The Anglican Church in the period of the Cold War: 1945-55

being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of Phd

in the University of Hull

by

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October 1990.
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Preface

Many people have contributed to this work. I owe a great deal of thanks to the many libraries and archives at which I spent a great deal of time and where the staff were invariably friendly and helpful. In particular I wish to mention the staff at the Public Record Office at Kew, at Lambeth Palace library, including the archivist of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations, at Christ Church, Oxford, at York Minster library and at Walworth Road. Helpful above and beyond the call of duty was Naomi Linell, the archivist at Kent University, where reside the papers of Hewlett Johnson, the Dean of Canterbury. Ms Linell not only allowed me free reign amongst the whole collection of papers, many of which were unindexed, but provided me with access to her own early work on the Dean.

I am indebted to a large number of individuals who generously gave of their time to recall for me their experiences and impressions of the period. In this respect I wish to thank C Abramsky, RA Bird, Anthony Montague Brown, Canon Edward Charles, AT D'Eye, Stanley Forman, Jack Gaster, Reverend Hinkes, Alger Hiss, Avis Hutt, Father Gresham Kirkby, Major General Lascelles, Kenneth Leech, John Little, Patrick Mendies, Professor Needham, Ian Mikardo M.P., Laurence Otter, Andrew Rothstein, John Rowe, and Mrs Ray Waterman.

I also wish to thank those who provided bed and board during the extensive period of my research, especially John and Renie Harrington, Robert Crothers, Tanya Rose, Irving Stone, John Williams and Constance Saville.
I want to thank the academic and administrative staff of the American Studies Department at the University of Hull for putting up with me for so long, particularly Dustin Mirick and Louis Billington, and the Departmental Secretary, Brenda West. I owe a great deal to my supervisor, John Saville, without whose determination and faith in the whole project, this work would not have come to fruition.

Finally, I owe an incalculable amount to my parents who without ever really understanding what I was doing, or why, were nevertheless always there.

Dianne Kirby,
September 1990.
Introduction

At the end of World War II the Western Allies were seeking to achieve precisely what they had sought to achieve at the end of World War I, the restoration and stabilisation of an old order convulsed by war and threatened by the radicalism fostered by war. This endeavour took many different forms which involved confrontation with the Soviet Union at many different points and set in motion a dialectic of escalation and counter-escalation.

Ever since the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917, anti-Communism has been a crucial factor, of profound implications, in the political affairs of the Western nations. Professor Arno Mayer has noted that "the Paris Peace Conference made a host of decisions, all of which in varying degrees, were designed to check Bolshevism."(1) Anti-Communism was a central element in the diplomatic and political history of the inter-war years. The containment of Communism and its spread through the British Empire was a major preoccupation of British diplomacy.

Anti-Communism also had a very specific impact on the conduct of the Second World War, particularly from 1942 onwards with fears of social upheaval at the end of the war and the contribution which Soviet military successes and advances might make to the revolutionary transformation in liberated countries. Anti-Communism was an even more critical factor in the post-war decade, which proved the formative period of alignment in international relations. Anti-Communism played a vital and significant role in the division of the post-war world into two armed and relatively disciplined camps, accompanied by the
sharpening of ideological conflict and a process of internal political repression to consolidate a quasi-wartime national 'consensus'.

The detailed study of anti-Communist repression in post-World War II America, *The Great Fear* by David Caute, states that:

Britain also committed itself to a political and military alliance against the Soviet Union, but without the corollary of domestic Red-baiting and witch-hunting.

Caute notes that "American liberalism failed to sustain the authentically liberal values and standards of tolerance that persisted in Britain despite that country's ... general posture of confrontation with Russia. The British of the Attlee era, unlike the British of the Pitt era or of the sixteenth century confrontation with Spain, kept their heads..." (2) For many years this was the conventional wisdom. My own research began as a study of British reactions to "McCarthyism". My findings brought into question the general assumption of British liberalism and tolerance in this era and led to an interest in the domestic impact of the Cold War on British politics, of which there was no major study. While the British experience was far removed from that of the American, the lesser public impression of McCarthyism did not denote its absence. This was pointed out in a 1984 article by Reg Whitaker, who observed that the Cold War was launched in other Western nations— allies to the United States and that its domestic implantation differed according to the specific conditions of individual countries. Whitaker argued that:

Although it was McCarthyism in its highly visible American form which raised the most concern among liberals, it is important to realise that state repression was, and is, an integral part of the domestic implantation and reproduction of the Cold War in all Western countries. The greater concentration among America's allies on the repressive apparatus of the state has misled many observers
into the false conclusion that domestic repression was a peculiarly American aspect of the Cold War. (3)

Whitaker pointed out that while "the British purge does seem mild compared to the American orgy", the principle involved is of considerable significance, in that Communism as a set of beliefs, and association with known Communists or alleged Communist organizations were made criteria for dismissal from public posts. Although the British purge was in part ineffective, as indicated by the numerous spy scandals of the post-war era, still it continued; from which Whitaker concluded that the ideological functions of the purge were as least as important as the possibility of detecting a potential espionage agent:

What the purge did accomplish was the official proscription of certain political beliefs and political associations, as a 'legitimate' exercise of liberal democracy. The state was setting an example, pour encourager les autres. The actual numbers affected are not then so important as the public notice that certain ideas and associations are no longer considered legitimate. The politicised excesses of McCarthyism are only ugly and unnecessary excrescenses on this system. The British establishment has no need of them. (4)

This ideological function, and how it was achieved, is of the foremost importance in examining the role of the Church in this era, which for many was the arbiter of Christian thought and conduct. My early research into the response of the British authorities to McCarthyism confirmed Whitaker's view of the purge. I discovered that while British officials were disturbed by McCarthyism, they were offended by the means, not the aims. McCarthyism was viewed with alarm as being a danger to the cause it espoused. In the early 1950s British middle-class sentiment was aroused by the excesses of McCarthyism. Its expression, however, was very much a means of venting resentment of American domination, traditional feelings of cultural superiority, and
mild British patriotism, without unsettling the basic links which bound Britain to America.

Detailed research into the domestic impact of the Cold War in Britain proved difficult in the realm of official Government papers because of the extreme sensitivity of state departments on the subject of Communism. This meant a tendency to retain relevant documents within the department. Many other documents relating to Communism and anti-Communism and listed in the PRO indices, were not in the indicated files. A large number of documents concerned with Communism and anti-Communism indexed in Kraus proved untraceable. This latter initially appeared problematic to certain staff at the Public Record Office who, after searching for the references themselves, finally passed it to superior powers. These too had no success.

In due course my field of research became narrowed to a concern with the role and place of the Churches, most particularly the Established Anglican Church. Here I discovered a wealth of material reflecting on the impact of the Cold War in Britain and on the Church's role, particularly in the private papers of leading ecclesiastics and in the records of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations, in the archives of Lambeth Palace.

The traditional anti-Communism of the Church, particularly that of Rome, has been examined by Francois Houtart who argues that the Church's social doctrine is determined by a reading of the most immediate aspects of social reality, namely inter-human social relations, with a refusal to read social reality in terms of class antagonisms and class struggle. This results in a theoretical basis for opposition to any form of social ethics which is elaborated in terms of a structural analysis of classes.
This opposition is exacerbated by the fact that during the transition to socialism the institutional space allotted to the churches is reduced for a variety of reasons:

On the one hand, the state takes over the organization of health, educational and cultural networks in order to extend them to the whole population. On the other, the transition is a difficult period in which ideological mobilization may take the form of constraint. Finally, the social space required for the autonomy of religious institutions is defined both by the specific religious model in question and by the degree of social rigidity deemed necessary for the transition to socialism. (5)

The emergence of more socialist countries in Europe was perceived as a direct threat to the institution of the Church. The Church adopted a hostile attitude and the socialist countries took measures against the Church and sometimes against religion itself. Outside Europe, the Vatican saw the process of de-colonization and the increase in Marxist-inspired revolutionary movements - not to mention the fact that whole countries like China were going over to Communism - as a basic threat to the Church and its mission work. It was in this context that new Western alliances culminated in the formation of NATO, that a series of religious conflicts broke out in the East, and that Pius XII adopted a hard-line towards Communism and the socialist countries. The dialectic of confrontation was present at every level, both theoretical and practical. (6)

Added to this inherent antipathy toward Communism, was the role of the Church as a part of the state apparatus. This was particularly true of the Church of England which was not only a state Church, but whose leadership in the main derived from the Establishment, and which had a vested interest in the maintenance of the status quo. The leadership of the Anglican Church supported and cooperated with the British Government
in both domestic and foreign affairs, particularly in its opposition to Communism. This meant that the Church was allied with a political system intrinsically bound up with the capitalist organization of society, with its integration into the economy of the West and with policies which were dominated by the United States. While the Church tried to maintain that its opposition to Communism had a spiritual and not a political basis, ecclesiastical anti-Communism was used as a political argument, which meant that the Church itself took on a political complexion. Although cautious not to be seen to be using religion for political ends, the Western powers sought to exploit the popular emotional objections to the atheism of Communism as a means of discrediting the whole philosophy of Marx. This led to a direct use of religion and manipulation of the Churches by Western Governments in their conflict with the Soviet Union and Communism.

Although the religious sources of anti-Communism have deep theoretical roots, the attitudes of the Churches and institutionalized religions are not monolithic. Large numbers of Christians, including some members of the clergy, accept the social analysis developed by Marxism and use it as a means to formulate an ethic. This inevitably formed a source of conflict within the Churches when statesmen looked to ecclesiastics to endorse and support a perspective of Communism which sought to present the confrontation between the Western world and the socialist world as a conflict between good and evil. Those who found meaning in Marxism and saw socialism as a step on the road leading to the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth were becoming, however, an increasingly marginalised minority in this period.
The majority of Church documents, then and now, begin their discussion of Marxism by describing its philosophy and its critique of religion, but the description itself is often simplistic or even caricatural. This practice emulates that of official Government documents which rarely give a succinct account of the various positions Marx and Engels adopted with regard to religion and they do not situate those positions in terms of the historicity of their production. This caricature of Marxist positions allows them to be more easily criticised and attacked. While a major objective of Church denigration of Communism has been to assert the superiority of a religious view of the meaning of life, man and the universe that is denied by Marxism, during the Cold War the spiritual antipathy to Communism was invested with a political dimension intended to give moral sanction to the containment of the Soviet Union and make the counter-revolutionary activities of the West appear as a necessary defence of Western civilisation and of Christianity.

Similarly, the western political application of the "totalitarian" label to both Communist and Fascist regimes was a part of the West's ideological warfare against the Soviet Union which the Churches emulated. The suggestion was that they were very similar regimes, and that Communism and Nazism were more or less identical. There are in fact enormous differences, despite their common use of mass murder and mass terror. The intent, however, was a message that here were two philosophies, equally repugnant, both of which Christians should equally reject.

The 1950 political campaign to elect a new British Government was begun with a Church service attended by leaders of all the parties at
which the Archbishop of Canterbury delivered a sermon setting "the amicable conflict of the election in the shadow of the deeper world conflict of Christianity and materialism." British support for the Cold War was inspired and consolidated under social democratic auspices. From the first days of the Bolshevik Revolution there existed alongside conservative anti-Communism a fierce social democratic anti-Communism. Profound divisions between right and left existed in the labour movements of capitalist societies. These were deepened by the Bolshevik victory, taking on new institutional forms; the repressive nature of the Soviet regime and Communist attacks on social democratic leaders served to reinforce already well developed tendencies towards a socialism which did not threaten the established order. This provided a powerful ideological basis of agreement between social democratic leaders and their conservative opponents, providing, from 1945 on, the basis for a broad consensus between them on foreign and defence policies. Britain's Labour Government played a major role in the legitimization of the Cold War and in the mobilisation of labour movements and of the Church behind the banner of anti-Communism.

Britain contributed directly to the international policies which led the wartime Allies into the fissure of Cold War. The British Government was initially more determined than the Americans to confront the Soviet Union and put the worst face on Soviet interests and intentions. The political convergence of the Labour and Tory parties, particularly in foreign affairs and with regard to anti-Communism and the establishing of Britain as part of the American sphere of influence, meant that American credit and American conditions pre-empted a distinctive social-democratic policy at home. Bevin's foreign policy, formulated and
impressed upon him by a conservative Foreign Office, was not conducive to a sustained socialist offensive in domestic affairs. The exacerbation of the Cold War undermined the Labour Left. As Robert Jones observed in *The Russia Complex*: "The reason was partly that socialism and Russia were interrelated ideas and the discrediting of one damaged the other, and partly that Cold War reactions to Soviet pressure strengthened the Right and weakened social democracy all over the world." (7)

The Labour Party did have a direct stake in using the Cold War to discredit opinion and activity on its Left. As a government it wished to encourage working class solidarity behind its projects, as a party it hoped to kill off its historical rival for working class support, and as the architect of the Anglo-American alliance it wished to maintain as much national unity and consensus behind its defence and foreign policies as possible. However, anti-Communism was of the greatest value to conservative forces in their struggle against the whole Left, social democracy included. In 1951 the Tory Party was returned to power.

The Cold War initiated a massive enterprise of anti-Communist propaganda and indoctrination disseminated by a multitude of different sources and means—newspapers, radio, television, films, articles, pamphlets, books, speeches, sermons, official documents, and so on. It was based on two fundamental contentions: that "Communism" was a supreme and unqualified evil; and an evil which the Soviet leaders were seeking to impose upon the rest of the world. The Soviet Union was depicted as being the principal and most dangerous enemy. These two contentions, and the depiction of the Soviet Union as the embodiment of evil, were
reiterated and given moral endorsement by ecclesiastical leaders vested with the spiritual authority of the Church.

Defenders of the Soviet Union, from 1917 until the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress of 1956, painted the regime in the brightest possible colours and resolutely dismissed all criticism of the Soviet Union. Because anti-Communism painted Soviet "Communism" in the darkest possible colours, they dismissed all criticism as propaganda, invention and lies. This was not sufficient justification for the total and unqualified endorsement given the Soviet regime by its defenders, particularly in view of the immense crimes committed during the Stalin era. There are reasons to account for the wholehearted support given Stalinist policies and actions, not least that alongside massive repression and murder there was also great construction and advance. The latter should not have served to occlude the former. By the same token, anti-Communists should not have under-stated or altogether ignored the advances made by the Communist regimes, nor the adverse conditions and circumstances in which these were made.

Anti-Communism was grossly selective in its view of Communist regimes, systematically presenting a highly distorted picture of the reality. Western Church leaders reinforced these views, particularly with regard to the highly emotive concern of religious persecution. Another respect in which the Church supported anti-Communist selectivity was in the condemnation of the political and human abuses of Communist dictatorships while condoning or simply ignoring the abuses and crimes of right-wing regimes. Similarly, while the Church spoke loudly against Communist persecution of religion in this era, it said little about other types, particularly Roman Catholic, bringing into question either
the genuineness of its own actual concern, or its own total submission
to political anti-Communism. Western Church leaders readily criticised
their counterparts in Communist regimes for cooperating with their
governments in the political sphere, although it was no more than they
themselves were doing.

In the post-war period, anti-Communism was an essentially
conservative stance which used the experience of Soviet-type regimes as
a means of combating as utopian, absurd, dangerous and sinister any
transformative project which went beyond modest attempts of social
engineering. Most Church leaders favoured reforms which would alleviate
the conditions of the poorest sections of society, and which would
incidentally remove the conditions they believed led to revolution.
They did not favour any radical changes to the established order, and in
this respect looked askance even at the moderate policies of the British
Labour Government. This attitude, however, was confined to the domestic
sphere; in foreign affairs, the Church leadership gave its wholehearted
support to the anti-Communist policies of first the Labour and then the
Tory governments.

Acting in their "individual capacities", certain leading British
ecclesiastics gave services of a very practical nature to the British
policy of Soviet containment. But it was in the ideological sphere of
the Cold War that the Church made its greatest contribution. Within a
common framework, there are numerous versions of anti-Communism, with
distinct positions, emphases and nuances. For purposes of political
warfare the most useful was the absolutist position, which finds many
expressions, but whose common denominator is a total, unqualified and
vehement rejection of Communism as the embodiment of evil, the work of
Satan, the product of the darkest and most sinister impulses of the human spirit, the negation of civilisation and enlightenment, and so forth. Couched in extreme moralistic terms, this form of anti-Communism often has strongly religious connotations which picture the Soviet Union as the material incarnation of evil and as the main source of the dissemination of evil. The release of Russia from its Communist regime was presented as a prime condition of human regeneration and salvation.

The absolutist position was presented in its most un tarnished form by the Vatican, for which the destruction of Communism was something to be prayed and worked for, fought and died for. While the absolutist position has very strong political resonances, it was not a position which the British government could readily adopt in the immediate post-war era, as a residue of sympathy persisted for the Soviet Union, owing to its tremendous wartime sacrifices, and the majority of people longed for peace, after the ardours of the anti-Nazi struggle. British leaders had perforce to deal with the Soviet Union in less inflamed terms, from which negotiation and even compromise could not be excluded. This was also the stance, following the government, of the Anglican Church. Privately the Foreign Office was often supportive of the Vatican crusade against Communism, although always wary of the political dangers of open support. The Archbishop of Canterbury in the immediate postwar years, for whom the Roman Catholic Church was an anathema, was strident in his condemnation of the Vatican's anti-Communist crusade, calling the Roman Catholic Church as totalitarian as the Soviet Union. Anglican antipathy toward the Vatican created a dilemma for its leadership when the President of the United States sought to create a Christian anti-Communist front against the Soviet Union, which demanded the cooperation
of the leaders of all the Western Churches with the Pope, under the direction of the United States.

Although such blatant political use of the Churches was resisted by the Anglican leadership, this did not deter its support for political anti-Communism. Even before 1917, conservatives had denounced those who opposed them as godless, immoral, unpatriotic and subversive. The fact that Communism could be identified with the Soviet Union and that after 1945 the Soviet Union was proclaimed to be a dire and urgent threat, meant that those on the Left could be denounced as supporters, allies or agents of their country's greatest enemy. Not all Communist sympathisers or friends of the Soviet Union were denounced as traitors; often they were denigrated as only weak and naive dupes. The Dean of Canterbury was regarded as being of the latter variety in the early days of the Cold War, but as the political situation deteriorated during the Korean War, he was denounced in no uncertain terms as belonging to the ranks of traitors. The activities of the "Red" Dean, his left-wing views and his support for the new Communist regimes were a source of embarrassment and anger to the Anglican hierarchy, forcing the Archbishop of Canterbury to issue a number of disclaimers dissociating himself both from the Dean and from his views, which he entirely condemned.

Where the Dean of Canterbury opposed American domination and supported the peace movement, the Anglican leadership supported the Anglo-American alliance and endorsed the Korean War as a necessary stand against Communist aggression. The Anglican Church, whose political intelligence derived in the main from the Foreign Office, subscribed to the view that the Soviet Union was imperialist and expansionist, and
thus reinforced the belief in the bogey of a Soviet military threat of world-wide dimensions. This bogey not only legitimated American and other interventionist enterprises in every part of the world against revolutionary and reformist movements, on the basis of the "domino effect", but also legitimated the arms race. The Archbishops of Canterbury and York both preached the need for a nuclear "deterrent" in view of the Soviet desire for world domination.

During the Cold War the Church of England acted as a political institution on behalf of the British Government, while maintaining that it acted independently as a spiritual institution which was above the political conflict. This was very clearly not the case, and ultimately such a stance could only undermine the credibility of the Church and damage its spiritual authority. It also created difficulties in its international relations with other Churches, and with many of its own clergy.
Notes to Introduction


The Cold War has been described many times as one of the world's great religious wars. Such a perception owes much to the success of Western propaganda's skilful presentation of the East-West power struggle and its own counter-revolutionary activities as resistance to the militant march of atheistic Communism. The roots of the Cold War struggle were planted prior to the Second World War, as early as 1917. The awareness of the conflict between two world philosophies was immensely sharpened with the civil war in Spain, from the summer of 1936. It appeared that two underlying sets of principles were at stake, which issued in opposed ways of thinking about society; touching the nature of justice, or the possibility of political freedom, or the rights of the individual, or even the old fraternities and equalities of the French Revolution. The nature of Western Civilisation was an increasingly important subject; the roots of Western culture, the place of the Judaeo-Christian tradition in the European inheritance, the moral principles of Europe became significant questions. Writers like Arnold Toynbee and Christopher Dawson grew in influence.

Within the European mind there was a wide, deep, often vague struggle between the traditional heritage of moral ideas in politics and society, and revolutionary doctrines of social morality which might be ascribed, not always plausibly, to Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Gobineau, Richard Wagner, Nietzsche and, most important of all for the left, Karl Marx. On January 25, 1937, Winston Churchill spoke at the
annual dinner of the Leeds Chamber of Commerce. He likened Fascism and
Communism to the Arctic and Antarctic zones of the world and said that
he preferred a temperate zone:

It is strange that certain parts of the world should now be wishing
to revive the old religious wars. There are those non-God religions
Nazism and Communism... I repudiate both and will have nothing to
do with either... They are as alike as two peas. Tweedledum and
Tweedledee were violently contrasted compared with them. You leave
out God and you substitute the devil.(1)

This speech shows how men who were not at all ecclesiastical and not
even particularly religious might see, in that war of ideologies, a
conflict of men for the soul of Europe. In this quest, the Churches,
indeed, Christianity itself, were inevitably of interest to the
politicians.(2)

The emotive power of religion has long been known to man and used to
inspire and comfort, as well as oppress, pacify and exploit, fellow men.
Neither Church nor State has hesitated to trespass into the other's
domain to protect or promote their own interests; and both have freely
collaborated when it has proved mutually advantageous. To twentieth
century man this historical process proved morally repugnant and
threatened within modern democracies to undermine the moral authority of
both political and spiritual institutions. Although this effected a
subtle transformation of Church-State relations, the practice persisted.
World War II and the Cold War illustrate that religion was too potent a
force, too powerful a weapon for political considerations to relinquish
to moral. While the resistance of the Churches to political
manipulation was neither insignificant nor ineffective, political
compliance and cooperation was the predominant practice, despite
ecclesiastical sensitivity to charges of political subservience. The
cooperation of the British Churches in the national war effort highlighted the fears of both Church and State to an adverse public response toward the use of the spiritual by the political. When these fears proved largely superfluous, the way was prepared for postwar cooperative relations in a joint Church/State assault on Communism.

Religious influences had played their part in World War I, with the respective Churches lining up behind their national governments. As World War II loomed ever larger upon the horizon a further religious role was anticipated and provided for within the British Administration. A Religions Division was set up within the Ministry of Information, an innovation which existed in shadow from 1935 to 1939. No comparable body existed in the First World War and it was clearly a response to the success of Goebbels's Ministry of Propaganda. (3) For several months prior to war being declared the Religions Division of the Planning Section of the Ministry of Information worked in informal consultation with the leaders of the Churches. The staff of the division were themselves clerics or prominent churchmen. The work was under the general direction of Mr Kenneth Maclennan, formerly General Secretary of the Conferences of British Missionary Societies, who gave special attention to the preparation of a programme for the dissemination of information among Protestant churches and missions. Through Lord Perth, the Honourable Richard Hope was related to work on the Roman Catholic side and received advice from Roman leaders. (4)

The reports prepared by Maclennan and Hope, who worked all along in close consultation, indicated that relations with the Churches would have to be handled in an entirely different way from other sections of the Ministry's activities. It was pointed out that by their nature the
Churches were ecumenical in outlook and supranational in their objectives; delicate questions had been raised as to whether it was possible or desirable that they should be used as channels of publicity. They concluded that it was of the utmost importance that the Churches and missions, which were themselves international, were not suspected of being used as channels of propaganda by one side in an international struggle. It was felt that with regard to Christian missions the most effective propaganda would be that their work should be carried on in full strength in as normal a way as possible, with the missionaries supplied with reliable information for use in such ways as they thought right. That is, individual missionaries could choose to act discreetly as willing conduits for British propaganda. Apart from the fact that the Ministry had no effective means to impose such a task upon missionaries in the field, coercion could only prove counterproductive in such a sensitive operation.

Confidential consultations with Church and Missionary Society leaders had made it clear that they could not be openly identified with the normal propaganda work of the Ministry. Individual churchmen, however, were willing to be brought into consultation with the Ministry and to act in friendly cooperation with it. This procedure was a corollary to the already established practice whereby various church bodies nominated onto their committees political figures who provided them with discreet direction. It was, however, a two way process in that the Church sought to increase its own influence in the corridors of power through these same men. This process was particularly demonstrated in the formation and development of the Church of England Committee on Foreign Relations. After the war when the Church of England perceived an
opportunity in the reconstruction process to reassert itself as a force in the life of the nation, then it quite deliberately looked for men of public affairs to be involved in Church affairs as a direct means of increasing its own influence in the political sphere.

The solution to the discreet incorporation of the Churches into the war effort was to set up a Religions Section of the Ministry with the stated purpose of promoting friendly cooperation, passing on reliable information to the different churches and missions and helping them deal with the problems arising from the war. It was suggested that the section needed to be semi-autonomous in character, but subject to the control of the Minister and in appropriate relations with the Foreign Office, the India Office, the Colonial Office and the Dominions Office. (5)

Hitler's exploitation of religion for strategic purposes was planned and activated well in advance of direct military aggression. Vital to Hitler's design for his domination of Europe was the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church had become a Church without a country when irreligion was proclaimed a fundamental law in the Soviet Union and excluded from any participation in public life. Hitler, unsparing in promises when he wished to secure the allegiance of powerful forces, cultivated the synod of emigre bishops who had established a headquarters at Karlovci under Anastasius and claimed to be the true representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Russian Bishop in Berlin was appointed by the Karlovci Council. By 1937 Hitler had obtained effective control of the machinery of the Karlovci jurisdiction in Germany and the warm sympathy of the Karlovci Council of Russian
Bishops by the granting of considerable subsidies, certainly to the former and probably to the latter. (6)

A strong well equipped 'Russian' Orthodox Church of Germany was considered to be a useful instrument for the permeation of the Balkans and ultimate domination of Russia. The planned Unified Orthodox Church was to include the Churches of Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Slovakia, Roumania, Bulgaria, Austria, Greece, the Ukraine, White Russia and Central Russia. Hitler's original concept was to make Germany a great Orthodox centre outside Russia where all the Orthodox of the Balkans would naturally gravitate. The intention was to start an Academy for the training of Orthodox priests and to create a new Patriarchate at Breslau, the capital of Silesia: requisite preparations for the collapse of the Soviet regime and the winning of the Russian people's confidence through the restoration of their Church. The Germans actually built a Russian Orthodox Cathedral in Berlin as part of this grand design.

Once Britain declared war against Germany it became part of Religions Division's task to counter Hitler's design in the religious sphere. There already existed in Paris a Theological Academy for Russian emigres opposed to the Communist regime which was supported by funds from Britain and the USA. Influential Church of England figures, George Bell, the Bishop of Chichester, Oliver Tomkins, Assistant General Secretary of the WCC and AC Don, Secretary to the Archbishop of Canterbury, urged the Religions Division to give financial support to the Paris Academy to enable it to meet the rivalry of the proposed Russian Orthodox Institute at Breslau under the control of Seraphim Lade, the Orthodox Metropolitan of Berlin, appointed by the Karlovci Council and owing allegiance to Hitler. Recognising the inherent danger
of Hitler's religious plans to the British war effort, the Foreign Office informed the Ministry of Information in April 1940 that, in view of the political factors involved, it might be possible to supplement from official sources those funds already received by the Academy from Britain and the USA. (7)

F.O. interest in the Academy meant that in June 1941 fears for its welfare led to the proposal that it be moved from Paris to either Britain, Portugal or the USA. Douglas doubted the value of the proposal feeling that matters had been left too late to implement effective action, while the doubts of A.C. Don concentrated on the question of whether the Paris Academy was really proving an effective means of countering the activities of Seraphim Lade. (8) Although the Ministry was in friendly relations with the Academy, it realised that more effective results could be obtained by direct contact with the Churches in Eastern Europe, ecclesiastical circles there being suspicious of the Academy.

Without any contacts of its own the Ministry necessarily had to rely on the influence of British ecclesiastics in Orthodox circles. The Bishop of Gibraltar, with the approval of the Archbishop of Canterbury and the assistance of the Ministry of Information, arranged therefore to take to the Balkans a party of English bishops and clergymen who had some knowledge of the Near East. (9) The Church of England delegation, which included Douglas, visited Yugoslavia, Greece and Bulgaria in May 1940. A secret report on the visit from Usher to Maclennan confirmed that it had been made as a counter to German propaganda trying to win sympathy in the area, especially that of the Orthodox through Seraphim Lade and an ambitious scheme for an Orthodox seminary at Breslau where
large numbers of students from the Balkans could receive a free education in Orthodox divinity and Nazi ideology. The report recommended that it was important to proceed as quickly as possible with the proposals by the Ministry and the Foreign Office regarding the provision of facilities for Balkan theological students at the Orthodox Theological Academy in Paris, or in this country. Britain needed to respond to the German willingness to educate freely and to Nazify any Orthodox theological students who went to them.

In Yugoslavia the delegation visited not only the King and the Patriarch Gavrilo, but also the Roman Catholic hierarchy, conveying greetings to them from Britain's Roman Catholic leaders. Usher subsequently recommended visits similar to the Church of England delegation's by Britain's Roman Catholic dignitaries to Croatia and Slovenia.

Although the major task of the delegation was countering German propaganda, anti-Russian propaganda was also an important consideration, as was made apparent in Usher's report on the visit to Maclennan:

Quite apart from general considerations of policy with respect to Russia, it is useless in Yugoslavia to devote propaganda to the misdeeds of the Russian Government. The higher clergy are already aware of the anti-religious policy of the Soviets though they hope that the partial restoration of normal relations between Yugoslavia and Russia will enable the Serbian Church to resume contact with the Metropolitan Sergius in Moscow and his colleagues. But everyone assured us that the feelings of the Serbian peasantry toward Russia were quite unchanged. Communism was a mere name to them. The Russians were Slav and Orthodox. They were their natural protectors, their brothers in blood and in faith. (10)

Usher's report regarded the visit as both successful and effective. Although it noted that the settling of the Cyprus question would have the most beneficial effect in Greece, in Bulgaria the delegation had been welcomed with pleasure and told that the Bulgarians were getting
tired of their over numerous German visitors. Most telling however, was the fact that throughout the journey the delegation was the object of persistent attacks over the German wireless and in the German press both of which complained of the "English spiritual offensive". Usher concluded that the generation of so much German hostility was an indication of the delegation's effectiveness, moreover the Germans lacked the available personnel to send round a rival delegation. Indicating the success of the delegation, Usher noted that certain steps had already been taken to follow up the visit, "That its effect may not be merely transitory."

The value of the Church of England to Religions Division and the war effort was clearly demonstrated by the success of the Anglican delegation in consolidating relations with the Orthodox Churches in that region. The Ministry received a further major religious ally in the ideological struggle for the Balkans when Hitler invaded the S.U. and the Russian Orthodox Church there, instead of giving its support to the Axis as saviours of Christianity from atheistic Communism, threw itself wholeheartedly into the struggle against Hitler, immediately providing the Allies with a powerful religious force in that region. This was important because it represented a major Christian rejection of Hitler's claim that his war against Russia was a crusade against the Godless Bolsheviks into whose hands the Allies would deliver Christian Europe.

Hitler's declaration of a crusade necessarily provided impetus to those elements in Britain who wished to present the Allied cause in crusading terms, while undermining the reluctance of those who suspected such a course would prove counter-productive, especially as the alliance with Communist Russia virtually demanded extra emphasis on Britain's own
Christianity. Whether or not Britain should present her cause as a crusade, whether or not religion should be used for propaganda purposes, to what extent the Churches should be used as political tools and how effective, or otherwise, such methods would prove, were major concerns within the Ministry of Information, particularly in the early days when the methods of working for Religions Division were being formulated. The Religions Division, staffed by clergymen and advised by the leaders of the Churches, was only too aware of the inherent danger of promoting God as a national champion. However in August 1940 the Head of Religions Division sought justification for so using religion when he sent the Director General of the Ministry a 'Revised Summary of Duties of Religions Division', in which he declared: "... the Nazi regime has openly derided Christianity and announced that it is setting up a new religion. The Christian issue has therefore become much more important than in other wars, where both sides invoked the same creed." (11)

Whatever reasons were given for using religion as a weapon of war, the justification followed the intent which was evident from the beginning by the actual formation of a Religions Division. The method of working anonymously through Church leaders was a deliberate policy initiated before the outbreak of direct hostilities. On September 12, 1939, the then Minister of Information, Lord MacMillan, addressed what was officially referred to as a 'select' group of Church leaders summoned, significantly, to Lambeth Palace, the headquarters of the Church of England, and under the auspices of the Archbishop of Canterbury. The invited were the Archbishop of York; the Bishop of Chichester; the Rev Prebendary W Wilson Cash; the Rev Canon Tissington Tatlow; the Very Rev Archibald Main, Moderator of the Church of
Scotland; the Rev M. E. Aubrey, General Secretary of the Baptist Union of England and Wales; the Rev S M Berry, General Secretary of the Congregational Union of England and Wales; the Rev W. T. Elmslie, Secretary of the Presbyterian Church of England, and the Rev John Roberts, Secretary of the Calvinistic Church of Wales. Macmillan explained to this select group that although he recognised that they were the acknowledged leaders of the Churches in Britain, his invitation had been extended to each as an individual:

I realize that the Christian Church cannot be used as an organ of propaganda. It is in its essential nature ecumenical and supra-national. But I trust that as individuals you will be ready and anxious to help us. {12}

MacMillan enquired if the Church leaders had considered the advisability of a Manifesto in which the Churches publicly declared their attitude to the war. Although MacMillan stressed that the issue of such a Manifesto was not the concern of the Ministry, he added his opinion that it would prove valuable and asked that they keep him informed of any action they took in this direction. MacMillan's address specifically clarified two ways in which the Ministry sought the cooperation of the Churches. The Churches were clearly regarded as important channels for disseminating the Ministry's propaganda:

It is very important that accurate information as to the issues at stake should be made available for the clergy and ministry of the Churches and to church members.

The Churches were also expected to make distinct the ethical nature of the British struggle:

It is the special task of the Christian Churches to help the nation to keep clear the spiritual and moral issues that are involved in all our efforts.
In other words, the Churches were required to support the idea of the war as a crusade, a task in which the Ministry willingly provided full guidance:

Suggestions as to ways and means by which the Ministry can assist the clergy, ministers and Christian laity of the country in promoting these ends have been prepared and will be laid before you for your consideration. (13)

Not only Church leaders were summoned to Lambeth for special meetings with the Ministry of Information. The cooperation of all those thought to wield religious influence was sought. Further meetings were arranged for the editors and journalists of religious publications and for about one hundred leaders of missionary organisations. (14)

'A Directive Letter to the Clergy and Others', issued on July 5 1940, revealed that during his period as Minister of Information Duff Cooper had no reservations about characterising the conflict as a religious war. (15) Crude exploitation of the theme was prevented by the staffing of Religions Division with clerics who worked largely through the Churches and maintained a natural concern for the integrity of the Christian faith and its Churches, fully aware as well that should the Church be compromised, so would its propaganda value. They were thus reluctant to label the war a crusade. In 1941 the Religions Division stated in 'Religious Propaganda at home', that "to speak of a Christian crusade is dangerously misleading." However, although the preferred course of action was to make a strong affirmation of Britain's Christianity, a Christian perspective of the war was argued to be justifiable: "You cannot spread Christianity by the sword, but you can defend a society in which Christian principles are allowed scope and in which there is freedom of thought and worship." (16) By 1944 Religions
Division were arguing that the Christian interpretation given the war in Allied propaganda was fully justifiable, although it was conceded not to be a crusade:

The war against Nazism, though not a crusade for Christianity, raised important moral and spiritual issues; a victory for Germany, with its declared hostility to the Christian ideal, would be a catastrophe for Christendom. A Christian interpretation of the war was therefore a legitimate and genuine part of the work of information, at home and abroad. (17)

The British 'crusade' actually made an exceedingly slow start. The 'Phoney War' meant there was no call for an immediate response to MacMillan's suggestion of a 'Manifesto' declaration and Britain's religious propaganda was practically dormant until spurred into activity by a Christian drive in German propaganda. As a Ministry of Information memorandum succinctly reasoned: "The Nazis fear religion. That is a sign that they regard religion as a dangerous power. That is reason enough to launch a systematic religious propaganda." (18)

Ultimately, it was the success of religious propaganda which overcame the 'scruples' surrounding its use. Moreover, Religions Division was not, as some had originally feared, looked upon as a department for exploiting the Church. As the Division grew in confidence it perceived itself as genuinely appreciated in Church circles and viewed the initial caution as overdone, referring to the "extreme, even excessive, sensitiveness" of the early planning memoranda in avoiding the impression that the Churches were being used for merely political ends. (19)

Religions Division was made up of four sections, Protestant, Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Jewish, the latter being added in 1941 and aimed primarily at cultivating the influential Jewish community in the
USA. (20) The Division enjoyed good working relations with the religious press and had secured the full time services of Mr Barnes of the Roman Catholic publication the Tablet. Missionary Societies were originally intended to be incorporated into the Division's work, but in view of the complex organisation of mission work it was recommended that a special section, distinct from the Religions Division, should be set up to act as a general liaison between the missionary societies and all the interested government departments. In practice, however, a liaison section was found to be unnecessary. The detailed plans and suggestions for the missionary field proved too elaborate and many were not followed up. This proved no great loss as it evolved that the original scheme had over-stressed the missionary side of the work. (21)

The alliance with Soviet Russia, caused by Hitler's invasion of that country, gave British religious propaganda a whole new impetus. The work of Religions Division had always been seen as concentrated on the overseas field and consisted mainly in emphasising the Christian nature of the British nation. (22) The new alliance with an atheist power made it yet more imperative to emphasise British Christianity, especially as Britain was now confronted with German claims to be leading a crusade to defend Europe from Godless Bolshevism. The alliance with Russia was a major turn of events which required deep consideration and analysis from the propaganda point of view. The religious dimension of the problem presented the Religions Division with a quandary. It was clearly necessary not to undermine Government support for Russia by condemning that State's atheism. Yet it was equally important to try and counter the inevitable criticism from a wide variety of religious sources without appearing to be indifferent, or, worse still, expediently
avoiding, the plight of Christianity in Russia. The initial British reaction was thus to stress that nothing had changed apart from the fact that Russia, owing to German aggression, now stood with the Allies in opposition to Hitler. Britain still opposed Communism and still fought for Christianity:

Aggression is aggression even when committed against an atheist state. We have not altered our opposition to Communism. We lend our aid not to Communism but to the Russian victims of Nazi aggression. The policy of the Government defined by the Prime Minister can be wholeheartedly accepted by Christians. Our business partnership with Russia is strictly limited; it has one aim only: the defeat of Hitler.

What remains of our claim to be fighting for Christian civilisation? The claim remains as before. We are fighting to retain the spiritual heritage of the West. Although many feel, especially on the Continent, that this spiritual heritage is threatened by Communism, there is no doubt that it is actually threatened at the moment by Nazi Germany. (23)

Perhaps even more significant, however, was the whole new emphasis put on Christianity in home propaganda, particularly when the Red Army defied Hitler's forces and instead of disintegrating beneath the Nazi onslaught, as predicted in the West, courageously fought back, to the astonishment of Western governments and the applause of Western peoples. The admiration of the British people for the Soviet stand led to an interest in all things Russian which alarmed conservative authority at home. This alarm was further compounded by the Ministry of Information's policy of promoting the Anglo-Soviet alliance, leading certain figures within the Ministry to search for a means of tempering British enthusiasm for her Communist allies.

The Ministry had anticipated that an alliance with the S.U. would pose problems for British propaganda and, aware beforehand that Germany planned to attack Russia, requested guidance from the Prime Minister. Churchill's reply that "Germany should be represented as an insatiable
tyrant that has attacked Russia in order to obtain materials for carrying on the war", failed to provide any adequate direction. (24) The required attitude was much more firmly indicated in a note sent to Duff Cooper by the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, summarising a discussion with Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador:

The Ambassador would understand how deeply was the dislike of Communism rooted in this country. Nothing could be more unfortunate than if the impression was ever to get abroad that, in a desire to promote better Anglo-Russian understanding... H.M. Government were lending itself to the popularising of Communist creeds, to which in fact it was strongly opposed. M. Maisky said that he fully understood this point... (25)

Eden's words served both to warn Maisky that Russia should not expect unbounded enthusiasm from Britain and defined for the Ministry the public attitude to be promoted. The fear of a positive public response to the S.U. was revealed when Maisky suggested that no harm could be done by the dissemination of culturally focused information. Duff Cooper was not so certain: "It is difficult to see how we could boost modern Russian culture without implying some approval of the experiment that has been going on there for these last 24 years." (26) Subsequent propaganda emphasised pre-Revolutionary Russian cultural achievement.

While the Ministry were willing to comply with Eden's directive, popular demand for up to date information about Russia proved insatiable, more interest being shown in Russia than in all the other Allies put together. Attempts to satisfy the demand "by interesting but innocuous issues of geographical, historical and economic backgrounds", proved futile: "the public are demanding stronger food." (27) The Ministry were forced to act more vigorously in their promotion of the Anglo-Soviet relationship because of, firstly, growing public suspicion that the Government was not enthusiastic about Russia and was not
providing her with full support; and secondly, left-wing speakers were supplying the public demand for information about Russia, conveying a more favourable impression than the Ministry desired and winning themselves popularity in the process.

The Ministry's response to this situation was to try and make it appear that the Government was whole-heartedly behind Russia and at the same time attempt "to curb exuberant pro-Soviet propaganda from the Left", by excluding Communist speakers and trying "to prevent iniative from falling or remaining in the hands of the Communist Party." These efforts, however, created yet more problems. Testimony from the regional officers regarding the rulings against Communist speakers revealed that not only was a great deal of confusion caused, but their own work was rendered less efficient. (28) Without resort to the Communists it was difficult to meet the demand for speakers on the S.U. and the Ministry, conceding that it was "woefully short of people who can speak at all on Rusia", tried to encourage Conservative speakers to tackle the subject: "The effect of factual talks by them stressing the support which this country is affording to Russia can scarcely be overestimated or over valued." (29) Clearly identifying themselves with the Conservative Party, it was the opinion of the Ministry that Tory activity in this sphere would "signify our support and admiration of the Russian war effort." (30) However, despite associating themselves with the Tory Party, the Ministry could not persuade its members to speak favourably about Russia. Although Conservative Party Headquarters expressed itself as ready and willing to cooperate, the only M.P. approached flatly refused.
To convince a suspicious public that its attitude toward Russia was sincere, while at the same time effecting some control over public attitudes towards that country, the Ministry decided it must steal the Communist's thunder: "The thunder shall be stolen from the left-wing Communists by outdoing them in pro-Russia propaganda on lines which may be suitably controlled." This policy was very deliberately aimed at allaying the suspicions of the lower orders, unfortunately for the Ministry it had the inadvertent effect of exciting those of the upper. An enquiry from no less a place than 10 Downing Street itself requested the Ministry to comment on a report from a Scottish whip which stated: "The British Communist Party have cashed in on the universal admiration and sympathy for the Russian people in their great stand. Films displayed by the Ministry of Information giving a colourful portrayal of life in Soviet Russia have served to change many people's ideas about Communism." (31) Specifically drawing the Ministry's attention to the latter sentence, it was clear that Downing Street's concern was that rather than stealing the left's thunder, Ministry actions were actually enhancing it. The Prime Minister's apprehensions about Russia's popularity were already well known in the Ministry from early in September 1941 when the Director General had reported to the Policy Committee that Churchill wanted the Ministry to consider what action was required to counter the present tendency of the British public to forget the dangers of Communism in enthusiasm over the Russian resistance to the Nazis. (32)

While Churchill's fears were specifically concerned with Communism, the Tory Party in general feared that its political opposition, the Labour Party, would prove the major beneficiary of Ministry activity, as
the Ministry was itself aware: "There are not wanting signs that the Labour Party, is exploiting these Anglo-Soviet weeks for its own political advantage, or at all events that the Conservative Party is under the nervous apprehension that this is what the Labour Party is, in fact, doing." (33)

The fact that the war would inevitably bring change was recognised by those in power, as was the need. Change that would alleviate the gravest social evils was encouraged, because their remedy was seen as safeguarding British society from the discontent which breeds revolution, that is from any real change. Changes to the actual structure of British society would not be tolerated. The fear that the British nation in its desire for change might be tempted by the lure of Marxism became a significant factor in policy making during the Second World War. To the extent that the British authorities on the whole did not understand Communism, confused it with Socialism and even with Conservative remedies for the alleviation of social ills, their reaction against it was motivated as much by fear of change itself as by the substance of revolutionary doctrines. The fundamental misunderstanding of the theoretical basis of Marxist/Socialist doctrine and the irrational fears common amongst British policymakers when Communism was the subject, were illustrated by the considerations of R H Parker, Director of the Home Publicity Division of the Ministry of Information, in a memorandum on the necessary "Policy Toward Communism":

Communism began to be in force in the extreme West of Europe after the destruction of the Russian monarchy in 1915. Since that time it has been slowly and continuously increasing. Before this war there were one and several crypto communist Members of Parliament. Many of the tenets of Bolshevism are identical with those of Socialism, and many more people hold these tenets and are so minded, than subscribe formally to the creeds. Even the Conservative Party has accepted many articles of pure socialism into its programme.
Weighty opinion anticipates that much of the War-control business will survive the Armistice, and some of it will survive permanently. (34)

Parker's assessment of the domestic situation revealed that conservative opinion was not concerned with subversion and fifth columns, but the prevalent trends they perceived within British political life as leading inexorably towards socialism. British propaganda had consistently promoted the British way of life as far superior to the Russian system; yet when the two had been put to the test by the Nazis, the British Empire had disintegrated while all the world thrilled to the courage of the Red Army. The fear was that the example of Russia was not only undermining the veracity of home propaganda which had for so long denigrated that country, but was stimulating tendencies within Britain to see socialism as a valid alternative to the present British system:

Before 1914 there was very little State assistance for the individual citizen, and when people were forced to look to it, they did so with repugnance. Control and National Service introduced by the last war familiarised the public mind to the idea of State provision for essential contingencies: and the more this was afforded, before and after each general election, the more this became part of the habitual public expectation. The unemployment benefit at once consolidated previous and subtended future history. It may be that the war did no more than accelerate this conception of a general sharing in the common wealth, but it certainly has accelerated it: the country now expects the Government to take measure over everything, and to arrange everything, and the general demand is not for freedom of choice but for the issue of orders. It is not impossible, but it is difficult to justify a system of individualism, uncontrolled save by taxation, which has to be violently abandoned at each war. The number of young persons who demand this justification has augmented. It must be remembered, too, that whereas the rich believe that some portion of their wealth will avail them in the latter end, and the poor that there will always be work and wages and the dole, the intelligent middle class knows that it is ruined, and has nothing to look forward to except from the State. It is the middle class which makes revolutions -the Danton, the Mirabeau, the hungry clever men without hope, not the Marats. They exploit them.

I judge, therefore, that even before the entry of Russia into the war the nation was vaguely ripening to a conception that
Socialism was either a reasonable alternative to the pre-war democratic theory, or a logical sequence to war measures. At the moment the dominant is simply that of sharing, not of equal shares, but of some share in the commodity for all. Various Ministers, including Lord Woolton, have made use of this. But public opinion is only immobile when it is dead. It is certainly not dead today; it must, therefore, be on the move.

At this climacteric the U.S.S.R. was attacked by Hitler, and instead of collapsing as a cranky political machine based upon illogic and phantasy (for as such it was authoritatively described) should, it has till now stemmed the onslaught of Nazism, foreseen its intentions, prepared against them, and is the first to succeed against it face to face on the earth. Whatever it may have thought before, the public mind can no longer regard Communism, on the facts visible to it, as either incompetent or unpractical. By comparison with other regimes, on the evidence before the public, Communism has produced a superior system, the only system that has so far countervailed Nazism. In the absence of evidence to the contrary I apprehend that the mobile mind may at its Left extreme now believe that Communism is the justified system of political life, and that there may be at the centre a strong tendency to acquiesce in it. (35)

Parker submitted that "the political theory of Communism has now both an audience and an occasion, and that it is necessary to counterpoise it." (36) Parker believed immediate action was the solution, arguing that the public mind was still too busy with the war and its private troubles to have set into a conviction. He considered that should the situation be allowed to develop further, its arrest would require a crusade and, "A crusade necessarily implies warfare." Rather than a future crusade against Communism, Parker saw a solution to the problem in presenting the current war as a crusade in order to divert public thought away from Communism and occupy it instead with divine inspiration. The idea of a crusade was not to be the sole propaganda theme, although it was to be the main one. It was to be supported by the more obvious forms of propaganda, "for purposes of insurance." Parker suggested that it was necessary "to canalise the public mind by distinguishing and constantly emphasising the difference between Russia and Bolshevism, by stating that what is necessary for the
Slav temperament, which neither needs organization, nor cares about it, and which is fantastic and poetic upon its outlook upon life, is not appropriate to the Anglo-Saxons who are matter of fact, disinterested in political theories, except where they show a patent utility." The virtues and advantages of British democracy were, as always, to be stressed, plus, while "we need not tell the public again that as Hitler has his Gestapo so Stalin has his Ogpu... we need never let them forget it."(37)

Parker was quite sure that the British people could be brought to hate Communism. Developing the theme that an Englishman's home is his castle, Parker argued that: "He automatically wishes, therefore, to keep it comfortable: he hates Nazism, and can be brought to hate Communism, because of their interference with his peace, his privacy, his comfort... " He was equally convinced that ensured a minimum standard of living, the British would not risk losing what they had by trying to gain more: "So long as there is a chicken in the pot there is no revolution in the State: and a man who is sure of that chicken next Sunday, and all Sundays, will not raise the Red Flag to make the chicken a turkey. The Englishman is not an idealist..."(38)

Although he maintained that the Englishman was not an idealist, Parker still looked to the realm of ideas to combat Communism. Moreover it was clear that he was not entirely convinced as to the efficacy and credibility of the traditional forms of domestic propaganda and, as Bevin was to do in the coming Cold War, Parker sought spiritual reinforcement. He wanted that the already approved proposal of promoting the war as a Christian crusade now be implemented as a means of safeguarding the British populace from the appeal of Communism:
Direct propaganda is scarcely ever effective propaganda, except in buying and selling. In England, particularly, it excites suspicion of itself but anywhere it excites controversy and breeds fanatics, missionaries, converts and holy wars. Oblique propaganda works another way. It fills the vacant mind and prevents, therefore, devils from entering in. It supplies the answers which lie dormant till a question evokes them; and the question then rebounds for the most part, and falls blunted.

The Board has already approved in principle the Idea for the War as a Crusade which, founded on a minute submitted by the Director Home Division to the Planning Committee, embodied much older, profounder and better thought by other members of the Administration, and this may be both a favourable and an appropriate time to launch it in order to oppose an Idea with an Idea, to put in a Belief to occupy the minds of men against a Belief.(39)

Parker saw a crusade as an alternative to dissident thought, a bulwark against Communism, and a means of inspiration giving the ordinary soldier a cause for which to die. He wanted the war projected in Manichaean terms: "Good must conquer evil." Parker could not believe that men would willingly give up their lives for the ideal of democracy, he believed that deeper inspiration was required: "No one can really love democracy to the extent of dying for it, any more than one can love Geography or Theology. Divinity is another matter."(40)

When Russian popularity started the alarm bells of revolution, when the war effort needed inspiration, Christianity was called to the front.

The British Government deliberately sought Christian endorsement of its political creed and actions, but it would not tolerate Christian intervention, nor an independent Christian voice, in what it regarded as the functions of government. The spiritual realm was expected to support the political one, and at the same time remain decidedly subordinate to it. Although the Church was desirous of securing Christian influence in political life, it had no desire to usurp political power. Its chief concern was survival and the restoration of its spiritual power, which the advance of secularism had so severely eroded.
The war, and afterwards the anti-Communist crusade of the West against the East, offered the Christian Churches opportunities to re-assert their spiritual power, but they were also means by which spiritual authority could be compromised by submitting itself to its secular counterpart. The revolution to establish a new earthly order was confronted by the counter-revolution which sought to preserve the status quo. The ensuing conflict divided nations left to right and the world East to West; the same was true of the Churches. The Cold War which divided the nations, also divided the Churches.
NOTES: Chapter 1.

1. Manchester Guardian, January 26, 1937. In July 1940 British propaganda sought to emphasise that "Nazism and Bolshevism are different aspects of the same type of revolution and attack many of the same things in very much the same way." A memorandum on "The Peace We are Fighting For" stated: 1) that Britain was fighting essentially for things of the spirit and not material gain; 2) that Germany was cutting at the Christian roots which Britain sought to preserve; 3) Britain was not preserving a decaying order, but furnishing a new one, i.e. the war was more than a defence of Christian civilisation, if by defence was meant the preservation of the existing order; 4) Christian tradition was challenged by a new pagan philosophy because men had not been true to Christian principles, the struggle was thus a crusade for Christian reconstruction. Christianity contained something infinitely more vital and fruitful than the barren Nazi creed. Memorandum, July 1940; INF 1 396.

2. The emerging significance of the developing concept of Western Civilisation, what it was and what it stood for, is discussed by Owen Chadwick in relation to the Vatican and the changing attitude of the Foreign Office toward the Pope prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, in Britain and the Vatican during the Second World War, Cambridge University Press, 1986, p 22-3. An idealistic concept of Western Civilisation was cultivated in the postwar period as a means of countering the ideals of Communism, see below.
3. For a critical analysis of the wartime operations of the Ministry of Information see Ian Macaline's *Ministry of Morale*.

4. Appointed as Head of the Catholic Section, Richard Hope was the third son of Baron Rankeillour, and thus a vital link between the Ministry of Information and Cardinal Hinsley. Rankeillour was one of three cousins of the Duke of Norfolk, the other two were Lord Howard of Penrith and Viscount Fitzalan of Derwent, who formed significant links between Hinsley and British national policy. Following Hinsley's appointment in March 1935, each of these Catholic peers offered his services to Hinsley in customary fashion, a fair indication in the opinion of Dr Thomas Maloney, the author of a study of Hinsley, that the role of informal aid to the Archbishop of Westminster was not freshly conceived. Rankeillour had been born in 1870 as James Fitzalan Hope, sat as a Conservative Member of Parliament from 1900 to 1929, briefly broken in 1924. Created 1st Baron Rankeillour in 1932, he was to become the most vocal representative of Catholicism in the Upper House. He placed his finger on precisely the area where his extensive parliamentary experience would carry most weight when he suggested to Hinsley in 1935 that, "perhaps I may occasionally be of some use in the borderland where ecclesiastical affairs touch on politics or vice-versa." Thomas Maloney, *Westminster, Whitehall and the Vatican*, 1985, p 27. In his book, Maloney illustrates "the ease of communication between the Archbishop of Westminster and the Catholic peerage, and ... the accuracy with which the views of the Archbishop were represented in the Upper House." p 125.

5. Memorandum on proposed organisation, September 6 1939; INF 1 38.

7. Foreign Office to Usher, April 27 1940; INF 1 769.


10. Ibid.

11. Maclennan to D.G., "Revised Summary of Duties of Religions Division", August 26 1940. A further consideration in the setting up of a Religions Division was that "since the last war pacifism has been closely and naturally associated with Christianity", as this was a sentiment the authorities did not wish to see receive undue promotion during a period of war, the preference was to have the Churches identified with the Government and its prosecution of the war; INF 1 117.

12. "Memorandum for Minister: Meetings arranged September 1939"; INF 1 403.

13. Ibid. This direct appeal to the Church's leadership was significant. In the postwar period the Church was kept in line with Government policy through personal contacts between key figures in authority in Church and Government. When Ernest Bevin decided in 1948 that the Church could
play an important role in promoting Britain's Cold War policy, he personally summoned the Archbishop of Canterbury and Cardinal Hinsley to discuss British foreign policy. Other denominational leaders were seen by Sir Stafford Cripps, a cabinet colleague who was a devout Christian. The efforts of President Truman to form a Christian anti-Communist front in the post-war period were conducted through his personal representative meeting international heads of Churches.


17. "Notes on the Early History of the Religions Division", prepared by R. Hope, Catholic Section, 1945; INF 1 416.

18. Memorandum, unsigned and no date; INF 1 788.

19. Hope, Notes, n.d.; INF 1 416. The value and importance to the Ministry of Information of Church leaders acting apparently independently and seemingly of their own volition in support of the British cause was peculiarly high-lighted when the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster did just that. Hinsley's whole-hearted public identification with the British cause actually proved problematic for
the American Division of the Ministry of Information when Professor Basil Mathews was planning a letter to the Roman Catholic clergy of the United States in which it was hoped to clarify Britain's reasons for engaging in war. Richard Hope, head of the Roman Catholic Section, felt it would be unwise to send the letter under Hinsley's sponsorship, because:

... the Cardinal has so completely and vigorously identified himself with the national standpoint in the present war that anything issued with his blessing is almost certainly bound to create suspicion in the highly sensitive atmosphere of Catholic America. Hope to Mathews, January 9, 1940; INF 1 766.


20. In a secret memorandum presented to the Executive Board of the Ministry of Information, on April 9, 1941, Hugh Martin asked that the question of an approach to the Jews as a religious community be reconsidered. When the Ministry was originally planned it was decided that the Jews should be approached territorially as American Jews, or Roumanian Jews, and not as a community. Observing that the Jews themselves were emphasising the religious aspect of the struggle and that spontaneous cooperation had been given the Division by a number of Rabbis in Britain and elsewhere, Martin added: "the influence of the Jewish community in many parts of the world, and especially perhaps in the United States, needs no emphasis." He argued that there was a great deal of common ground between Christian and Jew in this matter and
wanted "a suitable Jew" brought into the Ministry to direct and develop contacts of this kind. April 1, 1941; INF 1 770.


22. In September 1943, Religions Division was transferred from Mr Gates's (DDG) Controllership to that of Kenneth Grubb, "since its work is now principally concerned with overseas territories." DBW, September 6, 1943; INF 1 38. Grubb was to assume an important role in the postwar publicity of the Church of England, which was to prove of exceptional importance in supporting Britain's Cold War propaganda.

23. Memorandum, July 5 1941; INF 1 790. Where the British simply sought to show that the Russian Government allowed religious practice and that the war effort was supported by the Russian Churches, the Americans wanted to show that there had been a religious revival in the Soviet Union; see Roosevelt and Romanism.

24. War Cabinet Conclusions, June 19 1941; CAB 65 18.

25. Eden to Cooper, June 26 1941; INF 1 913.

26. Quoted by Maclaine in Ministry of Morale. A conversation between Parker and the Russian Embassy's M Zinchance illustrated how the Embassy willingly complied with the demands of British propaganda and made every effort not to give political offense. Zinchance was very insistent that
speakers provided by the Embassy would not be allowed to comment on political matters but would concentrate on literature, art and so forth; nor would they be allowed to wear uniforms: "The Embassy did not want to do anything which might strengthen accusations levelled against them that they were interfering through active propaganda in our domestic affairs." As the Ministry was desperately short of speakers on Russia it wanted to use Russian officials and, moreover, it wanted them in uniform. But because of the exceptional sensitivity of the situation, particularly the very fine distinction between what would be interpreted as providing information about Russia and what would be seen as Communist propaganda, the Ministry found it necessary to provide the Russian Embassy with reassurance that their aid in promoting the Allied cause would be protected from adverse criticism. Consideration was thus given to the possibility that it might be necessary for the Minister to send a letter to the Soviet Ambassador saying that the Ministry wanted Embassy speakers, wanted them in uniform, and was prepared to say before each meeting that HMG had invited them. Reluctantly the Soviet Ambassador had agreed to supply speakers on condition it was made quite clear there was no wish whatsoever to interfere with British domestic affairs. 'Record of Conversation with M Zinchance,' October 30 1941; INF 1 676.

27. Parker to D.G. through Lord Davidson, July 24 1941; INF 1 676.

28. Ibid, Memorandum from Mr Dowden. Without question the alliance with the Soviet Union and the fear of internal subversion complicated the Ministry's task. Having read papers provided him about the Communist
Party, the DDG considered there was a formidable case against the Party, "once it is accepted that no Government Department can be expected to foster revolutionary movements":

The difficulty for us is that the official approach involves the view that Communist support of the war, increased production, etc, is specious. It is in fact genuine, but is not dissociated from their plans, which involves the overthrow of capitalism, etc. It seems to me that the Government must choose either to adopt a very rigid attitude to everything that hints of CP (the M.I.5 attitude), thereby, I think, doing much harm to the war effort; or try to be as clever as the Communists and get out of them what assistance it can, without backing them or increasing their general prestige. The second line of policy, which I favour, means constant vigilance and mainly ad hoc decisions. Do you think you and Parker can carry it out? Ibid, DDG to S Gates, October 7 1941.

29. Ibid, Parker to Gates, October 20 1941.
30. Ibid.
31. Morton to Parker, January 19 1942; INF 1 677.
32. Policy Committee, September 4 1941; INF 1 676. On the same date the matter was considered by the Ministry of Information Executive Board, after which Mr Ryan of the BBC wrote to the MOI Director General about the difficulties involved in tackling the issue in broadcasts:

Before the Nazis attacked her, only a handful of cranks and Communists were actively interested in Russia. The man in the street, always suspicious, and uninterested in foreigners, vaguely believing that Russia walked out on the last war, disgusted by the reports, so heavily publicised, of the Russian trials, had no use at all for the Soviets. He wrote them off as oppressive and incompetent.... Now that the Russian armies have put up such a good show the man in the street in this country is undoubtedly asking himself how far he has been misled about the whole Russian set up.
Acknowledging that the new interest might be exploited by "professional Communists", Ryan noted that "it cannot simply be dammed." Ryan suggested that they could not "do anything either way about this curiosity", as "our own experts seem to know very little about how the wheels go round in Russia", and they could not afford to upset the Kremlin by critical publicity. He further submitted that with the battle raging, the public were in no mood to be reminded that "Communism is as oppressive, and as alien to our ideas of right and wrong as is Nazism." In order to "avoid putting out propaganda that listeners won't swallow", Ryan suggested finding out whether professional Communists were active among the workers, what they were saying, and how the workers were reacting. He also thought it would help if Ministers made references in their speeches to the "deep differences between our way of life and the Russian." September 4, 1941; INF 1 676.

33. Ibid, Parker to Gates, November 10 1941.

34. Ibid, R H Parker, "Secret: Policy Towards Communism", Note by Director of the Home Division, August 12 1941.

35. Ibid. Parker was known as Judge Parker because of his judicial career in India.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid, Memorandum, Parker, July 15 1941.
38. Ibid, Observations by Parker further to a paper he submitted July 13
1941, on necessity of deciding and setting a course of interpretation
about Russia.

commenting on Parker's deliberations agreed that for the first time in
this country the political theory of Communism had both an audience and
an occasion and that the tendency to extremism could be countered in one
of two ways, by downright repression or by the submission of an
alternative programme which would command public confidence. Observing
the unwisdom of criticising Russian achievement at just that moment,
"when it may well prove that the unparalleled sacrifice of the Russian
people has saved that civilised world which Communism was particularly
supposed to be out to destroy." Maxwell agreed with Parker's conclusions
that the only method they could employ was that of oblique propaganda
designed to fill the vacant mind and to supply the answers to as yet
unformed questions. Maxwell was himself of the opinion that the swing
towards Bolshevism was much reduced now that Russia was in the war: "Had
she remained aloof there might have been a tendency to attribute this to
the superior wisdom of Communist foreign policy, and the organical
strength of the Communist state. It has now been revealed that ideology
is no shield against aggression, and the hideous sufferings of the
Russian people prove to all the world that an authoritarian Government
is just as powerless to save its people from the fury of the aggressor
as is the most stable of the capitalist powers." September 3 1941.
40. Ibid. On September 9, 1941, Parker sent another copy of his August 12 paper on Communism to the Ministry of Information Director General noting that the time was then particularly favourable for launching the spiritual crusade. He also noted the need "to keep before the public mind the Draconic method of rule in the Soviet Republic and the denial of liberty to individuals equally with the German denial, and equally repugnant to ourselves." Commenting on the difficulty of handling the issue with subtlety, he suggested as a modus operandi that, "perhaps the Executive Board could issue a directive to all Divisions to produce a programme on these lines within the ambit of their own responsibilities... the Executive Board would then decide for or against each one, and construct some machinery for their co-ordination where necessary..." INF 1 676.
As the prospect of an Allied victory appeared more assured, each of the Allies gave increasing thought to its own postwar interests. A similar process took place within the Churches. During the war the Churches discovered how powerful and effective a force they could be, particularly when they cooperated nationally and internationally and enjoyed Government support. At the beginning of the war the British Government sought to identify their cause with that of Christianity and encouraged Church leaders to speak out in support of the war effort. On December 21 1940 the *Times* published a joint declaration from the Archbishops of Canterbury, York and Westminster and the Moderator of the Free Churches. The statement, "The Christian Basis for Peace", was widely used in the Ministry's propaganda, as R R Williams of Religions Division noted: "we have given very wide publicity to the statement in all parts of the world, as we consider it excellent propaganda and the kind of outlook which might easily draw to our side the most constructive elements in the various European countries."

Churchill's entrenched opposition to the Ministry of Information issuing any kind of declaration of postwar aims meant that despite using the statement, the Ministry were unable to give it their official sanction, as Williams further observed: "The Ministry certainly is in no position to take an official attitude in the matter. It is too dangerously near a statement of war aims for us to be in any way committed." "The Christian Basis for Peace" spoke of the religious and ethical foundations of a future peace and included a recommendation for the abolition of material inequality and a fair distribution of the earth's resources. The
prevailing feeling in the Ministry was that it was just such a statement as was needed:

Propaganda succeeds best when it is directed to a clearly defined object. Vague generalizations are comparatively ineffective... In time of war the progressive elements are eager to see the ideals for which the nation is fighting translated into concrete pledges of Government action at home and abroad. No one claims that the present social system is perfect. One effective remedy for possible discontent and disaffection in this country would be the adoption of a striking social policy. (3)

Both Duff Cooper and Sir John Reith urged the Government to make "constructive statements", but neither Chamberlain nor Churchill were willing to oblige. By 1941 public interest in the postwar world had already gathered considerable momentum. In the interests of morale and the war effort the Ministry would willingly have joined the debate which was both an opportunity and a challenge for its propaganda. The Prime Minister, however, not only refused to make a statement on war aims, he wanted complete silence, a stance which was at once untenable and unrealistic and unable to prevent the subject retaining its grip on the public imagination. Meanwhile the need to join the debate was urged upon the Ministry from a variety of sources, not least its own regional information officers. (4)

Although remaining apparently aloof from participation in the debate, in December 1942 the Ministry provided a blaze of publicity for the Beveridge Report. As with "The Christian Basis for Peace", the Ministry used the Report for propaganda purposes without directly associating itself with it. The enormous public response to the Beveridge Report surprised the Government which realized it had clearly underestimated the strength of popular feeling on the question. There was, moreover, fear that this sentiment was open to exploitation by the left. In March 1943, Sir John Anderson wrote to the
Minister of Information advising him of the concern expressed at a meeting of the Home Front Ministers about the extent to which, in matters of postwar reconstruction, the field of public discussion had been left open to extremists: "It was pointed out that on various postwar topics extreme views seem to be catching the public imagination; and it was thought to be high time that the balance should be redressed by gaining a hearing for more moderate and realist views."(5)

Church views inevitably and naturally fell into this latter category. The Religions Division, staffed as it was by churchmen, shared the intense interest of both the Ministry and of Church leaders in postwar matters, equalling the determination of the latter that Christianity should play a prominent role. One of the main considerations behind the formation of a Religions Division in the Ministry of Information was the recognition that Churches were a powerful influence whose help should be sought in times of national and world crisis.(6) The British Churches had responded willingly in support of the war effort and wanted to retain the enhanced position they had gained in the nation's life by playing an equally significant role in reconstruction. In August 1943 Hugh Martin argued that the changing war situation necessitated a new propaganda approach on the part of Religions Division:

Men's minds are on postwar issues. Even from the point of view of keeping them efficiently in the war we must now talk largely in postwar terms. This is true whether we are concerned with keeping people in good heart at home or with securing the continued wholehearted cooperation of our allies.(7)

During the early part of the war the aims of the Religions Division were decidedly short term, but as early as May 1943 reconstruction had become an important consideration in the formulation of Division propaganda:
The immediate aim of religious propaganda from Great Britain is to contribute to the disintegration of the German war machine and therefore to hasten victory. From the long term point of view it looks ahead and endeavours to prepare for reconstruction. The more distant aim may modify the means whereby the first aim is to be accomplished. (8)

Martin was determined that there should be a role for the Church in reconstruction. He wanted Religions Division to present what responsible leaders and representative bodies in the Churches were saying about postwar plans. Claiming that the world wanted to know what were British intentions, what was Britain going to do with victory, Martin declared, "In the total answer, the Church must not be left out." (9) Martin was not arguing for the Church to have an independent voice in reconstruction. He wanted Religions Division to show the religious world that the British Churches were equally as determined as the British Government on winning complete military victory and on the establishment of a juster, freer, more peaceful world: "This involves keeping up-to-date the story of religious persecution to remind people of the kind of enemy we have to face and as a counter to premature peace moves. It also involves the introduction of a new emphasis on reconstruction."

Stressing the necessity of providing Religions Division with a role in the reconstruction debate, Martin pointed out that religious circles throughout the world, especially in the USA and Latin America with twenty Roman Catholic Republics, were not only intensely interested in peace prospects and reconstruction, but also intensely anxious. He pointed to the political importance of religion in the Orthodox Balkan countries, noting that, "Axis Propaganda has always 'plugged' the materialistic-capitalist outlook of Britain and it is now hard at work suggesting that the alliance with Russia means a Peace which will threaten the future of Christianity in Europe and the world."
He strengthened his case yet further by stressing that in many of the liberated countries the Protestant and Catholic Churches would be found to be about the only organized survival from the past. Cooperation with them and their goodwill would be highly important. Here the links formed by Religions Division with Christian leaders in occupied lands, and with refugee governments, could prove of value. Martin pointed to the process already begun in the dealing of Religions Division with the French Protestant Church in North Africa. Completing his argument, Martin declared, "To sum up... Religions Division should now be encouraged to meet the new situation by developments in the realm of reconstruction." (10)

In fact both Religions Division and the Church looked far beyond the period of reconstruction, forseeing a much more significant role for religion in the future life of the nation, and indeed the world. By 1944 reconstruction and continuity were primary concerns within the Division, although their envisaged role was mainly connected with overseas publicity, thought unnecessary on the home front once peace was attained, as the Division's Director posited: "it is difficult to imagine that there would be any necessity for such activities in peacetime." (11) In June 1944, Kenneth Maclellan presented a memorandum on "British Overseas Publicity: Peacetime Needs", which argued that it would always be in the interests of Great Britain that religious bodies in other countries should be interested in the religious life of Great Britain, while the cooperation thereby developed would itself be a useful by-product of immediate service to international cooperation. Maclellan explained how wartime developments and changes in the international and military situation had contributed to a gradual modification in the aims of Religions Division. Many
of the nations to which publicity was directed had themselves joined the United Nations and generally shared Britain’s military aims. The interest of religious publicity had therefore become centred in the projection overseas of British religious life with an increasing emphasis on the contribution of the British Churches to national and international reconstruction:

The prominent themes in this projection are (i) the vitality and adaptability of British religious institutions (ii) evidence of constructive planning both in the reform of church institutions and in the working out of the Christian contribution towards general social reconstruction (iii) evidence of interest in and concern for the Churches of other countries on the part of the British Churches... It is clearly along the lines of this long term publicity that the peacetime future of British religious publicity lies. (12)

Plans for Religions Division exceeded simply remaining a department within the Ministry, in whatever form it might be retained after the war. Because the overseas work of the Ministry was carried out in close consultation with the Foreign Office, and because good relations with it were essential for the overseas tasks of Religions Division, the clergy working there necessarily formed a close working relationship with that crucial Department of State. Moreover it was recognised that each could work to the advantage of the other. Seeing Christianity as a powerful cohesive force which could be used to promote British interests, Maclellan felt the Foreign Office should be supportive of the Churches as they possessed considerable potential for aiding British policy. Describing the Church as an international entity able to promote international cooperation and help secure the peace, Maclellan argued that there were extensive grounds for paying attention to religious publicity:

In this connection it must be remembered that the Christian Church, Catholic and Protestant, is the oldest international society in existence and although its fabric has been partly weakened by the acids of modernity there remains throughout the world a network of religious contacts of very considerable importance.
On the Roman Catholic side the network finds its centre in Rome. Contacts are between territorial churches and the centre at the Vatican. The figure of the spokes of a wheel has often been used. There has not been a great deal of contact between e.g. the Catholics of Britain and the Catholics in America, but in this case and in several similar cases such contacts have been greatly developed through the work of this Division during the war, much to the advantage of British prestige and publicity.

On the Protestant side links between British and overseas Churches takes a number of forms.

1. The British Churches are linked up with the World Council of Churches (the so-called Ecumenical Movement) this type of contact is roughly comparable to the Catholic pattern (with Geneva replacing Rome as the centre). But there is much more international contact direct from country to country in the Ecumenical Movement than in the Church of Rome. The whole Ecumenical Movement is a factor of real importance which British foreign policy must take note of for the coming decade.

2. Various denominations in Britain have important contacts with their opposite numbers throughout the world. For example the Church of England has its network of contacts through the Anglican Communion, the Baptists have the Baptist World Alliance, the Church of Scotland has the Presbyterian Alliance, the British Methodists have strong links with American Methodists.

3. All these Churches (and for that matter the Catholics as well) have important commitments in missionary work in backward countries. In peacetime there are something like 10,000 missionaries overseas, roughly 8,000 Protestant and 2,000 Catholic.

Apart from the fact that these old and well established links provide a fertile field for the maintenance and development of interest in Great Britain there is a special reason for strengthening them in the immediate postwar period. On any showing the future peace of the world depends on international cooperation, especially on that between Britain, America, Russia and China. The World Christian Movement is thoroughly accustomed to the idea of international cooperation and in many countries e.g. America, it is the Christian Churches which are giving the lead to the general population in the demand for an international organisation for security. It is clearly much to the interest of Great Britain that this world wide, though at present inadequately organised force, should have full scope as an influence for international cooperation for all purposes. (13)

Maclean was aware of the Foreign Office preference for the Churches to act independently in order that it not be left open to the criticism that it used Christianity for political ends. In discussing the limits of official and voluntary efforts in this sphere, Maclean observed that once the restrictions of wartime were eliminated a great deal of contact between British religion and
that of other countries, at least on the Protestant side, would take place naturally without Government support. Prior to that, however, there might be an intervening period when contact would not be possible without some Government assistance. This point had already been put to Foreign Secretary Eden by the British Churches which, in return, had received an encouraging reply.

In fact, Maclennan anticipated, and clearly wanted, indefinite cooperation and involvement between Church and Government over religious publicity. He believed that there was reason to believe that even in peacetime British religious publicity would benefit from a measure of Government support as many wartime contacts, especially on the Catholic side, were considered likely to collapse unless officially supported for some time to come. Discussing the possible channels for British religious publicity overseas, Maclennan suggested that "both the British agencies and the British representatives of international agencies might cable much more news abroad if it were encouraged by some financial assistance..." He also suggested the large number of religious books and periodicals distributed free through Government sources to churchmen in America, the Dominions and other countries might continue in peacetime.

Maclennan knew that Government financing was a delicate matter, but it was equally an activity which he believed should be continued, particularly in the case of intervisitation: "throughout the war this has proved the most fruitful of all forms of international religious contact which includes the sending of British Churchmen to other countries and the welcoming of foreign Churchmen to this country. While it would be an entirely new departure for the Government to subsidise such intervisitations it is quite possible that assistance in this field would be welcomed and would be extremely fruitful."(14)
Maclennan proposed official action be instituted in the field of ecclesiastic relations, suggesting that the most suitable body to supervise such a wide field of publicity would be an expert section on religion at the British Council. The British Council lacked any previous experience with the subject, a fact of which Maclennan disapproved and sought to rectify: "So far the British Council has not touched religion, but it is quite inappropriate that a body which exists to project the culture of Britain overseas should ignore the whole religious side of British life." Moreover, Maclennan considered that the "Churches would not feel the same difficulty about cooperating with the British Council as they might about cooperating with the Government." He recognised that direct cooperation with the Government was now much more possible than it had been in the past: "The Churches have become accustomed to the existence of Religions Division and on the whole have welcomed it." So successful, in fact, had the wartime alliance between the Churches and the Government proven, that in January 1945 the Rev RR Williams, a specialist in the Protestant Section of the Division, recommended that "plans should be made for a small office to be opened, preferably at the Foreign Office, which in substance, and perhaps in name could be an Overseas Religious Relations Branch."(15)

Kenneth Grubb, the Controller of Overseas Propaganda, clearly preferred this latter suggestion to association with the British Council. In a letter which stressed the value of Religions Division and the part played in British history and in contemporary British thought by religion, Grubb advised David Scott of the Foreign Office that on the one hand the British Council had a wider geographical coverage than had the Foreign Office, but:

On the other hand, the desire of the religious bodies themselves to pursue their own international connections is a spontaneous one and they need,
not so much stimulation, as some guidance and help which would seem most naturally to come from the Foreign Office. I think it is true to say that this Ministry enjoys to a considerable degree the confidence of leading dignitaries of the British Churches and it is probable that religious leaders would feel more confidence in dealing with the F.O. itself than with the British Council. (16)

Scott also thought the Foreign Office to be the more appropriate body to deal with the matter than the British Council, which he hoped would "not attempt to harness religion to its chariot." (17) Scott favoured the Churches being left to maintain their own connections abroad with help and guidance from the Foreign Office, adding that of course this applied only should such help and guidance be wanted, as an entitlement available to any British organisation. In the postwar period the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations always sought Foreign Office guidance in the conduct of international ecclesiastical affairs, as a means of ensuring that Church policy remained in line with that of the Foreign Office.

During the war Herbert Waddams, a Church of England minister who worked for the Religions Division and subsequently was appointed secretary to the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations, perceived a coincidence of interests and the advantage of cooperation between Government and Church. In a confidential memorandum prepared for the Peace Aims Group, a sub-committee of the Russia Committee, in 1944, Waddams developed the theme that the problem of reconstruction could "legitimately be termed a spiritual problem." (18) Waddams argued that without the spiritual element, purely social, economic and political measures could not succeed. Church power could act as a complement to political power by providing the common ideal that was needed to unite men in a lasting bond of friendship:
Part of this problem is purely political, that is to say it depends on the political intentions and actions of the allied powers. With this we are not concerned as such. There remains a vast field in which the Church could and ought to play a fruitful part. Our experience in this war has conclusively shown how closely political objectives are related to religious beliefs. For purposes of work the two may be separated, but they must go hand in hand and must not be allowed to be contradictory in any particular. The religious and the political must be two aspects of the same activity.

This statement was a very important indicator of the type of relationship many leading churchmen desired with the State. Also of significance was the stress placed by Waddams on the potential of the Churches in constructing and rebuilding the war torn world:

In Europe today the Churches are the only organised bodies which have consistently and successfully resisted the National-Socialist weltanschaung, and its practical application. This means that there are numbers of people whose cooperation is assured, if they are rightly approached...

In many cases the clergy and bishops of the various Churches have become the leaders of their people in quite a new way. Because the Church has alone remained of all the peoples' organisations, it is through the Church that the people have expressed themselves. This leadership should be used and encouraged, as it would form a continuity of great value and because the people have learnt to trust the Church.

Waddams claimed that the Church would have two main objects which would be equally beneficial to the Allies:

The first would be to make a real and lasting contribution to European and world cooperation by throwing the influence of Christianity into the scales for this purpose. The second would be to give the Churches the place of leadership in the future outlook of Christians and non-Christians alike. This of course does not mean control by the Churches of practical plans after the war. It means that the Churches should establish themselves as the places to which men look for their purpose in life, and for the provision of moral standards. This is of the utmost importance both for the world, and also for the Churches. There is a great opportunity for Christianity to reclaim its proper place in the popular mind, and by doing so exercise a decisive influence on policy and behaviour. Moreover if the Allies are ready to allow the Churches sufficient scope, that in itself would be a great step in destroying suspicion and in assuring Europe as a whole of the sincerity of their intentions.
Waddams was convinced that, "... the end of the war will see a condition which may prove decisive for the Church in the future. There will be a gap into which the Churches can and must step, for if they fail to do so the chance may never again recur." Waddams envisaged a world organisation of Churches which would include the Roman Catholics and the Orthodox. He realized that in practice there would have to be some division of action between Protestant and Catholic, "but they must both be executing a common policy and must both be aiming at precisely the same thing." Waddams wanted the Churches to be ready to seize the initiative:

But the Churches themselves must be prepared immediately to seize any chance that occurs. It will of course be vital that the main Christian bodies should act together, and that they would have an agreed course of action... The World Council of Churches provides for a certain amount of practical joint action on the part of the Protestant world, but of course in a matter of this kind the cooperation of Roman Catholics and Orthodox in an official capacity is essential. If anything is to be done on a really useful scale the Vatican will have to be consulted and its active support will be a sine qua non of success.

With this memorandum, Waddams included 'Suggestions for the Agenda of a Meeting between Roman Catholics, Orthodox and Protestants.' Waddams recognised that vital to his plans for the Church was cooperation by the main Christian bodies, Protestant, Orthodox and Roman Catholic, on an agreed course of action, regardless of doctrinal differences: "Perhaps there is no need at this time of day to draw attention to the drawbacks and disadvantages of schism. But so many opportunities have been lost in the past that the point must be emphasised again and again." Waddams recommended immediate discussions, suggesting that the Roman Catholic organisation Sword of the Spirit and the Protestant Religion and Life afforded sufficient ground on which to begin. Eventually Waddams hoped to see the "establishment of a permanent body either privately or publicly,
representing all the Churches, to act together and to take advantage of every opportunity that offers."

Significantly, while Waddams emphasised that his projected role for the Church would complement political power, he was equally emphatic that it would not usurp it. His proposed agenda stipulated that there was to be:

"careful dissociation of the Churches from any attempt to get political power for themselves, either in general, or in particular countries. This is important, and where possible should be clearly shown by the leaders of the Churches, especially the Vatican and the Orthodox Churches in the Balkans.

Waddams pointed to one particularly significant reason why political authority should promote the cause of Christianity and the Churches in the postwar period, they all shared a common foe:

During the past 25 years the great cry in Europe has been the danger for Christianity of Communism. I cannot think that this cry really represents the chief problems for the Christian Churches, in that Communism seems to me to be merely one expression of a larger condition. It appears to me that the cry of Bolshevism has misled many people, and prevented them from coming to an accurate diagnosis. Communism, however, does represent in a strong form a tendency which is clearly to be discerned in almost every country of Europe; this is a tendency to cut adrift from the Christian faith and Christian doctrine of man and to trust in a secular materialism, political and scientific, which is supported by a half-baked, half agnostic philosophy (if it may be dignified by such a name). But the adherents of this view are not by any means necessarily or chiefly communists.

This whole attitude would appear to be a very damaging one for all the Churches, in that it undermines the traditional outlook on which European culture has rested for many hundreds of years - a readiness to accept the truth of Christianity, however badly the Christian life was lived in practice. Apart too from the specifically Christian side this new attitude is essentially destructive, in spite of the fact that it almost always claims to be constructive. Its very essence involves the removal of the rock on which the house is built, and in the long or short run this must mean catastrophe.

While Waddams saw materialism in general as posing the greatest threat to Christianity, there seems little doubt that the Foreign Office would have
interpreted Waddam's memorandum as proposing Christianity as an antidote to Communism. His claim that the war had not only raised the Churches into a leading role, but had forced people to think, "What are the things which really matter in life?", and possibly re-evaluate things spiritual, was also a warning:

These people are not necessarily Christians, but they have learnt to look to the Church for guidance and inspiration. If, after the war, the Churches do not seem to them to justify this attitude, Christianity will be replaced by the prophets of the new age.(19)

Although Waddams included all the emerging secular forces when he spoke of the "prophets of the new age", in the Foreign Office these were most commonly perceived as Communists, and Waddams in fact was effectively giving warning that should the Church not receive sufficient support to retain the elevated position it had attained during the war, then the faith currently residing in Christianity could be transferred to Communism.

In order to prevent the alienation of the Church from the working classes, the Churches always tried to dissociate themselves from political anti-Communism and the traditional establishment opposition to working class movements. That Communism was viewed by the Church as a rival faith meant that the Churches were naturally anti-Communist. Theoretically this was confined to the spiritual sphere, but in practice it extended also to the political, where it manifested itself in many ways. Most Churches, and churchmen, were essentially conservative and as equally opposed to Communism as a political force as an ideological. The concern of the Churches not to be identified with reaction, which they feared would lose them the working class support they needed to promote a religious revival, meant the Churches effected a distinction between spiritual and political anti-Communism. In theory the
distinction might have been valid, but in practice it proved impossible to maintain. The traditional and inherent anti-Communism of the Churches proved impossible to suppress, even during the war when military success seemed to depend on the alliance with Russia. As victory grew more assured, the anti-Communist bias of the Churches reasserted itself ever more fiercely.

On January 12, 1944, the Christian News Letter began in the by now familiar wartime pattern of praising Russian achievements; but the usual tempering with suggestive criticisms was replaced by a strident warning that while reform was needed at home, the Russian way meant disaster. First praising Russian achievements, then subtly instilling doubts about Russian intentions, the article went on to draw a frightening picture of despairing masses and mob rule, concluding with the proposition that any changes which needed to be instituted in the European order should be based on the Christian tradition; Communism could mean only annihilation:

It is not difficult to understand that millions in Europe are fascinated by Russia. The astonishing vitality of the Russian people, the extraordinary sacrifices they make for the common cause, the remarkable unity which they show, the independence and skill of their foreign policy and propaganda, the impression made by the Russian prisoners of war and Russian workers, all these things have helped to change the mental picture which continental Europeans had of 'bolshevism'. No propaganda is powerful enough to succeed against such facts.

The fascination is perhaps increased by the mystery which surrounds Russia. The dialectical tension and the contradictions in Soviet policy baffle anyone who tries to understand it, and make it impossible to arrive at a balanced judgement about the real significance of Russia's role in the present and in the future.

But however complicated the Russian situation may be, for the proletarianised masses it represents something very simple: namely, a working alternative to their present slavery. For them Russia becomes increasingly the country which offers what they want most: liberty and social justice.

This is true in the occupied countries, where communism plays a great role in the resistance movement. It is becoming increasingly true in Germany, where the processes of proletarianisation is going on at a terrifying speed and where the policy of an understanding with Russia is
making headway, especially, but not exclusively, in the army. Russian propaganda is making very clever use of this mood. The promises it makes seem far more concrete than anything which comes from the West. The possibility of a landslide towards the East would not be a great danger if it were certain that Russia will be a constructive element in the European situation. But this is by no means certain. If Russia is left alone in Europe, the temptation to dominate and exploit the situation will be strong. For the sake of the future it is essential that the Russian way out should not become the only way out.

But there is more. The turning of the proletarian masses toward Russia is not merely based on their desire for social justice, but also on their despair. Their interest in Russia is to a large extent their interest in the overthrow of all remnants of the traditional social and political order. It is clear that radical changes must take place in that order; but they should take place on the basis of the fundamental European tradition which is Christian and, therefore, personalistic and anti-totalitarian. For Europe as a whole to adopt the solution which these masses consider as the Russian solution would be to commit suicide.(20)

Fear of partisan movements and the fact that in the anticipated postwar chaos they might prove the only effective centres of organisation capable of establishing order had long been a subject of concern in the Foreign Office.(21) By mid-1944 fear of the partisan movements was being publicly expressed in Christian circles. The subject was further addressed in the Christian News Letter on May 31, in a discussion on the future of Europe which quoted Major-General Fuller, a one-time friend of Mosley and supporter of the British Union of Fascists:

Whatever recovery may be possible there will be large shifts in the foundation of society. New classes are emerging to displace the old. There are wide areas where, as Major Fuller says in the New English Weekly "the new and rising middle-class is composed of war profiteers and black marketeers. Extortion, bribery, cheating and thieving are the elements of the new morality, consequently the honest and law-abiding go to the wall. Nevertheless, these thieves and extortioners are not the most powerful element in the new social order for they are outclassed by the partisans - the rising aristocracy. These are violent men, men of a new feudal order. To them might is unquestioned right. What they want they take.(22)

To which the Christian News Letter added the endorsement:
The governing factor in the social order, as they understand it, is the rifle. (23)

This attack on the partisan movement brought an angry response from Religion and the People, but one also of dismay as it saw that the sentiments expressed were not isolated phenomena but actually represented an important section of Church opinion:

Why then this cowardly abuse of men who fight? If the Christian News Letter were to publish an article stating that the British Army represented a new modern banditry which believed that might was right and that the governing factor in society was the rifle it would lose all its episcopal support and most of the rest. How then is it able to say that men who support the British Army and its Allies in anti-fascist war, the partisan forces of Europe, are of this kind? The answer is simple. It is that the deadly fear of the 'Underground' that inhabits the Christian News Letter is reflected in many religious circles. The men who have taken arms because they feel that right must be supported by 'might' (even if the might is as inadequate as is so much badly armed partisan 'might') may demonstrate an independence in post-war Europe a trifle too vigorous for the Christian News Letter. (24)

The Christian News Letter was the official publication of the Christian Frontier Council, established during the war by Dr J H Oldham CBE under the chairmanship of Sir Walter Moberly. The group was small and during the war most of its members were Under-Secretaries in the war departments, or engaged in Parliament or public life. One of its office holders was Kenneth Grubb, Controller of Overseas Propaganda in the Ministry of Information. The idea behind the Council, according to Grubb's autobiography, "was that the Church failed to influence the institutions of society because it addressed them from the outside. The fruitful approach was not the official pronouncements of Church bodies, but the work and witness of laymen and laywomen...they were on the frontier between the Church and the World." (25) Religion and the People pointed out that the Christian News Letter was published by the Christian
Frontier Council which was officially linked, and reported to, the British Council of Churches, and observed: "What it now discloses is more than a temporary aberration. It is symptomatic of a deep rooted paralysis among influential people."

The growing pessimism of Religion and the People as anti-Communist and anti-Soviet views regained ascendancy among churchmen was fully justified. For the sake of the war effort most leading churchmen had obliged the Government by speaking in favour of Russia or maintaining a discreet silence. When victory was assured and postwar objectives took priority over military ones, fear and suspicion of Russia replaced the previous praise and apparent understanding. In October 1944, Dr Bell, the Bishop of Chichester, wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury, William Temple, concerning a discussion with Herbert Waddams, then working for Religions Division and destined to be appointed Secretary of the influential Church of England Council on Foreign Relations:

We discussed the Russian question generally, and I was glad to find that Waddams took the view that Russia is the big question mark over Europe; and that while it is of first class importance that the British and the Americans should be in full harmony with Russia in war and peace, nothing was gained by appeasing Russia. On the contrary it was of the utmost importance to say to Russia very plainly indeed what we objected to in a foreign policy, e.g. with regard to the Baltic States and Poland and Yugoslavia, and so forth. Russia understood strong language, and mistook politeness for weakness. (26)

Despite his recognition that postwar cooperation was essential to a continuing peace, Bell's attitude to Russia was distinctly hostile and he saw that country as the priority postwar problem. Bell's hostility was further revealed one month later at a World Council of Churches 'Peace Aims Group' meeting. In response to concern over the future of the Russian Institute at Paris, Bell retorted: "I would put the question this way: are the European
nations afraid of Russia or do they want to cooperate? In Sweden they were very much alarmed at the way in which Britain had fallen in love with Russia. People still do ask why we are friends with Russia. (27)

By the end of the war the growing disillusion perceptible in the pages of Religion and the People as clerical anti-Communism expressed itself through opposition to the postwar liberation and progressive movements and hostile gestures to the Soviet Union was fully realised with two events involving leading dignitaries of the Church of England. These two events occurring when they did, were seen as critical indicators that the Church's wartime attitude was not only insincere, but dictated entirely by political circumstances, as Religion and the People commented:

The foreign politics of the Church of England are always worth watching and are often important. They are conducted in a variety of ways - sometimes through the visits of Bishops, sometimes through the semi-official 'Church of England Council for Foreign Relations.'

It would be difficult to deny that between the wars the foreign policy of Canterbury was not wholly unlike that of Downing Street. It was anti-Russian and anti-Communist. Even though it found some difficulty in following Mr Chamberlain wholeheartedly - Hitler's policy with regard to the churches being a great embarrassment - there was no open breach and relatively few sermons were preached attacking the German concentration camps.

The war has brought a change. As the State has found a rapprochement with the Kremlin so Dr Garbett has visited the Patriarch. The foreign policy of the Church of England is now pro-Soviet and anti-fascist.

Does this come from conviction? Or is it simply the belated following of Downing Street?

In considering the answer to this conundrum two recent events should be noted. Despite the difficulties that have arisen over the creation of a new Government of Poland as agreed at Crimea, it must be obvious to all that the days of the London Polish Government now being attacked by its recent premier, Mickolaycz, are numbered. It is at this juncture that the secretary of the Church of England Council for Foreign Relations, Canon Douglas, chooses to accept at its hands the Order of Polish Restitution.

In Greece things go from bad to worse. The agreement which ended the Civil War is broken to the despite of E.A.M. The Regent installs a new government of the right.
At this juncture there flies to Athens the Archbishop of York, bearing a message from himself and his brother of Canterbury. Friendly calls are, no doubt, all to the good. But was the occasion used to press for the release of those Greeks who fought the Germans and are now imprisoned contrary to the recent agreement?(28)

The doubt evident in the questioning of the motives underlying the Archbishop's Greek visit were fully justified as the trip was intended to signify the British government's full support for the right-wing regime of Archbishop Damaskinos. Moreover, on his return to Britain, Garbett very deliberately reinforced British propaganda concerning the internal affairs of Greece.(29) Equally symbolic, and intentionally so, of the changing attitudes of Government and Church, was Douglas's acceptance of the Polish Order, as he made quite clear in a letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury.

Informing Fisher that the Foreign Office approved the Polish President's wish to decorate himself and the other nominee, the Roman Catholic Bishop Matthew, Douglas revealed his belief that it would be a gesture which would strengthen Matthew's difficult position in the British Roman Catholic complex and be a sign to Moscow, "that while eager to win their trust and friendship and while we eschew intervention in political issues as such we are not ready to give them carte blanche to do what they like with other Christian religio-nationalities." Douglas implied that this was equally the intent of the Foreign Office: "That the F.O. would not be sorry that they should receive such a hint is the reason, I imagine, for its approval of the Polish President's wish to confer an order upon Bishop Matthew and myself at this juncture."(30) The attitude of the Foreign Office was clearly an important consideration in Fisher's approval of Douglas's accepting the decoration. The Archbishop's chaplain informed Douglas that provided the Foreign Office authorities had
consented, then Fisher thought it was all to the good that Douglas accept the honour. (31)

The early intent of the Church to be an active participant in the postwar world, and the nature of its participation, was clearly revealed in the formation and development of the Committee for the Reconstruction of Europe. The decision of the Church to maintain and promote the new and political network of relationships built up during the course, and because of, the war, was evident not only in Religions Division but in the activity of ranking churchmen. In 1943 Canon C E Raven and Dr Hilderbrandt formed the Christian International Service, an interdenominational body, aiming at the creation of an informed Christian opinion on international relationships and the re-establishment of true fellowship between Christians of all nations. Hilderbrandt sought the advice of Bishop Bell, ardently anti-Soviet as well as anti-Communist, in drafting the aims of the service. Through his efforts the Service became connected with the British Council of Churches and there eventually emerged in 1944 the Committee for the Reconstruction of Europe, CRE.

The vast field of material reconstruction and the resettlement of displaced persons was the responsibility of UNRRA, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. CRE concerned itself with spiritual reconstruction and the rebuilding of Christian church life collaborating with the Department of Reconstruction and Inter-Church Aid set up by the WCC in Geneva which coordinated the contributions from the various CRE committees existing in Britain and America and a number of neutral countries.
While no discrimination was made between European Churches in the Reconstruction appeal and programme, Bishop Bell was deeply involved in the British venture, and his interest was directed mainly towards Germany. As soon as hostilities ended in May 1945, he began discussing with the authorities the possibility of renewing contacts with the German Church, pointing out the necessity of forestalling any moves by the Russian Communists and of employing all the latent Christian resources of Germany in rebuilding and re-educating the country. (32)

Although not quite as explicit as Bishop Bell, a similar sentiment was more than implicit in a CRE pamphlet explaining its aims and appealing for help:

YOU can share in the Christian Reconstruction of Europe. THIS IS A CHALLENGE TO YOU. Unless Christians everywhere realize their responsibilities and act together, non-Christian influences may shape the post-war reconstruction of the world. You, as a Christian, can share in combating these influences. Moral leadership everywhere must be strengthened and extended. Constructive action, inspired by faith and understanding, must be taken against the destructive forces now at work in Europe. Men have died for the peace and happiness of the world. For this we must live, work and pray, giving all that we have to offer, whether of money or of service. (33)

The only non-Christian forces in a position to influence the shape of Europe were the Soviet Communists liberating Eastern Europe from the Nazis and the indigenous resistance movements in which Communists had played a major role in actively opposing Nazi occupation. The CRE appeal was effectively a summons to the Christian forces in Europe to mobilise against the Communists.
The anti-Soviet, anti-Communist nature of ecclesiastical reconstruction at the end of the war, was equally evident in the ecclesiastical pursuit of a peace-time role in political affairs. The need to counter Nazism with a coherent ideology had given the Christian Churches an important wartime role. In the postwar world a similar need was perceived with regard to Communism. Government policy to enroll all British institutions in their efforts to contain Communism, including the Trades Union Congress, made Church involvement virtually unavoidable. (34) Not that the Church wished to avoid an active role in the political life of the nation. Its wartime experience had revealed to the Church how it could pursue an active political role which, without apparently compromising its spirituality, enhanced its power and influence at home and abroad. If the Church's traditional anti-Communism made it a natural ally of the Government, it was its postwar ambitions which made it a fellow combatant in opposition to the Soviet Union. At the end of the war, Religions Division, which was mainly composed of Churchmen anyway, and the Church, were equally eager to maintain the ecclesiastical network of communications established during the war and continue to expand and construct a postwar role on the foundations of the Church's wartime activities.

The Church recognised that the postwar period would be one of distress and disorganisation, with people looking for a lead out of the vacuum created by the war. It foresaw tremendous opportunities for the renewal of Christian life, bringing hope out of chaos, and for the re-establishing of the Church as a viable institution in the community, participating in its reconstruction and revitalization. Farther afield, the war had revealed the international desire for a new order. The
Church, its own ties renewed and strengthened because of the war, was determined to secure its place in that new order. This was particularly illustrated by the attitudes within the Church of England Committee for Foreign Relations. This body performed the same role for the Church as the Foreign Office did for the State, and from its inception it had sought to ensure that its functions were, if not complimentary, at least in no way opposed to that of its secular counterpart.

CFR's origins stretched back to the impetus given the Ecumenical Movement by the First World War. A Committee on Relations with Foreign Churches had been appointed on January 19, 1926. In its report to the Church Assembly in October 1926, it observed that the circumstances of recent years had given the Church of England a prestige and position of influence, leading to approaches from many other Churches. The Committee considered it desirable to emphasise the wide reaching character of this intercourse, and the great importance that it must have for the mutual relations of different countries of Europe with one another. Like the Ecumenical Movement, the Committee was inspired by the League of Nations, which it observed was bringing the civilised nations of the world into much closer intercourse with one another, and it was certainly as important that there should be an equally determined attempt made to create closer spiritual union between the different religious bodies throughout the Christian world. (35)

CFR superceded the Eastern Churches Committee, which was chairmanned by Bishop Gore before his death, coming into being on February 5, 1932, when the Church Assembly passed a resolution on the motion of the Bishop of Gloucester, seconded by the Dean of Chichester, requesting the Archbishops of Canterbury and York to appoint a Council on the relations
between the Church of England and foreign Churches, with the power to issue such reports as was considered desirable. It was thought that in view of the general movement towards fuller Christian Unity in every part of the world and of the interest increasingly shown by many foreign Churches in the position of the Church of England, that the time had come when relations between the Church of England and these foreign Churches should be regarded as a concern of the whole Church and not only of various voluntary societies within it. A Council appointed at the request of the Church Assembly and in close connection with the Assembly could either itself authorise and arrange conferences, commissions or conversations between Church representatives, or be aware of, and interested in, such opportunities of intercourse and could issue reports thereon for the information of the Church.

