THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

Heidegger and the Philosophy of Life:

Kantian and Post-Kantian thinking in the work of the early
Heidegger as the foundation for a new Lebensphilosophie

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by

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Abstract

The publication of *Sein und Zeit* in 1927 by the very young Martin Heidegger, a mere thirty-eight at the time, radically changed philosophy in a fashion that made returning to the ways of doing philosophy prior to *Sein und Zeit* impossible. Heidegger’s new way of understanding Being was through understanding the ways humans exist, as worldly beings. Any future philosophy would have to repudiate, argue in favour or against Heidegger’s analysis, but on whichever side a particular philosophy fell with regard to Heidegger they would have to acknowledge the importance of his work. Like many philosophy students I was intrigued by Heidegger, but felt that something was lacking in his analysis. This ‘lack’ I could only call a ‘sense of Life’, that in the insistence on the worldly and on death something equally fundamental had been lost, that human beings have Life and are living. Where in Heidegger is the notion of human beings as living animals? As I read Heidegger’s early lectures and those given just after the publication of *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger shows himself to be quite concerned with the issue. His early lectures are replete with reference to ‘Life’ and his lecture courses after its publication often make references to the issue of animality, as if he were trying to correct an issue left unresolved in *Sein und Zeit*.

In this thesis I shall argue not only that those thinkers Heidegger took himself for the most part to be disagreeing with: Descartes, Kant and Husserl, could have helped him answer the issue of Life; but that there is in *Sein und Zeit* itself a chance to reintroduce the notion of Life, a chance to which the early Heidegger was
either blind or simply ignored. In the final chapters I will show how phenomenology may develop without rejecting Heidegger’s thinking, so the concept of Life can return to phenomenological philosophy.
To Penguin
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The meaning of the life has been lost in the wind
And some people thinkin' that the end is close by
"Stead of learnin' to live they are learning to die. ‘Let Me Die in My Footsteps’

Bob Dylan
Contents

Abstract ......................................................................................................................... 1
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ 4
Contents ......................................................................................................................... 7
Major Works Cited ......................................................................................................... 10
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 12
  Painful Beginnings ..................................................................................................... 12
  Structure and Argument of the Thesis ........................................................................ 14
  Closing Remarks ......................................................................................................... 16
Chapter One: Heidegger and Descartes ................................................................. 17
  Introductory Remarks ................................................................................................ 17
  Heidegger and Descartes ............................................................................................ 18
  Descartes: Self as Substance ..................................................................................... 19
  Heidegger’s Opposition to Nietzsche’s’ Descartes ...................................................... 23
  Critique of Heidegger’s Descartes ............................................................................. 28
  Concluding Remarks .................................................................................................. 38
Chapter Two: The Early Heidegger’s Kant ............................................................ 40
  Introductory Remarks ............................................................................................... 40
  The ‘Special Relationship’ between Heidegger and Kant ........................................ 41
  Kant’s Critique ........................................................................................................... 42
  The Distinction between Phenomena and Noumena .............................................. 46
  Transcendental Unity of Apperception ..................................................................... 48
  The Paralogisms ......................................................................................................... 52
  Heidegger’s Critique of Kant ..................................................................................... 54
  Heidegger and Kant’s A Priori .................................................................................. 56
  Heidegger and the Kantian Subject .......................................................................... 59
  Subjectivity and Singularity ...................................................................................... 64
  Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 66
Chapter Three: Husserl & Heidegger: Reduction, Affectivity and Subjectivity .... 67
  Introductory Remarks ............................................................................................... 67
  The Two Husserls ...................................................................................................... 68
  Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology ............................................................... 70
  The Search for the Phenomenological Method ......................................................... 71
  The Epoché ................................................................................................................ 74
  Transcendental Subjectivity ...................................................................................... 82
  The Later Husserl ...................................................................................................... 85
  The Body and the ‘Paradox of Subjectivity’ .............................................................. 86
Chapter Four: Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Existence .......................... 105

Introductory Remarks ............................................................................. 105
What is the Project of Being and Time? .................................................. 106
The Question .......................................................................................... 108
Formal Indication .................................................................................... 112
The Phenomenon: Appearance and Phenomenology .......................... 113
Heidegger’s Phenomenology: Dasein and the Project of Being and Time ...... 117
Dasein Reborn ....................................................................................... 120
Being-in-the-World ................................................................................ 127
Worldhood .............................................................................................. 130
Affectivity ............................................................................................... 135
Anxiety ..................................................................................................... 141
Conscience ............................................................................................. 145
Care as the Being of Dasein ................................................................... 147
Conscience and First-Person Awareness in Being and Time .................. 150
A Need for an Account of Self-consciousness ....................................... 155

Chapter Five: From Freiburg to Kyoto: Heidegger’s Encounter with
Buddhism ................................................................................................ 157

Introductory Remarks ............................................................................. 157
Nishida Kitarō and Martin Heidegger: ‘Nothing’ Between Them?’ .......... 163
Nishida’s Intervention ............................................................................ 168
Nishitani Keiji (1900-90) ...................................................................... 172
Nishitani: Nihilism and the Self ............................................................ 173
Religion and Nothingness .................................................................... 175
The Later Nishitani on Heidegger .......................................................... 180
Nishitani on Conscience ....................................................................... 180
Conscience and Self-Consciousness ...................................................... 181
Self-Consciousness to Self-Awareness ............................................... 184
Nishitani on Heidegger and Conscience .............................................. 187
Heidegger’s Response to the Kyoto School ........................................ 188
Heidegger’s and The Kyoto School’s ‘Self’ ........................................... 190
Conclusion .............................................................................................. 192

Chapter Six: Towards a Phenomenology of Self-Experience ............... 193

Introductory Remarks ............................................................................. 193
Three Phenomenologies ....................................................................... 194
Levinas: Ipseity, Wakefulness & Affectivity ......................................... 195
Ipseity as Wakefulness .......................................................................... 195
Affectivity in Totality and Infinity: Enjoyment ...................................... 197
Sartre and Pure self-presence .............................................................. 202
Henry, Pure Immanence & Ipseity ......................................................... 203
Henry’s Phenomenology of ‘Life’ ......................................................... 207
Levinas & Henry: A Summary .............................................................. 208
The Third Phenomenology: A Heideggerian Preface ........................................... 209
The Phenomenology of Self-Experience: Introduction ........................................ 213
The Phenomenon of the Phenomenology of Self-Experience .............................. 215
From Being-in-the-world to Living-from-the-world ............................................. 217
Henry and the Living Self .................................................................................. 221
Ipseity and the Living Self .................................................................................. 228
The Living Self’s ‘return’ to the World ................................................................. 230
Being-Between or Being-in-the-Milieu ................................................................. 234
The Third Phenomenology: Summary ................................................................. 236
Conclusion: Is the Meaning of Life Lost? ............................................................ 240
  Preliminary Remarks ....................................................................................... 240
  Human Life Through The Early Heidegger ...................................................... 241
  Human Life in Being and Time ....................................................................... 244
  Why a Phenomenology of Life? ..................................................................... 245
Appendix ............................................................................................................. 247
Bibliography ....................................................................................................... 248
Major Works Cited

Since I refer to a number of books by several authors, some with multiple translators in this thesis, for some, instead of referencing the author by name, date and page number I refer to them by work and page number, for instance Being and Time instead being (Heidegger, 1962, pxx) is (BT:xx) and in the case of Being and Time I use ‘Heidegger’s numbering’ and not page number, unless it is quote by a particular author’s translation, such as Hubert Dreyfus and not the MacQuarrie and Robinson edition. Also the Nietzsche lectures by Heidegger is referenced as NIV as only the forth volume of this work is used.

Descartes


Husserl


*Heidegger*


S  Heidegger, M. (2002b) trans van Buren, J. *Supplements: From The Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond*. SUNY.

**Introduction**

**Painful Beginnings**

My interest in Heidegger grew out of my BA dissertation which was on the phenomenology of pain, an attempt to give a phenomenological description of chronic pain, a subject close to my heart as I have chronic back pain. To give this description I used the resources of philosophers inspired by phenomenology such as Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger and it was at this point in my philosophical development that I began to question Heidegger’s ideas, ideas I had hitherto accepted. Whilst I accepted and applauded Heidegger’s idea of ‘Being-in-the-world’ as a vast improvement on his predecessors, allowing the ‘problem of the external world’ to be revealed as mistake, since human beings are ‘in-the world’, it is simply is not an issue. Like many before me I read *Being and Time* for the first time, in my early years as an undergraduate, in awe of its depth and breadth and originality. However, when I returned to *Being and Time* whilst writing my undergraduate dissertation, of course I still found it exciting to read, but I now approached it with a sense of dissatisfaction and caution, a dissatisfaction that grew from a sense that the ‘payoff’ for Dasein’s ‘worldliness’ was too great. I felt that in order to develop his notion of Dasein as ‘Being-in-the-world’, placing the human being ‘back in the world’ and as public being, a being amongst others, something was sacrificed, that with his emphasis on worldliness and publicness, Heidegger has lost the notion of ‘inner’ or interiority of the self. There are experiences ‘I’ have that are my own, but not just in the sense that they are ‘mine’,
not that they are private, but they are personal, they are experienced as being particularly ‘mine’. Others will have similar experiences, they can be reported on but they will not be my experiences. Surely any thorough analysis of what it is to be a human being, which is after all a large part of Heidegger’s project, would have to account for this sense of ‘interiority’ or personal experience? Yet I felt such an account was lacking from *Being and Time*.

At this point in my philosophical education I did not have the resources to develop this line of inquiry. However, whilst researching for my Masters thesis I came across Japanese philosophy and in particular the work of the Kyoto School, a group of academics working in Kyoto from the late 1800’s to the present day and all highly influenced by Heidegger and German Idealists. They seem, at times, to read phenomenologists such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty as simply variations on Hegel, as if they were German Idealists in disguise. I was initially highly sceptical of their approach, but after a while I thought that their reading of Heidegger, being informed through German Idealism, particularly Fichte and Schelling combined with Zen Buddhism, could provide a way to work ‘the inner’ back into phenomenology. Whilst I do not just apply their ideas alone in this thesis they provided me with a way of reading and situating Heidegger’s work, in relation to Kant and Post-Kantian thinkers; asking whether or not Heidegger really truly succeeded in going ‘beyond’ those thinkers and ‘overcoming’ the subject, as he promised.
Structure and Argument of the Thesis

The thesis is divided into six chapters. In the first three I examine the philosophies of Descartes, Kant and Husserl, the early\(^1\) Heidegger’s critique of them, and possible interpretations of them which differ from that of Heidegger. For the early Heidegger, it is because of the failure of these philosophers to adequately address the problem of being or deal with the problem of the external world; and their allegiance to subjectivity, an allegiance, which in Heidegger’s view, leads to an ‘incorrect’ analysis of ‘Man’; that he is justified in carrying out his project of *Being and Time*. In the first three chapters I try to cast doubt upon this justification by showing that there may be alternatives to Heidegger’s critique of these philosophers. These alternative readings also point to gaps within Heidegger’s own work.

In chapter four I look at Heidegger’s own philosophy, both in *Being and Time* and in notes from lectures given up and just after its publication. Through an exegesis of the first Division of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* I attempt to show that Heidegger’s notion of *Dasein* is perhaps more indebted to Kant than Heidegger would care to admit; and that, with his account of conscience, Heidegger falls back into the first-personal language of subjectivity, a language that he was trying to avoid. My intention here is to show that Heidegger is vulnerable to the very notion

\(^1\) This is a commonly used way of dividing Heidegger’s career see Kisiel, T (1995). *The Genesis of Heidegger’s “Being and Time”*. University of California Press. pxiii
he is trying to escape, that of subjectivity. In the following chapters I attempt to show how Heidegger’s project could be salvaged in the light of my criticisms.

In chapter five, I begin the process of mapping out the road Heidegger could have taken by comparing his thinking to that of the Kyoto School, a group of Japanese philosophers and Zen Buddhists, headed by one Nishida Kitarô, whose book Zen no kenkyu ‘Inquiry into the Good’ was considered the finest work of philosophy in its time. The group was strongly influenced both by Buddhism, German Idealism and the work of Heidegger; Heidegger having taught many of them in the early 1920’s.² From the Kyoto School a conception of the self and subjectivity emerges that shows that there can be a more fundamental way of relating to the world than through intentionality. Advocates of Kyoto School philosophy believe we can speak of individual selves, endowed with the possibility of self-consciousness, without falling back into radical individualism or being subsumed by a Leviathan-like community. To achieve this, Kyoto School thinkers, especially Nishida and Nishitani, presents the self as self-affective, positing itself in a primordial experience of the world. For the Kyoto School, the experience of nothingness, far from being the negative experience it is for Heidegger, is a positive experience. It is still an experience of being temporarily separated from the community as a whole, but this separation is not necessarily negative and can in

² See Yusa, M. (1998) ‘Philosophy and Inflation. Miki Kiyoshi in Weimar Germany, 1922-1924’. Monumenta Nipponica Vol. 53, No. 1. (Spring, 1998), pp. 45-71. Sophia University for this interesting part of Heidegger’s biography. It is curious that a Japanese philosopher named Kuki Shuzo who was taught by Heidegger may have been the one to teach Phenomenology to Jean-Paul Sartre prior to his famous encounter with Raymond Aron that lead him to read Levinas. For this, see Stephen Light’s 1987 work Shuzo Kuki and Jean-Paul Sartre: Influence and Counter-Influence in the Early History of Existential Phenomonology Political Communication Yearbook Southern Illinois University.
fact be a spiritual experience revealing a new way of relating to the world, a way which is more fundamental, more primordial than intentionality or the ‘towards-which’.

Finally, we arrive at chapter six. In this chapter I present a discussion of two ‘French’\(^3\) phenomenologists, Michel Henry and Emmanuel Levinas. Both thinkers give an account of selfhood not dissimilar to that of the Kyoto School in that it is one where the self is conceptualised as auto-affective. I use their ideas and the idea of the Kyoto School to develop a phenomenology of self-experience which deals with the criticisms I had put to the early Heidegger, but does not lose the essence of the idea of Being-in-the-world.

**Closing Remarks**

In this thesis it is my intention to show that the early Heidegger in his attempt to escape the language of subjectivity, with its talk of ‘inner’ experiences, not only misses a fundamental aspect of what it means to be human, but falls back into the language of subjectivity in the process, the very language he was attempting to avoid. However, as I made clear above, this thesis is not meant to be a ‘philosophical assassination’ of the early Heidegger. With help from the Kyoto School and French Phenomenology the important parts as of his ‘existential analytic of Dasein’ can be retained, returning phenomenology back to *lebensphilosophie* or life-philosophy, one of the schools of thought phenomenology Heidegger rejected.

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\(^3\)French here refers to a certain way of doing phenomenology and not necessarily to their nationality, although both wrote in French.
Chapter One: Heidegger and Descartes

Introductory Remarks

The early Heidegger, the Heidegger of Being and Time, discusses his project in remarks he had made on Descartes in his Nietzsche lectures of 1939 (Nietzsche I,II,III & IV). The remarks about Descartes are made in Nietzsche IV: Nihilism. Aside from Being and Time, this is the only work published during his lifetime in which he mentions Descartes at length, albeit discounting lectures notes. The main aim of this chapter is examine Heidegger’s view of the notion of subjectivity, which, in any positive sense, is absent from Being and Time. A ‘subject’ is everything that Dasein is not, even though it is fair to say that with the notion of Dasein, Heidegger is attempting to account for all of the characteristics that ‘Modern Philosophy’ would attribute to the ‘subject’.

In this chapter I shall outline Descartes’ philosophy and Heidegger’s critique of it. I will then attempt to cast doubt on Heidegger’s critique, not to prove Descartes right but to cast doubt on Heidegger’s critique, and to show this critique to be ill-founded. If Heidegger’s interpretation of Descartes can be shown to be ill-founded or at least questionable then the idea of subjectivity remains a respectable philosophical notion. Despite Heidegger’s protestations, it does need to be accounted for in Heidegger’s ‘fundamental ontology’. In other words, Heidegger retains Cartesian elements since with the notion of Dasein, Heidegger is trying to
‘replace’ subjectivity and all its characteristics (save substantialism) therefore 
*Dasein* is ‘Cartesian’ in nature.

In order to argue this I shall present an outline of Descartes’s philosophy, 
followed by Heidegger’s reading of it and then I will present an alternative 
phenomenological reading of Heidegger’s critique of Descartes.

**Heidegger and Descartes**

Heidegger treated both Descartes (and Kant) as guilty of endorsing the 
substantiality conception of the subject - that the subject *qua* self is a substance, and 
for the same reasons. Whilst this particular criticism is justified if made of 
Descartes
4, Heidegger goes on to claim that the *cogito* should be read as ‘I represent 
my self’ 5, and as such my self has to be *re*-presented, given to me (and the world) 
as an object. Thus as a representational object of one’s own thought and the world, 
the Cartesian *cogito* will always exist for itself and to the world in a deficient mode 
of being: part of, but never quite *in* the world. In this chapter I will critique 
Heidegger’s interpretation just briefly outlined. Heidegger’s interpretation bears

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4 Descartes certainly held this view, but one can argue that Kant’s view of the subject is not so clear. 
Heidegger seems to conflate the metaphysical with the transcendental as if there was no difference 
between them - in *Basic Problems* wherever he mention Descartes, he almost always mentions Kant 
in the same sentence. For example:

“Kant fundamentally, retains Descartes definition [of the subject]. As essential as Kant’s own 
investigations in the ontological interpretation of subjectivity have been and forever remain the I, the 
ego, is for him, as for Descartes, *res cogitans, res, something* that thinks, i.e represents, perceives, 
judges, affirms, denies… and the like” (BP, p.177).

5 NIV, p.107
some similarity to Kant’s Transcendental Unity of Apperception. Firstly, however, I will outline some of Descartes philosophy with regards to the self and the *cogito*.

**Descartes: Self as Substance**

The main concern here is to outline Descartes philosophy in *Meditations on the First Philosophy*, published in 1641. In this work Descartes argues that other than the existence of God, the only truth of which he can be certain is his own existence. This is, of course, his famous *Cogito* or *cogito ergo sum* - I think, therefore I exist. From this apparently self-evident truth he argues that he must by nature be a *thinking thing* or *substance* - a *res cogitans*. This is the one of the key points of Descartes philosophy of mind - for Descartes the ‘I’, that is the ‘self’, *could only be a mental substance* and a *thinking thing*. This is its nature. Descartes states his famous principle at the beginning of the Second Meditation:

I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, *I am I exist*, is necessarily true.
whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. (AT VII:25).

If the *cogito* - that is, stating ‘I think therefore I am’, is to affirm a person’s existence it must be said in the first person ‘I (Michael Peckitt) think therefore I exist’ (in my own case). By stating ‘My brother thinks therefore he exists’ I cannot affirm his existence in the same way since I cannot be certain that he is *actually* thinking. Secondly, the grammar of *cogito* must be structured in the present tense if it is to ensure the certainty of one’s own existence. One cannot state ‘I will exist in the future’ because one may cease to be, and whilst it seems commonsensical to claim that ‘I’ existed in the past, such a claim relies on memory (perhaps given to me by the evil genius and as such is a deceiver), and therefore it is not reliable. Therefore the *cogito* can only ensure one’s existence in the present, where the present is defined as the moment one utters it. Thirdly, only the *cogito* can affirm my existence and must do so in terms of my *cogitatio* - my thinking. Any mode of thinking will suffice ‘I doubt,’ ‘I affirm’, ‘I reason’, but non-mental activities could not affirm one’s existence, stating ‘I walk therefore I exist’ is not sufficient since I could be dreaming I have legs. Once there is room for doubt one is forced into conceding that one only seems to be walking, and one’s existence is no longer certain.

The fourth feature is one disputed by Descartes scholars, including Heidegger himself. This is a question of whether the *cogito* should be understood as an inference, the result of a logical syllogism or as a performance, or as something else. I will not go into this in great detail here, but I shall briefly outline the main
positions. Certainly, one can arrange the *cogito* into a logical form. However, Descartes states:

> When someone says ‘I am thinking, therefore I am, or I exist’, he does not deduce existence from thought by means of a syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind. (AT VII:140)

Finally, Descartes, in his employment of the *cogito* does not presuppose any ontological claims about the nature of the ‘I think’. In particular, it does not presuppose any claims about the ‘I think’ as being a substance. The *cogito* is designed only to affirm as certain that because ‘I think’, ‘I exist’, when Descartes first states it in the *Meditations* he has yet to make any ontological claims about the nature of that ‘I’, the *cogito* originally only affirms one’s existence whatever the nature of the ‘I’ might be. Investigating the nature of the ‘I’ is Descartes next task.

Descartes goes on to argue that the ‘I’ or the self is a mental substance. However, before I outline his arguments, these terms need to be explained.

The term ‘substance’ comes from the Latin *substantia* and it means ‘Thing’ and for Scholastics and Aristotelians⁶ (whom Descartes was attacking) it refers to concrete entities. For example, individual human beings such as ‘Rene Descartes’ or an object such as ‘Michael Peckitt’s copy of *Being and Time*’. For Scholastics

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and Aristotelians it could not refer to types such as ‘human beings’ or ‘paper’, and it is on this point that Descartes parts company with them. For Descartes the concept applied to abstract entities, namely to physical (or extended) things and mental (or non-extended) things. The ‘I’ as the self is a mental substance, or a thinking thing.

Descartes main argument for ‘I’ being a mental substance is that he can doubt the existence of all physical substance but he cannot doubt the fact that he is thinking. From this Descartes concludes that he is a thing that thinks, a *sum res cogitans*. He gives three arguments for this: the first is an argument from doubt, the second from clear and distinction perception and the third is from divisibility.

The argument from doubt, as stated above, is simple. When he employs his method of doubt Descartes finds that he can doubt the existence of his body, but not of his mind, therefore the fact that he is thinking must mean that he is a mental substance:

….I saw that while I could pretend that I had no body, and that there was no world and no place for me to be in, I could not for all pretend that I did not exist….From this I knew that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is simply to think, and does not require…any material thing, in order to exist. (AT VI:33)

Secondly, he provides the argument from clear and distinct perception. Descartes argues that since he can know he exists without knowing he has a body, his mind’s
existence and that of his body are distinct and separate. Since he believes can have a clear and distinct idea of himself that does not involve his body, he concludes that he must be essentially a mental substance.

Finally, Descartes sets out his argument from divisibility. Descartes argues that not only is his mind distinct from his body, but that the mind operates in a different fashion, and responds to a different logic. This argument is as follows: the body is divisible whilst the mind is indivisible, and we can identify a part of our body such as a hand when separated from our body, but we cannot partition the mind in the same way.

Having outlined the main points of Descartes philosophy I will now give Heidegger’s critique of it.

**Heidegger’s Opposition to ‘Nietzsche’s’ Descartes**

In his 1939 lecture course *Nietzsche IV: Nihilism*, Heidegger criticises Nietzsche for viewing Descartes’ *cogito ergo sum* as a logical syllogism. Heidegger states:

At the outset, Nietzsche agrees with the familiar interpretation of the principle, which takes *ego cogito, ergo sum* as a logical deduction, underlying the logical deduction is the intention of proving that “I” am, that a “subject” is. Nietzsche believes it is
self-evident that man may be defined as “I” and that “I” may be defined as “subject” (NIV, p.124)

Heidegger berates Nietzsche, reminding him and us that Descartes had already defended himself against this fallacious understanding of his work in advance in the Principles of Philosophy when he states:

And when I have said that this proposition, I think, therefore I am is the first and most certain of all…I have not denied that one must know in advance of this principle what ‘thinking’, ‘existence’ and ‘certitude’ are. (AT: VIII, 8)

Descartes contra Nietzsche, as Heidegger tells us, does state that of course, the ideas of thinking, existence and truth would have to be known prior to the ‘realisation’ of the cogito. This defence, that any ‘truth’ about ‘existence’ presupposes knowledge of ‘truth’ and ‘existence’, is a notion congruent with both the project of Being and Time and the Meditations. But what exactly is Heidegger’s opposition to Nietzsche’s Descartes, the only Descartes worth considering for Heidegger? The answer begins with Heidegger’s own interpretation of the cogito.

Heidegger interprets the principle of cogito as cogito me cogitare, which he renders as ‘I represent myself’: “When Descartes grasps cogitatio and cogitare as perceptio, he wants to emphasise that bringing something to oneself pertains to cogitare. Cogitare is the presenting to oneself of what is representable” (NIV, p.105). And later states: “…[E]very “I represent something” simultaneously represents a “myself”, me, the one representing (for myself in my representing)” (NIV, p.106)
When Heidegger talks about “representing” he does not mean representing an object to oneself, such as Freiburg cathedral, to use Heidegger’s own example, or the computer I am looking at now. It is rather that ‘I’ am co-present with all ‘my’ re-presenting that the cogito or ‘I’ is present in re-presenting, that in the “representation” that ‘I’ itself is represented. Hence subjectivity is the representation of Ipesity, the ‘I’ present in the re-presenting:

Rather, the representing I is far more essentially and necessarily co-represented in every “I represent”, namely as something toward which, back to which, and before every represented thing is placed (NIV, p.107)

Heidegger appears to be offering a reading of Descartes that is Kantian in spirit, since his idea of cogito me cogitare as representation (Vorstellung), bears a striking similarity to Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception. The ‘I’ or human subjectivity must be present “in all my representations” that “I” am “involved” or present in all of “my” experiences. However, despite Heidegger’s quasi-Kantian arguments against Nietzsche, he has yet to show that Nietzsche’s idea of cogito ergo sum is mistaken. Heidegger now goes on to show that it is mistaken based on his own interpretation of Descartes. Heidegger’s argument is that since cogito ergo sum is to be understood as ‘I represent’, where the ‘I’, the “subject” is necessarily involved in the ‘representing’ of the ‘I’. Since it is not that we have the ‘I’ which then goes on to represent itself, as far as logical form is concerned the term “ergo” is redundant, since the ‘I’ is involved in all representing:
The “I” in its “I am”, or to be more specific, the one representing, is known in and for such representing no less than the represented object. The I-as “I am the one representing”- is so certainly present in the representing that no syllogism, no matter how logical, can attain the certainty bound up with this presenting to himself of the one representing….Hence we see at once why the ergo cannot be understood as the joining elements of a syllogism. The supposed premise- Is quo cogitate est- can never be the ground for the cogito sum, because that premise is derived from the cogito sum…The “I am” is not first produced from the “I represent”; rather the “I represent”, according to its essence, is the “I am” – that is the one representing-has already presented to me. With good reason, we might now omit the confusing ergo from the Cartesian principle. (NIV, p.113)

Heidegger’s second objection to Descartes, outlined in his Nietzsche lectures concerns the status Descartes accords Man qua subject. Man as the subject, therefore the “thinking thing” is now the most important entity in philosophical arguments. ‘Man’ is now the foundation and creator of all things, man is the subject, everything else is an object. In some philosophical systems ‘Man’ is even on a par with the Deity since ‘Man’ is ens creatum and ens perfectissimum the creator and created. This may indeed be because of the zeitgeist Descartes lived in; it was the time of Galileo and the birth of the New Science. Either way, this new status bestowed on ‘Man’ had a negative effect on philosophical debates: most importantly the debate about Being:

Man is the distinctive ground underlying every representing of being and their truth, on which every representing and its
represented is based and must be based if it is to have status and stability. Man is *subiectum* in the distinctive sense.... Being is representedness secured in reckoning representation, through man is universally guaranteed his manner of proceeding (**Vorgehen**) in the midst of beings, as well as scrutiny, conquest, mastery and disposition of beings in such a way that man, himself, can be the master of his own surety and certitude on his own terms. (NIV, p.119-20)

‘Man’ not God or Being is now the measure of all things, whether we are dealing with truth, beings or Being, ‘Man’ *qua* subject determines the essence of every entity, of every notion. ‘Man’ literally becomes the measure of all things, and Heidegger disagrees with this idea:

> Because man essentially has become the *subiectum*, and beingness has become equivalent to representedness, and truth equivalent to certitude, man now has disposal over the whole of beings as such in an essential way, for he provides the measure for all beingness of every individual being. The essential decision about what can be established as being now rests with man as *subiectum*. (NIV, p.121)

Heidegger’s displeasure at this conception of Man, of Man as subject in virtue of being a thinking thing or *cogito* is made clear at the beginning of *Being and Time* when he states:

> With the ‘cogito sum’ Descartes had claimed that he was putting philosophy on a new and firm footing. But what he left
undetermined when he began in this ‘radical’ way, was the kind of Being which belongs to the res cogitans, or-more precisely-the meaning of the Being of the ‘sum’. (BT:24)

By being the measure of all things Descartes can state that ‘Man’ is a thinking thing or res cogitans, that is what “I am” and if one asked “What is the meaning of the am or sum?” Descartes can respond that it is to have thoughts. This is enough for Descartes but not for Heidegger who wants to know what it means to be that thinking thing.

These are the two main concerns underpinning Heidegger’s critique of Descartes in Being and Time; this will be discussed later, in Chapter Four. What I have presented above are Heidegger’s concerns about the notion of subjectivity, that appear in Descartes, and which Heidegger wants to refute, in particular the notion of subjectivity, as Dasein is not a subject.

Critique of Heidegger’s Descartes

In this section, I aim to show that Heidegger’s interpretation of Descartes, whilst original, is ultimately flawed. My main claim is that Heidegger falls foul of the very fallacy that he berated Nietzsche for: interpreting the cogito ergo sum as something which is reliant on the notion of reflective thought and also possibly in agreement with the logical syllogism interpretation that he claims to disagree with.
However, before delivering this critique, there are a few preliminary aspects of Heidegger’s critique that I would like to make explicit.

To return to the deconstruction of Descartes that he did give, we must recall that Heidegger is giving a Kantian reading of Descartes by viewing the cogito argument as cogito me cogitare, and that he sees Descartes as committed to something akin to Kant’s Transcendental Unity of Apperception. Kant states: “It must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least, nothing to me.” (B131-2).

Now certainly, Heidegger’s interpretation of Descartes cogito me cogitare as ‘I represent’ bears some resemblance to this line of thought, but Heidegger does make some remarks that muddy the waters. Firstly he does at one point use the “deliberative action” when referring to representation as the statement cogito ergo sum as conscious act, under our control, which we can choose not to perform. Even if it is not what he means, Heidegger suggests this when he states:

….cogitare is always “thinking” in the sense of “thinking over,” and thus deliberation that thinks in such a way as to only the indubitable as securely fixed and represented in the proper sense. Cogitare is essentially a deliberative representing, a representing that examines and checks…(NIV, p.105-6).
Heidegger’s use of the terms ‘thinking over’ and ‘deliberative representing’ suggest that he may be reading the *cogito* as a syllogism. Both ‘Thinking over’ and ‘deliberative representing’ suggest that the one who recites the *cogito*, thinks slowly, deliberating until they come to the conclusion that the fact of their thinking proves their existence and that the agent goes through the practical syllogism. This appears at odds with Heidegger’s quasi-Kantian reading of the *cogito* as *cogito me cogitare*, as manifested in his insistence that the “I is far more *essentially* and *necessarily* co-represented in every “I represent”…”(NIV, p.107) However, the idea that he is ultimately reading the *cogito* as a practical syllogism is consistent with his ideas in *Being and Time*. In this text Heidegger uses the term ‘deliberation’ when referring to the type of intentionality marked by the practical syllogism during times of breakdown, where one has to think about one’s actions as opposed to being involved with the world. Deliberation is contrasted with non-representational intentionality, when one ‘deliberates’ in the ordinary sense of the word, one has to ‘think’ about what one is doing:

The scheme peculiar to [deliberating] is the “if-then”; for instance, if this or that is to be produced, put to use, or averted, then some ways and means, circumstances, or opportunities will be needed. (BT: 359)

There is certainly room to interpret Heidegger in this way, especially if one reads his Nietzsche lectures in the light of *Being and Time*, indeed in these lectures he is partly reflecting on the project of *Being and Time* and attempting to clear up confusions regarding his project. However, the question of whether he views ‘I
represent’ as deliberative is not the only question of importance, there is also the question of ‘I am’ being read as ‘I represent’ if at all? Being charitable to Heidegger, let us assume the ‘I represent’ has nothing to do with deliberative action and try to look at Heidegger’s interpretation on its own terms.

Jean-Luc Marion in his book *On Descartes’ Metaphysical Prism* puts forward the view that the ‘I’, or the represented object cannot be simply represented but:

…if it does represent what it cognizes, it does so by reflecting it, like a converging mirror that reflects rays by focusing them on a single point so as to render its object perfectly visible and at the same time appropriate it-as in the classical view (Marion, 1999a p93-94)

Reflection, which need not be deliberative (it could be immediate) is the only way that the ‘I’ could be represented, indeed Descartes supports this idea when he states “When the mind imagines or turns towards those impressions its operation is a thought”. (AT III: p.361 & p.13-15) Of course, it is neither Marion’s intention or mine to defend Descartes, I (and Marion) merely use Descartes to challenge Heidegger’s argument that the ‘I am’ as ‘I represent’ could be achieved in a way where the I is just “involved” in the action, that is, in a way similar to Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception. It cannot be that representations are simply there for me, the ‘I’ must do some work, whether it is reflecting or deliberating.
I will now look at Heidegger’s second critique, in which his worries about ‘Man’ are now being viewed as subject and the foundation of all things. What one needs to respond to is that we are sceptical of Heidegger’s telling of History of Western Metaphysics, and of the importance that the notion of the *Ego Cogito* holds for his history. Whilst this is not my point here, it is worth noting that few thinkers of the 17th and 18th centuries devote tomes to Descartes’ (in)famous principle. Whilst many thinkers mention Descartes, he is not necessarily the main focus of their inquiry. However the more significant point here is that just as Heidegger is accused of reinventing the notion for his own ends with ‘Man’ as the subject, Heidegger himself is guilty of a similar crime. Michel Henry in his book *The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis*, states that far from a place at the centre of the world, indeed of ‘his’ world, man is excluded from much of Cartesian thought:

This exclusion is accomplished in the reduction: what subsists has no eyes or ears, no body or worldly connection, nothing of the sort. The idea of man in established Cartesianism, comes to light only after its gaze has already slipped from the cogito to *cogitatum*; when, in the system of representation “cogito-cogitata,” the consideration of one of the cogitate (the idea of God) and its strange character lead to the thought that the system is, precisely, not a system and is not self-supporting. Man intervenes in Cartesianism only at the moment when he is discovered to be finite, *ens creatum*, and thus nothing like a foundation. (Henry, 1993, p.71)

It is possible to “tell the story” another way. The Cartesian has to doubt his senses and the existence of his senses, his body and his world, and despite debates about
the nature of Being (Man is ens creatum) man is a created being, since God exists and is more powerful. For Descartes, it is God and not Man that is foundation of all things. Man is merely a created, thinking thing. Whilst Heidegger has other worries about God being the founder of all things these will be discussed in Chapter five, Heidegger’s fears concerning Man’s foundational status were ill founded.

One question remains and it concerns the critique of Descartes in which Heidegger left the question of Being “undetermined”. Whilst this is not the place for a full defence of Descartes, it worth trying to create doubt by showing a little of why one could see Descartes as justified, that Descartes did not need to answer this question.

To make this argument I will again use the work of Michel Henry, a phenomenologist who offers such an interpretation of the cogito. In The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis Henry begins by reminding us of one the formulations of the cogito as it occurs in the Second Mediation; it is stated just after he has doubted everything - the videre videor: “At certe videre videor, audire, calescere” (Yet certainly I seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed).” (Descartes in Henry, 1993, p.17)

For Henry, Descartes is not affirming intentional subjectivity that would take the form ‘I considering my doubt, I seem to see’. Rather, for Henry, Descartes is offering a non-intentional subjectivity that is self-affective and absolute. Henry begins his argument by pointing out that at the stage of the Second Mediation,
Descartes has performed epoché, he doubts everything, the sky, the earth and all things in it, except his own existence:

I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case, I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. (AT VII: 25).

Even after doubting that everything may not exist, his own existence remains. Henry then asks, how a person that doubts the existence of the world and their own body make intelligible the thought, ‘Yet certainly I seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed…’ Henry argues that even after this ‘bracketing’ does not vision, the simple ‘seeing of things’ remain? Therefore what is seen indubitably exists:

[V]ision remain[s], pure vision considered in itself, reduced to itself, to its pure self-experiencing, from every relation to any presumed eyes, supposed body, or putative world? But if pure vision subsists as such, as a “phenomenon,” doesn’t what is seen also remain….as indubitable givens? (Henry, 1993, p.17)
Descartes responds of course, in the negative. There are no ‘indubitable givens’ the world may not be as it seems to appear, perhaps because of some evil genius, or it may not exist at all. For Henry, however, the consequence of this move is that ‘Seeing’, the videor, is essentially ‘rejected’, because of the truth of one’s ‘seeings’. Yet Henry reminds us, vision persists as the certe videre videor, vision “is given its true nature, the pure fact of seeing”. (Henry, 1993, p.18) And ‘seeing’ presupposes that there is a “…horizon of visibility, a transcendental light that Descartes calls “natural light.” ” (Henry, 1993, p.18). Therefore, we return to the problem of whatever exists, there has to be field of vision for objects to have the possibility of manifesting themselves, no matter how doubtful or false the object’s existence is vision must remain.

Descartes has to agree that vision and particular visions do exist, that they are seen to exist however false they may be. Henry now asks, what is existing? Henry claims that Descartes has already supplied the answer:

According to Cartesianism existing (being) means appearance, self-manifestation. Videor designates nothing but that. Videor designates the primal semblance, the original capacity to appear and give through which vision originally presents and manifests itself, regardless of what veracity is accorded it as vision, regardless of what it sees or believes itself to see, even regardless of seeing itself. (Henry, 1993, p.19)

In Cartesian philosophy the term ontology means to exist, it means to appear, to self-manifest, and videor from the Latin ‘to see’, is our original capacity as human
beings to appear with the possibility of vision, regardless of whether that vision is true or false.

