzy’ was caused by the Serbs’ willingness to help their ‘tortured brethren’ in Herzegovina. Journalist Philip Gibbs (1877-1962) similarly wrote on the eve of the First Balkan War in 1912 that the ‘display of martial spirit’ by the Serbian women, which was manifested by the practice of shooting for example, increased the spirit of the soldiers and consequently the ‘spirit of war thrilled like an electric charge’.

\(^{380}\) FO 881/2794, W. White to H. Elliot, Belgrade, 30 Sept. 1875.
forming soldiers’, they had not yet acquired the ‘qualities indispensable to fight the battles of their country’. On both occasions, White gave the same explanation for the unwarlike spirit of the Serbian army: the preoccupation of peasant soldiers with their ‘homes and farms’, not with the glory to be achieved by fighting for their country. Therefore, White believed, that after three months of warfare against the Ottoman army, Serbian peasant soldiers were already ‘utterly sick of war’.\footnote{FO 881/2964, W. White to Earl of Derby, Belgrade, 1 Aug. 1876. The Serbian peasants’ attachment to land and the land tenure system in the Ottoman and post-Ottoman Balkans will be discussed in further detail later in the chapter.} Lionel Marshall, the British vice-consul in Belgrade, shared White’s view. Marshall was convinced that the Serbian militias were not as militaristic and willing to fight as was often assumed, and stated the they would return ‘home to a man’ if the Ottomans decided to send a ‘horde of Bashi-Bazouks over the [river] Drina.’\footnote{WO 106/2, ‘Report by Vice-Consul Marshall Respecting Servia’s State of Preparation’ (1877).} The views of two English nurses, Emma Pearson and L. E. McLaughlin, who had travelled to Serbia during the Serbian-Turkish War to work for the British Red Cross, also confounded stereotypes about ‘martial Servians’.\footnote{See, Goldsworthy, Inventing, pp. 30-1.} They thought that Serbs were ‘reserved and indolent’ and that they were by no means ‘a courageous or heroic race’, while in contrast they argued that ‘we English are, by nature, a fighting race…but this is not the Servian character: they are [a] quiet and timid race’.\footnote{E. Pearson, L. McLaughlin, Service in Servia under the Red Cross (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1877), pp. 24-5, 84.} Similar assessments had already been made earlier in the decade when the Serbian army’s tactical readiness was discussed. In 1870, the British consul in Belgrade thought that ‘Servians might hold their ground in a defensive war, but…their troops are not adapted to offensive operations’.\footnote{WO 106/1, ‘Treatise by Lieutenant E. Baring R A – Armed Forces of Turkey’ (1870), p. 6.}

These perceptions changed dramatically during the First World War. In 1914, Sir Valentine Chirol argued that Serbia and Montenegro ‘boldly went to war with Turkey’ in the summer of 1876 on behalf of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but they were compelled ‘after a gallant resistance to make peace’ with
the Ottomans – merely because they were outnumbered by the Turkish army. Chirol connected this historical account directly to the present war effort:

The splendid pluck with which [Serbia’s] sons have faced the Austrian Goliath…and the cause for which she is fighting is to-day the same cause for which we are all fighting – the cause of freedom.\(^{386}\)

Thus, as with Bulgaria, attitudes to Serbia in Britain were more varied than the existing literature often suggests, and allusions to ‘militaristic Serbs’ and ‘heroic Montenegrins’ were often used as tools in propaganda treatises.

British military observers also believed that the lack of proper training of the peasantry contributed to the ineffectiveness of Balkan armies. For example, R. J. Kennedy argued that Montenegrin military organisation was ‘very simple and primitive’, and that the ‘Montenegrin troops’ would accordingly be ‘of little assistance in a regular war against trained troops’.\(^{387}\) This view of the Montenegrin army had long been prevalent in Britain. In 1885, Colonel Cameron reported to the Intelligence Branch of the War Office that the Montenegrin army was more like an ‘assemblage of armed men than an Army.’\(^ {388}\) British diplomats also believed that Serbian peasants could become ‘disciplined and trustworthy soldiers’ with a minimum of military training, because of their favourable ‘natural characteristics’.\(^ {389}\) However, they also believed that the ‘untrained ploughmen of Servia’\(^ {390}\) were not ready to form the core of an army that could take on well-trained European armies. Deficiencies in military training were also evaluated through religious considerations. Chermside, for example, maintained that mechanical and inelastic drill of the Bulgarian infantry was ‘in many ways well adapted to the civilisation and ideas of Orthodox Slav race’, because ‘in assembly, dismissal, parade observances, as also in

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\(^{387}\) Kennedy, ‘Montenegro’, pp. 4-5.


\(^{390}\) FO 881/2794, White to Elliot, Belgrade, 30 Sept. 1875.
religious parades, much of the Russian formalism…is still noticeable’. Chermside’s views were similar to those of Garnet Wolseley whose cultural conceptions about Islam as a force unifying Ottoman and Indian troops had informed his military policy recommendations during the Eastern Crisis.

The lack of trained orderlies was also regarded as a very hazardous factor which lessened the usefulness of the Bulgarian army’s medical corps during the Serbian-Bulgarian War, and the issue was highlighted by a comparison to a similar situation in the British army thirty years earlier: ‘their Army Medical Department was in much the same condition as was the British when the Crimean war broke out’. The training of Bulgarian medical officers and the army more generally had changed by the time of the Balkan Wars, and this change was also noted in a secret War Office report which stated that medical officers were ‘graduates of foreign universities and medical schools’ and showed ‘considerable tact and knowledge’, and continued that, on the whole, Bulgarian soldiers made ‘a most favourable expression on the critical military observer…as regards their physique and training’.

The lack of modern weaponry was also regarded as a factor that diminished the effectiveness of Balkan armies. Army physician Humphry Sandwith’s assessment of the reasons for Serbia losing the war against Turkey in 1876 was a telling example of these sentiments:

The Turks were highly-disciplined conscripts, officered by professional men, and armed with the newest and most formidable weapons, purchased mainly with English gold. The Servians were a mass of peasants and citizens, armed with old Russian muskets, some of which had been converted into breech-holders, [but] many remaining muzzle-loaders.

392 Lake, ‘Servo-Bulgarian War’, p. 381.
394 Sandwith, ‘Servian War’, p. 216.
According to British military observers, the absence of an aristocratic class from which officers could have been recruited was the final aspect which added to the ineffectiveness of the Balkan armies, especially in regards to command structures. Captain Hare argued that the lack of a ruling class in Greece had led to a situation in which ‘a Greek considers a fellow-countryman no better than himself’ and ‘has no respect for class [for] authority’. He believed that the command structure of the Greek army, and the possibility of it becoming an effective ‘military machine’, was negatively affected by this, because unlike in the British army in which authority was respected, ‘officers and privates assemble in the same cafés and lounge about the bazaars together’. The ‘lack of [a] superior class from whom officers may be drawn’ was also regarded by the British minister to Bulgaria as the major contributing factor to the breakdown in the discipline of the Bulgarian army during the Second Balkan War.

How accurate was the view that the aristocracy was non-existent in the Balkans? The Ottoman conquest largely wiped out the traditional land-owning class all around the Balkans except in parts of Bosnia and in the Romanian lands. After the conquest, Ottoman officers – both Muslim and Christian – were awarded estates in the conquered lands, and Serb as well as Greek notables converted to Islam and became a part of the Ottoman elite. Even after independence, the Balkan states remained primarily peasant democracies without an indigenous aristocratic class.

In the Ottoman Balkans, there were two types of land tenure systems, the timar and the chiflik. The former was dominant from the Ottoman conquest until the sixteenth century. Under timar estates, peasants enjoyed hereditary right to the land, and they could not be evicted while the fief-holders were strictly controlled by the central government, and the peasantry was also protected against wrong-doing by imperial laws. Peasants were obliged to pay tithes to the fief-holder and taxes to the government and the fief-holders were obliged to give military service in exchange for the revenue they received from their estates. This system began to erode in the

The sixteenth century for four main reasons: the declining power of the Ottoman central government; the ceasing of the imperial conquest; the extension of the activities of the janissaries from urban centres to rural areas; and the increasing Western European economic expansion in the region.

The emerging chiflik system – which spread throughout the fertile plains from the Peloponnesus to the Albanian coast – worsened peasants’ conditions considerably. The new land tenure system gave the landholder a practical monopoly over the estate, and he was now free to evict peasants from their farms, and the rents the peasants had to pay were higher. Under the chiflik system, the total produce of the estate was treated as one unit, and one tenth or one eighth of this produce was taken as a government tax, with the surplus produce then being divided equally between the tenant and the landlord. Because peasants had to pay various other duties such as the estate managers’ fee, they were usually left with approximately one third of the produce. This meant that peasants were compelled to borrow from estate owners, and, as long as peasants remained in debt, they were unable to leave the estate. Thus, peasants were in practice bound to the estate and the land.398

In Serbia, however, there was a tradition of self-rule under the Ottomans which in practice meant that there was a local, indigenous ruling class. Between 1791 and 1801, the province of Belgrade enjoyed autonomy at a local level because the province was made up of several ‘village republics’ in which the zadruga leaders elected their own chiefs and these village headmen then elected the district leader (knez). Although the local knezes assessed and collected taxes and acted as rural magistrates, the land was still owned by the mainly Muslim fief-holders (spahi). This relatively tranquil and stable rural organisation began to break down in the latter half of 1801, as the janissaries began to make increasing incursions into the Belgrade province. In February 1804, almost a hundred native elders were murdered by janissaries – an event known as the ‘slaughter of the knezes’ – that sparked off an uprising of the Serbian peasantry. The local rural leaders organised the peasantry into militias which also included Austrian volunteers and hajduks. The uprising led to the restoration of the former rural system that the janissaries had disrupted. In 1813, the

Ottoman army re-conquered Serbia, but, because the tradition of local self-rule was strongly rooted, the Sultan was unable to restore the foundation of the Turkish rule. Another Serb rising in 1815 saw the restoration of native hierarchy, and Milos Obrenovic became the supreme leader of Serbia. In 1830, Serbia became an autonomous principality within the Ottoman Empire, by which time Muslim landholders had already left Serbia. Ottoman military land tenure was abolished, and the peasants – even though they still had to pay land tax to the Serbian government, which in its part paid an annual collective contribution to the Porte – became the *de facto* owners of the land.

There was evidently a paradox with regard to the way in which the efficiency of Balkan armies was portrayed in British military writing. In the context of the ‘national efficiency’ debate between the 1880s and 1914, when there existed widespread concerns about the health and quality of British troops, individual Balkan peasants were represented as perfect soldiers, in terms of physical and mental qualities, compared with British soldiers. On the other hand, Balkan militaries were perceived to be ineffective, mainly due to the fact that Balkan soldiers were mostly peasants and not professional soldiers. In addition, the lack of proper training and modern weaponry as well as the absence of an aristocratic class were believed to contribute to the ineffectiveness of the Balkan armies against well-trained and properly-equipped troops.

### 2.5. Conclusion

Martial mapping of Balkan imperial ethnic soldiers bore a close resemblance to the ways in which the military qualities of Britain’s own imperial ‘martial races’ were evaluated in official British accounts. In both cases, hierarchical constructions based on religious, racial, social and cultural factors were used as a way of distinguishing between martial and non-martial groups of people. Martial classifications were also very similar to more conventional forms of anthropological mapping, not in itself very surprising, because many members of the various ethnological and

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anthropological societies in Britain were army officers. The difference between the two was that martial classifications were used as instruments in recruitment policy formation and in connection with other colonial policies, while other types of categorizations were mostly done with academic aims in mind.

In the Balkan case, Ottoman and Habsburg ethnic soldiers were conceived as ‘martial races’ because they had acquired a long tradition of combat experience which had ensured the development of militaristic cultures. Furthermore, British officers believed that Croatian, Albanian and Bosniak troops were loyal imperial soldiers because they had retained ‘medieval’ chivalric cultural codes and were therefore not ‘ruined’ by modern vices such as greed and self-centeredness. These beliefs thus closely matched contemporary British cultural discontents with materialism and modernism.

Montenegrin militarism was also constructed by using similar devices, but the ‘martial-races’ theory is not as effective an analytical tool in the case of Montenegro as it is when British officers’ evaluations of colonial soldiers of other imperial armies are examined. Montenegro was never used as a model for the British Empire’s defence problems, whereas various aspects of the Austrian military frontier regularly featured in British assessments before the border was dissolved in the 1880s. The Austrian military frontier was used in British accounts as an example of effective frontier organisation that could be introduced in the more unstable regions within the British Empire, such as southern Africa and New Zealand. Furthermore, it was used as a way of evaluating the effectiveness of existing military borders within the Empire. British colonial concerns were also discussed and linked to Balkan issues during the Eastern Crisis, when British officers were driven by their conceptions about the unifying power of Islam. This resulted in policy recommendations that urged using Muslim Indian troops alongside Ottoman soldiers in the war against Russia in the Balkans. These examples illustrate that Balkan issues were connected with concrete practical British imperial concerns, and that British views towards the region were not merely expressions of ‘cultural colonialism’ or ‘colonial discourses’.

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as much of the recent literature on the subject has suggested. They also showed that cultural perceptions had a direct effect on the way in which military policies were formulated.

Balkan issues were also closely connected with British domestic concerns between the 1880s and 1914 in the context of the ‘national efficiency’ debate, which can also be connected to the concerns expressed about the outcome of a possible European conflict. Gattie’s view illustrated the sentiment in Britain:

The fact has to be faced that, while the physique of the English army is deteriorating…the material from which foreign armies are drawn is on the whole becoming better and more vigorous; and this – be it remembered – has come about in spite of tremendous war which every Continental power of the first rank has sacrificed much of the flower of its youth.

Although Balkan states were not exactly regarded as first-rank continental powers, nevertheless, in this context, the Balkan peasant armies received a lot of praise from British officers. As was the case with martial races theorising in the colonial context, social as well as genetic qualities were taken into consideration when the military attributes of individual Balkan soldiers were evaluated. It was mostly the features that could be linked to agricultural pursuits and physical fitness that attracted admiration of British officers, and this led to the development of an image of the ‘tough Balkan peasant soldier’ which was perhaps the most widely-held belief within the British military about the Balkans. However, although individual Balkan soldiers were perceived as excellent fighters, many in Britain maintained that in a war against well-trained and sufficiently equipped troops, Balkan armies were unlikely to be successful because their soldiers were not professionals, their training was not efficient enough, and nor was the equipment they used. Finally, the absence of a Western European style aristocracy was also regarded as a factor that diminished the

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value and efficiency of Balkan armies. Significantly, Balkan issues were used to highlight social problems in Britain, and it was because of the anxiousness with which developments in Europe were viewed, that so many British officers were sent to the Balkans to formulate reports on the armies of the Balkan states.

Professional martial classifications also aimed at determining which subject races were warlike and which were not. In the Balkan case, Bulgarians were often distinguished from other South Slavs in terms of their perceived insufficient military qualities before the mid-1880s when, as a consequence of the Bulgarian victory in the war against Serbia, perceptions dramatically changed. In this case, it is plausible to argue that specific contemporary events sometimes played a significant role in shaping views about the Balkans in Britain because, after the war, allusions to ‘unwarlike Bulgarians’ disappeared completely from both official and popular accounts. Instead, the Bulgarians were increasingly conceived as the most militaristic of the Balkan nations, which means that Goldsworthy’s argument according to which classifications such as ‘martial Servians’ or ‘suffering Bulgarians’ was the way in which the Balkan Slavs were categorised from the 1870s, is not entirely plausible.403

The point is that there is a need for more detailed analysis of Balkan stereotypes: how they were formed, how long-lasting they were, and how and why they changed. In this particular case, the changed attitude was especially evident in professional British military writing, which hitherto has not received any attention in the scholarship on British cultural attitudes to the Balkans. Widening the scope of the primary sources being used to examine these attitudes could therefore lead to similar discoveries of considerable nuances in the British attitudes towards the region.

The power of events in shaping views about military qualities is especially important in this case because other stereotypes about Bulgarians, especially the one which highlighted the Bulgarians’ Asiatic racial origins and its effects on Bulgarian distinctiveness from other South Slavs, did not change after the Serbian-Bulgarian War. Similar event-driven shifts in British professional and popular attitudes to Indian soldiers had occurred in the mid-1850s in the aftermath of the Sepoy mutiny.

403 Goldsworthy, Inventing, pp. 30-1.
Chapter 3

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN THE BALKANS:
PERCEPTIONS AND REALITIES

The purpose of this chapter is to examine British commercial activities in the Balkans, especially in Serbia and Bulgaria. The first section will show how the Balkans were represented as a potentially lucrative region for British investors and companies and considers the ways in which these types of perceptions led to the establishment of numerous British firms whose aims were mainly to exploit natural resources in the Balkans and to establish banking and commercial agency operations. The second section investigates how British businessmen and merchants who had dealings in the Balkans, as well as in other parts of the world, regarded the region as a place in which to do business, and the kinds of difficulties they encountered. The third section examines requests and refusals of diplomatic assistance, and the subsequent sections will continue to deal mainly with diplomatic views of British business in the Balkans, and to examine the ways in which cultural perceptions and prejudices affected policy recommendations and how they were used as arguments in the pursuit of closer commercial ties. Overall, the chapter addresses four primary questions: first, what kinds of commerce-related perceptions were there about the Balkans in Britain; second, did these perceptions have any concrete relevance; third, did commercial encounters produce any specific conceptions; and, fourth, were there any differences between business and diplomatic attitudes?

3.1. Establishing ‘Anglo-Balkan’ Companies

From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the Balkans was regarded and represented in Britain as a land of countless business opportunities. The existence of vast, unexploited natural wealth was the most significant aspect that increased British commercial interest in the region. In addition, the real or perceived increases in financial stability and in the demand of manufactured goods, economic growth as
well as improvements in transport network, were used as arguments to boost British commercial interest in the Balkans.

British commentators were especially impressed by the possibilities of exploiting mineral and forest wealth. In 1856, the British consul in Sarajevo, Patrick Colquhoun (1815-91), praised the natural wealth of the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, stating that both provinces were ‘extremely rich’, especially in minerals:

Gold is found in several of the rivers…Copper is evident in several of the specimens I have seen…as also is silver and quicksilver, while iron is nearly everywhere visible along the high road from Travnik to Serajevo.404

Colquhoun was equally impressed by the quality and abundance of coal near Sarajevo and Mostar, as well as by the provinces’ vast forests.405 The traveller George Arbuthnot wrote that the province of Bosnia was ‘unusually rich in mineral products’, and that especially the mines near Fojnica and Kresevo, west of Sarajevo, ‘might be successfully worked’ by a company that had been founded ‘under the auspices of the British government’.406 In 1862, another contemporary noted Serbia’s considerable mineral wealth, and remarked that English viewers had pronounced Serbian coal ‘fully equal to the best Newcastle coal’, that there was ‘scarcely a country in Europe of the same extent which offers a fairer field for the employment of capital’, and that the development of the resources of all Balkan provinces was, in fact, ‘simply a question of the judicious application of foreign capital’.407

In 1866, the opening of the Varna-Rustchuk (Ruse) railway delighted The Times which stated that this railway was ‘an important link in speedy transit from London to Constantinople’, and that if more were done to improve the transport

405 Ibid.
406 Arbuthnot, Herzegovina, p. 223.
network in Bulgaria, the ‘agricultural wealth of this semi-civilized country could be
developed to a marvellous extent’.\footnote{The Times, 21 Nov. 1866.} Three years later, a Foreign Office report on
Ottoman Bulgaria praised the mineral resources of the province, and stated that iron,
copper, rock crystal, brown coal, coal and limestone were to be found. This report
especially highlighted the availability of limestone, which was found ‘near the banks
of the Danube in convenient positions for exploration’, ensuring that it would be easy
to mine and to transport into Central European markets.\footnote{FO 78/2089, W. Dalziel, ‘General Report on the Vilayet of the Danube’ (1869)}

The writer Edward Jenkins argued in \textit{The Contemporary Review} that immense
mineral riches lay in Serbia, but that they had not so far been exploited, because of
the lack of local capital. He was amazed that British companies were still investing in
mining enterprises in West Africa, while neglecting a ‘country as promising as any
in the world, [one] which lies within safe and easy reach of Paris or London’.\footnote{Jenkins, ‘Young Serbia’, p. 454.} The
journalist Herbert Vivian expressed a similar view writing that Serbia was only two
days away from London by train, and that it had ‘extraordinary fertility and potential
for wealth’.\footnote{Vivian, ‘Servia’, p. 656.} In another connection he argued that in Serbia ‘there is a fortune
waiting for whomsoever the spirit may move to canvas this very willing
constituency’.\footnote{H. Vivian, \textit{The Servian Tragedy: With Some Impressions of Macedonia} (London: G. Richards,
1904), p. 239.} Vivian also argued that Serbia was a ‘particular opportunity…for
small capitalists’ because of the possibility of generating large profits with small
investments.\footnote{Ibid., p. 243.} Coulson Bunn, a renowned mining engineer, wrote in 1889 that the
Avala mine in Serbia ‘will yield splendid profits and develop into one of the finest
quicksilver mines in the world’.\footnote{The Times, 20 May 1889.} In connection with the proposed railway from the
Danube to the Adriatic, one British diplomat saw numerous possibilities for the
English business as the line would pass through districts which were ‘extremely rich
in mineral and forest wealth’.\footnote{FO 368/47, Thesiger to Grey, Belgrade, 26 July 1906.}
These kinds of representations led to the formation of dozens of British companies which mainly aimed at exploiting the natural resources in the Balkans, and, in fact, roughly half of all ‘Anglo-Balkan’ companies operated or intended to operate in the mining sector.\footnote{See bibliography for the list of some of the companies that were established.} For example, the Avala Quicksilver Mines Ltd. was formed to purchase and work mines in Serbia in a well-known mining district near Belgrade. The company’s share capital was £150,000 of which the majority was subscribed in Belgrade.\footnote{The Times, 20 May 1889.} In 1913, the Croatia Lime, Coal and Lignite Co. Ltd., was established with a nominal capital of £400,000 – the company’s aims likewise being to acquire mining rights and to conduct exploration.\footnote{BT 31/14159/130963, Croatia Lime, Coal and Lignite Co Ltd., ‘Memorandum of Association’ (1913).} In the wider context of British overseas mining company formation, the number of companies formed to conduct mining in the Balkans was not huge, if compared, for example, to the western United States, where at least 518 joint-stock companies were established with British capital to conduct metals-mining between 1860 and 1901.\footnote{R. Burt, ‘British Investment in the American Mining Frontier’, Business and Economic History, 26 (1997), p. 515.} However, the image of abundance of minerals in the Balkans certainly influenced many British businessmen’s attitudes because they were ready to involve capital to establish companies in order to enter into business enterprises in the Balkans.

