Anglo-Prussian Relations and the Reciprocal Production of Status: Ceremonial and Diplomacy between London and Berlin, 1701-1714

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Publications


Abstract

The period between the 1648 Peace of Westphalia and the 1713 Pacification of Utrecht-Rastatt-Baden saw a transition in European princely society from a hierarchically arranged political order to a bipartite system. This led many princes and states to attempt to secure their position within the upper tier of this new system. Frederick III, Elector of Brandenburg, was one such ruler, and his efforts to gain admittance to the superior grouping resulted in him crowning himself as King in Prussia in 1701. This rank elevation could however not be unilaterally declared, for status production required the recognition and cooperation of others. The ceremonial honours granted to rulers and their diplomatic representatives acted as the primary means through which status within European princely society was brought into being, and this thesis adopts the culturalist approach to reinvigorate such performative actions with the meaning they held for contemporaries. Frederick consequently instrumentalised his relations with other princes throughout his reign to secure marks of acceptance, and construct his status as king.

Relations with English actors provided the most susceptive space in which the Prussian king was able to bring his potentate status into being. This was due to a number of facilitating factors which made the English consistently willing to grant greater ceremonial concessions than others, as well as other dynamics which amplified the impact of ceremonial concessions granted by the English. The Anglo-Prussian relationship likewise provided English actors with the opportunity to facilitate rank elevations. This is most prominently represented in the person of Baron Raby, the English representative to Berlin from 1703-1711, who managed to secure an increase in status, wealth, and prestige. Four case study chapters will demonstrate how Anglo-Prussian relations acted as an effective medium for reciprocal status production, re-emphasising the importance of the Anglo-Prussian connection during this period.
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Notes on Abbreviations, Names, and Dates

BL - The British Library
BLJ - The British Library Journal
CUP - Cambridge University Press
EUP - Edinburgh University Press
GSPK- Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz
HJ - The Historical Journal
HUP - Harvard University Press
JEMH - The Journal of Early Modern History
JMH - The Journal of Modern History
MUP - Manchester University Press
OUP - Oxford University Press
SUP - Stanford University Press
TNA - The National Archives (Kew)
UCP - University of Chicago Press
UPE - Exeter University Press
UPK - The University Press of Kentucky
YUP - Yale University Press
ZfF - Zeitschrift für historische Forschung

Throughout this thesis the names of historical actors will be anglicised when that figure is relatively well known under that name in the English-speaking world. This results in members of the Hohenzollern dynasty being referred to as ‘Frederick’ or ‘Frederick William’, while the rulers of Spain and Sweden are referred to as Charles XII and Charles II, and not Karl or Carlos. Less well-known rulers however, such as Johann Wilhelm Elector Palatine, remain in their respective language. Place names are also anglicised when there is a frequently used English alternative, resulting in: Vienna, Cologne, Munich, Guelders, and Hanover, etc.
Princely dynasties will also be referred to throughout under the names we now know them by. Thus, the terms ‘House of Hohenzollern’, or ‘Bourbon dynasty’ will be utilised, though this author is aware that this is a later construction which members of the ‘House of Brandenburg’ would not have used.

A number of the monarchs mentioned frequently in this thesis ruled over disparate composite states. This resulted in differing regnal numbers for their various kingdoms. Thus, Queen Anne’s father ruled as James II of England but James VII of Scotland. The same is true of Brandenburg-Prussia, with Frederick ruling as Frederick III Elector of Brandenburg, but from 1701 known as Frederick I King in Prussia. In general, when only one regnal number is used, it is that of the larger or more important kingdom. Likewise, there were a number of rulers named Frederick during the period of investigation, and so, when the name Frederick without a regnal number is given, the first King in Prussia is being referred to.

The 1707 Acts of Union united the previously separate kingdoms of England and Scotland into one whole - Great Britain. As such, effort has been made to use the appropriate terms within chapters straddling the date of union. Nonetheless, even after 1707, politics and international diplomacy remained dominated by English actors, meaning that occasionally this term may be used, though it could perhaps equally be substituted for Britain / British. Likewise, though no unified British crown existed before 1707, the crowns of England and Scotland (as well as Ireland) had been united in personal union since 1603. Thus, the term British may be used to refer to the diplomatic service or the army before the union, indicating that they were staffed by those from across the kingdoms, on behalf of all three crowns.

Throughout the period of study two calendars were in use. Most of continental Europe had adopted the Gregorian calendar by 1700, however Britain did not do so until 1752, and instead continued to use the Julian calendar. Resultingly, the ‘new style’ Gregorian calendar was ahead of ‘old style’ Julian calendar, by ten days before 1700, and by eleven days thereafter. This work will attempt to use new style dates as far as possible, however when necessary old-style dates will be followed by (OS) for clarity. When dealing with primary source quotes, archaic or incorrect spelling which might confuse the reader has been amended.
1. **Introduction**

1.1. **The Coronation**

The 18th of January 1701 began with a coronation. Early that morning in the audience chamber of the Königsberg Schloss Frederick III, Elector of Brandenburg and Duke of Prussia, took a crown and placed it atop his own head. Frederick then proceeded to his wife’s chambers where he also crowned her with ‘loving joyfulness’. Together they proceeded to a hall in which two thrones had been erected, and there received homage from the assembled estates and courtiers, where ‘with deep inclinations, [they] for the first time greeted their majesties as king and queen’.

This was not just any coronation, it was the act that founded a royal dynasty. The House of Hohenzollern to which Frederick belonged had held the title of Elector of Brandenburg since 1415. Their place in the hierarchy of European princes rested upon that title. Now, through this series of carefully choreographed actions Frederick was seeking to consciously communicate his claims to a higher rank, upon which his status within European princely society would henceforth be based. In an attempt to gain admittance to the select group of European crowned heads he was founding a new royal title upon his sovereign eastern duchy; he would henceforth style himself as Frederick I, the first King in Prussia.

______________________________


3 For a discussion on naming conventions see: K. Friedrich and S. Smart, *The Cultivation of Monarchy and the Rise of Berlin: Brandenburg-Prussia, 1700* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 14-16.
Once Frederick had returned to his residence of Berlin, he was inundated with foreign representatives congratulating him upon his accession, including a special English representative appointed by William III.4

And so, in May 1701, Thomas Wentworth, Baron Raby, arrived in Berlin and delivered a most complimentary speech during his audience with Frederick I, in which he congratulated him upon his new royal title.5 Their Prussian majesties showed Raby ‘great civilities’, which was owing to the respect they had for him.6 Raby and Frederick dined together over the following days, before Raby took his audience of leave.7 Frederick here presented him with a ring worth 26,000 Reichsthaler.8 Raby reported that he and Frederick parted ‘with so much mutual satisfaction with one another’.9 The Englishman’s Berlin sojourn had so ingratiated him with his hosts, that they would soon be requesting his return.10 This was the beginning of a mutually beneficial relationship which would allow the reciprocal production of status. Raby was in many ways similar to Frederick, a striving character seeking to increase his own rank in order to correct for perceived injustices.11 Raby’s connection to Berlin would have him successively raised to the rank of envoy, then ambassador, and also facilitate his acquisition of a series of further offices and titles. Upon Raby’s return to Berlin, Frederick was likewise able to utilise his presence in order to construct his status as king.

This thesis engages with the process that followed the coronation; a period in which the Anglo-Prussian relationship was beneficially utilised by actors from both sides and which in turn facilitated the reciprocal production of status. The act of self-coronation was just the beginning. A royal title was an object of inherent

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6 Hedges to Raby, 20.05.1701(OS), TNA, SP-104/200.
8 This was of far greater value than the gifts given to other representatives. Ibid., 3:131-140.
9 Hedges to Raby, 3.06.1701(OS), TNA, SP-104/200.
10 L. Frey, Anglo-Prussian relations, 1703-1708: Thomas Wentworth, Baron Raby’s mission to Berlin (Ohio State University: PhD, 1971), 78-79.
11 Discussed in the following chapter.
value in early modern Europe, nonetheless royal status could not simply be awarded or acquired, but instead required the acceptance of one’s peers. Diplomatic ceremonial was the primary medium through which Frederick secured this acceptance and thus carved out his position as king within the European society of princes. Frederick’s relations with England and later Britain contributed significantly to the production of his royal status through diplomatic ceremonial. In the period spanning from the coronation to the Pacification of Utrecht-Baden-Rastatt, British actors consistently made concessions that allowed Frederick to ceremonially establish himself as king before a European audience. Their cooperation allowed him to exhibit British acceptance of his royal status. The British actors involved were particularly willing to recognise Frederick’s royal rank via diplomatic ceremonial because of a particular culture of diplomacy that governed their behaviour in this sphere. Moreover, the effect of British assistance was magnified by facilitating factors unique to the Anglo-Prussian relationship. The relationship between the two states was nonetheless not solely instrumentalised for the benefit of one party. British actors were also able to utilise the contacts in order to facilitate their own rank elevations, although this functioned differently from the process of producing royal status.

This thesis aims to demonstrate the significance of the Anglo-Prussian relationship for both sides by examining four case studies in which Frederick and British diplomats were able to instrumentalise relations to construct status and actualise rank elevations. It will seek to understand why actors wished to produce status and bring about rank elevations in the first place. Thereafter the manner in which diplomatic relations were used as a medium through which to produce status will be brought to light. The question will also be posed, why did participant actors cooperate in reciprocally producing the status of another? What was in it for them? What governed their behaviour in this realm? Finally, the ultimate success of the parties in their respective processes of status production will be evaluated.

Analysis of the Anglo-Prussian connection can simultaneously contribute towards wider discussions of issues of interest to the historian of early modern Europe, including diplomatic culture, status, and networks within European princely society. This thesis therefore seeks to investigate these areas, and to pose questions for further study. It will explore the nature of the English *modus operandi* that governed the performance of diplomatic ceremonial, and determine the ways in which it was different from that elsewhere in Europe.
Likewise, suggestions will be made to explain the fundamental reasons why this different diplomatic ceremonial culture arose. Investigations into dynastic diplomacy during this period also reveal sub-networks operating within the larger European society of princes in which both Brandenburg-Prussia and England were engaged. The functioning of these networks impacted upon both of these states, and was ultimately influential upon European history during this period, and will therefore be outlined throughout. This thesis also handles questions relating to the conceptualisation of status. It questions the nature of status, asking what it was in the eyes of early modern contemporaries, delineating where its boundaries lay, and enquiring as to how one produced status in the world in which these actors operated. New phraseology will be proposed to more clearly define constituent status groups, and outline the select company to which Frederick wished to gain admittance. Through such contributions the importance of Anglo-Prussian relations during the reign of Frederick I can be brought to the fore. The re-assessment of this relationship through a new methodological framework can also challenge older historiography of Prussia’s first king.

1.2. Status and the Value of the Crown

Frederick sought to acquire a royal title because it was an object imbued with intrinsic value in early modern European society. The hierarchical princely-dynastic world in which Frederick lived placed immense importance upon status, rank, and titles. Nonetheless, this has not inhibited generations of historians from criticising the King’s efforts to secure his elevation. They have falsely applied the rationality of their own time to the early eighteenth century. By attempting to reconstruct the mental framework of contemporaries and the context in which they lived it is possible to revitalise such objects with worth. It consequently becomes evident that titles and status were justified political goals for early modern actors. This was more particularly the case for the Electors of Brandenburg whose traditional status was being challenged within a system in flux. Their princely neighbours and rivals achieved relational rank elevations, while between 1648 and 1697 the Hohenzollern electors suffered a series of humiliations and setbacks.\textsuperscript{12} A royal title was therefore sought after by the Hohenzollerns in order to improve their degraded position in the society of princes.

\textsuperscript{12} Discussed in the next chapter
The rank elevation that the Electors of Brandenburg and other European princes sought could not be unilaterally declared and immediately brought into being; they required a process of production. Ceremonial honours paid to rulers and their representatives at solemn occasions made the abstract hierarchy of European rulers perceptible. Indeed, the obtaining of ceremonial rights from others was what differentiated the various ranks. The intricacies of ceremonial minutiae inhibited the meeting of rulers themselves, and in response resident diplomacy developed more fully, while the rights and honours paid to diplomats became more standardised. The ceremonial forms granted to a ruler’s representatives came to reflect and define their status. The consistent securing of the appropriate honours was what actualised this status upon the European stage.

The key role played by diplomats in producing the status of their rulers could in turn reciprocally aid in facilitating the improvement of the diplomat’s status within diplomatic and noble society. They shared much of the same rationality as ruling princes, and were eager, if possible, to rise up within the hierarchically organised European society. The process by which diplomats facilitated personal status elevations functioned differently to that of rulers. For diplomatists rank elevations were granted from above, rather than being constructed horizontally with one’s peers. Thus, they relied on securing patronage, and winning favour. This was often done by demonstrating their utility and serving their monarch on a diplomatic posting, and they were subsequently rewarded with rank elevations distributed from a grateful ruler acting as arbiter.

Before this thesis proceeds it is necessary to delineate the methodological framework upon which it rests. This thesis adopts the culturalist approach to history throughout. This holds that culture constitutes a perspective through which one observes the world and conditions the construction of symbols. Individuals participate in these methods of perceiving, or symbolic codes, and through them ascribe meaning to events and actions, and

likewise make value judgements. Culture and the associated symbolic languages employed to comprehend objective structures are not constant or monolithic, but are constantly susceptible to change.\textsuperscript{15} This is true both between different geographic regions and time periods. Moreover, actors can be participant in multiple cultural codes.\textsuperscript{16} The cultural turn thus advocates putting on the glasses of the ethnologist to ‘understand our own pre-modern European past anew, as if it was something unfamiliar’.\textsuperscript{17} This is of particular utility to this thesis as it allows the partial jettisoning of contemporary ascriptions of meaning and value judgements. Instead the historian can attempt to reconstruct culturally specific modes of meaning attribution and attempt to unearth the meaning that concepts, events and objects took on when filtered through contemporaries’ particular cultural perspectives. This is undoubtedly extremely helpful in assessing a period and realm of action, that is very different from contemporary diplomacy and interstate status construction. This methodology can consequently help us comprehend why ceremonial deference and a superior position in the order of precedence were so important that diplomatic actors were willing to engage their rivals in deadly competition for them.\textsuperscript{18} This can primarily be achieved by assessing contemporary political and theoretical works, as well as those discussing ‘ceremonial science’. This is particularly crucial when assessing titles, status, and ceremony. By following this method, it is possible to revivify such concepts with the meaning they possessed for contemporaries.

Early modern Europe was hierarchical and based upon rank and status. Princely society represented the apotheosis of this; the rulers of the period were acutely aware of their status in relation to their peers within what one author has termed the \textit{Société des princes}.\textsuperscript{19} This society of princes was an elite class that sat atop European society. Its members were dynastically intertwined by marriage and personal ties. Moreover, its members shared a number of cultural norms and modes of perception. Relations between states where therefore, by and large, relations between princely dynasties and those who served them. They generally

\footnotesize{
\textsuperscript{15} Stollberg-Rilinger, ‘State and Political History’, 44-45.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 49.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 54.
}
pursued dynastic interest, but this was often intertwined with reason of state, whose language they deployed when it suited them. A royal title placed a ruler in the upper echelons of this society, above the numerous minor princes abundant on the continent. This precedence brought with it marks of deference from others, that would be made towards kings when two rulers, or their representatives converged. Acts of deference or submission in turn brought symbolic capital within the society of princes.\footnote{Symbolic capital in the sense described by Pierre Bourdieu, see: P. Bourdieu and L. Wacquant, \textit{An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology} (Cambridge: Polity, 1992), 119; P. Bourdieu, ‘The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups’, \textit{Theory and Society}, 14:6 (1985), 731; T. Medvetz and J. J. Sallaz, \textit{The Oxford handbook of Pierre Bourdieu} (Oxford: OUP, 2018), 359-360.} In a world that often-lacked systematised measures of power, a royal title and the majesty that accompanied this could often become a means of determining who was powerful. Kingly status also brought with it what some have termed ‘real advantages’, that is the ability to negotiate on an equal footing with other major powers and a seat at the negotiating table during the great peace conferences of the period.\footnote{Clark, ‘When Culture Meets Power’, 27-28.} However it should be emphasised that royal status was not the means to secure an end. Royal status was an end in itself.

Acceptance of the power and significance of a royal title within the early eighteenth-century society of princes consequently entails a refutation of much of the historiography surrounding the first King in Prussia and his acquisition of the crown. Most famously Frederick I’s grandson, Frederick II (the Great) derided him as follows: ‘He mistook vanities for true greatness. He was more concerned with appearances than with useful things that are soundly made . . . He only desired the crown so hotly because he needed a superficial pretext to justify his weakness for ceremony and his wasteful extravagance . . . All in all: he was great in small things and small in great things’\footnote{Quoted in: Ibid., 26.}

Numerous historians have followed this lead and disparaged what they characterise as Frederick’s vainglorious pursuit of the crown. Most vehemently, Johann Gustav Droysen of the ‘Borussian school’ was critical of the extent to which efforts to acquire a royal title, subordinated Prussia to the Habsburgs and lead Prussia away
from pursuing the supposed ‘true interests’ of the state.\textsuperscript{23} Hintze likewise characterised Frederick as having ‘more sense for the appearance of power rather than its essence’, while emphasising ‘his addiction to splendour and wastefulness’.\textsuperscript{24} Their views are derived from an anachronistic, nationalist view of Prussian history which saw German unification as Prussia’s destiny. They moreover derided Frederick I by comparing him to, what they saw as, his more illustrious predecessor and successors. For them Frederick-William, Frederick-William I, and Frederick II had enlarged the state and expanded the army, the pillars upon which the future success of the Machtstaat depended.

Other historians were not as extreme as the nationalist historians of the Borussian school and sought to place the acquisition of the crown in the context of its time and outline the benefits Frederick accrued by virtue thereof. No less an authority than Leopold von Ranke thought Frederick unexceptional in sharing ‘the taste of his times for outward show and splendour; but in him it took a direction which led to something far greater than mere ostentation’.\textsuperscript{25} Erdmannsdörffer regarded the crown acquisition as logical, for though Frederick possessed all the prerequisites of royal status, the title of king itself was an essential component thereof. For Erdmannsdörffer, recognition of Frederick as king brought a real increase in power, and so Frederick’s work cannot be derided as a product of petty vanity.\textsuperscript{26} Others such as Hinrichs have sought to emphasise the benefits a royal title brought, while simultaneously criticising the means employed to acquire it, which he deemed made Prussia into a ‘powerless cheated vassal’.\textsuperscript{27} The Frey sisters characterise Frederick as ‘obsessed with grandeur, but a grandeur designed to secure Brandenburg-Prussia its position in the system of the age’, for according to


\textsuperscript{26} B. Erdmannsdörffer, \textit{Deutsche Geschichte vom Westfälischen Frieden bis zum Regierungsantritt Friedrichs des Großen: 1648-1740}, Vol.2 (Berlin: Grote, 1893), 141-142.

\textsuperscript{27} C. Hinrichs, \textit{Friedrich Wilhelm I. König in Preussen: eine Biographie: Jugend und Aufstieg} (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968), 146-149.
them ‘the kingship enhanced Frederick’s position, it gave him an independence of action and a greater leverage in European affairs’.  

A range of more recent works has provided a more informed historical picture of Prussia’s first king, allowing the refutation of some of the older historiography so critical of Frederick’s attempts to acquire a crown. Peter Baumgart, Frank Göse, and Heinz Duchhardt have sought to relativise Frederick’s ‘crown project’ by providing holistic characterisations of Frederick as a baroque prince, and directly comparing him to his princely peers who undertook similar schemes to facilitate rank elevation. Great effort has also been made to comprehend the power of royal status around 1700, and the symbolic capital and ceremony associated with it. The methodology espoused by the cultural turn has here provided historians with the means to re-evaluate the crown, and reinvigorate it with the significance it held for contemporaries. Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger has built upon these foundations and argued that royal status was beneficial due to its ability to define a ruler’s status as part of an emerging ‘circle of sovereigns’. Frederick’s acquisition of the crown therefore fits into a rational and deliberate plan to attain membership of this group, and does not proceed from vanity of predilection for pomp. In this sense, many continuities emerge between the revered reign of the Great Elector and that of Frederick I. The son’s actions were the logical conclusion to his father’s frustrated efforts to secure Hohenzollern status and rank elevation.

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32 See also here: Friedrich and Smart, Cultivation, 1-51; Clark, ‘When Culture Meets Power’, 14-35.
An essential component of royal status was its acceptance by the other rulers of Europe. For as one of Frederick’s ministers made clear, ‘it is not enough to be crowned, one must also be assured that one is recognised as a king’. In this sense a long and arduous road led to the coronation of 1701. This involved securing the pre-emptive recognition or acceptance of other European princes via political expedients. Perhaps most importantly Frederick secured pre-emptive recognition from the Emperor for his royal ambitions, in exchange for pledging 8,000 troops to the Habsburg cause in the event of a Bourbon-Habsburg struggle over the Spanish inheritance. Cordial relations and political negotiations with other princes were also utilised to ensure that a significant number of European princes recognised Frederick’s title shortly after the coronation. The new King in Prussia accordingly received numerous letters from his princely peers congratulating him upon the assumption of the royal title. Likewise, when the coronation party returned from Königsberg to Berlin Frederick was greeted by diplomatic representatives conveying the well wishes of their masters.

Receiving letters of congratulation as well as verbal acquiescence to Frederick’s new title was not enough. As the bearer of Europe’s newest royal title, the King in Prussia’s position was precarious.\textsuperscript{40} His kingly status lacked tradition and the weight of historical precedent, while a number of rulers did not yet recognise his royal title.\textsuperscript{41} Thus, the aforementioned minister had advised Frederick that it was essential he also acquire full equality in titular and ceremonial honours as the other crowned heads of Europe.\textsuperscript{42} This symbolic parity as recognised through acts at solemn public occasions was an essential component of kingship. For if Frederick’s change in rank had not been mirrored by a similar change in the behaviour towards him, and the parity recognised amongst the other kings was denied to him, then he would have been ‘in effect not a true king’.\textsuperscript{43} To demonstrate his royal title had come into being, Frederick required that the royal title be able to alter the behaviour of others towards him.

The process of becoming a king and bringing the Prussian royal title into being was therefore not concluded with the coronation, nor shortly thereafter when a majority of princes accepted Frederick’s royal status in written form.\textsuperscript{44} The successful construction of Frederick’s royal rank required an ongoing process of production. This entailed the continued communication of his claims to royal status, as well as the securing of ceremonial honours thought to be due to kings, both in Berlin and at other courts. The acceptance of other European princes to the aforementioned elements was also vital. Finally, while positively producing his status through such actions, the process of becoming a king also required pre-emptive defence. This entailed the challenging of actions that were detrimental to the creation of Frederick’s royal status. The eschewal of

\textsuperscript{40} There was considerable discussion over whether the Emperor had ‘created’ the title, or merely ‘recognised’ it: Göse,\textit{ Friedrich I}, 230; claims were made Frederick was reviving an ancient kingdom, and a range of potential names was considered: Friedrich and Smart,\textit{ Cultivation}, 14ff.; Clark, ‘When Culture Meets Power’, 24ff.

\textsuperscript{41} The rulers of France, Spain, Bavaria, Cologne, the Pope, and the Polish Szlachta: Friedrich and Smart,\textit{ Cultivation}, 17-22; Göse,\textit{ Friedrich I}, 258; Ichon,\textit{ Anerkennung der preussischen Königswürde}.


\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 1:556.

\textsuperscript{44} For the ‘congratulations’ and ‘full recognition’ from the ‘most prominent Christian potentates’ see: G. Leibniz,\textit{ Deutsche Schriften}, G. Guhrauer, ed., Vol.2 (Berlin: Veit, 1840), 310.
occasions at which the correct ceremonial honours would not be awarded or at which Frederick’s royal rank would not be recognised was of the utmost significance.

The diplomats based at Europe’s courts acted as the primary means through which princes produced their status and realised rank elevations. However diplomatic service enabled these men to simultaneously engage in their own processes of rank elevation. The following analysis is primarily devoted to the English diplomatic service under Queen Anne due to its relevance to this thesis, however a number of observations likewise hold for continental diplomats. Those who carried out diplomatic negotiations were predominantly men of noble birth, though with some exceptions.45 Whether they derived from the nobility, landed gentry, or the urban burgher class, those men that filled diplomatic postings adopted a common diplomatic culture which emerged in the late seventeenth, and early eighteenth centuries, and which followed much the same rationality as the European society of princes.46 They were aware of their position within the societal order and the relational privileges due to them.47 They also sought to improve their lot and ascend within this hierarchical society, perhaps to secure ennoblement, or to rise from gentleman to baronet, or from baron to earl.48 A period of


47 For an example of urban elites following the same rationality see: T. Weller, Theatrum praecedentiae zeremonieller Rang und gesellschaftliche Ordnung in der frühneuzeitlichen Stadt: Leipzig 1500-1800 (Darmstadt: Buchges, 2006).

48 Scott and Storrs, Consolidation of Noble Power, 22-23; For Britain’s order of precedence see: B. Smithurst, Britain’s Glory (London: Crook, 1689), 94-97.
diplomatic service could prove the means through which this could be achieved. Diplomatic service entailed risks; it could be financially ruinous and there was a pervading fear that being abroad represented a sort of gilded exile which resulted in loss of favour with domestic patrons. Many therefore avoided diplomatic service. However, some chose to accept the risks, perhaps because of limited prospects at home or due to an inclination for foreign living. Some were ultimately able to utilise a period of diplomatic service as a springboard for further advancement.

Noble rank elevations functioned differently to process of princely status production. Fundamentally, such figures were enmeshed in patron-client networks that so defined early modern European society. Status, offices, and titles were disbursed by the ultimate patron in the form of the monarch. They usually had final say over the allocation of reward and patronage, although powerful ministers could often influence appointments. The monarch represented an arbiter, who could unilaterally grant status and enforce acceptance of newly elevated persons via the promulgation of royal decrees and orders of precedence. By contrast, the rulers who composed the society of European princes had no superior patron able to dispense status. Instead they relied on producing status and gaining acceptance amongst their peers within the system of European courts. But because the monarch represented an arbiter for aspirational subjects it was consequently not as vital for them to secure widespread recognition from their peers to facilitate a rise in status. Vertical movement within the noble titular hierarchy was achieved in one of two ways. Primarily, nobles could seek to win the favour of their monarch and secure elevation through the award of a higher title. Alternatively, nobles could amass landed estates and financial resources to such an extent that a title was granted as a recognition of present actualities. When not immediately forthcoming, extreme wealth could also enable the outright purchase of titles

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49 Scott and Storrs, Consolidation of Noble Power, 48.
51 Diplomatic posts themselves were also secured via patronage networks: Thiessen, ‘Diplomatie vom type ancien’, 488.
Diplomatic service could precipitate titular promotion in both of these manners. Actors sought to win approbation from their sovereign by leading a successful mission. However, the goals of any particular embassy were often so diverse that success is difficult to categorise. Each embassy was issued with particular instructions against which it would be measured, however fulfilling those objectives overwhelmingly relied upon the promotion of amicable relations and the establishment of contacts at court. Successfully concluding an alliance or treaty with a foreign ruler could ingratiate a diplomat with his own sovereign. Likewise, a continual flow of information on the disposition of the foreign court was an essential task of a capable diplomat.\(^5^3\) Gaining access to rulers, courtiers, and privy information inevitably required good relations, and hence the maintenance of cordiality contributed to a successful mission. Thus, if a diplomat’s mission was successful as measured against these diverse criteria then he could expect a reward that would take the form of a rank elevation. Upward mobility was brought about by securing a greater noble title than that already possessed, or by obtaining an office of state. Indeed, there was an expectation that such recompense would be awarded at the conclusion of an embassy.\(^5^4\) A successful diplomat might be given a diplomatic promotion, from envoy to ambassador for example, with the increased salary and perquisites this entailed.\(^5^5\) Offices of state and positions on the privy council were likewise distributed in recognition of service, which were bound up with lucrative salaries and the disposal of patronage resources.\(^5^6\) Furthermore, ennoblement or promotion within noble society often followed an embassy’s conclusion.\(^5^7\) The relations that a diplomat cultivated with a foreign court could therefore be mutually beneficial and result in the reciprocal production of status and simultaneous rank elevation.

This was specifically true of the diplomats participant in Anglo-Prussian relations, for those who aided Frederick’s rank elevation also secured their own. The Prussian diplomat Spanheim was ennobled in 1701 in

\(^{53}\) Roosen, \textit{Age of Louis XIV}, 143-157.

\(^{54}\) Many felt diplomatic service entitled them to titles, privileges and promotion: Thiessen, \textit{Diplomacy}, 77.

\(^{55}\) Though there was hardly a career pathway: Roosen, \textit{Age of Louis XIV}, 67-74; Horn, \textit{British Diplomatic Service}, 95.


\(^{57}\) Horn, \textit{British Diplomatic Service}, 90ff.; Black, \textit{British Diplomats}, 47. Examples of diplomats rewarded for successful service are provided by: Charles Whitworth, John Robinson, Paul Methuen, and John Methuen.
recognition for previous service and in order to prepare him for his London ambassadorial posting. John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough secured wealth and titles through gloire attained on the battlefield. However, his illustrious victories were made possible by the disciplined service of numerous Prussians, which his repeated diplomatic interventions helped to secure the use of. But the most notable instance of diplomatic service facilitating rank elevation is demonstrated by the case of Baron Raby. Through his successful mission to Berlin, Raby was able to secure multiple benefits. He obtained successive diplomatic promotions, first rising from envoy to ambassador to Prussia, and subsequently securing the post of ambassador to the Netherlands and plenipotentiary at the peace of Utrecht. The period following the conclusion of his Berlin embassy in 1711, until the Hanoverian succession in 1714 witnessed a remarkable series of triumphs. He was raised to the title of earl and inducted into the Order of the Garter. Likewise, he secured offices of state, including a position on the privy council and the position of First Lord of the Admiralty. Thus, at the very time Raby’s seal was adorning the Treaty of Utrecht, which confirmed the successful elevation of the Hohenzollerns, Raby was in turn reveling in his own ascent completed over the last decade. A change in political circumstances led shortly thereafter to a fall from grace and influence, but this nonetheless should not distract from Raby’s achievements up until this point.

1.3. Anglo-Prussian Relations and the Reciprocal Production of Status

In order to effectively bring his royal status into being Frederick required the cooperation of other princes. Their active collaboration was needed in order to secure the appropriate ceremonial honours and produce Frederick’s royal rank. The monarchs of England, and later Britain fulfilled this role by exchanging high

59 Most notable were his acquisition of the title and lands relating to the imperial principality of Mindelheim, as well as the gift of the estate and funds that would construct Blenheim palace. P. Barber, ‘Marlborough as Imperial Prince, 1704-1717’, BLJ, 8:1 (1982), 46-79; W. Churchill, Marlborough: His Life and Times, Vol.2 (London: Harrap, 1934).
ranking diplomats with Prussia, and providing Frederick and his representatives with the appropriate ceremonial treatment. The English representatives tasked with enacting ceremonial concessions also possessed the capacity to construct their own position as effective diplomats, and bring about personal rank elevations. A range of facilitating factors made the reciprocal production of status possible and contributed towards the distinctive character of Anglo-Prussian relations. Many elements unique to the British state proved extremely beneficial for Hohenzollern interests and made the Anglo-Prussian relationship one of the most meaningful for Frederick, if not also for the Stuarts. Recognising the dynamic role this relationship played in producing status allows a re-centering of Anglo-Prussian relations during this period, and a challenging of an established historical narrative that either assumes a later genesis of meaningful Anglo-Prussian cooperation, or places emphasis on Prussia’s relations with other states, to the detriment of Anglo-Prussian concerns.

The reciprocal production of status was primarily achieved through the diplomatic representatives of the two monarchies present at the respective courts in Berlin and London. In interactions with Thomas Wentworth, Baron Raby (extraordinary envoy 1703-1705, extraordinary ambassador 1705-1711) Frederick was able to secure the royal ceremonial from the representative of an established crowned head. Moreover, the sending of an esteemed and high-ranking diplomat with a representative character added to the prestige of Frederick’s court and festivities that occurred there. Raby’s presence could often be utilised before other rulers or their representatives in order to bolster Frederick’s claims to royal status. Likewise, Ezekiel von Spanheim, the Prussian diplomat (extraordinary envoy 1701, extraordinary ambassador 1702-1710) dispatched to the court of St James also aided the ongoing process of production. By securing equal treatment to the ambassadors of other crowned heads, he was able to assert the equality of the King in Prussia to his royal counterparts. By consistently gaining precedence over republics and lesser rulers he was similarly able to assert the relative position of his master within the European society of princes. What is more this was performed before the numerous representatives frequently present at the diplomatic nexus represented by London.

On four particular occasions Frederick was able to instrumentalise Anglo-Prussian relations in order to aid in the construction of his royal status. These instances will form the case studies of which this thesis is composed. In 1702 Frederick was able to dispatch his first ambassador to the London court and prominently secure the same treatment as other crowned heads. Between 1702 and 1703 Frederick was able to trade military assistance
for ceremonial concessions. This took the form of a new audience ceremonial with foreign envoys that more clearly emphasised Frederick’s royal status. Between 1705 and 1706 Frederick was able to secure the appointment of a British ambassador to his court. Despite the political turbulence of those years, he strove to retain the ambassadorial presence and the recognition of kingship that such an appointment constituted. Finally, at the Dreikönigstreffen of 1709 Frederick was able to utilise the presence of that British ambassador and the material splendour that accompanied him to communicate his status to the two visiting kings. These instances have been chosen because they are some of the most prominent examples that demonstrate the manner in which Anglo-Prussian relations contributed to the gradual construction of Frederick’s royal status. Moreover, each case study explores a different area and method of reciprocal status production, while they also all represent topics that have previously been neglected by historians of Anglo-Prussian relations, or otherwise assessed with differing methodologies.

The construction of royal rank was not achieved solely with English representatives, but the demonstration of Frederick’s status before observers and the subsequent communication and dissemination of ceremonial occasions also gradually produced Frederick’s royal status within European princely society at large. Between 1701 and 1713 Frederick obtained widespread recognition of his royal dignity, and was granted treatment befitting a king from a number of European rulers. Securing such treatment from the English monarch amongst others, contributed to the establishment of Frederick’s royal credentials in the collective consciousness of European princely society. When the War of the Spanish Succession was concluded in 1713/14, the House of Hohenzollern’s admission into the circle of sovereign kings was consequently confirmed by the peace treaties.62

Recognition of the utility of the Anglo-Prussian relationship to actors from both sides in this regard allows a reassessment of the place these relations hold in historiography. Some older English language monographs

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62 Frederick died in February 1713, before the conclusion of the peace treaties from April 1713 onwards. His son was therefore recognised as sovereign king in Prussia. Only the Pope and the Polish Szlatcha refused to recognise the King in Prussia. Friedrich and Smart, *Cultivation*, 17-22.
often overlook the significance of Anglo-Prussian interactions during Frederick I’s reign and assume a later genesis of more meaningful contact. Sir Richard Lodge’s work is exemplary in this regard.\textsuperscript{63} Despite the title of his book, he deals with Anglo-Prussian relations between 1688-1714 in a trifling number of pages. In-depth analysis of Anglo-Prussian relations only begins during the reign of Frederick II. Other works, although not explicitly denigrating the Anglo-Prussian connection, implicitly suggest the greater relevance of Prussia’s relations with other states.\textsuperscript{64} The extensive and consequential nature of Anglo-Prussian relations is recognised by a number of publications that focus on issues pertaining to military cooperation and diplomacy. In their PhD theses, both Ulrich Naujokat and Linda Frey have conducted important research on the associated primary sources.\textsuperscript{65} Nonetheless, their efforts are slightly hampered by their failure to adopt the methodology of the cultural turn. They are consequently unable to fully appreciate the importance of ceremony and status, and accordingly insufficient attention is paid to such elements. Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger has recognised the power ceremonial occasions had to define the status of participants within a system in transition. In this light, by assessing Raby’s ambassadorial entry of 1706 she demonstrated the significance of Anglo-Prussian relations during the reign of Frederick I, though there remains much fertile ground to be explored.\textsuperscript{66}


1.4. **Further Methodology**

As well as adopting the methodology of the cultural turn, this thesis also derives benefit from utilising other methodological tools. 67 The approach proposed by works advocating ‘new diplomatic history’ provide particularly useful methods of assessment. 68 They suggest looking beyond traditionally accredited diplomats and instead at a diverse range of actors who worked as vectors for cultural exchange and assisted in shaping relationships between polities. 69 Such a technique can undoubtedly be beneficial, both in general and in the particular Anglo-Prussian sphere. 70 This thesis is largely concerned with diplomatic ceremonial as a means of producing status, and because such ceremonial was not performed for all Britons who found themselves in Brandenburg-Prussia and vice versa, it will remain largely attached to studying diplomats. 71 Nonetheless, men accorded with formal diplomatic rank could invariably act as agents for cultural transfer, and engage in informal networks of negotiation. This thesis does converge with that school in accepting that foreign relations between dynastic states cannot be seen as the interaction of two polities with definite state interests and an obedient diplomatic apparatus designed to execute that will. Rather Anglo-Prussian relations were constituted by interactions between dynamic actors shaped by their own cultural backgrounds, loyalties and ambitions. Diplomats and ministers possessed considerable agency over strategy and the implementation of policies, and could therefore influence proceedings in accordance with their own conscious or unconscious preferences. 72

While accepting that negotiations between actors over ceremony, materiality, religion and culture are revealing of the mental framework such figures possessed, this work does not posit that the process of interaction itself

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67 See above, page 18ff.
70 For examples of such characters see the following chapter.
72 Thiessen, ‘Diplomatie vom type ancien’, 471-503.
is the primary object of study. Instead these contacts are of interest precisely for how they relate to the traditionally studied processes that shaped the lives of numerous Europeans, such as war, diplomacy, and state formation. Indeed, by attempting to reconstruct contemporary mentalities it may be observed the political importance such interactions were imbued with, and the significant role they played in these larger developments.\textsuperscript{73}

By widening the spectrum of diplomacy and politics and including informal channels, additional actors can be brought into analysis. Women played a considerable role during the period, and work has been conducted over recent years to highlight this.\textsuperscript{74} Most obviously, Queen Anne as monarch regnant of England exercised considerable influence over Anglo-Prussian relations. Royal consorts such as Sophia-Charlotte were also noteworthy.\textsuperscript{75} Likewise, female favourites and \textit{maitresses} such as Sarah Churchill, Abigail Masham, and Katharina Wartenberg shaped relations via their intimate relations with the monarch.\textsuperscript{76} It is worth noting that diplomatic rank was given exclusively to men. Women however were able to exercise significant influence over diplomacy, playing a key role as the \textit{ambassadrice}, or the wife of an ambassador.\textsuperscript{77} On occasion they were able to symbolically represent their husband at public festivities which the ambassador was not able to

\textsuperscript{73} Riches, \textit{Protestant Cosmopolitanism}, 6.
attend. This was particularly useful, as work obligations as well as illness could occasionally restrict an ambassador’s opportunities to attend public events. By having his wife there to take his place in processions or seating arrangements, the ambassador was able to assert his own rank and that of his master despite his absence. Moreover, the more informal role of the ambassadrice could often be used to overcome ceremonial impasses. The rooms of the ambassadrice within the ambassadorial residence constituted a space in which meetings could be conducted without ceremony, when host-guest ceremonial could not be agreed upon. The ambassadrice could also play an important role in building relationships at court and obtaining information. Spanheim and his wife acted as a diplomatic partnership in this regard throughout his time in London.\textsuperscript{78} Raby by contrast married only at the conclusion of his Berlin embassy, and lacked the accompaniment of an ambassadrice throughout.

This thesis also incorporates the study of material culture in order to further illuminate the history of diplomacy in general and Anglo-Prussian relations specifically.\textsuperscript{79} Objects were not mere accessories to diplomacy but were often integral communicative elements, possessing the ability to convey subtle messages, or those unable to be expressed by other means.\textsuperscript{80} The role things could play as gifts moreover facilitated further communication.\textsuperscript{81} As such they are a vital and complimentary partner to the textual sources with which a historian engages. Indeed, objects can express ideas so seemingly self-evident to contemporaries that they were not deemed worthy of inclusion in written documents. From the assessment of objects and their usage, the historian can glean greater insight into the cultural belief systems of the creators of such objects, patrons who commissioned them, further actors who may have used them, and the society to which such actors belonged.\textsuperscript{82} For historians of later generations equipped with completely different modes of thinking they are invaluable

\textsuperscript{78} His daughter also played a role. See chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{79} Chapters 3 and 6 in particular will engage with the materiality of diplomacy.


additional sources. Thus, in order to inform analysis of Anglo-Prussian relations various objects will be assessed, including: the material accoutrements of both Spanheim and Raby’s embassies, the gifts reciprocally exchanged by those diplomats and the English and Prussian courts, and even the very art and architecture of the court cities and their surroundings will be assessed.

This thesis focuses heavily upon the symbolic ceremonial performed at court festivities, and it is here worth noting that such ceremonial events were ephemeral in nature; they existed at a discrete time and place, and were often attended by only a limited number of onlookers. The communication of ceremonial occasions was therefore important. It in a sense kept ceremonial events alive and gave the symbolic gestures continued power beyond the specific moment in which they occurred. Those who observed and subsequently indelibly committed these events to paper, either in the form of letters, news-periodicals, or ceremonial compilations, were thus propagating their power to define the status of those involved. Those reports dispatched beyond the court, and to foreign lands and hands, show that actions that occurred in London and Berlin had the power to contribute towards a shaping of attitudes throughout Europe, even if only gradually and in unmeasurable ways. The significance of means that propagated these occasions should therefore not be underestimated.

1.5. **Sources and Court Decision Making**

This thesis utilises sources originating from both Britain and Brandenburg-Prussia in order to build an informed picture of Anglo-Prussian relations during the early eighteenth century. Extensive research has been conducted in the National Archives, the British Library, and the Rousham House archive in the U.K., and in Germany the holdings of the Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz have been consulted. Relevant primary source

material reproduced in printed form has also been assessed.\textsuperscript{84} The correspondence of rulers, leading ministers and diplomats has been used in conjunction with theoretical tracts, contemporary periodicals, the notes of both the British and Prussian masters of ceremonies, as well as archival material that informs an understanding of the materiality of the period.

These diverse genres of sources bring with them specific implications that must be recognised. The views expressed in tracts on diplomatic theory for example are often influenced by the author’s patron.\textsuperscript{85} Reports sent home by diplomats often emphasised their influence and the high regard in which they were held in at their particular court. Other source genres bring their own disparate implications. Factional loyalty or party-political attachment impact upon the opinions or value judgements expressed.\textsuperscript{86} The Prussian court exhibited factional divisions where actors struggled over the reins of power, but shared common political goals.\textsuperscript{87} The British system, with its emerging Tory-Whig duality was more distinctive in nature, with men governed not solely by patronage relationships or personal loyalty, but by ideological party stances on political issues.\textsuperscript{88} In light of this it is essential that all sources be critiqued and corroborated. Here the range of sources employed by this thesis, often with varying degrees of proximity to the events described, means that they can be effectively cross-checked for accuracy.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{85} Wicquefort for example argued that the electors should concede precedence only to kings. He had worked for both the Elector of Brandenburg, and the Dukes of Brunswick-Celle who hoped to gain an electoral title. A. Wicquefort, \textit{The Ambassador and his Functions}, J. Digby, trans. (London: Lintott, 1716); In 1706 Zwanzig advocated for the equality of sovereign kings, his patron was the recently crowned Prussian king: Z. Zwanzig, \textit{Theatrum Praecedentiae: oder eines Theils illustre Rang-Streit, andere Theils illustre Rang-Ordnung} (Frankfurt: Fritschen, 1709); H. R. I. Kugeler, ‘\textit{Le parfait ambassadeur’}: \textit{The Theory and Practice of Diplomacy in the century following the Peace of Westphalia}. (Oxford University: PhD, 2006), 81, 96, 132.
  \item \textsuperscript{86} There existed ‘two rival, transnational Anglo-Prussian court factions’. A faction centred around Frederick-William, opposed Wartenberg’s faction in Berlin. In Britain the Tory-Whig divide and Marlborough-Raby rivalry were of importance. Thiessen, \textit{Diplomacy}, 72-74.
  \item \textsuperscript{87} Naujokat, \textit{England und Preußen}, 57.
  \item \textsuperscript{88} G. S. Holmes, \textit{British Politics in the Age of Anne}, Revised (London: Hambledon, 1987).
\end{itemize}
A vast amount of British archival material exists which has been extremely beneficial in informing the research of this thesis. The way in which the English monarchy and government made decisions influences the types of sources that remain, the utility of respective sources, and the manner in which sources can be utilised. During the reign of William III the cabinet emerged as the premier forum in which affairs of state were discussed and decided.89 However, The stadholder-king’s masterful knowledge of diplomacy and war, as well as his penchant for personal rule, meant that ‘effective power remained in William’s hands’.90 Under Anne’s rulership the cabinet further wrestled influence from the privy council.91 Anne similarly retained the right to approve decisions made in the cabinet, and she did, on occasion, shape policy by forcefully asserting her own opinion. However despite her regular cabinet attendance, she did not assert herself as single-mindedly as William. Instead, the direction of military and diplomatic affairs was largely undertaken by Marlborough and Godolphin, as well as the Secretaries of State.92 They regularly took individual meetings with the queen, cooperatively planned state policy together in committee in the queen’s absence, and presented Anne with carefully curated information and policies to ratify. Thus, while systematic analysis of cabinet sources might effectively bring out the voice and agency of the Queen to a greater extent, examination of the sources of her leading ministers provides sufficient understanding of the policies undertaken by Anne and her government.

Government decision making and diplomatic policy have consequently been reconstructed by assessing the correspondence of leading English ministers such as Godolphin and Marlborough.93 The role of Marlborough’s

wife, Sarah Churchill, as court favourite with unprecedented access to the queen and as the third part of this decision-making trio should also not be overlooked.⁹⁴ Both Marlborough and Godolphin were members of the cabinet, and possessed considerable freedom of action in their respective spheres. The documents of other leading ministers are also useful, particularly the entry books of successive Secretaries of State for the Northern Department, who were responsible for relations with the Protestant princes of northern Europe.⁹⁵ These ministers exercised considerable influence over Anne during their frequent private meetings with her. The correspondence of several diplomats in the field with their respective secretary of state has aided in building an informed picture of Stuart diplomacy. The English representation in Berlin has undoubtedly been the most thoroughly investigated, however English sources emanating from other courts have also proved helpful, particularly as English diplomats actively corresponded with one another.⁹⁶

The papers of the British masters of ceremonies are also a valuable resource that illustrate the diplomatic ceremonial conducted between Britain and Prussia. A series of precedents governed how diplomats behaved in Berlin and how Frederick’s diplomats were received in London.⁹⁷ Comprehensive notebooks concerning ceremonial during Queen Anne’s reign exist at Rousham House in Oxfordshire. Historians have rarely employed these sources, and greater utilisation of such documents is required in future to provide a complete understanding of ceremonial during the later Stuart Period. Contemporary diarists and annals writers based in London also supply valuable insight into life in the English capital, and particularly the involvement of foreign

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⁹⁴ Some of her correspondence in reprinted in Snyder.
⁹⁵ The Marlborough-Godolphin ministry lasted from 1702-1710, this is the primary focus of this thesis, though documents from the reign of William III have also been consulted, as well as those of the succeeding Harley ministry (1710-1714). The area covered by the Northern Department encompassed: The Low Countries, the Empire, Denmark, Sweden, Russia and Poland. The office was held between 1700 and 1713 by, Hedges, Vernon, Harley, Boyle, and St. John. See: C. Cook and J. Stevenson, British Historical Facts 1688-1760 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), 56.
diplomats in English court festivities. They provide an aperture through which public opinion can be gauged, often recount the rumours of the day, and can be used to corroborate the reports of other ministers. News periodicals also prove invaluable sources for gauging the embryonic public opinion of literate elites. They likewise provide reports of public and ceremonial events, and reveal the aspects of these events that non-courtly society found of interest. Periodicals also demonstrate the circulation and reception of news throughout Europe. London was particularly blessed in this regard, however newspapers originating from beyond the British Isles prove similarly useful. This aspect is of particular note when assessing the ways in which rank was produced before a pan-European audience.

The material world of early modern diplomats has recently received much attention. The objects that accompanied an ambassador abroad are given only cursory mentions in traditionally studied correspondence. The personal and family correspondence of diplomats can be utilised to give an overview of the accumulation of objects. The notebooks of masters of ceremonies also reveal the lavish gifts awarded to diplomats. But most intriguing, perhaps also because such sources have not traditionally been included in narratives concerning diplomacy, are the records of those departments of the state concerned with the financing, production and reclamation of such objects. The records of the British Jewel House have been consulted for this thesis, providing a distinctive perspective on the silver plate discharged to British ambassadors. Likewise, efforts have been made to personally engage with the objects, as far as is possible.


99 See next chapter for a further discussion.

100 Cartwright, Wentworth Papers.
In Prussia too the privy council had gradually been eclipsed towards the end of the seventeenth century. A new body, the Dignitätsconseil or ‘dignity council’ was established in 1698 and rapidly and dramatically increased in importance. Frederick was personally present at the meetings of this group, where he was joined by his leading ministers. The group’s responsibilities initially concerned the acquisition of the royal title, however after the coronation the body developed into a smaller grouping which met separately from the king and controlled the affairs of state. This body (sometimes called the Staatskonferenz) came to be dominated by Wartenberg, who populated the grouping with his allies. In this system, state secretaries played an important role in communicating the monarch’s will and the decisions of the Staatskonferenz. This facilitated the rise of one such secretary, Heinrich Rüdiger Ilgen. By 1702 the opening of royal post was delegated to Wartenberg and Ilgen alone. After this point, only matters concerning relations with foreign powers required a royal signature, with Wartenberg and Ilgen deciding all other matters. Indeed, these two were allowed to issue royal orders on certain matters under the formula ‘on H.R.H.’s most gracious special order’, without submitting them to the monarch’s scrutiny. Frederick removed himself from the day-to-day running of government, and concerned himself primarily with the issues he deemed most important: those touching ‘sovereignty, rank, and magnificence’. Royal policy can therefore be glimpsed in documents produced by the king himself (such as correspondence with other monarchs or with his extended family), but also through


102 Including: Wartenberg, Fuchs, Barfuß, Besser, Schmettau, Ilgen, and Dohna: Göse, Friedrich I., 218-221.


106 Ibid. 66.

107 Ibid. 67-68


109 Göse, Friedrich I., 163
the letters of Wartenberg and Ilgen.\textsuperscript{110} It was these men that often issued royal orders and corresponded with diplomats at home and abroad, and their letters will therefore be investigated throughout this work. Wartenberg in particular was near constantly in the monarch’s presence, and this face-to-face relationship correspondingly leaves few traces of Frederick’s influence over Wartenberg’s policies.\textsuperscript{111} The term ‘Frederick and his ministers’ shall therefore be employed throughout this thesis to refer to both sources of uncertain authorship, or to identify decisions likely discussed between Frederick and his key ministers.

The sources utilised and the areas of state policy in which Frederick most frequently intervened, can sometimes mean that the Prussian king can come across as slightly monomaniacal in his pursuit of royal status. This was not the case. Frederick was a complex, three-dimensional figure. He passionately pursued other interests, such as the Orange Inheritance, or the union of the Protestant faiths.\textsuperscript{112} The unique position he placed himself in by attempting to produce the royal dignity of an invented crown did mean that he had to devote significant energy to attaining diplomatic and ceremonial recognition. But it should be remembered that all early modern actors sought to attain a higher status. It was only that they occupied different situations and used different means. Frederick’s concern for status was no greater than that of many of his peers, and it should be remembered whilst reading this thesis that he was simultaneously engaging with a range of additional topics.\textsuperscript{113}

The documents left by the Prussian Master of Ceremonies, Johann von Besser, have also been extremely useful for this thesis. These are primarily located in the Sächsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv in Dresden, though some useful documents also remain in the Geheimes Staatsarchiv in Berlin. The diligent work of Peter-Michael Hahn has in recent years made a vast array of the most useful ceremonial sources available by reprinting them in a four-volume series.\textsuperscript{114} Besser set ceremonial regulations, composed ceremonial reports, and advised on ceremonial


\textsuperscript{111} Göse, \textit{Friedrich I.}, 115,167.

\textsuperscript{112} Discussed in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{113} This is well demonstrated in: Göse, \textit{Friedrich I.}, 346-351.

behaviour for the Berlin court, as well as for Prussian diplomats based abroad. He did this in conjunction with a ‘ceremonial conference’ that also included Ilgen and Wartenberg.\footnote{J. von Besser, Schriften: Ergänzende Texte: Beiträge zum Amt des Zeremonienmeisters, zur Arbeitsweise und zum Nachlass, P. M. Hahn, K. Kiesant, et al., eds., Vol.2 (Heidelberg: Winter, 2016), 14-15;} Frederick took a deep interest in ceremonial matters and therefore held final say. Besser’s ceremonial conference would therefore submit ceremonial reports or guidelines to the monarch, and they would often return with amendments.\footnote{Ibid; Göse, \textit{Friedrich I.}, 239.} Thus, when ceremonial documents appear under Besser’s authorship it is safe to assume that they were crafted in conjunction with the king, or at least with his awareness.

It is possible to focus upon a small group of courtiers centred in Berlin and regularly in the presence of the monarch, because of the nature of state formation and the prevailing relations between the monarchy and the territorial estates. Works of recent decades on the topics of \textit{Staatsbildung} and the Brandenburg-Prussian \textit{Ständestaat} have created a complex picture, proposing challenges to the ‘myth of absolutism’.\footnote{K. Friedrich, \textit{Brandenburg-Prussia, 1466-1806: The Rise of a Composite State} (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2012), 23, 44; N. Henshall, \textit{The Myth of Absolutism: Change and Continuity in early modern European Monarchy} (London: Longman, 1996); P. H. Wilson, \textit{Absolutism in Central Europe} (London: Routledge, 2000).} The process of centralisation and exerting greater control over the estates, begun under Frederick William, was continued by Frederick I. In confronting his estates Frederick William had performed much of the heavy lifting, Frederick’s reign was marked by a more conciliatory tone, but also by unabated developments in favour of the monarchy.\footnote{Göse, \textit{Friedrich I.}, 138-9.}

This particular constellation is meaningful for this thesis’ analysis. By the latter half of Frederick’s reign the estates were rarely consulted over taxation for the army, or over foreign policy issues. Frederick rejected the estates’ appeals for a reduction of the standing army and complaints against the taxes used to fund it. In light of the two major conflicts that consumed almost the entirety of his reign, he was instead inclined to demand extraordinary taxes to support his troops.\footnote{Göse, \textit{Friedrich I.}, 139-142; Friedrich, \textit{Brandenburg-Prussia}, 32-33; Frey and Frey, \textit{Frederick I}, 156-157.} This was extended to recalcitrant parts of the Prussian composite
monarchy, with Magdeburg for example being forced to submit to taxation without consultation in 1708, following the example of other Hohenzollern territories.\textsuperscript{120}

During Frederick William’s reign the ability of the estates to appeal to foreign powers to defend them from excessive taxation was diminished.\textsuperscript{121} This, combined with the establishment of a standing army which could be used to implement electoral demands undoubtedly strengthened the Hohenzollern position \textit{vis-à-vis} their estates. This continued under Frederick I, with the estates losing the right to appeal to the Imperial courts in 1703.\textsuperscript{122} Frederick preferred not to deal with large estate bodies such as the \textit{Gesamtländtage}. Instead, he dealt with smaller, more professional, and more easily controlled committees, or \textit{Deputationstage}, representative of the estates.\textsuperscript{123} These were firmly established in some provinces, such as Brandenburg, which had seen its last general meeting of the estates in 1653.\textsuperscript{124} Elsewhere, \textit{Landtag} approved taxes for longer periods, and were even phased out completely.\textsuperscript{125} The last meeting of the \textit{Landtag} in Hohenzollern Prussia occurred in 1704, demonstrating continuities with the reign of the Great Elector.\textsuperscript{126} Although at the beginning of his reign Frederick had promised to consult the estates on foreign policy decisions, he decisively repudiated this in 1700 in negotiating the \textit{Krontraktat} and organising the coronation without reference to them.\textsuperscript{127}

The power Frederick exercised over his estates should however not be overemphasised. At times the development of monarchical power was achieved cooperatively.\textsuperscript{128} The nobility in particular traded

\textsuperscript{120} Friedrich, Brandenburg-Prussia, 54.
\textsuperscript{121} Article 180 of the \textit{jüngster Reichsabschied} of 1654 removed the estates’ ability to appeal for imperial moderation for matters concerning military taxes. Hohenzollern sovereignty over Ducal Prussia and the Kalkstein affair in the diminished the estates’ ability to appeal to the Polish crown. The removal of Dutch garrisons from Cleves-Mark removed that protector of the estates. Friedrich, \textit{Brandenburg-Prussia}, 47-53.
\textsuperscript{122} Though only for cases involving less than 2,500 Gulden. Friedrich, \textit{Brandenburg-Prussia}, 27.
\textsuperscript{123} Göse, \textit{Friedrich I.}, 137-142.
\textsuperscript{124} Friedrich, Brandenburg-Prussia, 49.
\textsuperscript{125} Frey and Frey, \textit{Frederick I}, 146.
\textsuperscript{126} Friedrich and Smart, \textit{Cultivation}, 39.
\textsuperscript{127} Friedrich and Smart, \textit{Cultivation}, 35-38.
\textsuperscript{128} Göse, \textit{Friedrich I.}, 137-152.
concessions over taxation and decision making for feudal manorial benefits, and they retained the right to
apportion tax obligations, ensuring the greatest burden fell upon the burghers.\textsuperscript{129} What is more, prevarication
over the payment of taxes was a form of passive resistance often undertaken by the estates.\textsuperscript{130} There were also
areas in which the estates could exercise concrete power, most notably in the raising and staffing of the
militia.\textsuperscript{131} Moreover, the continued expansion of the army and state administration offered chances to the
nobility, still impoverished by the legacy of the Thirty Years’ War, to forge a career in the service of the
state.\textsuperscript{132} Frederick did employ many foreign nobles in high state positions, but the opportunities offered to the
lesser nobility demonstrate the way in which state formation could be a mutually beneficial process. The voices
of the nobility and the estates will therefore rarely be heard within this thesis because they ultimately did not
influence Frederick’s military, ceremonial, and diplomatic policy. Instead this work will unashamedly focus
on those players that exercised power as part of the Berlin court milieu.

As has previously been mentioned, this thesis adopts the methodology of the cultural turn. This accepts that
the culture in which specific groups are enmeshed conditioned modes of perception, symbol construction and
the ascription of meaning. In order to adopt the methodology of the cultural turn and attempt to reconstruct the
mental framework of the time as a far as possible a considerable amount of analysis of early modern tracts
concerning ‘Ceremonial Science’ and diplomatic theory has been performed for this thesis. A range of sources
have been studied that encompass the seventeenth and the early-eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{133} This significant
timeframe has been chosen in order to demonstrate that many of the ideas espoused in earlier works were held

\textsuperscript{129} Friedrich, \textit{Brandenburg-Prussia}, 28, 59.
\textsuperscript{130} Friedrich and Smart, \textit{Cultivation}, 30-31.
\textsuperscript{131} Göse, \textit{Friedrich I.}, 140-142; Friedrich, \textit{Brandenburg-Prussia}, 32.
\textsuperscript{132} Frey and Frey, \textit{Frederick I}, 174; Friedrich, \textit{Brandenburg-Prussia}, 30-36.
\textsuperscript{133} G. Stieve, \textit{Europäisches Hoff-Ceremoniel} (Leipzig: Gleditsch, 1715); Zwanzig, \textit{Theatrum Praecedentiae}; Wicquefort,
\textit{The Embassador}; J. C. Lünig, \textit{Theatrum Ceremoniale Historico-Politicum, oder Historisch und politischer Schau-Platz
aller Ceremonien}, Vol.1 (Leipzig: Weidmann, 1719); J. Howell, \textit{A Discourse Concerning the Precedency of Kings}
(London: Reynolds, 1664); F. Callières, \textit{The Practice of Diplomacy}, A. F. Whyte, ed. (London: Constable, 1919); F.
Callières, \textit{The Art of Negotiating with Sovereign Princes} (London: Strahan, 1738); J. B. von Rohr, \textit{Einleitung zur
Ceremoniel-Wissenschaft Der großen Herren} (Berlin: Rüdiger, 1729); F. C. Moser, \textit{Teutsches Hof-Recht: enthaltend
throughout the period at the centre of this work and beyond. By reading this rich repository of sources, it is possible to attempt to perceive the world of ceremonial, ritual and status, in many of the same ways in which contemporaries did. Nonetheless these sources should be read critically; they were often normative in nature, with theoreticians proposing best practice or responding to changes and attempting to provide justifications for current forms.\textsuperscript{134}

Diplomatic representatives from other states were present in both London and Berlin and provide valuable insights into the activities of the British and Prussian courts. Diplomats had more access to privy information than news periodicals. The diplomatic communities also socialised with one another, so that such sources can provide fascinating character portraits of the constituent members of that society, as well as detailing friendships and rivalries.\textsuperscript{135} Representatives from other states also had differing political and ideological leanings that coloured their view on events. These can be particularly useful as contrasting against them provides a means to decipher the implicit biases inherent within Prussian and British sources. Assessment of the accounts of other diplomats also allows the construction of a comprehensive picture of diplomatic ceremonial in London and Berlin. The reports of Dutch diplomats contribute towards the picture of London that emerges, while diplomats from Denmark, Hanover, Saxe-Gotha, Mecklenburg and the United Provinces provide details of the Berlin court.\textsuperscript{136}


\textsuperscript{135} The Raby-Lintelo Rivalry for example

2. Ceremonial and Anglo-Prussian Diplomatic Relations in Post-Westphalian Europe.

The desire of Frederick I to have himself crowned as King in Prussia stemmed from fundamental changes that were taking place within European princely society. In the decades between the 1648 Peace of Westphalia and the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1701 the hierarchical system of European princes was disrupted. It gradually gave way to a two-tiered international system from which subjects were excluded.\(^1\) The years between 1648 and 1700 therefore saw a number of princes of lesser status attempt to define their status and membership as part of the group of sovereigns. They sought to obtain the constituent elements that could allow their accession into the superior group, namely: sovereign territory, a royal title, and the ‘royal’ ceremonial honours.\(^2\) That a number of Frederick I’s rivals and peers were successful in attaining these prerequisites before 1700, and therefore successfully constructed their status within the elite grouping, only further stimulated Hohenzollern desires to do likewise.

By 1701 Frederick had sovereign territory and a royal title. The period between 1648 and 1701 had amply demonstrated the power ceremonial honours had to define status, and the extent to which the denial of these rights could in future hinder attempts to assert sovereign or royal status. Thus, to effectively construct his status as belonging to the superior group within the binary system Frederick now needed to successfully secure the ‘royal’ ceremonial honours from one of his peers, a ruler whose position within the group of sovereigns was undeniable. As the case studies of this thesis will demonstrate, that party proved to be Queen Anne and her diplomatic representatives. England consistently and publicly granted Frederick the royal ceremonial and thus allowed him to construct his status on a European stage. Anne and her representatives were more willing to

\(^1\) Stollberg-Rilinger, ‘Höfische Öffentlichkeit’, 150ff.
grant ceremonial concessions than numerous other princes. A combination of particular factors provided England with a specific diplomatic ceremonial modus operandi which made English actors especially cooperative with Prussian desires to obtain the desired ceremonial. English representatives possessed considerable agency over decisions relating to ceremonial, and they used ceremonial concessions to win favour and facilitate their own rank elevations. Elements particular to the Stuart state, such as the inimitability of London as a metropolis and Protestant diplomatic hub served by a flourishing news-periodical industry, served to multiply the impact of ceremonial concessions gained from the Stuart court. It should nonetheless here be stressed that much additional work is required to enlighten the previously under-researched area of English ceremonial customs with foreign princes during the later Stuart period. Moreover, defining status through ceremony was one of many strands within the tapestry represented by the Anglo-Prussian relationship. Issues relating to war, religion, dynastic concerns, trade, and cultural exchange were also prevalent, and diplomacy and ceremonial intersected with these matters in multitudinous ways and cannot be divorced from them.

While the Anglo-Prussian relationship proved fruitful to both sides, it nonetheless did not exist within a vacuum. All rulers operated within the European society of princes. But even therein there existed various subgroupings. Throughout the thesis attention will be drawn to the Network of Northern Courts, a grouping of Protestant princes clustered around the North Sea and Baltic littorals which proved particularly amenable to facilitating the rank elevations of their fellow northern princes. By delineating the function of this network this thesis hopes to contribute to wider discussions of inter-princely relations during the early modern period. More specifically, this network was consequential for Britain and Prussia during the period of study; by securing the cooperation of participants within this network the Stuart and Hohenzollern rulers were able to accomplish dynastic objectives and secure the futures of their respective houses.
2.1. **The Network of Northern Courts**

The conception of a European *société des princes* as proposed by Bély has proved a powerful tool for assessing early modern history. Diplomacy and inter-state relations can more accurately be seen as the interaction of closely interrelated actors with shared norms who pursued their dynastic interest. Within this thesis, I posit that within the European society of princes there existed a subgroup: The Network of Northern Courts. This network encompassed princes located along the North Sea and Baltic Sea littorals. Its members were largely defined by their adherence to Protestantism, their status as imperial princes, an abundance of close familial connections, and common dynastic and political interests. The manner in which this network functioned was consequential for Europe between 1688 and 1714. Its members were more predisposed to aid one another, and the network represented an amenable proving ground for the mutual construction of status. Understanding the dynamics that existed between northern princes can contribute towards a greater understanding of how members cooperatively realised rank elevations, and how they navigated between the two great European conflicts of the early eighteenth century. Historiographical revisionism of Frederick I’s foreign policy, and unrealised dalliances with the Great Northern War can consequently be undertaken. Moreover, the manner in which Frederick enlisted members of this network to help facilitate his ascension into the circle of sovereign kings, as well as the ability of England to outdo other members of the network in this regard can be observed. The conception of a Network of Northern Courts consequently builds upon the work of others who have researched the relations of northern princes amongst one another. It proposes that the convergent interests and cordiality led to a greater willingness to cooperatively produce rank elevations of fellow northern princes, and what is more this occurred in a period in which numerous northern princes were seeking to accrue new titles and increase their rank within the society of princes. Diplomatic hubs and spaces at which these Protestant princes were represented and could fully engage in ceremonial communication will consequently be re-evaluated.

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3 Bély, *Société des princes*.  
4 See for example amongst others: Riches, *Protestant Cosmopolitanism*; Hassinger, *Brandenburg-Preussen*.  

The Network of Northern Courts was composed of a number of princely dynasties. Integral members were the Stuart monarchs of England / Britain, the Oldenburg kings of Denmark and the Swedish kings of the House of Palatinate-Zweibrücken. The network also contained a number of imperial electors including the Hohenzollern Electors of Brandenburg and Kings in Prussia, the Wettin Electors of Saxony and, from 1697, King of Poland, and the Welf Elector of Hanover. Finally, although nominally a republic, the United Provinces constituted a central part of this network. This was facilitated by the significant role played by the Princes from the House of Orange-Nassau, who possessed a prominent position within the republic as well as territories within the Reich and beyond. A number of more minor princes can perhaps be considered, but on account of the less consequential role they played during the period of study they have not been included.

The Network of Northern Courts had a number of defining characteristics. The princes who composed this network possessed territories dispersed throughout the Holy Roman Empire. There were three electors amongst their number, while princes with power bases located outside of the Empire controlled a number of counties, duchies, and secularised bishoprics.\(^5\) After the death of William III in 1702, the English monarch was the only member of this network not to possess imperial territory.\(^6\) Protestantism was another defining characteristic, although under this monolithic term there nonetheless existed a range of confessions, including Lutheran, Calvinist, and Anglican.\(^7\) Confessional affinity produced greater and more intense familial interconnections than occurred within the society of princes at large. Rarely did princely houses within this network intermarry with Catholic dynasties, limiting the pool of potential marital candidates.\(^8\) The degree of intermarriage was sufficient to form significant and conscious familial connections.