An issue remains unresolved, how does *videre* the ‘seems’ of the ‘Yet I seem to see’ manifest itself. It cannot be immanent to the *videor*, that is to say it cannot reside in vision, since Descartes has displayed doubts about the certainty of vision. But again, Descartes supplies his own answer:

‘It seems to me that I see, that I hear, that I warm myself, and this is properly what in me is called sensing (sentir), and this, taken precisely, is nothing but thinking’. (Descartes in Henry, 1993, p.20)

We sense our thought and whilst particular thoughts can be doubted there is, nonetheless, thought. For Henry, this sensing is:

pure self-identical appearance, identical to the being defined by the sensing. I sense that I think, therefore I am. (Henry, 1993, p.21)

It is *I* that is sensing, thus ‘seeing’ should be understood as sensing that I see, as a self-sensing or self-affection and that this self-sensing cannot be doubted, since the ego cannot deceive itself.

We ‘sense’ or affect ourselves in the act of performing or reciting the *cogito ergo sum*. This ‘affection’ is not one that occurs within the subject, such as ‘feeling sad’, but one which constitutes the subject. The idea of self-affection is not new, it
did not appear with Henry; it can be found as early as Enlightenment thinker Maine de Biran (arguably Henry’s predecessor) and in Heidegger, in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. In his exegesis of Kant, Heidegger:

takes the essence of time to be pure self-affection. And as Heidegger points out, the concept of self-affection does not merely designate a process in which something affects itself, but a process that involves a self. Not in the sense that self-affection is effectuated by an already existing self, but in the sense that… (Zahavi in Gron, Damgaard and Overgaard, 2007, p.138)

When he states:

“….time as pure self-affection forms the essential structure of subjectivity.” (KPM, p.132)

However, it should be made clear that Descartes never supported the move to self-affection, to reduce the immanent sensing of thought i.e., affectivity to *videre*. He makes motions towards it other works, for example in *Principles of Philosophy* in which he states “By the term thought, I understand everything which we are of as happening within us, in so far as we have awareness of it. Hence, *thinking* is to be identified here not merely with understanding, willing and imagining, but also sensory awareness.” (CSM I, p.195). Also in the same section:

….if we take ‘seeing’ or ‘walking’ to apply to actual sense or awareness to apply to actual sense or awareness of seeing or walking, then the conclusion is quite certain, since it relates to
the mind, which alone has the sensation of thought that it is seeing or walking. (CSM I, p.195)

Here Descartes does seem to be locating sensation and affectivity as immanent to the mind; however, ultimately he does separate thought from sensations. As Henry puts it he was unable to “understand that affectivity can belong to the essence of pure thought.” (Henry, 1975, p 141) Whilst Henry may not be true to the letter of Descartes, he may certainly be close to the true spirit of Cartesian Philosophy when he proclaims ‘Cartesianism is a phenomenology…a material phenomenology’ (Henry in Marion, 1999b, p.105).

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter I have outlined Heidegger’s debate with Descartes in an attempt to do two things. Firstly, I have tried to show why Heidegger (although he hardly wrote about Descartes) was engaged in an attempt to move as far away from Descartes as possible. This was due to the fact that Heidegger wanted no part in the Cartesian concept of subjectivity. Secondly, I attempt to demonstrate through a critique of Heidegger’s reading of Descartes in his Nietzsche lectures how Heidegger may have failed in this task because he failed to give a positive account of subjectivity. Indeed it is illuminating that in those Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger muses that subjectivity may be in the end inevitable when he muses on the project of Being and Time:
…the past thirty years have not succeeded in awakening at least a preliminary understanding of the question that was posed. On the one hand, the reason for such non-comprehension lies in our habituation, entrenched and ineradicable, to the modern mode of thought: man is thought as subject, and all reflections on him are to be understood to be anthropology. On the other hand, however, the reason, for such non-comprehension lies in the attempt itself, which, perhaps because it really is something historically organic and not anything “contrived,” evolves from what has been heretofore; in struggling loose from it, it necessarily and continually refers back to the course of the past and calls on it for assistance, in the effort to say something entirely different. Above all, however, the reason, the path taken terminates abruptly at the decisive point. The reason for the disruption is that the attempt and the path it chose confront the danger of unwillingly becoming merely another reinforcement of subjectivity. (NIV, p.141 modified by J.Taminiaux)
Chapter Two: The Early Heidegger’s Kant

Introductory Remarks

In the previous chapter, I examined Heidegger’s engagement with Descartes and his critique of Descartes’ conception of the subject. In this chapter I will look at Heidegger’s engagement with and critique of Immanuel Kant. As with Descartes, Heidegger finds fault with Kant’s conception of subjectivity. However, Heidegger’s relationship with Kant is more complex than the one he has with Descartes because, whilst he deplores his conception of the subject, Heidegger recognises that he may require the resources of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in order to formulate his own project of Being and Time. In this chapter I shall outline the elements of Kant’s Critical Philosophy that Heidegger criticises. I shall also outline certain points of agreement between the two thinkers. In the final section I shall examine Heidegger’s reading of Kant. I should make it clear that in this chapter I will be making use of the work on Kant that appears after Being and Time, such as Heidegger’s The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (originally given in 1928) and also his work in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (originally given in 1929). I realise that it might appear unfair to Heidegger to interrogate his ideas in Being and Time by using work that appeared after its publication. However, I think I am justified in using these texts on the basis that Heidegger promised a ‘destruktion’ of Kant, along with Descartes and Aristotle in the final part of Being and Time, which was to have three divisions. Of course, this part never appeared;
however it is thought that the books named above, do at least make up some of that unwritten material.

The ‘Special Relationship’ between Heidegger and Kant

Theodore Kisiel, in his book *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time* (1995) suggests that to inquire about a time when Heidegger was *not* a Kantian is akin to asking when Heidegger was a German. Whilst this statement is partly made in jest, there is a serious intent behind the joke. When he was working at Freiburg and Marburg, Heidegger was not just exposed to but rather was saturated with the Neo-Kantianism that dominated the German universities in Heidegger’s time as a young scholar. For example, he was a student under Heinrich Rickert, a member of the *Baden* or *Southwest German* school of Neo-Kantianism. Heidegger also spent time at a Seminary, where Kantian morality (whilst not entirely popular in Kant’s own time) was popular. To Heidegger, the son of a pastor, it expressed the German *Zeitgeist*, in much the same way that a certain conception of Humean ethics might be said to express the British *Zeitgeist* of the late 19th and 20th Centuries.⁷

However, Heidegger’s Kantianism is more than just cultural exposure. Do the projects undertaken by Heidegger and Kant share any similarities and if so, would Heidegger accept that this might be the case? The short answer to these questions is yes, there are similarities and Heidegger would accept them although

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he does go to great lengths to point out the dissimilarities, and he sees his project as an improvement on Kant’s work. In order to explore this claim I must begin by outlining some key points of Kant’s Critical Philosophy from *Critique of Pure Reason* (hereafter *Critique*), in so far as they relate to Kant’s reading of Transcendental Subjectivity and Selfhood, as well as to the aim of his overall project.

**Kant’s Critique**

The first issue I want to outline in Kant’s *Critique* is arguably the issue that makes the rest of the *Critique* possible: the notion of the *synthetic a priori*.

Kant begins his *Critique* stating that his mission is to find a middle ground between the rationalism of Leibniz (and Descartes) and the radical empiricism of Hume. The reason for a middle ground is that it is necessary to the resurrection of metaphysics as a respectable discipline. Kant considers that Leibniz allows *too much* to fall under the auspices of metaphysics, God would be one such example, whilst Hume allows *too little if anything at all* to be the proper object of metaphysical study. For Hume, *metaphysical* propositions about God, the self and causal terms must be given anchorage in empirical experience. Kant begins his *Critique* with one short statement that marks the beginning of what he terms Transcendental Idealism, his ‘middle ground’. “But though all our knowledge begins with experience it does not follow that all arises out of experience.” (B1).
Kant raises the possibility that contra Hume, knowledge, what we know, can be obtained through means other than experience. At the same time he warns Leibniz, that rationalist techniques alone, techniques that place a lesser importance on experience will not enable respectable metaphysics. However, beyond this opening warning to Hume and Leibniz, Kant has a far more serious challenge for both of them, which goes to the very heart of the question ‘What is knowledge?’ To appreciate this one has to know a little about the views of Hume and Leibniz on knowledge.

Regardless of their differences regarding the method of acquiring knowledge, as an empiricist and a rationalist respectively, Hume and Leibniz are united on one point. Knowledge, however it is obtained, is either necessary and therefore a priori, or contingent and therefore a posteriori: what Leibniz calls truths of reasons and truths of fact. The former, truths of reasons, are necessary truths and as such are known a priori, such as two plus two equals four: the truths of mathematics or ‘Natural Philosophy’ are all such truths. Truths of fact are known through experience, such as ‘the table is in the dining room’. To establish whether this statement is true or not we must have experience and because it is dependent on experience such knowledge is contingent and a posteriori.

According to Leibniz, we as humans can have a priori knowledge not just about mathematics and the sciences, but about God and the afterlife; for Kant, this seems to allow metaphysics too much scope. On the other hand, Hume limits all a
priori knowledge to relation of ideas and this seems to make the scope of metaphysics too limited. Kant has found a middle ground, by suggesting that whilst empiricists such as Hume are right to insist on their criticism that all knowledge “begins with” experience, rationalists such as Leibniz are also right to insist that this does not mean that all knowledge must always be produced by experience.

It is here that Kant introduces his notion of the synthetic a priori. For Kant all a priori truths are necessary or generalisable, and therefore must be true. There is, however, a difference between what Kant called analytic judgements, where (as Kant describes it) the predicate is “thought in” the concept of the subject and synthetic judgements where the connection between subject and predicate is “thought without identity”. Thus that all ‘bodies are heavy’ is synthetic since the concept of ‘heavy’ is not contained within the concept of ‘body’. Where Kant differs from Hume is in claiming that there can be synthetic, necessary a priori judgements. That ‘7 plus 5 equals 12’ is a priori but also synthetic since there is nothing in the concept of ‘seven’, ‘plus’, ‘five’ or ‘equals’ which means twelve, a synthesis is need, a combination of the concept of ‘seven’ and ‘five’ with the operation of ‘plus’ to give us ‘twelve’. However, it is a priori because it is necessarily true (B15). Kant goes on to claim that our knowledge of geometry is also synthetic and a priori.

Kant’s project was partially generated by the need to explain the possibility of a priori knowledge. Kant argued that synthetic a priori knowledge would only be possible if the world we experienced was required to conform to the nature of the
knowing mind. This was his *Copernican revolution*. Not only does knowledge have to conform to the world but also any world we can know has to be susceptible to the organising principles of the knowing mind. “Our explanation is thus the only explanation that makes intelligible the *possibility* of geometry, as a body of *a priori* synthetic knowledge.” (B41).

It is the possibility of *synthetic a priori* judgements that enabled Kant to establish a firm ground for metaphysics. This firm ground was to be established by showing that any claimed *synthetic a priori* propositions are ones that are necessary if experience is to be possible for us. It allows him to show that the spatio-temporal nature of the world we experience is known *a priori*. And, more controversially, to suggest that space and time are ‘in us’.

Kant goes on to argue that the human mind has two faculties. Firstly ‘sensibility’, which is our ability to ‘sense’ or be affected by objects. Secondly ‘understanding’, this faculty conceptualises the impressions that the faculty of sensibility receives. I see the computer before me because the faculty of understanding arranges or conceptualises a particular set of impressions under the concept ‘computer’. (B33-B34). The human subject has essentially two faculties. One deals with sense impressions or ‘intuitions’ and the other deals with the way in which understanding helps us to conceptualise these intuitions: both faculties are necessary to the subject if it is to be faced with a world it can make sense of. However, before I outline our main concern in this chapter, Kant’s explicit views on
subjectivity and selfhood, I also need to outline his distinction between Phenomena and Noumena.

**The Distinction between Phenomena and Noumena**

Kant makes the distinction between phenomena and noumena in his ‘Transcendental Analytic,’ where he is discussing the scope and limits of the faculty of understanding. To demonstrate its limits Kant discusses the difference between phenomena and noumena; a term Kant himself introduces.

The phenomenal world is the world as we experience it. It consists of two elements that we cannot experientially disentangle, intuitions and concepts: the deliverance of the faculties of sensibility and understanding respectively. Kant introduces the concept of the noumena to signal that the world as experienced is not the whole of what there is. The noumenal world, the world of things as they are in themselves, is outside the scope of our knowledge. However, we can say that noumena, unlike phenomena, if they were represented, would be “represented as they are” and not as phenomena which would be represented “as they appear” (A249-50). Not being an object of sensibility, the human mind cannot see them, or gain access to them via any sense, so they do not appear to us as large, heavy, small or light nor do they seem to possess any properties. Only God could *experience* the noumena.
However, noumena and things in themselves should not be understood as being the same concept. The ‘thing in itself’ is an ontological concept that refers to entities whereas ‘noumena’ is an epistemological concept. It signals something that it is not possible for us to know. The concept of things in themselves is theoretically useful, for whilst they are non-sensible and non-empirical, they serve to secure empirical objects as a respectable ontological notion. Phenomena are possible, they are represented “as they appear”, because they are an appearance of something, but what is that something? That something is the thing in itself. It secures the object, outside of its appearance as a respectable notion. Or as Kant puts it: “…if the senses represent to us something, merely as it appears, this something must also in itself be a thing, and an object of non-sensible intuition.” (A249).

I will now go on to outline Kant’s revision of the cogito in his account of the ‘Transcendental Unity of Apperception’ from within this framework of the distinction between phenomena and noumena and his project of securing synthetic a priori truths as universal conditions of the possibility of experience.

Kant is not saying that things or objects only exist if a human subject exists but that they can only be understood as objects of such and such a kind if the human subject categorises them in a certain way. For Kant, as human beings we can only understand the world from the human perspective.
Some philosophers are not convinced that Kant does not really fall back into an inadvertent Berkeleyan idealism. By arguing that the experience of the world is dependent on the existence of a human subject to make sense of it, some philosophers come close to Berkeley’s famous argument that ‘to be is to be perceived’. However, this is to overlook the fact that Kant does not say that things about which the unified consciousness makes sense can have no existence outside of our perceptions. He merely states that ‘things’ will appear to us as human beings in the way that our human minds conceptualise and make sense of them. What the thing itself really is can only be available to one with a different mode of cognition than that possessed by humans: for example God. For Kant, to be is not simply to be perceived it is to exist independently of our cognition, but that any understanding or experience is dependent on our (human) cognition. Within this framework of his distinction between phenomena and noumena and his project of securing synthetic a priori truths as universal conditions of the possibility of experience, I will now go on to outline Kant’s revision of the cogito in his account of the ‘Transcendental Unity of Apperception’.

**Transcendental Unity of Apperception**

Kant introduces the Transcendental Unity of Apperception to avoid both Descartes’ equation of the self with substance. However, perhaps a more obvious and pressing concern was Hume’s empirically motivated scepticism, and his argument that since experience is simply a succession of ideas that can make sense,
when he looks for the self, he finds no such entity, simply a ‘bundle of perceptions’. Kant argues that if a succession of ideas is to be experienced, it must be combined or ‘synthesised’ into a unified whole: Kant calls this the ‘manifold of intuitions.’ Unless experience is synthesised or combined into a unified whole, it cannot be understood as an experience at all. For example, as you read this piece of paper, you recognise the black marks as ‘words’ and the white parts as ‘paper’ and you know that what you are seeing is a ‘piece of paper with written word’. Kant would explain this as you ‘receiving’ the impressions thanks to the faculty of sensibility, and the faculty of understanding, which orders or makes sense of the ‘messy’ impressions by subsuming the impressions under categories such as ‘Quantity’ and ‘Plurality’. Thus you come to see this as ‘a collection of A4 papers’. However, this process, this unifying of experience is only possible if the different elements are held within a single consciousness. Therefore a *unified* succession of ideas requires a *unified* consciousness thus one cannot exist without the other. Such a consciousness could not be given empirically for even though one can take one’s self as an object: taking one’s self as an object is an experience which requires an a *priori* synthesis of impression and therefore requires a unified consciousness as a condition of its own possibility. For Kant, there must be then a “pure original unchangeable consciousness” (A107) or self. Thus, Kant introduces the ‘original and synthetic Transcendental Unity of Apperception:

It must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to
saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least, nothing to me. (B131-2)

Here, Kant appears to be saying that in order for ‘I’ to experience objects it must be possible that my consciousness is not only unified but also that I have some awareness of this unity. ‘I’ could recognise them as ‘mine’, that is to recognise a unified consciousness as their condition of possibility. It seems that it is not that one has to actually to reflect in such a way every time one sees something, in order to be able to say ‘I’ am experiencing this or seeing that object, but that it must at least be possible to do so.

The Transcendental Unity of Apperception is synthetic and a priori, since it is necessary to the condition of experience. It is synthetic for it presupposes the possibility of synthesis between two objects or representations (B134). Kant calls it pure apperception or original apperception because it not empirical, rather it is the form that the subject’s relationship to the objective world must take. Kant on occasion refers to the Transcendental Unity of Apperception as the “transcendental unity of self-consciousness” (B132) to show that it is universal a priori condition of the possibility of knowledge. This is ensured by the fact that all my representations must be able to belong to a unified self-consciousness, that is, ‘my’ self-consciousness. If this were not the case there would be no ‘experience’ or ‘consciousness’ at all.
Kant goes on to say something about how his position differs from Descartes. Since *transcendental apperception*, because it is transcendental, is a *formal* unity, the unity of representations available to the ‘I think’, it excludes knowledge of any particular representation. *Transcendental apperception* could not be equated with the self as material or immaterial substance, since these substantial selves are phenomenal, part of the world of experience. They involve intuitions unavailable to the ‘I think’ in its formal sense. Rather the ‘I think’ is a condition of their possibility. As Kant states:

This principle [transcendental apperception] is not, however, to be taken as applying to every possible understanding, but only to that understanding through whose pure apperception, in the representation ‘I am’, nothing manifold is given. An understanding which through its self-consciousness could supply itself to itself the manifold of intuition - an understanding, that is to say, through whose representation the objects of representation should at the same time exist- would not require, for the unity of consciousness, a special act of synthesis of the manifold. For the human understanding, however, which thinks only, and does not intuit, that act is necessary. (B139)

I shall now turn in more detail to Kant’s critique of Descartes conception of the self as outlined in the Paralogisms.
The Paralogisms

In the Paralogisms (paralogisms means invalid syllogism) Kant is attacking Descartes’ Metaphysics - here renamed that of the ‘Rational Psychologist’. He attacks four tenets of this metaphysics:

A) The view that the self is a substance.
B) The view that this substance is indivisible.
C) The view that this substance is a person (and thus has self-consciousness over time).
D) The view that this person’s mind is independent of its body.

Here I will be primarily concerned with the first paralogism: the claim that the self is a substance.

Rational Psychology, or Cartesian Philosophy, according to Kant, must ground itself on the cogito - the ‘I think’, it is its ‘sole text’ (B401). And because the ‘I think’ is non-empirical, Cartesian Philosophy is therefore attempting to answer the question ‘What is the constitution of a thing which thinks?’ (A398) on a priori grounds. According to Kant, the Rational Psychologist’s reasoning behind the view that the subject is substance is as follows:

That which is the subject of a judgement and cannot be predicated of anything else is substance. 2 I as a thinking being am always the subject of my thoughts. 3 Therefore I am a substance. (Gardner, 1999, p.225).
The logic of the Rational Psychologist’s argument is compelling. The subject or ‘I’ is only something of which things are predicated - I think, I feel, I am and so on. So it is correct that the ‘I’ must be viewed as the subject of thought. But, according to Kant, there is a flaw. There is equivocation on the notion of substance. As Kant points out, the ‘I’ occupying the category of ‘subject’ in any judgement should only be regarded in a logical sense. It makes no claim about such a subject as a thing. It is a statement about the formal conditions of thought, what needs to be in place for thinking to be possible, it does not claim that there is a real underlying substance or object or thing that is ‘the subject’.

Descartes believes that our knowledge of ourselves as substance with permanence is given a priori. ‘I’ is a subject, therefore a substance, and a substance is something that has permanence. Kant’s argument rests on a claim about concept application. Simply being a subject, experiencing one’s thoughts or thinking is not enough to provide us with knowledge of this subject as a thing, as an object, a substance in that sense. Thus, Gardner states:

The rational psychologist’s conclusion would be justified…if and only if the concept of substance were employed in synthesising the ‘I’. But all that is involved in synthesising the self is the ‘I think’, transcendental apperception. And transcendental apperception is a condition for application of the concept of substance…not conditional upon it. (Gardner, 1999, p.225-226)
The ‘I-think’ is purely formal; the necessary conditions for the application of the concept of substance, but is itself a substance. In short the mistake made by the Rational Psychologist is to read premise one ‘That which is the subject of a judgement cannot be predicated of anything else is substance’ as stating that the subject (S) actually exists and therefore we can assume that S is a substance. For Kant, Descartes was simply making a ‘category mistake’ by assuming that by definition the ‘I think’ had to be a substance.

For Kant, although we know that the role of subject has to be occupied for experience to be possible, we know nothing about what it is that fulfils this role. Consequently speculations about whether what fulfils this role is material or immaterial cannot be entered into.

**Heidegger’s Critique of Kant**

Heidegger’s attitude to Kant’s philosophy is far more ambivalent than his view of Descartes in the previous chapter. Whereas Heidegger appears simply to separate or demarcate his own philosophy from Descartes, his attitude towards Kant is one of both demarcation and appropriation. Heidegger rejects what he disagrees with and incorporates those parts he agrees with into his own philosophy.

The first of the ‘appropriations’ I will outline concerns Heidegger’s realignment of Kant’s project in his *Critique*. Heidegger attempts to align Kant’s
project with his own project on fundamental ontology in which he has the beginnings of an answer to the question ‘What is Being?’ Heidegger differs from contemporaries such as Cassirer by situating Kant as writing about the field of *metaphysica generalis* which is concerned with ontology and not *metaphysica specialis* which is concerned with rational theology, rational cosmology and rational psychology. Kant is concerned with the possibility of ontology and his arguments about the possibility of experience, of consciousness, and of the subject are simply instrumental to this goal:

The intention of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, therefore, remains fundamentally misunderstood, if it is interpreted as a “theory of experience” or even as a theory of the positive sciences. The *Critique of Pure Reason* has nothing to do with a “theory of knowledge”. If one generally could allow the interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a theory of knowledge, then that would be to say that it is not a theory of ontic knowledge (experience), but rather a theory of ontological knowledge. But even with this conception, already far removed from the prevailing interpretation of the Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic, we have not encountered what is essential, namely that ontology as *Metaphysica Generalis*, i.e., as the basic part [*Grundstuck*] of metaphysics as whole, is grounded [*begrundet*]. And here for the first time it is seen for what it is. With the problem of transcendence, a “theory of knowledge” is not set in place of metaphysics, but rather the inner possibility of ontology is questioned. (KPM, p.11)
Heidegger is recasting Kant as an ‘ontologist’ similar to Heidegger himself by asking ‘How is General Ontology Possible?’ According to Heidegger, Kant’s search for the conditions of experience and knowledge should be viewed as a search for answers to the question of how knowledge or experience in general is possible, but not as giving a theory of knowledge. This was in conflict with the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism, a school of thought largely formulated by Ernst Cassirer that does hold Kant’s *Critique* to have produced a theory of knowledge. Thus Heidegger sees Kant as having begun the project of fundamental ontology. I will now go on outline Heidegger’s treatment of Kant’s *a priori*.

**Heidegger and Kant’s A Priori**

In the footnotes of *Being and Time*, whilst paying a rare tribute to his former mentor Edmund Husserl, Heidegger makes the following statement about the *a priori*:

But to disclose the *a priori* is not to make an ‘*a-prioristic*’ construction. Edmund Husserl has not only enabled us to understand once more the meaning of any genuine philosophical empiricism; he has also given us the necessary tools. ‘*A-priorism*’ is the method of every scientific philosophy that understands itself. There is nothing constructivistic about it. (BT: 50 ft x)
It is informative that along with intentionality, Heidegger credits the discovery of the *a priori* to Husserl. Heidegger must have been aware that Kant had introduced the *a priori* in the *Critique*, and Heidegger’s talk of the *a priori* as a method belonging “to every scientific philosophy that understands itself” seems to suggest that the *a priori* in its transcendental or Kantian reformulation is necessary to phenomenology. And yet Heidegger seems to want avoid associating the *a priori* with Kant. In *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena* (originally given in 1925) Heidegger defines the *a priori* in Kant:

> The a priori in Kant’s sense is a feature of the subjective sphere. The coupling of the a priori with subjectivity became especially pertinacious through Kant, who joined the question of the a priori with his specific epistemological inquiry and asked, in reference to a particular a priori comportment, that of synthetic a priori judgements, whether and how they have transcendent validity. (HCT, p.73-74)

For Heidegger, the *a priori* is not simply something to do with the conditions of possibility for experience or knowledge, all of which are ontic claims, to do with ‘the subject’. “Against this, phenomenology has shown that the *a priori* is not limited to subjectivity, indeed that in the first instance it has primarily nothing to at all to do with subjectivity.” (HCT, p.74).

To what then, would Heidegger apply the *a priori*? Heidegger goes on to argue that phenomenology, if it is to do any work, must be the “…*analytic description of intentionality in its a priori.*” (HCT, p.79). Since phenomenology is
the only way to conduct ontology for Heidegger, phenomenology must be a description of our understanding of entities, that is our ‘being towards’ entities, or intentionality, therefore intentionality must be a priori.

The issue of phenomenology and the role and status of intentionality and a priori will be further discussed in the next chapter on Husserl and in chapter four on Heidegger. Heidegger contra Kant does not consider or at least does not primarily consider subjectivity a priori. His claim is that there is something upon which the project of phenomenology rests that is a priori and is more fundamental than the subject. It rests instead on Dasein, which is not a subject but something which is prior to or beyond the subject; hence the a priori and subjectivity are divorced from each other. Dasein, with its ek-stasis, is put in place of the subject. For Heidegger, Dasein constitutes the ‘something more fundamental’ upon which phenomenology is based.

Heidegger approaches Kant in Being and Time, and his remarks are both positive and negative. He applauds Kant for beginning the investigation into temporality, indeed Heidegger believes Kant to be the first philosopher to take this issue seriously, but ultimately he feels that Kant “shrinks back” from the task (BT: 23). In Heidegger’s view Kant’s allegiance to the philosophical methods of his time - the need for ‘deduction’ meant that he never quite grasped the link between Dasein and temporality. Instead, Kant emphasised time and space, and of course, he believed in the Enlightenment notion of deduction: the belief that logical argument will lead us to the truth of the matter. Heidegger, on the other hand, only
emphasises time and believes in the ‘reduction’ or the ‘leading back’. Instead of logically deducing his argument, Heidegger shows how ‘world’, ‘selfhood’ and ‘temporality’ all lead back to Dasein, and Dasein’s existence ensures their ontological possibility. In attributing the notion of the a priori to Husserl rather than to Kant, Heidegger may well having been trying to distance his work from Kant’s transcendental philosophy. However, it could be argued that the very notion of the transcendental (as opposed to the transcendent) does not go against the idea of Being-in-the-World. Indeed, at one point, early on in Being and Time, Heidegger states: “Every disclosure of Being as transcendent is transcendental knowledge. Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of Being) is veritas transcendentalis.” (BT: 38).

Heidegger objects to the Kantian idea of the ‘I am’, as the transcendental ground. I think Heidegger was wrong to dismiss the notion of the transcendental in the Kantian sense, which is something he most certainly did. I will suggest that Heidegger needs the notion of the transcendental ground to develop of his notion of Dasein, even if he radically reinvents the idea of ground. I will look at this in chapter four.

**Heidegger and the Kantian Subject**

Heidegger treated both Descartes and Kant as though each was guilty of endorsing the substantiality conception of the subject - that the subject qua self is a substance, and for the same reasons. Descartes certainly held this view, but one can
argue that Kant’s view of the subject is not so clear. Heidegger seems to conflate the metaphysical and transcendental as if there were no difference between them. In Basic Problems wherever he mention Descartes, he almost always mention Kant in the same sentence. For example: “Kant presupposes these basic ontological theses of Descartes without further ado.” (BP, p.148). What is it about the concept of subjectivity in modern philosophy that Heidegger is so opposed to? To understand Heidegger’s view we must return to look at Being and Time when he first launches his attack on Kant.

Heidegger’s main critique of Kant’s conception of the subject is as follows: despite his best effects to avoid a substance based conception of the subject, one certainly held by Descartes, Kant never quite escapes it. Kant simply “…shows that the ontic theses about the soul-substances inferred from specific characteristics [simplicity, substantiality, personality] are without justification.” (BT: 318).

For Heidegger, Kant has simply shown that Descartes’ attribution of specific characteristics to the substance which is the ‘I’ is wrong, but Kant has not shown that the idea of the substantiality of the subject is in itself wrong. Indeed, Heidegger believes that Kant adopts the substance view of the subject when he “…slips back into the same inappropriate ontology of the substantial, whose ontic foundations he has theoretically denied to the I.” (BT: 18-9).
The idea of Kant endorsing the substantiality of the subject in his discussion of the ‘I think’ seems to sit at odds with his explicit criticisms of Descartes in the Paralogisms, so how does Heidegger make such a charge stick?

Firstly, Heidegger reminds us that the transcendental unity of apperception, or the ‘Kantian I think’ is the basis or ground for us being able to experience the world. Moreover, the ‘I think’ is conceived by Heidegger in terms of mental representation, in a way that parallels his reading of the Cartesian ‘cogito’. Thus transcendental apperception forms “…the ultimate ground of our relation to entities, a relation Kant still conceives in terms of mental representation.” (Carman, 2003, p. 303). It is both the idea of transcendental apperception as grounding and the ‘I think’ as representing an object to thought to which Heidegger objects.

As far as Heidegger was concerned, for Kant, the ‘I think’, is a subject, something that always underlies – hupokeimenon. Heidegger’s use of the Greek term hupokeimenon is significant. It means underlying ground, or simply ground. Its Latin equivalent is substantia from which we derive the English term substance. For Kant (unlike Descartes) the ‘I’ might not be something given in empirical intuition. However, when Heidegger argues that Kant’s ‘I’ is a hupokeimenon, something which underlies, or supports and unifies its attributes, his claim is that Kant endorses substantiality, just like Descartes.

Kant fundamentally retains Descartes definition [of the subject]. As essential as Kant's own investigations in the ontological
interpretation of subjectivity have been and forever remain the I, the ego, is for him, as for Descartes, res cogitans, res, something that thinks, i.e., represents, perceives, judges, affirms, denies…and the like. (BP, p.177)

Heidegger continues his critique of the Kantian subject with an analysis of the Refutation of Idealism. Heidegger points out, that when Kant starts the refutation from the ‘Consciousness of my existence’ what Kant means is the consciousness of my being, res cogitans, or a thinking thing in Cartesian sense. Kant simply did not escape the Cartesian baggage of substantiality. However, Heidegger does make one concession to Kant in the following line:

… he [Kant] has denied that the ontical foundations of the ontology of the substantial apply to the “I” (BT: 319)

Heidegger is implying that Kant does see the incoherence of Descartes’ idea of simply equating the individual or particular ‘I’, such as ‘I, Michael’ with a substance, known a priori. However, Kant has only avoided equating a subject with a substance on the ontic or individual level. On the general or ontological level however, that is, the ‘I’ qua human beings in general, Heidegger maintains that Kant still takes transcendental apperception, the ‘I think’ as “substantial” (BT: 320-1). Heidegger’s point is that Kant like Descartes still regards the general or ontological ‘I-think’ as a substance since it is that which grounds the form for the possibility of experience. It is that which provides such grounding is ‘something’.
Are Heidegger’s criticisms of Kant, in fact justified? One point to make here is that Heidegger seems to run together discussions of the self or the subject that are kept distinct in Kant. The Refutation of Idealism starts with our empirical self, as encountered in our stream of consciousness. This is not the ‘I think’ which forms a transcendental condition of experience. Rather the ‘I think’ is a condition of our encountering such an empirical self. Kant also discusses the ‘noumenal’ self, about which we can have no knowledge, but which we need to assume if we are to make sense of the moral law. The need to assume such a ‘noumenal self’ only becomes absolutely necessary in Kant’s works on morality. In *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger evidences that he is not just working from the *Critique* and that he is aware of a Kantian self that is: “…immanent in its own thinking activity as a kind of ever-present normative guide or governing agency.” (Carman, 2003, p.307). It is something which “…informs my actions and thoughts by legislating the norms according to which I conduct myself at all times.” (Carman, 2003, p.306). Thus Heidegger maintains that Kant simply rejects the:

*res cogitans* as an intuitable object in consciousness and then reinstating it as the self-legislatng agency immanent in free thought and action as such. The self thus retains a kind of abiding presence to itself, not as a thing with properties but as a normative guide constantly informing its own cognitive and practical behaviour. (Carman, 2003, p.306)

For Heidegger, Kant has simply rejected one unsatisfactory picture, that of the cogito, and replaced it with an equally unsatisfactory picture with his ‘I think’ as
something present to itself. Although Heidegger is rightly criticising the assumption of such a noumenal self he has not necessarily shown problems with the transcendental unity of apperception. For Kant, it is this, rather than the noumenal or empirical self that is a necessary condition of experience.

**Subjectivity and Singularity**

In the *Paralogisms* Kant seems to address explicitly Heidegger’s criticism that the ‘I think’ as a precondition of experience is a thinking ‘thing’ in the Cartesian sense of that term.

Kant’s argument is that thinkers such as Descartes have made a fundamental error in that they have mistaken the ‘I-think,’ a formal condition of thought, for knowledge of the self, with empirical knowledge of one’s self. The Rational Psychologist has conflated substance with self; by equating these two entities he has come to the conclusion that one has knowledge of oneself as a thing or object. As Kant states:

The identity of the consciousness of myself at different times is therefore only a formal condition of my thoughts and their coherence, and in no way proves the numerical identity of the subject. Despite the logical identity of the ‘I’ such a change may have occurred in it as does not allow of the retention of its identity, and yet we may ascribe to it the same-sounding ‘I’, which in every different state, even in one involving change of
the [thinking] subject, may still retain the thought of the preceding subject and hand it other to the subsequent subject. (A364)

Kant uses the example of an elastic or rubber ball that hits another thereby transmitting its potential energy to it, and then to another, and another and so on. Similarly, one can imagine that the unity of the ‘I think’ is retained even when there is no identity of things. Whether the ‘I think’ is realised in one or many things is not something that we can know a priori. From the unity of apperception we can draw no conclusions concerning the identity of any thing. In this sense, we cannot lay any claim to anything transcendentally, but a formal unity or condition of thought for the self, not to knowledge of the self (A365).

The fact that Heidegger attributes to Kant a substantial subject grounding the possibility of experience, derives in part from Heidegger reading the ‘I think’ as he read the cogito: as a representation of self to itself. However, it is worth considering whether we need to interpret Kant’s account in this way. Certainly Kant provides a deduction of the Transcendental Unity of Apperception and Heidegger is in disagreement with him about the need for this. As stated above Heidegger would prefer a ‘reduction’, an analysis of Dasein that can show time, self (and all representations that would ‘accompany’ it in Kantian language). Kant also talks of the ‘I-think’ as an accompaniment to all our experiences. Of course, we might read this (as Heidegger seems to) as reflective, as treatment of the self as an object and this would lead to the problems Heidegger raises. I believe that the move to treat it the self as an object would be a mistake. It is also possible to read the ‘I-think’ as
reflexive, as a phenomenological awareness of the ‘mineness’ of experience. In this way it is much closer to aspects of Heidegger’s own thinking specifically his idea of the self ‘dealing’ with the world. Whilst Heidegger might reject a deduction of a unified consciousness as the *a priori* condition of experience, the phenomenological ‘mineness’ seems much closer to the phenomenological *a priori* that he seems to accept.

**Conclusion**

The young Heidegger’s relationship to Kant is a complex one. As stated above, Heidegger believed that at the ontological or general level Kant was guilty of endorsing a substantial conception of subjectivity as a transcendental ground. I have suggested this is not justifiable. In Chapter Four I will further discuss whether making the transcendental unity of apperception ‘phenomenological’ is a move Heidegger himself might need to endorse. I will also return to the issue of Heidegger’s replacement of the Kantian *a priori* with a phenomenological one.
Chapter Three: Husserl & Heidegger: Reduction, Affectivity and Subjectivity

Introductory Remarks

In the first chapter I gave an exegesis of Heidegger’s critique of Descartes. I argued against Heidegger’s critique of Descartes’ *cogito* as representationalist. This critique is based on his claim that the statement *cogito ergo sum* should be understood as ‘I represent (my self), I exist.’ Despite Heidegger’s argument to the contrary, I also argued that the phrase *ego cogito* is not necessarily referring to ‘Man’; indeed ‘Man’ seems to be have been inserted into this framework by Heidegger himself. I offered an alternative interpretation of Descartes based on the work of Michel Henry. For Henry, the subjectivity that the *cogito ergo sum* affords is self-affective life, in which no representationalism is involved. This is a reading of Descartes that I would endorse, though not uncritically, and it will be further explored in the final two chapters. At this juncture, the alternative reading of Descartes illustrates just one way in which Heidegger might be wrong or mistaken about the notion of subject, whether this means the alternative reading is indeed correct will be discussed later.

In the second chapter, I discussed Heidegger’s relationship to Kant. As with the chapter on Descartes this was to show that Heidegger’s attack on Kant’s notion of the subject might also be wrong and it was also to raise the question of how far
the notion of *Dasein* in Heidegger differs from the concept of the subject in Kant. I also intended to highlight parts of Kant’s transcendental philosophy that have parallels in Heidegger’s own philosophy.