In addition, from the early 1880s on, there had been a feeling within British financial and business circles that the Balkan states could finally be viewed as trustworthy recipients of western European capital:

> Roumania’s credit stands now exceedingly high; Greece is just issuing a fresh loan in London and Paris under very highest auspices; Servia has lately concluded important financial transactions with first rate European houses; and even the troubled Principality of Bulgaria is not wanting in offers of loans on the part of substantial capitalist.\footnote{The Times, 25 June 1881.}
In 1888, the British consul at Sofia urged ‘those merchants…seeking new markets’ to consider extending their trade to Bulgaria. He believed that the time was right for expanding British enterprises into the country because Bulgaria’s economy was growing and the country had fulfilled its financial treaty obligations amicably. The Pall Mall Gazette also argued that it was ‘very desirable to extend the influence of British capital in the newly-founded kingdoms in the Balkan Peninsula’, while The Bristol Mercury’s editors saw the ‘rapid development’ of the Serbian railway network as a factor contributing to the increase of trade between Britain and Serbia and an ‘omen of success’ for any British investment in the country.

Economic growth was also one of the most important factors influencing the Ottoman Bank’s desire to expand into Southeast Europe. The Bulgarian economy, for example, was growing relatively rapidly in the 1880s and Edgar Vincent, the new director, consequently saw the country as an attractive area into which banking could be extended. Contemporary official figures showed an increase in British trade – in 1887 almost 34 per cent of all Bulgarian imports came from Britain. The increase was due largely to a growth in the export of iron rails, cloth and cotton fabrics, which had occurred partly because of improvements in transport – namely, the opening of the Bulgarian state railway and of the Turkish-Serbian line from Salonica. Improvements in overland transport also meant that the value of British trade with the Black Sea port of Varna, hitherto one of the principal points of entry for British exports to the Balkans, diminished quite dramatically from £361,383 in 1884 to £32,100 in 1887.

The view that the demand for manufactured goods was growing rapidly in the Balkan countries was also often used to demonstrate that British exporters and investors should take more notice of the Balkan markets. The Times believed that the British should ‘realize how great are the possibilities for industrial development,

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FO 78/4139, C. Hardinge, ‘Remarks on British Trade and Commerce with Bulgaria’ (1888).

The Pall Mall Gazette, 29 March 1884; The Bristol Mercury and Daily Post, 1 April 1884.


FO 78/4139, A. Brophy to W. O’Conor, Varna, 14 Feb. 1888; FO 78/4139, C. Hardinge, ‘Remarks on British Trade and Commerce with Bulgaria’ (1888).
and...the consequent demand for engineering commodities...in the Balkan Peninsula’. Furthermore, ‘British merchants’, argued the British vice-consul to Sofia, ‘should note the flourishing state of this market, in which there is likely to be during the current season, an increased demand for foreign goods’.

Similar ‘boosterism’ was also evident when the founders of the Servian Bacon-Curing Company ran a powerful press campaign in 1891 in order to attract investors. According to their advertisement, their company had a good chance in succeeding because Serbia had been ‘noted for centuries as a swine-producing country’ and they also argued that in 1890 over a quarter of the produce in the ‘world-renowned’ pig market in Budapest was of Serbian origin.

Perceptions of increased financial stability, economic growth, and the increase in the demand for manufactured goods similarly led to the founding of British banks and commercial agencies, which generally aimed at mediating between British companies and the Balkans. British financiers had been keen on establishing banking operations in the Ottoman Empire from 1855 onwards when the Bank of Egypt, the first British joint-stock bank that was founded in a foreign country, had been formed. The most significant of these, the Anglo-French Imperial Ottoman Bank, emerged in 1862, and aimed at conducting commercial banking throughout the Ottoman Empire, including the Balkans. Its branches began to spread into Southeast Europe during the year of its founding – first to Bucharest and Salonica – and from the mid-1870s, it also expanded operations to Bulgaria, opening branches in Rustchuk in 1875, Philippopolis (Plovdiv) in 1878, Varna in 1880, and finally in the capital Sofia in 1890.

There were also other attempts to establish British banks in

426 The Times, 30 July 1913.
427 FO 368/659, W. Heard to Board of Trade, Sofia, 30 April 1912.
428 Northern Echo, 11 April 1891; Glasgow Herald, 13 April 1891; Birmingham Daily Post, 14 April 1891; Leeds Mercury, 15 April 1891; Belfast News-Letter, 15 April 1891.
the Balkans, such as the Anglo-Servian Bank Ltd in 1884 and the Anglo-Bulgarian Bank in 1894, and then again, in 1910.\textsuperscript{431} The aims of these undertakings were also to conduct commercial banking and agency business – that is, to ‘transact business as capitalists and financiers’.\textsuperscript{432}

The aims of these various British banking schemes corresponded roughly with the ways in which British international banks – whether overseas banks or merchant banks – operated elsewhere in the world. In most cases, overseas banks conducted banking in one particular overseas location, but they could also have had a presence in other markets either within or outside the British Empire. In contrast, merchant banks tended to make foreign direct investments (FDI) into existing overseas banking operations. They often also financed other overseas schemes, such as railway-building, by using the same method.\textsuperscript{433} Moreover, the majority of the proposed British banks in the Balkans tended to have a head office in London; British managers in their overseas branches; and a London-based board of directors. This structure also coincided with British international banks’ general institutional forms.\textsuperscript{434} In the Balkan case, the preference was that most of the capital would be raised in Britain, often for the simple reason that domestic capital in Serbia and Bulgaria was insufficient for large-scale enterprise.\textsuperscript{435} There was thus nothing specifically ‘Balkan’ about the intentions of the various British schemes that contemplated establishing banking business in the region.

In addition to banking, the British were also interested in establishing commercial agencies, a trend which occurred mainly from 1906 onwards when British-Balkan trade increased, and when, at the same time, representations of the Balkans’ commercial potential increased. For example, the period from 1906 to the

\textsuperscript{431} The Pall Mall Gazette, 29 March 1884; The Bristol Mercury and Daily Post, 1 April 1884; The Times, 3 Dec. 1895; FO 368/11, M. Mendelssohn to Petroff, Sofia, 20 April 1906; BT 31/13199/108981, Anglo-Bulgarian Bank Ltd, ‘Memorandum of Association’ (1910).

\textsuperscript{432} Anglo-Bulgarian Bank Ltd, ‘Memorandum of Association’ (1910).

\textsuperscript{433} Wilkins, ‘Banks over Borders, p. 224.

\textsuperscript{434} G. Jones, ‘Competitive Advantages in British Multinational Banking since 1890’ in Jones, Banks as Multinationals, p. 33.

beginning of the First Balkan War in 1912, has been described as the ‘golden years’ of the Bulgarian economy, when economic growth and foreign trade increased. These commercial agencies included, for example, the Anglo-Servian Syndicate, the Anglo-Balkan Syndicate, London and Croatia Syndicate, and the Balkan Agency. In general, their aims were to promote and finance British firms and ‘to induce British Capitalists to invest’ in ‘industrial…and other undertakings’ in the Balkans. The nominal capital of these agencies ranged from £12,000 to £20,000; these funds were not very significant and often designed only to cover the companies’ running costs.

Some of these firms were promoted and backed by well-known and well-connected figures. For example, Alexander Tucker, the former Serbian Minister to London, was one of the founding members of the Anglo-Servian Syndicate, while the Anglo-Balkan Syndicate was promoted by Alfred Stead, the brother of the newspaperman W. T. Stead, who was a renowned supporter of the South Slav cause. Similarly, Chedomil Mijatovic, another former Serbian Minister to London, sat at the Balkan Agency’s directors’ table. Other directors of this firm included: Colonel H. C. Surtees, who had served in the British legation in Constantinople and in the British army during the South African War (1899-1902); Richard Sewell, the former manager of the Sun Insurance Company Ltd., involved in the insurance business in Salonica; and T. O. Roberts, the manager of the influential London County & Westminster Bank. All of these agencies had therefore understood one of the main principles of the conduct of business in the Balkans, and elsewhere – the need for local knowledge and acquaintance with local political establishment. However, of

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436 Roumen Avramov, Bulgarian economic historian and the director of the Sofia NGO, Centre for Liberal Strategies, remarked this to me in a discussion on 19 March 2008 in Sofia.


these agencies, only the Balkan Agency had any success. (The reasons for business failure and success will be discussed in further detail at the end of this section.)

The close association with local political and business elites was also among the main contributing factors to the success of the National Cotton Spinning Company of Bulgaria, the most significant and longest-running British-established firm in Bulgaria, which operated continuously from 1899 until 1933 when its funds were liquidated.\footnote{BT 31/31524/52646, National Cotton Spinning Company of Bulgaria; Palairet, \textit{Balkan Economies}, p. 272. The company managed to pay out its first 5 per cent dividend in 1901-2, a figure which in 1905 increased to 10 per cent.} The company had obtained a concession in 1896 to operate a cotton mill in Varna. The concession was given to Ernest Lees, Nicholas Hazzopulo, Konstantine Bebis (d. 1913) and Stefan Simeonov.\footnote{BT 31/31524/52646, The National Cotton Spinning Company of Bulgaria, ‘Memorandum of Association’ (1897). In addition this company, Bulgarian Industrial Co. also established yarn manufacturing operations in Bulgaria. For details see, FO 368/278, Farrar & Co to Grey, Manchester, 8 March 1909; 4 Sept. 1909; FO 368/278, Farrar & Co to E. Grey, Manchester, 8 March 1909.} Virtually nothing has been written on any of them in the existing English-language literature. Konstantine Bebis was a Greek national who had moved to Rustchuk in Bulgaria after the Russian-Turkish War where he established the head office of his grain trading merchant house. Bebis was also involved in a variety of financial operations and was in close contact with leading Austro-Hungarian, Romanian, British and Greek banking houses. Between 1890 and 1896, Bebis was a member of the auditing board of the Bulgarian Insurance Company (BIC), one of the first Bulgarian joint-stock companies and the first national insurance company that operated until the Second World War. In 1897, Bebis was elected into the management board of the powerful Bulgarian Commercial Bank (BCB) that was established in Rustchuk in the same year and which remained the most important commercial bank in Bulgaria until 1947. Bebis became the honorary Greek consul in Rustchuk in 1910 and he also sat on the management board of the BCB until 1912.

Stefan Simeonov also began his career as a merchant, but later went into banking and ended up founding important banking houses in Bulgaria from the 1880s onwards. Simeonov had wide political contacts: he was a close personal friend of the
one-time Prime Minister Stefan Stambolov, and was elected to the Bulgarian Parliament, the Sobranije, on several occasions. Like Bebis, Simeonov was also heavily involved in the management of both the BIC and BCB. In addition to banking, Simeonov was involved in railway construction. He financed the building of the Rustchuk-Turnovo line and was ready to contract the so-called ‘parallel line’ from Burgas to Sofia. This project provoked serious pressure from foreign powers, most notably Austria-Hungary and France, who ultimately succeeded in blocking the parallel line from being built, a factor which forced the Simeonovy Brothers banking house into bankruptcy, also putting the BCB into jeopardy. The BCB was able to recover from this serious crisis, and by 1912, had become the most influential financial institution in the country.\(^{442}\) Nicholas Hazzopulo was a Manchester merchant of Greek origin who was closely connected to Logios Brothers, which was another Manchester shipping company.\(^{443}\) Initially, all major shareholders in the National Cotton Spinning Company – excluding Simeonov, Bebis and Hazzopulo – were British, but later the company also acquired other non-British investors, including the Zolas Brothers (Varna shipping agents) and the powerful BCB. The company’s shareholders were resident all over England and Bulgaria as well as in Constantinople.\(^{444}\)

As was the case with the Balkan Agency, the fact that the National Cotton Spinning Company was also founded in association with, and was later backed by, such powerful, in the latter case, Bulgarian businessmen seems to suggest that an ability to attract significant local investors, who were aware of the local conditions, and closely connected to powerful local politicians, contributed significantly to business successes in Bulgaria and elsewhere in the Balkans. In the particular case of the National Cotton Spinning Company, this aspect manifested itself, for example, in

\(^{442}\) I thank Dr Martin Ivanov from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of History, for these very useful biographical notes on Bebis and the Simeonovy Bros, and for his other interesting insights into Bulgarian business elites.

\(^{443}\) FO 913/17, K. Hazzopulo & Sons, Logios Brothers, Z & A Hazzopulo & Co to W. Dalziel, Rustchuk, 15 Dec. 1887. I have not been able to find any information on Ernest Lees, the only British founding member of the company.

\(^{444}\) National Cotton Spinning Company of Bulgaria, ‘Memorandum of Association’ (1897).
the fact that the terms of the concession were very favourable for the British firm. As well as receiving free land for factory construction, they were also exempted from all import duties on building materials, engines, boilers, tools, machinery, raw cotton, coal and petrol, as well as from all local taxes, including the customs and consumption (octroi) duties. Furthermore, a rebate of 35 per cent on the schedule tariff of the Bulgarian state railways on transporting machinery and materials required for its factories and on distribution of its products in Bulgaria, were granted. Significantly, all of these privileges had been granted at a time when foreign business opportunities were being restricted in Bulgaria, an aspect which will be discussed in further detail below, in connection with Ottoman Bank’s activities in the country.

Importance of local knowledge also seemingly influenced the chances of J. T. Barkley’s Danube and the Black Sea and Kustendije Harbour Construction Company of obtaining a concession in the 1850s to build and operate a railway in the fertile grain-growing region of the Dobrudja in Bulgaria. Although Barkley’s concession was not as favourable as that of the National Cotton Spinning Company, it was probably granted to him – rather than to the other applicant Thomas Wilson – because Barkley had spent time in Turkey as a manager of coal mines and as a coal mining advisor to the Ottoman government during the Crimean War. Although Wilson was closely connected with powerful London merchants and northern iron tycoons, and had earlier attempted to obtain a contract to build a canal in Bulgaria, he did not have powerful contacts in the Balkan provinces, or elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, a factor, which probably weakened his chances of obtaining the railway concession from the Porte. The Varna-Rustchuk line was completed by Barkley’s company in 1866.

Some business proposals were also initiated by Balkan businessmen, and local contacts were also regarded as important in this connection. In 1879, James Mason, an official at the British legation in Belgrade, was contacted by a Belgrade firm Krsmanovic-Paranos, whom he described as the ‘two wealthiest millionaires’ in the

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445 Ibid.

town, who offered to form a consortium with him in order to deliver the new Servian
gold and silver coinage. Mason believed that, because the then British Minister in
Belgrade was ‘so popular in the principality’ it was very likely that the contract for
the delivery of the coinage would be given to their consortium. In fact, this
undertaking collapsed only because the demand for colonial and British coinages was
so high, that the Royal Mint was simply unable to take any more orders. The
Serbian company, to which Mason referred, was one of the most influential in Serbia;
they had started business as prune merchants, but eventually went into merchant
banking.

Which other factors contributed to business success of British firms in the
Balkans? In addition to good local connections, state of war seemed to be among the
main contributors for success, in the case of smaller British companies that operated
in the region. For example, the Balkan Agency mediated effectively between British
arms manufacturers, such as Crompton & Sons Ltd., and the Serbian government
during the First World War, and war also increased business opportunities for other
British companies, such as the Anglo-Syrian Trading Co., which obtained a large
order of military uniforms from the Bulgarian government in 1913. The Bulgarians
had previously manufactured their own uniforms, but the Second Balkan War had
created an ‘urgency of delivery’ which, the representative of the Anglo-Syrian
believed, was among the largest factors that contributed to the increase in the
possibility of British companies securing large orders from the combatants.
Similarly, Rose Brothers & Co. obtained an order worth £34,000, for packing

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447 MINT 13/188, J. Mason to Deputy Master of the Mint, Belgrade, 6 May 1879; Deputy Master to
448 M. Palairet, ‘Merchant Enterprise and the Development of the Plum-Based Trades in Serbia, 1847-
1911’, *The Economic History Review*, 30 (1977), pp. 592-5. The beginnings of Serbian prune exports
are associated with this firm. Rista Paranos, from Trebinje in Herzegovina, was its most dynamic
member. Other significant Serbian businessmen associated with this company included Rista
Damjanovic, Luka Celovic Trebinjac and Ranko Godjevac. The Krsmanovic family became very
influential bankers in Belgrade who were involved in Beogradski Kreditni Zavod. Jovan Krsmanovic
became the first Serbian central banker in 1883.
450 FO 368/800, Anglo-Syrian Trading Co to Foreign Office, Manchester, 4 March; 23 May 1914.
machines after a Belgrade tobacco factory had been bombarded in the autumn of 1914.\textsuperscript{451} War also stimulated British exports during the Serbian-Bulgarian War, when, in January 1886, the Serbian War Office ordered 20 million rounds of ammunition from Britain.\textsuperscript{452}

However, a large majority of the British companies that were founded to conduct business solely in the Balkans were, at least initially, unsuccessful – often as a result of a mixture of problems that ranged from economic and financial difficulties to organisational and political factors. For example, the mining firm, Croatia Lime Ltd., was dissolved only two years after it had been founded, and, according to the company’s secretary, Howard Button, their business had become impossible because they had been unable to attract the necessary working capital because of the outbreak of the First World War.\textsuperscript{453} The war had also made it ‘impossible to proceed’ with the operations of the Anglo-Bulgarian Bank (est. 1910).\textsuperscript{454}

The Anglo-Servian Syndicate’s attempt to exploit the Rebelj copper mine in Serbia was also unsuccessful, and the firm was declared bankrupt in 1907.\textsuperscript{455} Thomas Wilson’s earlier attempt at canal construction fell short due to the inability of the promoters to guarantee returns on investments, and due to the brief UK financial crisis of 1857 which abruptly brought to an end the boom period that had lasted from the late 1840s, thus decreasing investor confidence.\textsuperscript{456}

J. T. Barkley’s railway line across the Dobrudja was also initially financially unsuccessful and failed to fulfil expectations of faster and more convenient transport between Western Europe and Constantinople, because the long-established and reliable Mediterranean sea route from Marseilles was still preferred by exporters and

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{451} FO 368/1115, Rose Brothers & Co to Foreign Office, Gainsborough, 14 Sept. 1914.  \\
\textsuperscript{452} FO 881/5200X, W. Hare, ‘Naval and Military Preparations in the Balkan Peninsula’ (1886), p. 1.  \\
\textsuperscript{453} BT 31/14159/130963, Croatia Lime Ltd (H. Button) to Registrar of the Joint Stock Companies, 10 Dec. 1914.  \\
\textsuperscript{454} BT 31/13199/108981, Acting Secretary of Companies Registration Office to Registrar of Companies Registration Office, 6 March 1914.  \\
\textsuperscript{455} FO 881/9467, J. Whitehead, ‘Servia – Annual Report, 1908’ (1909), p. 5.  \\
\end{flushleft}
travellers until the late 1880s. The overland rail transport only really took off when the Bulgarian state railway and the Serbian Turkish line were opened. Furthermore, a consortium that had attempted to gain the harbour construction contract in Varna in 1888 did not succeed because their terms did not satisfy the Bulgarian government who wanted a larger loan, so the scheme never came to fruition.

In addition, British companies suffered from high levels of domestic competition – the so-called ‘vertical specialisation’ – often cited as one of the generic shortcomings of British companies in comparison to their German and American counterparts. For example, the reorganisation of the Bulgarian army in the aftermath of the 1885-6 war had raised new possibilities for British cloth suppliers. In connection with this opportunity, Frank Lascelles (1841-1920), the British consul-general in Sofia, argued that ‘British industry might probably compete successfully with the German and Austrian manufacturers’ who at the time controlled this particular trade. This realisation increased competition in the northern manufacturing cities in England; when the Leeds Chamber of Commerce was provided with the particulars of a possible orders from Bulgaria, Dewsbury’s Chamber immediately requested the particulars as well, and emphasised that the ‘manufacture of Army cloths’ was a ‘speciality of the district’ as a whole and not just that of the companies in Leeds. This case illustrated well the basic scenario in Britain where many smaller companies were competing for the same orders while in Germany and the US, for example, more positive attitudes to corporatism and to larger firms resulted in less domestic competition which then often made the manufacturing sector as a whole more efficient in comparison to Britain.

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458 See, FO 78/4139, A. Brophy to C. Hardinge, Varna, 18 May 1888.
459 FO 78/3900, F. Lascelles to Earl of Iddesleigh, Sofia, 4 Dec. 1886.
460 FO 78/4036, Dewsbury Chamber of Commerce (H. Ellis) to J. Lister, Dewsbury, 25 Jan. 1887.
461 See for example, Coleman and MacLeod, ‘Attitudes to New Techniques’, pp. 588-611; H. Berghoff and R. Moller, ‘Tired Pioneers or Dynamic Newcomers?: A Comparative Essay on English and German Entrepreneurial History’, The Economic History Review, 47 (1990), pp. 213-38; P. Payne,
There was also often a gap between representations of Balkan commercial potential and the reality of the situation in the region, a factor which also significantly contributed to business failures. In the case of Bulgaria, however, the portrayal of the country was at least partly accurate. Minerals such as iron, zinc, lead and copper were widely available in the western, southern and east-central parts of the country, but they were often of such poor quality that it would perhaps not have been commercially viable to begin large scale mining operations in these areas.\textsuperscript{462} It is more difficult to estimate how much was actually known in Britain about the quality of minerals in Bulgaria at the time. As shown above, many contemporary British accounts suggested that minerals were of high quality, but this was not the case. This misrepresentation of commercial potential therefore directly negatively affected British firms’ possibilities of success in their commercial endeavours in the Balkans.

The view that improvements in the transport network would make the region more commercially viable was partly correct, because by 1912, almost 2,000 kilometres of track had been opened to traffic in Bulgaria. However, as was the case in the Balkans more generally, railway density was much lower than in Western Europe because Balkan railways were mainly international lines, a factor which was especially harmful for domestic economic development in the Balkan countries because the sparse railway network was not sufficient for the speedy transport of goods.\textsuperscript{463} However, for the purposes of prospective British companies, international lines would probably have been enough. This situation resembled the earlier one in some British colonies where railways were often built, for example, only from a goldmine to the coast so as to benefit the mining company that was working the mine and the railway company that was operating the line.


