The Politics of Workers' Participation:
A Study of Industrial Relations in
Tanzanian Public-Sector Factories

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ABSTRACT

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by Patrick Masanja

on

The Politics of Workers' Participation: A Study of Industrial Relations in Tanzanian Public-Sector Factories

This study of industrial relations attempts to throw light on the impact of ujamaa on the organisation of Tanzanian public-sector factories, especially the role played by Workers' Councils, Party branches and other work-place agencies in decision-making. The thesis draws on case studies of two enterprises in Dar es Salaam as well as data of a more general kind.

The orientation of the thesis is historical and action-oriented; the study eschews a priori, economic reductionist and functionalist perspectives in favour of an approach which is more amenable to throwing light on the politics of participation at work-place level. Chapters 1-3 argue that Tanzania since independence has been characterized by attempts by the political leadership to construct a corporatist type of political and industrial-relations system whose main features are stability, national integration, consensus, controlled popular participation and central control.

In Chapters 4-6 case studies are presented of management and participation in two factories, both located in Dar es Salaam. Drawing in part on documentary sources, the research also utilised in-depth interviews and observation. The case studies focus especially on the roles of the different factory agencies and the way managers and employees relate to them in dealing with factory issues.

Three conclusions are tentatively offered. First, the control
of public factory managements exercised by the national political leadership is uneven, with the effect that managers are able to use their dominant position within a factory to advance their private interests. Second, the influence of workers' representatives in factory decision-making is very limited (although normative pressures mitigate the cruder management practices towards employees), but chiefly for reasons other than those which have been stressed in the literature. Third, union and Party branches remain arenas of contention between management and workers.
To

My Mother and My Father
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INTRODUCTION

Public sector enterprises in Tanzania are largely a phenomenon of the period since the Arusha Declaration of 1967. Measures taken by the Tanzanian government in the wake of the above policy document led to a significant increase in the state's involvement in different sectors. During the colonial period, state ownership was limited to a few activities in public utilities, rail transport and some shares in a handful of enterprises. In 1964, the newly independent government created the National Development Corporation (N.D.C.) as an instrument for boosting industrial growth and increasing the state's involvement in economic activities. It was, however, only with the measures following the Arusha Declaration that there was a considerable increase in the size of the state sector. This expansion was achieved either through new government investment, or through the acquisition of shares in private firms, or else through a complete state take-over of existing private enterprises. Taken together, these measures resulted in a marked expansion of the state's role in the services, banking and transport sectors, as well as in export agriculture (mainly sisal) and manufacturing industry.

As well as affecting the structure of ownership of the economy, the Arusha Declaration led to political changes, especially in the organisation of the political party. The same document also formulated the policy of ujamaa (socialism) and self-reliance. These new policies affected various areas of the country's life and economy, and included notably the encouragement of ujamaa villages and the introduction of new measures related to labour and labour organisation. Especially important under the latter heading was the introduction of political party branches in work places and the creation of Workers' Councils in parastatal enterprises in 1970.
These developments provoked widespread interest in Tanzania's political economy, in the character of the Tanzanian state and in the meaning and impact of Tanzanian ujamaa (socialism). In this context questions were raised about the organisation of the state sector and more particularly about the position of labour and the functioning of workers' organisations in this new ujamaa experience. What was the impact of ujamaa on the organisation and running of public sector factories? What was the position and condition of workers in those factories? How did employees relate to the work-place organisations set up to give expression to Tanzania's socialist aspirations? Twenty years on, these are still questions that any study of Tanzanian industrial relations must seek to answer.

This thesis, a study of industrial relations in public sector factories in Tanzania, attempts to shed light on some of the above issues with particular reference to work-place processes, especially the practice of workers' participation in decision-making. Special attention is devoted to how workers' representatives and management relate to one another in dealing with work-place issues affecting them. The thesis is also centrally concerned with the role played by party branches and other relevant agencies in decision-making in parastatal factories. Introduced by decisions from "above", how do employees relate to these agencies purportedly created to cater for the interests of the workers, and how and under what conditions do they operate in relation to decision-making? How do employees articulate their relationship to the party and trade union in dealing with enterprise issues? And so on.

How one should go about exploring issues of the above kind is a far from simple matter. Some further explanation of the particular approach adopted in the thesis is therefore required. It is also
necessary to explain more specifically how the research presented relates to previous work in its field. This introductory chapter reviews the major approaches in the literature on industrial relations while simultaneously assessing some of the strengths and limitations of the approaches adopted. The objective is to illuminate, through this review, the aims, orientation and scope of the study. The argument can be summarised as follows:

Firstly, in terms of the two basic approaches in the general industrial relations literature (section 1 below), this study adopts the historical or "radical" approach as the one more susceptible to throwing light on the character of industrial relations in Tanzania.

Secondly, in contrast to several well-known perspectives on the state and industrial relations in Tanzania, the approach adopted is action-oriented, in the sense that the actions and interactions of workers, managers and others are taken as a focus for empirical research, not as something which can be deduced or "read off" from the existence of certain formal structures, particularly if the latter are seen in terms of a reductionist theory of the state. Section 3 develops this point.

Thirdly, unlike the bulk of the research on African labour and labour movements (section 2), the thesis is based mainly on a work-place study. The particular methods of research and the reasons for adopting them are further discussed in section 4.
1 CONVENTIONAL VERSUS HISTORICAL/RADICAL APPROACHES TO INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

a) Summary

The development of industry in different parts of the world has given rise to a vast amount of literature on labour and industrial relations. This literature encompasses a number of themes and is distinguished by a variety of approaches. Among the themes considered relevant in this study are: (a) processes and patterns of industrialisation, which identify the historical circumstances under which wage-labour was created, thus shaping its character and its relationship with employers; (b) the character of the political processes in the country concerned; and (c) the conditions of workers' associations or trade unions. The above three issues are interrelated and shape the form and content of industrial relations. Two basically different approaches to the study of industrial relations can be discerned in the treatment of these themes. These have been termed as the "liberal", "orthodox" or conventional approach on the one hand, and the "radical", "marxist" or historical perspective on the other. [Hyman, 1975; Gourevitch, et.al., 1978]. The differences between the two perspectives stem from their theoretical approaches to industrial societies and from their unit of analysis of industrial relations.

Thus, in summary, conventional perspectives (as exemplified in the human relations school, and the liberal pluralist approach) tend to concentrate on the work-place, in isolation from wider economic and political factors. These are assumed, rather than integrated into the account. The radical perspective, on the other hand, places factory dynamics in their economic and political contexts. Further, the conventional approaches perceive enterprise-level relations and the development of, for example, trade unionism as manifestations of an evolving industrialism towards which all societies are moving. Radical approaches, in
contrast, perceive these as historical products of socio-economic and political circumstances of different countries and different regions.

b) Conventional Perspectives

Pioneer studies in work-place relations like those of Western Electric in Chicago carried out by Mayo and his associates [1949] were inspired by managerial concerns concerning the behaviour of workers and in particular their restriction of output. The researchers focused on work-places and the behaviour of workers within them, neglecting to take into consideration the questions of ownership and control (i.e. the economic and political dimensions). The work-places were treated as isolated units within which workers' behaviour could be satisfactorily explained through consideration of the interpersonal relations between workers, the behaviour of supervisors and the amount of communication between management and workers. Liberal and conventional approaches to work-place analysis inherited this central methodological bias from the human relations school.

According to the liberal or conventional approach to industrial relations developed in the 1950's and the 1960's, as exemplified by the work of Dunlop [1958] and Kerr et al. [1962], modern industrial societies are moving towards institutionalised social consensus and harmony. After the initial social conflicts which corresponded to the period of early industrialisation lacking in social coherence, social cohesion is becoming the main feature of modern industrial societies. Social conflict in these pluralist societies is absorbed and controlled by a multiplicity of institutions (e.g. trade unions) catering for a variety of interest groups (employees) which compete and compromise. The end result is a social consensus which takes into consideration the interests of the
whole community. This logic of industrialism is reflected in the
definition of industrial relations as the agreed system of regulations
and rules controlling the relations between employers and employees or
between managers and workers. Through the system of collective bargain-
ing, social peace and cohesion is realized at enterprise or factory
level. Since, in this perspective, the enterprise or factory is also
considered as an autonomous unit, industrial relations are viewed as issues
basically between management and workers, at work-places. The state
or government tries to "maintain some kind of dynamic equilibrium" [Fox, 1966,
p. 2] and the common interest of all parties. National level politics
are neglected or considered as peripheral to industrial relations.

This "liberal or orthodox perspective" has been subjected to a number
of telling criticisms [for example, Hyman and Fryer, 1975]. But perhaps
the most telling critique has been the course of historical events, which
can hardly be grasped comprehensively by the perspective. Gourevitch
et.al. [in Doeringer, 1978] have aptly summarised recent developments,
with particular reference to America and Western Europe. In the wake
of "economic difficulties, inflation, stagnation and other economic ills", p.405]
the state has come to the centre of management-worker relations. State
policies relating to labour, incomes, prices and social welfare measures
as well as unemployment compensation have all had a profound effect on
industrial relations. In response to such changes, analysts have been
forced to take political processes and state policies as centrally
relevant in the study of industrial relations.

Two main criticisms have been levelled against the conventional
approaches to industrial relations. The first inadequacy is the isolation
of industrial relations from the wider socio-economic circumstances and
political processes in the country concerned. The resulting neglect
of differences in access to various resources, of the way domination and control are exercised in society and of the differences in interests among members of an enterprise, makes it hard to explain industrial conflict, which in turn helps to reinforce the idea that industrial conflict is an aberration due to early industrialism. The approach which focuses on the nature of the technology at the plant level such as advanced in the work of Blauner [1964] neglects the wider socio-political factors in a similar way, resulting in an overemphasis on the role of technology in determining industrial relations. Another variant related to what can be called organizational theory focuses on the way people are distributed into different occupational categories or jobs as a logical-rational development of industrial society. This approach shares a similar a-political and a-historical character. The bureaucratic hierarchy and the differential power relations are not perceived to be rooted in specific socio-economic circumstances but are seen as the logical consequence of modern industrial society [Thompson, 1984].

The second inadequacy in conventional approaches to industrial relations is related to its tendency to focus on the formal or legal aspects of the institutions or structural mechanisms which regulate work relations. On the one hand the legalistic perspective does not necessarily give an insight into the actual processes between management and workers. On the other hand, the perspective neglects to account for the social basis of the labour legislation which, as products of human purposeful action, are elements in the relations between groups.

c) The Radical/Historical Perspective

The second general approach to industrial relations is the "radical"
or historical perspective, generally influenced by "Marxist" theory on the development and character of capitalism. Within this broad perspective, industrial relations are considered as the "activities" of employers and of workers and their organizations [Nichols, 1980, p.12] or as "processes of control over work relations" [Hyman, 1972, p.12]. They are elements in the social relations and therefore rooted in the political economy of the country concerned. They relate and correspond to the phase and level of development of the capitalist mode of production and related social relations. With the development of capitalism, control and organisation of production passes to the owners of capital. The increasing technical division of labour leads to the deskilling of the greater part of the workforce. The alienation of the workers in a system of production oriented towards profit is the basis of constant friction and conflict between employers and employees. Enterprise-level activities are non-autonomous; they are closely linked to the evolving economic and political processes in the wider society, of which industrial relations are a part. Industrial relations are the historical product of the technical, economic and political processes of each country. Such an approach has inspired some writers and provided several insights into labour and industrial relations.

For example, in a penetrating summary of the "diversity of the capitalist labour process" and attendant industrial relations (especially the character of unionism) Burawoy [1979, p.231] proposes a scheme within a theory of the uneven development of capitalism which distinguishes competitive and monopoly capitalism and incorporates the historical and national diversities within and between countries. He considers the period between 1890 and 1920 in the U.S. as the transition between competitive and monopoly capitalism. During the earlier period of
competitive capitalism, the relation between employers and workers is marked by intense, often brutal struggles, with each party trying to get the best deal out of the unregulated situation in which workers' associations are unacceptable to employers. In the 1920's company unions became acceptable and this is linked by Burawoy to the rise of "welfare capitalism". Later, with the extension of monopoly capitalism, more autonomous unionism engaged in collective bargaining emerged.

Burawoy also identifies national differences in the general character of industrial relations and trade unionism. He argues that the differences between Britain, Japan and the United States arise from the timing, the pattern of industrialisation and the role of the state in the development of these countries. Citing the comparative study of Dore [1974], Burawoy sees the emergence of strong trade unionism in Britain as linked to the early period of competitive capitalism, with its strong craft and industrial unions, "considerable mobility of employment, a market-based wage and salary system" etc. [p.257]. This character of trade unionism tended to continue in the era of monopoly capitalism. In Japan, however, capitalist industrialisation took place at a later stage, with the state playing a central role in the process, which enabled Japan to "build a viable monopoly capitalism without the intense class struggles associated with the transition from competitive capitalism and the destruction of crafts" [ibid, p. 258]. This created a pattern of industrial relations in which there was collaboration between capital and labour through enterprise unions.

In contrast, as other authors have argued, early industrialisation in the United States passed through the competitive stage but workers' associations were not involved in political issues - "politics" in America at this time was "the affair of strictly local groups organized
on ethnic or racial lines by machine politicians" [Skocpol, 1985, p.26].
The U.S.A. political system had a different history from that of European
countries, with universal suffrage for white men occurring with the
inception of capitalist industrialisation. As Skocpol has aptly explained
[ibid, p. 26]: "In contrast to what happened in many European nations,
unions and workers in the United States did not have to ally themselves
with political associations or parties fighting for the suffrage in
opposition to politically privileged dominant classes and an autonomous
administrative state". That history explains to some extent the general
state of industrial relations in the U.S.A. - showing, incidentally,
that the formation of a national system of industrial relations may be
affected by political factors as much as by economic ones. The later
emergence of industrial unions in the monopoly sector firms became involved
much more with issues of collective bargaining and the settlement of
disputes at enterprise level. Any militancy was blunted by welfare
capitalism. These are some of the factors explaining the semi-corporatist
nature of trade unionism in the U.S. and the dominance of management
in industrial relations.

That economic and political processes have an impact on industrial
relations has been aptly argued in a slightly different context by Poole
[1978]. Discussing participation he advances the view that "the main activity of
governments in the field of industrial democracy has lain not in legal
enactments pertaining to workers' participation itself but in their
effect on the balance of power between the main social classes of any
society and in the creation therein of a constellation of general values
which bear on the issue in question". [p. 133].

This dimension comes out in the literature on industrial relations
in Eastern Europe. In his studies of the Polish and Yugoslav experiences,
Kolaja [1960 and 1965] reveals amongst other things that industrial relations and the workings of workers' councils and self-management schemes are shaped not only by the character, position and role of workers' organisations in the management of enterprises but also by the processes of national decision-making. Given the state's preponderant role in the different sectors of the economy and in employment in those countries, the exercise and distribution of power and concomitantly the position of labour in the wider society is crucial in the operation of those councils. The direct and explicit involvement of the state in economic affairs means that the resolution of factory issues such as wages, prices and working conditions very much depends on the relative strength and resources management or workers have or can have recourse to in the public domain. It also means that the relations between management and workers become explicitly political. Trade unions play a mobilising, social and welfare role. On the other hand, management's power depends on those who have control of state power through the Party.

Discussing the Yugoslav reforms through their system of self-management, Pasic [in Broekmeyer, 1970] argues that the system of workers' councils in that country is part of the direct democracy introduced in 1950 in that society. Workers' councils are one of the ways by which "working people" would exercise their right to decision-making in running their affairs, with management accountable to an elected workers' council. However, the economic situation, both internal and international, such as the level of technology, the market situation and reliance on external financing placed real "constraints on the processes of decision-making at local level" [Poole, 1975, p. 155].

Bettelheim's study of the Chinese experience during the 1966 to 1967 period [Bettelheim, 1974] highlights the intrinsically political
nature of workers' participation programmes and the historical specificity of each experience. Bettelheim demonstrates how the Chinese socio-political revolution took root initially in the countryside. The dispossession of the landlords and the passing of state power into the hands of the Red Army shaped the specific forms of workers' control that were adopted. These attempted to combine socialist economic planning at national, regional and local levels with mass participation at enterprise level. Enterprises were expected to take into account the national plan to cater for societal needs. The 'one-man' type of management was rejected in favour of a collective form of management based on revolutionary committees. Shop-floor participation involved the workforce, organised into teams or groups, dealing with grassroots issues such as improving productivity and maintenance of machinery. In an attempt to bridge the gap between manual and mental work, the occasional participation of administrative and managerial cadres in direct production work was encouraged.

In summary, the two broad approaches in the literature on labour and industrial relations differ in at least two ways: first, on the interpretation of those relations either as elements of broader socio-political processes, or as essentially concerned with issues between managers and employees; and second over theoretical perspectives on industrialisation. In both of these respects, this thesis will follow the "radical" approach.
2 LABOUR STUDIES IN AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW

The literature on labour in Africa has been influenced in one way or the other by the two perspectives outlined in the last section. The advent of colonialism in Africa and the subsequent transformation of African societies led to a variety of studies relating to labour and industrial relations by historians, economists and social anthropologists. The interest manifested in this subject during the colonial period has continued into the post-colonial period. The resulting literature on industrial work and industrial workers in Africa encompasses three main interrelated themes: (a) the penetration of capitalism during the colonial period and the process of proletarianization; (b) the development and character of trade unionism; (c) wage-labour and its condition, including adjustment to urban conditions. There have been relatively few work-place studies.

a) Labour Migration Studies

The penetration of capitalism leading to the creation of a wage-labour force, particularly via the phenomenon of labour migration, has been one of the constant themes on the literature on labour in Africa. Among the more important works on this issue are the study by Schapera [1947] on labour migration in the former Bechuanaland; Arrighi's study [1973] of proletarianization in the former Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe); Sandbrook's [1975] work on the case of Kenya; van Onselen's [1976] study on mine labour in what is now Zimbabwe; and Gutkind and Wallerstein [1976] on the broad lines of change that have occurred. These studies are concerned with the changes in the political economy of Africa with the advent of colonialism, a process of transformation of African societies which include the creation in some places of "reserves" of
migrant labour while in others there emerged an increasingly permanent wage-labour force. In an interesting recent addition to this line of enquiry, the edited work by Munslow and Finch [1984] offers an analysis which places the colonial state at the centre of the process of proletarianisation in Third World countries. Cases from Africa are given.

b) Trade Unions

Some of the above studies naturally deal with the growth of workers' organisations, and descriptive histories of the development of trade unionism have continued to be a major theme in labour studies and industrial relations in Africa. This is witnessed by the considerable volume of works ranging from studies of a more general nature covering the whole continent to more narrowly focused studies of particular countries. The former are exemplified by the early studies by Davies [1966], Woddis [1961] or Berg and Butler [1964] – the last-mentioned echoing the conventional approach of so-called non-political unions as compared with the radical approach represented by Woddis. Pioneering country-level studies of this type include Friedland [1969] on unionism in Tanganyika, Yesufu [1962] on Nigerian unionism, and Bates [1971] on mine workers in Zambia. Friedland [1972] and Kraus [1979] contain further references to some of the better known research on trade unionism in Africa. In these works the history of trade unionism or the growth and development of workers' organisations is related to labour struggles from the difficult beginnings during the colonial period to the chequered experiences during the post-colonial period. Particularly important in this regard are the compilations by Sandbrook and Cohen [1975] and Gutkind, Cohen
and Copans [1978], which are collections of studies on workers' struggles, including strikes, in various parts of Africa during and after the colonial period.

One key issue in writings on trade unionism in Africa has been the question of its "character", particularly in the light of its relationship to the state. In this regard, the literature has given different interpretations and analyses with the general theme that unions in Africa are instruments of control rather than of workers' struggle. Firstly, however, as Waterman [1970] correctly points out, such analyses are often based on idealised models of either 'free' trade union practice in advanced capitalist countries or 'revolutionary' trade unionism in socialist countries. The presence of unions corresponding to these norms is far from reality in those countries, let alone in Third World countries during or after the colonial period. Secondly, the enactment of a variety of legislative measures in African countries regulating the structure, organisation, and leadership of trade unions, or limiting strike action, should not deflect attention from the fact that in practice trade unions remain sites of contention. As Bates' [1971] study suggests, state control may not be complete or actually effective. The Zambian copper miners have effectively resisted control by the state. Structural or legal enactments, while placing constraints on workers' groupings does not automatically determine the content of their activities. A close examination of union activities is necessary to reveal the conditions under which workers' and their unions' activities correspond to the states' demands or get coopted or controlled. While there is little disagreement over the generalisation that governments have attempted to control both union activity, through the structural reorganisation of unions, and the direction of the leadership, especially at the national
level, there are grounds for thinking that more systematic knowledge is needed of how unions and other forms of employee organisations actually operate in work-places.

c) Labour and Urban Conditions

A considerable quantity of African research on labour takes the form of what have been termed urban studies. These deal with the worker's condition and his adaptation to the urban context. The works of Epstein [1958], Mitchell [1961], Mayer [1961], Pons [1969] and Gluckman [1940] are some of those which cover the colonial period mainly for Southern and Central Africa. Those of Peace [1979], Jeffries [1978], Sandbrook [1981], Peil [1972], and Waterman [1981] describe the conditions in the post-colonial period and the position of the employed and other poor in African urban centres. The focus of a study such as that of Sandbrook [1981] is on the urban community of which African labour is a part rather than the work-place or enterprise level. Sandbrook considers residence or housing conditions, low incomes and issues of ethnicity in an attempt to assess the kind of consciousness African urban workers have. The ideology of populism which they share with the other urban poor reflects, in his view, the conditions of dependent capitalism and early industry; it is below workers' consciousness which he presumes to exist among workers in developed central capitalist countries. His exposition of the poor material conditions of workers in African urban centres also contradicts the "labour aristocracy thesis" concerning the alleged privileged position of employed labour [Arrighi and Saul, 1973]. Adrian Peace's study is a good example of studies carried out in the post-colonial period which deal with migrant labour and the relations they develop in town. The author throws some
light on some aspects of shop floor life and in the work estate of Ikeja in Nigeria. The focus however, is on how this has ramifications on their life in the urban community and the wider political context.

d) Work-place Studies

Writings on workers in the work context and on enterprise level dynamics are relatively few when compared to those on migration, trade unions, or urban adaptation. We have referred above to the work of Peace which, in addition to urban residential aspects, covers some aspects of skilled and unskilled workers' relations with management (Chapter 4) and the labour movement over the industrial estate (Chapter 5) and how this was utilised in the urban community. Kapferer's [1972] study deals closely with the relations between the African workers and the Indian management in a Zambian clothing factory, including the various strategies the two parties deploy in that situation. Kapferer focuses revealingly on the social interaction between the two parties. However, in my view, his neglect of the structural or material constraints, both financial and technical, results in an over-emphasis on the behavioural aspects of the parties involved in the interaction. While Bates' [1971] work deals with the relationship between unionism and the state as its main theme, it also gives some insights into processes in the copper mines between employers, the then newly-independent state of Zambia and the miners' unions. The relationship between employers and employees at work-place level can be discerned also from studies which deal with industrial conflicts in several work situations such as those treated in the edited work by Gutkind, Cohen and Copans [1978]. The collection of essays on Industrial Relations in Africa edited by Damachi et.al. [1979] is rather typical in that it gives an up-to-date
summary of the industrial relations legislation or formal machinery in several African countries including histories of trade unionism, but leaves the issue of actual processes in factories or enterprises open and generally neglected.

3 PERSPECTIVES ON THE STATE AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN TANZANIA

With particular reference to Tanzania, the literature on wage-labour by historians, sociologists and economists is quite varied in theme and scope. Three broad concerns can be distinguished in these writings. The first theme is the emergence, growth and development of wage labour in Tanzania. These are mainly historical studies dealing with the changes which have occurred in the country from the last quarter of the 19th century with the advent of colonisation. In dealing with the socio-economic changes, the studies give varying accounts on the development of wage labour. In Rodney's article [1979] on the socio-economic impact of colonisation and the emergence and creation of a body of wage employees the colonial state plays a central role. Iliffe's [1979] history of Tanganyika, which is based mainly on written documents, devotes considerable space to wage-labour conditions and deals with some of the post-Second World War industrial conflicts.

The phenomenon of labour migration is an important sub-theme in the question of the development of wage labour, especially in the cases of the sisal plantations and mines [Rodney et.al., 1983; Sabot, 1979; Shivji, 1986]. These works reveal some of the ways wage labour was constituted as well as some of the characteristics of this labour force. The NUMEIST study [1977] was prepared by economists and has information on the characteristics of the urban wage-labour force, its distribution, and income and demographic characteristics. The issue of wage and
employment trends has been pursued by Valentine [1981] for the period after independence.

A second major theme, the study of trade unionism, has often attracted the attention of the literature on the development of wage-labour. For this, the case of Tanzania is not very different from that of other African countries. Friedland's *Vuta Kamba* [1969] is a book-length study of the emergence and development of the trade union movement in Tanganyika up to 1964. Friedland discusses some of the early forms of workers' associations and the creation of the Labour Department to guide them. He discusses the organisation of trade unions during the colonial period and shows how they were modelled on British trade unionism adapted to colonial Tanganyika. His institutional or, in terms of our earlier discussion, conventional approach leads him to argue unconvincingly "that Tanganyikan unions did not engage in political unionism or, indeed in politics at all to any significant degree ... The Tanganyikan unions were economic in their approach and in the success of their appeal" [p. 116].

Friedland's conclusion, I would argue, arises from a rather narrow definition of "political" linked to perceiving institutions as actors, rather than from a consideration of the activities of workers or union leaders. The insistence by officials of the Labour Department on registering and monitoring unions and on ensuring that they should not be political is significant. Further, the approach employed by Friedland leads him to distinguish economic and political struggle in a way which takes no account of the history of nationalist struggles in Africa. Workers' demands on employers, who were mostly expatriates, may have been initially economic but they could slide (and they did) into opposition to colonial rule. Wage-workers were an important section of the
nationalist movement; lack of organisational unity between T.F.L. (the Tanganyika Federation of Labour) and TANU should not blind analysts to this reality.

Friedland also goes wrong on the significance of independence for the labour movement. He underestimates the real control the state had over union organisation and activities during the colonial period - union autonomy is lost only in 1964 according to him. This, I think, confuses form and content of state control. The former changed, while the latter remained in the post colonial period. Moreover structural control of unions does not guarantee actual control of workers' activities. This leaves the issue of actual control open to empirical investigation. Attempts to control workers' activities in sisal plantations did not always succeed, as for instance the work of Bolton [1978] demonstrates.

The independence period especially the post-Arusha Declaration phase awakened renewed interest in labour studies in Tanzania. Initiating a third major theme, wage-workers and trade unionism came to be examined more and more in the broad context of Tanzania's political economy. The position of labour was a central topic in the wide-ranging debate on class relations and the post colonial state which took place in Tanzania from the late 1960's, and the most influential analyses of the political economy of Tanzania have influenced studies on workers and industrial relations. Shivji's original contribution has been especially important in the literature. The main lines of his thesis can be discerned in Shivji [1975; 1985; 1986], of which the main works are the first and the last references; the 1985 article is an introduction to a collection with other contributors.

Shivji has aptly summarised his central thesis as follows:
The transition from colonialism to neo-colonialism was marked by a change in the class character of the state; .... During colonialism the commercial and merchant bourgeoisie composed mainly of the immigrant nationality (Asians) provided the compradorial base to the ruling metropolitan bourgeoisie ... On independence, the petty bourgeoisie which led the independence movement, inherited reins of the state. Between 1961 and 1967 this petty bourgeoisie underwent significant differentiation in which its state based section emerged as a state bourgeoisie.

[1985, p. 3]

According to Shivji, in other words, independence in 1961 marked the political ascendancy of the petty bourgeoisie, which used the political movement TANU in its subsequent struggles with the mainly Asian commercial bourgeoisie. The Arusha Declaration and subsequent measures marked a decisive turning point in these struggles, leading a faction within the petty bourgeoisie to consolidate and carve out for itself an economic base, thus developing into a bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

As Shivji puts it, "The transformation of the state has taken place both on the level of state power - its class character - as well as in the reorganisation of the state apparatuses. Indeed in life the two are inseparable" [p. 5]. Thus, TANU, dominated by traders and the salariat without any working class component was a key tool in the struggles of the rising petty bourgeoisie. Subsequently, its organisational hegemony was maintained through the nationalisations and the ideology of ujamaa.

Shivji's state bourgeoisie is relatively autonomous from imperialism, and is seen as exploiting the peasantry and the working class. The working class, he maintains, fell victim to the intra-petty bourgeoisie struggles of the early 1960's, which led to the banning of autonomous trade unions and the introduction of a state sponsored and controlled national union in 1964. The workers' councils introduced in the after-
of the Arusha Declaration were established to serve the interests of the bureaucrats, and the hierarchy of institutions set up with token workers' representation has the ideological function of appeasing the workers and robbing the working class of its best elements. The workers' councils represent the 'ideology' – the false consciousness that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie would have the workers internalise.

The aim in this section is not to carry out a comprehensive critique of Shivji's work (a number of articles have done so – for example Gibbon and Neocosmos [1985] and Stein [1985]). Instead the argument focuses on two specific features of the analysis which tend to hamper investigation of social processes such as those of work situations, the role of the party or trade unionism. These aspects will again be the focus of attention in our discussion of the Tanzanian political system in Chapter 2.

First, Shivji's formulation is influenced by the instrumentalist perspective on the state. The Tanzanian state is viewed as the instrument of a class, the petty bourgeoisie, later bureaucratic bourgeoisie, or as representing the interests of that class rather than as shaped by a number of factors. The inadequacies of the instrumentalist view have been pointed out in general terms by several authors; for example, Gold et.al. [1975] and Mouzelis [1986]. Among the inadequacies to which these writers draw attention are 1) a unidimensional approach to social phenomena, and 2) economic reductionism. Thus (1) the approach tends to view state policies and social processes in voluntarist terms – neglecting the structural factors which constrain social processes and policies. State policies are too complex to be reduced to a reflection of the interests of one class or an alliance of classes. Some activities of the state, moreover, (2) are not to any degree concerned with promoting
the economic interests of a class but relate to more particular concerns of the state such as defending its territorial integrity in relation to other States or issues of national integration. The activities of the state cannot be reduced to only economic functions. Shivji's account of Tanzanian politics and society as a whole reflects these shortcomings.

Furthermore, Shivji's perspective has a second, related inadequacy. This lies in the fact that in his perception of legal enactments and measures taken by the ruling class seem to determine social processes. Legal structures, however, do not determine social processes but are elements in power struggles. That approach neglects the reactions and activities of the dominated groups and their influences on state activities and policies. It also underestimates the degree to which state activities may be more the result of the hand of particular members of the state bureaucracy who are crucial in the operation of the state machinery and who by virtue of their know-how and implementation ability are usually close to the formulation of policy.

Shivji's instrumentalist conception of the state and his formalist or structuralist view of political and social processes leads him to conclusions which are difficult to defend. The problems begin with his treatment of colonial labour policies. Shivji [1986] has a detailed history of labour legislation in relation to the character of labour during the colonial period and the early independence period. The author demonstrates how the colonial labour legislation was utilised to regulate and control wage labour. One flaw in his account is the playing down of the various forms of workers' collective action and resistance in the period of semi-proletarianisation, which he incorrectly considers to be individualized [p. 98], thus incorrectly dating the labour movement
to the 1930's. The point one would particularly like to make is that despite the legislation to regulate and control wage labour, this did not stop workers' collective activities in their own defence during the 1940's and 1950's.

The 1964 legislation creating NUTA certainly marked a further attempt by the state to control workers' activities but, as Bienefeld [1979] has argued, this does not determine the role which the unions actually played [p. 553]. In other words, the 1964 NUTA Act did not mark the death of the trade union movement as Shivji seems to imply unless trade unions or workers' activities are reduced to the legal, institutional structures. Similarly, the thesis that the Arusha Declaration and all the ensuing legislation on workers' organisation served the interests of the dominant or ruling class is not only problematic from a theoretical point of view: it begs some of the most important questions. One of the main areas in which there are gaps in our knowledge is the extent to which the designs on the part of the dominant groups have actually been realised as regards unions and workers' councils, and under what conditions this has taken place. Shivji's analysis merely obscures the need for research into these kinds of questions.

Shivji's work is only the most significant of the attempts to analyse the position of labour within the political economy of post-Arusha Tanzania. However, several other well-known contributions pose similar problems. For example, M. von Freyhold's [1977] employment of Poulantzas' structuralist categories tends to suffer from some of the inadequacies associated with the instrumentalist view of the state. The structural functionalism implied in her approach sees state policies and the organisation of the state as being determined by the economic
functions they perform. The main function of the state is taken as fulfilling the accumulation needs of the society's dominant classes. Employing the distinction between "governing class" and "ruling class", von Freyhold considers that the state fulfils the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie (the ruling class), who are in cohesion with a (local) governing class. This economic reductionism neglects the non-economic aspects of the state and of some state policies referred to above in the critique on the instrumentalist notions. The structuralist perspective also neglects the influence struggles of the dominated classes and groups may have on state organisation and state policies.

Saul's reading of Tanzania's political economy [1979] is more optimistic. In his view the class that came to state power at independence was an unformed class which could have initiated either socialist or capitalist policies. This arose according to him out of the relatively autonomous character of the state and its yet unformed class character. It was still composed of a progressive faction and a less progressive one. For those reasons the nationalisations of 1967 were "not merely a charade" but marked an incomplete break with western capitalism. The workers' councils were a bold move to eliminate the obvious alienation of labour in the parastatal sector. Indeed the increasing role of the Party in economic affairs was a step in the right direction, for this is what socialist planning entails. The Party guidelines of 1971 are viewed by Saul as a "crucial document in crystalizing popular pressures against oligarchic tendencies on the part of the wielders of state power". However, there were a number of weaknesses and problems which needed to be resolved in order for the industrial relations scene to progress forward towards socialism. These weaknesses according to Saul, included
the presence of non-radical party functionaries, unclear ideological formulations which left room for the cooption of workers' participation at enterprise level, and the low level of political consciousness on the part of the workers as well as their low cultural level and poor technical education. Similar views are expressed in Loxley and Saul [1975] on the position of workers in parastatals.

Plausible as much of it sounds, Saul's discussion is limited by lack of information of what actually happens - gaps which tend to be filled by prescription. Another inadequacy is the economic functionalism which in the final analysis is present in his conception of the state. The state is not, according to him, autonomous from fulfilling the functions of capital accumulation. The "relative autonomy" he employs is in terms of not being an instrument of one specific class - which is as yet an "unformed" one. The functionalism implied in the perspective does not explain how and why the state performs the function of maintaining the mode of production.

Cranford Pratt's various writings [e.g. 1976; 1979] give a very different view of the post-colonial political economy of Tanzania. In Pratt it is the ideas and visionary qualities of the political leadership which are held responsible for the positive moves towards socialism, as exemplified in the egalitarian measures of the Leadership Code and the democratisation of industrial relations through the workers' councils. However, this vision of the moral qualities of the leadership as the essential determinants of state policies and political institutions overstresses the subjective, voluntaristic factors at the expense of the objective structural conditions, both internal and external, which shape state policies. Pratt also neglects the struggles of other sectors of the population and the influence they may have on the emergence of
the state policies.

The literature just reviewed deals with labour and industrial relations indirectly, for the main focus of discussion is the nature of the socio-political system which emerged in Tanzania after independence and especially after the Arusha Declaration. Contributors were engaged in one or other debate: was Tanzania on the road to socialism? what was the character of the post-colonial state in Tanzania? and so on. There is, however, another reason why the organisation of industrial relations is dealt with in a rather perfunctory way. In these discussions, one of the themes that was neglected, as Goulbourne [1977] points out, was the political party and its position in the political system. This stems from perspectives which neglect to account for how political power is organised and exercised. The state is perceived as the instrument of dominant class or classes or as functional for accumulation, but there is no discussion of how the state is organised or how control and domination are effected and legitimised. Yet answers to such questions can throw important light on societal processes as well as those taking place in work-places. An important issue here is: what are the specific and different modes of domination and legitimation at the micro-level?

In the above mentioned seminal article, later published, Goulbourne[1979] attempts to redress the balance in the debate on the post-colonial state in Tanzania by focusing on the Party. Inspired by Fanon's insight concerning the way the independence party transforms itself into "an administration", Goulbourne advances the argument that the political party in Tanzania, "(unlike parties in developed capitalist formations) certainly ... ceases to be an instrument solely for mobilising support around broadly defined demands, but [is organised in such a way that]
it becomes, in addition, an instrument of coercion" [p. 2]. Functionally the Party plays a coercive and supervisory role over, for example, the educational system and in the field of industrial conflict. The Party acquires this role due to the "need for the dominant petite-bourgeoisie to establish firm control over all possible sources of power" [p. 2], in order to strengthen its weak socio-economic base. "This preponderance of the state over socio-economic life leads to a pre-emption of the activities of politics and forces the state to provide institutions whereby the rituals and the forms, if not the substance of political life are seen to be intact" [p. 3]. The form of political organisation is centred in the political party. Decisions, (if one extends Goulbourne's pre-emption argument) are imposed centrally by the political leadership while maintaining some mix of popular participation which is controlled to the point of popular depolitization.

Goulbourne's stress on the need to continue investigation on the political party due to its importance in the debate on the post-colonial state is timely. In broad terms it coincides with the general demands voiced recently for approaches which overcome the inadequacies of the instrumentalist and structuralist perspectives. In the already-mentioned book Mouzelis [1986] for example argues for a new perspective which avoids economic reductionism by developing "conceptual tools specific to the sphere of politics" [p. 201]. He argues that political structures and contradictions can be studied in their own terms without abandoning the "political economy" approach and "without falling into the type of compartmentalisation of the political and economic spheres which is to be found in non-Marxist political science" [p. 204]. Mouzelis thus suggests an approach which takes into account the way political power is organised and legitimized and the effects of that type of organisation
on state policies. Such a perspective promises to throw more light than some of the approaches reviewed here on work-place processes such as those of a public sector factory.

Of the labour literature which has dealt directly with industrial relations in Tanzania, most was written after 1970 in the wake of the introduction of the workers' participation programmes. Much of this is rather generalised. Mihyo's contribution on Tanzania in the volume on Industrial Relations in Africa [Damachi et.al., 1979], for example, deals with the history of trade unionism, outlines joint consultation, dispute settlement procedures and the structure of workers' participation in Tanzania. This, however, is the industrial relations machinery beyond which one needs to go if one is to comprehend the actual processes, taking place between management and workers. Earlier Mihyo [1975] made an investigation on three cases of industrial disputes in which workers were struggling with management in the early 1970's. This study gives an insight into the industrial disputes and how they were resolved, but the broad setting of the work situation, the work organisation and aspects of the enterprise life and distribution of power are not treated to any significant extent. The essay deals with workers' unrest in the early 1970's occasioned by the 1971 Party Guidelines (Mwongozo), which gave the workers the excuse to demand improved wages and conditions of service. Mihyo states that "workers' committees were used to oppress and exploit the worker with his own consent and acquiescence in the name of discipline and efficiency" and that "the workers' councils were a mockery of industrial democracy" [p. 66]. Both statements are difficult to sustain in the absence of further information on how the union was organised and perceived among the workforce.

Mapolu's edited papers [1976] contain two essays on workers'
participation in several enterprises in the early 1970's. While providing several insights on the actual workings of the workers' councils, the study's analysis is distracted from a consistent and positive approach by a pre-established abstract model which serves to gauge developments in Tanzanian enterprises. Various moves are discredited as ineffective for promoting workers' participation let alone workers' control. The *a priori* model, which has elements of the instrumentalist conception of the state, weakens the account of how (through the structures of the workers' council or the party branch) power is exercised and legitimized. Thus while both Mihyo and Mapolu have made significant contributions to Tanzanian labour studies, neither really gets to grips with enterprise-level dynamics, and both studies serve to highlight the need for research which looks in a more sustained way at the relation between workers and managers in particular work-places.

4 ORIENTATION, ORGANISATION AND METHODS OF THE STUDY

a) Orientation and Organisation

From the last section it should be clear that what has been relatively lacking in Tanzania is not so much literature on labour and industrial relations linked to the evolving economic and political scene, but rather empirical studies of what actually happens in factories and other work-places. Such studies are not only very few and far between, but have an especially important contribution to make in view of the influence exercised in Tanzanian social science of economic reductionist conceptions of politics and formalist/structuralist approaches to social processes. To gain insight into enterprise-level processes and the impact of the Arusha Declaration and *ujamaa* (Tanzanian socialism) on labour relations,
we need both more empirical studies of processes in particular work situations, and, at a "macro" level, an adjustment of perspectives on the political processes as a whole.

This study is designed to contribute to the literature on Tanzania's labour relations in these two ways. It attempts to overcome: 1) the limitations imposed by unidimensional and reductionist approaches to the study of the post-colonial state in Tanzania - approaches which are quite unhelpful in grasping the real context of labour relations and the politics employees are involved in at work-places in Tanzania; and 2) the lack of empirical studies and especially studies of the internal dynamics of work-places and labour organisations (as distinct from national-level studies) which take into account the objective situation in which employees are involved as well as the way they perceive and articulate their interests. In pursuing the above-mentioned objectives, the thesis presents case studies of industrial relations in Tanzanian public sector factories, which are first set in the wider context of the political and economic processes which have historically shaped the character of industry and wage-labour in Tanzania.

Among the factors which have shaped industrial relations are the nature of the economy, the character of industry and the level of technological development. We therefore need to highlight a number of characteristics of industry and industrial work-places, as well as other salient characteristics of wage-labour in Tanzania, spanning the colonial and post-colonial periods. This is done in Chapter 1.

Chapter 2 is an examination of the political system in Tanzania. The chapter attempts to interpret political processes as shaped by the corporatist objectives of the political leadership in search of national integration and harmony. These corporatist principles are specifically
examined in so far as they relate to labour policies and institutional structures in Chapter 3.

The second part of the thesis – Chapters 4 to 6 – presents the case study material which is concerned in the main with three broad areas of interest to the thesis: a) the work and organisational context; b) the factory agencies (union and party branches) and its employees; and c) factory issues: decision-making and implementation. The number and nature of the case studies, and other details of the methods of the study, are explained below.

A Conclusion draws together the major findings of the research.

b) Methods of Data Gathering

This research began and developed against the background of the political and ideological changes and labour legislation reforms which occurred in Tanzania over the decade or so after 1967. In the beginning I had only vague ideas about what I wanted to investigate. There were a number of issues I was interested in. These included the ujamaa (socialist) experience in Tanzania; the political party and its place in Tanzanian society; and industrial democracy or ujamaa in factories and how this affected employees' position and conditions. Discussions among social scientists tended to focus on the ujamaa experience in the countryside with the creation of ujamaa villages and the villagisation policy. However, interest in the Party and the political system was renewed with the creation of CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi) in 1977.

Exploratory Research

In collaboration with a member of staff at the University of Dar es Salaam, Dr. H. Goulbourne, I participated in a research project on
the political party, its organisation and relation with other institutions in socialist construction in Tanzania. The preliminary step was a reading of Tanzanian newspapers (Uhuru and The Daily News) for the years from 1967 to 1980, focusing on reports on the Party, Labour and Ideology. We carried out a number of in-depth interviews with national political personalities and Party bureaucrats at the Party headquarters. Information sought related to Party organisation and Party activities in economic planning and the role of the Party in regard to different political instances and organisations. The Party's history and orientation was discussed.

We carried out a reading of minutes of meetings of the National Executive Committee and the Central Committee at the Party Headquarters, noting their membership and the issues discussed. These meetings are confidential and so are the minutes. One of the aims was to evaluate the role of these national Party bodies and hence the meaning of the recently declared "Party supremacy".

Our third step was to discuss the relationship between Party officials and managers in enterprises outside Dar es Salaam. In-depth interviews were carried out with Party branch leaders and union leaders. This served for me as very useful experience in clarifying the organisation of the Party and some aspects of Party "supremacy". It also helped me in identifying more closely and focusing on aspects on which to concentrate my research. Finally, these preliminary explorations gave me some further useful experience in fieldwork.

Gradually, in discussion with a number of members of staff at the University of Dar es Salaam and the University of Hull, I decided to focus on factory studies against the background of industry and politics in Tanzania. The preliminary investigations became resource material
for my chapters on industry and politics. My exploratory readings and research also suggested leads as to what to concentrate on; and what documents and other likely sources of information to look for. I also gained familiarity with the practice of in-depth interviews with management and Party leaders: what could and could not be found out by this means; what key issues to concentrate my attention on; how to formulate the questions related to issues found in reading of minutes; and what to keep my eyes and ears open for during conversations and interviews. I also gained some knowledge of factory situations and acquaintance with Party and union activities - very crucial in interpreting situations and responses from interviewees and the meanings and the "culture" of factories.

As an employee of an educational establishment, I am acquainted with many aspects of work-place organisation in Tanzania. Party and union meetings are a general feature of Tanzanian society and work situations: rare is the month when there are no such meetings. It should therefore be added that gaining some information on factory situations was for me another, but not completely, different experience.

The Factory Studies

The second phase of my collection of information for the case studies was carried out for a period of six months during 1983-4. From January to April 1983 I carried out research on what I shall call Factory A. Another enterprise, Factory B, was investigated from May to the beginning of August 1984. During the intervening period I was on an assignment to write a report on a rural project.

Research Sites

The choice of the research setting was influenced in the first place by accessibility. If I wanted to carry out the investigation for some
continuous length of time, I needed to choose sites within easy reach of my domicile, which is in Dar es Salaam. Research outside Dar es Salaam would be costly and therefore impractical given my financial limitations. Secondly, Dar es Salaam is the *de facto* industrial and political centre of Tanzania. Thus public enterprises in Dar es Salaam were likely to reveal the workings of the industrial organisation and political reforms much more quickly than enterprises in other towns. Thirdly, I personally knew one or two persons working in the personnel offices of factories in the city, which was useful for gaining access even though I had a letter of introduction from the University of Dar es Salaam, the main prerequisite for obtaining the necessary cooperation.

**Choice of Factories**

Factory A - the subject of the main case study - is a wholly government-owned enterprise. With slightly over 650 employees, it is a medium-sized factory by Tanzanian standards. The factory manufactures hand agricultural implements using imported materials. It was and remains one of the more important industrial enterprises for the Tanzanian agricultural economy.

I went to study Factory B some months after my investigation in Factory A. Factory B is one of the biggest textile mills in the country. The information gathered in this case was particularly concerned with workers' councils and Party activities. The factory is larger and so I decided to restrict my interviews to 50 workers in the Weaving Section. The aim was to use the information from this and other establishments to throw extra light on my main case study.

**Techniques of Collecting Information**

Four techniques of collecting information were utilised:
i) Interviews with Factory Leadership

a) In-depth interviews with members of management

The interviews were in the form of a discussion. In Factory A I interviewed the Manpower and Administrative Manager, the Personnel Officer, Assistant Personnel Officer and the Training Officer on different occasions. The interviews dealt with general information on the factory: its history, organisational set-up, production, the workforce, marketing and general problems related to the enterprise and various services. Interviews went on to cover the different factory agencies created to involve the workers and managers' assessment of those agencies. How did they view those agencies and their activities? What did management consider as positive or negative in the activities of those agencies? How did they relate to them? And so on. Information was gathered during the interviews and later in less formal discussions. The Personnel Officer and the Training Officer were very helpful in discussing some issues or events which took place before I went to do the research.

b) In-depth interviews with Party and union leadership

In Factory A I carried out discussions with the Party Branch Secretary, who introduced me to the Party Branch Chairman, the Chairman of the union, JIUWATA, and the acting Secretary and two members of the Party Branch committee. He took me around the factory and introduced me to the Production Manager before seeing a Shift Foreman and a supervisor in the Forging and Pressing sections. He took me through different departments and explained to me the work process.