In this chapter, I shall turn to Heidegger’s critique of Husserl. Edmund Husserl is, of course, Heidegger’s mentor. As the ‘founder of phenomenology’, he has had a great influence on Heidegger’s thinking. Yet, as with Descartes, Heidegger devotes little time to Husserl in *Being and Time*. In this chapter I will examine Husserl’s thought and Heidegger’s critique of it. My aim is to illustrate Heidegger’s relation to another philosopher who, like himself, is trying to capture the everyday life that we live.

**The Two Husserls**

The first volume of *Logical Investigations* was published in 1900; following on from the time spent by the Early Heidegger as Husserl’s assistant in the 1920s, scholarship on Husserl has continued to grow and change throughout the century. Thus two camps have now emerged. The first I will refer to the ‘Standard Interpretation’ camp. This group believes that Husserl is an internalist regarding mental states: a philosopher of consciousness who uses a Cartesian framework. Indeed, the strongest exponents of this interpretation believe that despite his use of
Kantian terminology Husserl remained an ‘unrepentant Cartesian’ through his whole philosophical career. 

The second camp is a mix of Husserlian and Heideggerian scholars with varied interests. This group includes Steven Galt Crowell as well as Lilian Alweiss and Søren Overgaard. They argue against the internalist reading of Husserl. In some cases they suggest that this is Heidegger’s reading in the sense that it emphasises the Kantian aspects of Husserl’s thought. It is important to mention these two schools of Husserlian scholarship when attempting to give a faithful account of Husserl’s Phenomenology as this always raises the question of which Husserl one is outlining. The interpretation of Husserl I ultimately agree with does not fall neatly into either camp; for whilst I find some criticisms of Husserl’s internalism or Cartesianism unfounded, this does not necessarily mean that I accept all of Husserl’s Cartesian characteristics as welcome. Nor would I ignore his Kantian side. However, before presenting my own analysis, I will present the Husserl I believe Heidegger was reading based on his own critique.

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Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology

Husserl wrote many works during a period of thirty years. He began with *Logical Investigations*: the first volume of this was published in 1900. He wrote until his death in 1938, and much previously unpublished work has appeared after his death. My chronological analysis of his work starts in 1913, with the publication of *Ideas I*. This is the point at which Husserl’s thinking took a transcendental turn, and this is the aspect of his work that comes under sustained attack from Heidegger. Husserl had concluded that phenomenology should enable us not only to describe or see ‘the essential structures of all conscious experiences and their intentional objects’. It should also enable us to describe or see “the rootedness of these essences in a transcendental realm and in the transcendental ego as their “absolute source”. ” (Moran, 2000, p.125).

The fact that I am seeing a computer is self-evident, it is a conscious experience I am having now, but this is not Husserl’s main question. His main task is not to simply delineate experience in terms of what it is but rather to determine how such experience is possible. *How* is it possible that I am having this experience of the computer? As Husserl now conceives it, phenomenology should not only allow the practitioner to describe the infamous ‘things themselves’ or the essence of things, it should explain the *how* of the thing’s existence. Husserl asks: what are the grounds of existence? This ground must be found in the transcendental realm. This is what Husserl called the *question of constitution*: determining how the world appears as an object of possible experience. Or, as Søren Overgaard states:
Husserl, in other words, wants to understand how the world and worldly entities come to be given in our experience, a question that he identifies with the question concerning the constitution of the objects. The world does exist, it is revealed to us in our experiences, but we need to understand how this can be so. That our experience of the world is beyond all reasonable doubt does not entail that we already understand how our experiences “perform” this, how they can present an existing world, with existing objects to us… (Overgaard, 2004, p.36)

The question of constitution or determining the ‘how’ of experience becomes the fundamental task of phenomenology. Husserl now needed to find the method for answering this question.

**The Search for the Phenomenological Method**

What is called for is a scientific method that would explain the nature of experience. How is it possible to have experiences such as those described above? No one disputes the need for some method. However one might object that a perfectly good scientific method for determining the ‘how’ of experience exists and is to be found in the ‘non-phenomenological’ sciences such as physics, biology, chemistry and mathematics. For example, we know that wine goes off because it reacts with oxygen for too long, or that objects are pulled to the ground by gravity. We do not need phenomenology to help us here. Neurophysiology and cognitive science have an explanation for why we experience the world the way we do. This
explanation describes the nature of experience without reference to phenomenology. In view of this we might, ask why is transcendental phenomenology necessary?

According to one of Husserl’s supporters, Eugen Fink, we need Husserl’s phenomenology because it is not primarily concerned with the constitution of particular objects such as sour wine. As stated above, it must be remembered that Husserlian phenomenology is concerned with the constitution of the world; it offers explanations not just for particular kinds of experience but for how experience is possible at all. Whilst Husserl believes phenomenology to be a science, this does not mean that he views the other sciences as failing, or that phenomenology is necessary to connect all the sciences together, thereby creating one science. However, he does view phenomenology as the foundation for all the sciences. A phenomenological science is needed as a foundation for all the sciences because whilst each science will explain how particular objects exist (including the world), none will explain how the world exists for us, how does it appear at all. No science will explain how I can experience ‘wine’ as a thing to be experienced, and how such a phenomena can appear ‘sour’ or ‘gone off’ to me at all. Science can explain why wine goes off, but how it is that wine appears to me as ‘sour’, only phenomenology can do this. I shall now outline the method of phenomenology: the transcendental reduction.

Husserl ‘discovered’ the transcendental reduction in 1901 whilst he was studying Locke, Leibniz, Hume, Berkeley, Kant, Fichte and Mach; this was shortly after the publication of *Logical Investigations*. Husserl had already identified
Descartes as the one who discovered the transcendental sphere. The method of Cartesian doubt influenced his formulation of reduction in terms of the suspension of actuality or the *epoché*. Husserl considered that Descartes had covered up or failed to understand the importance of the transcendental for arriving at the truth of the *cogito*. In Husserl’s view this meant that Descartes had simply agreed with scholastics about the status of the ‘I’ as a metaphysical substance, a thinking thing.

Husserl turned to Hume whom he considered as the first proper transcendental philosopher. Husserl found in Hume someone who had understood and applied the idea of the Cartesian transcendental ego by taking it to its logical conclusion. Hume’s argument was that he found the position of the sceptic to be ultimately untenable with a problem such as the existence of the external world; yet at the same time there is no justification for believing that the world actually exists. By arriving at this formulation Hume had anticipated and applied what Husserl called the *epoché* - the suspension of our ‘natural attitude’, that is, our ordinary way of experiencing the world.

For Husserl, phenomenology must be without presuppositions but it has to start with the world. As he learnt from Hume, to deny that you are at least *experiencing* a world is senseless when it presented to you. But one can suspend, that is to say hold back on any judgement about whether the world *actually* exists.\(^\text{10}\)

Thus Phenomenology remains true to the requirement of being a pure science without presuppositions. Husserl’s transcendental turn brings him into discussion with Kant. Like Kant he is involved in a project that aims to provide the *conditions* for scientific knowledge.

\(^{10}\) Husserl famous ‘principle of principles’ Ideas I p.24
of possibility for knowledge, but unlike Kant “Husserl’s concern was not so much with the constitution of objectivity, as with the constitution of the world…” (Moran, 2000, p.61).

Husserl rejected Kant’s conception of ‘the thing itself’ as something unknowable. For Husserl, all that appears to consciousness is all that there could possibly be, ‘reality’ is as it appears to consciousness. I have outlined Husserl’s route to discovering the transcendental reduction. It is important to understand Husserl’s own reading of philosophy in order to appreciate the significance the transcendental reduction had for him as a necessary basis for phenomenology. Phenomenology must be without presuppositions if it to be a ‘rigorous’ science. Since nothing may be assumed, whatever method is employed, and whatever results from this particular application there can be no claims made about the actuality of objects as they appear to consciousness. Also, as stated above, Husserl wants not only to describe the essence of particular conscious experiences, but also to describe consciousness itself. I will now go through the *epoché* and the transcendental reduction.

**The *Epoché***

Since the natural sciences will not give us ‘the things themselves’ the transcendental reduction is necessary. The performance of the *epoché* is part of that reduction. Husserl offered different characterisations of the *epoché* throughout his
career, consequently philosophers differ as to how Husserl’s ideas on the *epoché* should be read. For example, what is the role of the *epoché*? Husserl recognised that the ‘natural facts’ discovered by science form the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions with which we approach the world: Husserl called this the natural attitude. He now needed some method of ensuring that such beliefs do not play a part in constitutive phenomenology. Husserl begins to explain the new method of the *epoché* in *Ideas I*:

> *We put out of action the general thesis which belongs to the essence of the natural standpoint*, we place in brackets whatever it includes respecting the nature of Being: *this entire natural world therefore* which is continually “there for us”, “present to our hand” and will ever remain there, is a “fact-world” of which we continue to be conscious, even though it pleases us to put it in brackets. (*Ideas I*, p.110)

As Søren Overgaard points out, “Few philosophical notions are as controversial as Husserl’s ‘epoché’ ” (Overgaard, 2004, p.42) and it is has been prone to much misinterpretation. This misinterpretation arises from an overemphasis being placed on the similarity between Husserl’s concept of the *epoché* and Descartes’ method of doubt. This similarity is all too easily made by Husserl’s use of the world 

> Ausschaltung (German for “switching off”). It is as if one were “switching off” the world in the same way one switches off a CD player: the music has stopped and it is no longer there. Husserl’s own comparisons between his method and Descartes method do not help and Husserl does make many, although there is a question as to how far Husserl wanted to take this comparison. For example, “We can now let the
universal *epoché* in the sharply defined novel sense we have given it step into the place of Cartesian doubt.” (*Ideas I*, p.110). Or from *Cartesian Meditations*, where he aligns his project with Descartes’:

As one who is meditating in the Cartesian manner, what can I do with the transcendental ego philosophically? Certainly his being is, for me, prior in the order of knowledge to all Objective being; in a certain sense he is the underlying basis on which all Objective cognition takes place. But can this priority rightly signify that the transcendental ego is, in the usual sense, the knowledge-basis on which all Objective knowledge is grounded? Not that we intend to abandon the great Cartesian thought of attempting to find in transcendental subjectivity the deepest grounding of all sciences and even of the being of an Objective world. If we were to abandon that thought, we should not be following Cartesian paths of mediation at all; our divergences would be more than modifications prompted by criticism. But perhaps, with the Cartesian discovery of the transcendental ego, *a new idea of the grounding of knowledge* also becomes disclosed: the idea of it as a transcendental grounding. (CM, p.27)

Despite all this it would be inaccurate to assume that Husserl’s argument is simply Cartesian. Broadly speaking, there are two readings of the *epoché* which are based on an overly Cartesian reading of Husserl. The first claims that in performing the *epoché*, Husserl rejects the existence of the world:

The *epoché* is a unique reduction over against every other. To
underscore its radicality, Husserl says that the epoché “annihilates” the world. After affecting this reduction, the world is no longer there for us as it was in the natural attitude; strictly speaking, it no longer exists. (Brainard, 2002, p.69)

This is simply not true as the beginning of the quote from *Ideas I* given at the beginning of this section clearly states, “...this entire natural world therefore which is continually “there for us”, “present to our hand”, and will ever remain there, is a “fact-world” of which we continue to be conscious, even though it pleases us to put it in brackets.” (*Ideas I*, p.110). Husserl elaborates:

I do not then deny this “world”, as though I were a sophist, I do not doubt that it is there as though I were a sceptic; but I use the “phenomenological” reduction , which completely bars me from using any judgment that concerns spatio-temporal existence (Dasein). (*Ideas I*, p.110-111)

However, Husserl’s attempt to clear up the matter and defend himself against Cartesian scepticism leaves him open to attack from another argument, that by ‘suspending judgement’ he does not deny the existence of the world, but he does deny belief in the existence of the world. Husserl is not saying that by bracketing one denies the existence of the natural world. For methodological reasons, ‘the world’ is ‘excluded’ or ‘ignored’, and yet even the idea of a denial of belief seems counterintuitive to some. What then, is the best way to understand the epoché?

The best way to understand the epoché is to focus on the idea of bracketing: bracketing is to parenthesise, to put aside, it is not to deny. As such once the epoché
is performed, the world does not cease to exist, nor does our belief in it. One does not ‘bracket’ or ‘lock up’ the world’s existence, this is not the point of the annihilation. It is to deny that one can constitute the phenomenological world on those grounds, using those beliefs. One does not deny the beliefs of the ‘natural attitude’, they simply cannot do the job of constituting the world as a phenomenology would describe it, they cannot describe the ‘how’. Marcus Brainard states: “However, the target of the reduction is primarily not the spatio temporally, psychophysically or physicalistically existent world, not some thing-in-itself, but rather the thesis of or the belief in the Being of the natural world.” (Brainard, 2002, p.69).

In this way there is a similarity between Husserl’s epoché and Hume’s argument for the external world. If Husserl is to be associated with anybody it should be Hume and not Descartes. As Lilian Alweiss points out in her book The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl (2003) just as Hume can neither deny scepticism nor justify his beliefs, “Husserl argues that true skepticism does not doubt the world but our capacity to judge whether or not there is a world.” (Alweiss, 2003, p.16), or least whether there is a world that is phenomenologically justified. Having performed the epoché, Husserl now has to explain exactly what is placed ‘in the brackets’ and this requires the transcendental reduction.

Before I go on to explain what Husserl considered as the function of the reduction there is the possible confusion left by the epoché that needs to be cleared
up. This confusion is caused by the idea that following the *epoché*, whatever is ‘discovered’ by the transcendental reduction is that which is ‘left outside of the brackets’. There is a misconception that after we have bracketed all our assumptions based on science or ‘common sense’ we have found or ‘discovered’ the proper area of study: the ‘non-bracketed’ or transcendental subjectivity. As Overgaard points out, “[I]n a way this is quite correct. However, I believe that there are some important qualifications that we need to make, in order to truly understand what Husserl’s so-called transcendental reduction is, and by implication, what Husserl’s project is…” (Overgaard, 2004, p.47).

The first qualification that must be made is that we need to be wary of a phrase such ‘that which is left outside the brackets’. It is true that in *Ideas I*, Husserl saw the *epoché* as ‘annihilating the world’ but he came to see this manoeuvre as problematic, since it presents one with a conception of subjectivity where subjectivity is cut off from the world. It would be a mistake to draw a close comparison between Descartes and Husserl on this issue. For Husserl, the *epoché* does not remove the world from the picture. The *epoché*:

…places the world (and the entities belonging to it) where it belongs, viz. in the *center of our research*, and as that which has to be explained…As that *explanandum*, it must never be lost sight of, it must continue, to guide us as, so to speak, that upon which we must aim. Therefore we are not left simply with whatever escapes the brackets; we will always be left with what is *in* the brackets as well. (Overgaard, 2004, p 48).
Secondly, it cannot be over-emphasised that Husserl’s phenomenology is not based on introspection. For Husserl, all phenomenological investigations involve the world. Forgetting the world and describing one’s ‘inner experiences’ does not make one a phenomenologist, such a manoeuvre would contravene Husserl’s principle of phenomenology as that which constitutes the world.

Thirdly, as Søren Ovegaard points out, “one should not over-emphasise the reflective character of Husserl’s phenomenology” (Overgaard, 2004, p.49). It is not the case that Husserl’s phenomenology is non-reflective, it is simply that one should distinguish transcendental reflection (which of course is not a reflection based on introspection) from natural reflection as being of a different character. As bracketed, the world appears differently, it is still present to us, but we reflect on it in a different way than we would in the natural attitude - if we would reflect on it at all: since in the natural attitude one is meant to accept scientific assumptions. As bracketed “the world” is no longer reflected upon naively, it is simply accepted for what it is. Rather, we reflect on our beliefs aware that they are just beliefs about the world and have no more validity than would a different set of beliefs.

Finally, there is one possible misunderstanding that must be avoided before we are in a position to say exactly what the transcendental reduction is doing. The transcendental ego, constituted by the transcendental reduction is not something that comes into existence after the epoché and the transcendental reduction is performed. Whilst it is correct to distinguish between a “pre-transcendental” attitude whilst working within the natural attitude and transcendental attitude after the epoché, it
would be wrong to look at the *epoché* as a kind of baptism where one *becomes.*

Transcendental subjectivity always exists as long as there is a world to appear to it, and yet in a sense we are “made aware” of our transcendental nature by the reduction. It may help if we look at the original Latin meaning of reduction. ‘Reduction’, means ‘to lead back’ - from the Latin *reducere*. Thus, in performing a transcendental reduction, just as one might walk back down the street to get home, *back to where one belongs*, Husserl is trying to go back to the essence of things. Since the reduction is transcendental, this means the essence of oneself as a transcendental subject. As Husserl states:

> Transcendental subjectivity, which is inquired into in the transcendental problem….is none other than again “I myself” and “we ourselves”; not, however, as found in the everyday natural attitude, or of positive science - *i.e.*, apperceived as components of the objectively present world before us - but rather as subjects of conscious life - *in* which this world and all that is present - for “us” - “makes” itself through certain apperceptions (Husserl in Overgaard, 2004 p.46).

Thus ‘we’ are transcendental subjects all along, the reduction simply revealed our nature as *transcendental subjects*, so what is the nature of transcendental subjectivity?
Transcendental Subjectivity

We are now in a position to elucidate the nature of transcendental subjectivity, as Husserl saw it. I will be focussing on the most important aspect of transcendental subjectivity, the concept of intentionality.

From the beginning Husserl has argued that his phenomenological investigations will reveal the essence of consciousness as that which belongs to transcendental subjectivity and is the essence of the cogito. Now the reduction has been performed he can reveal that essence as intentionality. Intentionality is the idea that all consciousness is consciousness-of something:

We understood under Intentionality the unique peculiarity of experiences to be the consciousness of something. (Ideas I, p.242)

One is always conscious of something, yet this ‘something’ that is the ‘object’ of consciousness can be real (or actual) or potential, in the sense there are intentional acts that could be performed, ‘objects’ that could become the ‘object’ of intentional analysis:

Husserl takes the term “consciousness” to cover the sphere of the “cogito” in the Cartesian sense of the term: I think, I understand, I conceive, I deny, I want, I do not want, I imagine, etc. The characteristic that necessarily belongs to the sphere of consciousness -both actual (attentive) and potential (the whole
sphere of consciousness’s possible acts, without which actual consciousness would be unthinkable) is to be always “consciousness of something.” Every perception is perception of the “perceived”; every desire is desire of the “desired,” etc. Husserl calls this fundamental property of consciousness intentionality (Levinas, 1998, p13).

With intentionality, Husserl is able to break with Descartes because Husserl is laying grounds for the absolute ego, that is the transcendental ego or the ‘I think’ in defining its essence as always conscious of something. In so doing Husserl has definitely broken with Descartes whose methodological scepticism never allowed him to make such a move. For Husserl, the cogito is not a substance, and is not, indeed cannot, be separate or separated from the world. As Gaston Berger states in his work The Cogito in Husserl’s Philosophy (1972):

Consciousness is not a substance whose accidents would be feelings and ideas, and thinking is not simply unravelling successive episodes of an internal dream. Thought has a bearing on things. Its own nature is such that it never closes in upon itself but goes outside itself to rush toward its objects; it is the thought of something (Berger, 1972, p.72-3).

Once he has introduced the idea of intentionality, Husserl now has to explain how the objects, which are the ‘objects of consciousness’, appear at all. How is it that there is a world to be experienced? Furthermore, Husserl must explain the possible existence of the world to be experienced without making reference to a pre-epoché ‘knowledge and terms’. Thus he cannot refer to causal explanation, or to some
natural disposition towards a belief in externality. To explain the existence of objects Husserl introduces another term, noemata. Noemata refers to the way the world and its objects are, when viewed from the phenomenological attitude.

For Husserl, thought is immanent to consciousness because intentionality is the essence of consciousness, thus one can claim that there is an object being experienced. For example, at the moment I can see a ‘computer monitor’, so already there is an ‘object-as-experienced’: what Husserl calls the noema. One must be careful here as I (following Husserl’s reasoning) cannot and do not claim when I see the computer monitor that the ‘computer monitor’ is ‘really there’ or that what I experience is the ‘real object’. All that is claimed is that I am experiencing the ‘computer monitor’ in as much I am experiencing an object there is an object that is there for me. And yet, it could not be another object, it is not case that scepticism is invited back in because it is ‘only an experience’ whereas in reality it may be a bottle of wine. Nor can there be no object there at all. The object-as-experienced, must bear some resemblance to the ‘real’ object, in as much as it is merely the ‘real’ object understood through a particular aspect, through experience. Also the noema, whilst inseparable from an individual act of consciousness, must be distinguished from the act of consciousness itself, the noesis to which it correlates. The desired object has to be separated from the desiring or the bracketing effect is removed and the natural existing world would return with its numerous unproven assumptions.
In this section I have presented Husserl’s initial theory regarding the subject/world relation. I have used work that forms the ‘Husserl’ of Ideas I. This is the Husserl who is the subject of Heidegger’s attacks. In the next section I will give an overview of some of Husserl’s later ideas. Whilst these are theories and notions that occurred to Husserl later in his life, they still relate to his pre-occupation with the subject/world relation and as such there is a certain continuity between his later and early work.

The Later Husserl

The prominence given to the Body is the most striking aspect of Husserl’s work after Ideas I. The body had played some role ever since Husserl’s Thing and Space lectures of 1907, but it is only with his later work after 1920, that the body takes on such a central role. Why does Husserl begin to talk about the body? To an extent it a continuation and an attempt to resolve some problems he was working on concerning the nature of the subject/world relation. For example, how are we to understand notions such as ‘here’ and ‘there’, or more fundamentally how can we make sense of a subject experiencing the world, without attention being paid to the body? This reformulation of the problem of how the subject relates to the world, however brought up new issues; once Husserl had attempted to answer questions regarding the body, questions regarding perspectivity arose, which in turn invited questions of their own, questions that went beyond the question of perspectivity. Despite this, the problems the ‘Later Husserl’ faces are the essentially the same as
the Husserl of Ideas I, but now Husserl has a clearer focus on the issues that need to be resolved.

**The Body and the ‘Paradox of Subjectivity’**

In *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* Husserl outlines what he calls ‘the paradox of human subjectivity’. The paradox is that the human subject is both a subject in the world and simultaneously an object in the world or as Husserl puts it:

Can we be simply satisfied with the notion that human beings are *subjects for the world* (the world for consciousness which is their world) and at the same time objects in this world?...the juxtaposition of “subjectivity in the world as object” and at the same time “conscious subject for the world,” contains a necessary theoretical question, that of understanding how this is possible. (*Crisis*, p.180-181).

To answer this question, Husserl emphasises the Janus nature of the body, its double aspect. There is the body that *I* experience and through which I act (the *Leib*) and the body *qua* object (the *Korper*). It is necessary to have both aspects, since it would be nonsensical to ground our spatial awareness in a spatial object, i.e. the *Korper*, or to say that an object is endowed with subjective awareness. For Husserl, one must be clear about the dual-aspect of the body and its foundation:
Here it must also be noted that in all experience of things, the lived body is co-extensive with the functioning lived body (thus not a mere thing), and that when it is experienced as a thing, it is experienced in a double way—i.e., precisely as an experienced thing and as a functioning lived body together in one (Husserl p14 - 57 in Zahavi 2003, p.101).

As Dan Zahavi goes on to explain in *Husserl’s Phenomenology* (2003), Husserl argues that the human subject does not originally experience its body as an object in objective space. In fact, originally we do not have consciousness of our body at all, one simply is one’s body. Originally: “…my body is experienced as a unified field of activity and affectivity, as volitional structure, a potentiality of mobility, an ‘I do’ and ‘I can’” (Zahavi, 2003, p.101).

I will now turn to look at the body as it ‘originally’ is, with regard to Husserl’s notions of affectivity and intentionality for an embodied subject. The self-experiencing, the subjective body or *Leib* leads us to the objective body or *Korper* (though not as the conditions of its possibility). Husserl’s ideas on affectivity and the embodied subject directly affect Heidegger’s critique of him and my counter-critique.

To help us understand Husserl’s philosophy of the body, let us consider two scenarios. In the first one I am in my house and I want to open a bottle of wine. I find a corkscrew and a bottle of wine and whilst holding the bottle in my left hand I insert the corkscrew and I try to extract the cork. But the cork seems to resist. At
the moment of resistance I become consciously aware of how I am holding the bottle and corkscrew and I can feel the resistance. Now consider this scenario. I am walking down the street and all of a sudden I feel a pain in my back and I crumble to the floor, I cannot get up because the pain is so bad. It is so bad that it is almost as though only my back exists. Husserl is drawing attention to the ‘two-sided aspect of the body’. In the case of the resistant wine bottle I am aware of gripping the bottle and the corkscrew; I am conscious of an experiencing organ, in this case my hand and the objects involved. However in the case of the back pain I am conscious of an experienced organ, my back. Our bodies supply us with interior and exterior experiences, but what is the nature of those experiences and what is the relation between the interior and exterior?

**Self-Awareness, Self-Affection & Self-Objectification**

As stated above, for Husserl:

> Originally my body is experienced as a unified field of activity and affectivity, as volitional structure, a potentiality of mobility, an ‘I do’ and ‘I can’. (Zahavi, 2003, p.101)

And Zahavi, following Husserl also states:

> As a ‘unified field of activity and affectivity’ embodied subjectivity ‘[o]ur primarily bodily awareness can consequently be described as self-sensation, self-affection or impressional self-manifestation’. (Zahavi, 1999, p. 215)
It is because ‘I’ am aware of myself as embodied being. However, it is not to be reflectively or thematically aware of one’s being-in-the-world, rather it is to be pre-reflectively or un-thematically aware of one’s own experiences. If I were thematically aware, ‘I’ would already be reflecting on an object and a prior affection, which brought the object to my attention would have to be presupposed, affectivity would have already ‘done its work’. (Zahavi, 1999, p.116)

Our bodies, or rather an awareness of our bodies, is an awareness which is self-affective, that is, it is an awareness of our self in which the self is itself constituted and pre-reflective. It is an awareness we have prior to the reflection and for Husserl, it is through self-affection, our as bodily existence lays the ground for reflection, Thus:

[t]o be affected by something is not yet to be presented with an object, but to be invited to turn one’s attention toward that which exerts the affection. If it succeeds in calling attention to itself, that which affects us is given, whereas it is only pregiven as long as it remains unheeded. (Zahavi, 1999, p.116)

Finally, we arrive at the issue of how the body becomes to be experienced as an object, as exterior. For Husserl the answer partly lies with self-affection. Since we are embodied, whilst we do not primarily experience ourselves as an object in space, as embodied beings we are worldly beings. Self-affection opened up the body to the world, it allowed it to be affected by other things, other objects and other people,
or as Husserl put it: “We perceive the lived body but along with it also things perceived “by means of it” ” (Husserl in Zahavi, 2003, p. 105).

For Husserl the body is *primarily* self-affective bodily awareness for that bodily awareness is interdependent with the ‘flip side of the body’, the objective body, which self-affection opens it to. Thus self-affection is interdependent with hetero-affection, the affecting of the self by the world.

Having outlined Husserl’s initial work on the transcendental reduction and his later work on the body and self-affection, I shall now turn to Heidegger critique of Husserl.

**Heidegger’s ‘Destruktion’ of Husserl**

I will now turn to Heidegger’s critique of Husserl. I will outline Heidegger’s three interrelated objections against Husserl’s work. Firstly, Heidegger objects to Husserl’s Cartesian philosophy of consciousness. Secondly, Heidegger objects to Husserl’s employment of the concept of the ‘subject’, viewing it as inadequate. Finally, he argues that Husserl’s Cartesian turn leads him to avoid the question of being.

One has to be careful when outlining Heidegger’s criticisms against Husserl on the grounds of Husserl’s Cartesianism. As Lilian Alweiss points out, whilst
Heidegger is attempting to reproach Husserl for returning to a philosophy of consciousness “…it would be a mistake to interpret that accusation in terms of the internalism/externalism debate.” (Alweiss, 2003, p.3).

Contrary to Pierre Keller in his book *Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience* (1999), Heidegger’s argument with Husserl is not because “…Husserl is strongly attracted to the Cartesian conception of mind as a kind of inner theatre in which mental events can be observed to come and go” (Keller, 1999, p.43). Indeed, in his *History of the Concept of Time*, Heidegger praises Husserl for overcoming Cartesian representationalism, by arguing that any mode of representation, our seeing an object, thematically presupposes intentionality which is non-thetic:

The interrelation of these modes of representation is a functional interrelation which is always prefigured in their intentionality. Empty intending, envisaging, sense perception are not simply co-ordinated as species in a genus, as when I say that apples, pears, peaches and plums are fruits. Rather these modes stand to one another in a functional relation and the fulfillment itself is of an intentional character. (HCT, p.49)

It is simply a mistake to think that Heidegger objects to Husserl on the grounds that Husserl regards the lived experiences of our knowledge of objects as reducible to mental content. It is true that for Husserl objectivity is made possible only through bracketing the world, so that consciousness becomes our only means of accessing the object. However, as Søren Overgaard points out, this might mean that for Husserl the subject is worldless, albeit in the sense that after the *epoché* one can
neither affirm nor deny the world,¹¹ but it is not objectless¹². This is Heidegger’s objection - by affirming I qua consciousness as that which provides the absolute ground of all appearances - all objects, Husserl abandons or ‘leaps over’ the phenomenon of the world. It is difficult to defend Husserl here, for as Lilian Alweiss points out, in the first book of Ideas Husserl states “Absolute Consciousness as the Residuum After the Nullifying of the World” (Ideas I, p.50).

The title of the sub-section (49) itself seems to suggest something counter to that expressed by Heidegger. Husserl goes on to argue after the reduction, is performed the world is ‘nullified’, consciousness would still exist, or as Husserl puts it “…the Being of consciousness, of every stream of experience generally, though it would indeed be inevitably modified by a nullifying of the thing-world, would not be affected thereby in its own proper existence.” (Ideas I, p.150).

Husserl argues that the being of consciousness or the ego remains untouched by the bracketing of the world, and as such it, consciousness, is the absolute ground for our experience of objects. To Heidegger, the idea that one can separate oneself from the world is unacceptable, and far too Cartesian for his taste:

In principle the possibility exists that consciousness itself is “not affected in its own existence” by an “annihilation of the world of

¹¹ Indeed one question is whether Husserl has a notion of world, outside the succession of spatio-temporal events.
¹² The objectless/worldless distinction is one made by Overgaard in Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the World. As similar objection is made by Lilian Alweiss’ 2003 work in The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl. Ohio University Press.
things” - a consideration which, as well known, Descartes had already employed. (HCT, p.104-5)

Moreover in Heidegger’s view Husserl adheres to the Cartesian program, not just in utilising a philosophy of consciousness, but in the privileged place he gives consciousness by making it an object of inquiry for an absolute science:

Husserl’s primary question is simply not concerned with the character of the being of consciousness. Rather he is guided by the following concern: How can consciousness become the possible object of an absolute science. This idea, that consciousness is to be the region of an absolute science, is not simply invented; it is an idea which occupied philosophy ever since Descartes. (HCT, p.107)

In Heidegger’s view Husserl conceives of the being of consciousness as something that ‘can be defined independently of the phenomenon of the world’ (Alweiss, 2003, p.24). This can be evidenced by the following passage from Ideas I:

[N]o real being, none that consciously presents and manifests itself through appearance presented and legitimated in consciousness by appearances, is necessary to the Being of consciousness itself (in the widest sense of the stream of lived experiences). Immanental being is therefore without doubt absolute in this sense that in principle by immanental being nulla’re’ indigent ad existendum (Ideas I altered for clarity, p.152)
That there may be things outside of consciousness that are not constitutive of consciousness itself; in this sense consciousness is immanent, and does not depend on anything but itself for its existence. Thus, like Descartes, Husserl believed that one needs only thought and not extension in order to be certain of one’s own existence. The world comprising of ‘things outside of me’ simply does not play a part in constituting my being. Heidegger, on the other hand, cannot conceive of Being as separable from the world, since for him:

The basic constitutive state of being-in-the-world is a necessary structure of Dasein. (HCT, p.157)

Thus Heidegger begins his attack upon Husserl. Husserl is no different from Descartes in that he claims consciousness as the absolute ground for the subject’s existence where only thought is necessary to be certain of the subject’s existence, and he is engaged in a program of rigorous, absolute science. I will now go on to Heidegger criticism of Husserl’s conception of subjectivity.

*Ontology - The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, are the published notes from a lecture course Heidegger gave in 1923, (also coincidentally they constitute the first major attack on Husserl) because they discuss the notion of ‘Man’ in philosophy. Here Heidegger does not mention Husserl by name, rather he looks at the concept of Man in biblical writings - Paul, Tatian, Augustine, Aquinas, Zwingli and Calvin, and also as it occurs in the phenomenology of Scheler. However, his critique of the way in which these thinkers understand the concept ‘Man’ is equally applicable to Husserl’s writing on the same subject matter. Heidegger’s critique is that
philosophy has conceived the human being as “...a living being endowed with reason (*animal rationale*), or as God’s creation...” (Overgaard, 2003, p.164).

Heidegger argues that it is a mistake to conceive the concept ‘human being’ in this way because either of these conceptions presupposes that there is this ‘thing of nature’, the human being, which then has values and attributes put upon it whether it be ‘reason’, ‘consciousness’ or ‘created by God’. Whatever attributes we give it, there is always this ‘pre-given’ thing called Man, or as Heidegger states:

Both conceptual definitions are concerned with defining the terms with which a thing, having been given in advance, comes to be furnished. A definite mode of being is subsequently ascribed to pre-given thing, i.e., the latter is indifferently allowed to remain as being-real. (OHF, p.17)

Thus Heidegger begins a critique of the subject that he will make much clearer and bolder in *Being and Time*, notions such as ‘ego’ or ‘subject’ and ‘person’ are questionable unless they are without ontological presuppositions:

Every idea of ‘subject’ - unless it is purified by a previous ontological basic characterization - still *ontologically* invokes the position of subjectum (*hypocheimenon*) no matter how emphatically one ontically resists the ‘soul substance’ or thingification of consciousness. (BT: 46 trans Overgaard in 2003)

Two points should be made clear here. Firstly whilst he hardly ever mentions Husserl by name, this attack is consistent with Husserl’s work and the critique in
Ontology and Being and Time is intended to apply to Husserl. Heidegger made this clear in correspondence, firstly in correspondence with Karl Lowith on his Ontology lectures:

…strikes the main blows against phenomenology. I now stand completely on my own two feet…There is no chance of getting an appointment now. And after I have published, my prospects will be finished. The old man [Husserl] will then realize I am wringing his neck - and then the question of succeeding him is out. But I can’t help myself. (Heidegger in Carman, 2003, p.58)

He would also later write to Karl Jaspers that if Being and Time was written “against anyone …it’s against Husserl, and he saw it immediately but clung to the positive from the outset. What I write against, only indirectly of course, is pseudo philosophy.” (Heidegger in Carman, 2003, p.59).

It seems that Husserl held to the conception of human being qua subjectum that Heidegger attacks. As Husserl states in Cartesian Meditations:

Since, by his own active generating, the Ego constitutes himself as identical substrate of Ego-properties, he constitutes himself also as “fixed and abiding” personal Ego - in the maximally broad sense, which permits us to speak of sub-human “persons” (CM, p.67)

Husserl’s view on the relationship between transcendental and empirical subjectivity is far more complex than can be conveyed in one paragraph. However,
by defining the pure ego as “fixed and abiding” as that which gives grounds for the personal ego or persons, he does seem to be committed to the idea of human being _qua_ subjectum. I am arguing that this is the very thing that Heidegger finds him guilty of.

I will now outline the third and final criticism that Heidegger levelled against Husserl; this is essentially an extension of the last criticism. Heidegger has been arguing that in Husserl the focus is on the subject; the subject is understood as that which justifies and gives certainty to one’s knowledge. Heidegger accepts that Husserl’s transcendental reduction does acknowledge the question of being ‘On the basis of this pure region [consciousness] it now first becomes possible to define the suspended being, reality. _The question of being is thus raised, it is even answered_’ (HCT, p.112).

However, as Lilian Alweiss points out, despite his appreciation for Husserl’s transcendental turn “…he [Heidegger] nonetheless objects to Husserl’s Cartesianism and insists that ‘the question of being itself is left undiscussed.’ ” (Alweiss,2003, p.19). Alweiss goes on to point out that Heidegger is not saying that Husserl fails to raise the problem of Being, but that because his method of dealing with being is epistemologically, as opposed to ontologically motivated, despite his phenomenology it fails to question the “…ontological meaning of performance[.] How is the kind of Being which belongs to a person to be ascertained in a positive way?” (BT: 48)
Since his inquiry into Being is epistemologically motivated, Husserl commits himself to the idea that Man is a ‘thinking thing’, but still he has not risen to the ontological level because he does not ask ‘What does it mean to be person who performs intentional acts?’ Thus, for Heidegger, Husserl ultimately fails to discuss the question of Being. As a result Heidegger makes a threefold criticism of Husserl: for his commitment to a philosophy of consciousness, his commitment to a certain conception of subjectivity and for his failure to discuss the question of Being. In the next section I will give a counter-critique of Heidegger’s view.

**Critique of ‘Heidegger’s Husserl’**

My criticisms of Heidegger’s view of Husserl are informed by the work of Michel Henry. Henry has objections to both Husserl and Heidegger and these objections are based on phenomenological grounds. I will offer a counter-critique of the first two objections: Husserl’s commitment to the philosophy of consciousness and his commitment to subjectivity.