Perceptions of Balkan financial stability, which increased in Britain from the 1880s, were mostly incorrect, also contributing to business failures. For example, although the granting of issuing rights to the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) in 1886 and its full establishment in 1897 were perhaps regarded as signs of increased financial steadiness, under the surface, Bulgaria was experiencing a multitude of financial problems. For example, the period 1880 to 1887 was marked by monetary disarray which included many ambiguities in monetary legislation which meant that coins from outside the Latin Monetary Union, which Bulgaria and Serbia eventually joined in 1889, were still accepted. This led to an inadequate demonetisation of the foreign currencies that were in circulation. The Bulgarian and Serbian national banks were also institutionally weak which further contributed to financial instability in both countries. It was not until 1906 that the Bulgarian economy entered a steady period of growth. Overall, perceptions were partly correct but there also were many misconceptions which contributed significantly to the many failures of British business in the Balkans.

In sum, there was a fairly widespread feeling in Britain that many parts of the Balkan Peninsula were potentially very profitable regions for British commercial expansion. In addition to the possibility of exploiting natural resources, improvements in transport networks and perceptions of increased financial stability from the 1880s onwards, coupled with increasing demand for manufactured goods, contributed to the growing British interest in the commercial potential of the Balkans. In general, British companies were becoming more interested in expanding into regions that had traditionally attracted less attention because of increasing competition from German and American manufacturers and providers of financial services. The British were largely drawn towards those commercial activities and sectors of which they had experience from other regions, including invisibles such as

banking, insurance and commercial agency activities, but also visible sectors, namely construction, mining and manufacturing. Patterns of overseas company formation also largely corresponded with those that had been evident in other regions, and there thus seemed not to have been any kind of anti-Balkan or ‘Balkanist’ biases in these respects; instead, enthusiasm (whether misguided or not) for extending business activities towards the region was often expressed. On the other hand, the Balkans did not seem to have a ‘special place’ in the British ‘commercial imagination’, because the region was portrayed in the same way as other parts of the world which were perceived as possibly lucrative regions for commercial expansion. Much of the pre-1914 British commercial commentary on the Balkans was also very similar to the more traditional forms of the ‘virgin soils’ rhetoric, thus mapping onto the century-long tradition of regarding regions outside Western Europe as open to invasion, because they were inhabited by supposedly culturally (even biologically) less advanced populations.  

Financial and economic impediments to British enterprises established to operate exclusively in the Balkans included currency instability in the host countries, high transport costs and logistic difficulties, as well as global financial crises which often damaged investor confidence. There was also a gap between borrower and lender expectations; the former often required larger investments than the latter was willing to commit to. British ideas about the commercial potential of the Balkans did not usually correspond with the reality of the situation in the host countries, which can also be regarded as one of the reasons for the failures of British enterprise in the region. British companies were also often unable to attract sufficient amounts of capital and failed to guarantee a return on investments; they were also often poorly promoted, had weak managerial structures, and suffered from high levels of vertical specialisation. Local knowledge, connections to local political and business elites, state of war, and strong financial backing seemed to be among the most important factors contributing to business success in the Balkans. (The importance of local knowledge will be discussed further in the third part of this chapter.)

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3.2. Doing Business in the Balkans: Concerns of British Businessmen

As shown above, there was some willingness in Britain to get involved in commercial contacts in the Balkans, but those businessmen whose goal was to establish companies which aimed at conducting business in the Balkans alone were more often than not unsuccessful. There were also numerous established British firms that sought to extend their existing operations into the Balkans, and those to whom the region formed only a part of their overall operations. British insurance giants – North British & Mercantile, Phoenix Fire and Life Assurance Co., Gresham Life Assurance Society, and the Sun Insurance Co. as well as the Imperial Ottoman Bank,466 all had long-established business connections in the Southeast Europe. These companies were massive multinational organisations with business operations in many other parts of the world and, cannot therefore be assessed by exactly the same criteria as the smaller British firms discussed above. But they can be used as a way of further illustrating that some British business activities in the Balkans succeeded. Their successes in the Balkans also showed the larger scenario in which the British economy had become increasingly dependent on the invisible sector as the largest contributor to the balance of payments surplus before 1914. Table 2 and Chart 1 below show that British insurance companies dominated, for example, the fire insurance market in Salonica in 1904 with a 36 per cent share of the total.

466 The Ottoman Bank’s activities in Southeast Europe were mostly dealt with by the Paris office, which is an aspect that will be discussed in further detail in the following section of the chapter.
Table 3.1.: Foreign Insurance Companies in Salonica, 1904

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Local agent</th>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Approx. gross premium income (£/annum)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North British &amp; Mercantile</td>
<td>Morpurgo</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assicurazioni Generali</td>
<td>A. Gutzzeri</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun Insurance</td>
<td>Whittall, Saltel &amp; Co.</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>Scialom &amp; Co.</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman</td>
<td>Jorge Carmonides</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’Union</td>
<td>A. Scialom</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Adriatica</td>
<td>F. Amar &amp; Co.</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic</td>
<td>Samuel D. Modiano</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aachen &amp; Munich</td>
<td>Isac Iatriel</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National of Athens (Ethniki)</td>
<td>T. J. Navroudhi</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Fonciere</td>
<td>Y. Kapandji</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian Insurance Co</td>
<td>Eli A. Amar &amp; Co.</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’Urbaine</td>
<td>S. J. Modiano</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian Phoenix</td>
<td>Eli A. Torres</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prussian National/Hamburg-Bremen</td>
<td>C. Campbell (German)</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sun Insurance Office Ltd (1904)\(^{467}\)

North British & Mercantile’s earnings were particularly significant, given that the Phoenix Assurance Co. earned £4965 per annum between 1901 and 1905 in Constantinople, its largest market in the region. Phoenix’s takings in Salonica averaged £877 per annum in its most successful years between 1877 and 1890.\(^{468}\) In Salonica, there were also nearly a dozen other smaller foreign companies whose annual gross premium incomes were each less than £500. The whole business for

\(^{467}\) GL Ms 31522/142, Sun Insurance Office Ltd., Foreign Agency Memorandum Books, ‘Salonica 3’ (1890s-1920s).

1904 was worth £24,100.\textsuperscript{469} This seems a very high figure, but the agencies in Salonica probably served a large area in the southern Balkans.\textsuperscript{470}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Chart 3.1.: Market Shares of Foreign Insurers in Salonica, 1904}
\end{center}

There were also numerous British arms manufacturers, railway locomotive manufacturers, construction companies, leather goods producers, cloth and jute-bag exporters, biscuit manufacturers, soap producers and so forth that had established business contacts in the Balkans. The perceptions of these British firms about conducting business in the Balkans have not so far attracted any systematic studies over a longer time-period. Basil Gounaris has written an interesting article on the difficulties that British and other companies faced in Macedonia from the Balkan Wars until the early 1920s, which included destruction of property, being compelled to pay extra fines and double duties, as well as industrial action by local employees. However, in his account, the views of British businessmen feature only marginally and his sources are mostly diplomatic. Michael Palai\'ret\'s approach is similarly based primarily on the consular reports that evaluated the commercial environment in Serbia and Bulgaria, and he examines British involvement mainly from the viewpoint of industrial development in the Balkan countries.\textsuperscript{471} Palai\'ret and Lampe have argued

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{469} GL Ms 31522/142, Sun Insurance Office Ltd., ‘Salonica 3’.
\textsuperscript{470} I thank Professor Robin Pearson for pointing this out.
\end{footnotes}
that xenophobia and corruption in the Balkan states were among the most significant aspects that drove away foreign investors. This was certainly part of the problem, but this view has been based purely on the examination of consular and diplomatic correspondence which does not give the whole picture. The following sections examine the realities of conducting business in the Balkans from the viewpoint of businessmen, merchants and investors, and investigate whether commercial difficulties contributed to the emergence of stereotypical views or cultural generalisations about the region.

British companies often complained that their offers were used by the Balkan governments to bring down the prices of other applicants, and that public contracts were not advertised early enough for British firms to submit meaningful orders. The view that the Serbian government used British tenders to ‘whittle down’ prices was fairly widespread within British commercial circles. For example, in 1910, a Birmingham-based armaments manufacturer, Imperial Metal Industries (Kynoch) Ltd., seemed certain that the Serbian government had urged them to quote for the supply of ammunition ‘so as to obtain their supplies at a cheaper rate…from the French company’, the Société Française Munition, whose price had initially been 400,000 francs higher than that of Kynoch.472 Another Midlands arms manufacturer, the Birmingham Small Arms Co. Ltd, faced similar difficulties. They had quoted the lowest price for the supply of rifles to the Serbian army, but later learned that the whole tender had been cancelled.473 Vickers, Sons & Maxim also encountered similar problems. Although the company had initially quoted the lowest price, £2.8 million, in the 1910 competition for the supply of mountain guns, the order had instead gone to the German manufacturer Krupps, after the Serbian government had informed the German company that they only had £2.3 million to spend.474 British companies thus worried that their offers were used to bring down prices of other applicants.

472 FO 368/456, Kynoch Ltd to Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Birmingham, 27 Jan. 1910.
473 FO 368/456, Birmingham Small Arms Co Ltd (K. Davis) to Whitehead, Birmingham, 14 March 1910.
Another concern was that public contracts were not advertised early enough for British companies to submit adequate offers. In 1907, after being requested by the Serbian government to tender for the supply of various types of railway locomotives, the Vulcan Foundry Ltd. of Warrington, argued that the ‘quotations are requested in Belgrade by the 1st March, which does not allow us sufficient time for obtaining [the] necessary particulars’.\textsuperscript{475} The case involving the bronze and marble works company Walton, Gooddy & Cripps was perhaps the most graphic illustration of this situation. In the spring of 1911, the company had tendered for a contract to take on the reconstruction work in St Alexander Nevski Cathedral in Sofia, one of the largest Orthodox cathedrals in the world. According to the company’s letter, they had met the terms of the tender, but because the time for preparing the quotation was so short (27 days), they were only able to provide un-worked samples of the marbles which they intended to use. Walton was sceptical whether the time for submitting applications had been the same for each applicant:

Our Representative presenting himself at the Hall of Exhibition of the samples and documents of the different competitors…was surprised to find that one competitor…had presented full sized drawings and models of the different details of the decorative work together with a portion of one of the principal ‘Iconostases’ executed in the different marbles…and precious stones to a reduced scale and accurately finished in the Byzantine style, work which could not be executed in less than 4 months, and our own Representative protesting was informed that the Drawings and particulars had been sent to all competitors contemporaneously!!\textsuperscript{476}

In the end, half the work was given to the Italian company, Triscornia – the impressive presenters – and the rest was divided between all other bidders, which

\textsuperscript{475} FO 368/126, Vulcan Foundry Ltd (W. Collingwood) to Board of Trade, Warrington, 26 Feb. 1907. 
\textsuperscript{476} FO 368/519, Walton, Gooddy & Cripps to Foreign Office, London, 6 May 1911.
meant that the British firm’s share of the total of 320,000-franc contract was only 20,500 francs.  

Problems in the conduct of day-to-day trade also generated comment from British companies, who often complained about the unavailability of reliable business information and about the negative or prohibitive effects of protectionism. For example, Kuypers & Ostler, the Leeds leather manufacturer, protested that their goods had been sitting in Belgrade because their Serbian buyers had refused to collect them. The company’s managing director argued that their Belgrade agent had not replied to any of their letters, ‘nor [given] us any information, but simply ignore[d] our questions’. British insurance companies also faced difficulties in obtaining reliable business information. Gresham’s agent, for example, had protested that, although the company had long been established in Serbia, it had become impossible to profit from their business because the information given to them by local sources was often unreliable, and they had frequently been subject to fraud.

British exporters were particularly concerned about protectionist measures in Bulgaria because the majority of British goods entered the Balkans through the Bulgarian Black Sea ports of Varna and Burgas or overland from Constantinople, and thus, any new legislation in Bulgaria was bound to have an effect also on British merchants. The Bradford firm, Ehrenbach, Brumm & Co., argued in 1908 that the rumoured twenty-five per cent duty increase would ‘have the effect of almost prohibiting entirely the importation of British goods into Bulgaria’, and when the tariff was actually increased, ‘several very important offers’ were cancelled. Carr & Co., the Carlisle biscuit manufacturer, was equally concerned with the increase in excise duty and argued that it had made ‘it impossible to do business in Bulgaria’, while Altendorf & Wright from Birmingham argued that their business had ‘come to a sudden stop’ owing to the duty increase and feared that unless the duty was reduced

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477 Ibid.
480 FO 368/174, Ehrenbach, Brumm & Co (S. Martin) to Grey, Bradford, 28 March 1908; 29 April 1908.
481 FO 368/278, Carr & Co (E. Brown) to Board of Trade, Carlisle, 30 Dec. 1909.
to its former level the ‘business will be lost to us forever’. Other British exporters voiced similar concerns. The Bradford cloth exporter, Brigg, Neumann & Co., had also experienced difficulties with the Bulgarian customs authorities. They explained that they had gone to great lengths in introducing their product in Bulgaria ‘in face of a very vigorous competition on the part of German manufacturers and merchants’, and argued that if they had to face such difficulties with every shipment ‘it would become impossible to export…to Bulgaria at all, no merchant being willing to risk such unpleasantness with every sending’.

Protectionism was regarded as an impediment to British trade in other parts of the world as well, and therefore in this case, as in many others, there was nothing specifically Balkan about the concerns that were expressed about it. As a net importer of foodstuff and raw materials, Britain had relied on free trade from the 1840s onwards when the Navigation Acts and the Corn Laws were repealed, a factor which perhaps made it more difficult for British exporters ideologically to stomach protectionism than for merchants from other countries such as Germany where protectionism had been an accepted policy from the late 1870s onwards. In this framework, Balkan etatism and protectionism often clashed with British businessmen’s and merchants’ beliefs in free-trade liberalism in which limited state intervention was one of the most important components. Anna-Maria Misra has shown that British businessmen in India had very similar ideas about the way in which business should be conducted: they believed in free-trade principles; in the preservation of small competitive firms; and in limited state intervention in business activity. British firms who had dealings in the Balkans approached the issue from very similar perspectives.

482 FO 368/519, Altendorf & Wright to Foreign Office, Birmingham, 12 April 1911.
484 FO 368/395, Brigg, Neumann & Co to Findlay, Bradford, 1 Nov. 1910.
British and colonial merchants also felt that import duties on British goods were higher than they were on goods from other countries. In 1887, for example, a group of Manchester merchants complained that the duty in Bulgaria was ten percent higher on their products than on those from Austria and Germany, because British goods were at times still taxed according to the Treaty of 1861 which had been abandoned even in Turkey itself.\textsuperscript{487} The Treaty of 1861 had fixed the import duties of the Ottoman Empire at 8 per cent, and the Manchester Chamber of Commerce was often aggressive in its attempts to maintain this duty in order to safeguard exports from Manchester whenever the Ottoman Empire lost territory. This was the case for example after the annexation of Bosnia in 1878, during the Anglo-Bulgarian commercial treaty negotiations in 1889, and again in 1907.\textsuperscript{488} These types of difficulties were also apparent on a colonial level. An Anglo-Indian exporter of jute-bags, Becker, Gray & Co., argued that they had been subjected to a much higher duty than was the case with the same products from other countries, and, as a result, their business in Bulgaria had become ‘quite impossible’.\textsuperscript{489} A similar difficulty was reported by the Dundee firm, Samson & Unna.\textsuperscript{490}

From the late 1880s onwards, these kinds of concerns were connected to the new legislation that was put in place in Serbia and Bulgaria when, for the first time, the Balkan governments were able to establish protection. In Serbia, the first law designed to support the development of home industries came into force in 1893, but its effects were not apparent until 1898, when protective tariffs were put into place. In Bulgaria, a similar trend was apparent.\textsuperscript{491} However, as shown above, restrictive legislation affected British commerce much earlier than the late 1890s. Although most-favoured-nation treatment was guaranteed to British goods entering Bulgaria in

\textsuperscript{487} FO 913/17, K. Hazzopulo & Sons, Logios Brothers, Z & A Hazzopulo & Co to W. Dalziel, Rustchuk, 15 Dec. 1887.


\textsuperscript{489} FO 368/10, Becker, Gray & Co to India Office, London, 12 March 1906.

\textsuperscript{490} FO 368/10, Samson & Unna to Dundee Chamber of Commerce, Dundee, 20 March 1906.

\textsuperscript{491} Berend and Ranki, \textit{Economic Development}, p. 88.
1889 and was extended to goods from British colonies and possessions in 1906, the complaints of British merchants did not stop: this was a clear indication that, in practice, the legislation was not working.

In addition to the difficulties connected with the commercial conduct of Balkan officials, British exporters and commercial agencies also often criticised British banks for their unwillingness to provide Balkan governments with state loans, which was perceived as a factor that considerably hindered the possibility of British firms to obtain contracts from Balkan countries. Middlemore & Lamplugh, for example, were very ‘anxious to do business’ in Serbia, but the firm wondered whether there was any ‘probability of the order being placed with an English firm’. They explained that in addition to two other Midland manufacturers, they had previously tendered for military supplies in Serbia, but ‘eventually found that there had been no prospect from the very beginning of the order being placed with an English firm, owing to the conditions upon which the loan had been negotiated’. Similarly, the Balkan Agency argued that the ‘Bonds issued by the Serbian Government do not find favour here with the Joint Stock Banks’, and as a consequence, the ‘British Manufacturer cannot compete for even a fair proportion of the Serbian trade’. This was indeed a significant handicap for British industry, especially after 1900, because most foreign capital came into the Balkans in the form of state loans. The system in which state borrowing was used to finance the import of goods had been in use ever since the 1840s when western European capital first began to flow into the Ottoman Empire. However, the Balkan governments had not been able to form their own commercial policies before the end of the nineteenth century.

493 FO 368/1115, Middlemore & Lamplugh to Commercial Intelligence Branch, Walsall, 17 Jan. 1914. See also, The Economist, 3 May 1913.
495 A. Kostov, ‘Western Capital and the Bulgarian Banking System: Late Nineteenth Century-Second World War’ in Kostis, Modern banking in the Balkans, p. 61.
One example of the unwillingness of British bankers to get involved in Balkan finances was provided by the London Committee of the Imperial Ottoman Bank. Although the Ottoman Bank was ‘at the very heart of Serbian finance’ from 1895 onwards, and heavily involved in Bulgaria until 1899, the London Committee was often very sceptical about involving itself in financial operations in the Balkans, and hence, Southeast Europe was mostly dealt with by Paris. For example, in 1890, when the Paris committee had ratified an agreement for the purchase of Serbian stock for 27 million francs, London’s allotment was only 3 (later reduced to 2 million) francs. In 1899, when the Bulgarian government requested a loan of 20 million francs, London declined, stating that ‘it is most undesirable for the Bank to be involved in any way in Bulgarian finance’. This sentiment was however not only an illustration of the generally negative attitudes of the London Committee towards Bulgaria; there were also real factors that hindered foreign firms’ ability to operate in the country. For example, the Bulgarian government had introduced a new Commercial Code in 1898 which had restricted foreign companies’ operations because they were compelled to appoint administration committees that were composed of Bulgarian nationals, or at least of foreigners who were residents in the country. According to Clay, this requirement was the ‘final straw’ that sealed the Ottoman Bank’s exit from Bulgaria. In addition, the gold convertibility of the Bulgarian currency, the Leva, was suspended from 1899 to 1902, which probably also contributed to the Ottoman Bank’s decision to leave the country. Furthermore, branch closures in Bulgaria were also linked to a run on the Ottoman Bank’s reserves in Anatolia and to losses in South African gold speculation.

Nevertheless, the London Committee also refused to make an advance payment to the Montenegrin government because the repayment of the first advance

497 Clay, ‘Imperial Ottoman Bank’, p. 150.
499 GL Ms 23967/6, IOB, ‘London Minutes’, 1 Nov. 1899.
502 Lampe and Jackson, Balkan Economic History, p. 226.
had been delayed.\textsuperscript{503} London also declined the proposed £150,000 loan to the municipality of Belgrade in 1901.\textsuperscript{504} Thus, although the London Committee was more sceptical about Balkan operations than its counterpart in Paris, London’s cynicism was not based simply on unfounded cultural bias against the Balkan states – there were also concrete financial and legal aspects that contributed to its decision-making processes, a fact which is of course quite understandable in connection with international banking operations and international business more generally. Furthermore, the Ottoman Bank’s decision to leave Bulgaria on the basis of financial difficulties that were seemingly only marginally connected to Bulgaria, illustrated that the Balkan economies were very closely connected to the global financial system by the end of the nineteenth century.