\(^6\) Although from 1705 Marlborough was Prince of Mindelheim: P. Barber, ‘Marlborough as Imperial Prince’, 46-79.
\(^7\) I would argue that despite Augusts II’s conversion to Catholicism, the continued influence of the Protestant Saxon estates and Wettin involvement with the *corpus evangelicorum*, merits Augustus’s inclusion (with caveats). However, I am aware that domestically, Augustus vigorously persecuted Protestants.
These shared characteristics led to common political interests, which predisposed these dynasties towards cooperation with one another. Their relative power and position within the European society of princes was one such factor. As princes of the Empire many felt a natural inclination to halt any unnecessary extensions of imperial power. Even the most ambitious northern princes did not hold aspirations to universal monarchy of the type entertained by Habsburg and Bourbon rulers. Accordingly northern princes were more content to sponsor a multipolar world, which limited the dominance of their Catholic counterparts. Although denominational tensions did exist, collective action in favour of the ‘Protestant interest’ was frequent. A series of setbacks for Protestantism had sharpened the minds of northern princes and they correspondingly attempted to obstruct the dominance of the Catholic Reichstände, and promote voices able to intervene on behalf of beleaguered European Protestants. In the traditional hierarchy of European princes, the northern rulers had not held particularly lofty positions and had fallen behind their Catholic counterparts in the order of precedence. They correspondingly had more to gain in sponsoring the shift from said hierarchy to a bi-layered system based upon sovereignty. Not only that but they were perhaps more willing to accede to the rank elevations of lowlier princes, because their relatively humble position in the traditional hierarchy meant they had less to defend.

Because of these shared political goals, a common outlook, and generally close relations, members of this network were more prepared to produce the status of their peers within this group. They were willing to cooperatively aid rank elevations, and were receptive to requests for ceremonial concessions. This was partly because aiding rank elevations served the political goals they shared, one need only think here of Anglo-Prussian efforts to advance the cause of the ninth electorate to redress the confessional balance within the Kurfürstenrat, or the support of German princes for William III’s English invasion as a means to prevent the

9 F. Bosbach, Monarchia universalis Ein politischer Leitbegriff der frühen Neuzeit (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1988).
11 See the promotion of Hannover to the electoral dignity, or the efforts of Prussia, England and Sweden to protect the Protestants of Silesia. J. Black, Eighteenth Century Europe, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan, 1999), 324.
12 Satow, Diplomatic Practice, 1:22.
catholicisation of England and simultaneously challenge French hegemony. The later example in particular demonstrates that military and dynastic assistance often cannot be disentangled from support for rank elevation. Likewise, the close familial ties in combination with similar political priorities engendered cordial relations, which in turn made northern princes more amenable to the ceremonial revisions or innovations of their peers. Here cultural exchange and the gradual diffusion of ceremonial norms throughout this group is evident within the period of study.\(^\text{13}\) Interconnected dynasties bound by marriage were prepared to aid in the production of another dynasty’s status, as this in turn had a reciprocal reflective effect.

Mutual cooperation and the facilitation of status production between members of this network was however neither omnipresent nor ubiquitous. Periods could pass in which members refrained from aiding their fellow princes. Indeed, rivalry persisted between certain members, such as between the Kings of Denmark and Sweden.\(^\text{14}\) Tensions can also be glimpsed in relations between neighbouring dynasties, which occasionally led to limited regional standoffs.\(^\text{15}\) Nonetheless such issues could often be overcome in order to facilitate cooperation on broader international issues facing both parties. Thus, what characterised this group was not constant beneficial cooperation between all members at all times, but a much higher degree of collaboration than with those outside the group. When the enmity between two northern princes was so great as to completely curtail mutual assistance, they correspondingly turned to other members of the network and intensified cooperative efforts with them.

\(^{13}\) For the diffusion of coronation elements: Duchhardt, ‘Die preußische Königskrönung’; S. Olden-Jørgensen, ‘Ceremonial interaction across the Baltic around 1700: The “Coronations” of Charles XII (1697), Frederick IV (1700) and Frederick III/I (1701)’, Scandianavian Journal of History, 28:3-4 (2003), 243-251; For royal orders: Friedrich and Smart, Cultivation, 39. For envoy ceremonial see related chapter.


\(^{15}\) Such as Kreis rivalry between Prussia and Hanover, as well as disputes over Nordhausen: Naujokat, England und Preußen, 72.
The Network of Northern Courts was therefore a group of similar princes, closely intertwined and in regular contact, who shared similar interests that often predisposed them to be willing to aid one another. This network proved an important space for the production of status; it represented fertile ground upon which support could be gained for rank elevations, and where ceremonial honours could be secured. Although rivalries existed within this network, its members rarely made recourse to open hostilities against one another. Evidence of influential relations between princes who comprised this northern network will be seen throughout the case studies that compose the basis of this thesis.

It is worth contrasting the cooperative status-constructing relationships the Hohenzollerns enjoyed with many northern princes to their relations with the Habsburgs, who were not part of this grouping. Amicable Habsburg-Hohenzollern relations had been instrumental in bringing about the Prussian coronation via Habsburg acquiescence expressed in the Krontraktat of 1700.16 This constellation was however temporary. It gave way to a relationship characterised by a barely functional military alliance pitted with mutual failures to meet subsidy and troop obligations. In ceremonial affairs, the Habsburgs undertook a strategy of obstruction and non-cooperation. Seeing the difficulties that Frederick’s royal elevation would pose, the Imperial general, Eugene of Savoy, remarked that ‘the emperor should hang the ministers who offered him such perfidious counsel’.17 The Habsburgs continued to assert the principle of Imperial pre-eminence, with their diplomats by extension claiming precedence before all others.18 As the supposed inheritors of the legacy of Rome, Holy Roman Emperors had long claimed the distinction of chief prince of Christendom.19 Such behaviour

16 Friedrich and Smart, Cultivation 6-10.
represented a stumbling block to any Prussian attempts to enlist Habsburg aid to cooperatively produce Prussian royal status via ceremonial. This imperious demeanour manifested itself in diplomatic practice, whereby Imperial actors refused to recognise the ceremonial equality of other crowned heads, and only granted diplomats of ambassadorial rank to the Pope and their Habsburg cousins in Spain.\textsuperscript{20} The Habsburgs also reacted contemptuously when Frederick tried to reduce the ceremonial accorded to them and put them on a footing with other European monarchs.\textsuperscript{21}

Militarily, Habsburg-Hohenzollern relations ran no smoother. Repeated Habsburg failures to pay subsidies and provide adequate winter quarters met with Prussian evasion of troop obligations to produce a decisive breach.\textsuperscript{22} In 1706 the vast majority of Prussian troops moved over to Anglo-Dutch pay and under the command of Marlborough, having abandoned the imperial army.\textsuperscript{23} Unable to settle disputes over outstanding subsidy payments, a complete break was achieved in 1707.\textsuperscript{24} The respective residents were recalled from Berlin and Vienna. There would be no Imperial resident in Berlin until 1713.\textsuperscript{25} Frederick I would correspondingly turn towards other partners, most notably England, to achieve his ceremonial objectives and maintain the functionality of the Grand Alliance.

\section*{2.2. Princely Society in Transition: From a Hierarchical Order to a Binary Division}

In the years preceding the coronation Frederick I traded away significant resources in order to acquire a royal title and secure the recognition of other rulers. Money amounting two twice the yearly income of the Prussian

\textsuperscript{20} Wicquefort, \textit{The Ambassador}, 8.  
\textsuperscript{22} Discussed in chapter 4.  
\textsuperscript{23} Discussed in chapter 5.  
\textsuperscript{24} C. W., Ingrao, \textit{In Quest and Crisis: Emperor Joseph I and the Habsburg Monarchy} (West Lafayette: Purdue, 1979), 60-68.  
state was spent on a coronation ceremony and royal accoutrements that were ‘unusually splendid’ even by baroque standards. In exchange for recognition, Frederick offered the services of his troops and relinquished his political independence. Subsequently, Frederick continued to expend effort in order to ensure he secured royal ceremonial honours and produced his royal status. One fundamental question presents itself. Why did Frederick expend such time, money, and resources in order to attain a royal title? The answer can in part be provided by adopting the methodology of the cultural turn and attempting to regard status in the manner contemporaries would have done. The second explanation comes by placing the Prussian king within the context of his own time. Fundamental shifts were occurring within European princely society which provided the stimulus for Frederick’s crown project. These changes undermined the status of a number of middling princes, such as the electors of the Empire, and in turn led to humiliations upon the European stage. Desire to gain admittance to the superior of the two groups within an emerging bi-layered system unleashed a ‘wave of regalisation’, in which princes of middling status sought to attain sovereign territory, royal titles, and royal ceremonial honours. The relational rise of a number of Frederick’s princely peers provided further impetus for him to redefine his status.

Before 1648 there had existed an approximate, and much contested hierarchy amongst Europe’s princes. A ruler’s place in this hierarchy regulated the precedence and ceremonial honours they received at solemn events. It was at such events and through these means that the abstract hierarchy of princes was brought into being before the assembled public gaze. The position of the Electors of the Holy Roman Empire within this European order was complex. They held that their status rested upon the principle of ‘electoral pre-eminence’, which

27 Ibid., 27.
28 This can be glimpsed in the 1504 order of precedence issued by the Papal master of ceremonies. The order reads as follows: Holy Roman Emperor, King of the Romans, then the Kings of France, Castile, Aragon, Portugal, England, Sicily, Scotland, Navarre, Cyprus, Bohemia, Poland, and Denmark. They are followed by the Dukes of: Brittany, Burgundy, the Palatinate, Saxony, Brandenburg, Austria, Savoy, Milan, Venice, Bavaria and Lorraine. Satow, Diplomatic Practice, 1:22.
reserved for them a place immediately behind crowned heads, but superior to all other princes and republics.  

Upon ceremonial occasions at which princes or their representatives encountered one another, the electors conceded only to crowned heads.  

This hierarchy was undermined by the congresses that led to the Peace of Westphalia. The negotiations at Münster and Osnabrück provided numerous European princes with opportunities to assert their status claims and initiated the move to an international system composed of two layers. This transition was sparked by those who had ranked low on the hierarchical scale which took factors into consideration including each kingdom’s age, territorial extent, date of conversion to Christianity, and the degree of absolute power the monarch possessed. The Swedish, Danish and Polish monarchs, as well as the sovereign republics of the United Provinces and Venice advocated for and received certain ceremonial rights indicating their equality to rulers such as the French king. Wicquefort described this trend in 1680 when speaking of the prevailing ‘competition between all the kings, because being all sovereigns, they judge that their rank ought not be regulated by their power, which is much greater, and more absolute in some than in others, but by the sovereignty only which admits of no comparison’.  

The assertions of sovereign kings and republics led throughout the course of the seventeenth century to the emergence of a new conceptualisation of sovereignty and contributed towards a transition from a hierarchically

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29 The concept of electoral pre-eminence can be traced back to the Golden Bull of 1356, which stipulated that the electors constituted the ‘flambeaus that gave light to the Empire; its buttresses, pillars and bases’. As well as the fact that they ‘bestow the crown of Germany upon who they please’. Wicquefort, The Embassador, 471-473.  


32 Steive, Hoff-Ceremoniel, 9-72.  

33 ‘The Swedes declared, they would not yield to the ministers of France in anything; because the Crown of Sweden, although less powerful than that of France, yet possesses the same Dignity, in the same degree; and so might justly pretend to the same rank’. Wicquefort, The Embassador, 226; Zwanzig, Theatrum Praecedentiae, 12; W. Roosen, ‘Early Modern Diplomatic Ceremonial: A Systems Approach’, JMH, 52:3 (1980), 460.  

34 Wicquefort, The Embassador, 225.
ordered princely society, to a system that more resembled two broad strata, one imposed upon on the other. The understanding of sovereignty that developed in practice differentiated itself from earlier legal and theoretical conceptualisations. These had centred around Jean Bodin’s delineation that a sovereign was one who recognised no (earthly) superior, who had final power to decide and promulgate laws, and who had the right to make alliances and wage war.\(^\text{35}\) Sovereignty in these aspects would prove insufficient as means with which to construct one’s status a part of the superior emerging group. In reality, in early modern Europe sovereignty was bound to status and social capital, and the figure that represented this interconnection was the king.\(^\text{36}\) Republican states which were undeniably sovereign in the legal and theoretical sense consequently cloaked their claims to sovereign status in monarchical guises.\(^\text{37}\) By contrast, those rulers or states unable to conjure up a satisfactory representative form of sovereign status were correspondingly unsuccessful in establishing themselves within the superior of the two groups that composed the new system.\(^\text{38}\) The upper strata of the two-tier order was thus defined simultaneously by both territorial sovereignty in the legal sense, but also by royal dignity; it was a locus at which both sovereignty and majesty intersected.


\(^{36}\) ‘That Supreme Title of King... which is distinguished from other dignities in this that it acknowledges no Superior, but, according to the various institution of several Kingdoms, is accompanied with the highest rights of Majesty and Sovereignty’, J. Selden, *Titles of Honor* (London: Tyler and Holt, 1672), 3.


\(^{38}\) The Swiss Cantons were undeniably recognised as sovereign after 1648, yet Louis XIV refused to grant their representatives the honores regii given to the other royal and sovereign members of this primary group. In a world shaped by royal courts it was unthinkable that the representatives of Swiss farmers should receive the same ceremonial honours as monarchs. Krischer, ‘Das Gesandtschaftswesen’, 216; Wicquefort, *The Embassador*, 188.
But how to refer to the superior of these two groups? As the examples of Venice and the Dutch Republic demonstrate designating such a group as purely monarchical would be misleading. Various historians have devised other nomenclature by which to succinctly refer to this concept.\textsuperscript{39} Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger for one has termed it the ‘circle of sovereigns’.\textsuperscript{40} Alternatively, André Krischer has described the construction of sovereign status in an international context.\textsuperscript{41} Such conceptualisations refer to more than just a ruler’s domestic sovereignty, additionally indicating a recognition within the European society of princes that a ruler belonged to the superior group within the emerging binary order. Nonetheless, in order to avoid confusion, I wish to propose different phraseology to neatly encapsulate these ideas. Here I find the term \textit{group of potentates} useful, with potentate representing the intersection of both sovereign and monarchical status. Eighteenth century dictionaries and lexicons varyingly defined potentate as ‘a monarch, prince, sovereign’\textsuperscript{42}, or ‘a title of honour, which one attaches only to emperors and kings’\textsuperscript{43}. The term derives from the Latin \textit{potentatus} or \textit{potens} which refer to ‘the function of holding power’ and ‘having (political, military , social etc.) power, influential’, respectively.\textsuperscript{44} Early eighteenth century Europeans were familiar with this word, and used it to refer to both

\textsuperscript{39} In contemporary literature in English for example this group is often referred to with the formulation: the crowned heads, and the Dutch and Venetian republics. See: Finet, \textit{Ceremonies}.
\textsuperscript{40} Stollberg-Rilinger, ‘Höfische Öffentlichkeit’, 148; Stollberg-Rilinger, ‘State and Political History’, 52-53.
\textsuperscript{42} S. Johnson, \textit{A Dictionary of the English Language}, Vol.2 (London: Strahan, 1755).
monarchs, and sovereign entities such as dukes, electors and republics. I therefore find it appropriate to use this term throughout my work to refer to the group delineated.

The question then arises, how did rulers produce their status as part of the group of potentates? Within the society of princes this was achieved relationally. A potentate was a ruler who received the customarily associated rights and honours from other established potentates. They were recognised by fellow potentates as an equal. This was particularly important at so called solemn ceremonial occasions, the most significant of which consisted of personal meetings between rulers themselves. At such meetings the abstract order within the society of princes was brought into being and communicated before an audience. Personal meetings between rulers became less commonplace as the seventeenth century progressed. A more formalised and permanent system of diplomatic representation correspondingly developed in response to this. Consensus gradually emerged on the hierarchy of diplomatic ranks, with ambassadors followed by envoys and thereafter by other lower ranking agents. The ambassador also came to be regarded as the exact representative of their ruler, and consequently were to be granted the same ceremonial honours as if the ruler was indeed present themselves.


51 Lunig, *Theatrum Ceremoniale*, 1719, 1:368.
In conjunction with intensifying diplomatic contacts certain ceremonial rights emerged which were thought to be fundamental to the status of a diplomat and their ruler. Indeed, to not receive certain ceremonial honours from others was to have one’s claims to a status rejected. Be that a ruler’s claims to potentate status, or the claims of their representative to ambassadorial status. Stollberg-Rilinger has spoken of a crystallising set of key rights, that made up the *Honores regii*, or royal honours, which powerful rulers expected their representatives to receive. To receive the royal treatment one did not necessarily have to be a king; the honours were also obtained by the representatives of republics and dukes. Contemporaries were aware of this when using the term, but for later historians the adjective ‘royal’ may slightly mislead. For our purposes, the royal honours may be thought of as those granted to potentates. Of chief importance were the right to receive the first visit from other diplomats, the excellency title, and the ‘hand’ or upper hand from their host. In addition the very right to send and receive diplomats of the highest rank, namely ambassadors, was itself an essential right of potentates. Ambassadors were entitled to a solemn public entry to the residence city upon arrival. An ambassador was likewise able to take his audience of the ruler to whom he was accorded under certain terms which indicated his status. Finally, throughout his stay at a foreign court an ambassador was at all times distinguished via ceremonial honours from the envoys whom he outranked. When a diplomat received such honours, it reflected the status of his principle and the rank with which they had clothed him, as opposed to the social status of the diplomats themselves. Whether a ruler’s ambassador received these amalgamated ceremonial honours consequently had the power to define whether that ruler belonged to the circle of potentates. As such, the case studies that form the core of this thesis will deal with these elements in detail.

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52 Contemporaries used the term ‘royal honours’ but were aware they were granted to a group encompassing more than just crowned heads.
54 Krischer, ‘Das Gesandtschaftswesen’, 197-239. This will be discussed with reference to primary literature in the case study chapters.
56 Discussed in chapters 3 and 4.
57 Though there were discrepancies and the social status of diplomats continued to play an important role: Thiessen, *Diplomacy*, 74-75.
The ability of the *honores regii* to define the status of a prince was proven in the period between the treaties of Westphalia and Ryswick. Those princes lacking sovereignty, or a royal title struggled to obtain these rights.

As the granting of these honours gradually became the means of differentiating the two emerging constituent groups within the two-tiered society of princes, those from whom the *honores regii* were withheld found themselves regarded as inferior to potentate princes. This was particularly the case for the imperial electors. The general deficiency of sovereign territory and royal dignity amongst their number prompted successive challenges which gradually assigned them a weakened position in the materialising binary order.

At Münster and Osnabrück the Elector of Brandenburg was able to obtain significant elements of the *honores regii*.\(^5^8\) His representatives were allowed to make a public entry into the congress city, they were granted the excellency title, and received the first visit from already present diplomats.\(^5^9\) Frederick-William built upon these foundations, and was able to secure sovereignty over his eastern duchy of Prussia via involvement in the Second Northern War.\(^6^0\) His ascension into the group of potentates seemed tangible, when at an audience with the Polish king at the Peace of Oliva, his representative received the royal honours.\(^6^1\) But in the wake of Oliva the Hohenzollern dynasty’s claims to potentate status, and the status of the electors in general, were repeatedly challenged. Habsburg representatives in particular refused to grant the constituent rights of the *honores regii* to Hohenzollern diplomats.\(^6^2\) The Habsburg example was followed by France, England, and Sweden, so that at the Nijmegen peace negotiations they questioned whether the Brandenburg representatives were entitled to

\(^{58}\) Stollberg-Rilinger, ‘Honores Regii’, 17.


\(^{60}\) H. Duchhardt and B. Wachowiak, *Um die Souveränität des Herzogtums Preußen: der Vertrag von Wehlau 1657* (Hannover: Hahnsche, 1998); although this sovereignty was crucially limited by the *homagium eventuale*. Friedrich and Smart, *Cultivation*, 3.

\(^{61}\) The Polish king made a few steps towards the Brandenburg envoy, and allowed him to recover his head as the audience progressed. Lünig, *Theatrum Ceremoniale*, 420.

certain rights, and denied others altogether.63 Thereafter in 1696 Frederick was affronted when during a meeting with his cousin, the English King William III, he was placed on an inferior stool for the meeting to mark his lesser non-royal status.64 This process reached its logical conclusion at the Ryswick congress, where both Brandenburg representatives were refused the excellency title.65 The link between ceremonial honours and status was demonstrated. Since the 1660s Brandenburg representatives had been continually denied ceremonial parity with other potentates, which led to them not being treated as a participant sovereign prince in 1697. Brandenburg-Prussia was present as an auxiliary power – with no claims or rights at the peace, and electoral diplomats were recognised as no more than members of an imperial deputation.66

The series of diplomatic and ceremonial setbacks suffered by the Hohenzollern electors between 1648 and 1697 provided two crucial lessons for the future. Firstly, the right of the electors to the honores regii had to be defended. No longer could they allow the withholding of certain rights or the differentiation of Hohenzollern representatives from those of kings and other potentates. When such distinctions were made, they produced detrimental consequences for Hohenzollern attempts to produce their potentate status. Secondly, claims to electoral pre-eminence were no longer efficacious. In the developing binary system there was no place for a group occupying a position below crowned heads but above princes of lowlier status. Moreover, as the example of Brandenburg-Prussia has demonstrated, the possession of territorial sovereignty was not enough to define potentate status. Princes needed to secure royal dignity and the concomitant royal ceremonial in order to construct their potentate status.

2.3. **The Wave of Regalisation**

The years in which the two-tier system of potentates and other diplomatic actors was emerging and in which the circumferences of these groups were being drawn, saw an unprecedented number of princes striving after rank elevations. This was an inherently logical course of action within a society in which status played such a prominent role. The quest for rank elevation was particularly ubiquitous amongst those who lacked the key elements of sovereignty and royal dignity, who were correspondingly deprived of the royal honours, and were therefore placed outside the emerging group of potentates. The princes of the Empire, republican entities, and various duchies all sought to enhance their status. Royal titles or the production of royal dignity was often pursued in order to supplement, or even substitute for sovereignty, while imperial princes attempted to secure tracts of sovereign territory outside of imperial jurisdiction. When princes successfully secured a higher rank for themselves this in turn stimulated further rank elevations. For within the society of princes status was relational, and princes were consequently loathe to pay deference to a ruler who had previously been their equal or inferior. What mattered was not absolute status, but over whom one took precedence. The spate of regalisation that occurred consequently provided quite the impetus to the Hohenzollerns. The Brandenburg electors were eclipsed by princes they had traditionally regarded as of equivalent or lower status, which ultimately proved a decisive factor in spurring the Hohenzollerns on to pursue their own royal title.

Alongside Europe’s monarchs, the republics of Venice and the United Provinces were some of the most successful in constructing their potentate status in the emerging bistratified system.\(^{67}\) This was partially achieved through their assertions of their sovereignty.\(^{68}\) But they also constructed the semi-monarchical dignity of their leaders. The Venetian doge was regarded as a sort of ‘quasi-monarch’, whose assertions of potentate

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\(^{67}\) Evidence of this can be seen in the words of contemporaries in which they often placed the two into the same group. When speaking of the ceremonial right of the first visit Wicquefort stated: ‘In which I said there is also a distinction made between the ambassador of crowned heads, where I comprise also those of Venice and Holland, and between those of the other Princes and Potentates of Europe’, Wicquefort, *The Embassador*, 170.

\(^{68}\) Ibid., 227; Stieve, *Hoff-Ceremoniel*, 138-139.
status were further aided by the Republic’s claims to the Kingdom of Cyprus.\(^9\) Within the Dutch Republic both the sovereignty of the Republic and the sovereign and dignified status of the Stadholders from the House of Orange-Nassau were emphasised.\(^7\) The successful construction of potentate status by the two republics allowed them to secure the *honores regii* and consequently take precedence over those who were yet to successfully assert potentate status such as the electors.\(^7\)

The Duke of Savoy was similarly successful in defining his potentate status. The dukes also claimed royal status through their own claims to the crown of Cyprus. The Cypriot pretension in combination with cordial relations with prominent European potentates, and the duchy’s strategic value allowed the Savoyard dukes to secure many of the royal honours at European courts.\(^7\) By 1700 it was widely accepted that the Dukes of Savoy ‘enjoyed the same honours as those of the crowned heads of Europe’.\(^7\) The acquisition of a royal title in 1713 merely confirmed what was accepted *prima facie*.\(^7\)

Those European rulers of lesser status used all manner of means to facilitate their rank elevations. For some this involved dubious assertions to long lost, or occupied kingdoms.\(^7\) Others were able to successfully gain control over kingdoms and acquire a crown. Some princes did not seek to link their claims to the *honores regii*

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\(^7\) Venetian envoys took precedence before those of Brandenburg-Prussia during the 1690 coronation of Joseph I as King of the Romans. Göse, *Friedrich I*, 216; Markel, *Entwicklung der diplomatischen Rangstufen*, 49-52.


\(^7\) Callières, *Practice of Diplomacy*, 72.

\(^7\) First Sicily in 1713 then Sardinia in 1720.

\(^7\) This practice was not limited to rulers, but was also engaged in by nobles: Horowski, ‘Subjects into Sovereigns’, 101-130.
to royal pretensions, but instead saw their assertions of sovereignty in combination with felicitous relations with foreign princes as more than enough to secure these. Nonetheless a spate of claims to royal titles was a prominent feature of the period between the peace congresses of Westphalia and Utrecht. Indicative were the assertions of the Republic of Genoa, and the Duke of Mantua to royal status on the basis of the crowns of Corsica and Jerusalem respectively.

Imperial princes were no different in this regard. They too sought to obtain higher titles in order to secure the associated honores regii and fashion their potentate status. Perhaps the most striking example is provided by the House of Welf. The younger line of this dynasty transformed themselves from Dukes of Brunswick-Lüneburg to imperial electors, and then to monarchs of Great Britain within a single generation. Through dynastic marriage and strategic manoeuvring, the Bavarian branch of the House of Wittelsbach also sought to secure rank elevation. Elector Maximilian II Emanuel’s son was to be awarded the majority of the Spanish inheritance under the terms of the First Partition Treaty of 1698. Rank elevation was here supported by other rulers as a means to resolve a problem and to avoid a succession war. However, the prince’s premature death in 1699 put paid to this solution. With no immediate prospect of keeping pace with the rank elevations of his rivals, Maximilian Emanuel unsuccessfully sided with the French in the Spanish Succession War in the hope of securing sovereign territory upon which a kingdom could be founded.

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76 Here the role of Versailles was crucial. Representatives from Lorraine, Tuscany, Mantua, and Malta secured parts of the honores regii during audiences and then elsewhere in Europe. Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:390, 425; Wicquefort, The Embassador, 26, 33, 44-45, 132; Duchhardt, Die preußische Königskronung, 1; Friedrich and Smart, Cultivation, 6; Clark, ‘When Culture Meets Power’, 27.
80 Frey and Frey, Treaties, 224.
Württemberg sought to have himself recognised by the French as King of Franconia in 1711. The Saxon elector, Frederick Augustus, clearly felt the acquisition of a kingdom was ‘worth a mass’, for the Elector converted to Catholicism so that he could be elected as King of Poland in 1697. Johann Wilhelm, the Elector Palatine entertained the fanciful scheme to claim the Kingdom of Armenia. After this project failed, he turned to a design to obtain a Mediterranean kingdom of islands. Some of these enterprises were unsuccessful and may seem far-fetched to the modern reader, but as Peter H. Wilson has remarked, ‘they were considered by contemporaries to be realisable’. The efforts princes were willing undertake demonstrates the critical nature of potentate status. Those successful in achieving a rank elevation only provided further impetus to the Hohenzollern crown project.

2.4. **Anglo-Prussian Diplomatic Ceremonial Cultures**

Once Frederick I had performed his own act of regalisation only one constituent element of potentate status remained missing. To truly ascend into the group of potentate rulers he had to consistently secure the appropriate ceremonial treatment. As has been discussed in the introduction, this was largely secured in cooperation with the House of Stuart and English representatives. A number of facilitating factors unique to the Anglo-Prussian relationship made this possible. Prime amongst these was that the English appear to have possessed a distinctive culture surrounding diplomatic ceremony: what shall here be termed the English diplomatic ceremonial modus operandi. Unearthing this system of operating that influenced Anglo-Prussian

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85 Wilson, ‘Prussia and the Holy Roman Empire’, 34.

86 Wilson, *War, State and Society*, 23.
interactions allows us to answer the question that will become prevalent throughout the case studies: why does it appear as though the English were so willing to grant ceremonial concession to Prussian actors? The English were not unwittingly utilised or exploited by the Prussians. They too gained from the relationship between the two composite monarchies. Nonetheless English compliance in this particular area made possible the instrumentalisation of Anglo-Prussian relations and the production of Frederick’s kingly status.

Multifarious elements in combination contributed towards the distinctive British culture surrounding diplomatic ceremonial. Political and foreign policy interests undoubtedly played an influential role. Some historians have also questioned whether early eighteenth century Britain followed a more modern and rational foreign policy aimed at state interests, that differentiated the parliamentary monarchy from its more absolutist European counterparts focused on dynastic interest. Such a view implies that while the English did not see ceremonial concessions as meaningless, certain actors did not value them highly and were willing to exchange them for things deemed more valuable. These were primarily political and military resources that could aid the successful prosecution of the War of the Spanish Succession. This certainly seems to have some merit. However, even in a state such as England dynastic interest cannot so easily be divorced from raison d’état. After all, once Louis XIV had recognised James III’s claim to the English throne the Spanish Succession War centred not solely around rational economic interest and the maintenance of a balance of power, but around the dynastic interest of the Protestant branch of the House of Stuart.89 Pursuit of the means to successfully prosecute this war therefore served dynastic interests.

The British valuation of foreign policy objectives was differently weighted because of the distribution of power within that state. During Queen Anne’s reign leading ministers such as Godolphin and Marlborough assumed

87 Kauer, Brandenburg-Preussen und Österreich, 45.
88 Marlborough remarked of Frederick: ‘he sets a greater value upon such a ceremonial, then upon matters of greater importance’. In this instance, matters of greater importance indicated troops. H. L. Snyder, The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, Vol.1 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), 73.
centre stage. The Queen was never wholly dominated by such ministers and it is anachronistic to speak of either of this duumvirate as an embryonic Prime Minister. However, for a period the Godolphin-Marlborough duumvirate ‘was more secure and unchallenged than any Royal minister since the Restoration’. For the Duumvirate the preservation of Anne’s ceremonial superiority over other monarchs took second place to securing resources which could enhance their own prestige. Within the Anglo-Prussian dynamic such ministers were consequently willing to trade ceremonial parity for the utilisation of Frederick’s troops. For Marlborough this was particularly acute; as allied generalissimo it was through battlefield success that he was able to bring about personal rank elevation. Prussian soldiers composed about a quarter of his victorious army at Blenheim, through which Marlborough was able to secure prestige and further titles for himself. The interests of the aristocratic political class in England were also divergent from those of the monarchy. Exchanging ceremonial honours for the use of continental troops reduced the burden of taxation and allowed the pursuit of a blue water colonial policy, all while preventing the accumulation of a large royal standing army potentially hazardous to liberty. Rarely did the estates of European kingdoms hold such power vis-à-vis their monarch as was the case in England.

The individual actors involved in decisions surrounding diplomacy and ceremonial contributed towards the British modus operandi. Their habits, preferences and personalities shaped it in distinctive ways. Marlborough and his inclinations have already been discussed. Likewise, Baron Raby played a key role. His ‘sense of

disinheritance’, at being deprived of the ancestral Wentworth estates and ‘only’ inheriting the title of baron in 1695 contributed towards his desire to gain the Earldom he felt was rightfully his.\textsuperscript{94} He appears to have hoped that dutiful and useful diplomatic service could bring him this, amongst other remuneration.\textsuperscript{95} Being useful at a foreign court of course meant ingratiating himself with the ruler, and Raby astutely used ceremonial concessions to achieve this with Frederick from the beginning of his time in Berlin.\textsuperscript{96} His willingness to adhere to new forms of ceremonial or concede precedence facilitated his own personal advancement, and had a profound effect on matters pertaining to diplomatic ceremonial within the Anglo-Prussian relationship.\textsuperscript{97} In this sense Raby resembles Frederick; both deemed their current position in society unsatisfactory, and were consequently determined to secure rank elevations and gain recognition from those around them.\textsuperscript{98}

In London, diplomatic ceremonial required the presence of the monarch, and the idiosyncrasies of successive rulers helped forge the culture surrounding diplomatic ceremonial. Under James I and Charles I there was growing standardisation of court ceremonial.\textsuperscript{99} During the reign of Charles II there was continued regulation under the auspices of Charles Cottrell, the diligent master of ceremonies. Nonetheless he was occasionally frustrated by the occasions on which his monarch broke with custom to reward or facilitate cordial relations.\textsuperscript{100} Ceremonial occasions between foreign dignitaries and William III were servery limited by the frequent lengthy periods he spent out of the country.\textsuperscript{101} Ceremonial audiences diminished in importance, and in 1699 foreign ambassadors were instructed to take their audiences with the nine-year-old Duke of Gloucester whilst William


\textsuperscript{95} Cartwright, \textit{Wentworth Papers}, 8-22.

\textsuperscript{96} Naujokat, ‘Mylord Raby’, 73.

\textsuperscript{97} For further characterisations of Raby see: Frey, \textit{Anglo-Prussian Relations}, 68ff.


\textsuperscript{99} See: Finet, \textit{Ceremonies}; TNA, LC-5/2.


was overseas.\textsuperscript{102} When William was in Britain, his asthma and desire for healthier air meant he frequently retreated outside of London to Hampton Court or Kensington. Nonetheless he did not disregard ceremony, though he found it ‘excessive and tedious’.\textsuperscript{103} He on occasion utilised ceremonial intricacies to emphasise rank differences between himself and lesser rulers when personally meeting with them.\textsuperscript{104}

The attitudes of previous monarchs towards diplomatic ceremonial shaped the culture at the time of Queen Anne’s accession. Anne by all accounts was punctilious in the matter of ceremony. She was ‘so exact an observer of forms’ and thought about ‘very little besides ceremonies and customs of courts’.\textsuperscript{105} A contemporary annalist wrote that she, ‘like most of her Sex, loved Pomp and Shew’.\textsuperscript{106} Sarah Churchill has been the most ardent espouser of this view. To her Anne had: ‘the greatest memory that ever was, especially for such things as are all forms, & ceremonies, giving people their due Ranks at Processions & their proper Places at Balls, & having the right order at Instalments & funerals’.\textsuperscript{107} Excessive concern for ceremonial and etiquette perhaps derives from Anne’s earlier experiences where William and Mary had used household ceremonial to slight her.\textsuperscript{108} Lady Churchill further remarked: ‘she naturally loved all forms and ceremonies, & remembered more of them that I could ever do’.\textsuperscript{109} The Duchess regarded ceremonies as ‘insignificant trifles’ and so perhaps held unusual views in comparison to her monarch and contemporaries.\textsuperscript{110} Historians have made much of Anne’s


\textsuperscript{103} A. Barclay, ‘William’s Court as King’, in E. Mijers and D. Onnekink, eds., \textit{Redefining William III: The Impact of the King-Stadholder in International Context}, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2017), 257-259; Troost, \textit{William III}, 215-216; J. Van der Steen, “‘This Nation was not Made for Me’: William III’s Introduction to Etiquette, Ritual and Ceremony at the English Court, 1688-1691”, \textit{Dutch Crossing}, 33:2 (2009), 121-134.

\textsuperscript{104} E. Heyck, \textit{Friedrich I. und die Begründung des preussischen Königtums} (Leipzig: Velhagen & Klasing, 1901), 28.


\textsuperscript{106} A. Boyer, \textit{The History of the Life and Reign of Queen Anne: Illustrated with all the Medals Struck in this Reign} (London: Roberts, 1722), 154.

\textsuperscript{107} Winn, \textit{Queen Anne}, 407.

\textsuperscript{108} Somerset, \textit{Queen Anne}, loc.3057ff.

\textsuperscript{109} Winn, \textit{Queen Anne}, 485.

\textsuperscript{110} Bucholz, ‘Nothing but Ceremony’, 290.
interest in ceremony, from her concern over the sermons and music performed at public thanksgivings, her exact observation of etiquette, to her revival of the practice of touching for scrofula. However they have invariably focused on elements of ceremony designed to communicate domestically with her own subjects, be they noble or common. Anne’s utilisation of ceremony to communicate with an international audience, and her conception of her place within the European society of princes remains vastly understudied.

Additional factors restricted Anne’s engagement with public ceremonial later in her reign, including her corpulence and deep state of mourning after the death of her husband George of Denmark in 1708.

The character of the English master of ceremonies significantly influenced diplomatic ceremonial culture. Charles Lodowick Cottrell succeeded his father to the office in 1686. He had however not been the intended successor. His older brother had been groomed to assume the office, however premature death put paid to this and the position fell to the ‘dissolute and troubled’ Charles Lodowick. A historian intimately acquainted with the Cottrell family has even described him as indolent, self-indulgent and lazy. Charles Lodowick Cottrell was thus far from diligent on assuming office. He delegated actions to his sons, and even appointed one as his assistant despite the fact he was away attending university in Cambridge. He accrued huge debts which contributed towards mental instability and depression. It thus appears that Charles Lodowick Cottrell was a less dedicated master of ceremonies than his predecessors or his continental counterparts. During Anne’s reign,


112 One example is the debate over whether the court should go into mourning after the death of the Habsburg Emperor: Winn, Queen Anne, 406.

113 Bucholz, ‘Nothing but Ceremony’, 300-301; Somerset, Queen Anne. For Anne’s disinclination for public entertainments see: R. Doebner, ‘Spanheim’s Account of the English Court’, The English Historical Review, 2:8 (1887), 757-773.

he was less resolute in defending ceremonial precedents and was often willing to make concessions. Cottrell can be contrasted to his Prussian equivalent, Johann von Besser. Besser kept meticulous records of the Prussian court’s ceremonial occasions. He was intimately aware of how each action would reflect upon the status of his prince and his position within the society of princes, and he often used his familiarity with court protocol to persuade others to accept ceremonial forms advantageous to him and his master.\textsuperscript{115} Prussian ceremonial culture was in response different from English, more considered and less compromising.

Excessive concern or musings over the importance of diplomatic ceremonial and its defining power are noticeably absent from many works concerning British monarchs and actors of the period. Instead many works discuss the engagement of British actors with what can be termed ‘domestic’ ceremonial. Perhaps historians have been guilty of focusing primarily upon ceremonial directed at a domestic audience, or perhaps contemporary actors were indeed disproportionately interested in this, as opposed to ceremonial designed to communicate within the European society of princes. Again, it must be stressed that this is an under-researched area in need of further illumination. However, what is clear, is that throughout the seventeenth century the threat to the status of the Stuart Dynasty had come largely from within, rather than from external sources. Charles I had been decapitated by his subjects after a decade of civil war within his kingdoms, and although James II was deposed by a foreign army, it was an army ‘invited’ by prominent nobles, and joined by yet more once it landed in England. It therefore appears self-explanatory that this influenced the British consciousness, and that dynasts and their ministers would have focused far more on the adequate communication of royal status and legitimacy with their own subjects, than to other rulers abroad.

The British were perhaps more willing to accept the ceremonial equality of traditionally inferior princes because it served their own interests. As already described, princely society was in a period of transition from a hierarchically organised order to a binary system. Nonetheless elements of the old system persisted. Those

who had traditionally sat near the apex were hesitant to treat previously inferior princes as their equals. English monarchs had not held an especially lofty position in the old hierarchy, therefore the propagation of a system which allowed the expanding and self-confident English monarchs to claim equality with the Bourbons and Habsburgs on the basis of sovereignty alone would likely have been welcome. Accepting the equality of previously inferior princes was therefore a promotion of this system. Moreover, by granting ceremonial concessions to certain dynasties the British were also supporting the elevation of potential successors to the British thrones. In the wake of the Act of Settlement the nearest successors to the English crown emanated from the Houses of Hohenzollern and Brunswick-Lüneburg. The English consciously aided the rise of the most immediate candidates by helping Hanover in gaining widespread acceptance of the electoral dignity assumed in 1692.\textsuperscript{116} A similar policy was undertaken with the Prussians. In 1706 Frederick-William the Prussian crown prince, who was sixth-in-line to the English crown, married his cousin Sophia-Dorothea of Hanover, who was fourth-in-line.\textsuperscript{117} Their future progeny would also hold a place in the order of succession. Acquiescing to Prussian demands for ceremonial equality and recognising them as amongst the crowned heads of Europe therefore aided in producing the royal dignity of a potential future heir. The contingent nature of life and death in early modern Europe meant this was never beyond the realms of possibility.\textsuperscript{118}

London’s position as a populous diplomatic hub with a thriving print industry also aided Frederick in his efforts to instrumentalise Anglo-Prussian relations to effectively construct his status. London was a central site in the European diplomatic network. It was a more frequented diplomatic posting than Paris-Versailles, Madrid, Rome, or Vienna.\textsuperscript{119} In December of 1702 alone there were sixteen diplomats representing ten different states present in the English capital, while throughout Anne’s reign her court was visited by diplomats dispatched by

\textsuperscript{116} Raby’s instructions asked him to ensure the establishment of Hanover as the ninth Electorate. 28.02.1703(OS), TNA, SP-104/203. William III had acted similarly: J. Macpherson, Original Papers, Vol.1 (London: Strahan & Cadell, 1776), 615.
\textsuperscript{117} For an overview of the line of succession see tables 1-3 in: Hatton, George I.
\textsuperscript{118} Before the 1707 Union it even appears as though there was some consideration of making Frederick or his son the next King of Scotland. Southwell-Hedges, 01.05.1704(OS), TNA, SP-63/365, f.226; Naujokat, England und Preußen, 134.
\textsuperscript{119} Roosen, ‘Quantification’, 1-13.
twenty-eight different states encompassing the length and breadth of the diplomatic network. London occupied a particularly significant position for Protestant princes. At other traditionally prestigious courts, such as Paris, Madrid, Rome, and Vienna, Protestant representatives were excluded from many courtly festivities due to their confessional character. In London they participated in Protestant ceremonies alongside their peers and there asserted the statuses of their masters within European princely society, which was almost wholly represented at the Stuart court. By Anne’s accession London was the largest city in Christian Europe, boasting 575,000 inhabitants. London’s population provided public festivities with a considerable number of spectators, which added greater prestige to proceedings. London’s ceremonial landscape also aided status production. Ceremonial sites were scattered throughout the metropolis and thus the distances involved in travelling from one site to another maximised opportunities for onlookers to observe and report on ceremonial occasions. London was the capital of a seafaring nation situated upon a broad river; the customary ambassadorial entry consequently took place by boat, which added a distinctive and prestigious element to this process. Finally, London was a centre of news reporting and information exchange, possessing an advanced news-periodical industry. Reduced press censorship led to a thriving print market, by 1704 44,000 newspapers copies were published weekly. In addition, the world’s first daily newspaper began circulation in 1702. Expansion continued and by 1710 there were fifty-three London news-periodicals producing two million...

120 Rousham, MC-19, MC-7.
121 For Swedish, Danish and English complaints about Vienna in this regard see: Pečar, ‘Symbolische Politik’, 291.
123 To contrast of the length of ambassadorial entries: London: Tower-Whitehall = 3.5km. Berlin: Belvedere-Fürstenhaus = 1.5km.
copies annually.\textsuperscript{126} This proliferation of sources was advantageous to many London based diplomats. Ceremonial successes diplomats secured were widely reported from various perspectives. The sheer availability of news concerning the London court also contributed towards the increased dissemination of English news to the continent via copying and translation.\textsuperscript{127} The reception of English news in other European cities thus enhanced the effect of actions undertaken in London, including attempts to assert rank and construct status.

An investigation into British diplomatic ceremonial and its practical implications between 1701-1714 is significant because this is a traditionally understudied, yet important transitional period. During the reigns of Charles I, and Charles II there appears to have been concerted efforts to reign in the distribution of preferential ceremonial treatment to diplomats of foreign rulers.\textsuperscript{128} The court ceremonial of William III and Anne has received attention, but such works have primarily concerned themselves with domestic ceremonial.\textsuperscript{129} Thereafter, a rather emaciated image of Hanoverian court ceremonial emerges, in which a lack of interest in both ceremonial within the royal household, and diplomatic ceremonial is apparent.\textsuperscript{130} Solemn court occasions appear to have been utilised less in the post-Utrecht period to communicate claims to status within the society of princes. This is partly due to the more settled nature of the states-system.\textsuperscript{131} There was also a decided move


\textsuperscript{128} See: Finet, Ceremonies; TNA LC-5/2.

\textsuperscript{129} Bucholz, ‘Nothing but Ceremony’; Bucholz, Augustan Court.


\textsuperscript{131} Horowski, ‘Subjects into Sovereigns’, 101-130; Thiessen, ‘Diplomatie vom type ancien’, 497; J. Black, A History of diplomacy (London: Reaktion, 2010), 111.
away from the employment of ambassadors, with the associated ceremonial disputes thought to hinder effective negotiation. 132 Ambassadors were therefore used more sparingly, with agents of secondary rank being preferred. 133 Nonetheless, such an interpretation is perhaps slightly whiggish, in viewing the move from a system paralysed by ceremonial disputes, to a rational system in which actors pursued reason of state. Further research is required into this important period, to discover the extent to which this holds.

2.5. Anglo-Prussian Issues and Interactions: 1688-1714

Interactions between England and Brandenburg-Prussia increased both in number and significance in the decades after 1648, particularly once Brandenburg’s regional influence and power had been demonstrated in the Second Northern War. 134 Anglo-Prussian relations were largely friendly and several commercial and military agreements were signed. Nonetheless their courses diverged during the Franco-Dutch war, and English diplomats could not be relied upon to promote Frederick-William’s interests at the Peace of Nijmegen. 135 1688 provided the watershed moment as the new elector, Frederick III, facilitated his Dutch cousin’s voyage across the Channel and acquisition of the English throne. 136 With William III as King of England, the Hohenzollern’s possessed a dynastic link to that kingdom, while contacts intensified as the Stadtholder-King sought to incorporate Brandenburg-Prussia into the series of coalitions ranged against Louis XIV.


133 The number of British ambassadorial appointments per annum decreased from 1.83 (Anne), to 1.15 (George I), and finally to 0.54 (George II). Horn, British Diplomatic Service, 44-45; Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919, 83.


136 H. King, Brandenburg and the English Revolution of 1688 (University of Freiburg: PhD, 1914).
Between 1688 and 1713 Brandenburg-Prussia was consequently tied in active military alliances with the British state. Military cooperation between the two alliance partners was therefore a significant issue, and one that often intersected with diplomacy and diplomatic ceremonial. British grand strategy during the War of the Spanish Succession was complex and multifaceted, but can perhaps be summarised in a few ways. Britain had entered the war for a number of reasons. British actors were determined to prevent Bourbon hegemony in I, as threatened by the spectre of a united Franco-Spanish monarchy. British commercial interests were also to be protected and expanded, particularly throughout the Spanish colonial Empire, with access to the lucrative Asiento much desired. Finally the War of the Spanish Succession was also in a sense the War of the British succession, for in 1701 Louis XIV had recognised the Stuart-pretender as James III. British strategy was designed to defeat France and force acceptance of the Act of Settlement. Meanwhile throughout the wartime years Jacobite incursions were to be guarded against as far as possible. British actors therefore sought to achieve these goals through successful prosecution of the war.


Their foe was the Sun King and his vast army of around 400,000 men. The British by contrast had imbibed fears of a standing army over the previous century and were resultanty hesitant to maintain forces on a similar scale as well as the considerable costs such a commitment would entail. This was coupled with divergent views on the type of war the British should prosecute, with many arguing in favour of a naval based approach, composed of either a ‘blue-water’ focused policy, or consisting of amphibious raids on the enemy’s coasts. The British would consequently never be able to directly bring significant force to bear against Louis XIV in the form of field armies. At the outbreak of war, the English army was composed of 7,000 troops in England and 12,000 garrisoning Ireland. In 1702 the three initial belligerents of the emerging ‘Grand Alliance’, mutually pledged to field 232,000 men, of which 40,000 would be provided by England. The number of British troops was quickly expanded to 48,379, however, even at the peak of British military continental commitment the British fighting contingents would still amount to no more than 50,000 men, and frequently less.

143 During the Nine Years War Louis XIV’s army had a paper strength of 420,000 of whom around 340,000 were effectives. During the War of the Spanish Succession the paper strength of the army peaked at 373,000 of which 255,000 were effectives. J. A. Lynn, *The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714* (London: Longman, 1999); J. A. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French army, 1610-1715* (Cambridge: CUP, 1998).

144 French allies contributed: 44,000 (Spain), 23,000 (Bavaria), 5,000 (Cologne), 9,000 (Savoy). P. H. Wilson, *German Armies: War and German Politics, 1648-1806* (London: UCL, 1998).

145 The British were fearful of the tendency for would-be absolutists to utilise standing armies domestically. At the conclusion of the Nine Years War, despite William’s hopes the army’s strength would be kept at around 30,000 men, those forces available in England were curtailed to 7,000. J. Childs, *The British Army of William III, 1689-1702* (Manchester: MUP, 1987), 184-208; Schwoer, *No Standing Armies*; Ostwald, ‘British Way of War’, 102.


Instead the increasingly assertive British fiscal military state relied on hired foreign troops, and the ability of Britain’s advanced financial mechanisms to fund them.¹⁴⁹ Britain therefore turned towards junior alliance partners, offering financial subsidies in exchange for the participation of their contingents in multiple theatres.¹⁵⁰ From 1701-1711 England paid around £5.3 million to eight coalition allies.¹⁵¹ In return for such subsidy agreements with the maritime powers various princes supplied considerable numbers of troops to the Grand Alliance. The later stages of the war saw 97,000 German soldiers serve in this way.¹⁵² This was a cheaper and politically more agreeable option for the English, for despite considerable payments, subsidies were frequently delayed and never wholly covered auxiliary troop costs.¹⁵³

Prussia was a major troop provider for the allies and the importance of the Anglo-Prussian relationship only grew in this regard as the war proceeded. In 1702, 11,000 of Frederick’s troops were in allied service, divided between Anglo-Dutch and Imperial pay. By 1704 Prussia had become the single largest provider of auxiliary troops.¹⁵⁴ Prussia would retain that title until 1712, reaching a maximum contribution of 31,000 men in 1709. Throughout this period the importance of British actors in brokering and maintaining these agreements became more central due to intra-alliance disputes between Prussia and other partners.¹⁵⁵ By 1709 Frederick was receiving 1.35 million Reichsthaler annually for his military contributions, of which the British were paying 64 percent.¹⁵⁶

¹⁴⁹ Brewer, Sinews of Power, 23-34.
¹⁵⁰ Wilson, German Armies; M. Braubach, Die Bedeutung der Subsidien für die Politik im spanischen Erbfolgekriege. (Bonn: Schroeder, 1923).
¹⁵² This does not include 12,000 Danish troops, nor 10,600 German troops in Italy nor 7,000 Palatine troops in Spain: Wilson, German Armies, 105ff.; Braubach, Subsidien, 170.
¹⁵³ In 1709 the cost of maintaining 33,000 ‘subsidised’ troops in the field cost Prussia 2.54m Reichsthalers, annual subsidies amounted to 1.35m Reichsthalers. Braubach, Subsidien, 125; Jany, Preussische Armee, 1:528.
¹⁵⁴ Wilson, German Armies, 108-111.
¹⁵⁵ The 1706 transfer of the altes Korps from imperial to Anglo-Dutch service provides one example.
¹⁵⁶ Braubach, Subsidien, 125.
Frederick utilised his army as tool with which to secure concessions. Discussions concerning how and where Prussian troops were to be used were ongoing throughout the war and intimately tied to other negotiations. When the Prussian king desired something from the allies, be it better conditions for his troops, or ceremonial concessions, he would often withhold his troops. On this pretext Prussian commanders even refused to serve in particular allied armies. Likewise, the signing or renewal of troop treaties was often timed to coincide with negotiations over some other matter, ensuring that troops could be used as leverage. This was made possible because during the War of the Spanish Succession Frederick retained greater control over his troops than had been the case in the Nine Years War. The nature of early eighteenth-century warfare also facilitated continual diplomatic negotiations which allowed for the extraction of ceremonial and other concessions. Every winter, campaigns would grind to a halt and troops would take up winter quarters. Access to an adequate area in which to ‘winter’ was a much-disputed issue. Frederick’s troops regularly wintered in his western territories, or in quarters awarded to them in the vordere Reichskreise. But there were occasions were Prussian troops wintered as far away from the seat of operations as the Oberpfalz, or even marched back to Brandenburg. This geographical separation from the front and allied oversight allowed Frederick to delay the march of troops, and threaten that the Prussians would not arrive for the recommencement of the campaigning. The treaties under which Frederick provided his contingents also allowed the utilisation of the army as a bargaining chip. Some, such as the Italian treaty, which provided 8,000 troops from 1704 onwards, required annual renewal. On such occasions the connection between military issues and those ceremonial concessions Frederick desired did not need to be drawn explicitly, however treaties were often made or renewed only once an adequate solution had been found in other areas of dialogue.

157 Frey and Frey, Frederick I, 210; Frederick had unsuccessfully attempted to obtain overall command of the Reichsarmee in the Nine Years’ War. He also failed during the Spanish War, but retained the right to appoint officers for his regiments in Anglo-Dutch pay. He proposed to furnish a consolidated Prussian army, but was only partially successful. Göse, Friedrich I, 185ff.; V. Loewe, Preussens Staatsverträge aus der Regierungszeit König Friedrichs I. (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1923), 15; Naujokat, England und Preußen, 26, 200; Jany, Preussische Armee, 1:424-425; Berney, König Friedrich, 54-5, 73-4, 120-1.


159 Wintering outside of one’s territories was regarded as a form of payment: Wilson, German Armies, 98, 185.

160 Jany, Preussische Armee, 442ff.
Trade and commerce was an area of Anglo-Prussian interaction which also intersected with British grand strategy. The English state attempted to obtain from outside of its borders those military materials it could not produce sufficiently itself. The procurement of naval stores for the ever-expanding Royal Navy was vital, particularly in wartime. Pitch and tar were some of the most critically required products, with the Royal Navy having traditionally relied upon Sweden for its supplies.\(^\text{161}\) The Great Northern War ravaged Swedish-Finland and altered the price and available supply of such goods to the detriment of the English state. Shortfalls and prohibitive prices hindered naval strategy in 1702/3 and forced the Navy Board to turn towards innovative solutions.\(^\text{162}\) Alternative Baltic suppliers were sought after, including Prussia, Denmark and Russia. The English diplomat in Berlin expended considerable energy attempting to arrange for the merchants of Königsberg to provide sufficient exports.\(^\text{163}\) By 1706 the supply crisis was over, and a glut of wares had reduced prices to their formally acceptable level.\(^\text{164}\)

In conjunction with military efforts the English also sought to prosecute the war against the Bourbons by weakening France’s economy. Privateers were engaged to disrupt and destroy the maritime commerce of the enemy.\(^\text{165}\) The English also endeavoured to impoverish France by embargoing trade, and persuading their allies


\(^{163}\) Raby’s instructions and procurement efforts: Clarke-Hedges, 13.03.1703(OS), R. Mahaffy, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Domestic Series: Anne, Vol.I. 1702-1703* (London: HMSO, 1916), 623; Memoranda, 17.03.1704(OS), TNA, SP-34/3 f.203; Raby correspondence, February 1704 - May 1705: TNA, SP-90/2, SP-90/3; Harley-Raby, 20.04.1705(OS), TNA, SP-104/51.

\(^{164}\) Malone, ‘England and Baltic Naval Stores’, 393; Kirby, ‘Royal Navy’s Quest’, 112.

to adopt the same stance. 166 1703 saw a major push in this direction and an agreement was signed between the three principle allies of the Grand Alliance forbidding commerce and communication with France. English diplomats spread throughout Europe were tasked with incorporating further states into this agreement. Raby undertook to have Frederick ban his country’s trade with France. 167 He was successful, and for a period of one-year trade with France was halted. 168 The restriction of trade however wrought terrible damage on the Dutch economy, and the embargo was consequently lifted after a solitary year. Trade was immediately resumed by Dutch and Prussian merchants alike. 169

Dynastic issues played a prominent role between England and Prussia. Throughout a period in which the future of the Spanish Succession was being resolved by military means, questions regarding the interlinked successions of the Houses of Stuart, Orange, Hanover and Hohenzollern were also salient. The Act of Settlement resolved that the English crown would be transferred to the Hanoverians, but it was widely thought that Prussian cooperation was required in order to achieve this. Just as William III had required Frederick’s aid in facilitating his leap across the channel in 1688, so would any prospective Hanoverian successor require similar backing. 170 Despite numerous shared interests and close familial ties, points of contention, such as competition over regional influence and the occupation of minor northern territories, still existed in the Hanoverian-Prussian relationship. 171 These were abated in 1706 by the renewed joining of the dynasties, with the marriage of Crown Prince Frederick-William of Prussia to Sophia-Dorothea. 172 Having only been raised to the electoral dignity in 1692, the Elector of Hanover was engaged in a process of producing a rank elevation

167 See Danish ceremonial chapter.
168 Raby Hedges, 11.08.1703, 14.08.1703, TNA, SP-90/2.
171 Ibid., 71-74.
172 Ibid., 126-143.
that was yet to be fully realised.\textsuperscript{173} In this sense the Hanoverian position somewhat mirrored their Prussian counterparts.

Frederick’s personal physician once remarked that: ‘the King has three chimeras: the union of confessions, alchemy, and the orange succession’.\textsuperscript{174} The untimely death without issue of William III of Orange in 1702 brought about the problematic issue of the Orange inheritance. Anglo-Prussian dialogue attempted to resolve this dispute concerning key members of the Grand Alliance.\textsuperscript{175} As Prince of Orange, William has ruled various territories dispersed throughout the Netherlands, the Empire, and France. Frederick I was the nearest claimant to inherit the title and lands, however William’s will named John William Friso of Nassau-Dietz as universal heir, with the Estates General named as executor.\textsuperscript{176} This arrangement embittered Dutch-Prussian relations, and held the potential to disrupt the effective functioning of the Grand Alliance. Prussian-Dutch quarrels, coupled with concurrent Habsburg-Hohenzollern disputes, placed extra significance on the Anglo-Prussian relationship. English ministers were consequently forced to play a difficult role. They desired a prompt resolution of the matter so as not to imperil the alliance, and were thus willing to support some of Frederick’s pretensions, but were unwilling to grant him other gains, such as the title ‘Prince of Orange’, until the issue was settled. The inopportune death of one of the claimants delayed matters, with a decisive solution only reached in 1732.\textsuperscript{177} Nonetheless, the King in Prussia claimed the title of Prince of Orange and occupied parts

\textsuperscript{173} Hanover was not admitted into the electoral college until 1708, and had struggle to have the title accepted through the Reich. The elder Brunswick-Lüneburg line (Wolfenbüttel) did much to obstruct widespread recognition of the ninth electorate: S. C. Dewhirst, ‘The Provoked Prince, or: Virtue Tested. Politics and Festivities in the Duchy of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel’, The Modern Language Review, 80:1 (1985); Whaley, Germany: 1648-1806, 2:74ff.

\textsuperscript{174} Hinrichs, Friedrich Wilhelm, 517.


\textsuperscript{176} Drechsler, Streit um die oranische Erbschaft, 81. William led Frederick to believe he would inherit the entirety; Frey and Frey, Frederick I, 187ff.; Frey, Anglo-Prussian Relations, 30-32.

\textsuperscript{177} Rowen, Princes of Orange, 150ff.; Dauser, Ehren-Namen, 238-257.
of the Orange inheritance in 1702. At the Peace of Utrecht British mediation managed to secure for Frederick those parts of the Orange inheritance to which he had rightful claim. However this was also as recompense for sustained Prussian military engagement, with the Orange claims providing a way to legitimise Prussian territorial expansion.

Religion was an extremely prominent element in the relationship between the two states. Concerns about the ‘Protestant interest’ linked Britain to Prussia and Hanover and shaped the dynastic policies of those states, with a series of setbacks running from 1685 to 1697 and beyond, providing the impetus for Anglo-Prussian cooperation in defence of Protestantism. The Elector of Saxony’s conversion to Catholicism created a leadership vacuum for the Protestants of the Empire. And thereafter Prussia and Hanover vied to head the corpus evangelicorum. England increasingly advocated for Protestant interests in the Reich, and began to emerge as a Schutzmacht of the German Protestants. The Saxons ultimately retained leadership of the corpus, however there were notable cooperative efforts by Prussia and Britain to protect Protestant liberties. These centred around attempts to safeguard the beleaguered Protestants of the Palatinate and Silesia.


179 Frey and Frey, Frederick I, 205; Frey and Frey, Treaties, 308; Drechsler, Streit um die oranische Erbschaft, 47-60.

180 Conceptualised in: Thompson, Britain, Hanover and the Protestant Interest.

181 A. Frantz, Das katholische Directorium des Corpus Evangelicorum (Marburg: Elwert, 1880); Whaley, Germany: 1648-1806, 2:150-158.


184 Erdmannsdörffer, Deutsche Geschichte vom Westfälischen Frieden bis zum Regierungsantritt Friedrichs des Grossen: 1648-1740; Whaley, Germany: 1648-1806; S. Nishikawa, English Attitudes toward Continental Protestants with
Such concerns prompted irenic initiatives in both England and Brandenburg-Prussia aimed at uniting the disparate branches of the Protestant faith.\textsuperscript{185} Proposals for Protestant union were largely modelled after the liturgy and structure of the Anglican church, which suited those who wished to see the Church of England strengthened at the expense of dissenter sects.\textsuperscript{186} As a Calvinist ruling over a largely Lutheran population Frederick was also enticed by the prospect of a confessional union.\textsuperscript{187} Moreover, Lutheran-Calvinist unification under Anglican doctrine held the prospect of easing the future Hanoverian succession.\textsuperscript{188} Irenic discussions were so advanced that in 1704 Frederick adopted Anglican liturgy in his chapel and the Berlin cathedral.\textsuperscript{189} Nonetheless, due to a combination of factors, attempts at ecumenical reconciliation ultimately proved fruitless.\textsuperscript{190}


\textsuperscript{189} Levis, ‘Anglican-Prussian Ecumenical Effort’, 385.

Much of the work towards a Protestant union was promoted by one man, Daniel Ernst Jablonski.\(^{191}\) The role that Jablonski, an Oxford educated court preacher in Brandenburg-Prussia, played points to the significance of actors who were not ministers of state nor accredited diplomats, but nonetheless contributed to the Anglo-Prussian relationship. ‘New diplomatic history’ has revealed the importance of such characters for inter-state relations.\(^{192}\) Numerous Britons and Prussians engaged in such roles. The Irish philosopher John Toland travelled to Brandenburg-Prussia in 1702 and was entertained by Wartenberg and Sophia-Charlotte, despite by his own admission having ‘no public station’.\(^{193}\) William Ayerst, Raby’s chaplain in Berlin also played a role in facilitating irenic discussions.\(^{194}\) Likewise the triangular dynastic relationship of England-Hanover-Prussia was mirrored by intellectuals within the republic of letters, with Spanheim and Leibniz facilitating the exchange of ideas between the states.\(^{195}\) Accredited diplomats also acted as vectors of cultural and artistic exchange between Britain and Prussia.\(^{196}\) Through Raby, British art and craftsmanship were displayed in Berlin, while Prussian architectural and artistic fashions diffused back to England.\(^{197}\)

Nonetheless, this thesis does not seek to document all the disparate strands of Anglo-Prussian interaction during the period of investigation. Instead, it unashamedly focuses on the reciprocal production of status, of Frederick I as King in Prussia, and of English actors such as Baron Raby. The assertion of this work is that


\(^{192}\) See: Thiessen, ‘Diplomatie vom type ancien’, 471-503; Riches, Protestant Cosmopolitanism.

\(^{193}\) J. Toland, An Account of the Courts of Prussian and Hanover: Sent to a Minister of State in Holland (London: Darby, 1705); J. Champion, Republican Learning: John Toland and the Crisis of Christian Culture, 1696-1722 (Manchester: MUP, 2009); Toland’s account was sent to Wartenberg and Frederick: Naujokat, England und Preußen, 50.


\(^{197}\) Eyres and Lomax, Diplomats, Goldsmiths and Baroque Court Culture.
diplomatic ceremonial was a key way in which this was achieved. Diplomatic ceremonial was only granted to accredited diplomats with determinate rank at solemn occasions. These interactions had the power to produce the status of actors involved. The justification for focusing on the actions of diplomats and rulers therefore becomes clear. Thus, with the aforementioned components of Anglo-Prussian dialogue delineated it becomes possible to turn to concrete case studies in which diplomats and ceremonial were instrumentalised for the reciprocal production of rank.

‘On the 16th [of June 1702] the Baron de Spanheim, Ambassador Extraordinary from the King of Prussia, made his public Entry, which was very Magnificent’.¹ These were the words of one contemporary London diarist, who also reported on the audience that the Prussian ambassador took of Queen Anne a few days later.² Spanheim was the first diplomat of ambassadorial rank dispatched by Frederick I, the recently crowned King in Prussia. Despite the new nature of the Prussian royal title, the ambassador representing the young Prussian kingdom nonetheless had at his entry and audience a plethora of ceremonial honours performed for him. This caused another contemporary diarist to note that Spanheim was ‘received with the same respect as the ambassadors of France and Spain’.³ The dignified ceremonial treatment accorded was moreover performed before a large audience. Thousands of English subjects thronged the streets of London as Spanheim undertook his grand entry, while the audience chamber in which he met the queen was similarly filled with onlookers. Foreign diplomats were also in attendance, scrutinizing the treatment Spanheim received and sending reports back to their masters.

The whole venture constituted an unequivocal success for Spanheim’s sovereign, Frederick I, the King in Prussia. The right to send and receive ambassadors was inextricably linked to sovereign status. Consequently, through the successful dispatch of an ambassador Frederick was able to assert his right of legation and thus potentate status. From the moment Frederick and his ministers conceived of the idea, this had been the unambiguous intention in sending an ambassador to the English court.⁴ The Stuart Queen had been chosen as the recipient of such an embassy because her court was regulated by coherent and recognisable rules on how

² Ibid., 1:52.
to deal with varying ranks of diplomats. The meticulously performed ceremonial consequently clearly denoted the rank of both the diplomat and their ruler. The Prussian master of ceremonies was well informed of the intricacies of English court ceremonial, and he used this amassed knowledge in negotiations with the English.\(^5\) He ensured that the correct ceremonial was executed at the entry and audience of Spanheim, so as to fulfil Prussian objectives of asserting Frederick’s royal rank. This was meaningful because the ranks of visiting ambassadors were not accepted undisputedly, but rather ambassadors were required to negotiate their status at the English court. Cordial Anglo-Prussian relations eased ceremonial negotiations, while English desires to incorporate Prussia into an anti-French coalition for the still incipient War of the Spanish Succession made the English more accommodating to Prussian requests for ceremonial parity.

The success of the Prussian embassy assumes greater significance when contrasted to the earlier struggles of the Electors of Brandenburg to have their right of legation recognised. Spanheim’s embassy established an important precedent, whereby within the ceremonial theatre composed of the city of London and the Stuart royal palaces, Frederick appeared the equal of the other potentate princes of Europe. The present chapter benefits from extensive research conducted on works of ‘ceremonial science’ and the notes of diplomats and masters of ceremonies, conducted in order to provide a holistic overview of English court ceremonial. Through this it is possible to reconstruct the meaning that elements of ceremony held for contemporaries, to comprehend the reasoning behind gradations in treatment, and to perceive conceptions of status and hierarchy. Spanheim’s embassy can consequently be assessed in context, and what is more it is possible to observe the gradual, but imperfect emergence of a new binary system, in which elements of the previous hierarchical order nonetheless persist. The place of the King in Prussia within this system in transition is delineated by negotiations concerning the ceremonial honours granted to Spanheim by the English as well as others. Because of the ultimate success of Spanheim’s embassy in contributing towards a long-term process of status production, it likewise reveals the manner in which status was successfully and cooperatively constructed in the early modern society of princes.

\(^5\) Having served as diplomat there from 1684-1685 and being informed by the notes of numerous others: Besser, *Schriften: Beiträge*, 2:301-303.
Spanheim’s embassy continued to contribute towards the construction of Frederick’s potentate status throughout the eight years he was based in London as ambassador. Interactions with the representatives of other princes allowed Spanheim to assert the relative position of his king within European princely society. Spanheim’s repeated presence at public festivities of the Stuart court allowed him to communicate his claims before the gaze of numerous observers. The frequency of these festivities, and the number of foreign diplomats present does much to reveal the scale of the Stuart ceremonial court. This thesis emphasises the significance of London as a ceremonial theatre and diplomatic hub, that remained an important space in which princely status could be asserted even once Queen Anne’s declining health restricted her appearances at public ceremonial occasions.\(^6\) The Prussian ambassador himself was also able to partake in his own process of production, whereby through his diplomatic service his was able to rise in rank and secure greater prestige for his family. The materiality surrounding Spanheim also reflected and communicated the ambassador’s elevated rank. The material largesse the English bestowed upon Spanheim likewise represented a break from the past, for the extravagant gifts they conferred were more lavish than those given to earlier electoral envoys, and consequently demonstrated the acceptance of Frederick amongst the group of potentates.