My interviews with the Party and union leaders dealt with the history, organisation and activities of the Party branch and the union. I also enquired as to what they considered the successes and failures of their agencies at the factory. How fervent were their members and what was
their relation with management? As I interacted with these representatives for several weeks, I added some of the information after the more "formal" interview-discussion was carried out in the Party office. These personalities were interviewed singly. The in-depth interview gave the flexibility to discuss issues or stumble on events, as for example when one respondent mentioned how managers misuse company property.

ii) In-depth Interviews with Employees

I interviewed 60 employees in Factory A. These were from the Materials Preparation Section, the Heat Treatment Section, and the Forging and Pressing Sections. I concentrated more on workers from the plant sections, although I had interviews with two security guards, two secretaries and one purchasing officer and accounts clerk. The machine operators were all from the shift, which in one week would be the morning shift and the following week the afternoon shift (from 3 p.m.). The interviews were carried out in the factory, in the office of the supervisor. I asked the foreman to allow the workers to come if they wanted and if possible to get a mix from the older employees and newer ones. My evaluation of responses to my invitation is that those who came came willingly, were not worried about talking to me (some thought, before I introduced myself, that I was an insurance promotions agent), and in general responded frankly to my questions.

For these interviews I used a guide questionnaire to steer the discussion-cum-conversation. This helped me to cover the main issues I wanted to collect information on and avoid wandering off too far. Whatever manner in which the interview developed, I tried to cover items like job, education, wage level and membership of the Party and union, not always in the same order. The guide questionnaire helped me to note the information under the appropriate heading or to fill it in in
the appropriate space after the interview. The information sought concerned, in addition to the employee's job, education, wages and memberships, his or her participation in union and Party activities, the meanings attached to these activities and the role seen to be played by these organisations. Similar procedures were used for the 50 interviews in Factory B.

iii) Documents

These consisted of copies of the minutes of Workers' Council meetings for 1979 to 1982; the minutes of Party meetings, especially the cell meetings in the Forging and Pressing Sections from 1975 to 1982; and the minutes of JUWATA (union) meetings for the whole factory. The documents varied in length and quality. The Workers' Councils minutes were long and included reports of departmental activities and figures on production, sales and purchases. Some of the JUWATA meeting minutes on the other hand, were three-to-four page summaries. Minutes of Party meetings were of mixed length; some were as short as four pages, others longer. The recording was sometimes a summary; at other times minutes recorded what one or other participant said. This proved valuable in gauging the participants' contribution in the discussions.

I was not allowed to make copies of the documents, some of which were confidential. However, in the course of the first days of reading and taking notes I devised a thematic format of recording my notes on the minutes and documents. The headings included: recruitment; sanctions; promotions; further training; wages; social services; investment and marketing decisions. How did the workers' representatives and management react to them? What issues were discussed in the different sessions and how were they dealt with by the different representatives from the agencies in the factory and by management? The Secretary
and Chairmen had been working for some years in the factory and their recollections of some of the more recent events (e.g. the "compulsory leave" episode; the loss of overtime issue; the problems about transport or the canteen; thefts; and the matter of "shady deals") complemented and could be used to check what I read in the minutes of meetings, and vice-versa.

iv) General Observation and Noting

In the course of my presence at the factory, in the Plant Section, the canteen, the Party office or the administrative block, and in the course of interviews or reading of documents, I came across situations, some of which were directly relevant for my research. For example, I was present when the Chairman of the Party branch was meeting members of the branch political committee; or when the Chairman of JUWATA came to the Personnel Office with several machine operators who had been warned for coming late to work. I was also a witness to numerous relevant exchanges in the factory canteen.

These methods of investigation and gathering information were not employed in a sequential manner but were used simultaneously and combined in the course of the field work. The combination of different methods was especially important in the course of my first days in the factory and in my preliminary analyses, serving to further guide me in the investigation. The use of complementary methods helped to clarify and reinforce some of the information which might otherwise have been less than completely reliable from the documents or interviews. One advantage of the in-depth method is to be able to clarify responses and cross-check them if need be. As the interviews were carried out in a form of a conversation or discussion, any question I felt was misunderstood I was able to reformulate. Sometimes I noted down the information immediately,
but other points were noted after the interviews.

In the course of my investigation I came across two episodes which I did not witness but which were significant in illustrating some of the issues discussed. One was the compulsory leave given to employees of Factory A for two months in 1982. The other was the allegation of malpractice in the company. The first event took place before I went for the research and I had to reconstruct what happened before, during and after the "leave". This was done through documents and interviews. The second "event" began before I went for the research and continued after. I relied on documents and interviews as well as newspaper reports for a picture of what happened.

A Final Note on Factory B

The study in Factory B was, as has already been explained, to supplement my main study. Here I concentrated on documents and reports of Workers' Councils. Records of Workers' Councils in this factory were often very long, with the names of who said what and what was suggested and agreed in the meetings. This proved particularly valuable in helping to assess how agreement or dissent was reached, as distinct from the content of decisions. As the main research was concerned chiefly with workers in the directly productive sections of Factory A, I chose machine operators from the Weaving Section as my interviewees in Factory B, as well as interviewing the officials from factory agencies from this large enterprise.
CHAPTER 1
THE DEVELOPMENT OF WAGE LABOUR IN TANZANIA

1. INTRODUCTION

The object of this chapter is to highlight key background information on the emergence, development and character of wage labour in Tanzania. In doing this, the aim is to gain some understanding of the kind of processes which have contributed to the creation of a working class in Tanzania. The scope will necessarily be selective, but we will touch on aspects of the economic processes which were implanted, the nature of the labour policies and the various forms of workers' activities during the colonial and the post-independence periods. This selective review will form a broad framework which will be useful in later appreciating labour policies and the position of workers in manufacturing public enterprises in the contemporary era.

In examining the record of the colonial period, three interrelated points are stressed. Firstly, wage labour emerged simultaneously with the introduction of a new economic system as a result of colonisation. The new economic processes did not emerge from the spontaneous internal dynamism of the pre-colonial societies of Tanzania, but were the result of a dynamism which originated from outside. This has important ramifications. Secondly, the state was directly involved in the creation of this new economic system and the emergence and growth of a wage-labour force. In other words, it emerges that the colonial state was not only the guarantor of societal peace within the given territorial space, but was actively and effectively engaged in the process of creating wage labour not only for private enterprises but also for the state. Thirdly, the economic system which gradually took root was oriented towards import/
export activities as the key structures of the economy. The wage labour force linked with these activities - in export agriculture and mining, construction and building, commerce and trading activities, and the administrative sectors - represented a small part indeed of the total labour force, a tiny minority of permanently wage-employed in the midst of semi-employed or those working on the land.

In other words, the emergence of categories of people who work in exchange for a wage or salary, as distinct from the various forms of slavery or serfdom, was in Tanzania as in other parts of Africa generally the product of western colonialism.[see Amin, 1976, Ch. 5 for a broad picture of the African continent]. Prior to formal colonisation of mainland Tanzania, forms of wage labour were found among porters on the caravan trade, and their numbers increased with added activities of trade companies in the mid-19th century [Iliffe, 1979]. The main focus of the discussion in the early part of this chapter, therefore, is the pattern of socio-economic development resulting from the impact of the colonisation which followed the rise of industrial capitalism in Western Europe. The implantation of capitalism in Third World countries and the simultaneous development of wage labour manifested itself in different forms in each country or region depending on how capitalism was introduced in the country, the nature of the societies with which it came into contact and the responses of the populations involved. These issues have a bearing on the character of wage labour which emerged and how it developed. The character of wage labour in Tanzania thus depended on the mode of implantation of capitalist relations through colonisation and the responses by the precapitalist societies during and after colonisation.

The "mature" colonial situation in Tanzania was characterised by efforts to create and run the above-mentioned extractive (export-oriented
agriculture and some mining) and import-export economy. Agriculture took two main forms: a plantation wage-labour employing sector and a household-based agriculture. The role of the state in this extractive/import economy was to create the conditions and infrastructure for servicing such an economy. This consisted of: the constitution of a transport and communication network to facilitate the expansion of export agriculture and the distribution of imported manufactured goods; assistance to employers to procure a labour supply in the face of chronic shortages; and the creation of the necessary administration and services within the territory in order to maintain some order. This pattern of activities shaped both the distribution and the character of colonial wage labour. Colonial wage labour was concentrated in plantation agriculture; transport (dockers, railwaymen, transporters); mining; government administration; social services and domestic service. Manufacturing was negligible. As the new production system did not emerge through the natural evolution of the concerned societies, employers had considerable difficulties in drawing labour from the pre-capitalist social formations. As in many other Third World regions, resort was had to "extra-economic" measures to recruit and procure labour [cf. Munslow and Finch, 1984]. The colonial state was active both in using forced labour or taxation to force labour out of peasant-household-based activities, and in laying down regulations for the treatment and organisation of that labour.

As we shall see, the recruited workmen reacted in a variety of ways, either individually or in combination, when faced with this new work situation. This was the beginning of trade unionism in Tanzania. State legislation enacted in the 1920's and 1930's governing workmen's combination was the state's response - its strategy for monitoring,
organising and containing the emerging forms of collective action. It should not be seen as the origin of trade unionism, I shall argue. Faced with an employer who was more often than not a "foreigner", workers were susceptible to the nationalist movement as it developed in the 1950's.

The discussion on the "post-colonial" period in the later sections of this chapter will identify some of the changes which emerged in the pattern of economic development, the role of the post-colonial state and its strategy as regards labour. That strategy as manifested in the labour policies of the new government was "rooted in the political economy which reveals its material basis" [Hyman, 1979, p. 329]. With independence in 1961, state power passed into the hands of the leadership of TANU, the popular nationalist movement. The leadership of the independent state was faced primarily with the task of ensuring societal unity and cohesion (given the country's many social divisions) while supervising an economy whose structures had been erected during the colonial period. The experience of the first years of independence was to prove that reliance on foreign private investment to meet the demand for growth, especially in manufacturing, was misplaced. To meet popular needs within the context of national sovereignty, the state increasingly became involved in the economy through the extension of the public sector, either by new direct investments or, especially after 1967, by nationalisation. As we shall see, these developments formed the material basis for the corporatist labour policies which were a feature of the post-independence scene.
Before becoming the German colony of East Africa in 1885 following the general "scramble for Africa" among West European powers, Tanzania consisted of a multiplicity of societies and communities with varied economic foundations and forms of social organisation, depending in part on ecology and history. [Kjekshus, 1977]. On the eve of formal German colonisation following the Conference of Berlin, the socio-economic situation can be summarised as follows. Along the coast were societies dominated by a landed aristocracy headed by the Sultanate in Zanzibar and composed of groups of Arab descent. This aristocracy employed slave labour on clove plantations and lived on the proceeds of the slave and ivory trades with the interior. The southern areas, the north-eastern zones around the Usambara Mountains and Mount Kilimanjaro as well as the areas near the lakes Victoria and Tanganyika in the north-west, were peopled by cultivators relying on household labour or that of kin or neighbours. In the north-west there existed a form of socio-economic organisation known as nyarubanja (a patron and client relationship based on land and loosely resembling feudalism). In the more widespread form of socio-political organisation, found in the west, south-west and southern parts and the moist parts of the centre of the country, cultivators belonged to small or big communities led by a chief, in some places known as the ntemi. Members of different households had to pay tribute to him in the form of grain or livestock or by cultivating his fields during certain days of the rainy season. In the dry central parts, clusters of hunters could be found, while in the north-central areas the picture was completed by the presence of pastoralists organised around households and age-sets [see Sheriff, 1979, p. 11 for a short version]. The only forms of wage labour before the
1880's were found in the caravan trade - porterage and other supporting services such as domestic servants and guards. These increased as new activities were undertaken by trading companies and missionary societies from the 1840's onwards [Iliffe, 1979, p. 279].

The establishment of German domination over the communities in this territory marked the beginning of a process in which these societies were gradually reshaped. The structure's new socio-economic patterns were built around two basic processes: (a) creating the conditions for the extraction or production and export of raw materials from the territory; and (b) the proliferation of imported manufactured products from abroad within the country. To advance these processes while at the same time protecting Germany's sphere of influence, the colonial state was established, with Dar es Salaam becoming the capital in 1891.

Soon after the turn of the century plans were put into place for the construction of the central railway line, which was intended not only to open up the interior but to be a strategic line of communication for quick movement of troops to quell any uprisings. From 1906 Dar es Salaam gradually became the main port and railhead for the interior. Further north, another railway was built from Tanga towards the fertile areas around Mount Kilimanjaro in 1905. The creation of a communication infrastructure went simultaneously with the creation of an administrative structure led by the governor with the local jumbes and akidas occupying the lowest ranks. These were locally recruited agents of the German colonial state who were used to put pressure on the population to produce agricultural commodities such as cotton and oilseeds or to collect bee wax and ivory.

Two main forms of agricultural production developed during the German period: (a) plantation agriculture in rubber and sisal in the
north-east and along the central railway between Dar es Salaam and Morogoro (this, as Rodney [1979] has noted, was the more important system of production with European settler farms mainly restricted to the Usambara Mountains being of lesser importance); and (b) peasant production of cash crops, mainly relying on household labour, which was developing in different parts of the country (e.g. coffee, copra). The creation of one territorial entity under a central colonial administration and the orientation of agricultural production towards export was paralleled by the importation of manufactured goods from abroad, mainly Germany.

These developments had a number of consequences for the economies and social structure of the societies within this territorial space. First, the country became divided into several discernible and unevenly endowed economic zones: (a) the areas where plantation agriculture was dominant, mainly sisal around the general area between Morogoro; Tanga and Dar es Salaam; (b) the labour-exporting zones – with the difficulties of getting labour in the areas near the plantations, labour was procured from the relatively poor central-west, west (Kigoma), south-west and southern areas; (c) peasant-based production where due to favourable ecology and state policy peasant cultivators produced crops like coffee (around Mount Kilimanjaro, Bukoba and Rungwe); cotton (in the Lake Victoria area); and (d) areas where a mixture of those activities could be found.

Second, the importation of manufactured goods in significant numbers led to negative effects on, and the demise of, "traditional" crafts, especially those related to iron works and the clothing industry [Phillips, 1976, p. 5]. Third, the gradual proliferation of the use of money and the need to use money accelerated the transformation of
the societies. In order to meet their requirements for such items as clothing, hoes and cash for paying taxes, individuals and households were induced into money-acquiring activities, either as cash-crop cultivators or as wage labourers. Outside merchants, traders and employers were the only ones who could provide the needed money. The relative self-sufficiency of households and communities was thus shattered and with it the basis for the social stratification based on age or sex in several parts of the territory. In those areas where in the precolonial period social differentiation was noticeable, that differentiation was now based on access to and control of cash cropping land; control of livestock; access to money through education and service in the colonial state; or trading and commercial activities.

Wage labour developed during the German period within colonial administration, transport and construction work (especially railway and harbours), agricultural work (forming the bulk of the workforce in non-native agriculture), trade and domestic service, with some mining. One study [Lebuscher, 1944] estimates that in 1912 there were a total of 139,515 wage earners in the service of Europeans or a total of 172,000 wage employees, if police and soldiers (6,000) and others employed by coloured employers are included [cited by Stephens, 1968, p. 21]. This was about 14% of the adult male population. As we have already noticed in general terms, the new system of production had not emerged from the internal processes of expansion, so that labour procurement initially, and indeed for a great part of the colonial period, was difficult. Several mechanisms were utilised, at the centre of which was the colonial state. Forced labour was utilised for construction and building work. Agents of the colonial administration used coercion for various projects such as the construction of the railway lines and roads as well as
buildings for local administrative centres, known as bomas. Force was utilised for procuring labour in agricultural plantations or communal projects for the production of cash crops such as cotton in south-eastern Tanzania. Another well-known form of labour procurement was the imposition of various taxes usually in money. In order to fulfil that requirement the population as a whole had two main options: engage in cash crop production or search for wage employment. Engaging in cash crop production depended on several factors: the ecology of the area for cash-cropping, transport possibilities and the proximity of markets to the area, and the state policy on cash crop production in the region. In the less favoured areas labour migration was the only available option. The overall result led to different regions occupying different positions in the colonial economy as mentioned above.

The changes brought about by the spread of money were reinforced by the introduction of a system of formal education. To man the junior ranks in the colonial administration, to be employed in education or social services or to occupy the position of assistant in commerce or the growing import-export trade, one had to pass through the school system which was introduced at this time. "About 9% of estimated eligibles were receiving some instruction in 1913".[Stephens, 1968, p. 22]. Apart from the different sectors of the colonial administration, export-agriculture and the import houses, the products of the schools were employed by the army as messengers and by religious organisations, with increased Christian religious conversions after 1908.

Wage labour was still in its great part agricultural wage labour in the plantations and a few mines and therefore rural. Nevertheless, towns like Dar es Salaam and Tanga were growing in importance as harbours,
railheads and centres of administration. The growing status of Dar es Salaam as the centre of administration for the whole territory, as the railhead and harbour for the hinterland and overseas trade gradually attracted a growing population from upcountry, with its population expanding from a modest few dozens of cultivators and fishermen before 1865 to 5,000 in 1886 and 19,000 in 1913 [Leslie, 1963, p. 21]. Sabot [1979, p.17] gives estimates of 20,000 in 1900 and 22,500 in 1913.

The story is similar for the growing small centres which emerged in many parts of the territory, forming the nucleus of an expanding urban population. Many of them began as trading posts and/or centres of administration, growing as these two activities and other supporting services for the core of the colonial economy expanded. Tanga developed as a railhead and harbour for the northern railway and an entreport for the interior and the export harbour for the growing sisal production in this zone. Moshi developed as a trading post from the railway station at the foot of Mount Kilimanjaro. Kigoma/Ujiji, originally a centre for the caravan trail and a slave trading post, grew as the railway reached the shores of Lake Tanganyika. Tabora, as the railway junction to Lake Victoria and towards Lake Tanganyika, developed into an important trading, communication and administrative post. Mwanza, a fishing village, became the administrative centre for the rich and densely populated Lake Victoria districts, and with the railway reaching there after the First World War, it expanded in population. Stephens [1968, p. 21] provides a useful table which shows populations of principal towns of German East Africa in 1896 and 1913.

The spatial residential division of the towns followed a pattern also observed in Dar es Salaam – the racial segregation of the town [Leslie, 1963]. The administrative centre manned by Germans contained
offices around which residential houses were built. In the commercial quarter one found Asiatic people whose place of work and residence was usually located in the same house. The African quarters were in the outer parts of the town, usually merging into the surrounding villages. As Dar es Salaam grew later, this pattern was repeated, each race being allocated its residential areas, with the familiar differences in housing quality, population density and facilities.

Labour conditions were similar to those in other colonial situations. Though slavery had been officially abolished by the German administration, the use of forced labour was normal in the construction industry, with flogging and regimentation in work camps and imprisonment of recalcitrant labourers. It was perhaps in the sisal plantations that regimentation was most pronounced, with the worst conditions among estates run by smaller employers with little capital opting for quick returns on their investments [Orde-Browne, 1946; Rodney et al., 1983]. Poor housing in the form of grass huts and poor sanitation has been documented [Rodney et al., 1983, pp. 34-35] as well as poor nutrition and a high incidence of disease. Wage workers in construction, quarrying and sisal estates were mainly unskilled with consequent low pay per assigned task.

The wage paid in such situations was a "bachelor's wage": the reproduction costs of the workers' labour-power and retirement benefits were not considered in fixing wage levels. The generally low wages meant that wage labour relied for its reproduction on the rural areas from which it had been extracted. This had a double disadvantage for the household and the rural area from which the labourer had emigrated: the loss of able-bodied manpower from the household sector to the wage sector; and the necessity to provide support to returning migrants in the absence of old-age pension or retirement benefits.
Workmen's responses to the incorporation into this colonial wage
labour market took various forms. We have already implied that there
was resistance to forced labour. Several authors have documented the
most notable example of such resistance, known as the Maji Maji Uprising
of 1905 [Iliffe, 1978; Rodney, 1980]. Sabot [1979] notes that "the Gotzen cotton scheme employed large numbers of men against
their will at extremely low levels of compensation; its existence has
been put forward as an explanation of the Maji Maji Rebellion" [p. 39].
The difficulty of securing sufficient labourers during this period was
a manifestation of the reticence of large numbers of rural dwellers in
taking up wage employment. For those, however, who did get engaged
in, for example, sisal plantations, the presence of hard labour with
low pay led to many deserting and fleeing to other countries like Kenya.
This is what happened following the resettlement of labourers from west-
central Tanzania in areas around sisal plantations between 1900 and 1902.
Many of them deserted and sought better paid jobs in Kenya or Zanzibar.
Other labourers deserted even before the termination of their contracts,
giving up their pay to return to their home areas. One response on
the part of employers was to attempt to dispense with indigenous labour.
To meet the chronic shortages in supply, the construction of railways
had to rely on a significant proportion of imported Indian industrial
workers. Sisal estates also recruited workers from outside the territory
[Sabot, 1979, p. 32].

Wage labour during these initial stages was not stabilised but
migrant [Orde-Browne, 1946]. The search for wage employment to meet
needs for taxation or the buying of imported manufactured goods would
be carried out during the dry seasons until the "targeted" amount of
money had been acquired through porterage, domestic work, building or
construction. This form of circular migration did tend to weaken the development of workers' unity, since they would remain at work-places only for limited periods before returning to their home areas.

However, the early stirrings of workers' collective actions can be discerned in the German period. There were workers' mutual aid schemes, especially in times of sickness or death. These were based on workers from the same district or speaking the same language and having similar cultural practices, helping one another, receiving new arrivals, arranging taking care of them and introducing them to the employer. These same groupings usually led by elders or long-timers were utilised to present petitions to the employers for the redress of grievances. Desertions and boycotts of harsh employers were also organised.

This point needs to be stressed, for a number of studies trace the rise of trade unionism to the passing of legislation on trade unions in 1928, or else to the rise of the unions as a phenomenon after the Second World War. The passing of trade union legislation which came somewhat later, during the British colonial period, was an expression of attempts by the colonial state to direct and channel already existing workers' collective actions into forms which the state could supervise and monitor through the Department of Labour. The legislation did not create the unions. These emerged spontaneously through efforts of wage employees who found themselves in new conditions of wage employment.

To be sure, these early expressions of workers' unity took traditional forms. Leadership of such informal mutual-aid associations tended to be in the hands of older migrants, as in many pre-colonial situations. Furthermore, the process of creating workers' unity was not without its contradictions and breaks – contradictions, which were
used by employers. Employers picked some labourers to act as gang leaders known as nyamparas (foremen) and utilised language and cultural differences to limit the cohesion of their labour force. Weak and lacking the recognised forms of a modern labour movement, these early efforts of self-organisation were in their substance the early development of trade union action.

3 THE BRITISH PERIOD

After the First World War, in 1920, mainland Tanzania became a mandate territory under a British colonial government. Most of the processes of socio-economic transformation which had been initiated during the German period were continued. On the other hand, the uncertain political future of the territory in the international political situation following the First World War was not very conducive to increased foreign investments [Leubuscher, 1944]. This relative lack of metropolitan interest in the development of the territory was aggravated by the economic crisis of the 1930's.

Among the economic innovations which did occur in the inter-war years and which have a direct bearing on wage employment were the extensions to infrastructure for communications and transport. The rail link between Tabora and Mwanza was completed in 1928; road construction continued, a telegraph service was introduced. Mining expanded, with gold mining in Musoma, Geita, Lupa and Sekenke; diamond mining; salt, tin ores and mica [Leubuscher, 1944, pp. 54-56]. The great labour-employing sector remained the sisal plantations, which recovered following the War. Sisal growing was extended along the central line. The Tanganyika Sisal Growers' Association was formed in 1923 to coordinate activities of plantation employers from many nationalities who had bought the estates
after the War. Wage employment in this sector continued to grow [Leubuscher, 1944, pp. 62-63; Rodney et al., 1983, p. 31]. Other notable sectors of wage-employment were in transport, domestic service and government administration, and there was now some local industry, including small bakeries and repair workshops, as well as a growing number of ginneries for cotton [Stephens, 1968, p. 48, Table 10]. The growing of agricultural export crops, other than sisal, such as coffee and cotton was mainly by smallholder peasant households. Coffee production on this basis had expanded, for instance, around Kilimanjaro and in Bukoba. By the 1930's, the Kilimanjaro Native Coffee Union (a cooperative) had been formed to deal with peasant-grown coffee. Cotton production, which had been introduced in the Lake Victoria zone, was linked to a number of Asian-owned ginneries.

As the mandate authority, the British colonial government became involved from the 1920's in regulations governing labour. In 1922 through the Involuntary Service (Abolition) Ordinance, forced labour was abolished. The main legislation, which dates from 1923 and was amended in 1926, was the Master and Native Servant Ordinance, which regulated terms of contract for recruiting and employing African wage-labour. This was complemented by the relaxation of forced labour except for public works; the provision of housing, food and health services for employees; and the recourse to court in case of a breach of a work contract, rather than resort to the employer's summary powers for sanctioning his employees.

In order to oversee implementation of and adherence to these laws, the Labour Department was formed in 1926 as a special branch of the colonial government. In 1938 a Labour Inspectorate was formed to supervise labour and safety conditions in work places. Through the
Labour Department, the state took charge of labour recruitment, which remained difficult, given the shortages of labour supplies chronic during this period. The Department was in charge of setting up transit camps and running them for labour from upcountry passing through the labour routes especially in Kilosa, Kimamba and Muheza. Safety conditions especially in the mines came under the Department's brief. Other important activities included supervision of modes of wage payment and medical care for labour migrants. Administrative officers in the districts became key figures in regulating labour recruitment [Friedland, 1969, p. 32f].

Legislation on trade unionism was also passed during this period. Prior to 1932, the year the Ordinance was passed, a number of unions had been formed: among civil servants - and teachers - the Tanganyika Teachers and African Civil Servants Association (1922); the Tanganyika Railways Asiatic Union (1925); and the Railway African Association (1929). These had existed often as "staff associations" for mutual welfare and social and cultural activities. The presence of anonymous and spontaneous African associations with political undertones in an urban context such as Dar es Salaam, with which many employees were undoubtedly in contact [Iliffe, 1979, p. 392] was regarded as potentially disruptive. The registration of Trade Unions with the government was made compulsory as a means of supervising their activities with the view that they should not be political and deal only with collective bargaining. Later, after the Second World War, various models were experimented with in further efforts to regulate labour relations in the wake of increasing wage employment.

The foresight shown by the experienced colonial administrators who initiated the recognition and supervision of trade unions in Tanganyika
was acquired through examples from other territories, through conferences of Labour Commissioners in East and Central Africa [Friedland, 1969, p. 35]. Experience was to prove them correct despite objections by some local employers particularly in the sisal estates. The seeds of state control over unions and workmen's collective activities were sown—a legacy which was to be developed and enhanced during the subsequent decades.

The last two decades of colonial rule represent a discernible phase, with marked changes in the development and condition of wage labour in the territory. Following the Second World War and during the 1950's a number of factors emerged which bore on labour. Reading the historiography of this period a number of crucial issues are discernible. Firstly, it was during this period that the British colonial state, now the trusteeship authority, began to be directly involved in economic activities within the territory. Apart from creating the administrative structures and laying down the necessary infrastructure, especially transport, for the functioning of the economy and facilitating the recruitment and organisation of labour, the colonial state took on a more actively promotional and even entrepreneurial role. Secondly, wage labour increased now not only in the agricultural sector but also as a consequence of the emergence of manufacturing industry, financed mainly by foreign private owners.

A third development was that the deterioration of economic opportunities in some rural areas without cash crops, and the recurrence of droughts, increased the availability of potential wage labourers and led to the presence of numbers of unemployed especially in Dar es Salaam. Fourthly, the increased registration of trade unions and the stirrings among workers led to the state's experimenting with different ways of
organising the work-force. Fifthly, the emergence of an organised nationalist movement, spearheaded by TANU raised mixed reactions among the trade union leadership in terms of the relationship between the two organisations. However, during the 1955–58 period, most wage-earners supported TANU [Iliffe, 1979, p. 542], as one of the ways of advancing their interests in their struggle with mostly foreign employers and against discriminatory, often racist, employer practices. Learning from the example of the nationalist movement which was working towards a unified organisation, trade unionists formed the T.F.L. (The Tanganyika Federation of Labour) in 1955 as the central organisation for trade union activities. The remainder of this section examines the record of the two decades before independence with special reference to the above factors.

State intervention in the agricultural sector started with government regulation of the manner and quantities in which peasant-based crops such as cotton and coffee were grown. With the War the growing of such crops as cotton and foodstuffs was enforced by administrative fiat under the Emergency Defence Regulations of 1940 and The Native Authority Ordinance of 1942 [Bowles, 1980, p. 168]. State Marketing Boards with a monopoly of marketing major crops were instituted: for tea in 1950, coffee in 1957 (changing the Native Coffee Ordinance of 1940), cotton in 1952 and other crops in 1949. The state's direct involvement in agricultural production occurred with the ill-fated state-sponsored Groundnut Scheme, administered by the Overseas Food Corporation funded by the British government. By 1949 the Scheme employed about 27,000 Africans at Kongwa, Nachingwea, and Urambo before it collapsed despite heavy investments to the tune of £36.5 million [Stephens, 1968, pp. 82-83].

Demand for sisal cordage during the Second World War and after
(especially during the Korean War) increased, boosting sisal growing and raising sisal employment, as documented by Rodney et al. [1983]. Ten years later the demand for sisal cordage was to collapse, resulting in a fall in wage employment in this sector in the early 1960's. The sector which did begin to generate at least relatively an increase in employment was manufacturing.

Manufacturing before this time had been restricted to agricultural processing of cotton, rice, maize and coffee; sisal decortication; small soap factories; bakeries; and some printers. A brewery, a subsidiary of East African Breweries, and a shoe factory (Bata Shoe Company) were the only sizeable factories, with Unga Ltd. (millers). Shortages of consumer products from overseas in the conditions of war had led to the growth of import substitution industries in several colonies. However, the satellite position of Tanzania in relation to Kenya (with whom there had been a customs union since 1927) meant that relatively few such industries were set up. Those that were established included a metal box factory, a paints factory, a meat packaging plant, a bottling plant, and a car and general retreading company for vehicle repair. These were properties of multinational companies. In the meat plant, Tanganyika Packers Ltd., the colonial government had a 51% share. In Williamson Diamonds opened at this time, the state had 50% of the shares and it had 81% in the Nyanza salt mines at Uvinza. In 1960 the first textile mill was set up. A number of small establishments were also set up by Asian businessmen. As Coulson [1982, p. 61, Table 3.1] has remarked, however, all the above were small establishments (the textile factory after expansion employing 687 workers, a blanket factory 190, a garment manufacturer 350).

Following post-Second World War development in attitudes towards
the colonies expressed in the 1945 Colonial Development and Welfare Act, a plan was drawn up for Tanzania which would encompass a 10 year period with government capital funding for social services such as town planning, the re-establishment of a Labour Department, the building of infrastructure and public works as well as social services, especially education and health, [Stephens, 1968, pp. 80-89]. This heralded an increase in employment in the government sector both in public works and in the social services [Stephens, 1968, p. 100, Table 26]. Earlier neglect of African education was followed by increased efforts in education but the structure created was highly elitist, with extremely small numbers entering secondary and university levels. "Only 14 per cent of those who attained the final standard of primary school went on to middle school and the size of enrollment in the first standard of secondary school was only 13% as large as the final year of middle school" [Stephens, 1968, p. 88].

Sabot [1979, p. 22] gives a summary of the balance sheet for wage employment in 1952. He estimates that over 50% of employees were in the agricultural sector, the bulk of them in sisal plantations owned by private foreign capital. About 4.6% were employed in private households. Another 22.7% were employed in non-agricultural private industry, which encompassed mining, construction, transport and commerce; about 22.4% of this employment in non-agricultural private industry was in manufacturing. Government administration and government-related services employed 20.2% of total wage employment, which for that year is estimated to have been 443,597.

The proportion of those more or less permanently employed still constituted a small proportion of the total labour force. Sabot [1979, p. 64] has calculated that the proportion of the male labour force in
wage employment was 19% in 1948 and 17% in 1957. One has to bear in mind, however, the under-numeration of those engaged by "African small-holders" and the casual or temporary employees in urban centres.

The increasing numbers in wage-employment coupled with growing stabilisation in urban areas combined to create conditions for increased workers' collective action to demand better wages and improvement of working conditions. It remained the employers' practice to offer low wages during the later colonial period. Strenuous work, especially in the sisal estates, coupled with labour practices such as the use of the kipande (card) system and the harsh forms of supervision prevalent in many work places could lead to discontent, and this manifested itself increasingly at this time. After the Second World War, wages received by "87% of government employees in Dar es Salam [were of a level] on which they cannot possibly subsist without getting into debt" [quoted in Iliffe, 1979, p. 354]. "Workers in the private sectors, such as dock workers, probably fell behind inflation", and this low rate of pay was the pattern for all sectors due to the rising cost of living [Iliffe, 1979, pp. 352-354]. Several writers have remarked on the growth of trade union organisation at this time culminating in the creation of T.F.L. in 1955 as an umbrella organisation uniting different groups of African employees. The increase in union activity was a reflection of the growing collective forms of action by workers in their work in relation to the employers. It was in this period that widespread strikes began to take place.
Recruitment for wage employment was from various sources but mainly tapped the rural areas. Labour migration continued to be chiefly from those areas without a viable cash crop or livestock economy, either due to ecological conditions (such as in central and some southern areas of Tanzania), but more often, as in the case of western and south-western Tanzania, due to distances from the main export exits and routes. In this regard famine and drought in 1943 and 1950 were a great catalyst. With the deterioration of economic conditions in the peasant economy, labour was thus pushed to search for paid employment in cash cropping areas (e.g. Sukumaland) and towards the sisal zones. A recruitment bureau known as SILABU began to operate. This has been documented with respect to the increase in numbers of peasants in search of work in the process of rural-rural and rural-urban migration [Sabot, 1979, I and II].

It was at this time that, for example, Dar es Salaam witnessed an increase in unemployed people. Not only had rural-urban migration accelerated, but Dar es Salaam was attracting a greater proportion of rural-urban migrants. Of the employed labour outside the agricultural sector, an increasingly large proportion was to be found in Dar es Salaam as the commercial, transport and administrative capital, soon to house the little manufacturing industry to be found in the country.

Another contributory source of labour employment and unemployment was the growing numbers emerging from the school system, which had limited places for secondary and higher education. Primary school leavers with four years of formal education would tend to move to urban centres in search of employment. For those with higher education paid employment was the goal of going to school in the first place.

Wage labour began at this time to be more stabilised and less
cyclically migrant. Earlier migration for work was undertaken as a means of earning money to fulfil needs which could not be catered for in the rural economies. It was a form of subsidy or complement to a basically agricultural, rurally-based, household economy. Now, increasingly wage employment was taking a more central role in a household's budget, particularly for those who were now being accompanied by their wives. The nature of work in government administration and services, manufacturing industry and processing or transport and communications, necessitated a more stable workforce which after the initial instruction to attain the basic skills for the jobs, had to be retained by the employer if work was to be done with the minimum of interruptions. This contrasts with the nature of work in sisal estates. There the bulk of activities which employed large quantities of labour consisted in activities which utilised "skills" which had been learnt in the peasant agricultural economy and needed strength. These included clearing the bush, hoeing, weeding, cutting of sisal leaves and carrying sisal bundles. This increasing stabilisation of labour and the increase of numbers of people looking for jobs meant an increase in job competition among urban dwellers.

Labour employment in the late colonial period showed a variety of conditions from the basically rural-based agricultural labourers in sisal estates to the urban-based dockers, railworkers and junior civil servants. Skills differed according to work. Most jobs in sisal estates needed only experience with agricultural work, with the more skilled jobs such as clerks or machine technicians falling to Asian or European employees. A similar hierarchy based on race could be discerned in the railways, with manual jobs going to African employees and the more responsible, trained jobs (white collar or engineering) falling into the hands of
Europeans or Asians. In construction and administration the pattern was similar. European employees received 20 to 30 times more than African manual workers. Businesses were usually owned by foreign private entrepreneurs or local Asian businessmen, who logically had the final say in such matters.

Despite the Masters and Native Servants Ordinance governing terms of contract, the lack of personnel to supervise the implementation of labour legislation, and the collusion between Labour Department officials and employers, meant that employers had a free hand as regards employment conditions and contract terms, maintaining monopsonic power over employment, and wages, and the right to impose summary dismissals. There was no legally enforced minimum wage despite legislation in 1939 giving a mandate to government to fix wages. The first minimum wage took effect in 1957 for workers in Dar es Salaam and only after independence in 1963 for the whole country [Sabot, 1979, p. 207].

As already noted, workers' restlessness grew with the rising cost of living in Dar es Salaam during the war and after. This manifested itself first among the dockworkers of Dar es Salaam, one of the more organised sections of the employed, who conducted four strikes between 1939 and 1950. It is remarkable that the 1947 strike was supported by other workmen including railwaymen, agricultural workers, miners and teachers in different parts of the country [Iliffe, 1970, pp. 119-148]. This was both a protest effort to improve their lot, and an attack on the colonial employment system. The importance of the work at the harbour and the potential for civil disturbances made the colonial state intervene in all four strikes, and the 1950 strike led to the dissolution of the Dockworkers Union by order of the High Court. For the next five years employers and state sought other means of labour control. This
was through the creation of staff councils among dockers and sisal estate workers; the adoption of the Employment Ordinance, which was being drafted from 1953; and the regulations governing unionism in the wake of the creation of the T.F.L. in 1955.

The increase in the numbers of registered trade unions during the 1940's showed the workers' increased militancy [Friedland, 1969]. Unionism had been encouraged by the Labour Department despite the reticence of many employers. However, after the experience of the dockers' militancy and the spate of strikes mounted by this stable labour force, unions were less favourably looked upon by the government. There was increased interest in Joint Staff Councils, which would bring together representatives of workers to air and express their grievances with management over social problems affecting workers and iron out day-to-day frictions that might arise. The Staff Councils would discuss work conditions, serve as a channel of communication between management and the workforce and promote a spirit of cooperation [Friedland, 1969, p. 37]. This form of direct relationship between workers and employers was of course liable to be controlled by the more organised and knowledgeable employers, rather than the employees who were less experienced in "bureaucratic instrumentalities". They served as a means of excluding unions, which, not being tied to one work place or employer, had the potential of being more militant.

The Employment Ordinance of 1953 sought to alleviate some of the malpractices and gaps as regards work and employment contracts. It had sections dealing with the necessity of a registered written contract for employees and employers, with consequent sanctions for any breaches. Settlement of disputes was to be through the Labour Commissioner, thus limiting the employer's powers for summary dismissal. Other sections
governed child employment, medical examination, housing and food provision—though most of these were not usually adhered to. The key section was the payment of wages in legal tender and the abolition of the truck system or the payment of wages in kind. The legislation reflected the perceived necessity to stabilise labour in paid employment. Many other rights of employees were to be recognised in law only after independence. Colonial labour legislation still favoured the employer, leaving wide areas to his discretion.

One other means utilised by the colonial state to reduce the efficacy of trade union struggles was the insistence that unions should not be tied to political parties. The rise of the nationalist movement TANU gave a strong impetus to the creation of the T.F.L. in 1955 as the central federation of trade unions, grouping several industrial unions with national scope into one general union of workers in transport, construction and light manufacturing. Structurally they were autonomous unions federated to the T.F.L. The T.F.L. was registered by the state on condition that the unions would not involve themselves in politics. Though many leaders and members of several unions affiliated to T.F.L. were members of TANU, there was no organisational link between the two structures.

It is, in other words, a myth that there were in the colonial period no laws limiting the independence of trade unionism. On the contrary, state regulations curbed the free activity of unionism in various ways, including the prevention a link-up with TANU. Paradoxically, with independence unionism came to be regulated through affiliation to the Party and incorporation into a new type of political system. The differences in the positions of labour and unionism during the colonial period and after independence does not lie in the presence or absence
of state control but in the forms state control takes, in the different strategies employed by the state and employers to organise, regulate and control labour.

4 THE PERIOD OF INDEPENDENCE

At independence agriculture was the main economic activity of mainland Tanzania, accounting for over 50 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product. Agricultural production was carried out by household-based peasants (partly for subsistence and partly for sale) and by large plantations mainly for export. Smallholder households produced the bulk of cotton, coffee, skins and hides for export, while export sisal and tea was by foreign-owned companies. The marketing of peasant produce had greatly increased, especially during the 1950's, but was controlled by export companies. Imports contrasted with exports in that they consisted largely of manufactured products: machinery, transport equipment, chemicals, textiles etc. [Smith, 1966, pp. 458-459, Tables]. The destination of exports and the source of net imports was mainly Western Europe. The banks were agencies of overseas banks, Barclays, D.C.O., The Standard Bank, The National and Grindlays [van de Laar, 1972, p. 84], as were the insurance companies. Industry was, as we have seen, limited.

Independence in 1961 and the creation of a separate political entity led the government to try to reduce the relatively satellite position of the country with regard to imports of manufactured goods from industries based overseas or in Kenya. Despite this aim, however, the policies followed the basic industrial pattern of the colonial period: industrial development took place in primary and secondary processing of agricultural products, and in import substituting industries, especially textiles and other consumer items. The industries tended to be privately owned
(mainly as branches of foreign corporations), with a heavy dependence on imported machinery and other manufacturing inputs.

The Three Year Plan for Tanganyika 1962/64 was built on the Development Plan for Tanganyika initiated by the colonial government. It envisaged industrial growth in the hands of private investors as had been recommended by a World Bank Mission which had been invited by the colonial government to make a study of development potential in Tanganyika. The government's main role consisted in running the supportive structures such as water and electricity; the training of personnel through the educational system and maintenance of industrial peace. A number of incentives were offered to investors as well as protection through the Foreign Investment Protection Act of 1963, guaranteeing compensation in the case of nationalisation. In some instances, though, the State was to have a share in some of the industrial enterprises. Following the Kampala Agreement of 1964, which tried to redress the trade and industrial imbalance between the three East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, Tanzania was allocated certain industries including aluminium, radio assembly and tyre manufacture which would serve the whole of the East African market and the encouragement of increased production for consumer industries in footwear, cement, cigarettes amongst others.

The first years of independence saw the establishment of Tasini Textiles, jointly owned by a Netherlands textile corporation, Smith Mackenzie and Co., Dalgety (E.A.), the Victoria Federation of Co-operative Unions and The Tanganyika Development Finance, partly owned by the Netherlands government (1961). The Mwanza Textile Mill (owned by NDC, VFCU and Amenital Holding Registered Trust) began operating under management by Maurer Textiles S.A. of Geneva and Textil Consult of Vaduz.
Other textile mills were set up by local Indian entrepreneurs. Other types of new import substitution activities included a paint plant owned by Leyland Paints (1963), an aluminium factory established by Aluminium African Ltd. in 1964 and a radio assembly plant by Philips Electronics of Holland — all of which were given tariff protection to varying degrees. The Matsushita Electric Company of Japan had a battery factory start production in Dar es Salaam. In agricultural processing the main development was the construction of a cashew nut decortication plant (Tanita) in 1963, with the Tanzania government having 40% of shares and the rest owned by a variety of private foreign financiers. A number of sisal cordage rope and twine factories were set up by foreign corporations or local Asian businessmen.

Rweyemamu [1973] has documented the case of the capital goods sector, or rather the lack of it at independence, and the need to import a wide range of intermediate inputs and raw materials: iron, steel, chemicals, petroleum products and fertilisers. In 1966, for example, the small Sapa Chemical Industries began operations, and an increasing number of garages and repair workshops appeared during this phase. Industrial location at this time tended to be restricted to Dar es Salaam. During the later period, after 1967, this tendency was reduced by deliberate policy, with other towns like Arusha, Mwanza, Tanga and Morogoro appearing in the picture.

The First Five Year Plan (1964-1969) reflected much the same priorities with 53% of planned investments to be contributed by government (central, local and E.A. common services) and 47% by the private sector. Of public sector investment 28.4% would be for social development (housing, town development and education), 24% for industry; 13.5% for commerce; 15% in agriculture and 16% in economic infrastructure. Private investment would be dominant in industry and commerce. It is
important to note further that of government's investments 78% would be from external financing, 14% from domestic borrowing and 8% from taxes [Rweyemamu, 1973, pp. 49-51]. Further, the private sector was mainly owned by foreign nationals or nationals of "Asian" descent.

Such an economy, dominated by "non-Africans" could have been expected to prove difficult for a TANU government - for a government which had come to power through African nationalism; a government which wanted to maintain its authority and legitimacy in the society as well as to make national independence more meaningful over and above the fact of having a national flag and a national anthem. In response to political pressure the government gradually got more involved in productive activities. While in the colonial period state involvement had arisen from the need to increase sources of agricultural products either for food or as dollar earners in the aftermath of the War, it was the independent government's strategy for societal integration, peace and legitimacy that prompted the state's increased involvement in economic activities.

Against this background, even before the Arusha Declaration, the state took several measures to get involved directly in the economy. In 1964 the National Development Corporation was formed as the industrial arm of government. It took over former Tanganyika Development Corporation's holdings (Tanganyika Packers, Mwandui Mine, Uvinza Salt Mines as well as mining, hotels and ranches belonging to the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation). NDC was charged with developing the country's industries. In the import and export trade the government took 90% in Intrata and a monopoly in the export of major agricultural crops, namely cotton, coffee, sisal, cashew nuts and major food grains. In the financial sector, the Central Bank was created in 1966, along
with a government Insurance Company, and a Tanganyika Bank of Commerce, as well as the Cooperative Bank to facilitate loans mainly for agricultural producer cooperatives. Though private industry and commerce was still the prime mover of the economy during these early 1960's, the state acquired an increasing share in economic activities with assets distributed among several sectors [Clark, 1978, p. 102, Table 25]. In the manufacturing industry, for example, parastatals accounted for 24 per cent of total manufacturing investment [Clark, 1978, p. 127].

The proportion of wage-employment attributable to government was similarly enhanced. This was mainly due to the growth of the civil service, public services, infrastructure and public utilities after independence. Overall wage employment was in decline during the last two years of colonial rule and continued to do so after independence. This decline was pronounced in the private sector especially in sisal plantations. In contrast, over the 1962-67 period government employment rose by nearly 5 per cent per annum [Valentine, 1981, p. 17]. Parastatals accounted for 1.4 per cent of wage employment in 1964, but by 1967 that had risen to 7.5 per cent. "The proportion of total wage-earners employed in the public sector increased from 27% in 1962 to 36% in 1967; the proportion reached a high of 43% in 1974" [Valentine, 1981, p. 18].

The state was therefore directly concerned about the question of wages and conditions of workers, being the main employer. It was also concerned about the organisation and control of the labour and the maintenance of industrial peace, not only in its own establishments but also in those owned and run by private capital - in order to encourage and maintain investment climate especially from abroad. This
had to be balanced against the pressures to improve the general economic welfare of the general population. The labour policies adopted at this time were the political leadership's responses to maintaining the balance between improving the workmen's conditions and the constraints created by the dominance of private foreign capital. These policies will be discussed further in Chapter 3.