London bankers took part in issuing a Serbian loan on only one occasion, in 1905, when the Stern Brothers, in collaboration with the Union Bank of Austria and the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, contracted a £2.8 million loan.\textsuperscript{505} Although British investors were hesitant about lending to Serbia and Bulgaria, the Danubian Principalities (later Romania) received six loans totalling £5 million from Britain between 1864 and 1870. Four of these loans were issued by the Anglo-Austrian Bank and by the C. Devaux & Co. (two each), and the other two by Stern Brothers and Frühling & Goschen.\textsuperscript{506} In addition, a £250,000 loan for the Montenegrin government was floated on the London market in 1909.\textsuperscript{507} An indication of the British reluctance to get financially involved in the Slavic Balkans especially was that, in 1913, only 0.69 per cent of British overseas banking operations were directed towards the Balkans while the corresponding figures for France and Germany were 15.38 per cent and 11.11 per cent respectively.\textsuperscript{508}

British investors and investment banks were also worried that their investments would be abused by their Balkan recipients. Philip Stanhope, for

\textsuperscript{503} GL Ms 23967/6, IOB, ‘London Minutes’, 17 Aug. 1898; 21 June 1899.
\textsuperscript{504} Ibid., 9 May 1901.
\textsuperscript{505} The Times, 9 March 1905.
\textsuperscript{507} The Times, 16 June 1909.
instance, who had invested in railway construction in Serbia and had lost a considerable amount of money after the First Serbian Bank (est. 1869) had collapsed in 1873 as a result of the crash of the Vienna stock-exchange, was unable either to reclaim his money or to claim rights to the securities of properties and bonds. He argued that English investors should be ‘warned from investing…one single halfpenny’, because in Serbia the ‘whole population seems to be bonded together for the purpose of obtaining credit from foreigners only for the purpose of abusing it’. 509

Another case which involved the National Investment Trust Corporation of England (NITCE) was a further illustration of this tendency. NITCE had concluded a contract with the Bulgarian government to provide a loan of almost 9 million francs at an interest of 4.5 per cent, for the construction of Dubnitza-Radomir railway line near the Turkish border in 1910. 510 At first it seemed that the British firm had been unable to finance the loan, and was therefore in breach of contract. The whole situation was turned upside down, however, when NITCE’s solicitors, Woodthorpe, Browne & Company informed the Foreign Office that the Bulgarian government had not been ready to accept the issue on the due date, even though the ‘monies were in readiness’, and therefore the ‘excuses put forward by the Bulgarian Government will not…bear investigation for a moment’. Furthermore, Woodthorpe & Co. declared that their client had lost £12,000, not to mention the ‘most serious loss of prestige, their reputation both here and abroad’ 511 having been practically ruined’, preventing them from participating in ‘any financial dealings of importance’ in the future. 512

British companies, the press and diplomats were also concerned about the effects of political instability on British commercial interests in the Balkans. The Times’ Halifax correspondent argued during the 1876 Serbian-Turkish War that owing to the war ‘new business can scarcely be expected to arise’ for the West


510 FO 368/518, Lindley to Grey, Sofia, 31 Jan. 1911.

511 The case attracted widespread interest all over Europe. On 22 April 1911, a Hamburg newspaper Der Wächter Auf Dem Kapitalmarkt termed the case ‘The Bulgarian Financial Scandal’.

Yorkshire wool producers. The Bulgarian declaration of independence in 1908 was regarded by the chairman of the Phoenix Assurance Co. as an impediment and as a destabilising factor for British-Bulgarian trade. He argued that Bulgaria’s newly-gained freedom ‘from any liability towards foreigners’ would mean that ‘British Companies and firms trading in Bulgaria will be seriously handicapped’ unless precautionary legislative measures to curb Bulgaria’s commercial independence were taken. In connection with a proposal to establish a British bank in Bulgaria in 1910, one British diplomat argued that if the bank was founded, its British managers ‘would have to exercise the greatest care in order to prevent their Bulgarian colleagues from using the Bank for political purposes’. Again there was nothing specifically ‘Balkan’ about these phenomena, because political disturbances have always played an important role in commerce, but increasingly from the early eighteenth century onwards.

At times, perceptions of political instability had a more direct and profound effects on British financial interests in the Balkans than any actual disturbance. For example, the London stock exchange reacted strongly to the rumours of possible hostilities between Serbia and Turkey in 1876 which led to the fall in prices of continental railway shares, which however, were not affected by the declaration of war by Serbia and Montenegro on Turkey. Similarly, in 1885, uncertainty about the intentions of Greece and Serbia meant that ‘buyers were very cautious, and business was restricted’. Serbia’s declaration of war on Bulgaria in November 1885 left the London stock market ‘completely upset’ because the war had come as a surprise since Serbia, had only a few days before the declaration, announced that it had ‘no intention of invading Bulgaria’. The situation had been different in 1876, when, according to The Times’ assessment, the declaration of war on Turkey by

513 The Times, 9 Oct.; 4 July 1876.
517 The Times, 9 June 1876.
518 Ibid., 9 Oct. 1885.
519 Ibid., 14, 16 Nov. 1885.
Serbia and Montenegro had no effect on the stock market in London because investors had anticipated it.\textsuperscript{520} Thus, uncertainty about political developments abroad was likely to affect investor behaviour. The stock market reacted quite strongly to rumours of revolutions or war, but was less likely to be affected once a war or a revolution had already broken out. However, markets reacted strongly to the declaration of war by Serbia on Bulgaria, largely because the conflict began so unexpectedly. Therefore, surprise and uncertainty seemed to have been viewed more suspiciously by speculators than an actual war.

Political instability also had direct and often negative effects on British companies that operated in the Balkans and on those British businessmen who tried to establish operations in the region. For example, in 1894, Max Mendelssohn came close to completing an agreement to establish an Anglo-Bulgarian bank, but the fall of the Stefan Stambolov regime, with which the contract had been negotiated, eventually led to the annulment of the contract.\textsuperscript{521} In the spring of 1909, the construction of the Bulgarian Industrial Co.’s mill was delayed ‘owing to the disturbed political situation in the Balkans’.\textsuperscript{522} Furthermore, the real financial effects of the Balkan Wars on the London stock exchange were much stronger than those of earlier Balkan conflicts at least partly because by the time the wars had broken out, Balkan government securities were much more widely held by British investors than before, which meant that the Balkan countries were more closely integrated into the global, or at least, into the European, financial system. The Balkan Wars were seen by \textit{The Times} as a ‘severe blow to the market’ of Balkan securities – a market which then was worth £120 million.\textsuperscript{523} In 1913, British investment in the publicly-issued securities of the Balkan States amounted to £17 million, which was roughly 14 per cent of the whole market.\textsuperscript{524}

To conclude, British companies were often concerned about the fact that their prices were used to bring down those of other applicants and that government

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[520]{\textit{Ibid.}, 14 July 1876.}
\footnotetext[521]{FO 368/11, Buchanan to Grey, Sofia, 19 April 1906.}
\footnotetext[522]{FO 368/278, Farrar & Co to Grey, Manchester, 8 March 1909.}
\footnotetext[523]{\textit{The Times}, 9 Oct. 1912.}
\end{footnotes}
contracts in Serbia and Bulgaria were not announced early enough. British firms also protested that they did not have adequate access to business information and that protectionist measures made their business dealings significantly more difficult; there were also fears that British investments could be abused. British exporters also criticised British banks for their unwillingness to get involved in financing public contracts, and the British press in particular were wary about political instability. The concerns expressed by British businessmen in connection with their business dealings in the Balkans were therefore dividable into criticisms of Balkan governmental agencies and complaints about British investors’ and banks’ unwillingness to get involved in Balkan projects. Significantly, commercial difficulties did not, however, lead to generalisations or expressions of derogatory ‘Balkanist’ attitudes because businessmen were mostly concerned with the economic and financial aspects of the problems that they had encountered.

3.3. ‘We Will Not Prejudice Our Position’: Requests for and Refusals of Diplomatic Support

British exporters and prospective investors often responded to commercial difficulties by requesting diplomatic support, which seemed however to be quite difficult to obtain. The non-interventionist approach was evident primarily within three contexts: company promotion; at times when British companies complained about protectionist measures; and when they requested assistance in connection with government contracts.

For example, when the Birmingham firm W. H. Davis & Co. complained about the increase in duty on their products in Bulgaria, and requested government intervention, the Foreign Office replied that as the articles Davis & Co. exported were ‘left untouched by the last commercial agreement between this country and Bulgaria’, the Foreign Office feared that ‘no useful purpose would be served by taking any action’.

525 Peek, Frean & Co., a biscuit manufacturer that also exported to Bulgaria, faced similar difficulties and was unable to receive diplomatic support. The company claimed that a Bulgarian firm had begun to manufacture biscuits with the word

‘London’ printed on the packaging, which the company believed was illegal under trademark legislation. They claimed that French manufacturers were ‘protected from such conduct’ and requested that British companies were placed ‘on the same footing as French Makers’. The Foreign Office, however, had ‘little hope that any further representations…would be more successful than those already made’.\(^{526}\) In addition, when one British firm complained that their consignment was wrongly measured in Bulgaria, Mansfeldt Findlay, the British ambassador to Bulgaria, argued that it was not possible to support the firms request, because the British government did not want to ‘prejudice [their] position by pressing a case in which the Bulgarian Authorities appear[ed] to be technically in the right’.\(^{527}\)

The Foreign Office was also unable or reluctant to give its support to British firms that had been affected by laws that encouraged home production. This was the case, for example, when Altendorf & Wright complained that the tariff on their exports had changed and hoped that diplomatic pressure could be put on the Bulgarian government. George Stanley from the Board of Trade’s commercial intelligence department stated that no ‘useful purpose would be served by any representations’ because the rise in the tariff was due to new laws for the protection of ‘native industry’.\(^{528}\) Political instability also prevented diplomatic support from being given. When Stewart, McLaughlin & Turtle Ltd. requested diplomatic support in connection with port construction in Serbia in 1912, the British legation replied that it was ‘altogether useless in the present disturbed state of affairs and disorganized condition of the public departments’ to approach the Serbian government.\(^{529}\) At times, however, moral support was also given in the Balkan context. In 1914, in connection with railway construction in Serbia, the British government expressed to

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\(^{527}\) FO 368/395, M. Findlay to E. H. Kanreuther & Co., Sofia, 17 Oct. 1910. The Birmingham firm’s shipment was measured correctly, but the weight did not match the Bill of Lading, ensuring that the Bulgarian customs could request higher tax from the British firm.

\(^{528}\) FO 368/519, Altendorf & Wright to Mallet, Birmingham, 12 April 1911; G. Stanley to Mallet, London, 1 May 1911.

\(^{529}\) FO 368/724, Stewart, McLaughlin & Turtle Ltd (J. Stewart) to Barclay, Belfast, 13 April 1912; Paget to Grey, Belgrade, 14 Oct. 1912.
the Serbian government ‘the hope that British contractors will be given opportunities for tendering equal to those extended to other foreign contractors’. Thus, the Foreign Office often followed a non-interventionist strategy in commercial disputes in the Balkans if there was no clear legal case for diplomatic intervention. It was also reluctant to press any one issue if previous interventions had been unsuccessful or if a request for support coincided with an unstable political situation.

Diplomatic support was also refused as a consequence of negative preconceptions, which meant that, if there was a perception in any of the British Balkan legations that diplomatic intervention would not guarantee success, support to British companies was rarely given. In 1908, when the Anglo-Servian and Balkan States Engineering Syndicate requested diplomatic support for their proposal to establish engineering works in Serbia, Louis Mallet, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied that the Foreign Office felt that it ‘would not be justified’ to instruct the British Minister in Belgrade ‘to use his good offices on behalf of the Syndicate’, because this support would not ‘ensure the success of the enterprise’. On the matter of establishing a British commercial museum and travelling exhibition in Bulgaria, the Board of Trade argued that ‘projects of this kind’ were almost ‘invariably unsuccessful’ and thus they were in no position ‘to recommend official assistance’. Others, however, believed that commercial museums played an important part in the process of gathering business-related information about less well-known regions. For example, an American observer was delighted by the opening of a commercial museum in Philadelphia in 1900: ‘Where else in the United States could you learn at the shortest notice what shape of butcher’s knife was preferred in Servia’?

Furthermore, in many instances, the Foreign Office refused to support schemes that had foreign connections or if the promoters were regarded as

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untrustworthy or financially unstable. These factors were best illustrated in the context of the establishment of an Anglo-Bulgarian bank. George Buchanan, the British ambassador to Sofia, stated that he had always, in principle, supported the establishment of a British bank in Bulgaria, but as he was unaware of the level of financial stability of Mendelssohn and his associates, he was unable to give their particular proposal his official backing. This distrust was also evident in the investigations conducted by the Board of Trade, which concluded that, even though Weiser and Puzey were perfectly ‘respectable’, the ‘Board doubt whether it would be advisable…to take any action in support of Mr Mendelssohn’s scheme’. Buchanan was concerned about Weiser’s connection with the Dresdener Bank, which ‘gave the whole scheme too much of a German character’. Buchanan also thought that if an Anglo-Bulgarian bank were founded its directors ‘should not be men of doubtful reputations’, because such a bank would be much too important in encouraging ‘British industrial enterprise in Bulgaria’ for it to fail because of inadequate personnel.

In addition, British diplomats and those that were connected to the ruling establishment often seemed to be prejudiced against Jewish businessmen. In 1878, for example, the Royal Commission produced a report on commercial morality in the London Stock Exchange, after there had been a campaign which claimed that the stock exchange ‘was haunted by adventurers – Jews, Greeks and so on’. The case of Captain Otto Fulton was a further illustration of this tendency. Whether it was indeed due to Fulton’s ‘slight foreign accent’ and ‘appearance and manner’ that were ‘suggestive of Hebraic extraction’, he nevertheless provoked suspicion in one British consular official in Sofia. William O’Reilly wrote to London that he believed that ‘Anglo-Bulgarian Bank…is intended to be a solid and genuine affair’ and that it

534 In addition to Mendelssohn, the establishment of the bank was promoted by Benito Weiser, a member of the London Stock Exchange, Fred Puzey, a well known Cape merchant, and a John Rodger London banker.

535 FO 368/11, Buchanan to Grey, Sofia, 19 April 1906.


537 FO 368/11, Buchanan to Grey, Sofia, 8 May 1906.

538 FO 368/11, Buchanan to Grey, Sofia, 28 Sept. 1906.

539 The Times, 21 March 1877.
‘would [therefore] be regrettable…were it…promoted by parties less likely to inspire confidence’ in the Foreign Office and in British companies and investors who would possibly use the bank’s services.\textsuperscript{540} Ralph Paget expressed similar sentiments when his opinion was sought about the promoter of the Anglo-Servian Trading Co. which had obtained a concession to establish a meat-packing company in Serbia in 1907. Paget argued that Edward Liebmann, the principal promoter of the company, was ‘a German-American Jew by birth’ and that he had a ‘most objectionable personality’.\textsuperscript{541}

These sentiments fitted in with the wider European and American cultural pattern of distrust, envy and prejudice towards Jewish businessmen – a sort of commercial anti-Semitism – which intensified in the late-Victorian and early Edwardian periods. For example, there were a number of ‘Jewish financier-villains’ in late Victorian literature such as Augustus Melmotte in Anthony Trollope’s (1815-81) \textit{The Way We Live Now} (1875).\textsuperscript{542} Curiously, Trollope described Melmotte as having the ‘slightest trace of a foreign accent’,\textsuperscript{543} a characterisation which, as shown above, was repeated almost word for word by the British diplomatic representative O’Reilly in connection with a banking scheme in Bulgaria. Trollope’s famous book also belonged to the genre of ‘cautionary tales’ about the dangers of investing in new companies, an economic activity which, to Trollope and numerous other writers such as A. MacFarlane and Malcolm Meason, was nothing more than speculation comparable to gambling.\textsuperscript{544} The Economist J. A. Hobson (1858-1940) also expressed similar views in \textit{Imperialism: A Study} (1902) in which he argued that the Boer War had been plotted by a group of international financiers ‘chiefly German in origin and Jewish in race’ who had aimed to gain ‘not out of [the] genuine fruits of

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{540}{FO 368/800, W. O’Reilly to E. Grey, Sofia, 30 Sept. 1913; 12 Oct. 1913.}
\footnote{541}{FO 368/580, R. Paget to E. Gray, Belgrade, 11 Oct. 1911.}
\footnote{544}{Iztkovitz, ‘Fair Enterprise’, pp. 130-1. For contemporary illustrations of the sentiment see, for example, MacFarlane’s \textit{A Railway Script; Or the Evils of Speculation} (1856) and Meason’s \textit{The Bubble of Finance} (1865). There were hundreds of other similar works.}
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industry…but out of the construction, promotion, and financial manipulation of companies'.

Again, British diplomatic views towards business promotion in the Balkans seemed to closely match Hobson’s anti-Semitic sentiments (from which he however later distanced himself.)

On the other hand, Sun Insurance Co.’s agent, Henry Rose’s (1815-72) assessment of credit- and trustworthiness in Salonica – which at the time of writing in the late 1860s, and for the several preceding centuries had been a predominately Jewish city – was very different as he argued that the town was ‘better than any other…in Turkey’ with regard to creditworthiness because ‘every one works on his own capital – they are punctual in their payments – seldom have failures, and are very trustworthy’. In his opinion, moral hazard did not complicate the conduct of insurance business in Salonica and the above figures for foreign companies that had operations in the town also point in the same direction – that is, Salonica was a profitable market.

Rose’s sentiment showed that there was a vast gulf between diplomatic perceptions and the attitudes of those who had hands-on business interests in the Balkans and could not afford to resort to repeating cultural stereotypes, but were compelled to give more accurate descriptions because, put categorically, their livelihoods depended on how accurately they were able to assess, for example, credit conditions in the various regions that they examined. Rose, a solicitor, was an interesting figure who had also worked as Phoenix’s agent in Smyrna where he opened the company’s agency in 1865. Rose’s brothers were also in the service of both Sun and Phoenix throughout the pre-war period.

Many travel accounts also seemed to correspond with diplomatic views, and travellers were also much more likely than businessmen or commercial agents to

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546 Mazower, Salónica, pp. 6-7.


549 Trebilcock, Phoenix, p. 167.
repeat cultural stereotypes. For example, Arthur Evans argued in 1876 that Jews in Sarajevo were the richest people in the town, but that their good fortunes were ‘not due to their commercial talents’ and that they were rich only because they were morally degraded and as ‘dirty as their gains’. 550 Thus, on a more general level, these different views again illustrated that source material through which British images of the Balkans are examined needs to be widened even further in order to get more accurate perspectives of the different and varying views that were held about the Balkans in Britain: we should not be content with the mere repeating of travellers’ and diplomats’ stereotypes.

It was thus clear that anti-Semitic sentiments played at least as large a part in the decisions of diplomats not to support British enterprise in the Balkans as other factors, such as the perceived or real financial instability of prospective promoters and their foreign connections, which furthermore illustrated that prejudices played an important role in diplomatic decision-making processes in connection with British commercial activities. As shown above, diplomatic support was refused if there was no clear legal case for intervention, if previous interference had been unsuccessful, or if the Board of Trade and the Foreign Office believed that there was no guarantee that diplomatic intervention would generate success. These were significant shortcomings because British businessmen believed that, at the same time, they were unable to proceed or succeed with their endeavours without official British backing.

It seemed that the prevailing diplomatic perception was that British schemes were being marketed by the ‘wrong’ type of promoters. As we have seen in the earlier section of this chapter, an acquaintance with local conditions, and with local business and political elites, was one of the most important aspects helping British firms to succeed in the Balkans. This was also the most welcome characteristic of a successful business promoter, a factor, which, in itself, was not surprising because it had been widely regarded as such in British commercial, financial and diplomatic circles. 551 For instance, H. A. Lawrence, one of the Ottoman Bank’s directors, was seen by Consul Buchanan as a suitable candidate for company promotion in Bulgaria because

550 Evans, Bosnia, p. 275.
he had experience of ‘business relations with the Near East’.\footnote{552 FO 368/11, Buchanan to Grey, Sofia, 8 May 1906.} Similarly, Alfred Stead was regarded as a perfect promoter of British commercial agency in Serbia, because he appeared ‘to be well acquainted with all the leading [men] in Belgrade’.\footnote{553 FO 368/47, Whitehead to Grey, Belgrade, 12 Dec. 1906.}

British diplomats also believed that local knowledge was important after the initial contact had already been made, because ‘British firms unacquainted with local conditions’ were unlikely to succeed in Bulgaria, when ‘Bulgarian labour & materials have to be employed’.\footnote{554 FO 368/518, Lindley to Commercial Intelligence Branch, Sofia, 21 Feb. 1911.} Similar views were expressed about Serbs. In the spring of 1907, when a group of British capitalists considered the establishment of an engineering works in Serbia, Whitehead doubted whether the scheme would be ‘remunerative’ because of the ‘absence of skilled labour’ in the country.\footnote{555 FO 368/126, Whitehead to Grey, Belgrade, 30 March 1907.} Awareness of local conditions considerably helped British companies to obtain contracts in the Balkans. For example, in the spring of 1913, the Anglo-Syrian Trading Co. managed to negotiate a deal with the Bulgarian government for the supply of military uniforms, and, according to the firm’s statement, experience in business relations with the governments of Greece and Turkey contributed considerably to their success in Bulgaria.\footnote{556 FO 368/800, Anglo-Syrian Trading Co. to Foreign Office, Manchester, 4 March 1913.}

The British were still quite unaware of basic living conditions in Bulgaria even in the early twentieth century. A letter from a prospective bookkeeper, with a job offer in the country, illustrated how little was known about conditions in the Balkans. R. G. Townsend wrote to the Foreign Office to ask whether the ‘climate and sanitary conditions would suit an ordinary Englishman’.\footnote{557 FO 368/278, Townsend to Mallet, Manchester, 18 Dec. 1909.} And it was not only the ‘ordinary Englishmen’ who lacked local knowledge. In response to Townsend’s letter, Louis Mallet, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated that ‘the climate of Bulgaria is generally considered healthy, but the cost of living may be...
somewhat higher than in England’, and although lacking local knowledge himself, he offered to furnish a memorandum on the matter.\(^{558}\)

How did the Balkan case fit within general patterns of diplomatic support for British business overseas? Non-intervention had been the defining characteristic of British foreign policy up until the mid-1880s,\(^{559}\) but thereafter, a downturn in home manufacturing industry, rising protectionist trade barriers, increased foreign competition, difficulties in finding new markets, and an increase in the diplomatic support given by other industrialised countries, caused nervousness about the future of British commerce, and, to an extent, compelled the British government to get more involved. For example, in the 1880s, German commercial involvement in Turkey had increased considerably which meant that the British government felt increasingly compelled to intervene and to give diplomatic support to British proposals, for instance, as British capitalists and industrialists attempted to gain concessions for various public works projects.\(^{560}\) The Foreign Office distinguished between official and unofficial support for British commercial interests overseas. Official support was given, for instance, to foreign bondholders in case there was any trouble with guaranteed or semi-guaranteed loans to foreign governments, whereas unofficial assistance meant giving moral support to British commercial interests. Unofficial support occurred frequently, and, according to David McLean, it was ‘an accepted aspect of British policy’.\(^{561}\)

In the case of the Balkans, as shown above, the Foreign Office was often very reluctant to support any one scheme, which showed that the region in this sense differed from the general pattern, although the case was similar, for example, with regard to diplomatic assistance to the British companies that operated in Peru.\(^{562}\)

\(^{558}\) FO 368/278, Mallet to Townsend, Foreign Office, 22 Dec. 1909.

\(^{559}\) See, Gallagher and Robinson, ‘Imperialism of Free Trade’.


Support was often denied on statutory grounds, if earlier interventions had been unsuccessful or if the political situation was unstable. Negative perceptions and stereotypes affected policy-making in this context, which meant that British schemes that were promoted by Jewish businessmen, or by someone who had significant connections to foreign companies or banks, were unlikely to receive any concrete or moral backing from the British government.

