THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

THE EARLY CAREER OF THOMAS, LORD HOWARD, EARL OF SURREY AND THIRD DUKE OF NORFOLK, 1474—c. 1525

being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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by

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Abbreviations used in the Notes

BIHR Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research
BL British Library
CCM Calendar of the Carew Manuscripts in the Archiepiscopal Library at Lambeth (London, 1867-73)
CCR Calendar of the Close Rolls, Henry VI - Henry VII (London, 1933-63)
CIPM Calendar of Inquisitions Post Mortem, Henry VII (London, 1898-1955)
CPR Calendar of the Patent Rolls, Henry VI - Philip and Mary (London, 1901-39)
CSPV Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, ed. R. Brown, C. Bentinck, H. Brown (London, 1864-98)
ECP Early Chancery Proceedings, Deputy Keeper of the Public Records
EE S Early English Text Society
ERO Essex Record Office
Hall E. Hall, Hall's Chronicle, (London, 1809 edn.)
HMC Reports of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts
KLBRO King's Lynn Borough Record Office
LP Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the reign of Henry VIII, ed. J.S. Brewer et al. (London, 1862-1932)
NRO Norfolk Record Office
PCC Prerogative Court of Canterbury, Wills
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Public Record Office, Chancery Lane</td>
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<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td><em>Rotuli Parliamentorum</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>SBT</td>
<td>Shakespeare's Birthplace Trust Record Office, Stratford upon Avon</td>
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<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td><em>Statutes of the Realm</em>, ed. A. Luders et al. (London, 1810-28)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRO</td>
<td>Suffolk Record Office, Ipswich Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td><em>State Papers, King Henry VIII</em> (London, 1830-52)</td>
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<td>TRHS</td>
<td>Royal Historical Society, Transactions</td>
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<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td><em>Testamenta Vetusta</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>UC</td>
<td>University of California</td>
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<tr>
<td>VCH</td>
<td><em>Victoria History of the Counties of England</em></td>
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<td>YRO</td>
<td>Yorkshire Record Office</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Why another thesis on the third duke of Norfolk, and why, in particular, a partial one? It is true that two competent studies of the duke have been made in relatively recent times; the first an M.A. thesis submitted in the University of Nottingham in 1961 by F.R. Grace, and the second, a Ph.D. in the University of Florida, submitted in 1978 by D. Head. Both of these suffer from one besetting problem. Because Norfolk lived to the age of eighty years, and from the age of thirty-eight occupied a very important position in the Tudor state, both were forced to deal almost exclusively with the massive bulk of material which survives concerning his actions in the public domain. The result is that we learned more about Norfolk the politician, but almost nothing new about Norfolk the man. Indeed, I would go further. The pressure to negotiate large quantities of material in the public records at speed forced both researchers to accept without question assumptions about the motivations of the duke which had been current for a very long time, and which a more detailed study of the early part of his life, and attention to private records might have modified.

Norfolk, who was respected and admired by contemporary chroniclers and foreign ambassadors alike, has had a very bad press for more than a century. However, on close examination the widely accepted portrayal appears strangely unconvincing. I believe the reason for this is that it combines two distinct, not to say incompatible, traditions. First, he was condemned on moral grounds for taking a *maîtrasse en titre* and packing off to her dower house his admirable wife (whose only error lay in being loyal to her admirable mistress the queen) while offering his two nieces to Henry's viciousness for political advantage, and finally sacrificing the life of his gifted son to save himself, thus embodying "the deterioration of English life under Henry VIII". According to this view Norfolk was self-seeking, servile and unprincipled, but by no means politically inept. The second view, which sits so uncomfortably with
This, offers us Norfolk the uneducated, rough and ready, sometimes brutal, military man, greedy for power, indeed anxious to become another Wolsey or a Cromwell, but so completely out of his depth in politics that on each occasion, having combined with other aristocrats and conservatives to bring the upstart minister down, he lacked the intelligence and ability to assume his place in government and soon lost power.°

It is, of course, a truism that historians see the century they study through the eyes of their own, but what is more puzzling than the righteous Victorian condemnation of Norfolk, either for lack of morality or intelligence, is the durability of such judgements, despite the contortions necessary to combine two disparate traditions. In 1963 Mattingly could write of the "ponderous, cold hearted, chicken brained Duke, moving sluggishly in the mists of the feudal past, like some obsolete armoured saurian", 4 while the most detailed assessment of Norfolk in the same period, in L.B. Smith's A Tudor Tragedy, is as confused as any that had gone before. For Smith Norfolk was both "a nobleman of limited mentality, few inhibitions and inordinate ambitions", who "blundered . . with magnificent stupidity", and, at the same time, "crafty, servile, compromising and versatile", thus representing "the feudal wolf . . domesticated, . . neither a very pleasant nor a very enviable creature." 5 It is true that Norfolk's abilities and tireless service have been somewhat grudgingly acknowledged in more recent years, so that he has gained the reputation of being a Tudor work horse,6 but as recently as 1985 Dr. Starkey could sum up the second and third dukes, in his book on Henry VIII as follows:

"events were to show that there was nothing, not even their own children, that they would refuse to sacrifice on the altar of royal favour. This made them always a formidable force in politics; but always too the supremacy they longed for eluded them. They had great name and reputation, and great military skills; they lacked only greatness itself." 7

This judgement is as unconvincing as any that had gone before and betrays its Victorian roots just as surely. It is time for a fresh look at the third Howard
duke of Norfolk.

My approach to this task has been to focus attention on the least studied, early part of his life, in an effort to re-connect Norfolk with his family's past, the ideals which underpinned his own upbringing and training, and his early experience, which together shaped his outlook and his goals in life. I have ignored the artificial and often unhelpful dividing line drawn by historians between the late medieval and early modern periods, and availed myself of the considerable body of excellent modern scholarship on the nobility in the fifteenth and first half of the sixteenth centuries to examine Norfolk in his role as heir to a great landed estate, as well as in his other roles as courtier, warrior and councillor. My aim has been to present a complete picture of the man, his family (so intimately involved in the life of every nobleman of this period) and their affairs in the years which are covered here.

There are, even so, aspects of his life which pressure of time and space have forced me to leave to one side in the belief that they are not crucial. I have not examined the ecclesiastical patronage of the family, though it was certainly great, as a result of their large estates. Nor, after examining surviving customs accounts for the period between his reaching adulthood and 1509, in a vain search for a trace of his or his brother Edward's involvement in trade, have I pursued this line of enquiry into a later period. It is very likely that members of the family were involved in trade, but to find proof of this in the very patchy records which survive is like searching for a needle in a haystack.

Though the structure adopted in the study is basically chronological, the aim being to present a clear picture of the development of Norfolk's career, it has inevitably been influenced by the nature, and haphazard survival, of the source material. Thus for the first chapter, which covers the years up to 1509, relatively little material concerning the then rather unimportant Lord Howard survives, and this has to be gleaned from widely disparate sources. For the sixth chapter, on Surrey's part in Henry VIII's second war with France and
Scotland, the problem is reversed, for the survival of a large proportion of Wolsey's papers means that over periods of months at a time, when letters passed between the cardinal and lieutenant several times in a week, very large quantities of letters and other documents survive, allowing a detailed examination of Surrey's competence as a military commander and diplomatist, the degree to which he showed independence in implementing his instructions, and several aspects of his character. However, such a wealth of material presents problems of interpretation of its own, for the lively picture these letters present is, inevitably, a partial one. Without his private correspondence, or much documentation concerning the details of his activity at the centre of government or in East Anglia, the weight of the evidence about him inclines rather heavily towards his role and characteristics as a military commander, diplomat and administrator far from the mainspring of government and often under great stress. Indeed, the part of his career about which we would like to know most in order to assess his political stature, namely what his office of Lord Treasurer entailed on a day to day basis, what he did when in residence in London throughout term time, his role in council meetings, and what the nature and frequency of his private meetings with the king and Wolsey was, all has to be inferred from very incomplete and inadequate source material.

The date at which I conclude this study may seem arbitrary. It was chosen on the basis that it avoided the most obvious pitfall of structuring it around someone other than Norfolk. Pursuing him to the end of the 1520s would have given the thesis too Wolsey-orientated a bias, while going beyond 1526 would have involved investigating his complicated relationship with his niece, Anne Boleyn, a relationship which it would be necessary to approach from many angles, not least their different approaches to religion and the way in which this contributed to their rival patronage of East Anglians during her period of greatest power. As it is, the study retains Norfolk and the Howard family as its focus and carries him just beyond the inheritance of his dukedom at the age of fifty, undoubtedly one of the most important events in his life. It is hoped
that by adopting this limited timespan and studying him in both greater breadth and depth than hitherto, this study will provide the basis for a new assessment of his character and his career when he was at the height of his power in the 1530s and 1540s.
Notes

1 See for example Hall; Vergil; Holinshed; GC; CSPV iv, pp 249-5
2 DNB x, p 67; J.S. Brewer, The Reign of Henry VIII ii, p 161
3 DNB x, p 66
4 G. Mattingly, Catherine of Aragon, p 265
5 L.B. Smith, A Tudor Tragedy: The Life and Times of Catherine Howard, pp 27-34
7 D.R. Starkey, The reign of Henry VIII, Personalities and Politics, p 57
PART 1

THE LORD HOWARD, 1483–1514
CHAPTER I

THE FAMILY AND THE TURNING WHEEL OF FORTUNE

The birth, probably in 1474 of Thomas Howard, heir and namesake of his thirty-one year old father, was no small event for the rapidly rising Howard family. His grandfather, John, Lord Howard, a trusted servant of Edward IV, then deputy lieutenant of Calais, had been shaken some three years earlier when he had almost lost his eldest and only surviving son fighting for the king, whose household servant he was, at the critical battle of Barnet. Surviving severe injury, Thomas overcame his rivals for the hand of Elizabeth Tylney, the widow of a less lucky brother in arms at Barnet, Humphrey Bourchier, heir to Lord Berners, probably due to royal promotion of the match. He could have aimed higher in the marriage stakes, Howard heirs lacking his Mowbray blood and proximity to the king having married into the baronage in the past, but he probably knew Elizabeth, and her attractions anyway included her immediate availability, proven fecundity, Bourchier connexions, and not insubstantial estates which were located largely in East Anglia, and would allow the Howards to extend their interests from Suffolk back into Norfolk, the county where the family had risen. Moreover, though Elizabeth brought her landless husband only a life interest in both her Bourchier jointure and the properties she inherited as daughter and heiress of the Norfolk knight Sir Frederick Tylney, royal favour enabled the Howards to forge a more lasting advantage by obtaining the wardship of her little son, John Bourchier, grandson and heir to Lord Berners, and marrying him to Lord Howard's own baby daughter, Thomas's half-sister, Catherine Howard.

It was thus the Tylney seat, Ashwellthorpe Hall, Norfolk, that became the residence of Thomas and Elizabeth, and probably here that she gave birth to the Howard heir. After ten years in the royal household, but for a period of months seconded to the service of Edward's brother-in-law Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, Thomas senior obtained license in 1477 to retire from his latest feed
office of esquire to the body, attendant on the king daily in quarterly rotation, in
order to turn his full attention to carving a niche for himself in the government of
the shire. With his proximity to the king he made an immediate impact, being
appointed to the commmission of the peace for Norfolk in 1476, pricked sheriff of
Norfolk and Suffolk for 1477-8, and in the former year served as M.P. for his shire. The combination of court office with local power was encouraged by the king amongst
the personnel of his household, for by these means he maintained contact with the
localities, but Howard's retirement was perhaps unusual, demonstrating the strength
of his ties, like his father's, with East Anglia and his family's past.

The History of the Howard Family

A brief account of Howard history, especially the life of John Howard, will
illustrate both how completely the family was integrated into the life of its native
region, and the continuity between the careers of the members of the family studied
here and their ancestors. The founder of family fortunes under Edward I, Sir William
Howard, was a lawyer in the flourishing port of King's Lynn, where his parents were
probably merchants, and rose to be Chief Justice of Common Pleas and a knight. Like so many of his profession he used his wealth to buy land, settling at the manor
of East Winch nearby, and left his family well established. Thereafter a succession
of Howard heirs improved their fortunes by expanding their estates through judicious
marriages within the East Anglian elite, increasing their local influence by holding
office as JPs, sheriffs and MPs, and serving their kings in their households and in
arms in Scotland and France, two of them serving as vice-admirals of the North
Sea.

Sir John Howard III, who died in 1437, had wealth beyond his rank, much of the
estates of the baronies of Scales and Plaiz accruing to him by his first marriage,
on top of his substantial patrimony; indeed his Essex and Cambridgeshire lands alone
were worth over £400 p.a. He it was who moved his seat, c.1398, from Norfolk to
Tendring Hall, Stoke-by-Nayland, on the Suffolk/Essex border after his second
marriage to Alice, the Tendring heiress. However, disaster almost struck the family
when his eldest son predeceased him, leaving only a daughter Elizabeth. Sir John had
a younger son, Robert, by his second wife, who made his own way by entering the
service of John Mowbray, later second duke of Norfolk, and distinguishing himself on
land and at sea in the campaigns of Henry V. He must have had other attributes
besides this to recommend him, for, c.1420 he married far above his station, namely
to Margaret, probably the senior of his lord's 2 sisters.

Their eldest son John, the first Howard to carry the blood of Edward I, Thomas
of Brotherton, the Warennes, Segraves, Fitzalans and Mowbrays, was born soon after,
the male heir but not the heir-at-law of his grandfather, and he inherited only his
paternal grandmother's Stoke-by-Nayland house and estates worth about £100 p.a.
when his grandfather died in 1437. The bulk of the Howard lands passed to his older
cousin Elizabeth, since 1424 the wife of John de Vere, twelfth earl of Oxford. The
fact that John maintained cordial relations with the de Veres even through the
period of their troubles under York, suggests his original pragmatic acceptance of
this settlement, helped, no doubt, by the fact that his Tendring inheritance lay well
within the de Vere sphere of influence. His grandfather had probably also provided
him with a respectable but not very profitable marriage to Catherine, daughter of
Lord Moleyns, who bore their eldest son Thomas in 1443.

John had probably been educated in the Mowbray household at Framlingham
where his quick wits and drive would have been spotted early, for he was soon
active on the Mowbray council. His administrative talents and dynamism, and a
personality in which forcefulness was balanced by loyalty, rapidly won him the
confidence and respect of his cousin and lord, John, third duke of Norfolk, so that,
travelling widely in his affairs, Howard became known throughout the ducal domain in
south Norfolk and north-east Suffolk, and by his cousin's influence took the first
abortive step in his public career as MP for Suffolk in 1449. Though Howard was
eminently qualified and certainly ambitious for local office, Norfolk's sympathy with
critics of the regime meant that his aspirations were blocked at court while Henry
VI remained king, thus his drive for advancement was, perforce, directed elsewhere.
That he found an alternative outlet may be deduced from the fact that by 1467, when
his income from land and offices was still small, he was able to lend his first
lord's son, the young fourth duke of Norfolk, the very large sum of £1,000.1

His seat lay in the parish of Stoke-by-Nayland which was an important cloth
producing centre in an area where the entrepreneurs making fortunes from various
aspects of the wool and cloth trade included the earl of Oxford himself, and there
is no doubt that Howard kept sheep in large numbers. Stoke enjoyed easy access to
the three busy ports through which the finished cloth was shipped to Blackwell Hall
in London for export, and vital inputs like dyestuffs imported. They were
Colchester, ten miles to the south, Harwich/Orwellhaven fifteen miles east, and
Ipswich the same distance to the north. Significantly, the first was dominated by
the de Veres, the last by the Mowbrays and both families had influence in the
second. The early development of John Howard's business career is obscure since
his surviving accounts do not begin until 1462, but the earliest evidence in the
public records of his involvement in east coast shipping in 1455 links his name with
those of powerful connexions, Oxford and Humfrey and John Bourchier. By the time
his own accounts begin the transportation by sea of the goods of others had become
his business, and he supervised this from properties he had acquired in all these
ports as well as London.

Of course he had impressive local contacts, but crucially he possessed the
characteristics of the tycoon: a keen eye for any opening where a profit might be
made, ruthless pursuit of it, and a personality which inspired trust and
confidence. The expertise developed in his private career as much as his local
standing, which sprang from his Mowbray service, business contacts and wealth, led
directly to his public career under York. His accounts later show him a shipowner,
shipbuilder, charterer of vessels, convoyer of merchant fleets, commissioner for the
suppression of piracy, chaser of pirates, supplier of ships to the king, fitter and
victualler of royal naval expeditions and thrice commander of Edward's fleets in
1462, 1470 and 1481.

The Transformation of Howard Fortunes

Between the battles of Towton and Bosworth the power of the Howards was
revolutionised by their access to royal patronage. On Edward's victory in 1461, when
John Howard was already about thirty-six, and his son 18, John was richer than many peers but owned little land and had not even been knighted. Howard played an important part in Edward's victory at the head of Norfolk's forces, and, since East Anglia presented a potential threat to the new dynasty, the duke of Suffolk and earl of Oxford having been among Henry VI's greatest supporters, while Norfolk had just died and been succeeded by his seventeen year old heir, the advantages of promoting a man like Howard, who would owe his position entirely to Edward were obvious.

Knighthood, important local offices combined with household office, and military and naval appointments were showered upon him, while vigorous service was rewarded with substantial land grants, a peerage c. 1459 and increasingly demanding and responsible employment. The loyalty of Lord Howard and his son in the crisis of 1469-71 reinforced Edward's earlier policy. The treasurership of the Chamber, the deputyship of Calais under Hastings and repeated ambassadorial appointments followed, marking the father as one of Edward's most versatile and trusted servants. As a result of his personal relationship with the king, he had no need of other patronage and wisely avoided court politics altogether. At the death in 1481 of Anne, the Mowbray heiress, Edward felt no need to raise him, as co-heir, to the dukedom or give him his share of the estates, but carried through his plan embodied in the marriage of the children and consequent 1478 Act of Parliament, to endow his second son Richard, duke of York, with the Mowbray titles and estates for life. Lord Howard was old, rich, powerful, and close to the king, and his family's exclusion was, moreover, not permanent. Indeed his status was enhanced by his new relationship with the prince, for his knowledge of the affairs of the ducedom must have made him still more useful in East Anglia.

On Edward's death in 1483, Richard, duke of Gloucester needed the Howards' support far more than his brother ever had. Their local power had grown steadily since the execution of Oxford and his heir in 1462; by 1483 Lord Howard had a landed income of approximately £830, held numerous stewardships, and had been left paramount in East Anglia as a result of the attainder of the thirteenth earl of Oxford in 1475, the death of the fourth duke of Norfolk in the next year, and in
1483 the execution of Anthony, earl Rivers. Sir Thomas's influence was likewise growing in Norfolk. In 1482 he and one of his friends had secured, by fair means or foul, election as the two knights of the shire in opposition to John Radcliffe de Fitzwalter, of Attleborough near Ashwellthorpe, with whom Howard had shared the 2 seats in the previous Parliament. Thus Richard was eager to win Howard support, and at his usurpation reversed Edward's arrangement over the Mowbray inheritance by ignoring Edward's Act of 1478 and sanctioning the partition of the lands in response to Lord Berkeley's petition for a moiety of the Mowbray inheritance as co-heir with Howard. It was Howard, however, who emerged with the East Anglian and the bulk of the Surrey and Sussex estates and senior title, duke of Norfolk, while Berkeley grudgingly accepted more scattered lands, mostly in the midlands and the junior Mowbray title earl of Nottingham.

Nor was this the only indication that Richard valued Howard support very highly. Most of the East Anglian estates then being in the hands of two dowagers, Richard further awarded Norfolk forty-six new manors with the issues of others to support his dignity, and the lucrative and prestigious offices of Steward of the Duchy of Lancaster South of Trent, Earl Marshal and Lord Admiral. Nor did his grants end there, for his crucial defence of London and the Home Counties against Buckingham in the autumn of 1483, and virtual control of the area during the king's extended absences in the midlands were also rewarded, leaving him with substantial portions of Oxford's, Rivers' and Buckingham's lands, so that his landed income alone rose by well over £1,000 and his holdings equalled the Mowbrays' at their peak. Though his role in East Anglia, where he now resided at the ducal seat, Framlingham Castle, precluded Norfolk spending much time with the king, his power now took on a national character. For the first time he exercised considerable patronage at court, promoting his relatives and associates to modest offices.

Richard also favoured Thomas, the Howard heir, granting him another Mowbray title, earl of Surrey, and an annuity of £1,100 during his father's life since Norfolk held the lands of the earldom. Moreover, he gave him an important office for which his earlier career had prepared him, that of Lord Steward of the Household, as a
result of which he became a councillor. In 1484 Richard further bound the Howards to him by betrothing his 9 year old niece Anne, one of Edward IV's five surviving daughters and the most suitable in age, to Thomas junior, now known by the courtesy title, Lord Howard. The making of this match followed Richard's accommodation with Elizabeth Wydeville in March of that year, in which Norfolk had been involved, whereby the king undertook to provide good marriages and lands yielding two-hundred marks per annum for each of his recently bastardised nieces, and was probably indicative on the Howard side of enduring affection for Edward IV. Though Surrey was certainly favoured, and probably spent more time at court than his father, it remains uncertain whether he had any real influence with the king.