At the same time as the balance between private and public employment was shifting for the reasons given, so too was the rural urban balance. The 1960's like the '50s were years of accelerated growth in urban population, especially in Dar es Salaam and Mwanza. A number of circumstances combined to create the conditions for rural-urban migration which was the main factor for this urban growth. One of these was the deterioration of living conditions among rural dwellers in different parts of the country. In the early colonial period the search for wage employment had been sparked by state action. Under the new circumstances, peasants' search for money and the failure in some areas to meet the demands for money through agricultural work (compounded often by droughts) led some rural dwellers to seek employment in the towns. Another was related to the first. Wage employment opportunities were mainly in urban centres, which consequently drew not only rural cultivators but also many of the growing number of primary school-leavers in search of wage employment. A greater part of the rural-urban migrants came from relatively poor rural areas or from areas where they felt they could not make ends meet.

Sabot [1972] and the NUMEIST [1972, pp. 11-12] have documented this process as regards the population of six major towns in mainland Tanzania which totalled 62,500 in 1948: "... from 1948 to 1971, the population nearly quadrupled, implying an average annual growth rate of 6.5%"
of which "... threequarters, or nearly 130,000 were made up of people born elsewhere who left their birth-place to come to one of the six towns". The dramatic population increases for Dar es Salaam are shown in the fact that in 1971, 82% of its population were not born in Dar es Salaam [Sabot, 1972, p. 49]. Its population rose from 69,200 in 1948 to 280,603 in 1967, and further to 769,445 by 1978. If the figures for the whole Tanzanian population are examined, the percentage of urban population has risen from 2.6% in 1948, to 6% in 1967 and 13.3% in 1978 (total population figures from the 1978 Population Census, Vol. IV, p. 1, Table 1, are 7,500,000 in 1948; 11,958,654 in 1967 and 17,036,497 in 1978).

Administration and commerce were the major activities of many towns such as Dar es Salaam. These gave the initial employment to those with formal training for work in administration, or manual work in commerce. Employment expanded in the services (education, medical) for those with some formal education. Many schools (higher) and hospitals were in urban areas. Industries, according to Sabot [1979] were placed by their owners in urban areas (mainly Dar es Salaam) where an existing infrastructure was ready at hand to get raw materials from abroad and a sizeable market was available. Sabot [1979, p.71] estimated that in 1961 Dar es Salaam had 9.4% of the country's total wage employment and that by 1970 it was 21.1%. For non-agricultural wage employment it was 19.3% in 1961 and 29.6% in 1970. Offers for work remained limited to the construction industry for those who had not gone further in formal education, as the manufacturing industry remained limited.

The urban population consisted of the following main categories:

(a) The "permanent" employed. These were those in regular employment, their conditions and pay generally regulated by labour legislation and
trade union laws. A section were technically trained in one field or another, while another section consisted of the less skilled employees. (b) The second broad category were the casual employed: urban dwellers who had no permanent jobs but depended on casual and temporary work. Some of them often engaged in small-scale activities as self employed but more often they were "employed" without adherence to the statutory regulations on pay, hours of work, sick pay, etc. Lastly there were (c) "the self-employed." [Sabot, 1979, passim].

The combination of rapid urban growth with limited employment opportunities not only placed a heavy burden on social services such as housing, transport and education. In a situation where there were no unemployment benefits, it also affected workers' budgets, since those regularly and permanently employed needed to support those irregularly working. The presence of many potential job takers also created bargaining conditions favourable to the employer over the permanent employee and affected his margin of militancy. Especially the less skilled, less technically trained, groups among the permanently employed tended to be vulnerable in their jobs.

Wage-employment furthermore still extended to only a small section of the Tanzanian labour force. By 1980, only 6.9% of the Tanzanian labour force were in wage employment [ILO, 1982, p. 66, Table 6.4]. Manufacturing industry by 1980 accounted for about 16.1% of wage employment, with agriculture taking about one third [ILO, 1982, p. 67, Table 6.5].

As we have seen, the industry created was the import substitution type of industry. It was thus dependent on imported machinery, spare parts, chemicals and other inputs, especially oil, all of which required foreign exchange earnings. The design and production of the machinery
used took place outside the country. Employees' role in the plants therefore consisted either in manning, operating and servicing or in repair work. The absence of a capital goods sector limited them as it does now to the development of industry. Dependence on the outside world for engineering and scientific processes had repercussions on the skills of the workforce employed and the stability of their employment. Industry was faced with fluctuating supplies, not only of raw materials but of spares, energy and other inputs.

These issues were to emerge much more clearly in the wake of the Arusha Declaration and in the Second Five Year Plan (1969-74), which was reformulated in the aftermath of Arusha. The measures which followed the Declaration deepened both the state's involvement in the economy and the development of wage labour. They also defined the characteristic political and industrial relations systems of present-day Tanzania, which are the focus of attention in Chapters 2-3. For the moment we will limit ourselves to the major changes in the ownership of the economy and the role of public-sector employment.

The historical circumstances in which the Arusha Declaration emerged have been discussed by several authors [e.g. Pratt, 1976; Rweyemamu, 1973]. In the first place, foreign investments had not been forthcoming in the amounts expected in the First Five Year Plan. Growing disillusionment with the foreign-investment-led model of development was swelled by the discontinuation of aid from West Germany over the Hallenstein Doctrine and the problems with Britain over Rhodesia. The newly independent government faced in any case the dilemma of increasing economic growth through foreign investment within the parameters of a strongly nationalist independence movement, TANU. As Mwalimu Nyerere declared, private economic development meant either relying on unreliable foreign investments
or else local Asian dominance. In the Arusha Declaration speech, Nyerere explicitly noted that Tanzania's independence was jeopardised so long as the President was a mere figurehead, responding to foreign investors seeking assurances should workers be restless in their demands. Back in December 1966, NUTA, the workers' organisation, had called for more government control of the economy. State control and nationalisations would be the solution. [NUTA, 1966].

Worries about national independence coincided with a concern to preserve national unity in the face of divisive socio-economic trends. There was increasing concern about social differentiation following the taking of top government posts under the Africanisation programmes. In Nyerere's thinking such problems were interpreted through intellectual and ideological influences from a variety of sources: the experience of Mao's China with rural cooperation and self-reliance; ideas of equality and equity from the Fabians, religious ideas of social organic harmony and cultural practices among many Tanzanian communities. Post-colonial conditions of low level economic growth, the slow rate of foreign investment, the absence of a sizeable African entrepreneurial class and the twin ideas of independence and organic harmony (unity) all combined to create the context in which the political leadership opted for the Arusha Declaration.

Regarding the state's role in development, what was new was the extent of state control and government involvement in the economy rather than the fact of government involvement which, as we have seen, started in the immediate post-independence days and indeed during the colonial period, especially in the 1950's. Major steps were taken over the period commencing in 1967, with some modifications and adjustments as the years passed. The earliest measures involved state control of
commercial and trading activities as well as nationalisation of some of
the large-scale industrial activities. Thus in February 1967, all
private banks were nationalised to form the National Bank of Commerce.
Insurance activities now fell completely under the National Insurance
Corporation. Eight large-scale import and export firms were national-
ised to form the State Trading Corporation. Eight large milling firms
were nationalised to form the National Milling Corporation (1968). On
the industrial scene, the government took a 60% share in seven major
industries dealing with beer, cigarettes, shoes, cement and pyrethrum,
as well as the Tanzania Metal Box Company. These were to be part of
the enlarged National Development Corporation (N.D.C.).

The government had had control over land and mineral resources since
1962, but in October 1967 it took a majority share (60%) in the sisal
estates. By 1969 full ownership was extended to 31 estates and 80%
in only 10 estates [Rweyemamu, 1973, p. 59; Clark, 1978, p. 45 ff.].
The take-over of the sisal industry gave the government control of a
section of the export agriculture directly, as owner and producer.

In other sectors of agriculture, it will be recalled that from 1962
the state had set up Marketing Boards which directed the marketing of
major crops such as maize, rice, cashew nuts, simsim, tobacco,
coffee, wheat, tea, dairy products and sisal [see Wagao, 1982, mimeo,
for the details]. In this set-up the Cooperative unions were
procurement agents for the Boards. With the policy of ujamaa vijijini
(rural socialism) encouraging the formation of ujamaa villages as the
basis on which at the grassroots cooperatives would be formed, a period
of uneasiness followed between the Marketing Boards and cooperative
societies. In 1972 a new set-up for the marketing of agricultural
produce was created, with new holding companies known as Authorities
for the major export crops: cotton, cashew nut, coffee, tea, tobacco, sial and pyrethrum. The marketing and processing of other crops would be under Corporations such as the National Milling Corporation, SUDECO for sugar and L.D.A. for livestock. With the creation of ujamaa villages, the villagisation operations of 1971 and 1974-75, and the Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975, villages were to evolve into a form of producer cooperative. Other trading activities, including the sale of goods to cooperative members, which had been done by some cooperatives, now passed to the Regional Trading Corporations. There were state corporations under the Ministry of Trade. Thus the road was open for the abolition of cooperatives in 1976. Henceforth crop marketing would be under Crop Authorities, with villages as agents of those Authorities.

The Arusha Declaration, then, marked a substantial increase in the state and parastatal sector. This meant among other things a notable increase in numbers of those employed in the public sector.

Following nationalization, most parastatal industries naturally remained located in the towns where they had been built originally: Dar es Salaam, Arusha and Tanga. Later investments have tried to redress the balance with new parastatal industries in, for example, Arusha, Mwanza and Morogoro towns. In other respects, though, the character of Tanzanian industry was little altered by nationalization. In economic and technological terms it continued to be characterised by a heavy dependency on imports and thus on the health of the foreign trade balance. Employment in industry continued to be a modest part of the total wage-employment picture, involving a minute proportion of the national labour force in largely unskilled and poorly remunerated occupations. These facts are an essential part of the back-drop to our study of the politics of labour relations in public sector factories.
Footnotes

1. These categories have been deemed more analytical than the "formal-informal sectors" divisions which tend to blur the relations to the property among those engaged in the sectors.

2. Meeting of NUTA General Council 27th December 1966 to 3rd January 1967 and memorandum to N.E.C. Arusha Meeting of 26th to 28th January 1967 calling the President to appoint a commission on the implementation of Ujamaa.

3. While Mwalimu Nyerere's writings articulate the meaning of Ujamaa, the thinking is shared by many and has a variety of sources which have been influential.
This chapter sets out to examine the political processes and the socio-political forces at work in the country since independence and especially after 1967 in order to provide some insight into the range of labour policies and structures which regulate work relations and shape activities by employees at enterprise level. Power relations at enterprise level can hardly be divorced from those at societal level. An examination of the political system in relation to labour policies and the industrial relations system is also appropriate because since independence in 1961, and after 1967 particularly, a lively debate has emerged on the post-colonial state in Tanzania in relation to which it is necessary to take a position. The chapter does not aim at presenting an exhaustive critique of the debate or to contribute to it beyond outlining a perspective which arises from a dissatisfaction with approaches one finds generally in the literature.

The first section of the chapter explains this alternative approach in general terms. Sections 2 and 3 explore aspects of the political system of Tanzania before and since the Arusha Declaration. The final section contains some illustrations of the process of decision making under the post-Arusha arrangements.

1 NEW ORIENTATIONS IN THE STUDY OF THE POLITICAL

Literature on the post-colonial state in Tanzania has been strongly influenced by formulations which seem to me to be inadequate. As we saw in the Introduction, much of this work has rested on either an instrumentalist or a structural-functionalist, and hence an economic
reductionist, view of the state. That type of analysis assumes complete identity in many instances between class power and state power or a total fusion between class power and state power. This perspective has been questioned by several writers. Shaw [1986, p. 248] convincingly argues against the tendency to over-politicize the power of social classes. The state "is not seen as identical with or a simple reflection of, the economically dominant class". Furthermore "the interests of states are normally embedded in complexes of class-economic relations, but they are also defined by the international relations of states". State power is also concerned with power in a given territorial area.

Mouzelis [1986] on his part suggests an approach which would overcome the limitations and the inadequacies of both instrumentalist and structural-functionalist approaches to the study of the state. In his view, instrumentalist and class reductionist orientations to the state neglect "to give due consideration to the complex organisational and institutional realities which lie between classes and the state (such phenomena as political parties, pressure groups, clientelistic networks, and so on)" [p. 200]. He argues:

"More generally, the attempt to analyse political developments in the semi-periphery/periphery in exclusively economic categories (class, requirements of capital) is especially absurd in view of the saliency of political structures and the role the state has played in generating capitalist industrialisation in such societies". [p. 200]

Mouzelis advocates an analysis which deals specifically with the "sphere of politics" [p. 201]. This can be achieved, he suggests, through making a distinction between a mode of production (and its relations of production) and a mode of political domination (and its relations of domination). According to Mouzelis, the state can be viewed as relatively independent of class or other civil society interests. Holders of the means of domination (state power) "have an enhanced capacity for
defending and, within certain limits of further promoting their own primarily political interests" [p. 215]. State activities may basically be geared towards political ends - an aspect which is neglected when one conflates economic and political power or reduces political power to economic power.

Applying some of these principles to the case of Tanzania, those who came to political power at independence were clearly not economically dominant, but since 1961 and most glaringly so in 1967 have been nonetheless able to make decisions and take measures dramatically affecting Tanzanian society.

My approach does not see state policies and activities as the mere expression of the class interests of those in power or that of the economically dominant class(es). The state is not a tool of the economically dominant classes; nor are state policies always oriented towards the structural maintenance of existing economic relations.

Secondly, political independence in 1961 has to be taken seriously as the establishment of a separate nation-state in which political processes, the competition for public (state) office and the struggle for domination and control, took place within the confines of a given territory with defined boundaries separating it from other states. In post-colonial countries such as Tanzania, the construction of a national community is a key factor in many state policies - national independence and national unity (uhuru na umoja) took centre stage particularly in the years immediately after political independence. Issues of national consensus, political legitimacy as well as economic development play an important role in shaping state policies.

Thirdly, however, these political processes take place within the context of a given economy and given social forces, both internal
and international, from which the state actors draw their resources and by which they are constrained. The state of the economy and the social aspects are the conditions in which political actors operate, shaping and constraining their actions and their capacity to implement those decisions and maintain their dominance and control. Lastly, as organisations state structures are not homogeneous entities, instruments of a group, nor are they actors, but forums or arenas within which actors with differential powers and perspectives contend for domination and control. I believe that analysis of the major features of the development of the Tanzanian political system amply confirms each of these general points.

2 INDEPENDENCE AND AFTER

a) The Nationalist Movement: Membership, Leadership, Organisation

In 1961, Tanzania achieved territorial independence and identity and with it control of the state machinery passed into the hands of the leadership of TANU - the nationalist movement which coalesced into a political organisation in 1954 and thence virtually dominated the struggle for political independence. During the 1950's various categories of the African population united under the banner of TANU in their opposition to colonial rule. In the rural areas TANU recruited its membership, leadership and support from African cultivators and traders from different parts of the country alienated by the colonial government's policies concerning land, agriculture or livestock. In Arusha and Meru, the colonial policy of land alienation from African peasants to white settlers was a grievance brought within the nationalist orbit and highlighted by the TANU leadership. In Sukumaland, rural improvement programmes which
included tie-riding and destocking were unpopular among cultivators and herders. This issue was taken up by TANU, making the movement very popular in those areas despite the banning of the organisation in those areas for some time in the 1950's. In Morogoro the enforcement of terracing became an issue generating support for TANU. In many places African traders in competition with Asian traders joined ranks in the movement, as did members of African cooperative societies. [see Iliffe, 1979, p. 523; Maguire, 1969, passim; for details]. The support for TANU leadership increased with the colonial government's attempts to impose local government on a racial basis and to set-up the settler-dominated United Tanganyika Party (U.T.P.). In the countryside, TANU leadership had popular support.

In urban areas the basis of the movement was among African traders, labourers and the urban poor. The underprivileged dwellers of the African quarters suffered the effects of the racialist differential services in housing, health and education [Stephens, 1968, p. 129], so that by 1957 Dar es Salaam was almost 100% a TANU town as far as the African population was concerned. The only African group who were not TANU members or supporters were the civil servants who by law were not allowed to be members. Members of the then small educated African elite who joined the movement had to resign from their posts or were members secretly. TANU support encompassed the main religious and regional groupings without exception.

The variety of the membership was reflected in the variety of social categories from which the movement recruited its leadership. These, included educated African nationalists who had resigned from their posts of employment (Mwalimu J.K. Nyerere the president of TANU was from this small category), leaders of African cooperatives, African
traders and rural notables disenchanted by colonial rule, and trade unionists for whom the struggle with mainly foreign or Asian employers for better conditions was linked to the cause of national independence.

Iliffe [1979, p. 523] notes that among TANU activists were traders; teachers; mission employees or catechists; former government clerks; police officers and medical aides "educated men excluded from local power". But this differed from place to place depending on who were the underprivileged in the colonial situation. In some places it would appear that some teachers opposed TANU, e.g. in Masasi, while in other places, e.g. Mbulu, they used TANU membership to promote their own ends. Even among the non-TANU members, however, the popular antipathy to colonial rule which was voiced by TANU, was shared by the population including chiefs.

TANU as a movement, then, became the vehicle articulating shared opposition to colonial rule among a variety of social categories and classes. It should be noted here that the political organisation of showed characteristics which distinguish it both from "Continental European" parties, which tend to be the political organisation of social strata or classes, and from "Anglo-Saxon" parties which are professional aggregating institutions for a variety of specialised interest groups (D.A. Chalmers [1972] makes this useful distinction in discussing the distinctive features of political parties in Latin America). In other words, TANU on the eve of independence was composed of several strata and social categories and was the forum for articulating the general opposition to colonial rule. The objective or goal was political independence and unity of all the people of the country. This was clearly stated in the Party's motto and objectives.

Authors, among them Bienen [1967, Chapter 2], have remarked on
on the "favourable conditions" for TANU being accepted as the nationalist movement and achieving national unity and consensus. They note the presence and widespread use of one language, Kiswahili, as a factor favouring national unity and integration and helping to counteract the alleged organisational weakness of the movement stemming from the plurality of ethnic, cultural and religious environments. However, I would argue that the credit for the achievement of a high level of national integration in the independence struggle must go to the political leadership and the line taken, rather than to the absence of a disruptive potential based on region, religion or status. Such strains did exist and could have had serious consequences, as in several instances they threatened to do before independence. In other words, it was the political conceptions and strategy utilised by the leadership which was the primary factor conditioning the political system of post-colonial Tanzania.

b) Independence: Political Centralisation, Mobilisation and Incorporation

At independence in 1961 the leadership of TANU took control of state power over the identifiable geographical space known as Tanganyika - a country with a diversity of social groupings, religions and cultures - diversities which could be a source of tensions and social conflicts, as experience in the 1960's in many formerly colonised countries was to show, if divisive tensions were encouraged or nursed. The political leadership of independent Tanganyika was guided by one fundamental objective: the creation of a stable socio-political order, independent and nationally integrated. From this stemmed a number of related tasks or intermediate objectives, including on the one hand the construction of an appropriate system of political institutions, and
on the other the promotion of socio-economic development.

Orientation of the Political Leadership

To achieve those objectives, the strategy employed by the leadership centred upon the nationalist party TANU, from whose ranks the government was formed. Through the Party, the different interests of all citizens were to be articulated and aggregated. Leadership conceptions of the Party at this time indicate that it was seen as a "two-way all weather road", passing on information from the government to the people and from the people to government. In 1962, Nyerere stated:

It is necessary to have an elected government which has full support and cooperation. It is also necessary to have a strong political organisation active in every village, which acts like a two-way all-weather road along which the proposals and plans of the government can travel to the people at the same time as the ideas, desires and misunderstandings of the people can travel direct to the government. This is the job of the new TANU.

[Nyerere, 1966, p. 158]

In a pamphlet published in April 1962 entitled TANU na Raia (TANU and Citizens) similar views were expressed: TANU was to deal with the problems of people of all types, not of one religion or tribe. Uhuru (independence) was for all citizens of Tanganyika. TANU was enhancing the unity of all the people of the country through justly elected leaders, a committed leadership of TANU which worked to help people in adversity. The work of TANU was to get rid of poverty and work towards the reduction of income differentials [Nyerere, 1962].

It followed that the Party would not be a medium for the articulation or aggregation of particularist interests, but a mechanism for popular mobilisation and communication between citizens and
decision-makers or wielders of political power. Party activities would therefore consist in facilitating that cooperation and channelling support for the government. The Party's structural organisation reflected on the whole that preoccupation. From 1962 membership was open to all citizens who adhered to the Party's beliefs, aims and objects as well as making the pledges. Membership of TANU as conceived created an ambiguity as to the difference between a TANU member and a loyal citizen of the country when for example the pledges of good citizenship and loyalty to the President of the United Republic are considered [TANU, 1962, E, IX, X]. In the early independence years public policy was to be in the hands of government officials and top party leaders. Party leaders were to be participants in decision-making supported by ranks of committed followers, but not spokesmen for specific programmes.

The TANU leadership's objective of creating a stable and harmonious socio-political order informs, in the main, the trajectory of political developments after independence. It would, however, be difficult to characterise them as a well laid out, coherent scheme or design from the beginning or as the work of a prophetic visionary [cf. Pratt, 1976] - political processes being more complex in the realm of reality than in the realm of mythology. The trajectory is characterised more by what Stephens [1977, p. 96] writing about an analogous process in Peru, has called "an action-reaction sequence rather than a pursuit of a clearcut strategy". The main element of coherence was that the options and measures taken were imbued with a conception of the state working towards the ideal human, democratic society without exploitation - *Ujamaa*.

To promote societal stability, national integration and harmony,
the leadership of TANU pursued two main options. Firstly, it aimed at a centralised political structure uniting the whole country under a central leadership. This entailed the creation of one popular organisation to which all citizens could belong and within which they could voice their ideas and desires as well as be informed by their rulers who would be elected. Another important element in societal stability would be the reduction of the potential power of particularistic groups by the creation of corporatist organisations linked to the state (cooperatives, unions, and youth and women organisations) as well as the regulation of conflict and tension between employers and employees by humanising aspects of work relations and workers' conditions. Secondly, societal harmony would come through the promotion of national economic independence and growth. This would entail increased investments especially by the state directly and drawing on other domestic resources.

This, then, was the dominant conception held by the mainstream political leadership, notably by Mwalimu Nyerere who as President of the Republic and head of the Party held a crucial position in the political system. Bienen [1967] in his work on the pre-1967 Party, [.. Chapter VI] has identified other conceptions, but these were then peripheral, with limited impact on the political structure at the centre of which was the Presidency and the Party, TANU.

Political Organisation

An examination of the 1962 Constitution and the Interim Constitution of 1965 reveals the centralised and integrative aspects of the decision-making process and the organisation of political power. Central authority and decision-making power were ultimately vested in
the President. He was both Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of
the armed forces. As Chief Executive he had power to appoint
ministers, regional commissioners and heads of institutions including
the Chief Justice, judges, the Governor of the central bank and
ambassadors. Presidential appointees were answerable to the
President, and through the Preventive Detention Act of 1962, No. 60,
he had sweeping powers that could not be challenged in any court. 1

Another salient feature of the political system was the centralised-
cum-popular aspects of the one-Party system which was made legal in
1965. Political activity could only be legally carried out within
the context of the different Party echelons and sittings, structured
from the cell at the grassroots to the national level (see Bienen
of the Party, however, was open to all who accepted the principles
of the Party in a general way, as we have seen.

Structures of government administration and TANU organisation
ran parallel from the local level to the national level. Along the
different structures there was a dovetailing or overlapping of roles.
As heads of government administration in their respective spheres,
area and regional commissioners were appointed. They were also
district and regional secretaries of the Party, while ministers were
deemed to be political commissars in their respective ministries.
At the national level the President of the Party, its Vice-President,
Secretary General and National Treasurer, held the respective posts
of President, Vice-President, Minister and Minister of Finance in the
government.

As well as this appointed leadership there was an elected leader-
ship of district and regional Party chairmen. They headed their
respective Party sittings, where discussions were held and views expressed concerning government officials' activities, and where government officials explained actions taken in their respective spheres. During the sittings at District and Regional levels, the Area and Regional Commissioners respectively were the secretaries of the meetings, noting down what had been discussed and expressed. This would be taken into account in the execution of their duties as heads of government administration in their areas or regions.

One notable element, however, was that the party sittings at District or Regional levels did not in practice have any authority to give directives to the regional or district administrations. Nor could they remove officials. The latter were accountable to the appointing authority. In other words, political power, the capacity to enforce decisions and allocate resources at District and Regional levels rested solely with the Commissioners, who were the President's representatives and appointees. Party meetings thus served chiefly as a forum for the expression of the population’s demands as well as one in which decision makers and implementors could inform the general public. The open membership of the party also enabled the meetings to serve as a basis for popular mobilisation in support of government decisions and measures.

Another important function of the Party organisation and sittings at District and Regional levels was that they served as a channel for the recruitment of new elites into the decision-making processes and leadership roles at higher levels. Given the one-party system, access to political leadership was through membership and activity in the Party; the Party structures were thus a ladder or sieve through which political leadership was recruited.
At the national level the parallel political structures of government and Party were linked by key political actors holding key positions in both organisations. In governmental terms, the highest organ was the Cabinet of Ministers chaired by the President of the Republic. In the Party's organisational structure, the central committee could be considered the corresponding body. However, at this pre-Arusha stage, it was a relatively small group consisting of the national leadership of the Party and some Dar es Salaam elders close to the President, who served as his personal counsellors and advisors.

The Party organ which could raise and which discussed policy issues was the National Executive Committee or Council (N.E.C.) which consisted of, over and above the national leaders of the Party, one elected member from each Region and, as ex-officio members, the Regional Commissioners and Regional Party Chairmen. P. Msekwa, a one-time National Executive Secretary of TANU, has argued in a study entitled Towards Party Supremacy [1976] that the N.E.C. exercised decision-making power in several instances, such as the selection of candidates for Bunge (National Assembly) elections, the decision to have a republican constitution and the Arusha Declaration. These were and are within the brief of N.E.C., which was to give general orientations.

On the other hand the political structure with the mandate to make laws was the National Assembly or parliament. The National Assembly was conceived as the popularly elected legislative arm of the state. According to the Interim Constitution of 1965, the Bunge was to consist of elected constituency members as well as ex-officio and presidential by appointed members [see Pratt, 1976, p. 205 and
Cliffe, 1967, for details]. But access to membership in the Bunge was through the Party machinery. Candidates for the Bunge had to be members of TANU and the two candidates to stand in constituency elections were nominated by the N.E.C. following suggestions and indications about their preferences from District and Regional levels. Election campaigns were organised and directed by Party committees. Use of tribe, race or religion as a basis for electoral appeals disqualified a candidate. National Assembly members were expected to discuss affairs as they affected the whole country: chosen from constituencies they were not to speak for constituency interests as such, and so did not represent in that sense the constituency. Similarly, those members who came through nomination by the trade union, N.U.T.A., or the cooperatives were not in Bunge to represent those organisations.

According to Pratt, one result of this system was that the Assembly tended to deal with government bills with superficial scrutiny [1976, p. 208]. And according to Hopkins [1971, p. 28], despite the honest and open criticism sometimes voiced, "the Assembly has been concerned with ratifying decisions made by some other group". In his assessment "the Assembly has been more often a sounding board and a forum for extracting approbation and applause for new government policies than a deliberative body that formulates policies or actually writes legislation".

Given the many structures and the crisscrossing of discussions and actors both in governmental structures and Party structures, it is difficult and unrealistic to try to say whether a particular decision was a government or Party decision. Underlying all the political structures and sittings was the basic reality that the decisions were those of the dominant political actors in a centralised decision-making
system. The many structures did play an important role in eliciting popular consent and consensus as well as acting as a basis for popular mobilisation in support of decisions and measures by the political leaders. Thus measures which needed legal backing were passed by Bunge, but only after N.E.C. discussed in a confidential forum the principles of a more general kind to be concretised in legal acts by Parliament. Thus for example the Arusha Declaration was approved by N.E.C. as a general policy document for ujamaa and self-reliance, while Bunge passed the specific and concrete acts of nationalisation and creation of the public sector, taking into consideration the Declaration.

Attempts to institutionalise a unitary and corporatist system revealed themselves also in the affiliation to the Party of already organised sectional interests – the youth and women's organisations, the cooperative movement, the Parents' Association and the trade union movement. These organisations were affiliated to the political Party and their Executive Secretaries and Secretaries appointed by the President.

Implicit in this political set-up was a rejection of the liberal pluralist conception of a political system in which individuals or groups of individuals pursue their particularistic goals in competition with one another. Similarly, the concept of social conflict and the irreconcilability of the interests of different social classes or groups as the basis of political structures was not the dominant perspective. Solidarity and the quest for the common good was the guiding concept. The leadership's implicitly corporatist ideas envisioned a harmonious development in which a centralised state regulates and organises groups, promotes the participation of all
groups and social strata under one roof and discourages particularistic representations based on social strata or territorial divisions. The key to this organic unity as the basis for national and social cohesion was the Party - TANU.

While membership of the Party became open to all races in 1962 and open to civil servants in 1964, the occupants of leadership positions prior to 1967 tended to retain their pre-independence characteristics. Apart from the topmost posts of President, Vice-President, Secretary General and National Treasurer, Party leaders in the Central Committee or the elected members of N.E.C. were mainly from the more popular elements of the membership - peasant activists in cooperative societies, teachers, traders, trade unionists or prominent elders [see Bienen, 1967, p. 186 for composition of Central Committee 1965; and Pratt, 1976, p. 211-212, on N.E.C. characteristics]. This reflected the social categories which had contributed to the independence movement and whose consent and support remained important for the leadership of the post-independence state. For this leadership and its supporters, the government's mission was to fight against ignorance, poverty and disease. This entailed improved educational opportunities, economic growth and the provision of health services among a population who felt that they had been neglected during the colonial period by the colonial state.

Decision Making and Implementation

In order to run a modern state and to organise an increasing state sector, the political leadership controlling the state had to have recourse to the social strata with the necessary "skills", especially as regards financial control and national budgeting, foreign exchange
control and planning. Initially these experts or technicians were drawn from the colonial civil service or from abroad, given the scarcity of local high-level manpower. These "experts" deployed in the ministries especially the Treasury, Central Bank, Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Commerce and Industries and N.D.C. had an important part in decision-making by virtue of their proximity to the political leadership, especially Ministers and the President. Their information, the resources (physical, human and financial) of their ministries, state institutions or related organisations placed them in important positions in decision-making as well as in the actual translation of those decisions into actual activities. With the Arusha Declaration, those charged with running and organising the state sector not only increased in number with the proliferation of parastatals in different sectors of the economy but their importance also grew, with the increased role of the state sector as an element of the political leadership's programme.

The socio-political system was thus characterised by a centralised state headed by the President, Ministers, and an administrative layer of principal secretaries and heads of parastatal institutions assisted by technicians and advisors. This was one aspect of the system. The other aspect was that the President and Ministers emerged from the leadership of the sole political Party. Its membership consisted of all elements in society. Its structural organisation from the grass roots (the cell) to the national level was also centralised and unified, with sectional or factional interests considered harmful for social harmony. Activities and interests of specific groups were brought under one roof in party-supervised organisations affiliated to the Party. These features were carried over into the 1970's and after.
3 POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES AFTER 1967

This section highlights the key characteristics of Tanzania's political system and political processes after 1967. We focus on the organisation and the structures of the Party (TANU, and from 1977, CCM) as the central political institution constructed by the political leadership. Those structures of domination and legitimation defined the conditions and framework through which public issues and goals were to be determined and implemented during the period of our study. The final section of the chapter will single out some decisions made between 1967 and 1977 to illustrate the general character of national-level decision-making and the maintenance of political control in Tanzania following the Arusha document.

a) Orientation Following the Arusha Declaration

As we have seen, the Arusha Declaration and the subsequent measures gave rise to an increased state sector. This was the main economic aspect of the event. However, the Arusha Declaration also had its political side, defining along with other documents of the period the public goals and objectives of Tanzanian society and the ways people were in future to accede to political power. In the wake of the internal and external crises facing the country during the early 1960's (see Chapter 1), the Arusha Declaration expressed the political leadership's preferred method of realising its fundamental objective of securing national independence, integrity and national harmony.

A number of related measures were to be undertaken. First, the country was to embark on the construction of a socialist and self-reliant society. The country would be socialist understood under three dimensions: there would be no exploitation of man by man; the
major means of production and exchange would be under state control; and that state would be a democratically elected state. The society would also be self-reliant, that is not dependent on foreign loans which could endanger the country's political independence, but reliant on its own resources and especially on agriculture (Arusha Declaration, Parts Two and Three [Nyerere, 1968]). These objectives of national independence and harmony would be achieved through the policy of social justice carried out by a morally committed and upright leadership and membership (Arusha Declaration, Parts Three and Four).

The main orientations of the political leadership's ideology as can be gleaned from this basic policy statement and from the other writings and speeches of the President of TANU, Mwalimu Nyerere [Nyerere, 1968] were characterised by what in analogous situations have been called "organic-statist" ideas [Stepan, 1978]. These entailed a commitment to a number of values: first, to a human community and human equality, the living in social harmony of people in a community with a commonality of interests; second, a commitment to social justice and an equitable distribution of resources and services; and third, the value of group or communal ownership, in which the state would control the major means of production and exchange.

Public control of major resources would ensure the realisation of the fundamental goals in the following ways. Firstly, increased economic development was crucial for maintaining national independence and national security. Secondly, state ownership would open up the way for a planned economy enabling the state as the expression of the general community's will to effect harmonious development and to cater for all citizens regardless of race, religion or tribe in the struggle to provide the basic services and to fight the main enemies (ignorance,
poverty and disease). Fourthly, a commitment to democracy and popular participation, "Ujamaa" (socialism) and self-reliance meant rejecting "liberal capitalism" and "doctrinaire socialism" in favour of the creation of a society free from conflict — a society in which members in state enterprises, cooperatives or communal (ujamaa) villages would work for the benefit of all.

While the Arusha Declaration spelt out the country's objectives and the qualities required of the political leadership (Arusha Declaration, Leadership Code), the Mwongozo (Party Guidelines) [TANU, 1971] spelt out the task of that leadership, namely to be the guide of the masses by setting objectives; monitoring performance and gauging results. The Party leadership would be the controller of major affairs in the public domain. This became enshrined de jure in the country's constitution of 1975, which gave effect to the principle of 'Party Supremacy'. To mobilise and organise the society, recourse would be had to the new state organisation Chama (the Party) which developed further the unitarist ideas enshrined in the one-party democracy of 1965, and the corporatist principles of centralisation and popular participation, and incorporation or cooptation of any would be sectional or particularist interests.

b) Party Organisation: Membership, Leadership, Structures

After the Arusha Declaration political power gradually tended to be organised and exercised around different echelons of the Party, touching with varying and uneven levels of intensity on local issues, through the grassroots structures (the cell) and on national and international issues through the national organs. Political activities could be legitimately undertaken only within and through the structures
of Chama (= the Party). In its membership, organisation and structures this body attained unique characteristics which combined mobilisation, decision-making and administrative roles. The structures show features of inclusionary corporatism as sketched out by Stepan [1978, p. 73] with particular reference to Latin America, namely the cooptation and inclusion in a new state organisation of associations of workers, youth, women, parents, cooperatives, etc. combined with attempts to improve social welfare through the public provision of education and other services. Partly perhaps because it came to function in this way, the Party in Tanzania has not sunk into "an extra-ordinary lethargy" - a characterization used by Fanon [1965, p. 137] for many African nationalist movements in the immediate post-independence years.

**Party Membership**

After 1967 the political movement retained the open mass character [Mwansasu, 1981, p. 172] it inherited from the pre-independence and immediate post-independence years. Membership in TANU had been perceived then as a mark of one's commitment to national independence and patriotism, as TANU had successfully mobilised towards the gaining of national independence. As we have seen, the opening up of membership to all racial groups after independence and to the civil service in 1964 meant that TANU had membership from all social categories in all parts of the country. On the other hand, the Arusha Declaration stressed the need for members to adhere to "the beliefs and policies of socialism" of the Party, and it also asserted that the Party was that of "peasants and workers" (Arusha Declaration, Part Four, TANU membership). Following this development, a department of political education was created at the national headquarters of the Party, to deal
with inculcating the political ideology of socialism and self-reliance among members. This seems not to have transformed the character of membership however. [Interview with Kyulule].

In 1970, for example, Msekwa [1976, p. 40] estimates that there were 3 million Party members from all social categories and from all regions of mainland Tanzania. In 1975, the TANU Central Committee reported that in that year there were 1,472,551 "active" members, representing about 20.1% of adult Tanzanians above the age of 18. The term "active" represents those who had paid their monthly contributions and fees [TANU, 1975, pp. 7-9]. The difference between the two years does not necessarily mean therefore that there was a fall in membership over the five years, but reflects more the increasing organisation and structuring. While in the 1960's membership was loose and membership obligations were generally vague, in the 1970's members were called on to show more commitment by paying monthly fees and other contributions and attending Party meetings in their locality or place of work. The 1975 figure is for the more active members, and the number of those with TANU cards was probably higher than in 1970.3

Recruitment methods also changed. While earlier the procedure for joining the Party was rather informal with any adult agreeing generally with TANU's nationalist principles going to a TANU office and buying a card, after 1967 procedures were begun to be put in place for gaining membership. Formerly the initiative for membership recruitment was on local branches through their leadership, especially the Chairman or Secretary. Branch secretaries were not paid but were allowed to take roughly 10% in order to improve their livelihood [interviews with Mzee Msindai], including visiting market places and
soliciting for prospective membership. After 1967, a system of filling forms was introduced, with local branch committees approving new membership. This though was not always strictly adhered to. Also, members in arrears for payment of party subscriptions could pay their dues at the time when they wanted to seek election in leadership positions.

An important new membership condition was introduced in 1974. At the Musoma N.E.C. meeting it was decided that ordinary members were from then on required to abide by the Arusha Declaration regulations on leadership and to be exemplary. These included being of good behaviour and not being involved in capitalist or feudal practices or having a house to let. In practice this was difficult to monitor or implement, even for cell leaders, who as the leaders at grassroots had been among those required to abide by these regulations from the start. The national leadership preferred to cast a "blind-eye" on the issue and considered, for example, the practice of letting a room or two as practically innocuous.

In 1977, with the creation of the CCM, adherence to these regulations became more stringent. To gain membership one had to fill in forms detailing one's family, education, career, occupation and political or criminal record. This was followed by a 3 month course in political education on the objectives and the ideology of the Party. At the end one had to pass an (oral) test. Regular attendance of Party meetings was stressed and one could lose one's membership either by not paying fees for 6 months or for not attending three consecutive meetings without valid reasons. In 1977, the total number of active members in CCM was 1,524,939 from 9,217 branches [CCM, 1978, p. 54].
Leadership

While more stringent regulations were being applied to membership, more ideological commitment was being expected of the Party leadership. For the lower ranks of the leadership such as cell-leaders, this was, as mentioned, not strictly implemented. There was also a marked ambiguity in the case of businessmen and traders over whether they could be members and especially whether they were eligible for leadership positions. In practice, the term worker or peasant was so loosely applied as to include quite varied categories of people.

Structures

In structural organisation TANU also retained its hierarchical character. At each level from the national leadership to the cell, there were committees consisting of a combination of elected and ex officio members. Candidates for the elected posts (usually two) had to be approved by higher bodies. Control by the national leadership was thus maintained.

The National Conference

Constitutionally, the highest authority in TANU and later CCM was the National Conference, whose membership apart from the national leadership included all members of Parliament; all district chairmen and secretaries of the Party; the members of the Central Committee and the National Executive Committee; and delegates from affiliated bodies of the Party - amounting to over one thousand delegates. The N.C. elected the national leadership of the Party; chose the members of the CC (Central Committee) and the N.E.C. (National Executive Council or Committee); and approved the candidate for Presidential elections.
Scheduled to meet every two years from 1971 and every five years after 1975, the National Conference had a limited influence on Party policy. Attended by a large number of delegates from different parts of the country assembled, usually in the Diamond Jubilee Hall, for at the most one week, the Conference could not carry out a serious deliberation of the issues presented. The Conference was usually addressed by the Party Chairman and other national leaders and culminated with the passing of resolutions based on these speeches.

For example, in 1982, the Chairman of the CCM gave a lengthy report on the five years of CCM government. This was followed by addresses from the Party Vice Chairman and other Party leaders exhorting the delegates to be committed and continue the work of CCM. A number of delegates got the chance to speak on problems and raise questions with the Party leadership and to point to some malpractices in the regions. A Conference Committee was then selected to draft resolutions based on the Chairman's speech. These were passed at the end of the Conference.

Another activity at the 1982 Conference was amendments to sections of the Party Constitution which on recommendation by N.E.C. the Conference was called upon to endorse. The third item of business was the election of the national leadership and members of the National Executive Committee. Delegates had copies of a curriculum vitae for each candidate. Each candidate was allowed three minutes to introduce himself to the Conference before delegates proceeded to make their choices by secret ballot. Candidates had been shortlisted by the CC and N.E.C.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the National Conference had great symbolic value as the visible expression of national unity with
delegates from different parts of the country and from all walks of life among the delegates united in the approval of programmes and resolutions which had been prepared by the national leadership. The participation of the Conference in the choice of the national leadership meant that this leadership was approved and endorsed by a nation-wide gathering. The National Conference also was a useful popular forum in which the leadership could explain and get approval of its policies from the wider membership.

Central Committee

The agency in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the Party was the Central Committee. Before 1969, the Central Committee was an informal group consisting of the elected TANU national leadership and TANU elders appointed by the President of TANU. These were usually resident in Dar es Salaam [Bienen, 1967, pp. 186-87]. In the reorganisation of Party structures from 1969, positions in the Central Committee became partly elective and partly appointees of the President of the Party. The elected members were one from each region and held office for five years.

Members of the CC in 1969 and those of 1974 showed similar characteristics. Of the elected members from the regions in 1974, 17 were notable elders, TANU stalwarts elected for their long standing in the Nationalist Movement and as old men respected for their wisdom and advice. Their formal training in the majority of cases was limited to primary education. Four were religious notables. In a sense they represented the more popular elements in the Party from the regions where they lived, being engaged in self-employment in agriculture. Of the three other elected members, one was an army captain (the Director of Political Education), another was a former Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Information and the third a
former medical assistant. Of the five Presidential appointees, four were long standing TANU elders while one was the Minister of State in the President's Office.[see TANU, 1974, pp.8-9; TANU, 1974(a) passim for some brief biographies].

Members of the Central Committee were constituted into four subcommittees in 1969. These were Economy and Finances; Political, dealing with Party matters and political education; Social Affairs, including health and education, and Defence and Security. In 1974 the number of subcommittees was increased to seven to facilitate the work of the Central Committee in the wake of the push to make the Party supreme. This went hand in hand with improved organisation and expansion of the Secretariat of the Party Headquarters with the creation of departments to service the Party leadership under the direction of the National Executive Secretary. The subcommittees had permanent chairmen resident in the new capital, Dodoma.

The Central Committee had the task of formulating Party policies, which would then be debated and decided upon in a wider body, the National Executive Council/Committee. The Central Committee through its subcommittees also had the task of supervising the implementation of government policies and the performance of parastatals. The Political Affairs and Defence and Security subcommittees dealt with Party membership and leadership issues. Aspirants to various leadership positions would be scrutinised and recommendations made to the Central Committee to be passed to the National Executive Council for decisions as to who would stand in elections – for example, those for the National Assembly, or for district or regional chairman of the Party.

On economic issues, the Economic Affairs subcommittee had the general task of supervising the implementation of Party policy on
economic programmes, including agricultural and industrial production and the use of natural resources. This covered the whole range of economic activities; the work of cooperatives, the transport sector, use of energy resources, and the performance of financial institutions [information on the work of the Economic Affairs subcommittee mainly from interview with Mzee J. Mbutu – Secretary]. The subcommittee was composed of members from the Central Committee plus coopted members from the relevant economic ministries such as Agriculture, Industries, Land and Housing, Commerce, Water and Communications. The latter would be called on at sittings of the subcommittee to explain the situation of the sectors they were in charge of and to report on the work of the government agencies and parastatals under their responsibility.

In this way the Central Committee would supervise economic affairs as well as be a source of new ideas which later could be discussed and become Party policy. For example, the Committee dealt with the Second Five Year Plan, 1969-1974, and readjusted it to give stress on rural development. In 1976, the subcommittee probed the unsatisfactory performance of UMITA (a freight parastatal) where there were losses and alleged misappropriation of funds. The probe led to a number of dismissals. The subcommittee also dealt with The National Housing Corporation scandal, which centred upon some building projects by this parastatal that had remained unfulfilled and the poor quality of several of the built houses. This led to the management's being dismissed. Another case considered was the unsatisfactory distribution of textiles by TEXCO (the textiles products parastatal), leading to warnings and the organisation of a seminar on the approved procedures in the distribution of textile products. The subcommittee probed
the Tanga Fertiliser Company where fertilisers had been piling up and a conflict had developed between the management and employees. The subcommittee also dealt with problems facing the National Milling Corporation and the losses it was making.

Another common procedure utilised by the Central Committee was the commissioning of a study. This task would usually be given to the National Executive Secretary. This is what happened in the case of the resolution on Universal Primary Education which was passed in 1974 at Musoma. The task was given to the National Executive Secretary to make recommendations on extending primary education to all primary age children. Technical advice was sought from the Ministry of Education and the University of Dar es Salaam (the then Vice-Chancellor of the University Nd. P. Msekwa was a member of the team). Recommendations were made to the CC and to the N.E.C., which after deliberations issued the famous Musoma Declaration.

With the exception of the President and the Vice-President and the Minister of State in the President's Office, the 1975 Central Committee was composed of people who did not hold ministerial posts. This being the case, the summoning of Ministers and Principal Secretaries or heads of parastatals before the CC did not always go well with some ministries. Some Ministers and Principal Secretaries saw the system of CC subcommittees as an intrusion into their sphere of authority, since they had been taught and had come to accept the myth of the unpolitical nature of government administration and the civil service. This involvement of members of the CC in the decision-making processes of government ministries was an important element in ujamaa political practices.
The National Executive Council

While the CC formulated policies and was in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the Party, Party decisions were finalised in the wider body of the N.E.C. - often referred to as National Executive Committee, but the Swahili name is better rendered by the English Council. Its composition was revised during the 1970's several times. In the early 1970's, the N.E.C.'s members consisted of:

- 20 members elected (one from each region) by the National Conference to compose the Party Central Committee;
- all 20 Regional Party Chairmen elected in the regions;
- 20 Regional Party Secretaries, appointees of the Party's National Chairman;
- Five other members appointed by the Party Chairman;
- the National Secretaries of all affiliated organisations (i.e. the trade union; the cooperatives, the Parents' Association, the women's organisation and the youth league), all of whom were appointees;
- the Attorney General;
- and the Principal Secretary to the President.

The Council was designated to meet every three months.

In 1977 the N.E.C. was enlarged to about 160 members to include members from both parts of Tanzania on an equal basis, but the principle of appointed and elected members was kept. The chairmen of the Party mass organisations also became members. In 1982 another innovation was introduced with the addition of five reserved seats for the youth organisation, women's organisation and the armed forces. The N.E.C. was to meet every six months.