The proposed Council would not be concerned with the relations of the Churches in the United Kingdom or in the Mission Field; nor was it to be regarded as removing from the Archbishop the authority and responsibility in such matters which properly belonged to the office he held. The work of the Council was largely to be done by Committees dealing with special branches of a subject and reporting to the whole Council. The Council as a whole was intended to meet but infrequently through the year.

The Archbishop of Canterbury felt it better that the active members of the Eastern Churches Committee became a sub-committee of CFR, if they wished. In November 1932, Cosmo Lang asked JA Douglas to become one of the secretaries, urging that it would be a position of real importance. Douglas had already developed a wide circle of contacts with other Churches, particularly the Orthodox. At the beginning of the
World War II, Douglas volunteered his services and contacts, and those of CFR, to the Ministry of Information. He was very concerned that there be an Anglican element in the Religions Division. However, Douglas was always careful not to compromise the suprapolitical role of the Church, in theory if not in practice. This was also illustrated in the nature of the relationship which CFR, under his guidance, developed with the Foreign Office. A member of the Foreign Office was invited onto the Council, to act in their individual capacity; but also intended as an unofficial liaison between the two bodies. Sir Stephen Gaselee was the first Foreign Office member of CFR, accepting nomination from Archbishop Lang in 1933. Following his death in 1943, Douglas wrote to Mr Perowne, explaining Gaselee's role and asking that he replace him:

We found him a great help to us in intimating from time to time what would be the mind of relevant officials in the Foreign Office to some matters upon which the Council was called on to advise His Grace. His death has been a great loss to us: for we have no one to act as unofficial link between the Council and the Foreign Office. (37)

Douglas advised Perowne that if he were willing to accept a place, the Archbishop of Canterbury would then write offering a place. Perowne consulted his Foreign Office superiors, who saw the situation as being entirely to their advantage, as Mr Loxley observed:

I understand from Mr Perowne that the Foreign Office representative's functions are mainly to act as liaison officer between the Foreign Office and the Council so that the latter may be able to find out if its ideas and projects are in harmony with our policy. The Foreign Office representative may also be able at times to prevent the Council from going off along the wrong lines. It therefore seems to me to be useful that the Foreign Office should be represented on the Council and if Mr Perowne is willing to act I would be in favour of his doing so. (38)
On November 11, 1943, William Temple officially asked Perowne to accept a place on CFR, and on November 15 Perowne responded with his acceptance of the proposal. (39)

During the war, Foreign Office and Ministry of Information officials had concerned themselves very much with Church affairs, becoming active committee members on CFR and WCC committees. This was a situation Douglas sought to perpetuate and extend in the post-war period. In February 1945, he wrote to the new Archbishop at that time, Fisher, asking him to appoint public figures, peers and M.P.s, as Douglas was concerned to have an element with influence in secular affairs on the Council. Douglas viewed the matter as important, particularly in view of the difficult and delicate problems which he envisaged the Council would soon be dealing with, such as the Baltic States, Poland and the Balkans. (40)

In March 1945, Douglas advised Ian White-Thompson that an overhaul of CFR was urgent. (41) There were many who agreed. But that overhaul was to deprive Douglas of the secretaryship. In a letter to the Bishop of Gloucester, who was retiring as Chairman of CFR, Fisher had expressed the necessity of Douglas continuing as Secretary because of his knowledge and experience: "but I now find a good deal of criticism that he likes to have fingers in too many pies and is inclined to intrigue and pull strings." (42) It was complained that it was easy to get Douglas's opinion, but not that of CFR. The question of Douglas's retirement was raised with him by Fisher who, acknowledging that the Council had largely been his creation, and been dependent upon him at every stage, told him that he was irreplaceable; but if he were intending to retire it would be better for him to go then: the end of
the war and the beginning of a new chapter would make it much better for the new secretary. (43)

Douglas was reluctant to give up his post. He told Fisher that he saw the duties of CFR as analogous to the Foreign Office, to advise, not to interfere, and although he liked and valued his mooted successor, Herbert Waddams, he considered him neither ripe nor well equipped at present to take over the secretaryship. He suggested that Dakin, another potential successor to Douglas, and Waddams become Assistant Secretaries to himself. (44)

This was opposed by the Bishop of Chichester who was to become CFR's new chairman and wanted that the chairmanship and the Secretaryship should change simultaneously. (45) Bell also considered that he and Waddams would work well together, for significant reasons. They both agreed that the big question mark over Europe was Russia, as Bell informed William Temple as early as October 1944. (46) This attitude on the part of both Chairman and Secretary was of the utmost importance in facilitating relations between CFR and the Foreign Office in the post-war period.

Bell's own appointment had initially aroused opposition within the Council, as there were those who feared he was not the right man and that he would be too inclined to rope them into his own enthusiasms. (47) The Chairmanship was thus first offered to the Bishop of Winchester, with the Bishop of Derby as next choice should he refuse. (48) The Bishop of Winchester, however, insisted that Bell was best equipped for the job. (49)

Bell certainly had plans for CFR. Within a week of being asked to accept the Chairmanship, Bell was telling the Archbishop that he wanted
an increased budget in view of the future role the Church of England would be playing. He stated that the European countries looked to Britain for moral leadership and the Churches looked to the Church of England with peculiar hope for all the encouragement and support that could be given. (50) Another indication of his plans for the Church was his desire that it employ Kenneth Grubb.

Grubb had already in 1944 accepted the Presidency of the Church Missionary Society. He had considered himself of insufficiently pre-eminent standing, but William Temple had impressed upon him "the new type of competence which the Church must seek in its practicing laity". (51) Temple subsequently summoned Grubb again and explained to him that for some time after the war it would not be clear who would emerge from the laity with the time and the disposition to serve the Church actively and he urged Grubb not to limit himself to CMS but to accept other posts if such came his way. (52) This Grubb did; not only in the Church of England but also the World Council of Churches where Temple's views were shared by Visser 't Hooft. Some years later, speaking of the urgent need after World War II for the Churches to concern themselves intelligently and seriously with international affairs, 't Hooft gave expression to what had then been the ecclesiastical perception of the new situation. With reference to Grubb's role in CCIA, 't Hooft stated: "This could only be done if men could be found who had clear Christian convictions themselves and who had also a sufficient knowledge of international affairs to be taken seriously by the statesmen and the international civil servants." (53)

It was for just such reasons that at the beginning of February 1945 Bell suggested Grubb as an ideal chief of staff to Fisher, adding that
he had been offered an Under-Secretaryship at the Foreign Office but had so far refused it. Bell noted that Grubb would need a pretty good salary, around £2000, but he was confident the Church could find that without difficulty. He added that Grubb was very keen on the Church of England. (54)

One year later, in February 1946, Bell was still urging Fisher to secure a position for Grubb within the Church. To this end he sent the Archbishop a memorandum on Grubb, with a covering letter which noted that he knew Anthony Eden well and the Prime Minister. He had now been offered the position of Assistant Secretary General to the United Nations. This meant a salary of £5000 and living in the United States. Bell felt it would be better if Grubb remained in England and worked for the Church, as this would make a great difference in the influence of the Church. He then suggested a salary of between two and three thousand pounds. (55) Bell's proposal was closely followed by a suggestion from the Christian Frontier that Grubb be made Secretary of the British Council of Churches, although it was conceded that the salary might create opposition, especially from those with left tendencies, the free Churches not being used to such salaries. (56)

Subsequent to this, Grubb wrote himself to Fisher, asking advice. He told the Archbishop that he regarded the United Nations position as meaning exile in the United States and as leading nowhere, as the Secretary-General's position would always be a political appointment. He added that he had been told that he was needed more at home in Church work than in America: there were opinions that Britain could recover a real position of spiritual leadership and there must be men who could work to that end. (57) Fisher himself was as keen as Bell to employ
Grubb. The problem was the salary. (58) Unable to afford Grubb as a full time employee, the Church still benefitted from his services in a number of capacities, including that of publicity officer to the Church Assembly. (59) Grubb committed himself to promoting the Church in the secular realm and, despite his sometimes exasperated view of ecclesiastical leaders and church affairs, he remained deeply involved with both.

The concern of the Church to exert an influence in the international sphere was demonstrated by its desire to be represented on the British Council, an important part of the British publicity machine. In May 1945 the Bishops in Egypt, the Sudan, Iran and Jerusalem, with the support of the Bishop of Gibraltar, urged Dr AC Craig, Secretary of the British Council of Churches, to take the opportunities of vacancies in the British Council to get in men who would exert a Christian influence: "We noted that the British Council has not always associated itself with the Christian Church in these lands, and that the impression often given is that the Council seeks to propagate British culture and civilisation without acknowledgement of its Christian connection." (60)

Craig consulted the Archbishop of Canterbury about the matter, also advising him that the British Council of Churches was considering adding to their staff Ian McMaster who they considered to have "abilities of a certain kind above the average". Of yet more significance was the fact that he worked for the Foreign Office and was in charge of the section of the Research Department concerned with relations with the Vatican. (61)

The question of the British Council was raised unofficially with Grubb by the Reverend Hugh Martin. Stipulating that Grubb's name was
not to be quoted, Martin subsequently informed the Archbishop that the situation was delicate, but the British Council was being reorganized. The British Council was under the control of the Foreign Office and likely to be even more closely related in future; the Foreign Office official in charge was Montague Pollock. After discussing the set up, Martin and Grubb agreed that the best approach would be direct to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs through the Archbishop, rather than going to any subordinate or to the British Council itself. Martin stressed that the matter was one of high policy and change could only be secured by interference from a very high quarter. (62)

Following this Fisher consulted Grubb personally, and afterwards advised Craig that nothing could be done until there was a new Government and the set up of the British Council clarified. (63) The episode revealed the widespread concern within Church circles generally both to get active Christians into positions of influence in secular bodies of influence and to secure the services of men of affairs, that the Church might exert an increased influence in the corridors of power. What seemed not to be considered was that such a transaction would be a two way process, with those same people exerting influence within the Church for purely secular or political reasons. Moreover, while the Church no doubt welcomed political advice which prevented it from accidentally transgressing Government policy and kept it on the right lines, this inevitably allowed a degree of direction and control which compromised the Church's suprapolitical status and undermined any attempt it made to keep distinct spiritual anti-Communism from the political version. Certainly the records of CFR committee meetings
illustrate that lay elements whose world view was strongly secular, urged actions on the Church to this effect.

In their attacks on Communism, both Primates tried to convey a concept of a spiritual struggle which was at once separate and above the political anti-Communist campaign. Moreover, they made a distinction between Marxian Communism and Christian Communism which hardline anti-Communists completely rejected, the Foreign Office included. The Foreign Office early realized that religion would play an important role in its opposition to Communism and the Soviet Union. In the Communist regimes it was seen that religion was a means of reconciliation, but it was also the main source of keeping opposition to the new regimes alive and active, as the Roman Catholic Church demonstrated. The Foreign Office through its Missions, and with the aid of Anglican dignitaries, sought to establish relations with elements in the Orthodox community which were opposed to their new Governments.
1. R R Williams to Miss Russell, Reference Branch, March 14, 1941; INF 1 785.

2. Ibid.

3. Memorandum by Reith, undated; INF 1 867.

4. One such officer wrote:

I venture to suggest... not as in any way an expert propagandist, but in my capacity as an observer trained to some extent in assessing public opinion... In the first place... with great deference... however well home propaganda may be planned it will fail unless it is inspired by a general and detailed policy which appeals to the public, and the policy which has the best hope of success today would be, in my opinion, a clear charter developing from the Atlantic Charter the details of the Government's proposals for national life and international relations after the war. Until the public has a clearer idea of what sort of life to expect after the war, and until it knows without the possibility of doubt that the Government envisages a state of society in which the majority will find the sort of life they want, we shall lack the inspiration to go all out in the war effort. Rowntree to Director of Regional Information Officers, April 25, 1942; INF 1 679.

Despite such appeals, the Ministry discouraged any discussion of the Government's postwar plans and actually warned Ministry speakers late in 1942 not to engage in "unsanctioned prognostication of future policy and legislation", and, even more specifically, to avoid "subjects about postwar reconstruction."

Parker to Regional Information Officers, November 3, 1941; INF 1 301.

5. Sir John Anderson to Brendan Bracken, March 6, 1943; INF 1 864. On March 21, 1943, Churchill revealed his own four year plan which emphasised the
interdependence of national security, the revival of trade, and domestic reconstruction. It was Churchill's plan rather than the Beveridge scheme which received prominence in a Ministry booklet published in June 1943 entitled *Post-War Reconstruction in Britain*.


7. Martin to Gates, August 13, 1943; INF 1 117.


9. Martin to Gates, August 13, 1943; INF 1 117.

10. Ibid.

11. Director Religions Division, June 1944; INF 1 416.

12. Ibid.

13. Director Religions Division, June 1944; INF 1 416. Emphasis added.

14. After the war the Foreign Office facilitated travel for those religious dignitaries who supported British foreign policy while it did all in its power
to discourage and hinder the Dean of Canterbury, a leading exponent of friendship with the Soviet Union, very pro-Soviet and an energetic supporter of the Soviet inspired peace movement.

The advantages of using the Church for positive publicity were not lost on the Russians, despite their professed atheism. Apart from the concessions given to the Russian Orthodox Church during the war, after the war ecclesiastical delegations from the Russian Church paid visits to their sister Orthodox Churches and to Orthodox communities all over the world, arousing a great deal of suspicion within the Foreign Office. At the close of the war delegations of Russian clergy continued the earlier series of visitations to the Balkan countries. On May 12, 1945, Bishop Ieronim of Kishinev brought the Rumanian Patriarch a message from Patriarch Alexei. A year later, Patriarch Alexei flew to Bulgaria for a ten day stay, where he was honoured by the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. The outstanding visit was that of Patriarch Alexei to the Orthodox Churches of the Near East. On May 27, 1945, accompanied by Metropolitan Nikolai Krutitsy, Archbishop Vitalii of Tula, and a suite of lesser clergy, Alexei flew to Teheran, Bagdad and Beirut. After a visit with the Patriarch of Antioch, the two motored to Jerusalem, where they were welcomed by the Patriarch and many of the Russian clergy living there. Never before had a Russian Patriarch appeared in the Holy City. Patriarch Alexei's journey then extended to Egypt, where King Farouk and the Patriarch of Alexandria served as hosts. On the return trip Alexei again visited Beirut, where he was entertained by the Soviet Ambassador and by the Patriarch of Antioch. His final stop was Damascus, where he was welcomed by the Patriarch.
This was the first time that a Russian Patriarch had visited the Levant. It is significant that Alexei omitted Constantinople from his itinerary. His relations with the Patriarch of Constantinople, like those of the Soviet Government with Greece and Turkey, were not cordial at that time. During these visits, Metropolitan Nikolai had left the patriarchal party at Alexandria, where he embarked by plane for London. He was welcomed by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York and visited King George. John Shelton Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State 1917-1950, 1965, pp 312-313.

15. Recommendation, R R Williams, January 12, 1945; INF 1 9543.


19. Ibid.


21. For example, a copy of an unsigned, undated letter sent to the Ministry of Information by the Foreign Office stated: "Communists are, as I have said, busy everywhere in Europe; indeed, they may form the only effective centres of
organisation during the postwar chaos here - the only power capable of bringing about some kind of immediate order. What kind of order would that be? One shudders to think." INF 1 785.

22. Religion and the People July 1944, p 1.

23. Ibid.


25. The idea behind the Christian Frontier Council, according to Kenneth Grubb:

was that the Church failed to influence the institutions of society because it addressed them from outside. The fruitful approach was not the official pronouncements of Church bodies, but the work and witness of laymen and laywomen with their stalls in the market place or sweating in the engine room. They alone could interpret industry and the professions from the inside and, with the help of theologians and divines, work towards discovering the relevance of the Gospel: they were on the frontier between the Church and the World.


27. "Peace Aims Group Meeting" afternoon session, November 7 1944; Bell Papers, Vol 25: 75.

29. Prior to his visit to Damaskinos, Garbett tackled the Greek question in his January 1945 York Diocesan Letter, supporting the official British line and stating that the Greek civil war was:

... a symptom of the condition of Europe as the black shadow of the Nazi horror is withdrawn from it. The people who are freed come out of a spiritual dungeon of darkness where they have been tortured, humiliated, starved and deceived by lying propaganda; they come out into the light with nerves strained, and the seeds of hate and suspicion sown by their oppressors ready to produce a baleful harvest. In country after country we shall have to deal with abnormal conditions. It is clearly the duty of the Allies to keep order until the freed peoples are able to manage their own affairs...

The Foreign Office were worried about the possibility of Russia extending its influence in Greece, especially via the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on their co-religionists in the Greek Orthodox Church. They thus welcomed a suggestion made by the Archbishop of York to the Ministry of Information in February 1945 that he should pay a visit to Damaskinos, the Regent Archbishop of Athens. (Oswald Scott to Douglas Howard, February 10, 1945; Minutes on the proposal stated, "An excellent idea." ADS, February 16, 1945; FO 371 48382.) In January 1945, Garbett had assented to a request from Douglas, Secretary of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations, for a message for Damaskinos, of which Douglas had noted to Douglas Howard at the Foreign Office: "My impression is that the message will strengthen Damaskinos' hands with outstanding Orthodox personalities who adhere to E.L.A.M. no less than those of other sections." (Douglas to Howard, January 5, 1945; FO 371 44556.)

The British Ambassador in Athens arranged for an invitation from Damaskinos to Garbett, and invited the Archbishop to stay at the Embassy during his visit. (Leeper to Foreign Office, March 22, 1945; FO 371 48382.) Garbett
arrived in Athens on April 18, 1945. On April 20, Leeper informed the Foreign Office that, "The Regent observed to me at lunch that now he had the moral support of the Anglican Church he could do without my help for three days. I replied that this period of repose would give me time to reflect on the next troublesome questions to which I might have to call his non-ecclesiastical attention."

The two Archbishops had many informal talks together, in which the Regent impressed upon Garbett his fear and suspicion of the Soviet Union and his belief that it was using the Russian Church to extend its influence in the Balkans. The search for a solution to the problem of Russian influence was the subject for discussion when Garbett made a return visit to the Regent in June 1945. Subsequently information from Garbett's visits was forwarded to the Prime Minister by the Foreign Office, which, Garbett was informed, was received with thanks as most interesting. (Minute, July 1945; FO 371 47854. The nature of the information was not specified, nor was it in the file; however it can be assumed that it concerned the Greek question.)

Prior to his departure from Greece, Garbett remained talking to Leeper late into the night about "any statement I might make to the press on my return."

He told the Ambassador that:

I proposed to speak about—:
1. The greatness of the Regent.
2. The welcome to the British and the popularity of the troops.
3. The horrors committed by the E.L.A.S. and the necessity of our intervention.
4. The need of food for the villages.
5. Intimidation still present in the remoter districts.
6. Personally I feel we ought to remain in Greece for a long period. This I believe is the wish of the more responsible people. (Garbett's Travel Diary)


32. George Bell: Bishop of Chichester, RCD Jasper, p 289.

33. Christian Reconstruction in Europe, pamphlet issued by the CRE Committee; CFR Papers.

34. In its campaign against Communism, the Foreign Office sought to use every possible source of resistance, from the Churches to the trade union movement. At the beginning of May 1948, RMA Hankey submitted a draft memorandum recommending consolidation of the political advantages gained in France and Italy by promoting a movement to wrest the key positions in organised labour away from the Communists: "in order to achieve this, the TUC should now at all costs be actively mobilised by the Labour Party to join the battle against Communism. The TUC should get in touch with non-Communist labour on the Continent in order to press the campaign forward." In France the 'force ouvriere' movement was to be encouraged to take the offensive and capture the key positions in French labour from the Communists. In Italy where the CGIL was under Communist control, the necessity of forming a non-Communist trade union confederation was considered; and even having CGIL leaders arrested on charges of tax evasion or black marketeering, "of which most Italians are
guilty", and getting them replaced by reliable socialists. There was also a desire to get real control of the World Federation of Trade Unions, WFTU, into non-Communist hands or else break it up: "At present it is a major menace and our delegates are made a laughing stock throughout the working class movement - all the more so because a British representative holds the chairmanship." Minute, May 3, 1948; FO 371 99346.

In October 1950, HG Gee, after discussion with the Provincial Information Officers of Lille and Marseilles, Mr Key and Mr Whitney-Smith, at a weekend course on Communism at Oxford, asked could not the TUC be persuaded to cooperate with foreign trade unions in countering Communist control, particularly in France and Italy: "It is evident that if the TUC are cooperating with other trade unions abroad in stamping out Communist infiltration it has not penetrated to Italy (I confirmed with Mrs Vranek, Information Department, Rome) and France, the two countries in Western Europe least capable of resisting a serious Communist menace, the importance of which needs no emphasis." Minute, October 13, 1950; FO 953 723.


38. JA Douglas to V Perowne, October 30, 1943; FO 370 858. Minute, Mr Loxley, Personnel Department, November 4, 1943; agreed by Sir A Cadogan, November 4, 1943; FO 370 858.


41. Ibid, Douglas to Ian White Thompson, March 13, 1945; Vol 2: 201.

42. Ibid, Fisher to Gloucester, April 16, 1945; Vol 2: 213-4.


44. Ibid, Douglas to Fisher, June 29, 1945; Vol 2: 243. Prior to this, the Bishop of Gloucester had told Fisher that Douglas did not like Waddams because Waddams had a will and a purpose of his own and Douglas wanted someone like the Bishop himself, sufficiently subservient to him.


46. Bell to Temple, October 7, 1944; Bell Papers, Vol 25.

47. Fisher to the Bishop of Winchester, June 13, 1945; Fisher Papers, Vol 2.

49. Ibid, Winchester to Fisher, June 14, 1945; Vol 2: 239.

50. Bell to Fisher, August 1, 1945; Vol 2: 285. In 1945 the CFR budget was approximately £1000; in 1954, the draft estimate of Budget expenditure was £4,380; Vol 121: 364.


52. Ibid; when Grubb expressed concern as to financial security, Temple retorted: "You have the native energy and skill to earn your living and at the same time to serve the Church. You will not be rich, but you will be satisfied."


54. Bell to Fisher, February 12, 1945; Fisher Papers, Vol 1. Although Bell insisted to Fisher that Grubb was keen on the Church of England, this wasn't quite true, he simply saw the Church of England as not being as bad as some of the other Churches. In Crypts of Power, Grubb's autobiography, he states: "The Church, like slavery in the States, is England's 'peculiar institution'." (p 215) On his own impression of the Anglican Church, he observed: "The Church of England is a noble and nice body, but it does not strike me with irresistible
force as an enterprising or an enthusiastic one, ready to spend and be spent in
the worldwide extension of the Kingdom of God." (p 154) Grubb admitted in his
autobiography to anti-clerical tendencies, and he was unable to resist inserting
not a few patronising, although humorous, comments. On the numerous
conferences he had to attend, Grubb remarked: "In Church government one
constantly encounters people of great piety and virtue; few things are more
trying to the nerves. Meeting is at best wearisome, and meeting the good
exhausting." (p 224) Discussing the WCC he noted: "But ecclesiastics can be
oppressive en masse. Like manure they are pungent in a heap but beneficial
when spread." (p 173) Discussing Church Unity, he stated: "Fear is a more
potent cause of alliances than goodwill or even common belief, however sincerely
held. 'When bad men combine the good must associate; or else they will fall one
by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible struggle'." (p 178, quote from
Edmund Burke, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontent, 1770) On the
importance of right and close relations between the clergy and laity, Grubb
added: "I do not speak of bishops because, although most devoted and able, they
are enigmatic, and it is well to regard them with caution. If a man has a
serious discussion with a bishop, it should not be a deux but with a witness,
say, one's solicitor, accountant, or psychiatrist, in attendance." (p 220)

Grubb also commented on the two men who most wished to have him working
for the Church. He thought Bell a great man, one of devotion and integrity to
whom he owed much, one to be respected with regard to Church unity, but not to
be consulted on the mission of the Church:

He was by no means easy to work with. He was a vigorous man of peace,
and such men like to have their own way. If he did not secure it, he
would go off on his own, ignore his colleagues and navigate his own canoe,
sometimes landing on the rocks. He would not scruple to take up the time
of very busy people with a proposal which, it was obvious, would be soundly defeated in the end. He would similarly initiate schemes without discovering that others had worked on them, or without reference to their findings. For George Bell the value of a proposal rested not simply on its merits, but on the fact that he had thought of it. (p172)

Grubb recorded a debt of gratitude to Fisher for encouraging and helping him play a part in the central affairs of the Church, and recalled the Archbishop's early career as the youngest ever Headmaster at Repton:

He preserved both his schoolmasterly and his masterly bearing and grasp to the end. He gave every appearance of enjoying such onerous tasks as the Church Assembly and all its business. He was rarely at a loss in the chair, and his rulings were prompt, clear and decisive. He readily controlled an awkward crisis; he could easily have settled an earthquake; he commanded where he could not reason. He did sometimes give the impression that the laity as much as the clergy were the paid servants of the Church and therefore bound to accept his behests. This is a small thing; Fisher would have risen quickly if tempestuously to the top in any profession or business. He communicated his mind without havering or ambiguity, and this is all-important when one must decide or drown. The forthrightness or (as I once heard it described wittily but most unfairly) the forthwrongness of his public statements was criticised, often by the same folk who grumbled that he gave no leadership. When I held office in the Assembly, I never had occasion to complain of lack of consultation on matters which concerned the House of Laity. (p 209)


56. Ibid, Christian Frontier to Fisher, March 5, 1946; Vol 6: 11.


58. By 1953, Fisher was so keen to have Grubb working directly for the Church that he considered "sacking" two men in order to have sufficient funds to pay Grubb, stating in a memorandum: "I suppose that it is just conceivable that if
Bradby and Stokes were just sacked there would be enough money to pay Grubb some kind of adequate salary...” Memorandum on Grubb by Fisher, March 18, 1953; Fisher Papers, Vol 126: 165-7.

59. Grubb became publicity officer to the Church Assembly, which effectively put him in charge of ecclesiastic propaganda.

60. Ibid, Bishops in Egypt, the Sudan, Iran and Jerusalem to Dr AC Craig, May 1945; Vol 2: 115.


As World War II drew to a close, fears of Russia began to reassert themselves in the United States, particularly where there was concern over Poland, as in the Roman Catholic community, and a refusal to view the issue within the larger context of Allied relations and pre-1939 Polish-Russian relations. Roosevelt realised that unless something could be done to reassure Catholics about Russia, his wartime consensus might collapse, isolationism would revive, and the Senate could even defeat plans for a United Nations, to say nothing of the defection of Polish-American voters from the Democratic Party. Already in late 1944 the Catholic Association for International Peace and the bishops had condemned plans for the United Nations because it gave too much power to the Communists. During the war, partly because of domestic considerations, Roosevelt concentrated a great deal of effort on cultivating Vatican-Moscow relations. In contrast, Britain had sought to rehabilitate Russia's reputation among the religious by concentrating on the actual situation within Russia, the growing freedom of the Russian Orthodox Church and the religious revival of the Russian people.

The attitude of the British, whose own history included a rejection of Papal interference in national affairs, was that the exclusion of the Roman Catholic Church from Soviet territory did not constitute a rejection of Christianity. This very argument was submitted to the Pope by His Majesty's Minister to the Holy See. The latter had been urging the Pope "most earnestly and strongly not to condemn the Russians, at any rate by name. For I said this
would have the worst possible effect in Moscow, and only slightly less unfavourable repercussions in London, and probably Washington." Osborne bluntly told the Pope that, "A specific denunciation of alleged Russian misdeeds would be compared with the absence of any specific condemnation of German crimes against the populations of the Occupied Countries." Osborne had no information on Russian conduct in Eastern Europe. "but I was quite certain that nothing the Russians might do could approach the atrocities committed by the Germans in many lands. To this His Holiness did not demur."(1)

The Pope went on to talk of Bolshevist atheism and the repression of the Catholic Church in Russia, where, he said, there was only one Catholic priest left, an American father at Moscow. Osborne responded with the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church would be the representative of Christianity in Russia, that it must be accepted as such, and that the government's preference for the Orthodox faith rather than the Catholic did not indicate atheism:

I reminded him of the recent official revival of the Orthodox Russian Church and said that this constituted an official repudiation of the atheism plank in the Constitution, even if, failing proof to the contrary, it might by some be regarded as only a temporary political expedient. But I did not disguise from him that I anticipated that, whatever latitude or encouragement were given to the Orthodox Church in Russia, the Catholic Church would not be given similar sanction. Religion in Russia was to be, like everything else, of a strictly nationalist brand. But, I pointed out, a distinction must be drawn between the rejection and the oppression of Christianity and of the Catholic Church. The latter was not the sole representative of Christianity, and if a country, or a Government, elected to discourage the Catholic faith in favour of its own particular brand of Christianity, this was not at all to foster atheism. The Pope took this argument, on which I insisted strongly, quite well.(2)

This was the course of action England had followed during the Reformation of Henry VIII. While the fact that British history was the discouragement of the Catholic faith in favour of its own national brand of Christianity possibly
influenced Osborne, the fact that a rapprochement between the Vatican and Moscow would not necessarily be in British interests certainly did.

While a working cooperative relationship between Moscow and Rome, which would necessarily affect the balance of power, might not prove beneficial to British interests, a nationalist church supporting the Communist regime was an equally threatening development. The potential of a resurgent Panslavism was viewed with some concern by both Protestant and Catholic churchmen during the war itself. An article in the *Tablet* in September 1943 articulated the Catholic fear of Panslavism. Arguing that it would be impossible to achieve any understanding among Slav people under Russian presidency so long as the Russian church was thrust into the background by an official atheism of Germano-Hebrew origin, the article went on to predict incalculable consequences should the church become allied with the state:

We should do well to recognise that the radical changes which Russian Communist ideology has undergone, and its transformation into a fiery national patriotism, have narrowed the gulf separating the messianic spirit of Communism from the messianic spirit of the Orthodox Church. The tradition of "Holy Russia" with an inspired mission toward mankind is ancient and ingrained. Under the stress of some intense emotion such as that of the present moment the Orthodox conception of a messianic Russia might well merge with the Marxist conception of a messianic proletariat, effecting a fusion of ideas the consequences of which would be incalculable. In the compressed space of twenty-five years the Russian Communist Party has passed through a process of schism and reform resembling that experienced by the Church only over a period of centuries, but the processes have been similar. The "Old Bolsheviks" who anathematised the reformer Stalin in 1936 corresponded exactly to the "Old Believers" who anathematised the reformer Nikon in 1666. The extreme self-abasement and immolation of the schismatics of 1936 were an expression of morbid religious fanaticism of which Church history provides many instances. The canonisation of Lenin, the worship of Stalin as a near divinity (which Beatrice and Sydney Webb regarded as a grave psychological danger) are significant facts with which we have to reckon. To all intents and purposes Stalin occupies today the position as the former Tsars, and it is in this capacity that he enthrones or deposes Patriarchs. Who knows but that we may yet see the erstwhile seminarist of Tiflis receiving blessing at the hands of the Patriarch he has created? It
would not be more fantastic than many other happenings in Russia since 1917. (3)

Protestant concern was voiced by the secretary of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations, Canon Douglas, an expert on the Orthodox Churches in Eastern Europe and an intimate of many of their leaders. Douglas wrote to the Archbishop of York in August 1943, shortly before his departure to visit the Patriarch of the Russian Church, a lengthy missive discussing "the whole problem of British relations with U.S.S.R. and of the relations of the Russian Church with the regime of the U.S.S.R."

The most difficult of all problems is the growing panslavism of U.S.S.R. Panslavism has been in Russia since Russia began - c/o the Messianic vision that Russia is to remodel the world crusade fashion which lies behind 'Moscow the Third Rome.' There are very definite signs that Stalin is envisaged as realising the dream of Ivan the Terrible of his Tsardom - Peter the Great, Katharine, Nicolas 1st etc. The new Soviet Socialist Russia has the Messianic vision to make the world what it should be. Unless I am mistaken, this type of panslavism is the dynamic in the idealist U.S.S.R. weltanschauung of today. It will appeal in a way to the Orthodox Russian who accepts Communism and its allure will make him enthusiastic and will have an effect upon non-Communist Russian Orthodox. Its scope probably at present very definitely includes not only Orthodox Balkan religio-nationalists (Serbs, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Greeks) but the Latin Poles and Czechs and Croats etc. and it has its eye on Constantinople.

If the above is correct, at least it is what even before the war showed forth such as Abp Stefan of Sofia and Nicolai Velimirovic anticipated: and without precisioning this detail or the other the Poles and Serbs are convinced that the U.S.S.R. is going out for panslavism.

For such a programme the influence of the Orthodox Church might be a very important factor. The Turks here appear to me to be hugely suspicious of the rapprochement of the U.S.S.R. regime with the Russian Church. (4)

Douglas lamented to Garbett that, "The English layman in general and our F.O. people in particular scarcely give a thought to the power and the influence of Orthodoxy as a religio-nationality in Russia." In fact the Foreign Office had already been alerted to the threat of panslavism by an informant passing on the views of "three shrewd continental observers." Although the Foreign Office
sought to conceal the identity of their informant, telling the Ministry that "no clue should be given as to authorship," the style and substance of the letter, particularly the concern for the future of Germany and the fear of Communist control of Europe after the war, strongly suggest George Bell, the Bishop of Chichester. Apart from the special interest in Germany, the letter represented certain convictions common to Bell and other clergymen of his ilk who saw the need for change but feared revolution. Despite their recognition that the Church had betrayed the social content of the Gospel, and their deep desire to see a new and more just society, these same clergy were traditionally and bitterly anti-Communist and opposed any reforms, and certainly any new order, in which there was any hint of Communism.

Following the Anglo-Soviet alliance, Bell had hastily returned from a trip to Europe expressing apprehension and misgivings about the SU. The fact that Bell's attitude toward Germany made him a figure of some controversy during the war, and that the Government did not want clerical warnings undermining the Anglo-Soviet alliance at that juncture, would make disclosure of him as a Foreign Office source unwise should he have been the one responsible for proclaiming panslavism as "the real menace of the future."

Relating the fears of three "informed" observers of Russia, the unnamed source stated:

All three men are gravely concerned about the Slav peril. One of them suggests that a further reason why the disarmament sine die of Germany is foolish is that Hitler is uniting the Slav countries against him as Napoleon united Germany and Italy (to our present sorrow), and that pan-Slavism is the real menace of the future. The future in question may not be so very far distant, as Communism is very active underground in all the Balkan countries (not to mention France, Germany and Switzerland). (S)
Throughout the war the Foreign Office Research Department, hereafter, referred to as F.O.R.D., maintained careful observation of the progress of the Russian Orthodox Church in its relations with the Soviet regime and with its sister Orthodox churches. Indications that it was attempting to reforge old links with other Orthodox communities were monitored, recorded and analysed. In the conditions of the German occupation there could clearly be no significant responses from the beleaguered Orthodox churches, yet any minor manifestation of support from them for the Russian Church was duly noted. When the Soviet government officially recognised the Russian Orthodox Church, detailed attention was focused on the Orthodox communities around the world. The Foreign Office Research Department, F.O.R.D., regarded the calling of a Sobor (assembly) of Bishops to elect a Patriarch and set up a Holy Synod as politically significant and the world-wide response generated was meticulously scrutinised.

At that time it was a move generally welcomed by the other Allies who wanted Russia to assume a more tolerant attitude toward religion. The Axis on the other hand sought to discredit the move and F.O.R.D. noted that German sources were "at pains to dig up some pronouncements from obscure Serb priests to the effect that the Soviets were trying to practice a piece of sly deception on God himself." (6) F.O.R.D. observed that the move had disturbed the Roumanians, with the press genuinely anticipating a resulting spread of Soviet influence in the Balkans. F.O.R.D. quoted two Roumanian publications: *Viata* which took the line that Stalin was out to convince the public that Russia was not a danger to the world, and, like other nations, had religious, moral and social sentiments, but pointed out that it was not so much Bolshevism that the European nations feared as Russian imperialism; and *Curentul* which stated:
"Panorthodoxy, with a judicious admixture of Panslavism, even if it has no decisive success, will at any rate disarm the resistance of Orthodox believers." (7)

The possibility that the Soviet Government intended to use the Church as a means of extending their influence in the Middle East was discussed in a despatch from Cairo by Mr Shone. (8) The Foreign Office was certainly concerned about the possible use of the Orthodox Church to spread Soviet influence. During the most intense years of the Cold War, when the Russian Church gave its support to the Communist peace campaign, the British Foreign Office unequivocally proclaimed that Church a tool of the Soviet government, a servant of Russian foreign policy rather than of the Lord. Yet in the immediate postwar situation Foreign Office attitudes toward the Russian Church vacillitated considerably and it was clearly unsure whether to view it as a potential ally of the Russian state or a potential focus for dissent against it. Aware of the many possibilities for exploiting religious susceptibilities and affiliations in the ideological chaos of the postwar world, where the churches remained major sources of cohesion and comfort, and fully conscious of its own manipulation of these institutions and the people within them, the Foreign Office was understandably suspicious of the Russian Church's relationship with the Soviet regime.

In contradiction to this suspicion stood two factors. Firstly, the traditional opposition of Christianity to Communism made the Church the most natural centre for organised opposition to the Soviet regime. Secondly, for the Communist government to use the Church would be a contradiction which would reflect badly on the Marxian principles on which its authority was founded.
However, the Foreign Office knew only too well that neither ecclesiastical nor
secular authorities were immune from compromise. The Foreign Office dilemma
was assessing whether the Russian Church would become the focus for the
dissident elements within the Soviet Union, or a vehicle for Soviet policies,
attracting believers and reconciling the discontent.

Observers acknowledged that the re-establishing of its position in the
Orthodox community of Churches was a legitimate and understandable activity on
the part of the Russian Church. Visiting British ecclesiastics noted the sincere
desire of the Russian hierarchy to form a relationship with the Church of
England and recognised their genuine need to have contact with those sister
Churches from which it had been excluded for so long. Nonetheless, whether it
was an incidental corollary or a deliberate plan, the resumption by the Russian
Church of an active role in the life of the nation was an asset to the
Communist regime both internally and externally. Foreign Office reservations
about the Russian Church were exacerbated further by its transactions in the
international domain, although the sending and receiving of ecclesiastical
dignitaries, the exchange of clerical delegations, the expressions of friendship
and support and the moving towards unity with sister Orthodox Churches, were
no different in substance or intent from the activities pursued by the western
Churches, particularly the Church of England. One aspect of this ecclesiastical
diplomacy particularly relevant to the postwar situation, was that when in May
1945 the Russian Patriarch Alexei visited the heads of the Orthodox Churches,
he went to Teheran, Damascus, Beirut, Jerusalem and Cairo. Significantly, he did
not go to Greece. Stalin and Churchill had made a wartime agreement that
Greece was to be in the British sphere of influence. Instead, the Archbishop of
York went to Greece, part of an exercise intended to reinforce the political power of the Regent, Archbishop Damaskinos, a British protege.

Initially there was uncertainty in the Foreign Office as to whether the Russian Church was responding to ecclesiastical considerations or Government pressure in its resumption of an active role in international Orthodox affairs and the seeking of reconciliation with religious communities of dissident emigres. The British Embassy in Moscow, however, had little esteem for the Russian Church and always viewed its activities from a political perspective. When in the summer of 1945 the Foreign Office enquired from the Eastern embassies what were their views on the rejuvenation of the Greek Patriarchate at Constantinople, the Moscow Embassy made explicit the political role which it perceived the Russian Church to have assumed:

While there is no doubt that the Orthodox religion in this country is still a living and independent force, which the Soviet Government failed to destroy, the present working arrangements certainly provide for the traditional subordination of the Russian Church in all matters of foreign policy to the interests of the State. The Soviet Government must be well aware of the important role which the Orthodox Church plays throughout South Eastern Europe and in the Levant, and although of course "democratic forces," in the Soviet sense of the word are those to which Moscow appeals in the first place, the Soviet Government are most unlikely to ignore the possibility of influencing opinion through religious channels likewise. As the new Syrian Minister, who was in Syria during Patriarch Aleksei's (sic) visit, noticed when calling on him here, His Beatitude cuts a far greater figure abroad than at home. The prestige abroad of the Russian Church as the biggest of all Orthodox churches is certainly being fostered in this and other ways, such as the successive visits of prelates from other Orthodox countries which have been going on ever since the Grand Assembly for Aleksei's enthronement in February.

It therefore seems unlikely that Soviet foreign policy will overlook the possibilities of the Patriarchate at Constantinople.

The Embassy remarked that the Russian press had given no indication of the line that the Church might take, it doubted, however, that the Government would think it good tactics to bring all the Orthodox Churches under the wing
of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Embassy considered that the Government would rather rely on "the traditional Communist technique" of infiltration, with the aim of ensuring that the present Patriarch should be succeeded by someone who enjoyed their confidence. The Patriarchate could then be used to combat opposition to the SU throughout the Orthodox world. The embassy was wary of the proposals which had been put forward for counter-action, opposing a scheme outlined by the Athens chancery which it predicted would mean a collision with the Russians, "and on present showing Moscow would probably come out of it better than Athens." Moscow advised letting events take their course, confident that the hand of the Soviet Government would prove sufficiently conspicuous to prevent effective influence being established:

Closer contact between the Moscow Patriarchate and the other Patriarchates is an inevitable development; and while we should certainly watch it carefully and remember that the Moscow Patriarchate is in effect an organ of the Soviet Government, it would we think be bad tactics for us to openly stand out against it. The Moscow Patriarchate has its weaknesses and shortcomings and these will become increasingly evident to the Orthodox Churches of South Eastern Europe and the Levant as contacts increase. We think we can leave it to them to prevent undue Russian penetration, without ourselves encouraging a direct conflict between our own proteges in Athens and possibly Istanbul and the proteges of the Soviet Government. (11)

This advice was to prove entirely superfluous as the Foreign Office did all it could, albeit indirectly and clandestinely, to promote ecclesiastic opposition within the Orthodox Churches to Russian influence, while the Americans for their part directly promoted an Orthodox opposition to the Russian Church much in the same way as had Hitler in preparation for his invasion of Russia.

The warnings about the Russian Church were circulated to other British embassies around the world. In August 1945 the Foreign Office informed the British Consulate in New York that the dominant note in reports from all
Moscow missions established a coincidence of interest between the Soviet state and the Russian Church. This was defined as:

a) closer relations with the Slav nations;
b) the spread of Soviet influence in the Near and Middle East;
c) a design to put pressure on Turkey to restore the former prestige and dignity of the Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople (including the return of Santa Sophia);
d) the proposal to call as soon as possible an Oecumenical Council of all "freedom loving Christians";
e) the reconciliation with the Moscow Patriarchate of the dissident Russian Orthodox communities in exile;
f) and exposure of the alleged relationship between the Catholic Church and Fascism.(12)

The Foreign Office continued its surveillance of the Russian Church, maintaining a watchful eye on developments in Asia, particularly India, and the Americas, particularly the USA. Although the Moscow Embassy was unable to furnish the Foreign Office with definitive proof that the Patriarch and his clerical colleagues were acting as agents of the Communist regime, its hostile reports fuelled suspicion. Responding to a May 1948 article in the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, entitled 'Heritage of the Apostle Thomas' on the Christian Church in India, the embassy declared it impossible not to suspect the "impartiality" of the Moscow Patriarchate's love for its little sister in India. It concluded that the establishment of close relations between the Church of St Thomas and the "Russian dominated Orthodox Church" would be a useful channel for the penetration of Russian influence into India.(13)

An area of special concern to the Foreign Office was the US where wartime enthusiasm for Russia had given an extra impetus to the potential reconciliation of the Russian Orthodox Church in America with the Russian Patriarchate. This was regarded with foreboding by the Foreign Office which in the immediate postwar period saw the extension of any Russian influence in that
vicinity as alarming. In the early postwar period, and even before the war had ended, the Foreign Office feared that the US might form a working relationship with the SU, and saw its task as leading America into an opposition to the SU which would safeguard Europe, and the British Empire, from potential Russian domination. The British had an ally in the American Episcopal Church which was equally suspicious of the Russian Church, taking a very low view of Russian activities in Yugoslavia and the Balkans generally and tending to fear the worst, particularly as most Orthodox communities were destitute and it was feared that any offer by the Russians to underwrite them would be gratefully accepted.

The American Episcopal Church facilitated British observation of the Russian Orthodox Church in the US. In April 1945 a Canon West from the Episcopalian Church provided the British Consulate in New York with confidential documents of a meeting between the Advisory Council on Foreign Relations of the Protestant Episcopal Church and Metropolitan Benjamin, the Head of the Russian Orthodox Church in the US. These revealed that while the Russian Church in America was only prepared to return to the Mother Russian Church on its own terms, it was "Genuinely desirous of doing so."(14) This desire for reconciliation received further confirmation in October 1945 when the New York consulate sought information about the progress of the negotiations between the two Churches from a man named Gregorieff, the son of a former imperial Russian diplomat then attached to an Orthodox theological seminary in New York. He stated that the American bishops wanted reunion for religious reasons and would welcome it whole heartedly if they could be sure that there were no political strings attached.(15) Despite all indications pointing the other way in
Gregorieff's opinion, he thought that the American Orthodox community would fall into line if only they were allowed to keep at least the outward appearance of autonomy.

The movement towards reconciliation continued with new prospects emerging from the Cleveland Synod of November 26 to 29 1946, where the Ecclesiastical Assembly recognised the Patriarch of Moscow as its spiritual head, voting 187 to 61 to retain the new allegiance to the Moscow Patriarchy and renouncing its previous allegiance to the anti-Soviet Karlovitz Council, while at the same time preserving American ecclesiastical autonomy and administrative independence. Details were to be agreed between the Metropolitan Theophilus of San Francisco and Metropolitan Gregory of Leningrad and Novgorod.(16) Shortly after this the Patriarch of Moscow cabled the Metropolitan Council of the Russian Orthodox Church in America, rescinding the degree of suspension imposed some ten years previously, and agreeing in principle to the request for autonomy.(17) The deteriorating relations between the US and the SU, however, combined with mounting American anti-Communism, clearly had an effect on the delicate negotiations. Prior to Metropolitan Gregory's arrival there was some controversy as to the purpose of his visit. Mgr Fulton J Sheen, Professor of Philosophy in the Roman Catholic University of Washington, charged the Russian prelate with being a "professor of atheism at the Soviet Atheistic College" and his visit "an attempt to win over the Russian Orthodox Church in the United States for Stalin."(18)

In mid-November 1947 the Metropolitan Gregory left the US without having been able to bring about the unification of the Russian Orthodox Church in America with that of Moscow, bringing it under the hegemony of the Moscow
Patriarch. The main stumbling block had been the insistence of the Metropolitan Theophilus of San Francisco upon the independent appointment of American bishops. The Metropolitan Gregory stated on the eve of his departure: "The American bishops want complete freedom in the matter of the appointment of bishops and also demand that their Council of Bishops should constitute a supreme tribunal." He added that influences antagonistic to the U.S.S.R. had prevented negotiations from reaching a satisfactory conclusion.\(^{(19)}\) The Metropolitan Theophilus in a rare public statement confirmed that the schism in the Church remained as wide as ever and asserted that the Orthodox Church in Russia had sought to use the Orthodox Church in America "as an instrument for Communist propaganda and espionage," adding that, "the words of members of the Church cannot be trusted."\(^{(20)}\)

It was with evident satisfaction that the British Ambassador in Washington reported to the Foreign Secretary that the prospects of reconciliation between the Russian and American Orthodox Churches had been effaced by "the independent and anti-communist attitude of the Metropolitan Theophilus, which appears to have the support of Archbishop Leonty of Chicago and other American bishops." Halifax was pleased to inform Bevin that: "The possibility of increased Soviet influence over the great majority of the Orthodox communicants in this country, who are alleged to number over one million, thus seems to have been eliminated for the present."\(^{(21)}\)

By the time the negotiations took place the chances of their reaching a successful conclusion in the hardening Cold War atmosphere were remote. Moreover, the chief negotiator on the American side, the Metropolitan Theophilus, was deeply involved in American sponsored opposition to the Russian
Orthodox Church. Shortly after the conclusion of the war, several Russian prelates abroad who refused to obey the Patriarch of Moscow met in Munich in the American zone of Germany. Twenty-six bishops were present or represented. The leader of the group, Metropolitan Anastasius, presided. These bishops issued a declaration which stated their belief that Patriarch Alexei was a willing tool of the Godless state and any obedience to him was pronounced impossible for free and conscientious men. Amongst those who signed the declaration were two recently consecrated bishops, Alexander Lovcki, administrator of the Orthodox chapels in the D.P.'s camps in the American zone; and Nathaniel Lvov, a similar administrator in the British zone. This same year, 1946, well prior to his critical negotiations with Metropolitan Gregory, Metropolitan Theophilus, according to the Pastoral Letter of Archbishop Vitalius, the Munich synod's representative in the USA, tried to persuade Metropolitan Anastasius to retire and hand over all the Russian parishes abroad to him. Anastasius refused. (22)

Analysing the make-up of the group and its implications, Serge Bolshakoff, a Russian emigre living in England and an expert on the Orthodox Church, noted in his monthly Bulletin, a commentary on religious affairs, that:

Besides these refugees who have no regularly constituted dioceses and who fled from the Red Army for reasons well known to those who know their war history, this Declaration will certainly be approved by those Russian prelates in the USA, Canada, Brazil and China, who support Metropolitan Anastasius. They are eight in North America, three in China and one in Brazil. All these prelates and their clergy are irreconcilably opposed to the Soviet regime and everything it implies. This group is large and probably constitutes the majority of the Russians abroad. Its bulk lies in the D.P. camps and in America, where anti-Sovietism is growing fast. (23)

When the Orthodox Church in the US rejected the conditions offered them by the Russian Patriarch, Bolshakoff observed that the American hierarchy were
moving to assume the leadership of the anti-Patriarch churchmen abroad and to replace in that respect the Metropolitan Anastasius and his Munich Synod which lacked funds, territory and influence. Although in 1946 Anastasius had resisted the attempts of Theophilus to have him retire and pass to him the Russian parishes abroad, it made little difference. The Japanese Orthodox Church had in 1946 been unable to enter into contact with the Russian Patriarch because of the American authorities opposition, and it was passed into the jurisdiction of Theophilus. In 1947 the Orthodox Latvian Bishop of Riga, John, with his clergy and laity in Germany, requested Theophilus to receive them into his jurisdiction, prior even to their arrival in America. Subsequently a good many clergy and laity abroad looked towards Theophilus as their Primate.

Not unnaturally Theophilus enjoyed American Roman Catholic support for his acts. The Lamp, a well known American Catholic monthly, stated in its January 1948 issue: "The opposition of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America to obeisance to a Soviet controlled Patriarch of Moscow deserves our sympathy and praise, and our hope that ultimately this body may seek its salvation within the portals ever held wide open for its entrance."(24)

Troubles similar to those of the American Russian Orthodox Church confronted other Orthodox groups in America, encouraged by America's predilection for supporting dissident clergy hostile to the East European Communist regimes. The fact that these clerics had often supported the Nazis did not deter the Americans, although it outraged many others. Under the heading "The Whereabouts of a Traitor", Religion and the People revealed a similar situation developing in the American zone with Ukranian Orthodox as had happened with the Karlovci Council:
It will be remembered that when Hitler invaded the Ukraine, the Archbishop Polikarp Sikorski attacked both the Soviet Government and the Orthodox Church, called on the people to work for Hitler who, he said, was going to give them religious liberty, and established a Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. Polikarp Sikorski is now running his autocephalous church, composed mainly of D.P.s from Munich, in the American Zone. He claims the support of twelve Bishops, 400 clergy and 15,000 laity. The Americans have provided buildings, and Polikarp has been able to open a Theological College and a Ukrainian Institute and to establish publications. (25)

One other dissident community the British and the Americans sought to keep in active opposition to the Russian Church was the Paris Theological Seminary. Following a course very similar to that of their Orthodox brethren in America, the Russian emigres in Paris in the immediate aftermath of the war seemed likely to return to the allegiance with Moscow and an Exarch was appointed by the Russian Patriarch. A revolt in the right-wing of the Paris emigres, who refused to accept the jurisdiction of the Russian Patriarch, was supported by the Patriarch of Constantinople, a British protege, who appointed the leader of the dissidents as his own Exarch for the parishes in Western Europe. (26) This inevitably put Moscow and Constantinople in direct conflict. Another Orthodox Church which did not return to the Moscow obedience was that of Finland, which also established relations with Constantinople. (27)

The Foreign Office did not only use its proteges in the Orthodox Church to ferment opposition to the Russian Church, it used its own established Church. Moreover, at a time when the Foreign Office and the Church of England were both distancing themselves from the Vatican publicly, the Foreign Office used the Anglican Church to promote relations between the Orthodox Churches and the Roman Catholic Church in Eastern Europe with the intention of creating a powerful religious alliance working against the Communist regimes.
Not long after the dissident Russian Orthodox bishops in opposition to Moscow met in Munich, the Bishop of Hereford, Dr Parsons, paid an official visit to the Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia with which the Church of England was in friendly relations. Dr Parsons was accompanied by the Rev Herbert Waddams, now secretary of the Church of England Council of Foreign Relations and very much involved in promoting Protestant ecumenicity through the World Council of Churches. During the war, Waddams had stressed the importance of postwar cooperation between Protestant, Orthodox and Roman Catholics. Waddams was firmly committed to the belief that political objectives were closely related to religious beliefs and that they should cooperate and be two aspects of the same activity. To ensure the development of this type of working relationship, Waddams advocated that the Churches should immediately seize any chance that occurred and, moreover, it was of course "vital that the main Christian bodies should act together, and that they should have an agreed course of action... The World Council of Churches provides for a certain amount of practical joint action on the part of the Protestant world, but of course in a matter of this kind the cooperation of Roman Catholics and Orthodox in an official capacity is essential. If anything is to be done on a really useful scale the Vatican will have to be consulted and its active support will be a sine qua non of success." (28)

In the early postwar period the association of the Vatican with fascism and reaction made it unwise for a Church such as the Church of England, which was trying to cultivate popular support among the working classes, to seem to be openly collaborating against Russia. In Yugoslavia where the Catholic Church had been seriously implicated in the forced conversions and massacre of
thousands of Orthodox believers during the war, open collaboration with that Church of any sort was impossible. The only form of collaboration Waddams could possibly hope to promote at that time would necessarily have to be clandestine, as seems undoubtedly to have been the intent of the Yugoslav visit. In his report on the bishop's visit, George Clutton advised the Foreign Secretary that "both Dr Parsons and Monsignor Hurley, the Regent of the Apostolic Nunciature at Belgrade, expressed the desire to meet each other in order not merely to exchange courtesies but to share views regarding the religious situation in this country." (29)

According to a confidential report submitted by Clutton to Bevin, the Bishop of Hereford's visit had been intended to have no political significance of any kind. The purpose of the Archbishop of Canterbury in sending the Bishop to Yugoslavia was solely to renew the ties of friendship which existed before the war between the Anglican and the Serb Orthodox Churches. Relations with the Acting Patriarch had been strengthened during the course of the war when the Foreign Office had in 1944 facilitated the sending of a "wisely worded" message from the Archbishop of York. Even before the Bishop's departure from England, however, it became clear that political considerations would inevitably be significant:

It became clear, however, even before the Bishop's arrival, that his visit might not be entirely without political implication. The Yugoslav Government had, early in April, readily expressed their agreement to the bishop's visit. On Easter Sunday, however, the Synod of the Serbian Church issued a Pastoral Letter in terms distinctly critical of the Government... it raised possibilities of an open breach between the Church and the Government, and seems to have caused the latter to reconsider their approval of the bishop's visit... At the same time the office of the Patriarchate let fall pretty broad hints that the bishop's arrival would occasion demonstrations of pro-British sentiment. (30)
Despite the sensitivity of the situation the British authorities determined to proceed with the visit, and the British Embassy in Yugoslavia applied repeated pressure to the by then reluctant Yugoslav administration "to secure from them a statement that no inconvenience would be caused by the postponement of the bishop's visit from the 10th to the 24th of May." (31) Clutton's report indicated that the "very impressive demonstration which must have been extremely unwelcome to the Yugoslav Government," had been, if not organised at least welcomed by the Serb Orthodox Church which clearly relished the prospect of political martyrdom: "The Acting Patriarch was indeed confidently and cheerfully predicting that he and most of his clergy would be arrested, but probably not until the bishop had departed." Clutton was himself well pleased with events, assessing the visit as a "resounding success... The visit demonstrated beyond any doubt that the extreme pro-British feeling of the great mass of the Yugoslav people continues to survive the consistent anti-British propaganda of the Yugoslav Government... At least the visit must have given the Yugoslav Government cause to realise that in following an anti-British policy they are acting in flat contradiction to the wishes of the Yugoslav people."

Clutton arranged for the Bishop of Hereford to meet the Apostolic Nuncio on the "neutral ground" of the embassy, expressing concern over the possible reaction of the bishop's host, the Acting Patriarch of the Serb Orthodox Church, and the possibility of a political and undesirable interpretation by the Yugoslav authorities should they learn about such a meeting. While Parsons concealed the meeting from the Yugoslav authorities, he made a point of telling the Patriarch that it was to take place, as Clutton informed Bevin:
Dr Parsons felt bound to inform the Acting Patriarch of this meeting and the reactions of the Metropolitan Joseph were interesting. He was extremely pleased at the idea, but begged Dr Parsons to warn Bishop Hurley that all his movements and every activity of the Nunciature were being watched by the secret police. He then said that when Bishop Sergei of Kirovgorod had visited Yugoslavia he had brought with him a message from the Patriarch of Moscow expressing his wish that the Serbian Church should associate itself with the Russian Church in denouncing the Catholic Church. The Metropolitan would, however, have nothing to do with such a proposal and informed Bishop Sergei that the Serbian Church, having lived side by side with the Catholic Church for centuries, knew what the Catholic Church stood for, whereas the Russian Church knew nothing whatsoever about the matter.

More interesting still, the Metropolitan informed Dr Parsons that what the Yugoslav Government feared most was a rapprochement or coalition between the Orthodox and Catholic churches. All their efforts were directed on keeping these two powerful influences in Yugoslav life apart. At present such a coalition was not practical politics, but he, the Metropolitan, had the matter well in mind, and when the time was ripe he would take the necessary action. (32)

Clutton, fully aware of the inherent political repercussions of the Patriarch's words, noted in this same report that: "These remarks reached me at the same time as a confidential report from His Majesty's Consul at Sarajevo in which extremely circumstantial details were given of an underground movement in Bosnia and Hercegovina with connections in Zagreb and Belgrade for the formation of a coalition of representatives of the Catholic, Orthodox and Moslem Churches. The aim of the combination was to force a new general election in an attempt to obtain a different and non-communist regime." This particular report was being sent under a separate cover, while the despatch about Parson's negotiations was being sent to the British missions at Prague, Moscow and the Holy See, as well as the Foreign Office.

The political importance of these religious negotiations to the Foreign Office was indicated not only by the presence and participation of Waddams, but also by the fact that his subsequent report on the proceedings was given a "top
secret" designation within the Foreign Office. Waddams' report was more detailed than that of Clutton, illustrating the leading role which he had played in the talks:

After lunch we had a long talk with Joseph with Father Lukovic as interpreter. We discussed three main topics, the Russians, the Roman Catholics and relation of the Orthodox to the political situation.

With regard to the Russians he said that Bishop Sergei had come with a proposal that the Serb Orthodox Church should join the Russian in a campaign against the Roman Catholics. They had been refused... the Metropolitan had told him to his face that it was impertinence for his to try to teach the Serbs how to deal with Roman Catholics...

The Metropolitan informed us that although nothing had been said openly, there was a campaign for the submission of the Serb Orthodox Church to Moscow. The Serb Church would regard this as a form of Papalism and would not consent to anything of the kind...

The Metropolitan expressed his doubts as to what the Russian Patriarch Alexei was doing in Bulgaria. He suspected that the Church was being used as an instrument of Soviet politics to strike towards an outlet in the Mediterranean and that the doings in Macedonia were connected with this and had the secret support of the Russian Church.

On the subject of the Roman Catholics, we informed the Metropolitan that we were proposing to have a talk with the Papal representative. He asked us to warn him that all Roman Catholic activities were closely watched, and that above all things the Government were frightened of a rapprochement between Orthodox and Roman Catholic. In particular any movements in this direction were the subject of the vigilance of the authorities. There had been terrible events in the past for which the Roman Catholics were not without responsibility, but the Orthodox were very careful not to attack them in any way. But the moment for cooperation and common action had not come, the time was not yet ripe.

I was very much impressed by the positive and enlightened attitude of the Metropolitan on the subject of the relations with the Roman Catholics. I am inclined to believe he will be ready to cooperate when such action becomes practical politics. At present it seems that in this field, as in others, his hands are to some extent tied by the opinion of his people.

We spoke of the dangers of the Orthodox Church being forced into opposition on political rather than religious grounds. The Metropolitan showed himself completely alive to this danger, and strongly emphasised his determination that the Church should not be identified either with the right or with the left...

I then spoke of the attitude of the Church of England on relations with the Orthodox. I said that in matters which were between the Orthodox, we could not and did not want to interfere. What we did want to do was to keep the connection open so far as possible with all the Orthodox, Russian, Bulgarian, Rumanian and Serb, and to nourish friendly relations and understanding.
... I emphasised the contributions which Churches could make to international confidence and mutual trust... (33)

The enlightened attitude which impressed Waddams would have horrified the Serb Orthodox faithful and aroused the most intense anger of the Serb nation. There was irony in the fact that the Acting Patriarch's attitude to the Roman Catholics was, however, no different to that of Tito who, like the Patriarch knew that public association with the Roman Catholic Church, no matter how necessary for the long term stability of the country, was at that moment impossible owing to the overwhelmingly hostile attitude of the Yugoslav people. Like the Acting Patriarch, however, Tito was quite prepared to enter into relations with that Church at some future time for his own political advantage. (34)

It was obvious from the above discussion that the Serb Orthodox Church was as aware as was the Church of England of the need to appear politically independent. Yet the substance of their talks clearly indicated the hostility existing between Church and State in the domestic sphere along with opposition to the SU in the international sphere. The stress which both Waddams and the Metropolitan placed on the necessity of cooperation with the Roman Catholics revealed that when Waddams spoke of the Churches' contribution to international confidence and mutual trust, he meant in the West and did not include the Communist regimes on which the Vatican had already declared the cold war. It was because the Vatican had declared the cold war in its relations with the Communist regimes at a time when the official public policy of the Western powers was cooperation and friendship with those regimes that the Church of England could not openly pursue the type of cooperation which it was suggesting
through its official delegation to Yugoslavia to the Orthodox and Roman Catholic authorities there.

It was significant, however, that after the delegation had ascertained the willingness of those authorities to cooperate for what were clearly political activities, and the British Legation to the Holy See was so informed by the embassy in Belgrade, shortly afterwards His Majesty's Minister to the Holy See returned to England to discuss collaboration of the Churches against Communism. Prior to his arrival in England, Osborne wrote to J V Perowne, the Foreign Office representative on the Church of England Committee on Foreign Relations, stating, "I should like to have a talk with someone on your Anglican Committee about a rather delicate question, the fact that it is left to the Pope to defend Christianity against marxian materialism and the Russian anti-religious campaign..." (35) Osborne had a particular interest in seeing the Bishop of Chichester, George Bell, a fierce opponent of Communism and the SU with whom Osborne had had previous contact: "I saw him when I was briefly home in 1943 and he had ideas about collaboration between the churches in the making of the peace. He might also have ideas about the collaboration against the common menace of marxism."

Although Perowne replied to Osborne that he could easily arrange a meeting such as that suggested, he advised him that it was not within his official competence and he had referred the matter to those more qualified to consider it. (36) Indicating just how important this matter of church cooperation against Communism was becoming, within a week of his initial reply to Osborne, Perowne contacted him again telling him that Christopher Warner would be gald to discuss his idea and would he therefore get into direct touch with him. (37)
The subject was clearly one for the higher echelons and for face to face discussion rather than correspondence. A meeting was swiftly arranged and executed. There was no record in the Foreign Office file of what took place between Osborne and Warner. However, within four days of his telling Osborne to contact Warner, Ferowne informed Warner that Osborne had told him what had been arranged following their meeting and that he himself had subsequently taken the opportunity of a meeting of the Archbishop's Council the previous day to tell the Bishop of Chichester that Osborne had something he would like to discuss with him in his "personal capacity." Bell's response had been entirely favourable, and Perowne told Osborne that the Bishop had expressed his delight. Two weeks later Warner contacted Osborne in Rome enquiring as to his meeting with Bell about anti-Communism. All further correspondence regarding the collaboration of the Churches against Communism was retained by the Foreign Office.

These clandestine negotiations between the Church of England, the Serb Orthodox, and the Roman Catholics, plus the involvement of the F.O. and His Majesty's Minister to the Holy See, were given an extra significance in light of the fact that the previous April President Truman had secretly written to the Pope announcing his decision to return Myron Taylor to Rome as his personal representative, as he had been for Roosevelt during World War II. Truman had written, "We must employ every resource at our command to bring to this sadly troubled world an enduring peace, and no peace can be permanent which is not based on Christian principles." In his reply one month later, the Pope observed that peace would be found "only in the light of God's revelation given to men through his eternal beloved Son. The Pontiff added that "a prime task
before the world's leaders is to lift the darkness of selfishness, of distrust, of hate and irreligion, and let men see the joyous brightness of the Mount of Beatitudes." (41) In another letter in November of the same year, Truman described his personal envoy as "the channel of communications for views which you and I may wish to exchange in the interest of a stable and enduring peace among all peoples." That the SU was an atheist state and the correspondence was conducted secretly at that time, invested the elevated language with an interesting dimension.

By this time in 1946, when the western powers moved into closer, although clandestine, relations with the Vatican, the hostility and enmity between it and the SU was openly expressed. The deteriorating relations between Moscow and Rome had been the subject of newspaper comment as early as the spring of 1944. The Sunday Observer had drawn attention to the doctrinal conflict between the Orthodox Patriarch and the Pope in April 1944, "Vatican Challenged By Russian Church: Patriarch Attacks Doctrine"; in August 1944 the same newspaper commented on the increasing Papal opposition to the SU, "The Vatican's Attitude to Russia hardens." (42) By mid-1946 the British press were not only revealing the extent of the conflict between Vatican and Kremlin, but were reflecting in the process the difficulty for the Western powers to openly ally themselves with the Vatican or give any open support to its anti-Communist crusade. On July 16, 1946 the Observer launched a fierce attack on the Papacy in which it critically exposed Vatican policies, equated the Pope with Stalin, and declared the former to be the greater threat to Europe:

One result of the recent elections in Western Europe is the emergence of a virtual Western bloc under Vatican leadership. Many believed that after all its deals with Nazism and Fascism the Vatican's political role in post-Fascist Europe would be negligible. This belief, too, has now been
refuted by facts. Both Stalin and the Pope have shown just enough opportunism and tactical flexibility to make people forget some unpleasant "episodes" in their records. Both have also been able to derive political profit from the blood and tears of their devoted followers who have shirked no sacrifice in challenging and sapping Hitler's "new order" (though it is only fair to say that the Communist contribution to the overthrow of that "order" has been incomparably greater than that of Catholicism.)

And now Vatican and Comintern are arrayed against each other in almost every country on the Continent. Which has the greater chance to sway Europe ideologically in the next five or ten years? My own guess is that it is the Vatican. (43)

In a lengthy analysis of the European situation the Economist was as condemnatory of the Vatican anti-Communist crusade as the Observer had been. However, the Economist predicted that although the working class might not want direction from Moscow, they would prefer it to that of Rome:

All the parties disclaim "clericalism," yet the influence of the Catholic hierarchy and the priesthood on the leaders and the voters in the Catholic parties is inevitably very great and is almost invariably exercised in a strongly conservative sense. The leaders of the Church are also intent on emphasising one issue in Christian politics that is bound to increase the Catholic parties' conservatism. That issue is anti-Communism. Russian policy in Eastern Europe and Communist tactics in the West have, of course, vastly added to the number of people ready to rally to an anti-Communist crusade. The fact remains that such a crusade is still the illiberal reactionary and potentially Fascist force which it was under Hitler - and still is under Franco. In France and Italy the Catholics fought the elections primarily as anti-Communists and now have behind them the inchoate and in part reactionary following that the cry of anti-Communism usually rallies. The worker may not relish direction from Moscow, but he prefers it to Rome. (44)

Working class opposition to the Vatican and support for the S.U., which persisted well into the postwar period, made it necessary for both government and church to conduct their early cold war operations circumspectly. Church awareness of, and concern about, this pro-Soviet sentiment was demonstrated by a warning from the Archbishop of York to his F.O. friend Pat Dean. Of particular note was the Archbishop's worry that the authorities might not appreciate the
extent and strength of this sentiment. Equally noteworthy was that following
his wartime activities on behalf of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of
Information, the Archbishop now revealed himself as still active on behalf of
the Foreign Office, this time in the domestic sphere. The information supplied
by the Archbishop was regarded as sufficiently important to be reported by Dean
directly to Christopher Warner:

I saw the Archbishop of York recently. He has been going about a
good deal in the North of England and the Midlands, visiting steelworks
and other big factories, and he told me something which may be of interest
to you. He said that he found in the South of England that people were
saying that there had been a considerable swing against the Russians
recently, and that they were much more unpopular than they were several
months or a year ago. He thought that the same was true of the propertied
classes and people like shop owners in the North and in the Midlands. He
was absolutely convinced, however, that this was not true as regards the
great mass of men and women in big industrial centres, particularly in
large factories. These people were as strongly in favour of the Soviet
Union as they ever had been, and regarded any criticism of the Soviet
authorities or the Soviet Union as due purely to class prejudice. The
Archbishop said he thought a number of people in official and semi-
official places had got a mistaken idea about the position and this seemed
to him rather dangerous. (45)

Dean added that the Archbishop’s information was endorsed by his own
brother-in-law, a parson in Sunderland who told him that the dock workers there
were all firmly and completely in favour of the SU. They were of the opinion
that the Soviet armies won the war and were very bitter if any contrary
argument were advanced. Dean understood the number of people concerned to be
"in reality very large, as these beliefs are widespread through the industrial
North and midlands."

The Archbishop’s warning was considered very important, Warner commented,
"This is certainly worth knowing and the Archbishop’s is likely to be very good
evidence." (46) A note written on Dean’s memorandum indicated that the Private
Secretary at No 10 was being asked if the Prime Minister would like to see it. The fact that the SU retained a grip on the popular mind was of concern to the Foreign Office which knew such must be eradicated in order to generate support for its own anti-Soviet, anti-Communist policies which aimed at an economic, political and military alliance of the West against the East. Until such a time as public opinion would support such policies, the Foreign Office had not only to conceal their pursuit and not appear provocative or unfriendly toward Russia. Of necessity it had to display a public adherence to the wartime promises of continued cooperation and goodwill between the three big powers. An alliance of the Foreign Office with the Vatican directed against the SU would certainly arouse an adverse public reaction. The unwisdom of official cooperation with Roman Catholicism and the Vatican was quite clearly perceived within the Foreign Office.

Foreign Office policy was thus to remain aloof from the Vatican-Kremlin conflict and not appear to be taking either side. Although the Foreign Office was traditionally and overwhelmingly opposed to the Soviet Union and to Communism, there was not a great deal of sympathy within it for the Vatican. There remained in the Foreign Office a residue of resentment owing to the Pope's perceived affinity for Germany, where he was formerly the Nuncio, during the war, and his failure to repudiate and condemn Nazism. His Majesty's Minister to the Holy See tried his best to explain and justify those Papal policies to which he knew his Foreign Office colleagues objected. In his 1945 Annual Review, Osborne defended the Pope for not condemning Nazi crimes. Conceding that the Papal weapons of excommunication and martyrdom were the
strongest in the world and that the Pope had failed to use them, Osborne argued that this failure was owing to the Pope's hope to become a mediator acceptable to both sides. The Pope felt that he had condemned Nazi crimes and that any more specific condemnation would have exposed German Roman Catholics to savage reprisals and the cruel dilemma of choosing between their conflicting loyalties to their country and their religion. (49) Such considerations were not, however, to deter the Pope from placing Eastern European Catholics in a similar dilemma when in the midst of the Cold War he issued an excommunication decree on all Catholics who supported Communism.

Osborne's advocacy of collaboration with the Vatican against Communism revived criticism of the Pope's attitude toward Fascism and Nazism. Implying that the Pope was an unreliable ally seeking only Vatican interest, Sir O Harvey stated that the Pope was all things to all men who were not Communists. Moreover, it was felt that while he maintained his associations with those elements who had opposed the allies in the previous war, his support of the anti-Communist cause was of no value: "What we feel is that all the Pope's anti-Communist propaganda would be more convincing if he had a more positive line to show as regards the Nazis and Fascists, their heirs and assigns and those who collaborated with them." (50) In reply, Osborne denied that the Pope faced both ways, and repeated the theme that Pius had wanted to be a mediator, his "meticulous and seemingly pusillaminous neutrality during the war is to be found in his abiding hope of being able to shorten the war and all its horrors and sufferings by mediation at the right moment." (51)

Osborne insisted that the Pope had had to remain above the conflict during the war. However, it was not just the Pope's wartime record which made the
Foreign Office wary of him, his postwar associations rendered the Foreign Office equally reluctant to be too closely linked officially with the Vatican. Harvey had questioned why the Pope had not "ceased to be tender to the collaborators," including Archbishop Stepinac of Yugoslavia, a known collaborationist. Osborne evaded trying to justify a course which had deeply offended those who had strove so hard to defeat the very forces which the Pope in his obsession with the defeat of Communism was now rehabilitating, and claimed that it was impossible for a layman or a non-Catholic to form a valid judgement of Papal policy or of the Vatican: "They reckon in centuries and plan for eternity and this inevitably renders their policy inscrutable, confusing and, on occasion, reprehensible to time-conditioned minds."

Like the Foreign Office, although willing to treat with the Vatican privately, the Church of England maintained a public distance. Moreover, while the Vatican was loudly denouncing Russia and actively opposing Communism, the Church of England was following the Government's official line of advocating friendship with and understanding of Russia and avoiding hearty denunciations of Communism for fear of appearing reactionary and alienating the working classes. This policy did not please everyone, and the Archbishop of Canterbury found himself the recipient of letters questioning the lack of zeal shown by the Church in the fight against Communism, especially in contrast to the Roman Catholics. Dame Beatrice Lyall argued that this factor was causing the Anglican Church to lose people who feared the Communist menace to the Roman Church: "Our Church up to date has shown a very obvious timidity in saying, or doing anything, that could even remotely be construed into criticism of Russia or her
vassal states." The letter appealed for guidance and instruction in the matter, adding that to many such appeared long overdue.(52)

In fact, shortly before Dame Beatrice voiced this complaint, the Archbishop had roundly abused the SU in Canada, taking a totally contradictory line to that he adopted before the British public. Speaking in the Winnipeg Auditorium on September 4, 1946 Fisher said: "The evils of the world all stem from fear, pride and greed, and Russia, so far as anyone can read her mind, is possessed of all three, and they are all urging her along the course she seems to have chosen.... She has tied them all to a political creed."

Although this was a controversial and a new line of argument on the part of the Archbishop, the British press reports of his speeches in Canada neither reported nor commented on these words. Such was not the case in Canada where one church newspaper, the Anglican Outlook, not only commented on the speech, but juxtaposed it to previous utterances on Russia from Lambeth, and then wrote:

It is difficult to resist the conclusion that these statements and changes have something to do with an external political situation. The last statement is a very serious indictment to make against a country that has just suffered the terrific cost of a modern war, with losses reckoned in millions of men, women and children, and in the destruction of tens of thousands of farms, homes and towns... It would seem a pity that a visiting Archbishop gave the Press the opportunity to headline him as saying that 'fear, pride and greed guide Soviet creed,' while ignoring the fact that he said that the democracies were not free from these evils - especially as he supplied absolutely no evidence for his contention. This makes it difficult to deny that there is a certain relation between the utterances of highly placed spokesmen and the dominant views of the State in which they are expressed. In other words, the Church of England, through its Archbishop of Canterbury, follows closely the line of the British Foreign Office in its utterances, and so lends itself by its deliberate policy to the greatest smear campaign on this continent against a country that not so long ago was a welcome ally, even though following a different political and economic creed.(53)
Unaware until some months afterwards of the substance of the views expressed by the Archbishop in Canada, Religion and the People commented, "The Press reports of the speeches of the Archbishop of Canterbury in Canada in September, 1946, omitted to point out that he took the opportunity of being in a country which had been swept by the hysteria of the atomic espionage episode to make clear - as he has not in this country - his real views on Russia. (54)" Abroad the traditional hostility of Britain to Russia was a known and accepted fact, and the Foreign Office had no need to conceal its desire to present Russia as an aggressive danger to world peace, as it did at home. Fisher's trip came some months after Churchill's Fulton speech, and his words, significantly, endorsed those of the ex-prime minister. Back in England, however, he continued to endorse the still official Foreign Office line of friendship with the Soviet Union being a prerequisite of the world peace actively sought by the Allies. This was illustrated by his reply to Dame Beatrice, made following his trip to Canada and his public attack there on the Soviet Union:

The Roman Catholic Church has declared open war on Russia as the seat of Communism, but the following facts should be borne in mind. If there is to be a war against Russia the Vatican will not have to fight it. In this country the first thing is to do everything in our power to lead Russia into the ways of cooperation with other nations. It is perfectly true that we may fail and that there may be another war. For myself I do not believe that there is any imminent danger of that, and I think that by slow degrees and with unsteady steps Russia is becoming more sensitive to Western opinion. Stalin's recent answers give some hope of that. At any rate at present our national duty is two fold: to stand firm for our own principles and to try to reconcile Russia. This precisely is what Bevin is trying admirably to do. It would be a grievous thing if the Church here made his task harder by coming out with provocative denunciations of Russia. (55)

Fisher pointed out another factor which, because of the secret negotiations which the CFR had recently conducted
in Yugoslavia, was equally deceptive and misleading. Although the Church, through its Council on Foreign Relations, was at that time actively collaborating with the Serb Orthodox and the Roman Catholic Churches in Yugoslavia in an attempt to oppose Russia and contain the influence of the Russian Church, Fisher claimed that the Anglican Church was constrained from criticism of Russia because of its relations with the Russian Church: "Our duty is to try to increase our connexions with the Patriarch of Moscow and help that Church as much as we can. To denounce Russia would close our doors of access to the Russian Orthodox Church." Fisher's concern for the Orthodox Church, which he stated the Vatican did not have, pointing to its forcible conversions of the Orthodox in Croatia during the war, had not, however, deterred him from attacking Russia in Canada.

From defending the Church of England to Lyall, Fisher moved to attack the Roman Catholic Church. Earlier in his reply, Fisher had said that there was no need to attack Communism since it had so little influence and was losing a good deal of what it had. His attitude to Catholicism was different, it was there that Fisher perceived the most insidious threat:

As I know, the Vatican would very much like our Church and others to rank ourselves in this matter behind the Church of Rome as the great defender of liberty, but so far as liberty goes Rome itself has a by no means unsullied record. I mentioned Yugoslavia just now. When the Italians were in occupation of Abyssinia the Roman Church seized the opportunity to do everything in their power to convert the Abyssinians from their traditional faith to Roman Catholicism. As a result they are hated now throughout Abyssinia and the churches they built for the people they were to impress into their ranks now stand empty and deserted. It is only natural that the Vatican should wish to lead a crusade to defend its own members. Our duty is to defend religious liberty wherever it needs defence and that is often enough against the Roman Church itself.
Concluding his defence, Fisher drew an analogy between Church and State to illustrate the independence of the Church and its preferred avoidance of political involvement: "So like Bevin in the political world we go on our own way in the ecclesiastical world standing firmly for our principles and, as I have said, Church leaders are constantly reaffirming them against the practices of Russia and their subordinates; but we cannot convert it into a political cry, nor can we accept Rome as a champion of liberty."

Neither Dame Beatrice Lyall nor the friend for whom she had first written, Mrs Marriott, were satisfied with Fisher's reply; they accused the Church of England of choosing the "expedient" rather than the "right" as had the Roman Catholic Church, accepting even persecution. Nor, they argued, did the Church of England need to follow Rome, it could lead. They countered Fisher's arguments, noting particularly that although the Vatican would not fight in the next war, Roman Catholics would. Dame Beatrice acknowledged the precarious position of the Orthodox Church, but asked if ignoring and acquiescing in what was being perpetrated helped. She concluded by refuting the claim that Stalin was moving toward the West in sensitivity, such, she stated, had been proven false by recent events.(56)

Fisher chose not to answer the points raised in this rebuffal of his first letter, but counter-attacked by concentrating criticism on the Holy See:

Between the Vatican and Moscow there is openly declared war. That is understandable. The Soviet has made an open attack upon the Roman Church in many ways and the Roman Church has openly attacked the Soviet. Here is a clash between two systems which are both totalitarian in spirit and method. I would suggest that the position of the Church of England does not rest just on expediency, though it does take account of all the factors in the present position. It does rest on Christian principle.(57)
Fisher's repudiation of the methods of the Roman Church did not, however, signify a repudiation of its aims, the countering of Communist influence, a process in which the Church of England was itself thoroughly implicated. In the British mobilisation of religious forces to contain Communist, while spreading British, influence, it was considered more effective to operate covertly. In particular, it was considered inadvisable to be competing with the Russian Orthodox Church in Eastern Europe. This point was emphasised in early 1947 by the East European missions when the Foreign Office sounded their response to the possibility of the Archbishop of York making a religious cum diplomatic visit to their domains. In principle the idea was fully endorsed, the times, however, were not felt to be propitious. It was advised that the existing circumstances would render the visit counter-productive. Mr Sarrel, the British representative in Bucharest, noted that the proposed dates for the Bulgarian visit would coincide with that of a Russian delegation. Although this might have been intended by the Foreign Office, Mr Sarrel advised against it: "it is clearly important that the visits should not clash, and that we should avoid any appearance of competing with the Russian Orthodox Church." (58)

The representative in Sofia, J C Sterndale Bennett was even more explicit in his opposition, although not in the official despatch which was written to be shown to the Church of England, as he explained in a private letter to Warner:

I have borne in mind not only the fear expressed by the Foreign Office that a visit of a Church of England Hierarch to Bulgaria might be taken as approval of the present political regime, but also the desire of His Majesty's Government as expressed in paragraph 8 of Foreign Office despatch no 91 Secret (M4242/710/63) of April 14, not to appear too prominently in the role of "official opposition" to the local Government. I think that at a later stage a visit of the kind proposed might provide a most useful encouragement to the Opposition, but from this point of view I think that it is premature at present. I would rather wait till we have got rid of the major obstacle to Bulgaria's freedom i.e. the outward sign
of Russian control in the shape of the presence of Russian armed forces. (59)

At this juncture political reasons inveighed against the Archbishop's visit, but within a very short time the balance was to change and political circumstances were to dictate that such a visit would, after all, be in the British interest. On June 6, 1947 Herbert Waddams, CFR secretary, called in person at the Foreign Office to inform them that the Dean of Canterbury might be going to the Balkans in the summer. Waddams told the Foreign Office that he regarded the visit as undesirable and that the Archbishop of Canterbury would be glad of any arguments the Foreign Office could suggest for use in persuading the Dean to cancel his plans. The Foreign Office offered, as carrying some weight, the adverse responses of their own missions to the recent exploration of the question whether it would be desirable for a bishop of the established Church to visit the Churches of Roumania and Bulgaria. The Foreign Office further advised that it be pointed out to the Dean that his presence would be politically exploited to give the impression that these regimes had the support of the Church of England, detailing excessively brutal practices allegedly employed by the governments of Roumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and warning, confidentially, that H.M.G. might shortly be publishing some rather horrifying facts about the Bulgarian regime, asking: "Could the Dean really wish to pay a friendly visit to a Government whose officers are allowed to use the most abominable tortures in interrogating prisoners and to threaten with death anyone who dares to question their policy?" (60)

The Foreign Office were opposed to Johnson's proposed visit because they knew he would take a sympathetic view of the developments in these countries.
Sir Orme Sargent informed Fisher that he opposed Johnson's visiting Hungary because the coalition government was under Communist domination, while the use of the police had instilled such fear into the anti-Communists that they were now incapable of resistance: "I hope therefore that the Dean of Canterbury is not thinking of going to Hungary or that if he does he will not allow himself to be used to cover up and approve what is going on."(61)

Foreign Office consternation at the prospect of the Dean visiting Eastern Europe was sufficiently aroused that when they received an enquiry from Johnson on July 15 regarding the necessary procedure for obtaining visas for Hungary, they fervently hoped it was for a trip in lieu of and not in addition to the one of which Waddams had warned them.(62) The Foreign Office did not consider that the Dean would deliberately set out to contradict their propaganda picture of these regimes, the fear was that he would do it accidentally:

From what I have heard about the Dean and Mr D'Eye they are likely, quite ingenuously, to declare themselves in favour of all kinds of policies at present being pursued by the Governments of the countries concerned, and their visit may therefore cause us some embarrassment... I therefore think we should reply to the Dean and Mr D'Eye by informing them that, until the Peace Treaty is ratified, the Soviet authorities will only consider the grant of entry permits if there are urgent compassionate reason for the visit, etc.(63)

This was quite clearly a ruse to prevent the Dean's visit going ahead, and there was concern that should this obstructionism become public, the Foreign Office might find itself equally embarrassed; nonetheless, the attempt was considered worthwhile:

There is one drawback to this course, that if the Dean makes a fuss by writing to the Times or in some other way, and we eventually have to put his application forward, I have little doubt the Russians will grant the permit with alacrity, since they have found his presence within their orbit useful in the past. We may then be made to look rather silly. I
nevertheless think it is worth trying to put the Dean and his friend off... (64)

The attempts to deter the Dean proved unsuccessful, as the Archbishop had anticipated when he informed Sargent that he would try to confine the Dean to visiting Czechoslovakia, but without using the Foreign Office arguments as he suspected they would only incite Johnson to go to prove how wrong they all were. (65) Fisher told Johnson that the weight of opinion, including authoritative sources in the Foreign Office and the British Ambassador in Yugoslavia, Charles Peake, counselled against a visit to the specified countries by an English ecclesiastic, owing to the unsettled political position and, more particularly, the very difficult relations existing between Church and authorities. The Archbishop averred that experience had shown that the existing difficulties of the Church were increased by Anglican visits and that the Archbishop of York was himself refraining from a trip to Yugoslavia and confining himself, at the most, to a trip to Czechoslovakia. The increased difficulties of which Fisher remarked, was a reference to the demonstrations which attended the Bishop of Herford's visit to Yugoslavia the previous year. These, however, had not been unwelcome to the British authorities, as was confirmed when Charles Peake subsequently invited the Archbishop of York to make an official visit to him the following year.

The Archbishop had accepted the invitation, but, although reluctant to relinquish his plans, was prepared to do so if the Foreign Office so requested. On learning of the prospective visit of the Dean, however, the Archbishop of York suggested to Orme Sargent in the July the possibility of using his visit...
as an excuse to head off that of the Dean of Canterbury, as a Foreign Office minute observed:

The Archbishop has apparently been invited by Mr Peake to go to Yugoslavia. The Archbishop would be quite prepared to go if we advise it in which case he would go also to Vienna and Budapest and could take the line with the Dean that in view of his own visit to Belgrade the Dean's visit to the Balkans would be unnecessary or inappropriate. (66)

Christopher Warner supported Garbett's proposal, noting that the Archbishop was "first class" and realised "that he would have to be very careful in Yugoslavia," an oblique reference to the previous Anglican discussions there about the planned collaboration of the Orthodox and the Roman Catholic. The proposal was further endorsed, "wholeheartedly," by the State Department: "Anything to keep the Dean away must be tried!" (67)

The Dean was not to be kept away. As Fisher had predicted, the efforts to prevent his going but fuelled his determination and in a letter to Fisher, which was almost a reprimand, he argued that Christians had a duty beyond obedience to the Foreign Office:

... to tell the truth of ourselves, to seek the truth from them, to break down the barriers of fears and suspicions, to show that our Church is a truly Christian Church, to prevent so far as I can the drift to fresh disasters and new wars. On this my conscience stands, and I cannot compromise with it.

In all humbleness I do suggest to you that "diplomacy" in the Foreign Office sense is not the guide for Christians and our Christian Church. We have seen what it has done during the past thirty years. We see what it is doing today. The results are with us at this moment. Their painful evidence is only too apparent in your letter. At all costs new endeavours must be made to break the viciousness of the present circle. Perhaps I can do little or nothing, but at least I feel I must try to do what lies in my power. (68)

Johnson was completely sincere in his commitment, but he understood the Foreign Office mind sufficiently to know that his arguments would carry as little weight with the Foreign Office and the Archbishop as theirs had with
him. He thus posited a further consideration for the Archbishop, knowing that the Foreign Office would not wish it to be revealed that they had sought to prevent his goodwill mission:

If, for example, it became known, as it must, that I was not permitted to visit these countries because of undue pressure from the Foreign Office and yourself, it would have a world wide publicity and significance of the gravest kind, and do immense harm in the Church and to our country. It could be interpreted only in one way - that we wished to enlarge the distress and suspicion, that forces here were working for a deeper cleavage between these new countries and ourselves. Such is the very opposite I am convinced of what we ought to do. I believe that these new countries of Eastern Europe can be a bridge between East and West instead of a barrier. (69)

This consideration probably proved the most effective part of Johnson's argument, because it threatened to reveal official attitudes which the authorities at that time preferred to keep concealed.

Unable to prevent the journey, the Foreign Office determined to render it ineffective. On August 5, 1947, Budapest was informed that the Archbishop of York would probably visit Belgrade in October and would be prepared, if so advised, to go on to Hungary. Warming Budapest that the Dean of Canterbury was also very anxious to visit Hungary, and that the Foreign Office might not be able to dissuade him, the suggestion was made that it might be advisable for the Archbishop to follow the Dean and try to counteract the impression that his strong pro-Soviet sympathies were representative. The Foreign Office asked Budapest's views as to the desirability of a visit by the Archbishop, whether or not he were preceded by the Dean. The response to the Archbishop's proposed visit, now that there was a prospect of the Dean of Canterbury being loosed in the region, was entirely favourable. On August 22, Sargent informed Garbett that
"we are all in favour of your visit to Yugoslavia and Hungary if you feel able
to undertake it."

Referring back to a recent conversation between himself and the
Archbishop, Sargent advised Garbett that it had been announced in the Hungarian
press that Johnson had been due to arrive in Hungary on August 19 as the guest
of the Hungarian Women's Democratic Association: "It is, of course, probable,
that considerable propaganda use will be made of the Dean's visit. It is certain
to be used as a sort of election stunt, to show that the clergy in England
sympathise with the Hungarian Government. Anything that you could do to
counteract the impression that the Dean's strong pro-Soviet views are
representative would be well worthwhile. We must of course leave the decision
to you..."

Johnson and D'Eye had been invited to Hungary primarily to observe the
manner in which the elections were conducted. The Foreign Office clearly
wanted their credibility as independent observers undermined. Sargent asked
the Archbishop was there no means of discrediting the Dean's prestige and
representative capacity as a leading churchman:

I suppose there is no way by which you could get some disclaimer
made publicly of the Dean's representative capacity, supposing the
communists make use of his presence as a really important electioneering
device in their favour? It occurs to me that perhaps some representative
Anglican society or one of the episcopal bench might write to the
newspapers. We could then almost certainly guarantee that the British
Broadcasting Corporation would refer to it in their Hungarian broadcasts,
which have a considerable effect in Hungary.

Agreeing with Sargent about the nuisance value of the Dean, Garbett informed
him that he was consulting the Archbishop of Canterbury to arrange an official
Johnson's tour of the Balkans was carefully monitored by the Foreign Office through their missions. The British Political Mission to Hungary sent a detailed report of Johnson's speeches, the responses to them, the receptions he attended and virtually every movement he made. The verdict they delivered on his visit was by no means damning: "All in all, our feeling is that, although the visit was made good use of by his hosts, his remarks and activities did no great harm." (75) Prague's observations lead them to an equally innocuous conclusion. Ambassador Nichols doubted that the "nonsense" Johnson talked had any great effect, although he suspected that the public probably over-rated his significance, it being said that a large number confused him with the Archbishop of Canterbury. (76) Even Charles Peake, who made no attempt to conceal his personal contempt for and dislike of the Dean, had to concede that the Dean inflicted no damage: "I do not think such Yugoslav officials as have talked to me about him regard him as serious in any way. Indeed they hardly bothered to conceal their smiles. On the other hand, they have not neglected his value as 'a turn'." (77)

Peake, a correspondent of both Archbishops, had a strong aversion to the Dean and complained that his visit, "induced in me a tendency to lowness of spirits which I find difficulty in resisting... I do not think that he took in anything that I told him. At all events the fixed smile of benevolent superiority which informed his features never relaxed... the impression he left on all of us was one of vanity and complacency quite out of the ordinary." (78) Peake had suggested to Johnson that he might care to come and see him and talk
over his impressions before leaving the country, adding that it might be useful to do so before giving a press conference. Despite the intent behind such a request being quite clear, Johnson did agree; although he only offered to consider a second suggestion from Peake, who advised that if he were proposing to talk about religious questions it would be courteous to call upon the Patriarch Gavrilo beforehand. Gavrilo, intensely anti-Communist and very pro-British and with whom Peake had established a confidential relationship, was a strong opponent of the Tito regime, which he constantly accused of religious persecution. Johnson explained to Peake that he had no wish to be drawn into religious controversy of any kind. Peake subsequently informed the F.O. that Johnson had made no attempt to see the Patriarch. This, however, was contradicted by a later report from the Archbishop of York who stated that he was told by Gavrilo that he had refused Johnson an interview, pleading indisposition, because he did not agree with the views expressed in his addresses to the Yugoslav people. (79)

Peake's report to the Foreign Office charged Johnson with talking like any Yugoslav Communist, "making plentiful use of threadbare cliches and catch phrases which are common currency of speech in Communist circles in Belgrade." Johnson was confronted by an embassy staff member over a statement published in the press that the Foreign Secretary had been put into office by the Conservative Party "as a mask." The Dean was not alone in this view which had many Labour Party adherents who perceived more toryism than socialism in Bevin's policies. Nonetheless, the remark had been made off the record and the Dean was distressed that it had been published, although he made no attempt to
retract or disavow the statement, but he was exceedingly critical of the press for using it.

Peake dismissed the activities of the Dean to the Yugoslavs with the line, common in England, that he was an old eccentric, regarded with charity at home, but not taken seriously. This was not the opinion of Peake's Czechoslovakian counterpart, Nichols, who reported from Prague that when he first met Johnson he gained the impression that he was by no means a fool, an opinion to which he held following Johnson's departure. Nichols succinctly remarked why British officialdom viewed the Dean with so much hostility: "In fact, it is not so much what he says that is so tiresome as that it is said by a man in his position." (80) This was supported by the fact that, as all the reports from the various missions made quite clear, Johnson's addresses were far from subversive.

Johnson's message was essentially that of the benefits to be derived from real East-West friendship and cooperation. Speaking only months prior to the Communist take-over in Czechoslovakia, presented with a doctorate by the John Hus Theological Faculty of the Charles University in Prague, Johnson told his audience that Czechoslovakia was fortunate to be situated half-way between East and West. This meant that she could and did benefit from the spiritual heritage of the West and the material benefits now conveyed to humanity by the East. The Western democracies supplied those personal liberties of speech, right of association, and political and religious convictions which constituted the special glory of the Western tradition; from the East came the right to enjoy leisure, freedom to live under a planned economy - in fact all the material freedoms without which the spiritual liberties were empty and meaningless. Nichols reported to the Foreign Office that Johnson "spoke technically well and
gave every appearance of sincerity." The Foreign Office responded with derision. Next to this section of the Nichols' despatch, R M A Hankey had penned five exclamation marks and inscribed "?other way round?!?", crossed it out and put at the top "Shocking old ass! RMAH."(81)

Whatever illusions governed Johnson's perceptions of Communism in Eastern Europe, still his message of East-West cooperation was supposedly the aim of the British authorities in this period, with its non-achievement subsequently attributed at home to the recalcitrance of the Russians with their unreasonable suspicions. Yet it was very clear that the Foreign Office did not want an English cleric of Johnson's position disseminating a message of East-West friendship as though it were endorsed by the Church of England. Rather than East-West friendship, the Foreign Office sought to ferment dissent and resistance to the new regimes among the indigenous peoples of Eastern Europe. A potential ally in this quest were the indigenous Churches and to encourage their trust and support the Foreign Office did not want an important Anglican cleric speaking in the opposite vein, telling them that the people of Britain sympathised with and applauded the Communist experiment.

Johnson encountered clerical opposition and hostility to the new regimes in Eastern Europe, and also to his support for them. He wrote of one such experience to his wife, Nowell, telling her also that the situation in the Balkans was very different from that inferred in home propaganda:

The talk about violence and oppression is absurd. We travel everywhere and attend meetings. Speech is entirely free. Men criticise the government fiercely and openly but with no violence on either side... The women's movement is most inspiring... We heard the Communist Party meeting and a good meeting of the Opposition Party on Sunday - all perfectly free to speak as they liked and the latter openly attacking the government. The Pastor at whose church I spoke did not care for my attitude or my service and in his prayer at the end prayed for "our
soldiers still in slavery in Russia... and may the old days return." Our people were very vexed. At the vicarage afterwards the daughter said to D'Eye we have no vote no freedom. But the Minister was openly fascist and was imprisoned after the war as a fascist. It is not unnatural that such should be disenfranchised. (82)

Johnson was not blind to the shortcomings of the new regimes and was worried by what he called dangerous undercurrents. Nevertheless, painfully aware of their struggle for survival, the baneful effects of the East-West divide and the ubiquitous fear of war, Johnson's views were overwhelmingly tempered by sympathy and toleration. Even more so because he held the attitude of the West greatly responsible for contributing to the less palatable aspects which he believed could have been overcome with Western aid. To Sir John Boyd Orr of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the U.N., Johnson wrote:

I have just returned from nine weeks strenuous travel in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and all six republics of Yugo-slavia and Bulgaria. I was able to travel far and see much. There is a wonderful throb of new life, but unfortunately all countries are terribly crippled for lack of machines and tools. America could have lasting gratitude from Eastern Europe had she out of her plenty traded at this critical moment with the new countries. Instead she earns despite and suspicion to put it very mildly. She is terribly afraid that America means war. (83)

At a time when the West was formulating a propaganda image of an aggressive East bent on eventual world domination, this ubiquitous, tangible fear of war prevailed throughout the SU and the East European countries. On his own return from the East, even the Archbishop of York felt forced to remark on this prevalent emotion, informing the press that there was a very real fear of a revanchist Germany. The Archbishop also conceded to the press that the new regimes fully supported the Russian Alliance.

The Archbishop of York received more welcoming receptions and inspired more favourable reports from the British missions than had the Dean. His visit
was declared a success by all, including himself in his diary, which further revealed that the embassies showed him every courtesy and provided him with every facility. Nichols declared the visit, "most useful as it drew attention to British interest in the religious affairs of Central Europe and to some extent served to counteract the unfortunate effect of the recent visit by the Dean of Canterbury."(84) In fact the Archbishop's visit was of much more critical political significance than simply countering the effects of the Dean; it was a demonstration of the important role religion was assuming in the alignment of West against East.

There seems little doubt that Garbett's visit to Yugoslavia had much to do with what had been achieved during the Bishop of Hereford's visit the previous year. Since then the Acting Patriarch, the Metropolitan Joseph, who had proven so "enlightened" and cooperative, had conceded his position at the Head of the Serb Orthodox Church when Tito had invited the original Patriarch, Gavrilo, who had fled the country during the war, to return. Although Gavrilo had proven himself a friend to Britain during the war, and had been at least partly responsible for Yugoslavia entering the war on the Allied side, the fact that he was returning at Tito's invitation clearly aroused Foreign Office doubts and they recognised the need to reaffirm the agreements of the previous year. Foreign Office fears for the health of their alliance with the Serb Orthodox Church were possibly exacerbated by the fact that during a recent sojourn in England Gavrilo had not received the treatment which a distinguished friend of the country who had rendered so invaluable a service deserved.