For Henry, Heidegger is right to take Husserl to task over his commitment to a Cartesian inspired philosophy of consciousness which inevitably leads to a ‘leaping over’ of the world, but for different reasons. Whereas Heidegger objects to a philosophy of consciousness, indeed he objects to the phenomenological reduction because it makes impossible any exterior to the conscious ‘I’, Henry objects to both. He objects on the grounds that such a reduction commits Husserl to what he calls
ontological monism; Henry also views Heidegger as being committed to some form of this. He feels that with the phenomenological reduction, Husserl ignores important features of the subject. According to Dan Zahavi, ontological monism is “The assumption that there is only one kind of manifestation, only one kind of phenomenality. It has thus been taken for granted that to be given is to be given as an object.” (Zahavi, 1999, p.51). Phenomena appear or manifest as objects for us. Ontological monism is the doctrine that phenomena only manifest themselves in one way, as objects.

Husserl falls foul of ontological monism because his conception of consciousness is bound up with his notion of intentionality. If consciousness is always consciousness of an object, then “Consciousness is actually nothing other than the relationship to the object.” (Henry, 1973, p.85). Thus consciousness is representational: it represents phenomena that will only appear in one way, as objects. Hence Husserl’s conception of consciousness falls foul of ontological monism.

*Consciousness signifies the essence of manifestation according to the fundamental presuppositions of monism...* Consciousness is thus understood in the light of the central concept of intentionality. Every consciousness is consciousness of something. Insofar as it is intentional, consciousness is the surpassing which give access to things. Final progress in the ontological determination of the concept of consciousness resides in the affirmation that consciousness is nothing other than this surpassing. Thus the Being of consciousness is truly identified with the ontological process of reality it ceases to be
the determined Being of a subject opposed, as a given reality, to the reality of the object, so that it may become the principle of reality as such. Consciousness is no longer predicate nor even the essential attribute of the substantiality Being of a subject. (Henry, 1973, p.76 & 88-9)

Consciousness understood through the idea of intentionality becomes that which gives the subject access to objects, as stated above it is nothing but relationship between itself and the represented object. The idea that there is a human being that has the special feature, that of consciousness is devalued since for Husserl it becomes simply a means of connecting the subject to an object. It is on this back of this critique of the philosophy of consciousness that Henry goes on to critique Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl. In Heidegger’s view, Husserl’s philosophy lacks an exteriority, it lacks a world. For Henry, this is simply the wrong move. To make this move is to overlook more worrying problems with Husserl’s phenomenology. For Henry:

…Husserl plays with different and incompatible forms of immanence and transcendence in order to stabilise phenomenalisation into an object and a subject, thus missing its radicalism. The transcendence suspended by the epoché is only of one, special variety, namely the ‘empirical world’, with the ‘psychical ego [moi] inscribed within it’. An outside, albeit empty, world as such remains – one that Henry emphasises as a specular, as a ‘view’. The idea of immanence concomitant to this empty but still present outsideness becomes that which is
For Henry, Heidegger’s focus on the exterior or ‘the world’ is wrong because it ignores problems within Husserl’s own phenomenology. Even though the ‘empirical world’ has been suspended by the *epoché*, another world remains: the transcendental world, empty of objects, but *there* nonetheless, immanent to the transcendental *I*. This seems unsatisfactory to Henry, because it posits an unnecessary ‘outside’, committing the ‘sin’ of ontological monism rather than focusing on subjectivity. Given this, Heidegger’s rush to form a conception of the exterior is premature: simply forming a conception of the exterior does not resolve the problem of how the world appears to us. If we take Heidegger’s route we risk overlooking this problem, which Henry believes can be solved by examining how the subject manifests itself (self-constitution in Husserl’s terms). According to Henry this can be achieved through self-affection: the self-affection of an absolute subject. This subject would be indifferent to such notions as ‘interior’ or ‘exterior’, since it is the absolute subject and manifests itself as such through affectivity:

Affectivity reveals the absolute in its totality because it is nothing other than its perfect adherence to the self, nothing other than its coincidence with self, because it is the auto-affection of Being in the absolute unity of its radical immanence. *In absolute unity of its radical immanence, Being affects itself and experiences itself in such a way that there is nothing in it which does not affect it and which is not experienced by it, no content*
transcendent to the interior experience of self which constitutes this content. (Henry, 1973, p.858-9)

Thus, through self-affection, the subject manifests itself as absolute, that is to say unified, non-ecstatic, with no ‘outside’, no ‘world’, no ‘interior’ or ‘exterior’. The absolute subject is a ‘given phenomena’ in Husserl’s terms, that is to say, a phenomenon given to the self, it is given to ‘I’ but it is ‘self-given’: given to the self itself. Unlike Husserl’s account it is minus the need for intentionality to achieve this self-givenness. The self itself is a phenomenon and it is given to itself. The idea of the absolute subject may also side-step the problem of the paradox of subjectivity that we find in later work by Husserl. Since the subject is absolute, beholden to no exterior, there is no Other to view the subject as an object, the paradox simply never arises.

Heidegger posed a second objection based on the claim that, for Husserl, subjectivity is hypocheimenon, the ‘underlying ground’ for the world and the other characteristics of the subject. Henry agrees that Heidegger is right to raise this issue, but, as with the last objection concerning the lack of the exterior, he simply gives the wrong response. The response from Heidegger’s appears to be that we should jettison all philosophical concepts such as ‘ego’, ‘person’ or ‘subject’ because invoking them often involves overlooking a philosophical presupposition upon which such concepts lie: thus the concept is not properly grounded. Instead we should talk about Dasein, the ‘being-there’, the being that we ourselves are, as such
it needs no grounds, no lengthy argument to justify its existence; it is in-the-world, as we are in-the-world, living our life.

As outlined above, Henry argued that _Dasein_ would be the wrong move as he himself favours an absolute subject, with affectivity as its essence. However, much as Henry wishes to endorse an absolutist conception of the subject, he can be viewed as in agreement with Heidegger’s assertion that Husserl needed to be taken to task for his failure to give grounds for the subject:

The _ego cogito_ gets a priority in the problematic whose significance is not merely chronological; but the subordination of ontology to ego-ology, whether implicit or not, in modern philosophy is no more justified than the ancient primacy of theology. Whether it be considered under the rubric of ‘subject’ or ‘spirit’, ‘person’ or ‘reason’, the _cogito_, whilst undergoing these non-essential transformations, remains an existent which as such cannot be confused with a foundation of the ontological order. Actually it is the significance of philosophy which has been lost it is the very possibility of bringing up the question of Being which is questioned. (Henry, 1973, p.21)

As a philosopher who does prioritise a form of the _cogito_\textsuperscript{13} over ontology, Heidegger’s criticisms are supported by Henry, the ‘subject’ and its priority is not justified. However, it should be made clear that Heidegger does not condemn transcendental subjectivity _in principle_ with this critique. That is to say that

\textsuperscript{13} Form because it morphs from ‘I think’ to ‘I can’ in different phases of Husserl’s career.
Heidegger never explicitly rules out the notion of the transcendental, nor jettisons the notion of subjectivity completely, Heidegger merely argues against its priority. It is entirely possible that there is a place for some notion of subjectivity, albeit not in fundamental ontology. Heidegger is also against the phenomenological reduction. However, for Henry, Heidegger’s Dasein is no suitable alternative for the failure of Husserlian subjectivity. Heidegger himself falls foul of ontological monism by characterising Dasein as ecstatic, for in being ecstatic, Heidegger demands a ‘world’ an ‘exterior’, it posits being once again as a ‘there’ to be grasped, which Henry would see both as limiting the notion of Being and, as an argument against Husserl, superfluous; one need not posit an exterior in order to point out the faults in Husserl’s philosophy, for Henry the demand for a world is not his main, but rather the incompleted project of immanence, that the subject is not immanent enough. I will give an outline of Heidegger’s ‘existential analytic’ before giving Henry’s full critique which is, after all, borne of a critique of Heidegger.
Chapter Four: Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Existence

Introductory Remarks

In the previous three chapters I examined the notions of self, subject and world in the work of Descartes, Kant and Husserl. I then went on to examine Heidegger’s perspective on these thinkers; finally I offer my own critique of Heidegger’s view. These thinkers are of particular interest to me because they are essentially Heidegger’s ‘targets’ in Being and Time. For Heidegger his project is justified because in his view the philosophies of Descartes, Kant and Husserl are in some way or another incomplete or simply wrong. With respect to the question of the subject, Heidegger rejected Descartes’ notion of the subject as a fundamental ground: a substance with a set of characteristics. He also rejected Kant’s conception of the foundationalist subject: namely a single unified consciousness, itself a substance although we can know nothing of its characteristics. With regard to Husserl, Heidegger wants to distance himself from Husserl’s account of the intentional objects of thought. In Husserl’s view these intentional objects form part of the contents of consciousness of a transcendental subject. Ultimately, Heidegger regards all three accounts (despite their individual complexities) as simply based on subjectivity: that is to say accounts of subjectivity and therefore explicitly or implicitly ego-based accounts. As such, all should be dismissed as merely providing three different versions of Cartesianism.
In this chapter I will provide an overview of Heidegger’s project in *Being and Time*. In relation to the project of *Being and Time* I will raise some troubling questions concerning Heidegger’s official refusal to engage with subjectivity.

**What is the Project of *Being and Time*?**

As strange a question as this might seem to some, it also very pertinent and difficult to answer. Before it can be answered, it might be more useful to say *when* the project of *Being and Time* began. Now, it is too simplistic to say that it began when Heidegger first put pen to paper with the intention of writing a book, a book that was to become *Being and Time*. Rather the project of *Being and Time* began when Heidegger first came across the ideas that were going to influence that work. However, one has to be careful here too, for just as it would be too simplistic to say that the project began when he first put pen to paper, equally it would be too simplistic to say it began when he first studied philosophy. This would be like saying that Beethoven’s *Ninth Symphony* began when he first played the piano. Theodore Kisiel in his book *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time* gives 1924 as the date when Heidegger began *Being and Time*. This date coincides with Heidegger’s lecture to the Marburg Theological Society on “The Concept of Time”. This is certainly when the first piece of work covering *most* of the issues in *Being and Time* were presented. However I would like to date the beginning of *Being and Time* as early as 1920 as this date coincides with his Lectures on *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, when Heidegger first mentions *Dasein* in
conjunction with ‘Life’. It is in this work that he begins to set out what phenomenology means to him, through an application of phenomenology to the writings of St.Paul and Augustine. The reason I want to give an earlier date for the project of *Being and Time* will become apparent when I discuss his notion of *Dasein*. However it is possible to elaborate here as it concerns part of the central point of my thesis. Heidegger’s main criticism of his philosophical predecessors is that their notions of subjectivity, selfhood and world do not accomplish the task for which they were introduced: they fail to answer the question of what it means to be human. In other words, their notions of subjectivity, self and world are not “fleshy” enough in the sense that they do not convey the impression that they describe a living human being, or in Heidegger’s terms, they do not provide us with the fundamental ontology. Heidegger wishes to provide an account that captures the human being but does not fall back into any of the problems previous accounts have encountered. This account is not one that would be grounded on subjectivity but would be something more fundamental, closer to the essence of what it means to be human. Given that this is the case it is difficult to understand why Heidegger expresses his notion of the human in terms of *existence*. This seems rather dry and theoretical especially when, in his earlier work, such as *The Phenomenology of Religious Life* he used the term *life* to describe human beings, and this seems to better capture the primordial nature of the human being. I will return to this issue.

To return to the question, ‘What is the project of *Being and Time*?’ In simple terms, the project of *Being and Time* aims to answer the question ‘What is Being?’ However, Heidegger goes about this task in a different way from previous
philosophers who have asked this question. He claims that since we (humans) are beings, we are the only species we know of that concerns itself with Being or existence. We can ask, ‘What does it mean to be?’ Therefore if we want to know the answer to the question ‘What is Being?’ we must first understand the being who is asking the question, namely us or human beings. To accomplish this task that Heidegger applies phenomenology, and in so doing, he radically alters the nature of phenomenology itself.

The Question

For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression “being.” We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed. (BT: 1)

Thus, with the above quote, begins Being and Time. It is no accident that Heidegger opens by quoting the ‘Eleatic Stranger’ from Plato’s Sophist, for Heidegger’s inquiry is almost the same as the Eleatic Stranger’s. He is asking ‘What is the meaning of Being?’ However, this is not the only reason that Heidegger has chosen to begin with that particular quote. By quoting Plato, he locates his project historically within the Western tradition. By citing Plato, Heidegger indicates that he sees this question as a dialogue with Plato, and not other Greek thinkers with whom Heidegger may have some sympathies, thinkers such as Heraclitus and Parmenides. According to Heidegger these thinkers worked before metaphysics was corrupted and the question of Being was lost, at least until Heidegger himself appeared. Finally, by citing Plato he avoids any explicit
comparison of his work to Husserl’s phenomenology (and to any of his peers). In *Being and Time* Heidegger is engaging critically with the Sophist, reworking the concepts of Being, Presence, not-being or Nothingness in the light of the idea of Phenomenology, but not any particular pre-existing phenomenology. Heidegger is, in the course of his inquiry, finding his own way to phenomenology.

Why did Heidegger feel that Plato had not answered the question of Being? It is not that Heidegger finds the Eleatic Stranger’s conclusion incorrect, that being is presence and the opposite of non-being, and rather it is that the wrong questions are being asked. This is what Heidegger means when he states, ‘This question has today been forgotten’ (BT:21). Heidegger felt that to *simply* claim that ‘Being is presence’ is to provide an essentially empty answer. He feels that the remark needs not just clarification but justification before it can be stated. Heidegger is not simply asking ‘What is being?’ he is asking ‘What makes being possible?’ To answer that question, we have to ask not only what is the meaning or sense of being, but what are we enquiring about? Therefore to even begin to answer the question ‘What is the meaning of being?’ we have to start by interrogating an entity which will, in Heidegger’s language, reveal the meaning of being.

Do we in our time have answer to the question of what we really mean by the word ‘being’? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew the question of the meaning of Being. But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression ‘Being’? Not at all. So first of all we must reawaken an understanding for the meaning of the question. Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning
of Being and to do so concretely. Our provisional aim is the Interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being. (BT:19)

Even Heidegger’s opening paragraph gives the reader clues as both to the reformulation of the ‘forgotten question’ and to how Heidegger views Being. That we the inquirer or questioner “...must reawaken an understanding of the meaning of the question and the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely” (my italics) suggests that the question has to be reformulated or rewritten so that it can be answered. Secondly, we are told by Heidegger that to begin to approach the question ‘What is the meaning of Being?’ we must take time into account because the answer to the question may in some way involve time.

Inquiry, as a kind of seeking, must be guided beforehand by what is sought. So the meaning of Being must already be available in an understanding of Being. Out of this understanding arise both the explicit question of the meaning of Being and the tendency that leads us towards its conception. We do know what ‘Being’ means. But even if we ask, ‘What is Being?’ we keep within an understanding of the ‘is’, though we are unable to fix conceptually what the ‘is’ signifies. We do not even know the horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be grasped and fixed. But this vague average understanding of Being is still a Fact. (BT:25)

Even though we do not know what Being is, we understand that we, as the ones inquiring are asking a question, a question about the meaning of ‘Being’. And that
we can ask the question ‘What is Being’ means that we have some understanding about Being, whether it simply means that we know what Being is not or simply the conclusion of Plato’s *Sophist*, which Heidegger would see as one of the ‘traditional theories’. “What we seek when we inquire into Being is not something unfamiliar, even if proximally, we cannot grasp it at all.” (BT:25).

At this point Heidegger makes his radical revision to the question of the meaning of Being. He concludes that ‘Being’ or “…that which determines entities as entities…” is not itself an entity. We the inquirer cannot simply define ‘Being’ or trace the origin of entities back until we discover their ‘Being’. Heidegger is careful not to say too much about Being at this stage. This is because he believes that the failure of philosophers such as Aristotle, Descartes and Kant was to assume more about Being than their argument warranted. Thus Descartes makes the mistake of stating that thinking is the proof of his existence, without knowing what it means to think or to exist. He had overlooked the *Being of* thinking or the *Being of* existence and that is why, in Heidegger’s view, his argument fails. However, Heidegger needs to properly begin his investigation into Being, that is to say, without making the same kind of assumptions that Descartes did. In order to introduce the subject without making any implicit or explicit assumptions about Being and without introducing concepts and terms not justified by his argument Heidegger uses what on previous occasions he has called ‘formal indication’.
Formal Indication

‘Formal Indication’ (formale Anzeige) is a method that Heidegger uses to introduce terms and concepts necessary to his project, without permitting those concepts to fall prey to particular, though not all philosophical prejudices. Concepts which have been ‘formally indicated’ are almost without content. Thus the term ‘am’ ‘formally indicates’ ‘to exist’ but it does not presuppose individual consciousness or the cogito. This is the ‘negative’ aspect of formal indication, that it has, in Heidegger words ‘a prohibiting character…’ (PIA, p.105). Formal indication embargoes discussions about the nature of a particular instance of a concept: what Heidegger called the ontic level. In short, whilst one can discuss the concept of ‘wine’ discussing particular kinds of ‘wine’ is prohibited. Talk about red wine, white wine, good wine or bad wine, is prohibited since they are not necessary to understand the concept of ‘wine’. A good or bad wine is still wine. “Formal Indication prohibits any ontic discussion for as a long as we are doing phenomenological ontology.” (Overgaard, 2004, p.85). It prevents the investigation into being switching from the ontological to the ontic level. This aspect of the formal indication bears similarity to Husserl’s epoché, in particular, ‘bracketing’. Just as Husserl’s epoché was designed to prevent any assumptions about an object, it is the prohibitive-deterring function of formal indication that prevents one from assuming that one’s surroundings are ‘natural’, ‘objects of nature’ that ‘I’ can touch and use.
However, concepts that give direction to the analysis must be chosen, so ultimately the concept will have some content. The term *Dasein* implies existence, similarly the term World implies surroundings and this brings us to the ‘positive’ aspect of Heidegger’s *Ansatzmethode* (formal method). These terms point to the ‘how’ of a thing, but not the ‘what’. *Dasein* implies existence - the ‘how’ of *Dasein*, but not to ‘what’ it is that makes this existence possible. Formally indicated concepts, whilst prohibiting discussion at the ontic level, are intended to point the inquirer towards the ontological problematic of being.

**The Phenomenon: Appearance and Phenomenology**

In section seven of *Being and Time*, Heidegger defines what he means by the concepts of phenomenon, appearance and phenomenology in the project as a whole. This is an important part of *Being and Time*, as it defines, to a great extent, how Heidegger will carry out his ‘existential analytic of *Dasein*’. Heidegger begins by defining the concept of ‘Phenomenon’. In short ‘phenomenon’ means “*that which shows itself in itself*” (BT: 51), that which is manifest, available to *Dasein*. It is not an appearance “…phenomena are never appearances…” and it is also not a semblance, a mere appearance of an appearance:

We shall….distinguish “phenomenon” from “semblance”, which is a privative modification of “phenomenon” as thus defined. But what both these terms express has proximally nothing at all
to do with what is called appearance, or still yet a ‘mere appearance. (BT: 28)

Heidegger also rejects the idea of the absolute or noumenon, he refers to this as the “non-manifest” (BT:51). When Heidegger refers to the ‘phenomena’ of phenomenology what he means is the presently unthematised ‘forms of intution’ that might be thematised and might be available to the agent. Such phenomena usually remain unthematised and are always foundational to experience, but to the phenomenologist can be made explicit. Or as Heidegger states they are:

That which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the ‘phenomenon’ as ordinarily understood and as accompanying it in every case, can, even though it shows itself unthematically, be brought thematically to show itself; and what shows itself in itself (the ‘forms of intuition’) will be the phenomena of phenomenology. (BT: 31)

Having determined what the ‘phenomenon’ is or what it means, Heidegger now begins to define phenomenology. Heidegger begins by noting a similarity between the concept of ‘phenomenon’ and the concept of ‘logos’. Logos, as Heidegger explains has been understood as “‘reason”, “judgement”, “concept”, “definition”, “ground” or “relationship”. (BT: 32) For Heidegger logos means “…letting something be seen in its togetherness with something-letting it be seen as something.” (BT: 31).
For Heidegger, both the concept of ‘phenomenon’ and the concept of *logos* have something to do with revealing or showing the presently unseen. However the ‘something’ made seen is not simply a brute fact which is made available by an ‘objective viewer’: the phenomenologist. For something to be seen “in its *togetherness*” the phenomenologist must ‘gather’ that something together, she/he must interpret it to make it sensible. This idea of showing or making something be shown is a clue to the concept of the phenomenology as Heidegger will use it. He distinguishes between three different conceptions of description: the *formal*, the *ordinary* and the *phenomenological*. The formal conception outlines phenomenology’s fundamental aim “to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” (BT: 34). This is Heidegger’s way of restating the main aim of phenomenology, one that does not depart *too far* from Husserl’s project to reveal phenomena as phenomena. However this conception does do one thing, it defines phenomenology as descriptive, with the understanding that there is no such thing as *mere* description, interpretation is always involved, but with no *theory* about interpretation. Phenomenology is certainly not about making deductions, nor is it about performing dialectics or arguments whether they are logical or transcendental: it is a description of phenomena.

The ordinary conception of phenomenology is advanced to make the point that any object can become the proper of object of phenomenological study, and that the task of phenomenology is to make the essence of the object explicit. (BT: 35)
We now arrive at the phenomenological conception of phenomenology, where Heidegger aims to do two things; firstly, to answer the question ‘What does phenomenology ‘let us see?’ What counts as a phenomenon of phenomenology? Secondly to answer the question ‘How does the phenomenon show itself?’ phenomenology allows that which is implicit or unnoticed to show itself. But it does not and cannot make the unnoticeable be seen. Phenomenology can reveal ‘the world’ for what it is, but it cannot reveal God or the absolute, or anything that would fall under the category of Kant’s thing-in-itself. Things such as these are simply unnoticeable: they cannot be shown. In this sense a good analogy for phenomenology is that of turning on the light in a darkened room. Imagine walking down a corridor, you know well, but it is night time and the lights are off, you know more or less where the wall is, where the door is and how far you are from them. However, they remain hidden, unnoticeable until you turn on the light, after that you can see all that was shrouded in darkness before. For Heidegger, phenomenology is essentially that light, it reveals what was hitherto not obvious but was already there for all to see.

Heidegger thinks that this interpretative method is well suited to investigating the meaning of Being. As with the corridor we have some idea, a pre-ontological understanding of Being. For Heidegger, phenomenology is the only way of doing ontology (BT: 35) because it will reveal Being by bringing it out of the darkness and into the light.
How does the phenomenon show itself for Heidegger? The answer to this has already been given: it is through interpretation that the phenomenon shows itself. However a short contrast with Husserl may illuminate matters further. Husserl argued that phenomenology should only study that which it can make “fully evident”, absolutely free from philosophical prejudices. Heidegger essentially reverses Husserl’s position. A phenomenon can never be fully evident, although it can be made explicit, but explicitness is not the same as fully evident, because it is made explicit through interpretation. Interpretation is necessary, along with some prejudices or prejudices about what the phenomenon might be without which we could not make the phenomenon explicit. We can only answer the question ‘What is Being?’ because we have a vague understanding of it. We are now in a position to arrive at a Heidegger’s definition of phenomenology. He states “Our investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomenological description lies in interpretation.” (BT: 37).

**Heidegger’s Phenomenology: Dasein and the Project of Being and Time**

I have now given an initial outline of Heidegger’s question and I have briefly outlined his phenomenological method. We are now able to look more deeply into Heidegger’s project in *Being and Time*. In particular we can look more closely at why Heidegger believes that the main ontological question ‘What is Being?’ can be answered only through phenomenology. Secondly we can look more closely at how Heidegger thinks phenomenology can achieve this end.
Heidegger believes that “Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible.” (BT: 35). ‘Ontology’ should be understood as the question “What is Being?” because only phenomenology is concerned with revealing the Being of entities. When used in a mundane sense this means to discover the essence of an entity. Thus a computer keyboard is a ‘thing to be typed on’, that is the ‘Being’ of the computer keyboard. However, because it is concerned with the being of entities, indeed with the whole science and nature of Being only phenomenology can answer the question ‘What is the meaning of Being in general?’ It aims to answer the question what is Being, understood not just as the Being of a particular object or entity but also understood as what is Being itself? Being in general would be ‘that which determines entities as entities...’ how we as persons come to see something as an entity at all. ‘Being in general’ should not be understood as the Supreme Being, as a collection or an aggregate of all the ‘beings.’ Rather an understanding of ‘Being in general’ allows us to think of a Supreme Being or a particular group of beings; for example, as we do with Biological categories such as genus and species. This is because the inquiry into ‘Being in general,’ which is necessarily a phenomenological investigation, is ontologically prior to investigations in Theology, Biology, Physics, Mathematics and other Natural Sciences. They apply an understanding of Being to a particular subject matter, but phenomenology is attempting to clarify the meaning of the very term ‘Being’ that they utilise. They deal with the Being of particular phenomena, but:

…phenomenology is the science of the Being of entities-ontology. In explaining the tasks of ontology we found it is
necessary that there should be a fundamental ontology taking as its theme that entity which is ontologically-ontically distinctive, Dasein, in order to confront the cardinal problem-the question of the meaning of Being in general (BT: 37).

With this statement, Heidegger shares his view on the why only phenomenology can resolve the question ‘What is Being?’ It is because phenomenology is the “science of the Being of entities.” And no other science has ‘Being in general’ as its object of study. He has also begun to introduce the how, through a phenomenology of Dasein. I have already mentioned Dasein in this thesis and at that point I left it unexplained and untranslated, except to say that it “implies existence”. In German Dasein means precisely that - existence. Heidegger has chosen the term quite deliberately for in a sense it is a quite common place and non-technical word. Immanuel Kant uses it in the Prologemena. For Heidegger however it takes on a whole new meaning. Since it does refer to ‘existence’ it is his way of making a start on the question of Being. And because it refers to existence it is, as he puts it “ontologically-ontically distinctive”. What he means is that existence has a relation to Being (ontologically) and entities (ontically). Because of this Dasein “has ontologically priority over every other entity” (BT: 37-8). The phenomenology of Dasein will also be hermeneutic in the sense that the phenomenology of Dasein will be concerned with revealing the structure of Dasein: in revealing the structure of Dasein it will also reveal the conditions for any future ontological investigations. (BT: 37). Thus Heidegger shows than an investigation of Dasein or an ‘existential analytic of existence’ will be necessary a step on the way to arriving at an answer to the question ‘What is Being in general?’
We are ourselves the entities to be analyzed. The Being of any such entity is in each case mine. These entities, in their Being, comport themselves toward their Being. As entities with such Being, they are delivered over to their own Being. Being is that which is an issue for every such entity (BT: 42).

Heidegger has made four ontological claims about Dasein:

A) Dasein’s being is in each case mine.
B) Dasein comports itself towards its being.
C) Dasein is delivered over to Being.
D) Being is an issue for Dasein.

I will now try to unpack these claims. Claim (a) “Dasein's being is in each case mine.” It may seem as though this is Heidegger’s way of saying that Dasein is a person or human being yet Heidegger does not use these terms. He avoids using them because whilst he would not deny that Dasein is “us” if pushed, he would want to avoid using terms such as ‘person’, or ‘human being’ because these are ontic categories whereas at this point his concern is an ontological one. He also avoids identifying Dasein with ‘subject’, ‘subjectivity’ or ‘self-consciousness’. He wishes to avoid these terms because they are associated with Cartesian and Kantian ontologies. In Heidegger’s opinion these approaches failed to capture what is fundamental to our being. He believes that there is something deeper and more fundamental about us than merely being a kind of thing (ontically) who reflects,
sees an object or conceives an experience as ‘mine.’ There is something more fundamental than the ideas that Western metaphysics has hitherto arrived at. If this is so, then how is ‘I’ am *Dasein or Dasein is mine* to be understood?

It may help if we look at what Heidegger says about *Dasein* and mineness or *Jemeinigkeit* a little later in *Being and Time* “…Dasein has in each case mineness [*Jemeinigkeit*], one must always use the personal pronoun when addressing it: ‘I am’, ‘you are’” (BT: 42).

*Dasein* is something ‘one’ can call ‘mine’ and it is in virtue of this ‘mineness’ that a human being is *Dasein*. The question we now need to ask is what does Heidegger mean by *Jemeinigkeit*? The term can be confused as many have used ‘mineness’ for entirely different reasons. For example in the following statement by Descartes ‘I am also taught by nature that various other bodies exist in the vicinity of my body, and that some of these are to be sought out and others avoided’ (CSM II, p159 *my italics*).

Now Heidegger is not invoking *mineness* in the same way that Descartes does. For Descartes existence or *Dasein* is mine in the same way that my copy of *Being and Time* or my body is mine and this appears to imply a subject/object relation. ‘I’, the subject, Michael has a copy of *Being and Time*, which is the object. Heidegger is making the claim that *Dasein* is mine and that I am *Dasein*, but there is a notion of mineness that is an alternative to the external relation of ownership invoked by Descartes. An understanding of *(b)* should clear up these matters.
When Heidegger states that ‘Dasein comports itself towards its being.’ he is, as William Blattner as argued, stating one of the basic claims of the existentialists about the nature of the self and existence: that the essence of the self is to exist. Kierkegaard is the first one to offer a variation of this position.

A human being is spirit. But what is the spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation’s relating itself to itself in the relation; the self is not the relation but it is the relation’s relating itself to itself. (Kierkegaard, 1989, p.43).

Kierkegaard’s language may be difficult to access and the passage is written using Hegelian language – a system which Kierkegaard and Heidegger are both attempting to overcome or avoid. Heidegger of course never uses the term ‘relates itself’. However it should be noted that the German for ‘comports itself’ is ‘verhalt sich’. According William Blattner this translates more easily as ‘relates itself’. As a result when Heidegger states ‘Dasein comports itself towards its being’ he could be said to mean ‘Dasein relates itself towards its being.’ For our purposes here ‘relation’ must be understood in a particular way and to understand this we turn back to Kierkegaard. What is important to Heidegger is the idea that Dasein is the “relation’s relating itself to itself”. For Heidegger, the traditional way of understanding the term ‘relation’ is to have entity A and a relational element that connects entity A to entity B. It cannot be said that instead of having a relational element, Heidegger makes Dasein the relation to ‘I’, it is rather that Dasein is
designated as the ‘relation’s relating’. *Dasein* is an active entity, it is to be understood as operating adverbially, therefore it is the *act of relating* to ‘I’, the relation’s relating.

Heidegger advances such an understanding of ‘relation’ as being in some way more illuminating than the Kantian ‘mine’ or ‘I-think’. *Dasein*, whilst it ‘is mine’, it not should be thought of as something which ‘I’ have, it is not ‘mineness’ experienced within the subject/object dualistic way of thinking. It is not that ‘I’ a separate, and self-contained entity experience an object as being mine. There is something about *Dasein* and its way of relating to the world which is simply *more fundamental* than this. *Dasein* is mine, and *Dasein* and its Being should be understood as an activity not just as a static thing it is a process: *Dasein* has being to “be” which is mine. The following statement suggests that Heidegger is using the term *Dasein* in this way;

> The “essence” of this entity lies in its to be [*Zu-sein*]. Its what-being (*essentia*) must, so far as we can speak of it at all, be conceived in terms of its being (*existential*)…*The essence of Dasein lies in its existence* (BT: 42)

This statement ends by pointing out that the essence of *Dasein* is to exist, and existence has something to do with being or rather to do with *Dasein’s ‘to be [Zu-sein]’*. One should notice use of the term *Zu-sein* and not *Sein*; this is because Heidegger is intentionally employing the adverbial sense of being – ‘to be’. In view
of this it is perhaps the line “The essence of Dasein lies in its existence” could be better understood as “The essence of Dasein lies in its ability to be”.

I will outline the last two ontological claims Heidegger made about Dasein. Firstly I will deal with (d) ‘Being is an issue for Dasein’. As a Dasein, my being is an issue or is of interest to me. This focus of interest or concern would apply to all other Dasein’s. Heidegger believes us to be ontologically unique, in the sense that we only have concerns, worries and hopes about our own ‘being’. To use a Heideggerian term, the significance of which I will explain later, we ‘care’ about our ‘being,’ we ‘care’ about what we are going to be, or what we could potentially be. We care about whether we are going to be a parent, and about whether we will be a good parent or a bad parent. We care about whether we will behave as good sons or daughters and we care about whether we will become Doctors of Philosophy. Heidegger believes that we are the only beings who care about our being in this way. Other creatures do not care whether they become good parents, or at least show very little of evidence of such care. (It is also curious, although a parenthetical point that even the word ‘being’ cannot be attached to non-human species, one rarely talks about ‘penguin-being’ or ‘rabbit-being’) Heidegger notes that “To entities such as these [non-human animals], their Being is ‘a matter of a indifference’; or more precisely, they ‘are’ such that their Being be neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite.” (BT: 42 altered).

In his view the issue of ‘care’ cannot arise because for non-human animals their being is simply not there for them as a possible concern.
Finally we turn to claim (c) ‘Dasein is delivered over to Being.’ It was this phrase that inspired Sartre to exclaim ‘Man is condemned to be free.’ Whilst in later work Heidegger would criticise Sartre’s way of expressing this point, it is quite useful for the purposes of exegesis and interpretation. In saying that we are condemned to be free Sartre was saying here that we have no choice but to choose our way of being. One must choose to be something or someone, and Dasein must choose. Because it is ‘delivered over to Being’, Dasein is potentiality, therefore it must choose. For example, it is faced with choices such as whether am I to be married or not, do I want to become a parent or not, do I want to become a student or not and so on. Because Dasein is potentiality, it cannot abdicate responsibility for choosing, even saying ‘I refuse to make anything of my life’ is itself a choice. Heidegger states all this rather cryptically:

And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, ‘choose’ itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only ‘seem’ to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic—that is, something of its own—can it have lost itself and yet won itself. As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness. (BT: 42-3).

Heidegger’s initial claims about Dasein can be summed up as follows. Dasein is the only entity for which Being is an issue, it is concerned with its own being, its
own possibilities, and it cannot choose to ‘be’ otherwise because it is delivered over to being. *Dasein* is not a subject in the Cartesian or Kantian sense as Heidegger reads them. I have suggested that we interpret the claim that *Dasein* is ‘in each case mine’ differently from the substantive idea of an experience being mine: for instance myself being aware of myself typing on a keyboard. Heidegger tries to elucidate this when he introduces the term *disclosedness*. When I wonder whether I am a good person or a bad person, I am asking the question ‘Who am I?’ and this is a question about my own existence or *Dasein*. When asking such questions *Dasein* is disclosed to me, it is revealed to me as something that ‘I am’. It is because of *Dasein’s disclosedness* that Heidegger says *Dasein comports* itself towards being. Coming to some sort of sense of being, is a practical action, therefore a term like comportment is perhaps better suited than ‘related’, although ‘related’ may better capture its existential characteristics for purposes of exegesis

Heidegger conceived the terms relation and mineness in a primordial sense with his notion of *Dasein*. He believed that he had begun to present a picture of our being that was not reliant on notions of subject and subjectivity or on the Kantian idea of experience as something that is there for me. *Dasein* aimed at something more fundamental. However, I wish to suggest that Heidegger’s use of ‘mineness’ is not free of the Kantian inheritance that he was trying to escape since it has to allow the possibility of the first-personal. My contention is that with his account of Anxiety and conscience Heidegger opens the possibility of reinterpreting his account of ‘mineness’ in very much the same vein as the Kantian way of thinking,
with its notions such of subjectivity and self-consciousness. Before I can elaborate on this argument, we must look at Heidegger’s conception of the World.

**Being-in-the-World**

Having formally indicated *Dasein* as that which refers to existence and having begun his phenomenology of *Dasein*, Heidegger indicates that whatever *Dasein* is, it is a being-in-the-world:

Dasein is an entity which, in its very Being, comports itself understandingly towards that Being. In saying this, we are calling attention to the formal concept of existence. Dasein exists. Furthermore, Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself am. Mineness belongs to any existent Dasein, and it belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible. In each case Dasein exists in one or the other of these two modes, or else it is modally undifferentiated. But these are both ways in which Dasein’s Being takes on a definite character, and they must be seen and understood *a priori* as grounded upon that state of Being which we have “Being-in-the-world ”. An interpretation of this constitutive state is needed if we are to set up the analytic of Dasein correctly. (BT: 53)

The extent to which *Dasein* is defined as a ‘Being-in-the-world’ has in part been indicated by the discussion in the last section. However, it is also worth noting that the word ‘Dasein’ means literally ‘there-being’ where the ‘there’ should be taken
spatially, temporally and existentially. We are as Dasein a being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world should be taken as Dasein’s ‘basic constitution’ in that everything that Dasein is, could and could not be, and does take place within the framework of being-in-the-world. Because it is “Being-in-the-world” Dasein’s relationship to the world is more fundamental than the relationship of a subject to an object. Dasein as Being-in-the-world is immersed in and familiar with the world, rather than the world being an object for an independently constituted subject. Dasein is constituted by its world, and the world, as we shall see, is constituted as being a world for Dasein. Heidegger indicates this through an etymological analysis of the phrase ‘I am’:

The expression “bin” [“am”] is connected with “bei” [“at the home of,” or “on the person of”], and so “ich bin” [“I am”] means in turn “I reside” or “dwell amidst” the world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way. Being, as the infinitive of “ich bin” (that is to say, when it is understood as an existentiale), signifies “to reside amidst…to be familiar with….