In 1974 the elected members, the elected Regional Chairmen of the Party and the twenty N.E.C. members from the regions elected by
the National Conference, tended to be drawn from the elder notables. These were personalities respected for their involvement in the Party since colonial times. They were drawn from the more popular sections and were people well known in their respective regions where they had influence and respect. This contrasted with the Regional Secretaries who were people with more formal education who had risen by being active in the Party's youth wing or in the Party administrative sections [CCM, 1977].

During the late 1960's and the 1970's the N.E.C. became the body from which several major pronouncements were made, leading commentators [Msekwa, 1976] to see it as the key decision-making body over a whole range of issues of national importance. The following examples of policy statements and directives that were deliberated upon and issued by N.E.C. can be cited from the Minutes of the N.E.C.:

1. The N.E.C. meeting of 1st June 1967 at Iringa deliberated on a report by the President on nationalisations and the payment of compensation to various companies - a follow-up to the Arusha Declaration meeting when the N.E.C. had urged further steps in the implementation of socialism.

2. The N.E.C. meeting of October 10, 1967 deliberated on NUTA's suggestion that more say be given to workers in the management of factories. It was agreed in principle that workers in parastatals should have more say and that means be investigated to realise that objective (Minute No. 100).

3. The N.E.C. in March 1970 discussed government's efforts to create a state commercial sector on the basis of a report prepared by the Minister for Industries. The Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture reported on the state of food production in the country;
and there was a discussion of ways of stemming corruption -
government officials would be required to explain how they got
property when required to do so by the President.

(4) The N.E.C. Extraordinary Meeting of February 1971 in Dar es
Salaam deliberated on the country's security and decided on the creation
of the People's Militia (military training for adult citizens).

(5) The N.E.C. session of January 18, 1972 agreed on the
Decentralisation Programme setting up a new system of Regional Admini-
stration and determined that 40% of government expenditure to be
utilised on development projects.

(6) The N.E.C. meeting of May 15, 1972 decided on the need to raise the
minimum wage in view of the rising cost of living, directing the
government to deal with the issue.

(7) The N.E.C. meeting of November 28, 1972 discussed housing
policy and the question of the Tanzania Housing Bank giving loans to
workers to build their own houses; they also discussed rents in
government houses, approving a report tabled by the Minister of Lands.

(8) The N.E.C. meeting of April 1973 in Dar es Salaam approved
the payment of bonuses to encourage productivity but decided these
were not to be paid to those with high salaries; it agreed on the
creation of an Anti-Corruption Squad to deal with corruption and
bribery; and the TAPA (Tanganyika Parents Association) and religious
organisations were allowed to run schools, since government was unable
to offer primary and technical education to all children.

(9) The N.E.C. meeting of November 22, 1974 at Musoma approved:
(a) the principle of Party supremacy, to be enshrined
de jure in the constitution;
(b) the implementation of steps leading to the goal of
Universal Primary Education;

(c) a procedure for University entrance, including vetting by Party branches and two years' work experience before joining institutions of higher learning;

(10) The N.E.C. meeting of March 10, 1975 in Shinyanga was informed of an imminent law on villages and ujamaa villages and the structures envisaged. N.E.C. gave its approval.

Other measures decided upon during N.E.C. meetings included the transfer of the capital from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma (1973) and the move of rural population into nucleated villages, placing control of land in many areas into the hands of newly constituted village councils under the Villages and Ujamaa Village's Act (1974).

The structures of the Party at the national level were linked with those of central government through the various holders of office in the two organisations. Thus the President of the Republic and the Vice-President were Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Party. Ministers had to be members of the Party and some of them were in the Central Committee. In the late 1960's and early 1970's members of the Central Committee tended to be drawn from the more popular elements, with few of them in the Cabinet, but by 1977 this situation had changed, with several Ministers now being members of the N.E.C. or of the Central Committee. In 1982, the President, Vice-President, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Finance were members of the Central Committee of the Party.

Regional and District Administration

The decentralisation programme which was introduced in January 1972 changed the structures of regional and district administration which had been created after independence. The
ostensible purpose of the new administrative set-up was to give people in their Region or District greater democratic control over matters which directly concerned them by bringing them closer to the implementors of those decisions. The new administrative structure would also speed up decision-making and implementation at the Regional and District levels, freeing them from the need to wait for central government approval.

The new system of regional administration introduced at the Regional and District levels a hierarchy of administrative officials and technical personnel in the fields of agriculture, education and health. These administrative officials and personnel were to be headed by and answerable to a Regional Development Director. The post of Regional Commissioner remained as the regional head, (as well as being Secretary of the Party Regional Structures) but the new post of Regional Development Director was to combine several responsibilities. He became Secretary of the Regional Development Committee which coordinated all regional plans before they were tabled to the Regional Party Committee for approval. He was the chief advisor to this Party Committee on proposed plans, indicating sources of funds and the state of material and human resources in the region. Regional plans were submitted by the Regional Development Director to the Prime Minister's Office where all regional plans were amalgamated before submission to the Economic Committee of the Cabinet.

In regional planning the Regional Director thus held an important position. In matters of implementation, the Director was the practical head of administration; as chief accounting officer he approved use of regional funds; and he monitored the implementation of projects as head of all the technical personnel who were answerable
to him in the region. At the District level, the District Development Director was in a similar position.

The Regional administration was linked to the structures of the Party through the Regional Commissioner, who as we have seen retained also the post of Regional Secretary of the Party. The Regional Commissioner chaired the Regional Development Committee which drafted plans for the region in the light of suggestions from Ward and District levels. This committee consisted of District Party Chairmen and Secretaries and District Directors. The draft plans would be submitted to the Regional TANU Committee chaired by the Regional Chairman of the Party and attended by delegates from Districts for deliberation and approval. In this way the regional administration and party political structures combined appointed officials and Party elected delegates and representatives.

At the village level, the village government was composed of a popularly elected, Party-based Council headed by the Party Village Chairman but managed by the centrally-appointed Village Manager. At the Ward level, the appointed Ward Secretary (katibu kata) combined the administrative post of Ward head as well as that of Party Ward Secretary. The same situation prevailed at the District level, with the Area Commissioner combining the post of chief executive and District Party Secretary. His work was to liaise with party political structures which were forums for local expression of demands and desires at their respective levels on issues relating to agriculture, education and other local services. Several studies in rural administration have shown that effective decision-making and implementation lies greatly in the hands of these appointed and technical personnel at the different levels [see, for example, Finucane, 1974].
In June 1975, "Party Supremacy" became enshrined in the Constitution of Tanzania. Henceforth public affairs and public policies were to be carried out under the guidance, supervision and approval of Party leadership: "the functions of the organs of the United Republic of Tanzania shall be performed under the auspices of the Party" (Chapter 1, pt. 1, Section 3(4) of the Interim Constitution). This was reiterated in the country's 1977 Constitution (Chapter 1, pt. 1, Section 3 (1-3)) with the creation of CCM, and in the 1984 Constitution. These provisions meant that the Head of State, state and government ministers would be summoned before sessions of the N.E.C. to account for government actions. But as the top posts in the government hierarchy and in Party were occupied by the same people, there was less prospect of disagreements than would otherwise have been the case. Such summons served in practice as an occasion for those N.E.C. members not in government to be involved in State decisions and for the President and the Cabinet to gain their approval and support. At the same time, as N.E.C. members were from different parts of the country, political leaders in government would be able to get feedback from the regions in a confidential and uninhibited atmosphere reminiscent of the palavers so common in the cultural practices of communities in many parts of Tanzania known as baraza (meetings or assembly of men, usually elderly, deliberating and coming to a consensus decision). With the separation of the posts of national Chairman of the Party and President of the Republic as a result of the 1985 elections, it remains to be seen how the provisions of Party Supremacy will affect the functioning of the political system.
4 DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES AFTER 1967: SOME ILLUSTRATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS

Some aspects of the analysis presented in the last section are best illustrated by the way the Tanzanian leadership handled a number of crucial episodes in the country's history since 1967. The following examples have been selected to highlight some of the more important issues.

a) Illustrations

Mwongozo

The N.E.C.'s Extraordinary Meeting of February 1971 was called following the military coup d'état in Uganda. The deliberations were attended both by N.E.C. members and by invited leaders in government: ministers, principal secretaries, and the heads of the armed forces, the University and the Party Ideological College. The Chairman explained the events in Uganda and the ramifications of that army revolt and how it would affect the East African community and the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa. Discussions during the week centred on the strengthening of the country's defences, the role of the Party, Tanzania's foreign policy and the consolidation of the country's economy. A working committee was chosen to draft what were to be the resolutions of the meeting, giving rise to the 1971 Party Guidelines (= Mwongozo). The resolutions and the decisions taken were initiated by different participants, including the Chairman in his opening address and other contributors speaking on the role of the Party (for example, Ngombale Mwiru, a former Secretary-General of the Party youth wing as well as principal of the Party ideological college who was considered to be on the Party's radical wing). Sokoin spoke in favour of the creation of a people's militia drawing examples from the way all
able bodied in his community (Masai) and in many parts of the country were usually trained and armed. This persuaded delegates to pass the motion for the creation of a People's Militia. Attention then moved to the question of the guiding role of the Party and the need to get members more involved. In the face of threats of political instability, the Guidelines were passed. Moreover the style of arriving at the resolutions was based on the assembling of different views and arriving at a consensus. The objective sought is societal integration and leadership's legitimacy [interviews with Msekwa and Mwiru, N.E.C. minutes].

Decentralization

The Decentralization Programme of 1972 followed a different course. In the first place the government commissioned a study to reform the regional administration to relate it to the development objectives set out in the Arusha Declaration. When the new structure was proposed, the Regional Development Director was to be chairman of the Regional Development Committee, which would have implied a relatively small role for elected Party personalities in regional economic affairs. When the N.E.C. met, at the suggestion of the Chairman, that proviso was removed from the final structure before it was approved by N.E.C. As we have seen, in the agreed decentralization arrangements, Regional Development Committees were chaired by the Regional Party Chairman [interview with Mzee J. Mbutu; Minutes of N.E.C., Minute 3]. Regional administration and programmes it was hoped would be more acceptable with an element of popular involvement.

Foreign Affairs

Kiwanuka [1979] has argued that N.E.C. as a body did not usually
discuss external relations except in terms of the general policy of
the Party, which stood for support of liberation movements in southern
Africa and the Non-Aligned Movement. N.E.C. was usually "briefed"
by the President on what action the government took on different issues
as they emerged. N.E.C. would then invariably support the government
stand. In other words, the style was that initiatives were presented
by the Presidency after initial discussion with the Ministry and
advisors. These were presented to N.E.C. for discussion and decision.
This forum was suited to this purpose, as its deliberations were
confidential, thus avoiding publicity which could embarrass the government
or generate conflict. That the Presidency felt the need to
at least brief and justify the N.E.C. is a measure of the importance
attached to gaining the acceptance and consent of the wider population
for governmental activities.

b) Observations

In all of the above instances decisions were by assent rather than
by strict voting. The emphasis was on integration and achieving
consensus, not on "adversary politics" and the imposition of the will
of the majority. Committee members participated not as representatives
of a specific category of the population but as members of a party
aiming to arrive at conclusions which would be for the common good.
The lack of organised "factions", separate interest groups or pressure
groups was typical of the N.E.C. as it was of the National Assembly,
both institutions reflecting the unitarist character of the political
system. The presence of members from various sections of the popu-
lation (youth, women, armed forces) far from interfering with consensus,
tended to defuse any potential mobilisation that could have arisen had
they been excluded.

The Tanzanian political system, then, was a centralised system in which the expression of particularistic interests was discouraged. This lack of pluralism, which was partly conditioned at independence by the relatively low level of differentiation of the population, made a number of things possible which would not have been possible in adversary politics. For example, the state was able to intervene in the economy in a continuous but largely conflict-free way, and – as we shall see in the next chapter – it was able to regulate relations between employers and employees without the problems this typically involves.

The power enjoyed by the central state actors in such a system is obviously not unlimited, however. It is circumscribed first of all by the resources available, the state of the economy, the international political and economic context, and the weight of foreign capital and financial agencies from which the state is constrained to borrow funds for pressing projects. The centralization of the political system of Tanzania was also quite relative, given the limited organizational resources and manpower available to the central authorities for implementing and enforcing decisions. In practice, this kind of limitation led to Regional, District and Ward officials retaining in their jurisdictions real power to implement and enforce decisions as they understood them and to interpret the country's policies as they saw fit, or even to pursue their own goals [Vide Samoff, 1974; Finucane, 1974].

Another qualification on the relative centralism of the political system concerns the necessarily general character of Party pronouncements at the top. National Party decisions were usually expressed
in abstract terms, often as moral ideals which needed practical translation into identifiable objectives that could be implemented. Gaps on that level often created ambiguities in the strategy to be undertaken. For example, the role of private activities after the Arusha Declaration was not always spelt out clearly in distinction from what the public sector would be engaged in. That kind of ambiguity sometimes led to important decisions being taken in a more ad hoc way. For example, the ill-defined limits to the role of the public sector led in 1976 to public take-overs of small enterprises such as butcheries and shops. This "Operation Maduka" (maduka = shops) was later reversed.

In the chapters which follow both the corporatist-type centralism of the post-Arusha political system and these important limits to its effectiveness will be very much in evidence.
Footnotes


2. This point recurs in several minutes of N.E.C. when discussing the creation of constituency boundaries.

3. TANU [1975, p. 9]. TANU fee-paying membership (hai) was 20.1% of adults.

4. This ambiguity showed itself in the term workers in the workers' participation programme and would refer to all employees.

5. Notes taken by author as observer to the Conference.

6. TANU, 1974(a) was the report of the National Conference of TANU of June 1974, during which time the practice was that candidates would introduce themselves verbally to the Conference. In those self introductions one gets a glimpse of those who were later elected.

   TANU, 1974 is an annual report listing names of members of the C.C. Information on them was obtained through interviews with Mzee S. Ny'waya, a long-time journalist with the Party Newspaper Uhuru.

7. There has been a change in the face of both the N.E.C. and the C.C. since the creation of CCM in 1977 and since the 1982 party elections. This was brought about by the union of the Afro-Shirazi Party and TANU and the need to include N.E.C. and C.C. members from both sides of the United Republic. Secondly, N.E.C. and the C.C. are more drawn from the ranks of government administration, parastatals or party administration and less from the more "popular elements" - the elders and notables of the 1970's. Thirdly, the simultaneous tenure of important posts in N.E.C., C.C. and government is another feature of the early 1980's. [Vide van Donge, K. and Liviga, A., 1985, for one summary of the 1982 N.E.C.].
CHAPTER 3

SALIENT FEATURES OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM

This chapter sets out to examine the industrial relations system in Tanzania after independence and especially since 1967. The objective is to review the general labour policies and the major items of legislation regulating work relations and shaping employees' activities at factory level. One central feature that is highlighted is the way the political system has articulated with or has informed the labour policies and the formal structures governing work relations. The chapter argues that three guiding principles expressed in the ideology of ujamaa—centralism, populism and humanism—have permeated the way workmen and industrial relations are organised, particularly in public enterprises. At a deeper level, the explanation for the range of corporatist measures introduced in 1964 and after 1967 lies in the socio-political system discussed in the preceding chapter—the labour policies and structures emanate from that system.

The chapter, in other words, conceives the industrial relations system in Tanzania as an element in the political strategy of dominant political actors, for an industrial relations system and measures governing the relationship between workmen and employers cannot be divorced from the nature of the political system. One of the central roles of the state is the maintenance of jurisdiction over the population in a given area. This includes employers and employees. The issue then as regards the industrial relations system is not the existence or non-existence of state control but rather the form this control takes. The character and content of political power affects the character and content of the industrial relations system, the structures of
organisations of employees, the bargaining procedures between employers and employees and the content of policies relating to working conditions. Implicit in this perspective is the belief that the industrial relations system is not a mere or a direct expression of the interests of a class but is rather one of the strategies of political actors pursuing certain primarily political goals.

The chapter discusses trade union organisation, the workers' participation programme (Workers' Councils), aspects of the organisational set-up of public corporations which affect labour relations and the regulation of industrial relations under the Permanent Labour Tribunal Act of 1967.

1. TRADE UNION ORGANISATION

At independence Tanzania inherited an industrial relations system in which the state through the Department of Labour was involved in direct regulation of working conditions and wages and as well as in the supervision of trade unionism. From this it was a short step towards the direct state control of unionism which was introduced in 1964. The decisive influence, though, was the political leadership's basic strategy, which as we have seen was strongly oriented towards national integration and harmony. In order to further national stability, consensus and harmony, the option was pursued of demobilising potentially partisan socio-economic groups by placing them under the umbrella of one organisation, whose leadership was linked to and answerable to the political leadership. This structural arrangement tended to circumscribe the independent activities of trade unions.

Cooptation of labour organisations was not the only instrument of the leadership's strategy. In order to promote societal peace and remove sources of industrial conflict, some of the first measures
of the independence government were designed to improve labour conditions especially in urban areas and remove those aspects of the work situation which were conspicuously unwelcome. It enacted a statutory minimum wage, established the right for paid leave and compensation in case of sickness, and set out procedures for dismissing workers, thus constraining the power employers had over their employees. As we saw in Chapter 2, such a combination of institutional incorporation and measures to provide material benefits to previously disadvantaged groups is typical of what Stepan [1978] calls inclusionary corporatism. Other aspects of the labour regulating measures working towards harmony and consensus were the systematic regulation of wages and salaries, government arbitration of disputes and the creation of avenues for workers' involvement and consultation. The last mentioned was, as we shall see in a later section, a crucial aspect of the work setting as it emerged after 1967, although elements of it were present from an earlier date.

At the same time as it was providing new social benefits to reward its supporters and consolidate its political base, the new government was intent on encouraging foreign investment and thus was concerned about curbing industrial unrest which could scare off prospective foreign investors. This double aspect of the labour legislation immediately after independence reveals itself in the series of Acts passed in the period 1962-67.

The major items of legislation were as follows.

- The Trade Unions Ordinance (Amendment) Act, 1962, which made it a condition for a union to remain legal that it should be affiliated to a designated Federation appointed by the Minister for Labour - in effect a measure for close supervision and control of unions by the government.
- The Trade Disputes (Settlement) Act No. 43 of 1962, which set up a long-winded tortuous procedure before a legal strike or lockout could be carried out — restricting strike action by employees. A similar act, The Civil Service (Negotiating Machinery) Act, 1962, concerned junior civil servants who were to be forbidden to go on strike by the Trade Disputes (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1964.

- The Severance Allowance Act No. 57 of 1962, granting some benefits to an employee or his dependents in case of loss of job or death. Such provisions had not existed before.

- The National Provident Fund Act of 1964, which provided some measure of retirement benefits in the form of contributions made partly by the employee (5% of basic wage) and partly by the employer (10% of employee's basic wage).

- The Security of Employment Act No. 62 of 1964 restricting the employer's arbitrary power to dismiss employees with the introduction of Workers' Committees in work places. Through the Act employee's Workers' Committees were to be consulted by the employer on issues relating to discipline and the sanctioning of workers. A Conciliation Board was to be set up consisting of representatives of the two parties under the chairmanship of a District Labour Officer to deal with disciplinary matters.

The National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA) Act No. 4 of 1964 was the law which affected workers' organisations most considerably and was the principal expression of the corporatist policies of the political leadership. In the wake of the army mutiny of 1964 and the threat to national integration and cohesion that event entailed, the Tanganyika Federation of Labour was disbanded and one central trade union (NUTA) was created to which all employees were to belong.
In its structures and procedures NUTA was to be closely linked to the political party. Unlike the hitherto "consumptionist" unions, the new union as an affiliate to the Party was to advance the policies as designated by the political leadership and promote increased production. Under the Act, the union was centrally organised at its national headquarters with several industrial departments. Its main executive officers, the Secretary General and his Deputy, were appointees of the President of the Republic. The union structures included elected committee-men at District, Regional and the National General Council levels. There were also appointed Secretaries at the head of each echelon. As an affiliate of the Party, the union sent delegates to the different sittings at District, Regional and National level as well as giving annual reports on union activities to the National organs of the Party. Positions of leadership, either elective or appointed, were restricted to those with membership in the political party. One point that needs noting particularly is that NUTA delegates at National sittings of the Party were not expected to participate in discussions as representing the particularistic interests of the employed.

As the organisation of the employed, NUTA was replaced in 1977 by JUWATA. This followed the restructuring of the Party set-up and the creation of C.C.M. Several changes affected the employer's organisation. JUWATA became designated as one of the Mass Organisations of the Party, to which all employees belong. While membership of NUTA had been through one's enrolment as a member or through the "closed-shop" system (whereby all employees were deemed members in a workplace consisting of more than fifty percent of membership), membership of JUWATA was by virtue of being employed, with the consequent monthly
payment of membership dues of 1% of one's basic salary or wage. Those seeking leadership positions in JUWATA either as chairmen or committee men at different levels were screened and approved by the Central Committee of C.C.M. before being submitted to a ballot of the workers (Paragraph 71 of Party Constitution [C.C.M., 1977]. JUWATA branch committee-men and elected Congress delegates were expected to attend meetings with Regional and National Secretaries who were appointees of the Central Committee of C.C.M.

JUWATA is a centralised organisation and manifests in its structure the unitarist and organic-statist conceptions of the political leadership. At the lowest levels is the JUWATA branch is composed of all employees with the obligation to pay their monthly subscriptions. The branch elects a Chairman and members of the branch committee, whose number depends on the size of the workforce with the proviso that there is one member from each department. The key role is played by the appointed Secretary of the branch who is in charge of all correspondence, finances and the holding of meetings. The C.C.M. Branch Secretary is also a member of the JUWATA branch committee. A similar structure is replicated at the District, Regional and National levels. The National Congress, which meets every three years, is composed of mixed delegates and elects the General Chairman of JUWATA. It also elects the smaller National Council (Baraza Kuu) whose members are partly elected (the Regional Chairman of JUWATA, twenty members elected by Congress, ten each from mainland and the Isles - and one member from each of nine categories of employees such as industrial workers, railwaymen, teachers, hotel workers, transporters, etc.) and partly appointees (the JUWATA Secretary General, C.C.M. National Executive Secretary and the Regional Secretaries of JUWATA).
Baraza Kuu, which according to the union constitution must meet at least once a year, is the body which generally supervises the implementation of Congress decisions including procedures relating to industrial disputes. The further smaller body in the hierarchy of JUWATA, Kamati ya Usimamizi (Executive Council), meeting at least once every six months, is with JUWATA Headquarters the implementator of union decisions. The daily conduct of union affairs at the National level is managed by the JUWATA National Secretariat. Under the union chief executive (the Secretary General) and one deputy each for mainland Tanzania and the Isles, the secretariat is composed of seven departments: Education and Culture; Publicity; Finances; Personnel; International Relations; Research and Planning; and Workers' Participation.

The system of hierarchies and the working procedures of JUWATA defined the conditions for industrial action by the union to take place. Any such action must start from branch level and be approved by the District and Regional hierarchies before submission to the National organs which alone can endorse any intended action. On the other hand, the National echelons cannot initiate any move until all the legal procedures governing industrial disputes have been exhausted.

JUWATA figures show that there was a steady growth in membership from 1977 to 1981, with total membership rising from 267,391 to 349,681. At the end of 1981 the JUWATA membership was 58% of the estimated total labour force of 600,000 employees of all categories. Among those who were not registered as JUWATA members were workers in household employment. The limited coverage of JUWATA membership was also the result of a lack of strict applications of the "closed shop" measures to employees who had been non-NUTA members. This usually involved
middle-level categories or white-collar employees – a legacy of the historical concentration of union membership among low-wage blue-collar workers. Despite these limitations, the increase in membership was reflected in a growth in the number of JUWATA branches from 1,383 in 1978 to 2,263 in 1981 [JUWATA, 1982].

When JUWATA formally took over from NUTA in February 1978, the NUTA leadership was passed over to JUWATA, with the Secretary General continuing as the chief executive of the organisation, a position he had held since 1969 as an appointee of the President of the Republic. The same happened to his two deputies. The Secretary General, a long-time trade unionist, also held the post of Minister of Labour. His deputies were longstanding active unionists. The National Chairman had formally held a government post as Area Commissioner before standing for election as the National Chairman of JUWATA. Departmental Heads at the National Secretariat had been active trade unionists.

Since the 1984 JUWATA elections, reflecting a tendency discernible also in the Party leadership, the National leadership of JUWATA has tended to be drawn increasingly from among white-collar employees in government administration or Party bureaucracy. The Secretary General, another long-standing union leader in the late 1950's and 1960's, came back to the Secretariat of JUWATA after varied spells as General Manager, Regional Commissioner and Ambassador. The new National Chairman is a former labour officer, Regional Development Director and Principal Secretary in the Prime Minister's Office. Among the five elected members of the JUWATA Executive Council from mainland Tanzania, one was an incumbent Regional Commissioner, another a Director of Personnel and Management in the Ministry of Trade, another a Regional Development Director and the last a District Party Secretary.
Figure 3.1
The Structures of NUTA/JUWATA

NATIONAL CONGRESS

- GENERAL COUNCIL

HEADQUARTERS EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

Sec-General

REGIONAL LEVEL REGIONAL COUNCIL

- REGIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Regional Secretary

DISTRICT LEVEL DISTRICT COUNCIL

- DISTRICT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

District Secretary

MEETING OF BRANCH COMMITTEES OF INDUSTRIAL AND SUB-INDUSTRIAL SECTIONS

FACTORY LEVEL BRANCH MEETINGS

- BRANCH COMMITTEE

Branch Secretary

Source: Drawn by the Department of Research International Affairs, NUTA, Year 1975 September.

Note: I have added the title JUWATA as structures are basically the same.
2. THE WORKERS' PARTICIPATION PROGRAMME: THE STRUCTURE OF WORKERS' COUNCILS

Another of the key features of the industrial relations system relating to public enterprises is the workers' participation programme introduced in 1970. In its origin, purpose and structural design the programme reveals once again values and conceptions which tend towards industrial harmony and consensus. The apparent objectives included the demobilisation of any potential organisation of sections of the workforce to make concerted demands; the keeping of decision-making power and the right to manage in the hands of the managerial cadre; and the creation of avenues of popular involvement or industrial democracy based on the assumption that there is no antagonism between management and workers. In accordance with one of the central tenets of the ujamaa ideology, workers and managers were seen as being in organic unity and harmony as parts of a body working towards the common good.

However, although in its purpose and design the programme aimed at the incorporation of the workforce and the maintenance of industrial peace, the programme set in motion processes of a different kind as workers utilised situations and events to advance their own more limited objectives. In other words how the workers reacted to the structures was contingent on how the workers and management defined their work situations – the results of this complex interaction were not always those anticipated by the designers of the programme.

The Workers' Council programme applicable to Tanzania's public enterprises was promulgated by the Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1970 and stemmed from the changes which followed the Arusha Declaration – the increased size of the state sector and the search for new ways of running these enterprises. Following the Arusha Declaration, sections
of the trade union leadership advocated a variety of workers' participation schemes or profit sharing programmes. In the course of the parliamentary debate on the Permanent Labour Tribunal Act in October 1967, [Session No. 10 of Bunge 24-27 October 1967], several Members of Parliament, mostly from the trade union leadership, raised objections to sections of the intended legislation, arguing that it put restrictions on workers' capacity to bargain with employers on wages and conditions of service. Several members of the Assembly argued for the necessity of putting into practice the Party's policy on Socialism and Self-reliance as regards salary/wage differentials. They also argued for the introduction of forms of workers' participation in planning and decision-making, giving examples from socialist factories in Eastern Europe and stressing the importance of industrial democracy on workers' control.

The issue of workers' participation was not pursued during the following sessions of the Assembly but it continued to be discussed in the trade union leadership. In 1969, in a memorandum sent by NUTA to government, the issue of workers' participation was raised, proposing a scheme for workers' participation and for workers' consultation.¹ The Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1970 initiating the Workers' Participation programme was a response to these proposals and demands. The purpose of the circular was to find ways of mobilising a new attitude among workers towards the enterprises they worked in, of spreading information to the workers as regards performance and targets, and of eliciting a sense of commitment towards increased productivity on the shop-floor (Para. 1 of the Circular [1970]). The creation of the Workers' Councils, it was hoped, would promote a sense of "common endeavour and common responsibility" (Para. 2) within the
workforce as well as creating a new form of industrial discipline based on workers being respected as partners in a common venture. This can be viewed as a strategy to elicit commitment without recourse to force.

To distinguish the Workers' Councils from the union workers' committees the main function of the Workers' Council was to be to "give practical effect to workers' representation and participation in planning, productivity, quality and marketing matters" (Para. 5), while the Workers' Committees would be concerned with conditions of service and work discipline. In practice this distinction proved difficult to adhere to when dealing with planning for enterprises wages and the welfare of workers. Employees' wages are a part of an enterprise plan.

Another source of tension was the discrepancy between the condition of workers as co-partners with management (as envisaged by the programme) and their actual position as employees of state organisation. An amelioration of the condition of workers as co-partners with management when taken to its logical conclusions could be a source of conflict not only with management but with the government as the ultimate source of authority over the parastatal sector.

The structural design of the Workers' Council as adopted by the Presidential Circular was basically informed by unitary, incorporationist principles of social (in this case work-place) harmony. The Workers' Council would consist of the Manager or General Manager and all departmental heads on the one hand, and members of the workers' committee and elected workers' representatives from different departments on the other (Para. 7 of the Circular), thus bringing together in partnership members of the workforce and management. Formally required to meet at least once in six months the main task of the Council was to advise
the Board of Directors on different aspects of the enterprise, from the current wages situation to aspects of the marketing of company products and matters of planning, including discussing the company's balance sheet. As an advisory body, the Council was designed to be a useful forum for the workforce to air their views and suggestions. Decision-making would remain, in principle, in the hands of the management and the Board of Directors, themselves operating under constraints instituted by higher authorities, to whom management and the Board of Directors remained accountable in their decisions. The Board of Directors was, however, to have at least one member nominated by the national authorities of NUTA.

The Workers' Council programme included the creation of smaller bodies known as Executive Committees chaired by the General Manager and consisting of heads of departments and members elected by the Workers' Council. The elected members were to be up to a third of the total composition of the Executive Committee (Para. 15). Its main task was to advise the General Manager on the day-to-day running of the enterprise.

Commentators have correctly remarked that the Executive Committee was "top heavy with bureaucrats" [Mapolu, 1976, p. 275] and that management was given a dominant role in the Workers' Councils. This dominant role given to state appointed management and the appointed Board of Directors in the formal structure of the workers' participation programme reflects, I would argue, the relative strength of the state elite which has come to exercise since 1967 not only political control but also increasingly economic control via the state sector. This is what shapes the position of management vis-a-vis the workforce rather than their formal position or numerical preponderance in the organisational
structure of the Workers' Councils. In its turn, the power the state elite has politically and economically at the societal level reflected the relative weakness of the post-colonial civil society in Tanzania.

Correspondingly, the impact of the Workers' Council programme depends on the responses of the employees, on their organisational activities, their level of coordination and the sum of resources they are able to muster both nationally and at the work place. The formal position they hold sets out the parameters under which they operate but hardly determines the actual operations of the Workers' Council in a work place to such an extent as to merit the blanket view that, like the union, it is a mere instrument of management. How the Workers' Council actually operates, and the workers' relation to it in any particular instance, merits investigation taking into account the economic and political conditions facing the workers in that particular time and place. Only after a consideration of contextual factors of this kind can one determine whether or not the Workers' Councils are mere instruments of management, as well as whether and in which way the workers' representatives may have used them as part of a strategy to promote their members' interests.

3. SOME ASPECTS OF THE ORGANISATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR FIRMS

The Workers' Participation programme involved attempts to modify the structural organisation of Public Enterprises. The Public Corporations Act of 1969 was the legislation which generally governed the organisation and management of public enterprises. Designed on the basis of the general set-up of public enterprises in Britain, the Act modified the previous legislation covering companies in both the public and private sectors. Through this 1969 Act, the President
was given the authority to move assets and personnel from one para-
statatal to another. This "erodes" as it were, the autonomy of the
companies.

Under the 1969 Act, the Chairman of the Board of a Public
Corporation is appointed by the President, while other board members
are appointed by the relevant or parent Ministry. The final decision
to start a new project lies with the Cabinet. However, some
ambiguity persists, as some Corporations have within their jurisdiction
the power to make decisions through their Boards. Through the Written
Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act of 1974, the President has the power
to re-organise, dissolve etc. a wholly-owned subsidiary. The Government
through the Central Bank has control of the financial resources of public
enterprises especially regarding foreign exchange allocations, or loans
for the purchase of spares, raw materials and wages.

To control the conduct and conditions of public sector employees,
the political leadership had created the Presidential Standing
Committee on Parastatal Organisations (SCOPO). Established in
September 1967 through Presidential Directive General Notice No. 1976,
SCOPO periodically issued directives on wages and conditions of service
to parastatals. SCOPO was chaired by the Principal Secretary to the
President; other members were: four Principal Secretaries, from each
of the Treasury, Central Establishments, Economic and Development
Planning and Agriculture; the Managing Director of the National Bank
of Commerce; and the General Manager of the National Development
Corporation. The Committee had two joint Secretaries. In its terms
of reference, it was granted the task of formulating training
programmes for employees in parastatals, reviewing salaries and fringe
benefits to be consistent with those in the public service and to
approve transfers of staff between government and parastatals [Gazette
of the United Republic of Tanzania General Notice No. 1976 of 1967].

In September 1976, SCOPO was reconstituted with the new composition as follows: a Chairman and a Secretary (appointed by the President); three Principal Secretaries (from the Ministry of Manpower Development, the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, and the Prime Minister's Office); the Chairman and Manpower Director of N.D.C.; the Director-General of the Tanzania Audit Corporation; the Head of the Political Education Department of the Kivukoni Party Ideological College and the Director of Public Investment in the Ministry of Finance [SCOPO, 1976]. Its terms of reference remained basically the same, with its mandate including ensuring that parastatal organisations moved towards efficiency. In its composition SCOPO remained dominated by civil servants though a representative from NUTA/JUWATA headquarters was invited to its proceedings.

SCOPO has given detailed directives on several aspects of the work situation and the conditions of pay over the last twenty years. Directive No. 2 issued on 17th November 1967 was on allowances and fringe benefits for various categories of parastatal employees: on housing, transport, entertainment, leave, and medical care.

On housing, for example, it was directed that parastatal organisations were under obligation to provide housing and furniture only to senior management (managerial, accounting and executive staff) with a salary not less than 3,001/= per month and to branch managers as deemed fit by headquarters management (Para. 4).

No employee would be entitled to rent free accommodation (Para. 6).

Among parastatal employees entitled to furnished housing were: the Governor of the Bank of Tanzania; the Chairman and Managing Director of The National Bank of Commerce (N.B.C.); the General Manager of
N.D.C. and any other top executive approved by SCOPO (Para. 5).

On transport no employee would be entitled to be provided with a motor vehicle or monthly car allowance. Company vehicles were not to be used for private domestic purposes (Para. 7).

Those mentioned in Para. 5 above were to be for transport between house and place of work "where this is considered essential or in the best interests of the organisations". Group transport for other staff was to be approved by SCOPO.

While the monthly entertainment allowance was to cease, those entitled (as approved by the Management Headquarters of their organisations) would be eligible to claim reimbursement (Para. 7).

Employees would not be entitled to paid servants or servant allowances, except for a pool of grass cutters!

Water and electricity bills would be the responsibility of each employee (Para. 11).

On the issue of allowances for travel on duty different categories of employees would be granted assistance "appropriate to their status" (Para. 18).

On these allowances and fringe benefits, the Directive emphasized that "the terms of the Directive have been approved by the President" (Para. 26).

SCOPO Directive No. 3 of August 1968 set out salary scales in parastatals. The Directive identified eleven groups of employees in the public sector. At the top was that of Chairman and General Manager with an annual salary of between 34,400 sh and 54,000 sh. This was followed by senior management and accounting staff (within the range of 40,000-46,000 sh.) and professional engineers; economists and lawyers; middle cadre administrative and technical staff; clerks and secretaries to subordinate staff with an annual salary of between
2,880 sh. and 3,840 sh.

In the salary/wage review of May 1974, the minimum wage was revised to reach 200 sh. in the rural areas or an increase of 15% if they had surpassed that rate. For those in urban areas the minimum wage was to be 340/= sh. per month. The review altered salaries/wages for other categories of employees with General Managers receiving between 54,000/= sh. and 57,600 sh. per annum. Senior management would be in the 43,600-49,600 bracket. Other categories were as follows: Chief Engineers 39,600/= sh. - 49,600/= sh. per annum; Engineers 22,380-32,220/= sh.; Chief Accountant 45,600-49,600 = sh.; Foreman 10,200-17,760/= sh.; Artisan 6,600-11,040/= sh.; Clerk 5,400-10,440/= sh.; Subordinate Staff 4,080-5,040/= sh. [SCOPO, 1974].

SCOPO’s recommendations were approved by the Economic Committee of the Cabinet and by the President for different groups and posts. These scales were to be applied to the lower ranges in adjustments made in July 1969. While decisions on wage/salary levels were made by SCOPO, the smooth implementation was left to each parastatal. The measures would take effect after authorisation by the relevant Board of Directors (Para. 16).

Another Directive related to the establishment of Appointment Committees to deal with appointments, promotions and discipline (Directive No. 6 of 15th March 1971).

The Directive set out three categories of employees: (a) those between the basic salary of 8,800 sh. per annum and 19,440 sh. per annum, i.e. the middle cadre. These would be under the Appointments Committee chaired by the General Manager, with the Personnel Officer as Secretary and three other members. (b) those with the basic salary
of above 19,440/= sh. per annum i.e. higher management and technical staff who would be dealt with by the Appointments Committee, but this decision would not be implemented unless ratified by the Board of Directors (Para. 3a). (c) those with the basic salary lower than 8,800/= sh. per annum, i.e. the lower category of workers who would be under the direction of the General Manager or his delegate (Para. 3b).

SCOPO Directive No. 8, 1971, put an end to special staff discounts and prices on goods sold or manufactured by the organisation.

SCOPO Directive No. 10 related to procedures for the employment of non-citizens in parastatals. In succeeding years, wage and salary scales were made periodically by SCOPO following the government's changes in the minimum wage. The Urban Minimum Wage was increased to keep up with rising costs of living to 170/= sh. in 1969, 240/= sh. in 1972, 340/= in 1974, 380/= sh. in 1975, 480/= sh. in 1980, adjusted to 580/= in 1980 and 801/= sh. in 1984.

In line with the government's policy, SCOPO's mandate involved improving employee's conditions in an egalitarian manner, that is reducing income differentials while ensuring maximum efficiency. There was as a result a marked improvement in differentials in favour of those in the lower range of the wage/salary scales when compared to the position in the pre-1967 era. However, some of the regulations have been circumvented in practice in workplaces.

As our case studies help to illustrate, loopholes exist on the use of parastatal transport for domestic private purposes, as discretion is left to Headquarters Management to grant permission in the best interests of the organisation. Employees in the higher grades are entitled to subsidised housing – the 12½% deducted from their basic
salaries as rent does not cover the economic rent of the housing—while lower grades have to look and pay for their own housing. Another source of differentiation is in subsistence allowance for duty travel, with top executives receiving 60/= a night but subordinates only 10/= in 1967. By 1976 the rates were 175/= sh. and 75/=sh. in large towns or 100/= shand 50/= in small towns [SCOPO].

4. REGULATION OF LABOUR RELATIONS SINCE 1967

One of the most important elements in the political leadership's strategy of consolidating its power over labour was through the Permanent Labour Tribunal Act of 1967. Like the Act establishing NUTA, this Act defined the form of the state's domination over two central issues: (a) the control of wages and (b) the regulation of industrial conflicts. The Act set out the procedures for wages regulation and defined the parameters for the resolution of industrial strife. The state's power lay in its definition of "the rules of the game", in determining acceptable levels of wages and salaries as well as the procedures to be followed before wages/salaries could be raised legally. By the same Act industrial disputes between employers and employees were to be carried out within the rules set out by the National Assembly and as applied by the Industrial Court.

Industrial unrest was obviously not very conducive to societal integration and harmony. To ensure a measure of industrial peace, the state after independence continued the practice of wage control. In 1962, a territorial statutory minimum wage for employees was fixed at 150/= per month for Dar es Salaam and Tanga townships, 125/= sh. for the other bigger towns and 100/= for workers in agricultural plantations. This was the first statutory minimum wage. Valentine
[1981, p. 9] has estimated that as a result of this measure there was a real rise in wages of about 45%. The government took these popular measures following a consultancy report by the Territorial Minimum Wages Board (1962). This legal measure was important in improving the incomes of wage earners. Before the average minimum wage had been a mere 49/= per month, although in 1960 slight adjustment had been made to the level of 107/= per month. Salaries of several senior and middle-level posts held by Africans through the project of Africanisation also increased considerably.

In 1967, following the study made in 1966 by an ILO team on the issue of incomes and wages the Permanent Labour Tribunal Act was passed. During the Parliamentary Debate which preceded the passing of the Act [10th Session of the National Assembly (Bunge), 24th October to 27th October 1967] several members of parliament were not in favour of certain sections of the intended legislation as they imposed (according to them) restrictions on workers' and the union's capacity to bargain with employers on working conditions and especially on wages. Several speakers opposed to the bill argued for a law which would oblige employers and employees to bargain over the level of wages and salaries after considering the national income and the level of profits, instead of submitting to a binding decision of a governmental organ such as the envisaged Labour Court. Others spoke at length of the need to have workers discuss the economic performance of factories and thus create industrial democracy. There should be a reduction of income differentials in the light of the principles of the Arusha Declaration which had been enunciated earlier in the year. For example, the then Secretary General of NUTA, who had earlier also been the Minister for Labour, spoke at length opposing the legislation for curbing the union's
bargaining power. He considered it to be legislation in favour of employers, especially as employees were not to be given the chance to be informed on the performance of their industries or to see the balance sheets of the companies that employed them.

Other speakers supported the Bill as tabled by the Ministry of Labour and argued that it would contribute towards industrial peace and increased production. The legislation was justified by the government on the grounds that the increase in wages was in stark contrast with the position of the majority of the population who were peasants and who were being exploited by these urban wage earners. Moreover, as the ILO report had asserted, the rise in wages was causing a decline in wage employment which was considered as detrimental as the tendency towards inflation which, it was argued, stemmed from the rise in wages. The supporters of the Bill outnumbered those against and the Bill became law.

The Act, Part II, set down a procedure for negotiating wage increases either as a result of a dispute or as a voluntary agreement. The agreement became operative only if registered by the Tribunal and was binding on all parties. Increases in wages and fringe benefits were not to exceed 5% in any one year and should not adversely affect industries of a similar kind. Other issues to be considered were effects on output prices; the effect on the foreign exchange balance of the country, and it should not destabilise the economy as a whole and trigger inflation. Decisions of the P.L.T. on awards or voluntary agreements were final and could not be questioned in any other court of law.

In practice wage increases for both the public and the private sector were by government directive announced either during budget
speeches by the Minister for Finance or in Presidential announcements on May Day. The P.L.T. registered agreements on fringe benefits like bonuses which were registered along with the envisaged production targets which needed to be surpassed before a bonus could be granted. Once the government made an announcement on wages, adjustments were made accordingly to the wage and salary scales taking into consideration length of service and employee qualifications. This was done by SCOPO for employees in parastatal enterprises. SCOPO also approved fringe benefits for employees in parastatal enterprises. Private enterprises could register their voluntary agreements. But as government and parastatals were the major employers they placed constraints in private establishments on wage/salary differentials likely to be permitted.

The Act also established in Part IV the procedure for the settlement of industrial disputes. This revolved around the Industrial Court, consisting of a Chairman and two Deputies, who are appointees of the President of the Republic and two assessors (one from NUTA/later JUWATA and one from the Federation of Tanzania Employers) appointed by the Minister for Labour. This was the body responsible for resolution or legal arbitration of industrial disputes. Before a complex procedure had been gone through and exhausted strikes could not be carried out and were illegal and punishable by law as a criminal offence. This compulsory arbitration could not be entered into by an individual worker or by the workers of a factory; only the official trade union was to take up the cases and only its national leadership could call workers out on strike.

This state of affairs has meant that there have been no legal strikes in Tanzania since 1967. This does not mean, however, that there have been no strikes, nor does it exclude 'go slows' or outbreaks
of absenteeism amounting to a form of industrial action. While there may be fewer reported strikes (as reported by Jackson [1979]) this does not mean that the Tanzanian industrial relations' scene is free of tension and conflict or that strikes have disappeared in Tanzania completely.

To take a well reported recent example, the Daily News of July 29th and 30th, 1986 reported the rioting of 500 sugar cane cutters at the Kilombero Sugar Company in Morogoro. At dawn the previous Sunday (27th July 1986) the workers reportedly blocked the gate of the factory "protesting against low wages", against "drastic deduction made on their wages to recover cash advances extended by the company" and against "management for delaying payment of the special allowancees announced in the 1986/87 Budget speech".

The riot led to a confrontation with the Police Field Force Unit and to the death of three workers and the injury of 17 workmen, three of them seriously (including a woman). Enquiries were carried out by Regional authorities and a three-man Commission of JUWATA. The University of Dar es Salaam Legal Aid Committee and the Academic Staff Assembly, (UDASA) in statements condemned the atrocities and called for an Independent Judicial Commission of Enquiry to establish the culprits.

Although rather unusual in respect of the violence of the repression unleashed by the authorities, this incident suggests something of the tensions underlying the apparent calm of the Tanzanian industrial relations scene. As we shall see in later chapters, grievances to do with deductions and the timeliness of payments are among the most frequent and strongly felt in Tanzanian factories.
Footnotes

1. Minutes of NUTA General Council Meeting of 28th to 31st October 1969, Agenda No. 8.

2. Several of the speakers who were against or had reservations on the Bill were from the Trade Union.

3. One of the more publicised legal industrial conflicts took place in 1982 between JUWATA and management of the Agricultural and Industrial Supplies Company (AISCO). The issue went before the P.L.T. over a number of irregularities involving misuse of company finances, the issuing or sale of company goods to some high government officials allegedly contrary to procedures and the use of company finances for a wedding. The ruling came out in favour of JUWATA and led to some dismissals [Uhuru: several issues in April, May, June, July, November 13th, 1982].
CHAPTER 4

TWO TANZANIAN FACTORIES: MANAGEMENT AND PARTICIPATION

The preceding chapters have discussed the emergent socio-political processes since independence and the labour policies covering public sector workers in Tanzania. These, it has been argued, are not just the result of the political leadership's desire to maintain close control of the public sector labour force, but also express its broader project of promoting national unity and social stability through a combination of organisational incorporation and redistributive social measures. The political system is thus characterised by the policies and structures of 'inclusionary' corporatism. The stress is on national unity, consensus, central state control and multiple forms of organised and state controlled popular involvement, which mask in many ways the deeper attempts of depolitization [Stepan, 1978, Chapter 3 and 4].

The remaining chapters of this thesis explore the workings of this system further by focusing on empirical data from a small number of actual work-places studied by the author. Two work-places in particular, Factory A and Factory B, were studied in some depth and are discussed at length. The present chapter concerns itself with the work context and the basic structures of management and participation (Workers' Councils) in the two plants. Chapter 5 introduces other structures, including those of the trade union. Chapter 6 reviews the ways certain major issues were handled and is devoted to a selection of key episodes in the lives of the two factories, with some reference to information on similar episodes elsewhere. Throughout, the main focus is on relations between management and workers, particularly how workers' representatives participate in decision-making. Other important themes
are the nature and exercise of managerial power, the factors preventing a more effective intervention in the participation system by employees or their representatives, and the ways workers see and relate to the agencies that represent them.