In July 1945 Fisher asked Sir A Cadogan that the Patriarch of Yugoslavia be allowed to visit the U.K. for the baptism of the
Crown Prince, as King Peter of Yugoslavia had requested. (85) Fisher pointed out that apart from ecclesiastical reasons, Gavrilo was a firm friend of Britain and the Church of England and had been instrumental in bringing Yugoslavia into the war on the Allied side, a fact confirmed by F.O. records. (86) The Foreign Office were prepared to allow the Patriarch to visit but not to stay, whatever services he had rendered Britain during the war. Although Gavrilo had suffered in German captivity and resisted efforts to use him for anti-Bolshevist propaganda, the Foreign Office knew that he held strong anti-Communist views and believed him to be out of sympathy with the government then in power. The Foreign Office thus decided there was no need to exert themselves on his behalf by facilitating his transfer from Austria to Switzerland, necessitated by his poor health; as a minuted comment stated: "We do not particularly want any Yugoslavs here who are not in favour with the Yugoslav Government." (87) As relations with the Yugoslav authorities changed with the onset of the Cold War, the British authorities in Yugoslavia sought to cultivate relations with the Serb Orthodox Church, and after his return to Yugoslavia, the British Ambassador developed a close relationship with Gavrilo, the nature of which was concealed from the Communist authorities. Peake, moreover, facilitated correspondence between the Patriarch and the Archbishop of Canterbury using his "safe hand" in the Patriarchate and the diplomatic bag. (88) A visit by the Archbishop of York was clearly calculated by Peake to be a mark of respect and show Anglican support for the Serb Orthodox Church; and it was at the Ambassador's invitation that Garbett's visit was originally instigated.

In the course of the critical year of 1947, other reasons for sending the Archbishop developed. Since the end of the war neither of the Archbishops had
concealed their contempt for Vatican behaviour during the war, and both had attacked the Roman Catholic anti-Communist crusade, despite the secret negotiations conducted with the Roman Catholic authorities in Yugoslavia by Herbert Waddams and the Bishop of Hereford. In a trip to Rome shortly after the war Garbett had refused to visit the Pope, despite his being patronised at that time by leading British statesmen, because of a speech he intended to make which attacked Vatican pronouncements during the war. More recently Garbett had been the subject of criticism in the Catholic press for an attack he made on the Vatican attitude to the Russian Church and a warning to Roman Catholicism about its identification with reaction. Significantly, however, the counter-attacks on Garbett were not made until the beginning of October, the same month in which he was scheduled to visit the Balkans, despite the fact that his attack on Catholicism had been made as long ago as July.

Speaking at Malton in Yorkshire, Garbett had apportioned some of the blame for the division of Europe into two blocs to Vatican policy; he had declared that the Catholic parties on the continent were the refuge of the reactionaries, so that, were the Left finally to triumph, the Church, and probably Christianity, would be treated as a political enemy; that, whereas Marxism and Christianity were logically opposed, it was wrong to think that there was no room for Christianity in a Communist State; and that, whereas it was undeniable that difficulties of understanding with Russia existed it would be wrong to regard these difficulties as permanent:

This separation of Europe into two strongly contrasted camps is encouraged by the Vatican policy, which treats Russia as the chief enemy of Christian civilisation and, wherever it has influence, supports the opposition both to communism and social democracy... The Catholic parties on the continent are at present progressive in their programmes but they are also the only rallying ground for the reactionaries, and in course of
time there is danger that, once again, on the continent Catholicism will be identified with reaction. (89)

Garbett not only criticised the Vatican attitude to Russia, but also to the Russian Church which the Archbishop defended:

Persistent Roman Catholic propaganda is directed against the Russian Church as a submissive instrument of the State: the Russian Church is indeed loyal to the new regime, and believes it is more in accordance with Christianity than the other social and economic systems, but its faith and worship are independent of the State. The revival of the ancient Church of Russia and its freedom recognised by the State, are the most encouraging events in these critical days. (90)

Garbett retained a great deal of respect and affection for the Russian Church. During his 1943 visit he had been much impressed by the vitality of its religious life, and the calibre of its leaders. While the Anglican hierarchy was traditionally anti-Roman Catholic, there was also the further consideration that official British policy was still opposition to a divided Europe.

Subsequent to Garbett's expressing these views, Britain's foremost ally, the USA, made a widely publicised approach to the Vatican, which, although rendered rhetorically in the elevated language of peace, was commonly interpreted as inviting the Vatican to join the US in an anti-Communist crusade. Since the end of the war relations between the Vatican and the US had lacked the closeness and importance they assumed during Roosevelt's time. The decision to return Taylor to the Vatican was widely interpreted as the beginning of intense collaboration between the two. Taylor left Washington on August 15, 1947 with Truman announcing his mission as seeking the views of "leaders everywhere" as part of the search for peace, and that his discussions with Pius XII would be on the means of establishing peace "under a moral world order." (91) On his way to Rome, Taylor spent time in London where he had
discussions with the Archbishop of Canterbury. On August 26, Taylor had the longest audience ever granted by the Pope to a diplomatic representative in recent years. On August 28 the Vatican and the White House made public an exchange of letters between the President and the Pope wherein they pledged to each other to work for lasting peace in the world.

The Pope and the President had of course been corresponding since April 1946, although this was not revealed at the time. The decision to publicly declare their alliance and their common objectives at what was a very critical political juncture, with relations between East and West rapidly deteriorating and anti-Communism spreading as Russia moved to consolidate her position in Eastern Europe, was widely interpreted as heralding an anti-Communist crusade.

Catholic circles welcomed this combination of the world’s greatest spiritual force with the world’s strongest lay power as a logical sequel to the US policy of firmness, as embodied in the Truman doctrine, against what they termed Russian imperialism. Whereas before Catholic clergy could do little more than denounce Communism and unmask its tactics, now they could use as a compelling argument the material advantages that might be enjoyed by those countries that would fight communism within their borders and join the ranks of democratic nations. Those opposed to the combination of Vatican and US accused the Pope of taking a direct part in world politics and of abetting US imperialism to establish what Unità, official paper of the Italian Communist Party, began to call “Truman’s new order,” a caustic reference to Hitler’s “new order.”

This inclusion of the Pope as a central figure in the western alliance meant that the criticism of Garbett by the Vatican press was taken very
seriously by Victor Perowne, the British representative at the Holy See, who sent the F.O. full translations of the comments of the *Osservatore Romano* of October 3 and of the *Quotidiano* of October 2, which were to be passed on to the secretary of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations, "Since I imagine that our friend the Reverend Waddams would be interested in knowing exactly what the Vatican press did find to say on this occasion." (94)

The *Quotidiano* responded to Garbett's not letting pass "the opportunity to attack the Catholic Church," by attacking him and the Anglican Church: "The affirmations of Dr Garbett are those which are current among those people who make the mistake of approaching facts from a basis of prejudice. And in this case the prejudice is the traditional anti-Roman spirit proper to the Anglo-Saxon world, and more particularly to Anglicanism." A reference to class warfare, "the negation of the Christian spirit," being transferred to the international plane was followed by an accusation that the Church of England used anti-communism as a tool with which to defend Britain's class-ridden status quo: "We know too well there are people among us who, while they pay lip service to the defence of Christian civilisation, are aiming at the preservation of privilege. But such people have nothing in common with the spirit of the Church." Garbett's assertions about the Russian Church were refuted and he was accused: "By his seemingly objective speeches, he ranges himself with the persecutors who in many European countries are combating the Catholics, even to the spilling of blood. And this is not a contribution towards the moral unification and the peace of the world." (95)

The *Osservatore Romano*, a semi-official Vatican organ, took a significantly different approach, chiding Garbett in a gently patronising rather than a
hostile tone: "The anxiety of the Anglican dignitary for the fate of the Catholic Church deserves a reassurance;" at one and the same time refuting his criticism and using it to explain Catholic policies and objectives. Osservatore Romano did not fail to mention the correspondence between the President and the Pope. Nor was there a counter-attack on the Anglican Church. Of note is the fact that these Roman Catholic responses were made three months after Garbett's offending criticism, and immediately prior to his departure for Eastern Europe.

Garbett's visits to Czechoslovakia and to Yugoslavia occurred after those two countries were subject to serious allegations of religious persecution by the Catholic press in Britain. In Prague Garbett was escorted by the British Ambassador Sir Philip Nichols, to meet individually Prime Minister Gottwald, President Benes and the Minister of Education. Garbett assured each one that the Roman Catholic allegations of religious persecution in Czechoslovakia were not believed in Britain and that the Roman Catholic press from which they derived, particularly the Tablet, carried no influence. These assurances were not, however, repeated in Yugoslavia. Instead, Garbett informed Tito that, "everyone in the United Kingdom sets the greatest value on religious freedom, and that we were not satisfied that this exists in Yugoslavia." These assurances were not, however, repeated in Yugoslavia. Instead, Garbett informed Tito that, "everyone in the United Kingdom sets the greatest value on religious freedom, and that we were not satisfied that this exists in Yugoslavia." These assurances were not, however, repeated in Yugoslavia. Instead, Garbett informed Tito that, "everyone in the United Kingdom sets the greatest value on religious freedom, and that we were not satisfied that this exists in Yugoslavia." These assurances were not, however, repeated in Yugoslavia. Instead, Garbett informed Tito that, "everyone in the United Kingdom sets the greatest value on religious freedom, and that we were not satisfied that this exists in Yugoslavia." These assurances were not, however, repeated in Yugoslavia. Instead, Garbett informed Tito that, "everyone in the United Kingdom sets the greatest value on religious freedom, and that we were not satisfied that this exists in Yugoslavia." These assurances were not, however, repeated in Yugoslavia. Instead, Garbett informed Tito that, "everyone in the United Kingdom sets the greatest value on religious freedom, and that we were not satisfied that this exists in Yugoslavia." These assurances were not, however, repeated in Yugoslavia. Instead, Garbett informed Tito that, "everyone in the United Kingdom sets the greatest value on religious freedom, and that we were not satisfied that this exists in Yugoslavia." These assurances were not, however, repeated in Yugoslavia. Instead, Garbett informed Tito that, "everyone in the United Kingdom sets the greatest value on religious freedom, and that we were not satisfied that this exists in Yugoslavia." These assurances were not, however, repeated in Yugoslavia. Instead, Garbett informed Tito that, "everyone in the United Kingdom sets the greatest value on religious freedom, and that we were not satisfied that this exists in Yugoslavia." These assurances were not, however, repeated in Yugoslavia. Instead, Garbett informed Tito that, "everyone in the United Kingdom sets the greatest value on religious freedom, and that we were not satisfied that this exists in Yugoslavia." These assurances were not, however, repeated in Yugoslavia. Instead, Garbett informed Tito that, "everyone in the United Kingdom sets the greatest value on religious freedom, and that we were not satisfied that this exists in Yugoslavia." These assurances were not, however, repeated in Yugoslavia. Instead, Garbett informed Tito that, "everyone in the United Kingdom sets the greatest value on religious freedom, and that we were not satisfied that this exists in Yugoslavia." These assurances were not, however, repeated in Yugoslavia. Instead, Garbett informed Tito that, "everyone in the United Kingdom sets the greatest value on religious freedom, and that we were not satisfied that this exists in Yugoslavia."
subsequently endorsed by Peake who told the Archbishop that the government "discouraged" religion rather than its being "openly persecuted."

Peake and Garbett discussed the Roman Catholic Archbishop Stepinac, whose trial had been used by the Vatican to focus a great deal of adverse attention on the religious situation in Yugoslavia. In a significant remark to Garbett, Peake implied recognition of Stepinac's guilt of the crimes as charged by the Yugoslav authorities, including collaboration against the new regime and criminal behaviour during the war. He stated: "Stepinac had certainly been very unwise; he was a young man and had committed himself unwise."

As the trial had drawn to an end, Peake had been instructed by the British government to see Tito and point out what indignation would be caused if Stepinac were sentenced to be shot; Tito had smiled when so informed and said: "We are not such fools as to kill an Archbishop."

In both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia Garbett had meetings with the leading representatives of the Roman Catholic Church. In Prague the Roman Catholic Bishop had "talked about cooperation over peace, especially about general action against what he described as 'the common enemy'." At his initial meeting with the Apostolic Nuncio in Belgrade, Bishop Hurley, who had the previous year had discussions with Waddams and Hereford, detailed allegations concerning the treatment of the Roman Catholic Church by the Yugoslav Government were made. During his interview with Tito, Garbett made representations on behalf of the Roman Catholic Church, warning of potentially adverse reactions from Britain should they not be heeded. When Tito had responded with complaints about the damaging allegations of the Roman Catholic press, far from giving him the same assurances as he had the
authorities in Prague, Garbett, as he noted in his diary afterwards, "... then took the chance of saying, and deliberately repeated it later on, that though we were not a Roman Catholic country all of us, and not only members of the Church, would be united in protest against any persecution of the Roman Catholics; we should feel such persecution as strongly as if it had been directed against members of our own Church." (104)

Tito sought to obtain Garbett's understanding for the complexities of the religious situation in Yugoslavia and the difficulties of his position. He made a distinction between the Orthodox and the Roman Catholic Church, as the latter had become involved in politics. Tito admitted that there had been excesses. These he attributed to the intense anger of the people, against the wishes of the Government. Tito blamed the Occupation when many Roman Catholic priests had not only sided with the Italians and Germans, but had committed terrible atrocities, especially in Croatia. Tito felt that the situation was improving and hoped in the future to establish friendly relations with the Roman Church, but stressed that while he was working and hoping for such, it was not yet a possibility, stating, as Garbett recorded in his diary: "it would be 'not yet'; he repeated 'not yet'." (105)

Tito told Garbett that cooperation with all the Churches was a government goal and it was for this reason that he had facilitated the return of Patriarch Gavrilo. Tito had told a visiting delegation of American churchmen that it was hoped Gavrilo's "arrival in Yugoslavia would greatly contribute to preventing the activity of certain elements in the Orthodox Church who, during the occupation behaved very negatively, so that at least this Church might not work against the State." Somewhat ironically considering Gavrilo's privately declared
opposition to the Tito regime and the nature of his association with Peake, the Communist leader had expressed his personal faith in the Patriarch as a nationalist: "It would be premature to say whether Patriarch Gavrilo will be completely able to justify our desires, but I personally see – from talks which I held with him several times – that he is endeavouring to improve this state of affairs. The positive thing is that he feels, as a Yugoslav, to be nationally responsible for improving this, that he realises that the Church should be Yugoslav. This means that he will not, as some other people, serve anti-national interests." (106) Gavrilo told Garbett that he had avoided meeting this American delegation, just as he had the Dean of Canterbury, as he objected to their having stated, before consulting him, that from their own observations religion in Yugoslavia was free. (107)

The Yugoslav Church leaders themselves had doubts as to the wisdom of reinstating Gavrilo. Archbishop Joseph, who had been Acting Patriarch when Waddams and Hereford had visited Yugoslavia, although himself not above political intrigue, had told his visitors that "perhaps in some ways it was a good thing that the Patriarch was not here since he is a very impulsive man and might take some precipitate step which would involve them all in a serious situation." (108)

Following his interview with Tito, Garbett had returned to the British Embassy and given a full account of the proceedings to Peake. That evening the Apostolic Nuncio, Bishop Hurley, dined at the Embassy, and was subsequently provided by the Ambassador with a summary of what had trespassed between the Archbishop and Tito. This was in turn relayed to Rome, which responded with
expressions of interest, as well as appreciation and gratitude for the Archbishop's efforts. Peake subsequently informed Garbett:

I thought it right to give in confidence to the Regent of the Apostolic Nunciature the substance of what passed between you and Marshall Tito regarding the Roman Catholic Church in Yugoslavia. Bishop Hurley passed this on to the Vatican, and he tells me that he has now heard from Mgr Tardini, the Papal Under Secretary of State, who asks him to convey to you, through me, a message to the effect that the Holy See were greatly interested in this conversation and wished you to know of their deep appreciation and gratitude for all you had said. (109)

As Britain's leading ally in the Cold War looked to develop a spiritual offensive against the Communists, seeking the support of the Vatican for this new crusade, the Church of England and the Foreign Office recognised the necessity of a significant gesture to the Vatican to cement the new alliance on their part. Within a very short time the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, following the lead of the American President, was to demand a spiritual dimension to British Cold War policies and seek an alliance in Britain of Anglican and Roman and all the other various denominations in support of British foreign policy.
NOTES: Chapter 3.

1. Osborne to Foreign Office, September 25, 1944; FO 371 44213.

2. Ibid.

3. The Tablet p 138, September 18, 1943.

4. Douglas to Garbett, August 23 1943; Garbett Papers.

5. Foreign Office to Ministry of Information, copy of text of original letter, minus details of date and authorship; INF 1 785.


7. Ibid Viata, September 8, 1943; Curentul, September 14 1943.

8. Shone to Foreign Office, October 19, 1943; FO 371 36963 N6339.

9. Following a memorandum from Waddams on Russian Church activities written on March 12, 1947, as a result of his visit to Paris, further consideration was given the subject within the Foreign Office. Thomas Brimelow contributed a
lengthy minute which illustrated the persistence of the Foreign Office's
ambivalent attitude towards the Russian Church:

The interest of the Soviet Government is to strengthen the influence of
the Russian Orthodox Church abroad in every possible way, to destroy the
Karlovtsy synod if possible, and to reduce the Oecumenical Patriarch to a
secondary position. Hitherto there has been no evidence to show that the
Soviet Government has put pressure on the Russian Orthodox Church to
pursue aims which it would not have itself pursued out of purely
ecclesiatical considerations. On the other hand, there is no guarantee
that the Soviet Government will not at any moment start to do so, and
although the Moscow Patriarch is at present maintaining the doctrine of
the equality of all the branches of the Greek Orthodox Churches, I doubt
whether it could or would put up a strong resistance if it were asked by
the Soviet Government to pursue a policy which, if so successful, would
merely enhance its own position in the eyes of the outside world.

As regards relations with the Anglican Church, the Russian Orthodox
Church has hitherto, with one exception, restricted itself to purely
ecclesiastical matters. The one exception was the request that we should
cease to pay subsidies to the Russian Orthodox Theological College in
Paris and the Karlovtsy representatives in the holy places in Palestine.
Neither of these requests has been pressed hard...

In view of the foregoing, I do not think that we should at present
ascribe unduly sinister motives to the Russian Orthodox Church although we
should be on the lookout for any signs of more active direction by the
Soviet Government of its present policy in the field of foreign relations.

As the Cold War intensified and the Russian Church gave its support to the
Russian Government, in the same way as the Church of England gave its to the
British, Foreign Office attitudes to the Russian Church hardened. The use of
national Churches for political ends was illustrated in Brimelow's minute, where
he commented:

As I have said, there have as yet been no indications that the Russian
Orthodox Church is authorised to play at politics. On the other hand, we
should certainly see that the British Delegates to any ecclesiastical
meetings at which the Russian Orthodox Church is represented are
thoroughly briefed before their departure. If this is done, I can see only
advantage in their meeting the Russians and dealing with them at first
hand.

When the Russian Church endorsed the Communist peace movement and
appealed to its Christian brethren in the West to give their support to peace,
the Foreign Office became exceedingly wary, to the point of discouraging, meetings of Anglican churchmen with Russian.

10. British Embassy Moscow to Southern Department, August 10, 1945; FO 371 48349.

11. Ibid.


13. Moscow Chancery to F.O. May 12, 1948; FO 371 71637.


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.


31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.


34. See below for meeting of Tito and the Archbishop of York, who made representations on behalf of the Roman Catholic Church with which Tito indicated a desire to establish good relations, but of which he claimed, like the Patriarch, to be prevented by the wrath of the Yugoslav people because of Roman Catholic complicity in war-time atrocities.

35. Osborne to Perowne, June 6, 1946; FO 371 66294.

36. Ibid, Perowne to Osborne, June 12, 1946.

37. Ibid, Perowne to Osborne, June 18, 1946.

38. Ibid, Perowne to Osborne, June 22, 1946.


40. New York Times April 23, 1953, p 20; the existence of this early correspondence between Truman and Pius XII was not made public until Myron Taylor published a book containing it, from which the New York Times quoted.
41. Ibid.

42. *Sunday Observer*, April 16, 1944; July 25, 1944; August 13, 1944.


44. Quoted in *Religion and the People*, July 1946.

45. Dean to Warner, June 20, 1945; FO 371 47854. Emphasis added.

46. Ibid, Warner, Minute, June 20, 1945.

47. Brimelow, Memorandum, September 9, 1946; FO 371 56788.

48. In 1945 the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster had complained to Downing Street about Soviet attacks on Vatican policy in British publications. The complaint was passed to the F.O. Observing that the Vatican used British freedom of press for its own "none too gentle" attacks on the SU, the F.O. declared that it was in British interests to keep out of the argument. Official F.O. policy up until the Cold War was openly and officially acknowledged, was to remain aloof from the polemics between the two and not seem to be showing favour to one side; FO 371 47959.

50. Harvey to Osborne, February 26, 1947; FO 371 67917.

51. Ibid, Osborne to Harvey, March 4, 1947.


58. Sarrel, Bucharest to Bevin, May 1, 1947; FO 371 47174.


60. Sargent to Fisher, July 16, 1947; Fo 371 66989 R9095/567/67.

61. Ibid.
While the Foreign Office hoped that the influence of the Archbishop of Canterbury might prevent Johnson from going to Eastern Europe, Fisher knew that official disapproval was more likely to inspire than deter his dissident Dean. He considered a proposed trip to Eastern Europe by the Archbishop of York a more effective and sure means of negating that of the Dean. Garbett had been asked to make a visit to Prague by a Professor Hnick, at the instigation of the Patriarch and with the approval of President Benes. Keen to accept the invitation, Garbett first consulted the Foreign Office. (Garbett to Fisher, May 23, 1947; Fisher Papers, Vol 38: 183). Informed of the proceedings, Fisher saw the invitation as a further opportunity for the Anglican Church to demonstrate its support for dissident Christians opposed to Communist influence in Czechoslovakia, as had the Bishop of Hereford’s visit, as well as a possible counter to the Dean. He told Garbett:
About Czechoslovakia, I think it would be a very good thing if you could go there. That country is putting up a brave fight to balance its unwanted Eastern connections by strengthening its connections with the West. The Bishop of Hereford was there a year ago, but that is no reason why you shouldn't go now and if the Foreign Office approves, I hope you will. I must add that the Dean of Canterbury tells me that he is going to be in Czechoslovakia about October 20th to receive a Degree. He is visiting Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Roumania on the way to Czechoslovakia. Perhaps it is more valuable that you should go there afterwards as a counterblast to the Red Dean!

Fisher corresponded with the British Ambassador in Yugoslavia, Charles Peake. The letters were often sent via the diplomatic bag. On June 10, 1947, Peake informed Fisher of a recent dispatch he had sent to the Foreign Office, the substance of which was to be sent to Waddams, secretary of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations, concerning Gavrilo, Patriarch of the Serb Orthodox Church. Gavrilo was apparently hoping for a visit from another English Bishop, although he professed to be fearful of the consequences for his staff, arrests had followed the Bishop of Hereford's visit which had occasioned demonstrations. Peake considered a wise procedure would be for a Bishop to make a private visit to himself; he would then naturally take him to visit the Patriarch, and also Tito. He urged that this was a valuable opportunity for conversation with the Patriarch, and suggested York or Chichester, the two most politically active ecclesiastics in the hierarchy, with known anti-Communist credentials, as two who would be well received. (Peake to Fisher, June 10, 1947; Fisher Papers, Vol 38: 185).

There was no doubt about Garbett's enthusiasm for the scheme, informed of the proposal he replied: "Belgrade sounds even more interesting than Prague!" (Garbett to Fisher, July 3, 1947; Vol 38: 188). The Foreign Office clearly approved, sending dispatches about the Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia to
Lambeth, with instructions for them to be shown to Waddams and Garbett before being returned to the Foreign Office. (Foreign Office to Fisher, July 5, 1947; Fisher Papers, Vol 38: 189). These had the effect of strengthening Garbett's determination to go to Eastern Europe, as he told Fisher:

The enclosure you sent me makes me more anxious to go. I had some talk over it with my friend in the Foreign Office. He strongly advises me to go, though not very hopeful of any practical results.

(Garbett to Fisher, July 15, 1947; Fisher Papers, 38: 194). Garbett was further urged to make the visit by Orme Sargent, who also wanted him to include Hungary in his itinerary. Garbett told Fisher, "He pressed this rather strongly." (Garbett to Fisher, July 26, 1947; Fisher Papers, Vol 38: 196).

On July 11, 1947, Fisher had written to Peake that: "We should dearly love to send another Bishop to Yugoslavia." (Fisher to Peake, July 11, 1947; Fisher Papers, Vol 38: 190). When Garbett expressed reservations about visiting Hungary, as Sargent had urged, because he doubted there was any non-Roman Church there he could visit, Fisher acknowledged the difficulty, but made it quite plain that Garbett was required to counter-effect whatever visits were made by the Dean of Canterbury:

The other day, I wrote to my Dean urging him not to visit Eastern Europe and using as my argument that you had thought it best not to go to anywhere except Czechoslovakia. Very likely he will disregard my advice. In that case, perhaps you will have to go to all the countries he has visited to undo his handiwork!

(Fisher to Garbett, July 31, 1947; Fisher Papers, Vol 38: 198).

68. Johnson to Fisher, July 30 1947; HJ 6739. Fisher wrote asking the Dean to refrain from his intended visits, noting Foreign Office objections. Fisher to Johnson, July 26, 1947; HJ 6740.
69. Ibid.

70. Sargent to Garbett, August 22, 1947; FO 371 66989.

71. Ibid.


73. Sargent to Garbett, August 22, 1947; FO 371 66989.

74. Garbett to Sargent, August 29, 1947; FO 371 47174.


76. Nichols to Hankey, October 24, 1947; FO 371 65786.

77. Peake to Warner, October 1, 1947; FO 371 66989 R14256.

78. Ibid.


80. Nichols to Hankey, October 24, 1947; FO 371 65786.

81. Ibid.
82. Johnson to Nowell Johnson, August 1947; HJ 8986.


84. Nichols, Prague, to Bevin, October 31, 1947; FO 371 65792.

85. Fisher to Cadogan, July 23, 1945; Fisher to Mr Maude, July 30, 1945; FO 371 4880.

86. Ibid, newspaper clipping relating drama of King Peter's escape from Nazis and Gavrilo's role.


88. Peake to Wallinger, August 20, 1947; FO 371 47174 R11350.


94. Perowne to R M A Hankey, October 8, 1947; FO 371 66409.

95. Quotidiano, "Those Responsible For Division", October 2, 1947.


97. Garbett's Travel Diary, "Visit to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, October-November 1947", pp 7-9; Garbett Papers. An example of how dramatically Garbett's views were changed by the Cold War is illustrated by the fact that he later used Roman Catholic sources in speeches to the Lords and also for his Cold War books; In an Age of Revolution, quotes the Tablet as a reputable source for facts and figures, see p 216.

98. Ibid, pp 33-34.


100. Ibid.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid, p 16.

103. Ibid.
104. Ibid, p 34.

105. Ibid, p 35.

106. Religion and the People, October/November issue 1947.

107. Garbett's Travel Diary; Garbett Papers.


109. Peake to Garbett, April 5 1948; Garbett Papers.
Conventional British history states that it was the failure of the projected postwar settlement, based on four Power cooperation, in 1947 which caused Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Office to construct an alternative settlement in 1948. Soviet intransigence and expansionism were blamed for what was claimed to be a new policy; but violent hostility to the Soviet Union and to Communism had long been a guiding principle of the diplomacy of the Great Powers. For British diplomacy in particular, the containment of Communism and its spread through the British Empire remained a major preoccupation. The collapse of Nazi and Japanese power, as had been foreseen, unleashed powerful forces of social revolt and nationalistic fervour. These forces caused consternation in the British Administration, with fears for the health of the Empire and Britain's status as a World Power, more so than any physical threat posed by the Red Army. At the end of World War Two the concern of the Western Allies was less that the Soviet Union might start another war, than how to restore and stabilise an old order convulsed by war and threatened by the radicalism it had fostered. This endeavour took many forms; and it involved confrontation with the Soviet Union at many different points. Thus was set in motion a dialectic of escalation and counter escalation which defined the history of the Cold War.

What was at issue was radical change in which Communists were certain to play an important, but not necessarily a monopolistic, role. At a time of great social and political upheaval in Western Europe in the aftermath of the war,
Communist parties played a crucial stabilizing role and rejected any adventurist policies that might have endangered their continued participation in the bourgeoisie governments they had entered. This strategy was of immense help in maintaining social discipline in the working class and was pursued in full accord with Soviet leaders. The Soviet Union did not insist on the Stalinization of Eastern Europe at the end of the war; not until 1947 amid a rising tempo of international aggravation were fully fledged Communist regimes installed in those countries which Stalin wanted in the Communist sphere of influence, with the inclusion of Czechoslovakia by way of a Communist takeover in 1948. It is also noteworthy that Stalin was prepared to abandon the Greek resistance to the Greek reactionaries supported by Britain, and to see Greece pass into the British and then the American sphere of influence. (1)

These factors were disregarded by the Foreign Office where suspicion of Communism was always paramount and for whom the emergence of the Soviet Union as a World Power threatened British power, prestige and commercial success. The emergence of America as the major world power did not arouse the same instincts, although America clearly perceived Britain as a commercial rival whose former position of power it had no qualms about usurping. Rather, the Foreign Office, perceiving America as a naive colossus susceptible to the influence of their own refined and superior diplomacy, saw it as Britain's main chance of retaining its Empire and regaining its lost power. (2) These perceptions led Attlee and Bevin to become the forerunners of the Cold War, adopting a much more hostile attitude to the Soviet Union than did their American counterparts initially. (3) They also led to the formation of a close
alliance with the United States and Western Europe which transgressed traditional precepts of British foreign policy.

Vital to the development of post-war foreign policy was the fact that Bevin and the Foreign Office shared the same anti-Communist views. When Attlee and Bevin took over from Churchill and Eden halfway through Potsdam, not only was there no change, there was not even an indication of a Socialist foreign policy, nor of an intent to cooperate with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Labour had been elected on a promise of Left speaking to Left, and while many within the Party regarded Communism with antipathy, capitalism was also an anathema. The Foreign Office recognised that in order to secure the foreign policy they deemed to be in the best interests of Britain, it would be necessary to exert what influence they could over the Foreign Secretary, whom they deemed the heavyweight in the Cabinet, to direct the Labour Administration. Waiting for Attlee and Bevin to arrive for the resumed Potsdam Conference, the permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Alec Cadogan, assessed the task before the diplomatic corps:

I think we may do better with Bevin than with any other of the Labourites. I think he is broadminded and sensible, honest and courageous. But whether he's an inspired Foreign Minister or not I don't know. He's the heavyweight of the Cabinet and will get his own way with them, so if he can be put on the right line, that may be alright. (5)

Foreign Office endeavours to put Bevin on the right lines operated on a variety of levels, including an appeal to man's natural vanity and the desire of all public figures to record a place in history. Aided by senior Civil Service figures, and Tory politicians such as Anthony Eden, the Foreign Office sought to persuade Bevin that he was personally vested with the responsibility, and the opportunity, of returning Britain to World Power status, by resolutely opposing
the encroaches of the Soviet Union and equally resolutely pursuing a permanent relationship with North America and to a lesser extent with Western Europe, as Britain's reduced means no longer enabled her to act as an independent power. The Foreign Office task was facilitated by Bevin's own imperialism. (6)

On August 21, 1945, following a speech made by Bevin on August 20, 1945 about the future direction of British foreign policy, Vansittart wrote to congratulate Bevin on "taking up your great new office", stating: "I should like, however, to tell you how glad I was to see the appointment and how sure I am that you will make a great name for yourself as Foreign Secretary." (7) Vansittart then asked to see Bevin in order to discuss a "particular matter" of which he was sure Bevin ought to be fully apprised, "...and I think what I have to say may be of service not only to you personally but to the nation."

According to handwritten notes on the letter, a reply was made by telephone that Bevin would be at the studio near Vansittart's home the next Sunday and could see him there. While there is no record of what transpired between the two, Vansittart had not only headed the Foreign Office and directed its virulent anti-Communist policies, but he was one of the most visible and vocal anti-Communist figures in British public life. It was Vansittart who coined the term 'Communazis' as a means of associating the two ideologies, a tactic Bevin was to seek to implement as part of his future Cold War propaganda policy. The conversation would naturally have covered what Sir Robert regarded as the major threat facing Britain at home and abroad, the spread of Communism. (8)

Although the Foreign Office emphasised the danger of Soviet expansionism, the major concern of the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of the war was to secure its borders with a cordon sanitaire of the nations which Stalin had
agreed with Churchill during the war should be in the Soviet sphere of influence. Direct evidence of this policy was indicated in a telegram, dated August 6, 1945, from H.M. Legation in Copenhagen to that in Oslo which stated that there was no evidence that the Soviet Government was trying to intervene in Danish politics, while there was evidence that the actions of the Norwegian Communist Party were dictated by Norwegian politics alone. (9) This struck Bevin who had clearly been giving independent consideration to Soviet intentions as based on a realistic assessment of their behaviour:

I have wondered recently whether Stalin is anxious to drop Communist Parties but before doing so discharge his obligations by getting them into Socialist Parties and thereby limiting his actions to states on his frontiers. (10)

Bevin instructed the Foreign Office to, "Look into this aspect."

The Foreign Office was already aware and had already sought to explain Soviet activity in terms of their own overall perception of Soviet intentions. Writing from Moscow on August 4, 1945, Mr Roberts had suggested to Warner that there was a decentralised form of control intended to render an appearance of independence; hence the American Communist Party would be controlled from Mexico; Spain, Portugal and the Antilles from Cuba, and so forth. (11) Roberts suggested that His Majesty's Missions abroad ought to pool all known information. Bevin's instruction and Roberts' suggestion led to a circular despatch requesting information about the relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties of other countries. However, prior to any response to the despatch, Thomas Brimelow submitted an argument against any potential assumption in Bevin's observations that the Soviet Union was not committed to confrontation with the West, clearly anticipating that the
The circular despatch which has been prepared requesting information on this subject may improve our knowledge, but I am not hopeful of our receiving much convincing evidence, as the lack of it appears to flow naturally from the present policy of the All-Union Communist Party. In countries outside the Soviet sphere of influence, crude use of the Communist Parties to further the ends of the Soviet Union would incur criticism and the years 1939-1941 showed that such criticism might do serious harm to the prestige of the Communists involved. It is to the advantage of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to respect nationalist feeling and to encourage the Communists of the Western countries to retain the reputation of patriotism which they earned for themselves after the German attack on the U.S.S.R. It is also in the interest of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that the Communists of these countries should increase their influence by the means most appropriate to the circumstances of the various countries, and that, if they are to further the ends of the U.S.S.R. they should do so discreetly, and should endeavour to create the impression that any pressure they bring to bear is a spontaneous manifestation of the popular will. This demands an intimate knowledge of local conditions, and it is, I think, probable that since the dissolution of the Comintern, Moscow has left much to the discretion of the local Communist Parties in the countries outside the Soviet sphere of influence, and has been content if they acted in a way generally consistent with the interests of the Soviet Union. If this assumption is correct, it is not surprising that for some time there has been little concrete evidence available of Soviet control of the Communist Parties in these countries.(12)

Brimelow noted that this did not mean that Moscow would not intervene in case of an emergency or continue to use prominent Communists of various nationalities. Refuting Bevin’s considerations regarding Stalin dropping Western Communist Parties, Brimelow concluded that: “He will abandon them without hesitation, as he abandoned them in Germany, if their sacrifice is required by the overriding interests of the Soviet Union, but they are too useful to be thrown overboard unnecessarily, and I am sure that he will use them to the full.” When the reports arrived from the various diplomatic missions they revealed similar thinking to Brimelow in the face of lack of any
hard evidence. (13) This then was the overwhelming conviction within the Foreign Office, and although disputed within the Labour Party, it was accepted by Bevin.

Bevin's anti-Communist and imperialist views facilitated a common outlook with the Foreign Office in the development of policy toward the Soviet Union. It was Britain's dire economic position and Bevin's desperate need for dollars that contributed to his supporting the Foreign Office policy of pursuing a 'partnership' with the United States. In the immediate postwar period there was tremendous friction between Britain and the United States and Bevin was outraged by the cavalier attitude of the Americans. The abrupt termination of Lend-Lease a few days after the capitulation of Japan in August 1945 came as a great shock to the British people. Public anger was compounded in the autumn of 1945 by Maynard Keynes' spectacular failure in the negotiations over the American loan, to which the absence in the Foreign Office of an appreciation of the new situation in Washington following Roosevelt's death greatly contributed. The Americans were determined to end the British system of Imperial preference and the discriminatory aspects of the sterling bloc. (14) However, the necessity of cooperation with the United States for the peace of the World had been a theme stressed by the Coalition Government through the war, and it was continued by Bevin and Attlee after the war. Both these figures sought to ease the tensions existing between the two nations. Prime Minister Attlee was determined that neither American economic pressures on Britain nor commercial rivalry should hinder the close collaboration of the British and American Administrations, for he was convinced that British survival required American aid. On August 16, 1945, Attlee urged President Truman that in order to insure
“the general collaboration between the United States and the United Kingdom upon which the peace of the world ultimately depends”, including collaboration in the research and defence field, the two leaders should authorise such collaboration and instruct their representatives “to get together and to work out methods for the solution of the commercial difficulties.” (15)

The termination of Lend-Lease had been used to pressure the British into the explicit acceptance of Bretton Woods and Bevin believed that America’s conduct over the loan was an “attempt to put tremendous pressure upon us to alter our way of life and economy to meet the desires of the worst elements of American capitalism”. He nonetheless directed his efforts toward curbing British media attacks on the United States and tried to have influence exerted on the American press to respond accordingly. (16) Bevin was convinced that, “if ever there was a time in which these two Powers should work in an atmosphere of mutual cooperation for the sake of the peace of the world, it is now.” (17) Bevin blamed the termination of Lend-Lease after “the terrific price we have paid in this country”, for creating most of the troubles, but did his best to get the British press to tone down their criticism of that act. He also consulted Byrnes who in turn communicated with the President to achieve some improvement in the situation in the American media. (18) The subject remained one of concern and in September 1945 Bevin privately asked Sir Stafford Cripps: “Perhaps you could have a talk with your friend and if he can cooperate with me in keeping both our presses steady, you may be assured that I will do my best as I have already done.” (19)

Despite these efforts, Bevin himself bitterly resented American attitudes, as he revealed in his letter to Cripps: “....there are thousands of things that
we have done in this war for which we have had no credit in the American press at all, and the Americans seldom acknowledge our ability or any of the effort we put in." He particularly objected to what he perceived as an assumption that Britain was "down and out because of what she has done in this war." Moreover, although he knew that discretion was a prerequisite of good relations, his gut reaction was that, "Britain should stand up for herself.... I do think the time has come when the world must realize that though we have paid such a terrible price in this war we are not down and out. We shall survive." At the same time he felt it absolutely necessary that British resentment be overcome, faced as they were by the magnitude of world events, and this demanded controlling public opinion in both Britain and the United States: "If this is done I think the policy of the two countries can be harmonized and brought on the right lines."(20)

Key influences encouraging both the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister toward closer association with the United States were Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden. Attlee had actually invited Churchill to return to Potsdam, "to come as a friend and counsellor and help on all the subjects on which we have been so long agreed."(21) Churchill refused as he regarded the country's rejection of the Tories as a personal humiliation. However, Churchill's correspondence with Attlee and Bevin in the immediate postwar period illustrates that Churchill did not allow his momentary pique to prevent his playing an active role in postwar policy. Bevin kept Churchill fully informed of proceedings and Churchill advised the new Minister on strategy. The Anglo-American relationship was one of the subjects on which the former Tory
Prime Minister advised the new Labour Foreign Secretary, in a letter marked 'Most Secret':

The long term advantage to Britain and the Commonwealth is to have our affairs so interwoven with those of the United States in external and strategic matters, that any idea of war between the two countries is utterly impossible, and that in fact, however the matter may be worded, we stand or fall together. It does not seem likely that we should have to fall. In a world of measureless perils and anxieties, here is the rock of safety.(22)

Churchill wanted Britain to press for Joint Occupation at all points as he believed it would greatly strengthen the power of the United States and the safety of Britain. He wanted Britain to insist upon going in on equal terms, feeling that although the United States was much more powerful, Britain had "so much to give". He was resolutely opposed to "the characteristic Halifax slant that we should melt it all down into a vague United Nations Trusteeship." He argued that a special and privileged relationship between Britain and the States meant both safety and influence.

Churchill's letter was full of religious overtones, clearly intended to add moral authority to his words. Discussing the necessity of close relations with the United States, Churchill intoned, "Whom God has joined together, let no man put asunder". Churchill told Bevin that if the British Commonwealth and the United States were for strategic purposes one organism, they would be better able to fulfill their duties to mankind and all states and nations:

The future of the world depends upon the fraternal association of Great Britain and the Commonwealth with the United States. With that, there can be no war. Without it, there can be no peace. The fact that strategically the English-speaking world is bound together, will enable us to be all the better friends with Soviet Russia, and will win us the respect of that realistic State. Strategically united, we need have no fear of letting them come out into the great waters and have the fullest efflorescence as their numbers and their bravery deserve.
Stripped of rhetoric, Churchill was essentially saying that together the Western Allies could better contain the Soviet Union. Churchill's conclusion illustrated the type of rhetoric from which Bevin and the Foreign Office were to construct their Cold War theology:

What we may be able to achieve is, in fact, Salvation for ourselves, and the means of procuring Salvation for the world. You are indeed fortunate that this sublime opportunity has fallen to you, and I trust the seizing of it will ever be associated with your name. In all necessary action you should count on me, if I can be of any use.

Churchill was put to use, in a politically significant strategy which involved the collusion of the American Administration. The occasion was Churchill's notorious Fulton speech, delivered on March 5, 1946, at Fulton, Missouri in the presence of the President and high ranking American officials. It created a storm. Both the American and British Administrations, still formally allied to the Soviet Union, went through a ritual of separating themselves from Churchill's ideas, although the historical record subsequently confirmed that both parties were privy to the contents of the speech, their agreement and approval expressed beforehand to Churchill who expressed his willingness to accept sole responsibility. (23)

In many ways the speech was used as a barometer of public opinion and to test the response to a policy of anti-Communism and Soviet containment. What it revealed was the necessity of 'educating' the public, making it conscious of the Communist threat as perceived by the Foreign Office and outlined by Bevin in a paper dated April 23, 1946. This argued that Britain had no choice but immediately to defend itself in every possible way and everywhere, including countering Soviet policy and propaganda. Bevin suggested a British campaign which was to be directed "against Communism as such (which we should frankly
expose as totalitarianism) rather than against the policy of the Soviet Government. The Prime Minister approved the paper and I Kirkpatrick was asked by Mr Harvey's Committee to convene a working party to consider ways and means of implementing the propaganda recommendation. The working party endorsed the need to inform the general public as to the nature of the Soviet Communist threat and concluded that the campaign would be a long term affair, "since it will be in essence an education campaign." The aim was "a steady drip rather than a sudden gush."

The working party clearly felt that the acts of the Soviet Government would have provided more scope for propaganda than the essence of Communism, and complained that the programme would not be easy to execute, particularly as its efficacy would depend largely on British policy as propaganda could not operate in isolation. Here it drew an analogy with the success of wartime propaganda: "We were not inhibited by the fear that the Germans would find out what we were doing, or that they might react or that we might be criticised."

A necessary part of the endeavour included influencing the Home press and foreign correspondents in the right direction. The working party posited that this would have to be very carefully and gradually done, pointing out that unlike the Russians they did not control domestic organs of publicity. However, the Foreign Office actually wielded considerable influence with the press. As safeguarding the Anglo-American relationship in 1945 had required media cooperation, so did the 'exposure' of the Soviet menace in 1946. Shortly after Churchill had delivered his Fulton speech, the Foreign Office made a secret recommendation that the Secretary of State should send for Mr Barrington Ward and give him a straight talk regarding the editorials in the Times which often
opposed Government policy; as the Foreign Office put it, "some urgent measure is necessary to prevent The Times - as so often happens when there is an issue with Russia - from again outflanking the British position." The Foreign Office noted that the editor, Mr Carr, probably knew that he might not be remaining for very much longer in Printing House Square and might use his remaining time opportunistically. This made counter-measures a necessity. Mr Ridsdale, the Foreign Office press officer, encouraged Mr Ewer of the Daily Herald to produce a counter-blast, and suggested correspondence to the Times by unofficial people of standing, "e.g. a few ex-Ambassadors who clearly cannot agree with the Carr line," criticising and protesting against some of his leaders. (25)

Subsequently Mr Barrington Ward was sent for and J.N. Henderson minuted his meeting with Bevin on March 11:

The Secretary of State took the opportunity of complaining to Mr Barrington Ward about the "jellyfish attitude of the Times on all important matters of foreign affairs". As soon as a clear issue of right and wrong such as had arisen in Greece comes before the world the Times drums home to all its readers the need for a useless compromise. So spineless was the bearing of the Times on all foreign matters that it had forfeited all rights to call itself a national newspaper. (26)

Although the proposed propaganda was meant to deal with Communism rather than the acts of the Soviet Government, the press was encouraged to print adverse material about Soviet activity by the Foreign Office, which itself provided the material. When in mid-1946 the Daily Herald refused to publish certain information given to their representative in Berlin, on the alleged ground that they were anxious not to appear anti-Soviet, RMA Hankey decided that it was time for the Foreign Office to define their requirements more specifically. (27) The fact that Britain was still officially allied to the Soviet Union and that the Government spoke in the rhetoric of cooperation
clearly confused press representatives. In August 1946, Hankey explained to the Prime Minister that the British press was reluctant to publish anti-Soviet material, "...partly because of a shortage of paper and partly because of a general feeling that it is not the wish of the Government and is not in the public interest to say material unpalatable to the Russians." Hankey argued that the time had come when it would be very useful if direct encouragement could be given to the press to publish such facts: "Even if paper is short this should not preclude periodical messages being printed in all newspapers. This would bring us more neatly into line with the Americans whose press does not suffer from the same inhibitions."

If you agree, I should like the press office at No. 10 and also the News Department at the Foreign Office to cooperate in giving confidential guidance to editors to the effect that in the Government's view it is definitely in the public interest that a steady stream of information should be published showing what is happening in countries behind the Iron Curtain, and also that reliable British journalists (and not local string-men subject to local pressure) should be sent to those countries, periodically at least, in order to get reliable information. (28)

By August 1946 the Foreign Office were beginning to realise the important role that propaganda was to assume in their anti-Soviet policies. The creation of an anti-Communist consensus became a major Foreign Office preoccupation, extended to include even administrative colleagues. Sir Orme Sargent, Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, considered other Government offices insufficiently aware of the Communist threat; in early 1946 he informed the Permanent Under Secretaries at the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office that the Foreign Office wanted information for their periodical surveys which required all the various Missions to follow the general pattern of Soviet policy & be alert for such things as developments in Malaya. This
was intended to alert officialdom to the gravity of the Communist threat:
"Another point we had in mind in initiating this correspondence was that we want to make the Colonial Office themselves more communist conscious than they are at present." (29) This made the Colonial Office response that they were not anticipating any sensational Communist moves and proposed only to send quarterly appreciations to the Foreign Office unsatisfactory and disappointing.

It was in April 1946 that, at the request of Christopher Warner, head of the Northern Department, the Russia Committee was created, an interdepartmental body, composed of deputy and assistant under-secretaries and counsellors of the Foreign Office. (30) The object of this committee was to co-ordinate policy towards Russia. (31) The Russia Committee was centrally involved in the British interpretation of, and reactions to, the Cold War. The Committee discussed all important telegrams and reports concerning Soviet activities and, in time, itself commissioned studies of Soviet policy in various areas of the world. The Russia Committee was intended to form an overview of Soviet foreign policy and consider what action, political, economic, or in the publicity field, should be taken. (32)

In this same period, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Orme Sargent, wanted to initiate more than consciousness raising about, and passive surveillance of, Communism. On June 21, 1946, he circulated all H.M. Representatives in Eastern Europe asking for their responses to the implementation of an active anti-Communist policy. (33) Sargent was forced to endure yet more disappointment as the bulk of the replies opposed the instigation of specific anti-Communist measures on the grounds that they would be counter-productive, if not detrimental to British interests. (34) By the end
of November 1946, the Foreign Office conceded that the only practicable strategy for their anti-Communist campaign in Eastern Europe was propaganda:

As regards the formulation of a general policy for Eastern Europe in face of the Soviet threat, I think it is clear from the letters under consideration that such a policy can only cover publicity. That is to say, we can make up our minds what line we are going to take about Communism in our propaganda to Eastern Europe, and apply it in each country with the necessary variants - which cannot, however, be very great - but the political situation in the area is too complex for us to be able to lay down a general line in regard to political action - i.e. the extent to which we can support Social Democratic parties.(35)

British propaganda to Eastern Europe aimed at spreading dissent and discord among the people: "We clearly cannot afford to allow this important mass of European manpower to be turned into an active and cohesive bloc against us." The Foreign Office regarded it as essential from the point of view of British military and strategic security, particularly the security of Greece and Turkey, to expose the Communists and their methods and to encourage other progressive elements to stand up to them.(36) Propaganda was also proving to be the main weapon against Communism and the Soviet Union in the West.

From the beginning Britain had adopted a tough stance toward the Soviet Union in negotiations for peace, while never failing to blame Soviet intransigence for the resulting wrangling. Moreover, Britain had encouraged her Western Allies to adopt the same uncompromising position as being the only method of negotiation possible with the Russians. After his Fulton speech and his discussions with American leaders, Churchill had reported with evident satisfaction to Attlee and Bevin: "I am convinced that some show of strength and resisting power is necessary to a good settlement with Russia. I predict that this will be the prevailing opinion in the United States in the near future."(37)
In September 1946, in light of the difficulties of the discussions at the Paris Peace Conference, Mr Roberts of the Moscow Embassy recommended to the Foreign Office that Britain should not be quite as brusque in their diplomatic handling of the Russians as the Americans and Australians had been at Paris. Roberts further suggested that although the hope of achieving a general settlement seemed illusory, we could none the less live side by side and continue to work for practical agreements with definite and limited objectives. CFA Warner thought that what Roberts meant was an uneasy balance of power with ad hoc arrangements, which he also considered attainable.(38) However, Roberts' view appeared far too optimistic to Thomas Brimelow in the Foreign Office, who responded with a lengthy analysis of Russian intentions and the necessary British responses. These are worth examining because they were endorsed by RNA Hankey who noted that the Foreign Office was already doing most of what Mr Brimelow proposed. Thus Brimelow's paper is important because it reveals not only how the Foreign Office mind was working just over a year after the end of hostilities, but also because it reveals how active it already was on the anti-Communist, anti-Soviet front.(39)

Hitler's invasion of Russia had wreaked terrible devastation on the country and people, much worse than in any of the other countries which suffered Nazi occupation. At the end of the war Russia was faced with enormous tasks of reconstruction. Although Brimelow acknowledged the present weakness of the Soviet Union, he saw this as merely temporary and drew a powerful picture of Russia's future strength as a vast land empire containing nearly all the raw materials necessary for a war economy and an industry capable of supporting in the field armies substantially larger than those of any other
country in Europe or Asia. He argued that as Russian strength increased, so would the rapidity of their process of seizing, consolidating and undermining as a preliminary to further seizures. This precluded the possibility of coexistence without active enmity. Moreover, the Russians were convinced that there would be a showdown with the West sooner or later and nothing the West could do would alter this conviction. Unable to prevent the inevitable clash, Brimelow argued: "It behoves us to strengthen our position and the position of the countries in which we are interested against Communist undermining, and to begin doing so now." Significantly, he added that although unable to improve matters, "it does lie within our power to make them worse more quickly. This we should try at all costs to avoid":

In Great Britain a general realisation of the pattern of Soviet policy will only come about slowly, and while it is forming every allowance will be made to the Russians and none to the Foreign Office. The result of this will be a split in public opinion between those who blame the Russians and those who blame the Foreign Secretary. If we are to keep this split to the smallest possible proportions - and this we must do if we are to reduce the effectiveness of Communist propaganda inside this country - we shall have to show patience, forbearance and a strict correctness in all our dealings with the Russians. We cannot afford to be in the wrong.

Among Brimelow's suggestions for tackling the Communist threat, which included undermining Communist parties and establishing Britain's own parallel to the Lenin school at Moscow, was the suggestion of a British doctrine to counter that of Communism: "We must have a basic, logical, coherent and sober doctrine that will be acceptable to men of common sense everywhere, and that we can oppose to the Communist ideology of struggle, hate and revolution." (40) Within the Foreign Office, and elsewhere, there was a growing conviction that the West needed an ideology with which to challenge that of Communism. Moreover, this need became an imperative as the realisation grew that the
struggle with Russia was increasingly concentrated within the realm of propaganda. Not only had this factor been illustrated by the response of the diplomats in Eastern Europe, but Sir Charles Nichols, the Ambassador in Prague, had specifically stated: "...if we wish to combat Communism we must produce an alternative system or way of life which will, if possible, command an equal devotion." He had further warned that, "A merely negative attitude to Communism will not suffice." That a constructive alternative to Communism was better than a destructive offensive-defensive was a principle already agreed in the Foreign Office. It was the construction of an alternative that remained problematic.

Nichols posited that Communism was a form of religion whose devotees were fanatics capable of greater efforts and sacrifices than members of other political parties; he suggested Christianity or Democratic Socialism as possible alternative systems with which to counter the Communist appeal:

There is perhaps only one system or way of life in the world today which could fill this role and that is Christianity, and in particular Roman Catholicism. But neither Christianity in general nor Roman Catholicism in particular are political creeds and it is doubtful how far they could be mobilised in this guise. Nevertheless, if we were to contemplate a holy war against Communism I hardly see how we could avoid finding ourselves allied, willy-nilly, with the Catholic Church. However, leaving Christianity on one side, there is one alternative to Communism which we could project and propagate and that is democratic Socialism, or as it may be termed, "Socialism without dictatorship" - in short, social democracy as we understand it and are now implementing it.(41)

The Foreign Office was already authorised to do propaganda in favour of Social Democracy, with a view to demonstrating its superiority over Communism as a political creed.(42) Although the Christian Churches had not been officially approached at this stage to add their spiritual authority to the anti-Communist campaign, Christianity traditionally opposed Communism and the Churches traditionally supported Government policy. The major problem for the
Foreign Office was that while it had to maintain a semblance of trying to reach agreement with the Soviet Union, it could not attack it as forcefully as it desired; and, at the same time, it lacked an inspirational ideology which could be used to counter that of Communism. The Foreign Office did use British Church leaders, but they were always cautious, concerned, as during the war, not to risk compromising the Church, thereby creating unwelcome political repercussions. The Foreign Office took care to maintain friendly relations with the Vatican, but regarded anti-Communist propaganda from that source as severely compromised by its reactionary associations. Moreover, too close an association with Roman Catholicism risked charges of reaction, particularly during this period when many of the more reactionary elements in Europe were girding themselves as Christian Democrats.

The problems of using Christianity as a political rationale were still less, however, than those which the use of Democratic Socialism would create for Anglo-American amity. While the Foreign Office might confuse the terms Democratic Socialism and Social Democracy, preferring the latter, the fact was that neither creed would be acceptable to the capitalist administration of the United States as the basis of a Western doctrine intended as an alternative to Communism. The Foreign Office already had sufficient problems convincing certain sectors of America that neither Attlee nor Bevin, or indeed any of the Labour Government, were not themselves Communists.

Nonetheless, the formation of a Western doctrine remained an important element of Britain's Cold War strategy. However, it was not until the public breakdown of relations between the powers that the Foreign Office was able to pursue and implement effective propaganda incorporating an anti-Communist
doctrine, supported both by Government policy and the British public. The breakdown over the German question supposedly speared the search for some alternative system of security. Although the Foreign Office did not openly pursue its offensive-defensive strategies until the category of events, involving the Stalinization of Europe, for which the Marshall Plan undoubtedly acted as a catalyst in late 1947 and 1948, it is clear that the Foreign Office never assumed that the general structure of peace would be based on cooperation between the Great Powers. Although this concept was allegedly not abandoned until the failure to resolve the crisis over Germany, it is notable how quickly the Marshall Plan evolved from an economic concept in mid-1947 to the political and military sphere in 1948. The Brussels Treaty, described as the hardcore of the European system, was signed on March 17, 1948. This was soon followed by the Atlantic Pact, which, for the first time, committed the United States and Canada to the defence of Western Europe, an achievement of what was indubitably the major objective of British foreign policy from the end of the war.

The pursuit of American involvement in Europe is particularly well illustrated by Bevin's corollary roles in implementing first the Truman Doctrine, following Britain's semi-withdrawal from Greece, and the Marshall Plan which evolved from the Truman Doctrine. These events are already well and revealingly documented to show the political motives behind the idealistic rhetoric. While the public formulations of the Marshall Plan took every precaution to avoid the stigma of anti-Sovietism, the real nature of the proceedings and what Bevin hoped would emerge from them for Britain, was illustrated during three days of talks between the British and Americans in London just before the meeting in Paris with Molotov and Bidault. Bevin tried
to convince the Americans to recognise Britain as a special partner in whatever emerged from the Marshall discussions. Britain, Bevin argued, was on a different basis from other European countries and should not be "lumped in" as just one more country. The anti-Soviet theme was stressed: "If the UK was considered just another European country, this would fit in with Russian strategy, namely, that the US would encounter a slump and withdraw from Europe; Europe would be helpless and out of dollars, and as merely another European country, the Russians, in command of the Continent, could deal with Britain in due course." (44)

The Marshall Plan was portrayed to the British public as an act of overwhelming and disinterested generosity on the part of the Americans, with no political strings, an image Russia's inclusion was meant to confirm. The psychological impact of Marshall Aid was one of the most significant factors shaping the political development of postwar Britain, not just the population at large, but much more importantly, those on the Labour Left who had been bitterly opposed to Bevin's foreign policy. For two years following the Labour Government's assumption of power in the summer of 1945, there was severe and continuous criticism of many parts of Bevin's general policy. Bevin's continuation of the Coalition Government's policies in Greece aroused a great deal of opposition within the Labour Party. The debate on foreign policy in November 1946 revealed the widely supported demand for a "Socialist alternative". Then the Government's "drift into the American camp" was vigorously attacked by RHS Crossman, one of Bevin's most vociferous critics. In the voting on the crucial amendment about 120 M.P.s were not accounted for. Within two months the "Keep Left" was officially formed, mostly of members of
what would later be called the "Bevanite" group. Their aim in foreign policy was to work for a "third force" between the two superpowers and independent of both blocs. (45)

It was Marshall Aid and the political initiatives of the Labour Administration, against a background of a rising level of diplomatic conflict between the Soviet Union and the West, that began to alter quite dramatically the politics of the Left within the Parliamentary Labour Party, and outside in the wider movement. By 1948 Crossman was announcing in the Commons his conversion from total opposition to Bevin's policies and his support for the American initiatives; and in the American liberal weekly The Nation he condemned Russian hostility in Iran and again called for a third force with the socialist parties of Western Europe. It was in 1948 that the attitudes toward President Truman changed and he began to be regarded as America's version of Clement Attlee. His re-election was greeted with enthuissiasm by many of the Parliamentary Left. There was a small group of genuinely independent socialists who remained opposed to Bevin and his policies; but in 1948 and 1949 most of the serious critics of Labour's approach to foreign affairs were expelled from the Labour Party. (46)

Significantly, in the formulation of British propaganda to support the Western Union on which America insisted before Marshall Aid began, Mr Mayhew in the Foreign Office suggested that the term "third force" could "be used generally for the anti-Communist forces to which we are anxious to give a lead." (47) This was opposed by Warner and others in the Foreign Office who considered it quite impossible and inappropriate to use the term for those forces in British publicity to the Middle and Far East; and even in Western
Europe, the term already had a specific connotation in French politics and could not, it was felt, readily be taken over by the Foreign Office and given a different connotation. A further consideration making Warner anxious that the term not be used in such a way as to become part of the basic directive in the Foreign Office's new publicity line was that it might be viewed badly in Canada, "and once we have started using it, it would be very awkward to slither out of it, supposing that the close association in policy with the U.S.A. which our security and our material needs force upon us was found to make it inappropriate." (48)

Regardless of Warner's anxiety, Bevin proceeded to use the term in his January 1948 paper to the Cabinet on "Future Foreign Publicity Policy"; in such a way, moreover, as to suggest that Bevin wanted Britain to lead in that sphere:

In my paper on "The First Aim of British Foreign Policy" (C.P. (48)6) I have shown that the Russian and Communist Allies are threatening the whole fabric of Western civilisation, and I have drawn attention to the need to mobilise spiritual forces, as well as material and political, for its defence. It is for us, as Europeans and as a Social Democratic Government, and not the Americans, to give the lead in (the) spiritual, moral and political sphere to all the democratic elements in Western Europe which are anti-Communist and, at the same time, genuinely progressive and reformist, believing in freedom, planning and social justice - what one might call the "Third Force." (49)

In this same paper, Bevin insisted that past British publicity, despite vicious attack from Soviet propaganda, had been confined to explaining and promoting the British way of life. Now something far more positive was clearly required and Britain must be prepared to pass over to the offensive. Bevin called for a rival ideology based on Christianity and Social Democracy:

We cannot hope successfully to repel Communism only by disparaging it on material grounds, and must add a positive appeal to Democratic and Christian principles, remembering the strength of Christian sentiment in Europe. We must put forward a positive rival ideology. We must stand on
the broad principles of Social Democracy which, in fact, has its basis in the value of civil liberty and human rights.

This policy was, of course, not new, and had in fact been being developed and implemented over a considerable period. The effort to construct an appealing ideology extended back to the struggle against Hitler's New Order, were Christianity and ideas of social justice had both been called into play. Hitler's possible conquest of Europe had unrelentingly been portrayed as a threat to Christian civilisation. Churchill's Fulton speech had referred to Soviet expansionism as a threat to Christian civilisation. Thus Bevin was treading a well established and well prepared path when on March 3, 1948, he presented to the Cabinet a paper on "The Threat to Western Civilisation". This followed the events in Czechoslovakia and Finland which provided the justification for Bevin to take his proposals for Western Union that step further toward a military treaty, something which before he had hinted at only very inferentially in his public disclosures. (50)

"The Threat to Western Civilisation" was actually written by Gladwyn Jebb in early February, prior to the Prague coup. (51) Bevin cited Communist aggression in Czechoslovakia and Finland to convince his cabinet colleagues that Britain would now have to go wider than the initial friendly intent of the original limited approach to Western Union as, "It really has become a matter of the defense of western civilisation, or everyone will be swamped by this Soviet method of infiltration." To gain Cabinet support for proceeding, instead of with bilateral treaties, with a multilateral economic, cultural and defence pact with France and Benelux which could be left open for accession by other Western
European democracies, Bevin drew a harrowing picture of Soviet activities and intentions:

There is only one conclusion to draw. After all the efforts that have been made and the appeasement that we followed to try and get a real friendly settlement on a four-Power basis, not only is the Soviet Government not prepared at the present stage to co-operate in any real sense with any non-Communist or non-Communist controlled Government, but it is actively preparing to extend its hold over the remaining part of continental Europe and, subsequently, over the Middle East and no doubt the bulk of the Far East as well. In other words, physical control of the Eurasian land mass and eventual control of the whole World Island is what the Politburo is aiming at - no less a thing than that. The immensity of the aim should not betray us into believing in its impracticability. Indeed, unless positive and vigorous steps are shortly taken by those other states who are in a position to take them, it may well be that within the next few months or even weeks the Soviet Union will gain political and strategical advantages which will set the great Communist machine in action, leading either to the establishment of a World Dictatorship or (more probably) to the collapse of organised society over great stretches of the globe.

All our evidence indeed points to the probable staging by the Soviet Government of further efforts in this direction during the next few weeks or months. We cannot be sure where exactly this showdown will take place nor even that it will not occur in several places at once. All we know for certain (since the Cominform has proclaimed it openly) is that its object will be the frustration by one means or another of the European Recovery Programme and the consequent development of a situation in which the Communist cause will triumph in many countries largely as a result of a process of economic decay. But this does not mean that the Soviet Government are determined to have their way whatever the outside world may say or do. There is no reason even now to suppose that it could possibly welcome the World War which would undoubtedly result from its overstepping the mark. It is commonly accepted Communist doctrine that no issue should be forced until the moment is ripe and victory almost certain. If, therefore, the upholders of true democracy and opponents of dictatorship can present a really united front, and if the necessary economic means are made available by those who have them, the danger of war is, in my opinion, not imminent. Indeed it is my considered view that the only danger of war arises from the non-fulfilment of those two conditions. Provided they are fulfilled I believe that Communism will be forced onto the defensive and that for many years at any rate we may look forward to a period of relative calm. (52)

The fact that Bevin represented these views, which were actually those of Gladwyn Jebb, as his own considered opinion, is in itself a testimony to the
symbiotic relationship between himself and the Foreign Office. It was equally a demonstration of how quickly the Foreign Office were able to expand and develop Bevin's views, when compared to his January proposals when the emphasis was merely that Britain should adopt a more positive anti-Communist stance. Then, in his consideration of Britain's anti-Communist publicity, Bevin had stated: "In general we should emphasise the weakness of Communism rather than its strength. Contemporary American propaganda, which stresses the strength and aggressiveness of Communism, tends to scare and unbalance the anti-Communists, while heartening the fellow-travellers and encouraging the Communists to bluff more extravagantly. Our propaganda, by dwelling on Russia's poverty and backwardness, could be expected to relax rather than raise the international tension." (53) The Foreign Office realised however that if they were to secure their overall aims with regard to Western Union and American aid, then they needed to emphasise international tension. The "Threat to Western Civilisation" was considered by the Cabinet at their 19th meeting on March 5, and Bevin's recommendations were endorsed. On March 7, diplomatic representatives of the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg met in Brussels to negotiate what became the Brussels Treaty, agreeing to economic, social and cultural collaboration and collective self-defence. Gladwyn Jebb was the British representative. Following the signing of the Brussels Treaty on March 17, Jebb was dispatched to Washington with instructions, in his own words, "to find out how the land lay and, generally speaking, to put the case, in very informal and non-committal talks, for the early formation of something like an Atlantic alliance." (54) Bevin's paper had recommended the necessity of Britain bringing the real facts of the situation home to the Americans.
A further, and very important, recommendation endorsed by the Cabinet had been that steps should be taken to associate the Christian Churches in Britain with H.M.G.'s policy regarding Western Union. The Cabinet agreed that the Foreign Secretary should himself take whatever action he thought appropriate to this end. Following this, Bevin personally met with the Archbishop of Canterbury and Cardinal Griffin. Subsequently, Bevin agreed with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps, a committed and active Christian, that the latter should henceforward assume the primary responsibility for pursuing the matter, and should in particular see the Moderators of the Church of Scotland and of the Free Churches. Letters had been despatched to these latter two gentlemen on March 12, asking them to call on the Foreign Secretary at a convenient opportunity, "in order to discuss certain questions connected with our present foreign policy." 

Neither the recommendation, nor the decision, to associate the British Churches with Britain's Cold War foreign policy, was mentioned by Lord Gladwyn in his memoirs. Nor is there any record in the Foreign Office documents of Bevin's meetings with either Archbishop Fisher or Cardinal Griffin. The only indication that they happened was correspondence from the Foreign Office to the Treasury on March 15, 1948, informing the latter of the letters sent to the Moderators and enclosing copies, and noting that the Foreign Secretary had already met with the Archbishops following the March 5 Cabinet meeting.

The decision to involve the Churches officially seems to have been implemented before it was discussed at Cabinet level. Bevin had announced his intention to mobilise spiritual forces in the series of papers he presented to the Cabinet in early January. In "The First Aim of British Foreign Policy", he
had categorically stated: "It is not enough to reinforce the physical barriers which still guard our Western civilisation. We must also organise and consolidate the ethical and spiritual forces inherent in this Western civilisation of which we are the chief protagonists."(58) Moreover, Gladwyn's "Threat to Western Civilisation" note was written in early February 1948, immediately after which plans were made for a meeting of officials in Brussels and a trip to the United States. Thus, it is hardly surprising that before official endorsement was given to associating the Churches with foreign policy, both Archbishops spoke out forcefully in terms which projected a conflict between Christianity and Communism.

On the last day of February 1948, the Archbishop of Canterbury, at a meeting in Lambeth, declared his opposition to Communism: "Creeping across Europe is a political power that denies all things that in the English family we value above life itself. It is a creed in which there is not discussion but force."(59) Fisher's statement received immediate support from Cardinal Griffin who one week later was even more explicit in projecting the political conflict as one between Christianity and Communism:

Europe, and in fact the world, is faced with a great challenge. That challenge is whether we are going to be for God or against God. Whether we are going to defend the rights of God and the personal rights of man or submit to a system which makes men slaves while masquerading under the name of democracy. Where the rights of God are ignored, the rights of man are denied; he becomes a slave and not a citizen, a tool in the hands of unscrupulous dictators.(60)

Christianity was traditionally associated with enmity to atheistic Communism. However, the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union, the subsequent formation of the United Nations and official Government policy of four-Power cooperation, suppressed any major public venting of clerical anti-Communist
sentiment. This was unleashed by the Archbishop of Canterbury's own attack at the end of February. One such example appeared in the *Sunday Graphic* on March 7, 1948. Written by the Sub-Dean of the Chapels Royal, the Reverend W.H. Elliot, the article, "Challenge of the Hour", was clearly inspired by Fisher's address and reflected Bevin's new publicity line, particularly the equating of Nazism and Communism. (61) Calling for the "forces of the spirit" to combat Communism, it echoed Fisher's "Creeping across Europe..." statement: "Look at the shadow creeping across Europe. Austria comes next, then Italy, then France. The old game! Remember what we said about Munich!")(62) On March 11, the *Christian World* devoted its front page to an attack on "Communism", etched in headline in large bold letters. Pleading the necessity for "as yet free" people to realise, "the evil, the anti-Christian nature of the Communist conspiracy", the *Christian World* urged its readers to hate Communism:

"Our first Christian duty with regard to Communism is to hate it with a mortal hatred, to teach our children to hate it, and if it ever comes to the point of actual conflict, to fight it with as fierce a resolution as that with which we fought Nazism." (63)

The surge of ecclesiastical anti-Communism following Fisher's statement led Stanley Evans, constantly alert to the political nuances of Anglican behaviour, particularly the leadership, to observe in the left-wing monthly newsletter, *Religion and the People*: "A new 'Christian' attack on Communism has begun. In Great Britain it is headed by the Archbishop of Canterbury." (64) While *Religion and the People* was right in claiming the attack to be new, as it was in the respect that it was more widespread than previously, this did not mean that ecclesiastical anti-Communism had not existed before 1948. Indeed, by mid-1947 a significant anti-Communist movement was already evident within
the Church: significant because it involved the higher echelons and men of standing. Widely respected in the Church of England was the Community of the Resurrection. In the latter half of 1947 its quarterly newspaper published an article by Mark Tweedy, one of its members, attacking the Russian Orthodox Church, which the Foreign Office regarded as a medium capable of reconciling Christians to an acceptance of the Soviet regime. Tweedy argued that the Russian Orthodox Church was but a tolerated tool of the State which "would be liquidated overnight", should it indulge in politics. In the article Tweedy clearly addressed Russia as an enemy state and claimed the Soviet regime would not survive:

Next Sunday, when you return from the altar to give thanks after your communion, will you join your prayers with some Ivan or Maria who has been doing the very same thing away in the fastness of Russia which - though temporarily occupied by the enemy - is being daily prepared by the Lord on whom her faithful (near and far) continually call to manifest again the true riches of Russian Orthodox piety. (65)

The Dean of Chichester's 1947 Battle of Britain Sunday sermon urged the maintenance of powerful armed forces in Britain because the country was now faced with an adversary worse than Nazism:

Once more our beloved country is confronted by a foe still more ruthless than the Germans, though not so powerful. This foe is endeavouring to destroy us by plot and by propaganda, by open attacks, by secret machinations and by slander and abuse. In nearly every country of the world this foe employs its agents to weaken the influence of Britain. (66)

The Dean subsequently explained to the press that the foe in question was Russia.

The most overtly political action taken by a high ranking Churchman in this period was that of the Bishop of Chichester, George Bell the Chairman of the Church of England Committee on Foreign Relations, who tried to secure a
resolution in the Convocation of Canterbury supporting a United States of Europe, prior to the Foreign Ministers' Conference in November 1947. While he spoke in terms of securing peace, the project clearly involved the formal division of Europe rather than unity, as was acknowledged by Bell in his speech: "If we cannot get a United States of Europe as a whole on the basis of freedom and respect for justice, then a beginning must be made with those states that are at present willing and can unite on this basis." The resolution was opposed by Bishop Barnes of Birmingham, a pacifist and a socialist, and thus a figure of controversy in the conservative ranks of the Bishops. He recognised such a policy as divisive, not unifying, and admonished: "We should not seem to imply anything which can suggest an alienation of Western Europe from the Slav peoples, and, in particular, from the great Soviet Republics." (67)

In May 1945, Religion and the People observed the Church of England's manifestations of support for the Polish Government in London and the reactionary regime of Archbishop Damaskinos in Greece, and questioned the sincerity of its official support for Russia. The newsletter speculated whether the Church's wartime pro-Soviet, anti-fascist policy had come from conviction or was simply the belated following of Downing Street. After all, "It would be difficult to deny that between the wars the foreign policy of Canterbury was not wholly unlike that of Downing Street. It was anti-Russian and anti-Communist. Even though it found some difficulty in following Mr Chamberlain wholeheartedly - Hitler's policy with regard to the churches being a great embarrassment - there was no open breach and relatively few sermons were preached attacking the concentration camps." The war brought change, and "as
the State has found a rapprochement with the Kremlin so Dr Garbett has visited the Patriarch."(68)

Just over a year later, in June 1946, Religion and the People returned to this same theme: "it would be difficult to deny that there is a certain relation between the official utterances of the churches, or the utterances of their highly placed spokesmen, and the dominating views of the state in which they are expressed."(69) The newsletter then gave examples of the Church of England's opposition to Moscow and Communism prior to 1941 compared to the support it gave after the Anglo-Soviet alliance. Following these, it proceeded to compare Christian support for the activities of the Soviet regime in 1943 with Christian attacks on the very same activities in 1946, noting that while the activities had not changed, the political situation had. Particular emphasis was given to the transformation in attitude to relations with the Soviet Union of the British Council of Churches. In a 1943 report, "The Christian and World Problems", the BCC had not only stated, "the greatness of the Soviet achievements should be willingly acknowledged", it had posited, in line with official British foreign policy, that, "One of the supreme needs for the future peace and welfare of Europe is the removal of mutual suspicion and the development of cordial cooperation between the U.S.S.R. on the one hand and Britain and the U.S.A. upon the other." In 1946, in, significantly, the Council's report on Atomic Power, the BCC cited the Soviet Union as the "greatest immediate obstacle to the realisation of world community". Noting that the Soviet Union repudiated the democratic tradition and was unrestrained by public opinion, the British Council of Churches warned:

We must therefore be prepared for a period during which Russia will appear as the crucial obstacle to the emergence of world community and even as a
menace to world peace, and there might even be circumstances in which the Western democracies might find themselves confronted with a direct challenge, in which the use of force, or at any rate, the readiness to use force, might be the sole means remaining to them of defending their national existence and, what is equally important, of maintaining the conditions necessary for the emergence of world community.(70)

At this juncture in mid-1946, this was the sort of publicity which the Foreign Office both desired and encouraged, aimed at converting the views of the British public from their wartime support of Russia into a suspicion and hostility which would support Britain's Cold War plans. An examination of the activities and statements of the Anglican leadership in the immediate postwar period reveals the extent to which the Church of England did follow Downing Street. This included participating in the Foreign Office's "education campaign", of which the Church leaders' consciousness was illustrated by the Archbishop of York's warning to Patrick Dean about the retention of affection and admiration for Russia in the North of England.(71)

Initially the Foreign Office's anti-Communist propaganda was confined to overseas, while the pretense of friendship and seeking cooperation with the Soviet Union was maintained at home. Thus in his visit to Canada in September 1946, a country recently swept by hysteria following atomic espionage trials, the Archbishop of Canterbury took the opportunity to attack Russia, something which he had not publicly done previously in Britain, and something which, significantly, the British press reports of the Archbishop's speeches in Canada omitted.(72) This attack came only six months after the furore created by Churchill's Fulton speech and at a time when Fisher was repudiating British appeals for him to lead an anti-Communist crusade. To one such request, shortly after the Canadian visit, Fisher had responded, "So far as this country
is concerned there is no need to attack Communism at present since it has so little influence and is losing a good deal of what it had. On occasion Church leaders have said what needed saying." (73)

The Foreign Office decision to take a more definitive anti-Communist line at home and to blame the Soviet Union for the deterioration in international relations, was reflected in the Archbishop of Canterbury's Diocesan Notes, in which in May 1947 he expressed similar sentiments to those he had first voiced in Canada in the autumn of 1946:

While no nation can ignore its own national interests progress depends on their subordination to frank and friendly cooperation on the basis of justice and good neighbourliness. Such subordination never easy, is made far more difficult by the fact that the Soviet Union has distorted conceptions of justice and good neighbourliness which antagonise good feeling and impede cooperation, and which lead them to blame others for actions which are the consequences of their own acts. (74)

That Fisher was lining up politically was suggested when he took the chair for Winston Churchill at a United Europe meeting in the Albert Hall. "Mr Churchill," said the Archbishop, "led Europe out of the jaws of death. He now leads it in a crusade for its continuing life and hope." The question, he said, was whether a Europe near to death should now "sink into final chaos" or recover its life "by recovering its unity and that by recovering the spirit which created it." (75) Despite the fact that the United Europe movement was claimed not to be anti-Soviet by many circles, Churchill's own speech most certainly was. Very shortly after this, in a complete turnabout and in decided contrast, Fisher made a statement to the British United Press in which he pleaded for patience and understanding between the Western democracies and Russia:

This required readiness on one side to understand Russia's historical growth, and to appreciate her immense war losses and her genuine concern
to establish for the first time in Russia a coherent social code with a
good standard of living for all its citizens. On the other side Russia
must lay aside her suspicions of the Western Powers and cease her
unfortunate habit of attacking the statesmen of other nations and
attributing to them dishonest motives. She must come to believe that
there was real goodwill ready to meet Russia, and she must be ready to
courage the free interchange of thought and experience with other
peoples, and to abolish the barriers of secrecy. (76)

This abrupt reversal of attitude toward Russia followed Bevin's
welcoming the inclusion of that nation Russia in Marshall Aid. The
Marshall Plan, with the institutional developments that came into being
in order to implement its proposals, confirmed the division of Europe
into East and West blocs. It was essential, however, that it not appear
as a divisive element as this could only generate opposition in Britain
and on the Continent. Thus in the period following its announcement
there was a pronounced emphasis on the West's desire for friendship with
the Soviet Union, as the changed attitude of the Archbishop of
Canterbury illustrated when he said: "the only method of safeguarding
world peace was the long and patient one of approaching an international
understanding instead of opposition between Russia and other States
whose ideas of the meaning of democracy were not the same as Russia's."
Reiterating the Government line, Fisher declared this was of course a
long term policy, Soviet suspicion and hostility leaving the West no
alternative but to combine in its own defence, an action which the
Russians must understand concealed no aggressive intent nor the wish to
engender aggression: "the Western democracies would have to reaffirm and
protect the fundamental principles of the freedom for which they stood.
Russia must not take this as being aggressive, and on her side must show
evidence that she did not wish to be aggressive either." (77)
That the Archbishop was responding to political expediency in speaking of a rapprochement with Russia at some future time, is illustrated not only by the contrast with his previous sentiments, but also by the fact that within two months of these statements Fisher became party to the anti-Communist collaboration between the President of the United States and the Pope being effected through Truman's personal emissary to the Vatican, Myron Taylor. In mid-August 1947, President Truman announced Taylor's return to the Vatican and his mission to seek the views of His Holiness and other leaders in Europe on problems relative to the establishment of peace under a moral world order and the alleviation of suffering, plus: "to obtain the energetic cooperation of all men and women of goodwill, whether in religion, in government, or in other activities of life, in the interest of progress toward the resolution of these problems." (78) Before proceeding to Rome via Paris, Taylor spent a few days in London where he had discussions with Fisher.

After his arrival in Rome, on August 26 Taylor had the longest audience ever granted by the Pope to a diplomatic representative in recent years. (79) The New York Times reported that although relations between the United States and the Vatican had not had the closeness since the end of the war as during Roosevelt's time, it was believed that the Taylor visit would mark the beginning of intense collaboration. On August 28 the White House and the Vatican made public an exchange of letters between the President and the Pope which pledged to each other to work together for lasting peace in the world. The President's letter, dated August 6, denounced "the chains of collectivist organisation" as destructive of the God-given rights of man. Truman called for a renewal of
faith" the world over "to the end that the individual's sacred rights, inherent in his relation to God, will be respected in every land.

Pope Pius was no less emphatic in placing the rights of the individual ahead of those of civic society. In his reply, the Pontiff observed that "once the state, to the exclusion of God, makes itself the source of the rights of the human person, man is forthwith reduced to the condition of a slave or a mere civic commodity to be exploited for the selfish aims of a group that happens to have power.

The President made it clear in his letter that he sought to cooperate with the Vatican for world peace and had instructed Myron Taylor to pledge the same cooperation to every leader of the world's moral forces. Truman said that he had requested Taylor to return to Rome to resume the audiences with the Pontiff that "have already contributed profoundly toward a sound and lasting peace and to the strengthening of the impelling convictions pursued by peoples of the world in their quest for a moral world order firmly established in the life of nations." These moral principles were to be found the world over, the President said, wherever the principles of free cooperation and voluntary association in self-government were honoured. He said the war had demonstrated that all persons, regardless of divergent religious allegiances, could unite to preserve freedom, morality and justice. The same unity of effort, he continued, must be brought about for an enduring peace if the individual forces for a moral world order were not to be weakened and rendered impotent. He added that all men of goodwill shared the responsibility of vindicating the great hopes for which men died in World War II. Truman stated that, "An enduring peace can only be built on Christian principles", and said that as a nation declared to be Christian by
the highest court of the land, all Americans desired to banish war from the world whose creator ordained that men everywhere should live together in peace, goodwill and mutual trust.

Claiming that the greatest need of the world was a renewal of faith, "faith that mankind shall live in freedom, not in the chains of untruth nor in the chains of a collectivist organisation of their lives", Truman yet warned that that faith must be strong enough to struggle if necessary for the right, able to endure troubles and hardships, attack and even contempt from forces of evil - and able to arise reborn and revitalised from the daily struggle.(80)

The Pope's response fully endorsed the substance of Truman's message, and declared, "No one more than we will hope for its success and for the happy achievement of the goal. We pledge our resources and earnestly beg God's assistance. The Pope assured the President of the wholehearted cooperation of the Church in his fight for the dignity and freedom of the human person. Telling Truman that in striving to bring men and nations to a clear realisation of their duty to God, the Church would go on, as it always had done, "to offer the most effective contribution to the world's peace and man's eternal salvation", the Pope declared:

From her foundation almost two thousand years ago she has championed the individual against despotic rule, the labouring man against oppression, religion against persecution. Her divinely given mission often brings her into conflict with the powers of evil whose sole strength is in their physical force and brutalised spirit and her leaders are sent into exile or cast into prison or die under torture. This is history of today but the Church is unafraid. She cannot compromise with an avowed enemy of God.(81)

Neither Truman nor the Pope, as was usual in Papal pronouncements, made any direct reference to the Soviet Union nor Communism, yet their inferences
were clear. As the Pope had made clear that he regarded effective means to combat Communist doctrines and check their spread as a necessary part of any effort to establish and consolidate peace, Vatican circles interpreted the exchange of letters as a virtual pledge to resist Communism by all means at their command. From Rome, Arnaldo Cortesi reported to the New York Times that an "anti-Red crusade" was anticipated:

Indeed, the Pope's references to Communism were so insistent, and his belief that it barred man's progress toward peace so obvious, that it was being whispered in the Vatican today that the true purpose of Mr Taylor's present mission in Rome is to enlist the Vatican's support for an anti-Communist "crusade" that Mr Truman is thought to be about to launch. If this is so, there is no doubt that the Pope intends to lend it all the assistance in his power.

It is pointed out in Vatican circles that Mr Taylor, after delivering Mr Truman's letter on Tuesday, remained for an hour and a half conversation with the Pontiff. It is certain that Mr Taylor informed the Pope minutely of Mr Truman's intentions and of the circumstances under which the letter was written and therefore that the Pope was fully aware of the President's thoughts and plans when he penned his reply.

The Pope's anti-Communist utterances assume new significance if this fact is borne in mind. (82)

The New York Times, in its editorial columns, cited "this unusual correspondence", and particularly the fact that it was published, as not only a sign of crisis, but intended to emphasise how "fragile" was the structure of peace. (83) Truman and the Pope had actually been in correspondence since April 1946, but their previous letters were neither published nor acknowledged; so the release of these two letters was clearly intended to have a calculated impact at that specific point in time. (84) Catholic organisations regarded the correspondence as a major propaganda coup and planned to print tens of thousands of copies to be distributed among the faithful, including in Eastern Europe.
Camille M Cianfarra reported from Rome on August 29 to the *New York Times* that satisfaction was felt in Catholic circles over what, in the final analysis, was frankly stated to be an anti-Communist crusade. In their view the official joining of the Catholic Church as the greatest spiritual force and the United States as the strongest lay power in the Christian world was a logical sequel to the then current United States policy of firmness, as embodied in the Truman Doctrine, against what they termed Russian imperialism. Moreover the implicit pledge of material support for the Vatican's spiritual campaign was seen as a convincing and useful factor enabling Catholic clergy to point to the material advantages available to those countries that oppose Communism within their borders and joined the ranks of the democratic nations. The Vatican anticipated considerable results from such an approach in Europe, particularly when compared to Soviet unwillingness to cooperate in application of the Marshall Plan. This was in fact an extension of the strategy being used by the United States and the Vatican to stop Communism in Italy.

The Vatican knew that it would be accused of direct involvement in world politics and of aiding American imperialism, particularly as during the war the Pope had, in his public declarations, claimed the necessity of the Vatican stance being one of determined neutrality. In practice, the Pope had been far from neutral, but he had never declared, as he was now doing, his opposition to one side and his support for the other. Nonetheless, during the war the Pope's distaste for Communism was suspected by the Allies of making him unduly sympathetic toward the Germans. Thus, after the Pope's pact with Truman, *Unita*, official newspaper of the Italian Communist Party, began referring to "Truman's new order", a caustic reference to Hitler's "new order". In defence, Catholic
circles argued that during the war the Vatican had been physically surrounded by a Fascist power that, if it had wanted, could have virtually isolated the Holy See and seriously crippled its work by means of reprisals. The situation today was quite different. The issue now was to secure an enduring peace based on Christian principles. While the fight might appear as political to laymen, as far as the Vatican was concerned it was nothing more than its mission to defend the Catholic faith wherever and whenever it was threatened. (85)

On August 28, 1947, Myron Taylor sent a telegram from Rome to the Archbishop of Canterbury:

> Declarations by President Truman and His Holiness the Pope in harmony with our discussion will be released to the press today. We hope Your Grace will make public statement along generally parallel lines to indicate growing solidarity of religious denominations toward a common objective. You are of course free to state that at President Truman’s request I had called upon Your Grace to discuss these matters. (86)

On August 29, Taylor sent Fisher actual transcripts of the correspondence; and on September 4 he wrote requesting further discussions with the Archbishop. (87) Fisher replied that he wished much to see Taylor and invited him to stay at Canterbury. (88) There is no record of what transpired between Taylor and Fisher during the former’s stay with the Archbishop. Fisher kept no records of any of his meetings with the President’s personal emissary to the Pope. Nor is there any indication of the Foreign Office being kept informed, although it seems unlikely that they would not have been. However, from a letter sent to Fisher after his return to the United States, it is clear that the Archbishop had agreed to support Truman’s scheme for Christian unity in opposition to Soviet Communism:

> On arrival home and after preparing my report to President Truman concerning my visit to Europe, I found that he was much pleased with my conversations with Your Grace, and particularly with the prospect of the
address by you before the Assembly of the Knights of the Round Table, which I believe is to take place the middle of this month. Your remarks I understand will expand the pattern of the effort through common faith in God to give encouragement to struggling mankind and to create in the world a beneficent influence to offset the growing propaganda and accomplishments of the Soviet which are contrary to our faith and imperil human liberties.

Both the President and I await delivery of your address with interest and confidence. (89)

Fisher replied to Taylor on October 20, following his address. He told Taylor the gathering was very successful, and although it did not receive very much publicity, there had been a large and distinguished audience. Five leaders of the different Churches had been asked to say something about their common mind as to the Christian contribution to world peace. Fisher ventured to Taylor that he thought himself the only speaker who really dealt with the subject. He noted that Cardinal Griffin had given a little address on Christian marriage, while the others did not say much. Fisher's speech had claimed there was a common mind, partly owing to the realization of the Churches that even if they could not yet be one, they must yet do their utmost to think and act together as Christians in relation to the world; and partly owing to the increasing external challenge to the fundamental truths and values of the Christian faith. Fisher included among his illustrations of this movement the Pope's numerous calls for the collaboration of all Christendom and the recent exchange of letters between the Pontiff and the President. The rest of his speech concerned the contribution that the Churches could make in achieving peace. He concluded his speech on the fundamental principles of the moral law, the worth of human personality, the essential rights of man and of the family against the State, the over-riding principles of freedom, justice and neighbourliness, and the fact that in defence of the moral law the Church stood
with and would work with all men of goodwill. (90) This latter declaration was exactly what Truman was asking for.

The substance of this speech proved that Fisher had pledged himself willing to cooperate with the President's and Taylor's plans. The speech itself was evidence of his compliance. However, the fact that the Archbishop did not seek to give it more publicity, as he could have done through his press office, and the fact that it was not made at the time of the actual exchange of correspondence, as Taylor had initially requested, suggests that the Archbishop's compliance was, at least, cautious. Several factors could account for this, including the domestic situation in Britain where the Vatican was regarded as a seat of reaction by many, and there still remained suspicion of American intent. Moreover, Fisher himself was fiercely anti-Catholic and had no wish to line up behind the Pope, particularly in what was indisputably a political anti-Communist crusade such as the Anglican Church had repeatedly repudiated. In November 1946, Fisher had stated in a private letter, "As I know, the Vatican would very much like our Church and others to rank ourselves in this matter behind the Church of Rome as the great defender of liberty, but so far as liberty goes Rome itself has a by no means unsullied record." (91)

Despite his aversion to the Roman Catholic Church, Fisher was prepared to cooperate with it politically, if not spiritually. Following Truman's pledge to the Pope the Anglican Church identified with the struggle of the Roman Catholic Church in Eastern Europe. This was illustrated by the Archbishop of York in his visit to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in the autumn of 1947.

Truman and Taylor, clearly seeing the atheism of Communism as Russia's ideological achilles heel, sought to promote a united Christian front which could
exploit that weakness and, with its combined moral and spiritual authority, command a world wide audience. This, at the very least, would have tremendous propaganda value. Fisher's participation as a key figure in this scheme was illustrated in March of 1948 when, with the Cold War rapidly escalating, Bevin called for Church support. Fisher's response included a proposed statement calling for Christian unity in face of the Communist threat. The intent was to articulate a condemnation of Communism which could be signed by all Christian leaders, bar those in Eastern Europe. Notes by the Reverend Waddams, General Secretary of CFR, on this statement, show it to have been written in March 1948, the same month that Bevin met with Fisher. The notes were dated March 15, which was after Bevin's meeting with the Archbishop, which suggests that he must have been at least privy to, if not responsible for, its preparation. (92)

A memorandum by Waddams about the aims and substance of the proposed statement illustrated that the objective was to try to secure its agreement over the signatures of leaders of the majority Churches of all countries in the world which would normally be termed "Christian" countries. These included Roman Catholic Churches; so a prime necessity was to have the support, or at least the sympathy, of the Vatican. The statement was to be submitted for comment to a small but select number of individuals before general submission. Most important, the proposal was to be made as a personal demarche by the Archbihop of Canterbury, personal letters being written and delivered through British Missions throughout the areas concerned. These fell into four main groups: Western Europe; North and South America; the Dominions, and the Near East. Eastern Europe was omitted, a significant fact in itself. Although the authorship of the Archbishop of Canterbury was clearly meant to conceal the
The advance of Communism both in its control of whole countries and in its penetration of countries which still maintain non-Communist or anti-Communist Governments is a serious threat to the whole basis of civilisation as it has been hitherto understood. We must, however, emphasise the fact that Communists do not form more than a small minority in any country in the world, even in those countries which they control. We are not here attempting to deal with political problems as such. We do not desire to maintain any political status quo which has proved inadequate to deal with the problems of modern society, nor as Christians do we recommend any one political system as a solution of national and international difficulties.

The threat which in Communism is focussed and expressed in an extreme degree is to be found in some measure in every land, but Communism demonstrates its nature in an unmistakeable form. It is the threat of the breakdown of those accepted moral principles on which all civilised life has been built.(93)

The statement went on to revile the nature of Communism, unequivocally blaming it for all the world's problems: "We feel it is our duty to publicly direct the minds of men to the root cause of the present disorder and misery which trouble our world." Stating the choice before mankind to be basically spiritual and moral, the statement referred to the "many pronouncements dealing with these moral bases made by Christian leaders, especially to those issued from time to time by His Holiness the Pope". The statement appealed to all Christians, including non-practicing, to join in the work of restoring moral values to the world, inserting the hope that members of other religious Faiths would add their influence.

Waddams considered that in view of the many difficulties, "perhaps insuperable", the statement could not be strong in its wording and could not touch upon many desirable points: "But whatever its merits or demerits as a
statement, the success of such a plan would provide a sensational example of Christian solidarity hitherto unmatched." Even the attainment of a partial success was thought to be worthwhile. The plan was not, however, pursued at this point. With the Lambeth Conference and the first meeting of the World Council of Churches on the horizon, it was considered unwise for the Church to be seen to be associating itself too much with political causes, as Visser 't Hooft pointed out to Kenneth Grubb in connection with another Christian scheme in which Bevin was implicated.

While Fisher's Christian appeal to oppose Communism was still under consideration at Lambeth, the Archbishop received from Kenneth Grubb copies of correspondence between Grubb and Visser 't Hooft, General Secretary to the World Council of Churches, concerning a possible meeting of Christian politicians on the present world crisis. The conference was the suggestion of Grubb, Controller of Overseas Information at the Ministry of Information during the war and afterwards widely involved with a number of Church organisations, including the WCC, in which he was chairman of the Churches Commission on International Activities, the BCC and the CFR. He explained to Fisher that he had had reason to believe that the conference which he then had in mind would be agreeable to the Foreign Office:

I based this upon discussion with certain officials, who reported that Mr Bevin had heard of the possibility of this idea and thought well of it. I have since heard through a Foreign Office official that Mr Bevin has expressed a much more active interest, in the sense of saying that he would like to stir up the appropriate church body authorities to take a lead in the matter. It has struck me, therefore, that he might in the first instant communicate with Your Grace, and hence my present action. It does not of course follow that Mr Bevin's objectives and those of this Commission in seeking to promote such a conference would agree. They certainly would not agree all the way. There might be a considerable common ground between them.
Because of his correspondence with 't Hooft, Grubb felt he could not press the matter, unless he in turn was advised or pressed from other quarters. The Secretary of the WCC did not think the time appropriate, particularly with the Amsterdam and Lambeth conferences coming up. Moreover, he was concerned that the nature of the proposed conference "would increase the already too widespread impression that the World Council is linked up with the Western Powers. Now that impression would do more harm than good..." (95) 't Hooft further advised Grubb that the dates June 2 to 5, 1948, had already been set aside for a small conference of Christian political leaders. The meeting concerned the forthcoming assembly of the WCC, but it could be used for a frank facing of the responsibility of Christian leaders in the present situation. Grubb acquiesced to this alternative, although he advised he was himself unable to attend the meeting. (96)

Fisher recognised the difficulties alluded to by 't Hooft. Moreover, he had little faith that such a conference would actually achieve anything: "nor is it altogether easy to see what they could do." (97) He informed Grubb of an already arranged Christian Action meeting, organised by the Anglican Canon Collins, "it is hoped to get Christian laymen from Western Europe to be among the speakers. It is an attempt to put a constructive Christian lay impetus behind the movements in the West." Fisher clearly perceived Christian Action as presenting a preferable alternative to Bevin's meeting of Christian politicians scheme.

The inaugural meeting of Christian Action was held at the Albert Hall on April 25, 1948 and was chaired by the Earl of Halifax. Described as "A call to action by Christians in the present crisis", it was a "Campaign to build up the
Western Union of European Nations on Christian lines, and to give spiritual energy and courage to the peoples of the world to face their present difficulties." Initially it generated a great deal of support and enthusiasm from Church leaders, including the Bishop of Chichester as well as Fisher. However, Canon Collins later proved too independent in the atmosphere of conformity engendered by the Cold War. CFR came to regard him as a maverick and advised that Church support be withdrawn. (98)

Fisher's following of the Foreign Office line was fully endorsed and supported by his fellow Primate, the Archbishop of York. Garbett had already proven himself a skilled ecclesiastic statesman through his wartime services for the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Information. If Truman and Taylor had proven able to persuade the very anti-Roman Catholic Fisher to cooperate with the Vatican, then it was hardly surprising that the patriotic, nationalistic Garbett, susceptible as he was to the influence of men of affairs, was persuaded to give his support to the postwar Anglo-American alliance, despite its compromise of British sovereignty.