(BT: 54)

What Heidegger is saying here, and what he goes on to show phenomenologically is that as Dasein, we live and act in the world, it is where we work and rest. For example, at the moment I am in my flat in Hull, typing on my computer in a corner of my living room. This is not what Heidegger means by familiarity with the world or “Being-in” because what I have just described is purely physical description, a phenomenon that Heidegger calls “Being-alongside”. This has nothing to do with Dasein as he makes clear in the following statement “There is no such thing as the
‘side-by-side-ness’ of an entity called Dasein with another entity called ‘world’. ”(BT: 55)

Heidegger is not denying physicality; for Heidegger, the world is of course, a world of chairs next to tables, upon which might sit computers, perhaps all to be found in a living room. But this does not capture what Heidegger means by familiarity with the world, what he means is for the world to be ‘encounterable’, to be mine, or there for me. Thus in my living room I find myself in room of computers, television and chairs all which are familiar to me because I can use them. The computer is mine in that I can type on it and the chair is mine in that I can sit on it. It should be emphasised that this sense of ‘mineness’ is not a legal claim of ownership, it is rather that the object is there for me. In another environment objects are ‘encounterable’ by me, even though I do not own them. And this is what Heidegger means by familiarity with the world or ‘Being-amidst’ which is a translation of sein-bei or Being-in, and since they are ‘encounterable’ they are related to Dasein. This is, as Heidegger calls it, a ‘unitary phenomenon’, not something that should really be divided into ‘Being-in’ and ‘world’, since this goes against the idea of ‘Being-in-the-world’, of our life being in the midst of the world and its surroundings. But for the purposes of exegesis, Heidegger does separate this phenomenon into three parts: ‘Being-in’, which I have begun to describe above, ‘Wordhood’ or ‘in-the-world-ness’ and finally the answer to the question who are we referring to when we refer to Dasein.
Worldhood

Heidegger begins his analysis of the world first by putting forward four definitions of the world. He rejects the first two because they seem too similar to Platonic and Cartesian conceptions of the world, they are:

1. “World” is used as an ontical concept, and signifies the totality of those entities that are present-at-hand within the world.
2. “World” functions as an ontological term, and signifies the Being of those entities we have just mentioned. And indeed ‘world’ can become a term for any realm which encompasses a multiplicity of entities; for instance when one talks of the ‘world’ of a mathematician, ‘world’ signifies the realm of possible objects of mathematics. (BT: 64-65).

Definition one, seems to refer to a Cartesian picture of world, the term ‘present-at-hand’ (a term Heidegger elaborates on later) refers to objects existing in the world, and conceived of as res extensa. This is the conception of the world adopted by science. Definition two could apply to both Plato and Descartes. Heidegger was not precise and the conceptions he rejects may have been characterised so as to cover many other conceptions of the world. It would be wrong to presume that one definition is meant to fit one particular thinker, more a way of thinking about the world. It just so happens that Plato and Descartes advance similar conceptions in their corpus.
Having rejected two conceptions of the world Heidegger settles on a conception of the world that consists of entities one can encounter within the world, they are public and are a world where Dasein can be. This is the world qua environment, and Heidegger’s full description is given below:

3. “World” can be understood in another ontical sense-not, however, as those entities which Dasein essentially is not and which can be encountered within-the-world, but rather as the ‘wherein’, a factical Dasein as such can said to “live”. “World” has here a pre-ontological existential signification. Here there are different possibilities: “world” may stand for the ‘public’ we-world, or one’s own closest (domestic) environment (BT: 64-65).

By examining the Being of entities in the world qua environment Heidegger hopes to arrive at an existential conception of the world, which is the conception he ultimately wishes to endorse. To do this he needs to find the Being, the nature as it were of entities, Other Dasein’s and the Being of Dasein itself. Heidegger believes that when this is done he will arrive at the fourth conception of the world: the existential conception. This conception would be the a priori nature of the third concept or worldhood revealed by the third conception of the world. In short, it would be the essence of the world.

…Finally, “world” designates the ontologico-existential concept of worldhood. Worldhood itself may have as its modes whatever structural wholes any special ‘worlds’ may have at the time; but embraces in itself the a priori character of worldhood.
in general. We shall reserve the expression “world” for our third signification. (BT: 64-65)

The world *qua* environment consists of three essential components: *Dasein* as *Existenz*, entities which have the Being *Zuhandenheit* or ‘ready-to-hand’ and entities which have the Being *Vorhandenheit* or present-to-hand. I will now outline the categories of *Zuhandenheit* and *Vorhandenheit*. One thing must be made clear, the entities are not a thing in themselves, it is being ready or present that makes them ready or present entities.

All objects exist in a network of relation and never in isolation. The keyboard exists ‘in-order-to’ type, the printer ‘in-order-to’ to print, the paper in-order-to be printed on. Every object refers to something else:

The hammering does not simply have the knowledge about the hammer’s character as equipment, but it has appropriated this equipment in a way that could not possibly be more suitable ...the more we seize hold of it and use it the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unwieldy is it encountered as that which it is - as equipment. The hammering itself uncovers the specific ‘manipulability’ of the hammer. The kind of Being which equipment possesses- in which it manifests itself in its own right - we call *readiness-to-hand*. (BT: 69)

This is how Heidegger introduces the category of *Zuhandenheit* or ready-to-hand. According to Heidegger objects in the world that we can use, are encountered by us
as \textit{ready-to-hand}. Such an object as Heidegger’s own example of the hammer is \textit{ready-to-hand} or usable because it exists in a particular network of relations between other objects and their function as was described above. The hammer exists as a hammer in relation to nails, wood, et cetera. The hammer in isolation would be meaningless for it would not have “equipmental totality” a place which gives the hammer a function and meaning. Thus the hammer is available for us to use, it exists for us as something ‘in-order-to-hit-nails’. We do not need not to think or form intentions as to how to use it, its purpose and our knowledge as to what to do with it is already there, by being part of the ready-to-hand and part of the equipmental totality.

The concept of \textit{Vorhandenheit} or the present-at-hand is a little more difficult to explain. This is because Heidegger does not give it the same amount of attention as he does to \textit{Zuhandenheit}. The present-at-hand being of entities is revealed when we view objects merely as there, but un-usuable. There is no one passage that defines the present-at-hand, but Heidegger does make many remarks, for example:

When an assignment has been disturbed - when something is unusable for some purpose - then the assignment becomes explicit...When an assignment to some particular’ towards-this’ has been circumspectively aroused, we catch sight of the ‘towards-this’ itself, and along with everything connected with the work - the whole ‘workshop’ - as that wherein concern always dwells. The context of the equipment is lit up, not as something never seen before, but as a totality constantly sighted
beforehand in circumspection. With this totality, however, the world announces itself. (BT: 74-75)

The environment, that is to say, objects within the world are disclosed to Dasein as ready or present, objects that can be used for some task or objects that are merely there, or perhaps, objects we cannot engage with because we are unable. A consequence of Heidegger's account of the interdependency of Dasein and World, is a change in the meaning and function of intentionality. Whereas for Husserl intentionality was attributed to consciousness, signalling the content of our conscious states, for Heidegger intentionality is more fundamental than consciousness. It captures the constitutive feature of Dasein as the ‘towards-which’:

Because the usual separation between a subject with its immanent sphere and an object with its transcendent sphere—because, in general, the distinction between an inner and outer—is constructive and continually gives occasion for future constructions, we shall in future no longer speak of a subject, of a subjective sphere, but shall understand the being to whom intentional comportments belong as Dasein, and indeed in such a way that it is precisely with the aid of intentional comportment, properly understood, that we attempt to characterise suitably the being of Dasein (BP, p.64).

Thus Heidegger shifts away from the transcendental ego as the ‘seat of intentionality’ moving it to Dasein. Dasein, when the world is disclosed as ready, does not need to be conscious of the object, in the sense of deliberating in order to
use it, the object, such as a computer keyboard, discloses itself ‘for typing’ and *Dasein* ‘comports’ itself ‘towards’ the object in the appropriate manner.

It should be made clear that neither in the above quotation from *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, nor in *Being and Time* does Heidegger deny that there may be occasions when the subject/object model of the relationship between existent and world does capture an aspect of our phenomenology. Indeed, presumably during times of complete breakdown, that is how we view an object. Heidegger’s point is that just that the subject/object model is not fundamental. It is not constitutive of the being of *Dasein* or of the World.

**Affectivity**

Heidegger’s concept of *Befindlichkeit* is very difficult to translate let alone elucidate. Macquarrie and Robinson translate it as state-of-mind, which suggests a mental state, and this is misleading. It is an attempt to capture the German ‘Wie befinden Sie sich?’ which can be roughly translated as ‘How do you find yourself?’ meaning ‘How are you?’ An equivalent expression is difficult to find in British culture. ‘Fit like?’ that is found in the Doric dialect, spoken in some parts of the North East of Scotland and literally meaning ‘What like?’, is close. Another example also found in Scotland would be ‘How’s your self?’ both are a general inquiry to health and wealth, but most importantly they explain *Befindlichkeit*, emotional well being. Others translate *Befindlichkeit* as ‘disposition’ or

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14 Thanks to the McPhersons of Huntly for this example.
disposedness, but this suggests behaviourism, that one is ‘disposed to feel sad’, which would also fail to capture Befindlichkeit. No word really does the trick so throughout this section I will use ‘affectedness’ or simply Befindlichkeit. ‘Affectedness’ or Befindlichkeit is essentially Dasein’s sensitivity or ‘attunement’ to a given situation that is expressed through mood (Stimmung): “What we indicate ontologically by the term affectedness is ontically the most familiar and every day sort of thing; our Stimmung, our being-attuned” (BT: 134).^{15}

There can be some conceptual confusion with Heidegger’s account of Befindlichkeit beyond mere translation of the word; this occurs with his idea of Stimmung. This word Stimmung translated from the German is ‘mood’. However, not all the ‘moods’ he analyses are conventionally considered moods. Fear, for example is certainly an emotion, not a mood such as ‘sadness’. It appears that Stimmung must be doing more work than it would be in common language. It can refer to a certain world-view such a ‘the climate of fear’, or to a particular culture ‘the post 9-11 World’, or to a spirit of the times such as ‘uneasy’. It can also apply to the mood of a particular situation, for example ‘the tense atmosphere’, and of course, the mood of a particular person when faced with that situation. All of the above examples fall under the concept of Stimmung. They each describe a different sort of ‘mattering’, a salience that is always already there, the ontologico-existential condition of Dasein.

^{15} I should make clear that for the purposes of explaining Befindlichkeit alone I will refer to Dreyfus’ translation of Sein und Zeit, which translates Befindlichkeit as affectedness. The page number of Dreyfus (1991) is given followed by the ‘Heidegger number’. Disposedness is also a translation of Befindlichkeit as given in Being in the World A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I. MIT Press.
Moods have four main characteristics. Firstly they are public, available to all. Secondly, they reveal Dasein’s thrownness. Thirdly, Moods provide the conditions for disclosedness: the necessary condition for the world ‘showing up’ for Dasein at all. The fourth characteristic, which Heidegger says little about, is Affectedness; this is also the basis of intentionality. I shall now attempt to explain these characteristics.

Heidegger is very keen to avoid the shadow of Cartesianism in his account of Affectedness, as it would seem to lend itself so easily to such a reading. So in the first instance he rejects conceptions of affect where they are private and discovered via conscious reflection:

But affectedness is very remote from anything like coming across a psychical condition by the kind of apprehending which first turns round and then back. Indeed it is so far from this only because the “there” has already been disclosed in affectedness can immanent reflection come across “experiences” at all. (BT: 136)

Moods are public. By making moods public Heidegger is accomplishing two tasks. He is avoiding Cartesianism and giving expression to an everyday expression of moods. He notes “Publicness, as the kind of being which belongs to the one, not only has in general its own way of having a mood, but needs moods and “makes” them for itself.” (BT: 138).
The Public or ‘the One’ is Dasein. Dasein defines itself in terms of the public world, a public world that Heidegger calls Das Man. This can translate as ‘The Anyone’, ‘the They’ or, the ’The One’ as I will translate it following Dreyfus. The One is an impersonal community not a community made up of particular Dasein’s but a mass, faceless herd. However as the public world, all our ideas, beliefs and social practices have their origin and are given legitimacy by ‘The One’. We see the effect of ‘The One’ everywhere, for example when someone does something rude such as interrupting someone who is speaking or when someone commits an act of violence, it is understood if not voiced ‘that one does not do those sort of things.’ Thus ‘The One’ is the source of all Dasein’s possible being. Whatever one might become, whatever values one espouses, these ideas are possible only because they are to be found in ‘The One’. Taylor Carman calls it ‘the anonymous social normativity’ (Carman, 1994, p221), because it judges what ideas, beliefs and social practices are acceptable and which are to be rejected. Of course there is no one particular ‘judge’ because of ‘The One’ being an impersonal community. Heidegger believes that for the most part we do not have our ‘own’ self distinct from others, a self that only ‘I am,’ as what ‘I’ do, in virtue of Dasein’s publicness has already been decided by what ‘Others’ are doing. Therefore what gives moods their foundation is ‘The One’ or the public. If moods were not public, no individual Dasein could have them. ‘The dominance of the public way in which things are interpreted have already been decisive even for the possibilities of having a mood - that is for the basic way in which Dasein lets the world “matter” to it’ (BT: 169-170).
Everybody has moods and everyone is at some point in a mood, and yet philosophy has seldom looked at Mood, with a few notable exceptions: Descartes *Passions of the Soul* and Scheler’s *The Nature of Sympathy*

16 to name two. Hubert Dreyfus offers the possibility that it may be the very commonality of mood that has prevented it from being subjected to philosophical treatment. It can be said that Mood also “…contradicts the traditional assumption that one can always know something best by gaining a reflective and detached clarity about it.” (Dreyfus, 1991, p.173). Heidegger writes “Ontologically mood is a primordial kind of being for Dasein in which Dasein is disclosed to itself *prior* to all cognition and volition, and *beyond* the range of disclosure.” (BT: 136).

We can never fully know or control our moods, they are ultimately beyond ‘the realm of knowledge’ or disclosure and not under the control of one’s will. Since Dasein is always affected by some mood or another, it is always surrounded by a world that ‘matters’ to it, a world of salience, from which, ordinarily, there is no escape. Dasein is ‘already’ in a world of salience reveal by mood that is its throwness:

This characteristic of Dasein’s being-this “that it is”- is veiled in its “whence” and “whither”, yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the “throwness” of this entity into its “there”…The expression “throwness” is meant to suggest the facicity its being delivered over. The “that it is and has to be”

which is disclosed in Dasein’s affectedness. (Dreyfus, 1991, p.173-4: BT:135)

Not only does mood reveal the world as ‘mattering’ to Dasein, it also provides the conditions for the specific situations that affect us and it influences how we may react to them. In a sense it both limits and opens possibilities for Dasein. If I am afraid, that may prevent me from acting because I am paralysed with fear, but it might also spur me to act. Or as Heidegger states “The “bare mood” discloses the “there” more primordially, but correspondingly it closes it off more stubbornly than any not perceiving.”(Dreyfus, 1991, p.174: BT:136).

Moods do not just disclose, or indeed, close the world off to us rather they disclose Dasein itself, in its thrownness as being ‘in a mood:

A being of the character of Dasein is its “there” in such a way that, whether explicitly or not, it finds itself in its thrownness. In affectedness Dasein is always brought before itself, and has always found itself, not in the sense of coming itself by perceiving itself, but in the sense of finding itself in the mood that it has. (BT: 135)

Dasein ‘finds itself” in a mood, not by introspection, but by discovering that the world appears in a certain way. This experience is not unusual, one can, in a particular situation find a mood ‘creeping up on one’ such as sadness at funeral, or happiness at unexpected good news. It is not that the person introspects and perceives ‘sadness’, rather they just find things in the world sad.
It is worth emphasising that as the conditions of Originary Intentionality, by making some things ‘show up’ as mattering and others not, moods “provide the background” (Dreyfus, 1991, p: 174) for intentionality. For example, I may not fix the washing machine, because at the time it needed fixing I was receiving good news about my brother passing his exams. Compared to this the washing machine ceased to ‘matter’ in that way, so it did not take on the shape of ‘something to be fixed’. As Heidegger points out “Mood has already disclosed, in every case, being-in-the-world as a whole and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something.” (BT: 135) Heidegger goes on to show how affectedness may ‘provide the background’ for particular intentional directedness towards specific entities. It does this by contrasting the ‘affect’ of fear with Anxiety.

**Anxiety**

Heidegger begins his discussion of Anxiety with a discussion of fear which he sees as ontologically less important; however he wishes to differentiate it from fear, so it is with fear that we begin this discussion. According to Heidegger, when we are afraid we have the feeling of fear, that is to say the sense itself, an object or situation of which are afraid, and/or an object we are afraid of. When a gun is pointed at me it is something I am afraid of, losing a limb or my life is what I am afraid of, I am ‘in fear of my life’, and then there is the actual sensation of fear. Dreyfus points out that “Primarily and usually, Dasein is in terms of what it
concerned with. When this is endangered, being-amidst is threatened.” (Dreyfus, 1991, p.176: BT180-81).

Fear has an object, the thing of which we are afraid, therefore the phenomenon of fear opens the possibility of new courses of action for the ‘towards-which’. However, for Heidegger Anxiety is not like that. Whilst one can be anxious about something, this is not Anxiety for Heidegger. He uses the term Anxiety in a very specific way because for him Anxiety is objectless, that is to say that it does not have a specific object, for example the failure to finish a piece of work on time. The only example from everyday life would be a panic attack or nervous breakdown in which Anxiety grips one to such an extent that one is simply incapable of action.

Even though Heidegger’s exposition of fear is brief, he does go on to show how Anxiety is markedly different from fear. Anxiety is a “privileged way in which Dasein is disclosed” (BT: 185). The aim of this brief account of fear was to help us see why Anxiety is a ‘privileged way’. And why is this account needed at all? Heidegger needs to show how Dasein can be disclosed to itself, how all the different modes of being must be found in Dasein’s mode of being. Without that Dasein would seem to play no part in fundamental ontology, or at least it is difficult to make the case that it has a role to play in that project thus the project itself risks falling apart.
If the existential analytic of Dasein is to retain clarity in principle as to its function in fundamental ontology, then in order to master its provisional task of exhibiting Dasein’s being, it must seek for one of the *most far reaching* and *most primordial* possibilities of disclosure—one that lies in Dasein itself. (BT: 80-81)

Now whatever allows Dasein’s self-disclosure, it cannot be found in every day experiences for these rely on particular and possibly private experiences, therefore they are not adequate to the task for whilst I may have this experience another may not. Instead Heidegger chooses Anxiety for this task. There is logic behind this, just as the breakdown of equipment reveals the ready-to-hand so *Dasein* is ‘broken down’ by Anxiety:

Anxiety individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as “*solus ipse*.” But this existential “solipsism” is so far from the displacement of putting an isolated subject-thing into the innocuous emptiness of a world of a worldless occurring, that in an extreme sense what it does is precisely to bring Dasein face to face with its world as world, and thus bring it face to face with itself as being-in-the-world. (Dreyfus, 1991, p.176: BT188)

However, during an experience of Anxiety, the public world is without significance for *Dasein*. Dasein relates to it as an unready object, only worse for “anxiety is total is disturbance” (Dreyfus, 1991, p.177). Instead of “revealing some part of the…world from the inside ... the whole world is revealed “as if from the outside” (Dreyfus, 1991, p.177). But unlike simple unreadiness ‘the world’ is still ‘there’ is just appears unusable. Anxiety has disengaged *Dasein*. The world collapses away
from *Dasein*, not as an “unstructured mass”, to use Dreyfus’ term, which the inauthentic Dasein can see, but not use. And in Anxiety “Dasein’s ... not-being-at-home breaks through” (Dreyfus, 1991, p.179) Unable to engage in the world *Dasein* is “unsettled” or “not-being-at-home” (BT: 188). Everything is there and nothing is usable. However as disconcerting as the experience is, it reveals *Dasein’s* essential structure to itself, it is (usually) thrown temporalised existence, directed through intentionality made possible through affectivity, and it is just not that now. Unsettled, cast out from the world, it is now aware of the ready and the present, of worldiness, and of the mood it now lacks to enable directedness, ‘nothing matters’.

With Anxiety, *Dasein* is individualised in the sense that it is *singled out alone*, hence the reference to *solus ipse*, it is now apart from all other particular *Dasein’s*, and comes ‘face to face with itself as being-in-the-world’. Through Anxiety *Dasein* is now distinct and separate from other Daseins, it has been *individualised*. However, whilst a particular *Dasein* has be located and separated from the ‘The One’, the general herd, Anxiety can be expressed in the third-personal, it has however ‘set the stage’ and made possible the first-personal. This possibility is to be found with the call of conscience.
Conscience

*Dasein* has been individualised by Anxiety, although this does not mean that it has now become a subject, in the Cartesian or Kantian sense of that notion, with a singular, particular, ‘I’ and a singular *conscience*, an ‘I that I am’. However, Anxiety has individualised and particularised *Dasein*, that is to say *separated* it from other *Dasein*’s. However Heidegger still couches the language of *Dasein* in the third-personal. He now wishes to characterise being-a-self, as opposed to a one-self, being a particular Self without falling into the ‘Cartesian/Kantian trap’ of using the first-personal. Heidegger intends to achieve this through investigating the phenomenon of conscience (*Gewissen*).

The ‘call of conscience’ is one way in which *Dasein* self-discloses and makes disclosure to the world, but it must be a particular type of disclosure. It must not show *Dasein* to be merely dependent on the public world, on the ‘they-self’. This condition means that the call of conscience cannot be a set of moral or social principles, ready packaged for *Dasein* to lead its ‘authentic’ life. Instead, ‘the call’ must place *Dasein* beyond this, beyond simply acting out any moral principle that may usually apply in a given situation. In this sense, what the *voice* of conscience does not say is just as important as what does say to *Dasein*. Heidegger says:

The call asserts nothing, gives no information about world-events, has nothing to tell. Least of all does it try to set going a ‘soliloquy’ in the Self to which it has appealed. ‘Nothing’ gets the called *zu [zu-gerufen]* this Self, but it has been *summoned*
In understanding what Heidegger means by the ‘call’ and the ‘voice’ of conscience we must recall that throughout *Being and Time* Heidegger has been emphasising *Dasein*’s disclosedness, that it discloses itself and the world to itself. Therefore it should not come as a surprise, that *Dasein* is to be both the ‘caller’ and the ‘called’. In Heidegger’s call of conscience, what is being talked about? In other words, to whom is the appeal made?

Manifestly *Dasein* itself. The answer is as incontestable as it is indefinite. If the call has so vague a target, then it must at most remain an occasion for *Dasein* to pay attention to itself. But it is essential to *Dasein* that along with the disclosedness of its world it has been disclosed to itself, so that it always understands itself...And to what is one called when one is thus appealed to? To one’s own *Self* (BT: 272-3).

Thus, *Dasein* calls and answers, but one must clear about what Heidegger means by that. The call is made to “the they-self in its Self” to the One to isolate the Self as a potential singular self, a singular *Dasein*, to choose to accept its possibilities as a singular self, different from the ‘One’ or the public. Heidegger states “…such an appeal…summons the Self to its potentiality-for-Being-its-Self, and thus calls *Dasein* forth to its possibilities.” (BT: 274).
Thus, *Dasein* is both the ‘caller’ and the ‘called’ of conscience, in its own attempt to bring itself forth to its own Being. And yet it should be made clear, *Dasein* cannot be aware that it is the origin of its conscience. The ‘call’ seems to *Dasein* to be non-specific in origin. Indeed whilst the caller is *Dasein*, it seems to *Dasein* that the ‘call’ came from ‘beyond’ it.

Indeed the call is precisely something that *we ourselves* have neither planned nor prepared for nor voluntarily performed, nor have we ever done so. ‘It’ calls, against our expectations, and even against our will. On the other hand, the call undoubtedly does not come from someone else who is with me in the world. The call comes *from* me and *yet* from beyond me. (BT: 274)

**Care as the Being of Dasein**

Heidegger, having outlined *Dasein’*s various ways of being is now able to give an answer, albeit incomplete, to his question ‘What is the meaning of Being?’.

His answer in short is Care (*Sorge*):

*Dasein* exists as a being for which, in its being, that being is an *issue*. Essentially ahead of itself, it has projected itself upon its ability to be before going on to any mere consideration of itself. In its projection it reveals itself as something which has been thrown. It has been thrownly abandoned to the “world” and falls into it concernfully. As care - that is, an existing in the unity of the projection which has been fallingly thrown - this entity has been disclosed as a “there”. (BT: 406)
However, Heidegger’s use of the term ‘Care’ should not be taken to mean something such as ‘I am a careful person, because I work hard’ or ‘I am worried about my thesis.’ It is not referring to the concern of one particular agent for him/herself. It should be primarily understood ontologically not ontically as “the being for whom being is an issue” in that Dasein ‘cares’ about itself, its projects, its surrounding world and others:

[Care] is to be taken as an ontological structural concept. It has nothing to do with “tribulation,” “melancholy,” or even the “cares of life,” though ontically one can come across these in every Dasein. These-like their opposites “gaiety” and “freedom from care”- are ontically possible only because Dasein, when understood ontologically, is care. (BT: 57)

Since the Being of Dasein is Care, Care is like the world, “always already there”, it is constitutive of Dasein. One cannot ‘opt out’ of Care, for care is not only constitutive of Dasein, but is involved in all of Dasein’s activities, in fact it makes them possible:

Care, a primordial structural totality lies “before” [“vor”] every factual “attitude” and “situation” of Dasein, and it does so existentially a priori; this means that it always lies in them. So the phenomenon by no means expresses a priority of the “practical” attitude over the theoretical. When we ascertain something present-at-hand by merely beholding it, this activity has the character of care just as much as does a “political action” or taking a rest or enjoying oneself. “Theory” and “practice” are
possibilities of a being for an entity whose being must be defined as a “care”. (BT: 193)

Now, since the analysis of Dasein was ultimately going to be ontic, the ontic or particular modes of ‘care’ are included but are derived from the care qua ontological:

Because being-in-the-world is essentially care (Sorge), being-amidst the available could then be taken in our previous analyses as concern (Besorgen) and being with the Dasein-with of others as we encounter it within-the-world could be taken as solicitude (Fursorge). (BT: 193)

To conclude this part, it is important to make clear that Care as the Being of Dasein, is an ‘incomplete’ answer because the issue of temporality was never fully articulated and resolved by Heidegger aside from his claim that temporality should be understood “as the Ontological Meaning of Care.” (BT: 323). Exactly how this was to be understood is more difficult to say since Heidegger never finished Division II. What can be gleaned is that Heidegger is pointing towards the idea of Dasein as ecstatic:

The being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-being-already-in-(the world) as being-amidst (entities encountered within-the-world). This being fills the signification of the term “care,” which is used in a purely ontologico-existential manner (BT: 192).
Dasein, is always amidst, always ‘out there’, ecstatic. It is always ahead of itself, it looks towards the future therefore it has a horizontal temporal structure. Thus temporality is what gives care its “ontological meaning”. Thus it is because the Being of Dasein is care that individual Dasein’s can perform actions such as writing theses, negotiating the world and being with others, indeed living a life.

I have given an exegesis of Heidegger’s ideas in Being and Time. I will now evaluate and critique his project in the light of his criticisms of his predecessors and my own concern with subjectivity.

**Conscience and First-Person Awareness in Being and Time**

Using Heidegger’s account of conscience, I wish to argue that he may have committed himself to giving an account of first-personal self-awareness or self-consciousness. It should be understood that Heidegger never denies the first-personal, but he is cautious how the first-personal is to framed and understood. Certainly Heidegger never meant Dasein to be understood as in the Kantian sense of an autonomous thinker. The existential analytic of Dasein whilst it concerns particular human beings – ‘me’ and ‘you’ is framed in third personal language, in order to give an general account, one that can apply to all human beings. However, the language Heidegger must use to give his account of conscience lends itself to first-personal description. The call of conscience is made to ‘one’s own Self” and as Dasein is both caller of and ‘responder’ to conscience seems to suggest first-
personal description. Heidegger would remind us that ultimately the call comes from ‘beyond me’ from the general Dasein, the one-self and is answered by ‘I’ the particular self. However, “the call comes from that entity which in each case I myself am” (BT: 278). It is difficult to interpret this as anything but first-personal self-awareness. It seems that with conscience Dasein is further individualised as personal self, a self, suffering breakdown after Anxiety and singled out by conscience as subject: an ‘I that I am’. This is suggested by his discussion of conscience and being-Guilty. After all, it was ‘I myself’ that watched ‘House M.D’ instead of doing my thesis it was no other person, it is I alone who must answer for my laziness. It is difficult to interpret this in any way other than the first-personal.

However, one might still ask, what is the nature of this first-personal self-awareness that has been located? It is certainly not the one-self, the general ‘I’ and neither is it the singular self, rather it is as Crowell puts it, “a hidden condition of both” (Crowell, 2001, p.444), that first-personal self-awareness is a necessary condition for both. Again Heidegger himself suggests this (however inadvertently). Crowell states:

The uncanny ‘nothing at all’ revealed in breakdown and voiced as conscience is Dasein’s ‘basic kind of being in the world, even though in the everyday way it has been covered up’ (BT: 322/277). Thus even the call ‘to the Self in the one-self does not force it inwards upon itself, so that it can close itself from the “exterior world”’ (BT: 318/273), this is not because subjectivity is somehow ‘part’ of that world or totality of significance. Rather it is because this image of subjectivity – an ‘interior’ space of representations cut off from the external world – is not subjective enough. (Crowell, 2001, p.444)
If the uncanny is *Dasein*'s ‘basic state’ and is fully shown to *Dasein* as conscience then some sort of first-personal awareness must be a condition of the *Dasein*, since (as Crowell and I contend) conscience can only be understood in first-personal terms. However it is not that ‘Heidegger’s subject’ is merely general *Dasein* ‘retreating’ into itself, as *Dasein* being interdependent with the world, is always part of the world would not be subjective enough. Rather it is something even more subjective something so subjective that is manifests itself even before *Dasein* is in-the-world. It must be part of *Dasein*’s initial ‘make-up’, its constitution. I will now go on to examine how this different notion of the subjective changes the whole meaning of Heidegger’s phenomenology in *Being and Time*. In particular, I believe that a different understanding of disclosure and self-disclosure, forces Heidegger’s position closer to Kant’s *transcendental unity of apperception* than Heidegger would be comfortable with. In order to show that Heidegger’s position is not as far away from Kant as Heidegger would like to think, we must return to *Jemeinigkeit*. The salient point here is that with the idea of mineness, *Dasein*, is characterised as follows: its ‘existence’ is something that ‘I’ can call mine. That ‘*Dasein* is mine’ might seem innocuous. Heidegger does not use and in fact opposes terms such as self-consciousness, awareness or self-awareness and instead favours disclosedness. As explained earlier in this chapter, disclosedness is *Dasein*’s familiarity with world, familiarity is *a priori* – hence the world is always already there for *Dasein*. Admittedly in one sense Heidegger does differ from Kant. For Heidegger, there is no ‘manifold’ to synthesise; *Dasein* can approach the world since it is already interdependent with it, objects are familiar, such as typing on this keyboard,
because *Dasein* as Being-in-the-world is linked with the world *a priori*. Thus ‘I’ am familiar with both *Dasein* and world.

However, although he has moved away from one aspect of Kantian language, Heidegger has moved closer to another. If it is possible to claim that *Dasein* and the world are available to me or ‘are mine’ because of some prior unity, for example of *Dasein*’s Being-in-world, then this bears some similarity to the following statement:

> It must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least, nothing to me. (B131-2)

It is not obvious why Heidegger’s *disclosedness* might bear similarity to Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception. I will now explain how this seemingly bizarre comparison can be made.\(^{17}\) Since *Dasein* is disclosed as Being-in-the-world *a priori* and as ‘mine’, Øverenget points out that “It appears to itself, but not as an object, and not independently of the appearance the world. Thus it is not its own object but is nevertheless aware of itself, i.e., of its very essence.” (Øverenget, 1998, p.164).

\(^{17}\) Much of this argument comes from Einar Øverenget ’s *Seeing the Self: Heidegger on Subjectivity* (1998) *Kluwer Academic Publishers*
Recall that “The essence of Dasein lies in its existence”, an existence which is to be ‘addressed’ as ‘mine’ and understood in the first person – ‘I am’. Whether it is called disclosedness, awareness or relatedness, Dasein must have the possibility of relating to its own essence and on the basis of this, and only on this basis are reflections such as ‘I did this’ possible. If it could not do this it would not be Dasein. And since Dasein is Being-in-the-world, Dasein’s essence is a relatedness to the world. This would be a non-positional relatedness, Dasein as is related to itself as itself, not as an object.

It is Øverenget’s contention and mine that Heidegger is embracing a notion of self-consciousness very similar to Kant here. If Dasein must possibly be related or directed towards itself non-positionally, and on the basis of this relatedness, reflection is possible, Dasein as the ‘towards-which’ is primarily directed not towards an object, or the world as sociality, but itself, this kind of directedness would be neither practical nor theoretical intentionality, rather it is a transcendental condition of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. In other words a condition of Dasein’s being ‘in-the-world’ is that it must be directed towards itself as an ‘I am myself’, in the first person. If it did not have this intimate relationship with itself as part of its constitution as Being-in-the-world, it could not have the relationship that it enjoys with the world and with others, and ultimately with itself as a worldly creature. The one-self and the self after conscience would not be possible without it. Since this condition is necessary for Dasein to ‘be’ at all, Dasein is a subject since it is founded on the first-person directedness towards itself. It is also a Kantian-flavoured subject since it is Dasein’s directedness towards itself it could be
construed as a kind of self-consciousness. In this sense one could make the same criticism of Heidegger that he makes of Kant when he characterises Kant as using the ‘I think’ to form “…the ultimate ground of our relation to entities, a relation Kant still conceives in terms of mental representation.” (Carman, 2003, p.303).

The ‘I-think’ establishes the subject for Kant, and Heidegger needs to make exactly the manoeuvre with *Dasein*, namely that a first-personal disclosedness or awareness acts as grounds for *Dasein* as subject. And, like Kant’s ‘I think’ since *Dasein* is related to itself, as it is for Kant, a form of self-consciousness.

**A Need for an Account of Self-consciousness**

In *Being and Time* Heidegger wishes to characterise the ‘I’ of the ‘I am’ as impersonal, understood in the third-person, it is *Dasein* as Being-in-the-world which is understood as mine, it is *Being* and not the Ego, not the Self that is ‘mine’.

In itself, this move is not problematic. However, I wish to suggest that it becomes problematic when we try to reconcile the task of Division I of *Being and Time* with Division II. In Division I Heidegger is giving an account of the one-self: a general, impersonal *Dasein*. However, in Division II he wishes to show how *Dasein* can understand itself, not just as part of ‘The One’, but as a Self, its own Self. Authenticity and care can be understood impersonally: that *Dasein* cares for *itself* not myself and that it becomes its ‘ownmost self’ can all be described in the third-person. However, the process by which *Dasein* arrives at the care-structure and
becomes a resolute authentic *Dasein*: as in the phenomena of Anxiety and conscience cannot be couched in *purely* third-personal terms, but rather must be described in first-personal language, the language of self-awareness. This language opens the possibility of understanding terms such as self-disclosure and self-understanding ontically: as pertaining to a particular subject, thus putting concepts such as subjectivity and self-consciousness back in play. This may force one to read Heidegger’s account as quasi-Kantian.

In the next chapters I will attempt to articulate a phenomenology of self-experience taking into account the possibility of a Kantian reading of Heidegger. To do this I will use the resources of Zen Buddhism, German Idealism, and French Phenomenology.
Chapter Five: From Freiburg to Kyoto: Heidegger’s Encounter with Buddhism

Introductory Remarks

In this chapter I will be comparing Heidegger’s view of selfhood with a view given by a Japanese school of philosophy called The Kyoto School, so named because many of its leading exponents taught at Kyoto University. It is worth noting that a discussion of Heidegger and the Kyoto School is not a juxtaposition of ideas but rather it provides an interesting exercise in comparative philosophy since Heidegger himself was personally acquainted with many of its members.18 They included in particular, Nishitani Keiji, Miki Kiyoshi, Kuki Shuzo and its current leading exponent Ueda Shizuteru. It is believed that Kuki, the author of *Iki no kozo*19 is the very real template for one of the participants in Heidegger’s ‘Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer’20 and he is certainly mentioned in the dialogue. Heidegger’s teaching and interaction with his Japanese students is well documented in a number of sources, and a good overview is to be found in the article by Yuasa in Graham Parkes’ *Heidegger and Asian Thought*21 (87/92) and Reinhard May’s *Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East-Asian Influences On His Work*

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19 Kuki’s most famous work ‘Iki no kozo’ translated can be found in Hiroshi Nara’s 2004 work *The Structure of Detachment: The Aesthetic Vision of Kuki Shuzo* published by University of Hawai‘i Press.


(1996). We know that Miki was instructed by one Kita Reikichi to offer Heidegger a post at Tokyo, at a new Research Centre, an offer that was turned down by Heidegger. It may be difficult to imagine how *Being and Time* would have turned out if Heidegger had written it spatially and existentially closer to the Zen gardens of Kyoto instead of the Black Forest of Germany, but this is something I will not try to imagine here. The ideas of The Kyoto School especially those of Nishitani and Ueda pose some difficult questions to Heidegger especially with regard to his ideas on Nihilism, the self and Nothingness, yet I believe we can hazard a guess at how Heidegger may respond. I will begin by examining what can, with quite some justification be called the key idea of The Kyoto School, that of ‘pure experience’; this was first expounded by The Kyoto School’s founder, Nishida Kitarō in his maiden work *Zen no Kenkyu* (1911) translated as *Inquiry into the Good* (1990):

To experience means to know facts just as they are, to know in accordance with facts by completely relinquishing one’s own fabrications. What we usually refer to as experience is adulterated with some sort of thought, so by *pure* I am referring to the state of experience just as it is without the least addition of deliberative discrimination. The moment of seeing a colour or

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23 It is often the form to put ‘family name’ of Japanese thinkers first, hence Miki Kiyoshi  
25 An interesting although parenthetical point is that the phrase ‘Being-in-the-world’ can be found in Okakura Kakuzo’s “The Book of Tea” published in 1906. Okakura writes “Chinese historians have always spoken of Taoism as the “art of being in the world,” for it deals with the present—ourselves” (Okakura, 1906/2007, p20). Okakura spent much of his time with the young Kuki Shuzo and was most likely his biological father. Kuki certainly read this book.
hearing a sound, for example, is prior not only to the thought that the colour or sound is an activity or an external object or that one is sensing it, but also to the judgment of what the colour or sound might be. In this regard, pure experience is identical with direct experience. When one directly experiences one’s own state of consciousness, there is not yet a subject or object, and knowing and its object are completely unified. This is the most refined type of experience (Nishida, 1911/1990, p. 3-4).