The discussion of Factories A and B in this chapter begins with some of the more salient aspects of the work context in the factory. The following aspects of the work context are considered especially important:

(a) The industrial environment [Blauner, 1964, p. 6]; that is the economic and technological base of the factory encompassing the kind of machinery, raw materials, labour skills and products involved as well as the system of financing of the enterprise.

(b) The organisational structure of the factory: the administrative set up of the factory, particularly as it affects the way the workforce is categorised and formally organised.

(c) The differentiation within the workforce in terms of job, skills, education and pay.

(d) A general view of the conditions of service, such as transport, meals, medical care etc.

The above aspects of the work context will be a basis for an examination in this and subsequent chapters, of how workers' representatives participate in decision-making at the factories. Decision-making and workers' participation in decision-making processes have several dimensions, as suggested by Stephens [1977, pp. 17-18]:

(a) The range of decisions; that is, on which issues or decisions can or do employees have decision-making power? In any hierarchy of decisions, which issues are open to the workforce and which to management?

(b) The degree of decision-making - whether there is information, joint
consultation, co-determination or control by the workforce.

(c) The time or direction of decisions, in terms of initiating or veto power over decisions.

Our descriptions of participation in Factory A and Factory B will, as far as possible, cover each of these dimensions.

1. FACTORY 'A': INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENT, WORK ORGANISATION, CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

The Public factory which for the purposes of this account will be called Factory A is situated about 8 km to the west of the city centre of Dar es Salaam, within the Ubungo industrial area. Within walking distance to the east and the south are some of the most populous areas of Dar es Salaam, the main industrial and urban centre of Tanzania.

Established in 1968 as a wholly-owned government factory, Factory A is one of the public factories initiated by the post-independence Tanzanian government in line with the political leadership's aspirations to national economic independence and its commitment to self-reliance. Following Mwalimu Nyerere's visit to the People's Republic of China in 1964, during which the President had been impressed by China's small scale rural industries, an agreement was signed between the governments of China and Tanzania. Under the agreement financial assistance was accorded to the Tanzanian government in the form of a long-term soft loan and technical expertise for the creation of a centre dealing with the production of hand tools, agricultural implements and animal-drawn tools. After feasibility studies, the National Development Corporation (N.D.C.), the state body for the promotion and management of state and parastatal industries, recommended the opening of a training centre for agricultural tools manufacture. However, a government decision from the Presidency opted for the creation of a factory with the task of manufacturing hoes,
axes and plough butts. These implements had hitherto been imported from abroad by foreign private companies. The decision reflected the desire to reduce dependency on foreign imports for implements considered vital for the largely peasant based agricultural sector of the country. Historically, then, the factory's inception and financing were linked to the highest levels of government and imbued with the political leadership's policies. N.D.C. was assigned the task of organising the project.

After the construction phase, trial production began in August 1969, with actual production commencing in March 1970. After initially making small losses the enterprise made a small profit in 1972. In 1973, the factory not only held the monopoly of the manufacture of hand-operated agricultural tools and implements but was also granted by government the monopoly over the import of such implements and of all animal-drawn ploughs. The factory was expanded in 1977 by the construction of a foundry: for recycling materials and the making of some spare parts as well as plough wheels.

The factory's machinery installed from 1968 onwards was designed in and supplied from China. Initially, raw materials and spare parts were from the same source but by 1980, raw materials were being obtained from other countries: semi-finished plough parts from India, raw iron from Japan, dyes from Britain and chemicals from West Germany; machinery and spare parts continued to be procured mainly from China. Given the very limited iron, steel and chemical industries in Tanzania, the technological constraints faced by the factory and its dependence on outside supplies are evident. Electric power is supplied by TANESCO's hydro electric scheme at Kidatu, which serves the city of Dar es Salaam. The scale of production and sales from the plant over the years is shown by Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31b R/E Hoes</td>
<td>208,766</td>
<td>239,325</td>
<td>414,923</td>
<td>1,119,628</td>
<td>797,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/4 lb R/E Hoes</td>
<td>63,843</td>
<td>88,631</td>
<td>19,303</td>
<td>99,070</td>
<td>58,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21b R/E Hoes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,093</td>
<td>9.271</td>
<td>43,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Bottoms&quot; Assembly</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>9,753</td>
<td>7,922</td>
<td>12,217</td>
<td>11,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beams Assembly</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>5,793</td>
<td>3,836</td>
<td>4,845</td>
<td>10,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheels Assembly</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>9,475</td>
<td>8,328</td>
<td>6,738</td>
<td>15,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handles Assembly</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>6,625</td>
<td>8,837</td>
<td>6,428</td>
<td>10,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upset Shares</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>83,268</td>
<td>53,652</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flat Shares</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,920</td>
<td>112,944</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>24,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grass Slashers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,066</td>
<td>39,682</td>
<td>66,386</td>
<td>38,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baling Hoops (Tons)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>666.4</td>
<td>128.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Photocopy of Table entitled: Factory 'A' Utengenezaji halisi ukulinganisha na malengo la kila mwezi Tangu 1970-1982 (= Targets and Actual Production Since 1970-1982) given to researcher by Personnel Officer. Years 1980 to 1982 were handwritten.
TABLE 4.2

FACTORY A: SALES IN MILLION SHS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Actual Sales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>5.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>13.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>24.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>55.948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>60.808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>59.628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>77.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>101.723</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The factory began with a small labour force of 112. This increased to 330 in 1973 and to 541 in 1979. In 1983 there were 680 employees belonging to different departments of the plant and supporting services. The plant itself, which on the organisational chart of the company is shown as the Technical Department, is the part concerned directly with the production processes of the factory. It consists of 434 workers (for the two shifts) who are divided into 14 sections. The latter correspond to the basic technical processes involved in the production of hoes, axes and grass slashers and the assembly of plough parts. This is the first aspect of the work context of the factory.

The work process for the production of hoes and axes begins in the materials preparation section where pieces of iron and steel are cut
into the required sizes. The workers need certain basic skills such as those involved in measuring and handling of manual and/or electric saws. The cut pieces are then taken to the forging and pressing sections, where after intense heating in furnaces, the red hot pieces are repeatedly beaten into the required shapes on anvils by the use of electrically operated hammers controlled by machine operators who work as craftsmen. The pieces are then pressed into the standard shapes of hoes or axes. Forging and pressing operations are carried out when the hoes and axes are still hot.

Workmen are organised in teams of six, one of whom is the group leader. A supervisor is in charge of each of the 14 sections and acts as the foreman. Further, each shift has two technicians - blacksmiths whose job is to see that the different sections and groups work smoothly without interruption. Work on the anvils and presses is initially learnt on the spot over a period lasting six months during which a blacksmith trains and supervises apprentices in their work.

Heat treatment and quenching follows forging work. This process, as the name implies, involves the intense heating of hoes and then cooling them. This hardens the hoes to specified standards through the quenching process. The pieces are also reduced to the required sizes. Workers place and remove items from heaters after the required period of heating and cooling. The next process is grinding and polishing, consisting in smoothing out surfaces on products and grinding them to give cutting edges. The products are held on grinders and rotating polishers which are electrically run. The final process is the painting of the products in the oil-painting section.

In the plough assembly part of the plant, work consists in welding different imported prefabricated parts and frames. Other sections in
the Technical Department are the Lathe and Bench sections where fitters and turners carve out bolts and small spares. These fitters and turners have all had technical training in trade or vocational schools.

Working in different sections of the plant there are also electricians, masons, maintenance crew, carpenters and quality control inspectors. These have had specialised training in their respective fields. The Technical Department or the plant sections of the factory work in two eight-hour shifts with a one-hour lunch or meal break.

In addition to the plant proper, the factory has other supporting departments as follows:

The **Administration Department** engaged in general personnel and administrative matters and housed in the Administrative block. Headed by the Manpower and Administrative Manager, the department had 110 employees in 1983: drivers (17); security guards (29); office assistants and attendants (9); personal secretaries, clerks and typists (12); dispensary personnel (7); canteen and welfare services staff (14); personnel affairs officers (4) and gardeners (5).

The **Accounts Department**, headed by the Chief Accountant, had 24 employees consisting of accounts clerks (2); accounts assistants (8); assistant accountants (5); a cashier, an account machine operator and a cost and a financial accountant.

The **Marketing Department** led by the Marketing Manager had 3 sales attendants, 2 shop assistants (auxiliaries), 3 cleaners, 1 cashier, 3 stores assistants, 3 sales clerks, 5 sales assistants, and 10 marketing officers.

The **Purchasing Department** had two stores led by the Senior Stores Officer, who is acting Purchasing Manager. There were a total of 30
employees divided into various sections ranging from stores auxiliaries to stores assistants and purchasing officers.

The workforce in the factory is thus differentiated in the first place according to whether they work in the plant sections or in the supporting services. Related to this differentiation are the various skill levels and various formal educational and vocational qualifications. Most employees in the different sections of the Technical Department are manual workers known as machine operators who have craft skills learnt on the job during their periods of apprenticeship. Their skills cover the handling of saws and the operation of pressing or forging machines. Even though some of the work is repetitive, such as grinding or forging, considerable craft skills are needed to carry on the main work operations of cutting pieces, forging, welding and painting. The formal education of the workers is usually seven years of primary school, though it is less in a few cases.

Other workmen in the plant, such as electricians, carpenters, masons, welders, laboratory technicians or those in the Lathe and Bench sections, are artisans. Their skills were learnt outside the factory before they were employed. Most have formal technical training as blacksmiths or artisans over and above their formal primary and in some cases secondary education.

During the first six years, Factory A's top technical personnel were expatriates. The Technical, Maintenance and Design Engineers were from China, while the Chief and Cost Accountants were from India. Since 1974, those posts have been manned by Tanzanians trained on the job from among the artisans. The Technical Manager, who is in overall charge of production, is a man in his late forties with two years of secondary education in a technical secondary school, a certificate in
mechanical engineering from City and Guilds and in-plant training in welding and production management. He is assisted by eight production engineers whose formal education ranges from eight years of primary education (for six of them to four years of secondary school (1) and two years (1)). Their technical training also varies - four have in-plant technical training, two have grade III trade test certificates, and two have general certificates in engineering and diplomas in foremanship and supervision. [Source: Technical Department, Training Program of the Factory 1981-1983, cyclostyled papers].

Formal professional training and certificates or diplomas are essential for jobs in the Accounts, Marketing and Purchasing Departments. In the Accounts Department employees have four or more years of secondary school with further certificate courses in book-keeping and accountancy. As for the Chief Accountant, she has ICCA and CPA awards. In the Marketing Department employees have similar formal secondary education to those in the Accounts Department - with diplomas in business administration or marketing. Professional certificates, including diplomas in business administration, storekeeping certificates and book-keeping are also in evidence in the Purchasing Department.

Employees in the Administration Department are of mixed formal education and training. At the bottom end of the formal schooling are messengers, security guards and cleaners. Their formal education, if any, is primary school and their work generally requires no specialised training. On the other hand, drivers have had some training and work experience and are held in higher social esteem. At the other end, are the personnel and welfare officials and administratives heads. They have higher levels of formal education and professional diplomas in administration and management. Given their formal training and
the nature of their administrative work, they are referred to as wasomi (those who have gone to school or "elites" in the pejorative sense) or ofisa (official) in contrast to vibarua (strictly meaning casual labourers but used to refer to machine operators).

Formal education and professional training are important criteria affecting the employees' wages or salaries. The salary/wage scales follow the different grades set up by the directives of the Presidential Standing Committee on Parastatal Organisations (SCOFO) for different posts in the parastatals. Within the same job categories (e.g. machine operator) there are differences due to length of employment in the factory. The Parastatals Wages Grades are known as M.S.U. (from the Kiswahili Mshahara wa Shirika la Umma). Grades in this factory range (1983) from M.S.U.2 at the lower scale to M.S.U. 12 at the top end of the scale. In the low wage category are machine operators (in the Technical Department), cooks, messengers, cleaners and watch guards (in the supporting departments). Their basic wages are within the bracket M.S.U.2 and M.S.U.3 ranged between 620/= and 700/= a month or 740/= and 980/= a month respectively. In 1983 the official exchange rate was 12/ T.sh. = 1 U.S.$. The black market exchange rate was about 80/= sh = 1 U.S.

In the Forging and Pressing section, for example, out of 172 employees, there were 111 machine operators in the M.S.U.2 bracket receiving the basic monthly wage of 660/=; 40 workers in the M.S.U.3 category with a basic monthly wage of 850/=; 15 earning between 1085/= and 1605/=; 5 receiving between 1680/= and 2240/= and one with over 2340=/=.

Similarly in the Heat Treatment section, of the total of 34 machine operators, 27 were in the M.S.U.2 bracket; 5 in the M.S.U.3 grade and one each in the M.S.U.4 and M.S.U.5 categories. The latter
two are long term machine operatives who were recruited in 1969. In the supporting departments, the messengers, gardeners, cooks and security guards received wages within the M.S.U.2 and M.S.U.3 categories.

Management salaries were considerably higher, with the General Manager receiving 4405/= a month and other Heads of Departments being in the M.S.U.10 category with a basic monthly salary of around 4300/=.

These are the Technical, Marketing, Manpower and Administration Managers and the Chief Accountant. Their basic salaries were thus up to six or seven times the wages of the operatives or of minimum wage earners.

Middle-level management (such as financial and cost accountants, senior stores officers, and senior production engineers) are in the M.S.U.7 or 8 categories with monthly salaries ranging between 2590/= and 3450/=, and between 3215/= and 3840/= respectively in 1983. Senior technicians, artisans and electricians (some of whom are supervisors), as well as the accounting and administrative personnel such as the personnel and welfare officers, personal secretaries and assistant accountants, are in the middle categories of pay receiving basic monthly salaries in the M.S.U.5 and M.S.U.6 categories - salaries which ranged between 1460/= and 1950/=; and 2040/= and 2490/= respectively in 1983.

Differences in overall remuneration between employees also arise through indirect payments and the provision of services, such as housing, transport and medical care. The factory has no housing of its own for employees and most workers therefore rent rooms in different parts of the city, in nearby popular suburbs of Manzese, Ubungo and Mburahati (up to 2 miles) or farther away in Magomeni or Ilala, where they pay at the commercial rates. The rooms cost from 30/= to 70/= apiece (1983) depending on location in the city and construction material used. For management with salaries above M.S.U.8, the factory rents houses
in the medium or low density areas of the town from various individuals at commercial rates of 3000/= or 4000/= a month per self-contained house. These are located in the new housing estate of Sinza or less populous areas of Kinondoni or Upanga, and they are allocated to members of the above-mentioned management categories at the charge of 12½% of their basic salaries, which at the most cannot exceed 800/= at 1983 rates.\(^2\)

The company bus is used to provide transport to and from work for the afternoon shift, which ends at night, and to work only for the morning shift. The bus picks up those who live far from the factory at designated collection points. For managerial, administrative and accounts staff transport is arranged in the company's three vans ('combis'), a minibus or other smaller vehicles. There is a car permanently assigned to the General Manager, the Marketing and Plant Managers have the use of vehicles assigned to their departments as "personal" cars.

The factory has a dispensary for employees and their families constructed in 1978 and staffed by two assistant medical officers, a laboratory technician, three nurses and a medical auxiliary. For more serious specialised treatment and for hospitalisation, employees are referred to the Magomeni government dispensary, to the Muhimbili government hospital or to one of the Occupational Health Group dispensaries at Kisutu. Those on salaries above the M.S.U.7 grade, on the other hand, are sent to the Aga Khan private hospital at the company's expense. Hospitalisation in a private hospital is worth up to 200/= a night.

The factory has a canteen offering subsidised meals, usually consisting of rice or ugali (maize meal) with meat or beans. Workers
have a right to one subsidized meal per day when at work. Meal payments vary with salaries and wages. In 1983 those receiving between 390/= and 750/= per month were charged 31/=90 a month for meals, while those receiving above 750/= a month, paid 63/=80 a month. Operatives working in the dusty or hot sections of the factory floor are entitled to a milk allowance or a free packet of milk a day. Canteen costs for 1980 totalled shs 537,752/=; 25% of this expenditure was met by workers' contributions and the balance by company funds deriving from an excess production of 7500 hoes per month. The daily meals one finds in the canteen cost five to seven times the subsidised price in the open market, so subsidised meals are of significant financial help to employees. For many bachelor machine operators, in fact, the factory meal is the only main meal of the day, especially towards the end of the month when they are waiting for the next pay.

2 MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES IN FACTORY A

Organisationally, Factory A is characterised by a management hierarchy on the lines set out in the Presidential Circular No. 2, 1969 (The Rationalisation of Parastatal Organisations), the Public Corporations Act of 1969 and the Prime Minister's Directive of December 12, 1974 (setting up Management Committees). While the Public Corporations Act of 1969 had created Boards of Directors composed of Ministers, the Presidential Circular No. 2 of 1969 placed corporations under their relevant sectoral ministries with a Board constituted not by Ministers but by members who would be appointed by the relevant ministry to deal with the affairs of the Corporation without constant ministerial involvement. The objective was also to create some harmony
among enterprises engaged in similar activities by placing them under a common Holding Company, especially as regards research and training programmes among subsidiaries. The composition of the Boards of Directors tended to come mainly from outside the concerned enterprises - from the government bureaucracy. As civil servants, many board members were on several boards in the difficult position of dividing their time between parastatal affairs and the work of government departments. Moreover, there tended to be a separation between decision makers and those involved in implementation.

To overcome those limitations, the Prime Minister's Directive of December 1974 spelt out anew the composition of Boards of Corporations and set up the Management Committees. The Directive stressed the need to have 60% of Board members who were neither civil servants nor parastatal employees. This would give Tanzanian citizens and leaders from the Party and its affiliated organizations a greater say in the running of Public Corporations. Views would come both from parastatal employees (from within) and from outside among the political leadership: the Party, Members of Parliament or other Party affiliates.

As for the Management Committee 40% of its membership would be drawn from inside the factory. This was an advance on the earlier situation in that those directly at the work-place would now be involved in the plans. This, it was hoped, would facilitate better performance and implementation [Prime Ministers' Directive of December 12, 1974, para. 7].

In 1981, Factory A's Management Committee consisted of:

a) From outside the enterprise

Chairman: the Managing Director and Chairman of N.D.C. (ex-officio member, appointed by the President).

Secretary: a company secretary from N.D.C. headquarters.
Members: - two officials from the Ministry of Finance and another from the Ministry of Industries, both economists.
- a lecturer in Engineering from the University of Dar es Salaam, appointed by the Minister for Industries.
- the General Manager of TAMTU (The Tanganyika Agricultural Machinery Testing Unit).
- the Member of Parliament for the area in Dar es Salaam where the factory is situated.
- the Member of Parliament from Shinyanga, the area which uses the highest number of agricultural implements.

(All the above members of the Management Committee are appointees of the Ministry of Industries and are not employees of the factory).

b) From inside the enterprise
- the General Manager.
- the CCM (Party) branch and JUWATA branch chairman (ex officio members).
- a blacksmith and a production engineer, appointed by the Workers' Council.
- the Technical Manager and the Marketing Manager, appointed by the General Manager.

The Management Committee thus contains both appointed officials and elected members and reflects the political commitment to have committee members from both inside and outside the factory. It also has a variety of views and expertise both from the wider Tanzanian society, in the form of Members of Parliament, and from the Ministry of Industries; it has officials and individuals with technical know-how, and finally it has views from the employees. All are perceived as working for the common good in the improvement and development of the
The complexion of the Management Committee of Factory A thus reflects the preoccupation and design of seeking different views from both within and without the factory and arriving at a consensus.

Among the members chosen from among the employees, the directive stressed the need to have workers who were members of TANU and NUTA, literate and well disciplined. No other specific technical skills were required. In this factory, both the CCM Chairman and the JUWATA Chairman were machine operators in the Forging and Pressing sections. They have been in the factory for 10 years. The other "insiders" were a blacksmith and a production engineer and two departmental managers appointed by the General Manager who was himself an ex-officio member.

In principle, the "outsiders" or the elected "insiders" and outsiders could out-vote the managers. In practice, in the Management Committee, Managers have tended to dominate for a number of reasons. They work in the enterprise and retain control of their sections on a number of levels. They have control of the information on the human and material resources of the factory which is vital for effective decision-making. Their technical know-how related to the enterprise lends weight to their views in discussions. Documents and papers submitted for discussion to the Committee were prepared by the enterprise management, who furnished formally the information to the Committee. Those from "outside" the factory did not have other links with the factory or with its employees for sources of information or views. The meetings took place within a framework of formal consultation and this was an advantage for management, who could withhold information. Committee members did not utilise other than formal channels to learn about the performance of the factory. In one event, it needed the intervention
of a high level party probe team to rectify some "unbecoming" activities by members of management. Management was (in the words of the 1981 Annual Report of the Chairman of the Committee) "slow to accept suggestions and views" made by members who were not employees of the enterprise.

There were other reasons for the managerial dominance. According to the 1981 Annual Report by the Chairman of the Management Committee, the meetings of the Committee were few. In 1981 there were only three sittings, not really sufficient to monitor effectively the implementation of decisions. Among decisions not implemented by management was the preparation of a report on the reasons for the breakdown of new production lines. No report was prepared (contrary to directives) for four months without any explanation. In its April 14, 1981 Session the Management Committee complained:

(a) In an earlier session it had directed that an investigative document be prepared for discussion on possibilities of starting a credit union among employees. The move had been recommended by a report of the Tanzania Audit Corporation as a means of reducing debts by employees which were taking enterprise funds. Contrary to the directives of the Management Committee, no such study was made and presented for discussion.

(b) The Management Committee had demanded that session papers should be distributed in time for members to study them properly before sittings. This had not been done.

(c) On the employment of new employees, which fell under the Management Committee authority, factory management should only make recommendations and suggestions and leave room for the Committee to decide. This had not been adhered to in practice by factory management.
The Management Committee seemed powerless in the face of such "sabotage". [Source: 1981 Report by Chairman of Management Committee].

The day to day responsibility of organising and monitoring work in the enterprise is placed under the General Manager assisted by the Departmental Managers in charge of their respective departments. Each Manager authorises payments for the department within the budget of the company and as approved by the General Manager in consultation with the Chief Accountant who monitors the overall financial position of the company. Managers authorise the movement of products. They also determine the placement of personnel in different sections, and approve sales and purchases.

Departmental Managers have technical know-how gained through formal training, like the Manpower and Administrative Manager and the Chief Accountant; while the General Manager has long administrative and organisational experience. The Production Manager also has experience in metal work. This gives them weight not only in the Management Committee but also in other bodies like the Workers' Council, in the deliberations and in the implementation of their decisions.

In terms of accountability an important fact is that the Management Committee does not have the authority to sanction the General Manager since he is a Presidential appointee; the disciplinary body for the General Manager is the Presidency. This creates an ambiguity in terms of the power of the Management Committee over the factory's management, for the General Manager can appeal to and justify his decisions and actions before the authority which appointed him. The Management Committee relies on the General Manager for the implementation of decisions taken and for monitoring progress made. And it is the management headed by the General Manager who are the responsible
body for the success and especially shortcomings in the enterprise performance. This helps to explain among other things how management were in a position to use their posts for personal and private ends in the ways documented in the following chapters.

3 FACTORY A: THE WORKERS' COUNCIL

a) The Full Council

To advise the Management Committee there is the Workers' Council which in Factory A was started in 1970, immediately following the Presidential Directive of that year, as discussed in Chapter 3. One of the characteristics of the Workers' Council, as with other enterprise organisations, was the presence of a combination of appointed ex-officio members, usually departmental heads (managers), and members elected by the workforce from the ranks of longer serving, technically skilled workmen. Workers' Councils, as discussed earlier, are required to include the General Manager and the Departmental Managers, the Chairmen of the Party and Union branches, and workers elected from the employees. The members of the Council elect their own Chairman (except the first year when the General Manager became the first Chairman). The Secretary to the Council is an appointee of the General Manager. His work is to coordinate affairs relating to organising Council meetings, distribution of papers for discussion and taking minutes.

During the period 1981-1983 the composition of the Workers' Council in this factory was as follows:

1. As Chairman, the members elected the General Manager. He is an ex-officio member of the Council, but was elected to the chair. When the Workers' Council was initiated in 1970 the General Manager became the Chairman and later the post was occupied by another
member. In 1981 the General Manager was elected to that post again. This reflected the dominant position he enjoyed in the factory, together with elements of paternalism in an enterprise that was not very large.

2. The Five Departmental Heads who continued to be ex-officio members in accordance with the Presidential directive on Workers' Councils.

3. The Chairmen of CCM and JUWATA branches at the factory, who continued to attend Workers' Council meetings by virtue of their positions.

4. Five members elected by the workforce. These included:
   - two blacksmiths;
   - a supervisor in the oil painting section;
   - a fitter and turner;
   - a production engineer.

   Of the two blacksmiths, one was a 32 year old senior artisan. He had successful professional training in his trade for which he had a Grade II certificate as well as a Trade Test Certificate. His 11 years of service at the factory made him one of the more influential persons in the enterprise organisations. He was also a member of the Management Committee.

   The other blacksmith was also an artisan with Standard Eight primary education and seven years' work experience in the factory.

   The fitter and turner was an artisan with a long period (11 years) of work at the factory. The fourth member elected by the workforce was a 35 year old technician with 4 years of secondary education followed by a certificate in painting. He underwent training in supervision and was the Head of the oil-painting section. Like the other elected members he had 11 years of service at the factory.

   The fifth member was one of the production engineers. His technical
training as a mechanical engineer and craftsman enabled him to work as an assistant to the Production Manager. He had also been working for a long time (12 years) at the factory and was active on factory committees including the Management Committee. The Personnel Officer, a man in his early thirties with Form Four secondary education and a Certificate in Secretarial Matters, was appointed by the General Manager as Secretary to the Workers' Council.

The composition of this Workers' Council fits closely the designs and purposes of the Workers' Council programme. As we have seen in Chapter 3, the Workers' Councils in Tanzania are seen as a means of involving members of the workforce in discussing the affairs of the enterprise with management. The members, even those elected from and by the workforce, however, do not represent the workforce in the narrow sense of advocating and advancing the interests of the workforce alone. They, in unity with others, are supposed to work for the common good of the enterprise and the country, and not of some narrow sectional interests (least of all those of the particular factory section they were chosen from).

So in Factory A Workers' Council members come from different sections of the enterprise with the objective of pooling together ideas for the advancement of "the enterprise". In fact, they do not really consult the workforce. There are no institutionalised channels to consult or report to the workforce on the Workers' Councils deliberations as a regular means of getting suggestions from and reporting to the sections in which members work. Formally, Workers' Council sessions and deliberations are confidential and members are not expected to divulge what is discussed during the meetings. In practice there was contact with the workforce on an informal basis,
which meant that the rule on the so-called confidential discussion was not always kept.

The Workers' Council in Factory A meets at least twice a year. As the minutes show, the meetings tend to follow a standard agenda of the following type:

1. Opening of meeting by Chairman (usually at 9 am in the morning).
2. Reading and Approval of Minutes of Previous Meeting.
3. Matters Arising.
4. Reports of Enterprise Activities According to Departments:
   - Production
   - Purchases
   - Sales
   - Administration and Personnel
   - Finances
5. Other items as approved by Chairman or by Management.
6. Formal Closure of Meeting.

The meetings may take one or even two days, often extending up to midnight. A variety of issues relating to the enterprise are discussed on the basis of the departmental reports presented by the respective Departmental Managers. There are also items for noting by the Council. These are decisions which have been taken by the Management Committee or by government or action by other relevant bodies. Other items presented in the departmental reports are either for approval or for discussion, suggestion and approval. On the more technical issues, the meeting serves as a forum for informing the Council what is taking place in the enterprise as a whole. Information is furnished by the managerial members of the Council on such matters as orders for spares, sources of raw materials, and sales and purchases. The non-managerial
members of the Council such as the CCM and JUWATA Chairmen are more active in the deliberations on the less technical issues. Among the less technical items are personnel matters and social services, including new employment openings, increases in allowances, moves to improve the procedures for the payment of wages, leave payments, and so on.

The 26th Workers' Council meeting which was held on the 30th December 1980 will serve to illustrate the kinds of issues discussed by the Workers' Council. Information on this was obtained mainly from the minutes of the meeting. The issues deliberated and the contributions of different participants were not always specified. However, I was told by one participant, the Personnel Officer (who sometimes took the minutes), that this can be taken to be because the item was tabled by a member of the factory management, and that there was no negative reaction from other participants.

On matters arising from the previous meeting, the session of 30th December 1980 was informed of delays in the construction of a water tank as drawings had been altered. The meeting was also informed: of the difficulties of getting raw material supplies from China for 1981; of moves to obtain supplies from Japan and India for the basic raw materials for ploughs; and also to obtain semi-finished products from India; of the purchase of a forklift; and of overtime payments to five supervisors. The session expressed the view that SCOPO should be asked for permission for these overtime payments as they were an incentive (= motisha) for the supervisors. The Council discussed the question of workers who had incurred debts with the company and agreed that all efforts should be done to try to recover those debts from the said employees. This was a perennial problem, the solution to which
was difficult to find given the low level of workers' incomes. A question about canteen cleanliness was raised and it was said that the distribution of meals needed to be improved. The latter was an item raised again by the elected members of the Workers' Council, who suggested an increase in the number of plates in the canteen.

Issues relating to production were discussed during the session as introduced by the Technical Manager's report. These included the strengthening of ariana ploughs and planter designs. The Technical Manager also explained why targets for 1981 were higher than those for 1980. This was due to the fact that new machinery had been installed after the expansion of the factory. He also explained the malfunctioning of the heat treatment crane and reported that the shortages of raw materials, chemicals and spare parts from China were brought about by changes in organizations in China which used to supply spare parts to the factory. Such shortages were a constant problem in the early 1980's.

The Department of Purchases submitted its report on the activities of the department in a similar fashion. In the following discussion the Council agreed that all items bought and their prices should be shown in the Report rather than the total value of goods only. This would enable the Council to ascertain that the proper purchases had been made at the proper prices. The suggestion was made in order to stem inflated pricing on some items which could be concealed by the mere indication of total values. The session was informed by the General Manager that rolling dies which had been in short supply were on the way. The factory had obtained 75/= million in foreign exchange allocation out of the 107/= million requested for purchases. The session stressed the need to use this allocation on the more important
items in short supply such as raw materials and spare parts. Purchases should be carried out in close consultation and closer coordination with departmental heads and the General Manager. The Purchase Department had tended to make some purchases without close coordination.

The Council was informed by the Sales Department that sales targets in 1980 had been reached, as the price of hoes had been increased. The Council agreed with the department's suggestion that plough parts which were in store should not be sold as spares but should be utilised as plough components to reach the 1980 target of 20,000 ploughs. The target for the first quarter of 1981 - 4,000 ploughs - had been reached, the meeting was informed.

On the Manpower front, the departmental head proposed, and it was agreed by the Council, that vacant posts be filled as soon as possible in the first quarter of 1981 giving preference to those who had done People's Militia training; that a qualified factory security officer be employed, as the factory had expanded; that eleven office attendants be employed; that the drivers' roster should be improved to enable them to work eight hours without being exhausted. The Council further agreed with the suggestions to increase allowance for those working at the burner and for teachers coming from outside the factory. These proposals were to be tabled to the Management Committee. The Council further agreed to create a credit union beginning in February 1981 to deal with loans for employees.

The Accounts Department's chief informed the meeting that the company had a bank overdraft of several million shillings. The meeting decided to follow up debts to the company incurred by one Regional Trading Company (Kagera) in an effort to improve the financial position of the company. Parastatal companies bought goods from the enterprise
on credit. Some were slow to pay, leaving the company in difficulties. Sales through private traders on the other hand were against government directives on the sale of such goods. The meeting also agreed that there was a need to speed up the payment of wages and leave allowances. The CGM Chairman had raised this issue saying workers were unhappy and inconvenienced by the delays when going on their annual leave.

On the 1981-85 Development Plan, the meeting was informed that the company was planning to cooperate with another company for the production of spades, nuts and bolts; that the plan envisaged raising the educational levels of the Workers' Council members, and that it was proposed to initiate a building society. To study the workings of the latter, a sub-committee was chosen. Other information reported was on new salary/wage scales as issued by SCOPO.

The 27th meeting of the Workers' Council held on 13th April 1981 at Tabora gives other insights into the types of issues discussed. The search for harmony through a consensus of views is once again a key feature. The meeting serves several purposes. On the one hand it is a platform for management to inform other employees about some aspect of the enterprise: a means of assisting departmental heads in the smooth execution of their daily duties in a harmonious atmosphere thanks to the goodwill generated by informing some members of the workforce. On the other hand, the Council also would serve as a platform for managerial recommendations and decisions to be presented to the Management Committee. The meeting on this occasion was held in Tabora to coincide with the opening of the company's depot in that town. The depot was to serve as the main distribution centre for the plant in north and western Tanzania. The holding of the meeting outside Dar es Salaam would serve as a means for members to get a glimpse
of the country they are servicing in terms of the products.

The 27th Workers' Council first reviewed issues of the previous meeting. The session was informed by management about matters which seemed to recur in several meetings. The Chinese technicians who were to construct the water tank and the training centre had arrived. The Accounts Department was in the process of completing the list of employees having debts with the company. The department was encouraged to follow this up and recover any money advances paid to employees including those who had left the company. The Chairman informed the meeting that canteen services were being improved and that the Accounts Department was gathering further information on the creation of the proposed Credit Union. Management hoped that this would reduce the need for company loans; workers would get loans from deposits they made with the Credit Union.

The issue of the increased allowances that had previously been proposed was proving difficult to justify before SCOPO as the factory had had several incentives approved recently. Wages and other payments, crucial as they are, were outside the jurisdiction of the Workers' Council, being centrally regulated by the government agency.

The Council then discussed documents prepared by Departmental Managers on different aspects of the factory. In response to the Technical Manager's Report on Production, the session recommended that the Technical Department strengthen its work by employing more technically qualified people in the technical and research sections. Approving the Purchases' list as reported by the Purchases Department, the meeting reiterated the need to plan better the placement of orders for raw materials and chemicals. The document reporting the 'sales' situation, prepared by the Deputy Marketing Manager, was endorsed by the Council.
new salary and wage scales as reported by the Manpower and Administration Department, it was agreed to call meetings in all sections of the factory to explain the changes to the workforce to reduce complaints about increments. All vacant posts for security guards should be filled at once.

The General Manager was re-elected Chairman of the Workers' Council for another three years. After this, a member from JUWATA headquarters suggested that documents and discussion papers should reach members at least seven days before meetings to facilitate discussion. This was an attempt by the member to make the discussions meaningful instead of being a ritual formality as it tended to be when discussion papers were circulated during meetings. The proposal was accepted.

On loans to workers for national or religious holidays - advances which assisted workers' families to have some part in the festivities - it was agreed that loans be redeemed within three months instead of one month. Interviews with machine operators on the monthly deductions (= makato) that were made from their wages showed that invariably among the deductions was the item: mkopo wa sikukuu) (= loan for feast day). Other usual deductions were: income tax; JUWATA and CCM deductions; mid-month advances; and the National Provident Fund contribution.

To summarise, different factory issues were brought into the Workers' Council's sessions for consideration and deliberation. The issues touched on activities of all departments: on the finances of the factory, sales, purchases, availability of raw materials and spare parts, personnel matters and social services. Workers' Council discussions covered a broad range of matters concerning the internal working and organisation of the enterprise as well as its relation with other outside bodies such as SCOPO or the Bank of Tanzania. This information has
been gleaned from a reading of minutes of Council meetings and from interviews with participants.

As regards the scope or degree of participation, the Workers' Council sessions were for both information and joint consultation with management. Matters which had been decided upon by higher bodies such as SCOPO or the Price Commission were brought to the Council sessions as a matter of informing the members especially the non-managerial members. Relevant action which had been taken by other bodies was also brought to the attention of the Workers' Council. Other issues brought to the Council were for deliberation and approval for onward transmission to higher bodies for decision. The proposed recommendations were usually prepared by management and after discussion were endorsed for transmission to the relevant decision-makers. Other issues did not need decisions of higher bodies but management brought them to the Council as a means of consulting the non-managerial members on matters such as the improvement of services and work procedures thereby building up goodwill among the workforce.

How and by whom were issues raised in the Council? Management usually initiated decisions or recommendations as previously generally agreed in consultations between the General Manager and Heads. Other individual members could and did make suggestions from time to time during the meetings as they saw fit. There were, however, crucial differences between managerial and non-managerial members of the Council. Management through their weekly meetings acted in concert and on the basis of previously agreed recommendations. Their views were often backed by reasons and information. For the non-managerial members, in contrast, their suggestions or proposals did not carry the weight of concerted organised action. Since Council members do not attend
the meetings as representatives of the Party, of the Union or of any other collective entity, any such co-ordination of opinion would have seemed quite inappropriate. Even suggestions made by the CCM or JUWATA Chairmen were an individual's suggestions and were not previously agreed upon; the one's interventions were not necessarily supported by the other, or by the ordinary non-managerial members.

The management thus retains a dominant position in the Workers' Council in Factory A. They initiate and orient the direction of discussions by the preparation of documents and papers to be tabled at the meetings and the recommendations to be presented to the Management Committee. Management proposals form the core and the greater proportion of the Workers' Council's deliberations. Issues concerning production, sales, finances, and purchase orders are usually endorsed by the council after brief discussions and without changes, although as we have seen, on matters concerning pay and social services, non-managerial members tend to participate more.

In Factory A management dominance is enhanced by the fact that the General Manager has been present as Head of Management since the factory began and has seen the factory grow from its small beginnings. His views and those of his management heads thus carry extra weight. The importance of this personal factor in this factory is attested by the repeated re-election of the General Manager as Chairman of the factory's Workers' Council for a further term of three years. In general, however, management has final responsibility for what takes place in public sector factories such as Factory A. Any suggestions made in the Workers' Council to management are implemented if, but only if, the managerial personnel are satisfied that they can justify them and defend them.
b) The Executive Committee

The operational structure of the factory resembles the one in use in private enterprises. The work of organising and monitoring enterprise performance is formally placed in the hands of the General Managers and his heads. However, to advise the General Manager in this task is the Executive Committee of the Workers' Council. This was introduced in 1970 as a further means of involving non-managerial members of the workforce. The Executive Committee would include not only Departmental Heads but also the Chairmen of the CCM and Union branches and two elected members from the Workers' Council.

In the period 1981 to 1983, Factory A's Executive Committee included a blacksmith and a production engineer chosen by the Workers' Council, of which they were members; and the CCM and JUWATA Chairmen. For the day to day monitoring of enterprise performance and activities, a Factory Planning Committee was initiated by the General Manager. This Committee, which met every Friday, included the CCM and JUWATA Chairmen and the five departmental heads and their assistants. Meetings much more frequently than other sittings, this body served as an advisory management body, monitoring factory performance. The Committee's sittings were served with weekly reports not only from departmental heads on their activities, but also on the CCM branch activities and those of the JUWATA branch. These were in the form of reports which monitored performance and followed up resolutions. The conclusions of the Planning Committee were submitted to the Executive Committee which, headed by the General Manager, made suggestions governing the day to day affairs of the factory as deemed necessary. Since the members and the issues dealt with were virtually the same, there was often in practice little distinction between the two.
In the Management Committee, the Workers' Council and its Executive Committee, the factory management holds centre stage on the basis of its access to and control of the information of the factory; its initiation of the issues to be discussed in the various sittings; its links with the highest level of government, to which it is ultimately responsible; and its presence in all the various sittings, which is the formal role given to them in the organisation of the enterprise. The inclusion of JUWATA and CCM Chairmen as well as some members from the employees in a hierarchy of meetings is one of the main features of the organisational setting. The latter's impact is contingent on their technical know-how and skills coupled with experience and alertness in following up and reacting to issues raised. To some degree these factors can compensate for the weak position which is theirs in the structural organization of the sittings. While for the reasons just emphasised there is unquestionably a hierarchy of organs and sittings, the involvement of some members of the workforce in the Management Committee or Workers' Council mitigates the strength of the hierarchy - promoting a situation in which other personnel can give their views and thereby influence management decisions.

What further factors shape work-place relations apart from the structural/formal set-up and the kind of industry and the level of skills of workers? As we shall see, other relevant considerations include the way the workforce relates to the hierarchy of factory organs and sittings; the extent to which the workforce responds to work-place organisations and the way they participate in them. Such variations are important even though the scope of those sittings are only informative and advisory.
4 FACTORY 'B': INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENT, WORK ORGANISATION AND RECRUITMENT

In the next chapter we shall extend our discussion of the politics of participation in Factory A by reviewing the roles of the Party and Union branches in the enterprise. Before doing so, however, we introduce Factory B— one of the largest public textile factories in Tanzania. In this section salient features of the work context are described. The final section studies management and participation with particular attention to the workings of the Workers' Council, providing a second case-study to complement that of Factory A.

Factory B contrasts with Factory A in a number of ways. Firstly, this is in Tanzanian terms, one of the largest factories in the country with over five thousand employees. Secondly, the nature of the basic production processes, spinning, weaving and dyeing, means that the bulk of the workforce are machine operators, or to be more exact, machine tenders, requiring less skills than in the case in Factory A, where craft skills are more needed. Thirdly, the basic raw material for production at the factory (cotton) is internally procured rather than imported from abroad. Other manufacturing inputs (such as chemicals and dyes) and machinery were, however, acquired from abroad. These factors create a different work context from that of Factory A.

Textile production by local rudimentary crafts virtually disappeared in Tanzania during the colonial period. Textile needs were fulfilled through importation. Towards the end of the 1950's and with the approach of political independence textile mills began to appear. As we saw in an earlier chapter, the first were small-scale privately owned textile mills. The first large-scale textile mill was a joint
project between a local cooperative society and a foreign consortium which supplied the machinery. Local textile production obtained a further boost with the construction of another large-scale, state-owned factory in 1966. This Dar es Salaam-located enterprise was financed by a loan from China, and all the machinery in the plant was supplied by China. Other post-independence textile factories include a Dar es Salaam-based joint project between West German finance, which supplied the machinery, and the National Development Corporation (N.D.C.). Other large joint projects are located in Mwanza, Arusha and Musoma. Further projects are earmarked for Mbeya and Tabora. The bulk of textile production is under the control of the state - initially after independence under the N.D.C., later under TEXCO (the Textile Corporation of Tanzania). In 1977, for example, total textile production was 80 million square metres of which 67 million was accounted for by TEXCO subsidiaries and 13 million by private companies [Budget Estimates, Minister of Industries, 1978/79, p. 19].

Heavy reliance on imported machinery and spare parts as well as raw materials (other than cotton) is a striking feature of textile production in Tanzania. Machinery breakdown due to the age of the imported machinery or to lack of spare parts, is a regular occurrence at many factories. Another problem which textile mills share with other plants is the cuts in electricity supplies which affect production from time to time.

From that point of view, Factory B's work context is not very different from that of other Tanzanian textile plants. The factory was constructed in 1966 on the basis of a 60/= million T. shillings loan with the N.D.C. providing 10/= million T. shillings, making it one of the biggest textile factories in the country. At this point it had
40,000 spindles for spinning and 979 weaving machines. In 1975 the factory was extended, thus increasing its weaving capacity to a total of over one thousand (1,194) weaving machines. The machinery was supplied by China. Numerous other inputs required by the factory, such as spare parts, chemicals and dyes, have been procured from different foreign sources, including chemicals from English and Swiss companies, and spare parts from Japanese and Indian private companies.

In 1983, as Table 4.3 shows, the factory had 5,111 employees distributed in seven functional departments which is the practice in both public and private sector factories in Tanzania. The mill sections or Production Department employs the greater part of the workforce, corresponding to the main work processes of textile production – spinning, weaving and processing. The other departments are support and maintenance departments. Factory B is an integrated textile factory combining the three basic manufacturing processes just mentioned, beginning with raw cotton and ending with the finished textile products. The factory produces dyes, bleached linen and shirting, bleached drill, dress prints, khanga and vitenge, mulmul and grey shirting, cotton yarn, bandages, curtains, bed sheeting and printed drills. Table 4.4 gives some indices of enterprise performance for the period immediately preceding our study.

The production processes of the factory display the features of a "totally integrated cotton mill" so aptly described by Blauner [1964, p. 63], the classic example of the machine-tending technology, involving low levels of skills for the bulk of the workforce; the products (khanga, vitenge) are standardized and workers "mind or tend" spinning and weaving machines which are largely automatic. In contrast to craft production, machine tenders can hardly transfer skills outside automatic textile mills.
Table 4.3
Factory B: Distribution of Employees, 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department/Section</th>
<th>Actual - December</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Production Manager</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spinning I</td>
<td>717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spinning II</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weaving I</td>
<td>1176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weaving II</td>
<td>1014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing &amp; Dyeing</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>4030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OFFICE OF TECHNICAL MANAGER</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ENGINEERING</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Chief Engineer</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshop</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boiler</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric Workshop</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Cooler</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Cooler</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ADMINISTRATION AND SERVICES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Manager's Office</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel and Administration</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FINANCES</strong></td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PURCHASES</strong></td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MARKETING &amp; SALES</strong></td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>5111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.4

Factory B: Enterprise's Performance 1978 - 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weaving (metres) (000)</td>
<td>31,614</td>
<td>30,257</td>
<td>29,748</td>
<td>27,014</td>
<td>24,200</td>
<td>19,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Production Costs (000)</td>
<td>174,445</td>
<td>183,817</td>
<td>220,445</td>
<td>232,627</td>
<td>293,657</td>
<td>297,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages, Salaries Allowances, shs (000)</td>
<td>53,132</td>
<td>57,720</td>
<td>68,910</td>
<td>68,667</td>
<td>71,008</td>
<td>87,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales Turnover without sales tax. shs (000)</td>
<td>242,136</td>
<td>237,815</td>
<td>261,872</td>
<td>325,541</td>
<td>333,441</td>
<td>291,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Expenditure shs (000)</td>
<td>209,987</td>
<td>219,299</td>
<td>241,697</td>
<td>268,281</td>
<td>335,003</td>
<td>337,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Profit</td>
<td>52,692</td>
<td>35,474</td>
<td>38,521</td>
<td>92,915</td>
<td>39,785</td>
<td>(3,046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit before Tax</td>
<td>34,574</td>
<td>18,516</td>
<td>20,266</td>
<td>57,280</td>
<td>3,760</td>
<td>(45,836)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Profit/Loss after Tax</td>
<td>13,136</td>
<td>8,035</td>
<td>10,697</td>
<td>29,709</td>
<td>25,515</td>
<td>(54,638)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Return on Investment %</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Return on Investment %</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees Total Labour Force</td>
<td>5,360</td>
<td>5,383</td>
<td>5,258</td>
<td>5,328</td>
<td>5,284</td>
<td>5,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productivity Ratio (metres/man/annual)</td>
<td>5,896</td>
<td>5,620</td>
<td>5,658</td>
<td>5,073</td>
<td>4,596</td>
<td>3,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productivity Index - % Base Year 1978 = 5896 meters/man/year</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Letter of 7 April 1984, by Manpower and Personnel Manager to Labour Commissioner, Factory B.
Organized hierarchically, the Production Department is led by the Production Manager assisted by assistant mill managers, shift officers, supervisors and foremen, who with the machine operators form the production hierarchy. In 1984 the labour force was technically divided in the mill as shown in Table 4.5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Machine Operators</th>
<th>Supervisors</th>
<th>Foremen</th>
<th>Shift Officers</th>
<th>Mill Managers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spinning I</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weaving I</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Artisans</th>
<th>Technicians</th>
<th>Senior Technicians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Processing &amp; Dyeing</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering Workshop</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boiler</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric Workshop</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooling Plant</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: As compiled by Training Officer on researcher's request.