Toward the end of 1945, the Foreign Office feared that the ill will created in Britain owing to the abrupt termination of lend-lease and the wrangling over the British Loan might sour Anglo-American relations and provide support for opponents of their American policy. Bevin had done his best to influence the press in both countries to counter adverse effects, and the situation clearly demanded positive publicity. (99) In December 1945, the Archbishop of York received a letter from the British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Halifax. Garbett was a great admirer of Halifax, and during his 1944 tour of America, in which Halifax had been instrumental, had written of the Ambassador
in his travel diary: "He is a truly great man, so simple and devout, with wisdom and strength... I was so glad to find that the Americans now appreciated Halifax." (100) Halifax's letter to the Archbishop concerned the loan. Garbett's reaction to financial transactions between Britain and the United States matched those of most other Englishmen, Bevin included. The general feeling was that Britain had given her all during the war and was deserving of greater consideration now the war had been won. Halifax sought to give the Archbishop an American perspective in order that he might adopt a more sympathetic attitude to the action of that country:

I was very disappointed about the way the Houses of Parliament handled all our loan business... the debates revealed how great the gulf is between opinion here and in England, and once the Americans made up their minds that they could not give us a grant in aid or an interest free loan I do not think that their terms and actions were ungenerous. English opinion has given much less weight than the Americans themselves are prepared to attach to it to the clause permitting reconsideration and there seems to have been little or no recognition of the fact that the United States Administration was really conducting a negotiation on two fronts; with their own public opinion at the same time as with us. Now, of course, they are tempted to say "If people in England dislike all this so much, why should we do it at all? Certainly most of us do not want to do it merely for the blue eyes of Professor Laski." (101)

By the time the loan was worked out, Garbett had still not fully overcome his resentment, "Any grace or friendliness that might once have been attached to it has been destroyed by the slow and grudging way it has been granted. At times, indeed. it looked as if such humiliating conditions might have been attached to it that Great Britain would eventually have been compelled to refuse it." Nonetheless, despite these harsh words, his treatment of the loan was in effect an act of reconciliation: "But while we resent and regret many of the speeches made during the passage of the loan, we must not forget that the
United States Government did its utmost to secure its acceptance and that there are many Americans who showed true friendship to this country." (102)

Garbett accepted that Britain needed American financial aid, but while he spoke in conciliatory terms, he remained suspicious of American intentions. During his wartime visit to the United States, Garbett had been most impressed with the country, but he had detected dangerous undercurrents which made him fear for the future of Britain. These he confided to his travel diary:

I have come away greatly impressed with the United States. Its people will see the war through to the end, but afterwards they may easily lapse into imperial and economic isolationism. We must not easily assume their continued cooperation. They may use their military and economic power for their own interests. There are pacifist, isolationist and anti-British influences which will make themselves felt later on. But cooperation with the States will be essential for the future of the human race. Power and influence are passing, if they have not already passed, from Great Britain to the United States. The energy and enterprise of its people are amazing. But they are highly strung, emotional and impulsive; very sensitive to criticism, but very ready to criticise other nations. They have little experience of public affairs, and know nothing about Europe. But the future of the world probably lies with them and Russia even more than with ourselves. Canada is loyal to the Crown, very proud of its national independence; suspicious of any suggestion for federal organisation which might interfere with its own self-government. But Canada will cooperate with us. (103)

Apart from revealing his suspicions as to how America would use its power and his doubts about postwar cooperation in the postwar period, Garbett was also critical of certain aspects of American society:

In the United States there will undoubtedly be difficulties after the war. Compared to ourselves it is backward in social reform. The relationship between Labour and Capital is most uneasy, and probably there will be a series of strikes. Strikes in America are much more serious than in this country, for violence is used by the contending parties. And of course America has the great colour problem. This has become much more acute during the war. The negroes have been used for labour in all parts of the States. They are conscious of their poor and humiliating position. The North begins to understand the anti-negro sentiment of the South. It is strange that the Americans should be so ready to criticise our treatment of Indians, and yet leave their own problem in their own country of dealing with the darker race quite unsolved. Canada will
gravitate towards the United States, and its policy will always be
influenced by that of its more powerful neighbour. But the Canadian is
critical of his Yankee brother, and would not wish to be absorbed. There
is however in Canada among the younger Roman Catholic priests an anti-
British element which might prove dangerous in the future.(104)

Anxiety over American intentions and resentment over American attitudes
remained constant concerns of the Archbishop, even during the last months of
the war: "We are immensely grateful to our American friends.... we admire greatly
their contribution to the American war effort... But they do not always
sufficiently realise that people who have for nearly six years given their all,
without reserve, in the fight for freedom, are exceptionally sensitive to
criticism... Nor do our American friends always realise how anxious we are about
our industrial and economic future. Is their 'big business' going to cooperate
with us or hinder us in our steps toward recovery? Is the United States
prepared to take an active part, as we hope and pray, in the restoration of
Europe, or will she only advise us in the days of peace about our duties to the
world?"(105) During the negotiations for the loan, Garbett was well aware that
the failure of the two nations to cooperate would mean bitter Anglo-American
rivalry throughout the world: "If the Loan had been rejected on either side of
the Atlantic there would have followed years of bitter and unfriendly rivalry in
every part of the world."(106)

British need for the financial aid which came to be known as the Marshall
Plan was partly occasioned by the financial crisis created when sterling
convertibility, insisted on by the Americans as part of the Loan, was
implemented during the summer of 1947. However, largely owing to a positive
press and propaganda exercise which emphasised American magnanimity while
concealing less palatable aspects, such as Britain's economic subordination, it
engendered a wholly favourable attitude in Britain toward the United States. Garbett, however, remained unconvinced, unable to eradicate the ambivalence of his feelings:

There are some who believe that the miracle which may save us will be action by the United States. Here again we must not deceive ourselves by wishful thinking. In that great country there are large numbers of people who are friendly to Great Britain and anxious to help us: but there are many who dislike us and wish to see us weakened: Zionist and Isolationist propaganda are always traducing us. Moreover, the political and economic policy of the States is largely determined by hard headed men of business who are not prepared out of mere sentiment to throw good money after bad. America is only likely to come to our help if she is convinced that we shall survive as a Great Power. At present she is very doubtful about this. (107)

Garbett's uncertainty and foreboding about the United States were exacerbated when he visited Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in the autumn of 1947. There he was confronted with Eastern Europe's dread and fear of another war and the terrible apprehension of America. He returned declaring the need for Britain to remain aloof from American pressure to combine against the Soviet Union:

I came away more convinced than ever that we in this country ought to take no part or give any support to those appeals which are sometimes made to us from the other side of the Atlantic by the lining up against Russia and against Communism. (108)

This was entirely contrary to the sort of publicity desired by the Foreign Office, particularly from such an important public figure as the Archbishop of York. Following the Cabinet decision to enroll the British Churches in Britain's Western Union plans, Garbett's pronouncements fell neatly into line. In his Diocesan Leaflet for April 1948, Garbett referred to the existence of "two camps" in such terms as to completely repudiate the feelings he had expressed after his experiences in Eastern Europe:
The Eastern camp is well organised and confident; the Western camp is hastily making ready to protect its heritage of ordered freedom. Our country, and notably our Foreign Secretary, did its utmost to avoid a cleavage which is bound to be dangerous to the peace of the world. But through no fault of our own the two camps are now established and are watching one another in armed fear and suspicion. (109)

Moreover, he provided exactly the sort of Christian publicity desired by the Foreign Office for their Western Union propaganda:

First, we must make our western camp both materially and spiritually as strong as possible. It must have the physical strength of armaments to protect it against any attack; a defenceless camp invites aggression. No single European nation is strong enough to stand alone; security will only be found in a close military alliance between the nations which share the same ideals. But there must be spiritual as well as physical ramparts. Those who are within the western camp must understand clearly the heritage they possess and the reasons why they treasure it; both the youth and the adults of the allied countries must be taught the nature and meaning of the values which they may have to defend with their lives. Here the Communists give us an example through the care they take in instructing their members. We must make it plain that we value justice, mercy and freedom more than life or peace. We who are Christians, whatever our Church, have a special responsibility in building the spiritual ramparts. It was through Christianity that the West received its moral and cultural heritage. A divided Christendom has weakened its defence against secularism. Now in the hour of crisis all Christians should bear united witness to the religious and moral values which they possess. Behind all material strength there must be moral conviction. (110)

Significantly, however, revealing that the Archbishop had not entirely banished his former doubts about the United States, in the same article Garbett warned: "There are necessary precautions the State must take for its own security, but there must be no "spy mania" nor "witch hunting". We must not confuse the Christian Communist with the marxian. It is the latter and not the former who is the menace to peace."

There was a parallel transformation in Garbett's attitude toward American aid. Writing in his Diocesan Leaflet for May 1948, Garbett declared that Marshall Aid would be "honoured by future historians as an unique act of
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6. Bevin's desire was to return Britain to World Power status. This included preserving the Colonial Empire; if possible, he would have refrained from giving India its independence. See Bullock, Vol 3.

7. Robert Vansittart to Ernest Bevin, August 21, 1945; FO 800 463. Bevin's speech indicated that Britain's future foreign policy would be a continuation of that of the Coalition Government and not Socialist. Bevin's speech illustrated the conflict which already existed between Britain and the new Eastern European regimes as he expressed his dissatisfaction with the Governments set up in Bulgaria, Roumania and Hungary:

   The Governments which have been set up do not, in our view, represent the majority of the people, and the impression we get from recent developments is that one kind of totalitarianism is being replaced by another. This is not what we understand by that very much overworked word "democracy," which appears to need no definition, and the forms of government which have been set up as a result do not impress us as being sufficiently representative to meet the requirements of diplomatic relations.

   With reference to the forthcoming Bulgarian elections, Bevin expressed his dissatisfaction with the electoral law and stated: "We shall not, therefore, be able to regard as representative any Government resulting from such elections." Hansard, August 20, 1945.

   The foreign policy carried out by Bevin was fully supported by Churchill and the Tory Party with laudatory appraisals of his term of

Bevin was shrewd and he soon saw that the problem of his term of office would be how to withstand the growing Soviet appetite. At the close of the war our country was in no mood to be alerted to this new danger and it took a man of stature and sincere convictions, first to discover the extent of the danger for himself, and then to lead his people to share his judgement. This Bevin did and it is to his enduring memorial.

Foreign Office satisfaction with Bevin was articulated by the Permanent Under Secretary Orme Sargent on his retirement in early 1949, by which time Bevin's Cold War policy was firmly in place: "...in particular I want to tell you how greatly I shall always value the privilege of having served under you during the last three all important years and of being able to watch you at your great work of re-establishing Great Britain as a world Power in the face of every sort of difficulty and discouragement...may I say...how much I admire the great work you are doing." Sargent to Bevin, March 2, 1949; FO 800 463.

8. Vansittart had retired from the Foreign Office in 1941 in order to be free to vent his views on Germany, however, he continued to view himself as a public servant with a public duty and as a spokesman for the Foreign Office. In this context it is significant that Vansittart first publicly voiced anti-Russian sentiments in August 1944. Protesting against Russian inaction at the Warsaw uprising, he equated for the first time the similarity of purpose and method between German and Soviet strategy which Bevin was to specify for use in his 1948 anti-Communist publicity programme. See, Norman Rose, *Vansittart: Study of a Diplomat*, 1978.
9. Copenhagen to Oslo, telegram, August 6, 1945; FO 371 47521.

10. This instruction was written in Bevin's own hand on a copy of the telegram; FO 371 47938.

11. FK Roberts to CFA Warner, August 4, 1945; FO 371 47938.

12. T Brimelow to E Bevin, August 29, 1945; August 29, 1945; FO 371 47938.

13. The majority of the replies from the various missions stated that they were certain such control was exercised, but they could produce no hard evidence; FO 371 47938.

14. The Origins of Economic Disorder, FL Block:

In general, Britain was seen as a kind of bridge between the U.S. and the rest of the world. If the U.S. could count on British economic, political and military resources in the pursuit of U.S. global aims, it was thought that it would then be infinitely easier to gain the acquiescence of other countries. It was precisely U.S. dependence on British cooperation in a variety of areas that made U.S. policy toward Britain so complicated. On the one hand, if Britain were too strong, if she had substantial currency reserves, it would be difficult to force her to act according to American wishes. On the other hand, if Britain were too weak, if her payments position were desperate, she would be of little help in financing European trade, in working to eliminate trade and exchange controls, and in a whole variety of other tasks. The trick, then, was to keep Britain weak and dependent, but not too weak, and debates that took place within the U.S. Government over the proper size of British reserves reflected the subtlety of such an undertaking.

15. Attlee to Truman, August 16, 1945; reported to Foreign Office by Washington, August 17, 1945; FO 800 512.
16. Bevin to Cripps, September 20, 1945; FO 800 512.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.


22. Churchill to Bevin, November 13, 1945; FO 800 512.

23. Churchill to Attlee and Bevin, March 7, 1946; FO 800 513.

24. "The Soviet Campaign against this Country", I Kirkpatrick, May 22, 1946; FO 930 488. The theme of "educating" the public, which included stressing the positive aspects of the Western system as well as the negative ones of Communism, remained a constant factor in Cold War propaganda. Kirkpatrick's memorandum had recommended requesting the Central Office of Information to prepare suitable material: "This should include both material showing positively what we are doing in the field of industrial welfare, social services, etc. (this aspect is already in hand) and material exposing Communism." It was clear from Kirkpatrick's list of disseminators, in which the press and broadcasting featured strongly, that Britain's anti-Communist propaganda was intended for
international as well as home consumption. The importance of this was reflected in a Foreign Office minute written by Joseph Robinson in November 1950 which argued the case for establishing a Council for the education in external affairs of the home public: "...its work would be conducted by a small executive on which the Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, Colonial Office and Ministry of Defence would be represented; and to which representatives of N.A.T.O., the Brussels Treaty Organisation, the Council of Europe and, perhaps, United Nations would be coopted..."

Robinson argued that some device was required by which N.A.T.O. and other external bodies supported by His Majesty's Government could have the appearance and some of the reality of direct access to the home side of "the British propaganda machine, e.g. to the Home Division of the Central Office of Information." Robinson considered that "such an example might be used to influence weak sisters like France and Italy (which seem so incapable of taking an effective and continuous positive line let alone of enforcing anti-Communist propaganda) to follow suit." The Foreign Office were at that time charged with the sponsorship of propaganda towards the United Kingdom, but Robinson doubted that in the long run the Foreign Office were properly competent to conduct publicity within the United Kingdom, "however efficient and responsive the C.O.I. may be at any given moment." Joseph Robinson, November 24, 1950; FO 953 640.


27. RMA Hankey to Attlee, August 18, 1946; FO 371 56788.

28. Ibid.


30. Lord Gladwyn refers briefly to the Russia Committee in The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn, London, 1971, pp 226-7. Lord Gladwyn, then Gladwyn Jebb, was Chairman of the Russia Committee in 1948. In 1946 and 1947, the Russia Committee contained a number of senior and influential Foreign Office officials including Assistant Under Secretaries Sir Oliver Harvey and Sir Nigel Ronald; Christopher Warner, head of the Northern Department and subsequently Assistant Under Secretary; and Robin Hankey who succeeded Warner as head of the Northern Department.

31. The terms of reference for the Russia Committee, Christopher Warner and Sir Nigel Ronald, April 12, 1946; FO 371 56885 N5170/169/38. The Russia Committee did not function as successfully as Warner hoped. The bulk of its time was spent in looking through long draft Intelligent Summaries in great detail. When the Committee was originally set up at Warner's instance, the idea was that the political and economic Under Secretaries should pool recent information regarding Russian doings affecting their various areas in order to get a collated picture and consider what action, political, economic or in the publicity sphere,
should be taken as a result. It was in the latter capacity that it failed. Warner recalled Moley opposing a Joint Planning Committee for the whole work of the Office, but regarding such as valuable for matters concerning the Russians since the Russians themselves clearly planned their campaign and therefore it made sense to try to assess their plans and make joint Office counter plans, but, as Warner explained to Jebb:

"This started quite well, but afterwards failed because Oliver Harvey, who was Chairman and also ought to have spoken at each meeting on Germany and Western Europe, practically never turned up, and gradually other Under Secretaries dropped out too."

In 1948 a plan was instituted for reviving something along the lines of the original idea, by having a small Sub-Committee to consider specific problems thrown up by the Russians after the meeting of the main Committee. Warner, who was absent from the Foreign Office when this was devised, believed that it would be much more valuable to revert to something like the original idea, making a greater effort to get all the Under Secretaries that mattered to come or to send adequate substitutes if unable. Warner to Jebb, November 22, 1948; FO 371 71687.


33. Memorandum, unsigned, November 26, 1946; FO 371 66362.

34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Churchill to Attlee and Bevin, March 7, 1946; FO 800 513.


40. Ibid.

41. Sir C Nichols to Orme Sargent, August 3, 1946, in this despatch Sir C Nichols used the term Social Democracy and Democratic Socialism as if they were interchangeable terms; FO 371 56787.

42. Minute, Lambert, November 29, 1946; FO 371 66362.

43. "Gatt, the Marshall Plan and OEED", V Clayton, Political Science Quarterly, December 1963, pp 493-503; a paper on "Security in Western Europe and the North Atlantic", presented to the Cabinet on November 9, 1947, illustrated that a Western bloc against the Soviet Union and supported by the United States was an early objective of British policy makers:

   As a means of providing some part of the necessary depth of defence against a hostile U.S.S.R., a western group of allies, if such a group could maintain its effectiveness in face of a major threat from the U.S.S.R., would be of even greater value than against a re-armed Germany. A strong and friendly France would be
essential. The inclusion of Sweden, Spain, Portugal and Iceland would again be desirable.

Since the territory in which we have a major strategic interest includes much of Germany, we examine below the practicability of obtaining German help against the U.S.S.R. We cannot be confident of obtaining adequate assistance from this source.

Our own forces and those of our European allies would be utterly inadequate to limit a Soviet advance through Poland and through a disarmed Germany into Western Europe.

The United States is, therefore, the only country which possesses sufficient man-power and reserves to stabilise and restore the situation. Time will be the crucial factor if the Western European States are not to be overwhelmed. It is, therefore, vital that United States help should be forthcoming with minimum delay.


45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. CFA Warner to Mayhew and Sargent, January 1, 1948; FO 953 128.

48. Ibid; the "Third Force" concept actually meant three different, but, closely related things: a) ideological; b) political; c) military. The ideological concept, particularly in the months that followed the Labour victory in Britain, hoped that Western Europe would develop a political and ideological pattern of its own, which would be different from both American capitalism and Soviet Communism. A blend of Socialist planning and justice and of political freedom, it would contribute to the enlightenment and emancipation of the colonial peoples, would largely avoid unemployment and other scourges of capitalist organisation, and would be something with which Communism would find it much harder to
compete than discredited old time capitalism, as still largely represented by the United States.

The political concept - which related to separate countries - developed particularly after 1947, when the Communists were eliminated from the French and Italian Governments, and when it took the concrete form of Third Force parties and of Third Force governments, with Oppositions both to their Right and their Left. Such parties and governments claimed to pursue civilised, progressive, middle course policies, neither too conservative nor too socialistic. Finally there existed the conception of a geographical or military Third Force, especially among French political thinkers who thought of Western Europe as a terrain d'entente, or even as a buffer of wisdom and moderation between two impetuous young Colossi. It was this final idea, perhaps the least realistic of the three, that was current at the time that Bevin used the term, and why Warner was so anxious it not be used in the Cabinet paper in such a way as to become part of the basic directive on the new publicity line, as the United States was known to oppose it.


51. Ibid, p 211.

52. "The Threat to Western Civilisation", CP(48)72, Bevin, March 3, 1948; CAB 129 25. Although presented to the Cabinet as Bevin's own
views, they were actually taken, virtually word for word, from a memorandum of the same title prepared by Gladwyn Jebb in the February and repeated in his Memoirs, p 211. It is worth noting that prior to articulating the threat to western civilisation in 1948, Jebb had been an advocate during the war of presenting the Allied cause as a Christian crusade. In his memoirs he noted that during the war a great deal of Foreign Office energies went in trying to think out the right lines for weakening the German war effort. He put forward a "Christianity versus Paganism" line, which engendered correspondence with Rex Leeper who opposed the use of such; p 96.

53. "Future Foreign Publicity Policy"; CAB 129 23.

54. The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn, pp 214-15:

After Brussels it was thus evident that the next step was to get in touch with the Americans. As a matter of fact it had been decided in February (before the events in Prague) that I should be the right person to act as a sort of dove sent out from the Ark, and I was duly dispatched, but only got so far as New York when I was recalled, since the moment was deemed unpropitious. However no sooner was the treaty signed than I arrived in Washington with instructions to find out how the land lay and, generally speaking, to put the case, in very informal and non-committal talks, for the early formation of something like an Atlantic Alliance. The first meeting took place (on Bevin's initiative) on 22 March and was followed by five more, and the 'consensus' which eventually emerged did, I think, bear a strong resemblance to the North Atlantic Treaty, formal negotiations for which began in Washington on 4 July.

56. FK Roberts to the Rt Rev DM Stewart, Moderator of the Church of Scotland, and to the Rt Rev JW Richardson, Moderator of the Federal Council of the Evangelical Free Churches, March 12, 1948; FO 371 173053.

57. See notes 51 and 52.


59. Religion and the People, April 1948.

60. Ibid.

61. A common propaganda theme used to disparage Communism was to equate it with Nazism; in 1950 Vansittart coined the phrase "Communazis". In his memorandum on "Future Foreign Publicity Policy", Bevin put forward as one of the principles which should guide publicity, "Equally important is that we should stress the civil liberties issue pointing to the many analogies between Hitlerite and Communist systems."


64. "Christianity and Communism", Religion and the People, April 1948.
66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid, May 1945.

69. Ibid, June 1946.


71. See previous chapter on "Pan Slavism" for Garbett's warning to the Foreign Office regarding his concern that there was insufficient awareness in certain circles of the admiration and affection still retained by the masses from the war for the Soviet Union.

72. For a condensed background to the Canadian espionage trials, see the index to the New York Times, 1946; also Keesings Archives, 1946, news summaries.

73. Fisher to Dame Beatrix, November 7, 1946; Fisher papers, vol 63: 13.


77. Ibid.


80. Truman to Pius XII, August 6, 1947.

81. Pius XII to Truman, August 27, 1947. This was an unmistakeable reference to Eastern Europe.


84. The Truman/Pius XII correspondence was eventually published in a book by Myron Taylor in 1953 which for the first time publicly revealed the existence of correspondence dating back to April 1946; see *New York Times*, April 23, 1953, p 1.


89. Ibid, Taylor to Fisher, October 8, 1947; vol 37: 15 & 16. It is noteworthy that while the published correspondence between the President and the Pope avoided specific mention of the Soviet Union, the private correspondence between Taylor and Fisher cited "the Soviet" as the enemy of mankind.


91. Ibid, Fisher to Dame Beatrix, November 7, 1946; vol 63: 13.


93. Draft of "Joint Statement", n.d. but probably prepared in March 1948: Crossed out was the following: "We do not here criticise the political programmes of Communism which are largely phrased in unexceptional terms of honourable associations. Nor do we desire to maintain any political status quo which has proved inadequate to deal with the problem of modern society." CFR Papers.


96. Ibid, Grubb to 't Hooft, March 17, 1948; vol 40:311.

97. Ibid, Fisher to Grubb, March 22, 1948; vol 40:312

98. On September 10, 1949, Waddams complained to the Archbishop that Collins had formed a new organisation, the "Christian Movement for European Unity", without any prior consultation with CFR. Further, Waddams had heard at Strasbourg that Collins was leading the Movement up the garden path as far as Church support was concerned, to which he deprecatingly added: "Moreover, he is - or appears to be - nothing but an ignoramus and a bungler so far as the Romans are concerned." Waddams was also offended by Collin's complaints that Church officials were stiff and did nothing. In the circumstances, Waddams asked Fisher to consider withdrawing all support from Collins and to notify Cripps and Halifax, fellow supporters, accordingly; further advising the Archbishop that he should also decline to appoint to the Christian Action Committee. Waddams to Fisher, September 10, 1949; Fisher Papers, Vol 54.

99. See above for Bevin's efforts to restrain adverse publicity in the media over the American Loan.

100. "United States Tour, March 31 to May 9, 1944", Garbett's Travel Diary; Garbett Papers.
101. Ibid, Halifax to Garbett, December 26, 1945. The suggestion was that Britain, with a Socialist Government, should be grateful for any American support.


103. "United States Tour"; Garbett Papers.

104. Ibid.


106. Ibid, August 1946.


110. Ibid.


112. Warner, Memorandum, August 8, 1948; FO 953 481.
113. Ibid. Anti-Communist themes were prominent in virtually all of Garbett's publications, from his *Diocesan Leaflet* to newspaper articles to books.
Political interest has long clad itself with high idealism for which it has sought Christian endorsement. The association of politics with Christianity is ancient. Cold War warriors invoked Christian inspiration for what were effectively Western interests. The theme of saving Christian civilisation had been fought over in the Second World War. The Allies claimed to be saving it from the pagan Nazis; the Axis from the Godless Bolshevists. In the Cold War, with atheist Communism as its opponent, the West considered itself to have an advantageous monopoly of Christianity which it determined to exploit to the full. Cold War oratory was suffused with religious imagery. The Foreign Office discussed the use of Christian themes in its propaganda and surreptitiously used sympathetic Church leaders to support its policies. It was the United States, however, which effectively endorsed the concept of the Cold War as a crusade against Communism by its formal alliance in common cause with the Vatican. Despite the separation of Church and State insisted upon in the American Constitution, a display of religious faith was essential to politicians seeking electoral success in America. While references to God and Christian aspirations were common place in American political speeches, after Truman's correspondence with Pius XII was published, the President's use of Christian appeal inevitably gained a new significance.
In the days of Empire, British leaders told the public that their mission was to spread Christian civilisation. In the twentieth century, looking to create an economic Empire, the American public were told that their mission was to save Christian civilisation. Truman propounded the theme that American defence of the free world was a God-given duty. In his annual message to the Congress on the State of the Union, delivered in person before a Joint session on January 7, 1948, Truman began his address with the claim that the basic source of American strength was its spirituality: "For we are a people with a faith." Truman declared, "The faith of our people has particular meaning at this time in history..." In the speech, which was carried on a nationwide radio broadcast, the President referred to American faith in God supplying strength and vitality. In his conclusion, he stated that the whole world was looking to America for leadership and that this was the hour to rededicate their faith. (1)

On the day the Brussels Treaty was signed by five European nations, Truman again addressed Congress in person to deliver a special message on the threat to the freedom of Europe. To counter this threat, Truman recommended first that action on the European Recovery Programme, Marshall Aid, be speedily completed and, second, that universal training legislation be promptly enacted. He urged that assistance to other nations and American strength were prerequisites in carrying out America's great purpose."(2)

That same evening, discussing these recommendations before the Society of the Friendly Sons of St Patrick, Truman spoke of "the righteousness of our course", and emphasised the Christian foundation of the American alliance with Europe: "The faith in God which sustains us, also sustains men in other lands. Together we can erect an enduring peace." In this speech Truman also made
an attack on Communism which particularly stressed its atheism: "And even worse, Communism denies the very existence of God. Religion is persecuted because it stands for freedom under God. This threat to our liberty and to our faith must be faced by each one of us."(3) The protection of Western civilisation with its Christian foundation was a theme used by Bevin to persuade the nations of Western Europe to unite and accept American aid in their defence; it was used by Truman to persuade Congress and the American people to send the aid.

While Bevin emulated Truman in the use of idealism and Christianity to elaborate the Russian threat, he wanted Britain to take the spiritual lead with regard to Europe. Although Bevin was well aware that American finance was essential for Western Union to succeed, he believed that its acceptance by the rest of Europe necessitated British leadership: "Material aid will have to come principally from the United States, but the countries of Western Europe which despise the spiritual values of America will look to us for political and moral guidance in building up a counter attraction to the baleful tenets of Communism within their borders and in recreating a healthy society wherever it has been shaken or shattered by the war."(4)

In his initial suggestion of what he called "a spiritual union of the West" to Marshall, Bidault and the British Cabinet, Bevin proposed "close consultation" rather than the formal alliance which subsequent events revealed to be his real aim. To the Cabinet, Bevin portrayed this "close consultation" as a means whereby British prestige, leadership and world power could be restored:

Provided we can organise a Western European system such as I have outlined above, backed by the power and resources of the Commonwealth and of the Americas, it should be possible to develop our own power and influence to equal that of the United States of America and the U.S.S.R.
We have the material resources in the Colonial Empire, if we develop them, and by giving a spiritual lead now we should be able to carry out our task in a way which will show clearly that we are not subservient to the United States of America or to the Soviet Union.

Bevin possibly perceived that with American domination of the scheme, Social Democracy would not have the same opportunities for expression. Bevin clearly felt that it was for Britain as a European and a Social Democratic Government and as, in Bevin's view, the chief protagonist of the ethical and spiritual forces inherent in his concept of Western civilisation, to provide leadership, not the Americans. Bevin recognised that British leadership could not be based solely on Social Democracy. The addition of a religious dimension, or as Bevin termed it a spiritual and moral lead, would greatly widen its appeal. In his consideration of British publicity, Bevin stated: "...in the Middle East and possibly in certain Far Eastern countries such as India, Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, Indonesia and Indo-China, Communism will make headway unless a strong spiritual and moral lead ... is given against it, and we are in a good position to give such a lead. In many countries of Western Europe the forces of Social Democracy will be the mainstay, but even in Western Europe and obviously in the Middle East and Far East our appeal could not be only to Social Democratic Parties."

Bevin's desire to assert British leadership, as well as his anti-Soviet, anti-Communist policies, received the full support of the Prime Minister. In his New Year's broadcast of January 3, 1948, Attlee gave what he stated to be a reasoned case for British Socialism - and implicitly for Bevin's Third Force. Attlee spoke of the "British Approach" and emphasised that a Socialist Britain would not be a half-way house between American Capitalism and Russian
Communism, but an organic development of Western European civilisation. He presented the issue as how to preserve their way of life in a world dominated by two non-European Powers, both of which were opposed to colonialism. The broadcast emphasised, by comparison with Russia and America, the positive role of British Socialism in the postwar world, with Attlee specifically stating that Britain was not aiming at a watered down version of the American way of life. However, it was the anti-Communist content which was emphasised in the press reports of the speech, particularly in the United States.

According to the weekly political summaries sent to the Foreign Office by the Embassy in Washington, Attlee's January 3rd broadcast was favourably and prominently headlined in a number of western as well as eastern newspapers. Whilst it evoked no great volume of comment amidst a welter of other matters, it was evident a very favourable impression had been created in the Administration, trade unions and other quarters by the Prime Minister's denunciation of the totalitarian and imperialist practices of the Soviet Union and its Communist adherents in other countries. The summary noted that reports from American correspondents in London had led to a belief that His Majesty's Government would shortly redefine British foreign policy in terms which would make clear that Britain recognised itself as a "defender of western values" rather than a mediator between east and west. (?)

British foreign policy had never been to mediate between Russia and America; and a Foreign Office minute on the above summary noted that this mistaken theory of British intent to mediate, "dies hard". On a more positive note, the minute observed that, "American opinion evidently sets store by our
support for practicable steps being taken to curb Soviet expansion, and values it more highly in the light of our economic improvement." (8)

Bevin's reasons for wanting British leadership in Europe rather than American was a complex mix of patriotism and national pride, British interest and the desire to make Britain the leading Social Democracy with London the Mecca for Social Democrats:

We should develop visits by important Trade Unionists from abroad and other influential, non-Communist foreigners, and set up a "Wilton Park" in which we could offer them courses on British life and institutions, and make available to them material and ideas useful for the struggle in their own countries against Communism. In short, we should seek to make London the Mecca for Social Democrats in Europe. (9)

Bevin's determination to secure the leadership of Western Union in the spiritual sphere was illustrated by Foreign Office considerations of the new policy for publicity in relation to Communism. This was an area in which collaboration with the Americans obviously had to be considered, as Warner informed Sir John Balfour in a secret communication to the Washington Embassy in February 1948. After deliberation, the Foreign Office had decided that it would be inadvisable to have any general agreement or understanding with the United States "which would in any way tie our hands." This was clearly intended to allow the Foreign Office more scope in developing their propaganda themes to promote British interests and the British way rather than the American. There were other considerations too: "On the whole the Americans seem to be very ham-handed in their anti-Communist and anti-Soviet publicity. Our line is likely therefore very often to differ from theirs. We should hope however by consultation in suitable cases to prevent our getting in each other's
way. We also - perhaps rashly - rather hope to be able to influence them imperceptibly in the direction of greater subtlety."(10)

A considerable amount of time and effort was given to developing Bevin's concept. A Foreign Office working party was set up under the Chairmanship of CFA Warner to consider the spiritual aspects of Western Union and provide terms of reference. The first was "to examine the factors common to the Western Union countries other than political, strategic and economic which can contribute to building up the Western Union conception".(11) This problem was tackled at the first meeting of the working party, which took place on February 19, 1948, and at the second meeting, it was agreed to approach various outside people with a view to getting ideas.(12)

From the responses it is possible to gauge that religious themes were already important. There was, however, a warning note, which illustrated the way in which the Foreign Office intended to use religion and Social Democratic economic theories. Arthur Goodhart argued that the Foreign Office was confusing the problem with which they were faced by making a distinction between Western democracy and a totalitarian state based on economic theory and a special attitude to religion. He argued that there was not necessarily conflict between religion and totalitarianism, because a country which recognised religion could be totalitarian, as in the case of Spain. He observed that there was always a tendency at times of revolt to attack established religion on the ground that it supports the status quo, but when the revolutionary government has become established its conflict with the Church might cease. Goodhart noted that this was what seemed to have happened in the Soviet Union, where it would now hardly be surprising to find it playing the
defender of the Greek Catholic Church in the Middle East. Goodhart thus objected to describing the basic division between Western democracies and the totalitarian states as a conflict between Christianity and Communism.(13)

In the middle of April the working party produced a preliminary memorandum outlining the aims of British foreign policy and how these would be facilitated by establishing an anti-Communist educational institution such as had been recommended by Bevin, offering courses on British life and institutions to "influential non-Communists" and making available to them material and ideas useful for the struggle against Communism in their own countries. Bevin's proposal evolved from an already established institution, Wilton Park at Beaconsfield, Buckinghamshire which was originally a re-education centre for German prisoners. Apart from illustrating the lengths to which the Foreign Office were preparing to go in their propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union, the institution was a testimony to the British desire to use the concept of Western Union and the anti-Communist struggle as vehicles to promote British leadership, British interests and the British way of life:

Britain has taken the lead in drawing Western Europe together in order to promote its recovery from the effects of two disastrous wars and to organise its spiritual defence of the western tradition against the Communist assault. To achieve these ends it is essential that the ideological ties between Britain and the Continent should be reinforced. As a step in this direction it is essential that the other Western countries should realise more vividly than in the past how much the Western way of life owes to Britain and how closely it knits them together with her, not merely in their common fight against the totalitarian doctrine of the East but in their common effort to restore the dynamic power and the prestige of European civilisation in the world.

The main purpose of the institution will therefore be to afford a certain number of fellow Europeans from the Continent the opportunity for studying the British contribution to Western civilisation first hand. An understanding of the British conception of representative government, the freedom of the citizen, social security and social justice should create a bond of sympathy between them and this country and a sense of sharing a
great common heritage. It is on such psychological foundations that the
new Europe must be built.

It is suggested that emphasis should be laid on this positive and
constructive aim of the enterprise rather than on the negative aim of
strengthening the common front against Communism: The former necessarily
includes the latter. The exposition of the principles of a free society
necessarily involves pointing the contrast to unfree societies organised
on party dictatorial lines, whether Fascist or Communist. The credit of
the institution will stand much higher if it is looked upon as a
contribution to the spiritual unity of Western Europe rather than an
instrument of anti-Communist propaganda. (14)

Finance and administration were to be provided by the universities, the
TUC and other such bodies, as well as the Government. Bevin was enthusiastic
about the scheme, but Ralph Murray foresaw pitfalls. He argued that, largely
owing to international jealousies, there was no clear path for Britain to run
indoctrination courses or courses of instruction and inspiration in the anti-
Communist struggle; there was no particular reason why Britain should be
accepted as entitled to brief all and sundry against Communism. Murray
considered a more realistic policy would be to pursue an international centre,
giving full play to each nationality, which could instruct, inspire and inform
individuals engaged in the battle for the defence of Western principles and
ideals and, in particular, in the active struggle against Communism; these
individuals could be drawn not only from the signatories to the Brussels
Treaty, but also from other territories where possible. Britain would thereby
be able to establish an indoctrination centre or international "Wilton Park"
which could draw on the whole of Europe for instructors, lecturers and
resources." (15)

After the signature of the Brussels Treaty, Mr Murray proposed an
"Information Executive" be attached to the Consultative Council. Murray's
proposal was agreed in the Foreign Office and subsequently presented to the
representatives of the Five Powers at the Commission's meeting of May 5, 1948, where it was accepted as a basis for approach. Bevin did not, however, abandon the plan for a British project, even attempting to secure it a Royal Charter. The Lord President resisted the move which he regarded as inappropriate for "What is, after all, an experiment!" (16) The project subsequently encountered difficulties both in securing the requisite finance and a suitable chairman. It had initially been agreed that £1 million should be found for a West European Educational course, half from the Treasury and half from public appeal. (17) Despite the difficulties, the project was not abandoned until the end of June 1949. (18) Although Bevin's original concept did not survive, some of the ideas behind the project did, and were implemented at Wilton Park as part of its job of promoting Anglo-German relations. (19)

The emphasis on propaganda, and its nature, at this stage, are noteworthy, particularly because in his address to Parliament when he outlined his concept of a spiritual union, Bevin spoke against propaganda. Bevin's speech to the House on January 22, 1948, during a two day debate on foreign affairs signalled to the United States that Britain was ready to fulfil the American conditions for Marshall Aid. At the same time, Bevin's words were clearly designed to convince the domestic audience that American aid was not politically motivated, and nor was Britain's response. Bevin assumed a high moral position in discussing British policies and aspirations. He claimed that the concept of a unified Europe as the heart of western civilisation was accepted by most people, and that the Government had striven for closer association and economic development, and eventually for the spiritual union of Europe as a whole. Russia's fait accompli in Eastern Europe prevented the fruition of this hope.
The European Recovery proposal had been put forward in the same spirit, it was offered to the whole of Europe, including Russia. While Britain always wanted the widest concept of Europe, Russia repudiated a great cooperative movement and deliberately chose to risk the creation of such a movement within the confines of Western Europe. (20)

Bevin told the House: "Propaganda is not a contribution to the settlement of international problems. They are all so important that the only way to solve them is coolly and calmly to deal with them on their own merits." (21) This was stated at the very same time as the Foreign Office, following Bevin's recommendation to specifically collect and disseminate information on Communist policy, tactics and propaganda, was forming an anti-Communist publicity section. The work of this department involved providing anti-Communist material for use at home and abroad, including for the use of other countries. Its Head, CFA Warner, also had charge, significantly, of the Foreign Office working party examining the spiritual aspects of Western Union. The existence of the section was not widely known, as Warner, informed the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir John Balfour in February: "Thus far we are only at the beginning of the organisation of our new anti-Communist information department, (which is to be called the Information Research Department and is to be under my supervision and the functions of which must so far as possible be kept strictly confidential)." (22)

The Foreign Office argued the need to enlighten public opinion and alert other countries to the threat posed by Russia. However, the nature of the publicity they disseminated was constructed to support their policy actions, rather than provide an objective analysis. This was well illustrated by a
Foreign Office Research Department paper on "Anglo-Soviet relations since 1939", which the Foreign Office issued to twenty selected Members of Parliament for information. The paper issued was actually a re-make of a previous F.O.R.D. paper on Anglo-Soviet relations which the Foreign Office had criticised because it argued that Soviet policy could be understood as a search for security. The replacement paper began: "The Soviet Union is not merely a State among other States. It is the vehicle of an aggressive ideology. It was dedicated by Lenin and has been repeatedly re-dedicated by his successors to its task of reshaping the world to a Marxist pattern." (23) The second paper specifically repudiated the argument contained in the first: "Apologists for the Soviet Union attempt to explain her expansionist tendencies as a "search for security", a natural desire to convert a former sphere of Western influence into a Russian cordon sanitaire against the West. The superficiality of this view is obvious to all who have read the basis works of Marxist-Lenin ideology..." The paper, which was lengthy, proceeded in the vein of Foreign Office orthodoxy: that the Soviet Union cooperated with other nations only in so far as that cooperation furthered the triumph of Communism on a world scale; that the wartime alliance with Britain was but a necessary evil to Soviet leaders; that Cominform had been the ceremonial reinstatement of Comintern, and that the dominant feature of Soviet domestic and foreign policy since the end of the war had been the vehement reassertion of uncompromising Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy.

The paper necessarily treated British foreign policy during this period, arguing that their objective had been the establishment of a modus vivendi under which all nations could work together in the interests of general peace and prosperity. The Foreign Office attitude to a modus vivendi was well
illustrated in the notes prepared for Bevin's speech in Parliament's January foreign affairs debate. These advised Bevin to include a passage stating: "We believe that countries with different ideologies can cooperate", only because it was believed that Stalin had said something to this effect which might be quoted in a question. Bevin was further advised to say that Britain was endeavouring to cooperate with the peoples of Eastern Europe but the acts of Cominform, like its predecessor Comintern, afforded the greatest hindrance to mutual confidence and understanding. (24) Bevin, of course, spoke accordingly.

Within the Foreign Office Ralph Murray was responsible for the distribution required by Mr Mayhew of the second F.O.R.D. paper on Anglo-Soviet relations to the selected people. He could not resist a cynical comment on the affair in the minutes:

I take it that scholarship goes ahead and issues, and propaganda does a rehash: but that scholarship's version does not get sent to M.P.s etc., and propaganda's does. I have taken the liberty of detaching Mr Mayhew's requirements so that we may work to them. (25)

While it is clear from the Foreign Office papers of 1948 that propaganda was assuming an ever increasing importance in foreign policy considerations, there were still those who preferred more direct action against the Soviet Union, both in and out of the Foreign Office. These included Winston Churchill, whom the Foreign Office believed to favour a "show down":

We have reason to believe... that Mr Churchill is in fact in favour of a "show down". He is known very confidentially to have explained his ideas in conversation with Mr Marshall at the beginning of December. On that occasion he emphasised the immense importance of the atomic bomb, and argued that the U.S.A. should use their monopoly of it to arrest the forward movement of the Soviet Union, as a policeman stops oncoming traffic. The Americans should, Mr Churchill said, tell the Russians plainly that they must withdraw within their own borders and cease from troubling the Western world. If this were said at once, he thought, the Russians would be bound to give way. If, on the other hand, the Americans waited until the Russians also had the atomic bomb, they would merely make
it certain that both sides would eventually destroy each other. These remarks are said to have evoked no response whatever from Mr Marshall at the time.(26)

The question of a "show down" was discussed by the Russia Committee on January 29, 1948, when the consequences of such a drastic action were deliberated. It was considered that the Russians, far from complying with demands made to them, might overrun Western Europe in preparation for a conflict. They might even appeal to the Security Council, and the effect of such an appeal on public opinion in Great Britain and the Dominions would require careful assessment.(27)

American support was a prerequisite of any such action, which meant exploring how the State Department's mind was moving on the subject. Moreover, as RMA Hankey observed, "We should have to be very careful not to convey the impression that we favoured an idea of which the Americans would have to bear most of the cost, and it would have to be done in such a way that there was no risk of subsequent leakage of any sort."(28)

Information supplied from Washington revealing American hesitance about supporting Western Union did not encourage the belief that the United States would be likely to "show their hand over this far more delicate and difficult question".(29) Mr RH Bateman posited that Churchill's idea was that the Western Powers should address the Soviet Government in unison, and in the absence of a Western Union the Americans would not budge. He declared, and Gladwyn Jebb penned his agreement in the margin, that Churchill's proposal lacked reality at that moment and should be put in cold storage.(30)

Not quite so drastic, but looking to achieve in Western Europe what Stalin had achieved in Eastern, but in reverse, was Sargent's scheme, discussed at the
time of the meeting of the Brussels signatories, to eradicate all Communist influence from Western governments. A top secret minute sent from the Foreign Office to Mr Broad of the North American Department stated:

Sir O Sargent has asked me to produce for him a list of countries with Coalition Governments (containing a Communist element) which may be liable to pressure from the Soviet Government working through local Communists.

Sir O Sargent would also like to have an expression of opinion whether the time is ripe to ask any such Governments to cast out these snakes from their respective bosoms. (31)

The response from the North American Department concluded that they lacked adequate grounds at that moment to approach any of the Governments with which they were concerned. (32)

The lack of option with regard to initiating any form of direct political action against the Soviet Union naturally meant even more importance attached to propaganda. The development in this period of Bevin's concept of a spiritual union led to attention being focussed on religion. This included Islam which the Foreign Office Research Department generally thought to be opposed to Communism, but warned that Muslims were becoming more susceptible owing to the encroaches of Western materialism. F.O.R.D. also pointed out that there was no foundation for the belief that Islam and Communism were incompatible. It was thought that the revivalist movements hitherto vaguely directed against Europe and Christianity should come out with even greater force against Communism as a destructive influence. This did not mean that any genuine rapprochement would take place with other opponents of Communism however. F.O.R.D. concluded that Islam "occupies an intermediate position between Western civilisation and Communism and the direction in which it moves will not only decide the fate of Islam but will have a profound effect upon western civilisation itself." (33)
The Foreign Office was also concerned with the role of the Russian Orthodox Church, about which there existed many conflicting and contradictory opinions. Because it was recognised as a means of reconciling Christians to the regime, as well as a potential cultivator of Russian nationalism and Pan-Slavism, the official attitude was to regard the Russian Church as a tool of the Russian Government. The Foreign Office were concerned about the tendency of visitors to Russia and Eastern Europe to return to the West testifying to the vigour of Church life in the countries under Communist domination. They took particular exception to left wing clerics such as the Dean of Canterbury, Hewlett Johnson, who not only testified to the strength of the Christian churches in the East, but preached the compatibility of Christianity and Communism. When at the end of 1947, prompted by the Archbishop of York and the Bishop of Chichester, the Archbishop of Canterbury issued a public disclaimer of his "Red Dean", it was perceived by those on the clerical left as yet another example of the consonance of ecclesiastical events with general political events. (34)

Following the failure of the Foreign Ministers' Conference, the public attack on the Dean paralleled the splitting of the Trade Union movement in France and the public attacks on the Communists in the British trade unions. (35) The precedent for Fisher's censure was that of Cosmo Lang, who had reacted similarly prior to the war when the mood of country and Church had been vehemently anti-Soviet and anti-Communist. Further, as Fisher's action involved no question of disciplinarian or other measures against the Dean, it was effectively a symbolic gesture against the leftwing of the Church. However sincerely held were the beliefs of leftwing clerics, the Foreign Office opposed
them as being useful to Soviet propaganda. The Foreign Office was opposed to the Russian Orthodox Church for the same reason.

This attitude led to consideration in the Foreign Office of means of sabotaging the Moscow Conference for Orthodox Churches, organised by the Patriarch of the Russian Church, by advising the leaders of the Churches with which they had influence not to go. However, no decision was reached about dissuading Orthodox Patriarchs from attending before the Foreign Office learned that a considerable number had accepted their invitations. The Foreign Office response was relief that they had not proceeded with the proposal, as B Miller observed: "In the circumstances I think it a good thing that we did not intervene with definite advice not to go; we should have put our foot in it." (36)

The Foreign Office regarded such conferences as dangerous because of the false propaganda picture which could be constructed from them. No objections or fears were expressed about the Lambeth Conference, nor the Assembly of the World Council of Churches, two major Christian conferences held in the West, although prior to both these conferences there was a great deal of unease in Church circles, on the right, the left, and the centre, that political considerations might distort spiritual aspirations during what was a very critical period for the Church and the world.

Expression was given to unease on the left in an open letter from the Society of Socialist Clergy and Ministers which contained an appeal to the assembled bishops not to endorse the clamour for a Christian crusade against Communism and the Soviet Union. The letter referred to changing Christian attitudes in the critical international tension: "There is a tendency, of which
your Lordships cannot be unaware, for official ecclesiastical pronouncements of
the Church of England to follow much the same line in foreign policy as that of
the Government. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that a change is
coming over episcopal pronouncements as the estrangement grows between the
Soviet and the British Governments. (37)

Occupying the centre ground, JA Douglas, former General Secretary of CFR,
expressed his grave concern to Herbert Waddams about which Orthodox
personalities were to attend: "When I surveyed the possibilities I was very
depressed..." His depression was engendered by the fact that the Orthodox to
attend were to be of the Greek religio-nationality whose presence would carry a
political implication. Douglas considered that the very emphasis of their
special relation with the Lambeth Conference would give the impression that the
Anglican Communion was ranged on their side in the very difficult and dangerous
jurisdictional conflict which threatened schism between Constantinople and
Moscow and the rest of the autocephalous churches; that was between ten million
or so of the former and the scores of millions of Slavs and other non-Greek
Orthodox. Douglas foresaw potentially dire consequences: the disruption of the
Orthodox Communion; the weakening of religion behind the Iron Curtain; the
engendering or confirming of the notion, greatly increased in the past twelve
months, that the Church of England was a political puppet, and that to have
dealings with the Anglican Communion was perilous. Douglas told Waddams that
he was therefore aghast at the idea of throwing "a maximal Nikaean function" at
which Damaskinos and the Greeks would be the outstanding figures. (38)

Douglas told Waddams that his target of the past twenty years had been
the establishing of "maximal practical relations possible" with every Christian
Communion: "My principle has been nihil Christiani a me alienum..." Nonetheless, Douglas recognised the necessity of studying the political situation, if only because churches are not only ecclesiastical institutions but have religio-national characters: "Thus in the old days I was bold always to declare in Athens that where the politician expected the Anglican Communion to reflect the British Government's sympathy for Greece as against Bulgaria that I was a Bulgaroo-phil and so on." From the information at his disposal, Douglas judged the guest list, which included Churches which the Russian Church denounced as schismatic and the Soviet Government as rebels, and the presence of a major hierarch such as Damaskinos himself, as enhancing the suspicion and resentment which the feting and limelight of the guests of the Conference was certain to arouse the other side of the Iron Curtain.

Douglas concluded his forebodings to Waddams with an observation which John Birbeck used to impress upon him, that the great obstacle to advance with the Orthodox was the repercussion of the open rivalry between Russia and Great Britain in world politics.(39)

Unease over the impact of the political on the ecclesiastical was expressed on the right by the Archbishop of York. His concern was the perennial Church fear of being compromised by being implicated in political activity. The Church of England was quite willing to have its Ministers condemn Communism and Russia from the pulpit, but it did not want to be seen to be participating in a politically orchestrated campaign against them which would, on the one hand, identify the Church with social reaction and possibly alienate the working classes; and on the other, identify it with a political position which would deny its supranational, suprapolitical status, adversely effecting its relations
with Christian Churches in Communist States. The desire of the Church to maintain a distinction between its anti-Communist activities and the political anti-Communist campaign then gaining momentum, was elucidated by the Archbishop of York in his Presidential address to the Convocation of York at the end of May 1948. Garbett began his address with an attack on "Marxian Communism", which he called "a religion without a God" and "a corrosive acid eating away and destroying the foundations of truth, honour, mercy and fair dealing, on which alone a stable civilisation can be built." (40) He next sought to distinguish between "Marxian Communism and "Christian Communism", before inveighing against the Church becoming involved in a "Holy War" against Communism. Nonetheless, resorting to a distinction employed by the Ministry of Information during the war when it wanted to use Church leaders for its propaganda, the Archbishop endorsed the involvement of individual Christians in the aforesaid political campaign: "The individual Christian will as a good citizen naturally support the Government when it takes steps to defend the nation against danger."

Garbett tried to differentiate the roles of Church and State by contrast:

The weapons of the Church should be different from those of the world. While the statesman and the politician must use the appropriate weapons at their disposal to defend their nation and its allies, the Church must rely on the spiritual weapons of sound teaching, of persuasiveness, of love as against violence, and of brotherhood as against class warfare.

More to the point, and on a matter which at this juncture was of real concern to the Church, Garbett warned of the consequences for Christian relations should the issue between Marxian Communism and the Churches become
confused with the political conflict in which Russia and the Communist regimes were ranged on one side and the Western democracies on the other:

If, therefore, we joined in a Holy War, using political and spiritual weapons indiscriminately against all who called themselves Communists, we should be making a breach with millions of Orthodox and other Christians; we might easily also prejudice their position with their Communist rulers; and we should certainly be giving the militant atheist an excuse for demanding the resumption of persecution on the ground that Christianity is a danger to the State.

There was no question but that the Cold War confronted the Church with immense problems and dilemmas. The Church's attempts to meet the Cold War challenge, and the pressures to make it succumb, were expounded at the 1948 Lambeth Conference, a meeting of Anglican representatives from all parts of the world, which took place in London in July and August of that year. Presided over by the Archbishop of Canterbury, 329 Bishops, 198 of which were from abroad, met for five weeks of grave deliberations. (41)

The procedure of the Conference was that it met in private with no reporting of its deliberations allowed, but with a Conference Report published following its conclusion. The Conference was divided into Committees, each of which adopted a report on a particular subject. On the basis of these reports a series of resolutions were drawn up and adopted. The Encyclical Letter of the Conference enshrined the policy of the resolutions.

The published Committee Reports from the Conference are illuminating in that they reveal that despite the Cold War tension created by the Berlin crisis and press hysteria, not to mention the prevalent mood of anti-Communism, still many Churchmen sought to acknowledge and welcome the progressive changes wrought by the postwar revolution. The Committee Reports, however, carried only the authority of the Committees by whom they were respectively prepared and
presented, the Conference as a whole being responsible only for the formal resolutions and the Encyclical Letter. Unfortunately, the final resolutions produced an innocuous report, seemingly calculated not to offend either the British or the American Administration. This effectively nullified the inherent challenge of certain vital Committee Reports. Moreover, the essential reticence of the Conference to confront issues which challenged Anglo-American interests was illustrated by the fact that while there was a resolution on Palestine, there was none about Malaya, China, Indonesia or other troubled areas of controversy involving the Western Powers.

The disorders of the contemporary scene were considered by the vital Committee on "The Church and the Modern World", which was presided over by the Bishop of Albany and included the Archbishop of York. In 1848 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels wrote: "A spectre is haunting Europe, the spectre of Communism." One hundred years later the same spectre was clearly haunting episcopal minds, and as well as having its own section, the subject of Communism touched most of the others. The Report was divided into six sections: 1. Human Rights; 2. The Church and War; 3. The Church and the Modern State; 4. Communism; 5. Christian Education; 6. The Church Militant. The influence of the Archbishop of York was clearly discernible throughout, not least in the Report's preoccupation with Communism. The Report not only reflected the didacticism of Garbett's own writing, but contained characteristic topics dealt with in his own publications: past failures of the Church, now comprehended and redressed, all notably confined to "the formative decades of the industrial era", the era that produced Marx; and a contrasting of
Christianity and Marxism, with the early Christians held up as an ideal against which the prophets of the new age compared badly.

The Committee began with a discussion of human rights which condemned the emergence of the modern totalitarian state, and quite clearly meant Russia and the new Communist regimes. Totalitarian police states were the subject of discussion in the section on "The Modern State", and the reference to their being "accepted by some as a necessary means to the communal life, based on social justice..." made it plain that the Communist regimes were again being indicted: "Such, however, is the evil in human nature and the corrupting influence of power that the dictators and their subordinates fall in love with power and the exercise of coercion over others. No agreement is possible between the dictatorship of police states and the Christian way of life." This statement was extraordinary in that it effectively condemned all the Churches then functioning in Eastern Europe with the consent and cooperation of the authorities, and at a time when the Anglican Communion was voicing dismay at the prospect of deteriorating relations with just those Churches.

In "The Church and War" section, the Committee was unequivocal in declaring its opposition to war: "We are faced with a choice between the avoidance of war and race suicide. Peace is no longer desirable: it is an absolute necessity." The Bishops acknowledged the seriousness of the existing tensions, but declared these should and could be resolved other than by war: "Nations have, in fact, lived a long time in uneasy relations with their neighbours without going to war. It can be done again." Although such words effectively endorsed a state of cold war and suggested political expediency rather than reconciliation, of uneasy rather than good relations, and with no
word of friendship, they were an accurate reflection of the political crisis, and considering the degree of tension then existing, were actually quite bold as well as wise. In repudiating force, the Bishops again gauged the situation accurately and wisely: "Force is never a final solution, since all conflicts are ultimately in the realm of ideas and one cannot kill ideas with bombs."

The section on "Communism" began with wise words: "As Christians we ought to strive to prevent the world dividing into two mutually hostile camps." The Bishops stated that this involved, "A clear understanding of the truth as well as the errors in positions with which we are compelled... to disagree." The Report disclosed that its compilers were not always successful in adhering to their own recommended criteria. A study of the positive aspects of Communism which made it appealing was recommended: "Both its critical insights into history and its desire to help the oppressed." It was posited, however, that Marxist Communism was born of despair, based on "Proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains." This was quoted as the penultimate sentence of the 1848 Communist Manifesto. It is actually the last but two.

The Report did contain a token recognition of the hope and strength of Communism which it described at one point as having "the resilient strength of a confident hope". However, the main emphasis was on Communism as a negative force. It was asserted that Communists did not hesitate to use despotic power to achieve their ends; and, where they gained control of a state they were ruthless in social action, indifferent to freedom of thought, careless of the sanctity of human life, in fact all "that contradicts the Christian faith in eternal life and justice and Christian love as a criterion of human behaviour".
Significantly, these adverse aspects of Communism were attributed simplistically and unequivocally to its atheism:

This lack of scruple springs from the atheism of Marx's creed. He accepted no moral imperative in the relations of man with man except a compulsion to set forward the Communist revolution by every achievable means. He believed that this revolution was the only way to achieve social justice and a classless society, and therefore the ultimate goal justifies any means. By its despotic use of power, Communism not only becomes a cloak for men of ambition and for imperialism, it is also bound to defeat its own ends. In God's world, good cannot be achieved by evil means, nor a true community by hating one's neighbour. (42)

This concentration on the atheism of Communism was criticised by Religion and the People, which noted in its critique of the Report the historical error contained in the suggestion that early Christian history knew nothing of despotic power or cruelty; it also questioned the wisdom of blaming "this lack of scruple" on the atheism of Marx's creed as such an argument "lends itself too easily to the tu quoque". Citing the Inquisition, the execution of Hus by the Council of Constance and the fact that countless other examples could be given, Religion and the People asked was it to be assumed that these sprang from theism and accused the Bishops of using atheism as a simple means of evading a discussion of the real issues raised by Communism. Religion and the People further criticised the Report for contributing to the widespread propaganda "That Communists use wicked means, and of course everybody else, especially Christians, believe only in the use of perfect means"; admonishing that such an argument should not be repeated by those who were supposed to have had some training in moral theology and casuistry. The Report was further taken to task for descending to the level of malicious slander in using statements such as, "Marxian Communism regards mercy and pity as weakness." (43)
The Report claimed Christianity as the force to challenge and overcome Communism. The Bishops declared that Marxism was a powerful proselytising force possessing a religious appeal which could only be overcome by a true religion and a greater force - that of Christianity. It was argued that the birth of Marxism had been made possible by the failure of Christianity at a critical point in historical development; a powerful proselytising force, it could only be defeated by a superior such force, a successful Christianity: it could not be overcome by secular forces, neither armed strength nor propaganda: "Communism cannot be overcome by argument alone. It has to be outlived, not merely outfought. Under the province of God its truths will pass into the experience of humanity; its untruths and half-truths will be self-destructive."

The gauntlet thrown down, the Report declared the Church ready to battle; significantly, it noted that the battle was from loyalty to God’s cause, not the State’s: "It is for the Church to be faithful to the Word of God and for Christians to live, and, if need be, die for the truth of God as He allows them to see it. But let us be sure that its martyrs die for the Kingdom of Christ and not for some lesser loyalty." The Report explicitly rejected the Church becoming involved in the political crusade against Communism: "By making common cause with anti-Communist forces, the Church might have some success but such a short term policy would prove in the end disastrous to the Church, both in the East and the West."(44)

Ecclesiastical concern was expressed that the Church not be identified with social reaction which would alienate it from the workers from whom Communism derived its power; more was to be gained by competing with Communism in the field of social reform: "In the long term policy to win
workers for the Kingdom of Christ and to win them from a policy based on materialism, Churchmen must begin by entering into the despair as well as the hope that has inspired modern Communism. They must proclaim human rights without equivocation; they must be seen to be sincere; "They must practice corporately what they preach and so cleanse the household of faith that the Spirit of God is able to work through it with power."

The Report reflected ecclesiastical concern, common also to the Roman Catholic Church, to cultivate the working classes and not alienate those who subscribed to the economic theories of Marxism. Churchmen, it stated, "must realise that those who accept an economic theory of Communism as distinct from Marxian atheism do not thereby put themselves outside the fellowship of Christ's Church." (45) It was pointed out that in the spiritual fight against Communism there would be potential allies among the enemy who would be ready to join forces with a Christianity that appeared really redemptive in that essential sphere. This expansion of the appeal of Christianity by the addition of an economic element resembled Bevin's efforts to produce an appealing Western ideology based on Social Democracy and Christianity.

In many respects the Report succumbed to the prevalent mood of anti-Communism, reflecting both class prejudices and those born of the era's ubiquitous propaganda. Nonetheless, the Report spoke clearly against a third world war and a divided world; plus it effectively identified anti-Communist forces as reactionary and pointed to the dangers of an anti-Communist crusade and where it might lead. However it was these bold and positive declarations which largely disappeared in the resolutions adopted by the Conference as a whole. Thus, the resolution on war reaffirmed the 1930 Lambeth Conference
resolution: "War as a method of settling international disputes is incompatible with the teaching and example of our Lord Jesus Christ." Not included, however, was the Committee's assertion that modern war was incompatible with the welfare and possibly the continued existence of man and the absolute necessity of peace. There was no word of reconciliation between East and West. Instead, after laying down the duty of Governments to work for disarmament, the resolution stated that "until such a time as this is achieved" war might be necessary and justified.

This brought a suspicious and cynical rejoinder from Religion and the People which implied that the chairman, the Archbishop of Canterbury, had removed any material which might offend the political powers:

The challenge of the Committee's report is dropped. In its place there comes a statement that war might be right. In other words, between the Committee and the Conference, somebody has asserted himself to see that not a word should be said of which the American or British Governments might disapprove. (46)

Although in many respects the Report had been exceedingly condemnatory of Marxian Communism, in others it had seemed to strive for objectivity and understanding. It had conceded that Communism was a potent force with a "dynamic power", comparable to Christianity, which appealed to the hearts and minds of the best young men and women, including Christians, declaring: "It has the intellectual power of a revealing general principle and the quality of an overmastering faith." In contrast to this, the Conference resolution conceded that there were practicing Christians who were Communists, but totally rejected that such a position had any validity:

The Conference, while recognising that in many lands there are Communists who are practicing Christians, nevertheless declares that Marxian Communism is contrary to Christian faith and practice, for it denies the existence of God, Revelation, and a future life; it treats the
individual man as a means and not an end; it encourages class warfare; it regards the moral law not as an absolute but as a relative to the needs of the State. (47)

The challenge of Communism, as it was recognised and met in the Report, was simply disregarded or dismissed in the Conference resolutions.

The distinction which the Committee had clearly sought to impose on the Church's opposition to Communism to differentiate it from the dangers of the political anti-Communist crusade received no consideration in the resolutions which, moreover, effectively proposed that the Church perform a corollary role:

The Conference holds that while a State must take the precautions it regards as necessary to protect good order and peace from all subversive movements, it is the special duty of the Church to oppose the challenge of the Marxian theory of Communism by sound teaching and the example of a better way, and that the Church, at all times and in all places, should be a fearless witness against political, social and economic injustice. (48)

Religion and the People interpreted the above as the Church's abdication from any moral responsibility with respect to State action instituted in the drive against Communism, whatever it entailed:

This sentence enshrines the crux of the Lambeth Conference. In plain English it means that whatever measures the State takes against Communism, the Church will not interfere. Hitler asked no more from the Church as, by eradicating the left, he set the stage for war. At this point no safeguards are inserted about human rights, nice means, or anything else. The State must do what it wills. (49)

The Committee recommendation that Communism should be studied in order to know which elements to resist and which were a "true judgement on the existing social and economic order," was endorsed in the Conference resolutions. In the shadow of the preceding resolution it seemed both futile and contradictory. Religion and the People deemed it "laughable", a sop for the Bishops' consciences for which it showed its contempt by comparing them to the Spanish Inquisitors, recalling that they were never guilty of murder, they simply
condemned for heresy and then watched while the State performed the burnings.

Emphasising its disgust with the proceedings at Lambeth, Religion and the People quoted Kipling as its own judgement on the modern Lords at Lambeth who shared with the Inquisitors what Kipling called "corruscating innocence":

"The charge is old?" - as old as Cain - as fresh as yesterday;
Old as the Ten Commandments - have ye talked those laws away?
If words are words, or death is death, or powder sends the ball,
You spoke the words that sped the shot - the curse be on you all.

They only said "intimidate," and talked and went away -
By God, the boys that did the work were braver men than they!

While the Conference Resolutions were a counteraction of the Committee on the Modern World's Report, the Encyclical Letter was subversion of it. The Report had bravely tried to make distinct, and underline the dangers inherent, in a confusion of the Church's opposition to the atheism of Marxism with the political conflict between the Western democracies and Russia. The Encyclical Letter equated the two causes, conveying a sense of identity and common cause, in which the only distinction was the divine nature of the Church's mission:

This is an hour of testing and peril for the Church, no less than the world. But it is the hour of God's call to the Church. (50)

The importance and significance of the Encyclical Letter was not simply that it obscured the redemptive features of the Committee Report, but that it was presented to the public as the essence of the Conference when it became the collective voice of the Anglican Bishops, read out in Churches throughout the world on October 10, 1948. (51) At a time when some gesture of conciliation was needed, the Bishops' proclamation simply added to the mounting tension and became yet further grist for Government propaganda:

Mankind has only recently escaped conquest by totalitarian states which deified their own power. It now finds itself threatened by the new menace of Marxian Communism which exalts atheism, puts supreme confidence
in material progress, and proclaims its gospel with a militant enthusiasm which expects to conquer the world. Christians must repudiate this form of Communism and must condemn the cruelties, injustice and lying propaganda which are inherent in it. (52)

The campaign against Communism was portrayed as a modern crusade:

In the world of our time two ways of living, two beliefs concerning the meaning of human life, contend with one another for man's soul. The battle is between that faith in God and man through Christ, by which man is set free, and (against it) the creeds of materialism and the will to power by which he is enslaved. (53)

After the Second World War many within and without the Church had hoped it might be an international instrument of peace and reconciliation. Its conversion to a Cold War institution was itself an illustration of the irresistible pressure of the Cold War mentality in that period, while the Church became an indicator of the extremes of Cold War polarisation. The World Council of Churches had yet to speak; there many appealed for a third way, but Lambeth had already repudiated it:

Finally, we invite all men and women to join with us under Christ's banner in the war against the evils which wreck man's life and against the false creeds which debase it. In that war there can be no neutrality. To those who stand aloof Christ says, "He that is not with me is against me." (54)
The Lambeth Conference, an exclusively Anglican affair, was followed by the Assembly of the World Council of Churches held at Amsterdam in August and September, 1948. Here were represented the overwhelming majority of the Christian Churches of the world, save for two significant blocs, those of the Russian-led Orthodox Churches and the Roman Catholic Church. Cold War pressures were exerted quite blatantly at the Amsterdam meeting to achieve a further Christian condemnation of Communism and the policies of the Soviet Union. However, deep misgivings in the Christian community regarding the West's attempt to monopolise Christianity as a rationale for political purposes, were expressed at Amsterdam. Similar misgivings had been silenced under the authoritarian procedure of Lambeth, but at Amsterdam they resulted in a Christian rejection of both Communism and laissez faire capitalism, and a resolution to seek an alternative means, a third way.

This result was of exceptional significance because political pressure from the United States aimed at influencing the direction taken by the WCC was tremendous. Throughout its development, the organisation of the WCC had been subject to pressure from the United States, and Britain, aimed at creating an organization which identified and was sympathetic to the West. In the origins of the WCC there was no intent that the body should be subject to political influences or used for political reasons. The WCC grew out of the various streams of the Ecumenical Movement. A reunion of the Churches was regarded by many as essential for the revival of the Christian faith as a meaningful world movement. The question of Church reunion had long been in existence, yet before
the Great War it had made little headway. The War of 1914–1918, however, brought the whole question forward and gave it urgency, in the words of JG Lockhart: "in part from a consciousness that religious division was one of the circumstances which had made such a catastrophe possible, in part perhaps from a sense of shame that in every beligerent country the Church had given almost unreserved fealty to the secular power, and in part through an attraction towards secular unity which was bringing to birth a League of Nations."(55)

Progress toward reunion proceeded during the inter-war years culminating in the meetings at Oxford and Edinburgh in 1937 under a design inspired and promoted by William Temple which brought the various streams of the Ecumenical Movement into the broad river of the World Council of Churches, intended to facilitate more effective Christian action in the modern world. Following a conference in Utrecht in 1938, the Ecumenical Movement was organised into the World Council of Churches in the Process of Formation. It was established in Geneva and was run by a Provisional Committee and an Administrative Committee with Dr Visser 't Hooft as secretary-general. World War Two interrupted the process of formation and led to some significant changes owing to the inability of the Provisional Council to function and the death of the movement's leading spirit, William Temple, as well as other founding figures such as William Paton. The Occupation of Europe inhibited the growth and development of the Ecumenical Movement there, whereas in America it grew and flourished. The North American Ecumenical Conference held in Toronto in 1941 was supported by thirty-five Churches with delegates from North, Central and South America.

When the founding of the WCC was proposed at Oxford and Edinburgh, the American section of "Life and Work", which in practice was the personnel of the
Federal Council of Churches' Department of Relations with Churches Abroad, formed a Joint Executive Committee to cooperate with Geneva and Oxford. The American members of the Provisional Committee were all members of the Joint Executive Committee and Dr Henry Leiper served both groups as executive secretary. This later became the American Committee for the World Council of Churches. An office was set up in New York and, amongst a host of other activities, it created the American Advisory Committee for the Study Department, set up to re-examine the whole WCC programme which it was claimed the outbreak of war necessitated.

From 1937 on, the New York office carried the heavy financial burdens of the WCC, particularly as the number of countries which could support the Council became smaller and smaller. The magnanimity of the member Churches in the United States received a special tribute from the Central Committee of the WCC in 1954; this monetary provision made possible the favourable financial situation the organisation enjoyed in the first years of its life. In the post-war period financial contributions from the United States were vital to the health of the WCC. At Amsterdam in 1948 a goal of $240,000 was set; this was reached by contributions from the United States in 1951; that level was exceeded in 1952 and 1953, necessitating the creation of a special reserve fund for allocation at a later date. Thus, during a period of dire economic stress throughout Europe, the WCC had more money than it could spend. Moreover, this meant that the WCC was in an analogous position to the Vatican which was also believed to receive the most substantial part of its income from the United States.
The WCC also received substantial contributions in the post-war period from John D Rockefeller, the American multimillionaire commonly associated with Standard Oil, one of the biggest, and toughest, organisations supporting the structure of American capitalism. In may 1945, Visser ’t Hooft explained the task of the Churches in the post-war world to Rockefeller. He argued that in the struggle with totalitarian ideologies the Churches realised their own responsibility for the dechristianisation of their countries and the need to evangelise in all realms of life and to reoccupy the many fields of thought and life from which they had retreated. They were, however, gravely handicapped by lack of leadership, particularly in Europe, and required trained leaders with a strong foundation in Christian doctrine and a vision of the existing reality of the worldwide ecclesia militans. Rockefeller was so interested in these views that he offered half a million dollars for the opening and launching of an Ecumenical Training Centre, meant firstly for the European theatre and then, as soon as possible, for the whole world. Further financial contributions came from this same source in 1950.

During the war years the attention of the Council came to be focussed on postwar reconstruction, including not only mutual help between Churches, but general discussions concerning the international post-war order. This was of particular concern to the "Just and Durable Peace Commission" of the Federal Council of Churches in the United States, headed by John Foster Dulles, and the "Peace Aims Group" in Britain, which included Sir Alfred Zimmern of the Foreign Office Research Department, Geoffrey Wilson from the Foreign Office and Herbert Waddams from the Ministry of Information.
The origins of the Just and Durable Peace Commission under the leadership of John Foster Dulles, in the light of subsequent events, was really quite ironic. Dulles was among the Church leaders and influential Christian spokesmen who shared strong misgivings about reacting to the war in Europe in the spirit of a religious crusade, as it was being presented in America by the "Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies". Leaders of the Department of International Justice and Goodwill, in particular, turned their energies to keep the Federal Council of Churches from moving in this direction. Faced with a serious division of opinion, the leadership of the Federal Council of Churches sought some common ground. During Executive Committee and special study group meetings in the spring and summer of 1940, it became clear that however deep their disagreements might be on the causes of the war and the nature of the belligerents, they shared common long range goals. It was decided that each should take an individual stance on the nature of the war and the desirable response of the United States. The collective effort would be directed to a policy for implementation after the war.

With Protestant thinking channelled on the post-war world, a consensus emerged on the desirability of organising a major study commission. In December at the biennial meeting of the Federal Council in Atlantic City, approval and support were given for the creation of a "Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace", designed to "Clarify the minds of our Churches regarding the moral, political and economic foundations of an enduring peace." John Foster Dulles was named as Chairman. The Commission evolved into a body committed to interesting the American people in international affairs and convincing them of their God-given duty to the rest of the world.
In this respect the Commission was an important element opposing American isolationism, and as such was naturally of interest to the United States Government which was vitally interested in the post-war world and the opportunities it would bring America.

Between 1941 and 1945 the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace elaborated a number of basic tasks for producing a new and better world order which reflected similar preoccupations of other internationalist groups in the United States. The Commission aimed for stimulation of a vast segment of American public opinion, publicity efforts and publicity campaigns becoming dominant ingredients. Dulles proposed a major campaign to "force" a positive decision on the question, "Will the American people now commit themselves to a future of organised collaboration within the areas of demonstrated world interdependence?" The result was a set of propositions christened the "Six Pillars of Peace" which received massive media promotion in America with wide European coverage.

In July 1942 Dulles travelled to England at the invitation of British Church leaders in the hope of beginning some transatlantic cooperation. The substance of the visit proved to be, as Dulles remarked, "more on the secular than the religious side." He had lengthy meetings with almost every member of the War Cabinet, including Anthony Eden and Ernest Bevin, but found little direction and enthusiasm in Church circles. The following year however, in July 1943, fourteen British Church leaders, including the Archbishop of Canterbury, issued a statement entitled "A Christian Basis for Reconstruction" which was modelled closely on the Six Pillars of Peace and was endorsed and publicised in the United States by the Dulles Commission. In that same month
the general secretary of the recently formed British Council of Churches travelled to an International Round Table held at Princeton to enable Protestant leaders to consult with Dulles as a group. The meeting included political leaders who were invited as sources of information and ideas. The work of the Commission was privately endorsed by President Roosevelt and Sumner Welles of the State Department. However, Welles' plan for State Department discussions with the Commission were quickly terminated by Leo Pasvolsky, Secretary Hull's special assistant for work on an international organisation. (65)

Prior to Dulles' involvement with the Commission, he had deprecated any identification of national self-interest with righteousness. (66) Yet during 1942 and 1943, intent "that the American people be filled with a righteous faith and a sense of mission in the world", he unfailingly characterised the Commission's purpose as a great crusade that would bring a bright, peaceful future. In his "Christian Message" address Dulles emphasised that "Almost everywhere a new society must be built. This is not only a calamity, it is an opportunity, the like of which man never saw before." (67) Notably, however, after the Moscow Declaration's promise of a new international organisation, Dulles shifted his emphasis from that of opportunity to that of calamity. This step went only part of the way, he insisted, and could turn out to be little more than an empty gesture: "To move from words into functioning institutions infused with the spirit of Christian fellowship remains a spiritual task of immense proportions." (68)

Dulles was concerned about the potential nature of the settlement of immediate post-war issues which would inevitably reflect the interests of others than those of the United States: "Many of the major decisions are within
the power of others than ourselves and the necessities of continuing war collaboration compel compromises as to post-war arrangements..." Moreover, any world organisation created by the victorious Allies might "adopt and sanction such post-war settlements and seek to perpetuate them." (69) In 1947, when the WCC's Churches Commission on International Affairs defined the desired relationship between churches and governments in its summary of the study paper "The Church and the International Disorder", it reflected a similar concern: "One of the functions of the Churches is to keep before the leaders of states the demands of the moral law, lest the necessary compromise in political action go farther than necessary in the direction of mere expediency and so bring disaster." (70) That agreements with the Soviet Union were the object of concern in both statements was clear. Significantly, the CCIA had based their study on the "Statement on Soviet-American Relations" of the Federal Council of Churches and the Dulles Commission, despite the fact that it naturally and inevitably reflected American interests first and foremost.

Dulles rhetoric was full of Christian and moral concern, fired with a striking missionary zeal, but this did not blind him to more substantive political and economic goals. In October 1941, in a private letter, Dulles criticised the self-righteous cast of the Atlantic Charter not to seek special advantages for the United States and Great Britain:

"...I ..believe that our national policy will in fact very greatly 'aggrandise' our nation to some extent 'territorially', and to a great extent 'otherwise'. The statement may be correct if emphasis is put on the word 'seek'. It may be that our aggrandisement will not be of our 'seeking', but nevertheless it will be a fact. We have acquired for ninety-nine years far-flung naval bases in the Atlantic. We have taken over Greenland and Iceland, and through the guise of developing commercial aviation we have driven the German and Italian airlines pretty much out of South America and are developing there what in reality are United States military air bases. We are greatly developing naval and air bases in the far distant
Pacific islands and in the northwestern extremes of Alaska. These, coupled with our two ocean navy, will put us in a position to dominate the Far East. I do not think there can be any question but what the United States will come out of this period with a combination of naval power, air power and strategic bases controlling both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and South America to an extent that we will have aquired a dominant position in the world comparable to that of England during the last century. It seems to me that this is 'aggrandisement, territorial or otherwise.' (71)

Dulles had no objection to the likelihood of these developments, as was illustrated in his visit to England in 1942. Worried about "turmoil and confusion" in Europe after the war, Dulles told Anthony Eden and Stafford Cripps that London and Washington, not some world organisation, should come to "rather definite views as to what should be done in Europe" and then do it "firmly, backing the element in each country who shared those views"; he told Clement Attlee they "should make up their mind as to what should be done and then go in and do it." In discussions of underdeveloped areas, Dulles told Eden and Colonial Secretary Lord Cranborne, "What you have got to do is have some of your important people say that from now on we are going to have a new deal and open up the door to these colonies and start off on a new basis." He further advised that the British would have "to pocket their pride" in order to secure post-war American collaboration in the development of the great colonial areas of the world. (72) The fundamental exploitative relationship of great powers and underdeveloped regions was to remain untouched, Dulles sought only to eliminate conflicts between the great powers in a manner ultimately beneficial to American interests.

Although during World War II Dulles made global reform a religious as well as an ethical imperative, adopting a lofty tone in his Commission work, he was effectively using Christ's words and the Christian tradition, with its emphasis
on caring and unselfishness, to put forward what were essentially political solutions with American interests at heart. In a 1944 meeting at the White House, Franklin Roosevelt told Dulles that he could see the logic of his proposals, but that he should "put some steeples on them" in order to rally public support. (73) This is exactly what Dulles had been doing with measureable success. From Versailles through the interwar years, Dulles had not only consistently cast his appeals in terms of national or self-interest, supporting his claims with political, economic, social and security arguments, he had equally consistently deprecated appeals to man's emotional being, despite acknowledging their potency. Prior to the Second World War, religious references, ideological overtones, moral appeals, and any crusading aspects were noticeably absent from his writings and speeches. During the war these very elements were responsible for taking him to centre stage in international affairs. Dulles involvement with the Federal Council of Churches and the emerging World Council of Churches proved effective platforms from which Dulles was able to espouse political arguments in the guise of ethical religious ones with added moral authority. In the post-war period Dulles moved more exclusively into the realm of political statesmanship, but he retained both his Christian rhetoric and, more specifically, his connections with Christian organisations, particularly the WCC.

During the weeks just before and just after the end of hostilities in Europe, groups of WCC Provisional Committee members held important meetings in London and New York during which the foundation was laid for the post-war period, the organisation of a Reconstruction Department, soon to become larger than all the older departments put together, was completed and a decision taken
to open a World Council Office in London. The New York meetings were attended by a European delegation composed of the Bishop of Chichester, Dr Visser 't Hooft and Pastor Boegner.

While the United States carried the main financial burden of the WCC and played an active part in directing its development, Britain played a corresponding role. Britain contributed financially to the support of the WCC both during and after the war, and had participated in the interchange of thought on the issues of the international order continued through the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace and the corresponding commission on the British Council of Churches. At Utrecht in May 1938, Dr William Paton, Secretary of the International Missionary Council, had been appointed one of the General Secretaries of the Provisional Committee of the WCC with headquarters in London. The International Missionary Council at its Madras meeting in 1939 approved the setting up of a Joint Committee under the chairmanship of Dr John Mott, with Dr Paton serving both bodies as General Secretary. Their unity and interdependence was declared an acknowledged principle in 1946.

In August of that year, an international Christian conference was held at Cambridge, on the joint invitation of the WCC and the International Missionary Council. These two Councils there decided to set up a "Commission of the Churches on International Affairs" (CCIA) to "explore, educate and express the mind of the Churches on international problems." The foundation of such an organisation had already been thoroughly discussed by the Provisional Committee in Geneva in February 1946. (74) Starting with an initial concentration on the question of international safeguards for religious liberty and related human rights, the Commission constructed a procedure for action on a wider front. (75)
Following the Cambridge Conference, offices of the Executive Chairman, KG Grubb, and of the Director, OF Nolde, were promptly opened in London and New York respectively. The location of the offices was decided with a view to the "closest possible contact with the international centres of political activity." (76) The early work of the Commission was guided by British and American "continuation committees" which had been appointed at Cambridge. Provision was also made for a President and three Vice-Presidents. John Foster Dulles was appointed as one of the latter. (77)

The CCIA was made responsible for special studies on international issues in preparation for the Amsterdam meeting and, in that connection, served as Commission IV of the Study programme. The papers submitted for study show a preoccupation with Communism and the Soviet Union. Interestingly, concern over the Soviet Union as a world power predominated over concern with Marxism. The subject of relations with the Soviet Union dominated CCIA studies. Its importance was acknowledged by the discussion at the Cambridge Conference and subsequently in a memorandum on the Commission's projected studies:

...the subject of the relation of the USSR to the world will be one. It may, indeed, prove as important as to be the only major one, for, adequately treated, it involves both the principle international "crisis" as well as the "critical" confrontations of outlook between the Christian view of man in his own nature and society, of government and politics, and of the purposes and content of the peaceful and good life, and the Communist view of those things. Most of the anxieties and hopes which move men's minds today are involved in this confrontation. (78)

The CCIA's major concern became, "the problem raised for the Christian conscience by the state and tendency of relations between the USSR and the rest of the world." Grubb, who enjoyed close connections with the Foreign Office, felt that this necessitated other than simply Christian views: "Although this
will have to be studied as a piece of work prepared for an official assembly of the Churches, it is important that on many points full account be taken of the views of qualified judges who may have no explicit confessional connection with the Churches." (79) This provided for outside consultation with a whole range of interested parties, including political and economic, and was an attitude previously endorsed and justified as making their statements better informed and more effective by the Provisional Committee in Geneva at its February 1946 meeting: "A primary condition of effective utterance on contemporary issues will be adequate provision for continuous and intensive study and consultation." (80)

The anti-Soviet bias clearly discernible in the study preparation of the CCIA was in opposition to the a-political aspirations of the World Council of Churches. At the Amsterdam Assembly in August 1948, 't Hooft presented a report on behalf of the Provisional Committee which denied political bias:

A second misunderstanding in some quarters is that the Council pursues political ends. We live in a world possessed by politics and large masses of men cannot believe that any great undertaking of an international character should be free from political bias. Our task is to prove in word and deed that we serve a Lord Whose realm certainly includes politics but Whose saving purpose cuts across all political alignments and embraces men of all parties, and all lands. (81)

Nonetheless, full recognition was given the fact that the value of VCC statements was that they were authoritative announcements from a Christian body. CCIA statements were considered as probably finding their chief value in the stimulus and guidance afforded to the Churches rather than in their direct influence upon the secular world. They were to be in effect an ecclesiastical corollary to the Foreign Office's more general "education campaign": "In so far as the Commission succeeds in focusing the attention of Christians in all the Churches on issues which are of crucial moment, it will be fulfilling an
important function." Even the largest and strongest denominations were regarded by the Provisional Committee as having much more limited outlooks than the ecumenical fellowship and needing the "perspective and sense of direction" which it could provide. (82)

In its approach to the study of international questions, it was clear that the CCIA identified itself with Western interests against the Soviet Union. As a Western organised body, this was natural, but the pretensions of the WCC were that as a religious organisation representing the World's churches it was supposedly independent and above the East-West conflict. Its Western bias was illustrated by a consideration raised by one response to a long draft outline study on the USSR prepared by Grubb but eventually withdrawn on the advice of his colleagues as too ambitious. The consideration, described as "very questionable" by Grubb, was, "That it is a mistake to concentrate attention on the issues between the USSR and 'the rest'. What is wanted is a general study of the relations between the Great Powers." This advice went unheeded. The "Statement on Soviet-American Relations", a summary of the "unavoidable and avoidable tensions" in Soviet-American relations, prepared by the Federal Council of Churches and the Dulles Commission, was selected as the starting point for the British study of postwar relations. It was a step of which Grubb approved: "There is much to be said for this, for whereas the document would need close scrutiny and lifting out of its immediate American context, the advantage of closely engaging American interest would be great." (83)

Grubb thought there might be a divergence of opinion between American and European Christians as to whether the CCIA were trying to write a study on political relations, what they should be and how they should be pursued, or a
statement by Christians on their attitude to existing political situations and
the assumptions which these appeared to reveal: Grubb favoured concentration
on the latter. (84) In its study preparations the CCTA viewed the forthcoming
Amsterdam Assembly as a "demonstration of the merits and weaknesses of the
tactics of democracy in relation to a situation of totalitarian rigidity", and
sought to define "an attitude of temper and outlook which should govern the
Christian mind in approaching the dilemma created by the policy of the USSR
and of Communist tactics in the world." (85)

The identification with the West of both the WCC and the CCIA was
particularly well illustrated in the study contributions and other preparatory
material for Amsterdam composed throughout 1947 and the first half of 1948.
Western propaganda and the Lambeth line were clearly discernible in Assembly
Commission IV's "The Church and the International Disorder", which stated that
the Communists resorted to violence to achieve their ends:

   The present conflict of ideologies which find their expression in differing
   political structures and which are supported by different national groups
   is the cause of the gravest apprehension, for while there is no
   irreconcilable conflict between many of the social ends which are
   professedly sought by Soviet Communists, and those ends which Christian
citizens seek, there is a great difference as to the means which should be
   used... The existence of severely conflicting systems in a closely
   interknit world presents the danger of a "series of frightful collisions",
   especially since the proponents of one system profess that change involves
   the use of violence. (86)

An anti-Soviet, pro-Western perspective was naturally imposed on all the
various international issues considered by the CCIA. This was illustrated in a
CCIA paper on the "Characteristics of present international tension", dated
December 15, 1947, which discussed nationalism. In reference to the revival of
nationalist feeling in Russia it was noted that it had made no difference to the use of Communist parties abroad:

The organisations which were originally formed in order to spread world revolution are now used to further the national aims of the Soviet Union, and the difference in effect is not easy to perceive. In fact the power of the Soviet Union may be and often is best extended by the spread of chaos and revolutionary conditions. The emphasis has changed since the old days but the methods remain much the same. (87)

In discussing the growth of nationalism, colonial governments were credited with providing the essential prerequisites; territories were "unified and given good government by Western Imperial Powers. This was the task discharged by the United States in the Philippines." (88) Where nationalism was regarded as being disadvantageous, it was thought "not unreasonable to maintain that the independence would be better withheld." (89) Correspondingly, the civilizing imperialism and territorial expansion of Western empire builders was defended:

Similarly Christians should not permit themselves to become carried away by unthinking condemnation of "imperialism" and "imperialists". The great empires of the world have brought untold benefits to mankind. It was the existence of the Roman Empire which was a chief reason for the spread of Christianity through the then civilised world. Europe received some of its most valuable civil traditions and customs from the Roman Empire. The French, Dutch, Spanish, Portugese and British Empires have also been tremendous civilising and beneficial influences in the world. Moreover the conquering and incorporation of adjacent lands by force, although not always referred to as imperialism, do not in fact differ in any way in principle from it. Few would deny that the territorial expansion of the United States has been beneficial to the areas concerned. (90)

In its relations with Churches outside the ecumenical fellowship, the WCC adopted much the same attitude as did the political opponents of the Soviet Union; thus its efforts were more directed toward cultivating relations with the Roman Catholic than with the Russian Orthodox Church. Where the war acted in
many ways as a stimulant in bringing the Churches closer together and revealing to them the value of combined action, it also presented the possibility of bringing the Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox Churches into the new spirit of cooperation. Following Mussolini's occupation of Albania on Good Friday, 1939, Pope Pius XII stated in his Easter sermon that any lasting peace must of necessity be founded on Christian principles. The views expressed by the Pope were in line with those which had been issued by the Oxford Conference of 1937, and Bishop Bell of Chichester, who was deeply committed to ecumenicalism, conceived the idea of an approach to Rome by representatives of the Ecumenical Movement with a view to producing a joint statement on the basic principles of a true international order. Securing the approval of the WCC representatives, including the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, Lang and Temple, on June 10, 1939, Bell proposed to Archbishop Godfrey, the Apostolic Delegate, that there should be preliminary conversations to discuss the project confidentially. The proposal was rejected by Rome.

Bell remained undeterred. He responded sympathetically to the Pope's Christmas Eve message of 1939 where he outlined what came to be known as the Five Peace Points. His was one of the signatures, together with those of the Archbishops Lang and Temple and the Reverend VH Armstrong, the Moderator of the Free Church Federal Council, which endorsed the points and added to them the Five Economic Standards of the Oxford Conference. Bell went on to draw up a plan for joint cooperation within wartime Britain, the Chichester Memorandum, which became the basis of discussion at informal talks between Catholics and Protestants. A plan was agreed on January 24, 1942, whereby there were to be parallel movements, the Sword of the Spirit for Roman Catholics, and Religion
and Life for the Protestant Commission of the Churches. These were to undertake joint action at the local level. A joint official statement was issued on May 28, 1942, which emphasised the compelling obligation resting upon all Christian people to maintain the Christian tradition and to act together to the utmost possible extent "to secure the effective influence of Christian teaching and witness in the handling of social, economic and civic problems, now and in the critical postwar period."(91)

Although there was considerable disagreement between the WCC and the Vatican with regard to the post-war formation of an anti-Communist Christian front, intercourse between Protestant and Catholic leaders was encouraged by the West's political leaders who sought a spiritual dimension to their political opposition to the Soviet Union. While from the Ecumenical point of view the Vatican drew no closer to the other Churches, in that no doctrinal differences were resolved - in fact, owing to the Pope's pronouncement on the Virgin Birth in this period doctrinal conflict was exacerbated - there was much more cooperation and working together on the administrative and political levels. Yet in the immediate post-war period the Vatican was closely identified with reactionary elements and in 1948 Amsterdam declared against an anti-Communist crusade such as the Vatican supported.

Despite the Protestant Churches in the West being closer doctrinally and more in sympathy theologically with the Russian Orthodox Church than with the Roman Catholic, while the Pope and the Vatican were regarded with suspicion, and worse, by many Protestant leaders, it was with them rather than the Russian Patriarch that ecclesiastical cooperation was attempted. There was a war-time attempt to establish relations with the Russian Orthodox Church. Initiated by
the Russians, an exchange of delegations took place between the Church of England, represented by the Archbishop of York in September 1943, and the Russian Orthodox Church, whose delegation came to England in June 1945.

While Churchmen on both sides recognised the political inspiration of their renewed ecclesiastical relations, still, the desire to promote friendship between their Churches was genuine. Nonetheless, while the WCC presented itself as a world-wide Christian body transcending national and racial frontiers, there were doubts within it as to the advisability of including the Russian Church in the Ecumenical fellowship. In December 1943 Visser 't Hooft, the WCC General Secretary, wrote to William Temple: "What must we make of the new Church situation in Russia? Are we wrong in thinking that the Patriarch and the Synod are not really echoing the word of their Lord, but the word of the Kremlin? Is there not reason to fear that the entrance of the Russian Church upon the ecumenical scene would mean the introduction of a definitely political element in our, thank God, supra-political movement?" (92) In fact, 't Hooft's objection to the Russian Church was applicable to any national Church within its membership; certainly the Church of England. That it was considered only in relation to the Russian Church was a critical indicator of 't Hooft's anti-Soviet sentiments. These were significant because as Darril Hudson in his study of The World Council of Churches in International Affairs remarked of 't Hooft:

The effect of the chief administrative officer of the World Council, its General Secretary, on the whole organisation, but especially on its primary political voice to the outside world, is important. He, after all, sets the tone of the international work of the organisation. (93)
Contacts between the Russian Orthodox Church and the WCC were characterised by a large measure of caution. On April 23, 1946, the Presidents of the Provisional Committee of the WCC sent an official invitation to the Patriarch of Moscow, informing him that at the meeting which took place in Geneva in February it had been decided to seek increased contact with the Orthodox Churches and a meeting of delegations was proposed. The WCC was uncertain as to what response to expect, knowing that the Russian Church followed the Byzantine tradition of emphasis on eternal rather than earthly questions. Moreover, a fact which had been considered before extending the invitation, the Russian Church would be extremely wary of joining in any statement which criticised the Soviet Government. Nevertheless, the Russian Church expressed an interest in participation and requested further information and publications relating to the Ecumenical Movement, of which they had a very limited knowledge.

In Russian Church circles there was undoubtedly interest in the Ecumenical cause and in contacts in general with those Churches from which it had been separated for so many years. The political complications to be encountered were probably not immediately envisaged by the Russian Church, but as they learnt more of the movement they gradually became apparent. Following the Church Conference of heads and representatives of the Autocephalic Orthodox Churches held in Moscow from July 8 to 17, 1948, the Russian Orthodox leaders decided to refrain from taking part in the Ecumenical Movement "with its present tendencies". The Patriarchates of Antioch, Jerusalem and Alexandria and the Orthodox in the satellite countries supported the Moscow decision. The Kremlin probably exerted an influence mitigating against participation,
suspecting the WCC to be a political tool of the Americans, in the same way as
the West suspected the Orthodox Church to be a tool of the Russians.

There were also confessional difficulties preventing the Orthodox Churches
joining the WCC; a number of Orthodox representatives raised ecclesiastical
objections to their participation at the Moscow Conference. The decision was
not wholly unwelcome in the WCC; certainly the participation of the Russian
Church had appeared as potentially problematic. A CCIA study outline of the
Soviet Union had noted that the possibility of Russian Orthodox delegates from
the Patriarchate, "must be remembered, as well as the fact that significant
documents are carefully studied in Moscow." (95)

Comments on the study contributions to Assembly Commission IV on "The
Church and International Affairs" reveal a mixed response to the Dulles line.
Reinhold Niebuhr had no criticism to make of John Foster Dulles' "excellent
paper" on "Continuing Christian Responsibility in a Changing World". (96) But
the same paper made "a most horrible impression" on the Reverend Frits Kuiper.
Complaining that he had but shortly received the paper and had no time to make
a detailed criticism, Kuiper called it "not a contribution to help the Church to
find its way in the international affairs of the day but an example to show us
how we should not make our approach to this theme:

If we want to know the arguments many American Christians are using
to support their government in its present policy towards the Soviet
Union, the study of Mr Foster Dulles' paper is certainly of very great
value. But it seems to me to lack comprehension of the Biblical teachings
of judgement and grace, as we can find them in both Old and New
Testament. It is not looking on both friend and enemy both in the light
of God's revelation.

In the diagnosis of the situation the paper fails to deal with the
guilt of the democracies toward the world. In the formulation of the
Christian attitude there is a lack of modesty that is rather apt to close
doors between the Christian and non-Christian parts of the world instead
of opening them.
Although Stalin's "Problems of Leninism" are cited often and not incorrect, the paper proofs a very serious lack of understanding for the background of the Soviet attitude. (97)

This disparity of views and the opposition to the American way prior to the 1948 Assembly anticipated the coming conflict which was to prevent the WCC giving the sort of endorsement and support as had Lambeth's Encyclical Letter to the West's Cold War policies.

Inevitably at Amsterdam, amidst growing Cold War tension, Commission IV's "The Church and the International Disorder" proved to be the main arena of conflict within the Council. The leading protagonists were the United States Foreign policy expert, John Foster Dulles, and the Czech professor of the Hus Faculty at Prague, JL Hromadka, a respected non-Communist who was also the leader of the Evangelical Church of the Czech Brethren, that country's largest and most influential Protestant Church. Dulles' speech declared war on Communism: Communist parties, he said, dominated the governments of seven countries, which accounted for nearly a quarter of the population of the world, and they alone rendered impossible the immediate creation of a universal organisation for world peace. When he proceeded to discuss the necessity of a better organisation of the Churches against Communism, he was effectively calling for an organisation of the Churches against Communism. He stated that Communism rejected the world law; the Communist regime was not a regime of peace, and was opposed, in principle, to peaceful change. Communism had world wide ambitions. The solution - supposing there was still time - was not the use of force but the further integration of the moral idea into social institutions. (98)
Dulles' oversimplified Christian anti-Communism was resisted by Hromadka whose own analysis of the post-war situation attempted to transcend the East-West conflict:

What we are witnessing is — speaking in secular and political terms — the end of Western supremacy within the realm of the international order. The repercussions of this appalling upheaval are noticeable everywhere, in politics as well as in trade and business, in literature as well as in spiritual and moral life. I am not speaking about the fall or decline of the West. What I have in mind is simply the fact that the Western nations have ceased to be the exclusive masters and architects of the world. The era of the Western man is approaching its end under a terrific storm which is sweeping through all humanity. For several decades many a deep and responsible observer has been pointing to the portentous omens of the forthcoming crisis... Somewhere deep under the ground we can hear a resounding echo of the millions of the underprivileged, the underdogs of society, marching and claiming a full share in the material and cultural goods of modern society...(99)

Hromadka's speech was not uncritical of Communism, but it also pointed to the features which Christians could appreciate and recognise:

Nevertheless Communism represents, although under an atheistic form, much of the social impetus of the living Church, from the Apostolic age down through the days of the monastic orders to the Reformation and liberal humanism. Many barbarians are, through the Communist movement, coming of age and aspiring to a place in the sun.

Hromadka did not minimise the inherent dangers of Communism, but he regarded the anti-Communist solution as futile: "The perils of Communism cannot be overcome by equating it exclusively with totalitarianism and by marshalling all the possible and impossible groups against it." He posited that the way forward was not through opposition but understanding, with an appreciation of Christian failure combined with a new willingness for future dialogue and cooperation: "It is our great task to understand our own failures, omissions and intangible selfish motives, to acknowledge the right of the new barbarians to
become co-builders and heirs' of the treasures that were accumulated through the centuries and enjoyed only by some few nations of Europe and America."

Thanks to the striking part played by Hromadka in the discussions, this section of the final report repudiated Christianity taking sides in the Cold War:

The greatest threat to peace today comes from the division of the world into mutually suspicious and antagonistic blocs. This threat is all the greater because national tensions are confused by the clash of economic and political systems. Christianity cannot be equated with any of these...

The Assembly was divided over whether or not the use of war could be justified, although it did state that "war is contrary to the will of God". Moreover, it further declared: "A positive attempt must be made to ensure that competing economic systems such as Communism, Socialism or free enterprise may co-exist without leading to war", and called on all Christians to examine critically all actions of governments which increased tension or aroused misunderstanding.

The section on "The Church and the Disorder of Society" discussed Communism and Capitalism. The appeal of Communism was recognised, but the report was excessively critical and contained statements regarding the nature and beliefs of Communism which were essentially misleading. Objections were also raised about Capitalism, but nothing was said about ruthless methods as it was of Communism. Nonetheless, the conclusion was important because, like the section on "The Church and the International Disorder", it warned against the Church associating itself with one side or the other in the ideological conflict of the Cold War: "The Christian Church should reject the
ideologies of both Communism and laissez faire capitalism." Instead they must seek new creative solutions.

In 1948, with the Cold War rapidly gaining momentum, the stance of the World Council of Churches at Amsterdam was courageous and, however momentary, raised it above the political conflict and set a standard against which all subsequent proposals had to be measured.
NOTES: Chapter 5.


3. Ibid, St Patrick's Day Address in New York City, March 17, 1948, pp 186-190.


5. Ibid.


8. Ibid, minutes, January 10, 1948.

10. Ibid.


13. "Economic Theory and Religion", Arthur Goodhart, March 12, 1948, FO 953 145. Warner's working party also sought the views of JO Rennie who suggested a different approach to Western Union. He proposed a "Purity of Motive" theme which would at one and the same time discredit the Soviet Union and make it possible to explain how the British Administration was able to combine state direction in the economic field with respect for individual liberty. It could be pointed out, for example, how both Russia and the West support artists and scientists, in parenthesis Rennie noted that in fact Russia gave materially a better deal, but Russian support was for blatantly political or aggressive motives and was therefore exploitative. Similarly, he posited that both Western Union and Totalitarianism give assistance or financial aid, either directly or in the form of tax relief, to mothers and children; but the Totalitarians do it to provide cannon fodder, while the Governments of the West do it because they value and respect and care for the welfare of the individual.


15. Memorandum, Ralph Murray, March 14, 1948, FO 953 145.

17. Memorandum, March 1948, FO 953 150.


19. Memorandum, CFA Warner, August 8, 1949, FO 953 481.


21. Ibid.

22. CFA Warner to Sir John Balfour, February 16, 1948, FO 953 128.


27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.


31. Foreign Office, indecipherable signature, to Mr Broad, North American Department, March 8, 1948, FO 371 71649.

32. Minute, Mr Broad, March 11, 1948, FO 371 71649.

33. "Islam and Communism" Foreign Office Research Department, April 1948, FO 371 71707A; Foreign Office minutes reveal a discussion regarding the potential of Islam to resist or oppose Communism. GL Clutton pointed to Albania and Yugoslavia and Bulgaria where the Moslem Churches were the first to become satisfactorily and completely integrated into the new order. Clutton considered that Islam's weakness in this respect arose from the fact that the history of Islam was not the history of the struggle between Church and State as was the case of Roman Catholicism, making, "that Church in Eastern Europe the only obstacle to the Communist Party's plans for the establishment of a completely totalitarian state." CRA Rae noted that there was a certain measure of resistance to the Soviet, as there had been to the Tsars, among the Muslim tribes of Central Asia; and one or two contemporary attacks among their few literary productions could conceal something. However he hesitated to say
whether this was based on religious sentiment as distinguished from more primitive tribal feelings. Clutton, May 12, 1948; Rae, May 13, 1948.