Nishida is advancing two theses here. The first concerns the nature of reality; the reality referred to here is essentially one or absolute, a reality that does not originally admit of any divisions or conceptualisations into subject and object. This in itself is not new, many philosophers have claimed that reality is a unity, and we as subjects’ conceptualise, divide and separate the reality in order to make sense of it. Where Nishida differs from nearly all of Western Philosophy is with the claim that reality is originally experienced as unity, an absolute unity between knower and known, in which there is no distinction between subject and object, hence pure experience. Yet, as we shall see, there is a self that is experiencing this reality.

The second component articulated by Nishida, as implicit in the idea of pure awareness, is his notion of self-awareness, or to use the roman form of Japanese jikaku. This is a difficult term to translate. It similar to the French ‘conscience a soi’, meaning self-consciousness, although it must be understood that Nishida in no way treats the self as an object, in fact, it is this move, that Nishida views as a very Western way of thinking about self-awareness, one he is trying to avoid. In order to avoid the ‘Western conception of self-consciousness’ Nishida and the Kyoto School
tend to avoid the term when talking about pure experience and the absolute, although there are exceptions. As Miki explains the notion of self-awareness is favoured and self-consciousness avoided “…because the latter is fraught with many epistemological problems, while at the same time retaining its essential meaning of “self knowing its self.”” (Nagatomo, 1995, p.29).

It may help if we return to the Japanese and examine the meaning of the term. Mayuko Uehara states:

The term jikaku is made up of two Chinese characters: ji, which means “self,” and kaku, which means “awake.” The meaning of the term itself incorporates the significance of the word jiko, which, together with jikaku, plays a major role in Nishida’s writings. Jiko is generally taken to be the equivalent of the French soi or moi, but these latter belong fundamentally to a system of personal pronouns whereas jiko belongs to a different grammatical system of terms designating the person. (Uehara, 2006, p.55)

Jikaku, then, is a composite of ‘self’ and ‘awakening’, where self or ji should not be taken to mean ‘person.’ for this would involve committing to an ontology that Nishida has yet to develop. Rather the self, whilst it refers to the selfhood that we human beings have, should be understood more simply as ‘that which experiences’. Kaku meaning ‘awake’ indicates that self-awareness for Nishida is closer to a notion of auto-affectivity of the self or what Jim Heisig calls “an auto-awareness of the self” (Heisig, 2001, p.50) in that experience constitutes or awakens the self as a self.
One has to be careful of how ‘thick’ a notion of *self-awareness* or *self-awakening* one can get from this one passage in *Inquiry into the Good*. Whilst Nishida certainly mentions *jikaku* in this book, he does not elaborate a great deal until his book *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness* (1917). However there is much in his maiden work and the term can be found in his earlier notes and lectures:

The term *jikaku* appeared long before *Intuition and Reflection in Jikaku* (1917), in fact even before the book that launched his philosophical career in 1911, *A Study of the Good*. I would point in particular to the use of the term in two texts written between 1904 and 1906, “A Lecture on Psychology” and “A Proposal for an Ethics.” Nishida took the psychology of Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) as his guide in composing his “Lecture,” but even so, we can see hints of his original philosophical position there in germ. A short section of the “Lecture,” intended as an outline of Western psychology, is set aside for the concept of *jikaku*. (Uehara, 2006, p.57)

Nishida challenges Western Philosophy with his ideas of pure experience *and self-awakening*, including the phenomenology of Heidegger. For Nishida, with his idea of *self-awakening* there is something more fundamental than our relationship to the world as a subject to an object as it occurs in Philosophy from Descartes to Kant. It is also more fundamental than our *primary* way of existence as Being-in-the-world (as it was for Heidegger and the Husserl of *Ideas II* onwards). For Nishida, Being conscious-of, or the ‘towards-which’ i.e. intentionality, is not the most fundamental way of experiencing the world. Pure experience undercuts
such a notion by presenting a world of experience, given to the self, but prior to the appearance of subjectivity and objectivity and, crucially for Heidegger, prior to the experience of the world, as world. A similar idea can be found in Lacan’s notion of the Real, a ‘pure’ experience of the world prior to the world being divided into subject and object, but unlike Nishida, since this is a stage in developmental process, once passed it cannot be reported on. For Nishida not only can pure experience be reported on, albeit not necessarily exhaustively, being the ‘most refined type of experience’ it is not a stage on the way to subjectivity. Rather subjectivity is what one must overcome to achieve pure experience. It would also be a mistake to view pure experience as a non-positional awareness of the world in the same sense that Sartre intends those terms. Whilst pure experience is ‘before’ reflection, it is perhaps misleading to call it pre-reflective as the ‘pre’ suggests that reflection is an inevitable step to forming some kind of subjectivity. This is not the case for Nishida. Pure experience is instead a mode of experience we all should seek, for only then do we know the world for what it truly is, in the work of Nishitani, this is absolute nothingness. I will outline this further below.

Nishida’s notions of pure experience and self-awakening form the basis of Kyoto School thinking. Much of the work done by its ‘members’ re-interprets these notions, in the same way that much Continental Philosophy started out as treatises on either Husserl or Heidegger. Before moving on to examine other Kyoto school thinkers it is important to compare Heidegger’s work with Nishida himself.

26 Nishida being influenced by Zen Buddhism is ultimately describing a spiritual experience with pure experience and as such some aspects may be too personal to describe in words.
In many ways Nishida and Heidegger were similar people. Both men were born as the turn of century approached (although Nishida was 19 years Heidegger senior) they both lived as mature philosophers in times of great strife in their respective countries. Nishida was born in a time when the restored Emperor Meiji had begun to rule after the fall of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1868. After this there was a period of relative quietude until December 1931 and the infamous ‘Manchuria Incident’. This was followed by the war in the Pacific, and ended of course with Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Heidegger lived through the First World War, the Depression in Germany, and the rise of National Socialism in which Heidegger himself to some degree played a part. Added to this, he witnessed the near destruction of the Nazi regime in Germany during the Second World War. As philosophers within their own countries even their respective status is similar. Both men were seen as philosophers par excellence, and both dealt with the issue of ‘Being’ and ‘Nothingness’. Whilst Nishida was not a phenomenologist or an existentialist both were attempting to ‘renew’ philosophy.

However, on the issue of ‘Being’ and ‘Nothingness’, they are very different philosophers and as Nishida points out this may be one of the defining differences between East and West:

What, then, were the differences in the forms of culture of East and West as seen from a metaphysical perspective? I think we
can distinguish the West to have considered being as the ground of reality, the East to have taken non-being or nothingness as its ground. (Nishida in Dilworth et al, 1998, p. 21)

At first glance, this statement may seem unkind to Heidegger. Remember that Dasein is grounded in groundlessness, in the Abgrund and that this could be interpreted as another way of saying that it is grounded in the Das Nichts, the Nothing. Moreover Heidegger agreed with Hegel in What is Metaphysics? that ‘Being and Nothingness amount to the same thing’. Also Nishida seems to have ignored “…the traditions of “the East” that are not guided by the thought of the Nothing, and to overlook the deep similarities he often finds with the thought of nothingness in the “the West” ‘ (Maraldo, 2003, p.32).

However, we must remember that by Nothingness, Nishida means absolute nothingness and by absolute he means ultimately Buddha. Not only does Heidegger not admit of the absolute he certainly wants the deity or theology to have nothing to do with philosophy, except for his famous call that “Only a God can save us now.” (Wolin, 1993, p.113). In saying this Heidegger is stating a need for the divine, but not a Christian God and it is unclear that Heidegger’s ‘God’ would have anything to do with philosophy.

Heidegger has his reasons for his reaction against a role for God or the absolute in metaphysics and these are most clearly explained in his 1957 lecture
‘The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics’. In this lecture he is asking the question ‘How does the deity enter philosophy?’ thus making philosophy and in particular metaphysics onto-theological in nature. If we can understand the way in which metaphysics came to talk about God, we can go some way in preventing such discourse with the result that metaphysics would be a more open-ended discussion. His reason for wanting to remove reference to God from metaphysics was not rabid atheism, indeed Heidegger was a believer, but rather that in his view the inclusion of God would limit metaphysics as a field of philosophical inquiry. Heidegger makes a three-stage argument for this. Firstly he reminds us that metaphysics is concerned with Being and beings and their grounds “…all metaphysics is a bottom, and from the ground up. What grounds, what gives account of the ground, what is called to account by the ground, and finally what calls the ground to account.” (Heidegger in Caputo, 2002, p.69). His second move is to argue, as he had in Being and Time, that ontology is an attempt to find an answer the question ‘What is Being?’ and to show how Being can act as a ground for beings. He notes “Ontology, however, and theology are “Logies” inasmuch as they provide the ground of beings as such and account for them within the whole. They account for Being as the ground of beings.” (Heidegger in Caputo, 2002, p.69).

We now approach the problem that God or the deity poses for Heidegger’s conception of metaphysics. In the history of Western Metaphysics God has always had the status of Causa Sui. It or the Godhead is its own cause. If God is its own

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cause, then it is the only candidate for Being, for an entity that could act as the ground for all beings. Metaphysics is therefore onto-theological:

Being as the ground, is thought out fully only when the ground is represented as the first ground…The original matter of thinking presents itself as the first cause, the \textit{causa prima} that corresponds to the reason-giving path back to the \textit{ultima ratio}, the final accounting. The Being of beings is represented fundamentally, in the sense of the ground as \textit{causa sui}. This is the metaphysical concept of God. (Heidegger in Caputo, 2002, p. 69)

With the inclusion of God the question of what acts as the ground of beings as whole, has been answered, before metaphysics has begun, the answer will always be God: God must be the Being of all beings. And the idea of being whose nature is \textit{casua sui} feeds into modernity with the idea of the subject, with ‘I think’ being its own grounds for its existence, it exists in and of itself, dependent on no other Being for its self-actualisation. We, as ‘Metaphysicians’ should give up the idea of giving an account of God, or indeed what God is not, we should abandon such ‘talk’ of God within metaphysics:

The ground itself needs to be properly accounted for by that for which it accounts, that is, by the causation through the supremely original matter - and that is the cause as \textit{casua sui}. This is the right name for the god of philosophy. Man can neither pray nor sacrifice to this god. Before the \textit{causa sui}, man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music and
dance before this god…The god-less thinking which must abandon the god of philosophy, god as casua sui, is thus perhaps closer to the divine God. Here this means only: god-less thinking is more open to Him than the onto-theolo-logic would like to admit. (Heidegger in Caputo, 2002, p.74-75)

The idea of God qua casua sui would prevent the activity of giving grounds, and stop ontology ‘in its tracks’ by taking the place of the Being of beings. The idea of a God, some notion of God not as casua sui and not within metaphysics, is something to which Heidegger is not opposed. In Heidegger’s essay on Nietzsche ‘The Word of Nietzsche: God is Dead’ 28, Heidegger remarks that Nietzsche’s madman, who seeks God in The Gay Science is certainly seeking God despite the nihilism that surrounds him. He simply awaits God’s answer. In short, Heidegger will accept some notion of God but not accept that it has a role to play in metaphysics.

Could Heidegger accept Nishida’s idea of the Deity, qua the absolute nothingness? Heidegger had dismissed the idea of Buddhism as a replacement for God, in his interview in Der Spiegel, (given in 1966 on the understanding that it would be published after his death, which was in 1976). He stated:

It is my conviction that a reversal can be prepared only in the same place in the world in which the modern technical work originated, and that it cannot happen because of any takeover by

Zen Buddhism or any other Eastern experiences of the world
(Wolin, 1993, p.113).

Only A God can save us now, for it is God we have lost and Technology has taken its place as the creator of all things. Heidegger believes that we cannot simply replace this with another kind of religious figure such as the Buddha. However, it is curious that according to Reinhard May, Heidegger could be seen with German translations of Daoist and Zen texts. Whatever the truth of the matter, it would appear that Heidegger would not be receptive to intervention from a Zen influenced philosopher such as Nishida Kitarô.

Nishida’s Intervention

In his article ‘Rethinking God: Heidegger in the Light of Absolute Nothing, Nishida in the Shadow of Onto-theology’ 29 John C. Maraldo points out that in “the traditional Buddhism that inspired Nishida, there was no speaking of a God as ground, or God as word from elsewhere; nothing was said of God at all.” (Maraldo, = 2003, p.35).

There is little mention of God in Buddhism; Maraldo explains that Christianity and Western Philosophy, possibly coupled with his interest in Fichte and Hegel, convinced Nishida that one had to explain or account for God. However,

29 For this article see pp31-49 in Jeffrey Bleechl’s (1993) Religious Experience and the end of Metaphysics. Indiana University Press
as Maraldo points out it also convinced Nishida that “…there is no getting around the notion of God if one is to think philosophically. Here he seems to comply with Heidegger’s conviction about the destiny of philosophy as metaphysics.” (Maraldo, 2003, p 35).

However, the fusion of Western Metaphysics and Christianity with Zen Buddhism creates theory, the foundation of which has been explained with his notions of pure experience and jikaku. This introduces a notion of God as “largely unaffected by onto-theological destiny.” (Maraldo, 2003, p 35). The use of God in a ‘Buddhist sense’ does necessarily use notions such as casua sui or highest being. Nishida believed that his notion of “God” is still an underlying subject, just as Heidegger diagnosed the Western conception of God, but it is not a substance, nor should it be understood through the concepts of identity and difference. Rather it is understood as absolute nothingness.

Nishida’s notion of the ground is radically different from Heidegger’s. It is not about giving reasons or accounting for Being, the foundation upon which all rests. Rather the understanding of ground is reversed, it is the place where all is found, and that place is ultimately the Nothing or the emptiness – sunyata to use the Buddhist term. Now one might argue that Heidegger uses a similar notion with the ‘groundless ground’, it has Nothingness as its ground, literally Nothing. But this is to miss the point of sunyata, it is not Nothing qua ground as grounding, that creates or accounts for particular beings, rather it is ‘placemaking’ to use John Maraldo’s term. It is a way of thinking about Nothingness in the sense of finding it a place, a
place where all are. In this way Buddhist thought is similar to the Ancient Greek thought of Heraclitus, All is One, and that One ‘is’ Nothingness. The One does not ground rather it is the Many, the place of all things.

Secondly, the character of absolute nothingness must be made clear. God qua absolute nothingness is not an absolute that stands in opposition to the relative. This would simply make absolute nothingness a “relative absolute”, with the notion of the absolute and relative opposing each other. But how is it possible to get away from such a logic, the logic of either/or. Nishida’s suggested solution is to through the logic of “self-negation”. Again this is an idea that comes from Buddhist texts, in particular the Diamond Sutra with the quote ‘Buddha is not the Buddha and therefore is the Buddha’. As this statement may seem non-sensical it might be illustrated by an example. If one were to ask ‘What is fire?’ we could respond ‘Fire burns’ and that fire burns is something fire does it is burn-ing, that is the essence of its Being, and yet fire cannot burn itself. Therefore Fire only is, only has Being by negating its own nature, its own self, therefore one could argue that ‘fire is fire and at the same time not fire’. It is possible to think of fire as existing and as not existing, as Being and Nothing at the same time, something that is expressed in Japanese through the phrase soku. Soku should as Maraldo points out be understood not merely as “‘co-independence’, ‘relativity of opposites or a ‘transformation of one thing into its opposite’ ”. Soku should be understood as ‘the co-habitation of space’ (Maraldo, 2003, p. 40). It is difficult to explain soku without using metaphors but when it is combined with a negative (hi) it allows that
an entity could be *and not be at the same time*, for example ‘fire is fire and therefore not fire’ or ‘fire soku-hi fire’.

To return to absolute nothingness aimed with this idea, the absolute is not opposed to the relative because of the following logic. The absolute *is* absolute only by having Nothing opposing or standing relative to it. To maintain this, the absolute must become *nothing itself*. It must negate its own being to ‘be’ absolute nothingness. Or in the words of the example given above the absolute is not the absolute therefore is absolute. The Absolute has “being” by being absolute nothingness, it for this reason that Nishida calls absolute nothingness ‘an absolutely self-contradictory self-identity’.

It is therefore clear that this notion of absolute nothingness is distinct from the concepts of both ‘the nothing’ and ‘God’ as they appear in Heidegger’s work. Consequently the accompanying notions of pure experience and *self awareness* are also distinct from any notions Heidegger employs. I will discuss in a later section whether such concepts enable us to offer illuminating alternatives to Heidegger’s concepts of ‘Being’ and ‘World’. But first I will trace the development of these concepts as they appear in other writers of the Kyoto school.
Nishitani Keiji (1900-90)

Nishitani Keiji was born on 27th February 1900 in Ishikawa Prefecture, just like Nishida. He read philosophy under Nishida at Kyoto, writing a thesis on Schelling. He became an adjunct Professor of Philosophy at Otani University in Kyoto in 1928, a position he held until 1935. Philosophy alone never satisfied Nishitani and in 1936 he began to practice Zen Buddhism in Kamakura. In 1937, he received a scholarship from the Ministry of Education to study under Henri Bergson. Bergson’s age meant that Nishitani had to go to Freiburg, where he also met and studied for two years under one Martin Heidegger. Heidegger’s thinking was to have a great influence on Nishitani’s. They later came to share the same philosophical interest – nihilism. He studied Nietzsche with Heidegger and Nishitani himself delivered a talk on Nietzsche and Eckhart. His first major work The Philosophy of Elemental Subjectivity was published in 1940. In December 1946, Nishitani was forced to take a leave of absence for having supported the wartime government – another feature of his biography that, along with nihilism he shares with Heidegger. His book Religion and Nothingness was published in 1956. He retired from academic life in 1963 and died in 1990.

Nishitani’s engagement with Heidegger takes up much of his career. In this chapter I will focus on three stages. Firstly, his early work, The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism (1941/90) where Nishitani is giving a survey of Nihilism that includes Heidegger. Secondly, Religion and Nothingness (1956/83) where Nishitani is

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30 Curiously Nishida, Nishitani & Tosaka of the Kyoto School were all were born or spent their childhoods in Ishikawa, leading to a joke that the Prefecture ‘breeds philosophers’.
laying out his own ideas and these ideas have consequences for Heidegger’s philosophy. Finally there is On Buddhism (2006) which are lectures on Buddhist thought, given in 70’s, where Nishitani also seems to be addressing directly Heidegger’s notion of Conscience, Nothingness and Self.

**Nishitani: Nihilism and the Self**

In his work *The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism*, Nishitani offers a survey and analysis of Nihilism in Western Philosophy from Hegel to Nietzsche, looking at Russian Existentialism, Heidegger and finally Sartre. He makes it clear that nihilism is primarily an existential problem concerning the concept of selfhood: our ‘own’ selves:

[N]ihilism is a problem that transcends time and space and is rooted in the essence of human beings, an existential problem in which the being of the self is revealed to the self itself as something groundless…The phenomenon of nihilism shows that our historical life has lost its ground as objective spirit, that the value system which supports this life has broken down, and that the entirety of social and historical life has loosened itself from its foundations. Nihilism is a sign of the collapse of the social order externally and of spiritual decay internally-as such signifies a time of great upheaval. Viewed in this way, one might say that it is a general phenomenon that occurs from time to time in the course of history. The mood of post-war Japan would be one such instance. (Nishitani, 1990, p. 3)
Just as Heidegger encountered the problem of nihilism after Germany’s defeat during the First World War, similarly Nishitani encounters it in Japan after the Second World War. Both Heidegger and Nishitani saw nihilism as an existential problem and as such, it is not a problem that can be remedied by a social policy since it affects our own selves, what it is to be, to exist. Of course, it is not just something that the Japanese faced after the War, Nishitani refers to the Kamkura period (and does often throughout his works) when paradoxically a rise in Buddhist belief was accompanied by a belief that Buddhist law or dharma would ultimately degenerate and finally end. This was called mappo thinking and it is similar to the Christian idea of the ‘End of Days’: the idea that slowly, belief would disintegrate.

...[N]ihilism is disclosed as a universal phenomenon, appearing, for example, at the end of the ancient period or the medieval period in the West, and in Japan in the mappo thinking of the Kamakura period. (Nishitani, 1990, p.4)

Like Heidegger before him Nishitani has defined the problem of nihilism as an existential and historical problem about the self. Unlike Heidegger, or least to a far greater degree, Nishitani also views the problem of the self as a spiritual one, informed by his Buddhist upbringing. When talking about Nietzsche Nishitani remarks:

The body in Nietzsche is the kind of self that is conceived from the side of an ultimate self-awakening beyond self-consciousness, or what I previously referred to as “Existence.” The affirmation is on the same level as that of a religious
believer who can affirm a God beyond death. (Nishitani, 1990, p.97)

Following Nishida, Nishitani distinguishes between the self that is involved in the mundane world, the self that is conscious and self *qua* self-awakening. Nishitani outlines his own ideas on the self in later works such as *Religion and Nothingness* and lectures such as *On Buddhism.* I will now go on to outline these ideas and compare them to Heidegger’s ideas on the self in *Being and Time.*

**Religion and Nothingness**

In *Religion and Nothingness,* Nishitani is developing the line of thought begun in *The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism,* that nihilism is an existential problem concerning the self. In what way is this case for Nishitani? We concern ourselves with the irrelevant things or necessary worldly tasks that divert our attention away from the threat of nihilism. However, because we have consciousness and self-consciousness we can reflect on our ‘lot in life’ and in so doing we “…discover the threat of nihility underlying all existence.” (Stambaugh, 1999, p.101). This may seem similar to Heidegger’s idea of the authentic resolute self, realising the meaninglessness of existence. But Nishitani goes further than Heidegger. He wishes to overcome consciousness and self-consciousness, to decentre or make inapplicable to any conceptualisation of ‘man’ but unlike Heidegger Nishitani’s aim is to do this by becoming nihility itself:
Consciousness is the field of relationships between those entities characterized as self and things. That is, it is the field of beings at which the nihility that lies beneath the ground of being remains covered over. At this level, even the self in its very subjectivity is only represented self-consciousness as self. It is put through a kind of objectivization so as to be grasped as being. Only when the self breaks through the field of consciousness, the field of beings, and stands on the grounds of nihility is it able to achieve a subjectivity that can no way be objectivised. (Nishitani, 1956/83, p.16 my underscore)

The first part of the above quotation, the underscored part is Heidegger’s diagnosis of philosophy. If we understand the self and others, including things as beings, then all we can do is represent them as beings, and such a representing will distort how the entities really appear. Heidegger goes on to investigate the question of Being. Nishitani on the other hand investigates nihility itself. For Nishitani, investigating the question of Being will only reveal more distortions and representations because Heidegger’s inquiry is an inquiry into Being grounded on presence. Like others that were to follow him, for example Derrida, Nishitani wonders what has happened to absence. For Nishitani, if we are to achieve a satisfactory notion of subjectivity we must overcome nihility.

Nishitani believes that Heidegger’s notion of ‘Nothingness’ has the characteristic of being a thing, and therefore it is not ‘Nothingness proper’. Nishitani feels that accounts of the self carried out by Nietzsche and Heidegger leave us facing the problem of nihility, that nothing matters to us. The task remains,
to subject nihilism itself to such an interrogation. Here Nishitani offers us a different account of ‘Nothingness’. It is not like Heidegger’s ‘Nothingness’ encountered through an experience of Anxiety. Such a ‘Nothingness’ is not really Nothingness at all, because it is grounded in nihilism through Anxiety. It is what Nishitani Keiji calls ‘relative nothingness’ or ‘relative emptiness’ it is relative to nihilism that is itself grounded in Anxiety. As Nishitani states in *Religion and Nothingness*:

[N]ihility is still being viewed here from the basis of self-existence as the groundlessness (*Grundlosigkeit*) of existence lying outside of existence. This means that lying outside the “existence” of the self, and therefore also as something more than that “existence,” or distinct from it. We find this, for example, even in Heidegger’s talk of self-existence as “held suspended in nothingness,” despite the fundamental difference of his standpoint from other brands of contemporary existentialism or nihilism. The very fact that he speaks of the “abyss” or nihility already tells us as much. In Heidegger’s case traces of the representation of nothingness as some “thing” that is nothingness still remain. (Nishitani, 1956/83, p.96)

Nothingness grounded in nihilism is not ‘nothingness’ at all. Nothingness for Nishitani must be just that, grounded in absolutely nothing, not even a ‘groundless ground’, ground, even a groundless one is still a foundation. Like Nishida, Nishitani espouses absolute nothingness or emptiness coined from the Buddhist term *sunyata*:

…sunyata represents the endpoint of an orientation to negation.

It can be termed *absolute negativity*, in as much as it is a
standpoint that has negated and thereby transcended nihility, which was itself the transcendence-through negation of all being. It can also be termed an absolute transcendence of being, as it absolutely denies and distances itself from any standpoint shackled in any way whatsoever to being. In this sense, emptiness can well be described as “outside” of and “absolutely other” than the standpoint shackled to being, provided we avoid the misconception that emptiness is some “thing” distinct from being and subsisting “outside” of it. (Nishitani, 1956/83, p.97)

absolute nothingness or Emptiness does not go through a stage of nihility to reveal nothingness, absolute nothingness is just that, it cannot be reached by some intermediary stage or it would not absolute nothingness, but relative nothingness.

Nihility has a particular meaning here it is the:

…nullification of self by the nullification of the ground it has to stand on. It is not that the self is annihilated out of existence, but that all certitude is completely absorbed in doubt, and that this doubt becomes more real than the self or the world it belongs to. It is a Great Doubt. (Heisig, 2001, p.220)

Unlike Descartes, we should not look upon this Great Doubt as a method more as a way of being. Nishitani tells us it is not a ‘state of consciousness’ but rather doubt ‘presents itself as a reality’ and ‘in its presence the self becomes Doubt itself’. I become the doubt, and then there comes third and final stage. This stage may never
come to some, but may to others. Nihility is itself nullified, but as James Heisig reminds us - not annihilated:

…but transcended through its negation-in the awareness that the world of being rests on the nihility of the self and all things is only a relative manifestation of nothingness as it is encountered in reality. Beneath that world, all around, there is an encompassing absolute nothingness that is reality. Nihility is emptied out, as it were, into an absolute emptiness, or what Buddhism calls sunyata. (Heisig, 2001, p.220-1)

Thus for Nishitani, absolute emptiness/nothingness or sunyata is simply different in character to Heidegger’s Nothingness in Being and Time. Firstly, it is not revealed in the same way or for the same reasons; sunyata is not something we experience as a result of Anxiety, but rather it is a process of alleviating Anxiety or Doubt. It is not negativity as it is for Heidegger it is a relief to ‘find’ sunyata, because it does not bring Anxiety with it as one is staring into the abyss. Sunyata is transcendent. Because the experience is spiritual, it is not there for me in the same way as one might experience the abyss, or as Nishitani puts it “It is not something “out there” in front of us” (Nishitani, 1983, p 97) I am simply aware of sunyata and sunyata whilst transcendent, is “co-present” with being and “structurally inseparable” from it. In short, for Nishitani, Being and Nothingness are the same.
The Later Nishitani on Heidegger

I will now go on to outline Nishitani’s later views on conscience, which were partly a critique of Heidegger’s notion of conscience in *Being and Time*. Unlike Heidegger, Nishitani believes that conscience is a phenomenon reliant on self-awareness and self-consciousness such that if a human being did not have self-consciousness or self-awareness it could not hear the ‘call of conscience’. For Nishitani ‘the call of conscience’ can only be ‘heard’ if there is a community and this is also true for Heidegger. But unlike Heidegger, Nishitani has a much ‘thicker’ notion of community in mind, not an impersonal ‘One’, but a community where every self is interconnected to every other human being.

Nishitani on Conscience

In his work *On Buddhism* (2006), Nishitani discusses the idea of conscience and its role as a Buddhists Ethics for modernity. His account is Heideggerian to an extent, in that he emphasises that conscience is a relation to oneself (or indeed the one-self), the self that I am. Secondly it is a relation to other things and thirdly to other people, again as an egoless ‘I’ both in the metaphysical and in the social sense - ‘I’ am not more important than another. The relation with others and other things is less emphasised in Heidegger, although it is there to some extent. However it is the fourth characteristic that represents a complete departure,

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at least from the Heidegger of *Being and Time*: Conscience opens up a field where the absolute, that is God or Buddha can be received. It is the absolute in which conscience itself is grounded, in absolute nothingness or emptiness.

Like Heidegger, Nishitani provides an etymological analysis of the word ‘conscience’, with interesting results, for conscience or *ryoshin* in the romaji means ‘good mind’ and as such is related to the concept of consciousness. For Nishitani then, conscience requires some kind of self-awareness. Of course self-awareness is a notion that Heidegger has no time for, but I want to suggest it is one that he needs.

**Conscience and Self-Consciousness**

I will deal with Nishitani’s second characteristic of conscience first: his claim that conscience is a relation to things and people. Whilst not explicitly stated by Heidegger I believe this to be unproblematic. We say ‘He is a conscientious student’, or feel that our conscience ‘pricks us’, or that a particular action was done ‘in all good conscience’; these are statements about particular persons. A person might feel bad because they have not done enough work or not feel they have helped a friend to the best of their abilities, and this is a matter for their conscience. However, the first characteristic – the relationship with oneself – is more problematic. Whilst Heidegger sees the ‘call’ of conscience as answered by the ‘caller’, arguably he does not elaborate sufficiently on how the relationship between called and caller - that is *Dasein* as ourselves – is to be understood in both cases. Is
conscience one’s ‘inner voice’, or ‘Kantian duty’, and if it is neither of these, how is conscience to be understood in Heidegger? Or rather, how are we to understand that caller/called relationship? Nishitani offers some elaboration on Heidegger’s account:

“Con” indicates a gathering of all things together, and the original meaning of “science” is “knowledge.” “Con” has to do with that which is all-inclusive, which consists not so much in all things collected one by one as in the whole that is given birth when these things are brought together. Thus, the “con” gives expression to the whole as such. It is because of the fact that all things are united at their basis and thus constitute the whole that the collecting of them one by one is rendered possible. (Nishitani, 2006, p.137)

Nishitani reminds us that the English word ‘con’ used to mean ‘with’, so the prefix ‘con’ necessarily refers to the idea of the whole, of two or more entities being brought together, ‘being-with’ in Heideggerian terms. We are related through conscience to other people and things, ourselves and the absolute. How we are related to these entities, is where the ‘science’ part of ‘conscience’ comes into play. Nishitani has already reminded us that ‘science’ originally meant ‘knowledge’, although we should not understand ‘science’ here in a ‘scientific’ manner, to do with ‘the sciences’, it merely refers to one’s ability to know and to knowledge itself:

As I mentioned, “science” is concerned with “knowledge” and the means “to know”. At the background of knowledge thus established lies the fact that the self knows itself when it returns
to itself. When it is said that we feel relieved, and settle down to ourselves, this means we have returned to ourselves. And this involves within itself a kind of self-knowledge through which the self knows what it is really like. This self-knowledge exists at the very bottom of every individual. Such knowledge involves self-consciousness within itself. In this case, reference is made to self-consciousness. The word “conscious” is related to “conscience,” and includes, after all an implication of knowing (Nishitani, 2006, p.137-8).

Nishitani views conscience as necessarily a relation of knowledge with and of oneself and others and as such it is not enough to simply consider the call and the called as being oneself, as Heidegger does. It is not enough for the call to come to me and alert me to the possibility of realising my guilt. A person becomes aware of their guilt by viewing what they have done against the reactions other people, and whilst Heidegger does have a notion of a community, it is not one made up of many singular selves, rather it is mass. Nishitani believes, in a similar logic to Sartre that guilt can only be recognised by seeing oneself through the eyes of an actual or possible singular other, and to do that we require self-consciousness the ability to reflect on ourselves.

What, then is self-consciousness for Nishitani? “It is not what could be called a ‘Cartesian’ model of self-consciousness where we contemplate our selves, or strongly adheres to his or her self-consciousness.” (Nishitani, 2006, p.138). Knowledge of oneself - that is self-consciousness, is cultivated through a public activity through which we are related both to the act and to others. A painter may
paint a picture, whether it is a landscape or portrait, and through the act of painting comes to know him/herself better, as a painter. But what the painter has created is also public; it can be viewed by others and becomes identified with him/her. Hence we speak of ‘Picasso’s Guernica’ or ‘Bacon’s Screaming Popes’ the painter is in the art, and is not just the producer of it.

Nishitani is proposing an account of self-consciousness that is not self-centred or egoistic, as it always points to an other as a necessary feature if one is achieve this self-knowledge. But this other is not separate nor separable from the self that cultivates self-knowledge, there is not a self/other distinction, rather self and other are mutually dependent and inseparable, what the Japanese called \textit{jitafuni}.$^{32}$

\textbf{Self-Consciousness to Self-Awareness}

However, for Nishitani, the notion of self-consciousness outlined above is not quite sufficient to secure selfhood. Despite its emphasis on publicness and activity Nishitani feels that there is still a danger of it leading to a concept of self understood egoistically, the self as simply ‘that which I am’:

\begin{quote}
[self-awareness] is concerned with problem of how the self truly comes to know itself. By contrast, since everyone in ordinary self-consciousness becomes conscious of his or her own self, the
\end{quote}

$^{32}$ If Nishitani’s account of self-consciousness seems to use Heideggerian model to demonstrate his point (Nishitani’s own example was actually that of a carpenter not a painter, it is because he studied with Heidegger in Germany between 1937-9.
question of how the self comes to know itself does not really arise here. In the worst case, a strongly egoistic tendency surfaces. Therefore, the standpoint of self-consciousness is rather a standpoint in which the self is captured for itself. And concerning this, I have the impression that here the self confines itself within a narrow prison. But this is not a basic feature of the existence of the self. (Nishitani. 2006, p.139-40)

One could, like the painter, immerse oneself an activity so that one becomes aware of one’s ‘painterhood’, that one is a painter and can be identified as a painter is through showing one’s work. However, none of this tells us how the question of the self arises in the first place, not ‘how do I become a self’ but how does selfhood come to be at all. For Nishitani, the question of how I or we become a self or how we come to possess an ego must be answered non-egoistically. Put more simply, what is the basis of the self, how does one achieve selfhood as an individual or how does one become an individual?

The idea of self-awareness partly refers back to the Kyoto schools ‘founder’ Nishida Kitarô with his notion of Pure Experience; Nishida first expounds this in his maiden work Inquiry into the Good, outlined earlier in this chapter. But to reiterate, once we understand jikaku as self-awakening, as self-constitution we can see what the painter might not achieve from what Nishitani calls ‘the standpoint of self-consciousness’. The painter, whilst they might realise they are a painter, would not realise how being a painter became possible for them at all. How did they come to see themselves as painters who produced ‘their art’? This is what they learn from the ‘standpoint of self-awareness’, how selfhood was possible at all, but this
selfhood is not *qua* painter. Hence for Nishitani one’s existence as a self is established at the same time as self-knowledge (Nishitani, 2006, p.146). The self’s existence and knowledge must be constituted in such a way that “…once the self truly comes to know itself, it is not because it becomes conscious of itself ambiguously, but rather that it becomes *awakened* to its real features, saying, “This is ‘I’” (Nishitani, 2006, p.146 *my italics*).

For Nishitani, if one were merely conscious of oneself, it would be a second rate kind of knowledge, possibly treating the self as an object, which raises the concerns outlined above. Also “there is no difference between being and knowledge.” (Nishitani, 2006, p.145) for Nishitani since ‘self-awakening’ would be impossible if they separated, one might have to rely on the standpoint of consciousness. However, it is not only concerns regarding selfhood that Nishitani has in mind with the idea of self-awareness, but also concerns regarding conscience. Conscience as self-knowledge, requires one to ‘know thyself’, for the self to be related to itself. If the self were separated from knowledge, one would have to rely on the standpoint of self-consciousness, look for some ‘objective facts’ on which to base our knowledge. We determine through an act of conscious reasoning that ‘I am a human being’. Through using ‘objective facts’, through objectifying, we re-introduce the subject/object dichotomy that the standpoint of self-awareness was to help us avoid, we fall back on egocentric knowledge (Nishitani, 2006, p.147). Once introduced, the subject/object dichotomy allows us to reason, to use an example from history of which Nishitani was a part ‘I am Japanese, they are not, therefore I oppose them’.
Nishitani on Heidegger and Conscience

One can use Nishitani to draw out a challenge to Heidegger. Recall that to hear the call of conscience, Dasein must first be ‘individualised’ by Anxiety. Why, Nishitani might challenge, in order for conscience to be an issue for us, must it first be individualised? For Nishitani, this claim for individualisation would seem to move towards an egoistic account of subjectivity, with its emphasis on being. It is the individual Dasein and not Dasein in general that hears the voice of conscience and whilst that individualised Dasein could be a person, a society or whole planet, it nonetheless invites an I/Other dichotomy. It makes thoughts like ‘I am a solider, they are the enemy’ possible, and despite its benevolent intention ‘I must help them for they are in danger’, it invites a dualism between self and other. Secondly, why is Dasein individualised, made almost solitary at the very time when it ought to remember its nature as Being-with or jitafuni, that it is connected to all people and all things, and not just a solitary individual facing the abyss and their own conscience? Conscience is rarely solitary, we feel we have done wrong to someone, or had wrong done to us, by its very nature conscience involves at least two.