This technical division and hierarchy of posts is reflected in the employees' salaries and wages. Entry points for the salaries and wages were as follows in July 1981:

- Production Manager: M.S.U. 11 i.e. 5065 sh. per month
- Senior Mill Manager: M.S.U. 10-9 4945 "
- Assistant Mill Manager: M.S.U. 6 2345 "
- Shift Officer: M.S.U. 7 2970-3570 "
- Supervisor: M.S.U. 6 2870-3345 "
- Foreman: M.S.U. 5 1680-2240 "
- Machine Operator: M.S.U. 2-4 600-1604"

Source: Schemes of Service, Factory B.
The levels of pay correspond to levels of education which the Personnel Officer estimated as follows: 75% of the employees (machine operators) had primary school education, i.e. 4 to 7 years; 15% below Form IV, usually two years after primary; 10% Form IV and above. Those who were highly educated were found mainly in the support (especially Accounting) and maintenance departments. When the factory began, technical and engineering work was carried out by Chinese technicians. Since 1974, however, all these posts are manned by Tanzanian employees.

Work in Factory B's mill sections takes place in three 8-hour shifts. Work is carried out following targets which are technically set on the basis of the machines' present capacity. In the spinning section two workers tend three machines, while in the weaving sections each machine operator tends 8 machines. Because of the age of the machinery, the operator is kept constantly moving from one machine to another in the bid to keep them working. Results are recorded on cards. Weaving is generally recognised as one of the most difficult operations in this factory. The work-place is characterized by heat and noise from the machinery. It is hardly surprising that every month about 40 workers leave work, especially given the fact that the hard work is compounded by the need to work night shifts.

Overtime is allowed and paid for for essential work such as emergency repair or urgent spinning. However, those over M.S.U. 4 are not allowed to earn overtime payments according to SCOPO regulations. This is not popular with some long-term machine operators and foremen who are in those categories and have to do those essential jobs.

The majority of the employees were born and grew up in rural
areas outside of Dar es Salaam. They come from every region of Tanzania: Musoma, Mwanza, Arusha, Dodoma, Kilimanjaro, Mtwara, Rufiji, Tabora and Iringa, from where they or their parents migrated to Dar es Salaam in search of work.

From the interviews I carried out with workers in the Weaving II, we get some hints of the kind of factors which may have led these Tanzanians to seek wage employment in town. Many of them mentioned difficulties in making a living in rural areas – especially the "low" prices of crops in rural areas. Agricultural activities were often perceived as not bringing in regular returns, with money coming in only after harvest, i.e. once a year. Some came from average or poor households without any money, assets (such as livestock) or permanent cash crops, and with only small food reserves.

To illustrate some of the workers' rural backgrounds and their responses to my questions, four brief sketches are offered of workers from different parts of Tanzania and in different jobs.

Mr. K, a 28 year old "beam fixer", machine operator, was born in rural Moshi, Kilimanjaro, the first of nine children from peasant parents. He completed primary school. His parents had a small plot of land (3 acres). He began to work as a labourer on road works. Later he came to Dar es Salaam in 1973 and a neighbour introduced him to the Factory, where he got employed. He also has one acre in Moshi where he grows maize. He feels that if he had a bigger plot he would go back and carry on agricultural work. Wage-employment is something he depends upon in the circumstances, even though his wage of 1170/= a month is insufficient.

Mr. T., a 36 year old senior supervisor, was born in rural Tabora. He completed primary schooling in 1965. His parents were cultivators of maize and cassava and had some 16 goats which got stolen. After school, Mr. T. felt it would be better to look for paid employment. Prices of crops were not encouraging and in his village there were no permanent cash crops. He feels that his work as a Factory employee since 1968 (in the various posts of shuttle fitter, machine operator and now supervisor) is now a sort of habit but is comparatively a better situation than being without work or farming. Wage-employment is still a difficult way of making a living with rising inflation.
Mr. U., a foreman, was born in 1949. His father used to work as a head of work gangs along the Central Railway line, later retiring to become mkulima wa kawaida (= ordinary subsistence peasant) without any real property. Mr. U. completed primary school in 1966 and in 1967 began work as a machine operator, then becoming a clothing repairer and moving to foreman in 1980. Being employed is important for him. Farming does not bring as much money as being employed — "Ukulima hauna pesa!" (= Farming has no money).

Mr. L., from Kilwa in southern Tanzania is a 35 year old machine operator in "Drawing Frame". His parents are subsistence peasants growing cassava, maize and some cashew nuts. He completed primary school in 1966 and stayed on in his village teaching literacy classes. In 1969 he joined the national Youth Service; then worked as a labourer on the Tazara Railway construction before being laid off in 1970. Farming life seemed to produce small returns, so he came to Dar es Salaam in search of work before getting employed in 1974 at the Factory. "Uchawi wa binadamu ni pesa" (= Money is man's magic wand), he believes. Wage employment would solve his problems.

5 MANAGEMENT AND PARTICIPATION IN FACTORY 'B'

a) Management Structures

Factory B, in accordance with the Public Corporations Act of 1969 and the Presidential Order of December 11, 1973, establishing the Textile Corporation of Tanzania (TEXCO), became a subsidiary of the above holding company. The latter was established in an effort to rationalise and coordinate textile activities in the country by offering advisory services to companies as regards training and technical expertise whose costs individual companies could not have met alone. The holding company would also serve as a means of providing a uniform system as regards personnel affairs and the recruitment of higher technical cadres, as well as comparable standards in production.

It is through TEXCO's Board of Directors that textile subsidiaries are related to the government. The Executive Chairman of TEXCO is a Presidential appointee; other Board members are appointed by the Minister for Industries. The Chairman of TEXCO's Board of Directors
is also Chairman of Factory B's Management Committee. The General Manager of this factory is also on the Board of TEXCO. Other Board members include two Members of Parliament; Ministry of Industries officials and knowledgeable citizens from non-commercial, non-productive parastatals, such as the Institute of Finance Management and Mzumbe Institute of Development Management. (According to the Prime Minister's Directive of December 1974; members of the Board of Holding Companies would be drawn 40% from civil servants and parastatal employees, and 60% from outside, from notable members of the public such as the Party, Trade Union Cooperatives, Members of Parliament and Institutions of Learning – Paragraph 6).

At the level of the factory (subsidiary) there is the Management Committee which is composed of 40% from the factory and 60% from outside the factory. At the time of the study the composition was:
- As Chairman, the Executive Chairman of TEXCO, a long time government official who had worked as a Principal Secretary – appointed by the President.
- The Company's General Manager.
- Two Members of Parliament, one of whom was a judge.
- The Principal of Kivukoni Party Ideological College.
- Four Departmental Managers (Sales, Personnel, Finance and Production).
- The Chairman of the Party Branch (the Spinning Manager who had been elected by Party members at the factory), and the Chairman of the JUWATA branch (the machine operator).
- a Foreman in the Administration Department (a messenger; an elderly man who has been in the factory for over ten years and a former Chairman of the Party branch).

The Board of the Holding Company, TEXCO, meeting twice a year,
had a mixed impact on its subsidiary. The company's plan was submitted to the Ministry of Industries and to the Board of TEXCO which would put pressure on the factory when the latter's activities were not in line with TEXCO's general investment plans (see the section below on the question of redundancies in Factory B). The Board was influential in the placement of managerial cadres below the General Manager (who, as we have noted, is a presidential appointee).

The holding company was not popular with the factory management for it seemed to duplicate the work of the Ministry of Industries. In August 1976, for example, the Workers' Council in the factory passed a resolution calling on the Party and Government to abolish the holding company as uneconomical and superfluous. A delegation consisting of the General Manager, the Political Commissar (on which more in a later section), the trade union Chairman and Chief Accountant went to discuss the issue but were unsuccessful (Workers' Council, Session 14 of 3/8/76 – 22/8/76).

In its turn the Management Committee of the factory deals with company issues and is crucial in promotions and demotions of employees under its jurisdiction and for disciplinary matters for those above the M.S.U. categories but below the managerial categories. As in Factory A, day to day activities are left to the factory management. The overall result is that the factory management have a generally decisive influence: not only do they have representation on TEXCO's Board of Directors but they also dominate the enterprise's Management Committee even though numerically they are in a minority. As in Factory A, whereas ordinary members of the Committee functioned as individuals merely presenting their own personal ideas, management's views were coordinated and could be presented as those of the enterprise.
b) The Workers' Council

The Workers' Council in this factory was among the first to be established in the country following the Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1970. A number of factors contributed to the early creation of the Workers' Council here. The factory had been constructed in 1966 but began actual production in the context of the Arusha Declaration, which stressed the creation of public factories. From 1967, the leadership of the factory was drawn from trade unionists. The first General Manager was a former assistant and later Acting Secretary-General of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour, Deputy and later Secretary-General of NUTA/JUWATA, and one of the most active trade union leaders before and after independence [CCM, 1982, p. 352 for a brief biographical note]. The high "political" profile of the factory meant that the first Chairman of the Party branch was the General Manager and that the factory was often in the forefront in the implementation of government policies.

The successor to the first General Manager of the factory, also appointed by the President, was again from the trade union movement, then, in 1971, working at the NUTA headquarters as an Assistant Secretary. Furthermore, since this was the factory employing the largest number of workers in the country, the Secretary-General of the NUTA often visited the factory to mobilise the employees towards involvement in union matters and encourage them towards increased productivity.

Management was thus from the beginning well disposed to the creation of the Workers' Council and the involvement of workers' representatives in discussing company plans and company performance and in keeping workers informed. The first General Manager on the
creation of the Workers' Council became also its first Chairman. Since that time the factory has had a "tradition" of the Workers' Council despite the changes in management. In 1974 the factory got another General Manager from NUTA headquarters, a former NUTA Assistant Secretary-General. In 1977 a manager from another textile mill was appointed General Manager.

Initially, the organisation of production was in the hands of Chinese technical experts, one of whom was the Production Manager; personnel affairs were in the hands of a Tanzanian citizen, who had been active in the nationalist movement and a one-time Regional Commissioner.

Given that the factory was large, the organisation of the Workers' Council here was based on two levels: each department had its own Workers' Council and then there was the master Workers' Council for the whole factory. This master Workers' Council, like the departmental ones met twice a year.

It was the minutes of this master Workers' Council that were examined to see what issues were discussed and how they were discussed. In Factory B the minutes of the meetings were detailed with attached reports from each department. The minutes in each case were twenty to thirty pages long with sections for issues from each department, questions and suggestions made during the discussions, mention of those who spoke and a summary of the resolutions. In the next session, there would be a report on what had been done or implemented concerning the previous resolutions before new items were tabled and discussed by Council. Details of the procedure were checked against my interviews with the Administrative Officer dealing with personnel matters, the Personnel Officer, the Training Officer and the Chairman.
and Secretary of the JUWATA branch. After an initial reading of the minutes, I took detailed notes on 14 sessions from the 15th Session of 20/12/76 to the 28th Session of 12/12/83.

The minutes give a picture of the factory over the years, revealing some of the problems encountered as well as the factory's successes. For example, the 27th Session of the master Workers' Council of 28/7/83 to 30/7/83 which discussed the crisis the factory faced in terms of shortages of necessary spares, inputs and power cuts, contrasts with other sessions when the Council would be discussing bonus payments after fulfillment of targets or the necessity to employ more machine operators (Session 15, Resolution No. 1 concerning the Spinning Department).

The following is a summary of the 23rd Session held from 14th August 1981 to 19th August 1981 and illustrates the issues discussed and some of the ways they were discussed. I picked this Session's minutes because so many of the central problems of the factory were discussed: falling production due to problems of spares and water cuts; the question of incentives and overtime; schemes of service that were being awaited from SCOPO; new prices for the factory's products that were being awaited from the Price Commission; transport and thefts at the factory; and the financial problems incurred by sales on credit to state trading companies which delayed payments. The session presented an interesting view of how these were tackled, which in turn revealed in several ways the status of the Workers' Council and the nature of the politics of participation in Factory B.

The meeting opened at 10 o'clock in the morning. There were a total of 76 participants. Thirty-one members were from the management (including the General Manager, Departmental Managers and
heads such as medical officer, the police officer in charge of the factory security and administrative assistants. Other participants drawn from the CCM and JUWATA branches included the Chairman of CCM and JUWATA, the Branch Secretaries and delegates from both branches including from the youth section and the women's organisation (U.W.T.). From outside the factory came an Assistant Secretary at the JUWATA headquarters. The Member of Parliament for the District was also invited to attend the meeting as a guest of honour. It was a practice for sessions to have a prominent person to address the meeting, thus symbolically underlining the importance of the deliberations.

The first item was on the concern expressed by the Chairman of the Council at delays in electing a new Workers' Council. The Administrative Manager was called to explain the delay. The explanation given was that they were waiting for instructions from the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare on how to select participants from departments and from the departmental Workers' Councils for the master Workers' Council. The meeting agreed to proceed and await the instructions.

The next set of issues dealt with were those which had been raised in the previous session. These included a report by the Marketing Manager explaining the theft of goods which had been destined for export. The Council endorsed the report. Another issue was the granting of 30 per cent of gate receipts to members of the factory jazz bands. This had been suggested by members of the band. The Council directed that the jazz band should abide by the old arrangements and not raise their share of gate receipts unilaterally.

One member from the CCM branch, an elderly Supervisor in Administration (and former Chairman of the branch), enquired on the
question of improving transport for the workers by increasing the frequency of trips. In reply the General Manager pointed to the fact that the capacity of the buses was limited and cautioned members against blaming drivers when the situation was beyond the factory's control - shortages of buses.

The session was informed by the Administrative Manager that the Scheme of Service which had been prepared by management was still under scrutiny by SCOPO. He further informed the session that given the new salary scales, overtime payments would be for those receiving below 1,605 sh. per month.

On the question of transport of cotton, a key raw material from up-country, the Purchasing Manager informed the council of shortages of railway wagons and the need to purchase lorries instead, to transport this necessary raw material effectively and on time. A resolution was passed to that effect by the Council.

Then followed discussions on written reports tabled by Departmental Managers on the performance of their respective sections. First was the report by the Production Manager, who presented and highlighted the key issues in summary form. Then the General Manager took the floor to further stress various issues: (a) the critical situation facing the production of the factory; (b) the factors affecting production both from "within" and from "without" or beyond the factory's control. He called upon the Council to consider seriously finding means to raise performance and increase productivity, suggesting incentives for those who reached targets or contributed ideas. Water availability, electricity flow and foreign currency were mentioned as some of the problems affecting the factory's production.

Among suggestions for improving performance strict supervision,
the freezing of any new employment and the retirement of those past the retirement age, were mentioned. Incentives such as a pair of khanga or kitenge material should be given to those who surpassed targets. On overtime payments, these should be checked and curtailed. Heads of Departments were asked to make sure all overtimes were genuine - a reflection of the fact that some workers in collusion with some supervisors approved bogus overtime payments as a strategy of raising their incomes. The Chairman of the Council suggested that workers should not be paid money in lieu of leave as several workers tended to do in order to improve their income. This was unanimously accepted by the Council.

Since water shortage was a problem which constantly hit the factory, the General Manager suggested that the Ministry of Water be contacted over the issue. Government and Party leaders should be informed of the gravity of the situation which could lead to the closure of the factory. Another suggestion was the creation of storage wells. These were accepted by the participants.

On the system of selling goods to State Regional Trading Companies on credit, the Council members agreed with management's views that this was detrimental to the financial health of the factory. The government, it was agreed, should be informed about it and the need should be stressed to change the system of sale of goods on credit to those companies. There were a lot of delays in the payment of the debts. This in turn created problems for the proper functioning of the factory.

Some participants suggested that the Engineering Department should be more innovative on the question of spare parts. With foreign exchange reserves limited, the procurement of spares from abroad
would continue to be a perpetual problem, including getting wrong specifications.

Discussions then moved to the Department of Technology following the tabling of the Department's report. Concerning the quality of cloth produced the blame was put on poor supervision of the weavers. The Weaving Manager responded by complaining in turn that the participation of JUWATA left much to be desired and was discouraging since, he alleged, guilty and lazy workers were left unpunished. This undermined management's authority. A JUWATA delegate responded by saying that the union never defended lazy workers and that any reconciliation decision was subject to appeal. Another participant from JUWATA alleged that most members of management were involved in "personal projects" and tended to neglect their factory responsibility and accused workers instead. Workers should be given the chance to improve in their performance. It was finally agreed that there should be cooperation by all employees without blaming each other.

Discussions moved on to the report of the Engineering Department. This dealt with the new engineering workshop. A JUWATA participant enquired who had incurred the costs of creating the workshop. The Chief Engineer in response indicated that this was part of the development programme of the section in an effort to make on the spot items needed in the factory. This was commended by the Council which resolved that the Department should also indicate the values of items made and how much the factory had saved by making them. It was also agreed, on the suggestion of another JUWATA participant, that all tasks which could be performed at the factory should be carried out by the Department and not subcontracted.
Concern was expressed on the question of thefts of spare parts and the Chief Engineer called upon the Council to find ways to deal with those thefts. One member from CCM complained about the negligence of some members of management who—"it was repeated—only indulged in personal private projects and neglected their duties. The General Manager replied that if there was any evidence on this he would take action.

Then followed a report by the Sales and Marketing Department. After favourable comments on the sales achieved by the Department, a question was raised on the government's practice of linking bonuses to the sale of export products worth at least 49 million shillings. Management promised to look into the matter.

One member raised the question of prices but since this was being considered by the Price Commission the Marketing Manager said nothing could be done until the Commission had agreed to fix new prices. Prices of industrial products were not under the jurisdiction of the factories or parastatal decision-making but had to be approved by the national Price Commission.

The Purchasing Department report, next on the agenda, dealt with the purchase of drugs, uniforms and soap, which seemed in short supply. The Manager explained that due to the condition of the country's economy, these were in short supply; that this was a general, national problem.

Over the days, the discussion then went on to deal with the report tabled by the Administrative and Personnel Manager on the post of the Personnel Officer which, one participant felt should be filled by better trained staff and should deal with more substantial duties other than issuing loans and signing leave of absence chits for workers.
The Administrative Manager reported that a seminar was in the pipeline to train the personnel staff and that some of them would be going for further training.

Questions were asked about the performance of cultural groups and how much money was raised from their activities. The Administrative Manager gave information on the money raised by those groups and the factory's hiring of its Social Hall for dances. He also reported on procedures for the repainting of the factory's five hundred houses.

One member charged the Administrative Manager with sanctioning over-employment in his department. The General Manager intervened and informed the session that the issue would be discussed between him and the Administrative Manager. This was accepted by the Council to avoid embarrassments.

On the report by the Financial Manager concerning the factory's debtors and why they were not listed, the Council was informed that this would embarrass the debtors, the list, however, was with the holding company TEXCO. One JUWATA delegate wanted to have the Internal Auditor's Report tabled. The General Manager responded by informing the Council that such a report was his concern and confidential and could not be tabled before the Council. That settled the matter.

On the rise in administrative costs from 13 million sh. to 16 million sh. in one year, the Financial Manager explained that this was due to rises in costs including overtime. This prompted a discussion on the question of the overtime payments which was costing the factory so much but which many managers were reluctant (wary) to stop as that might affect work performance of their subordinates. This was a touchy issue but managers and supervisors should be prepared
to face it to reduce the factory's costs.

A report was presented by the Department of the General Manager on the security and safety of the factory. On the question of thefts in the Finance Department, raised by a CCM delegate, the General Manager informed the sitting that measures had been taken and the culprits sent to court.

Under "Any Other Business", one delegate suggested that management inform the workers about the decisions of the Council. In response, the General Manager said it was the duty of the elected delegates to inform the workers. Another member complained about the way some members of management tended wrongly to accuse JUWATA delegates of absenteeism when they were fulfilling their duties attending to reconciliation cases at the JUWATA branch office. On the question of working hours, the Council unanimously agreed to maintain the 7.30 am to 3 pm day, with a half hour lunch break at 12.30. Winding up, the General Manager commended the participants on their work and, quoting the President, he said leaders should be people of action not words. He then invited the Member of Parliament to address the sitting. The M.P. commended the factory for its work and exhorted all employees despite the difficulties to continue with their work which was so important to the nation. He promised to look into some of the questions raised which could be dealt at the level of Ministries (e.g. Water) or Parliament (the question of Holding Companies).

Typical of the 14 meetings on which I made detailed notes, the 23rd Session of the Workers' Council of Factory B was also strongly reminiscent in several ways of the Workers' Council sessions at Factory A. Although larger and more structured (and hence better recorded in the minutes), the Factory B sessions showed crucial
similarities with those of our first case study. As in the first case, the Workers' Council dealt with different aspects of the factory's life, being informed on and discussing improving production, marketing, personnel matters, prices, incentives, and so on. Discussions were on the basis of reports prepared by Departmental Managers who prepared the agenda, though individual participants could bring in suggestions and views which could be taken as resolutions if acceptable to the participants. While membership of the Council was drawn from both management and other sections of the workforce, the management through the departmental reports were able to act as a group and present positions which had been more or less agreed upon previously. The other members gave their suggestions but not as the position of the Union or Party branch as such, but as mere suggestions from individual delegates. Most non-managerial interventions were for suggestions or seeking information.

Workers' Councils Sessions were followed by resolutions for future action. Some of those decisions/resolutions were implemented or a follow-up was made on them (for example on the question of prices for products, or schemes of service, which were under the authority of the Prices Commission, or SCOPO respectively). Other decisions, however, were not implemented and would have to be raised again (e.g. the issue of transport).

The Council's deliberations often involved either advice to higher authorities, or getting information or giving directives to lower bodies when acceptable to management. Other issues were a matter of getting information on why certain things had been done by management and explanations were given by management on different activities that had provoked concern with some of the participants.
What seems important in all this is the overall impact of the existence of the Workers' Council. Workers' participation was clearly of the inclusionary controlled type. Given the system of representation and the social ideal of working together to solve common problems through consultation and discussion, the Council only marginally affected managerial power. As a merely advisory body it could not insist on its decisions being put into practice. On the other hand as a forum in which the management was occasionally forced to defend itself against potentially embarrassing questioning from non-managerial members, the Council provided more than a purely symbolic avenue of popular participation. The following chapter pursues these issues by examining the roles of the Party and Union branches in factory situations.
Footnotes

1. During the 1970's and 1980's Tanzania encountered a number of serious economic problems. A number of issues both domestic and international or a combination of both have been cited as the causes of those problems. Reasons often quoted include: the world oil price increases, severe droughts, the movement to villages in many parts of rural Tanzania, disruption of agricultural marketing; and the Uganda war in 1978/79. Among the effects have been rising inflation and a fall in the country's foreign exchange earnings. These had telling effects on industrial performance and the real incomes of wage-earners. As a consequence there has been the necessity to constantly revise the minimum wage and other wage and salary scales to cope with rising inflation during these years. From 1972 there has been a rise of the minimum wage as discussed in Chapter 3 above. Valentine [1981, p. 58] has compared the rise in prices with the growth of money wages and has shown that the price rises have outstripped the rise in wages. The price rises are much more felt by lower wage earners on food, housing and clothing. The situation has been aggravated by shortages in maize meal (= sembe), sugar, rice, soap, and cloth, giving rise to escalating parallel market prices (nicknamed popularly in Kiswahili mwendo wa kuruka (literally = flying speed) and to all forms of hoarding and marketeering (= ulanguzi).

The period is also marked by a rapid fall in the exchange value of the Tanzanian currency, the shilling. The official exchange rate in 1983 was 12/=50 for the U.S. dollar. This was considered in many circles as overvalued, with the market value of illegal traders offering 70/= to 80/= sh. for the U.S. dollar. Since 1984 a series of devaluations of the Tanzanian shilling have been made as a result of which the rate has fallen from T.sh. 16/=50 to the dollar to about T.sh. 70/= to the dollar in mid-1987. According to the Financial Times of 23rd October 1987, the current exchange rate was 71/=, set to fall to 90/= by January 1988.

2. Housing in the popular and populous areas of Dar es Salaam ranges between the house made of cement bricks with a corrugated iron roof and the type with wooden poles-cum-mud brick walls and tin or makuti (palms) roofing. The former improved type usually has a cement floor while the latter may or may not have a cement floor. Low wage earners (machine operators, messengers, junior clerks) live in these houses whose design is known as the Swahili type of house. This consists of one main front building and a built up backyard. The front building has six rooms and a middle corridor. At the backyard, there is the common kitchen, bath and toilet and other smaller rooms let out to tenants. In one such house or housing unit, several families usually live, each family having a room or rooms according to their capacity to pay. Rooms in the front houses in areas like Ilala and Magomeni in 1983 cost about 70/= up to 100/= for a seven by eight feet bare room. Those at the back tended to cost less, from 30/= to 50/=. Tenants have a common water source or fetch water from one of the nearby street kiosks. Incidents and tales of frictions and conflicts between residents, their families, and the usually elderly landlords or landladies are rife.

Similar types of houses in the nearby Manzese or Tandale have rooms
(without a ceiling) to rent with the improved houses having electricity for lighting, instead of the more common kerosene-tin wick lamps (= koroboi). Some of the older artisans and technicians have built their own houses in these areas and may let a back room or two to other workers.

The managerial and middle level administrative and accounting staff live in houses in which the family usually occupies a housing unit or flat, with two to three bedrooms with water and electricity. These are in the medium or low density areas of the city.
CHAPTER 5

THE PARTY AND THE UNION

A factory is a site of relations, a context or field in which management and workers compete and/or cooperate over issues in pursuit and in the realisation of objectives. In this interaction management and workers have differential resources at their disposal. One of those resources is the organisation of the factory. The last chapter dealt with some of the aspects of factory organisation which shape management/worker relations: after introducing the industrial environment and the composition of the workforce in the two factories, we focused on the organisation of management and the structuring of workers' participation through the Workers' Councils. Another major feature of the organisation of Tanzanian public sector factories are the enterprise-level branches of the Party (CCM) and the national trade union (JUWATA), and it is on these that we focus in this chapter, paying attention throughout mostly to the case of Factory A.

In examining the factory Party and union branches, our objectives are to see not only how those agencies are organised, but also the way employees perceive and relate to them and how they articulate their membership of those agencies in pursuit of their interests. The approach adopted is that these agencies are considered as sources or a medium of power and therefore essentially dynamic. Their "saliency" depends not only on the way they are formally organised but also on the way the members of those organisations and other relevant actors perceive, define and articulate their relation to them. By looking at the matter in this way, we hope to overcome some of the limitations of the formalist and functionalist conceptions of those agencies.
which were criticised in the Introduction – conceptions which assign them a simple and straightforward "character" on the basis of the formal/legal structures or an assumed function or functions within a wider scheme of things. Those approaches not only neglect the way different actors (management and workers) see and relate to Party and union bodies; they also necessarily oversimplify the problem of the way these organisations' written rules and regulations are actually implemented in the real world of factory life.

1 ORIGINS OF WORK-PLACE PARTY BRANCHES

Before introducing the Party branch of Factory A, it will be helpful to make a short digression on the origins and significance of work-place branches in relation to the history and structure of TANU/CCM. The introduction in 1969 of Party branches in work-places created a new dimension in industrial relations, particularly in para-statal factories. TANU Party organisation up to that year had been based on residential and administrative divisions. This had been one of the main organisational features of the pre-independence nationalist movement. When residence-based Party cells were first introduced in Dar es Salaam city in 1965 and later extended to the whole country, they became the grassroots sections of the Party. The cell comprised all TANU members in designated nyumba kumi (= ten houses). This organisational structure on the basis of administrative divisions was a reflection of the mainly electoral preoccupations of the Party leadership in the pre-independence days. At that time Party branches (through the activities of their leadership or those of the ordinary members in public meetings or through private contacts) served as a means of recruiting new members into the movement, as well as
a source of mobilisation of the general public in support of the leadership's competition with other organisations (such as UTP or the Congress Party) as well as in the struggle with the colonial administration.

After independence the branches continued to be organs for mobilising popular support for the independence TANU government. Mainly through public meetings, the Party organisation continued to fulfil that function as well as being now a forum in which participants could present their demands and wishes to the political leadership. Another role the TANU organisation continued to play was to be the medium of recruitment of new political activists, later leaders, in the different positions of the expanding political hierarchy after independence. Given the virtual dominance of TANU and the weakness of other political organisations, TANU organs at the grassroots after independence played a variety of social functions including serving as local avenues for the amicable, ex-judicial settlement of disputes by conciliation among neighbours or sometimes between spouses [Muzo et.al., 1976; Bienen, 1967]. The 1965 introduction of Party cells to deal with neighbourhood issues such as security and crime reflected further changes and extensions to the functions the Party organisation.

The introduction of Party branches in work-places in 1969 was related both to changes in the Party organisation and to the growth of parastatal enterprises heralded by the Arusha Declaration in 1967. The rationale for the creation of Party branches in work-places lay in the political leadership's feeling that in the new period Party membership and Party leadership needed to become more involved in work-place issues (such as production and discipline) and that the existing Party structures were too much what the President/Chairman
of the Party called "talking shops". This view was expressed by the Party Chairman during the National Executive Council (N.E.C.) meeting of March 1967:

"TANU is an instrument to encourage and stimulate the implementation and realization of the policy of socialism and self-reliance. One of the tenets of this policy is work; we must work. If we have to work and if that is the way to implement the policy of socialism and self-reliance and the vehicle is TANU, we need to ask ourselves: 'When TANU was founded and its various structures established, were those structures for work or for talking?' The answer is that TANU meetings are for talking not for action! We did not create avenues for implementation". [TANU, 1969, p. 11]

(Author's translation from Kiswahili)

The Party Chairman argued for the need to make TANU structures organs for putting into action the policy of Socialism and Self-reliance and that there was no better context to put into effect the Party's policy than in work-places, especially in parastatal enterprises, where work would be carried out for the benefit of the whole national community as well as for those employed in the factory.

Following the decision of N.E.C., in March 1969, to introduce Party branches in work-places, the Party National Secretariat was given the task of implementing that decision taking into account that work discipline should be enhanced, leading to increased production. Taken by the central organs of the political leadership, the decision was naturally framed in general terms, leaving many practical issues to be dealt with. Ambiguities remained on the role of the work-place branch leadership, its relation with management of enterprises, its relation to the workforce and other existing factory organisations such as the Workers' Committees (later NUTA/JUWATA branches).

As far as the National Party leadership was concerned, the work-place branches were supposed to play an important role in the political
(ideological) education of the workers. To enable them to participate fully in socialist production and planning, branches would facilitate discussions on technology and Party policies. The Party branch would also function as an avenue for the workforce to present suggestions and views to the Party leadership and the government. Work-place Party branches would operate as "sessions for discussing technology among the workforce." (These general functions are spelt out in TANU [1969, p. 12].

The general nature and necessarily vague definition of the position and role of Party branches left the situation open for various interpretations. This led to an ambiguity over whether the Party's role would be chiefly one of exhortation and mobilization (i.e. motivating the workforce) or whether it should play the supervisory role (acting as a watchdog and monitoring management performance), or indeed whether the Party branch should be involved in managerial affairs. Those ambiguities have continued to dog the organisation and performance of work-place Party branches, reflected in branch leadership's often vacillating or inconsistent patterns of behaviour.

In practice, as we shall see, the position and role of factory Party branches emerged gradually as elements of strategies adopted by the membership, leadership and management. While management's stance and definition of the role of the Party branch tended towards making it a tool aiding management and facilitating production and discipline, workers perceived it as a resource in their work situation — one which they could utilise to enhance or improve or protect themselves. The strategy or stance adopted by the branch leadership was shaped by and depended on the particular personal capacities of the Party branch leadership, the resources at their disposal and the
conditions under which they operated (the economic and financial position of the factory, for example), in addition to the constraints imposed upon them by the formal structural organisation of the factory, which weighed in favour of management.

2 THE PARTY BRANCH AT FACTORY 'A': MEMBERSHIP, PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES

Like other public factories, Factory A has a Party (CCM) branch. Started in 1970 as a TANU branch with 50 members, the branch has grown in membership and has seen the different, organisational innovations which were attempted during the 1970's. Membership of the Party branch increased as the workforce grew with the expansion of the factory. In 1977 there were 280 members out of a total workforce of 403. These TANU card holders and regular Party contributors (known in Kiswahili as wanachama hai (= living or active members) became the "founder" members of CCM in 1977 when TANU on the mainland and the Afro-Shirazi Party on the Isles became one Party. In 1980 there was a further increase, to 461 members out of 670 employees, and by 1981, there were as many as 502 card holders and fee-paying members.

One notable characteristic of the Party membership in 1970 was the predominance of blue-collar workers, machine operators, and lower supporting staff, (drivers, guards, supervisors, messengers and cleaners) together with sections of top management. Middle-level administrative staff such as clericals and accounts clerks only became more active from 1975. This pattern is explained by the history of the factory, with its close links to the national political leadership in its inspiration and inception as one of the projects of the TANU government. It will be recalled that the General Manager appointed by the President to head the factory was a prominent trade unionist. He also had been
an active Member of Parliament, one of those who spoke strongly in favour of forms of workers' participation in the 1967 Assembly discussing the Labour Tribunal. The Personnel Officer was also an active trade unionist and a member of TANU. The first workforce in the plant section was recruited from different parts of the country among young men who had gone through the National Youth Service and were members of the TANU Youth League. On starting work they became full members of the Party. Other employees had become members in different ways. Some, like the General Manager or the CCM Chairman, at the time of our study, were Party members before independence and before starting work at the factory. On the other hand, TANU Youth League members (like the CCM Secretary at the time of the study) had been young men associated with Party activities in residential areas who were recruited for work in posts as machine operators which did not require any post-primary formal education or training.

Becoming a Party member at that time was not very formalised. Membership was through payment of 2/= T.sh. for the TANU card at any of the TANU offices and a monthly contribution of 50 cents. Nevertheless, for jobs like typists, secretaries, clerks, accounts clerks and general administration, recruitment for employment was on the basis of having some skills in those fields. Membership of the Party did not feature greatly as a factor in recruitment for such positions even though it was already important for both the top management posts and the lower cadre machine operators and supporting staff.

In contrast to the situation of 1970, since 1975 the middle-level administrative staff with secondary formal education and training in clerical work and accounting have also tended to become members. According to the Chairman and Secretary of the branch, administrative
staff started joining in the hope of getting posts in the different Party echelons, with the more motivated aiming for posts at the Divisional, District or Regional levels.

Joining the Party branch at the factory is also more formalised than it used to be. One has to apply formally by filling in a form which details one's background including age, formal education, marital status, any previous convictions or membership of other political organisations (Items listed on application for membership form). The application is followed by a three months' course of political education organised by political education teachers from the District Party organisation. The course consists of a popular general history of the country, the history of colonisation, the Party's history and constitution, the Arusha Declaration and the country's Constitution [Political Education Syllabus for New Party Members]. Among the other requirements for membership are good conduct, discipline, no drunkenness as well as adherence to the Leadership Code. Since the 1974 Musoma Resolution of N.E.C., members as well as leaders have to adhere to the Leadership Code.

In practice at Factory A, after regularly attending the political education classes, aspirants are assessed orally for their political knowledge and granted membership by the branch Committee. Membership cards are issued to them in a ceremony at which they swear loyal membership in the presence of an invited Party leader from the District or Regional office as the guest of honour who presents the cards to the new members. The application of the procedures for membership is rather generous, refusal of admission being unusual. In 1978, for example, three were refused membership at the factory on the grounds that they were waiting trial on charges of theft and had not
regularly attended political education classes [Minutes of Party branch, Mkutano wa Halmashauri ya Tawi, of 9/10/78].

Employees who profess belief and acceptance of the Party's policies and attend the political education classes regularly become members, with the effect that in 1983, non-Party members at the factory were mostly those recently recruited to work at the factory, according to the CCM branch Chairman and Secretary. Party membership is thus now drawn from all sections of the workforce: from the top management to the machine operatives and office cleaners. While the earlier membership tended to be among the blue-collar workers and top management, the present membership of the branch incorporates in its membership as well, middle-level administrative staff, and accounts clerks.

The Tanzanian Managers of the factory have naturally been members of the Party from its inception as this is a state factory and one that plays an important role in the country's agricultural sector. Initially working with the Chinese technicians who headed the Technical Department, managerial as well as political qualities were obviously important in the appointment of the General Manager and Personnel Officer both of whom had been trade unionists. When the factory expanded and all the departments came to be manned by Tanzanians, the heads of departments were expected to be Party members as well as having technical skills. Party membership for the management is not a necessary qualification or condition, but an "expected" one for persons holding leadership positions in a parastatal factory. "Party supremacy" involves not only the approval by the National Party leaders of persons to take charge of specified leadership posts but also involves the principle that those persons would, wherever possible come from among Party members. Thus although membership to the
Party is not compulsory, there is moral pressure for persons wishing to rise into leadership ranks, or those already in them, to be members of the Party.

Thus in Factory A in 1983 all departmental heads as well as the General Manager were active members of the Party branch in terms of party contributions and the attendance of Party meetings in their sections. By visibly responding in a positive way to the national leaders' call for committed membership and leadership, departmental heads thereby showed themselves to be good potential for appointment to higher management positions. Membership in the Party was an asset for department Managers for another reason too. It smoothed the daily exercise of their supervisory work as it tended to mean that they were perceived as being cooperative and in unity with the lower members of the workforce.

Since the 1974 Musoma Resolution whereby applications for further education or higher training needed the approval of the workplace Party branch [Musoma Resolution, Section 35] membership within the Party is important for anyone wishing to improve his career prospects by pursuing further training in one of the country's institutes or universities or abroad. This consideration is particularly relevant among middle cadre accounts and administrative staff and among technicians and artisans who wish to improve their professional knowhow and careers (interviews with members of staff in those categories, February 1983 and with the CCM Branch Chairman).

As mentioned earlier, machine operators and supporting staff such as messengers had been recruited among persons who had passed through the Voluntary National Youth Service and were thus Party members or in the youth wing. Membership for them had been useful in getting
employed. Once on the job, continued active membership was perceived as being helpful and the last resort for securing just treatment and fairness particularly in protecting themselves against victimisation by supervisors or officials. In the residential areas of the town where workers return after work, membership of the Party accompanied by a card is also a form of insurance against harassment by the People's Militia and accusations of vagabondage, idleness or other forms of incriminating behaviour. For machine operators and lower supporting workmen, Party membership is perceived as the "stick of the weak" (fimbo ya mnyonge) to which they can appeal for support in unity with other workers and citizens. The Party is thus perceived, as in the days of the movement for national independence, as the unity of patriots pursuing common interests regardless of tribe, creed, race or social status. Belonging to the Party gives one a sense of social identity and solidarity with other people from different parts of the country - an asset especially in an urban setting in which the workers live with their families.

Some of the daily affairs of urban residents formally require the approval or "blessing" of the Party cell leader or branch leadership as a recognised authority or witness - for example, new registration of children's education. In the neighbourhood setting it is also the case that quarrels or small conflicts between neighbours are settled at the cell level or branch level with the Party leadership acting as arbitrators. A new resident taking a room in a residential area of the town normally informs the cell leader in the street. These are usually elderly men, whose houses have the Party flag in front. The cell or the Party branch does not become an administration as such, but is a forum or centre for the spreading of information from the
government. During 1982 and 1983 when there were acute shortages of consumer items, the Party cells and branches served as distribution networks for the rationing of maize meal, flour, sugar, soap and clothing material (khanga and vitenge). These facets of the Party's role in the extra-factory situation must have helped to shape the machine operators' and messengers' view of CCM as the union of the patriotic, law-abiding citizens and the refuge of the weak.

In one way or another, then, employees considered Party membership as an asset. The following illustrations will help to develop the point. Party membership was considered useful chiefly in facilitating chances for further education or training. This "instrumental perception" of Party membership was aptly expressed by a worker whom I shall call A.M. A.M. was a 25 year-old machine operator in the Forging Section. When in primary school he was a youth winger of the Party. On completing Standard Seven, he spent a year in his rural area before coming to Dar es Salaam, where he stayed with his cousin who works in a nearby factory. With his primary school education he found it difficult to get work. When he "managed" to get employed in the factory as a machine operator, he felt that further training was important if he wanted promotion or to change jobs. He therefore became a full member of the Party as, he felt, this could enable him to overcome any hurdles if he made an application for courses in fitting or turning. Without Party membership, he thought, the Party leadership could not be favourable to his application for training, as he might be considered not to be cooperative.

Another 25 year-old machine operator, an ex-primary school leaver, held similar views. M.S. was being trained as a craftsman. Though he was then a non-Party member, he had decided to join the Party
because this was important. "Nimeamua kujiunga maana bila kitambulisho cha CCM inakuwa matatizo. Mtanzania au mfanyakazi bila hiyo huwezi kusafiri nje an kusoma" (= I have decided to join because without the CCM card one can have problems. A Tanzanian, or a worker might find it difficult to travel abroad or take courses). Similar views on Party membership as a form of insurance were expressed among middle-level administrative clerks and accounting staff, many of whom wanted to improve their positions and to go for courses.

This "instrumental view" of Party membership was not only, however, for those who wanted to go for further training or courses. We mentioned that in the residential areas it was a means of self-protection. For F.M. for example, it was an asset both outside and within the factory situation. F.M. was a 40 year-old machine operator in the Forging Section. When he migrated from his rural area to go to look for work, first in sisal plantations and later in Dar es Salaam, he saw the Party membership card as important. This was, for him, a form of identification that he was a law-abiding citizen and not a thief. This was helpful in getting accepted and in getting employed at the factory, where he had been employed for the last 11 years. In the work-place he saw that Party membership was helpful in dealing with practical problems of daily life (such as uniforms or food). The management needed someone to remind them, to shake them from their sleep (kuwaamsha) - otherwise they would ignore workers' complaints or demands, he declared.

For C.O., another machine operator (aged 23) in the Forging Section, Party membership was a ngao (shield) in the residential area to resolve quarrels with neighbours or some unreasonable landlords. In the factory sometimes, he felt, one could be mistreated by a supervisor
or have one's rights trampled on. In that case one could consult the branch leadership to redress the situation by talking to management.

For other employees, Party membership was synonymous with good citizenship and patriotism. This was the perception of J.S., a 41 year-old machine operator who had worked in the factory since 1973. He joined the Party even before coming to work at the factory because he wanted to be "in unity with his fellow men" (= Niwe nguvu mo ja na wenzangu) and as a citizen of the country. O.M.S., a younger (23) machine operator who joined the Party within a year of being employed felt the same. As an indigenous (= mzaliwa wa) person of Tanzania, it was natural, he felt, that he become a good member of the Party, for the Party had brought independence.

A 26 year-old quality control assistant with Form 4 secondary education joined the Party as a way of increasing unity among Tanzanians and helping them to work together for the good and the development of the country. In the factory the Party would be helpful in reducing favouritism or nepotism in management, he believed. K., a purchasing officer and a university graduate in economics, saw Party membership as a way of voicing one's views and of reducing unwarranted managerial practices in relation to employees (such as nepotism). One could also voice views for improved services and training courses. K. was a member of the Party Youth League when in secondary school and continued his membership when he started his working career, so that he might actively participate in different representative positions in the factory agencies. He unsuccessfully contested for the Chairmanship of the Party branch.

As for S.M., a 36 year-old male machine operator in the Heat Treatment Section, his views on the Party and his membership in it
are related to the circumstances which led to his joining the Party. He was a Youth League member in primary school. Then he started work in a private textile factory owned by an "Indian". It was there that he joined as a full adult member in 1972, when he saw the need to support actively the government's call to protect the economy of the country. The dangers seemed especially real in that private company where the owner's commercial activities "might be detrimental to the country's economy" by any illegal transactions. Now in the public sector factory, he was of the view that Party membership should play a part in checking managerial malpractices.

While the ordinary membership had varied views and perceptions concerning the role of the Party branch, the perceptions of the leadership and those of the management also showed some variations. The Branch Chairman saw himself and the branch Committee as a link (= *kiungo*) both between management and workers, and between workers. When employees had a problem or a demand to make, they would do it through the Party sittings or leadership. According to the Chairman, if an employee had a grievance, the Chairman's task was to tell the worker the person or official who could resolve the issue. *Kamwone fulani* (= Go and see so and so), "then come and tell me how things were resolved or dealt with". If the grievance was generalised, the leadership could take the initiative by talking to the Personnel Officer or the General Manager as the case might be. On the other hand the leadership defined as one of its tasks the encouragement of workers to be disciplined and to avoid laziness and increase productivity: *Kazi ya uongozi wa tawi ni kuhimiza uzalishiji na utimizaji wa malengo* (= fulfilment of targets).

For the Branch Secretary, the task was to encourage harmony and
increased production at the factory, but also the Party was to be vigilant to ensure that decisions concerning the factory were implemented; to see to it that management did not go against the policies of the party (Uongozi wa kiwanda usikiuke siasa ya chama); and that there were no malpractices carried out by management as regards recruitment or sales of company products. The branch leadership had also the task to speak on behalf of employees vis-a-vis management (kuwatetea wafanyakazi).

This view of the task of the Party was echoed by cell leaders in Materials Preparation, Forging and Pressing (A and B) and Heat Treatment. The main task of Party leadership was to defend the workers (kuwatetea wanyonge = to defend the weak) in the work-place. This view held by cell leaders corresponded to the perceptions of many ordinary members among the workforce.

As far as management was concerned, the factory Party branch was for the proper functioning of the work-place by involving the leadership of the branch in solving conflicts that may arise at the factory and to mobilise and exhort workers. The Party should involve workers in matters affecting the factory, but they should not meddle into affairs that were "purely managerial". The Party branch was there to enhance cooperation and common endeavour among the workforce and with management. The important thing was to effect a good relationship between management and the Party members.
3 THE PARTY BRANCH: ORGANISATION AND ACTIVITIES

a) Leadership

The grassroots organisation of the Party at the factory consists of 15 Party cells which correspond to the administrative sections of the enterprise. Each cell has an elected cell leader. These cell leaders and two delegates from each of the Mass Organisations in the factory (Youth, Women and trade union (JUWATA)) constitute the branch council led by the elected Chairman and the appointed Secretary of the branch.

Day to day affairs of the Party are administered by the Secretary of the branch who works as a full-time official. Appointed by the District party leadership from among four other machine operators (appointment of Secretaries is a general feature of CCM organisation), the Secretary is a long-time employee of the factory and had been active as a cell leader in the Forging and Pressing Section. His formal education is Primary level and since his appointment as Secretary he has attended a 6-month leadership course in Party Affairs and Organisation at one of the Party Zonal Colleges. His work is general administration of Party affairs, scheduling meetings, dealing with correspondence and attending meetings both within and outside the factory. One copy typist from the factory is attached to the Party office. The branch Secretary works in this office whose expenses are catered for in the branch budget. Salaries on the other hand, for the Party Secretary and Chairman are paid for by the company. This is a general feature of Party organisation, with national echelons run on a government subsidy voted for by Bunge.