The Spanheim embassy of 1702 was momentous, for as one of Frederick’s advisors had said only two years previously ‘it is not enough to be crowned, one must also be assured that one is recognised as a king’.\(^7\) Frederick’s coronation thus did not mark the end of the process, but merely its beginning. Truly becoming a king required numerous assertions of one’s royal status. The dispatch of an embassy by the King in Prussia to the English queen represented one such emphatic assertion. Indeed, Spanheim’s embassy was one of the most consequential acts to follow the Prussian coronation, for status could not be unilaterally declared, but required


\(^7\) Ilgen, 11.11.1700, in Waddington, *L’acquisition*, 426.
Throughout his London embassy (1702-1710) Spanheim acted as a beacon through which Frederick’s status was continually asserted in the uncertain years in which Frederick’s ascension into the group of potentates was far from guaranteed.

3.1. **The Right of Legation and Brandenburg-Prussian Diplomatic Legacy**

‘There is not a more illustrious mark of sovereignty than the right of sending and receiving ambassadors’, so stated Abraham de Wicquefort in his eighteenth-century tract on diplomatic theory. Wicquefort was expressing a notion thought commonplace in his time, that the right to dispatch diplomats of the highest rank was limited to a select group of rulers. Others such as James Howell echoed his thoughts on ambassadors, proclaiming that ‘none can send any under that title unless he be a sovereign prince: there is no subject capable to send or receive any ambassador’. Both of these writers were expressing what they thought to be the defining characteristic of that group of rulers entitled to send ambassadors: sovereignty. They were speaking about sovereignty as a legalistic concept but also as a social status. However, as their other writings make clear not all sovereigns possessed the right to send ambassadors. The Swiss Cantons were indisputably recognised as sovereign after 1648, however those they sent as ambassadors were not recognised as such. Indeed it was not sovereignty alone that determined a ruler’s right of legation. What regulated this right was whether a ruler belonged to the group of potentates; an ill-defined, emerging and select group of European

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8 Spanheim’s embassy can be placed along the Raby embassy sent to Berlin in 1706. Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger has done much to draw attention to the ‘disproportionately high value’ of the latter to the Hohenzollern dynasty. Stollberg-Rilinger, ‘Höfische Öffentlichkeit’, 145-172.
9 Wicquefort, *The Embassador*, 44.
13 Stollberg-Rilinger, ‘Honores Regii’, 20-21; On the Swiss Cantons Wicquefort remarked ‘when they send thither Extraordinaries, they are not treated as Embassadors’. He went on to call such diplomats ‘Pretend Embassadors, whom all Ministers treat as their Inferiors, and who in reality are not Embassadors’, Wicquefort, *The Embassador*, 188.
princes in which the principles of sovereignty, majesty and royal dignity intersected to produce potentate status.\footnote{See previous discussion of potentate status.} Potentate status brought with it the right to send forth ambassadors to one’s fellow potentate princes and have them recognised as such. Thus, in this sense we can revise the statements of contemporaries; there was no more illustrious mark of a ruler’s rank as potentate, than their ability to dispatch ambassadors, and have them accepted as such.

The struggles of Frederick-William, the Elector of Brandenburg, provide the necessary evidence that the right to send ambassadors was not predicated upon the possession of sovereignty alone. The Great Elector had secured sovereignty over his possession of Ducal Prussia in 1660, yet this significant acquisition had not strengthened his ability to send forth ambassadors. Throughout his reign Frederick-William suffered ignominious setbacks in this regard. Foreign princes, and particularly those of potentate status refused to grant treatment befitting an ambassador to the elector’s diplomats. Electoral diplomats were denied the ambassadorial honour of recovering themselves before the King of France.\footnote{Stollberg-Rilinger, ‘Höfische Öffentlichkeit’, 163.} Likewise the Bourbons were unwilling to grant both Hohenzollern diplomats the title of excellency at the congress of Nijmegen.\footnote{Kugeler, Le parfait ambassadeur, 131.} The English negotiator at this peace conference similarly questioned whether the electors possessed the right to dispatch ambassadors.\footnote{E. Jagenburg, Die Diplomatie Brandenburgs zur Zeit des Großen Kurfürsten. (University of Bonn: PhD, 1936), 109-110.} At the Russian court the credentials of electoral diplomats were also called into question, and they were subsequently greeted with fewer honours than those of other rulers.\footnote{Stollberg-Rilinger, ‘Höfische Öffentlichkeit’, 167; Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:390.} Frederick-William’s diplomats were consistently denied the honours customarily granted to ambassadors. The Elector was consequently placed into a sort of diplomatic no man’s land, where, as he was unwilling to accept such humiliations he refused to dispatch diplomats with the rank of ambassador and instead merely sent diplomats
of the second and third order. Likewise, because of the degradations his representatives suffered at foreign courts, Frederick-William vowed to treat foreign diplomats in the same manner in Berlin. Potentate princes were consequently disinclined to send high ranking representatives to the Brandenburg court.

The inability of successive electors of Brandenburg to have potentate princes grant their diplomats the royal honours, and thus recognise their right to appoint ambassadors, influenced the next elector, Frederick III. They contributed towards his desire to acquire the other essential component of potentate status; a royal title, in order to alleviate such difficulties. With the Prussian coronation of January 1701 Frederick III / I appeared to have secured that element of ‘majesty’ that could supplement the possession of sovereignty over his eastern territory, and thus facilitate his ascension into the group of potentates. The next logical step was to actively pursue and secure those rights other potentates enjoyed in order to produce his status as part of this group. The full acceptance of Prussian ambassadors abroad was undoubtly one of the most essential of these.

3.2. England as a Diplomatic Destination

The next question such a policy raised was, to whom ought the King in Prussia to send his first ambassador? The answer settled upon was England. However, it is important to understand the process through which this came about. Difficult relations with other princes hampered projects to dispatch a Prussian ambassador to courts besides London. The Emperor had consented to Frederick’s assumption of a royal title, however the Imperial court remained reluctant in symbolically recognising the equality of the King in Prussia. For quite some time the imperial electors had abstained from sending ambassadors to Vienna, due in part, to their desire

20 Jagenburg, Diplomatie Brandenburgs, 110.
21 Potentates consequently refused to dispatch ambassadors to the electoral court, and were merely content to send envoys and residents. Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:497; L. Bittner and L. Gross, Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder seit dem Westfälischen Frieden: 1648 - 1715, Vol.1 (Oldenburg: Stalling, 1936), 104,128,180,210,483,515; Jagenburg, Diplomatie Brandenburgs, 91-95.
to avoid undue competition with the Venetian representatives present there. The Protestant electors had an additional reason to refrain from sending ambassadors to the Imperial court, namely because the majority of the solemnities at which an ambassador could display his rank were of a Catholic religious nature, and so closed off for the representatives of Protestant rulers. Moreover the Viennese court held onto practices that claimed Imperial pre-eminence, and resultingly few princes dispatched ambassadors to the Habsburg court. It was also doubtful whether the Emperor would have acknowledged the electors’ rights to send ambassadors within the Empire. The Emperor had fiercely contested this privilege before the Westphalian and Nijmegen peace conferences. The right of legation was only recognised at the latter because it was a neutral venue; for these rights would not be awarded for occasions inside the Reich. This pattern was confirmed by the Krontraktat of 1700, whereby Frederick accepted that within the Empire his representatives could not possess the highest diplomatic rank, and particularly not in relation to Imperial representatives. Inherent within the project of dispatching the first royal Prussian ambassador was that a reciprocal ambassador was desired in Berlin, however the Emperor dispatched ambassadors almost exclusively to the King of Spain and the Pope.

Opportunities to have a Prussian ambassador recognised at the French court were similarly limited. The effect of such an embassy would have been impactful, with Versailles being an important point of diplomatic exchange at which many from the society of princes were represented. However previous difficulties in Franco-Prussian relations made such an achievement appear unlikely. Louis XIV had intermittently challenged

\[22\] Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:450.
\[23\] Ibid.
\[26\] Kauer, Brandenburg-Preussen und Österreich, 43-44.
\[27\] ‘Usually the emperor was only represented at the princely courts of the Empire by residents’. Wicquefort, The Embassador, 8. The Emperor felt no need to dispatch ambassadors, for until 1702 his residents enjoyed many of the honours customarily awarded to ambassadors. See: Berney, König Friedrich, 216-219. The Emperor similarly refused to send ambassadors to the Reichstag, as this was deemed the representative one sent to other monarchies. Instead the emperor was represented by a Prinzipalkommissar, the representative one dispatched to subjects. B. Stollberg-Rilinger, The Emperor’s Old Clothes: Constitutional History and the Symbolic Language of the Holy Roman Empire, T. Dunlap, trans. (Oxford: Berghahn, 2015), 225.
the right of the electors to send ambassadors, and in 1701 the Sun king was yet to recognise Frederick’s royal title.28 The fact that relatively shortly after the coronation, 8,000 of Frederick’s troops marched to confront the armies of Louis XIV further stymied any designs for a Prussian ambassador at the Sun King’s court.29 That this commitment to the anti-French alliance only continued to grow via treaties signed in subsequent years, only precluded this further.30 The French recognition of Prussian royal status would not be issued until 1713. Neither did other courts besides Vienna, Paris, and London offer attractive alternatives. At many the court ceremonial was not yet orderly regulated, while few were hubs of diplomatic exchange in the manner of the aforementioned capitals.31

By contrast there were various factors that facilitated the dispatch of a Prussian ambassador to England. Frederick enjoyed relatively friendly relations with the English monarch. In 1701 Frederick’s maternal cousin sat upon the English throne. King William III was indebted to Frederick as he had aided the Prince of Orange in securing the English throne during the Glorious Revolution of 1688. While William’s troops had undertaken their landing at Torbay, Prussian troops had garrisoned the exposed Netherlands against the French threat.32 William had generously rewarded his cousin by inducting him into the order of the Garter in 1690.33 Thereafter the two met regularly on William’s European expeditions.34 King William was moreover one of the first to recognise Frederick’s royal title, sending Baron Raby as special envoy to the post-coronation festivities.35

29 These were the 8,000 troops provided by the Krontraktat, who engaged the French at the siege of Kaiserwerth, 16.04.1702, F. S. Seydel, Nachrichten über vaterländische Festungen und Festungskriege, Vol.2 (Leipzig: Darmann, 1819), 13-22.
30 5,000 more troops were committed against France later in 1702, and 8,000 under the Italian Treaty of 1704.
31 The only one that could perhaps rival these was Madrid, however the importance of this court was on the wane, and there was no strong tradition of Spanish-Prussian relations. There were disagreements over debts remaining from the last war, and once Philipp V successfully secured Madrid, and Frederick’s armies took to the field against the Bourbons, any chance of a Prussian embassy to Madrid was precluded.
32 Göse, Friedrich I, 173.
34 Göse, Friedrich I, 202-208.
William even undertook to secure recognition of the Prussian royal title from other European rulers.\textsuperscript{36} There was also precedent for an embassy to England. The English court had on one occasion previously received an ambassador from Brandenburg with full ceremonial honours.\textsuperscript{37} In 1661 Johann-Moritz, Prince of Nassau-Siegen, and Statthalter of Cleves-Mark received a similar reception and audience as the representatives of other potentate rulers. This spoke to the unique situation in post-restoration England, as well as the social status of the diplomat himself, and his already friendly relationship with the English monarch.\textsuperscript{38} Nonetheless the embassy of 1661 showed that the admission of an ambassador from Brandenburg-Prussia was within the realm of possibility. Thus, in the wake of Frederick’s coronation the state of affairs with England looked more encouraging than with many other princely dynasties.

A successful Prussian embassy to England could prove impactful not just in the English capital but throughout Europe. London, alongside the French court, acted as one of Europe’s diplomatic exchanges. Numerous representatives from the princes of Europe were sent there, encompassing diplomats from Portugal to Russia, and Sweden to Venice.\textsuperscript{39} These diplomats occupied the full spectrum of ranks, with many princes choosing to send ambassadors to the English court. Thus, the rights of ambassadors of potentates were manifestly displayed in London, in direct comparison to diplomats of lesser rulers. If Frederick’s ambassador could in London attain what the representatives of other potentates had, then he could demonstrate his accession into that group. Moreover, the reverberations of such an event would be all the greater, for any such ‘royal’ treatment given to Prussian diplomats would undoubtedly be communicated back to the princes of Europe by the panoply of diplomats observantly stationed in London.\textsuperscript{40}

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\textsuperscript{36} With Portugal for example: Ibid., 20.
\textsuperscript{39} Bittner and Gross, \textit{Repertorium}.
\textsuperscript{40} For inter-courtly communication see: Bauer, ‘Höfische Gesellschaft’, 29-68.
\end{flushright}
The discrete stimulus that the Prussians required to dispatch a successful embassy had by 1701 not yet come about. Frederick’s coronation itself did not provide this, for this act of self-aggrandizement did not necessarily suggest all others would immediately treat him or his diplomats in a different way to the way they had before the coronation. Thus, in May 1701 an English envoy arrived in Berlin to congratulate Frederick’s on his assumption of the royal title. By June the envoy had departed Berlin, resuming the situation whereby a lowly chargé d’affaires conducted English diplomacy in Berlin.\(^{41}\) Similarly, in April 1701 the newly crowned Frederick dispatched an envoy rather than an ambassador to England.\(^{42}\) This continued a pattern of behaviour stretching back to his days as elector, as well as to the reign of his father before him. The envoy, Ezekiel Spanheim arrived in London in May of 1701.\(^{43}\)

The coronation alone would not prove the decisive influence in upgrading Spanheim from an envoy to an ambassador. International events made the successful dispatch of a Prussian ambassador to England a concrete possibility. Throughout 1701 England moved gradually towards entering the War of the Spanish Succession, spurred on by the French occupation of the southern Netherlands, as well as Louis XIV’s recognition of the Stuart pretender.\(^{44}\) William III began to re-form the Grand Alliance of 1689, along with the Dutch Republic and the Emperor. Inherent within these efforts was also the desire to incorporate as many German allies as possible, as had been the case between 1689-1697. Prussia, as the imperial territory with the second-largest army was consequently a much sought-after partner.\(^{45}\) Spanheim, the Prussian envoy to England therefore travelled to the Hague to take part in the negotiations concerning Prussian accession to the coalescing Grand Alliance.\(^{46}\) Spanheim was part of the delegation that presented a list of initial demands to the allies, as

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\(^{42}\) Loewe, *Spanheim*, 146.


\(^{45}\) In 1701 Prussia had an army of 26,000 men. This was expanded during the War of the Spanish Succession to 40,000 men, of whom 31,000 entered allied service: Braubach, *Subsidien*, 105,124; P. H. Wilson, *From Reich to Revolution: German history, 1558-1806* (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004), 226ff.

\(^{46}\) Loewe, *Spanheim*, 146ff.
conditions for Prussia’s entry into the alliance. These even encompassed Prussian requests to be granted a new world colony, with Tobago being suggested, however this was merely the most notable of a number of unacceptable requests, that were consequently rejected.

The Stadtholder-King was however still eager to see Frederick incorporated into the Grand Alliance and directed his ministers to do all they could to secure the use of Prussian troops. Diplomatic concessions were offered in order to abate disagreements between the parties, with William already proposing to dispatch a permanent English envoy in order to incorporate Frederick into the Grand Alliance. In November 1701 the Earl of Albemarle conducted discussions with Spanheim where he suggested that William would be willing to accept a Prussian embassy and even reciprocate. Albemarle also promised that Frederick’s ambassador ‘should be treated equal to crowned heads’. Spanheim subsequently received instructions to take on the character of ambassador to the English court as long as certain conditions were met. By the beginning of December accession negotiations with the Maritime powers were largely concluded, and Spanheim returned to England. Other factors were naturally in play, but it appears that the English concession of allowing a Prussian ambassador to be received in London was influential in successfully concluding the alliance talks. Frederick became a part of the alliance ranged against Louis XIV and transferred a further 5,000 Prussian

48 Ibid.; Loewe, Preussens Staatsverträge, 10-11.
49 ‘The King is very desirous to have me conclude the treaty with the King of Prussia’, Marlborough to Godolphin, 17.09.1701: Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 1:30-31.
51 Spanheim to Frederick I., 08.11.1701, GSPK, I.HA, Rep.34, 6799.
52 This, Cottrell reported had been ‘promised by the late king and confirmed by her present majesty’, 16.06.1702, Rousham, MC-10; or in the words of Spanheim ‘because my lord Albemarle on the contrary had already given me the royal assurance, to have all the same distinctions that the King had ever granted any other ambassadors of crowned heads’, Besser, Schriften: Beiträge, 2:276.
54 Loewe, Preussens Staatsverträge, 11; Loewe, Spanheim, 147.
55 Supplementary factors including the fact that supporting the large army raised without allied subsidies was becoming burdensome: Naujokat, England und Preußen, 26.
soldiers into Anglo-Dutch service. This is an early indication of the link between issues of ceremony and status production on one side, and military and diplomatic matters on the other. For contemporaries they were two sides of the same coin. At times this can be observed explicitly in the sources, at other times the connections and interplay between such matters is less evident. Nonetheless these were not divorced in the minds of contemporaries. Concessions in one area often coincided with cooperation in another.

The decision to advance Spanheim was a clear manoeuvre to facilitate Frederick’s accession into the group of potentates. Spanheim had held credentials as envoy since May 1701, but in January 1702 he was raised to the rank of ambassador extraordinary. The intentions of Frederick and his ministers become apparent through the instructions sent to Spanheim discussing his rank elevation. Firstly, dispatching Spanheim as ambassador to a crowned head and sovereign was designed to establish Frederick’s right of legation. A royal rescript of early 1702 elaborated that the intention of this appointment would be that ‘thereby equality with the other kings, with respect to the right of legation, may be fully established’. As André Krischer has explained, the right to send ambassadors defined which princes belonged to the elite group atop the European society of princes. The claim to membership within this group did not depend on how frequently a ruler sent ambassadors, but only whether it was possible to do so.

The ceremonial treatment Spanheim received in London also had the power to set precedents, and thus it was essential that he receive the honours customarily given to ambassadors. To deny him these was not just to cause affront, but to essentially deny that person the character of ambassador, and consequently to deny

Frederick’s ability to send representatives of that rank. For as contemporaries acknowledged, envoys and ambassadors possessed the same ability to negotiate; the differences between their characters stemmed essentially from the ceremonial honours accorded to them.\(^{61}\) The rights given that implied ambassadorial status, or the *honores regii*, consisted primarily of: the excellency title, the right of the first visit, and the Hand (*Oberhand*).\(^{62}\) Alongside these the right to a public entry and defrayment, as well as certain privileges during the public audience with the monarch, were essential to the symbolic character of the ambassador. Securing these rights was therefore critical in establishing the right of legation; without them Spanheim was no more than an envoy, but with them he was the equal of ambassadors of sovereigns and kings. Frederick was aware of this, and Spanheim was specifically instructed not to concede or compromise on the point of ceremony, but ‘on the contrary to remain much more careful, because this is the first embassy that we have sent after the assumption of the royal dignity and that ceremonial’.\(^{63}\) The King in Prussia was also aware of the potential for the treatment Spanheim obtained to establish wide-reaching precedents, and that it ‘would henceforth be held to be the standard and the rule not only in England, but to a certain extent also at other courts and places’.\(^{64}\)

Spanheim’s treatment assumed further importance as ambassadors possessed a representative character and were consequently to be treated at ceremonial occasions as if their dispatching monarch were themselves present.\(^{65}\) Consequently ambassadors were granted dignified ceremonial treatment at entries, audiences, visits, and on other solemn occasions. Because ceremonial meetings between ruling princes themselves were rare, ambassadors equipped with representative characters consequently became the means through which rulers chose to test out acceptance of their rank claims and to relationally construct their status in the society of princes.\(^{66}\) The treatment awarded to Spanheim was thus the treatment accorded to Frederick, and degradations in the ceremonial honours performed were slight on Frederick’s rank pretensions.


\(^{63}\) Loewe, *Spanheim*, 148-149.

\(^{64}\) Ibid.


\(^{66}\) On the infrequency of meetings see: Paulmann, *Pomp*, 30ff.
The primary focus of Frederick and his ministers lay upon the initial stages of Spanheim’s posting. At Spanheim’s public entry and audience the honours awarded to him had the ability to establish Frederick’s right of legation and demonstrate the ceremonial equality of the King in Prussia with Europe’s potentates. This would also be the most visible element of the embassy. During public entries the populace usually thronged the streets in Greenwich, along the Thames, and through London. Audiences at St. James’ Palace were also well attended by observers. The honours paid on these occasions were therefore some of the most easily readable to observers, with clear gradations in treatment that corresponded with rank. Once the public entry and audience were completed much of the most strenuous work of the ambassador had usually been completed. It was not uncommon for ambassadors to subsequently while away their time at the appointed court and only intermittently become involved in court festivities. This was true of Spanheim, for there were plans afoot to demote him from ambassador extraordinary to ambassador ordinary upon completion of the embassy’s initial ceremonies in order to save on the more extravagant cost of an extraordinary representative.67 Further, the day to day work of diplomacy was never so burdensome to Spanheim with much of the diplomatic workload shifted to his colleague, Schmettau, Prussian envoy to the Estates General.68 Spanheim’s ability to negotiate with the English was never a critical aspect of his role as ambassador, and this allowed him to engage in other, more learned pursuits.69

3.3. **English Ceremonial Custom**

The organisation of English ceremonial occasions, such as ambassadorial entries and audiences, was carefully planned and differentiated according to preestablished factors. The task of arranging these events fell within the purview of the master of ceremonies, an office established by James I / VI. Under the influence of

68 Schmettau was based in the Hague and was able to negotiate with both the Estates General and Marlborough. Loewe, *Spanheim*, 148.
successive holders of this office, English ceremonial customs gradually became standardised throughout the seventeenth century. In order to gain an audience with the monarch all foreign diplomats were required to notify the master of ceremonies. This minister consequently arranged audiences as well as other events. For this task the master of ceremonies would follow the instructions of their monarch, while also drawing upon their knowledge of ceremonial precedents both at the English court and from abroad. Over the course of the seventeenth century certain rules emerged for dealing with diplomats of varying provenance and rank. By the time of Spanheim’s embassy there was a regulated system for treating foreign ministers which was backed by a century of precedents. There were cases of exception to most of these rules, however what is important is that contemporaries viewed these as exceptions, and that despite occasionally breaching the established procedure, they nonetheless returned to the standard when determining how to treat incoming diplomats.

Audiences and entries were conducted in varying manners, with the treatment of the diplomat corresponding to his rank and the status of his principle. Officially, only two ranks of diplomat were greeted by the English court, with Charles I having decreed that only men possessing the character of either ambassador or agent would be accepted. Ambassadors received far greater respect than the agents of inferior rank. However, even within this foremost group, subtle distinctions could also be made. Extraordinary ambassadors received more deference than ordinary ambassadors. Furthermore, in line with established ideas regarding the hierarchy of European rulers, the treatment accorded to those possessing ambassadorial credentials could occasionally vary;

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70 Finet, Ceremonies; Finet, Finetti Philoxenis. Finet established many of the precedents that regulated court and diplomatic ceremonial into the eighteenth century. The notes of his successors, Sir Charles Cottrell (1641-1686) and Sir Charles Lodowick Cottrell (1686-1710) can be found in LC-5/2 and at Rousham House.

71 Order of 11.05.1679 OS, TNA, LC-5/2.

72 TNA, LC-5/2, f.37.


74 Aside from the aforementioned notes of the English Masters of Ceremonies, the following are useful resources for English ceremonial customs: Besser, Schriften: Beiträge; Wicquefort, The Ambassador; Lüning, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719; Howell, Precedency of Kings; J. Jusserand, A French Ambassador at the Court of Charles the Second : le Comte de Cominges from his Unpublished Correspondence (London: Fisher, 1892); Keay, Magnificent Monarch.

75 TNA, LC-5/2, f.37; Finet, Ceremonies, 34.
with those sent by crowned monarchs receiving a handful of additional concessions to distinguish them from their counterparts sent by dukes and republics.

By far the greatest disparity in treatment occurred between ambassadors and ministers of the second order. By the turn of the eighteenth century the most common designation for men occupying this secondary category was that of envoy.\(^76\) Envoys received considerably fewer honours than all types of ambassador, reflecting their inferior rank. The ceremonial treatment that the English court gave to diplomats clothed with varying ranks by their masters therefore had a performative effect; it clearly and visibly delineated the ranks of these men and thus brought their rank into being within the London court milieu.

The public entry and first audience demonstrated most visibly the differentiation in the ceremonial treatment accorded to the various ranks of diplomat. It is therefore necessary to give a brief account of the ways in which diplomats of various ranks experienced these ceremonies. Once this examination has been conducted, it will be possible to contrast the Spanheim embassy of 1702 to custom and historical precedents, and thus the treatment Frederick’s ambassador received in comparison to the representatives of other European potentates.

In London, extraordinary ambassadors dispatched by crowned heads were granted the most reverential treatment. The extraordinary ambassador would arrive in London and remain incognito, perhaps taking a private audience with the English monarch during this time.\(^77\) He would then, on an appointed date begin his public entry, a right that was deemed sacrosanct for ambassadors. He would depart from his accommodation in London and leave the city, repairing either to Gravesend or Greenwich.\(^78\) He would remain there a short while, where the master of ceremonies would come to meet him to begin the fiction of his first entry into the city. The master of ceremonies would be assigned an escort by a member of the English peerage; with an earl

\(^76\) Referred to as agent extraordinary by Finet, but accepted as envoy by this point.

\(^77\) TNA, LC-5/2, f.38 Keay, *Magnificent Monarch*, 104-109.

\(^78\) TNA, LC-5/2, ff.37-38.
being dispatched to accompany him in the case of extraordinary ambassadors.\textsuperscript{79} Within the hierarchy of the English peerage an earl ranked in status below dukes and marquises, but was superior to viscounts and barons.\textsuperscript{80} These three men and their entourage would then board the royal barge and be taken upriver, where they would land at the Tower of London.\textsuperscript{81} Upon landing at Tower Wharf the ambassador would be greeted by the constable of the Tower of London.\textsuperscript{82}

The party would then climb into the king’s coach which would be outfitted with six horses.\textsuperscript{83} They would set off through London followed by the numerous coaches of other court persons.\textsuperscript{84} The procession would then continue to an appropriate residence where the ambassador would be ‘defrayed’ at the monarch’s expense. This involved several days of entertainment and dining with local notables all paid for from the monarch’s purse.\textsuperscript{85} Thereafter, the day appointed for the ambassador’s audience would arrive, and on that morning the master of ceremonies would collect the ambassador. Another noble would be appointed to accompany this party, once more possessing the title of earl.\textsuperscript{86} The entire party would then enter the King’s coach once more, which would take them to the place appointed for the ambassador’s first audience.\textsuperscript{87} The ambassador would dismount from the coach before it entered the cour d’honneur, where he would be received by a number of the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[79] TNA, LC-5/2, ff.39; Finet, Ceremonies, 28, 151; Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1:475; Jusserand, A French Ambassador, 73.
\item[80] See: Smithurst, Britain’s Glory, 94ff.; C. Young, Order of Precedence: With Authorities and Remarks (London: Bentley, 1851).
\item[81] TNA, LC-5/2, f.39; Howell, Precedency of Kings, 208.
\item[82] TNA, LC-5/2, f.39; Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:624.
\item[83] TNA, LC-5/2, f.40; Howell, Precedency of Kings, 208; Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:475; Jusserand, A French Ambassador, 73.
\item[84] They were previously accompanied by the coaches of other diplomats, but this was halted after the infamous entry of the Swedish ambassador in 1661. The defect in coaches was made up by ‘the lords of the court and the rest of the nobility in town’, TNA, LC-5/2, ff.39-40. Act of State, 06.02.1662 OS, TNA, LC-5/2, f.7. For the Estrades-Watteville conflict see: Satow, Diplomatic Practice, 1:26ff.
\item[85] W. Roosen, The Age of Louis XIV: The Rise of Modern Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1976), 116; Howell, Precedency of Kings, 208; Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1:475; Keny, Magnificent Monarch, 104ff.; the period of defrayment was limited to 3 days, TNA, LC-5/2, f.37.
\item[86] Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:475; Jusserand, A French Ambassador, 74.
\item[87] Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:476.
\end{footnotes}
household guard. He would enter the palace still attended by the earl and master of ceremonies. The grand chamberlain would greet him before the presence chamber and lead him in once the monarch was ready. The monarch would be seated at the far end of the hall facing the door through which the ambassador had entered; they would be sat on a chair with a back and arms, atop a raised platform and under a canopy of state (occasionally called a dais). The Monarch would also be wearing a hat or a cap. The ambassador would proceed across the hall to the monarch, and then make three reverences, taking off their hat after the last. At some point the monarch would stand and remove their own cap, usually upon seeing the ambassador enter the room, or after the second reverence. Shortly thereafter the monarch would re-cover themselves, form held that the ambassador should do the same at this instant. Occasionally the monarch would extend an invitation for the ambassador to do so, however if this were not forthcoming the ambassador would recover himself without prompting. The ambassador would then deliver their harangue and make compliments to the monarch. Thereafter they would take their leave, retreating backwards out of the presence chamber. It was in this manner that the public entry and audiences of the highest-ranking diplomats in London took place.

Slight variations in ceremonial treatment could be made between diplomats possessing the rank of ambassador. Minor distinctions were made between extraordinary ambassadors and ordinary ambassadors. The less prestigious ordinary ambassador (sometimes called a resident ambassador) was met by the master of ceremonies at one of the two sites outside of London. However, the ordinary ambassadors would not be accompanied from Greenwich or Gravesend by an earl. Rather, ordinary ambassadors had to wait until their

88 No carriages entered the inner court in England, apart from one Russian one of 1662 which enjoyed a few exceptions: Vinogradoff, ‘Russian Missions’, 36, 56ff.
89 Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:476; Finet, Ceremonies, 28; A brief note here on English a German usage of the word Dais, in English it often refers to a raised platform with a chair upon it, often under a canopy of state. In German it is often used to refer to the canopy of state itself.
90 If male
91 Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:476.
93 Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:476.
94 Keay, Magnificent Monarch, 107.
landing at the Tower of London to be received by an earl.\textsuperscript{95} Defrayment in its entirety was also a right solely resolved for extraordinary ambassadors.\textsuperscript{96}

The English court also treated ambassadors differently depending upon the ruler or state which had dispatched them. Ambassadors sent by dukes or republics consequently received slightly altered ceremonial treatment from the aforementioned forms reserved for the ambassadors of crowned heads. The overall process proceeded as outlined above, however with some minor discrepancies. Extraordinary ambassadors originating from a duke or a republic were only to be collected from Greenwich or Gravesend by the master of ceremonies alone. They were not accompanied from these sites to the Tower by an Earl, as the extraordinary ambassadors of crowned heads were.\textsuperscript{97} The differences in rank between royal ambassadors and their princely or republican counterparts was once more demonstrated at their disembarkation at Tower Wharf. Not only did the location at which a nobleman received the ambassador vary, but so too did the quality of the nobleman tasked with receiving the diplomat. Thus, whereas royal ambassadors were greeted by an earl, non-royal ambassadors were instead received at the Tower by a lower ranking member of the peerage in the form of a baron.\textsuperscript{98} This same pattern was repeated when the ambassador was brought to his first audience. He was collected by the master of ceremonies and a baron, rather than an earl.\textsuperscript{99}

Envoys, in comparison to ambassadors, were paid far fewer honours when they arrived at the English court. Certain rights were publicly and noticeably denied to those diplomatic representatives of the second class, making their inferior rank visible. Envoys, no matter which ruler dispatched them, did not possess the right of a public entry to the English capital.\textsuperscript{100} They therefore received none of the associated pomp and splendour

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{95} Finet, Ceremonies, 27-28, 159-161; Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:624.

\textsuperscript{96} In 1626 defrayment was limited only to extraordinary ambassadors. TNA, LC-5/2, f.21; Boyer, The History of the Reign of Queen Anne, Vol.1, 151.

\textsuperscript{97} Besser, Schriften: Beiträge, 2:170-173; Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:620; Finet, Finetti Philoxenis, 228.

\textsuperscript{98} London Gazette, No.2024, (1685); Wicquefort, The Embassador, 136. Finet, Ceremonies, 28, 163; Howell, Precedency of Kings, 208.

\textsuperscript{99} Howell, Precedency of Kings, 208; Finet, Ceremonies, 28; Finet, Finetti Philoxenis, 231.

\textsuperscript{100} Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:477, 622.
\end{flushleft}
that accompanied this occasion, nor were they greeted by distinguished persons. The process of defrayment at the monarch’s expense was also denied to envoys. Men of this lower diplomatic rank were granted a public audience once they had arrived in London and taken up residence. However, this procedure occurred in a very different manner to that received by ambassadors, in order to make the disparity in rank perceptible.

The envoy would be brought to the audience in the king’s coach, but they would not be accompanied by a peer of the realm, only by the master of ceremonies.101 In the audience chamber, the diplomat would make three reverences to the monarch, however in contrast to their behaviour towards ambassadors, the monarch would not stand either upon seeing the envoy enter the room, nor after the reverences, but would instead remain seated under the dais. It was not customary for the monarch to remove their hat; they should remain covered throughout their audience with diplomats of the second rank.102 They would often merely touch their hat at each reverence and at the mention of the diplomat’s principal. The envoy would contrastingly remain uncovered, having taken off their hat during the reverences.103 The monarch would not proffer the invitation that the envoy re-cover themselves, and form held that the envoy should continue throughout the audience standing and uncovered.104 There was thus a range of ceremonial treatment given to diplomats of different rank and provenance at the English court. The honours granted made tangible the rank of diplomats in relation to one another, and the relational status of their rulers within the society of princes.

102 TNA, LC-5/2, f.38, 147.
103 Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:620.
104 See chapter discussing the Danish Ceremonial
### Figure 1: Ceremonial Honours Performed for Various Diplomats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reception at Gravesend / Greenwich</th>
<th>Reception at Tower of London</th>
<th>Accompaniment to audience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Royal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraordinary Ambassador</td>
<td>Earl &amp; Master of Ceremonies</td>
<td>Constable of the Tower</td>
<td>Earl &amp; Master of Ceremonies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary Ambassador</td>
<td>Master of Ceremonies</td>
<td>Earl</td>
<td>Earl &amp; Master of Ceremonies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Envoy</td>
<td>Did not have public entry</td>
<td></td>
<td>Master of Ceremonies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duke or Republic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraordinary Ambassador</td>
<td>Master of Ceremonies</td>
<td>Baron</td>
<td>Baron &amp; Master of Ceremonies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary Ambassador</td>
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<td>Baron</td>
<td>Baron &amp; Master of Ceremonies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Envoy</td>
<td>Did not have public entry</td>
<td></td>
<td>Master of Ceremonies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.4. Ceremonial Negotiations

Few were more aware of the performative effect of ceremonial treatment in helping to determine rank than Johann von Besser, the Prussian master of ceremonies. Besser himself had spent time at the English court as part of the Brandenburg-Prussian legations of 1684 and 1688, and had even managed to stage a successful ceremonial coup during the coronation of James II.\(^{105}\) Alongside his personal experience, Besser also remained informed of the ceremonial of the English court, with his library containing copies of works of ceremonial literature that detailed English practices.\(^{106}\) Additionally, Besser collected the reports of Brandenburg-Prussian envoys that had been posted to London, which were replete with indications of the differing types of treatment the various ranks of diplomat should expect to receive.\(^{107}\) By compiling these reports he even put together a summary of the prevailing ceremonial at the English court.\(^{108}\) Besser was thus aware of the ceremonial which the ambassador of a crowned head could anticipate when reaching the English court. Once the decision had been made to raise Spanheim, Besser instructed him to keep an accurate journal, so that he could monitor the ceremonial conducted, ensure that it was befitting of ambassadorial status, and gain an even better understanding of the ceremonial of the Stuart court.\(^{109}\)

The negotiations at the beginning of the embassy are extremely informative; with Spanheim’s statements further delineating the intentions of both Frederick and Besser in sending their first ambassador, namely, to establish the right of legation and assert equality with the representatives of other crowned heads. The discussions between Spanheim and Cottrell further exhibit acute Prussian understanding of English customs, and awareness over the status defining power of ceremonial. Spanheim was willing to put this knowledge to good use in order to battle to gain equality with the ambassadors of other potentates. The preliminary


\(^{108}\) Ibid., 2:257.

\(^{109}\) Ibid., 2:277.
negotiations here represent an essential component of ceremonial communication; for the assertion of status claims, conflict over elements of ritual, and finally the consensus reached by actors, formed the first part on the continuum of ceremonial representation.\textsuperscript{110} The solemn event itself can best be understood by placing it in context, with the consensus expressed at the events themselves representing a resolution of conflict. Moreover, the ceremonial communicative process did not end with the event’s conclusion; as important were the subsequent efforts by involved parties to effectively communicate their depiction to the appropriate audience and to convince them of its definitiveness.

Spanheim was desirous to know the rank of the person assigned to conduct him during his audience and entry. Through the reports of previous Prussian envoys to England, as well as general ceremonial literature, both Besser and Spanheim were informed of the treatment customarily awarded by the English court. The right to be accompanied during one’s public entry and to the first public audience by an English earl had long belonged to royal ambassadors. Venice and the Dutch Republic had gradually secured this right over the course of the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{111} In contrast the representatives from lowlier ranking princes or republics were only awarded a baron to accompany them. Spanheim’s questioning of Cottrell was all the more pertinent as just a few days before the Prussian would make his own entry, it was announced that for their forthcoming entry, the Dutch ambassadors would receive the Earl of Essex as accompaniment.\textsuperscript{112} Spanheim thus expressed his expectation that high ranking earls would also escort him.\textsuperscript{113} Cottrell duly notified Spanheim that he would be conducted by the Earl of Abingdon during his entry, and brought to his audience by the Earl of Winchelsea. Spanheim contentedly transmitted this news back to Berlin.\textsuperscript{114}


\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 2:273-274.
The discussions surrounding Spanheim’s prospective defrayment and a potential innovation in this area once more displays Spanheim’s awareness of precedent and the rights due to royal ambassadors. On this particular issue Frederick’s ambassador was willing to press his point and refused to accept unfavourable proposals when presented to him. It was an honour due to extraordinary ambassadors that they were defrayed at the monarch’s expense. Indeed, this right set extraordinary ambassadors apart from their ordinary counterparts, as well as differentiating them from envoys and other lowlier diplomats. In England there was however no firmly established Hôtel des Ambassadeurs. A private residence in New Palace Yard in Westminster was occasionally employed for such purposes. The visit of particularly esteemed diplomats could however be rewarded with far grander lodgings. During the reign of Mary & William III, and later Anne, a house in St James’s Square was utilised for ambassadorial defrayment.

In 1702 none of these residences appear to have been available. In light of this, Cottrell suggested that rather than find another suitable residence in which Spanheim could be defrayed, the crown would instead pay the Prussian ambassador ‘a grant of 4[00] or 500 pounds sterling’ with which he could pay for his own defrayment. Spanheim quickly rebuffed the offer. He reported to Besser, ‘I answered, that here in ceremonial I would neither pretend to more, nor in the least therein without prejudice desist from those [rights] that succeeded to me, and all royal ambassadors, nor would I be able to favour such an insignificant profit of a few hundred pounds sterling [over] the honours due to my character’. He railed further against Cottrell’s

115 TNA, LC-5/2, f.21.
116 Belonging to one Lady Williams. However, it was far from the grandest of lodgings. TNA, LC-5/2 f.40; Keay, Magnificent Monarch, 104.
119 Ibid., 38-39; This appears to have been 1. St James’s Square: F. H. W. Sheppard, Survey of London: Volumes 29 and 30 (London: LCC, 1960), 77-83.
120 Besser, Schriften: Beiträge, 2:275.
121 It should be mentioned that this amount was less than the previous cost of defrayment, a grant of £100 was provided for each meal, of which there were six. This is not to mention the cost of renting and furnishing the place of defrayment, which could often be considerable. Thus, the proposed expenditure of £400-500 was a significant reduction from the norm. Jacobsen, Luxury, 37-39; Besser, Schriften: Beiträge, 2:275.
proposal, ‘to defray in this manner is likely customary with the Muscovite and Turkish ambassadors, but [is] towards none of the other European kings [customary]’. He remarked that it was unbelievable that the English monarch should want the first alteration of this treatment to be performed ‘with us as an elevated king’. Such a course of action would ‘keep a distinction between us and other kings’. He referred back to his discussions with Lord Albemarle, who, as he reminded Cottrell, had given him the royal assurance that Spanheim would receive the same distinctions as the ambassadors of other crowned heads. Spanheim even somewhat impudently proposed that the English could easily rent another house in close proximity to the residence previously used for defrayment. The situation was resolved when Cottrell acquiesced. Spanheim would be defrayed, and apartments in the Cockpit in Whitehall were assigned for this purpose. Queen Anne herself had resided in the Cockpit while Princess of Denmark, and Cottrell therefore commented that Spanheim was receiving more honour than many previous ambassadors.

The ceremonial negotiations surrounding Spanheim’s embassy serve to remind us that the English did not willingly dole out ceremonial concessions with complete largesse. The English had to be poked, prodded and occasionally reminded not to renege on their promises by Prussian actors. The combined wits of Spanheim and Besser were required to keep an eye on historical precedents, to ensure that they were receiving the same treatment as those they now considered their peers. Making certain Frederick and his representatives were in no way negatively differentiated from other crowned heads was an integral part of this. They further had to be careful that no new, and potentially harmful, innovations were established on their watch. Prussian ambassadors could in future conform to ceremonial innovations as they gradually became the norm. But to be

123 Ibid., 2:276.
124 At least five rooms and a kitchen were provided for Spanheim and his retinue, Orders were given for ‘furnishing an apartment at the Cockpit for the Entertainment of the Ambassador from Prussia… for the Eating Room a Canopy of State, of Crimson Damask with Silke Fringe, with one Chair, one footstool, Two Cushions Suitable, One Barbary Matt, one green Cloth Carpet for the Eating Table, three pair of Window Curtains of Crimson Serge to draw back; in the withdrawing room, two pair of Window Curtains of Crimson Tabby, one Walnut Table Glass & Stands; in the Bedchamber, Two pair of White Tabby Window Curtains, a black Table Glass & Stands, one Barbary Matt’. M. H. Cox, G. T. Forrest, et al., *Survey of London: Volume 14* (London: LLC, 1931), 46-55.
the first to adhere to a reduction in ceremony as the representative of a recently crowned king was dangerous, and could have jeopardised Frederick’s ascension into the group of potentates.

3.5. **Spanheim’s Entry and Audience**

Spanheim made his public entry on June 16\(^{th}\) 1702 (OS). With regards to sources, both the English and Prussian master of ceremonies provide accounts of this occasion, along with the subsequent audience.\(^{126}\) Quite naturally the notes of Besser dive into far more detail than his English counterpart, due to the consequential nature of the occasion from a Prussian perspective. Alongside the two ceremonial masters, contemporary sources emanating from London also discuss the event.\(^{127}\) The notes of Cottrell make clear from the outset that at his entry and audience Spanheim was to be given the most prestigious ceremonial treatment. The English monarchs themselves had directed that Frederick’s ambassador ‘should be treated equal to Crowned Heads’.\(^{128}\)

Having already delineated English ceremonial custom it is now possible to compare Spanheim’s case to the norm for the ambassadors of kings and potentates.

Spanheim first set out for Greenwich, the point from which his public entry would truly begin. He was transported from his residence thither by a series of barges organised by Cottrell. Once there he was temporarily lodged in the residence of the royal captain of the hunt, which had also housed previous ambassadors. These included, as Besser himself noted, the Comte de Tallard, ambassador from Louis XIV who had made his entry to London in 1698. The party assigned to collect Spanheim and accompany him during his entry arrived in Greenwich. Cottrell was there, and to partner him came the Earl of Abingdon. After lunch, the company made its way onto a small flotilla of barges and set out for London.\(^{129}\) They arrived at the Tower

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\(^{126}\) This section, unless specifically stated, draws on notes from, Besser, *Schriften, Vol.2*, 235-256; 16.06.1702, 19.06.1702(OS), Rousham, MC-10. Besser’s notes are extracts from his correspondence with Spanheim and his secretary.

\(^{127}\) Such as Narcissus Luttrell and Abel Boyer, as well as numerous London newspapers.

\(^{128}\) 16.06.1702 OS, Rousham, MC-10.

of London, where their landing was greeted by ‘an innumerable amount of observers, who had posted
themselves on the bank of the water, on ships and their upper masts, as well as in the windows and on the roofs
of the houses’. Baron Lucas, constable of the Tower of London, received Spanheim as he disembarked. He
thence led Spanheim to their royal coach, where he seated himself next to the Earl of Abingdon, and opposite
Cottrell. The rest of the retinue were placed in other coaches arranged before the tower. As the cavalcade set
off for Whitehall, the cannons of the tower fired off a 61-gun salute. The procession itself was composed of at
least 37 coaches, as well as numerous footmen, and mounted pages. As it moved through London it was
observed by numerous exuberant spectators. From the streets came cheers and cries of ‘God bless the King in
Prussia’, and ‘the Prussians are good Englishmen’. The procession arrived at the Cockpit, where Spanheim
was to be defrayed. He remained there for three days, receiving the customary 6 meals.

The 19th of June was the day appointed for Spanheim’s public audience with Queen Anne. Cottrell,
accompanied by the Earl of Winchelsea, escorted Spanheim to the ceremony. Having collected Spanheim
from the Cockpit, they set out in the Queen’s carriage, disembarking at the gate of St James’ Palace and
entering the inner courtyard where they were saluted by the palace guards. Spanheim proceeded through the
palace, and was greeted by various notable courtiers. Finally, he reached the antechamber before the audience
chamber, where the Lord Chamberlain the Earl of Jersey greeted him. The Earls of Jersey and Winchelsea then
conducted Spanheim into the audience chamber and before the Queen. She was sat upon a chair under a canopy
of state. Spanheim approached her, gave his first reverence, which was ‘returned with a gracious bow’. Then,
after Spanheim’s second reverence ‘the Queen rose and stood till he came up to Her’. Anne remained
standing and made one step towards him. Spanheim stood before her with his hat in his hand, Anne then asked
him to recover himself, which he duly did, before once more uncovering himself to deliver his harangue. It

130 Ibid., 2:239.
131 Ibid., 2:242.
132 He was also visited and greeted by numerous guests. Although Spanheim refrained from sleeping at the cockpit.
133 Abingdon was again present, but outranked by Winchelsea.
134 19.06.1702 OS, Rousham, MC-10.
135 19.06.1702 OS, Rousham, MC-10.
should be noted that the standard procedure was here altered somewhat. Anne did not remove her own hat as Spanheim removed his. Female rulers wore bonnets or headdresses, the associated etiquette was governed by different rules and they were consequently not removed.\textsuperscript{136} The gentleman and ladies of the court were arranged around the two in a circle, and were so numerous that ‘it was difficult to get in due to their number’.\textsuperscript{137} Having given over his credentials to the queen and received an answer to his harangue, Spanheim subsequently departed to take his audience of Prince George of Denmark. Upon the conclusion of this, his duties within the palace were complete, and he was escorted by Cottrell and the Earl of Winchelsea back to his residence.

These comprehensive accounts of Spanheim’s entry and audience facilitate comparison with English ceremonial custom. The very act of allowing a diplomat to undertake a public entry recognised his rank as ambassador, for this was reserved only for diplomats of the first order. During his triumphant procession from Greenwich to St James’ Palace Spanheim received equal ceremonial treatment to those royal ambassadors that had come before him. The entry concluded when Spanheim was defrayed at the monarch’s expense, an immutable right of extraordinary ambassadors in London. Minor variation in the forms observed marked out whether the English saw the ambassador as ordinary or extraordinary, as well as whether the embassy was royal, republican or ducal in nature. In this framework Spanheim received the highest set of honours one could hope to obtain at the English court, with the ceremonial privileges according with the character of extraordinary ambassador that his king had equipped him with.\textsuperscript{138}


\textsuperscript{137} Besser, \textit{Schriften: Beiträge}, 2:250.

\textsuperscript{138} Spanheim’s instructions to ‘appear in public with the character of ambassador extraordinary’, Ibid., 2:233. Credentials as ‘Legati Extraordinary’, 10.01.1702, TNA, SP-104/201.
The differences in treatment awarded to differing ranks of diplomat would have been all too apparent to Spanheim himself, who after all had arrived in London just over a year beforehand. In 1701 as the extraordinary envoy of the King in Prussia Spanheim had not been granted a public entry. Before his public audience as envoy he was collected from his residence by the master of ceremonies alone. During the audience King William remained seated and covered, whilst Spanheim as envoy stood and was uncovered. A year later and equipped with a higher diplomatic rank Spanheim could perceive the altered entry and audience experience and contrast it against his previous London posting. The improved treatment he obtained recognised his changed character as a minister of the first order, as well as Frederick I’s right of legation, and by extension his status as a potentate ruler.

The manner in which Spanheim was received can be contrasted not only against historical precedent but with the experience of other ambassadors stationed in London during the same period. The extraordinary ambassadors from the Kings of France and Sweden, who both arrived in 1698, were received at Greenwich by an earl, at Tower Wharf by the Constable of the Tower, and then conducted to their audience by an earl. Despite their republican nature, extraordinary ambassadors from the Dutch Republic and Venice were equally treated in this royal manner. This had long been the case as they had as each had adequately constructed their potentate status. That Frederick’s ambassador was granted the same ceremonial honours as the representatives of Louis XIV, Charles XII, and other potenates was in itself significant. Furthermore, the fact that successive ambassadorial entries and audiences during the reigns of William and Anne were carried out in the same manner is also of consequence. The established and regulated nature of such occasions indicates

139 Ibid., 2:227-232; London Gazette, No. 3710, (1701).
140 Ibid., 2:229.
143 See previous chapter.
that the royal honours awarded to potentate representatives had become enshrined in custom. As such, it was readily perceivable which ambassadors were granted the royal treatment. Thus, when Spanheim was received by an earl at Greenwich, and likewise conducted to his audience by an earl, contemporaries could perceive that Frederick’s representative was being accorded royal treatment, which in turn produced the rank of Frederick as a constituent of the group of potentates.

3.6. **Prussian Reaction and Transmission of Accounts**

The reaction of the King in Prussia shows that he was largely satisfied by what had transpired in London and considered the embassy to have achieved its objectives. Spanheim’s successful entry and audience had undoubtedly established the right of legation, while the ambassador’s acquisition of the *honores regii* served to establish Frederick’s equality with the representatives of crowned heads. As one historian well acquainted with the Prussian archival documents has stated, ‘king Frederick was greatly pleased with the good course of this court action’. From the Hague, where Frederick was stationed for the summer, the King transmitted reports of Spanheim’s entry and audience back to the privy council in Berlin. He asked that his queen be informed of Spanheim’s success, and that excerpts from Spanheim’s reports be forwarded to his diplomats at other foreign courts. These excerpts should be put in such an order to show ‘that We are hereby henceforth in the complete possession of the right to send ambassadors with full honours to one of the most illustrious royal courts of Europe’. Such a view is corroborated by the reports of the English representative based at Frederick’s court. Philip Plantamour provides details of the report concerning the entry and audience sent from Spanheim to Frederick as well as its reception. Spanheim praised the welcome reception he had received. This in turn gave Frederick ‘much contentment’. Frederick then commanded Plantamour to relay his gratitude to

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144 Loewe, *Spanheim*, 150.
145 Ibid.
the Queen, and to express that he would be delighted to have the opportunity to show Anne the special consideration he has for her.146

The entry and audience of the Prussian ambassador of 1702 contributed towards ongoing processes of production. Most obviously these events established Spanheim’s status as an ambassador at the London court. However, the initial stages of the embassy also assisted in the production of Frederick’s rank as sovereign king, and consequently his potentate status. The latter of these two outcomes was not solely limited to the Stuart court. But rather Spanheim’s embassy had the power to produce Frederick’s potentate status at other courts across Europe. Spanheim’s arrival as minister of the first order was also observed by many who subsequently transmitted this information across Europe. These multiple acts of transmission, and the mediums through which they occurred, therefore contributed to the construction of the image of Frederick as king in the minds of European princes, their ministers, and informed Europeans who consumed the growing number of news-periodicals. In this sense Spanheim and Frederick benefitted from the advanced state of news reporting and publication in Stuart London.147 Also useful were the large number of foreign diplomats present at any one time at the English capital. London, far more than many other European court cities, possessed an almost constant abundance of foreign ministers, who in turn reported the goings on of the city to their respective rulers.

The correspondence heads of state and their ministers received from agents based abroad would have been effective in constructing their sense of the relational status within the European society of princes. Anthonie Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary of Holland received regular reports from his correspondents based in London, and in select pieces he was informed of Spanheim’s entry. An exiled Huguenot correspondent reported to him that ‘Spanheim has made his public entry’.148 While the Dutch envoy to England expounded, explaining that the entry of Spanheim was ‘very magnificent’ and that he had undertaken it with three coaches equipped with

146 Plantamour-Hedges, 11.07.1702 (NS), TNA, SP-90/1, f.215.
147 See discussion of the news-periodical industry in London in previous chapter.
eight horses and one with six, alongside eight pages and twenty-four lacqueys.\footnote{Vrijbergen-Heinsius, 27.06.1702(OS), Ibid., 1:311.} The simple exchange of information between these actors should not be underestimated. Particularly in light of the mental framework that would have governed the meaning and interpretation of such information. Heinsius, like many of his contemporaries would have known that public entries were only granted to ambassadors, and only kings and sovereigns were deemed able to send diplomats of this rank. This point would have been particularly apparent to ministers of the Dutch Republic, for the Republic had continuously fought have its sovereign status recognised, and obtaining the right to dispatch ambassadors had been one of the primary ways in which this had been achieved. It is likely that the other foreign ministers present in London during 1702 would have sent similar reports to their masters at home.\footnote{For present foreign ministers see: Rousham, MC Vrijbergen, 27.06.1702(OS), Ibid., 1:311.} These reports in combination with other acts of production undertaken by Frederick gradually contributed to the emergence of the image of Frederick as a sovereign king, and potentate ruler.

Occasionally diplomats did not feel the need to comment on the daily occurrences of London, but instead contented their rulers by enclosing newspaper reports within their own diplomatic correspondence. Accounts of Spanheim’s entry and audience as royal ambassador were published in a range of British periodicals which could be forwarded to foreign courts, presuming there was someone who could understand English.\footnote{Accounts of Spanheim’s entry and audience appeared in: London Gazette, No.3819, No.3820, (1702), English Post with News Foreign and Domestick, No.263, (1702), Daily Courant, No.50, (1702), Post Boy, No.1106, No.1107, (1702).} Never mind if this were not the case, for continental publications soon seized upon the news and republished it in French, German and Dutch. To take but three examples of this phenomenon, Dutch language reports of Spanheim’s public entry were published in Amsterdam in the Europische Mercurius.\footnote{Europische Mercurius, Vol.13, Part.2 (Amsterdam: 1702), 207.} Likewise German language works such as the Historischer und Politischer Mercurius, reported that, ‘the Baron Spanheim, Ambassador of the King in Prussia held on the 27th of this his public entry with a magnificent retinue… On the 30th of June he had his public audience with the usual ceremony’.\footnote{Dates here are (NS). Historischer und Politischer Mercurius, July (Nuremberg: 1702), 75-76. On reporting ceremonial in news-periodicals see: Bauer, ‘Höfische Gesellschaft’, 41ff.} Detailed reports of the entry were
likewise provided in French in *Esprit des Cours de l’Europe*. This repeated portrayal of the bestowing of the rights of a royal ambassador upon the representative of the King in Prussia would surely have been impactful. Across the literary public of Europe such representations thus contributed towards a gradual shaping of the conception of Frederick as a sovereign king and potentate ruler. This perception of Frederick would also have disseminated through the society of princes via personal consumption of diplomatic or newspaper reports, or via interaction and exchange with others who had imbibed such ideas.

### 3.7. Spanheim’s Interactions with Foreign Ministers

In the wake of his entry, Spanheim continued to assert Frederick’s royal status via interactions with the ministers of foreign princes based in London. However, the diplomats of other princes did not effortlessly grant Spanheim the appropriate royal honours. Instead there was a noticeable difference between the more amiable English, and the representatives of other rulers who were less willing to concede to Spanheim. Spanheim’s position was regularly challenged by other diplomats present in London, and particularly by the Imperial envoy. Nonetheless, through adroit manoeuvring Spanheim was able to find pragmatic solutions to these challenges. Spanheim regularly secured the rights associated with royal ambassadors. Any troublesome occasions were resolved by conducting events ‘sans ceremonie’, or alternatively by Spanheim’s complete avoidance of events where he felt his status would not be correctly acknowledged. Significantly, Spanheim as the first ambassador dispatched by the new King in Prussia established positive precedents that his successors could build upon. He entirely avoided the occurrence of detrimental precedents which could have weakened not only his own position, but the perceived ability of Frederick to dispatch ambassadors.

155 Not least by the hosting of auspiciously timed parties. Such as the ‘magnificent Ball and entertainment to a great number of the prime Nobility of both Sexes and Foreign Ministers’ to celebrate the anniversary of Frederick’s coronation. A similar celebration marked the Blenheim Victory. *Post Man and the Historical Account*, No.1072, (1703), No.1315, (1704).
The right of the first visit was thought to intrinsically belong to ambassadors in the early eighteenth century. This thought had developed from a long line of argument prevalent in numerous seventeenth century works that discussed diplomatic theory. Howell encapsulated it rather well when he wrote, ‘it is a maxim among ambassadors, that the first come is to visit the last come’. These thoughts are echoed by a range of other diplomatic theorists. Securing this right from other diplomats consequently aided in the construction of the status of the diplomat as ambassador. Furthermore, it also facilitated the production of the status of his principal, as a potentate recognised by others of possessing the right to dispatch ambassadors. The ambassadors from the Dutch Republic quickly obliged Spanheim in this matter. Two days after his audience they arrived at Spanheim’s residence in their carriages, accompanied by their lacqueys. Here Spanheim occupied the role of host and thus gave the Hand and all its concomitant privileges to the visiting ambassadors of equal rank. He received them at the bottom of the steps which led to his residence and for their conference the Hollanders were given armchairs placed under a dais, on an equal footing with Spanheim himself.

The visit of the numerous envoys present at the Stuart court proved more problematic. Envoys had to be received in a different manner and consequently the aforementioned respectful treatment could not be accorded to representatives of an inferior rank, even if they occupied the role of guest. The giving of the Hand during the first visit was a recognition of equality, and so it was uncommon for ambassadors to make such a concession to lower ranking envoys. Nonetheless some of those envoys who paid Spanheim a first visit after his

156 Howell, Precedency of Kings, 208. The practice seems to have evolved somewhat from the thoughts of seventeenth century theorists, whereby envoys also paid visits to ambassadors, though these were conducted in a ceremonially diminished fashion.
157 Callières, Practice of Diplomacy, 100; Howell, Precedency of Kings, 208; Wicquefort, The Embassador, 184-192; Steive, Hoff-Ceremoniel, 225-226; Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:380; Finet, Finetti Philoxenis, 232.
159 An 1668 order of Charles II was subsequently contained in the instructions issued to all English envoys: ‘ambassadors should not for the future give the hand in their own House to Envoys in pursuance of what is practiced by the Ambassadors of other princes, and did therefore not think it reasonable his envoys should pretend to be treated differently from the Treatment he had directed his Ambassadors to give to the Envoys of other Princes. We do… direct you not to insist to have the hand from any Ambassador in his own house’. Here from the instructions of J. Vernon, envoy to Denmark, 08.02.1701(OS), TNA, SP-104/201.
appointment seem to have demanded this right, for as Besser records, ‘because he [Spanheim] did not want to give them the Hand, the visits occurred only in the apartments of the ambassadress without ceremony, so that he neither received nor accompanied the envoys’.  

160 Once these visits had been made, custom obliged Spanheim to pay a ‘re-visit’ to those who had come to him. Because Spanheim had refused to give the Hand to the Imperial envoy during his visit, the Imperial envoy reciprocally refused to grant this to Spanheim during his re-visit to the Imperial residence.  

161 The occasion was therefore conducted ‘without ceremony’, despite Spanheim’s superior rank. However, Spanheim declared himself pleased at this state of affairs as the course of events had not prejudiced his character.  

162 Thereafter, almost all of London’s diplomats visited Spanheim’s residence. Some of them obliged him with the correct form of visit.  

163 Others via their pretensions to better treatment did not. However, Spanheim dexterously extracted himself from trouble by conducting those potentially hazardous visits, and even his own re-visits, without ceremony. There was here a difference between a ceremonial occasion at which one was denied customary ceremonial rights, and an occasion that was conducted wholly without ceremony.  

165 No observer could thus regard visits without ceremony as representative of the status of diplomats and their masters within the society of princes, and Spanheim avoided the establishment of detrimental precedents.

160 In particular it appears to have been the Imperial envoy who demanded this. These visits appear to have taken place in March 1702, before Spanheim made his entry and took on his public character. Besser, *Schriften: Beiträge*, 2:295.  

161 In fact, the Imperial envoys refused to give the Hand to any ambassadors. Ibid., 2:296.  

162 Ibid.  

163 He was visited by envoys from, the Emperor, Genoa, Portugal, Denmark, Savoy, Florence, Brunswick-Celle and Hanover. The only exception being the Polish envoy: Ibid., 2:295-297.  

164 The Dutch ambassadors for example, or the envoy from Brunswick-Celle, who appears to have accepted treatment befitting the disparity in status between Spanheim and himself. Ibid., 2:297.  

165 A visit conducted with a denigrating level of ceremony where one did not receive the Hand from the host would involve only being received atop the steps, or at the door of the residence, rather than at the carriage itself. From the carriage guests would be accompanied by servants rather than the host. The audience would still take place in the audience chamber of the host, however a mark of denigration, such as the giving of an inferior chair, would separate the host from the guest. At non-solemn events by contrast the visitor’s carriage would only being equipped with two horses, as opposed to the six customary on ceremonial occasions. They would be neither received nor accompanied, and the audience itself would take place in a non-representative space, such as the rooms of the ambassadress.
A similar theme was in evidence at the coronation of Queen Anne. Here it can be observed how it was, on occasion, preferable for Spanheim to shun public ceremonial events, rather than concede to an erroneous and detrimental representation of his status or Frederick’s position within European princely society. All foreign ministers in London were expected to attend the coronation of Anne in April of 1702, and by this time Spanheim had received his credentials as extraordinary ambassador, though he was yet to formally enter the city with his new character.\textsuperscript{166} Discussions occurred amongst the diplomats and the master of ceremonies over the order of precedence to be observed, including the seating places that were to be given to the foreign ministers within Westminster Abbey itself. Spanheim believed he should receive the most prestigious place as he was one of only two ambassadors present in London.\textsuperscript{167} The other emanated from Venice, however he was only an ordinary ambassador and thus inferior to Spanheim’s extraordinary character.\textsuperscript{168} However both the Venetian ambassador and the Imperial envoy raised various objections to Spanheim receiving the position of precedence at the coronation ceremony.\textsuperscript{169} In the end a suggestion was made that both the Imperial and Venetian representatives found suitable, namely to sit \textit{Pêle Mêle}, or in any order without ceremony.\textsuperscript{170} Spanheim had however expected different benches to be provided for representatives of the first and second order respectively, and so rejected these suggestions.\textsuperscript{171} He insisted on his own bench ‘because he would be the sole royal ambassador’ present at the coronation.\textsuperscript{172} The English master of ceremonies argued that there was precedent for non-precedential seating, and so settled upon this. Spanheim consequently resolved not to attend Anne’s coronation, and his justifications for this are telling; he announced he would not be present, ‘because it [would be] of far too great importance and consequence, that he as ambassador should sit without

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{166} He received credentials on 10.01.1702, Firth and Chance, \textit{Diplomatic Relations}, 40.; Rousham, MC-19.
  \item \textsuperscript{167} Besser, \textit{Schriften: Beiträge}, 2:304.
  \item \textsuperscript{168} Ibid., 2:303-304.
  \item \textsuperscript{169} These included that Spanheim was still incognito because he had yet to make his entry, as well as the Venetian referring to his enjoyment of the royal honours at the English court and the fact that Venice had yet to recognise Frederick’s royal title. Ibid., 2:304.
  \item \textsuperscript{171} As was done in Paris and Vienna, Besser, \textit{Schriften: Beiträge}, 2:304.
  \item \textsuperscript{172} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
rank and Pêle Mêle with the envoys at a public solemnity, before the eyes of England’.

He further argued that if he accepted the proposed arrangement, the Venetians would receive a right which they could in future invoke, while Imperial envoys would have a pretext to challenge the rank of Frederick’s ambassadors. On these grounds Spanheim thus absented himself from Anne’s coronation ceremony, while the Venetian ambassador sat Pêle Mêle with the other ministers of the second order.

Certain diplomats were reluctant to appear at public ceremonies alongside Spanheim. This is particularly true of Count Wratislaw von Mitrowitz, the Imperial envoy, for he represented the Emperor, a prince who had historically possessed a far superior status. Wratislaw engaged in all manner of obfuscating tactics to avoid appearing publicly alongside Spanheim, he avoided occasions where, as a lower ranking envoy he would be forced to concede precedence to the Prussian ambassador. On the day of the Lord Mayor’s show of 1702, the Lord Mayor invited the Queen, and ‘all the ambassadors and envoys to dinner’ at the Guild Hall. Many were predisposed. However Wratislaw promised Spanheim that he would go with him, and even that he would be willing to follow him, as he recognised he could not compete for precedence with an ambassador from a crowned head. The two representatives realised that at the banquet they would be sitting on the less prestigious left-hand-side of the Queen, her leading ministers and councillors being sat on her right as was customary at this particular occasion. Nonetheless Spanheim and Wratislaw resolved to go so long as the Queen attended. There was confusion over this, as Anne initially decided not to go due to her husband’s ‘unhappy indisposition’, but eventually concluded to attend. Nonetheless Wratislaw had astutely utilised the confusion created and sent away his equipage and servants from London. He therefore excused himself to

173 Ibid.
174 Ibid., 2:305.
175 25.10.1702, Rousham, MC-10.
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
180 Rousham, MC-10; Ibid.
Spanheim, stating that without these he would be unable to attend.\textsuperscript{181} Spanheim discovered that he must go alone, without accompaniment from another diplomat and so excused himself from attending. In his excuse Spanheim stated ‘I could not sit completely alone at a table without prejudice’.\textsuperscript{182} To have been the only diplomat to accept the perceived detrimental innovation would have been hazardous to Spanheim’s character. If any doubt remained surrounding Wratislaw’s intentions, Cottrell dispelled them, stating ‘Count Wratislaw did do all he could to interrupt and puzzle with punctilios, and by accident had success in preventing any foreign ministers going to dinner. For he would have had by an unjust pretension the Right Hand’.\textsuperscript{183} The Lord Mayor’s dinner thus represents another occasion upon which the Imperial envoy rebuffed the opportunity to appear alongside the Prussian ambassador and concede him precedence. Wratislaw was willing to cancel at short notice and allow Spanheim to take up the ceremonially inferior left-hand side alone. Spanheim’s astute realisation of the potential implications for his character as ambassador relative to London’s other diplomats, and his subsequent course of action successfully avoided the establishment of a detrimental precedent.

\section*{3.8. Thanksgivings and Military Parades}

Throughout the remainder of his stay in London Spanheim was provided with a number of other public ceremonies at which he was able to assert the status of his king. These events were engendered by the ongoing War of the Spanish Succession, in which the English and Prussians were fighting side by side. Ceremonies of public thanksgiving and military parades were consequently held to mark the turning points of the war.\textsuperscript{184} The public nature of these events allowed Spanheim to communicate his own and Frederick’s rank claims before the assembled eyes of the English court. Spanheim, as the extraordinary ambassador of a crowned head could rightfully take precedence before all envoys present in London. These included those sent by kings or even the

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\textsuperscript{181} 25.10.1702, Rousham, MC-10. \\
\textsuperscript{182} Besser, \textit{Schriften: Beiträge}, 2:306-307. \\
\textsuperscript{183} 25.10.1702, Rousham, MC-10. \\
\end{flushright}
Emperor. The royal status of Spanheim’s master likewise empowered him to assume precedence before the oft present republican ambassadors dispatched by Venice or the Dutch.