Thus after 24 years of Yorkist rule, when at the ages of about sixty and forty-two respectively John and Thomas led their East Anglian retinues in the vanguard of Richard III's army against Henry Tudor, the father was one of the richest and most powerful magnates in the whole country, holding lands in 12 counties, while his son the earl of Surrey, though not a magnate in the sense that his estates remained small, was nonetheless a very wealthy and powerful man. As pillars of Richard's regime the Howards could not, with honour, stay at home or wait out the battle on the sidelines, nor could they switch their allegiance before the battle, though the prominence of Norfolk's cousin Oxford in the opposing army gave them every opportunity. There is no reason to suppose that they ever contemplated any of these alternatives, for they threw themselves wholeheartedly into Richard's support. Contemporaries regarded this uncompromising stance as both honourable and valorous, the contrast in the treatment accorded the corpses of the king and Norfolk, who was buried with full ducal honours, underlines the fact that any odium attaching to the regime did not touch them.

The Collapse of Howard Fortunes

Bosworth was undoubtedly an unmitigated disaster for the Howards, but Norfolk's death in action had the advantage of satisfying the blood lust of the winning side so that his son, sorely injured and perhaps preferring death on the battlefield to disgrace, was in fact incarcerated in the Tower. Oxford, who had
recently shared Henry's exile and made an invaluable contribution to his cause, and so stood in high favour, may have spoken up for his cousin Surrey from the first, for he promised his goodlordship to the countess Elizabeth in response to her personal appeal to him, so that five weeks after the battle she was acknowledging herself and her lord deeply indebted to him. Henry himself was not given to bloodletting, and probably wished to avoid disturbance in East Anglia which Oxford would be in a poor position to deal with after his long absence.

Contradictory rumours of impending execution and imminent release, with the facts that Surrey must have received medical attention and was boarded according to his rank, all indicate an ambivalence in the attitude of the new king towards him which is readily comprehensible. For his part, two episodes enshrined in folk tradition suggest that Surrey was at pains to explain that Howard loyalty would always belong to the crowned king of England, whoever he might be. For Henry, the earl embodied the dilemma he faced coming to the kingship as an outsider without any previous experience of English government or a sizeable party of insiders among his supporters whom he could trust to guide him. Among the Yorkist councillors Surrey was ostensibly both one of the most dangerous and most useful, because of his own and his father's long and varied experience in royal service. The solution Henry reached regarding Surrey is vital to this study, in that it set a completely new tone for the relationship between the Howards and the crown. This relationship, in stark contrast to that of mutual advantage with the two Yorkist kings, was one in which the Tudor king always held the whip hand. Moreover, this tone was so lastingly defined that the heirs to each side of it came keenly to appreciate its essence. Henry set out to control and discipline Surrey by reducing him initially to a position so abject that he would know himself entirely reliant upon the trust and favour of his new master to regain any semblance of his former status and power. This favour Henry did not intend to give lightly; it was to be won only by rendering loyal, tireless and, if required, self-sacrificial service to the new dynasty, so that restoration, occurring stage by stage, would make Surrey aware that he remained always on probation.
Though Henry VII's chosen instrument for this was the old weapon of attainder, it was thus employed as part of a more consistent policy. Norfolk and Surrey were listed second and third after Richard himself in the act of attainder which was passed by the first parliament of the reign on 7 November 1485. The Howards underwent all the rigours of 'legal death', being stripped of all their titles and estates: grants by Richard were returned to their rightful heirs, while the Mowbray inheritance escheated to the crown. Henry replaced Howard estate officers with his own supporters, granted some of the profits from the lands to others and even granted certain lands away.

Surrey's heir was in capable hands meanwhile. His wife had removed all her children out of harm's way to the remote Isle of Sheppey, whence a dash to the continent could have been effected if necessary. Meanwhile she negotiated for their future security. In early October 1485 she found, on trying to arrange their removal to Ashwellthorpe, that Surrey's previous opponent in Norfolk, now lord Fitzwalter, a late convert to Henry's cause who succeeded Surrey as steward of the household, had dismissed her servants and disbanded her modest household on the slenderest of excuses. This she had clearly not expected, for at her interview with Oxford mentioned above, Fitzwalter had been present and had promised her and her husband his goodlordship. This promise she hoped to redeem by means of the cooperation of John Paston, an acquaintance in Norfolk who was one of Oxford's councillors. Clearly Oxford's goodwill had not, in those early days, been sufficient to protect her interests, but her instincts had undoubtedly been sound in making her initial appeal to him.

Henry, recognising the essential conjunction of his own vital interests in East Anglia with Oxford's, set out not only to restore him in blood and possessions to all his family had lost in 1462, but also to enhance the earl's local position to one of pre-eminence, entrusting him with John Howard's offices, and, among many other new grants, a considerable portion of the Howard estates. Thus de Vere/Howard positions under York were reversed, and again self-interest and loyalty to relatives proved entirely compatible. Though granted the Howard lands in tail
male, Oxford clearly regarded himself as their custodian.\textsuperscript{60}

Indeed, Henry's special trust in Oxford, the earl's profits from Howard lands and suitability as a cousin, may have meant that in the three and a half years between Bosworth and Surrey's release and partial restoration in 1489, Oxford assumed responsibility for Surrey's children and step-children. They then included John Bourchier, Lord Berners, eighteen years old in 1485 and his future wife Catherine, his two sisters and Surrey's own children, Thomas, then eleven, Edward eight, Edmund, perhaps several years younger, and the girls Elizabeth and Muriel. Of the boys who were old enough to leave their mother's household, Berners and Edward may have been taken into Oxford's, for Berners was left an annuity by Oxford in his will, while Edward's attachment to the navy, command of the fleet in the ageing earl's place in 1512 and succession to Oxford as Lord Admiral may be significant, though most persuasive is the earl's choice of him to head the feoffees for the marriage of his heir to Edward's half-sister Anne in 1511, rather than the obvious choice, Lord Thomas.\textsuperscript{61} If Edward was taken into Oxford's care it is more than likely that his elder brother entered either the royal household or Margaret Beaufort's.\textsuperscript{62}

In March 1486 Surrey's reprieve from execution was acknowledged in a limited pardon, although Henry retained the right to imprison him.\textsuperscript{63} A more hopeful sign may be seen in the fact that in April the Mowbray dowager Elizabeth was granted the late dowager Katherine's lands, so that she had a life interest in all of the former Mowbray lands in Norfolk and half of those in Suffolk, preserving intact most of an inheritance which Surrey might thus hope one day to regain.\textsuperscript{64} However, in August a commission was appointed to enquire into the possible concealment of Howard lands.\textsuperscript{65} Surrey's period of incarceration was not uneventful for on Lincoln's rebellion in 1487 he may have been offered his freedom by the constable of the Tower.\textsuperscript{66} Since Lincoln, a nephew of Richard III and his chosen heir, belonged to a family whose younger members had been as loyal to Richard as the Howards, the offer may have been a test of Surrey's loyalty which he did well to decline.\textsuperscript{67}
First Steps in the Long Climb back to Favour

Release came in January 1489, preceded by the reversal of the Howard attainders and an oath of allegiance, Surrey's restoration to his former title, and to the lands held in right of his wife, along with those he inherited from others than his father, and those granted by letters patent to Oxford and Daubeney if he could come to an agreement with them. His return to Ashwellthorpe was brief, however, for the murder of the earl of Northumberland at Thirsk on 28 April, during resistance to the collection of a subsidy, gave Surrey an opportunity to prove his loyalty and usefulness, obtaining, probably through Oxford's good offices, the appointment to suppress the disorders. He set out with the vanguard of Henry's army, but the revolt may have collapsed before he reached York, and Henry, following behind, arrived to find order restored. The recommendations of royal councillors in York and Henry's unwillingness to concede anything in the matter of the subsidy induced him to appoint Surrey informally as Prince Arthur's deputy, in effect the king's lieutenant in the North. His mandate was to bring the north, where loyalty to Richard III had been strongest, firmly under Tudor rule by military, administrative and diplomatic means.

This testing assignment far from both his former power base and the court clearly did not find him wanting in Henry's eyes, for each of his military successes was followed by a petition to the king for the return of a further part of his inheritance, endorsed by an act of Parliament. Thus in the second session of Parliament in 1489 a bill was passed the effect of which was to return to him the lands held by his father before 1476, saving his step-mother's life interest. He was granted the reversion of all Howard lands which the king had granted away and all reserved rents, but specifically disclaimed any right to the reversion of the Mowbray dowager Elizabeth's lands. In 1491 Surrey was called upon to put down a riot at Ackworth near Pontefract which he did with speed, executing the leaders but suing for mercy for the remainder of the rebels, thereby both satisfying the king and advancing his credit in the north. This was followed by another petition to the king confirmed by Parliament in which the exclusion clause relating to the
While in the north Surrey did not neglect his interests in East Anglia, probably making at least annual visits to his estates, though of course he did not lack friends there, including Oxford, as his correspondence with John Paston proves.\textsuperscript{78} By various arrangements he soon began to redeem Howard lands which had been granted away, so that by 1494 he held Framlingham and other Mowbray manors, and in that year, on his step-mother's death, came into the Tendring estates.\textsuperscript{79} The year before he and his wife were licensed to enter on her father's lands as part of a settlement, in 1495 he purchased from lord de la Warr for five-hundred marks the barony of Bramber which he had been granted, and he gradually bought back further Mowbray manors, and rents and annuities levied on others which had been granted away in 1486.\textsuperscript{77} By 1495, six years after his release, he was drawing a gross income of £666 p.a. from his East Anglian lands which represented the major, but by no means the only source of his landed income, and he could afford to marry his heir to a wife who brought him no dowry.\textsuperscript{78} By then he was employing on his estates and in his council men of considerable local weight.\textsuperscript{79}

This recovery is sufficiently spectacular to raise the question of how he managed to finance the repurchase of so much of the Howard estates given that the purchase price of land was often 20 times its net annual value and he had supposedly been deprived of all the Howard assets on his attainder.\textsuperscript{80} Probably he was able to purchase at somewhat lower prices given his title in law, but, as a result of their business activities, the Howards were wealthy in jewels and goods which might easily be secreted away, a surmise made all the more probable by the fact that both the countess and the duchess Margaret, who came from a London mercantile background, appear to have been capable women.\textsuperscript{81} Though Ashwellthorpe may well have been ransacked by Fitzwalter, Margaret probably fared better at Stoke as it was so firmly in Oxford's sphere of influence, and she was close to her step-son, Surrey.\textsuperscript{82} In addition, the nature of John Howard's known business ventures
suggests that he probably had money variously invested at the time of Bosworth, in shipping and goods partly outside the realm. Further, Surrey had been involved in his father's business as a young man, thus he had contacts in the business communities of East Anglia and London, and would not have found it difficult to raise loans once he had secured Oxford's support. He certainly reached some favourable repurchase arrangements, the life annuity of a hundred marks he awarded Oxford in part payment for certain Mowbray manors on which it was secured, which he appears to have begun to pay off only in 1498, suiting his circumstances perfectly, while demonstrating the importance of Oxford's role in the recovery of Howard fortunes.

The Education and Marriage of Lord Thomas

In 1495 a turning point was reached in the rehabilitation of the family with the marriage of Surrey's 21 year old heir Lord Thomas to the king's sister-in-law Anne, the 19 year old fifth born daughter of Edward IV to whom he had been betrothed ten years previously at the height of Howard fortunes. The wedding took place at Westminster Abbey on 4 February in the presence of the king. As a public expression of royal self confidence this union of two former Yorkists under Tudor auspices could not have been surpassed, and from Henry's viewpoint it had the important advantage of binding the Howards further to him, for the Howard heir became part of the queen's family as a result of Elizabeth's warm affection for her mother and four sisters and pleasure in having them often about her and her own children. Anne had been ten years old on her eldest sister's marriage in 1485, and must have been a bright and confident child, for she immediately began to assume significant roles in royal ceremonial, carrying the chrism at the christenings of her nephew Arthur in 1486, and her niece Margaret in 1489, attending upon her sister at both the Garter Feast at Windsor and the court Christmas celebrations at Sheen in 1488 and representing Elizabeth at their mother's funeral in 1492.

The marriage brought important political advantages to Surrey, including the fact that henceforth he was able to include the Archbishop of Canterbury and other prominent ecclesiastics and councillors in all his enfeoffments. The financial
benefits were all Henry's, however, for in this way he disposed respectably of one of his sisters-in-law at minimum cost. Apart from the 6s. 8d. he offered at the ceremony, Anne's marriage cost him nothing, not even the two-hundred marks Richard III had promised her, for the contract drawn up after the wedding to provide for the young couple was entirely a matter between the queen and the earl. Before examining what it reveals about the life of the young couple, something must be said of the groom's upbringing and education.

Though we know nothing substantive about these, certain things can be deduced. His education probably began at home at Ashwellthorpe, where John Howard visited his grandchildren in July 1482. He probably joined his grandfather Norfolk's household before Bosworth, but what happened thereafter is more uncertain. From 1489 when he was 15, all the children returned to Surrey's care and were probably educated by a private tutor or tutors at Sheriff Hutton under the watchful eye of his father, and it is likely that this continued to his marriage and perhaps beyond. To judge from the literary abilities of his step-brother, Lord Berners, whose handwriting bears a strong resemblance to his own, his step-sister Margaret's reputation as a blue stocking, and the evidence of his own elegant handwriting, consistent spelling, fluent French, competent Latin, grounding in Italian, and habit later in life of reading every night before he slept, his education was as broad and thorough as one would expect in the light of Surrey's own. Indeed, Howard admiration for Burgundian culture, derived from John's diplomatic missions there and Thomas's service as a young man at the court of Charles the Bold, created a sophisticated cultural tone equalled in few English noble households of this period.

The shared education with his younger brothers and elder step-brother fostered competition, particularly in the martial sports in which they had a very thorough training, but for which he lacked his brother Edward's physical advantages, being fairly short and slight whereas Edward was tall and broad. Surrey's position had an impact on these teenagers, for Sheriff Hutton was an imposing fortress, ten miles north of York, where the earl enjoyed the prestige, power and responsibility of
the king's representative, head of the group of councillors who ruled the region from the Trent to the Scottish Borders. Whenever Surrey rode forth it was with a large retinue, he entertained lavishly, while on each occasion he entered York he was received by the mayor and city worthies with great ceremony. However, a stranger in the north, his style of leadership was necessarily one of consultation and consensus and perhaps his sons observed this, for if he followed his own father's practice, he took them about with him when they were of suitable age to gain practical experience. Thomas probably had his first taste of campaigning in 1491 aged 17, when his father suppressed the rising at Ackworth.

The marriage contract drawn up between Surrey and Queen Elizabeth immediately after the marriage of his heir to her sister is revealing. No dowry was paid but Surrey undertook to provide a jointure worth about £200 p.a. consisting of valuable Norfolk and Suffolk manors then held by the Mowbray dowager which were to be placed in the hands of trustees of the queen's choosing (including Anne's half brother the marquis of Dorset, her nephew Prince Henry and Henry Bourchier, earl of Essex) as soon as they came to him on her death. Another group of 4 of Surrey's manors, worth about £140p.a., was to be settled on the same feoffees to the earl's use for life but then to the couple and their heirs. Since they would thus have no income initially they were to live with Surrey, but the queen awarded the earl an annuity of £120 (part of which she hoped to persuade Henry to take on) for the support of Anne, and she undertook to provide her sister with all her clothing during the same period. Anne's new lifestyle was to be fairly modest but comfortable, with seven horses, and eight household servants: two gentlewomen, a girl, a gentleman, a yeoman, and three grooms. Surrey further agreed not to alienate any others of his lands, except to a fixed amount to provide a jointure for a second wife and to pay off his debts. These clauses limited his freedom of action so as to guarantee his adherence to the demands of primogeniture over natural affection, but Surrey was probably not unwilling to comply. It is worth noting that the queen bore all the legal costs of making the estate.

The annuity was regularly paid in the eight years between the marriage
contract and the queen's death in February 1503, to judge by the surviving portion of her privy purse accounts, which show that a retrospective annual payment was made in March 1503. Contrary to the letter of the contract, this was paid direct to Lord Thomas, but the circumstances were exceptional. The accounts also show that the queen bought Anne expensive cloth when she bought for herself, for instance in May 1502, while in December 1502 and February 1503 she gave her 10 marks, or £6.13.4d for her personal use, apparently a regular payment intended for minor personal expenses. Thus it appears that the queen more than honoured her side of the agreement even if she was not always punctual in her payments, but that her husband did not share the burden.

Early Military Experience

In the years immediately following the marriage the young couple spent some time with the queen, but there were reasons for them to have been mainly in the north. English relations with James IV were then deteriorating so that military action might at any time be necessary and Surrey's sons were anxious to support their father and for the opportunity to increase their experience of warfare. They were not without experience by then. When war with France broke out in 1492 Berners (who had come of age and obtained livery of his lands the previous year) contracted to serve in the king's army overseas as a spear and Edward, then about fifteen, accompanied Poyning's naval force to the siege of Sluys in August. The culmination of the long siege in the fall of the town on 13 October, no doubt caused envy among his brothers and reinforced his taste for warfare. Surrey had himself originally been appointed to the force which was to attack France under the king, and his sons no doubt hoped to accompany him, but Henry decided he was more useful guarding the realm in his absence. There is no trace in the surviving records concerning Lord Thomas, but since Oxford led a large force of East Anglians to France it is unlikely that Surrey sent a force, and far more probable that Howard remained in the north to assist his father in case there was trouble with the Scots.

In the winter of 1496-7, following James's fleeting September invasion, Surrey
went to Alnwick to inspect the Border fortresses and mounted an audacious and very destructive winter raid into Teviotsdale to avenge Henry's honour, and it is more than likely his sons accompanied him. On 4 April 1497 their mother Elizabeth, Countess of Surrey died, and on 8 November the earl, who needed a wife to preside over the female side of his vast household and many guests, married Agnes Tylney, a young cousin of his first wife and sister of his servant Sir Philip. Like Surrey's own father's second marriage, this was clearly based on personal choice not financial or dynastic considerations, for Agnes had no property.

The same year brought further action eagerly grasped by the young Howards. An army was raised in the south to assist Surrey's northern host against the Scots, but in the event the crisis which developed in May and came to a head in mid June, when the Cornish rebels rose and marched on London in protest at the collection of the subsidy for the war, detained the army in the south. Lord Thomas, who moved with considerable speed, especially if he was in the north, led a retinue of fifty men, probably from his father's East Anglian estates, to join Daubeney's army in the defence of London, and Berners was also present. Howard's small force participated in the action at Blackheath of 17 June, though he might have been in the part of the army first on the scene which fared badly, for he was not amongst the sixty-eight knighted by Henry on the battlefield after the rebels were routed or during his triumphant entry into London.

He and Edward then went north, probably by the fastest means available which was by sea, since Surrey's army had substantial naval reinforcements and much of his ordnance had been transported thus. There they joined the army of about eight to nine-thousand men their father had been raising even before the challenge posed by James's invasion in late July and siege of Norham castle. Surrey's advance caused James to raise his siege and retire over the Border where the English pursued him on 15 August, destroying minor strongholds and laying siege to the fort of Ayton just a mile from his camp two days later. The castle was surrendered after a three hour battery, and duly razed to the ground by placing two barrels of gunpowder in the vault. However, neither by this provocative action, his invitations to battle
nor the disposition of his army in battle array in James's sight could Surrey force an engagement.

It has been suggested that he did not pursue the Scottish army for as long as he might because his instructions were to allow time for Henry's diplomacy to mature. Though he was certainly aware of Henry's desire to make a lasting peace with Scotland, the fact that a very substantial and well supplied force had been provided suggests that Henry shared the common English penchant for negotiating with the Scots from a position of strength and regarded a notable victory as likely to be most conducive to such a result. Hall and Vergil between them cite the difficulties of foul weather and supply consequent upon the rapid advance to rescue Bishop Fox at Norham as the reasons for the early termination of the campaign, while the Great Chronicle and the Venetian ambassador suggest that Surrey was temporarily in trouble, and was recalled to London to explain his reasons for curtailing the expedition by sixteen days. Due weight should, however, be given to the unreported tactical problem of forcing a Scottish army to fight in the safety of its own territory, which probably persuaded Surrey of the pointlessness of spending further sums on wages when nothing could be achieved thereby, and Henry is likely to have appreciated this point.