The branch Secretary works in constant consultation with the elected branch Chairman. The latter has an office in the Party offices.
The post of Chairman is not a full-time job. The Chairman normally works as a machine operator and only comes in the office when there is a scheduled meeting or during the lunch break to get up to date with developments and be briefed by the Secretary. Factory A's Chairman was employed in 1970 as a machine operator. A middle-aged ex-Standard 8 man from one of the coastal peoples, many employees consider him as mzee (= an elder, wise man) for which he commands respect among workers. His views and counsel among the workforce and management are difficult to ignore. His long-time employment and his age were instrumental in his winning the election over a younger and more educated Purchasing Officer.

The Party organisation and leadership at the factory have been modified from time to time. When the factory began full production after the period of trial production, the branch was started under the inspiration of the General Manager, who became the first Chairman of the branch; one machine operator was elected Secretary from the workforce, working on a part-time basis during work breaks or when off-duty. The branch office then consisted of a room allocated by management. Later Party membership contributions led to the building of the Party Block which houses the office of the Secretary, Chairman, a typist's office, a meeting room and an office for JUWATA.

In 1975 TANU Political Commissars were introduced in parastatal factories throughout Tanzania. Nominaly modelled on the experience of several East European countries, these were officials appointed by Party national headquarters to act as Party branch Secretaries working on a full-time basis in an effort to give impetus to Party work-place branches in the supervision of the implementation of Party policies in those enterprises. This was the period when the
issue of "Party Supremacy" came to the forefront of national policy. The Political Commissars enhanced and gave structure to many Party activities, increased membership, and stimulated the creation of cells and subcommittees. The Commissar had similar status to a departmental manager, and some of the same rights. He was not an employee of the factory, though his pay was budgeted in the annual plans of the factory. The Commissar attended management meetings and took part in the deliberations as one of the invited members. His position in the factory was peculiar in that he was under the control of Party headquarters and reported to them; he was not under the factory management. On the other hand, factory management was not answerable to him. His main task was to organise Party programmes while being the Party's watchdog on what was happening in a given parastatal enterprise and report it to the National Party headquarters. The Political Commissar's role was thus controversial. The innovation had not "been thought out fully before" and its relation to management was ambiguous [interview with Msekwa]. Pressures quickly built up leading to its abolition in 1979.

In Factory A as elsewhere, the post of the Political Commissar led to several frictions with management. The management, which believed in "the right to manage", were unhappy with the existence of such a post and often resisted suggestions by the Commissar. In one incident, the Commissar spoke against the granting of a twelve thousand shilling loan to an employee of the factory as that was against SCOPO regulations. Several managers stood out against the objection and even intimated that the Commissar was simply jealous! They proceeded to grant the loan. Other members of the Party branch Council did not, it appears, support the Commissar. On another occasion the Commissar queried
the loss of 136,000 shs. of company property but no answer was forthcoming from management on the grounds that this was "confidential". [CCM Branch Council Minutes of 10/9/77].

A particular source of conflict in Factory A was the inexperience of the Commissar, which sometimes led him act as an alternative Personnel Officer in matters related with work discipline, including writing warning letters to workers for indiscipline or bad conduct. This was naturally seen as interfering with the work of the Manpower and Personnel Office and was resisted by management. While the incumbent's inexperience, combined with the lack of clear definition of the Commissar's position, contributed to tensions with management, the deeper reason for the conflict lay with the management's basic antipathy towards "this interference" with their work. In factories in other parts of Tanzania where the author gathered data, the results of the Political Commissars episode were more dramatic than they were in Factory A.3

In 1979 the present structural organisation was created, reverting to the system of a Party secretary chosen from the work-place's own employees. The post remained an appointed one, incumbents being nominated by the higher echelons of the Party.

b) The Cell System

As we have noted, the grassroots sections of the Party organisation in Factory A were the 15 cells which corresponded to the administrative units of the enterprise. Formally, cells were supposed to meet once a month to discuss issues relating to their sections [Section III, 26 (1) of Katiba ya CCM (Constitution) 1982]. But this was not strictly adhered to and cells met irregularly, as Table 5.1 indicates.
Table 5.1

Party Cell Meetings in Factory 'A', 1978–80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Numbers of Meetings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials Preparation</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forging &amp; Pressing A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grinding &amp; Polishing</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heat Treatment, Laboratory &amp; Design</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lathe &amp; Bench</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Painting</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohari/Stores</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repairs</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration &amp; Personnel</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forging &amp; Pressing B</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kariakoo Shop</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design (1980 only)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Reports of Branch Activities for 1978–1980; Minutes of Party Meetings.

The frequency of the meetings depended on the respective cell leader. Cells which met comparatively often, for example, the Forging and Pressing Sections A and B, were often simply those with active leaders. In some of the sections which did poorly, such as the Accounts cell, there was a long vacancy for the post of cell leader. Elsewhere there was apathy when the meetings did not always produce the results desired or when the same things were always voiced.

Cell meetings are designed to bring together a section of the workforce to discuss matters arising in their work-place. The meeting is open to all workers including non-members and differs little, if at all, from a section meeting or work meeting except that it is chaired by the cell leader. Every employee is welcome to participate in the forum without distinctions. There is no membership control
except for candidates. The departmental Manager usually attends or otherwise someone who can answer questions on his behalf.

Issues dealt with in the cell meetings include questions of Party membership, payment of fees and attendance in meetings. These are raised by the cell leader, who does not have many sanctions when workers do not come to the meetings. Personnel affairs and services linked to conditions of work are constant matters raised in cell meetings. Matters relating to production and work discipline are favourite issues raised by supervisors and management. Members of the rank and file workforce often raise matters relating to social services, while departmental heads take the occasion to raise problems concerning work discipline and the necessity to increase productivity by working hard. In other words, the cell has no one specific function but is perceived and used differently by the various participants.

To illustrate some of these issues let us take some extracts from the minutes of meetings of the cells of Forging and Pressing A and Forging and Pressing B from the end of 1977 to the end of 1980. Similar views were expressed by employees in interviews generally.

The issues discussed during the cell meeting of 13/12/77 were:

a) The problem of lack of morning transport: the person responsible should be on time since some people started work at seven.

b) Issues concerning food and the way it was served: workers complained about the procedure for serving tea in the morning; there were too many delays. Furthermore, the food in the evening was not enough and some people missed their shares.

c) On availability of components: Workmen were reminded that the problems concerning the shortage of dies were well known; workers nevertheless were encouraged to work hard.
d) Late payment of dues: A letter from the branch Secretary was read reminding nine workers who had not paid their party contributions to do so.

The meeting held on 4/2/78 discussed:

a) Working conditions: Machine operators raised the question of work uniforms, gloves and boots and petitioned that those concerned should supply them when required.

b) An issue of work safety: Where switching of "single point machine" is done by hand instead of foot workers considered this risky; the technician in charge promised to look into the matter.

c) The issue of shortage of evening food raised again: Demands were made that it be increased; the problem of the procedures of serving tea was also not yet resolved, according to the machine operators.

d) Productivity: There was general consensus that there should be better cooperation between workers in this section and those in the Repairs Section and the Lathe and Bench Section in order to increase productivity. Workers agreed that they would increase their efforts and stop being late or slovenly at work.

When the cell met five months later on 10/7/78 members were again admonished to value cell meetings and not miss them. The question of uniform and boots was raised by machine operators. The section head informed the meeting that the necessary items of uniform had not been available in the market for some time, but from now on things would be alright. As for the work boots the meeting was informed that some workmen had got their share and further supplies were being awaited for from Arusha. The question of transport was discussed again: machine operators complained that the driver passed too early, before scheduled time, leaving many workmen behind. Health services
were discussed: workmen petitioned for the restoration of the former system of medical examination every six months. The meeting concluded with a reminder from the cell leader about payment of Party contributions.

The cell meeting of 6/12/78 discussed the Annual Report prepared by the branch, and congratulated the branch leadership for preparing such a report for the first time. The meeting agreed that anyone involved in theft should be dealt with. The session agreed with the suggestion of the Technical Manager to break the second shift and move some workers to the Grinding, Heat Treatment and Oil Painting Sections in order to increase production and reach the plant's targets. Members who had not paid their fees were reminded that at the end of the year they would have to reapply for membership if they did not pay their arrears.

The session which was held on 10/4/79 was attended by all members and workers from the section. This meeting was informed by the Technical Manager that materials for uniforms were now available. Machine operators suggested they be served with ugali (= maize meal) instead of the potatoes they were being given since rice was in short supply: potatoes made too light a meal for men doing hard work. Members were again reminded to pay their Party dues.

On 16/8/79, the cell met and was informed that arrangements for medical checks and treatment were being made. Some machine operators complained that they had no work boots, and the Sectional Manager informed them that the popular sizes (No. 8) were not available in sufficient numbers. The cell leader and a technician urged workers to work harder in production as the country had just ended a war (in Uganda). The meeting was also informed of the procedure for distributing basic items such as cooking oil, khanga dress materials and sugar.
The 19/11/79 meeting reveals a similar pattern of types of issues discussed and style of interaction. Once again cell members were urged to pay their Party fees. Due to the long breakdown of one machine the section would not reach its output target of 80,000 hoes, and so workers were urged to work harder. It was suggested that they even work overtime on Sundays. The cell leader and section head were asked to present these suggestions to the relevant authority. Washing soap for uniforms was not being issued as it was hardly available.

During 1980, the cell of Forging and Pressing A had a total of four meetings, in April, June, July and December. Both the issues and the style remained very much as they had been during the previous two years. In each meeting there were new petitions, old demands which were now being met, and new appeals for greater effort in production.

To sum up, the Party cell through its meetings and leadership functioned as a forum for members of the workforce. Within the work section it served as a medium of information as well as a platform for workmen to air their views, present their petitions on working conditions, iron out small disputes and query certain managerial practices. For management it was a useful vehicle for efforts to maintain work discipline: a means of increasing production through group discipline. Giving workers an outlet for minor grievances helped to maintain a cooperative atmosphere in the factory, without compromising in any way the responsibility and decision-making authority of the section head. Much the same was the case of the Party cells in Factory B.
c) The Branch and Branch Council

To some extent, the role of the cell at the section level is reproduced in the role of the branch leadership at the level of the whole enterprise. The branch through its periodic meetings is supposed to make the presence of the Party felt. Apart from urging for the payment of membership fees and so forth, the Branch leadership organises general meetings for the whole workforce which bring together issues touching the employees both as employees and as citizens of the country.

When the Party branch opened in the early days of Factory A, the Party general meetings was the most common type of Party meeting. This was before the coming of the Political Commissar and before the creation of cells in different sections of the factory. The general meeting would be called by the Secretary in consultation with the General Manager, who was the first Chairman of the branch, whenever there was an important issue to be announced to the employees or when a political personality visited the factory. With the coming of the Commissar and the creation of CCM in 1977, the public general meeting became a once-a-year affair. According to the CCM constitution[CCM, 1982, paragraph 30(5)] a general meeting is supposed to be held once a year and all members of the branch are supposed to attend.

In Factory A, given the size of the attendance at these meetings, the issues to be dealt with could only be of a general nature. When interviewed on whether they attended meetings and what was discussed, employees invariably responded that issues discussed concerned the payment of membership fees and contributions, increasing work effort, combating negligence or matters concerning those in the militia who were either on training or on guard duty either at the factory or other
parts of the town. Alternatively, meetings were organised when a political personality came to visit the factory and address the workers (e.g. a Member of Parliament, a member of N.E.C. or a Minister).

The minutes of Party General Meetings were not so well kept as those of the cells and the Party Branch Council. This was no doubt due to their being held once a year. I was, however, able to read a summary of three General Meetings. Two were Annual General Meetings of the factory (1980 and 1981) and another was an Ordinary General Meeting (in September 1981) on the occasion of a visit by the local Member of Parliament.

In the latter meeting, which had been called at a rather short notice during work time, there were 263 attending and 183 absent from the meeting. The Chairman introduced the M.P. who had come to get to know his constituents and talk about ways to tackle the severe economic crisis. The M.P. talked at length about the problems then facing the country: floods in some places, drought in other parts, the collapse of the East African community and the consequent need to finance some services on own costs instead of sharing with other countries. The country was facing severe foreign exchange shortages as it spent 60% of its foreign exchange earnings on oil whose price had increased. The prices of manufactured goods had also risen. This was leading to shortages of consumer items.

The M.P. urged workers to increase production and to be especially careful with machinery and raw materials. He also urged the management and the Party branch leadership to cooperate and look for common solutions. Then followed some questions from employees. What plans were at hand for improving industrial production by government? (This was being studied). What was government doing to stop racketeering?
(The M.P. responded that the Central Committee had called on Party members not to buy or sell goods at hiked prices). There was concern about water shortages due to cuts in the District. The M.P. said this was due to the age of the pumps and scarcity of spares. The meeting ended with the Chairman exhorting members to take to heart and go and practice what had been said by the M.P.

Efforts of inculcating the "ideology" of the political leadership were clearly evident during this meeting. In another illustrative example, the Annual General Meeting of 7 February 1981 consisted mainly of a report of the annual activities of the branch. Members were urged to attend meetings in their cells more regularly, and JUWATA was urged to hold meetings for workers. It was resolved to increase production for the year and fulfil targets. The General Manager then addressed the meeting. He informed them that a bus had been bought by the factory to transport workers. He went on to urge everyone to do their best, to avoid slovenliness and reach their production targets: the Party leadership should help in that endeavour. The Manager also informed members that the factory's club which had just opened that month would help raise money to build houses for workers. The Chairman closed the meeting urging all to take into account what had been said and inviting non-members to join the Party and work together.

In Factory B, General Meetings used to take place, but given the size of the factory they became organisationally impractical. Another factor that may have contributed to their demise is that with the expansion of the factory some of the General Meetings had deteriorated into a near-"riot". During one General Meeting machine operators persistently enquired (i.e. complained) about goings on in the factory cooperative shop which they felt was being "misused" to enrich some
individuals from the factory through illegal sales of factory products.

Between General Meetings or in their absence, the Party organ concerned with factory-wide matters was the Branch Council or Committee. According to the Party Constitution [CCM, 1982] consists of the Chairman, the Secretary, ten members elected by the Branch General Meeting and two delegates from each of the Mass Organisations of the Party (Youth, Women, Trade Union, Elders and Cooperative Union). In practice in Factory A the Council had 25 members, the elected cell leaders (15) from each section and two representatives each from all the Mass Organisations except the Elders, with the Chairman and Secretary completing the number.

The Council was divided into several subcommittees, the most "powerful" of which was the Political Committee. In this factory it consisted of the Chairman, the Secretary, the JUWATA Branch Chairman, two technicians, a senior artisan and a senior production engineer, the last sometimes serving as Chairman in the absence of the Chairman.

The Party leadership in this factory had some similarities with those in Factory B. In both the initial years when the General Managers in both factories were also Chairmen of the Party branches, now the leadership tended to be drawn from the production sections among the longer serving employees. In Factory B, the elected Chairman of the branch was the Production Manager, who took over from an electrician who had been preceded by an elderly foreman. In Factory A, though the Party leaders were designated as machine operators, they were group leaders in their sections. (In other factories visited during our exploratory research, I found that the group of manual workers and messengers who tended to be in the leadership positions initially was now being replaced by long-serving technicians or artisans, some of
whom were in supervisory positions).

The activities of the Branch Council in relation to factory life included both its own (and its Political Committee's) meetings, and the participation of the Chairman and the Secretary in the various meetings of other committees or bodies at the factory (the Appointments Committee, the Workers' Council, the Workers' Education Committee and the weekly Planning Committee), as well as in approaches to management.

A reading of the minutes of the Party Branch Council in Factory A was carried out to see what issues were discussed and what activities the Party branch was involved in. These may be grouped into two:

a) "Specifically Party Affairs". These related to issues like reminding members of payment of contributions; organising the recruitment and political education of new members; organising recruitment and training of the People's Militia with other work-places under the coordination of the District Party headquarters; interviewing those aspiring to Party and union posts; and organising meetings in the general sphere of raising social awareness.

b) Matters related to the personnel and work at the factory. These included "unbecoming" conduct by workers, such as absenteeism, thefts, and lack of performance of duties. The Party leadership would, for example, send letters to the more subordinate staff who were in need of correction. Other such matters related to workers' demands and petitions which would be forwarded to management and which were of very much the same kind as those recurring in the cell meetings: questions about overtime, transport, canteen services, delays in payments of monthly wages, availability of loans, and settlement of conflicts in an amicable manner. In these activities the Party branch leadership played an important social role in the factory.
It was through its participation in other bodies that the Party branch leadership got involved more directly in issues related to the work of the factory. But as has already been discussed in relation to the Workers' Council, and as will be illustrated by our review of selected issues and episodes in Chapter 6, this involvement marked a change without however transforming in any fundamental way the relations between management and workers.

4 TRADE UNIONISM IN FACTORY A

Trade union organisation in Factory A has taken different forms but is as old as the factory itself. The first form of union organisation was the Workers' Committee which was established in 1970 under the encouragement of the General Manager and the Personnel Officer, both former trade unionists, and in line with government labour regulations requiring the creation of a Workers' Committee as the only legal avenue through which workers might present their grievances and demands to management. Since this was a parastatal enterprise and recently commissioned, members of the workforce were "encouraged" to be NUTA members. As the factory expanded new recruits among the workforce were deemed to be members of NUTA, through the "closed-shop" practice — which stipulated that when 50% of employees were members, the rest of the workforce could be considered as NUTA members. Deductions were made monthly from their pay through the "check-off system" to meet their union dues.

From among these early members, a Workers' Committee consisting of machine operators and a messenger was constituted, working closely with the Personnel Officer. Since the 1964 legislation setting up NUTA as one, national and centralised union, all categories of workers
belonged to NUTA, but leadership in the Workers' Committees could be drawn only from the lower, rank and file wage earners—those receiving a wage of less than 701/= T.sh. a month. The Security of Employment (Amendment) Act No. 45 of 1969, however, made the Workers' Committee open to administrative staff and clerks receiving a salary of less than 701/= T.sh. a month. The Workers' Committee leadership in Factory A, nevertheless, continued to be drawn mainly from machine operators and messengers.

The 1975 Labour Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 1, abolished the Workers' Committees and created NUTA work-place branches in their place, opening up leadership positions in factories and work-places to all employees. This led to the election to union leadership positions in Factory A of some members of the administrative staff: a quality controller in the production section, a cost accountant and a marketing officer.

When in 1977 the trade union became one of the Mass Organisations of the Party, changing its name to JUWATA, this did not make any practical differences in terms of membership. By making the union a department of the Party organisation, all employees became ipso facto members of JUWATA. In that way any workers' organisation and activity would ultimately be controlled by the political leadership. In Factory A this was the case already and union dues were already being deducted - 3/= T.sh. for those with monthly pay below 701/= T.sh. and 5/= T.sh. for those with more than 701/= T.sh. Factory A thus had a union branch to which all employees (from the General Manager to the machine operators) belonged.

All union leadership positions in the enterprise were elective under the Party guidelines which also stipulated that candidates for
JUWATA posts had to have been members of CCM for at least five years and shown themselves to be disciplined workers. Aspirants were vetted by the Party Branch Political Committee. Then the list of candidates was approved by the District Party Political Committee for polling by all employees.

On September 29, 1978, elections for JUWATA leadership positions were held at the factory. Polling was carried out during a public meeting, and a JUWATA Committee of 15 was eventually elected. This consisted of the Chairman of JUWATA, the Union Secretary and one committee member from each department of the enterprise [Taarifa ya Halmashauri ya Tawi JUWATA].

To the chair of JUWATA (considered a relatively important post) was elected a machine operator who was a long-serving employee of the enterprise (employed there since 1970) and who had been an active member in the NUTA Committee. He was regarded as a fair and reasonable person who could be trusted to present workers' grievances and speak in their defence to management.

To the other important post, the Secretaryship of the JUWATA, was elected a fitter and turner who also had been in the factory since 1970. The other members of the Committee were: - a twenty-eight year-old senior artisan, employed at the factory since 1977 in the Heat Treatment Section; - a 34 year-old blacksmith with work experience at the factory since 1969 in the Heat Treatment Section and now a supervisor and group leader; - a thirty-two year-old technician grade II who had worked at the enterprise since 1969 and was now a supervisor; - a twenty-nine year-old senior artisan and blacksmith in the Design and Testing Section; - a thirty-two year-old technician with nine years at the factory, a group leader and supervisor in the Oil
Painting Section; – a male machine operator in the Forging and Pressing Sections who had been in the factory since 1974; – a male quality control assistant who had been at the factory since 1969; – a male machine operator, being trained to be a quality control assistant, on the job since 1971.

Elected to the union leadership positions, then, are long-service employees in their thirties or older. Apart from the Chairman and another committeeman who were machine operators, other members of the union branch leadership were elected among artisans and/or technicians, usually employees with supervisory or leadership duties in the workplace. Such people would have been preferred because their potential as leaders would already have been seen by the workers. They could be counted on not to be timid in front of management.

The JUWATA Branch Council/Committee in the factory formed three sub-committees to deal with specific aspects of the union's work. These were Discipline and Economy, Defence and Security, and Education and Culture. The Chairman of the branch also headed the most important and active sub-committee, that of Discipline and Economy, which dealt with personnel issues including disciplinary matters (sanctions, dismissals, conciliation services). and employees' pay and fringe benefits. The Secretary chaired the sub-committee on Defence and Security, which dealt with protection of company property and safety at work. The 34 year-old supervisor-blacksmith chaired the sub-committee of Education and Culture.

The leadership of the union at the factory has been dogged by instability. Several of the Council members elected in 1978 had left the factory by the end of the year. They included the Secretary, who resigned, two others who left work of their own accord and another
two who were dismissed for "personal mistakes". This adversely affected the activities of the union branch. During the whole of 1979, for example, there were no meetings for all employees organised by JUWATA. This prompted the General Manager on 2 January, 1980, to call in a delegation of three union leaders. He exhorted them to arrange general meetings for all workers at least once every four months, and he suggested that the union Council should meet at least once a month.

Meetings of the union Council remained irregular and not always marked by successful deliberations. For example, the minutes of the 17/12/81 meeting which discussed the schedule of activities for 1982 was marked by disagreements, with complaints that Council members were not active in attending meetings and that CCM was not very helpful in filling the posts of those who had left. The meeting ended abruptly without agreement and with recriminations.

Despite these shortcomings the union was active through its sub-committee of Economy and Discipline, and through the Chairman who was a member of other enterprise committees and bodies.

As far as the National political leadership is concerned, the function of the JUWATA branch is as spelt out in the JUWATA regulations:

a) to foster improvement in work performance;

b) to supervise and insure the implementation of workers' education programmes;

c) to see to it that employers and employees reach production targets and protect the country's economy;

d) to strengthen JUWATA at the work-place, and hence the unity among the workforce; and

e) to enhance cooperation among employees and between employees
and between employees and management (own translation of Kanuni za Jumuiya ya Umoja wa Wafanyakazi wa Tanzania, Sehemu ya Tatu, 15). [JUWATA Regulations, n.d.].

These regulations or procedures of JUWATA were approved by the National Executive Committee of CCM. Similar views on the role of JUWATA branches are discernible in speeches by the political leadership. On January 28, 1980, in a speech at a symposium on the Role of Workers in the Construction of Ujamaa held at the University of Dar es Salaam, R.M. Kawawa, a member of the CCM's National sub-committee on party affairs, spelt out some of the functions of JUWATA in work-places. These included, he said, workers' education, the running of workers' shops and canteens, and kindergartens for working mothers. He added that unlike NUTA, JUWATA was a part of CCM. Opening a seminar in December 1982 on Party branches in the Ilala District of Dar es Salaam, Kawawa, now the Party Secretary-General, reiterated the need for Party branches and JUWATA to put into effect those tasks [Mzalendo, 12 December 1982, p. 3].

Some of the above definitions and perceptions on the role of union branches were echoed by members of management in Factory A. During his meeting with JUWATA officials of 2/1/80, the General Manager called upon the JUWATA branch leadership to educate workers to have disciplined conduct, to establish good relations among employees and to maintain good relations between workers and management. Similar views were expressed by the Manpower Development and Administrative Manager who saw the union's role as a way to involve workers in the affairs of the enterprise "except for those which were purely managerial" [interview, January 1983]. Adding further that union leaders and Party leaders at the factory were fully involved in the affairs of the enterprise.
The JUWATA leadership for its part, saw itself as the "link between the employer and the employees" [Minutes of JUWATA branch meeting of 29/9/78]. The union's task as seen by them consisted in uniting all workers for the day to day affairs of the work-place in order to enhance cooperation and instill discipline and work enthusiasm. This aspect of being the channel or link between employer and employee was stressed in the above-mentioned branch meeting of 1978. The Committee wanted this understood by every worker.

In an interview with the Chairman of JUWATA a second definition emerged of the role of JUWATA branch, as a tool to protect the rights and material interests of employees [interview, January 1983]. The latter was certainly the more pervasive definition of the task of the JUWATA factory branch held by workers, as was evidenced by the employees interviewed. Asked what the union branch leadership's task was, they responded with: to deal with problems of workers and speak for their interests; to be the workers' spokesman and encourage work performance; to protect employees from victimisation; to reconcile any conflict between management and workers; to facilitate loans or advance payments; or to ask pardon when real mistakes have been made by workers. Such perceptions of the tasks of JUWATA branches were the prevailing ones among workers in the plant sections. (Similar views were often expressed concerning the Party branch, whose functions were often confused with those of the union.)

The fact that there had been no General Meetings held by JUWATA since 1978 did not raise particular concern among the rank and file union members. The employees had become members of the union, in many cases, on being employed at the factory; and as it was the only union, being a member of JUWATA was one of those things linked to being
employed and when one had difficulties in the work situation. The Committee itself had irregular meetings and had to be encouraged to meet by management. This did not, however, prevent the JUWATA leadership from being involved in factory affairs through membership in the different factory committees and through dealing with conciliation, settlement of disputes and intervention against unwarranted punishments and/or dismissals. The latter took up the greater part of the JUWATA leadership's time. Moreover, since the Party branch was active in presenting grievances and demands as well as holding general meetings for employees additional meetings called by JUWATA would have been seen as duplication.

The usual form of communication between union and employees was more on an informal basis; either individual workers suggested issues to the JUWATA leadership or, since the committeemen worked in the different sections, they became aware of some of the complaints of employees which they could then voice in the factory committees. Similarly, in the absence of any regular JUWATA meetings, issues discussed with management were informally communicated back to the workers by the JUWATA leadership. Much hinged around the "militancy" of the leadership - something which was shown more by the Chairman and two of the committeemen than by other leaders.

When the union leadership met it was usually to present petitions or voice complaints. Some meetings were held with members from management (either the General Manager or the Manpower and Administrative Manager, or the Personnel Officer), with the latter as invited participants who would answer questions raised or promise "to look into the matter" and report back to the union leadership. At other times the union held meetings alone, and then sent the issues to:
management.

A number of issues were covered during such meetings, as the minutes of meetings show. During the union Council meeting of 2/1/80, for example, complaints were brought by security guards concerning their section head who allegedly did not listen to their problems: that he did not accept excuses from work due to sickness; that he was inflexible in arranging the guard roster and did not listen to anybody's advice; that he was not circumspect and told off his juniors publicly; and so on. The union Council in the presence of the Personnel Officer agreed that the Chief Guard should be advised to mend his ways and that he should be instructed in leadership practices.

The 21/1/80 union Council meeting discussed services at the factory, especially soap, canteen services, workers' education and transport. Members also raised concern that they were not involved in planning for the Tenth Anniversary of the factory. As a follow-up, on 28/2/80 the Council was informed that soap would be available and that soap arrears would be paid in money; that a workers' education officer would be employed full-time to deal with raising workers' education; that a bus would be available for the evening shift; and that attention was being given to the fringe benefits (milk) for those in the Heat and Grinding Sections.

Other issues discussed at these meetings were: concern about the misuse of company cars (the head driver and Manpower and Management Officer would be invited to discuss the issue); lack of transport leading many to arrive late for work (8/7/80); complaints that some of the leaders in the company did not value JUWATA delegates; complaints that the work performance of the Accounts Office was resulting in delays in payment of loans or wages (17/10/80); discussion of the
President's speech on the need for increased discipline and to combat late arrival for work (13/11/80); and delays in purchases of materials for the factory.

The scope of these petitions and the way they were handled is illustrated by the meeting of 22/7/80, which was attended by the General Manager and the Manpower and Administrative Manager. JUWATA had five items on the agenda for this meeting which they had earlier prepared on 18/7/80. These were:

1. The termination of JUWATA's participation in interviewing prospective employees.
2. Management's failure to inform appropriate bodies of those elected for further training in the country or abroad.
3. Lack of a Chief Security Officer in the factory.
4. Workers' transfers to sections not relevant to their training or skills.
5. Workers' evening transport.

In answer to the complaints, management responded by saying that it had been management's decision to involve JUWATA in the interviews of prospective employees and it had been management's decision not to include JUWATA for they did not have the technical knowhow to select the best applicants. Management argued that it would be better to include heads of relevant sections in the interview, and that since JUWATA leaders were elected, one tended to have different persons for the committee, leading to lack of continuity. Branch leaders were in any case in the Appointment's Committee and in the Workers' Council and so they could have their voices heard.

On the question of education programmes and involving JUWATA in selection for training, no committee had been constituted yet, but
plans were in hand and the General Manager promised to follow the matter up. On transfers, management argued that they were responsible for all personnel so there was no need to consult with JUWATA. If there was a need and if it was deemed important they would do so. But this remained within managerial competence. On transport, the General Manager explained that the company did not have enough vehicles and they were waiting to buy a company bus. The Personnel Officer added that in the six months of 1980 there were only two workers who had been warned for coming late to work.

JUWATA petitioned management to send abroad some of the lower paid employees so that they might also be motivated to work hard. They also asked management to improve payment procedures, as workers were taking a long time and having difficulties in getting their wages. Management were also asked to follow up the conduct of several typists and office attendants whose work performance was wanting. The meeting ended with a call for love and cooperation between JUWATA and management over their joint decisions [Minutes of meeting].

This meeting illustrates how the union leadership related to management. The branch remained a platform for grievance and petition presentation by workers and a channel of information by management to workers without interfering with management's right to decision-making. On questions of recruitment or training, management retained its power to choose candidates. On questions related to improving services such as the issues of a regular supply of uniforms, facilitating payments of loans, and canteen or medical service improvements, the union was more successful in obtaining results. By the same token it objectively was playing the role of Assistant Personnel Officer by informing workers of management's decisions and thus reducing any
potential for friction through lack of communication.

As we shall see more fully in the next chapter, the domination of management is mitigated in issues dealing with discipline and sanctions against workers. A great part of the union leadership's activities in the factory was involved with conciliation and settling of disputes following alleged infringements of the disciplinary code. This was done by the JUWATA Subcommittee of Discipline and Economy chaired by JUWATA Chairman. Infringements of work discipline at the factory ranged from arriving late at work to absenteeism, thefts, drunkenness, failure to reach daily work quotas and bad behaviour.

Appropriate sanctions for each type of breach of work discipline are enumerated in the Appendix to the Security of Employment Act of 1964. These range from a warning to a severe warning, fine or dismissal. In Factory A, minor infringements and warnings were usually (according to the JUWATA Chairman and the Personnel Officer) dealt with on the shop floor. The foreman would talk to the concerned worker in the foreman's office in the presence of the supervisor and/or the JUWATA Departmental Representative. In the major or more serious cases, however, especially those involving serious warnings, fines or dismissals, the Personnel Office would be informed by the departmental head, thus putting into motion the conciliation/sanction machinery. The Personnel Office on behalf of the employer filled in what is known as Form 1 giving notice to the worker of the infringement of work discipline and the sort of sanction envisaged. A copy of the form would be sent to the union branch which would indicate whether it intended to defend the worker or not.

Getting a form from the Personnel Office was considered by workers as serious. This would affect one's job and jeopardise one's job
security, especially if the form involved a sanction or serious warning, a warning with a fine or dismissal. These touched either on one's job security or one's pay at the end of the month. Those served with such notices usually saw their JUWATA Departmental Representative or the JUWATA Chairman. Despite the general lack of interest in JUWATA public meetings among workers, the question of protecting one's job was very important and so recourse to the union branch when one's job was in danger was prompt. The JUWATA leadership in its turn was keen to come to the help of affected workmen.

[Summary of notices of intended sanctions issued to workers by the Personnel Office and reactions of the JUWATA branch from January 1982 to January 1983].

In the cases involving imminent dismissal or serious warning the union responded by seeking arbitration. In cases in which the intended sanction would not seriously affect the worker's job, the union would accept the discipline after checking informally with the worker and if the worker did not raise objections. Some of the cases involved workers being absent from work for four consecutive days without informing management. Even so, the union still insisted on checking the whereabouts of the workers before final action was taken by management. Contrary to suggestions that unions were tools of management, the union branch did play a defensive role, prompting management on occasion to tell the leadership that they were not there to protect indisciplined workers.

The union leadership was involved in two types of arbitration concerning breaches of the work code. The first was the factory-level arbitration in which cases for conciliation were considered every Tuesday. The Personnel Officer and his assistant would sit down with
the union sub-committee on Discipline (usually the JUWATA Chairman and the sectional representative) as arbitrators. Evidence would be sought from, for example, the time keeper (for absenteeism or being late for work) or the foreman and other witnesses for issues at the shop floor. The arbitration would be arrived at by consensus between the union representative and the Personnel Officers.

This happened for example in the case of one machine operator in December 1982, who had been given notice of dismissal for not completing work targets several times and for absenting himself from work. Evidence was given by his supervisor and fellow group workers showing which days he had not reached the required work targets; they described his constant complaints that his wage was not sufficient, his late arrivals, his neglect of work instructions and his frequent absence from the job (which meant that his fellow workers could not function, as they were working in a line of production). The Technical Manager had sent a memo to the Administrative Manager advising dismissal on those grounds. This was also discussed. For purposes of justice, the JUWATA Chairman said, the union leadership had insisted on arbitration, though the case was clearly one deserving dismissal. This was to avoid victimization or future complaints from the worker or from the Party branch leadership that the union leadership was not doing its work properly. The final decision was taken to dismiss the machine operator.

The second type of arbitration was the more formal one involving recourse to the legal procedures of a trade dispute settlement under the provisions of the Permanent Labour Tribunal Act of 1967. This arbitration was sent to the District Labour Office where a Conciliation Board sits with the District Labour Officer (or one of his deputies)
as Chairman. Other members are from industry: the factory Personnel Officer and JUWATA Chairman, the District JUWATA Chairman, and a Personnel Officer from a related enterprise. The concerned worker is a witness.

One discrepancy in the whole arbitration system was that though the union was the body entitled to raise the matter on behalf of the workman, in practice the JUWATA representatives became arbitrators with management. This, according to the JUWATA Chairman, ensured that their voice was heard. Another paradox was that the union was unlikely to make an industrial dispute out of one affected worker unless a number were touched by a case, in which case it would be forwarded to the Labour Tribunal. In this factory no cases ever reached that far. All were resolved by factory or District level arbitration whose decisions could not be reviewed in ordinary courts.

Despite those limitations, the active involvement of the union as spokesman of the workmen did on the whole make management in Factory A cautious about victimization and arbitrary sanctions or the "impetuous actions" which used to be the case in private employment. The following chapter, which includes a broader view of the way work-place organisation affect the issue of job security in our two factories, tends to confirm this conclusion.
Footnotes

1. This view was not only found in Factory A. In another factory, visited during the "exploratory research" in Tanga, one General Manager expressed the view that the workers and the Party branch leadership should not interfere with "managerial" issues: Wasiingie jikoni (lit. they should not enter the kitchen i.e. be cooks). There would be discussions in which Party branch leaders would participate, but after that the Manager becomes mnyampara (= the boss).

2. The Factory Branch Estimates of Income and Expenditure can be gleaned from the following Budget Estimates of the branch for the year 1978:

Income
- Membership fees: 1250 sh.
- Contributions by the factory football team: 1600 sh. (contribution for strengthening Party branch through matches)
- Voluntary contributions by members: 500 sh.

TOTAL: 3350 sh.

Expenditure
- Salaries for Typist, Messenger, Driver, Assistant Secretary and Secretary: 65,900 sh.
- Car transport: 15,000 sh.
- Allowances (for Party delegates attending meetings outside factory): 1700 sh.
- For Seminars in factory: 1600 sh.
- Filing Cabinets:
  - Cupboard: 8000 sh.
  - Electric kettle: 500 sh.
  - Table & 35 chairs: 3500 sh.
- Safari (= transport) for outside factory: 5000 sh.
- To welcome visitors (= entertainment) 3000 sh.
- Contingencies: 5000 sh.

This total of 117,200 sh. would be included in the total annual plan of the factory [Source: Party Branch Council Agenda of 5/11/77].

3. The case of the Tanzania Fertiliser factory in Tanga is an instance that could be cited here and on which I collected first-hand information. Since the story is worth telling at some length, it has been included as an Appendix III.
CHAPTER 6

THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION:

ISSUES AND EPISODES

The last two chapters have focused attention on the history and organisation of the main work-place agencies - the Workers' Council, union and Party - including the way employees relate to those agencies in our case-study enterprises. In this chapter we take a closer look at some key issues in the life of these factories. How these issues were confronted and resolved throws further light on the relations between the different actors in the factories. In some instances we concentrate on a single episode or sequence of events which highlights some aspects of the nature and distribution of power in the work-place. The underlying approach here is that a work-place such as a factory is not only a site for the production of goods but is also where social relations are woven between actors. The cooperation or contention, however, is between unequal parties with varying resources who struggle to advance their interests.

The issues which are considered were selected from among those that for obvious reasons are central to factory life or factory activities. The chapter looks in turn at recruitment issues, further education and training for the workforce, job security and "shady deals" and corruption in factory management. The main focus of attention is Factory A, but complementary information was also taken from Factory B. Generally, since the issues were treated in very similar ways in the two plants consideration of Factory B tends to be limited to supplementary anecdotes. Experiences from a small number of other work-places are incorporated in the same spirit.
1 RECRUITMENT ISSUES

The deterioration of living conditions in rural areas and the annual increase in the number of school leavers have been mentioned as some of the factors which have swollen the ranks of those looking for work in urban areas, especially Dar es Salaam. The shortage of wage/salary employment on a permanent basis has meant that there is a lot of competition for the few jobs especially in the unskilled categories. Under these circumstances employers do not find it difficult to hire their workforce.

In Factory A, the first batch of employees was hired through the national youth service through the Dar es Salaam Labour Bureau. But since the early 1970's the factory has had its own Personnel Department headed by a Manager who deals with the recruitment of the workforce. In the early days a number were engaged at the factory entrance on a casual basis before being hired permanently. This was also the practice at Factory B where large numbers of labourers were employed for loading and unloading of cotton bales and building materials. With the creation of the Personnel Department and with the shortage of jobs, however, the gaining of a post has to pass through several stages.

At the gates of both factories there is the usual sign Hakuna kazi (= no vacancies). Recruitment has to follow certain laid out procedures. On the basis of recruitment authority one can distinguish four basic categories among the employees:

(a) Those below 980 shillings a month (1983), who are in the province of the General Manager.
(b) Those below M.S.U. 6 - within the wage/salary scale 1085 sh. and 2345 sh. a month - who fall under the Appointments' Committee but need to be approved by the Management Committee.

(c) Those above 2240 shillings a month, who fall under the authority of the Management Committee via the N.D.C.

(d) The General Manager, who is an appointee of the President.

**Category (a):** The General Manager has the mandate to hire employees in these categories. In practice in Factory A (also in B) this function was delegated to the Personnel Office under the Manpower and Administrative Manager. The process of interviewing prospective candidates/applicants was carried out by the Personnel Officer and his two assistants; also present during the interviews was the prospective Departmental Manager or his representative. This category was composed mostly of machine operators who would be under the control of the Technical Manager. The General Manager subsequently approved the names selected by the Personnel Office. The key process in the hiring of this category of employees is the interview.

It was from these recruitment interviews that the JUWATA branch leadership was excluded in Factory A. In its meeting of 18th July 1980, the JUWATA leadership queried their exclusion from interviews when earlier they had been involved, which, they felt, meant that they were being ignored by management. The General Manager explained that JUWATA's initial inclusion in the interviews had been optional not compulsory and depended on the decision of management. In the larger factory, B, a JUWATA representative participated in the interviews of this category of workers - a measure which was a concession to the active JUWATA branch.

Employees in **Category (b)** could be employed on approval by the
Appointments' Committee composed of Departmental Managers and chaired by the General Manager. The Party and JUWATA leadership participated in the Committee's deliberations. But, according to the Party Branch Secretary, their influence was limited, as the interviews and selections had already been carried out by the Personnel Office in conjunction with individual Departmental Heads. The Committee was usually asked to confirm the appointments. (For example, the Record of Appointments Committee, Session of 6th June 1980, reads: "Committee informed of the engagement of 31 machine operators and lower staff... Committee is asked to confirm the engagement of 5 new technicians and purchase officer"). Many of the applicants in this wage/salary category are secondary school graduates with certificates from business, accounting or technical institutions (e.g. Dar es Salaam Business College, Dar School of Accountancy). What is crucial in their getting employed are their certificates. Within the Appointments Committee, the General Manager and the secretary to this Committee (the Manpower Manager) were the main actors in the decisions over selections, and also in the implementation of the decisions through sending letters.

Category (c): The third category of senior employees with salaries above 2345 shillings per month (1983) are hired by the Management Committee. This group includes the Departmental Managers and senior engineers and accountants. In practice they were posted by N.D.C. headquarters to fill the different posts initially; then when vacancies arose, management promoted existing employees to the posts. This was the case with the present Purchasing Manager, Training Officer and Cost Accountant. The Management Committee was virtually informed only of the action [Vide Annual Report of the Chairman of the Management Committee for the Year 1981, complaining of this practice]. Instead
of recommending appointments, the management had already filled the posts - a situation which was difficult to reverse. Union and Party leaders at the factory had evidently limited say, if any, in the hiring of these categories of employees, even though they participated in the sessions which confirmed the new appointments.

At the top of the factory hierarchy the General Manager, the chief executive of the enterprise, was appointed by the President. When the first General Manager in A was relieved of his job by the President after a Party probe committee on "irregularities or shady deals", he was replaced by another Presidential appointee from another factory. The Party branch and the union leadership had no role in law or in practice in this appointment.

All this points to the conclusion that the process of recruitment was in the hands of the Personnel Department which short-listed the prospective candidates for interviews and finally sent the letters for those who had been selected. The manipulation of the recruitment of the lower categories of employees was made possible as the procedures were structured in the belief that management was the competent body to deal with those issues which (like firing) were perceived to be the preserve of managerial duties. This factor contributed to the strange paradox where in recruitment management in a public factory acted in a manner very close to that of private employers.

The shortage of jobs in Dar es Salaam factories leads to competition for vacancies among existing employees looking for placements for their relatives or acquaintances. The minimum qualifications of basic literacy and physical strength necessary for the work of machine operator of lower ranks of supporting staff (e.g. cleaners, cooks, attendants) are not sufficient to differentiate applicants.
On the other hand, as we have seen, the organisation of recruitment leaves a lot of power in the hands of management, especially the Personnel and Manpower Office, with room for favouritism and corruption. This is especially true for the employment of machine operators (with so many applicants and little in terms of required qualifications).

In Factory A, there were some allegations of favouritism. Some employees believed that to get a job, "deals" and mipango (= "arrangements") were necessary; and that the technique of saying "Come tomorrow" was a hint to come with some chai (= tea) — in other words a bribe to accompany the application. Even to put in an application, it was alleged, one had to know someone in the factory hierarchy or be accompanied by a note of introduction.

In Factory B which employed a number of women in the production sections, especially in spinning, allegations of "harassment" were not uncommon during the early 1970's. This was at a time when the factory was relatively new and was recruiting large numbers. Such harassment seems to have stopped or to have been considerably reduced through complaints raised by JUWATA and Party branch leadership.

One of the usual allegations in recruitment concerns the question of "tribalism". This type of complaint was implied in the allegations of mismanagement in Factory A in 1982. The regional origins of the factory's workforce in 1982 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factory A: Regional Origins of Workforce</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morogoro 106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilimanjaro 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pwani 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanga 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbeya 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindi 41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Information read to author by Personnel Officer.
Employees from one region, Morogoro, seem to have been over-represented. It was the view of the Manpower Office that the proportion of machine operators from Morogoro region was higher than would be expected. But they argued that these had been employed earlier by Chinese technicians from the workforce who had been employed building the Tanzania-Zambia railway line. The fact, however, that the Head of the Manpower office was from that region was seen by some employees as evidence of favouritism and abuse of position. Another allegation was that it was not accidental that the second highest number of employees came from the same "home" region as the General Manager (Kilimanjaro).

But rather than necessarily implying malpractices, the allegations are more a reflection of how people actually get jobs. Information about vacancies in a factory is usually through informal channels; relatives, people from the same region/local background, or friends tell jobs seekers about potential openings long before they are actually advertised (if they ever are). Potential applicants for jobs are more likely to learn about vacancies in different factories if they have relatives, "tribesmen" or friends in management positions especially in the Personnel departments. Where competition for work is so intense it is hardly surprising if they are also more likely to be shortlisted for interviews among a host of applications, for the less skilled jobs, and more likely to be engaged.

2 FURTHER EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Acquiring further education or training becomes an important objective for those who are successful in obtaining a job in Factory A or B. Formal training and the acquisition of formal certificates
remains in Tanzania an important element in a person's life in general, and for an employee in particular. Obtaining a job and rising in one's occupation or profession is partly determined by the formal education and training one has undergone. Formal certificates can enable an employee to move to another factory or work-place or even change occupation. At another level, the acquisition of technical skills such as fitting, turning and carpentry are a means of carrying on (outside the paid employment) a part-time or self-employed activity among artisans, carpenters and technicians.

Among managerial, administrative and supervisory staff, the possession of formal certificates is also a great asset for rising up in the managerial and supervisory grades. While experience and long service is appreciated in work performance, possessors of formal certificates retain an advantage in terms of pay and rising up in the different grades. The quest for further education and training in search of skills and formal qualifications engages not only managerial staff, administrative staff, supervisors and technicians but also machine operators who would like to improve their standing in factories and increase their incomes.

Planning and selection for further training or for attendance of different courses are made at factory level and involve some of the factory's resources. This makes it one of the salient workplace issues attracting the attention of employees.

In the Technical Department of Factory A, which comprises the plant (productive) sections and the maintenance and repair sections, one could distinguish two basic skill categories among employees. There were (a) the machine operators in the materials preparation, forging and pressing sections, who were semi-skilled workers who had
learnt and acquired their skills during their apprenticeship at the factory. Most of them were primary school leavers. Conducted in Kiswahili primary schooling consists of seven years in the three R's" and elements of Tanzanian history, geography, general science, and some English. Primary education continues to function basically as a preparation for secondary and higher education for the small section of the primary school pupils who get selected for the relatively few secondary schools. The 1982 JASPA Report estimates that 95% of Standard Seven leavers would not enter secondary school in 1985/86. "The curriculum is still heavily academically biased" and the aspirations of parents, pupils and teachers is to enter secondary schools [ILO, 1982, pp. 112, 117]. It is no wonder that machine operators, most of whom were primary school leavers, expressed their desire to improve their formal education and acquire training in turning, fitting, welding, or carpentry, or as blacksmiths, electricians, or mechanics (all generally encompassed by the Kiswahili term of fundi (technician or craftsman)). These qualifications were seen as a valuable asset.