Public thanksgiving days provided one particularly eye-catching opportunity for the continued display of Spanheim’s rank as ambassador. These religious ceremonies were performed at the conclusion of successful campaigning seasons and occasionally to celebrate individual military victories. There was precedent for such celebrations, with similar events having been organised by monarchs from Elizabeth I to William III. However the scope of these celebrations expanded during Anne’s reign. Previously the three significant elements of the English body politic had given their thanks separately. The monarch worshipped at the royal chapel within Whitehall palace, the Lords at Westminster Abbey, and the Commons at St. Margaret’s Church. Under Anne this custom changed, and to celebrate the triumph of English arms in 1702 all three branches gave thanks in the newly constructed St. Paul’s Cathedral. The change of venue added extra prestige. St Paul’s was Britain’s first Protestant cathedral and one of the largest in Europe. It therefore allowed a far greater number of participants access to the ceremony. Most significantly the monarch was required to travel through London in order to make their way to the cathedral itself. This involved a ‘grand

185 Jarnut-Derbolav, Österreichische Gesandschaft, 207.
186 As a ‘List of the foreign ministers, anno 1702 December’ makes clear Spanheim was the highest-ranking diplomat in the English capital. His name occupies the first place on the list, ahead of the ambassadors from Venice and the United Provinces, as well as envoys from the Emperor, Portugal, Denmark, Holland, Hanover, Florence. Rousham, MC-19. Similarly, Spanheim’s extraordinary character entitled him to take precedence before any ordinary ambassadors. The plans to demote Spanheim from extraordinary to ordinary ambassador had not been acted upon. This was significant for in November 1702 a Venetian ordinary Ambassador arrived in London, Spanheim’s extraordinary character thus trumped his. Besser, Schriften: Beiträge, 2:287; London Gazette, No.3867, (1702).
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid., 214.
190 Ibid.
191 It also allowed the queen to be visible in St Paul’s, as opposed to the practice in the royal chapel. Ibid.
cavalcade’ in which the entire court was represented.193 This stately procession was witnessed by a large number of onlookers throughout the city and additionally reported in the contemporary press.194

Alongside these religious ceremonies, London also hosted celebrations of martial might related to individual battlefield victories.195 The triumph of allied arms at Blenheim and Ramillies were celebrated by military processions through London, at which captured enemy standards were carried through the city and hung up at public buildings as trophies to the ‘signal victory’ the allies had secured.196 These events had a purely military character and celebrated the army itself. Consequently, the court, ministers of state, both houses of parliament, foreign diplomats, and even the military commanders themselves were absent from proceedings.197 However in the wake of both parades, Marlborough, the successful military commander was ‘entertained regally by the City of London’.198 This involved a grand banquet, and just as the Queen made her way to St Paul’s in a grand procession, so did the Captain-General of the British army make his way into the City of London.199

Foreign ministers were present during these magnificent processions through London, as well as at the services in St Paul’s and the banquets themselves. In taking part they demonstrated their status not only before the assembled English court, but also in relation to each other. This was significant for Spanheim was one of the highest-ranking diplomats in London, and the processions were meticulously organised so that each participant took the place their status granted them. Places within the cathedral and banqueting halls were also assigned according to precedence. As a royal ambassador Spanheim therefore would have taken place before all others;

194 Bucholz, ‘Nothing but Ceremony’, 297.
196 The standards from Blenheim were put up in Westminster Hall, those from Ramillies in the Guildhall. London Gazette, No.4085, (1705), No.4290, (1706).
197 Schaich, ‘Standards and Colours’, 258.
198 Ibid., 256.
199 The places themselves were: Goldsmiths’ Hall and Vinters Hall, Ibid.
receiving a ceremonially superior position at the services, banquets, and in the cavalades. At the Protestant thanksgiving ceremonies Spanheim’s high status in relation to the ministers of other princes was particularly evident, for the diplomats of Catholic princes, such as the Emperor and the King of Spain, absented themselves from the Protestant services.

Between 1702 and 1708 there were six public thanksgiving ceremonies which the Queen personally attended. Alongside this, 1705 and 1706 saw military parades and the subsequent banquets hosted in honour of Marlborough. Many of the accounts of these events produced by English contemporaries are meticulous in describing the order and precedence of the Peerage and courtiers. However, they often satisfy themselves describing the role of foreign diplomats in only the most basic of terms. English lack of interest should nonetheless not distract from what would undoubtedly have been impactful upon the diplomats present in London. For thanksgivings, English observers repeatedly merely mention the position of the diplomats within

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200 An indication that precedence was observed in the procession can be seen not solely in the order of those that followed, but via statements such as: ‘the Peers, being all in their Robes, followed in their coaches according to their Order of Precedency’. The Present State of Europe, Vol. 13, 1702, 441.

201 As Spanheim remarks of one of the thanksgivings: ‘there were none of the Roman Catholic ministers [present]’, instead they attended a Te Deum held by the Habsburg envoy: Besser, Schriften: Beiträge, 2:327-328; A. Boyer, History of the Reign of Queen Anne, Vol.5 (London: Roper, 1707), 154.


St Paul’s itself. The sole reference to foreign diplomats in a report of the thanksgiving of 1702 describes the seating position of, ‘the Foreign Ministers in the Two lower Galleries next the Throne’. While when describing the role of diplomats during Marlborough’s two processions the London Gazette is content to remark that Marlborough, ‘was followed by a great Train of other Coaches, in which were the Foreign Ministers, with several Persons of Quality’.

It is however possible to extrapolate what is likely to have been the case for the relatively unknown processions and ceremonies, from those instances for which more is recorded. The 1706 thanksgiving that took place in the wake of the victory at Ramillies is one such instance. Not only do English contemporaries provide slightly more detail than other similar occasions, but Spanheim’s secretary also gives a description of proceedings. Importantly we know that Spanheim’s embassy took part in the grand procession of Lords and privy councillors that made its way to St Paul’s. This group included both the Lord High Treasurer, as well as the Archbishop of Canterbury. In the words of a contemporary, ‘in the Procession went Baron Spanheim, the King of Prussia’s Ambassador in a chair, attended with a fine equipage, and his Lady, Daughter, etc. in a Coach and six Horses’. This company arrived at the Cathedral before the queen. Once Anne had conducted her own progress through the city, ‘the great Officers, Nobility, etc. came down to the lower End of the Church to receive Her’. Within the cathedral places were prepared for the foreign ministers in the middle gallery. Here they were seated in an ‘honourable box’, on the same side as the peers. They were seated according to

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204 The Present State of Europe, Vol. 13, 1702, 442.
206 Besser, Schriften: Beiträge, 2:325-328.
211 Besser, Schriften: Beiträge, 2:327.
rank, with the ambassador of the Prussian king (and his wife and daughter) taking precedence before the envoys from Denmark, the Dutch Republic, and Hanover.212

It seems possible to extrapolate from this a picture of what is likely to have occurred during those other processions, banquets and thanksgiving ceremonies for which limited detail is provided. During the processions that led to both St Paul’s and the banqueting halls it is likely that Spanheim participated as he did in that of 1706. One can assume that he once more appeared in the procession alongside the Lords with a fine equipage. Indeed, at the thanksgiving that marked the conclusion of 1706 the whole event was carried out ‘with the same Solemnity and Ceremonies as were used before, after the Victory gained at Ramillies’.213 It thus seems logical to assume that in December of 1706, Spanheim would have been involved as in the previous June. It is not unreasonable to conclude that he was also present in procession for a least some of the four additional public thanksgivings. Spanheim presumably accompanied Marlborough in procession to banquet as one of the ‘foreign ministers’ in January 1705, and December 1706.214 The Prussian ambassador and his family were likely also part of the nebulous group of ‘foreign ministers’ seated in the middle gallery for thanksgiving services in St Paul’s. Occasionally he or his family are named explicitly.215 Elsewhere he is merely subsumed under the moniker of ‘foreign ministers’.216

The appearance of Spanheim at such occasions significantly contributed towards the ongoing process of status production. This concerned both Spanheim’s rank as ambassador and Frederick’s rank as king. Spanheim appeared publicly in his character as royal ambassador, before the English monarch, court and populace at

212 Ibid.
214 London Gazette, No.4086, (1705), No.4290, (1706).
215 Such as at the thanksgiving of August 1705, ‘in one of the seats under the Gallery, sat Monsieur Roseneraans, and Monsieur de Vryberge, the Danish and Dutch Envoys, with Lady Spanheim and her Daughter, besides other Gentlemen and Ladies of the Retinue of Foreign Ministers’. One can only assume that Spanheim was perhaps ill or elsewhere engaged on this occasion. A. Boyer, The History of the Reign of Queen Anne, Digested into Annals, Vol.4 (London: Coggan, 1706), 83.
216 Such as in September 1704: ‘the Foreign Ministers, with their Ladies, filled the places prepared for them in the Middle Gallery’, A. Boyer, History of the Reign of Queen Anne, Vol.3 (London: Roper, 1705), 98.
large. His demonstration of his rank was thus observed by the considerable number present at the range of events in London. Numerous observers would have seen him appear with his ‘fine equipage’ made possible by the considerable allowance granted to ambassadors. Not only that but reports of these were published and distributed far and wide in newspapers and periodicals, thus maximizing the impact of such occasions. In processions, as the highest-ranking diplomat in the English capital, he would have taken a ceremonially more prestigious place than the other diplomats. This taking of precedence through place would have been repeated in the seating arrangements at the services within St Paul’s.

3.9. **Diplomatic Departure Gifts**

The materiality that surrounded a diplomat’s embassy had the power to communicate status claims and indicate the recognition of that status by others. The materiality of Spanheim’s embassy both exhibited Spanheim’s status, and likewise made the position of his master within European princely society perceptible. One of the most significant ways in which the diplomat’s rank was materially realised was via the objects given as gifts to the diplomat upon their departure from their posting. At the Stuart court the type and value of the gift was intimately connected to the rank of the ruler who had dispatched the diplomat. According to this logic the materiality of Spanheim’s departure gift differed radically from what had been awarded to previous electoral diplomats who had been sent to England by the Hohenzollerns. The increase in value of departure gifts given to Spanheim thus demonstrates the English recognition of Frederick’s change in status after 1701. English acceptance of Frederick’s royal title and claims to equality with other potentates was materially exhibited in

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219 One can glean this from the fact that when the diplomats present at services in St. Paul’s are listed, they are listed in rank order. Besser, *Schriften: Beiträge*, 2:327; Boyer, *History of the Reign*, 1706, 4:83ff.

220 In general the rank of the diplomat and their dispatching ruler were taking into consideration. Falcke, *Geschenkwesen*, 205.
the form of the departure gifts awarded to the Prussian ambassador, for the gifts dispensed to Spanheim were of equivalent monetary value to those usually bestowed upon the ambassadors of potentate rulers.

Various forms of gift exchange were associated with diplomats in Stuart England. Important was the gift of hospitality, given to ambassadors upon their arrival in London. Thereafter a royal gift was often made between rulers and presented by the arriving diplomat. However the most interesting present was made upon the diplomat’s departure from court. Diplomats would themselves be given a personal gift from the ruler. These were usually given in gratitude and, in the words of one historian, ‘in recognition of the part he had played in facilitating the negotiation of whatever business was at hand.

These departure gifts are for our purposes most consequential. The standard of the gift followed clearly delineated rules and closely mirrored the rank of the diplomat and the ruler whom they served. Ambassadors therefore received gifts of greater value than envoys, while within the same diplomatic rank, those sent by crowned heads almost always received more than those dispatched by republics and other princes. The form the gifts took evolved over the Stuart period. Under the first Stuart kings gifts consisted of a cupboard of gilt plate, which was unsurpassed and ‘prized throughout Europe’. There was a recognised system whereby

\[221\] Jansson notes ‘five kinds of gifts’ though only ‘three actual gifts’, these included: gift of diet, toasting, the royal gift, the departure gift, and the personal gift’. M. Jansson, ‘Measured Reciprocity: English ambassadorial Gift Exchange in the 17th and 18th Centuries’, JEMH, 9:3 (2005), 357. For the gifts of other European courts see: Falcke, Geschenkwesen, 206.

\[222\] This was the earlier described process of defrayment, whereby the ambassador was hosted and fed at the monarch’s expense for a limited period. Finet, Ceremonies, 30-32; Jansson, ‘Measured Reciprocity’, 359-360.

\[223\] This gift was designed ‘to show courtesy and extend friendship from one ruler to another but also to pave the way for successful and positive negotiations’. These gifts were to be ‘understood as tokens of friendship, courtesy, and generosity’. Jansson, ‘Measured Reciprocity’, 355, 360-363. On the orders of Frederick, Spanheim gifted Anne a number of Prussian horses, Besser, Schriften: Ergänzende Texte, Vol.2, 284-285.


\[225\] ‘Ambassadors, envoys, and secretaries should receive a leaving present varying in value with their dignity’, Vinogradoff, ‘Russian Missions’, 38; ‘the representatives of great princes had to be properly rewarded... [gifts] had to equate both to equate both to the standing of the ambassador's state, and to the success and/or length of his residence’, Heal, The Power of Gifts, pp172-173.

ambassadors from crowned heads received 2,000 ounces of gilt plate, at a cost of £800. Ambassadors emanating from republics or other princes were given 1,200 ounces worth £420.\textsuperscript{227} Envoys meanwhile were normally presented with a gold chain and a medal worth around £210.\textsuperscript{228} However as with almost any precedent regulating early modern ceremonial matters there were of course exceptions.\textsuperscript{229}

Over the course of the seventeenth century the form of gift disbursed underwent a process of change.\textsuperscript{230} There was a gradual shift away from plate, towards other types of reward.\textsuperscript{231} Jewels were often given out by themselves.\textsuperscript{232} Also common were royal portraits, often mounted on medallions or necklaces and encrusted with jewels to add extra value.\textsuperscript{233} Rings became common later in the seventeenth century. The reasons for the development are manifold. The ‘depletion of treasure in the Jewel House’ forced Stuart monarchs to find other forms of dispensation.\textsuperscript{234} The preferences of diplomats also played a role. In 1631 the ambassador from Savoy asked for another form of gift rather than the customary plate. He remarked that the onerous amount of plate

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227 Finet, Ceremonies, 37. This in itself had been reduced during the reign of James I by and order of 1615 from amounts previously awarded. These consisted of 4,000 ounces to crowned heads, 2,000 to republics such as Venice, and 1,600 to archdotal representatives. LC-5/2, TNA, f.21; Howell, Precedency of Kings, 208-209; Jansson, ‘Measured Reciprocity’, 364; F. Heal, The Power of Gifts: Gift-Exchange in Early Modern England (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 174.
228 Finet, Ceremonies, 37.
229 Exceptions could be made if a particularly exquisite gift had initially been given to the monarch, in the case of close relations between the rulers or even between the visiting diplomat and ruler themselves. To take one example from report on the English court’s giving of presents: ‘These rules are followed ordinarily, but we are not so strongly subject to them that we cannot sometimes stray from them, when we want to gratify some minister for specific reasons, something that happens so rarely that it does not amount to much’. Cassidy-Geiger and Vötsch, ‘Court Gifts’, 152.
230 While Sowerby can make the claim for Jacobean protocol that ‘these jewelled miniatures did not replace the standard departure gift of a cupboard of plate, this necessarily meant that the costs involved in this aspect of Jacobean diplomacy were considerably higher than previously’. By the post restoration period the shift was however complete, and plate was rarely given out. T. A., Sowerby, ‘Negotiating the Royal Image: Portrait Exchanges in Elizabethan and Early Stuart Diplomacy’, in H. Hackett, ed., Early Modern Exchanges: Dialogues Between Nations and Cultures, 1550-1750, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), 124.
231 Heal, The Power of Gifts, 175.
232 These were rarely individual stones themselves, but rather pieces of jewellery. For an example see: Sowerby, ‘Negotiating the Royal Image’, 123.
233 Sowerby, ‘Negotiating the Royal Image’, 120-137.
\end{justify}
would incur significant damage on his return journey and that English silver plate was not fashionable in Savoy. Moreover, he feared that such a considerable gift was likely to be appropriated by his master and ‘never more restored to him’. Instead he requested a ring of significantly lesser value.\textsuperscript{235} Power struggles between English office holders also played a meaningful role. The Master of the Jewel House and the Master of Ceremonies were in constant competition to retain what they saw as their perquisites.\textsuperscript{236} The former held the right to present diplomats with plate awarded to them.\textsuperscript{237} Whereas the master of ceremonies was allowed to present gifts of jewellery or royal portraits.\textsuperscript{238} This was significant for upon receiving their gifts most diplomats gave out a gratuity to the officer who presented these to them. With the considerable amount of diplomatic traffic at the Stuart court, these kick-backs could prove lucrative.\textsuperscript{239} The shift from plate to jewellery therefore financially favoured that officer who had most contact with foreign diplomats, the master of ceremonies.\textsuperscript{240} Inducing gift requests of a certain type from foreign diplomats, as well as relaying gift recommendations to the monarch, would consequently have significantly benefitted the master of ceremonies.

The right of the master of ceremonies to a gratuity upon bestowing departure gifts contributed towards the next development in the type of gift awarded. During the reign of Queen Anne, the standard present once more changed from jewellery and royal portraiture into cash in the form of specie or bills of exchange. This seemingly occurred in 1704 when the departing Count Wratislaw, who was envoy of the Habsburg rulers Leopold I and Charles III, was awarded ‘a double present’ in recognition of his dual role.\textsuperscript{241} This comprised ‘the Queen’s picture enameled and set in Gold’ while the secondary component was ‘fifteen hundred pounds

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\textsuperscript{235} In the end he received: ‘a jewell sett with a diamond of 500 £ prince, having under it the Kyngs and Queens pictures lyvely limmed’, Finet & Loomie (ed.), Ceremonies of Charles I, 103-104.
\textsuperscript{236} See the entry of 1713 concerning the present made to the Duke d'Aumont in: Rousham, MC-7.
\textsuperscript{237} Finet & Loomie (ed.), Ceremonies of Charles I, 38.
\textsuperscript{238} Finet, Finetti Philoxenis, 101; Jansson, ‘Measured Reciprocity’, 365.
\textsuperscript{239} The standard gradually became around 15% of the value of present given. Vinogradoff, ‘Russian Missions’, 38; Cassidy-Geiger and Vötsch, ‘Court Gifts’, 152; Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:388.
\textsuperscript{240} Possibly influential was the fact that the Master of the Jewel House was already found to be making profit from the process in that he consistently provided goods under the value of the warrants granted: Finet, Ceremonies, 38.
\textsuperscript{241} Rousham, MC-7.
\end{flushright}
in specie’. In a later supplementary remark the master of ceremonies noted, ‘this I think the first Present given in money; the fees are now constantly discharged by the Crown’. Awarding ready cash made it far easier for perennially indebted diplomats to give the master of ceremonies a cut of their gift. Moreover, because the value of a gift played an important role in communicating the ceremonial recognition of rank, purely cash gifts were welcome as they allowed for less ambiguity. Cash gifts also limited opportunities for corruption and malfeasance. The materiality of departure gifts changed abruptly at this juncture. No longer were elegantly crafted pieces of jewellery, plate, or portraiture dispensed. However, cash gifts, whether awarded in specie, silver, or bills of exchange still had a material element to them. And moreover, a material worth that was still intimately tied to the rank of the diplomat and the standing of their master.

Traditionally, when historians have written about departure gifts they have drawn heavily on the notes of John Finet, Master of Ceremonies (1627-1641). The records of later holders of this office have often been overlooked. Selected notes from the next two masters of ceremonies (Charles Cottrell, 1660-1686 & Charles Lodowick Cottrell, 1686-1710) were copied out by a nineteenth century historian and can be consulted in the National Archives at Kew. These archival documents have distilled the vast collection of original notes held at Rousham House, the ancestral seat of the Cottrell family, to a limited set of precedents. The documents contain a list of the significant departure gifts given out by Charles I and Charles II, but are unfortunately silent on the practice during the reigns of later Stuart monarchs. The notebooks at Rousham House provide

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242 Rousham, MC-7.
243 Rousham, MC-7. This was not the first case of such a practice, in 1681 Cottrell granted the Russian ambassador ‘200£ in Silver in lieu of a Gold Chain & Medall’, Vinogradoff, ‘Russian Missions’, 62.
244 As Heal states ‘Jewels were less easily converted to money value than plate’ and so it was harder to determine how large the gratuity should be, Heal, Power of Gifts, 175.
245 ‘because there was some fakery for several years of those, one gives a bank note of the same value, payable upon arrival, and he who receives it sends it to the bank to have it converted into gold or silver. Cassidy-Geiger and Vötsch, ‘Court Gifts’, 152.
246 Finet, Finetti Philoxenia; Finet, Ceremonies.
247 Copied out by M. Chester in 1830, TNA, LC-5/2.
248 LC-5/2, TNA, f.22
valuable detail about the gifts of this period but have been chronically underused by historians.249 It is these sources that reveal the transition from plate, to jewellery and imagery, and finally to cash.

The notes that outsiders, and in particular Johann von Besser, amassed concerning the practices regulating English diplomatic gift giving are also instructive. Through amalgamating the reports of numerous diplomats based throughout Europe with historical precedents, Besser was able to form an overview of prevailing practices, and unearth a few hard and fast rulings that determined the value of gifts.250 Besser’s papers concerning ‘presents’ importantly reveal a Prussian awareness of the differentiations in gifts awarded, the reason for such distinctions, and consequently what an ambassador from the new King in Prussia could expect as a gift. Indeed, such knowledge could be weaponised, for as Besser declared in his notes: ‘under ministers of the same status, an equality of presents should be maintained’. Thus, when the English envoy to Denmark received a present of greater value than his Prussian counterpart, the Prussian envoy successfully pressed for the value of his gift to be enhanced.251

By the conclusion of the seventeenth century a more or less regulated system for the disbursement of departure gifts had been implemented.252 Within such a framework, ambassadors dispatched by crowned heads received gifts of £1,000 and gifts for ambassadors emanating from republics were valued at £800.253 Most envoys received gifts worth £300, though significant exceptions were made for notable princes.254 The extensive range of the notes provided by the English and Prussian masters of ceremonies cover the period 1661-1713 and allow for statistical analysis of gift giving trends. The data also allows the tracking of the position of rulers of

249 In particular: Rousham, MC-7. These consist of original notes, compiled by Clement Cottrell (1686-1758), with additional supplementary comments occasionally added.

250 Cassidy-Geiger and Vötsch, ‘Court Gifts’, 114-177.

251 Ibid., 148.

252 The regulation of gift value in accordance with the rank of diplomat and dispatcher was a Europe-wide phenomenon; Falcke, Geschenkwesen, 216ff.


254 £1,000 for Imperial envoys and £500 to those from France and Spain. Lesser sums were awarded to envoys from minor German or Italian princes. Ibid., 150-152.
Brandenburg-Prussia within the society of European princes, as reflected in the value of gifts awarded, and how that position dramatically changed in the wake of the 1701 coronation.

The Electors of Brandenburg had traditionally sent envoys to the English court and received gifts appropriate for that diplomatic rank.\(^{255}\) Between 1662 and 1699, 16 gifts were made to electoral envoys and 3 to residents.\(^{256}\) These consisted of 10 rings, 4 medals, 3 jewels, 1 royal portrait, and 1 gift of 100 ounces of gilt plate.\(^{257}\) The average value of these departure gifts stood at £271.1, the most frequently occurring value was £300. Indeed, Spanheim and Besser were both familiar with the level of gift an electoral envoy could expect, having each completed previous missions to London and receiving four gifts ranging in value from £200 to £300.\(^ {258}\) The appointment of a Prussian ambassador in 1702 brought about a change in this state of affairs. Spanheim’s case is somewhat unique as in the role of ambassador he received not one but two departure gifts.\(^ {259}\) The first was made to him after his departure audience of 1706. Following on from the precedent established in 1704 Spanheim received cash in the form of ‘a thousand pounds in silver’.\(^ {260}\) Before he could return to Berlin, Spanheim was ordered to remain in London with the same character.\(^ {261}\) He continued for some years,

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\(^{255}\) With one exception. For the post-restoration coronation of Charles II Frederick-William sent an ambassador, along with his Staathalter, prince Johann-Moritz of Nassau-Siegen. This period was exceptional in many ways. Firstly, the dispatch of a ruling Reichsfürst imbued the mission with extra prestige. Secondly, for the coronation many states that traditionally did not send ambassadors chose to send men of this rank (such as Florence and Genoa) for the occasion. In total there were 11 ambassadors in London 1660-1661. Finally, the restoration of the Stuarts made Charles II particularly profligate with departure gifts for those present 1660-1661. Thus, Prince Mortiz was given a bejewelled picture (£1,200) and the ambassador ‘a jewell of 600 (£)’. After 1661 things settled down into a more regular pattern at the English court and the Hohenzollerns no longer sent out ambassadors. Rousham, MC-7; Ibid., 149.

\(^ {256}\) Rousham, MC-7. It should be noted that these were the ranks the English recognised them having within their framework. For further information see: Bittner and Gross, Repertorium.

\(^ {257}\) Rousham, MC-7.

\(^ {258}\) Spanheim received gifts as Palatine envoy in 1676 (£230), and as Brandenburg envoy in 1680 (£250) and 1685 (£300). Besser was present as Brandenburg resident in 1685 (£200). Rousham, MC-7.

\(^ {259}\) This is because of the failed recall of 1706. Spanheim took his audience of leave and received ‘very rich presents’. Spanheim then ‘embarked at Greenwich... but before he sett sail he received orders from his master to continue here’, Luttrell, Historical Relation, 6:77, 96-97; Boyer, History of the Reign 5:333.

\(^ {260}\) Rousham, MC-7.

\(^ {261}\) For more information see 1706 chapter within this thesis.
until on the 14th November 1710 (OS) he died ‘of a lethargy, in the eighty first Year of His Age’. Spanheim’s second departure gift was consequently not made to him personally, but rather to his family. There was an established practice of awarding the relatives of deceased diplomats their outstanding departure gifts. Therefore seven months after his death, Spanheim’s daughter Mary-Anne de La Rochefoucauld, Marquess de Montandre received ‘one thousand pounds, as Her Father’s Present’, it was noted that this was ‘the usual Present of this Court to Ambassadors Extraordinary’.264

The two gifts, each valued at £1,000, that were awarded to Spanheim placed the Prussian ambassador on a par with the ambassadors of other potentates. The following figure shows departure gifts made to ambassadors across the period 1667-1713. One can see that after the profligacy of the initial years of the restoration, the practice settled back into a regulated order. The most frequently occurring value of the 42 gifts was £1000. The mean value is £955, however within this a number of subdivisions can be made. The mean value of gifts awarded to ambassadors from crowned heads stands at £1,055, while the mean of those made to republican ambassadors is £820. There were some exceptional gifts which exceeded the average by £200 or more, made to the ambassadors of Sweden in 1667, 1673, and 1698, France in 1673, and Spain in 1674. However most royal ambassadors received gifts worth £1,000.

262 Post Boy, No.2443, (1711); London Gazette, No.4785, (1710). The regard in which he was clearly held at the English court can be glimpsed by the fact he was buried at Westminster Abbey and also in a eulogy written for him in Post Man and the Historical Account, No.1958, (1711); British Mercury, No.104, (1710).
263 In 1672 ‘Two Jewells each of the value of £200’ were ‘given to the widdow and son’ of the Spanish envoy. Rousham, MC-7. The son of the French ambassador was given a gift worth £1,200 in 1637, after ‘his father dying here during the embassy’, LC-5/2, TNA, f.22.
264 Rousham, MC-7; Boyer, Life and Reign of Queen Anne, 55; Cassidy-Geiger and Vötsch, ‘Court Gifts’, 148.
265 Unless specifically stated, all figures in this section, are drawn from TNA, LC-5/2, ff.22-23; Rousham, MC-7.
266 The gifts made to ambassadors from Russia and Morocco are not included.
267 12 of the 23 gifts were of this value.
268 These more expense gifts were made because of the extraordinary business the embassy conducted, and the social character of the diplomat. Jean-Baptiste Colbert was the French ambassador. The Swedish ambassador returned the deceased Charles XI’s ensigns and habit of the order of the Garter. G. Adlerfeld, The Military History of Charles XII, King of Sweden, Vol.1 (London: Knapton, 1740), 10; Beltz, Order of the Garter, cxx.
269 Swedish and Portuguese ambassadors on occasion received gifts worth less than this amount.
It may appear as though there was a direct relationship between a diplomat’s rank and the value of the departure gift. This was not the case. The gifts made to men equipped with the rank of ambassador from Florence, Genoa, Morocco, and Russia fell short of the customary minimum value of £800 awarded to the ambassadors of those princes the English regarded as potentates.\textsuperscript{270} The value of the gifts made to Spanheim marked him out as the ambassador of a potentate. Not only that, but he did not merely enter this select grouping as its newest and therefore least prestigious, member. The presents given to Spanheim indicate the higher regard in which this royal ambassador was held, in comparison to his counterparts from those republics who were normally granted the royal treatment. Thus, while in 1706 Spanheim received £1,000, Venetian ambassadors received gifts worth £800 in both the years preceding and succeeding Spanheim’s first gift.\textsuperscript{271}

The question therefore remains, to what extent did the awarding of this level of departure gift aid in the production of Spanheim and Frederick’s rank? The effect was perhaps limited because the act of bestowing the present was not particularly public. Presents were ‘carried’ to the residence of the ambassador and awarded there by either the master of ceremonies or his assistant.\textsuperscript{272} Other court observers or foreign diplomats were not there to witness the present and to assess its value, though details of the exchange may have been relayed by either party. Reports of the monetary value of gifts occasionally appeared in news-periodicals.\textsuperscript{273} Luttrell reports vaguely on Spanheim’s gift, stating ‘it’s said her majesty has given very rich presents to Baron Spanheim’.\textsuperscript{274}

\textsuperscript{270} The Russian embassies of 1663, 1664 and 1681 received gifts valued at £350, £200 and £200. In 1661 the Genoese ambassador received £760, the Florentine ambassador £650. The Moroccan ambassadors of 1707 and 1709 both received gifts worth £500. Vinogradoff, ‘Russian Missions’, 62.

\textsuperscript{271} Rousham, MC-7.

\textsuperscript{272} For repeated mention of the departure gift being ‘carried him’, see, Vinogradoff, ‘Russian Missions’, 36-72.


\textsuperscript{274} N. Luttrell, \textit{A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs}, Vol.6 (Oxford: OUP, 1857), 77.
The act of awarding the departure gift likely had a performative effect upon the master of ceremonies and those other English ministers involved in the handing-over.\textsuperscript{275} The very act of procuring a warrant to disburse the same amount of money for Spanheim as for the ambassadors of Louis XIV, Charles XII, Christian V or Charles II would have done much to mentally place Frederick in the same category as those other kings. The formation of such a conception of Frederick by the master of ceremonies was important as Cottrell in turn determined the ceremonial awarded to Spanheim at other occasions. Overall, rather than aiding the process of producing potentate status, the gifts made to Spanheim more accurately represent the acknowledgment of the successful production of that status. The gift of 1706 depicted the success of Spanheim’s embassy up until that point. He had taken up those customary rights and honours due to ambassadors, had appeared in public with status, and had avoided any ceremonial ignominy that could have perhaps indicated that he was somehow of lesser status to other royal ambassadors. The present of 1711 recognised the continued production of that status from Spanheim’s reaccreditation until his death.

\textsuperscript{275} As well as perhaps the monarch themselves if they were consulted on the nature of the gift.
Legend: Sweden, Denmark, Spain, Venice, Dutch Republic, France, Portugal, Savoy, Prussia

(Ambassadors from Russia and Morocco have not been included in this graph.)
3.10. **The Reciprocal Production of Spanheim’s Status**

The representative who acted as the beacon through which Frederick’s claims to potentate status were asserted also improved his own rank and status through his London embassy. By proving his utility to successive princely patrons Spanheim was able to receive a series of rank promotions, and produce his status as a learned scholar, agile diplomat, and noble courtier in the favour of princes at home and abroad.

Spanheim was in many ways an atypical appointment for a high diplomatic rank. He was not a high-born noble, but instead the scion of a multi-generational family of scholars. A position as professor of rhetoric in Geneva was Spanheim’s first professional appointment, and thereafter he earned himself repute as a scholar of some note, publishing a number of books on numismatics and ancient history.

Despite his non-noble background Spanheim proved his utility through a series of successful diplomatic postings. He served as a diplomat for the Elector of the Palatinate in Paris, Rome, Cologne, and London. Thereafter he entered the service of the Brandenburg-Hohenzollerns, first as envoy to England, and thereafter as envoy on a posting to France (1680-1689). After the conclusion of the Ryswick peace he returned to Paris as envoy of the new Elector of Brandenburg where he remained between 1698-1701. Through his diplomatic and state service up until this point Spanheim was able to secure a number of marks of favour, such as appointment to the privy council. During the period in which the Nine Years’ War forced an intermission to his two Paris postings Spanheim was also named as director of the electoral library and of the *Comissariat français*, positions that reflected his status a learned francophone Calvinist.


In the wake of the 1701 coronation Frederick sought to appoint an ambassador to secure for him the royal honours and communicate his claims to potentate status. Spanheim appeared a most suitable appointment for such a post. Spanheim was well acquainted with London and the Stuart Court, having already served there diplomatically on a number of occasions. The London embassy would involve much negotiation and difficulty surrounding the appropriate ceremonial honour, and Spanheim’s previous service at the ceremonially arduous court of Versailles had prepared him for such a role.

For such a prestigious role in which he was required to obtain the greatest ceremonial deference, Spanheim’s relatively humble background had the potential to prove problematic. Diplomacy at the highest levels was characterised and carried out by high-ranking and socially prestigious nobles. Although it was the rank of the ambassador that accrued the royal honours, conceptions of social status continued to play a role. For any high ranking noble to be forced to grant the non-noble Spanheim “the hand”, as well as other treatment indicating equality, would have contravened many of the status-based social conceptions of the day. Thus, partly to overcome such potential future difficulties and partly in recognition of his dutiful state service, Spanheim was in July 1701 ennobled, receiving the title of Freiherr (equivalent to the English Baron). Henceforth, Ezekiel von Spanheim conducted dutifully his London embassy, securing for his master the royal honours, and eschewing circumstances which might have injured the potentate status of the Hohenzollern king. The raising of Spanheim into the ranks of the nobility undoubtedly made his embassy easier, ensuring that Spanheim’s personal status did not undermine his attempts to emphasise Frederick’s new, greater title.

279 Ibid., 85-100; Loewe, Spanheim.
281 M. Gritzner, Chronologische Matrikel der Brandenburgisch-Preussischen Standeserhöhungen und Gnadenacte von 1600-1873 (Berlin: Mitscher, 1874), 12.
Through his noble and ambassadorial status Spanheim was able to patronise and elevate his family members. He successively employed his relatives Frederick and Ludwig-Friedrich Bonnet as embassy secretaries and Prussian residents in London.\[282\] Likewise through the social status and rank he had obtained Spanheim managed to secure a favourable match for his only child, Mary-Anne. In April 1710 she was married to François de la Rochefoucauld, Marquis de Montandre, a fellow Huguenot and career soldier rapidly advancing through the ranks of the English army.\[283\] Spanheim remarked he was pleased ‘to dispose of my daughter in a very honourable marriage’ to the chief of a French noble house, and ‘a man of confessed merit’.\[284\] Throughout his London sojourn Spanheim was held in high regard by the English court, and a mark of their affection for him can be seen in that upon Spanheim’s death in 1710 he was buried within Westminster Abbey.

Spanheim’s ‘stellar career’ can be contrasted to the numerous non-noble diplomats who failed to secure elevation above even the most lowly of diplomatic ranks.\[285\] By contrast Spanheim, the bourgeois former professor of eloquence had by his death managed to attain the most prestigious of diplomatic ranks and to facilitate the ascension of his family into the nobility. His last eight years had been spent in London accruing social and symbolic capital as the representative of a crowned head. Spanheim’s career and the manner of his rise demonstrates that while diplomats were used as vectors to communicate and produce the status of their masters, they were ultimately also able to engage in their own processes of production, and to facilitate personal rank elevations.


\[284\] Agnew, Protestant Exiles, 124. Mary-Anne was a celebrated London beauty: J. Browne, The British Court: Describing the most celebrated beauties at St. James’s, the Park, and the Mall (London: Bunchley, 1707), 9; J. Timbs, Clubs and Club Life in London (London: Chatto, 1872), 50.

3.11. A Cautionary Tale of Negotiable Status

It may appear that having one’s ambassador and right of legation recognised in London was an uncomplicated matter, that a ruler need only designate their diplomat as an ambassador and the royal treatment would subsequently accrue to him. This was not the case. The ability to dispatch ambassadors and have them receive the royal honours was within the power of the established crowned heads of Christian Europe. Over the course of the seventeenth century a select company of others were able to acquire this power. The King in Prussia was the latest to join this group early in the eighteenth century. However, the period is also studded with examples of the failed attempts of rulers to have their diplomats recognised as ambassadors, or be accorded the same level of deference as the old monarchs of Europe. Rulers recognised as sovereign were unable to secure those honours thought customary for ambassadors. They were denied the right of public entry. They were refused defrayment at the monarch’s expense. For their audiences they were forced to stand before a seated and covered monarch. Other diplomats refused to accord them the first visit, or begrudgingly performed it without the attendant honours. At public ceremonies they were awarded inferior places which did not befit their rank. Their departure gifts were also of significantly inferior quality to those doled out to the ambassadors of potentates. Wicquefort spoke of Ambassadors that did not receive some of these rights, stating that, ‘they are not treated as Ambassadors… These pretended[sic] Ambassadors, whom all Ministers treat as their inferiors, and who in reality are not Ambassadors’.  

The representatives of numerous princes fall in to such a categorisation. These included diplomats sent by Italian princes and republics, such as Genoa and Florence amongst others. Ambassadors appointed by the Swiss Cantons were also denied the full ceremonial honours. In addition the representatives of the Tsars of

286 Primarily Venice and the Dutch Republic.
287 Wicquefort, The Embassador, 188.
288 Ambassadors from Genoa and Florence received gifts of far lesser value than those awarded to others. Rousham, MC7.
289 Wicquefort, The Embassador, 188.
Russia received some elements of this inferior treatment.\textsuperscript{290} Such examples demonstrate that status was not designated through a one-way process, but instead negotiated between parties in discussions over the form of ceremony to be practiced during the diplomat’s residence in London. Such discussions were primarily carried out between the English master of ceremonies and the diplomat in question. Though each of these was in turn influenced and directed by their respective sovereigns and their leading ministers. Naturally, notions of the social prestige of the diplomat’s ruler here came into play. Particularly cordial relations, as well as close dynastic ties could aid discussions. On the other hand, poor relations as well as notions of foreignness or ‘otherness’ could stymie negotiations. The outcomes were also determined by the utility of the particular ruler to the English court and Stuart dynastic policy.

A striking example of the failure to successfully negotiate one’s status as ambassador is provided by Ahmad Qardanash, who was appointed as ambassador by the Sultan of Morocco in 1706.\textsuperscript{291} Upon landing in England, he received a public audience of Queen Anne, however as far as is evident, he received no public entry to the city of London, as was customary for all ambassadors.\textsuperscript{292} A period of defrayment was also denied him. At public thanksgivings the Moroccan ambassador received different treatment to the ambassadors of potentates who had successfully constructed their status. At the aforementioned St Paul’s thanksgiving of June 1706, Qardanash was denied a place in the ‘honourable box’ in which the Prussian ambassador was seated. Instead he and his retinue were placed in the ‘little middle gallery’ of St. Paul’s, apart from the other diplomats. The Moroccan ambassador did not want to suffer this indignation and tarnish the reputation of his ruler and consequently retired from the occasion.\textsuperscript{293} Likewise Qardanash’s departure gift illustrates that despite his supposed ambassadorial rank, the English court regarded him as inferior to his counterparts from other potentates. Whereas in 1706 Spanheim had received £1,000 as his departure gift, Qardanash was given only

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{290} The gifts their ambassadors awarded for example were consistently undervalued in comparison to the ambassadors of other monarchs. Vinogradoff, ‘Russian Missions’; Rousham, MC-7.
\item \textsuperscript{292} \textit{London Gazette}, No.4223, (1706); Boyer, \textit{Life and Reign of Queen Anne}, 228; \textit{The Present State of Europe: or, the Historical and Political Monthly Mercury}, Vol.17 (London: Rhodes, 1706), 172.
\end{itemize}
£500 upon his departure a year later in June 1707.294 Two months thereafter the departing Venetian ambassador received a gift worth £800.295 The value of Qardanash’s gift placed him apart from the ambassadors of both royal and republican potencies. Qardanash’s treatment throughout his embassy can perhaps partially be attributed to the fact that he emanated from Morocco, a Muslim sultanate not fully integrated into the European system of states, nor society of princes.296 But the example also serves to remind that designation of character did not directly condition the treatment diplomats received. Diplomatic status was at times negotiable, and had to be forcibly implemented.297

3.12. Conclusion

The Spanheim embassy of 1702-1710 was one of the first and most significant steps in the process of constructing Frederick I’s potentate status. The embassy asserted Frederick’s rank to those in London, as well as throughout Europe. There were a number of factors that made the dispatch of an ambassador to England particularly beneficial. Spanheim secured the royal treatment at a court in which the ceremonial was both well-regulated and easily observable. There were a range of other diplomats, as well as a sophisticated news industry that reported upon Spanheim’s success, and so transmitted the message they conveyed on to a wider audience. Spanheim was also able to interact with the relative panoply of diplomats stationed in London, and assert the position of Frederick in relation to their masters. London also played host to a series of solemn public events at which Spanheim was able to appear and once more produce the potentate status of his master. Here he

294 In 1709 another departing Moroccan ambassador was awarded only £500 as a departure gift, Rousham, MC-7; Cassidy-Geiger and Vötsch, ‘Court Gifts’, 152.
295 Rousham, MC-7.
297 For this concept see: Krischer, ‘Souveränität’, 23-24.
benefitted from the similar religious disposition of the English court, alongside the on-going Anglo-Prussian alliance. This allowed him to participate in many of these events and utilise them for communicative purposes.

Diverse facilitating factors contributed to the unique nature of Anglo-Prussian relations and allowed Spanheim to score such significant successes. English concerns over the ongoing War of the Spanish Succession were foremost. The desire of English monarchs and ministers to incorporate Frederick and his army into the Grand Alliance gave the Prussians a crucial bargaining chip with which they could secure ceremonial concessions. Close dynastic ties between the Houses of Orange and Hohenzollern, as well as a legacy of mutual aid had likewise contributed towards the initial promise to receive a Prussian ambassador. That is not to say things were overly straightforward for the Prussians. The negotiation of status required these prerequisite factors in combination with adroit diplomacy. Prussian knowledge of English ceremonial custom had to be effectively instrumentalised. Spanheim also had on occasion to resolutely press for the treatment he felt was owing to him. His adept manoeuvring on multiple occasions extricated him from situations that could have been damaging to the establishment of Frederick’s potentate status. Spanheim’s eight year posting substantially contributed towards the process of producing the King in Prussia’s potentate status, for throughout this timeframe Spanheim remained in London as a constant flag-bearer for Frederick’s cause.
4. **Prussian Adoption of the Danish Ceremonial: 1702-1703**

Alongside seeking the symbolic acceptance of his potentate status at foreign courts, Frederick I also undertook to obtain the ceremonial befitting a potentate king at his own court in Berlin. In the Prussian residence, as in London, interactions between ruling monarchs and diplomats representing their masters had the power to construct the relational status of each. Berlin was however not a destination frequented by ambassadors, and so, while still seeking to encourage this, the King in Prussia implemented a new form of ceremonial to be used at the audiences of newly arrived envoys. This was a ceremonial befitting the royal dignity; it semiotically indicated the superiority of Frederick as king to diplomats of the second order who did not possess a representative character. It differed from the form of ceremonial observed by the imperial electors and other minor princes and placed Frederick on an equal footing with established potentate monarchs. It was the Danish envoy who first adhered to the new ceremonial, however as the Danish king was simultaneously introducing ceremonial innovations, that exchange can best be characterised as the reciprocal recognition of two innovators, or late adopters, striving for higher status. Further recognition was required, and thus, when in July 1703 the new English envoy took his audiences of the Prussian royal family under the new ceremonial protocol, the altered status of the Hohenzollern dynasty and Frederick’s accession into the group of potentate rulers was communicated to all.

The adoption of the ceremonial itself exhibits the ways in which ceremonial norms gradually spread throughout the Network of Northern Courts, for this specific form of envoy ceremonial disseminated from England, to Denmark, and thence to Prussia. Ceremonial practice evolved dynamically but was often couched in terms which asserted its unchanging nature, or which portrayed innovations as a reversion to tradition. The implementation of this ceremonial reform in Denmark and Prussia also exhibits the way in which fellow northern princes were willing to cooperatively aid one another in constructing their status and facilitating rank elevations. The process of cooperative status production amongst northern princes moreover reveals the
significance of the English recognition of Frederick’s status and new ceremonial. For despite the English not being the first to conform to the Prussian ceremonial innovation, it was the audience of the English envoy that provided the Prussians with the self-confidence and assertiveness to henceforth insist upon compliance from the representatives of other princes, and precipitated a wave of adherence. Here Prussia’s position as the fulcrum between the two great conflagrations simultaneously engulfing Europe proved beneficial, with belligerents engaging in a diplomatic arms race to outdo one another and secure Prussia for their cause via ceremonial concessions. Anglo-Prussian negotiations regarding the new ceremonial in Berlin likewise provided the opportunity for the eventual English envoy, one Baron Raby, to reciprocally produce his own status and to commence the process which would bring about his own advancement.

Most significantly this chapter displays the interplay between issues regarding ceremonial and status production with the realms of diplomacy and military affairs. To contemporaries these matters represented two sides of the same coin and could not be divorced from one another. Cooperation between these two spheres was intimately connected, with ceremonial concessions often being used as a tool through which to secure military assistance. Between 1702 and 1703 English actors explicitly discussed how the granting of ceremonial concessions could be used to secure the unrestricted use of skilled Prussian troops. Cooperation in the process of status production was part of a package of inducements used by the English to bind Frederick to the Grand Alliance. English willingness to comply with Frederick’s ceremonial innovations and by extension symbolically recognise Frederick’s potentate status also reveals much about the English culture relating to diplomatic ceremonial, as well as the strategic imperatives of leading English actors. The connection between the yielding of ceremonial privileges and securing the participation of Prussian soldiers in the anti-Bourbon coalition is significant and should be considered throughout this thesis. Often the relationship between ceremonial and military matters is not expressed in such an unequivocal manner as in the negotiations between 1702 and 1703. Nonetheless these issues were at the forefront of the minds of contemporaries, and the background of the ongoing War of the Spanish Succession should be used to supplement any discussion of ceremonial and status production and vice versa.

While the granting of desired ceremonial forms regularly secured the extensive military participation of Prussian troops, ceremonial issues were nonetheless not the only decisive factor in such decisions. The
cooperation of English diplomats in the process producing Frederick’s potentate status was on occasion unable to wholly obtain the desired troop commitments. Here Frederick’s complex relationship to the Reich and imperial collective defence was in evidence, and English appeasement was unable to overcome such factors. Nonetheless, the importance of the ceremonial production of status to Frederick is evidenced by the fact that on such occasions when Frederick’s troops were withheld for reasons unrelated to the English, he was willing to compromise in other areas as a token of his goodwill and satisfaction.

4.1. Ceremonial Theory – Audiences

As has been shown with Spanheim’s London embassy, the initial stages of a diplomatic posting and the ceremonial forms observed had the power to produce the rank of the diplomat in question, and by extension define the status of their prince. One significant area in which this was played out was in those customary first public audiences that occurred between diplomats and the rulers to whom they were accredited. There were various ways in which the audience could be conducted, depending upon the rank of the participants involved. The honours each received were in this sense relational and depended upon whether the diplomat possessed the rank of ambassador, envoy or resident, and whether the ruler was in turn an emperor, king, duke, or otherwise. The honours displayed could thus on occasion exhibit the apparent equality between the two, or the precedence of one actor over another.

There were a number of the ways in which the relational rank of participants was made clear and through which status was produced.¹ Which of the participants were admitted the right to sit, and which must remain standing constructed the power dynamic and relational status between ruler and diplomat. Tim Neu has described how the right to sit in the presence of another who was standing symbolised dignity, whilst

possessing the privilege of sitting alongside another who was also sitting could imply parity. Since the Middle-Ages the right to sit had constituted an expression of dignity and the elevated status of a person in society. Stollberg-Rilinger has meanwhile highlighted the manner in which standing or sitting could act as a constitutive form of communication, distinguishing the rank of the participants in relation to one another. Whether actors stood or were seated was not of absolute importance, but rather accrued relational meaning dependent in turn upon the position and actions of other participants.

The right to wear one’s hat in the presence of another performed a similar function in delineating the position of participants within the social hierarchy. To remain covered in the presence of another was a symbol of authority and superiority, while to temporarily remove (or doff) one’s hat, or remain uncovered was a mark of respect and an acknowledgement of the equal, or even superior status of another. It should however be noted that the ceremonial of the hat was a form of symbolic communication reserved for men. Women wore different headwear, which was more difficult to temporarily remove, and they consequently remained covered during audiences. Standing or being seated, remaining behatted or uncovering one’s head, these were practices of symbolic communication that permeated all levels of European society. They were moreover actions imbued with great significance when performed during the first audience between diplomat and ruler.

As already discussed, ambassadors possessed a representative character, and so during their audiences with sovereign kings they received the same equality denoting ceremonial honours as if their principal were

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7 See previous chapter.
themselves present. Of particular importance here were the honours of the customary first audience, and here the symbolic communication of standing and sitting as well as ‘hat honour’ once more comes into play. Audiences between crowned monarchs and ambassadors as the representatives of potentate rulers were subsequently consciously designed to represent the equality between the ruler to whom the ambassador was accredited, and the ruler from whom he was dispatched. As such, although it was common for both king and ambassador to stand for the duration of the audience, it was not unheard of for both actors to sit. Similar custom was observed with regards to hat ceremony. Ambassadors though occasionally doffing their hat to the monarch would recover and avoid remaining bareheaded for any lengthy period. For as one court historian states, ‘in England, for example, in the seventeenth century it was correct for a visiting full ambassador, as distinct from an envoy or common person, to wear his hat in an audience with the King’. It was important that during such audiences the pretence of equality was maintained by both parties performing the same action. Informality or respect on one side, perhaps represented by a monarch removing their hat for an extended period, could be countered by the ambassador doing likewise. Such gestures maintained the symbolism of equality.

Diplomatic ministers of the second order by contrast did not possess a representative character. Under this moniker were subsumed a diverse number of titles, including: envoy, resident, agent, and minister amongst others. Consequently, at the audiences between a monarch and a minister of the second order the ceremonial of standing or being seated, as well as hat ceremonial was designed to communicate the superiority of the ruler over the diplomat. For such audiences rulers would remain seated and covered throughout, while the diplomat in question would remain standing. Having uncovered, the diplomat would not be invited to recover and would conduct the audience bareheaded before the behatted monarch.

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8 Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:368; Stieve, Hoff-Ceremoniel, 217.
11 Wicquefort, The Embassador, 33ff; Markel, Entwicklung der diplomatischen Rangstufen, 38ff.
12 Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:368-369; Callières, Practice of Diplomacy, 73.


4.2. Development of Envoy Ceremonial

During the course of the seventeenth century more and more princes began to clothe their diplomatic agents with the newer character of envoy. The position of this rank within the diplomatic hierarchy was still somewhat undefined. Wicquefort spoke of this development, stating that ‘the envoy is as it were a Resident Extraordinary’, but nonetheless lamenting that ‘the Ministers who have had this Quality have been for raising themselves to something more, and making themselves considered as little ambassadors’. Wicquefort found that ‘haughty’ envoys were claiming ceremonial honours to which they were not entitled. The French and English monarchies took the lead in withdrawing ceremonial honours from envoys. By the end of the century Callièrè could report that in France envoys ‘speak to the King standing and bareheaded, the King being seated and covered’, with the English adopting similar protocols.

Affairs at other courts were differently regulated than in England and France. Diplomatic theorists such as Wicquefort stated that ‘none but kings’ should demand that envoys took their audiences standing and uncovered, whilst the prince in turn sat and was covered. At the time at which Wicquefort was writing, the Electors of the Holy Roman Empire did not possess royal titles, nor had they successfully constructed their potentate status within the European society of princes. The electors correspondingly conducted their audiences with envoys in a different manner to the Kings of France and England. According to Callièrè, the electors did ‘receive them [envoys] and speak to them standing and bare headed’, a claim substantiated by the anonymously published Ceremoniale Brandenburgicum of 1699.

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13 Wicquefort, The Embassador, 36-37.
14 Callièrè, Art of Negotiating, 66; Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:467; TNA, LC-5/2, 38; Keay, Magnificent Monarch, 109-110.
15 Wicquefort, The Embassador, 160.
16 He was writing in the 1680s before the wave of regalisation that began with the Augustus II’s acquisition of the Polish crown.
17 Callièrè, Art of Negotiating, 67; Anonymus, Ceremoniale Brandenburgicum, 11, 51. For further information on this source see: Vec, Zeremonialwissenshaft, 15ff.
Like the electors, not all kings were so punctilious in their ceremony towards ministers of the second order as those Stuart and Bourbon rulers. Somewhat disparagingly Wicquefort remarked that, ‘in the Northern Courts the ceremonies are not so well regulated, as in those that are neighbours of France and Italy’.  

The ‘Northern Courts’ or ‘Northern Kings’ was a term often taken to encompass those rulers of Denmark, Sweden, and Poland, and Wicquefort was correct in that the protocol of audiences differed somewhat from other western European courts. This was particularly the case with regard to the audiences envoys took of these rulers. In 1659 for example the King of Poland had allowed a minister of the second order to be covered and seated for the duration of his audience. Meanwhile envoys had previously been accorded a significant number of honours at the Danish court, although the Danish King was attempting to curtail the extent to which these were given.

4.3. Danish Ceremonial Reform

After the 1660 institution of absolutism in Denmark, court ceremonies were more prominently designed to emphasise the dignity of the Danish king. As part thereof the Danish court thus underwent a protracted process whereby the rights accorded to envoys were gradually reduced. In 1671 envoys were informed they would no longer be brought to their first audiences in a carriage equipped with the same number of horses as an ambassador. The Danish King also sought to further reduce envoy honours, most notably those that occurred during the first audience. Here the examples of the French and English monarchs were influential

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18 Wicquefort, The Embassador, 43, 180.
19 Ibid., 159-160.
20 Ibid., 160.
22 The Danish struggle to gain ceremonial parity with Europe’s crowned heads perhaps reflects their diminished standing in international affairs. They lost territory and control of the Sound Dues in 1658. Frost, Northern Wars, 180ff.
23 It was common for an ambassador to be brought to his audience in a carriage equipped with six horses, envoys were brought by four horses, residents and agents only by two: Wicquefort, The Embassador, 160.
upon their Danish counterpart. In a world in which a binary model of European princely society was gradually emerging, in which one was either classified as belonging to the forming group of potentates, or excluded from its boundaries, it was consequently vital that sovereign Kings insist upon the same ceremonial as their counterparts. This was particularly true of the King of Denmark, for although not as wealthy, nor having as many troops under arms, he viewed himself as equally sovereign as his monarchical cousins elsewhere. As such, if the Stuart and Bourbon monarchs showed their superiority over envoys during public audiences, then the Danish king wished to do the same.

The reform of honours given to envoys continued under successive Danish rulers. King Frederick IV further curtailed the honours representatives of the second order received at their first public audience with the royal family. Envoys had previously claimed better treatment than residents and ministers, but they now found themselves placed in the same class. The court issued a memorial regulating the audience, with the most significant revision being that the King was to be ‘sat with his hat on’. The king would remain ‘sat down covered all the time the envoy made his speech’, and would ‘not touch his hat’ excepting when the envoy mentioned the ruler in question, at which point he would raise his hat slightly. All the while the envoy would remain standing and uncovered before the monarch.

The envoy would then proceed to take separate audiences of the Danish king’s family including the Queen, the Crown Prince, and the King’s sister and two brothers. The new ceremonial stipulated that the Queen and Crown Prince should also be sat down during the audience, while the audiences of the King’s siblings should proceed ‘much the same as that of the King’. The requirement that the envoy should show the same signs of deference to the royal family as to the monarch regnant reflected upon the prestige of the ruler. Such a protocol also displayed the respect being paid to the dignity of the crown and the royal house, and therefore

24 Kugeler, Le parfait ambassadeur, 255.
25 J. Vrigny, Travels through Denmark and some parts of Germany (London: Taylor, 1707), 96-97.
26 Ibid.
indicated that acceptance of ceremonial revisions was not merely performed as a favour to one specific monarch which could be removed upon their death. Precedent was a powerful concept in early modern Europe. The ability to demonstrate one had once been in possession of something, be that a title, property, or ceremonial honours, considerably strengthened the ability to continue to possess such things. Having the crown prince, the queen, and the royal siblings take their audiences with envoys under the same ceremonial as the king, ensured that those who occupied prominent positions within the order of succession would be able to invoke this earlier precedent and consequently ensure the endurance of ceremonial reform after the death of the current monarch.

This ceremony was ‘the ceremonial of a sovereign kingdom’, and was designed to affirm the potentate status of the Danish king within the society of European princes.\textsuperscript{28} By remaining comfortable, seated and covered, whilst in turn visiting envoys were forced to stand bareheaded, the Danish king was indicating his superiority over those diplomatic representatives of the second order without representative characters. He was thus to conduct his audiences as the sovereign Kings of France and England did, and not in the manner of the imperial electors.

Once the Danes had decided to implement their ceremonial reform it became imperative that they conduct an audience under these new regulations. For the period immediately after the adoption of the new ceremonial could either aid in the production of the King of Denmark’s potentate status, or conversely harm his attempts to forge it. This was the ceremonial of a sovereign king, and that adopted by other rulers who had successfully defined their status as ‘potentate’ rulers. The Danish king had introduced such a ceremonial, yet if foreign envoys and their masters were to refuse to abide by it, then such an action would have been extremely damaging for attempts to produce potentate status.\textsuperscript{29} Conversely, immediate recognition of the Danish ceremonial reform by other princes, and particularly by those who had constructed their potentate status, had the potential to massively aid Frederick IV.

\textsuperscript{28} A. Berney, König Friedrich I. und das Haus Habsburg (1701-1707), (Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1927), 218.

\textsuperscript{29} The French did indeed refuse to adhere: Frey and Frey, \textit{Olive and the Horse}, 33.
4.4. Danish Negotiations with Princes

The Danish king thus turned to foreign princes with whom he could successfully implement the new ceremonial. The Habsburg Emperor Leopold I would have been a useful ally in this regard, however there was already an Imperial resident accredited to the Danish court. Baron Heems had been appointed in 1699 and would remain accredited until 1713, and therefore did not require the first public audience that occurred when a new diplomat arrived at court. Furthermore it is unlikely the Emperor would have acquiesced, as the Danish had recently retracted honours that were usually awarded to Imperial representatives. The Danish king was challenging the traditional preeminent position of the Emperor and his representatives, and instead chose to treat them with no more honour or ceremony than the representatives of other European monarchs. Discussions regarding ceremonial innovations were therefore not conducted during those talks that led to the Habsburg-Danish alliance treaty of June 1701; such issues would have likely scuppered the agreement for Danish troops in the forthcoming war.

Anglo-Danish relations instead presented a more fruitful opportunity for acceptance of the new ceremonial. In February of 1702 James Vernon was given his credentials and dispatched as the English envoy extraordinary to Copenhagen. Shortly thereafter Queen Anne made her accession to the English throne, alongside her consort Prince George of Denmark who was uncle to the Danish king. Clearly the English were unsure of the

33 Vernon’s credentials from William III. 19.02.1702, TNA, SP-104/201. The father of English envoy was also called James Vernon and was Secretary of State for the Northern Department during 1702. In cases where it is not clear I shall use (Sr.) to indicate the father and (Jr.) to indicate the son.
correct course of action, with the Secretary of State for the Northern Department stating ‘I don’t yet know what we are to do about the ceremonial not long since introduced to that Court’. 34 Vernon’s instructions mentioned that ‘we are informed that the King of Denmark has set up a new pretention, as for some ceremonies, to be used at the audiences of envoys extraordinary’. 35 The newly issued ceremonial had caused problems for diplomats already present in Copenhagen and Vernon was to find out ‘what has been done by the envoys of other Princes’ and make assurances that ‘we shall be willing to concur with what shall be done by other princes in this affair’. 36 However before he could report the situation Vernon received orders to take the public audience according to the new ceremonial. 37 Vernon thought it proper to ask for assurances from the Danish that ‘no envoy should be received in any other manner’, and thought that the foreign ministers were ‘extremely pleased’ by his setting the precedent and being the first to take an audience under the new ceremonial. 38

The Danish clearly hoped that Vernon’s audience would prompt other diplomats to take their audience in the same manner. 39 On May 6th 1702 Vernon thus took his public audience of the King of Denmark. The event largely went according to the memorial issued by the Danes; whereby during the audience ‘the King sat covered in an Elbow-Chair, with a Turkey Carpet under his feet’. 40 Vernon then took his audience of the Queen, who likewise sat for the duration of the audience as the King had done. 41 The English envoy then went to the Crown Prince, the future Christian VI of Denmark, who under the new ceremonial was also supposed to be seated for the audience. However, the fact that the Crown Prince was ‘not 18 months old’ prevented this,  

34 Vernon (Sr.) to Stepney, 24.01.1702, J. Vernon, Letters Illustrative of the Reign of William III from 1696 to 1708, G. James, ed., Vol.3 (London: Colburn, 1841), 167.
35 Vernon’s credentials, 19.02.1702, TNA, SP-104/201
36 Vernon’s credentials, 19.02.1702, TNA, SP-104/201
37 Vernon(Jr.)-Vernon(Sr.) 02.05.1702, TNA, SP-75/24; Vrigny, Travels, 94.
38 Vernon (Jr.)-Vernon (Sr.) 02.05.1702, TNA, SP-75/24.
39 A Danish letter in: Vrigny, Travels, 98.: ‘his said majesty (Frederick IV) acknowledges the same, as a mark of Friendship, that the Queen of Great Britain, would show an example to other crowned heads, to make no more difficulty in complying with the ceremoniale established by him’.
40 Ibid., 100.
41 Ibid.
and so he was held in the arms of his governess while a person of quality spoke on his behalf.\textsuperscript{42} In rejection of the initial ceremonial memorial Vernon ultimately insisted that the princes of the blood be standing and uncovered for his audience of them as this was the practice in England.\textsuperscript{43}

Once the audience was concluded Hedges sent further instructions to Vernon that reveal the intentions of the English, as well as their willingness to use ceremonial concessions to facilitate greater military cooperation. Hedges instructed Vernon that Danish satisfaction regarding the settling of the ceremonial should be exploited, and that Vernon should correspondingly ‘make use of this juncture which you think is very favourable to that purpose to press the Danes to enter into the Grand Alliance’.\textsuperscript{44} This explains why Danish relations with England offered such a fruitful opportunity to obtain recognition of the new ceremonial. Anne and her ministers were shortly to take England into the War of the Spanish Succession. Here they would be attempting to limit the seemingly hegemonic aspirations of Louis XIV of France, and preserve the balance of power in Europe. English forces would be facing the colossal Bourbon army. However, in comparison, Anne herself had very few troops at her disposal.\textsuperscript{45} The help of continental allies was thus required in order to counter the Franco-Spanish threat. Here the Danish king, who commanded 27,000 troops, would be useful.\textsuperscript{46} Allied subsidies could be used to secure the services of these troops, yet the lure of subsidies alone was often not enough to secure full commitment to the Grand Alliance. The acquiescence of the English court to Danish ceremonial alterations was seen as a negotiating tool that could be used in order to bring Frederick IV wholly into the

\textsuperscript{42} The practice of having an audience with a toddler was established in other kingdoms - for example in England: Keay, \textit{Magnificent Monarch}, 25.

\textsuperscript{43} The King’s brothers ‘pretended to receive the envoy sitting and covered, in the same manner as the King does’. This was regarded as an unacceptable innovation and so Vernon refused to comply. Vrigny, \textit{Travels}, 97. For Vernon’s audience with the Princes of the Blood both parties were to be ‘standing and uncovered’, this ceremonial was to be henceforth ‘reciprocal between us’. Hedges-Vernon 12.05.1702(OS), TNA, SP-104/2; Vernon-Hedges 12.08.1702, 05.09.1702, TNA, SP-75/24.

\textsuperscript{44} Hedges-Vernon, 12.05.1702(OS), TNA, SP-104/2.

\textsuperscript{45} For the disparity between the English and French armies see the second chapter of this thesis.

Grand Alliance. For Anne and her ministers the concession to a new form of ceremonial with the Danish king was an acceptable price to pay to secure the use of Danish troops for the common cause.

4.5. **The Prussian View on Ceremonial Developments**

Events in Copenhagen were observed with great interest from Berlin. The Prussian court gradually became aware of the Danish ceremonial reforms, with Frederick’s envoy extraordinary to Copenhagen, Adam Otto von Viereck, reporting as early as January 1702 that the Danish had adopted a new ceremonial. Viereck also informed Frederick of the arrival of Vernon, and remarked that the ‘very favourable’ relations between the English and Danish courts presented the opportunity for King Frederick IV to conduct his audience with the ‘dispatched minister of the second order’, both ‘seated and covered’. Viereck subsequently transmitted a report of the audience itself, importantly communicating that ‘the King sat with a covered head’, while ‘the envoy stood before the same [Frederick IV]’. Viereck also passed on the news of the Danish resolution that henceforth all ministers of the second order would receive their audience in the same fashion.

Already in a memorial of November 1701 Frederick IV of Denmark had made tentative moves towards Frederick I King in Prussia. In this memorial the Danes proposed that the ceremonial of sitting and being covered during audiences should be handled in the same manner in both Berlin and Copenhagen. However

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47 It was hoped that Denmark would enter the war not merely by providing auxiliaries under defensive alliances, but as a full offensive belligerent and thus raise more troops to be directed against France. For the treaties see: J. Almon, *A Collection of all the Treaties of Peace, Alliance, and Commerce, between Great-Britain and other Powers*, Vol.1 (London: Almon, 1772), 40-51; Reedtz, *Répertoire historique*, 164-165.

48 21.01.1702, Viereck to Frederick, GSPK, I.HA. Rep.11, 8764.
49 02.05.1702, Viereck to Frederick. GSPK, I.HA. Rep.11, 8764.
50 06.05.1702, Viereck to Frederick, GSPK, I.HA. Rep.11, 8764.
51 09.05.1702, Viereck to Frederick, GSPK, I.HA. Rep.11, 8764.
52 17.11.1701, GSPK, I.HA. Rep.11, 8764.
Frederick did not wish to be the first to concede to the new ceremonial, and difficulties ensured that Viereck’s new audience was delayed.54 This was possibly to avoid granting a new ceremonial that other princes would refuse to acknowledge and to therefore have the ignominy of being the only prince to concede. If the Prussian envoy were the only one to take his audience of the seated and covered king, then this would denigrate his master by establishing a division between him and other kings. The danger of this occurring was removed once Vernon took his audience under the new custom. Whilst preparing for his audience, which was the first to take place under the new ceremonial, Vernon remarked, ‘the foreign ministers seem extremely pleased with my giving them this precedent which they will be all glad to follow’.55 It thus became easier for Frederick to grant the new ceremonial to the Danes in the wake of this, as there was no chance his minister would be alone in making the concession, but rather would be treated just as his English counterpart had been.

The success of the Danish court in instituting the ceremonial of a potentate monarch, and in securing English recognition of that innovation was observed covetously by the Berlin court. Frederick himself wished to adopt this form of ceremonial and assert his claims to potentate rank.56 After Vernon’s audience the ground was gradually prepared for the reciprocal institution of this ceremonial between Denmark and Brandenburg-Prussia. Frederick issued a memorial stating that Viereck would take his public audience under the new ceremonial. Further, Frederick and his ministers asserted that henceforth the same ceremonial would be adopted in Berlin.57 No foreign envoy would be permitted to take their public audience in any other manner than that which had been introduced in Copenhagen. The King in Prussia had from this moment adopted the envoy ceremonial belonging to a crowned head.