Though not the twenty-three year old Lord Thomas's first experience of a campaign, this was the largest and longest to date, and provided invaluable experience in the problems of campaigning against the Scots (not least among them that of holding an English northern army together) and his father's methods of dealing with them. Surrey sought to make the most of such small success as he had had, and to encourage the Northern gentry who had cooperated by the creation of forty knights, mainly from among their ranks, after the action at Ayton. He did, however, also knight his two eldest sons who thus acquired the credibility as leaders of men so essential to their status. The campaign probably strengthened the bonds between the three of them and also enabled Lord Thomas to make the acquaintance of Fox, who spent several months in the north working with Surrey both in organising the campaign and in conducting negotiations with Scotland.
Their knighthoods were opportune, for, on 30 September a seven year truce was concluded between Henry and James, Surrey being one of the commissioners, which in 1499 was extended to last one year beyond the death of whichever of the kings lived longer. Thus all hope of furthering their reputations by feats of arms in the north disappeared, and, as their father spent increasing amounts of time in the south as a result of his commission to try Warwick and Warbeck in 1499, they spent less and less time at Sheriff Hutton. In 1500 Surrey vacated this residence without immediately relinquishing all of his responsibilities in the north, an area of expertise on which he was consulted for the rest of his life, but he had proved himself too valuable to be left in the north once there was no fear of invasion.

Surrey's Rehabilitation Complete: the Howards in Council and at Court

Though he had probably been a councillor since 1494 or 1495, it was in June 1501 that Surrey attained a position in the state which outstripped even any that his father had held, when he was appointed Lord Treasurer of England, the second ranking of the four great officers of state after the Lord Chancellor. There can be little doubt that he obtained this office on the basis of his financial and business expertise, his father's reform of the household as its treasurer probably enhancing his credentials. Current research is proving that the exchequer, far from being the moribund institution it has long been considered, was an integral part of the 'chamber system' of finance; indeed Surrey's period of tenure saw some important reforms in the exchequer of receipt.

Moreover, the treasurership was clearly not the sinecure it was once thought to have been. Undoubtedly it conferred on its holder great prestige, useful perquisites and lucrative patronage within the exchequer and the customs, but the freedom which fifteenth century treasurers had had to help themselves had disappeared, and Surrey's fee was a fixed £365 p.a. with £15 in livery. Though as treasurer he was rarely involved personally in the movement of cash, he and the chancellor were personally accountable for exchequer revenues and, though the surviving source material is very inadequate, he certainly took an active role as negotiator for the crown of loans to foreign merchants and, later, perhaps due to
Lord Admiral Oxford's increasing absence, arranged the convoying of the fleets of the Staple and Merchant Adventurers. However, the primary duty of the treasurer was to advise the king on financial matters, particularly trade and prices, and since these were deeply affected by other domestic issues and foreign policy, this made the treasurer one of the king's most important councillors, and required his regular attendance. Surrey immediately became a frequent attender of meetings of the inner ring of Henry VII's council, missing only two of the recorded council meetings during the remainder of the reign, and he also assiduously attended the House of Lords when parliament was in session in 1504.

Lord Thomas and his wife were with the queen on several occasions during the two years after Surrey's appointment, at her manor of Havering-at-Bower, Essex. Their participation in court ceremonial at this time was such that they were often at one or other of the royal palaces, for her relationship to the royal family made their presence essential on great occasions. Both Lord Thomas and his father attended the funeral of Anne's nephew Prince Edmund in the summer of 1500. Though he was not involved in the spectacular reception of Catherine of Aragon on 2 October 1501, Howard was present at her marriage to Arthur at St Paul's on 15 November and at the evening celebrations at the Bishop of London's residence. On 10 January 1502 he was at the palace at Richmond with his father and sister Muriel, Lady Lisle, at the ceremonies when Princess Margaret was affianced to James IV, an occasion on which his father shared the credit for bringing about the marriage. He did not apparently accompany his father to Ludlow when Surrey, whose experience of the Burgundian court made him a master at arranging ceremonial occasions, was despatched there in April 1502 to organise the funeral of Prince Arthur.

The unexpected death of the queen on 11 February 1503 altered the financial status of Thomas and Anne by the loss of her annuity, allowance and clothing. It should, in fact, have benefited them, for Anne and her only other surviving sister Katherine, wife of William Courtenay, son and heir of the earl of Devon, became co-heirs to the earldoms of March and Ulster. It is perfectly clear, however, that neither acquired, nor probably expected to acquire, any part of this inheritance from
the king, who had rights under common law in a third of the estates at least, and in fact had simply absorbed them into the crown lands. Elizabeth's funeral constituted the most grand and solemn of court occasions for many years and of course as family members Anne, Lord Thomas, Surrey and his countess and Edward Howard were all present, being issued with cloth for mourning attire for numerous servants, Anne outranking them all. On a happier note, Surrey and his wife presided over the progress of Princess Margaret to her marriage in Scotland that summer, which, stunning contemporaries with its grandeur, reflected almost as much honour on the Howard family as the Tudor monarchy. There is no direct evidence that Thomas and Anne accompanied them, but his sister Muriel and brother-in-law Boleyn certainly did.

The Reconstruction of Howard Influence in the Localities

After the death of the queen, Lord Thomas and his wife may have been less at court, for in contrast to Surrey's situation as a young man under Edward IV, the growing power of the father did not result in office for his son and heir. Thus while his father of necessity spent the law terms and much time beside attending on the king and in council, visiting Framlingham, the heart of the former duchy where he was undertaking extensive rebuilding, whenever he could, Lord Thomas was free to represent him in the localities where his influence was less well established. He and his family did, admittedly, use the grand Mowbray house in Paradise Row, Lambeth, occupied by Surrey and various family members periodically by 1501 at the latest, and a property in Tottenham, probably rented, in a fashionable area popular with courtiers and exchequer officials. However, once Surrey regained the Barony of Bramber his heir also resided at the grand Chesworth Place just south of Horsham, Sussex, and after 1502 the manor house at Bramley in Surrey, which lay very close to Guildford on the Horsham road and was the heart of a smaller cluster of former Mowbray estates.

In 1491, while he was in the north, Surrey had experienced a serious setback in that area at the hands of his cousin William Berkeley, earl of Nottingham, who had deviously taken advantage of his absence to have a bill passed in parliament, of
which Surrey was ignorant until it became law, the effect of which was to eliminate half of his quarter share in the barony of Lewes in Sussex, Mowbray lands acquired through a marriage to a Fitzalan heiress. A lack of concern for his interests among the lawyers of the council who dealt with parliamentary business is hardly surprising at this early date, but his ignorance suggests a more serious problem, namely that he had not yet won the loyalty and co-operation of former Mowbray servants and associates among the local elite. John Howard appears to have served the Mowbrays mainly in East Anglia, and had only held and visited the southern estates briefly between 1483 and 1485, while Surrey had probably had no chance to rectify this omission himself since his reinstatement. In 1501 he was appointed to the benches of both counties after which his influence grew, while the struggle of the unfortunate Berkeley heir, Sir Maurice, to reconstitute his inheritance inclined him to seek Surrey's goodlordship, as a result of which the relevant eighth was returned in 1504.

Nowhere are Surrey's efforts to replace Mowbray influence at a local level by bringing influential families within his orbit better illustrated than in his telling use of his major assets, his children. The marriages of his older step-children, whom he brought up with his own, though arranged by his father, were useful. Berners, who married his half-sister Catherine Howard, inherited lands in Surrey and Sussex as well as East Anglia and became a JP in both counties from 1498. Anne, his eldest sister was married c.1492, probably by John Howard's arrangement, to Thomas Fiennes, Lord Dacre of Hurstmonceux, Sussex, in which county he was a major power. Dacre had a legal training, thus became a useful feoffee to Surrey when he recovered his lands in the south, served like Lord Thomas at Blackheath in 1497 and went north with him to fight the Scots, and was increasingly associated with the Howards thereafter, both Surrey and his heir nominating him for the Garter in 1514.

A marriage for Berners' other sister, Margaret Bourchier, was also arranged in 1478 when she was still a child, the prospective groom being John Sandys, second son of Sir William Sandys of The Vyne, Hampshire who, in exchange for a dowry of £300, undertook to provide the Howards at once with a jointure worth fifty marks in
Surrey, Sussex and Hampshire, since the children were to live with them until of marriageable age. The marriage brought Surrey nothing but tedious litigation in common law courts and Chancery, however, for Sir William and his heir took advantage of the reversal of Howard fortunes at Bosworth to evade fulfilment of their side of the contract. On John Sandys' death Surrey hit upon the happy expedient of marrying Margaret to Thomas, son and heir of the wealthy and influential Chief Justice of Common Pleas, Sir Thomas Bryan, again a landowner and JP in Surrey and Sussex, so that the matter appears soon to have been settled. The young Bryans were at court by 1509, when Surrey probably secured their places in the new queen's household, thus their son Francis later became a royal favorite, one daughter married Henry Guildford and the other Nicholas Carew, while Margaret later became governess to the princesses Mary and Elizabeth. The close Howard-Bryan connexion, based on co-operation at court and in the counties was useful to both sides and thus endured, and a Bryan was auditor to Thomas junior when duke of Norfolk in 1528.

Of Surrey's own children, he married Edward after Thomas, c. 1500, to Elizabeth, daughter and co-heiress of Miles Stapleton, who also held jointure of two previous husbands, Sir John Fortescue and William Calthorpe, and was considerably his senior. Her estates lay in Norfolk, Suffolk and Berkshire and on the strength of them Edward was admitted to the Norfolk bench in 1502, before his father or elder brother. Elizabeth died in 1505 leaving him landless, since they had no children, and he promptly married another wealthy widow Alice, sister and heiress in 1488-9 to Henry Lovel, Lord Morley, who had been close to Edward IV. Her first husband, who died just before Edward's first wife, was Sir William Parker, a substantial East Anglian knight by whom she had several children. Alice held considerable estates in Norfolk, her residence being at Hingham, and in Buckingham, Hertfordshire, Essex and Oxfordshire, and Edward was soon active in looking after their landed interests, which included Bowerhouse, a sub-manor at Stoke-by-Nayland rented from his father by 1506. They had no children since she was about forty when they married.

Edmund, the third son's, marital history belongs to the next reign, for he was
several years Edward’s junior and unknighted. He entered the Middle Temple in 1510, but if a legal training was ever seriously intended it was abandoned for he left soon after when a suitable marriage opportunity arose, the bride being Joyce, daughter and co-heiress of Sir Richard Culpepper of Aylesford and Holingbourne, Kent, who was also the widow of Ralph Legh with several children by him. The lands she held lay in Surrey and Sussex as well as Kent, and of course she brought him and his father a considerable network of influential relations in those counties, notably Sir John Legh of Addington Place, Surrey, a JP and sheriff in 1509. Edmund became an active JP in Surrey from 1511 and sat on various commissions, serving his father’s interests in the southern counties.

Surrey’s two daughters were perhaps Edmund’s senior, at any rate they were married long before him. The eldest, Elizabeth, may have been intended for a ward her grandfather acquired under Richard III but who was lost after Bosworth, Henry Bourchier, Earl of Essex. She was married, c. 1500, to Thomas Boleyn, son and heir of a wealthy landowner and JP, Sir William Boleyn of Blickling, Norfolk, whose family’s background was also mercantile and whom Surrey knew from his period of residence in that county. The Boleyns became very closely associated with the Howards, the father becoming a baron of the exchequer in 1502, while Thomas received a customs post in his father-in-law’s gift. Indeed Sir William made all the adult male Howards and some of their associates feoffees to his will of 1505. From Surrey’s point of view the connexion was also highly advantageous, for not only was Sir William very active in local government in Norfolk, but he brought several other powerful Norfolk families closer to the Howards, such as the Sheltons, Heydons and Cleres.

Surrey’s second daughter, Muriel, was married in 1503 to a ward Surrey had acquired by 1499, John Grey, Viscount Lisle. Lisle had livery of his estates in several southern and midland counties in 1503, but he died the next year leaving a baby heiress Elizabeth, whereupon the Howards once more became trustees of his estates. With a substantial jointure Muriel was an attractive catch, too attractive one might say for the man who snapped her up, Thomas Knyvet, esq. of
Hillborough and Cranwich, Norfolk, who should have been heir to his grandfather Sir William of Buckenham, had the latter not favoured his second family by Buckingham's daughter. Sir William had been close to Surrey during his residence in Norfolk and was a powerful local figure, living close to certain ex-Mowbray manors, thus it is not surprising that the earl did not object to a marriage probably made by his son Edward and son-in-law Boleyn, Knyvet's friends, especially since Knyvet had personal qualities to recommend him.

It appears from all this that it was in Sussex and Surrey that the earl felt he particularly needed to extend his influence, while his earlier residence in Norfolk enabled him to cement useful relationships there. His seat at Framlingham, his father's long residence in Suffolk and friendship with Oxford clearly made him confident of his influence in that county. Of course Howard marriages over many generations gave Surrey an extensive network of contacts in East Anglia. His recovery of his Mowbray lands brought him many important and influential men as tenants, and before long not only they but also East Anglians beyond the Mowbray affinity were looking to him as a feoffee and executor. His own servants and estate officials were often substantial landowners in their own right, while by 1500 he had retained important lawyers in the royal service at court and locally like Sir James Hobart, now attorney-general, as steward of his lands in Suffolk, and John Mordaunt, king's serjeant, also of the royal council, chief steward of his manor of Willington, Bedfordshire. Other lawyers whom Surrey appears to have employed irregularly were the two Robert Southwells and Henry Spelman, former Mowbray servants and influential East Anglians.

The offices of Justice of the Peace in Norfolk and Suffolk and the joint shrievalty give some indication of the revival of Howard influence in East Anglia. In 1497 Surrey's servant Sir Philip Tylney was called to the Suffolk bench and became escheator sitting regularly when sessions were held at Ipswich. In 1502, the year that Edward joined the Norfolk bench, Sir Edmund Jenney, a former Mowbray servant, was pricked sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk, and in 1503 John Timperley, Surrey's brother-in-law, was added to the Suffolk bench, with the two Robert Southwells.
In 1504, three years after he became treasurer and long after he had first regained lands in the area, Surrey was at last appointed to the benches of both counties, and Lord Thomas followed, indicating royal endorsement of Howard influence there.

The records of the sessions which survive for the period up to 1509, which, if not complete, do record sittings in both counties for almost every quarter, show only Sir Edward Howard sitting twice on the Norfolk bench. The circumstances are instructive. The first case, of riot, heard in Easter term 1505, concerned Surrey's steward for Southgreenhough and Northpickenham hundreds, who had been intimidated while presiding at his hundred court by an influential local Howard tenant, Sir Edmund Bedingfield of Oxburgh, who forced the steward to convene a second session at his own house, in turn disrupted by the other party in the dispute, the details of which are obscure. The matter was clearly settled amicably enough, for when the records of Surrey's gifts from his deer park at Framlingham begin a few years later Bedingfield received a buck. Of the bench of four, three can be linked with Surrey: his son Edward, brother-in-law Sir William Boleyn, and John Heydon. The second case, in Easter term 1507, was less important, and only Sir Edward and Hobart sat. One session will illustrate the extent of Howard influence on the Suffolk bench. It concerns a riot involving important friends of the Howards, the Willoughby family in 1507, when the extraordinary number of ten magistrates, all from amongst the higher gentry sat, of whom over half had strong Howard connexions: Hobart, Jenney, Tylney, Timperley, Wentworth and Southwell.

Thus the failure of Surrey and his heir to sit despite John Howard's practice up to 1483, was largely the result of increased rank and absence, but also of the fact that both Howard and royal interests, which they were of course appointed to further, were reliably served by the lawyers and gentlemen named above, so that Surrey had no need to deploy his heir in Suffolk, and only rarely required his second son's considerable weight in Norfolk. Nor was Henry's purpose in nominating important royal servants like the Howards that they should attend regularly to the administration of justice, but rather that they might be speedily deployed when occasion demanded extra weight on the benches. Indeed the royal view
of both the dependability and local influence of the Howards at this date is confirmed by the appointment of Sir Edward as a commissioner for a delicate subsidy assessment in Norfolk.\textsuperscript{183}

Returning Wealth and the Attentions of the Council Learned

However, 1506 marked a new development in Howard relations with the crown when, soon after many other tenants in chief, family members began to suffer from the unexpected, arbitrary levy of feudal dues.\textsuperscript{184} The most important of these involved the Lisle estates, worth about £800 p.a.\textsuperscript{185} Surrey, Lord Thomas, Berners, Sir Edward Howard and other Howard and Lisle associates were feoffees to Lisle and Muriel for her jointure in 1503.\textsuperscript{186} Under Lisle's deathbed will of 1505, the young Howards and their associates acquired the wardship of his unborn heir, and they were behind Muriel's hasty second marriage to Knyvet.\textsuperscript{187} All this did not long escape royal attention, for on 24 March Knyvet, Lord Howard, Sir Edward, their cousin Sir Thomas Wyndham, Thomas Boleyn, John Shelton and Oliver Pole, the long standing clerical administrator of the lands, were hauled up before the king in Chancery and forced to bind themselves in a series of recognisances totalling 1,600 marks for the infringement of his rights.\textsuperscript{188} Knyvet was to pay six-hundred marks for his license to marry Muriel, and two-hundred marks for Lisle's unlicensed alienation of part of Muriel's jointure, while the wardship of the baby lady Lisle apparently cost the Howards and their friends eight-hundred marks.\textsuperscript{189} By an indenture between Henry and the Knyvets of 23 May, following legal proceedings initiated in Chancery, the disputed part of the jointure was settled on the Howards to the use of the Knyvets, but the king gained the right to appoint officers to these lands and they lost the other part to the king's use.\textsuperscript{190} On 9 July a pardon for the feoffees followed.\textsuperscript{191}

The king likewise exploited the unlicensed second marriage of Sir Edward to his financial advantage, so that Lord Thomas's role as a feoffee to his brother and Lady Alice in her estates involved him in another recognisance.\textsuperscript{192} On 12 February 1506 Edward, with Lord Thomas, Knyvet and Wyndham were initially bound to pay the king one-thousand marks before the Feast of the Purification as feoffees with Thomas Boleyn.\textsuperscript{193} This recognisance appears in the king's book of payments under 24.
March, presumably because Boleyn, being there too, was then bound with them. Clearly Sir Edward and Alice found it impossible to meet the full sum in the time specified, for on 20 November following he was before the king again, mortgaging certain manors by placing them in the hands of the king's nominees in order to raise over the next four years a total of £433. 6s. 8d., which was then outstanding. When Henry died Sir Edward still owed £200, though he had been forced to sell one of his wife's manors. It is indicative of Howard contacts in the city of London that he avoided selling to a member of the council learned, and sold instead to Sir William Capel, the Lord Mayor of London.

A lesson was clearly learned from all this. On 15 May Boleyn enfeoffed the earl, Lord Thomas, Sir Edward, Knyvet, Heydon, William Paston, and others with 5 manors in Norfolk, to the use of himself and his wife Elizabeth Howard as jointure, in accordance with his will. He bargained with Henry over the settlement in advance, with the apparent result that in the case of a single manor the modest sum of four marks was recorded as the cost of the license, though it seems unlikely that this was all that was paid.

It is instructive that despite Surrey's prominence in the council and close association with the king's lawyers and administrators like Hobart, Mordaunt, Wyatt, Southwell and Reynold Bray, his family was unable to escape the attentions of the council learned at law. Perhaps the king took pleasure in tripping up these confident young men who had shown themselves adept at exploiting the system to their own advantage, and were already attracting the attention of his young son, Henry, Duke of York. However, others closer to the king in these years, indeed involved in his extortions, John Hussey and Edmund Dudley, were not immune from his growing mania for control over his subjects through their purse strings, so too much should not be made of the personal element. Lord Thomas's name headed all the recognisances, indeed was the only one consistently present, and he was cited in Chancery by the king, but his involvement in every one of the property deals probably resulted chiefly from his position as future head of the family.

In November of that difficult year the Mowbray dowager duchess Elizabeth died
at last, and Surrey and Lord Howard inherited the sizeable remaining East Anglian portion of the Mowbray inheritance, so that their East Anglian holdings at last equalled Oxford's. This was bound to have important consequences for Howard regional power, for Oxford, cousin and invaluable friend, lacked an adult male heir to inherit his regional authority, in contrast to Surrey. Moreover, there was no one else to rival Surrey, for he enjoyed good relations with all the lesser local noblemen. Edmund de la Pole, Earl of Suffolk, who like the Howards had been close to Richard III, and whose landed power lay close to theirs in the east of the region, was a feoffee to Thomas and Anne in 1495, though he had long since been removed from the scene by his flight and imprisonment. Henry Bourchier, Earl of Essex, whose landed power was more remote from their own, was both a cousin of Surrey's step-son Berners, and a nephew of Lord Thomas's wife, and close to Oxford, while Surrey's former rival in Norfolk, Lord Fitzwalter, who also held land in Essex, had been attainted in 1495. Finally, William, Lord Willoughby d'Eresby, whose seat at Parham made him a neighbour, was a close friend of the Howards.