(b) The second broad skill category in the Technical Department consisted of artisans, technicians, and engineers. These were skilled workers. Many among them were primary school leavers but had acquired special skills on the job and/or had trained in one of the vocational or trade schools in the country. Skilled workers expressed the wish to get Trade Certificates or do further training in Technical Colleges. This would enhance their chances of promotion to supervisory or managerial positions. However, among those who had obtained their skills through experience and who were long-term employees of the factory, their low level of formal education in mathematics and physics was a handicap for admission to higher level courses. Secondary schooling was a prerequisite for admission to Technical College as
well as for the University of Dar es Salaam engineering courses.

In the support departments, among administrative and accounting staff, courses preferred were in administration, financing, stores management and accounting. During the late 1960's and early 1970's, the relative expansion of public sector factories and services (banking and state trading companies) had opened up opportunities for citizens with certificates, diplomas and degrees in: (a) accountancy (from e.g. the Dar es Salaam School of Accountancy, the University of Dar es Salaam, the Mzumbe Institute of Management or abroad); (b) business studies (from e.g. The Institute of Finance Management, Dar es Salaam Business College); or (c) administrative and managerial courses. The contention for managerial and supervisory posts among the middle and higher level administrative and accounting staff spilled over into the search for training or courses among this category of employees.

Education in the early post-independence period reflected the colonial legacy in respect of the absence of technical education and the dominance of productive activities which required limited technical skills and little formal education (e.g. sisal plantation workers, porters, dockworkers or construction labour). The expansion of primary schools through the Univeral Primary Education (UPE) (1974) programme, the stress placed on adult education and the expansion of secondary school and higher education places, are some of the hallmarks of the educational policies of the post-independence government. Since independence, adult education in the form of literacy classes has been an element of the educational policies of the political leadership. The education of adults and specifically the policy of workers' education and training was given a boost by
the Prime Minister's Directive of July 1973 urging the setting up of programmes for different forms of workers' education and the setting aside of funds and time for the improvement of employees' levels of education and training. Despite these efforts, however, technical education has remained limited to a few vocational and trade schools.

This situation was reflected in the training programmes of Factory A which until 1982 relied on in-plant, on-the-job courses for its machine operators for work in the plant sections. For employees in the other support departments, management organised the selection for different courses. The Manpower Development and Administrative Department Manager in liaison with the office of the General Manager selected employees for further training on courses on recommendations from sectional heads. Individual employees could apply, but applications had to be submitted through and approved by management. There was no direct involvement by the Party branch leadership or by the union in the selection and the organisation of the courses.

In Factory A, the Committee for workers' education was created in 1982. In 1981, management in conjunction with N.D.C. Headquarters had completed plans for a 1.8 million shilling plan for the construction of a Training Centre at the factory. Plans for the centre included plant-related courses (such as fitting, turning, welding, forging, electricity); managerial orientation programmes (for supervisors and managers); and general formal schooling. The latter would be the equivalent of junior and senior secondary school, but would also include special courses in mathematics, chemistry, physics and engineering. By 1983, the project had not been implemented due to the financial constraints facing the factory. Training programmes
were instead carried out with outside educational institutions. Literacy classes were being run in the CCM conference room at the factory.

A variety of employees were selected by management to undertake courses in 1980. The courses included short leadership and supervisory seminars, seminars for members of the Workers' Council on how to read a balance sheet; technical courses in engineering or trade craftsmanship; long and short study tours abroad; and courses in which only one or two employees were involved leading to certificates in accounting, nursing and office management, and diplomas in business administration, metallurgy, agricultural engineering, commerce, shorthand and social welfare. The courses which took most employees were in adult literacy (29); short courses in craftsmanship at the National Vocational Training Centre Chang'ombe (49) and political education. Except for the political education classes, the courses were organised and arranged by management [Minutes of Management Committee, Session of April 9, 1981].

Short study tours abroad were usually undertaken only by senior managers and officials of the factory. As with the other courses, management had the power to select and decide who was to go on these tours, which involved, it may be said, some economic benefits which were not necessarily less important for those selected than the educational benefits and the acquisition of new skills.

Factory A's Workers' Education Programme was initially conceived as a means of improving the workers' general technical know-how, especially among those involved in the productive sections. It was also intended that union and Party leaders would be closely involved in selecting and monitoring. However, the realisation of those
goals has been hampered by a combination of the organisation of the programmes and the prevailing values which accord remuneration and promotion on the basis of certificates. Other hindrances are not of the factory's making but reflect the nature of the country's educational systems. Thus supervisory and administrative courses for the higher level manpower are given equal if not more weight than technical courses to the lower section of the workforce. To undertake further technical training there is the barrier of prerequisite qualifications and the language in which the courses are conducted. Some of the courses merely reproduced the secondary school education which many machine operators missed but paradoxically in a way that perpetuates especially the more negative aspects of the secondary school in Tanzania.

3 JOB SECURITY

The protection of one's job is generally one of the key concerns among employees and logically one of the important aspects in the relationship between management and workers. In a situation where there is no system of social security or unemployment benefits the loss of a job assumes a further importance in workers' lives. Control over conditions or situations which relate to an employee's loss of employment is one of the aspects of factory "politics". We shall take here two aspects of the issue upon which contention or conflict tends to centre:

i) The definition of the conditions under which loss of job is considered legal and ii) the degree to which workers or their representatives can exercise power to prevent dismissals.

The definition of what constitutes just grounds for loss of
employment has been prescribed centrally in the Disciplinary Code of the Security of Employment Act 1964. This Act details the activities which are deemed to be breaches of work discipline that can lead to loss of employment. The question of lockouts by employers is similarly defined. At factory level the issue of contention tends to be whether or not a breach of discipline has occurred in a particular case.

Breaches of work discipline in Factory A were coordinated in the Manpower and Personnel Office. Late arrivals or absence from work was recorded by the time-keeper who worked at the factory gate. In the plant, foremen and supervisors monitored work performance in their sections. Infringements of work discipline as defined in the Disciplinary Code of the Security of Employment Act 1964 were recorded and the Personnel Office informed.

One of the positive effects of the above Act has been that any intended disciplinary action against a worker must involve the union branch leadership. When, in this factory, workers were given notices of warning or dismissal they usually went to see the union Chairman or the CCM Chairman (who would tell them to see the union Chairman). These were usually disposed to discuss the matter with the Personnel Office or plead for the worker. Warnings and minor reprimands on minor offences were usually resolved amicably with hardly any record kept. The presence of the union branch in that sense hindered arbitrary dismissals and victimisations. For infringements which were considered by management to be serious and as deserving dismissal, employees were suspended on half pay for six months. After the six months the suspension was without pay.

In the course of the research I came across two employees who
had been suspended for indiscipline at work. These illustrate the limited extent of the union's power in cases of suspension. One was a machine operator who had allegedly been disobedient, had absented himself from his post without permission and had not fulfilled work targets on several occasions [Employer's Notice of 16/2/83]. While the case was waiting resolution at the District Labour Conciliation Board, he remained on half pay. Even though the union leadership wanted reconciliation on grounds of hardship, for the machine operator had a family and the half pay was proving insufficient to maintain his family, management insisted on waiting for the law to take its course.

The second case was that of a secretary [Employer's Notice of 11/12/82] who normally was a hardworking Personal Secretary to the General Manager, but had not delivered an important and urgent letter from management to the Ministry of Industries as requested by the General Manager. She was suspended for this infraction and was awaiting resolution of the case. The union leadership was working for her reinstatement but could not do anything against the suspension before the long procedure of reconciliation was exhausted. Meanwhile she was on half pay and another person had taken her post. The union leadership felt that the suspension was unfair and that she should have been issued a warning instead, given her previous work record. That would have allowed her to continue working and earn her livelihood.

As ordinary courts have no jurisdiction over labour disputes there is no other recourse in such cases to appeal for justice. The secretary had to wait and undergo the long procedure so long as management was unwilling to alter the penalty of "summary dismissal".
In cases where an employee was involved in a criminal offence (such as a traffic case (for drivers) or thefts) acquittal in the courts did not guarantee reinstatement in one's job, and here again the union could not oblige the employer to reinstate the employee.

Looking at the complete picture it does seem likely that the union and Party branch leaderships contributed to reducing the instances of ill-treatment or blatant victimization either by recourse to the legal procedures or by appealing to general exhortations on the basis of "utu" or "ubinadamu" (= humanity) as expressed in the Party documents on Ujamaa and Mwongozo as a way of discouraging harshness among supervisors and managers. However, the scope of their action was circumscribed by the legal framework which left plenty of room for legal suspensions and terminations.

More generally, "job security" was a relative concept and employment remained precarious for most of the workers in our factories. This was brought home by the episodes described below in the sections on "Unexpected Compulsory Leave in Factory A" and "Redundancies in Factory B". In both cases the loss of jobs was "legal". As we shall see, in this kind of situation not only did the unions and party branches acquiesce in the move, but the presence of the union and Party branch, and the position of these organisations tended to blunt any "militancy" which might have emerged. The authorities insisted that the workers use "existing channels" in dealing with grievances. The workers' action was limited to the point beyond which they would break "the law". On the other hand, in these instances as well as in more normal times the presence of organisations pressing the workers' point of view was helpful in preventing crude treatment by management and in resolving some of the less contentious problems.
that were nonetheless important in the workers' lives.

Episode 1: Unexpected Compulsory Leave in Factory A

In August 1982, the management of Factory A, decided to send the bulk of its 661 employees on unexpected compulsory leave for two months. For at least a year the factory had been facing growing financial and technical problems. These were related to serious shortages of its essential raw materials: iron, plough parts, chemicals and dies. At the same time spare parts were also becoming difficult to secure for some of the plant's ageing machinery. These were mostly secured from abroad and since there was a general shortage of hard currency in the country for foreign purchases, the factory found it impossible to secure them. Moreover the factory had outstanding debts with several of its foreign suppliers which meant it was not able to buy goods on credit.

The factory's precarious position had been discussed in several Workers' Council meetings and the weekly Planning Committee meetings, meetings which the Chairmen of the CCM and JUWATA branches attended; but no solution seemed feasible. Since the factory usually closed in December to allow general maintenance and repair to be carried out, it was decided that the factory should close in August for the workers' annual leave and then remain closed for another month while steps were taken to procure the necessary finance to purchase the raw materials and spare parts. The second month of the lay-off would be without pay.

Workers were informed of the emergency measure in a public meeting. Those temporarily laid off were paid one monthly wage/salary and a fare to enable them to reach their home villages. The JUWATA weekly
report for the week ending 19th August 1982 reads: "Not a good week as workers were going on unexpected two months compulsory leave. Complaints could be heard from some though there was no way out of the situation". The Party branch leadership discussed the situation in its committee meeting but felt they could not do anything but accept the measure. The fact that the two organisations were informed in advance and participated in the meetings which approved the measure, pre-empted to a large extent any possible complaints they could have raised on the basis of not being informed.

Though the measure was a difficult one for the branch leadership to accept, the deeper causes lay outside the control of factory management. The factory management had reached their decision in consultation with the N.D.C., the leading agency of the parastatal sector, and in these circumstances they felt that they could not challenge the measure. Since this was a public enterprise, one could not insist, they felt, on the due benefits for temporary loss of employment. JUWATA headquarters saw the management facing a genuine dilemma, as foreign exchange shortages were affecting the whole country. There was not much that could be done.

The reaction of the workers in the plant was to grumble and to resort to their own individual strategies: many remained in Dar es Salaam doing some odd jobs they could find such as petty trading (e.g. selling vegetables or fruit) or as casual labourers on building sites. The more successful ones sought and obtained permanent alternative employment. These were "people with paper qualifications" (according to the Personnel Officer) who were the ones who left employment. When the factory reopened 50 employees did not come back. These were mostly fitters, turners, junior clerks, carpenters or service
personnel; only 3 machine operators failed to return. The majority of machine operators, many of whom may have sought but could not find alternative viable employment, returned to their jobs.

On resumption, however, some of the working conditions had changed. Subsidised meals were not re-introduced until January 1983. There were to be no overtime work and payments. To many machine operators whose average monthly overtime earnings often amounted to the equivalent of the average monthly wage of 620/=, the loss of this source of income was a serious blow, especially when the temporary halt of canteen services is also taken into account. According to the Manpower and Management Officer there was a noticeable increase in pilfering and petty thefts of factory property during this period.

The CCM branch leadership proposed stringent measures and increased vigilance in workshops and stores to protect company property - which was welcomed by the management. They also proposed a special allowance of 50/= for those in the production sections while waiting for the reopening of the canteen. This, however, was not implemented, though the suggestion hastened the opening of the canteen in January. Both proposals were supported by the union leadership as was the petition to reinstate overtime payments for those in the plant sections on the grounds that the monthly wage was not sufficient. Management argued that the financial position of the enterprise was not yet secure to reintroduce overtime payments. Overtime was still suspended in the factory as late as April 1983.

In summary, this series of related events touched on questions of job security and working conditions as well as the role of extra-factory forces. The compulsory leave was imposed in consultation with union and Party branch leadership. The fact that the measure
was taken and carried out with their involvement assisted in its being implemented rather smoothly with minimum trouble. However, the involvement of those representatives and their suggestions did not mean that they had any real control over the situation or power to extract compensation for the temporary loss of jobs and income or for the fall in earnings with the abolition of overtime payments. In this relationship management had the upper hand. Factory A was a public factory and the solution had been discussed with N.D.C. and the parent Ministry. The country's "general economic crisis" was to blame and demanding compensation from a public enterprise was not "legitimate". The only recourse was to individual strategies of survival: seek alternative employment, petty theft, pilfering or individual hardship petitions to management.

Through the intervention of the President to the Central Bank to grant the sum of 98 million T. sh. the enterprise acquired that foreign exchange to purchase the most pressing raw materials and spare parts. In other words, the temporary resolution of the issues was through the intervention of the state, which showed itself as always one of the main actors in industrial relations.

Episode 2: Redundancies in Factory B

In the early 1980's many Tanzanian factories faced acute production problems within the general economic crisis that was ushered in by the war in Uganda. Factory B did not escape that situation. The problems became particularly severe in 1982 and 1983. In a report to the Workers' Council Session 27, of July 28th to 30th, 1983, the factory's General Manager gave a detailed account of the problems that were facing the factory. In the production sections,
work targets had not been reached. While in 1979 the factory had produced above set targets and workers had earned a bonus, by 1982 spinning and weaving were now both 19 per cent below target. The mill No. III section was as much as 30 per cent below target.

In 1983 the situation deteriorated, the main problems being listed out as follows:

(i) shortage of chemicals and dyes due to foreign exchange shortages.

(ii) lack of spare parts for the production of khanga materials.

(iii) Electricity cuts (16.25 hours) and lack of water (199 hours) from the main city supplies which had had technical problems.

(iv) Constant breakdowns of machinery in the plant.

These difficulties had led to falls in the quantity and quality of goods. Sales had also decreased at a time when the factory was incurring higher costs due to the rise in the price of raw cotton in July 1983 from 15/=60 to 19/=50 per kilogram.

All new recruitment of labour was stopped in an effort to reduce costs. When this could not substantially improve the factory's situation, the Board of Directors of TEXCO, the holding company, opted for a reduction of the workforce. Out of the total workforce of 5,100 in March 1983, 475 employees were to be declared redundant and laid off. Instead of the former four shifts, the factory was to have three shifts per week. This important decision affecting such an important state textile mill was communicated to government.

Different agencies in the factory were informed of the decision. This included the Workers' Council, the JUWATA branch leadership and the CCM branch leadership. These were asked to consider the best ways to effect the redundancies. The criteria which were agreed
upon between management and the workers' representatives, including Regional and District JUWATA officials, were to take into account good work record, length of service and importance of the job.

Each department was to face a 22% reduction of its employees. Those laid off were paid one month's wages; 7 days of their entitled 28 days annual leave; and fares to reach their home areas. They were also entitled to take their National Provident Fund contributions. Those who did not meet the agreed criteria and were selected for redundancy were mostly machine operators in the Technical Department but also included some members of the subordinate staff from other departments including clerks.

During the implementation of the exercise a number of the laid-off workers were naturally disgruntled at the loss of their jobs and allegations of nepotism and favouritism were echoed against management. Some of them were also unhappy about the whole question of the redundancies and tried to present their case to JUWATA headquarters or talk to the news media. But such ad hoc actions were to have limited impact despite the Party sending a probe team. While the latter found minor irregularities in the selection of some of those who were laid off, the basic desirability of the redundancies was not questioned. According to the Personnel Officer, the different workers' organisations were involved and informed of the reasons for the redundancies - the severe situation facing the factory. Participating in the Workers' Council session (April 1983), the CCM Branch Chairman in the closing speech exhorted participants to educate workers to face the difficult economic situation in the country; he asked management to be considerate in their dealings with employees and commended JUWATA leadership for being firm against those engaged in
intrigues to give a bad image of the enterprise.

One element revealed by the event is the relatively ad hoc positions in which workers found themselves despite having organisations to represent them. Some of the workers who had been declared redundant went to complain to the Permanent Labour Tribunal, but they were not supported by the JUWATA branch at the factory. They were told that they had not followed the laid down procedure of presenting their grievances which was to have been through their JUWATA branch.

On the other hand, the acquiescence of the union and Party branch leaderships was more the result of conditions (political and economic) which weighed against any options they could contemplate than of any alleged cooption of the union leadership by the management. Security of employment, as emphasised above, remained relative and dependent on management, who themselves were under strong pressure from the holding company and the general economic situation. In these circumstances JUWATA through the branch leadership could do little else than help in the smooth carrying out of the operation by focusing on minor aspects such as victimization in the redundancy exercise.

4 CORRUPTION AND "SHADY DEALS"

During 1982 a number of complaints and accusations were circulating in Factory A concerning the conduct of members of the management. The charges levelled against the General Manager and some of his subordinates included corruption; misuse of company property; "shady deals" in the sale of products; and corrupt purchases. Many of these complaints and charges had reached the N.D.C. headquarters and the Anti-Corruption Agency from employees who had secretly written to those bodies. The General Manager became aware of these allegations
and decided to call meetings with different sections of the enterprise.

In August and September management held a number of meetings (with which the Chairmen of the CCM branch and JUWATA were associated) to discuss and sort out the allegations. On August 31st, 1982, a special committee was created by the General Manager to deal with the allegations. The special committee was chaired by the CCM branch Chairman; the secretary was the Marketing Manager; other members were: the Technical Manager, the Administrative Manager, the Purchase Manager and the Chief Accountant. The committee was to study the complaints and allegations and report their findings to the General Manager.

Among the allegations levelled against management were:

(i) **Shady sales to private traders.** Government directives laid down that products of the company were to be sold to Regional Trading Companies. The committee was informed by the Marketing Manager that for the more important products such as hoes and plough parts, the government policy and directives had been followed. On other smaller products such as adzes, since these could be sold to private dealers, there were no misdemeanours. Moreover, it was argued, Regional Trading Companies and cooperatives bought on credit, while private dealers paid cash. (The regions owed the company more than 33 million shillings, the General Manager later claimed.) The Marketing Manager also had discretion to sell some of the goods outside the stipulated allocations provided this did not disturb the sales programmes and give rise to marketeering by private channels.

(ii) **Corrupt deals with some foreign suppliers.** Management and the General Manager in particular, was accused of gaining unfairly by purchasing some spares and materials from overseas suppliers.
Management explained that the purchase of those items from sources other than China arose from the difficult financial position which the company had faced which meant that it could not be supplied with materials in the normal way. The said suppliers were willing to supply the products needed on credit. Higher bodies outside the factory (e.g. the Central Bank and relevant Tanzanian embassy) had been consulted before the company made the decision.

(iii) "Suspicious gifts". It had been suggested that the General Manager was giving corruptly acquired cars to managers. The committee was informed that the three small cars and a lorry were free gifts from a supplier to the company, which had had problems with transport for collecting goods from the port and for the daily work of the managers. There were no grounds to refuse those gifts.

(iv) Misuse of company vehicles. This allegation was denied and the committee concluded that on the whole company cars, whether the self-driven ones assigned to some managers or those in the transport "pool", were used well and for official purposes.

(v) Malpractices related to recruitment were denied. The problems arose from many employees (including some leaders) asking for places for their relatives. Since there were not always enough places to hire all the people involved, this gave rise to the complaints and allegations.

(vi) "Private projects". It had been alleged that the Technical Manager had a number of private projects involving the use of company goods. This was denied. The allegations, the committee was informed, arose from internal conflicts and jealousies within the Technical Department where some engineers despised their Manager, claiming that they were better trained than he was and that their suggestions were
not taken into account, leading to some of the plant machinery to break down.

The factory probe, after going through the books, and relevant documents and interviewing some of the officials, found no evidence of misdemeanour. Six months later, however, the same allegations resurfaced in a number of newspaper reports [Daily News, March 15th and 19th, 1983; Uhuru, Machi 19, 1983]. Individual workers had written confidentially to the national Party leaders and the Commission of Enquiry. The Party National Executive Council (N.E.C.) decided to institute a probe team to investigate the allegations on shady sales contrary to Party policy and government directives.

The probe team was composed of members of the National Executive Council (N.E.C.). The Prime Minister and the Party Secretary-General revealed some of the findings of the probe team. The factory had followed directives on marketing products through R.T.C.'s but had sold some goods especially in some regions on the borders through private traders. In fact, sales to private traders had amounted to 41.83% of all sales in 1982. Moreover the company Cooperative shop had sold to private traders goods worth 3/= million sh. Employees had bought hoes worth "thousands of shillings" contrary to laid-out procedures – a fact that indicated that they were sold at hiked prices.

The Party Secretary-General talking to the CCM branch leadership and members of the enterprise shop wondered whether the Party leadership was not really aware of those malpractices and asked how they could allow such serious practices to occur before their very eyes – questions which were greeted by silence by the branch leadership. The Party Secretary-General admonished the Party members to be more vigilant in the future.
The result of the probe, some weeks later, was a shake-up of management. The General Manager was relieved of his post after almost 15 years in the job. Two other executives were also sacked [Daily News, July 11th, 1983] during the nationwide anti-racketeer campaign.

The issues raised by this episode relate to the control of managerial activities in public enterprises, and to the power of the Party branch leadership. Despite the Secretary General's exhortation to the branch leadership to be more vigilant in the future and not allow such malpractices, the organisation of the factory was ambiguous on their practical role and how they were expected to control management's activities. During the days of the political commissars they could have monitored what was going on and reported to higher authorities, but with the new set-up which involved them in managerial decisions they tended to become accessories to any questionable activities. Since managerial decisions were confidential and not to be divulged to the workforce, any organised control over factory management could only come from outside bodies such as the National Executive Council (N.E.C.). Any input by the workforce as a whole to the branch leadership, which was supposed to represent the workers, was curtailed. The allegations made against the management of Factory A were resolved eventually by the intervention of higher bodies. Management had tried to utilise its position in the factory investigation to clear the accusations by involving the Party branch leadership in the investigation. There was no real organised follow-up of the allegations by employees. In the resolution of the issues, the employees were mainly reduced to silent spectators of a drama between factory management and higher political authorities in the
Party and government.

"Corruption" as the use of public office or public resources contrary to public objectives and principles for private benefit is an issue which has touched public administration and public sector factories generally. Two factors may be advanced as contributing to corruption in public sector factories: (a) the lack of systematic control from the political leadership and (b) the lack of control or monitoring at the base. This leaves management with power to allocate and dispose of resources for private ends. Although it has the objective of enhancing one's income or that of associates, "corruption" has the contradictory effect of damaging the economic condition of the very enterprise on which the employment and incomes of managers depends.

It was argued earlier in this thesis that one of the objectives pursued in the creation of the public sector in Tanzania was to provide a basis for national and social integration. The retention of some sectors in state hands for the common good would enhance societal integration, legitimacy and therefore societal stability. The emergence of "corrupt practices", occasioned partly by lack of public monitoring, threatens therefore to frustrate one of the objectives of the public sector. That "corruption" as a social phenomenon leads to social discontent is shown by the popularity of the "crackdown" on racketeers, price hikers etc. which was attempted in 1983.

Information from other workplaces suggests that the use of managerial position to enhance incomes and give favours to other people was practised in other public sector enterprises than Factory A, and indeed that it was present in not a few enterprises. In 1982 and 1983 publicised instances of "corruption" and "malpractices"
among parastal management reached alarming proportions. These practices became much more visible given the shortages of goods and services in the general economic crisis of the early 1980's. A campaign was launched by the government in an attempt to crackdown on racketeers, price hikers and smugglers.

On 1st April, 1983, the President officially announced that a crackdown on economic saboteurs had silently started in March. Two kinds of culprits were to be arrested: (a) those who bought goods in bulk (often from parastatal enterprises) and hoarded them for future sale at hiked prices; and (b) those who dealt in illegal transactions of foreign currencies and indulged in the smuggling of goods in and out of the country.

During the months following the launching of the campaign, daily reports of those arrested showed the socio-occupational categories from whom most of the alleged culprits were drawn as the following news items show:

*Daily News, May 23, 1983:* Acting Regional Manager of the parastatal shoe company Bora, arrested for allegedly creating artificial shortages of shoes, bicycle tyres and tubes worth one million shillings.

Regional State Trading Company Administrative Manager arrested for selling goods to racketeers.

*Daily News, May 25, 1983:* Fourteen employees of the National Distributors (parastatal distributors) in Dar es Salaam accused of stealing sugar worth 6.5 million shillings.


Daily News, June 4, 1983: Regional Trading Manager (Coast) and Marketing Manager arrested for selling goods worth 16 million shillings to racketeers.


Daily News, June 14, 1983: National Chairman of JUWATA and a District Party Secretary accused of illegal foreign currency transactions.

On June 4, 1983, the then Prime Minister was reported as saying that out of the 1,300 up to that time arrested 50 per cent were businessmen, 30 per cent were unlicensed speculators and the rest were government or parastatal employees who collaborated with those racketeers and saboteurs.

The illegal activities often involved the distribution of essential consumer goods, such as maize flour, rice, sugar, textile products and soap, which were handled by parastatal organisations often retaining a monopoly over the product. As in the productive enterprises or factories, management retained control over marketing and distribution activities with limited opportunity for union Party branch scrutiny or supervision. Management could use their position to their personal advantage without control from "below". Accountability only emanated from the top echelons of government as was the case in the campaign.

A specially appointed tribunal was set up to try offenders. Those appointed by the President to sit on it included a Regional Party Chairman, a National Executive member, three judges, a former Inspector-General of Police, a Personnel Manager of a hotel (former Regional Commissioner and former Manager of a cigarette company). Initially popularly welcome, the campaign had lost momentum within a year. One of the problems seems to have been the limited input
from work-place organisations. The whole process was centralised in the Tribunals: once again accountability was enforced vertically from "above".
Footnotes

1. "Tribalism" is presumed to occur between people who come or whose parents came from the same district or region. "Ndugunisation", from ndugu (= relative) is nepotism.

2. In the early 1980's a number of scandals involving high government and Party officials attracted public attention. Mlimuka and Kabudi [in Shivji (ed.), 1985] have documented a number involving the dramatic removal of a Regional Commissioner; a Government Minister and a General Manager; the "irregular" sale of a ship to a private company; and "frauds" at parastatal stationery company (pp.76-79).
CONCLUSION

This conclusion summarises the theoretical and empirical findings which emerge from our study of the politics of participation in public sector factories in Tanzania since 1967. The thesis set out to examine industrial relations in Tanzanian public factories: the power relations between management and workers; the decision-making and implementation processes; and the way management and workers articulate their membership of work-place organisation such as the Workers' Councils, Party branch and trade union, to deal with factory issues.

Adopting a historical approach to the study of industrial relations, as opposed to the conventional approach which tends to consider local level relations outside their broad context, this investigation was placed in the changing economic and political context of Tanzania. To make it possible to relate local-level processes to those at the national level, the first three chapters of the thesis explored salient features of Tanzania's economic and political transformation, including the nature of the state and its policies for industrial relations.

In examining this wider context of change, the study opted for an approach which eschews a priori and economic reductionist perspectives on the state and state policies. Inspired by perspectives such as those suggested recently by Mouzelis and others, the approach adopted was one which, while not neglecting the ways in which the state and politics are constrained by the nature of the socio-economic system in a society, tries to consider also the non-economic dimensions of state activities and state policies and sources of political power. A feature of this approach is that it tries to identify empirically the relationship between the political and
the economic — granted that state policies and actions are moulded not only by the shape of the economy, the structure of class domination etc., but also by the nature of the system of political domination and by the structure of the state — the type of party organisation, type of administration and so on — and by the specifically political objectives of those in power.

Within the above general framework Chapters 2 and 3 discussed the orientation of the political leadership, the organisation of decision-making and implementation in the Tanzanian political system, and state (especially labour) policies after independence. These were seen as attempts by the political leadership to institute a corporatist political system in the pursuit of societal integration, national security and national consensus. This system was characterised by the twin features of centralised political control and domination and regulated popular participation. These factors, we argued, have their echoes in work-place relations, which were the focus of attention in Chapters 4 to 6.

The approach adopted in the second part of the thesis stemmed from a rejection of structural determinist approaches which tend to downplay and pre-judge the interplay between dominant and dominated groups. We tried to develop an "action-oriented" approach which took into account not only the structural conditions of factories (dependent industry and technology, limited workers' skills, limited employment opportunities and hierarchical formal organisations) but also the way enterprise actors with differential resources utilised situations and articulated their relationships to organisations, which in turn were viewed as resources or areas of contention.

From the case material we cannot draw any firm general conclusions
about work relations and the organisation of management and participation in Tanzania's public sector factories. Nevertheless our cases do point to some provisional findings, suggesting hypotheses which might be pursued in further work. This is the case on at least three levels.

Beginning, so to speak, from the top, our cases suggest that control of public enterprises by the national political leadership is uneven. The political leadership have control over the appointment of top managerial personnel and the determination of wages/salary scales and output prices. They also control the workers' organisations via labour legislation and politically by a combination of general calls for unity, peace and cooperation and occasional direct interventions. However, as far as management is concerned this control is not altogether effective. In the absence of local-level political monitoring, as was attempted during the "political commissars experiment" of the mid-1970's, practices are able to arise in which managers dispose of publicly-owned resources as if they were their own private property and/or exploit their authority for private individual ends (i.e. "corruption"). Needless to say, this has negative developmental implications for the public sector and also generates social discontent and instability.

This finding has a bearing on our criticism of reductionist approaches to the relation between economic and political power. As just described, the relationship between the national political leadership and public sector management in Tanzania is one which is not illuminated by the concept of "state bourgeoisie" which deliberately conflates the two sorts of power. The source of management's power is control of economic and technical resources, in contrast
to the politicians' power which is based on state power, the control of the means of coercion and legitimation. The complexities, tensions and nuances involved stem from the different situations, perspectives and motivations of the two groups.

On a second level, we have found that workers' influence on decision-making is very limited, but chiefly for reasons other than those emphasised in the literature. In our case study factories, management retained power of decision-making and implementation over all the central factory issues: employment of personnel, promotion, training, planning and organising production, marketing, and so on. By judicious intervention in the state-sponsored work-place organisations they attempted to retain control of them and were generally successful. Meetings with union and party branch leaders were held mainly to inform the latter about decisions already made by management. Their influence was more marked on matters relating to social services: suggestions concerning loans, canteen issues and transport. The existence of work-place organisations and the controlled participation of workers' representatives did have the effect of limiting the crude power of management in cases where victimization might occur. Given existing legislation on issues concerning disciplinary matters, union representatives had to be consulted and their views taken into account. Other normative pressures, for fair play based on the values of ujamaa and haki (= justice) and against unyampara (= authoritarianism) or kunyanyasa (= denigrate, despise), were sometimes helpful. Workers' representatives participated in several enterprise organisations (not as a united body, in contrast to management who were united), but often the key decisions had been previously taken by management. The role employees had was limited to being informed and giving
suggestions which management could accept or reject.

It cannot be assumed, however, that this result was inevitable given the nature of the work-place institutions themselves. Other, powerful factors were operating against a more meaningful participation by workers. The work context in the case-study enterprises is characterised by dependent industry and technology, a numerically small workforce in the urban context with limited skills. Given the difficult economic situation of the early 1980's, with shortages and problems facing industries and increasingly limited political space, workers were obliged to adopt strategies of silent resistance - what Cohen [1980] has called "hidden forms of resistance" - such as udomokzi (= thefts), absenteeism, or udegea (= go slow); or else to pursue individual approaches to management personnel. This was more an appreciation of existing conjunctural realities than the result of being hoodwinked, or "bought off", by organisational structures as suggested by overdeterministic or overstructuralist interpretations.

At a third analytical level, the study suggests that the role of factory organisations remains ambiguous. Writings on union and Party branches have tended to see these as instruments in the hands of management, or as under the control of the petty-bourgeoisie, to enhance productivity and industrial peace by coopting workers into "the system". Our study indicates that the Workers' Councils and the Party and union branches remain arenas of contention. For management, the factory organisations were considered as useful for mobilising workers towards production and increased efficiency and as avenues for informing the workforce and maintaining industrial peace. For the workforce, they were considered as a means of advancing petitions and redressing grievances - as resources for advancing their interests.
The contradictions of controlled workers' organisations (which on the one hand are seen as means of advancing workers' interests, while on the other serving as agencies for assisting management) lead to an ambivalent position for the Party and union leaderships. Party and union branches were often identified with the branch leaderships by employees; employees tended to relate to party and union branch in an "instrumentalist" fashion, more as a means of advancing private, individual goals than as avenues for collective pursuits. When there was an increasing discrepancy between what was spoken and what was realised through the organisations, a tendency towards apathy and disillusionment set in, manifesting itself in a growing lack of interest in attending meetings.

The incorporation pressures exerted by management were not always entirely successful, however, and it cannot be said that a submissive workforce is an inevitable result or characteristic of trade union practice in Tanzania. Local-level relationships such as those which we could discern in the public factory situation reveal the ambiguities and ambivalences of corporatist-type political system. In a more favourable conjunctural setting these could be expected to be revealed in a significantly different pattern of management/worker relations.

What does all this suggest for future research? The abandonment of structural deductionist and economic reductionist approaches opens up not only the relation between management and workers, but also other work-place relationships as real issues for investigation that would facilitate the building of a more comprehensive picture of the politics of participation through more local-level studies focusing on actual processes rather than formal structures. Such studies could take into consideration variations between work-places in
technology; by sector (e.g. health, education, transport); by region, etc.

It follows from this that it is not enough to see national level processes: we need more local-level, small-scale studies, such as studies of factories, if we are to gain increased understanding of the way national political processes affect those local-level relations and the way people cope with the situations created by particular historical conjunctures. It is still true, however, that small-scale processes need to be related to national contexts, and improvements are needed in the way we go about analysing these. The abandonment of economic reductionism is a fruitful starting point but this line of investigation needs to be taken further to develop a better understanding of the relationship between the different irreducible levels of structure and of action.
Appendix I
Exploratory Research

As mentioned in the Introduction, I collaborated with Dr. Harry Goulbourne in a research on Labour, Party and Ideology in the Socialist Construction of Tanzania, 1967-77. This was intended to get a better understanding of the meaning of Party Supremacy and the position of the Party in the country's socio-economic transformation. We carried out a number of interviews with political personalities; gained access to the National Executive Council and Central Committee Confidential Minutes at Dodoma CCM Headquarters and in collaboration with a number of students then at the University of Dar es Salaam made newspaper summaries; interviewed management and Party leaders in four factories in Tanga (The Fertiliser Company, The Steel Rolling Mill, Saw Mills, and Ngomeni Sisal and Rope Factory) and interviewed officials at the Regional JUWATA office, Tanga. I participated in a Symposium on "The Role of Unions in Ujamaa Construction" held at the University of Dar es Salaam in January 1980, when I met trade union leaders. I also attended JUWATA General Council Meetings and the 1982 CCM Electoral Conference as an observer.

Among political personalities who were interviewed by Goulbourne and myself on the History and Activities of the Party and the achievements and the tasks ahead for the Party were:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
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<tr>
<td>Msekwa, P.</td>
<td>National Executive Secretary then</td>
<td>11.9.79</td>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ditopile, U.</td>
<td>Principal Assistant Secretary and Head of Research</td>
<td>13.9.79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mhaville, J.</td>
<td>Regional Commissioner and former TANU National Executive Secretary</td>
<td>13;19.9.79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mlaki, C.</td>
<td>Head of Finance Planning CCM Headquarters</td>
<td>15;16.9.79</td>
<td>Dodoma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muro, D.</td>
<td>Head, Foreign Affairs Department, CCM</td>
<td>15.9.79</td>
<td>Dodoma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ngombale-Mwiru</td>
<td>Regional Commissioner</td>
<td>16.10.79</td>
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<td>Nkurlu, M.</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
<td>16.10.79</td>
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<td>Ng'hwaya, S.</td>
<td>Uhuru/Mzalendo newspapers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wambura, R.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Msindai, I.</td>
<td>Head, Regional Personnel CCM Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kawawa, R.M.</td>
<td>Member of NEC and CC of CCM</td>
<td>17.10.79</td>
<td>Dodoma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kyulule, L.</td>
<td>Head, Dept. of Political Education</td>
<td>17.9.79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lindi, J.</td>
<td>Head of Audit, CCM</td>
<td>17.9.79</td>
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<td>Mapunda, G.</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td></td>
<td>former Minister of Labour</td>
<td>18; 19.10.79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mbutu, J.</td>
<td>Principal Assistant Secretary (Administration)</td>
<td>20; 21.9.79</td>
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<td>Mponda, A.</td>
<td>Regional JUWATA Secretary</td>
<td>1.1.80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wamba, R.</td>
<td>Regional Research Officer JUWATA</td>
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<td>Chambaka</td>
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<td>Mapunda, Z.</td>
<td>Personnel Officer Steel Rolling Mills</td>
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<td>Mettah, J.</td>
<td>Personnel Manager and Acting General Manager, Tanga Fertiliser Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stevens</td>
<td>Personnel Officer, Tanga Fertiliser Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saite, G.</td>
<td>General Manager, Rope Factory (Tanga)</td>
<td>4.1.80</td>
<td>Tanga</td>
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APPENDIX II

GUIDE QUESTIONNAIRES

As stated in the Introduction, one of the techniques relied upon was in-depth interviews with various actors in the factory. I chose the in-depth interview for its advantages in flexibility. Through the in-depth interview I was able to discuss issues, reformulate questions which were not understood, follow up interesting answers with further questions and so on.

I had a list of issues and topics which I wanted to cover in the interviews. These were written on three pages and I would fill in the information as the "conversation" progressed. I also filled in as soon as possible after every interview some of the information I had not been able to note down during the interview. When I introduced myself, I told informants I was writing a history about workers in public enterprises.

(a) Guide Questionnaire for Employees
1. Age, sex; place of birth; parent's home and occupation; marital status; number of children; the number of dependents.
2. Formal Education and Training.
4. What is his actual job now? Who is his leader in the work? Who arranges his work?
5. Income (pay, allowances, overtimes); does he have a shamba-(farming plot)? Does he have any activity to augment income? (e.g. small petty business, who runs the trade when he is at work?).
6. Do you have a house to let?

7. What is the occupation of his/her spouse?

8. What is the job of his dependants who are in town?

9. Has he borrowed from the employer, the credit union or other people? (Who?).

10. Has he lent anyone money? Who? How much? When in need of money, where does he go for help?

11. Where does he stay in town and the type of house? Is there water and electricity? How much does he pay every month? How did he gain access to house (rooms)? Who introduced him?

12. Transport to and from work.

13. CCM Membership
   His membership in the Party (TANU and CCM). When did he join? What attracted or made him join? Does he have any leadership position in the Party? Is he a member of the People's Militia? How much do you contribute every month? Does he attend meetings? What is discussed in those meetings. Who is his CCM representative? The Chairman of the Branch? Do you have contact with him? Have you ever gone to the Party branch or to your representative in the factory? What was the issue? How was it resolved? What does the Party branch in the factory deal with?

14. JUWATA Membership
   Are you a member of JUWATA? When did you join? What led you to join? How much do you contribute every month? Who is your representative or Chairman of JUWATA? Have you ever contacted them for an issue? Which issue? What does JUWATA in the Factory do? Have you attended meetings of JUWATA at the factory? What do those meetings deal with? What do you think of JUWATA?
15. **Workers' Council Activities**

Do you know any members of the Workers' Council? What does the Workers' Council deal with? Have you ever suggested anything to the Workers' Council?

16. How do you find the life of a worker?

**(b) Guide Questionnaires for Members of Management**

Questions 11 to 16 above plus the following additional questions:

1. **General information** about the factory (workforce, history of the factory, services programmes).

2. **On their own work** and in the execution of their duties how did they relate to Party branch and union at the factory; What did they think about it?

3. What they thought about the Workers' Participation Programmes.

**(c) Guide Questionnaire for Party and Union Leaders**

As for employees, plus the additional questions:

1. History of the organisation at the factory.

2. How was the branch organised?

3. What activities were carried out in the factory? How do they relate to management of the factory.

4. How did they assess the membership in relation to the organisation. Who are the members?

5. Do you inform workers what is decided in the Workers' Councils etc.?

6. Any suggestions by workers to the various sittings.

7. What did they think of the Workers' Participation Programmes?
Appendix III

Conflict between Party Branch and Management at the Tanzania Fertiliser Factory - Tanga

Drawing on information gathered during the "exploratory research", this appendix reports the events in the Tanzania Fertiliser factory in 1976, which illustrates some of the ambivalence which existed between management and the Party and union branches in Tanzanian factories during the time of the experiment with the post of Political Commissar between 1975 and 1978.

The Tanzania Fertiliser Company (T.F.C.), unlike Factory A or B, was a jointly-owned enterprise between the National Development Corporation which owned 60 per cent of the shares and Klockner Industrie Company of West Germany owning 40 per cent. Completed in 1972, the factory was operating under a 5-year (renewable) management agreement through which top management as well as machinery were to be supplied by Klockner. In 1972, for example, there were 43 expatriate staff manning the key posts of General Manager, Technical, Electrical and Production Engineers, Finance Manager and Marketing Manager. By 1980, the number of expatriates was reduced to 17 and some of the senior posts (Personnel Administration, Finance and Marketing) were localised through various training programmes in Tanzania and abroad or on the job training schemes using senior staff.

The enterprise commenced with a total workforce of 500 permanent employees and by 1980 this had risen to 730 permanent workers and a fluctuating number of about 150 casual workers engaged in seasonal jobs such as off-loading of raw materials, or as labourers and helpers to masons.
One conspicuous feature of the work setting in this factory was the presence of expatriate staff who held the managerial and supervisory positions in the different departments. The differences with local employees were exasperated by differences in income, with the expatriate staff receiving over and above the basic salary linked to their posts an untaxed inducement allowance of 75 per cent of basic salary. Expatriates were also given a fully furnished house, to which only a few of the local senior staff were entitled.

When the factory began production in 1972, 34 of the workers, mainly machine operators and clerks, were members of the Party. In June they opened a factory Party branch. By 1974 the branch had 420 card carrying members and carried out its activities in an office within the factory compound given to it by the management.

The chair of the branch passed from the original Chairman, who was a security guard foreman, to a production clerk in 1974 and a medical assistant in 1979. During most of this time the branch Secretary was the Personnel Officer, and between 1976 and 1979 he was also acting Chairman of the branch when the production clerk was transferred. In 1975, however, a Political Commissar was appointed from the Party Headquarters to be the Party Branch Secretary.

According to the Administrative Manager, the post of Political Commissar heralded a period of some confusion since the post was not well defined in terms of the factory set-up. The Commissar attended management meetings and those of the Workers' Council. With expatriate management this created some tension and friction. Initially expatriate management had worked peacefully with a Party leadership which worked to boost work morale as well as push for services (such as a canteen and transport). It had served as a source of advice
to management on issues and problems affecting local staff. However, when the Party and union branches under the Commissar began to deal closely with the utilisation of company property and the issue of local staff training, tension and conflict came into the open.

The union branch at the factory was as old as the factory; a Workers' Committee was formed straight away through the encouragement of the District Union Secretary. The Chairman was a senior operator who acted also as a supervisor. The Secretary was a laboratory supervisor. Other members of the union leadership were drawn from among middle rank supervisory employees in different departments. Over a number of years, leadership and membership in the Party and union branches became an important resource for local personnel to advance their interests in competition with a largely expatriate management and senior technicians.

In April 1976, the Political Commissar of the fertiliser company revealed to the Press a number of irregularities taking place at the factory [Sunday News, 4 April, 1976]. As Party Branch Secretary he revealed that the company was in serious economic trouble brought about by gross mismanagement. He alleged that there was: financial mismanagement brought about by lack of proper accounting procedures; extravagant use of public property; and economic sabotage shown by the stoppage of factory production bringing losses amounting to 150,000 shillings. In general, the Party Secretary revealed to the Press, there was no proper programme to train local expertise in engineering, thus keeping the factory under expatriate managerial and technical control. He concluded his allegations by stating that employees in the factory were no longer keen on their work and that
the factory was in danger of collapsing. He called for a probe committee to investigate the company's situation and rectify the managerial malpractices.

These press reports irritated management, who retorted that these were unfair allegations and arose from the Party and union leadership interfering in managerial duties which was not their function. Management understood the function of those agencies as consisting in helping in the smooth operation at the work-place, informing management on issues which might be sensitive for an expatriate management which might not be aware of local cultural practices and to be a link between management and the workforce. Their job was not to "put their noses in everything". That was interference.

As for the Party branch leadership at this time, they perceived their function in patriotic terms - as the national watchdog on what was happening at the factory. Their action was covered by the meaning of "Party Supremacy" whereby the Party had to supervise the implementation of national policies and the proper utilisation of public property and finances. The Party leadership saw it as its duty to see to it that there was a localisation programme for the managerial and technical posts at the factory. The presence of expatriate personnel was fertile ground for some of the local skilled personnel to agitate for the posts, and this was done through the Party and union branches - activities which would, naturally, make the expatriate technicians feel threatened.

To resolve the crisis which was threatening to engulf one of the important manufacturing industries in the country an investigative team was formed from the national Party headquarters. The team was chaired by a member of the Party's Central Committee and a Secretary
from the Party Secretariat. Other members of the team were the Minister for Industries; an economist from State House (the President's office); the Commissioner for Industries, and an N.D.C. representative.

The team discussed with Party leaders in the region including the Regional Party Secretary, District Party Chairman and District Member of Parliament. The team then went to the factory and discussed with management and Party leaders at the factory.

Some of the problems at the factory were related to the management contract between N.D.C. and Klockner Industrie in the creation of the enterprise. The terms of the contract gave a lot of powers to the partners of N.D.C. One of the findings of the team was on the relationship between management and Party leadership at the factory. The team stated that the branch leadership had the right to know and to be informed what was going on in the factory. The presence of Party leadership was a fairly new innovation and all parties in parastatal enterprises had to adjust to forms of collective leadership.

However, the institutional set-up left power of decision-making and implementation with management, making the Party leadership's position ambiguous. In a case of local management, as in Factories A and B, this ambiguity could be fudged by the General Manager himself being the Chairman of the Party branch or using his influence in Party sessions. But the ambiguous role of the Party branch in management affairs was much more glaring in the presence of expatriate (non-Party member) management as was the case of T.F.C.
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