Nishitani’s account of conscience shows up deficiencies in Heidegger’s account since it lacks not only a sense of positive connectedness to others, for example that ‘I’ am part of ‘whole,’ but it is also disassociated from those Others and from itself qua self. It is not connected to others until it is made ‘resolute’.
This resoluteness can only be achieved through self-consciousness; this is something that Heidegger wishes to avoid. Resoluteness or self-knowledge is simply not something one can come to completely alone, it is can only be achieved by a person endowed with self-consciousness, it must be done amongst singular not general others whom we are intimately connected to and Being-with simply does not offer such interconnectedness.

**Heidegger’s Response to the Kyoto School**

It is difficult to imagine Heidegger’s response to Nishida and Nishitani, whether he actually would feel the need to disagree with them or whether he would accept what they say. The *Der Speigel* article with its anti-Eastern stance seems to suggest that Heidegger would resist Nishida and Nishitani, even if he accepted some of their premises and arguments. However in *What is Metaphysics?* Heidegger states “Pure Being and Pure Nothing are therefore the same This proposition of Hegel’s (*Science of Logic*, vol I, *Werke* III, 74) is correct.” (BW,p.108).

This seems promising, for in this statement Heidegger is agreeing with the *essence* of the idea behind all Kyoto School thinking, that Being and Nothingness are the same, that one implies the other. However, Heidegger quickly follows this statement with:
Being and nothing do belong together, not because both – from the point of view of the Hegelian concept of thought – agree in their determinateness and immediacy, but rather because Being itself is essentially finite and reveals itself only in the transcendence of Dasein which is held out into the nothing. (BW, p.108)

Heidegger views Nothing as that which “…is manifest in the ground of Dasein…” (BW, p.108). *Dasein* is Being-in-the-world whose essence is Nothingness revealed through Anxiety. This is very different from the idea of Nothingness or indeed Being put forward by Nishida and Nishitani which is *anything but worldly*. For Heidegger, Being-in-the-world or Worldhood, is *Dasein*’s fundamental state, and it is through investigating this worldly entity that the truth about Being will be revealed to us. However for Nishida and Nishitani Being-in-the-World is where the investigation begins not ends. For Kyoto School thinkers the truth about Being, Nothingness and the Self will be revealed once we have overcome the world.

This is the fundamental difference between Heidegger and the Kyoto School, and the difference is essentially one of the phenomenological beginnings of the investigation. For Heidegger it starts with the *Dasein* as Being-in-the-world and analyses *Dasein*’s *lived experiences* of Being-in-the-world. Such an analysis would reveal the Being or essence of the world and of *Dasein* subsequently this would lead us to the meaning of Being itself.
However, for Nishida and Nishitani, the investigation begins with world but this is in order to overcome it, to arrive at pure experience. It is with pure experience that the meaning of Being, Nothingness and our self is revealed. It is not that our ‘worldly’ self is of no consequence, after all, a Buddhist has to eat, sleep and work, it is simply that, contra Heidegger these worldly activities ultimately will not reveal the fundamental truth about ourselves, the fundamental ontology as Heidegger would phrase it.

Heidegger’s and The Kyoto School’s ‘Self’

The Kyoto School offers an interesting and useful corrective to Heidegger’s existential phenomenology. Firstly, with the notion of pure experience it offers an idea of a relation to the world that does not rely on the concept of intentionality or the idea of the ‘towards-which’. It is rather that the world of pure experience is the ground or conditions for intentionality since it is a world prior to conceptualisation before ‘the world’ is divided into objects and subjects; yet there is still some kind phenomenal experience, experienced by a singular self. Heidegger whilst he does refer at times to the ‘primordial’ simply would not admit such a description of the self in his phenomenology. It allows us to talk about highly subjective experiences something Heidegger seems unwilling to do.

Secondly, Nishida and Nishitani show Heidegger’s preoccupation with Being, or presence to have negatively influenced his view of Nothingness. Both
Heidegger and the Kyoto School are concerned about the problem of nihility, but for Heidegger, at least in *Being and Time*, it seems to be a obstacle to be overcome in the experience nothingness: an experience that reveals the self to the world in a moment of Angst. However, for Nishitani, any inquiry into Being will be blighted by the fact that the problem of nihility had not been dealt with properly. This failure to do so affects Heidegger’s account of nothingness and conscience. In Nishitani’s opinion Heidegger views nothingness as an encounter with a *thing*, as if nothingness were an abyss that was ‘out there’ ready to swallow Being up in the experience of Anxiety. If Heidegger had viewed nothingness not as something experienced by *Dasein* through Anxiety, but as something that transcended anxiety and nihility then he would have a more coherent picture of Nothingness. Nothingness stands alongside Being, and it is still an experience that is available for the individual self, just not one that is revealed though Anxiety. The opening of the self to conscience would not then begin with terror but would be welcomed. It would be ‘welcomed’ because Nothingness is not experienced in isolation from Being, it is experienced in the presence of others. They may not be experiencing with you but it is an experience within a community of other beings. Heidegger’s account isolates *Dasein*. In Nishitani’s view this leads to a highly mistaken picture of conscience because for Nishitani one can only recognise one’s guilt through particular others, through their actual or imagined responses. And an account of conscience, one that recognises that as ‘conscientious’ beings, and as such conscious of others, aware of our self as connected to others, is required for an adequate concept of self-consciousness.
Conclusion

Whilst giving a very radically different account of selfhood, admittedly one that requires an acceptance of a religious ontology, the idea of pure experience and self-awakening advanced by the Kyoto School thinkers presents a challenge to Heidegger’s idea that Dasein as Being-in-the-world is fundamental. In the next chapter I will attempt to elaborate on this challenge by incorporating these ideas into a phenomenology of self-experience.
Chapter Six: Towards a Phenomenology of Self-Experience

Introductory Remarks

In the sixth and final chapter of my thesis, I shall attempt to conclude the critique of Heidegger developed in the fourth and fifth chapters and I will offer a tentative alternative critique. In chapter five, I used Japanese philosophy of the Kyoto School to argue that Dasein as being-in-the-world is not the fundamental experience of the world, that there is a condition of existence more fundamental than this and that is pure experience. Dasein, because of its worldliness, does not capture the subjective character of existence and could never do so, as Dasein only appears with the world: the world of things. The idea of a more fundamental experience, something prior to intentionality itself, something that would capture the subjective character of existence is not a possibility for Heidegger, except as the indescribable primordial. Through Zen influenced philosophy, Nishida and Nishitani allow one to conceive of experience, as immediate experience of a ‘non-object.’ The Japanese novelist Yukio Mishima puts this so well when he states, “If only one can direct the eye of self-awareness so intently towards the interior and the self that self-awareness forgets the outer forms of existence, then one can ‘exist’ as the ‘I’ in Amiel’s Diary.” (Mishima in Lingis, 1994, p.78).

In this chapter, I will put the lessons of the Kyoto School to use in an attempt to describe self-experience, with its subjective character, that which is
‘forgotten’ by Dasein. I will be using the ideas of pure experience and jikaku in order to develop a phenomenology of self-experience. Nishida and Nishitani are not phenomenologists in the ‘German’ or ‘French’ sense of the term. However I wish to explore the idea of a phenomenology that includes the idea of pure experience, as I believe only this idea, or something similar can capture the subjective character of experience. I will also be using the ideas of two phenomenological thinkers, Emmanuel Levinas and Michel Henry, and the ideas of the Kyoto School thinkers in order to develop the beginnings of a phenomenology of self-experience. In this chapter I will give an exegesis of each phenomenology and I will then apply these ideas to my own critique.

**Three Phenomenologies**

As briefly stated above, a phenomenology of self-experience is needed to anchor notions such as self-consciousness, self-awareness, and conscience because these are certain kinds of self-experience which are so personal, so subjective, that neither ego-based subjectivity nor Dasein is capable of capturing them. Such a phenomenology aims to capture a more fundamental experience, one that could not be said to have been experienced by ‘I’ qua Ego, but which certainly involves ‘me’. Such a phenomenology would not deny the existence of the world, but, in a move similar to Husserl, the question of the world (though not the world itself), what it is and how I relate to it, must itself be suspended. To aid the development of such a phenomenology I will start by looking at the work of Emmanuel Levinas and
Michel Henry. The third phenomenology will be my own. I have chosen the work of Levinas and Henry because both place great emphasis on ipseity and affectivity in their phenomenological accounts and they also pay attention to the notion of ‘life’. These ideas will play an important role in the third phenomenology. I shall begin by looking at the work of Levinas.

**Levinas: Ipseity, Wakefulness & Affectivity**

Emmaunel Levinas (1906-1995) was born in Lithuania and studied phenomenology with Husserl and Heidegger. He is largely responsible for bringing phenomenology to France with his work, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s phenomenology*. This work offered a whole new way of reading the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger. I will be looking at his work on the nature of first-personal experience or ipseity. For Levinas, Ipseity has two essential characteristics, wakefulness and affectivity, and these give rise (one could say ‘birth’) to a third: ‘life’. I shall discuss wakefulness first.

**Ipseity as Wakefulness**

In an article discussing Husserl’s phenomenology called ‘From Consciousness to Wakefulness’ (1974), Levinas states the following:
The apodicticity of the *Cogito-Sum* rests on the infinity of the “iteration”. The apodictically indubitable comes from no new trait of evidence that would ensure it a better openness upon being or a better approach. It is due only to the deepening evidence, to a change of level, where, from the evidence that illuminates it, the subject awakens as if from a “dogmatic slumber.” In the “living presence of the Ego to itself,” does not the adjective “living” designate that wakefulness that is possible only as an incessant awakening? (Levinas, 1998, p.159-160)

Whilst discussing Husserl’s *Cartesian Meditations*, Levinas has introduced a notion not dissimilar from Nishitani’s ‘Great Doubt’. Husserl is endorsing an ego based subject, but both are in different ways a radicalisation of the *cogito sum*. Such a radicalisation appears here with the idea that the ‘apodicticity of the *Cogito-Sum* rests on the infinity of the “iteration” ’. In other words, if a living human being is to be constituted, the *cogito sum* must be perpetually recited and each recitation constitutes or ‘awakens’ the subject again and anew. Levinas goes on to argue that this notion of *wakefulness* also indicates a notion of ‘life’ in Husserlian Phenomenology, a notion of ‘life’ as subjectivity which would be understood in phenomenological terms through the concept of experience or *Erlebnis*, and not through the idea of intentionality, or the ecstasy of being-in-the-world, nor as self-consciousness. Rather, *wakefulness* presents ‘life’ as a ‘living presence’ to the self, a presence which *awakens* or constitutes the living self as a transcendent in immanence:
Does not the adjective “living” express the apodicticity of the subjective, which is not only a degree of certainty but the ‘Life’ mode - the *liveliness* of ‘Life’? Does not the adjective reveal the importance, from the beginning of the Husserlian discourse, of the word “Erlebnis,” which designates the subjectivity of the subjective? The lived, and ‘Life’, would thus be described by the ecstasis of intentionality, not by the *outside-one-self* of being in the world, nor even as...in the passive synthesis of time, into a “presence to self”, a perfect knowledge of self-consciousness, a perfect immanence. Presence to self, as a living presence to self in its very innocence, casts its center of gravity outside: always presence of the self to self *awakens* from its identity as a state and presents itself to an ego, that is “transcendent in immanence”. (Levinas, 1998, p.160)

Whilst I would want to reject the suggestion that living presence has nothing to do with self-consciousness, I do embrace Levinas’ ideas of *wakefulness* inasmuch as it similar to the Japanese notion of *jikaku*. Just as for Nishida, the self is constituted by ‘self-awakening’ a primordial experience of the world, the self for Levinas is originally and continuously (re)constituted as a self, as ‘I am,’ the repetition of the *cogito sum*. I will now outline the second characteristic of ipseity for Levinas, *affectivity*.

**Affectivity in Totality and Infinity: Enjoyment**

Emmanuel Levinas appears to see ipseity as grounded in affectivity, it is affectivity understood as pleasure or ‘enjoyment’. In *Totality and Infinity: An Essay*
on Exteriority (1961/69) the account of ipseity given by Levinas seems to be a philosophical doppelganger to Henry, even the title of the section where he writes about ipseity is similar “Affectivity as the Ipseity of the I”\textsuperscript{33}. In this account Levinas sees affectivity \textit{qua} enjoyment as being the essence of the I, and affectivity immanent to the I, although it gestures towards an ultimately unknowable and transcendent exterior. Levinas characterises the essence of affectivity as ‘enjoyment’. Enjoyment is how the self relates to itself, not through representing enjoyment to the self or through ‘reason’ as found in a Kantian account, nor through intentionality \textit{per se}. It is more fundamental than just a pre-reflective awareness of oneself, negotiating the world. Indeed at one point Levinas calls enjoyment a “…withdrawal into oneself.” (Levinas, 1961/69, p.118). Because it is characterised by enjoyment and not by practical or pure reason, or even intentionality, the I is beyond being, it is simply enjoyment: Or as Levinas states:

Enjoyment is a withdrawal into oneself, an involution. What is termed an affective state does not have the dull monotony of a state, but is a vibrant exaltation in which draws the self. For the I is not the \textit{support} of enjoyment. The “intentional” structure is here wholly different…To be I is to exist in such a way as to already be beyond being, in happiness. For the I to be means neither to oppose nor to represent something to itself, nor to use something, nor to aspire to something, but to enjoy something. (Levinas, 1961/69, p.118 & 120)

Enjoyment is the essence of the self but not because it is something we do in an instrumental sense, such as we ‘enjoy work’; neither is it a ‘state of being’. In fact it constitutes the ‘I’ as beyond being, for enjoyment has nothing to do with being. Enjoyment is the essence of the ‘I’ where enjoyment and therefore the ‘I’ exists for itself, for its own enjoyment, although as always with Levinas, the I faces the (im) possibility of an encounter with the transcendent Other.

Whilst Levinas says much about ipseity in *Totality and Infinity*, some themes, namely those concerning the passivity of experience and radical alterity are perhaps best brought out in a later piece of work, *Useless Suffering*. Arguably passivity is the key theme in the account given by Levinas. Despite its passivity, or rather because of it, suffering is not reducible to an object’s presence-at-hand. Nor is pain or suffering a thing upon which we can act, there is nothing one can do with pain. Pain can merely be experienced and endured through consciousness. Thus pain is not “the performance of an act of consciousness” but rather “…in its adversity, a submission; even a submission to submitting, since the ‘content’ of which the aching consciousness is conscious is precisely the very adversity of suffering, its hurt.” (Levinas in Bernasconi & Wood, 1988, p.157).

All we can do is *feel it*. The problem with pain is that because of what pain is - hurt, it cannot be an object of knowledge, and therefore useful; one can be pre-reflectively conscious of it, one can be aware of the hurt, but one certainly cannot, to use Kantian language, as Levinas does, synthesise it into knowledge. One cannot allow pain into one’s conceptual apparatus because the very nature of the sensation
- the painfulness of pain- makes such an act impossible. Pain is not an act of consciousness because as suffering it makes conscious acts impossible.

The sufferer is passive, and yet this passivity Levinas passionately impresses on us, is not because suffering has struck “…a blow against freedom”. (Levinas in Bernasconi & Wood, 1988, p.157). Rather suffering is an:

...evil which renders the humanity of the suffering person, overwhelms his humanity otherwise than non-freedom overwhelms it: violently and cruelly, more irremissibly than the negation which dominates or paralyzes the act in non-freedom. (Levinas in Bernasconi & Wood, 1988, p.157)

All of which sounds very depressing. However there is some optimism in Levinas’ ideas. Suffering, despite its violence to one’s consciousness, brings a possibility of salvation of a sort. As noted by Paul Gilbert and Kathleen Lennon, what pain locates is:34

…an experience of something other, of alterity, but also what he takes to be our basic relation to things, jouissance - enjoyment. It is here that he departs most fundamentally from Heidegger. (Gilbert & Lennon, 2005, p.40)

The issue of enjoyment is one I shall address later. I now wish to look at Levinas’ insistence on exteriority, his insistence that suffering opens up the possibility of

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something Other, something beyond ‘I’: an Other that may provide relief. Also, one must recall that for Levinas suffering itself is never fully grasppable by consciousness, it is “unassumable”. Certainly it is experienced by me, but it is not quite grasppable by me:

Is not the evil of suffering - extreme passivity, impotence, abandonment and solitude - also the unassumable and thus the possibility of a half opening, and more precisely, the possibility that wherever a moan, a cry, a groan, or a sigh happen there is an original call for the aid, for curative help from the other whose alterity, whose exteriority promises salvation? (Levinas in Bernasconi & Wood, 1988, p.158)

Thus, for Levinas suffering is a passive, self-experience which gestures towards an exterior, an exterior which promises salvation – an end to pain and the promise of possible pleasure. Whilst the suffering may also manifest itself physically, it is the interior that concerns them, the ‘mental’ torment.

What interests me about Levinas’ account of affectivity, as the essence of ipseity, is that ipseity’s essence is shown to be a phenomenal experience, but also an originary experience in the sense that it constitutes the self as a self. In this way his account is similar to that of the Kyoto School with their idea of self-awakening.

I shall go on to demonstrate that a similar account can be found in the work of Michel Henry. In order to understand Henry, it is worth outlining the kind of account he is trying to oppose, and for this I turn to Sartre. I do so because Sartre’s
philosophy shows in a sharper and clearer manner the aspect of Heidegger’s phenomenology that Henry rejects: the facticity/transcendence dualism.

**Sartre and Pure self-presence**

Of course, Sartre is opposed to the idea that self-awareness is some kind of pure presence. Rather he defends the view that:

…self-awareness and self-transcendence are interdependent. In his view, subjectivity is characterized by a pre-reflective self-awareness of not being the object, of which it at the same time is intentionally conscious. (Zahavi in Gron, Damgaard & Overgaard, 2007, p.134)

In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre begins by arguing that the very notion of presence involves some kind of division, and this is no less true of self-presence, where there is a division within the subject itself:

Concretely, each *for-itself* is a lack of a certain coincidence with itself. This means that it is haunted by the presence of that with which it should coincide in order to be *itself*. But as the coincidence in Self is always coincidence with Self the being which the For-itself lacks, the being which would make the For-itself a Self by assimilation with it-this being is still the For-itself...What must be noted here is that the For-itself is separated from the Presence-to-itself by Nothing and in another sense by the totality of the existent in the world, inasmuch as the
For itself, lacking or possible, is For-itself as a *presence* to a certain state of the world. (Sartre, 1943/2003, p.125-126)

What Sartre is saying here, is that human subjectivity is not a whole, present to itself, and can never be so. For Sartre our notion of human subjectivity is constituted by a division between what we are, our facticity on the one hand and on the other hand, our transcendence, our possibilities or what we can become. As human subjects we will *always* lack the latter (until we die) since there will always be more possibilities; hence, for Sartre the human subject can never achieve self-presence.

For Henry, the separation within this duality between facticity/transcendence is pernicious. He will not accept a bifurcated subject because for him the subject must be absolute. However, for Sartre the human subject is self-aware because of its facticity, but this self-awareness cannot be viewed in terms of self-identity, because to be self-aware is an attempt at transcendence towards future possibilities, through intentionality. Hence there is *always* a division between self-awareness and self-identity, a ‘fissure’ within consciousness.

**Henry, Pure Immanence & Ipseity**

Henry accepts no fissure, fracture, separation, division or self-alienation within the subject. Nothing but absolute subjectivity where the self *completely*
coincides with itself will do. Henry’s motivation behind such a radical conception of the subject is, of course, to combat ontological monism, the idea that the ‘phenomenon’ of phenomenology, in order to ‘show itself’ must be an object, exterior, ecstatic, in anyway worldly. This insistence on the ontological priority of the world has left self-consciousness or self-awareness to be achieved through reflection, introspection, or at best pre-reflective experience. But all involve some kind of separation within the subject, which Henry wishes to avoid. For Henry “the self-manifestation of the subject is an immediate, non-objectifying and passive occurrence and is best described as a self-affection.” (Zahavi in Gron, Damgaard & Overgaard, 2007, p.137).

Absolute subjectivity is immanent to itself, and (with some similarity to Levinas) the essence of its ipseity is affectivity. Whereas Levinas, in Totality and Infinity, bases his ipseity on enjoyment, and makes references to suffering in ‘Useless Suffering’, Henry grounds the essence of ipseity in affectivity, and in Suffering. Henry begins to describe his account in The Essence of Manifestation (1973):

Affectivity reveals the absolute in its totality because it is nothing other than its perfect adherence to the self, nothing other than its coincidence with self, because it is the auto-affection of Being in the absolute unity of its radical immanence. In absolute unity of its radical immanence, Being affects itself and experiences itself in such a way that there is nothing in it which does not affect it and which is no experienced by it, no content
For Henry, the absolute subject which appears through self-affection is not worldly, it is as stated above, immanent to itself, it affects itself, experiences itself as itself without interference from ‘outside’. Therefore it is not experiencing sensations or affections, in the sense of feeling ‘the smoothness of paper’, for that would be to bring in the world and succumb to ontological monism. It is experiencing itself as itself, and this experience is entirely interior. It is through this that the subject appears.

However, despite this very ‘unworldly’ subject, Henry does have more to say about it, despite its interiority, the ipseity of the absolute subject is to be understood in suffering. For Henry suffering is passively experienced by the self and as such admits of no Other no divide. When one suffers, whilst there may be an external cause or reason for the suffering, one’s experience is ‘ourselves’ alone, it is experienced by ‘me’ and no other. Nor is it initially subject to reflection. One does not have chance to contemplate suffering, one merely receives it. Hence affectivity understood as suffering is called by Henry “original ontological passivity”:

[T]his is what the passivity of suffering means, this is what happens in it; the effectiveness of Being given. In it, in its original passivity with regard to the self, feeling takes possession of its content, experiences it, experiences itself, enjoys the self and in this enjoyment of the self, as constitutive as such of its Being, arrives at this Being and places itself in it in
effectiveness. *In the helplessness of suffering the power of feeling is born.* (Henry, 1973, p.475)

The experience of suffering, giving rise to the ‘power of feeling,’ does not give the subject access to the world, rather it gives subjectivity its essence, affectivity:

“The subjectivity constitutive of Being and identical to it is the Being-with-self, the arrival in the self of Being such as it occurs in the original passivity of suffering. The essence of subjectivity is affectivity.” (Henry, 1973, p.476)

The understanding of ipseity as affectivity qua suffering in turn leads Henry to the conclusion that: “Every ‘Life’ is essentially affective, affectivity is the essence of ‘Life’.” (Henry, 1973, p.477). Thus the Phenomenology of ‘Life’ is born, or rather self-affected. One can see some similarities here to Nishida’s concept of ‘pure experience’ in as much as, whilst Henry does admit a subject/object split, where Nishida does not, this is an experience of self prior to any intrusion by the world.

Henry has a very specific notion of ‘Life’\(^{35}\). Firstly, ‘Life’ is absolute and transcendental; when Henry speaks of ‘life’, he is not referring to individual persons or empirical egos, and in this way he parts company with Heidegger and part of Husserl. Also ‘Life’ has nothing to do with Being, ‘life’ is “not”. Or as he states in *I am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity* (2003):

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\(^{35}\) Henry has a very specific notion of ‘Life’. ‘Life’ – when capitalised refers to Transcendental Life, to the Absolute, ‘life’ refers to the everyday material life. Therefore when discussing Henry ‘Life’ is often capitalised.
What we must steadfastly rule out of the analysis of ‘Life’-at least if we want to grasp ‘Life’ as coming forth in itself, and moreover, to understand the manner in which it does so-is the concept of being. As we have already observed we are not using the verb “to be” on the subject of ‘Life’- say, for example, ‘Life’ is,” and then taking this fallacious proposition as a piece of evidence, even though we are speaking of ‘Life’ in human language, which is that of the world- which is precisely that of Being. ‘Life’ “is” not. Rather, it occurs, and does not cease occurring. (Henry, 2003, p.55)

Henry’s Phenomenology of ‘Life’

It is because Henry’s phenomenology of ‘Life’ so insists on avoiding talk about the world or exterior that I believe it is able to locate the element of subjectivity lacking in Heidegger: a very fundamental relation to myself, one that is not accounted for by mineness, since mineness is to be grasped by Being, which for Heidegger is worldly. As I argued in Chapter Four, Heidegger, has no adequate concept of self-experience that can account for the self-experience of a particular human being, as opposed to human beings in general. Whilst such experiences are, of course, had by particular human beings ‘in-the-world’, in a very real sense the experience itself is not worldly, in that it is not an experience the person is having of themselves in-the-world, or in virtue of their being-in-the-world. Self-experience is a very special kind of experience because it is radically subjective, it is an experience of one’s ‘inner’ and not of the world. Henry’s radical immanence of the experience of self allows for an account which gives expression to those kinds of
experiences which are deeply subjective and personal. The experience of my self related to my self should be understood as self-consciousness. However, I would admit that because of the nature of his account, Henry gives the reader very little idea what it would be like to experience such subjectivity. Of course it is ultimately impossible to give a full picture since Henry’s account of the subject takes place prior to its being-in-the-world. However we can see how it could be helpful in understanding self-experiences such as pain and pleasure. Since it is ‘me’ that is experiencing the pain, pain is self-experience par excellence. In pain we are not experiencing an outside force or another person, but our own self. As such pain may be considered to be auto-affective, it constitutes subjectivity through self-affection. It is as an experience of self where the self is completely unified and the pain is immanent to it.

**Levinas & Henry: A Summary**

It would easy to present Levinas and Henry each as the other’s Jungian shadow. Henry believes in absolute subjectivity, whereas Levinas advocates an excess just beyond the subject’s grasp. For Levinas’ phenomenology is essentially a phenomenology of the 'Other' whilst Henry’s phenomenology is that of a radically immanent self, the self that is ‘me’. However, despite these radical divergences both place great emphasis on affectivity as the essence of the ‘I’, both emphasise the passivity of experience and they each have a place for self-affection.
The Third Phenomenology: A Heideggerian Preface

“‘Life’ is not an existential structure of Dasein. Yet Dasein dies”. (Krell, 1992, p.34). So states David Farrell Krell in his book Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy. Krell points to a strange anomaly in Heidegger’s work in that he considers himself justified in talking about death or Dasein dying, and yet he wants to avoid talk of ‘Life’. This is at best an odd asymmetry, or does it perhaps reveal that the foundations of Heidegger’s phenomenology are not as strong as they seem? At one level it seems that Heidegger wants to avoid, and indeed criticise advocates of Lebensphilosophie, or Life-Philosophy, such as Bergson, Scheler and Jaspers. This is certainly indicated by his review of Jaspers’ Psychology of Worldviews published in 1920, where Heidegger states:

It is in this muddled fashion that problems in contemporary philosophy are predominately centred on life as the “primordial phenomenon” in one of two ways. Either life is approached as a fundamental reality, and all phenomena are seen to lead back to it, so that everything and anything is understood as an objectification and manifestation “of life”, or life is seen as the formation of culture, and this formation is thought to be carried out with reference to normative principles and values. (S, 2002b, p.81)

Life as a ‘fundamental reality’ is of course the kind of ‘Life’ that Nishida and the Kyoto School would espouse and Heidegger firmly rejects here. It seems that here Heidegger has rejected the concept of ‘Life’ and Life-philosophy, and yet
references are made to it throughout his work. For example in an earlier lecture, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life* from a section subtitled ‘Molestia [Trouble] – the Facticity of Life:

1. The “*the more life lives*” means: the more fully the *directions* of experience of facticity are enacted. In the first instance, this does not so much concern the fullness of *what* is experienced, but the directions of experience as such—the surrounding-worldly [*sic*], communal-worldly, and self-worldly directions--; the more *these* as such are full (that is, the more they surrender to themselves their complex of enactment, or the complex of enactment proper to their facticity), the more the full sense is explained historically factically, [This means:] The more the *curare* engages itself in every direction and pulls alongside itself the others according to their sense of experience in the respective engagement…2. The ‘*more Life comes to itself*’ is the second determination and indicates that the *being* of Life somehow consists in the fact that it is had: the more Life experiences that it is itself, its *being*, that is at stake in its full self-enactment. (The categorical sense-structure of this being is the problem for which the executed interpretation should provide a certain cultural-historical, phenomenal situation. Regarding the concept of life, cf the critique of Jaspers in the lecture “Phenomenology of Intuition and of Expression”). (PRL, p.181)

In this lecture, given as early as 1920, Heidegger is beginning to develop a concept of world and of existence, not dissimilar to the one he would give in *Being and Time*, although the notion of *Dasein* has yet to appear fully and be properly
developed. Here it is “factual Life” that experiences the world both as a phenomenological and as an historical situation.

In his later lectures Heidegger is talking about ‘life’ as a notion with phenomenological relevance, in connection with Being and Dasein, as well as ‘World’ and ‘Care’. Dasein is discussed but it takes on a role of lesser importance. In a course entitled *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Invitation to Phenomenological Research*, Heidegger, in Part III, Chapter One states that “‘[L]ife,’ and the verb, “to live” i.e., in the circuit of the indicated expressive directions, a peculiar sense now resounds: life = existence, “being” in and through ‘Life’.” (PIA, p.64). ‘Life’ is discussed here, in some detail, in connection with the concept of World and Caring, in way unnerving similar to the way that he would discuss Dasein *Being and Time*, ‘Life’ = existence whereas the author of *Being and Time* would claim that Dasein = existence.

It seems that the Early Heidegger *did* consider ‘life’ as a term with phenomenological significance and then he abandoned it, leaving little clue as to why. Heidegger always did show some disagreement with certain ways of philosophising about ‘life’ in a phenomenological sense, such as ways indebted to Henri Bergson, where ‘life’ is seen as a ‘stream’ or as an ‘infinite process’. According to Heidegger:

…attempts to understand life is forced to turn the surge and flux of the aforementioned process into a static concept and thereby
destroy the essence of life, i.e., the restlessness and movement (again something understood more as an occurrence than as a direction to something) that characterize Life’s actualizations of its ownmost qualities. (S, 2002b, p.84)

Is it that Heidegger just truly disagreed with Scheler and the modern day followers of Lebensphilosophie, on the basis that ‘life’ was used to encompass all, and as such it had been used to explain all things as he stated in his Psychology of Worldviews review? Or, given that Dasein is meant to refer to human existence, and to ourselves and we are human, living beings, could this be the reason be that Dasein might be dependent on the concept of ‘life’ for its own legitimacy? Maybe if a discussion were begun, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology would ‘descend’ into what he regarded as a ‘muddled’ Lebensphilosophie. Heidegger’s complete remarks on ‘life’ in section forty-nine and fifty of Being and Time are curious:

In the order which any possible comprehension must follow, biology as a ‘science of life’ is founded upon the ontology of Dasein, even if not entirely. Life, in its own right, is a kind of Being; essentially it is accessible only in Dasein. The ontology of life is accomplished by way of a privative Interpretation; it determines what must be the case if there can be anything like mere-aliveness [Nur-noch-leben]. Life is not a mere Being present-at-hand, nor is it Dasein. In turn, Dasein is never to be defined ontologically by regarding it as life (in an ontologically indefinite manner) plus something. (BT: 49-50)

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36 It is also worth noting that in Being and Time Heidegger makes references to “Life” in at least 20 sections. They are Section 10,12, 35-38,40-43,47-49, 68, 78-81.
This passage raises far more questions than it answers. Firstly, ‘Life’ is accorded the status of Being, yet one only accessible to Dasein, and it appears that ‘Life’ is a necessary conceptual tool that enables us to speak of ‘mere-aliveness’. Yet ‘Life’ is not just present-at-handness; the concept ‘Life’ is obviously doing some philosophical work, but what? It cannot be the condition of Dasein, if it were Dasein would not be fundamental, and yet it certainly relates to Dasein. I shall aim to resolve some of these questions through giving a phenomenology, whilst not true to the letter of Heidegger’s wishes, is certainly not meant to be against Heidegger.

**The Phenomenology of Self-Experience: Introduction**

Before proceeding to give my own phenomenological description of self-experience I feel it is necessary to put aside a few misconceptions about ‘self-experience’ and to indicate what I take the term ‘self-experience’ to mean. In giving a phenomenology of self-Experience, I am not attempting to give just an account of how ‘the self’ experiences an entity as an object, including itself, but neither am I denying that such experiences are self-experience. In fact the phenomenology will begin with a critique of Heidegger’s *In-Der-Welt-Sein*. I wish to give an account of self-experience, similar to the one given by Henry, where the self coincides or relates to itself in an immediate way, and I also want to point out that Heidegger misses out or obscures this type of account with his emphasis on *Being-in-the-world*. In so doing I am not suggesting that this type of self-experience is a ‘philosophically superior’ form of self-experience. The reason for
this attempt at neutrality is that I do believe that the ‘present to itself’ conception of Self-Experience is one we need to articulate in order to challenge Heidegger, and for this reason I place great emphasis on Henry’s notion of Life. However I also believe that Henry’s own ideas of Self-Experience are suspect, because of his lack of a world. To construct a more satisfactory phenomenology, one that can take account of Self-experience as a phenomenon concerned with the Self and as a phenomena concerned with the self and world, requires a kind of fusion of Henry’s Metaphysics and the ‘Eastern Logic’ of the Kyoto School. In fact it should be emphasized that the structure of this phenomenology, owes a great deal to the Kyoto School. It should not be understood as a deduction or a reduction, but rather as dialectic. That is to say, it is not that we begin with an account of the world, move on to account of ipseity qua self present to itself, and then move back to the world, at which point we arrive at ‘the truth of self-experience.’ It is rather that there are three clearly discernable ‘stages’. They are:

(1) The self understood as ecstatic, Living-from-the-world.
(2) The self as present to itself.
(3) The self returned to the world as ecstatic.
(4) If one can say anything about self-experience it is that it is a way of engaging, or a place from which we can understand a certain phenomena, for example ourselves.
The Phenomenon of the Phenomenology of Self-Experience

Phenomenology is the study of phenomena. Whilst individuals studying phenomenology may argue whether ‘study’ should mean science, this is the generally accepted definition of phenomenology. From Heidegger onwards, ‘phenomena’ or ‘phenomenon’ has meant ‘that which shows itself’ or that which reveals itself to us. In Heidegger’s time, perhaps paying due attention to philosophy’s Kantian inheritance, phenomena would be things we could experience, they would appear to us. And it was presumed by some that to be experienced was to appear in the realm of sensibility, in much the same way as this piece of paper appears to us as humans. Of course ‘Being’ would not appear as something ‘out there’ but it would for Heidegger be disclosed, made available. However, Henry has pointed out that in this commonly held view of phenomenon there was a dangerous assumption, the assumption of ontological monism, that phenomena will necessarily be something exterior, ‘out there’ or worldly. The idea that phenomena can be subjective or interior has simply been ignored.

In September 1997 at Villanova, there was a debate on ‘The Gift’ between Jacques Derrida and J-L Marion. Most of details of what they were debating are not necessary\(^{37}\) for my purposes, but one at one point, one of the debaters brought up Husserl’s famous ‘first principle’.

\(^{37}\) Derrida argued that the ‘pure gift’ could not be described, because being ‘pure’ any description would involve destroying the gift’s purity by placing it within the exchange economy. There is no possibility of thinking about the ‘pure gift’ and remaining phenomenological, since the very idea of the ‘pure gift’ is something of which we cannot conceive. To treat it phenomenologically would be
...that whatever presents itself in “intuition” in primordial form (as it were in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in which its then presents itself. (Ideas I, p.92)

Husserl is saying that what presents itself to intuition, to consciousness, must be accepted as it is. But one could not do this with the ‘pure gift’ because one would need to add qualities in order for one to make sense of it within an economy of exchange. Marion responded by arguing that as long as description is possible, we remain in the field of phenomenology. Derrida argued that such a description would only make sense against a theological background and would be untrue to the spirit of phenomenology.

Whatever the truth of this matter is, Henry and the Derrida/Marion debate raised a larger question regarding our understanding of the concept of ‘experience’. Why must we understand ‘experience’ in the Kantian sense, as that which must be ‘given in intuition’ and why must the phrase ‘given in intuition’ be taken to mean available to one’s consciousness, so that it can be recalled, thought about? Why can phenomena not be just ‘pure givenness,’ in the sense that it is something given but not to consciousness as in the Kantian picture? It is experienced but not in the sense that we could describe it. Rather, if an experience is pure givenness then it is given to one’s self and thus it has the possibility of being sensed, but it is not given to violate Husserl’s famous ‘principle of principles’, the bedrock of phenomenology. For this debate see Caputo, J.D & Scanlon M.J. (1999) God, the Gift and Postmodernism. Indiana University Press.
through the senses, it does not come from the world. Phenomena may be given as constitutive component of the self or simply as the self itself. This is the lesson of ontological monism, that some phenomena will be so subjective or interior, immanent to the self and therefore not experienced in the same way as ‘worldly’ phenomena, but we may still investigate these via phenomenology. Such phenomena, with its radical subjectivism, would be necessary to accommodate self-experience in a way Heidegger’s *Dasein* simply cannot capture. Henry believes that only some notion of Life will do the job of capturing such a notion of self-experience. His conception of life is intended to offer an account of self-experience that is more immediate, *existentially closer to* our own selves, than Heidegger’s *Dasein*. On this point, I agree with Henry. However, unlike Henry I believe that such phenomena can also be revealed through our everyday activities through our ‘worldly experiences’. Therefore, unlike Henry, this phenomenology will begin with a description of Being-in-the-world.

**From Being-in-the-world to Living-from-the-world**

As human beings, as a human subject, one lives in a world of people and things. As ecstatic beings in the world, we encounter objects which are ready-to-hand and usable or present-at-hand and unusable. To this extent I take Heidegger’s notion of *Dasein* as Being-in-the-world, as described in his ‘Worldhood of the world’ section of *Being and Time* as my starting point. I will not describe it in detail here as it has already been described in Chapter four, but is worth stating
clearly that I do accept Heidegger’s notions of readiness-to-hand and present-at-hand. However, I will suggest that, even with his revolutionary conception of Being-in-the-world, Heidegger has missed out or at least dismissed an aspect of Being-in-the-world, and yet it is an integral component of our negotiations with the world, that the world is where we live. I will also suggest some modifications to another of his terms, that of ek-stasis, the ecstatic nature of Dasein as ‘always outside of itself’. I shall start by outlining the first criticism, the ‘missed’ element of In-Der-Welt-Sein.