54 The Danes insisted that Frederick not give private audiences to diplomats who had not agreed to take their public audience under the new ceremonial, Vernon-Hedges, 06.01.1703, TNA, SP-75/24.
55 Vernon(Jr.)-Vernon(Sr.) 02.05.1702, TNA, SP-75/24.
56 Envoy ceremonial reform had been previously considered. Besser, Schriften: Ergänzende-Texte, 4:34-36.
57 Transmitted inside Ilgen to Viereck, 12.12.1702, GSPK, I.HA. Rep.11, 8764.
By January of 1703 the path was therefore clear for Viereck with Vernon reporting from Copenhagen that ‘Viereck, the Prussian envoy had his audience yesterday upon the precedent I gave him’.\(^{58}\) The Prussian master of ceremonies later received a report of the audience whereby he was informed of the manner in which it had occurred. Viereck was taken into the audience chamber with the Danish master of ceremonies and a Marshall of the court, Frederick IV was seated with his hat upon his head, and upon seeing him Viereck made three reverences, with the King doffing his hat at every instance. The king remained seated and covered for the duration of Viereck’s address to him. Viereck then paid a visit to the Queen, who was seated throughout. Finally, Viereck took an audience of the prince royal, addressing the young prince Christian, who was sitting and covered, with a person of quality answering on the prince’s behalf.\(^{59}\)

### 4.6. Prussian Negotiations

Once Frederick and his ministers had issued the memorial on their adoption of the new ceremonial, it became crucial that they received recognition of this act. In this case, an act recognising the royal equality that Frederick was asserting was to be manifested in the audiences of foreign envoys. Frederick required that these envoys acquiesce, and take their audiences standing and uncovered, whilst the King was seated and covered, just as Frederick’s ministers of the second order did in France, England and at other courts. Acceptance of the Prussian ceremonial would be a mark of Frederick’s royal equality to those other crowned heads. As such Prussian privy councillors immediately began negotiations to implement the ceremonial with the envoys of other crowned heads.

First on this list was Denmark. The Danish had made earlier overtures to the Prussians whereby they had promised to accept the same ceremony in Berlin as they had recently introduced in Copenhagen.\(^{60}\)

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58 Vernon-Hedges, 06.01.1703, TNA, SP-75/24.
60 Hartmann, *Die Beziehungen Preussens*, 26.
Danish negotiations were therefore concluded relatively swiftly. In December 1702 the Prussian court adopted the ceremonial whereby Frederick would hold audiences with envoys seated and covered.61 The Danish accepted this revision, and with Viereck having undertaken his audience in this fashion in Denmark, the corresponding audience of Ahlefeldt, the Danish envoy to Berlin took place on January 15th 1703. Ahlefeldt was conducted into the audience chamber in the Berlin palace by the master of ceremonies and the grand chamberlain, there the King awaited him, where ‘his royal highness sat on a fauteuil (wooden chair with arms) under a canopy’.62 Besser noted one of the more salient details of the audience, that ‘the King is seated with his hat upon his head’.63 Around half an hour later Ahlefeldt proceeded to take his audience of the Queen, who was seated throughout, and then of the Crown Prince, who was likewise seated and covered.64

Here was the much-desired recognition of Frederick’s equality to one of the traditional crowned heads of I; Frederick I in Prussia, like Frederick IV of Denmark was able to indicate his superiority to ministers of the second order, due to their lack of representative character. However, the granting of this treatment by the Danes was not as influential as might have been hoped. Frederick would have hoped that the Danish acceptance of his adoption of this new ceremonial would have precipitated further acts of recognition from across the society of princes; that it would have established a precedent whereby the crowned heads of Europe were willing to acknowledge their ceremonial equality with the King in Prussia. Yet the ability of Ahlefeldt’s audience to lead to this outcome was somewhat limited. After all, this was part of a reciprocal negotiation, where the Danes had also received recognition of their own recent ceremonial innovation from the Prussians. As such, we may observe this as a reciprocal recognition of innovations, rather than an influential European monarch freely recognising Frederick’s equality. This type of recognition did not carry the same weight as the recognition from those crowns which had long ago adopted this form of ceremonial and who set the pace for the rest of

61 Besser, Schriften: Ceremonial-Acta, 3:158. ‘His majesty had agreed with the Danish court, after the example of the English and French courts to seat himself and remain covered during the audiences of envoys. Conversely the envoys as before should remain standing and uncovered’.

62 Ibid., 3:160.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid., 3:160, 174. Ahlefeldt took his audiences of the royal siblings without any ceremony.
Europe. Further the power of Danish recognition was somewhat reduced by the fact that the Danes were experiencing problems of their own with regard to recognition of the new ceremonial. In their relations with the Swedish king for example the Danish envoy had been denied his audience with King Charles XII for a period of fifteen months.65 This was designed to punish the Danish for the introduction of the new ceremonial, which the Swedish refused to abide by. The Danish were struggling to secure widespread acceptance of their recent ceremonial alterations and were consequently not in a position to influence European princes to also accept Prussian pretensions.

Frederick and his privy councillors sought the acceptance of the newly introduced ceremonial from other, more influential actors. Chief among these was the Habsburg Emperor Leopold I. The acknowledgement of so weighty an actor, the traditional leading ruler of Christendom, and further, Frederick’s feudal overlord, was a much sought-after goal. Frederick had vigorously pursued Leopold’s support for his project to attain a royal title, and Leopold’s eventual acceptance of the crown project had been influential in bringing about the coronation of 1701.

There was some reason to be hopeful, for article 7 of the Krontraktat, concluded between Frederick and Leopold in 1700, had decreed that the Emperor would grant the new King in Prussia the same titles and honours as he did to other European monarchs, ‘in particular those kings of Sweden, Denmark and Poland’.66 However article 10 of the same treaty provided a restrictive stipulation. It stated that that while the Emperor would treat the King in Prussia in the same manner as the aforementioned kings, if any of them sought to introduce ceremonial innovations, then the King in Prussia was obliged not introduce the same himself.67 Imperial behaviour can be explained by a desire to preserve the status quo in which Imperial diplomats were treated more irreverently in recognition of the role of the Emperor as the leading prince of Christendom.68 The issue of Prussian ceremonial innovations and the position of that court in relation to those of Stockholm, Warsaw

66 Moerner, Staatsverträge, 814. For discussion of titular see: Dauser, Ehren-Namen, 225ff.
67 Moerner, Staatsverträge, 815.
68 Zwanzig, Theatrum Praecedentiae, 2ff.; Anonymus, Ceremoniale Brandenburgicum, 5ff.
and Copenhagen had previously been thorny. However following the Danish adoption of a new envoy ceremonial it became acute. Once the Prussians discovered the details of the Danish ceremonial they attempted to negotiate the same ceremonial for the audiences of Imperial envoys that were dispatched to Berlin. The Prussian envoy to Vienna asked for the replacement of Heems (the Imperial resident in Berlin) with an Imperial envoy, so that an audience on the new footing could be undertaken.\textsuperscript{69} The Habsburgs rejected this request and merely referred to article 10 of the Krontraktat, which had obliged the Prussians not to imitate the innovations of the other northern kings.\textsuperscript{70} By August of 1702 the Habsburg court had decided that it would decisively reject Prussian requests that they abide by the new ceremonial.\textsuperscript{71} Yet Frederick meanwhile stressed that he hoped to enjoy the royal dignity and dependent prerogatives no less than other kings.\textsuperscript{72} This ambiguity was enshrined in the treaty concluded in December of 1702 that marked Frederick’s official entry into the Grand Alliance. Here it merely stated that ‘with regard to the ceremonial, it should be brought into line under the guidance of the treaty of the 16\textsuperscript{th} of November 1700’ (the Krontraktat).\textsuperscript{73} This allowed the stalemate to continue, with the Prussians calling for royal equality with the Danes, and the Habsburgs rejecting Prussian innovations. No Habsburg envoy was to take their audience with Frederick under the new ceremonial.

The very accession treaty that bound Frederick to the allies precluded the possibility of the recognition of the new Prussian ceremonial by the Bourbon monarchs of France and Spain, against whom Frederick had now committed his troops. The voices of these rulers, and particularly that of Louis XIV of France, counted for much in European affairs; for besides the Emperor, the Sun King was one of those who had the power and influence to set precedent for the princes of Europe. Yet because Frederick’s allegiance during the War of the Spanish Succession, legitimisation could be secured neither from the most Christian King of France, nor his most Catholic majesty the King of Spain.

\textsuperscript{69} Berney, König Friedrich, 219.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{72} Ilgen, quoted in: Ibid., 217.
\textsuperscript{73} Loewe, Preussens Staatsverträge, 25.
4.7. **Anglo-Prussian Negotiations**

At the time at which Frederick instituted his ceremonial reform he was enjoying friendly relations with Queen Anne; the two rulers being bound as allies in war against the Bourbons. Likewise, whilst Anne was punctilious in her observance of ceremonial forms domestically, she and her ministers were often willing to grant ceremonial concessions to other princely dynasties and their representatives.\(^\text{74}\) English strategic objectives also made ceremonial concessions possible with the Prussians. Ceremonial concessions to troop providing princes secured auxiliary battalions and were regarded as a less costly alternative to providing monetary inducements.\(^\text{75}\) This was particularly the case between 1702-1703. Up until the Empire’s declaration of *Reichskrieg* on 30 September 1702 ceremonial concessions alongside other means were used to persuade German princes to more actively cooperate and to field a greater proportion of their forces against the French.\(^\text{76}\) After the declaration of *Reichskrieg*, such methods were used to encourage the imperial princes to fulfil their commitments to the *Reichsarmee*. This however did not mean the Stuart Queen, or her ministers were willing to hand out ceremonial concessions profligately. The princes of Europe still had to battle for these to be granted to them, but unlike with the Habsburgs or Bourbons, it was possible for the English to award these concessions.

Frederick therefore sought to gain acceptance of the new ceremonial with the English. As early as January of 1702 Frederick and his councillors became aware of Danish intentions to institute a new ceremonial similar to that practiced at the English court.\(^\text{77}\) Correspondingly in April 1702 Frederick dispatched instructions to Spanheim, the newly appointed Prussian ambassador to London, which showed his desire to institute the new ceremonial with English representatives. Specifically, Frederick wished to be seated and have his head covered

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\(^{74}\) See chapter 2.

\(^{75}\) Marlborough to Godolphin, 24.06.1702, Snyder, *Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence*, 1975, 1:74.


\(^{77}\) Viereck to Frederick, 21.01.1702, 24.01.1702, GSPK, I.HA. Rep.11, 8764.
during the solemn audience with the long-awaited English envoy.\textsuperscript{78} English representation in Berlin was at this point wholly inadequate, for their chief-diplomat was Philip Plantamour with the lowly rank of chargé d’affaires.\textsuperscript{79} For significant dealings James Cresset, the English envoy to Hanover, travelled to Berlin. The stationing of a more senior diplomat at the court of Frederick’s regional rivals of inferior rank would no doubt have irritated, and accordingly when Cresset ventured to Berlin he was treated poorly. This, alongside Cresset’s contemptuous attitude towards Frederick made promoting English interests in Berlin challenging.\textsuperscript{80}

Frederick’s entreaties for an English envoy to take his audience under the new ceremonial became more frequent once the Danish were granted the very same during Vernon’s first audience in May 1702. Marlborough reported to Godolphin that Wartenberg ‘has desired me from his master that her Majesty would allow her friendship to the King of Prussia, in settling the ceremonial with him as it is in Denmark’.\textsuperscript{81} Prussian efforts intensified, with Wartenberg sending Marlborough a further request in July.\textsuperscript{82} Meanwhile Marlborough received instructions from the Queen to grant Frederick the desired ceremonial. He informed Godolphin that ‘I shall let the King of Prussia’s minister, the Count de Wartenberg, know her Majesty’s kind intentions of gratifying his master as to the ceremonial’.\textsuperscript{83} Marlborough consequently notified Wartenberg of the Queen’s decision regarding the ceremonial, and told him that ‘I can assure you that all this will happen to the satisfaction of your master’.\textsuperscript{84} At the beginning of the next year Marlborough once more wrote to Wartenberg, informing him that the Queen would dispatch a diplomat with the rank of envoy extraordinary to Berlin.

\textsuperscript{78} Loewe, \textit{Spanheim}, 150.
\textsuperscript{79} Horn, \textit{Diplomatic Representatives}, 103.
\textsuperscript{80} C. Cole, \textit{Historical and Political Memoirs, Containing Letters Written by Sovereign Princes, State Ministers, Admirals, and General Officers from almost all the Courts in Europe, Beginning with 1697 to the End of 1708} (London: Millan, 1735), 125, 128, 147.
\textsuperscript{81} Marlborough to Godolphin, 24.06.1702, Snyder, \textit{Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence}, 1975, 1:73.
\textsuperscript{83} Marlborough to Godolphin, 13.07.1702, Snyder, \textit{Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence}, 1975, 1:81.
\textsuperscript{84} Marlborough to Wartenberg, 16.07.1702, Murray, \textit{Letters}, 1845, 1:10.
The man chosen to fulfil this task was none other than Baron Raby, the same diplomat who had come to Berlin in 1701 to congratulate Frederick upon his accession. Raby secured this posting partially through his connections to leading ministers. But the appointment was also made because English ministers discovered that Raby’s appointment would be particularly pleasing to the Prussian court. Raby had already demonstrated a willingness to bend to Prussian ceremonial demands, accepting in 1701 a ceremonial position behind the Prussian first minister, much to the pleasure of Frederick. In addition Raby’s high social status as a peer of the realm contributed to his appeal; a noble accepting the new ceremonial was undoubtedly more impactful than deference shown by a diplomat of lower birth. We may therefore see how Raby’s utility to Frederick as a means to produce his own status in turn secured the envoy posting for Raby. It was the beginning of a diplomatic posting that would continue until 1711 and provide ample opportunity for Raby to reciprocally secure his own elevation.

Raby was issued his instructions for his appointment as Anne’s envoy extraordinary in March 1703. Therein Raby was specifically told, ‘you shall ask an audience, and take it with the accustomed ceremonies, and as the envoys of the other crowned heads have done as soon as you possibly can’. On the last day of the month Raby departed for the continent and began his journey to Berlin. Frederick was at the same time pressing for Raby to take his first audience as envoy with the same ceremonial as Vernon had in Copenhagen. On his journey Raby passed through Bonn, where he dined with Marlborough and questioned him upon the ceremony to be observed in Berlin, for the Queen had instructed Raby upon his departure ‘that whatever Lord Marlborough had promised relating to the ceremony she would have observed’. Marlborough was unwilling

85 See introduction.
86 Marlborough to Wartenberg, 11.01.1703, Murray, Letters, 1845, 1:64; Naujokat, ‘Mylord Raby’, 75; Cartwright, Wentworth Papers, 9-10. Frederick’s reaction: Plantamour to Hedges, 27.1.1703, TNA, SP-90/1.
88 Anne’s instructions to Raby, 11.03.1703, TNA, SP-104/203.
89 31.03.1703, Luttrell, Historical Relation, 1857, 5:280.
90 Frederick to Spanheim, 4.4.1703, GSPK, I.HA. Rep.11, 73, 26A.
91 Raby-Hedges, 19.05.1703, TNA, SP-90/2.
to say anything decisive, stating only that he had promised Frederick ‘the same ceremonies should be used to
him as was to other crowned heads’.\(^9_2\) Having unclear instructions, Raby thus aimed to prolong his journey to
Berlin, so that he could receive more precise orders about the ceremonial conduct to be observed. He was
unsure, and wished to have directly from Hedges instructions for, ‘what I am to do, being it is but a new thing
to have an audience of the northern Kings themselves sitting with their hats on, Mr. Vernon is the first and
only instance of its ever being done’.\(^9_3\) Raby further wished to know whether he take an audience of the crown
prince, and whether this should be done in the same manner as Vernon had taken his in Copenhagen.\(^9_4\) Once
Raby arrived in Berlin on the 9\(^{th}\) of June, he received instructions advising him on the contentious issue of his
audience with the prince royal.\(^9_5\) Here he was instructed to ‘observe the same ceremony in relation to the Prince
Royal, as the envoy extraordinary of the King of Denmark has done’.\(^9_6\) He was further to procure an ‘authentic
act’ from the Prussians which would assure that henceforth all envoys would conduct their audiences upon
these terms.\(^9_7\) Frederick was aware of these orders and the ceremonial concessions being offered, which Raby
reported were ‘very pleasing to him’.\(^9_8\) Raby’s first audience was delayed however as Frederick insisted that
it take place in the Berlin palace, however the stairs were in the process of being altered meaning that it was
put back by a number of weeks.\(^9_9\)

The audience finally occurred on the 10\(^{th}\) of July. Raby commented that it was ‘observed with a great deal of
ceremony and splendour’.\(^10_0\) Raby referred Hedges to an account given by his secretary of the ceremony

\(^9_2\) Raby-Hedges, 19.05.1703, TNA, SP-90/2.
\(^9_3\) Raby-Hedges, 19.05.1703, TNA, SP-90/2.
\(^9_4\) Raby-Hedges, 19.05.1703, TNA, SP-90/2. ‘If Mr. Vernon had orders from you to take an audience of the prince royal of Denmark, I believe we must be obliged to have it of the prince royal of Prussia in the same manner’.
\(^9_5\) Raby-Hedges 09.06.1703, TNA, SP-90/2.
\(^9_6\) Additional instructions Anne to Raby, 24.04.1703, TNA, SP-103/203. - Vernon had taken an audience of the Crown Prince of Denmark, however he had not been seated as he was a young child at the time and so was held in his governess’s arms. The Crown Prince of Prussia was however a teenager at the time of Raby’s audience and so could take his audience seated and covered as his father would.
\(^9_7\) Additional instructions Anne to Raby, 24.04.1703, TNA, SP-103/203.
\(^9_8\) Raby-Marlborough, 09.06.1703, BL, Add. MSS. 61137.
\(^9_9\) Raby-Hedges, 16.06.1703, TNA, SP-90/2.
\(^10_0\) Raby-Hedges, 14.07.1703, TNA, 90/2.
surrounding the audiences and the King’s birthday celebrations that took place the next day.101 All importantly, as the details from Besser’s ceremonial records make clear, Raby took his audience just as the Danish envoy had done before him. He was escorted to the audience chamber of the Berlin palace by the master of ceremonies and the grand marshal, where Frederick was awaiting him seated and with his hat upon his head. Raby made three reverences, with the King touching his hat on each occasion. The King then remained seated and covered throughout Raby’s harangue and the rest of the audience, only touching his hat again when Raby mentioned Queen Anne.102 The audiences with the Prussian queen and the crown Prince took place according to the precedent issued to the Danish envoy earlier that year. Whereby during his audience with her, Queen Sophia-Charlotte was seated, whilst Crown Prince Frederick-William was seated and covered.103 Raby, like Vernon and Ahlefeldt before him refused to take his audiences of sitting and covered royal siblings, and this was the only point at which the audience diverged from the stipulated ceremonial.104 With Raby’s audience taking place in the prescribed manner Frederick had achieved his ceremonial wishes with the English representative. He received the same ceremonial honours as a sovereign king, and vitally he received them from a major European monarchy, fully sovereign in its own right, and able to set an example for other European Princes.

4.8. Ceremonial Negotiations and the War of the Spanish Succession

101 These even included the unveiling of the renowned equestrian statue of the Great Elector. Giving a feeling of the court Raby told Hedges that, ‘if you have time and curiosity enough to divert yourself with our splendour and entertainment here, then you may spend a quarter of an hour in reading those accounts. For as the situation of other courts makes the ministers send you long accounts of preparations for battles and sieges. I can only send you from hence relations of shows, dancing and other such like diversions’. Raby-Hedges, 14.07.1703, TNA SP-90/2.


103 Women did not wear hats, see chapter 3. For a minor dispute regarding who was to receive Raby see: Raby-Hedges, 14.07.1703, TNA, SP-90/2; Ibid., 3:174; Hahn, ‘Der Hof Friedrichs III./.’., 65; Besser, Schriften: Ceremonial-Acta, 3:172-175.

For Frederick, achieving his aims had not come easily, nor free of cost. It is therefore important to investigate those issues and negotiations that ran parallel to Anglo-Prussian ceremonial discussions. For this the focus must be placed upon the War of the Spanish Succession, which significantly impacted upon diplomacy during this period. It was in relation to this expected war that Frederick had secured imperial support for his monarchical aspirations. And so, under the terms of the Krontraktat, concluded in 1700, Frederick was obliged to provide 8,000 men for the Emperor’s cause.105 This force therefore assembled in April and May of 1701 in the west, occupying the city of Cologne.106 These 8,000 troops constituted Frederick’s initial commitment to the allied cause, however as time went on, he more and more placed himself in the allied camp. The 8,000 troops would therefore not be his sole obligation to the cause of the now emerging ‘Grand Alliance’. In December of 1701 Spanheim and Schmettau negotiated the delivery of a further 5,000 Prussian troops into English and Dutch service for the next campaigning season.107 In addition, as the French threat to the Empire continued to grow throughout 1702, and the Bavarian threat emerged, the Reichstag voted for a triple quota for the Imperial army (tripulum), consisting of 120,000 men and subsequently declared a Reichskrieg upon Louis XIV and his allies. Here the system of imperial collective defence sprang into action. The overall total of 120,000 troops was divided into various contingents to be supplied by each imperial circle (Kreis).108 The total was then subdivided by the Kreis director and allocated to the individual princes who made up the Kreis.109 Frederick possessed territories in three separate Kreise: Upper Saxony, Lower Saxony and Lower Rhine-Westphalia, and was therefore obliged to provide Kreis contingents for these territories, with his overall contribution to the Reichsarmee amounting to 9,279 men.110 Thus between Frederick’s treaties with the

105 Moerner, Staatsverträge, 810-823.
106 Jany, Preussische Armee, 1:434; Berney, König Friedrich, 16ff.
107 Loewe, Preussens Staatsverträge, 14-15.
108 The total was split across eight of the ten Kreise, with the Austrian and Burgundian Kreise not contributing. Wilson, German Armies, 107-114.
109 Wilson, ‘Prussia and the Holy Roman Empire’, 19; Wilson, German Armies, 17; Wilson, Reich to Revolution, 183-184.
110 For Kreis politics see: Wilson, German Armies, 17-22. Berney, König Friedrich, 46. This total includes Frederick’s Orange annexations, East Frisia and other territories Frederick had contracted to provide troops for. Braubach estimated Frederick’s obligation at 6,000 men, and Jany at 10,000. Braubach, Subsidien, 105; Jany, Preussische Armee, 1:444.
Emperor and the Maritime powers for auxiliary troops, alongside his obligation to imperial defence, we can see that Frederick’s commitment to the Grand Alliance amounted to 22,279 troops.\textsuperscript{111}

From an English perspective the commitment of the overwhelming majority of Frederick’s large, and by all accounts well trained and disciplined army to the allied cause was pleasing. For despite English commitment to the goals of the Grand Alliance, English manpower contributions were far from excessive. At the time of Charles II of Spain’s death, the English only had 19,000 men under arms.\textsuperscript{112} Whilst the outbreak of war brought a concomitant expansion of the English army, Queen Anne was never able to commit more than 50,000 men to the European theatre. Louis XIV by contrast possessed a formidable army with a paper strength of 380,000 men.\textsuperscript{113} In order to make up the huge numerical shortfall Anne and her ministers came to rely heavily upon using their extensive powers of finance and credit to fund the soldiers of other princes to fight the Bourbon foe. The Dutch, although fielding a larger army themselves engaged in a similar strategy and so as early as 1703 there were already over 50,000 troops from various German princes in Anglo-Dutch pay.\textsuperscript{114}

As the campaign season of 1702 got underway Prussian troops engaged in their first actions. Reichskrieg would not be declared until later that year and so the Prussian troop commitment dictated by the treaties stood at 13,000 men.\textsuperscript{115} These troops took part in the successful siege of Kaiserswerth alongside Dutch forces, and thereafter besieged Venlo, which capitulated to a combined Anglo-Prussian-Dutch force.\textsuperscript{116} It was during these actions that the Prussian troops, and thus Frederick’s friendship, proved their worth to the English, and in particular the Duke of Marlborough. It was the Prussians who during the siege of Venlo were instrumental in

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{111} Out of a total army of 30,000 men at the start of 1702, Jany, \textit{Preussische Armee}, 1:435.
\textsuperscript{112} For an extensive discussion on the English Grand Strategy and how this impacted upon relations with Prussia see chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{113} Wilson, \textit{German Armies}, 105.
\textsuperscript{114} This total rose to 90,000 in 1707. The Emperor similarly relied on auxiliaries for the German Princes and Denmark, having 27,000 troops provided from these princes in 1703, and 20,000 in 1707. Ibid., 105-111.
\textsuperscript{115} According to the Krontraktat of 1700, and the treaty with the Maritime powers of 1702.
\end{flushright}
the assault on the Fort St. Michel that stood on the opposite bank over the river Meuse. In a display of military valour they stormed through the moat with their muskets above their heads and subsequently pushed their way through the breach, with the first to enter being one particularly brave Prussian grenadier sergeant who was subsequently given an officer’s commission.\textsuperscript{117} The Prussians alongside their English allies took the fort with minimal casualties, while of the 400 defenders only 80 escaped, the rest being either drowned whilst fleeing across the Meuse, or giving themselves over to captivity.\textsuperscript{118} With the fort intended to defend the town of Venlo having fallen, and being surrounded on all sides by besiegers and bombarded by artillery, the Franco-Spanish garrison quickly capitulated. An English Major-General commented upon the resolve of Frederick’s soldiers, ‘on the side of the Prussians, the Prince of Anhalt attacked the ravelin with all possible bravery and prevailed. But the enemy having broken the bridge between the said ravelin and the fort, the Prussians threw themselves into the ditches, they then swam to ascend the rampart’.\textsuperscript{119}

Upon arriving with the allied armies in the Low Countries Marlborough, the newly named Master of the Ordinance and Lord Treasurer, received a letter from the Count Wartenberg requesting that his master be given the same ceremonial honours as the King of Denmark.\textsuperscript{120} Marlborough turned to his confidant Godolphin for council, explaining that Frederick was also ‘pressing to be put in possession’ of the Orange Inheritance, this would be impossible to grant at this time, but all must be done to attempt to keep Frederick ‘in good humour’.\textsuperscript{121} As Marlborough elaborated ‘it is absolutely necessary that this King should be kept in her Majesty’s interest’, for ‘if they [the Prussians] should be carried to the interest of France, a great part of this country would lie open. So that this King must be flattered’.\textsuperscript{122} Marlborough suggested the means with which Prussia might be

\textsuperscript{117} Jany, \textit{Preussische Armee}, 1:441.
\textsuperscript{118} Seydel, \textit{Nachrichten}, 2:25-32.
\textsuperscript{120} Marlborough to Godolphin, 24.06.1702, Snyder, \textit{Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence}, 1975, 1:73.
\textsuperscript{121} Marlborough to Godolphin, 24.06.1702, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
bound more tightly to the allied cause, ‘I am told that he (Frederick) sets a greater value upon such a ceremonal, than upon matters of greater importance’. He went onto state that ‘I know not how her Majesty can do it cheaper’. Finally Marlborough recommended that despite whatever promises were made to the Prussians regarding the ceremonal, nothing should be granted this summer; ‘so that they may be kept firm by the hopes of it’. He would later delay the appointment of an envoy to Frederick, telling Godolphin that he thought ‘nothing might be done in that matter till I see you. For this winter we may have use of that court, which will be much easier governed before the ceremonies are settled, than when that point it over’. In late September upon hearing that James Cresset was to be posted as Envoy to Berlin, he asked ‘If it be not gone far, I think it might be for the service to stop it for some time, for when that ceremony is over you will have less hold of his majesty’.

As previously noted, Marlborough then informed Wartenberg of Anne’s intention to grant his ceremonal requests. In a series of letters Marlborough then drew the explicit link between the promised ceremonal concessions and the use of the Prussian troops in the on-going campaign. He forwarded Godolphin a letter from the Prussian General Heiden, who commanded a contingent of 8,000. Heiden’s battalions had up until now been ordered to remain stationary and protect Frederick’s territory of Cleves. However, at Marlborough’s request, Frederick allowed them to cross the river Meuse and engage in joint offensive operations. Marlborough thus told Godolphin ‘you may see the great effect the Queen’s resolution of the ceremonal had over that King, which at this time proves of very great consequence, for if we had not those troops it would be impossible to lay siege to Venlo’. In another letter he elaborated, stating that Frederick’s

123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Marlborough to Godolphin, 04.09.1702, Ibid., 1:106.
126 Marlborough to Godolphin, 25.09.1702, Ibid., 1:117.
127 Marlborough to Wartenberg, 16.07.1702, Murray, Letters, 1845, 1:10.
128 Ibid., 1:11; Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 1:81ff. The French had attacked Cleves-area in April 1702: Jany, Preussische Armee, 1:439.
129 Marlborough to Godolphin, 03.08.1702, Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 1:92.
pleasure at being granted ‘the ceremonial he so much desired’ had brought the obedient commitment of Prussian troops, ‘which we could [not] have had, if he had not been pleased with this thing’. 130

While the effective utilisation of Prussian troops for the allied cause during the campaign of 1702 had been effectively brought about by English promises of ceremonial concessions, it proved more difficult to secure their services for the campaign of 1703, mere promises no longer sufficed. Frederick had augmented the 8,000 strong corps during the winter, and under its new commander Lottum this grouping now stood at a strength of 12,000 men.131 Lottum’s forces began the campaigning season by beginning a long blockade of the Spanish controlled fortress of Guelders.132 To Frederick this siege was of particular importance with the town and attached territory lying in close proximity to his possessions in Cleves. He harboured longstanding desires to acquire this area.133 As Lottum commenced the blockade, Marlborough was assembling his forces with the design of heading south in order to reduce the enemy fortress of Bonn.134 This force included the Prussian Hilfskorps of 5,000 men, however Marlborough asked for further Prussian troops from Lottum’s command.135 Frederick agreed to dispatch some of Lottum’s men, however Marlborough thought this force insufficient and asked Wartenberg to entreat with his master to provide further troops.136

Again ceremonial concessions were thought appropriate to secure the proper use of Frederick’s military means. With Marlborough writing to Godolphin about the Prussian ceremonial in April; ‘I am sure the promise last year got us during the sieges ten thousand men, and should he [Frederick] be disappointed, it would lose us as many this year… If you acquaint her Majesty with this, and what passed last year, I hope there will be no

130 Marlborough to Godolphin, 21.08.1702, Ibid., 1:100.
131 Jany, Preussische Armee, 1:444.
132 Ibid., 1:445.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Three cavalry regiments and two infantry battalions, Marlborough asked that this force be supplemented by two battalions of infantry. Marlborough to Wartenberg 27.03.1703, Murray, Letters, 1845, 1:74-75; Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 1:159.
farther delay in dispatching my Lord Raby’.\textsuperscript{137} Once Marlborough had assembled his own army at Maastricht and was ready to march east and invest Bonn he continued to press for the dispatch of a more sizeable force from Lottum’s army to his own.\textsuperscript{138} Yet the desired transfer of a sizeable number of troops was not forthcoming.

It was only on the first of July that Frederick finally met Marlborough’s request. On this date Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau took a command of 6,000 Prussians, broke away from the blockade of Guelders and marched them south.\textsuperscript{139} By this point however the siege of Bonn had been concluded with the allies taking possession of the fortress, Marlborough thus turned his attention north and sought to recommence hostilities on the Brabant front.\textsuperscript{140} Anhalt-Dessau’s detachment continued south in order to reinforce the Imperial army under the command of Margrave Louis of Baden.\textsuperscript{141} They joined with Imperial forces in the vicinity of Höchstadt, where they would soon encounter French forces.\textsuperscript{142}

Significantly the dispatch of the Prussian troops had been ordered in June, only occurring once the long-awaited English envoy arrived in Berlin with instructions to observe the new Prussian ceremonial.\textsuperscript{143} The sending of Raby and his acceptance of the new Prussian ceremonial had previously been delayed in order to exert control over Frederick. Now Raby was hurriedly sent to Berlin in order to break Frederick’s intransigence. In this sense it was somewhat successful, Raby’s arrival had brought about the southward march of a significant number of Prussian troops, but it had come too late for Marlborough and his attack on Bonn.

\textsuperscript{137} Marlborough to Godolphin, 06.04.1703, Snyder, \textit{Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence}, 1975, 1:159-160.
\textsuperscript{138} Marlborough to Schmettau, 16.04.1703, Murray, \textit{Letters}, 1845, 1:81.
\textsuperscript{139} Jany, \textit{Preussische Armee}, 1:448.
\textsuperscript{140} W. Coxe, \textit{Memoirs of John, Duke of Marlborough, With his Original Correspondence}, Vol.1 (London: Longman, 1820), 244.
\textsuperscript{141} Being threatened as they were as Villars’ army had crossed into the Empire and linked up with Bavarians.
\textsuperscript{142} Falkner, \textit{The War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1714}, 54; Jany, \textit{Preussische Armee}, 1:452.
\textsuperscript{143} Jany, \textit{Preussische Armee}, 1:448; Raby arrived on 09.06.1703. In a letter Raby sent that evening to the Duke of Marlborough he made it clear that Frederick already knew of the ceremonial concessions Raby was permitted to make. On 23.06.1703 the last ceremonial issue was resolved, Raby receives a letter from the Queen telling him to take his audience of the prince royal as the envoy of Denmark has done.
This did not resolve the last of the troop issues. Raby had been tasked upon his arrival in Frederick’s capital to obtain assurances regarding the Prussian quota for the Imperial army. Under the Reichstag voted *triplum* of 120,000 troops Frederick was obliged to contribute 9,279 men for his territories spanning three Kreise.\(^{144}\) He was required to field this contingent, as well as those organised under other allied treaties for the 1703 campaign season.\(^{145}\) Throughout June Raby received orders from England ‘to press him (Frederick) to send his quota and use his interests with the other princes of this circle to send their troops also’.\(^{146}\)

Frederick did not wish to send his full quota for the Reichsarmee for various reasons. In particular Frederick refused to send his quota of 2,764 troops for the Lower Saxon Kreis to which he belonged as ruler of Magdeburg and Halberstadt.\(^{147}\) The Kreise were often vehicles for larger princes to assert their dominance within regions of the empire, with the role of Kreis director allowed the greatest exercise of power.\(^{148}\) When the Emperor and Reichstag had established the Kreise in the sixteenth century most had been assigned two directors, one a secular and the other an ecclesiastical prince.\(^{149}\) The directorship of the Lower Saxon Kreis was held by the Dukes of Brunswick, with the ecclesiastical position alternating between the bishops of Bremen and Magdeburg.\(^{150}\) At the conclusion of the Thirty Years War these bishoprics were secularised and awarded to the King of Sweden and the Elector of Brandenburg respectively, with these rulers becoming the alternating co-directors.\(^{151}\) Raby explained to Marlborough the reasons for Frederick’s quota neglect, ‘he will

\(^{144}\) Jany, *Preussische Armee*, 1:444.

\(^{145}\) 5,000 troops to the Maritime powers and 8,000 to the Emperor

\(^{146}\) Raby-Hedges, 09.06.1703, 16.06.1703, Raby to Nottingham, 16.06.1703; TNA, SP-90/2; Raby-Marlborough, 09.06.1703, BL, 61137.


\(^{148}\) Kreis directors controlled all official communication between the Kreis and higher bodies such as the Reichstag, they could also set the Kreis assembly’s agenda, they compiled the final recess, maintained the regional archive. Further they also had control over the quota the Kreis was to contribute to the Imperial army, and importantly how that burden would be divided across the constituent territories of the Kreis. Wilson, ‘Prussia and the Holy Roman Empire’, 19; Wilson, *German Armies*, 17; Wilson, *Reich to Revolution*, 183-184.

\(^{149}\) Wilson, *Reich to Revolution*, 183-184.

\(^{150}\) Ibid.

\(^{151}\) Frederick-William was only given the expectancy to the Bishopric of Magdeburg and so had to wait until 1680 for the last ruling Wettin Bishop to die before he could take possession of the territory. Ibid., 184.
not do it till a diet is first called because the King of Sweden and he are directors by turns and on the calling of the next diet he will be director and pretends they can’t demand his quota till they have first assembled a diet’.  

Raby elaborated that he would attempt to persuade the King in Prussia, but that he doubted his chances of success, for ‘he (Frederick) has a great mind to have the directorship in his own hands out of the King of Sweden’s’. Indeed this meant that for the campaign of 1703 the 1,800 men from Hanover constituted the entire Kreis contingent from Lower Saxony, far short of the triplum obligation of 12,087.

Frederick was not particularly forthcoming on his troop commitments for the other Kreise either. The Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg were required to provide the vast majority of the Upper Saxon Kreis contingent. But due to Frederick and Augustus’ other priorities the Kreis fielded a dismal 2,250 men in 1703, again short of the obligation of 12,087 troops. Frederick was no more forthcoming in the Westphalian Kreis, and indeed overall Prussia contributed no more than around 4,000 men as Kreis contingents between 1703 and 1705.

Marlborough continued undeterred and in June he once more pressed Raby to secure the dispatch of the Prussians, stating that; ‘I am confident your lordship will spare no pains… in pressing the King to send his quota to the empire with that of the Circle, for sure they never could come more seasonably than at this time’. Frederick and his ministers engaged in further evasion in order to decline Marlborough’s requests. Raby relayed Frederick’s reply that ‘they had ordered between six and seven thousand men to march for the emperor’s service, which was even more than his share of the quota came to. When I objected that those troops were in the service already, and we hoped for the quota besides, I could get no other answer from them’. In July Raby once more pressured Frederick on Marlborough’s commands, to whom he explained; ‘I had pressed

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152 Raby-Marlborough, 09.06.1703, BL, 61137; Raby-Hedges, 09.06.1703, TNA, SP-90/2.
153 Raby-Marlborough, 09.06.1703, BL, 61137.
154 Braubach, Subsidien, 83; Wilson, German Armies, 65; A. Danzer, Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen von Savoyen, Vol.5 (Vienna: Gerold, 1889), 118-120.
155 Wilson, German Armies, 65, 114; Wilson, ‘Prussia and the Holy Roman Empire’, 16.
156 Braubach, Subsidien, 84.
157 Marlborough-Raby, 22.06.1703, Murray, Letters, 1845, 1:120.
158 Raby-Hedges, 16.06.1703, TNA, SP-90/2; Raby to Nottingham, 16.06.1703, TNA, SP-90/2.
them in the queen’s name and had given the King a letter from the queen before about it; that they had sent 4,000 men pursuant to the treaty for the royalty with the Emperor, had the other 4,000 at the blockade of Guelders which made the 8,000. Besides which they had sent about 2,000 more for their quota’. Concluding that they had ‘sent in all towards the Rhine above 6,000 men.”159 He once more exasperatedly reported that ‘I find the King thinks here that the troops sent into the emperor’s service together with those already employed in the blockade of Guelders are all that he is obliged either by treaty with the emperor, or the quota, to furnish’.160

One tactic Frederick utilised in order to be seen to be meeting his obligations was, as Wilson states; ‘at times temporarily designating auxiliary or other troops as contingents with the imperial or Kreis forces’.161 Frederick also engaged the troops of other princes to meet his Kreis and other commitments.162 In 1702 Frederick took into his service 2,400 troops from the Prince of Saxe-Gotha163, 600 troops from Nassau-Dillenburg164, while in 1703 the Prussians hired a dragoon regiment of 250 men from Mecklenburg.165 These troops were all made their way into either the Anglo-Dutch or Imperial army, in order to meet Prussia’s alliance and Kreis commitments.166

159 Raby-Marlborough, 03.07.1703, BL, 61137.
160 Raby-Hedges, 14.07.1703, TNA, SP-90/2.
161 Wilson, ‘Prussia and the Holy Roman Empire’, 19.
162 Ibid., 20.
163 Wilson, German Armies, 107-110; Braubach, Subsidien, 70. Prussian troops invaded Saxe-Gotha as a consequence of the prince’s ties to France and forced his troops into Prussian service. Loewe, Preussens Staatsverträge, 26.
164 Jany, Preussische Armee, 1:437; Wilson, German Armies, 110.
165 Jany, Preussische Armee, 1:448; C. Jany, Urkundliche Beiträge und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Preußischen Heeres, Vol.7 (Berlin: Mittler, 1905), 52; Wilson, German Armies, 110.
166 Troops from Saxe-Gotha in March 1703, Wilson, German Armies, 110; Jany, Preussische Armee, 1:437. Their strength was increased to 2,600. Hattendorf, England in the War of the Spanish Succession; 408. Raby-Marlborough 29.07.1703, BL, 61137: ‘you would be pleased to take into the Queen’s service the regiment of Nassau-Dillenburg that is now before Guelders’. The regiment from Mecklenburg joined the Imperial army in June of 1703 as part of Prussia’s contingent for the Upper Saxon Kreis: Jany, Preussische Armee, 1:448.
These extra troops, alongside Frederick’s own already in the field, certainly came close to fulfilling Frederick’s obligations. However they fell just short. And here we can see one of the primary reasons Frederick was loath to provide all of the troops he was supposed to. For in the treaties made with both the Emperor and the Maritime Powers, Frederick had exchanged the service of his army for subsidies. The financial subsidies however were infrequently paid and often stood in arrears. Regarding the English subsidy payments for the 5,000 Prussian troops, Marlborough reported in April 1703 that ‘I find that the Prussians, Hessians, nor Hanoverians, has [sic] not received any of their extraordinaries’. For long periods subsidies from both the Maritime Powers and the Emperor remained unpaid. Further, tradition stipulated that each prince’s quota was convertible into a financial sum, accordingly Frederick could therefore claim to more or less be meeting his troop obligations to his alliance partners, for the shortfall in troops was more or less equivalent to the lacking subsidies.

Frederick did not use troop issues solely to extract the granting of the new ceremonial to him from the English. His reluctance to fulfil his commitments was multifaceted, and was tied up in relations to both the Emperor and the Empire. It was English actors such as Marlborough and Raby who deliberately attempted to link English ceremonial concessions to similar Prussian concessions over troop issues. Just as they had done with

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167 Obligation was 22,279. Frederick had roughly 20,000 in the field.
168 The Krontraktat of 1700 granted Frederick 150,000 Gulden (75,000 Reichsthaler) yearly. Annual subsidies of 360,000 Reichsthaler were paid by maritime powers for the 5,000 troops under the treaty of 1701. Braubach, Subsien, 107, 125; Moerner, Staatsverträge, 810-823.
169 Marlborough to Godolphin, 06.04.1703, Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 1:159. Marlborough asked Godolphin to check the accounts of Lord Ranelagh, the Paymaster of the forces. Ranelagh engaged in ‘slipshod administration and grossmalversation’, and had previously been found to have embezzled £900,000 in his role. A. Graham, Corruption, Party, and Government in Britain, 1702-1713 (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 46; C. Pal, Republic of Women: Rethinking the Republic of Letters in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: CUP, 2017), 156.
170 For how Frederick used subsidy arrears as a ‘diplomatic weapon’ see: M. Plassmann, ‘Der Preis der Krone: Preußische Truppen im Spanischen Erbfolgekrieg’, in J. Kunisch, ed., Dreihundert Jahre preussische Königskrönung, (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002), 229-256. If Frederick’s entire quota were to be converted into cash instead of troops it amounted to 37,176 Reichsthaler monthly, 446,112 annually. Accordingly, the 150,000 Gulden lacking from the Emperor could have supported a force of 2,231 troops (446 cavalry, 1785 foot). The troop ratios and annual costs taken from: Jany, Preussische Armee, 1:444.
the Danish, English ministers attempted to bind Prussia more closely to the Grand Alliance once they had accepted that court’s new ceremonial. For Marlborough the granting of a new form of audience to the King in Prussia was thus a small price to pay, if it could possibly end disputes and bring about the dispatch of more, vital Prussian soldiers. Once an English envoy had finally arrived in Berlin and Frederick became aware that he had instructions to accept the new Prussian ceremonial, Frederick made a concession to Marlborough in allowing the southward march of 6,000 men under Dessau.\(^{171}\)

After his arrival Raby persistently pressed Frederick to send more troops to aid the Allies, and meet his quota obligations. Either through truly misunderstanding his obligations to imperial collective defence, or cunning chicanery Frederick avoided sending further troops. Despite this, the English continued to adhere to plans whereby the English envoy would take his first audience under the newly introduced ceremonial. Raby pressed on with preparations for this event, perhaps hoping that the audience itself would bring about further troop agreements, just as promises of the arrival and audience of an English envoy had secured troop movements throughout 1702 and in June 1703. Frederick however did not send the desired reinforcements; he was not withholding his troops from the Grand Alliance merely to secure the acquiescence of the English to his ceremonial innovations. Frederick thus failed to meet his quota obligations despite Raby taking his audience on the 10\(^{th}\) July 1703.

English pleas for the King in Prussia to send his full quota therefore fell upon deaf ears. However, Frederick was willing to make some concessions. In the wake of the audience Raby received orders to get Frederick to concede to a prohibition of trade with France.\(^{172}\) It was hoped that by banning trade, and particularly imports, the French economy would suffer. The burdens of an extended period of war would therefore become more troublesome for the French king and his people.\(^{173}\) Frederick was initially reluctant, however he subsequently consented, and so on August 11\(^{th}\) Wartenberg wrote to Raby confirming the prohibition of commerce between France and Prussia for a period of one year.\(^{174}\) Raby later explained the reasons behind this, drawing a link

\(^{171}\) Raby arrives in Berlin on 09.06.1703, receives Prince Royal orders on 23.06.1703, Dessau’s troops move on 01.07.1703.

\(^{172}\) Raby-Hedges, 11.08.1703, TNA, SP-90/2.

\(^{173}\) For the strategy of trade prohibition see: Clark, ‘War Trade’, 262-280; Clark, ‘Neutral Commerce’, 69-83.

\(^{174}\) Wartenberg to Raby, 11.08.1703, TNA, SP-90/2.
between Frederick’s delight at Anne’s ceremonial concessions and his desire to reward her by prohibiting trade with France: ‘the King thinks himself obliged to her [Anne] for all her compliance with his desires’, and that he would comply with ‘everything that is recommended by her’.¹⁷⁵ As such Raby reported that Frederick would ‘prohibit immediately their commerce; and to show it was done on my pressing it from the queen only; they had not yet acquainted Monsieur Spanheim, nor any of the King’s ministers aboard’.¹⁷⁶ This instance shows that English compliance with Prussian ceremonial wishes could not overcome all issues and make Frederick a wholly obedient member of the Grand Alliance. Nonetheless the institution of the trade ban seemingly in response to the English envoy’s audience shows Prussian willingness to make a gesture of gratitude when the English aided in the production of Frederick’s potentate status.

⁴.⁹. The Cooperative Production of Status within the Network of Northern Courts

Queen Anne of England, Scotland and Ireland was one of few European princes to recognise Frederick’s royal rank and claims to potentate status through the ceremonial honours accorded to him. The granting by English envoys of the new audience ceremonial did just that. Accepting the newly introduced Prussian ceremonial was consequential. Not only did the conduct of English diplomats provide an example that those from elsewhere in Europe could follow, but the fact that a minister of the second order from the Queen of England stood uncovered before Frederick, who meanwhile retained his hat and was seated, aided him in the production of his rank as a potentate ruler. Recognition of this type only emboldened Frederick. The English granting of the new ceremonial therefore altered Frederick’s behaviour towards other princes. It manifested itself in a growing self-confidence; and a desire to see the representatives of other princes recognise his royal rank and potentate

¹⁷⁵ Raby Hedges, 14.08.1703, TNA, SP-90/2.
¹⁷⁶ Raby Hedges, 14.08.1703, TNA, SP-90/2. This ban was continued in December of 1703, all post to France was also halted, it was a mark that Frederick was ‘always ready to comply with whatever the Queen desired’. Raby-Hedges 22.12.1703, TNA, SP-90/2.

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status through the new ceremonial as the English had done. Here the role of the Network of Northern Courts as a constructive space in which cooperative status production could be achieved becomes important. Ultimately, English acceptance of Prussia’s new envoy ceremonial helped to bring about more widespread recognition of Prussian ceremonial innovations and consequently of Frederick’s royal status.

In particular Frederick agitated to have other members of the Grand Alliance acknowledge the newly introduced Prussian ceremonial. This is apparent in Frederick’s relations with the Dutch Republic. After Raby had taken his audience under the new ceremonial in August 1703, Frederick turned to the Republic and similarly required that they might dispatch an envoy to him, so that the new ceremonial could be performed. But Frederick was not content to wait idly by for the Estates General to meet this request. The King in Prussia was also perfectly willing to punish those who harmed the production of his potentate status. This he thought the Dutch to be doing, for the representative in Berlin of the United Provinces was merely the secretary to the previous envoy to Frederick, who had since departed from the Prussian court. As such this former secretary, Christiaan Karel van Lintelo, remained merely there as ‘only a resident here from the States’.\textsuperscript{177} It was remarked that this former secretary and ‘sort of resident’ was ‘not overly agreeable to this court’.\textsuperscript{178} This was due to Lintelo’s lowly rank, for Frederick as a newly anointed king expected to receive representatives of a loftier rank than resident. Frederick therefore sought to alter the situation once he had received envoys from both Denmark and England who took their audiences under the terms of the new ceremonial. He therefore demanded the Estates General also send him an envoy, with the English envoy recounting the situation in October 1703; ‘the King is resolved to recall his envoy from The Hague unless the States General send one to him immediately’.\textsuperscript{179}

The threat seemed to work, as the Estates General recalled Lintelo and then posted him back to Berlin the following year, this time with the character of envoy. He arrived in June 1704 and as Raby remarked ‘it is not

\textsuperscript{177} Raby-Hedges, 02.10.1703, TNA, SP-90/2.
\textsuperscript{178} Raby-Hedges, 22.12.1702, TNA, SP-90/2.
\textsuperscript{179} Raby-Hedges, 02.10.1703, TNA, SP-90/2.
doubted but that he will conform to the ceremonial without any scruple.

Lintelo was forced to delay his public audience in order to await his equipage. However in August he was finally ready to take his public audience. This was taken ‘according to the newly introduced ceremonial’, for Lintelo was given a memorial on the style in which the audience was to proceed, and thus contented himself to come before Frederick in the same manner as those envoys from England and Denmark had done. Like his English and Danish counterparts before him, here was a potentate representative granting Frederick the treatment that indicated belonging to that group.

While the adherance of successive envoys to the new ceremonial aided in the production of Fredrick’s potantate status, the ephemeral and temporary nature of ceremonial occasions limited the impact and status defining power of such events. The observation of Frederick’s symbolic assertions of rank were initially limited to those present in the audience chamrber itself. This could be counteracted by inviting as many spectators as possible, including Berlin’s foreign diplomats and notable courtiers. The effects of the audience were then propagated by the reports disseminated abroad by observers. Both Raby and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz were present at Lintelo’s audience for instance, and each transmitted news to England and Hanover respectively that it had occurred under the new ceremonial. Likewise, when reports of these audiences were included in European news-periodicals, the ability of such events to define status amongst European society at large once more multiplied. Accounts of the audiences of Ahlefeldt, Raby, and Lintelo under the new ceremonial were all published in various European news-periodicals or ceremonial compendiums.

180 Raby to Harley, 24.06.1704, TNA, SP-90/2.
181 Raby to Harley, 28.06.1704, TNA, SP-90/2.
183 The republican envoy Lintelo was guaranteed that ‘henceforth no minister of the second order from a crowned head would be admitted to his audience in this court under any other ceremonial’. Ibid., 3:203-204.
184 Raby to Harley, 30.08.1704, TNA SP-90/3; W. Li, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz - Kurfürstin Sophie von Hannover: Briefwechsel (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2017), 517ff.
185 Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:643; The Present State of Europe: or, the Historical and Political Monthly Mercury, Vol.14 (London: Rhodes, 1703), 276; Theatri Europaei, Vol.16 (Frankfurt: Weyland, 1717), 244.
These successful audiences influenced Frederick’s relations with the Swedish king, Charles XII. With the Great Northern War raging on in Poland, and Charles attempting to dethrone the Polish-Saxon king, Augustus II, Frederick’s cooperation in the Commonwealth was much desired.\textsuperscript{186} Anders Leijonstedt was hence posted as Swedish envoy to Frederick’s court. He arrived in March of 1704, but almost immediately began to encounter problems that made him an ineffective vehicle for Prussian-Swedish cooperation. In March Raby reported that ‘Monsieur Leijonstedt the Swedish envoy here has not yet seen the King nor notified his arrival to any of us foreign ministers, because he seems to be of the opinion that his master will never allow him to take his audience of the prince royal sitting with his hat on, and this court is firmly engaged not to receive him otherways by the instruments they gave Monsieur Ahlefeldt and of which I sent you a copy’.\textsuperscript{187} Frederick thus refused to see the Swedish envoy.\textsuperscript{188} Leijonstedt expectantly awaited instructions from his sovereign to comply with the new ceremony.\textsuperscript{189} However the Swedish king had no desire to conform, the main Swedish objection to the new ceremonial was ‘its having been begun by Denmark, whose fashions the Swedes say by no means they like to follow, no more than I believe the Danes do theirs’.\textsuperscript{190} The Swedes had previously punished the Danes because of their ceremonial innovation, and so understandably were reluctant to grant such treatment to the King in Prussia, as this would strengthen the claims of his Danish counterpart to such ceremonial


\textsuperscript{187} Raby-Hedges 29.03.1704, TNA, SP-90/2.

\textsuperscript{188} Raby-Hedges 29.03.1704, TNA, SP-90/2. Besser asked whether he had instructions to conform the newly introduced ceremonial, he had no such instructions and so Besser explained that due to the newly introduced ceremonial, and the memorials supplied to the English and Danish envoys, Frederick could have neither public nor private audience with him till he had such orders from the King of Sweden. Besser, \textit{Schriften: Ceremonial-Acta}, 3:189.

\textsuperscript{189} Raby-Hedges, 05.04.1704, TNA, SP-90/2.

\textsuperscript{190} Raby-Hedges, 06.05.1704, TNA, SP-90/2. There was of course a fierce rivalry between the two Scandinavian kingdoms as well as a history of internecine warfare, the latest bout of which was only brought to an end in 1700. S. P. Oakley, \textit{War and Peace in the Baltic, 1560-1790}. (London: Routledge, 1992); Frost, \textit{Northern Wars}. Charles XII also feared it could disadvantage him with the French and Spanish. Li, \textit{Briefwechsel}, 517ff.
treatment.\textsuperscript{191} Lejonstetd would continue to wait futilely for instructions to comply with the new ceremonial, however none were forthcoming.\textsuperscript{192}

Charles XII was so unwilling to grant Frederick I the new envoy ceremonial, that he instead dispatched an ambassador, one Johannes Rosenhane, to Frederick in February 1705. This of course precluded the act of having to conform to the new ceremonial, which only concerned envoys. Ambassadors represented the person of their master and so did not have to denigrate themselves by standing while others remained seated and covered.\textsuperscript{193} Ministers of the first order with a representative character received treatment indicating the equality of their master with the host.\textsuperscript{194} Yet for Frederick this was a most agreeable situation. Rosenhane was the first ambassador Frederick received as King in Prussia.\textsuperscript{195} The right to dispatch, and equally to receive ambassadors was thought of as the mark of sovereignty, and the presence of ambassadors at a court went some way to producing that ruler’s potentate status. Frederick had sent his first ambassador as king to England in 1702, however he awaited the reciprocal act of recognition by the appointment of an ambassador to his own court. The appointment of the Swedish ambassador changed that. Frederick received the same right that those rulers within the group of potentates had themselves secured, and therefore aided the construction of his status as part of this group. The formal entry that Rosenhane made to Berlin, (a right that set ambassadors apart from

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\textsuperscript{191} The Danish envoy had waited fifteen months for an audience with the Swedish king, but to no avail; Durand to Greg, 29.01.1702, Ward, \textit{Manuscripts of the Duke of Portland}, 2:59.

\textsuperscript{192} He was still waiting expectantly: Raby-Hedges, 10.06.1704; Raby to Harley, 28.06.1704, TNA, SP-90/2; Raby to Harley, 04.10.1704, TNA, SP-90/3.

\textsuperscript{193} For example, in the audience Rosenhane took of Frederick-William, the crown prince remained standing in front of his chair, Besser, \textit{Schriften: Ceremonial-Acta}, 3:224, 256.

\textsuperscript{194} Once more it was not prescribed whether such audiences should occur seated/standing, or covered/uncovered. The appearance of equality was what was most important. See previous chapter.

\textsuperscript{195} Stollberg-Rilinger claims the Count Tobiansky, dispatched on behalf of Augustus II of Poland (but not the Republic itself) was one of the first ambassadors sent to Frederick. Stollberg-Rilinger, ‘Höfische Öffentlichkeit’, 174; K. L. von. Pöllnitz, \textit{Memoiren zur Lebens- und Regierungsgeschichte der vier letzten Regenten des Preussischen Staats}, Vol.1 (Berlin: Voß, 1791), 329. Other sources indicate he was only an envoy, although one of high noble rank. Bittner and Gross, \textit{Repertorium}, 1:143; Waddington, \textit{L’acquisition}, 316-317; \textit{Theatri Europaei}, 1717, 16:124. For earlier less impactful embassies see: J. Luh, ‘The Using of Peter the Great’s visit to Prussia by Frederick III of Brandenburg’, in C. Horstmeier, ed., \textit{Around Peter the Great: Three Centuries of Russian-Dutch Relations}, (Groningen: NOS, 1997), 24-28.
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lesser diplomats) again displayed in a very public manner Frederick’s tentative steps into the group of potentates. In order to avoid the embarrassment of following the example of their rivals, the Swedes had thus recognised Frederick as their equal via the dispatch of an ambassador with a representative character. It was however English acceptance of the Prussian adoption of the Danish ceremonial that made Frederick so unmoving in his demands with other Princes. Raby’s audience had given Frederick the confidence to demand as much from those rulers equal to the Queen of England. Further Raby’s audience had produced assurances that henceforth all envoys must take their audience in the same manner. Due to the Swedish envoy’s refusal to conform to this, and Frederick’s resultant refusal to see him, it is thus reasonable to state that the English acceptance of the new ceremonial led to Frederick receiving his first foreign ambassador in Berlin as King in Prussia.

4.10. Conclusion

Throughout 1702 and 1703 as Frederick I adopted a new form of envoy audience ceremonial the Prussian king used his relations with English actors to assert his status as King in Prussia, and consequently produce his potentate rank. The ways in which this occurred were twofold. Firstly, Queen Anne’s acceptance of Frederick’s ceremonial revision assisted in the process of production itself. The very sight of a representative of the Queen of England, Ireland, and Scotland submitting himself before the King in Prussia, by standing uncovered whilst Frederick himself sat and was covered was influential. Frederick, as a recently crowned king, and ruler striving for potentate status was showing his superiority over ministers of the second order, just as those monarchs in London and Paris did. Frederick recognised none but other sovereigns and kings (potentates) as his equals. He would only conduct audiences that indicated equality with those representatives that possessed a representative character, thus ambassadors and not envoys. The fact that this event was carried out in a very public manner, before the assembled eyes of the Berlin court and the foreign diplomats present there further aided in the

production of Frederick’s potentate status. Other representatives could read Frederick’s intentions and see the rank he was attempting to assert. Observers also transmitted reports on this topic, multiplying its effects.

The second way in which Raby’s audience of 1702 aided in the production of Frederick’s potentate status was in influencing his relations with other princes. Once Frederick had secured the tacit recognition of Queen Anne to his claims to potentate status, he became more confident and assertive in his relations with other European princes. He demanded the same from others as the English queen had given him, and was unwilling and unable to give foreign envoys audiences on different terms to that Raby had taken. In this way Anne’s acceptance of the Prussian ceremonial innovations supported the production of Frederick’s status as a potentate king with other European rulers.

The English were willing to concede to Frederick’s request for an English envoy, and that he take his audience under the new ceremonial because they required Frederick’s assistance in the War of the Spanish Succession. Their promises ultimately helped in binding Frederick to the Grand Alliance and securing the services of a significant proportion of the Prussian army. Despite ceremonial concessions however the English did not obtain as many troops as they had hoped to extract from the Prussian king. The production of his status as part of the group of potentates was one of Frederick’s primary objectives. His behaviour with other princes reflected this. He was willing to reward those princes that supported the production of his potentate status by conceding to his ceremonial demands in a number of ways; by making his troops in the field more cooperative or imposing trade bans upon the enemies of the Grand Alliance. Frederick was also willing to punish those who refused to bend to his ceremonial demands and therefore assist in the production of potentate status. This would be a pattern that would continue throughout Frederick’s reign as he continued the on-going process of asserting his rank.
5. **Status and Ambassadorial Rank: New Reflections on the Resolution of the 1706 Raby Crisis**

Attaining ambassadors from potentate rulers was the next phase in the process of successfully producing Hohenzollern potentate status; for Frederick desired to have his own rank asserted through the rank of other princes’ representatives at his court. The promotion of Baron Raby to English ambassador and his subsequent ceremonial entry of April 1706 offered the opportunity to establish Prussian potentate credentials. Because of the status producing function of ambassadorial postings rulers were willing to undergo lengthy and hard-fought negotiations to secure such appointments. Anglo-Prussian negotiations once more reveal the tendency of the King in Prussia to reward actions he deemed to aid his status production, and to censure those who failed to, or even inhibited such production. The English propensity to intertwine matters of ceremony and status, with those relating to troops in the War of the Spanish Succession can likewise be observed.

The significance of ambassadorial presence to Frederick is discernibly exhibited in the king’s desire to retain Raby in Berlin as ambassador, even once a personal and political crisis of 1706 seemed to have made the Englishman’s position untenable. Once it became clear that Raby’s successor would not hold the same lofty rank, complications were overcome in order to retain an English ambassadorial presence in Berlin. Upon hearing of his impending recall and demotion Raby likewise worked hard to recover his reputation and remain in Berlin, evidencing how the ambassadorial position was part of his own long-term process of gradual ascension.

There is also a very human background to the appointment of Raby as ambassador, the crisis of 1706, and his ultimate retention, that contributes towards discussions of ‘new diplomatic history’, or ‘Diplomatie vom type ancien’.

1 Diplomatic relations between England and Prussia are revealed not to be the obedient execution of

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1 Thiessen, ‘Diplomatie vom type ancien’, 471-503.
centrally dictated orders by diplomats acting as little more than tools of state. Instead these diplomats, as well as rulers and their ministers, brought with them their personal goals, animosities, and factional attachments to Anglo-Prussian interactions.

The crisis that forms the core of this chapter is a well-known but rather understudied case. The incident was engendered by factional and personal rivalry, a purported royal mistress, and the English ambassador’s alleged affair with her. Many works mention the interesting particulars of this case, without diving into depth, and while relying on outdated and flawed research to explain how this predicament was overcome. This chapter provides a key contribution by presenting a new perspective on the resolution of the crisis. This author’s explanation takes into account the actors’ interests, and primarily their concern for status and rank. Here it challenges traditional historiography in shifting agency away from English actors and distributing it across both sides of the Anglo-Prussian nexus. This chapter not only focuses on the sensational elements of the crisis, but also considers how events interplayed with broader themes in Anglo-Prussian relations, such as matters of diplomacy, ceremony, military cooperation, and factional antagonisms.

5.1. The Contribution of Ambassadorial Presence to the Ongoing Construction of Potentate Status

5.1.1. Potentate Status and Ambassadorial Presence

It has already been established that the right to send and receive diplomats of the first order with a fully representative character was deemed as the sole preserve of ‘sovereigns’, or ‘kings’, or what this thesis has termed as potentates.² The reception of ambassadors was particularly prized by rulers eager to assert their potentate credentials. At the ceremonial entry to their residence city and ensuing audience potentates assumed far greater control over ceremonial proceedings that when dispatching their own ambassadors to foreign courts.

The staging could be carefully managed, with splendour being deployed, and ceremonial elements being used to communicate the host’s status claims. The host could also reproduce accounts of the event and control their subsequent distribution beyond the court.

The requirement that all envoys adhere to the newly introduced ceremonial had already resulted in the arrival of a Swedish ambassador, Johannes Rosenhane. Rosenhane performed his ceremonial entry to Berlin on May 8th 1705. The entry of Charles XII’s representative however occurred under the shadow of official mourning, for the body of the recently deceased Sophia-Charlotte had only been returned to Berlin on March 22nd. The full grandeur of the court could thus not be displayed at an event fewer than seven weeks later. Rosenhane was likewise in personal mourning for his recently deceased wife. His entry therefore took place with a reduced entourage, equipage and fanfare, with those present turning out in simpler black clothes of mourning.

The Prussians were eager to attain further ambassadors in order to utilise the concomitant ceremonial events to assert Frederick’s status. Raby relays an incident involving the Marquis de Prie, who had previously served the Emperor and the Duke of Savoy, as ambassador in Turin and Vienna. In 1705 the Duke of Savoy dispatched him to Berlin as envoy, however despite this Raby reported: ‘here indeed at court they put him upon the foot

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3 See previous chapter.
8 Ibid., 3:218ff. For the extent of mourning see: Raby-Harley, 10.02.1705, TNA SP-90/3.
of an ambassador because they affect to have as many with that character as they can’. Likewise reacting to the rumoured dispatch of an Imperial ambassador to Denmark, the Prussians ‘now insist upon having an [Imperial] ambassador also here’, the Imperial Court had no intention of complying with such wishes.

5.1.2. English Ambassadorial Appointments

The appointment of an English ambassador in particular was much desired by Frederick and his ministers. The potentate rank of the English monarch was never in question and consequently reception of an ambassador from Anne was deemed an impactful recognition of potentate status. An English ambassadorial appointment was also meaningful because the English were far from profligate in that regard. Between 1688 and 1714 a total of 34 diplomats were appointed to the rank of ambassador. Ambassadorial appointments constituted just sixteen per cent of diplomatic postings between 1648 and 1715. The recipients of these representatives were the highest-ranking rulers in Europe. The reception of an ambassador therefore reflected the rank of the ruler in question.

Between 1688 and 1714 English ambassadors were received by the Kings of France, Spain, and Portugal, alongside the Habsburg Emperor. The Ottoman Sultan and the Russian Tsar likewise received ambassadors, as did the Republics of Venice and the United Provinces, an indication that the dispatch of an ambassador depended not only upon the dignity and social rank of the receiving ruler, but upon the potentate status of the ruler or state in question. Two further appointments were made to the King in Prussia and the Duke of Savoy.

9 Raby-Stepney, 24.03.1705, BL Add. MSS. 7061; Bittner and Gross, Repertorium, 1:165, 475; Besser, Schriften: Ceremonial-Acta, 3:213.
10 Raby-Harley, 27.02.1706, TNA, SP-90/4.
11 Raby spoke of Frederick’s ‘pressing insistences’ regarding the promotion of Raby to ambassador; Raby-Harley, 12.07.1704, TNA, SP-90/2.
12 Horn, British Diplomatic Service, 45.
13 Ibid., 44.
15 Drawn from: Bittner and Gross, Repertorium; Firth and Chance, Diplomatic Relations; Horn, Diplomatic Representatives.
but significantly only once each had secured a royal title and engaged in a long-term process of potentate status construction. This indicates that the rank of both rulers and diplomats were to some degree dynamically reflective of one another. The rank of diplomats dispatched represented the extent to which the receiving ruler had effectively undertaken a process of potentate status production, and the perception of their status by the dispatching ruler. This conception of status combined with the dynastic and strategic priorities of the dispatching state to determine the diplomatic rank of accorded representatives.

5.1.3. **The Incomplete Process of Production**

Anglo-Prussian relations constituted one of the primary means through which Frederick sought to communicate and secure recognition of his claims to potentate status throughout European princely society. Raby summarised the Prussian position towards Anne’s recognition of the royal title: ‘all they expect from her is her Good offices to get his title owned in other courts’.\(^{16}\) This was especially imperative for in 1705 the Prussian royal title, and by extension Frederick’s position as a potentate was far from secure. The rulers of France, Spain, Bavaria, Cologne, the Pope, and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were yet to recognise Frederick’s royal rank.\(^{17}\) Contemporary European periodicals had also cast doubt over whether Frederick’s title would be recognised throughout Europe.\(^{18}\) Even the new Habsburg Emperor, Joseph I, Frederick’s wartime ally, withheld the title of ‘Majesty’ and corresponding royal respect from him.\(^{19}\) The behaviour of numerous other princes in relation to Frederick had also barely altered since the coronation.

Four years after the coronation in 1705, there was a sole ambassador at the royal court of Berlin in the form of Rosenhane, the Swedish representative who served from 1705-1707.\(^{20}\) Frederick continued to receive representatives possessing the rank of envoy or lower from numerous princes, including those with whom he

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\(^{16}\) Raby-Stepney, 21.07.1703, BL Add. MSS. 7061.

\(^{17}\) Baumgart, ‘Ein neuer König in Europa’, 173-175; Friedrich and Smart, *Cultivation*, 17.

\(^{18}\) Koopmans, ‘Glorification’, 150.

\(^{19}\) Göse, *Friedrich I*, 269.

was united in the Grand Alliance.21 Worse still, from some rulers he received no representatives at all despite his elevation.22 If the rank of diplomatic agents reflected the rank of the ruler to whom they were accorded then it would appear as though in 1705 few regarded Frederick as any more significant than he had been as elector.