However, Surrey's license to enter on this important inheritance was costly, if proportionately less so than the charges levied against the younger family members. His heir and Knyvet, the guarantors, appeared before the king in Chancery on 1 February 1507 and bound themselves for the payment of five-hundred marks at Whitsun, five-hundred at Candlemas and the same at midsummer 1508, totalling £1,000. This was one of those bargains which Dudley, in the Tower for his sins two years later, and clearly troubled about all the charges levied against the Howards, recalled specifically as having been "too sore", the annual value of the lands being not much above £600. It is clear that Surrey had some difficulty in meeting the payments despite the fact that his feoffees settled the lands on him in May 1507, for though the first two bonds were duly met, all three men appeared before the king on 1 February, one day early with the second, in order to seek the rescheduling of the last. An extension of over eight months was granted "of our grace and favour" and new bonds entered into specifying payment on 12 February 1508, in order to allow time for the collection of further rents. These bonds were
apparently duly met and cancelled.

According to the terms of the marriage contract between Surrey and Elizabeth of York of 1495, Lord Thomas and Anne should, on the death of the dowager, have come into their jointure of 4 Norfolk and 1 Suffolk manor plus a hundred in Norfolk, but a new settlement was now made. By indenture between father and son of 15 May "...for the promocion and comfort of the said Thomas Lord Howard, as for other dyverse consideracions movynge the said erle, and also for other pleasures and somes of money gyvyn unto the said erle by the said Thomas Lord Howard..." Surrey settled 18 and one-third manors, a hundred and a half, and a town and castle in Norfolk and Suffolk, including many of the richest lands of the former duchy, on feoffees to his own use for life and then to the use of Lord Thomas and his heirs. It thus appears that Lord Thomas was able and willing to forgo a modest landed income immediately in favour of greatly expanding his guaranteed inheritance. His interest in the lands in question was probably publicised immediately by his frequent residence at the substantial Mowbray house at Kenninghall in south Norfolk, one of the manors in this indenture which was very well-placed for overseeing these lands.

The financial assistance he gave his father must relate to help in meeting the entry fine, and, since he almost certainly had no landed income, strongly suggests that, as one unverifiable source has it, he as well as Edward were involved in mercantile activities in these years, though this does not necessarily mean that he went to sea as Edward did. The unspecified pleasures he had done his father can also be deduced with some plausibility. On 12 February 1507, just after they had both been bound in recognizances to the king, and some weeks before the first payment was due, Lord Howard purchased the manor of Beechamwell in Norfolk from John Ashfield, a man who had taken advantage of Surrey's absence in the north to sue him in Chancery. The purchase price was £160, but 2 days later Howard sold it to Lovell for £120. These transactions were thus probably undertaken to facilitate the transfer of the Mowbray inheritance to the Howards, by Lord Howard acting as a 'front man' for Henry or Lovell in the purchase of the manor.
Howard's loss of £40 over the deal suggests this may have constituted part of the payment of the first bond, though it is not known how much more the Howards paid in cash.

Henry may also have been behind Lord Thomas's joint purchase on 24 November of the same year of some lands in Bedfordshire with John Hussey, from William Waltham, another Suffolk man. The lands were perhaps substantially undervalued for the purchase, and Waltham had just inherited and not even entered into them at that date, thus the use of improper influence in this case seems likely, though less so in the previous case, since Ashfield later became a servant to Howard. Since Howard did not hold Waltham's lands later it again appears that the transaction was undertaken for the benefit of the king and/or Hussey to facilitate his father's and his own inheritance of the Mowbray estates, though Hussey was later close to Lord Thomas.

Surrey's Growing Role in Foreign Relations

Whatever the financial penalties suffered by Surrey and his family in the last three years of the reign, shifts in English foreign policy in response to continental developments brought the earl an increasingly important role in foreign affairs. Alive to his own and thus his country's prosperity, Henry sought to ally himself with rulers who shared his fear of an increasingly powerful and ambitious France, which could disrupt England's trade and thus his vital customs revenue. The urgency of dynastic considerations made Henry inclined to closer alliance with Ferdinand of Aragon, but the death of Isabella of Castile in 1504 and the inheritance of that crown by their eldest daughter Joanna and her ambitious husband Philip of Burgundy, suggested welcome alternatives. Thus Henry turned from Ferdinand, particularly after the latter's treaty with France, and sought marriage alliances with the Emperor Maximilian and his son Philip. In this policy it is very likely that Surrey was implicated, for his own honour was much bound up with his early service to Burgundy, while his office as treasurer carried responsibility for the country's trade, the most important element of which was the wool and cloth trade with the Low Countries, in which there was a strong East Anglian element.
By March 1505 the emperor had offered Henry his daughter Margaret in marriage and Henry was enthusiastic enough to part with considerable sums of money in support of the political aims of her family. The bargaining was accelerated by the unscheduled but opportune arrival in January 1506 of Philip and Joanna on their way to claim her inheritance. Surrey’s knowledge of the Burgundian court meant that he was much involved in arrangements for their lavish entertainment, presenting to Philip the Order of the Garter and speaking the customary words in French for his benefit, in the ceremonial exchange of the Garter and Toison d’Or at Windsor on 9 February. Lord Howard not only participated in all the ceremonial, but on 7 February, in partnership with his brother-in-law Dorset against another pair, demonstrated his skills in a tennis match before Philip and Henry on the royal court at Windsor. Though Surrey was not a signatory to the Treaty of Windsor, the treaty of marriage between Henry and Margaret or the treaty concerning trade between their territories which resulted, later developments suggest that he was involved in negotiations.

Henry’s triumph was shortlived because of the sudden death of Philip in Spain in the same year and Margaret’s refusal to marry the English king, but Maximilian proposed a marriage between his grandson Charles, Philip’s son, and Henry’s daughter Mary, which could not be solemnised for some years. Despite Habsburg dilatoriness Henry was confirmed in this course by the failure of an attempted rapprochement with Ferdinand based on his marrying the widowed Joanna. Surrey was chosen with Fox, the prior of St John’s and Nicholas West to go to Margaret in Brussels in 1507 to retrieve what they could of Philip’s treaties, and in 1508 he headed a mission by John Young, Master of the Rolls, and Thomas Wolsey, the king’s almoner, which spent several months at Margaret’s court in Malines, also negotiating with the Emperor Maximilian at Antwerp. Lord Howard appears to have accompanied his father for some part of his mission in 1507, no doubt anxious for the experience of so important a court on the European stage.

The mission was not an easy one and Wolsey informed the king that "inconstance, mutabilite and lytyl regard of promysys and causes" bedevilled it.
The earl was honoured by a long-awaited, formal meeting with the Emperor and Charles, at which Young delivered the Latin oration and Sir Robert Wingfield (already at the court) and Wolsey were also present when the emperor pronounced himself flattered that "so gret and honoraerbly men of such gravyte" had been sent by Henry. Almost 2 months later, on 21 December a successful conclusion was reached when both a treaty of alliance between Henry and Charles, which provided for the marriage of Charles and Mary, and a separate treaty of friendship with Maximilian were signed. Surrey and many other English noblemen, including Berners, stood surety for a fifty-thousand crown bond for performance of the marriage. The importance of the earl's role as emollient courtier in assisting the other negotiators can be inferred from Wolsey's correspondence. Henry regarded the treaty as a considerable diplomatic coup, the answer to Ferdinand's Treaty of Blois, for he had thereby allied himself in one marriage with the future ruler of all the important territories bordering France. Thus celebrations were held throughout England, with elaborate festivities in the presence of the Flemish ambassadors at Richmond Wolsey may have owed his reward, the rectory of Lymington, at least in part to the earl, while though there is no evidence of any reward to Surrey, his prestige was undoubtedly greatly enhanced.

The Howards at Court in the Last Years of the Reign

The end of the reign thus saw Surrey riding high, while his three eldest sons, step-son and sons-in-law Boleyn and Knyvet increasingly at court, at least in part as a result of the revival of knightly combat as an entertainment. In May and June 1507, when Lord Howard was probably in Flanders, his brothers and Knyvet took part in the unprecedented series of tournaments in honour of the marriage alliance which were held over six weeks before the court at Greenwich where the fifteen year old Prince Henry was much in evidence, though not participating. The performers were drawn from among the small and relatively new company of the king's spears, who included Lord Berners and Charles Brandon, and possibly Lord Howard. Though the names of few of the select spears are known in this reign, the same is not true of the second, much less exclusive body which provided jousters, the esquires for the
body, of whom ninety-three were listed at Henry's funeral. Amongst their number were Boleyn, Knyvet, Shelton and Heydon, who probably owed their position to Surrey, other East Anglians more likely to have been clients of Oxford and Essex, and still other friends of the Howards.

The Howard residence at Lambeth, much used by Surrey, was doubtless crucial to the development of the friendships of the younger members of the family and their increasing attachment to the court, which was, of course, usually within easy access by river. In August 1508 Lord Thomas and Anne buried the longest-lived of their children, a boy, alongside their 3 other unbaptised babies in the chapel there, indicating that they were often in residence there as well as in Tottenham. Thomas Knyvet, who had apparently entered the royal service, also lived there with his wife Muriel, and the Boleyns perhaps from time to time, while when Edmund Howard married in 1510 he acquired a new reason for being there. Sir Richard Guildford's centre of activity as royal armourer was in nearby Southwark, and his sons Henry (who was a member of the prince's household) and Edward were friends of the Howards. Likewise Charles Brandon, who had been at court as sewer to the board's end and then became master of the horse to the earl of Essex, used his uncle, Sir Thomas Brandon's house in Southwark until the latter's death in 1510 when both the house and his office of marshal of king's bench went to him. In 1511 both he and Edmund Howard joined the Surrey bench which often sat there.

Of the family Edward Howard, Thomas Knyvet and their close friends may have been assiduous in seeking out the company of the prince, for they were his confidants almost as soon as the new reign began. By early 1508 Edward Howard and Edward Guildford were Brandon's firmest friends, attending his secret marriage at Stepney, while Howard stood godfather to Brandon's first two daughters, he and Brandon bought a wardship together, and Brandon and Knyvet borrowed money from Henry VII. Though Lord Howard naturally had his own friends, some closer to him in rank, such as his wife's brothers-in-law Dorset and Henry Courtenay, heir to the earl of Devon, Lord Mountjoy (one of his feoffees along with Lord Daubeney, both Lords Scrope and Edward Guildford) and the new reign was to show Lord Thomas
friendly with original members of the king's spears.\textsuperscript{237} It would thus be wrong to draw too sharp a distinction between the two circles in which the Howard brothers and brothers-in-law moved, for the settlements and recognisances discussed above demonstrate that they were deeply involved in each others affairs, a microcosm perhaps of the larger circle of men at court bound together by ties of chivalric skills and ideals and a largely unfulfilled desire to make a mark in the world.
Notes

1 PRO C142/103/56; PRO PROB11/37, f 103r-105r
3 N. Davis ed., The Paston Letters 1, pp 441, 448; Weever, op. cit., p 555; GEC ii, p 153; CIPM Henry VII, p 23
4 J.M. Robinson, The Dukes of Norfolk, pp 1-4
5 Ibid.; CIPM Henry VII, ii, p 23; Testamenta Vetusta ii, p 404; NRO Phi/543, 578
7 Weever, op. cit., p 555; C. Ross, Edward IV, p 372; Tucker, op. cit., pp 28, 29;
9 Weever, op. cit., p 555; Crawford, op. cit., p 87; CPR 1462-71, p 566; Tucker, op. cit., p 30
10 Robinson, op. cit., p 2
11 G. Brenan and E.P. Statham, House of Howard, pp 1-19; H. Howard, Indications of Memorials of the Howard Family, pp 1-7
12 Crawford, op. cit., pp 10-11
13 Robinson, op. cit., p 4
14 GEC ix, p 610 notes c, d, ii, pp 133-5; J. Smyth, The Lives of the Berkeleys, p 158; Weever, op. cit., p 555 Thomas's biography has two assertions that his father was the rightful heir to the dukedom.
16 GEC x, pp 237-241; Crawford, op. cit. p 14; Notes of the late Susan Flower, Oxford D. Phil. student on de Vere landholding deposited in the Essex Record Office.
17 Crawford, op. cit., pp 16, 24
18 Crawford, pp 16, 25, 71-2, 122; Hall, p 228; DNB, x, p 42; Tucker, op. cit., p 14
19 T.H. Turner, Manners and Household Expenses of England, p 467; Crawford, op. cit., p 66
22 Crawford identified 10 vessels owned by him, though not all at once, pp 55, 46-67, 125-127, 133-7
23 Crawford, op. cit., pp 57, 64
24 Ibid., p 62
25 Ibid., pp 123-4, 153-4
26 Crawford, op. cit., pp 154-181
27 Ibid., pp 155, 158, 163-180; C. Ross, Edward IV, pp 81, 317
Howard's son was 1 year Edward's junior.

32 RP vi, pp 168-70, 205-7; Thomas was knighted at the marriage, W.A. Shaw, Knights of England, 1A, p 138
33 R. Virgoe, 'Recovery of the Howards', p 5; M. Sayer, op. cit., p 315
34 GEC x, p 237, ix, p 609, xi, p 23; Crawford, op. cit., p 30-1
36 CPR 1476-85, pp 358-9; RP vi, p 411-2; This in no way implies, as has been alleged, Tucker, p 40-5, Howard involvement in the death of the princes, c.f. A. Crawford, 'The Mowbray Inheritance' in Richard III, Crown and People, pp 182-200; Contemporaries thought them sure to protect Edward's sons, H. E. Madden, ed. The Cely Papers, pp 132-3; Berkeley had sold his share to the crown, GEC ii, p 133
37 CPR 1476-1485, pp 358-9, 365; R. Horrox, P. Hammond eds. British Library Manuscript Harleian 433, i, pp 72, 75
38 CPR 1476-85, pp 363, 365, 479; Crawford, 'John Howard', p 40
39 Crawford, 'John Howard', pp 202-3
40 P.B. Wolffe, The Crown Lands, p 64
41 Myers, op. cit., p 278; Tucker, op. cit., p 38
43 Compare the assertion of absence in Weever, Funeral Monuments, p 555 written when a pillar of the Tudor regime, with Hall's statement, p 419, that he was "greatly familiar" with Richard, construed by Tucker as indicating that he had real influence with the king, p 45.
44 Crawford, op. cit., pp 139-41, 204
47 W. Camden, Remains, p 217; Hall, p 419
49 CSPV, i, 506; W. Campbell, Materials for a History of the Reign of Henry VII i, 208; S.B. Chrimes, Henry VII, pp 52, 101
51 S.B. Chrimes, Henry VII, p 52
54 RP, vi, pp 267-76
56 N. Davies ed., op. cit., ii, pp 444-5; Probably to the Benedictine Priory there, though we lack the name of the prioress at this period, VCH, Kent, ii, p 150, or the Cheyne's manor of Eastchurch, HP 1, pp 634-5 for Sir Thomas, HP J.C. Wedgwood ed., p 181 for Sir John. The family were tenants of the duke of Norfolk in Essex, CIPM Henry VII i, p 238 and feoffees to Thomas on the Sandys jointure in 1478, CAD vi, C7059
58 RP vi, pp 282, 473-4; C. Rawcliffe, 'Baronial Councils in the Later Middle Ages' in Patronage, Pedigree and Power, C. Ross ed., pp 96-7; C. Rawcliffe and S. Flower, 'Noblemen and their Advisers', p 159
59 CPR, 1485-94, pp 121, 128; Virgoe, 'Recovery of the Howards' pp 8, 44; D. MacCulloch, Suffolk and the Tudors, p 55
60 Crawford, 'John Howard', pp 26-29; Virgoe, 'Recovery of the Howards' p 12
61 W.H.S. Hope, ed. 'The last Testament and Inventory of John de Vere, Thirteenth Earl of Oxford', Archaeologia (1915) p 319; PRO E36/1, f 34; LP i, 1365; PRO C76/192 m 14, C54/379 m 136d; C142/28/2
62 G.Brenan and E.P. Statham, House of Howard, p 120; B.J. Harris, Edward Stafford, Third Duke of Buckingham, p 34 on the children in her care who included Lord Thomas's future wife Anne, daughter of Edward IV.

