Securing Public Safety in the ‘Danger Zone’: Naval and Aerial Bombardment on the North-East Coast of England during the First World War

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May 2019

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Abstract

The First World War was ‘total’ in scope, in that it involved the mobilisation of the entire belligerent societies, turning civilian men into soldiers for the battlefront, and endangering the lives of those remaining on the ‘home front’. While historians have dealt with the military aspects of the war from many angles, including the social and cultural lives of ‘citizen soldiers’, in addition to the movements of troops, decisive battles and military strategy, there remain omissions in the study of the home front. In particular, the experiences of non-combatants in the direct line of fire has received scant attention. This is surprising, given the degree to which civilian spaces were militarised in response to the threat of invasion and bombardment, initially from naval vessels and then from Zeppelin airships and aeroplanes. In Britain, the north-east coast of England was particularly badly affected by naval and aerial attacks, but historians have not reflected in detail on the specificities of coastal community experience in the war context.

This thesis provides a multi-faceted analysis of the phenomenon of bombardment, with a distinct focus on beleaguered coastal-urban towns and cities. Taking a social and cultural approach to an array of written sources and material culture, multiple levels and voices are explored, from that of Whitehall politicians and civil servants, to local councillors, borough engineers, special constables and civilians. Beginning with pre-war and wartime narratives related to the threat of invasion and bombardment, the thesis moves on to the social and cultural resonance of bomb damage to the coastal-urban environment. This is then followed by analysis of varying levels of government policy pertaining to defence, both military and civil, including state policy-makers, local government officials, military leaders and police forces. The thesis concludes with a long view of the legacies of bombardment, beginning during the war and ending with the recent centenary period (2014-18).

This thesis makes the case for a unique coastal-urban experience of war on the home front, underpinned not only by the shocking record of attacks upon the north-east coast, but by the reflection of prevalent fears about invasion and bombing in pre-war and wartime planning perspectives and policing strategies. By exploring the development of nascent civil defence as a guard against civilian bombardment, the thesis also puts forward a perspective on the endurance and resilience of civilians in coastal communities. Notions of public safety and defence, including the repulsion of enemy actions and the defence of family, community and ‘home’, undergirded both official and popular narratives. As such, this work presents a view of the coastal-urban environment at war that can enrich historical perspectives on the First World War home front, in addition to state-society and central-local relations. These phenomena are seen through the lens of the manifold activities governments and civilians themselves devised to steel resolve in the face of attack.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Anti-aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACMA</td>
<td>Authorised Competent Military Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>Admiralty</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIR</td>
<td>Air Ministry</td>
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<tr>
<td>BL</td>
<td>British Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAB</td>
<td>Cabinet Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Committee for Imperial Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DORA</td>
<td>Defence of the Realm Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>Defence of the Realm Regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERYA</td>
<td>East Riding of Yorkshire Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAPMG</td>
<td>Hartlepool Museums &amp; Galleries</td>
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<tr>
<td>HBM</td>
<td>Heugh Battery Museum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCL</td>
<td>Hartlepool Central Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
<td>Hull History Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>HO</td>
<td>Home Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWM</td>
<td>Imperial War Museum</td>
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<tr>
<td>LC</td>
<td>Liddle Collection, Special Collections, Leeds University Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYCRO</td>
<td>North Yorkshire County Record Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>SL</td>
<td>Scarborough Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMT</td>
<td>Scarborough Museums Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Teesside Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNA</td>
<td>The National Archives</td>
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<td>WO</td>
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This research would not have been possible without the personal support and exemplary supervision of Richard Gorski and Shane Ewen. Our individual and team meetings always provided honest and thorough feedback on works-in-progress, most often peppered with fresh reading lists and advice on career development. I would not have engaged in nearly as much activity beyond the thesis itself where it not for the kind advice and encouragement of Richard and Shane. As a result, I feel myself on a firmer footing for the future, developing as a person as well as a scholar. For me, there has been much more to the process of research and writing than a 300-page thesis. Indeed, while I have often been the conventional lone scholar, confined to archives and libraries, overall the process has been a socially enriching experience. Not only have I made firm friends in the PhD office and through University networks, the supportive framework and funding provided by the Heritage Consortium has facilitated my travel to archives and conferences around the country and across Europe. This again has pushed my development beyond that of the purely academic.

For providing access to crucial materials, I am indebted to Mark Simmons at Hartlepool Museums & Galleries. Though my trip to Sir William Gray House was fairly late in the process, Mark’s encyclopaedic knowledge of Hartlepool’s collections and of the 1914 bombardment was extremely helpful and formative in the finished thesis. Diane Stephens at Heugh Battery Museum provided a similarly vital service, enabling me to gain insights into the museology of bombardment, as well as granting access to materials I would have otherwise have not known existed. It was also fabulous to have almost free reign in the museum for a morning, replete with a steady supply of frothy coffees. Angela Kale at Scarborough Library and Tom Richardson at North Yorkshire County Record Office also provided access to uncatalogued materials of which I would not have otherwise been aware. I am immensely grateful for their knowledge and enthusiasm for the subject area. Of course, I am also grateful to the Arts & Humanities Research Council and the Heritage Consortium for the stipendiary funding, research grants, research training and study support that made this work possible. Supportive conference audiences – notably those at the Urban History Group (2016, 2019), War Through Other Stuff (2017) and European Association for the Study of Urban History (2018) conferences - have profoundly strengthened the thesis, and have led to great friendships and working relationships (most notably, with the illustrious Felix Fuhg, a comrade in arms, academically and otherwise). My attendance at the 2018 Historial de la Grande Guerre summer school in France and Belgium (funded by the University of Louvain) played an important role in my approach to the wartime urban environment and material culture, as well as cultivating some worldwide friendships and collaboration partners. I also met and had discussions with a good few of the most influential historians cited in this thesis: John Horne, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, Annette Becker and Nicholas J. Saunders no less!

Last, but not least, I am grateful as always for the support of my mother and father, and my partner Haleema. Without them, I would not have the drive to continue pursuing the academic path. I would not have finished the thesis without plenty of reassuring words, encouragement and emotional support. This whole process has been one of ups and downs, but it has been all the more rewarding for the work and struggle required to get to this point. Additional thanks are owed to Boris Brejcha, Étienne de Crécy, Solomun and Amelie Lens for sound-tracking the most intensive periods of writing in my final year.
CHAPTER 1: Introduction

The First World War has become the exemplar of a thoroughly modern way of conducting warfare: the self-destructive possibilities of modernity incarnate. In the words of intellectuals, artists, philosophers and historians, this was a modernity of rapid technological change and breakdown of old orders and mores. The war itself unleashed a maelstrom of destruction, laying waste to rural and urban landscapes, displacing populations and turning civilians into soldiers and mourners in equal measure. The First World War was both the culmination of social and political developments that had been underway since the mid-nineteenth century, and a radical break with what had come before: a ‘loss of existing points of orientation’. It remains a cultural touchstone for discussions of modern conflict. In the context of the present day, where civil wars and internecine conflicts are now more often played out within civilian landscapes – city streets, homes and businesses, places of worship – reference to the first truly global, mechanised war that redrew the traditional boundaries between home and the battlefield is crucial to understanding ongoing twenty-first century conflicts. However, despite a generally accepted understanding of the conflict as a ‘total war’, encompassing the entire human and material resources of belligerent societies, historians have generally taken a metropolitan perspective, overlooking the manifold dimensions of this totality, including the experiences of provincial towns and coastal communities.

Understandably, even primarily social and cultural historical studies of the war have taken the soldiers of the Western Front in France and Belgium as their focus. However, the conventional theatres of war did not exist in a vacuum. Indeed, the supply chains used to feed the frontlines spanned the civilian spaces of town squares, streets and homes, co-opting fuel

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supplies and felling forests. Of course, ‘citizen soldiers’ of all social ranks had to be drawn from somewhere. The voluntary character of military recruitment in Britain, prior to the introduction of conscription in 1916, meant that local authorities and the media played a focal role in encouraging men to fight. Often, as Brad Beaven notes, local recruiters displayed a locally-refracted ‘practical patriotism’ which could eschew War Office calls to defend the nation and empire. These men (and often boys) preserved links with their loved ones through frequent correspondence and care packages, and through the maintenance of pre-war behaviours such as smoking and shaving. These minutiae could provide a sense of normalcy in the hell of the trenches. Recent work by social and cultural historians has unearthed the great richness of this trench culture, where the domestic and quotidian enabled servicemen to make sense of their situation, and adapt to it as best they could.

The hitherto sacrosanct spaces of everyday urban life were militarised by home defence installations such as coastal trenches and barbed wire entanglements, anti-aircraft guns and lighting restrictions, in addition to the appearance of soldiers on leave and injured veterans. However, in a way that fundamentally disrupted or even erased a home/battle front dichotomy, developments in naval hardware and aeronautics across Europe transformed towns and cities into theatres of war. They became battlegrounds where non-combatants needed to run for shelter at the sound of sirens and where people were plagued by anxieties that an attack might happen at any moment. As such, some of the most frightening and violent aspects of modern war were domesticated. Therefore, increasingly, the home was a site of direct local and central state intervention, most often through the police, as force was used to implement nascent and largely improvised civil defence measures. Though state intervention in the home was not new – it had been implicit in nineteenth-century urban planning and social welfare – the First World War dispersed the power to observe and

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obstruct everyday civilian life among an array of public bodies, many of which were regional and local in jurisdiction. Following more than twenty years of debate regarding a continental invasion threat, the first forays of enemy vessels into British waters to attack military targets in 1914 were accompanied by the expectation of an enemy landing. By early 1915, this experience provided a helpful motif for framing the fresher challenge of air raids, as the Zeppelin airship came to dominate the imaginations and realities of civilian life.

Using towns from the north-east coast of England as case studies, this thesis provides a multi-faceted interpretation of the transformation of home front life by the advent of naval and aerial bombardment. Just as the slough of the trenches was ever changing and literally shifting, civilian spaces were not reliable constants, however much this may have helped soldiers conceptualise their own experiences of an alien war landscape. As Margaret Garb notes, the built environment can take on an appearance of durability and inevitability, despite its ‘human-made and historically determined’ character: ‘the tangible and mundane qualities of buildings, roads, bridges—any landscape—seem fixed in the present even if they evoke a bland nostalgia for some moment in the past’. As Robert Bevan reminds us, the material damage wrought by naval shells, and airborne incendiary and explosive bombs, disoriented this belief in material fixity, in addition to the communities and identities intimately connected with place. Alongside the ‘reciprocal hatreds’ engendered by a belligerent war culture, such acts of destruction could aid the mobilisation of non-combatants by provoking a ‘defensive patriotism’. For many civilians (and, indeed, citizen soldiers), the perceived comfort and safety invoked by ideas of home was shaken to its core by seemingly unwarranted attacks upon ordinary communities. This was very literally the home front, a ‘danger zone’ much like the hellish mire of the battlefront.

This introductory chapter will outline the primary intersecting themes of the thesis, situating each theme historiographically and with reference to illustrative examples. The selected case studies and their significance will then be explored. The central research

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questions of the study will then be discussed, in addition to its primary source base and methodological approach.

Central themes
This study applies a comparative analysis to selected case studies, taking into account the different, frequently intersecting, social strata of wartime society. These case studies are used to illuminate the effects of naval and aerial bombardment on civilian populations. In order to unpick the manifold facets of this experience, a thematic approach is applied. The themes are elucidated from a thorough engagement with empirical evidence from the case studies and from consultation of relevant historiographical areas; namely, social and cultural history approaches to the First World War home front under bombardment, studies of ‘total war’, histories of urban governance and central-local government relations, interdisciplinary approaches to the coastal-urban sphere, explorations of wartime resilience, and the commemoration and memorialisation of bombardment. The central themes that arise from this approach are the coastal-urban environment as a concept, wartime urban governance and its role in developing nascent civil defence, and the concurrent role of public safety discourses in inculcating civilian resilience. There is also a fresh perspective on wartime and post-war commemoration and memorialisation, where the sacrifice of non-combatants is the primary focus, rather than that of military losses.

Firstly, the significance of the coastal-urban sphere during the war is outlined and examined. Experience within this sphere can be seen as unique to that of inland areas, particularly when considering the encroachment of naval and aerial vessels upon zones not conventionally associated with conflict or combat. Prior to the first Gotha bomber raids upon London in 1917, some of the most severe bombing raids were visited upon towns on the east coast of England, with the highest numbers of dead and wounded in the north.\(^\text{15}\) Indeed, given that late nineteenth and early twentieth century ideas of British identity were framed by reference to the country’s island form and the threat of hostile invasion, it is crucial that places bordering the sea are submitted to scrutiny. As will be explored below, while wartime urban environments have received a great deal of attention from historians and interdisciplinary scholars, conurbations bordering the sea remain a largely untouched terrain.

They are important, not only as sites of action, but also as formative actors that undergirded the experience of non-combatants.

Secondly, the thesis analyses urban governance in the war context, particularly the role democratic representatives and unelected government officials played in developing responses to bombardment. The work of urban historians is crucial for this theme, though scant attention has been paid to wartime governance (at least in this conflict), particularly with regards civilian bombardment. Of course, the First World War enacted fundamental shifts in the function of government at all levels, in addition to shifting civil society onto a war footing, involving the majority of the civilian population in the war effort to some extent. This work explores these broader shifts and how they contributed to the development of anti-bombardment public safety measures, including early warning systems and changes in coastal-urban infrastructure and socioeconomic function (the installation of physical defences and lighting restrictions, for example), in addition to programmes of public information related to bombardment. Just as war led to a need for new, dynamic structures of governance to ensure its continued prosecution, the safety and resilience of civilians and their communities was not possible without the cooperation of a panoply of actors spanning all levels of society, including civilians themselves.

Thirdly, the thesis explores the reiteration of public safety discourses developed in the previous century for the war context, with consequences for civilian resilience. Indeed, this latter point provides an overarching theme, to which the other themes fundamentally contribute. This is because the coastal-urban environment itself was integral to the way it was governed in the interest of ‘public safety and the defence of the realm’, by a diversity of actors. These actors not only wished to continue to successfully prosecute the war, with minimal social unrest, they also wished to mobilise civilian populations. A central facet of wartime social and cultural mobilisation was the inculcation of resilient attitudes that could boost morale and encourage endurance, particularly crucial at times of anxiety, strain and widespread disillusion with the war. A significant portion of these efforts was undertaken


18 Steven Loveridge, ‘Seeing Trauma as Sacrifice: The Link Between “Sentimental Equipment” and Endurance in New Zealand’s War Effort’ in *Endurance and the First World War: Experiences and Legacies in New
by civilians themselves, and hence the concern in this thesis with the interaction of civilians with anti-bombardment measures, including the self-led activities of particular non-combatant groups.

Finally, the thesis provides an analysis of changes in bombardment commemoration over time, beginning during the war itself. Taken as a piece, the thesis chronologically traces the phenomenon of civilian bombardment and fear of invasion from its pre-war roots – particularly the turn of the twentieth century - in public debates and popular culture surrounding the rising military-industrial power of Germany and the ensuing consequences for Anglo-German relations. Just as wartime military losses on the conventional battlefield were immediately commemorated in town and city streets, through the building of makeshift ‘street shrines’, bombardments were marked both culturally and spatially in the places affected. During the war, this most often took the form of bombardment-themed fundraising events, such as Hartlepool and West Hartlepool’s joint ‘Bombardment Thank-offering Days’, which were held annually on the anniversary of the 16 December 1914 attack, and continued to be held during the interwar years. Following the armistice, plans were developed for physical memorials, including military monuments inclusive of civilian losses in bombing raids (as in Scarborough and Hartlepool).

During the First World War centenary period (2014-18), there were renewed efforts to publically remember bombardment across the case studies. In some towns, particularly Scarborough and ‘the Hartlepools’, local history and heritage narratives of the war were, and continue to be, framed by the local experience of hostile attack during the First World War. It is important to focus the latter part of the thesis upon the legacies of bombardment, as the afterlives of bombardment enabled contemporaries during the interwar years and beyond to make sense of mass conflict. However, it is notable that, one hundred years after the material destruction and trauma of the events themselves, local identities in north-eastern coastal towns continue to be framed by civilian bombardment, especially given the shadow the Second World War has cast over popular conceptions of British national identity. This gives credence to the view that the coastal experience of war, and the local identities coloured

20 Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 16 December 1915, 2.
by this experience, were in many ways unique and perhaps say something generally about the
nature of coastal social and cultural life.

The north-east coastal region and the coastal experience of war
Throughout this work, the phrase ‘north-east coastal region’ is used to refer to ‘the
Hartlepools’, Whitby, Scarborough and Hull. This delineates an area conducive to in-depth
study, underlining the significance of geographical placing and socioeconomic character in
framing the war experience of the places in question. These case studies have been selected
both for their degree of involvement in civilian bombardment during the period 1914-18, and
for their complimentary and contrasting urban-maritime characters. This makes them
especially conducive to comparative analysis. A number of notable towns and cities from the
wider region are consciously absent from this study, most notably Newcastle-upon-Tyne and
Sunderland. However, this is not because these places did not suffer under bombardment.
Rather, Zeppelin raids affected both cities in 1915 and 1916 respectively, as they possessed
legitimate military targets at this time, in the form of industrial facilities.22 The choice of the
Hartlepools, Scarborough and Whitby reflects their shared involvement in the first successful
attack upon British shores of the First World War, the German naval raid on the morning of
16 December 1914. This series of raids by six vessels of the German High Seas Fleet -
beginning at around 8am and ending at 9.11am - killed 157 people and injured more than five
hundred.23 This number approximately matched that seen on a single night in London during
the Gotha bomber raids in 1917, a significantly higher populated region of the country faced
with a much more formidable weapon than the lumbering ‘Zepp’.24 Furthermore, though
there were a further eleven raids by naval vessels during 1915-18 – all on the north- and
south-east coasts of England - only a relative handful of casualties were the result.25
Nevertheless, the shock of the naval raid and otherworldly floating threat of Zeppelin raids,
foreshadowed by narratives regarding the coming ‘war in the air’, in many ways structured
the ways urban civilian populations related to the war, while the safety of loved ones on the

22 Thomas Fegan, The ‘Baby Killers’: German Air Raids on Britain in the First World War (Barnsley: Pen &
23 Jann M. Witt and Robin McDermott, Scarborough Bombardment: The Attack by the German High Seas Fleet
on Scarborough, Whitby and Hartlepool on 16 December 1914 (Berlin: Palm Verlag, 2016), 113; Mark Marsay,
Bombardment! The Day the East Coast Bleed (Scarborough: Great Northern Publishing, 1999), 459, 486, 493-4;
War Office, Statistics, 676.
24 Brett Holman, The Next War in the Air: Britain’s Fear of the Bomber, 1908-1941 (Abingdon: Routledge,
2016), 222.
home front was a subject of concern for those fighting abroad in the slough of the Western Front.\textsuperscript{26}

Hull features as a case study due to its protracted experience of Zeppelin air raids, with eight attacks between June 1915 and August 1918, killing 57 and injuring 151 in total.\textsuperscript{27} This acts as a counterpoint to the naval focus of the other cases, while demonstrating, chronologically, the development of wartime fears of bombardment from that of naval raid and invasion to a preoccupation with aeronautics and aerial bombing.\textsuperscript{28} Even with this transition, the coastal context was still important to contemporaries’ understanding of the ongoing conflict at home, particularly as the coast remained in easy reach for the enemy.\textsuperscript{29} In the area under analysis here, the Zeppelin loomed large figuratively as a troubling encapsulation of modernity, of the frightening potential of technology, and the undermining of international law. Any such war in the air was seen to have a ‘morale effect’ upon the civilian population, damaging the war effort at home in order to shake national resolve.\textsuperscript{30} Bombardment of non-combatants away from the conventional theatre of war was proof of the enemy’s ‘frightfulness’, underpinning the British and Allied ‘war culture’ (\textit{culture de guerre}) which defined in text and images the enemy and its relation to war aims.\textsuperscript{31} It was primarily viewed as an attempt to demoralise those on the ‘home front’. In reality, the Zeppelin proved to be a much less effective weapon than the aeroplane, as it was unduly affected by adverse weather conditions, but its image retained a contemporary currency, largely due to the strangeness of its appearance and the sounds it made as it approached its target.\textsuperscript{32} They also possessed a potential for metaphor-making, ‘part animal and part machine’, ‘natural and constructed, primordial as well as futuristic’.\textsuperscript{33} As already alluded to, pre-war narratives of a


\textsuperscript{28} Holman, \textit{Next War}, 23.


\textsuperscript{31} Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 30, 102-3, 107; Horne and Kramer, 175.


\textsuperscript{33} Friedman, ‘Zeppelin Fictions’, 50-1.
future air war, exemplified by the work of H.G. Wells, presaged the bombardments of the First World War, to a great extent fuelling civilian and military expectations when hostilities opened in 1914. Following the German occupation of Belgium in August 1914 and the widespread reporting of `atrocities stories’, invasion was seen by many as a distinct possibility. From December 1914, these fears were compounded by the actual experience of a raid upon British shores.

This thesis situates the case studies in question within the framework of the coastal environment, as urban spaces situated away from inland conurbations. Within the context of the First World War, a coastal position meant a closer proximity to the dangers of the enemy across the North Sea, while inland the west coast areas were relatively sheltered, until the increased threat of aerial warfare after 1915. This proximity to danger was borne out in contemporary reflections on the effects of bombardment. Alongside cartographic presentations of affected areas, the nautical miles between the English coast and the German naval base at Heligoland were marked: ‘14 HOURS PASSAGE for a FAST CRUISER SQUADRON at 22-25 Knots’. West coast seaside resorts, such as Morecambe, stressed their safety compared with east coast equivalents, turning a particularly fraught situation into an opportunity to bolster the local economy: ‘The West Coast Health Resort. Protected from Air Raids and Bombardment by its natural position on the beautiful Morecambe Bay’. Even with the coming of the aerial bomber – in the form of Zeppelin or aeroplane – coastal areas remained the worst affected.

While Hull is the only city covered, the ‘north-east coastal region’, as defined here, is urban in character. As such, the case studies are also linked by shared processes of urbanisation and suburbanisation, and a close proximity to the sea and hinterlands. Though each may differ in important ways, ports here are treated as urban entities, with specific impacts on local culture and perceptions of the conflict. As outlined above, during the early

In the twentieth century there was a concern regarding exposure to the North Sea and the danger of invasion by France and, by the 1910s, Germany. This issue, in addition to the subsequent actual experience of naval and air raids by civilians, reiterates the significance of the urban coastal context during the war. In British popular culture, the Royal Navy and images of the sea itself were operative in patriotic and imperial imagery and symbolism, particularly from the late nineteenth century. This was sharpened by growing continental rivalries at the beginning of the twentieth century. It was assumed that, as an island nation, Britain would be secure as long as it had a strong navy that could pre-empt any invading force. In this narrative, the sea itself served as a ‘wall’ which any foes would struggle to successfully breach.39 As Hartlepool historian Frederick Miller eloquently put it in early 1915:

The North Sea is part of the great moat unabridged, save by the stately ships which carry food and fare, nature’s raw product and man’s finished work, with man himself, hither and thither. The moat is the silver streak which surrounds the buttressed walls, the shelving slopes, the deep set inlets of our island home. On the other side of it, some 200 or 300 miles away, is the home of our Teutonic forefathers, against whose descendants we, emigrant children, are now raging relentless war [emphasis added].40

However, such a view was thrown into sharp relief by internecine squabbles and convergent policy-making among the ministers and officials of the Army (War Office) and Navy (Admiralty), from the late nineteenth century up to and including the First World War. Indeed, as David G. Morgan-Owen notes, even following the advent of the Committee for Imperial Defence (CID) as a mediating body, the two services ‘[produced] wildly divergent, independent approaches’ to the question of a future war with Germany.41

The case studies are chosen, not to act as discrete units of study in themselves (possibly seen as exceptional, as often seen in amateur local history), but as correctives to a picture of the First World War that is generally national and metropolitan in scope.42 As is

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41 Morgan-Owen, Fear of Invasion, 155.
borne out by evidence from the region under scrutiny, civilian experience of the war was shaped by local conditions, including geography and socioeconomic character. While national mobilisation had a ‘totalising logic’ that enlisted every facet of the belligerent society, both citizen-soldiers and non-combatants were mobilised in ways that refracted national mobilisation efforts through a local lens. In the context of defensive responses to warfare against civilians, who inhabited specific spaces and local cultures, the ad hoc efforts of local civic and military elites can be seen as part of a process of ‘acculturation’ of national mobilisation strategies. Therefore, while emergency legislation and military mobilisation set the tone of nascent civil defence planning, local elites generally devised their own public safety literature and guidelines, according to recent experience and in specific local contexts. In this way, mobilisation was ‘state-led’, rather than ‘state-directed’.

Though work on civilian bombardment and the home front has remained largely national and metropolitan in scope, there are exceptions, in which a broader national and international perspective is offered through the use of governmental planning documents, tempered by the subjective views of civilians themselves. Case studies from the north-east of England are a way to elucidate absences in the historiography of the First World War home front, namely the lack of perspectives on the effect of war on coastal or maritime communities, a significant battleground away from the traditional theatres of action associated with the First World War. Indeed, for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the North Sea was not only synonymous with global interconnections of trade and commerce, seafaring adventure and imperial conquest, it was a space within which tensions between European states were played out and, as Jan Rüger has demonstrated, performed. It was paradoxically a site of Anglo-German interaction and cooperation, and a source of considerable anxiety should a war arise between the two imperial nations. In the period, sea

University Press, 1999), began a concerted focus within First World War studies to assess the social and cultural impact of the conflict on major European capital cities.
48 Rüger, Heligoland, 125.
power was not won with ships and naval strategy alone, but through a cultural battle to lay
claim to the vast ‘stage’ of the North Sea, to project power at the expense of foreign foes.49

The key to elucidating wartime experiences specific to coastal conurbations – both
industrial towns and seaside resorts – is to properly situate events within the coastal area as a
stage for action, whilst viewing it as an agent formative in individual and collective
conceptions of wartime activities, both defensive and hostile.50 Coastal towns and cities have
a clearly material dimension: it is self-evident that the sea or other significant bodies of water,
such as estuaries, situate them. They are also proximal to their hinterlands. Ports have
docking facilities, in addition to warehouses and industrial units associated with processing
trades. These material forces enable and constrain human activity, channelling it in particular
directions.51 Indeed, it is human activity that elucidates ‘place’, as distinct from ‘space’,
following Michel de Certeau. In de Certeau’s view, space is ‘composed of intersections of
mobile elements. It is in a sense actuated by the ensemble of movements deployed within it’.
In contrast, ‘place’ implies a degree of stability and positioning in space, ‘the order (of
whatever kind) in accord with which elements are distributed in relationships of
coexistence’.52 In wartime, a ‘sense of place’ provided an anchor for understanding the
ongoing conflict, enabling individuals and groups to navigate the dangers specific to their
location. This sense also enabled soldiers to maintain a semblance of their pre-war civilian
identities whilst in uniform. Concurrently, cultural representations and discourses of the
imperial port or petit-bourgeois seaside town informed the mobilisation of citizens through
popular culture. Such places were bound up with an awareness of the sea’s presence, its role
in facilitating local social and economic life, and as a cog in a much bigger machine of
international trade and conquest (an ‘imperial system’), defended by a strong navy.53 With
the commencement of naval and aerial bombardments, the centrality of local place identities
was rendered stark, as the assumed permanence of the built environment was literally
destroyed by munitions.54

49 Rüger, Naval Game, 210-12.
50 Robert Lewis, ‘Comments on Urban Agency: Relational Space and Intentionality’, Urban History, 44 (1)
(2017), 137-44.
51 Ibid., 138.
53 Brad Beaven, Visions of Empire: Patriotism, Popular Culture and the City, 1870-1939 (Manchester
University Press, 2012), 12-13; Redford, ‘Sea Blindness’, 67. For a local example, see North Yorkshire County
54 Bevan, Destruction, 24; Anthony Vidler, ‘Air War and Architecture’ in Ruins of Modernity, eds. Julia Hell
The port can be, in Isaac Land’s words, an ‘enclave with a unique personality that bears comparison to nothing else’. Despite the seemingly natural boundary of the sea or ‘coastal zone’, these entities are socially constructed. Port and seaside architecture reflects specific socio-economic functions and structures, in turn shaping coastal urban cultures: simultaneously outward-facing and exposed, and concerned with unique local needs and interests, be it international trade or a seasonal leisure economy. Urban coastal environments, much like cities generally, are ‘dynamic entities that both produce and are produced by their interaction with people’. Coastal conurbations, as social and physical entities, have a ‘spatial referent’: their location and relations with other locations constitute their character. It may be self-evident, then, that the coastal urban is not the same as the inland urban, in peace as well as war. Of course, inland ports upset neat demarcations between the two. Indeed, if not expressly targeted by bombers during the First World War, inland ports such as Goole in East Yorkshire and Boston in Lincolnshire played an important role in wartime transport networks, providing a nexus for the coming and going of Allied soldiers and of enemy prisoners-of-war.

Just as much as other conventional urban entities, the ‘parameters, traits, and physical extent’ of the coastal zone are constantly changing, contested and immersed within power relations. In wartime, this was pronounced, with the militarisation of coastal spaces – particularly in Scarborough and Hartlepool - hitherto associated with leisure or civilian habitation, and a fundamental shift in the character of the place, albeit for a short period. The physical, social and economic facets of the coastal-urban were transformed for the purposes of home defence. As bombardments occurred and became more frequent, bomb damage to buildings, monumental and vernacular, reinforced a sense of coastal vulnerability. In

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56 Lewis, 139, 141; Garb, ‘Urban Space’, 1081.
58 Lewis, 140, 143.
59 Panikos Panayi, Prisoners of Britain: German Civilian and Combatant Internees during the First World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), 203.
60 Land, ‘Coastal Zone’, 268.
Scarborough, damage to prominent historic buildings was incorporated into tourism narratives and used to boost the local economy in the post-war period.61

Whilst anxieties regarding the possibility of air war were common, though eminently more pronounced in urban settings, naval bombardment brought with it expectations of invasion; a phenomenon obviously more acutely contemplated in coastal towns. Throughout the war, while London remained the expected primary target, towns and cities the length of the east coast of Britain were, at different periods, seen as potential entry points for landing a hostile army. Pre-war army manoeuvres by Territorial Force (home defence) troops, encompassed the north-east of England as much as the capital, underpinning much governmental and public debate when the ‘mock invasions’ appeared to present an unprepared armed forces.62 Given that a ‘bolt from the blue’ was commonly assumed to be the likely method of invasion, taking place at the immediate start of a continental war, the December 1914 bombardment of the north-east coast is especially significant.63 Indeed, a Hartlepool woman recalled that an invasion was believed in some quarters to have immediately followed the raid: ‘They were running along Lynn Street shouting “The Germans have landed”’.64 Even Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty during the bombardment, stated in a letter to the mayor of Scarborough: ‘We have all heard the Germans are quite likely to try an invasion… We have been told that the Scarborough locality is a likely place for them to try and land troops’.65

This study engenders a deep engagement with notions of space, place, locality and community within the war context. Significantly, it traces the intersection of different levels of government and military authority with wartime popular culture and civilian mobilisation against bombardment, allowing non-combatants significant agency in engaging with home defence and civil defence efforts, including the contestation of authority figures and authoritative bodies at particular junctures in the conflict. These multiple, intersecting levels of wartime experience are seen as mutually constitutive, eliding a simple cause-and-effect model of experience where the activities of elites are seen to impact upon plebeian groups from the top down.66 In this sense, while a significant engagement is made with central and

63 Morgan-Owen, 131-2, 153.
64 Teesside Archives (TA), OA/584, Oral Histories Collection, Mrs G. Petch (Hartlepool).
65 ‘Rumours and Invasion’, Daily Gazette for Middlesbrough, 26 December 1914, 2.
local governmental actors, this is not at the expense of civilian constituencies acting ‘from below’.67 This comparative and multi-level framework allows us to demonstrate the effect of ‘war cultures’ upon the ‘pre-existing social fabric of the communities under scrutiny’, of attempts to adapt to the war situation.68 As we will see in subsequent chapters, this was achieved both through ‘official’ channels and independently of the local and central state.

Urban governance, central-local relations and militarisation of the civil sphere

Studies of urban governance in Britain have focussed conventionally on the ‘long nineteenth century’ and the post-war period: ending their analyses at the cusp of war in 1914 and taking them up again in the 1920s. Nonetheless, the war usually features as a catalyst for changes in urban governance during the interwar years.69 However, the administration of war on a mass scale entailed sizeable organisation and administration, encompassing the activities of the central state, local authorities and military bodies in concert. The concept of governance is used here rather than government. Governance, following Simon Gunn, ‘[consists] of multiple interacting groups and agencies – private, public, institutional, informal – which collectively constitute a particular mode of rule’.70 It describes the ‘set of institutions, rules and procedures by which a political system is governed’, rather than the government itself as a potentially static entity in a dichotomous relationship with the rest of society.71 This concept allows for a more nuanced perspective on the prosecution of war, of a conflict necessarily requiring the collective action of government and civil society, with power and responsibility dispersed rather than operating in a top-down fashion. Therefore, governance as a concept is not only concerned with activities at the state level, but with the ‘permeable

68 Purseigle, ‘Beyond and Below’, 96.
and blurred’ boundaries between the multiple interacting levels of the state and between the state and civil society.\footnote{Morris, ‘Governance’, 1.}

This thesis accounts for the interaction of different levels of wartime governance, illuminating aspects of central-local relations, which had changed significantly since the late nineteenth century. Such shifts were to a great extent cemented under the ‘totalising logic’ of modern war.\footnote{Mike Goldsmith and John Garrard, ‘Urban Governance: Some Reflections’ in Urban Governance: Britain and Beyond since 1750, eds. Robert J. Morris and Richard H. Trainor (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 18; Purseigle, ‘Beyond and Below’, 98-9.} In this context, the phrase ‘central-local relations’ refers to the interaction of local authorities with the central state, usually in terms of politics, economics and policy. In other words, the interaction of the central state with processes of local governance, through top-down policy provision and legal frameworks, supplies of funding and oversight by state officials.\footnote{E.P. Hennock, ‘Central/Local Government Relations in England: An Outline 1800-1950’, Urban History Yearbook, 9 (1982), 45.} The late nineteenth century saw the increasing domination of central government in local government finances, affecting the autonomy of local authorities and their leaders. Issues such as crime, epidemic disease and education were increasingly viewed as national rather than local issues. Concerns about public health and the ‘human resources of the nation’ at the turn of the century (following the Boer War, 1899-1902) reinforced this view.\footnote{Ibid.; John Davis, ‘Central Government and the Towns’ in The Cambridge Urban History of Britain, Vol. III, ed. Martin Daunton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 273.}

The First World War saw similar attempts by central government and military authorities to control vast swathes of everyday civilian life, from the co-option of land for defensive purposes, to the centralised control of food supplies and industrial production.\footnote{Barry Supple, ‘War Economies’ in The Cambridge History of the First World War, Vol. II: The State, ed. Jay Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 300-2.} However, it would be wrong to assume a straightforward encroachment of the state upon the structures of local governance during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.\footnote{Barry M. Doyle, ‘The Changing Functions of Urban Government: Councillors, Officials and Pressure Groups’ in The Cambridge Urban History of Britain, Vol. III, ed. Martin Daunton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 289.} Rather, the liberal state and liberal conceptions of governance had already extended into the everyday lives of citizens, including the private space of the home, through processes of urban planning, sanitation, health and education. Power worked through civil society, rather than upon it, but was still dependent upon a ‘strong state’.\footnote{Joyce, Freedom, 258-61.} The First World War considerably reinforced the strength of the central state, but power and responsibility remained dispersed through organisations on a regional and local level, including local...
government, the police, military bodies and, through self-led activities, citizens themselves. The ‘mechanisms of rule’ in the context of war were dependent upon the, sometimes strained, cooperation of a range of national, local, public and private actors.79

The local press was central to the reciprocal relationship between different levels of wartime society. While civic leaders and local government officials could communicate directly with police constables, military authorities and government departments, civilians were dependent on letters to the press, and sometimes petitions, to make their voices heard publicly. Correspondence columns could act as a ‘forum for the debate of local issues’, as well as a mediator for local and national policy dissemination.80 Indeed, even with many aspects of the press officially censored from the first weeks of the war, editors continued to publish readers’ opinions and anecdotes on the experience of home front life. Newspapers such as the Hull Daily Mail were inundated with letters following Zeppelin raids, to the extent that they had to remind their readers that ‘discussion of this particular occurrence is not permissible in our columns’. Nevertheless, barely veiled discussions of raids and potential future defensive measures were frequently published.81 Though few historians have focussed on the implications that engagement with the local press had during the early twentieth century (let alone the war), evidence from this thesis suggests that many civilian writers sought influence within their community; if not upon local policy, then on the conduct of their fellow citizens.82 In some cases, letters communicated misgivings about local home and civil defence measures, or lack thereof, and put forward alternative policies for those in power to consider. Beyond posters and circulars, newspapers were also an important means for local and central government to communicate with citizens, particularly crucial at a time when those on the home front needed to enact new behaviours to deal with the threat of bombardment.83 This culture of letter writing is particularly remarkable, given the restrictive role of emergency legislation, which interrupted the normal running of civil society. Most markedly, this included democratic functions, particularly elections, the suspension of which

was renewed annually until 1919, following the passing of the Elections and Registration Act on 22 July 1915.  

At a local level, gaps in discussion of bombardment and civil defence measures among elected councillors during the war can be explained by the passing of many duties to unelected officials, bureaucrats and experts. This included, in particular, town clerks, city architects and city engineers, often in close conjunction with chief constables. As Barry M. Doyle has noted, the growing technical complexity of much local authority business at the turn of the twentieth century enhanced the power and status of administrators and experts, most notably town clerks and engineers, though the social and political relations of officials and elected representatives remained close. In a process that had been underway in towns and cities since the mid-nineteenth century, this was sharpened by the exigencies of total war, where electoral accountability was stifled and dynamic leadership was required to respond to rapidly changing circumstances. While the town clerk had been the ‘repository of local knowledge’ since the mid-nineteenth century, during the First World War, at least in the region in focus, the city engineer became all-important in the development of civil defence infrastructure, such as early warning sirens and air raid shelters. However, this elevation of expert knowledge - including the use of already established ‘networks of knowledge’ to share best practice and develop public safety measures – was not necessarily at the expense of the elected representatives in wartime. For example, in Hull, the majority of local government committees met regularly throughout the war, despite the cessation of municipal elections. This is an early twentieth century example of the relative autonomy of committees in conducting their everyday business, usually with recourse to expert knowledge and political

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84 ‘No Registration and Local Elections’, The Times, 22 July 1915, 6; ‘The Commons and the Register’, The Times, 17 August 1916, 7; Purseigle, 119.
88 Ibid., 69.
experience. Nevertheless, there remained a lack of accountability among these figures, again bolstering the role of the local press in providing a voice for non-combatants.

In wartime, elected councillors could not fruitfully discuss the fallout of enemy bombardments or civil defence plans, with the responsibility for drawing up defensive measures under the control of a shifting coalition of police, military, central and local government actors, known as the Authorised Competent Military Authority (ACMA).

Within what was effectively an amorphous coalition of civil and military bodies, the traditional military authorities, based at the War Office and General Headquarters, were responsible for the stationing of home defence forces (Territorial Force battalions) and the provision of anti-aircraft guns and military defence installations to mitigate the effects of a hostile landing. Conversely, local civil authorities and police forces took charge of early warning systems and other preventive measures, including public information posters and circulars, to guard against further bombardments. As with emergency legislation, the boundaries of the ACMA were not impervious to change if warranted by events. Rather than a simply top-down system, these responses mobilised civilians, encouraging them to participate in maintaining their family’s safety through adherence to certain procedures.

Subsequent chapters will delineate responses to naval and aerial bombardment according to the terms ‘home defence’ and ‘civil defence’. Invariably, the former refers to central state and military efforts to shore up and coordinate physical coastal and aerial defences, most often in the form of new gun batteries and emplacements, seaside trenches and barbed wire entanglements, and the stationing of Territorial Forces in specific defended ports. In the period, it could also refer to the Royal Navy’s assumed command of the sea, which for some precluded the need for a military body of men to repel a seaborne invasion.

On the other hand, though the two terms are not always discrete, civil defence refers to responses concerned with managing civilian populations and minimising the risk posed to non-combatants, by providing practical measures against bombs, such as air raid shelters, lighting regulations and preparedness guidelines. Though the term ‘civil defence’ was not used by contemporaries during the First World War, the extension of the term to this period is

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90 Moore and Rodger, ‘Municipal Knowledge’, 51.
not anachronistic. Rather, the term, which gained currency during the interwar years and Second World War, clearly differentiates between different forms of public safety discourse and policy.\textsuperscript{94} In the context of this thesis, the term also accurately describes the kinds of measures and frameworks developed by the central state in Britain, in addition to military planners and local governments, in response to bombardment, from early 1915 onwards. While, as Noakes and Grayzel state, ‘nothing had been done in advance to prepare civilians for attacks that might affect them in England rather than some foreign field’, significant inroads into what would become known as civil defence were made during the First World War itself, and more fully codified during the interwar period.\textsuperscript{95} These measures sought to encourage resilience in civilians, using practical acts of vigilance to turn the anxiety-inducing unknown into something calculable, taking the form of risk. The combination of home defence and civil defence activities could then help people to cope with uncertainty, by providing means to work against risk.\textsuperscript{96}

In the run up to 1914, ‘the Hartlepools’, Scarborough, Whitby and Hull had taken strikingly different paths in their economic and social development. However, a shared geographical placing on the same portion of the east coast united them. The industrial port character of both Hull and Hartlepool also put them on competitive terms, though Hartlepool would never be able to outstrip the much larger and diversified Hull. From the late nineteenth century, the exposure of this coastline to the North Sea would unite the resorts of Scarborough and Whitby with industrial Hull and Hartlepool as military manoeuvres anticipated a possible enemy invasion. From 1914, the difference in the economic character of the places would be bypassed by a shared experience of bombing, material destruction and civilian distress.

**Civilian resilience in wartime**

When discussing the wartime adaptation of pre-war notions of public safety, and the incorporation of these discourses into nascent civil defence information and procedures, it becomes necessary to engage with the mobilisation and endurance of civilians in this context. How did home and civil defence enable non-combatants to deal with their situation as residents of wartime urban landscapes? By the same token, how did an awareness of these

\textsuperscript{94} Susan Grayzel, *At Home and Under Fire: Air Raids and Culture in Britain from the Great War to the Blitz* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 123.
\textsuperscript{95} Noakes and Grayzel, ‘Defending’, 32.
ideas among soldiers fighting at the front provide reassurance that their loved ones were safe.\(^9^7\)

The terms ‘endurance’ and ‘resilience’ are central here, concepts with a strong, and often, contested, currency in history and the wider humanities.\(^9^8\) In First World War studies, historians have attempted to understand the ways civilians and soldiers endured the conflict, especially as it became protracted and literally entrenched.\(^9^9\) The term ‘resilience’ figures here as a way of understanding the wartime strategies and practices of coping and planning for potential attacks. It is related to endurance, but distinct from it in the sense that a resilient attitude is inherently future-orientated, attempting to make sense of risks and manage them.\(^1^0^0\) Following a destructive event, it aids processes of reconstruction. As Kevin Rozario notes with regards to the fallout from ‘urban disasters’, not only must material structures be rebuilt, but ‘torn cultural fabrics and damaged psyches’ must be repaired.\(^1^0^1\) Resilience is as much about recovery as survival, about materiality as much as cultural and social mobilisation. Therefore, it can be viewed in terms of the ability of the urban fabric to recover from disaster and of urban dwellers to socially and psychologically plot their way through perceived dangers before, during and after they occur in reality.\(^1^0^2\) Just as the trenches of the Western Front were ‘humanised realms saturated with significations’, the streets and domestic spaces of towns and cities were saturated with war-specific meanings.\(^1^0^3\) They became ‘war landscapes’, inherently damaged repositories of memory, particularly if the wartime destruction continued to be marked and commemorated after the conflict’s end.\(^1^0^4\)


\(^9^9\) Loveridge, ‘Seeing Trauma’, 49-65.

\(^1^0^0\) Kai Erikson, ‘Notes on Trauma and Community’ in Trauma: Explorations in Memory, ed. Cathy Caruth (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 194.

\(^1^0^1\) Kevin Rozario, ‘Making Progress: Disaster Narratives and the Art of Optimism in Modern America’ in The Resilient City: How Modern Cities Recover from Disaster, eds. Lawrence J. Vale and Thomas J. Campanella (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 27.


War fundamentally disrupts everyday life and attempts to destroy the rootedness of home in place, exemplified by the built environment, but elements of this destruction can be incorporated into reconstruction efforts. As Bevan notes, ‘The worth of such places increases where efforts to destroy them remind communities of this value’. On the fighting front, entrenchment cut into unspoilt rural landscapes and artillery produced craters and destroyed soldiers whether fighting or at rest, driving them into a subterranean world; incendiaries and explosives dropped by Zeppelins scarred the urban fabric and drove civilians into basements and away from the range of guns and bombs. Despite this clear parallel, which servicemen made themselves in letters home, an essential difference was present nonetheless. This was that, until late 1914 at least, and in spite of pre-war invasion fears, most people could not rationally countenance bombardment of the home front. Conversely, it was an accepted fact that all manner of modern weaponry would be in use on the conventional battlefront, and it was clear from the outset that this would take a devastating toll upon combatants. Hopes of a short war helped to mitigate this startling, though undeniable, fact.

Strategies of resilience were, as David Monger notes, a fundamental part of combatant and civilian mobilisation. This has long been implicit in the work of military, social and cultural historians, though, until recently, civilians have not been the primary object of study in this regard. Despite the historiography generally overlooking the methods civilians used to inculcate resilience, social and cultural historians have given considerable thought to ideas of home and its defence. Though, again, the focus has most often been on soldiers, the broad consensus is that the ‘emotional survival’ of fighting men was dependent upon maintaining lines of communication with loved ones, which in turn aided the maintenance of pre-war civilian identities. Domestic routines and the continuation of consumption patterns associated with pre-war normalcy could have a similar effect, while cultural representations

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105 Bevan, *Destruction*, 26-8, 229.

As the bombardment of civilians became incorporated into everyday rhythms in urban areas, the home became increasingly associated with danger, though it was not usually viewed as on a par with the Western Front: the immense losses, particularly during 1916, made this untenable.\footnote{Adrian Gregory, \textit{The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 113, 133.} Nevertheless, the terrible transformation of soldiers’ home towns – particularly the destruction of vernacular architecture – offered a radical challenge to the image of a home front fundamentally separate from the rigours of trench life. As one serviceman from Whitby wrote from France in April 1916: ‘It has often occurred to me & I’ve often heard our fellas remark that nowadays we are a lot safer here than our people are at home. I’ve been wondering this last day of two if these rotten Zeppelins are still worrying you up Whitby way’.\footnote{Imperial War Museum (IWM), Dept. of Documents, Documents.16285, Private Papers of Lieutenant P. Thornton, P. Thornton to E. Ormiston, 22 April 1916.} Others, like Private L. Gamble of Hull, likened the atmosphere of air raids to that of the trenches under fire: ‘I see the Zepps wont let you alone but they wont be able to do as they like now you have got the anti-aircraft guns, otherwise coughing Claras as we call them. There is one pelting away just now at a German aeroplane it has made him shift a bit’.\footnote{Liddle Collection, Special Collections, University of Leeds Library (LC), LIDDLE/WW1/GS/0603A, Papers of L.W. Gamble, 4th East Yorks, L.W. Gamble to Mother, 20 April 1916.} Though frequent correspondence between the fronts intimately connected separated loved ones from the very beginning of the war, the experience of bombardment transcended the geographical and imaginative space that separated home and trench. This shared phenomenon – albeit experienced in extremely different settings – reiterated for soldiers the importance of defending home and family, in what was widely perceived as a war for civilisation.\footnote{Rollett, ‘The Home’, 316-17; Meyer, 14.}

The study of Britain’s first forays into what would become known as civil defence, and the resilient attitudes this was seen to inspire, also poses questions of the medical history of the conflict, in particular its impact upon mental health. This intersects with other overarching themes of this study, namely public safety discourses, and wartime definitions and expressions of fear/anxiety.\footnote{Noakes and Grayzel, ‘Defending’, 33; Bourke, ‘Fear and Anxiety: Writing about Emotion in Modern History’, \textit{History Workshop Journal}, 55 (2003), 111-133.} Indeed, while historians have contributed much to the
study of war-related illnesses – both physical and psychological – during the First World War (when debates intimately connected with the destructive nature of modern war abounded across Europe, under the guise of ‘shell shock’), the exploration of similar conditions in civilian populations remains a small, though burgeoning, area of interest. While a comparable malady could not have been widespread among non-combatants - owing to the low number of civilian deaths and casualties on the home front compared to the untold military losses of all belligerent nations – contemporary psychologists and medical experts nonetheless discussed it. Indeed, suggestions were put forward for practical remedies for psychological disorders linked to air raids and bombardment. Civilians were said to suffer from a ‘special form of anxiety’, due to the uncertainty that accompanied the anticipation of raids, followed by the actual ‘horror of the exploding shells’. Peacetime conceptions of ‘traumatic neurosis’ and ‘neurasthenia’ could be readily applied to both military and non-combatant constituencies, given the concurrent experience of traumatic events on the battlefront and home front. In the case studies covered in this work, incidents of suicide, alcoholism and death from shock were reported from 1914 onwards, with some victims succumbing long after the initial experience of bombing raids.

Beyond the opinion of medical professionals, ordinary people developed their own common-sense explanations to reinforce civil defence efforts, often couched in terms of reassurance, particularly of those considered naturally weak or ill-disposed to wartime adaptation. This was seen as eminently responsive both to the persistent threat of aerial bombardment and to neglect by national and local elites. For example, in Hull during 1915, advocates for a self-organised ‘night patrol’ to spot Zeppelins and neighbours of an impending raid justified their actions by referring to the frightened ‘women and children’ of poorly defended working-class districts close to the docks (in law, legitimate military authorities had no power to patrol the city).

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120 Fiona Reid, Medicine in First World War Europe: Soldiers, Medics, Pacifists (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 85-6.
121 ‘Hull Woman’s Death: Killed by the Buzzers’, Hull Daily Mail, 14 July 1915, 3.
targets). These clearly gendered terms spoke to the need for non-combatant men (too old, too young or unfit to serve in the military) to construct a ‘useful masculinity’, framed by broader notions of wartime sacrifice and stereotypes of martial masculinity. In the wartime social and symbolic order, the ‘sacred khaki’ occupied a focal position. Moreover, women could be seen as inherently predisposed to ‘weak nerves’, a notion built upon nineteenth-century conceptions of ‘innate physiological weakness’. This predisposition was even more likely to manifest itself in the heightened emotional timbre struck by the growing threat of warfare against civilians. Again, as with relations between families and their soldier relations abroad, bombardment was a powerful motif and framing device for understanding the direct experience of war. The engagement of civilians both in official (such as joining the Special Constabulary) and in unofficial civil defence activities (night patrols) could now be integrated into the ‘economy of sacrifice’ thrown up by the war. As John Horne has underlined, notions of sacrifice were crucial in processes of self-mobilisation to continue the propagation of the war. As well as producing a resilient attitude in civilians – evidenced by positive responses by those protected by special constables and night patrolmen in equal measure – these activities provided some men with an outward sign that they were not emasculated by their non-combatant status.

The socioeconomic and geographical character of the case studies

In order to properly contextualise the effect of bombardment upon the north-east coastal region, it is necessary to outline the broad character and function of each place, to foreground the interconnections and divergences possible within and between the places in the war context. As we have already seen, the towns and cities were united by their common situation on the east coast of England, but in some ways divergent when the socioeconomic conditions in which contemporaries experienced war are compared and contrasted (Figure 1.1). These case studies do not only illuminate overlooked aspects of a broader national picture, they raise questions related to distance, scale and intentionality, as well as agency, both of historical actors and ‘non-human actors’ in the shape of infrastructure, technology and the

125 Horne, ‘Mobilizing’, 12; Gregory, 150.
126 Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 87.
built environment. Indeed, this study takes several scales of cultural, social and political life in order to construct the wartime development of nascent civil defence activities. This approach seeks to draw together elements that may otherwise be seen as discrete from one another, or at least related only formally. In the subsequent analysis of civilian perspectives on anti-bombardment information and planning, in addition to actual civilian interactions with different agents of wartime authority, the consequences of shifting central-local boundaries and, by extension, state-individual relations, an attempt is made to recover the agency of civilians in a heavily militarised everyday setting. While not quite microhistorical in method or aim, this close study of four locales (five if ‘The Hartlepools’ are separated into Hartlepool and West Hartlepool) shares elements of an approach put forward by István Szijártó: the use of a ‘diversity of contexts within the frame of a relatively limited investigation’. In this way, the level of individual cases and the level of the general are linked: ‘while these contexts are presented, the fabric of society may also be reconstructed’. In so doing, a straightforwardly deterministic perspective on wartime social relations is avoided.

129 István Szijártó, ‘Four Arguments for Microhistory’, Rethinking History, 6 (2) (2002), 211.
A focus on the coastal-urban also eschews an assumed generic or undifferentiated experience of bombardment in urban settings, as might be expected of metropolitan histories. Seeing the coastal context as uniquely predisposed – by geography and cultural norms – to particular ‘war cultures’ allows us to see the communities in question as bound together by the experience of bombardment. Simultaneously, the chosen case studies are diverse enough to avoid sweeping conclusions: two seaside resorts of varying size and function and two largely industrial ports, again differing in capacity and occupation. The boundaries of community structured how civilians saw the world, and the war, to some extent. Therefore, a community – be that of Hullensians, Hartlepudlians or Scarborians - could be seen as fundamentally different to particular locales, such as the enemy country, the Western Front or inland conurbations. Conversely, sharing similar experiences could transcend geographical space, to unite civilian populations in a shared sense of wartime sacrifice. In addition, a community viewed as discrete in wartime could aid social and military mobilisation, defining the relation of the coastal town to the rest of Britain, while providing a material and cultural

counterpoint to the lands of the alien enemy and the battlefields situated across the North Sea. In short, geography, civil society and cultural representations came together to make the east coast a sort of battlefield, within which civilians could make sense of their wartime experiences.\footnote{Catherine Rollett, ‘The Home and Family Life’ in \textit{Capital Cities at War, Vol. II: A Cultural History}, eds. Jay Winter and Jean-Louis Robert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 315-7.}

All of the case studies were transformed by the onset of war in 1914, in common with most European societies. Winter and Robert’s landmark edited collection, \textit{Capital Cities at War}, exemplifies an approach that seeks to break free from a strictly national framework of analysis, to attempt to get at ‘community life in wartime’.\footnote{Jay Winter, ‘Paris, London, Berlin 1914-1919: Capital Cities at War’ in \textit{Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin 1914-1919}, eds. Jay Winter and Jean-Louis Robert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 3.} It is also a comparative social and cultural history that underlines the intersection of local, national and imperial identities in wartime. However, where Winter and Robert collect together studies of the major capital cities of western Europe – chosen for their size and obvious social, cultural and political centrality to the prosecution of war – this study opts for the urban coastal setting.\footnote{Ibid., 8.} On the one hand, this is an understandable shift in focus, due to the lack of attention paid to the coastal-maritime home front in First World War historiography. But, it is the broader questions of state and civilian responses to aerial and naval bombardment that cement the centrality of these case studies, as contemporaries on the east coast in particular were deemed to be most exposed to enemy action, due to their close proximity to the North Sea.\footnote{Miller, \textit{Shell-fire}, 9-10.} Furthermore, though a much more substantial study is possible, taking in localities in the south east of England and Scotland, it has been a conscious decision to opt for a northern region. This is not only because it has been overlooked by historians, but because of the considerable sacrifices borne by this area as a result of bombardment, and the substantial local and national cultural attention focused upon it both during and after the war. It is with this in mind that the character of the localities in focus will be sketched, following a full explanation of population levels.
Table 1.1 Total population and gender ratio in north-east coastal towns, 1911.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Male population</th>
<th>Female population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hull</td>
<td>277,991</td>
<td>136,006 (49%)</td>
<td>141,985 (51%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartlepool</td>
<td>11,442</td>
<td>5,755 (50.5%)</td>
<td>5,687 (49.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Hartlepool</td>
<td>61,658</td>
<td>30,412 (49%)</td>
<td>31,246 (51%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarborough</td>
<td>37,201</td>
<td>15,583 (42%)</td>
<td>21,618 (58%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitby</td>
<td>11,139</td>
<td>4,946 (44%)</td>
<td>6,193 (56%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: *A Vision of Britain through Time*, total population and gender statistics (1911 census).136

Table 1.2 Casualties following naval and aerial bombardment in north-east coastal towns, related to national total, 1914-18.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Injured</th>
<th>Total casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hull</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘The Hartlepools’</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarborough</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitby</td>
<td>7 (3 ‘official’)</td>
<td>c. 10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>National total</em></td>
<td>641</td>
<td>1,840</td>
<td>2,481</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*airship and naval raids only*)


As can be seen in Table 1.1, Hull was the largest conurbation in the case study area, with a greater percentage of its total population being female. This was also the case for West Hartlepool, Scarborough and Whitby, as with the British population as a whole.137 Hartlepool is likely to have had a higher proportion of male residents (50.5%) relative to the other towns owing to the concentration of the town’s population in heavy industries such as coal transport, engineering and shipbuilding. Hartlepool’s closest comparator, Hull, possessed a broader array of maritime processing industries and associated light trades which also employed women. In wartime Hull in particular, these population differentials did not


substantially affect the availability of men who were not able to join the armed forces (due to age, lack of fitness or poor health) from engaging in voluntary duties on the home front, such as joining the Special Constabulary or self-led night patrols. These were the nominal roles related to public safety and civil defence for motivated non-combatants on the home front. Even so, considerable pressure was still exerted upon the city, as across the country, by the call for men to join the colours. A much lower uptake of Special Constabulary service in Scarborough and Whitby is likely to have reflected the slim possibility of direct attack in the months before December 1914. Interestingly, though it possessed a similar male population to Whitby, relative to population Hartlepool provided the largest number of special constables in the case study area, with 2.6 per cent. By comparison, Hull provided 2 per cent, and approximately 0.4 per cent joined in Whitby. However, recent research suggests that military recruitment, during its voluntary stage prior to 1916, was more sluggish for the North Riding (including Scarborough and Whitby) than in Hull, so a relatively substantial proportion of the male population would have still been available for voluntary service on the home front.

Table 1.2 underlines the scale of civilian sacrifice within the area in question, lending credence to the aims of the thesis; namely, to enrich the historiography of the First World War home front by ‘writing in’ the experience of provincial, coastal communities with a direct experience of hostile action. While casualties produced in the wake of bombardment were dwarfed by that of the military - as well as by the civilians killed in the air raids of the Second World War – the significance of the north-east coastal region within the shifting demography of the conflict is glaring. These were, after all, demographic shifts enacted, not in conventional theatres of war, but by hostile forces in conventionally civilian spaces, comprising wartime constituencies uninvolved in actual combat. When the case study area is taken as a whole, the number of casualties equated to 23 per cent of the national total, if aeroplane raids (which did not affect the region) are discounted. Furthermore, 33 per cent of the national death toll occurred on the north-east coast. Significantly, 20 per cent of the national total occurred in ‘The Hartlepools’ alone, again testifying to the losses borne by this overlooked area of the country at war. Within the region, 61 per cent of deaths occurred in ‘The Hartlepools’ alone, perhaps hinting at the longevity of bombardment commemoration in the towns.

As a counterpoint, a comparison of London and south-east England’s experience of raids by Gotha bombers in 1917 is enlightening. These large, multi-engine aeroplanes operated in daylight (unlike the Zeppelin) from bases in occupied Belgium. Astoundingly, some 55 per cent of those killed in any kind of raid, aerial or naval, perished in the Gotha aeroplane raids of 1917, as well as intermittent skirmishes in 1916 and 1918. A single raid on London in June 1917 killed 162 people (wounding 432), slimly exceeding the numbers of civilians killed in the December 1914 naval raid. Death on this scale was not matched again during the conflict. It should be noted that, by 1917, raids by Zeppelins were much less likely, just as the threat of repeated seaborne bombardment had passed in the summer of 1915. During the remainder of the war, there were few significant raids on the north-east coast. However, the combined toll on life and limb on this part of the coast measured up to the technologically advanced destruction of the height of the Gotha raids upon the capital. Therefore, in wartime, civilians in Hull, ‘The Hartlepool’, Scarborough and Whitby could feel justified in situating their sacrifice within a broader national ‘economy of sacrifice’, underpinned by a ‘social morality’ thrown up by the conflict. To quote John Horne, this was a ‘set of reciprocal moral judgements on the contribution of different groups to the national effort’, thereby spurring on voluntary enlistment and the patriotic mobilisation of non-combatants for the war effort. This suitably presages subsequent chapters on the direct experience and legacies of bombardment for the region, with collective memory and popular narratives continuing (unevenly) to maintain a presence into the interwar years and, in the case of Hartlepool, up to the present day.

Hull

While similar in character to Hartlepool in some respects – coupling industrial functions with a port character – Hull at the outbreak of war was a considerable city, with a bustling trade-focused port. Apart from international trade, Hull’s primary industries from the mid-nineteenth century were concerned with bulk processing of imported products, including tanning, oilseed crushing and paint manufacture. Industries connected with trade and merchant shipping were also important, most notably shipbuilding and marine engineering.
The market for shipbuilding and other ancillary trades was strengthened by a buoyant fishing industry from the 1880s, further underlining the city’s wider economic reliance on maritime activity. Fishing, growing in prominence from the mid-nineteenth century due to new railway connections, also gave impetus to local fish smokehouses, curers and fishmeal plants, concentrated around the ‘trawlertown’ of Hessle Road and its environs. The bulk of local economic activity and growth was facilitated by the development of docking facilities (developed by railways companies, such as the North Eastern Railway Co.), which enabled coastal and seaborne movement of people and goods. In 1900, an estimated 10,000 people were involved directly in the fishing industry, as trawlermen, fish market and dock workers, engineers, and in ancillary processing trades. By 1911, marine mercantile occupations still provided the largest number of employment opportunities, with work available in docks and harbours, on the river or the sea itself. After this, shipbuilding and engineering predominated. On the eve of the war, local industries provided 68 per cent of male employment and 71 per cent female, including in new trades such as metal box manufacture.

Promoted locally as the Empire’s ‘third port’, the summer of 1914 saw the culmination of a period of concerted effort on the part of the local authority to develop the port’s capacity for shipping and warehousing, in concert with regional railway and shipping firms. Accompanied by much local and regional fanfare, King George Dock was opened to the east of the city centre on 26 June 1914, just over a month before the outbreak of war. For local commentators, the opening of the largest dock (initially 53 acres of water area) on the north-east coast cemented Hull’s ‘place in the sun’. The port’s geographical placing close to the North Sea and therefore to Europe and the Baltic was central to local ‘boosterist’ efforts, while the canal system and efficient railways provided access to the ‘teeming West Riding and Lancashire, and to the South, the opulent Midlands’. Despite this enthusiasm for a coming ‘Greater Hull’, growing continental tensions in early summer 1914 effectively

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146 Ibid., 144.
147 Byrne, ‘Trawlertown’, 246.
152 ‘An Empire Dock’, Hull Daily Mail, 26 June 1914, 12; Tom Hulme, ‘“A nation of town criers”: Civic Publicity and Historical Pageantry in Inter-war Britain’, Urban History, 44 (2) (2017), 273.
armed discussions of civic and industrial progress. Drawing upon ideas that had been common since the ‘military embarrassment’ of the Boer War, an editorial in the *Eastern Morning News* declared on 29 June, England was in need of ‘national efficiency’. This was necessary due to the increasing presence of ‘foreign competition, and of the way other countries, and Germany in particular, are arming themselves in the great industrial battle that is ever being fought’. In this way, the conflict on the horizon was couched in economic and military terms, reflecting widespread fears about Germany’s growing global stature (aided by free trade arrangements) and their role in the naval arms race, the ‘dreadnought challenge’ that underpinned the battleship construction agendas of both Britain and Germany until the eve of the war.

‘The Hartlepools’

At the onset of hostilities in 1914, the town known today as Hartlepool was combined with its younger sister West Hartlepool, known colloquially and semi-officially as ‘The Hartlepools’ until the 1960s. Indeed, wartime news and other forms of popular culture utilised this term liberally, though the two towns were politically separate, with their own elected politicians and councils. They were distinct in other ways, with social, demographic and economic differences, including a longstanding enmity linked to political disagreements around ostensibly rival dock developments in the nineteenth century. Following armistice, commemoration and collective remembrance of the December 1914 bombardment was most often shared between the two towns, under the rubric ‘The Hartlepools’. It is interesting that this shared identity remained into the interwar years and beyond, given the difference in numbers killed in each town: approximately 49 in West Hartlepool and 38 in Hartlepool. Similarly, wartime and post-war reflections by local historians did not differentiate between the towns. Rather, given that the infant West Hartlepool shared a maritime-industrial

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158 HAPMG, ‘Bombardment of the Hartlepools’ poster, Chas. A. Sage, c. 1914.
character with the older port of Hartlepool, the local sense of community was likely one bound by a shared proximity to the sea and maritime industry, though it may be presumed that people living at Hartlepool headland, near to the Heugh Gun Battery, felt more exposed to danger. Indeed, popular images and published accounts that emerged following the event reflected these concerns, more often depicting sites close to the battery. War memorials developed in the interwar years also differed in each town, with Hartlepool opting for a memorial that accounted for the civilians who ‘fell’ in the bombardment. Conversely, West Hartlepool’s official effort took a more traditional route, memorialising only the sacrifices of the military and naval forces. This suggests that, to some extent, the bombardment was the social and cultural property of Hartlepool owing to its greater investment in maritime industry and association with home defence, though it should be noted that West Hartlepool also developed following the expansion of docking facilities, and residents in the past were known as ‘West Dockers’. The Hartlepool headland was also the first bombsite and the site of the first military death in the town, again imbuing Hartlepool with an almost sacred status.

The geographical placing of both Hartlepool and West Hartlepool may balance this analysis. As a contemporary account of the 1914 bombardment stated: ‘West Hartlepool [was] not so easily distinguished in the imperfect light of a hazy December morning’. Despite covering a larger area possessing a greater number of public buildings and churches, the Western borough sustained less material and architectural damage when compared with Hartlepool. The three German bombarding vessels, SMS *Seydlitz*, *Moltke* and *Blücher*, were positioned close to the shore nearer to the Headland and its batteries, with the lead vessel (*Seydlitz*) only around 2¼ miles away. This close proximity meant that the vessels aiming at Heugh Battery and other emplacements at the Hartlepool headland could not issue ‘dropping fire’ upon the town’s armaments, causing overshooting into the residential areas and fields beyond. Official reports suggested that the heaviest damage occurred near to the Heugh Battery, with the residential streets immediately behind receiving an arc of fire: the result of ‘shells… which ricocheted [sic] off the vicinity of the batteries’. Witt and McDermott add that, owing to the short firing distance, the ‘shell fuzes employed, which

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160 *The Sphere*, 26 December 1914, front page. See also James Clark’s 1915 painting, *The Bombardment of the Hartlepools*, held by Hartlepool Museums & Galleries.

161 Wood, 26.

162 Miller, *Shell-fire*, 110.


164 Miller, 85.

were designed to be effective against armoured ships, were unable to detonate the main charge in the shells’.\(^{166}\) This at least partly accounts for the range of damage visited upon the towns, as well as the preponderance of unexploded ordnance found in farms and fields beyond West Hartlepool itself.\(^{167}\)

In terms of socioeconomic character and function, in 1914 Hartlepool was a busy industrial port, with shipbuilding and coal transportation predominating.\(^{168}\) With a relatively small population, the majority of people living in Hartlepool would have been involved in marine engineering and maritime industry in some capacity, especially as residential housing was tightly packed close to the town’s principal docks and factories. In a similar sense to Hull’s Hessle Road fishing district, Hartlepool was something of a ‘taskscape’, where community is defined by shared social and economic activities.\(^{169}\) This is a ‘means of imagining place as the located ensemble of collective tasks, sensations, sounds, and encounters performed in the process of communal living’. Therefore, such a taskscape impacted upon the urban landscape, shaping the form of both industrial and domestic areas, just as geography provided a basis for the foundation of the town. The coastal-urban landscape is, therefore, the outcome of collective interactions within place, or the ‘taskscape in palpable form’.\(^{170}\) Put another way, such a ‘landscape is not only mountains, plains, beaches, forests or deserts, but also the physical modifications made to them by successive generations of humans, and the cultural beliefs and practices which are embedded in and projected onto the terrain’ [emphasis in original].\(^{171}\)

West Hartlepool developed as a new town following the expansion of the railways in the mid-nineteenth century. Indeed, as local historians have stated, it was largely the product of the Hartlepool Dock and Railway Company and grew following the building of a harbour and docks in 1847.\(^{172}\) The district surrounding the West Dock had a maritime industrial character, much like Hartlepool itself. Beyond the docks to the south were developed shopping streets and substantial amounts of housing, with the north-east edge of the new

\(^{166}\) Witt and McDermott, 111.

\(^{167}\) Miller, 105.


\(^{171}\) Selena Daly, Martina Salvante and Vanda Wilcox, ‘Landscapes of War: A Fertile Terrain for First World War Scholarship’ in *Landscapes of the First World War*, eds. Selena Daly, Martina Salvante and Vanda Wilcox (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 5, 8.

\(^{172}\) Wood, 42; Miller, 42.
Such developments were spurred on by a growing population, with the demands of the shipbuilding yards, iron and steel works, paper mills and other small trades calling for greater and greater numbers of workers during the first decade of the twentieth century. By the onset of war, the only real separation one could make between the towns would be along the lines of population and, potentially, proximity to the danger of an invading enemy force, underlined by Hartlepool headland’s jutting peninsular. This was also, as already noted, the site of the Heugh Battery and the site of an array of potential military targets.

**Scarborough**

In contrast to the other case studies, Scarborough was primarily a fashionable spa resort in the early twentieth century, known to contemporaries, and presented to tourists, as the ‘Queen of Watering-Places’. Possessing mineral waters, sea-bathing facilities, opulent hotels, parks and gardens, Scarborough was particularly popular with the urban middle-classes of the region, though there were swathes of working-class excursionists and short stay visitors from the 1850s. By the turn of the twentieth century, the provision of mass leisure to a broader social milieu was central, but the town did not lose entirely its aura of exclusivity. A class divide was palpable and expressed geographically, both in terms of permanent terraced housing and the areas frequented by working-class people in season. Whereas the South Bay was reserved for respectable pastimes such as sea-bathing and the sedate entertainments of the Spa, in addition to palatial villa accommodation for well-off residents, the North Bay was developed for a more plebeian seasonal consumer. The hills of the town enabled this separation to continue into the interwar years, meaning that ‘it has been able to tout for the masses without losing caste’. As John K. Walton notes:

> [The South Cliff provided a decidedly exclusive environment for the northern haute bourgeoisie, while the social tone of the North Bay around the cricket ground was lower-]

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173 Wood, 41.
174 Miller, 47.
middle-class and the area around the old fishing quarter was reserved for the genuine proletarians.\textsuperscript{179}

The North side of the town was also the site of working-class housing developments in the late nineteenth century, featuring long rows of terraced housing for permanent residents and tall, cheap lodging houses for less wealthy visitors.\textsuperscript{180} There were also developments further inland to the south, providing accommodation for railway and gas workers, undercutting to some extent the pretentions of the town council and commercial interests to ‘develop Scarborough majestically’ in the face of increasing democratisation of the seaside resort from the late nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{181} In addition to the local leisure economy, Scarborough had a considerable, though dwindling, fishing industry at the onset of hostilities. The advent of the railways in the mid-nineteenth century enabled the rejuvenation of an industry that had been hitherto overshadowed by merchant shipbuilding. The coming of steam-powered vessels signalled the eclipse of Scarborough, where line-fishing still predominated. This was reinforced by a lack of harbour space and restricted access to coalfields, meaning ports like Hull, Grimsby and South Shields were able to grow in prominence.\textsuperscript{182} By 1914, there were no active trawlers and only one line-fishing vessel in operation, though post-war tourism literature boasted of a buoyant herring fishing industry, suggesting that the town’s maritime heritage formed an integral part of narratives used to encourage visitors.\textsuperscript{183}

\textbf{Whitby}

Late Victorian and Edwardian Whitby saw similar shifts in its economic base to Scarborough, switching from a mainstay of shipbuilding to that of leisure and, to a limited extent, fishing. As in Scarborough, the lack of sufficient harbour space meant that the demand for larger ships, following the transition to steam, accelerated the decline of the industry.\textsuperscript{184} As a result, the economic saviour of the town was leisure and tourism, a situation encouraged and enhanced by the coming of the railways.\textsuperscript{185} Though Whitby is recorded as possessing a

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{180} Binns, \textit{Scarborough}, 290, 295.
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid., 296-7; John K. Walton, \textit{The English Seaside Resort: A Social History} (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1983), 213.
\textsuperscript{182} Binns, 321, 324.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., 72.
natural spring, coastal erosion in the early nineteenth century, and subsequent neglect by the local authorities, led to this potentially profitable resource going unexploited. By mid-century, sea bathing was well established, as were lodging houses for seasonal visitors, catering mainly to the well-to-do. A guidebook of 1849 described the town as ‘a highly fashionable resort and a much frequented watering-place, as the consecutive visits of strangers testify’. From 1914, the local authority took a more active role in developing the resort capabilities of the town, purchasing the Spa theatre and foreshore rights. In the post-war period, this control of local land and resources allowed the Whitby Urban District Council to redevelop the Spa theatre, install new entertainments and a cliff tramway on the seafront, a new road along the West Cliff and, in the 1920s, municipal tennis courts, miniature golf and bowling greens.