The desire to obtain further ambassadors was part of Frederick’s cumulative fears about his tentative grip on the royal title, and incomplete ascension into the circle of potentates. While the behaviour of many other princes towards Frederick stayed unchanged, there remained the very real prospect of failing to adequately produce his potentate rank. Remarks made in 1700 by Frederick’s privy councilor Heinrich Rüdiger von Ilgen remained just as valid: ‘it is not enough merely to be crowned, one must also secure the recognition that one has become King’.23

5.1.4. **Titles of the Royal Brothers**

Alongside the disputes over diplomatic rank that rumbled on between 1701 and 1706 ran another that is similarly revealing of Frederick’s concerns over construction of his rank. Having only one son, Frederick desired that his half-brothers Philip-William, Albert-Frederick, and Christian-Ludwig, the Margraves of Brandenburg-Schwedt, be given the title of ‘royal highness’, so that if Frederick and his son were to die, and his possessions pass to his brothers, their succession to the royal title would be eased by the greater dignity in which they would be regarded. Historians have traditionally considered the threat to Prussian territorial integrity posed by these agnate princes of the blood. And while assessments also occasionally reflect that Frederick’s assumption of the royal dignity and lack of heirs obliged him to build up the status of his half-

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21 Denmark, the Dutch Republic, Savoy and the Emperor all merely sent envoys; Bittner and Gross, Repertorium.
22 Spain and Portugal: Ibid.
brothers, analysis of these efforts is focused on the Prussian court, with the production of the margraves’ status in the European courtly sphere being neglected.24

The establishment of the margraves’ royal credentials was a matter of the utmost importance, for as Baron Raby remarked of the brothers’ pretensions to the title of royal highness in 1705: ‘[Frederick] desires, it would secure to them the succession of Prussia as a kingdom in the manner he now enjoys it. For he has great reason to doubt that if his brothers should in the manner they are looked upon now succeed him, the title of king would be much disputed’.25 Frederick’s concerns over the royal rank he had secured for his house are played out here. For whilst Europe’s newest king was treated differently from his peers, he feared that his would be a mere paper title, which would sink back into the sandy soil of Brandenburg upon his death, or when his allies no longer needed him. The brothers’ dispute was an articulation of Frederick’s fears, and indicative of the value he placed upon securing treatment equal to other crowned heads.

Throughout 1705 and 1706 the Prussians deeply considered whether they could justly claim the title of royal highness for the margraves.26 They requested it from the Swedish and English representatives, and Raby too expended much ink expressing his thoughts on whether the brothers should be termed as ‘royal highness’ or merely as ‘highness’.27 Ultimately the Swedish and English felt this an unreasonable pretension, for even Anne only received the title of ‘royal highness’ once her father became king.28 Both Raby and Rosenhane would continue to address the margraves merely as highness during their audiences, refusing to grant them the ‘royal’

25 Raby-Harley, 02.06.1705, TNA, SP-90/3.
27 Raby-Harley, 02.06.1705, TNA, SP-90/3; Rousham, MC-15, 129ff.
This instance is nonetheless relevant for historians in revealing Prussian concerns over the fragility of the royal status, and attempts to construct equality to Europe’s crowned heads through ceremonial forms.

5.2. **The 1706 Diplomatic Crisis**

5.2.1. **Raby’s Appointment as Ambassador**

Once Raby had been installed as envoy Frederick began requesting that he be raised to the rank of ambassador. This was the next logical step for a ruler attempting to assert their potentate status through the rank of diplomatic agents. An English ambassador would be the complementary appointment to Spanheim, ambassador in London since 1702. What is more, the arrival of the Swedish ambassador in 1705 emboldened Frederick in his pleas for the same from the English.

Already in July of 1704 Frederick received word that Queen Anne intended to raise Raby to ambassador to satisfy him. Raby reported that Frederick was ‘extremely pleased’ by this. Yet despite his pleasure, the King in Prussia was also impatient. William III’s promise of a permanent envoy to Berlin had taken two years to come about and Frederick had no desire to again be left waiting. Frederick thus insisted upon the prompt promotion of Raby. In December 1704 the Duke of Marlborough promised Frederick that Raby would soon be raised to the rank of ambassador. Raby likewise felt it was the proper time for his promotion, especially as the first Italian Treaty had been concluded in November and the ambassadorial appointment had clearly been used as a bargaining tool in order to secure the dispatch of 8,000 Prussian troops to Savoy. However, he also realised the long-promised appointment may prove chimerical, nothing more than a negotiating gambit.

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30 See Chapter 3.
31 Raby-Harley, 12.07.1704, TNA, SP-90/2.
32 Raby-Harley, 10.12.1704, TNA, SP-90/3.
Alternatively, the promotion might only be awarded after much delay once sufficient concessions had been extracted from the Prussians, as was the case with the envoy posting. Frederick impatiently questioned Raby as to why he was not yet purchasing the equipage befitting an ambassador, Raby conceded to Secretary of State Harley, ‘I dare not tell him [Frederick] I could not yet count upon it as a thing’.

Life in Berlin was consistently made difficult for Baron Raby whilst he awaited his promotion to the rank of ambassador. This was possibly a Prussian tactic to encourage Raby’s prompt elevation. Frederick had used a similar strategy in dealing with Charles XII. The Swedish king’s envoy had found ‘many difficulties and obligations’ relating to ceremonial issues, particularly because of his rank. His master thus thought it easier to send an ambassador to the Hohenzollern court. The death of Sophia-Charlotte and the delivering of the English condolences brought about ceremonial problems, with the Prussians pressing for a public audience which would be ‘very ceremonious and troublesome’. However, Raby remarked that: ‘the changing of my character… will put an end to that matter’. Here it can be observed how the Prussians attempted to influence the timing of English appointments to Berlin.

On July 18th 1705, Baron Raby received his credentials as Queen Anne’s ambassador to the Prussian court, with Frederick immediately expressing his satisfaction at Raby’s elevation. The preparations for Raby’s official entry as ambassador took up much time and involved numerous difficulties. Most notably Fredrick postponed Raby’s entry until the court was wholly out of mourning for Frederick’s late wife and daughter.

34 See previous chapter. Also: Frey, *Anglo-Prussian Relations*, 34.
35 Raby-Harley, 10.12.1704, TNA, SP-90/3.
36 Raby-Stepney, 10.01.1705, BL, Add. MSS. 21551.
37 Raby-Harley, 11.04.1705, 26.05.1705, TNA, SP-90/3. Due to desires not to repeat the envoy ceremonial ‘till we had seen how many Crown'd Heads would follow Her Majestyes Example’, Rousham, MC-15, 129.
38 Raby-Harley, 18.07.1705 & 25.07.1705, TNA, SP-90/3.
40 Louise-Dorothea died 23.12.1705. Rousham, MC-15, 117
Raby was therefore able to make his entry in ‘gala’, as opposed to the more muted Swedish entry. The entry thus occurred on April 7th 1706, and was by all accounts a grand affair.

Raby followed Frederick’s exact post-coronation procession route through Berlin while placed inside a coach of state; ‘the finest ever made in Berlin’. Exceptionally, this was drawn by not six horses but by eight, the extra set having been granted by the King. Throughout his entry Raby was accompanied by martial splendour: two guards battalions greeted his arrival ‘with Colours flying, and Drums beating’, a 20-gun cannonade salute was thrice fired, and resplendently dressed Swiss halberdier-guards flanked his ascension into the Fürstenhaus. The city was ‘thronged with Greater Crowds of People than have been seen in Berlin’, with many crying ‘God save the queen of England’. In the words of one contemporary ‘anyone who witnessed this entrance… had to admit that it would have been difficult to improve upon the good order and splendour’.

During Raby’s defrayment he remarked: ‘all the rest past with a world of satisfaction on all sides and I was treated in every respect as the King himself the three days, there was not the least difference; which is not so with us in England’. Raby’s audience with Frederick also passed in the utmost splendour, and Frederick expressed his gratitude towards Anne ‘for distinguishing him by a public embassy’, and announced his satisfaction with Raby’s harangue. This derived not only from the magnificence of this occasion, but from the fact that Raby’s entry had allowed his uninhibited assertion of his rank as a sovereign king, and the

43 Rousham, MC-15, 120.
45 For Frederick’s Swiss Guards see: Jany, Preussische Armee, 1:422.
46 Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:643-644.
production of his potentate status.\textsuperscript{49} For the first time Berlin, as Frederick’s capital, received a foreign diplomat of the highest rank with all the pomp and opulence that was concomitant with such an occasion. The traditional public entry to the city had allowed Frederick to unfold the magnificence of his court before numerous observers, many of whom transmitted reports thereof across Europe.\textsuperscript{50}

The presence of two ambassadors and a number of envoys from potentate princes marked the emergence of Berlin as a proto diplomatic hub, and certainly demonstrates a significant transition from the beginning of Frederick’s reign. Once Baron Raby had been installed as English ambassador, Frederick and his ministers were keen to preserve an ambassadorial presence at the Hohenzollern court. For in general there were two types of ambassadorial appointments. Those of a longer term, who were usually succeeded by representatives possessing the same exalted rank, and those who were granted the lofty rank of ambassador temporarily, or merely for special missions.\textsuperscript{51} England had on occasion used the later type. In 1668 an English envoy was temporarily granted the status of ambassador so that his induction of the Elector of Saxony into the Order of the Garter could be ‘performed with greater dignity’.\textsuperscript{52} There is some indication that a similar temporary status was adopted by two Englishman when they presented Frederick with the Garter in 1690.\textsuperscript{53} Yet once their brief missions were completed these agents either resumed their former character, or left the respective courts altogether.\textsuperscript{54}

These two types of ambassadorial appointment reflected the rank of the two types of ruler. Short term and ceremonial ambassadors were dispatched to minor princes temporarily enjoying prosperous relations with

\textsuperscript{49} The impact thereof is assessed in: Stollberg-Rilinger, ‘Höfische Öffentlichkeit’, 145-172. See also: Thiessen, 'Diplomacy', 63-84.
\textsuperscript{50} Including himself: Berner, Briefwechsel König Friedrichs I., 90. London Gazette, No.4220 , (1706).
\textsuperscript{52} Roosen, ‘Diplomatic Ceremonial’, 473.
\textsuperscript{53} G. King and J. Johnston, An Account of the Ceremony of Investing his Electoral Highness of Brandenburgh with the Order of the Garter (London: Chiswell, 1690); Firth and Chance, Diplomatic Relations, 32; Horn, Diplomatic Representatives, 102.
\textsuperscript{54} See also the Lefort embassy of 1697 which lasted only a month: Luh, ‘Peter the Great’s visit’, 24-28.
England. Rulers of undisputed potentate status received longer-term, or successive ambassadorial appointments which had the power to aid potentate status production. Such an appointment was therefore much desired by Frederick and his ministers. Yet once Raby assumed the post of ambassador various currents began to play out at the Berlin court which in turn endangered the Englishman’s position.

5.2.2. Anglo-Prussian Court Factions

The machinations that took place at the Berlin court throughout 1706 were deeply intertwined with the factions at play within this environment. Multiple historians explain the crisis of 1706 through the prism of court factionalism and so it is important to assess the situation at the Hohenzollern court, even if only to facilitate later critical analysis of their work. Factions dominated the court of Frederick I far more than was the case with his predecessor or successors. Frederick was more willing to consult, delegate, and at times be led by his ministers, particularly in comparison to other, less compromising Hohenzollern rulers. Factional strife was therefore commonplace in Berlin, while spying and gossip abounded. As Raby commented in 1704, ‘revolutions happen daily in the councils of our little Court, for what is advised one day and agreed on by one party of councillors is obstructed and altered the next day by another party; each being willing to insinuate themselves with their master and to make him believe they seek nothing but his grandeur’.

The fall of Eberhard von Danckelmann in 1697, upon whom the ills of the treaty of Ryswick were widely blamed, precipitated the rise of a cabal of powerful minsters around Frederick. Designated by detractors as the three W(oes); Wartenberg, Wittgenstein, and Wartensleben rose to prominence, with Count Johann Kasmir

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55 Most notably: Naujokat, Frey & Frey, and Noorden. Their work is discussed later.
Kolbe von Wartenberg at their head.\(^{60}\) Wartenberg quickly gained much influence within Brandenburg-Prussia, securing numerous important offices and holding them simultaneously.\(^{61}\) By 1701 he had placed the purple cloak upon Frederick at the coronation, was the first to be inducted into the newly established Order of the Black Eagle and was named as Frederick’s prime minister or grand chamberlain.\(^{62}\) Indeed so complete was Wartenberg’s accumulation of offices and power that in 1703 Raby commented that in Berlin ‘all affairs go through the hands of only one minister’.\(^{63}\) With this position came the ability to enrich himself, which Wartenberg exploited.\(^{64}\) The Grand Chamberlain’s views of foreign policy broadly favoured Prussian involvement in the west.\(^{65}\) He sought to continue the opulence of the Berlin court, which could only be done with the assistance of subsidies granted by the Maritime Powers in lieu of troops. The money that poured in from England and the Dutch Republic also presented further opportunities for the Grand Chamberlain to supplement his income. Consequently, he sought in general to avoid entanglement in the Great Northern War on Prussia’s eastern frontier.\(^{66}\)

The self-enriching practices of Wartenberg drew both criticism and resentment from other groups at the Berlin court. Opposition was particularly prevalent from a clique, which included two of Frederick’s privy councillors, Heinrich Rüdiger von Ilgen and Friedrich Wilhelm von Grumbkow, and centred itself around the Crown Prince, the future Frederick-William I.\(^{67}\) The Dutch envoy Christian Karl von Lintelo was also closely aligned to this group. Frederick-William was critical of both the lavish court lifestyle supported by Wartenberg, and the self-enrichment in which he was engaged, and therefore sought alongside his allies to reduce

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\(^{60}\) Frey and Frey, *Frederick I*, 83-89.
\(^{61}\) Including hereditary postmaster, marshal, imperial count and Statthalter for the Orange Possessions, these brought Wartenberg an annual income of 123,000 thaler: Feckl, *Preussen*, 210.
\(^{62}\) Göse, *Friedrich I*, 162-164, 236.
\(^{63}\) Raby-Hedges, 21.08.1703, TNA, SP-90/2.
\(^{66}\) Naujokat, ‘Mylord Raby’, 76.
\(^{67}\) Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, 87; Naujokat, ‘Mylord Raby’, 79.
Wartenberg’s power. In general there were no significant differences between the foreign policy views espoused by the opposing factions. However personal animosities, and competition over access to resources and patronage, meant that even when theoretically united on certain issues, divisions and opposition could be seen between the two factions.

Queen Anne’s English ministers also straddled this factional divide. Baron Raby had largely attached himself to Wartenberg and his faction, enjoying close relations with Frederick’s prime minister, as well as his wife. Indeed it even appears as though Raby was engaged in an affair with the Countess Wartenberg, which granted him considerable influence over her, and by extension her husband. Despite this cuckoldry Raby remained close to Wartenberg, perhaps the thirty year age disparity between man and wife meant Wartenberg was willing to allow the younger Raby to tend to his wife’s needs. Raby’s attachment to the Wartenberg faction was made all the more definite by his personal dislike of members of the opposition. He detested Grumbkow, whom he at various times labelled as ‘the half minister’, ‘silly’ and ‘a block head’. Raby also disliked the Dutch envoy, Lintelo, whom he mocked as a ‘coxcomb’ who nevertheless often appeared in shabby clothes and looked far worse than anyone else at court. He even went so far as to state ‘I have the pleasure daily to see [Lintelo] mortified, and to contribute to it myself now and then as far as my character will permit me’. These personal relationships bound Raby more tightly to Wartenberg’s faction, and earned him the ire of their opponents.

The other character of note who engaged in the court intrigues of Berlin was John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough. Marlborough, a leading English statesman and part of the duumvirate dealt extensively with the

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70 Naujokat, ‘Mylord Raby’, 76-79. There are numerous letters detailing their friendship: Raby-Hedges, 14.08.1703, TNA, 90/2; Raby-Harley, 11.11.1704, TNA, 90/3; Raby-Harley, 6.01.1705, TNA, 90/3.
73 Raby-Cadogan, 09.04.1707, BL, Add. MSS. 22196; Raby-Stepney, 18.12.1704, BL, Add. MSS. 7061.
74 Raby-Cadogan, 09.04.1707, BL, Add. MSS. 22196.
Berlin court. He regularly wrote to Frederick and Wartenberg, and made a number of visits to Berlin throughout the period. Alongside the considerable influence that Marlborough brought to negotiations with Frederick throughout this period, he also carried his personal animosities and political loyalties.

The embryonic nature of party politics during Anne’s reign often makes party allegiances difficult to evaluate. However, the political attachment of the two protagonists must be assessed in order to fully understand their actions. Although not wishing to be dominated by either party Marlborough had moved more towards the Whigs by 1705 in the wake of their electoral triumph. By March of 1705 the Earl of Portland was reporting to the Grand Pensioner of the Dutch Republic that ‘the liaison is thoroughly effective between the Whigs and Marlborough and Godolphin’. This contrasted to Raby’s own nominal attachment to the Tory party. On top of this, the personal enmity between the Churchill and Wentworth families influenced Marlborough’s actions towards Raby. Marlborough showed his disdain for Raby, designated him as ‘impertinent and insignificant’, and moreover a ‘coxcomb’.

Additionally, Marlborough’s overarching priorities as a general of the English and allied forces ruled him. He required that as many Prussian troops as possible be put at the disposal of the allies. Anyone who failed to sufficiently aid him in this matter was sure to incur his wrath. Raby by contrast often worked primarily to increase his own standing, seeking lofty appointments to the army or privy council, increases in pay and greater titles. He often pressed Frederick in his troop commitments, but for him they were not as great a priority as for Marlborough.

75 Frey, Anglo-Prussian Relations, 21.
78 Quoted in, Noorden, Europäische Geschichte, 2:248.
81 Frey, Anglo-Prussian Relations, 76.
As a consequence of their differing goals and personal animosities, hostile manoeuvres played out at Frederick’s court between the two men. Marlborough often worked to undermine Raby’s position in Berlin, attempting to limit his power, whilst doing everything within his means to increase his own. Marlborough set up a means of communication from which Raby was removed, utilising members of the faction opposed to Wartenberg, with Grumbkow in particular acting to pass information between Frederick and Marlborough. When the time came to negotiate important treaties between England and Brandenburg-Prussia, rather than leave such negotiations to Anne’s ambassador in Berlin, Marlborough preferred to make the journey east and conduct them himself. The renewal of the Italian Treaty of 1705 was negotiated by Marlborough in this manner. The Duke circumvented Raby; unilaterally negotiating the continuation of 8,000 vital Prussian troops on the Italian front. Indeed during Raby’s time in Berlin he lamented that he had not signed one bilateral treaty, but that all had been signed by Marlborough.

Between 1705 and 1706 there were therefore two clearly delineated and antagonistic factions at the Berlin court. The group centred around Wartenberg and his associates enjoyed the favour of the king and held numerous positions of importance. The opposition, consisting of the Crown Prince, Grumbkow, and Ilgen, worked to limit Wartenberg’s power and do all to ‘injure him in the mind of his royal master’. The two leading English diplomats in Berlin were bound to either side of this divide; Raby to Wartenberg and his faction, and Marlborough to the opposition. It is worth noting, that this chapter will focus exclusively upon high ranking Berlin courtiers, as the Brandenburg-Prussian estates and the territorial nobility did not significantly influence Frederick’s military, diplomatic, or ceremonial policies. With this arrangement of

84 Pohlig, Marlboroughs Geheimnis, 227.
85 Naujokat, England und Preußen, 144.
86 Frey, Anglo-Prussian Relations, 89.
87 Coxe, Memoirs, 1820, 2:326.
88 See section discussing sources and courtly decision making in introduction.
persons in mind we may thus turn to the events of 1705-1706 aware of how the personal antagonisms influenced the course of events.

5.2.3. **Troop Issues: 1705-1706**

Despite having made his solemn entry to Berlin in April of 1706, Baron Raby’s position at the Berlin court almost immediately became rather precarious.⁸⁹ For the aforementioned reasons Marlborough sought to limit Raby’s influence in Berlin. What compounded this desire was Raby’s role in the troop issues that rumbled on throughout 1705 and 1706. The Prussians deemed that the three main bodies of their troops in allied service were inadequately paid, exposed to disproportionate and unnecessary casualties, and provided with poor winter quarters. Consequently, the delay or complete withdrawal of these indispensable troops was repeatedly threatened. Raby was deemed by Marlborough to have been unable to resolve such issues satisfactorily.

The required annual renewal of the Italian Treaty which ensured the continued service of 8,000 troops to northern Italy was made difficult, despite these troops being regarded as essential by the allies.⁹⁰ Frederick was concerned by the excessive losses his units serving in Italy suffered throughout 1705 and 1706.⁹¹ This, Frederick blamed on the incompetent and malicious Habsburg generalship.⁹² Resultant threats were then made, including that the Italian Treaty would only be renewed under more preferable conditions, and with Frederick on one occasion exclaiming that he would ‘never send any more men into Italy’.⁹³

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⁹² Raby-Marlborough, 8.05.1706, TNA, SP-90/4.
⁹³ Raby-Harley, 19.09.1705, TNA, SP-90/3; Raby-Harley, 8.05.1706, TNA, SP-90/4.
Frederick also threatened the recall of his Brabant-based auxiliary corps of 5,000 men. The troops were jointly maintained by Anglo-Dutch subsidies and provisions, however the Dutch had been delinquent in their payment and provisioning. By the end of 1705 the troops were in a pitiable condition, primarily due to outstanding Dutch subsidies. As Grumbkow remarked of the troops ‘it is impossible for them to subsist any longer, unless the King will either pay them himself or oblige the Dutch to pay them better’. Frederick correspondingly threatened to withdraw the 2,500 troops supported by Dutch pay unless the Estates General undertook to provide more frequent imbursement.

Within the Empire on the river Moselle, the 12,000 Prussian troops constituting the ‘altees Korps’ and serving under Margrave Louis of Baden were fairing no better. Louis failed to allocate the Prussian contingent adequate winter quarters; prioritising other troops instead. As a result of this maltreatment Frederick withdrew all 12,000 of his troops from service on the upper Rhine under the command of Louis, alleging that the Catholic Margrave ‘has a design to ruin all the Protestant troops’. Frederick complained that: ‘They are either intentionally led to the slaughter by the Margrave of Baden, or they are to be ruined and die miserably, from hunger and deprivation, because of the poor preparations the Emperor has made in almost all respects’.

Frederick insisted that the 12,000 troops should instead join up with the 5,000 strong auxiliary corps in Brabant and serve under Marlborough. The Imperial court disapproved; under the terms of the Krontraktat the troops

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95 Raby-Harley, 19.09.1705, TNA, SP-90/3.
96 Raby-Harley, 12.09.1705, TNA, SP-90/3.
97 Raby-Harley, 24.10.1705, TNA, SP-90/3.
100 Raby-Harley, 17.04.1706 & 08.05.1706; Raby-Marlborough, 08.05.1706. TNA, SP-90/4.
101 Frederick-Grumbkow, 1.06.1706, Quoted in; Jany, *Preussische Armee*, 1:486.
102 Raby-Harley, 8.05.1706, TNA, SP-90/4. This was part of Frederick’s longstanding aim of summarising his obligations by providing an independent corps of 20,000 troops under Prussian command. Berney, *König Friedrich*, 47-55; Plassmann, ‘Der Preis der Krone’, 253. This was partially realised in 1709. Naujokat, *England und Preußen*, 200.
were obliged to serve within the Empire, yet Raby encouraged acceptance; ‘for the King will send his troops where he pleases, or keep them at home’.

There was therefore much uncertainty surrounding the commitment of the Prussian troops. The repeated threats that Frederick might withdraw his soldiers was detrimental to Marlborough, who was planning the allied manoeuvres for the forthcoming campaign of 1706. The potential recall of some or all of the 25,000 Prussian troops would have significantly hindered allied strategy, to which Marlborough’s personal prestige was intimately connected. It was moreover feared that the withdrawal of well-disciplined Prussian battalions might be the precursor to Prussian engagement in the Great Northern War. Prussian participation in the northern conflict would have likely triggered similar retreats from Prussia’s neighbours, including Hanover and Denmark, perhaps amounting to 40,000 men.

Marlborough correspondingly worked tirelessly to secure the troops for the forthcoming year, both personally and through the English representative in Berlin. Yet despite resolving some of the troop issues before the commencement of campaigning, the 12,000 strong altes Korps had still not joined up with other allied contingents. Adamantly refusing to serve under Margrave Louis they disobeyed Imperial instructions, remaining behind the front at Wesel rather than marching to Mainz as ordered. Faced with Frederick’s recalcitrant attitude the English position gradually shifted; for they preferred for the altes Korps to serve under Marlborough than to be wholly absent. As late as June there were still fears that Frederick would withdraw the 12,000 troops altogether. Indeed Prussian troops were absent for the commencement of the campaigning

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103 Raby-Harley, 8.05.1706, TNA, SP-90/4; Frederick made other demands, refusing to dispatch his troops until he received an answer. Frederick I.-Joseph I., 17.04.1706; Raby-Harley, 23.02.1706, 22.05.1706, 29.05.1706, TNA, SP-90/4.
105 The Italian Treaty had been renewed in December 1705 and the Italian Corps marched from Bavaria to Italy in March of 1706; Loewe, Preussens Staatsverträge, 75; Feckl, Preussen, 78. Raby-Harley, 06.03.1706, TNA, SP-90/4.
106 Raby-Harley, 08.05.1706, TNA, SP-90/4.
107 Raby-Harley, 01.06.1706, TNA, SP-90/4; Marlborough-Sarah, 10.06.1706, Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 1:571.
season, failing to join the allies for the battle of Ramillies in May of 1706.  

Marlborough informed Frederick of the subsequent allied victory, describing his regret that Prussian troops had not served but continuing: ‘however I do not wish to despair of seeing them yet in my army’.  

The mood of the Prussian court and the behaviour of the King annoyed Marlborough, which he regarded as ‘abominable’. The Duke was similarly perturbed by Baron Raby’s recent conduct, who he now perceived as an ineffectual English representative in Berlin. He confided to Godolphin, ‘as yet we have no certainty of having the Prussian troops, and as I am informed here at The Hague, nothing can go well in that court as long as Lord Raby is there’. Marlborough alongside Godolphin therefore resolved as early as May to attempt to remove him from Berlin. Marlborough only suggested they wait, as ‘I desire you would not think of removing him till I see what way that court will behave themselves’. The Prussian troops were eventually dispatched on the 5th of June 1706, but the damage had been done. Marlborough’s told Godolphin, ‘there should be no time lost in sending him [Raby] from that court’, Marlborough would summon Raby to his camp, and ‘let him know plainly how matters stand’.  


109 Marlborough to Frederick I., 24.05.1706, Murray, Letters, 1845, 2:521-522.  

110 Marlborough-Godolphin, 11.06.1706, Marlborough-Sarah, 31.05.1706, Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 1:556, 571.  

111 Marlborough-Godolphin, 11.06.1706, Ibid., 1:571.  

112 Godolphin-Marlborough, 09.05.1706(OS), Ibid., 1:542; Naujokat, England und Preußen, 143-144; Frey, Anglo-Prussian Relations, 249.  

113 Marlborough-Godolphin, 07.06.1706, Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 1:564. The troops were dispatched on 05.06.1706 and a courier was sent to inform Marlborough of this on 07.06.1706; Frey, Anglo-Prussian Relations, 228.  


115 Marlborough-Godolphin, 11.06.1706, Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 1:571.; Marlborough-Harley, 24.06.1706, Murray, Letters, 1845, 2:628.
Marlborough had willing allies in Berlin; the faction comprising Crown Prince Frederick-William, Ilgen, Grumbkow, and Lintelo was strongly opposed to Wartenberg, and by extension his ally Raby. Their opposition intensified throughout the crisis surrounding the Prussian troops. The Crown Prince thought the policy of delaying the dispatch of troops was indefensible and had been promoted by the unscrupulous Wartenberg and his cabal. Grumbkow was likewise opposed to the withdrawal of the Prussian troops and had urged Frederick to dispatch them to the front. This group’s interests therefore intersected with those of Marlborough.

5.2.4. The Fall of Wartenberg and Raby

The anti-Wartenberg faction then exploited a set of felicitous circumstances. In April the Grand Chamberlain was struck down with gout, and this coincided with the movement of Frederick’s court to Frankfurt an der Oder, thus meaning Wartenberg was unable to follow. The court then embarked on a peripatetic few months, successively travelling to Charlottenburg, Oranienburg, Potsdam, on to Hanover in June, and finally to Cleves in July. This extended period of travel excluded Wartenberg and the opposing faction worked to reduce his influence.

By the spring 1706 Frederick was growing weary of the Grand Alliance and the squabbles with his partners, he looked longingly to the east and at potential gains that could be made from intervention in the on-going Great Northern War. Wartenberg had always discouraged flirtations with the east and urged commitment to

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116 Frey, Anglo-Prussian Relations, 248.
117 Raby-Harley, 22.05.1706, TNA, SP-90/4.
119 Raby-Harley, 24.04.1706, TNA, SP-90/4. For the peripatetic character of Frederick’s court see: Elsner, Friedrich III./I.
120 Raby-Harley, 24.04.1706, 01.05.1706, 15.05.1706, 18.06.1706, 03.07.1706, TNA, SP-90/4.
121 Feckl, Preussen, 80; Naujokat, ‘Mylord Raby’, 80.
the west; partially in order to obtain subsidies to maintain Frederick’s lavish court. Nonetheless this allowed Wartenberg’s enemies to portray him as a ‘creature’ of England, working exclusively for the benefit of the Maritime Powers. Consequently there were murmurs that Wartenberg would assume the blame for Prussia’s fractured relations with the allies, and failure to capitalise on eastern opportunities. The rupture was definite by mid-June, and it seemed somewhat attributable to Marlborough’s influence – for as Linda Frey states, ‘the Grand Chamberlain told Raby that the King no longer consulted with him freely about the interest of the Allies since Marlborough’s last visit.’

In order to further undermine Wartenberg the opposition faction also sought to weaken Raby’s position. Grumbkow worked alongside Marlborough to politically exclude Raby, while the out-of-favour Wartenberg was unable to defend his ally Raby from the accusations that abounded against him. It is during this period that Ulrich Naujokat claims the anti-Wartenberg faction insinuated that Raby was the lover of the Countess Wartenberg. This problematic rumour further suggested that through Countess Katarina von Wartenberg, Raby controlled her husband, the Grand Chamberlain, and by extension the King. The Countess was however not, as has previously been claimed, the King’s own lover, nor his Maîtresse-en-titre.

Through this influence Raby made Frederick and Wartenberg follow broadly pro-English policies, and made the latter into ‘an English puppet’. Marlborough confided to Godolphin, ‘the Grand Chamberlain’s enemies

have persuaded the King that Lord Raby governs his lady’, and therefore that Wartenberg pursued English interests more than ‘the true interest of his master’. Rumours about the two had previously abounded and so Raby’s relations with the Countess were a sensitive topic.

The effect upon Frederick was as intended and by June Marlborough could report that ‘the Countess of Wartenberg I hear is in disgrace’. He also informed Godolphin that ‘whatever Lord Raby may write, I can assure you that he is so far from being well with the King, that he can forward nothing, but may spoil everything’. By July the break was complete. Marlborough was informed by Grumbkow of Frederick’s desire to have Raby removed. Grumbkow relayed the King’s reasoning that ‘his [Raby] being so well with the Grand Chamberlain’s wife… gives him [Frederick] ridicule all over the Empire’. Frederick’s desire to see Raby removed was clearly sincere, as while Grumbkow was communicating this to Marlborough, Ilgen and Wartensleben were asking the Dutch envoy whether he could help procure Raby’s withdrawal.

Frederick’s plan was to first recall Spanheim from his ambassadorial posting in England. Spanheim was supposedly recalled to be made president of Frederick’s privy council, but it is unclear whether this was just a ruse. Ultimately, Spanheim would not leave London, but his recall nonetheless triggered diplomatic protocol that could be used to tactfully withdraw Raby. Few at the Anne’s court seemed enthusiastic for the withdrawal of Spanheim; he was well regarded by Anne and her ministry. Nevertheless Spanheim took his audience of

131 Marlborough-Godolphin, 31.05.1706, Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 1:555.
133 Marlborough-Harley, 24.06.1706, Murray, Letters, 1845, 2:628.
134 Marlborough-Godolphin, 07.06.1706, Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 1:564.
135 Marlborough-Godolphin, 08.07.1706, Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 2:602-603.
136 Marlborough-Heinskius, 20.05.1706, Hoff, Correspondence, 232-233.
137 Marlborough-Godolphin, 08.07.1706, Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 2:602-603.
138 Lintelo-Heinskius, 08.05.1706, Veenendaal, De briefwisseling, 1983, 5:224.
139 Marlborough-Godolphin, 8.07.1706, Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 2:603.
140 Luttrell, Historical Relation, 1857, 6:77. Tilson was told his departure ‘may yet run on for some time’. Tilson-Lewis, 03.08.1706, TNA, SP-90/105.
141 Godolphin-Marlborough, 15.08.1706(OS), Marlborough-Godolphin 01.09.1706, Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 2:652-655; Loewe, Spanheim, 154.
leave on August 22nd, where Queen Anne presented him with ‘very rich presents’. He was set to depart back to Berlin, but upon his embarkation at Greenwich in late October he received orders to remain on in London. Either Frederick never truly wished for Spanheim’s return, or other events altered Frederick’s decision.

Raby had meanwhile been summoned to Marlborough’s camp. In early August, he received new orders explaining that: ‘the changes there render it impracticable for your excellency to return to Berlin, yet the Queen is not willing to lose the benefit of your Excellency’s service and therefore her Majesty has commanded me to offer to your Lordship the going to Vienna, which is a place of higher dignity’. Harley conceded, ‘it is true the character of ambassador is not practicable in that court’. This was because, as the traditional head of Christendom, the Emperor was not willing to accord foreign ambassadors with treatment that recognised the equality of their dispatching ruler. In order to avoid ceremonial difficulties Raby would therefore be reduced to the rank of envoy.

Raby expressed his surprise and asserted that ‘the temper of the King, [and] the situation of the court of Prussia have not been rightly represented to you in England’. Raby insisted he be allowed to return to Berlin in order to pay his debts and take his audience of leave of Frederick: ‘There being (I believe) no precedent of any Ambassadors returning from a Court where they have been so long & which continues in alliance and friendship with the prince from whom the Ambassador was sent, without paying that respect of taking leave’. Raby went on to make a number of requests he thought should be awarded him as compensation for his demotion: ‘as I must fall from the title of Ambassador, to make that matter the easier, & to support my credit…

141 Marlborough-Godolphin, 5.08.1706, Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 2:633.
142 Luttrell, Historical Relation, 1857, 6:96.
143 Marlborough-Godolphin, 05.08.1706, Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 2:633; Luttrell, Historical Relation, 1857, 6:74-77.
144 Harley-Raby, 06.08.1706(OS), TNA, SP-104/51.
145 Harley-Raby, 06.08.1706(OS), TNA, SP-104/51.
147 Raby-Harley, 26.08.1706, TNA, SP-90/4.
148 Raby-Harley, 26.08.1706, TNA, SP-90/4.
[Anne] will be pleased to declare me one of her Privy council, and her plenipotentiary as well as Envoy… I need not tell you what an expensive court that at Vienna is, & that one who has the character to support, as I must there, cannot be able to do it upon less pay that what I have had at Berlin’.  

Raby stated that he would head to Berlin and await a reply to his propositions there, not taking his audience of leave until his requests were answered. Harley instructed Raby not to return to Berlin, and sent him his papers of revocation which Raby should merely forward to the Prussian king, thus relieving himself of the trouble of an audience of leave. Raby would therefore be unable to use his charms to reverse Frederick’s decision, nor appeal to any former allies at court. Raby disobediently ventured to Berlin anyway, and Harley was forced to accept Raby’s Berlin expedition as a fait accompli and allow him to take his audience of leave. Raby’s requests for a reasonable allowance and the title of Plenipotentiary were both granted, while the request to be privy councillor was denied, with Harley unable to find any precedent of it being granted to people overseas. Raby consequently asked for a further pay increase, and again stated he would defer his audience of leave until he received a reply. It is possible that these numerous requests were a sort of delaying tactic. Raby would have been aware of the impossibility of being granted the title of Privy Councillor, however his entreaties for compensation bought him time in which he could return to Berlin and begin to work against the current situation.

In October Raby heard from a Hanoverian newsletter that Spanheim was now to continue on in London, his recall having only been a ruse to secure Raby’s own withdrawal from Berlin, because Raby had supposedly ‘grew so disagreeable to that court’. Raby refuted this and asked that Harley protect him from this defamatory attack. Yet if we follow Marlborough’s writings and his correspondence with Grumbkow, the

149 Raby-Harley, 26.08.1706, TNA, SP-90/4.
150 Raby-Harley, 26.08.1706, TNA, SP-90/4.
151 Harley-Raby, 20.08.1706(OS), TNA, SP-104/51.
152 Harley-Raby, 27.08.1706(OS), 06.09.1706(OS), TNA, SP-104/51.
153 Raby-Harley, 10.10.1706, TNA, SP-90/4.
154 Raby-Harley, 10.10.1706, TNA, SP-90/4; For the reporter see: Schaich, ‘Information Professionals’, 76.
155 Raby-Harley, 10.10.1706, TNA, SP-90/4.
newsletter’s claims do not seem so far from the truth. Raby nonetheless assured Harley he could procure a letter from Frederick affirming his continued good standing and the King’s desire to retain Raby in Berlin.156

5.3. The Reversal

Raby thus set out for Berlin, and upon arrival ‘had a private audience of the King… at Charlottenburg in his Bedchamber’. He reported to Harley ‘the obliging things the King said to me, and that he hoped I should not leave his court’. Frederick reportedly indicated that he ‘would send monsieur Spanheim his credentials as ambassador on the purpose that that might have the influence of keeping me here’.157 To drive home his point that his position had been misrepresented, Raby told Harley: ‘that after several reports that was spread t’was very agreeable to me to hear from his majesty himself that he continued the same good opinion of me he ever had, and that he had a particular consideration & esteem for me’. According to the humble Raby himself: ‘I begged of him not to think of sending monsieur Spanheim his credentials again upon my account since his majesty was pleased to tell me t’was for that reason alone, and after the King was pleased to give many repeated assurances of his friendship to me’.158

If accurate, such a conversation would represent a complete reversal from the proceeding months. The private nature of the audience allows the accuracy of Raby’s testimony to be called into question, and the extent to which Raby exaggerated or embellished is also unknowable. Yet his report is useful in that it reveals Raby’s awareness that the circulating rumours regarding his fall could be seriously damaging. The blow his reputation would suffer if dismissed in disgrace from Berlin would have undoubtedly limited future employment opportunities both at home and abroad. Moreover, the apparent desire to remain in Berlin as ambassador rather than be demoted to envoy to Vienna shows the priority Raby himself placed upon rank and status. Hence the reason for Raby’s repeated quotation of Frederick’s supposed satisfaction with him, and desire that he remain.

156 Raby-Harley, 10.10.1706, TNA, SP-90/4.
Raby’s report was a pure propaganda exercise, aimed at an English domestic audience, including those such as Anne, Marlborough, and Harley, who thought his position beyond recovery.

Despite Frederick’s ‘agreeable’ expressions of the ‘good opinion’, ‘consideration and esteem’ he had for Raby, the Briton told Frederick he soon expected to be moved to Vienna. However Frederick subsequently wrote to Anne and Marlborough requesting that Raby remain in his posting at Berlin.159 Raby sent Harley duplicates, which he described as ‘obliging in relation to me’.160 He declared that he was still in the King’s good graces, and that the London news writer, ‘is out in his politics and I do assure you I was very far from desiring or expecting either one of these letters, though I was sure if I had desired it the King would have done it & more in my favour’.161 Importantly Raby announced he would remain in Berlin until his English superiors responded to these letters.162

The veracity of Raby’s testimony regarding the audience may be questioned, but significantly, a marked change in Frederick’s behaviour can be observed thereafter. Frederick resolved to retain Raby in Berlin. The aforementioned letters sent by Frederick to Anne and Marlborough clearly display Frederick’s change of opinion with regards to the ambassador. These are more striking in light of the King’s previous desire to have Raby removed only three months earlier. The letters worked as intended, for shortly thereafter numerous sources were reporting that Raby would continue in Berlin at Frederick’s desire, and even that Spanheim would only continue in the role of ambassador as long as Raby did likewise at Berlin.163

Frederick’s dramatic reversal occurred only once Raby took his private audience with the King. It is apparent that Raby in some way influenced the King’s decisive change in stance. It must therefore be asked, how did

162 Raby-Harley, 30.10.1706, TNA SP-90/4.
Baron Raby manage to transform Frederick’s temperament? Particularly when in the weeks and months before many were reporting upon Raby’s poor standing with Frederick, and the King had been enthusiastic for his removal.\textsuperscript{164} Raby was well known as a charismatic figure, and it is possible he could have used his charms upon Frederick in order to persuade him.\textsuperscript{165} Wartenberg’s recovery of influence may have also have aided in the reversal of Frederick’s decision.\textsuperscript{166} Furthermore some had indicated that Frederick would be unable to show his displeasure with Raby in person, and that he could only show his annoyance through messengers.\textsuperscript{167} Diplomats were well practiced in the arts of persuasion and banked on their abilities once granted an audience. Raby’s belief that all could be resolved in his favour once face to face with Frederick is evidenced by his willingness to ignore orders and return to Berlin. However, it seems it would have taken more than a little charm to repair the disastrous situation in which Raby found himself in October 1706. Alongside his ability to influence, Raby also needed to show Frederick that his preservation was also in the King’s interest.

5.3.1. Historiography of the Reversal

What then are the opinions of other historians on this issue? Each source has its flaws when looking at the crisis that developed over the course of 1706. Most give primary agency to Queen Anne and her ministry. They focus on why English actors decided, or allowed Raby to maintain his position as ambassador in Berlin. As such they seem to see Frederick, and his ministers, as mere chess pieces in the game of international diplomacy, which English actors could move around more or less at will. Opinions such as these are coloured by an Anglo-centric viewpoint due to the archival material upon which they are constructed. The extensive holdings of the British Library, and National Archives are often consulted, yet few works refer to sources in the Geheimes

\textsuperscript{164} Marlborough-Sarah, 31.05.1706, Marlborough-Godolphin, 07.06.1706, 11.06.1706, 08.07.1706, Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 1:556-571; Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 2:603.

\textsuperscript{165} Frey and Frey, Frederick I, 194.

\textsuperscript{166} Naujokat, ‘Mylord Raby’, 81. ‘[Wartenberg] has again got the upper hand of the faction against him... the Lady is more in favour than ever.’ Raby-Marlborough, 05.10.1706, BL, Add. MSS. 61138. Wartenberg likely convinced Frederick the rumours were baseless.

\textsuperscript{167} Frey, Anglo-Prussian Relations, 250.
Staatsarchiv in Berlin, or its predecessor in the German Democratic Republic. These works are undoubtedly influenced by the power relations of the time. Britain, on her post-Glorious Revolution ascent to preponderance is seen as the dominant power in this relationship. The Hohenzollerns by contrast are still characterised as mere auxiliary powers.\(^{168}\) The judgements of history also shape the opinions of historians. The words of Frederick the Great in characterising his grandfather as a weak petty man still reverberate, and if even subconsciously this plays into assessments of the events. For if Frederick I is thought of as vain, weak and vacillating, then it is difficult to attribute intelligent or cunning actions to him.\(^{169}\)

In attempting to explain the Raby crisis of 1706 William Coxe draws heavily on Marlborough’s private correspondence to inform his view.\(^{170}\) He consequently assigns primary agency to Marlborough in this tome, to which he supplements a flawed chronology and causality. He asserts that Marlborough’s Ramillies victory gave him influence over Frederick, who ‘ceased from pressing for the immediate recall of Lord Raby, and afterwards desisted entirely from his demand’.\(^{171}\) Moreover Coxe makes the dubious claim that as late as 1707 Marlborough could have easily secured the recall of the ‘disliked’ Raby, but instead ‘laboured to restore lord Raby’.\(^{172}\) This is contradicted by the sources which show Marlborough willingly working throughout 1706 to rid Berlin of Raby. Chronological inaccuracies also abound. Frederick was calling for Raby’s removal months after the Ramillies victory, and there is no evidence to suggest the Raby crisis continued into 1707.\(^{173}\)

A range of works discuss the Raby crisis of 1706 but provide wholly unsatisfactory explanations for its resolution. Winston Churchill in his four-volume series on the Duke of Marlborough makes the inadequate

\(^{169}\) Ibid., 224-225.
and unenlightening remark, ‘in April the King demanded Raby’s recall. However, in those days letters passed slowly’. 174 Roosen recounts the incident, adding that ‘then the king unaccountably changed his mind and insisted that Raby stay at his post’. 175 Thiessen meanwhile states that ‘the weakening of Marlborough’s power as well as the duke’s desire to keep his rival away from England prevented Raby’s dismissal’. 176

In her PhD thesis on Raby’s mission to Berlin, Linda Frey provides the explanation that, ‘the threat to Raby’s position by a cabal headed by Ilgen and Grumbkow was thwarted by Raby’s friendship with Frederick’, concluding that the reversal was symptomatic of his ‘vacillation’. 177 She fails to allow that there may have been logical reasoning that influenced Frederick’s thinking, rather than merely his own weakness. Such an explanation derives from the utilised source material, with Frey’s thesis relying on archival material from London, the Hague, Vienna, and Hanover. The Zentrales Staatsarchiv of the German Democratic Republic is not cited, although this author acknowledges the difficulties international doctoral students would likely have encountered when attempting to utilise this institution’s resources. 178 The biography of Frederick I subsequently produced by Linda and Marsha Frey does utilise Prussian sources, however the section dealing with the Raby crisis of 1706 is constructed upon the foundations of Linda Frey’s earlier doctoral work. 179 Thus the Frey sisters repeat the claim that it was ‘friendship’ which had saved Raby and that this is revealing of ‘the vacillation of Frederick’. 180

175 Roosen, *Age of Louis XIV*, 123.
176 Thiessen, *Diplomacy*, 74.
179 Frey and Frey, *Frederick I*, 193-205.
180 Ibid., 205.
Carl von Noorden contributes further understanding of the crisis.\textsuperscript{181} He doubted any assertions that Marlborough sought to aid Raby, emphasising the antagonism between the two and Marlborough’s involvement with the anti-Wartenberg faction’s plots. The political allegiances of the two Englishmen are brought in to play, with Marlborough who was ‘ever more openly ruled by the Whigs’ certainly not working to preserve the ‘strongly Tory’ Raby. Noorden holds that the Raby crisis was intimately bound up with the fall of Wartenberg that took place from May 1706, and that consequently Frederick’s desire to retain Raby was a product of Wartenberg’s recovery of power and influence, which was complete by the winter of 1706. Noorden does not illuminate how the Grand Chamberlain went about swaying Frederick to produce the letters that marked the volte-face.

Ulrich Naujokat provides the most extensive analysis of the situation, drawing on sources from both the English and Prussian archives.\textsuperscript{182} However Naujokat’s assessment shares similarities with older historiography in still attributing Raby’s continuation as primarily due to English actors, for according to him ‘the explanation is revealed by English domestic politics’, rather than actions undertaken on the Prussian side.\textsuperscript{183} Naujokat states that English ministers wanted the removal of Raby from Berlin, but that they thought it important that Frederick be seen to wish for Raby’s dismissal himself. This occurred when Grumbkow communicated the King’s wishes to Marlborough in July.\textsuperscript{184} The Marlborough-Godolphin Duumvirate did not wish to conspicuously remove another Tory, as Queen Anne had already criticised this. This was attributable to Anne’s own personal attachment to the party in question.\textsuperscript{185} Additionally, the increasing power of the Whig-Junto also played a role, for Anne did not wish to fall under the domination of one party.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{181} Noorden, ‘Preußische Politik’, 322-324.
\textsuperscript{182} Naujokat, ‘Mylord Raby’, 71-91; Naujokat, England und Preußen, 118-151.
\textsuperscript{183} Naujokat, England und Preußen, 149, 279.
\textsuperscript{184} Marlborough-Godolphin, 8.07.1706, Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 2:603.
\textsuperscript{185} Somerset, Queen Anne, loc.3966.
\textsuperscript{186} Naujokat, England und Preußen, 147-150.
The Whigs constantly sought to increase their power by having more members of the Whig-Junto placed in government positions to the detriment of the Tories. They sought to oust the Tory Robert Harley from his post as Secretary of State for the Northern Department at the beginning of 1706.\textsuperscript{187} After this failed attempt the Whigs, with whom Marlborough and Godolphin were by now almost wholly allied, turned their attentions to other less prominent Tories, including Charles Hedges, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, who they sought to replace with the Earl of Sunderland, a member of the Whig Junto, and Marlborough’s son-in-law.\textsuperscript{188} Anne feared the Whigs’ growing predominance and disclosed her fears to Godolphin that ‘making a party man Secretary of State when there are so many of their friends in employment of all kinds already, is throwing myself into the hands of a party, which is a thing I have been desirous to avoid… For if I should be so unfortunate as to fall into the hands of either, I shall look upon myself, though I have the name of Queen, to be in reality but their slave, which as it will be my personal ruin, so it will be the destroying of all Government’.\textsuperscript{189}

Anne preferred as few dismissals of Tories as possible, in order that she would not be ‘brought into the power of one set of men’.\textsuperscript{190} According to Naujokat the removal of Raby from his rank as ambassador extraordinary would have dispatched the last Tory-sympathetic diplomat from the Queen’s service.\textsuperscript{191} Thus the Duumvirate changed tack. No longer did they focus on removing both Hedges and Raby, but they accepted that the removal of one of these high-ranking Tories would be all that was palatable to Anne, and focused exclusively on replacing Hedges with Sunderland. The Whigs therefore begrudgingly accepted Raby’s continuation. According to Naujokat, this shift in the attentions of the Duumvirate and the Whig-Junto thus brought the Raby crisis to an end.

\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., 149.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{189} Anne-Godolphin, 30.08.1706, B. Brown, The Letters and Diplomatic Instructions of Queen Anne, 2nd edn (London: Cassell, 1968), 196.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{191} Naujokat, England und Preußen, 149.
Naujokat’s analysis can be critiqued in a number of ways. Firstly, although Naujokat repeatedly labels Raby as a Tory, Raby’s political attachments can to a certain extent be called into question. As Holmes has asserted ‘it would have been equally hard and quite irrelevant to attach a party tag to Thomas Wentworth, Lord Raby, the most persistent and shameless go-getter of his day’. An explanation that relies upon stark political differences consequently becomes less compelling.

5.3.2. A New Explanation for the Resolution of the 1706 Crisis

Naujokat’s work merely explains why Raby’s adversaries such as Marlborough and Godolphin were willing to accept Raby’s continued role as English ambassador when that had once been so distasteful. But their acceptance was in relation to a decision already made. For what brought about the reversal of the situation was a change in the winds at the Prussian court. It was Frederick who decided, having previously wished for Raby’s removal, that he now wanted to retain him. That the reversal was due to Frederick and not English ministers can be seen in letters produced throughout October and November 1706. On October 19th Raby reported to Harley that Frederick had extolled his virtues and expressed his desire for him to remain. On the same day Frederick sent Anne a letter requesting Raby be re-confirmed as ambassador. A day later Frederick informed Marlborough of his wishes, and asked him do everything possible to aid in the continuation of Raby. In reaction to the letters produced by Frederick’s about turn Marlborough bemoaned ‘the fickle temper of that prince’, while Godolphin asked Marlborough ‘to unriddle this mystery and tell us what is to be done with

193 Holmes, British Politics in the Age of Anne, 368; Jacobsen, Luxury, 219.
196 Frederick-Marlborough, 20.10.1706, BL, Add. MSS., 61108; Marlborough also reported to Raby that Frederick’s letter had expressed Frederick’s ‘earnest desire’ that Raby might continue in Berlin, Marlborough-Raby, 01.11.1706, Murray, Letters, 1845, 3:201.
people that are so wavering and uncertain’.197 Here is an indication that long before Marlborough and Godolphin decided to accept Raby’s continuation, they were merely reacting to Frederick’s reversal, which was the fundamental reason for Raby’s preservation. Likewise, Harley wrote to Raby: ‘I do not question but your excellency will in a little time discover the true source of this sudden turns of late in the court of Berlin concerning your excellency and Monsieur Spanheim’.198

When trying to account for Frederick’s radical shift it is pertinent to return to one of the primary goals of Frederick’s reign, the construction of his royal and potentate status through relations with other princes, and the rank of diplomatic representatives at his court. For whilst the crisis of 1706 rumbled on and Baron Raby’s position was perceived as more and more untenable, there was much talk of potential replacements as the next English representative in Berlin. The difficulty in procuring Prussian troops and personal animosities led Marlborough to consider replacing Raby, whom he deemed ineffective. However, as the Marlborough-Godolphin correspondence reveals, the Duumvirate did not feel it necessary to replace the English ambassador with a man of equivalent rank. They were content to downgrade English representation in Berlin to an envoy. This was partly designed as punishment for Frederick’s disobedience within the Grand Alliance and his withholding of troops, which Marlborough had termed ‘abominable’.199 The desire to chastise Frederick for the supposed peace talks he was conducting with the French also played a role.200 The reduced expense to the crown that an envoy represented in a period of wartime indebtedness was also influential.201 Moreover the potential successor-candidates were not of ambassadorial class, having never previously held a role above the rank of envoy. Finally, Marlborough’s desire to be the most senior English diplomat should not be

197 Marlborough-Godolphin, 01.11.1706, Godolphin-Marlborough, 22.10.1706(OS), Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 2:719-721.
198 Harley-Raby, 15.11.1706(OS), TNA, SP-104/51.
199 Marlborough-Godolphin, 11.06.1706, Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 1:571.
201 Raby thought the appointment might not last long due to expense: Raby-Harley, 10.12.1704, TNA, SP-90/3. Horn, British Diplomatic Service, 45ff., 77.
underestimated. Neither should his logical wish to have a lower ranking colleague in Berlin, to whom Marlborough’s personal treaty negotiations, and circumvention of said colleague would be more palatable.

In May of 1706 Marlborough was already intimating to Godolphin this potential demotion of the English representation in Berlin. Godolphin asked Marlborough his thoughts on ‘who should succeed Lord Raby if recalled. You know he was only made ambassador only to gratify the King of Prussia, so that her majesty will have no great difficulty complying with what you would have done in this thing’. 202 In response Marlborough asserted that ‘if there should be a necessity of recalling Lord Raby, an envoy would be sufficient for that court’. 203 Godolphin replied that ‘in case you are for recalling him, the Queen will send no more than an envoy to that court, which has given suspicion enough of having hearkened to France’. 204 In July the prospect of replacing Raby with an envoy was further repeated in secret talks between Marlborough and Grumbkow. 205 It was after this point that potential successors were considered, with Emanuel Howe, envoy to Hanover, and Richard Hill, envoy to Savoy, all contemplated for Berlin. 206 In October, John Pulteney wrote to Godolphin regarding the soon to be vacant post. He explained: ‘I am informed my Lord Raby is soon to be recalled from the court of Berlin and that the Queen has not yet made choice of any person for that character. If so I shall think myself very happy to have my son [Daniel] sent to that Court rather than to Denmark, the air being much better and the way of living much better at Berlin than at Copenhagen... I do not think it reasonable that this change, if Her Majesty consent, should be any extraordinary charge to the Crown, and I am well content to bear the expense’. 207

It is revealing of the thinking surrounding the next appointment to Berlin that John Pulteney felt able to suggest his son, a man who, like the other potential successors, Hill and Howe, had never held a posting above the rank

202 Godolphin-Marlborough, 09.05.1706(OS), Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 1:542.
203 Marlborough-Godolphin, 31.05.1706, Ibid., 1:555.
204 Godolphin-Marlborough, 26.05.1706(OS), Ibid., 1:562.
205 Marlborough-Godolphin, 8.07.1706, Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 2:603.
206 Godolphin-Marlborough, 22.07.1706(OS), 07.08.1706(OS), Marlborough-Sarah, 30.08.1706, Ibid., 2:630, 646, 654.
Moreover John Pulteney’s suggestion that his son’s expenses would be paid by himself seems to indicate that all concerned were aware that the posting to Berlin would be of the economical rank of envoy, for it is unlikely that John Pulteney would have been willing to bear the far greater expense associated with an ambassadorial position.

Word of Raby’s impending revocation was circulating around London. The contemporary diarist Narcissus Luttrell noted the forthcoming removal of Raby from Berlin and his thoughts that Pulteney would be appointed in his stead. He reported: ‘Tis said the lord Raby, ambassador to the King of Prussia, is to go envoy extraordinary to Vienna; that Mr Poultney envoy in Denmark, is to succeed his lordship at Berlin’. If Luttrell, the contemporary diarist and Member of Parliament knew about this, then it is probable that others were aware of the rank of Raby’s successor. Spanheim knew, and had intimated to his sovereign, that the next appointment to Berlin would not possess the rank of ambassador. He informed Frederick that Pulteney would replace Raby but with the rank of envoy. Through his domestic contacts Raby also knew of the reduced status that his successor would bear when sent to Frederick.

The reversion of the rank of the English representative in Berlin, from ambassador back to envoy, after so fleeting an appointment, would have damaged Frederick’s attempts to assert his potentate status. To have received Raby in April, for him to have been away with the army for some months during summer, and then for him to move on to Vienna in October would have categorised Raby’s embassy in a very different class to that which potentates received. Such a temporary appointment corresponded to the treatment granted to minor

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208 See: Horn, Diplomatic Representatives.


210 Luttrell, Historical Relation, 1857, 6:97.

211 Ibid.


213 He revealed to Marlborough that he knew of his replacement on 02.11.1706, Raby-Marlborough, BL, Add. MSS. 61138. Raby-Craggs, 09.11.1706, BL, Add. MSS. 22196.
princes.\textsuperscript{214} Here the agent was given ambassadorial rank for a temporary special mission, but it was quickly removed thereafter. In order to produce his potentate status Frederick desired longstanding ambassadorial presence at his court, or alternatively the appointment of successive ambassadors as other potentates received.

These salient details can inform an understanding of what altered Frederick’s course. It is impossible to truly know all that transpired at Frederick and Raby’s private audience, however, using knowledge of both characters, their concerns, and history of interaction, it is possible to make intelligent assumptions. Raby did everything possible to make his way back to Berlin in order to take a physical audience with Frederick, rather than merely forward on his letters of revocation to the King as he had been instructed.\textsuperscript{215} Raby knew Frederick’s concern with his new royal status and his desire to produce his potentate rank through the rank of diplomats at his court.\textsuperscript{216} He was also aware that his successor to Berlin would be of a lowlier rank, and it is very likely he used this information to persuade Frederick to retain him as ambassador to Berlin. He of course had his own motivations for this, not wishing to be disgraced and suffer demotion to the rank of envoy. It is also possible that alongside the concern of diplomatic rank Raby used issues of social status to convince Frederick of his utility. For unlike Raby, those considered as replacements, Howe, Hill, and Pulteney, were not members of the peerage. Frederick would have known that he was unlikely to receive another baron, or man of equivalent social standing after Raby’s departure.\textsuperscript{217} Both Raby and Frederick needed one another to retain what they desired.

Raby and the English diplomatic service in general also recognised how important the interaction between ceremony and rank was to Frederick, and how such issues could be used to influence him. In 1706 it was noted by one English diplomat that Frederick had to be, ‘humoured in the Darling point of Ceremony, beyond Reason or Convenience’.\textsuperscript{218} Raby recognised that through a combination of flattery, ceremonial and rank concessions

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{214} Roosen, ‘Diplomatic Ceremonial’, 473.
\item \textsuperscript{215} Disobeying instructions: Harley-Raby, 20.08.1706(OS), TNA, SP-104/51.
\item \textsuperscript{216} Raby-Stepney, 24.03.1705, BL Add. MSS. 7061.
\item \textsuperscript{217} Naujokat, ‘Mylord Raby’, 81.
\item \textsuperscript{218} Stepney-Hedges, 27.08.1706, BL, Add. MSS. 37353.
\end{itemize}
Frederick could be significantly influenced.\footnote{Naujokat, ‘Mylord Raby’, 76.} As he confided to Hedges, ‘we must manage this King, and not drive him’.\footnote{Raby-Hedges, 21.08.1703, TNA, SP-90/2.} During his 1701 mission Raby had accepted a ceremonially inferior position which ingratiated him with Frederick.\footnote{See introduction.} In 1703 he remarked that he held great influence in Berlin, in part due to the ceremonial concessions he had recently accepted at a reception with the Prussian queen.\footnote{Raby-Hedges, 14.07.1703, TNA, SP-90/2.}

The explanation for why Raby maintained his position as English ambassador proposed by this thesis places agency with Prussian actors and emphasises the significance of rank and ceremonial issues. It was Frederick’s overriding concern to produce his potentate status through the rank of diplomats, and Raby knew how to exploit this to his own advantage. These salient details provide context to inform our understanding of what truly occurred at the Charlottenburg audience and brought about the reversal.

The desire that Frederick’s potentate rank would be produced through the rank of diplomats was exhibited in the weeks that followed. After the meeting of October 1706, Frederick informed both Queen Anne and Marlborough that he would only continue Spanheim as ambassador to the court of St James if Raby retained his rank as ambassador in Berlin.\footnote{Frederick-Anne, 19.10.1706, Frederick-Marlborough, 20.10.1706, GstA-PK, I.HA Geheimer Rat, Rep.11 Auswärtige Beziehungen, Akten, 1850.} Many contemporaries noted this explicit stipulation. Godolphin informed Marlborough that, ‘Monsieur Spanheim has new credentials of ambassador, conditionally that my Lord Raby remain at Berlin in the same character’.\footnote{Emphasis added, Godolphin-Marlborough, 22.10.1706(OS), Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1975, 2:720.} Luttrell reported, ‘Baron Spanheim, the Prussian ambassador here, by his new credentials is only limited to continue with that character as long as the lord Raby stays at Berlin with the same’.\footnote{Emphasis added, Luttrell, Historical Relation, 1857, 6:101.} Hedges told Harley, of ‘an extraordinary credential Monsieur Spanheim has for resuming his character if Her Majesty will declare Lord Raby shall continue the same he has with His Prussian
Frederick was now insistent upon Raby remaining in Berlin, with a particular emphasis upon his continuation as ambassador.

This veiled threat that should Raby not continue as ambassador, then Spanheim would be recalled in displeasure was all the more crucial because of relations between the leading allies in 1706. Frederick’s relationship with the Estates General and Joseph I had largely broken down due to a number of disputes. His interactions with England therefore assumed even greater importance, with Anne and her ministers tasked with keeping the Prussian king bound to the Grand Alliance.227

The explanation proffered here appears far more plausible than that offered by other historians, which have already been evaluated and critiqued. Raby fell from favour as an opposition faction undermined his position. Frederick sincerely requested his departure from Berlin. Upon discovering this Raby did everything possible to make his way back to Berlin, while simultaneously learning that his successor would not be of ambassadorial rank. At the Charlottenburg audience Raby, knowing the King’s concern for constructing his potentate status, likely attempted to persuade Frederick to retain him and English ambassadorial presence. Once the salient details became known, Frederick would probably have needed little persuading, for Raby’s continuation suited his political objectives. Frederick wrote to the English informing them of the reversal and stipulating the conditions under which Raby must remain, with English ministers correspondingly expressing their consternation and bewilderment. Other factors played some role in proceedings. The machinations within the English ‘political nation’ proposed by Naujokat explain why English ministers were willing to reluctantly tolerate Raby’s continued posting in Berlin.

Moreover, the Great Northern War, and specifically Charles XII’s invasion of Saxony, made Raby’s diplomatic presence in the east of the Empire all the more important. Raby was able to pass information about the intentions of both Charles XII and Augustus II back to London, as well as communicate pleas from Queen

227 Naujokat, England und Preußen, 118-126; Frey, Anglo-Prussian Relations, 205ff; Frey and Frey, Frederick I, 201ff.
Anne that neither party embroil the Empire in war. This was crucial, as Queen Anne had ‘no Ministers at present with the King of Poland’. The information regarding the on-going conflict and Charles XII’s intentions inside the Empire that Raby fed to Marlborough was indispensable. These factors made Raby’s continuation more agreeable to his former enemies, yet it was most definitely Frederick that decided upon his staying in Berlin, and it was matters of rank that brought the King towards such a position.

5.3.3. Raby’s Defence of his Status

Raby remained in Berlin not solely due to Frederick’s desires, but because Raby himself fought to preserve his position. Raby’s promotion to ambassador served the Englishman’s own process of status production and rank elevation. By ensuring he was not ousted in disgrace by the crisis of 1706 Raby preserved his rank and retained royal favour both at home and in Prussia. This would in turn serve to open up future opportunities for Raby’s further rise.

With the appointment to ambassador Raby had accrued a number of benefits. Most obviously the financial compensation he received from the crown increased markedly, from a weekly ordinary-income of £35 to £100. Future financial gains were associated with the ambassadorial post; Raby received a set of gilt and silver plate as ambassador (worth over £3,000), which he could expect to be personally awarded at the embassy’s conclusion. He would likewise receive a parting gift from Frederick as ambassador that would

228 Hedges-Raby, 25.10.1706(OS), TNA, SP-104/51.
229 ‘I am obliged to you for two former letters, both relating to the invasion of the King of Sweden into Saxony, and must own I am very much in the dark as to those matters’, Marlborough-Raby, 01.11.1706, H. L. Snyder, The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, Vol.3 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), 201.
230 Horn, ‘Rank and Emolument’, 24. His extraordinary expenses also increased from a quarterly rate of £100 to £300. See: BL, Add. MSS. 31150.
far exceed what other diplomats received. The elevation to ambassador had likewise granted Raby prestige, while he obtained symbolic capital through the deferential ceremonial treatment he was accorded as his monarch’s exact representative. Most significantly, with the promotion to ambassador Raby could be entitled to expect the bestowal of one of the great offices of state upon his return.

The crisis of 1706 threatened to depose Raby and consequently jeopardised his access to the aforementioned benefits. The mooted move to Vienna as envoy would have reduced Raby to a lesser salary, he would have lost the expensive ambassadorial accoutrements, and the proposal that he depart Berlin without audience of leave would have deprived him of his parting gift from Frederick. The demotion to envoy would also have resulted in a loss of prestige for Raby, who expressed his thoughts that it was not necessarily the magnificence of the court that made an appointment attractive, but instead the diplomatic rank that one possessed. Most significantly, demotion in disgrace would undoubtedly have hindered future opportunities to gain further promotions and continue his own process of elevation.

This is important to consider, for although diplomatic service was in some senses attractive, in others it represented a sort of gilded exile entailing great personal expense. The cost of keeping up appearances for an ambassador often far exceeded the limited and irregularly disbursed pay they received from their

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232 Regulations stipulated departure gifts of 2,000 ducats for ambassadors and 1,000 ducats for envoys. Cassidy-Geiger and Vötsch, ‘Court Gifts’, 153. Raby’s envoy departure-present (1705) was worth 8,000 Reichsthaler, his ambassadorial departure-gift (1711) was worth 12,000 Reichsthaler. Besser, *Schriften: Ceremonial-Acta*, 3:231, 414.

233 See introduction.

234 Harley-Raby, 20.08.1706(OS), TNA, SP-104/51.

235 Harley told Raby he would be posted to the ‘superior court’ of Vienna, which would allow him to exercise his abilities ‘on a larger theatre’, Harley-Raby, 20.08.1706(OS), TNA, SP-104/51; Raby replied: ‘It is not the character of the court one is sent too, that distinguishes a man; but the character given by the greatest Princess in the world; & certainly that of ambassador from her, be it to what Prince it will, is the greatest dignity a subject can have abroad’. Raby-Harley, 10.10.1706, TNA, SP-90/4.

236 Generally demotions did not occur. Thiessen, ‘Diplomatie vom type ancien’, 491-492. For the consequences for Raby see: Tilson-Tucker, 03.08.1706, TNA, SP-90/105.

sovereign. Raby repeatedly complained about the ever-increasing expensiveness of the daily more splendorous royal capital of Berlin. He grumbled of expenses paid ‘out of my own pocket’, and owned ‘I find I shall be no Gainer by my embassy’. Diplomats stationed abroad were also cut off from domestic employment and advancement opportunities. Such disadvantages were tolerable when it was thought that a successful period of diplomatic service would lead to reward at home upon return, however the crisis of 1706 threatened to stymie Raby’s future opportunities.

This therefore explains why Raby in conjunction with Frederick worked so hard to preserve his rank as ambassador in Berlin. His diplomatic rank served his own process of status production, it enriched him by providing him with access to financial and symbolic resources, and it made his further promotion and elevation at some future moment more likely. Raby was ultimately able to weather the storm of 1706 and remain in Berlin for a fruitful five further years. These as we shall see contributed markedly to the stellar rise he was able to achieve in the final years of Queen Anne’s reign.