- 43 -
63 W. Campbell, *Materials for a History of Henry VII* vi, 392
64 **CPR** 1485-94, p 99
65 W. Campbell, op. cit., 536
66 Weever, op. cit., p 556; Hall, p 419
68 *RP* vi, pp 410-12; Virgoe, 'Recovery of the Howards' p 12
69 C.L. Kingsford, *Chronicles of London*, p 194; M.A. Hicks, 'The Yorkshire Rebellion of 1489 Reconsidered' *Northern History*, (1986) pp 40, 50; Davis ed. *Paston Letters* ii, p 460 The appearance of Oxford with Surrey as the only non-northerners on the commission to try the rebels is suggestive.
70 M. Hicks, op. cit., p 45
71 Ibid. pp 61-2; R. Reid, *The King's Council In the North*, pp 58-78; Tucker, op. cit., pp 51-74
72 *RP* vi, pp 426-8
73 T. Stapleton ed., *Plumpton Correspondence*, pp 95-7; Weever, op. cit., p 556
74 *RP*, vi, pp 448-50
75 Davis ed. *Paston Letters*, ii, nos 842, 843, 844; Virgoe, 'Recovery of the Howards', p 13; Surrey was in London in February 1495, YRO, York City Books, vi, f 171
76 Virgoe, op. cit. p 13; *CPR* 1485-1509, 500; *PCC* 16 Vox; Pembroke College Ms. B 4
77 *CPR* 1485-94, p 458; *CCR* 1485-1500, 824, 939, 1209; PRO E372/352
78 Virgoe, 'Recovery', p 13; *HMC De L'Isle and Dudley*, lxxvi1, 1 p 223; *RP* vi, pp 479-80; In 1499 he had a schedule of arrears drawn up for his lands in south Lincolnshire, presumably to pursue them, while the one Yorkshire manor listed was less severely in arrears, BL M 772(49) item 944
79 S.R.O. T4373/225 Most were former Mowbray servants like John Goldingham, receiver for Framlingham and other Suffolk manors, but Philip Tylney, farmer of the agistments and warren at Kelsale was handling money for the earl.
81 *GEC* ix, p 612; Crawford, op. cit., p 113-4, 97
82 Davis ed., *Paston Letters*, ii, pp 444-5; *TV* ii, p 404
83 Crawford, op. cit., pp 45-68; 94-5
84 *CPR* 1485-94, p 458; *CIPM Henry VII*, ii, 18-19; *NRO* Phl/606/4
87 J. Leland, *Collectanea*, iv, pp 205, 253, 241, 245; BL Arundel Ms. 261, f 296
88 *CPR* 1494-1509, p 114, 2 items; *CAD* B3999; PRO E327/354
89 T. Madox, *Formulare Anglicanum*, pp 109-10
90 J.P. Collier, ed. *Household Books of John Duke of Norfolk and Thomas Earl of Surrey*, p 222
91 Based on his father's education, Crawford, 'John Howard', p 94
92 *DNB* ii, pp 921-2, iii, p 150; *HP* i, p 527; *CSFS* iv, 1 228, p 360; 250, p 422; Tucker, op. cit., p 28; Crawford, op. cit., p 161
93 Weever, op. cit., p 555; Her name is variously rendered but was perhaps Mireille, often called Muriel; *CCR* 1500-09, 244, 254, 569
94 D.R. Starkey, 'The King's Privy Chamber 1485-1547' Cambridge Ph.D. (1973) p 81; Edward wore Henry VII's armour at his funeral, BL Harl. Ms. 3504, f 265; *DNB*, x, p 61
96 Weever, op. cit., p 556; YRO York City Books, vi, f 171
97 Tucker, op. cit., pp 51-74; Crawford, op. cit., p 94
98 Weever, op. cit., p 556; T. Stapleton ed., *Plumpton Correspondence*, p 95-7; Tucker, op. cit., p 59
99 Madox, op. cit, pp 109-10; *RP* vi, pp 479-80; Essex was the son of another of Edward IV's daughters; valuations from 1524 valor, PRO C54/392 mm 3, 4
100 Madox, op. cit., p 110
101 Mcfarlane, op. cit., pp 62-81
103 Ibid., pp 9, 79, 94
104 Tucker, op. cit., p 65
105 NRO, Phil/v43, 578; F. Blomefield, County of Norfolk, v, p 151; TV, p 533, n 5; Rymer, Foedera, xii, 479
106 Hall, p 456; J.D. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, p 108
108 Weever, op. cit., p 577; YRO, York City Books viii, p 129; Tucker, op. cit., p 66
110 Crawford, 'John Howard', p 98
111 J.D. Mackie, Earlier Tudors, p 141-3
112 Ibid., D. Hay, ed. Vergil, p 94; Hall, pp 479-80; GC, p 275-8; W.C. Metcalfe, Book of Knights, pp 27-31; W.A. Shaw, Knights of England, ii, pp 31-2; DNB ii, p 920
114 GC, pp 279-80; Hall, pp 480-1; Vergil, p 101; Weever, p 557; Tucker, pp 66-7; Mackie, op. cit., p 147
115 M. Oppenheim, op. cit., viii, xlvi-lfi
116 Ibid., pp xlvi-xlviif; Tucker, op. cit., p 68
119 He made 36 after Flodden; Metcalfe, op. cit. pp 31, 57; Shaw, op. cit., ii, pp 37-8; By comparing supplies issued to those returned Oppenheim shows how little fighting there can actually have been in 1497, op. cit., p 111
120 Hall, p 480; Vergil, p 99
121 Rymer, Foedera, xii, 673, 722, 729
123 Tucker, op. cit., pp 72-4
124 CPR 1494-1509, p 239
125 Crawford, op. cit., p 155 on the Black Book of the Household he produced with John Elrington; Previous treasurers had often been men with commercial experience like Bourchier, L.S. Woodger, 'Henry Bourchier, Earl of Essex and his Family', Oxford Ph.D. 1974
128 J.D. Alsop, op. cit., pp 183-5; L.S. Woodger, op. cit., p 146; PRO E101/62/33; E36/216, ff 346-9
129 The oath of office of the Treasurer emphasised his role as councillor to the king, Black Book of the Exchequer, PRO E36/265; Ellesmere 2654, ff 17, 18, 2655, f 2; J.F. Baldwin, The King's Council during the Middle Ages, pp 73, 210, 213, 215, 220, 225
130 Weever, op. cit., pp 557-8; Tucker, op. cit., pp 79-80
131 PRO C67/60 m 3
132 PRO LC2/1 f 4v
133 Ibid., f 15
134 J. Leland, Collectanea, p 259
135 PRO LC2/1 f 15
136 CAD iv, A7551, v, A13566
137 PRO SC6/Henry VII 1669, 6238, 6239, etc.; CP25/2
138 PRO LC2/1 ff 59, 59v, 75v, 76v, 78, 79v; N.H. Nicholas ed., Privy Purse Expenses of Elizabeth of York, p xciii
139 Account of John Young, Somerset Herald in Leland, Collectanea iv, p 265-302, 293; John Howard had performed the same service for Margaret, sister of Edward IV,
Tucker, op. cit., p 28
140 NRO Ph1/606/4; Virgoe, Recovery of the Howards, p 14
141 PRO C67/60 m 3; M. Stephenson, 'A list of Monumental Brasses in Surrey', Surrey Arch. Coll. (1816) pp 120-122
142 PRO C67/60 m 3; Chesworth is incorrectly given as being in Essex and Bramley as Bromley, Kent; E327/352, 354; For Chesworth VCH Sussex, vi, 2 pp 156-7; D.G.C. Elwes, C.J. Robinson, Castles and Mansions of Western Sussex, pp 118-120; for Bramley VCH Surrey, iii, p 83
143 SR, iii, p 58-61; VCH Sussex, vii, pp 5-6; Tucker, op. cit., p 52 note
144 Crawford, op. cit., p 40
145 CPR 1485-1509, pp 660, 326; GEC ii, p 135; J. Smyth, Lives of the Berkeleys, pp 126, 159
146 CPR 1494-1509, p 652
147 He was a servant of Richard III, HP ii, p 517; L.B. Smith, op. cit., p 42
148 GEC x, p 137; HP i, p 456
149 TV, ii, p 465; CPR 1494-1509, p 479
150 PRO KB9/437 m 12, 13 etc.; John Shelton was married to one of Sir William's daughters, Anne, and Sir Robert Clere to another, Alice, while Shelton was close to John Heydon, HP i, p 651; for the Sheltons' former Mowbray and de Vere links, Sayer, op. cit., p 312
151 Lisle was his tenant in certain of his lands, CIPM Henry VII, ii, 823, iii, 721 and he had probably bought the wardship from Lisle's stepmother, TV ii, p 411, 466; SBT, DR/2892
152 GEC viii, p 61
153 E.W. Ives, Anne Boleyn, pp 3-5; GEC, x, 137-40; CCR 1485-1500, 143; D. Hay ed., Vergil, pp 52, 84; TV, ii p 465
154 HP ii, p 517; L.B. Smith, op. cit., p 42
155 PRO KB9/459, 458 no 104/5
156 Horrox and Hammond, eds. op. cit., 1, p 229, Essex's lands in Essex and Suffolk combined with John Howard's long association with all the Bourchiers made him a natural guardian. He married Mary d. and coheir of Sir William Say of Broxbourne and Essendon, Herts, another man with Howard links, CCR 1485-1500, 742; GEC v, pp 138-9; DNB ii, p 919
157 Lisle was his tenant in certain of his lands, CIPM Henry VII, ii, 823, iii, 721
158 and he had probably bought the wardship from Lisle's stepmother, TV ii, p 411, 466; SBT, DR/2892
159 He married Mary d. and coheir of Sir William Say of Broxbourne and Essendon, Herts, another man with Howard links, CCR 1485-1500, 742; GEC v, pp 138-9; DNB ii, p 919
160 GEC viii, p 61
161 E.W. Ives, Anne Boleyn, pp 3-5; GEC, x, 137-40; CCR 1485-1500, 143; D. Hay ed., Vergil, pp 52, 84; TV, ii p 465
162 Horrox and Hammond, eds. op. cit., 1, p 229, Essex's lands in Essex and Suffolk combined with John Howard's long association with all the Bourchiers made him a natural guardian. He married Mary d. and coheir of Sir William Say of Broxbourne and Essendon, Herts, another man with Howard links, CCR 1485-1500, 742; GEC v, pp 138-9; DNB ii, p 919
163 Lisle was his tenant in certain of his lands, CIPM Henry VII, ii, 823, iii, 721 and he had probably bought the wardship from Lisle's stepmother, TV ii, p 411, 466; SBT, DR/2892
164 GEC x, p 137; HP i, p 456
165 TV, ii, p 465; CPR 1494-1509, p 479
166 PRO KB9/437 m 12, 13 etc.; John Shelton was married to one of Sir William's daughters, Anne, and Sir Robert Clere to another, Alice, while Shelton was close to John Heydon, HP i, p 651; for the Sheltons' former Mowbray and de Vere links, Sayer, op. cit., p 312
167 His brothers-in-law included Sir John Wyndham of Felbrigg, Norfolk, John - 46 -
Timperley, esq. of Hintlesham, Suffolk, and Robert Mortimer, esq. of Essex, and the Daniels were sons of one of his aunts, another having married Lord Burgavenny, whose land around Bury, Suffolk, involved George Neville, Lord Burgavenny as a cofoe of fee of the Howards, PRO CP25(1) 224/123


174 The Southwells had a long association with the Howards as fellow Mowbray servants, Sayer, op. cit. p 309 and Spelman was a tenant, CIPM Henry VII i, 1159

175 Virgoe, 'Recovery', p 14

176 CPR, 1494–1509, pp 9, 355, 538; Virgoe, op. cit., p 15

177 CPR, 1494–1509, pp 651, 660

178 PRO KB9/437 m 12, 13

179 BL Add. Ms. 27,451 f 14; CPR 1494–1509, p 479; CIPM Henry VII ii, 5

180 PRO KB9/444

181 PRO KB9/445, m 32

182 Crawford, 'John Howard', pp 68–71

183 CPR 1494–1509, p 506


185 PRO SP1/4, f 9; LP i, 2537

186 CCR, 244, 254, 569;

187 FCC 17 Holgrave; TV ii, 466; CIPM Henry VII, ii, 823, iii, 134

188 PRO E36/214, f 394

189 Ibid.

190 CCR, 1500–09, 569

191 CPR, 1494–1509, pp 465, 479, 486

192 CCR, 1500–09, 609; CIPM Henry VII, i, 491, 500

193 PRO E36/214, f 394

194 PRO E36/214, f 504

195 Walkern, Herts. was sold soon after 1506, VCH Hertford, iii, p 154; Capel was a victim on a still larger scale, W.C. Richardson, Tudor Chamber Administration, p 153

196 CPR, 1500–09, pp 484, 479

197 Bray, RP vi, p 488. His nephew Sir Edward of Henfield, Sussex, was soon a Howard servant as a result of the proximity of his lands to theirs.

198 HP, ii, pp 423–4; DNB vi, p 100–2; Condon, op. cit., pp 121–2 and information on Hussey's forfeited bonds resulting from his shrieval office, for which I am grateful.

199 TV ii, p 483; Virgoe, 'Recovery', pp 15, 16

200 GEC xili, pp 451–4, RP vi, p 480

201 GEC v, pp 486–7, xili, pp 670–3, Willoughby was often at Parham, Framlingham. Parker's accounts show his close involvement with the Howards, BL Add. Ms. 27,451, Add. Roll, 16, 554, 17,745; GEC v, pp 138–9

202 They appear to have paid twice the annual value in entry fines.

203 PRO C255/8/10 unbound, 4 warrants relate to the Howards

204 BL Lansdowne 127 no. 51; C.J. Harrison ed. 'The Petition of Edmund Dudley', Eng. Hist. Rev. (1972) pp 83, 89; BL Lansdowne 127 f 28, 32, 47; Chrimes Henry VII, pp 311–13; Virgoe, op. cit. p 16

205 PRO E36/214 f 400; C255/8/10

206 T. Madox, Formulare Anglicanum, pp 109–10

- 47 -
207 PRO C54/372 16d, CCR 1500-09, 766; For valuations PRO C54/392, mm 3-4
208 PRO C67/60, m 3; Blomefield, i, 215-220; M.F. Serpell, Kenninghall: History and St Mary's Church, pp 5-9, 26, 29
209 Brenan and Statham, op. cit., p 83
210 PRO C54/374 f 1d; ECP, iii, B. 83 p 32 no 8
211 CCR 1500-09, 802, 867
212 Information supplied by Margaret Condon of several such cases in these years.
213 CCR 1500-09, 815
214 Ibid, PRO E13/IND 7346
215 PRO C142/103/56, CAD 1890-1913 iv, A7551, v, A13566; Steward of his Castle of Folkingham from 1514, though Hussey already held this office under the crown, Arundel Ms. A 1588; HP ii, p 423
217 Mackie, op. cit., p 183
218 Weever, p 559; Rymer v, pp 239-256; CSPS i, pp 562-72; J. Gairdner ed. Memorials of Henry VII, p 295; Mackie, op. cit., pp 187-188
219 J. Gairdner, Memorials of King Henry VII, p 292
220 Ibid., op. cit., pp 185-7
221 Ibid., p 187
222 HMC Mss. of the Corporations of Southampton and Kings Lynn (1887) p 113; Rymer, v, pp 239-256; J. Gairdner ed., LP Richard III and Henry VII, i, pp 438-449
223 Ibid., op. cit., p 121
224 J. Gairdner ed., LP Richard III and Henry VII, i, pp 438-449
225 Ibid., and ii, 87; Rymer, v, pp 239-250; HMC Mss. of Southampton and King's Lynn, pp 113-4
226 LP Richard III and Henry VII, i, pp 438-449
227 Rymer, v, p 257; LP Richard III and Henry VII, p 339; S. Anglo, Spectacle, Pageantry and Early Tudor Policy, p 107; LC9/50 ff 143r-147v; S. Doran on trade, pp 13, 20-1
228 DNB, xxii, p 796
229 The most important jousts of the reign took place in 1492, 1494, 1501, and 1506, and I am grateful for information supplied by Neil Samman; BL Harl 69, 2b, 67 f 3; W.C. Hazlitt, Remains of the Early Popular Poetry of England, p 109; GC pp 12-15, 247; BL Harl 69 f 6b; RO E36/214 f 20; S. Anglo, The Great Tournament Roll of Westminster
230 S.J. Gunn The Life and Career of Charles Brandon, Duke of Suffolk, c. 1484-1545, p 6
231 LP i, 20; CPR, 1494-1509, p 479
232 Those listed were receiving gifts of venison from Framlingham park, BL Add. Ms. 27,451
234 LP i, 120, 132 (89) (53); Rymer, p 4; PRO C25/8/10; PRO KB9/459
235 Gunn, op. cit., pp 5-7; KB9/458, no. 104/5; PRO KB9/459
236 Gunn, op. cit., p 6
237 John Carr, a spear, was clearly a friend before the reign was out, PRO E36/215, f 9; CCR 1500-09, 766
CHAPTER II

HOWARD INFLUENCE AT COURT AND IN COUNCIL, 1509-1512

It has been repeatedly alleged that from the accession of the young Henry VIII Surrey exploited his position as treasurer to win royal favour by promoting profligate spending at court and war with France, as leader of a noble faction opposed by keeper of the privy seal, Fox, and other clerical councillors. Further, it has been implied by Surrey's biographer that the royal favour enjoyed by the younger members of his family was an important means whereby the earl influenced Henry, thus that his sons and sons-in-law were his instruments in forwarding a war policy. In order to assess the nature of the new regime and Surrey's place in it this chapter therefore begins with an examination of the transition of power at the death of Henry VII, and goes on to examine the role of the earl and his family in court ceremonies, jousts and revels to establish their proximity to Henry, while their favour is assed by the number and nature of the grants made to them in the years under investigation. The effect of the accession of Henry VIII on Surrey's power in the localities where his territorial strength lay, and the role of his sons in promoting it, is then examined, since the effectiveness of the earl's patronage vis a vis appointments to both local and central office is a sure indication of his own influence with the king. Finally, Surrey's role in the council is examined to establish whether he did head a noble faction, indeed whether politics in these years were characterised by conciliar factions, while the influence of the Howards on foreign policy, apparently the focus of attention of king, court and council, concludes the chapter.

The Nature of the New Regime and Surrey's place in it

The death on 21 April 1509 of Henry VII, whose kingship had rested upon the closest personal supervision of affairs of state, and the accession of his seventeen year old son, who had not even been introduced to them, overturned
the old political order, in particular the relative weight of the twin foci of royal power, the council and the court. Since the death of the queen court life had changed; the king had withdrawn from the society of his greatest subjects, whom he increasingly mistrusted, and took counsel increasingly from a closed circle of handpicked administrators and financiers. His heir, even in appearance akin to Edward IV, was entirely a product of a Burgundian style court which owed much to Yorkist influence. He had been steeped in the chivalric values of the aristocracy and displayed remarkable courtoisie even as a child. From the moment of his accession, he therefore presided over his court with full regal confidence, attracted to his side the flower of his nobility and chivalry, and fostered a sense of his own power by showing royal largesse to those who sought it from him. That he should exercise personal control over the details of government by presiding over daily meetings of his council in the manner of his father was unthinkable; the reaction against this model of kingship among those who gathered at his side met with complete sympathy in the ebullient young king, who imagined, with the naivety of a seventeen year old accustomed to deference, that he need only issue instructions for his wishes to be carried out.

Thus it was that much of the executive power so jealously guarded by Henry VII, passed on his death to a group of his most trusted councillors, though not quite that which he had intended. His will named eighteen executors, headed by his mother, Margaret, Countess of Richmond and Derby, while within this group an inner ring of twelve was intended to shoulder the real burden of work under the direction of Warham, the Lord Chancellor, supervisor and surveyor of the will and arbitrator among the executors in case of disagreement. A second group, made up mainly of lawyers and spiritual advisers was, not unusually, set up to examine complaints against the dead king and redress such wrongs as it deemed necessary for the welfare of his soul. Surrey was the senior, by virtue of his office, of only four noblemen who were made executors, and though he was not appointed to Warham's working committee,
he, Shrewsbury and Herbert (all regular councillors) were appointed to what should have been the less important group for redress of grievances since he had a special jurisdiction in cases involving debtors to the crown as treasurer.11

However, the councillors meeting in Henry VII's last days, who included Surrey, were evidently deeply concerned that the atmosphere of fear and suspicion his fiscal policies had produced would result in a dangerous backlash immediately his death was known.12 Thus on 10 April a general pardon for all offences but felony and treason was issued, while a second, with still wider terms, followed two days after his death.13 Though many groups had grievances, not least the king's greatest subjects and the clergy, the reaction of London was to be feared most immediately, since the city authorities, who might otherwise have restrained the mob, had suffered severely.14 This danger the great exchequer officials, Surrey, Sir John Cutte (undertreasurer) and Lovell (chancellor) had good reason to appreciate, since all had recently been involved in conveying insistant royal demands that each livery company submit a detailed account of its members' imports since 1485 for purposes of subsidy assessment, and this had resulted in a further sharp deterioration in relations between royal government and the city.15

Clearly drastic measures were required, and the precaution of raising men, perhaps to protect their London properties, taken by two councillors already infamous there as Henry's agents, facilitated the creation of scapegoats in order to deflect anger away from the council as a whole.16 Probably the politically adept Lady Margaret, who had returned to court to ensure the smooth succession of her grandson, and may, with Henry's spiritual advisers, have urged the first pardon, was instrumental in the arrest by 23 April of these men, Sir Richard Empson, chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster and Edmund Dudley, king's attorney, and their exclusion, by 30 April, from the general pardon.17 She alone had the necessary authority, standing above the councillors appointed to redress grievances, who included Empson and Dudley,
while the fact that she signed warrants in semi-regal fashion, as if she were regent, and may even have attended working meetings of the executors, further suggests her authority. Moreover, she had bonds with Lovell, Marney, Fisher and other bishops, and no more reason than they, or others of her class to like the lawyers her son had raised from nothing and used to execute his unpopular policies against their social superiors.

There are reasons for thinking that the Howards had some part in the putsch despite a lack of traceable links with the Lady Margaret prior to this date. The entry fine of 1507 and other heavy exactions suffered by Surrey, his sons and sons-in-law in 1506 were bound to have made them hostile towards whichever members of the council learned had handled their cases; certainly Dudley and probably also Empson. Equally important, these two had pursued other noblemen and city associates of the Howards, so that the earl, deeply associated as he and other exchequer officials clearly were with the old regime, must have been particularly anxious to deflect wrath elsewhere. Furthermore, while his sons had the opportunity to influence the king, who, all the reports suggest, played a considerable part in the arrests, Surrey attended almost all meetings of the council before Henry died and of executors before and after the coup, and thus had the opportunity as well as the motive for playing an active role. As second ranking officer of state to Warham he presided, in the chancellor's frequent absence, over meetings of the executors which became increasingly indistinguishable from council meetings as the business connected with the will eased off. The fact that Warham was so often absent strongly suggests that he was not in sympathy with developments and felt that his authority under the will had been overridden, which it clearly had.

Further, because Surrey could claim to represent his class, as fifth ranking nobleman in the realm, and one who had suffered like others from the fiscal policies of Henry VII, he was uniquely well placed among councillors to contain the inevitable noble backlash by convincing the king and the aristocracy of conciliar commitment to a new order which would restore great
men to their rightful place in his counsels. Only if the council could do this could it obtain the crucial mandate for those with the necessary experience to direct affairs. It is therefore not surprising that reform, or rather a return to traditional values, became the watchword of the new regime, or that the early propaganda against Empson and Dudley specifically, and the old regime in general, was written or commissioned by men associated with the Howards, like Thomas More, Richard, Earl of Kent and William, Lord Mountjoy.

Words alone could not meet the case, however, and the council proceeded to issue nationwide commissions of *oyer and terminer* to hear complaints, call a great council of noblemen to advise the king, and summon Parliament for the following January to deal with a whole range of 'reformist' legislation. Beyond the cancellation of many recognisances and, more significantly, the failure to take new ones, little came of much sound and fury, and no further changes took place in the composition of the council. Indeed councillors were as prominent as aristocrats amongst the men to benefit from early royal grants, indicating that, whether motivated by political expediency or conviction, the council was successful in its bid to hold on to power by espousing the aristocratic viewpoint.

**The Howards at Court**

A political message may therefore be detected behind the lavish ceremonial with which the new reign began, while the prominence of Surrey and his family throughout indicates their important place in the new regime and proximity to the young king. Having experience of organising royal funerals and a hereditary claim to the office of earl marshal, Surrey played a major part in organising that of Henry VII. The family's presence at court is confirmed by the fact that Surrey's step-son Berners and step-son-in-law, Sir Thomas Bryan, accompanied the corpse on its first journey from the closet to the chapel at Richmond, and attended masses in the next three days. The whole family was generously furnished with cloth for mourning attire, including Knyvet and Boleyn among the esquires for the body, Surrey himself having 15 servants to
attend him, while his own allowance on this occasion equalled that of the dead
king's sister-in-law, Lady Anne Howard. Sir Edward Howard's part in the
funeral procession of 10 May proclaimed both Howard proximity to the royal
family and, crucially, its representation of the chivalric ethos of its class,
for, the office then being vacant, he performed the role of king's bannerer,
riding just two men ahead of the hearse, his horse trapped with the king's
arms, dressed in the king's armour with his face bare, and the king's battle
axe, face down, resting on his foot. Surrey himself was among the group of
six great noblemen who followed the hearse, Lord Thomas and Berners among the
barons, while on the following day, when the procession reached Westminster
Abbey, Surrey played the prominent role in the funeral dictated by his rank and
office.