34. Religion and the People, January 1949.

35. Religion and the People, January 1948.

36. Minute, B Miller, May 6, 1948 FO 371 71673.


39. Ibid.


41. The Lambeth Conference 1948, part I, p 15.

42. Ibid, part II, p 22.


45. Ibid.


48. Ibid.


52. Ibid, p 19.

53. Ibid, p 16.

54. Ibid p 18.

55. *Cosmo Lang*, JG Lockhart, p 266.
56. In principle all member churches were meant to contribute to the financing of the work of the World Council of Churches. But it was to America that the Council looked for its major source of income, and the Amsterdam Assembly actually set a goal of $240,000, for American contributions. This sum was modest compared to the figure of $10,000,000 a year which was projected budget for a Four Year Plan presented by the Director of the Reconstruction Department to America's denominational leaders during 1947. The plan originated in the spring of 1947 with the leaders of Church World Service, the American counterpart to Britain's Christian Reconstruction in Europe, who saw a necessity for long term planning in Europe, in line with the Department which was already active in several long term projects. The plan was written up fully mand despatched by mid-summer 1947 to America, in the hope that it would commend itself to American Church leaders and be used by them, after correction and adjustment, for the launching of a new campaign of support throughout America. The major purpose of the Four Year Plan was: "to inspire a more zealous giving of funds for the spiritual life of the Churches in Europe." Although the Plan was not relaised, its concept illustrated how European Church leaders, like their political counterparts, looked to the United States for funds and financial support. Moreover, the request for such an amount indicates their recognition of how important America regarded the need to strengthen Europe's spiritual ramparts. Visser t' Hooft, The Ten Formative Years, First Assembly of the World Council of Churches, Amsterdam, 1948, pp 40-1.

57. The First Six Years 1948-1954, a report of the Central Committee of the WCC, p 84.
58. The Church of England was also the recipient of substantial financial aid from the United States. Addressing a joint session of the General Convention of the American Episcopal Church in Philadelphia on September 12, 1946, the Archbishop of Canterbury noted that the General Convention had given over £90,000 to the Church of England in two years during the early part of the war, for Church of England Missionary Societies. Fisher stated: "That gift inaugurated a new relation between us in regard to the missionary work of the Anglican Communion. It started a system of cooperation between us in this field, long overdue, and of great importance and benefit."

In the postwar period, the wealth and increasing influence of the American Episcopal Church, led it to assume the leadership of the Anglican Communion which had belonged to the Church of England.

59. During a 1912 strike by Standard Oil workers in Colorado, strikers were sprayed with oil and set on fire, causing an untoward number of deaths; cited in Religion and the People, June 1946.

60. The Ten Formative Years, Visser 't Hooft, p 49.

61. RW Pruessen, JF Dulles: The Road to Power.

62. The "Commission on a Just and Durable Peace" file in the Dulles papers contains extensive information on media and publicity efforts.

63. RW Pruessen, JF Dulles: The Road to Power, p 198.
64. Ibid.

65. Dulles to Welles, August 19, 1942 and October 30, 1942; Welles to Dulles, November 19, 1942; Dulles Papers.

66. RW Pruessen, *JF Dulles: The Road to Power*.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. WCC Assembly Commission IV on "The Church and the International Disorder", summary of vol IV, Second Draft, Annex 1, n.d. but can be placed in 1947 or early 1948; CFR Papers.

71. *JF Dulles: The Road to Power*.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.


77. Visser 't Hooft, *The Ten Formative Years*, pp 58–9. In a 1977 study of the WCC, *The World Council of Churches in International Affairs*, Darril Hudson noted that: "The Anglo-American predominance in the preparations for the conference was obvious." (p 30) He also commented on the influence exerted on the organisation and conduct of the WCC's international affairs by the "rugged individualists" Grubb and Nolde:

> In the formative years the leeway given to CCIA officers was such that it was they who chose the direction followed, and their judgements which determined the priorities set and the topics concentrated upon (within the broad limits imposed by the World Council Assemblies)). pp 18–19.

78. CCIA Memorandum, n.d., but can be placed after Cambridge meeting of August 1946 and prior to the Amsterdam Assembly in August 1948; CFR Papers.


82. Ibid.


84. Ibid.


86. WCC Assembly Commission IV, "The Church and the International Disorder", n.d. but probably 1947 or early 1948; CFR Papers.


88. Ibid, paragraph 171.

89. Ibid, paragraph 174.

90. Ibid, paragraph 175.


93. Darril Hudson, *The World Council of Churches in International Affairs*, 1977, p 39; which adds that as a "youthful Dutchman", 't Hooft "graduated" from leading the World Student Christian Federation to be the first occupant of the major office of the embryonic World Council in 1939.


96. Comments on Dulles by Reinhold Niebuhr, WCC Study Department, Study 408/1. December 1947; CFR Papers.

97. Ibid, Comments on Dulles by Rev Frits Kuiper.


100. For a critique of this section see *Religion and the People*, November 1948.
In the post war period the Church of England became one of the means of spreading and reinforcing British Cold War propaganda. This was achieved mainly through the contacts of the hierarchy with Government sources, and particularly through the relationship of the Foreign Office with the Church of England's Council on Foreign Relations. Herbert Waddams, the Secretary of the Council, became well known to Information Research Department (IRD), the Foreign Office anti-Communist department. Although this department was not formed till 1947, its practice of supplying information to selected sources for unattributed distribution was already a common Foreign Office practice. During the war, the Archbishop of York, who had made a number of propaganda visits on behalf of the Ministry of Information with the collusion of the Foreign Office, had been the recipient of a number of official despatches, containing information which he was advised he might use, but without divulging its source.

IRD was the creation of a Junior Foreign Minister, Christopher Mayhew, who in 1947 presented Bevin with a confidential paper which proposed a covert "propaganda counter offensive" against the Russians by means of a Foreign Office Department to be formed specifically for that purpose. It is noteworthy that IRD's ideological roots were in Social Democracy. Even before the creation of IRD both Archbishops were propagandists for the Welfare State, although neither was a socialist nor firmly committed to the socialist experiment. When anti-Communist propaganda came to the fore, expressions of
support for the Welfare State were superceded by admonitions against the dangers of the totalitarian centralised state, with both Archbishops revealing doubts about the wisdom of the socialist experiment, and expressing fears regarding its potential for corruption. (5)

Mayhew's early papers talked of creating a socialist "third force" in Europe half way between Washington and Moscow, but as the Cold War intensified this quickly succumbed to an extreme Atlanticist view in which those who did not support the American alliance, whether they intended it or not, were actually aiding its enemies. Both Archbishops gave full support to the alliance with the United States, lauding Britain's great and generous ally and preaching the necessity of never allowing any rift to divide them. Moreover, both Archbishops preached the doctrine of Anglo-American friendship on both sides of the Atlantic, visiting the United States twice each within seven years of the war ending. (6)

In the aftermath of the war, both Archbishops spoke in support of friendship with Russia, that being the official British foreign policy. When this position was officially abandoned, both Archbishops joined the chorus of attacks on Communism, applauded Bevin for trying his best to achieve an agreement in the face of Russian intransigence, and blamed the Soviet Union for the division of Europe and for forcing the West to adopt "defensive" measures. From the end of the war until the Cold War was officially proclaimed at the beginning of 1948, there was an interim period in which the Government knew that hostility towards Russia would be the mainstay of British foreign policy and for which they assiduously prepared public opinion by means of an "education campaign." (7) Both Archbishops were part of this campaign which
emphasised uncooperative Russian behaviour and the less palatable aspects of the Soviet system.

Churchill's Fulton speech had deliberately invoked the image of a beleaguered Christianity: "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended across the continent." Everywhere else, except in the United States and the British Commonwealth, communists and fifth columnists "constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilisation." Just six months later, reinforcing this image by his ecclesiastical persona, the Archbishop of Canterbury attacked the Soviet Union during a tour of Canada in terms far stronger than he had used in public speeches at home. By mid-1947, his antagonism toward the Soviet Union was indicated in Britain by his taking the chair for Winston Churchill at a United Europe Meeting in the Albert Hall, and stated in his Canterbury Diocesan Notes for May 1947 where he said: "the Soviet Union has distorted conceptions of justice and good neighbourliness which antagonise good feelings and impede cooperation, and which lead them to blame others for actions which are the consequence of their own acts."(8)

Both Archbishops were active propagandists for British policies, and in contact with the Foreign Office, well before the establishment of IRD. Moreover, the Church was a declared spiritual opponent of Communism. It was thus natural they should become recipients of the "grey" propaganda disseminated by IRD.(9) The Church and Churchmen were particularly suitable for IRD's approach, summed up in a note marked 'Secret' to Bevin from Mayhew who said: "One of the problems which constantly faces us in anti-Communist publicity work is to discover publicity media which are definitely non-official (so as to avoid undesirable diplomatic and political repercussions when certain
issues are handled)." (10) The Church position was putatively neutral, above politics and independent of the Government. At its command were not only pulpits throughout Britain and a national, regional and local Church press, but an international network of contacts with a vast publicity potential.

The need for anti-Communist publicity not to be simply negative, but to have a positive side was agreed on throughout the Foreign Office. The Church was very important in this respect. In a meeting of November 18, 1947, called to discuss Mayhew's October 17 proposals to Bevin for a covert "propaganda counter-offensive" against the Russians, the need for something to believe in was raised. (11) Orme Sargent agreed on the need for offensive rather than defensive propaganda. This, he felt, could consist of attacks on Communism and also of an attractive presentation of a "better way of life." He strongly advocated offering the world "something in which it could believe." Kirkpatrick agreed, pointing to the lack of progress made in converting Communists in Europe, and urged that something more than mere exhortation to observe the British way of life and copy it was called for. (12)

The message of the Church in this period was that Christianity was the answer to Communism and the solution to man's disorder. (13) This was the message of Lambeth and of Amsterdam and, of course, of the Vatican. In answer to the material benefits and new world order promised by Communism, the Church promised immortality in a heavenly afterlife. It also added its voice to the demands for a better life for the masses and portrayed itself as on the side of suffering humanity. Having obtained the approval of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary for his scheme, amongst the ideas Mayhew put forward at the November 18 meeting was that "we shouldn't appear as defenders of the status
quo but should attack Capitalism and Imperialism along with Russian Communism." (14) This was the course advocated and endorsed by Lambeth and Amsterdam in 1948, the two major Protestant Conferences of the post-war period, both of which were chaired by the Archbishop of Canterbury. It was equally endorsed by the Vatican.

At the November 18 IRD meeting it was also agreed that the Russians should be attacked at certain sensitive points, for example, the Ribbentrop/Molotov dealings, and the close similarity of Nazism and Communism in their terror and propaganda. The latter was a propaganda point exploited fully by Church of England ecclesiastics in their attacks on Communism at the beginning of 1948, including the Archbishop of Canterbury. (15) It was the latter's example which set in motion the Anglican tirade against Communism and it was his own speech which suggested the Nazi/Communist analogy. (16)

The type of information that IRD dealt with was not the "black" propaganda of lies and fiction. Rather, it concentrated on the "grey" area: carefully selected factual material dealing with deficiencies in the Soviet system and the advantages of the Western. (17) The existence of the Department was confidential and its work was under cover. IRD drew on secret service information as well as information gathered openly by diplomats in overseas missions. All of this was energetically reproduced and distributed to a great variety of recipients. These included: British Ministers, MPs and trade unionists, the International Department of the Labour Party and UN Delegates, British media and opinion formers including the BBC World Service, selected journalists and writers. It was directed at the media all over the non-Communist world, information officers in British Embassies of the Third World
and Communist countries, and the foreign offices of Western European
countries. (18) Amongst its recipients in the ecclesiastic world were the
Vatican and the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations.

The type of information supplied to the Vatican and the Council on Foreign
Relations mainly concerned the religious situation in East European countries.
Apart from IRD, certain missions, such as the Legation to the Holy See, sent
information directly to Waddams (19); certain ambassadors, such as Peake in
Yugoslavia, corresponded directly with the Archbishop of Canterbury (20); the
Archbishop of York received information direct from the Foreign Office through
his friend Patrick Dean. (21) Information supplied by IRD was doubtless
accepted in the same way as these other Foreign Office sources. More than
likely the recipients appreciated that they were being fed a British viewpoint,
and were able to discern its anti-Communist/pro-British nature, and gave their
support from a mixture of patriotic motives and a conviction that what they
were receiving was fundamentally true. The most effective propaganda is almost
invariably based on the truth, but the facts are selected to fit the
propagandist's case. IRD's activities were backed by a virtual monopoly of
information on what Mayhew called "Communist themes". The flow of reports from
overseas missions and intelligence officers backed by hundreds of researchers
and analysts - both British and American - relating to the Soviet orbit which
was virtually closed to independent observers, was doubtless perceived as an
invaluable source of information. (22)

The credibility of apparently objective reporting is completely destroyed
once it is revealed as government special pleading. IRD, providing as it did
non-attributable information, or "grey" propaganda, acted as a major hidden
influence on public opinion at home and abroad towards Communism; that the public, and in some cases the recipients, were deliberately deceived in that the material's origins were obscured, in as much as it derived from a secret department designed to distribute specifically anti-Communist information, gave the information acquired the stamp of objectivity. In the process of selection, negative features only were reported resulting in a distorted picture of Eastern Europe. This not only effected the nature of the material distributed by the Church, most particularly with regard to religious persecution in the Communist regimes, but gave it a false perception of the Churches in Eastern Europe and thus effected relations with them.

The influence of Foreign Office anti-Communist propaganda on the Church can be demonstrated by the transformation effected on the attitude of Herbert Waddams who, as Secretary of the Council on Foreign Relations, played a vital part in directing Church affairs in the post-war period. His attitude in 1946, prior to the organization of IRD, was significantly different to what it became by 1950 under the impact of selected "grey" propaganda relating to the religious situation in Eastern Europe and the aims of Communist Governments. Waddams' pre-IRD views are illustrated in a paper he submitted to Kenneth Grubb in January 1947 as his contribution to the CCIA study documents preparing for the Amsterdam Assembly of 1948. (23) Waddams' study concentrated on "the tension and indeed struggle between Soviet Russia and the West."

Waddams had spent the war working in the Ministry of Information; so he had a very clear understanding of propaganda and also of the workings of the Foreign Office, aspects which clearly influenced his study. He began by noting that principal issues were oversimplified or misinterpreted for the sake of
propaganda and stressed the necessity of detachment in order to be able to be free of the "differing interpretations and distortions of national political and ideological propaganda." Waddams believed that "Christians have a specific contribution to make in this realm of international affairs", for which "the nature of Communism must be clearly grasped and also the degree to which it is a Russian phenomenon and the degree in which it finds parallels in the life of the rest of the world." Waddams appreciated that there were "a series of opinions whose gradations extended from those Christians who see in Soviet Russia the nearest approach to the realization of Christian principles on earth yet achieved by man, to those who regard Soviet Russia as the most intimate handmaid of the powers of darkness." He also recognised that the perspective on Communism had more to do with salary and status than the "inescapably Christian." (24)

Waddams argued that "From a Christian point of view, one idolatry, one anti-Christian religion is much the same as another in the fact of its opposition, and its substitution of something else as an idol in the place which should be given only to God":

In fact the essentially and most vitally anti-Christian characteristic of Communism, as seen in the Soviet Union, is first the belief that man is master of his own destiny and of the destiny of the world, and secondly the preaching of a gospel of material progress and satisfaction as sufficient.

If this is admitted to be true, it is at once seen that Communism is not an isolated phenomenon so far as its essential nature is concerned... Atheistic humanism, secularism and materialism are widespread throughout the world and manifest themselves in many countries in one form or another. Quite apart from Communism they do in fact supply a religion to those who have lost their Christian faith.

Communism is... so to speak, one of the highly developed forms of the Godless humanism of our time. But there are equally serious developments in other countries, not less serious because they are largely unrecognised, nor because their supporters number many friends of Christians among them. In the West and North of Continental Europe, in Britain and in
America secularism and materialism are on the march and are not at all confined to the bodies which are political communists. (25)

Waddams developed this theme stating that "the danger of Communism in Soviet Russia resides chiefly in its ideological appeal... but it may be doubted whether this situation is in fact as dangerous as the position in the West."

Waddams perceived that it was increasing Western materialism, "a largely undiagnosed disease, which at this time is more dangerous to Christianity, for it saps the supports on which Christendom rests... the deadly creeping paralysis which almost unnoticed is rapidly spreading among the populations of the so-called Western Christian democracies." (26)

Waddams posited that "Communism therefore, may be regarded from a Christian point of view as the expression in one country of a diseased state of mind which exists all over the world, and which springs largely from the Western technical civilisation, in which such pride is manifested by men everywhere, including Christians... It would therefore seem misleading to say the least, for Churches to draw attention to Communism as the dangerous enemy, when its danger is created by the failure of the churches (a) to recognise the disease in their own surroundings and (b) to take adequate steps to counteract it and to create conditions of intensified Christian life where Communism would cease to exercise any ideological attraction." (27)

To Waddams' mind the solution was that while Christians should struggle against Communism as against the powers of darkness in the world, "the most effective struggle is likely to be conducted by Christians in various countries who can come to grips with the spirit of materialism which through the weakness of Christian witness has already gained disquieting victories."
In his comments on the actual international situation, Waddams tried to put the behaviour of the Soviet Union into the context of normal international behaviour. He looked first at the Christian interpretation of events:

In Central Europe, many Christians believe that the future of European civilisation is at stake in the struggle between Communism and the Christian tradition, and this is often identified with or translated into a struggle between Soviet Russia and the West. It is pointed out that there is a great common tradition of European civilisation which is permeated by the influence of Christianity and retains many of the values which have been derived from the Christian Faith. On the other hand, in the East stands a wholly different tradition which denies many of these traditions and substitutes for them a materialist pseudo scientific civilisation which threatens to swallow up all the elements of the Western tradition which most clearly enshrine Christian principles. Such as the conception of justice, the value of men as persons, the tradition of political freedom, and freedom of thought and culture. Soviet Russia denies all these in their Western sense.(28)

Waddams next posited that, regardless of motives or justification, the Soviet Union could be seen as an expansionist power, despite denying an expansionist outlook, because "since the beginning of the war the Soviet Union has vastly expanded." Noting that the "inference to be drawn from these facts is that if Soviet Russia is given the opportunity it will extend its influence still further", Waddams equally noted:

But it must also be remembered that other nations also seek to extend their influence, notably the United States of America, which does it in various ways, chiefly (a) by the influence of trade and the spread of cultural and economic propaganda, (b) by the acquisition of additional bases in the Far East, (c) by intervention in the affairs of China and (d) by virtual monopoly in the control of Japan. In fact every country tries to extend its influence in any way which is open to it, and it should cause no particular surprise when Soviet Russia does the same thing... The Foreign Offices of the World have never done anything else except spend their time trying to extend the influence of their own country and to prevent the extension of that of others...

The Foreign Offices of the world, one may be sure, and of Britain and America in particular, are continually occupied with the question of how to stop Russia extending further, and even how to press her back, without prejudicing the chance of establishing stability. The Russian Foreign Office is occupied with precisely the same problem vis a vis Britain and
America, just as Britain and America are vis a vis each other - to think otherwise is self-delusion. (29)

Waddams emphasised that "the best way to fight Communism may be for the Churches to convert the people in their own countries, and that political resistance to the Soviet Union is not necessarily the obvious way to advance the Kingdom of God." Waddams was also concerned that should Christians outside Russia "band together and urge upon the rest of the world political resistance to Soviet Russia, it is more than likely that the Christians who are under Soviet influence or control will suffer as a result." Waddams then asked:

Have other Christians the right in such a case to act in this fashion as Christians? As citizens of other states, Christians are entitled to urge any political views they favour, but to try to acquire a Christian imprimatur for them is a most serious step. Our Lord's attitude and the attitude of St Paul to the heathen Roman Empire is a relevant factor which must be considered. (30)

Waddams view was that "Christianity must avoid identifying itself with any political group and that its task is to bring the Christian Gospel by conversion into the lives of the men and women by whom all political systems are controlled."

Waddams complained that, "One of the most misleading tendencies in the Western democracies is the inclination to picture their policies as moral virtues." He recognised in this an "unconscious tribute to the tradition of Christianity in the past and the importance of Christians in the present." The need to commend themselves to the people meant that Governments presented their foreign policy "largely in terms of moral principles and not as naked self-interest" which had the effect of "hoodwinking the people, for the truth is so wrapped up in high-sounding phrases that it is difficult or impossible for the ordinary person to discover it." (31)
Despite this exceedingly frank and realistic appraisal, as the Cold War intensified, Waddams himself succumbed to Foreign Office propaganda. In his position as Secretary of CFR, and an adviser to the Archbishop of Canterbury, Waddams was involved in formulating Church of England policy, and that Church, in the post-war decade, described Communism as the most dangerous foe confronting Christianity; submitted to the belief that the aim of Russia was world domination and the eradication of Christianity; endorsed the need for the West to defend Christianity and Western Civilisation, and supported Western accusations of Communist persecution of religion. (32)

The charge of religious persecution was one to which the Communist regimes were peculiarly sensitive, because they recognised it as an emotional issue which not only lost them support or toleration in the West, but which created a great deal of active enmity toward their existence. Waddams had considered the Communist attitude toward Christianity and the question of religious persecution in his 1947 study, stating:

Communism does clearly provide men with a religion, and it is a religion which is implacably hostile to Christianity. This hostility is inevitable, is inherent in its own nature. But this is not to say that Communism necessarily persecutes Christianity, to assume this would be non sequitur: it may or it may not. For persecution is a matter of tactics or strategy from a Communist point of view, and not a matter of principle. This is demonstrated by the history of Communist Russia, and it is also confirmed by numerous statements by Communist leaders that persecution of the Church only strengthens it, and religion must be fought by education and not by force. (33)
A wartime survey revealed that the public regarded one of the major obstacles to an understanding between Britain and the Soviet Union to be the Soviet treatment of religion. (34) Although the war had forced the Ministry of Information to emphasise in their propaganda that the Russian Orthodox Church supported the Russian war effort, and that the State allowed freedom of religion, there was often an element of qualification which increased as victory became more assured. After the war the Foreign Office deprecated those who returned from Russia and the new regimes enthusing about the deep religiosity of the people and the new life in the Churches. The Dean of Canterbury, because he was a high cleric in the established Church was regarded as particularly objectionable. As the crisis between East and West deepened, Foreign Office views of him underwent a radical transformation. At the end of the war he was seen as a naive dupe; as the Cold War gripped he became a danger to be discouraged; during the Korean War he was a traitor to be suppressed.

In 1947, the concern of the Foreign Office was to prevent the unofficial delegations that went to the Soviet Union to see for themselves what life was like under Communism, from returning to England and spreading around the idea that religion was free and the Church flourishing in the Soviet Union, giving rise to the unwelcome concept that Marxism and Christianity were compatible and able to exist and work together. (35)

The theme that Christianity and Communism were incompatible was clearly important to the Foreign Office. In November 1948 it was the subject of some controversy in the correspondence columns of the Times. Giving rise to the controversy was an address by the Archbishop of York,
at the annual service of the Industrial Christian Fellowship. His address was devoted to the response of Christianity to Communism, during the course of which he made a distinction between Christian Communism and Marxian Communism. This was not unusual for the Archbishop, who had made a very similar speech some six months earlier, in May, to which the Times had not reacted at all. This time, however, an editorial took Garbett to task for sanctioning such distinctions:

Many Christians will not go so far as the Archbishop in distinguishing between Marxist and non-Marxist Communism; in practice the Communist force of today is wholly Marxist, but all will agree with him that Marxist philosophy is incompatible with Christian belief. The predicament of those Christians who sincerely believe it is possible to combine loyalty to their Church with membership of a political party which attacks that Church is painful indeed, but the Churches cannot flag in their campaign against Communism out of concern for a minority which at the best must be regarded as a victim of grave if innocent error. (36)

That the subject was indeed one of public concern was illustrated by the correspondence which it initiated. The Daily Worker joined the dispute, arguing that many Christians reconciled their beliefs with membership of the Communist Party and many others associated themselves with the general aims of Communism and were staunch friends of the Soviet Union whose Constitution allowed free practice of religious beliefs and where tens of millions of practicing Christians were devoted and loyal citizens of the Soviet State:

These facts, life itself, give the answer to those who rant about the deadly incompatibility of Christianity and Communism, to those who, in letters to the Times denounce the horrors of Communism in an effort to conceal their own immorality in attempting to reconcile the teachings of the early Christians with the upholding of a class system of society which is based on privilege, property, class oppression, and which results in mass economic crises and the degradation of millions. (37)

Although the controversy had been centred on the incompatibility of Christianity and Communism, the theme of religious persecution had been
included as an accepted and a proven assumption by the *Times* leader which had stated that in Eastern Europe "priest and laymen of the Christian faith are already suffering active and increasing persecution," whereas in the West a part of the opposition to Communist penetration came from political parties which based their programmes "on the social teachings of the Gospels and Canon Law." (38) The fact that none of the published letters addressed this subject was regarded with suspicion by *Religion and the People* which commented: "The whole campaign to induce Christians to attack Communists falls to the ground if it becomes known that they are working harmoniously together in Eastern Europe. Therefore, all evidence on this point must be suppressed." (39)

At this point in time, the accusation of religious persecution to attack the Communist regimes was used mainly by the Vatican. According to the Archbishop of Canterbury, there was a strong Roman Catholic influence in the *Times*, amongst other significant influences. At the end of 1946, in an address on religious freedom at Pusey House, Oxford, Mr Christopher Dawson, a well known Roman Catholic thinker, sounded a warning that unless Western Christians united in order to defend essential democratic liberties, continually encroached upon by the growing might of the secular state, they would find themselves in an atmosphere in which religion could not breathe. This was of course a very thinly disguised attack on the new Communist regimes. It was, however, countered by another speaker, Mr Parker, who pointed out that pure religious persecution was hardly ever known. The French Huguenots, Roman Catholics in England, and Jews on the Continent were persecuted largely for political and economic reasons. Once these motives
disappeared persecution ceased. Mr Parker also pointed out that no State, however powerful, and no planning authority, however efficient, could deprive man of his essential spiritual freedom.

Commenting on these two addresses, Serge Bolshakoff, an astute and practiced observer of the Russian religious situation, noted that events in Russia largely justified Mr Parker's views. Not only had the Godless Movement failed to destroy religion, the Soviet leadership, hardboiled realists, now understood well that it did not pay to persecute religion. (40) The existing tensions between Church and State in the Communist regimes were in their essence political. As much was conceded by the Times when it concluded the correspondence on the compatibility of Communism and Christianity:

Today the theory and practice of Communism presents Christians with an inescapable challenge. The great persecution in Eastern Europe has arisen not from a deliberate assault by the State on the prerogatives of the Church, but from the Church's refusal to buy the large measure of freedom offered to it at the cost of giving its blessing to Marxist dogma and Communist practice. The Christian case for property in a sinful society stands. The real question for Christians to answer is whether men and women can continue to enjoy freedom in a society in which all economic power is vested in a Government composed as it always must be of fallible men. (41)

This argument brought forth an angry response from Religion and the People:

"The great persecution" is a myth. The Times has now made itself clear. Only those church people in Eastern Europe (a minority) who accept the Vatican line and fight their Governments on the question of property may be called Christian. The whole argument is not about Biblical interpretation or doctrine or philosophy. It is about property. If property is socialised, there is by definition (of the Times) no freedom. Economic power must not be vested in Governments because men are fallible. The fact that company directors are also men and therefore fallible (but not answerable to the people as is a Government) had not apparently dawned on the leader-writer. If it had, he apparently thought it wiser not to mention it. (42)
The religious situation in Eastern Europe was infinitely more complex than the simplistic crudities of either Eastern or Western propaganda were able to encompass. Complicated by the religio-nationalist antagonisms which permeated Eastern Europe, the situation varied from region to region, and was far from static. Indeed, at the time the West was most vigorously charging religious persecution, as part of their anti-Communist propaganda during the Korean War, the worst of the State pressure on the Churches was over. While Communists and Christians were not liaising quite as harmoniously as the wishful presentation in *Religion and the People* often suggested, nor was the black and white picture conveyed by Western propaganda of Communism versus Christianity anything like suggestive of the true story.

Relations between individual Communist Governments and the Churches in their domain depended much on the attitudes of their respective leaders to one another and on the local situation and circumstances.

In the Soviet Union the Russian Orthodox Church and the Communist Government had developed a modus vivendi which was far from ideal but which did allow Christian practice and Church organisation. Moreover, the situation was not complicated by the existence of a beligerent anti-Communist Roman Catholicism as it was in other of the regimes. As anti-Communist propaganda mainly evolved in the West as a weapon with which to attack the Soviet Union, Communist persecution of religion did not initially receive the same emphasis in secular, or in Protestant, political propaganda as it did in that of the Vatican. Furthermore, Western Governments appreciated the political nature of the restraints applied to the Churches, and certainly in the case of the Catholic
Church were able to understand, if not sympathise, with the attitudes of the new regimes to troublesome Churches.

Before the war had ended, the British representative to the Holy See had actually warned the Pope that he should not expect the Soviet Union to allow the Roman Catholic Church free reign, and he must not regard the restrictions imposed on it as religious persecution. Osborne told the Pope that Russia's preference for the Orthodox Church to the Catholic Church was not an indication of hostility to religion. At that time the fact that countries should prefer their own national brand of Christianity appeared understandable and acceptable to the West; subsequently, in a different political atmosphere, it was to charge domestication and persecution when the Communist regimes sought to establish the sort of cooperative relationships, in which the Churches were politically subservient to the State, which the West had already established with its own main stream Churches.

The demands of the Roman Catholic Church with regard to what it considered its religious perogatives could prove problematic even to Western regimes. The American Government had its own problems with the demands of the Roman Catholic Church. These were addressed by Norman Mackenzie in the *New Statesman*, in September 1949, in an article entitled "American Democracy and Catholicism". Mackenzie observed the dilemma created by the fact that in the modern state its jurisdiction and that of the Church increasingly overlapped, with competing claims often difficult to reconcile. There were further complications with the Roman Catholic Church because first, it was not a democratic institution, and second, ultimate authority resided in the Pope outside of American society: "Politically, therefore, the American Catholics are
a powerful pressure group whose basic policies are defined for them by a leadership over which they have no control, which can use most persuasive religious arguments to ensure their active support, and which is ultimately not American."(44)

Mackenzie noted that the Catholic Church was a "State within a State" which reached into every corner of American life: "For every social activity it creates its own organisations with its own policies. Through this vast network, the Catholic is not only bound more closely to his Church, but he may also be mobilised more readily for whatever campaigns the hierarchy may choose to launch." Mackenzie illustrated how the problems raised for American democracy by the problems of its Catholic minority were not, for the majority, religious problems at all, although the Catholic social programme was advanced in the name of religion. Criticism, he stated, was not discrimination, it was the prevention of domination by an assiduous confusion of the real issues.

Catholic education was as much a source of controversy in the United States as it was in the Communist regimes. In America, Cardinal Spellman accused the very liberal Eleanor Roosevelt, a recognised champion of minorities, of being a bigot and exercising consistent prejudice against his Church because she opposed its seeking of Government funding for its private schools. In Hungary, the Government's intent to nationalise the schools resulted in a threat from Cardinal Mindszenty to excommunicate all Catholics who gave it their support.

America had established free schools from which sectarian religion was excluded, the rights of Catholics to support their own special schools was, however, conceded, although the consequent segregation of a
minority's children was regarded as unhealthy in a democracy which was seeking to "Americanise" a hundred minorities and there were strenuous objections to any attempt either to encroach upon the public school system or to make Catholic schools a charge upon public funds.

Mackenzie observed that:

Every society creates an educational system in its own image. In its public schools, American democracy trains its future citizens to fit into a definite social pattern, to acquire common habits and assumptions. The Catholic Church rejects many of these assumptions and, as a society within the greater society, it has established an educational system of its own.

Mackenzie saw the education controversy as a crucial aspect of the conflict between the social policies of American Catholicism and the principles of American democracy which illustrated excellently "the difficulties that arise from the Church's extension of its doctrine of superior allegiance from spiritual to temporal matters." Mackenzie argued that the distinction had to be made to allow an honest discussion of the reactionary policies of the hierarchy in American life without interfering in any way with the religious liberties of American Catholics, adding, "Such a discussion is what the hierarchy seeks to prevent by raising the bogy of bigotry." (45)

The Roman Catholic Church's deliberate use of religious persecution accusations to obfuscate many political issues on which it opposed the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, meant that Western Governments and Churches were initially reluctant to support or endorse the Vatican campaign against these Governments, or make indiscriminate use of such charges themselves. A great deal of pressure had been exerted to secure a protest from the British Government when Yugoslavia had tried and imprisoned the Roman Catholic Archbishop Stepinac. Nonetheless,
throughout the Government maintained that the question was one of Yugoslav internal politics. So much so that Marshall Tito conveyed his appreciation to Bevin through the British Ambassador in Belgrade:

"Marshall Tito asked me to thank you and say that he had followed with close attention the proceedings in Parliament about Archbishop Stepinac, and he would like me to tell you how much he personally appreciated the firm attitude you had maintained." (46)

For the Church of England the issue was of particular sensitivity as their fellow churchmen in Eastern Europe had let it be known that such charges did not help their situation. When Canon JA Douglas, concerned by the pressures to which Churches in the Communist States were subjected, proposed to put down a motion for discussion in the Church Assembly, he found himself opposed by members of the hierarchy. In a letter to the Bishop of Chichester, Douglas noted that the Archbishop of Canterbury had previously asked him not to press the matter as it would embarrass him. (47) Bell likewise advised that he not put down a motion or a question in the Assembly on religious persecution in Eastern Europe:

...my view is that the heads of these particular churches are in an extremely perilous condition. If they were considered to be in friendly correspondence with the Church of England the Government might take that as good enough reason for locking them up or putting them on trial. We should therefore do a great disservice to these Churches. On the other hand the Government might press them very hard to give a reply, which would have the drawback of having been given under compulsion. So my advice is not to put either motion or question down. (48)

Douglas heeded neither the Bishop nor the Archbishop, and went ahead with his motion, which in turn drew an angry response from the Secretary of CFR, Waddams, who complained to Fisher and Bell: "The question at issue is a political one and it is therefore not one which falls within..."
the competence of the Council whose business it is only to deal with
relations with foreign Churches." (49) As the Cold War intensified, CFR
not only relinquished its opposition to being implicated with such
charges, despite the fact that they were potentially damaging to its
relations with the Churches in Eastern Europe, but itself became a
producer and disseminator of "religious persecution" propaganda. Barely
two months after rebuking Douglas, the Bishop of Chichester, speaking in
the Lords on March 3, 1948, deliberately projected the East-West
conflict as being religious by drawing a direct analogy between the
existing situation and the Thirty Years War of 1618 to 1648. Drawing
attention to the religious nature of the latter struggle, Bell used the
comparison to reinforce Cold War propaganda that fundamentally the
East/West struggle was one of history's great religious wars: "It was a
struggle for the supremacy of Europe. It was also a struggle between
two religions, ranging far and wide..." (50)

Subsequently, some months later, the Archbishop of Canterbury
sanctioned the charges of Communist persecution of religion when the
arrest and trial of Hungary's Roman Catholic Cardinal Mindszenty became
the focus for Western anti-Communist propaganda and set the West off in
full cry against Communist persecution of the Churches. The fact that
it was the Mindszenty case which the West elevated to a cause celebre
illustrated the political motivation which underlay the charges of
religious persecution. The selection of this particular case very
possibly had more to do with the time it occurred than its actual merits
as an example of religious persecution. Just prior to Mindszenty's
arrest, the West had suffered what it considered a major propaganda
defeat, and was consequently looking to redress the balance by blackening the Communists.

Vyshinsky's 1948 proposal for disarmament was seen as a propaganda coup for the Soviet Union by the Foreign Office Russia Committee. At its October 28, 1948 meeting, General Jacob of the BBC stated that the Soviet delegation with their simple proposal for disarmament had got the initiative leaving the West on the defensive. Although it was considered that the speeches of the United Kingdom delegates had wrested it back to some extent, a future need was perceived for a simple proposition which would capture public opinion. Mr Jebb explained that the Foreign Office had tried over many months to agree such a line with the Americans but without success. (51)

In America the Mindszenty case caused an uproar, and its use against the Communists was clearly something which America and Britain were able to agree on. The week preceding the Cardinal's arrest, the Vatican had been informed by the Hungarian authorities that unless Mindszenty were removed, it would be necessary to take legal action against him. (52) It later emerged that the Americans, who were implicated in the trial as having been involved in the alleged plan to return the Hapsburgs to power, had tried to persuade the Cardinal to flee the country, but acted too late to prevent his arrest. (53)

Prior to the Archbishop's arrest, the British Administration were well aware of the political nature of his activities. In 1946, the despatches from the British Political Mission in Hungary were full of complaints about the "fanatical primate", Cardinal Mindszenty, whose excessive behaviour was seen as "inviting martyrdom"; and praise for the Government which was seen to be exercising commendable restraint in
the face of extreme provocation. So grave was the concern about Mindszenty's activities, that Sir D Osborne tried to use his influence at the Holy See to have the Cardinal's behaviour curbed; he appealed to the Under Secretary at the Vatican:

Do you think it might be wise to urge the Cardinal Mindszenty to be a little less violent and provocative in his utterances and attitude? It seems to me that he is going too far in exposing himself to the charge of bringing the Church into politics. (54)

If the Vatican did urge the moderation which Osborne advised, there was no obvious change in the Cardinal's behaviour. In July 1946, AK Helm, reporting from the British Mission in Hungary, and clearly concerned not to overburden Southern Department with "literature" about and from the Prince Primate, sent copies of correspondence between Mindszenty and Ferenc Nagy, the Hungarian Prime Minister. Helm thought there was more of interest in Nagy's reasoned reply than Mindszenty's dire threats and observed:

It is highly regrettable that the Leader of the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary at this time should have so little sense of tactics and of statesmanship. By his actions he is doing grievous harm to his flock and to the Hungarian people. Events of the last few days suggest that the Russians are going slow, at any rate for the time being, but nothing seems more likely to make them turn the heat on again than the constant goading which they are receiving from the Prince Primate. (55)

Earlier in July 1946 Helm had informed Southern Department that he was trying to keep contacts with Mindszenty to a minimum, but that was not easy, as he subsequently observed: "The Cardinal Archbishop bombards the Commissioner and myself almost daily with vitriolic effusions which I do not even acknowledge." (56) Mindszenty also bombarded the Hungarian Government, examples of which correspondence Helm sent to the Foreign Office, which in turn sent them to Osborne who showed it to the Under-Secretary at the Vatican:
Monsignor Tardini appears to be only too well aware of the intemperance and provocation of the Cardinal's conduct and speech, but professes helplessness to control him. He says that a Nuncio, were there one at Budapest, could exercise a lot of control, but there is no present hope of that. And, in the absence of a local and overriding representative of the Holy See, the Primate seems to be beyond control. It is anyway difficult enough to communicate with him, but opportunities do present themselves. I impressed upon Monsignor Tardini as strongly as I could the harm the Cardinal was doing both to his Church and his country, and I hope that maybe a further warning and injunction may be sent to him, but I doubt whether it will have any effect.

He is a fanatic, both as a patriot and Churchman, and I believe that there is in the Hungarian constitution an article which says that, in the absence of the Regent, the Prince Primate is the highest authority in the country; it is probably by this article that the Cardinal justifies his political activity. (57)

When the Hungarian Government eventually arrested Mindszenty two years later and charged, tried, and found him guilty of treason, the West reacted to the case as being part of a universal Communist drive against Christianity. During the proceedings against him, Bevin declared that it was not the Cardinal that was on trial but the Hungarian Government. This clearly won favour with the Catholic hierarchy who were violently denouncing the Hungarian authorities. The Anglican hierarchy added their support. The Archbishop of Canterbury opened the Convocation of Canterbury with a speech which projected the trial as part of the struggle between Christianity and Communism, stating: "We are witnessing a deadly struggle between the Christian faith, on the one side, and, on the other, a Communism which will not tolerate any form of the Christian Church unless it is subservient to itself." (58)

While the more responsible sectors of the press tried to present reasonably objective accounts of the proceedings of the trial, it was otherwise widely sensationalised. (59) The Catholic press was flagrantly sensational, as were others. The Catholic Times followed the lead given
by Cardinal Spellman in a sermon delivered at St Patrick's Cathedral in New York on February 6 1949 where he preached: "If this be treason - to deny allegiance to an atheistic Communist Government - then, thank God, Cardinal Mindszenty confessed to treason" (60) As the editor of the New Statesman, Kingsley Martin, pointed out, Spellman's argument amounted to saying that in an atheistic state the Church has a duty to plot and intrigue against the civil authority. (61) The Catholic Times defended Mindszenty's action, rationalising it in a domestic context: "Suppose that every one of the political charges had been fully proved. They amounted to no more than what any patriot would expect of the Archbishop of Canterbury if - which God forbid - this country fell under Communist tyranny. Would he not seek to interest civilised powers? Would he not protect the Regalia, and have plans for the restoration of his country, convinced that the tyranny couldn't last long?" (62)

While the various accounts of the case were equally sensational, they were not equally consistent. On February 1, the Intelligence Digest reported: "Since his arrest, Zakar, Cardinal Mindszenty's secretary, has been tortured. He has been forced for hours to sit cross-legged on a small iron apple which causes the most intense pain, and has suffered other tortures which it is not possible to describe... It is believed that it has been decided to hang him." (63) This account contrasted markedly with that of the Catholic Herald which reported: "Father Zakar, the Primate's faithful secretary, noted for his piety, spending his Sunday in jail, avidly reading the Marxist-Communist classics... it is a revelation of what may be achieved by drugs, or hypnotism, or a combination of both." (64) In yet a further contrast, and apparently quoting a press service, the Tablet reported: "The
Cardinal's secretary, Dr Zakar, seems to have been in a pitiful condition, slouched silently on a bench, said the correspondent of the British United Press, in contrast to the Cardinal, and seems to have given occasional signs of the characteristic anxiety to incriminate the Cardinal." (65)

The Catholic Herald and the Tablet provided the Catholic faithful in Britain with substantially different accounts. The Herald presented the version which claimed that the Cardinal was appearing under the influence of drugs. It referred to those arrested as being so changed after several weeks in jail that their words and behaviour were meaningless. The Herald declared, "For his magnificent profession of faith, Cardinal Mindszenty has suffered the supreme penalty which only modern scientific ingenuity has made possible - the penalty of standing before the world as a gross distortion of his very self."

In virtual opposition to the Herald account, the Tablet stated:

Yet at the trial itself, he (Mindszenty) was master of himself and was, indeed, handling the situation as he then found it with no small amount of skill. He was handling it himself in effect because the lawyer nominated for his defence, Dr Kickzo, an elderly and hitherto obscure man, did him small service. The Cardinal might have risen angrily in Court, with all the fire he has shown on countless occasions during the past three years, to denounce his accusers. But to have done so would have meant, perhaps, the instantaneous arrest of other members of the Hierarchy... it is fully in line with the Cardinal's character for us to believe that he humbled himself almost intolerably - although never compromising his conscience - to spare others, and the Church herself. (66)

The Tablet had initially given the same currency as the Herald to the "lurid account of the drug torture" allegedly given the Cardinal, but had changed its presentation following criticism in the New Statesman to which the Tablet's editor, Douglas Woodruff had replied in defence, "The account which we printed had reached us direct from the
Cardinal's entourage in Budapest. It was not printed as evidence that the Cardinal had, in fact, been drugged, for he had then only just been arrested, but as evidence of what was anticipated."

The course of the trial, in the presence of the world's press who emphatically stated that they were fully able to report the trial and transmit their reports without censorship, and the conduct of the Cardinal, falsified the stories of drugs and torture originally put forward, initially as prophecies but so oft repeated that they were reported as fact. This forced the Vatican to issue a statement on the trial which, in the words of Kingsley Martin, "made a nonsense of its own former attitude and of thousands of words which had been written and spoken in innumerable papers and pulpits":

Repudiating its former view that the Cardinal had by foul means been reduced to composing a false and shameful confession, it said that it was now possible "to take an objective and truthful view" of the trial and that the Cardinal had chosen "the way of justice and honour. He admitted what was true and denied what was false." In brief, the Cardinal, speaking without coercion, was right in telling the court that he was guilty "in principle" of the charges against him, while he repudiates the theory fathered upon him by Cardinal Spellman, that in a Communist country loyalty to the Church demands treason to the State. If this Vatican statement had been issued a few hours earlier it would have been impossible for the leaders of the Catholic Church in England to utter the violent words that were heard in the Albert Hall on the same night, or, for Mr Bevin, as Foreign Secretary, to take the surely unprecedented course of sending a message from the platform in which he said that it was not Cardinal Mindszenty but the Hungarian Government which was on trial. The Vatican statement has caused great confusion in the ranks of Catholic propagandists. (67)

Despite the Vatican statement, the case continued to be a source of anti-Communist propaganda, for Protestants as well as Catholics. On February 18, the Anglican Church Times declared: "Almost without exception, Christians in England recognise that the arrest of Cardinal Mindszenty was not due to secular authorities' exasperation with a
'turbulent priest', or hatred of the Vatican's political power. It is part of a deliberate plan to stamp out religion in the Balkans."(68)

Although not yet prepared to accuse the Communists of a systematic plot to eradicate Christianity, Waddams was also taking a less favourable view of the religious situation in Eastern Europe. While at the beginning of 1948, Waddams had objected to a motion Douglas put before Convocation regarding religious persecution in Eastern Europe, complaining that the "persecution" of the Churches behind the Iron Curtain was political and as such not within the compass of CFR, later that same year he himself gave an address, "Communism and the Churches Today," which emphasised the disabilities of the Churches in Communist regimes. Waddams did concede that Communist measures against the Churches were mainly in the sphere of administration, curtailing Church independence and ensuring that the Churches did not interfere with the Communist programme in any form. He talked of what he called "post-persecution Communism as far as the Churches are concerned...":

By a post-persecution phase I mean that the Communists in these countries have learnt wisdom from the Russian experiences of wholesale attacks upon Christians and religion in general on religious or political pretexts. They are likely to avoid some if not all of the mistakes made then.(69)

The mistakes were that such methods did not destroy Christianity, but reinforced it. Although Waddams pointed out that this did not mean that Church people were not being attacked or were not suffering, he ended his address on a positive note, which included a warning not to judge the Communist regimes "by standards which may be wholly inappropriate." Waddams stated that despite the restrictions "It must also be remembered that there are many essential activities of the Christian Churches which remain unaffected":

The sacred mysteries can still be celebrated, and the model of the Gospel held up through them before the eyes of men. The message of Redemption can still be brought to the individual soul, and the Christian life can still be lived. These are not things to be lightly jeopardised.

In the years that followed it was this positive aspect which was eliminated from the Church's treatment of the question of religious persecution in Communist regimes. This was particularly the case with Waddams and CFR. Moreover, were before it was a subject the Church preferred not to treat because it was seen as political and because it was feared that it would make worse the lot of Christians and Churches subjected to Communist authority, from 1949 it became a frequently addressed topic for adverse ecclesiastic public comment, with CFR deliberately contriving to keep the subject in the public eye. By the fifties, the Churches in Communist countries had usually reached an accommodation with the State, yet it was in this period that religious persecution was most forcefully charged by the West. Nor was there was a corresponding attack on known religious persecution elsewhere in the world. Religious persecution virtually always meant, and soon became synominous with, Communist treatment of the Churches.

In his 1947 paper on the "Christian in International Affairs", Waddams remarked, "it must be remembered that governments have much information of which they release only that part which suits them, and a partial view is often quite as misleading as a deliberate falsehood." Nonetheless, within three years of making this comment, Waddams was party to the compilation of a book on Communist persecution of the Churches which derived its material mainly from Foreign Office sources. On September 13, 1949, GL Prestige wrote to Sir A Rumbold at the Foreign Office requesting permission for Colonel JB Barron to
have access to their files. Prestige explained that Barron was currently producing for CFR a factual statement on the relations of Communism with organized Christianity behind the Iron Curtain and they wanted him to look through the relevant files on Roumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and if possible Hungary and Czechoslovakia. (71) Rumbold replied with a prompt yes on September 15, 1949. (72) Information was also obtained direct from Charles Peake, the British Ambassador in Yugoslavia. (73) The book, *Communism and the Churches*, produced and written by Waddams and Barron, described as a documented study, was an example of the "grey" propaganda selective techniques of IRD. It was welcomed and favourably reviewed by the Church press. On the Left, Stanley Evans subjected the study to a thorough and exceedingly critical analysis. Although the critical reception given *Communism and the Churches* by *Religion and the People* was not itself without bias, and while it would not have had a sufficiently wide impact to bring the book's contents into question, its detailed analysis serves today as a comment both on the lack of objectivity which characterised publications which placed too much reliance on Foreign Office sources and the polarisation of views caused by the Cold War in the ecclesiastical world.

*Communism and the Churches* stated that it was based on "basic and indisputable" facts; a statement disputed by *Religion and the People* which reviewed the book in three consecutive issues from May to July 1951, challenging its various assertions country by country. (74) The partiality of the composition was illustrated by comparing it with Roman Catholic publications, which *Communism and the Churches* cited as sources. Summarising events at the beginning of the section on Hungary, *Communism and the Churches*
recorded the murder of Mgr Alpen and attacks upon the clergy by Communist sympathisers. Contradicting the latter claim, *Four Years Struggle of the Church in Hungary*, published under the imprimatur of the Vicar-General of Westminster, writing explicitly of 1945, stated that the Communists "started launching attacks against the Church" only two years later. Illustrating the selectivity practiced by *Communism and the Churches*, the Catholic publication recorded and it did not, the attack of the Hungarian Bishops on the Government in May 1945, because "the rights of property" were assailed; their attack on the agrarian reform and, at the same time, their admission that, "The rumours that the Red Army would destroy all the churches did not come true. We even met with some consideration in ecclesiastical matters." (75)

*Communism and the Churches* did not report positive developments in the Church field in Hungary, such as the reconstruction of church buildings, the church social services, the church press and church publications which received coverage in the West in the reports of the Vatican newspaper *Osservatore Romano*. The Vatican newspaper made frequent allegations of religious persecution against the Hungarian Government, but still it noted the success of the Hungarian Church in the rebuilding of churches and the increasing religiosity of the people: "Even before the spiritual revivial took place in the soul, the faithful had rebuilt, one after the other, the churches and chapels destroyed during the war." (76)

An example of how selective reporting verged on misrepresentation was illustrated by the assertion in *Communism and the Churches* that in July 1948 the Roman Catholic Church advised teachers to leave Hungary; omitted was the
fact that any teacher who accepted a contract from the Government was threatened with excommunication. (77)

Communism and the Churches presented allegations of religious persecution as isolated phenomena without placing them in their political and social context. In the treatment of Czechoslovakia, Religion and the People objected to the manner in which the summary noted "attacks" against the churches without indicating what had motivated them and without any reference to the vindication offered, justified or otherwise, by the Communist authorities with the support of Church leaders sympathetic to them. Relative freedom and democracy had existed in Czechoslovakia prior to 1948, yet only three occurrences were recorded in the Summary of Events for that period, the formation of the Provisional Government in April 1945; the First Assembly in June 1946, and a protest from Archbishop Beran in December 1946 at the closure of Church schools in Slovakia. This further illustrated the objective of presenting only negative aspects of the religious situation.

Complaining of inaccuracies, mis-statements and omissions in Communism and the Churches' presentation, Religion and the People considered that events needed to be placed in a relevant context to give a fuller appreciation of the situation. To a quotation which Communism and the Churches took from the Irish press concerning Father Plojhar who was disciplined by the Roman Catholic Church "not as a punishment for political activity or for endorsement of the People's Democracy, but as a punishment for disobedience", Religion and the People added supplementary information which it considered essential to any comprehensive presentation of the case:

The reader is not told that whereas Plojhar had refused to resign the Ministry of Health at the request of his ecclesiastical superiors, no such
request was ever made to the quisling Fr. Tiso to resign the leadership of the Slovak Government during the war, yet it is precisely the juxtaposition of these two facts that throws a flood of light on the entire situation under discussion. (78)

The papers of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations at Lambeth Palace amply testify to the volume of material sent to CFR detailing anti-religious activity in Eastern Europe, including official despatches and published articles taken from the Communist press; news of restrictive measures against the Churches, and any sort of information relating to the less favourable aspects of the religious situation in the Communist countries. Invariably the material supplied by the Foreign Office contained a request that the source remain confidential. (79) In 1955 the Foreign Office began a bi-monthly publication, Quotations, which consisted of a selection of quotations from the Soviet press and radio, the Large Soviet Encyclopedia and the Marxist classics, "reflecting trends, shortcomings and anomalies in Soviet internal and external propaganda." JO Rennie sent a copy to Waddams on March 1, 1955, with an index showing the subjects to be covered in future issues, advising:

If you would like to receive it regularly, under the usual conditions (i.e. that you make any use you wish of the contents provided there is no attribution to the source), would you kindly let me know? (80)

An independent contribution to CFR anti-religious material was a 1951 report from HP Johanss, of Denmark, who had studied the Soviet press and radio to ascertain the extent and intensity of the Russian anti-religious campaign which was a subject of great concern in the West at the beginning of the fifties.

To what conclusion have I come? In fact there is an increasing anti-religious propaganda, but not at all of such dimensions as the Western religious papers tell us. Most Russian periodicals do not know anything of such an atheistic campaign, and the journal which specialised in these matters did not offer it more than one tenth of its columns.
All the actual information of such a campaign, which was given in the papers of the Western Churches, is more than questionable. (81)

Johanns found that many of the charges against the "Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge" were clearly untrue; such as the accusation that it had 500,000 "anti-religious propagandists" when "the society in question has only reached 265,000 members in April 1951." (82) Most important, in his concluding paragraph Johanns observed that he found little difference in attitudes toward religion between the Russian people and those of Northern Europe:

Northern Europe and Russia are quite different regarding politics, ideology and economy. But regarding religion the matters do not seem so divergent. The majority of the Russian population does not seem to be interested in religion or struggle against religion, just as in Northern Europe. A minority of the Russian population is highly interested in religion and church, just as in Northern Europe. A minority of the Russian population are "specialists in godlessness" as they call themselves, they are organised as a department of the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge. In Northern Europe for the time being the godless are usually not organised. Is that the whole difference? (83)

If Johanns findings had any impact within CFR it was not discernible; CFR remained susceptible to Foreign Office publicity and suggestions. In May 1952, JH Peck wrote from the Foreign Office to Waddams about a Pavyolkin book, "Religious Superstitions and their Harmfulness" published during the winter by the State Publishing House for Political Literature in Moscow. (84) Peck had been told that this book was probably the most complete guide for anti-religious propagandists published not only since the end of the war but since the disbandment of the All-Union Society of Militant Godless in 1941. Offering to help with the translations, Peck suggested:

I am sure you will agree that selected extracts published in pamphlet form would be of use and I wonder if you would consider the matter and
let me know whether this could be undertaken by the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations.(85)

Later that year CFR considered establishing a small committee for the dissemination of information about Communist persecution of religion.(86) Prior to both these events, Waddams had suggested to Bishop Bell in October 1951 that Part II of *Communism and the Churches* be updated and circulated to the Church Assembly, "because it seems to me desirable that this information should be brought up to date, and it would do something to educate the Assembly in the situation."(87) Waddams further suggested the publication of *The Churches in Communist Countries*, a general survey of the whole situation written for the Old Catholic Conference at Brighton, which he said had received a very favourable reception.(88)

The appointment of a "Special Sub-Committee on Information about the Treatment of the Churches in Communist Countries" was considered by CFR on December 1, 1952. The Minutes of the Council relating to the appointment were:

That a small committee should be set up to consider and report to the Council at its next meeting the best ways by which information about the treatment of the Churches in Communist countries could be brought to the attention of the general public and in particular the Church public. The following were appointed members of the Committee: Dr Kenneth G Grubb, CMG (Chairman); Major Tufton Beamish, MP; the Hon Mrs B Miller; Dr Tracy Philipps; Dr George Bolsover; the Dean of Chichester; Colonel JB Barron; Mr DA Routh, and the Rev HM Waddams (Secretary ex officio).(89)

Five methods of operation were defined: 1. By the circulation of existing literature; 2. By the production and circulation of new literature; 3. By communication of materials to the press; 4. By means of the BBC; 5. By lectures and talks. The meeting recognised that the promotion of these activities would take time and involve some expense: "The first expense would be the
provision of an officer, part or whole-time, and an office to promote a campaign, or rather general activity on the lines above."(90)

The composition of the appointed Committee was notably right-wing and its perception of the task before it was indicated by the desire of Dr Philipps that Sir Reginald Leeper be included:

I should like to express strongly an opinion that the late head of the F.O. psychological warfare, and an ambassador in a country nearly overwhelmed by the internal techniques dictated from outside by the agency which our committee has to consider, should not be forgotten for us, as he is already a member of the CFR. I mean Sir Reginald LEEPER. It may be that you have already arranged that we should not be deprived of the advantage of his experience. If so, no action needed. If not, would you represent it?(91)

Giving some indication of the nature of the material which the Committee was considering for dissemination, Philipps asked Waddams had he seen Bob Darke's Penguin Special which had just appeared. Darke was an ex-Communist who had written a sensational expose of Communism confirming the propaganda picture of a cloak and dagger fifth column aiming at the overthrow of the British Empire. Philipps told Waddams, "Parsons and C. of E. school teachers and all Anglican organisations in industrial areas ought, I should think, to be made aware of the existence of this documentation."(92)

This was exactly the sort of literature which Waddams did not want the Committee to be circulating, and it confirmed the doubts about the Committee which Waddams had expressed to Grubb following Council discussions about the role of the Committee:

In the discussion at the Council there seemed to be some confusion between the question of spreading information about what was happening in Communist countries on the one hand, and propaganda against Communism in general on the other. Of course, the former would no doubt have a propaganda effect, but the general question of combatting Communism in
this country is not one for this Council at all. I think the committee will have to get this clear."(93)

One of the means of dissemination selected by the special sub-committee was lectures and talks, and a suggestion was made that these should be given to theological colleges. This was proposed to the Rev Oliver Tomkins, Assistant General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, by the Rev WH Macartney, Assistant General Secretary of CFR.(94) In a reply which implied that the views represented by the Council were selective, Tomkins would promise nothing and stated:

The great difficulty of course is to get people informed about all the facts. Whilst the news of persecution and so forth is important it is equally important for people to know that what church life there is is very often of an intensity and fire which were never known before. I have never met anybody who has stuck to his post beyond the iron curtain who has not included this note of thanksgiving in his testimony, and the greater the Christian the greater the thanksgiving (I think of talks only last month with that remarkable man Kreissig from East Germany).(95)

When the special sub-committee to disseminate information about Communist treatment of the Churches was formed, Grubb was informed of the necessity of additional finance and staff as the pressure on the staff of CFR was such that the task could not be undertaken by it without additional provision.(96) The lack of funds was a subject discussed by Grubb with Fisher in March 1953, who subsequently reported their conversation to Waddams, informing him, "It did not appear to me, nor he confessed in confidence to him, that there was any money to spend on this purpose, or that, if there were, it could justifiably be spent on this purpose.(97) The problem was assessed as the need to improve literature and articles, "a great many of which do already appear," to provide a panel of speakers on the subject and a means of getting information into the press or the BBC, correcting errors that appeared and encouraging common action
between the Churches and interested groups. Fisher said that as far as he could see there was no possibility of propaganda, "properly so-called", because there simply was not the money to pay for a man and an organisation: "but there might be something to be said for keeping more constantly before people's minds the state of affairs in Iron Curtain countries." The Archbishop conceded the desirability of getting across the information they received and suggested the possibility of a Watching Committee and the use of BCC resources as well as CFR.(98)

While inadequate finance inhibited CFR from entering the propaganda field in the ambitious way clearly desired by certain members, nonetheless, it still continued to produce literature and provide speakers on the subject. In early 1954 CFR published a brochure, "The Churches of Europe under Communist Governments", and in February 1954, Waddams made a broadcast on the BBC's European Service on "The Church of England and the Persecution of the Churches", in which, despite the general nature of the title, the persecution was confined to that allegedly committed by Communists.(99)

Waddams desire to disseminate information on this subject as widely as possible was illustrated in his instructions to the Bishop of Derby who had agreed to introduce CFR's Report, which included a survey on Communist Persecution of religion, to the Church Assembly in February 1954:

I suggest that your speech should concentrate on taking one or two of the salient features of the Survey which is attached to the Report and discoursing upon them, and above all else in trying to impress the Assembly, both clergy and laity, with the importance of understanding what is really going on in Communist countries and what are the aims of Communist Governments with regard to the Christian religion. I should like the Assembly to be strongly urged to buy and to circulate and to sell copies of the Report in their districts and parishes and to get as many of their local shops to put it on sale as possible.(100)
One of IRD's activities was the secret sponsoring of anti-Communist books by supposedly reputable publishers - as the CIA had done with the American firm of Frederick A Praeger. (101) They were published through a small firm, Ampersand Ltd. started by Leslie Sheridan, Deputy Head of IRD, and Victor Canon Brookes. (102) By the late fifties there were a vast number of titles dealing with Communism from an anti-Communist perspective. In June 1958, GFN Reddaway informed Waddams that the Foreign Office had been consulted confidentially about a bibliography on Communism from 1946 to 1957 inclusive, which was to be published commercially. The section on the Communist persecution of Religion was to be one of the most important, and Waddams was requested to give the benefit of his advice and look through the thirty-five books selected for inclusion. (103) Included in the selection were all the CFR books, as well as some Catholic publications and one by the Church of Scotland, "The Church Under Communism", published in 1952. There were also eight Crisis Booklets, all written by Christian ministers and published by Ampersand. (104)

The good relationship enjoyed by the Foreign Office with Waddams put them in a very good position to influence the hierarchy of the Church of England and the various national and international Christian organisations with which it was in contact. The effectiveness of Waddams as a conduit was illustrated at the Church Assembly at the beginning of 1954. The Church of England as a body was somewhat incoherent, having no easy way of expressing corporate opinion on general matters of interest, and debate in the Assembly was the nearest way of doing so. The survey which Waddams attached to the CFR Report to the Assembly was a means of allowing the Church to state its position on Communist persecution of the Churches. The Bishop of Derby introduced the topic in the
Assembly, as he had been asked to do by Waddams, pointing out that "conditions in Communist countries vary but the Communist objectives remain constant, namely to undermine and destroy Christian faith and the Christian Church in the most effective way possible. Their limited success up to date is a striking tribute to the power of the religion of Christ to live under persecution, whatever form it may take."(105)

The Dean of Chichester, a member of CFR, addressed the same topic in his speech, pointing to the intense Communist hostility directed toward the Roman Catholic Church. The policy of the Communists in dealing with the Churches was summed up for the Assembly by the Archbishop of York who concluded his speech warning that there must be no doubt as to "the implacable hostility of Communism to Christianity and its determination to extirpate the Christian religion if possible."(106)

This was not the first time that the Archbishop of York had been a spokesman for the Foreign Office on the subject of religious persecution. In 1950 there was some consternation in the Foreign Office when it was heard that the Archbishop of York had put down a motion, "to ask H.M. Government to bring before the United Nations Organisation the question of persecution of religion in Communist controlled states; and to move for papers." The dilemma in the Foreign Office was that while they regarded religious persecution as an emotive issue with which to discredit the Communist regimes, because it was related to the whole question of human rights and because that was an issue which threatened British interests in the Colonies, the Foreign Office did not want it raised at the United Nations.(107) Thus, while neither Northern, Southern nor the Information Research Department saw any special advantage in attempting to
precipitate such a debate, both the United Nations Political Department and the
United Nations Economic Department had reasons for not wishing to raise this
problem at Lake Success. Such a debate was regarded as doing no good for the
people behind the Iron Curtain, while the United Nations, particularly the small
countries, were "tired of the cold war debates precipitated by the major
powers." (108) More importantly, however, "We feel that the matter would raise
questions about the interpretation of the 'Domestic Jurisdiction Article' of the
Charter which might have far reaching implications in the Colonial Empire and
which would therefore have to be subjected to detailed legal scrutiny." (109)

A Mackenzie preferred "to avoid discussing the matter", and considered it
would be better "if the Archbishop could be persuaded privately not to press his
question at the present time; or if he cannot agree to that, to rephrase it."
Mackenzie's views were supported in a minute by JB who opined: "the Russian
attitude is unlikely to be thereby changed, the propaganda advantage is
probably not so great as in such questions as forced labour, and the precedent
might lead to unwelcome counter-attacks on practices employed in our
Colonies." (110) The misgivings about the desirability of raising the question
formally at the United Nations were shared by Pierson Dixon, later Sir Pierson
Dixon, who had been Private Secretary to Eden and Bevin between November 1943
and December 1947. Nonetheless, he considered that, with the Archbishop's
cooperation, the debate could be advantageous: "Indeed from many points of view,
it is desirable, in my view, that the issue of religious persecution should be
kept before the Parliaments of the free world." (111) Dixon was confident that
if the difficulties about the proposal that H.M. Government bring the question
before the United Nations were explained to the Archbishop he would be willing
to confine his motion to the general question of religious persecution; Dixon added that there was no objection to his phrasing the motion in such a way as to point out that this persecution of religion was in contradiction to the Declaration of Human Rights.

Because the terms of his question were already on the paper and it would be difficult to do so, the Foreign Office decided not to ask the Archbishop to amend it. It was decided to let him know privately and in advance the difficulties with regard to the United Nations proposal in order that he might adjust the development of his theme. Subsequently Lord Henderson, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote to the Archbishop informing him of the discussions which had taken place in the Foreign Office, frankly disclosing all the difficulties, including the "intricate problem" of domestic jurisdiction: "The interpretation of this article is a matter of considerable legal controversy. It is of special concern to us as it obviously has far reaching implications as regards the intervention of the United Nations, including the Soviet Union, in our Colonial Empire."(112)

Garbett's motion was brought before the Lords on November 29, 1950. When the debate was drawn to a conclusion by Lord Henderson, he informed the Lords that "there is no legal basis upon which to bring these matters before the United Nations." Garbett promptly withdrew the motion. This effectively rendered the debate nothing more than a propaganda vehicle for attacking the Communist regimes, which had been Garbett's intention all along, as he remarked upon withdrawing his motion: "I feel it has already secured the purpose for which I moved it - namely to give this House an opportunity of expressing its abhorrence of the persecutions which are now taking place."(113)
Nor did the Lords waste the opportunity, indeed certain of them expressed gratitude for it, namely the Earl of Perth and the Viscount Cecil of Chelwood who declared himself "profoundly grateful" and claimed the House owed the Archbishop a deep debt "because this is the most important question that we have yet discussed, or are likely to discuss..." (114) A number of the Lords expressed the hope that the debate might be a means of publicising the issue. The more publicity the better was the view of Lord Lloyd, while the Earl of Perth hoped the debate would "stimulate attention" and "concentrate public interest on the tragedy."

One Lord who took full advantage of the opportunity afforded by the debate was Vansittart. He began with the complaint that Britain seemed impervious to the denunciations of atrocities and persecutions: "Nothing on God's earth would set this country afire, and that is precisely one of our great dangers. One of our most urgent security measures is that we should stop preening ourselves on our dispassion. We may die from the atomic bomb; we may also die from moral leukaemia; and the bloodstream of our body politic shows a continuous increase in white corpuscles. Here in this motion is a chance for an antidote."

Declaring that Communism was "bent on liquidating religion, just as it is bent on launching a Third World War", that religious persecution was the chief agent destroying the whole fabric of Christian civilisation, Vansittart claimed it was their task to frustrate Communism and devoted the rest of his speech to outlining his antidote, "the disruption of the Communist cold war machine." (115)

The defence of Western civilisation was inevitably a major theme of the debate. Lord Lloyd stated, "...this country has always been a Christian country. The whole of our institutions, and the whole way of our life, are based upon
Christianity... Christianity is fundamental to the whole of European civilisation... it is not our Church which is being attacked, but that is purely geographical good luck... other countries... might well have taken some action before we did... I cannot see that the fact that they have not done so is any reason why we should hold back... It is Christendom that is being attacked, and I think we should give a lead in this matter."

Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, also saw a threat to British civilisation; referring to the "widespread attempt to stamp out Christianity", he urged: "It is important that we should recognise the enormous importance which this problem holds for us: that if Christianity is destroyed or removed from practical effect, it would mean the end of our whole civilisation, and there would be nothing left of it in this country."

In his opening speech, Garbett had stated that "there is no persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church at the present time."(116) This did not prevent the Russian Church, nor the Soviet Union, from being indicted in the debate. Viscount Swinton, who followed Garbett, blamed Russia for Eastern Europe's religious crisis claiming that the suppression of religious freedom was instigated and enforced by Russia. Vansittart said there was no persecution because the Russian Church was subservient to the Kremlin. The Earl of Perth quoted Lenin to illustrate that the ultimate aim of religious persecution was the destruction of Christianity and he denigrated the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church as "protagonists of Russian foreign policy." Lord Henderson, a spokesman for the Foreign Office, said that religious persecution was "an instrument of state policy in Soviet Russia, and countries within its orbit... The model for the oppression of the Churches and the restrictions on religious
activites was set by the Soviet Union, and today all the satellites are working to that model and with the same ruthless efficiency and implacable consistency."

The inevitable comparison of Communism with Nazism was introduced by the Earl of Perth, whose efforts to brand the former as worse than the latter led him to make a dubious distinction: "I am sure that in a sense the present persecution is worse than the wicked persecution by Hitler. His were mainly racial; this is mainly religious."

The Lords concentrated on emotional issues such as alleged atrocities, freely citing Roman Catholic allegations of vast numbers of priests imprisoned, executed, ill-treated, and of the widespread closure of religious institutions. Viscount Stansgate was alone in attempting to put the religious situation into its political context observing that "the problems which have been raised possibly deserve a little more examination and exploration." He tried to gain a hearing for the religio-political complexities of the East European situation: "I should like to make clear at this point that some of the fiercest controversies that exist in Central Europe today, and which have resulted in imprisonment and punishment, really have nothing to do with what we call religion." He also asked the Lords not to declare the Cold War in Christian relations: "if that is done, then in my judgement, the last ray of hope for peace fades."

Stansgate recognised that the debate was a means of attacking Communism rather than religious persecution per se, and he challenged the Motion: "This Motion is partial... The purpose of the Motion is to focus our attention upon the treatment of the Churches in certain countries."(117) Stansgate's observation was valid; and it applied not just to the Lords, but to the
treatment accorded religious persecution by the Church of England in this period.

Religious persecution was a legitimate concern of the Church, but the selective way in which it was expressed suggested that its treatment was dictated by political considerations. Garbett was fiercely anti-Zionist and had publicly condemned the activities of what he called "Jewish terrorists" in the Lords and in his York Diocesan Leaflet. In January 1948 Garbett's Presidential Address to the Convocation of York concentrated on religious persecution of Christians in Palestine. The Archbishop appealed to all Christians to ensure that there should be complete religious freedom in the future Jewish and Arab States:

...freedom to worship, freedom to teach, freedom to evangelise; and that those who profess Christianity should not be subjected to any kind of legal disability on account of their faith...

It is not generally known that Christian Jews have always been refused help or recognition by the Jewish Agency in Palestine. They regard a Jew as a person of Jewish blood in whole or in part, of any or no religion, provided he is not a Christian.

The Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem and the Presbyterian Moderator of Jerusalem submitted to the United Nations Committee a memorandum in which, referring both to Jew and Moslem, they said: "We speak from long experience of many individual cases, when we say that in spite of theoretical religious liberty converts to Christianity in Palestine are liable to be, and frequently are, deprived of their inheritance, boycotted in, or even dismissed from their employment, turned out of their homes, pilloried in the Press, 'framed' in the Law Courts, and threatened with, and often subject to, personal violence. We ask the Commission to see that complete religious freedom is secured for Christians as well as for Jews and Moslems in these new States."(119)

Later that year when Garbett moved a Motion on Human Rights in the Lords, although there was discussion of religious discrimination, Garbett did not raise the plight of Christians in Palestine. Moreover at the Lambeth Conference in July 1948, the resolution dealing with Palestine excluded any reference to the
religious issue and was confined to a general expression of concern for all suffering in Israel. Nor was the subject of Palestine discussed in Committee, despite being included with the Resolutions adopted from the discussions of "The Church and the Modern World."

Throughout the following Cold War years, the Church maintained a comparative silence on the subject of religious persecution in Israel, although there were important similarities between it and that of the Communist regimes. While there was not the excess of violence which characterised the religio-political issues in the Communist regimes, political factors were similarly at the root of the intolerance, derived from the insecurity and internal fears of these newly formed states established in the face of international opposition and hostility. While the Christian Churches in the Communist regimes were able to reach an accommodation with the authorities, the situation for Christians in Israel remained unchanged, as reports from Christian organisations in the region illustrated. Yet the Communist regimes were continually attacked and condemned while nothing was said about the situation in Israel. This distinction was more than likely owing to political factors. Israel was an ally of the West in its opposition to Communism and the Soviet Union. Israel also enjoyed favoured nation status with the United States owing to the importance of the Jewish bloc in domestic affairs, particularly elections and the strength of the Jewish lobby on Congress.

A further consideration was the way in which the West used religious persecution of the Churches in the Communist regimes to support the claim that the Soviet Union aimed at the eradication of Christianity and ultimately world conquest. This sequence of deductions could patently not be applied to Israel
where the same sort of persecution took place. To have drawn attention to the persecution there could have undermined the basis of Western opposition to the Soviet Union and the Communist regimes, and to an important justification for the Cold War.

The influence that political considerations exerted on the Churches public attitude toward religious persecution was clearly illustrated by the events surrounding the visit to England of the Communist leader of Yugoslavia, Marshall Tito, in 1953. In 1946, Tito had incurred the wrath of the Vatican when Yugoslavia had judged the Roman Catholic Archbishop, later elevated to Cardinal, Stepinac, guilty of treason and subsequently imprisoned him. Tito also had troubled relations with the Serb Orthodox Church, about which CFR was kept fully informed by the British Ambassador in Belgrade, Charles Peake. Peake had contacts in the Patriachate and cultivated good relations with the very pro-British Patriach Gavrilo, who was fiercely opposed to Tito's Communist regime and complained bitterly about the new legislation imposed on religious orders. Peake tried to develop a similarly close relationship with his successor in 1951, Vinkentije. (121) Peake was naturally involved with the two Church of England delegations which visited Yugoslavia in 1946 and 1947 which both encouraged a cooperative relationship in opposition to the Communist regime between the Serb Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church in Yugoslavia. (122)

Because of what was regarded in the West as his adverse record on religious issues, when it was learnt that Tito was to visit England, it was suggested to the Archbishop of Canterbury that a delegation be sent to protest against his record and to put forward certain demands. Fisher himself was
critical of the increased hostility which the Yugoslav authorities were allegedly then expressing toward the State, but insisted that Bevin would himself raise the matter with Tito and opposed the formation of a Church protest. (123)

The Archbishop's reluctance to make an official Church protest was doubtless owing to the political fact that Tito had not only broken with Stalin but appeared responsive to Western overtures. (124) This was certainly the case with the Archbishop of York. Garbett had previously visited Yugoslavia in 1947 and made personal representations regarding the treatment of the Churches, including the Roman Catholic, by Tito's regime. (125) Moreover, one of Garbett's books, The Church and State in England, published as recently as 1950, had specifically attacked Yugoslavia's religious situation and commended the stand of the Roman Catholic Church, praising its resistance to State domestication and subservience: "The Roman Catholic Church is bravely resisting this policy, and by doing so is defending human freedom against tyrannical totalitarianism." (126)

Following the break away of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc, its position had received a more sympathetic approach in Garbett's book, In An Age of Revolution, published in 1952, in which he attributed Communist persecution of religion as primarily owing to the opposition of Christianity to Marxian Communism, with political factors subsidiary:

There is also the vindictiveness of triumphant Communism against Roman Catholicism as the ally of their political opponents and as the supporter of reaction; sometimes, indeed, justification has been given for oppressive measures, for in Yugo-Slavia some Roman Catholic priests openly sided with the Italian armies and took part in the harrying of both the Orthodox and the Communists. Elsewhere Roman Catholic priests and monks showed active hostility to the newly established Communist governments. But even if these subsidiary causes had not sharpened the hatred of the
Roman Catholic Church, there would still have been persecution, for the totalitarian State, whether Nazi or Communist, cannot tolerate a powerful rival which rejects its claims. (127)

This slight concession was still a long way from expressing a real appreciation of the complicated religious situation inherited by Tito at the end of the war and the widespread hostility of the Yugoslav people to the Roman Catholic Church. (128) Garbett came considerably closer under the impetus of further political developments which brought Tito substantially nearer to the West, and he actually made an appeal to the British people to give the Marshall a welcome when he arrived in England:

Towards the end of this month the nation expects as its guest Marshall Tito, the head of a Communist State. I hope very much that he may receive a cordial welcome. He represents the one Communist nation which has broken away from Russian aggressiveness and is prepared to live on terms of peace with the Western democracies. It has been said that Britain ought not to receive him on account of his attitude toward the Roman Catholic Church. Those who take this line forget that during the Italian and German occupation of his country there was severe persecution of the Greek Orthodox Christians by the Roman Catholics, and in Croatia a policy of forcible conversion was adopted which involved the murdering and suffering of many of the Orthodox clergy and laity. Religious persecution anywhere is hateful, and on several occasions I have expressed publicly my detestation of the persecution of Roman Catholics by Communist States. But both popular anger and reasons of national security made it necessary for the Marshall's Government to take steps against those Roman Catholics who in the war had collaborated with the invaders, and who in some cases had been guilty of grave crimes against the non-Roman Catholic population. Our welcome to Marshall Tito will not imply approval of his religious, social or economic views and policies, but it will be a tribute of goodwill and honour both to a brave man and to the sturdy, hard-working peasant community of which he is the head. It will show our sympathy with him in his defiance of the aggressive totalitarianism of Russia. (129)

At the Lambeth Conference in 1948, the Anglican bishops had ruled that the Church should not implicate itself in the political opposition to Communism but adhere to that dictated by Christian considerations alone. (130) Tito's resistance to the Soviet Union was not such a consideration. Yugoslavia
actually prided itself as being the country most authentically true to the revolutionary inspirations of the Marxist classics and most creative in its application of Marxian principles, a factor impressed upon Garbett during his 1947 visit. (131) In theory the Church of England should have been more opposed to Yugoslavia than to the Soviet Union which had shown itself ready to accommodate religion, did not persecute the faithful and had the support of the Russian Orthodox Church. (132)

The condemnation of Communist persecution of the Churches was notably and increasingly used by the Church of England to express its solidarity with the Vatican in the struggle against Communism as the Vatican came to be regarded as a vital ally by the British Government in its anti-Communist policies. This meant that Roman Catholic persecution of other faiths was most usually disregarded in Anglican indictments of religious persecution, which were also notable for their conspicuous lack of protest about the privations endured by Protestants under Franco's totalitarian regime in Spain. At a CFR meeting in 1949, which discussed dissemination of information regarding Communist persecution of religion, the Dean of Westminster had suggested that the Archbishop of Canterbury be asked to set aside a Sunday for prayer for persecuted Christians. Waddams pointed out that Christians were being persecuted in Spain and Latin America by Roman Catholics and asked were those too to be taken into account when prayer was offered for persecuted Christians. They were not: "Mr Tracy Phillips said a distinction should be drawn between the persecution of Christians by atheists and persecution by Roman Catholics of other Christians." (133)
The concern of the Anglican authorities for fellow Christians suffering persecution for their faith was natural and justifiable. However, the selectivity of its expression, concentrating almost exclusively on Communist persecution of religion, indicated that Church policy depended on that of the Government, and the main impetus of Government in this period was anti-Communism. The clearest expression of Church policy in this period was usually through the two Archbishops, and it is clear from their statements and speeches that Church policy was subordinate to that of the Government throughout the first Cold War decade.
NOTES: Chapter 6.

1. In the early fifties Waddams considered a low-level trip to Moscow to try and revive Anglican/Orthodox relations. When the proposal was submitted to the Foreign Office, P Mason commented: "Mr Waddams, who is well known to IRD, is experienced in international ecclesiastical politics, and is unlikely to do or say anything which might embarrass HM Ambassador at Moscow." P Mason, December 18, 1951; FO 371 94934.

2. Garbett Papers.

3. Information about IRD's role and functions demonstrates that Britain was the first to adopt a counter-offensive position against what was perceived as the threat of Communism - and in a highly organised, determined and aggressive manner. See Lyn Smith, "Covert British Propaganda: The Information Research Department 1947 - 1977", Journal of International Studies, Vol 9, No 1, 1986, p 68.

4. In September 1949 Garbett visited the United States where he was asked many questions about the Welfare State. He explained that in principle it was now accepted by all Parties, that it gave a sense of security to millions, and that it was "a rampart against the spread of Communism." York Diocesan Leaflet, October 1949. His doubts about Socialism were revealed in 1950 in the Lords and in his book Church and State in England. Like Garbett, Fisher approved of the theory of the Welfare State: "Here is a great expansion of work essentially Christian." Christ declared all the principles of the Welfare State when he said
'love your neighbour as yourself'. However, he had similar doubts to Garbett's about what he called "this great experiment". In an Australian broadcast made during his 1950 tour, Fisher discussed the potential dangers he feared: that "power to control the machine passes to a few hands"; that "it may easily come to think that material provision is enough"; that it might assume the place of the Church in shaping the thoughts, habits and ideals of its citizens and in educating its young. Fisher declared that, "The Welfare State dare not (this side of Communism) invent its own Religion. But it needs for the proper working of the Welfare State, that which in fact only religion can provide..." (Addresses delivered by the Archbishop of Canterbury during his visit to Australia in October and November 1950)

Fisher's biographer records how the Archbishop perceived dangers of tyranny in the Welfare State; Purcell, p 210.

5. Garbett had once protested in private conversation with a brother prelate that he was really a much more dangerous reformer than William Temple, an illusion no doubt deflated when in 1942 he found that it was universally accepted that he had been sent to York to exert a steadying influence on the New Primate. At public school he was remembered as being staunchly conservative. Like many of his ablest contemporaries, he was interested in social reform and the condition of the poor. In a diary entry for December 1939 he described himself as "suspected (rightly) of Labour sympathies" in the House of Lords. His concern for social justice drew him to the Labour Party, but in his final years he became exceedingly critical of it. (Smyth pp 465-6) In November 1949, Manny Shinwell, Secretary of State for War, complained of ill-informed
speeches made by those who were not politicians and not fully aware of the circumstances, citing Garbett as "a most deplorable example". (Times, November 14, 1949) In September 1951, Jim Callaghan, the Parliamentary Secretary, Admiralty, replied to Garbett's remarks on accusations of warmongering, an accusation made by the Tories against Labour during the General Election of that year, complaining that the Archbishop was simplifying things too much and taking "too innocent a view of the present situation". (Church Times, September 7, 1951)

In Garbett's papers is a letter from a successful Tory candidate of the 1951 election, signature indecipherable, who wrote in such terms as to leave no doubt as to which side Garbett had revealed his support. He declared to the Archbishop, "Above all, it is the greatest relief that the Foreign Office is in safe hands once more and I am told that UKO has had fresh life breathed into it." (November 9, 1951) Garbett was in Australia at the time of the election, and expressed concern in his diary over the size of the Tory majority: "The Conservative majority is far too small, but I hope Churchill will concentrate on the restoration of Great Britain to her rightful place in the world..." (Garbett's Travel Diary, Visit to Australia September 21 to December 10, 1951) Smyth records at length Garbett's commitment to the Empire and his great regret at its demise, stating that with regard to foreign affairs, and particularly the Empire, Garbett was "a Tory of the Tories." (p 467) The desire that Britain might regain her former status was frequently expressed by the Archbishop in the post-war decade.

At the time of his appointment Fisher was regarded as the Tory candidate; yet in a letter to Myron Taylor Fisher revealed that he sympathised and identified with the Liberal Party:
As you know, in this country the Liberal party with its fine principles and great traditions has almost been squeezed out of existence between the upper and the nether millstones of Conservatism and Socialism to the great loss of our political life. In this political situation there is a lesson and I think a warning. The Anglican tradition of the Christian faith and doctrine stands as the Liberal party used to stand in its sphere for permanent and eternal truths, the correlation in due order of authority and freedom without excess on one side or the other. That tradition is poised between an upper and a nether millstone; on the one hand the unrestrained and unlicensed freedom of many of the Sects of Christendom and on the other the blind and false absolutism of the Roman system. (October 31, 1951; Vol 90:308)

However the Archbishops perceived themselves, the perception of their clergy was another matter. Writing to Stanley Evans in August 1950, the Reverend John Tunnicliffe referred to:

"Arch: York" who is not totally reactionary...
"Fisher: Cantaur" who is much more reactionary...

Stanley Evans Papers, DEV 1/2

6. 128. Both Archbishops promoted Anglo-American amity. On his return from his 1949 tour of the United States, Garbett concluded, "Our information Department requires strengthening and extending if dangerous ignorance is to be expelled." AJ de la Mare, Acting Consul General in San Francisco, reported on Garbett's visit from the 24th to 30th of September to attend the 56th General Convention of the Episcopal Church, to Bevin. The Archbishop's speech on "The Attack on Western Civilisation was broadcast and reached a very wide audience on the West Coast. Discussing the onslaught of Marxist Communism and the necessity of educating children, students and all citizens of the meaning of Western Civilisation and about the methods and tactics of Communism, he warned the audience of ignorance and mentioned the attempts now being made by Soviet propaganda to spread false and distorted rumours in America.
concerning Great Britain. The despatch remarked that Garbett's visit was timely when certain elements in the United States, the Hearst press especially, were attempting to present Britain under its present Government as a thinly veiled totalitarian state. De la Mare was convinced that Garbett's visit was beneficial an outstanding contribution to closer Anglo-American understanding. (October 1, 1949; FO 371 74249/AN3151.)

7. See previous chapters.

8. Religion and the People, June 1947, reported Churchill's United Europe Meeting; Canterbury Diocesan Notes, May 1947, contain Fisher's remarks.


10. Mayhew to Bevin, October 17, 1947; IRD Documents, quoted Lyn Smith, p 68.

11. Meeting of November 18, 1947, to discuss Mayhew's paper of October 17, 1947; IRD Documents, quoted Lyn Smith, p 69.

12. Ibid.

14. Meeting of November 18, 1947, attended by Orme Sargent, then Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office; Ivone Kirkpatrick, Assistant Under Secretary in charge of Foreign Office Information; and Christopher Warner, an Under Secretary in the Foreign Office. Mayhew was a Foreign Office Junior Minister in 1947.

15. See above.

16. Ibid.

17. Mayhew explained to Lyn Smith: "It was not our aim to distort or twist the British media... it was only black propaganda in the sense that our work was under cover and the existence of the Department was confidential." CP Mayhew, interview with Lyn Smith, quoted p 69.


19. Perowne to Shuckburgh, January 20, 1950: "I have been keeping the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations posted privately about developments in regard to the kindred questions of Christian Unity and the cooperation between Catholics and non-Catholics in defence of Christian values, and have sent Prestige a copy of the Instruction." FO 371 89832. Perowne, the British representative at the Holy See, had at one time been the Foreign Office's unofficial representative on the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations.
20. Peake not only corresponded with the Archbishop of Canterbury, but acted as a conduit between him and the Patriarchate. On September 1, 1948, Peake asked the Foreign Office to send to the Archbishop of Canterbury a report from the Serb Orthodox Patriarch, Gavrilo, which he sent first to them, remarking, "You probably know that I occasionally correspond directly with the Archbishop of Canterbury regarding church questions which come within his province." FO 371 12447/R10151; see also "Pan Slavism" chapter.

21. Dean was a personal friend of the Archbishop of York, and made visits to Bishopthorpe with his family. Garbett Papers.

22. The other side of the case was presented by Soviet sympathisers such as the Dean of Canterbury; however, his witness was ignored by the Church and discredited by the Foreign Office because of his known sympathies. In contrast to Johnson's overt activity, the Foreign Office acted covertly both in their attempts to discredit him and diffuse anti-Communist propaganda within the Church. The care which the Foreign Office took to conceal their activities in supplying propaganda material to the Church was illustrated by a letter which was also an attempt to blacken the Dean. On this occasion Waddams not only chose to disregard the information, but he omitted to return the letter as requested. The Foreign Office had written:

I wonder if you would mind looking at the attached? These notes came to us by a roundabout route in case we could make any use of them. It is quite a formidable collection, and I see no reason why we should be very tender in our treatment of the Dean. In general we do not like to publicise overseas British nationals who have gone off the rails in any manner, but he has become such an international figure that I think anyone wishing to refute him should have some material at his disposal.
I think however that you should know what is going on, and if you wish to use any of this material yourself there would be no objection. If on the other hand you would prefer to know nothing of this, please return the letter and the enclosure which will then have never been sent. JH Peck to Waddams, September 29, 1952; CFR Papers

Waddams returned the material on October 2, 1952, advising against its use:

... I agree that there is no reason why he should be tenderly treated and I should be very glad to see him debunked. But I am pretty sure that the kind of notes you enclosed are not the right way of doing it.

... I think you would be making a mistake to use this material...

This correspondence took place after Johnson had created a furore when he returned from a visit to China with a number of appeals from Chinese Christians, who were well known and respected in the West, against the American use of bacteriological warfare against China and North Korea. The Dean was then subjected to a vicious press and parliamentary campaign of vilification. CFR Papers.

23. HM Waddams, "The Christian in International Affairs", although the paper is undated, it was sent to Grubb on January 30, 1947; Grubb to Waddams, February 4, 1947; CFR Papers.

24. Ibid. Religion and the People, October 1949 quoted JL Hromádka, head of the Czech Brethren and an evangelical theologian, as reported by F Ruse in the Czech Communist magazine Vzestnys, taking a positive attitude to the Communist Party, and observing that "Genuine Communists must necessarily be welcome to us."

26. Ibid. Religion and the People, January 1947, reported that the WCC in recently summing up the religious situation, stated:

> It has become plain that the most traditional methods of evangelism are all now bankrupt. The Church continues to exist and bear witness. But over a large part of what used to be known as Christendom, the minds of men are becoming increasingly alienated from the Christian faith... If this process of disintegration is to be stopped, the Church must set itself to discover again the content of the Gospel of God... the class the evangelisation of which presents the greatest difficulty of all - the contented and ineffectual church-goers.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid; Waddams' reference to "Western sense" illustrates an appreciation of how the Western interpretation differed from the Eastern with regard to the religious situation because of different perceptions. The WCC's Secretary, 't Hooft, conceded this in a confidential memorandum he circulated in March 1949:

**The Marxist conception of Religious Liberty:** Much of the deep misunderstanding in this field is due to the fact that the terminology of the Marxists differs fundamentally from the terminology to which we are accustomed in the Western world. Thus the statement made by the Communist spokesmen that there is real religious liberty in the Eastern European countries is not a conscious falsehood. It is rather a statement which is true in a purely Marxist context, but untrue in a Western context.

**What Marxists mean by "Religion":** The Marxist concept of religion is very much narrower than the Western concept. Marx himself considered religion as a purely otherworldly affair. Russian communism finds this concept applicable to its own experience, for it is confronted with an Eastern Orthodoxy which is primarily sacramental and liturgical. Thus when Russian communists or communists under Russian control speak about religion they think exclusively of worship and of the holding of religious services.... Russian communism considers that whatever goes beyond the actual life of worship of the Church is not really "religion", but represents an interference of religion with other realms of life which have nothing to do with religion.
22. The CFR Report to the Church Assembly in 1952, "European Unity and the Church of England," prepared by Waddams, illustrates how he too succumbed to British propaganda and endorsed Bevin's concept of a spiritual Western Union. In the report the CFR appealed "with energy and conviction for a fresher realisation of the responsibilities of the Church of England towards the creation of a common European consciousness, and the restoration of Europe through the Christian faith, as a spiritual whole." Stating that "European civilisation would be inconceivable apart from the Christian faith," the report argued that if that civilisation were to survive "a common European consciousness must be created. Europe will then be able to play its true role in the world", and in this the Christian Church had a great task to fulfil.

CFR Papers.

34. Martin to Temple, December 1942; Temple Papers, Vol 38: 285: Martin told the Archbishop that in a recent survey which covered "the more intelligent members of all sections of the population" on the attitude of public opinion in Great Britain to the Soviet Union, of all those who felt there were obstacles to understanding between the two countries, 72% named Soviet treatment of religion as the chief difficulty.

35. A *Kom Pravda* article of October 18, 1947, denigrated those who wished to combine their Communism with religious practices. The Foreign Office hoped to place this material "usefully", especially in the press. The Foreign Office were concerned that people should not get a "mistaken impression" about the compatability of Christianity and Communism and freedom of religion in Russia, particularly from returning delegations which had visited the Soviet Union. Of particular concern at that time was a party of Labour M.P.s whom the Foreign Office feared to have gained "a somewhat erroneous impression about the freedom of religion there." The minutes commented:

> It would be a pity if Mr Thomas or other members of the party were to be widely quoted in this country to support the quite mistaken view that it is possible to be both a good Communist and a good Christian... Since the subject is obviously an important one in the eyes of many people...

Minutes, October 30, 1947; FO 371 66409 N12452.


40. *The Bulletin*, January, 1947; edited by Serge Bolshakoff, who wrote and privately published it, it had a very limited circulation, most copies going to people in America. Bolshakoff claimed that while small, the people to whom the publication was circulated were mainly men of influence.


43. See "Pan Slavism" chapter.


45. Ibid.

46. Belgrade to Foreign Office, December 30, 1946; FO 371 47174: Ambassador Peake further reported that Tito had expressed satisfaction that:

> Nobody could say that the British Government had shown the slightest wish to interfere in what was a matter concerning Yugoslavia alone. He told me confidentially that he would be glad to dispose of the case, but it would be quite impossible for him to do anything at present. Such action would not be understood in the country, and he could give no plausible reason for letting the Archbishop out. He wanted to see what was going to be the
attitude of the Roman Catholic Church and the Vatican, and whether the Church was prepared to remain in its own sphere and stop inciting people against the State. He remarked that he too had been the recipient of letters and telegrams from the United Kingdom, among which was one from a Presbyterian congregation in Scotland warmly commending his action and saying it would be a heavy blow to the Pope, who, the Marshall supposed, was less popular in Scotland than in Italy.

47. Douglas to Bell, January 8, 1948; Fisher Papers, Vol 2: 279.


49. Ibid, Waddams to Fisher and Bell, January 19, 1948; Vol 2.


51. Russia Committee Meeting, October 28, 1948; FO 371 71687.


53. Religion and the People, June 1951; Professor Juhasz, a Hungarian scholar who arrived in the United States in the fifties, stated that in 1948 he was asked to accompany a "diplomatic person" connected with the American Embassy to help convince Mindszenty that he should flee the country.

54. Osborne to the Under Secretary at the Vatican, March 15, 1946; FO 371 59014. Foreign Office concern regarding Mindszenty's behaviour led them to distance
themselves from the Cardinal. When a request from him in March 1946 for an escort for himself and a car purchased from Rome, plus a lorry for medical and food supplies provided by the Vatican for Budapest, was forwarded by Osborne to the Officer of the British Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, it was not favourably received. Pointing out the difficulties, IG Macpherson replied to Osborne:

In any case am I not right in thinking that there was a Foreign Office telegram to Budapest the other day about this Cardinal? ... My recollection is that this telegram made it clear that we could not consider any assistance on the lines requested by him.

Macpherson to Osborne, March 25, 1946; FO 371 59014 R5210.

55. AK Helm, 'British Political Mission in Hungary to Southern Department, July 30, 1946; FO 371 59014.

56. Ibid, July 26 & 30, 1946.

57. Osborne to Foreign Office, August 22, 1946; FO 371 59014.

58. Fisher's opening address to Convocation, quoted in Religion and the People, February 1949. Prior to the trial the British representative to the Holy See, Perowne, had tried to discuss Mindszenty with the Pope, but had found him unresponsive. Perowne reported that at his audience with the Pope between Christmas and New Year, "He was not to be drawn about Cardinal Mindszenty, or Palestine, merely saying - more than once - that one must have courage and be
firm and remember that there are still very many good people in the world."
Perowne to Foreign Office, December 29, 1948; FO 371 79901.

59. The following statement was issued from Budapest during the trial. It was
signed by the representatives of Reuters, the Times, the Daily Express, the
Daily Worker, the Daily Telegraph (Great Britain); Associated Press, Telepress,
International News Service (USA); and representatives of journals and agencies
in France, Italy, U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria, Rumania, Sweden,
Switzerland:—

In view of the untrue reports written and broadcast abroad about the
journalistic coverage of the Mindszenty trial, the undersigned foreign
correspondents wish to state that they regard these charges as unfounded
attacks upon the integrity of their own reporting and they categorically
wish to deny:—
(1) That censorship of any kind is being exercised upon their telephonic
or telegraphic despatches;
(2) That the translation of the trial from Hungarian to their various
languages is inaccurate. The majority of correspondents either speak
Hungarian themselves or are accompanied by their own personal
interpreters, and there have been no complaints or indications that the
official interpreters who are provided in addition are guilty of any kind
of sly distortion;
(3) That the only correspondents granted visas or admitted to the
courtroom are communists or communist sympathisers.

Quoted in The Trial of Cardinal Mindszenty, by Stanley Evans, p 2.


61. Ibid.


67. Ibid.

68. Church Times, February 18, 1949.

69. "Communism and the Churches Today", address given by Waddams, undated, but refers to trip to Moscow, "over five years ago," and Waddams went to Moscow in October 1943, which possibly places the paper in late 1948 or early 1949.

70. Ibid.

71. Prestige to Rumbold, September 13, 1949; FD Rees, Secretary of ECC, to Waddams, September 15, 1949, mentions that Communism and the Churches was a project which emerged from a BCC meeting at Edinburgh where a need for such a book was expressed. CFR Papers.

72. Rumbold to Prestige, September 15, 1949; CFR Papers.
73. Peake to Barron, January 20, 1950; enclosing information and booklets; CFR Papers.

74. *Communism and the Churches*, January 1950; in the "Preface", Waddams stated:

>This book is an attempt to clarify the attitude of Communist Governments towards the Churches by quoting the words of Communists themselves, either expressed in public speeches or enshrined in their own official documents. In order to avoid bias the text is almost wholly devoid of comment. Its pages contain basic and indisputable documents and facts, and from these the reader can draw his own conclusions. He is thus provided with a small but ready reference volume on a question of the utmost importance to all who have at heart the preservation of Christian values, or the traditions of European civilisation.

The Archbishop of Canterbury provided the "Foreword":

>This book has been prepared at the request of the International Department of the British Council of Churches, in order to fill a notable gap in the available literature in the field with which it deals. I believe that hitherto there has been no documented study of the official attitude of the Communist Governments towards the Churches. A good deal of research has been necessary for the compilation of this book; and this has been done by persons who have made a study of the subject and whose judgement can be trusted.

As President of the British Council of Churches I commend the information here contained to the careful study of all Christians. They already recognise, I doubt not, the grave challenge and menace which Communism presents to civilisation and to the Christian Churches. It is important that they should acquaint themselves with such facts as are here recorded that their judgement may be well informed.


78. Ibid.

79. Material in CFR files testifies to the fact that the Foreign Office sent reams of material giving an adverse picture of religious life under Communism and adversely commenting on the religious situation in Eastern Europe and of the Russian Orthodox Church, as it was felt that CFR took too favourable a view of it. See final chapter.


81. HP Johannes, (or possibly Juhesz, signature difficult to decipher). Denmark, undated, but a postscript refers to articles just received, the latest date of which was July 1951. The journal to which he was referring in his study was Science and Life. In the postscript he remarks: "After finishing this article I received one anti-religious pamphlet and 3 nos. of Science and Life (May-July) and 4 nos. of Bolshevik (June-July). In these nos. I have not found a single anti-religious article, but only very few anti-religious remarks. Accordingly the rather insignificant anti-religious campaign seems to diminish in 1951." CFR Papers.

82. Ibid, "... the '20 million anti-religious pamphlets' must be a misunderstanding of a broadcast; for in January 1951, we read in Science and Life that the Society plans to print 250 pamphlets in 25 million copies in the year 1951: out of the 250 pamphlets '13 are to be devoted to scientific-atheistic themes', again less than one tenth. In Copenhagen I found more than 100 pamphlets edited by the Society, out of
which three were directed against the Roman Catholic Church, and only two against religion generally."

83. Ibid.


85. Ibid.

86. Waddams to Grubb, November 18, 1952; CFR Papers.

87. Waddams to Bell, October 5, 1951; the Church Assembly was regarded as the ecclesiastical equivalent to Parliament; CFR Papers.