3.4. ‘Bribery Is a Habit of the Country’: Diplomatic Responses to Commercial Difficulties

Although British exporters, business promoters, and investors rarely managed to secure diplomatic backing, the difficulties of British business in the Balkans were widely discussed in many diplomatic accounts. In addition to evident anti-Semitic prejudices, diplomatic correspondence and reports also transmitted evaluative generalisations about the ‘commercial aptitude’ of Serbs and Bulgarians far more often than did the British businessmen, who almost never believed that their problems in the Balkans were caused principally or even partly because the Balkan Slavs were somehow ‘lesser peoples’ than themselves or ‘commercially inept’. British diplomats were usually very sceptical about British companies’ chances of success in their business endeavours in the Balkans, their disbelief often being linked to the expressions of numerous problems that British firms had reported in connection with their experiences in Serbia and Bulgaria.

According to many diplomats, the existence of corruption in the form of bribery and favouritism was one of the most difficult problems facing British business in the Balkans. This view was expressed mainly when British companies attempted to obtain public contracts in Serbia in the early twentieth century. In 1912, a Liverpool construction firm, Stewart, McLaughlin & Turtle Ltd., approached the British legation in Belgrade, asking whether they would have any chance of obtaining a contract for the construction of the new port in Prahovo on the Danube. Ralph Paget was not very optimistic about their chances and he argued that, because in Serbia ‘in Government contracts bribery plays the principal part’, it was likely that the Serbian government had showed interest in the Liverpool firm only in order to bring down the
James Whitehead argued that many government agencies in Serbia were clearly corrupt because continental firms ‘were able to obtain the specifications through private channels’ before British companies, and that the intervals for submitting offers were kept consciously short ‘in order to favour those who had personal relations with the officials concerned’. Whitehead’s view was based on the case in which the Serbian authorities had ‘circulated privately’ the details of the tender for new telephones to Austro-Hungarian, German and Belgian firms, which the British vice-consul had heard about the tender ‘only accidentally’.

Many further diplomatic accounts questioned the honesty of Serbian government agencies. In 1910, Colville Barclay, the British ambassador to Belgrade, argued that Vickers’ attempt to obtain a contract in Serbia had been unsuccessful because the ‘department responsible [was] amenable to bribery’ and that, in fact, ‘the whole system of placing army contracts’ was ‘rotten’. He also believed that corruption was so widespread in Serbia that British firms were unlikely to obtain government contracts in the country unless they were ‘prepared to embark upon the wholesale system of bribery’. Whitehead argued that British firms were unlikely to obtain contracts for the construction of light railways in Belgrade because the Serbian Railway Department, which was the advisory body on railway questions, was ‘trained in Austrian traditions’ and was likely ‘to criticise severely plans prepared on a…practical system, such as have been successfully adopted in British Colonies and possessions’. Xenophobic sentiment in Bulgaria was another concern that was evident in many commercial diplomatic accounts. In connection with the introduction of new commercial legislation, Findlay stated that the ‘present Government [of Bulgaria] are decidedly more anti-foreign and uncompromising in commercial disputes than any of their predecessors’, and even though the Bulgarians were ‘anxious to attract foreign

565 FO 368/219, Whitehead to N. Pasic, Belgrade, 12 March 1908.
568 FO 368/126, Whitehead to Grey, Belgrade, 27 May 1907.
capital…they have the strongest objection to see it earn but the most modest return’. Thus, he believed that as long as this was the case ‘it would do much better to stay at home’.  569 Henry Bax-Ironside argued that the influential permanent government officials in the Bulgarian administration were ‘hostile to all foreign interests’ and ‘entirely fail to realise the necessity of the introduction of foreign capital into the country’.  570

Thus, diplomatic reactions to the problems of British business in the Balkans were mostly criticisms of particular government agencies, but on some occasions stereotypical generalisations about Serbs and Bulgarians also became visible. One Foreign Office official’s take on the Vickers’ bribery case of 1906 was a revealing example of how the Serbs were regarded in terms of commercial morality in Britain in the early years of the twentieth century: ‘bribery…is a habit of the country’. 571 Findlay’s opinion was a good illustration of British attitudes to Bulgarians with regard to their perceptions and treatment of foreigners in the commercial context:

The fact is that while desirous of attracting foreign Capital in order to develop their country, the Bulgarians cannot bear to see Foreigners making money. It is the peasant point of view.  572

George Buchanan’s opinion from 1907 was perhaps the most vivid illustration of this sentiment: he believed that ‘a profound jealousy of anything in the shape of foreign interference, have always been marked features of the national character’ of the Bulgarians. 573

Generalising or stereotypical views about Bulgarians also emerged in connection with the problems that British enterprise encountered as a consequence of new commercial legislation in the 1880s and 1890s. Brophy argued that the ‘homely proverb of being “given an inch and taking an ell”’ applied ‘in full force’ to

Bulgarians and believed that not succumbing to bribery was rare in Bulgaria where opportunities for dishonest business dealings ‘were by no means wanting’. Ambassador Bax-Ironsides’s assessment of the Bulgarian customs authorities in 1912 followed a similar pattern:

Indeed, it may be said that the general attitude of the Government in matters relating to the customs is characteristic of the national reputation for “hard bargaining”.

Although these views were expressed mainly from the 1880s onwards when commercial contacts in the Balkans increased, they had been evident in the diplomatic evaluations of the commercial climate for British economic expansion at least from 1860 when the British consul in Belgrade reported that ‘jealousy against foreigners’ was so widespread in Serbia ‘that it may be doubtful whether the country at present offers a good opening for the capitalist’. Thus, to an extent, Homi Bhabha’s definition of a stereotype as ‘a form of knowledge and identification that vacillates between what is “in place”, already known and something that must be anxiously repeated’ is also a useful analytical tool in assessing British diplomatic attitudes to Bulgaria and Serbia as business partners. Gordon Allport’s rather old, but useful definition of a stereotype also captures well one of the ways in which the British viewed Serbs and Bulgarians in the commercial context. Allport argues that a stereotype is ‘an exaggerated belief’ that is ‘associated with a category’ and functions ‘to justify (rationalize) our conduct in relation to that category’. However, as shown above, these negative views were not shared by the numerous writers, businessmen, and promoters who, throughout the period, urged British capitalists to invest in mining and other enterprises in the Balkans.

574 FO 78/3773, Brophy to Lascelles, Varna, 13 April 1883.
National stereotyping also worked in the other direction, which meant that British diplomats, and to a lesser extent British businessmen, regarded themselves as honest and straightforward while other nationalities’ commercial morality was questioned. One of the most obvious illustrations of this sentiment came from the manager of the Anglo-Servian Syndicate whose company had drifted into trouble as they had attempted to obtain mining rights of the Rebelj copper mine near Valjevo in Serbia. Allegedly, some unknown ‘Englishman in Belgrade’ had denounced the financial stability of the Anglo-Servian Syndicate, thus undermining the company’s chances of obtaining the mining concession. When it turned out that this was not the case – but that a French company that owned the mining rights to this same mine considered continuing their operations – the British firm’s manager seemed relieved and argued that he had not believed in the first place that ‘there exists an Englishman who would stoop to such dishonourable methods of doing business’.\(^{579}\) Another example also illustrates this tendency. In 1912, in connection with the proposed harbour-construction concession in Serbia, Ralph Paget argued that corruption was so widespread in the country that ‘British applicants are always at a disadvantage as compared with foreign applicants, who understand these tortuous methods, and have less repugnance in adopting them’.\(^{580}\) The British discourse can therefore also be situated within the framework of legitimate versus illegitimate business, the former referring to solid commerce and the latter to speculation and over-trading. The Church of Scotland Minister and social reformer, Thomas Chalmers (1780-1847), had already made this distinction before the mid-nineteenth century.\(^{581}\)

Perceptions about commercial ineptitude and deceitfulness sometimes informed the thinking of British diplomats and the British press as they considered ways of improving trade relations with the Balkan countries. For example, a 1906 Foreign Office report argued that relations with Serbia could be improved by the establishment of an Anglo-Serbian bank, but that such a bank should be ‘conducted

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\(^{580}\) Paget, ‘Servia, 1912’, p. 9.

by Englishmen and founded with British capital’, involving Serbian businessmen only in administrative positions. The report stated that this should be the case because many Serbian commercial agents were ‘dishonest or incompetent’, but also because, as most Serbian agents lived in Trieste, Vienna or Budapest, they also had to rely on sub-agents in Serbia which often led to ‘misunderstandings and fraud’. 582 Serbian banks often received similar assessments from British diplomats. Dalyell Crackanthorpe, the British ambassador in Serbia, argued in 1914 that the Poslovna Bank of Belgrade was ‘not a very solid institution’ and thus British firms should not ‘rely too much on private contracts with the Bank in question’. 583 The Times was also an advocate of the establishment of an Anglo-Serbian bank and very explicit in its view that it should be founded with ‘English capital’ and be run by ‘English managers’, which would ensure that ‘only sound and safe investments in Servia’ were brought before ‘English investors’. 584 It was not, however, only a case of misguided diplomatic perceptions, because problems of unreliability did exist in the Balkans. For example, in 1912, the Birmingham Metal and Munition Co. Ltd., was unable to obtain the order for sheet brass because their local agent in Serbia had been denied access to the Serbian War Office because he had been accused of unfair trading. 585

Representations of Serbs and Bulgarians as inherently commercially unethical can also be interpreted as signs of commercial ‘otherness’. In the imperial context, colonial governors in India in the early part of the nineteenth century attributed to the Bengalis qualities such as indolence, dishonesty and untrustworthiness because these were among the traits that were most despised within British middle-class culture. 586 On the whole, the British upper and upper-middle classes tended to evaluate different cultures by ‘measuring other peoples against themselves’. 587 The same logic was at work in the British-Balkan framework. In the commercial context, this meant that the British diplomatic, and to some extent business classes, saw themselves as

582 FO 368/11, ‘Report for the Year 1904 on the Trade of Servia’ (1906), p. 16.
583 FO 368/1115, D. Crackanthorpe to E. Grey, Belgrade, 17 March 1914.
584 The Times, 2 Dec. 1895.
585 FO 368/724, Barclay to Grey, Belgrade, 16 Feb. 1912.
587 Porter, Absent-Minded Imperialists, p. 100.
honourable and law-abiding – attributes that were often equated with high levels of commercial morality. The British distanced themselves from foreigners, such as Serbs and Bulgarians, but also from the French, Belgians, Germans and Russians, who, the perception was, had almost equally low levels of commercial ethics.

3.5. ‘Frugal Mode of Life’: Perceptions of Bulgarians as Customers and Businessmen

The views discussed above emerged essentially in the context of specific cases of commercial difficulty and often – despite occasional allusions to and generalisations about ‘national characteristics’ in the diplomatic, and to a lesser extent in the businessmen’s accounts – references were made primarily to particular government agencies and ministries. However, British businessmen and diplomats were also at times keen on evaluating the Bulgarians as possible business partners and buyers of British goods and services; in this connection, generalising attitudes were more evident than in cases of commercial abuse. Featuring in a variety of accounts from the 1850s onwards, these types of assessments were often connected to particular circumstances and were used in order to determine various concrete commercial questions, such as whether or not a British bank should be established or the types of products that could be exported into the country. In many instances, the perceived ‘economical’ character of the Bulgarians, which was sometimes regarded as a negative factor, but mainly as a positive one, was used as the main argument. Other Balkan nationalities were not evaluated in this way.

The British consul Edward Neale’s report from 1858 was one of the earliest ‘official’ expressions of this sentiment. On this occasion, Neale, who was a significant diplomatic figure because he had established the first British legation in Bulgaria in 1847, connected the Bulgarian peasant society with the inability of the province to succeed in enterprise, mainly because the Bulgarians had a ‘habit of secreting money’ which impeded the development of Bulgaria’s trade relations and social conditions. The British consular agent used the same argument in his

attempts to convince the Foreign Office to back a scheme to establish an English bank in Bulgaria in 1913:

The frugal mode of life of the nation is alone responsible for [Bulgaria’s] sound financial condition. The Bulgarian, whether well-to-do or poor, is accustomed to live modestly and economically and his only purpose is to save money, there is scarcely a nation in Europe with so few needs as the Bulgarian, and it is owing to this characteristic that it enjoys the best credit of all the Balkan peoples.589

The same sentiment was also evident when the British assessed the Bulgarians as possible purchasers of British goods. In 1888, Charles Hardinge, the British consul in Sofia, believed that even though at times the Bulgarian customer was ‘deceived by showy appearance of Austrian, French and other foreign goods’ the fact that ‘Bulgarian race are remarkable for their thriftiness and economy’ meant that they would eventually choose British products because of their solidity and durability. Hardinge also reminded that ‘judicious selection’ should be involved when the suitability of products for the Bulgarian market was being considered, because, in his view, customer habits generally change quickly when the mass of the population of an (uncivilised) country, such as Bulgaria, comes into closer contact with ‘Western civilisation’.590 Another argument that was used to evaluate Bulgarian customer habits was to stress their supposedly ‘Oriental’ character. In 1909, W. H. Davis & Co of Birmingham, argued that there was no point in exporting bedsteads ‘without floral decorations’ because the Bulgarians had ‘oriental aspirations and tastes’ and therefore required ‘high coloured decorations’.591

British diplomats also evaluated Bulgarians’ aptitudes as businessmen. In connection with the proposed establishment of a commercial museum in Sofia, the British vice-consul, William Heard, listed the benefits that it would bring to Anglo-Bulgarian trade, but he also evaluated the business experience and qualities of the two

590 FO 78/4139, C. Hardinge ‘Remarks on British Trade and Commerce in Bulgaria’ (1888).
Bulgarians, Veleff and Sheomkoff, who had been assigned to run the museum. According to his view, Veleff was a ‘sound man of business’ because of his wide financial experience, and especially because he was ‘unlikely to be rash in giving credit’. This characterisation corresponded with the more general representations of the Bulgarians as ‘industrious, sober, and thrifty’ and as ‘good men of business’, because they possessed ‘a talent for co-operation’. Bulgarian businessmen were also praised for their knowledge of the English language.

Veleff’s cousin Sheomkoff, however, was not regarded in this way because he had spent many years in America where he supposedly had ‘assimilated a certain amount of American “Hustle”’ which, in the vice-consul Heard’s view, was ‘lacking in the ordinary Bulgarian businessman’. Heard’s perceptions of Sheomkoff coincided more closely with another popular view about Bulgarian businessmen. This view was present in Consul Francis Lindley’s assessment, when he stated that, although the British showroom in Bulgaria was important in helping in the ‘popularising [of] British goods’ in the country, British firms should be careful because ‘Bulgarian merchants’ tended to sell goods ‘at exorbitant prices’.

British businessmen were indeed careful in their transactions with Bulgarian customers. The London construction company, Joseph Baker & Sons, for example, stated that they always insisted on getting payments in advance when ‘doing business in Eastern Europe’. Similar views had been expressed in connection with the Serbs earlier in the nineteenth century. For example, the traveller Andrew Crosse described his encounter with a Serbian boat-owner who had been contracted to take English tourists across the Danube and who charged two ducats (about nine shillings) for the trip: ‘I thought it a monstrous charge, but the fellow had us in his power. I do not think the Servians are much liked by those who have to do business with them’.

592 FO 368/519, W. Heard, ‘Memorandum’ (1911).
593 FO 881/6731, A. Brophy to A. Nicolson, Varna, 27. July 1895.
594 FO 368/982, H. Bax-Ironsides to Board of Trade, 18 April 1911.
595 FO 368/519, W. Heard, ‘Memorandum’ (1911).
596 FO 368/519, Lindley to Grey, Sofia, 17 March 1911.
3.6. Conclusion

The Balkans was regarded and represented as a potentially very profitable region for British commercial expansion from about the mid-nineteenth century onwards. This view was widely expressed in travel accounts, in diplomatic correspondence, in the press, and also by professionals such as mining engineers who were employed by prospective investors to examine the possibilities for profit-making. The region was represented in this manner largely because of the existence of vast amounts of natural resources. Perceptions about the region’s financial stability increased from the 1880s onwards, and this was coupled with improvements in the transport networks and an increase in demand for manufactured goods and armaments. British companies were also concerned about the increased competition from German and US manufacturers from the 1880s onwards, another factor increasing British commercial interest in the Balkans.

These perceptions contributed to an increase in the establishment of companies in Britain that intended to operate principally in the Balkans. These British companies were mainly interested in sectors such as mining and banking – that is, in which there had been a tradition of success elsewhere in the world, and in which the possibility of success also seemed the highest in the Balkan framework. However, the majority of British companies failed. The reasons for failures included financial and economic ones, such as currency instability in the host countries, comparatively high transport costs, as well as the financial crisis of 1857 and the 1873 crash of the Vienna stock-market. There was also often a gap between borrower and lender expectations, with the latter normally being reluctant to lend as much as the former required. British companies were also often unable to attract sufficient capital, and they failed to guarantee a return on investments. They were also poorly promoted, weak in managerial structures, and had to put up with high levels of vertical specialization. In addition, perceptions about the commercial potential of the Balkans did not always match the reality of the situation in the region, thus also contributing to business failures. These problems however were experienced by British overseas companies in other parts of the world, and thus there was nothing specifically ‘Balkan’ about them.
British exporters and investors faced a whole range of problems in their commercial dealings with Serbia and Bulgaria. These problems were especially evident when British companies were involved in competitions for public contracts and concessions in Serbia and when protectionist legislation was introduced in Bulgaria from the 1890s. The representatives of British companies often argued that the prices of British goods were used by successive Serbian governments as a way of bringing down prices of goods from other countries and therefore lowering prices altogether. Another worry was that public contracts were not advertised early enough for British firms to submit adequate offers, leading to a situation in which competitors from continental Europe were placed in a more favourable position than British firms. In addition, British and colonial exporters of manufactured goods often expressed the view that duties were higher on British goods than on goods from other countries, thus increasing the prices of British goods and making British products less attractive to Balkan customers, again placing British manufacturers and exporters in a less favourable position than their continental rivals.

British companies also complained about the unwillingness of British banks to lend to Balkan governments which meant that British firms were unable to compete for public contracts on a level playing field with firms from other countries. At the same time, British investors protested about the lack of reliable business information and about the fact that their investments had been abused while, on some occasions, banks were concerned about the delays in the repayments of loans, all of which made British financiers reluctant to involve capital in the Balkans.

Political instability was also seen as harmful to British commercial interests. Wars in the mid-1870s were regarded by the British press as harming the possibility of exports of non-military manufactured goods, although specific evidence of whether this was actually the case, was not presented. The activities of Macedonian terrorist organisations in the early twentieth century were also regarded as possibly having effects on British financial operations in the Balkans, a perception which led to views that urged British financiers not to commit their resources to the region. Rumours about possible outbreaks of hostilities were more likely to affect share prices in the 1870s and 1880s than an actual state of war. The situation became worse during the Balkan Wars when Balkan securities were more widely held by British
investors, and the direct impact of war was therefore more profound. These again were generic problems which were not particular to the Balkans.

These difficulties however did not lead to generalisations or expressions of stereotypical derogatory ‘Balkanist’ views. British businessmen were mostly concerned with purely commercial aspects such as pricing and how business problems actually affected or could affect their livelihoods, rather than with making condescending and stereotypical statements about the supposed national characteristics of Serbs, Bulgarians or other Slavic peoples in the Balkans. British exporters reacted to commercial difficulties by appealing to diplomats for support, but often without success. Diplomatic assistance was often refused on three grounds: as a consequence of statutory realities which were mostly to do with protectionist legislation; as a result of negative attitudes in terms of the prospects for success even if diplomatic support were given; and if promoters had foreign connections, and especially, if they were Jewish.

British diplomats also believed that corruption in Serbia was so widespread that it was unlikely that British firms would succeed in their business endeavours. They also thought that xenophobic sentiments in Bulgaria drove away foreign businesses and thus British investors and companies should not commit to business arrangements in the country. On the other hand, Bulgarians were also represented in diplomatic accounts as ‘thrifty’, a perception that was used in some instances as a way of illustrating that investments would not be abused and that British manufactured goods would be popular in the country because they were more durable than goods from Britain’s continental competitors. Diplomats also believed that business ethics and capabilities in Britain were much more developed than in the Balkan and in continental countries and, therefore, if British investors or companies wanted to increase their contacts in the Balkans, they should do so by employing British capital and personnel in order to avoid the difficulties that were likely to arise with local agents, banks and government officials.

The diplomats – bombarded with complaints from British companies and investors – were much more likely to fall into generalising ‘Balkanist’ categorising than the businessmen, perhaps out of frustration. There could also have been some class issues at work here. Diplomats were often aristocratic, and were more often than
not steeped in the prejudices and preconceptions of that class, especially in terms of their attitudes to the peasantry. Diplomats were also more likely to have been involved in colonial administration which also carried with it a certain world-view which was not necessarily shared by those employed in commerce, especially commodity trade. Thus, corrupt and xenophobic practices in Serbia and Bulgaria – or those deemed as such by British diplomats – sometimes transformed into generalising statements about ‘national habits’ in these countries which meant that, for example, Bulgarians were considered to be adverse to foreign investments because they were from peasant backgrounds and therefore did not understand much about profits and finance. It is possible that bankers were more influenced by diplomatic prejudices and perceptions than ordinary merchants, especially Northern ones, because bankers and the political elites were very close culturally and socially. Thus, negative diplomatic perceptions possibly had an impact on British bankers’ caution about getting involved, for example, with state loans in the Balkans, which then hindered the possibility of British manufacturers competing with continental producers.