Howard influence at court may be gauged by the family's appointments to
the new queen's household. Surrey may have favoured Henry's marriage to
Katherine of Aragon for financial, diplomatic and dynastic reasons, and as a
means of rapidly transforming the atmosphere at court which had suffered so
seriously from the lack of a female presence. He was among the councillors
who, on 10 June, agreed the princess's jointure with the Spanish ambassador,
the culmination of prolonged haggling over her marriage to Henry. Surrey must
have been as insistent as his colleagues on the point that the marriage could
not take place until Ferdinand assented to the marriage between his grandson,
Charles of Castile, and Henry's sister Mary, since he had played a vital role
in negotiating it, but he was probably able to convince Katherine, whom he
knew personally, that he was working for the marriage in council, where Warham
at least had opposed it in the past, and Fox supported it. At any rate,
whether by his or his family's exertions, the Howards again became strongly
identified with the queen. Surrey's wife Agnes was among five countesses to
attend on Katherine at the coronation in June, but far more important, his
daughters Elizabeth Boleyn and Muriel Knyvet, and his step-daughter Margaret
Bryan, made up the senior half of the new queen's ladies in waiting who became

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her regular attendants, while Howard patronage was also effective further down
the hierarchy of her household.

Surrey also exercised great patronage at the coronation as a result of
the acknowledgement of his claim to the enormously prestigious post of ear-
marshal, granted to him for two days over the coronation. The court of the
constable and marshal, consisting of the young duke of Buckingham, as
constable, Surrey as marshal, and two lawyers adjudicated all petitions to
exercise office at the coronation. Not surprisingly, among the 26 knights of
the Bath dubbed just before the coronation, 11 can be linked with the Howards,
Lords Scrope of Bolton and Mountjoy and Richard Wentworth, all feoffees, Boleyn
and Knyvett and Boleyn's associates, Shelton and Heydon, Maurice Berkeley, co-
heir to Mowbray property, and Thomas Bedingfield, Francis Cheyne and Henry
Wyatt, all Surrey's tenants. The whole Howard family was again generously
issued scarlet cloth for the coronation, while among those members of the royal
household and administration similarly provided were a number of East Anglians
of varying rank who had ties of one sort or another with the earl or his
sons.

During the coronation processions and ceremonial Surrey was always close
to Henry. Processing from Westminster to the Tower on 23 June he walked with
Essex, who bore Henry's sword of state just ahead of the king, while on the
following day, when Buckingham bore the crown, Surrey carried the sceptre to
one side of him and Arundel the rod on the other, followed by Warham with the
chalice and the king himself. They were preceded by the new knights and the
lords, including Berners and Howard. Surrey was fifth to do homage to the new
king after the ceremony following Buckingham, his relatives Arundel and Oxford,
and Northumberland in order of rank.

Surrey's extraordinary patronage among the new Knights of the Bath, as
well as the military overtones of many of the appointments obtained by the
young members of the family early in the reign, are important indications of
the nature as well as the success of the Howard relationship with the young
Many of the changes at court in the early years of the reign can be explained in terms of Henry's determination to win for himself a reputation for the chivalric virtues of courtoisie, largesse, franchise and most important of all prouesse, equal to that of his greatest predecessors, in particular his namesake and model, Henry V. Moreover, the reputation for chivalry of Howard ancestors, derived from Howard and Mowbray history of service in arms to England's kings, also attached to his sons and step-son Berners, who, nearer to the king in age though still considerably his senior, had undergone a rigorous training in military skills and shown their devotion to the demands of chivalry by seeking out battle and tournaments at early ages, though like their contemporaries they had been denied the opportunity to make reputations in war under Henry VII.

Not surprisingly, therefore, at the spectacular two day tournament held before the court and public in honour of the coronation, when the six enterprisers represented the royal couple, dressed in green, their trappers and tabards decorated with golden roses and pomegranates, Lord Thomas led them and his brothers Edward and Edmund, Knyvet, Dorset's brother, Lord Richard Grey, and Charles Brandon made up the rest of his team. Having emerged from their pageants the leaders of the teams, Lord Howard and Sir John Petchie, opened proceedings by running five courses at the tilt, after which the others ran in turn, but at the end of the afternoon Howard and Petchie had attained the highest scores. On the following day the opposing sides tourneyed with swords on horseback, first the leaders alone matching their skills against each other, and then the teams joining combat for a fixed number of strokes. Competition became so fierce, however, that the rules were forgotten and, the marshals being unable to call the two sides to order, the king's guard had to be sent in to part them. The ferocity of this encounter, reminiscent of tournaments in their heyday in the thirteenth century, reflected the eagerness of the
participants to prove their valour and win repute. Even though Henry was probably sympathetic, the council was evidently not, for the third day's events were cancelled.

The record of the young Howards and their brothers-in-law in ceremonial jousts and tournaments in the years covered by this chapter shows Thomas and Edward participating on the same four occasions, Edmund on two, one of them when neither of his brothers were there, while Boleyn jousted in three tournaments and Knyvet four. Henry's own participation, which could not be long delayed however much his councillors disliked it, led to a realignment by May 1510 among the teams, for once the king led the enterprisers or challengers they were made up of his intimates, his partners in private practice, while the noblemen/courtiers who were not so consistently with the king became answerers. Thus Lord Thomas, Edmund and Boleyn provided Henry with worthy opposition, but Edward and Knyvet, like Brandon, generally made several appearances in the course of a tournament as members of his team, identified with him in dress, and, like him, often identified as the knights of the queen. Their skill in combat is proven by some surviving jousting cheques for these tournaments, Edmund distinguishing himself as prizewinner among the anwerers on the second day of the tournament held to celebrate the birth of the prince in February 1511, when in six attempts he broke four lances on Henry's body, a rare achievement. His brother Edward gained a still greater reputation in the jousts and tournaments, his best remembered feat being that of felling an enormous 'Almain', probably the Burgundian Guyot de Heulle, after a fiercely fought foot combat in October 1510, but Knyvet also made a reputation for himself.

The standing of the young Howards and their relatives among other aspirants to chivalric honours may be judged by the nominations at the chapter of the Garter, for the young king was determined to restore a more martial image to this illustrious body which his father had packed with bureaucrats. The first chapter of the reign, which preceded the coronation, met to fill two vacancies,
and Thomas was nominated to one by five of the thirteen present: his father's colleagues Lovell and Herbert, and three noblemen among those recently returned to court and favour, Buckingham, Kent and his own relative by marriage, Devonshire. Berners was also nominated, though only by Arundel. The choice of these relatively young men whose only distinction was military was probably intended to please Henry and perhaps also Surrey. The earl, for his part, made nominations chiefly designed to further high policy, including the two who were chosen, Darcy and Dudley.

In 1510 ten members of the Order of the Garter met to fill three vacancies. Lord Howard was nominated by five, this time all noblemen; Oxford, Arundel, and Shrewsbury who were close to his father, Dorset, his own relative by marriage and Wiltshire, a fellow courtier, while Sir Edward and Knyvett each gained a nomination. Others did considerably better, Burgavenny receiving nine out of the ten nominations, de La Warr six, and Ferrers equalling him with five, but Howard, de La Warr and Sir Henry Marney were chosen. This strongly suggests Howard's personal standing with the king, based on his military skills, for war with France was growing more likely and membership of the order greatly enhanced a nobleman's credentials for military command. The outcome of this meeting pleased Surrey, for not only was his heir chosen but de la Warr was a neighbour with whom he had long been on good terms and he had nominated Marney in the past.

One further development in early 1510 demonstrates both Henry's preoccupation with martial skills and the part of the young Howards and their friends in this. Henry initiated the revamping and expansion to fifty men of the King's Spears under the captaincy of Essex and lieutenancy of Petchie, which gave many knights and aspiring young squires, especially the jousters, the opportunity to improve their skills in handling a lance on horseback at the king's expense, at court. Sir Edward was admitted immediately and probably Edmund and their brothers-in-law and associates too, though it is impossible to be certain until April 1511. Surrey is reported, on uncertain authority, to
have been against the expansion of the spears on the grounds of expense, and the body was not maintained after the first war because of its cost, though perhaps also because of the pressure these young men with reputations to make had exerted on the king in favour of war.  

Sir Edward Howard, Knyvet and their friends, who are to be identified as Henry's closest friends through the jousts, were also consistently to the fore in the revels which usually followed them and took place on other occasions, when they might also be identified in dress with the king, or, as in the celebrations at the birth of the prince, wear lavish costumes covered with the initials of their royal master and mistress. As in the jousts, and particularly the pageants which preceded them, there was much reference to themes of courtly love, and no doubt that Henry's companions advertised their devoted service as Katherine's knights, all the more natural since several of the Howard women served her, and much time was spent by the king and his companions in the queen's chambers. Indeed, at about this time Thomas and Muriel Knyvet named one of their sons Ferdinand. Muriel, her sister Elizabeth and step-sister Margaret Bryan no doubt participated in many of the early revels for which no accounts survive, and in others where the participants are unnamed, for we know that Muriel and Margaret took part in the disguising of 14 November 1510, when they were given their lavish costumes, one of the benefits of intimacy with the royal couple which Edward and Knyvet, like Brandon, enjoyed regularly. Boleyn also took part, though less frequently, and the same may be true of Lord Thomas.

Grants to the Howards and Their Relatives

The standing of both Surrey and the younger members of his family with the king, indeed, the degree of their individual proximity to Henry was demonstrated by the scale and nature of royal generosity towards them. In May 1509 Sir Edward secured the grant of the office of king's bannerer which he had performed at Henry VII's funeral, with a useful fee of £40 p.a, while Lord Thomas obtained a joint loan of £33. 6s. 8d. with a fellow courtier/jouster.
In June their father obtained a grant designed to facilitate the collection of his annual fee of £20 for his earldom out of the counties of Surrey and Sussex, and in July confirmation in the treasurership, while at the end of the year Lord Thomas and his wife, the king's aunt, were granted a property in Stepney, probably the one by the riverside formerly owned and used by his grandfather when doing business in the city. In July Knyvet had been granted the office of standard bearer in succession to one of Surrey's tenants, and Boleyn became keeper of the foreign exchange at Calais, an appointment indicative of his father-in-law's support as well as royal favour.

In August came the first of the grants reversing Henry VII's exactions when Muriel and Knyvet were assigned reasonable dower in the Lisle lands, and in November the original family group, which included Boleyn, was leased the Lisle estates during the minority of the heiress. A few days later Sir Edward and Lady Alice were released from their remaining £200 debt to the crown. In the following February Knyvet was advanced by Henry to an office which entailed involvement in organising all the king's equestrian sports and the movements of the household, that of master of the horse, while in September he obtained the first of several lucrative offices in crown lands which suggest the usefulness of being always at Henry's side.

Also in 1510 by far the most important of the early grants to the Howards took place when Lady Anne, Lord Thomas's wife, and her only surviving sister Katherine Courtenay, Countess of Devon, had their rights as co-heirs to the earldoms of March and Ulster fully acknowledged at last. No single transaction illustrates more clearly than this the reversal in policy towards the nobility in general and the Yorkist families in particular which accompanied the new reign, for by a legal fiction the king now recovered the lands of the two earldoms from the daughters of Edward IV, which his father had in fact absorbed into the crown estate, granting Anne and Katherine alternative lands in lieu of these. However, while the Howards signed an indenture in July whereby they renounced Anne's rights in exchange for lands worth a thousand marks per annum.
which they held before the end of the year, the Devonshires were merely restored in April 1511, to the Courtenay inheritance by the reversal of the 1504 attainder. Lord Thomas specifically forswore any right, by courtesy, in Anne's estates after her death on the basis of the children they had had, since these were all dead, but he was compensated for this by the grant of two manors which lay conveniently close to existing Howard estates, while a third was added, apparently as a special mark of favour at the last minute. Thus his marriage to Anne now paid off handsomely, and the couple, who had held no land of their own to date, became considerable landowners with estates in nine counties, the core of them in East Anglia close to the lands which were to come to him on his father's death by the settlement of 1507.

In July Surrey obtained a grant in tail male of the office of earl marshal with his fee backdated. Edward, with various combinations of friends like Knyvet, Brandon, Sir Edward Guildford and Sir Edward Neville, obtained freedom from customs duties on three occasions in these years, suggesting that, in the manner of his grandfather, he was shipping wool and other goods to the Mediterranean and the Low Countries in his own and hired vessels, with handsome royal loans, sometimes in foreign currency, facilitating his business. Boleyn received grants of office in royal lands in January and July, and was party to a large royal loan with Edward and Brandon in September 1511, perhaps intended for their war preparations. Lord Thomas was not part of this group, and probably closer to other courtiers like John Carr and especially other noblemen often at court. Lord Mountjoy, who, no doubt with Surrey's support, became master of the mint early in the reign, was clearly a friend, as were the others who were likewise bound in two-hundred marks for him, Robert Radcliffe, Lord Fitzwalter, (the disposition of whose estates, combined with the effects of his father's attainder having convinced him of the wisdom of cultivating the Howards) Henry, Lord Scrope, a Howard feoffee, William Lord Willoughby d'Eresby, one of the closest friends of the family, and his relative Lord Willoughby de Broke.
The Growth of Howard Power in the Localities

The question as to whether Surrey's position in the council and Howard influence with the young king resulted in enhanced influence in the localities where he held land, and if so what shape this took, is a matter of some importance, as the following chapter will demonstrate.

In Surrey and Sussex the earl's landholding in relation to other peers, and therefore his influence, remained restricted by the fact that the baronies of Bramber and Lewis were divided amongst co-heirs and their tenants did not look exclusively to him. However, the paucity of estate accounts and court rolls for these lands in this period, or of any local equivalent to the list of recipients of venison from Framlingham park, despite the fact that Surrey had parks in the area, impedes analysis. He cultivated members of the local elite, of course. Berners was a JP and prominent in Surrey, Lord Howard occasionally resided at Chesworth and Bramley, and the family must have had influence in Lambeth, due to almost continuous residence there, but the effects of all this are hard to gauge. There is one qualification to a rather static picture, however, for Edmund Howard's marriage to the landed and twice married Joyce Culpepper, discussed in the previous chapter, resulted in his nomination as sheriff of Surrey and Sussex, and appearance on the bench in July 1511, and he immediately sat at Southwark in Michaelmas term, where he and his relative by marriage John Legh, sheriff in 1509, made up half the bench. Clearly his wife's connexions were as important as his father's name in giving him weight, for they were later to draw him into partisanship in local conflicts.

In Essex, where Surrey held only one manor, he was not on the bench but was very close to the major peers and other important JPs like Sir James Hobart, Sir John Cutte, Sir Henry Marney, and Sir Robert Southwell. Much the same was true of the Hertfordshire commission, a county in which his first wife's lands had long made him a significant influence, though, unlike Berners the eventual heir, he was not on the bench. Sir Edward's wife, Lady M rley, also held several manors in these two counties but Sir Edward was not admitted
to the bench, and the office of sheriff of the two counties appears to have continued to be in Oxford's nomination. Surrey was on all three Lincolnshire commissions as a result of his group of lands south of the Wash, between King's Lynn and Spalding, and in nearby Boston his influence was considerable due to the proximity of his own and particularly his servants' lands. In November 1509 both Sir Philip Tylney and Thomas Blennerhasset, steward of his household, were granted the weighs of the port, Tylney was appointed to the commission of sewers, and in November 1511 he was also appointed joint bailiff of royal lands in the county with William Compton.

East Anglia was, of course, where Surrey was territorially strongest and best established, therefore his influence there is best documented. The joint shrievalty of Norfolk and Suffolk, where Oxford's nominees had been interspersed with former Mowbray servants and independents, demonstrates his growing influence. In 1509 the three nominees for the shrievalty of Norfolk and Suffolk were his son-in-law Boleyn, Sir John Heydon and Sir Richard Wentworth, the first two close to Surrey in Norfolk and the third, who was pricked, a former Lancastrian whose residence close to Framlingham in Suffolk had brought him into the Howard sphere, becoming a feoffee to Surrey for the barony of Bramber in 1506, and a knight of the Bath at the outset of the new reign. In 1510 Boleyn and Heydon were again nominated, but John Heveningham, a Suffolk tenant of Surrey, who was regularly on his gift list at Framlingham, was pricked, and in 1511 it was Roger Townshend, a tenant in Surrey's first wife's lands who was later to show strong attachment.

The commissions of the peace were already well stocked with men on whom Surrey could rely, particularly in Suffolk, but Boleyn was added to that bench in November 1510, just preceded by the legally trained Anthony Wingfield, already a bailiff to Surrey. In Norfolk there was more leeway to make up and in 1510 the additions of Surrey's nephew Thomas Wyndham, Boleyn, Henry Noon and John Shelton were probably all due to his influence, while in the following year he secured the appointment of his servant Nicholas Appleyard, and of James
Boleyn. Commissions for sewers and gaol delivery in Norwich and King's Lynn in 1510 and 1511 show the same story, Sir Philip Tylney appearing on the Lynn commission, while the 1509 commission to enquire into the late viscount Beaumont's lands in Suffolk included Surrey's servant John Goldingham and two lawyers in his employ, and the Norfolk commission also contained lawyers close to him.

It was thus in East Anglia that Surrey's growing power was most in evidence, despite the fact that he was clearly absent for a large part of the year. In stark contrast to his distant cousin Oxford, who was much less at court, he had three adult, active sons of growing status, not to mention his step-son and sons-in-law, all of whom might represent him in his absence to their mutual advantage. A pardon roll entry of 1511 shows that as well as living at Tottenham and Lambeth, Lord Thomas resided at various of his father's manors, though probably mostly in East Anglia, while among the surviving accounts of Surrey's parker at Framlingham, nineteen entries between 1508 and early 1513 testify to the activity of Lord Howard and his wife there. Four references, all in the later years, suggest that after his marriage Edmund was sometimes at Framlingham, and two indicate the presence of Berners, while of the women Catherine, Lady Berners, Elizabeth Boleyn and Margaret Bryan visited or were sent gifts. Among these entries some represent only a gift or hunting party, but both Edmund and Berners presented Surrey's venison to East Anglians, and Thomas and Anne did so with considerable frequency, she to a servant and local vicar, fulfilling the role of the absent countess, while he entertained Lord Willoughby there and sent venison to his father's connexions, relatives, and the civic authorities of Bury, Norwich, Ipswich, Yarmouth and Bungay during or after his visits. Only Edward makes no appearances in these accounts, probably due to his regular residence at court, since he was involved with his father in other ways, as tenant of one of his sub-manors at Stoke-by Nayland, and, during 1510-11 he availed himself of his father's influence to harass a neighbour by bringing a case of trespass concerning one of his wife's Norfolk
properties before the barons of the exchequer.\textsuperscript{10}

Surrey's largely biannual distribution of large-se from Framlingham park amounted to an impressive 100-200 animals per year, but the fact that it was not much changed by his growing power says something for the stability of most of the relationships to which it bears testimony.\textsuperscript{10} The core group of regular recipients of venison had longstanding territorial connexions with the estate, often as landlords or tenants, in the former category mainly abbots and abbesses of East Anglian and more far-flung monastic foundations.\textsuperscript{10} Others were his tenants, held land bordering on his own, or were incumbents in the parishes where he owned land and held the advowson. Others were clearly honoured for their influence, such as the sheriff, civic officials, guilds, or wealthy merchants in towns where he held land nearby or had interests, great local men like Oxford, Lord Willoughby, and the bishop of Norwich and the servants of such, but the largest category is that of the local knightage and gentry, many of them former Mowbray adherents, of course, but many also of the de la Pole, de Vere or Willoughby affinities.\textsuperscript{10} There were lawyers of varying standing whom he probably employed, his estate officials and household servants at Framlingham and the various other Howard establishments, even servants of relatively lowly rank receiving venison when they married or had children. Thus it is clear that a prestige attached to Framlingham venison which resulted in it being sent to Lambeth for entertaining guests, as far north as Kings Lynn and as far west as Lavenham, despite the fact that Surrey also raised deer much closer at Kenninghall and Earsham, and Stoke respectively.\textsuperscript{14}

The principal exceptions to the rule of stability are the occasions on which he once had venison sent to London for the feast of the serjeants-at-law and sent gifts to prominent courtiers and councillors at the outset of the new reign: to John Young, master of the rolls, Christopher Urswick, dean of the chapel royal, and the dean of St Paul's.\textsuperscript{10} Edward Jerningham, chief cup-bearer to the queen, Robert Washington, sergeant at arms in the royal household, and Christopher Garneys, gentleman usher to the king, were similarly favoured, the
latter, of East Suffolk origin, with twelve live deer for his own park.\textsuperscript{101}

In the case of such East Anglians climbing in the royal service it would be rash to conclude that they were originally Surrey's clients, or even that he was responsible for their promotion in these years, though there are reasons for thinking that East Anglians were turning increasingly to the Howards for patronage. Oxford, who alone among East Anglian noblemen could rival the spread of Surrey's estates, attended so much less at council and court as to suggest that his health was deteriorating; thus instead of being a rival focus for patronage, he may well have used his young relatives to forward his own clients.\textsuperscript{117} Only Essex was as prominent at court, though not on the council, and of course he lacked a comparable landed base in the region.\textsuperscript{1} However, the common constraint of lack of evidence concerning patronage applies in full to the Howards, so that it is impossible to tell how far Surrey and his family acted concertedly. They had the potential to be a highly effective agency for the promotion of clients from the counties where family members held land, for there are indications that, given the many stages which obtaining a grant entailed, and Henry's habitual inattention to business, the royal assent a one could be ineffective without a sympathetic presence on the council. In this context it may be significant that Boleyn continued to obtain grants where his father-in-law's support was probably as important as royal favour, and that Sir Edward brought a case of trespass before the barons of the exchequer in 1511 calling himself the treasurer's servant.\textsuperscript{105} All that can be said with certainty is that, like family members, East Anglians attached to the Howards had recognizances cancelled and did very well in terms of appointments to commissions and wardships in the period under review here.\textsuperscript{116}

The Howards were certainly well supplied with influential friends among courtiers and administrators, bonds which had grown up prior to 1509 being strengthened by the opportunity for mutual advantage. One man in the second category who secured unusually striking rewards in the first years of the reign despite a very low profile at court is Sir Robert Southwell, a protegé in royal
estate administration of Sir Reynold Bray, whom he succeeded in 1503 as principal royal auditor. In 1509 he already administered various lands in royal hands in Norfolk and Suffolk, but in July he was appointed steward of the forfeited de la Pole lands there. The fate of this inheritance was of particular concern to Surrey since its heartlands, the honour of Eye, lay contiguous with ex-Mowbray lands in north-central and eastern Suffolk and south Norfolk. The de la Pole estates had been eroded since late 1507 by grants to Dorset, Lord Willoughby d'Eresby and Lord Burgavenny, but after the appointment of Southwell there were no further inroads until May 1510 when Charles Brandon secured two Suffolk manors, a park and a warren for his uncle Sir Robert, with reversion to himself. Soon after, in July 1510 Lord Thomas and Anne indented with the king for her inheritance, obtaining, among other lands, a core of valuable de la Pole manors in Suffolk and Norfolk which were ideally placed for administration from Kenninghall, including the caput of the former dukedom of Suffolk, Wingfield Castle. Perhaps the grant to the Brandons of lands so close to his own was seen as a challenge by Surrey, who does not appear to have had much liking for the family, for several grants to Howard clients followed, despite the fact that Surrey and Lord Thomas were far from hostile to Edmund de la Pole, as late as February 1512 including him as a feoffee in the jointure of Lord Thomas's second marriage.