90. Ibid.

91. Dr T Philipps to Waddams, November 25, 1952; CFR Papers.
92. Ibid.

93. Waddams to Grubb, November 18, 1952.

94. WH Macartney to OS Tomkins, December 19, 1952; CFR Papers.


96. Grubb, December 1, 1952; Barron subsequently enquired from Canon Widdrington on December 11, 1952, if funds would be available from the Buxton Trust; CFR Papers.


98. Ibid. Paul Anderson of the National Council of the Young Men’s Christian Associations of the USA, sent Waddams a memorandum on July 6, 1954 on a “Christian Literature Programme to Meet the Communist Literature Programme.” On December 28, 1954, he wrote to Waddams:

Dr Goncharoff is now engaged in preparing a series of studies under my editorial supervision. The general title is ‘Study of Communist Theory, Methods and Tactics with Suggested Principles Underlying the Alternative in Christian Action.’ Two Studies in this series have already been prepared: 1. Communist World Strategy as it Affects the Christian Hope (Herewith). 2. The Tactical Application of Communist Strategy with Special Attention to Southeast Asia (Ready mid-February).

Please let me know if you wish to have a copy of the Study II. Two further studies are in preparation. Your comments and suggestions on this Study and on the series will be appreciated.

At the Anglican Conference at Evanston in the United States in the autumn of 1954, an Anglo-American Committee was set up. Waddams' correspondence with Anderson suggests that although the Church of
England was unable to finance a large scale project such as the NCYXCA was able to fund, CFR sought to provide an Anglican contribution.


102. Ibid, p 105.


104. The Crisis Booklets published by Ampersand, London 1954, were:


Stanley Evans was outraged by the Survey, which was published as "Written by a member of the CFR at the Council's request" and exclaimed:

"It is not entirely surprising that its author seeks refuge in anonymity, although it is by no means difficult to guess his identity, for this document represents the fullest expression we have yet seen of the entire submission of the machinery of the Church of England to certain of the junior branches of the Foreign Office. It uses the languages and techniques of the cold war; it
accepts the cold war automatically as correct; it is obviously concerned with propaganda here and for that purpose, in the name of the Church of England Council for *Foreign Relations*, it is prepared to insult freely the leaders and the members of the Eastern Churches.

Evans was as outraged by the timing of the report as he was its contents:

At no time could this have been defended on Christian grounds, but now, when this whole line of conduct and action is collapsing on every hand and is no longer believed in by anybody, at a time when even the *Daily Telegraph* is calling for increased East-West trade and the whole political temperature is cooling, it can only be said that the mis-timing of this myopic essay in international hostility is monumental.

Evans devoted substantial column inches in three consecutive editions of *Religion and the People*, April, May and June 1954, to refuting the charges of the Survey as had been done with the previous CFR publication, *Communism and the Churches* in 1950.

106. Ibid.

107. British colonial policy meant that it had to move with great circumspection in the realm of Human Rights, an issue which the Americans were eager to use against the Soviet Union, for which reason they could not understand Britain not giving them support at the United Nations. On January 29, 1948, the Rev WW Simpson, General Secretary of the Council of Christians and Jews, pointed out to Fisher that British representatives at the United Nations were not supporting the General Convention, which meant they were on the same side as the Soviet Union against the United States. The Marquess of Reading, Vice President of the Council, suggested that Simpson ask Fisher "whether you would be good enough to put down a question in the House of Lords which would
give the Foreign Office an opportunity of explaining the attitude of the British Government in this matter." Accordingly the Archbishop put a suitable question in the House on February 4, 1948. (Hansard)

Subsequently Simpson sent a letter of thanks to the Archbishop, remarking:

The question you put in the House of Lords has elicited just the answer that we needed to convince our American colleagues of the good will of the British Government in relation to this matter, and of their desire to find the most effective means of dealing with what we are all agreed is a detestable evil. Fisher Papers, Vol 45.

Subsequently, the Archbishop was involved in a BCC deputation to the Foreign Office about Human Rights on which issue the stand of the British Government was causing some concern, particularly among religious organisations. Afterwards the Foreign Office minutes on the meeting showed they were well pleased with the outcome: "Generally, the whole discussion was in the tone of friendly agreement and, amongst other things, the clerical associations intimated that they would continue to support the line which H.M.G. are taking and in particular on the question of postponing the submission of human rights to the General Assembly for another year and on persuading people to take a reasonable middle line on enforcement of the Covenant." (E Beckett, April 21, 1948; FO 371 72804; "Joint Committee on Religious Liberty: Report of Deputation to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs", April 20, 1948.) Bevin did not receive the deputation, he suggested a subordinate, Mr Macneil, as better equipped; SH Hebblethwaite, April 13, 1948; (See also, Rees to Beckett, April 23, 1948 and Beckett to Rees, May 8, 1948. See also Fisher Papers, Vol 48: 72 & 83, correspondence between Rees, Grubb and Fisher.)

109. Ibid.


111. Ibid, Minute, F Dixon, November 22, 1950.

112. Ibid, draft letter for Lord Henderson to Garbett, undated, but clearly November 1950.


114. Ibid.

115. Ibid; Vansittart's proposals ranged from economic sanctions and suppression of subversive organisations such as the "so-called friendship societies... all hotbeds of sedition", to closing down the "alien Communist press", including the New Central European Observer, another small publication written by Stanley Evans which portrayed the positive aspects of life behind the Iron Curtain.

116. Ibid. Garbett, like Waddams, had been much impressed by his wartime visit to the Russian Orthodox Church and was afterwards always reluctant to compromise either it or its leaders.
117. Ibid.

118. *York Diocesan Leaflet*. In April 1946, Garbett made a trip to the Middle East, from where he commended the great restraint being shown by British military authorities and condemned the "ceaseless propaganda against Great Britain", and the outrages against British soldiers, many of whom had "already lost their lives at the hands of the terrorists." (April 1946) During 1946 and 1947 the troubles in Palestine were a frequent topic of discussion in Garbett's *Leaflet*. As one who looked upon anti-Semitism as a sin, and who had repeatedly protested against the wicked crimes on the Continent against the Jews, Garbett was "deeply grieved and disappointed over the failure of the Jews to take a stronger line against the terrorists". (February 1947) Garbett stated that it was British protection which had made possible a Jewish homeland in Palestine and it was therefore "cruelly ungrateful" for the Jews to carry on "bitter and unscrupulous propaganda throughout the world against the one country which has steadily befriended them." To Garbett's mind it was "madness to let all dispossessed Jews pour into Palestine..." (September 1946)


120. Chaplain of Haifa's Annual Report for 1955, Garbett Papers:

No Jew in Israel at present is really and truly free to work out his own salvation and to embrace Christianity if he desires to do so. Though religious freedom is nominally guaranteed by the Constitution of Israel, real freedom is far from being achieved in practice, and a Jew by race who becomes a Christian, or is even suspected of such tendencies, is a marked man and is soon made to feel his offence.
It is not too much to say that a Jew professing Christianity is commonly regarded at best as an anomaly, a freak, or near impossibility; and at worst as an apostate and a traitor whose general respectability and loyalty to the state must be seriously open to doubt. And though no doubt some Jews of all religious and political parties deeply deplore the fact, the fact nevertheless remains that for an average wage-earning Jew to travel openly along the Christian road in Israel is for him to attempt social and economic suicide, in which he is almost bound to succeed... The inevitable consequence of all this is that an unknown number of people are placed in a cruel dilemma and suffer distress of mind and conscience in varying degrees...

One reflects that religious intolerance is found in other countries besides Israel, wherever a particular religion is bound up with a particular nationalism. Time and experience may teach the unwisdom of religious discrimination and that it is ultimately a weakness to true nationalism and true democracy.

121. Peake to Waddams, February 16, 1951: "I am anxious to cultivate my present good relations with him (new Patriarch Vikentije), since I think that good may result. Once he feels himself firmly on his feet, I shall expect him to take a much more independent line, and I do not want to put him off by doing something which might offend him." (FO 371 95573/R/1782/3) Following the visit of the Bishop of Armagh to Belgrade, Peake reported to the Foreign Office that his reception by the Patriarch in his own home, with the obvious approval of the political authorities, was not only a sign of the improvement of Church/State relations, but also of the importance attached by the regime to putting "religious tolerance" in the front of their Western shop window. (July 6, 1951; R/1782/15) Peake remained unable to derive the desired response from the Patriarch, however, complaining to the Foreign Office on July 7, 1951, that Vikentije's "many expressions of goodwill towards us during the recent visit of the Bishop of Armagh had led us to believe that we could expect a greater measure of sincerity from him in private conversation." (R/1782/14) Nonetheless, Peake gave permission for
Tomkins of the WCC to use the diplomatic bag for writing to persons in the Serb Orthodox Patriarchate "with printed material that might otherwise be delayed in the post." (Tomkins to Southern European Section, July 17, 1951; FO 371 95573 R/1782/17.)

122. See "Pan Slavism" chapter.

123. Marshall Tito's visit to Britain as a guest of H.M. Government was announced by the Foreign Office on November 25, 1952. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster requested representations be made to Tito over persecution of the Church in Yugoslavia on December 6, 1952; he was followed by the Archbishop of Canterbury on December 10. At the time of Tito's visit, the pressure to which the Serb Orthodox Church was subjected in Yugoslavia had, according to Fisher's address to the Annual General Meeting of the Council of Christians and Jews, "become increasingly hostile." Fisher told the meeting that while this remained true, it would obstruct the development of any real friendship between the two countries. Observing the necessity that Tito should be made aware of the strength of feeling in Britain about this, he told the meeting:

I do not doubt that the Foreign Secretary will make him fully aware of it, and he will know best how to do it. And I am at present satisfied that the best thing is to leave him to do it rather than proceed by deputation." December 10, 1952; CFR Papers.

On December 16, the Patriarch of the Serb Orthodox Church replied to Fisher, maintaining that relations between State and Church were improving and stating that they did not need a mediator. Tito released a statement on the same day. On January 27, 1953, a delegation led by
Michael Stokes M.P, called on Eden asking him to bring to Tito's attention the strong feeling of many people in Britain about the Yugoslav Government's attitude toward religious liberty. *Keesing's Archives*, January 24-31, 1953, no. 12713.

124. At the end of the summer in 1953 there was a press campaign in Yugoslavia attacking Orthodox Church leaders; this was accompanied by local outbreaks of violence against Orthodox Bishops and others. Waddams considered that the Archbishop of Canterbury ought to make some public comment about this state of affairs, but first consulted the Foreign Office, which replied that if Yugoslavia were to be singled out for criticism, "it would do more harm than good." The Foreign Office also counselled that criticism from abroad was more likely "to have the opposite effect to that desired." The Foreign Office then pointed to Government deprecation of the attacks: "information which we have received subsequent to the documents already forwarded to you suggest that the authorities themselves recognise that they have gone too far in their provocations." (September 29, 1953; CFR Papers.) Fisher's address to the Convocation of Canterbury on October 14, 1953, mentioned Yugoslavia, and the pressures on religious freedom in the rest of the Communist world, noting Tito's condemnation of events and there being "grounds for cautious optimism that things there might improve."

125. See "Pan Slavism" chapter.


128. During Garbett's visit to Yugoslavia in 1947, Tito had informed him that the State hoped to develop relations with all of its Churches, but was constrained by the will of the people with regard to the Roman Catholic Church. The culpability of the Roman Church for war-time atrocities, for which it never publicly admitted regret, created deep feelings of anger and bitterness in the people. During World War II the policy of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which was in a leadership position during the war of liberation, was not to alienate the large masses of peasants who were overwhelmingly religious. Therefore no atheist propaganda was permitted, and the Partisan units were encouraged to accept priests and allow them to perform religious services. Some priests who were sympathisers of the Communist Party before the war, reached high political positions.


130. *Lambeth Conference 1948*.


132. In 1957 the Bishop of Gibraltar, reporting the religious situation in Yugoslavia to Waddams, blamed the Roman Catholic Church there for the restrictions on religious freedom: "There is much evidence that the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church continues adversely to effect the attitude of the Yugoslav authorities to religious bodies in general and
constitutes a serious obstacle to further progress in the direction of complete religious freedom." (January 2, 1957; CFR Papers) According to Paul Mojzes in Christian-Marxist Dialogue in Eastern Europe, when the Communist Party of Yugoslavia eventually initiated a Christian-Marxist dialogue, it was the Roman Catholic Church which responded, whilst the Orthodox, which traditionally rejected political involvement, showed no interest. The Christian-Marxist dialogue thus became, for all practical purposes, a Roman Catholic-Marxist dialogue. (p 129)

133. CFR meeting, undated but can be placed prior to July 1949, when Leeper and Halifax approached Fisher regarding a service of intercession for persecuted Christians in Eastern Europe, as it was at this same meeting that the decision to make this suggestion was agreed. CFR Papers.
At this point a great deal of Western propaganda overshoots the mark. For the available evidence does not prove that that is at the present moment an objective of Communist policy. On the contrary in several countries Communist Governments are subsidising Churches and theological faculties. They go out of their way to declare that they are not antagonistic to the Churches. And there is no evidence that the Governments organise anti-religious campaigns such as took place in Russia during the early stages of the Revolution. (1)

't Hooft regretted the publicity given the Mindszenty case, and also that of the Bulgarian pastors, as both allowed Communist propaganda to present Church leaders as reactionaries. He stated, "The fact that
Cardinal Mindszenty had obviously been closely connected with monarchist and feudal groups outside and inside his country and the fact that the Bulgarian pastors maintained such very close relations (and that not only in the ecclesiastical realm) with America, the country of 'reaction', made the holding of these trials extremely attractive from the point of view of propaganda." 't Hooft considered that the Western press had unconsciously played into Communist hands in publicising the trials, the dilemma being that to defend them proved the Communist case, not to defend them showed bad conscience: "unfortunately very few in the West have seen this. The political obsession has already gone so far that it becomes almost impossible to speak about these matters in a dialectical form."

't Hooft advised against an unreserved defense of either case as such was taken to mean a defense of their political attitudes: "We ought therefore not to make them appear as martyrs of the Christian faith. What we can and should say is that in spite of the political stand which they have taken and with which the Church cannot identify itself we must protest against the sinful treatment to which they have been submitted by the Courts." The Churches were to protest the punishment as out of all proportion to the "the actions performed", and that "the trials have shown most clearly that Communism in Eastern Europe is building up a totalitarian society in which no one is allowed to hold a political opinion which differs from the official one." (2)

't Hooft suggested no criticism of the West's implication. When America condemned the Rosenbergs to death two years later for conspiracy to commit treason, 't Hooft did not circulate a memorandum to WCC leaders recommending the Churches protest that the sentence was out of
proportion, or make any observation as to what the trial revealed about American society. This was the essence of the WCC dilemma, that while it sincerely wanted to follow the Amsterdam resolution of seeking new, creative solutions, of forging a third way, it was too closely identified and associated with the West psychologically for that to be possible. 't Hooft recognised this problem, and advised that the WCC must not appear committed to the status quo: must not defend the pre-revolutionary situation of Communist bloc countries, and must concede the benefits Communism bestowed; must not defend in toto the systems dominating Western nations and must, in order to make a convincing judgement on Communism, attack the evils of capitalism. But this in itself illustrated the strength of identification with the West, because the advised judgements against it were very much token criticism meant to give an appearance of objectivity to the WCC.

Equally, 't Hooft opposed identification with a general anti-Communist crusade: "It must become clear that our stand against Communism is exclusively motivated by Christian convictions." For this reason it was important the the WCC not follow the Vatican and that it avoid the impression of in any way emulating its lead or example: "For the Vatican has identified itself strongly with the defense of the established order in the West and does not bring into its message that note of repentance and self-criticism which alone can save the struggle against Communism from becoming a pure struggle for power." In theory this was fine, but in practice it proved more difficult as was demonstrated within the Church of England. Both its Archbishops supported the WCC position and repudiated an ecclesiastical anti-Communist crusade, while at the same time both publicly endorsed and
were actively involved in the implementation of the British Government's anti-Communist policies.

't Hooft realised that the international situation was making it increasingly difficult to maintain the position formulated at Amsterdam, that the deteriorating political situation and the sharpening conflict meant even less "vital space" for a third way. Nonetheless, 't Hooft considered that Amsterdam's commitment to new, creative solutions was a responsibility which could not be taken too seriously: "If the World Council can really become a centre for those who seek a better way it will fulfill a great historic mission." The WCC third way was not a middle way between two extremes, that was too static a concept. It was a new way, a search for the solution of the real problems which lay behind the deadlock between the East and West: "it is the realistic tackling of the problems of social disintegration and economic disruption which neither capitalism nor Communism can solve in a way which is compatible with the dignity of man and with his responsibility to his fellows."

't Hooft predicted that the attempt to indicate a general direction which Christians could and should follow in order to lead the world out of its present impasse would often be misunderstood:

It will be accused by the left and by the right of half-heartedness and of refusing to choose in a world where only two choices seem to be available. But it will draw to itself that great number of men and women in all Churches and nations who look beyond the present situation, who are increasingly troubled about the sterility of the war of the propagandas and who look to the Church for a word of hope which will transcend the present conflict."(3)

't Hooft's prediction was borne out by the experience of the German Evangelical Church which tried to implement the Amsterdam resolution.
The fact, however, that that Church was alone and that it did not receive the support of other member Churches of the WCC was a testimony to the strength of Cold War forces and the inability of the Churches at that time to transcend the East/West conflict.

The experience of the German Evangelical Church illustrated the difficulties for Churches which tried to steer an independent course unaligned with either East or West. The endeavours of its leaders to implement new, creative solutions was seriously misrepresented by both the Church press and the secular media. In 1949, Mary Bailey submitted a memorandum to CFR which elucidated the actions of this Church. Bailey was concerned about the sensation created by recent statements made by Dr Martin Niemoeller and Propst Heinrich Grueber, leaders of the German Evangelical Church, and the amount of adverse criticism directed toward them. Bailey's memorandum was an attempt to give Christians abroad the facts and explain their motivation, particularly as they had been almost universally misunderstood. The remarks of Niemoeller and Grueber were used by the Eastern press to show agreement with Russian and East German policy. This led to a violent reaction on the part of the Western press which responded with accusations that there was a movement in the Evangelical Church to cooperate with the Russian and the East German Governments in order to increase the influence of the Evangelical Church in the Eastern Zone, and to secure at all costs the political unity of Germany.

Bailey explained how Niemoeller and Grueber's statements should be understood within the context of the attitude of the Evangelical Church to the political situation as a whole and in accordance with the WCC's resolutions:

In line with the decisions taken at Amsterdam the Evangelical Church in East and West Germany is trying to avoid allying herself either with a
Communist (Eastern) or a Capitalist (Western) political set-up and feels it is her duty to remain free to criticise injustice in both East and West and to acknowledge good on both sides where she sees it. (4)

Bailey went on to point out how the German Evangelical Church was faced with the problem of having to exist under, and therefore deal with, the de facto Government. Its recognition of the Government went so far as to appoint a liaison officer, Grueber, but did not exceed that of the Roman Catholic Church: "In practice the Catholic Church, which in public has declared war on Communism, has also to negotiate with the 'de facto' Government; and does not hesitate when necessary to do so."

Bailey argued that Niemoeller had focused the attention of Christians everywhere on the concrete case of Germany where the division of the world into two hostile blocs was most obvious, and put before their conscience the question, "are we to accept this situation as inevitable (as most of us seem to be doing) or if not, what concrete steps can we take to alter it?" She concluded:

The Evangelical Church in Germany existing as it does as a unity on both sides of the Iron Curtain is trying to find the "third way" which Amsterdam believed to be the way the Church should take in the present situation; she is experimenting on behalf of us all to see whether this third way can find concrete expressions in the complicated political situation in Germany. (5)

If CFR were committed to the Amsterdam way, then this document was clearly one for serious consideration. Instead, it was suppressed. Bailey's declared intent in writing it was to inform Christians everywhere. CFR gave it no circulation. On it, in bold, black capitals was the printed instruction "NOT TO BE QUOTED".
The trend in this period of both statesmen and Churchmen was increasingly to identify the West with Christianity; Western opposition to the Soviet Union was portrayed as the defence of Western civilisation, anti-Communism was the protection of Christianity and Christian ideals. There were those who saw where this was leading and objected, amongst them the world famous theologian Dr Karl Barth, who, in a lecture on April 17, 1949, stated

We must have no part in this East-West antagonism! It in no way concerns us as Christians. We can only warn against this even greater crime of wishing to convert this conflict into a third world war. We can only advocate any possible easing of this tension. Influence from America is strong and we must take care that we do not regard our Western judgement as being unquestionably the right, the Christian judgement. The Church is not identical with the West. The Western conscience is not necessarily also the Christian conscience...

...I must demand of the Church something else than godless political calls. What right have we then to speak of a Christian West and seek to come to its aid in a spiritual, political and eventually in a military crusade?(6)

As the Cold War intensified, however, so did the trend, bringing further conflict into the Church between those who wanted to follow Amsterdam and those who wanted to follow the British Government. The Dean of Chichester was one of the latter, and when the British Council of Churches rejected a statement by the Joint Religious Bodies Consultative Committee, of which the Dean was Chairman, the Dean responded by giving notice of his intention to move a reduction in the Assembly vote to the BCC during the budget debate in order that he might draw attention to certain trends of thought on the Council regarding international matters.(7) Those trends of which the Dean complained were effectively the BCC's efforts to follow the decisions of the WCC. Writing to Waddams about the matter, the BCC's Rev RD Say explained to him that the statement, for which the Dean had been responsible, had been adversely
criticised in the Council and turned down altogether by the Executive, and noted that most of those who had opposed him were Anglicans. In order that Vaddams might have a clearer understanding of the issues, Say included a summary of the main reasons for the statement's rejection.

The statement had described the ideals of "European culture" as if they were universally accepted and as if they were the principles upon which governments and nations normally acted, without making clear that the practical life and administration of "European civilisation" has always fallen very far short of these ideas, and that the ideals themselves have often been denied: "This whole body of belief and practice painfully built up through the ages" was claimed to be faced by a new world order of a wholly evil kind. The Executive considered such a picture to be too much black and white and unqualified. Moreover, the document was representative of the school of thought which sought to build up a "Christian-Western" bloc versus a "materialistic-Soviet" bloc, on the lines of Vatican policy. This was the very stance rejected by the Amsterdam Assembly. Advisers in touch with Continental conditions urged strongly that it would be unwise, or very unhelpful, for the BCC to be associated with such a document.

The Dean of Chichester as Chairman of the Religious Bodies Consultative Committee, argued that the statement was inadequate if it were to be a statement of the Council. But the point was that it was an agreed statement drawn up by a Committee of Anglicans, Free Churches, Roman Catholics and Jews. The Council was being asked, as were the Roman Catholics and Jewish authorities, to say that this was important as an agreed statement. However, neither the Council nor the Executive could find any formula by which it could
respond to the Dean's request without committing the Council to a responsibility it did not wish to take. While desiring cooperation where possible with Romans and Jews, members did not wish to associate themselves with the Vatican against Russia.

Despite desiring to cooperate in any way possible with Roman Catholics and with the Jewish community, it was not clear to the Council and Executive that there was any positive case for the publication of any such agreed statement in international affairs at that juncture. It was pointed out that the Joint Committee had not been created for any such purpose. All in all, the statement was held to be gravely inadequate, and if it were urged that it was the most that could secure agreement on the Joint Committee, as the Dean did urge, then it was felt that it was better to make no public pronouncement at all.(8)

The efforts to secure symbolic Christian statements or rituals which would identify the Churches with political anti-Communism was a never ending quest for those who were determined to endow political Communism and Western policies with spiritual sanctity. The concept of suffering Christians oppressed by Communism behind the Iron Curtain provided a powerful emotional stimulus with which to politically mobilise Christian sentiment. In mid-1949, Halifax and Leeper, late Ambassador in Greece, approached Fisher with an idea they wished to put into his mind. They proposed that sometime in the autumn there should be a Service in Westminster Abbey of intercession for all the persecuted Christians in Eastern Europe under the heel of Communism. They suggested that this Service should be attended by the King and Queen, the Government "and everybody else", and that on the same Sunday clergy throughout the Church of
England should do the same in their parish churches. They posited that it would be a national mark of British sympathy with persecuted Christians, and a national disclaimer of Communism, and it would bring encouragement to their persecuted brethren. A further consideration put to Fisher was that such would be greatly appreciated by Rome while at the same time it would avoid any appearance of joint action with Rome such as might offend Protestant feeling. (9)

Informing Garbett of the proposal, Fisher considered it necessary to separate the idea from the particular clothing given it by Halifax, which in the Archbishop's opinion was somewhat grandiose. Further, a Service to be attended by the King and the Government on a Sunday would really have to be a day of prayer appointed by the King. Fisher thought such a scheme, observed throughout the country, would be overdoing it. Although Fisher eventually rejected the scheme, it clearly had appeal:

I do wonder, however, whether there is something in the idea. If the Service was in the Abbey on a week day as an act of the Church, and if a representative of the King and members of the Government came, it might be suitable - less obviously political and more obviously an evidence of Christian solidarity. (10)

What gave the very obvious political motivation behind this scheme yet more significance was that it was intended as an act of solidarity with the Roman Catholics. It was thus an endorsement of the Pope's very recent anti-Communist decree and an indicator of how the political situation was pushing the Anglican Church closer to the Vatican position. As the British Government pursued a closer and more cooperative relationship with the Vatican, in the wake of American endeavours; so too the Church of England followed suit, despite the fact that Roman Catholicism was regarded as most unpalatable by many within the Church, not least the Archbishops themselves.
Then they had claimed the time was not ripe, in January 1949 they stated that now Communism must be kept on the run and the time was ripe for Italy to commit herself. The Vatican, of course, along with the United States, had played a key role in the defeat of the Communists in Italy’s 1948 elections. (17) Subsequently, on February 11, 1949, the Pope identified the Christian cause against atheism with that of the West’s opposition to the Soviet Union. As part of the response, on February 20, 1949, a long feature article appeared on the Pope in the New York Times Magazine which documented his transformation from a "diplomatic" Pope to a "fighting" Pope:

Today the peacemaker has become the warrior. He is using as weapons the moral authority as well as the physical resources of the Church to fight, side by side, with Christian lay powers, the Communist juggernaut. The premise of Pius’ present attitude is that no compromise is possible between the Catholic Church and Moscow. He is no longer "neutral". Suavity has been replaced by firmness; mediation by a political realism that has led him to advocate the creation of "blocs" of nations, which he sees as anti-Communist dams. His appeals to reason, good-will and understanding have been replaced by the sombre counsel that the duty of the Christian world is to resist aggression even "by force if necessary". (18)

Foreign Office documents illustrate that there was conflict between Rome and Moscow before the war had ended, and that this conflict steadily worsened. The Pope had never adopted a neutral attitude, nor shown goodwill. However, the claim that he had done so reinforced the similar claims of the British and American Governments, making it appear that everyone had tried to reach agreement with the Soviet Union and that it was the Russians alone who were responsible for the political crisis. The Pope’s "new" realism, brought him into line officially with the Western policy of resistance and preparation against aggressive Communism, a fact which did not pass unobserved by the Communists.

In their response to the Pope’s Exhortation on "Atheism", made to the Catholic
Episcopate on February 11, the Italian Communist leader Signor Togliatti wrote an article entitled, "God and the Atlantic Pact".

In the article, Togliatti asked what had provoked the "violent" Exhortation. It could not have been dictated exclusively by the irritation caused to the Holy See by the embarrassing situation in which it had been placed by the trial of Cardinal Mindszenty, that "hero and martyr manque, that political intriguer and conspirator manque". (19) Leaving aside the Pope's request to the Bishops that a special mass of expiation should be celebrated on a particular day, a question which did not concern him, Togliatti saw in the Exhortation an argumentation, followed by a political conclusion, and that was the serious part of the document. The argumentation was that atheism was whipping up a conspiracy "against the Lord and against His Christ". Togliatti went on to say that this was a false premise. The Illuminists, indeed, in the 18th century, and the principal thinkers of the new and triumphant bourgeoisie in the 19th and 20th centuries, had carried out propaganda against religion and the Catholic Church in particular. Since the moment, however, when the working classes and the people had taken the lead in the struggle against Fascism, the working class movement had in no way undertaken anti-religious propaganda. The real purpose, therefore, of the Pope's Exhortation lay in his political conclusion, in which, to counter this alleged atheist offensive, he welcomed "those initiatives which tend to unite nations in ever closer bonds". The Pope's intention was clear, said Togliatti; he wanted a Holy alliance of God and the Atlantic Pact against the peoples who had committed the sacrilege of freeing themselves from capitalism and imperialism, that American imperialism which
refused to reduce armaments or abolish the atom bomb and was preparing a new war. (20)

The Vatican was always exceptionally sensitive to charges that it was in political collusion with the West, and a semi-official pronouncement protesting that Togliatti had falsified the Pope's meaning was made in Osservatore Romano. (21) As the British representative to the Holy See frequently had occasion to report, "the Vatican is peculiarly sensitive to the charges which Communist spokesmen are fond of making, that the Church is 'warmongering', or the tool of the Western 'imperialists', or the ally of Capitalism." (22) In order to refute such charges the Vatican used, amongst others, a tactic also employed by the VCC, it spoke out against capitalism. On May 8, 1949, Count dalla Torre published in the Osservatore Romano an article entitled "The Catholic Church and Capitalism", designed to refute the accusation that there existed an alliance between the two. The Encyclicals of Leo XIII, Pius XI and the reigning Pontiff were quoted to show that the Church had pronounced herself against the accumulation of enormous wealth and hence power in the hands of a few. Although in a note published subsequently, dalla Torre stated that he was writing for himself alone, and that his words could not commit the Vatican, the article concorded generally with a number of recent utterances by the Pope himself and with the Pastoral Letters of certain Italian Bishops, which Perowne summarised in his despatches to the Foreign Office. (23)

The Pope further exposed himself to Communist attacks when the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office issued a decree dated 1st July, 1949, the terms of which excluded from the Holy Sacraments Roman Catholics who wittingly and freely enrolled or lent active support to the Communist Party. The public
pronouncement on July 13 of this decree caused a sensation throughout Italy. The theological meaning of the decree was clear enough, as its application in practice and its effect were not. *Pravda* charged that it was dictated by international reaction and that it constituted a decree of anathema against "one third of mankind". (24) *Pravda* pointed out that President Truman in Washington and Prime minister Attlee in London had almost simultaneously launched attacks against Communism. Truman had blamed the Communists for America's catastrophic drop in production and Attlee for Britain's financial collapse. (25)

In Italy, the middle of the road papers *Umanita*(PSLI) and *Voice Republican* showed concern over possible repercussions of the decree in the Italian political field. Given the persecution of Catholicism, the decree was seen as legitimate, but there was fear that a new psychological situation could arise as a result of it which could alter the principles and methods of the Western democracies. Opposed was any change that would make the Communists appear as victims of persecution, nor should the principles of foreign policy be altered to make the U.S.S.R. feel that the Western democracies wanted to exercise political influence within the satellite countries. *Umanita* asked why it had been decided only now to strike a blow at the atheistic political and materialistic doctrines while the Kaiser, the Czar, Haille and Mussolini went scott free. If Communism was a political fact, so was excommunication and it would have far reaching effects. (26)

The Italian press in general were chary of commenting upon the Holy Office's decision to excommunicate Catholics who defended and spread the anti-Christian and materialist doctrines of Communism. Christian papers stressed
that the Church was defending herself against her enemy and the decree was not inspired by political but by religious considerations. (27)

The Pope received Perowne in audience on July 17 to explain the necessity for the decree. The Pope declared that the persecution in the Iron Curtain countries was worse than anything in previous history; and that Christianity and Communism were completely incompatible. The Pope told Perowne that he was a man of peace, but that, little as he might like it, he had no alternative but to fight, there was nothing else to do. The Pope believed the decree would be effective, especially in America. He was pleased with the use of the decree by the BBC in its foreign service transmissions, and also by the Bishop of Chichester's pronouncements concerning the mutual incompatibility of Communism and Christianity. (28)

The Foreign Office were well pleased by the decree, as the minutes illustrated:

We should welcome this most important development on the anti-Communist front. The Pope was quite right in foreswearing appeasement, recognising his enemy and attacking him with every available weapon. John Russell, Western Department. (29)

The Catholic Church has always been strongest where it was most dogmatic, and it was probably a sound instinct which made them throw down this gauntlet to Communism. Indifference is Communism's greatest ally in the religious as well as the political field. CAE Shuckbrough. (30)

The only qualification came from Christopher Mayhew:

My personal experience suggests that Catholics are active and effective on the anti-Communist front in this country. But the fact that a man is a Catholic lessens his value as a propagandist greatly among non-Catholics. (31)

The immediate impact of the decree was difficult to quantify. When the Italian Communist Party Deputy Giancarlo Pajetta said that the decree had been to a large extent ineffective, the non-Communists responded that that was one
A way of saying there had been immediate repercussions which were important enough to be recorded in an official party report. (32) The New York Times stated that reports described the reaction of Catholics as one of bewilderment and uneasiness, noting that the decree was being taken seriously by Communists and Catholics alike. (33) In a report on the effect in Italy of the decree from Sir V Mallet to Attlee, Mallet said the public announcement on July 13 had caused a sensation throughout the country and it had been generally recognised as one of the most important in the modern history of the Roman Church. Mallet noted that the Communists were minimising the whole affair and taking the line that the decree was a political move of a purely tactical nature, nevertheless, the Rome edition of Unità was reported to have dropped by about 20,000. (34)

The New York Times did a survey of the effects of the decree in various European countries, asking their foreign correspondents to report the local response. In Czechoslovakia and Poland the decree was thought to have given an impetus to the fight against the Church; while generally, Catholic priests didn't understand how to apply the decree and were tending to wait for further directions. (35)

The New Statesman observed that it was the threat that Catholics might delude themselves into believing that they could remain sons of the Church and yet voluntarily accept Communism that had so greatly alarmed the Vatican and caused the decree. It further noted that the Pope had not made a blanket condemnation, but had distinguished between those forced to acquiesce in Communism, those who did so for personal gain, and those who were avowed believers. The first were pitied rather than condemned, the second were denied the sacraments but not excommunicated, the third, like Albigensian and similar
heresies in the past, were diseased limbs which must be amputated and removed from the Church. (36) In his appraisal, Sir V Mallet noted that it was widely thought that, having taken an unequivocal theoretical stand against the Communists and having "finally disposed of the insidious idea that it is possible to be both a good Catholic and a good Communist, the Church will show itself in practice understanding of human frailty and will not necessarily insist on the strictest application of the decree." (37)

While Mallet's observations confirmed that the decree was in many ways symbolic, one of its effects was to divide still further the Churches of East and West. On August 26, 1949, in Moscow, speaking on behalf of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Metropolitan Nikolai responded to the Vatican decree by telling the All-Union Peace Conference that the Orthodox Church stood firmly behind the Soviet Government and the Soviet people in the fight against the threat of a new war, stating that, "The Russian Church cannot stay neutral now." He rejected charges that the Church in Russia was persecuted as hypocrisy or nearsighted calculation designed to deceive. He denounced the Pope as an agent of imperialism and a warmonger; opposed to which was the Soviet Government's humane aim, directed at the peaceful life of their land in which it had the full support of the Russian Church. (38)

With the WCC vehemently opposed to the Vatican line, Fisher, as one of its Presidents, could not follow the Foreign Office and express support of the Pope's action. That same month, however, he spoke out forcefully against Communism in a significant manner, equating political good sense with good Christianity, calling Communism evil, and decrying religious persecution in Eastern Europe:
In this matter, as in others, political good sense is good Christianity too. As Christians know to their cost, political Communism is in its roots and in its fruits destructive of the Christian sanctities of human life and hostile to the Christian Faith. The Christian Church still exists in Eastern Europe and can still preach the Gospel and administer the Sacraments - but on sufferance only and on the condition that it says and does nothing obnoxious to political regimes which are totalitarian in their powers, ubiquitous in their system of espionage and offended by anything which departs one jot or tittle from their own opinions. Not everything that Christians there want to say or do is right and not everything that the political regimes want to say or do is wrong. But the system is evil: and its consequences are evil too. No end can justify these means and the end is as unjustifiable as the means. (39)

Throughout 1949 the Vatican’s energies were principally taken up with the struggle against Communism and in countering the theory that Communism and Catholicism were compatible. This was the assessment of the British Legation to the Holy See in its annual review. This same review also noted that the Vatican regarded Great Britain as one of the main pillars of world stability and was thus accordingly interested in developments in Britain and in the attitude of His Majesty’s Government. (40) Earlier in the year, in March, the Vatican Radio had broadcast a talk on "The Christian Business of Reform" in which tribute was paid to the British Labour Party. The commentator had stated that in the coming Holy Year, contact and cooperation between the Catholic Church and those Socialists who shared the same social principles must be maintained and extended. He quoted the Prime Minister’s statement that British Labour derived its Socialism from Jesus Christ, rather than Karl Marx; he praised Sir Stafford Cripps’ book, Toward Christian Democracy, stating that if Sir Stafford Cripps was an authentic mouthpiece, it would seem that British Socialism was saved from the contamination of Marxism by its regard for property as a symbol of personal independence. (41)
Apart from sharing a common enemy and a mutual regard, the Vatican and the Foreign Office had a common interest in Eastern Europe. A 1949 Foreign Office Research Department document had observed that as the Orthodox Church collaborated, and Jewry were not in Eastern Europe in force, the Roman Catholic Church was the only organised religion of Eastern Europe which was opposing Communism. (42) This was an important consideration from the Foreign Office viewpoint. On November 24, 1948, the terms of reference for the "Cold War" sub-committee of the Russia Committee were enunciated in a top secret document, giving the following objectives:

(a) loosening the Soviet hold on the orbit countries and ultimately enabling them to regain their independence;
(b) pending the attainment of this relatively long-term objective, we should aim at promoting civil discontent, internal confusion and possibly strife in the satellite countries so that they will be a source not of strength but of weakness to Russia and a drain on her resources of manpower and trained personnel. We must hope to make the orbit so disaffected that, in the event of war, it would be a dangerous area requiring large armies of occupation and not a source of useful manpower for Russia. This in itself will make war less likely.
(c) seizing every opportunity of discrediting the Soviet regime or weakening its position. (43)

In June 1949 there appeared an article in a Czech newspaper about the Vatican's "espionage services", one of which was meant to be the "Pro-Deo" movement. The Foreign Office minuted that it was not to be taken seriously. Chancery dismissed the allegations that the Pro-Deo organisation was sinister, however: "To return to the 'Pro-Deo' movement, it seems to us that it is a small but useful ally in the anti-Communist fight, and steps have already been taken to supply it with Research Department material." (44)

Throughout 1949 relations between Great Britain and the Vatican became increasingly close, and there was undoubtedly a great deal of cooperation on the
anti-Communist front. Much of this was connected with the Vatican plans for Holy Year, as was indicated in the Vatican Radio broadcast. Holy Year, of course, had specific political aims. The plans and preparations for Holy Year, 1950, including the creation of a united front against militant atheism, took place in 1949. The vast majority of the diplomatic documents for 1949 relating to the correspondence between the British Legation to the Holy See and the Foreign Office have been retained by the Foreign Office. The number retained amounts to fourteen pages of indexed documents, which indicates not only that the correspondence was of extreme sensitivity, but was also substantial, more than for any other year in this period. (45)

The retention of this body of documentation indicates how, as the ideological dimension of the Cold War expanded, Christianity assumed an increasingly significant role in Western propaganda. Charges of religious persecution were used to attack the Communist regimes, while the defence of Western civilisation with its Christian heritage was used to justify what was termed the West's 'offensive/defensive' policies. As the Cold War escalated, pressures on the Church intensified, as a dissenting voice in the ecclesia might bring into question the important spiritual base to which Western propaganda had laid claim. Christian themes became even more critical in early 1950 with the coordination of British and American propaganda. This was a transformation from 1948 when Bevin had wanted propaganda about Social Democracy to be an integral part of Britain's publicity policy. Then the preference had been to remain independent of American propaganda, partly because of American hysteria and its inept handling of anti-Communist themes, and also to allow Britain more scope in promoting her own interests. In 1948 Bevin had envisaged Britain as
giving a lead to the Social Democratic forces of Europe, but as early as February 1949 this policy was proving difficult to implement without offending the Americans and jeopardising the close relationship sought by the Foreign Office. (46)

In February 1949, furore had arisen in America over a speech made by the Parliamentary Under Secretary, Christopher Mayhew, who was part of the British delegation to the United Nations in New York. By his own admission he had greatly underestimated the sensitiveness of the Americans when, as he explained in a despatch on February 27, 1949, to Bevin, he had made a speech in which he extolled British social democracy:

The Council is a forum where British social democracy and the Marshall Plan are constantly under attack. It includes delegates from a number of countries which look to us for a confident political lead against the Communist campaign. It was therefore necessary for me to give a warm account of our economic and social achievements and to forestall and rebut allegations of British subservienct to United States imperialism, by demonstrating that the acceptance of Marshall aid in no way lessened our political and economic independence. Since I am responsible to you for our general overseas publicity work - I felt entitled to try if I could to do so without indiscretion, to strike an unusually challenging note. The debate posed the familiar problem of steering a course between holding back too much on British recovery and British social democracy on the one hand and coming to grief in Washington on the other. (47)

By April 1950 Britain was trying to avoid Europe with regard to anti-Communist propaganda and Mr Murray was arguing that there were good reasons why Britain should "fight shy" of efforts to coordinate Western European propaganda or the creation of intergovernmental machinery. (48) A major consideration was that the other European powers lacked the machinery for handling and collating anti-Communist material and material about the Soviet Union and for getting it published. There was also the feeling that their
European colleagues lacked the will to implement anti-Communist publicity along the same lines as the British: "You cannot do publicity by means of a multi-lateral international committee, particularly if some of the members, like the French and Belgians, are so nervous of the Soviet Union and always wanting to keep the way open for a compromise." (49)

Another consideration was that the Americans did not propose to go ahead with including an item on the Atlantic Council agenda in 1950 on joint measures to combat the Communist menace; "their latest idea seems to be to discuss these bi-laterally with us first." (50) The Foreign Office preference had thus changed from 1948 when it wished to keep its hands free from the Americans to wanting in 1950 to remain aloof from any European multi-lateral machine in order to "keep our hands and those of the Americans as free as possible." (51) Shortly after these Foreign Office deliberations in early 1950, an Anglo-American Information Committee was created to coordinate British and American propaganda; and by July 1950 the Foreign Office were objecting to the Post Office principle that no foreign authority should be allowed to operate a broadcasting station in British territory when it was applied to the Americans. The Foreign Office argued that in the past three years great strides had been made in coordinating British and American policies and in combining their resources in the defence of Western democracy against Communist infiltration: "In all information work we and the Americans now operate very much as one team..." (52)

Operating as one with the Americans in the publicity field inevitably meant that the promotion of British social democracy was not as an acceptable a theme as the defence of Christianity. Part of the British and American
operation was to use Christianity as a source of resistance to the Communist regimes and a means of creating opposition among East European Christians both against the Soviet Union and their own Governments. This tactic was very evident in "James Dobson's Political Commentary", a BBC broadcast forming part of their Albanian and Bulgarian programmes. Certain broadcasts were clearly designed to incite Christians. One told how the the Bulgarian Government's avowed aim of deleting the word Christian from the Bulgarian language meant not only attacking Christianity where it could, but also horrible methods such as bribery, ridicule and "the meanest kind of trickery" practiced on children, on whom Communist propaganda was allegedly concentrated. The broadcaster illustrated with an example which was said to come from Czechoslovakia, warning that it might easily take place in any Bulgarian school:

At a school in a small town near Prague it was customary to have daily prayers before starting work in the morning. One day the pupils noticed two large boxes standing on the teacher's desk and asked her what they were for. She told them that one box belonged to God and the other to Stalin. The teacher then gathered the children round the first box and told them to pray very hard so that God would fill the box with chocolates. They did so, and the teacher opened the box, which was empty. The same procedure was repeated with Stalin's box, which, when opened, was full of chocolates. (53)

This was cited as proof that the Communists recognised in Christianity "not only their most bitter opponent, but an opponent whom they can never overcome". In comparison to Christianity, the "highest they can offer is a life where everything depends on the whim of the head of the Soviet Government and an acknowledgement of no other source, not only of power, but also of wisdom and knowledge." In concluding, the broadcaster noted that the Communists themselves knew that they could not defeat Christianity, and urged that the listeners not simply be comforted but, "let us show the Communsists that we know
also that Christianity is unconquerable; let us show them that Christians have an unconquerable faith to support them which Communism can never provide!" (54) The broadcaster very deliberately identified Britain both with Christianity and with the Bulgarian people.

Also in early 1950, the BBC began purely religious programmes to Eastern Europe, broadcasting Orthodox Church services. The British missions, however, did not feel that these were as useful as actual talks with some political content, even where oblique. (55) The Press Department of the British Embassy in Moscow thought the services a good idea, but had doubts regarding the value of the project. (56) While there were undoubtedly large numbers in the Soviet Union who would appreciate the services and they were an innovation which might help to encourage them to look to the West: "these were not people who had any political influence." (57) The value of the Slavonic Orthodox services were further undermined by Soviet jamming. (58) The services were thus discontinued, the final transmission taking place on July 2, 1950. (59)

The Moscow Embassy's preference for political substance in Russian language broadcasts applied equally to the projection of Western Civilisation. Talks on aspects of Western life such as the Welfare State, sport and culture, which had been the practice before Carlton Greene took over, were not favoured in Moscow: "we think the concentration in recent months on important political themes was a big improvement. Surely the BBC's main theme should be Soviet policies or actions in relation to Western civilisation." (60)

Another major undertaking for the Anglo-American Information Committee and BBC propaganda in this period was to "debunk" the peace campaign. (61) The Soviet peace movement was supported by the Russian Orthodox Church and other
East European Churches, churchmen and religious organisations, showing that the Communists too recognised the value of ecclesiastical support on the ideological battlefield that was the Cold War. The political value of Christianity on both sides of the Iron Curtain made this a critical period for ecclesiastic relations as Churches became strategically important and an integral part of their national Cold War propaganda machines. In Britain, the political role assigned to the Church during the war, and its continuation in the Cold War, made Church leadership a politically sensitive role, particularly for the Church of England, as the Established Church. Throughout this period all the Churches, in East and West, were exceptionally sensitive to charges of political control. But while spiritual allegiance was reserved for God, the Bible sanctioned allegiance to constitutional authority, and all the Churches, with the exception of the Roman Catholic which placed the Pope above heads of State, were subordinate to their respective national governments. In the Communist regimes, the situation was more complex because the governments were new and their authority recent. Moreover, the Communist regimes deprived them of the wealth and status enjoyed under former regimes which, unlike the Communists, recognised and gave allegiance to God, at least in theory. Communist pressure exerted on the Churches to secure ecclesiastical cooperation of the kind established in the West often led to crude political manipulation in the East, which generated charges of religious persecution.

In Britain relations between the Church and the State had developed over the centuries to a point of subtlety and sophistication where each tried not to transgress on the authority of the other and in which they cooperated to their mutual advantage. The Church of England was an hierarchical, authoritarian
institution over which the State exercised control through its relationship with the leadership. The subtlety with which state control was exercised was demonstrated during World War II and the ensuing Cold War. It depended not upon orders and commands but upon mutual understanding, respect and shared values, as well as a common interest in the preservation of the status quo.

The political mobilization of the Churches in the East-West conflict meant that the Cold War inevitably entered into ecclesiastical relations. Because Britain's opposition to the Soviet Union led to a close alliance with the Vatican, the Anglican Church necessarily had to follow suit, although Fisher nurtured a distinct aversion to all things Roman Catholic. (63) Similarly, because the Foreign Office perceived the Russian Orthodox Church as a tool of the Soviet Government and a vehicle of Pan Slavism, the relations which had been renewed during the war between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Church of England were allowed to fall into abeyance, although Fisher was more sympathetic toward the Russian Patriarch than the Pope.

Because Fisher was himself anti-Communist and because he respected authority and saw it as his duty to support the State, compliance was not unduly onerous. Moreover, the Foreign Office appreciated the necessity of the Church retaining an appearance of independence, and was careful not to openly compromise its spiritual authority. Nonetheless, Cold War demands confronted Fisher and the Church with numerous dilemmas. Ironically, it was the subject of peace, an issue on which the Churches, of all institutions, should have been united, which most revealed how divisive a force the Cold War became in Church relations, splitting them East to West internationally, and right to left domestically.
The peace movement was originally an instrument of mass emotional appeal against the use of atomic weapons. As it grew and evolved it became an important part of Soviet propaganda, possessing, in the aftermath of the horror of World War II, an even greater visceral appeal than the West's propaganda theme, the defence of Western civilisation. The Communists used peace to arouse opposition to what they perceived as aggressive Western policies threatening their continued existence, both amongst their own subjects and those of the free world. The British Government perceived the growing peace movement as an instrument of Soviet policy with sharply defined tasks which threatened the Western way of life. In October 1950, Bevin sent the Prime Minister a minute arguing that the World Peace Movement had two main functions which it performed for Cominform. First, under the guise of general peace propaganda it sought to enlist support for peace on Soviet terms. Second, it aimed at the incitement to subversion and sabotage of the rearmament efforts of the North Atlantic Treaty powers, and obstructing the movement and supply of arms to Europe from the United States. Bevin argued that from a movement of mass emotional appeal, "it has turned into a "cover organisation" for the agitation towards industrial unrest and sabotage of rearmament..."(64)

The peace movement was of major concern to the Foreign Office which sought to actively discourage all support, particularly that of British ecclesiastics. In October 1949 the Foreign Office wrote to Archbishop Fisher advising him that they were warning their people in Rome about the attendance of Hewlett Johnson, the "Red" Dean of Canterbury, at the World Peace Conference in Rome.(65) Fisher responded by trying to dissuade Johnson from attending, claiming he was worried about relations between the Church of England and that
of Rome, owing to the Soviet inspiration of the Conference and the Vatican's attitude to the religious persecution in Eastern Europe. (66) Johnson replied that he was unable to refrain from attending. His mission was to prevent a third world war, besides such an endeavour all else seemed small, including the relations between the two Churches. He advised Fisher that if the peace campaign were Soviet inspired, then all should join and it would become Christian and world inspired. (67)

The Secretary of CFR wrote to Perowne at the Holy See about the Dean, enclosing a copy of the Archbishop of Canterbury's latest disclaimer of him, issued in March 1949. Perowne replied to Waddams that he had passed on the contents of the letter and the statement to the Ambassador and also to Montini to whom he told, "in strictest confidence, that it was against the express wishes of the Archbishop that the Dean was at present in Rome." (68) Perowne reported to Waddams the Dean's activities in Rome and sent translations of his remarks at the meetings taken from Unita. Perowne wrote twice more to Waddams on the subject of the Dean. First to inform him that the Archbishop's disclaimer had been published in the Christian Democrat newspaper Il Popolo; and secondly with a copy of the Ambassador's despatch to the Foreign Office in which he expressed strong feelings deploiring the presence of the Dean at the Peace Congress. (69)

The Roman Catholic Church was much more severe and decisive in dealing with what it regarded as dissident clergy who supported the peace movement. (70) Moreover, the Vatican had already made an attempt to answer the Communist conferences by organising one of its own in Rome on the subject of "Communism" in April 1949. (71) The British Foreign Office applauded this Vatican response,
requesting papers from the conference for their own use. (72) As the peace movement grew throughout 1949, so did Foreign Office correspondence with the Vatican. Although most of this correspondence has been withheld from the public domain, it is a logical conclusion that the Foreign Office sought some counter to the mass emotional appeal of the peace movement through an organisation expert on matters of mass emotional appeal. 1949 was also the year that the Vatican laid its plans for the forthcoming Holy Year whose central theme was to be opposition to Communism. (73)

Following the Dean's appearance at the Rome peace conference, the Reverend Dr GL Prestige made an unofficial mission of friendship to Rome from November 21 to December 7, 1949. The object was to make the acquaintance of leading Roman Catholics who might be interested in the Church of England, and to explore the possibilities of improving relations between the Church of England and that of Rome. The Archbishop of Canterbury was aware of the proposed visit and of its general object, but deliberately left its conduct to the discretion of Prestige. Before Prestige left England Fisher furnished him with a formal letter stating that he was not himself directly concerned in the matter; and he issued no instructions for Prestige to observe. (74)

According to a report prepared by Prestige on his return, considerable pains were taken in advance to arrange contacts in Rome. He took with him a "Personal Memorandum" designating matters which Prestige was anxious to discuss, of which copies were distributed to Mgr Montini, Vatican Secretary of State, to Cardinal Tisserant, and to Father Charles Boyer, S.J., Editor of Unitas. Included was the suggestion that it was important "to secure all practical
cooperation possible in matters of common interest to the two communions by means of private and unofficial consultation". (75)

The Memorandum further stated: "It is desirable that the authorities on both sides should discourage all expressions of ill-will, contempt and suspicion." Ironically, during Prestige’s visit, a fierce controversy enraged the Anglican hierarchy, provoked by an article in the Times concerning relations between Rome and the Christian world. The article precipitated a large volume of mail virtually every day throughout November and the first week of December, engaging certain elements of the Anglican leadership. Fisher was instrumental in arranging for replies, but was careful to avoid any personal involvement. At its conclusion Fisher remarked privately that the correspondence would have done good if it had made Anglicans aware that Roman Catholicism was making a renewed effort to capture the Church of England from within. (76)

Prestige reported that he had a brief discussion with Cardinal Tisserant, the only non-Italian Cardinal in the Curia. He had much more prolonged conversations with Mgr Montini and one of his assistants, the American Mgr Carroll; with Mgr MacMillan and Mgr Duchemin and members of their staffs at the two English seminaries already mentioned; with Father Boyer; with Father Tindal-Atkinson, O.P., Prior of Santa Sabina; and with Father Gill, S.J., of the Oriental Institute. All the discussions were friendly and frank and the general atmosphere was sympathetic to his proposals, "sometimes very markedly so." Prestige did not enter into any discussion of practical or political problems in detail, but confined himself to "the main object of commending the principle that such discussions were desirable and practicable." (77) No objection was
taken to the suggestion that unofficial consultations should be held between responsible persons on either side, on practical matters in which both sides have a common interest. Such consultations would be designed primarily for the exchange of views on public problems and policies, but would not necessarily lead to joint public action, unless in particular cases this were considered specially advisable.

Prestige found a strong desire expressed on many occasions that contacts should be made between the authorities of the Church of England and of the Roman Church. He was told again and again that now the time had come to establish friendly relations both between leading personalities on either side and also between some of their leading assistants. Considerable interest was shown quite spontaneously in the life, and to a lesser degree in the organization, of the Church of England, and on one occasion Prestige was told that to Roman Catholics the Church of England appeared to resemble the Church of Rome far more closely than did any other non-Roman communion.(78)

Although the visit was supposedly made by Prestige in his private capacity, it is notable that he was one of the Archbishop's leading assistants at Lambeth and very involved with the Committee on Foreign Relations. Equally notable was that a report of his visit was submitted to the Foreign Office. Moreover, following Prestige's visit, Ernest Bevin himself visited the Pope, at the end of January 1950. The British Legation to the Holy See judged the visit a success, noting that the Pope had provided his personal elevator for Bevin's use, although it was stressed that the visit was purely one of courtesy.(79)

CFR, with the knowledge of the Archbishop and the encouragement of the Foreign Office, were quietly working to establish a cooperative relationship on
a low level with the Vatican on non-theological matters. Onto this subtle operation descended Myron Taylor on a mission from President Truman which, although it indubitably had many of the same political aims as had the Prestige visit, was a much more blatant anti-Communist exercise: the major aim being a conference between President Truman and the world's moral leaders, including the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Pope. Taylor informed Fisher of Truman's desire to do everything in his power "to support and to contribute to a concert of all the forces striving for a moral world order," in a letter and a visit on November 21, 1949, while Prestige was still in Rome. Taylor's letter was couched in flamboyantly idealistic rhetoric, stating that it was the President's desire to contribute "his own highest personal effort" to a renewal of faith on the obtainability of the world's peoples of freedom of religion, of conscience, from want, from fear, and to strengthen and encourage the forces working for a world order built upon the dependable foundation of morality:

All who have fought and died during the last decade have suffered and died in vain, if we who survive cannot out of their sacrifices and suffering find a road to a just and lasting peace which all nations can travel together. This is our supreme opportunity. We must not fail. There is no problem of any nation or between members of God's great family of nations that will not yield to the intelligence, the courage and the magnanimity in the religious faith of free men. Though the way ahead is long and hard and full of travail, through a union of moral forces we can bring near the day when the United Nations will fulfill the dream of peace under freedom, the Parliament of man.

Fisher was decidedly unimpressed by the extravagant claims, seeing clearly the political objectives they clothed, as his interpretation of the proposed meeting to Garbett revealed:

I do not think he had any sort of idea what the Agenda should be beyond the fact that it should oppose Communism and all its works and declare large and necessary principles of a godly civilisation. Apparently he envisages that if the idea were approved the American State Department
would summon and organise the Conference and he fondly imagines that the world would take notice of it. (82)

Fisher regarded Taylor as well meaning but muddle-headed and very ignorant of ecclesiastical affairs and frequently deprecated the "muddled ideas" Taylor presented whenever he was passing through between America and Rome: "he urged on me before Amsterdam that official representatives of the American Government and of ours should be invited to it and I had to suppress it. He also put his finger into getting the Pope to send official observers to Amsterdam and caused a good deal of trouble and confusion." Taylor had for a long time wanted "some joint statement signed by Christians, Jews, Hindus, Moslems and everybody else who, as he says, believes in God." A prime consideration for Fisher was, as he explained to Garbett, "I must suppose that Truman is indeed behind this present proposal: indeed, Myron Taylor tells me that he has borrowed some of the wording of the enclosed letter from Truman's letter of instructions to him." (83)

Taylor wanted to know Fisher's view before he consulted the Pope. Fisher told Taylor that he could express no opinion until he had consulted Garbett, to whom he sent Taylor's letter of November 21:

If you think that such an idea coming from no less a person than Truman ought to be followed up I would do my best to agree with you. If, on the other hand, you are against it I hope that in your reply you will give me some reasons against which I can pass on to him. One of the reasons against which I feel one cannot very well express to him is that the idea of the American President calling a conference of the religious leaders of the world is in itself likely to cause offence as being part of (a) America's opposition to the Soviet Union and (b) America's will to dominate. (84)

Garbett was totally opposed to the proposed conference, as much because it would have placed other religions on the same level as Christianity as because
of its political objectives. Garbett warned: "I should not feel able to join in any joint statement issued by Christians, Jews, Hindus and Moslems." He stated that he disliked intensely the attempts occasionally made to put all the faiths on exactly the same level. Garbett had no illusions about the political considerations inspiring the move. He observed: "This would only be another form of American opposition to the Soviet Union. It would be regarded widely as a political move. There would soon follow a counter-conference held in Moscow at which the Baptists, Orthodox and others in the Soviet States would reply to the Washington Conference." He also thought that as every religious conference in America had spoken repeatedly and loudly about action on the part of moral forces, that such a conference would be a sheer waste of time. He advised Fisher to have nothing whatever to do with it, voicing additional concern about the Pope's role: "I should also be a little suspicious as to how far the Pope, or at any rate the Roman Catholics, are engineering this through Myron Taylor. You will remember some time ago Taylor asked you if we could not cooperate more actively with the Pope in his attack on Communism." (85)

Acting on the advice of the Bishops and his own convictions, Fisher composed a very lengthy diplomatic reply claiming that the proposal, coming from the President of the United States, had commanded his earnest consideration, and he was grateful for the motives leading the President to draw together spiritual powers to meet the grave disorders and diseases of the world, but he, and the Archbishop of York, considered the scheme impracticable. Fisher detailed the many problems he envisaged, the ecclesiastical difficulties and the religious conflicts which would first need to be resolved. Despite the objections he had raised with Garbett, Fisher was disturbed to be rejecting a
scheme of the President of the United States, and clearly sought to absolve himself from being unnecessarily obstructive:

Unfortunately the very position of the President would be liable to misinterpretation and the purely spiritual effect, which would be the aim of the conference, would be opened to this distortion. You know how ready I am to give heed to everything you say and how I appreciate both your earnest desire and that of your President to forward the true bases of human well-being under God. I hate ever to appear to be critical of proposals which come out of such true and deep motives."(86)

Taylor was not deterred. He returned to the charge on December 7, 1949, suggesting that all the questions raised by Fisher could best be settled by a small meeting at the office of the President in Washington at a convenient time by such a group as would be represented in the first instant by Fisher himself and selected colleagues, representatives of the Pope, few in number, and some group representing Churches in America. Taylor solemnly stated that Fisher had been selected by the President as one of the world's moral leaders who should give thought and express it to him by word of mouth, as the representative not only of the Church of England but of advanced thought in the field of religion.(87)

Fisher felt the same reasons as told against the conference originally proposed, told equally against the latest scheme, as he explained to Boegner who had also received a visit from Taylor and whose opinion of the proposals coincided with that of Fisher.(88) Fisher intended to discourage this latest initiative, dubious as to how much was Myron Taylor's wishful thinking and how much really represented the mind of the President.(89) Fisher further doubted that Taylor would receive much encouragement from the Pope for any meeting summoned by the President. He considered nothing could be expected of the suggestion that the Pope himself should invite the Heads of the various
Churches to meet him in Rome to make a pronouncement, least of all during the Holy Year: "If he were to summon such a meeting it would be an admission by him that the Heads of the great Confessions were in some sense Churches, and he would think long before publicly giving such an impression."(90)

Despite Fisher's conviction that Taylor would not be able to secure Papal cooperation, events suggested that the Pope was making some effort to comply. In Rome on December 23, 1949, Pius XII called upon all Protestant and Orthodox Christian Churches to "return" to that of Rome and urged all Christians as well as Jews to support the Roman Catholic Church in the creation of a united front against militant atheism.(91) These were among the main objectives of Holy Year which, according to the Pontiff, should be the inspiration and motivating force for the Christian crusade because, he said, it should bring about a resurgence of religious feeling and solve the spiritual crisis caused by the struggles between atheistic materialism and religion.(92)

The Pope explained that Catholics must be at the forefront of the crusade. He offered reconciliation to atheists. He appealed to the Jews, those "who adore Christ - not excluding those who sincerely but vainly await His coming - who must join the common battle."(93) This reference, at a time when the Vatican and Israel were at variance over the manner in which the Holy Places in Jerusalem should be safeguarded, was interpreted as a conciliatory gesture on the Pope's part and a call to Israel to modify her attitude to facilitate the solution of a question that deeply concerned the Vatican.(94) He invited other Christian Churches to rejoin that of Rome, as Popes through the centuries have appealed to other Churches that no longer recognise the Pope as supreme leader to come back into the fold of the "Mother Church"; but the invitation gained
particular political significance when read against the background of Myron Taylor's activities.

Another aspect which gave the invitation a political significance was the cooperation of Christian Churches in Eastern Europe with the Communist authorities. According to CM Cianfarra, the Rome correspondent of the New York Times, Vatican circles claimed that many of the autocephalous Orthodox Churches had become instruments for the furtherance and consolidation of Soviet power beyond Russian borders and were therefore vehicles for spreading Communism. They, above all, must cooperate with other Christian Churches to build a dam against Communism. (95)

Cianfarra had no doubt but that the Holy Year had a political aim. Putting it in the context of the anti-religious drive of Moscow, and claiming that the Communist onslaught had already gained some physical success in Eastern Europe, he projected it as epitomising the spiritual issue at stake in the struggle between religion and materialism:

The main objective of the offensive directed by the Kremlin, as the twentieth century headquarters of atheism, is the destruction of the Roman Catholic Church, largest and most powerful religious group in the world by virtue of its more than 400,000,000 adherents and the discipline and compactness of its hierarchical organisation. (96)

A New York Times editorial subsequently portrayed Holy Year in a much wider context, stating that it was a challenge to Communism, and that:

Holy Year must inevitably dramatise the conflict between Communism and the Catholic Church - indeed, the conflict between Communism and any faith which emphasises the dignity of man and the value of the individual human life. (97)

On the same day that the Pope delivered his Christmas Message urging a fight against militant atheism, an exchange of Christmas messages between the
Pontiff and President Truman was released and published simultaneously in Washington and Rome, in which the two leaders declared their joint objective of securing peace. (98) Truman’s letter re-dedicated the United States to the “creation of a peaceful and advancing world order”; while the Pope’s reply paid tribute to that nation’s people, praising their generosity, “so bounteous and spontaneous, we recognise with pleasure, and hold up as an example to all, that good will which, according to the Christmas message of the angels, gives glory to God and hastens the coming of peace on earth.” (99) The substance of both letters dealt with the necessity of a Christian foundation for civilisation as the only basis able to secure a just and enduring peace.

Truman’s letter was delivered personally to the Pope by Myron Taylor in December 1949. In September, Taylor had made a tour of Europe, visiting London, Paris, Berlin, Rome and other cities, going farther afield than on any of his other journeys. The New York Times reported “Taylor to Report on European Tour” to the President. Prior to his visit to Rome, Taylor met with both the Archbishop of Canterbury and with Prime Minister Attlee in London. (100) Although there is no record of what trespassed between Attlee and Taylor, the substance of their discussion can be gauged from those with Fisher. There are also records of talks the previous year when Taylor met religious and political leaders in Spain.

In early April 1948, Taylor visited Madrid just after the American House of Representatives voted for the inclusion of Spain in the Marshall Plan. The Pope was one of those who supported the rehabilitation of Spain and its readmission into the European community of nations. Ernest Bevin saw it as a necessary and inevitable part of Western Union. (101) Taylor met with Franco,
Artajo, the Foreign Minister, the Nuncio and high ecclesiastics. (102) The American charge d'affaires, Culbertson, was present during Taylor's meeting with Artajo, the Foreign Minister, but had been excluded from the meeting with Franco who had insisted on seeing Taylor alone with only his interpreter present. (103) At the meeting with Artajo, Taylor had started by saying that it was quite time that all the anti-Communist countries got together and helped each other against the Communist menace. Artajo replied that he could not agree more, but Spain was excluded from the family circle of anti-Communist countries. Taylor told Artajo that it was up to the Spaniards to make the necessary changes which would render their admission possible. Very shortly after this meeting the American decision to include Spain in the Marshall Plan was reversed, and Taylor's mission was rendered futile. (104)

Amongst those with whom Taylor had discussions during his 1949 tour was Luigi Gedda, the leader of Catholic Action. Their meeting was given a sinister interpretation by the Dutch Communist newspaper De Waarheid, which stated that Gedda, head of the "terrorist and spy organisation", Catholic Action, was said to have been interviewed by the Vatican Under-Secretary of State, Montini, and Myron Taylor, and to have discussed with them "methods of increasing activity against Communism and materialism." The newspaper further stated that it had been decided to found "special intelligence schools" in Rome, Leghorn, Florence and Ferrara. (105) Such suspicions of Taylor's activities were fostered not only by the anti-Communist nature of his mission, but also by adventurist activities in the United States involving American business and religious organizations; Taylor himself was a business man and former chairman of the board of United States Steel. (106) On December 22, 1949, the New York Times reported that in
1947, with the approval of the Holy See through its Sacred Congregation for the Oriental Church, and with the financial help of Thomas J. Watson of the International Business Machines Corporation, a small unit of selected student priests was established at a monastery in Connecticut; they were being prepared to carry the Gospel behind the Iron Curtain, "to slip unheralded into the underground for assignments in Russian-dominated countries." (107)

A further indication that the Vatican was trying to cooperate with Truman's desire to create a religious front, uniting all faiths, against Communism, was its approach to the Muslim world, reported in *Time* on February 10, 1950. (108) Following this, the *Manchester Guardian* reported that the Egyptian Minister to the Vatican, a descendant of the Caliph Omar, had proposed a "new Holy Alliance aimed at joint Islamic-Christian action to revive and strengthen the practice of religion, to improve world conditions, and to defeat atheistic Communism." (109) The Church of England was a passive participant in this Muslim/Christian activity. Following the Pope's approach to the Muslim world, an approach was made to the Archbishop of Canterbury by His Eminence Muhammad Abdul Aleem Siddiqui who wrote on February 14, 1950 from the Islamic Cultural Centre suggesting discussions as to ways and means for all religions to cooperate against the menace of materialism and Communism. His Eminence noted that Marxist Dialectical Materialism was challenging all Religion and Absolute Morality and called for a comprehensive counteraction by the world of religion. (110)

No one at Lambeth had any idea who His Eminence Muhammad Abdul Aleem Siddiqui was. Professor Rushbrooke Williams, the *Times* specialist on Muslim affairs, explained that he was a Muslim divine of prominence. The Professor
told Lambeth that the Muslim world was "buzzing with excitement" over the approach from the Vatican, and thought the solution to the dilemma created by His Eminence's approach to the Archbishop would be to send a representative to meet him, pleading that the Archbishop was unable to himself. This course was followed by Lambeth, and a meeting was arranged between His Eminence and Waddams. The discussion centred on Siddiqui's hope that religious leaders would get together, as they were all threatened in the same way by Communism. He referred to the World Congress of Faiths, a lay conference of which he thought little, stating that such should be done by clergy and ecclesiastical leaders. Neither Fisher's Papers nor CFR records give any indication of this initial discussion being followed up, nor is there any available record of Islamic/Anglican cooperation against Communism.

On December 13, 1949, Taylor had informed the Pope that he intended to retire owing to personal considerations of age and health; and on January 18, 1950, President Truman accepted Taylor's resignation. Shortly after this, Franklin C Gowan, a career diplomat borrowed from the State Department to act as Taylor's assistant at the Vatican, was recalled to Washington by Truman "for consultation." Although this meant there was no American representative at the Vatican, the State Department had no wish for relations with the Vatican to lapse. The State Department regarded the resumption of normal diplomatic relations with the Vatican as desirable for a number of reasons, not least the belief that direct relations would assist in coordinating efforts to combat Communism, particularly in the ideological field.

Although Taylor's resignation was anticipated at the Vatican, Gowan's recall was totally unexpected, particularly the immediate closing down of his
Moreover, Truman's statement to the press that the question of whether the post of Presidential representative to the Vatican should be maintained was under consideration, caused considerable bewilderment and surprise in Vatican circles, who said they had received no indication of such a development. The hope was expressed by these circles that the President would re-open the office as soon as possible and that he would resume the collaboration between Washington and the Vatican, which, they said, had been "mutually advantageous."

This state of affairs, where there were no direct relations between the Vatican and the United States, was as unwelcome to the State Department as it was to the Vatican. Apart from the very obvious diplomatic advantages of relations with the Holy See, the State Department feared not simply misunderstanding in the Vatican, but also on the part of millions of Catholics in Communist countries to whom a termination of the relationship might imply a lessening of the interests of the United States in their eventually regaining freedom.

As equally perplexed as the Vatican by the closure of the American office was the British Legation to the Holy See. The British Embassy in Washington reported that the State Department viewed the Taylor resignation as quite natural. Sir F Hoyer-Millar reported to Perowne that in point of fact, the State Department were not at all sorry that Taylor had resigned as he had been really much too old to do useful work during the past few years and from the work angle his departure was viewed with little regret. The State Department had felt that the Taylor Mission had not provided adequately for maintaining full consultation and liaison between the American Government and
the Holy See in matters in which the foreign interests of the United States were deeply involved. Experience had shown that the Vatican exerted great influence on other Catholic nations of the world in support of its own interests, with the result that those nations in some instances pursued courses in opposition to that of the United States. In such instances it proved most difficult to bring about a change of attitude through diplomatic pressure on the countries concerned, and virtually impossible to take the matter up directly with the Vatican. (118)

Perowne appreciated the State Department's sentiments, but observed that Taylor's resignation did not look nearly so natural from Rome. Taylor had seldom been there, and then only for short periods; as seen from Rome, he could either have resigned sooner, if his years were weighing, of which there was no particular sign, or have let the appointment run on until the question of a successor had been decided. The removal of public United States representation from the Holy See at the very opening of the Holy Year, which was so important from the Catholic point of view and as regarded the strategy of the Church's battle with Communism, appeared from Rome "as a slap, and a rather unexpected slap", in the face for the Vatican, "and 'figura', as you well know, counts for a good deal here and elsewhere." (119)

In the practical field, the closing of the Taylor office caused a lot of turmoil and inconvenience with no official means whereby arrangements could be made "for the hordes of American tourists coming to Rome to be received in audience by the Pope." Perowne's Latin American colleagues, of whom there were no fewer than eighteen, under the leadership of the acting doyen, the Chilean Ambassador, addressed an official note to Jimmy Dunne, the American Ambassador,
asking that the State Department be informed of their strong feelings that Pan-
Americanism required that the United States should not be unrepresented at the
Vatican. This information was given Perowne on March 18, 1949, by Mgr Montini,
the Under-Secretary for Ordinary Affairs, who was careful to say that the
Vatican had in no way inspired this demarche, its attitude to which was
completely neutral. Perowne noted that it would not be in accordance with
Vatican practice to take the initiative in a matter of that kind, but he seriously
doubted whether the Vatican were as indifferent to the issue as Montini
pretended. (120)

Perowne's perceptions about the Vatican attitude were correct. On June 30,
1950 Franklin Gowen called on the Pope to take leave on his transference to
Washington. The Pope referred to the events of January when immediately upon
Taylor's resignation Gowen had been ordered to cease all activities at once. He
said that it had been considered most unusual that the mission had ceased in
this manner as he had never received any communication in the name of the
President that the President had decided to discontinue relations with him.
Neither, the Pope added, had there been any indication as to what form further
relations might take if any were still desired. The Pope said he wished in
this connection to deny most emphatically rumours that no American
representative below the rank of ambassador would be acceptable to him. He
pointed out that on the contrary he would gladly accept an ambassador, a
minister, or even a charge d'affaires if the American Government should, he
repeated, desire to establish official relations with the Vatican on a permanent
basis. The Pope said that America was a country especially dear to him and
that he felt now more than ever all the free countries of the world should unite in renewed effort in the cause of truth, justice and peace. (121)

Following this communication from the Pope, Truman asked Taylor in mid July 1950 to return to Europe, "as an American citizen of good will seeking to enlist leaders in religion of various and varying allegiances in a quest for peace... It is my earnest hope that you will continue to discuss with men of open minds - wherever you find them - whether leaders in church or state of civic affairs generally, the possibilities of a meeting here in our Capital City to lay the groundwork for peace and to promote goodwill among men." (122)

Taylor subsequently went to London, Paris and Rome; but without success, as was noted in a memorandum by the Administrative Assistant to the President, Elsey, to the Secretary to the President, Hassett, on November 11, 1950. (123)

President Truman, at a press conference in the White House on August 3, 1950, finally broke his public silence on the matter and disclosed that he was considering the possibility of sending a regular diplomatic mission headed by a Minister to the Vatican, while no further representation on a personal basis, as had been the case with Myron Taylor, was being considered. (124) This statement came after the outbreak of the Korean War, in June 1950, and the British Embassy in Washington considered that his decision to come so far into the open on this controversial question before the November elections indicated that he felt that in the light of the general international situation and the present state of American domestic opinion, it was possibly a propitious moment for the establishment of permanent United States representation at the Vatican, "and the move could be justified as part of the crusade against Communism." (125)
An official of the State Department had informed the British Embassy that as far as they were concerned the situation was unchanged and the matter was still in the hands of the President. If formal diplomatic relations were to be established with the Holy See, both the post and the nominee would be subject to Congressional approval. Taylor's appointment as the President's personal representative and without pay, had been independent of Congressional authorisation.(126)

Truman personally certainly wanted a replacement for Taylor in what he regarded as a "politically sensitive post".(127) He even propositioned his old regimental chaplain, Monsignor Tiernan, who was retiring from the army, stating, "I need someone to get at the Pope through the backdoor and I think you are the one to do it."(128) Monsignor Tiernan, however, did not share Truman's conviction and declined the offer. A more significant figure whose possible appointment as Minister to the Vatican Truman discussed with Secretary of State Acheson was that of Allen W Dulles, brother of Foster, and subsequently Head of the CIA. In May 1950 the President decided the time had come to bring the matter to a conclusion and to proceed expeditiously with this appointment.(129) However, nothing came of this, and in August 1950 the British Embassy reported to the Foreign Office a confidential political report from the British Information Services in Washington, from Major CB Ormerod to the Controller, which stated that Ormerod had been told confidentially by Mr Jackson Martindell that he was to replace Myron Taylor. Martindell was described as a right-wing Republican and a bitter opponent of all forms of socialism.(130) In the event, no nomination was forthcoming at this stage.
The tale is told that at Yalta, when reference was supposedly made to the views of the Pope, Stalin inquired with heavy sarcasm, "And how many divisions does he have?" (131) The story is apocryphal. The Vatican, in terms of temporal domain a cartographical dot, was thought by the Americans to be regarded as a special and dangerous menace by the masters of the Kremlin. In the chaotic world of ideological confusion that was the Cold War, America viewed the dual institution of the Papacy as a spiritual and a lay power, as being of special significance. This perception was formed from watching the struggle in Italy, where at the end of the war in 1945 the most significant organisations left intact were the Communist Party and the intricate administrative complex of the Church. Subsequently, in one phase of Italian national life or another, Communism and Christian Democracy, the political expression of Catholic views, were constantly contesting for Italian authority. The Vatican, with the aid of American finance, was perceived to have played an important part in preventing the Communists winning power in the 1948 Italian elections.

Moreover, behind the Iron Curtain, Catholicism was the greatest coordinated force opposing Communism in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and to a lesser degree in the Baltic States, Rumania and Albania. Apart from stoking the fires of Catholicism in Eastern Europe and urging the preservation of faith and therefore of anti-Communism, the Vatican was perceived in America as having a profound influence in the democratic world, as an article by CL Sulzberger in the *New York Times*, entitled "Vatican Has a Big Role in Fight on Communism", illustrated:

Today in Western Europe there is a significant if informal spiritual alliance among the political leaders in Italy, France and the Bonn Federal
Republic. The most persuasive supporters of the European Defence Community, that bugbear of Moscow, have been the Catholic statesmen, Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman and Georges Bidault, Alcide De Gasperi and Mario Scelba.

Christian Democracy, a phenomenon of the post-war world which seeks to unite new social concepts in the material sphere with ancient spiritual tenets, is still dominant in Western Germany and Italy and strong in France. This is the political philosophy closest to the Vatican and approved by it. It is the practical force of militant Catholicism.(132)

From the point of view of foreign affairs, direct relations with the Vatican was to America's advantage, but domestically the issue was politically controversial. Although the American Administration had no desire to offend the Vatican, domestic considerations took priority over the appointment which the Vatican so desired, as a State Department memorandum on the question had conceded:

While the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with the Holy See would be preferable from the foreign policy point of view, the foreign considerations are probably less important than the avoidance of religious controversy in the United States and the President may well wish to base his decision primarily on domestic considerations."(133)

A number of memoranda in the State Department papers testified to the strength of feeling opposing a Vatican representative and the various means considered of allaying the violence of the opposition.(134) On August 7, 1950 the Under Secretary of State discussed the question with Truman and the President decided that it should continue being studied. On August 28 Secretary Acheson discussed the question with the President, stating that representatives of Protestant denominations wanted to see him about the problem. In September 1950 the President said informally in a staff meeting he would not act on an emissary to the Vatican until after the November elections, and that he would refer the matter to Congress then. Subsequently, on board the Presidential yacht, Truman stated his intention to nominate a Minister to the Vatican and
let the Senate argue it out. (135) This was the course the President eventually took, but not until October 1951, after the failure of his plans for a meeting of Christian leaders, including the Pope, in Washington.

At the end of October 1951, Truman announced the proposed appointment of General Mark Clarke as United States Ambassador to the Holy See. This was followed by a storm of controversy in the United States. There was also a great deal of criticism over the White House inclusion in the announcement a reference to a coordinated effort between the United States Government and the Vatican against Communism. (136) In Rome, Somers-Cocks asked Tardini, the Under-Secretary for Extraordinary Affairs, what he thought of recent developments in the matter:

He dodged giving any direct Vatican views, but said that President Truman's moves in the matter evidently turned on considerations of internal politics, and that the Vatican could only lie low until these problems had been got out of the way somehow or other.... Tardini also commented that the United States was a rich, powerful and young country which could permit itself the luxury of disregarding the impression which some of its antics created abroad. His indulgent attitude, which conflicts very markedly with the periodic blasts of L'Osservatore Romano against the materialistic capitalism of the United States, confirms my diagnosis that the Vatican are secretly most anxious to have a United States Ambassador accredited to them, and are ready if necessary to swallow a General as the first Ambassador. (137)

Somers-Cocks was clearly perplexed by the appointment of a military figure and he concluded his report with the comment: "But I can't for the life of me see why President Truman made things more difficult both for himself and for the Vatican by nominating a man of blood for the job." (138)

Opposition to the nomination of an American Ambassador to the Holy See was so strong and so emotional in the United States, that Truman's nominee, General Mark Clarke, withdrew his acceptance of the nomination. (139) Truman
made no further nomination and the affair remained unresolved until Eisenhower was elected. He had stated in his election platform that he would not appoint a representative to the Vatican. (140)

The Americans handled the whole affair very clumsily from the Vatican point of view, causing a great deal of unnecessary offence. While the Vatican appreciated the difficulties created by domestic considerations, it still felt that the United States had behaved discourteously. When nothing more was heard about the representative Truman had announced he was considering in August 1950, the Under Secretary at the Vatican, Montini, aired the Holy See's displeasure to the Secretary at the British Legation, Somers-Cocks. (141) Montini noted that the Vatican had been exceptionally cooperative with Myron Taylor, to the point of arousing sardonic comment against itself. (142) Montini protested that the Vatican having accredited Taylor in the critical days of the war, should not have been dropped when the war was over. Moreover, Taylor had expected, and the Vatican had granted, facilities on a scale such as no Diplomatic Mission to the Holy See had ever dreamt of demanding. Not only had the Pope received him every week when he condescended to be at his post and was not throwing his weight about in other parts of Europe, but his office had constantly disturbed the Vatican routine by requesting and obtaining audiences for V.I.P.s at unreasonably short notice. (143)

Montini pointed out how after the outbreak of the Korean War President Truman had announced the possibility of a regular Diplomatic mission to the Holy See, but nothing more was heard. With regard to which Montini remarked that the Vatican was more interested in collaboration with temporal powers in the works of peace than in offering them moral support in time of war. He
recalled the Pope’s refusal of an audience to General Eisenhower at the time of the closure of the American office, and stated that it was for such reasons that the Pope would not see the General.(144)

Somers-Cocks told Montini that he was sorry there was a chill in Vatican-United States relations, but there was some good in that Communist propaganda would now find it more difficult to claim that the Vatican was in the pay of American imperialist warmongers, which propaganda had done a great deal of harm recently. In response, revealing that the Vatican was still desirous of an American representative, Montini emphasised that if the United States had been in proper diplomatic relations with the Vatican, the Pope would have received Eisenhower in spite of the Communist campaign of calumny which would have followed it. This prompted Somers-Cocks to end his despatch with the kind of sardonic remark of which Montini had earlier complained Vatican concessions to Taylor inspired:

It certainly is too bad that the Vicar of Christ should now be given the bird, after having to play red hot momma all these years to God Almighty, incarnate in Myron Taylor.(145)

Later that year, despite offense over American behaviour, the Pope granted a private audience to Myron Taylor on June 6, and to Margaret Truman, the President’s daughter, on June 28, 1951.(146) As Fisher informed the Bishops of York and Chichester on June 25, 1951, Myron Taylor was “on the go again”.(147) Fisher referred to Taylor as “Truman’s personal representative at the Vatican”, illustrating that Fisher still perceived him in that capacity. Moreover, from the nature of his activities, despite his resignation, it was clear that he was still acting on behalf of the President. Having been unable to establish relations through official channels, Truman was again reverting to Taylor to try
and achieve his objectives in the religious sphere. (148) This time Truman also exerted pressure on the Head of the American Episcopalian Church, Bishop Sherrill. Prior to receiving Taylor's letter, Fisher had been informed by Sherrill, that he had had a long talk with Taylor regarding the possibility of some statement being made by individuals representing various Churches with regard to the international situation. As a result of the talk Sherrill, who lived in New York, went to Washington where he spent some forty minutes in discussion with President Truman. Sherill subsequently informed Fisher that the subject was one greatly on Truman's mind; moreover, the President wanted to change the emphasis from a group of people in the United States to a much wider area. The thought was that Bishop Sherill, Archbishop Fisher, Bishop Dibelius, Athenagorus, Pastor Boegner, and possibly the Pope, might join in an appeal to the peoples of the world for peace and for the establishment of freedom based upon justice. (149)

Taylor met with the Pope, and subsequently informed Sherill that the Pontiff was willing to evaluate the project and give it serious study. (150) Sherill told Fisher that it seemed to him that five or six individuals, including the Pope, could sign such a statement; it would be of historic significance as breaking down barriers which had stood for many years, even in a cause in which faith and Church order were not involved. Sherill was coming to England and told Fisher that he would go into further detail when they met. It was a subject which needed to be talked over at length and seemed to him, "due to its authorship", of possibly very great importance. (151)

Fisher wanted that the discussions on this matter be initially limited to Taylor, Sherill and the British Bishops, Garbett and Bell. (152) Fisher informed
the latter two of what was proceeding, noting in reference to Taylor: "If anything is to come of this suggestion I should certainly want your advice about it while if it is as woolly and unsubstantial as his other suggestions I should value your aid in resisting it."(153) He stated that the matter was important, and that great importance was attached to it by Sherrill because of Taylor's position as a go-between the President and Pope.

Bishop Bell was asked by Taylor to see Bishop Dibelius, following which he reported the German Bishop's response to Fisher. According to Bell, Dibelius considered, roughly, that anything that would convince the countries in danger of coming under Communist rule that it was the West that brought peace and freedom, would certainly not be useless; if Myron Taylor were to secure an appeal to that effect "it would certainly be something". Dibelius said that German leaders would join in, if asked, and he quite thought they might not be, although they would not feel that anything particular had been done. A good moment would be if the Korean War ended, and all Church leaders, with special emphasis on the Orthodox, spoke. That would be a great thing.(154)

On July 3, Taylor met with Fisher, Sherill, Bell and Garbett. Fisher subsequently reported the proceedings to Pastor Boegner in Paris. Sherill had begun by stating that the President in his ardent desire for peace earnestly wished the Heads of the Christian Churches, including the Pope, should put out a Call based on high moral principles for the promotion of peace.(155) Taylor then reported his meeting with the Pope who had made two comments: Firstly, that it would be very difficult indeed to draft a document which the Heads of all the Churches would be willing to sign; and secondly, that the other Churches had shown themselves unfriendly to him in their comments upon the new dogma.
The previous year, Fisher had denounced the Papal Encyclical "Humani Generis," and both he and the Archbishop of York had "felt obliged" to put out a brief statement in reply to the announcement of the Corporal Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary being made a necessary article of faith for Roman Catholics. On September 12, 1950, Fisher told Convocation:

"We cannot understand their insistence on requiring acceptance within their own ranks of doctrines altogether outside the Bible and the ancient universal creeds. It leads only to the confusion of Christian truth when Roman Catholic theologians draw inference from inference far removed from any evidence, historical or otherwise, and when their authorities impose a priori deductions as being equivalent to divine revelation and equally necessary for salvation." (156)

In reference to the new Papal dogma, Fisher spoke of the necessity of cooperation between Christians and all men of goodwill "who desire to defend the civic and social virtues on which civilisation rests", adding that for constructive work, "Christians as such need to stand together." He then deplored the Pope's dogma for making cooperation with the Church of Rome "more and more difficult". As Fisher sought to blame the Vatican for the inability of Christians to come together and cooperate against Communism, he was attracted to a suggestion from Sherrill, following the meeting with Taylor, that the Protestant Bishops should make a show of cooperation with Truman in order that the Pope might be blamed for the non-achievement of Truman's scheme. From Taylor's report the Bishops had concluded that it was extremely unlikely that the Pope would join with them in signing the proposed document; and without the Pope there was no point, since a non-Roman effort would simply be a duplication of pronouncements made by the Presidents of the World Council of Churches. This caused Sherill to suggest that they draft a possible document for Taylor to show the Pope, the Pope would certainly refuse to sign with the non-Roman
signatories, "and that would finally convince Myron Taylor and Truman that it was the Pope to blame for frustrating a general appeal." (157)

The Bishops were well aware that Truman's design had nothing to do with peace, as Fisher quite plainly told Boegner:

Myron Taylor really meant this document to be a clarion call to everybody this side and that of the Iron Curtain to cast away the Communist works of darkness and put on the armour of light, i.e. it was an attempt not to make peace but to strengthen a crusade. (158)

Fisher suggested making the appeal one which could give no offence to either side, based on "the principle to which both sides had publicly adhered that it was possible for the Communist and Capitalist societies to dwell together side by side in peace and without mutual attack", and could be signed by even the Russian Patriarch: "If it was an appeal to lay aside recriminations and to dwell in peace with one another there would be no ideological reason why he should not sign it since it is what the Soviet Peace Movement says and of course if a document was signed by the Pope and by the Patriarch of Moscow along with all of us it would be front line news." (159)

Fisher was here effectively suggesting to the Bishops what Hewlett Johnson had suggested to him in 1949, that if all joined the peace movement it would become world and not simply Soviet inspired. The chances of such a document coming to fruition in the West during the Cold War were remote; a fact of which Fisher could not fail but to be aware, as the other Anglican Bishops clearly were. Although Fisher asked the other Bishops each to prepare a draft document along these lines, from which a final draft could be created for submission to Myron Taylor, neither Bell nor Garbett thought the effort sufficiently worthwhile to do so. (160) Fisher nonetheless asked their advice on his own
draft, written, as he explained to the Bishops, so that Sherrill's version of a possible appeal might not stand alone, as he, after all, had to answer to Truman and to some extent to Myron Taylor, and, moreover, "He is quite sure that the Pope will not sign any document but he wants the blame for refusing to be on his shoulders and not on ours, so that he may look Truman in the face and for that reason, he is very anxious we should suggest some document for Myron Taylor to submit to the Pope."(161)

At the same time Fisher asked advice about the structure of the document from Sherill, to whom he wrote that he had been greatly impressed by the point that Taylor ought to be given some kind of document to show the Pope so that if, as one could assume, the Pope turned it down, both Taylor and Truman might understand the blame rested on the Pope and not them.(162) Garbett was also impressed with this point, and while he otherwise did not feel the attempt to secure an agreed declaration worthwhile, in view of Sherrill's strong opinion and his relationship to the President, he thought, "even if it is against our better judgement, we ought to make some attempt, so that if there is failure the responsibility rests with the Pope."(163) Garbett also feared that Sherrill might lose some of his influence with the President if an effort to comply with his wishes were not seen to be made. He therefore agreed with the letter Fisher proposed to send to Myron Taylor.(164)

The Bishop of Chichester remained opposed to the Truman/Taylor proposal. Under his chairmanship the Executive Committee of the WCC considered proposals that the WCC should seek the support of other Churches in issuing a general Appeal for Peace, but stated that peace could not be conjured up by the stroke of a pen while the acute international tension had lasted too long and
was too complex in origin to admit of a quick termination, or a simple solution. Neither Truman or the Vatican were mentioned by name; however, the report's timing and its content clearly registered the WCC's opposition to Truman's objective and his means of attaining it:

Nor are they true friends of peace who, while crying out for peace, create strife and so intensify division, for the World Council of Churches to seek to join with other great Churches outside its membership in a general peace appeal now is not a practicable policy and its pursuit would not help the general situation. (165)

The Bishop of Chichester supported the idea of a peace appeal, but not in conjunction with the Vatican. Bell was Chairman of the WCC Executive Committee; and the position of the WCC was in opposition to what it perceived as "the Vatican line", the creation of a Christian Western bloc in opposition to a materialist atheist Eastern bloc. Moreover, Bell had his own ideas about an international peace conference which he regarded as superior to those of Truman. Having been party to the VCC's rejection of any participation by the Churches in their membership in a scheme such as Truman proposed, Bell set out his own scheme in a lengthy letter to Sherrill on August 16, 1951. Bell proposed a four Power Conference, with unrestricted agenda and an independent Chairman belonging to neither bloc. (166) Bell's own position was not as independent nor as objective as he himself considered it to be, for he was another authoritative, ranking churchman implicated in surreptitiously spreading the British Foreign Office line on the Soviet Union. At the beginning of August 1951 he had written to Waddams asking to be supplied with a dozen copies of an April 1951 Foreign Office review of "Peace and Soviet Policy", for "discreet distribution - without saying it came from the Foreign Office", to the Executive
Committee meeting at Rolle to discuss the proposal of a joint statement by all faiths. (167)

On August 28, 1951, Sherrill wrote to Fisher stating that in view of the WCC's decision, he felt it better to abandon the project. (168) This was greeted with relief by the Archbishop of Canterbury. (169) However, it did not please Truman. His frustration at being again thwarted in his scheme to launch a religious crusade was expressed in an attack on the Churches for being unable to cooperate in the world's hour of need, delivered in a speech at the National City Christian Church to the Washington Pilgrimage of American Churchmen. The speech identified the American nation with ancient Israel, created by God for a special purpose and with great obligations imposed by their religious heritage. Truman cast the international crisis as the preservation of a world civilisation in which man's belief in God could survive and spoke of the need for all men who professed belief in God to unite:

"It is not just this church or that church which is in danger. It is not just this creed or that which is threatened. All churches, all creeds, are menaced. The very future of the Word of God - the teaching that has come down to us from the days of the prophets and the life of Jesus - is at stake.

For some time I have been trying to bring a number of the great religious leaders of the world together in a common affirmation of faith. And that common affirmation, as I said a while ago, is in the 20th chapter of Exodus, and in the 5th, 6th, and 7th chapters of the Gospel according to Matthew - the Sermon on the Mount. And I have been trying to make a common supplication to the one God that all creeds and all religions profess. I have asked them to join in one common act that will affirm these religious and moral principles on which we all agree.

Such an affirmation would testify to the strength of our common faith and our confidence in its ultimate victory over the forces of Satan that oppose it.

I am sorry to say that it has not yet been possible to bring the religious faiths together for this purpose of bearing witness in one united affirmation that God is the way of truth and peace. Even the Christian churches have not yet found themselves able to join together in a common statement of their faith that Christ is their Master and Redeemer and the source of their strength against the hosts of irreligion
and danger in the world, and that will be the cause of world catastrophe. They haven't been able to agree on as simple a statement as that. I have been working at it for years. (170)

Truman indicated the necessity of persevering with the effort to bring the Churches together in greater unity in a crusade for peace, concluding with the plea that God might "unite the churches and the free world, to bring us peace in our time." (171)

Responding to this attack by the President of the United States on the Christian Churches, Visser 't Hooft, secretary of the WCC, wrote to Fisher:

'It may be that President Truman's statement is a good occasion to make clear that the Church cannot possibly identify themselves to such an extent with any particular national or international policy or ideology that they lose their birthright and give up their independence and their right to speak their own word in obedience to their Lord." (172)

't Hooft attacked the veracity of Truman's speech, declaring that Taylor's mission had been for "a fighting statement against Communism", not what Truman claimed, a declaration on religious and moral principles on which all agree. (173)

Although he was one of the Presidents of the WCC, Fisher had not consulted 't Hooft about the recent meetings between himself and the other Bishops with Taylor at Truman's behest. Truman's statement and 't Hooft's response forced Fisher to admit to knowing "what provoked Truman to make this very silly statement, and I should perhaps before now have told you about it." Fisher then related the whole affair, concluding, "No doubt Taylor communicated with Truman who then fulminated." (174) Fisher was clearly concerned not to offend Truman further and make matters worse. He told 't Hooft that he preferred that the WCC made no reply to Truman's statement, "I sincerely hope that we shall take no notice whatsoever of Truman's statement, and not attempt to answer it as a
World Council", although he conceded the necessity for indirect replies, from
time to time, as made by the American Bishop Dun, who put the Church viewpoint
on political affairs and received coverage from the New York Times.(180)

Fisher agreed with 't Hooft that it was not for political leaders to try to
mobilise the Churches. He considered that while secular powers were perfectly
right in wanting to strengthen in every kind of way the political resistance to
Communism and the Church encouraged them, still the Church was not part of the
political armoury of the secular states and must go its own way about things.
Fisher observed that politicians must talk in terms of strength to resist
aggression, political manoeuvering and so on: "The Church, even though it has to
admit the necessity of such things and to approve much of them, must yet
always remain in some sense above this conflict, free to criticise secular
governments of the West when they act unrighteously or unwisely, and free all
the time to say to Communism that the Church's voice to them is one of peace
seeking and peace making as the Church's primary concern, calling them to seek
the same spirit."

Informed of the proceedings, 't Hooft responded that he was pleased with
the stand taken by the Archbishop and the other participants in resisting
Truman's design:

We are already being told from behind the Iron Curtain that there is no
difference between our voice and the voice of Wall St and there are many
in Continental and Western Europe, particularly in France and Germany, who
are all too ready to believe that sort of propaganda. So it was in one
way a very useful thing that we could make it clear that we are not going
to let ourselves be used for political purposes. In this way President
Truman may have rendered us a real service."

't Hooft told Fisher that he intended to exploit the situation to the full with
a series of articles clarifying the position of the Church.
In theory the position of the Church was exactly that claimed by 't Hooft and Fisher. In practice the "encouragement" given State resistance to Communism by the Church was its full support; and Church approval of the necessary means was invariably interpreted as a Christian endorsement. While Fisher was ready to insist that the Church must be free to criticise Western Governments, he was not as prepared to exercise that freedom as he was to defend it. On Fisher's own admission, throughout the first decade of the Cold War he and the Church which he led supported British policy every step of the way. In December 1955, speaking at the Royal United Service Institution on "The Church's Answer to Communism", Fisher stated:

We believe that Communism has to be resisted by every appropriate means. The Church recognises that our statesmen and country must, under God, take every possible political step to deliver us from the threat of Communism.

The Church is not itself concerned to do more than observe what politicians do, and judge it with such powers and judgement that they have... I think it is true to say that the Church over the last ten years, since the war, has approved all the steps that our Governments have taken, both to preserve peace to the utmost, and yet not give an inch to the illegitimate demands of Communist States...(178)

Those within the Church that did exercise the right to disagree with British policy or criticise it, as in the cases of Hewlett Johnson and Stanley Evans, discovered there were consequences, that the Church's toleration was as theoretical as Fisher's statement to 't Hooft that the voice of the Church to Communism must be one of peace seeking and peace making. The voice of the Western Church to Communism was not one of reconciliation and peace, it was one of hostility and threats, and it echoed those of the Western States.

The resistance to Truman's design had much to do, as he had stated, with internal conflicts among the different religions, and much to do with the fact that the political motives which inspired Truman were so blatant that to have
acquiesced in such a conference would have indelibly undermined the credibility of the Churches as having any independence at all. Much more subtle and effective was the British method of encouraging the Church to promote anti-Communism by its own methods, with unobtrusive Government guidance which gave an appearance of independent action on the part of the Church authorities. This provided the anti-Communist cause with moral sanction apparently undefiled by political intervention.
1. Visser 't Hooft, "Notes on the World Council of Churches as Between East and
West: Confidential, Not to be quoted, March 1949; Fisher Papers, Vol 66: 200n.
Owing to his position as General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, 't
Hooft was an influential figure in the Christian world, and during the war, as
General Secretary of the WCC in Formation, 't Hooft was party to the Christian
Peace Aims Group discussions. At one such meeting, attended by the Bishop of
Chichester and other Church dignitaries, where the Jewish question was raised,
't Hooft observed that he favoured letting the Jews into Palestine under US and
British supervision, otherwise he foresaw a real problem with stateless Jews.
He commented:

   Our failure has been at this point. We say, let the Jews behave
   better. God has had his experience with those Jews a long time ago. They
   were behaving like that then. Do we say as Christians that our principles
   hold only for pleasant people, or also for unpleasant people? I do not see
   the slightest hope for any real change of attitude to the Jews on the
   purely 'natural' level. The natural man is anti-Semitic.

Peace Aims Group discussions, 1944; Bell Papers.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Mary Bailey, "Confidential Memorandum", n.d., but accompanied by Grueber
   Report, "Sachsenhausen 1940-1949".
5. Ibid.

6. Karl Barth, lecture, April 17, 1949, reported in the Dutch Communist newspaper Die Wahreit, and quoted in Religion and the People.


10. Ibid.

11. Harvey to Osborne, February 26, 1947; FO 371 67917.


15. British Legation to the Holy See to the Foreign Office, January 24, 1949; minuted on the report was the hope that the Legation would not be passing the "comments" on to the Holy See, implying that some were possibly irreverent, and
that British sympathy was not always with the Church but, as in the Mindszenty case, could reside with the Communist authorities. FO 371 79902.