**Research questions, structure and methodology**

As briefly outlined above, this study seeks to provide an insight into the coastal-urban experience of war, through an exploration of the naval and aerial bombardment of areas inhabited by civilians. Indeed, as post-war statistics reveal, 96 per cent of those who perished in raids upon Britain were civilians, as opposed to military or policing personnel engaged in protecting military targets (known to planners as ‘vulnerable points’). The work is multi-level in its engagement with the policy discussions of central government, in addition to the interaction of government ministers and officials with each other and with local government officials, such as town clerks and city engineers. It also accounts for the interaction of non-combatants with their local polity, most often through correspondence with the local newspaper, in addition to wider cultural and political engagement through the production of petitions to government related to the perceived excesses of emergency legislation, and the publishing of commemorative books and pamphlets reflecting on bombardment. The production of art and photographic mass media (most notably, postcards and features in illustrated magazines) also contributed to a bombardment-focused war culture, which in turn contributed to conceptions of British war aims and imagery surrounding the German enemy. At all times, these efforts were refracted through a local lens, just as early attempts to protect

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187 Ibid.
civilians from attack were largely improvised and often required a sustained period of experiment and intraregional cooperation. Non-combatants are also engaged with as a historical population ‘from below’, through their activities as agents in the development and enforcement of civil defence. Broadly, this includes the motivated citizens of the Special Constabulary – who retained a civilian status during the war – in addition to members of unofficial ‘night patrols’, which supplemented the work of the police in working-class districts with strained police resources. There are also, of course, the citizen-soldiers away in the trenches of the Western Front, who corresponded with their loved ones about bombardment and often made striking parallels with their experience of artillery and munitions.

Given the acknowledgement by historians of increased direct civilian involvement in violence during the First World War, both as participants and victims, it is notable that few book-length works have focused expressly on the role of bombardment in facilitating this involvement.\(^{191}\) As a way of rectifying this omission, the role of emergency legislation and regulations (the DORA and DRR) is explored in terms of the public safety and naval-military defence discourses underpinning them. Such central government actions provided a pliable framework within which local and regional authorities (a shifting military and civilian coalition of forces) developed nascent public safety responses to the threat of further attack. This dynamic relation of authorities during the war also points to shifts in military-civil relations, in addition to relations between the centre, locality and individual. The ways civilians experienced the fallout from bombardment, through engagements with civil defence measures and ideas related to local defence and safety provides an ideal empirical base and analytical potential for enriching our understanding of the changing governance entailed by the onset of total war.

As such, the thesis primarily asks, to what extent did measures that served to guard against future bombardments build upon and further already existing conceptions of public safety? Given the widespread acceptance, after 1916, that the war required both civilians and combatants to ‘remobilise’ in order to endure the conflict, how did early forms of civil defence contribute to civilian resilience?\(^{192}\) Was experience of bombardment, as well as the responses to it by authorities and communities, different in the coastal-urban environment to

\(^{191}\) Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 54-64; David R. Meddings, ‘Civilians and War: A Review and Historical Overview of the Involvement of Non-Combatant Populations in Conflict Situations’, *Medicine, Conflict and Survival*, 17 (1) (2001), 6-16.

towns and cities inland? How did a coastal situation affect the kinds of public safety and defence measures developed? Did port towns and seaside resorts in the north-east of England cultivate their own unique war cultures – related explicitly to their geographical, cultural and socioeconomic characters, as well as to the experience of bombing – that framed everyday life in the midst of war? Fundamentally, what does the experience of bombardment in this region of England say about broader conceptions of the British home front and its relation to the First World War as a global phenomenon?

The study seeks to answer these questions by combining elements of a number of sub-fields of modern historical research; namely, First World War studies, cultural and social history, maritime history and urban history. Indeed, it would not be possible to adequately assess the broad and long lasting ramifications of civilian bombardment in the coastal-urban context without such an approach. This is because it is eminently necessary to reflect perspectives on the history of the First World War – specifically home defence and life on the home front - which seek to understand the role of this facet of the war, in the context of modern conflict. Furthermore, we cannot properly position this study within an urban coastal/maritime context without thoroughly engaging with the historiography of the port town and seaside resort, agglomerations both covered in detail in this work, in addition to studies of naval defence and maritime culture.

Significant elements of urban history – mainly studies of urban agency, governance and the urban environment itself – also play a role in chapters on civil defence policy, war damage and commemoration. Indeed, the main themes already outlined form a thread running throughout the thesis. It would not be possible to understand the destruction of the urban landscape without an understanding of the role of the built environment in forming individual and collective identities, in providing during wartime something to defend, the loss of which struck at the heart of community. The methods of social and cultural historians – familiarity with demography, mapping and the charting of trends, in addition to the use of visual and non-textual sources – are also vital, as they provide a way into the worlds of constituencies beyond that of elite decision-makers and military strategists. While chapters on civil defence policy and the cultural resonances of bombardment and invasion fear engage with these groups, usually through analysis of government planning documents, memoranda and private correspondence, it is not at the expense of those without access to the corridors of power. Indeed, this is why local newspapers form such a substantial corpus of the primary sources cited throughout this work, in addition to contemporary pamphlets, postcards, photographs, civilian ‘trench art’ and personal correspondence. Without these, we would struggle to
comprehend fully the ways non-combatants actively engaged with the wartime social world, particularly as public safety and civil defence – much like the war more broadly – required a substantial mobilisation of civilians.193

The primary source base comprises textual and non-textual material from national, regional and local archives. The sections of the thesis dealing with central government policy on home defence, primarily files from the Home Office, Admiralty and War Office, are situated at the National Archives in Kew, with supplementary material from the Imperial War Museum, London. The IWM’s collections of soldiers’ correspondence, photographs and files related to the Hull Zeppelin raids are also particularly central to chapters on bombardment fear and the development of wartime policing and civil defence. Rare pamphlets related to the Special Constabulary and tourism literature for Scarborough and Whitby for the war and interwar periods have been accessed at the British Library’s Yorkshire branch in Boston Spa, in addition to allowing access to printed matter, notably the Municipal Journal and Police Review and Parade Gossip. Local newspapers from all the case studies have been accessed mainly online, through the British Library’s British Newspaper Archive and, in the case of some editions of the Hull Times and Eastern Morning News, as originals.

The thesis as a whole rests upon a corpus of diverse materials from archives and libraries spanning the north-east of England. For the Hull case study, in addition to the IWM, the Hull History Centre provided a vast quantity of data related to petty offences during 1914-18, from which DORA and DRR infractions were drawn for the chapter on policing and policy enforcement. Qualitative accounts were also accessed here, including personal letters and diaries written by civilians, in addition to diaries, school magazines and school minute books consulted at the East Riding of Yorkshire Archives in Beverley. For Whitby and Scarborough, materials have been drawn primarily from the North Yorkshire County Record Office in Northallerton, consisting mainly of local authority minutes and court records, in addition to anti-bombardment pamphlets and posters. Scarborough Library provided a wealth of uncatalogued material related to the militarisation of the town immediately following the December 1914 bombardment, as well as personal correspondence sent between local officials and central government and military leaders. Scarborough Museums Trust also

granted access to a collection of material objects related to the bombardment. For ‘The Hartlepools’, material related to local government activities, including civil defence and bombardment commemoration, was accessed at Hartlepool Central Library and Hartlepool Museums & Galleries. In the latter repository, elements of wartime material culture, propaganda and public information were accessed, in addition to a large collection of postcards depicting war damage. Finally, Teesside Archives in Middlesbrough provided a collection of oral histories related to the region’s experience of civilian bombardment, in addition to school minute books and justices’ minute books.

The thesis is structured thematically, though the chapters have a rough chronology, beginning with pre-war and wartime fears of bombardment, through to pre-war and wartime civil defence planning, to the experiences of bomb damage and the legacies of bombardment from 1914 to the First World War centenary period. It is a social and cultural history, keen to capture the voices of a diverse cross-section of wartime British society through the close reading of a variety of written and visual materials. Though it utilises case studies from a finite geographical area, its scope is far from parochial, taking in the views (albeit channelled towards the north-east coast) of the loftiest government ministers and military officials, through to regional police constables, to local mayors, councillors, special constables and voluntary workers. The overarching theme of civilian resilience and defence against bombardment unites the themes within the study, allowing us to make connections between wartime governance and the inculcation of resilient attitudes and behaviours within the coastal-urban context.

Conclusion
The study of the home front during the First World War remains an emerging field, with recent works displaying an awareness of the manifold social and cultural connections between the civilian sphere and the conventional battlefront. Moreover, the longstanding concern of a number of historians with the mobilisation and self-mobilisation of both non-combatants and citizen soldiers has rendered stark the fundamental involvement of civilians in the war efforts and broader ideas of wartime sacrifice. Ground-breaking work by social and cultural historians, particularly Susan R. Grayzel, has explored the devastating impact of

bombardment, particularly aerial raids, upon civilian spaces, and has charted the development of home defence into civil defence in the interwar period. However, there is a considerable absence within this burgeoning area pertaining to the effects of bombardment on civilians away from the metropolis or contained within an assumed national perspective.

While the role of emergency legislation in Britain has been explored, this has been with a view firmly to the changing fates of political dissidents and labour militants, rather than to the effects of legislation such as DORA upon the rhythms of everyday life. Indeed, beyond the control of land and space for the means of defence, and the suppression of information damaging to ‘public safety and the defence of the realm’, one of the primary applications of this legal framework was in the protection of civilians from bombardment. Most notably, this took the form of regulations curtailing public and private lighting at night, in order to affect the ability of enemy naval and aircraft to find a suitable target. Though it did not initially state so explicitly, this legislation was open-ended enough to legitimise local experiments and ad hoc public safety responses to raids, most often taking the form of improvised shelters, guidelines for correct civilian comportment and early warning systems such as sirens and ‘buzzers’. Importantly, the idea of ‘public safety’ implicit within DORA and in local civil defence information was one which built upon a nineteenth-century precedent of risk management, where the unknowable (which encourages anxiety) was translated into the knowable (a fear that could be pinpointed and pre-empted). Risk was also dispersed across civil society, with policing processes, government information and insurance companies all contributing.195

This study contributes an analysis of this adaptation of existing public safety discourses for the context of war. Where it differs from recent work on emergency legislation, namely André Keil’s comparative study of Britain and Germany, is in a concern with the specific experience of coastal communities, which suffered some of the worst material damage and human loss experienced anywhere in the United Kingdom during the conflict.196 Not only is the north-east coast important because of this considerable sacrifice, it also loomed large in government planning against bombardment and invasion, and saw some of the earliest efforts to guard against future attack; a point which makes sense given the chronology of attacks upon the British mainland by naval and aerial vessels. Fundamentally, this study develops a multi-faceted perspective on the presaging, experience and post-event

195 Dodsworth, 39.
196 Keil, ‘States of Exception’.

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reflection of civilian bombardment. It does this by exploring the various ways coastal communities sought to inculcate resilient attitudes and behaviours, within a conflict that affected the entire populations of the belligerent nations and their empires. Attacks upon the civilian sphere framed the ways many civilians saw the conflict and their place within it. Indeed, given the proximity of north-east coast towns and cities to the North Sea, the sense of exposure to the dangers of bombardment and invasion was more keenly felt there than inland. As such, the war context enables the elucidation of a specific coastal culture. This was a culture which emphasised exposure and the potential material and cultural isolation it generated, alongside the hardiness of coastal denizens who occupied the ‘front line’ against seaborne attack.197

CHAPTER 2: Constructing fear of invasion and bombardment

Introduction

The turn of the twentieth century brought with it developments in the theory and technology of aviation and aeronautics across the Western world, though the pace was much greater in Europe. The rapid development of experimental aircraft, both dirigible airships and aeroplanes, caused concern among military and civilian authorities: in particular, those anxious to prevent an eclipse of Britain’s apparently unparalleled naval supremacy by a new, morally dubious weapon. The development of aviation, for both commercial transportation and, later, military applications, was coupled with a late-nineteenth century concern in Britain with sudden invasion. This fear had been presaged since the 1870s in ‘war of the future’ narratives, published as novels or serialised in the popular press and ‘boys’ papers’.1

Intermittent ‘defence panics’ also typified responses to prevalent narratives surrounding those perceived as enemies – usually internal, as opposed to later external threats - since at least the 1840s, where risks to the nation at large were identified and amplified by press condemnation and the intervention of experts.2 This phenomenon would later be mirrored in the widespread evocation of ‘atrocity stories’ on both the Allied and German sides in the First World War.3

Though we have conventionally come to view the First World War as a war of trenches, attrition and inept military leadership, for many civilian populations, the ‘war in the air’ was a very real threat to life and limb away from the battlefront. Indeed, as a number of historians have concluded - after helpful critiques of the home-battle front dichotomy typified by the work of Eric Leed and Paul Fussell – the distance between fighting men and civilians was far from insurmountable. In many cases, through a highly effective system of communication, particularly mail correspondence, lines of continuity were maintained with pre-war civilian life, family relations and local culture.4 Personal and collective ties fostered

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by civilian trade and occupational backgrounds, as well as local landmarks and street names, also enabled fighting men to continually reinforce their civilian identities throughout the war, therefore never entirely losing their sense of home. David Monger goes further in stating the propensity of wartime populations, military and civilian, to a new form of ‘concrescent community’, or a ‘community growing together through shared wartime exertions’. This term functions in a similar war to Jay Winter’s ‘fictive kin’, the networks of ‘small-scale agents’ who mourned and remembered collectively during and after the war. In the context of increased bombardment of civilian areas, such a community was underwritten by the inability to maintain a battle/home front dichotomy. Indeed, as a number of recent studies have posited, this way of thinking may not be entirely helpful to the study of wartime civilian populations and the militarisation of domestic life. As Susan Grayzel notes, ‘the boundaries erected between the home and war fronts were often porous’, with non-combatants being present in conventional battle areas, while aerial bombardment literally brought war home to civilians. These civilians were workers, charity and civil defence volunteers and, by 1915, ‘citizen soldiers’ on leave. They were men and women, though it should be borne in mind that the concept of demarcated ‘fronts’, devised during the war, helped maintain the gendered status quo by enabling patriotic action to take place within the confines of popular assumptions about male and female roles. The concurrence of women’s domestic roles in the home with paid work during wartime also ensured that gender roles were not fundamentally challenged.

The blending of domesticity with military masculinity in the trenches undermined this binary, just as frequent correspondence and the receipt of ‘comforts’ parcels could reinforce the continued ties between fronts. During the First World War, the home front, at times, resembled a battlefield, as the urban environment received damage unimaginable in any previous modern conflict. As Diefendorf has noted, the city could take on an otherworldly

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8 Susan R. Grayzel, Women's Identities at War: Gender, Motherhood, and Politics in Britain and France during the First World War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of Carolina Press, 1999), 11-12.
10 Grant, Philanthropy, 19; Reeve, ‘Special Needs’, 483-501; Proctor, Civilians, Ch. 3.
and unsettling appearance, shaking collective identities invested in architectural stock to the core: ‘aerial bombardments, [dramatically] transformed the urban environment: high explosives reduced brick-and-mortar buildings to rubble, while fire turned wooden structures into ashes. Cityscapes looked more and more like surreal natural landscapes – wild moonscapes littered with ruins [...]’. 11 In port towns and cities, including some not associated with trade or industry, the combination of material destruction and geographical location led to an increased fear of potential invasion from the North Sea. This is important to bear in mind, given the assumption of British naval supremacy that preceded the war. 12 As this chapter will explore, this discourse had a long period of gestation in the years preceding the outbreak of war, a process that was encouraged by the popular press and anticipated by central government agents well before war was declared.

Given both the propensity of local newspaper titles – particularly from the mid-nineteenth century - to copy news items verbatim from popular national daily newspapers, fear of a coming ‘war in the air’ or invasion received a ready audience in the provinces. However, local journalists and commentators also adapted this narrative for use in the locale, often bringing into play varying notions of local identity and ‘local patriotism’ to evoke the threat of invasion from sea, air or both. 13 Understandably, anxiety was keenly felt in port towns and cities on the east coast of England, particularly those with naval connections or militarily-important targets such as heavy industry and manufacturing districts. The east coast was, of course, an access point to the North Sea. Workers and commentators in port towns with long-standing connections with French, German and Baltic ports, like Hull and Hartlepool, could readily imagine an invading force from across the sea. This heritage was reflected in post-war commentary on the local experience of the conflict, and bombardment in particular. 14 The years 1908-9 were decisive in the development of aerial technologies, giving weight to concerns that even Britain’s command of the oceans through the Royal Navy

14 Frederick Miller, Under German Shell Fire: The Hartlepools, Scarborough and Whitby under German Shellfire, First Edition (West Hartlepool: Robert Martin, 1915), 72-73; Hull History Centre (HHC), CIWD/1, “To Commemorate Peace after the Great War 1914–1919” (Hull Peace Celebrations Committee, 1919).
could be challenged and even bypassed by flying machines of some form or other. This fear was compounded by the rise of the submarine, an invention which threatened British national security, ‘conjing images of the hostile boats slipping past harbour defences to attack the Royal Navy and, thus, Britain’s freedom’. This was a freedom encapsulated by the Royal Navy’s ability to lawfully command the sea.

After 1905, German naval power was seen as the greatest threat to British interests and security. Rising international tensions coincided with the development of Germany’s naval strength, in addition to aeronautic experiments across Europe. These years included successful experiments by the Wright Brothers in France, Bleriot’s cross-channel flight and events such as the London to Manchester Air Race. In 1909, one of a score of patriotic pressure groups was established to encourage the government to take up the cause of aeronautics, the Aerial League of the British Empire. The League, in agreement with two other patriotic groups – the Aero Club and the Aeronautical Society – promoted the concept of ‘Aerial Defence Companies’. Similar in intent to other ‘preparedness organisations’ developed in the period, these would be groups of volunteers incorporated into the already-existing structures of the Territorial Force, with a duty to defend ports and military installations in particular. These suggestions were dismissed by the War Office, as the threat of aerial attack was not, officially, considered possible at this time. Following the establishment of the League in January 1909, sister branches were formed in other major cities, including Sheffield in June (just three weeks after the League’s first General Meeting). Enthusiasts in other towns and cities, including Hull, called for similar branches to be formed, with most correspondents eager to stress Britain’s mastery of the seas, which was perceived as promoted at the expense of supremacy in the air. One Hull correspondent, utilising the nom de plume ‘A True Briton’, even offered to design and build ‘a machine that will go a long way towards giving us the supremacy of the air, as well as the sea’, as long as

sufficient support could be garnered from other patriotic supporters of aeronautics.23 However, a Hull branch of the Aerial League did not materialise following this impassioned plea.

Earlier continental experiments with dirigibles had resulted in similar calls for public vigilance and awareness of the threat of aerial attack and possible coastal invasion (or the two in tandem), leading to experiments by the British Army with airships as early as July 1908.24 A Hull Daily Mail editorial of April 1909 doubted the benefits aeronautical developments could have for mankind, highlighting instead the military applications of such technology. The passage, while taking a decidedly melodramatic tone, eerily presages the attacks on the city during the First World War:

What the emotions of the people of Hull will be when they behold the first airship floating in the firmament above them can hardly be hinted, so infinite will be the variety. [...] The airship in the dark is preparing to hover over our sleeping heads like the Destroying Angel, with weapons more bloody and frightful than his sword of speedy and merciful death. Our cities in times of war will be turned to bomb-proofs, spires and monuments will be targets of aerial fray, and the community will take to its cellars, burrowing like moles away from the light.25

The writer goes on to suggest that, when compared with other technological advances, the development of air ships is fundamentally unnerving: ‘aviation will always have attached to it something unnatural and inhuman’.26 A concern with the ‘unnatural’ character of aerial technology - feared most for its negative, destructive potential – was also shared with that of submarines and the tank; these advancements were seen to flout the rules of gentlemanly comportment in war.27 Fear of the decline of British naval capabilities, bound up in the figure of the Dreadnought, was also a major factor encouraging concern with German aerial developments, especially as the country was seen as increasingly in advance of British efforts.28 As Paul M. Kennedy puts it: by 1907, ‘the naval expansion was creating a lasting enmity’.29 However, concern had its counterpoint in expressions of awe at the, admittedly overplayed, potentialities of aerial technology.

26 Ibid.
29 Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, 418.
Many advertisers, as resourceful in the immediately pre-war scene as they would be during the war years, were adept at adapting their promotional messages to suit the prevalent hopes and fears of the day. When only six months away from the outbreak of war, the Hull Brewery Co. alluded to the increasingly popular appeal of aerial flight, with a focus on the novelty of the flying exploits of ‘heroes of the air’ (Figure 2.1). The advertisement brings to mind the daring experimental flights of the Wright Brothers, Louis Bleriot and Claude Grahame-White, set against the Hull skyline. In order to promote its products, this local firm was willing to utilise imagery that belied a certain excitement at the prospect of aeronautical developments, while remaining decidedly ambivalent. Indeed, it was tempered by concerns regarding the uncertain morality and applications of such technology. While it does provide a neat metaphorical device for the advertiser, it could also miss its mark by striking a raw nerve in the form of invasion and bombardment fears. Prior to the outbreak of war, some commentators observed, as Anglo-German relations continued to strain, that Britain was being eclipsed in the development of aeronautics, just as it was on the seas. Alarmingly, this development included military applications, with political will, and economic means, seemingly lacking to rectify the situation:

The reply of Germany to our three-quarters of a million on aeroplanes is seven millions. This is depressing, but quite up to expectation. Germany has not under-estimated the advantage of aerial equipment as an adjunct to her fighting forces. Neither has France. We have. That is the difference between us.

Following the outbreak of hostilities, concerns regarding German military aeronautical developments were tempered by scorn at what was evidently a machine unsuited to modern warfare. Some commented upon the development of dirigible airships in Germany – the infamous Zeppelin – as, to paraphrase, ‘delightfully limited’, ‘an ungainly and uncontrollable brute’ rendered helpless in adverse weather conditions. A similar view seems to have informed some government branches, including the Air Ministry, which deemed it necessary to note both the ‘state of the moon’ and ‘atmospheric conditions’ when compiling reports of aerial raids. A like approach was followed in places outside the capital, with Hull City Police even devising a ‘Moon Chart’ as a means to pre-empt when a raid might occur.

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30 Paris, 41.
32 Ibid.
33 TNA, AIR 1/606/16/15/251, ‘Reports on Seaplane, Aeroplane, Airship Raids, 1914-1917’.
34 IWM, LBY K 81705, ‘Zeppelin Raids on Hull’ folder.
weather was also cited as possessing a potentially ‘Anti-Zep’ quality. As the *Hull Daily Mail* put it in February 1916: ‘The severe gales of the last few days have reassured nervous people who have reflected that they would “keep the Zepps, away”’.35 Earlier in the month, a *Yorkshire Post* correspondent intoned the ‘Message of the Moon’, putting forward a theory that future Zeppelin raids could be predicted because previous attacks had approximately coincided with a new moon, when the sky was at its darkest: ‘This is, after all, just what we should expect, for are not the Zeppelins a true example of the powers that “love darkness rather than light?”’36 This was duly featured on the same day, in reduced form, in the *Hull Daily Mail*.37

![Figure 2.1 Hull Brewery Co. advertisement, 1914.](source: Hull Daily Mail, 5 February 1914. Used with the permission of Hull History Centre.)

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However, depictions of aeroplanes, such as those used by Hull Brewery Co., could also reassure readers of their safety, given the ease with which the aircraft apparently gambols above the city, presenting a view that Britain could be better defended by such machines. It was this sometimes dangerous mixture of fascination and apprehension that characterised many responses to bombardment, particularly among civilians with immediate and often disturbingly visceral experience of raids.38 A serviceman from Whitby, stationed in Egypt, made abundantly clear the blurred relation between fronts from his perspective in a conventional theatre of war:

> It has often occurred to me & I’ve often heard our fellas remark that nowadays we are a lot safer here than our people are at home. I’ve been wondering this last day or two if these rotten Zeppelins are still worrying you up Whitby way.39

For this soldier, 2nd Lieutenant P. Thornton (East Riding of Yorkshire Imperial Yeomanry), conditions ‘back home’ were clearly integral to maintaining morale and psychological health when on active service in a foreign land. Throughout 1915 and 1916, correspondence to his fiancée Enid makes frequent allusions to threatened and actual Zeppelin raids, as well as the threat of invasion. In a letter dated 31 December 1915, Thornton responds to Enid’s detailing of local gossip regarding the threat of invasion in a patently dismissive tone:

> What awful nonsense for Mrs Gills & such nervous people fearing a repetition of the bombardment, I wish I had been there I should have had some fun having them on about it. Some people will take any bluff from any source. Just imagine it, the Germans coming across again if they could for the sake of keeping a threat. Admiral Jellicoe would have been only too pleased in thinking to have things simplified for him in that way.40

Here, not only is Thornton casting doubt upon the news received by civilians on the home front, he is attributing such gullibility to a nervous condition among some members of the non-combatant population. This idea, as this chapter will continue to demonstrate, had its roots in a contemporary awareness of psychological distress and ‘war neuroses’, albeit prejudiced in this case by the civilian status of those involved. By late 1915, the leading medical journal *The Lancet* recognised the reality of civilian stress and trauma, accompanied

38 Proctor, *Civilians*, 107; Stefan Goebel and Derek Keene, ‘Towards a Metropolitan History of Total War: An Introduction’ in *Cities into Battlefields: Metropolitan Scenarios, Experiences and Commemorations of Total War*, eds. Stefan Goebel and Derek Keene (London: Ashgate, 2011), 22.
39 IWM, Department of Documents, Documents.16285, P. Thornton to Enid Ormiston, 22 April 1916.
40 Ibid., 31 December 1915.
by the first civilian admissions to psychiatric hospitals for ‘war shock’.\(^{41}\) In May 1916, Thornton began to sympathise with the situation at home, following a naval bombardment reminiscent of the bombardment of Whitby, Scarborough and the ‘Hartlepool’s’ in December 1914, at all times sure of the supremacy of the Royal Navy:

That certainly was a cheeky affair the naval raid in Yarmouth & Lowestoft. It reminds you of a year last December very strongly doesn’t it? No wonder people in Whitby were beginning to get anxious, no one could blame them for being a bit fidgety. It isn’t fair of us to blame the navy I think all the same, for it is quite impossible for the Grand Fleet to be lounging around the North Sea all the time waiting for the enemy, making these spasmodic efforts.\(^{42}\)

This passage, as well as those above, suggests that scaremongering stories in the press were one of the main culprits for encouraging anxiety regarding enemy invasion. Thornton’s frequent references to Zeppelin raids, despite Whitby itself never experiencing a successful attack from the air, also points to the wartime censorship of newspapers and, therefore, the lack of geographical specificity contained within reports of raids. Reports of air raids simply on ‘an East Coast town’ abounded in the local and national press.\(^{43}\) In some cases, newspaper audiences, including servicemen, would have to assume, or confirm from personal experience, reports of raids and where they occurred. Despite attacks on Whitby proving unsuccessful, the town did have abundant experience of air raid warnings and ‘false alarms’:

These Zeppelins again! You must be getting quite used to the alarms by now. Anyhow you seem to take them in a new philosophic way. Perhaps you’ll forgive me when I confess Enid that I did chuckle right heartily when I read in your last letter of the ear-splitting, window-shaking bomb that left you sound asleep. But just you take note Miss Enid I said nothing about snoring. I merely said sound asleep, I can’t remember just for the moment what I thought — ahem! Anyhow you’re quite right in deciding that you might as well be killed in bed as sitting-up. It is silly sitting in the miserable darkness till all hours in the morning! Do you remember that afternoon we all sat up in the Drawing room & watched the lightning?\(^{44}\)

This humorous anecdote permits a complex reading of the war situation for civilians from the point-of-view of a serving soldier. The underlying assumption is that sustained exposure to the experience of air raids resulted in desensitisation, a condition that would chime well with prevalent definitions of ‘British phlegm’ as a facet of national identity.\(^{45}\) But Thornton’s

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\(^{42}\) IWM, Department of Documents, Documents.16285, P. Thornton to Enid Ormiston, 20 May 1916.


\(^{44}\) IWM, Department of Documents, Documents.16285, P. Thornton to Enid Ormiston, 26 April 1916.

assertion that Enid now appears to stoically endure raids suggests his grounding within a burgeoning gendered discourse of female stoicism, where women now assumed the role of de facto protector (of innocent children) in the absence of husbands, who simultaneously required female support, first to enlist and then to fight.\textsuperscript{46} In line with psychological texts examining the mass responses of civilians in air raids, it can be suggested that encouragement of stoic behaviour was seen to combat the feelings of dread and panic many women were assumed to have taken on when anticipating, and recovering from, bombardment.\textsuperscript{47} Indeed, contained within this was the assumption that women needed to be placated, rather than being ‘naturally’ capable of stoic behaviour themselves. Thornton also seeks to mirror the experience of bombardment with a more sedate occurrence from quotidian civilian life (watching a storm from the drawing room), rendering tangible the event which is, for him, many hundreds of miles away, while softening the potentially nerve-wracking effects of bombardment for his fiancé.

For other fighting men, familiarity with occurrences at home enabled them to gain a real insight into the living conditions of civilians, effectively bridging the gap assumed between fronts.\textsuperscript{48} Private L. Gamble, of Hull, referred frequently to ‘Zepps’ and ‘buzzers’ in correspondence spanning the entirety of his military service, from August 1915 to his death in June 1917. In some letters, his intention was to placate his mother and sister: ‘You want to take no notice whatever about the Zepps laying Hull flat. He will never do it in a month of Sundays’.\textsuperscript{49} In others, he admitted that feelings and expressions of apprehension and post-raid trauma were not solely feminine behaviours:

\begin{quote}
So Uncle Willis’s name is going to be Johnny Walker next time the Zepps come, well I dont blame him, with them living in the centre of town. It is rather hard luck Frank did not get any sleep but he will soon get over that. […] Glad to hear that Lewis is doing alright, but I bet he would curse when he had to go out on account of the buzzers blowing.\textsuperscript{50}
\end{quote}

Here we gain a snapshot of familial relations put under intense strain by the effects of war ‘at home’, where expressions of vulnerability could also persist among men. Gamble’s immediate inclination is to make light of the situation, using joking terms to refer to his

\textsuperscript{46} Susan R. Grayzel, \emph{At Home and Under Fire: Air Raids and Culture in Britain from the Great War to the Blitz} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 39-40.  
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 83. \textsuperscript{48} Roper, \emph{Secret Battle}, 49.  
\textsuperscript{49} Liddle Collection, Special Collections, Leeds University Library (LC), LIDDLE/WW1/GS/0603A, Papers of L.W. Gamble, Pte. L.W. Gamble to Mother, 1 April 1916. \textsuperscript{50} LC, LIDDLE/WW1/GS/0603A, L.W. Gamble to Elsie Gamble, 9 April 1916. ‘Johnny Walker’ refers to a popular brand of whisky (Johnnie Walker).
uncle’s newfound alcoholism, while acknowledging the stress and danger incumbent upon those living in urban centres. Indeed, medical experts marked out both alcoholism and insomnia as symptoms of civilian ‘nervous strain’ in the preceding month.\(^{51}\) When reflecting upon the physical and psychological effects of the First World War on civilians, Maurice Wright, physician to the Tavistock Clinic, London, wrote that activities such as drinking to excess were evidence of the ‘flight into sensuality’. This was a wholly negative ‘mental defence’ against anxiety; its positive counterpoint was the ‘acquisition of strict discipline and control along lines widely different from those of peace-time’, exemplified by the conduct of nurses, firemen, voluntary police officers and ambulance workers.\(^{52}\)

Physiological disorders could also result from this ‘special form of anxiety’, including hair loss. Crime writer Dorothy L. Sayers, whilst working as a French teacher in Hull, described to a friend a bald patch on her head. She was diagnosed by her doctor with a ‘nervous disease, resulting from nervous strain or shock… Eventually put down to shock of Zeppelin raids’.\(^{53}\) Air raid sirens (‘buzzers’), as well as the aural assault of shelling itself, were also a cause for annoyance and disruption, affecting quality of life through loss of sleep. For a man of working-class stock, such as Private Gamble’s uncle, this would have been an immediate concern, with thoughts of the next day’s labour looming. Even so, Gamble’s tone is reassuring, contending that Frank will ‘soon get over that’. As in other wartime and post-war representations of civilian behaviour under bombardment, it was necessary, for the sake of maintaining morale and mobilisation efforts, to claim a widespread stoicism, if only to encourage a dogged determination to carry on.\(^{54}\) By October 1917, the *Lancet* could claim with confidence that civilians fundamentally required adaptation to the circumstances of aerial bombardment: the more civilians experienced warfare upon and within the urban environment, the more brave and prudent they would become.\(^{55}\)

The spectre of armed invasion was evoked in a range of capacities across the north-east coastal area, from the serious and speculative opinion of experts to the nominally frivolous and comical. This had been the case, to a lesser extent, since the turn of the twentieth century, when fraught Anglo-French relations provided the focus of British invasion fears, though tensions were eased gradually from 1904 with the beginning of the

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\(^{51}\) ‘War Shock in the Civilian’, *The Lancet*, 4 March 1916, 522.


\(^{54}\) Grayzel, 77.

Anglo-French Entente.\textsuperscript{56} Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) discussions in early 1903 revealed concerns about the growing naval strength and colonial ambitions of Germany.\textsuperscript{57} By the end of the first decade of the new century, undergirded by a widespread martial language and in the midst of a palpable ‘Germanophobia’ in popular culture (from 1909 onwards), the language of invasion and bombardment provided a potent motif for advertisers, entertainers and political and military commentators alike.\textsuperscript{58} A Hartlepool Bonfire Night celebration in November 1897 was promoted under the auspices of ‘The Great Bombardment’.\textsuperscript{59} In 1900, Hull’s Theatre Royal was given over to a production of the unsubtly titled, ‘Invasion of Britain’. In this ‘Original Patriotic Spectacular Play’, bird’s-eye views of the city and district were imagined as probable targets for enemy invasion, including ‘Paull, Market-place, Carr-lane, and West Park’, all locations well-known to local people. These places were to be subjected to quite an ordeal:

When the invasion has been carried on for a little time there will not be left much of poor old Hull! Shells will fly from the ships in the Humber, demolishing the Monument, wrecking Holy Trinity, and bringing the Dock Offices and the Town Hall to ruins. (Pity something cannot be done for some of our slums!) These effects will be represented by mechanical appliances.\textsuperscript{60}

Though the intimate targeting of everyday thoroughfares of the city for the purposes of entertainment seems, at first glance, insensitive and potentially dangerous, it was not necessarily viewed this way by theatre-goers. One correspondent, George Franks, described an occasion for local patriotism, underlining the potential future need for home defence:

In my opinion, no one could witness the play in question without being imbued with sentiments of the loftiest patriotism – sentiments strengthened by the fact of witnessing the marching on the stage of those who would be called upon to defend our town did what Mr Bourne [the playwright] pictures actually take place.\textsuperscript{61}

Significantly, the playwright seemed intent on using the play to discuss the potential erosion of international agreements on the ‘rules of civilised warfare’, explored through a scene imagining the kidnap of a Hull citizen:

\textsuperscript{56} Martin Pugh, \textit{State and Society: A Social and Political History of Britain since 1870} (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 137; Rüger, \textit{Naval Game}, 225.
\textsuperscript{57} TNA, CAB 3/2, CID papers, ‘The Military Resources of Germany, and Probably Method of their Employment in a War between Germany and England’.
\textsuperscript{58} Paris, \textit{Winged Warfare}, 46.
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail}, 2 November 1897, 2.
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Hull Daily Mail}, 28 June 1900, 2.
\textsuperscript{61} George Franks, “The Invasion of Britain”, letter to editor, \textit{Hull Daily Mail}, 28 June 1900, 4.
A foreign war vessel steals up the Humber before war is declared and enveigles [sic] a townsman on board, where he is detained until an indemnity is paid for his release. As this is outside the rules of civilised warfare, reprisals are naturally permissible, and the white pocket-handkerchief… should not be taken too seriously…

In the face of fierce criticism of such ‘white flag treachery’ as surrender to a foreign invader, even outside of the proper conduct of war, Bourne imagines a future where such a shift in martial behaviour and relations is possible and even understandable. Indeed, in this imaginative world, even reprisals are permissible, presaging to some extent the guilt-ridden anxiety that would underwrite invasion fears following British attacks on German targets on the Western Front and in German-occupied France. Discussion of the ‘rules of civilised warfare’ in the play also contributed to a wider debate about the laws of war and the status of civilians in the war or invasion context, particularly following the Hague Convention of 1899.

Late nineteenth-century invasion narratives

The issues of foreign invasion and bombardment of urban areas were also explored, from the late 1880s, through mass military and naval manoeuvres. Imagining invasion by a European foe, such exercises provided potential scenarios for the inhabitants of towns and cities deemed most likely to be affected by invasion, notably naval and industrial ports. The potential enemy envisaged at this time was France and/or Ireland, the latter being the focus of political wrangling on the subject of Home Rule at this time. As yet, Germany was not the primary focus of naval strategists, though her ‘belligerent foreign policy and colonial ambitions’ ensured a shift by the turn of the century. Hartlepool, alongside a number of other ports along the north-east coast, experienced a scare in August 1888, when naval vessels proceeded to fire blank rounds upon the town, to the shock and disdain of some local commentators:

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The dead silence of the town under the bombardment is to us inexplicable! Are we or rather were we afraid of the enemy? Surely not. Yet the fact remains that in the dead hour of a cold winter’s night if a mortar be fired, in five minutes two thousand people will man the ramparts. Where were these same thousands this morning? […] That we should have been found all unprepared for the attack, especially seeing that so many places were attacked before us, is not only a local, but a national disgrace.68

Tynemouth, Sunderland, South Shields and Berwick-upon-Tweed were also hit in this ‘mimic naval war’.69 The apparent lack of readiness displayed by civilians was a cause for real concern. Public apathy regarding air raid precautions would be cited repeatedly during the First World War and was, in 1916, presented as evidence of selfishness and a ‘wilful neglect [of] the whole neighbourhood in which they live’.70 The Volunteer Force battalions, reported to number around 500 men in 1885 (4th Durham, West Hartlepool), were revealed as inept in the face of invasion, however ‘imaginary’ the experience was in reality: 71

Have we not, too, a right to ask – where were our local volunteers? Ships to the north of us, ships to the south of us; is it not their bounden duty to mount guard at our sea-side batteries, and give any foreigner who shows his face a hot reception? If not, of what use are they? Why this lop-sided warfare? How comes it that this craft is allowed to boast to the whole world that, of all places, Hartlepool has been caught napping?72

Nevertheless, in 1889, the Mayor of West Hartlepool still referred to the volunteers as a ‘credit to the town’, loyal and decidedly ‘martial in appearance’.73 As late as 1905, War Office officials expressed concerns regarding the readiness of many volunteer units. However, by early 1907, some defensive positions in southern England were earmarked for decommission by the Committee of Imperial Defence: all would be well, ‘as long as our naval supremacy is maintained’.74 Secretary of State for War Richard Haldane’s personal view underlined this assumption: ‘The first purpose for which we want an army is for overseas war. The fleet defends our coasts’.75 However, the sense that Britain’s coastline was immune to the threat of invasion was now, in the minds of many, hard to maintain. For some,

71 ‘Local Volunteers’, Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 16 February 1885, 3.
75 Ibid., 396.
including members of the Withernsea Rifle Club, ‘the probabilities of England being invaded were… almost a certainty’.76 Furthermore, it was thought that Hull would be the probable first point of attack, though coming from men with a stake in encouraging others to take up shooting, this could be viewed as paranoid. However, as war progressed, patriotic and sporting rifle clubs became important organisations in the raising of voluntary home defence forces, just as they had formed an influential constituency in the nineteenth-century Volunteer Force (forerunner to the Territorial Force and Territorial Army).77 Men of this ilk comprised a substantial body of the voluntary battalions raised during the Boer War of 1899-1902, as Beaven has noted.78 However, those that maintained faith in the unshakable ability of the Royal Navy to patrol British waters could more readily dismiss such fears:

Fortunately, we still possess the stormy alliance of the ocean, and, even if steam has practically annihilated space, we can yet depend on our navy to make the way of the possible invader both a difficult and a dangerous one… Fortunately, the possibility of such an invasion is one that does not immediately present itself.79

Such views enjoyed the endorsement of the establishment, in the figure of Conservative leader Arthur Balfour and Lord Roberts, former Commander-in-Chief of the Forces. But it seems plausible to suggest that the seeming ease with which ‘invading’ ships ‘captured’ towns such as Hartlepool and Hull during training exercises led some, particularly those with an interest in military and naval matters, to declare invasion a very real possibility.80 Indeed, by 1908, Arthur Balfour, former prime minister and chairman of the Committee for Imperial Defence (CID), declared in a report to the Sub-Committee on Invasion:

[The] trend of events has been to give the Germans some advantage in respect of invasion which were never possessed by the French, and if we were seriously involved with some other great naval and maritime Power, and felt ourselves obliged to denude ourselves of any large portion of our military force, I should feel that we were in a more perilous position than we have been for some generations.81

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76 ‘Withernsea Rifle Club Prize Night: The Fear of Invasion’, Hull Daily Mail, 24 December 1909, 8. Withernsea is a seaside resort to the east of Hull, approximately fifteen miles from the city limits.
79 ‘Stray Notes’, Whitby Gazette, 4 December 1908, 10.
80 Morgan-Owen, 165; ‘The Cavalry Manoeuvres’, The Times, 9 September 1890, 8.
81 TNA, CAB 3/2, CID papers, ‘Statement made by A.J. Balfour before the Sub-Committee on Invasion, Friday, 29th May, 1908’.
Invasion fears gained a currency within the broader context of perceived technological change, particularly in the spheres of aeronautics, naval and commercial maritime shipping technologies. The latter struck a definite chord within fishing and industrial ports, such as Hull and Hartlepool, owing to the effects of steam-powered vessels upon trawling in particular, a process cemented in Hull from the 1880s. As Rieger notes, such developments elicited enthusiastic and anxious responses in equal measure: viewed with wonder at their innovative potential, and uncertainty at their potentially disruptive effect on the established patterns of everyday life.

Led by Sir John French, a ‘mimic invasion’ took place across a number of major industrial and maritime locations in September 1905, culminating in a six-mile long entrenchment exercise in the hills of Henley-on-Thames, after first seeing 300,000 troops ‘force the British defenders South from the line of manufacturing centres which stretches from Manchester to the East Coast, and to threaten London itself.’ The Leeds Mercury offered in June 1909 a foretaste of what would become a staple of national and local journalism during the First World War: the ‘news from the Front’ report. At a time when European war seemed possible but not inevitable, this was merely a stylised device borrowed from the reportage of the Boer War, which culminated some six years earlier. But its intention was to provide a riveting account of a mock invasion of Scarborough by the Leeds Rifles and, by all accounts, figured to be an occasion of great sport for those involved. Initially, the report offered a terrifying reminder of the dangers of complacency at a time of international political insecurity:

Long before the ordinary sleepy citizen was astir this morning the Leeds Rifles had been mobilised and had rushed off to repel the invader who had already gained a footing in Yorkshire, and who – pushing on from Scarborough – was forcing his way inland, devastating the country and spreading terror and disaster throughout the East Riding.

In a sanguinary encounter in the small hours of this morning, the defensive forces on the coast were overcome, before in actual fact they were able to strike a single blow, and an urgent message appealing for assistance from the West Yorkshire Regiments was received in Leeds.

85 ‘Repelling the Invaders’, Manchester Courier, 26 September 1905, 7.
Despite the wider context in which this event was held, local people seem to have been little fazed by this incident, with many of the local Territorial Force choosing not to repel the invading units for fear of losing a day’s wages. The men of Leeds were also to be met by a civic reception and expected to encounter a great number of onlookers, though the writer does not appear entirely convinced that this will occur: ‘Scarborough is awaiting her defenders from the west with the utmost interest, and when the Leeds Rifles enter the town to-day they will find a warm welcome from the Mayor, Corporation, and townspeople – though the number of visitors is not yet very large, and there are no trips organised in connection with the motor “dash.”’

The organisation of such a large-scale training exercise, with the involvement of local civilian as well as military authorities, betrayed a widespread concern for the safety of coastal conurbations during this fraught period. This is true even for a small resort town such as Scarborough, whose value as a military target was perceived as negligible in this period, including its description as the ‘Queen of watering places’ as late as June 1914. In fact, this highly gendered definition of Scarborough’s place identity was later used in Hartlepool to delineate a regional economy of sacrifice, in light of the actual raid of Whitby, Scarborough and Hartlepool on 16 December 1914.

The Hull Daily Mail was unequivocal in stating its concerns regarding the safety of Hull in the event of war and the relative readiness of her citizens. This was in response to a mock ‘seizure’ of Hull in September 1905, with the Northcliffe-owned title utilising the occasion to criticise the military strategy of the War Office:

We are not surprised, not even alarmed, at the news that Hull has been “seized.” The mines at the mouth of the Humber, be it noted, did not stop “the enemy” in this imaginary invasion. Hull, therefore, is not safe. We do not believe that it is safe; we believe that foreign torpedo-boats could steal up the Humber, and work unlimited havoc here without their approach being discovered.

We wonder if the War Office is of the same opinion? Does it believe that Hull is safe? There is a vague impression and a perilous popular belief that Hull could not be “raided.” We believe that it could. In other words, we assert that the defences of the Humber are not adequate – that they are not invulnerable.

The view of the War Office, expressed to commanding officers in June 1905, seemed to concur with this pessimistic view, stating ‘that many Volunteers units are reported… not to

89 Eastern Morning News, 24 June 1914.
90 ‘To-day’, Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 21 December 1914, 2; Gregory, Last Great War, 150-1.
91 “Seizing” Hull’, Hull Daily Mail, 18 September 1905, 2.
be in an efficient state to take the field’, though this was later withdrawn. Later in the *Hull Daily Mail* piece, the writer takes a peculiar pride in the susceptibility of Hull to foreign invaders, owing to its economic and industrial importance in relation to local rivals across the Humber:

> The enemy has disembarked rapidly in great force at Birkenhead (and on the East Coast), but the only place mentioned as having been “seized” is Hull. The “enemy” apparently did not attempt (or it had not the chance!) to “seize” any other port. He did not even bestow a thought upon Grimsby. Perhaps he was not aware of its existence. Hull was their natural prize, their strategic goal. Why should it be “seized” so easily and so obviously we do not know, but to be “seized” is something – if it is only in the Autumn manoeuvres of the British War Office.

These expressions of concern at Britain’s apparent unpreparedness for potential invasion presaged public opinion during the First World War regarding the fallout from sea and air bombardment, and the subsequent precautionary measures to be taken at the national and local level. Following the war, such manoeuvres became commonplace among the newly constituted Territorial Army forces after 1920. Precautionary measures, particularly those attached to air raid threats, developed unevenly during the war. At the onset of hostilities, the majority of British ports, including those covered by the case studies in focus, were under-armed and underprepared for war on the civilian population. As will be borne out by ensuing analysis, local authorities dealt with the ever-increasing threat of air raids in pragmatic ways, adapted with close reference to the specificities of the locale, with varying degrees of success. In terms of physical, military coastal defence, the north-east coastal region was, arguably, severely under-resourced even as war continued to inflict civilian casualties.

**Fear and anxiety in the context of total war**

In order to understand the reactions and responses of wartime communities to aerial and naval bombardment, it is necessary to define what is meant by the terms ‘fear’ and ‘anxiety’, both as analytical concepts and as understood by historical actors. This is important given the prevalent narratives of aerial bombardment and invasion that presaged the actual attack of towns and cities from the late-nineteenth century. These were also oft-repeated terms in the early twentieth-century and particularly during the First World War, with cases of ‘death by shock’ repeated in many localities. There were also reports of ‘nervous shock’ among

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92 Longmate, 393.
93 “‘Seizing’ Hull”, *Hull Daily Mail*, 18 September 1905, 2.
civilians, with experience of Zeppelin raids the common cause. Such reports should be seen in the context of a wider awareness among contemporaries of psychological disorders, including the clinical definition of neurasthenia or ‘shell shock’.\textsuperscript{95} Such conditions, once defined discursively as the outcome of combat or war strain, became emblematic of the trauma of total war, and its effects on the mind and body.\textsuperscript{96}

In the context of the First World War, it is possible to see the nominal definitions of ‘fear’ and ‘anxiety’ as interlinked and intimately related to the uniqueness of wartime experience. Defined simply for the context at hand, ‘anxiety’ referred to feelings of dread and worry associated with the anticipation of a horrifying or disruptive event, such as an air raid. In contrast, though interconnected, ‘fear’ referred to an emotional response to an immediate danger. As Bourke notes, even with such working definitions, unpicking instances of fear and anxiety within historical sources is a complex and difficult process, so historicising and contextualising fear is vital to its study: ‘looked at historically, subjective feelings are invisible’.\textsuperscript{97} We must also be mindful of the language of fear and anxiety and how this has changed over time. But, as Bourke reminds us, it is important to see emotions as grounded in a broader social and cultural context, underpinned by rules, narrative conventions and power relations.\textsuperscript{98} Furthermore, in many situations, expressions of anxiety could reveal a panoply of concerns and uncertainties regarding the trajectory of modern civilisation.\textsuperscript{99} This is no less the case in expressions of concern at the state of the British Empire, or the ambivalent rise of aeronautics. The disdain shown for the rule of law, international diplomatic agreements and normative moral codes, as occurred during the First World War, could also be said to lead to states of anxiety, as the ‘ontological security’ of citizens is shaken by rapid change.\textsuperscript{100}

Scapegoating was a powerful by-product of fear and, as a number of scholars have shown, could mask deeper concerns regarding the local community, economy and wider political situation.\textsuperscript{101} Instances of anti-German rioting occurred sporadically during the war,

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\item \textsuperscript{96} Fiona Reid, ‘“His nerves gave way”: Shell shock, History and the Memory of the First World War in Britain’, \textit{Endeavour}, 38 (2) (2014), 91.
\item \textsuperscript{97} Joanna Bourke, ‘Fear and Anxiety: Writing About Emotion in Modern History’, \textit{History Workshop Journal}, 55 (1) (2003), 114.
\item \textsuperscript{98} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{99} Bourke, \textit{Fear}, 189.
\item \textsuperscript{101} Gregory, \textit{Last Great War}, 236; Panikos Panayi, \textit{The Enemy in Our Midst: Germans in Britain during the First World War} (Oxford: Berg, 1991).
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most notably following shocking incidents of ‘German atrocities’. It would be easy to see such actions as simply knee-jerk reactions to frightful events, but often the geographical spread and apparent motivations of rioters belies this explanation. As Gregory notes, this was the case in Hull, when riots gripped parts of the city in May 1915 following the sinking of the RMS Lusitania. These riots were concentrated primarily in the districts roughly related to the fishing industry (including Hessle Road and Hedon Road), whose pubs were well known for anti-social behaviour on Saturday nights. Anti-German violence had also occurred much earlier, during the first fleeting days of war in August 1914, again suggesting a more immediate concern in the city with the effects of the war economy and the place of ‘enemy aliens’ within it. With this in mind, an attack upon businesses assumed to be under German ownership unsurprisingly took place in the Hessle Road area on a Saturday night when many people were revelling after the exertions of the working week: ‘Hessle-road on the Saturday night is usually pretty lively, and, naturally, the crowd swelled to big proportions as the demonstrators proceeded on their way.’ On this occasion, two of the three attacked pork butchers’ shops were owned by naturalised German citizens, with a British-born family on the premises at the time. Moreover, following the first Zeppelin raids on Hull in June 1915, anti-German riots became more widespread. This suggests that events such as a sinking of the Lusitania were the ‘occasion rather than the cause of anti-German anger’, as the reasons some participants rioted were intimately connected with economic grievances, rooted in the transition to a war economy. The fishing industry in Hull was particularly badly affected, with many trawlers requisitioned for work as minesweepers by the Royal Navy – under the auspices of the Trawler Section of the Royal Naval Reserve – by the end of the war.

The experience of air raids and, indeed, the wider experience of total war, engendered a specific spatio-temporal dimension to private and public life. Air raid precautions and emergency measures, including plans never actually practiced, helped structure the expectation and then anticipation of war from above. As Saint-Amour has noted, the temporality of urban experience was transformed by war, converting towns and cities into ‘spaces of rending anticipation’. Indeed, encouraging citizens to anticipate a possible

105 Gregory, 236.
bombed event could aid a local population’s acquiescence in measures of wartime social control, including those regulating leisurely behaviour like drinking in pubs, the use of lights in homes and on motor cars. This was the ‘traumatising power of anticipation’, ensuring popular political docility by ‘manipulating the expectation of violence’.108

Susan R. Grayzel has explored efforts to encourage civilian resilience through the provision of public warnings, including audible sirens, citing debates in 1916, following renewed bombing in the capital, as indicative of a changing mood among government planners. Still, government guidelines remained largely clandestine and pertained to public places of worship and entertainment, including theatres.109 In late 1915, open, audible warnings had been discussed but were ultimately discouraged due to fears that alarms would cause widespread panic and disrupt businesses, while Home Secretary Sir John Simon feared loud public warnings would aid in the navigation of enemy aircraft.110 The 1917 Gotha aeroplane raids upon the capital were the turning point, resulting in the introduction of public warnings in July of that year.111 By August 1917, there were similar discussions among officials at the Home Office and War Office, including Sir Edward Troup, about the expediency of producing a leaflet for the public detailing air raid precautions and, significantly, provisions against ‘poison bombs’.112 In July, a conference of government officials, military figures and scientists had recommended the use in domestic basements or lower rooms of special ‘curtains which could be drawn over the doors or windows and wetted with water or some simple solution’.113 Detailed instructions were devised by the government’s Anti-Gas Committee for a ‘household respirator’ that civilians could produce at home, including everyday items in its construction, such as food cans, clothes pegs and paper clips.114 However, it was later decided that these could not be made easily in the home, given their stipulation that slaked lime and Portland cement were essential ingredients. Instead, only respirators manufactured to the Committee’s specifications would be

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108 Ibid.
109 Grayzel, At Home, 56.
110 Ibid., 46-49, 59-60.
111 Ibid., 72, 79.
113 Ibid., ‘Conference held at Adastral House on July 18th, 1917’.
recommended. This change was reflected in the printed leaflet, of which earlier versions had provided instructions on how to make the ‘simple respirator’.  

When measures developed by local authorities according to local conditions are taken into account, a much more complex picture is revealed, though repeated exposure to bombardment certainly sharpened the need for public warnings and civil defence measures, as in the capital. However, responses on the north-east coast appear to have been more reflective of a shared coastal experience of bombardment. Indeed, more than five months before the first Zeppelin raids on Hull in June 1915, steam whistle ‘buzzers’ were installed in the city in response to the raid upon the coast on 16 December 1914.  Experiments were carried out almost concurrently in Scarborough, using equipment designed by a Hull engineering firm, though not entirely successfully. Across the region, a variety of measures promoting preparedness and resilience were published almost immediately after the 1914 attack. These first took the form of posters with scant information beyond recommending people to shelter in domestic cellars, ‘as practically no casualties occurred to those who did during the bombardment’. From 1915, detailed posters and circulars incorporated elements of the DORA regulations, most patently those related to showing lights, in addition to recommended measures for civil defence, public safety and first aid. By 1918, civilians were actively encouraged to anticipate attacks by listening for particular sounds and by being aware of the material dangers of the urban environment when under attack. Instead of direct harm from bombs, shrapnel and falling debris from houses and public buildings were the clearest signal of a raid, while instructions for a makeshift gas mask reflected wider fears about the use of chemical weapons on the home front following their first use on the Western Front in April 1915. While these efforts demonstrate a willingness to respond to the material and psychological damages enacted by bombardment, as seen in London, on the north-east coast, the development of civil defence warnings and rudimentary systems was both quicker and entailed a greater degree of regional cooperation. Indeed, in Hull, early

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115 Ibid., War Office to Army Council, 15 September 1917.
116 Credland, Hull Zeppelin Raids, 17.
117 Scarborough Library (SL), Uncatalogued Bombardment Correspondence (UBC), George Clark & Sons to Harry W. Smith, 18 January 1915; SL, UBC, Harry W. Smith to C.M. Shaw, 28 January 1915; ‘Warnings Against German Air Raids’, Birmingham Daily Post, 26 January 1915, 10.
119 North Yorkshire County Record Office (NYCRO), ZW (M) 15/2, ‘Notice. Bombardment or Raids’, 7 October 1915.
120 NYCRO, Z.1028, North Riding Lieutenancy, ‘Forewarned is Forearmed’, February 1918; Grayzel, ‘Defence Against the Indefensible: The Gas Mask, the State and British Culture during and after the First World War’, Twentieth Century British History, 25 (3) (2014), 420; Reid, Medicine, 76.
warning hooters were developed months before the city was attacked, so the experience of bombardment further up the coast only a month before was the primary motivator for warning the local populace. Furthermore, the technology and expertise of a Hull firm was then shared with Scarborough. Therefore, to some degree, an awareness of a shared wartime, coastal experience was at play in these developments.

Improvements in military gas prevention technology from 1916 – following a complete lack of protection for soldiers at the start of the war – were reflected in suggestions distributed to civilian populations in the jurisdiction of the North Riding Lieutenancy, including Scarborough and Whitby. This took the form of a ‘piece of cotton waste, enclosed in gauze, to tie around the head and saturated in a strong solution of washing soda’. As early as June 1915, the National Fire Brigades’ Union also recommended a ‘very simple form of respirator’ in the event their members should encounter asphyxiating bombs. This was similar in appearance to that recommended by the North Riding Lieutenancy, though with a more complex list of ingredients and a note on precise measurements. However, the mask’s technology was essentially the same, though with the addition of hydrosulphate of soda and glycerine. The same pad-based respirators were present around the same time on the Western Front, though these were replaced with small box respirators, capable of filtering out solid substances from gas clouds, in early 1917. Authorities beyond the government made clear parallels between developments at the front and the growing danger of the use of gas at home. This included the Hull chief constable George Morley, who made enquiries in November 1917 regarding respirators for the local fire brigade, at this time still a joint fire-police enterprise. A.L. Dixon of the Home Office replied in the negative, before attempting to assuage Morley’s concerns:

I take it the only masks which would be any good for this purpose would be the box masks such as are used at the front and the War Office say they cannot supply these as they are all wanted for the soldiers. So far, poison has never been used in aircraft attacks in this country.

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121 Ibid.
123 Reid, Medicine, 76.
suppose the use of poison is not impossible but there seems a good deal to be said for not
diverting large numbers of masks from the front where they are so much needed while there is
no immediate occasion for their use here.126

Air raid protocols recommended by local authorities and chief constables, including drilling
in schools, played a focal role in instilling a culture of anticipation. This perspective is
undergirded by the ideas of Lewis Mumford on the culture of urban life and, in particular, his
views on the transformation of the city by war.127 In addition, Grayzel has highlighted child-
and school-centred measures introduced elsewhere, often developed in response to the death
of children in air raids. This offered the clearest evocation of the blurred boundaries between
military combatants and civilians: sacrifice was increasingly shared, but the deaths of young
children, the future generation, were unthinkable and atrocious.128 While bombs and naval
guns could destroy the urban landscape, rendering seeming bastions of local civic and social
life vulnerable, the ‘violent temporality’ introduced by the spectre of possible air war altered
the war-participant’s experience of time. This was achieved through the sequence of actions
present in the transition from preparatory air-raid drill, sirens, searchlights and the falling of
bombs themselves, to the moment of catastrophe. For Mumford, preparation for air attack
was nothing more than the ‘materialisation of a skilfully evoked nightmare’, beginning with
the warning siren and ending in, potentially, mass death and material destruction.129
Mumford goes on to outline the social and psychological processes underway within the
modern war context, regardless of whether bombardment is real or rehearsed, giving a
dizzying snapshot of the urban experience of war:

The sirens sound. School-children, factory hands, housewives, office workers, one and all don
their gas masks. Whirring planes overhead lay down a blanket of protective smoke. Cellars
open to receive their refugees… Fear vomits: poison crawls through the pores. Whether the
attack is arranged or real, it provides similar psychological effects. Plainly, terrors more
devastating and demoralising than any known in the ancient jungle or cave have been re-
introduced into modern urban existence… Fear is thus fixed into routine: the constant anxiety
over war produces by itself a collective psychosis comparable to that which active warfare
might develop.130

Originally published in 1938, these words presaged the area bombing of the Second World
War, while reflecting on the consequences of the First World War’s forays into aerial

126 Ibid., Dixon to Morley, 9 November 1917.
128 Grayzel, At Home, 68, 71; Horne and Kramer, German Atrocities, 210-11.
129 Mumford, Cities, 275.
130 Ibid., 275.
bombardment on the home front. But, Mumford also alludes to a common definition of ‘total war’ in which the assumed boundary existing between the fighting and home fronts is not only interconnected but broken down, as the indiscriminate killing of civilians becomes more commonplace. Crucially, it also brings to the fore the role of fear and anxiety in framing wartime experience, as fear of bombardment and invasion aided definitions of the enemy ‘other’, allowing hatred to ‘spread by means of the newspaper and the newsreel and the radio program to the most distant provinces’.131 This is the ‘collective psychosis’ that fundamentally undermines the civilising social and civic functions of the city, ‘[subordinating] life to organised destruction’. In other words, the war-city is a ‘non-city’, as it ‘unbuilds’ the co-operative, protected urban environment, transmuting it into a kind of ‘Hell’.132

Mumford also underlines the centrality of the changing aural landscape enacted by war on the home front. Not only the noise and violence of aircraft and ordnance, but the sound of the pre-emptive siren. There was a clear parallel, spanning an assumed gulf between the fighting and home fronts, with the often darkened and largely subterranean world of the battlefront. Visual observation of an onslaught of shells and bullets was not possible in the trenches, leading to the creation of a ‘distinctive aural culture’ where active listening was central to the anticipation of attack and the recognition of allies in the ‘jumble of sounds’ engendered by the battle environment. Active listening practices could also prevent loss of life, by discerning the difference between the machines of the rear support and the deadly bursting shells and flying shrapnel of the enemy.133 The scientific and technological applications of sound were also foremost in defence planning in the period, not least because of the nocturnal character of Zeppelin raids. In the context of blackout and the potential inherent in wireless technology to track enemy aircraft, audibility rather than visibility was crucial to air defence.134 Combined with darkness, ‘buzzers’ and hooters could be an anxiety-inducing signal to those in earshot. Indeed, medical professionals discussed ‘war shock’ seriously during the war, a civilian comparator to ‘shell shock’ in the soldier.135 This was clearly related to the constitutive relationship of anxiety and fear, a state which had been seen in peacetime in situations of natural disaster.136 The Lancet declared in 1916:

131 Saint-Amour, Tense Future, 275; Mumford, Cities, 275.  
132 Mumford, 278-9.  
136 Bourke, Fear, 224.
While the stress of war on the soldier is discussed, it should not be forgotten that the nervous strain to which the civilian is exposed may require consideration and appropriate treatment… [We] see it in the children who after residence in a bombarded town wake in terror at night to the slightest sound which suggests to them the horror of the exploding shells… A special form of anxiety is present aggravated by the slightest impression from without, such as the receipt of a letter or telephone message. The disposition becomes unstable and the temper uncertain.137

The sensual experience of bombardment is again underlined here as a primary cause of a ‘special form of anxiety’, triggered particularly by sound. This is also evidenced by local expressions of confusion regarding early warning sirens, and the anxiety induced by false alarms and local military activity. In Hornsea, a small seaside resort near Hull, the sound of a salvo of rounds from a nearby firing practice caused a state of panic: ‘The people in Hornsea many of them rushed into the cellar, & one woman fainted, & all the old people were much alarmed, & said, “Is it ‘the bombardment’”?138 In this case, the point of reference was the December 1914 bombardment upon the north-east coast. Elsewhere, the ‘soundscape’ of civil defence efforts was similarly arresting, with accusations of false alarms leading to considerable local debate.139 This was not only due to the startlingly alien character of the alarms in a non-military space, but to the clash of individual perceptions of risk and the perceived likelihood of actual attack. The persistence of voluntary ‘night patrols’ in some districts was testament to the insecurity of many residents, who felt that more concrete measures were needed to ensure civilian resilience.140 Perceptions of public insecurity also provided an ideological underpinning for the continued existence of the Special Constabulary in wartime, as a reassuring presence in areas covered by regular patrols or ‘beats’.141

As Dorothee Brantz has observed of the war landscapes of the Western Front, with the ‘new spatiality above and below ground’ caused by entrenchment, the soldier’s visibility was significantly reduced, because of both nocturnal bombardment and the limited scope afforded by the trench’s construction. This elevated the role of sound in sensing the battlefield environment.142 The sensorium of the home front saw a similar transformation, a

138 East Riding of Yorkshire Archives (ERYA), DDST/1/8/2/2, Margaret Strickland Diaries, 4 December 1915 (27 Nov. 1915 – 9 Oct. 1917).
need to make sense of unknown and disturbing sounds, such as falling and exploding bombs, and early warning alarms. Civilians developed ad hoc ‘listening practices’ with a similar role to that of military operatives: they needed to discern different types of alarms and to listen for approaching enemy craft. Indeed, these practices were central to the work of special constables, who had to warn civilians should a hostile naval or aircraft approach.

In Hull, the character of the city as a busy port meant that air raid ‘buzzers’ were not always audible above other dockside and maritime traffic noises. Barely a month after the first Zeppelin raid on the city (5/6 June 1915), residents responded with complaints that, unless the air raid siren could be clearly discerned from other hooters and klaxons, ‘needless alarm’ would ensue. Others saw the local populace to be in a state of ‘nervous tension’, aggravated by the closure of schools following false alarms and by the cacophony of everyday sounds that would drown out any warning of an impending raid. For some suburban residents, the buzzers (both alarm and dismissal) were not loud enough, causing confusion among civilians and special constables alike. In some cases, this messy soundscape led to tragedy. Jane Ann Booth was reported to have been ‘killed by the buzzers’ in July 1915:

Her husband drew her attention to the blowing of the buzzers. She dressed, went downstairs, and complained of internal pains. Her husband gave her brandy, which she was unable to take, and sent for Dr Weatherall. The latter promised to send medicine, but Mrs Booth died before this was received.

A malady evocative of the Lancet’s 1916 definition of civilian ‘war shock’ was also cited – again, in July 1915 - as the cause of an attempted suicide. ‘Nervousness caused by the recent alarms in Hull’ led Elizabeth Hannah Richardson to throw herself into a drain on 5 July. Following her arrest, Richardson was discharged from Hull City Police Court given her husband’s promise that he would ‘look after her in future’. However, the proximity of this date to raids a month before and alarms just days before suggests that, for some, the anxiety caused by expectation of an attack was enough to seek a desperate escape from the

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143 Hartford, ‘Listening’, 100.
144 ‘Our Day of Rest’, The Bystander, 17 February 1915, 30.
146 J. Saunders, ‘Cannot the Authorities Take Action’, Hull Daily Mail, 8 July 1915, 2.
147 ‘Unofficial Buzzers’, Hull Daily Mail, 8 July 1915, 2; ‘Experiment with “Buzzer”’, Hull Daily Mail, 7 July 1915, 2.
150 ‘War Shock in the Civilian’, The Lancet, 4 March 1916, 522
Indeed, according to official reports, an alarm on Saturday 3 July 1915 (opening 12.20am, ‘all clear’ at 3.15am) was the tenth such alarm in Hull since 14 April, with only one ‘successful’ raid occurring at all, that of 5/6 June. Other sounds could be a cause of consternation and paradoxically, for some, a potentially reassuring presence. For a correspondent to the Hull Daily Mail in March 1916 (nom de plume, ‘Danger Zone’), the furious barking of neighbourhood dogs was far too likely to aid an enemy craft in finding its target: ‘I am not expert enough to know whether the crew of a Zeppelin could hear dogs barking, but if they can, they will know well enough that where dogs are there are sure to be men and women’. Conversely, certain animals were said by some to have an instinct for detecting approaching enemy aircraft. Birds would make a considerable commotion at the approach of a Zeppelin, while horses would stampede. Others saw parrots as peculiarly adept at foretelling danger, with one writer raising a French example they hoped would be replicated in Britain:

Warning is given by the birds in a peculiar way. Their feathers literally bristle with excitement, and they yell and screech until they are pacified... This peculiar power of parrots was discovered quite accidentally by the excitement they showed whenever the Paris air patrol were flying or a raid was made by the German aircraft.155

Eugene Minkowski delineated the difference between two modes of experiencing the immediate future: activity and expectation. The first mode allows the individual agent to move toward the future, while in the second the future hurtles toward the individual as the external environment becomes overwhelming. The war enabled the latter mode to predominate, as no one, soldier nor civilian, could calmly stride into the future, confident that the effects of the war would not be felt for many years to come. Minkowski described expectation, in an unpublished work from 1918, as a ‘phenomenology of life in the trenches’: ‘It contains a factor of brutal arrest and renders the individual breathless. One might say that the whole of becoming, concentrated outside the individual, swoops down on him in a powerful and hostile mass, attempting to annihilate him’. This powerful image is readily applicable to the imagined experience of air raids, as death can be brought at any time by

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152 IWM, Dept. of Documents, K 81705, ‘Zeppelin Warnings in Hull’; Credland, 108.
machines still relatively novel in the eyes of British civilians. The ‘whizz bangs’ of trench-based attrition here are transmuted onto the terrain of urban landscape. Civilian non-combatants could obtain a taste of the routine fear and apprehension felt by soldiers, particularly in the face of artillery bombardment. This mode of warfare made up sixty per cent of those killed and injured during the conflict, a much more effective weapon than cavalry fire in devastating enemy forces.\(^{157}\) Despite a widespread awareness of the potentials of aeronautics by the outbreak of war in 1914, many people, including political elites, did not view the threat seriously, as long as Britain possessed a strong naval presence. The combination of Mumford and Minkowski’s perspectives can aid our understanding of civilian experience under bombardment. This is partly because it broadens our understanding of trauma, in the way both writers suggest its establishment before the culmination of a catastrophic event, or what might be termed ‘pre-traumatic stress syndrome’.\(^{158}\)

It could be argued that meagre responses on the part of local government were borne both of a lack of funding for mass public shelters and in the face of the widespread shock caused by the novelty of the war brought home to British communities. However, given the ubiquity of invasion-fear narratives and aeronautical debates, including within the pages of the local popular press of all political alignments, those in authority were acutely aware of the dangers of air raids. As we have seen, this was evidenced by local authority attempts to develop early warning systems and public information for proper conduct during and following raids. There was also a historical precedent for a fear of air war, given that as early as 1911 Italian forces used aeroplanes to bomb towns in Ottoman Tripolitania (Libya), notably Ain Zara and Taguira.\(^{159}\) Airships were also used as bombers in March 1912, alongside employment in reconnaissance and propaganda drops near Arab troop positions. The precedent for bombing of civilian areas was finally cemented during October and November 1912, when Bulgarian aeroplanes bombed Adrianople (Edirne, Turkey).\(^{160}\) Despite this, in most areas of Britain, including Hull, Scarborough, Whitby and Hartlepool, the provision of naval and air raid precautions and relief throughout the war was hotly debated, and actual measures were improvised and often experimental. In most cases, this situation was never fully resolved. However, it is important to note the immediate actions of

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\(^{158}\) Saint-Amour, 2.