5.3.4. **Prussian Concessions to Reward Cooperative Status Production**

Whilst Frederick was willing to punish behaviour deemed detrimental to his objectives, primarily by threatening the withdrawal of his own ambassador to England if Raby should not continue at his court, he was also willing to reward behaviour contributing towards his status construction. On November 2nd Hedges instructed Raby to remain in Berlin and one-week later Raby’s continuation as ambassador was reconfirmed.

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239 ‘The expense of the employ must be here so great that I shall obtain no profit by it’. Raby-Harley, 10.12.1704, TNA, SP-90/3; Raby-Hedges, 07.07.1703, TNA, SP-90/2
240 Raby-Hedges, 30.06.1703, TNA, SP-90/2.
242 Discussed in conclusion.
243 Hedges-Raby, 22.10.1706(OS), 29.10.1706(OS) TNA, SP-104/51.
Frederick rewarded this behaviour. On the 24th of November Wolfgang von Schmettau, the Prussian envoy to the Dutch Republic, agreed terms with Marlborough for the renewal of the Italian Treaty. 244 This treaty pledged that the 8,000 Prussian troops currently serving in Italy were to remain there for another year in allied service. The presence of these hardy and much praised troops was vital, and the renewal of the treaty even more so, for it had at times appeared extremely doubtful. 245 Marlborough was clearly pleased by the treaty, reporting to Raby that, ‘Monsieur Schmettau has signed both the treaties, and sent them over, which is an instance of the good humour you tell me the King is in’. 246 Raby drew the link explicitly ‘I hope it is pretty evident since my return hither her Majesty’s service has not suffered and this court has done what could be desired of them both in the continuation of the troops in the low countries and renewing their treaty for those they have in Italy’. 247 Raby even stated that since his return to Berlin, Frederick was looking to find ways in which to reward the allies and demonstrate his commitment to the common cause. Raby therefore explained that Frederick had pledged to deliver ‘four thousand horse as an addition to the troops they have in the Netherlands’, as a mark of his satisfaction. 248

5.4. Conclusion

Between 1705 and 1706 Frederick I’s place amongst Europe’s potentates had still not been unequivocally constructed. He consequently sought to obtain an English ambassador at his court to aid his process of status production. Raby’s ceremonial entry to Berlin symbolically demonstrated Frederick’s claims towards potentate rank, and the ambassadorial presence showed English recognition for Frederick’s claims to equality amongst Europe’s leading rulers.

244 Loewe, Preussens Staatsverträge, 79-80.
245 Raby-Harley, 08.05.1706, TNA, SP-90/4.
248 Raby-Harley, 06.11.1706, TNA, SP-90/4.
This process was threatened by the diplomatic crisis that broke out in 1706 and made Raby’s position as ambassador precarious. The crisis itself reveals much about court factionalism both in Brandenburg-Prussia and England, and how groups with overlapping interests could form cooperative transnational factions. Diplomats and state actors engaged in the Anglo-Prussian diplomatic relationship brought their own personal priorities, biases, and animosities to this dynamic, displaying that inter-state diplomacy was something messier and far more complex than merely the emotionless execution of the will of the monarch.

Raby’s position was made precarious by the intractable will of the Prussian court throughout 1705 and 1706. Once more Frederick instrumentalised his army as a tool through which to extract concessions from the allies. The delay or complete withdrawal of bodies of Prussian troops was similarly utilised to chastise actions deemed to contravene the interests of the king.

Raby’s recall from Berlin at Frederick’s behest, which marked the culmination of the 1706 crisis, is often relayed by historians due to its supposed adulterous causes. Despite the episode’s familiarity, it is a clinically understudied instance, whose risqué details are retold, but whose resolution remains shrouded in mystery. This chapter has challenged the work of other historians who have either provided wholly unsatisfactory reasoning for the resolution of the 1706 crisis, or who have made valuable contributions whilst nonetheless overlooking factors important to contemporaries.

Adopting the methodology of the cultural turn, which allows the modern historian to reimburse status, rank, and ceremonial with the meaning and value they held for contemporaries entails the proposal of more satisfactory explanations of the 1706 crisis than have heretofore been provided. This chapter seeks to remind historians that when attempting to account for seemingly unexplainable actions undertaken by Frederick’s court, it is most logical to look towards what was arguably Frederick’s primary goal of his reign for explanations: the production of his rank as king and status amongst the group of potentates.

Despite whatever personal ructions and factional manoeuvring that may have occurred within that year, Raby ultimately remained in Berlin because he was aware that demotion to envoy to Vienna, with wild rumours circulating about his fall, would have been severely damaging. He disobeyed his government’s orders and
utilised a number of delaying tactics to make his way back to Berlin, and to provide himself with an opportunity to exert his influence over Frederick. He was aware of Frederick’s concern for producing his potentate rank through ceremony and the rank of diplomatic agents accorded to Berlin, and knew of the inferior rank and social standing of his proposed successor to Berlin. He likely communicated this to Frederick and showed that his retention as ambassador accorded with the king’s interests. Realising this Frederick communicated with a number of leading English actors, insisting that Raby remain in Berlin with his present character, and threatening to withdraw Spanheim and jeopardise functional intra-alliance relations if this were not the case. Despite the perplexity of English ministers they countenanced Frederick’s demand. Raby remained as ambassador at the Prussian court. The continued presence of an English ambassador contributed towards the ongoing production of Frederick’s potentate status, and as a mark of his gratitude Frederick provided additional commitments and war making resources to the Grand Alliance.

This explanation to the conclusion of the 1706 crisis allocates agency to Prussian, as well as English actors. Most significantly it displays that for Frederick and Raby the Anglo-Prussian relationship was mutually beneficial and contributed towards the reciprocal production of their respective statuses. The ambassador and the king were both striving to achieve and gain acceptance for their accession to the next rank and a greater status. Their relationship provided the means for them to achieve this. Their respective behaviour during 1706 not only shows how the two derived mutual benefit from their relations, but it also reveals an awareness that they knew their interactions reciprocally contributed towards each other’s status production. The autumn endeavours by both to maintain the spring status quo is indicative of this.
6. Frederick, Raby, and the 1709 Dreikönigstreffen

‘Here come two Fredericks to visit a third’.1 This was the greeting delivered by Frederick IV King of Denmark to Frederick I King in Prussia as he alighted from his carriage in Potsdam. The visit of this king, alongside king Augustus (Frederick-Augustus) during the summer of 1709 would later come to be known as the Dreikönigstreffen, and this momentous occasion presented Frederick I with a unique opportunity to demonstrate his equality to other European crowned heads.2 However, despite the opportunity offered by the meeting, it ultimately proved disappointing; the visiting monarchs restricted Frederick from wholly utilising the occasion to assert his potentate credentials. Over the course of the Dreikönigstreffen however, there occurred a series of significant interactions between the three kings and the British ambassador. On three major occasions Frederick was able to instrumentalise Baron Raby’s presence in order to communicate his rank claims before the two visiting kings. Moreover, while this had previously been the case at ceremonial occasions, objects and the materiality of rank played a central role during the course of the Dreikönigstreffen. Analysing the role Raby played during this meeting of three kings allows us to understand why Anglo-Prussian relations proved so valuable to Frederick throughout his reign, and how, in a certain sense, Raby’s utility and representative character allows the event to be considered as a meeting of four monarchs. Raby willingly cooperated in this process because it also reciprocally contributed towards his own process of status production. He was able to accrue considerable personal prestige from his intimate role in proceedings, and to re-assert his diplomatic utility at a key moment.

1 Quoted in: Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 50.
2 The regnal number of Frederick I will be used to distinguish him from his Danish counterpart Frederick IV. Where no regnal number is given, the Prussian king is being referred to. Augustus II ruled Poland from 1697. Deposed in 1706, he thereafter retained a royal title, without a kingdom, and was known merely as King Augustus. All three kings at the Dreikönigstreffen were called Frederick. Augustus was christened Frederick-Augustus and ruled the Electorate of Saxony under that name.
6.1. **The Dreikönigstreffen**

6.1.1. **The Political Background to the Dreikönigstreffen: The Great Northern War**

The Dreikönigstreffen came about as a direct result of the Great Northern War (1700-1721). Throughout the seventeenth century the Kingdom of Sweden had enlarged itself at the expense of its neighbours. However as the century drew to a close it became apparent that the once mighty Swedish Empire was not as unassailable as it had previously been. Thus when in 1697 the 15-year-old Charles XII assumed the crown, menacing enemies began to circle around this seemingly vulnerable target. Peter I, Tsar of Russia had laid the groundwork for an anti-Swedish alliance during his European travels in the 1690s. He secured both Augustus II King of Poland and Elector of Saxony, as well as Frederick IV King of Denmark for his cause. In 1700 these confederates set out to humble the Swedish Empire and began what would become known as the Great Northern War.

The teenage Charles XII unexpectedly proved to be an astute military mind and skilled commander. He recorded a series of stunning victories over the coalition ranged against him. He knocked Denmark out of the war in 1700 and was able to depose Augustus from the Polish throne. He subsequently installed his own candidate, Stanislaus Leszczyński, as Polish king. In order to force Augustus to accept this humiliating diktat Charles invaded the elector’s hereditary territory of Saxony where Augustus would sign the treaty of Altranstädt (1706). Augustus renounced his claims to the crown of Poland and recognised Stanislaus as Polish King. Augustus did retain a royal title but would henceforth be styled merely as ‘King Augustus’ rather than

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‘Augustus II King of Poland’. By September of 1706 Charles XII of Sweden had largely disassembled the alliance once ranged against him. Only Peter I remained and Charles consequently turned eastwards to engage him. His army spent 1707 and 1708 fighting its way across the Commonwealth and the Ukraine. By 1709 this force found itself under supplied and drastically reduced in manpower, all the while facing an ever more emboldened Russian foe.8

This was the political constellation at the beginning of 1709. The Swedish king was far removed and his once invincible army much diminished. Those princes who had suffered losses at the Swedish king’s hands sought recompense. The issue was particularly acute for Augustus; for in a world based upon status and rank it was pressing that he regain the territory to which his royal title had been attached. Augustus was still supported by large numbers of the Polish nobility, whilst Stanislaus’ position was tenuous.9 Moreover there were many Polish magnates at Augustus’ court in Dresden urging him to reclaim the Polish crown to which he had been rightfully elected.10 Before launching any prospective revanchist campaign Augustus wanted to secure the support of other princes, so that if Charles returned victorious from Russia he would be able to mount an effective defence of his reacquired kingdom. Augustus sought the aid of Frederick IV of Denmark, a prince who had likewise suffered humiliation at the hands of the Swedish king.11 The Danish House of Oldenburg also harboured longstanding ambitions to regain those Scanian provinces lost to Sweden in 1660, and to diminish the power of the pro-Swedish Duke of Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorp.12 Augustus thus invited the Danish king, who had been undertaking an extended visit to Italy since 1708, to tarry in Dresden upon his

7 Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 25; Wilson, German Armies, 137.
9 Frost, Northern Wars, 268-270.
10 ‘There are many Poles at Dresden to invite king Augustus to return’, Raby-Boyle, 20.07.1709, TNA, SP-90/5.
12 Frost, Northern Wars, 104, 209-213, 228.
return journey to Copenhagen. Here they would discuss the potential of launching a campaign against the Swedish king.

Frederick IV’s sojourn in Dresden presented Augustus with two opportunities. Military cooperation between the two parties was concluded under the terms of the Treaty of Dresden; an offensive Danish-Saxon alliance directed against Charles XII and his Polish surrogate Stanislaus. Secondly, the visit of a foreign monarch allowed the deposed Polish king to demonstrate that his court still possessed royal splendour, and that he was still the equal of his royal peers. Frederick IV’s visit, which lasted from the 26th of May to the 26th of June 1709, was therefore accompanied by a cornucopia of magnificent events, all designed to display the splendour which early modern Europeans naturally associated with royalty.

6.1.2. Planning the Dreikönigstreffen

Now committed to the recommencement of hostilities against Sweden, Frederick IV and Augustus sought further allies to bolster their prospects. They turned to Frederick I, and his well-drilled and battle-hardened army of 40,000 men, hoping to incorporate him into their alliance. The Hohenzollern ruler’s territories occupied a unique strategic position bordering both the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden’s German footholds. The anti-Swedish coalition could offer Frederick appealing inducements to persuade him to join their cause. The Hohenzollerns harboured longstanding desires to attain all of the Pomeranian inheritance that had been denied to them by the Swedes at the close of the Thirty Years War. Frederick’s cooperation could perhaps alternatively be bought at the cost of ceding Royal Prussia from Poland, which would contiguously unite Frederick’s domains east of the Elbe. Moreover Saxon-Danish overtures would occur on fertile ground. Frederick’s significant contribution to the Grand Alliance in the West had not brought

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13 Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 27.
14 Ibid., 33.
16 Whaley, Germany: 1493-1648, 1:599-604; Whaley, Germany: 1648-1806, 2:12, 38, 139.
him the gains he had expected. The allies had refused to grant him both the full Orange Inheritance or the province of Guelders, while the preliminary negotiations for peace had also embittered Frederick by their terms.\(^\text{18}\) It thus appeared that it would be possible to coax Frederick from his western commitments and lure him and his forces eastwards with the promise of territorial gains.

Throughout May and June of 1709 Frederick was informed of the events taking place during the Dresden meeting between Frederick IV and Augustus.\(^\text{19}\) On June 3\(^{\text{rd}}\) Frederick was informed of the Danish king’s desire to meet with him whilst on his way back to Copenhagen.\(^\text{20}\) Frederick IV would travel to Magdeburg and there hoped to become acquainted with his Prussian counterpart.\(^\text{21}\) Augustus also expressed his interest in attending the prospective Magdeburg meeting.\(^\text{22}\) It was here that the two monarchs would attempt to induce Frederick to join their anti-Swedish coalition. The Prussian representative in Dresden assumed that Frederick IV had proposed Magdeburg due to its equidistance from Dresden and Berlin.\(^\text{23}\) It is however likely that other reasons were at play, including the fact that the Danish king wished to deny Frederick I an opportunity to perform acts of monarchical self-representation in his residence of Berlin, or elsewhere where Frederick possessed the appropriate representative palaces. Magdeburg conversely had fewer suitable palaces or monarchical structures.\(^\text{24}\) This played into the Danish king’s hands as he wished to conduct the entire meeting with as little ceremony as possible.\(^\text{25}\) The Prussian king would also have to travel to meet his monarchical peers in Magdeburg, and in a society in which a few steps made towards another could be seen as indicating ceremonial deference, the undertaking of the considerable distance to Magdeburg represented a substantial concession from the Prussian king. Frederick I accordingly asserted that he had no intention of complying, but instead

\(^{\text{18}}\) Ibid., 170-171, 201-207.

\(^{\text{19}}\) Czech, Drei Königstreffen, 33-34.

\(^{\text{20}}\) Frederick-Bieberstein, 25.05.1709 & 01.06.1709, GSPK, I.HA. Rep.11, 249, a 3, Nr. 12.

\(^{\text{21}}\) He desired treatment ‘without great ceremony’ and asked that no ‘magnificent reception’ be arranged. Bieberstein-Frederick, 03.06.1709, GSPK, I.HA. Rep.96, Nr.121, Band F.

\(^{\text{22}}\) Bieberstein-Frederick, 03.06.1709, GSPK, I.HA. Rep.96, Nr.121, Band F.

\(^{\text{23}}\) Bieberstein-Frederick, 03.06.1709, GSPK, I.HA. Rep.96, Nr.121, Band F.

\(^{\text{24}}\) Frederick himself complained that Magdeburg was too far and lacking the appropriate furnishings, Frederick-Bieberstein, 04.06.1709, Charlottenburg, GSPK, I.HA. Rep.11, 249, a 3, Nr. 12.

\(^{\text{25}}\) Czech, Drei Königstreffen, 37.
suggested that Frederick IV make his return journey via Berlin, Spandau, or Potsdam. The Hohenzollern’s remonstrations were successful and in early June he was informed that both Frederick IV and Augustus would come to Potsdam.

The final issue to be resolved to allow this meeting of three kings to occur concerned the ceremonial to be observed throughout. Both Frederick IV and Augustus wanted the occasion to occur as far as possible without ceremony. The very fact that the two monarchs intended to avoid the residence of Berlin helped to solve this problem, as did the fact that they would eschew other ceremonial occasions. However there still remained other issues to resolve for the daily functioning of the meeting. It was a maxim long accepted that the host gave the ‘hand’ or precedence to guests of an equal rank. The actors possessing precedence received a range of privileges, including those places regarded as ceremonially superior at meals and during coach journeys, the most prestigious lodgings, and the place of honour to the right of the host on diverse occasions. This regulated how a host was to treat one guest of an equal rank, however it did not settle how relations were to be resolved between two guests of equal rank as at this unique occasion. Which of the two royal guests should receive precedence and all its concomitant privileges? The two visiting monarchs established a form of ceremonial to enable the meeting to function, concluding that they would daily change who held precedence, with the initial precedence holder being decided by the drawing of lots.

6.1.3. The Dreikönigstreffen as an Opportunity

Once more Frederick’s possession of a large and well drilled army which the princes of Europe vied to have on their side brought him the opportunity to produce his potentate status before a European audience. Just as

26 Frederick-Bieberstein, 04.06.1709, GSPK, I.HA. Rep.11, 249, a 3, Nr. 12.
27 Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 37.
28 Ibid., 35-39.
29 Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:145-146.
the Grand Alliance’s need for Prussian Troops in the War of the Spanish Succession had extracted ceremonial and political concessions from England, the Dutch, and the Emperor, so did it bring Frederick IV and Augustus to Potsdam in 1709.

The visit of two foreign monarchs to a third was an extraordinary event in early modern Europe, and contemporaries recognised this fact, as one periodical noted ‘it is something amazing and unheard of, that three kings with one name come together in one place’. Clearly this unique occasion provided the first King in Prussia with an opportunity to assert his equality to other kings whose statuses were more established. Frederick could continue the process which had begun at the Königsberg coronation of 1701, and was frequently buttressed by representative acts of production throughout his reign. As Vincenz Czech states ‘in a certain manner in this period, the dynastic quality of a guest always transferred itself also onto the host’. The meeting of 1709 correspondingly represented a momentous opportunity for Frederick to endow his crown and dynasty with some of the prestige accrued by the heads of the visiting royal houses. The newest of European kingdoms could assert its equality to two ancient crowns, and thus legitimise itself amongst the pan European society of princes.

The visit of Frederick IV and Augustus held the potential to construct Frederick’s potentate status throughout the society of princes. The festivities occurred under the watchful gaze of foreign emissaries who propagated reports of proceedings. One foreign minister remarked of the ceremonial that he would ‘pay careful attention, and as far as is possible to observe and note everything’. Small acts and concessions that might occur between the three kings therefore assume much greater significance, for in being broadcast throughout Europe they had the power to define Frederick’s position within the European society of princes. Prussian actors also transmitted such symbolism themselves; through printed reports, commissioned paintings, minted coins,

31 Die europäische Fama, welche den gegenwärtigen Zustand der vornehmsten Höfe entdecket, Vol.90 (Leipzig: Gleditsch, 1709), 446. For reactions from other periodicals see: Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 16.
32 Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 38.
33 Letter from the Mecklenburg envoy: Ibid., 46.
34 Paulmann, Pomp, 48-54.
medals, and illustrative engravings. Such symbolic communicative processes could go some way towards establishing precedents, and ensuring Frederick’s potentate status would in future be recognised throughout Europe.

The Dreikönigstreffen offered Frederick an opportunity to assert his position as potentate at a key moment. The War of the Spanish Succession churned on relentlessly, though it was becoming clear there would be no conclusive victor. A great peace conference that would draw the whole conflict to a conclusion beckoned. The preliminary articles for such a meeting were already being drawn up. The question of which rulers’ representatives would take their places around the conference table remained to be decided. The humiliating treatment of Frederick’s representatives at the Ryswick conference had still not been forgotten. The construction of potentate rank thus became imperative in order to secure a seat at the negotiating table alongside his royal peers. Utilising the Dreikönigstreffen to demonstrate this parity was therefore part of an ongoing process of production that could secure considerable benefits.

6.1.4. The Dreikönigstreffen as a Struggle

The two visiting kings had no desire to allow Frederick to utilise their visit in order to produce his potentate status. Both Augustus and Frederick IV did not wish to endow the recently crowned King in Prussia with further prestige and legitimacy. Despite being universally recognised as kings both Augustus and Frederick found themselves in insecure predicaments. Augustus still possessed a royal title but was now a ruler without a kingdom, and his status and prestige had suffered accordingly. The continued royal status of the Wettin dynasty was therefore in doubt; for the Polish crown was elective, and Augustus’ opportunity to carve a smaller

35 Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 82-94.
hereditary territory out of the Commonwealth appeared to have vanished.\textsuperscript{38} In addition, Augustus’ chances of influencing the next royal election in favour of a Wettin candidate had diminished in the wake of his forced abdication.

Frederick IV of Denmark was in a more secure position, defeat at the hands of Sweden had not stripped him of his royal title. However, the Kings of Denmark had long received fewer ceremonial honours than their royal counterparts elsewhere in Europe.\textsuperscript{39} Thus, both kings attempted to avoid the establishment of a precedent by allowing the Prussian king to assert his untrammelled equality with them. Frederick I’s royal title remained unrecognised by some of the mightiest rulers in Christendom, and in the zero-sum game represented by ceremonial relations between crowned heads, recognising Frederick’s royal equality could harm the status of Frederick IV and Augustus. To set a precedent whereby they accepted Frederick’s ceremonial equality, but others such as the Kings of France and Spain did not, could at future occasions symbolically demote those rulers into a secondary group of monarchs alongside the Prussian king.

The meeting of the three kings in Potsdam occurred immediately after the festivities in Dresden which had accompanied the Danish-Saxon alliance negotiations.\textsuperscript{40} Because of the proximity of these two events the visiting kings wished to restrict the extent to which Frederick could utilise the Dreikönigstreffen to assert his potentate status. Frederick IV’s visit to Dresden had been an unprecedented success for Augustus. It had given him the opportunity to reassert his rank, and to display the wealth and splendour of his court, reminding all that despite his deposition, Dresden remained a royal residence. Detailing the Dresden festivities allows the assessment of the extent to which such spectacular events aided Augustus’ status proclamations, but also facilitates later comparison with the more muted festivities that took place in Potsdam and Berlin. The list of events is remarkable, and included: a gladiatorial-style arena battle of exotic animals, a chariot race of brightly dressed female courtiers, a medieval style tournament with over 600 participants, and a firework display on

\textsuperscript{38} Wilson, \textit{German Armies}, 130; Frey and Frey, \textit{Treaties}, 23.
\textsuperscript{39} Wicquefort, \textit{The Embassador}, 43-45, 180. See chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{40} The festivities ended on 25.06.1709, the kings left Dresden on 29.06.1709, and arrived in Potsdam on the 02.07.1709, Czech, \textit{Dreikönigstreffen}, 31-48.
the river Elbe celebrating the previous year’s conquest of Lille. Here a seven-story tall ‘fortress’ was constructed across eighteen ships moored in the river, and then ‘bombarded’ for over two hours.\textsuperscript{41} Frederick IV and Augustus played characters various at various grand events. At the ‘carousel of the four corners of the earth’ Augustus appeared as ‘King of the Moors’, while Frederick IV was ruler of the Europeans. At the ‘procession of the gods’ Frederick IV donned the garb of Mars, while Augustus was dressed as Apollo; while at the ‘festival of farmers’, Frederick IV wore the costume of a Norwegian farmer, and Augustus that of one from France.\textsuperscript{42} The Danish king’s sojourn in Dresden was accompanied by numerous other events, including ballet performances, market displays, and formal dinners.\textsuperscript{43} The Dresden festivities were propagated across Europe by reports from foreign observers and contemporary periodicals, which spoke of nothing but the activities in Dresden.\textsuperscript{44} Augustus’ entertainments were therefore successful in emphasising his royal rank before a European audience. For this reason, Augustus wished to limit the corresponding meeting in Brandenburg-Prussia. He had no desire to see the glowing reports of the splendour of his court pushed from the minds of Europeans by even more spectacular events heralding a meeting of three kings in Potsdam.\textsuperscript{45} Awareness of the remarkable extent of the Dresden festivities also facilitates comparison with the \textit{Dreikönigstreffen}, and the disputation of a historiographical tradition that falsely portrays the \textit{Dreikönigstreffen} as an occasion of extraordinary magnificence.

The King of Denmark had some influence over how proceedings in both Dresden and Potsdam-Berlin unfolded. One thing which had eased the meeting in Dresden in particular was a shared familial and dynastic link. Frederick III of Denmark (1609-1670) had been grandfather to both Frederick IV and Augustus and they


\textsuperscript{42} Czech, \textit{Dreikönigstreffen}, 29-33.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.; Lüning, \textit{Theatrum Ceremoniale}, 1719, 1:209-211.

\textsuperscript{44} Czech, \textit{Dreikönigstreffen}, 32; E. Bodemann, \textit{Briehe der Kurfürstin Sophie von Hannover an die Rauräfinnen und Raurafen zu Pfalz} (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1888), 311.

\textsuperscript{45} Czech, \textit{Dreikönigstreffen}, 96.
themselves were cousins. The presence of Augustus’ mother, and Frederick’s aunt - the Princess Anna Sophie of Denmark in Dresden in 1709 eased this interaction.  

Augustus’ reassertion of his royal rank correspondingly became more palatable to Frederick IV, for as the Saxon was also a descendant of the House of Oldenburg, this in turn enhanced the prestige of his own house and aunt. Frederick IV was therefore content to allow Augustus to appropriately instrumentalise his stay in Dresden. The familial connection with the House of Hohenzollern was not present in the same way, which in turn influenced the level of festivities Frederick IV was content to agree to.  

Both kings did not wish to present Frederick I with opportunities to assert his potentate rank, yet they came to Potsdam nonetheless. This is a measure of how eager Frederick IV and Augustus were to incorporate Frederick I into their anti-Swedish alliance. They would seek to restrict Frederick I’s opportunities, but not to deny them entirely. Conversely, once this party arrived in his territories, Frederick I, though receiving strict limits and instructions from the two kings regarding ceremony and splendour, would tentatively push at such boundaries in the hope of effectively utilising the meeting to his own ends.  

Other reasons contributed to the comparative lack of splendour on display during the Dreikönigstreffen. A full four months of planning lay behind the Dresden reveries, the Dreikönigstreffen and its concomitant festivities by comparison were organised in fewer than four weeks. Financial considerations also played a role in limiting the extent of monarchical display. Frederick I had been almost continually engaged in war since 1688. His coffers received allied subsidies in exchange for the use of his troops, however these were often delayed, or not payed at all. At the time of the Dreikönigstreffen for example, the allies were in serious arrears with the  

46 Ibid., 27, 40.  
47 Distant familial connections existed, as amongst many princely houses. Frederick IV himself was patrilineally descended from Joachim-Friedrich Elector of Brandenburg (1546-1608), and matrilineally from Georg-Wilhelm, Elector of Brandenburg (1595-1640). The differences was that the distance was greater, and there was no living embodiment of the dynastic links in Berlin as there was at Dresden.  
48 Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 27-28, 44. ‘This king is in the mean time making all things ready for their reception, which will not be very extraordinary by the reason of the short warning he has had of their coming’, Raby-Boyle, 15.06.1709, TNA, SP-90/5.
Prussians. Frederick’s lavish court lifestyle had also established a serious budget deficit, and the financial problems engendered by this were greatly exacerbated between 1709 and 1711 by a large plague outbreak in Prussia. An indication of Prussian anxiety is given by Raby who midway through the occasion stated: ‘all the court is concerned because of the continuation of the expense’.

### 6.1.5. The Course of the Dreikönigstreffen

Exhaustive descriptions of the day to day occurrences of the Dreikönigstreffen will not be provided here. A good chronological overview can be obtained from the work of Vincenz Czech, as well as the relevant primary sources. The current author however wishes to expound upon some of the major themes of the Dreikönigstreffen in order to inform later analysis.

The Dreikönigstreffen did not take place in one location but was instead of a peripatetic nature. The two foreign kings were received at the small abbey of Zinna, on the border between Prussian and Saxon territory on July 2nd. From there they made their way to Potsdam, where they stayed for a significant proportion of the meeting. Frederick I however travelled to Berlin on the evening of July 3rd, visiting his daughter-in-law who had just given birth to a daughter. He returned to Potsdam the next morning, upon which both kings offered to stand as godparents to Frederick’s new-born granddaughter at a later ceremony in Berlin. The party remained in Potsdam until July 8th, when they undertook a day-excursion to the Lustschloss Caputh. On the 9th the company departed Potsdam and headed for Oranienburg, where they spent two nights. On the 11th they departed to

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49 Naujokat, England und Preußen, 114-205; Frey and Frey, Frederick I, 214; Berney, König Friedrich, 221-224.
51 Raby-Boyle, 06.07.1709, TNA, SP-90/5.
54 Visiting Lustschloss Ruhleben. Ibid., 4:368.
Charlottenburg, passing through Spandau on route. The trio finally entered Berlin on the July 12th. The remaining days of the meeting were passed in the Residenzstadt, with Frederick IV departing on the 16th and Augustus leaving the following evening.55

Political negotiations occurred throughout the Dreikönigstreffen as the visiting kings wished to secure Frederick for their forthcoming revanchist campaign against Sweden. By July 6th Raby was already reporting upon the private political meetings of the kings.56 Negotiations continued during the expedition to Caputh, where the kings cajoled Frederick into active engagement against Sweden.57 Augustus hoped to press this advantage at Oranienburg where the kings conducted talks without ladies or foreign ministers.58 Here however Frederick was counselled by his own ministers who ‘opposed warmly such an undertaking’.59 Negotiations continued in Berlin on July 15th, and there the three kings signed a treaty. This was however purely a defensive alliance and did not oblige Frederick to engage in hostilities against Sweden.60

The meeting threw up a range of ceremonial issues and solutions were devised which in turn influenced the course of proceedings. Before coming to Brandenburg-Prussia the kings had agreed to a system of rotating precedence. Once they arrived they promptly drew lots to determine who would receive this honour on the first day, with precedence being conferred upon the Danish king.61 He was consequently awarded the ceremonially prestigious lodgings on the right side of the Potsdamer Schloss.62 At that evening’s dinner he

55 Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 79-82.
56 Raby-Boyle, 06.06.1709, TNA, SP-90/5. This letter is incorrectly dated as 06.06.1709 and will hereafter be cited as 06.07.1709.
57 Raby-Boyle, 20.07.1709, TNA, SP-90/5; Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 58.
58 Raby-Robinson, 10.07.1709, BL, Add. MSS. 22198.
59 Raby-Boyle, 20.07.1709, TNA, SP-90/5.
61 Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 48; Besser, Schriften: Ergänzende-Texte, 4:358.
62 The precedence holder was awarded the superior lodgings on arrival at a new location. Besser, Schriften: Ergänzende-Texte, 4:360-368.
was given the Oberstelle, and the participants toasted his health before all others. On the following day Augustus took precedence and received its concomitant honours. This pattern continued throughout, with Frederick IV and Augustus receiving those ceremonially prestigious positions from Frederick on alternating days.

The visiting kings sought to eschew ceremony as much as possible. For their entrance to Potsdam the kings ‘declined the Solemnity intended for their Reception’ and so were received with reduced ceremony. They diminished the ceremonial surrounding the public banquet in a number of ways, desiring that an ‘ordinary oval table’ be used instead of the traditional ceremonial table. Moreover, ministers were permitted to sit at the royal table. According to their wishes the celebratory firing of cannons was also abandoned. The visit to Berlin was also carried out under reduced ceremony. The kings initially desired only to come incognito. This did not come to pass, however their entry to the city itself occurred without ceremony due to their wishes. It should also be noted that the kings were together for fifteen days and this contributed to the nature of the Dreikönigstreffen. The relationships between the kings evolved throughout, and dynamics that had been established at the beginning of proceedings could be altered or overcome as the days progressed.

64 Ibid., 4:364-365.
65 Stollberg-Rilinger, ‘Entscheidung durch das Los’, 77.
69 Moser, Teutsches Hof-Recht, 2:506; Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 54.
70 Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 56-57.
71 Ibid., 70; Besser, Schriften: Ergänzende-Texte, 4:379-380.
6.2. Historiography of the Dreikönigstreffen

The entire occasion was far less grand than generations of historians have sought to depict. The Dreikönigstreffen was not a vainglorious indulgence of Frederick’s vanity for ceremony and magnificence, nor was it a series of spectacular parties and exorbitantly costly festivities. Instead the festivities were rather ordinary by the standards of the day. The assertions of certain historians can be refuted, or at least relativised. Koch, who for example states that ‘party followed party’ and that ‘money was wasted in a royal fashion’, Likewise Hinrichs, who states that Frederick ordered that the occasion and the kings should want for nothing. Giersberg surely exaggerates when stating that the Dreikönigstreffen consisted mostly of celebrations and allowed Frederick ‘to display the entire splendour of the court’. Bartoscheck similarly, speaks of the Dreikönigstreffen as an occasion for court merry making, ‘at which all lustre was mustered’, and Hassinger mentions ‘magical glittering parties’. Such statements are made because they accord with preconceptions of Frederick’s baroque court, but have little connection to reality.

The fact that the Dreikönigstreffen was actually rather ordinary in scale can be gleaned from a close reading of contemporary sources, and a comparison to other events. This becomes immediately apparent if we contrast the Dreikönigstreffen to reports of that year’s celebrations in Dresden. The scale of the two events was wholly different. That one of the most spectacular elements of the Dreikönigstreffen, which was also explicitly

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72 For Dreikönigstreffen historiography: Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 17-24.
73 W. Koch, Hof und Regierungsverfassung König Friedrich I. von Preussen (Breslau: Marcus, 1926), 88.
74 Hinrichs, Friedrich Wilhelm, 386.
76 Gert Bartoschek in: F. Windt, Preußen 1701: Eine europäische Geschichte, Katalog, Vol.1 (Berlin: Henschel, 2001), 166; Hassinger, Brandenburg-Preussen, 227. Most secondary sources rely on three primary sources: Besser’s Relation, die europäische Fama, and Theatri Europaei. These describe the occurrences in a very matter of fact way. With statements like ‘again a ball [was held]’ or ‘a French opera and comedy were played’, Besser, Schriften: Ergänzende-Texte, 4:377-383. These were reused and embellished in the posthumously published in: Pöllnitz, Memoiren. He characterised the occasions as one of ‘pomp’ and ‘great splendour’ without providing precise details. Generations of historians have accepted this judgement, adding their own elaborations, embellishments and exaggerations and therefore reconfirming the myth of the Dreikönigstreffen without providing new evidence. See; Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 10-25.
publicised by the court, was an arrangement of confectionary at the evening meal in Berlin on July 12th is of note.\textsuperscript{77} This was the day of Frederick’s birthday and the christening, and though the table adorning grotto of the gods in baked and sculpted sugar form might have been eye catching, such an arrangement can hardly be compared to the firework display, the great tournament, or chariot race that took place in Dresden.\textsuperscript{78} Contemporaries attested to the lesser level of magnificence, \textit{Theatri Europaei} stated that although plenty of effort had gone into receiving and hosting the kings ‘majestically’, there were not as many ‘money devouring playthings’, as had been employed in Dresden.\textsuperscript{79} Meanwhile Frederick himself questioned whether the two kings had been satisfied by the ‘low level of hospitality’.\textsuperscript{80} Also indicative of the scale of the \textit{Dreikönigstreffen} are the entourages the kings brought with them to Potsdam. Augustus brought 96 courtiers to accompany him in 1709. However, when Augustus had accompanied the previous Saxon elector to Berlin in 1692 he had been part of a grand retinue of 346 people.\textsuperscript{81}

The limited success of the \textit{Dreikönigstreffen} from a Prussian perspective therefore provides a possible explanation as to why such a unique event in European history does not stand out further in the sources. There were few contemporary reports produced and distributed, which undoubtedly would have been numerous and widespread if Frederick had felt the occasion had contributed to the production of his status as King in Prussia.\textsuperscript{82} Furthermore, non-literary pieces of media representing the meeting are far from abundant.\textsuperscript{83} The limited historical presence of the \textit{Dreikönigstreffen} in reports, objects, and media is also of course limited by the insignificance of the political proceedings that occurred between the three kings. The defensive alliance concluded ultimately had no major impact upon the course of the two great European wars. Thus, no one could retrospectively harken back to the occasion as one that had been decisive.

\textsuperscript{77} This pamphlet published on ‘royal orders’ is reproduced: Czech, \textit{Dreikönigstreffen}, 93, 191.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 191, 194-195.
\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Theatri Europaei}, 1720, 18:119.
\textsuperscript{80} Berber, \textit{Briefwechsel König Friedrichs I.}, 170.
\textsuperscript{81} Czech, \textit{Dreikönigstreffen}, 49.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 94.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 82-94.
6.3. Baron Raby’s Role at the Dreikönigstreffen

The Dreikönigstreffen was primarily an instance of interaction between the heads of the Houses of Hohenzollern, Wettin, and Oldenburg. However, the Dreikönigstreffen can in some limited sense also be considered as a meeting of four monarchs due to the significant role played by the British ambassador as representative of the House of Stuart. Despite Frederick’s disappointingly restrictive relations with the foreign kings, his simultaneous interactions with the British ambassador were more satisfying, for these were effectively instrumentalised to produce his potentate status. The ambassador’s attendance at the major set pieces of the Dreikönigstreffen enabled those few successes possible. Raby’s ambassadorial presence indicated the tacit British recognition of Frederick’s potentate status and this was repeatedly displayed before the two visiting kings. Moreover, through Raby Frederick was provided with limited opportunities to display the splendour of Berlin as a royal court and to secure ceremonial successes.

The significant role Raby played seems curious at first glance. The crisis of 1706 appeared to have discredited Raby at court, and though he recovered and retained his position, his political influence never returned to its former level. During the dramatic summer of 1706 Marlborough had deepened his contacts with the opposition court faction centred around Crown-Prince Fredrick-William and Ilgen. He had also constructed a covert communication network with Grumbkow which further excluded Raby from political correspondence. 84 However despite Raby’s gradually increasing irrelevance in some areas, Frederick still had use of him in others. As Queen Anne’s representative, and a man of high rank and considerable social status, Raby was of prime ceremonial significance at the Berlin court.

84 Pohlig, Marlboroughs Geheimnis, 226-232; Linda Frey, Anglo-Prussian Relations, 89.
Raby was involved in proceedings from the beginning of the *Dreikönigstreffen*. On June 15th he first reported that ‘we shall have three kings together’. 85 However he simultaneously reported that this event ‘will not be very extraordinary’, due to ‘the short warning he [Frederick] has had of their coming’, and because ‘the two kings have desired the king would make no expense for them, but give them leave to be entirely incognito, and to avoid all difficulty and ceremony’. 86 On June 29th Raby was ‘preparing to follow his majesty’ to Potsdam, while warning his superior that, ‘my expense will be very great’. 87 Raby reported on the kings’ arrival, and his initial interactions with them, adding that ‘both kings are wonderfully civil to me’. 88 By July 10th Raby, along with the other foreign ministers, retired from Potsdam to Berlin, whilst the kings went alone to Oranienburg and then Charlottenburg to conduct political talks. The arrival of the three kings in Berlin was eagerly awaited by Raby amongst others. 89

### 6.4. The Christening: The Spatial Communication of Rank

On July 12th all three monarchs entered Berlin. This date, which was also Frederick’s birthday, had been appointed for the christening of Frederick’s granddaughter Wilhelmine, who had been born to Sophie-Dorothea and crown-prince Frederick-William. Frederick and his master of ceremonies sought to turn this event into an act of monarchical self-representation, endeavouring to use the presence of the two monarchs to endow the House of Hohenzollern with further prestige. It was also at this event that Raby’s true involvement would begin. The Prussians used the occasion to shift the *Dreikönigstreffen* to Berlin and once there Besser utilised the presence of the British ambassador to bolster the royal credentials of his master by drawing attention to Raby’s character. By visibly emphasising Raby’s elevated rank in relation to his peers, and thus

85 Raby-Boyle, 15.06.1709, TNA, SP-90/5.
86 Raby-Boyle, 15.06.1709, TNA, SP-90/5.
87 Raby-Boyle, 29.06.1709, TNA, SP-90/5.
88 Raby-Boyle, SP-90/5, 06.07.1709; The Present State of Europe: Or the Historical and Political Monthly Mercury, Vol. 20, July 1709, 211.
89 Raby-Robinson, 10.07.1709, B.L., Add. MSS. 22198.
demonstrating the recognition Frederick enjoyed from the British monarch, Frederick was actively constructing his potentate status.

Frederick had initially hoped to utilise the birth of a grandchild in order to assert the royal dignity of his house.90 As a letter of June 1709 makes clear, he was delighted that Frederick IV and Augustus would be making their visit during the expected time of delivery. This would provide the chance to gain those two kings as godparents, and to have them physically present at the christening itself.91 He must therefore have been pleased when they willingly extended this offer to him on July 4th.92 Securing royal godparents was not in itself particularly unusual. As Elaine Kruse states ‘monarchs were often chosen to be godparents’, and ‘the usual godfathers for royal children were from royal houses’.93 The choosing of royal godparents was used to cement alliances and improve dynastic relations, and it likewise demonstrated the prestige of the child’s parents.94 Queen Anne had for example been asked to stand as godparent to two children of Margrave Philipp of Brandenburg-Schwedt, and the son of crown-prince Frederick-William and Sophie-Dorothea in 1707.95

The physical presence of royal godparents at the baptismal ceremony was a rarity, for royal godparents were usually represented by proxies.96 At the baptism of the aforementioned first son of Frederick-William; the young Frederick-Louis (died 1708) was provided with a range of prestigious godparents, including Queen Anne, George-Louis Elector of Hanover, the electtress-dowager Sophie, the Estates General, and the Swiss

90 It was hoped that the child would be male, providing an heir to the throne and securing the succession. In 1709 Frederick-William was the sole direct heir. He regularly undertook hazardous trips to the Flanders-battlefields, and a new dynastic arrival would consequently have been much welcomed.
91 Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 43; Frederick-Bieberstein, 17.06.1709, GSPK, I.HA. Rep.11, 249, a 3, Nr. 12.
95 11.04.1704(OS), 17.01.1707(OS), 04.03.1707(OS), 28.11.1707(OS), 02.12.1707(OS): SP-90/105, TNA.
Cantons. However none of these high-ranking persons were present at the ceremony itself. Anne and Sophie were represented through the person of Baron Raby, while the Prince of Anhalt-Dessau stood as representative for George-Louis, the Swiss Cantons, and the Estates General. In contrast to this situation Wilhelmine’s esteemed godparents would be present at her christening.

By contrasting the christenings of Frederick-Louis and Wilhelmine it is possible to observe some of the differences monarchical presence engendered, though the role of gender should also not be overlooked. Having royal godparents present at the ceremony itself undoubtedly leant greater lustre to the occasion, endowing the christened child and their family with prestige. However, presence as opposed to representation also imposed limitations. When proxies were utilised rank differences were submerged. Thus in 1707 Raby could represent a queen and an electress, actors of vastly different ranks, upon the same stage. However, in 1709 it would have been impossible to place a lower ranking actor on an equal footing with a reigning monarch. The representation of godparents via proxies was also made problematic. For the representative of any ruler, no matter how prestigious, would have been forced to cede precedence to a present ruler. Such factors limited the number of godparents in 1709. The setting of the event could also be influenced. In 1707 the christening of Frederick-Louis was performed ‘publicly in the Cathedral’ ‘with great solemnities’. Here there was a large audience, with the entrance of the Berlin Cathedral being manned by soldiers due to the throng of people. By contrast Wilhelmine’s christening occurred within the confines of the palace-chapel, and in front of a much more limited audience. This is attested to both by those present, and by the paucity of


99 For the influence of gender on baptismal festivities see: Petersen, *Geburt*, 114.


description in contemporary periodicals. The potential prestige gain of having two kings stand as godparents was therefore limited by difficulties associated with such a situation.

The birth of a granddaughter, as opposed to a grandson, also produced gender-derived responses that curtailed the significance of the christening. The young Wilhelmine was unlikely to ever ascend the throne, for in Brandenburg-Prussia according to primogeniture, younger brothers superseded their older sisters in the line of succession. Frederick-William and Sophie-Dorothea would go on to have plenty of sons who would overtake Wilhelmine. The potential prestige win of having two monarchs present at the baptism of a future Prussian king was therefore not secured. That the birth of a female was not valued as much as a male is presented by Czech, who states that Wilhelmine’s father was not recalled from campaign in Flanders; ‘because it was just the christening of a daughter and not that of a possible successor’.

A further disappointment was provided by the act of relativisation undertaken by the visiting kings. In the afternoon before they performed the honour of standing godparents to a royal princess, they also took up this role with the new-born son of the Prussian courtier Wartensleben in his residence. Wartensleben’s son was christened as Frederick-Sophie in their presence. Again, it was not necessarily extraordinary for monarchs to take up this role for subjects. The remarkable aspect is that the honour of monarchical presence was given to the Wartensleben family on the same day it was performed for Wilhelmine. This appeared to somewhat devalue the great honour being done to Frederick’s royal blooded granddaughter, as almost simultaneously the

103 Apart from the retinues of the two kings, the only members of the court present were three foreign diplomats, with other courtiers being forced to wait outside the chapel. Besser, *Schriften: Ergänzende-Texte*, 4:370; *Present State of Europe*, 1707, 18:478; *Present State of Europe*, 1709, 20:246.
105 Of their fourteen children, four sons lived into adulthood.
106 Czech, *Dreikönigstreffen*, 74.
same act was performed for a mere subject. It conveyed the message that the two kings were not honouring the Hohenzollern’s because their royal status demanded it, but rather that they were content to occupy this role with any infant born during the course of their visit. This action clearly perturbed Sophie-Dorothea, the mother of the baptised child, who angrily labelled the kings ‘fools’, and their behaviour as ‘hardly charming’.

What is more this act of relativisation would have been doubly infuriating for Frederick, for it occurred on his birthday. Already Frederick’s customary celebrations had been curtailed by the wishes of the two kings. In previous years Frederick’s birthday had been a grand affair. He had held lavish ceremonies to unveil the equestrian statue of his father, conducted solemnities to induct new members into the Order of the Black Eagle, and indulged in operas, feasts and parties. This year those events that occurred on Frederick’s birthday took place ‘without solemnities, because both foreign majesties had declined such’. As another observer remarked ‘at court, there occurred no splendour or festivities, neither with dancing or otherwise, apart from that the kings dined together’. This puts Frederick IV and Augustus’ act of relativisation into greater context.

As Czech states, ‘although it was the birthday of the Prussian king, and in the evening the baptism of his grandchild was to be completed, Frederick IV and Augustus did not think it necessary, to reserve this day exclusively for the king’. The timely birth of the crown-princess had however provided one significant advantage in that it gave Frederick a pretext to expand the scope of the Dreikönigstreffen and shift proceedings to his residence of Berlin. There, there arose further opportunities to produce his royal rank in ways impossible in Potsdam.

110 ‘They in a way relativised their position as royal godparents... they bestowed the same honour upon one of his subjects in the afternoon, as upon his grandchild in the evening’, Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 73-75, 82, 96-97.
115 Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 73.
The christening required much preparation, and in Besser’s notes one can see the still-forming Prussian royal ceremonial and its conscious effort to mirror the court ceremonial of established kings.\textsuperscript{116} The infant princess’s baptism commenced at seven o’clock in the evening, with the kings entering the Erasmus Chapel within the Berliner Schloss, with Frederick IV and Sophie-Luise at the head of their column.\textsuperscript{117} Frederick I and Augustus followed thereafter. The child was brought in by Markgräfin Johanna-Charlotte, alongside other family-members of the Brandenburg-Schwedt cadet branch.\textsuperscript{118} They approached the baptismal font, where the three kings and the Prussian queen stood, covered by ‘a sumptuous dais’.\textsuperscript{119} The child, who was wearing a ‘small diamond crown’, was given over to the Queen, with Augustus also helping to hold her.\textsuperscript{120} The princess was baptised and given the name Frederica SophieWilhelmine, her names in honour of her three godfathers, her godmother the Prussian queen, and her father respectively.\textsuperscript{121} Once named, a hymn was sung and the cannons of the Schloss thrice fired a salvo in celebration.\textsuperscript{122}

The exclusive guest list for this event comprised the extended Prussian royal family, as well as both foreign kings and their entourages. The small size of the chapel however left little room for additional attendees. The remaining places within the chapel were allocated to foreign diplomats: the British ambassador Baron Raby, and the Russian and Dutch envoys.\textsuperscript{123} The attendees attest to the target audience of this ceremony; Frederick and Besser were willing to deny Prussian courtiers places in order to ensure that foreign actors were present.\textsuperscript{124} The occasion was designed to enhance the prestige of the House of Hohenzollern within the society of European princes, and those actors that had constructed their potentate status were correspondingly

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{117} Due to him holding precedence that day, Ibid., 4:369-370.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid. Followed by other female courtiers. A rank dispute supposedly lead to a scuffle between Countess Wartenberg and Lintelo’s wife: Pöllnitz, \textit{Memoiren}, 1:513ff.
\textsuperscript{119} Besser, \textit{Schriften: Ergänzende-Texte}, 4:369ff. The three kings on one side opposite the queen.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 4:370.
\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Theatri Europaei}, 1720, 18:122.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 4:370.
\textsuperscript{124} ‘Our courtiers had to remain in the antechamber before the chapel’, Ibid.
\end{quote}
represented. Frederick coveted recognition for his own potentate claims from these fellow potentates. It was expected that the British, Dutch, and Russian representatives would report home on the occasion, and thus extend the event’s impact across the society of princes. Envoys from other princes were not present. The diplomats from those princes of the Empire who had not constructed their potentate status were conspicuous by their absence.

The present diplomats were differentiated by their rank. Those sent to Berlin by the Tsar and the Estates General were ministers of the second order, possessing the rank of envoy. The diplomat dispatched by Queen Anne possessed the character of ambassador. This rank difference was spatially communicated at the christening ceremony. The diplomats were seated on benches immediately before the altar upon which the royal company was assembled. As Besser states, ‘beside the pulpit was a bench for the English ambassador, Mylord Raby, and behind this yet another bench for the lord envoys, the Russian and the Dutch’. The British ambassador therefore sat alone at the front of the chapel, his dignified presence adding to the occasion. His representative character and resultant monarchical embodiment likewise meant that not only were three reigning kings present at Wilhelmine’s christening, but so in a sense was Queen Anne of Great Britain. The observed fiction that Raby personified Anne was the reason for the separate seating arrangements. One would not contemplate seating Queen Anne beside two ministers of the second order at this occasion, and thus her representative also required a separate place.

Raby cut an isolated and noble figure at the front of the chapel. This was intentional, for this was an act of prominent display before the two visiting kings. Just as the diplomats seated in the congregation constituted the target audience of the baptismal ceremony, the visiting kings likewise were the intended recipients of the message being conveyed by the foreign diplomats and their seating arrangements. Raby’s rank was spatially communicated to the two kings. As Frederick IV and Augustus stood around the font and looked backed at the assembled congregation they would have seen the physical manifestation of a difference in rank. Both kings

125 Ibid.
126 Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:368.
would have been aware of the symbolic act of recognition and legitimation that an ambassador constituted. The placement of the ambassador within the chapel therefore constituted a communication of Frederick’s own claimed rank.

The effect of Raby’s presence was not just absolute but relational. Neither Frederick IV nor Augustus possessed a British ambassador at their courts. This was not some temporary aberration. English and British ambassadors had not been present in Dresden / Warsaw or Copenhagen for a considerable period of time and certainly not during the reign of the current monarchs. A continual stream of envoys had been sent to Denmark. Appointments to Augustus had been even more sporadic, with the most recent envoy having departed in 1707. The Dreikönigstreffen thus occurred at a time when there was no British representation at that king’s court.127

The effect of Raby’s presence was all the more pronounced because of this. Just as Raby’s elevated status was produced in comparison to his two peers, so was Frederick’s in relation to the other kings. Both would have recognised that British ambassadors were not dispatched in a profligate manner to rulers, nor merely to temporarily improve relations. Rather they were a serious undertaking, and only sent to those rulers whose court demanded a representative of the Queen herself. Thus, despite the recentness of his coronation, and the centuries of royal prestige that his title was lacking, the King in Prussia possessed that discernible mark of recognition from one of the oldest, most prestigious and powerful monarchies in Europe.

Frederick and Besser were attempting to utilise Raby’s presence to provide an example to those Danish and Saxon-Polish monarchs and ministers present that day. Thus, even while those kings denied Frederick the unrestricted utilisation of the occasion for the means of potentate status production, the very presence of Raby was a challenge to those beliefs that underpinned their behaviour. If Queen Anne acknowledged Frederick’s equality, and allowed her representative to be utilised to construct his status, then why should the visiting kings continue to deny such opportunities to Frederick? In this sense Anglo-Prussian relations were highly significant at the Dreikönigstreffen. The recognition of equality from one potentate ruler was instrumentalised in order to secure it from others.

127 Horn, *Diplomatic Representatives*. 
6.5. **Ceremonial Victories at a *locus tertius*: Lunch at the Ambassadorial Residence**

A luncheon hosted by the British ambassador and attended by the three kings provided a further opportunity for Frederick to assert his potentate status in cooperation with Baron Raby. The occurrence of this event within the confines of the ambassadorial residence allowed Frederick to overcome the host-guest dynamic, which had previously forced him to alternately grant precedence to the visiting kings. Within the embassy building Frederick was also considered a guest, and consequently was able to assume the ceremonially superior place at the ambassador’s table. By taking precedence over the foreign kings, just as they had previously done with him, Frederick was able to demonstrate his equality with those monarchs, simultaneously constructing his royal and potentate status.

The luncheon occurred around midday on July 15th, and was attended by the three kings, alongside a limited number of distinguished male and female courtiers. The select nature of the event means there is a paucity of primary sources dealing with the occasion.128 The question must first be posed, how did this trip to the British ambassador’s residence come about? According to Besser, Raby invited the three kings to dine with him once they came to Berlin.129 This cannot have been planned too far in advance, for it only became possible once the kings decided they would come to Berlin after the birth of Wilhelmine, while the kings only entered the city on July 12th. Besser makes an interesting remark in his notes, where he writes that Raby’s invite was extended, ‘because days before I had remembered, that the ambassador’s house would be a “third place” for our king, and therefore inside he would not be able to concede to the foreign kings, rather the [drawing of] lots would have to remain, because of the custom such as had occurred between both foreign kings’.130 It would thus

128 The paucity of detail provided by most sources reveals the closed nature of this event: Besser, *Schriften: Ergänzende-Texte*, 4:381; Czech, *Dreikönigstreffen*, 149; Goerlitzer, ‘Reise’, 488; *Theatri Europaei*, 1720, 18:122.


130 Ibid.
appear that Raby’s invitation was at the instigation of the Prussian master of ceremonies. After all, the Dreikönigstreffen, despite not being as opulent as originally hoped, was still a strictly managed affair. Foreign diplomats would not have been encouraged to randomly extend dining invitations to the three kings. The question whether Besser discussed the idea or its implications with Frederick himself must remain open. Regardless, since the coronation Besser had always fought to produce Frederick’s status as king, introducing ceremonial reforms and using his extensive ceremonial knowledge in order to do so. The organisation of a luncheon in order to secure a ceremonial victory for his master therefore falls within Besser’s established patterns of behaviour.

Besser considered the British ambassador’s residence to be a locus tertius or ‘third place’.131 Here Frederick was also a guest, and thus did not have to concede precedence as hosts customarily did. The host-guest dynamic had heretofore been somewhat inconvenient for Frederick. Because the Dreikönigstreffen had played out entirely upon Prussian territory, Frederick IV and Augustus had been regarded as guests, and in turn always publicly taken the Oberhand, or the place of precedence from their host. 132 Thus, although the Dreikönigstreffen seemingly presented Frederick with the opportunity to assert his equality with the visiting kings, he was consistently obliged to publicly show them deference. This situation did not technically indicate Frederick’s inferiority to his guests; however, it would have been frustrating for a monarch so ardent to demonstrate his equal potentate status. Moreover, in an epoch in which appearances created realities the repeated enactment of such power relationships could define the status of the actors involved. The desire to avoid the host-guest dynamic and consistent concession of precedence made monarchical meetings infrequent, and placed restrictions on those that did take place. When Henry VIII met Francis I at the1520 Field of the Cloth of Gold, they did so in a field equidistant from nearby English and French towns.133 On this near-neutral ground both kings were guests.134 Likewise, the 1807 meeting between Alexander and Napoleon took place

131 Ibid.
133 Paulmann, Pomp, 45.
on a raft moored in the Niemen river between French and Russian territory. This solution allowed the two to meet upon an equal footing.\textsuperscript{135} An excursion to Raby’s residence likewise presented the opportunity for all three kings to be regarded as guests. Further, if the practice of drawing lots for precedence was continued, then it presented Frederick with an occasion on which he could, perhaps, secure the \textit{Oberhand} from the two visiting kings.

The proposal that Raby’s residence constituted a third place was not easily accepted by the foreign kings and their ministers. Augustus was to hold precedence on the day of the visit, and his minister Count von Flemming was loathe to part with this privilege. He protested that in no way would Augustus regard Raby’s house as a third place.\textsuperscript{136} Besser then used his masterful knowledge of international law, and diplomatic ceremonial, arguing that as long as the ambassador resided there, Frederick possessed neither authority nor power over it. Besser believed the ambassadorial residence did not belong to the ambassador, but rather to their principle. The ambassador’s house was accordingly exempted from the jurisdiction of the territorial ruler. Flemming claimed such an arrangement would constitute a ‘state within a state’. However, Besser countered, leaning upon Grotius and his definition of extra territoriality. Besser eventually emerged victorious; lots would be drawn for precedence within the house of the British ambassador, and Frederick would be included in the draw.

The luncheon came about not solely because Besser realised he could secure ceremonial parity at this occasion, but also because the occasion matched the norms of the day and suited the interests of the British ambassador himself. It had long been expected that ambassadors should host occasions such as this to honour both guests and their masters. Wicquefort mused that; ‘the ambassador extraordinary cannot well avoid keeping an open Table, if he will do Honour to his Master’ and, ‘the ambassador’s house is that of his sovereign, and the minister’s table ought to represent the grandeur of his master, by making known the honourable salary he


allows him’. Alongside the obligation of custom and his character the luncheon presented Raby with other advantages including the opportunity to gain personal prestige and facilitate his further elevation.

The lunch also provided Raby with an opportunity to influence the approach of the three kings to the Great Northern War. Frederick IV and Augustus had resolved to re-enter the war against the Swedes. This ran counter to British interests, for in the West considerable numbers of Saxon and Danish troops served under Marlborough. Moreover the British had acted as guarantors of the Treaty of Altranstädt and were therefore desirous to uphold its terms. An exacerbation of the war in the North could only distract from the battle against Louis XIV. Particularly so, if Frederick I became involved and withdrew his 31,000 troops to use in conjunction with Augustus and Frederick IV. Raby was therefore granted the chance to halt Frederick’s drift away from the Grand Alliance and to serve his Queen’s interest. This was a unique opportunity, for his rank as ambassador and social status as baron gave him a level of access and influence that others, such as the Dutch and Russian envoys, could only dream of.

On the afternoon of the 15th of July 1709, the luncheon took place. Lots would be drawn to settle matters of precedence, and in particular the place of persons around the ambassador’s table. The three kings, alongside their first ministers were in attendance: Wartenberg from Prussia, Rosencrantz from Denmark and Flemming from Saxony-Poland. Raby completed the list of seven gentlemen present. The men were to be paired off with ladies according to the lots they drew. Sophie-Luise, the Prussian consort filled one such position. The others were taken up by the Countess Wartenberg, the wives of important Danish and Prussian ministers, and the

137 Wicquefort, The Embassador, 207.
138 Discussed later.
139 Braubach, Subsidien, 98-132.
141 The Prussian army had a strength of around 44,000 men in 1709, of which 31,000 were in the service of the allies; Braubach, Subsidien, 124.
ladies-in-waiting to the Prussian queen. Once the entire company of guests had assembled Raby presented them with an ‘Indian basket’ from which they drew lots for their places at the table and their partners. However, this was with the exception of Frederick and Sophie-Luise, who had already been partnered up and drawn lots beforehand in the presence of the two visiting kings. The pairs were assigned the following places at the table. (Figure 3.)


146 Figure 3. Table plan for the lunch of 15.07.1709, drawn from Besser’s notes in: Besser, Schriften, 4:371-374. Numbers indicate lots drawn.
Figure 3: Dining Arrangements at the Ambassadorial Residence
The process of drawing lots is not made particularly clear by Besser’s writings. He states: ‘our king had number 5 and as partner our queen’, he states that this had already been decided by the drawing of lots before the main draw, and in the presence of the two foreign kings.\footnote{Besser, \textit{Schriften: Ergänzende-Texte}, 4:373.} However what he fails to make clear is whether this first draw merely decided with whom Frederick would be partnered, or whether it also decided his place at the table.\footnote{Ibid.} For as Besser asserts in his writings, each pair drew a number and was seated according to it, ‘so the requested guests sit down couple and couple, \textit{according to their number}, and as the lot had arranged each’.\footnote{My emphasis; Ibid., 4:373-374.} However as figure 3. shows, if the pairs were placed according to their number, then it was done in an odd fashion. Instead of being placed successively in a clockwise or counter-clockwise order around the oval table, the pairs were instead arranged alternately on either side.\footnote{Though the placement of the 6\textsuperscript{th} and 7\textsuperscript{th} pairs does not hold to this pattern.} The question as to whether this method of placement had been decided upon beforehand, or whether it was merely done once the kings had drawn their respective numbers, in order to keep them all on one side of the table, must remain open. Likewise, it is impossible to know whether the draw was conducted in a ‘fair’ manner, or whether the pretence of a draw was merely a means to ensure the acceptance of the result. The ability to refer to the draw as the decisive means was less prejudicial to the visiting kings’ honour, and provided them with an excuse to grant Frederick precedence without setting a detrimental-precedent for future rank-disputes.\footnote{Schmidt, \textit{Das Los}, 366-367.} They retained the future right to reject the binding-nature of the rank order being symbolically represented and could instead point to the supposedly random nature of the draw.

The position of Frederick and his queen at Raby’s table constituted a ceremonial victory for the King in Prussia. As Czech remarks ‘he [Frederick] had therefore drawn the top place (\textit{Oberstelle}) at the table’.\footnote{Czech, \textit{Dreikönigstreffen}, 78.} Frederick and his queen sat on the long side of the oval table, in the middle of the four monarchs that occupied that side. They sat next to the fireplace facing the door, while Frederick himself sat to the right of his queen in the place...
of precedence.\textsuperscript{153} That this place was the most prestigious is further corroborated by the seating arrangements from the earlier first evening meal of the \textit{Dreikönigstreffen} in the Potsdamer Schloss. Frederick IV held precedence that evening and accordingly received the ‘highest ranking place’.\textsuperscript{154} This was the same prestigious position that Frederick occupied on the afternoon of July 15\textsuperscript{th}. Frederick’s taking of this position as well as the other deferential honours he received would have had a powerful symbolic effect.

Due to the character of the British ambassador and the outcome of the draw, Frederick was able to assume precedence over the visiting kings at the luncheon within Raby’s residence. By occupying such a place Frederick was communicating his claims to equality with his royal counterparts, and consequently constructing his rank as potentate. Frederick demonstrated that, although this had heretofore rarely been the case, his rank as king allowed him to receive deferential honours from other crowned heads, once the host-guest dynamic had been overcome. The effect would not have been lost on the observers present. It is of course unquantifiable; however, it is logical to assume that this would have contributed to the production of Frederick’s potentate status within the assembled company. Frederick’s position at the table had a performative effect, constructing Frederick’s equality to two other crowned heads in visual form. All of this occurred because of Frederick’s cordial, and mutually beneficial relationship with Great Britain. Those relations had secured the presence of a British ambassador in Berlin, whose residence was deemed an inviolable ‘third place’. Frederick’s friendly relations with Raby made him an ally, who was willing to cooperatively contribute towards the production of Frederick’s status. Thus, at the likely instigation of Besser, Raby was willing to host a luncheon to the mutual benefit of himself and Frederick, and was likewise willing to be complicit in organising the supposedly fair and random drawing of lots. Once more the utility of Anglo-Prussian relations were demonstrated, even during the momentous visit of two foreign kings.

\textsuperscript{153} Besser, \textit{Schriften: Ergänzende-Texte}, 4:374. That this was the place of precedence see: Löwenstein, ‘Vom Tafelzeremoniell’, 554.

6.6. The Ambassadorial Residence as Part of the Landscape of Royal Magnificence

The production of royal rank and potentate status required the display of the splendour and magnificence expected of a baroque monarch. During the Dreikönigstreffen opportunities for sumptuous display were severely limited. The wishes of both Frederick IV and Augustus to do away with as much ceremony as possible restricted Frederick’s ability to show, through materials, events, and objects, that his had become a royal court. Frederick was unable to organise public ceremonial festivities at which opulence could be exhibited. However, those days in July still presented some minor opportunities for opulent display and Frederick sought to utilise them as fully as possible. In particular, the residence of the British ambassador formed part of Frederick’s landscape of royal magnificence, for it was through the successful assertion of his potentate status that Frederick had obtained a British ambassador in the first place. The aforementioned visit to the British ambassadorial residence therefore enabled Frederick to exhibit the splendour of Raby’s residence to the visiting kings. The luxurious objects therein demonstrated Raby’s exalted rank as ambassador, and in turn reflected upon Frederick’s own status. This was most aptly demonstrated by lavish collection of white and silver plate from which the three kings dined during the luncheon.

Throughout the Dreikönigstreffen Frederick sought to display the grandeur of his royal court in order to demonstrate his royal rank to his guests.\textsuperscript{155} He took the opportunity to exhibit his major palaces to the visiting kings; Potsdam, Caputh, Oranienburg, Charlottenburg, and the Berliner Schloss.\textsuperscript{156} They visited and travelled


\textsuperscript{156} Oranienburg and Charlottenburg stressed Frederick’s links to the quasi-royal Houses of Orange and Hanover respectively. P. M. Hahn, ‘Die Hofhaltung der Hohenzollern. Der Kampf um Anerkennung’, in P. Bahners, ed., Preussische Stile. Ein Staat als Kunststück, (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2001), 85. For palace visits as dynastic self-


158 Europäische Fama, 90:444.


161 Ibid.

162 Besser, Schriften: Ergänzende-Texte, 4:371, 374; Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 149. For the impression made upon visitors see: Goerlitzer, ‘Reise’, 473-489.
another monarch. Nonetheless these objects had been earned by the adoption and construction of the royal title and thus reflected Frederick’s rank. The consumption of the splendour on display in the ambassador’s residence also had a comparative element. For while Dresden and Copenhagen possessed sights that could rival any in Berlin, they did not possess the residence of a British ambassador nor the splendour that went along with it. Through the materiality of rank exhibited at the luncheon Frederick was once more unmistakably demonstrating that Queen Anne recognised his royal status and attempting to encourage the visitors to accept his potentate equality.

Raby’s residence lay in ‘one of the most fashionable quarters of Berlin’, where he lived ‘in considerable style’.\textsuperscript{163} The residence itself must have been rather sizeable, for Raby employed sixty-nine persons there, including: secretaries, a chaplain, pages and twenty footmen, which included a ‘blackamoor’.\textsuperscript{164} Alongside these Raby also employed a confectioner, sommelier, as well as personages of diverse origins including ‘Dutch Mary’, ‘Dutch John’, ‘French John’ and ‘Simon the Dane’.\textsuperscript{165} This was a relatively well manned establishment in comparison to other diplomatic missions. Raby’s household was far larger than those of previous English ambassadors to Florence or the Ottoman Porte for example, while Raby’s staff was not significantly smaller than the eighty that the Earl of Portland employed in his renowned and spectacular embassy to Paris in 1697.\textsuperscript{166}

The interior of Raby’s residence and the objects that lay therein were also impressive. In 1705 Raby took on the character of ambassador and the interior of his residence accordingly changed in order to reflect his enhanced rank. As a rule, British ambassadors received a range of objects that represented their distinguished rank and could be displayed to guests in their audience chamber. Each was given a chair of state, which constituted a throne for the monarch’s representative, as well as a canopy (dais), which would be positioned

\textsuperscript{164} BL, Add. MSS. 22197, ff.37-40.
\textsuperscript{165} BL, Add. MSS. 22197, ff.37-40.
\textsuperscript{166} The Florence embassy was composed of 16 people, that to Constantinople 30: Jacobsen, Luxury, 62.
above the chair, and a crimson velvet cloth of state to hang behind it. Ambassadors were also given a generous allowance with which to commission a portrait of their reigning monarch. Raby commissioned his likeness of Queen Anne from the renowned Godfrey Kneller.