17. Ibid, although not widely known at the time, the deliberate efforts of the Americans to insure a Communist defeat in the Italian elections, which included finance to the Vatican which was pursuing the same end, is now part of the historical record. See Paul Blanshard, *Communism, Democracy and Catholic Power*, 1952, p 272. The connection between financial aid to Italy and the Vatican in joint opposition to the Popular Front did not, however, pass without comment. In March 1948, *Religion and the People* observed how U.N.R.R.A. butter and flour had been distributed with the label attached: "Dona del Papa (Gift of the Pope)" Following the defeat of the Left in the Italian elections, the *New Statesman* commented:

Invited by Togliatti and Nenni to dispense with material aid from the West and spiritual salvation from the Church - to forgo the good offices of both Mr Hoffman and St Peter - they have firmly declined to do without the $700 million proffered under ERP, and have shown an unmistakable reluctance to risk hell-fire by voting for the Popular Front.

*New Statesman*, April 24, 1948, p 1. Mr Hoffman was the Administrator of ERP.


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.


23. Ibid.


25. Ibid.

26. Sir V Mallet to Foreign Office, July 19, 1949; to the list of names the Foreign Office added, "? Hitler", indicating that resentment of the Pope's wartime neutrality and his refusal to condemn Hitler still persisted; FO 371 79883.

27. Ibid.


33. Ibid.


36. New Statesman, August 1, 1949, p 1.

37. Mallet to Attlee, August 8, 1949; FO 371 79883.


40. "Annual Review of 1949" by Somer-Cocks, First Secretary to the British Legation to the Holy See to the Foreign Office; FO 371 89815.

41. Perowne to Sir I Kirkpatrick, March 23, 1949; a minute on the report observed, "To my mind the broadcast reads rather patronisingly - somewhat on the lines of the late Lord Beauchamp's reference to the people of New South
Wales as 'worthy individuals who had wiped out the shame of their origins' or words to that effect." FO 371 79887.

Commenting on the Vatican's acceptance of alliances with Socialists in France, Belgium and the Netherlands in order to defeat Communist power more effectively, Paul Blanshard observed in 1952:

To justify this cooperation the Vatican has evolved a formula which divides socialism into two varieties, the materialist kind and the humane or Christian variety. Marx and his materialist philosophy are still anathema, but all other brands are acceptable if not commendable, especially if they acknowledge the vague and sentimental contributions of Leo XIII and Pius XI to the literature of reform.

Communism, Democracy and Catholic Power, p 276.

On August 1, 1949, the New York Times reported that the Catholic bishops of West Germany had endorsed the "Christian doctrine of socialism, as the Popes have demanded for so long." Nonetheless, Pius XI in his encyclical Reconstructing the Social Order, after praising the moderate tendencies of some Socialists, still concluded:

We pronounce as follows: whether Socialism be considered as a doctrine, or as a historical fact, or as a movement, if it really remain Socialism, it cannot be brought into harmony with the dogmas of the Catholic Church, even after it has yielded to truth and justice in the points We have mentioned; the reason being that it conceives human society in a way utterly alien to Christian truth.

Five Great Encyclicals, p 157.

42. Foreign Office Research Department Review, December 5, 1949; FO 371 79904.

In November 1950, Mr Gregory Macdonald, head of the Polish-Czech-Hungarian Section of the European Service of the BBC called at the British Legation to the Holy See. He explained that one of his main jobs was to try to prevent Communism capturing the minds of the three countries with which he dealt, and
that part of that job was to try and maintain the resistance of the Catholic Church and the faithful. To this end he was supplied with a steady stream of information by the Foreign Office, including copies of despatches from H.M. Representatives in the countries concerned, and would like copies of material from the Legation. The Legation responded that they were willing to help in any way they could, requesting an exact statement of needs from the BBC to be sent via the Foreign Office's anti-Communist Information Research Department, after consultation with the Vatican, if necessary. British Legation to the Holy See to the Information Research Department, November 30, 1950; FO 953 704.


44. British Legation to the Holy See to Western Department, June 29, 1949; FO 371 79881.

45. At the end of the war, in 1945, the amount of correspondence between the British Legation to the Holy See and the Foreign Office was negligible; but from 1945 on there was a noticeable increase, reaching a peak in 1949 when an extraordinary number of documents were retained by the Foreign Office from general release to the Public Record Office. See Public Record Office indices for the Foreign Office, FO 371, Western Department, "Vatican".

46. In *Communism, Democracy and Catholic Power*, 1952, Paul Blanshard argued: Already our reputation in Europe is shockingly reactionary. We are known as an enemy of Socialism, and for the European masses Socialism is almost
synonymous with social welfare. Whether we like it or not, we should be honest enough to admit what every trained observer of European politics knows - that free enterprise has already been partially dethroned in Europe and that Communism cannot be defeated on that Continent without the aid of the middle-of-the-road Socialist movement. An American policy which ties us to a reactionary clerical bloc and to anti-Socialism is destined to defeat no matter how many billions in American relief go with it. (p 297).

Blanshard quoted former Assistant Secretary of State, Adolfe Berle, who had pointed out: "Principles aside, the pragmatic results (in the European war against Communism) suggest indeed that the chief political instrument against Stalinist Communism is precisely support of the Socialist groups." Truman, however, also sought an alliance against Communism with the Vatican. In this he was followed by the British Foreign Office, as shown by both the documentary evidence and the number of retained documents.

In 1948 and 1949, Social Democracy and Christianity, together, were claimed by British propaganda to be the solution to Communist domination. By 1950 the emphasis was almost wholly on Christianity. Even before the British Labour Government had lost power to the Tories in 1951, the emphasis which Bevin had placed on the role of Social Democracy in British foreign policy was notably diminished, if not completely absent.

Political circles in both America and Britain perceived themselves as being at war with Communism and the Soviet Union. Foreign Office correspondence made numerous references to the "undeclared war". In a top secret report on "British Overseas Obligations," dated April 27, 1950, this precise term was used twice. Firstly, in noting that: "Owing mainly to the state of undeclared war with the U.S.S.R. the United Kingdom is obliged to support larger forces, which must be equipped with far more costly armaments."
Secondly, in recording the feeling of some parties that "the United Kingdom cannot, in its present economic position, support the status of a World Power, with obligations not only to hold many exposed positions of the present state of undeclared war but also to make heavy unrequited payments in order to sustain its political influence." Also of significance was the meaning given the term "West" in this report:

Where reference is made in this paper to "the West" or "the Western world", these phrases are intended to mean those countries which are associated with the United Kingdom and the United States of America in the world-wide struggle against Stalinist communism.

"British Overseas Obligations", April 27, 1950; PREM 8 1200.

Political warfare between East and West had, of course, been in existence since 1917, but in the Cold War it dominated policy making and created a need for a Western ideology as a counter to Communism. In September 1948, N Birley, Educational Adviser to the Military Governor in the British zone of Germany, urged the necessity of political training on RMA Hankey in the Foreign Office:

**POLITICAL WARFARE.** Each recruit would have to be trained to understand the nature of the political struggle with Russia and Communism. This would naturally involve a study of Marxism and modern Communism. But that would not be enough. When the Russians set up schools for political warfare, they do not teach the students about what they will fight against, but what they will fight for. We should do the same. There are obvious difficulties in this. Western Democracy, of its essence, has no political Bible and no one "Credo". But it has a positive answer to Communism and this can be expounded. The greatest danger is to think that this can be found in the works of nineteenth century Liberal thinkers. It is essential, also, that Eastern and Slavonic answers to Communism should be studied.

The Foreign Office had plans for creating a corps of experts in this field, making use of the School of Slavonic Studies, where a great deal of controversy was created during this period over the dismissal of the Communist lecturer Andrew Rothstein. Birley thought the plan of insufficient scope.
(Birley to Foreign Office, September 29, 1948; FO 371 71631.) In a subsequent letter to RMA Hankey, Birley acknowledged the importance of an "Education Branch", but still thought it insufficient as people had no idea what they were faced with. (Birley to Hankey, November 23, 1948; FO 371 71632A)

47. Mayhew to Bevin, February 27, 1949; FO 800 495/77146. Bevin replied February 28, 1949, telling Mayhew not to make any further comment. After consultation with the Foreign Office News Department there were two vigorous defences of Mayhew's comments in the News Chronicle, "Odd Business" on March 3, 1949, and a further article by Vernon Bartlett.

By the end of 1949 Bevin was expressing concern to the British Ambassador in Washington about recent manifestations of American policy towards Western Europe as the American Economic Cooperation Administration sought to impose courses of action upon O.E.E.C. countries by assertion rather than argument, a fact remarked upon by independent observers such as the Canadians: "There is growing talk everywhere that the United States policy is one of 'satellisation'... This is the sort of thing which, if it got out, would be a gift to Soviet propaganda." FO 800 516/85031

48. Minute, Murray, April 11, 1950; FO 953 627.

49. CFA Warner to Sir D Kelly, Moscow, April 27, 1950; FO 953 627.

50. Ibid, Minute, Murray, April 11, 1950.
In other words, Moscow preferred offensive propaganda, the Communist threat to
Christian civilisation, rather than defensive propaganda which concentrated on projecting a positive image of the British way of life.

61. Ibid, British Legation, Bucharest to Southern Department, May 25, 1950; states: "We are also anxious that the BBC should as far as possible debunk the 'peace' campaign." A suggestion was made that "coordination in the field between the BBC and the Voice of America may be one of the subjects that might suitably be considered by the new Anglo-American Information Committee."

62. The sensitivity of the Church of England to charges of State control was, significantly, shared by the Foreign Office, as was illustrated by the response of the British Legation to the Holy See to an Italian article which made such charges. On July 23, 1948 a Roman Catholic publication, *Nuovo Cittadin*, published an article about the Church of England by a priest named Nietzsche, who lived in Switzerland and was apparently an authority on Nazism. In two places the article stated or implied that the Church of England was subject to control or was supported by the British Government. Victor Perowne responded by sending a letter of protest claiming that the author was seriously misinformed and gave a very wrong impression of the Church of England. Perowne pointed out that the Church was not financed by the Government and while certain appointments were in the hands of the King, "the Church deals with its own problems without any kind of interference from the Government." Perowne made it quite clear that he wanted his criticism of the article printed, stating, "I am sure that in the interests of accuracy and mutual understanding you will readily acquiesce in my requests that you should publish this letter of
correction." Perowne even brought the matter up with the Vatican, speaking to Montini about it, as he subsequently informed Waddams of CFR when he sent him a copy of the "letter of correction".

63. In conversation with Purcell, Fisher stated:

I grew up with an inbred opposition to anything that came from Rome - I objected to their doctrine; I objected to their methods of reasoning; I objected to their methods of operation in this country. So I grew up, and I saw no reason for differing from that opinion as the years went by. p 271.

Fisher did modify his views in later life after a meeting with Pope John XXIII, whose personality impressed him greatly; p 273.

64. Bevin to Attlee, October 27, 1950; discussed at meeting of Ministers October 30, 1950 at 10 Downing Street with Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and Attorney General in attendance; CAB 130 171/73034.


68. Perowne to Waddams, November 1, 1949; CFR Papers.

69. Perowne to Waddams, November 4, 1949. As an excuse to publish the material provided by the Legation, Il Popolo began its article "with a somewhat
mendacious little preamble saying that it was doing so in view of unfounded rumours that the Archbishop of Canterbury was himself in Rome." Perowne to Waddams, November 29, 1949; the enclosed despatch was from Ward to Attlee:

I cannot deplore too strongly the presence of the Dean of Canterbury at the "Peace Congress". As will be seen from the enclosed report, he was on two occasions mistaken for the Archbishop of Canterbury, and we were able to publish the text of a statement by the Archbishop setting forth his views on the Dean's wanderings, which was sent by the Reverend Waddams, the Secretary of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations, to His Majesty's Minister to the Holy See. Nevertheless, while Anglicans can appreciate the arguments used by the Archbishop of Canterbury, it was almost impossible to persuade Roman Catholic Italians, accustomed as they are to the strong discipline of the Holy See, that a mere Dean could travel abroad without his Archbishop's permission. His presence contributes to the wavering of many sentimental Christians and must have a deleterious effect. Mercifully the Italian press of all complexions concentrated more on his picturesque exterior than on the pernicious opinions he expressed.

70. On April 22, 1949, Perowne's despatch from the Holy See to Bevin noted that Roman Catholic clergy who supported the peace movement were punished by the Church for "their errors and misdeeds". Perowne to Bevin, April 22, 1949; FO 371 79883 23277.

71. "Week of Study of the Philosophy of Communism", April 19 - 26, 1949, a conference organised in Rome under the auspices of the Pontifical Academy of St Thomas Aquinas and of the Catholic religion, speakers included ecclesiastics, professors and politicians. Foreign Office Minute: "This is, in a small way, an answer to the various Communist 'intellectual' conferences. But worldly goods overshadow reason in the working man's life." MB Jacomb, May 3, 1949. IRD requested the texts be sent to them when they arrived from Perowne in Rome. Perowne noted in his despatch to Bevin, April 27, 1949:
The Week had joined with the Popes in demanding an improvement of the condition of the workers, and if Communism adopted Christian ideals of liberty, justice, peace, unity and humanity, that was no reason for the participants in the Week to abandon them. The speakers during the Week had, however, gone fully into the principles of the philosophy of Communism, and had demonstrated that these could not stand up to a dispassionate examination by the light of reason... (Communism) denied the two truths which enabled the world to be explained and the conduct of man to be directed - namely, the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. To limit man to life on this earth, if it could be proved, would be the gravest mutilation possible, but since this could not be done, because man is as God made him, to preach such a limitation was the most dangerous of deceits. FO 371 79883.

72. Ibid.

73. See below.


75. Ibid.

76. Fisher watched the Times carefully, suspicious of its Catholic management, and continually sought evidence of its Catholic bias. On February 28, 1949 the Bishop of Dover sent the Archbishop some notes, "You asked me some time ago to get you any evidence I could about the Roman Catholic influence on the Times." He had obtained the notes from a member of the staff who wished not to be implicated but whose name the Bishop could disclose to the Archbishop. The notes dealt with the Editor, the Assistant Editor and the new manager, giving background details and Roman Catholic influence. The notes claimed that both
the Editor and the manager were Irish Roman Catholics, that Fleet Street was
full of Irish — formerly wise sons of the "English Garrison" in Ireland. It was
also stated that several of the lead writers were Irish and one a very ardent
Roman Catholic. Fisher subsequently complained to Campbell Stuart who replied
that the Assistant Editor, Mr Tyrerman, was not a Catholic, and while the Editor
was, he was a non-practicing one and perfectly ready to avoid any bias. Fisher
remained suspicious and was upset when Roman Catholic ecclesiastical news was
put before that of the Church of England. Fisher informed some directors
plainly that many people felt that the Roman Catholics had captured the Times
and they had better watch what was happening carefully.

An article in the Times, "Catholicism Today: Relations between Rome and
the Christian World", on October 31, 1949, gave further confirmation to Fisher's
suspicions, as well as generating a great deal of controversy in the
 correspondence columns from November 2 till December 5, 1949. The controversy
spread into other publications: "Catholicism Today: Is Britain Isolated?",
Catholic Herald, December 2, 1949; "Half a Century" by Mgr RA Knox, Tablet,
November 19, 1949, p 331; as well as a further leader in the Times, "Rome and
Europe", November 29, 1949. Fisher asked the Bishop of Winchester to make a
reply; the Bishop of London preached on the matter in the Minster, but felt it
unsuitable for a Bishop to reply by writing, thus the Church Union were
arranging a correspondent; the Bishop of Lichfield on the other hand was
"almost hysterical in his indignation", according to Garbett, about the Anglican
failure to respond and wanted all the Church's historians and scholars turned
on to counter-argue.
Fisher detailed his responses to the affair in a memorandum. He began by making a complaint to Sir Cambell Stuart who came to see him agreeing with all his strictures "and very distressed about the situation." He advised him to see Astor: "Cambell Stuart's own position is delicate and we agreed that the fact that I had been in touch with him should remain entirely secret." Astor came in immediate response to a telephone message and Fisher told him that many people were disturbed about the Roman element in the Times office and regarded the leader in question as a sign of their influence. Fisher considered that Astor was shaken about the leader, although, "he himself is quite aware of the infiltration methods of the Romans, and their readiness to exploit any position to their own advantage..." (Memorandum, "Catholicism Today", Fisher, December 8, 1949) Fisher's final assessment of the controversy was that: "The correspondence in the Times will have done good if it has made Anglicans aware that Roman Catholicism is making a renewed effort to capture the Church of England from within." Fisher Papers, Vol 63, 121 - 137; and Vol 75, 174 - 178.

77. Ibid, Prestige Report, p 3.

78. Ibid.

79. Bevin's private papers, "Report on the Vatican preceding the visit of the Secretary of State", stated that Communist propaganda affirms that the Vatican is in the pay of Wall Street and a lackey of Anglo-American warmongers, and that the Vatican was sensitive to these affirmations. The report noted that while relations between the United States and the Vatican were probably not
very close, the Vatican was undoubtedly interested in the United States, both as a great opponent of Communism and a source of much money needed to meet "Church expenses". The United States, said the report, contained the largest single bloc of Catholics in any non-Catholic country, some 25 million in all. FO 800 578, "Vatican 1945-50".

Bevin's visit to the Pope was stressed as being a "courtesy call", and Perowne reported to the Foreign Office that it was a success, with the Pope appearing more favourable to Bevin than to most guests. Bevin was not in the best of health and had stipulated his inability to walk more than 30 yards; so the Pope had allowed Bevin to use his own private lift. February 1, 1950; FO 371 79901.


81. Ibid.

82. Ibid, Fisher to Garbett, November 22, 1949; Vol 78: 3.

83. Ibid. Truman was not noted for his piety, thus Fisher naturally suspected that Taylor was attributing a Christian inspiration to Truman which was more a product of Taylor's "wishful thinking" than of the President's real sentiments. On July 15, 1950, Truman asked Taylor to resume his past efforts to form an alliance of religious leaders, despite Taylor's resignation as his personal representative to the Holy See and the controversy it had caused there, in a letter which stressed the President's desire for peace as being paramount.
Truman's tone and the substance of the letter resembled the rhetoric used in Truman's public speeches when he addressed the subject of America's moral duties to the rest of the world, and showed that Taylor's elevated language was derived directly from his Commander-in-Chief:

Dear Mr Taylor: The heart of the world is set on peace. The soul of mankind yearns for peace in a world riven by anger, hatred, jealousy and ill-will. Peace, we know, would descend overnight but for the machinations of one wicked man who is spokesman for a cabal of evil associates. The victims of these doers of evil are found throughout the satellite states. They are whole populations held in slavery under totalitarian tyranny. They are filled with longing for the happiness which was theirs before their countries were despoiled. That happiness can be restored and made real only through an honorable and enduring peace.

So I invite you again to go to Europe. I ask you to resume, with such leaders as are free to talk with you, the possibility of a common peace effort among free people.

Your mission will be personal, and quite informal. You will go without rank or an official commission, as an American citizen of good will seeking to enlist leaders in religion of various and varying allegiances in a quest for peace. We have no other objective.

Now through several years you have been discussing with Christian men, among many nations, the possibility of common action for peace. You and I have talked many times of the plan and purpose to hold in Washington a conference dedicated to peace - no other objective except peace.

Your appeals happily have been received with sympathetic understanding in Europe and at home by many religious leaders, but not by all. However, we are undismayed. We are steadfast in our conviction that righteousness exalteth a nation and, strengthened and inspired by that conviction, we shall always place the power and prestige of this nation and all the authority of this office on the side of peace.

We must therefore cooperate with all religious leaders who share our conviction that only through peace can happiness again become the portion of mankind.

I ask you, then, in that spirit to go out again on your noble mission. As I have implicit confidence in your character and in your discretion, I give you no specific instruction. It is my earnest hope that you will continue to discuss with men of open minds - wherever you find them - whether leaders in church or state or civic affairs generally, the possibilities of a meeting here in our Capital City to lay the groundwork for peace and to promote goodwill among men.

If the proposed Washington meeting is to be fruitful of tangible results we must all come together in the spirit of brotherly love and Christian charity. If we cannot meet on that basis, I fear that our
gathering would be a vain thing and our counsels as idle as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. FRUS, Vol III, 1950, pp 1795-6.

The timing of this endeavour was significant. It came when the peace movement was gaining increasing support throughout Europe, including a quite substantial number of churchmen, particularly the Stockholm Peace Treaty which had been endorsed by the Russian Orthodox Patriarch. Truman was concerned to try and counter the peace movement and was probably encouraged in this endeavour by the fact that two days earlier, on July 13, 1950, the Executive Committee of the World Council of Churches had released a statement in Toronto commending America's resistance to aggression in Korea.

Of interest is the implication in the first part of the letter that peace meant the elimination of Stalin and the restoration of the Eastern European countries to their former conditions. This was a popular cause in America and was to become an important plank in Eisenhower's campaign for the Presidency in 1952. In 1953, Taylor privately published, with Truman's blessing, the correspondence between the President and the Pope during 1946 and 1949, to show, according to the New York Times of April 23, 1953, Truman's desire to establish "a world order based on peace, justice and freedom." (p 1) Taylor had asked Fisher might he and the President use the correspondence with him, to illustrate the same purpose, but Fisher refused. (see below) The tone of the letter from Truman to Taylor suggests that it was written with publication in mind. Taylor did subsequently, in 1953, privately publish the correspondence between Truman and the Pope. At a time when America was being widely condemned as a warmongering nation, Taylor sought to highlight Truman's efforts for peace.
84. Ibid.


86. Ibid, Fisher to Taylor, November 30, 1949; Vol 78.

87. Ibid, Taylor to Fisher, December 7, 1949; Vol 78.


89. Ibid, Fisher to Boegner, January 9, 1950; Vol 78: 12.

90. Ibid.


92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

95. "Holy Year Has Political Aim: Vatican Hope the Spiritual Effect Will Counteract the Kremlin's Offensive", CX Cianfarra, New York Times, December 25,
1949, IV, 5: 7; Holy Year was aimed against all organisations of the Left which had anti-clerical tendencies, with reference to the constant attacks against the Italian clergy, the Vatican and the Pope himself, Cianfarra noted that anti-clericalism in Italy was not confined to the Communists:

Moreover, the Communists are not the only ones who carry out campaigns against the Church. On that issue they find allies in the Socialists, both of the left and right wing, the Republicans, and the small but influential group of intellectuals belonging to the Liberal party. These parties are avowedly anti-clerical in a lesser or greater degree.

96. Ibid

97. "Communism and the Holy Year", New York Times editorial, December 26, 1949, 28: 2. Paul Blanshard, the Nation's special correspondent in Rome for the Holy Year, and who subsequently wrote a book Communism, Democracy and Catholic Power comparing the Vatican with the Kremlin, argued that the American press were deferential and uncritical in their treatment of the Vatican. Although Blanshard described the New York Times as "one of the world's most accurate and valuable news organs", he included it in his indictment stating:

The Times has rendered a great public service in exposing the repressive tactics of the Church in Spain... but at home its policy is at times inexplicably timid and vacillating... the pressure of Catholic influence upon that august journal in recent years has produced some flagrant shadings of the news, and it has resulted in the suppression of honest expressions of critical thought concerning Catholic policy. (p 127).

99. Ibid, the President's letter was dated December 17, 1949; the Pope's letter was undated. The Pope's effusive tributes to American generosity were doubtless owing to that nation being a major source of Vatican finance, and to the Pope's recognition, which emulated that of the British Foreign Office, of the importance of American support.

100. JL Pumphry to Taylor, December 7, 1949, confirms the Prime Minister will see him at 9-45am, Friday, December 9, 1949; FO 371 74181/AN 3735. Kraus lists another file number with regard to this meeting, AN 3755, however, this file was missing, with no indication that it has been retained, suggesting that it has possibly been destroyed. In FO 371 67919, which contains reports on the foreign representatives at the Holy See, the index lists file number Z7543 as being on Myron Taylor; however, the file is not there and again there is no indication of its having been retained.

101. In his Memorandum "The First Aim of British Foreign Policy", January 4, 1948, Bevin stated the necessity of including Spain in Western Union: "As soon as circumstances permit we should of course wish also to include Spain and Germany, without whom no Western system can be complete. This may seem a somewhat fanciful conception, but events are moving fast and the sense of a common danger drives countries to welcome to-morrow solutions which appear unpractical and unacceptable to-day." The British Legation to the Holy See reported to the Foreign Office the Pope's desire to see Spain rehabilitated into the "family" of European nations.
102. Douglas Howard, British Embassy, Madrid, to PM Crossthwaite, Western Department, April 6, 1948; FO 371 733335/135480.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid, Howard obtained his information from Culbertson, the American charge d'affaires in Madrid. The European belief that Britain was influential in the United States was illustrated by the American decision not to include Spain in ERP:

The Americans became overnight, as Culbertson himself put it, our rivals for first place in unpopularity, although there are many Spaniards who lay the blame on us and are convinced that it was we who persuaded the Americans to go into reverse.

105. From BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 1, no 59, November 4, 1949; FO 371 79883.


111. Ibid, Memorandum on Meeting between Waddams and Siddiqui, prepared by Waddams, Vol 78: 374. DATE


113. "The Question of Possible Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the Holy See", Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State, Secret, January 19, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, hereafter referred to as FRUS, 1950, Western Europe, Vol III, pp 1790-2. Taylor's resignation and the termination of his mission confronted the United States with three possible courses for future action: another personal representative; normal diplomatic relations; permitting all ties with the Vatican to lapse. The State Department's preference was for normal diplomatic relations as a continuous channel for conveying the American viewpoint and American policies to the Holy See which would be of assistance in securing the influence of the Holy See on 300,000,000 Catholics throughout the world in support of American objectives and, to some extent, on the thirty-eight governments which maintained diplomatic relations with the Holy See. The State Department further considered that the influence of the Holy See with other American republics would contribute toward Western Hemisphere solidarity.
The Holy See's vigorous engagement in the fight against Communism would be assisted by the coordination which direct relations would facilitate, as would the opportunity to supplement American sources of information throughout the world. The State Department considered the Vatican Secretariat of State to be "undoubtedly one of the best informed in the world." Finally, the State Department believed that the Vatican would welcome diplomatic relations with the United States at that time.


115. Ibid.


119. Ibid, Perowne to Hoyer-Millar, copied to Western Department, March 20, 1950.

120. Ibid.


123. "Memorandum by the Administrative Assistant to the President (Elsey) to the Secretary to the President (Hassett)", November 11, 1950; George M Elsey Papers, Harry S Truman Library, quoted in FRUS, Vol III, 1950, p 1798.


125. Ibid.

126. Ibid.


128. Ibid, p 448, Margaret Truman gives no precise date for this occurrence, but places it in Truman's Second term.

129. "Memorandum of a Meeting with the President by the Acting Secretary of State", May 22, 1950, Confidential eyes only for the secretary; FRUS, Vol III, 1950, p 1794.

130. Ibid, British Embassy, Washington to Western Department, August 4, 1950.


133. FRUS, Vol III, 1950, p 1792. Opposition to a Vatican representative was not based wholly on religious and constitutional objections. Bertrand Russell in a lecture at Columbia University in November 1950, just after he had been awarded the Nobel Prize, declared it a "dangerous error to think that the evils of Communism can be combatted by Catholicism." He catalogued the shortcomings of the former, and then stated: "Everyone of these evils was exhibited by the Catholic Church when it had power, and would probably be exhibited again if it recovered the position it had in the Middle Ages. It is therefore irrational to suppose that much would be gained if, in the defeat of communism, Catholicism were enthroned in its place." *New York Times*, November 17, 1950.

Similar sentiments were expressed by Paul Blanshard in *Communism, Democracy and Catholic Power*: "... a victory even for the right principles may be transformed into defeat if the triumph is scored in cooperation with anti-democratic forces." The anti-democratic force to which he referred was Roman Catholicism. (pp 2n).

134. The Protestant Churches in the United States were well organised and bitterly opposed to the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Vatican. While the subject had always generated a moderate amount of mail to the State Department, mostly opposing relations, in March 1952 the State Department began
to be inundated by an average of three thousand protest letters a day from church members and suspected that at least the Presbyterian and Methodist, Churches were encouraging their members to write both the Department and their Congressmen opposing resumption of relations with the Vatican. Even prior to this deluge of protest the State Department had been considering ways to mitigate opposition to a representative being appointed to the Holy See, including the appointment of a corresponding emissary to a Protestant agency such as the World Council of Churches. Myron Taylor looked into this question and reported to the President that the Council would not accept representatives of governments. FRUS, Vol III, 1950, p 1792) The World Council was an association of denominations without reference to nationality and not a sovereign entity like the Holy See.

Another solution considered was the designation of a Special or Personal Assistant to the President for the specific purpose of maintaining contact with faiths other than Roman Catholic. It was felt that a less controversial solution would be for the President to designate a single person as his personal representative in dealings both with the Holy See and with other faiths. As a memorandum from Perkins to Acheson conceded, "This latter course was essentially that followed with Mr Taylor who did meet frequently with Protestant groups and devoted considerable effort with limited success in promoting cooperation between them and the Catholic Church"; Taylor's work had been conducted almost surreptitiously with Taylor working alone and reporting to the President rather than the State Department which felt "It would probably be more desirable that this aspect of the work of a successor to Mr Taylor be given more emphasis and be more widely publicised than was the case..."
in the past." The Methodist Bishop Oxnam of New York City, one of the leading critics of Taylor's mission to the Vatican, advised Taylor that opposition would be greatly lessened if his designation were changed to "Representative to the Religious Peoples of the World." FRUS, Vol III, 1950, p 1792-3.


136. British Embassy Washington to Western Department, November 10, 1951; FO 371 96287 WV10345/7.

137. Ibid, Somers-Cocks to GP Young, November 8, 1951; WV10345/6.

138. Ibid, Somers-Cocks, at the request of his Minister, reported to R Cecil of the Foreign Office American Department, that Mr Raymond Gram Swing, the well-known American broadcaster, then working for the "Voice of America" and in Rome to cover the N.A.T.O. Conference, told Somers-Cocks that he was sure Truman nominated Clarke purely for reasons of political expediency, without any expectation that it would go through. He said the appointment was certain not to pass the Senate, for the opposition aroused by it was certain to increase and not diminish. By making the appointment, however, the President would have a) demonstrated good intention towards the Holy See, while showing them at the same time the internal difficulties he had to face, and b) pleased American Catholics, with an eye to the Presidential election next year. To which a Foreign Office minute responded:

Mr Swing was convinced that the President chose a serving General on purpose, so that the constitutional complications arising therefrom should
make the appointment even more impossible to get through the Senate... We find it hard to believe that the President was so cynical as all that; the friendliness of his messages to the Pope and his desire to enlist the Pope's help seem too genuine. And is it likely that he would want to present the Holy See deliberately and gratuitously, with a successful demonstration of anti-Catholicism on the part of the American people, thus encouraging the Holy See to join the "neutralist" camp?

November 28, 1951; FO 371 96287 WV10345/8

139. Truman's appointment of a representative unleashed a storm of controversy, as anticipated, closely monitored by the New York Times which gave the issue serious consideration in its editorial columns, citing the principal arguments for and against the appointment on November 1, 1950:

For the appointment: Vatican city, created in 1929 by agreement between the Church and Italy, is a full fledged secular state, maintaining diplomatic relations with thirty-seven countries. Between 1939 and 1950 Myron Taylor, an Episcopalian, gave valuable service as the President's personal representative to the Pope. An ambassador now would help in "coordinating the effort to combat the menace of Communism," the White House argued.

Against the appointment: The Taylor appointment was a violation of the principle of separation of church and state, and a Clarke embassy would be a greater violation. It is a fiction to say Vatican City, only one sixth of a square mile in area, is a sovereign state. The Pope is important only as the Head of Roman Catholicism;

The New York Times also reported the speculation surrounding the timing of the nomination, just prior to adjournment, the consensus being that the President did not expect an early appointment knowing there was no time for Senate to act. One theory, that Truman wanted to enable Congress to gauge the strength of public sentiment on the issue was indicated at a news conference where the President said the nomination would enable "everyone to get things off their chest". Another theory was that Truman was merely making a gesture, aware that many Congressmen would rather do nothing than take sides in a "hot"
religious controversy and anticipated that the Clarke appointment would be "sidetracked". Meanwhile the President would be on record as favouring a move much welcomed by Catholic voters, thus hoping to counter the influence of such Catholic Senators as Joseph R McCarthy and Pat McCarran with their charges of "softness" to Communism in the Administration.

A further factor was that the appointment of a military man contravened a long standing Federal law forbidding those in the military to accept diplomatic posts, and it required action by both the Senate and the House of Representatives to exempt General Clarke from this statute, whereas in normal circumstances only a majority of the Senate was needed to confirm nominations. This added further fuel to the speculation that the appointment was nothing more than a gesture.

The Vatican papers expressed genuine gratification at the appointment of an Ambassador and the British Legation to the Holy See reported that the Vatican were delighted with the appointment as it meant an Embassy and not a mere legation; they regarded the military status of the appointee initially as owing to American internal politics, stating that President Truman knew the Senate best. This gratified the British Legation which was pleased to see that the Vatican was not being stuffy over points of protocol. (British Legation to the Holy See to Morrison, October 25, 1951; FO 371 96287) Press comment on the appointment of a general was not so generous, particularly the Communist, which saw a politico-military plot with the Vatican as a notorious spy centre. Moscow Radio stated that the new Ambassador would direct a psychological campaign for the preparation of a new war, already entrusted by the United States to its Vatican accomplice. The Osservatore Romano responded with
articles rebutting the Communist charges. (Ibid, British Legation to the Holy See to Morrison, October 26, 1951)

140. The issue was kept open for consideration in the State Department, although when asked about the return of an envoy to the Vatican at a press conference in October 1954 President Eisenhower said his views remained unchanged. During his 1952 campaign Eisenhower repeatedly emphasised that he did not favour an Ambassadorial appointment to the Vatican and before considering any such action, he would certainly seek the advice of the whole American people as demonstrated by their representatives in Congress. New York Times, October 29, 1954; 13: 3.

141. Somers-Cocks, British Legation to the Holy See to GP Young, Western Department, February 13, 1951; FO 371 10214/96284.

142. Ibid. A common practice among all the Churches, not just the Vatican, was the proclamation of their neutrality in political matters, although the reality of their allegiances was obvious in practice; particularly so in the case of America and the Vatican, and British officials were not immune to the sardonic comments of which Montini complained. A Foreign Office Minute of May 6, 1947 recorded concern among the Cardinals in Rome that the Pope might be replaced by a non-Italian were he to die and were "convinced that if this should happen the new non-Italian Pope would shortly become a tool in the hands of the Americans, that he would be used by the United States Government as a weapon in their anti-Communist campaign and that the Vatican would thus lose its age long
tradition of neutrality in political issues, etc, etc"; to which OG Bleight responded:

It is new to me that the Vatican is at present neutral as between Communism and anti-Communism. Since the Vatican derives the far larger part of their income from the USA they had better bethink themselves of the text: "Where your treasure is there will your heart be also," and accept it in their own case. FO 371 67921.

143. Ibid, Somers-Cocks to Young, February 13, 1951.

144. On January 17, 1950, the New York Times reported that it was understood that General Eisenhower would be received in a private audience by the Pope before his departure. Eisenhower was in Italy for discussions with the Italian Government. Following Taylor's resignation and Gowan's recall, the Pope refused to see him. On January 19, 1950, the New York Times reported that Eisenhower and the Pope both wished to meet each other, however "the view prevailed that it was preferable for the Pope, who has never ceased to plead for peace and who considers himself outside and above all 'earthly competitions', not to meet him."


146. Ibid, Somers-Cocks to Young, June 29, 1951; in the spring and early summer of 1951, at a time when anti-Americanism was rife in Europe, the President's daughter made a six week "good-will" tour of Europe, visiting England, France, Holland, Luxembourg and Italy. She had a twenty-minute private audience with Pius XII; she also lunched with British and Dutch royalty and described the
high point of her visit as lunch with Winston Churchill at Chartwell. Harry Truman, Margaret Truman, pp 522-3.


148. See above.


150. Ibid. Taylor to Sherill, June 6, 1951, informed Sherrill that the Pope was willing to evaluate the subject and give it serious study; Vol 90: 230.


152. Ibid, Fisher to Taylor, June 24, 1951; Vol 90: 233; the Bishop of Chichester, George Bell, was Chairman of the Church of England Committee on Foreign Relations and also of the Executive Committee of the World Council of Churches.

153. Ibid, Fisher to Garbett, similar letter sent to Bell, June 25, 1951; Vol 90: 235.

154. Ibid, Bell to Fisher, July 5, 1951; Vol 90: 244.

156. "False Imperialisms", the Primate's Address to Convocation, September 12, 1950. Well before Sherill suggested his plan for casting blame on the Pope for the failure of Christian cooperation, Fisher had effectively been doing exactly that in his own addresses, as the British Government looked to him, as Truman did to Sherill, to cooperate with the Vatican in opposition to Communism. Fisher's September address to Convocation attacked the Pope for his most recent Papal Encyclical Humani Generis, issued August 21, 1950, and blamed him for preventing the creation of a common Christian front:

It contains statements and arguments so far removed from the conception of Christian truth held outside the Roman Church that their publication and enforcement cannot but increase the isolation of that communion and must make any approach to understanding more difficult. Even so, we might hope that we might be able to stand together with them in the defence of freedom when they are suffering so much in that cause. But it is unfortunately the fact that here too the Roman Church takes its own line and does not stand as an ally towards other Christian Bodies in the cause of freedom. For there are parts of the world in which the Roman authorities permit without protest and even encourage the use of political compulsions in their own favour against Christian Bodies not of their obedience, and sometimes with the design of ending their existence.

The times are inimical to freedom. All who value it on Christian grounds should stand together. The Vatican has several times recently called for a common front among Christians: it is tragic that the Roman Church at the same time says and does so much to make a common front impossible.

Fisher also attached blame to the Pope in his private correspondence. On August 15, 1950, an appeal was made to Fisher from Eleanor Adlard for all Christians to unite in a great crusade against Communism and asked if Fisher, standing as he did between the Roman Catholics and the Non-Conformists, could not launch it. (Vol 70: 279) In his reply of August 21, Fisher distinguished
between spiritual and political action and asserted it was the former that was the constant work of the Churches to encourage. He then referred to the increasing fellowship of the Churches, adding, "It is nothing but a tragedy that the Church of Rome should choose this moment to take unilateral action in adding a doctrine which has no foundation in Scripture or the early Church its Creed." (Fisher Papers; Vol 70: 280)

From the Catholic viewpoint one of the most important developments of the Holy Year was the November 1, 1950, solemn proclamation by Pius XII of the dogma of the Assumption of Our Lady to heaven. Claimed by Catholic writers as a tribute to the Mother of God and a spiritual contribution to the Pope's peace efforts, it was seen by Protestant leaders as yet a further obstacle to a common Christian front. This was regarded as unjustified by Catholics for whom the dogma of the Assumption was "merely a solemn confirmation of a traditional belief of the Church", in a matter in which there had always existed a basic difference between Catholics and Protestants. Stating that the Holy See "could not give up any principles of faith even for the purpose of strengthening the peace front against Communism", the Catholic historian Oscar Halecki observed: "Unfortunately, some prominent Protestant leaders interpreted the new doctrine in an entirely different way - as a decision which tended to increase the division among Christians at a time when it was necessary to create a common front against the Communist danger and in defence of freedom." Oscar Halecki, Pius XII, 1954, pp 310-11.

157. Ibid, Fisher to Boegner.
158. Ibid.

159. Ibid.

160. Ibid, Boegner to Fisher, July 13, 1951; Vol 90: 250-1; Boegner welcomed the idea of a demarche with a view to achieving a common appeal for peace, agreeing the absolute necessity of avoiding anything that would appear to be an attack against Communism or an invitation to some kind of crusade. He doubted the Pope would sign; but the Patriarch of Moscow would in any case be invited to give his agreement and cooperate. Boegner believed that if the agreement of all could be obtained it would certainly have immense repercussions.

161. Ibid, Fisher to Bell, similar letter to Garbett, Aug 16, 1951; Vol 90; Waddams was involved in the drafting of a peace appeal for Fisher to submit to Taylor and the Pope and it brought forth an interesting angle on the Church's perspective of war. Waddams warned the Archbishop that there were two points which ought to be watched in any statement to the public: (a) Christian leaders must not say "War is not inevitable", Waddams believed the Christian thing to say was that "war is inevitable if human beings act in sinful ways"; and (b) "Christian leaders must not (unless they are pacifists) imply that war is the worst evil, and in fact they ought to guard against any such misinterpretation." Waddams to Fisher, July 24, 1951; Vol 90: 253.

162. Ibid, Fisher to Sherill, August 16, 1951; Vol 90: 271.

164. Ibid.

165. Ibid, Bell to Sherill, August 21, 1951; Bell sent Fisher a copy of his letter to Sherrill and a copy of the Executive Committee Report, "Peace and the WCC", August 4, 1951, Central Committee 64; Vol 90.

166. Ibid.

167. Ibid, Bell to Waddams, August 4, 1951; Vol 90: 256.


169. Ibid, Fisher to Sherrill, September 6, 1951; the same sentiments were expressed in similar letters to Garbett and Bell; Vol 90: 294


171. Ibid.

173. Ibid.


175. New York Times, October 1, 1951; sent to Fisher by 't Hooft along with a copy of President Truman's speech.

176. Ibid, Fisher to 't Hooft, October 11, 1951.

177. Ibid, 't Hooft to Fisher, October 16, 1951; Vol 90: 302. This attitude resembled that taken by the British Legation to the Holy See when there was a chill in United States/Vatican relations. See above.

The outbreak of the Korean War exacerbated Cold War tension and sharpened the ideological conflict. This meant further deterioration in the relations between the Churches of East and West. What was essentially a civil war was presented by Western leaders as part of the East-West struggle, with American action hailed as the defence of the free world against unprovoked Communist aggression. This perspective was upheld by Western Church leaders. The Archbishop of York claimed, "Much more than the freedom of South Korea is at stake, for the defeat of the democracies would give an immense stimulus to aggression elsewhere, and would encourage a triumphant and Militant Communism to launch a supreme attack on Western Civilisation." (1)

Communist leaders blamed America and the Russian Orthodox Church condemned American aggression, as the Western Churches condemned Communist aggression, and made an appeal to the United Nations Security Council for an immediate peaceful settlement. (2) This elicited an unsympathetic response from Lambeth, whose attitude was indicated by a CFR memorandum on the "Russian Orthodox and Peace":

The Patriarch Alexei of Moscow has now wholeheartedly and formally associated himself and his Church with the Communist inspired World Peace Movement and the activities of the so-called World Peace Council. An official statement of his appeared in the Tass News Agency "on behalf of the Russian Orthodox Church."

The Patriarch's expressions of his desire for peace are of course entirely blameless and thoroughly desirable in any Christian, but he seems unable to distinguish between the Christian desire for peace which all genuine Christians have, and identification with a particular peace movement which has a particular political programme.

The Russian Orthodox Church leaders are always complaining of the tendency of western Christians to get mixed up in political affairs, and
are always reiterating the claim that they have nothing to do with politics. Yet, not only does the Russian Patriarch identify himself with the political programme of the World Peace Council, but in his statement he claims as absolutely necessary "termination of the sanguinary American aggression in Korea."

The most charitable explanation of his attitude is that he is misled by Soviet propaganda in a judgement which he would not maintain if his ignorance were dispelled. (3)

The Korean War stimulated support for peace in many quarters, particularly among clergymen who increasingly gave their support, to the Stockholm Peace Treaty, which called for the outlawing of atomic weapons. This trend was not welcomed by the Church of England whose two Archbishops issued statements condemning it and discouraging clergy from lending support. (4) Telling the clergy to refuse to promote the appeal and to advise their people not to sign it, Fisher stated: "The Church is foremost in its desire for peace; but it puts above peace the good ordering of the world on sure foundation of justice and truth." (5) Garbett was equally critical and suggested it be sent not to the House of Commons but the Kremlin, "whose representatives have blocked, over a period of several years, all proposals for international control with an effective inspectorate." (6) The previous March Russian Church leaders had issued statements supporting the Treaty; so its condemnation by the British Primates was yet another source of friction.

The fact that Anglican/Orthodox ecclesiastic relations were subject to political fluctuations caused some concern at Lambeth. In November 1951, Waddams presented a memorandum to Fisher in which he stated that he thought the time had come for the Archbishop to make another attempt to create better understanding between the Church of Russia and that of England. No positive proposals had been made since 1947/8 when the Russian Church was invited to
send representatives for consultation at the time of the Lambeth Conference and a suggestion was made for consultation on the subject of Anglican Ordinations. The first of these was declined and the second misinterpreted, so that nothing came of either proposal. Since that time Fisher had tried to explain his point of view about the Stockholm Peace Appeal and the political perspective of the peace movement as viewed from the West, while constantly reaffirming his good will toward the Patriarch. Nonetheless, international events had indubitably created some tension, as Waddams conceded:

In general I should say that during the last four years our relations have deteriorated somewhat, though not seriously. I believe the Patriarch of Moscow understands our Christian sentiments and good will, and probably appreciates our good care not to put him and his Church in a difficult position by making impossible requests and proposals. At least I hope so!

Nevertheless the Peace Campaign has injected an additional cause of misunderstanding into a situation that was already difficult enough. The Russian Church has never been one of those most sympathetic to Anglicanism, though friendly. Its own history and the element of messianic selfsatisfaction in it together with distance and lack of contact have combined to erect a formidable barrier of ignorance and wrong ideas.

Passivity is perhaps the best policy still from some points of view, but from others some initiative is highly desirable. It should not consist of anything startling, and the less publicity about it at first - the better. (7)

Waddams memorandum gave official voice to existing concern within the Church of England about deteriorating relations and misunderstanding between it and its sister Churches in the Communist bloc. Although Waddams assumed that the Patriarch appreciated the sentiments of the Anglican Church, not everybody was so convinced. Sydney Linton, the chaplain of the English Church in Finland who travelled frequently to Moscow to minister to its English community, wrote to Waddams on May 4, 1951 saying that he doubted that the Patriarch had
appreciated the attempts of Fisher to convey his perspective of the peace movement:

...church leaders in Russia are just as much in the dark about conditions outside Russia as the rank and file. Having nothing but the official propaganda to go on, they are probably genuinely unable to conceive what people are thinking abroad, or to understand how the Archbishop of Canterbury could write as he did. It was an excellent letter, but I do not think they could ever understand it, because we think a different language in a different environment.(8)

Waddams' associate in CFR, Macartney, was concerned to promote relations between the two Churches. He wanted Fisher to respond to an article in the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, in which comments were made on the Archbishop's reply to the appeal of the three Patriarchs, with their justification for identifying with the movement of the Partisans for Peace.(9) In his note to the Archbishop, Macartney suggested sending the Patriarch a sermon on peace which Macartney had prepared for him. He mentioned that he had discussed the scheme with Professor Zander of the Moscow Jurisdiction in Paris who had felt that it could do no harm, and stressed the point that "the Church in Russia must not be judged by the hierarchy, and when the Iron Curtain eventually drops, our relationships with the Russian Church will depend to a large extent on how consistently we have tried to keep in touch with her."(10)

The sermon was clearly written to persuade the Patriarch that Fisher was earnestly working for peace and that he took an objective stance on international events, because it contained a number of criticisms of the British Government, as well as of statesmen and politicians in general. Britain's colonial policy was criticised, and her exploitation of third world countries. Fisher's position on the Korean War coincided with that of the British Government, that it was a necessary stand against Communist aggression.
Macartney's sermon written for the Archbishop included a remark about, "the war that is now raging in Korea where a backward nation is being sacrificed most cruelly to the political rivalries of the day."(11)

Nor did the Church escape censure:

It is nor surprising that these evils are still so evident in our society when we consider how plain they are in our Church. The same evils are in fact there in our midst producing the same results - divisions, disunity and strife instead of the oneness of the true Body of Christ. Has the centuries old quarrel about the supremacy of the Church had effect on the strife we now see among nations to be "top nation"? Has the jealously guarded individuality of each Church not conduced to the emphasis on nationality? Has the stress on antiquity and prestige not fed the sense of racial superiority which bedevils the relations of East and West? Whether or not the Church is the Mother of such terrible offspring, she cannot deny that she shares their dreadful features. Shame be upon us in God's sight.(12)

In his note to Fisher, Macartney explained that the idea for the sermon as an answer to the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate article had not occurred until Waddams had gone. Waddam's absence certainly accounts both for its submission to Fisher and its content, as well as the suggestion that the Archbishop present it as his own views, which it was anything but, as he subsequently informed Macartney in no uncertain terms.(13) Querying point after point in Macartney's composition, Fisher told him that he did not want to make a statement or preach a sermon of that kind. Moreover, having read the article in question, he felt, "It is quite unseemly that I should reply to that article myself, or take any notice of it."(14) Despite Fisher's dismissal of Macartney's effort, the episode was significant in demonstrating that, despite Fisher's reaction, there were churchmen in positions of influence, who were most certainly not left-wing, who were becoming increasingly critical of the Western
contribution to international tension and were deeply concerned about the consequent effects on ecclesiastical relations.

The impact of the East-West struggle on Church relations was illustrated by developments in the WCC after Korea. Immediately after the WCC's Toronto Executive Resolution on July 13, 1950, describing the United States-United Nations action as a "police measure which every member nation should support," the Chinese President of the Council announced his dissent and invited others to join him. According to Religion and the People of February 1951: "The result was a breach largely on racial lines within the Committee. Chinese Christians strongly backed the action of their President."(15) Nor did the Resolution have a positive impact upon Asian Christians. The strain created by the Korean War was reflected in the Ecumenical Review which stated: "The declaration on Korea (in which the E.C. of the World Council supported the U.N. war) has not evoked such a favourable response even among the more thinking Christians of Asia."

In the same issue, another article pleaded, "The name of Jesus Christ must not come to Asia linked with the names of Bao Dai and Syngman Rhee."(16)

The next important statement by the WCC, made in early 1951, revealed a measure of compromise when it conceded that within the World Council constituency "there are many different opinions about rearmament," and commented on the international crisis:

The governments and many people of the West have come to fear that the more powerful of the Communist nations are ready to extend the area of Communist influence by means of force, and, as a result, they are rapidly rearming. In Eastern countries there is a growing fear that these developments might lead sooner or later to the outbreak of a preventative war. Thus rearmament has become the main and general emphasis everywhere. Its declared purpose is peace, but it can in reality endanger both peace and security and social justice is seriously threatened.... We are convinced that it is the duty of all the churches to champion peace with justice. The churches which still have real opportunities to
influence government policies have a special duty... Every chance for negotiations must be used.(17)

Waddams' subsequent suggestion that the Church of England attempt to reach a better understanding with the Russian Church was less a CFR initiative as a reflection of a growing desire within the Christian community to reach a settlement with Russia and achieve a stable peace. At its 1951 General Assembly, the Unitarian Church of Great Britain passed a resolution stating:

This annual meeting of Ministers and delegates of the General Assembly of Unitarian and Free Christian Churches, in order to fulfil the hope cherished by the peoples of the world, whatever be their views of the causes that have brought about the danger of a world war, and in order to strengthen peace and safeguard international security, urges the conclusion of a pact of peace among the five Great Powers, the United States of America, the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic, Great Britain and France.(18)

In April 1951, the International Department of the British Council of Churches proposed a resolution which included the need "to maintain and if possible strengthen available means of communication and intercourse with the leaders and members of the Churches in Eastern Europe and China."(19) It further resolved "to support H.M. Government and the United Nations in persistent attempts, over a period of years if necessary, to negotiate with Soviet Russia and with the People's Republic of China a just and workable settlement of outstanding problems that threaten the peace of the world."

After a keen debate the BCC inserted into this resolution on the international situation, at the insistence of the Dean of Chichester and the Archbishop of York, a paragraph about supporting "H.M. Government and the United Nations in their efforts to uphold the law of nations."(20) This did not, however, detract from what was a very significant indicator of Christian sentiment.
That same sentiment revealed itself in the Church of England in a debate in the autumn session of the Church Assembly on a motion proposed by the Bishop of Chichester which supported the resolution of the BCC:

In view of the many areas of tension and danger in the world, and with a full realization of all the points contained in that programme, *Christians and World Affairs*, published by the BCC, the Assembly calls particular attention to the third and fourth points which emphasize the need to support H.M. Government and the U.N. both in their efforts to resist aggression and also in persistent attempts, over a period of years if necessary, to negotiate with Soviet Russia, and with the People's Republic of China, a just and workable settlement of outstanding problems that threaten the peace of the world."(21)

This plea for negotiation was vehemently opposed by the Provost of Portsmouth, the Rev N Porter-Goff, who asked why should the Assembly urge negotiations with Soviet Russia or China? This was the kind of matter he thought that should be left to the Government. The Provost, who was at one time Secretary of the Churches' Commission of the League of Nations Union, was strongly supported by the Dean of Chichester, at one time Chairman of the same Commission, who affirmed that the Church Assembly should not have a foreign policy. Nonetheless, an amendment to omit all reference to Russia and China was defeated and the motion was carried by 124 votes to 112.(22) Considering the very conservative composition of the Church Assembly, this was another significant indicator of growing concern within ecclesiastical organizations that the tension between East and West be in some way resolved.

Symbolic of these ecclesiastical proceedings was a meeting between representatives of the WCC and the World Peace Council, which was reported in the *Ecumenical Press Service* on November 30, 1951. The meeting took place on November 24, at the Hotel Continental in Paris where there was an exchange of information and a clarification of their respective positions. While nothing of
moment emerged from these conversations, that they took place at that point in time was itself of significance.

On July 23, 1951 a further peace appeal had emanated from the Eastern Christian Churches. Issued by the Heads of the Orthodox Churches of Antioch, Russia, Rumania, Georgia and Bulgaria and endorsed by the Albanian Orthodox Church, it blessed the demand, "of the peoples for the conclusion of a peace pact among the Great Powers, for we believe that such a pact is the wisest and best solution of the world crisis." (23) This appeal gained in significance when a Quaker delegation returned from Moscow with a report that the Russian Patriarch was "obviously favourably inclined" to a proposal for talks between the Church leaders of East and West. (24)

There is no doubt but that within the Church of England there was anxiety that the Russian Church be given an appreciation of its own solicitude for peace related matters, and that a clearer understanding of the Russian Church's position was sought. This concern was illustrated in a letter from Linton to Waddams, discussing a Russian article on the Church, "The Captivity of a Russian Conscience":

The middle part of the article contains what may be an attempt by the Orthodox Church to convey to us some explanation of their line of action. They write: "There are in the world many Christians who... consider it their Christian duty to work with those who are striving for peace without knowing the Gospel, and who in that very striving reveal the beginning of faith in the 'one living truth', and in a better order of human life upon earth which may be a step on the way to the Kingdom of God". Do they mean by this: "We are fishers of men and are trying to manouevre a very big fish into waters where he might be hooked into the Kingdom of God"? They plead that "Jerusalem" be not destroyed "before she can learn what it is that belongs to her peace and salvation". Do they mean "Give us time to save Mother Russia from within before you destroy her from without"? And are the two references to "heroic living" an inverted claim that they are doing their best in a very difficult situation? (25)
While there were genuine and valid ecclesiastical reasons for pursuing relations with the Russian Orthodox Church, there were political restraints which Waddams had to consider, as he conceded when noting that from some points of view "passivity is perhaps the best policy." (26)

The military stalemate in Korea meant an increasing emphasis on Cold War propaganda which inevitably meant increasing pressure on the Churches owing to the ideological conflict and the Western stress on the defence of Christian civilisation and ideals. A memorandum prepared by request for Sir Harold Parker by George Catlin in July 1952, stressed "that the extreme importance of the development of the democratic case and of propaganda is an issue which has to be faced." Catlin's remarks were made following discussions with "Mrs FD Roosevelt, General Eisenhower, Mr John Foster Dulles, Senator William Benton (USA), Mr Eric Harrison, Mr Percy Spender (Australia), Sir Hartley Shawcross, Mr Henry Hopkinson, Mr John G Foster, Lord Vansittart, Sir Michael Wright and Sir Robert Fraser." (27)

Catlin posited that:

Recent Soviet gains in prestige and power, although supported by the Red Army, have in fact been achieved neither by bombs nor armies, but chiefly by an exceedingly skilful propaganda perfected over many years and based on theories occasionally shown empirically to be right. (28)

It was essential to counter these gains; Catlin pointed out that the perfection of propaganda was more than a technological matter of means in press and broadcasting, but required extensive and acute studies:

Propaganda must be considered as no less than a very important 'fourth arm' of war; but yet constructive, bloodless, and relatively inexpensive. It is not to be compared with either (a) the passive and perhaps financially wasteful handing out of information or, still less (b) with a caricature of itself, the technologically good development of ill-considered or blundering propaganda which can have actually a harmful
effect. Expert consideration of policy must precede technological perfection. (29)

Concluding, Catlin emphasised Eisenhower's comment, as President of Columbia University, that a great deal of available expertise was not yet harnessed to the work of national and collective security; and he recalled Eisenhower's words of January 22, 1952: "It does appear that there is room for action in the great field of moral and intellectual leadership." (30) Such views on the part of the world's political leaders inevitably had repercussions for those of the world's Churches. This meant that the political perspective on peace had an impact on the ecclesiastic.

As far as the West was concerned, the Vatican counted greatly in the field of moral and intellectual leadership, and there was a good deal of concern in the Foreign Office that the Papal attitude toward peace had the potential to be construed in such a way as to seem to lend support to the aims of the peace movement. In June 1950, the Vatican organs of publicity had come out strongly against the Communist Peace Campaign, stating that the Communists did not want men labouring for peace, but automatons obedient to chiefs who would not hesitate to cause mass bloodshed. (31) However, the outbreak of the Korean War inspired especially pressing appeals for peace from the Pope because, as Roberts pointed out in his report to the Foreign Office, a war between East and West would be disastrous for the Vatican which wanted the Christian world united under the moral supremacy of the Pope. Roberts informed the Foreign Office that the Pope considered "that the West, unlike the East, lacks a coherent ideology round which to rally." (32)
Following the Pope's 1950 Christmas speech, a Foreign Office minute noted:
"Rather an anodyne speech which, no doubt, circumstances required it to be."(33)
Nonetheless, the Foreign Office was well aware of the dilemma in which the
Korean War placed the Pope, recognising his peace appeals as necessary counters
to those of the peace movement. In spite of this, there was still concern,
voiced particularly in the British Embassy in Paris, that the Vatican was
adopting a peace policy which adapted itself particularly well to Communist
peace propaganda.(34) In his report from the Vatican on February 28, 1951,
Somers-Cocks quoted the Pope's speeches at length in order to show that he had
not changed his position, including the statement that "The Christian will to
peace meant strength not weakness."(35) Commenting on this despatch in the
Foreign Office, MD Butler observed:

Mr Somers-Cocks reports that the Holy See's policy towards Communism and
Peace remains unchanged and much as it should be from our point of view.
The Pope's recent emphasis on peace does not mean "Peace at any price",
though some people have thought it does, but it is merely a necessary
reaction to the "Peace Campaign".(36)

Following the departure of Myron Taylor from the Vatican and the closure
of his office, there had been something of a chill in U.S.-Vatican relations.
However, in November 1951, Somers-Cocks reported to the Foreign Office that the
prospect of the appointment of a United States Ambassador to the Vatican had
led Tardini to make much more indulgent remarks than hitherto about that
nation. Tardini was also exceptionally forthcoming about the true attitude of
the Vatican, which in public remained steadfastly "neutralist" to the
containment of the Soviet Union and the Peace Movement:

Monsignor Tardini went on to say how fortunate it was that the
United States had got the atom bomb first and had kept the lead in atomic
research, for that alone had kept the Soviet Union at bay. I remarked
that I was glad to hear this, in view of the rumours that the Vatican had
gone "neutralist". Nor was it so long ago that L'Osservatore Romano had thundered against the policy "Si vis pacem, para bellum", and had insisted that the only common sense policy was "Si vis pacem, para pacem". I realized that the Holy See must preach peace and nothing but peace, but I was glad that the necessity of negotiating from strength with the Soviet Union was appreciated in private by the Secretary of State. Monsignor Tardini replied that no effort must be spared, whether by the Holy See or anyone else, to achieve a detente, but the Soviet regime was just a lot of bandits and it must be kept at bay meanwhile.

This, I think, is the conclusive answer to the suggestion... that the Vatican is in favour of appeasing the Soviet Union at any price. I have felt all along that the Vatican were realists in private and that they must be aware how much they, and the whole civilized world, would stand to lose from any weakness towards the Soviet Union.(37)

In his review of 1951, the British representative to the Vatican noted that there was a demand in the free world that the Pope should choose between the Communist states and those opposing them. On the other hand, the Communist World Council of Peace had invited the Pope to support its disarmament proposals. This led the Pope to restate the position of the Holy See as "neutralism."(38)

The Foreign Office preference, naturally, was that the Pope should speak out in support of the West, and in 1952, consideration was given to the means of developing closer relations with the Vatican, regarded as particularly important now that the United States was no longer in formal diplomatic relations with the Holy See. In the Foreign Office CG Thornton noted that HMG and the Vatican had much in common in their attitude toward the Communist menace. He thought that Britain should accept an Inter-Nuncio from the Vatican as, apart from gratifying British Roman Catholics, it might help to promote a closer understanding in the anti-Communist field between HMG and the Vatican if the latter's representative in London were permitted diplomatic rank.(39) NJA Cheetham observed that any action to be taken in that direction must
include consulting the United States, as the Foreign Office had no wish to embarass them by agreeing to a reciprocity with the Vatican such as they had rejected. (40)

In May 1952, the Foreign Office approached the Home Office stating that they had been approached by Roman Catholics canvassing the question of the appointment of an Inter-Nuncio in London which would give the Vatican full diplomatic representation in Britain. The Foreign Office remarked that they did not consider there would be much opposition from the ultra-Protestants. (41) The Home Office, however, were opposed to such an appointment. (42)

In August 1952, the Foreign Office took another tack, informing Roberts at the Holy See that they would like to see the English hierarchy represented in the Curia. It had been the opinion of the Foreign Office in the thirties that such could be advantageous. In November 1937, Sir O Sargent had instructed the Minister to continue to press directly for such. It was thought important from a political point of view. The views of a Foreign Office official of the time were repeated. He apparently took the view that it would be helpful to have an English Cardinal in the Curia to help in those delicate and mainly herarchical matters where the Legation would doubtless not wish to tread and where the rather isolated Hierarchy of Great Britain were powerless to act. (43)

Roberts did not think that there need necessarily be a British Cardinal, but he certainly felt the need for a British element in the central administration of Rome, stating that the lack of such put him at a disadvantage as compared, for instance, with the French or Irish Ambassador. Moreover, "If a British senior ecclesiastic - not necessarily a Cardinal - were among the Pope's advisers here, there would be some chance at least that the statement or
declaration or whatever it might be would not be prepared without some appreciation of British foreign policy."(44) When Roberts' despatch was received in the Foreign Office, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick recommended steps to get a British element into the central Vatican administration and suggested Roberts' views be aired in the Catholic Union. Aware that a Foreign Office official could not approach the Catholic Union on a matter of this kind, Kirkpatrick suggested that Roberts' letter be shown to Sir George Rendel, the Vice-President of the Catholic Union.(45)

In May 1953, Roberts talked to the Pope about closer relations between him and the British Secretary of State, stressing their particular importance at that juncture when the Holy See had no diplomatic contact with the USA and was also cut off from Soviet Russia and China. This meant that the Vatican was effectively only in touch with one Great Power.(46) In Roberts' opinion "the crying need of the Western world in its struggle against Communism is ideological cohesion."(47) Roberts reasoned that a large part of the Western world paid allegiance to democracy, and a large part also paid spiritual allegiance to the Holy See; thus it was important that the two institutions could pull together effectively. However he recognised that the extent to which the Holy See would pull with the democracies would depend largely on those democracies providing stability and security against Communism: "If they fail to do so, the Holy See will, I regret to say, be liable to reinsure with those who desire authoritarian regimes of the Right." To which he added: "This would not be good for the ideological cohesion of the Western world."(48)

While there was no question but that the Pope was at one with the West in opposition to the Soviet Union and to Communism, he was extremely sensitive to
the Communist charges of war mongering, and he tended to be cautious in his public expressions of support for the anti-Communist policies of the Western Governments. At Christmas 1951, Roberts had a long talk with the Pope, whom he wanted to praise and encourage the efforts of UNO, which he had not mentioned by name in his Christmas speech. The Pope had in fact never expressed his approval of the aims of the United Nations. Roberts also wanted his position on peace clarified, as during the Korean War, Papal pleas for peace were seized upon by peace movement supporters to imply Vatican support for their cause. Roberts, however, was not optimistic that the Pope would comply, he considered him overly concerned with Italy and Communism there: "...I am left with an impression of a saintly character and of a most able teacher who will always inspire deep devotion and maintain order, but I find few signs of a prophet capable of leading his followers in an inspired spiritual crusade. I hope I may prove to be mistaken." (49)

During 1952 the Pope did express his approval of the United Nations, as part of his desire to promote peace. He also, in an address to the 'Pax Christi' association in September, 1952, welcomed the movement for European unification. (50) However, the Vatican still came in for frequent criticism for continuing to hold its fundamental policy of political neutrality, which it felt unable to openly renounce by publicly supporting one camp over the other. This aspect occupied one of Roberts' final despatches before he left the Vatican. Roberts considered that the Roman Catholic Church played an important part on the world stage and that it should be more widely understood.

Conscious that Britain's reputation stood high in the Vatican, Roberts stated:
She is regarded as the one Power in the free world which, during and since
the second world war, has shown exceptional qualities of stability,
resilience and political wisdom. (51)

Nevertheless, the Foreign Office needed to appreciate that the aims of the Holy
See and of temporal States were fundamentally different, and that this would
always affect their relations with regard to political judgement. He quoted his
predecessor at the Vatican, D'Arcy Osborne, who in 1947 told the Foreign Office,
"the Pope and his advisers do not consider and resolve a problem solely in the
light of its temporary and obviously apparent elements. Their approach and
survey are by habit and tradition unlimited in space and time... and this
inevitably renders their policy inscrutable, confusing and on occasion
reprehensible to time conditioned minds." To which Roberts added:

It is true that the Church is at one with the Western Powers in its
rejection of Communism, and is active in exposing Communist aims
throughout the world. But it has been careful to avoid taking sides in
the political conflict; for to be associated with any alliance of States,
no matter how praiseworthy their purposes, would be inconsistent with what
it conceives to be its founder's teaching and its secular mission to
humanity.  

We on our side must, therefore, as I see it, be careful not to fall
into the error of regarding the Church as a potential partner in applying
our policies for the defence of the free world. (52)

The Foreign Office supplied the Vatican with a great deal of anti-
Communist material, and looked to the Vatican as a source of extra intelligence;
however, it found the Vatican less than forthcoming, an issue which Roberts
addressed in his summary:

The Vatican regards the material for exposing Communist policies prepared
by the research departments in London and passed on by this post to the
Secretariat of State and to other centres in Rome, as most valuable. I am
assured that no such material is received from any other source and that
much of it is of higher quality than that compiled by the Church itself.

It has been suggested from time to time that we should press the
Vatican to reciprocate, and I did in fact speak in this sense to Mosignor
Tardini, Pro-Secretary of State for Extraordinary Affairs. But on
reflection I have come to the conclusion that we should be wise not to
press the matter. I do not think that the failure to reciprocate is due to lack of goodwill but rather to the fear of similar requests from other governments. In the back of their minds may also be the thought that it would be inappropriate to single out for special favours a Government with which the Holy See is not in full diplomatic relations. (53)

The despatches from the British Legation at the Holy See illustrate how the Foreign Office regarded the Vatican as an important ally which it sought assiduously to cultivate during the Cold War, without, however, exerting the type of pressure applied by President Truman via Myron Taylor. This more subtle British approach certainly paid some important dividends in the propaganda field, however, as Roberts indicated, despite winning Vatican respect and the continuation of good relations, they were no more successful than were the Americans in forcing the Pope to abandon his public declarations of "neutralism".

While the Foreign Office fully supported the Vatican in its anti-Communist crusade, the Archbishop of Canterbury, despite important concessions, was at best a reluctant participant, as he explained to Myron Taylor following the failure of his mission on behalf of Truman to secure a joint Christian statement condemning Communism:

Part of the trouble in all this conflict against Communism is that we cannot whole-heartedly claim the Roman Church as a champion of freedom against Communist tyranny when, regretfully though one must have to say it, the Roman system is itself a spiritual absolutism, which is really foreign to Christian doctrine. (54)

Although Fisher found the concept of anti-Communist cooperation with the Pope unpalatable, and although he had failed to cooperate fully with Myron Taylor's anti-Communist mission, he himself was fully committed to anti-Communism in both the spiritual and the political sphere. However, like the Pope, Fisher needed to appear above political conflict and, again like the Pope,
had to act cautiously. (55) The care exercised by the Church in its anti-
Communist activities was illustrated in early 1950 by the secret formation of a
special committee to advise the Archishop on combating Communism

George Bell, Bishop of Chichester and Chairman of CFR, was responsible for
gathering together a group, Sir Reginald Leeper, Tracy Philipps, Major Tufton
Beamish, M.P. and the Dean of Chichester, to discuss the Church of England and
Communism: "With a view to considering in an objective way what line it might
be useful to take, so far as the Church of England is concerned, in face of the
general campaign from Moscow for world Communism." (56) Bell, quoting Tracy
Philipps, asked: "are we clear that Russian Communism intends to dominate the
world, and in certain countries is using the Churches as tools? What can we do
here? And what can we do abroad?" (57)

Bell informed Fisher that the meeting agreed with the view that Communism
could not be met, "as Bevin thinks", by purely economic measures. It required
the building up and the teaching of a better religion and a truer philosophy.
Eyes in England needed to be opened, particularly in the Trade Union movement
and in the schools: "the Church of England could take a wise, as well as an
active part in this and also in the teaching of the truth of Christianity as
opposed to the falsehood of Communism." Bell then told Fisher:

It was suggested that there should be a small group of Church of
England people, whose existence would be unknown to the public, who would
meet together quite privately and discuss ways and means. It was thought
that the best way of appointing it, so as not to make it too official and
yet be in close touch with yourself - if you approved - would be that I
should be allowed or encouraged to invite a few persons to form such a
private committee, saying in the invitation that I was doing it with your
approval. Naturally such a committee would like to feel that any
suggestions or advice it gave would be carefully considered by you, with a
view, if you thought wise, to following them up. (58)
Along with themselves, the meeting proposed for the committee: Harold MacMillan, "who knows a great deal and feels intensely that the economic answer is not the deepest answer (he and Beamish both live in the same village in my diocese, and are both strong churchmen)"; Lord Salisbury, "who is believed to be sympathetic"; TS Eliot; Dorothy Sayers; General Jacob, of the BBC; Dr Kallas, and Voigt as a possible addition. A handwritten note, obviously not by Bell, added with reference to Voigt, "a most intransigent and impossible "Liberal" and anti-Muscovite of the Atholl School." (59) Those at the original meeting were all notably right-wing and deeply anti-Communist, those selected by them were all Establishment figures with known anti-Communist credentials. This clearly indicated that such a committee would be giving the Archbishop if not a prejudiced, certainly a far from objective view.

With the proviso that the Committee remain secret, the Archbishop was fully in favour of its formation and approved its proposed membership:

I can see no harm and indeed considerable good in your calling together a Committee such as you suggest, provided that its existence should remain confidential, at least at present: and the names which you mention for the committee so far as they are known to me are admirable. (60)

Fisher was not clear as to what, if anything, the Church could properly do more than it did already in a general way, "but it would be valuable to have your group thinking along these lines":

It is at present nobody’s particular business in the Church of England to give special attention to communist propaganda and the possible action and reaction from the side of the Church of England. Vansittart would say that it is quite time that we did something to purge our own ranks! (61)

At the end of his letter to Fisher, Bell had stated, "I do very much hope that you will see your way to encouraging the formation of such a
committee." (62) To which Fisher responded, "I should certainly encourage you to form a group and should hope to be kept in touch with its deliberations." (63)

The formation of the group was confidential, as were its deliberations and the advice given the Archbishop. However, there were certain incidents in the following years where its influence was detectable. One of these was Fisher's approval of anti-Communist pilgrimages to certain major British cathedrals. In the first half of 1949, a CFR Committee meeting had endorsed a scheme to hold a service of intercession for those suffering religious persecution in Communist countries. The idea had then been put to Fisher by Halifax and Leeper, but although the Archbishop had responded favourably in the first instant, he eventually decided against it. Leeper had discussed his regret at this decision with Prestige, the acting secretary of CFR, who then wrote to Bell to suggest Leeper as a suitable member for the group he believed Bell to be assembling: "If you are collecting a group to discuss this sort of thing (as I rather gather that you are), may I suggest that Leeper would be a good person to have in it."

Prestige told Bell that Leeper had discussed his scheme exhaustively with Halifax before it was proposed to the Archbishop, and that he was against general intercession services throughout the country, "which would merely give an opportunity to idiot parsons to say absurd things," and favoured the Archbishop alone speaking from St Paul's: "He and many others, feel a strong obligation upon the Church of England to protest against the persecution of Christians in Eastern Europe, (of course an intercession service should not be regarded as a form of public protest), and to pray for its victims." (64)

Prestige clearly felt that religious persecution was abhorrent and a valid cause for protest; however, he was equally clear that it should not be simply
the justification for an anti-Communist exercise aimed at the Soviet Union, an opinion of which he informed Leeper and Bell:

I said that in my judgement any such protest ought to be accompanied by an unequivocal assurance of our determination not to interfere in the domestic affairs of Russia, and of our entire political acquiescence in the Communist regime for Russian use; it is accepted by the entire Russian people and Church, and I fancy that anyone acquainted with the Russian mind (except of course, a Russian emigre) realises that only through the development and humanisation of the existing Communist regime can Russia conceivably hope to find her own salvation; our aim therefore is to influence and humanise, not to indulge futile and abortive hopes for the overthrow of Communism in Russia." (65)

Although Prestige told Bell that "Leeper seemed perfectly content to assent to this standpoint", Bell's letter to Fisher certainly implied that the group wanted to see the Church active in a field which went far beyond the confines of protesting about religious persecution; it stated a belief that Communism aimed to conquer the world, and that the Church should be active against it nationally and internationally. (66)

The anti-Communist substance of Fisher's Loyal Address, delivered before the King on June 21, 1950, suggested the influence of the Bell group. The address was written on May 9, 1950, shortly after the group's formation; its influence was discernible in the condemnation of Russia as an imperialist, expansionist power, and of Communism as anti-Christian. In the speech, Fisher spoke of Russian ambition and Communist hostility to Christianity:

Much has been accomplished in all these tasks by the great efforts of our people with the cooperation and help of Your Majesty's dominions and of the United States of America as of other friendly nations. But it must be sorrowfully recorded that Soviet Russia, which had so gloriously shared in the winning of the victory, was misled by her Communist masters into refusing to cooperate in the re-establishment of orderly conditions and, by linking its political theories to imperialist and expansionist ambitions has kept the world in a constant state of anxiety and alarm, gravely increased by the fact that Communist governments have displayed a
conception of human life hostile to Christian principle and to the most valued traditions of our race and country.(67)

The organization of anti-Communist pilgrimages by the National Pilgrimage Movement in the early 1950s had all the hallmarks of the original Leeper scheme. Committee influence is suggested by the fact that whereas previously, left to his own initiative, Fisher had discarded the Leeper/Halifax proposal for the very similar services of intercession, this time he overrode strong objection to try and ensure the success of the pilgrimages. The first pilgrimage was to Canterbury Cathedral. The pilgrimages were organised by the National Pilgrimage Movement which received public endorsement from Fisher, who gave his permission for the Movement to use the sermon he had delivered after the King's death, informing the Executive Committee that he approved the following:

In allowing us to use the following extract from his sermon in St Paul's Cathedral after the King's death, the Archbishop of Canterbury writes appreciating the declared purpose of the National Pilgrimage Movement to strengthen the spiritual foundations of the nation against the perils of Communism and Materialism and to lead the laity back to Church going and collective prayer.(68)

The literature of the movement stated:

We believe that in this hour of peril and anxiety all Christians must seek the help of God in overcoming the Communist conspiracy against Christian civilisation...
Christianity and Communism are incompatible, and we shall go on the pilgrimage believing that the time has come when Christianity must meet the challenge of Communism by itself becoming the challenger...
We prayed that our Nation might be inspired to put on the whole armour of God in the supreme struggle against the evil and godless forces of Communism and Materialism...(69)

A great deal of controversy was created in January 1952 when Canon Collins refused to give the movement special facilities at St Paul's Cathedral. Letters of protest were written to the Daily Telegraph by Lord Vansittart,
Major-General Lindsay and Herbert Ashley, published under the heading: "St Paul's and Communists, Doing Justice to the Truth." (70) According to a memorandum in the Fisher Papers, Canon Prestige had certain knowledge that the letters of three prominent persons sent to the Daily Telegraph stating the other side of the case were not published. (71) On January 28, 1952, the Daily Telegraph published a letter from Martel, under the heading "Fighting Communism"; and on February 9, 1952, its editorial dealt with the "Peril to the Church."

Fisher himself was the recipient of a protest from Smithers, who not only complained about the lack of reception given the movement, but also criticised the Church of England. (72) Fisher defended the Church, but agreed with Smithers about the lack of courtesy from St Paul's. (73) Fisher's response to the controversy was illustrated by a memorandum in his papers in which he noted that he had encouraged Martel, who was running the movement while Lord Craigavon was away in Australia for some months, to have another and bigger pilgrimage:

I did suggest that the first thing should be to have another pilgrimage of an outstandingly successful kind which would bury the St Paul's trouble and remove the taste it left in one's mouth. (74)

Fisher strongly advised Martel at their next meeting to have his next pilgrimage at Lichfield Cathedral, as it would not recall the St Paul's trouble and would enable his northern adherents to show their support. However, as Fisher remarked to Alan C Don, the Dean of Westminster, the next chosen venue of the movement, "I do not think he has got many Northern supporters." (75)

Don felt as little inclined as had Collins to welcome the movement, complaining to Fisher that Martel was obsessed with Communism. (76) Fisher
conceded this characteristic, but told Don that, 'I rather like him and he is quite sincere. As you say a little obsessed by the menace of Communism but really anxious to strengthen the spiritual foundations of the Nation.' Fisher urged Don to follow the example of Canterbury where one of the Canons, at an appointed time, went into the pulpit and said a prayer provided by the movement.(77) Fisher further observed: 'To say no to him is extremely difficult and at once makes a controversy, and since they are a respectable body of Godly people why should one say no to them?'(78)

Don and his chapter did not regard the movement as simply "a respectable body of Godly people", as the Dean pointed out to Fisher after the chapter's deliberations on the matter in June 1952:

... we did not feel justified in doing what the General suggested - partly on the ground that the National Pilgrimage Movement has, through what happened at Canterbury and, more especially at St Paul's, become identified in the public mind with a definite public opinion and that, whether that identification is justified or not, we must take account of it; and partly on the ground that we felt that the promoters of the movement are not a sufficiently representative body to warrant a special service at Westminster Abbey, which would involve the closing of the church for the time being to the general public and so forth.(79)

Don himself also found the credentials of the Executive Committee less than palatable:

Personally I cannot say that I am impressed by the list of names on the Executive Committee, consisting as it does of Lord Craigavon, a diehard Ulster Protestant and Tory; General Martel, a very gallant soldier with a one-track mind; Mrs Pollock, the widow of the late Bishop of Norwich whose views were notoriously reactionary; and three other people of whom one knows nothing whatever. I feel that until the movement has the support of more representative people it would be difficult to regard them as a "national" movement in such a sense as to justify the placing of Westminster Abbey at their disposal.(80)

Fisher replied with a friendly and informal letter, apologising for the fact that Don had "to wrestle with Martel." He told the Dean there was no need
whatever to shut the Abbey or provide a special service. Pointing out that Don
could not keep them out if they wanted to come in without closing the Abbey to
everybody, Fisher reasoned, "Is it not better to let them come in and knowing
that they are there to say this prayer, which takes about five seconds, and let
them depart in peace." Fisher argued that to refuse them admission would cause
another row "of the worse kind", which would certainly be publicised as St
Paul's was.(81)

Persuaded by Fisher's argument, Don relented, telling Fisher that his
letter had tipped the scale in their favour: "Whether they will be content with
this remains to be seen, but at any rate we have not slammed the door in their
face."(82)

Throughout this period the Foreign Office continued to send information to
Lambeth regarding Communist anti-religious activities. It was also very
unsympathetic to clergy at home who supported the peace movement in whatever
innocuous way. In May 1953, Mr Egg of the Foreign Office called in person on
Colonel Barron to draw his attention to a letter in the Manchester Guardian of
May 8, 1953, in which the Dean of Manchester stated that he welcomed the
holding of a peace congress in Manchester on May 17, 1953, and that every
Christian should do so, he did not know anything of the organization behind it
but he authorised the Rev V Watts to make use of his letter in any way he
wished in support of it.(83)

Mr Egg said the Foreign Office took this as a typical example of an
intellectual who was being hoodwinked by the Communist peace propaganda and
was lending it their support without any knowledge of the facts. As Bishop of
Singapore, the Dean had been a prisoner of the Japanese.(84) Egg produced a
document, British Peace Congress 1953, and asked if CFR had seen it and if a copy could be sent to the Dean of Manchester. He also asked whether:

1. CFR could help in getting over this type of document to members of the clergy;
2. CFR would submit for their guidance a list of Church newspapers, societies, women's guilds, etc. which we think would benefit by an unofficial circulation, if necessary from the Foreign Office, of this kind of pamphlet.

The following August JH Peck sent Waddams a Foreign Office paper "on propaganda moves which the Soviet Government might take to further its campaign to secure world-wide favour as the champion of 'peace and friendship' between nations." Waddams was informed:

Should you wish to use any of the information contained in this paper, please do so, but I must ask you to ensure that neither the paper itself, nor the speculation it puts forward, is attributed to the Foreign Office.

Stating that the main method would principally be pressure on public opinion largely exercised through "peace" propaganda, the paper listed a series of conciliatory gestures which the Soviet Government might take in support of its "peace and friendship" policy. These included a possible approach to foreign Churches: "Church delegations, congresses in Moscow, etc. Perhaps even some sort of compromise with the Vatican. Permission for two Roman Catholic priests to be appointed in Moscow."

On October 22, 1954, Waddams requested the Foreign Office to provide him with a list of front organizations which might present a temptation to clergymen. As Waddams subsequently explained to Fisher, his request originated in a suggestion which was made to him that the "clergy needed to be warned about a number of organizations which they might be prevailed upon to join or support without knowing in the least what their objectives were."
The Foreign Office replied that the "Communist-tainted bodies which clergymen might be induced to support" could be divided into three categories. There were three societies specifically aimed at practicing Christians; there was also a dozen or so bodies which, although purely secular in character, might attract clerical support; and there were six organizations which, although not proscribed by the Labour Party, could fairly be described as Communist in aim and character.

The Foreign Office cited the Society for Socialist Clergy and Ministers, the Christians and Crisis Group, and the Christian Peace Group as the organizations existing to "mobilise Christian opinion." The first was the oldest, and the Foreign Office said, "by far the most dangerous." The latter two were regarded as of comparatively slight importance, "and indeed seem to have merged." Waddams was sent accounts of these bodies and lists of the front organizations by the Foreign Office, and he passed them onto the Archbishop, asking him if he thought it worthwhile for some information on the subject to be circulated, possibly to the Bishops, or possibly to some other group of responsible persons. Waddams suggested that even publication might be considered in one form or another. Fisher certainly thought the Bishops should be informed, and a draft statement was accordingly prepared to be read at the Bishops' meeting where Fisher told his colleagues: "It has been brought to my attention that there are a number of bodies which exist to try and mobilise Christian opinion in support of Soviet policies. Some of them masquerade under harmless names and it is possible that a certain number of clergymen become attracted to them without appreciating their real character." Without attributing his source, Fisher repeated the information.
provided by the Foreign Office, including a list of the names of Anglican clergymen who were associated with the Society for Socialist Clergy and Ministers, which Fisher stated to have been under the indirect control of the Communist Party for some years. This naming of names and black-listing was in the worst tradition of established anti-Communist witchhunting.

Certain members of these organizations had participated in the unofficial ecclesiastic delegations to East European Churches, deprecatingly reported by British Missions abroad, which reports were then passed on to Lambeth. After the death of Stalin in May 1953, and the end of the Korean War in August, there was a thaw in Anglo-Soviet relations. One of the ways in which the Foreign Office took advantage of this was to try and get the Soviet authorities to use official delegations rather than those provided by left-wing organizations which were genuinely sympathetic to the Soviet Union and the new regimes of Eastern Europe and had provided visitors when no one else would... This point was made in a discussion between Sir William Hayter, British Ambassador in Moscow, and Mr Yakovlev, the Deputy Head of VOKS. In his despatch to the Foreign Office, Hayter reported that they spoke of the Anglo-Soviet Friendship Society and the Society for Cultural Relations and their involvement in arranging delegations to the Soviet Union. Hayter considered that Yakovlev:

seemed to be somewhat on the defensive about this, recognised that they were under Communist control and had been banned by the Labour Party, but asked how, if they did not arrange meetings through them, they were to do it; he said they would like to put the matter "on a broader basis." Hayter remarked to Hohler that this would fit in well with the proposals which they had discussed when he was in London.
Within the Foreign Office, L Richardson commented that Yakovlev's raising of the question of the channel for cultural relations and his remarks confirmed the impression formed from ones made earlier at a meeting with Mr Corsellis of the E.I.C. that the Soviet authorities would be prepared to deal with a more representative body than the two societies. (95)

Hohler told Hayter that in London the Foreign Office were careful to avoid any connection with the celebrations of "British-Soviet Friendship Month", an annual event held in November under the auspices of the British-Soviet Friendship Society. A circular was issued in the Foreign Office and, with the approval of the Home Office, advice was offered to other Ministries in Whitehall, that invitations to functions which were being held in connection with this event should be refused, even if they came from the Soviet Embassy. This attitude was adopted because the various concerts, receptions and meetings were clearly advertised as being under the sponsorship of the Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR (SCR) and the British-Soviet Friendship Society (BSFS). BSFS was proscribed by the Labour Party, but SCR was not similarly discredited, and Foreign Office efforts were "chiefly directed towards enlightening Whitehall about the true nature of SCR." (96)

Hohler advised Hayter to boycott any function in Moscow with which SCR or BSFS were demonstrably connected, although he admitted exceptions had been made in London as they were not able to explain to the Soviet Embassy the real reason for the refusal of invitations, considering it best "not to make our hostility to the SCR and BSFS clear to the Soviet Embassy until we can point to the existence of some alternative body capable of organising Anglo-Soviet cultural exchanges." (97) At that moment in time there was a proposed Committee
under the auspices of the British Council for organising cultural exchanges which, Kohler stated, "would of course meet our needs admirably."

Later that year the Soviet Relations Committee of the British Council was established: "formed with the encouragement of H.M.G., with the object, inter alia, of thwarting the activities of the so-called 'friendship societies'." Jellicoe informed the Charge d'Affaires in Moscow that the Foreign Office had taken steps to see that the Soviet Embassy had no illusions about H.M.G.'s attitude toward these societies.(98) With Foreign Office approval the Chairman of the Soviet Relations Committee, Mr Mayhew of IRD, had spoken to the Soviet Embassy on several occasions about the "undesirability of channelling exchanges through unrepresentative organisations."(99) The British representative at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers also took this line with the Soviet delegation. The Foreign Office had subsequently taken a much stronger stand about performances organised for British-Soviet Friendship Month, trying to get them under the auspices of the Soviet Relations Committee rather than BSFS. Jellicoe considered it desirable that the Soviet authorities in Moscow be left in no doubt about the strength of H.M.G.'s feelings in this matter: "I think it desirable to make our position clear cut to the Russians."(100)

At the same time as Hayter was indicating to Yakovlev that delegations to Moscow by unrepresentative bodies were not approved as exchanges likely to foster good relations between the two countries, Prebendary Arrowsmith was delivering a similar message at the Moscow Patriarchate on behalf of the Archbishop of Canterbury.(101) On December 28, 1954, after assuring the Partiarch that Fisher "was anxious to do everything possible to strengthen the ties between the two Churches", Arrowsmith raised the subject of the invitation
to Canon Collins. The Patriarch knew nothing of this, and Metropolitan Nikolai explained it had been a parallel invitation from the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet All-Union Baptist Society. Arrowsmith said that "the Archbishop would greatly appreciate it if he could be informed of such invitations." Expressing concern that he had not been, it was agreed that in future invitations to Anglican delegations were to be made through the Archbishop. This was clearly a means of controlling the personnel who formed such delegations and was essentially intended to stop the visits of left-wing clergy and replace them with delegates who enjoyed the support and approval of the Church of England and hence the Foreign Office.

The Moscow Embassy sent a despatch reporting the conversation between Arrowsmith and Alexei to the Foreign Office, from where Jellicoe sent a copy to Waddams. Arrowsmith told the Embassy that Fisher had opposed the Collins' delegation and warned two Anglican clergymen not to take part, he also reprimanded Collins.

Fisher's intervention certainly had the desired impact. In July 1955, the official objection to these sorts of delegations was stressed by Waddams to a delegation of Russian Christians visiting the United Kingdom. He told them that the Archbishop of Canterbury, on more than one occasion, had adverted to the character of unofficial delegations visiting Russia of Church of England clergymen, pointing out that some very unwise persons had been included. The Churchmen told Waddams that Karpov, secular Head of Religious Affairs in the Soviet Union, had "made a point at their last reception that delegations should be more official and steps would be taken to implement this on their return."
The Russian delegation had been invited by the Archbishop of Canterbury in his official capacity as President of the British Council of Churches. Before issuing the invitation, the Council consulted the Foreign Office "informally". The Foreign Office response was discussed in a minute which noted:

We encouraged them to proceed with it, since, as you know we favour direct exchanges of this sort between representative bodies in the Soviet Union and this country. (105)

Despite this policy, it was also policy to oppose the peace movement, and amongst the clergy invited, were those who had given it active support. A confidential memorandum within the Foreign Office considered "Should we grant visas to these members of the delegation of Russian Churchmen, invited to this country by the BCC, who are connected with the Peace Campaign?" (106) It was thought that "In view of the fact that contributions to the Peace Campaign are 'de rigueur' with the Churches in the Soviet Union", making it difficult to have a representative delegation without one or two peace campaigners, and as these particular clergymen were not exceptionally prominent in the Peace Campaign, nor were they coming to England to promote it, visas ought to be granted. This decision was influenced by the fact that: "To refuse them visas would gravely embarrass their hosts and would, I suspect, be taken amiss by public opinion."

The Foreign Office thus recommended to the Home Office that they did not wish Peace Campaign affiliations to be a bar to the granting of visas on this occasion. (107) IRD concurred. (108)

Nonetheless, the issue of visas for the Russian Churchmen was raised again, questioning whether in view of the lateness of their application they should be refused. Although they were not refused, they were delayed; and on July 1, 1955, Hayter informed the Foreign Office that the Patriarchate had
informed the Embassy that in the absence of visas they had been obliged to alter their travel arrangements. The Patriarchate wished it to be known that they were offended by this delay. (109) When the delegation did arrive, the Foreign Office advised the Secretary of State not to attend the British Council of Churches' reception for the delegation, stating it was not high ranking, "definitely the third XI." The Home Office were informed of this advice, being "rather sensitive about being left out of things of this sort." (110)

This cavalier attitude toward the Russian Christians, despite the "reputable nature" of their British sponsors, illustrated that the Foreign Office were far from reconciled about how to view or treat the Churches in the Soviet Union. Although a Commonwealth Relations Office Memorandum, dated July 26, 1955, had noted, "we are anxious to support the Christian Church within the Soviet Union, of whatever denomination", within the Foreign Office there was a diversion of opinion as to whether the Russian Churches were friends or foes, particularly with regard to the Russian Orthodox Church. In July 1954, Sir V Hayter had reviewed the position and prospects of the Russian Orthodox Church, stating:

This picturesque anachronism naturally attracts the attention of foreign visitors, some of whom tend to regard the Church as the only form of organised opposition to the Communist 'line' and to imagine that at some future date it might emerge as an independent and active force. Such hopes are in my opinion without foundation. (111)

Hayter argued that a superficial view might indeed create the impression that the Church in the Soviet Union was by no means in a bad way, but such a favourable impression would be misleading. (112) He posited that the Church survived on sufferance for two main reasons: that it was no danger to the regime and was of some slight positive use: "It plays its part in the Peace
Campaign at home and abroad, and from its continued existence the Soviet Government can claim credit for tolerance and magnanimity. Hayter expressed his agreement with Lenin by remarking that the Church kept some people happy who might otherwise be tiresome: "i.e. it is still to some extent 'the opium of the people'." (113)

Hayter considered that survival was the most the Russian Church could hope for in the future, which, apart from the attitude of the regime, he attributed to the inherent nature of the Orthodox Church. Noting that it had long been subject to the State, he called its leaders "timid, cautious, sly characters", and stated that the Orthodox religion lacked moral content and missionary zeal, remarking that it "never much bestirred itself to attract believers." (114) Hayter emphasised the formal observance, carried out in traditional detail, at traditional length and in traditional, and to most Russians incomprehensible, Church Slavonic, of the Orthodox Church, which he regarded as not only ill-equipped to challenge Soviet materialism, but further considered it unlikely that it either could or would adapt itself to face this task. (115)

Hayter thought that as material conditions improved and the regime was able in some measure to justify its promises, "the people will have less need to look beyond it for comfort than they do now; they will have less need of opium." He concluded that the Church enjoyed little popular support and that its influence seemed unlikely to increase to any marked extent in the future, but that there was no reason why it should not be permitted to exist for some time to come as it had its uses in the propaganda field and presented no threat to the regime. (116)
Hayter's observations and conclusions would not have been agreed by numerous independent observers, nor were they fully endorsed within the Foreign Office. Richardson and Jellicoe agreed with Hayter's conclusions, although Richardson thought there were too many imponderables to be dogmatic about the future. He disagreed that observers saw the Russian Church as potential opposition, his impression being that they were more likely to think of the Orthodox Church as prosperous and free and a willing partner in the Soviet Peace Campaign. (117)

Jellicoe and Richardson recommended that the despatch be printed. Hohler, however, advised against this; partly because subsequent to its being written there was a renewal of anti-religious propaganda in the Soviet Union which he felt changed the situation; and also because he disagreed with much of its content. He argued that if it had been possible to destroy the Russian Church this would have been done in the early days of the Revolution, and while he agreed with Hayter that its survival in relative peace was because it caused no real anxiety to the regime, he also considered that was "because the regime has found the religion of the people too insidious to stamp out." He also thought it:

...arguable that traditional church observance does contain for Orthodox believers (and half-believers) a greater challenge to dialectical materialism than if the Church deserted its traditional role and entered the arena of politics. During the most dangerous days of the war the Church emerged as having a far greater hold on the minds and imagination of the people than Western observers had realised to be true then, and the Soviet Government were glad to seek its assistance in keeping people happy in the bad times. Many more churches are open now than during the war and a further moment of national stress might yet reveal new strength in the Church, if it can keep its position and survive. To survive it must, as Sir W Hayter says, be sly; and it is also possible that the traditional services in Church Slavonic provide as good a target for sly inscrutability as can be found. (118)
Mrs B Miller, of the Foreign Office Research Department and the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations respectively, took issue with Hayter on a number of counts. She agreed that it was not in the nature of the Russian Orthodox Church to act as an organised potential opposition to any regime, nonetheless, if times of trouble were ever to recur in Russia, it was not impossible that the Church would serve as a rallying point for national unity and a focus of order and authority. Commenting that Church leaders could hardly be any other than cautious and sly if they were to survive, Miller saw distinctions between individual characters and groups among the hierarchy:

... some give the impression of genuine Christians biding their time, others of being complete 'stooges' of the regime, with in between a group of not altogether insincere Jingoists who regard Soviet successes in the world 'not without relish'.(119)

Miller added that the underground or non-juring Church should not be forgotten; though acknowledging that its influence might be exaggerated, she stated that it undoubtedly existed and there was evidence that many Christians in the Soviet Union had little to do with the official Church.

Miller considered that Hayter's description of the Russian Church as lacking missionary zeal required some qualification. The Byzantine Church before the Turkish conquest was certainly as zealous in evangelising as Rome, and the Russian Church in the nineteenth century prosecuted a most vigorous missionary policy. As to Church Slavonic, Miller declared it to be at least as comprehensible to Russians as was Latin to Italians; observing, moreover, possibly with a thought to the interpretation of the Gospel according to Christian Socialists such as Hewlett Johnson and Stanley Evans, that: "A
Protestant Church with its main emphasis on the Ministry of the Word is more exposed to perversion by Communists."\(^{(120)}\)

Although the validity of Hayter's observations were questioned in the Foreign Office, and by no means agreed, still it was suggested that his despatch be brought to the attention of the Anglican authorities. It was proposed that IRD send a copy to Waddams. This proposal was supported by Hohler, who had himself been at variance with Hayter's views, on the grounds that, "...we should not encourage wishful thinking at Lambeth." Moreover, Hohler considered the time particularly propitious in that the Foreign Office were currently well placed to put over "unvarnished facts" as the Archbishop of Canterbury had recently written to the Secretary of State to say that he had been very much impressed by the news he had received of the religious activities of the Foreign Office Missions and Legations in Iron Curtain countries.\(^{(121)}\)

As Waddams was then at the WCC's Assembly at Evanston, the issue was raised by RH Mason with CFR's Mr Holt, who was informed that the Foreign Office had a document they wished Waddams to see. Holt took the opportunity of his conversation with Mason to discuss the views of Serge Bolshakoff who, he explained, worked closely with CFR and was considered an expert on the Orthodox Church. Bolshakoff, he said, was at that time writing two books on the Church behind the Iron Curtain, one for publication in Britain and one for America. Bolshakoff had written to Holt that a friend whose judgement he trusted had recently been in Russia and had reported that he had been particularly struck by the fact that the churches in Moscow were open and full during Easter, that the Orthodox monastery at Zagorsk had been beautifully restored and that
numerous monastic communities and young monks and pilgrims were to be seen:"

He had estimated that 30% of the total population of Moscow go to church
regularly and that this proportion was higher than that in most European
capitals and other cities including Paris, Barcelona and Brussels. He applied
this percentage to the whole of the Soviet Union and concluded that there are
millions of Christians in Russia."