Thus, perceptions whether negative or indeed positive, whether true or based on preconceived ideas, certainly affected the type of advice that diplomats gave and the views they transmitted. In effect, the diplomatic view was that British firms would not succeed because they were unaware of how ‘the system’ worked in the Balkans, which meant that British businesses should not commit to operations in the region, or, if they did, they should do so only with British capital and personnel in order to avoid trouble with ‘the locals’. Therefore, the prejudices of the diplomatic class were likely to have had an effect on commercial policy decisions while there was no evidence that negative preconceptions had any impact on changing, or affecting in any way, the decision-making processes of British businessmen. On some occasions, however, perceptions about cultural attributes of the Bulgarians informed British businessmen about customer habits in the country, thus partly informing them about the types of products that could be successfully exported there.
Chapter 4
THE BALKANS IN SATIRE: VISUAL AND TEXTUAL REPRESENTATIONS IN PUNCH CARTOONS

Punch cartoons have been used widely as a historical source, but detailed studies of the magazine’s attitudes towards the Balkans have so far attracted little thorough attention. Andrekos Varnava’s article on the British occupation of Cyprus in 1878 and Anthony Cross’s comparative work on representations of the Crimean War in Punch and in Russian satirical magazines are the only ones that coincide even loosely with the aims of this chapter. Katarzyna Murawska-Muthesius’s interesting piece on Punch’s conceptions of Eastern Europe during the Cold War also touches on issues that are discussed here. The lack of detailed investigation of Punch’s attitudes to the Balkans is a significant gap in the literature given that the magazine was one of the most famous British cultural institutions. This chapter has three overall aims: first, to examine the tools utilised by cartoonists to represent Balkan issues, and second, to investigate how these portrayals were connected to domestic British concerns. Furthermore, the ways in which power relations were portrayed is also analysed.

4.1. Balkan Provinces and States as Children: Depicting Power Relations and Domestic Social Concerns

In Punch, the Balkan provinces and states, like Ireland and India, for example, were often portrayed as children, mostly as the submissive party in the parent-child equation. This mode of representation was very popular among Punch cartoonists from early on and continued to be so throughout the magazine’s history. For example, during the Cold War, Eastern European states were often portrayed as school children that were shown as being disciplined or controlled by more sensible and powerful

Western European countries.\textsuperscript{600} David Norris has also argued that Western European powers regarded small nations as ‘children with no right to exercise their own voice’ and that the assigning of an ‘inferior’ status was essentially a powerful form of western ‘cultural colonialism’.\textsuperscript{601} In the Balkan case, the parent-child metaphor was adopted in connection with the Austrian occupation of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878, and again in 1909, when Bosnia was annexed by Austria; to refer to Ottoman response to the unification of Eastern Rumelia with the province of Bulgaria in 1885; to illustrate European reaction to intra-Balkan antagonisms during the Balkan Wars and when the Montenegrin forces captured Skutari in Northern Albania in the spring of 1913, during the Second Balkan War; and to depict Macedonia’s liberation from Ottoman control in 1912. The following section examines how this metaphoric device was utilised by the magazine’s cartoonists in their portrayals of Balkan issues.

The cartoon ‘A Nice Time of It’ appeared in \textit{Punch} in August 1878, and it was one of the most illustrative examples, on the one hand, of how the parent-child metaphor was used to depict power relations between small Balkan provinces and great powers, and on the other, how it was utilised in order to represent British social concerns. The cartoon was drawn by Edward Linley Sambourne, who was almost as well-known as John Tenniel, but he was much more connected to the political establishment. Perhaps this explains why Tenniel was much keener to draw political cartoons than Linley Sambourne.\textsuperscript{602} The cartoon featured Bosnia and Herzegovina as hooligan street children that were keeping the ‘Austrian Bobby’ busy in his ‘new beat’.\textsuperscript{603} In terms of events, the cartoon referred to the Treaty of Berlin by which the two provinces were made Austrian protectorates.

\textsuperscript{600} Murawska-Muthesius, ‘On Small Nations’, p. 281.
\textsuperscript{601} Norris, \textit{Balkan Myth}, pp. 28-9.
\textsuperscript{602} Varnava, ‘Occupation of Cyprus’, pp. 172-3.
\textsuperscript{603} ‘A Nice Time of It; Or the New Constable and the Naughty Boys’, \textit{Punch}, 31 Aug. 1878.
Figure 4.1.: ‘A Nice Time of It’, Punch (1878)
Linley Sambourne’s portrayal of the two Balkan provinces, dubbed ‘Bozzy’ and ‘Herzy’, as vicious, dirty, disorderly and violent street children, was directly comparable to the ways in which domestic juvenile delinquency was represented. These kinds of characteristics were associated with the uneducated, parentless and poor children – the ‘street Arabs’ – who lived on the streets of the larger British, but also continental European and American cities. Many contemporary accounts in Britain reflected concerns about the well-being of these street children with a language that was identical with Punch’s portrayals of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Frederic Mouat (1816-97), one time Inspector-General of Prisons in Bengal, described the ‘street Arabs’ as the ‘most depraved and incorrigibly vicious children’ while Charles Booth (1840-1916), the famous businessman-cum-social investigator, argued that the disorderly young men that roamed the streets of every major city were ‘incapable of improvement’ and that the ‘children of this class’ were ‘the street Arabs’ who ‘are principally to be found separated from their parents’. The absence of parental control was also seen by the Treasurer of the Statistical Society, James Hammick, as one of the major problems facing the children of the urban poor in the British society as a whole.

Punch commented on the transfer of the ‘parental control’ of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Ottoman Empire to Austria, and the provinces were portrayed as difficult to control, just like street children in the UK. The magazine had already commented on child poverty in the early 1840s when the issue was still largely being ignored in the so-called ‘high arts’. Although the Pre-Raphaelites had been interested in modern topics in the 1850s and 1860s, including the urban poor, it was only in the 1870s and 1880s that poverty and social deprivation became accepted.

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topics for discussion in British artistic circles.\footnote{J. Treuherz, \textit{Hard Times: Social Realism in Victorian Art} (London: Lund Humphries, 1987), p. 29.} Thus, referring to Bosnia and the Herzegovina as poor and unruly street children in the late 1870s probably resonated well with the magazine’s largely middle class target audience.

‘A Nice Time of It’ also had obvious connections to the views that represented the Balkan provinces as ready for western European economic expansion. As the previous chapter has shown, the availability of unexploited natural resources was one of the most widely-used arguments in this context and the cartoon, in which the provinces were described as being ‘rich in tips and perks’\footnote{‘Nice Time of It’ (1878).} also transmitted the same view. This suggests that the Balkans were widely represented in this way because otherwise \textit{Punch} would not have taken up the issue.

In another cartoon, ‘The Little Bulgar Boy’,\footnote{‘The Little Bulgar Boy’, \textit{Punch}, 17 Oct. 1885.} again drawn by Linley Sambourne, the parent-child metaphor was once more used to depict power relations and to comment on domestic problems in Britain. The cartoon was an adaptation of Richard Harris Barham’s (1788-1845) \textit{Ingoldsby Legends}, a collection of myths, ghost stories and poetry, which first appeared as regular series in the \textit{Bentley’s Miscellany} in 1837 and was illustrated by John Leech (1817-64), George Cruikshank (1792-1878) and John Tenniel, all of whom were deeply involved in \textit{Punch} in the early years. The \textit{Ingoldsby Legends} was very widely read throughout the Victorian era and comparable in popularity to Alfred Tennyson’s poem \textit{Enoch Arden} (1864).\footnote{L. Erickson, ‘The Poet’s Corner: The Impact of Technical Changes in Printing on English Poetry, 1800-1850’, \textit{EHL}, 52 (1985), p. 904.}

This cartoon was therefore among the finest examples of how \textit{Punch} used intertextuality with other literary forms to enhance the resonance of its cartoons with the magazine’s readers.\footnote{Codell, ‘Imperial Differences’, p. 418.} Intertextuality was something that stayed with \textit{Punch} throughout the magazine’s history. In 1948, for example, the cartoon ‘One Man River’, which referred to the Danubian free-trade negotiations, utilised a well-liked
American folk song the ‘Ol’ Man River’, popularised by the famous African-American civil rights activist, singer and athlete Paul Robeson (1898-1976).613

The original chapter in the Ingoldsby Legends was entitled ‘Misadventures at Margate: A Legend of Jarvis’s Jetty’ and it was a dialogue between ‘Mr. Simkinson’ and a homeless boy who was loitering at the Margate pier in London. Mr. Simkinson urged the boy to go home to his mother, but the boy cried that he had neither a mother, nor a home to go to.614 In Punch, Margate became Philippopolis, the Eastern Rumelian capital, Mr Simkinson the Turkish Sultan, and the homeless boy the ‘Vulgar Bulgar Boy’.

Figure 4.2.: ‘The Little Bulgar Boy’, *Punch* (1885)
In terms of events, the cartoon referred to the unification of Eastern Rumelia with the province of Bulgaria. This occurred as a result of a *coup d’etat* in Philippopolis which effectively ended the Ottoman control of the area. Another significant aspect of this development was that the subsequent growth of Bulgarian territory was viewed very suspiciously in Serbia, which was one of the key factors that contributed to the outbreak of the Serbian-Bulgarian War in 1885.\footnote{R. Hall, *The Balkan Wars: Prelude to the First World War* (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 3-4.}

As shown above, the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were portrayed as immature troublemakers that created problems for Austria. In ‘The Little Bulgar Boy’, Bulgaria was also represented as a young, unruly prankster that was no longer controlled by the Ottoman Empire, its former master. The break-down of this relationship was illustrated by a dialogue in which the Turkish character, Abdul Hamid II (1842-1918), the Ottoman Sultan between 1878 and 1909, who was a ruthless autocrat, attempted to reassert its former authority: ‘Don’t you hear, my little man, your Suzerain speaks!’ to which the Bulgarian character replied that he had ‘no Suzerain, so that kibosh will not wash’.\footnote{‘Little Bulgar Boy’ (1885).} The ‘Vulgar Bulgar Boy’ was very similar to Linley Sambourne’s earlier characters ‘Bozzy’ and ‘Herzy’ and he was again exploiting issues of juvenile delinquency and child homelessness in this cartoon, which showed the ‘Vulgar Bulgar Boy’ running away with the suitcase ‘Eastern Rumelia’ which he had stolen from the Ottoman Sultan.

The representation of Serbia as a child soldier in another Linley Sambourne cartoon, ‘A Handsome Concession’\footnote{‘A Handsome Concession’, *Punch*, 10 March 1909.} from 1909, also fell into the category in which Balkan states were depicted as unruly children that were creating all kinds of problems for the European great powers. On the more obvious level, the cartoon referred to the annexation of Bosnia by Austria which had created a lot of ill-feeling in Serbia, but the caricature can also be interpreted as a comment on economic issues.
Figure 4.3.: ‘A Handsome Concession’, Punch (1909)
From 1904 onwards, British and other non-Austrian firms were increasingly presented with the possibility of doing business in the Balkans, owing to Austria-Hungary’s trade embargo on Serbia, which also became known as the ‘Pig War’. However, although the number of Austrian concessions in the country had decreased, new business had gone mostly to French and German and, to a lesser extent Belgian companies, and the British firms were still unable to obtain ‘handsome concessions’ in Serbia. This very serious dispute between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was extremely harmful to Serbia’s economic development, and, after Austria had increased the import duties on Serbian livestock, the country’s exports to Austria decreased from 86 per cent to 28 percent. Austria had already introduced similar measures against Serbia in 1895-6. In any case, this cartoon must have resonated well with British middle-class businessmen who had been unsuccessfully trying to obtain concessions and public contracts in the country. *Punch* had also flirted with Eastern economic issues in the mid-1870s when the magazine commented on the difficulties that British bondholders – who were portrayed as a caricature of a city magnate ‘Mr Jobberstock’ – had had with Turkish government bonds and unpaid Turkish and Egyptian state loans.

Two further examples illustrated the way in which *Punch* employed the parent-child metaphor in order to depict power relations. Leonard Raven-Hill’s (1876-1942) ‘The Good Boy of the East’ represented Bulgaria and Serbia as unruly classroom monsters threatening to attack Greece. European sentiment was depicted by the figure of ‘Dame Europa’, an elderly teacher, who attempted to discipline the disorderly Balkan states, and demonstrated, by holding a whip behind her back, that she was ready to use force if necessary. In term of events, the cartoon referred to the quarrels that had broken out between the members of the Balkan Alliance over territorial issues. The classroom was one of the most popular settings in which the *Punch* cartoonists represented power relations between small and more powerful states. Murawska-Muthesius has argued that showing Eastern European countries as

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monstrous children who were ‘lectured by their superiors’ was a much-used metaphoric device during the Cold War years and that it was a mode of representation that was invented by the whole of the editorial team, and did not therefore so much reflect views of any one cartoonist. The key was that ‘this strategy justified the inequality of power by the mechanism of metaphorical substitution which explains (and legitimizes) the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar’. All of this also fitted well in the ways in which the Balkan provinces and states were portrayed before 1914; *Punch*’s later artists did take many of their ideas directly from their famous Victorian and Edwardian predecessors.

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THE GOOD BOY OF THE EAST.

TURKEY (from the corner in which Europe has put him). “I FEAR, MADAM, THAT OUR YOUNG FRIENDS ARE CAUSING YOU SOME EMBARRASSMENT. BUT, WHILE GREATLY DEPLORING THEIR INSUBORDINATION, I REGRET THAT I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO RENDER ANY APPRECIABLE ASSISTANCE TO YOUR AUTHORITY.”

Figure 4.4.: ‘The Good Boy of the East’, Punch (1913)
The representation of Montenegro as a peasant child playing with guns in ‘Five Keels to None’ from 1913 also fell into the same category. The cartoon referred to the Montenegrin capture of Skutari in Northern Albania, and the broken toy-castle in the illustration was an allusion to the six-month shelling of the town by Serbian and Montenegrin forces while the European powers were attempting to persuade the Montenegrin figure to leave Albania. Referring to Montenegro as a child was quite peculiar given that the country had managed to remain independent even though the Ottomans had on numerous occasions attempted to invade it, and, in fact, the Montenegrin state was already established in 1851. Thus, although, by 1913, the country had been an independent state for sixty-two years, it was still represented in *Punch* as an unruly and erratic child.

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\[622\] ‘Five Keels to None’, *Punch*, 9 April 1913.
Figure 4.5.: ‘Five Keels to None’, *Punch* (1913)
In *Punch*, therefore, the child metaphor was used mostly to depict immaturity, unruliness and unpredictability, and to represent power relations between the small Balkan provinces or nations and European great powers.

However, on some occasions, such as in the cartoon ‘At Last’,\(^\text{623}\) drawn by Bernard Partridge, the symbol was applied to portray hope and triumph. Partridge was an interesting individual who, in addition to working for *Punch*, also drew posters for the Liberal Party and was involved in the advertising campaigns of the soap manufacturing giant the Lever Brothers,\(^\text{624}\) who, as we have seen in the previous chapter, also had operations in the Balkans, namely in Bulgaria. The cartoon, which appeared in the magazine only a little over a week after the Ottoman forces had capitulated to the Bulgarian army in Thrace and to the Serbs in the Battle of Kumanovo in November 1912, featured a Macedonian peasant girl with broken shackles around her wrists and ankles, which were references to recent liberation from Ottoman control. The burning village in the background as well as the roughness of terrain magnified the difficulty of the struggle. Furthermore, ‘freedom’ seemed to have been ‘Heaven-sent’, a gift from the neighbouring Christian nations, which had finally managed to push the Ottomans out of Europe.

\(^{623}\) ‘At Last’, *Punch*, 27 Nov. 1912.

Figure 4.6.: ‘At Last’, *Punch* (1912)
‘At Last’ was one of the few Punch cartoons in which the “liberation” of a Balkan province from Ottoman control was visibly celebrated. These sorts of developments were usually approached with sarcasm as in the cartoon ‘The New Leg’ (1878), drawn by John Tenniel, in which Serbian and Bulgarian autonomy resulting from the Treaty of Berlin was represented as the new wooden leg of the Turkish Sultan. This cannot however be seen as an indication that Punch was pro-Turkish in its politics during the Eastern Crisis. On the contrary, the magazine openly endorsed the anti-Turkish stance, but without portraying any overtly pro-Russian sentiments either. Punch followed general Liberal outrage towards Conservative Eastern policy and was unwavering in its support for Gladstone over Disraeli. However, Punch was not really Liberal in its politics either, but seemed to always be against whichever party was in power, at the same time largely going along with what it believed to be the dominant public sentiment about any given issue.

To conclude, Punch’s portrayals of the Balkan provinces and states as children fitted very well into the magazine’s editorial decisions and this was the way in which most non-Western European nations and peoples were presented in its pages. The Balkan characters were either portrayed as ‘street children’ or ‘classroom monsters’, which again was in line with Punch’s wider editorial politics, as was the use of intertextuality and familiar metaphors in attempts to bring the rather distant Balkan issues closer to the magazine’s mainly middle-class audiences in Britain. The most interesting utilisation of the child metaphor was in the case of Macedonia when the province was freed from Ottoman control during the First Balkan War, because on this occasion the symbol was used to portray hope and triumph, which completely differed from the more generic clichés that the magazine’s cartoonists employed when commenting on Balkan issues. Representations of power relations between small and more powerful states were also very similar to the ways in which they were

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portrayed in diplomatic and political language at the time. In addition, *Punch’s* attitudes towards the Balkans closely matched those transmitted in travel literature.

### 4.2. ‘A Vicious Mob’: Constructing Group Identities

Balkan provinces and states were also often depicted as a ‘violent mob’ and this approach was adopted especially during the Eastern Crisis, when the magazine commented on the rise of Pan-Slav sentiments in Russia and the Balkan provinces, but also during the Balkan Wars. In addition to utilising the child metaphor, the *Punch* cartoonists were keen on using animal symbolism which meant that the ‘Russian Bear’, the ‘British Lion’, and the ‘Ottoman Turkey’, for example, featured regularly as representations of national characteristics in various contexts. Furthermore, the *Punch* cartoonists, especially Tenniel, often turned Irish rebels and Catholic republicans into snakes, dragons and apes.628 Tenniel was a very significant figure in Victorian cultural circles as he had famously illustrated much-loved literary works such as *Alice in Wonderland* (1865). He started at *Punch* in 1851 and succeeded John Leech as the chief cartoonist in 1864, holding the post until 1901. Tenniel was also an essential and important figure in transforming the magazine into a national institution. His politics were also quite controversial. Although he was a self-confessed Conservative, this did not prevent him from ridiculing Lord Beaconsfield.629 However, most of Tenniel’s satirical approaches to Beaconsfield were directed primarily at the latter’s Jewish origin and rather less at his Conservatism.630

On some occasions, such as in Tenniel’s ‘The Dogs of War’ (1876),631 the Balkan provinces were depicted as black dogs. The ‘black dog’ metaphor had been widely used as a symbol for depression and death in Victorian literary culture and this particular sign was probably also chosen by Tenniel because it was likely to resonate

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630 See Introduction.
631 ‘The Dogs of War’, *Punch*, 8 April 1876.
well with the magazine’s readers, again illustrating the magazine’s keenness on intertextuality. In Victorian literary culture, the ‘black dog’ had been loaded with negative connotations as ‘an ever-present companion, lurking in the shadows, always on alert, capable of overwhelming you at any moment’. 632 ‘Black dog’ symbolism was used by Tenniel to depict the supposedly erratic and violent element in the character of the Balkan Slavs, a view which again closely matched popular pre-1914 cultural conceptions about the region. According to Mark Mazower, the Balkans had been perceived as a region of ‘violence and bloodshed’ in Western Europe since the early nineteenth century as a result of continuous revolts against Ottoman rule.633

633 Mazower, Balkans, p. 4.
Figure 4.7.: ‘The Dogs of War’, *Punch* (1876)
Historically, this cartoon referred to the hostilities that had been going on between Herzegovinian and Bosnian rebels and Turkish government forces since the summer of 1875. From early 1876, there had been a significant growth of Pan-Slav sentiments in Russia and by the time the cartoon appeared, it was well-known in Britain that the Montenegrins were openly assisting the rebels. This situation developed into a larger conflict which resulted in a declaration of war by Serbia and Montenegro on Turkey on 30 June 1876 which was also graphically illustrated, again by using the ‘black dog’ metaphor, in the cartoon ‘Keeping the Ring’.634

‘The Dogs of War’ also showed how power relations were represented in *Punch*. Russia was shown as being in total control of the Balkan provinces, while British sentiment was portrayed by the figure of John Bull, who was addressing the Russian figure that ‘it might be awk’ard’ if the dogs were let loose. The fact that John Bull was addressing Russia – not the Balkan provinces – and that Russia was shown to be in control of these provinces, was not only an illustration of the feeling that these small provinces were not to be trusted with the control of their own destiny, but also, that, as a unified front, they could pose a threat to the Ottoman Empire, and at the same time destabilise it even further.

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634 ‘Keeping the Ring’, *Punch*, 22 July 1876.
Figure 4.8.: ‘Keeping the Ring’, Punch (1876)
The same unified Pan-Slavic front featured in the cartoon ‘Keeping the Ring’ which also depicted European powers, in the form of John Bull and Mr Punch, as distant and disapproving observers of the situation.

The violent group identity of the Balkan provinces was also constructed by depicting them as fierce peasant soldiers. This was the case, for example, in another Tenniel illustration, ‘A “Critic”-Al Situation’ from 1877. Punch’s keenness on intertextuality was again visibly present. This cartoon was a direct reference to Richard Brinsley Sheridan’s (1751-1816) play The Critic, Or, A Tragedy Rehearsed (1779) in which the renowned playwright and aspiring Whig politician explored similarities between the world of theatre and the world of politics. Punch’s cartoon referred to The Critic’s Act III which portrayed a scene from an imaginary tragedy, ‘The Spanish Armada’, in which six characters, described as ‘a heroic group’ by the play’s imaginary director, ‘Mr Puff’, were in a deadlock situation, pointing daggers to each other, each being ‘afraid to let go first’. These characters were replaced in Punch by the Montenegrin, Herzegovinian, Bosnian and Russian personages that were pointing their daggers at Turkey. Lord Derby, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was depicted as The Critic’s sentimental character, ‘Beefeater’, who ordered the combatants to drop their ‘swords and daggers,’ ‘in the Queen’s name’. This caption was taken directly from Sheridan’s play in which the characters did indeed drop their weapons, while in the Punch’s adaptation, the situation remained unsettled, as reflected by the remark ‘but do they?’ Punch’s prophecy about the continuation of the conflict turned out to be a correct one, because only less than three weeks after the publication of the cartoon, on 24 April, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire.