As ambassador, Baron Raby possessed a representative character and therefore enjoyed the right to be treated in the same manner as the monarch he represented. As Jacobsen states ‘for the period of his embassy, the diplomat lived in quasi-royal status’, and this was represented by the materiality of his embassy. Just as Queen Anne would receive guests sat upon her chair of state and under a canopy in her palaces of St James, or Kensington, so did her ambassador receive guests similarly in his residence abroad. If those visiting Baron Raby needed any further reminding that Raby represented Queen Anne then the portrait would have achieved this. Through this likeness, hung prominently in Raby’s audience chamber, and through Raby’s representative character, Anne was in a sense present at those solemn occasions that occurred within the embassy.

Ambassadorial silver and plate further contributed to this effect, and these objects are particularly important when assessing the lunch that Raby hosted during the Dreikönigstreffen of 1709. Plate issued from the royal jewel house was given to all English and later British ambassadors. Diplomats below the rank of ambassador did not receive such an allowance, so this plate acted as an important rank signifier. Indeed it ‘lent tangibility

168 Ibid., 27-28.
170 Jacobsen, Luxury, 36.
172 Jacobsen, Luxury, 29.
173 Long-term resident ambassadors. ‘The Jewel House warrants contain no evidence of ambassadors being granted any plate for purely ceremonial visits, such as missions of condolence or compliment, understandable given the expense and time delay in issuing, producing, delivering and transport’: Jacobsen, ‘Ambassadorial Plate’, 3.
174 Jacobsen, Luxury, 3-4; Wicquefort, The Embassador, 206.
to the exalted rank of ambassador'.

When Raby was granted the title of ambassador in 1705, he therefore received an allocation of 5,893 ounces (167kg) of white plate and 1,066 ounces (30kg) of gilt plate. The extent of this allowance was significant, for it was constant for all ambassadors serving the British crown.

In contrast, the allowances granted to diplomats for extraordinary expenses varied from court to court, with diplomats sent to the Emperor, France, Spain, and Holland, receiving the greatest amount. Such variations reflected traditional notions of the hierarchy of princes, as well as assessments of importance. Diplomats sent to Prussia therefore received less in extraordinaries than their counterparts dispatched to the aforementioned destinations. However, all ambassadors regardless of destination received the exact same allowance of plate. Ambassadors themselves were only dispatched to those of potentate status, and the equality of potentates was to some extent reflected in the plate allowances of ambassadors accorded to them. Demonstrative thereof; the British ambassador to Louis XIV received the same quantity of plate as his counterpart sent to Frederick I.

Baron Raby therefore received the standard allowance of 5,893 ounces of white, and 1,066 ounces of gilt plate, and was allowed to direct exactly how this allowance should be apportioned. Raby’s allowance of white plate was made up into ‘thirty and two dishes of several sizes’, ‘thirty six plates’, ‘one Large Godrooned basin’ and ‘one large fountain curiously enchaced’. While from his allowance of gilt plate he further commissioned ‘twenty four plates’ ‘twelve knife halfts’ as well as ‘twelve spoons and twelve forks’ with ‘gilt silver gilding

176 Jacobsen, Luxury, 14.
178 BL, Add. MSS. 31150, f.25ff. Horn, ‘Rank and Emolument’, 26-27. Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 12. By an order of 1689 ambassadors received quarterly: Spain, France, Holland (£400), Denmark, Sweden (£300). Envoy: Emperor, Spain, France, Holland (£150), Sweden, Denmark, Venice (£100). Portugal, Savoy, Brandenburg (£75). Envoy allowances to Savoy and Prussia were subsequently increased to £100. Raby’s expenses hovered around £100 while envoy, but leapt to £300 upon becoming ambassador.
181 Inventory provided in: LC-9/47, TNA, ff.68-71.
and fashion’. Thereafter came a set of casters ‘finely enchased and wrought’, ‘two knarled salvers’, a salt box and one ‘reced gilt basin’.\(^{182}\) He also placed an order for ‘one large cistern, curiously enchased and curled with lions heads at each end’, which used up his remaining allowance.\(^{183}\) In total the items amounted to £3,000, 5s, 6d, slightly above the average estimated cost of around £2,500.\(^{184}\)

As was customary, all of these objects were engraved with the Queen Anne’s coat of arms.\(^{185}\) As the receipts of the jewel house make clear, the engraver was given instructions to mark ‘9 large arms with supports…and 120 small arms’ upon the objects.\(^{186}\) As Jacobsen states, ‘the monarch’s arms were engraved on ambassadorial plate making it clear that it was through the bounty (and wealth) of the king that the minister was able to entertain in such lavish style and providing a visible sign of his fealty, his political loyalty, and his livelihood’.\(^{187}\) Further evidence of this is provided by Raby’s mother, who upon going to inspect the ‘fine cistern’ reported to him that it was emblazoned with ‘the Queen’s arms’.\(^{188}\) Raby’s reception of this lavish plate collection in November 1705 symbolically indicated his transition to ambassadorial rank.\(^{189}\)

Raby’s residence was so lavishly outfitted, that it was deemed fit to regularly host a king. Frederick had twice visited Raby’s residence and dined with him when he had held the rank of envoy.\(^{190}\) Yet once Raby was issued his credentials as ambassador, and objects such as Queen Anne’s portrait, the chair, the canopy of state, and the plate collection began to arrive, the rate at which Frederick dined at Raby’s residence markedly increased. In the twelve months that followed Raby’s assumption of the ambassadorial title Frederick dined at his

\(^{182}\) LC-9/47, TNA, ff.68-71.

\(^{183}\) Lomax, ‘Ambassador’s Plate’, 69.

\(^{184}\) Ibid., 67-69. However, LC-9/47 gives £2,164, 5s, 0d, plus the large cistern at a cost of £1,154, 7s, 9d. I therefore make a total of £3,318 12s 9d, of which Raby had to provide £40 himself.


\(^{186}\) LC-9/47, TNA, f.71.


\(^{188}\) Lomax, ‘Ambassador’s Plate’, 69.

\(^{189}\) Ibid., 68-69. The cistern did not arrive until May 1706.

\(^{190}\) 27.11.1704 & 26.12.1704, Besser, Schriften: Ceremonial-Acta, 3:201-211.
residence four times. In total, the Prussian king dined at the British embassy fourteen times between July 1705 and March 1711. In comparison, Frederick dined only once at the residence of the Dutch envoy between 1704 and 1713. On those occasions he dined at Raby’s residence Frederick brought with him an assortment of prestigious guests, including the Margraves of Brandenburg-Schwedt, Frederick-William, Wartenberg, Eugene of Savoy, the Crown-Prince of Hesse-Kassel, the Prince of Anhalt-Dessau, and of course Frederick IV and Augustus. Thus, when in July 1709 the kings proceeded to luncheon at Raby’s residence, Frederick knew what to expect. In fact, Frederick, the Queen, and Wartenberg had dined at Raby’s table in May of 1709, a mere two months prior to the Dreikönigstreffen.

It becomes possible to construct a picture of the materiality of Raby’s residence, that can inform our understanding of exactly what must have happened that July afternoon. This is all the more important, for the two sources that describe the lunch in any sort of detail; namely the notes of Besser and the letters of Raby, do not pay particular attention to the material splendour on display. Besser spends his time describing the drawing of lots and the seating arrangements, while Raby’s letters are overflowing with accounts of the political negotiations that took place and their implications.

Nonetheless, despite the paucity of information provided, it is possible to create an image of what happened. Frederick arrived first at the ambassador’s residence, he was followed by his queen, the two kings and the rest of the entourage. Frederick and Sophie-Luise drew lots first and were paired together. The rest of the company drew lots for their partner and place at the oval table. The meal itself took place in the dining room, which was

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decorated with bright wallpaper.\textsuperscript{195} The oval table stood in the middle of the room, ‘under a sumptuous dais’.\textsuperscript{196} Raby’s chaplain performed a prayer in English, and thereafter the guests took their places according to their lots.\textsuperscript{197} The King and Queen in Prussia took the ceremonially most prestigious place, on the long side of the table, between the two other kings. The meal would have been served on Raby’s ambassadorial plate. Augustus, Frederick IV, and their leading ministers would have dined from fine white and silver plate and used the cutlery and various other items of the British ambassador. Each piece was engraved with the Queen Anne’s coat of arms, and so this symbol would have been impossible to avoid. The large cistern would have been used for such an occasion. Perhaps it stood in the middle of the oval table, or perhaps on the edge of the room. However, this magnificent gleaming silver cistern, with its curled lion heads, would have been a striking element. More so, for it would have drawn the gaze of the visitors, who would have once more recognised Queen Anne’s arms emblazoned upon its side. We can only guess as to the food and other richness on offer. But something can be gleaned by the fact that Raby claimed an allowance of £300 for the occasion of the ‘treating of the three kings’.\textsuperscript{198}

While the dining room was brightly decorated, Raby’s audience chamber, was appropriately in a state of mourning due to the death of Anne’s consort, Prince George of Denmark.\textsuperscript{199} The room would thus have been bedecked in black fabric. It is unclear the extent to which the party utilised the audience room, as well as which objects remained therein. It would appear the canopy of state had been moved into the dining room, as it was under this which the kings sat as they dined. Similarly, it seems likely that the chair of state, as well as Kneller’s portrait of Anne were shifted into the dining room for the occasion, so that Anne could gaze down upon her guests and in a sense transform this occasion of three monarchs, into the meeting of four. This question must

\textsuperscript{196} Ibid. The canopy of state was likely temporarily moved from the audience - into the dining room.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., 4:373-374.
\textsuperscript{198} BL, Add. MSS. 31150, ff.40-53.
\textsuperscript{199} George died on 7.11.1708 (NS), ambassadors were expected to decorate their abodes in black and cover everything with black cloth; Jacobsen, \textit{Luxury}, 25-26. Raby claimed £400 for putting his household into mourning. BL, Add. MSS. 31150, ff.37-53.
remain open, for it is also possible that these objects remained in the audience chamber. What is certain, is that those present viewed these objects, no matter which room they lay in.

Besser gives a description of the audience chamber indicating that he, and one must therefore also suppose the other guests, saw this room.200 While in Raby’s letters reporting on the occasion, he describes movement between the rooms of his residence, from which one can deduce that movement from the dining room must logically have been to the audience chamber. He describes how after the company had finished dining, the King of Denmark, ‘took me aside’, in order to have ‘a pretty long discourse’.201 While Raby remarks later that he sent Count Flemming to fetch Augustus to join them. Augustus himself who was ‘talking to the Queen in t’other chamber… came immediately and interrupted us’.202 By moving between the rooms of the residence, the assembled guests must therefore have encountered all the objects that communicated Raby’s ambassadorial rank.

Raby’s household contributed to the production of Frederick’s potentate status in a number of ways. Generally, Frederick perceived Raby’s ostentatious demonstrative-consumption as a communicative act honouring his royal dignity.203 The materiality of Raby’s embassy was a physical reflection of Raby’s exalted rank, and his rank was in turn a reflection of Frederick I’s status. The material splendour of the embassy thus indirectly reflected the royal rank of Frederick. The embassy’s materiality also constituted an act of legitimation from Queen Anne. It displayed that the Stuart monarch recognised Frederick as one of Europe’s potentates and exhibited this recognition through the rank of diplomats she sent to Frederick’s residence, and the objects that accompanied them. This point would have been driven home to the guests at the embassy by the fact that they passed underneath Queen Anne’s coat of arms as they entered, they dined from exquisite plate engraved with

201 Raby-Boyle, 20.07.1709, TNA, SP-90/5.
202 Raby-Boyle, 20.07.1709, TNA, SP-90/5.
the same coat of arms, and that this was done under the watchful gaze of a portrait of the British monarch. Moreover, the fact that no similar act of recognition in the form of objects or agents was present in either Dresden or Copenhagen would have further contributed to the effect. Finally, the splendour on display within Raby’s residence bolstered Frederick’s claims to potentate status by contributing to the idea of Berlin as a magnificent royal capital.

### 6.7. Raby’s Reassertion of Utility at the Dreikönigstreffen

Baron Raby willingly played his role at the Dreikönigstreffen because he accrued tangible benefits from his participation. Most notably, Raby gained considerable prestige and symbolic capital from the meeting. He derived this from the experience of having been so close to proceedings, and from the illustrious place he was given at events such as the christening. The visit and hosting of the three kings in Raby’s residence represented the most valuable occasion, for few ambassadors could claim this honour. Just as the dynastic quality of Frederick’s guests to some degree transferred itself onto him, so did that of the three kings transpose itself onto Raby. An indication of the extent to which such a visit enhanced Raby’s reputation can be observed in the efforts to highlight his role that Raby subsequently commissioned, and that appeared at his Yorkshire residence. The status production Raby achieved during his years in Berlin would subsequently be used to support later rank articulations.

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205 Czech, *Dreikönigstreffen*, 38.

206 Raby’s importance and close relationship with the three kings are emphasised by an inscription added to a portrait of the three. See: C. Matthews, ‘Dreikönigsporträt’, *Texte des RECS*, 27 (2018).

The *Dreikönigstreffen* held importance for Raby’s own process of rank elevation because it allowed him to recover influence and reassert his utility after his fall and political exclusion. In some senses Raby’s ongoing process of elevation continued despite his enemies’ obstructions.\(^{208}\) Notwithstanding his worries about lack of advancement Raby was promoted to Lieutenant-General in 1707 and in 1708 purchased the estate that would later become his grand country residence.\(^{209}\) Yet in Berlin, although the British ambassador stabilised his position after the 1706 crisis, he never truly regained the same level of influence as before his scandalous relations with Countess Wartenberg were revealed. During the crisis Marlborough had decisively sided against Raby and Wartenberg. Most significantly he established a network of contacts with which he could bypass Raby and communicate with Frederick-William and Ilgen. This was most aptly represented in the person of Grumbkow, who shuttled back and forth between Berlin and Marlborough’s camp.\(^{210}\) Through him Marlborough sounded out the mood of Frederick and the Berlin court and it was through this channel that important negotiations proceeded.\(^{211}\) Likewise, in a further weakening of Raby’s position, General-Major Palmes was dispatched to Berlin in 1708 on a temporary mission to conduct troop negotiations.\(^{212}\) Raby was gradually shut out of political correspondence and excluded from the 1708/9 negotiations that gained the allies the *neues Korps* of 6,200 Prussian troops.\(^{213}\) Raby accordingly lodged complaints, protesting that he was never taken notice of, nor allowed to sign treaties. He further complained of his mistreatment and even sardonically referred to himself as a ‘useless minister’.\(^{214}\)

The visiting kings arrived in Berlin in the middle of the 1709 campaigning season, and so Marlborough was unable to conduct his personal diplomacy as he had done in the inactive months of 1704, 1705, and 1707.\(^{215}\)


\(^{211}\) Naujokat, ‘Mylord Raby’, 283ff.


\(^{213}\) Ibid., 195ff.

\(^{214}\) Raby-Cadogan 09.03.1709, BL, Add. MSS. 22196; Frey, *Anglo-Prussian Relations*, 89-90.

Grumbkow and Lintelo did not possess the required rank or social status to gain access to intimate gatherings such as the luncheon at Raby’s residence. The *Dreikönigstreffen* therefore allowed Raby to reassert his importance by promoting the political interests of his sovereign. These included maintaining Frederick’s commitment to the anti-Bourbon war in the West, and doing all to hinder the migration of German princes from the Grand Alliance, to involvement in the Great Northern War. Raby was able to use his discussions with the kings to clarify Anne’s position, and to warn them of the dangers of northern intervention. Through such means, and ultimately through the fact that Prussia engaged in no offensive anti-Swedish agreement, Raby was able to prove his utility to his Queen and her Government. The effective promotion of British foreign policy interests re-emphasised Raby’s abilities at a timely moment, and kept his name in contention for future diplomatic and government appointments. Promotion would come about in 1711 when Raby was named as plenipotentiary for the Utrecht peace conference.\(^{216}\) This had much to do with the reversal of the political landscape in Britain, but nonetheless through continuous demonstrations of his utility and diplomatic skill Raby remained in consideration until after the Tory electoral triumph of 1710 made his further elevation possible.

### 6.8. Initial Assessment

With the departure of Augustus and Frederick IV in the days that followed the luncheon, this unique meeting of three kings drew to a close.\(^{217}\) With an overall picture of what occurred over the course of those days in July an initial assessment may be made. Since his coronation in 1701 Frederick had consistently attempted to use relations with other princes to produce his potentate status. The *Dreikönigstreffen* was no different in this regard. However, the question must be posed when reflecting upon those July days, ultimately how successful was he?

\(^{216}\) See conclusion.

The fact that the meeting was ultimately without ‘political’ result in the traditional sense is not of great significance here. The three kings signed a defensive pact which did not pledge Frederick to move against Sweden. Political-military cooperation may have been the primary objective for the visiting kings, but this was never the main issue for Frederick. As was the case throughout his reign, the construction of his status was an ambition that superseded all others. Moreover, while the kings had been busy partaking in merriments at Caputh, the Russian army had routed Charles XII’s forces at Poltava. As the news of Peter I’s victory reached the other kings it retrospectively changed the tone of the meeting; for Frederick IV and Augustus, Prussian assistance became less essential. Both would re-enter the Great Northern War shortly after the Dreikönigstreffen, without the commitment of Prussian troops. News of Peter I’s victory reached the kings on July 30th, shortly thereafter Augustus crossed the Polish border and regained his crown.

The meeting nonetheless constituted a missed opportunity from Frederick’s perspective, for he was unable to sufficiently utilise the presence of Frederick IV and Augustus to produce his royal rank before a European audience. The vast majority of the meeting had been accompanied by as little ceremony as possible, due to the wishes of the two kings. As Besser lamented, ‘the kings wanted to be treated and greeted entirely without any ceremony’. They sought to deny Frederick all possible opportunities to produce his potentate status, initially refusing to come to Berlin and instead selecting one of Frederick’s less grand towns where opportunities for ceremonial self-representation would be more limited. Solemn public ceremonial occasions demonstrated the status of European princes in relation to one another, as well as within the society of princes at large. The presence of monarchs at such occasions indicated their acceptance of the order being semiotically represented. For this very reason the two kings severely constrained the staging of such events. Most likely because the visitors and the host had different estimations about their status within the hierarchy of princes.

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220 Present State of Europe, 1709, 20:246; Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 98; Göse, Friedrich I, 279.
221 Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 95-99.
222 Besser, Schriften: Ergänzende-Texte, 4:356.
6.9. **Princely Meetings in Context**

‘It is something amazing and unheard of, that three kings called Frederick are come together in one place’ declared one contemporary periodical of the *Dreikönigstreffen.*\(^{223}\) That it may be, but we should also be careful to emphasise which elements were so unique and to place this episode within context. It was rare that three rulers met and certainly unique that they bore the same name and represented the three faiths of the Empire. However, meetings between monarchs and rulers were not as extraordinary as may first appear. Instead the *Dreikönigstreffen* fitted into a framework of princely meetings, which were facilitated by reduced ceremony and splendour. Augustus and Frederick IV’s avoidance of solemn ceremonial occasions thus becomes more comprehensible, while Frederick’s attempts to use the occasion to score ceremonial victories can correspondingly be seen as a breaching of established norms.

Meetings between early modern rulers were made complicated by a number of factors. The great distances involved, the uncomfortable nature of travel, and the embryonic transport network made the prospect of visiting one another unappealing to many rulers.\(^{224}\) Moreover, the costs involved in maintaining a ruler’s dignity on such a journey could be prohibitively exorbitant.\(^{225}\) The frequent nature of warfare, inherent within the process of early modern state-formation also hindered such meetings. Peaceful relations constituted the minimal requirement for a meeting, and monarchs had little desire to meet with past or future adversaries.\(^{226}\)

The ‘irksome ceremonial nature’ of such meetings provided a further limitation.\(^{227}\) Meetings provided rulers with opportunities to assert their position within the European society of princes, but when participants disagreed about their respective positions in relation to one another, and the resulting ceremonial honours they

\(^{223}\) *Europäische Fama*, 90:446. For further reactions: Czech, *Dreikönigstreffen*, 15-17.

\(^{224}\) Rohr, *Ceremoniel-Wissenschaft*, 358.

\(^{225}\) Ibid.


\(^{227}\) Rohr, *Ceremoniel-Wissenschaft*, 358.
should receive, then meetings became more unlikely. Ceremonial concessions could not easily be granted, and if they were then this would not pass without consequence, but rather had the capacity to newly define the position of participants. Concessions made could be observed by the representatives of other princes and thus had the potential to weaken the participants’ positions within the society of princes. Such hampering factors meant that according to Paulmann, ‘meetings between the reigning monarchs of the great powers barely occurred’ between the sixteenth century and the Napoleonic period.

This can be somewhat qualified. Rulers often found a way to make meetings work. Incognito was one method that allowed rulers to meet whilst avoiding many of the consuming ceremonial difficulties. By travelling incognito, rulers abandoned the majesty naturally associated with monarchy. Their actions and ceremonial relations with them consequently did not communicate claims to a position in princely society. Instead of representing the embodiment of the dynastic state, they appeared merely as a private person. They often assumed aliases, but they did not disguise themselves; the identity of the incognito person was known to all. Adopting this character meant that rulers could meet in more informal settings and interact with one another without implications for their position in the society of princes. The period thus contains several examples of such meetings.

228 Paulmann, Pomp, 48.
229 Ibid., 53-54.
230 Ibid., 46-47.
231 Steive, Hoff-Ceremoniel, 155.
232 Hennings, Russia, 166-167.
233 For aliases adopted see: Wade, ‘Waterfront Entertainments’, 349; Hennings, Russia, 164; Present State of Europe, 1709, 20:18; Barth, Inkognito, 105.
During the period a number of meetings occurred between monarchs with a tentative grip on their royal status. Hindsight should not be used to differentiate meetings between dynasties that ultimately successfully established their royal dignity from those that did not. Meetings therefore occurred between the Habsburg King of Spain Charles III and the English and Portuguese monarchs, as well as that between James III of England and Louis XIV.235

Within the Holy Roman Empire there also existed a different tradition, and it was far more commonplace for electors, dukes and landgraves to travel the shorter distances and meet personally with one another. These meetings had the flavour of a working business meeting, and were often held to secure alliances, marriage compacts, or regional cooperation. They therefore occurred without the same level of pomp and opulence that was required by monarchical summits, and hence avoided inhibitive ceremonial practices. Frederick met with numerous princes of the Empire throughout his reign as king. These occasions were not replete with magnificence, nor were they designed to define the position of the participants.236 Within the Empire women also played an important role, with consorts and female-members of princely dynasties shuttling between courts and establishing connections.237 The unique traditions of the Reich are significant, for whilst holding royal titles, the three participants of the Dreikönigstreffen were also princes of the Empire.238 The gathering in Potsdam in 1709 is rightly viewed as that of three crowned heads. But it should also simultaneously be viewed as an assembly of three imperial princes, for whom there existed a traditional framework to such meetings, which did not prescribe that royal magnificence should be displayed at every turn.

235 Later Emperor Charles VI.: Lünig, Theatrum Ceremoniale, 1719, 1:206-209.
237 Numerous women moved back and forth between their familial courts and Berlin, including, Sophie (Hanover-Prussia), Sophia-Charlotte (Hanover-Prussia), Sophie-Dorothea (Hanover-Prussia), Elisabeth-Sophie (Courland-Bayreuth-Prussia), Luise-Dorothea (Prussia-Hesse-Kassel), Marie-Amalie (Prussia-Saxe-Zietz). Besser, Schriften: Ceremonial-Acta, 3:141-379; Elsner, Friedrich III./I., 57, 70; Güttner, Leben und Thaten, 341; K. Feuerstein-Praßer, Die preußischen Königinnen (Munich: Pulset, 2000), 70.
238 Frederick IV as Duke of Holstein and Count of Oldenburg. Augustus as Elector of Saxony, and Frederick I as Elector of Brandenburg.
We should bear this context in mind when assessing the Dreikönigstreffen. It informs our understanding of the lack of splendour in Potsdam and Berlin, and likewise Frederick IV and Augustus’ dismissal of Frederick’s attempts at magnificent display. The Dreikönigstreffen is almost unfortunate that it took place in such close proximity to the festivities in Dresden. These constituted a truly extraordinary event. It was thus perhaps equally unusual and out of the ordinary that Frederick should request that a meeting in his lands should be allowed to take on such a character.239 The Dreikönigstreffen remained halfway between two extremes. It was neither a magnificent ceremonial occasion designed to produce the actors’ statuses, nor was it a brief transactional meeting conducted incognito. The kings made concessions in retaining their public statuses and in coming to Berlin, but they remained firm in other areas.

6.10. Presence vs. Representation

The arrival of two reigning monarchs in 1709 made Potsdam and Berlin loci for interaction between present monarchs. The consequences thereof offered some distinct disparities when contrasted to mere monarchical representation through diplomats. Actors of differing rank played by different rules, which in turn regulated their behaviour at the Dreikönigstreffen and prescribed what could be achieved in relations with them. Ceremonial concessions granted by present monarchs had the greatest power to produce status and define the rank of other actors, however limitations inherent to monarchical presence resultantly meant that munificent ceremonial behaviour was difficult to obtain from them. Though less impactful, ceremonial cooperation by a present ambassador could support assertions of status, and was more easily co-opted.

The presence of kings undoubtedly lent far greater prestige and majesty to occasions. Acts of concession, recognition or legitimation performed by a monarch in person were all the more meaningful. These rulers operated within a ‘culture of presence’ where the mere presence of a ruler at a ceremonial occasion implied their acceptance of the structure and order which was being symbolically represented, and thus created. As

239 Frederick’s refusal to travel to Magdeburg can be contrasted with previous excursions to meet rulers: Besser, Schriften: Ceremonial-Acta, 3:154, 379, 344, 428; Luh, ‘Peter the Great’s visit’, 24-28.
Stollberg-Rilinger states of princely presence: ‘through their participation they affirmed acceptance of what was being ritually staged’, and ‘only he who was present in person professed his assent to what was being formally decided and ritually staged’. The participation of a present ruler in a solemn ceremonially occasion was therefore more likely to establish a precedent defining the statuses of participants in relation to each other.

Ambassadors possessed a representative character, but contemporaries nonetheless recognised distinctions between monarchical presence and representation. This is reflected in contemporary ceremonially-literature. Howell stated; ‘in the present Prince there is real majesty, in an Ambassador only a representative; In the prince there is the truth of the thing, In an ambassador the effigies or shadow: Now as the shadow yields to the light, so an ambassador must yield to a prince’. Zuniga thought an ambassador merely the ‘hieroglyph’ of his ruler. Stieve thought likewise; ‘This effigy of dignity, so great it is in itself, so is it at the same time not in all respects the same as the original’. The presence of a ruler themselves rather than their representative, effigy, hieroglyph or shadow, therefore increased the effect of performative acts undertaken by them.

The potency of acts committed by present rulers brought forth further consequences that inhibited their meeting in general, while similarly severely restricting the freedom of monarchs once present at such encounters. By contrast the lesser impact of diplomatic representation enabled diplomats greater freedom of action. By 1700 the figure of the long-term diplomat was emerging across Europe, and a growing number had considerable knowledge of diplomacy, court etiquette, and ceremonial. This was due to an ever-increasing number of didactic works, as well as specific instructions from their ministers at home. They became experts in

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241 Paulmann, Pomp, 48.
242 Howell, Precedency of Kings, 187-188.
244 Stieve, Hoff-Ceremoniel, 217. For a practical example: Stollberg-Rilinger, Emperor’s Old Clothes, 140-141.
246 See Raby’s instructions concerning ‘the hand’: 11.03.1703(NS), TNA, SP-104/203.
ceremonial minutiae, constantly aware not to carelessly relinquish the majesty of their principal. Monarchs on the other hand were often not as knowledgeable in ceremonial matters and could be prone to making ceremonial faux pas. With their greater comprehension of diplomatic ceremonial, knowledgeable diplomats could on occasion make small but deliberate concessions that would ingratiate them with their hosts. Raby did so on numerous occasions. To take one example, Raby made during his 1703 audience of the Prussian queen a minor concession in the ‘small part of the ceremony’ of who was to receive him in order to win royal favour. Nonetheless Raby’s precise ceremonial knowledge and understanding of its implications is made clear through the writings of Besser. The concessions made by individual diplomats were less likely to establish binding precedents than those given by rulers themselves, and diplomats accordingly retained to some degree an aura of plausible deniability.

These factors regulated Raby’s behaviour at the Dreikönigstreffen. Four monarchs were at this gathering, but only three were present. The ambassador representing Anne thus conducted himself throughout this meeting under an entirely different set of rules. Raby did not request that his monarch receive a position as godparent and stand aside her peers at the christening, and when the three kings were hosted at Queen Anne’s pleasure, her representative was content to accept a ceremonially inferior seat at his own table. Although concessions from rulers who were present possessed greater power, other factors made those rulers far more cautious in awarding symbolic concessions. Kings were not adept in every aspect of ceremonial, and actions they undertook were observed by all of Europe and could consequently alter their position within the society of princes. Therefore, although concessions from monarchical representatives such as Baron Raby were not theoretically as weighty, the greater likelihood of their occurrence gives them added significance.

248 Raby-Hedges, 14.07.1703, TNA, SP-90/2.
6.11. **Dreikönigstreffen? Or a Meeting of Four Monarchs?**

The *Dreikönigstreffen* was not as exceptional as first thought, either in constituting a meeting between rulers, nor in the reduced level of splendour in evidence. The differences between present and representative actors governed their behaviour at this multi-day event. These structural factors combined with the whims and dynastic objectives of the visiting monarchs and brought about a ceremonially restricted occasion at which Frederick I could not significantly produce his potentate status. Prussian relations with the Saxon and Danish rulers during the *Dreikönigstreffen* can consequently be viewed as constituting an unrealised opportunity.

Frederick’s failure to effectively utilise his relations with the Danish and Saxon-Polish monarchs endows his relations with the fourth monarch represented in Berlin with even greater significance. Via interactions with the ambassador representing the British queen, Frederick was able to engage in acts of monarchical self-representation and produce his potentate status. The very presence of a British diplomat bearing the rank of ambassador acted as a symbolic demonstration of Anne’s recognition of Frederick’s claims to potentate status. The embodiment of this recognition was paraded before the two kings on several occasions. Both kings were aware that such symbolic markers of acceptance were not dispersed profligately: for there were no British ambassadors at either of the visiting kings’ courts. The presence of a British ambassador also allowed certain occasions to arise that worked to Frederick’s advantage. At these events Frederick was able, in a limited manner, to demonstrate his potentate status and equality to the visiting kings. There were three key instances on which this was achieved. At the christening Frederick was able to demonstratively display the rank of the British ambassador before a foreign audience, which in turn supported the construction of his own potentate status. The dinner that occurred at Raby’s residence and the resultant seating arrangement allowed Frederick and his queen to illustrate their symbolic equality to the visiting monarchs by prominently assuming the *Oberstelle*. Lastly, the splendour contained within the British embassy allowed Frederick to advertise another constituent part of his magnificent royal capital, bolstering his royal credentials through prominent display, and simultaneously exhibiting the Stuart Queen’s recognition of his potentate status.
Raby occupied a unique position at the *Dreikönigstreffen*, for he was the only foreign diplomat present in Berlin that could significantly aid in constructing Frederick’s potentate status. Firstly, despite a number of foreign diplomats being present in Berlin for the momentous meeting of three kings, Raby was the only one who bore the exalted rank of ambassador alongside his high social status as a peer of the realm. All others merely held the rank of envoy or lower and so could not be utilised in the same manner. Moreover, Raby had been dispatched by Queen Anne, a powerful ruler, from an established kingdom that commanded respect. Her status as a potentate was largely established and so her representatives were not required to quibble over ceremonial minutiae in the way others were. Relations between Britain and Prussia were also largely amicable, each depended upon cooperation from the other in order to further their aims within the realm of European dynastic politics. Thus, even if the ambassadors of other rulers had been present, it is unlikely that they could have contributed to the same extent as Anne’s representative. Anglo-Prussian relations provided Frederick with a means through which to produce his potentate status, at a time when similar relations with the Danish and Saxon rulers had failed in this regard. This and the important role played by Anne’s ambassador during proceedings therefore make it worthwhile to question whether the *Dreikönigstreffen* can to some extent be considered as a meeting of four monarchs.

In recognition of Raby’s involvement, Frederick’s gratitude was bestowed in material form. In the wake of the *Dreikönigstreffen* very few objects were produced to commemorate the occasion. However amongst that limited number, are a set of striking paintings completed by Samuel Theodor Gericke. Here the three kings are depicted standing in ceremonial dress, crowns atop their heads, holding hands in fraternity. The image asserts the equality of the three present crowned heads, and thus Frederick’s potentate status. This was evidently what Frederick had hoped would result from the occasion, however his hopes remained unrealised. Four copies of the painting were produced, with each king receiving his own personal copy. We know little

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251 Czech, *Dreikönigstreffen*, 82-94.

252 Ibid., 84; Matthews, ‘Dreikönigsporträt’. 
about the whereabouts, or the historical use of those paintings sent to Copenhagen and Dresden.\textsuperscript{253} Frederick I’s copy today sits in the palace of Charlottenburg.\textsuperscript{254} Besides the crowned heads, one further person received this idealised depiction of the \textit{Dreikönigstreffen} - Baron Raby. This copy made its way back with Raby to his country house in Yorkshire, where it was prominently displayed.\textsuperscript{255} Today after a long a curious history, it once more sits in Schloss Caputh on the edge of Potsdam, that site of merry drinking at the beginning of the \textit{Dreikönigstreffen}.\textsuperscript{256} Whether the painting was gifted to Raby explicitly to reward the minor successes his presence had engendered must remain open. What is clear is that those actors who wished to enhance their own status through the meeting of the three kings, namely Frederick and Raby, displayed this idealised vision prominently. The two visiting kings, who denied Frederick the opportunity to assert his untrammelled equality with them, sought not to conspicuously exhibit Gericke’s work. The paintings, their historical usage, and ultimate destinies stand as symbols of the \textit{Dreikönigstreffen}, and the stance of the various actors in relation to it.

6.12. \textbf{Status Production, War, and Diplomacy within the Network of Northern Courts}

The \textit{Dreikönigstreffen} represents perhaps the most striking instance of Berlin becoming the site of diplomatic competition between those princes comprising the Network of Northern Courts, and distributed across alliance blocks engaged in the two great European wars. This trend had been common throughout Frederick’s reign, with the Network acting as an amenable proving ground for potentate status construction. Actors from England, Sweden, Denmark, Saxony-Poland, and the Dutch Republic allowed Frederick to instrumentalise his relations

\textsuperscript{253} Czech, \textit{Dreikönigstreffen}, 86.
\textsuperscript{254} Matthews, ‘Dreikönigsporthät’.
\textsuperscript{255} It was displayed in the picture gallery of Wentworth Castle, Hagemann, ‘Lord Raby’, 17-21. The inscription added later reads ‘given by those Kings to the Earl of Strafford on the having all three dined together with him when Lord Raby Ambassador Extraordinary at Berlin’.
\textsuperscript{256} The painting was owned by Andy Warhol before coming back to Caputh: Matthews, ‘Dreikönigsporthät’; Czech, \textit{Dreikönigstreffen}, 83.
with them to serve his status-based objectives. This was not due to their altruism, but because they sought to secure Frederick’s army for their own wartime-coalitions. Northern princes successively sought to outdo one another; offering Frederick status and ceremonial concessions in exchange for the participation of Prussian arms. Assessing the extent to which northern actors were willing to aid Frederick in the production of his potentate status can make a significant contribution to the historiography of Frederick’s involvement in the Great Northern War. Despite not formally intervening in the northern conflict Frederick was able to gain by tactful political manoeuvring. Nonetheless, even though Frederick acquired the limited complicity of various northern princes in facilitating the production of his potentate status, Swedish, Saxo-Polish, Dutch, and Danish actors were often not as accommodating as their English counterparts.

Recognising the utility of Anglo-Prussian relations to Frederick can do much to explain why he remained committed to the Grand Alliance and refrained from engaging in the Great Northern War. Borussian School influenced historiographies of Frederick and his policies towards that northern conflict can therefore be challenged. These have been critical of Prussia’s lack of northern intervention, asserting that had Frederick thrown his lot in with the Russo-Saxon-Danish alliance he could have secured concrete political and territorial gains.257 Johann Gustav Droysen chastised Frederick’s policies, critically remarking that he conducted, ‘in the West war without politics, in the East politics without an army’.258 Erdmannsdörffer suggested that Frederick’s policies held the Prussian state back from reaching its true political goals. Instead, ‘the young kingdom sold itself to the Emperor and the Maritime powers’, so that it resembled an auxiliary power or vassal.259 Carl von Noorden was more dispassionate but nonetheless characterised Frederick as a weak king, who turned away from the logical north-eastern expansion of the Prussian state.260 Such thoughts were echoed by Otto Hintze, who stated that despite those gains made because of western involvement, great political gains would have

257 These include Ermland and Royal Prussia which were being offered to him at the time of the Dreikönigstreffen. Naujokat, England und Preußen, 158, 215.
258 Droysen, Preußischen Politik, 4:129, 163.
been attained in the East, if only Frederick had actively intervened.™ These historians variously ascribe Frederick’s unrealised northern intervention to the influence of his leading ministers, Frederick’s craven lust for allied subsidies, or the agreements into which he had naively entered to secure the crown that subsequently restricted him. Many of these assessments undoubtedly derive from a reverence for the Machtstaat, and from a notion that the crown was of less political value than the expansion of state power to the northeast.

More recently, historians have attempted to somewhat revise this image. Klaus-Ludwig Feckl states that Frederick ‘acquired little’ from the War of the Spanish Succession, but that he had resolved upon the crown and this entailed commitment to the West. Economic and military weakness hindered simultaneous or independent involvement in the East, and Frederick wisely heeded these restraints.™ The Frey sisters, Ulrich Naujokat, and Frank Göse have noted the difficult situation Frederick had to navigate, contending that northern intervention entailed numerous risks that might outweigh prospective gains. Moreover, these potential gains were not the easily attainable prey depicted by earlier historians. By contrast Frederick’s relations with the Grand Alliance allowed him to make safer, and nonetheless valuable gains, such as subsidies, the recognition of his royal title, and territorial acquisitions. Frederick therefore wisely heeded restrictions imposed upon him and made the most of his difficult situation.™

This revisionism can be developed further. Through his involvement in the West Frederick gained near universal recognition for his royal title, an achievement of incomparable value in the status-conscious society of princes. This was not some meaningless title that was a supplementary inducement alongside subsidies and minor territorial gains, but was a key political goal that fulfilled the long-held ambitions of the Hohenzollerns to raise themselves into the circle of potentate rulers. Implicit here is the adoption of the culturalist approach to history, through which historians must attempt to reconstruct the meaning which status and rank possessed for contemporaries.

261 Royal Prussia or Swedish Pomerania: Hintze, Die Hohenzollern, 274; Braubach, Subsidien, 104.
262 Feckl, Preussen, 201-207.
Many of the aforementioned Borussian-influenced critiques derive from the supposition that with the coronation of 1701 Frederick had successfully completed his ascension into the group of potentates, and that he could thereafter have freely removed his troops from the West in order to make eastern territorial gains to supplement his already constructed potentate status. This was not the case. In order to successfully bring about his potentate status, Frederick needed to undertake an effective long-term process of production. The continued presence of his troops in the anti-Bourbon coalition ensured the cooperation of the Maritime Powers in this process.

Frederick did not intervene in the Great Northern War because he gained significantly from his position as a desirable partner for diverse interest groups from within the Network of Northern Courts. As earlier delineated: the Network of Northern Courts comprised a number of princes situated in close proximity along the Baltic and North Sea littorals. They shared a common protestant heritage, close and often intertwined familial connections, and similar strategic interests. This predisposed them to be more amenable in contributing towards the status production and rank elevation of fellow members. Although rivalries existed within this network, its members rarely made recourse to open hostilities against one another. The Great Northern War provided a notable exception, and this conflict, alongside the Spanish Succession War, split the network into three primary interest groups. Several northern princes were dedicated to the anti-Bourbon Grand Alliance. The Swedish king by contrast was focused solely on defeating the foes ranged against him in the Great Northern War. The Danish and Saxo-Polish rulers constituted a third group, half-heartedly committed to the western alliance, while simultaneously either engaged in, or seeking to re-enter the conflict against Sweden.

The King in Prussia occupied a fourth position; committed to the anti-Bourbon Grand Alliance, though occasionally perturbed by the treatment he received from the allies. He consequently left room for manoeuvre in the North and East, intermittently contemplating intervention, which in turn encouraged overtures from both northern factions.

264 See earlier discussion and list of constituent members.

265 Sweden itself proved the exception to some extent, waging war against the Dutch, Prussia, and Denmark at various points.

266 Brauch, Subsidien, 98-132.
Throughout the span of the two conflicts Berlin was the site of a diplomatic arms race. Concessions facilitating status production were made by the three major factions to the King in Prussia in order to secure him for their cause. The competition between these two sides led to an escalation in concessions, with each seeking to outdo the other. Between 1703 and 1706 it was primarily Anne and Charles XII who vied to influence Frederick in their favour.267 Anne sent Frederick his much-desired envoy, with orders to accept the new ceremonial. In response the Swedish king likewise sent an envoy. It subsequently became clear that the Swedish envoy would be unable to take his audience under the new ceremonial, but because of Frederick’s strategic value, a Swedish ambassador was dispatched in 1705.268 This was then matched by an English ambassador to ensure that Charles XII was not able to remove Frederick from the Grand Alliance. By 1709 the tug-of-war entered its next phase. Charles XII was far removed and in a weakened position, while his ambassador had departed from Berlin.269 The Danish and Saxon rulers consequently took up the mantle from Sweden, attempting to pull the Prussian king into the Great Northern War on their side. British actors conversely attempted to parry the advances of the anti-Swedish coalition and maintain Frederick’s western involvement. Ultimately Augustus and Frederick IV failed to lure Frederick away from the Grand Alliance, just as Charles XII had before them.

One of the reasons for Frederick’s continued western commitment and consequent failure to pivot eastwards was that England was consistently willing to go further than the other faction members in cooperatively assisting the process of status production. This was due to the distinctive culture that governed diplomacy and diplomatic ceremonial in the Stuart Kingdom.270 English actors repeatedly awarded Frederick’s representatives ceremonial concessions, dispatched high-ranking diplomats as a recognition of his status, and provided him with public occasions at which he could effectively communicate status claims. Other northern princes by

267 England emerged as the most important alliance partner for Prussia, due to difficulties with both the Emperor and the Dutch Republic. Naujokat, England und Preußen, 104ff.
268 See earlier chapter.
270 See chapter 2.
contrast offered Frederick lesser inducements coupled with potentially hazardous commitments to the northern war.

Thus, while Augustus and Frederick IV were willing to offer Frederick extensive territorial concessions, they were unwilling to significantly help Frederick achieve his primary goal, the construction of his status as a potentate. Conversely, England, Frederick’s main alliance partner in the West, though unwilling to support territorial enlargement on the scale offered by Augustus, was willing to allow Frederick to instrumentalise Anglo-Prussian relations to support status construction; Queen Anne and her ministers had willingly cooperated since the coronation, and continued to do so during the Dreikönigstreffen of 1709.

By the time of the Dreikönigstreffen Frederick’s affairs in the West remained largely unsatisfactory; the dispute regarding the Orange Succession remained unresolved, subsidies were still in arrears, and the terms of the preliminary treaty were extremely displeasing. Yet the British had pledged to secure recognition for Frederick’s royal title at a future peace, and they consistently allowed Frederick to construct his potentate status in relations with them. These British concessions aided in securing the political means they sought. To baroque rulers the construction of their status at solemn occasions in cooperation with other potentates could be worth just as much as an additional province.

When taking a broader perspective and observing Frederick’s relations with northern princes over the longue durée a number of useful observations may be made. The Network of Northern Courts served as an amenable space for reciprocal status production for Frederick amongst others. Frederick tactfully manoeuvred between two major European wars, gaining concessions that facilitated status production from various factions. Frederick’s failure to wholeheartedly intervene in the Northern Conflict was therefore not due to his weakness or vacillation. Instead an under-considered factor must be emphasised. British actors represented Frederick’s

271 They were also unable to match the required subsidy inducements offered by the anti-Bourbon coalition. Naujokat, England und Preußen, 56; Feckl, Preussen, 80.
273 They also supported minor territorial concessions: such Frederick’s acquisition of Neuchatel: Ibid., 163-176.
greatest allies in facilitating the production of his potentate status. The impact of such considerations upon his foreign policy should not be underestimated.
7. Conclusion

The Prussian coronation of 1701 was a momentous act in the history of the Hohenzollern dynasty. With this Frederick III/I attempted to construct for himself a new status within the European society of princes. The gradual shift during the seventeenth century from a hierarchically organised princely order to a bipartite system provided the stimulus for numerous princes to seek to secure themselves greater rank. Those such as Frederick III/I sought to supplement territorial sovereignty with royal dignity in order to forge a position within the emerging elite group of European princes, what this thesis has termed the group of potentates, with potentate status consisting of an aggregate of sovereignty and royal dignity. In order to assert his status as a crowned head and gain admittance to this group, Frederick undertook a long-term process of production, attempting to secure from other potentates ceremonial treatment that indicated his equality. Ceremonial honours performed on solemn occasions had the power not only to communicate the rank claims of participants, but to actualise that status within princely society. Frederick and his ministers consequently fought for the appropriate reverential treatment, both for the king himself, and for his ministers abroad. Through many such actions, visibly and publicly performed upon the Theatrum Europaeum and communicated throughout the continent, Frederick was able to construct his status as King in Prussia and a potentate prince.

Frederick’s relations with Britain acted as the primary means through which he was able to assert his potentate status following the coronation. Queen Anne, her ministers, and diplomats consistently proved willing to recognise Prussian rank claims and concede on matters of ceremony. Indeed, they were regularly prepared to go further than other potentate rulers in cooperating with Frederick’s process of rank constitution. An admixture of factors unique to the British state made actors therefrom particularly amenable to accepting Prussian ceremonial innovations. British ceremonial cooperation depended upon the Prussians exchanging military assistance and commitment to the anti-Bourbon Grand Alliance, though the Prussians could still threaten military non-cooperation in order to stimulate further ceremonial concessions. Alongside securing British strategic interests, the Anglo-Prussian military-ceremonial exchange also provided the opportunity for British actors to reciprocally engage in their own status production and rank elevation. The disciplined service of Prussian troops in allied armies helped secure Anne’s position in a war that can to some extent also be
regarded as the war of the English succession.¹ The battlefield gloire that Prussian battalions earned Marlborough at Blenheim and elsewhere likewise secured him the gifts, including his own princedom from the Emperor, and Blenheim Palace from a grateful English nation. Most significantly the Anglo-Prussian relationship facilitated the rise of Baron Raby, who through cooperation with the King in Prussia, ascended in status alongside him.

The period that brought about the conclusion of the War of the Spanish Succession and the Treaties of Utrecht represented the high-water mark for the mutually beneficial Anglo-Prussian relationship.² Baron Raby departed from Berlin on March 24th 1711, having been named as ambassador extraordinary to the United Provinces, and thereafter Plenipotentiary for the forthcoming Utrecht peace congress.³ Raby had spent years angling after this posting, and his success only became possible with the electoral triumph of the Tories in 1710 and the assumption of the reins of government by his confidant Harley.⁴ Nonetheless his continued and effective diplomatic service had kept him in the frame throughout the years of Whig dominance, and made him the outstanding candidate alongside his fellow plenipotentiary John Robinson. At the Utrecht negotiations Raby worked diligently to advance Frederick’s interest alongside that of his own sovereign.⁵ Ultimately it was his seal that concluded the treaties of peace and friendship between Britain, and France and Spain that secured a number of vital British interests.⁶

¹ See chapter 2.
⁵ For Raby at Utrecht see: M. C. Herman, Sir Thomas Wentworth, Third Earl of Strafford, and the Treaty of Utrecht, 1711-1713 (University of South Carolina: PhD, 1988); Naujokat, ‘Mylord Raby’, 88ff.
⁶ These included French recognition of the Hanoverian Succession and abandonment of the Stuart Pretender, land in Canada, as well as Minorca and Gibraltar, the asiento, and the right to dispatch and annual trade ship to the Spanish Americas. Frey and Frey, Treaties, xiii-xxvi; C. Parry, Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol.28 (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1969).
The years between 1711-1714 marked the culmination of Raby’s own personal process of rank elevation. In September 1711 Raby was raised to the Earldom, and henceforth styled as Earl of Strafford.Anne’s preamble to the patent bestowing this rank is notable for its references to Raby’s service in Berlin as a catalyst for his repeated elevation. He was first raised to ambassador because: ‘he behaved himself for several years with such signal applause that we thought fit to honour him’, while at Frederick’s court ‘he was so very useful to us, and peculiarly acceptable to said Prince’. His close links with Harley’s Tory-dominated ministry had secured Raby the Utrecht posting as well as further ‘monuments of our royal favour, as the reward of a life employed for the good of his country’. He was accordingly inducted into the Order of the Garter, appointed to the Privy Council, and granted the post of First Lord of the Admiralty in 1712.

The fickle nature of British party politics brought Raby’s stellar career to an end in 1714. The Hanoverian Succession that followed Anne’s death brought the staunchly pro-Whig George I to the throne. Harley’s ministry was replaced, and the period of Whig domination began. Raby was dismissed from his offices, and impeachment procedures were even begun against him and his peers for their part in the Peace of Utrecht. These amounted to nought, but Raby was nonetheless forced to quit the court and his political career was brought to a premature end. Alongside occasional Jacobite involvement, Raby dedicated his remaining years to the construction of his grand Yorkshire residence, which was replete with references to his more glorious days in Utrecht, the Hague, and Berlin. Raby’s fall from grace should not drive from view the astonishing rise in rank and accumulation of titles he was able to accrue beforehand. It was his successful and useful diplomatic work, alongside political allegiances, that facilitated that rise.

7 Further referred to as Baron Raby for simplicity.
8 Collins, Peerage, 3:317-319.
10 Naujokat, ‘Mylord Raby’, 89. See also his significant wealth: Cartwright, Wentworth Papers, 29.
12 Eyres and Lomax, Diplomats, Goldsmiths and Baroque Court Culture.
This thesis has primarily sought to assess whether Frederick I was able to successfully construct his royal and potentate status, and to consider the extent to which Anglo-Prussian relations were essential in this process. The Utrecht peace treaties which Raby helped shape are the ultimate measure of this; through them the Hohenzollern dynasty was able to secure not inconsiderable territorial gains. Prussian possession of Neuchatel, Valangin, Moers, Lingen, and Tecklenburg was confirmed, while Guelders was likewise transferred from Spain. Most importantly, in a treaty of April 11th 1713, the monarchs of France and Spain recognised the royal status of the Hohenzollerns. Here they promised to grant the King in Prussia ‘all the Honours annexed to the Royal Dignity’, and to show his diplomats ‘the same Honours, either old or new, which are shown to other Ministers of crowned Heads, without any difference’. Likewise during the treaty negotiations and the signing ceremony itself, all effort was made to ensure the parity of the parties, with Prussian diplomats appearing as the equal of their French and British counterparts.

Frederick did not live to witness this, for he died of dropsy on February 25th 1713. It was therefore his son, Frederick-William I, whose royal dignity was recognised at Utrecht. The near-universal acceptance of the Hohenzollerns as sovereign kings, and by extension potentates, represented the culmination of a dynastic

17 Göse, Friedrich I, 342.
18 By France, Spain, Cologne, and Bavaria. The Pope and Poland remained the remaining exceptions. Friedrich and Smart, Cultivation, 18-23.
strategy stretching back two decades or more. Nevertheless, the equal potentate status of Frederick-William I was not unquestioningly accepted without challenge from 1713/14 onwards. Ceremonial difficulties and precedence conflicts continued thereafter. In 1716 Frederick-William spoke of his need to ‘stabilise the sovereignty and establish the crown’. Likewise, even into the reign of Frederick II, the King of France could find it perturbing that the mere ‘Margrave of Brandenburg’ addressed him as his equal. In this sense, kings resembled the naval warships of the day, all were ships, but there were significant differences between a first rate ship-of-the-line, and a lower rated vessel. Vincenz Czech has likewise argued that if we are to measure the status of a dynasty by their matrimonial matches, then that of the Hohenzollerns remained largely unaltered despite the assumption of the crown.

Assessing the extent to which Hohenzollern potentate status was established is also complicated by changes that occurred after 1714. Diplomatic and ceremonial norms underwent alterations, though these were nonetheless not as dramatic as historians have previously depicted. Frederick-William I, and Frederick II thus dedicated less of their energies to matters of ceremony and rank than Frederick I, due to these shifts. Firstly, there was a noted move from the employment of ambassadors to envoys, who could avoid negotiation impeding ceremonial disputes. After Raby’s departure for example, though there was near constant diplomatic representation, there would be no British ambassador in Berlin for the rest of the eighteenth century. This however coincided with broader trends in the reduction of ambassadorial appointments, the British went from 1.69 appointments per year under Anne, to 1.07, 0.52, and 0.82, under the first three

21 Quoted in: Ibid., 234.
23 Czech, Dreikönigstreffen, 96.
25 Dauser, Ehren-Namen, 258.
26 Marschke, ‘Monarchical Representation’, 239.
27 Horn, Diplomatic Representatives, 104ff.
Hanoverian kings respectively.\textsuperscript{28} The decreased need for ambassadors and their status-defining ceremonial roles partly indicates the degree to which the group of potentates had become a relatively defined and closed group after 1714.\textsuperscript{29} Negotiation and representation of status was no longer as essential a component of diplomatic embassies; diplomats resultantly more regularly eschewed ceremonial in order to facilitate negotiation. The second and third Kings in Prussia could therefore reject and mock the excessive ceremonial of Frederick I’s reign, but only because they more or less safely occupied a position within the group of potentates.\textsuperscript{30} All three monarchs occupied a liminal period where competing valuations of power existed, though as the century progressed greater emphasis was placed on military or territorial might at the expense of previously dominant factors, such as one’s position in the symbolic order of precedence. Nonetheless on required occasions both Hohenzollern successors summoned up all the splendour their court could muster, adhering to the expectations of royal display and remaining acutely conscious of the status defining implications of ceremonial events.\textsuperscript{31} There was no point at which potentate status was wholly and irrevocably constructed, the process continued indefinitely, it was only that Frederick’s heirs required demonstrative rank assertions to bolster their claims to potentate status on a less regular basis.

Between 1701 and 1713, Frederick I and his ministers had been able to instrumentalise cordial Anglo-Prussian relations as a means through which to gain ceremonial cooperation and construct the potentate status of the House of Brandenburg. This ongoing process of production not only meant that by the time the Utrecht peace conference commenced the gathered representatives were willing to accept Prussian potentate status and the ceremonial equality of Prussian representatives, but indeed, repeated and successful rank-assertions likely made acknowledgement thereof feel natural.\textsuperscript{32} After 1713/14 the status of Frederick’s successors may have

\textsuperscript{28} Horn, ‘Rank and Emolument’, 22.
\textsuperscript{29} Horowski, ‘Subjects into Sovereigns’, 105, 128.
\textsuperscript{30} Stollberg-Rilinger, ‘Höfische Öffentlichkeit’, 176.
\textsuperscript{32} Stollberg-Rilinger, ‘Honores Regii’, 25.
been questioned or challenged, but the difficulties encountered were not greater than those faced by other less powerful European potentates.\textsuperscript{33} Discussions of the exact rank-position of the Prussian kings, or the ceremonial privileges they were warranted, did not mean they did not occupy a position within the group of potentates, and this importantly had been Frederick I’s aim. His son and grandson added military might that allowed for independent action, territorial expansion, and cultural prestige to supplement and enhance the royal and potentate status the first king had established. The symbolic actions and ceremonial strategies undertaken by Frederick I should be considered as an essential part of the ‘the rise of Prussia’.\textsuperscript{34}

A number of overarching themes have extended throughout this thesis which have supplemented the primary area of research and contributed towards broader historical debates. When actors sought to bring about rank elevations, they could not achieve these unilaterally but instead required recognition and participation from others. This recognition manifested itself most significantly in alterations in behaviour of other actors towards aspirant rank claimants. This thesis has dealt extensively with these changes in behaviour, adopting the methodology of the culturalist turn and reimbuing them with the meaning they held for contemporaries. Small alterations in gestures, forms of address, accompaniment, material surroundings, place and style of reception, and positions at solemn ceremonial events symbolised the recognition of altered status. The performance and further propagation of these acts ultimately actualised the status of actors within European society at large.

The importance that matters of rank and status held for early eighteenth-century contemporaries therefore entails a recognition of the consequential impact of components of ceremonial. Consequently, discussions of status and ceremonial cannot be divorced from diplomacy, war, statecraft, and other areas of high politics, as has occasionally heretofore been the case. Indeed, due to the priority early modern figures placed upon such issues they can be reintegrated into analysis of the aforementioned areas. This thesis has attempted to highlight

\textsuperscript{33} Such as Savoy and Russia amongst others. Storrs, \textit{War, Diplomacy and the Rise of Savoy}; Hennings, \textit{Russia}. For rank disputes see: Lübke, \textit{Theatrum Ceremoniale}, 1719; Zwanzig, \textit{Theatrum Praecedentiae}.

the extent to which *quid pro quos* spanned across these interlinked areas, with concessions in one realm often facilitating cooperation in another. Marlborough for example repeatedly and explicitly advised that ceremonial concessions be dangled before Frederick, but only granted once Prussian military commitment had been secured. Frederick likewise threatened to withdraw said commitment when his ceremonial requests went unfulfilled, but was content to release further military resources to allied service when ceremonial agreements were reached. Ceremonial issues were integral in intra-alliance diplomacy during these years, and a holistic understanding of diplomacy in this period cannot ignore them.

The nature of this extended down to individual actors, for as this thesis has emphasised, status construction often occurred reciprocally. The gradual establishment of Frederick’s royal and potentate credentials in cooperation with Raby, who in turn brought about his own rank elevation, serves as the most powerful example thereof. That individual diplomatic agents could also utilise the inter-dynastic relations for their own ends also contributes towards larger debates on ‘new diplomatic history’ in revealing the considerable agency diplomatists possessed, and thus demonstrating that diplomacy was not the mechanical and obedient execution of a ruler’s coherent will, but that it was tempered by the idiosyncratic desires of diplomats, and their factional attachments.

Actors such as Raby and Marlborough possessed significant scope for action within the realm of ceremonial negotiations. This speaks towards the unique English diplomatic ceremonial *modus operandi* during this period, which meant that English actors were far more willing to grant ceremonial concessions than their continental counterparts. This way of operating was a product of internal power dynamics and strategic priorities, and ultimately deemed ceremonial concessions as a ‘cheaper’ way of securing military assets to achieve other objectives.35

35 Marlborough-Godolphin, 24.06.1702, Snyder, *Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence*, 1975, 1:73.
Much recent scholarship has focused on the emergence of a common diplomatic culture through the mid-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{36} While increased professionalism, and the adoption of a common language and behavioural norms may have made diplomacy in some areas more homogenous, it is nonetheless important to remember that the states that employed such diplomats remained diverse, with varying strategic or dynastic interests, and domestic power distributions. Such factors regulated the behaviour of diplomats and contributed to heterogenous spectrum of conduct.

The extent to which the British diplomatic ceremonial 	extit{modus operandi} diverged from continental norms facilitated the reciprocally beneficial Anglo-Prussian relationship, for concessions each side deemed less significant could be traded to the other for those regarded as more important. This allowed English ceremonial recognition of Frederick’s potentate status to be exchanged for Prussian military commitment to the anti-Bourbon coalition. This can be contrasted to the 	extit{modus operandi} of the Danish and Saxo-Polish monarchs, who would not sanction the excessive transfer of symbolic capital to Frederick, even if this precluded his incorporation into their revanchist alliance. Nonetheless despite the interesting nature of English diplomatic ceremonial under the later Stuarts, literature dealing with English ceremonial vis-à-vis the international sphere has been somewhat neglected. Instead much work has been conducted on ceremonial and ritual directed at a domestic English audience.\textsuperscript{37} This thesis thus calls for a reversal of this state of affairs, and greater research into English ceremonial and symbolic rituals directed towards continental princely society. Though the status-defining power of performative ceremonial acts might not have possessed the same importance for British monarchs as it did for their European counterparts, British ceremonial actions and traditions were nonetheless enmeshed in European networks and remained influential in defining the status of others. Moreover, London was a diplomatic hub with a thriving news-periodical industry, which made ceremonial treatment secured there by diplomats impactful in producing status throughout European princely society.

\textsuperscript{37} See for example: Sharpe, \textit{Rebranding Rule}.
This thesis has engaged with the theme of the emerging states system in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The position of numerous rulers within princely society after 1648, and the widespread ambitions to obtain royal titles that permeated throughout, does much to debunk the Westphalian myth. Münster and Osnabrück did not establish an equal system of sovereign states, for sovereignty was not only a legalistic concept, but also a social status tied to the dynasty of the ruler. Thus, the states system remained relatively fluid until 1713/14, with numerous aspiring claimants to sovereign status, and other examples that demonstrate mere domestic sovereignty was often not enough in itself to ensure international equality.

This situation explains why princes who had previously occupied a satisfactory position in hierarchical princely society, but were now faced with the challenge of an emerging binary system, sought to acquire the necessary components of sovereignty and majesty in order to establish their position within the superior group. This unleashed a veritable race for royal titles amongst middling princes, who with the help of sometimes dubious claims to royal rank attempted to secure their status as part of the dominant grouping. This thesis has proposed new Anglophone nomenclature to neatly encapsulate this idea, designating the ‘group of potentates’ as that emerging elite circle which rulers aspired to be part of. Potentate status was a point at which domestic legal sovereignty intersected with the requisite majesty expected within early modern princely society. Acknowledged potentate status ensured respect, and more or less equal ceremonial and diplomatic treatment. The articulation of the potentate status of the monarchs of Prussia and Savoy, confirmed by their accession to royal titles between 1701 and 1713/1720, more or less defined the boundaries of this group for the remainder of the century.

Frederick I was able to produce his potentate status as part of this group due to strategic inter-dynastic policies and a successful process of self-representation. Analysis of Hohenzollern accession to potentate rank can also reveal much about how outsiders are able to fashion their status as part of a select group. The cooperation of an ally already firmly established within said group undoubtedly helped. But Frederick’s British allies also had other overriding priorities and were not merely concerned with maintaining the established political order. The

party seeking to enter the elite group - Frederick - was useful in pursuing these other British objectives, and thus arrangements could be made through which Hohenzollern status could be gradually forged in exchange for access to the means with which other British interests could be secured. Assessment of this process opens up fruitful opportunities for cross-pollination between historians and sociologists working on status construction and social group membership.

This thesis began as a bilateral study of Anglo-Prussian relations but has evolved beyond those initial boundaries due to the importance of a sub-network of actors within the broader society of European princes. The Network of Northern Courts, as thematised by this thesis, provided a number of actors sharing commonalities of character and interest with a susceptive space for reciprocal status construction. Attention has been drawn to the status defining ability of inter-courtly relations amongst members of this network, simultaneously emphasising that no bilateral relations existed in a vacuum, but were instead shaped by interactions within the broader group. By placing the Network of Northern Courts at the forefront of historical analysis of its constituent members, greater understanding of their ceremonial, diplomatic, and military policies can be brought about.

Material culture and the materiality of rank has also been extensively discussed in this thesis, with the aim of highlighting the important role it played in early modern diplomacy and status production, and to call for greater incorporation of this aspect into studies of those topics. Analysis of objects such as the departure gifts that Spanheim and other diplomats received in London, the material surroundings of Raby’s Berlin embassy, and a stylised depiction of the Dreikönigstreffen, has contributed towards the understanding of the Anglo-Prussian relationship and its consequences. Material objects occupied an impactful position at ceremonial occasions, alongside and often in tandem with gestures and other performative acts. Objects communicated rank claims and their recognition to audiences who came into contact with them, or consumed propagated descriptions thereof. The value, quality, or amount of such objects could express subtle distinctions in status, and this function remained even when material gifts were transmuted into financial gifts with a given value. Holistic assessment of these factors allows the historian to gaze into the mental framework of contemporary actors, often revealing judgements of status or suppositions not clearly expressed in written sources. British
perceptions of the emerging group of potentates can for example be observed in the differing value of departure gifts given to foreign diplomats of varying provenance.

Likewise, comparative assessment of the equipage and residence allowances granted to British diplomats abroad is useful in revealing contemporary attitudes. The £3,000 of ambassadorial plate, the expensive furnishings for the ambassadorial residence, and the quarterly extraordinary allowance of £300 that Raby received, demonstrate that the English regarded Frederick as a useful potentate that must be appeased. The award of such objects to Raby similarly reveals much about his utility and powers of persuasion, and nascent process of rank elevation. The utilisation of material objects by actors, sometimes for other purposes than initially intended, can also inform our understanding of actors’ modes of thinking. The four copies of the Dreikönigsporträt were variously utilised, with the extent to which the painting was prominently displayed very much contingent upon the degree to which the owners of said copies agreed with the message this image was communicating, as well as the extent to which it supported the owner’s own status assertions.

This thesis has contributed towards a number of areas of historiographical debate; supplementing, and at times challenging existing historiography. Frederick’s pursuit of a royal title, once regarded as a vainglorious endeavour of something inconsequential, has been reassessed. Aspiration to higher status was an essential element of early modern princely existence, and a royal title brought advantages in the form of deferential ceremonial and honorific treatment that was highly valuable in the status conscious early eighteenth-century. Once royal treatment was secured, rulers could more freely engage in diplomatic negotiations over other issues, while status as a crowned head brought with it influence and a seat at the negotiating table. Acquisition of royal dignity was made all the more pressing for a number of princes during the period 1648-1713, for a gradual shift from a hierarchical to a binary was initiated, with royal dignity acting as one of the defining characteristics for the superior group. That pursuit of a royal title was a rational contemporary objective is evidenced by the wave of regalisation that occurred in this period, whereby numerous middling princes sought to secure royal titles.

The present work has also reemphasised the significance of Anglo-Prussian relations during this period. Here it adds to the work of those such as Naujokat who have shown that close Anglo-Prussian relations were crucial
to the ongoing functioning of the Grand Alliance. However, relations with England were not solely important because they sustained Frederick’s coalition commitment despite disputes with the Dutch and Habsburgs, but because the English government and their diplomats were the most cooperative in aiding Frederick produce his potentate status. The recognition that this could not be achieved unilaterally, but required the cooperation of an established potentate therefore allows the true significance of the Anglo-Prussian dynamic to be understood. This relationship can correspondingly be placed in importance before Frederick’s relations with other princely houses.

Individual issues have also been discussed. A significant contribution has for example been made towards the understanding of the 1706 diplomatic crisis, with this author assigning agency to Prussian actors, illustrating the influence that individual diplomats could exercise, and highlighting the importance of matters of status and rank to actors as motivating factors. Likewise, the Dreikönigstreffen, which Vincenz Czech has revealed was far less grand than once depicted, has been an area of historiographical investigation. Czech’s findings have been built upon, with this work showing that due to the restricted nature of this event, the ceremonial victories and opportunities for dynastic self-representation Frederick secured through cooperation with Raby were of great value to both actors. Finally, Frederick’s approach to the Great Northern War has also been reassessed. Older Borussian historiography best exemplified by the criticisms of Droysen has been rejected, and even the more recent literature has been augmented. These state that Frederick made the best of a bad situation, and remained committed to a western war from which he would gain little because eastern intervention would have proved far too perilous to the territory upon which his royal status was founded. This thesis goes further; Frederick gained significantly from participation in the Grand Alliance. His involvement secured moderate territorial expansion, but this was notably more than many of the other small and middling princes secured for their participation. Crucially Frederick’s commitment to the Grand Alliance secured by 1713/14 near universal recognition of his royal crown, and importantly English cooperation in matters of ceremonial and status construction throughout. Although involvement in the Great Northern War could potentially have secured greater territorial aggrandisement, impactful ceremonial inducements were not to be found there to the same extent. The monarchs of Denmark, Saxony-Poland, and Sweden were more hesitant in according Frederick treatment which indicated his equality as a crowned head. Thus, in line with the overarching objectives of his reign Frederick pursued a rational policy between the two great wars of his age, largely committed to the
Spanish Succession War due to the advantages to be won there, but nonetheless tactfully playing towards the belligerents of the Great Northern War when concessions could be won.
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