Holt told Mason that Bolshakoff had formed a favourable view of conditions
for Christians in the Soviet Union. It seemed to Mason an altogether too
favourable view. He expressed scepticism at the indication that conditions were
favourable for believers, particularly in view of the reported revival of
religious persecution. Holt had heard of this also, and said he regarded
Bolshakoff's figures with some reserve. Mason, however, had the impression that
Holt was inclined to believe the general picture painted by Bolshakoff and was
clearly concerned at the prospect:

We are of course aware that there is a tendency in the Church of
England Council on Foreign Relations to emphasise the fact that the
Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union still gives Christian witness and to
ignore, or minimise, the fact that they suffer themselves to be used as a
tool of the Party and the Government. It is not to be expected that the
Council would see eye to eye with us on this matter and it has never been
our policy to insist too much upon the political aspect. Nevertheless I
cannot help feeling slightly uneasy about the potentialities of Mr B. to
encourage the Council to be even more tolerant towards the Orthodox Church
in the Soviet Union. I hope to see Mr Holt in the near future and find
out a little more about B. and their attitude toward him. (122)

Mrs Miller, herself an experienced member of CFR, offered some reassurance on
this point, declaring that the Council was not unduly influenced by Bolshakoff
who was at best an "Exalte." (123)

On his return from Evanston, Waddams called at the Foreign Office on
September 23, 1954, to read the Hayter despatch. It had been decided in the
Foreign Office that security at Lambeth was inadequate to permit its release there. (124) Waddams read the despatch in Mason's office. His main objection was that the Ambassador was not altogether justified in saying that the Church enjoyed little popular support; he considered the recent anti-religious drive in the Soviet Union indicated the contrary. Although he agreed that it had a long history of subservience to the State, he felt that the Russian Church had developed a strong spiritual side. Nor did Waddams accept that it had been lacking in missionary zeal, particularly within Russia; moreover, it had been active in Alaska and the Middle East, although he realised that the latter had had political inspiration. Reporting this meeting with Waddams and the latter's reaction to Hayter's comments, Mason stated:

Mr Waddams did not react nearly as strongly to Sir William Hayter's criticisms of the Orthodox Church as I have known him to react to much milder criticisms in the past. (125)

The Foreign Office were clearly pleased to see that Waddams was coming to view the issue from a similar perspective to themselves. They subsequently informed Hayter that Waddams' comments were rather similar to their own and those of the Foreign Office Research Department. (126)

When the anti-religious drive referred to above had begun, the Foreign Office, with evident satisfaction, had noted its prompt seizure by the Press. They were less pleased with a series of articles on Russia by Patrick Sergeant published in the Daily Mail in October 1954, which included a favourable assessment of the religious situation. (127) Sergeant's articles were based on his acceptance of the Soviet challenge of actually going to Russia and seeing "what sort of people we are - how we live and what we believe in."
Sergeant reported the strength of the Russian Churches and Russian spirituality. He stated that the Churches in Russia were both free and flourishing, both spiritually and financially, and with congregations full to overflowing. He found that the anti-religious campaign was affecting neither church attendance nor religious freedom, and quoted one Baptist minister who thought the campaign actually of benefit to the churches as it aroused the people's interest in religion. Declaring religion to be a strong, free and growing force in the Soviet Union. Sergeant praised the Russian churches, claiming it was they which, knowingly and deliberately, would prevent the submission of the Russian people to Communist ideology. (128)

The revival of anti-religious propaganda was the subject of Hayter's report to Eden on November 19, 1954. He reported that Kruschev had signed a decree issued by the CPSU, "On Mistakes in Carrying out of Scientific-Atheist Propaganda among the Population," which was published in Pravda. While the decree re-stated the Party's attitude to religion, it associated Kruschev personally with a particularly moderate line in a question closely affecting popular feelings and criticised recent excesses in anti-religious propaganda, stating:

The feelings of believers must be respected and there must be no administrative interference in the work of religious bodies. It was entirely wrong to represent clergy and believers as politically unreliable. (129)

Hayter insisted that the position of the Orthodox Church remained as described in his July despatch. Similarly, Soviet leaders remained committed to a thoroughly materialistic society. However, he stated that "In issuing this
corrective it seems to me that the party leaders deliberately took the occasion
to make a significant shift in the general line":

If the Party had merely wanted to check local excesses and raise
propaganda standards, they could have done this, as they have done it
before, by suitable articles and lectures. No decree, especially a decree
issued with the personal authority of the Secretary of the Party, was
necessary. It was unnecessary also for the Party to emphasise so
categorically that the clergy and the believers in the Soviet Union are
good citizens, and generally above political suspicion. The statement
criticises the excesses which have occurred much more sharply than
hitherto. I suspect that the effect of the statement will be to increase
church attendances; religion will become almost respectable, although of
course, only for non-party people. The statement is likely to be well
received, not so much perhaps for the greater tolerance which it promises
for religious practice - that would only touch a small minority of the
population - but because the moderation in anti-religious propaganda for
which it calls is another step away from the Russia of the purges which
was brought to mind at the time of the Doctors's plot on January, 1953.
While being in no sense a departure from basic Communist doctrine on
religion, this new statement smacks of common sense rather than any
extremism. It seems to be another step in the regime's slowly evolving
policy of trying to turn the Soviet Union into a "normal" country, whilst
maintaining its Marxist-Leninist basis.... the Soviet leaders want to instil
into the people the common sense "efficient" attitude to life which they
themselves think is necessary for the solution of the Soviet Union's
present problems. Both religion and excess of religion are unnecessary
distractions, and baiting of religious people merely sets up conflicts
within Soviet society without achieving any practical purpose.(130)

It is noteworthy that Waddams was not summoned to the Foreign Office to read
this Hayter despatch, as with the previous, nor was it referred to him.

Following the Russian delegation's visit to England, the Church of England
arranged to send an Anglican delegation to the Russian Orthodox Church in July
1956. The prospect of this visit concerned Sir W Hayter, who viewed the
Russian Church as a tool of the regime and wrote to Hohler in December 7, 1955,
urging caution on the Anglican delegation.(131) Hohler accordingly spoke with
Waddams, although he told Hayter that he had to go carefully with the Anglican
authorities as they did not readily accept advice from the Foreign Office about
their relations with other Churches: "They would, I am sure, feel that it was
their Christian duty to give such aid and comfort as they can to Churches in
Eastern Europe whose position under Communist rule is so appallingly difficult."
There was also the further consideration that as the position of these Churches
was perfectly valid canonically, "however subservient they may be to the secular
power, the Anglican authorities have no choice but to give them full
recognition."(132)

Hohler did, however, sound a note of caution to Waddams, and was able to
inform Hayter that: "the worthy canon, (about whom there is nothing starry-eyed) made it quite clear that they were aware of the pitfalls you have in
mind."(133) For example, the discussions in Moscow were not to disturb their
relations with the Oecumenical Patriarch. The intention, therefore, was to go
as far, but no further, than they already had gone in their discussions with the
latter.(134)

While Hayter welcomed this proposal concerning the extent of the
discussions, he was disturbed by Hohler's remark that the Church of England did
not readily accept advice regarding their relations with foreign churches:

I quite see that we have to go carefully with the Church of England
in this matter. They will surely admit, however, that the external
relations of the Russian Church must be closely controlled by the Soviet
Government, that any "aid and comfort" extended in this connexion to the
Church would probably also bring "aid and comfort" to the Government, and
that to this extent the Foreign Office is entitled to put its views
forward.(135)

The ambiguous attitude of the Foreign Office to the Churches in Eastern
Europe, and the problems this created for Lambeth, was again displayed in April
1956, in regard to the visit of the Supreme Catholicos of the Armenian Church
to the Armenian Church in Britain. Fisher had invited him to stay at Lambeth
Palace and had written to H.M. the Queen suggesting that she might wish to receive the Catholicos. He also invited the Secretary of State to a dinner which he was giving for the Catholicos during his visit. Added to this, CFR had been approached by Archbishop Toumayan, the Head of the Armenian Church in England, with a suggestion that the Foreign Office might be prepared to send a representative to meet the Catholicos when he arrived at London airport. The Soviet Relations Committee also considered whether they should offer hospitality to the Catholicos. (136)

All these questions were considered in the Foreign Office, as was the fact that: "The Armenian Church, in collaboration with the Russian Orthodox Church, has vigorously supported the Soviet 'Peace' Campaign":

The statements of Soviet Church leaders are exploited in Soviet propaganda to further the current aims of Soviet foreign policy. Recognition of the Catholicos by H.M.G. might be used to aid Soviet subversive activities in the Middle East. (137)

There was also the consideration that branches of the Armenian Church in the Middle East were staunchly anti-Soviet. (138) The decision was therefore taken that H.M.G. should not make any special effort to mark the visit of the Catholicos to Britain. Hohler thus recommended that the Queen was not to receive the Catholicos; the Secretary of State was not to attend the dinner, and a Foreign Office representative would not meet him at the airport. (139)

In the immediate post-war period, the Foreign Office had seen the potential of Christianity to form the core of popular resistance in Eastern Europe to Communism. (140) To this extent the Christian Churches there were to be supported. However, this perspective was sharply tempered by the fact that where the Christian Churches established working relations with the Communist
regimes, then Christianity became a means of reconciling Christians to the Communist authorities. The Churches were also useful in supporting the Communist propaganda offensive against the West. Causing yet more concern was the fear that the Churches could help the Soviet Union to promote Pan Slavism, and thus become a medium for Russian imperialist ambitions. Doubts about the Eastern European Christian Churches appeared confirmed to the Foreign Office when those Churches voiced support for the Peace Movement. From viewing these Churches as potential weapons of internal subversion within their own countries against the Communist regimes, the Foreign Office came to regard them with some suspicion as they recognised their potential to be used to the advantage of their Communist Governments against the West.\(^{(141)}\) However, the one consideration did not necessarily negate the other, and there was considerable ambivalence and conflicting attitudes within the Foreign Office on this issue.

Governments either side of the East-West divide saw the Churches of the other as national tools, and sought to use their own Churches accordingly, each side trying to give an appearance that in all cases the Churches gave their support freely, willingly and independently. This not only confronted the Churches with numerous difficulties at home, but put ecclesiastical relations in real jeopardy. United in loyalty to God, earthly allegiance divided the Churches. Churches either side of the divide recognised the restraints placed on their brethren by their respective Governments, East and West. The methods differed, but the aims did not. All the Churches understood the necessity of rendering unto Caesar. As the Cold War thawed more normal ecclesiastical relations could be pursued; as normal, that was, in a world where the demands of Caesar tended to displace those of God.
NOTES: Chapter 8.


3. Memorandum, unsigned, but initialled by Barron which suggests either written or received by him; undated, but can be placed shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War and the Patriarch's appeal; CFR Papers.

4. See appendix, "Stanley Evans".


6. Ibid.

7. Waddams to Fisher, memorandum, November 26, 1951; CFR Papers


10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.


14. Ibid.

15. Religion and the People, February 1951; In August 1951, Religion and the People, using as its source the Kwan Ming Dail of July 11, 1951, reported an interview with Chao-Tse-chen, the Principal of the school of religion of Yenching University, about why he had resigned as one of the Presidents of the WCC. Chao-Tse-chen had been appointed in August 1948 by the preparatory committee to represent the younger Churches of the Philippines, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Burma, India and Africa as one of the six Presidents of the WCC. In July 1950 the Central Committee of the WCC issued a statement condemning North Korea as an aggressor and questioning the motive of the Stockholm Peace Appeal. He, however, was not consulted, and the first he knew of it was what he read in the press. In view of the support of the WCC for the UN action in Korea, and as a loyal citizen of the Republic of China, Chao-Tse-chen felt himself in an anomalous position. His resignation letter stated that he should have endorsed the WCC statement condemning Korea as an aggressor as one of the Presidents, and he could thus no longer remain in that position.

16. Ibid.
17. Ibid, March 1951.


19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.


27. Catlin to Parker, July 22, 1952; FO 953 1216 122431.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.


32. Ibid.

33. E.L., minute, January 10, 1951; FO 371 96243.

34. Minute, unsigned, February 28, 1951; FO 371 96240.

35. Somers-Cocks to Foreign Office, February 28, 1951; FO 371 96293; Somers-Cocks reported that the Pope's pronouncements on peace, contained in his Christmas allocution for 1950 and in his speech to the Diplomatic Corps on New Year's Day, had had "more serious repercussions":

The first sign of this was an article in the non-party newspaper II Messaggero of January 5th, suggesting that these pronouncements indicated a shift of emphasis in Vatican policy. According to the writer, the Pope was showing a more intense preoccupation for peace and trying to lift the Holy See to a position above the dispute between East and West. He was now addressing himself to the Atlantic Powers and to the United States in particular, and pleading for a four-power conference and a settlement in the Far East. In the immediate post-war period, the open hostility shown by Russia and its satellites to Catholicism had driven the Holy See into a de facto cooperation with the United States and the Western Powers against Communism. That policy, however, lasted only so long as the war remained "cold". As soon as there were signs of a "live" war, the Vatican made it clear that the anti-Communist forces in the world must remain at peace up to the last possible moment and that for the sake of peace one should negotiate with anyone, rejecting no understanding reconcilable with the highest Christian principles. In particular, there must be no question of a preventative war. The correspondent in Rome of the Times thereupon spread this thesis outside Italy in an article published in his newspaper on January 6th. He commented, however, that this shift of emphasis in Vatican policy, if such it were, clearly could not mean that the Catholic Church would lessen its opposition to Communist atheism. L'Osservatore Romano of January 10th gave emphatic confirmation to the Times.
correspondent's conclusion, but denied strongly that there was any shift of emphasis in the Church's policy; it remained what it always had been, in favour of a true Christian peace.

However, L'Osservatore Romano's denials have failed to damp down speculation. Early in February, H.M. Embassy in Italy told to me that it was still current in Rome, while... it has reached France and gained considerably in amplitude... it is suggested in France that the Vatican has changed its attitude towards Communism and that the Pope is in favour of peace at any price, or at any rate of appeasement of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, if the Vatican took an openly defeatist or neutralist line, the effects on French Catholic circles might be very serious.

36. Ibid, MD Butler, minute, March 6, 1951.

37. Ibid, Somers-Cocks to GP Young, November 8, 1951; WV1071/10. Somers-Cocks report about the Holy See and neutralism was sent to the Foreign Office in April 1951: Somers-Cocks to Western Department, April 24, 1951; FO 371 96290 WV1071/6.


40. Ibid, NJA Cheetham, minute, May 26, 1952.


42. Ibid, Roberts to Robey, July 31, 1952.

43. Ibid, Robey to Roberts, August 14, 1952.
44. Roberts to Kirkpatrick, October 17, 1953; FO 371 107803 WV1011/2.

45. Ibid, Kirkpatrick, minute, December 2, 1953.

46. Roberts to Foreign Office, May 23, 1953; FO 371 107810.

47. Roberts to Eden, June 19, 1952; FO 371 162143 WV1022/2.

48. Roberts posited that in recent years the Vatican had come to regard democratic institutions as providing the best opportunity for the Church to conduct its affairs without State interference, subject, however, to reservations:

"The Holy See does not admit that the Will of the People, even though expressed in a constitutional manner, must always prevail.... if the people have the right to place in power an atheistic-materialistic regime such as Communism, then democracy is to that extent a faulty system."

Valuing stability highly, the Holy See preferred constitutional monarchy to democratic republics which when unstable and superceded allowed the Communists to fish in troubled waters. The Holy See felt that the Catholic Church, as by far the most powerful spiritual influence in the world for the defence of the free world against Leninist Communism, ought not to have to rely on the Christian-Democrats to save Italy from Communism every few years to prevent the Pope becoming a prisoner in an enclave, cut off from the world by an all-powerful Italian Communist Government. Roberts considered it was this that had induced a special degree of nervousness in the Vatican of late, prompting the
Holy See to make its unwise attempt to persuade Centre parties to join forces with the Neo-Fascists in the recent elections. Roberts concluded that:

... the Holy See would like to see, *mutatis mutandis* of course, the sort of situation which existed in England in the days of the Old and Young Pretenders, when there was liberty for all except Catholics, who were too subversive of the established order to enjoy that liberty.

49. Roberts to Eden, January 4, 1952; FO 371 102143; on November 23, 1951, the Consulate General in Jerusalem reported to the Foreign office a rumour regarding plans for the Papacy should Russia invade Rome. Arrangements had been made for sufficient numbers of Cardinals to leave Italy for Canada where a new Pope would be elected. The old Pope would resign and remain in Rome; so as not to be charged with running away, but to deprive Russia of the person of the Supreme Pontiff in their possession. They had no idea if the story were true.

When this was transmitted to the Legation to the Vatican, they commented on December 4, 1951, that it was not unlikely to be true that the Holy See would be evacuated. During the Berlin air-lift, transfer plans were made for the New World - the Legation thought more likely South America than Canada. In 1948, however, the Pope insisted he would never leave Rome. Now, however, the Legation considered that he would go too having seen how many prelates behind the Iron Curtain speak as the Communists wished. The Legation told the Foreign Office that they would be grateful if they would treat this matter as secret. FO 371 96243.

51. Roberts to Kirkpatrick, October 17, 1953; FO 371 107803 Wv1011/2.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.


55. Fisher was greatly alarmed when in January 1952, he received a cablegram from Myron Taylor stating that he and the President wished to publish the correspondence between himself and the Archbishop "concerning parallel religious endeavours toward world peace during the period 1948-51." Behind this request was Truman's desire to represent himself as a seeker of peace at a time when the whole world feared that American action in Korea risked global strife. Fisher had early recognised these "endeavours" to be anti-Communist manoeuvres and had no desire for his part in them to be made public. The Archbishop replied to Taylor that the correspondence had been private and confidential:

... it was never in my mind that they should be made public, and if I had had that in mind, no doubt, there is much in them that I should have said otherwise, or not said at all. I could not authorise their publication as they stand, while if I went through them and altered them to make them suitable for publication, that would be a falsification of them.

There is, I think, a general principle involved here anyhow. Discussions at this level, such as we have had on such topics, are only possible if it is recognised that all that is said is informal and off the record. If at such discussions there was always looming the possibility that they might be made public in a few years' time, all the freedom and the value would go out of them. Fisher to Taylor, January 28, 1952; Vol 106: 201.
Fisher sent a copy of his reply to Sherill, noting that, "After all most of my letters were so framed as to be suitable to Myron Taylor's vague and woolly mind and to win his appreciation. I could not let them be published nor would it do any good to anybody." Fisher to Sherrill, January 28, 1952; Vol 106: 200.


57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Fisher to Bell, April 3, 1950; CFR Papers.

61. Ibid.


63. Fisher to Bell, April 3, 1950; CFR Papers.

64. Prestige to Bell, February 23, 1950; CFR Papers.

65. Ibid.


70. Daily Telegraph, January 8, 1952.


77. Ibid, Fisher to Don, June 6, 1952; Vol 105: 371.

78. Ibid.


80. Ibid.


84. Ibid.

85. Ibid; note written by hand and dated May 15, 1953, stated had telephoned Egg who said he would send two copies for CFR use.

86. Peck to Waddams, August 17, 1953; CFR Papers.

87. Ibid.
88. JO Rennie to Waddams, November 2, 1954; CFR Papers.


90. Ibid.

91. "Draft statement for the Archbishop to be read at the Bishops' Meeting", undated, but very probably November/December 1954; CFR Papers. On May 2, 1947, the Rev Stanley Evans, editor of Religion and the People, had asked JA Douglas, former Secretary of CFR, if he would address the British-Soviet Society's annual conference on June 7 and 8, 1947, in view of the great importance of British-Soviet relations at that time. Whether or not Douglas participated in the June conference is not stated in the papers, but on September 29 1947, Stanley Forman sent Douglas an agenda for the BSS National Conference and reminded him of his promise to take part. Douglas Papers, Vol 42: 74n. The BSS was regarded as a subversive organisation by the Foreign Office which wished to discourage reputable support such as that provided by reputable churchmen like Douglas.

Following the Foreign Office, the Church of England discouraged its clergy from supporting the friendship organisations with the Communist regimes and gave its own support to organisations which were sanctioned by the Foreign Office. One such was the Anglo-German Association which, according to the Fisher Papers, was formed in December 1951 and had the active support of Eden and the Foreign Office, Eden being President. Described as non-political, its aim was to create a better understanding between Britain and the new Germany.
Requested by the Honorable Harold Nicholson CMG to become a patron, Fisher replied:

I have every sympathy with an Anglo-German Association. The Church of England and the BCC have been doing a great deal to build up relations with Germans during the last few years, but of course it needs doing on a great scale. The Association of which you speak is obviously well sponsored, and I am very glad therefore to consent to be a patron of it whether or no other religious leaders accept your invitation.

Fisher to Nicholson, May 13, 1952; Fisher Papers, Vol 106: 137-138. Fisher's support and endorsement of this organization would inevitably influence clergy and laity alike, as would his condemnation of organizations promoting friendship with the Communist countries.

92. Lambeth already had in its possession a "blacklist" of clergy associated with SSCM, sent by John Baker White on April 5, 1950, with the "more interesting names marked". A memorandum on the Society stated:

This is the type of movement that lends itself to easy penetration and exploitation by Communist elements. In its statement of aims it admits that some of the members of the Society are members of the Communist Party. There is no suggestion that members of the organisation are all Communists, but by belonging to it they do place themselves in a position in which they may be exploited for Communist ends. The statement by the Society that, "We believe that the establishment of Socialism in any country depends upon maintenance and strengthening of good relations on a really permanent basis between the people of that country and the people of the USSR" has a very familiar ring about it. One of its more active members declared not long ago "Communism, like Christianity, stands for the equality of all races, the power of the working people, the dignity of women, belief in science and international peace." Broadly speaking this Society is a Marxist organisation formed to encourage the clergy to preach the class war from the pulpit.

One of the specifically marked members was the Rev John Kent. On April 28, 1950, the Archbishop of York wrote in his defence, explaining that he had joined the Society before it became so extreme and did not approve of its later
developments, although he had never resigned. Garbett stated that Kent was not a Communist, "or anything like one, though he is a supporter of the Labour Government..."; Fisher Papers, Vol 77: 290-3.

93. Hayter to Hohler, December 29, 1954; FO 371 116671 NS1052/1. VOKS, the Russian Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.


95. Ibid, L Richardson, minute, January 6, 1955.


97. Ibid.

98. Jellicoe to Charge d'Affaires, Moscow, January 4, 1956; FO 371 122839 569.

99. Ibid; One of the first indications to the Russians that their use of "friendship societies" was unwelcome to the Foreign Office, was a snub administered in Moscow to Hewlett Johnson by a Parliamentary Delegation. Johnson was not only prominently associated with friendship societies and an ardent exponent of friendship with Russia, but was actually the President of BSFS. On November 24, 1954, Hohler stated the necessity in a minute that the Foreign Office attitude toward BSFS and SCR should be made clear to the Soviet Embassy:
The Soviet authorities may not realise that H.M. Government do not propose to have any dealings with the BSFS and/or SCR and I think it to our advantage that the position should be made unmistakably clear to them. They will have been prepared for such a development by the refusal of the Parliamentary Delegation to the Soviet Union to sit down at table with the Dean of Canterbury. If they genuinely wish to promote Anglo-Soviet exchanges this may cause them to reverse their present policy of channelling such exchanges through communist-front organisations.

An obstacle to this policy was that initially the Foreign Office had no means of its own to replace the services provided by these societies, as JGW explained in a confidential memorandum to Hohler on December 3, 1954:

> I had some discussion with the Permanent Under-Secretary this morning about this problem and found him inclined to share my doubt about the feasibility of an all-out assault on these societies in present circumstances. It seems likely that we shall have to continue to act as best we can ad hoc and in the hope that if we can get some respectable machinery afoot for channelling Anglo-Soviet cultural exchanges we may be able to persuade or coerce the Soviet Government to deal more and more with that body to the neglect of the stooge organizations in this country. (The Soviets are always very ready to discard local Communists when they become more nuisance than use.)

To meet this contingency, the Soviet Relations Committee was formed; however, the Soviets did not discard the friendship societies as the Foreign Office had anticipated. Moreover, rather than the British Council's SRC superceding the societies, it endowed their activities with respectability, as Jellicoe observed:

> The Soviet attitude seems to be the quite pragmatic one that they will make what use they can of the Soviet Relations Committee and also continue to extend their contacts as far as possible with the various Friendship Societies in order to capitalise in every way on the present international situation.

> We are indeed getting to the situation in which the aura of respectability which the activities of the Soviet Relations Committee is conveying on Anglo-Soviet exchanges is redounding to the credit of the British-Soviet Friendship Society, whose real antecedents are unknown to the majority of the British public. (Jellicoe, Restricted Memorandum, September 1955; FO 369 5055 S1052/17).

Hohler expressed the same concern on September 16, 1955, observing:

> It seems clear that organisations like the British Soviet Friendship Society and the Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR are doing
their best to cash in on the "Geneva Spirit". They may be meeting with a measure of success. Some quite sensible people seem to be under the impression that, given the present relaxation of international tension, these societies may be coming more respectable... In view of this I think it desirable that a circular should be sent out to all Government Departments warning officials to keep clear of the British-Soviet Friendship Month manifestations, even if they are sponsored by the Soviet Embassy. (Hohler, Confidential Minute, September 16, 1955; FO 369 5055 S1052/20)

On January 4, 1956, the Foreign Office telegrammed to Moscow that:

We have recently taken every opportunity of impressing on the Soviet authorities our desire that Anglo-Soviet contacts should be entrusted to the Soviet Relations Committee or other representative organisations in this country, rather than to the British fellow-travelling societies. Our attitude towards the latter was made clear by our delegation at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers.

100. Ibid, Jellicoe to Moscow Charge d'Affaires, January 4, 1956.


Arrowsmith's message was reinforced by the Archbishop of York, an ecclesiastic who always had his finger on the Foreign Office pulse and whose pronouncements were disseminated far and wide. Moreover, just as CFR took note of the messages in the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, so it was known that their Soviet counterparts paid attention to the pronouncements of the English Archbishops, made in their monthly newsletters, as well as in the press. In May 1948 the Soviet Embassy had requested both Archbishops' newsletters, and back-copies, and the Rev John Findlow had written asking that they be sent
regularly straight from the publishers to the Soviet Embassy. (CFR Papers, Findlow to Fisher and Garbett, May 19, 1948.) Writing in his York Diocesan Leaflet for December 1954 about the prospects for peace, Garbett observed that co-existence was not a permanent substitute for world peace; that it should be a stage on the way to something more positive. He stressed that the West wished to live in peace with Russia and China and all Communist states and had no thoughts of aggression. Directly referring to the hopeful symptom of increased intercourse, the Archbishop stated: "It is, however, a mistake and may lead to dangerous misunderstandings if these delegations consist chiefly of pacifists and left-wingers who, quite unintentionally, may give to the Russian people a false view of the opinion in Great Britain."


103. A "Note to the Archbishop" in the Fisher Papers, unsigned and undated, but probably from Waddams and clearly in 1954, states that Collins had organised a trip to the USSR, with expenses paid by the Russians, for seven or eight Church of England clergymen, its aim being to pave the way for an official Anglican/Russian Orthodox get together. The venture was not approved by Lambeth. Fisher papers, Vol 138: 64.

105. Jellicoe to RMK Slater, Moscow, February 28, 1955; illustrative of the necessity for CFR to consider secular political implications as well as ecclesiastical in their dealings with foreign churches. was Waddams enquiry whether the Foreign Office had any objection to the BCC including their invitation to the Estonian and Latvian Churches in their letter to the Patriarch, adding: "We thought on ecclesiastical grounds it might perhaps be undesirable for Lutherans to be invited through the Orthodox Church. Politically, we wondered whether this might not imply recognition by the Churches here of the annexation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union." The Foreign Office replied:

...that the Russian Orthodox Church was not a State Church and that, although the Church of England was an established Church, the British Council of Churches could in no way be considered to be speaking for Her Majesty's Government in issuing the invitation. In any event the channelling of an invitation to the Estonian and Latvian Lutheran Churches through the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church would be quite compatible with the de facto recognition by Her Majesty's Government of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States.

106. Foreign Office Memorandum, unsigned, May 28, 1955; FO 371 116830. The Foreign Office were particularly concerned that the Metropolitan Nikolai, "one of the doughtiest Peace Campaigners", was among the delegates. As he was coming to the U.K. not on overt World Peace Council business, "but in response to an invitation from a most reputable body", the Foreign Office were prepared to recommend to the Home Office that he should not be refused a visa. IRD concurred in this view. It subsequently transgressed that he was not to come. The other Soviet delegates claimed it was owing to his health, but Waddams remarked in his diary that this was not the reason the Metropolitan himself
gave to the Christian Action delegation in Moscow; Waddams did not elaborate on what the Metropolitan said.

107. Ibid, June 14, 1955; NS1782/19.


110. Ibid, July 1955; FO 371 116830 NS1782/26. After the Russian delegation departed, Hugh S Young, of the Ministry of Defence (J.I.B.) Division of Scientific Intelligence, informed Pat Dean of the Foreign Office, on July 18, 1955, that he believed that the Dean of Westminster had gained interesting knowledge from conversation with the Russian delegation: "I know that the Foreign Office have to tread like Agog in any matters which touch religion, but in case the information is of any value to you I am passing it on." Dean, who was a friend of the Archbishop of York, subsequently called on the Dean of Westminster, however, there was no indication in the file of what trespassed between the two. FO 371 116830 S1782/32.

111. Hayter to Eden, "Reviews the position of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union and its potential opposition to the current regime", July 21, 1954; FO 371 111789 NS1781/8.
112. Ibid. During his meeting with the Patriarch, Stockwood had asked about the payment of priests. The Director had replied that that depended on the quality of the individual, since all priests were supported by their own faithful. In the towns it was possible for a good priest to earn 70 or 80 thousand roubles a year, some earned as much as 100,000, so the Director had heard. In the country, the income would be lower, but even there there was no hardship. (Account of interview between Canon Stockwood, the Director of the Moscow Patriarchate, and the Patriarch Alexei, sent by the British Ambassador in Moscow to Waddams; CFR Papers).

During the visit to the United Kingdom of the Russian Christian delegation, Waddams wrote in his diary:

One of the overwhelming impressions I received was of the immense wealth of the Russian Orthodox in terms of money. They seem to have so much that they do not know what to do with it - and the Academies are almost their only expense apart from personal salaries etc. It seems that the Church economically is entirely independent.

The Rev Masters, reporting the visit to Moscow of Father Barejska, stated that he was impressed by what he considered "the enviable prosperity of the clergy." He noted that the clergy lived on the alms of the faithful; while there was no Government support, buildings were held tax-free and kept in repair by the State. Barejska commented on the lavish expenditure involved in the Peace Congress, including expensive gifts from the Patriarch. (Masters to Waddams, May 21, 1952; CFR Papers) Waddams also remarked on this trait of giving gifts to visitors when he was a member of the visiting Anglican delegation to the Russian Church in 1956, observing that "The reception of the English delegation was extremely generous and warm.... Presents were showered upon the delegation from all and sundry to such an extent as almost to be embarrassing."


114. Ibid. Stockwood had told the Patriarch that in his opinion there were some fundamental errors in the Marxist theory and asked whether in the Soviet Union the Church engaged in any religious propaganda to combat the growth of atheism. The Patriarch replied that he possessed only the vaguest ideas as to the details of the Marxist system. He said, however, that this system clearly contained much that conflicted with religious teaching but that the Orthodox Church had never been a Church that engaged in militant proselytizing or propaganda. It was the duty of the Church to carry out its functions as laid down, to hold its services regularly and so on; but it had never sought to spread the faith by fire and sword. "God will provide", said the Patriarch in this connection. (Account of Interview between Canon Stockwood, the Director of the Moscow Patriarchate, and the Patriarch Alexei, sent by British Ambassador in Moscow to Waddams.)

115. Ibid. In contrast to Hayter's views, were those of the Rev Sydney Linton, who ministered to the British community in Moscow:

...as I see the crowds in the churches in Russia, I feel that Christian worship is a great national movement there. It is the people as a whole who go to church, not a class of church-goers. At least, the privileged classes of the regime are absent from church, but the mass of the people is there. The battle for religious worship does seem to have been won in Russia by the common people. And however much the regime may dislike it, to renew persecution of the church would be to rouse wide discontent. The church leaders must be conscious of their power and the backing they
possess in the people, even though they must walk warily vis-a-vis the regime.

116. Ibid.


118. Ibid, Hohler, minute, August 17, 1954.

119. Ibid, Miller, minute, October 5, 1954; Miller's views were repeated to Moscow, but not to Waddams when he was asked to read the Hayter despatch.

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid, Hohler, minute, August 20, 1954.

122. Ibid, Mason, minute, September 6, 1954.

123. Ibid, Miller, minute, September 6, 1954.


125. Ibid. In fact, neither Waddams nor CFR were as indulgent towards the Russian Orthodox Church as the Foreign Office imagined. However, Waddams' more apparent sympathy with the Foreign Office viewpoint could possibly be, in part,
attributed to his involvement at Evanston in establishing an Anglo-American group which hoped to influence both the Foreign Office and the State Department, which would be difficult if he were thought to take a pro-Soviet view. The idea for such a group originated with Waddams, and was chiefly concerned with discussing "matters of conflict or tension between the two countries; in this it emulated a major concern of the British Government as well as the Foreign Office. The idea was proposed to Waler van Kirk, Waddams stressing that "my idea was a small group of those like himself engaged pretty well whole time in that kind of sphere and having good contacts with the State Department and the Foreign Office." Waddams' Diary, "Evanston, USA, 1954"; CFR Papers.

126. Ibid, Northern Department to Moscow Embassy, October 29, 1954.


128. Another article which displeased the Foreign Office appeared in the Spectator, June 3, 1955, "Church and State in the Soviet Union", p 699. Written by John Lawrence on his return from Moscow as part of a Christian delegation which had visited the Russian Patriarch, it favourably reviewed the position of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union. Foreign Office minutes commented on the article:

It seems a pity that Mr Lawrence approaches his subject with the inhibiting thought - "and who are we to throw stones?" We have every right to expose the cynical exploitation of the Orthodox Church by the
Soviet State. Mr Lawrence's article could have been robuster. It could also have been worse.

Hibbert, June 8, 1955; FO 371 116830 NS1782/17

129. Ibid, Hayter to Eden, November 19, 1954.

130. Ibid.


132. Hohler to Hayter, February 27, 1956; FO 371 122981. Hohler told Hayter that, rather to the surprise of the English Churchmen, "the Russians made the running at the Lambeth meeting and seemed very anxious to push on towards closer relations and even inter-communion." While Hohler told Hayter that he was sure that he was right in urging caution on the English churchmen in their dealings with the Russian Church, he could not subscribe to his view that it was no more than a picturesque survival: "Any Church that has kept going under the pressure and persecution of the last 39 years in Russia has claims to be unexpectedly tough and inextinguishable".

133. Ibid.

134. Ibid.
135. Ibid; Hayter to Hohler, March 7, 1956; responding to Hohler's disagreement with his view of the Russian Orthodox Church, Hayter said:

As to the general condition of the Church here, I agree that it has considerable capacity for self-preservation. But, as you know, we have always been less optimistic than you as to its vitality. In my view it survives only because, and to the extent to which, the Soviet Government wishes it to survive.

He then informed Hohler that he preferred not to press further than he had for a firm commitment to dates for the arrival of the British delegation: "I should not wish to press them further; it would minister to their superiority complex to the Church of England."


137. Ibid.

138. Ibid.

139. Ibid.

140. On July 17, 1956, the Moscow Embassy sent the Foreign Office a translation of a Komsomol Pravda article indicating anti-religious activity:

The article is of interest as showing that in Lithuania there seem to be a considerable number of young people who attend church. The author's suggested remedies for this state of affairs are various. He first suggests that more pagan festivals should be organised such as those held at the end of spring sowing and also popularised versions of the ancient Lithuanian marriage ceremony. He secondly states that, "no church can
bear comparison with a good club" and suggests how kolkhoz clubs can be improved.

Moscow informed the Northern Department that copies of this letter were being sent with enclosure to IRD and FORD; and that "We shall draw the attention of the Church of England delegation to this article."

141. Even the Vatican, despite its unimpeachable anti-Communist credentials, was looked at askance by the Foreign Office when it seemed that some of the Pope's speeches on peace might lend support to the Peace Movement. See above.
Before the end of the Second World War, official British opposition to the Soviet Union, particularly its emergence as a world power, was manifest. At the end of the war, one of the strongest ingredients brought to their new offices by Attlee and Bevin in the summer of 1945 was hostility to the Soviet Union. In certain quite crucial respects these two Social Democrats were front runners in world anti-Communism. Subsequent American hegemony over the Western alliance was encouraged by the Labour Government which played a vital role in establishing the relationship between America and Europe in which the central theme was anti-Sovietism. During the period of the Attlee administration the evolution of British subservience to the United States was significantly advanced as Britain lined up against the Soviet Union and espoused enthusiastic Cold War ideology on the international front. This caused Britain to lock itself into a warfare economy, with closely integrated defence and security-intelligence networks.

The Cold War was clearly seen by all participants as a war on two fronts: abroad and at home. Internal controls over dissent were increased, particularly dissent from the political and military logic of the Cold War itself. The Cold War demanded conformity in a period which was characterised by the extreme polarity of left and right. This created a real dilemma for supporters of peace and those who advocated friendship with the Soviet Union, or indeed any of the new Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. This applied with equal force within spiritual institutions, despite their natural association with peace and reconciliation. In the Church of England pacifism was not always
approved, but it was generally tolerated. This tolerance was severely eroded by what the Anglican leadership termed the “Soviet-inspired” peace movement which it unequivocally condemned. The Anglican leadership morally endorsed the British Government’s anti-Communist policies and spiritually sanctioned the Western anti-Soviet alliance, and made it quite clear that dissent was not welcome.

On the domestic front the Church actively approved the purging of the state apparatus of “security risks” of doubtful “loyalty”. It imitated the Government in labelling left-wing opinion and activity as “subversive” and potentially connected to the enemy abroad, and by its very specific intervention in the domestic political community where it delegitimated certain ideas while strengthening others.

The Church was of exceptional value in projecting anti-Communism as a positive ideology which sought to promote and defend human rights, political freedom, religious toleration and so forth. Anti-Communists made great use of a rhetoric which assigned a very large place to these essential values, despite the selectivity which they brought to their defence and the indulgence which they proved willing to extend to the most repressive of regimes, provided they were not Communist. The Church not only acquiesced in this process, but on its own part vociferously condemned Communist persecution of religion while remaining silent about other forms of religious persecution perpetrated by supporters of the Western alliance.

Apart from the selectivity with which both Government and Church manifested their concern for human rights and freedoms, they both applied to them an extremely circumscribed meaning. These rights were taken to be violated when people were deprived of the opportunity to
exercise elementary civic and political rights and were persecuted for their opposition to their government or regime. However, as Hewlett Johnson, the Dean of Canterbury, persistently pointed out, human rights were also violated when people were denied the elementary requirements of life. Unemployment, poverty, hunger, disease induced by destitution and high mortality rates are great violations of human rights which anti-Communists failed to address. Anti-Communism rather led to the acquiescence in, and even the support of, social orders responsible for such violations, in opposition to movements which sought to undo the status quo.

The Church was an invaluable ally in the propaganda sphere of the Cold War. Its support for the West's anti-Communist forces greatly contributed to vesting the political policy of containment with the moral accoutrements of a spiritual crusade. The Church endorsed the concept of the bogey of a Soviet military threat of world-wide dimensions which sought to eradicate Western civilisation and destroy Christianity. This played an absolutely essential part in the development of an anti-Communist crusade theme which served to legitimate American and other interventionist enterprises in every part of the world against revolutionary and even reformist movements, on the principle that these movements, if allowed to grow and succeed would facilitate Russian expansionism aimed at world domination and the destruction of Western civilisation. It also served to legitimate the arms race.

Despite the fact that Church leaders were genuinely horrified by the destructive powers of nuclear weapons, they defended and justified the arms race on the grounds that the Soviet Union was an aggressive power
against which a nuclear deterrent was the only realistic alternative able to maintain the peace while preventing Soviet domination. Moreover, the rejection by Western statesmen of Soviet overtures directed toward limiting the arms race and securing peace received ecclesiastical support on the grounds that it was impossible to negotiate with regimes whose ideology denied the dignity of human beings.

When the Churches in Eastern Europe called on their brethren in the West to give their support to the Soviet peace movement, the Western Churches reiterated the political stand of their Western governments that the peace movement was a Soviet ploy to exploit people's desire for peace as part of their strategy of eventual world domination. By supporting the call for peace, the East European Churches were alleged by their Western counterparts to have become tools of Soviet expansionism. This created a spiritual divide which paralleled the political divide between East and West. A further divide within the Churches existed between left and right.

The Anglican Church had within it a strong tradition of Christian Socialism. However, with the descent of the blanket of conformity which comprised the Cold War, progressive views within the Church became increasingly unwelcome and subject to systematic attack. The Christian Socialists within the Anglican Church presented it with similar problems to those with which the modern Catholic Church has been confronted by liberation theology. Both begin with the position of the oppressed and read the Gospel from the point of view of the poor. In the immediate post-war period the Church of England could ill afford to be seen to be taking the part of the more affluent sectors of British society against
the working classes; nor could it appear to be witch-hunting, particularly given the British distaste for McCarthyism, when it was a putatively politically tolerant institution.

The outbreak of the Korean War hardened sentiment against Communism, and the perceived association in this period between not simply socialists, but political dissidents of all degrees, peace campaigners particularly, and the Soviet "enemy", encouraged the Church to take a more decisive line against its politically "turbulent" priests. This was particularly evident in the cases of Hewlett Johnson and Stanley Evans, both of whom were critics of Britain's Cold War policies, were opposed to the Anglo-American alliance, condemned the Korean War and advocated peace and friendship and trade with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European regimes.

At the end of the Second World War, Social Democracy and Christianity both found themselves poised in commanding positions on the world stage. In a war-torn world, where reconstruction and the building of new and better societies which would safeguard against the recurrence of a major war headed the priorities of most peoples, Social Democracy and Christianity were presented with both the challenge and the opportunity to establish themselves as popular movements, as well as to restructure the social order and implement more just and humane systems. These aspirations were, however, undermined by the Cold War and the traditional anti-Communism with which the leadership of both were imbued. By concentrating their post-war efforts on the containment of the Soviet Union and the stemming of the growth of Communism, Social Democratic and Christian forces contributed to the resurgence of reaction and their own eclipse as counter-revolutionary and conservative
powers came to the fore in the post-war world they had helped to create. In 1951 the Labour Government not only conceded power to a Tory Government headed by Winston Churchill, but left it without any effective socialist opposition as its own anti-Communist offensive had defeated the major forces of the Left, leaving them blunted and confused by the Cold War itself.

World War II had revealed to the Church the power of moral authority and the desire of people for a coherent and just system such as that promised in the New Testament. Ecclesiastic leaders perceived the potential in the post-war world for Christianity and the Church to reassert their influence both at the state level and in the hearts and minds of the common man. However, where their collusion with Government during the war and their opposition to Nazism had worked to their advantage, their collusion with Government after the war and their opposition to Communism did not effect the same impact. Both Fisher and Garbett were suspicious and wary of the socialist reforms effected by the Labour Government and reserved their most enthusiastic support for the Government's anti-Soviet foreign policy. The inability of the Anglican leadership to abandon their role as an institution of the Establishment and overcome the prejudices of their class and side with the cause of the common people on the domestic front alienated the Church of England from the ordinary man.

On the international front, Anglican support of British anti-Soviet policies created a rift between them and those Churches in the Eastern bloc which sought a modus vivendi similar to that enjoyed by their sister Churches with Western Governments. At the same time, the Anglican leadership found itself unable to comply with the demands of
the American President Truman to join in the creation of a religious anti-Communist front directed against the Soviet Union. This had nothing to do with ethics nor opposition to organised anti-Communism. There was recognition of the design as part of the plan for American domination and a feeling that it was too blatant a propaganda exercise. Also, deep-seated Anglican antipathy to Roman Catholicism and a conviction of superiority over other world religions prevented the Anglican leadership from committing itself to a religious anti-Communist crusade headed by the Pope and including diverse other faiths.

Anti-Communism divided the Churches East to West and right to left. The Second World War opened doors of opportunity for both Social Democracy and Christianity to assert themselves in Britain and throughout the world. Their submission to Cold War forces lost them these opportunities. The tragedy of Social Democracy was that its preoccupation with defeating Communism, perceived as a political and ideological rival, led to its failure to implement Socialism and contributed to its own political demise in favour of the class enemy of both Communism and Socialism. Similarly, the tragedy of the Churches was that they failed to implement Christianity. Like the Social Democrats, Christian leaders saw in Communism a rival, and had no hesitation in calling it a rival religion which they feared would have more appeal to the working classes than a Christianity much debased by centuries of political intrigue and association with the ruling classes. Yet again, however, in the effort to render unto Ceasar the things that were Ceasars' and unto God the things that were of God, the leadership of the Church of England got the balance wrong and allowed too much political accomodation and cooperation.
In many ways the post-war struggle against Communism must have appeared to the Anglican leadership as an ideal means for the Church on the level of state to re-establish its position as an authoritative institution, while, on the level of the people, to proselytize amongst the less privileged sectors, those most susceptible to the promise of Communism. By joining forces with the Government, however, and allowing itself to be used for political ends, the Church ultimately undermined its own authority and alienated those very classes it sought to win.

One of the declared aims of anti-Communism was to save Christian civilisation from Communism. In the process the Churches were mobilized and manipulated politically. The effect was to compromise the Churches and discredit Christianity.
Post-war Britain might have escaped the extreme purges of the McCarthyism which plagued Cold War America; the files of the National Council for Civil Liberties, however, prove that Britain suffered from an anti-Communist campaign which extended, as in America, beyond the persecution of Communists to include people of progressive and liberal thought and even to those who were mere associates of such people. While the British purges might not have been as extensive or as violent as the American, still they served the same essential purpose; to demonstrate that certain beliefs and associations were wrong and would not be tolerated. Like their American counterparts, they began at the centre, within government institutions, and then spread.

There are a number of reasons why the British purges never reached the extremes of those in America. Britain had a Socialist Government in the immediate post-war period, and while it initiated the witch-hunting against Communists, it was wary of its being extended too wide and thus attacking the base of its own support; although this did happen, particularly after the Tories took power in 1951. Naturally, the Tory opposition gave full support to the anti-Communist measures of the Labour Government. Ironically, had they tried to institute such measures, they would have encountered strong Socialist opposition.

Inevitably, concentrating public fear on the Left eroded Labour's own power base and aided the Tories. Once in power, the Tory Government proved far less discriminating than had the Labour Government, and the epitaph "Communist" was liberally applied to all who opposed Tory policy, although this process had, in
all fairness, begun under Labour, particularly with application to those who supported the peace movement or friendship with the Eastern regimes.

One of the most interesting facets which distinguished the British purges from the American, was the degree of caution applied. In America left-wingers were witch-hunted with an almost gay abandon, and McCarthy enjoyed, at least initially, an overwhelming amount of public and Republican support. In Britain Vansittart was dubbed "Lord Witch-hunt" and held up to general ridicule by the press which had vowed to keep Britain free from the McCarthyism which was seen as tainting their allies across the Atlantic. The British public was genuinely appalled by McCarthy and McCarthyism. Until 1948 official British foreign policy had been friendship with Russia. While the vast majority of the British people and were overwhelmingly opposed to Communism in Britain, they preferred some sort of modus vivendi with the Communist regimes to a relationship of tension and conflict which might lead to war.

Concern existed at all levels of British society that rampant McCarthyism might take America into waters into which Britain preferred not to venture. This meant a certain caution in the domestic application of the British purge in comparison to the unrestrained abandon of the American version. In Britain, where security was involved, the charge of Communism, or association with Communism, was regarded as valid. In other areas, while Communism or, more usually, progressive opinion was the motivating factor for removing a suspect from their post, alternative causes would often be cited. This guarded against possible charges of witch-hunting and a public outcry against "McCarthyism". There were certain commercial institutions which unashamedly and unreservedly
emulated McCarthy tactics. Establishment institutions, however, particularly the Universities and the Church, preferred a more cautious approach. (3)

The Church of England was at that time traditionally known as the "Tory Party at prayer", a perception it sought to dispel in the post-war world as it strove to establish a broader base of support in British society. Adverse perceptions of the Anglican Church were partially ameliorated between the wars, owing to the commitment of many Anglican ecclesiastics to the alleviation of the worst of the social evils associated with poverty. This was, however, a preoccupation of many in that era and not just the Church. Nor did Church concern with the more blatant social consequences of the industrial era eradicate its opposition to the Left, particularly Communism but also Socialism. In the Cold War, the Church had few reservations about proclaiming its staunch opposition to the atheism of Communism, but it was careful not to attack those principles of Communism which appealed to the working classes. It was recognised that not to acknowledge the positive aspects of Communist doctrine, many of which were akin to Christian principles, would have identified the Church with reaction and alienated the very people to whom the Church looked for post-war support.

Stanley Evans was an Anglican clergyman whose commitment to the working class movement and to left-wing causes denied him employment in the Church for many years. Throughout those years, Evans was left in no doubt by his ecclesiastical superiors that it was his political activities which caused his unemployment. In the McCarthy years, the early fifties, rather than leave themselves expose the Church to charges of witch-hunting, the diocese of London, to which Evans was attached, denied that Evans' political beliefs were
the cause of his non-employment and, while emphasising that the Church was indifferent to his political beliefs and wished only to help him, endeavoured to dispose of what threatened to become a controversial issue by appointing Evans to a poor living away from the public eye.

The Church looked with disfavour and disapproval on politically active clergymen with inclinations towards socialism. Although this remained a constant feature of the Church leadership, its expression differed according to the political climate. During the war, prior to the Anglo-Soviet alliance, it was expressed to Stanley Evans in no uncertain terms in a letter from the Bishop of Barking. During the McCarthy years, wary of political controversy, disapproval of Evans' political activity was equally strong, but condemnation was confined to oral messages as care was taken not to compromise the Church. A letter such as that sent to Evans by the Bishop of Barking in February 1941 would have been inconceivable after the war, although the sentiments remained unchanged. Barking's amazing letter, replete with deliberate grammatical and spelling errors, was remarkable not simply for its sheer effrontery, but for the Bishop's absolute confidence that he could blatantly decry both the workers movement and the Soviet Union without any thought of political repercussions.

The immunity of the Church leadership from political considerations concerning the working classes is illustrated by the sarcasm and absence of any note of respect in Barking's letter to Evans, then a young curate in his care:

My dear Evans
I am sending you an further cheque - thinking things over I realise that you have been severely underpaid by that vicar - it so often happens that those who talk most about sweating etc are the worst offenders - of course we are rather pleased about this because we have trying to catch your vicar out for some time and now let him raise his voice about wages!
Of course we were very sorry for you when you went there. We knew the whole thing would be a failure and thank goodness it has been. As you know I was very much against his going there at all but Henry would have it and said it "would certainly quiet him". Of course between ourselves we never thought he would be able to get a curate at all but you let yourself in for it without asking us.

I will let you have some more cheques from time to time but think it better that it comes this way so that we can still have it up against Putterill.

May I say how delighted we are that you are on the National Committee - it is splendid that the church is represented in the midst of the workers' movement - it is good for us to have a footing in this camp so that if the workers do bring anything off (which we pray earnestly that they wont) then we can cash in on it. And between ourselves if they make you an Archbishop of Canterbury do remember me for Winchester, I have always wanted to go there - Please dont breathe a word about this especially to Putterill.

Of course if you could desert the movement and the workers at some stage and denounce Russia you can rely on anything from us - there are some very good livings that would suit you about £1000 a year and good sailing and fishing and golf.

We are not at all keen for you to stay on at St Andrews - it will be much better to have you in a decent living and somewhere near to your National Committee work - perhaps one of the city livings ) preferably one of the demolished Churches - you wouldnt want to be bothered with a congregation - it would seem strange to you coming from St Andrews. I shall do all I can for you and keep you well in mind. Please understand that all I said about your getting married was a pure blind to rattle Putterill. If you could let us have any scandal about him we should be delighted and reward you handsomely. Please remember my daughter and I to your delightful wife and daughter and rely on me for everything - Remember me to Pritt and Dut - 3/4 splendid fellows. By the way is that Charles a friend of yours - he's a splendid fellow and we should like to have him in the soup diocese - do remeber us to him when you see him. Cheerio another cheque following.

J.T. Barking,(4)

Stanley Evans trained at Mirfield, home to the Community of the Resurrection, from 1929 to 1935, before being ordained in the Diocese of London. He was ardently committed to the workers movement and following his ordination
became actively involved with a number of London and national organisations at committee level, including the Industrial Christian Fellowship in 1937; the London Federation of Peace Councils in 1936, and the International Peace Campaign in 1937. At the same time he publicly censured British policy toward Spain and India and was a vocal opponent of Colonialism. On December 20, 1938, he led a deputation to Mr Butler on behalf of Spain and against the granting of belligerent rights to Franco. On February 22, 1939, he led a deputation to Lord Plymouth, emphatically protesting against the possible recognition of Franco by the British Government. On June 11, 1939, he was part of the Hyde Park demonstration that condemned the delay of the National Government in concluding a pact of Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. Thereafter, up until the Anglo-Soviet Alliance in mid-1941 following the Nazi invasion of Russia, Evans was opposed to the war which he saw as a conflict between rival Empires.

For Evans, political activity was an extension of his Christian ministry. Writing in the sixties, following his disillusion with the Soviet Union and his break with the British Communist party following the Russian invasion of Hungary in 1956, Evans elucidated his perception of Christianity and of faith, which in turn elucidated why an Anglican clergyman had become a political activist, often supporting causes which his own Church despised. For Evans there was "no such thing as Christianity apart from a way of living in community with God and man, a way of living which is according to the whole and which is therefore Catholic."(5) With regard to faith, Evans was "not concerned at all with faith in the abstract, with faith in and for itself, with faith as a dogmatic assertion for dogmatism's sake": his concern was more with
"faith as a handmaid to living.... Faith is the means to the end, not the end itself". (6)

Evans believed that, "He that doeth the will shall know the doctrine", as being a fundamental principle of the Church. Faith was the handmaid to the living of a Christian life, "as a navigational aid to those who would be in the way that leads to God's Kingdom, and not as an academic exercise for members of a hydrographical department who have lost their taste for putting to sea, or as a reflective study for those who would spend their days lying quietly at anchor." (7) There was an implicit criticism of the Church in this analogy which expressed Evans' conviction that the Church should be "on the march with man", a participant, an activist. Only then could the Church have any real meaning in the life of man, any real hope of renewing man's faith and performing God's will:

The renewal of our faith begins and must begin in action, in the service of man in all his needs. A Catholic faith which is afraid to discuss the morality of nuclear weapons is wrong to talk of renewal, it can only prepare for atrophy. In all his need man must find the Church by his side, whatever the need may be. There is no situation which the Church has any right to avoid.

The renewal of the faith is to be found in marching with man for the future of man, in the practical reassertion of the doctrine of God's Kingdom, because there the Church encounters its Lord. Man is not God, but he is the glory of God, and it is here that the divine image is to be found. (8)

In the intellectual debate which fed Cold War propaganda, one of the most important questions concerned the compatibility of Communism and Christianity. Christianity repudiated the concept that a purely materialistic outlook could provide an adequate basis for human life. Many churchmen of that era, however, perceived Marxism as having the potential to incorporate religion. Evans shared that perception. Writing in the sixties, he stated:
It (Marxism) is a serious philosophy which starts from a recognition of the objective reality of the external world, and while it starts from matter it is acutely aware of the changing of quantity into quality and the existence of the mental and the Spiritual. It sees no need of the hypothesis of God and regards contemporary religion as "opium for the people". On the other hand, it makes an acute study of the process of historical development which it sees proceeding in a recognisable direction which it would call purposive, if such a phrase would not be the admission of theism by the back-door. Archbishop Temple regarded it as the only serious philosophy of the 20th Century apart from theism. (9)

In the post-war period Evans considered that Marxism, with a Christian impetus, could help achieve the Kingdom of God on earth.

One churchman who continually tried to help Evans find a position within the Church commensurate with his abilities, regardless of his left-wing activities and associations, was the Rev O H Gibbs-Smith. Although Gibbs-Smith did not share Evans' political convictions, nor his vision, he subscribed to the idea that it was people with conviction and vision who could most stimulate and carry forward the work of the Church. On March 23, 1942, Gibbs-Smith, who was then Rector to a combination of parishes in St John's Wood, asked Evans if he would like to work with him. (10) A mutual acquaintance subsequently advised Evans of Gibbs-Smith's attitude and of his own feelings on the matter:

He seems obviously very keen and was quite happy about your political line etc - indeed seemed keen to get someone who had given much thought to a special sphere of Christian responsibility but could be trusted to fulfil the other functions of pastoral and priestly care...

There seems little doubt that he is ready to give you scope to do any good you can - partly out of sheer joy at finding someone who has fresh visions of his function and ministry. And on the whole I think he is right that in such a situation you would have more scope in preaching and ministering to the unconverted than in many of the alternative spheres where one is mainly talking to those who already agree...

My own opinion, which I am diffident to press, is that if nothing obviously more fitting has presented itself, you would be well advised to accept and plan out the scope of the job as colleagues rather than Vicar and assistant. It will I think open up real opportunities of valuable work and of preaching the Word and what follows depends upon your own ability and the movement of the Spirit. (11)
Evans gave valuable service during this period, including being an officiating chaplain to the Air Force during the war; reporting, under the chairmanship of the Archdeacon of London, on the answers to the questions submitted to the clergy at the Bishop's Primary Visitation, and being a member of the Dean of St Paul's Committee which prepared the message for the Mission to London, quite apart from the manifest duties imposed by day to day parish work. In 1946 Evans resigned his post in St John's Wood at the request of the diocese in order to facilitate the ecclesiastical reorganisation of the area. He was told that his action was appreciated and that as soon as a suitable post was vacant he would be appointed. In the post-war period the Church was desperately short of man-power. Evans was a first-rate scholar who had rendered services to the Chapter of St Paul's as a scholar of mediaeval Latin. He was an accomplished writer and preacher. His admirers state, and his detractors concede, that he had a piercing intellect, was a wonderful orator and was possessed of a great capacity for hard work.(12) Yet the years passed and the promised post never materialised.

In 1953, Evans had been seventeen years in Orders, but remained without an independent sphere of work in the diocese. Without a permanent position since 1946, he had been forced to rely on temporary postings, occasional offerings and work outside the Church such as teaching and journalism.(13) Gibbs-Smith, then Archdeacon of London, valued Evans' abilities and advised him to write direct to the Bishop when his own efforts on his behalf proved futile.(14) In advising Evans what to say and what to emphasise in his letter to the Bishop, the terminology used by Gibbs-Smith was a crucial indicator of the nature of
the proceedings and that Gibbs-Smith, on his part, had no doubt but that it was Evans' politics which were responsible for his ecclesiastical non-employment:

   State your politics are left-wing (as he knows) but that you are not and never have been a member of the Communist Party (Refer to your interview with him). (15)

   Up until the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, Evans followed the Communist line implicitly on all the major issues of the day, and he was suspected in many quarters of being an actual Party member. He was certainly suspect at Lambeth where Herbert Waddams, Secretary of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations, informed the Archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffrey Fisher, that John Lawrence had been told that Evans definitely was a Communist Party member:

   John Lawrence told me this morning that he had heard from a reliable friend of his who has been a very active fellow-traveller and was now an Anglican that Stanley Evans was and has for a long time been a member of the Communist Party and that it was the Party which had ordered him to become a parson. John Lawrence thinks this may be true: if it is it presumably means that Evans is not a Christian at all in anything but name. (16)

   Passing this information to the Archbishop at the request of Waddams, Fisher's chaplain expressed doubt about the presumption:

   Evans may be, and probably is a member of the Communist Party now. He was at Mirfield for five or six years 1929 to 1935. I cannot think that he pulled the wool over the eyes of all the acute members of C.R. who were there at that time. Some time ago Gibbs-Smith told me that they were always able to trust Evans absolutely in any preaching engagements of locum duty he undertook in London not to preach Communism, though of course they know that outside the Church he is active in Communistic circles. (18)

   When Evans was interviewed for an appointment to Willesden in May 1954, the Dean commented that he had been assured that Evans did not preach politics from the pulpit and asked was that true. Evans said it was, noting that he was
unusual in that he did not discuss Russia in services. This, of course, was an implicit criticism of the right-wing of the Church which frequently addressed the subject of Russia in that period, usually in decidedly unfriendly terms. (19)

In April 1953, when Evans wrote to the Bishop of London regarding his unemployment, he insisted that he was not a member of any political party:

.... I am aware that the fact that my political opinions are left-wing is the occasion of a measure of suspicion but it is perhaps right to add that I am not a member of any political party and that the cause which I have most espoused, that of friendship between East and West, is of fundamental importance not only for our national future but also for the future of Christianity as a whole. (20)

Subsequently Evans was received by the Bishop in the May and was advised that if he were given an appointment, "there might be criticism", the implication being that the criticism would be of a political nature. At that time Evans was deeply involved in the "Save the Rosenbergs Campaign", a politically controversial and sensitive issue which was commonly regarded as being of Communist inspiration and intended to discredit the United States. (21)

At the end of July Evans was informed by Christian Action, an organisation formed by Canon Collins of St Paul's which initially enjoyed the support of the Anglican leadership, but which was withdrawn after Collins proved a trifle too independent, that Clifford Rhodes, editor of the Church of England Newspaper would be happy to address the problem of his inability to secure work in the diocese. This was a significant development because Evans had frequently criticised the anti-Communist, anti-Soviet stance of the Church of England Newspaper in his newsletter Religion and the People. Nonetheless, illustrating the depth of British revulsion against American McCarthyism and the
determination to guard against political witch-hunting in Britain, Rhodes was willing to publicise the dilemma of his erstwhile detractor. (22)

Although Evans did not take up the offer, at the end of November, still without a living, he once more approached the Bishop, this time mentioning that one of the Church newspapers had asked confirmation of the story that his ecclesiastical unemployment had a political basis. Evans added that while this particular journal had stated its disagreement with his views, they felt bound to oppose political victimisation in the Church of England. Evans informed the Bishop that he had evaded any kind of reply, but was apprehensive that a refusal to answer actually implied an answer:

...I have no desire to state that the answer to their question is 'yes' but a categorical 'no' would, I fear, be less than honest. I have always tried to avoid publicity of this kind but it is not possible, as I am sure your Lordship will understand, wholly to obscure the fact that I am seeking work. I should much welcome your advice in this matter. (23)

To which the Bishop of London succinctly replied:

I don't think you need have any hesitation in telling your enquirers that your failure to secure ecclesiastical employment is not due to your political views. Clergymen of the Church of England are free to hold what political views they like. (24)

Evans' experience within the Church and with the Bishop was, of course, in direct contradiction to the Bishop's statement, to which Evans effected a "perplexed" rejoinder. He told the Bishop that "as the years have passed, on the rare occasion when I have seen a member of the Diocesan staff it has never been suggested that the hesitance to appoint which had arisen was due to anything but questions of politics." (25) Evans reminded the Bishop that at their last interview in May, he had implied the same himself. Evans stated that if his non-employment was not owing to the political reasons he had
always been given to understand, then he wished to be told what the reason was, "for in the one hand it is obviously right that I should exercise my ministry and on the other I have a family to keep and am in need of church." (26)

In his reply to Evans the Bishop provided no alternative reason, but repeated his assurances that politics were not involved and that there were simply no suitable posts vacant. Significantly, however, the Bishop informed Evans that "the Archdeacon of London has told me this morning that he is prepared to have a talk with you and explain the position to you by word of mouth. You will be hearing from him in the near future." (27) Evans heard from the Archdeacon the very next day, and what he had to say proved that the Bishop was guarding himself against any possible political repercussions by refusing to put the real reasons for Evans' situation in writing. It also proved that the Bishop was aware that his action would not meet with public approbation. It was equally an illustration of how the Church sought to conceal its true political identity.

On the eve of the Rosenberg execution, Evans had led a dramatic last-minute appeal direct from the London demonstrations to Churchill at Chequers. Appeals for clemency in this case had come from virtually all the major European leaders, including the Pope and the French hierarchy, and it was widely believed that Churchill's influence with Eisenhower could tip the balance if only he would intervene on their behalf. Churchill's repudiation of the delegation and his refusal to appeal for clemency was reported throughout the media the following day when the Rosenberg execution dominated the news. At its climax the clemency campaign had the support of all the major organs of the British press and the sympathy of most of the British people, and Churchill was
furious with Evans for placing him in the invidious position of withholding his support from what had become a popular cause. Gibbs-Smith told Evans that the Bishop had been informed of Churchill's displeasure by the Prime Minister's secretary. He had been exceedingly embarrassed. (28)

Evans understood from his conversation with Gibbs-Smith that where his chances of ecclesiastical employment had not been favourable at the beginning of the year, inciting the Prime Minister's wrath had considerably worsened his already less than auspicious prospects. Evans discussed his predicament with two friends and fellow Christian Socialists, the Labour M.P. Tom Driberg and the Reverend Jack Putterill. Both were outraged and determined to pursue the matter with the Bishop, a fact of which Evans informed Gibbs-Smith. (29) Putterill subsequently informed Evans that he had sent the Bishop a ten page letter in which "you can be assured I have not spared plain speaking! I trust it will disturb him and provoke him into action - ".

Putterill's missive had the desired effect. The Bishop subsequently summoned Gibbs-Smith and spoke about Evans in "the most friendly terms". He claimed to respect Evans' position and hoped to find something suitable for him. He also declared himself to be entirely happy for Gibbs-Smith to approach the Bishop of Chelmsford or some other patron on Evans' behalf, although with the proviso of, "it being understood that we should be perfectly frank with them about the difficulties which have arisen in this Diocese over the question of a living." The Bishop even expressed concern for the needs of Evans' family as Christmas approached and gave Gibbs-Smith a £25 cheque to give to Evans, "from a private fund at the Bishop's personal disposal". (30)
On his part, Evans expressed gratitude for the Bishop's kind message and gift and indicated his own willingness to "welcome the offer of a living from any patron." Although heartened, Evans clearly felt that the ill treatment accorded him by the Diocese of London, and his claim against it, should not be simply disregarded in the light of the new developments:

I do honestly think that any such approach should not be allowed to obscure the fact that I have a claim against the Diocese of London and that 'the difficulties' which are supposed to have arisen are only difficulties so long as the Diocesan authorities insist on regarding them as such and that to have played any part in a movement to try to save the lives of two people is not something which should be held against a cleric even of the Church of England!(31)

This prompted yet more plain speaking from the Bishop, through his emissary the Archdeacon of London. Evans received a request to telephone the Archdeacon, who reiterated and emphasised on the telephone the great embarrassment the Downing Street business had caused the Bishop, although he concurred that of course a man must not be penalised for acting according to his conscience; he was thus doing all he could to secure a position for Evans. Some possibilities were then mentioned. Of particular interest in the course of their dialogue, was the introduction of an hitherto unmentioned factor allegedly effecting Evans' employment prospects. It was now claimed that part of the difficulty supposedly lay with Church Councils.(32) This latter consideration had first been used by the Bishop in his letter to Tom Driberg in explanation of Evans inability to secure a living. This shifting of the onus of responsibility from the leadership to the laity was a very firm indication of how worried the Bishop was about the whole affair, particularly when it was an allegation that was to be proved to have no foundation. His increasing concern over the Evans'case was reflected in his giving a further financial donation to
help the Evans family. Gibbs-Smith informed Evans, in concluding the above
conversation, that another cheque was being sent to him as the Bishop was
worried about his financial position and did not want his family to suffer.
Evans was told that if in need of money he was to go to the Bishop who would
"find a way."

When Evans originally disclosed his situation to Tom Driberg, he had sent
him copies of the correspondence with the Bishop in which the latter had denied
that political considerations were the reason for Evans not being offered a
position, following which Gibbs-Smith had specifically informed him by word of
mouth that it was exactly such considerations which were responsible for his
situation. Evans explained:

Following the last letter I saw the Archdeacon of London on Tuesday,
December 8, who then informed me he was directed by the Bishop to say
that my name had been on the list from which appointments are made, that
my name had not been removed from the list, but that the situation had
been changed by the fact that some time ago the Bishop had been informed
by the Prime Minister's secretary that I had led a deputation to the Prime
Minister on the question of the Rosenbergs which had caused embarrassment
to Downing Street. This communication had naturally caused embarrassment
to the Bishop and had made the question of an appointment 'more
difficult'.(33)

Driberg subsequently wrote himself to the Bishop, enclosing a copy of
Evans' letter, stating:

I do not myself share all Mr Evans's political views, and he is associated
with organisations to which members of the Party to which I belong are
not permitted to belong. Nevertheless, there are aspects of this episode
which seem to be disquieting, particularly the intervention by the Prime
Minister, in view of his constitutional position as adviser to the Crown
on ecclesiastical preference.(34)

The Bishop replied with what Driberg later termed to Evans "an
extraordinary letter."(35) The Bishop told Driberg:

It is good of you to interest yourself in the case of Stanley Evans.
This chap is his own worst enemy. We don't care two hoots about his
politics, as you can imagine, but every time we are on the verge of doing something for him he gets himself in the headlines, and then of course no Churchwardens or Parochial Church Council would consider accepting him, and we have to let the thing die down before we can start again.

I don't know what he has got in mind about the Prime Minister, but I can assure you that there is not the slightest truth in the suggestion that the Prime Minister intervened in his case in the slightest degree. I am sure that Evans would not intentionally make a false statement, but he must be under some very odd misapprehension somewhere. (36)

A similar line was taken with Putterill who informed Evans:

It looks to me as if they intend denying all knowledge of Churchill's reprimand - which explains why it wasn't written in the first place. They likewise fear any political bias - and put the case solely on the difficulty of presentation - "(37)

The Bishop's categorical denial of political considerations and of Churchill's intervention, deflated Putterill's hopes of marshalling a campaign on Evans' behalf: "They are acting with considerable caution and I don't want to do anything to make your position worse - ".

The Church's solution to the problem created by Evans was to isolate him with an appointment to a poor living away from his political activities in London and hopefully keep him out of the public eye. In February 1954, Gibbs-Smith asked Evans if he wanted a nomination to Mucking in Essex, frankly disclosing that it was "the sort of place designed, I imagine, to kill the soul of any man who undertakes it." (37) This placed Evans in a dilemma, for if he refused it the Diocese would be able to claim they had found an appointment for Evans and he had turned it down, and thus keep him waiting indefinitely. Evans sought advice from another left-wing ecclesiastic, Hewlett Johnson, who had also suffered political victimisation at the hands of the Church authorities having incurred the wrath of the secular powers. Evans wrote:
I am now offered by St Paul's the Parish of Mucking, a little place between Tilbury and Canvey where they deposit the contents of London dustbins. It has a population of about 750... What ought I to do? (38)

Johnson and his wife Nowell both cautioned against Evans refusing the offer. Aware that the Church had played a very clever hand which left Evans without recourse, and sensible to Evans' natural dejection, the position being far removed from what a man of his dedication and abilities aspired to, still they knew that the simple provision of a parish for a man of Evans' political convictions would still displease the Church authorities. They thus introduced a note of levity into their advice to Evans, illustrating that they were fully aware of how the Church authorities regarded them and others of their political ilk:

The parish is not what should have been offered to you, perhaps there was nothing else available at the moment!

But the offer having been made we think you would be ill advised to refuse it. To do so would remove a valuable weapon from your hands. And the offer is a stepping stone... It opens a gap into security at any rate. (39)

The humorous approach was also taken by Putterill who gave the same advice: " - and as to Muck perhaps St Paul had this place in mind when he said condescend to things of low estate." (40) Evans thus informed Gibbs-Smith that if Mucking were to be offered him he would accept it, although he made no attempt to disguise the fact that it was in no sense what he would have liked, and that he recognised it as a form of banishment. He equally recognised that within the limitations imposed upon him, Gibbs-Smith had done what he could to help Evans, for which Evans expressed his gratitude and also apologised to Gibbs-Smith for all the trouble he had caused him. (41)
Following the first tentative offer of Mucking, made on February 12, 1954, Evans received a telephone call from Canon Collins of St Paul's who had the nomination of Willesden and wanted to nominate Evans. Collins told Evans that he had charged Gibbs-Smith to discuss the proposition with the Bishop of London, confident that his support could be gained as at that time the Church was suffering a great deal of adverse publicity over the Harman affair. Harman was an Anglican priest with pacifist convictions who had lost his living owing to his attendance at a peace conference. At that time Tom Driberg was raising the matter in the House and had already secured the support of 150 M.P.s. Collins told Evans that the Bishop was "in a state of diarrhoea" as Evans was still without a job and it seemed likely that his case would also be brought to the attention of the House and also to that of the public. Driberg had, in fact, already approached Evans, as he was quite prepared to include his case in the campaign for Harman. Evans was, however, more concerned to secure work within the Church than to use its treatment of him as a means of exposing its reactionary attitudes. This in itself is an interesting comment on Evans and his commitment to his priesthood. Evans told Driberg on March 14, 1954 that he preferred to secure the Willesden posting which it seemed the Harman case could make possible:

I don't know whether you have yet got any further with the matter we discussed but the signatures you have collected in the Harman case have transformed the situation and Falkner is in full flight! A London job is under discussion at the moment and looks as if it will come off. The whole story is very complex and I will gladly tell it you whenever you have a moment to spare, but at this precise moment publicity would stop it and I would suggest therefore, provided nothing has yet gone too far, suspending any question of publicity until we see the outcome of their latest moves.
Although this letter of the 14th revealed optimism, on March 10 Evans had been informed by Gibbs-Smith that there were "more problems about Mucking than we thought" and that the P.C.C. seemed unwilling to accept Gibbs-Smith's nomination and that the Bishop of Chelmsford was not prepared to insist on Evans' appointment. Gibbs-Smith was clearly suspicious of and disgusted by this turn of events: "There is a feeling (and I think we both share it) that the Diocese of London is just using this opportunity to try and wash its own face, and so appear to make itself clean of any further responsibility to you." (45)

The London job to which Evans referred was Willesden, where Evans knew that the Churchwardens and the P.C.C. wanted him. Evans had ministered at Willesden, albeit on a temporary basis, and was known and well liked. Moreover, he was the only nominee. The Bishop, however, in spite of the Harman affair, intervened, and on March 14 Collins was called by Gibbs-Smith who told him that the Bishop was against Evans being appointed to Willesden as it was much too important a living. The Bishop had complained to Gibbs-Smith that Evans had twice put him in a very difficult position, Belgium in 1948 and Churchill in 1953 and he could not possibly now acquiesce to an appointment such as Willesden represented. (46) The Bishop subsequently instructed Gibbs-Smith to talk with the Dean at Willesden and have inserted into the the P.C.C. minutes at their next meeting that the Bishop opposed Evans' appointment. This resulted in a search for further nominees to stand in opposition to Evans. The Chapter subsequently agreed to consider further nominees. (47)

On May 1, 1954, Evans was accorded a further interview with the Bishop of London who told Evans that he would be perfectly frank. He stated that the
Diocesan staff were mostly against putting Evans on the list for appointments as they did not want another Dean of Canterbury business. The Bishop claimed his main concern was the "the peace of the Church"; with Evans as an incumbent he foresaw trouble. He tried to persuade Evans of his unsuitability, adding that the Communists would really want Evans. To this Evans replied that if progressive people came to church it would be a good thing. The Bishop disagreed, "No, the motives would be wrong!" Evans questioned the right to judge motives. The Bishop then related how he had lectured the staff college on Communism, taking the "Lambeth line", only to have thrown in his face that a London priest had converted an officer to Communism. The Bishop had assumed, wrongly, that it was Evans. Evans commented on how if scores of clergy wrote nonsense about Russia in magazines that was non-political. If one said a word of friendship that was wildly political.

It became clear to the Bishop that he was not able to persuade Evans to willingly give up Willesden. He finally declared, "You are out. Sitting in your study writing and lecturing mainly out of London you can't cause us much harm. If we make you an incumbent we put you on a pedestal. We shall be criticised." Evans responded that in any case they might be criticised for not so doing. To which the Bishop replied, "Of course, I realise that. But we are covered with the Church view." In his record of the interview, Evans noted that the Bishop feared (a) criticism, and (b) influences.(48)

Evans did not receive the appointment to Willesden. By the end of May three alternative candidates had been assembled, and the appointment was offered to a returned missionary from South Africa, who already had another living in York offered.(49) The decision created a furore which threatened to
culminate in legal proceedings. The Churchwardens and the P.C.C. protested the decision, sending a deputation to the Dean and appealing to the Bishop. The Deputation was received by the Dean on June 17, 1954, and told that however many men they turned down they would not get Evans. In a letter to Evans, the secretary of the P.C.C. termed the Bishop's reply as being "simply unpleasant". The P.C.C. were told they had no right of nomination and should consult the Rural Dean before any question of legal action. (51)

The Churchwardens and the P.C.C. decided against legal action, being given to understand that another suitable living had been offered to Evans. On May 18, 1954, Evans was received by the Bishop of Stepney who offered him Holy Trinity, Dalston, a living apparently commensurate with that of Mucking. Evans expressed gratitude, but explained he was waiting a decision on Willesden. The Bishop observed to Evans that he had rather been thinking in terms of a bird in the hand being worth two in the bush. (52) The Church was clearly willing to sacrifice the poor living of Dalston to Evans in order to insure that of Willesden against him, a fact recognised by Evans who subsequently informed Driberg: "I have now been appointed to the parish of Holy Trinity with St Philip, Dalston (which they appear to regard as expendable)". (53)

Driberg received a similar message from Collins:

I am afraid I lost the battle on Saturday about Evans. The Diocese has played an extremely clever game by emphasising that the Bishop intends to appoint him to Dalston. Despite this, I nearly won. For one moment the Dean himself became very strong, and insisted that we ought to appoint the best man, regardless of his political views... Evans, himself, is extremely disappointed, but has taken things extremely well. I am afraid he is now doomed (unless the Diocese is going to behave even more disgracefully than it has done up to the present) to Dalston, where I expect he will be left to rot. (54)
Collins was not alone in expressing his distaste for the proceedings; the Archdeacon of London, Gibbs-Smith, wrote to Evans: "I'm still 'chaffing' about Willesden. The whole affair was a piece of dispiriting dirt."(55)

Evans was inducted on January 4, 1955. The ceremony was attended by progressive figures from all over the country, with a deluge of greetings from progressive figures all over the world.(56) Nor did Evans "rot". The Church was too mindful of the apathy in the East End and did not sufficiently consider the determination, energy, courage and the faith Evans had in people. He inspired the community and turned Dalston into a flourishing parish.

Following Hungary and Suez, many people were forced into a re-appraisal of their convictions, and in the detente of the mid-fifties, opinion was not so polarised as in the depths of the Cold War. In particular, Kruschev's speech had proven a water-shed for Evans and his contemporaries in S.S.C.M. They felt they had to admit they had been too starry-eyed about the Soviet Union, although they still believed those who had been totally opposed were equally wrong. Thereafter there was no reason for any division of Christian Socialists; so S.S.C.M. amalgamated with the Christian Socialist League and formed the Christian Socialist Movement.(57)
In the more temperate climate which followed the Cold War, Stanley Evans was able to find more scope for his abilities within the Church. Mervyn Stockwood, a fervent anti-Communist Socialist in the Cold War, appointed Evans as Canon and Chancellor of Southwark Diocese. There Evans inaugurated a scheme for training Church of England members of the priesthood while still at work, which pioneered the way to many similar schemes in other dioceses which are operating at present.(58)

Unfortunately for the Church and the Socialist movement, Stanley Evans was killed in a car crash in the mid-sixties. He had contributed much to both. At the time of his death Evans was still committed to and worked for both Christianity and Socialism, each of which he saw as inseparable causes in the endeavour to establish God's Kingdom on Earth.

2. Interview by author with Ian Mikardo; June 25, 1984.

3. The files of the National Council for Civil Liberties from this period are at Hull University and illustrate the large number of cases which involved political persecution with regard to a person's non-employment or loss of employment if they were a known or suspected Communist. The nature of academic employment made suspicions that political reasons were responsible for the rejection of certain candidates difficult to prove. See DCL Filing Case No 25, "Academic Freedom in Universities 1950-53", which includes the Andrew Rothstein case; and Filing Case No 66, "Political Discrimination in Teaching"; and "Academic Freedom 1951-56"

4. The Bishop of Barking to Evans, February 1941; Evans Papers.


10. Christ Church, St Marleybone with St John's Wood Chapel and St Stephen, Avenue Road with St Andrew, Allitzen Road, shared the one staff. Gibbs-Smith was Rector. On March 23, 1942, he wrote to Evans:

I venture to think that this may well prove to be the right opening for you... there is no doubt you would have great scope here, amongst both the educated people of St John's Wood, as well as the artisans of the St Andrew's area. You would, of course, have a share in the preaching in St John's Wood Chapel, as well as in St Stephen's and in St Andrew's, and in the former at any rate you would be addressing the unconverted, and have chance to form contacts amongst people of varying types and positions, which I am sure you would feel very worthwhile. Compared with a parish which is wholly industrial, I should say that you might well feel that such a place as this offers a better scope for your ministry.

It is clear from the correspondence between Gibbs-Smith and Evans that the latter had made his political stand quite evident, including showing him copies of Religion and the People. Gibbs-Smith appreciated Evans' frankness and observed:

On reflection, I cannot feel that there is very much that I actively disagree with, and I certainly have general sympathy with your whole standpoint. In Theological matters our views approximated very closely as you will remember. Evans' Papers, DEV 1/2.

11. Indecipherable signature to Evans, n.d. but most probably March 1942; Evans Papers, DEV 1/2

12. Edward Charles and Stanley Forman both testified to these traits in interviews with the author.

13. Evans understood that his ecclesiastical non-employment was owing to his political activities and beliefs, and turned to his friends and
colleagues on the Christian Left for help. Hewlett Johnson endeavoured to try and secure work for Evans in the ecclesiastical field: Duke of Bedford to Johnson, February 20, 1953; Johnson to Sir Charles Trevelyan, March 4, 1953; Johnson told Trevelyan that Evans was "now without any means of support." Johnson Papers.

Johnson further suggested that Evans contact his associate A T D'Eye, to try and secure a teaching position. Apart from clerical work, Evans had done some teaching for the Workers Educational Association, on the subject "Modern Russia". However, as the political climate turned against Russia, it was a subject for which demand rapidly decreased, and Evans found that this means of supplementing his income vanished.

14. Some indication of how Gibbs-Smith valued Evans' work is indicated by the following expressions of gratitude which he sent to Evans:

I want to thank you most warmly for so kindly preparing those notes for a sermon on Quincuagesima Sunday... I think I shall have your support for my suggestion that a solemn declaration should be issued holding out the hand of fellow-ship to all other nations, etc. If you can spare time to tell me your opinion on my suggestion I should be most grateful. February 12, 1951.

I am enormously grateful to you for the sermon which is very much after my own mind and heart, but infinitely better than I could ever have expressed myself... So once again I am greatly in your debt. May 30, 1952.

The Clergy Centre Committee at a meeting held last week studied most carefully your Study Scheme and Sermons, and I am asked to write and tell you how much they value your work. They were very pleased not only with your Study Scheme, but with the material and arrangement of your sermons. July 13, 1953.

15. Gibbs-Smith to Evans, n.d. but probably February/April 1953; Evans Papers, DEV 1/2.

17. Ibid.


The Bishop of London in this period was John William Charles Wand, D.D.

21. In Britain it was generally accepted that the Rosenbergs were guilty and opposition to the death sentence was based on humanitarian grounds rather than being an indictment of American justice. In America the issue was politically explosive. The momentum of the clemency movement throughout Europe forced most European leaders, including the Pope, to make clemency appeals. Churchill's refusal isolated him from the rest of Europe's leading statesmen and made him appear less prepared to challenge American domination than was the rest of Europe. Churchill's refusal to intervene on an issue which had overwhelming public sympathy made it appear that he was unsure of the "special relationship," and was not prepared to test it. Failure on the part of Eisenhower to respond to a personal appeal from the British Prime Minister would have exposed the special relationship as much less than the equal partnership vaunted before the British public.
22. Collins to Evans, July 1953; Evans Papers, CEV 1/2.


24. Ibid, Bishop of London to Evans, November 25, 1953; DEV 1/2.


26. Ibid.

27. Ibid, Bishop of London to Evans, December 7, 1953; DEV 1/2.


29. Ibid, Evans to Gibbs-Smith, December 11, 1953; DEV 1/2.

30. Gibbs-Smith to Evans, December 15, 1953, and Putterill to Evans, n.d. but clearly December 1953; DEV 1/2. Putterill was clearly incensed by the affair and saw the issue as one to take a stand on. He suggested that if the Church maintained its position of penalising Evans because of his role in the Rosenberg Campaign, then the Rosenberg Committees should be called back into action on his behalf. He also suggested a general petition from the Clergy and the Laity of the Church; questions in parliament; press articles and interviews; protest meetings at Caxton Hall and further representations and deputations to the Bishop.

32. Ibid, Evans Memorandum, December 22, 1953; DEV 1/2.

33. Evans to Driberg, December 10, 1953; Driberg Papers, Oxford.


35. Ibid, Driberg to Evans, December 18, 1953.

36. Ibid, Bishop of London to Driberg, December 17, 1953.

37. Gibbs-Smith to Evans, February 12, 1954; Evans' Papers, DEV 1/2.

38. Evans to Johnson, February 14, 1954; Johnson Papers.

39. Johnson to Evans, February 18, 1954; Evans' Papers, DEV 1/2.

40. Ibid, Putterill to Evans, n.d. but probably February 1954; DEV 1/2.

41. Ibid, Evans to Gibbs-Smith, March 2, 1954; DEV 1/2.

42. Canon Christopher Harman was the sixty-four year old vicar of South Marston, near Swindon. He was offered the living of East Harptree, Somerset, from which he was subsequently asked to withdraw by Sir Clive Burn, Secretary to the Duchy of Cornwall who, in a letter to the Canon, said there were two objections to his transfer to East Harptree - that
he was a pacifist and that in 1952 he attended a People's Peace Conference in Vienna. Interviews followed with Sir Clive and the Bishop of Bath and Wells, Dr Henry Bradfield, following which Harman withdrew his acceptance. The publicity given the Harman case, and the motion tabled by Tom Driberg M.P. on his behalf, disturbed the Bishop who subsequently wrote to the Canon stating that his pacifism had nothing to do with his being asked to withdraw and castigating him for the attendant publicity:

The situation is now made worse by the fact that I see a Motion is being tabled in the House of Commons... this will put me in an even more embarrassing and difficult situation.

I am most sorry that you thought fit to give an interview to a reporter on Sunday instead of confining yourself to the statement which I suggested to you, and which could have done no harm.

As it is, I fear that a great deal of harm has been done and not least to yourself!

Harman had been promised another living provided he withdrew from accepting Harptree, but the Bishop continued with a warning that following "this immense publicity" the Parochial Church Council might not want his appointment. (Daily Herald, March 15, 1954). On March 14, Mr Harry Crookshank, Leader of the House, refused time for a Commons debate on Driberg's motion attacking political discrimination against Canon Harman. On March 19, the Times reported that Harman was offered another living following the withdrawal of his acceptance of Harptree, but that it had since been withdrawn.

43. Ibid, Evans Memorandum, February 1954; DEV 1/2.

44. Evans to Driberg, March 14, 1954; Driberg Papers. Falkner was Sherard Falkner Allison, D.D., the Bishop of Chelmsford.
45. Gibbs-Smith to Evans, March 10, 1954; Evans' Papers, DEV 1/2.

46. In 1948 Evans had delivered a political speech in Belgium in which he spoke about friendship with the Soviet Union. This had annoyed certain Anglican clergy who complained to the Bishop who in turn wrote to Evans and demanded that, "when you are speaking in countries where there are chaplains under the jurisdiction of the Diocese of London you will restrain from having yourself advertised as coming from this Diocese." The Bishop accused Evans of embarrassing local clergy, and questioned whether it was advisable for a priest to speak on party politics at all, and that if he did he certainly should not advertise himself as being a priest. Evans replied that he was unaware of there being any criticism from the Brussels clergy to whom the Bishop had been referring, adding:

... although I am aware that at the moment the view I take of the possibility of British-Soviet friendship is that of a minority I am also convinced that a priest of the Church of England should work for international friendship at its most difficult point and that to do so is not merely consistent with but an expression of his loyalty to the basic teachings of the Church as a whole and therefore also of the diocese to which he is licensed."

Bishop of London to Evans, December 23, 1948; Evans to Bishop of London, December 1948; Evans' Papers DEV 1/2.


49. The three alternative candidates were: a returned missionary from South Africa, who already had a job offered; the elderly Vicar of St
Matthew, Kenilworth, and the Chaplain of Wormwood Scrubbs. The appointment was offered to the Reverend Oakley almost immediately following his interview, the exceptional haste being explained as owing to his verging on the acceptance of another living in York. In the event he rejected the York offer as he didn't like the Vicarage. Evans Memorandum, June 28, 1954; Evans' Papers, DEV 1/2.

50. Ibid, Evans Memorandum, June 17, 1954; DEV 1/2.

51. Ibid, Eileen McMahon to Evans, June 22, 1954; DEV 1/2.

52. Ibid, Evans Memorandum, May 18, 1954; DEV1/2.

53. Evans to Driberg, July 20, 1954; Driberg Papers.

54. Collins to Driberg, June 1, 1954; Driberg papers.

55. Gibbs-Smith to Evans, n.d. but probably shortly after the Willesden affair; Evans Papers, DEV 1/2.


58. Ibid.
The first number of *Religion and the People* appeared in May 1941. It was a duplicated sheet produced by two Anglican clerics, one, Stanley Evans, in the East End of London and the other, Edward Charles, in a factory district near Birmingham, both of whom, having endured much bombing with their people in time of war, "and having seen the unemployment and degradation of many of their people in time of peace," felt, "the complete inadequacy of existing journalism to meet the real situation in which people were living and struggling and dying."(1)

The preoccupation with air-raids was reflected in the first edition.(2) The remainder of the issue was taken up with a discussion of theoligico-political trends, chiefly concerned with what ought to be the approach of the Church in the years ahead. Discussed were the Five Peace Points of the Vatican, joint statements on educational principles, the Malvern Conference and the People's Convention.

*Religion and the People* perceived its main task to be the surveillance of "the constant and ever-flowing interrelation of religion and politics":

because we believe that politics is always influenced by religion and because we believe that the Christian faith is a way of life lived in society and must therefore have a political expression. We believe that politics must be moralised or, to move to a higher plane, that the life of Grace must be lived in society; that the City of God is the only port our barque may know.(3)

At various times a good deal of information was printed about the Russian Orthodox Church, and, after the war, about the Churches in Eastern Europe, "because it was not being printed elsewhere."(4) Information about ecclesiastical news which was not readily published in the mainstream media nor the established church newspapers, was dealt with in the scanty pages of
Religion and the People. It printed statements from the Greek Bishops in favour of the Greek resistance, which were quoted from it in the Security Council of the United Nations. It quoted the support of East European Church leaders for the Communist regimes and the aid given by those regimes to religious bodies to rebuild churches or mosques and to establish seminaries, at a time when Western propaganda was emphasising the determination of Communism to eradicate all religion. It published details about the trials and tribulations of American clerics being witch hunted for their liberal beliefs when America was presenting itself as the saviour of Christian civilisation and the citadel of democracy. It revealed the extent and scope of ecclesiastical support for peace and friendship with the Soviet Union while Western leaders strove to establish a religious anti-Communist alliance. Nor did Religion and the People refrain from attacking Anglican Bishops, or even the Archbishops, on both domestic and international issues. Equally, it was ready to praise as well as criticise, to try and understand the forces operating on ecclesiastical decisions, and, where possible, give an optimistic interpretation.

Apart from the provision of information, Evans, who was editor, and Charles, whose role was mainly in the background as manager, took available documents and books, reports of religious conferences, such as Lambeth and Amsterdam in 1948, works of Berdyaev and others, for analysis and comment: "for the assessing of current trends is always one of the most difficult and one of the most important tasks confronting those who would play their part in shaping the future of the world in which they live."(6)

Religion and the People derived its information from a wide variety of sources. Evans had entrees at East European Embassies; the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate was available in an English edition; contacts with East
European church people and with like-minded clerics around the world. It was Evans' acute analysis and his willingness to deal with the controversial which distinguished Religion and the People from other theological publications.

The two-man enterprise, run an a shoe-string budget, was meant to be self-financing. Evans did all the writing and Charles was manager and sometimes financier; when subs failed to meet circulation and printing costs Charles made up the deficit from out of his own pocket. Despite its small circulation, Religion and the People was not without influence, as its being quoted at the United Nations indicates, and it managed to penetrate both the higher political and ecclesiastical echelons. Copies of Religion and the People are to be found in the archives of Lambeth, among the papers of the first two secretaries of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations. Both Douglas and Waddams retained some issues of the newsletter. Waddams did not fail to note the critical review given his 1950 book on Communism and the Churches.

Serge Bolshakoff, a Russian emigre expert on the Russian Orthodox Church who had some influence as a counsellor to CFR, also took note of the news and views expressed in the newsletter, to which he occasionally made reference in his own private publication, the Bulletin. Bolshakoff very deliberately cultivated relationships with men of influence, and was known at the Foreign Office as well as at Lambeth Palace. Bolshakoff claimed that his Bulletin was specifically written for an American readership. He stated that while the circulation was small, it was significant because it was the more influential and the thinking people who subscribed. Like Religion and the People, the Bulletin printed news about the Churches in Eastern Europe and the complexities of religio-politics, although the two publications operated in isolation from one another, with different audiences and different aims.
Charles recalls that *Religion and the People* was ignored by the media, but that it nonetheless did have some influential readers, although many disliked what they read. Although Charles considers that there was no large scale impact, he equally feels that, "as providing ammunition" and "the thin red line of progressive and socialist Christians", its influence was "modestly not negligible."(8)

*Religion and the People* also produced a number of pamphlets, again all written by Evans. One about the Mindszenty trial, which Evans attended as correspondent for the *Daily Worker*, achieved a sale of 30,000.(9) Evans also wrote pamphlets for *Magnificat*, the organ of the Council of Clergy and Ministers for Common Ownership, C.C.M.C.O., which subsequently became the Society for Socialist Clergy and Ministers, S.S.C.M. *Magnificat* dealt much more with purely political topics. Both Charles and Evans were members of these organisations. Evans also wrote the *New European Observer* which was subsidised by the Czechoslovakian Embassy.

Both Evans and Charles openly gave their support to left-wing causes, which, however humanitarian their inspiration, incurred the opprobrium of the ecclesiastical authorities, as well as the secular. Charles was more fortunate than Evans. Working in the diocese of Bishop Barnes of Birmingham, himself a progressive and controversial figure, Charles was never denied employment. Evans, however, was denied preferment and for many years was forced, in Charles' words, to "scratch a living with the help of his teacher wife."(10)

The objectivity of *Religion and the People* and the reliability of its sources are clearly important considerations in assessing its value as a focus on the period of which it was an observer. There is no question but that it had a left-wing bias and a too uncritical view of Russia and the new Communist
regimes. This was frankly admitted by its author, Stanley Evans, in a pamphlet, *Russia Reviewed*, written after the revelations in Britain of the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. Stating that it was an elementary duty for all who had worked for friendship with the U.S.S.R. and the New Democracies to consider their position afresh, Evans observed that there were lessons to be learnt:

The first is that most of us who have written and spoken about Russia and Eastern Europe, while we have reported truly and gauged accurately some aspects of Soviet life and the life of the New Democracies, have been grievously wrong about others. Our appreciation of the good and of the forward strides led us to reject uncritically much of the evidence which did not suit our particular interpretations. There is probably nobody who wrote in support of the U.S.S.R. of whom this is not true - and it certainly includes the present writer. The excuses we hear, that other people (anti-Soviet writers) were also wrong, are completely beside the point, just as is the alibi that there are brutalities in Colonial countries. We are discussing the future and not the past; we are concerned with the answer to colonialism. The excuse that we reported what we saw and that we could not know more again will not do. Other people manifestly did know and the fact is that we relied too exclusively on official sources of information and failed to distil the truth from sources we regarded as hostile.(11)

Evans' statement was both a reflection of and a comment on the period of which *Religion and the People* was very much a product. Cold War polarisation equally permeated the spiritual and secular foundations of British society. 1956 was, however, a time for reassessment for all parties. Kruschev's revelations were followed by Hungary and Suez. During the Cold War years leading up to these events, *Religion and the People* had not been afraid to speak frankly or criticise despite the increasingly suspicious and hostile reception given left wing critiques. Nonetheless, the newsletter remained steadfast in its commitment to Socialism and in its defence of the new Communist regimes. It also strove to give what it regarded as true Christian witness:

For this in our turn we have been criticised and more. Criticism of our criticism has been healthy and useful; criticism of the fact of criticism has been a reflection of the minds of those afraid to grow up together. For there has been no age of the Church when vigorous and robust
discussion has not been part of the life-blood coursing through its arteries and in our generation the rejection of discussion can only be seen as the rejection of the very life of the Church itself. (12)

Although this enterprise of Charles and Evans survived much longer than most of its ilk, and, moreover, as they conceded in the final number of March 1957, "in some fair weather but mainly foul," rising costs made deficits inevitable and they had gone "beyond the limit." They also considered that while their task was not done, it was different from what it had been. Keenly aware that in a world of massive rearmament, of racial tensions, of growing economic crises, "The way to the Good Life means more than the provision of private transport systems and private cinemas to every home; that the rewards it promises are deeper and the struggles in the way such as need more profound equipment than is being provided." (13) They perceived the new need, now that the sort of news they printed was being more widely published, was for thought and discussion: "A magazine is needed which can be used as a focus for the thought of Christians concerned to plot their way to the true deeps through which the tidal stream may bear them home." (14) It was to this new endeavour that Charles and Evans then turned their efforts. The demise of the monthly newsletter Religion and the People was followed by the birth of their new publishing enterprise, a quarterly magazine which, in consideration of the times, they called The Junction.
Notes: Religion and the People.

1. Religion and the People, March 1957. I am deeply indebted to the Reverend Canon Edward Charles who provided me with a full run of Religion and the People newsletters.

2. Ibid; the immediate preoccupation of air raids was noted in a mention of Dr Barnes, the progressive Bishop of Birmingham, and the Cement Rings and the quotation of a verse seen in a fish and chip shop:

God is our refuge, be not afraid.
He will be near you all through the raid.
When bombs are dropping and danger is near
Jesus will keep you until the all clear.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.


8. Ibid.


11. Stanley G Evans, *Russia Reviewed*, a *Religion and the People* publication, n.d. but can be placed in 1956, after March 20, when newspapers around the world carried the news about the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.


13. Ibid.

14. *The Junction* was already planned before *Religion and the People* ceased publication. In the final newsletter of March 1957, Evans expressed the wish that all who had supported the latter publication would transfer their subscriptions to the new one.
List of Abbreviations:

ECC        British Council of Churches.
BSFS       British-Soviet Friendship Society.
CCMCO      Council of Clergy and Ministers for Common Ownership.
FO         Foreign Office.
FORD       Foreign Office Research Department.
HJ         Hewlett Johnson Papers.
IRD        Information Research Department.
SSCM       Society of Socialist Clergy and Ministers.
WCC        World Council of Churches.
British Government Documents, Public Record Office, Kew.

Cabinet Minutes and Proceedings (CAB).

Colonial Office (CO).

Foreign Office: Consular (FO 369); Library (FO 370); Political (FO 380); Private Collections (FO 800); Communications (FO 850).

Home Office (HO).

Ministry of Information (INF).

Prime Minister's Office (PREM).
Published Documentary and Statistical Material.

The Catholic Directory.


Crockford's Clerical Directory.

Dictionary of Labour Biography.

Dictionary of National Biography.


Foreign Relations of the United States, Department of State Publication.

Hansard, House of Commons Debates.

Hansard, House of Lords Debates.

Kraus, Foreign Office index.
The Lambeth Conference, 1948.

Public Papers of the Presidents, Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the Presidents, US Government Printing Office.


Who's Who.
Archival material.

Anglican Pacifist Fellowship, Oxford.

Clement Attlee, Churchill College, Cambridge.

George Bell, Lambeth Palace Library.

Ernest Bevin, Public Record Office, Kew.

Stafford Cripps, Public Record Office, Kew.


Colindale Newspaper Library.

J.A. Douglas Papers, Lambeth Palace Library.

Tom Driberg, Christ Church, Oxford.

Stanley G. Evans, Hull University.

Geoffrey Fisher, Lambeth Palace.
Cyril F. Garbett, York.

Hewlett Johnson, Kent University.

Labour Party Archives, Walworth Road.

Cosmo Lang Papers, Lambeth Palace Library.

National Council for Civil Liberties, Hull University.


William Temple Papers, Lambeth Palace Library.

Lord Vansittart, Churchill College, Cambridge.
Newspapers, periodicals and pamphlets.

**An Open Letter to the Bishops (at Lambeth Assembled),** Society of Socialist Clergy and Ministers, Magnificat publication no 15, 1948.


*The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*.

*Canterbury Diocesan Notes*.

*The Catholic Herald*.

**Christians and Africa**, Stanley Evans, Magnificat publication no 19.

**Christians and Communists**, Stanley Evans, Magnificat publication no 17, April 1949.

**Christians and World Peace**, Stanley Evans, Magnificat publication no 18.

**Christians in the Kingdom of God**, Gilbert Cope, Magnificat publication no 16.

Christian World.

Church and State in Eastern Europe, Stanley Evans, New Central European Observer pamphlet no 3.

The Church Demands Peace, Bishop M Novak, Religion and the People publication.

The Church of England Newspaper.

The Church Times.

Commonweal.

Daily Herald.

The Daily Mirror.

Daily Telegraph

The Daily Worker.


The Economist.

Foreign Policy: the Labour Party's Dilemma, the Fabian International Research Group, 1946.

The Guardian, Church of England Newspaper.

Hungarian Christianity in the New Hungarian State, Bishop Bereczky, Religion and the People publication.


International Affairs.

Joseph Stalin, pamphlet of an address given by Stanley Evans on March 13, 1953.


The Junction, Newsletter, edited by Stanley Evans.

Keesings Contemporary Archives, Weekly Diary of World Events.
Korea - I saw the truth, Jack Gaster, 1952.

Magnificat, SSCK monthly newsletter.

Manchester Guardian.

Michael Scott of Africa, Stanley Evans, Religion and the People publication no 3.

Nature

New Central European Observer.

News Chronicle.

New Statesman and Nation.

New York Herald Tribune.


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Theology.

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