\(^{159}\) Ashworth, *War and the City*, 138.

some local authorities, particularly in Scarborough, where the needs of the local populace following the December 1914 raid on the north-east coast pushed the local authority and constabulary into action; most notably to safeguard school children. In Hull, audible air raid warnings were installed as early as January 1915, though their presence was contested throughout the war.161

A general lack of preparedness, including a shortage of effective defensive weaponry, led local civic leaders and politicians to act in lieu of clear guidelines from central government, sharing expertise and experimenting with civil defence measures barely a month following the first raids. Following the coastal raids of 1914, the most devastating being on ‘the Hartlepool’, Scarborough and Whitby, central government was criticised for not adequately explaining safety procedures to be followed in the wake of bombardment. Instead, the fallout of the attack was dealt with in a ‘piecemeal and furtive fashion’.162 The official response was to bolster military mobilisation and underline the role of the Royal Navy in repelling the bombarding forces, rather than necessarily defending the surrounding waters of the island nation:

The safeguarding of England – not necessarily of little bits of England – is a consequence of naval strategy, but not its primary and immediate object. The purpose of the Royal Navy is to engage and destroy the ships of the enemy, and that purpose will be inflexibly pursued in spite of all subtle temptations to abandon it for other objects. Neither raids nor invasion will deter our Fleet from the aim for which it was created, and for which it keeps the seas.163

As subsequent chapters demonstrate, early forms of what were referred to in the interwar period as ‘civil defence’ were developed in an ad hoc fashion according to local conditions. Much like emergency legislation developed by central government, these were constantly subject to change and adapted to circumstances.164

Conclusion
The fear of invasion by a foreign foe during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was propelled by representations of aerial technology and an awareness of its potential military applications. Prior to debates surrounding aeronautics in the 1910s, the military staged mock invasions as exercises for Territorial soldiers, making coastal towns and cities -

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161 Credland, Hull Zeppelin Raids, 17.
163 Ibid.
including notable skirmishes on the north-east coast – testing grounds for the nation’s preparedness in the event of a continental war. These representations and actions also foreshadowed the wartime events that were to come. However, following the declaration of war in 1914, Britain was not fully prepared either to repel an invading force, or protect the civilian population from bombardment. As explored in a subsequent chapter on the development of central government policy on home defence and public safety, interdepartmental debates between the Admiralty and War Office were ever-present from the start of the century, with the threat posed by aerial attack downplayed by official planners. A discourse on the imperturbability of a strong naval presence, and the natural barrier presented by the sea, predominated in discussions of funding and strategy, while belief in a possible invasion waxed and waned during the pre-war period. Notably, preoccupation in wider society with the rise of the Zeppelin air ship and aeronautics generally could not prevent the first attack upon British soil during the war from being naval in character.

While images of war vessels and imperial bluster related to the sea were commonplace in the period, civilians on the north-east coast on 16 December 1914 were not prepared for what seemed to them a surprise attack. Following the eclipsing of naval bombardment by aerial raids in early 1915, the fear of invasion was not eradicated. Indeed, while bombardments continued across the country, the regional experience of naval bombardment framed ensuing popular conceptions and local official policy-making, though the danger of falling bombs and fires was a more pressing concern. The defence of urban landscapes became foremost in the everyday lives of civilians following December 1914 and figured in local ‘war cultures’, as yet another iteration of enemy barbarism and a sign of the country’s vulnerability, given the ability of aerial vessels to transcend the sea’s natural barrier.

The following chapter explores the material, social and cultural significance of bombardment for inhabitants of the north-east coast, including the use of the 16 December 1914 bombardment as a national call to arms, spurring on military recruitment and encouraging civilian resilience. Chapters then follow on national, regional and local developments in pre-war and wartime home defence and public safety planning, where the spectre of invasion remained ever-present, though gradually transmuted by the immediate threat of death in the street or in the assumed safety of home. Though, to some, a hostile landing had seemed imminent in December 1914, this did not happen. However, the north-east coast remained united in its shared experience as an exposed and vulnerable area of the country, close to the dangers of both naval and aerial attack. As will be seen subsequently,
the events of winter 1914 continued to figure in home defence plans across the region and nationally, even when the Zeppelin became the central threat for civilians. Furthermore, though bombardment provided a means for common understanding and solidarity with other coastal towns, this did not make for a monolithic experience. Rather, the socioeconomic functions of the localities – be they industrial ports or seaside resorts – framed the anticipation of and responses to bombing. As the next chapter will demonstrate, the complexities of maritime place identity, made clearly visible by the disruption and destruction of war, were played out, drawn and redrawn, through representations in the media, visual arts and material culture.
CHAPTER 3: Representing war damage and destruction following bombardment

Introduction

The First World War enacted a trail of material, social and psychological destruction across the urban and rural environments of the nations involved, both openly belligerent and officially neutral. Whereas neutral Belgium, in particular, was affected by the rigours and repressions of occupation and mobile warfare during the opening months of the war, many cities across Britain were at least partly transformed by aerial and naval bombardment. Though, in Britain, the damage wrought by incendiaries and explosives was less serious than the bombing raids of the Second World War, in some areas the marks left on the urban landscape maintain a semblance and relevance to this day. This is reflected in a number of prominent heritage narratives, and in commemorative artefacts and productions, not least those organised during the First World War centenary period, 2014-18.

The accelerating military destructiveness of states and peoples during the twentieth century has been given due attention in the historiography, though the shock of war on an industrial scale on the ‘home front’ – which saw its fair share of warfare during 1914-18 – is still an emerging area for research. This is particularly the case concerning the intersection and interaction of government legislation with media representations and the self-expression of civilian populations subjected to bombardment. In addition, though considerable attention has been given to ‘war culture(s)’ and the production of narratives defining the enemy ‘other’, the role of civilian bombardment in crystallising attitudes towards the enemy is still yet to enjoy a concerted focus. Foremost in any such narratives are condemnations - often racialized – of enemy actions and concomitant moral frameworks, but also the ‘proof’ of the intractable enemy’s ‘frightfulness’ in the physical destruction of urban environments. War


cultures in all the belligerent countries acted as a ‘collection of representations of the conflict that crystallised into a system of thought which gave the war its deep significance’. As John Horne and Alan Kramer argue, this enabled the connection of victimhood with nationhood, the brutal actions of the enemy defining the ‘national community’ in terms of suffering and outrage. This was a strikingly visual conflict, with cultural representations playing a prominent role in framing popular perceptions of the nation, of the enemy, and the nature of the conflict itself.

Largely absent from common conceptions of the First World War home front is the social and cultural significance of bombardment of civilian areas and, in particular, the representations of damage to the built environment that often accompanied commemorative processes and military recruitment drives. These were often graphic, sometimes neatly staged, photographic efforts in which both monumental and vernacular buildings were foregrounded, to symbolise the devastating extent of total war. Reproduced as picture postcards, these images were published in both local and national illustrated magazines and featured in commemorative pamphlets. Pictorial renderings, photographic representations and material ephemera enabled civilian populations to make sense of the damage wrought upon their homes, schools, churches and businesses, while many civilians themselves collected and traded in ‘war relics’ such as unexploded ordnance and pieces of shrapnel. Others utilised such material culture in creative ways in order to mark the passing of a bombardment or air raid, including the production of civilian ‘trench art’ for display in the home or, in some cases, as part of public exhibitions. Such objects were an ‘artistic elaboration, perhaps ironic transformation… of a deadly weapon’. Crucially, such efforts could provide meaningful ‘memory objects’ for civilians wishing to mourn the loss of loved ones and mark the passing of a bombardment. In the absence of material traces, photographic postcards could play a similar role, while doubling as representations of place-specific war damage. While less figurative than conventional war memorials, they nonetheless occupied specific places in the

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7 Jennifer Wellington, Exhibiting War: The Great War, Museums, and Memory in Britain, Canada, and Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 25.
8 Nicholas J. Saunders, Trench Art: Materialities and Memories of War (Oxford: Berg, 2003), 12.
9 Ibid., 3, 45.
wartime urban landscape. This place-marking was often branded upon the image itself, clearly underlining the importance of the community and its built environment: a ‘site of memory’ vital to maintaining future awareness of civilian bombardment. War damage photographs have a mnemonic function because they are:

simultaneously semiotic and material, fleeting and tangible. They are not only images, but also material objects with certain specific physical characteristics that make them powerful in constructing, inducing and disseminating ‘memory travel’.

Central to this chapter are the perspectives of historians who have focussed almost exclusively on the effect of war on urban environments, though analysis of the First World War is scant when compared with that of other conflicts. This is perhaps due to the predominance of battlefield archaeology related to the Western Front, where work has tended to focus on disfigured and transformed rural landscapes and omitted the traces that remain of war damage in urban centres. Damage and destruction of primarily civilian spaces in 1914-18 is also conspicuously absent from recent volumes on the heritage and commemoration of war, as well as books on the ‘home front’. Admittedly, in many cases, the traces of this damage may no longer be visible, or may suffer from a lack of sustained commemoration practices, such as annual ceremonies or memorials. Nevertheless, the point still stands that, especially in the case of the north-east coast, the destruction of monumental and vernacular architecture was marked by contemporaries - local commentators, civilians and propagandists alike - in ways that connected ruins with the moral values and national identity of the enemy, as well as the perceived threat of the destruction of civilisation itself. In the case of coastal areas, the assumption that ports could act as bastions against enemy invasion – presupposing a strong navy - was common in early twentieth-century Britain, among both policy-makers

10 Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, Understanding, 186.
and a wider public.\textsuperscript{17} However, it is not surprising that civilians in coastal towns and cities affected by bombardment expressed anxiety at the possibility of raids, given that the assumption that the navy could ensure the country’s safety was undermined by the ‘surprise’ attack of December 1914 (and later, air raids by Zeppelins and aeroplanes), while fear of invasion was presaged by pre-war narratives prevalent in popular culture and in the activities of naval and military planners.\textsuperscript{18}

A number of historians, architects and heritage scholars have focussed on architectural destruction in a broader sense, encompassing attacks on the patently more commonplace fixtures of everyday civilian life. The heritage researcher and consultant Robert Bevan views the damage and destruction of vernacular architecture as an attack on the community itself, including its sense of continuity over time.\textsuperscript{19} While official reports and newspaper commentators both during and after conflict often focussed on the material loss and economic cost of bombardment, for the residents of damaged homes the attached meanings are not only deeply personal - their destruction threatens the apparent fixity and permanence of buildings and therefore the memories and personal ties forged within them: ‘To lose all that is familiar – the destruction of one’s environment – can mean a disorientating exile from the memories they have invoked. It is the threat of a loss to one’s collective identity and the secure continuity of those identities’.\textsuperscript{20} The wartime home could be a source of ‘psychological stability’, as well as a ‘light-producing, flammable threat to the material urban environment’; its windows offering a potential signal to enemy aircraft and its contents offering kindling to fires caused by incendiary bombs.\textsuperscript{21} With this in mind, the destruction of ordinary homes and businesses – though supposedly not the aim of German attacks on the north-east coast in 1914 – could have the effect of reconfiguring the historical record in ways which disrupt everyday normalcy and therefore damage civilian morale. In the case of

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} James Greenhalgh, ‘The Threshold of the State: Civil Defence, the Blackout and the Home in Second World War Britain’, Twentieth Century British History, 28 (2) (2017), 192.
Hartlepool in particular, the importance of vernacular architecture was underlined by the sheer volume of popular depictions of damage to housing following the December 1914 bombardment, lending weight to Bevan’s claim that plebeian housing can also be monumental in the broadest sense. This is because it provides a basis for community and a ‘stimulus to the memories that evoke group identity’. In this way, we can see the material loss, or damage, to buildings as emblematic of wider fears related to the loss of community at a time of intense shifts in everyday rhythms. Furthermore, given the taken-for-granted nature of the vernacular built environment (to the point that it is ‘invisible’), damage and destruction asserts its visibility and reminds those inhabiting it of the role the exterior environment plays in structuring everyday life.

Other scholars, notably Thilo Folkerts, Andrew Herscher and Kevin Rozario, have assessed the values and meanings attached to architectural destruction in varying historical contexts, while Martin Brown and Dorothee Brantz have provided a framework within which it is possible to elucidate parallels between trench experience and violence on the home front, exemplified through damage to the environment. Furthermore, Folkerts is in accordance with Bevan in his concern with the use of landscape as a site of memory, with destruction being in some ways productive and operative in the contemplation of a site and its history in place.

It is important to underline the difference acknowledged by contemporaries between damage and destruction. While the total destruction of a building by enemy shelling - be it Hull’s Edwin Davis department store or Hartlepool Baptist Church - left a void that could be filled with evocations of resilience and commemoration, a damaged building left a worrying reminder of ‘what might have been’. Similar phrasing was used to frame depictions of the damage wrought upon Gladstone Road School in Scarborough. It was a ‘Terrible “If…”’ due to the bombardment taking place before the start of the school day: ‘What the sacrifice of young lives might have been is awful to contemplate’. On a larger scale, a similar idea lay

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22 Ibid., 25.
25 Folkerts, 76.
behind commemorative efforts in the wider Humber region, following a ‘near miss’ in September 1916. A plaque in the village of Scartho (now part of Grimsby), where fourteen bombs fell without harm, celebrated the preservation of ‘the inhabitants of this village from death and injury’, enabling local people to make sense of their survival through the lens of a religious moral framework.27 Similarly, the Rev. Dr Frank Baker, of Hull, remarked in his diaries that a Zeppelin raid on 5-6 March 1916 caused ‘great injury to a row of old houses in Collier Street, many of which fortunately were empty, but deplorable to relate’.28 Baker, therefore, ascribed a human attribute to damaged vernacular buildings, not only suggesting an implicit hierarchy of seriousness related to war damage, but ranking attacks on buildings alongside that of people, even conflating the two, as seen in the famous example utilised by the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee in recruitment posters.29 We can also see Baker’s anthropomorphism as an attempt to make sense of the destruction of the built environment in both readily understandable and emotive terms.30

While a building, such as a house, appears solid and long lasting, bomb damage is not only destructive but productive, mainly of new perspectives on the apparent fixity and continuity of daily rhythms. In this way, the increasingly vulnerable urban environment – lent a greater degree of exposure if placed by the sea – acts upon its human inhabitants.31 However, it must not be forgotten that at the heart of bombardment is the activity of other human actors, in the guise of the enemy. Intonations of vulnerability are therefore dependent on the probability that an attack will occur, as well as popular perceptions of external threat. This was very much the case in debates surrounding the rise of air power before the outbreak of war, giving the technology’s radical undermining of naval defence doctrine.32 While ports are conventionally associated with flows of people, products and materials, it is this very openness that makes war upon coastal areas particularly disruptive, mainly because maritime trade, transport, leisure and tourism cannot carry on in the same way.33 As Isaac Land puts it:

27 Fegan, *Baby Killers*, 149.
28 HHC, L DIGT/1/9, Rev. Dr. Frank Baker diaries, Sunday 5 March 1916.
‘[T]he coastal zone is a place of transmission, but equally one of discontinuities and enforced ruptures’.  

As we will see in this chapter, the unsettling of the *genius loci* through bombardment suggests a destruction of the past, given that its ‘material proof’ can be threatened or, in some cases, completely erased. In the case of both depictions of war damage by contemporaries and post-war commemorative efforts, representing damage through mass-produced photographs or architectural simulacra *in place*, was an attempt to combat the loss of a sense of collective memory and identity, just as rebuilding a wrecked church could function as a poignant reminder of the event that transformed it into rubble. As Derek Sayer notes, photographic images can possess a ‘totemic quality, making the absent present and reconnecting the viewer to the thing that is lost but the image recalls’.

While bomb damage was a helpful tool in the hands of propagandists to sharpen the image of the enemy ‘other’, belligerents of all stripes often claimed to be targeting buildings and installations of only military importance. For instance, this was the claim put forward by the commander of the German battlecruisers that attacked the ‘Hartlepools’, Scarborough and Whitby: in Scarborough, the object of the medium-sized guns was the gasworks, the target of the light guns, the railway station. In Hartlepool, they targeted the steel works and defensive batteries. When reported and reflected upon by members of the press, in addition to civilian correspondence with the editor – plus a litany of other productions, from letters to diaries and published poetry – these claims were reversed, reflecting the locally-refracted ‘war culture’ of the place affected by bombardment. For example, a Hull writer used an acerbic and ironic phrase to describe the German actions of 16 December 1914: ‘The “Brave” Bombardment’, referencing the reported ‘jubilation’ of the enemy following the event, in a letter that demanded reparations for damage done to the stricken coastal towns.

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38 Witt and McDermott, 89, 111.
commentators, the enemy firing was ‘indiscriminate’, proof of an essentially ‘racial’ characteristic of savagery:

Now and then they ran amok, so to speak, and hit out right and left against all and sundry. The Germans proved themselves impartial barbarians… A war of extermination is strictly in accordance with German ideas of development. We can almost hear the Emperor, in one of his many homilies to his infatuated people, saying: “Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth, but only with Vaterland stock.”

The imagery of war damage and destruction could provide a ‘condensed representation of the enemy’, particularly when civilians were affected directly. Comments by the First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill on the killing of civilians played a similar role in shoring up the war culture surrounding home front experience, while asserting Britain’s naval prowess: ‘Whatever feats of arms the German navy may hereafter perform, the stigma of the baby-killers of Scarborough will brand its officers and men while sailors sail the seas’.

This chapter will explore the materiality of destruction on the north-east coast, taking as its primary sources the visual representation of war damage wrought upon the urban built environment, in addition to the material artefacts collated and, in some cases, exploited by civilians across the social spectrum. This includes mass-produced postcards, published photographs, pieces of shrapnel and unexploded ordnance, civilian ‘trench art’ and the bomb damaged urban fabric itself. In so doing, it will be informed by historians and scholars who have assessed the destruction of the built environment in the war context, though work with a wider purview will also be of relevance, given the scant historiography related to war damage during the First World War.

Representing war damage on the north-east coast

The air raids and naval bombardments of 1914-18 may not have wrought as much material destruction, or killed as many people, as those of 1939-45, but the relatively limited damage to people and places was still marked, literally and figuratively, in localities across Britain. Apart from the popular press, the most accessible representation of war damage took the form of picture postcards, with local photographers capturing the aftermath of raids. These were produced cheaply and made widely available to those wishing to both mark the occasion for posterity and commemorate an event damaging to the built environment and the local

41 Frederick Miller, *Under German Shell-fire: The Hartlepool, Scarborough and Whitby under German Shell-fire* (West Hartlepool: Robert Martin, 1915), 93.
42 Horne and Kramer, 295.
collective psyche. Images were also made available to the local and national press, with photographic studios, printers and news agencies providing much of the material. Of course, some raids became renowned the world over, with the production and dissemination of manifold representations reflecting an international mood of condemnation. After the 16 December 1914 bombardment of the north-east coast, Scarborough’s plight became shorthand for the lawlessness and barbarity of German ways of conducting war, following the precedent set by the ‘rape of Belgium’ in the summer of 1914.

Anti-German propaganda and commemorative efforts were produced both locally and nationally, though local representation tended to suggest the uniqueness of the locale’s experience when related to the broader evocations of sacrifice across the country. Other forms of artistic production and popular publishing were also foremost in the drive to record and represent the bombarded locality, often with a strikingly didactic purpose in view. It is clear, from research conducted by John Fraser, that picture postcards were immensely popular even before the outbreak of war, with over 900 million being posted in Britain in 1913. The co-option of the postcard into local and national propaganda efforts only furthered their spread. The production of cards with patriotic, naval and military themes grew in popularity following the Boer War (1899-1902) and, according to Fraser, reached a peak during the First World War, when postcards became both a cheap means of communication for soldiers fighting abroad, and an effective means of delivering propaganda messages, including those promoting war bonds and war charities such as the Red Cross. Therefore, war damage postcards can be apportioned the same impetus to malign and define the enemy as in earlier conflicts, while their production took place in the context of a loosely-integrated system of military and civilian mobilisation wherein commercial and charitable bodies played a vital role.

Within the north-east coastal area, depictions of war damage in a popular form were most common in Hartlepool and West Hartlepool. These took the form of cheap picture

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44 One advertisement from December 1914 quotes a price of one penny for single bombardment postcards. This was around the price of a postage stamp. See Scarborough Mercury, 24 December 1914, 7.
48 Ibid., 42.
postcards printed locally. These postcards tended to depict the aftermath of specific raids, setting down visually the otherworldly presence of urban destruction, signalling a tangible break with the pre-war rhythms of everyday life.

Surviving examples held in archives retain a high quality and wide variety: the analysis here takes account of a sample of the most common images related directly to the bombed urban environment.\(^5\) An absence of postage or franking on the reverse side is common to the sample, as would usually be the case with postcards: their use as a means of communication in the conventional sense was not utilised in all cases during the war. This is despite their apparent cheapness, convenience, brevity and speed of delivery, at the centre of the ‘Edwardians’ new communications landscape’.\(^5\) In addition to postcards themselves being cheap and readily available, in Britain the price of postage was low (one could be sent for a halfpenny).\(^5\) Furthermore, in popular seaside resorts such as Scarborough, picture postcards were commonplace as tourist souvenirs, while more mundane postcards embraced a variety of communicative functions.\(^5\) This suggests that these items were prized by many as collectable, perhaps even talismanic in the manner of ‘trench art’ or ‘war relics’ collected on the battlefield or following raids on civilian areas.\(^5\) Therefore, the sense that civilians were living through potentially historic times does not seem to have been lost on collectors. This is compounded by the survival of booklets that appear to collect together postcards that were also available individually, handily packaged by publishers and sold in stationers’ shops.

This is not to say that war damage postcards were not written, stamped and sent in the conventional way. The fact that few examples survive, even among collectors, may point to some of the peculiarities of collecting and archiving. Individuals with an inclination to collate particular objects for a perceived intrinsic or historical value – often deposited in archives and museum collections – may leave a much deeper mark upon the ‘historical record’ than those prized for their functionality, which may have been discarded or lost. As Sharon Macdonald notes, the adding of an object like a postcard to a collection can impart additional significance and meaning to it: ‘in most cases, the life of objects once in a collection is notably different from their pre-collection existence’. This can be seen in terms of reduced (or, in some cases,

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\(^{5}\) This amounts to 65 individual postcards in total. The majority relate to ‘The Hartlepool’ and Scarborough. See LC, LIDDE/WW1/DF/GA/SBH/1, postcard collection; HAPMG, 1981.44, postcard folder.

\(^{5}\) Julia Gillen, ‘Writing Edwardian Postcards’, *Journal of Sociolinguistics*, 17 (4) (2013), 488-89.


\(^{5}\) Saunders, *Trench Art*, 45.
increased) access to the public, and in relation to individual collecting practices. The latter may be transformed by depositing in an archive, as they may have been previously collected for distinct personal reasons. In the case of this particular genre of wartime postcards, it is likely that used examples do exist in the realm of the private collectors’ market. As Frank Staff has written, at the turn of the twentieth century, postcard collecting was already very popular across Europe, with early British manufacturers, such as Evelyn Wrench, receiving more orders than they could supply without financial difficulty. Indeed, Wrench - who would go on to found the Over-seas League in 1910 - went bust in early 1904, but this did not prevent him from using innovative postcards in his Over-seas League Tobacco Fund during the First World War, with each ‘ready-addressed to the donor, to bring back the grateful thanks of the men’.

A detailed online search of auction websites such as eBay reveals a number of examples related to the bombardment of the north-east coast, including a limited number replete with writing and postage. One was written and sent from a Scarborough holiday-maker and, despite a grim depiction of the Grand Hotel’s wrecked restaurant, the writer maintains an upbeat tone and remarks only on commonplace occurrences, such as the weather. This was common among civilian and combatant correspondents alike, with the latter often not wishing to unduly worry loved ones at home with more detailed descriptions of trench life, while both top-down and self-imposed forms of mail censorship could also affect the extent of details provided. This was mirrored by civilian letters which referred to air raids, though this did not prevent servicemen from expressing concerns about the safety of their family. As Jessica Meyer notes, a comparative approach was common in letters sent from both the home and battle fronts, where the relative safety of either site was stressed in an attempt to reassure the reader. There are extant examples mailed from locations around Britain, so the spread of these postcards was clearly wider than the orbit of purely local collectors. Indeed, one example was sent from a civilian correspondent in Oldham to her non-combatant husband in Barnsley, while another – depicting a wrecked shop in Prospect Road,
Scarborough – was posted by a Plymouth civilian to a fellow civilian recipient in Tavistock (both in Devon). Another - its photograph depicting damaged flats in Scarborough – was sent by a French civilian writer to an army serviceman, giving an international angle missing from archival collections. Such evidence does not lessen the significance of collected postcards, which were prized for their intrinsic value as war souvenirs and *aides-memoire*. Rather, it suggests that the underlying function and unique brevity of postcards - particularly in a seaside resort such as Scarborough - was retained alongside more formal collecting and commercial promotion of postcard sets.

While individual postcards were collected – evidenced by their deposit in miscellaneous stacks in local archives and among postcard dealers – publishers found other ways of disseminating depictions of war damage. This included the publication of commemorative pamphlets and booklets, common following the December 1914 bombardment, which positioned picture postcards or photographs (many being the same or similar images) alongside analyses of the bombardment, local history, military technology and claims as to the centrality of the locale in the wider war effort. The connection of individual postcards through the use of ‘rudimentary narrative elements’ was common during the ‘golden age’ of postcard production, between 1898 and 1918. Examples include *The German Raid on the Hartlepools*, published in 1915 by Sage booksellers and stationers of West Hartlepool. As an advertising leaflet put it, such a work provided a ‘complete and permanent record of an [sic] unique event of great historical and local interest’.

For some producers, publishing sets of postcards – sold both individually and in booklet form - could act as a means for boosting sales, presuming customers would attempt to collect the set in its entirety. Most of the surviving examples for Hartlepool and West Hartlepool were part of the ‘Stonefield Series’ and involved both original, possibly commissioned, photographs and loans from newspapers and other commercial providers. Trade directories and newspaper advertisements reveal the producer of this popular series to

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65 Prochaska, 384, 391.
67 Prochaska, 391.
68 LC, LIDDLE/WW1/DF/GA/SBH/1, postcard collection; Hartlepool Museums and Galleries (HAPMG), 1981.44, postcard folder.
be a stationer named Saul Stonefield, a naturalised German, trading postcards from a shop in
Lynn Street, West Hartlepool.69 Given Stonefield’s lineage, his prolific production of war
damage postcards is remarkable, though his stake in the town as a local businessman with a
young family most likely elided any claims to conflicting loyalties.70 Many of the images that
were printed as postcards were purchased from other local printers and stationers, while bulk
purchases of already produced postcards were not uncommon. At times, this trade resulted in
legal disputes over copyright, testament to the profits envisaged by local businesses in the
sale of war damage representations.71

By 14 December 1915, Sage were able to boast that sales of their souvenir booklet
had increased, while ‘souvenir coat-of-arms shells [priced] at 9d and 1s. 3d. each are finding
many purchasers’.72 This latter point shows that the publisher was also involved in producing
or stocking commemorative objects that fused images evocative of the bombardment with the
foremost symbol of civic belonging and affiliation: the civic coat-of-arms. These were
marketed specifically to mark the first anniversary of the bombardment. Similar products
were produced all over Britain, including Hull and Scarborough, where heraldic china
manufacturers created ornamental submarines, gunners and tanks. A damaged Scarborough
Lighthouse was also immortalised in the form of an ornament by Carlton China.73 Heraldic
china was already, by this point, a popular souvenir product, often purchased as a holiday
memento in a similar way to postcards, with the convention of stamping civic and county
crests on porcelain models established by the firm of W.H. Goss in the late nineteenth
century.74 Cheap commemorative pottery enjoyed popularity in a number of contexts from
the eighteenth century, following advances in mass production technologies. This included
the communication of political messages and memorialisation of military heroes within the
context of a burgeoning celebrity culture.75 The Scarborough Mercury minted a range of
‘Bombardment Medals’ produced to ‘keep in perpetual memory the bombardment of the

Northern Daily Mail, 8 December 1916, 1.
70 Ancestry.com, Census Returns of England and Wales, 1911.
73 Robert Southall, Take Me Back to Dear Old Blighty: The First World War Through the Eyes of the Heraldic
China Manufacturers (Horndean: Milestone, 1982), 79; ‘Rare Model of Scarborough Lighthouse with
Blackened Holes by Carlton China’; ‘Model of Submarine by Carlton China, inscribed ‘E9’, (Hull)’, Dreweatts’
Auction Catalogue, 26 February 2013, 6, 34. Available:
74 Southall, Take Me Back, 7.
75 Simon Morgan, ‘Material Culture and the Politics of Personality in Early Victorian England’, Journal of
town by German ships’. These were advertised prominently from June 1915. Designed in a similar style to the anti-German ‘Lusitania Medal’ produced following the sinking of the passenger vessel in May 1915, the Scarborough medals represented the shelling of the South Bay on one side, with the inscription ‘Bombardment of Scarborough & Non-combatants by the German Fleet, Dec. 16, 1914’ on the reverse. Larger medals included the civic emblem alongside a depiction of the German battlecruisers. These medals, cast to resemble coins in bronze, silver and gold (with prices corresponding to the value of the metal) were, according to advertisements, sold in jewellers’ and stationers’ shops.

The involvement of commercial publishers in the circulation of such images underlines the importance placed in marking the passage of the event, particularly crucial given the suddenly fragile appearance of the built environment: they were clearly considered a profitable venture, particularly as the prevailing war culture encouraged depictions of German ‘atrocities’ as a way of justifying British war aims and encouraged an ‘adversarial patriotism’. Conversely, such narratives could also crystallise forms of local identity and solidarity in ways that underlined the importance of home defence, or at least the defence of an ‘idea of home’. A separate pamphlet, produced for Whitby, inserted the bombardment into the wider experience of the town. This included the running aground of the hospital ship Rohilla only seven weeks previously off the coast of Whitby; an event which saw similar efforts to immortalise the disaster in picture postcards. In the pamphlet’s narrative, this stood as an example of the fortitude and heroism of Whitby people, whose ‘self-sacrificing efforts’ did so much to help the ‘unfortunate crew’. This perspective was tempered in the rest of the introductory text by a complex unpicking and reassertion of the town’s, and the nation’s, enduring maritime identity and faith in the navy. The material damage visited upon the town was seen as uncannily like that occurring in the trenches of the Western Front, rendered doubly shocking by its shaking of conventional ideas of Britishness. Following the

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76 ‘The Bombardment of Scarborough: An Issue of Commemoration Medals’, Scarborough Mercury, 23 June 1915; Gregory, Last Great War, 61; Scarborough Collections, care of Scarborough Museums Trust (SMT), 177.056, token of 1914 bombardment.
77 ‘Bombardment Medals: Have you got one yet?’, Scarborough Mercury, 30 June 1915, 4.
78 David Monger, Patriotism and Propaganda in First World War Britain: The National War Aims Committee and Civilian Morale (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2012), 114.
81 ‘The Wreck of the “Rohilla”’, Whitby Gazette, 27 November 1914, 10.
82 ‘The “Rohilla Disaster”’, Whitby Gazette, 8 June 1917, 4.
sinking of three British cruisers by German U-boats in the North Sea in September 1914, the maritime identity of Whitby was utilised to frame the destruction of war, particularly important given the inherent ‘love of the sea’ found among Whitby folk:

Poignant was the grief into which the town was plunged by these losses, but they were far away; war was a distant thing, and the vagueness a rigid censorship imposed, which permitted us to learn of things happening “somewhere in France,” tended to exaggerate this idea of the conflict as being fought on distant fields and seas, and of the ruination following in the wake of shrapnel and lyddite as incidental only to other lands – certainly not to our sea-girt Britain.84

The rest of the introduction related this broader experience to the human and material destruction wrought by the December 1914 bombardment. As with most narratives on the bombardment, both during the war and after, the steadfast bravery and calmness of the townspeople was underlined. At the same time, the plight of poorer people whose houses have been damaged was treated separately to that of the historic and monumental architecture of Whitby Abbey. While the former was very much an economic concern, the latter was highly symbolic, with the ‘venerable ruin’ emblematic of local and regional affiliations, as well as a more general aesthetic value: ‘[T]he beautiful Abbey of St. Hilda, pride of north-east Yorkshire, and a joy to the lover of the beautiful architecture of which it remains such a magnificent example’.85 This focus on the ‘injury’ of monumental, religious architecture shared a clear affinity with contemporary depictions of Belgium and parts of northern France, following invasion and occupation by German forces in August 1914. These were attacks not only on the built environment, but on the cultural stock of Britain and the traditional tenets of decency and morality.86 As one illustrated feature put it, churches and other ‘sacred buildings’ were ‘favourite targets here, as in France and Belgium’.87 The bombardment of churches in West Hartlepool and Whitby’s ‘beautiful ruins’ proved that ‘the “ruthless” policy of German warfare has outweighed religiosity’.88 The image of the German ‘Hun’ gained pace following these events, leading to the insertion of claims of German ‘atrocities’ within commonplace narratives and representations.89 As Sandra Camarda notes, depictions of bomb damaged and ruined buildings ‘displayed an aesthetic of war and destruction that stressed the

85 Ibid.
86 Horne and Kramer, 217; Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction, 27; Bevan, Destruction of Memory, 117.
87 ‘The Usual German Target!’, Illustrated War News, 23 December 1914, 9.
88 Ibid.
theme of the violated homeland, perpetuating an image of the enemy as the barbaric destroyer of heritage’. This process, in turn, shored up local war cultures, particularly as monumental and historic heritage architecture tends to be associated intimately with place.90

More closely related to bomb damage, illustrated features published in winter 1914 reproduced detailed photographs of wrecked Belgian churches. These were framed in ways strikingly similar to those later utilised on the north-east coast, including the inclusion of civilians in the frame.91 The term “Kultur” was also applied vigorously to post-event reflections upon the bombardment of Whitby, Scarborough and Hartlepool, with some commentators drawing clear parallels with the occupation of Belgium. One such commentator in Hull encouraged the reader to ‘think for a moment how they have, and are treating Belgium, then let us contemplate how these “Kultur” people would treat us were we in their power’.92 Such an affinity was underlined by other writers in the region, including one that referred to those fleeing Scarborough into inland Ayton following the bombardment as ‘refugees’.93

The bombardment of the north-east coast ignited a demand among some writers for the seizure of German wealth held in British banks to pay for the relief of the beleaguered towns. The essential ‘otherness’ of the German enemy was again underlined, the sardonic use of “Kultur” emblematic of Germany’s apparent sense of cultural, linguistic and even racial particularity, worlds away from the heights of European civilisation.94 Subsequent national coverage related to the December 1914 bombardment followed similar aesthetic formulae. One example, from *The Sphere*, presented captioned photographs of the bombarded ‘Three East Coast Towns’, layered upon an illustrated, three-dimensional map depicting the bombardment itself. In this double-page spread, photographs of vernacular architecture predominate, while the geographical verisimilitude of the illustration suggests the coast’s vulnerability to attack (British naval vessels are conspicuously absent). However, where ‘historic landmarks’ are present, as in Whitby and Scarborough, they are pictured at an exaggerated scale.95 The *Graphic* published a similarly detailed map on the same day, though with a greater emphasis on Scarborough; not only its landmarks, like the Grand Hotel,

91 ‘Some Achievements of German “Kultur”’, *The Sphere*, 14 November 1914, 29.
94 Horne and Kramer, 214, 217.
95 ‘Bombardment of Three East Coast Towns’, *The Sphere*, 26 December 1914, 302-3.
lighthouse and castle, but ordinary housing. The exact locations where bombs fell are marked, as are street names (Figure 3.1). Elsewhere, the damage to Whitby Abbey and a nearby lodge were connected with both local and national cultural heritage: ‘From its association with Cædmon, Whitby Abbey is known as the cradle of English poetry’. These examples define the ‘frightful’ actions of the enemy in terms of disruption to everyday life and the destruction of sites of aesthetic beauty and historical importance, as practiced in depictions of beleaguered Belgium. However, it is interesting to note, given that representations of German ‘atrocities’ in Belgium presupposed a distance between the occupied nation and the British home front, photographs of bomb damage on British soil fundamentally shook this façade, bringing the war shockingly home. In this vein, the Illustrated London News featured photographs of housing, shops, civic and historic buildings in a series of reports devoted entirely to Scarborough, foregrounding the status of the town as a well-known, unfortified holiday resort. Other patently more sensational depictions represented Scarborough as a town under siege, riddled with shells and almost entirely consumed by fire. This contrasts with the much wider spread and range of enemy fire on the town, while documents drawn up by the local authorities suggested only a handful of especially dangerous sites to avoid following the attack.

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96 The Graphic, 26 December 1914, 9.
100 Illustrated London News, 26 December 1914, 9-11.
102 Scarborough Library (hereafter SL), Uncatalogued Bombardment File (hereafter UBF), ‘Dangerous parts of the town. Damaged through Bombardment’ (n.d.).
Figure 3.1 Map depicting the 16 December 1914 bombardment of Scarborough, Whitby and ‘the Hartlepools’.

‘Reading’ war damage in postcards

The picture postcards produced on the north-east coast depicted visually-arresting examples of bombardment damage, most often with labels appended to note exactly where the photograph was taken. Published collections sought to editorialise the images, giving them a narrative flow in line with the chronology of the bombardment. Conversely, individual postcards, available at booksellers, hotels and gift shops, provided a more disjointed picture, with each example presenting a stand-alone image potentially exceptionally meaningful to a relatively small group of people, such as a family. Some bombardment-related materials, including commemorative pamphlets, were even expressly marketed towards visitors. Even following armistice, such booklets – including titles such as ‘Under Shell Fire’ and ‘German Raid on the Hartlepool’ – were advertised alongside ‘Light and interesting Holiday Fiction’ and photographic postcards of local views, with one title, priced at one shilling, in its eighth edition by June 1919.

While central government propagandists and military recruiters made hay of the bombardment in materials disseminated nationally, postcards produced locally had the potential to take on intimate meanings for those involved, connecting those featured in the frame with the local landscape and therefore an affiliation with it and its fate. In many of the examples related to Hartlepool, local people were depicted among the ruins, usually posing with taciturn expressions, though defiantly addressing the viewer. While these subjects may be disinterested souvenir hunters, searching among the rubble for shrapnel and unexploded ordnance, it is possible that, in many cases, the subjects were families made homeless by bombardment. They may also have been voluntary workers or neighbours clearing the debris to find injured civilians. The fact that most of the scenes depicted few authority figures and little evidence of clearance activity, suggests that photographers – most likely employed by local publishers and printers – were on the scene rapidly following the bombardment. Such a response was made possible by the accessibility of cheap handheld cameras in this period, such as the Kodak ‘Brownie’, a roll-film box camera with a price tag of only five shillings. The importance of the specific place and building depicted was compounded by the marking of the address and the date of the attack’s occurrence upon the image itself: the inclusion of captions scratched onto the exposed photographic negative was

106 Staff, Picture Postcard, 70.
107 Derek Sayer, ‘The Photograph’, 59; Kodak advertisement, Hull Daily Mail, 8 September 1911.
common in postcard production at this time. For instance, one example, showing a wrecked house in Girvan Terrace, West Hartlepool, clearly shows a huddled family, including a woman and three school-age boys (Figure 3.2). Others show young children posing nonchalantly for the camera (Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.2 A family pictured among the rubble at Girvan Terrace, West Hartlepool, 1914.

Source: Special Collections, Leeds University Library. Used with permission.

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108 Prochaska, 391.
109 LC, LIDDLE/WW1/DF/GA/SBH/1, postcard collection.
Figure 3.3 Children pose outside a damaged church, Hartlepool, 1914.


Figure 3.4 Postcard marked ‘Sussex Street’ (bottom right, outside of frame).

Source: Hartlepool Museums and Galleries. Used with permission.
Other postcards were clearly produced to elicit emotional responses from viewers. This includes a photographic postcard whose location is marked as Sussex Street, West Hartlepool (Figure 3.4). Though it is impossible to determine the exact response contemporary viewers may have had to this postcard, its design suggests that a number of reactions were expected. Given the posing of a young girl with a baby in arms, the vulnerability of women and children is underlined. Furthermore, the fact that only children are given space within the frame could suggest that they have been orphaned by the bombardment. That the girl meets the viewer’s gaze does not necessarily imply a resilient attitude, as in other examples. Rather, she is imploring the viewer to act on her behalf. Such an appeal would have resonated in maritime communities such as Hartlepool, given the tradition of charitable efforts focussed on supporting the children of seamen, as in the Jack’s Bairns’ Welfare League, which operated in the north-east.110 The war also sharpened the focus among welfare and public health providers on children’s health, building upon early twentieth-century fears over ‘national efficiency’ and declining birth rates.111 Children’s welfare was also at the heart emerging conceptions of post-war reconstruction. As Rosalind Kennedy highlights: ‘It was hoped to replace the ‘lost generation’ with a happier, healthier, better-educated new generation, ready and willing to rebuild a stronger Britain’.112 Though these photographic productions were apparently presumed to ‘speak for themselves’ – assuming an ‘inbuilt’ aura of authenticity - other examples were more openly didactic and prescriptive, encouraging specific responses from viewers and consumers.113

The best surviving examples related to Hartlepool, West Hartlepool and Scarborough, take the form of published photographs and picture postcards. Images of Whitby bomb damage were also common in illustrated magazines and on postcards. They were, however, less numerous; most likely owing to the relatively light damage wrought upon the town when compared with Hartlepool and Scarborough. The postcards conform to the photographic style seen in other locales in the period, reflecting the town’s status as a picturesque seaside destination. However, surviving examples imitate the ‘before and after’ format exhibited in earlier postcard depictions of damage to French and Belgian churches, most notably Ypres.

113 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (London: Penguin, 2003), 23; As in Roland Barthes’s words from Camera Lucida: ‘Whatever it grants to vision and whatever its manner, a photograph is always invisible: it is not it that we see. In short, the referent adheres’. See Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography (New York: Hill & Wang, 1981), 6.
(Figure 3.5). These images were, of course, bound by their concern with damage to monumental architecture. The depiction of churches, cathedrals and castles in picture postcards was already established during this period across Europe, with monumental architecture reflecting an ‘aura of respectability’ suggestive of the sender’s social standing. This was cemented by the common association of particular classes with certain seaside resorts. In war, the use of churches in popular imagery had a strong political intention and cultural consequence: the evocation of a fundamentally barbarous enemy bent on destroying the cultural stock of Europe.

Postcard images of Hull’s damage following Zeppelin raids have either perished or were not produced at all during the war. This is most likely due to a less prevalent postcard culture in the city, given its industrial character. In addition, Defence of the Realm Regulations (DRR) discouraged – by threat of court martial - the publication of specific details regarding military activities, a rule that was not so much overlooked in December 1914 and early 1915 as conveniently sidestepped for the purposes of propaganda. Though there was not a single specific regulation pertaining to the effects of reporting enemy actions upon civilians, several points could be said to have rendered difficult the reporting of places affected by bombardment. Regulations 12 and 19 published in August 1914 were calculated to discourage the sharing of information publicly:

12. No person shall without lawful authority publish or communicate any information with respect to the movement or disposition of any of the forces, ships or war materials of His Majesty or any of His Majesty’s allies […].

19. No person in, or in the neighbourhood of, a defended dock or harbour shall by word of mouth or in writing spread reports likely to create disaffection or alarm among any of His Majesty’s Forces or among the civilian population.

The inclusion of this latter point is especially interesting, as it is clearly vague enough to allow for an interpretation that could extend to the reporting of places affected by enemy bombing. In coastal towns such as those covered in this study, the definition of a ‘defended dock or harbour’ could quite easily extend its purview to include the entire town, including its

115 Kramer, 236; Wellington, 67.
117 TNA, ADM 1/8397/370, Defence of the Realm Regulations, 12 August 1914.
hinterland. In any case, the contemporary concern with civilian morale as the war continued discouraged precise reporting on bombed areas, though this was by no means consistent. Specific information in the press related to bombed locations would not only hamper the ‘re-mobilisation’ of those on the home front, but could also aid enemy strategists. As Andre Keil notes, such inconsistencies were the result of the Liberal government’s ‘soft’ approach to press censorship, in which journalists were indirectly influenced to act in particular ways, rather than impelled in a top-down fashion.

**Figure 3.5** ‘Before and after’ postcards depicting bomb damage in Ypres and Whitby.

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120 Keil, 118, 124.
Examples from both Hartlepool and Scarborough alluded to the ‘British battle cry’ of ‘Are we downhearted? No!’, a rousing phrase with roots in the first decade of the twentieth century, and popularised in the wartime context by a patriotic song composed by Lawrence Wright and H. Worton David. In 1911, the phrase adorned postcards published to oppose the National Insurance Act. Focussing on the supposed plight of domestic workers and servants, the postcard suggested that such workers would be happier without the burden of 4d (men) or 3d (women) per week. The phrase was also applied in different contexts earlier in

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the century, including sporting ventures and Suffragist propaganda. However, the advent of mass, mechanised war, and the concomitant need to mobilise civilian populations, led to a war-specific adaptation of this phrase. In Scarborough, the now well-known epithet was daubed across the shuttered shopfront of antique dealer Charles S. Smith, alongside a framed photograph of Field Marshal Kitchener. For the Scarborough Pictorial, such a phlegmatic statement was a testament to the ‘spirit of the town’, especially given the shop’s location only ‘ten yards from a spot where two men were killed in South-street’. Therefore, this image was intended to engage with a sense of local identity and affiliation while underlining the resilience of the townspeople in the face of bombardment. It also tacitly admitted to the shocking fragility of the built environment in the face of bombardment. Similarly place-focussed images appeared in national illustrated magazines, though without the inclusion of the indomitable phrase.

In Hartlepool, ‘Are we downhearted?’ was combined with patriotic and heart-rending imagery to encourage resilience following the bombardment. The best preserved example depicts a somewhat forlorn bulldog replete with a bandage across one eye, featuring the words (superimposed onto the image) ‘The Hartlepools’ and ‘Are we downhearted? NO!’ in bold beneath (Figure 3.6). Notwithstanding the obvious allusions to the ‘British bulldog’ motif – so common during the war years - this was not only a highly symbolically- and emotionally-charged postcard image. It was, on the whole, far less literal than other attempts to render the bombardment in visual form. Not only was it devoid of allusions to actual bomb-damaged buildings, but it could also be adapted to suit any beleaguered town or city. The very literal connection of war experience and place identity was therefore elided here, though not completely, given the clear reference to the towns emblazoned across the image. Other examples used humour to make light of what was, for many, a time of anxiety and disruption. In the case of an undated postcard depicting an otherwise commonplace beachfront view, the addition of text may have been applied by a mischievous recipient or

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125 For example, ‘Lord Kitchener quite unshaken by the bombardment of the east coast towns’, The Sketch, 23 December 1914, front page.
126 ‘The Allies’, Illustrated London News, 12 June 1915, 15. In this example, Maud Earl’s painting depicts the Allied nations as dogs: ‘The Japanese Spaniel; The Belgian Griffon; The Russian Borzoi; The French Bulldog; and The British Bulldog’.
sender as an ironic and phlegmatic comment on local war experience, rather than a satire-savvy publisher, though specific details are scant (Figure 3.7).\textsuperscript{127}

The prevalence of such images – both literal and figurative - in the bombed towns of the north-east coast is understandable, given the contemporary need to engage with a mass audience expected to join a nationwide war effort.\textsuperscript{128} Given that contemporary audiences were already enmeshed in an increasingly visual mass culture – dominated by advertising – the need to effectively convey mobilising messages to a large and potentially inattentive audience was foremost in the minds of producers.\textsuperscript{129} Hence, the mix of both highly-charged symbolic images and place-specific depictions of war damage. In the latter case, the inclusion of people in the frame only further underlined the threat modern warfare posed to civilian populations.

\textsuperscript{127} Antony Easthope, \textit{Englishness and National Culture} (London: Routledge, 1999), 154.
\textsuperscript{128} Proctor, \textit{Civilians}, 29.
Figure 3.6 The embattled British bulldog postcard, c. 1914.

Source: Hartlepool Museums and Galleries. Used with permission.

Figure 3.7 ‘Away lads the Germans are coming again’. Postcard, c. 1914.

Source: Hartlepool Museums and Galleries. Used with permission.
Displaying the physical traces of bombardment

In addition to photographic depictions and illustrations of bomb damage, the physical remnants of shells and weaponry that littered beleaguered towns following bombardment acted as both mementoes and *aides-memoire* for civilian populations. Following the bombardment of Hartlepool, Whitby and Scarborough, a bustling trade in shell fragments and shrapnel developed, growing due to an ambivalent attitude as to the danger of such objects among local authorities. This was present across the region, reflecting the wider significance of the attack. For example, in Hull, the chief constable asked civilians in January 1915 to ‘take any fragments of shell they might find to the police stations, in order… that the military might form an idea of the size of the missiles thrown, and of the character of the engines of destruction in the air’. Though the chief constable anticipated air raids by Zeppelins - which were to come to Hull in June 1915 – these words followed the naval raid upon the north-east coast only a month before. They also implicitly admitted a lack of awareness among the authorities of the weapons being used against civilians, though precautionary guidelines published later would urge greater caution. Whitby’s Emergency Committee ordered in October 1915 that unexploded shells should not be touched, ‘but the military or police authorities should be informed of their whereabouts’. By March 1916, the North Riding Constabulary suggested a similar response to remains of shell found following raids, ordering special constables to take charge of any fragments and hand them to the regular police. In Hartlepool, caution was exercised much sooner – only hours after the bombardment - though an inclination to document and learn about enemy ordnance can be sensed even in this cautionary proclamation: ‘Any unexploded shell must not be touched, but information as to the position thereof given to the nearest Policeman or to the Police Station’. Public safety and reassurance were also foremost in this proclamation, presaging to some degree the rudimentary air raid precautions that would follow later in the conflict: ‘The civil population are requested to keep to their houses for the present. The situation is now secure’.

The trade in shrapnel permeated the civilian streets of the north-east coast in the aftermath of the December 1914 bombardment, with children being among the most prolific

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131 NYCRO, ZW (M) 18/12, ‘Bombardment or Raids’ notice, Emergency Committee for the Whitby Petty Sessional Division, 7 October 1915.
133 ‘Proclamation: Naval Bombardment’, *Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail*, 16 December 1914, 1.
sellers. Indeed, this trade was reinforced by civic officials keen to utilise the shock of the raid to bolster military recruitment and mobilise civilians for the war effort. Within weeks of the attack, local authorities from around Britain contacted Scarborough officials in search of shell fragments. The engineer and surveyor of Chiswick District Council contacted the Scarborough borough engineer, H.W. Smith, with a specific request:

The Chairman of my Council is strongly of opinion that some pieces of shell and shrapnel may have fallen in your town would be a great help to recruiting in this neighbourhood, and he would certainly arrange to keep same officially as a memento of the calamity which has just fallen upon your noted town.

The borough engineer’s replies suggested a sudden rush for keepsakes and ‘war relics’ following the bombardment, with the Scarborough Borough Corporation having to compete with members of the public for items. Smith attested on 21 December 1914 that ‘[t]here is a very brisk demand for them and finders have been selling pieces wholesale and if I can get you a piece, I will’. Two days later, he was able to confirm that he had obtained a shell remnant, though it was a somewhat inferior specimen: ‘I am sorry I have been unable to do better for you but the demand for these mementoes is so great, that good specimens are now scarce and are fetching very big prices’. His purchase came at a cost of four shillings. Chiswick’s engineer replied with a note of thanks, hoping that the ‘small sample of shell… will assist the cause of sending more men to the front, and thereby eliminating the risk of similar trouble for many years, if not for ever’. Variations in the market price for shell fragments were signalled by a letter to the Hull city architect on 29 December 1914, when the Scarborough borough engineer admitted that he paid six shillings for a piece of shell obtained for the purposes of local military recruitment. By the end of the month, Smith remarked to the burgh surveyor of Cowdenbeath in Scotland that the difficulty of obtaining shell fragments had increased markedly, though he would enquire as to possible avenues still available. By January 1915, the price had risen as high as £1, when a sample of fragments was sent to Camberwell. Clearly, the resonance of Scarborough’s experience – well-known as a respectable resort town – was widely felt and seen to favour military mobilisation.

134 Witt and McDermott, 135; Teesside Archives (TA), OA/311, Oral Histories Collection, R. Hunter.
Such fragments were put to use in a variety of ways, by local authorities, businesses and philanthropists. In March 1915, Gray’s Piano Depot, of King Edward Street, Hull, advertised its display of a ‘Shelled Piano’, a ‘relic of the Scarborough bombardment’. As the shop’s restorers were tasked with repairing the instrument, its ‘terribly damaged’ state acted not only as a reminder of enemy actions, but of the unsurpassed expertise of Gray’s specialists. A similar display was constructed in the premises of antique dealer Charles S. Smith, under the title ‘A Shell in a China Shop’. Money was apparently raised for local war relief. Efforts in West Hartlepool were organised by the local authority, culminating in an exhibition of shrapnel and discarded shells displayed alongside images of damaged buildings. Some of these were later reproduced as postcards. The Hartlepool Public Library Committee intended such a display to be of national importance. In March 1915, possibly relating to increased knowledge of enemy ordnance, descriptive labels were appended to the ‘specimens’. This collection was no doubt boosted by an auction in March 1915 at the Birks’ Café in West Hartlepool of an assortment of ephemera related to enemy ordnance. There was a significant local demand for fragments of shell, shell bases, fuses and other components, evidenced by the high prices attained for particular items. The highest priced item was the nose of an 8” shell, sold for £4. 12. 6. (the equivalent of £273 today). However, it is notable that some items were withdrawn from sale after fetching prices deemed inordinately high, such as Lot 131, the armour-piercing nose of an 11” shell, withdrawn from auction at £6 (£354). The base alone of a similar specimen reached £5 before being withdrawn. By 1918, the corpus of bombardment relics was seen to provide the ‘nucleus of a local museum’, whose collection would grow through the ‘gradual accumulation of trophies, relics, drawings, &c.’. The West Hartlepool Library Committee placed advertisements in the local newspaper and in shop window displays asking for people

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142 Hartlepool Central Library (HCL), County Borough of West Hartlepool minutes, Jan-Dec 1914, Public Library Committee, 30 December 1914, 11.
143 HCL, County Borough of West Hartlepool minutes, 1916, Public Library Committee, 29 March 1916, 99.
147 HCL, County Borough of West Hartlepool minutes, 1918 minutes, Public Library Committee, 27 March 1918, 119.
to come forward with photographs of the aftermath of the bombardment, ‘for permanent record’. By late March 1915, over 70 such photographs had been received.  

The collection of found shell fragments was also represented in posed photographs, again printed as postcards. This included depictions of both military servicemen and civilians, pictured either holding or standing next to unexploded ordnance or fragments of shell and debris. The fact that in one postcard a West Hartlepool police officer looks on while a man poses for a photograph holding large fragments of shell in each hand suggests a lack of clear instructions from the local authority and central government about the danger of collecting ‘war relics’ and bombardment souvenirs at this early point in the war (Figure 3.8). In others, workers posed with unexploded ordnance seemingly without police or military supervision (Figure 3.9).

Figure 3.8 West Hartlepool man pictured holding shell fragments.

![Figure 3.8 West Hartlepool man pictured holding shell fragments.](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Man_with_shell_fragments_(5634004383).jpg)

149 This image was also published as a postcard, including the caption: ‘Bombardment of West Hartlepool. Pieces of what look like a 12-in. shell’. See LC, LIDDLE/WW1/DF/GA/SBH/1.
In May 1915, the bomb damaged home of solicitor J.H. Turner, known as “Dunollie” on Filey Road in Scarborough, was granted, free of charge, to the Scarborough Townsmen’s Association for use as an exhibition space for ‘bombardment relics’. The ‘Bombardment Museum’ opened to the public in June 1915, with the house kept ‘exactly as damaged by the German bombardment’. Indeed, pieces of masonry and other debris were visible among the people present at the opening ceremony, in photographs published in local newspapers at the time. Newspaper reports immediately following the bombardment described in detail the extent of the damage done to “Dunollie”, astounding given the southerly position of the house, relatively distant from the seafront. It was all the more shocking for the deaths of two people, a postman and a maid, killed by a shell ‘on the doorstep’. Given that the building was left as it had appeared following the bombardment, it is clear that the owner and exhibition organisers wished the structure to take on a memorial quality, in a similar sense to

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150 ‘Local Retrospect For 1915’, *Scarborough Mercury*, 31 December 1915, 6.
that of Hartlepool Baptist Church (discussed below), and consistent with local efforts around the country. Other notable collections of relics in the region included that held by Scarborough Town Hall. This took the form of a number of objects found in the town, including a six-inch ‘common shell’ excavated in North Marine Drive in September 1915. A similar motive was stressed in published commemorative literature, including Sage of West Hartlepool’s series of ‘Real Photograph “Raid” Postcards’, ‘showing Shell havoc before any attempt at rebuilding or clearance of debris has been made’. The apparent lack of adulteration in these displays accorded them an aura of authenticity, acting as a tangible embodiment of the bombardment, much like the looted ‘souvenirs’ collected by soldiers.

Visitors to the “Dunollie” ‘Bombardment Museum’ and consumers of ‘realistic’ photographic ephemera were attempting to engage with the experience of bombardment, seeking a ‘concrete expression of the war experience’. The material destruction left in the wake of enemy attack took on both a memorial and emblematic function. Preserved unexploded bombs and fragments of shell were ‘invested’ with the experience of bombardment. Time became ‘embedded’ in the objects, conflating its material presence with the bombardment itself and thus acting as a striking reminder to those that displayed them in their homes or viewed them in exhibitions. As such, experiential aspects of bombardment and war damage were also incorporated into Scarborough’s tourist industry, expressions of what we might now call ‘dark tourism’ or ‘dissonant heritage’. Tourist guidebooks incorporated sites of bombardment damage into recommended walking excursions for visitors to the town. Between 1919 and 1923, the Scarborough edition of the “Handy” Guide Series included in its ‘Six Walks from N.E.R. Station’ feature, ‘Piers, Marine Drive, Castle, Bombardment remains, Sands N. Side (8 miles)’. A promenade along the piers and harbour then led to the base of Castle Hill, where the tourist had the option of adding two hours to their walk by ‘Visiting the Castle, and the Barracks smashed at German bombardment, en

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156 Wellington, 22-3.
157 Ibid.
route’. The fact that this was included in a guidebook is testament to the resonance of the 1914 bombardment.\textsuperscript{161} Indeed, the image of Scarborough was foremost in national military recruitment and civilian mobilisation efforts from early 1915, to the chagrin of many in the Hartlepools, who suffered greater sacrifice in the form of property damage and loss of life.\textsuperscript{162} Even so, Hartlepool writer and historian Frederick Miller could intone in 1915 that the events of December 1914 had encouraged visitors, though he was keen that they enjoy the more picturesque aspects of the towns: ‘West Hartlepool, like Hartlepool, has become quite a “show” since the bombardment. Those who come to see its wounds should find relief in a survey of its still sound parts and pleasanter prospects’.\textsuperscript{163}

This engagement with sites associated with direct war experience was not dissimilar to popular trench reconstructions, in that they were a ‘means of satisfying both patriotic duty and the demand for leisure’.\textsuperscript{164} It also satisfied the curiosity of visitors who were bound to be aware of Scarborough’s wartime trials, while incorporating what was an immensely difficult aspect of the town’s recent history into tourism narratives, during a period of socioeconomic vulnerability and insecurity. By integrating bombarded urban landscapes into an otherwise routine walk, these tourist guides were imparting meaning into the ruined buildings: an attempt to construct a particular cultural memory of the locality at war, utilising the ‘atmosphere’ of the site.\textsuperscript{165} This was strikingly similar to the underpinning of battlefield tourism across the Western and Eastern Fronts in the interwar years, which saw a particular boom in interest during 1919-23.\textsuperscript{166} To some extent, the material traces of the bombardment were incorporated into post-war reconstruction efforts, while at the same time providing a markedly more sensuous engagement with the post-war tourist landscape of Scarborough.\textsuperscript{167} In wartime, such reconstructions were used variously to promote commercial endeavours and swell the ranks of the armed forces. For example, Blackpool utilised training trenches – staffed by wounded veterans - to create a tourist attraction in the form of “Loos Trenches” in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
  \item Ibid., 1919 edition, 11.
  \item Gregory, 56.
  \item Miller, \textit{Shell-fire}, 49.
  \item Lloyd, \textit{Battlefield Tourism}, 102-3, 114.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
1916, while a 1917 visit of Bruce Bairnsfather’s musical comedy *The Better ‘Ole* to Hull was promoted by the Palace Theatre with novel decorations in the foyer.\(^{168}\)

Sandbags, rifles, bayonets, accoutrements, and some scenery, [will] convert the vestibule of the theatre into the semblance of a dug-out. To attain this end [the management] invite suggestions from soldiers on leave from the front or discharged… The management will be grateful for the loan of any German trophies, such as helmets, bayonets, etc.\(^{169}\)

In April 1916, a display of bombardment ephemera was installed at the offices of the *Hull Daily Mail* on Whitefriargate, one of the central shopping streets of the city. In this case, the ‘relics’ on show belonged to a downed Zeppelin, the *L15*, brought down in the Thames on 1 April. Though the objects themselves had no direct connection to Hull, unlike those exhibited in Hartlepool and Scarborough, the manner in which they were transported was expected to evoke a sense of local pride. A Hull trawling vessel, the *Olivine*, was on the scene when the Zeppelin was downed, working initially to tow the stricken gondola and remaining envelope of the airship towards the shore. Following the Zeppelin’s sinking – it was a ‘dead weight’ – the captured crew of the *L15* were carried aboard the *Olivine*.\(^ {170}\) For local commentators, this provided fodder for naval propaganda and for underlining the especial fortitude of Hull men:

As generally happens, a Humber vessel and a Hull crew were “in at it,” assisting to complete the work of destruction of one of those invading airships. It was a smart Hull trawlerman, now one of H.M. Patrols, who brought in these relics for our inspection, and to be exhibited to the public as a proof that the “Navy is doing something.”\(^ {171}\)

The material displayed consisted of ‘several pieces of the silk envelope, on one of which a portion of the Iron Cross can be discerned’, alongside part of the aluminium framework of the craft. Peculiarly, a selection of personal effects belonging to the captured German crew were also shown, including a pair of oilskin trousers ‘with German names on the buttons’ and a pair of discoloured boots. In light of the apparent availability of such war materiel in Hull following the Zeppelin raids of preceding months (raids totalled three by early April 1916), the *Hull Daily Mail* envisaged an expansion of the collection, adding that, should a public room be needed to display them, a small charge would be appended, with all proceeds going

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\(^ {168}\) Espley, 326-9; ‘“The Better ‘Ole”’, *Hull Daily Mail*, 8 November 1917, 4.

\(^ {169}\) ‘“The Better ‘Ole”’, *Hull Daily Mail*, 8 November 1917, 4.


to local ‘patrol and minesweepers’ funds’. The use of such objects – fundamentally symbols of destruction and loss – in charitable efforts was common on the north-east coast. Similar efforts at collecting bombardment ephemera were made by Hull Museums, under the tutelage of curator Thomas Sheppard, with the result envisaged to form a ‘War Memorial Museum’, comprising captured German guns, military honours attained by local men, postage stamps and other ephemera. This would build on a collection already extant at the Wilberforce House Museum, seen as an exemplar for replication in ‘each important place in the country’. This collection included ‘armlets, badges, posters, Zeppelin relics and trophies secured by Hull men, and objects made at the local munition works’.

Other efforts at collecting war materiel in order to mark the passing of bombardment were less auspicious than those above, though no less important or creative in approach. The premises of Thomas Rutherford, an antique dealer in West Hartlepool, were transformed by a small display of shell fragments, very likely assembled through trade with customers. The connection of the disparate objects to the fateful event was made clear with banners. Indeed, the image, later reproduced as a postcard, had the quality of an advertisement, given the arrangement of shop sign and explanatory notice (Figure 3.10). More personal was an example of civilian ‘trench art’, whereby a piece of German shell was fashioned into a decorative, commemorative object by a Scarborough postman, Joseph H. Southwick. However, rather than being a personally meaningful work, Southwick envisaged the sculpture to carry a symbolic and virulently anti-German message. Intending it to ‘immortalise the Huns’ “great effort to make history and also to bring fear by murderously bombarding unfortified towns, and killing unprotected men, women and children”’, the sculpture depicted a winged beast replete with a German Pickelhauber helmet (Figure 3.11). A similar, though cruder, example was reproduced as a postcard by a Hartlepool publisher in the same period. Rather than a three-dimensional sculpture, the postcard depicts the ‘Kruppt Kaizer constructed of shell’, a bricolage of war materiel (including shell fragments and replica Iron Cross medals), pencil drawing and text, connecting the alliance of German industry and government, with a now questionable code of honour (Figure 3.11).

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172 Ibid.
173 HHC, City and County of Kingston Upon Hull Municipal Corporation and Urban Sanitary Authority, Minutes and Proceedings of Committees 1917-18, Property Committee, Museum and Records Sub-Committee, 17 December 1918, 12-13; op. cit. 14 January 1919, 29; op. cit. 17 April 1919, 94.
174 LC, LIDDLE/WW1/DF/GA/SBH/1. The postcard is not dated or postmarked and no other form of advertisement for the small exhibition appears to have survived.
175 “Kultur”, Scarborough Pictorial, 2 June 1915, 11; Saunders, Trench Art, 45.
176 “Kultur”, Scarborough Pictorial, 2 June 1915, 11.
177 LC, LIDDLE/WW1/DF/GA/SBH/1, postcard collection.
Scarborough, fragments of shell were also mounted and displayed in the home. This at once
commemorated the bombardment and dulled its violence by presenting the object of
destruction in a domestic setting. These were symbolically charged ornaments that
underlined the location of the bombardment, both by labelling and by stressing the shrapnel’s
local provenance.

Figure 3.12 depicts a mounted fragment of German shell, complete with a replica Iron
Cross (likely to be a one of the mass-produced ‘spoof’ versions of the medal manufactured to
commemorate the bombardment and encourage military recruitment) and a label describing
its purpose as a commemorative item. Rather than a commercial commission, the
mounting appears to have been carried out by an amateur craftsman named S. Smurthwaite, a
young clerk from West Hartlepool. This is consistent with the civilian genre of trench art
and was replicated in a number of other surviving examples. However, what is most
remarkable is how strikingly the item was incorporated into the domestic setting, used in the
photograph as a stand for a bowl containing sweets and chocolates. Similar examples are
extant for Scarborough, but photographic evidence is not available regarding their context of
use, though it can be supposed that they were displayed in similar ways to other decorative
commemorative objects.

179 Ibid., 45.
182 Saunders, 50; HAPMG, uncatalogued, shell fragment with attached plaque (‘German Shell. Hartlepool
Bombardment. Dec. 16. 1914’).
Figure 3.10 Display in Thomas Rutherford’s antique shop, West Hartlepool, c. 1914.

Source: Leeds University Library, Liddle Collection. Used with permission.
Figure 3.11 Civilian ‘trench art’ utilising shell fragments and other ephemera to deliver anti-German messages.

Figure 3.12 A mounted piece of German shell, used as a stand for sweets and chocolates, c. 1915.

Sources: “Kultur”, Scarborough Pictorial, 2 June 1915 (Scarborough Library); Leeds University Library, Liddle Collection. Used with permission.

Source: Hartlepool Museums and Galleries. Used with permission.
Such examples are testament to the thorough incorporation of bombardment and anti-German narratives into the everyday life of coastal communities, as well as the normalisation of ‘war relic’ collection and display. Indeed, other elements of local visual and material culture actually served to belittle the symbolic and discursive power of enemy bombardment, by situating its traces in markedly banal situations. This included the advertisement of shell fragment sales, in addition to guides and pamphlets designed for both a local and tourist audience.\textsuperscript{184} The Scarborough café, Bonnet & Son’s, went as far as producing chocolate models of French 75mm. shells to act as ‘souvenirs’ of the bombardment. In words seemingly inappropriate to the gravity of the situation, an advertisement read: ‘The Latest Novelty to send to your Friends’.\textsuperscript{185} Such examples show the degree to which the experience of bombardment was incorporated into local ways of understanding the war itself, often making light of the destructive and atrocious. As in other aspects of wartime popular culture, the use of bellicose language and imagery was normalised, while businesses clearly adapted to straitened economic circumstances in ways which recognised the often frightened and unpredictable mood of civilians increasingly in the line of fire.\textsuperscript{186}

\textbf{Conclusion}

This chapter has explored manifold depictions and representations of war damage produced in towns and cities on the north-east coast, as well as published images in national illustrated magazines and newspapers. It is clear that popular depictions of war damage, both monumental and vernacular, were a way of framing the experience of total war in a strikingly local fashion, drawing upon understandings of the coastal-urban landscape and underlining the significance of the destruction of the built environment in crystallising truly civilian conceptions of war.\textsuperscript{187} Within the north-east coastal region, popular representations of war damage were framed by the socioeconomic character of the towns. In Scarborough and Whitby, picturesque seaside towns with traditions of postcard and souvenir production, the visual culture of bombardment was expressed through images of well-known buildings, including some, such as Whitby Abbey with considerable cultural cachet. By contrast, the industrial port of Hull produced no postcards depicting bomb damage, reflecting it status as a legitimate military target and subject of more stringent regulation regarding images of


\textsuperscript{185} \textit{Scarborough Mercury}, 3 December 1915, 5.


\textsuperscript{187} Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 58.
damage committed by the enemy. However, it is notable that the most numerous examples of bombardment images were produced in industrial Hartlepool, where local popular culture provided a means for situating the town’s sacrifice within regional and national narratives of war effort, disruption and loss. The sheer number of people killed or traumatised by the attack provided opportunities for eminently topical memorial and commemorative products, linked intimately to place.

While war damage photographs and illustrations could act as a way of marking the passing of a bombardment – possibly as a means to focussing mourning and remembrance practices – such images could also provide a source of resilience. They reminded civilians of the impact of industrialised war on hitherto sacrosanct civilian spaces, reminding viewers that they had passed through a life-threatening event, while sharpening an idea of the intractable enemy capable of committing atrocious acts against undefended coastal towns.

Though the examples discussed were not propaganda per se (they were not produced with specific war aims in mind), they nevertheless served to mobilise civilian populations to remain defiant in the face of attack.\footnote{Michael Sanders and Philip M. Taylor, \textit{British Propaganda during the First World War, 1914-18} (London: Macmillan, 1982), 2.} Indeed, the use of phrases such as ‘Are we downhearted? NO!’ made this abundantly clear. In less didactic examples, such as postcards depicting damage to houses and churches, the images were left open to the interpretation of the viewer, though clearly calculated to elicit emotional responses capable of raising morale. It is clear that both pictorial and material representations of war damage on the north-east coast fulfilled a number of functions for civilians. While they most obviously commemorated bombardments, they also underlined the significance of the locality, its urban and coastal landscape, in articulating a specifically civilian war. These depictions were both ‘tokens of place’ and potent tools in propaganda efforts, helping anti-German writers to crystallise an image of the intractable enemy in the minds of civilians.\footnote{Price, 113.} Finally, with the intimacy and verisimilitude possible only with photographs, postcards and published images outlined the shocking human cost of war, in terms of lives lost, businesses destroyed and communities shaken by bombardment, while allowing the communion of people with their local landscape. This place-specific sense of injustice and sacrifice was vital for civilian communities in these coastal towns to understand the war itself, and their place within it.
CHAPTER 4: Public safety and home defence: the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) and central government policy

Introduction
The outbreak of war in August 1914 brought with it significant challenges for government and the forces of law and order. Far from a conflict that happened on disconnected battlefields, the First World War saw a thorough blurring of the dichotomy between what are often called the ‘home’ and ‘fighting’ fronts. Not only did civilian men volunteer to fight abroad – becoming ‘citizen soldiers’ – Britain itself was transformed by the changed material and social conditions of ‘total war’. It was a truly total war, in the sense that whole societies across Europe were mobilised in order to prosecute it, though the usefulness of such an easy definition is still a subject of considerable debate among historians. Nonetheless, factories and workplaces were re-gearied towards war industry; many women began to work in jobs that had previously been the preserve of the male breadwinner. In the view of some historians, barriers of class and gender began to break down, as codes of deference and ‘separate spheres’ were rendered moot. This is the ‘war-as-watershed’ thesis of women’s experience during 1914-18, exemplified by the work of Arthur Marwick and recently critiqued by Gail Braybon. However, this period was also one in which vast swathes of British society came under the control of the authorities, including many aspects of civilian private life.