It is interesting that Levinas begins Totality and Infinity with a quote, “the true ‘life, is absent’, yet we are in the world.” He could be read as putting forward the idea that whatever Life is, or rather is not, as philosophy and phenomenology have yet to understand it. However, with this quote Levinas indicates the possibility that any understanding of Life has to begin in the world. We can, as Levinas does, talk about ourselves as ‘living in the world’. Living, however, cannot be reduced to our negotiating the world through our engagement with tools that are ready-to-hand and avoiding or learning how to use those tools which are present-at-hand. Indeed, the idea of ‘Living’ for Levinas has nothing to do with treating intra-worldly objects (such as the computer I am using whilst writing my thesis) as ‘simple tools’ designed for specific tasks, and as such of little or no importance once the task has been completed. There are engagements with the world and intra-worldly objects whose nature simply cannot be defined in such terms. That the computer exists for ‘the sake of typing my thesis’ does not exhaust our understanding of what it is to live in the world. In fact, it misses the idea of ‘Living’
completely. The claim that I am ‘Enjoying typing up my thesis’ is a phenomenon loaded with affectivity. Typing my thesis on my computer brings me enjoyment and it may bring suffering. This shows that it is not *merely* ‘a tool’, a means to an end in fact it should not be understood as a tool at all. Typing up my thesis on the computer has an affective component that can be characterised by the fact that I am enjoying writing up my thesis:

We live from ―good soup,‖ air, light, spectacles, work, ideas, sleep, etc…. These are not objects of representation. We live from them. Nor is what we live from a ―means of life,‖ as a pen is a means with respect to the letter it permits us to write-nor a goal of life, as communication is the goal of life. The things we live from are not tools, nor even implements, in the Heideggerian sense of the term. Their existence is not exhausted by the utilitarian schematism that delineates them as having the existence of hammers, needles, or machines. They are always in a certain measure- and even hammers, needles, and machines are-objects of enjoyment, presenting themselves to “taste”, already adorned, embellished. Moreover, whereas the recourse to the instrument implies finality and indicates a dependence with regard to the other, living from… delineates independence itself, the independence of enjoyment and of its happiness, which is the original pattern of all independence”. (Levinas, 1961/69, p.110)

It is that I *enjoy* writing my thesis and not that I have negotiated my computer in all its readiness-to-hand that is the mark of Living-from-the-world. Levinas goes on to say the following about ‘Life':
Life is not the naked will to be, an ontological *Sorge* for this ‘Life’. Life’s relation with the very conditions of its Life becomes nourishment and content of that Life. Life is *love of life*, a relation with contents that are not my being more but dear than my being: thinking, eating, sleeping, reading, working, warming oneself in the sun. Distinct from my substance but constituting it, these contents make up the worth [prix] of my life. When reduced to pure and naked existence, life dissolves into a shadow. Life is an existence that does not precede its essence. Its essence makes up its own worth [prix]; and here value [valeur] constitutes being. The reality of life is already on the level of happiness and in this sense beyond ontology. (Levinas, 1961/69, p.112)

Levinas argues that ‘Life’ is not equivalent to *Sorge* or Care, which is of course the ‘Being of Dasein’. I believe that here Levinas is hinting strongly towards the idea that ‘Life’ is self-affective. In his statement “Life’s relation with the very conditions of its ‘Life’ becomes nourishment” and the essence of that ‘Life’ Levinas is suggesting that ‘Life’ is self-affective. Since ‘Life’ continues to exist or ‘to live’ by the very conditions that make possible, it could be argued that ‘Life’ (re)creates itself through the very act of living, as paradoxical as that seems. For Levinas ‘Life’ is also ‘beyond’ ontology; it does not fall under the category of ‘Being’.

The critique Levinas makes of Heidegger’s view of intra-worldliness is compelling. He argues against the view that the world conceived merely as a world of ready and present objects is fundamental, and he focuses instead on the affective
relation. We ultimately have an affective relationship to what we do ‘in-the-world’, a relationship which is prior to our relationship to worldly activities as object based activities. Any notion of Being-in-the-world must account for this kind of engagement; Being-in-the-world must be Living-from-the-world.

By invoking Levinas’ critique, I am postulating that Heidegger’s picture of Being-in-the-world is missing a notion of Living, where Living should be understood as an affective relation to the world.

**Henry and the Living Self**

However, both Heidegger’s and Levinas’ account are ‘worldly’ and we can ask: is self-experience only an experience we have of ourselves in the world? self-experience is also a more intimate phenomena, one that is self as experienced by itself. self-experience, that it is to say experiences of my self, what Henry calls ‘The living self;’ where the self is not treated as an object, but where the experience is connected to self, without the need for concepts such as subject or object; is not possible as long as the world is a concern. This kind of self-experience cannot be experienced by Dasein, for it is simply ‘given’ to the self rather than experienced as ‘worldly’. It is a far more intimate experience than the world can provide. As Jean-Luc Marion states in his work *In Excess Studies of the Saturated Phenomena* (2002):

Daily life scarcely gives me access to myself; actually, it dispenses me from having the desire and even need of it. For I
have passed a tacit accord with myself [moi]: I will pretend I have access to myself, but I will exempt myself from verifying it too often so as to be able to deal with my worldly business with a free spirit. Since I am here (or rather there), why burden myself with confirming it? (Marion, 2002, p.82)

How can this kind of self-experience be accessed? One possible way is endorsed by Kyoto School scholars, especially Ueda Shizuteru (1926-) and Bret W Davis. Ueda, a pupil of Nishitani follows in the footsteps of the original Kyoto School scholars, with their grounding in ideas of pure experience and absolute nothingness. Davis has written extensively on his work. In his article ‘Letting Go of God for the Sake of Nothing’ which uses much of Ueda’s work, Davis points out that ‘Ecstasy –in the strict sense of ek-stasis literally means a “standing outside of oneself,” which implies, as the Japanese term datsuji...literally means, “a shedding of the [ego] self” (Davis, 2008, p.224).

What is described above is very similar to Heidegger’s idea of ecstatic Dasein; yet Davis, building on Ueda’s work on Meister Eckhart, takes this notion further. Ueda’s and Davis’ original argument was aimed at understanding the nature of the relation between the self and God, however I believe they can be adapted to suit my purpose, simply by focussing on the self. In his work Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit (2007) Bret W Davis makes an interesting point about the will and the Dasein. Davis argues that there is a duplicity to the will and thus the self that he calls “ecstatic-incorporation,” something that Heidegger, Levinas and Nishitani all write about. Ecstatic-incorporation means that the will
both reaches out to the world and at least attempts to bring the world into the self’s grasp, if not immanent to it:

There is thus a double movement essential to willing, “Willing allows ways to bring the self to itself; it thereby finds itself beyond itself” (63/52).…or as Heidegger writes in his Schelling interpretation it is a matter of “what strives back to itself and yet expands itself. (SA 155/128). In willing, we exceed ourselves only to bring this excess into the self: “in willing we [seek to] know ourselves as beyond ourselves; we have the sense of having somehow achieved a state of being-master [Herrsein] over [something]” (NI 64/52). The ekstasis of willing is thus always incorporated back into the domain of the subject; the will’s movement of self-overcoming is always in the name of expansion of the subject, and in his territory, his power. Willing is, in short, “being-master-out-beyond-oneself [Uber-sich-hinaus-Herrsein]” (76/53). I shall call this doubled-sided or “duplicitous” character of the will: ecstatic-incorporation” (Davis, 2007, p.9).

Dasein, the subject or human being, because of its existence as a creature that wills, is constantly striving forward and then incorporating or appropriating that towards which it strives; therefore there is always more to be striven for, which is itself incorporated. As such we should not view Dasein’s ecstatic nature as fixed, a point at which we have arrived, so that once one introduces the idea of the Dasein as ‘being outside of itself’ that ‘being outside of itself’ is simply what Dasein is. For even Heidegger recognised that its ecstatic nature meant that it is always ‘running-ahead’.
However, what Heidegger does not seem to consider so deeply is the idea that because of the very nature of the eco\textit{static}, \textit{Dasein} could overcome or go beyond \textit{Dasein} as Being-in-the-world (except for the possibility of the death of \textit{Dasein}). In other words, Heidegger does not consider that there may not be simply one but multiple ‘ecstasies’ of \textit{Dasein}, that bring the living self into relation with the world, both as Being-in-the-world and ‘out-of-the-world’, where the self returns to itself and perhaps returns to other kinds of relations. I propose that there are multiple ‘ecstatic movements’ or ‘ecstasties’, multiple ‘sheddings’ each revealing new ways or a way of understanding the self. Following the ecstatic movement to ‘shed the ego’ a second ecstatic movement occurs, the shedding of \textit{Dasein} as Being-in-the-world, in favour of absolute nothingness or \textit{emptiness} as this was first theorised by Nishitani.

Through this ecstatic movement proposed in the last section, the self moves beyond itself \textit{qua} Being-in-the-world but \textit{incorporates} itself as present to itself. Being-in-the-world is overcome by the self so that all that remains is the self, but a self capable of experiencing. It is Being that is negated in favour of absolute nothingness or emptiness. There is still in essence, a place, a world of sorts, but a world of pure experience where the living self experience itself and other phenomena without interference from categories. This is what is described by Nishida and Nishitani. I will now give a more detailed description of the self after this ‘shedding of \textit{Dasein}’.
I wish to advance a conception of the self that has some similarity to Henry’s description of the self in *The Essence of Manifestation*, and throughout all his later works. For Henry, the self is immanent to itself, it experiences itself. The essence of ipseity is self-affection in that the self affects itself and in that act of self-affection gives or constitutes the absolute or transcendent subject, which Henry calls ‘Life’. As explained above, for Henry, the self is immanent to itself it completely coincides with itself, with no world, no exterior or outside. Part of Henry’s, ‘refusal’ of the world and worldly phenomenology rests on the assumption that what is to be found in the world are ‘outer’ objects, the mistake of ontological monism. However, ‘the ‘world’ of pure experience is not really a ‘world’ but a ‘place’ or *basho* to use the Japanese term. Recall that in the ‘place’ of pure experience there are no objects or subjects, inner or outer, so what is experience is experienced as immanent to the self, it has not been categorised as in for example ‘computer’, nor is it even a *mere thing*: it is experienced directly by the Self without mediation from any kind of outside. What would it be like to experience ‘phenomena’ like this? To better elucidate such experiences I turn to the thinking of the Zen master Dogen Kigen.

Dogen Kigen (1500-53) was a Zen Buddhist and founder of the ‘Soto school’ of Buddhism. In his work *Shobogenzo* (The Treasure of the True Dharma Eye) Dogen stressed the importance of seated meditation (*zazen*), which he called ‘just sitting’ (*shikan taza*) as the key to enlightenment, for it is by practising ‘just sitting’ that body and mind are ‘cast off’.
Dogen believed that of all the methods of seeking enlightenment open to a practising Buddhist only just sitting (shikan taza) would allow to achieve enlightenment. He inherited this method from his own Zen Master Nyojo. The ‘just’ singles out a particular way of sitting and it is used to single out the practice from other forms of zazen. Through ‘just sitting’ Dogen believed one achieves illumination because one is ‘Adjusting [one’s] body and mind’ before one can perform shikan taza. Dogen advises the following:

...a quiet room is suitable. Eat and drink moderately. Cast aside all involvements and case all affairs. Do not think good or bad. Do not administer pros and cons. Cease all of the movements of the conscious mind. Zazen has nothing whatever to do with sitting and lying. (Dogen in Nagatomo, 1992, p.114)

Thus ‘just sitting’ is not just sitting. It is an activity which must be learnt. One must train to disengage from the world - putting aside all our worries, ideas, and thoughts. Dogen then requires us to assume the lotus position or some variation (provided by a Zen Master) and then:

[T]ake a deep breath, inhale and exhale, rock your body right and left and settle into a steady immobile sitting position. Think of non-thinking. How do you think of not-thinking? Non-thinking. This in itself is an essential art of zazen. (Dogen in Nagatomo, 1992, p.115)
Dogen never makes it clear what ‘non-thinking’ is or indeed is not, possibly because it is something which one is meant to recognise by experiencing it and it is not intellectual, although I shall attempt an explanation here. Non-thinking cannot be an ‘attitude’ towards the world, or ‘stance’ we take on it, because this would involve thinking. Nor can non-thinking be the active engagement with the world that Heidegger advanced, because just sitting is achieved when one is disengaged from the world. A contemporary of Dogen, Sawaki Kodo gave the following description of Soto Zen meditation:

In such a Zen meditation, the residue does not remain even in the occurrence of thought or in the hearing of sounds. Sounds are simply heard, and thoughts simply occur and then naturally disappear, just like the incoming and outgoing of breath. (Sawaki in Nagatomo, 1992, p.119)

The use of the term ‘simply’ enables us to gain great insights into what is meant by non-thinking. Dogen, read by Sawaki, wants us to see sounds, images and thought as simply things that occur, just that and nothing more, they are not the basis for deliberative contemplation or conceptualisation. The sound of a car stopping outside as I meditate is not for further investigation - it is simply the sound. Sawaki reminds us of the following quote by Dogen, “I did not hear thundering sound such as this, although, I was aware of it.” (Dogen in Nagatomo, 1992, p.120).

Here, Dogen gives expression to how the self experiences the world or place directly. We have already said the self of pure experience is so disengaged from the
everyday world, and immanent to itself, that it experiences ‘phenomena’ ‘directly’ without the intrusion of categorisation brought in by ‘outside’. The self experiences the ‘phenomena’ also as immanent to itself, only this way could it experience them without categorisation. Thus we can be aware of the sound of thunder or the tapping of a keyboard but we do not hear it, for ‘hearing’ would involve intentionality and the subject/object split. Rather the ‘sound of thunder’ was given to the self, and as a given constitutes the self as a self. It is this kind of subjective experience that Heidegger’s Dasein cannot account for, an experience of self and ‘phenomena’ that does not need intentionality or Jemeingkeit, but requires a self that is present to itself. I will now go on to talk about the essence of this Self: the self of pure experience.

Ipseity and the Living Self

The essence of ipseity is self-affection: the self affects itself and in that act of self-affection gives or constitutes the living self. The ‘living self’, a term borrowed from Henry is the ‘self that I am’, by which I meant the self in the first person. In this sense it is similar to Descartes’ cogito. Where it differs from Descartes is that the living self, like Henry’s transcendental self is immanent to itself it completely coincides with itself, with no world, no exterior or outside and it is certainly not a substance: selfhood is achieved though an original given experience, an experience of radical passivity. It is because this being given through self-affection, and the radical passivity of the given experience, that
selfhood is not constituted through some sense of a bare ‘I’ or ‘me,’ rather the reverse. As Henry puts it:

Because this engendering of the me in Life’s Self-affection is phenomenological in a radical sense, the coming of the me into itself, which rests on the coming of Life into itself, is lived as basically passive with respect to this coming of Life. We have seen that the me is what self-affects itself, but since this self-affection is imposed on it by Life and it is just like that of Life, one could say, more exactly, that the “me” is constantly self-affected. This character of the Self being self-affected is designated by its being put into the accusative: “me”. In the end, “me” signifies this: for each me, its ipseity does not come from it, but inversely, it comes from ipseity. (Henry, 2003, p.135)

The self-affection of the self is not an activity that simply occurs at the original constitution of the self, rather self-affection is a process that happens again and again, and in so doing (re)constitutes a new living self, the self understood as a ‘me’, who is someone. Just as Levinas describes enjoyment as an activity a ‘pulsation of the I’ self-affection is achieved through the perpetual re-assertion of the Self qua absolute nothingness or sunyata. Remember that for Ueda, absolute nothingness is to be understood ‘dynamically’ as the ‘activity of emptying out’ (Davis, 2008, p.225). absolute nothingness is itself an ecstatic movement and, just as one ecstatic movement ‘sheds’ the self as Being-in-the-world and constitutes it as a ‘presence to itself,’ another will ‘return’ it to the world. As ‘present’ to itself the living self is overcome by absolute nothingness. It, or rather I, come to the realisation that I ‘am’ or rather am characterised by absolute nothingness. The self literally ‘overcomes’
or sheds itself. After its constitution as a self in the place of pure experience, the living self, the ‘me’ is reconstituted or returned to the world, but with the knowledge provided to me by pure experience. This knowledge is the knowledge of non-duality, that there is a way of relating to things and people that need not involve intentionality, at least not as Heidegger conceived of it, and that appropriation or ‘grasping’ is not our only way of knowing an object. As Davis rehearses Ueda’s thoughts “…the true self realises itself in an “ekstasis/instasis,” a standing outside of itself and into a non-dual engagement with other persons, things, and events.” (Davis, 2008, p.225).

The true self must enter into a non-dual engagement with the world, an engagement comprising ‘persons, things, and events’ and of course, its own self in order to allow the subjective character which Jemeinigkeit conceals to be opened up. In the final section I will give some indication of how this would look.

**The Living Self’s ‘return’ to the World**

Before I elucidate the final part of this Zen influenced phenomenology, I should clear up a misleading phrase invited by English language usage. The living self does not so much *return* to the world, rather after its fundamental ‘true’ way of Being-in-the-world is revealed to it in the *basho*, it now acts ‘in-the-world’ in the way that it has learned in *basho*. But one should not look at Being-in-the-world as entering ‘different worlds’ but rather as different aspects or ways of experiencing
the world. Hence Ueda Shizuteru refers to his conception of the Self-World relation as a ‘two layered world’. The place of absolute nothingness or the world of pure experience revealed to the living self that there is a different and more fundamental way of relating to things and people, than intentionality. However, it would be difficult to relate to people and things in exactly the same way as one did in the world of pure experience, for there the self was immanent to all things. *The world is social*, that is to say full of people and things with which we interact, and this seems a long way from the world of pure experience. However, it is possible to retain the essence of ‘directly experiencing’ the world found in the world of pure experience, by utilising another notion, the notion of *aidagara*. This idea, which has its origins in Buddhist thought, is to do with the ‘betweenness of all things’: the idea that ‘I’ am related to all people and all things. For example in the tenth and final Oxherding picture, a man is shown walking around a market talking with wine sellers and butchers and ‘they are all converted into Buddhas’. Having learnt about *sunyata* the Oxherder now walks through a market conversing with all, for he now realises he is related to all. This idea of relatedness or betweeness was theorised most thoroughly by a thinker called Watsuji Tetsurô. In two famous works *Fudo* and *Rinrigaku*, inspired by Heidegger he gives a hermeneutical-phenomenological analysis of the concept of human being or *ningen sonzai*.

Watsuji grounds his work in an etymological analysis of the Japanese word for ‘human being’ - *ningen sonzai*. He places great significance and philosophical weight on this term. *Nin* is the everyday term for person or people, whilst *gen*, which can also be read as *aida* or *aidagara*, is much more resistant to translation,
for it could possibly mean a whole family of concepts - space would be one translation, and interval another. I choose betweenness, as do the translators of the Rinrigaku, Robert E. Carter and Yamamoto Seisaku.

Watsuji is purposely playing with words here. Nin has to presuppose gen since the existence of an individual presupposes the existence of a community. Nin and gen therefore share a dialectical structure, each affirming and negating the other. However, for Watsuji, unlike the exponents of Western metaphysics - most notably Hegel, the dialectic does not have to be violent. Harmony should be sought between the individual and communal aspects of ningen sonzai, so a double negation occurs. The community negates the individual and subsumes her, the individual then negates the community and is reconstituted as an individual, but one tied to a network of social relations. Only when one realises that ningen only realizes its authentic self within the context of relationships, its aidagara or betweenness, does one understand the nature of the individual, the nature of one’s self.

Ningen sonzai, qua human existence, is necessarily a social relationship to the world. It is not enough to say just ‘this is used in order to hit nails’ or ‘this is the workshop’ but one has to be able to say ‘I am cold in the workshop’. That I am in the workshop is an aspect of the world that only the individual is concerned with, but that it is cold is a social aspect, an aspect of the climate or fudo with which all individuals would be concerned. It is the ‘we’ not ‘I’ that feels the cold. Even that statement ‘I feel cold’ is never truly individual or asocial because in talking about
coldness one has made a relationship with the climate, something which all humans share. Thus human beings recognise themselves as selves in relation to the climate, and that climate is neither subject nor object, but is something to which all *ningen sonzai* are related by virtue of being *ningen sonzai*.

Watsuji presents us with a picture of the world or *seken* where betweenness or relatedness is primary. *Seken* or world is also by its nature ‘public’ for the original meaning of *seken* or *yo no naka* (in the world) is ‘public’. Hence as Watsuij states ‘The original meaning of the word *ningen* is *seken* or *yo no naka*, whose meaning is quite ordinarily understood to connote an extended real of ‘Life’ interaction’ (Watsuji, 1937/1996, p.145).

Everything has the characteristic of betweenness, of being related to something. This is how Watsuji views an agent’s relationship to the world and all in it. Watsuji liked to use the metaphor of transportation when explaining this. Everyone is on a journey, not only where we are going is important, but also how we get there. I may be talking to some people about Watsuji and (one would hope) they are listening, even if my audience is unable to understand, a relation exists between us. And *we are all at a seminar*; this if nothing else, is what is ‘between’ us all here. However, one should not mistake that we are all at a seminar as an objective fact, but rather one should recognise it as an inter-subjective relationship (as Watsuji called it). This might be a very bad seminar to some and not to others but we can all agree that we are at a seminar where someone is giving a paper.
Being-Between or Being-in-the-Milieu

What Watsuji is suggesting may sound very like if not identical to Husserlian or Heideggerian intentionality, but this is not the case. *Aidagara* enables intersubjectivity or relations between subjects and things, but despite this *aidagara* is not an act. For Watsuji, the world is not something which ‘I’, the subject, objectifies or rather treats as an object, although we are subjects, the world is not an object in that way for us. Rather the world is something with which we are involved, not through employing intentionality as Brentano, Husserl, and Heidegger conceived of it, in which we are agents directing ourselves towards objects. We can utilise Watsuji’s own example of ‘feeling the cold’. Although it is an Intentional relation, betweenness is not an act ‘for the sake of’:

[It] is not a ‘point’ which establishes a relationship directed at the cold, but is in itself a relationship in virtue of its “feeling” and it is in this relationship that we discover cold. The intentionality of such a relational structure is thus a structure of the subject in relation with the cold. The fact that “We feel the cold” is, first and foremost, an “intentional experience” of this kind. (Watsuji, 1927/1961, p.2)

“We” and not *I* ‘feel the cold, we enter into a relationship with the cold, but we do not ‘direct’ ourselves towards the cold, rather we are simply related to it, and we are related to it as a community.
This is the way that the self now understands its nature as Being-in-the-world that differs from Heidegger’s *Dasein* or ‘towards-which’, which seems mono-directional, as if there the relationship between myself and another is one initiated by ‘me’ and could not be started by ‘them’. We are all related to all things and each other. It is not that one has to ‘set’ that relationship up through intentionality *qua* some kind of directedness. Watsuji and I are in agreement with Heidegger that *we are always already there*, but it is not that *I* am ‘towards’ another, but that *we* are related to each other, in a milieu or surrounding world and inwardly related to our self.

Mineness, the idea that an experience is mine in virtue of it ‘being available to me’ as the ‘towards-which’ is not the fundamental way *I* actually experience the world. Whilst *I* experience the world as part of a community, as a subject my experiences can also be personal and have a subjective character that Heidegger does not accommodate. We can now speak of the self being present to itself, experiencing itself, as a ‘worldly’ being. Just as there is something *between* myself and another, there is a relation between the self and itself. Experience is *given to me*. *I* can feel myself and think my own thoughts, as can every other being to who I am connected.
The Third Phenomenology: Summary

The phenomenology of self-experience I have offered here is one that challenges Heidegger on two fronts. Firstly, it challenges Heidegger’s own notion of *ek-stasis*, by showing that, welcome and necessary though that idea is, Heidegger did not realise its full potential. *Ek-stasis* is not just the nature of *Dasein*, it is a movement. Whilst Heidegger saw it as a ‘movement’ or ‘beyondness’ as *Dasein*’s ‘stepping outside of itself’, what he may have not have recognised, as Ueda did, is that this very movement ‘outside of itself’ would mean that *Dasein* itself as Being-in-the-world would be ‘moved beyond’ to reveal or disclose new ways of understanding our nature as human beings or *ningen sonzai*. What results from such an new understanding, is an understanding of what it means to be a human being that moves beyond ontological concerns over ‘Being, since ‘human being,’ or ‘Life’ does not fall under the category of Being. As Levinas and Ueda point out it is not ontological, at least not in Heidegger’s understanding of ontology, it *may* belong in a different kind of ontology, or it *may* belong to a different part of philosophy all together such as the ethical. I should make it clear at this point that there are some differences between the views of Henry and Levinas concerning the notion of ‘Life’. For example Henry makes far more use of the Transcendental, whereas Levinas does not use that notion at all, however there remain many similarities. Both Henry and Levinas see ‘Life’ as beyond ontology, as belonging to another field, both see ‘Life’ as self-affective at least some of the time. Also if ‘Life’ has an ‘essence’ (as one should be careful to use the word essence when talking of phenomena ‘beyond’ ontology) then that essence is affectivity, even
though they each define affectivity differently. Heidegger, who is trying not to talk about ‘Life’ would not necessarily accept any of these definitions, but they are not inconsistent or out place in his kind of phenomenology.

This new understanding of *ek-stasis*, presents us with at least two new ways of understanding the self. Firstly where the self is unified with itself, this offers a picture of self-experience where the self is *directly experienced*, in a way that owes much to the idea of pure experience expressed by the Kyoto School. This is the ‘true’ nature of the self, the self that ‘I am’ or the living self. This way of understanding selfhood offers an account of subjective experience that the Heidegger of *Being and Time* does not supply us with.

However, one cannot stay in this mode of selfhood forever, since in this mode the self understands itself as ‘Being’, it overcomes itself to realise its true nature as absolute nothingness, and is ‘returned to the world’ with this knowledge, the knowledge gained in the place of pure experience. The agent now knows that Being is not the most fundamental question or way of understanding humans, and that intentionality is not the most fundamental way of engaging with the world. Rather it sees everything as interconnected, although again in a much more subjective sense than Heidegger would allow. Heidegger’s idea of community through his concept of *Das Man* or ‘The One’ is an impersonal community where no particular *Dasein*’s need to exist, there is simply ‘The One’. At best we relate to people and to objects in a mode of ‘towards-which’, through intentionality, but even this places a barrier between myself and the Other, since intentionality is necessary.
I must always be searching out ‘something’ or ‘someone’ and for a particular end, as opposed to just experiencing the world. Zen Buddhism offers an alternative, to Heidegger, in that it offers a view of human beings as intimately connected to each other and to all things as individuals. Regarding the last two ways of understanding self-experience (Heidegger’s and Zen Buddhist) it must be made clear that whilst Zen practitioners, would of course say the first is the ‘best way’ of understanding the self, I make no such preference. These two ways must be seen as processes or at best as two standpoints or ways of understanding the same phenomena. To give analogy from my own experience, in Kyoto there is a Zen garden at the Roan-ji\textsuperscript{38} Temple and in this garden there are fifteen stones only fourteen of which can been seen at any one time no matter what your vantage point. Consequently there is no ‘best place’ to view the garden there are merely thirteen rocks, only eleven of which can be seen, so it would foolish to speak of a ‘best view’. Similarly, whilst we wish to challenge Heidegger’s view of self-experience, or rather his lack of a view of self-experience, it would be dangerous to suggest that there is a ‘superior’ alternative, although there are of course alternatives.

Finally, my phenomenology suggests that it may be Heidegger’s starting point, his concept of Phenomenon and phenomenology that leaves him unable to speak of self-experience in this way, even if he wished to; his later work on \textit{Gelassenheit} and Schelling may suggest he does. Like many exponents of phenomenology both before and after him, Heidegger views the phenomenon as

\textsuperscript{38} For a photograph of the garden at Roan-ji with the author of this thesis and his wife highly engaged in the search for satori – Enlightenment see the Appendix. The photograph was taken quite covertly by Keiko Oka, photography not being allowed in this particular Zen Temple.
‘object’, ‘world’ or ‘exterior’. This concept of the phenomenon means that any phenomen-ology, and study of the phenomenon will also be existentially dis-stanced, moved away from its goal by having to work within the subject/object split, albeit a split Heidegger cannot recognise. I have suggested that a phenomenology with pure experience as its foundation provides the resources for an account of subjectivity that Heidegger’s starting point makes it impossible for him to offer.
Conclusion: Is the Meaning of Life Lost?

Preliminary Remarks

This thesis grew out of a certain discontentment with Heidegger’s idea of ‘Being-in-the-world’. Whilst I agree Heidegger was right to emphasise our nature as humans as being ‘world-involved’, part of the world and not a spectator looking in, this certainty seemed to come at price. The price was that features of ipseity are lost. Whilst Cartesian introspection may be unreliable, it nonetheless provided one with a way of accounting for self-awareness or self-knowledge. What was missing, I felt, in Heidegger’s account, is a provision for the ‘inner’ or subjective, for the fact that ‘I’ experienced ‘my’ thoughts, feelings and emotions, and this was not reducible to Being-in-the-world. Whilst I can only recognise these phenomena because I am a public being, part of the world, the having of these phenomena is not simply public. What was missing it seemed was the interiority of the self. Have we arrived at the meaning of being but lost the meaning of life qua selfhood? If so, I am reminded of Nikolai Berdyaev in his The Meaning of the Creative Act (1914/1962)\(^3\) when he stated:

The human spirit is in prison. Prison is what I call this world, the given world of necessity…The true way is not a movement left or right in the plane of “the world,” but rather movement upward and downward on lines of the ultra-worldly, movements

\(^3\) Russian Existentialist Philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev 1874-1924
in spirit and not in “the world”. Freedom from the reactions of “the world” and from opportunitistic adaptations to it is a great achievement of spirit. (Berdyaev, 1914/62, p.11)

For Berdyaev, “the given world” is that which imprisons the self or the spirit, as a philosopher one should not enter into relations with the world blindly and so willingly as Heidegger does, as it inhibits one’s freedom. Whilst Berdyaev’s concerns were religious as well as ontological, he does capture what I want to argue, that simply surrendering ‘Man’ to ‘the world’ and thereby to Being means that a part of ‘Man’ will be lost. This is not to deny that we, as human beings are part of the world, but to insist that how we relate to the world could be described differently, in a way that does not rob of the self of those subjective phenomena nor deny characteristics of ‘Man’ which do not pertain to Being as Dasein.

**Human Life Through The Early Heidegger**

The early Heidegger, the Heidegger preparing and writing the work *Being And Time*, was attempting to capture the essence of human existence, what it is to be a human being, in order to answer what he considered the most important question in philosophy, the *Seinfrage*, the question of the meaning of being. He ‘deconstructs’ Descartes and Kant in *Being and Time*, and in this work and later in his career, his critiques of any thinker work on the presupposition that they simply have failed to capture what it is to be a human being, to experience life and the

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40 “Man is essentially this relationship of responding to Being, and he is only this.” (Heidegger trans Stambaugh, 1957/2002, p31) Even if, as Heidegger states Being is an excess not a limitation, might not there be some phenomena that does fall under Being?
world as a human being. In the case of Descartes, in his *Nietzsche* lectures of 1939, Heidegger indicates that despite Descartes not viewing the *Cogito* as a logical syllogism, nonetheless Heidegger’s understanding of *cogito ergo sum* as *cogito me cogitare*, ‘I represent myself’, is an intellectual grasping of the *Ego Cogito*, and suggests a reading of the *Cogito* as a practical syllogism, which is not as Descartes intended it.

I have suggested, through the work of Michel Henry that the interpretation of the *ego cogito* as meaning ‘Man’ and then Man *qua* subject, is a status Descartes never accorded it in his own life-time. A reading of Descartes was offered using the work of Michel Henry, showed that Descartes, far from being a sceptic, actually affirms ‘Man’s’ existence as a self-affective absolute subjectivity. Thus Descartes did not leave the ‘meaning of the *sum* undetermined’ despite Heidegger’s claim to the contrary; the ‘*sum*’ is that that ‘I’ am a thinking thing, born out of an act of self-affection, it is this self-affection that is the ‘*sum*’.

The early Heidegger’s encounter with Kant is far more ambivalent and far less dramatic. Heidegger cannot, nor does not, at least explicitly, deny any Kantian influence in *Being and Time*, he was educated during the time of the great Neo-Kantians, Natorp, Rickert and Windelband. However, he does reject the majority of Kant’s own conclusions, viewing him as nothing more than a modification on Cartesian thinking, the Kantian ‘I-think’ is, for Heidegger, a conception of the self as a ground and therefore a subject where ‘things outside of me’, are re-presented as objects. Again I suggest that there are ways of reading Kant to counter Heidegger’s
critique. Kant does invoke *mineness*, and introduces the notion of the *a priori*, and Heidegger does acknowledge this. One of the reasons I offer in chapter four for this grudging acknowledgment is that Heidegger, whilst being quite critical towards Kant, cannot be too critical, because much of Heidegger’s own philosophy, the notions of *Dasein* and *Jemeingkeit*, his ‘existential analytic’ and the *a priori* owes something to Kant. Heidegger is inescapably Kantian in spirit.

Heidegger never really interrogates Husserl properly in *Being and Time*, but in work and lectures written prior to *Being and Time* and immediately after, it is clear that Heidegger has two main objections which can ultimately be reduced to one, that of Cartesianism. Firstly, Heidegger criticises Husserl’s allegiance to a philosophy of consciousness (although not for positing ‘inner mental contents’) as overly Cartesian and therefore inadequate. Once again in Husserl, Heidegger finds a conception of human beings *qua* subject which he finds abhorrent. Finally, he argues that Husserl’s Cartesian side leads him to avoid the question of being. However, as Henry argues, Heidegger may be right, but his ‘solution’ to this Cartesian virus running through Husserl’s work is misguided, simply formulating ‘Man’ as exclusively Being-in-the-world is for Henry, a mistake.

The respective philosophies of Descartes, Kant and Husserl, all have one common denominator; they all fall foul of an allegiance to subjectivity, which will, in Heidegger’s eyes close off the possibility of describing the self and world as it is truly is and experienced, as something more intimate, more fundamental, a union between human being and world that he calls *In-Der-Welt-Sein*, ‘Being-in-the-
world’. However, with each thinker I have offered alternative interpretations to Heidegger’s using, for the most part, the thought of Michel Henry. The purpose of these alternative interpretations, whilst I also agree with them as critiques of Heidegger, is to cast doubt on Heidegger’s justification for his project, for the question of the meaning of Being. If alternative interpretations are possible, then the ‘need’ for *Being and Time* is in doubt. I attempted to show that Descartes, Kant and Husserl *could* possibly be read as a giving an adequate account of human life, albeit by employing the concept of subjectivity which Heidegger wished to avoid.

**Human Life in Being and Time**

In the fourth chapter I turned to Heidegger’s *Being and Time* to evaluate whether he had succeeded in providing a satisfactory alternative account with the notion of Being-in-the-world, one that shows self and world to more intimately connected and avoids the notions of subjectivity and subject/object dualism of which he accuses Descartes, Kant and Husserl. I argued that in his account of conscience, Heidegger relapses into a philosophy of subjectivity when describing *Dasein*’s call to conscience. I claimed that there are elements of the first person and some characteristics of subjectivity in his account of conscience, but far from seeing this as a negative aspect of this work, Heidegger could have appropriated it as a positive aspect, that if anything *Dasein* is not subjective ‘enough’. However, since he chose not to do so, what remains is an ambiguous account of human subjectivity as world-involved. Heidegger’s need to portray human being as ‘in-the-world’
means that some element of their ipseity or the liveliness of life as Levinas put it is lost.

In the final two chapters I went to show how Heidegger could have developed a phenomenology of life by using both the work of the Kyoto School and French Phenomenology. The former describe a way of viewing the world and conceiving of the self that would seem to show a more fundamental way of understanding the self and world than through intentionality, and the latter shifts the discussion away from being concerned ultimately with the question of being, making the question the following: What is human life?

**Why a Phenomenology of Life?**

A Phenomenology of Life is appropriate for two interrelated reasons. Firstly it acts as a corrective to Heidegger’s anti-subjectivism, a subjectivism that had he embraced it, would have aided his account of conscience. Secondly, it restores to the self those phenomenal qualities that the self experiences, that have been lost by human beings now being described as a being-in-the-world. A Phenomenology of Life cannot deny that we are world-involved beings, but how we relate to the world can be more carefully delineated so as not overlook ipseity and the demands of the world and the community. The world need not be a ‘prison’ as Berdyaev fears. Accommodations, for want of a better term, can be made.
‘Life’ here is to be understood phenomenologically, and although I have not introduced a scientific understanding of ‘Life’ into the debate, neither have I rejected that discourse. Biology is literally the study of Life. There is no reason why Biology could not be understood philosophically. For example, one of the basic principles of life could be the possibility of reproduction, cells divide and children are born. Philosophy has an equivalent of this, which was used in this thesis, self or auto-affection. With auto-affection one ‘produces’ and ‘reproduces’ one self. These are merely indications, but something has been said about how this phenomenology of life would take shape, and I hope to have achieved a beginning of such a phenomenology in the final sections of my final chapter. I draw upon those thinkers with a phenomenological background, many having being taught by Heidegger but also have a strong allegiance to German Idealism and philosophy of life or Lebensphilosophie in attempt to show how Lebensphilosophie and Heidegger’s phenomenology are compatible and that the former can help in the development of a phenomenology of Life, a phenomenology I hope to develop further in future work.
Appendix

A couple looking at the rock garden at Ryoan-ji, Kyoto, December, 2005
Photography by Keiko Oka
Bibliography