The most obvious point of comparison with Sheridan’s comedy was with the unstable situation of contemporary international politics which threatened Britain’s

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635 ‘A “Critic”-Al Situation’, Punch, 7 April 1877.
637 R. Sheridan, The Critic, Or, a Tragedy Rehearsed (1779).
638 ‘“Critic”-Al Situation’ (1877).
639 Sheridan, The Critic, Punch, ‘“Critic”-Al Situation’.
global and domestic positions. Sheridan’s play appeared in the late 1770s when Britain faced considerable threats to its national and colonial security in the form of the American Revolution and there were also fears of invasion posed by the Franco-Spanish fleet. In the late 1870s, the Eastern Crisis provided a similar threat to British interests, namely to the policy which aimed at maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey’s position had been seriously challenged between the summer of 1875 and the spring of 1877 by revolts in the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the uprising in Bulgaria that had been violently suppressed by the Turkish irregular soldiers, leading to the massive public outcry in Britain against the Conservative government’s eastern policy, and by the brief Serbian-Turkish War which had ended in February 1877. Serbia’s absence from the cartoon was probably a reference to the poor performance of the Serbian army in the war against the Ottomans.

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Figure 4.9.: ‘A “Critic”-Al Situation’, *Punch* (1877)
The way in which the Balkan provinces were represented in this cartoon also closely matched prevalent cultural perceptions about them in British popular science and literature and in media. This was the case especially with regard to the Montenegrins who were widely portrayed as a naturally militaristic warrior race by prominent Britons such as Edward Freeman, Henry Howorth and Alfred Tennyson. The placing of the personage of Montenegro in the foreground in the *Punch* illustration can be seen as an expression of the same sentiment.

Other visual reportages, for example, in the *Illustrated London News* and *The Graphic* also portrayed the Balkan Slavs as fierce peasant soldiers. The ‘Fate of a Turkish Spy’ was just one example of the dozens of similar illustrations in these magazines during the mid-1870s Eastern Crisis, most of which showed Balkan insurgents attacking Turkish convoys in mountain fastnesses.

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642 See Chapter 3 of this study.

Figure 4.10.: ‘Fate of a Turkish Spy’, *The Illustrated London News* (1876)
Although the Balkan provinces were portrayed as a ‘violent mob’ primarily during the Eastern Crisis, similar depictions also emerged during the Balkan Wars. For example, Bernard Partridge’s cartoon, ‘No Prizes’, from the autumn of 1912 depicted the Balkan League (or the Balkan Alliance) of Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Greece, as a wild gang that was determined to take on the Ottomans, despite European warnings. The Balkan Alliance had emerged in the spring of 1912 and was directed against both the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and received significant moral, military and financial support from Russia. European sentiment was again portrayed through an authoritative female figure ‘Dame Europa’ that urged the Balkan Leaguers to stop, because ‘if they should win, Europe would disqualify them’. The Balkan League decided to take their chances.

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645 Ibid.
Figure 4.11.: 'No Prizes', *Punch*, (1912)
Depictions of Balkan rebels in *Punch* were comparable to the eighteenth century portrayals of European revolutionaries by artists such as James Gillray (1757-1815) who represented Scottish Jacobins as ‘rebels with long faces, wild eyes, snub noses, flaring nostrils, cavernous mouths and jutting jaws’.  

In conclusion, the violent group identity of the Slavic Balkans was constructed in *Punch* by using familiar cultural devices, metaphors and intertextuality. Balkan provinces were portrayed as dogs of war and ferocious peasant warriors, a depiction that was also evident in other visual representations of the region such as those transmitted in illustrated journalism and travel books. Furthermore, *Punch* also used historical analogies, another often utilised tool, such as that which was drawn between the Eastern Crisis and the late 1770s when there seemed to be imminent threat to Britain’s colonial and domestic security.

### 4.3. ‘A Patchwork of Rival Nationalities’: Representing Intra-Balkan Antagonisms

The second Balkan war showed that these passionate little peoples could attack one another more fiercely than they had fought their old Moslem masters.

During the Second Balkan War in 1913, a new pattern began to emerge in the way in which the Balkan states were depicted in *Punch* – a focus on their willingness to fight each other. As the quotation above illustrates, the same pattern was emerging in other British portrayals of the region as well. In *Punch*, this mode of representation surfaced primarily as a direct response to alterations in the relationship between the Balkan states. Up to this point the Balkan Slavs were portrayed either as a unified Christian front merged together to fight against the evils of Ottoman rule or as driftwood in the power struggles of the European powers. Although the Serbian-Bulgarian War of 1885-6 was the first conflict which involved two Balkan countries, it was only during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 that this issue captured the

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imagination of the *Punch* cartoonists. The same change manifested itself in other forms of British writing on Balkan issues as well.

The first cartoon that illustrated the breaking up of the Balkan Alliance, ‘The Balkan Pas De Quatre’, drawn by Leonard Raven-Hill, appeared in December 1912. In the drawing, the Balkan Alliance was depicted dancing a traditional folk dance, but Greece was shown to be ‘out of step’ with the other members. The cartoon referred to the opening months of the First Balkan War that had commenced in October 1912 when the Ottoman forces ended up fighting on four different fronts: in Thrace against the Bulgarians; in Macedonia against the Bulgarians, Serbs, and the Greeks; in Albania against the Greeks, Serbs and the Montenegrins; and in Kosovo against the Montenegrins and Serbs.

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Figure 4.12.: ‘The Balkan Pas De Quatre’, *Punch* (1912)
Greece was shown as being ‘out of step’ with the other members of the alliance possibly because the Greek forces had been less successful in their military campaigns than the other Balkan armies. The Greek army had been unable to take Ioannina even though they faced weaker opposition there than the other combatants on their respective fronts. Furthermore, in the first months of the war, the Greek army had been the only one that had fled from the Ottomans; and in the battle of Bitola in Macedonia, for example, the Serbian army had moved in, in order to prevent the Greek army from collapsing. Furthermore, the cost of war had not been as grave for Greece as it had been for the other members of the alliance.  

*Punch*’s depiction of Greece in a traditional costume and the others (except Montenegro) in European uniforms was interesting, especially if the drawing is compared to an illustration of Greek soldiers that was drawn by a British officer, Captain W. A. Hare, in 1881.

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650 Hare, ‘Greek Army’ (1881).
Figure 4.13.: ‘Greek Soldiers, Athens’, W. A. Hare (1881)
Hare’s illustration shows that only about a half of the soldiers were dressed in the traditional uniform, and that they were mostly gathered amongst themselves. According to Hare, by 1881, only the riflemen wore traditional uniforms and most of these soldiers were in fact not Greek, but Albanian Christians. Hare’s overall assessment of the Greeks as fighting men was very negative, but his distinction between recruits from rural and those from urban regions was a defining feature of his report. ‘There is a vast difference’, argued Hare, ‘between [the] country-bred Greek and the town-bred Greek’, which, according to him, had a negative effect on the standard and efficiency of the Greek army. He argued that the ‘countrymen as a rule are fine men, hardy, and excellent pedestrians’, whereas the ‘town-bred men…appear to have no stamina; they are narrow-chested, and sickly…the majority are quite unaccustomed to anything approaching hard work’.

But his perceptions of Albanian riflemen were completely different. He argued that these soldiers were ‘accustomed to mountain work’ and that they were of ‘excellent physique’, ‘fairly tall, spare, well-made and active’ and that the riflemen were ‘far superior to the rest of the Greek army’ in ‘appearance, manner and dress’ simply for the reason that the European uniforms that were ‘sent en masse from France’ did not fit the Greek soldier. Thus, the issue was misrepresented in Punch where familiar cultural signs and ideas about Greece were exploited in order to make the cartoon resonate better with the audience. Similar views about tight, uncomfortable and ill-fitting western uniforms were also held in connection with Turkish officers and regular soldiers earlier in the 1840s when the renowned Finnish explorer and orientalist Professor Georg August Wallin (1811-52) wrote in his diary at Constantinople that:

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651 Ibid., p. 21.
652 The non-militaristic character of the Greeks seemed to be a fixed notion, used by many commentators, such as F. Urquhart who in 1914 wrote that the Turks had despised the Greek ‘military incapacity’, and therefore only very few Greeks, mainly from the highlands of Mount Pindus were ever recruited to the Ottoman army.
653 Hare, ‘Greek Army’, p. 2.
654 Ibid.
Selvästi näkyy, että turkkilaiset eivät vielä ole ennättäneet tottua uusiin vaatteisiinsa. Ei juuri voi nähdä mitään säältävämpää kuin on turkkilainen sotilas tiukasti istuvissa housuissaan ja pienessä röijyssään, joka selässä muodostaa tuhansia ryppyjä, parrattomana ja ilman turbaania, tavallisimmin kengät lintallaan ja sukat syltysää. Eivät upseeritkaan ole oikein kotonaan uudessa univormussaan; he näyttävät noloilta ja pingottuneilta kuin koiria, jolta on häntä katkaistu.

The quotation above shows that there was not necessarily anything particularly British about many of the views that were expressed about Turkey or the Balkans, but that they were perceptions that were more commonly held by upper middle and upper classes throughout Europe, even in the northern fringes – although Wallin was an exceptional Finn who had received many acknowledgements from leading European academies such as from the UK’s Royal Geographical Society in 1850, which awarded Wallin the same prize given to David Livingstone the year before. Wallin’s knowledge of the Middle East had also been used by the English East India Company to draw a commercial map of the region.

Before 1914, Romania featured much less frequently in *Punch* than its Slavic neighbours, although the country had been very much in the public eye after the publication of Bram Stoker’s *Dracula* in 1897. *Dracula* was very popular from the

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655 G. A. Wallin, *Tutkimusmatkoilla Arabien Parissa: Otteita Matkapäiväkirjasta* (Juva: WSOY, 2000), p. 26. *Translation by Mika Suonpää*: ‘It shows that the Turks have not yet had time to get used to their new clothes. There is scarcely anything more pathetic than a Turkish soldier in his tight trousers and tiny shirt, beardless and without the turban…nor do officers seem at home in their new uniforms; they look embarrassed and tense like a dog whose tail has been cut off’.


657 For British perceptions of Romania see, C. Andras, ‘Romania and Its Images in British Travel Writing: In-Between Peripherality and Cultural Interference’, *TRANS*, 14 (2002). Available:
outset mainly because late-Victorian readers enjoyed vampire and other horror stories. The novel also succeeded well in America and on the continent.\textsuperscript{658} It was therefore actually quite surprising that \textit{Punch} cartoonists did not exploit the issue by drawing vampire-inspired or gothic cartoons about Romania. However, two cartoons, ‘The Bayard of Bukharest’ and ‘Kleptoroumania’,\textsuperscript{659} both drawn by Raven-Hill, included Romanian characters. The first cartoon was a reference to the Romanian aristocratic class, the boyars, and the second, to the perceived Romanian tendency to steal things without the desire to profit from them. Both of these cartoons referred to the territorial dispute between Bulgaria and Romania over Silistra, the fortress town on the Danube, which was situated in the Dobrudja, an important and rich grain-growing region.

In the summer of 1913, \textit{Punch} illustrations that referred to the rise in intra-Balkan antagonisms increased in number as a consequence of the fact that the territorial disputes between the Balkan Alliance had become more visible and more widely publicised. The cartoon ‘The Looker-On’\textsuperscript{660} showed Serbia and Greece ready to take on Bulgaria, while Turkey was shown to be sarcastically delighted about the disputes between the former allies:

\begin{quote}
It pains me, gentlemen, to think that you, who have been animated from the first by pure Christian zeal on behalf of opposed nationalities, should fall out over the swag.\textsuperscript{661}
\end{quote}

This caption was a reference to the way in which the Balkan Alliance had justified the First Balkan War by arguing that Turkey had failed to carry out the reforms it had promised in Macedonia. It was also a reference to the increase of patriotic sentiment in Serbia and Bulgaria on the eve of the war in 1912 with the aim of liberating

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\textsuperscript{661} \textit{Ibid.}
Christians in Macedonia and Serbia’s historical homeland in Kosovo, while, according to Misha Glenny, the ‘real aims were coldly strategic and expansionist’.  

Figure 4.14.: ‘The Looker-On’, Punch (1913)

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662 Glenny, Balkans, p. 246, 232.
Although intra-Balkan antagonisms began to feature more frequently in Punch during the Second Balkan War, only on one occasion did the magazine suggest that the hostilities were somehow an indication of ‘how things had always been done’ in the region. Bernard Partridge’s illustration ‘A Way They Have in the Balkans’, featured Serbian and Greek soldiers discussing how they would divide the Macedonian lands in the case that they were victorious against Bulgaria. The Serbian character stated that ‘of course we fight each other’ for them. 663

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Figure 4.15.: ‘A Way They Have in the Balkans’, Punch (1913)

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663 ‘A Way They Have in the Balkans’, Punch, 16 July 1913.
In sum, in 1913, the Balkan quarrels began to attract more attention in *Punch*, and more generally in British writing on the region, in direct response to what was going on between the former allies. Some aspects, however, were misrepresented in order to lure readers and to make the cartoons more intelligible to the public. Sarcasm, one of *Punch*’s trademark traits continued throughout the Balkan Wars as well, illustrating that the magazine, although often overtly political, aimed mainly at amusing and entertaining the public.

4.4. Conclusion

In general terms, *Punch*’s perceptions of the Balkans were very close to those that were evident in other types of popular textual and visual representations because the Balkan provinces and states were in many cases portrayed as children, animals, or medieval-type peasant warriors, and as troubled by internal squabbles. In addition, the magazine utilised familiar metaphors, intertextuality, historical analogies and connected many Balkan questions with British domestic social concerns. These modes of representation, and the devices that were exploited, were used primarily in order to bring the audiences closer to the cartoons and thus to attract more readers.

This commercial aim was also shown by the fact that the magazine always seemed to be on the side of public opinion and against whoever happened to be in power at any one time. Thus, in its handling of Balkan questions, *Punch* had drifted very far from its earlier radicalism, and had become very much part of the entertainment industry that sought to exploit Balkan settings and stereotypes, and domestic British concerns, in order to sell magazines.

The large majority of the *Punch* cartoons that featured Balkan characters or commented on Balkan questions were published during wars or other disturbances and this aspect played an important role in shaping middle-class Britons’ views towards the region. Earlier studies have emphasised that ‘Balkanist’ discourses were created first and foremost in these types of circumstances, which means that *Punch* cartoons were among the prime examples of British middle-class Balkanist discourse.
CONCLUSION

The main aim of this thesis has been to deepen our understanding of the ways in which the Balkan Slavs were perceived and represented in Britain between the mid-nineteenth century and 1914. This has been done by concentrating on four specific discourses – religious, military, commercial and satirical – which have hitherto received little detailed attention in the literature on British images of the Balkans. The lack of focused research on these specific areas has been especially evident in the context in which the concrete relevance of prejudices and other perceptions are examined in specific historical circumstances. This has been the core analytical purpose of this study.

The interest in Britain towards the Balkans was deeper than the existing literature has conveyed. Within the outlines of the four larger areas set out above, other, more specific, debates have been examined here. These include the Anglican-Orthodox reunion debate, the Bulgarian atrocities agitation campaign, the debate about the future of the Ottoman Empire, the ‘national efficiency’ question, and the role of the Balkans in British strategic planning, as well as the question over the British commercial involvement in the region. These deliberations contained concerns expressed about themes such as secularisation, juvenile delinquency, national health, poverty, commercial morality, business failure and success and so forth.

This conclusion addresses each of the three main research questions in turn: first, what kinds of concrete connections were there between the Balkans and British domestic and imperial questions; second, in what ways and to what extent did perceptions and prejudices affect decision-making processes; and third, what was the relationship between representations of the Balkans in Britain and realities of the situation in the region and what, if any, were the concrete outcomes of possible misconceptions?
British-Balkan Concrete Connections

British-Balkan connections manifested themselves in religious, political, military, and social contexts. The Anglican-Orthodox reunion debate, which began around the mid-nineteenth century, but which had longer historical roots and accelerated in the early twentieth century, was one of the most concrete examples of how Balkan issues surfaced in Britain. The aim of these ecumenical discussions was to achieve an understanding on doctrinal issues, with the view to establishing closer ties to an extent that would enable the ultimate movement towards the intercommunion of Anglican and Orthodox churches. Although these debates rarely penetrated into wider public arenas in Britain, they can, at least partly, be seen as illustrations of Anglican and Church of England concerns for the loss of their dominant position within English society as more and more worshippers, especially in the manufacturing North, had switched, or were born into other Protestant denominations. There were also other challenges to traditional religious life as a result of changing patterns of everyday life, especially with regard to ‘non-religious’ Sunday leisure activities replacing the tradition of churchgoing. From the Anglican perspective, one of the aims of proposing reunion with the Orthodox was to strengthen their position in the face of these types of challenges.

Although English Nonconformists were not interested in establishing closer religious, let alone theological, connections with the Orthodox, they too found common ground with Balkan Orthodox Christians. In the case of Nonconformity, the connection was much more specific and occurred only briefly during the Bulgarian atrocities agitation campaign in 1876, when the majority of pro-Bulgarian activists came from among the Nonconformists – especially from the ranks of Wesleyan Methodists, Congregationalists and Baptists. These and other Nonconformists made the connection between their own struggle over the Burial Bill in England and the similar difficulties that Eastern Orthodox Christians were facing with burials under Ottoman rule. Thus, although both Anglicans and Nonconformists considered their own positions through Balkan questions, there was a vast difference in the way in which this was done.
Anglican interest in Eastern Orthodoxy was limited mainly to the upper echelons of the clerical elite and was expressed over a longer time period. Furthermore, enthusiasm stemmed mainly from doctrinal or theological considerations and came primarily from the Anglo-Catholic lobby within the Church of England, which advocated catholic or universal elements in Christian theology by denying many of the Reformation aspects of Protestant theology. It was only during the Bulgarian atrocities agitation that Anglican enthusiasm for reunion was discussed in wider public forums while, on the other hand, this was the only time when English Nonconformity took any significant notice of or interest in Orthodox Christianity. Thus, Anglicans and Nonconformists shared some of each others’ main elements in terms of their attitudes to Orthodox Christianity, but Anglican interest towards Eastern Orthodoxy was mainly theological and long-term, while Nonconformity’s was political, directed against state-led religious suppression and occurred only during a very short space of time.

British-Balkan connections were also noticeably present in domestic and imperial military contexts. For example, in the 1850s and 1860s, the Austrian military border in the northern fringes of the Balkan Peninsula, was used as an example of an effective organisation of imperial defence. The border was also seen as a way of assessing the efficiency of British Empire’s own military borders, and, as a possible instrument for guaranteeing closer imperial harmony – namely through the introduction of a system, in which land instead of a pension was given to colonial soldiers after they had ended their service. This system was in use among Slav and other native soldiers in the Austrian frontier. British military observers regarded this arrangement as effective because it had tended to ease post-service discontent among soldiers, and, was thus perceived as a scheme that could have been successfully adopted also in some areas of the British Empire, such as southern Africa.

British imperial and Balkan questions also directly coincided during the Eastern Crisis when advocates of the ‘imperial school’ of British strategic planning recommended using Muslim troops from India in conjunction with Slav and other ethnic troops in the Ottoman army in any war against Russia. Although this recommendation never materialised, it showed that the Balkans featured significantly in connection with concrete British imperial concerns, and not only in the context of
‘cultural colonialism’ as is suggested in the majority of existing literature. This aspect also illustrates that there is a need to broaden the scope of the primary source materials used to examine British perceptions of the Balkans, as has been done in this thesis, not least because the essence of British attitudes are only partially captured if only those views that were transmitted in travel accounts or in political propaganda treatises are being investigated, which has been the trend in the recent historiography.

At the same time, there is also a need to be more specific about how connections between the British Empire and British ‘imperial culture’ and the Balkans and other regions that were not under the British rule were being made at the time and how they are examined in the historiography. For example, this study has argued that British imperial ideologies such as the concept of the ‘martial races’ is genuinely useful as an analytical tool for historians in assessing regions that were not ruled by Britain, only when those areas were directly connected to British imperial concerns by the contemporaries. This means that although attitudes to Montenegrin militarism, which was largely constructed in popular and professional accounts by references to the country’s epic struggle against the much larger enemy, and by making comparisons to other stereotypically martial societies or to societies with ‘invented traditions’ – militaristic or otherwise – were seemingly similar to those that were expressed in connection to Slavic imperial soldiers who served in Ottoman and Habsburg armies, they were in fact different. This was due to the fact that the ‘martial races’ theory was used especially as a tool in the recruitment of colonial soldiers and as a way of organising and assessing administrative borders in the colonies. A similar policy aspect was also evident when British military personnel and diplomats assessed the military qualities of the Balkan Slavs: Montenegro was never used as an example of how the problems of British imperial defence could be resolved, whereas this aspect was often behind many assessments of Balkan imperial soldiers.

Furthermore, Montenegrin militaristic traditions were invented in a similar fashion as, for example, those of the Scottish Highlanders, because many professional military accounts in Britain emphasised that the Montenegrin army would not in reality be very useful in regular warfare against professional armies, and that it was less an army than a collection of weapon-carrying men, who knew little about modern warfare. Furthermore, geographers also were responsible for the shattering of the
myth of ‘invincible Montenegrins’. They argued that Montenegrins had been able to remain independent throughout centuries, not as a consequence of their superior military qualities, but because of the fact that the country was surrounded by inaccessible mountains which made it difficult for invaders to occupy its territory.\textsuperscript{664}

British domestic concerns were also linked to and explained by using examples from the Balkans in the framework of the debate on ‘national efficiency’ which began around 1880 and reached its apogee after the South African War (1899-1902). There was a belief in Britain that various changes in British society, such as the decrease in the agricultural and manufacturing populations, had had a negative effect on the quality and quantity of British troops. What made matters even worse was that statistics seemed to show that there was an increase in the number of prospective British soldiers that were deemed unfit for service on physical grounds, especially during the Boer War. In the early 1900s, comparisons were being made between Britain and Serbia, for example, which showed that the same percentage (little over seventy) of Serbian conscripts were fit to serve their country, as were announced unfit for service in Britain.

A dichotomy emerged between agricultural and post-industrial societies. Agricultural societies, such as Serbia, were equated with physical and mental strength, which meant that ‘raw material’ for the armed forces there was more adequate than in societies such as Britain that were well on their way towards a post-industrial condition – post-industrial, in that, ‘invisible earnings’ received, for example, from overseas investments, shipping and insurance business, had begun to surpass ‘visible earnings’ in importance to national income. This was an extremely important aspect, because after the 1870s, British balance of payments account was kept in surplus principally by the income that was generated from invisibles, rather than the commodity trade. In this sense, it was not difficult to see why connections between declining manual industries and the decrease in the physical sufficiency of British troops were made, and why this situation was explained by using examples from the Balkans.