Perhaps surprisingly, this aspect of First World War governance and, indeed, civilian experience, has received little attention from historians. While a focused study of emergency government and legislation in Britain is yet to be published, among the manifold works related to the First World War generally, the wartime legal and political shifts signalled by such legislation have received scant attention. As André Keil has recently demonstrated, without analysis of frameworks such as the Defence of the Realm Act (1914) and the Aliens Restriction Act (1914), it is impossible to understand the transformation of home front politics and social relations during 1914-18. This historiographical absence is remarkable.

given the unprecedented intervention of government, military and naval agencies in the
everyday lives of civilians during the war, a situation that suspended hitherto crucial elements
of constitutional arrangements, leading to what some scholars have called a ‘constitutional
dictatorship’, threatening the traditional separation of judiciary, executive and parliament.192
Other scholars have similarly referred to a ‘total state’ or ‘state of exception’, underlining the
transformation of civil societies engulfed by war.193 Indeed, this fundamental societal shift
did not go unnoticed by contemporary commentators and academics, including the historian
Sydney W. Clarke, who commented in 1919 that ‘of the phenomena exhibited during the four
years of warfare, none is more remarkable than the docility with which the people of this
country submitted to the abrogation of many of their most cherished rights’. For Clarke, a
number of central constitutional principles – including freedom of the press, trial by jury and
‘An Englishman’s House is his Castle’ - were reduced to ‘mere shreds of their former
consequence’ during the conflict.194 In addition, as Patrick Graham has noted, an ‘alliance of
Conservative and Liberal peers’ provided a ‘scathing critique’ of the illiberal emergency
proposals in the House of Lords, including among its number Lord Halsbury and Lord
Parmoor, who expressed concern both at the haste with which the legislation was introduced
and its apparent attacks upon parliamentary sovereignty and constitutional convention.195

More recent work by historians focused on emergency legislation – most notably
Brock Millman and Charles Townshend – has provided a firm basis for further research,
ostensibly by providing detailed analysis of the legal and political debates and entanglements
that enabled the enactment of emergency legislation.196 However, for Millman and others,
including David Englander, the focus has been primarily on public order and the control of
political dissent.197 By way of contrast – though certainly owing much to the example set by
this small group of scholars – this chapter attempts to situate emergency legislation within the

192 André Keil, ‘States of Exception: Emergency Government and ‘Enemies Within’ in Britain and Germany
during the First World War’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Northumbria University, 2014), 3; Clinton L.
Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in Modern Democracies (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1948).
193 This includes work by intellectual historians and political philosophers, notably Richard Wolin, Jens Petersen
194 Sydney W. Clarke, ‘The Rule of DORA’, Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, 1 (1)
(1919), 36.
196 Brock Millman, ‘British Home Defence Planning and Civil Dissent, 1917-1918’, War in History, 5 (2)
(1998), 204-32; Charles Townshend, Making the Peace: Public Order and Public Security in Modern Britain
197 David Englander, ‘Military Intelligence and the Defence of the Realm: The Surveillance of Soldiers and
Civilians in Britain during the First World War’, Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History, 52 (1)
(1987), 24-32.
broader context of public safety discourse and home/civil defence planning, while relating this ideological development to the experience of civilians and war workers on the north-east coast of England. Notions of ‘public safety’ were not new in 1914. They had roots in mid-nineteenth century occupational legislation, often passed in response to widespread coverage of industrial accidents and mining disasters. Contemporary conceptions of ‘risk’ and insurance also played a role in defining dangers, structuring and managing the anticipation of harmful events. In the context of war, these ideas were adapted in order to define contemporary threats and disperse risk across society, sharing the financial burden of risk through insurance schemes, as well as managing the social-psychological effects of anticipated attack through specific pre-emptive activities.

In addition to engaging with the limited secondary literature on the subject, this chapter will trace the contestation and debate of emergency policies within and between central government departments, the military, police and local authorities. The aim of the chapter is to understand wartime emergency legislation as protean and subject to change in response to volatile conditions. Most importantly, the policing of emergency regulations had a direct connection with the civil defence protocols developed during the war, most notably those related to aerial and naval bombardment. While making reference to the north-east coast, this chapter will provide a detailed outline of the machinations of central government departments before and during the conflict with regards coastal and artillery defence, fledgling civil defence efforts and public safety discourse. Building upon this groundwork, subsequent chapters will explore the interaction of different levels of wartime governance in efforts to defend the north-east coast.

Emergency legislation, in the form of the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA), appeared only days after war was declared. Particular behaviours and activities viewed as inexpedient to the conduct of the war were kept in check through Defence of the Realm Regulations (DRR). This was a legal framework that sought to ensure that the entire human and material resources of the country were mobilised towards the war effort. This legislation allowed for the registration and interment of those defined as ‘enemy aliens’. A by-product was the stigmatisation and victimisation of many thousands of naturalised, second and third

generation immigrants, including many who did not have German heritage.\textsuperscript{200} DORA also put in place a system of censorship, whereby newspapers could not legally print the places of military manoeuvres, or accurately describe where bombing raids took place on British soil. Indeed, the rule did not only apply to the media, but had much wider ramifications:\textsuperscript{201}

No person shall without lawful authority publish or communicate any information with respect to the movement or disposition of any of the forces, ships, or war materials of His Majesty or any of His Majesty’s allies, or with respect to the plans of any navy or military operations, or with respect to any works or measures undertaken for or connected with the fortification or defence of any place.\textsuperscript{202}

This must be kept in mind when assessing the popular written media in wartime, particularly as the identities of the columnists, editors and journalists that staffed daily and weekly titles were largely hidden; either omitted or pseudonymous.\textsuperscript{203} In the areas covered by this study, coverage of the war was, at times, muted; at others, rich and revealing. Indeed, the December 1914 raid on the north-east coast avoided to a large extent many of the strictest publication controls meted out to localities later in the war, such as the frequent intonations of a certain ‘North East Coast’ target (Hull) when Zeppelins attacked in 1915.\textsuperscript{204} This difference was most likely due to the initial shock of the December 1914 attack and the need to produce Allied propaganda capable of mobilising people in the context of a non-conscription military and naval tradition. This built upon the ‘war culture’ of beleaguered Belgium and the figure of an irreconcilable enemy to reinforce the ‘frightfulness’ of German actions. These narratives, underwritten by the fear of invasion and further attack, produced a ‘condensed representation of the enemy’ that allowed both soldiers and civilians ‘to adapt to and perpetuate conflict’.\textsuperscript{205}

The emergency legislation and regulations – adapted at least nine times during the conflict - passed by government were implemented by a consortium of public bodies, composing regional and local military and naval authorities, in addition to police forces and

\textsuperscript{201} Keil, ‘States of Exception’, 114.
\textsuperscript{202} TNA, ADM 1/8397/370, Defence of the Realm Regulations, 12 August 1914, 3-4.
\textsuperscript{204} ‘The Zeppelin Raid of June 6’, \textit{Yorkshire Post}, 19 June 1915, 8.
local authorities.\textsuperscript{206} City, county and borough chief constables acted in concert with military authorities to enforce DORA regulations, though county chiefs generally saw themselves as superior to the heads of city and borough forces.\textsuperscript{207} In practice, the Home Office often disseminated home and civil defence information to all levels of police leadership and took local and regional issues, when raised, on a case by case basis.\textsuperscript{208} The military authorities had long seen a role for the army in controlling the civilian population in periods of social upheaval or invasion. In 1888, Edward Stanhope, Secretary of State for War in Lord Robert Cecil’s Conservative cabinet, produced a memorandum stating ‘aid to the civil power in the United Kingdom’ to be its highest priority.\textsuperscript{209} This led to frequent calls for legal powers for the military in the event of invasion and the social turmoil bound to ensue. At this time, ‘a French attempt to rush the Channel had to be provided against’.\textsuperscript{210} Germany was not yet ascendant in the eyes of the military and naval top brass. However, despite these War Office priorities up to the turn of the century, the government consistently vetoed their plans. By 1913, the government, through the auspices of the Solicitor-General and Attorney-General, deemed the enactment of emergency legislation unnecessary and legally questionable. Just weeks before DORA was first introduced, the powers sought by the military were deemed unnecessary, as common law already provided the requisite powers.\textsuperscript{211} Other contemporary legal commentators cited a similar prerequisite in common law for planning for ‘all contingencies of danger’, keeping police duties firmly in the civil realm.\textsuperscript{212} Therefore, the police were to be drawn from the private citizenry: ‘The right and duty of the subject to assist in keeping the peace is indistinguishable historically from his right and duty to assist in defending the realm’.\textsuperscript{213}

From September 1914, amendments to DORA were negotiated by an interdepartmental committee, the Defence of the Realm Regulation Amendment Committee,

\textsuperscript{211} Graham, ‘Public Order’, 10.
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid., 50.
before being put before the Cabinet. Modifications were not solely the result of changing circumstances, but because the orders were often nuanced and therefore open to interpretation. As J.M. Bourne has noted, DORA was largely a ‘series of ad hoc responses’ with ‘no overall plan, no philosophy of action’. In a similar vein, Keil comments that the ‘state of exception’ enabled by DORA was ‘not a clearly elaborated programme of measures… it was to a large extent a process of experimentation under exceptional circumstances’. Similarly, Patrick Graham terms it an ‘impulsive measure, devoid of foresight’. The fact that much of the original Act was vague had the twin effect of aiding and disabling central authorities in particular, as local authority officials and chief constables frequently requested clarity or provided their own interpretations as they tried to enforce DORA rules. However, what is clear from the bill debated in parliament on 7 August 1914 was a notion of public safety, and that such safety came at the expense of pre-war civil liberties. The first point stated:

His Majesty in Council has power during the continuance of the present war to issue regulations as to the powers and duties of the Admiralty and Army Council, and of the members of His Majesty’s forces, and other persons acting in His behalf, for securing the public safety and the defence of the realm; and may by such regulations authorise the trial by courts martial and punishment of persons contravening any of the provisions of such regulations [...].

As Englander notes, this legislation allowed military authorities to encroach upon vast swathes of the everyday lives of non-combatant citizens, even criminalising many activities associated with pre-war normalcy, including leisure pursuits. For the small number of historians that have focussed on DORA specifically, this has been generally seen as an unprecedented attack on ‘classical liberal conviction’, especially since the regulations were attended by only ‘exiguous debate’ in the House of Commons and none at all in the Lords. However, the extent to which DORA impinged on traditional notions of ‘English liberty’ and legal ‘conventions and restraints’ that ensured freedom of the individual has been debated by

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214 The Director of Military Intelligence George MacDonogh and head of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) Vernon Kell played prominent roles in this process. See Keil, ‘States of Exception’, 116.
217 Graham, 2.
218 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
220 TNA, ADM 1/8397/370, Defence of the Realm Bill, 7 August 1914.
221 Englander, ‘Military Intelligence’, 25.
historians. Charles Townshend refers to the work of the American historian and political scientist Clinton Rossiter to claim that the ‘possible far outstripped the actual threat to individual liberty. Even the massive, unprecedented, and – on paper – alarming spate of DOR regulations did not jar too much on the daily lives of most people.’ He goes on to emphasise the popular character of the emergency measures and the lack of public opposition or complaint in response, though this analysis is tempered by an acknowledgment of the enduring legacy of the legislation and regulations, leaving a ‘permanent imprint in English political culture’. In contrast, Keil has emphasised the complexity of emergency government during the early months of the conflict and the continued historiographical controversies surrounding the willingness of parliament to grant such wide-ranging powers: emergency government ‘opened a Pandora’s Box with regards to civil liberties and the vanishing limitation of the powers of the state in Britain’. Defence of the Realm Regulations (DRR) were ‘so vaguely defined that soon all areas of daily life were affected by them’. Conversely, Ewing and Gearty highlight pre-war public fear of invasion as precipitant in the formation of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) in 1909, leading to calls for a secret service separate from any other government department and for a new Official Secrets Act to create ideal conditions for its formation. The amended Official Secrets Act of 1911 arguably paved the way for DORA, given the similarity of some of its content, particularly sections related to ‘prohibited places’ and preventing the ‘wrongful communication of information’.

Wartime emergency government in Britain, given the lack of historical precedence for such measures (apart from the 1714 Riot Act which served a similar function to DORA in terms of public order), did make significant impinges upon the traditional liberties of British subjects. In the context of the north-east coast of England, in contradistinction to Townshend, evidence related to the case studies featured in the present work suggests that there was a degree of open resistance to DORA regulations in some coastal localities. In some cases, offenders risked punitive fines or custodial sentences in their efforts to refuse or impede the actions of special constables or the military police. Indeed, when one views DORA through the lens of anti-bombardment and public safety discourse – including, most pertinently, lighting restrictions – the willingness of many ordinary people to transgress against

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224 Keil, 117.
emergency measures is clear, evidenced most clearly by court records and legal testimony. However, it must be noted from the outset that the reasons for such willingness to break the law were manifold, including both justified grievances at the extent of new police powers and a lack of general understanding stemming from the vagueness of the regulations themselves.

While illustrating a number of points with examples from the primary case studies, this chapter will focus mainly on the efforts of central government agencies and military/naval bodies to plan for bombardment or potential invasion, including air raid precautions and other measures seeking to safeguard public safety. The north-east coast will also be situated within central government schemes, in order the gauge the region’s importance within broader home defence efforts. The chapter which follows will elaborate upon the activities of local and regional authorities, voluntary bodies and civilians in carrying out orders from the centre, in addition to policies specific to the locality, often devised after a degree of interpretation and experimentation.

The Authorised Competent Military Authority
Police forces acquired new responsibilities following the introduction of this wide-ranging legislation and associated regulations.226 This included the issuing of orders related to all manner of public and private activities, from the licencing of homing pigeons, to household and vehicular lighting. Police forces assumed a second line of defence for the regular military should an enemy invasion occur, with an express responsibility for the social control of civilians. The DRR even included a section entitled ‘Control of Movements of Civil Population’, with powers to impel civilians to remain indoors or prevent them from travelling. Restrictions on household lighting and noise also furthered the encroachment of the state upon the individual, while chief constables issued orders designed to silence barking dogs and loud laughter in the streets during air raid sirens, for fear that ‘enemy aircraft may be guided by sound as well as by light’.227

Early forms of civil defence were devised within the framework of DORA and the DRR. The Authorised Competent Military Authority (ACMA) for the district, whose expressed purpose was to cooperate with police and other agencies seeking to govern civil

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226 Wall, Chief Constables, 52.
society, was charged with implementing government policy related to defence. In practice, the ACMA was a shifting coalition of both military and civil partners and, though it was named the ‘Authorised Competent Military Authority’, civil authorities and the police often carried out some of the most visible and far-reaching elements of its business with regards civilian defence. The Home Office desired that the responsibility for warning civilian populations of an impending attack ‘should be in the hands of a single authority – either the Chief Constable… or the Local Military Authority, as may be arranged’. The ACMA was directly accountable to General Headquarters and subordinated all local authorities, including chief constables. Admittedly, police constables undertook the majority of administrative work within the ‘special administrative areas’ devised to carry out the work of ACMAs, though serious offences related to sedition, detention of aliens and labour militancy were expressly reserved for military authorities. However, towards the end of the war, in light of the police strike of August 1918, central military authorities admitted their reliance upon the ‘men in blue’, who ‘were to the army what a guide dog is to the blind’.

In practice, the military authority referred to as the head of the ACMA for a given area occupied a hierarchical position. While the Home Forces were organised into loosely geographically-defined zones – the Northern, Eastern and Scottish Commands – the ACMA appears to have referred to the local/regional military or naval bodies responsible for defended ports: for the Hull area, this was the Humber Garrison; for Hartlepool, the Tees and Hartlepool Garrison. Particularly when related to the position and movements of home defence troops or the construction of defence installations, local forces were largely subordinated to the geographically-defined ‘special administrative area’. Hence, local military leaders made requests to the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of Northern Command for an improved defensive capability, who was subordinated in his turn to General Headquarters. A War Office map from February 1916 provides a rough overview of Northern Command (Berwick-upon-Tweed to the Wash) in relation to the military districts.

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229 TNA, HO 45/10753/266118, Edward Troup, circular to chief constables, 10 May 1915.
232 TNA, AIR 1/564/16/15/79, J.A. Ferrier to Headquarters Northern Command, 10 June 1915; TNA, AIR 1/564/16/15/79, Commanding Hartlepool & Tees Garrison to Headquarters, Northern Command, 15 April 1915.
233 These took the form of ‘commands’: Scottish Command, Northern Command (Berwick-upon-Tweed to the Wash) and Eastern Command (The Wash to the South Foreland, including London). See TNA, WO 32/5273, Field Marshal French, Commander-in-Chief of Home Forces, ‘Defences of the United Kingdom’, 13 February 1916.
surrounding it, the sites of coastal guns and armaments and defensible areas surrounding particular conurbations (areas in blue, from the top: South Shields, Tees and Hartlepool, the Humber) (Figure 4.1).

**Figure 4.1** An approximate map of Northern Command (War Office, February 1915).

Many offences defined within the remit of public safety and security, including guarding against aerial bombardment and, by extension, certain inappropriate or ‘unpatriotic’ behaviours, were invariably tried in civil courts at the local level. The precedent was set for this framework in the first ‘general’ regulations, published on 12 August 1914, stating that ‘civil offences will be dealt with by the civil tribunals in the ordinary course of law’, making it clear – contrary to the initial government bill – that military authorities could not mete out justice to civilian transgressors.234 However, until the passing of the Defence of the Realm (Amendment) Act in 1915, the right of civilians to trial by jury in a civil court, as opposed to court-marshal (normally reserved for military personnel) was not fully codified. Even with

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234 TNA, ADM 1/8397/370, Defence of the Realm Regulations, 12 August 1914, 1.
the passing of this Act, trial by jury in a civil court could still be suspended by Proclamation in ‘the event of invasion or other special military emergency arising out of the present war’. Furthermore, whether or not a case was referred to courts-martial or the intelligence services depended upon the ‘gravity of the offence and status of the offender’. Between 4 August 1914 and 31 March 1920, nationally 82 per cent of civilians tried via military courts were convicted, with the majority receiving spells of six months and twelve months’ hard labour (14 per cent were acquitted and 8 per cent quashed/not confirmed). All of the 379 convictions ‘at home’ were for breaking Defence of the Realm Regulations.

The constabulary, alongside civil and military authorities, drew upon and reinforced a ‘culture of risk management’ that had developed in the previous century, whereby processes of information management and circulation combined with efforts to predict future crime patterns. The risks and costs associated with modern life were socialised in the process, with models of insurance also contributing to the communal ‘dispersal of risk’ across the community. With the introduction of DORA in 1914, this coalition of authoritative bodies sought to govern the behaviour of civilian populations in ways that, implicitly, guarded against an anticipated (or sometimes) imagined risk to collective life and limb. Therefore, this governmental framework could aid efforts to cope with uncertainty by constantly reminding people that certain activities could work against risk, including the cessation of public lighting. As the physician Maurice Wright wrote in 1939, reflecting upon First World War civilian experience: ‘Evidence, clear evidence, must be given to the mass of the civil population that there is preparedness, that there is organisation’. At the very least, vigilance could anticipate and pre-empt belligerent enemy actions by attempting to turn the unknowable – when would an air raid or naval bombardment occur? – into the calculable, in the form of risk. In the view of many local and regional authorities, measures such as early-warning systems (air raid sirens or ‘buzzers’) and both rudimentary and detailed instructions for civilians in the event of an enemy attack, could provide a degree of

236 Englander, 25.
237 As a comparator, this figure stood at 92 per cent for officers and soldiers tried on home soil. See War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire (London: HMSO, 1922), 644.
238 Ibid., 647, 655.
reassurance and act against perceived risks. Indeed, as this chapter will explore, calls for civilian resilience generally entailed preparing non-combatants for potential bombardments by encouraging practical measures that, on the whole, relied on the individual to regulate his/her own behaviour. This included guidelines for emergency provisions – in the form of candles and warm clothing – and suggestions for suitable shelters, usually within the family home.242

Defending the north-east coast from the centre

The north-east coast of England was a particular focus for military and naval policy-makers – particularly the ports surrounding the Tyne, Tees and Humber – from the beginning of the twentieth century. While the planning for this region did not necessarily take precedence over areas close to London – the centre of government and of empire – it could be argued that they, at times, ranked alongside them in terms of importance. Focussing on defended ports outside of the metropole and its hinterlands can provide a fresh perspective on pre-war and wartime defence planning, by situating provincial ports within broader national narratives of anti-invasion and coastal artillery defence. Indeed, such analysis can possibly complicate an assumed national experience.

Understandably, military and naval historians have tended to dominate the field related to coastal artillery defence construction and planning, though archaeologists and heritage practitioners have provided detailed reports and surveys of the physical remains of batteries and their precise locations.243 Though the literature pertaining to First World War civil defence is limited, as explored above, the historiography of War Office and Admiralty machinations and debates regarding the state of British army and naval defence strategy is rich, though works focused expressly on coastal artillery and defence are fewer in number.244 It is beyond the scope of this study to engage fully in the broad literature on defence, given that it is a social and cultural history of civilian bombardment. It is, however, vital that the historiography of coastal defence and fortification, in particular, is engaged with fully and the

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242 NYCRO, ZW (M) 15/2, Emergency Committee for the Whitby Petty Sessional Division, ‘Notice: Bombardment or Raids’, 7 October 1915.
case studies situated within it. For the purposes of this chapter, an outline of the debates that concerned military and naval elites during the first decade of the twentieth century will be sketched, with a view to situating the north-east coastal region within them. Without a firm basis in pre-war and wartime national policy related to coastal defence and anti-invasion measures, it would be impossible to adequately understand the local delivery and interpretation of such policies.

Admiralty and War Office discussions at the turn of the twentieth century tackled the question of coastal defence and the possibilities of invasion by a foreign foe. Tensions with a burgeoning German industrial and naval power developed as the first decade of the century wore on, with the Austro-German political and military elite increasingly inclined to disregard facets of the ‘culture of peace’, related to laws, procedures and norms devised after 1815 to encourage harmonious international relations.\(^{245}\) As Morgan-Owen has explored, fears abounded at the turn of the century that the despatching of large numbers of British and colonial troops to South Africa during the Boer War (1899-1902) had left the ‘heart of the Empire’ open to attack by an ‘opportunistic European power’, most likely France at this time. By late 1900, voices in the War Office, including Major Gerald Ellison and Lord Roberts, posited the need for a ‘home defence scheme which would remain operative even though every paid professional soldier of the Crown were called away to take part in some distant offensive movement’. In other words, this was a reiteration of the Regular Army’s ‘double duty’ to protect both the outposts of empire and the home islands.\(^{246}\) This was not a view shared by the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief, General Sir William Nicholson, who was much more concerned with protecting India and Egypt from the encroachments of Russia and France respectively.\(^{247}\)

Though discussions in 1900 looked intently at the forms a naval attack may have taken, a force capable of storming a fortified British port was deemed ‘improbable in the face of our existing naval strength and of the defences already provided’; a clear example of the conventional ‘bluewater argument’ propagated by the Royal Navy (prior to fresh debates reassessing this basic premise in 1903-5). This argument, though frequently subjected to scrutiny, maintained a cultural relevance throughout the First World War, and was predicated

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\(^{246}\) Morgan-Owen, Fear of Invasion, 78, 89.

\(^{247}\) Ibid., 74, 78.
upon the assumption that a ‘powerful battlefleet was sufficient to guard against invasion’. The summary of an interdepartmental conference held in Whitehall on 18 December 1900 declared that southern British ports (Sheerness, Portsmouth and Plymouth) were unlikely to suffer at the hands of an invading ‘Maritime Power’, while the ‘ports on the east coast are somewhat more exposed’. Even so, the prevailing view was that existing coastal batteries would provide adequate defence in the event of an attack. Given the degree of exposure attributed to east coast ports, an appended list of ‘defended ports open to attack by seagoing torpedo-boats and destroyers’ included the Tees, Hartlepool and Humber, in addition to a number of Welsh and Scottish ports, Jersey, Guernsey and the Thames. At the time this report was produced, Hartlepool already possessed four coastal batteries around its headland, the earliest completed being Lighthouse Battery in 1860. The Humber had one major facility, Fort Paull, built between 1861 and 1863. A number of other batteries and emplacements were built during the First World War, with many mothballed by the interwar period. Despite official claims to the contrary, even at this time a sense of the east coast’s potential exposure and vulnerability was palpable. Despite Britain and Germany’s mutual dependency based on ties of trade and culture, the ‘image of two hostile nations facing each other across the North Sea dominated public discourse’.

A memorandum in February 1903 assessed the possibility of a war between Britain and Germany, contending that, though not likely, ‘such a war is a possibility which cannot be ignored in our plans for the contingencies of war’. The two powers were, in this view, quite evenly matched: ‘A war between Germany and Great Britain would in some ways resemble a struggle between an elephant and a whale, in which each, although supreme in its own element, would find difficulty in bringing its strength to bear on its antagonist’. The military plan discussed within the memorandum suggested a break from a purely ‘bluewater’ perspective, stating the renewed need for a ‘home defensive army’. However, it must be

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250 Ibid., 4.
251 Joe Foster, The Guns of the North-East: Coastal Defences from the Tyne to the Humber (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2004), 143-67.
253 TNA, CAB 3/2, Committee of Imperial Defence, Home Defence “A” Series, Vol. 1, 97, ‘Memorandum of the Military Policy to be adopted in a War with Germany’.
borne in mind that this statement was published in the context of interdepartmental debates related to army reform, spearheaded by Prime Minister Balfour.\(^{254}\) As Richard Dunley notes, the Admiralty were largely content with the status quo, within which the navy was accorded the prime position in home defence. The War Office, on the other hand, wished to protect the regular army from cuts to its budget and manpower, while reforming the auxiliary forces.\(^{255}\)

The latter had proved especially lacking during the Boer War though, at this point, substantial reform of the auxiliaries would only be necessary if colonial disagreements between Britain, France and Russia led to an impasse;\(^{256}\) therefore,

should Germany throw in its lot against us, while we were engaged in a war with France and Russia, the situation would no doubt become a serious one, and strenuous efforts would be necessary to improve the auxiliary troops which form the main portion of our home-defence army. The possibility of this contingency is, in fact, a very strong proof that an efficient force for home defence is necessary to the safety of the United Kingdom, notwithstanding that we aim at, and hope to attain, sea command.\(^{257}\)

A summary of discussions prepared by the CID in May 1904 outlined its decision to append responsibility for ‘protecting the United Kingdom against invasion’ to the navy, while the army would retain ‘responsibility for the local protection of naval bases and commercial ports, and for maintaining sufficient field forces to deal with such small bodies of the enemy’s troops as might be able to elude the navy and land for raiding purposes’. This was to be a ‘combined scheme for Home Defence’, envisioning a reduced and more efficient voluntary force. The minimum war requirements – ‘measured solely by the contingency of war with France and Russia’ - were stated to be 298,000 auxiliary forces across the country, a reduction of 23,000.\(^{258}\) From this point on, debates continued to rage regarding a reduction in auxiliary forces, with plans for reform led by Secretary of State for War, Hugh Arnold-Forster, during 1904, who took a ‘bluewater’ view of the situation. Arnold-Forster proposed the formation of two armies with differing remits: a Short Service Army, available for service overseas and to expand existing forces in time of war, and a Long Service Army, to meet ‘immediate overseas needs’ (i.e. the defence of imperial possessions). In the case of both formations, permanent field home defence was not countenanced. By July 1904, signs of

\(^{254}\) Dunley, ‘Invasion’, 618.

\(^{255}\) Ibid.

\(^{256}\) Kennedy, *Anglo-German Antagonism*, 266.

\(^{257}\) TNA, CAB 3/2, Committee of Imperial Defence, Home Defence “A” Series, Vol. 1, 97, ‘Memorandum of the Military Policy to be adopted in a War with Germany’, 23 February 1904.

open opposition to these reforms emerged both in parliament and amongst the Militia and Volunteer Force themselves.\(^{259}\) Indeed, for many, such voluntary schemes were synonymous with a passionate and ‘spontaneous [form] of patriotism’, making it a ‘unique force… one which contributed largely to the greatness and security of these realms’.\(^{260}\)

Similar debates as to the efficacy of home defence forces held sway during 1914-18, primarily in response to the increased incidence of naval and aerial bombardments. This was particularly so with regards local defence groups of varying kinds, including longstanding rifle clubs which, in many cases, formed a considerable contingent of the voluntary home defence forces.\(^{261}\) It must be noted, however, that the responsibility for home defence continued to be affixed to the Royal Navy, more specifically a combination of a fleet in home waters (the English Channel and North Sea) and a ‘margin able to break up and destroy the invading flotilla’.\(^{262}\) With the formation of the Territorial Force in March 1908, and the liquidation of the old Militia, the possibility of service overseas was established from the outset, undermining the traditional focus on home defence alone.\(^{263}\) However, this wish – commonly associated with Lord Haldane’s army reforms – was not realised before August 1914. Despite frequent demands from pressure groups such as the National Service League for compulsory military service – who claimed that the TF was unable to muster enough men on a voluntary basis – the addition of a ‘foreign service obligation’ was encouraged only as a voluntary commitment beyond the standard home defence duties.\(^{264}\) In 1913, less than ten percent of the force’s total strength had signed up to second-line overseas service (1,152 officers and 18,903 rank-and-file out of a possible 251,000). It was only with the introduction of Kitchener’s ‘New Armies’ in August 1914 that a considerable number of Territorial units volunteered to be a second line to the regular army overseas. Though Kitchener himself was opposed to the concept of voluntary soldiering either at home or abroad, the Territorials were nonetheless integrated into the wartime force, forming second and third line units by November 1914.\(^{265}\) The Territorial units which remained on home soil became central, in some defended ports, to home defence planning.

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\(^{259}\) Cunningham, *Volunteer Force*, 132-135.

\(^{260}\) Winston Churchill, quoted in Cunningham, 136.


\(^{263}\) Longmate, 398.

\(^{264}\) Dennis, *Territorial Army*, 29.

\(^{265}\) Ibid., 31.
With regards the case studies in focus in this thesis, papers prepared by the Admiralty and War Office in 1912 and 1913 are of particular interest. Meetings in September 1912 between the Admiralty and War Office, through the auspices of the CID subcommittee on the defence of Cromarty, Scapa Flow and the Humber, had failed to fully discuss improved defences at the Humber.\textsuperscript{266} In fact, the growing economic and naval strategic importance of Hull had been recognised by the Home Ports Defence Committee in April 1912, envisioning a wartime role of ‘anchorage for colliers and other fleet auxiliaries’, therefore leading to calls for better defences.\textsuperscript{267} By late October 1912, a recommendation fielded by the subcommittee suggested the construction of two batteries, each containing two 6” Mark VII guns earlier discarded by the navy, for the defence of the Humber.\textsuperscript{268} These would be placed on the south and north shores of the river, close to Stallingborough (near Immingham) and Sunk Island (near Hull) respectively in emplacements built into the sea wall.\textsuperscript{269} Correspondence between Naval Secretary Maurice Hankey and Permanent Secretary to the Treasury Sir Robert Chalmers just days later revealed that the navy was distinctly lacking in suitable guns for use in coastal defence, at least in the case of the Humber.\textsuperscript{270} Such inconsistencies in the work of the CID had long hampered its work by this point, owing to widespread indifference and outright hostility among senior government figures, who resented the Committee’s apparent usurping of the Cabinet’s decision-making function on such matters. Naval and military leaders similarly resented an umbrella organisation straddling both the often competing services.\textsuperscript{271} Relations were tried even further by the CID’s apparent inability to meet frequently, eliciting frustration among certain of its number.\textsuperscript{272} The report of the CID standing subcommittee on north-east coast defences in November 1912 reiterated the proposal for two 6” ex-naval guns, though the problems in attaining suitable weaponry were omitted. Importantly, the report outlined a consideration by the committee for ‘economies which might be possible to effect in coast defences elsewhere in order to compensate for expenditure incurred in connection with the defence of Cromarty, Scapa Flow, and the

\textsuperscript{266} TNA, CAB 17/31, ‘Coast Defences’ (1912), M.P.A. Hankey to Lord Haldane, 18 September 1912.

\textsuperscript{267} TNA, CAB 3/2, Home Ports Defence Committee memorandum, ‘The Humber’, April 1912.

\textsuperscript{268} TNA, CAB 17/31, ‘Coast Defences’ (1912), M.P.A. Hankey to General Henderson, 29 October 1912.

\textsuperscript{269} TNA, CAB 17/31, ‘Coast Defences’ (1912), ‘Report and Proceedings of the Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the North-East Coast Defences’, 29 November 1912, 48.

\textsuperscript{270} TNA, CAB 17/31, ‘Coast Defences’ (1912), M.P.A. Hankey to Sir Robert Chalmers, 31 October 1912; Hankey was also Secretary of the Committee for Imperial Defence (CID), 1912.38. See Graham, 10, fn. 40.


\textsuperscript{272} TNA, CAB 17/31, ‘Coast Defences’ (1912), Hankey to Churchill, 20 November 1912.
Humber’.273 This was in line with Treasury demands for a decline in government spending generally.274 Despite this, among many policy-makers, the industrial importance of Hull as an imperial port – owing to rapid developments in docking facilities in the years preceding the outbreak of war – motivated calls for improved defences in the Humber.275

Admiralty papers from 1913 outlined the practicalities of defending the east coast, with mobilisation plans focused upon three periods: ‘peacetime’, ‘precautionary’ and ‘war stage’, developing further a structure introduced in earlier CID discussions.276 Peacetime plans for the strengthening of home defence forces envisaged a supplementation of regular troops (namely the Royal Garrison Artillery, with men stationed at the Humber, Tees and Hartlepool) by Territorial forces.277 A move to the precautionary period would involve the mobilisation of defended ports, though not on an equal footing. This was due to the probability of attack, with the Forth, Tyne and Harwich deemed the most likely to be raided during this period. In contrast, Tees and Hartlepool (construed as a single entity), and the Humber, would not see guns manned during this period, and peacetime levels of personnel would remain. However, these levels could be subject to change, in the event that the ‘garrison of the Forth and Tyne happened to be much below establishment’. By the time of the ‘war stage’, the coastline ‘from Lunan Bay Forfarshire southward down the East Coast as far as the Thames’ would be watched by a 3,700-strong mobilisation of Territorial Cyclists.278

The relative importance of the different ports to Admiralty planners was suggested by plans for troop numbers to be stationed at the defended ports. While the Tyne would see the mobilisation of 1,038 regular troops and 61 cyclists, the Humber would see only 92 regulars and 52 Territorial soldiers. Tees and Hartlepool were admitted to be in the weakest position, receiving no regulars and so defended solely by 45 Territorial men and two officers. This small force was ‘intended only to guard the batteries and light emplacements against the action of ill-disposed persons or small armed parties landed from hostile vessels’.279 This

273 TNA, CAB 17/31, ‘Coast Defences’ (1912), ‘Report and Proceedings of the Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the North-East Coast Defences’, 29 November 1912, 8-10.
275 TNA, CAB 17/31, ‘Coast Defences’ (1912), ‘Report and Proceedings of the Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the North-East Coast Defences’, 29 November 1912, 18, 32.
277 TNA, ADM 116/3107, ‘East Coast Defences, 1913’, 5 August 1913.
278 Ibid.
279 Ibid.
latter detail is especially interesting, given that Hartlepool was the first successfully raided coastal town in England, with some of the heaviest casualties received amongst civilians at any point in the war. On the other hand, it is interesting to note the focal role given to Territorial troops, in both defending the ‘Land Front’ if a landing party should approach the coast, and in replacing regular soldiers who would be needed overseas. It is also unsurprising, given the attitude of the CID in September 1914 with regards the mustering of local authorities in the event of enemy actions on the coast. Local authorities and the police ‘[had] no instructions as to how they would act in case of a raid or invasion’, though a memorandum published on 14 September 1914 pressed for the drawing up of instructions, related mainly to the removal of impediments to the armed forces in building entrenchments, the ‘felling of trees for the provision of obstacles, destroying bridges, &c.’ 280 A subcommittee of the CID was convened in October 1914 to oversee the production of such instructions, with plans to communicate them to the public through the press. The substance of the proposed instructions related to both the threat of a hostile landing and the conditions envisaged should a landing actually take place, and laid down the means for local administration though local emergency committees. This became the prevalent system of instruction and dissemination to the public throughout the war, though, as we will see in relation to the north-east coastal region, who was fundamentally in charge of the scheme was not always clear-cut. In any case, the proposals in October 1914 saw all local authorities as subordinate to military authorities. 281

The figures related to the defence of the land front portray a slightly different picture, with both the Tees and Humber given parity in terms of working companies of the Royal Engineers (around 100 each), while the Humber would see the mobilisation of more than double the manpower of the Special Reserve Infantry, part of the pre-existing voluntary brigades. 282 This is not to say necessarily that the Tees were overlooked in favour of the Humber as an industrially and military vital port. It more likely reflects both the size of the ports and prevalent attitudes to the rising imperial importance of Hull and Immingham, as well as the accessibility of the Humber mouth from the North Sea relative to that of the Tees. Indeed, a December 1913 meeting at the War Office agreed that ‘[t]he value of the port and its contents to ourselves’ and ‘its value to an enemy’ would be the deciding criteria when

282 3,504 men and 87 officers at the Humber, compared to 1,168 men and 29 officers at the Tees. See Ibid.
surveying defended British ports. The value and national importance of both the Humber and Tees were discussed in this meeting, with clearly contrasting perspectives coming to the fore. In its concluding view, the Humber ‘[w]ould be in war our great southern fuelling base and Fleet anchorage. It contains very important oil reserves, docks, and Cleethorpes wireless station’, so approving the addition of new guns and batteries. Four new 9.2” guns were to be added to the existing 6” armaments, working in conjunction with submarines based off the coast.

The Humber featured prominently in the 1913 Naval Manoeuvres, which were seen by Prime Minister Asquith as ‘serious experiments in landing a raiding force’, capable of enriching the CID’s investigations into the probability of enemy invasion, particularly possible disembarkation times. In the case of the Tees and Hartlepool, ‘[e]xisting armament suffices, and instant readiness is not required. Present arrangements can hold good in this latter respect’. Despite this view, Hartlepool was provided with new batteries in 1915 (Mobile Battery, Old Pier Battery) and 1917 (Palliser Battery), while longstanding facilities, namely Heugh Battery, were modified at various points between 1913 and 1918.

During the war itself, correspondence between the commander of the Home Forces and the War Office reveals the importance placed on the geographically-defined areas of responsibility within the remit of home defence. Though all defended ports were potentially vulnerable to attack from the North Sea, the east coast (within Eastern Command, covering the Wash to the South Foreland) was deemed especially so, ‘by reason of the fact that a landing of 160,000 men is considered possible, and because London is an objective whose possession might have decisive effect’. Conversely, Northern Command (Berwick-on-Tweed to the Wash) was considered ‘reasonably secure’, with the legitimate military targets being the ‘munition areas in Yorkshire and the North Midland Counties’. These were considered relatively safe, as they were inland. Nevertheless, temporary batteries were added to the coastline surrounding the Humber estuary, mobile guns were provided for the Tees and Hartlepool, and trenches and barbed wire entanglements were constructed in

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283 TNA, ADM 116/3107, ‘Proceedings of a conference held at the War Office in the room of the Secretary of State for War at 10 a.m. 10th December 1913’. Present were the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War, the First Sea Lord, the Master General of the Ordnance, the Chief of Staff, the Director of Military Operations and the Assistant Director of Operations.
284 Ibid.
285 Morgan-Owen, 217.
286 TNA, ADM 116/3107.
287 Foster, 149.
288 TNA, WO 32/5273, Field Marshall French to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 13 February 1916, 3.
289 Ibid.
Scarborough. Though mobilisation figures put forward in February 1916 by Field Marshall French, Commander-in-Chief of Home Forces, displayed concern with finding ‘economies’, the total number of troops to be stationed at home rose from a total of 32,042 men at the ‘war stage’ in 1913 plans to 227,000 mobile troops.²⁹⁰ In these new recommendations, Northern Command alone would possess 24,000 mobile troops, while Eastern Command would have 199,000.²⁹¹ This was a considerable reassessment, given the 1913 expectation that from ‘Lunan Bay Forfarshire southward down the East Coast as far as the Thames’ only a 3,700-strong mobilisation of Territorial Cyclists would be required.²⁹² In all, given a renewed effort to build up coastal artillery defences and armaments, as well as improve anti-aircraft defences (not a consideration in 1913), the total strength of forces to muster for home defence was declared to be as follows (Tables 4.1 and 4.2):²⁹³

### Table 4.1 Planned home defence mobile troop numbers, February 1916.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Formations</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mounted troops</td>
<td>4 Divisions</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Brigades (or 5)</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>9 Divisions</td>
<td>153,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional Brigades</td>
<td>10 Brigades</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyclists</td>
<td>23 Battalions</td>
<td>11,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>227,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TNA, WO 32/5273, Field Marshall French to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 13 February 1916, 12.

### Table 4.2 Planned home defence fixed installations, February 1916.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Installation</th>
<th>Formations</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lines of Communication and Vulnerable Points</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>39,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-aircraft Defence</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>17,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garrisons</td>
<td>127 Battalions (at a fighting strength of 1,000 all ranks)</td>
<td>127,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Garrison Companies (varying establishments)</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>146,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL (mobile and fixed)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>429,500</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TNA, WO 32/5273, Field Marshall French to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 13 February 1916, 12.

²⁹⁰ The 1913 plans covered as far south as Harwich, but did not stretch to London and the South Foreland. See ADM 116/3107, ‘East Coast Defences, 1913’, 5 August 1913; Marder, 409.
²⁹¹ TNA, WO 32/5273, Field Marshall French to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 13 February 1916, 6.
²⁹² TNA, ADM 116/3107, ‘East Coast Defences, 1913’, 5 August 1913.
²⁹³ ‘Strength’ in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 refers to the numerical strength of the potential force raised in terms of men.
These approved recommendations, which followed a joint services conference in January 1916, assumed that the Navy could not effectively interpose in ‘landing operations in less than 24 hours after the sighting of the enemy’s transports from British shores’. However, as Marder suggests, given that there was little expectation of invasion at the Admiralty during this time, a ‘feeling of insecurity on the part of the generals’ was responsible for retaining at home such high numbers of Territorial and regular troops, who could have otherwise been posted abroad. Following the Battle of Jutland in May/June 1916, ‘any German invasion… was viewed as a very remote contingency indeed’, particularly by the Admiralty, whose ongoing strategy was not to protect Britain against an invading party, but to destroy the enemy’s naval forces in advance of any such attempt.

By October 1918, in the view of the Army Council, the possibility of an enemy landing was most likely ‘further to the north of the Wash, or to the west of the Straits of Dover’, adding the caveat that the ‘enemy force landed would almost certainly be destroyed’ and so the likelihood of invasion and damage was low. In the same period, correspondence between the Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the War Office, B.B. Cubitt, to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of British Forces included a table in which the defended ports were ranked according to ‘relative importance’. The Tees and Hartlepool and the Humber were both considered to be of ‘highest importance’, along with the Forth, Tyne, Sunderland and Blyth, Harwich, Thames and Medway, and Dover. This suggests that, though devised in the context of reduced government expenditure and a general opinion as to the relative safety of the Northern Command ports, wartime home defence planning did not completely rule out maintaining levels of defence in the north-east. Indeed, Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, reflected the still active interdepartmental debates related to the funding of the armed services when writing to the War Cabinet in October 1918:

I should like to make clear to the War Cabinet what will be the effect of the proposed reductions on Home Defence. We must keep at our Defended Ports on the East Coast sufficient troops to defeat any raid which may be anticipated; otherwise we should be running the risk of allowing the enemy to destroy the valuable naval and industrial works at these ports.

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294 Marder, 409.
295 Ibid., 410.
296 Ibid., 412; Millman, ‘British Home Defence’, 212.
297 TNA, WO 32/5274, B.B. Cubitt to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Forces in Great Britain, 21 October 1918.
298 Ibid.; Graham, 21.
299 TNA, WO 32/5274, Henry Wilson to General Staff, 2 October 1918.
Reductions in the home forces would, in this view, mean fewer men stationed in coastal areas, entailing a rush of defensive troops from ‘inland centres’ should a landing take place: ‘They, therefore, will not be able to prevent the enemy from landing, although they will eventually crush him’.  

This was an interesting position for Wilson to take, given his earlier criticisms of the Territorial forces. Other correspondence, between General Headquarters and the War Office, suggested disagreement between the services was still present even at this late stage, given the onus still placed on the Admiralty to ‘take any further measures they can so as to be in a better position to interrupt and prevent attempted raids and other hostile landings’. Furthermore, the ranking of ports in terms of importance to the national war effort at this time can be contrasted with plans made in October 1914, when the Admiral of Patrols dealt with the Tees and Hartlepool after all others, including the Humber, when conferring with military and civil authorities with regards anti-invasion measures.

This picture is complicated by the perspective on home defence developed by Brock Millman, who situates the decision to retain large numbers of troops for home defence during 1917-18 within the context of growing fears of civil disturbance and industrial unrest. Given the perspectives and numbers detailed above, the question remains as to why home defence forces remained in such numbers, given the apparent unlikelihood of invasion by this point. As Millman notes, the only home defence scheme in existence up to April 1918, known as Emergency Scheme K, continued to identify throughout this period the threat, however slight, of foreign invasion. Schemes devised after this date similarly stated this threat as the overriding impetus for home defence planning, though, in Millman’s view, the prospect of home grown revolutionary dissent may have been the deciding factor in maintaining personnel levels at home, in the context of increasingly politicised war-weariness. Though fears regarding the rise of dissenting voices may have concerned members of the government, in popular culture the spectre of the bomber and raider occupied a prominent position throughout the war. Indeed, it may be argued that this is what motivated local elites and politicians in pushing for clarifications of central government and military orders and memoranda at varying points.
Planning for bombardment: precautionary measures, ‘buzzers’ and lighting restrictions

There was much debate among central government policy-makers during the conflict as to how best prepare civilian populations in the event of bombardments and air raids, often with emphasis on coastal areas. Before discussions began in earnest among officials at all levels regarding early warning systems, anti-aircraft (AA) guns had been the only fixed defence, and even then were only concerned with protecting military and maritime infrastructure and not civilian spaces.\(^{306}\) Local and regional authorities also joined this debate, fielding frequent questions and calls for clarity to ministers and commanders via correspondence. This was most patently the case with lighting restrictions, with an array of detailed dossiers assembled during the span of the war.\(^{307}\) In addition, the difficulties entailed in the provision of early warning systems in advance of air raids – known colloquially as ‘buzzers’ – was discussed at all levels. Local authorities devised, tested and delivered systems suited to their locale, often in concert with towns and cities of a similar coastal or port character.\(^{308}\) This included designing and testing hooters with sounds markedly different to other harbour sounds, as was the concern of Scarborough officials in February 1915.\(^{309}\) Interestingly, there was little guidance from the centre with regards early warning systems, while lighting restrictions were present from the earliest incarnation of the DRR. The reason for this may lie in the overarching structures of governance during the war, as responsibility for delivering precautions was with either the ACMA or the police (or both in concert). Therefore, to some extent, some measures were left to the discretion of the nominated local and regional authorities, a common feature of central-local government relations during this period.\(^{310}\) A 1915 Home Office circular to chief constables highlighted these relations clearly:

> If arrangements are made for warning the civil population of threatened bombardment… the responsibility for giving the warning sound should be in the hands of the Chief Constable (or other superior Police officer) or of the Military Authority […].\(^{311}\)

Furthermore, geography was of prime importance while warning systems were to be devised according to conditions ‘on the ground’:

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307 See TNA, HO 45/10751/266118.
308 The specific measures devised in the north-east coastal region are explored in the chapter that follows.
309 SL, UBC, Harry W. Smith to F.W. Spurr, 10 February 1915.
311 TNA, HO 45/10753/266118, ‘Restriction of lights on approach of hostile aircraft’ file, Home Office to chief constables, 10 May 1915.
The Chief Constables principally concerned in the matter are, of course, those whose areas are on or near the East and South East Coasts or in the Midlands: the possibility of attack by hostile aircraft in the West is considered extremely remote […].

If warning of bombardment is to be given by means of sound signals (Syrens [sic], hooters etc.), care should be taken that the signal chosen for this purpose is distinct from any signal in use in the neighbourhood for giving an alarm of fire or for any other purpose, and full particulars of the signal chosen should be advertised beforehand, so as to avoid any danger of one signal being mistaken for the other. The public should also be warned that, if they hear the signal warning them of threatened bombardment, they should not flock into the streets, but should take the best shelter available, and should carefully avoid showing any lights. 312

While these guidelines refer to the provision of air raid sirens, it should be noted that the towns most affected by bombardment in December 1914 were already testing ‘buzzers’ four months’ prior to the Home Office memorandum, in January 1915. 313 Later in the war, Home Office guidelines referred explicitly to advance-warning signals under the heading ‘Taking Cover’. ‘Public warning[s]’ were understandably imagined to alert civilians that an attack was imminent and cover should be sought. Interestingly, the sound of anti-aircraft guns and the explosion of bombs were also seen to act equally as an effective alarm, orders which were repeated in regional public information literature. 314

Localities across Britain utilised an array of precautions and provisions against bombardment, but this is not to say that central government or military authorities laid down an unequivocal framework for appropriate civilian conduct in advance of, and during, raids. Indeed, while DRR became more detailed and thoroughgoing as the conflict wore on, they did not prescribe bombardment precautions or early-warning systems. DRR explicitly related to public safety during bombing raids usually focused on the effects of public and private lighting on a locale’s visibility from the air, without any specific guidelines as to appropriate alarms. This is most likely due to the widespread belief that early warning of an impending attack would cause panic or encourage civilians to disobey precautionary guidelines. In many cases, people would leave their homes to ‘trek’ to less built-up areas, or the alarm would be ‘false’, therefore engendering anxiety and frustration in the hours following the abortive alarm. 315 As outlined above, these concerns became manifest in government circulars to

312 Ibid.
313 SL, UBC, George Clark & Sons to Harry W. Smith, 18 January 1915.
regional and local police authorities, most likely in response to publicised reports related to civilians leaving their homes during raids or alarm periods.

While DRR provided official regulations related to the control of civilians during periods of enemy activity, in the weeks following the unprecedented attack upon the north-east coast in December 1914, local authorities devised measures uniquely suited to local conditions. This included geographical position, such as proximity to the sea, and the economic character of the locale. Where official public information was disseminated related to bombardment precautions – commonly in the form of posters, pamphlets and newspaper notices – it most often advised civilians to remain indoors during raids and provided guidelines for the conduct of special constables and other public order agents. It was also related overwhelmingly to lighting regulations, with relatively little information pertaining to sirens or hooters. Crucially, though much of this information was devised according to orders from the War Office and Admiralty, in many cases the ACMA was able to tailor anti-bombardment and air raid guidelines to local conditions.\(^{316}\)

During the first months of the conflict, discussions among Admiralty personnel focussed expressly on public lighting in coastal towns, including separate memoranda related to the showing of lights seaward (as a number of DORA prosecutions would later reflect). A general order circulated by the Admiralty on 30 October 1914 specified that:

> Municipal Authorities at towns on the East and South Coasts of England, as far West as Weymouth (inclusive), and on the North and East Coasts of Scotland, have been requested by the Home Office and Scottish Office to reduce to the greatest possible extent the number and intensity of lights on shore which are visible for seaward or which would cause a glare in the sky visible from seaward.\(^{317}\)

The finer details included orders to dispense with ‘sky signs and brilliantly illuminated shop fronts’; the extinguishing of the majority of street lamps, including a 10 p.m. curfew expressly for seaward-facing lights; the use of blinds and painting upon windows to obscure any lights ‘in windows facing the sea’.\(^{318}\) Those towns observed by the ACMA to have not effectively carried out these orders were to be reported. Areas of ‘special attention’ were also defined: ‘Brighton, Hove, Worthing, Eastbourne, Hull, and Grimsby’.\(^{319}\)

In addition to already-existing coastal artillery facilities, lighting restrictions were the main precaution utilised by authorities on the north-east coast, in the absence of centrally-


\(^{317}\) TNA, HO 45/10751/266118, Admiralty to Home Office, 1 December 1914.

\(^{318}\) Ibid.

\(^{319}\) Ibid.
controlled plans for public shelters. Elsewhere in Britain, including London, other precautions - most notably public shelters - were devised, but this was on an ad hoc basis and was not necessarily provided by the state. Beyond the scope of public information posters, pamphlets and declarations, public bodies and civilians themselves often improvised measures to suit their specific circumstances. In some cases, central government plans and advice were adapted with the specificities of the locale in mind, often in response to feedback from local civil and military authorities. This practice is evidenced by a wealth of correspondence collected in Home Office and Admiralty dossiers related to the general delivery of lighting regulations, in addition to specific locales.

Local authorities and police forces, at first, offered guidelines on the extinguishing of lights, detailing the importance of such a measure given the likelihood of attack at night. This rule was more strictly enforced as the war continued, with many arrests made for breaching it. The curtailing of urban illumination provided a jarring effect for modern urban populations accustomed to street lighting. This was mainly due to the concomitant social and cultural consequences of street illumination, particularly in urban areas. A newfound preponderance of dark streets could have ambivalent effects. The introduction of schemes of street lighting was associated, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with technological innovation. Enlightenment ideas of progress played their part in these tropes, sticking as they did to a dark/light binary, associated with the transition from barbarism to civilisation. Darkened streets bred crime, vice and uncertainty: lighting was required in order to inculcate a self-regulatory culture, overseen by government inspectors.

Improvements in lighting technology could provide deterrents to nocturnal criminals while extending metaphors of increased freedom contained within narratives of modernity. Pedestrians and motorists were able to perceive more of the urban environment and explore the city free from the day/night binary, though the complete lighting of cities was never realised. This technology could contribute to the continued ‘conquest of nature’ and

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325 Otter, *Victorian Eye*, 221.
mastery of external environment associated with the ‘modern age’.\textsuperscript{326} Such ideas conformed to popular liberal notions of English ‘national character’, embodied in the terms ‘egalitarian, self-governing, enterprising and adaptable’. In the context of turn-of-the-century imperial and economic developments, the latter two were particularly crucial in making sense of modernising processes, including industrialisation and urbanisation.\textsuperscript{327} The promotion of free enterprise, and the locale as a site for prime investment opportunities, was also part-and-parcel of this discourse, evidenced by place-promotional advertisements that appeared alongside royal portraits and ‘boosterist’ articles on the eve of war.\textsuperscript{328}

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the development of government and military/naval policy regarding bombardment precautions and coastal defence from the turn of the twentieth century to the latter years of the First World War. While setting out to present a broad picture of efforts emanating from ‘the centre’ during this period, it has also situated the north-east coast within the discourses and policies of national strategic and home defence planning. What is clear is the stark contrast between pre-war anticipation of war and invasion, and the degree to which central authorities dealt with the very real threat of naval and aerial bombardment. Clearly, the preventive qualities imbued by lighting restrictions won out in wartime precautionary planning, while in the immediately pre-war period, debates surrounding the question of home defence and the balance of forces either towards the navy or army framed efforts aimed at facing enemy forces from across the North Sea. In the event of actual bombardment, both sea- and airborne, local and regional civil and military authorities were able to improvise responses in the wake of attacks, though the framework of the Defence of the Realm Act and its incumbent regulations remained a powerful guiding force.

Evidence from War Office and Admiralty records provides a rich perspective on the development of anti-invasion and anti-bombardment planning from the turn of the twentieth century. Though the status of the Humber region, the Tees and Hartlepool shifted during the period 1912-18 – waxing and waning in line with debates about the possibility of an enemy attack on the British coast – even in October 1918 they were of the ‘highest importance’ to central government and military planners. This meant they ranked alongside vital maritime

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{326} Rieger, “Modern Wonders”, 167.
\item \textsuperscript{327} Daunton, ‘Consciousness’, 119.
\item \textsuperscript{328} ‘Come to Hull’, \textit{Hull Daily Mail}, 26 June 1914, 3.
\end{itemize}
industrial zones in London, the south-east of England and Scotland, including the Forth, Thames and Medway, and Dover. Officially ‘unfortified’, the seaside towns of Scarborough and Whitby did not feature in government plans. However, this did not prevent local authority officials in Hull and Scarborough from working together to develop early warning buzzers and sirens.

Measures which carried a strong cultural resonance – most notably, early-warning systems or ‘buzzers’ – among civilians received scant attention from government officials. However, rather than an area of deliberate neglect, the semi-devolved structures governing wartime civil populations left room for regional and local authorities to devise measures specific to the locality. While this chapter has alluded to this important point, the following chapter will explore the efforts of north-east coast officials and policy-makers in greater detail, in order to understand the effects (positive and negative) of central plans and orders upon the stricken region.

329 TNA, WO 32/5274, B.B. Cubitt to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Forces in Great Britain, 21 October 1918.
CHAPTER 5: Local interpretation and implementation of central government policy on home and civil defence

Introduction
As the previous chapter explored, the First World War entailed a significant expansion of the central state and its encroachment into the everyday life of citizens. In the ‘state of exception’ brought about by war, the need to enforce rules related to home defence and public safety saw long held beliefs in the sanctity of personal liberty undermined.¹ However, the war also facilitated the cooperation of the various levels of the government, military and navy, in the guise of the Authorised Competent Military Authority (ACMA). As we have already seen in outline, this was a dynamic organisation capable of dealing with the rapidly changing conditions enacted by war, mobilising both technology and manpower in defence of the realm.

Taken at face value, the formation of the ACMA implied a combination of legitimate military and state forces capable of dealing with the complexities of wartime governance. The intersection of national, regional and local government with military and admiralty bodies lends credence to this image. However, the introduction of DORA and the DRR, and its enforcement by the agents of ACMA and the Secretary of State, presents a decisive break with the ‘liberal state imaginary’ of the late nineteenth century, wherein trust in the state was assumed because its machinations were defined as essentially distant from wider society itself. This was a conception of ‘liberal governance as rule through freedom’, predicated on the basis of a ‘strong state’ but dependent upon ‘highly dispersed agency’.² Concurrently, through the material practices and information technologies of state institutions such as the Post Office, the presence of the state was reiterated, but this was a presence ‘restrained and conditional, dependable and firm… [s]omething that was present but not overwhelming, illiberal, and arbitrary’.³ Indeed, while DORA stated that its rules would not impinge upon the ‘ordinary avocations of life and the enjoyment of property’, the operation and administration of the ACMA lent the DRR a material dimension.⁴ Therefore, DORA inhabited the actions of the various agents involved in wartime governance, including within

this its techniques of internal and external communication, the uniforms of police constables and soldiers, and the visible, at times intimate, involvement of the police in the private realm, blurring formerly sacrosanct boundaries between public and private.\(^5\) Through the ACMA, land was requisitioned by order for military use, and defensive installations transformed the function and appearance of coastal-urban spaces.

As a number of historians have noted, the effects of total war upon society expanded the role of the state in the everyday lives of citizens, both during the following the conflict.\(^6\) This trend was furthered in the interwar period and cemented during the Second World War.\(^7\) While the ACMA signalled the supposed effectiveness and aloofness of the state, it also entailed the militarisation of facets of everyday life, no less the urban thoroughfare and seaside promenade, evidenced by defensive installations in Hull and Scarborough in particular. In addition to the introduction of mobile anti-aircraft guns, searchlights, defensive trenches and barbed wire roadblocks, already existing coastal batteries and gun emplacements were improved and new ones were built; though many were not complete even at the close of hostilities.\(^8\)

The First World War’s fledgling civil defence measures entailed encroachments upon the private space of the home, but this was built upon the precedent of late nineteenth-century social welfare, urban planning and household sewerage systems.\(^9\) Such policies had gradually granted state agents access to the home, meaning that the actions of the police and local authorities to ensure public safety in the name of defence were not entirely sensational, though not necessarily engrained enough to avoid both latent and open criticism. In addition, civilians were accorded responsibility for civil defence, with very little infrastructural development at the state level.\(^10\) During the First World War, this entailed the following of public information instructions for proper conduct in advance of and during bombardments,


\(^8\) Foster, *Guns of the North-East*, 143-67.


while DORA was designed to encourage the self-regulation of behaviour through punitive sentencing and heavy fines, tried in civil courts. Local authorities, under the tutelage of city engineers and planners, often worked in tandem to produce early warning systems, experimenting with technologies and sharing best practice with colleagues across the region. While civilian spaces were militarised, the threat of bombardment ‘domesticated’ warfare. Bombs not only fell upon homes and their residents, they ushered in a greater level of state control of everyday civilian spaces, activities and rhythms. Furthermore, while responsibility for maintaining vigilance and personal safety during bombardment was situated with the individual, local, regional and state authorities sought to organise and mobilise civilians through both ideological and material means.

While the Defence of the Realm Regulations (DRR), among other functions, codified rules and restrictions designed to guard against naval and aerial raids, the responsibility for enforcement was spread across the ACMA, taking advantage of the specialisms of the forces involved. When necessary, certain agencies came to the fore, while the Home Office reserved ultimate power particularly in relation to matters of home defence and control of the civilian population. This chapter analyses the interpretation and implementation of central government policy by the various agencies empowered by the state to safeguard public safety and enable the successful continuation of hostilities, including within its remit the interactions of civilians with local authorities, police forces and the military.

As a number of scholars, most notably André Keil, have stated, there was a lack of historical precedence in 1914 for such a regressive suite of regulations, which effectively meant the suspension of established constitutional arrangements, such as the separation of the legislature and judiciary and the sovereignty of parliament, in favour of a strong executive. As Townshend notes, wartime case law reveals ‘judicial abnegation regarding the protection of civil liberty’. Given that naval and aerial bombardment affected the built environment as well as the community’s human stock, in contrast, a more ‘protective attitude’ was taken towards private property rights. It should also be borne in mind that the exceptional nature of the war context was taken by most policy-makers and commentators to allow for a cessation of normal government, even at a local level. This facilitated the introduction of a

12 Keil, ‘States of Exception’, 123.
‘de facto constitutional dictatorship’ whereby government could rule by decree without recourse to parliamentary scrutiny.\footnote{Keil, 123; David Dyzenhaus, \textit{The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 17; Stuart Halifax, ‘“Over by Christmas”: British Popular Opinion and the Short War in 1914’, \textit{First World War Studies}, 1 (2) (2010), 103-121.} The sheer extent of fines and custodial sentences meted out by civil courts for infringements of lighting restrictions alone suggests the seriousness with which matter of public safety was taken by local governments, though the exceptional circumstances were, in some ways, made to fit the pre-existing structures of civil jurisprudence. In Hartlepool and Scarborough, in particular, everyday contact with the voluntary agents of a specifically wartime law and order was of a markedly more banal character, though it was nonetheless an affront to many private citizens.

While all early home and civil defence measures were developed in response to DORA regulations, this broadly took the form of four strands. The first was the installation of physical coastal defence and the staffing of these facilities by armed men, primarily developed and maintained by the armed forces within the ACMA. These activities followed the work carried out by pre-war military and naval planners, with adaptations in wartime responsive to changing conditions. Secondly, lighting regulations formed the bedrock upon which other forms of early warning system were developed; namely, the ‘buzzers’ and hooters utilised to mobilise civilians in advance of air raids. Thirdly, civilians were warned of the possible dangers of enemy attack on their homes and businesses via published literature, posters and press statements, often with a view to influencing the everyday behaviour of those on the home front. Lastly, the forces necessary for the implementation of policy and the enforcement of rules and regulations, including the Territorial Forces, special constables, local government officials and, in the case of Hull, self-organised civilians with different (though complementary) aims.

**Home defence on the north-east coast: trenches, guns and barbed wire**

While military nor civilian authorities had been prepared for the coastal bombardment of 16 December 1914, the ensuing months saw the intensification of defensive efforts on the north-east coast of England. The industrial ports of Hartlepool and Hull witnessed a marked military presence, while Scarborough was transformed from a demure seaside resort into a militarised defensive position, replete with trenches dug into the beach and barbed wire roadblocks to prevent the forward march of an invading force. While a second naval attack did not occur to challenge these quickly devised physical defences, the threat of attack from...
the air gained traction in national and local popular culture. Following guidelines circulated by central government, the danger posed by Zeppelin raids from the early months of 1915 foregrounded the lighting restrictions central to the DRR. Prior to this, as a Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) memorandum of September 1914 put it, ‘local authorities, such as county councils, district councils, parish councils, municipalities, police, &c., have no instructions as to how they would act in case of a raid or invasion’. The relationship between the different levels of government and the military authorities was outlined as mutually constitutive. The production of regulations related to the safety of the local communities would be carried out collaboratively:

Instructions should contain the text of proclamations to be issued for the guidance of the civil populations in the event of the occupation of their district by the enemy. They might contain directions for the compilation of panels of men suitable as guides for our troops, and instructions for the destruction of any large quantities of food, forage, petrol, &c., on receipt of instructions. Valuable aid might be rendered by the employés [sic] of the public bodies in the way of felling trees for the provision of obstacles, destroying bridges, &c. Lists of men, and of those who possess implements, might also be prepared for the purpose of supplying labour for entrenching positions under military direction when called on. The regulations would have to be carefully concerted between the War Office and the Local Government Board, and should be issued confidentially […].

The defended ports of the Tees, Hartlepool and Humber all possessed longstanding permanent coastal batteries at the beginning of the war, with more facilities built during the conflict as a deterrent to further seaborne bombardment. At the mouth of the Humber estuary, the already extant Fort Paull (built 1861-3), down river from Hull to the south-east of the city itself, became largely superfluous as a defensive battery in the early months of the war. This was due to the building of two new facilities in 1915, Sunk Island Battery and Stallingborough Battery, the former at the Hull side and the latter situated approximately opposite on the Lincolnshire side of the Humber estuary. In addition, the Home Forts Defence Committee planned two sea-forts: Bull Sand Fort and Haile Sand Fort. Again, each was parallel with either the Hull or Lincolnshire coastline, with construction beginning in 1915. However, these facilities were not completed until 1919, owing mainly to bad weather, and so never saw action during the war. While the construction of these impressive and

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15 Grayzel, At Home, 25.
17 Ibid.
18 Foster, 162.
19 Ibid., 166; Longmate, Island Fortress, 445; TNA, WO 32/5528, ‘A Summary of the Policy and Work of Coast Fortification in Great Britain during the past 60 years’, March 1918, 18.
expensive fortresses was not completed until after the war, new guns and armaments were installed in the Humber. By late December 1914, ‘various new factors had come into play, namely, two anti-submarine net obstructions in the estuary, and also a war anchorage of primary importance extending over a considerable area to the north side of the river opposite Grimsby’.20 These ‘new factors’ admitted the existence of the U-boat threat, as Germany’s response to Britain’s economic blockade made itself known. In this ‘unrestricted submarine warfare’, British merchant vessels could be sunk without warning: a violation of international law. As a result, Germany declared a ‘war zone’ in the waters surrounding Britain from 18 February 1915.21 Two heavy guns, connected by a standard-gauge railway, were installed at ‘each end of the Spurn peninsula’ (that is, Spurn Point and Kilnsea). In addition to light armaments and searchlights at Spurn Point and Haile, ‘medium armament for guns and lights’ was added at Bull Sand.22 Following approval by the Army Council on 8 February 1915, temporary batteries were constructed at Spurn Point and Haile, consisting of four 4.7” guns. The works were expedited in order to ensure their completion by autumn 1915.23 Despite these works developed in response to the bombardment of the north-east coast, the Admiralty’s policy of a ‘foot-free Fleet’ was not, by and large, altered in order to permanently station ‘small and scattered units’ to protect the coast.24 Rather, new guns and emplacements on the shore would suffice.

The Tees and Hartlepool defended ports saw similar developments in the form of new defensive batteries. Again, the new projects were not completed until after the war. Instead, Hartlepool relied on the Heugh Battery at the headland, in addition to a mobile battery at Spion Kop following the 1914 bombardment, almost two miles to the north of Heugh.25 Despite its small size and low calibre (two 6” breech loaded guns), official reports in the wake of the attack suggested that Heugh Battery was effective in countering the blows of the enemy flotilla.26 At the time of the bombardment, Hartlepool also possessed two cruisers,

23 The total cost of the temporary batteries, including accommodation, guns and railway transport, was £318,875. The combined cost of the ‘island forts’ at Bull Sand and Haile Sand was £403,860. The new defences built at the Forth, in comparison, cost a total of £70,629. See Ibid., ‘Statement of Cost’.
24 Marder, 148.
25 Foster, 145.
Patrol and Forward, in addition to a submarine, C9. Both the patrol boats and the submarine were hampered in their defensive response by the low tide, as they had to remain docked until aided by a tug vessel.\textsuperscript{27} The heavy enemy fire caused the tug to seek shelter, leaving an unassisted Forward to limp into the open, which she did not reach until the action was over. Similarly, C9 could not effectively submerge due to the low tide. When she finally reached the mouth of the channel, after being hit by a shell fragment, '[she] then submerged and struck bottom and by the time she got out the enemy was gone'.\textsuperscript{28} 

In stark contrast, the primarily leisure resorts of Whitby and Scarborough possessed no working military defences during the early months of the war, with gun emplacements in Scarborough having only an ornamental historical function. The local 3\textsuperscript{rd} (Northern) Cavalry Depot acted as an administrative office only, though German intelligence reports apparently concluded to the contrary.\textsuperscript{29} An ‘old Crimean gun’ was in place on the West Cliff seafront in Whitby at the time of the raid, causing some to advise its removal ‘to some spot in the rear of the houses, where it cannot be seen from the sea’. As a correspondent to the local newspaper remarked, ‘the people of Whitby do not wish to give the slightest cause for the enemy to call the town a “fortified place”’.\textsuperscript{30} Conversely, according to the government, both Scarborough and Whitby were ‘completely defenceless’ at the time of the attack.\textsuperscript{31} 

With 16 December 1914 still looming large in the local press, the first months of 1915 saw demands for improved defences across the region. This included Hull, which had not yet seen enemy action by either naval vessels or aircraft. Though civilian correspondents with newspapers and journalists alike referred explicitly to air raids in proposals for civil and military defence measures, concerns in January 1915 were all the more fraught due to the experience of the north-east coast just a month before. Suggestions included a night time curfew and a tightening of lighting restrictions, with one writer tacitly suggesting that an early warning system was urgently required: ‘We have had elaborate arrangements and instructions given as for when a raid should happen, but it’s of little use being wise after the event’.\textsuperscript{32} The instructions referred to were those issued only days before by Hull’s chief

\textsuperscript{27} Witt and McDermott, 110-11. 
\textsuperscript{28} TNA, AIR 1/564/16/15/79, ‘Hostile raids and bombardments of the English coast’ file, ‘2\textsuperscript{nd} Raid, The Hartlepools, Scarborough and Whitby. Wednesday, December 16\textsuperscript{th} 1914’, ‘Action taken by British flotilla at Hartlepool’. 
\textsuperscript{29} Witt and McDermott, 147; ‘The Germans Call These “Fortifications”!’, Scarborough Pictorial, 27 January 1915, 5. 
\textsuperscript{30} Whitby Gazette, 24 December 1914, 6. 
\textsuperscript{31} TNA, AIR 1/564/16/15/79, ‘Hostile raids and bombardments of the English coast’ file, ‘2\textsuperscript{nd} Raid, The Hartlepools, Scarborough and Whitby. Wednesday, December 16\textsuperscript{th} 1914’. 
constable, drawn up in response to a memorandum from the Home Office related to lighting in homes and motor vehicles.  

The Zeppelin raids of June 1915 on Hull led to further indignation among local people, resulting in floods of suggestions for defensive measures in local newspapers. This included a call for ‘more energetic action by the authorities in regard to protection from hostile aircraft’:

Let us hope that Government are doing their best. In the meantime, why should we not do something ourselves to protect women and children? We have plenty of space in and around the city for bombproof shelters. We have millions of tons of sand not many miles away. I believe sand is the best resisting material known against shells and bombs. I know wood is scarce, but I think there would be sufficient for the purpose. If not, cut down the trees. Human lives are more precious than ornamental trees.