Though Howard control of the heart of the de la Pole inheritance increased the family's power in the centre and east of the region considerably, it was overshadowed by developments in the following year. Oxford's health failing and his heir still a child, he acknowledged his relative Surrey's ultimate succession to his own preeminence in East Anglia in November 1511 when he contracted to marry his young nephew, John de Vere, to Anne, Surrey's eldest daughter by Agnes, before May 1512. He clearly intended that after his own
death the Howards, in cooperation with his councillors, would oversee de Vere interests until the fourteenth earl reached his majority in 1520. The consequences of this marriage contract in the years after his own death would be considerable, for by far the two greatest magnate families in East Anglia would be united under a single lord, with territories spanning the whole region.\textsuperscript{1}\textsuperscript{10} It was probably in an effort to reduce the danger of de Vere interests being totally subordinated to Howard interests that Oxford chose Surrey's second son, Sir Edward, to head the feoffees for the couple's jointure, though they may anyway have been close, and Edward already had a useful influence in Essex and Hertfordshire as a result of his wife's lands there.\textsuperscript{1} Among the other feoffees were Knyvet, Boleyn and the Howard cousin Sir Thomas Wyndham, along with trusted Howard and de Vere councillors and important local gentlemen of both affinities.\textsuperscript{120}

The Howard Role in Conciliar Politics and influence in Foreign Affairs

The death of the Lady Margaret a few days after the coronation, when the initial crisis of the reign was only just over, left great power and responsibility in the hands of the small circle of Henry VII's senior councillors/executors who had co-operated with her. Surrey's reappointment as treasurer in July 1509 confirmed his membership of this inner ring of councillors and his attendance of council meetings after the coronation remained amongst the highest, rivalled only by that of Fox and Ruthal, other councillors with whom they often worked being Shrewsbury, Herbert, Lovell, Marney, Sir Thomas Brandon and John Englefield.\textsuperscript{1} Few lawyers seem to have attended regularly once the business connected with the will was over, but the most striking change is the number of warrants signed by Surrey at the head of other councillors; many instructing chancellor Warham to cancel recognizances, apparently because he continued to attend council meetings rather rarely during the early months of the reign.\textsuperscript{1}\textsuperscript{2}

Speculation concerning the relative power of ministers and their supposed alignment into rival camps has been as rife among historians as it was among
contemporaries. The standard conclusion is that a belligerent noble faction on
the council was led by Surrey, while Fox led an opposing clerical faction
dedicated to the continuation of the supposedly peace-orientated policies of
Henry VII, but contemporary evidence is far more confusing than this analysis
allows. Rumours from London communicated by Darcy to Fox in August 1509 show
that Fox was thought to have endeavoured to exclude from royal favour Ruthal,
Surrey, Shrewsbury, Marney, and Brandon, but, finding himself unable to do so,
had then brought in two noblemen, Buckingham and Northumberland, to bolster his
position. By contrast, Herbert suggests alliance between Fox and Surrey who,
together, had "brought all business within their verge", though surviving
ambassadorial reports from court, particularly those of the Venetian
ambassador, often leave Surrey out of account, suggesting that Fox and Ruthal
together shared the direction of foreign affairs. Indeed, Henry declared Fox
to be the least Francophile of his councillors (though he also knew him to be
subtle) and thus the most useful in dealing with France, while in May 1510
Badoer went so far as to call him alter rex. However, Wolsey's letter to Fox
in late 1511, which must carry more weight since it was written by a
councillor, demonstrates that in the crucial sphere of foreign affairs, apart
from Henry, only Surrey was made privy to Fox's advice as a matter of
course. Moreover, Wolsey regarded the earl's permanent lodgings and regular
presence at court as an important source of an influence over the king which
only Fox could equal.

Clearly, we are dealing here with a dynamic situation, but this was
probably less important in generating a wide range of opinions than the
differing aspirations and points of contact of the sources with what was, at
the level of the inner ring of the council, a cohesive and secretive body. Its members shared long service to Henry VII, and thus a loyalty to his dynasty
and his legacy which had facilitated the radical solutions at his death of
ejection of the unpopular element among its membership and its espousal of the
aristocratic principles favoured by the young king. This transformation must
have favoured noble councillors over clerics and lawyers alike, had they been intent on pressing home their advantage, and the fact that Surrey and Fox soon enjoyed an equal influence over Henry suggests that the council never was so divided.

Indeed, the common conclusion that an equality of influence between these men led to rivalry for a monopoly of power, their espousal of opposite poles in foreign affairs, and thus a seesaw effect on policy, has no support in contemporary evidence. Even Wolsey's letter, which is by far the most convincing source for rivalry (the other one being Vergil), also offers problems of interpretation, for Wolsey was not a member of the inner ring at the time he wrote to Fox, is most unlikely to have been privy to all his thoughts and dealings with Surrey, (Fox had been a feoffee to Surrey since 1495) and may have used the language of partisanship as a means of expressing a strident loyalty which, he may have judged quite erroneously would advance him 'n Fox's esteem. There is, indeed, much counter evidence to suggest that the council was fundamentally united by common goals and preoccupations, and, given the fact that, as Wolsey's letter clearly implies, the aggressive influence in English foreign policy emanated primarily from the king and court, if any of the most powerful councillors had favoured war with France, the others would have suffered so severe a relative loss of favour that it is difficult to see how negotiations with France and Scotland could have been sustained."

The most obvious of the shared preoccupations of the inner ring of councillors was naturally with the security of the realm, where the combination of the youth of the king, his lack of an heir, and his open belligerence towards France caused a concern it was unwise to voice too openly. These men approved Henry's marriage to Katherine of Aragon with the important proviso that the cornerstone of Henry VII's latest plans for his dynasty, the Habsburg marriage, be endorsed by Ferdinand, for somewhat different reasons to Henry, regarding it as the speediest means of securing the succession. "Henry's enthusiasm for it probably derived both from a chivalrous gallantry
towards Katherine and his desire for a powerful natural ally against France, and here councillors were apparently confident that they were equal to the devious Ferdinand.¹³³

England's greatest strategic weakness, of especial concern when she was at war with France, was undoubtedly her vulnerability to attack from Scotland, clearly a major concern to both Surrey and Fox, whose common experience of the north and James IV may have led them to regard increasing incidents on the border and at sea as a test of the resolve of the new regime.¹³⁴ The result was the prompt installation of Ruthal in the see of Durham, and the early persuasion of the trusted councillor Darcy to abandon court office and take up residence and responsibility on the east march, followed by the resumption of border negotiations.¹³⁵ The same approach of combining a show of strength with a willingness to negotiate was adopted with regard to France, for the order was given for musters to be held at Calais very early, and Sir John Petchie was despatched with reinforcements of 100 men for the garrison in September 1509, while friendly communications were despatched to Louis XII by foresighted councillors immediately Henry came to the throne.¹³⁶

The council was clearly behind the resultant renewal of Henry VII's treaties with England's potential enemies, concluded with Scotland on 29 August 1509 and with France in April 1510, for the leading members of the inner ring were all signatories to them and probably all received French pensions, since Shrewsbury certainly did.¹³⁷ Though Henry was persuaded that these were purely pragmatic, temporary extensions to treaties with the enemy, forced upon him by the need to strengthen his own position until the League of Cambrai could be dissolved and replaced with a league against France, he increasingly demonstrated impatience with such temporising. The language he used against France and Scotland, recorded by the delighted Venetian ambassador, was thus a weapon which councillors might deploy to bring pressure to bear on Louis XII and James IV to negotiate, but it was a double edged sword for them as for Ferdinand, who also argued restraint, for on at least one occasion councillors
experienced an embarrassing loss of face when Henry gave them a public dressing down for having exceeded his instructions in negotiating with the enemy.\textsuperscript{136} Frustration clearly underlay his remark that but for Fox (easily the most subtle of his councillors, as he knew) all were pro-French, and it looks suspiciously as if his handsome grant in tail male to Surrey of the coveted office of earl marshal, on 10 July 1510 was an attempt to divide and rule his council by persuading the earl to obstruct confirmation and Papal endorsement of the French treaty on the one hand and speed negotiations for an offensive alliance with Ferdinand on the other.\textsuperscript{138} If so, it did not succeed on the first count. Moreover, Henry certainly took exceptional personal interest in the progress of his ambassadors sent, probably on his own initiative, to negotiate for a grand alliance against France.\textsuperscript{140}

Moves to build up England's military strength have generally been attributed to the young king, and sometimes also to Surrey, but considerations of security suggest that other councillors were initially in favour of these.\textsuperscript{141} The expansion of the officer corps of king's spears was demonstrably inspired more by king and courtiers than king and councillors, for warrants for proclamations for country wide musters, and a programme of training to improve deteriorating standards of fitness for war among the population at large, were apparently the work of a group of councillors headed by Surrey.\textsuperscript{142} Further, during the first year of the reign two prestigious warships, perhaps intended to outdo James IV's, were put into commission, the Mary Rose and Peter Pomegranate, followed soon after by a third, the Henry Grace a Dieu, and here Henry's initiating role is not open to doubt.\textsuperscript{143} We lack direct evidence of Howard involvement here, but John Howard's naval career makes it likely that Surrey appreciated the importance of naval strength in war with France and Scotland, while Edward's ship ownership, seafaring experience, role with the navy from mid 1511 and reports on the sailing qualities of the new ships as admiral, strongly suggest that he proffered technical advice to the king and was an important influence from the outset.\textsuperscript{144}
We are on firmer ground with the commissioning of new artillery, which appears to have taken place as a direct response to orders placed in Flanders by James IV, reported to Surrey by Thomas Spinelly, Henry VII's agent at the court of Margaret, regent of the Low Countries. Surrey handled negotiations on the English side, via Spinelly, with Hans Poppenreuter of Malines for twenty-four cortaulds and twenty-four serpentines, also negotiating to buy James IV's recent order. It is probable that the early loan to Lord Thomas Howard and John Carr, discussed above, was connected with this, for the sum was exactly that of the initial down payment, the order was virtually a government to government contract and Carr at least is known to have been there in late 1509, Spinelly reporting that he was well received by Margaret's lords for Henry's sake. Thus, in building up English military strength the Howards of both generations played an important role.

Surrey's involvement in the commissioning of artillery had a deeper significance, however, for among the inner ring of councillors, where some specialisation in dealing with foreign powers existed, his major area of activity naturally lay with Henry's relations with the Emperor and particularly his daughter, Margaret, the regent of the Low Countries. His early service to Charles the Bold and responsibilities for trade (as lord treasurer) had culminated in a central role in bringing about the treaty of 1508 for the marriage of Mary Tudor to the heir to Habsburg dominions and Spain, Charles of Castile, a personal dimension being given to this relationship by his meetings in 1508 with Margaret, her nephew Charles, who was in her care, and Maximilian. Thus Surrey handled discussions concerning the early despatch of Mary to Flanders, and put pressure on Margaret for the Emperor's entry into an offensive alliance against Louis XII, which resulted, first in Sir Robert Wingfield's mission to the Emperor and then, early in 1512, in the despatch of Surrey's son-in-law Boleyn to Margaret's court. He was probably also behind the inception of new trade negotiations with Margaret begun in 1510, and increasing warmth between the two countries. This special relationship is
nicely demonstrated by the fact that, at the christening of Henry's shortlived son, born in January 1511, Agnes, Countess of Surrey, represented Margaret as godmother.\textsuperscript{181}

The effects of this relationship upon Surrey's stance on foreign policy and relations with France in particular are crucial. The treaty of 1508 had given the king of England an even greater stake in the welfare of the Low Countries than that which already existed as a result of the vital trade link, and her security was far more vulnerable than England's to French hostility, due to her long common border with France and the fact that her financial resources and fighting men were generally creamed off by the Emperor for his wars in Italy.\textsuperscript{182} We lack direct evidence that Surrey championed the financial support of such forces as Margaret could hire against the encroachments of the French backed duke of Gueldres in 1510, but the nobility and council are likely to have been united in support of the alliance which Henry VII had urged his executors to carry out because of the great benefits he conceived would flow from it, not least since they were bound in large sums for its performance.\textsuperscript{183}

Though continental developments, particularly the break up of the League of Cambrai, the efforts of Julius to put together an alliance against France, which he soon perceived as the greater threat to Papal interests in Italy, and then Louis's schismatic council, meant that Henry's stance gained increasing support at home and abroad, the activities of Scottish privateers, in particular the Barton family, are likely to have been most persuasive with Surrey since they affected the Low Countries.\textsuperscript{184} Operating under James's letters of marque against the Portuguese, the Scots were attacking shipping in the Channel quite indiscriminately, causing increasing disruption to trade, so that Surrey must have been constantly referring complaints from English merchants to the council, for the matter was raised in border negotiations, the regent Margaret was moved to complain bitterly to James and Anglo-Burgundian cooperation was attempted to meet the threat.\textsuperscript{185} Mercantile pressure of this sort must also have come from East Anglians, while of Surrey's family Edward,
Knyvet and their friends at least were trading in this period, Edward himself probably going overseas late in 1510 for two months or more; thus they were well aware of the situation.165

Perhaps none of this would have been sufficient to move Surrey had Anglo-Imperial relations not been rocked to their foundations at this juncture by a rumour that Maximilian, who had other priorities besides the security of Low Countries, was considering a French bride for Charles, thus putting the 1508 treaty in jeopardy.167 Margaret, who had worked hard to achieve cooperation with England, reacted immediately by sending Spinelly post-haste to Surrey with explanatory letters and a special message from Charles, and the matter was rapidly patched up.169 The result, however, was that Surrey and the many councillors and noblemen associated with him who had been negotiators or guarantors of the treaty were willing to make concessions to please Maximilian as never before, so that instead of further financial assistance, Charles was sent a force of 1,500 archers under Sir Edward Poynings.169 This pressure, combined with that already discussed must have been considerable, but whether it was sufficient to commend to Surrey positive action against Scottish privateers, which must push tense relations with Scotland into open war is doubtful, and a report that he said, "The king of England should not be imprisoned in his kingdom while either he had an estate to set up a ship, or a son to command it" cannot be substantiated.160

The opportunity offered itself when word was obtained that Andrew Barton with two vessels, presumably laden with plunder, was about to pass Dover on his homeward journey to Scotland.161 Edward Howard, deputizing for Oxford, was just then fitting out three hired vessels for the king to escort a fleet of the Merchant Adventurers to Zeeland, thus he and his elder brother Lord Thomas, in command of two of these ships, set sail under Henry's auspices in late June 1511.162 They were separated, but each succeeded in intercepting one of the vessels, Lord Thomas Barton's own, the Lion, in the Downs, and Edward the Jenet Purwyn after a chase. Both were taken despite ferocious resistance, Barton
dying of his wounds, and Thomas put into Sandwich in the first few days of July and sent a messenger with a Scottish prisoner to the king, then on progress. Both vessels and their prizes were brought into the Thames at Blackwall on 2 August, the prisoners being sent to the archbishop of York's prison under Lord Thomas's supervision, where they were harangued by Fox and other councillors, perhaps with the aim of inducing so abject a plea to the king for mercy that Henry's honour would be satisfied without executing them, an act which was bound to incite a declaration of war from James, which councillors were doing their best to prevent.

The effects were nonetheless immediate and far reaching. James IV was "wonderfull wrothe", demanding restitution, and that the Howards be brought to justice as common pirates, a grave slur upon their honour, and though Henry's reply was hardly conciliatory, the efforts of the council, combined with French pressure on James to hold back, were sufficient to stave off the outbreak of war. The belligerence of the young Howards and their friends towards Scotland was fuelled by James's response, however, and that at a time when their influence with Henry was enhanced by their impressive success. At the end of September Wolsey wrote to Fox, in the letter already mentioned, that Edward "mervelusly incendyth the Kyng agenst the Scottis, by whos wantone meanys hys grace spendyth mych money, and ys more dyssposyd to ware than paxe", and indeed border defences were being strengthened too. From his return, Edward had been continuously occupied in preparing the royal ships for war, this being the most likely expense which Wolsey regretted, though of course he was also given the Jenet Purwyn by the king. Clearly the council, whose grip on the situation was never very secure, was in danger of losing it entirely, especially, Wolsey flattered Fox, in his absence.

Surrey, by contrast with his sons, had just had a frosty reception from Henry and withdrawn from court, apparently most unusually for a whole week. This suggests that he and the younger members of his family did not see eye to eye on the desirability of war at this juncture. Despite Ferdinand's dramatic
volte face in June of that year, when he swung from holding Henry back, to strongly advocating an attack on Guienne, Surrey perhaps opposed continental campaigning while Scotland remained free to attack his rear, or indeed of fighting France without the Emperor, especially alongside Henry's father-in-law in the remote south.\textsuperscript{170} Beset by Henry's anger, pressure from the queen and her household, his family, the nobility and courtiers on one side, and on the other by the formation of the Holy League, he finally bowed to the inevitable, came back to court, and in early October negotiated with Shrewsbury, but without Fox or Ruthal, an offensive alliance with Ferdinand based on a joint invasion of Guienne in the spring, which was concluded on 17 November, four days after Henry's entry into the Holy League.\textsuperscript{171} No doubt he still hoped to win the Emperor round before campaigning began, and he certainly redoubled his efforts, with royal approval, by the despatch of Boleyn as accredited ambassador to Margaret's court, but it appears that, with other councillors, he was being dragged into war by the king, their arguments and delaying tactics having collapsed one by one.\textsuperscript{172}

In the winter and spring before campaigning began an event occurred which demonstrates the proximity of the young Howards to the queen and particularly the standing of Lord Thomas, no doubt already committed to the Guienne campaign, in royal favour.\textsuperscript{173} Late in 1511 his wife Anne died, probably in childbirth, leaving him at thirty seven with the prospect of going to war without an heir.\textsuperscript{174} He therefore wasted no time in taking a second wife, the lady of his choice being Elizabeth Stafford, the fifteen year old eldest daughter of Buckingham, whom he must have known from the queen's chamber, since she had been a lady in waiting to the queen with Howard's sisters and step-sister since 1509.\textsuperscript{175} She was about to be married to the earl of Westmorland, thus Buckingham tried to palm him off with his second daughter, but Howard was immovable, being in a strong position to avail himself of royal assistance.\textsuperscript{176} Buckingham was thus persuaded to change his plans and grudgingly consented to a portion of two-thousand marks, which Howard no doubt planned to use to finance
his war preparations. He was disappointed, however, for though the marriage took place before Easter, Buckingham was tardy in paying up, still owing Howard part of the sum in 1518. However, a magnificent royal loan for the full sum compensated him for his disappointment and allowed him to prepare himself to serve Henry in a manner which would do them both honour.