The persistence of these sentiments in the pre-war period also showed that, despite vast developments in military technologies from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, there still existed a widely-held belief that an adequate army was primarily made up of brave, physically fit, and well-trained individual soldiers. Thus, it was not only Germany and Japan that were perceived as model societies for ‘national efficiency’, because all Balkan countries were also represented in a similar fashion. However, there was an important difference here: in the more widely-used examples of Germany and Japan national efficiency was connected to increased competence in industrial production and organisation, while in the Balkan case only the aspect of national health, perceived as the main building block and the basis for greatness of any nation, was taken into account in British commentaries, an aspect considered to be significant especially in the aftermath of the South African War.

Problems of juvenile delinquency and homelessness in Britain were also portrayed through the examination of Balkan issues. For example, during the Eastern Crisis, the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were represented in the satirical press as unruly and dirty street children. In this framework, an analogy was constructed between the poor, disorderly, and parentless street children of the larger British cities and the poor and unruly Balkan provinces. The portrayals of ‘Bozzy’ and ‘Herzy’ were therefore directly comparable with the way in which juvenile gangs, the ‘street Arabs’, were being depicted. Similar representations were created about Bulgaria in 1885, when the ‘Vulgar Bulgar Boy’ was added to Punch’s repertoire of imaginary Balkan characters through which British domestic social concerns were being portrayed. Thus, the very popular child metaphor was primarily used to articulate images of unruliness, but also of hope, as was the case when Bulgarian and Serbian troops had crushed Ottoman armies in Macedonia during the First Balkan War in 1912. In the case of Punch, and in the British satirical press more widely, the Balkan connection, in addition to familiar historical analogies and allegorical devices, was often illustrated by making references to famous British stories, in order to bring Balkan questions closer to the sensitivities of the magazine’s largely middle-class reading public.

The attention that was given to, and the connections that were being made with, Balkan questions and those in Britain were therefore more widespread and
deeper than earlier studies have suggested. For Britons, the Balkans were much more than a tourist attraction, an obligatory throughway *en route* to Constantinople and further, or raw material for horror stories. Concrete British-Balkan connections were evident in politicized and theological religious debates, in domestic and imperial strategic discussions, and when domestic social problems were examined.

Furthermore, the region also attracted wider academic interest than the current historiography has suggested. Academic interest in the Balkans manifested itself mainly as ecclesiastical-historical studies of Orthodox Christianity, and as anthropological, ethnological and socio-linguistic mapping of the Balkan populations. In this framework, the Bulgarians were often distinguished from other Slavs on the basis of linguistic and racial differences, and, at times, British academics argued that this kind of ‘otherness’ also played an important role in practice and manifested itself, for example, as Bulgarians’ desire to seek ecclesiastical independence in the late 1860s. Similar arguments were not used, however, when the Serbs acquired their religious independence in 1879. Thus, racial and linguistic differences were deemed as very important indicators of various societies; the contemporaries also regarded them as factors that had concrete bearing on the modern world.

**The Impact of Perceptions and Prejudices on Decision-Making**

This thesis has also examined the connection between perceptions and decision-making processes. One of its aims was to investigate whether preconceptions and prejudices, or any other types of perceptions, influenced the courses of action that were taken, or recommendations that were given, in any given situation, primarily in connection with ecumenical and political debates, military and imperial policy discussions as well as in connection with international business contacts.

In the ecumenical framework, negative preconceptions about Eastern Orthodox theology did not seem to have any kind of influence with regard to the issue of Anglican-Orthodox reunion. Orthodox doctrines were represented in Anglican (and to a lesser extent in Nonconformist) discourses as flawed, immobile and rigid primarily because the Orthodox Church had refused to accept the adding of the words ‘and the Son’ to the confession of faith, and because other doctrinal
differences were perceived as not appropriate to the social climate of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The apparent ‘stagnation’ of Eastern Orthodox theology was attributed mainly to Orthodox Church’s close historical and cultural connection with Islam, as well as to its centuries of intimate, almost symbiotic, coexistence with what were perceived of by Anglicans as the old-fashioned state structures of Byzantium and the Ottoman Empire. This aspect was also regarded as contributing to the general lack of progress in the East which in the West had manifested itself, for example, in the development of various religious heresies. Orthodox religious practices were also represented in Anglican and Nonconformist texts as primitive, outdated and ceremonial, but also as Biblical and Oriental. Anglican attitudes to Orthodox theology, in terms of both doctrine and ritual, were thus mostly negative, mainly because Orthodoxy had not been able to adapt to changing social circumstances.

In addition, deeper ‘civilisational’ explanations were given, which meant that Orthodoxy was represented as the complete opposite of western Christianity: a dichotomy was constructed between the ‘metaphysical East’ and the ‘practical West’, a construct which has often been used as a way of assessing the differences between Christianity and Islam as well as those between Europe and the Orient. In the case of Anglican perceptions of Orthodox theology, this distinction was also clearly evident. This suggests that ‘doctrinal otherness’ – which refers to portrayals of aspects of Orthodox doctrines in Anglican discourse as different and inferior to Western doctrines – serves as a valuable analytical tool when these attitudes are examined. Thus, in Anglican discourse, Eastern Orthodox theology was depicted as an ‘other’ rather than as an ‘incomplete self’.

On the other hand, the unvarying characteristics of Eastern Orthodoxy were also praised and admired by Anglicans, because their perception was that this changelessness had ensured that Orthodox Christianity was closer to the early, undivided, Christian Church. This conception was closely connected to those treatises that stressed Orthodox Christianity’s role as the instigator of many Christian church customs, as the creator of the Christian Creed, and generally, as the ‘parent of

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These factors were especially emphasised by the Anglo-Catholic lobby who were also the main advocates of Anglican-Orthodox reunion. This did not mean that Anglo-Catholics or other supporters of reunion did not possess negative perceptions of Orthodox theology (they did), but positive attitudes towards Eastern Christianity’s purity seemed to override the negative ones because there was a wide consensus among Anglicans that steps towards reunion must be taken despite the presence of doctrinal differences.

This issue became more politicised during the Eastern Crisis, when the rather unusual coalition of Gladstonian radical Liberals, Nonconformists, and liberal Anglican clerics – an unofficial alliance that was created by the common moral outrage against the Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria – exploited the issue as one of the ways of attacking the Conservatives’ pro-Turkish foreign policy. During the Eastern Crises, the Church of England, as an institution, refused to side with some of its most vocal ‘pro-Balkan’ clerics, because the Church felt that, as a national institution, it needed to support government policy. Therefore, in the context of the reunion debate, which was also reflected in wider domestic and international political concerns, negative preconceptions and attitudes did not have any effect on influencing decisions to seek out closer ties, as was illustrated, for example, in the Resolutions of the Lambeth Conferences of 1888, 1897, 1908 and 1914 and other treatises.

In the framework of military policy discussions, however, preconceptions did have a direct effect on policy recommendations. For example, between the 1830s and 1880, politicians, diplomats and army officers considered turning the Balkan provinces into a defensive bulwark against Russian expansionism. This Liberal idea emerged partly from the belief that the Balkan Slavs were ‘martial races’, but mainly as a result of assumptions about Serbian and Bulgarian desires to be independent rather than ruled by the Ottomans or manipulated by Russia. Events and other circumstances, however, showed that even though the Balkan Slavs were conceived of as potentially militarily useful to Britain, it was the absence of professional armies,

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the lack of modern weaponry, and deficiencies in the military training of the peasantry, that contributed to the image of inefficiency of the Balkan armies, which, therefore, also diminished their real strategic value to Britain. Although Gladstone, for instance, continued to support the idea of turning the Balkan provinces into defensive barricade against Russia, there were numerous reasons, including the increasing, although periodic, influence of Russia over the Balkan provinces, the damage that could have been done to the balance of power in Europe by an active British military involvement in the Balkans, and the inefficiency of Balkan armies, that eventually led to the abandonment of the idea.

A more direct link between cultural perceptions and policy recommendations was evident during the Eastern Crisis, when a group of British officers suggested that Muslim troops from the Indian army should be shipped to the Balkans to fight alongside Slavic Muslim and Turkish troops as well as other Muslim troops in the Ottoman army. The assumption was that because they all were ‘fanatical Mahommetans’ they would fight effectively together against the common enemy, Tsarist Russia. Thus, in this case, cultural perceptions about Islam had a direct impact on the kinds of policy recommendations that were being put forward by high profile military officials.

The connection between cultural values, perceptions and decision-making was also evident in the commercial context. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the Balkans was perceived and represented in Britain as a region for countless business opportunities mainly because of the existence of vast amounts of unexploited natural wealth. The image of abundance led to the establishment of numerous British companies whose sole purpose was to conduct business in the Balkans regardless of the fact that other regions might have offered more obvious opportunities to make profits. Thus, although there existed real financial and economic difficulties in the Balkans – which included currency instability, transport costs and logistic problems – the image of abundance, and the view that there were plenty of possibilities for making money, sometimes over-ruled rational (in the neo-

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classical sense) economic considerations in the context of overseas company-formation.

Diplomatic decision-making was also clearly influenced by cultural prejudices – more so than in the case of any other group of people that has been studied in this thesis. One of the ways in which cultural prejudice manifested itself in diplomatic decision-making was the negative view that was often taken by diplomats towards Jewish promoters of British business in the Balkans. This attitude was in line with common European and American prejudices against Jews which were, of course, especially strong in the commercial context, an aspect that was also illustrated by the existence of numerous Jewish ‘financier scoundrels’ in late-Victorian and Edwardian literature. British diplomats repeated stereotypical cultural views about ‘slight foreign accents’ and ‘Hebraic appearances’, which meant that anti-Semitic sentiments evidently played a large part in their decisions not to give diplomatic assistance to Jewish promoters of British business in the Balkans.

However, business promotion was generally (not just in the case of the Balkans) often regarded as a very dubious commercial activity because of its non-productive nature, and because it tended to attract so-called ‘adventurers’ who were not afraid to take risks, and who often had very few financial resources themselves. Diplomats often mentioned these kinds of aspects in their reports, a factor, which also clearly contributed to the lack of diplomatic support that was given to these types of commercial enterprises. Thus, quite naturally, promoters’ financial stability was also often an important factor when decisions about whether to back any given scheme or not were taken. However, the existence of numerous anti-Semitic remarks in diplomatic commercial correspondence, which derived directly from wider cultural beliefs, point to the fact that prejudices influenced diplomatic decision-making at least as much as these other ‘non-cultural’ factors.

Diplomatic perceptions about doing business in the Balkans differed hugely from the views expressed by British merchants and ordinary businessmen, that is, those who had actual commercial contacts in the region. Their views have attracted almost no attention in the current secondary literature, which on the whole, has been content to repeat diplomatic stereotypes about doing business in the region. Although faced with numerous difficulties – which in addition to those discussed above,
included unfair competition, political instability and protectionism – merchants and businessmen never explained or saw these problems as somehow arising from an inherent inability of Balkan businessmen and government agencies to engage in free and fair commerce. There were no anti-Semitic remarks, no expressions of deprecating Balkanist stereotypes and no reductionist generalisations about national characteristics, all of which featured regularly in diplomatic accounts. Businessmen and merchants were too busy in looking after their real and personal interests to resort to repeating cultural stereotypes, which were much more evident in the commercial diplomatic correspondence, and even more so, in the travel literature on which the majority of existing historiography of British perceptions about the Balkans is based.

Thus, unlike the case of British diplomats, the decision-making of established British companies with trading links in the Balkans was rarely influenced by cultural preconceptions or prejudices, because economic and financial factors took precedence. In practice this meant that British companies, such as the Lever Brothers, never stopped trading with Bulgaria, even though they experienced difficulties with the customs officials and commercial legislation. Furthermore, unlike diplomats and travellers, the representatives of this, and many other British firms, never expressed stereotypical views, for instance, about the Bulgarians, even amid difficulties. However, on a very few occasions, cultural perceptions about the Balkans also influenced the reasoning of British businessmen, for example, when they attempted to predict customer behaviour in the Balkans. Even in these types of cases, however, businessmen’s predictions were based more on previous experiences of dealing with Balkan customers than on cultural preconceptions about the region.

Perceptions about political instability also affected investor behaviour. Rumours about insurrections and wars often had a more direct effect on, for example, bond prices than an actual state of war, showing that the element of uncertainty created a perception of instability and affected the ways in which investors made decisions, which then in turn had an effect on the prices of securities and bonds. Negative views about the lack of commercial morality in Serbia and Bulgaria also seemingly affected the decisions of British banks not to invest in these countries. This lack of enthusiasm was shown by the fact that of a total of over thirty foreign loans to Serbia and Bulgaria since their independence and autonomy in the late 1870s, only
one was issued in London. It is also possible that bankers were more influenced by
diplomatic prejudices because of the close cultural connection between the Southern
banking community and the political establishment, than was the case, for example,
with Northern merchants and manufacturers and ordinary businessmen. Thus,
cultural attitudes, at least to some degree, might explain the unwillingness of British
bankers to get involved in Balkan finances.

At the same time, this unwillingness of British banks to provide Balkan
governments with state loans was regarded by British manufacturers and other
businessmen as a serious impediment to their chances of obtaining profitable
government contracts. One contemporary commercial agent captured the sentiment:
‘Bonds issued by the Serbian Government do not find favour here with the Joint
Stock Banks’, and as a result, the ‘British Manufacturer cannot compete for even a
fair proportion of the Serbian trade’. However, it must also be stressed that
bankers’ and investors’ decision-making was not solely influenced by cultural factors
or aristocratic prejudices – that is, by any unwarranted negative perceptions – but
also, perhaps even more so, by the careful examination of the financial conditions of
any given country.

Accuracy of Perceptions and Consequences of Misconceptions

The thesis also examined the relationship between reality and representation –
making an attempt to determine the accuracy of British evaluations and the concrete
relevance of possible misconceptions and misrepresentations.

The Anglican view that portrayed the Orthodox Church as completely
stagnant and deprived of any intellectual progress as well as having a close historical,
cultural and political connection to Islam and the Ottoman Empire was partly realistic
and based on accurate readings of Orthodox history. It was indeed true that the
Orthodox Church was on the defensive under Ottoman rule, and as survival was the
most important aim, intellectual considerations and doctrinal development were given

668 See, Y. Cassis, ‘Bankers in English Society in the Late Nineteenth Century’, Economic History
a lower priority. On the other hand, the core purpose of Orthodox Christianity is, and has been, to maintain and transmit all aspects of Orthodox tradition to future generations as unchanged as possible. Thus, in this sense the centuries under Turkish rule were perhaps not as harmful in the context of theological development as many of the pre-1914 Anglican theologians and other scholars made them out to be. Thus, the insistence of Anglican clerics, ecclesiastical historians and other scholars that Orthodox Christianity was stationary also showed their fundamental ignorance of the core principle of Orthodox faith – the maintenance of tradition. Furthermore, the Church of England itself was by no means a beacon of progress, and Anglican representations of Orthodox stagnation therefore emerged more directly from Enlightenment attitudes towards Byzantium than from any in-depth and unbiased examinations of the history of Orthodox Churches and societies.

Another often-repeated viewpoint, one closely connected to the beliefs examined above, was that Orthodox Christianity had been completely untouched by any religious developments in Western Europe such as the Reformation and Counter Reformation. This perception was not entirely based on an accurate interpretation of the situation either, because Orthodox Christianity was more influenced by western religious developments than Anglican texts suggested, because of educational contacts and Protestant and Roman Catholic missionary activity. Furthermore, western diplomatic representatives often chose to propagate their approach to the Gospel very vigorously in foreign lands, including the Balkans. However, none of the misinterpretations about the character of Eastern Orthodoxy seemed to have any power in influencing decision-making and views in connection with the intercommunion debate.

Perceptions of the patriarchal nature of South Slav communities were quite accurate, because family rituals were male dominated and because there existed networks of ‘patrilineal familial clans’, especially in Montenegro and Albania. This view probably had some practical weight, because it was articulated in diplomatic correspondence in which the fighting efficiency and organisation of Balkan armies were considered. Perceptions of patriarchalism of certain African societies indeed led

to their increased recruitment into the French army during the First World War. These types of views were also likely to affect British military policy-making. The view that the extended family was still the prevalent form of social organisation in the latter half of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth centuries was not accurate. For example, as a consequence of the various land reform measures in Serbia which began in the mid-1830s, and as a result of a decrease in the role of the extended family as a unit of defence, the *zadruga* ceased to be the primary form of landholding and familial organisation by the late 1830s. This latter perspective, however, did not have any concrete consequences, other than perhaps misinforming the public, because it was mainly expressed in journalistic accounts.

Similarly, the perception that there was no aristocracy in Serbia and Bulgaria was partly correct. It was true that the Ottoman conquest in the fourteenth century had wiped out the traditional land-owning class all around the Balkans, with the exception of parts of Bosnia and Romania. There was, however, a tradition of self-rule in Serbia under the Ottomans which meant that an indigenous ruling class had developed. Despite this, most Serbs remained deeply attached to the soil well into the twentieth century. Therefore, there was no aristocracy in the British or western European sense of the word in these countries. These views were also present in the British officers’ and diplomats’ evaluations, a factor, which once more probably had concrete relevance to the ways in which military policies were formulated: one British diplomat, for example, argued that the ‘lack of [a] superior class’ in Bulgaria was one of the major contributing factors to the breakdown of the discipline in the Bulgarian army during the Second Balkan War.671

Views about Bulgarian racial timidity in comparison to other South Slavs were completely incorrect, if measured according to the levels of rural unrest, which were as extensive in the Bulgarian lands as in Bosnia, Herzegovina and in Serbia throughout the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the bandit tradition was as much alive in Bulgaria as elsewhere in the Balkans. Indeed some scholars have argued that the tradition was actually born in the country in the fifteenth century. Again, it is not possible to assess the exact impact of the misconception about the Bulgarians’

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timidity, but as many of these views were present in diplomats’ and officers’ evaluations, they were likely to influence the types of policies that were made. For example, the diplomatic view was that because the ‘Bulgarian race’ was peaceful and their cultural traditions did not celebrate banditry, they were unlikely to revolt against Ottoman rule. Very different views were put forward about Serbia, whose willingness to revolt was similarly often connected to cultural and ‘racial’ characteristics.

Portrayals of Bulgarian distinctiveness from other Slavs in terms of martial qualities must be seen within the framework of a larger pseudo-scientific mode of categorisation in which the Bulgarians were also cut off from their neighbours by references to the Bulgarians’ Central Asian racial origins and to the differences between the Bulgarian language and other South Slav tongues. These differences were also largely insignificant and based on misguided information because, for example, the creation of the Bulgarian independent church in 1870 did not result from any ancient racial distinction between the Bulgar on the one hand, and the Slav and the Greek on the other – as claimed by some Victorian scholars – but as a consequence of political developments in the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans more generally. Another important contributing factor was the awakening of Bulgarian national feeling.

The case of Bulgaria also illustrated that Balkan stereotypes were not necessarily fixed and that events often had a significant effect in altering conceptions in Britain not just about Bulgaria, but about the Balkans more generally. After the Bulgarian victory in the war against Serbia in the mid-1880s, references to the Bulgarians’ unwarlike nature disappeared from all types of British accounts, and, instead, the country was venerated as the new military power in the region – a perception that further strengthened during the Balkan Wars. Alterations in conceptions were accompanied by a large number of War Office reports on the Bulgarian army which were mostly positive evaluations of the effectiveness of individual Bulgarian soldiers. This shift in opinion was comparable to a similar change in the ways in which Sepoy soldiers were perceived by British officers and recruiters after the Indian mutiny in 1857. After the Serbian-Bulgarian War, the Bulgarians – after decades of being labelled as a ‘timid’ and ‘peaceful’ race – were suddenly perceived as the most warlike people in the Balkans because of their
success in the war; high-caste Hindus were equally abruptly given the label ‘unwarlike’ and ‘effeminate’ after their active role, as the instigators of the mutiny, had become apparent to British colonial administrators.

Positive evaluations of the commercial potential of the Balkans were also partly accurate, but there were also some obvious misconceptions which, importantly, affected the rates of success and failure of British businesses in the Balkans. The main pull factors for British enterprise in the region included: the existence of mineral and forest resources that had not been tapped because of the absence of local capital; agricultural potential; increased financial stability; improvements in the transport networks; and in some cases, the proximity to central European markets as well as the increased demand for manufactured goods. All of these aspects were used as arguments by prospective investors, newly established companies, and, to some degree, by diplomats in order to attract capital from Britain in order to finance a variety of projects.

However, there were several problems with misconceptions in this context. Although minerals were found in abundance in many parts of the Balkans they were often of poor quality – an issue that was frequently omitted or misrepresented in contemporary British accounts. This meant that, although on the face of it mining presented possible business opportunities, in reality, the potential for serious profits was at best marginal. Moreover, although the transport network did improve from the late Victorian period onwards, the railway density was still very low which impeded accessibility. However, this was more of a problem for domestic economic development in the Balkans, because many of the railways were international and designed to cater for the interests of the great powers. Perceptions about increased financial stability were also largely based on misguided information, because, throughout the period, a whole host of economic and financial problems presented themselves in the Balkan countries, including problems with demonetisation of foreign currencies, interest rate instability, and the institutional weaknesses of the national banks after they had been created. Established British banks took these factors into account, but often ‘petty capitalists’, who had little or no experience of overseas business dealings, stumbled upon these types of hurdles. Thus,
misrepresentations and misconceptions definitely had concrete and negative relevance in the context of British commercial involvement in the Balkans.

In conclusion, British domestic and imperial concerns coincided and were discussed through Balkan questions on a very concrete level, of which the Anglican-Orthodox reunion debate, the Bulgarian atrocities agitation campaign, issues related to domestic and imperial defence, social problems as well as representations of commercial potential of the Balkans, were the most visible. The attention that the region attracted in Britain was therefore more nuanced than has been argued in the current literature. British people had a real interest in the Balkans that went beyond horror stories. Preconceptions and prejudices had an effect on military and business decision-making more often than on religious positions which remained largely unaltered, although negative and condescending attitudes did also exist. In many cases, representations of the Balkans were at least partly accurate, although grave misunderstandings and misinterpretations also occurred. These views had concrete relevance most visibly in connection with newly-established British firms, whose misconceptions about the commercial potential of the Balkans partly contributed to their business failures in the region.
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