The writer even included a sketch of his idea for a ‘bomb-proof shelter’ funded through public subscription and built by voluntary labour. However, other calls for a Lord Mayor’s Fund in aid of defence had already been summarily dismissed, with the separate local defensive system this would entail deemed inappropriate. Similar suggestions for shelters were put forward by correspondents, with an analogous distrust in the state’s precautionary measures displayed:

The military authorities are apparently too humane to take retaliatory measures on enemy towns, and we (being merely civilians) can but leave defensive measures to the military powers that be. We can do nothing in the matter, but it is in our power to do more for the protection of our lives and those of our wives and children. [...] We have several public parks and a good deal of waste land in the district which could be made use of for dug-outs, capable of holding a great majority of the townspeople. As for labour, there is plenty for the asking.

Another letter writer put forward the idea of a ‘Volunteer Flying Corps’ for Hull, stating that ‘There are men in Hull waiting to go up; now don’t keep them waiting’. Again, subscription was proposed as a means to pay for a fleet of ten aeroplanes, with 2s. 6d per week suggested.

In a similar way to the controversial ‘self-appointed’ night patrols organised by some civilian men, this scheme was justified in gendered language: ‘your wives and children will be able to

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35 Ibid.
37 ‘Dig Ourselves In!’, Hull Daily Mail, 16 March 1916, 2.
sleep peacefully (when we get the planes). Such language was used to underpin early civil defence efforts more generally, in addition to the evocation of war aims as the defence of family and the home, particularly the violation of women. In response, another correspondent suggested that the purchase for the city of one “Anti-Zepp.” (or air Dreadnought), with a crew of 100 men, would be more use than 50 biplanes. In this case, a detailed description accompanied the call to arms, suggesting a greater concern with defensive hardware:

It should have a cigar-shaped hull with pointed ends to ram and cut in two amidships the Zepps, and be made of steel, with gas-bag protected by steel canopy, so that no bombs could reach the envelope. It should also have a platform above the canopy, resting on spiral springs, so that if bombs did drop, the catapult-like action of springs would shoot the bomb back again at the Zeppelin.

This was a decidedly labour-intensive scheme, requiring ‘10,000 men (mechanics, engineers and chemists)’ who would apparently complete construction in one week. This was an unusual view, considering that many of the most enthusiastic promoters of ‘airmindedness’ proposed plans for large fleets of aeroplanes as opposed to airships, though non-rigid airships went on to become an integral part of anti-submarine operations in the North Sea. The shift from a naval function to one of home defence would have been a considerable innovation, had this civilian suggestion been taken into account. The central point to take from these examples is that some civilians, often influenced by debates in the local and national press, devised their own plans for defence following the experience of raids. These were not only responses to harrowing experiences, but contained accusations of inaction directed towards the military authorities and government. This suggests that some non-combatants sought a degree of agency through their interventions in defence policy, though the ideas put forward were often impracticable. While some in Hull sought better physical defences to protect the coast and its hinterland from harm, others promoted a view more akin to that of ‘airminded’ military and naval staff, underpinned by the wider popularity of flying.

In Hull, searchlights and mobile anti-aircraft (AA) guns were not installed until 16 March 1916, ten days after a second Zeppelin raid on the city, which killed 17 and injured
Reports compiled by local photographer T.C. Turner following each of the raids suggested a distinct lack of local defensive capability. Following the first raid on 6 June 1915, Turner stated that there had been ‘No defence of Hull. No aeroplanes, no searchlights, no guns worth having’. Following the second raid on 6 March 1916, Turner wrote in a letter to the General Headquarters of Home Forces:

There was no defence against the raider, and this after an experience nine months old [referring to the June 1915 raid]! Why cannot we have guns firing incendiary shells, rocket guns? Would you believe it possible that this great city was entirely at the mercy of an enemy for over an hour this morning? Again I have watched with indignation an event which for its cruelty far exceeded the June exploit.

While Turner’s legitimate concerns were eventually heeded, local air raid defences were primarily reliant on ACMA forces, with Territorial Force battalions responsible for manning gun emplacements and searchlights. Boy Scouts and Boys’ Life Brigade members also worked alongside special constables in guard and first aid duties, with the boys often taking up stretcher-bearing roles. In March 1918, the Hull Anti-aircraft Volunteers were formed to replace regular soldiers sent to fight in France. This was raised along similar lines to the earlier Volunteer Force, drawing recruits from ‘men of the mills and influential gentlemen’. This was clearly carried out for practical reasons, and the 250 men eventually raised spanned the social spectrum, including mill workers too old to attest or exempt from military service.

In Hull and the surrounding district, demands among military officials at the local and regional level surfaced in June 1915. Major-General J.A. Ferrier, commander of the Humber Garrison, laid out his suggestions in a memorandum to Northern Command on 10 June 1915, four days after the first Zeppelin raid. In this, he reflected upon the usefulness of fixed gun emplacements, given the mobility of airships, and put forward his view as to a suitable response. In Ferrier’s view, mobile anti-aircraft guns were required, mounted on either motor vehicles or field carriages. Claiming that ‘I have not anti-aircraft guns to spare’, he went on to suggest the imminent delivery of three AA guns: one to be positioned in the city centre, a second to patrol the north of the city and a third to patrol the vicinity of the Grimsby

46 ‘The Protection of Hull’, Hull Times, 8 February 1919, 7; Credland, Hull Zeppelin Raids, 110.
50 ‘“Anti-Aircraft”’, Hull Times, 8 February 1919, 3; Dennis, Territorial Army, 9.
Headquarters, on the Lincolnshire banks of the Humber. When Major-General H.M. Lawson, Commanding-in-Chief of Northern Command, forwarded these requests to the War Office on 14 June, he dismissed Ferrier’s call for more guns. In the process, he reiterated the widespread belief that lighting regulations were generally sufficient to guard against the effects of air raids on cities, suggesting that munitions factories and other ‘vulnerable points of great strategic importance’ in the region, including Immingham’s oil tanks, were best served by AA guns and not the city of Hull itself. Therefore, he maintained ‘the opinion that the best passive protection against Zeppelins is darkness’ [emphasis in original], though he did not discount fixed gun emplacements. Furthermore, mobile gun units ‘stationed at suitable points covering the more probable course of Zeppelins towards their objectives’ were useful precisely because their whereabouts could not easily be attained by the enemy. More than two months passed before Ferrier again prompted Northern Command to provide more guns, stating ‘I shall be glad to know if there is any chance of my getting any of the A.A. Guns, as we are absolutely dependent on them in the event of a hostile Airship evading our aeroplanes, a possible contingency in cloudy weather’.

The fact that Ferrier saw fit to reiterate his earlier demands - even adding two more possible AA sites at Hornsea and Spurn – suggests that the decision-making process related to military installations was, in practice, a largely top-down affair. Given that the local ACMA was subordinated to Northern Command, a body directly accountable to the War Office, this is perhaps unsurprising. However, it can be inferred from Lawson’s response that concerns surrounding civilian districts of the city were barely countenanced in matters of military defence. While more than twenty people were killed in the June 1915 raid in primarily residential areas, facilities directly connected with the propagation of the war effort such as armaments factories and fuel depots were to be prioritised. This contrasted clearly with the civil defence measures devised by local authorities in the region, which were developed in response to government guidelines and the DRR, but adapted specifically to local communities. As we will see, as the threat of invasion seemed to wane, local civic officials, particularly in Scarborough, came into conflict with the military leaders of the ACMA on the question of military installations on the residential streets and seafront of the town.

51 TNA, AIR 1/564/16/15/79, J.A. Ferrier to Headquarters Northern Command, 10 June 1915.
52 TNA, AIR 1/564/16/15/79, H.M. Lawson to War Office, 14 June 1915.
53 TNA, AIR 1/564/16/15/79, J.A. Ferrier to Headquarters Northern Command, 14 August 1915.
54 Ibid.
Though Scarborough did not enjoy the same status as the ‘defended ports’ defined by the War Office and Committee of Imperial Defence, the December 1914 bombardment saw an efflorescence of military activity in the town. This resulted in a number of physical defensive measures, manned by regiments of the Territorial Forces, installed immediately following the attack. Barbed wire entanglements and sandbag barricades were installed in the principal streets running perpendicular to the seafront, in addition to trenches dug into beaches and cliffs.\(^{55}\) As the historian A.J. Grant put it, through the guise of an unnamed Scarborian, in 1931, these changes reflected German ideas of culture and civilisation, presenting a break with a sedate and peaceful past:

The streets he had trodden in early childhood were barricaded with sand-bags, the gardens where he had played were trenched for troops, the countless staircases leading from the beach to the town were tangled with barbed wire. Yawning gaps in the Grand Hotel, holes through the lighthouse and the workhouse: these were the marks of the progress of civilization, of the march of science.\(^{56}\)

The 8\(^{th}\) Battalion, West Yorkshire Regiment (Territorials), known as the ‘Leeds Rifles’, were dispatched to Scarborough following the bombardment, travelling by train from their base in York. Following their arrival, while a number of men proceeded to clear away debris in the damaged railway station, the majority of the battalion marched to the foreshore in order to take up defensive positions, as an invading force was still deemed a possibility.\(^{57}\) Trenches were dug into the beach beneath the Grand Hotel in South Bay, while in the North Bay intricate trenches were built into the cliff itself.\(^{58}\) These efforts were described in detail by a local teacher: ‘[N]ot only rows and rows of trenches are to be seen, but also wonderful little subterranean rooms which honeycomb the sides of the cliff and look almost comfortable and – what is far more necessary – safe’.\(^{59}\) The description here is remarkably similar to an image published in December 1914 in the *Illustrated War News*. The feature, depicting ‘entrenchments of the type used at the front, on the cliffs’, makes a clear parallel between the militarised space of the battlefront in France and Flanders, and that of the potentially vulnerable east coast.\(^{60}\) Such changes in landscape were enacted by the ‘war-specific

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\(^{55}\) Marsay, *Bombardment!*, 66, 128.  
\(^{57}\) ‘Rumours and Invasion’, *Daily Gazette for Middlesbrough*, 26 December 1914, 2.  
\(^{58}\) Marsay, 128.  
\(^{59}\) ‘Bombardment of Scarborough’, *Bath Chronicle*, 19 December 1914, 3.  
\(^{60}\) ‘Defending our East Coast from Invaders’, *Illustrated War News*, 30 December 1914, 34.
environmental conditions’ brought about by military activity. Though it was forbidden to publish the precise location of the trenches or, indeed, even carry a camera in a defensible zone, a photograph of defence installations on the ‘East Coast’ was accompanied by a detailed description: ‘[The] trenches on the East Coast are constructed on the latest pattern as developed in the war, with deep passage-ways, roofed sections, traverses, and zigzags to avoid an enfilading fire from the flank’.62

Elsewhere in Scarborough, barricades and barbed wire entanglements were erected:

[Y]ards of barbed wire have been crossed and re-crossed, thus making an effectual and spiky barricade about six feet high across the roads. Then in the principal thoroughfares there are placed massive sand-bag barricades. These are formed by numbers of large sacks, filled tight with sand, placed on top of each other to a height of about eight feet, while planks are built in between them to make the wall more secure, and holes are left at regular intervals for the guns, in case the Germans land and are rash enough to do a little sight-seeing.63

Though this account was not published locally, it is verifiable when cross-referenced with post-bombardment records and documents devised by the local authority (Figure 5.1). As can be observed, barbed wire entanglements were placed at regular intervals at the steps down to the beach in the North and South Bays, while both sandbag barricades and wire entanglements were placed in the streets perpendicular to the seafront, including Eastborough and Bland’s Cliff (Figure 5.2). In an interwar account, Sylvia Pankhurst recalled a visit to the town in the days after the attack: ‘The little steep streets, leading up from the foreshore, were barred by wire entanglements… great stakes driven into the ground, with a mass of stout barbed wire threaded around and around them, and tangled about between’.64 Despite the effort and expense involved in these defensive responses, by March 1915, the military authorities began dismantling some of the defences, while others were adapted to allow for the smoother running of traffic.65

In Hartlepool, while defence planners relied primarily on the existing Heugh and Lighthouse Batteries for protection, in addition to a regular naval patrol, defensive trenches were built on Middleton Beach (close to Central Dock) and North Sands Beach (near to the

62 Illustrated War News, 30 December 1914, 34.
65 SL, UBC, ‘NOTES of an interview with Brigadier N.T. Nickalls on Tuesday, the 23rd. March, 1915, with respect to Barbed Wire Entanglements, Trenches &c.’. This is explored in greater detail below.
headland). Though regimental police, including officers of the Royal Defence Corps, guarded them. Though the RDC were only formed in 1916, it is reasonable to assume that the defences were installed earlier and staffed by Territorial detachments, as in Scarborough. Local recruitment efforts encouraged men aged 41 to 60 to enlist for home defence – mainly guarding bridges and ‘vulnerable points’ - though pay was at a standard army rate. Defences were later strengthened with the addition of a ‘monitor’ boat, equipped with two 12-inch guns, moored in the port as part of the wider shore defences. While Hartlepool was worse affected in both human and material terms, the very fact that Scarborough was caught off guard by the bombardment undergirded local efforts to install defence. This was compounded by the weight of public opinion and the propaganda value of Scarborough in the bombardment atrocity narrative, whereas Hartlepool was an industrial port with broadly agreed military targets. Nevertheless, Hartlepool saw the installation of similar facilities and the limited strengthening of pre-existing defences.

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69 Marsay, 393.
70 Marwick, Deluge, 84.
Figure 5.1 Map depicting military defences of Scarborough, c. 1914.

Source: Scarborough Library. Used with permission.
Figure 5.2 Barricades and barbed wire entanglements at Eastborough (top) and Bland’s Cliff, Scarborough (c. 1915).

Source: Scarborough Collections, care of Scarborough Museums Trust. Used with permission.
Early warning systems and preparedness for bombardment

Away from the discussions and guidelines of military planners, the civilian partners of the ACMA drew upon DORA regulations in order to develop rudimentary early warning systems for use in advance of naval or air raids. The 1914 attack brought the war vividly home to local authorities in Scarborough in particular, where civic officials worked in earnest to install ‘buzzers’ in order to warn the public of approaching aircraft. This entailed a great deal of cooperation and knowledge circulation between different authorities on the north-east coast, who drew upon both recent experience and local expertise.

Prior to the development of ‘buzzers’, preliminary communication of an impending attack by either sea or air was only possible between members of the military and navy, and even then specific details of scheduled enemy movements were scant, or signals sent between leaders whilst at sea were received too late to be of use.71 The development of a rudimentary early warning system entailed a large degree of regional cooperation, between local authorities and commercial bodies, largely without guidelines from central government. In Scarborough, preliminary tests in January 1915 utilised two ‘Organ Valve Whistles’ provided by Hull brassfounders Messrs. G. Clark & Sons Ltd., with the hooters affixed to the icehouse on West Pier.72 These were said to give ‘piercing notes, which are not inharmonious’.73 The Scarborough Emergency Committee’s public notice on the upcoming ‘experiment’ stated that ‘[it] is understood that the tone of the hooter will differ from those of ordinary steam vessels which are usually heard at Scarborough’, therefore ensuring that residents would be sufficiently alarmed.74 The hooters were also similar in form to those placed in Hull earlier in the month, with official guidelines issued by the chief constable as to the proper conduct of the public following the five-minute blast ‘if any Air Raid appears to be imminent’.75 Scarborough’s ‘6” Steam Whistle’ was not deemed successful by the borough engineer, given the town’s geographical composition: owing to the lie of the land, the sound of the siren was lost in the lower portion of the town. This opinion was reinforced by the views of unsatisfied writers to the local newspaper. Despite the tone of the whistle itself differing sufficiently from that of ordinary steam vessels, it was still not deemed loud enough.76

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71 Witt and McDermott, 65; Marder, 144.
72 SL, UBC, George Clark & Sons to Harry W. Smith, 18 January 1915.
73 ‘Warnings Against German Air Raids’, Birmingham Daily Post, 26 January 1915, 10.
Further tests were completed in early February 1915 of ‘two 2” Steam Whistles in conjunction with a Siren’, this time affixed to the Electric Supply Works. This equipment was again supplied by Clark & Sons Ltd., and combined both sirens and whistles in order to be discernible from the analogous sounds emitted by local maritime traffic.\textsuperscript{77} According to Scarborough’s borough engineer, the ‘sounds it is possible to get from this is sufficient to awaken the dead’, clearly marking this attempt out as incomparably better than before.\textsuperscript{78} However, as with the first test, local residents raised concerns as to the efficacy of the system. A local councillor standing in Wykeham Street at the time of the test claimed to have ‘“just heard it’’, before suggesting that the first test at the icehouse (approximately one mile distant) ‘could be heard more plainly’.\textsuperscript{79} However, on both occasions, the fault apparently lay with the insufficient elevation of the hooters and the ‘lie of the Borough’.\textsuperscript{80} Nevertheless, it appears that this second test was deemed successful by the authorities, with the borough engineer opting for the combination of two 2” steam whistles and a siren, situated at two separate points in the town; the West Pier icehouse and the Electric Supply Works, each possessing complementary elevations on the landscape.\textsuperscript{81}

Information on Scarborough’s ongoing experiences with anti-raid techniques was relayed to officials in other local authorities, including Aberdeen and Worcester, which sought advice on the best means for protecting their cities given Scarborough’s shocking example.\textsuperscript{82} Later in 1915, the chief constable of Scarborough Borough Police admitted in a letter to the Home Office that it was undesirable to:

give public warning of the approach of Aircraft by the sounding of hooters, and have regard to the distressing effect which the adoption of those methods has caused in some Towns where they have been adopted the Local Authority still feel that it is better in the interests of the community to enforce the darkening of Shops and Houses so that only the Public Street Lamps have to be extinguished when the necessity arises.\textsuperscript{83}

Similar sentiments were expressed during a conference of northern munitions firms and police authorities in Manchester in February 1916. The conference carried a resolution leaving ‘the matter of warning the munition firms and also the question of lighting in the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{77} SL, UBC, Harry W. Smith to F.W. Spurr, 10 February 1915.
\item \textsuperscript{78} SL, UBC, Harry W. Smith to C.M. Shaw, 2 February 1915.
\item \textsuperscript{79} ‘The “Hooters”’, \textit{Scarborough Mercury}, 5 February 1915, 8.
\item \textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{81} SL, UBC, Harry W. Smith to F.W. Spurr, 10 February 1915.
\item \textsuperscript{82} SL, UBC, Harry W. Smith to C.M. Shaw, 2 February 1915; SL, UBC, Matthew Hay to Harry W. Smith, 14 January 1915.
\item \textsuperscript{83} TNA, HO 45/10883/344919, Henry Windsor to A.L. Dixon, 19 November 1915.
\end{itemize}
hands of the authorities’, agreeing to subordinate their decisions to that of the military. Again, the efficacy of lighting regulations was espoused, a much safer bet owing to the lack of clarity in the preliminary experiments with buzzers.84

In Hull, following the installation of the first warning buzzers in January 1915, additional facilities were installed throughout the year and experiments made with different iterations of the system.85 In some cases, further experiments were deemed to cause ‘needless alarm’ and stress, particularly among women and children. Following one such experiment a month after the 6 June 1915 raid, one writer, using the pseudonym ‘Disgusted’, complained:

After the excitement this afternoon, and the frantic fetching of children from the schools, would it not be better, think you, if any new buzzers, hooters, or syrens [sic], or whatever you may choose to call them, were experimented on at five o’clock p.m., when the workmen are leaving, and when they would not excite the people, rather than cause such a ridiculous panic as to-day’s?86

In addition to experiments, the buzzers themselves were also frequently decried for possessing a lack of clarity compared to other sirens used to summon special constables to their posts. Following widespread complaint, the Lord Lieutenant of East Yorkshire, Lord Nunburnholme, attempted to define the specific reasons a buzzer should be sounded. This was primarily ‘to bring out the special constables to do their duty in case the aerial visitor should happen to appear’.87 Still, greater clarity was sought by public-spirited civilians. Charles Rankin, a probation officer, suggested that a second alarm, ‘different from the constables’ should be sounded for the sake of civilians, in order to distinguish it as a legitimate warning of an impending enemy raid.88 According to some complainants, steamers and other commercial vessels were continuing to sound their hooters whilst docked late at night, causing an ‘uproar’ in the city centre.89 Another writer suspected that some people were impersonating the buzzer, which was made possible by a lack of clarity as to how it was supposed to sound, compounded by the noise of the busy port. Indeed, in the context of war, the sounds that were hitherto part of the atmosphere of the urban environment could become a source of anxiety:

84 ‘Precautions Against Air Raids: Government Measures to Protect the North’, *Yorkshire Post*, 18 February 1916, 8.
85 Credland, 17.
86 ‘Experiment with “Buzzer”’, *Hull Daily Mail*, 7 July 1915, 2.
87 ‘“Buzzers” and Needless Alarm’, *Hull Daily Mail*, 7 July 1915, 2.
88 Ibid.
In the present state of nervous tension, when every blast excites attention, it is nothing short of a public scandal that colourable imitations of the Zeppelin buzzer should be used. Of course, any whistle is noticed now; but one cannot but think that many of the railway whistles, ships’ and shops’ buzzers could be used less frequently, or at any rate in such a manner as not to be misunderstood. I have even heard motor-horns being used in imitation of the Zeppelin call.90

For others, the problem was that the buzzers were not loud enough to provide adequate warning at all, as was later found in London when the ‘weird sounds’ emitted in trials were drowned out by traffic noise.91 One Hull correspondent commented in a letter to the *Hull Daily Mail*: ‘If the authorities intend to sound the alarm, let it be one that can be heard, and not as occurred last night, so faint that it was almost impossible to hear when one was awake, much less asleep’.92 In some cases, the buzzers could not be heard in certain districts, meaning some constituencies were warned at the expense of others. This was attributed to the disconnection of the buzzer (known as ‘Big Lizzie’) at Blundell’s paint works to save money, following the apparent profligacy of the Hull Corporation’s Property Committee in purchasing an oak mantelpiece for £500.93 One critic, in a letter to the editor of the *Mail*, asked:

> Cannot the Corporation leave it over till after the war? […] Now, which interests the public of Hull more – a “mantelpiece” or a warning in case of raid? The percentage would be a thousand to one, if not more, on the alarm.94

Given the wider discourse of sacrifice in which civic officials were working alongside the military to encourage enlistment, this purchase could not be justified in the eyes of many citizens: ‘If the city has £500 that it doesn’t know what to do with, let it be invested in the War Loan or devoted to the war fund for the sick and wounded’.95 For another writer, the reliance upon just one city-wide buzzer was little more than short-sighted: ‘Some say it is a matter of £ s d, but surely the cost is comparatively small compared with the results’.96

The prospect of public air raid shelters - so synonymous with images of the Second World War home front – was not on the agenda until October 1917 for Hull.97 A resolution of the assembled City Council on 11 October 1917 stated:

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95 ‘Ibid.
97 Grayzel, *At Home*, 274.
That it be an instruction to the Watch Committee to at once take steps to ascertain what public and private buildings are available in which the public may shelter in the event of daylight air raids, and that notices be posted on such buildings giving the necessary information and guidance.98

However, this resolution did not pass without contestation, with one member deeming the action ‘unnecessary as far as Hull is concerned’.99 When this was taken to the Watch Committee of 31 October, members resolved to enquire at the offices of the chief constable and city architect to ascertain a list of suitable public buildings, including chapels, for use in the event of daylight air raids upon the city. A Watch Sub-Committee of February 1918, under the advisement of the above experts, resolved that:

It is very undesirable owing to the extreme risks involved to make arrangements for public shelters in the event of daylight air raids, and that this Sub-Committee recommend that the Chief Constable be instructed to issue public notices requesting persons in the event of air raids to remain in their homes, or, if in the public streets, to immediately take shelter at the nearest available place, and also requesting the public to afford shelter as far as possible to those requiring it.100

Here we see a local authority primarily concerned with securing public safety during air raids, though with a minimal effect upon the organisation or financial capabilities of the local authority itself. The Watch Sub-Committee was vague and irresolute in asking the public to shelter in the ‘nearest available place’ when in the street, while suggesting that people also allow their own homes to become makeshift shelters. In spite of a clear public concern regarding the threat of further air raids, the dangers involved in the amassing of people in buildings that could have served as desirable targets for the enemy far outweighed widespread calls for public shelters. Indeed, the city architect expressed concern at the degree of responsibility he would be taking in recommending any building as safe for such a purpose.101 As Ashworth has noted, such ambiguity and hesitation would typify local government attitudes and responses to air-raid precautions during the interwar years and into the Second World War.102 By 1917, the police were given official powers to enter suitable private properties in order to discern whether they could be utilised as public shelters. DRR

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98 HHC, C TCW, Minutes of Proceedings of Committees 1917-1918, Watch Committee, 31 October 1917, 164.
17A permitted the ‘chief officer of police of the police area in which the premises are situated, or any person authorised by him, to allow those premises or any part thereof to be used as a shelter against hostile attack by air’. 103

When bombardment precautions were debated, commentators generally focussed on lighting restrictions and warning sirens, with emphasis being on preventing harm to people and property in the event of an air raid. One article pre-dating the first Hull Zeppelin raid outlined the chief constable’s guidelines for ‘safeguarding the citizens’ should enemy aircraft visit the airspace of the city. 104 It began by bemoaning the apparent indifference of some citizens as to the potentialities of aerial bombardment, in a similar tone to that expressed in the previous century in the face of ‘mock’ invasions. The article went on to outline the roles of special constables and the Civic Guard – a local voluntary home defence force - in maintaining public order and reinforcing precautionary measures, before inducing people to vacate the street should a siren be sounded and, if possible, seek shelter in the residential cellar. 105 However, a criticism was fielded by an ‘ex-Army man’ as to the usefulness of such a measure, given the scarcity of cellars in Hull. He instead suggested residents construct dug-outs in their gardens. 106 In a sense, this image, though never actually realised, transported battlefield conditions into the civilian realm. Therefore, citizens may have to ‘[burrow] like moles away from the light’. 107 The published guidelines concluded that pedestrians should hand in to the police found fragments of shell following any prospective raid, in order ‘that the military might form an idea of the size of the missiles thrown, and of the character of the engines of destruction in the air’. 108 This betrayed a certain insecurity amid expectations of bombardment, given the relative newness of the event: even the authorities could not be sure of the calibre of weapon and its destructive power until bombardment had occurred. When it came to actual bombardment later in the war, many ordinary people kept shell fragments as mementoes and eschewed any calls to relinquish such finds to the authorities. 109

The Hull City Police Fire Brigade (HCPFB) were quick to respond to air raids. Following the first raid on 6 June 1915 (killing twenty-four people), fires were extinguished

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105 The 2nd Volunteer Battalion (Civic Guards), Voluntary Force had 188 recruits by 6 January 1915. See *Hull Daily Mail*, 6 January 1915, 5.
106 Ibid.
107 ‘Hull Must Look Up!’, *Hull Daily Mail*, 6 April 1909, 4
not only by firefighters, but by police officers and a property owner, pointing to the lack of institutional and organisational clarity between the police and fire brigade during the war in some localities. The widespread view that fire prevention and firefighting were best organised according to local circumstances undergirded the dearth of central funding available to municipal governments for this purpose, with the lion’s share of funds coming from local rates.\textsuperscript{110} However, it is difficult to ignore the separation of ‘Police’ from ‘the Brigade’ in the minutes, suggesting that, despite being under the auspices of the chief constable, there was a degree of distinct professional identification at play within Hull’s combined Brigade. Nevertheless, special constables became active in preventive measures related to fire, particularly in preparing civilian householders and business owners should a conflagration arise following bombardment. According to guidelines issued by the Watch Committee, promoted in the local press and through postal circulars, civilians were to ensure that buckets of water were placed ‘in front of houses and business premises… as soon as the siren alarm has been sounded’.\textsuperscript{111} These were for the use of special constables in extinguishing incendiary bombs, which were described as relatively safe to handle once spent as they had a handle attached (Figure 5.3).\textsuperscript{112} Indeed, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, E.R. Henry, stated in a memorandum on 17 June 1915 that ‘No bomb should be handled unless it has shewn [sic] itself to be of the incendiary type. In this case it may be possible to remove it without undue risk’.\textsuperscript{113} In addition, baths were to be filled with water, presumably to cool fragments of shell should one make a direct hit, and to extinguish fires in the home. Owing to the ‘drastically altered position’ of the fire brigade because of the war, special constables were to aid firefighters by having at their disposal ‘four large extinguishers, or 30 small hand appliances, per area’.\textsuperscript{114} Hull Watch Committee’s guidelines appear to have been drawn up in response to recommendations made by the British Fire Prevention Committee (BFPC) in early June 1915.\textsuperscript{115} The BFPC, a voluntary organisation

\textsuperscript{112} ‘Precautions at War Time’, \textit{Hull Daily Mail}, 11 June 1915, 4; \textit{The Sphere}, 5 June 1915, 8.
\textsuperscript{114} ‘Fires in War Time’, \textit{Hull Daily Mail}, 9 June 1915, 3.
\textsuperscript{115} \textit{The Sphere}, 5 June 1915, 8; ‘The German Incendiary Bomb: Its Composition and Precautions Against It’, \textit{Illustrated War News}, 2 June 1915, 26; Ewen, ‘British Fire Service’, 332.
established in 1897, aimed to improve safety standards in building construction. In its guidelines it described the character of incendiary bombs dropped by Zeppelins and how to fight bomb-related fires. This was made available as a ‘placard for posting in public institutions or private houses alongside the instructions for using the fire extinguishers’. Later in the same month, the National Fire Brigades’ Union (NFBU) produced a pamphlet suggesting similar means of combating fires caused by incendiaries, in addition to designs for a ‘very simple form of respirator’ for firefighters combating the effects of asphyxiating bombs. Following the June 1915 Zeppelin raid on Hull, there were also calls for specials to be provided with professional equipment to deal with the aftermath of air raids. SPC Pexton, a deputy group leader in Hull, suggested an ‘axe and belt, so that assistance might be quickly rendered to persons pinned under the debris of damaged buildings in the event of an air raid’. In addition, ‘there should be stationed at various depots, within easy reach of the sub-group leader, a small stock of pick-axes, shovels, crow bars, a small coil of rope, and also a supply of fire extinguishers’. In 1917, taking a tip from the French army, Scotland Yard was reported to be considering regulation steel helmets (the ‘S.O.S. cap’) for special constables, while regular officers would receive capes replete with ‘shrapnel-proof armour… a sort of chain mail made of piano wire’.

118 TNA, HO 45/10883/344919, ‘Incendiary Attacks by Enemy Aircraft’, 23 June 1915; HO 45/10883/344919, National Fire Brigades’ Union, ‘Suggestions for fire brigades situated in areas liable to incendiary attacks by enemy aircraft and precautions against poisonous cases’, June 1915; The NFBU was formed in 1887, amalgamating a number of regional associations for voluntary and works’ fire brigades. See Ewen, *Fighting Fires*, 100.
In a city where both police and firefighters were under intense strain due to the frequency of fires and the demands of military recruitment, Hull took the step, in July 1915, of employing twenty auxiliary firemen, rising to fifty-three by the end of hostilities. They were paid 30 shillings per week, rising incrementally to 34 shillings. The HCPFB stated their reasons clearly, displaying a level of foresight not present in other quarters. The auxiliaries were ‘to augment the staff at the Station, on account of six firemen serving in the Army & Navy, and to be prepared for any future air-raids which may take place’. This obviated the need to recruit a ‘Voluntary Fire Brigade’, an untimely endeavour considering the changeable conditions introduced by Zeppelin raids. True to the originally stated intention, the majority of auxiliaries had resigned or been dismissed by 1920. The apparent intransigence of proponents of ‘municipal economy’ – despite war offering clearly straitened circumstances - was seen by critics as the central reason for the continued existence of police fire brigades. Combined brigades were already, by 1914, an outmoded concept, given the development of distinct professional fire brigades in Birmingham, Leicester and Manchester in the late-nineteenth century.

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122 ‘Strengthening the Hull Fire Brigade’, Yorkshire Post, 4 August 1915, 3.
124 Ewen, Fighting Fires, 75, 83; ‘Councils in War Time’, Municipal Journal, 6 April 1917, 337.
Precautionary measures for Whitby had been debated at length in the days following 16 December 1914. Among central government planners, air raids were not yet countenanced, with ‘common-sense’ precautions following the 16 December 1914 bombardment taking precedence over all else. At the local level, the task was to improvise precautions after the shock attack, with most focussing on the reduction of public lighting, in domestic and commercial premises, as well as motor cars. As elsewhere, Whitby residents were asked to leave streets and public buildings in the event of an alarm sounding, seeking refuge in their homes. Tactically, the guidelines berated government inaction: ‘In the absence of any official instructions on the subject of precautions to take during bombardment the public must do a little hard thinking for itself, and out of this we may evolve a better plan than official advice could provide’. Therefore, the recent harrowing local experience was seen by some as adequate in grounding bombardment precautions. It was still fresh in the minds of Whitby’s inhabitants and written into the urban landscape through bomb damage. As such, in this view, the civil authorities (perhaps even civilians themselves) were best placed to devise appropriate precautions.

More than a year after the December 1914 bombardment, Scarborough’s chief constable included among the town’s precautionary measures the cessation of tolling bells and chiming clocks, claiming that they might ‘under certain circumstances, afford hostile aircraft useful navigational data, or reveal the position of a town which, owing to the reduction of lighting, would have escaped observation altogether’. This included the chiming of the workhouse bell, scheduled at 8pm daily. This suggests a greater awareness of the threat of air raids which, by this point, were likelier than offshore bombardment, given several well-publicised raids (albeit slightly enigmatic owing to censored reporting) along the east coast of England. There had been twenty air raids nationally by January 1916, with five partly occurring in the area covered by Northern Command.

Whitby also revised its air raid and bombardment precautions as war continued. A notice produced by the Emergency Committee for the Whitby Petty Sessional Division – the body responsible for processing local DORA offences brought before the court – in October 1915 provided more detailed advice than that offered in the weeks immediately following the 1914 bombardment. The guidelines retained the call for citizens to shelter in their own

125 TNA, HO 45/10751/266118, Admiralty to Home Office, 4 January 1915.
homes. However, they appended the caveat that ‘All persons should remain in the lower part of their houses and should provide themselves with food, water, warm clothing, candles and matches’. Remarkably, statistics related to loss of life collated following the December 1914 bombardment noted the number of deaths that had occurred in the upper rooms of houses, setting them apart from those that were killed in the street. The notice also took care to discourage people from gathering to spectate upon sighted aircraft – a problem often connected with the technological newness of the aircraft and the spectacle of bombardment itself - as well as discouraging the collection of shrapnel following attacks. There was also an effort to underline DORA regulations around the use of firearms and the obscuring of lights. Similar concerns were also raised in Hull, particularly surrounding the tendency of a number of people to leave their homes to witness the spectacle, including cyclists ‘who seemed to turn out as soon as the buzzer sounded’ to see if there was ‘anything doing’, in the process providing a ‘procession of lights’ to guide enemy aircraft to their target. A pamphlet published by the North Riding Lieutenancy in February 1918 added yet more detail. Though the North Riding was seen to fall outside of the likely target range for enemy aircraft by this point, the pamphlet proclaimed ‘Forewarned is Forearmed’. The pamphlet stated that ‘it is impossible to give notice in advance of Air Raids’, given the propensity of warnings to cause unnecessary alarm and the scattered population of rural areas in the region. Perversely, the ‘noise of explosives, of anti-aircraft guns in action, and in populous districts a general stoppage of electric tramways’ were seen to act as warning enough, until the ‘all clear’ was given.

What is especially interesting here is the apparent wish of military authorities to allow civilians to enter harm’s way – potentially leading to a state of panic – rather than utilise intelligence to provide warning prior to hostile actions. This was clearly contrary to the largely preventative strategy pursued by police and civil authorities, despite the ACMA relying to a considerable extent on these bodies to carry out the gamut of duties within its remit. As James Greenhalgh has observed with regards the Second World War, civil defence discourse, even prior to 1939, increasingly permeated the privacy of the home, laying it bare to the gaze

129 North Yorkshire County Record Office (NYCRO), ZW (M) 15/2, ‘Notice. Bombardment or Raids’, 7 October 1915.
131 NYCRO, ZW (M) 15/2, ‘Notice. Bombardment or Raids’, 7 October 1915.
133 NYCRO, Z.1028, North Riding Lieutenancy, ‘Forewarned is Forearmed’, February 1918.
of the state.\textsuperscript{134} However, though DORA regulations and agents of the ACMA attempted to influence the behaviour of urban dwellers through the publication of guidelines, in doing so immediate responsibility for public safety was shifted to the individual family within the home.\textsuperscript{135}

Basements and cellars were delineated as the safest places to shelter. An illustrated guide was published in \textit{The Sketch} as early as November 1914, when raids were expected but had not yet occurred anywhere in Britain. ‘Funk-holes for Bomb Dodgers: How to Get In and Get Under!’ was clearly produced within the prevalent war culture, given its allusions to trench construction (funk-holes) and bellicose tone.\textsuperscript{136} Therefore, (male) civilians were encouraged to adopt ‘\textit{Home}-opathic Remedies’, constructing a ‘subterranean stronghold’ in the cellar, in addition to packing sacks with earth from the domestic garden to diminish bomb damage to the roof (Figure 5.4).\textsuperscript{137} The illustrated guide intoned: ‘You can sleep in peace with these earth-bags on the rafters of the loft above your bedroom’. A man was pictured cheerfully reading a newspaper in his cellar, in another he calmly eats breakfast. Oddly prefacing to some extent debates in early 1915 about arming non-combatants, the same man was shown pointing a gun from his funk-hole, ready to ‘give Count Zeppelin a bit of his own back’ (Figure 5.5).\textsuperscript{138} In November 1914, no substantial attempt had been made to raid Britain with airships, meaning that pre-war fears of aerial bombardment prefigured these early wartime depictions of civil defence to some extent.\textsuperscript{139} However, the accompanying text still declared that many civilians were ‘suffering from the Zeppelin nightmare in a more or less acute form’, presumably owing to anxiety related to the possibility of attack and not to actual experience.\textsuperscript{140} As Holman has explored in detail, ‘air panics’ had convulsed sections of the press during 1913 – following reports by readers of German ‘phantom airships’ attempting to attack Britain - leading to calls for better air defences by advocates of air power.\textsuperscript{141} Owing to the looming threat of air raids in the early months of the war, according

\textsuperscript{134} Greenhalgh, ‘Threshold’, 186-208.
\textsuperscript{135} Joyce and Mukerji, 13.
\textsuperscript{136} \textit{The Sketch}, 18 November 1914, 12-13.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140} \textit{The Sketch}, 18 November 1914, 12.
to *The Sketch*, ‘nervous householders’ required practical measures in order to ‘sleep soundly in their little beds’.\(^{142}\)

‘Common-sense hints to the public’ were published in Whitby during the week that followed the December 1914 raid. In these, civilians were advised to prepare a ‘safety room’, preferably a basement, ‘looked to as regards emergency exits, and if the number is limited, a pick, hammer, and other implements should be stored there so that a way may be hacked out if necessary’. Houses without basements or cellars required a greater level of preparation in advance of raids:

> A shell may come in through the roof and pierce the ceiling. Against this the best protection is to lay mattresses and cloth on the floor of the room above. Of course, a big shell will not be stopped by a mattress, but it will give no small protection against the after-effects of an explosion... Failing mattresses, take the bed clothes and other cloth articles, and cover every weak spot, such as windows, doors, and the wall nearest the firing line.\(^ {143}\)

The fact that these improvised guidelines envisioned a ‘firing line’ suggests that the 16 December attack was still the frame of reference for local commentators and planners. As such, the suggestions were designed with the specific location and experience of Whitby in mind, though they pre-empted the installation of buzzers and similar precautionary guidelines across the region as the war progressed. The final summarised guidelines stated: ‘Await some public signal announcing that danger is over, or wait for half-an-hour after sound of firing has ceased’.\(^ {144}\) As we have seen from examples published later in the war, the recommendation to shelter in the private home, avoiding the danger lurking outdoors, became commonplace. However, suggestions that one member of the family unit should ‘sally out to discover damage’ would be later discouraged owing to the dangers of unexploded ordnance and shrapnel.\(^ {145}\)

\(^{142}\) *The Sketch*, 18 November 1914, 12.

\(^{143}\) ‘Bombardment Precautions’, *Whitby Gazette*, 24 December 1914, 12.

\(^{144}\) Ibid.

\(^{145}\) Ibid.; NYCRO, QP (MIC 1392): NR Constabulary books 1857-1920, 6 March 1916.
Figure 5.4 A man has breakfast in his ‘subterranean stronghold’.

Understandably, at the beginning of 1915, a great degree of concern was expressed for the fallout of the December 1914 bombardment in the localities affected, though concern also spread to Hull. The immediate aim was to survey damage to homes, schools and businesses. A special meeting of Whitby Urban District Council discussed applying to central government for ‘compensation to those who have suffered loss in Whitby through the German bombardment, or any other suggested method of compensation’. A motion, moved by Councillors Woodwark and Turner, asked for government assistance for ‘all owners of property in seaside resorts in insurance against war risks’. Discussion of war risks,

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146 NYCRO, DC/WHR, Whitby Urban District Council records, Special Meeting of Council, 18 December 1914.
insurance and compensation was common following the December bombardment, increasing their spread and visibility following the first Zeppelin raids in 1915. In a number of cases, local officials and residents expressed dismay at the apparent inadequacies in compensation from central government. In the case of a Scarborough woman seriously injured during the December 1914 bombardment, the Mayor of the town, C.C. Graham, wrote to the local MP Walter Rea, stating that ‘the award in at least one case of compensation in consequence of the bombardment has been unsatisfactory’. This award stood at £7 and 10 shillings, apparently woefully inadequate for injuries sustained both physically and psychologically:

The lady I referred to was in a house which was completely demolished from top to bottom, she had a fragment of shell in her side and was badly knocked about by the debris of the falling house. She appears to have had her nerves completely shattered and I fear is unfit for work of any kind.147

Rea’s reply did not hold out much hope for a change in circumstances.148 Concurrent with his first correspondence to Rea, Scarborough’s Mayor also contacted the Mayor of Hartlepool asking if he had any similar plans to communicate local disaffection with the awards to the East Coast Raid Committee, the organisation set up in January 1915 to assess claims for damage to property and personal injuries sustained during the December 1914 raid.149 His reply cited the case of a Hartlepool mother who had lost a leg, who was grateful for her compensation of £25, an amount appropriate to the extent of the injury. He signed off with a decidedly patriotic conclusion: ‘I do not see that any action can be taken against the East Coast Raid Committee, the action should be against the Germans who caused the loss and suffering’.150 In the context of the locality’s war culture, such a response could be seen as eminently pragmatic and measured.151

After very little movement on the issue by 9 August 1915, Graham expressed his frustration: ‘I think the awards to those personally injured are most disappointing and fear it will be difficult to get anything done’. It is interesting to note that, by 16 August, Graham was supported in his endeavour by J. Percy Hall, of John Hall & Son Architects, whose father died in the bombardment. As well as being motivated by such a devastating personal loss, the

147 NYCRO, DC/SCB III 1/1 143, Borough of Scarborough: East Coast Bombardment Awards file, Mayor of Scarborough to Mayor of Hartlepool, 26 July 1915.
148 NYCRO, DC/SCB III 1/1 143, Mayor of Scarborough to Walter Rea, 24 July 1915; Walter Rea to Mayor of Scarborough, 27 July 1915.
149 ‘East Coast Raids’, The Times, 25 September 1915, 3; NYCRO, DC/SCB III 1/1 143, Mayor of Scarborough to Mayor of Hartlepool, 24 July 1915.
150 NYCRO, DC/SCB III 1/1 143, Mayor of Hartlepool to Mayor of Scarborough, 25 July 1915.
151 Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, Understanding, 102-103.
The detailed lists made by the army, in accordance with local police authorities, following the 16 December 1914 bombardment, display an awareness not only of the human cost of the attack, but of how and where civilians were killed. The lists compiled for Scarborough detailed the name, age and place of those who died. Those with non-fatal injuries were listed separately, with explicit details appended as to the place on the body an injury was received. Lists pertaining to Hartlepool and West Hartlepool fulfilled a similar function, but were less detailed on the specific wounds received by bombardment casualties. Following a Zeppelin raid on 6 March 1916 in Hull, comparable details were also compiled, though again less extraneous remarks were left out of the record. Taken as a whole, it is clear that the compilation of detailed data related to bombardment casualties, the majority non-combatants, was central to military authorities in Scarborough. Indeed, as explored above, this data was useful in the classification of applicants to private and state

152 ‘Inquests on Victims’, *Yorkshire Post*, 19 December 1914, 7; NYCRO, DC/SCB III 1/1 143, Mayor of Scarborough to George Rowntree, 9 August 1915; J. Percy Hall to Town Clerk, Scarborough, 16 August 1915.


154 NYCRO, DC/SCB III 1/1 143, G.B. to George Rowntree, 31 July 1915.

155 ‘£1,000 Air Raid Insurance’, *Hull Daily Mail*, 23 August 1917, 3.


157 TNA, AIR 1/564/16/15/79, ‘Hostile raids and bombardments of the English coast’ file, ‘Appendix “D”: List of persons killed at Scarborough during the bombardment on the 16th December 1914’.

158 Ibid., ‘List of persons killed or died of injuries at Hartlepool’; ‘List of persons injured at West Hartlepool’.

159 IWM, Dept. of Documents, K 81705, ‘Zeppelin Raids on Hull’. 
bombardment insurance schemes, while the East Coast Raid Committee required such information in order to award compensation claims (from ‘national funds’) related to personal injury for the raids committed up to 15 June 1915. However, a commitment to compensation was not forthcoming, and victims of bombardment after June 1915 were expected to subscribe to a government insurance scheme, provided by the War Risks Insurance Office. Early in 1916, deputations from the east coast attended a conference at Mansion House in London to discuss the government insurance scheme for air raid and bombardment damage, which was described as a ‘special war tax upon those least able to bear it’. This was due to the exposed location of coastal towns and cities close to the North Sea. As the secretary of a meeting on ‘east coast distress’ later put it: ‘Beyond those ordinarily imposed upon local authorities, special burden had fallen upon the East Coast owing to geographical position’. In the view of the meeting, citizens were expected to pay a premium merely for living on the coast. Attendees at this meeting included MP for Scarborough Walter Rea.

It was in the latter part of 1915 that the Scarborough Streets and Sanitary Committee began to discuss lighting restrictions and the marking of obstacles during periods of blackout, going as far as encouraging the whitening of post boxes in order to improve visibility in the darkened streets. The early concern for the safety of school children seems to have outweighed planning for the wider local population. In a period of economic instability and social flux, the protection of the innocent, the children that would become adults in the post-war period, was prioritised. The principle that children embodied an innate innocence, warranting ‘emotional shelter’, found full form in this context. Indeed, the highly-gendered category of ‘women and children’ received attention from commentators and even became the focus of psychological research. The loss of children in air raids also aided in equating civilian and military experience of war. The ‘economies of sacrifice’ into which different

164 NYCRO, DC/SCB (MIC 1050), Borough of Scarborough Corporation, Streets and Sanitary Committee, 17 September 1915, 19 November 1915.
groups of wartime actors were placed saw the hitherto binary ‘fronts’ increasingly intermeshed: the supremacy of the soldier’s ‘moral sacrifice’ could be challenged – though not on the same scale – by civilians.\(^{168}\) This was a sentiment at the forefront of many civilian expressions of indignation following air raids. For example, following a March 1916 raid on Hull that resulted in the deaths of eighteen people, one *Hull Daily Mail* correspondent referred to ‘helpless women and babies murdered before our eyes’. Another, while remarking on civilians’ helplessness in the face of aerial attack, stated that ‘it is in our power to do more for the protection of our lives and those of our wives and children’.\(^{169}\) This was an expression of the popular ‘baby-killers’ motif, a discourse built on the atrocity narratives related to the German invasion and occupation of Belgium in the first months of the war.\(^{170}\) Within this context, schools in Hartlepool, Scarborough and Hull adapted the school day to fit around lighting restrictions, while local education committees instituted schemes such as ‘bombardment drill’.\(^{171}\) Scarborough was particularly concerned with earmarking cellars in nearby residential and commercial properties for use as shelters by school children.\(^{172}\) In Whitby, the Mount Boys’ School conducted an emergency drill on 29 January 1915, ‘as a prelude in the event of a second bombardment’. Teachers led approximately 160 pupils to nearby Khyber Pass, where a tunnel honed into the rock would serve as protection.\(^{173}\)

There were other situations in which working relations between the civilian and military authorities – with the latter enjoying almost complete freedom to act under the DORA and DRR – could become strained. This, again, was largely due to inconsistencies in approach to the enforcement of emergency measures, as well as lapses in effective communication between the parties. In Scarborough, the local business community petitioned the Home Office in November 1915, seeking a suspension of lighting restrictions in the town. This petition, which received more than 300 signatures, cited seasonal failures in the summers of 1914 and 1915, in addition to anticipated further disruption at Christmas, as grounds for the suspension of lighting restrictions. It also referred to the economic consequences of local people leaving the town to seek safety, in addition to the dangers

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\(^{170}\) Horne and Kramer, 302; Grayzel, 37.

\(^{171}\) ‘Bombardment Drill’, *Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail*, 6 January 1915, 3; East Riding of Yorkshire Archives (ERYA), SL227/1, Hull St Mary’s High School Records, annual general meeting, 11 January 1917.

\(^{172}\) NYCRO, DC/SCB (MIC 1140), Borough of Scarborough Corporation, Education Committee, 25 January 1915.

\(^{173}\) NYCRO, S/WH 11/1/3, The Mount British/County School log book, 1912-1945, 29 January 1915, 81. This tunnel served as a shortcut to residential streets and a docking area.
inherent in obscuring public and domestic lighting.\textsuperscript{174} The resultant reply to the petitioners – almost a month after it was submitted - disregarded all of their demands, ‘in the face of the advice received from the Departments best able to judge of these matters’.\textsuperscript{175} This included Lieutenant-Commander Sinclair of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, who saw ‘no substantial reason for [the enemy] not coming and I can imagine that nothing would please the gentle Hun more than to drop bombs onto Christmas gatherings’.\textsuperscript{176} Similarly, Secretary Maud of the War Office suggested that ‘The Germans are not likely to forego any opportunity of raiding this country for sentimental reasons’.\textsuperscript{177}

Given the exposed nature of Scarborough’s seafront and the town’s reliance on seasonal trade, it is hardly surprising that some civilians began to clash with the ACMA, in particular those officers in charge of defensive installations. Shifts in provision were made in response to both public opinion and a military assessment of the current threat of future bombardment or invasion. As early as March 1915, the Admiralty, in concert with the War Office, had begun to scale back plans devised to guard against invasion.\textsuperscript{178}

In March 1915, Brigadier-General Nickalls of Northern Command outlined in an interview the changes to be enacted in Scarborough regarding post-bombardment defensive measures. In the main, measures that impeded the normal functioning of public amenities and leisure facilities (intrinsic to the town’s seasonal economy), including trenches and barbed wire ‘entanglements’, were recommended for removal.\textsuperscript{179} This included barbed wire entanglements in road openings close to the sea and promenades in both the north and south bays of the town. Surprisingly, the entanglements that blocked access to the town from the beach at Royal Albert Drive were advised for removal, while ‘half of the openings from the South Foreshore to Eastborough can be removed’. Prominent public gardens close to the seafront were also advised for reopening, though St. Nicholas Gardens (in the shadow of the Grand Hotel) could only open on the proviso that the ‘trenches are railed off to the public so that any earth &c., cannot be trodden into the same or the trenches damaged’.\textsuperscript{180} Despite this, as late as February 1916, Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief of the Home Forces, Lord French, recommended using trenches as a guard against invasion:

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\textsuperscript{174} TNA, HO 45/10754/266118, ‘To His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department’ petition, November 1915.
\textsuperscript{175} TNA, HO 45/10754/266118, Anon. to Messrs. Medley & Co. Solicitors, 6 December 1915.
\textsuperscript{176} TNA, HO 45/10754/266118, F.C.H. Sinclair to A.L. Dixon, 20 November 1915.
\textsuperscript{177} TNA, HO 45/10754/266118, G. Maud to A.L. Dixon, 22 November 1915.
\textsuperscript{178} TNA, ADM, 137/966, War Office to Admiralty, 10 March 1915.
\textsuperscript{179} SL, UBC, ‘NOTES of an interview with Brigadier N.T. Nickalls on Tuesday, the 23rd. March, 1915, with respect to Barbed Wire Entanglements, Trenches &c.’.
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
A trench is the strongest position which troops can occupy, and a trench which cannot be opposed at close quarters by an enemy trench, and against which field and heavy artillery cannot be brought to bear is doubly strong. Such would be the position of our troops entrenched on the sea shore.  

In other areas close to the traditional leisure facilities of the resort, defences were to be compromised but not dismantled. On Eastborough (opening onto the Foreshore Road), ‘A footway can be made through this entanglement providing the Corporation do the work’. In this case, something of an impasse seems to have occurred in relations between the Corporation and ACMA, as the work had still not been completed in early April. This is evidenced by a letter from a local business owner, Mr T. Wilson, forwarded by the Town Clerk, Sydney Jones, to the Borough Engineer on 8 April 1915:

Could you kindly let me know if there is any prospect of an opening being made in the barbed wire barricade outside my premises my business is being affected to an alarming extent owing to pedestrian traffic being diverted and the fact that one of my display windows is entirely blocked up with wire across it. I think it is high time something was done in this case otherwise I might as well shut the place up it is not worth my while standing in it.

The response of the Borough Engineer, Harry Smith, to Mr Wilson two days later betrayed a degree of frustration at the military command’s hesitation. After all, even under common law, the ACMA could ‘enter private land in order to erect fortifications’. Furthermore, under DRR 2, dating from 28 November 1914, the ACMA could ‘take such steps as may be necessary for placing any buildings or structures in a state of defence’. Smith stated: ‘For your information, I would say that the Council have had several interviews with the Officer Commanding with a view to the removal of this barricade, but so far they have been unsuccessful in their efforts’. This encounter seems somewhat strange when seen in relation to correspondence between Mayor C.C. Graham and Brigadier-General Nickalls a month earlier, when the barricades at the precise location of Mr Wilson’s business were earmarked for removal ‘to allow free passage on footpath on one side’ [emphasis in
original]. This suggests - given Mr Wilson’s location at the corner of Eastborough and Sandside – that the side of the street left open was likely to be the one opposite Wilson’s shop (the left-hand side when facing Eastborough from the seafront).

In late April 1915, after accusations fielded towards the Corporation by Lieutenant Colonel W.M. Smith regarding the unwarranted removal of barricades, the Borough Engineer offered this acerbic riposte:

[… I visited the entanglements on the North Side and found that we had not removed any entanglements beyond those authorised at our interview on the morning of the 3rd. instant. I think that you will find that the Sea and not the Corporation, is responsible for the removal of the entanglements you refer to.\textsuperscript{188}

Here, following a very clear expression of disappointment with an incommunicative ACMA, we see a glimpse of strained relations between supposedly interrelated and even dependent bodies of wartime governance. Not only did the military command avoid responding to local authority concerns regarding the plight of the local business community, it was quick to blame the civil authorities for the loss of certain defences, drolly attributed by the borough engineer to the ravages of coastal erosion. The above also suggests that military authorities prioritised particular areas of the defensible coast only three months after a bombardment that had shattered the town, while scaling back only slightly areas still apparently deemed to be of risk. This is likely to have been in response to a declining threat of naval bombardment, just as the likelihood of aerial attack rose, while reflecting the operational difficulties of coastal defence.\textsuperscript{189}

Clearly, initial preparations for further attack following the December 1914 raid were drawn up with the town’s geographical placing in mind, as it was conducive to the landing of enemy troops. It was eminently exposed, with businesses and residences accessible just yards from the beach; hence, the rapid building of roadblocks and barbed wire entanglements at the entrance and at regular intervals along prominent streets. The negative criticism of the defensive measures, most notably by members of the business community, was driven by economic concerns. The town was reliant on seasonal trade in the summer and during public holidays, including Christmas, which had been heavily affected by the bombardment and wider privations of war during 1914. Further disruption to the local economy through invasive defensive installations, even out of season, was perceived by some to promote the

\textsuperscript{187} SL, UBC, N.T. Nickalls to ‘Mr Graham’, 23 March 1915.
\textsuperscript{188} SL, UBC, Harry Smith, Borough Engineer to Lieut. Col. W.M. Smith, 22 April 1915.
\textsuperscript{189} George Morey, \textit{The North Sea} (London: Frederick Muller, 1968), 229.
ruin of local businesses and therefore the economic backbone of the town. The dismissive response of various government departments to the Scarborough petition against increased defences suggests that there was an essential disjuncture between the efforts of military and government planners – who viewed Scarborough in light of its recent experience of bombing and its exposure to the North Sea – and civilians attempting to continue their lives amid the disruptions of wartime, with a view to economic stability and to post-war recovery.

Conclusion
The governance of the fledgling civil defence measures developed in response to the bombardment of the north-east coast in December 1914 entailed the cooperation of military and civil authorities, with responsibility for precautionary activities reserved largely for the latter. Military authorities in Scarborough and Hartlepool were quick to prepare the coastline in case of a second bombardment or attempted invasion, while in Hull Northern Command, in concert with a critical public, put pressure on the War Office to provide more anti-aircraft guns and better physical defences for the city. In all of the case studies, Defence of the Realm Regulations provided the framework for preventive measures, relying primarily upon reductions in lighting in private homes, business premises and public streets. Early warning systems, in the form of buzzers and sirens, were developed across the region, with Hull leading the way in experimenting with sounds and positions from which to sound the alarm. Furthermore, the advent of this anti-bombardment technology required considerable cooperation across the region, and garnered considerable attention from local authorities across Britain.

Across the region, the still-raw experience of bombardment loomed over attempts in early 1915 to install better precautions and defences, evidenced most clearly in definitions of prominent buildings being in the ‘firing line’, with particular walls facing towards the likely direction of enemy fire. As the threat of further naval bombardments lessened in likelihood, the firing line was less easy to delineate, though many of the guidelines devised for the benefit of public safety remained largely the same. Watch committees and educational officials at the local level were dynamic in utilising buildings surrounding schools for shelter. This was particularly the case in Whitby and Scarborough.

While the dynamic character of the ACMA sought to respond rapidly to changing conditions, it was at times hamstrung by its reliance on the central state. When better defence installations, anti-aircraft guns and equipment were required, the local military authority was forced to appeal repeatedly to an unresponsive War Office in Whitehall. At other times, the
ACMA and its non-military partners exercised considerable agency, particular when it came to devising civil defence precautionary advice and navigating the complexities of lighting regulations. As the threat of aerial bombardment increased and the likelihood of naval attack lessened, relations between local civil and military authorities became strained, especially as defensive installations were seen to hamper seasonal trade. Indeed, as a meeting in London on the relief of ‘East Coast Distress’ put it, coastal inhabitants had borne a ‘special burden’ owing to their geographical situation.\(^{190}\) In reality, though the experience of bombardment was shared across the region, it was the less well defended seaside resorts, particularly Scarborough, that were seen to have sacrificed most. For some Hartlepool commentators, this view – based on fame Scarborough’s fame and unfortified status – obscured the greater loss of life in Hartlepool and West Hartlepool: ‘The authorities… seem to have overlooked the fact that we were by far the worst sufferers by the bombardment’. Indeed, given the shocking loss of life in these fortified towns, intoned the Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, ‘the defences should be more adequate to the work which is expected of them’.\(^{191}\)

This chapter has explored in detail three of the four facets of civil defence introduced at the outset: military defence of the coastline and potential enemy targets; lighting regulations and early warning systems; preventive and preparatory public information and literature about comportment under bombardment. While the fourth - related to the forces responsible for enforcing such measures - has been glimpsed, its complexities will be explored fully in the subsequent chapter. While the shifting boundaries and responsibilities of wartime governance have been discussed, the next chapter will explore the technological and human resources required in the implementation of home defence measures. Indeed, while wartime structures of governance dispersed responsibility for public safety both beyond and below the local military authority, it was through the deployment of armed and unarmed agents that the Defence of the Realm Act sought to prevent further harm to life and limb, while encroaching upon the boundaries of the hitherto sacrosanct space of the home.

\(^{190}\) ‘To-day’, Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 21 December 1914, 2
\(^{191}\) Ibid.
CHAPTER 6: Agents of implementation and enforcement: policing DORA

Introduction
The onset of hostilities in August 1914 saw the wholesale mobilisation of civil society in order to propagate the war at home and abroad, in a process that became known as ‘total war’. While thousands of fit men were required to fight in Britain’s voluntary army, many millions remained at home and continued to live under the straitened circumstances brought about by war on an industrial scale. This mass of non-combatants was an important consideration for government and military planners, who saw the potential for social disorder within the fluid context of the war, especially as substantial elements of the economy were affected by changed trading conditions, labour shortages and rising prices for everyday goods. Though initially concerns were primarily focussed upon the panic that would be induced by enemy invasion, from 1917 the government saw ‘industrial and revolutionary unrest’ as likely, in light of the Bolshevik revolution and ongoing civil war in Russia and increasing trade union militancy at home. Hence, efforts at surveillance and information gathering, through the auspices of the Intelligence Branch of the military General Staff, concentrated considerable resource upon these constituencies. However, as David Englander notes, the central state and its agents were granted considerable powers by the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) and its regulatory framework (the Defence of the Realm Regulations or DRR), empowering most of all the military and criminalising ‘vast areas of everyday life’. However, as this chapter explores, power was not exercised in a simply top-down fashion. Rather, the responsibility for policing the civilian population and enforcing emergency regulations was shared by a shifting coalition of actors, including local authorities and the police.

In addition to central government and local authorities, the police played an increasingly central role in the reinforcement of wartime public safety and security regulations. While regular, salaried police forces maintained a presence, with the pressures of military recruitment their numbers were much diminished. The dearth of regular police officers meant that an ancillary force was required to quell potential civil disturbance and, in

194 Ibid., 25.
the context of a growing bombardment threat, to guard military targets such as factories and bridges. A voluntary policing body, the Special Constabulary, was raised to deal with the rapidly changing situation on the home front. This was comprised mainly of men unable to join the military front or engage in any other form of useful wartime work, owing to either fitness or age. Not only was there a need to enforce emergency regulations related to the safety of civilians under threat of attack, what was seen by many as an unpredictable and potentially unruly group required a visible and material policing presence. The introduction of the ‘specials’ in urban streets reassured and irritated civilians to varying degrees, with some seeing these agents as overly bold in their trespasses upon the privacy of the home in order to extinguish lights. For others, they were a vital, public-spirited force comprised of selfless patriots wishing to defend their home from attack. Specials themselves often felt underappreciated by the wider structures of the police and the public at large, though popular culture engaged with the figure of the special and its role in spotting approaching aircraft and guarding ‘vulnerable points’, often as a figure of fun.196

Debates about the growing prominence of special constables abounded in the press, usually surrounding the usefulness of the force and its relation to the military. In policing journals, specials were accorded a secondary status, behind that of regulars, as the ‘amateur brothers’ and ‘temporary helpers’ of the professional force, and were criticised by some serving officers as undermining regulars’ pay.197 Any sense of enmity was denied by some writers, who stressed that the ‘general testimony of the ordinary Policeman is appreciative of the good manners and kindly sympathies of the Specials’.198 However, their growing wartime importance was recognised, evidenced by the introduction of regular features for the Special Constabulary in titles such as the Police Review and Parade Gossip, including regular news digests and discussions through the correspondence pages, in addition to targeted advertising.199 For some, the line was blurred between the military and the specials as, if the latter were expected to police the panicked civilian population in the event of an invasion (possibly repelling the invaders by force), then it was logical that they should be armed. However, as this chapter demonstrates, while the question of an armed police force remained vexed throughout the conflict, common law undermined such an occurrence. Fundamentally,

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police officers occupied the same status as civilians, doing a job (in uniform) traditionally expected of a public-spirited citizen in the event of malfeasance. Similarly, for the government and military, an armed force of what were essentially civilians was seen as a hindrance in the event of a hostile landing. Though a number of forces were apportioned rifles by the War Office, they were to be stripped of them in the event of a landing. It was the perceived ‘exigencies’ of war that made the boundaries between agents so difficult to maintain.\footnote{\textit{War Exigencies}, \textit{Police Review}, 10 March 1916, 115; Charles Townshend, \textit{Making the Peace: Public Order and Public Security in Modern Britain} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 63.} If the regular police were so stretched, who was to take their place? With the military primarily focussed on fighting abroad, and home defence undertaken by voluntary Territorial soldiers, would the auxiliary police require arms in order to aid its colleagues in repelling an invading force? Did war justify such a shift in the role and perceptions of the police in civil society?

Earlier chapters have discussed the lack of scholarship exploring emergency legislation and regulation, particularly the effect of these frameworks upon beleaguered civilians. The historiography of policing during the First World War is similarly limited in scope and number, particularly with regards the Special Constabulary. For historians such as Brock Millman, the implementation of emergency regulations was fundamentally about the prevention of upheaval and revolution, notably radical politics and militant trade unionism.\footnote{Brock Millman, ‘British Home Defence Planning and Civil Dissent, 1917-1918’, \textit{War in History}, 5 (2) (1998), 204-32.} André Keil and Patrick Graham provide perspectives on DORA that tackle its political (civil-military relations), legal and constitutional facets, though with scant regard for the consequences of emergency legislation for those under threat of bombardment.\footnote{André Keil, ‘States of Exception: Emergency Government and ‘Enemies Within’ in Britain and Germany during the First World War’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Northumbria University, 2014); Patrick Graham, ‘Public Order in Britain’s Wartime Emergency, 1914-18: The Defence of the Realm Act’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Queen Mary University of London, 2015).} David Englander makes a similar case in his earlier work, focussing primarily on surveillance and the collation of intelligence.\footnote{Englander, ‘Military Intelligence’, 24-32.} He has also presented a more rounded view of DORA and the enhanced role of the police and particularly the Special Constabulary. This was a voluntary force capable of steeling civilian resolve, by providing a visible presence in the streets. It was presented concurrently as a guard against constitutional damage, preventing the encroachment of the military into everyday civilian settings by mobilising elements of the citizenry.\footnote{Englander, ‘Public Order’, 92, 97.} Historians of the modern police have generally agreed that the role of the newly
raised auxiliary force was in response to the exceptional circumstances of the war, an eminently practical exercise given the pressures placed upon regular officers needed for the front, though the role this force played in wider structures of governance has not received due attention. Those interested in the state have underlined the further encroachment of central government agencies into the everyday lives of citizens, signalling the decline of liberal ideas and forms of governance. However, what these historians do not provide is a thorough analysis of wartime urban governance, through which the DRR were implemented, which went beyond (and below) that of the central state. As historians such as James Greenhalgh and David Edgerton have argued, twentieth century wars facilitated the further growth of an interventionist state, though this shift was built upon conditions inherited from the previous century: a period of liberal hegemony regarding conceptions of the state and its relation to civil society and the individual. Certain techniques of liberal governance enabled subjects to be free, with material and social facets (the ‘technosocial’) guiding conduct, encouraging self-regulatory behaviours. We see a similar process at work during the First World War, where the installation of material defences was combined with the circulation of public safety information, under the influence of technical experts such as city planners and engineers.

In the case of wartime policing, it is appropriate to speak of a diffused power, circulating through varying levels of governance and public administration, especially as police forces remained within the purview of local authorities during the First World War, though the war essentially facilitated a more central role for the Home Office in guiding the activities of regional police forces. The war elevated the role of chief constables above that of the watch committee and, by the early 1930s – in light of a growing need for counterinsurgency planning - the direct responsibility of the Home Office for public order

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209 This was achieved through the establishment of regional conferences of chief constables, co-ordinated and hosted by the Home Office from 1918. These events allowed attendees to reflect upon wartime experience of cross-force co-operation in order to manage wartime emergency policing. See Critchley, *A History*, 182-3.
was secured, and police forces’ accountability to the local authority severely undermined.210

This chapter presents the Special Constabulary as a dynamic body that was central to the enforcement of DORA and the DRR. Though local government and policing authorities became increasingly centralised after the war, during hostilities neither the central state or military were solely responsible for guarding against naval or aerial attack.

In the context of total war, many DRR related expressly to civilians and their comportment under bombardment, as well as in the conduct of their everyday lives. While the special constable’s duties were seen as exceptional in some ways, they were largely related to the policing of quotidian behaviours and the inculcation of war-specific attitudes. While specials were initially envisaged to ‘fill up the gaps’ left by regulars who had attested to fight, their stature grew throughout the war, mainly owing to their eminently local character and ideological underpinnings, within in the frameworks of wartime sacrifice and ‘social morality’.211

The ACMA dispersed responsibility for elements of nascent civil defence among regional and local agencies.212 Local authorities, through the auspices of the watch committee, worked closely with the nominally independent chief constable, to devise public safety plans and distribute safety information.213 We have already seen evidence of this dispersal of power in the preceding chapters. Foremost in the actual enforcement of DORA regulations were the special constables, a voluntary force drawn predominantly from the respectable working and middle classes. The modern Special Constabulary was founded in the early nineteenth century as a ‘back-up force’ to aid regular police officers in emergency situations, usually expected to take the form of civil disturbance or disorder. The 1831 Special Constables Act built upon similar acts introduced in 1673 and 1820, which allowed for the temporary recruitment of citizens in response to specific emergencies, a historical precedence that was not lost on contemporaries.214 The First World War required the regeneration of this force, particularly as military recruitment put an immense strain upon

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211 Bourne, 11; Englander, ‘Public Order’, 98; Townshend, Making the Peace, 61; Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 103.
police regulars, including chief constables, many of whom had military backgrounds. As David Wall notes, many chief constables were ‘enticed’ back to their old regiments at the onset of hostilities. The Special Constables Act, introduced in 1914, adopted similarly opaque language to that used in the DORA and DRR, with the exigencies expected in war implicit in the caveat that ‘His Majesty may, by Order in Council, revoke, alter, or amend any Order in Council made under this section as occasion requires’ [emphasis added]. What also made the 1914 Act markedly different to earlier Acts was a shift from recruitment only at a time of national crisis or revolt, to one specifically related to war conditions. Point I (1) (a) stated:

that the power to authorise the nomination and appointment of special constables under the Special Constables Act, 1831, may be exercised although a tumult, riot, or felony has not taken place or is not immediately apprehended […] [emphasis added].

This was a ‘war-created police force’, which responded to war conditions and was underpinned by forms of ‘civic duty’ and ‘local patriotism’. For some, including the policing press, the outbreak of war brought the expected conduct of non-combatants in the war context into sharp relief, consequently blurring the boundaries between the police and military: ‘The Police will doubtless will be largely concerned in the maintenance of good order within our own borders. They are in effect soldiers for the protection and peace of the home life of the nation’. As this chapter will demonstrate, though both the regular and voluntary arms of the constabulary remained civilian in character, they nonetheless took part in regulating the significantly militarised spaces that many towns and cities became under bombardment.

Though common law specified that the ‘private citizen, the parish constable, the special constable, and the police constable may be regarded as so many species of the same genus’, it was still unclear early in the war as to whether special constables would be conferred the same ‘statutory powers… exceeding those conferred on private citizens’.

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217 Ibid.
law, the difference between private citizens and police constables was the latter’s duty to arrest those suspected of a felony ‘whether a felony has been committed or not’. In contrast, private citizens had a similar duty under the law to arrest wrongdoers, but they were required to have actually witnessed an offence first. The open-ended and potentially malleable legal character of the Special Constabulary, adapted to the exigencies of war, also led to debates about whether the police should be armed during particularly fraught periods. Indeed, a conference of War Office and Home Office representatives was proposed in December 1914 to discuss the changing status of the police in wartime. By early February 1915, the question was settled. Sir Edward Troup, Permanent Under-Secretary to the Home Office, made clear that the forces of law and order would retain a non-combatant status:

In this connection I am to inform you that the possession of arms by the police, for the more efficient maintenance of law and order under present conditions, does not constitute that body a part of the armed forces of the Crown, or give them the position of combatants. The police, therefore, should on no account use arms, or commit any act of hostility against armed forces of the enemy, and they should not carry arms if the area in which they are acting is occupied by the enemy.

Even in the event of a hostile invasion or occupation, the police were not to take part in military operations. This was in accordance with a position held by the War Office since the onset of hostilities. The police were a ‘non-combatant body and, therefore, without the rights and protection afforded to belligerents by the law and customs of war’. Such orders did not prevent a debate among chief constables about the value of a professional-looking Special Constabulary to distinguish itself from civilians and the military, though full uniforms were not compulsory. In some cases, as in London during the Lusitania riots of June 1915, the use of armlets was not enough to discern specials from ordinary civilians, leading to their involvement in violent clashes, as the men still wore largely civilian dress. In Hull, uniform caps were introduced in 1917, to the chagrin of some specials, while the local authority also provided badges and regulation trousers, ‘made from Corporation standard

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221 Ibid., 51.
223 The National Archives (TNA), HO 45/10940/227740, ‘Status of Police in event of hostile landing’ file (1914), Home Office to War Office, 7 December 1914.
224 TNA, HO 45/10940/227740, ‘Status of the Police in the event of a hostile landing’ file (1915), Sir Edward Troup, circular to chief constables, 2 February 1915.
225 TNA, HO 45/10940/227740, ‘Status of Police in event of hostile landing’ file (1914), War Office to Home Office, 29 August 1914.
serge’. Targeted advertisements, published in February and July 1915, still depicted the special constable as a smartly dressed civilian with an armlet, much like the force raised to police strikes in 1911 (Figure 6.1).

**Figure 6.1** British Commercial Gas Association advertisement, 1915.

![Image](image.png)


The policing press from the very first weeks of war anticipated that special constables might be construed by some as an inferior sibling to the regular force. In late August 1914, the Police Review and Parade Gossip referred to the exceptional circumstances of the war to pre-empt potential conflicts among the regulars and specials, particularly if a special rate of pay was used in recruitment drives:

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[It] should be remembered that men called up temporarily for pressing emergency may have to be tempted by something more than ordinary Police pay, and that the regular Policeman has lasting employment, and the secure future provided by his pension. […] Our advice to the regular Constable is – always make friends of all the Citizens. Special circumstances afford special opportunities in this direction. To depreciate others is not the best way to exalt oneself.\(^{229}\)

Furthermore, regulars would be more likely to maintain their pay and conditions by ‘compelling the esteem of temporary helpers [rather] than by repelling them in any spirit of envy or discontent’.\(^{230}\) Later in 1914, disaffection among Birmingham regulars was reported, due to specials being paid in excess of the regular rate of pay to encourage new recruits.\(^{231}\) This resulted in counter-claims by ‘temporary helpers’ that remuneration would actually lead to resignations. Service as a special constable was, for some, a strong display of patriotism, ‘the only opportunity of doing something, and the Police themselves readily acknowledge the value of our assistance’.\(^{232}\) The *Police Review* reflected on the state of regular-special relations in August 1916, concluding that adverse criticism fielded during the previous two years was not justified. Rather, war service would improve the standing of the police in the post-war period when specials were no longer required: ‘It is desirable, when the time comes for the voluntary service to cease, that the Specials should retire to their citizenship with a good understanding of all that concerns the duties, the emoluments, and the difficulties of permanent Policemanship, and that the Police still remaining at the work should feel confident of the good opinion and friendly sympathy of those who have relinquished their voluntary aid to the service’.\(^{233}\) The work of special constables did aid in the duties of the increasingly stretched regular force, especially as the voluntary men undertook duties outlined in emergency legislation as specific to the war context and therefore less in the purview of professional policemen, who were needed for more serious crime. Though convictions fell during the conflict, the extra duties imposed by war conditions still advocated for an auxiliary force to lighten the load of regulars.\(^{234}\) The switch from ‘ordinary’ to wartime ‘special duties’ impacted policing priorities, with petty theft and ‘general problems of order on the streets’ now secondary to the enforcement of the DRR and guard duties that aided the

\(^{229}\) ‘Special Constables for the War Crisis’, *Police Review*, 28 August 1914, 419.

\(^{230}\) Ibid.


\(^{232}\) ‘News of “Specials” in Brief’, *Police Review*, 16 October 1914, 505.

\(^{233}\) ‘Regulars and Specials’, *Police Review*, 11 August 1916, 349.

military authorities. Furthermore, many petty offences were simply reported less often or went unnoticed by officers.  

The ad hoc organisation and provision of special constables’ uniforms was connected in some quarters with the working conditions of the unpaid volunteers. The public were reminded that, despite the provision of some regulation items by local authorities, the men themselves bore the brunt of the expenses incurred in the course of duty. A particular cost was related to ‘replenishing certain articles of their wardrobe which are bound to suffer while they are on duty, such as boots and overcoats’. This explains the prevalence of targeted advertisements, particularly in Hull, where gas fireplaces, hardwearing soles and asbestos-lined coats were all marketed to specials. Indeed, consumption was seen as central to the special constable’s duties, a way in which the men coped with the cold and boredom of their beat: ‘One hears of “specials” enjoying a fragrant pipe on duty, and others being entertained, not with cakes and ale exactly, but with hot coffee, very grateful indeed to the “inner man” on these blighting “Spring” nights, when the wind is colder than mid-December’. Other popular representations evoked cold evenings and early mornings, in bad weather, huddled in a sentry box choked by the fumes of a coke fire, often with little to do: ‘When the night wind cuffs you and the neighbourhood is too enviably asleep to amuse you any longer, you make up your coke fire and seek the shelter of your sentry box’. Commentators joked about the propensity for inordinate layers of warm clothing: ‘massive garments which would make a South Pole constable spend his pocket money buying fans’. Indeed, the cold led some serving specials to complain that they were ill-treated by the local authority, given a lack of welfare provisions:

In most of the other big towns the “Special” is well looked after, being supplied with leggings and mackintoshes, etc. They are even given hot drinks, but we have to stay contented with nothing, but to go on duty, like in the last case, from 8 p.m. till after 2 o’clock in the morning (nearly frozen all the time).

236 ‘Special Constables’, *Globe*, 30 October 1915, 2.
239 ‘Our Captious Critic’, *Illustrated Sporting and Dramatic News*, 20 February 1915, 18
The special’s ‘second arm’ was a vacuum flask, the contents of which would spur a ‘[solemn] debate round our coke fires on the various advantages of filling it with beef tea or “sailor’s tea”’.\footnote{Our Captious Critic, \textit{Illustrated Sporting and Dramatic News}, 20 February 1915, 18. ‘Sailor’s tea’ is black tea flavoured with rum.} Or perhaps it would be coffee, as Milkmaid Brand hoped for their ‘wonderfully sustaining and stimulating’ instant \textit{Café au Lait}.\footnote{Milkmaid Brand \textit{Café au Lait} advertisement, \textit{Police Review}, 18 December 1914, 615. In the summer months, Milkmaid suggested that specials use the same product to make ‘Café Frappé’, a ‘delicious and refreshing cold beverage, which will be appreciated after a spell of afternoon duty in the sun-baked streets’. See ‘A Delicious Beverage’, \textit{Police Review}, 25 June 1915, 303.} The early mornings associated with beat and guard duties were not only proof of the steadfast patriotism of specials, they sharpened the men’s hatred of the enemy: ‘If… the Special goes to bed, he can be certain that when his alarm clock explodes at 1.15 a.m. at that moment his hatred of the Kaiser will be all that his King and country demand of him’.\footnote{Our Captious Critic, \textit{Illustrated Sporting and Dramatic News}, 20 February 1915, 18.} Despite inhospitable nights and mornings ‘spent craning our necks skywards’, some commentators suggested the volunteers were overlooked or, at best, treated with indifference by the authorities: ‘Not even for me the excitement of being criticised. One the contrary, I am simply neglected, ignored’.\footnote{Our Day of Rest, \textit{The Bystander}, 17 February 1915, 30; ‘Our Captious Critic’, \textit{Illustrated Sporting and Dramatic News}, 20 February 1915, 18.} It is clear that some specials and their adherents wished for this voluntary force to be properly integrated into the wartime economy of sacrifice.\footnote{Gregory, 245.} This was justified by the deaths of officers in the line of duty, though the boredom and inclement conditions that often greeted them when working were foremost in justifications of the force. Other critics from within the Special Constabulary drew direct parallels between their own voluntary patriotic duties and that of soldiers in the trenches. A letter to the \textit{Daily Mail}, reproduced in the \textit{Police Review}, stated:

\begin{quote}
[I’m] not sure that we Special Constables are not the most modest, heroic, and self-sacrificing of all the men of action in this war. \textit{We} get no kudos, there are no subscriptions to buy \textit{us} dainties; nobody sends \textit{us} cigarettes and tobacco; no girls glance at \textit{us} in the streets with that ‘there’s one of the dear fellows’ look; no correspondents photograph \textit{us} under the railway bridge; no one writes poems about \textit{our} cheerfulness by the reservoirs; no one talks of how \textit{we} dream of home when we fall asleep at the gas works; no one writes letters to ‘the lonely Special’; no one gets out of bed to see ‘the boys come home.’ And what sort of a reception do you think we should get if we came home at two in the morning singing ‘Tipperary’?\footnote{News of “Specials” in Brief, \textit{Police Review}, 22 January 1915, 38.} Though such testimony was not common, it and other examples of culture from within the police ranks, particularly poetry, made both clear and oblique parallels with the living and
working conditions of soldiers on the Western Front.\textsuperscript{248} Just as Tommies were hunkered down in trenches and bunkers, special constables were assailed by unpleasant coke fires and long hours in inclement weather, sheltering from the elements in makeshift sentry boxes.\textsuperscript{249} Though the parallel may not be fair in hindsight, for contemporaries it was easy enough to make and leant upon a prevalent language of sacrifice, which framed wartime service.\textsuperscript{250}

Police forces that borrowed arms from the War Office shortly after the outbreak of war (‘for the protection of vulnerable points’) were, by February 1915, advised to relinquish any unused weapons.\textsuperscript{251} Furthermore, the rifles authorised for use by guards at ‘vulnerable points’ were not to be used and, in the event of a hostile landing, handed to the military. The War Office kept accounts for the rifles and pistols disseminated to county and city police forces. Hull and Scarborough each possessed 25 rifles, though neither Hartlepool nor West Hartlepool were assigned any individually.\textsuperscript{252} A circular signed by Sir Edward Troup stated that if in the event of invasion, the:

\begin{quote}
circumstances should render it impossible for the arms to be surrendered to a Fortress (Garrison) Commander before the approach of a hostile force, they should be deposited, also by previous arrangement, in the Town Hall or Municipal Offices in order that, if the town should be occupied, they may be declared to the Commander of the hostile force by the Mayor or other responsible Civic Authority.\textsuperscript{253}
\end{quote}

This circular was distributed to chief constables across Britain, including at a county level the North Riding and Durham, and at city and borough level, Hartlepool (Durham), Hull (East Riding) and Scarborough (North Riding).\textsuperscript{254} West Hartlepool was not included.\textsuperscript{255} This was

\textsuperscript{248} Officer-penned poems that made direct references to battle front experience published in the \textit{Police Review} included ‘A Lonely Special’s Song’ (22 January 1915, 39): ‘Round the waterworks I’m roaming./ While the night rain falleth fast;/ Water’s everywhere and – though I do not/ swear - / I can feel a chilly blast!’; ‘And now we’re off in single file,/ To tramp with willing feet’ (‘The Special Constable’, 25 September 1914, 468).
\textsuperscript{249} Brantz, ‘Environments of Death’, 74.
\textsuperscript{250} Gregory, 133; Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 103.
\textsuperscript{251} TNA, HO 45/10940/227740, ‘Status of the Police in the event of a hostile landing’ file (1915), Sir Edward Troup, circular to chief constables, 2 February 1915.
\textsuperscript{252} TNA, HO 45/10940/227740, ‘Status of Police in event of hostile landing’ file (1914), ‘Rifles issued to certain police forces’, c. December 1914.
\textsuperscript{253} TNA, HO 45/10940/227740, ‘Status of the Police in the event of a hostile landing’ file (1915), Sir Edward Troup, circular to chief constables, 2 February 1915.
\textsuperscript{254} Ibid., ‘List of Separate Police Forces’; TNA, HO 45/10750/266118, ‘Emergency measures: question of withdrawal of police from occupied areas’ file (1918), Sir Edward Troup, Home Office circular to chief constables, 25 February 1918.
\textsuperscript{255} At this time, Hartlepool, as a municipal borough, possessed its own police force, Hartlepool Borough Police. West Hartlepool was incorporated as a county borough in 1902 and was therefore independent of Durham County Constabulary jurisdiction. Though detailed information is scarce, a body known as West Hartlepool Police was referred to in local media during the period. See Anon, ‘West Hartlepool’, \textit{Hartlepool History Then & Now}, http://www.hhtandn.org/venues/1333/west-hartlepool (accessed 25 January 2019); \textit{Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail}, 1 October 1914, 6; \textit{Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail}, 7 February 1917, 2.
presumably because it was not provided with any weapons in the first place. The Special Constabulary in Hartlepool and West Hartlepool was, after all, small and responsibility for ‘vulnerable points’ (bridges, factories, gas works) is likely to have fallen to Territorial soldiers to a greater extent than in Hull, a much larger conurbation with a greater need for non-military civil forces.\footnote{In reports published during 1917-22, there were approximately forty special constables in West Hartlepool, around 150 in Hartlepool and 3,000 in Hull. ‘Special Constables at Hart Church’, Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 21 May 1917, 3; ‘Hartlepool Police: Chief Constable’s Annual Report’, Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 26 February 1918, 4; ‘Hull “Specials” Gift to Ex-Chief Constable’, Yorkshire Post, 15 December 1922, 9.} After all, Hartlepool, prior to the bombardment, was home to two companies of the Durham Royal Garrison Artillery (RGA), which primarily manned trenches and the guns of the Heugh and Cemetery Batteries.\footnote{Frederick Miller, The Hartlepools and the Great War: A Record of Events in the History of the Hartlepools during the Great War 1914-1919 (West Hartlepool: Charles A. Sage, 1920), 85; TNA, AIR 1/564/16/15/79, ‘Hostile raids and bombardments of the English coast’ file, ‘2nd Raid, The Hartlepools, Scarborough and Whitby, Wednesday, December 16th 1914’, ‘The bombardment of the Hartlepools’.} Therefore, special constables in the towns were primarily responsible for patrolling the darkened streets and ‘knocking up’ residents in advance of air raids. They were also engaged in first aid duties following the 1914 raid, a situation for which they were prepared with widely circulated educational information, rather than training classes.\footnote{Chris A. Williams, Police Control Systems in Britain, 1775-1975: From Parish Constable to National Computer (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), 92; ‘Books for Police Officers’, Police Review, 7 August 1914, 383; ‘The Police and First Aid’, Police Review, 18 June 1915, 296; ‘The Police and First Aid’, Police Review, 27 August 1915, 419.} This reflected an already extant self-educational culture within the police, with educational supplements common in the policing press, aiding promotion and highlighting technical aspects of police duties.\footnote{Miller, 110.}

Given the size of the group assigned to the north-east ward of Hartlepool (covering at least a portion of the docks and industrial facilities), consisting of 45 specials, it can be supposed that some of these men were accorded some responsibility for guarding potential military targets.\footnote{TNA, HO 45/10940/227740, ‘Status of Police in event of hostile landing’ file (1914), ‘Rifles issued to certain police forces’, c. December 1914.} Of course, it is also likely that Durham’s consignment of weapons was seen to be adequate to cover both of ‘the Hartlepools’, though it again only possessed 25 to cover the city of Durham itself, Hartlepool and Gateshead.\footnote{‘Self-defence for Special Constables’, Police Review, 27 November 1914, 572.} It is perhaps due to this mixture of ambivalence and outright opposition to an armed voluntary police force that the policing press, even beyond the ubiquitous truncheon, posited other means of self-defence. From November 1914, instruction in the Japanese martial art of ju-jitsu was given through illustrated weekly instalments.\footnote{Miller, 158.} The instructions, written and demonstrated pictorially by
martial arts pioneer William Garrud, were suggested as a helpful supplement to the truncheon, which ‘has to be carried in the trousers pocket, and it would take a second or two to take it out’. This time lag would leave the special constable vulnerable to attack, particularly from stabbing weapons or pistols.\textsuperscript{263} Particular self-defence manoeuvres were seen as useful for repelling remonstrations with the public and were not uncommon in the context of emergency public safety regulations.\textsuperscript{264} Ju-jitsu manuals were also advertised especially to special constables, given that their duties ‘depend upon a brainy use of their physical powers in dangerous emergencies’.\textsuperscript{265}

The Special Constabulary and policing the DRR
While broadly concerned with issues of public order, special constables were expected to undertake work related to the fallout from air raids; mainly, ensuring that bystanders did not approach pieces of hot shrapnel or unexploded ordnance, collecting any such debris for the police authorities, and the stop-and-search of motor cars for violations of lighting regulations. The men were generally unpaid, though they received some expenses and had badges and, eventually, uniforms provided by the local authority.\textsuperscript{266} However, it is interesting to note that War Office orders to Northern Command (covering Hull, Whitby, Scarborough and Hartlepool) in April 1915 - signed off by Director of Home Defence, L.E. Kiggell - outlined only the detailing of roadside ‘pickets’ to enforce DORA lighting regulations and arrest suspected enemy alien spies. Indeed, these same guidelines admitted the distinct possibility of ‘attack by aircraft… in the immediate future’ and the fear that enemy agents may use ‘motor cars equipped with powerful lights’ to signal enemy craft.\textsuperscript{267} Such activities extended the pre-war notion of public order to one of social order; in other words, a concern with the minutiae of everyday civilian life under the threat of bombardment. Hence, notions of public safety were also at the heart of these efforts. Later guidelines saw the role of special constables as central to the control and welfare of populations fleeing in advance of an invading enemy: ‘[They] should withdraw with the inhabitants, endeavour to direct and control their

\textsuperscript{265} Advertisement for \textit{Ju-jitsu Self-defence} by W. Bruce Sutherland, \textit{Police Review}, 31 March 1916, 151.
\textsuperscript{266} ‘Tenders for Trousers’, \textit{Hull Daily Mail}, 3 December 1914, 6.
\textsuperscript{267} TNA, AIR 1/564/16/15/79, WO 79/6899 (H.D.), The General Officer, Commanding-in-Chief to Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command, 15 April 1915.
movements, so as to prevent them embarrassing the movements of the military, and assist in providing them with food and accommodation’. 268

As discussed previously, DORA rules were often open to interpretation by those charged with enforcing them. With a lack of guidance from central government, local authorities policed lighting regulations according to local conditions, while reaching out, through correspondence with government, to attain a degree of clarity. Of course, local government and regional ACMA activities could also be subjected to scrutiny and interpreted differently according to the position of those charged with safeguarding public safety. A March 1916 memorandum to the officers of the North Riding Constabulary outlined officers’ duties as follows:

To allay panic,
“ To deal with outbreaks of fire,
“ See that lights are obscured,
[…]
“ Patrol streets and roads as and where required and carry out orders as to lights on vehicles, and deal generally with any emergency that may arise.” 269

While vague, the first duty – ‘to allay panic’ - contained a germ of deeper significance. While it did not make clear what officers should do to allay panic, the fact that such a duty was included suggests that police officials (usually with adherence to circulars and orders handed down from the Home or War Office) saw outbreaks of panic to be likely in the period immediately following bombardment. Taken as a piece, it may be suggested that all such duties were seen to work toward the public good in some way, in that they related to managing the newly calculable risks of aerial bombardment. 270 Urban spaces had to become ‘knowable’, subjected to social and material practices, and bodies of knowledge, focussed upon defence and public safety. 271 This partly reiterated the image of the respectable ‘Bobby’: the idealised ‘self-sacrificing defender of the public’. 272 In short, the appearance of a well-organised and visible force for public order was required to reassure embattled citizens. In 1917, as war-weariness set in, such a presence was vital to ensure the ‘re-

269 NYCRO, QP (MIC 1392), 6 March 1916.
mobilisation’ of civilians for the war effort. This reasserts the idea that the modern police, from its inception, was largely preventive in scope, with notions of public protection often underwritten by hegemonic masculine tropes, especially given common techniques of physical surveillance to prevent disorder, extended in the war context to include the regulation of everyday behaviour. Handbooks distributed to specials prized observation above all else. A 1918 example stated:

A Constable who patrols his beat with unseeing eye, or who through concentration of thought on a subject foreign to his duty, is oblivious to all that is going on around him, or who engages in animated discussion or argument with another, might as well be at home. The duty of a Constable is to see everything possible that transpires in his vicinity, and he can only hope to do this by concentrating his attention on his work, and utilising his powers of observation to the full.

A 1922 report estimated that Hull possessed around 3,000 special constables during the run of hostilities, out of a male population of approximately 136,000 (two per cent of the total) (Table 6.1). In February 1918, the chief constable of Hartlepool reported there to be 150 special constables in the town, down slightly from the same month in 1917, drawn from a male population of 5,750 (2.6 per cent). Figures published in 1915 give a total of 184, so the number recruited appears to have declined slightly year-on-year (3.2 per cent). West Hartlepool, covering a much larger area, was reported to possess 350 special constables, including group leaders and despatch riders, recruited from a male population of 30,400 (1.2 per cent). Therefore, we can see here that relatively more of the male population (allowing for inaccuracies caused by the loss of men to the armed forces) in Hartlepool were recruited

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to the specials during the run of hostilities. Though we can only speculate as to the precise motivations of local men for becoming specials – beyond ineligibility for military service on grounds of age or fitness - in local terms it may be suggested that the threat of further bombardment or even invasion was felt more acutely at the headland and near to the docks of Hartlepool itself.

Table 6.1 Special constable numbers related to population size and number of DORA public safety infractions, 1914-18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Total male population (% of overall total)</th>
<th>Special constables (% of male pop.)</th>
<th>DORA infractions (offences per special constable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hull</td>
<td>277,991</td>
<td>136,000 (49)</td>
<td>3,000 (2)</td>
<td>2,279 (0.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartlepool</td>
<td>11,442</td>
<td>5,750 (50)</td>
<td>184 (2.6)</td>
<td>95 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Hartlepool</td>
<td>61,658</td>
<td>30,400 (49)</td>
<td>350 (1.2)</td>
<td>512 (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarborough</td>
<td>37,201</td>
<td>15,580 (42)</td>
<td>240 (1.5)</td>
<td>824 (3.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitby</td>
<td>11,139</td>
<td>4,940 (44)</td>
<td>20 (0.4)</td>
<td>163 (8.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: A Vision of Britain through Time, total population and gender statistics (1911 census); Yorkshire Post, 15 December 1922; Hull Daily Mail, 21 November 1918; Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 26 February 1918; Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 21 February 1917; Yorkshire Post, 19 August 1915; Scarborough Mercury, 1 April 1915; Whitby Gazette, 1 December 1916.

When the number of available special constables is set alongside the statistics related to transgressions of DRR, the picture is further complicated (Tables 6.2 and 6.3). As the data shows that far more offences were prosecuted in West Hartlepool, it may be suggested that the number of special constables available meant there were ample officers to ‘catch’ offenders and a visible presence of police to deter rule breaking, particularly the showing of lights at night. The much larger number of cases brought before the court in West Hartlepool also testifies to the effectiveness of the local force, though it must be borne in mind that the population was three times that of Hartlepool. It should be noted that Hartlepool possessed, at its height, 184 special constables, and 95 DORA offences were prosecuted (0.5 offences per special constable), while West Hartlepool’s numerically stronger force of 350 led to 512 offences (1.5 offences per special constable) going before the court. Hartlepool’s force also formed a higher percentage of the local male population (3.2 per cent in 1915, 2.6 in 1917) than West Hartlepool (1.2 per cent). Therefore, it can also be said that Hartlepool’s Special Constabulary was potentially very effective preventative force, though relative to total population, only 0.8% of both Hartlepool and West Hartlepool committed an offence against DORA.
West Hartlepool’s relative shelter behind the peninsular of Hartlepool headland, combined with the position of the hostile vessels, accounts for the difference in levels of damage (Figure 6.2). However, given the greater concentration of population in West Hartlepool, more people were killed there. In light of this experience, one might assume a doubling of preventive policing in West Hartlepool, but the lower number of special constables raised suggests that the fortified, legitimate military targets in Hartlepool – the batteries, defensive trenches and Coast Guard station – were seen to require a more numerous force, particularly to guard ‘vulnerable points’. However, orders given to the attacking German fleet did not omit targets at the docks, engine factories and gasworks at the north-west and south-east of the North Basin in West Hartlepool, close to docks in both towns (including Central Dock to the south-west and Victoria Dock to the north-east) (Figures 6.3 and 6.4).\footnote{280 Witt and McDermott, 111.}
Figure 6.2 Partial map depicting the position and movement of the enemy vessels.

Source: Hartlepool Museums and Galleries. Used with permission.
Figure 6.3 Partial map of Hartlepool and West Hartlepool, 1923.281


281 Contemporary maps of good quality not available for reproduction here.
It should be noted that the population of Hartlepool/West Hartlepool was concentrated more densely than the sprawling urban port city of Hull, so it is probable that fewer men were needed for home and civil defence duty, especially given the demands placed upon eligible men to enlist for the armed forces. The figures are also relative to population size: 2.6 per cent of Hartlepool’s male population were enrolled as special constables, and 1.2 per cent of West Hartlepool’s male urban residents. Similarly, in Hull, two per cent of the male population was enrolled. 1,800 special constables were raised in the North Riding County Council district (including Whitby and Scarborough), though it is difficult to ascertain the exact proportions of men across the area, which included other towns, such as Ripon and Northallerton. Approximate figures do survive for Scarborough – ‘about 240’ - in the form

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283 ‘Recognition of the North Riding Special Constables’, Yorkshire Post, 19 August 1915, 7.
of an April 1915 news report, and it should be noted that Scarborough had its own police
force at this time, Scarborough Borough Police, led by Chief Constable Henry Windsor.  
It is, however, unclear whether such numbers were sustained throughout the war, making the
figures far from conclusive. If we take the available numbers at face value, 1.5 per cent of
Scarborough’s male population (15,580) joined the Special Constabulary. In Whitby,
though few records related to special constables are extant, one commentator remarked in
December 1914 that, following the bombardment:

one neither saw, nor have heard of them being in evidence as such last week. May we
publicly ask who they are, and where they may be found – for the future guidance of
the inhabitants, especially the helpless old people and young children.

Though it should be assessed with caution, given the paucity of sources for Whitby on this
subject, an estimate of at least 20 special constables is possible, according to a newspaper
report on a constabulary social event in 1916. This was drawn from an urban male
population of around 4,940 (0.4 per cent). Whether accurate or not, it is likely that few
men would have been raised for the Special Constabulary in Whitby, where no military home
defence planning was developed, though local and regional civil defence information was
distributed throughout the war. The pressure of military recruitment would have also been
more keenly felt in a smaller conurbation, with a substantial young male demographic,
though military recruitment campaigns generally tended to yield better results in larger towns
and cities, as recruiters could move systematically through populous districts. Though an
accurate figure is difficult to obtain using census data, approximately 39 per cent of the local
male population were of military age. This percentage was roughly mirrored in
Scarborough, while close to fifty per cent of the male population in Hull, Hartlepool and

284 ‘Scarboro’s “Specials”’, Scarborough Mercury, 1 April 1915, 6; Anon, ‘Scarborough Borough Police’,
286 Whitby Gazette, 24 December 1914, 6.
287 ‘Local and District News’, Whitby Gazette, 1 December 1916, 4.
289 NYCRO, Z.1028, North Riding Lieutenancy, ‘Forewarned is Forearmed’ pamphlet, February 1918;
NYCRO, ZW (M) 15/2, Emergency Committee for the Whitby Petty Sessional Division, ‘Notice: Bombardment or Raids’, 7 October 1915.
West Hartlepool were eligible for military service according to age alone. 292 In addition, it was not an officially ‘fortified’ location and, though much was made of the damage to Whitby in pamphlets and postcards, it was slight when compared with the other shelled locations. 293 It is worth remarking that Whitby was second only to Scarborough in terms of percentage of the local population who defied DORA regulations related to lighting and public safety (with 1.5 and 2.2 per cent respectively) (Tables 6.1 and 6.4). These figures possibly reflect the local Special Constabulary’s efficiency in carrying out its tasks, especially as local civil defence information was frequently issued during the war. 294 This suggests that the expectation of further attack did not abate, though it shifted towards the threat of aerial bombardment by Zeppelins. However, there is evidence that the local force itself was organised on an ad hoc basis, particularly as it was unclear to some if the Special Constabulary was a separate entity to the Territorial Force, while orders were not always promptly received by the new intake. 295 Furthermore, following the December 1914 bombardment, the already extant Special Constabulary in the town was not a visible presence, as evidenced by contemporary reports. 296 In the national police press, similar complaints as to delays in beginning duties or not receiving the necessary equipment (truncheon, whistle and armlet) were frequently raised. 297

Given the relatively small number of voluntary police across the case studies, one might expect their anti-bombardment precautionary activities – many carried out within the confines of DRR – to have had little influence on the majority of people in the areas covered. Numbers were stretched at various points in the war, just like the regulars they were replacing. However, relative to the level of personnel available, the policing of the DRR appears to have been efficient if, at times, its strength was low and its tactics improvised. Only a meagre percentage of the population of each locale committed a public safety-related offence against DORA, perhaps pointing to the effectiveness, overall, of the Special Constabulary in helping to maintain civilian resilience. The frequent evocation of rudimentary civil defence guidelines throughout war must also have had its effect on both defining the limits of the law, and assuring non-combatants that particular actions were

292 Hull 47%, Scarborough 43%, Hartlepool 46%, West Hartlepool 47%.
293 Seven deaths were attributed to the bombardment in Whitby, though only two were ‘officially’ declared the direct result of shelling. See Marsay, 486-7.
294 NYCRO, Z.1028, North Riding Lieutenancy, ‘Forewarned is Forearmed’ pamphlet, February 1918; NYCRO, ZW (M) 15/2, Emergency Committee for the Whitby Petty Sessional Division, ‘Notice: Bombardment or Raids’, 7 October 1915.
296 Whitby Gazette, 24 December 1914, 6.
297 Police Review, 2 October 1914, 82; Police Review, 2 November 1917, 350.
necessary to guard against future attack, prompting self-regulatory behaviours.\textsuperscript{298} On the whole, as with many of even the most negative aspects of the war, the general public acquiesced.\textsuperscript{299}

Evidence from both newspapers and court records suggests that, for some people in residential areas, the duties of special constables and regular officers could infringe upon the assumed sanctity of the home and the conventions of individual privacy. This is remarkable given that the first DRR stated that ‘The ordinary avocations of life and the enjoyment of property will be interfered with as little as may be permitted by the exigencies of the measures required to be taken for securing the public safety and the defence of the Realm’.\textsuperscript{300} The sheer number of custodial sentences and punitive fines handed out to civilians by civil courts also suggests that efforts to police everyday behaviour were not entirely successful. The policing of activities taking place within the confines of the private home – namely, using gas and electric lighting at night - was literally beyond the reach of officers, meaning a legal recourse was viewed as an effective way to discourage further infractions. However, this did not prevent officers from crossing the assumed boundary between the public and private spheres. The indefinite and often vague language used in DORA proclamations is key to understanding the actual enforcement of the DRR. Length of sentence and level of fine varied depending on the seriousness with which the offence was treated in the regulations. Standardised fines were set for the most routine infractions, though these remained flexible, while charges of potential signalling with lighting equipment were taken more seriously.

In July 1915, an ‘important case’ came before Hull magistrates ‘involving the question of the nature and extent of powers possessed by special constables’. On this occasion, John Henry Patrickson was accused of ‘obstructing a special constable in the execution of his duty’.\textsuperscript{301} The duty in question was an attempt to enter the Manchester Hotel (where Patrickson was a guest) at around midnight on 8 June 1915, in order to extinguish a light visible from the outside. According to the prosecution, Patrickson kept a special constable waiting eleven minutes at the entrance before admitting him into the premises. Prior to this, Patrickson had opened the door, rudely exclaiming ‘What the devil do you want?’, before closing the door in the officer’s face. His defence rested on his being a guest at the hotel and thus not legally obligated to open the door, in addition to a contention that

\textsuperscript{299} Townshend, 57; Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 100.
\textsuperscript{300} TNA, ADM 1/8397/370, Defence of the Realm Regulations, 12 August 1914, Reg. 1.
\textsuperscript{301} ‘Powers of Special Constables’, \textit{Hull Daily Mail}, 23 July 1915, 8.
special constables did not possess the same powers as regular officers. However, the prosecution reiterated that, despite earlier evocations of the limits of the Special Constabulary (‘they had no power to enter licensed premises’), ‘[by] the definitions contained in the Special Constables Act, 1914, all the powers of ordinary police constables belonged to special constables, both in their own and in adjoining districts’. This also accorded with common law statutes. Given the length of time the special constable was kept waiting at the door, a crowd gathered to view the affair, beginning with around fifty and swelling to more than 200. A witness stated that the crowd was ‘angry’, but it is unclear if this was because of the actions of the special constable or of the defendant. Patrickson was eventually fined £3. 12s. 6d. (if in default, 30 days’ imprisonment).

A similar complaint was raised in March 1916 towards members of the Hull Civic Guard. During a period of alarm, a group of young women were assailed by a member of the Civic Guard, who ‘rudely ordered’ that they cross the street, presumably to escape an expected source of danger. However, given that this was the opposite direction to where the group were travelling to get home, the women politely refused. The officer then pursued the women, asking for their names. For the women, this was stepping beyond the realms of appropriate behaviour for a voluntary officer, one which did not account for the stress and fear induced by the expectation of an air raid: ‘He did not consider what a shaking the “buzzer” gives people! Civility becomes everybody. But perhaps he wanted to show his authority.’ Though a legal case did not follow this incident, it is clear that the authority of special constables and the Civic Guard could not be assumed to be respected by the public at large. Indeed, the actions of these officers were seen to induce further panic during particularly fraught periods, a view explored in greater detail below. Other insinuations were made against special constables, including claims of drunkenness by disgruntled defendants summoned for breaches of lighting regulations. In the case of a Hartlepool Co-operative Stores assistant who allowed a light to shine on the roadway outside of the shop, rather than explicitly related to specials committing acts inappropriate within their expected duties, the allegations took advantage of the stores being situated near a public house, in addition to the specials’ essentially civilian and therefore unprofessional status.
off-duty special constables rushing to the pub or drinking ‘on the job’ were not uncommon in satirical magazines and newspaper recollections, though popular periodicals such as the *Illustrated Sporting and Dramatic News* and the *Graphic* depicted the force as a hardworking and ‘eminently sober body’.³⁰⁹ For some, a drink could be justified given the dreary nature of guard duty:

Upon a certain night the specials had been on duty about six hours in the docks section of the Old Town. An elderly man came up to the leader of the group and said, “Will you have a drink, sir?” The man kept a small public house nearby.

“Yes,” was the answer. It was a very cold night, and the drinks (consisting of whiskey and lemonade) were handed round to the other specials. Needless to say they were much appreciated.³¹⁰

In 1916 and 1918, there were a number of documented cases of verbal assaults upon special constables attending to anti-bombardment duties. In the main, these duties entailed knocking on the doors of both private residences and business premises, whose inhabitants had not properly shaded their windows, leaving a light visible from above or, in the case of Scarborough and Hartlepool, the sea. Two cases are of note, both situated in the Hartlepool headland administrative district. The first case took place in late November 1916, when Thomas Murray was accosted by an officer regarding an ineffective window blind:

I saw a bright light coming from the downstairs window of 18 Princes Street, defendant’s residence. The window had a dark blind up but it was too small. 2 inches margin on each side unshaded allowing the lights of a paraffin lamp to shine on to the roadway & on the building opposite. I knocked several times on the window & after about 10 minutes Murray shouted out “Who’s that”. I said “police. Put that light out”. He replied “F--- you, I will not”. I could not get into the house to put the light out so I pulled the window down & then saw the defendant on the [illegible] & again asked him to put that light out. He made the same reply, so I leaned over through the window & put the light out myself.³¹¹

Murray’s brazen use of a profanity towards a representative of authority is striking, as is his wish to disregard his orders once received. This, in addition to the Hull case, may reflect the relatively lowly status of the policeman during this period as, prior to 1918, the officer on the

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beat held no inherent powers higher than that of an ordinary citizen. As the British constitutional lawyers, Thomas Baty and John H. Morgan, put it in 1915: ‘The line which separates the powers and duties of the police from those of the private citizen is even to-day somewhat indistinct’.312 It also reflected (as Greenhalgh has found among Second World War householders), the feelings of some civilians that DORA regulations, promoted in the name of public safety and home defence, were intrusive and tedious.313

Regular and special constables were drawn from the community they served, though the auxiliary officers sought to plug gaps left by enlisted men were still expected to possess a firmly respectable bearing and background.314 The propensity of some officers to trespass upon the traditional boundaries of civil life and the precepts of the English ‘common-law mind’ may have clashed with this expectation. In effect, by reaching into the offender’s window to put out the light himself, the Hartlepool officer was undermining the constitutional caveat contained within the first DRR: ‘The ordinary avocations of life and the enjoyment of property’.315 However, given the ambiguity of English common law generally, the ability of the constable to undertake such actions with impunity is understandable. In common usage, concepts such as ‘the rule of law’ often implied that ‘obedience to law must be signalled by visible law enforcement’. Together with the extraordinary conditions thrown up by the war, such actions could again be justified.316 Indeed, a wide range of agents and powers were included in DRR 11, which focussed on the ‘Control of Lights and Sounds’:

\[
\text{[A]ny police constable, or if no police constable is available, any soldier, sailor or airman on}
\text{sentry patrol or other similar duty, may extinguish or obscure any light which is not}
\text{extinguished or obscured in accordance with the order, and for that purpose may enter any}
\text{premises and stop and seize any vehicle [...].}317
\]

The second Hartlepool case involves a similar domestic setting. The testimony of special constable George Marshall was noted in a case against Elizabeth Kinsburg:

312 Baty and Morgan, War, 50.
315 Townshend, 5; TNA, ADM 1/8397/370, Defence of the Realm Regulations, 12 August 1914, reg. 1.
316 Townshend, 5.
317 Cook, DORA Manual, 98.
In this case, the combined presence of two special constables and a regular police constable was not enough to deter Kinsburg in breaking DORA lighting regulations. Her actions betrayed a lack of understanding of the seriousness of breaking the DRR, while ignoring an actual air raid warning. This could suggest a mistrust or dearth of respect for the police, but, importantly, it could also point to different attitudes to civil defence vigilance at varying points in the conflict. By March 1918, Zeppelin air raids had, according to official figures, affected the East Riding, Durham, Lincolnshire, Lancashire and Warwickshire, with the highest death toll occurring in Durham on 12-13 March: eight dead, including four children. The majority of injuries were suffered by women, 19 out of a total of 39.\(^{319}\) When these dates are cross-referenced with contemporary newspaper accounts – by this point patently less concerned with revealing bombed locations – it is found that this raid affected Hartlepool directly.\(^{320}\) Therefore, it is surprising that a civilian living in a recently bombarded area would so flagrantly ignore calls to seek safety and obscure all lights, only a week after a deadly raid.\(^{321}\) A lack of respect for the police should also not be assumed, especially since many special constables, possessing varying degrees of respectability, were drawn from the community they served.\(^{322}\) Therefore, in the areas where these cases took place, officers were likely to have been of working-class stock. Nevertheless, for her intransigence, Kinsburg was eventually fined 19s. 6d. (or 14 days’ imprisonment in lieu of payment).\(^{323}\)

In Scarborough, the local press reported abuse directed towards special constables by soldiers stationed in the town. Thomas Kennedy, of the 10th Supernumerary Company West Yorkshire Regiment, was summoned to the Police Court for using “threatening language in a certain public place called Falsgrave-road, with intent to put persons in fear, on the 15th


\(^{321}\) Though it must be said that, more broadly, concern among commentators had moved away from naval and Zeppelin bombardment to the patently deadlier aeroplane, as evidenced by attacks on London in 1917 and early 1918. See White, *Zeppelin Nights*, 211.


November, 1915”. The direct threat made by Kennedy towards special constables Richardson and Cliff concerned the apparent ‘pimping’ of the voluntary officers in Falsgrave Park. In this context, ‘pimping’ referred to the act of informing on someone, a now archaic rendering of the term. Therefore, Kennedy was affronted that a ‘man cannot take a girl for fair sport without some ---- pimping us’. The mayor, present at the hearing, raised the ubiquitous notion of wartime duty and sacrifice, while an allusion to services rendered to ‘the community’ underlined a concomitant notion of working-class citizenship, as would prove common in Hull with the advent of civilian street patrols (explored below). This had been foremost in earlier recruitment drives to the Special Constabulary by the local press in April 1915, with local identity and affiliation at the heart of the performance of duty. This included a uniform ‘cap with a replica of the Scarborough Coat of Arms on it’. As if to reinforce the interrelation of wartime policing with ideas of public safety, as well as duty, citizenship and local patriotism, the specials were said to ‘give an increased feeling of security to the inhabitants’ by ‘looking out for anyone likely to cause annoyance or trouble’. With this in mind, rather than receiving fear-inducing threats, the special constables ‘needed encouraging’ owing to their ‘services for the good of the community’ and ‘valuable work’. In the end, it was declared by the magistrate that ‘the Park was under the control of the military at the present time, so there could be no question of any pimping’. Therefore, the soldier’s threatening behaviour appears to have been based on a view of the Special Constabulary prejudiced by wider debates as to the efficacy of the force and its role in undermining rights to personal privacy.

In July 1916, this concern was expressed in more constructive language by a Scarborough boarding-house keeper and borough councillor who came before the court on charges of disobeying calls to shade or obscure lights at his property. The complaint made against Frank White – ironically, the incumbent chair of the local council’s lighting committee – was both made and received in accordance with conditions specific to the town’s seaside character. This included evidence suggesting ‘that a light was visible over the top of the blind of the front bay window on the second floor facing the sea’ [emphasis added]. It is the latter detail that was marked in the case of both Hartlepool (though not West

324 ‘Soldier Threatens Special Constables’, Scarborough Mercury, 10 December 1915, 6.
325 Ibid.
326 ‘Scarboro’s “Specials”’, Scarborough Mercury, 1 April 1915, 6.
327 ‘Soldier Threatens Special Constables’, Scarborough Mercury, 10 December 1915, 6.
328 Ibid.
Hartlepool) and Scarborough court records as a separate offence to other forms of lighting transgression on domestic or commercial premises.330 This demarcation not only reflected the geographical locations of the bombarded towns, but a continuing fear of being exposed to further naval bombardments. However, it must be noted that White was not prosecuted on this occasion owing to a protest couched in terms that reflected his own business interests and the wider economic wellbeing of the town:

Councillor White, in the box, said he was outside his house, and standing very near the special constables – six in number on the particular night. They were engaged in conversation for about twenty minutes or half an hour, and he wished publicly to protest against the noise that was made by “specials” every night. The Corporation were doing their best to advertise the town, whilst the “specials” were doing their best to drive visitors away.331

White’s claim that tourists were being ‘driven away’ by the actions of ‘over-zealous’ special constables was evidenced by another claim; namely, that a party of four visitors had organised to stay at his boarding house on the Saturday following the alleged offence and subsequently ‘went away, evidently expecting a Zeppelin raid or something’.332 Rather than meaning to make a criticism of the Special Constabulary per se, White instead complained, as a businessman and politician, ‘in the interest of the town’.333 This suggests that, for some, the presence of special constables, especially in large numbers, could be construed as a cause for alarm, given that such a presence would presuppose unfavourable business conditions during the second summer season of the war. After all, just as such forces could provide assurance that action was being taken to defend the townspeople from harm, they could also be seen as markers of impending enemy action.

Other residents, including holidaymakers, were perturbed by the willingness of special constables to infringe upon personal privacy under the auspices of policing the blackout. Harry Fowler, a visitor staying at a boarding house with his wife in July 1916, was fined ten shillings for showing a light visible from the street.334 Amendments to the DORA (Consolidation) Regulations in June 1915 potentially incriminated ‘not only the servant or visitor temporarily controlling the lights but the hotel-keeper will be guilty of an offence’.335

330 West Hartlepool was no less exposed than Hartlepool, though its docking facilities were comparatively sheltered by Hartlepool and its jutting peninsula. See ‘Boundary Map of West Hartlepool CP’, A Vision of Britain Through Time, http://www.visionofbritain.org.uk/unit/10054369/boundary (accessed 9 May 2018).
Though he received the fine with good grace, the report of Fowler’s court appearance notes that ‘[the] only thing he objected to was that when he and his wife had got to sleep the special constable went with two other special constables and insisted on him going downstairs. They asked numerous questions and took voluminous notes’. Most remarkably, ‘[they] wanted to examine his bedroom, but his wife being there he told them they could not do that. He thought that really they might have gone next morning, and not have awakened the whole household’. It is evident that DORA regulations did indeed embolden some special constables to transcend the traditional boundaries of personal privacy and, to some extent, decency. Though Fowler’s response was reasonable – ‘The last thing he wished to do was infringe the Act’ – this nevertheless provides an instance of where the actions of authorities were deemed excessive, even when the spirit or principles of the regulations received broadly popular support (or at least ambivalent acquiescence). However, some official guides for special constables were clear on how far an officer could go in carrying out his duties. This included James Batley’s *Elementary Guide* (1918): ‘Don’t be officious, provocative, meddlesome, or overbearing, conduct of that kind does far more harm than good, and is an abuse and misuse of your powers’.

**Measuring the efficacy of DORA: court records**

The tables in this section outline infractions made against DORA regulations pertaining to lighting and public safety, as these were the primary form of anti-bombardment defence utilised in all of the case studies, apart from naval activities and military installations. Though there are variations, as explained below, these offences were broadly defined by the site in which they were committed and the character of the offence. Categories, therefore, take the form of: lighting not properly shaded in a house or business; light visible from the sea; light emitted by external fires, flashlights or fireworks; the use of photographic equipment on docks or defensive works; shop curfews to prevent the showing of lights at night; trespassing on docks or defences. The data are derived from handwritten court records (petty sessions) held in local and regional archives as hardbound volumes. In the case of Hull, the court records were intimidatingly numerous, spanning twenty-eight volumes for the relevant period. In the case of Scarborough, Whitby and ‘the Hartlepools’, the process was less arduous but the records remained detailed and varied in their form. In all cases, the research

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337 Ibid.; *Townshend*, 58.
process entailed painstakingly counting each offence associated with DORA and DRR, reading each page in detail and noting details about the offence as well as noting its location and type of property (often omitted), the occupation of defendants (if provided) and finally tallying the number of offences. There were omissions and inconsistencies in the records, which are noted in greater detail below. Despite this, the data is indicative of the primary forms of infraction against DORA and in all cases presents clear temporal changes as the war progressed.

The tables will be analysed in order to discern trends and divergences across the case studies, with a view to assessing the local significance placed in the DORA and DRR by civilians living in places affected and threatened by bombardment. The extent to which these regulations cemented the blurring of public/private boundaries will be traced, most patently the encroachment of agents of the ACMA into the private realm of the home, and the criminalisation of quotidian activities which were not discouraged in the pre-war context. For example, the use of cameras in seaside towns, the showing of lights in shop windows and houses, and the striking of matches. The fines and custodial sentences levied at individuals who disregarded regulations will be discussed in order to establish whether civil legal bodies regarded particular offences with a greater degree of seriousness than others, with reference to the specific place in which the act was committed.

| Table 6.2 Borough of Scarborough DORA offences, 1916-18 (of case studies total: 21%) |
|----------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
|                                  | 1916 | 1917 | 1918 | TOTAL |
| Home                             | 293  | 319  | 177  | 789   |
| Business premises                | -    | -    | 2    | 2     |
| External lamp/fire               | 10   | 6    | 3    | 19    |
| Chimney fire                     | 1    | 1    | -    | 2     |
| Light visible from sea           | 1    | -    | 2    | 3     |
| Shop curfew                      | -    | 6    | 1    | 7     |
| Photography                      | -    | 1    | 1    | 2     |
| Trespassing (defences, docks)    | -    | -    | -    | -     |
| **TOTAL**                        | 305  | 333  | 186  | 824   |

N.B. Scarborough Municipal District: 1911 population = 37,201. 2.2% of population commit a DORA offence related to public safety.

Table 6.3 Borough of Hartlepool DORA offences, 1914-18 (of total: 2%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1914</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1916</th>
<th>1917</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business premises</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External lamp/fire</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimney fire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light visible from sea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shop curfew</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photography</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trespassing (defences, docks)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. Hartlepool PA/CB (Parish-level Unit): 1911 population = 11,442. 0.8% of population commit a DORA offence related to public safety.


Table 6.4 West Hartlepool DORA offences, 1914-18 (of total: 13%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1914</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1916</th>
<th>1917</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business premises</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External lamp/fire</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimney fire</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light visible from sea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shop curfew</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photography</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault of Special Constable</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obstructing officer on DORA duties</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoking on docks</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trespassing (defences, docks)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. West Hartlepool CP (Parish-level Unit): 1911 population = 61,658. 0.8% of population commit a DORA offence related to public safety.

### Table 6.5 Whitby DORA offences, 1915-18 (of total: 4%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1916</th>
<th>1917</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business premises</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External lamp/fire</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimney fire</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light visible from sea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shop curfew</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photography</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trespassing (defences, docks)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. Whitby Urban District: 1911 population = 11,139. 1.5% of population commit a DORA offence related to public safety.

Sources: NYCRO, Whitby Court Registers (Petty Sessions), 1915-18, PS/W/1/6 (1915-17) and PS/W/1/7 (1917-18); A Vision of Britain through Time, [http://www.visionofbritain.org.uk/unit/10173541/cube/TOT_POP](http://www.visionofbritain.org.uk/unit/10173541/cube/TOT_POP) (accessed 14 March 2017).

### Table 6.6 Hull DORA offences, 1914-18 (of total: 59%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1914</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1916</th>
<th>1917</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business premises</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External lamp/fire</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimney fire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light visible from sea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unshaded vehicle lights</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shop curfew</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obstructing officer on DORA duties</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photography</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ship lighting/sound</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signalling (incl. fireworks)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoking on docks</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trespassing (defences, docks)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>2279</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. Kingston upon Hull MB/CB: 1911 population = 277,991. 0.8% of population commit a DORA offence related to public safety.

Sources: Hull History Centre, C DPM/2/137, Magistrates Court Minutes, Jul-Sep 1914; C DPM/2/138, Sep-Nov 1914; C DPM/2/139, Nov-Dec 1914; C DPM/2/140, Dec 1914–Feb 1915; C DPM/2/141, Feb-Apr 1915; C DPM/2/142, Apr-Jun 1915; C DPM/2/143, Jun-Jul 1915; C DPM/2/144, Jul-Sep 1915; C DPM/2/145, Sep-Oct 1915; C DPM/2/146, Oct-Dec 1915; C DPM/2/147, Dec 1915-Jan 1916; C DPM/2/148, Jan-Mar 1916; C DPM/2/149, Mar-May 1916; C DPM/2/150, May-July 1916; C DPM/2/151, July-Sep 1916; C DPM/2/152, Sep-Oct 1916; C DPM/2/153, Nov-Dec 1916; C DPM/2/154, Dec 1916-Mar 1917; C DPM/2/155, Mar-May 1917; C DPM/2/156, May-Jun 1917; C DPM/2/157, Jul-Sep 1917; C DPM/2/158, Sep-Nov 1917; C DPM/2/159, Nov 1917-Jan 1918; C DPM/2/160, Jan-Mar 1918; C DPM/2/161, Mar-Jun 1918; C DPM/2/162, Jun-Aug 1918; C DPM/2/163, Aug-Nov 1918; C DPM/2/164, Nov 1918-Feb 1919; A Vision of Britain through Time, [http://www.visionofbritain.org.uk/unit/10136295/cube/TOT_POP](http://www.visionofbritain.org.uk/unit/10136295/cube/TOT_POP) (accessed 16 April 2018).
The first clearly discernible trend among the data was the much higher number of offences related to lighting in domestic premises. While there is a lack of clarity in some records as to whether a defendant committed the offence in a home or business (particularly so with the Hull registers), nevertheless in each of the case studies the clear majority were largely committed in residential neighbourhoods. Allowance must also be made for the absence of data related to 1914 for Whitby, and 1914-15 for Scarborough. However, given relatively low figures for 1915 in Whitby, a seaside town with a similar character despite a smaller population, it can be assumed that if this data were available the overall picture would not be substantially affected. Similarly, the figures for 1914 in each table are negligible. In addition, while the number of vehicular infractions was high (particularly in Hull, where they formed 22 per cent of the total), the figures are particularly unreliable due to the fact that only a limited number of defendants were prosecuted for DORA-related vehicle lighting offences unequivocally. The majority pertained to defendants fined (paradoxically) for not showing lights while travelling, as opposed to a small number noted as being fined or imprisoned for not failing to trim the wick of a lamp or, for example, ‘failing to obscure an acetylene lamp on bicycle’.

Therefore, these offences have been omitted from the tables. In the case of Hull, where some infractions were clearly marked as related to the improper shading of vehicle lights, these have been included.

The geography of offence is also important here, though it cannot be mapped conclusively for any of the case studies, given that postal addresses or specific neighbourhoods were not consistently noted in court records. In Hull, where data on the location of DORA offences is available, offences did not occur further than four miles to the north from the mouth of the Humber (Beverley Road); to the west, no further than two miles (Hessle Road, De La Pole Avenue); to the east, no further than three miles (Aberdeen Street, Holderness Road). The majority, though pertaining to residential properties, were in the city centre or in areas close to docks and industrial facilities (Figure 6.5). This zone of offence was not only considerably built up at this time, with many residential districts - being near to the centre and maritime commercial heart of the city - it was also substantially policed and the site of a number of potential enemy targets.

In Hartlepool and West Hartlepool, the majority of offences took place in heavily residential areas close to docks and factories. Indeed, where addresses are available in court records, the subsequent picture is off an arc of

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339 HHC, C DPM/2/159, Magistrates Court Minutes, Nov 1917-Jan 1918, 11 December 1917.
340 Table 6.6, sources.
offences surrounding the port at the confluence of West Hartlepool and Hartlepool (including the headland).\textsuperscript{341} In Scarborough, the data does not consistently note the specific location of the offence, so a clear pattern cannot be discerned. However, given that the vast majority of offences in the town occurred in residential properties, it can be assumed that the residential districts to the north-west of the town bore the brunt of DORA policing, in addition to the town centre. A clear pattern of offence location is not discernible for Whitby, which was a much smaller town, with a third of the population of Scarborough. However, it is again likely that accommodation situated in the town centre and residential districts was the primary site of lighting offences, as borne out by the court records.\textsuperscript{342}

\textbf{Figure 6.5} Map of areas where DORA offences were committed (sample) (1930s map), represented by stars.

Sources: Digimap.edina.ac.uk; Tables 6.1-6.5, sources.

Notwithstanding the fact that multiple offences were committed by some defendants (though the majority were separate cases), Scarborough saw the highest number of infractions against lighting regulations (2.2 per cent of the population within the municipal district), with 96 per cent of cases committed in the home. 1.5 per cent of Whitby’s urban population appear

\textsuperscript{341} Tables 6.3 and 6.4, sources.

\textsuperscript{342} Tables 6.2 and 6.5, sources.
to have engaged in similar activity, with 88 per cent of cases taking place on domestic premises. In the Borough of Hartlepool (encompassing the headland closest to the sea, including Heugh Battery), less of the population appear to have broken DORA regulations (0.8 per cent), though a majority were committed in the home (45 per cent), followed by business premises (including hotels, shops and theatres, at 26 per cent). In West Hartlepool, with a large number of homes further inland, 0.8 per cent of the population acted against lighting regulations, but a higher number of activities were committed on business premises. This included hotels, warehouses, bakeries, clubs and cafes. While Hull similarly saw 0.8 per cent of its population engage in compromising behaviour, 40 per cent of offences occurred on domestic premises (32 per cent within businesses). Perhaps unsurprisingly, given its size relative to the other case studies, Hull also witnessed the highest number of offences when the case studies are taken together, with 59 per cent occurring in the city (2,279 out of 3,873). This is followed by Scarborough, with 21 per cent (824). The reason for this imbalance in numbers is due also to the range of offences possible in the different case studies, owing to the varying characters of each.

While all are united by their broadly maritime character, ‘The Hartlepools’ and Hull differ from Scarborough and Whitby, in that they were industrial ports during the period, with each possessing docking and industrial facilities deemed to be legitimate military targets. Scarborough and Whitby, on the other hand, were primarily undefended seaside ‘watering-places’ at this time, though Whitby still possessed a small fishing fleet. Frederick Miller summarised the contrasting characters of the three bombarded towns: ‘The Port of Hartlepool is for the industrially active; Scarborough for those who seek recreation in activity; Whitby favours the society of those who claim the seclusion of rest’. For this reason, the offences of trespassing on docks or defences, the showing of external lights and smoking on docks were prevalent in Hull and Hartlepool, with 13 per cent of offences in both places related to trespassing. DRR 28a and 29, preventing unauthorised entry to docks and ‘defensive works’, covered this offence. No such offences were recorded in either Whitby or

343 Ibid.
344 Ibid., Table 6.3.
345 Ibid., Table 6.4.
348 Tables 6.3 and 6.6.
Scarborough. In Hull, the city’s status as a busy commercial port was reflected in an additional offence for unauthorised signalling and the use of bright lights and hooters on ships in dock. During 1915-16, infractions by ships in the form of inappropriate use of hooters and unshaded lights rose by 50 per cent.\textsuperscript{350} Fines and their alternative custodial sentences also rose in severity throughout the period, from £2.2s or 29 days (in lieu of payment) in February 1915 to a height of £10.10s or 51 days a year later.\textsuperscript{351} However, though it cannot be deduced exactly, some fines are likely to have varied due to the size of vessel and the amount of light deemed to have been emitted, details which are not contained in the registers.\textsuperscript{352}

In addition, the offence of smoking whilst in a dock was punishable in West Hartlepool and Hull. While it was the fifth most numerous offence in Hull, the fact that it was taken separately from other external lighting infractions suggests that it was related not only to lighting DRRs, but to wider concerns about public safety. Not only did a burning cigarette show a light, the match struck to ignite it was a danger on docks with wooden jetties, and near warehouses holding timber, such as Alexandra Dock.\textsuperscript{353} Therefore, to some extent, pre-war rules about safety in docks and fire prevention were adapted in the context of a looming bombardment threat.\textsuperscript{354} This is clear in detailed court notes pertaining to Hartlepool headland in March 1918, where a Thomas Wray, surrounded by a group of colleagues, refused to cease lighting matches near a defensible area, even after an air raid buzzer had sounded. Indeed, a witness went as far as to claim that ‘[b]ombs were dropping at the time’.\textsuperscript{355} While he was chastised by his mates, Wray refused to desist and was later fined £5, plus 10s. 6d. costs.\textsuperscript{356} Again, smoking in such locations was also covered by DRR, in this case in wide-ranging rules endorsed by the Admiralty.\textsuperscript{357} The striking of matches in public places, most often to light cigarettes or pipes, was also widely punished by civil courts. This included a gentleman staying at a Salvation Army hostel in Hull, who was ‘locked up for striking a match to light

\textsuperscript{350} Table 6.6.
\textsuperscript{351} HHC, C DPM/2/148, Magistrates Court Minutes, Jan-Mar 1916, 8 February 1916; C DPM/2/154, Dec 1916-March 1917, 16 January 1917.
\textsuperscript{352} Detailed court minutes, provided by the clerk of the court, are not extant for Hull in this period.
\textsuperscript{353} HHC, C DPM/2/142, Hull Magistrates Minutes, Apr-Jun 1915, 25 May 1915.
\textsuperscript{354} Dodsworth, ‘Risk’, 40.
\textsuperscript{355} TA, PS/H/14/30, Justices’ Minute Book, Hartlepool Headland, Jun 1917-Oct 1920, 20 March 1918.
\textsuperscript{356} TA, PS/H/1/12, Register of the Court of Summary Jurisdiction in the Borough of Hartlepool, Jun 1914-Nov 1919, 20 March 1918, 222. Wray had been summoned before the court only a month before this incident for not shading lights in domestic premises. See ‘Unshaded Lights’, Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 13 February 1918, 2.
\textsuperscript{357} Cook, DORA Manual, 445.
On 25 April 1916, Hull Police Court heard 23 cases related to the striking of matches, including several in a public urinal and one outside a cricket ground. Fines as high as £2.18s. (or 30 days’ imprisonment) were levied in some cases, almost equivalent to the sentence for petty theft. Indeed, the tariff for stealing matches was almost equivalent to that levied for lighting them in public at night. Given the importance placed on this subset of the lighting regulations, special constables were asked to ‘set the example by themselves abstaining from this practice’.

Violations of lighting regulations became so routine across the case studies that fines and custodial sentences took on a semi-regular character as the war progressed. It can be seen from the tables that all of the case studies saw considerable increases first in 1915, before a dramatic spike in 1916. Hull saw a rise of more than 10 per cent between 1915 and 1916, while Hartlepool saw rates of offence rise by almost 40 per cent in the same period. West Hartlepool and Whitby witnessed rates of 8 and 30 per cent respectively. The sudden rise in 1915 reflected the shock of bombardment across the region, resulting in a concomitant rise in the policing of regulations. Both magistrates and chief constables were aware of the potential inherent in a legal recourse to punishing infractions of the DRR. Alderman Hunter, a presiding magistrate in Hartlepool, stated that ‘[the courts] were impelled to inflict fines as a protection for the defendants themselves and others who resided in the borough’.

Though lighting regulations had been a matter for home defence planners since autumn 1914, the experience of naval and aerial bombardment led to a greater degree of awareness among the agents of enforcement of the bombardment threat. Following Hull’s first Zeppelin raid in June 1915, discussion of the proper protocol for special constables following an air raid buzzer increased, while group and section leaders ramped up plans for transport to casualty clearing stations. Special constables were asked to use their cars as makeshift ambulances. Among some officers, confusion is palpable in their letters to the chief constable, who believed air raid responses to be ‘muddled’ by the action of different

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360 HHC, C DPM/2/152, Sep-Oct 1916, 19 September 1916; A defendant was fined £3.12s.6d. on 27 April 1918 for ‘Stealing 1 tin of corned beef, 1 tin of herrings & 1 tin of sardines’. See HHC, C DPM/2/161, Mar-Jun 1918.
361 A defendant caught ‘stealing a small quantity of matches’ in May 1918 was fined £3.12s.6d. or 28 days imprisonment. See HHC, C DPM/2/161, Mar-Jun 1918, 4 May 1918.
362 ‘The Lighting of Matches during Air Raid Alarm’, *Hull Special Constables’ Gazette*, 3 September 1915, 42.
363 Figures for 1916 in Scarborough have not survived.
forces working at cross-purposes. For one writer, a lack of clearly discrete duties for special constables and the Civic Guard caused problems following an alarm:

When the buzzers blow, no one seems to know anything; on every side it is “Lights out there!” All the Special Constables seem to work against one another, and when we are not united, we must realize that a break-down of the scheme is unavoidable. One cannot help but think we have a most muddled scheme regarding the Civic Guard and Special Constables. I dread to think what would happen for an Invasion Call […].

To a great extent, this confusion was understandable, particularly given ongoing debates surrounding the status of the police and of the military home defence forces. While this writer suggested that the special constables in particular were poorly organised, the dual deployment of different groups was clearly unhelpful. Beyond the specials themselves, other civilians saw the Civic Guard as an extension of the police force and not a military body for home defence. Following the mayor’s call for volunteers to the Civic Guard, one writer responded that a paucity of proper training would stand in the way of raising such a force, while ‘our worthy constables’ would offer little opposition ‘to the Germans’ rifles if they come up the Humber’. In reply, the editor of the *Hull Daily Mail* quipped that ‘Our correspondent hardly appreciates the object of the Civic Guard’.

The duties of the Civic Guard initially stated by the chief constable – who would take primary responsibility for the scheme – had clear similarities with those outlined for the Special Constabulary. They were to, ‘in case of fire, panic, or invasion, form part of an organised scheme as suggested by the military authorities’. Furthermore, the Civic Guard’s ‘special duties’ included vigilance against the ‘spy danger’ and as first responders in the event of an air raid. This was, more or less, the role already assigned to the Special Constabulary, couched in the guarded terminology of DORA. However, for those promoting the scheme and hoping to attract recruits among ‘over age’ civilians, rifle club members and other notable commentators envisaged the Civic Guard to be an essentially military force, which would be armed at the appropriate time. To this end, Lord Nunburnholme, Lord Lieutenant of East Yorkshire, argued in favour of raising local funds to purchase rifles for the Guard, costing around £7. 16s. each. However, this vision was at odds with the views of prominent figures, including the chief constable, who stressed that the military facets of the

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369 “Marksman” (nom de plume), ‘Hull Civic Guard’, *Hull Daily Mail*, 5 December 1914, 3.
370 Ibid., 1.
371 Ibid., 3.
372 ‘Non-Combatants and Invasion!’, *Hull Daily Mail*, 21 December 1914, 1.
Civic Guard’s training – including drill, requisite physical fitness and training in arms – were preparatory and ‘will result in many being made efficient to join a military body when the great necessity arises’. The spectre of the Belgian ‘francs-tireurs’ (civilian resistance fighters) was raised to reiterate the danger of civilian armed opposition, which was seen to lead to ‘reprisals of a fearsome nature’. Other commentators reminded readers that Belgium’s Civic Guard (Garde Civique) had been disbanded in late August 1914, as it was construed by the German army as quasi-military and seen to engage in fighting with enemy forces. In some cases, this led to severe reprisals against the wider civilian population in Belgium. The Hull scheme, as envisaged, was severely hampered by government guidelines (in addition to international law) on the position of civilians in the event of invasion. As such, Hull’s Civic Guard, just like the special constables, was to be disarmed ‘when the enemy were at the city’s gates’.

The Civic Guard’s recruits were to have a similar background and character to that of the special constables, in that they were to be men ineligible for military service at the front: ‘It will be open only to those who are disqualified by age or circumstances for services in the army, but are desirous of serving their country in the way most useful under present conditions’. Indeed, Civic Guard volunteers had first to join the Special Constabulary, but would not have to undertake beat duty, or ‘perform any of the duties at present managed by the police’. It would primarily act as a ‘spare time’ force that would be mobilised to ‘respond to any call when the necessity does arise, and will have to prepare for emergencies’. As such, here we see the crux of the often unclear delineation between these interrelated agents of implementation. It was something of a hybrid adaptation, embodying elements of the specials and the old militia, and expected to find its adherents among the county’s rifle clubs and the traditional milieu associated with the Volunteers and Territorial Force. In effect, this would be a Voluntary Force battalion raised on a purely civic basis, rather than a county or regional level as seen previously. Therefore, the Civic Guard was essentially seen to combine certain duties of both the Special Constabulary and the Volunteers, responsible for ‘[guarding] public buildings, bridges, railways, docks, etc.’, with the possibility of being

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373 “Marksman”, ‘Learn to Shoot!’, Hull Daily Mail, 27 October 1914, 3; Horne and Kramer, 94.
375 TNA, HO 45/10940/227740, ‘Status of the Police in the event of a hostile landing’ file (1915), Sir Edward Troup, circular to chief constables, 2 February 1915; Proctor, Civilians, 19.
377 ‘Civic Guard for Hull’, Hull Daily Mail, 19 October 1914, 1.
378 Ibid.
379 Dennis, 9.
required to ‘line the trenches on the coast’. Furthermore, enquiries were made by the city council in January 1915 as to whether certain ‘practical men’ from building and construction backgrounds were willing to ‘undertake the duties of demolishing or loop-holing buildings to military requirements’.

Given that an invasion did not take place, in addition to provisions devised by central government in order to maintain the civilian status of the police, the Civic Guard as a quasi-military body was, for all intents and purposes, the same as the Special Constabulary. It is clear, however, that some men affiliated with either one or the other title and undertook their duties according to different shift patterns and understandings of appropriate conduct. The intention of its adherents in Hull - ‘for the protection of the city in case of need, composed of persons who are disqualified by age or circumstances for service in the Army’ – did little to adapt the primary purpose of the Special Constabulary, which had both wartime public safety duties and an imagined role in the event of hostile invasion. In the case of both the Civic Guard and Special Constabulary, even if arms were supplied, they were to be taken away so as to allow the military authorities to operate unhindered. However, what the mayor’s scheme underlined was the central role given to patriotic sacrifice in the service of the city. This sense of local patriotism was capable of mobilising men to join voluntary schemes like the Special Constabulary and Civic Guard, combining an inclination to serve with a semblance of military training and esprit de corps. Away from the efforts of local officials and policy-makers, some ordinary civilians sought a similar form of ‘useful masculinity’, taking the form of ‘night patrols’. This provided a micro-local expression of patriotism not necessarily bound by conventional symbolism and with a clearly working-class complexion.

Civil defence ‘from below’
The mixture of overstretched numbers and an intermittent jostling for position in the ACMA hierarchy left areas unpoliced and lighting regulations without enforcers. In some areas, particularly working-class neighbourhoods, ‘self-elected patrols’ began to undertake duties similar to the special constables. For some, these groups were ‘stop-out-all-night cranks… a slur on our Civic Guards’. For those involved, it was a worthy evocation of patriotic

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380 ‘Non-Combatants and Invasion!’, Hull Daily Mail, 21 December 1914, 1.
381 ‘Hull Building Trades’ Employers’, Hull Daily Mail, 13 January 1915, 5
382 ‘Hull Civic Guard’, Hull Daily Mail, 16 October 1914, 8.
service: ‘We don’t want to leave all the work to the Civic Guard; we will willingly do our share’. 385

In Hull, the earliest volunteer night patrols were formed to maintain a nightly watch for enemy aircraft following the first Zeppelin raid in June 1915. Patrols were seen as corollary to the ‘buzzers’. Residents would be diligently awoken (‘knocked up’) should the alarm sound. Men unarmed and without uniforms organised their own patrols of select streets in predominantly working-class districts of Hull, mimicking in many ways the duties of the Special Constabulary. Interestingly, this does not seem to have had its mirror in Hartlepool, Scarborough or Whitby, possibly owing to the relatively lower number of air raids upon these localities. In contrast, though Hull did not suffer naval bombardment, there were eight Zeppelin raids between 1915 and 1918, resulting in 208 casualties. 386 In ‘the Hartlepools’, a combined Special Constabulary force of around 500 appear to have been deemed sufficient by the non-combatant population.

Night patrols unofficially policed the darkened streets, ensuring friends and neighbours were aware of the ‘buzzers’ and that lights were effectively shaded or extinguished. The fact that such patrols arose, organised on a street-by-street basis, suggests that ‘official’ air raid vigilance was inconsistently deployed. As Clive Emsley notes, despite the provision of central regulations, there was often little central direction as to where priorities should be placed: we have already seen above the vague language in which regulations were often framed. 387 The exigencies of the war also took their toll on the human resources required for policing DORA regulations. In Hull, while a rejuvenated force of special constables had existed since the first weeks of war, the force does not seem to have been deemed large enough to maintain a nightly watch for enemy aircraft. As local records suggest, the pressures of military recruitment and the need to direct officers to docks and factories under DRR 29 considerably stretched the Special Constabulary. 388 This was explicitly acknowledged by members of the night patrols themselves, in impassioned replies to detractors in the local press: ‘[Previous] to our patrol commencing their duty (just now a week old) it was noticed that scores of women and children would not go to bed… After the patrol is on duty, the general cry is “I’ll go to bed now.”’ 389 Therefore, this writer implicitly

386 Credland, Hull Zeppelin Raids, 111.
387 Emsley, English Police, 125.
388 Wall, Chief Constables, 52; ‘Dock Guard’, Hull Special Constables’ Gazette, 26 January 1917, 328; Cook, DORA Manual, 119.
suggested that the night patrol was necessary owing to the lack of police presence in the area (in this case, Walker Street and Adelaide Street, close to the Albert Dock). Others made a similar case that not only were alarms alone not enough, but the presence of an organised local patrol was invaluable:

I should like your correspondent “W.M.” to know that it is far more comfortable to have the “patrol cranks” patrolling the streets than have the Zepps patrolling the air. How many poor souls are there who would have been glad to have been knocked up before the Zepps came on their visit. This patrol movement has been organised so that people can go to bed and sleep knowing that someone will knock them up before someone comes to knock them down.390

Night patrols, many in areas near to docks and industrial districts, tended to be made up of men too old or too young to fight at the front, in addition to those exempted from military service.391 Indeed, its demographics in terms of age were similar to that of the Special Constabulary, though correspondence and geographic spread suggests that it was a primarily working-class force. The fact that many specials had to balance their nocturnal duties with a day job was recognised by local commentators, who called for a greater recognition of their efforts. This further underlines the similarity of night patrol duties to that of the Special Constabulary:

Nobody has said “Well done!” to our gallant and self-sacrificing “Special Constables” in Hull, and so I am going to be forward enough to give them a pat on the back, for really last week they had a “strenuous” time, too! I hear that certain of them were up until after half-past two in the morning, and although some of them went off to work at half-past five as fresh as paint, others did not. Some, too, went to work at half-past nine feeling that they not only had done their duty, but that they had one of the experience of their lives.392

Similarly, Hartlepool’s specials, or ‘unpaid guardian-helps’ were not comprised of the ‘opulent or leisured class’: ‘Rather were they hardy sons of toil who, after a day’s work, were cheerfully willing to patrol the streets at night to exclude as far as possible the danger invited by thoughtless and careless people. Strange, but true, light was a menace to security’.393 An anonymous writer remarked upon a member of a Hull night patrol:

391 Credland, plate 25; Marwick, *The Deluge*, 97.
393 Miller, *Hartlepool*, 262.
I suppose that last week-end one of them spent most of his time in bed – he was thoroughly run down. Can it be wondered at; think, three or four nights every week? It is enough to kill horses, never mind men.394

Another put forward a scheme that would provide patriotic employment for the unemployed, justified in order to safeguard the health of working-class volunteers:

Those unselfish and patriotic gentlemen who undertake this voluntary work are either losing their natural rest (so necessary after a hard day’s labour), or else losing a quarter. The deprivation of either will be very harmful to the women and children.395

This patrol comprised of “out of works”, aged between 40 and 60, would be paid ‘half a crown a night (from dusk to dawn)’, with men assigned to each street in the city and issued a ‘luminous badge (the letters N.P.)’.396 This raised the issue of visual recognition of officers, among an already crowded policing scene, though the correspondent essentially sought official acknowledgement of the extant street patrols. Therefore, the badge would also add a note of legitimacy to the force, should the city council take up the suggestions. Later efforts to draw together the disparate patrols through a central committee (including the payment of a subscription fee of 6d.) led to the introduction of a ‘button badge’ for patrol men.397

Commander of the Humber Garrison, General Ferrier, was met with outrage in September 1915 after he claimed that night patrols may have broken the law. Stating that such actions were emblematic of fear and therefore ‘contrary to the best traditions of British courage’, ‘knocking up’ neighbours was not in the interest of the ‘safety and honour of the City’.398 These remarks were echoed by the Bishop of Hull, Francis Gurdon, who added that people were generally safer indoors following a raised alarm and should not engage in an ‘exodus’ into the countryside surrounding the city (known as ‘trekking’).399 Such a response to the alarm was indicative of a lack of fortitude, indicating panic and low morale. Therefore, trekking was ‘not only contrary to the best traditions of British courage, but deliberately plays into the hands of the enemy’.400 This advice was later coupled with concerns regarding the behaviour of young men and, particularly, women when in the presence of soldiers on

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396 Ibid.
398 ‘The Air Raids on the East Coast: Are Street Patrols Illegal?’, *Hull Daily Mail*, 7 September 1915, 4. These arguments were also common during the Second World War, where trekking was assumed to be a symptom of ‘war neurosis’. See Ian Burney, ‘War on Fear: Solly Zuckerman and Civilian Nerve in the Second World War’, *History of the Human Sciences*, 25 (5) (2012), 66.
399 Credland, 53.
leave. 401 Particularly as little contrary advice was offered, civilian correspondents, many of
whom were involved in street patrols, had short shrift for such sentiments expressed by elite
figures. For most, the presence of a neighbourhood force was seen to provide a source of
confidence and relief for anxious women and children. Indeed, with ‘emotional resources’
stretched to breaking point by familial separation and air raid anxiety, such efforts were seen
as essential to civilian endurance and resilience. 402

The exclusively male demographic of the patrols added a tone of concomitant male
patriotic, patriarchal duty: the masculine bonds born within the confines of the trench had
their mirror in the activities of some non-combatant men. 403 This could, as in the Courtney
Street night patrol, cut across the emasculating effects of old age, and the undeveloped men
of the local youth. 404 In the context of a wartime ‘economy of sacrifice’, this lent men who
could not otherwise conform to codes of military masculinity a form of ‘useful masculinity’,
as Jessica Hammett has explored. 405 For one correspondent, the ‘Real Object of the Night
Patrols’ was ‘[To] allow those “nervy” ones of the weaker sex to retire at night, feeling
confident that they would be woke up on the buzzers blowing, and I am afraid that if the
patrols have to stop we shall have these people sitting up, as they did nearly all the month of
June’. 406 Another commented in a similar vein:

[The] institution of the night patrol work in this city has undoubtedly pacified the minds and
sent to bed many of the weaker sex. Had not such patrols been got together it is certain that
we should have seen many of the women folk stood in their doorways or seated outside their
homes from night until the early hours of the morning. 407

Other writers were clear in their invocation of a force that protected the weak, working not
for money, but for the safety and coherence of the community. Indeed, remuneration was
seen by some to spoil the ‘right spirit of the movement’: 408

[The] whole success of the scheme is in its voluntary nature and local character. We are
finding the true meaning of “neighbourliness,” and men who never previously spoke to one
another now find in a walk and talk while on patrol that Mr So-and-So is a genial fellow, and

401 Ibid., 33.
402 Bart Ziino, “‘I feel I can no longer endure’": Families and the Limits of Commitment in Australia, 1914-19’
in Endurance and the First World War: Experiences and Legacies in New Zealand and Australia, eds. David
403 George L. Mosse, The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity (Oxford: Oxford University
404 Credland, plate 25.
405 Hammett, ‘‘It’s in the Blood, isn’t it?’’, 352.
not the unsociable chap we thought him. The whole street trusts the neighbour appointed for
duty, and, as a fellow resident, that person naturally honours the trust.  

Emphasis was placed here not only on the respectability of voluntary action, but on its ‘local
character’. The fact the patrols were made up of recognisable, or at least friendly, figures
from the neighbourhood made it all the more possible to trust them and their activities. It was
the ‘true meaning of “neighbourliness”’ because it brought together friends and
acquaintances while breaking down imagined boundaries that may have existed in the pre-
war community. For others, gender norms combined with cries of class inequality at the
audacity of local establishment figures to disregard their patriotic efforts:

If the patrolling is stopped it will mean 16 men stopped from patrolling Courtney-street, and
then think of the hundreds who will be sitting outside all night – men, women and children –
because I know it will be impossible to get the women and children to bed if they know no
one is patrolling the streets... You must remember that we cannot afford motor-cars to be able
to clear out of it in case of danger. Oh, no, it’s the same thing over and over again – it’s the
poor that helps the poor... Think of the poor souls who may be asleep and murdered in bed.
What harm is done patrolling? We are not asking to be paid for it. All we ask for, as
ratepayers in a free country, is a little freedom [emphasis added].

Therefore, the patrols were distinctly, and proudly, working-class in character. The fact that
they were self-organised at the street level, without help from military or civil authorities,
was a source of pride for most correspondents. In addition to patrols being staffed by
members of the community, engendering trust in their anxious neighbours, it was a service
provided because of ‘mutual agreement among the people of the street… and surely no one
has the power to interfere with such an agreement’. Therefore, for many, voluntary patrols
were the ideal kind of community solidarity, ‘the product of shared adversity’. These
activities followed already established patterns in working-class districts of ‘providing aid to
neighbours in distress’, underpinned by their longstanding socioeconomic relations. As John
Bourne puts it: ‘They were forced into it by the demands of their situation’. Shorn of its
specific class associations, this was a form of social rather than financial ‘mutual aid’, which
helped to cultivate community self-reliance, later described by William Beveridge as distinct

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410 ‘If Patrolling is Stopped?’, Hull Daily Mail, 9 September 1915, 2.
from philanthropy, long part of respectable working-class communal life.\textsuperscript{414} Forms of insurance against common contingencies such as unemployment, illness and old age through friendly societies and clubs already engendered this tradition of reciprocal support, particularly among the skilled (respectable) working class.\textsuperscript{415} Involvement in an activity useful to the well-being of the city (a ‘civic duty’) could be simultaneously seen as a patriotic act and contribute to the maintenance both of the community itself and of individual social standing.\textsuperscript{416} The above quotes suggest the ‘respectable’ status of at least some of the adherents of street patrols; what we may call civil defence ‘from below’. Towards the end of 1915, efforts to centrally organise the night patrols through monthly meetings and a central committee meant that aid could be solicited from fee-paying members when a ‘tried and tested patrol man’ passed away, leaving his wife in ‘poor circumstances’.\textsuperscript{417} In a similar show of local patriotism and community spirit, money raised by the Daltry Street night patrol (near the Albert Dock), as ‘a mark of gratitude shown by the inhabitants of the street to the men who have patrolled to let others sleep undisturbed’, was donated to the 4\textsuperscript{th} East Yorks. Tobacco Fund. The patrol’s treasurer wished the collection to provide ‘necessities for soldiers at the front’, directed solely to locally raised battalions.\textsuperscript{418}

Not only was a ratepayer status central to the identity of a number of correspondents, a conception of self-help and dutiful citizenship, despite the snobbish attitudes of civic and religious elites, was central. However, the defence of the locale was central to these activities, as opposed to a more abstract national patriotism.\textsuperscript{419} Given the preponderance of patrols, and correspondents, in predominantly maritime working-class neighbourhoods, like Courtney Street and Campbell Street (the former close both to the River Hull, Humber Dock and King George Dock, the latter to Albert Dock), claims to a \textit{general} respectability, at least in terms relevant to contemporaries, may be questioned.\textsuperscript{420} Whether actual or aspirational, what is


\textsuperscript{416} Ibid., 168; Brad Beaven and John Griffiths, ‘Exemplary Citizen: The Changing Notion of Citizenship in Britain 1870-1939’, \textit{Contemporary British History}, 22 (2) (2008), 211.


\textsuperscript{419} Beaven and Griffiths, ‘Exemplary Citizen’, 209; Reeve, ‘‘Darkest Town’’, 44.

clear is the sense of injustice felt by some members of these communities at the inability of their social betters to understand their situation. Implicit is the idea that the efforts of the state, local and national, to protect citizens were not effective enough in combating the threat of aerial bombardment. These views echoed earlier calls for improved military defences, more powerful anti-aircraft guns and clearer early warning systems. Therefore, to some extent, it can be said that pre-existing class tensions were not transcended by the shared experience of bombardment, as seen in the sense of community engendered by personal loss.\footnote{Jay Winter, ‘Paris, London, Berlin 1914-1919: Capital Cities at War’ in Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin 1914-1919, eds. Jay Winter and Jean-Louis Robert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 14.} This is despite the experience of bombardment affecting people across the social spectrum. However, given the existence of self-organised night patrols, there is evidence to suggest that areas primarily populated with the families of dock workers and trawlers felt particularly vulnerable.

Geographically, the identifiable night patrols were situated in close proximity to principal sites of bomb damage from the first Zeppelin raid in June 1915, in addition to being working-class residential neighbourhoods close to potential targets, such as timber yards and docks (Figure 6.6).\footnote{By principal sites, I am referring to the areas worst affected by fires and with a predominance of serious casualties. See Credland, 109.} Night patrol areas were also on the fringes of the city centre, with a principally residential character. In particular, the area in which the Porter Street, Walker Street and Campbell Street night patrols operated was the site of a number of civilian deaths and serious injuries, while special constables and home defence soldiers much more amply staffed the city centre and ‘vulnerable points’ around the docks and industrial facilities.

Clearly, the experience of the city’s first Zeppelin raid spurred on local voluntary mobilisation, as some areas with a perceived shortage of other police or military forces self-organised vigilance patrols. As such, all of the night patrols appear to have been formed following this initial raid, given the veracity of debate about the role of the patrols during July to November 1915.
Figure 6.6 Map of Hull with identifiable night patrols and sites of serious bomb damage, death and injury following the 6 June 1915 Zeppelin raid (1920s map).


Key:
- Night patrol area
- Site damaged

The short shrift given to comments by Francis Gurdon, the Bishop of Hull, suggests that local affiliations and community ties could cut across ministrations from above, particularly if these fell in line with other establishment figures’ seeming encroachment upon working-class communality. As seen above, impassioned defences of night patrols were made in local press correspondence. These cast establishment figures, such as the Bishop, as benefiting from class privilege in their calls for civilians to remain indoors, when they themselves could easily flee in motorcars. The questioning of the patriotism of local patrolmen also clearly offended a number of correspondents, who saw their efforts to defend the community from harm as eminently patriotic, as well as necessary and practical. For some, as Gregory notes, the ‘high diction’ espoused by such elite figures could ring hollow, though the wider language of sacrifice still permeated popular culture outside of congregational circles.423

Interestingly, the Hull special constables’ official publication, *Hull Special Constables’*

Gazette, did not contribute to this lively debate, instead reporting matter-of-factly the Bishop’s comments.\footnote{Hull Special Constables’ Gazette, 10 September 1915, 46.} The issue of community-organised night patrols either did not come to the attention of the journal’s principle editor, Chief Constable George Morley, or was overlooked in the scramble to muster the over-stretched force during this period. Following an increase in call-outs due to frequent ‘buzzers’ in the weeks following the June 1915 raid, the editor acknowledged that:

\[\text{[t]he strain on men who are so frequently called out for duty is very great, and Group Leaders are advised that the best method to be adopted will be that of instructing their Sub-Group Leaders, when from information they have received they can safely do so, to liberate the men who can be conveniently dispensed with, giving preference to those who have to commence work at an early hour.}\footnote{Hull Special Constables’ Gazette, 3 September 1915, 44.}

Furthermore, at different points in the war, often following air raids, the redeployment of special constables to guard posts close to bombsites and supposed enemy targets meant that many residential areas had a shortage of patrolling officers.\footnote{‘Dock Guard’, Hull Special Constables’ Gazette, 26 January 1917, 328.} By January 1917, changes in special constables’ duties tacitly acknowledged the need to provide a street patrol in residential neighbourhoods, though this coincided with a concomitant call for more officers to guard docks, including a continuous guard at the Railway Dock.\footnote{‘Change in Special Constables’ Duties’, Hull Special Constables’ Gazette, 19 January 1917, 322.} Therefore, the force was considerably stretched by the need to cover both militarily vulnerable points and residential areas. By February 1917, many specials had transferred from street patrol to dock guarding duties, owing to the importance placed on these facilities by the chief constable and military authorities.\footnote{‘Dock Guard’, Hull Special Constables’ Gazette, 9 February 1917, 334.}

**Conclusion**

The structures of wartime governance utilised to enforce Defence of the Realm Regulations dispersed responsibility across a number of military and civil bodies. While the Authorised Competent Military Authority (ACMA) maintained a hierarchical, though reflexive, character during the war – particularly regarding troop mobilisation and defensive installations – the enforcement of DORA regulations took a different path. Local authorities often relied on the military bodies they were officially subordinated to in order to produce public safety information and plans. However, the responsibility for maintaining public order and ensuring

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{424} Hull Special Constables’ Gazette, 10 September 1915, 46.  \\
\textsuperscript{425} Hull Special Constables’ Gazette, 3 September 1915, 44.  \\
\textsuperscript{426} ‘Dock Guard’, Hull Special Constables’ Gazette, 26 January 1917, 328.  \\
\textsuperscript{427} ‘Change in Special Constables’ Duties’, Hull Special Constables’ Gazette, 19 January 1917, 322.  \\
\textsuperscript{428} ‘Dock Guard’, Hull Special Constables’ Gazette, 9 February 1917, 334.}\]
the smooth running of air raid alarms or the fallout of bombardments primarily rested with the police: more accurately a body of volunteers, the special constables. While this force also followed the DRR, mainly defining their powers and duties in wartime, it was permitted a degree of agency in carrying out its business. This reflected the longstanding separation of the military from civil policing, a division that was blurred during the conflict but not obliterated. Indeed, while special constables, Boy Scouts and other patriotic organisations at times shared responsibility with the military in guarding ‘vulnerable points’, government plans anticipating an enemy invasion largely absolved them of their duties at the crucial moment.

On the north-east coast, the Special Constabulary played a central role in policing the DRR, most patently rules related to public and domestic lighting. It was in cases prosecuted under lighting regulations (DRR 11, 11a, 12a) that predominated in Hull, the ‘Hartlepools’, Scarborough and Whitby. Offences were tried in civil courts at the local level and, in the majority of cases, individuals brought before the magistrate were arrested or summoned by special constables or the regular police. Even in cases of trespassing on military defences, though army personnel may well have reported infractions, still the civil courts tried the defendants in question. In addition to enforcing legal frameworks, special constables were expected to provide reassurance during air raids and were the primary point of contact for civilians following an attack, taking part in firefighting and ensuring residents were provided with water and supplies. Despite the benign public service role envisaged by both central and local government, the police as agents of enforcement frequently overstepped their perceived role, encroaching upon the private spaces of the home. Though far-reaching powers – equivalent to regular police officers – were allotted to special constables, nevertheless the ‘common-law mind’ assumed of British citizens was affronted by those that trespassed upon the threshold.

Though it in many ways aped the duties of the Special Constabulary, for some working-class communities, a self-organised night patrol of vigilant non-combatants was the solution to the exigencies of war and shortages of policing personnel. In the process, longstanding neighbourhood relations were sustained and furthered, though this often operated in the context of a class-based discontent at the actions of local elites. Though bound up with notions of working-class community and defence, these efforts were forms of self-

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430 Townshend, 5.
policing, whereby resilient attitudes could be forged in those ‘protected’ by the patrols. In many ways, moralising and conservative ideas, with pre-war forebears, found a footing among ordinary workers and volunteers due to the ubiquity of public safety discourse. On the other hand, these activities displayed the agency of working-class communities under the disruption and distress enacted by war. Night patrolmen had a clear perspective on the risks involved in maintaining community morale and considered it a patriotic duty to safeguard their communities. The fact that Hull was the only case study to have a civilian night patrol is testament to the close integration of the city’s working-class inhabitants with their primary places of work: the docks and maritime processing industries, eminent ‘vulnerable points’ in need of defence. As we have seen through an analysis of differing levels of anti-bombardment and anti-invasion measures, codes of resilience, and the perception of wartime experience, could be complicated by longstanding class affiliations and local identities.

CHAPTER 7: The wartime and post-war legacies of civilian bombardment

Introduction
The commemoration of the immense material and human losses of the First World War began from the earliest point of the conflict, as survivors, their families and kinship networks attempted to make sense of what had occurred, to grieve and reflect. As we have already seen, commemorative efforts could even utilise the shocking images of urban destruction following bombardment in order to sharpen the image of the ‘unreconcilable enemy’. Referring usually to soldiers from a locality who had died far away from home, war memorials and their accompanying remembrance ceremonies sought to repay symbolically the self-sacrifice of local men who had laid down their lives for a just cause. From the earliest weeks of the war, ordinary people found immediate ways to mark the death of a loved one – or, more vicariously, that of other local men – including the construction of ‘street shrines’. These ‘sites of memory’ provided a roll of honour listing men that had enlisted and died from the immediate locality, often with poems and patriotic regalia appended. As Winter notes, these efforts drew together localities with a sense of a broader national community under siege. They provided a physical marker of the human cost of war, encouraging, initially, fit men to sign up to fight. As King notes, this form of commemoration was not a ‘retrospective activity’, postponed until the close of hostilities. Rather, it provided an impetus for local people to channel their grief and anger into the war effort. Therefore, they possessed a didactic impetus similar to the widely-published images of war damage already discussed.

As the list of those honoured grew longer, such ‘living memorials’, situated in place, became sites for the expression of grief and were therefore central to the mourning process. Rolls of honour also adorned the walls of workplaces, schools and churches, and were printed in local newspapers. By the close of hostilities, local authorities began to plan in earnest for large, permanent memorials – many taking the form of stone monuments - that would

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3 King, Memorials, 30.
5 King, 60.
6 Winter, Sites of Memory, 93.
represent those that fell from the locality while situating their loss within the national discourse of sacrifice.\(^7\) However, on the whole, the deaths of non-combatants on the home front were conspicuously absent from this process, particularly at the national level. Where civilians were included, they did not attain parity with that of fallen servicemen. Conversely, in some cases, the extant parallels between the dead on both fronts – whether killed in a trench or in a city street – were drawn out. As we have seen, the harrowing experience of Zeppelin raids and naval bombardments was a source of concern for men fighting abroad, leading some to suggest they were ‘a lot safer here than our people are at home’.\(^8\) Among some civilians, the resonance of the December 1914 bombardment was felt throughout the war, as a frame of reference in later air raids or when guns sounded in the distance.\(^9\)

This chapter will examine the commemorative activities pursued by local elites, businesses and individuals in the north-east coastal region during and after the war. Given the relative lack of monumental memorials built with the express purpose of remembering civilians killed in enemy attacks at home, the full extent of memorial activities – from the staging of fund-raising events to special publications and remembrance services – will be explored, including ‘commemorative endowments’ that took the form of buildings, such as hospitals and churches.\(^10\) As King has written, it is possible to see ‘public commemoration as a medium in its own right, which exploited a variety of means of representation’.\(^11\) This will include activities performed during and after the war, taking into account the ‘unofficial activities’ of non-governmental, civic and commercial bodies and groups that undergirded later efforts by the central state.\(^12\) Indeed, the interaction of these different actors was central to the development of war memorials and remembrance practices. In the closing months of the war and those following its end, debates raged among local citizens who engaged wholeheartedly with their elected councillors and civic officials through the auspices of war memorial committees. The changing memorial landscape was also keenly observed by publications such as the Municipal Journal, which collected reports spanning the length and

\(^7\) Gregory, *Last Great War*, 112.
\(^8\) Imperial War Museum (IWM), Documents. 16285, Private Papers of Lieutenant P. Thornton, Thornton to EnidOrmiston, 22 April 1916.
\(^9\) East Riding of Yorkshire Archives (ERYA), DDST/1/8/2/2, Margaret Strickland Diaries, 4 December 1915 (27 Nov. 1915 – 9 Oct. 1917).
\(^10\) King, 42.
breadth of Britain during the first months following armistice, in addition to engaging with
the socio-economic fallout from bombardment for local authorities.\textsuperscript{13} This weekly
publication enjoyed a high readership among urban civic officials, though this was in
significant decline by 1914. Nevertheless, it was likely to be the predominant means for
exchanging policy ideas related to local government even during the exigencies of war.\textsuperscript{14}

This chapter will also explore the longer term legacies of these activities, in both the
post-1918 and 2014-18 centenary contexts. As will be borne out by comparing and
contrasting the case studies with each other and with the national scene, commemoration
most often combined with fundraising efforts aimed at providing succour to those affected
both by the war overseas and at home. Along with the construction of memorial hospitals,
hostels and schools, dedicated charitable funds were a form of ‘utilitarian’ remembrance,
imbued with a ‘constructive rather than a merely sentimental and decorative purpose’.
Therefore, ‘giving was the essential commemorative act’.\textsuperscript{15} In some places, such as
Hartlepool and West Hartlepool, this process was more pronounced than in others, with
resonances throughout the twentieth century and during the 2014-18 centenary period. At the
time of writing, this is a process still underway, though one which has been subject to
constant and intense reflection by historians, heritage practitioners and social scientists.\textsuperscript{16} As
Jay Winter concludes in a recent review of First World War centenary activities,
‘commemoration is a very pliable art; it changes when ideas about war and loss of life in war
change’.\textsuperscript{17} This was no less the case during the conflict itself and in the months and years that
followed.

In Hull, the commemoration of attacks upon civilians was more muted than in
Hartlepool, Whitby and Scarborough. While local elites debated the development of fitting
tributes to those who had fallen in Zeppelin raids, there was a less focused attempt to mark
the anniversary of the most serious attacks, such as the 6 June 1915 raid, which killed more

\textsuperscript{13} ‘Memorials of the War’, Municipal Journal, 5 April 1919, 327; ‘Aircraft and Bombardment Insurance’,
Municipal Journal, 11 February 1916, 123.
\textsuperscript{14} ‘Memorials of the War’, Municipal Journal, 5 April 1919, 327; John Griffiths, ‘Were There Municipal
Networks in the British World c. 1890–1939?’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 37 (4) (2009),
578.
\textsuperscript{15} King, 42.
\textsuperscript{16} James Wallis and David C. Harvey, eds., Commemorative Spaces of the First World War: Historical
Geographies at the Centenary, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018); Jay Winter, ‘Commemorating Catastrophe: 100
War Today’ in Remembering the First World War, ed. Bart Ziino (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 30-62; Joan
\textsuperscript{17} Winter, ‘Commemorating Catastrophe’, 253.
than twenty people and injured many more. It was in the months immediately following armistice that the wartime sacrifice of civilians under bombardment was recognised, though this was generally still less emotionally-charged than efforts in the ‘Hartlepool’s’. In Hull, the celebrations associated with armistice in November 1918 and Peace Day in July 1919 became the site for the commemoration of bombardment by Zeppelins.

1914-18: making sense of bombardment

Following the December 1914 bombardment, residents of Hartlepool and West Hartlepool used creative forms of commemoration to mark the passing of the event. In many cases, fundraising events – most often in aid of bombardment survivors and the families of victims – were imbued with a memorial quality. In the post-war period, the reconstruction of selected prominent buildings became a nexus for memorialising the bombardment and entailed a great deal of cooperation between custodians and the local community. In addition, following the cessation of hostilities, stone memorials were built to both the civilian and military dead, with a plaque marking the exact spot where the first shell fell in the town. The names of civilians killed also adorned a plaque on a stone memorial wall at the Hartlepool headland (Redheugh Close), unveiled on 17 December 1921. This unveiling was no different to broader national trends in memorial construction in the immediately post-war period, though the inclusion of a plaque for civilians suggests the degree of seriousness with which the bombardment was treated in Hartlepool, much more so than other towns. Official monuments to the fallen – built under the auspices of the local authority and usually involving public subscription – were built a number of years after armistice, given the degree of planning and community engagement involved in organising such a feat. In some localities, including Hull, the construction of a stone memorial was elided in favour of a large, practical fund – the City of Hull Great War Trust – until veterans began agitating for a ‘city cenotaph’ in 1922.

During the war itself, the anniversary of the bombardment was marked with live entertainment, lectures, teas and dances, most with a didactic and philanthropic component. Given the unprecedented scale of the attack upon the north-east coast, this degree of sustained commemorative activity is not surprising. Perhaps what is most interesting is the inconsistency of approach across the region, with Hartlepool and West Hartlepool seeing fit

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21 Ibid., 27; ‘A Cenotaph for Hull’, *Hull Daily Mail*, 20 November 1922, 7.
to frequently commemorate and reflect upon December 1914 (much more readily than Scarborough or Whitby). Wartime commemoration of the Hull Zeppelin raids was scant, most likely due to the potential penalties for publically discussing enemy actions by the middle years of the war, particularly as air raids remained a threat from 1915-18.\footnote{‘Zeppelin Raids: Newspaper Prohibitions’, Hull Daily Mail, 7 June 1915, 3; Brett Holman, The Next War in the Air: Britain’s Fear of the Bomber, 1908-1941 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 51.} In the ‘Hartlepools’, prominent conceptions of sacrifice and duty played a role in framing what would become annual ‘Bombardment Thank-offering’ days, the first taking place over the weekend of 18-19 December 1915.\footnote{‘Bombardment and Thank-offering Day’, Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 4 December 1915, 2; Winter, Sites of Memory, 115.} These were repeated throughout the conflict and continued during the interwar period, with impetus provided by a ‘mixture of awful memories and intense thankfulness from wonderful deliverances in the cruel German bombardment’.

All funds raised were donated to two local institutions where injured civilians and servicemen had been treated following the attack, the Hartlepools’ Hospital and Cameron Hospital.\footnote{‘For the Church: Bombardment Day’, Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 11 December 1915, 2.} The term ‘Thank-offering’ shared an affinity with Christian concepts of charitable giving in return for deliverance from misfortune, and was utilised during and after the war to raise money for Christian charitable efforts while marking the advent of peace.\footnote{‘Two Thank-offerings at Blackburn’, Northern Daily Telegraph, 5 May 1903, 4; ‘Peace Thank-offering’, Nottingham Journal, 25 November 1918, 3; Church of England Appeal, Birmingham Daily Post, 27 November 1918, 3; Church Army advertisement, Globe, 27 August 1919, 5.}

The inaugural Bombardment Thank-offering Day combined plebeian entertainments – most notably a ‘grand football match’ – with the sale of fundraising tokens. These took the form of flags and commemorative medallions specially-designed for the event.\footnote{‘For the Church: Bombardment Day’, Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 11 December 1915, 2.} Rugby matches were also organised, with teams drawn from the Durham Royal Garrison Artillery, Yorkshire Regiment and Royal Naval Air Service. Away from displays of military-sporting prowess, a ‘huge exhibition of war trophies’ was held in Church-square School, West Hartlepool, while residential streets played host to ‘side shows’ of palm-reading, magic, concerts and a whist drive. In addition, a variety show was held at Hartlepool Town Hall.\footnote{Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 16 December 1915, 2.}

Some of those soliciting donations for the hospital fund wore fancy dress, including ‘boys made up as shells’: a very direct, though playful, allusion to the bombardment itself.\footnote{Frederick Miller, Under Shell-fire: The Hartlepools, Scarborough and Whitby under Shell-fire, Third Edition (West Hartlepool: Robert Martin Ltd., 1917), 122.} The focus of this annual event was the entertainment of the local (largely) civilian population,
without the sombre and often funerary tone that would later accompany memorial rituals and remembrance services.\textsuperscript{29}

The overall structure of the event was provided under the auspices of a committee, comprising local councillors, dignitaries and businessmen, including the mayors of Hartlepool and West Hartlepool. The committee’s patron, when registered under the War Charities Act in 1916, was local shipbuilder Sir William Gray.\textsuperscript{30} For some commentators, this effort was tantamount to a memorial in itself, showing that contemporary perspectives on memorialisation were about much more than stone, mortar and religious symbolism. Memorial funds blended practical action with paeans to the work of emergency services and ordinary citizens, broadening the parameters of wartime sacrifice. As an anonymous columnist phrased it on 11 December 1915:

\begin{quote}
All this deserves a lasting memorial and what better form could it take than an annual public collection as a thank-offering to the Cameron and the Hartlepool Hospitals? What should we have done that day without their aid? Men, women, and children lay about the streets, with awful wounds, and the hospitals came to the rescue.\textsuperscript{31}
\end{quote}

This particular column was shot through with religious language, though a similar tack was also followed by secular writers during the war. The wartime ‘language of sacrifice’ embodied the ‘high diction’ of Christian tradition, even where overt references to religious symbols and themes were absent.\textsuperscript{32} In this way, the actions of civilian volunteers were exalted, with reference to a burgeoning ‘tradition of gratitude’ in which civilians had a duty to honour their saviours – doctors, nurses, soldiers and voluntary aid workers – by supporting hospitals for reasons both practical and deeply emotional. Such terms were saturated with the language of an ‘informal religiosity’. Hence, the hospitals became ‘centres of mercy and skill’, its doctors and nurses the agents of ‘deliverance’.\textsuperscript{33} The commemorative tokens distributed on Thank-offering Day and other fundraising events, such as ‘bombardment flag days’, were also designed with this language and cultural system in mind. The 1918 version of the commemorative badge designed by committee member and furniture dealer C.F.

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\textsuperscript{30} ‘Bombardment Anniversary Day’, \textit{Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail}, 21 October 1915, 4; Miller, 123.
\textsuperscript{32} Gregory, \textit{Last Great War}, 152.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 153; ‘For the Church: Bombardment Day’, \textit{Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail}, 11 December 1915, 2.
\end{flushleft}
Burton placed violated womanhood at its centre, though it was a practical-spiritual, regenerative female figure that provided a counterpoint. In the centre is seen the prostrate figure of a woman, representing those wounded in the bombardment of the Hartlepools. Standing over her is another figure representative of the nurses of the hospitals who did such heroic and devoted work on that memorable day, December 16, 1914. The nurse is pointing towards a cross, symbol of the Christian faith, and emblem of Divine mercy and sympathy. Rays of light are diffused from the cross on to the tableau.

While suffused with Christian imagery, this badge tacitly subverted the conventional association of heroism with military masculinity by allowing a nurse to fulfil a heroic role in saving another woman and child. However, this female heroism was placed within a recognisably feminine field associated with care and compassion. As Noakes and Grayzel note, shifting conceptions of citizenship during wartime were reinforced by the killing of women and children in bombardments: the sacrifice of non-combatants whose deaths could not be incorporated into the ‘heroic mould’ of earlier forms of conflict commemoration and remembrance because civilian deaths could not be justified as benefiting the ‘greater good’. Therefore, civilian deaths as a result of bombardment were emblematic of enemy barbarity and so worthy of a strong emotional response, a response that could be utilised by military recruiters and propagandists to spur enlistment. Ordinary citizens could also situate their own experience within that of the national effort. Hence, the figurative significance of the ‘prostrate figure of a woman’/devoted nurse on the Hartlepool Thank-offering badge, at once a victim of a recalcitrant and barbaric enemy and a deliverer of ‘willing, patriotic sacrifice’ both for the town and the nation. In an age of declining religious engagement, and during a war defined by death on an industrial scale, such language paradoxically signalled the waning suitability of traditional Christian tropes of consolation and Victorian mourning rituals. Indeed, ‘informal religiosity’ was indicative of an increasing clash between the mourning

36 Heugh Battery Museum (HBM), uncatalogued, 1918 Thank-offering Day badge; Jessica Meyer, Men of War: Masculinity and the First World War in Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), 8–9; Grayzel, ‘Defence Against the Indefensible: The Gas Mask, the State and British Culture during and after the First World War’, Twentieth Century British History, 25 (3) (2014), 422.
37 Lucy Noakes and Susan R. Grayzel, ‘Defending the Home(land): Gendering Civil Defence from the First World War to the ‘War on Terror’’ in Gender and Conflict since 1914: Historical and Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Ana Carden-Coyne (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012), 32; Rowlands, 132.
practices of individuals within family groups and the vast scale of death.\textsuperscript{39} As Cannadine notes, by this point ‘bereavement had become a more universal experience than ever before’.\textsuperscript{40} Despite the numerical difference between servicemen and non-combatants killed during the war, the inclusion of civilians alongside the military fallen on memorials on Hartlepool headland and in Scarborough reflected not only their unique status as coastal towns stricken by war damage and death, but the limited cultural and social space accorded to death in the wartime and post-war context: such memorials were rare and reflected efforts to universalise war sacrifice.\textsuperscript{41} The unprecedented scale of the war and its effects may have spurred mass commemoration and collective mourning rituals, but the relatively limited numbers of fallen civilians had to be situated somewhere in order to fit into the ‘economy of sacrifice’ thrown up by the war.\textsuperscript{42}

Subsequent bombardment anniversaries during the conflict followed much the same pattern – concerts, war-related exhibitions, teas - though with some remarkable adaptations. This included an expanded programme of sporting events, comprising a ‘great rugby football match’ in 1917 between military personnel and civilians, making a friendly rivalry out of what would become, for some, a primary definer of war experience, particularly in post-war ‘disillusion’ narratives.\textsuperscript{43} By December 1918, the committee recommended a more muted affair ‘owing to so many other calls being made upon the public just now’, presumably referring to the demobilisation of local men and the numerous national and local fundraising initiatives related both to welfare and memorialisation.\textsuperscript{44} Notably, this included the Hartlepool War Fund and the West Hartlepool War Memorial campaign, the latter beginning a funding drive in November 1919.\textsuperscript{45} Instead of mass entertainment, the sale of commemorative brooches and badges came to the forefront, while the main attraction of the 1918 Thank-offering weekend was a docked German submarine: \textit{U94}. According to newspaper advertisements, visitors could board the surrendered German vessel at Union Dock, West Hartlepool at a charge of 10 shillings (or 6s. for an external view).\textsuperscript{46} The fifth

\textsuperscript{40} Cannadine, ‘War and Death’, 217.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 253; Rowlands, ‘Remembering to Forget’, 134.
\textsuperscript{42} Gregory, 245.
\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail}, 10 December 1917, 2; Proctor, \textit{Civilians}, 3; Watson, \textit{Fighting Different Wars}, 220.
\textsuperscript{44} Peter Grant, ‘“An Infinity of Personal Sacrifice”: The Scale and Nature of Charitable Work in Britain during the First World War’, \textit{War & Society}, 27 (2) (2008), 70.
\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail}, 13 December 1918, 6; \textit{Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail}, 17 December 1918, 2.
anniversary of the bombardment in 1919 was marked in advertisements as the ‘final effort for the local hospitals’, though more straightforward subscription drives to maintain a steady source of charitable funding were continued, including a major campaign in 1920.47

In Hartlepool, the passage of time seems to have affected the treatment of bombardment commemoration, as the reflective character of the Thank-offering Days was regenerated during the interwar period. In 1924, the tenth anniversary of the bombardment was marked in much the same way as during the war, with the organisation of whist drives, teas and concerts, in addition to the sale of flags and badges. As before, the events raised money for local hospitals. One advertisement intoned: ‘You may have to go into hospital some day - Let us get it ready for you’. Given that the events organised were described as ‘Your FIRST Chance to Help the Hospitals of the Hartlepool’, this important anniversary seems to have been the site for the re-emergence of bombardment commemoration, under the auspices of hospital fundraising.48 In later years, including during the Second World War, hospital fundraising would more commonly take the form of ‘Hospital Sundays’, with allusion to the 1914 bombardment dropped completely.49 However, the term ‘Thank-offering’ was retained in many cases, given the continued association of the fundraising days with the church and traditions of Christian giving.50 Such events were common across the country before the advent of the National Health Service.51 At the twentieth anniversary of the bombardment in 1934, commemoration was limited to the activities of veterans’ groups, most notably the Durham Heavy Brigade, Royal Artillery (Territorial Army), who planned ‘social events to bring past and present officers and men together’, reflecting upon the experience of ‘all ranks who were members during the action of 1914’.52

Elsewhere in the north-east coastal region, commemoration and remembrance efforts were less sustained during the conflict. In Whitby, this was likely due to the town being less badly affected than elsewhere, particularly Hartlepool, both in terms of lives lost and damage to the urban environment. However, this did not prevent contemporary commentators from highlighting the bomb damage at Whitby Abbey as tantamount to an attack on the cultural heritage of Britain, with mass-produced postcards including images depicting ‘before and

47 Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 17 December 1920, 4.
48 Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 21 November 1914, 4; 12 December 1924, 4.
49 ‘Hospital Sundays’ took the form of civic parades and church services until the late 1940s. See Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 16 May 1942 and 15 June 1946.
52 ‘By the Way’, Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 10 December 1934, 4.
after the attack.53 Local commentators in Whitby also debated the possibility of a war memorial specifically for the victims, civilian and military, of the 1914 bombardment. The deaths of two men in particular were considered emblematic of the wider community: ‘This would certainly be a tangible memorial, on the one hand of a gallant Naval man, and on the other of a well-known and much respected townsman, who, whilst working for his employers, was also very much in the nature of a public servant’. Other suggestions wished for every house affected in the town to be marked with a plaque.54 A considerable amount of mass-produced popular culture and illustrative journalism focused in particular on damage to Whitby’s nationally renowned cultural cache, an act of commemoration in itself, encouraging collective remembrance.55

Scarborough was already a well-known seaside resort in the early twentieth century; its ‘unfortified’ status cemented its place in a British ‘atrocities’ narrative, similar in tone to those related to the occupation of Belgium.56 Indeed, this parallel experience of war against civilians was borne out explicitly in local and national publications, including a striking piece in the *Illustrated War News*, which drew upon popular concerns with both Belgium and events on the Western Front. Accompanied by a photograph of a wrecked living room, the article presented a ‘Louvain or Ypres scene in a house at Scarborough’:

> The German bombardment of Scarborough, Hartlepool, and Whitby has brought home to English people what war means as waged by the Germans, and has enabled the inhabitants of those towns to realise only too vividly the experience of Belgium. […] It had no military value, and its only result has been to brace the nation’s nerve and stimulate recruiting.57

In Hull, wartime commemoration of Zeppelin attacks was decidedly muted, most likely owing to strict controls on the reporting of enemy actions, which tightened as the war progressed.58 Initially, press censorship of information pertaining to troop movements and enemy actions was attained on a cooperative rather than a purely top-down basis, with newspaper proprietors generally in favour of regulations and checks by the Press Bureau. From early 1917, the newly formed Department of Information (led by C.H. Montgomery of

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53 *The Graphic*, 26 December 1914, 9; Author’s collection, postmarked Scarborough 1933.
54 ‘Local Jottings’, *Whitby Gazette*, 19 March 1915, 3. The writer was referring to W.E. Tunmore, a rulleyman for North Eastern Railway killed at Whitby during the December 1914 bombardment. The ‘Naval man’ was coastguard Frederick Randall, who met a similar fate.
56 Horne and Kramer, *German Atrocities*, 86.
57 *Illustrated War News*, 23 December 1914, 41. For a local example, see *Hull Daily Mail*, 23 December 1914, 5.
the Foreign Office) oversaw the management of news output, alongside a less formal grouping of newspaper proprietors who conferred with Prime Minister Lloyd George about ‘what was good for the country to know’. With the dissemination of Defence of the Realm Regulations from 31 August 1914, it was much more difficult to report details that could be deemed damaging to the British war effort. This shift in censorship rigour - coupled with a lack of preparedness for attack - may account for the ease with which the popular press was able to report on the events of 16 December 1914, despite censorship regulations already being in force. As the conflict wore on, the danger of air attack was deemed more likely than naval bombardment, again possibly accounting for the ramping up of prohibitions related to enemy actions. As a Hull newspaper reflected in June 1915, this was a helpful change: ‘One can imagine that the officers commanding the Zeppelins would look out eagerly for information in the English Press. Every district named would be, as it were, a sailing direction for the next raid’. In addition, the propaganda value of the December 1914 attacks - in terms of sharpening the image of the enemy and for articulating British war aims – was too high in the early months of the war to obfuscate in the same way as Zeppelin raid reports were in 1915. In 1919, the local press in Hull was free to detail the effects of censorship upon the reporting of civilian bombardment: ‘Not only was all mention of the locality forbidden, but the names of the victims had to be suppressed, and only the most sparse and vague comment made’. This was, therefore, a ‘muzzle… which, at one time, threatened to break the harmonious loyalty with which the workers of Hull had served their country’. As a result, sustained efforts to reflect upon and commemorate Zeppelin raids in Hull did not occur until the Peace Day and Armistice celebrations of July and November 1919.

Post-war: armistice and interwar remembrance

Peace Day 1919

Peace Day on 19 July 1919 officially marked the close of hostilities, with celebrations across Britain following closely upon the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. Though it was a national scheme devised by government, local authorities were left to arrange their own

59 Montgomery joined the Foreign Office as a clerk in 1900, becoming Chief Clerk and Assistant Secretary after the war. See ‘Sir Hubert Montgomery’, The Times, 5 December 1942, 6; Alice Goldfarb Marquis, ‘Words as Weapons: Propaganda in Britain and Germany during the First World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, 13 (3) (1978), 473, 476-7.
60 Hopkin, 154; Cook, DORA Manual, 108.

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celebrations, with little direction from the centre.\footnote{Brad Beaven, ‘Challenges to Civic Governance in Post-war England: the Peace Day Disturbances of 1919’, \textit{Urban History}, 33 (3) (2006), 379.} Generally, these events were designed to ‘blend traditional solemnity with recreational entertainments in a similar manner to earlier royal celebrations’.\footnote{‘Peace Celebrations’, \textit{Municipal Journal}, 4 April 1919, 341; Roberts, ‘Entertaining the Community’, 456.} As was the case during the opening of war memorials and other post-war monuments, these events continued to display elements of traditional civic performance, though more space was allowed for working people to self-organise celebrations at the level of the street and neighbourhood. Recreation formed a central pillar of the peace celebrations, organised by both local authorities and communities themselves.\footnote{Roberts, 457.} Beyond this, there were ad hoc activities more akin to the carnivalesque, taking the form of ‘limited outbursts of deviance’ which ‘tested social boundaries’.\footnote{Robert Darnton, \textit{The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History} (New York: Basic, 1984), 83.} Collective and temporarily disorderly celebration among some young people acted as a release following the privations and stresses of war.\footnote{Beaven, ‘Challenges’, 370.} The fever of celebration was infectious: ‘A crowd which has slipped off the robe of seriousness and put on the motley of frivolity is like a snowball, it enlarges by its own momentum, for mirth spreads faster than influenza’.\footnote{‘End of a Perfect Day’, \textit{Hull Daily Mail}, 21 July 1919, 10.}

While the municipality directed funds towards the organisation of teas and concerts, decorated public buildings and printed souvenir booklets for distribution to school children, working-class neighbourhoods made their own entertainment, including the burning of effigies, impromptu fireworks displays and street parties. The latter were especially prevalent near the docks and fishing districts of Hull, where micro-local and potentially more personally meaningful interpretations of wartime events – like the Zeppelin raids - were reflected through celebrations.\footnote{Roberts, 457.} They also entailed a note of subversion and carnival, which was not present in the more sedate districts of Scarborough and Whitby, though there were few reports of disorderly behaviour in the wake of the celebrations.\footnote{‘Hull’s Sober Peace Day’, \textit{Hull Daily Mail}, 21 July 1919, 4.} Most importantly, rather than refracting local experience through the ‘prism of civic or national identity’, the intimate surroundings of the street, near to the pre-war home and the site of bombing raids, offered an ideal stage for interrogating the civilian experience of war.\footnote{Ibid.}

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\item \footnote{Brad Beaven, ‘Challenges to Civic Governance in Post-war England: the Peace Day Disturbances of 1919’, \textit{Urban History}, 33 (3) (2006), 379.}
\item \footnote{‘Peace Celebrations’, \textit{Municipal Journal}, 4 April 1919, 341; Roberts, ‘Entertaining the Community’, 456.}
\item \footnote{Robert Darnton, \textit{The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History} (New York: Basic, 1984), 83.}
\item \footnote{Beaven, ‘Challenges’, 370.}
\item \footnote{‘End of a Perfect Day’, \textit{Hull Daily Mail}, 21 July 1919, 10.}
\item \footnote{Roberts, 457.}
\item \footnote{‘Hull’s Sober Peace Day’, \textit{Hull Daily Mail}, 21 July 1919, 4.}
\item \footnote{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
In Hull, the peace celebrations organised by the municipality involved a civic and military procession replete with traditional civic adornments and ceremonial such as that seen during earlier royal visits and dock openings. The respect of the Corporation for the local demobilised military forces was displayed by the observation of a ‘march past’, with the Lord Mayor, aldermen and councillors processing from the Sessions Court door of the Guildhall in full ceremonial dress before assembling on a dais at the side of the road. The assembled civic officials then proceeded to salute local forces as they passed, including members of the East Yorkshire Regiment and the East Riding Yeomanry. Coldstream Guards, a 200-strong group of St. John’s Ambulance volunteers, 300 National Reservists, followed the main body of the procession, in addition to a naval contingent, Voluntary Aid Detachment (VAD) nurses, wounded servicemen and patriotic youth groups, including the Boys’ Brigade and Girl Guides. The boating lake in East Park was the scene of firework displays and a ‘costume carnival’, in which a display of decorated boats accompanied by people in fancy dress was judged by civic officials. In some cases, costumes reflected on wartime experiences, with some elements obliquely referencing civilian life during the conflict, in addition to marking the passing of the city into a less servile and democratic post-war age. This included: “From Father’s War-time Allotment” (the girl in this instance being decorated with various vegetables),… Early Victorian husband, wife and maid, Justice, Belgian girl,… Moonlight,… a war widow’. An allusion to moonlight evoked the spectre of darkened streets following the introduction of lighting regulations.

The firework display which followed the daytime festivities blended the traditional with clear references to the war, including the experience of bombardment on both the home and fighting fronts. Balloons, evocative of barrage balloons or Zeppelins, were launched into the sky in advance of ‘imitation shrapnel… blown from mortars on the ground’. Illuminated pictures of Admiral Beatty (‘Jutland’s Hero’) and the King followed the display, with public involvement in the event later described as overwhelmingly patriotic: a form of ‘mafficking’, a term which gained renewed currency during the conflict after its earlier use during the Boer War. Impromptu firework displays followed long into the night in working-class streets, similarly evoking wartime civil defence: ‘Fireworks were being let off everywhere, and it

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72 At this point, the most recent frame of reference was the royal opening of King George Dock in June 1914. See ‘History of the Joint Dock Scheme’, Hull Daily Mail, 26 June 1914, 5.
74 Hull Daily Mail, 21 July 1919, 9.
75 Ibid., 10.
76 Ibid.; Hull Daily Mail, 23 July 1919, 3; Paul Ward, ‘Socialists and ‘True’ Patriotism in Britain in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries’, National Identities, 1 (2) (1999), 185.
was long after midnight before the early to bed people realised the “all clear.”

Despite a limited effort to reflect the trials of the home front during the conflict, overall the impetus of the official municipal celebrations was, as the Hull Daily Mail pointed out in its commentary, a ‘tribute to those splendid men whose bravery and dogged determination on sea and land achieved the victory’. Even so, it is clear that the involvement of great numbers of civilians was sought by the Peace Celebrations Committee, and that recreation – albeit through the lens of national unity and military sacrifice – was foremost in the celebrations. ‘Recreational civic ritual’ in the form of the civic and military procession, accompanied by a 100,000-strong crowd of spectators, was presented alongside more unbridled entertainment in the form of firework displays and fancy dress.

In Hull, a greater effort to reflect the experience of bombardment was made away from the official Peace Day proceedings, in the streets and homes of working-class inhabitants. In many cases, these ‘bottom-up’ events took place in or near places directly affected by bombing, particularly those close to the docks. In some cases, these were already areas synonymous with the onshore revelry of disembarked trawlersmen and their families. Street-based celebrations included the construction of effigies in working-class districts, such as Estcourt Street in east Hull, where representations of an ‘aeroplane and the Kaiser’ were displayed in the street alongside a Zeppelin marked with the Iron Cross. These objects – clearly as sombre as they were celebratory, judging by the downcast expressions of the photographed onlookers – hovered above the street attached to washing lines. Revellers proceeded to set the mock Zeppelin alight, performing a symbolic and potentially cathartic act of community self-defence (Figure 7.1). A contemporary report described the significance of this unique street party:

Although, during the many air-raids on Hull, Estcourt-street people never had the satisfaction of witnessing the stirring spectacle of a Zeppelin being brought down in flames, they did have the satisfaction of seeing a “Zepp.” burned on Saturday night. This was a miniature Zeppelin a few feet long, and constructed of bombs covered with brown paper, and a gondola.

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77 Hull Daily Mail, 23 July 1919, 3.
78 Ibid., 7.
79 Ibid.; Roberts, 450.
In the Hessle Road fishing district, effigies of ‘Kaiser Bill’ were ‘stuffed with hay, hung on a line and full of squibs and crackers’, before being set on fire and blown up. According to some reports, young working-class women were often the instigators of such activities. For one commentator, the young women’s class character was indicated by their ‘shrill’ voices, in addition to their location, evoking prevalent stereotypes of the rough and immoderate working woman.  

Local journalists did not miss the irony of civilians using fireworks to celebrate the end of hostilities: ‘The particular display was generally agreed to have been one of the best ever seen in Hull, though the bangs and the flashes of light were painfully reminiscent of Zeppelin nights’. Indeed, reports after an air raid on the city in March 1916 likened the bombardment to a firework display: ‘[Two Zeppelins] threw out starlights of all

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colours, which made a glorious display, and the fireworks effect was heightened by the
explosion of dropping bombs and the boom of the guns’. In 1919, it was all the more
significant to make use of fireworks, given that they had been effectively banned under
Defence of the Realm lighting regulations during the war. Military authorities were keen to
point this out, particularly when Bonfire Night neared.

Burlesque performances were played out during the July peace celebrations among
young people keen to subvert the social relations associated with both the straitened
circumstances of war and the perceived distance between combatants and non-combatants.
This included ‘masquerades’ of girls who adorned their brothers’ military or naval attire.
Such acts facilitated reconciliation following the separation enacted by war, an outwardly
transgressive performance which masked heartfelt emotions and attributed a degree of
finality to the coming of peace. The social and moral ambivalence of this post-war moment
can be sensed from the outset:

The number of girls who masqueraded in their brothers’ clothes was somewhat
remarkable. Especially so was the many who had donned the suits of jack tars, and with the
bell shaped trousers and the blue blouses it was an attire that certainly made the utmost of
their figure if at the time one regretted to see the misuse of the uniform. Of course, on such an
occasion, much license is given, though, as a matter of fact, it is illegal for one sex to dress in
the attire of the other… Though aping the boy, these girls were unmistakably self-conscious
of the deception from the side and uneasy glances they cast upon the passers-by proclaimed it.

Elsewhere in the city, cross-dressing girls were less uneasy in borrowed army uniform, ‘with
a swagger as pronounced as it was brazen’.

Peace Day in Scarborough was primarily concerned with honouring returned
servicemen, though forms of organised recreation involved a considerable number of
civilians. Reports described the ‘chief public event of the day [as] the entertainment of
discharged and demobilised sailors and soldiers’, taking the form of a concert at the Floral
Hall and a ‘meat tea’ at the cricket ground on North Marine Road. In his speech to the 600
guests at the tea, Mayor C.C. Graham did not mention the effects of the 1914 bombardment
on the town. Instead, his focus was on the role civilians should play in facilitating the smooth
transition of ex-servicemen back into their previous careers, while all survivors owed a
‘tremendous debt of gratitude to those who had laid down their lives, and they must do their

86 Brig. General O.S. Nugent, Commanding Humber Defences, ‘Proclamation’, Hull Daily Mail, 15 October
1914, 4.
best to pay it’. This was another evocation of the ‘economy of sacrifice’, in which civilians had to not only situate themselves in relation to combatants, but were expected to provide unselfish service in return for the ‘blood tax’ of fallen soldiers. Many demobilised soldiers expected a smooth transition back into civilian life and their pre-war professions, a situation made difficult by socioeconomic disruption during the war and structural economic imbalance after it. Furthermore, homecoming was made more frustrating by widespread feelings of entitlement following armistice, as society was indebted to the men: it ‘owed them’ for their wartime sacrifice. In addition to the tea and concert, a sports contest was held, with involvement dependent upon military status and degree of disability. For example, while still-serving and demobilised men ran a 100-yard race, one-legged men ran only 30 yards. There were also rounds especially suited to disabled men, including a ‘potato race for one-armed men’, though care seems to have been taken to include races bringing together able-bodied and disabled men, notably the tug-of-war.

In a similar way to Hull, the remainder of the official celebrations in Scarborough revolved around evening entertainments in the form of fireworks displays and ‘illuminations’. Record crowds were reported to have congregated on the seafront to view the spectacle, which was remarkable for the sheer amount of lighting, provided artificially, by fire and searchlights. For Scarborians, this was a clear counterpoint to the compulsory darkness of the war years, in which seasonal businesses had lost customers and private citizens received fines and custodial sentences for showing lights. Fireworks were launched from minesweepers and naval vessels assembled in the South Bay, which in the daytime had been decorated with bunting. Though it was not made explicit in press commentary, the overall show resembled the noise and ‘pandemonium’ of bombardment, in addition to rudimentary attempts at civil defence:

The searchlights were projected on the vast crowds of people, and on buildings and cliffs, the Harbour, the old Castle walls, and the Spa… One of the craft commenced to make mournful and weird noises with its hooter, which caused the greatest amusement, and others joined in the chorus, until a sort of pandemonium reigned, punctuated by explosive fireworks and, from time to time, the persistently mournful notes of the first to commence.

88 ‘Entertaining Returned Warriors’, Scarborough Mercury, 18 July 1919, 5;
90 Adam R. Seipp, The Ordeal of Peace: Demobilisation and the Urban Experience in Britain and Germany, 1917-1921 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 141-2, 146.
92 See Chapter 6.
Despite enthusiastic descriptions in the press, there were nevertheless critics of the scale of the peace events. A Scarborough Mercury editorial described the celebrations as ‘negligable’ (*sic*), before praising the selfless efforts of volunteers present at the veterans’ tea.94 Elsewhere, the festivities were described as ‘a “miserable frost,” that is at any rate for folks who glory in watching processions and all that sort of thing’. In this view, the celebrations were successful primarily because of the sunny weather and the ‘lure of the sea’ for inland inhabitants. Therefore, in future the day would be remembered as an ‘ordinary public holiday’ and not as a celebration instilled with a memorial or commemorative quality.95

While Scarborough paid less attention to the experience of civilians in its official celebrations, this would nevertheless be rectified with the later development of a war memorial inclusive of bombardment victims. In Hull, while working-class communities sought to celebrate peace with an eye to the hyperlocal experience of Zeppelin raids, built memorial efforts disregarded bombardment victims entirely. This was in spite of earlier calls for a memorial to the city’s Zeppelin victims.96

Hartlepool’s Peace Day celebrations primarily took the form of military parades and functions for veterans and demobilised men. As such, the events were organised by veterans’ groups, including the local chapter of the Comrades of the Great War, and the local authority.97 Surprisingly, the official programme for the day did not feature direct references to the bombardment or civilian experiences, apart from one instance. A commemorative medal, again designed by C.F. Burton, was struck, for presentation to local school children: ‘On one side there will be a representation of the bombardment of the Hartlepoools by German warships, and on the other of a Zeppelin dropping bombs’.98 This design reflected the home front experience of war, from its shocking outset to the growing risk of air attack as the conflict wore on.

Beyond this, the scheduled events took a similar form to those held in London, as well as being reminiscent of traditional civic displays and parades, particularly those accompanying Jubilee and Coronation celebrations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth

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centuries. London’s ‘Great Peace Pageant’ was an opportunity to display the military and naval might of the British Empire, with the uniforms of the men providing an enduring image for commentators: ‘To the eye it was a feast of colour – blues, greys, mignonette-greens, succeeding one another in harmonious process’. In addition to military parades and a ‘salvo of guns… fired from the Hartlepool battery’, the main events in Hartlepool and West Hartlepool were ‘demonstrations’ of children (10,000-strong), who were presented with the commemorative medals. This segued into a procession headed by the mayor and members of the Corporation. Later in the day, a parade of ‘serving and demobilised soldiers and sailors, members of the Merchant Service, Volunteer Corps, and the Ambulance Corps’, was joined part way by a contingent of the Special Constabulary. The lack of activities reflecting upon civilian bombardment in the official celebrations was likely due to the routine commemorative character of the Thank-offering Days. These already provided a hub for the expression of national- and local-patriotic identities, in addition to continuously reiteration the centrality of the bombardment to local experience of the war.

**War memorials to the civilian ‘fallen’**

The weeks and months following armistice entailed sustained discussion among local elites and citizens about the appropriate way to remember the fallen. While war memorial committees were formed in all of the case studies, their inauguration occurred at different times and with varying degrees of democratic process. In all cases, public subscription was the financial backbone of memorial efforts, particularly in terms of stone memorials and monuments. However, a broader notion of war memorial functionality was present in most cases, and employed effectively outside the realm of official memorial planning at the town and county level.

Scarborough Town Council established a War Memorial Sub-Committee on 15 November 1918, just four days after armistice was declared. Its stated aim was to ‘consider and report upon all questions related to War Memorials for the Borough’. At a public meeting in June 1919, Scarborough officially recognised the establishment of a physical war

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100 ‘The March of the Victors’, *The Sphere*, 26 July 1919, 2.


102 North Yorkshire County Record Office (NYMCO), DC/SCB, Corporate Property and General Purposes Committee, Minutes of the Proceedings and Resolutions or a Meeting of the Town Council of the Borough of Scarborough, 15 November 1918, 25.
memorial for the town, taking three interconnected forms. A circular posted to residents encouraged them to contribute to the General War Memorial Fund and outlined the construction of a ‘Memorial Building of architectural beauty on or in which should be recorded the names of those Scarborough men who lost their lives in the service of their Country during the Great War’. Alongside this development, memorial hostels for ‘incapacitated’ servicemen and a new ‘Sea Training School’ were suggested and approved, the latter being an expansion upon an already existing Royal Navy institution. Geography had both a practical and symbolic function in the imagined location of the project, with the ‘memorial building’ (most likely a hall), school and hostels situated on and around Castle Road, close to the famous Scarborough Castle. This not only provided a commanding view of the South Bay, it was necessarily situated in an elevated position, above the lower ground of the town itself. Scarborough Town Council procured land in Longwestgate for the memorial scheme in October 1920, with sanction from the Ministry of Health, paying £550 for a number of yards on the site. By early November 1919, the preliminary appeal had raised around £2,000, with donations coming from both from Scarborough and further afield, including Leeds in West Yorkshire, Leighton Buzzard in Bedfordshire and Dumfriesshire in Scotland. Considerable amounts were also received from local businessmen, including the managing director of Scarborough department store W. Boyes & Co., Mr W. Boyes himself (also a Justice of the Peace, councillor and later mayor), who contributed £100 to the fund.

In spite of these efforts, the initial target of £30,000 was not reached, leaving the Corporation in possession of tracts of land that could not be used for their intended purpose. In the face of fierce criticism by public health officers and inspectors, who declared in May 1921 that the area was unsanitary and too costly to redevelop, an alternative plan, initially approved at a public meeting in March 1920, was revived by the local authority. Instead of the trio of memorial buildings outlined in the initial plan, the revised plan earmarked a plot of land in Valley Park near South Bay and Scarborough Spa for a ‘[temple] of architectural beauty’ with a cost of between £7,000 and £8,000. Other reports described it as a ‘memorial hall, with a museum attached’, though efforts at museology were

103 NYCRO, DC/SCB/III/559, War Memorials Papers, ‘War Memorial’ circular, October 1919.
105 NYCRO, DC/SCB, Scarborough Town Council minutes 10 November 1919 to 29 October 1920, Corporate Property and General Purposes Committee, 25 October 1920, 1156-7.
106 NYCRO, DC/SCB/III/559, Mayor Whittaker to H. Brent Grotrian, 28 October 1919; Mayor to E.C. Everley Taylor, 28 October 1919; Mayor to G.R.T. Taylor, 6 November 1919.
107 Ibid., Mayor to W. Boyes, 27 October 1919.
108 *Yorkshire Post*, 19 May 1921, 9.
more pronounced among private individuals and voluntary organisations. A contemporary description of the proposed design by architect Edwin Cooper (originally from Scarborough) saw it fall very much in line with the fashions of the period, while alluding to traditional monumental form:

The temple will be of concrete, faced with Roman stone, the interior will be lined with marble, and to contain bronze tablets, bearing the names of the fallen heroes in raised letters… The Mayor hoped that money would be forthcoming to place in the temple a statue of “Victory.”

While taking on forms of traditional funerary monument – inscribed wall-tablets, the use of stone and marble and a crypt-like appearance – the war memorial ‘temple’ was also consistent with a prevalent fashion for classicism in civic design during the period. This can be observed in the architectural plans of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century civic buildings such as town and city halls, including examples designed by Cooper himself, like the neo-classical Hull Guildhall (newly re-built in 1914). This design was also similar to war memorials under development elsewhere, including Birmingham’s 1919 proposal for a ‘Hall of Memory’, taking the form of a ‘well-proportioned and beautifully decorated chamber, not necessarily of great size, in which the roll of honour would be suitably enshrined’. Such developments were not purely commemorative in scope. They were fuelled by a need to renew and rebuild the urban environment following the war, materially and in the imagination, fostering a sense of civic pride while boosting local economies. A similar format was considered for a ‘War Memorial Museum’ in Hull, comprising ‘war trophies’ in the form of captured German guns and postage stamps from across the belligerent states, alongside military medals and a roll of honour. Scarborough’s revised plan still overlooked the contribution of non-combatants to the town’s war effort and record of sacrifice, with the mayor stating that the names included on the memorial would be ‘those

110 ‘A Scarborough War Memorial Temple’, *Yorkshire Post*, 27 March 1920, 12.
111 Ibid.
115 HHC, City and County of Kingston Upon Hull Municipal Corporation and Urban Sanitary Authority, Minutes and Proceedings of Committees 1917-18, Property Committee, Museum and Records Sub-Committee, 17 December 1918, 12-13; op. cit. 14 January 1919, 29; op. cit. 17 April 1919, 94.
who belonged to the Army, the Navy and the Flying Corps; and also those who gave their lives sweeping the mines from our shores. The latter must not be left out’. 116 While the latter group was composed of civilians – trawlermen co-opted into the Royal Naval Reserve – they were still nevertheless employed on naval defence duties and were therefore not ‘defenceless’ non-combatants. 117

A memorial akin to the Cenotaph at Whitehall was eventually unveiled on 26 September 1923, taking the form of a 75 ft. obelisk of Yorkshire stone, reached by steps at each of its four sides. This was built at Oliver’s Mount, a point of high ground to the south of the town, around two miles distant from the South Bay and the initial memorial site at Longwestgate. 118 As with the ‘temple’ plan, the geographic placing of the monument was one of its primary talking points: ‘High on the top of Oliver’s Mount it stands, a landmark visible for miles around, to the mariner at sea and the traveller approaching Scarborough by rail or road’. 119 However, in a departure from earlier plans, the sacrifice of local civilians was given parity with that of naval and military personnel, allotting them one of the four sides surrounding the obelisk for name panels. This change reflected the degree of involvement of local civilians in approving and supporting the war memorial scheme, both through financial contributions and attendance at public committee meetings, which were called following public displays of plans in local shop windows. 120 As with similar schemes around the country, public opinion and participation was central to shaping the final war memorial, while its form – decided following more than four years of debate – reflected the tone set by ‘national forms of remembrance’ in prior years, most patently the national memorial at the Cenotaph in 1920. 121 While early plans had elided the inclusion of non-combatants in lists of ‘the fallen’, the record that remains of the planning process in Scarborough for the Oliver’s Mount memorial suggests a shift in emphasis.

Rather than a list solely recognising the military heroism of local men, subscription forms produced by the war memorial committee during the Oliver’s Mount fundraising drive attempted to compile a register of ‘Scarborough Fallen for Inscription on Panels’. This

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118 Times, 27 September 1923, 12; Yorkshire Post, 30 March 1922, 4.
119 A Landmark for Miles”, Yorkshire Evening Post, 26 September 1923, 7.
120 Scarborough Library (SL), Uncatalogued Bombardment File (UBF), Scarborough War Memorial draft circular, 17 March 1922.
included in its purview personnel of the army, navy, mercantile marine and non-combatants killed in the 1914 bombardment or on active service as a non-combatant auxiliary worker. Crucially, the main qualification for inclusion was length of residence in Scarborough, to ensure an accurate local character for the planned memorial, though people killed away from Scarborough in air raids were also eligible for inclusion.122 This latter feature apportioned a degree of parity with military men serving overseas, given that their local affiliation acted as the fundamental link between their ‘fallen’ status and their place of death. In this way, local identity was underpinned by the defence of the locale, thus acting as a proxy for national patriotic service, capable of transcending geographical location in a similar sense to the unnamed soldiers buried without ceremony in the fields of France and Belgium.123

The war memorial’s stone-laying ceremony was more akin to a remembrance service, such as those organised annually on Armistice Day from November 1919 though, as Winter notes, such services still maintained a semblance of pre-war civic ceremonial through their social composition.124 Indeed, just as in earlier civic ceremonies, the stone-laying included a procession, with the mayor and principal councillors at its head, followed by religious leaders.125 The Yorkshire Post reported a ‘large attendance’ at the ceremony, though only civic dignitaries and church leaders (representative of Anglican, Catholic and ‘free’ denominations) had a direct involvement in the ceremony itself.126 Speeches made by Graham and the incumbent mayor William Boyes remained largely conventional in their allusion to the heroism of local men who died fighting for a just cause, but some commentaries underlined the broad remit of the memorial. It was not only meant for the military and naval fallen, but served to ‘[keep] in grateful memory… all those who took part and suffered in the great war’.127 The speeches also evoked a vision of post-war citizenship consisting of a duty to honour and remember the fallen: ‘[the memorial] would remind them and those who followed of the sacrifices made by Scarborough men, and of their own responsibilities and duties’.128 Once built, civic speakers expected the towering structure of

122 NYCRO, DC/SCB/III/669, Scarborough War Memorial folder, blank registration form.
124 Winter, Sites of Memory, 97.
126 ‘War Memorials’, Yorkshire Post, 18 September 1922, 11.
128 Ibid.
the 75ft obelisk to be a constant, physical reminder of the town’s sacrifice. In his speech, wartime mayor Graham reflected:

There will be no danger… of Scarborough people forgetting the war and its lessons and sacrifices. By its record of example and incentive, the memorial might prove of unestimable (sic) value and benefit not only to those of them there that day; but to the many generations to come. Might it endure through the ages to be a moving power and a power for good.129

While the speeches maintained the ‘high diction’ and patriotic sentiment of politicians and churchmen of the period, nevertheless the stone laying inaugurated a publically-endorsed space for mourning, for the working through of personal grief collectively.130 This was compounded by the high numbers of local people reportedly present at the event, estimated at between 400 and 500, with motor coaches laid on to convey them from the town to the higher ground of Oliver’s Mount.131

While newspapers did not report speeches related to remembering the loss of local civilians in the 1914 bombardment, an associated commemorative activity – taking the form of a ‘time capsule’ specific to the local war experience – provided a narrative form inclusive of differing sections of the wartime community. While it was not listed in the ceremony’s programme, a bottle containing objects related to different aspects of the war was placed within a ‘cavity in the foundation’ prior to the stone-laying itself. According to the Yorkshire Post, this contained:

[A] copy of “The Times,” with the announcement of the declaration of war, another of “The Times” announces the armistice, local papers reporting the bombardment of Scarborough, signed photographs of Mr. C.C. Graham and Mr. W. Boyes, the present Mayor, a parchment giving the names of the War Memorial Committee and the officers connected with it, a booklet of Scarborough, and a programme of the day’s proceedings.132

The order in which these objects were placed proceeds from the national to the local, beginning with the official beginning and conclusion of hostilities in the form of the Times clippings. The objects that follow bring the local civic elite to the forefront, surrounding the wartime and incumbent mayors in an aura of semi-celebrity, according them and the officials associated with the war memorials committee an elevated status and the primary credit for producing the memorial. This is despite the clearly collaborative nature of the project, due to

129 Ibid.
130 Winter, 85.
132 ‘War Memorials’, Yorkshire Post, 18 September 1922, 11.
its reliance upon public opinion and subscriptions to succeed. This aspect of the ceremony bears a striking resemblance to that of earlier ‘urban development ceremonies’, in which the promotion of the town and the celebration of the municipal government’s achievements took centre stage. The remaining booklet and programme connected the ceremony with the town’s auspicious reputation as a respectable seaside resort and concluded the narrative thread with the stone laying itself. Given the presence of such objects in the foundation of the obelisk, the symbolic function of the activity was clear. The memorial was not only imagined to be representative of the town and its citizens. It was seen as fundamentally the product of the local authority’s ability to deal with public opinion productively, while remaining financially feasible during an economically fraught period, following the culmination of hostilities. Some local commentators shared this perspective: ‘No one had done more to surmount the difficulties [of public consultation] in Scarborough than the Mayor’. As we have seen, the extent of public disagreement and the frequent redrawing of plans was evidence for some councillors of a need for a practical final decision, foregoing further consultation.

In Hartlepool, the war memorial unveiled at the headland in December 1921 included civilians killed in the bombardment alongside local servicemen and sailors. While its statuary was conventional in tone and execution, the stone screen which accompanied it in Redheugh Close (less than 500 feet from the Heugh Battery) included non-combatants in its conception of ‘The Fallen’: ‘These include 351 names of men of the Navy, Army, and Mercantile Marine, and 52 men, women, and children killed in the bombardment’. This unveiling came two years before the completion of Scarborough’s civilian inclusive memorial, though little influence is discernible, given Hartlepool’s use of figurative statuary. Rather than the more oblique obelisk, Hartlepool’s winged figure and Gothic stone base consciously attempted to bridge the gap between the ‘ancient town’ and its post-war rebirth. The programme of the unveiling service made this clear:

The Memorial records the past and present, and inspires the future, in such a way as to bring the rich traditions of this Ancient Town to a climax in the heroism and sacrifice of our own day. It has been felt that a memorial should serve as a symbol and incentive to a renewed

133 Roberts, ‘Entertaining the Community’, 449.
136 Ibid.; King, 9.
activity and an inspiration to social service for intellectual and spiritual progress. Only with such an ideal can the great loss and sacrifice be commemorated.\textsuperscript{137}

Mayor of Hartlepool (1917-19) C.T. Watson made a clearer connection between the history of the town, its wartime experiences, and an active local citizenship and pride. For Watson, the war was responsible for ‘destroying the past, developing a new present, and, as a sequence, evolving an altogether new future for the peoples of the earth’:

A memorial in Hartlepool should be of such a kind as to link up past historical tradition with the activity, the sacrifice, and in a word, with the life of to-day, that we may be more proudly conscious of our town and make it more worthy of the best of our traditions. […]

True artistic effort and production expresses and inspires insight into the essentials of our being, and it should not be too much to hope that the sacred memorial, which will have sprung out of the town’s ancient glories and recent sacrifices, will open out a life of greater possibilities, so that Hartlepool may ultimately be a more delightful place in which to live.\textsuperscript{138}

The memorial was seen, therefore, as operative in post-war reconstruction efforts, both material and psychological. It was a way of elucidating the sacrifice and war record of the town, while ‘boosting’ its image following the untold rigours of war.\textsuperscript{139}

While Scarborough wished to see an imposing physical structure ‘visible from all parts of the town and also from the sea’, Hartlepool combined funerary culture, in the form of the inscribed tablets, with a traditional allegorical figure. As King notes, such figures were usually conceived as ‘statements about the war or the dead’.\textsuperscript{140} The unveiling ceremony on 17 December 1921, timed to coincide with the seventh anniversary of the bombardment, provided a conduit between the military and civilian spheres. While the main body of the ceremony combined conventional civic display with Christian images of sacrifice and deliverance, its conclusion utilised a site of war damage, bringing together the civilian and military experience \textit{in place}. This was achieved through the dedication of a memorial plaque near to the Heugh Battery and lighthouse, ‘indicating the place where the first shell from the leading German Battle Cruiser struck…, and also recording the place where the first soldier was killed’.\textsuperscript{141}

By contrast, despite its considerable involvement in the material and human damage of the bombardment, West Hartlepool’s physical war memorial – unveiled in October 1923 -

\textsuperscript{137} HAPMG, uncatalogued, Hartlepool War Memorial programme, 17 December 1921. I am grateful to Mark Simmons for providing a digitised version of this material.

\textsuperscript{138} Miller, \textit{Hartlepool}, 243-4.


\textsuperscript{140} ‘A Landmark for Miles’, \textit{Yorkshire Evening Post}, 26 September 1923, 7; King, 132-3.

\textsuperscript{141} HAPMG, uncatalogued, Hartlepool War Memorial programme, 17 December 1921.
elided the wartime experience of civilians. This memorial was instead to include only the ‘names of all local men who gave their lives’, rather than situating the dead of the bombardment alongside military and naval personnel.142 This is surprising, given that the Hartlepool headland memorial featured only its own fallen civilians and so it could not be assumed to be a fitting memorial to the combined loss of the towns.143 The fact that Hartlepool’s memorial recorded 52 civilian deaths meant that the remaining 60 were West Hartlepool victims.144 Nevertheless, these did not feature. A newspaper article on the unveiling of the West Hartlepool memorial remarked upon the bombardment, but only to underline the role of the local home defence battalion, the Durham Garrison Artillery.145 However, as in Hartlepool, the building of the war memorial was as much about looking to the future as the recent past. This was intimately linked with the reconstruction of the town and processes of municipal improvement:

The idea is to create a Public Space or “Place” on which Municipal Buildings would front when set up; to erect a War Memorial, with the name of all local men who gave their lives and, on the south side of the “Place,” to raise public buildings, with a noble elevation, to balance the Municipal Buildings on the north side.146

It is difficult to ascertain the reasons for not commemorating the civilian losses of West Hartlepool, though it may be suggested that the efforts of Hartlepool were seen to be sufficient in marking civilian wartime experience and sacrifice in a general sense, while intermittent Thank-offering Days in the interwar period provided a space for commemoration of the combined ‘Hartlepools’. Furthermore, the provision of a number of convalescent cottage homes for the elderly and infirm may have been seen to benefit civilian residents of both towns, as stated in the programme for the memorial’s unveiling.147 However, it may be that the nature of West Hartlepool’s design process resulted in a military-focussed memorial. The eventual design was reached through a public competition, beginning in 1919, won by George John Coombs of Leeds.148 In contrast, the Hartlepool design was provided by Philip Bennison, a local resident, with designs put forward without a competitive element, which

142 Miller, 245.
143 Marsay, 494-5.
145 “West Hartlepool War Memorial”, Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 11 October 1923, 2.
146 Miller, 245.
147 HAPMG, uncatalogued, ‘West Hartlepool War Memorial 1914-1919’ programme, 10.
were then assessed by councillors. Though simplistic, this may at least partly account for the more reflective design of the Hartlepool memorial, which placed greater stock in both the specific site upon which it was placed – close to the defensive batteries and where the first shells of the bombardment fell – and local civilians acutely aware of the sacrifice of their families and neighbours. By contrast, the open, competitive character of the West Hartlepool project - situated in the civic centre of town (Armoury Field, later Victory Field) – more readily leant upon traditional allegorical and civic imagery. It also solely recognised military loss from the town, the norm nationally, even in places similarly affected by bombardment, like London. In addition to the decisions of a designs sub-committee comprised of councillors, the competition was also run within the professional boundaries of an architectural assessor, Ernest Newton, a former president of the Royal Institute of British Architects. This professionalization of the design process meant that, as long as the local authority accepted the choices of the assessor, a great deal of power could be exerted by the architect over the project.

Whitby did not develop a public war memorial to either military personnel or non-combatants. Instead, a new cottage hospital was given a memorial character: an example of a ‘social service’ or ‘living’ memorial building. This hospital was opened on 18 November 1925 by Princess Mary, Countess of Harewood, and her husband Viscount Lascelles. It was envisaged as ‘a memorial to over six hundred Whitby men and women, who gave their lives as an expression of their patriotism in the Great War’. Given that local loss of life in the bombardment of Whitby was negligible compared with Scarborough and the ‘Hartlepools’, it is not surprising that civilian remembrance did not figure in the memorial hospital’s opening ceremony. As we have seen, though a ‘tangible memorial’ for the civilian dead of the bombardment was put forward in Whitby, it did not come to fruition, during or after the conclusion of hostilities.

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151 ‘West Hartlepool War Memorial’, *Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail*, 12 December 1919, 3.
152 King, 115.
153 Ibid., 68; Bernard Barber, ‘Place, Symbol, and Utilitarian Function in War Memorials’, *Social Forces*, 28 (1) (1949), 66.
154 ‘Whitby’s Welcome to Princess Mary’, *Yorkshire Post*, 19 November 1925, 5.
155 Only three civilians ‘officially’ died as a result of the bombardment, though damage to property was considerable. See Marsay, 486-90.
Traces of bombardment in the post-war urban environment

A clear example of the deep significance of bombardment was the reconstruction narrative that accompanied the rebuilding of Hartlepool Baptist Church; one of the most badly damaged public buildings in the town. In late May 1915, the Northern Baptist Association conference in Newcastle voted to put concerted pressure on the government to provide compensation for the damaged Baptist Church in Hartlepool, estimated to require a £2,000 replacement due to the extent of destruction. Contemporary photographs, reproduced as postcards, depicted the considerable external and internal destruction of the church, including a collapsed upper gallery and a mangled organ. It was also featured in the national illustrated press. An initial payment from central government of £710 was insufficient to cover the costs entailed by the bombardment. As a local newspaper put it in November 1918: ‘It would have been more accurate to speak of total destruction, and ask for a larger sum’. Further government assistance was not forthcoming, and the church was forced to reach out to parishioners in order to fundraise for a replacement building. This process was indicative of wider shifts in central-local relations, particularly the elevated role of civil society in providing finance, material relief and human resources both during the war and after.

Monies were solicited through ordinary church collections, and fundraising for the wider cause of post-bombardment recovery in the town was not abated by the loss of a stable place of worship. Indeed, regular newspaper advertisements reminded readers that Hartlepool Baptist services were now held in the Town Hall, a site that had also been damaged but much less severely. Towards the end of the war, with a more modest target of £1,000 in mind for rebuilding, house-to-house collections were organised. The resulting efforts amounted to ‘a little short of £30’. An advertisement announcing the commencement of a week-long campaign made connections between the disruption and privations of war and the significance of the church within the wider community: ‘During the war we have not been

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159 Illustrated War News, 23 December 1914, 9; The Sphere, 26 December 1914.
162 A commemorative pamphlet published in 1915 suggested that a number of the Town Hall’s windows had smashed in the wake of shells passing over the town ‘at some distance’ from the building. See Anon, Illustrated Memorial to the East Coast Raids by the German Navy and Airships (Middlesbrough: Hood & Co., 1915); ‘Hartlepool Baptist Church’, Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 17 November 1917, 2.
163 ‘Hartlepool Baptist Church’, Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 29 November 1918, 4.
allowed to re-build. With the Dawn of Peace, however, we hope for the early erection of new premises… Will the people of Hartlepool please help us to replace the sanctuary destroyed by the Germans?’. It is clear, therefore, that rebuilding efforts in this case were imagined as integral to broader notions of sacrifice, including language suggesting that the church was a refuge for all, given its inclusion of the citizenry of the whole town in its call for assistance. In words reminiscent of other commentators and religious leaders in Belgium and France, the enemy had destroyed the sanctuary of the church and, given the inclusion of the community at large in fundraising efforts, attempted to erase the cultural stock of the town. This was the ‘ultimate proof of barbarism’, transplanted from Rheims into a northern English coastal town.

By July 1920, when the foundation stone for the new church was laid – in its original location – the Building Committee still required around £900 to complete the structure. Despite this shortfall, it is remarkable to note that the majority of the funds raised were amassed in the two years following the cessation of hostilities, amounting to £1,500. By this point, the amount required for reconstruction was revised to £3,600, including furniture. The straitened circumstances of the war, and the working-class character of many worshipers, hampered fundraising efforts during the conflict itself. As the Reverend Harry Kay put it shortly after the close of hostilities, ‘the congregation has the double duty of maintaining their ordinary work and raising this new building’. In July 1920, in response to steadily rising funds, Kay again commented: ‘It was no mean achievement for an ordinary artisan congregation’. With the figure of £2,000 already raised, the church pledged to independently raise £400 in the subsequent two years. By September 1920, the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust and the Northern Baptist Association had pledged an additional £500 and £100 respectively, though the latter was contingent on the church itself raising £200 within a year. In addition to funds donated by ordinary parishioners, civic figures and local grandees, large gatherings that had long been an annual mainstay of the church became sites for fundraising efforts. The most important of these was the annual tea, held at varying locations around the town. In 1920 – only the second to go ahead since the outbreak of war -

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164 Ibid.
165 Horne and Kramer, 218.
166 ‘Hartlepool Baptists’, Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 16 November 1918, 4.
167 Ibid.
the tea was held in the Town Hall and attracted record numbers. Five hundred people filled
the hall, up from 350 in 1919.169

These efforts at rebuilding made by ordinary people in Hartlepool point not only to
the importance placed by many on the centrality of religious assembly to local civic life, but
to the sacrifices made by civilians in war. In the case of Hartlepool Baptist Church, as with
other places of worship in the town and across Britain, this was again placed within a broader
wartime economy of sacrifice. Underlined by Rev. Kay’s regret that the ‘spiritual home of the
Baptist people was destroyed’, a sense that the destruction of Hartlepool Baptist Church was
an example of ‘cultural destruction’ and loss is palpable, striking at the heart of community
and spiritual life.170 For Rev. Kay, the new church was a physical marker of resilience in the
face of total war, but it also had a poignant and sombre function: ‘These new premises would
be a memorial of their suffering and trouble as well as of the scholars and Sunday school
secretary who were killed in the bombardment’.171 This, as elsewhere, would be a practical,
‘living’ memorial to the fallen, but it was also imbued with Christian and secular symbolism,
including allusions to violence.

To further reinforce the indissoluble connection of the reconstructed church with the
violent destruction of its forerunner, assistant secretary to the church, J. Illingworth, placed a
bottle containing a piece of German shell within the ‘recess of the structure’. This latter detail
appended a layer of meaning only attainable through the experience of war to a relatively
commonplace civic ceremony, in the form of the stone laying, with stones placed by civic
dignitaries.172 Indeed, apart from this, the ceremony itself could be likened to any other of its
kind in the pre-war context.173 The fact that the church was reimagined as a memorial
suggests an attempt to make sense of the December 1914 bombardment, to overcome the
feelings of helplessness the unimpeded attack had upon the town and its residents. With
shrapnel physically incorporated into the fabric of the building, a material remnant of
destruction was transformed into one of reconstruction.174 In the words of local writer

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169 ‘Hartlepool Baptist Church’, *Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail*, 10 September 1920, 6; ‘Hartlepool Baptist
170 ‘Hartlepool Baptists: Foundation Stone Laid of New Church’, *Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail*, 14 July 1920,
6; Kramer, *Dynamic*, 26, 234.
171 ‘Hartlepool Baptists: Foundation Stone Laid of New Church’, *Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail*, 14 July 1920,
6.
172 Ibid.
173 For example, the foundation stone of the new central premises of the Hartlepools Cooperative Society was
laid by Justice of the Peace, Thomas Tweddell on 22 November 1913, followed by a tea and concert at the
Town Hall. See advertisement in *Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail*, 20 November 1913, 2.
Frederick Miller in 1921: ‘Destruction had in a moment fashioned out of itself a nobler edifice’.\textsuperscript{175} The church became an embodiment of the loss and bereavement that followed bombardment, a built ‘document’ indissolubly connected with the surrounding environment.\textsuperscript{176} Locally, the church acquired a wider resonance beyond its immediate worshipers. Not only did the extent of the damage inflicted upon the sanctified building, situated close to the seafront, elicit strong feelings of outrage, it also presented a shocking spectacle (Figure 7.2). This latter point is evidenced by the variety of photographs reproduced depicting the damaged church.\textsuperscript{177}

At the time of the rebuilt church’s opening ceremony on 20 July 1921, the \textit{Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail} made clear that this was not merely a facsimile of a lost building, declaring it ‘The new Bombardment Memorial Church – as it is styled’.\textsuperscript{178} Coupled with the physical incorporation of enemy shrapnel into the walls, this underlined the role of the church in wider processes of memorialisation and commemoration in the town. This seems almost elementary, given the building’s public status: many more houses were damaged and destroyed than any other form of architecture. Yet a public building became the focus for concerted voluntary and philanthropic reconstruction efforts. The award of Carnegie United Kingdom Trust funding further suggests that the building, and its community purpose, was seen to have a much broader significance, given that such grants were usually awarded on the basis of a perceived public health benefit. Indeed, a May 1921 report by the Trust suggested that providing grants to help rebuild damaged architecture in the post-war period had become a major part of its work. For the organisation, involvement in ‘building operations’ provided the biggest break with ‘pre-war days’.\textsuperscript{179}

\textsuperscript{175} \textit{Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail}, 16 December 1921, 4.
\textsuperscript{176} Annette Becker, ‘Remembering and Forgetting the First World War in Western Europe’ in Ideas of Europe since 1914: The Legacy of the First World War, eds. Menno Spiering and Michael Wintle (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 91; Winter, \textit{Sites of Memory}, 79.
\textsuperscript{177} HAPMG, postcard collection.
\textsuperscript{179} ‘Carnegie United Kingdom Trust’, \textit{The Lancet}, 21 May 1921, 1086.
From the Second World War to the centenary

In Hartlepool, the culmination of hostilities and the decline of bombardment-themed fundraising activities did not see the complete diminution of commemoration related to bombardment. Even after the Second World War, Territorial regiments which had defended Hartlepool in 1914 continued to hold an ‘annual bombardment dance’ into the mid-1950s.\(^{180}\) Away from the town itself, the ‘centrepiece’ of an assembly of the Royal Artillery Association in June 1950 at the Royal Albert Hall in London was a ‘dramatic re-enactment of

\(^{180}\) Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 12 December 1951, 9; 18 December 1952, 14.
the defence of the Hartlepool’s’, in a strikingly similar evocation of the remembrance-focused historical pageants of the interwar period: a form of ‘collective remembrance’, a ‘cathartic reliving’.\(^{181}\) As well as a scripted drama, the event also occasioned the use of a replica gun, which fired blanks. This was played out to an ‘audience of 5,000 ex-Gunners and their families’.\(^{182}\) In 1951, during the 750\(^{th}\) anniversary of the signing of the Hartlepool town charter, the script and props used in this performance were borrowed to create a ‘bombardment tableau’ in the town itself.\(^{183}\) This latter event blended civic performance with the celebration of military honours, as the experience of bombardment was weaved into a historical narrative of the town’s development since its inception, again similar to traditions of historical pageantry established at the turn of the century and rejuvenated in the interwar period.\(^{184}\) In subsequent years, commemoration of the bombardment was left primarily to military and veterans’ associations, such as the 18\(^{th}\) Durham Light Infantry (Pals), who organised an evening of ‘light refreshments’ in 1954 to mark the fortieth anniversary of the attack.\(^{185}\) The fortieth anniversary also saw the reunion of Territorial veterans who operated the town’s guns in 1914, including members of Durham Coast Regiment, Royal Artillery (TA) in the Drill Hall at West Hartlepool.\(^{186}\)

In Hull, the experience of bombing in the First World War was eventually overshadowed by the bombing raids of the Second World War, which paid a heavy toll on the city. However, while there were not annual memorial or commemorative events to mark specific raids, the Zeppelin bombardments were nonetheless frequently used as a reference point during the fraught years of the Second World War.\(^{187}\) This was particularly so prior to the Blitz (1940-41). This, and other shorter periods of civilian bombing, had killed


\(^{184}\) Tom Hulme, ‘A nation of town criers’: Civic Publicity and Historical Pageantry in Inter-war Britain’, \textit{Urban History}, 44 (2) (2017), 280.

\(^{185}\) \textit{Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail}, 2 December 1954, 14.


approximately 60,000 British non-combatants by 1945.\textsuperscript{188} In April 1940, local tabloid the \textit{Hull Times} purported to present a ‘comprehensive record of one of the most exciting and trying periods in the history of Hull and hereabouts’, the Zeppelin raids of 1915-18.\textsuperscript{189} This provided an historical grounding for contemporary events. Following a small-scale air raid in July/August 1940, the experience of a Mrs Stephenson was compared to a similar attack by Zeppelins in ‘the last war’, ‘when the ceilings of the same house were extensively damaged by bombs’.\textsuperscript{190} Hull’s most intense period of bombing was May 1941, when more than 400 people died in the city at the hands of Luftwaffe bombers, eight times the number killed during 1915-18.\textsuperscript{191} While this experience put paid to overt references to the comparatively less devastating raids of the First World War, prior to the latter months of 1940, the Zeppelin raids provided an important facet of the ‘cultural work’ necessary to preparing civilians for the anticipated air war that would follow.\textsuperscript{192}

In Scarborough, the fiftieth anniversary in 1964 saw an efflorescence of local activity related to the memory of the December 1914 coastal bombardment. A special feature in the \textit{Scarborough Evening News} reproduced the Admiralty’s official statement, which had been published briefly after the raid, accompanied by eyewitness accounts made by contemporary journalists who had covered the story. Other local titles followed suit in providing in-depth retrospective coverage of the bombardment.\textsuperscript{193} In addition, the fiftieth anniversary was marked with a new ‘bombardment exhibition’, opened in the entrance to the central library, ‘containing between 20 and 30 items illustrating the bombardment’. This was seen by library staff as ‘something special to mark the Bombardment’.\textsuperscript{194} The news items fulfilled much the same role as earlier anniversary commentaries, including another published in the \textit{Scarborough Evening Post} in 1934. At this time, it was seen as necessary to renew the local narrative for the younger generation:

Too great a proportion of Scarborough’s present population have their own vivid memories of that demonstration of German “frightfulness” for any detailed description to be necessary of

\textsuperscript{188} Peter Stansky, ‘‘9/7’, The First Day of the London Blitz: The Context’ in \textit{Cities into Battlefields: Metropolitan Scenarios, Experiences and Commemorations of Total War}, eds. Stefan Goebel and Derek Keene (London: Ashgate, 2011), 64-5.
\textsuperscript{189} ‘When Zepps Roamed the Skies’, \textit{Hull Daily Mail}, 17 April 1940, 5.
\textsuperscript{190} ‘King and Queen Told of Bombing’, \textit{Hull Daily Mail}, 2 August 1940, 6.
\textsuperscript{192} Grayzel, \textit{At Home}, 252, 286.
\textsuperscript{193} ‘Bombardment 1914’, \textit{Scarborough Evening Post}, 16 December 1964, 2; Advertisement for a special issue of the \textit{Scarborough Mercury}, op. cit.
the terrible half-hour… There are many, of course, now in the early twenties or younger, and others who are newcomers to the town, who know nothing of the realities of that occasion.195

Such efforts provide evidence of the continual process of construction and reassessment inherent in ‘popular memory’, while offering tacit acknowledgments of the ‘moral obligation’ of post-war generations to remember the dead, in order to continually impart meaning into their loss.196 Crucially, in these interwar and post-Second World War examples, this process was applied to non-combatants almost exclusively. A gradual or sudden trailing off at certain points, particularly the years immediately following the celebration of peace in 1919 and closely after 1945, suggested shifts in contemporary priorities. As a number of scholars have noted, constant attention is required to ensure the continuation of remembrance ceremonies and maintenance of physical monuments, with interpretation charged by present day political priorities and debates.197 In light of experiences, some so immediately arresting that they forego those before them (if only temporarily), the heritage of war is ‘constituted in the act of identifying what is appropriate to remember and preserve’.198 Engagement with the material and symbolic by-products of war, through memorial-focused rituals of commemoration and remembrance, reinforced the contemporary relevance of wartime events. In Hartlepool, more than any other site on the north-east coast, and possibly nationally, this process was the most thoroughgoing and continuous, with a legacy lasting to the present day.199

With the passage of time, anniversaries become important for commemoration and remembrance because they present a tangible signpost of an event, a rallying point for those wishing to reiterate and often remake public historical narratives, imbued with ‘local meaning and local relevance’.200 The enduring nature of bombardment narratives in Hartlepool is testament to this ongoing process which, however interrupted, requires the activity of a multiplicity of people working towards a similar aim. This does not discount the role political elites, national and local, play in this process. Indeed, events related to the First World War centenary (2014-18), particularly those related in some way to civilian experience, have

196 King, Memorials, 194.
encouraged considerable debate at all levels, opening ground for the reinterpretation of dominant narratives, while potentially closing off other opportunities for alternative understandings.\(^\text{201}\) The salient point is that active agents are involved in ensuring an event like the 1914 bombardment is regularly or otherwise commemorated, to produce a ‘locus of communal and individual remembrance’.\(^\text{202}\)

At the national level, centenary commemorations have largely elided the civilian experience of war, and particularly instances of bombing and violence against non-combatants. The most high-profile events were those with a more general character, in which an assumed national audience could be targeted. This was the stated aim of government ministers involved in pre-centenary planning.\(^\text{203}\) Given the sheer number of people likely to have an ancestor affected by the war, this was a logical step to take. This included artistic displays, such as the well-publicised ‘Blood Swept Lands and Seas of Red’, an installation of ceramic poppies at the Tower of London, which underlined the rootedness of the war, and its dead, in the physical landscape.\(^\text{204}\) In addition, performances such as #WeAreHere saw volunteers portraying soldiers within public spaces and transport hubs around Britain, in a ‘memorial to mark the centenary of the Battle of the Somme’.\(^\text{205}\) While both of these examples underlined the centrality of individual commemoration and mourning (the poppies represented individual lives and the actor-soldiers were attributed the names of actual fallen soldiers, and distributed cards with their name and rank to spectators), the memory of civilian bombardment was not included in any commemorative activity on the same scale or level of exposure.\(^\text{206}\) Significantly, the event which launched the centenary in 2014 and marked the declaration of war on 4 August 1914, ‘Lights Out’, did not comment on the state-imposed darkness that actually typified the experience of war for those on the home front. While organisers asked ‘everyone in the UK… to turn out all but one light or have a candle burning between 10-11pm’, the clear connection with DORA lighting regulations and civil defence


\(^\text{204}\) Ibid.; Selena Daly, Martina Salvante, and Vanda Wilcox, ‘Landscapes of War: A Fertile Terrain for First World War Scholarship’ in Landscapes of the First World War, eds. Selena Daly, Martina Salvante and Vanda Wilcox (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 2.

\(^\text{205}\) Anon, ‘‘First World War Soldiers’ have been appearing around the country today. Who is behind the memorial?’, The Telegraph [online], 1 July 2016, [https://www.telegraph.co.uk/art/artists/why-have-first-world-war-soldiers-been-appearing-around-the-coun/](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/art/artists/why-have-first-world-war-soldiers-been-appearing-around-the-coun/) (accessed 30 April 2018).

\(^\text{206}\) Jeffery, ‘Commemoration’, 566.
was ignored in favour of a far more symbolic sentiment. This was instead based upon wartime foreign secretary Edward Grey’s epithet, ‘The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our life-time’.

In any case, war narratives that affected only certain regions or localities were unlikely to be reflected in national commemorative events. However, this is not to say that they have not been the subject of intense activity in localities with a history of civilian bombardment. Indeed, as Jeffery notes, centennial activities in Britain have combined ‘high official state ceremonial with local communal and individual engagement’.

In the case of the latter, local communities have engaged in the research and heritage presentation process – often with the financial support of special centenary grants from the Heritage Lottery Fund (HLF) – and weaved the ‘micro-stories of the conflict, the communal memories and family narratives’ into a broader national picture.

In Hartlepool, the much more sustained tradition of bombardment memorial and commemoration was given renewed focus during the centenary period. While an annual memorial ceremony, complete with volunteers dressed in First World War-era soldiers’ uniforms, has been organised annually on 16 December by the Heugh Battery Museum (since 2008), the centenary, and 2014 in particular, saw larger numbers of people assembling for the official civic service.

While it has retained a broadly military character, through the presence of serving military personnel and actors in uniform, civilians have also played a focal role. In particular, the sacrifice of children has been borne out, with name readings, balloon releases and the planting of wooden crosses being utilised in their memory. The involvement of local school children in paying this particular tribute has lent poignancy to the event.

As elsewhere, the legacies of the bombardment and its effect on family histories, local collective memory and ‘micro-stories’ was cited by organisers as a central reason for

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208 Jeffery, 566.


210 Diane Stephens, Manager of Heugh Battery Museum, e-mail to author, 27 April 2018.

continuing the annual memorial. This was cemented materially with the unveiling of a new memorial to the bombardment near Heugh Battery, including a plaque commemorating the Royal Navy’s involvement in defending the town, in addition to scenes from James Clark’s 1915 painting of the attack. Other commemorative activities during the centenary included a series of plays performed near the battery itself, presenting ‘an emotive response to the legacy of the bombardment, loss, fear, and separation’. On the centenary in 2014, a ‘site-responsive performance’ by a local theatre group, featuring ‘dynamic 360 degree action, pyrotechnics and silent film-style digital projections’ was installed and performed at Hartlepool headland. While it presented a multi-faceted approach to the war and home fronts, including sections on pre-war labour militancy and the changing status of women, a segment was dedicated to the bombardment, including the immersive recreation of bombing through the use of fireworks and pyrotechnics, followed by a reading of victims’ names. A commemorative garden on the grounds of Heugh Battery and a coffee table book featuring reflective poetry and photography by local school children and college students also contributed to the centenary efforts.

Centenary events in Scarborough centred upon the legacy of the bombardment, with remembrance services taking place 100 years to the day of the attack. In a memorial service at St Mary’s Church on 16 December 2014, this entailed a melding of civilian, military and naval sacrifice, with wreaths laid for each group. This included a wreath dedicated to the victims of the bombardment, laid by the German Naval Association (Deutscher Marinebund), who also co-produced a dual language book with Scarborough Museums Trust, published by German publisher Palm Verlag in 2014. A civic service at the Town Hall, beginning at the time the first shells struck the town in 1914, included speakers from Scarborough Borough

Council, and the local heritage centre, flanked by members of the military, reading aloud the details of bomb sites and the names of those killed. Lord Lieutenant of North Yorkshire, Barry Dodd CBE, issued a message of peace, before releasing a flock of eighteen white doves (coinciding with the number of local bombardment victims).219 A flotilla of yachts, alongside the local lifeboat, also marked the centenary of the bombardment. Maroons replicated the sound of bombs hitting their mark in the town, while alluding to sounds familiar to regular Remembrance Day attendees. Such sounds resonate because they punctuate the alternating sombre readings and silence of the ceremony.220 Prior to these events, the bombardment was only intermittently marked in Scarborough, most often coinciding with notable anniversaries. The renewed ‘ritual cycle of remembrance’ engendered by the centenary period has rendered visible the physical and symbolic traces of bombardment – the former brought out fully in the speeches and commentary of officials and journalists – even if only for a brief period. The intensification of this activity during the centenary period underlines the constitutive relation of memory and place: ‘geographies of memory circulate both in material form and through the bodily repetition of performance and cultural display’.221

In Whitby, centennial commemoration of the civilian experience of war took the form of a memorial garden, unveiled on 16 December 2014. Developed by the charity Whitby in Bloom, the memorial redeveloped a neglected sunken garden on the West Cliff, producing in the process a facsimile of a bomb damaged home.222 Incorporating an original unexploded shell (on loan from the local authority), the project reflected upon the changed status of civilians in war in a broad sense, though the material and human toll bombardment had on the town was foremost in historical interpretation.223 While the garden was not situated on an actual 1914 bombsite, it was representative of the material impact of the bombardment on the domestic sphere. A traditional religious service accompanied the garden’s unveiling,

223 Amanda Smith to author, e-mail, 9 March 2018; Memorial garden information board. I am indebted to Amanda Smith, Chair of Whitby in Bloom, for providing access to this material.
alongside speeches by members of the coastguard and Scout Movement. Despite a generally positive response by visitors, the memorial received criticism for both its aesthetic qualities and setting on the ‘beautiful coastline’, in a location where houses had never existed. Online comments even questioned the legitimacy of a memorial to civilians, bringing to mind wartime conceptions of service and sacrifice as exclusively military, in addition to post-war literary stereotypes of the serviceman/civilian dichotomy. For some, the degree to which the memorial garden deviated from established norms of design and intent was seemingly construed as a criticism or downplaying of the military war dead themselves. Other commemorative events included a candlelit remembrance service at the local war memorial (built in 2013) and a church service at St Hilda’s Church on West Cliff.

In Hull, a new monumental memorial funded by public subscription was unveiled in May 2018 in order to commemorate ‘Hull people killed during raids by German aircraft in the two World Wars’. Taking more than six years of planning and consultation, a public vote decided the winning design. This took the form of a metallic globe of ash leaves, with each leaf inscribed with a name of a person killed during air raids. The choice of motif was highly symbolic and evocative of post-war reconstruction discourses: ‘The ash leaf has been chosen as it represents regeneration and healing. When an ash leaf falls it leaves behind a

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224 Howell, ‘Centenary’.
Similarly, the choice of a globular shape was seen to reflect the self-reliant uniqueness of Hull and its people, a sort of world in itself:

The people were often said to have more in common with the people of Flanders, The Baltic and Holland than the rest of the UK. Having been bombarded in the Civil War, in World War One and World War Two we certainly learned to look after ourselves. Mostly, because we had to! The Globe then, might be seen as the perfect shape for our city, our people and our community… Hull being ’ill, we help our own, deal with the fear and pain by pulling together, usually in a way which was never seen anywhere else in the United Kingdom.

For the designers, then, Hull’s civic identity should ideally be underwritten by the twentieth century history of mass conflict, and rooted in the city’s geographical and imagined separation from both the southern seat of power and other cities in the region. This was a conscious effort to include the civilian losses of the major conflicts of the twentieth century, to a national and local historical narrative primarily concerned with military losses. Where memorial efforts have focused on civilians, they have more often commemorated losses in the Blitz of the Second World War. Apart from physical memorial building, the centenary of the Zeppelin raids was marked by newly commissioned creative works, including Dave Windass’s radio drama *Yearning Hearts*, broadcast to coincide with the time the first bomb fell on Hull in June 1915. Prior to centennial installations and events, Hull had not significantly marked the passing of Zeppelin raids, at least not in the public sphere. Indeed, references to the Zeppelin raids of 1915-18 were most prevalent in the immediately post-war period, as we have seen.

**Conclusion**

In Scarborough’s official centenary ceremony in 2014, the release of eighteen white doves, combined with the involvement of a German contingent, imbued the ceremony with a note of

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231 Ibid.
234 Building works seeking to redevelop the city centre in advance of Hull’s UK City of Culture programme in 2017 stalled the memorial project and led to a change of location. Angus Young, ‘Hull’s stunning People’s Memorial to victims of World War Two Blitz Bombing raids to be unveiled’, *Hull Daily Mail* [online], [https://www.hulldailymail.co.uk/news/hull-east-yorkshire-news/hull-peoples-memorial-blitz-victims-1556818](https://www.hulldailymail.co.uk/news/hull-east-yorkshire-news/hull-peoples-memorial-blitz-victims-1556818) (accessed 7 June 2018).
235 Connelly, ‘“We Can Take It!”’, 55.
reconciliation and a desire to maintain peace. This was not present elsewhere on the north-
east coast, though it mirrored similar calls for peace in the immediately post-war period.
While a yearning for an end to war, particularly one popularly defined as futile and wasteful
of human life, was common in British memorial rituals, Scarborough’s reconciliatory aspect
during the centenary is unusual, even with the passage of time, due to the common conflation
of national memory and patriotism.237 Hence the ubiquity of military personnel and regalia at
remembrance ceremonies, from the close of the First World War to the present day, and an
omission of overt references to the vanquished enemy. As Osborne notes, though war has
been defined as a tragedy to be avoided, it has also been seen as intrinsic to nation-building
and national historical periodization.238 The continued presence of the military in
remembrance ceremonies is also linked to present day British involvement in conflicts around
the world, with the wounded and disabled figures of serving soldiers and veterans providing a
common motif in the media and popular culture.239 Forms of ‘banal nationalism’ also play a
role, conceiving soldiers as representatives of the nation par excellence, with ideas related to
Britain’s victory still foremost in present day conceptions of the war and its legacies.240
Historically, notions of consolation for loss and the public mediation of bereavement were
common in conventional remembrance services in Britain. However, it would be wrong to
assume homogeneous meanings and interpretations for remembrance, as it still stands that
notions of indebtedness in the post-war context were largely directed towards fallen
servicemen and not to non-combatant victims of bombardment.241 In this sense, Hartlepool
remains an exception.

The uneven development of war memorials that included bombardment victims across
the north-east coast underlines the intensely political character of commemoration, which
involved (and continues to involve) a constant debate about who should be remembered and
the appropriate form this should take.242 As Paul Cornish notes, ‘the politics of
commemoration is manifested as much by the absence of its physical expression as by its

237 Brian S. Osborne, ‘Reflecting on the Great War 1914-2019: How Has it Been Defined, How has it Been
Commemorated, How Should it be Remembered?’ in Commemorative Spaces of the First World War:
Historical Geographies at the Centenary, eds. James Wallis and David C. Harvey (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018),
209.
238 Ibid., 209, 215.
of the Home Front’ in The Home Front in Britain: Images, Myths and Forgotten Experiences since 1914, eds.
241 Marshall, 39; Winter, Sites of Memory, 95; King, Memorials, 175.
presence’. The ‘geography of commemorative spaces’ is inherently lopsided due to the process of contestation and compromise.\textsuperscript{243} Therefore, the engagement of local communities in commemorative projects is paramount and decides which constituencies will be included in categories of ‘the fallen’. Whilst in Scarborough, the decision to include non-combatant bombardment victims in the pinnacle of the town’s war remembrance efforts was the result of a sustained period of debate, in ‘the Hartlepool’s those killed in the 1914 bombardment were present in war memorial planning from the outset, though this was more marked in the solidly industrial and maritime working class area of Hartlepool.

While Hartlepool’s headland memorial included civilians killed in the bombardment alongside local servicemen and sailors, the shocking and unprecedented nature of the attack upon civilians led almost immediately to calls for separate commemorative activities situated \textit{in place}. These were built at the sites agreed locally to have seen sustained enemy action or, in the case of the plaque placed near the Heugh Battery, at the exact spot where the first British lives of the war were lost. Similarly, though they were never realised practically, suggestions for bombardment memorials in Whitby involved uniquely local evocations of loss and remembrance, exemplified by a call by Whitby Townsmen’s Association for ‘a tablet upon each house which suffered during the bombardment’.\textsuperscript{244} This was clearly evocative of the ‘street shrines’ that were placed in working-class neighbourhood the length of the country to immediately record and commemorate the local ‘fallen’.\textsuperscript{245} Others in Whitby wished to see a central bombardment memorial placed where the first naval and military deaths occurred in the defence of the town, directly mirroring Hartlepool.\textsuperscript{246}

While Hartlepool has maintained a tradition of inclusive remembrance up to the present day, for the remaining case studies the 2014-18 commemorative ‘festival’ has facilitated the most thorough engagement with civilian histories of war since the end of the conflict itself, if only limited to particular localities.\textsuperscript{247} Events in 2014 in Scarborough presented an image of shared wartime experience with resonances in the present day, while Whitby’s bombardment memorial garden was received negatively by some due to its abnegation of a popular military-focused view of modern conflict. Indeed, the continuing involvement of civilians in present day conflicts was a motivating factor for the memorial’s

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\textsuperscript{243} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{244} ‘Local Jottings’, \textit{Whitby Gazette}, 19 March 1915, 3. \\
\textsuperscript{245} Winter, \textit{Sites of Memory}, 80. \\
\textsuperscript{246} ‘Local Jottings’, \textit{Whitby Gazette}, 19 March 1915, 3. \\
\end{flushright}
developers.\textsuperscript{248} It is clear, more than anything, that the history and heritage of civilian bombardment will only maintain a presence in communities as long as there are active agents involved in the process of collective remembrance. It is in Hartlepool where the legacies of bombardment have maintained the strongest profile. The ever-present traces of the events of December 1914 can be seen in the built fabric and in a local place identity imbued with a mingled sense of pride and sacrifice, which was in many ways informed by the town’s proximity to its defensive installations and to the sea itself. This material-spatial dimension was and is part-and-parcel of a coastal urban identity. The perceived exposure, isolation and hardiness of the town and its people was sharpened by the experience of a devastating external attack.\textsuperscript{249} Indeed, to this day the events of 16 December 1914 continue to frame local community identity and self-perception, exemplified by the longevity of Hartlepool’s commemorative activities.

\textsuperscript{248} Amanda Smith to author, e-mail, 9 March 2018; David R. Meddings, ‘Civilians and War: A Review and Historical Overview of the Involvement of Non-combatant Populations in Conflict Situations’, \textit{Medicine, Conflict and Survival}, 17 (1) (2001), 6-16.

CHAPTER 8:
Conclusion: towards a history of the coastal-urban environment at war

This thesis has taken a multi-faceted approach to the experience of civilian bombardment during the First World War, exploring its social, cultural, political and psychological aspects. The work required such an approach, given the diffuse and ad hoc nature of public safety discourses, where the legislative frameworks of central government were applied and interpreted by regional and local authorities, including the police. In addition, civilians themselves were expected to implement (and internalise) particular behaviours and adapt their domestic surroundings, in order to provide shelter and defence from bombardment.\textsuperscript{1} The selection of coastal conurbations - seaside towns and port cities - has provided another perspective from which to view the effect of industrialised war on non-combatants away from the conventional battlefront. Indeed, both the pre-war run up to conflict, and wartime experience, was informed by debates about the role of the sea in British national identity, and the Royal Navy in particular in policing the ‘great moat unabridged’, which kept the country’s foes at bay.\textsuperscript{2} The North Sea played a central role in this performance of national and imperial identity, allotting the east coast a major practical and symbolic role as the threat of invasion and bombardment grew.\textsuperscript{3} Indeed, seaside resorts on the west coast of England, such as Morecambe, exploited the perceived exposure of the east coast to promote their own seasonal economy, seriously affected (as elsewhere) by the social and economic impacts of the war.\textsuperscript{4} The ‘coastal zone’ within which the case studies existed informed the ways civilians understood their role in the war and developed strategies of resilience to combat its threats upon the home front.\textsuperscript{5}

The north-east coast has maintained a link with its wartime past, expressed through annual remembrance ceremonies and a veritable festival of commemorative activities during the centenary period (2014-18). Despite this heritage, remaining ever-present for some and reflected in prominent monuments and physical marks on the urban fabric – particularly in Hartlepool – historians have not grasped the importance of the 16 December 1914

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1} James Greenhalgh, ‘The Threshold of the State: Civil Defence, the Blackout and the Home in Second World War Britain’, \textit{Twentieth Century British History}, 28 (2) (2017), 199.
  \item \textsuperscript{2} Frederick Miller, \textit{Under German Shell-fire: The Hartlepools, Scarborough and Whitby under German Shell-fire}, Third Edition (West Hartlepool: Robert Martin Ltd., 1917), 9.
  \item \textsuperscript{3} Jan Rüger, \textit{The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 200-1.
\end{itemize}
bombardment in the development of nascent civil defence measures. Indeed, as we have seen, Hull began to develop early warning systems in earnest only following this attack further north, despite the more immanent threat by early 1915 being Zeppelin airships. This part of the east coast of England loomed large in national representations of German ‘atrocities’ committed on British soil, with Scarborough in particular becoming a ‘watchword [for] German aggression and provided the first wave of what became iconic images of attacks on civil spaces’. 6

There is considerable scope for expanding the historiography of the First World War home front and civilian bombardment, as the specific experiences of coastal communities have not been explored in detail. 7 Indeed, while the focus of these studies remains understandably urban, the coastal-urban sphere is still largely unexplored with regards both civilian wartime experience and in terms of the growing threat of bombardment during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This thesis provides a response to this scholarly gap, showing the interaction of different levels of society in the war context. Without this multi-level perspective, it would not be possible to understand fully the improvised nature of public safety discourses developed in response to bombardment, as the implementation of central government policy was carried out by a shifting coalition of civil and military partners, therefore diffusing power and responsibility. Anti-bombardment measures were not merely imposed upon civilians. Rather, they were actively interpreted and implemented by non-combatants in tandem with various authorities, with a combination of self-policing and active, sometimes personally inhibiting, police activities.

This concluding chapter will explore the wider themes revealed by this study, themes which the research questions and thematic organisation elucidated in the course of their application to the case studies. While the thesis set out to explore discrete though interconnected areas of the same phenomenon - through the lenses of coastal space, urban landscapes, public safety discourse, urban governance and resilience – its findings revealed historical trends which will be relevant to historians with a variety of interests. This includes, primarily, those working within First World War studies, but the research also provides

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insights into aspects of early twentieth century urban governance, civil-military and central-local relations, social-psychological functions of the built environment, emergency legislation and policing. The significance of these areas reaches beyond that of the First World War, to the twentieth century more generally and specifically to the history of coastal towns and cities. Indeed, the coast at war is best explored at the cross-section of maritime history, urban history and the environmental history of war, as exemplified by recent publications seeking a broader understanding of war landscapes.8

**Wartime resilience**

The development of effective responses to bombardment typified the activity of local government decision-makers during the war, who acted broadly within the framework of emergency legislation: the DORA and the DRR. However, measures such as early warning systems (the oft-mentioned ‘buzzers’) and guidelines for home-based shelters were often developed in lieu of direct intervention from the central state. DORA was vague enough to allow for a wide variety of interpretations and shifts in policy throughout the conflict, thus allowing the government to undermine elements of common law and constitutional rights, a situation heavily criticised by contemporary legal experts, though little open dissent was registered in parliament, the House of Lords, or in wider society.9 Despite this, it was largely local government actors that determined the direction of anti-bombardment measures. In the context of suspended democratic procedures, most notably regular municipal elections (prevented by act of parliament), unelected experts such as borough engineers and town planners came to the fore, largely in line with developments underway before the war.10 However, this did not prevent local government committees, including elected councillors, from meeting regularly in an advisory capacity. The sluggish processes of local government may account for a lack of public discussion of civil defence matters, enhancing the role of unelected professionals to meet with colleagues and share ideas and experiences, as

evidenced by correspondence between town clerks, engineers and mayors across the region in focus.

Implicit in much of this activity was a concern for public safety, a concept enshrined in the first DORA. The role of this emergency framework was to ‘[secure] the public safety and the defence of the realm’. Notions of public safety had gained sway in the late nineteenth century and were intimately connected with conceptions of risk and insurance. Through insurance schemes, risks were made calculable and therefore manageable and controllable, leading to a decline in anxiety (in this context, particular forms of crime). Insurance itself proposes the dispersal of risk communally, where a risk is defined and the burden for guarding against its potential effects shared by members of a given scheme. In so doing, the risk becomes calculable and the future more certain, and so less of a source of anxiety and potential panic. Even so, this certainty is socially defined and dependent on debates in wider society, where certain risks are designated as important. The rise of bombardment insurance in late 1914, most often related to Zeppelin raids, testifies to this process of defining risks and socialising individual responsibility (in terms of private property and individual safety). It is not only a financial instrument, but a ‘moral technology’: ‘To calculate a risk is to master time, to discipline the future’. The advent of nascent civil defence measures indicated an awareness among local authorities in particular of the potential public order issues inherent in any situation of panic caused by the expectation of invasion or attack. In view of the pre-1914 presaging of a coming threat against civilians, such an event was deemed possible by many; though the ubiquity of ideas related to the ‘blue water’ school of naval defence dulled the effect of these visions to some extent. The experience of naval bombardment in the north-east in late 1914 led to the installation of extensive military defences in Scarborough and Hartlepool, and prompted further calls for improved coastal defences along the east coast. However, it was in response to the more pressing threat of air raids in early 1915 that the public safety elements

11 The National Archives (TNA), ADM 1/8397/370, Defence of the Realm Bill, 7 August 1914.
15 Grayzel, At Home, 34.
16 Ewald, 208.
of DORA were combined with policing techniques in the broadest sense. Practical measures were vital at this juncture to diminish the potential for mass panic among civilians, an expected product of invasion and attack in government plans. Part of this perceived need to pacify non-combatants was the importance of maintaining morale on the home front, vital to the self-mobilisation of civilians in aid of the war effort. The twin anxieties of having loved ones fighting abroad and the imminent threat of attack at home meant that endurance and resilience became central to defence efforts away from the conventional battlefield. These efforts had material, social and psychological facets.

The coastal-urban environment became a site for the development of a specific ‘war culture’ related to the civilian experience of the war. Broader understandings of the war itself, and the place of non-combatants within it, were negotiated within this context. However, the experience of war within this ‘coastal zone’ was not uniform. Though coastal-urban places - such as Hull, ‘The Hartlepools’, Scarborough and Whitby – were united by a common geographical position and exposure to bombing, their specific socioeconomic characters were central to how local communities viewed the war and their roles within it.

This was most clearly marked in the responses to bombardment developed by local authorities, under the umbrella of the ACMA, DORA and DRR. More specifically, many inhabitants of the seaside towns of Scarborough and Whitby, with local economies built around seasonal tourism and leisure, were concerned with the effects of bombardment upon visitor numbers and the negative impact on local businesses. As such, some hoteliers and shopkeepers sought a relaxation of civil defence efforts just months after the 16 December 1914 attack. Wider national representations of these towns focused on the damage and destruction wrought upon famous landmarks, such as Whitby Abbey and Scarborough Castle. They were also ‘unfortified’ and contained no legitimate military targets, resulting in widespread outrage when they came under enemy fire. By contrast, the industrial ports of Hull and Hartlepool – both containing recognised military targets in the form of docks, factories and military installations – saw calls for improved defences regularly throughout the war and, in the case of Hull, before the city was even attacked directly.

Strategies of wartime endurance and coping have been central to studies of combatant culture and experience, in addition to research on maladies associated with modern combat,
most notably neurasthenia or ‘shell shock’. This thesis has extended these phenomena to the spaces of the coastal-urban home front and, indeed, within the walls of the home and the built environment itself. Resilience was key to the mobilisation and re-mobilisation of civilians during the war. Following initially widespread assumptions that the conflict would be short lived, when the social and economic strain of the war became pronounced in 1917, civilians could not assume that the end of the conflict was in sight. Indeed, as John Horne has explored, the state actively engaged at this time in producing anti-pacifist material reiterating the country’s war aims. The intention of this activity was to combat war-weariness and ‘rally the nation behind the long war effort’. Even before this point, the direct experience of warfare in civilian spaces doubled the social, material and emotional efforts of non-combatants, who had to juggle concern for loved ones fighting abroad with the very real fear of death and injury at home. This was mirrored by servicemen in the trenches, who expressed concerns in correspondence regarding the safety and psychological stability of family members on the home front. Therefore, in places badly affected by bombardment, the need for practical safeguards - material and psychological – presented itself most markedly during the first months of 1915. This experience underlined the framing of war aims as a way of attaining ‘national survival’. This made the wider war strikingly present for civilians, not just a conflict happening in a distant land. Therefore, success was not predicated solely upon military victory, but the steadfastness of the entire population.

This thesis has found that early warning systems, lighting regulations and shelters were seen to guard against further material and human destruction from naval and air raids. In addition, the raising of a Special Constabulary to enforce emergency regulations suggested that the inculcation of certain behaviours could encourage the resolve of non-combatants. This approach combined coercive and persuasive methods to bolster public safety and

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25 Liddle Collection, Special Collections, Leeds University Library (LC), LIDDL/EWW/1/GS/0603A, Papers of L.W. Gamble, Pte. L.W. Gamble to Mother, 1 April 1916.

26 Horne, 204.
encourage resilience. DORA and the DRR provided far-reaching and dynamic rules for civilian comportment, while policing ensured that these rules were followed, in the hope that civilians would increasingly police their own behaviour (shading lights and windows, remaining quiet at night, staying indoors). The civil courts punished those who broke these rules, with penalties similar to those seen in the pre-war period for petty crimes, such as theft.

More positive was the role that the Special Constabulary had in maintaining a presence on the streets and at particular ‘vulnerable points’, such as bridges, docks and factories.  

For many, this presence was reassuring and the actions of officers eminently patriotic and selfless. For some, as we have seen, special constables were seen to overstep the bounds of appropriate behaviour, trespassing upon the sacrosanct space of the home and overzealous in their efforts to maintain darkened streets. Where the number of specials was lacking, as at various points during the war in Hull, groups of working-class men and boys unable to contribute fruitfully to the war effort stepped in to provide a similarly reassuring presence, forming ‘night patrols’. Here, emphasis was placed on the class-prejudiced attitudes of local authorities and their apparent lack of attention to the safety of people in poorer neighbourhoods, often close to military targets, such as docks. As one pro-night patrol supporter put it in September 1915: ‘[I]t’s the poor that helps the poor… Think of the poor souls who may be asleep and murdered in bed. What harm is done patrolling?’

This civilian ‘force’, organised from below, displayed considerable agency in the interest of public safety and community defence. These efforts were incorporated into a wider culture of patriotic voluntary action, connected to British war aims and conceptions of ‘war effort’, while somewhat paradoxically undermining any sense of a unified wartime population by shedding a light on the class biases of those in positions of authority.

The provision of anti-aircraft guns and the building of coastal batteries – actively demanded by community-spirited civilians and regional military leaders – also provided a source for the inculcation of resilient attitudes. However, the often improvised measures of local authorities in distributing public safety information and experimenting with early warning buzzers saw the most consistent engagement with civilian constituencies across the region. While physical military installations changed the character of the urban landscape, civil defence guidelines sought to direct the behaviour of civilians without the need for new public infrastructure, such as shelters. In Whitby, early efforts to ensure public safety through

29 ‘If Patrolling is Stopped?’, *Hull Daily Mail*, 9 September 1915, 2.
the printing of locally-specific guidelines were seen to be in lieu of ‘official’ activities. In this narrative, central government and military planners were not adequately prepared for the bombardment of civilian areas. Therefore, in the light of shocking and devastating experience, nascent forms of civil defence were improvised, including pamphlets and newspaper articles recommending the use of basements as air raid shelters, and guidelines for fighting fires following incendiary bomb attacks. Through the medium of newspaper correspondence, concerned civilians put forward their own ideas for civil defence. Indeed, given that there was no top-down provision of civil defence initiatives – a phenomenon often associated with the Second World War – it is likely that at least some of these writers felt they could on some level influence local policy. Just as DORA was a ‘process of experimentation under exceptional measures’, efforts to guard against future attack were ad hoc and responsive to a rapidly changing coastal-urban environment.\textsuperscript{31} Popular cultural representations of the north-east coast tacitly suggested a defensive imbalance between fortified industrial ports and unfortified seaside resorts, while underlining the common exposure to potential bombardment and invasion due to geographical proximity to the North Sea. After the first major bombing attack occurred in December 1914, the visual media reflected upon the militarisation of sedate seaside resorts like Scarborough, who took on an alien character through the installation of military facilities, roadblocks and barbed wire entanglements.

It has been demonstrated that civilians on the home front did not only require a means to endure what was increasingly seen as a punishing and potentially lengthy conflict, they had to survive attacks upon the urban environment. Just as soldiers developed material, social and cultural strategies for dealing with the anxieties, disruptions and pressing dangers of the battlefield, civilians needed both physical safety and psychological hardiness. Indeed, various forms of resilience, including personal and community, have been presented as fundamental to maritime and coastal communities, reflected in the unique ‘lifeworlds’ of fishing districts, seaside promenades and tourist beaches.\textsuperscript{32} In the First World War coastal zone, those who could not attain a hardy attitude could have recourse to alcoholism or suicide, remarkably like

the trenches though without the regulating strictures of military discipline.\textsuperscript{33} The key point here is the central role of local authorities in devising public safety information specific to the community, including its socioeconomic character and geographical placing, rather than relying on generic information disseminated by a government ministry. Though the DRR provided a broad framework for drawing up local plans and guidelines, it was in the face of actual attack that civilians needed to be mobilised to ensure their own safety. The experience of the First World War led to the development of centralised civil defence plans during the interwar years, finding a use during 1939-45.\textsuperscript{34} Central facets of the ideology of early civil defence remained part of Cold War home defence planning in the 1950s and 1960s, including the promotion of volunteerism, the existence of the Special Constabulary and guidelines for building makeshift shelters in the home.\textsuperscript{35}

**Power relations**

In analysing the effect of bombardment upon civil society from a variety of levels and perspectives, this research has engaged with long established debates about the changing role of the state during the early twentieth century. In particular, it has been assumed by some historians that the war signalled the culmination of the terminal decline of liberalism; though others have argued that the liberal state was itself part of the process of government centralisation and encroachment upon the everyday life of citizens during the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{36} At the heart of this debate is the relationship between the central state, local government and the individual. The First World War, through the lens of nascent civil defence on the home front, has provided a useful basis for exploring these shifting relations, as David Edgerton has found in the years following the conflict.\textsuperscript{37}

The advent of the Authorised Competent Military Authority (ACMA) saw the hierarchical ordering of wartime governance, with the military authorities occupying a central position below the government itself. However, as this study has found, this was not a top-

\textsuperscript{34} Lucy Noakes and Susan R. Grayzel, ‘Defending the Home(land): Gendering Civil Defence from the First World War to the ‘War on Terror’” in *Gender and Conflict since 1914: Historical and Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, ed. Ana Carden-Coyne (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012), 33-6.
down administration that imposed a universal order upon wartime populations, in order to
secure ‘public safety and the defence of the realm’, though the DRR remained an overarching
framework throughout the war. Rather, the ACMA was directly responsible for the control
of land for military purposes and the installation of physical defences and anti-aircraft guns.
It did not itself directly control civilian movements and activities. While it maintained
considerable influence among central government and local authority actors, power was
dispersed among a variety of bodies which took responsibility for particular activities.
Police forces, the newly raised Special Constabulary in particular, were charged with
enforcing the DRR, given their basis within communities and assumed patriotic commitment
to ensuring public safety and discouraging social unrest. Municipal authorities retained the
right to inform citizens of the dangers inherent in wartime urban settings, providing
guidelines immediately responsive to events. Given that DORA did not provide a blueprint
for defending urban environments from attack, particularly in terms of shelters and early
warning systems, local authorities improvised and experimented with measures suited solely
to their locality.

Just as patriotic tropes associated with the nation as a whole were reframed by
evoking the bombardment of Scarborough, national defence from invasion and attack was
framed by evocations of one’s threatened home and loved ones. For soldiers at the front,
this was an important link with pre-war civilian life and the current trials of the home front.
For civilians, the experience of bombardment framed understandings of the war more
broadly, while defining personal and community sacrifice comparable to that of soldiers.
While the wartime ‘economy of sacrifice’ allowed for non-combatant losses, they were
usually accorded the status of victim and occupied a separate commemorative space to the
soldier-hero. However, commemorative and memorial efforts both during and following the
war, particularly in Hartlepool (and to a lesser extent in Scarborough), saw attempts to
broaden conceptions of ‘the fallen’ to include those killed in bombardments. Negotiations
surrounding the development of war memorials in the 1920s testify to this process. Specific

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local war cultures - based upon the cultural resonances of bombardment, the level of material and human loss relative to military deaths and socioeconomic character of the community – led to differing conceptions of civilian sacrifice.43 An oppositional dynamic was particularly pronounced between Scarborough and Hartlepool/West Hartlepool, framed around popular conceptions of local sacrifice. According to one Hartlepool commentator, British newspapers had ‘lost their sense of proportion’ when reporting the 16 December 1914 attack: ‘A great deal has been said in them about the loss of life and destruction of property at Scarborough, but comparatively little about what happened in Hartlepool and West Hartlepool, though the casualties here were about six times greater than at the fashionable watering-place’.44 Though the writer assented that Hartlepool contained legitimate military targets, the piece ended with a plea for improved defences: ‘[If] the Hartlepools are to be treated as a fortified place the defences should be more adequate to the work which is expected of them’.45 As this thesis has demonstrated, many ordinary citizens were not perturbed from contesting elements of DORA and the DRR, including the deliberate breaking of lighting regulations and demands for a relaxation of rules at inopportune periods. Others were keen to admonish authority figures – local, regional and national – for not providing adequate defences against aerial and naval attack, with newspaper correspondence providing a ready means for at least a modicum of democratic accountability.46

Rather than discrediting perspectives on the ever-centralising late Victorian and Edwardian state, it would be more accurate to say that wartime governance – carried out in a time of emergency or ‘exception’ as it was – in the context of public safety remained thoroughly liberal.47 It was liberal in as much as the DRR and local public information in particular sought to inculcate particular behaviours in citizens, which were not necessarily enforced directly by the police. Rather, people developed methods of self-governance which - following guidelines developed locally but loosely within a central government framework – privatised anti-bombardment measures to a considerable extent.48 This was ‘liberal governance as rule through freedom’, based upon a ‘strong state’ but dependent upon ‘highly

44 ‘To-day’, *Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail*, 21 December 1914, 2.
45 Ibid.
dispersed agency’.\(^{49}\) This transformed the home into a space of danger, where the urban fabric could cause further damage through fire and debris following bomb damage. As Grayzel notes, these efforts ‘domesticated’ early forms of civil defence, a trend that continued during the Second World War, though with greater state involvement in the provision of protective materials.\(^{50}\) Paradoxically, local authorities promoted vernacular architecture as a potential shelter from harm, especially as they were, largely, unable to provide public shelters. Instead, even before any naval or air raids had occurred, civilians were advised to ‘sit in the cellar if you would rest your confidence on concrete foundations’.\(^{51}\) With power dispersed among different civil and military bodies, what does this wartime mode of governance say about patterns of twentieth-century urban governance in a broader sense? This study provides evidence that processes that began prior to the onset of war in 1914 were continued during the war and adapted for the war context. This was true not only of public safety discourses but of the relation of the central state to the local sphere and individual subject, underlining the fluid and protean character of wartime urban governance.

In terms of wartime governance and urban governance more broadly in the twentieth century, this research has offered a multi-faceted perspective on the administration of the First World War home front, with a focus firmly on the interconnections of military, governmental and municipal authority. A dynamic and practical coalition of governing bodies was required to enable the material and human mobilisation required to wage total war. Such a situation required a ‘haste-process’, able to quickly respond to changing conditions.\(^{52}\) As we have seen, central government was often not hasty enough in its actions for stricken coastal communities, who instead worked regionally to develop their own early warning systems and printed public safety guidelines. In terms of military defence planning and provision, sluggish supplies of anti-aircraft guns and coastal defences required the action of local civil and military officials, including regional military commanders, who expressed frustration at the lack of awareness of their plight at the higher echelons of power.

On the home front, each governing partner, however unequal in official stature, was responsible for a different area of social life and largely responsible for areas appropriate to its expertise. Though the government remained at the helm, able to rule by decree according


\(^{51}\) ‘Funk-Holes for Bomb-Dodgers’, *The Sketch*, 18 November 1914, 138.

\(^{52}\) Townshend, *Making the Peace*, 64.
to the intentionally vague and ad hoc DORA, the lack of pre-war planning for sustained attacks on civilian areas, beyond plans against hostile invasion, meant that wartime government was impossible without a dispersal of responsibility throughout civil society.\(^{53}\) Indeed, while the military were given thoroughgoing powers to try civilians in military courts for infringements of DORA – an affront to common law - only months later was this responsibility transferred to the civil courts.\(^{54}\) While the war accelerated processes of state intervention and centralisation already underway, it did this gradually and with periods of reassessment and negotiation. Even measures such as the ubiquitous lighting regulations – the main official central government civil defence measure, albeit policed by local authorities – were frequently questioned and resisted by local officials and civilians alike, with the latter using both legitimate and illegal means to demonstrate discord. This included moments of direct confrontation with special constables when demanding the cessation of household lighting, with some civilians bold enough to insult officers and bar entrance to their property.\(^{55}\) Even during air raid alarms and sirens, there were steadfast refusals to put out lights that could be visible to enemy aircraft.\(^{56}\) Nonetheless, the majority of civilians acquiesced in the maintenance of emergency public safety legislation, pushed as they were by the exigency of the situation, made all the more pressing by being actually under threat from bombs.\(^{57}\)

This study has made clear that the First World War played a focal role in the transformation of twentieth century urban governance and power relations. While the broader structures of government planning in the economy, industry and health would see a deepening of centralisation processes in the interwar period, during the war itself liberal government required the self-government of individuals through the inculcation of particular behaviours. This method of social control was combined with conceptions of materiality, embodied in notions of the coastal-urban fabric, built environment and the provision of physical barriers to protect against weapons and ordnance.\(^{58}\) The war saw the operation of

\(^{53}\) Ibid., 58.


\(^{57}\) Townshend, 61, 63.

state power through legal frameworks, political legitimacy and social organisation. However, as Joyce and Mukerji note, the conflict entailed the ‘impersonal power of governance through things: legal documents that regulate conduct, the arsenals and soldiers formed to enact legitimate violence, and too the countless other things… shape the human and non-human environments’. This factor, coupled with the diffusion of wartime governance throughout society, including the self-regulated individual, made the early twentieth century state a ‘shape-shifting assemblage of people and things’. The material realm of the urban fabric, its homes, businesses, churches and schools - on the coast, its shoreline and proximity to the sea – was interpreted in the context of war, and deployed as a means of defence while maintaining inherently dangerous physical properties as a flammable environment vulnerable to bombardment and invasion.

The coastal-urban environment at war

A concern with the influence of materiality upon everyday civilian life played a central role in the overall framing of this study. Not only does the north-east coast act as a geographical zone within which the history of civilian bombardment can be explored, its coastal character was crucial to understanding wartime experience for people who lived there. This coastal identity united the towns in focus, cutting across function (industrial/recreational) to frame their shared experience of bombardment. The urban landscape and the built environment were closely connected with this geographical context, forming points of continuity and permanence, dramatically shattered by the intervention of enemy warships and Zeppelins. However, as alluded to above, differences between different kinds of coastal urban places – be they industrial ports or seaside resorts – should not be overlooked. Popular depictions of bombarded buildings proliferated in towns with established postcard cultures – Scarborough and Whitby – and in the primarily industrial Hartlepool. This is evidence not only of the significance of bombardment experience in framing local ideas of sacrifice, but of the considerable effort expended during the war and following armistice to situate individual communities within a competitive ‘economy of sacrifice’. Representations of wrecked buildings presented to the world outside of the locale the seriousness of the bombardment threat and could underwrite claims to a unique local burden in the form of loss of life, limb and property.

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59 Joyce and Mukerji, 5.
60 Ibid., 15.
61 Gregory, Last Great War, 150.
This study has explored differing societal levels of engagement with defence against bombardment, in addition to the experience and aftermath of attack. Pre-war central government planning was particularly concerned with defending the east coast of Britain, as this was expected to be the likely entry point for an invading foe. The lighting regulations developed within the confines of emergency legislation also accorded extra significance to the nocturnal targeting of coastal towns and cities. All urban areas had the potential to inadvertently signal to enemy naval or aerial vessels through unshaded windows. However, windows that could be viewed from the sea were, on the north-east coast at least, treated as a separate offence. As the war continued and the threat of naval attack lessened, this offence nevertheless maintained its presence in court minutes.

Anti-bombardment planning by local authorities in the region was also defined by the coastal context. Municipal officials, notably city engineers and planners, had to work within significantly militarised spaces much different to their pre-war professional conditions. In Scarborough, the December 1914 bombardment saw almost immediate efforts to dig trenches on cliffs and beaches, in addition to street roadblocks, to repel an expected follow-up bombardment or landing of enemy troops. The Scarborough town clerk and borough engineer liaised with regional military authorities to seek relaxations in these physical installations in early 1915, given the effects of barbed wire entanglements on local businesses as the summer season approached. There was, therefore, an interesting paradox at play: it was because of the town’s ‘unfortified’ status that defensive and military structures were sought, while its reliance on seasonal tourism was seen by some as grounds for exception from public safety regulations.

Local authorities in Scarborough and Hull collaborated to devise early warning ‘buzzers’, sharing expertise and the results of experiments on the ground. While the effect of warfare and wartime privations affected both inland and coastal communities across Britain, the dependence on seasonal visitors and passing trade in seaside resorts such as Scarborough and Whitby was a condition with relevance only in the coastal context. The fact that military activities and emergency regulations were seen by some vested interests as fundamentally disruptive rather than synonymous with public safety provides a complex picture of this particular facet of the home front. Indeed, such measures did significantly undermine the widespread promotion of economic continuity (‘business as usual’), especially as they were seen to render the town unattractive the visitors, a point not lost on west coast rivals.62

62 ‘We Want to Get Visitors and Not Drive Them Away’, Scarborough Mercury, 19 March 1915, 8.
Ironically, local tourism narratives in guidebooks in the immediate post-war period used sites of bomb damage as a means to improve the economic fortunes of the town. In Hull, where tourism was far less important to the local economy, municipal officers, following public opinion, pressured the regional military authorities to provide improved defences for the city, including anti-aircraft guns and coastal batteries.

The periods preceding and following the war were as important as the war years in constructing a particular coastal understanding of total war. While pre-war concerns focused on the threat of invasion, the shock of bombardment in late 1914 seemed to give credence the theory of the ‘bolt from the blue’ common among military strategists, where lapses in naval defence were seem to leave the country open for the landing of enemy troops. While this was eclipsed by fears of the ‘knock-out blow’ associated with aerial technology, coastal areas remained primary targets for enemy bombing raids.63 While this was partly a practical consideration for German forces – the east coast was close to Germany, in range of Zeppelins and battleships, and contained many military targets – the beleaguered status of coastal conurbations during the war confirmed pre-war assumptions of coastal vulnerability.

Broadly, for coastal communities the processes of mobilisation did not markedly differ from those inland. Civilians and would-be citizen-soldiers were exposed to a belligerent war culture, much the same as anywhere else. However, where the coastal-urban community was unique was in its specifically local war cultures, wherein exposure to the dangers of the North Sea was underlined and ideas related to resilience (social, psychological and in terms of national identity) crystallised. British and Allied war aims could be reframed as fundamentally about ‘avenging’ the ‘murdered’ civilians of the north-east coast, much like earlier iterations of revenge for German ‘atrocities’ in occupied Belgium and northern France.64 In ‘the Hartlepoools’, the events of 16 December 1914 were intensely emotionally and politically charged during the war, reinforcing civilian voluntary action to raise money for hospitals, local men fighting abroad and, crucially, for the victims of the bombardment and their families. For many, this event provoked an intensely anti-German outlook and justified national war aims: a fight to victory rather than the compromise of a negotiated peace.65 While those affected by bombardment were undoubtedly victims, in wartime and post-war commemorative narratives, they took on a semblance of the hero status of fallen

63 Holman, Next War, 27.
soldiers. This was possible precisely because the attacks had occurred in locations primarily associated with civilian habitation, even if industrial sites had been targeted. On the north-east coast, the idea that ‘the Hartlepool’s had shouldered an intense sacrifice was exemplified by wartime and post-war commemorative events and popular representations, including commemorative rituals that continue to this day. An oppositional relation to Scarborough as a well known ‘fashionable watering-place’ also reinforced claims that Hartlepool was overlooked in national narratives of civilian bombardment, made all the starker by military recruitment posters that focussed solely on Scarborough.66

Conclusion

Scholarly interest in the First World War continues to be concerned with the urban and with the civilian as a wartime actor. While this thesis has explored an area of the east coast of England, the methods employed in this study can be applied in further comparative research. A comparison of coastal towns and cities in the north of England with those in the south may prove illuminating, as would transnational comparisons of towns and cities similarly threatened by bombardment.67 Comparative work in this area has overlooked the specific experiences of maritime communities, though the transformation of urban spaces by bomb damage has been noted, largely from a military and demographic point-of-view.68 Given the exposure of the east coast – reflected in wartime imaginaries and in reality – it may be fruitful to turn attention to the more sheltered west coast, in either standalone or comparative studies.

This thesis has explored the cultural, social, material and psychological impacts of bombardment upon coastal-urban environments and their inhabitants. Combining approaches from urban history and First World War studies has made it possible to contribute to debates about the state and its relation to civil society, as well as the shifting parameters of urban governance in wartime. We have also seen a detailed exploration of the pre-war and wartime development of public safety discourses designed to guard against bombardment and protect

civilians from harm. The shocking and tragic experience of bombardment shifted official and popular conceptions of war at home, from one of assumed foreign invasion – prevented with a strong navy and the provision of coastal gun batteries – to that of surprise attack from sea and air. Many inhabitants of coastal towns and cities believed they lived within a ‘danger zone’, a sense that was sharpened by the rise of air power and the undermining of the apparent impenetrability of the ‘silver streak which surrounds the buttressed walls, the shelving slopes, the deep set inlets of our island home’. 69

An awareness of the social and cultural specificities of maritime community and the ‘coastal zone’ in wartime broadens our understanding of the First World War home front, giving a voice to constituencies often overlooked even in social and cultural histories of the conflict. Not only were coastal civilians active in voluntary actions and in bolstering local resilience to future attack, more than any other place, civilian bombardment retained a lasting significance and a cultural legacy lasting for many years after armistice. In Hartlepool, the process of commemoration was maintained more-or-less consistently throughout the twentieth century, acquiring renewed vigour during the 2014-18 centenary. In Hull, Scarborough and Whitby, commemoration was less sustained, but the recent centenary ‘festival’ has renewed public awareness of bombardment and its often still visible effects upon the urban fabric and local cultural and social identities.

Most importantly, this thesis has underlined the significance of coastal urban communities and their specific experiences during the First World War. These experiences were framed by local conditions: geographical, political, social and cultural. Not only was the coast more likely to be bombarded, residents felt the threat of attack acutely, perhaps to a greater extent than those further inland. This study offers a sustained effort to understand the role of the coastal-urban sphere in the development of civilian identities in the context of twentieth century conflict, particularly the differing conceptions of threat and danger depending on one’s proximity to the sea. This thesis also contributes to a burgeoning movement within First World War studies to account for the multi-faceted nature of the home front, not as a binary opposite to the conventional battlefield, but as both an imagined and an actual battleground, both for historical actors and for historians wishing to understand the social and cultural aspects of modern war beyond the metropolis.

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