Since the war itself sheds much further light on many of the issues raised in the first page of this chapter, it would be inappropriate to re-evaluate them all at this point. However, certain things are clear. The very considerable, but by no means exclusive influence of the Howards over Henry is established beyond doubt, while it is also clear that this influence was exerted at two levels, both by attendance at court, and in council and parliament. Though Surrey was clearly an assiduous courtier, with other members of the inner ring providing the chief link between the king and his executive, he was almost certainly more in sympathy with the mood of caution of the council than that of aggression of the young courtiers, including his sons and step-sons, who had the greatest influence over the king. However, the family may well have cooperated in obtaining grants for themselves, members of the Howard affinity and other East Anglians besides, though this is impossible to prove, while there is much evidence of continuing close links between Surrey and the younger members of his family. Ideological differences between them should not be exaggerated either, for they shared commitment to the ideals of chivalry, and to the emperor and the Low Countries, and, probably, increasing hostility to James IV. Perhaps the major difference between them lies in the fact that Surrey, being so well established himself, could, like his colleagues, afford to put the best interests of the king above those of personal advantage in a way which those with reputations still to make could hardly be expected to do.
Notes

2 M.J. Tucker, Second Duke, pp 93-4
3 G.R. Elton, Reform and Reformation p 17; Scarisbrick, op. cit., p 21
5 D. Hay ed., Vergil, p 149-151; LP ii, 395; Loades, op. cit., pp 19, 21-3, 27; Scarisbrick, op. cit., p 33
6 P.S. and H.M. Allen eds., Erasmus, Opus Epistolarum, i, 1
7 Scarisbrick, op. cit., pp 38-9
8 Scarisbrick, op. cit., pp 34, 45; D. Starkey, op. cit., pp 40-1
10 Warham (Canterbury), Fox (Winchester), Fitzjames (London), Fisher (Rochester), Shrewsbury (Lord Chamberlain), Herbert (Lord Steward), Fyneux and Rede (Chief Justices), Young (Master of the Rolls), Lovell (Treasurer of the Household, etc.), Ruthal (Secretary), Empson (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster), Dudley (king's attorney), the king's confessor, the Provincial of the Friars Observant, and Attwater (Dean of the Chapel)
11 Arundel, distantly related to Surrey, was the other nobleman; Tucker, op. cit. p 82.
12 LP Add. i, 52; J.R. Lander, 'Bonds Coercion and Fear' in Crown and Nobility, p 339; D. Hay ed., Vergil, p 129; Hall, p 504; Chrimes, op. cit., pp 209, 216
13 Hall, p 504; P.L. Hughes, J.F. Larkin eds., Tudor Royal Proclamations, i, p 81; Chrimes, op. cit., p 315
16 It is impossible to tell how far the vilification of Empson and Dudley was the result of the propaganda of the new regime, but Dudley had made himself unpopular as undersheriff of London and both had reason to fear the London mob. GC, p 339; A.H. Johnson, History of the Drapers, iii, p 1; E.W. Ives, Common Lawyers, pp 235-6; Richardson, op. cit., p 70-1, 107, 152
17 Ives, op. cit., pp 253-6
18 See note 10 above; PRO SP1/1 ff 10-16, 18, 19a, 23, 24, 26; G.R. Elton, Reform and Reformation, p 17, n. 1; Storey, op. cit., p 210; Chrimes, op. cit., p 316
19 Fisher had been her confessor, Marney had risen through her household, and Lovell another of his executors, LP i 158 (24); Chrimes, op. cit., p 240
20 Surrey was on friendly terms with lady Willoughby, one of the countess's senior gentlewomen, LP i 20, 81; BL Add Ms 2754, ff 11-25.
21 Empson seems to have unearthed evidence on which charges concerning the prerogative were instituted, and Dudley to have prosecuted, Richardson, op. cit. pp 154-5; C.J. Harrison, 'The Petition of Edmund Dudley', Eng. Hist. Rev. (1972) pp 344-8; R. Somerville, 'Henry VII's Council Learned', Eng. Hist. Rev. (1939) pp 427-42
22 Many Howard relatives and friends among the nobility had suffered, including Oxford, Berners and Dorset, J.R. Lander, 'Bonds Coercion and Fear', pp 282-3. Apart from exchequer officials under him and feoffees among the clerics he had associations with Bray, (d. 1502) Hobart and Southwell, see chapter 1, while his feoffees included John Ernley (attorney general) Henry Wyatt (keeper of the exchange, assayer of the coinage and keeper of the jewelhouse) was his tenant and probably his client, and Lord
Thomas at least had some connexion with John Hussey, *CCR* 1500-09, 815. For their parts in executing Henry's fiscal policies see Richardson, op. cit., pp 96-7, 107, 145-6. For association with the Howards, *CCR*, 1500-09, 766; BL Add. Roll 215; *CCR*, 1500-09, 815.

23 PRO SP1/1 ff 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 21, 23,


26 More was at Lincoln's Inn, where Surrey appears to have had connexions to judge by some of the admissions, eg. Knyvet in 1510, *Records of Lincoln's Inn*, p 34, others 30, 32, 33, 34, 36, 38. More's father was a serjeant-at-law with connexions with the Mercers and Merchants of the Staple, Surrey being connected with both, J. Guy, *The Public Career of Sir Thomas More*, pp 3-5; Kent and Mountjoy were feoffees *CCR* ii, 766.

27 Starkey, op. cit., pp 42; H. Miller, *Henry VIII and the English Nobility*, p 106-7 Surrey was certainly involved in setting up the commissions of oyer and terminer, Ellesmere 2655, f 7.

28 J.D. Mackie, *The Earlier Tudors*, p 232; Grants: Ruthal, *LP* i, 70; Marney, 94 (96), 146, Hussey, 132 (55, 56) 158 (17, 88), Southwell, *LP* i, 158(71); Cancellation of recognizances from 2 May, *LP* i, 54 (3).

29 He had organised Arthur's, PRO LC2/1 f 15; The Mowbray dukes of Norfolk had held this office, M.J. Tucker, p 90

30 *LP* i 20, no. 3

31 PRO LC2/1 ff 118, 119, 119v, 120, 125

32 The office had been Sir Anthony Browne's (d. 1506) and his heir, who got it eventually, was too young to perform it, *TV*, i, p 533; PRO SP1/1 f 31; *LP* i, 43, 54 (42); BL Harl. 3504, 265; Rymer, *Foedera*, vi, p 2.

33 BL Harl. 3504 f 265; For a book made for the fourth duke on the role of the Earl Marshal see C. Howard, *Historical Anecdotes of Some of the Howard Family*, pp 151-163.

34 D. Lloyd, *State Worthies*, p 155 gives, without any source, four reasons Surrey urged in favour of the marriage, two concerned with foreign policy and the others with her dowry and delays involved in sending her home and starting again. They are more persuasive as the council's reasoning.

35 *LP* i 94 (35); G. Mattingly, *Catherine of Aragon*, p 86.

36 *CSPS*, i, 13

37 He had met Katherine on her arrival in England and had gone to Ludlow to supervise Arthur's funeral and probably accompanied her back to London, PRO LC2/1, f 15; Mattingly, op. cit., pp 114-5; Scarisbrick, op. cit., p 29

38 PRO LC9/50 f 212-3; Edward Jerningham, gentleman usher to Henry VII, became her cup-bearer and his wife Mary, who had served the princess Mary, one of her gentlewomen, perhaps as a result of Howard patronage, though Sir Thomas Tyrrell, her master of the horse, probably had other patrons, BL Add. Ms. 27,541 f 11; *LP* i, 20 p 14, 82 p 38.

39 *LP* i 94 (43), (68): H. Miller, *Henry VIII and the Nobility*, pp 166-7

40 *LP* i 94 (88); G.D. Squibb, *High Court of Chivalry*, p 1; C. Howard, *Howard Family*, pp 141-9

41 BL Tib. E VIII, f 100v; Scrope and Mountjoy *CCR* 1500-09, 766; Wentworth, PRO E327/354; Shelton, Heydon and Berkeley, see chapter 1; Bedingfield, *SR* 3 Henry VIII, c 16; Cheyne, *CIPM Henry VII* i, p 238; Wyatt, BL Add. Roll 215

42 BL Harl. 6079, f 21b; PRO LC9/50, ff 212-3; *LP* i 20, 81, 82

43 BL Add. Ms. 6297, pp 344-5

44 BL Add. Ms. 6113, f 72

45 *CSPS*, ii, 45; M. Keen, *Chivalry*, p 2; Scarisbrick, op. cit., p 39; S.J. Gunn, 'The French Wars of Henry VIII', pp 35, 36-37; H. Miller, op. cit., p 133

- 80 -
Oxford's military record was impressive, *DNB* xx, pp 240-2; *GEC* x, pp 239-43

For the service of other Howards and the death of Sir John Howard (Surrey's great grandfather) on pilgrimage in Jerusalem, the nearest he could come to crusading, Robinson, op. cit., p 4; for Surrey's sons, see chapter 1 above.

Hall, pp 510-12; *GC*, pp 341-3 These accounts do not agree on Edmund Howard's participation, and unfortunately no jousting cheques survive.

Ibid.

Keen, op. cit., pp 85-6

N. Samman, 'The Henrician Court during Wolsey's Ascendancy, 1514-29', University of N. Wales, Bangor, Ph.D. (forthcoming 1988) Appendix iv, 'Participants in Jousts and MASKS 1509-29'

*Lp* i, App. 9

Hall, pp 517-9, 520-1; *GC*, pp 368-74, 456; Holinshed, iii, p 559; *LP* ii pp 1494-7, 1450, i 700, 710

BL Add. Ms. 6079, f 36b; S. Anglo, *The Great Tournament Roll of Westminster*, i, pp 51-60; Lord Howard was chosen by Henry, with Brandon, to run against him in an extension of the contest "for the king's lady's sake". Perhaps Henry felt he had bad luck not to have scored better, (2 attaints in 6 passes against Henry's 4 attaints and 1 lance broken) and he did better in the final 2 passes, breaking 1 lance to Henry's 2 in 2 passes, though Brandon did best. Howard rode behind the king in the closing procession with Henry's helmet on a truncheon.

Hall, p 515

*S. J. Gunn*, 'French Wars' in *Origins of War in Early Modern Europe*, J. Black ed., p 41

J. Anstis, *Order of the Garter*, pp 269-71

Apart from Ferdinand, he nominated mainly northerners, demonstrating a common concern with other councillors for the security of the border. The one exception to the rule of high policy before personal interest is Sir David Owen, a tenant of Surrey in Sussex who was a Tudor bastard and an active councillor, SR iii, p 35

Anstis, op. cit., pp 272-4; Shaw, *Knights*, i, p 20 Edward was named by Oxford and Knyvet by Buckingham.


PRO E327/352; Anstis, op. cit., pp 259-71; Marney was perhaps increasingly associated with Surrey at this time, regularly attending council meetings with him.

BL Titus A XIII, f 186, printed in full in *S. Pegge, Curialia*, pp 2-9; Hall, p 512

*LP* ii, p 1445; PRO E101/417/7 f 93; for other members see appointments to war in 1512-13.

Lloyd, op. cit., p 155; *S. J. Gunn*, 'The Act of Resumption of 1515', note 27; *LP* i, 880, 1201

*LP* ii, pp 1493, 1490-1, 1494-7; Hall, pp 513-4, 517-9

S. Anglo, 'Spectacle, Pageantry and Early Tudor Policy', pp 111-4; M. Keen, *Chivalry*, p 30; *LP* ii, 1446

*LP* ii, pp 1490-9; *S. J. Gunn*, *Charles Brandon*, p 7

*LP* i, p 1490 and as bearer at the funeral of the prince, *LP* i, 707

Edward's office carried a fee of £40 p.a., PRO SP1/1, f31; John Carr, spear to Henry VII, just appointed sewer of the king's mouth, *LP* i, 54 (76) S. Bentley, *Exerpta Historica*, p 132; *LP* i, 244, 1441; joint grant, PRO E36/215, f9. The loan may have been connected with a purchase of arms.

PRO C54/377, m 16; *LP* i 123, 132 (98); 414 (44); A. Crawford, 'John Howard', p 61

Tenant, Sir John Cheyne, *LP* i 120, 132 (53) (89); 122, 132 (92)

PRO C54/377, m 21; *LP* i 257 (40)

*LP* i 257 (53)

*LP* i 381 (76); *Gunn, Charles Brandon*, pp 12-14; *LP* i 563 (21)

Starkey, op. cit., p 43; *CAD* iv, A 7551; PRO SC6/1669, 22-3 H VII, SC6/6238 24 H VII-1 H VIII. Henry's feoffees in the new settlement had probably
negotiated with the Howards; Lovell, Marney, Englefield, Erneley and Porte.

76 PRO C54/378, m 16 no 13, CAD v, A 13566; LP 1, 749 (23) Catherine had secured an annuity of 200 mks p.a. in 1509, LP 1, 158 (20)

77 PRO C54/378, m 16; C66/612 m 17; LP 1, 520, 546 (27, 31), 636 (63), 749 (6), 632 (64, 63) His manors were Claxton and Hellington in Norfolk, formerly de la Pole property, and Findon in Sussex which was Dudley's.

78 PRO C54/378, m 16; C66/612 m 17; LP i, 749 (23) Catherine had secured an annuity of 200 mks p.a. in 1509, LP i, 158 (20)

79 PRO C54/378, m 16; C66/612 m 17; LP i, 520, 546 (27, 31), 636 (63), 749 (6), 632 (64, 63) His manors were Claxton and Hellington in Norfolk, formerly de la Pole property, and Findon in Sussex which was Dudley's.

80 PRO C54/378, m 16; C66/612 m 17; LP i, 520, 546 (27, 31), 636 (63), 749 (6), 632 (64, 63) His manors were Claxton and Hellington in Norfolk, formerly de la Pole property, and Findon in Sussex which was Dudley's.

81 PRO C54/378, m 16; C66/612 m 17; LP i, 520, 546 (27, 31), 636 (63), 749 (6), 632 (64, 63) His manors were Claxton and Hellington in Norfolk, formerly de la Pole property, and Findon in Sussex which was Dudley's.

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83 PRO C54/378, m 16; C66/612 m 17; LP i, 520, 546 (27, 31), 636 (63), 749 (6), 632 (64, 63) His manors were Claxton and Hellington in Norfolk, formerly de la Pole property, and Findon in Sussex which was Dudley's.

84 PRO C54/378, m 16; C66/612 m 17; LP i, 520, 546 (27, 31), 636 (63), 749 (6), 632 (64, 63) His manors were Claxton and Hellington in Norfolk, formerly de la Pole property, and Findon in Sussex which was Dudley's.

85 PRO C54/378, m 16; C66/612 m 17; LP i, 520, 546 (27, 31), 636 (63), 749 (6), 632 (64, 63) His manors were Claxton and Hellington in Norfolk, formerly de la Pole property, and Findon in Sussex which was Dudley's.

86 PRO C54/378, m 16; C66/612 m 17; LP i, 520, 546 (27, 31), 636 (63), 749 (6), 632 (64, 63) His manors were Claxton and Hellington in Norfolk, formerly de la Pole property, and Findon in Sussex which was Dudley's.

87 PRO C54/378, m 16; C66/612 m 17; LP i, 520, 546 (27, 31), 636 (63), 749 (6), 632 (64, 63) His manors were Claxton and Hellington in Norfolk, formerly de la Pole property, and Findon in Sussex which was Dudley's.

88 PRO C54/378, m 16; C66/612 m 17; LP i, 520, 546 (27, 31), 636 (63), 749 (6), 632 (64, 63) His manors were Claxton and Hellington in Norfolk, formerly de la Pole property, and Findon in Sussex which was Dudley's.

89 PRO C54/378, m 16; C66/612 m 17; LP i, 520, 546 (27, 31), 636 (63), 749 (6), 632 (64, 63) His manors were Claxton and Hellington in Norfolk, formerly de la Pole property, and Findon in Sussex which was Dudley's.

90 PRO C54/378, m 16; C66/612 m 17; LP i, 520, 546 (27, 31), 636 (63), 749 (6), 632 (64, 63) His manors were Claxton and Hellington in Norfolk, formerly de la Pole property, and Findon in Sussex which was Dudley's.

91 PRO C54/378, m 16; C66/612 m 17; LP i, 520, 546 (27, 31), 636 (63), 749 (6), 632 (64, 63) His manors were Claxton and Hellington in Norfolk, formerly de la Pole property, and Findon in Sussex which was Dudley's.

92 PRO C54/378, m 16; C66/612 m 17; LP i, 520, 546 (27, 31), 636 (63), 749 (6), 632 (64, 63) His manors were Claxton and Hellington in Norfolk, formerly de la Pole property, and Findon in Sussex which was Dudley's.

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94 PRO C54/378, m 16; C66/612 m 17; LP i, 520, 546 (27, 31), 636 (63), 749 (6), 632 (64, 63) His manors were Claxton and Hellington in Norfolk, formerly de la Pole property, and Findon in Sussex which was Dudley's.
to East Anglians, 3 to servants (1 of which to servants at Stoke) 1 to his uncle Tymperley, 1 to Lambeth and 4 on one occasion to Kenninghall.

There is one gift recorded to Thomas Knyvet, probably Surrey's son-in-law, BL Add. Ms. 27,451 f 21; Edward Howard, SRO S1/ 13/19.4 (3); PRO IND 7346 2, H. VIII

100 BL Add. Ms. 27,541; MacCulloch, op. cit., pp 66-7; Surrey clearly continued customary payments and gifts going back to Mowbray practice, with additions, perhaps, by his father to serve his business interests.


103 Towns not mentioned so far are Woodbridge, Dunwich and Harleston. Merchants include Daundy and Halt of Ipswich, and Sir Robert Curzon. Former loyalties of gentry families from Sayer, op. cit. It is impossible to tell whether Surrey was rewarding or wooing such men or where such gifts merely continued a tradition.


105 BL Add. Ms. 27,451, ff 13, 14
106 Ibid., ff 13, 14, 16, 18
107 R. Virgoe, 'Recovery of the Howards', p 16; As already noted Oxford nominated Thomas and Edward for the Garter in 1510, and there signs of proximity to Edward in his naval work, Knyvet, PRO E36/215, f 653, and Boleyn, LP 1, 833 (14)

108 He was prominent in jousts and revels, LP ii, pp 1490-9; H. Miller, op. cit., pp 80-2, 93. His estates were largely in Essex, around Halstead, though he had some land at Blistedt and Henall, Suffolk, PRO E101/56/25. His mother was an elder sister of Lord Thomas's wife Anne and his wife a Say, whose brother was Surrey's tenant in Herts.

109 E.W. Ives, 'Patronage at the Court of Henry VIII: The Case of Sir Ralph Egerton of Ridley', BJRL (1979) pp 367-8; LP 1, 149 (56); Boleyn, LP 1, 122, p 1458; Edward, PRO IND7346/2 Henry VIII

109 LP 1, 81; Wyndham and Jerningham, etc. LP 1, 190 (4) 604 (35); Heveningham etc. LP 1 804 (40); John Goldingham, PRO E36/215, f 669; Cancellations of recognizances for East Anglians; LP 1, 731 (52), 804 (40)

110 Richardson, Tudor Chamber Administration, pp 177-9, 180; B.P. Wolfe, Crown Lands, p 143; Grants, LP 1, 158 (71); 381 (34) (43); 546 (66); 709 (14); 874

111 He had served on the council of the Mowbray dowager and was probably retained by Surrey, R. Virgoe, 'Recovery of the Howards', p 15; J.C. Sainty, 'Officers of the Exchequer', p 119

112 Richardson, op. cit., p 182; LP 1, 156 (71)

113 LP 1, 2055 (95); 682 (40), manors of Thorndon and Wattisfield, a warren in the latter and park at Rockingham with other rights.

114 CAD v, A 13566, manors of Wingfield, Syleham, Veales, Stradbroke, (Suff.) and Frostenden, Creating St Olave, Costessey, and Stockton, (Norf.)

115 Richardson, op. cit., p 307; Grants LP 1, 604 (35); 682 (33); 2055 (95); enfeoffment, RP vi, p 480

116 Sir Robert received only 2 gifts of venison in the ten years which the accounts cover, MacCulloch, op. cit., p 57. Frosty relations date back to the minority of the last Mowbray duke when Sir William Brandon achieved a great influence over the duke, apparently causing Sir John Howard, lately so influential, to withdraw from his cousin's council, Sayer, op. cit., p 307; Grants LP 1, 604 (35); 682 (33); 2055 (95); enfeoffment, RP vi, p 480

117 PRO C142/28/2

118 Livery of lands, LP iii, 956; MacCulloch, op. cit., p 56
Since the register of council meetings does not survive, the best sources are conciliar warrants to administrative departments, particularly chancery, and the countersignatures of councillors to royal grants. PRO SP1/1, ff 11-32; LP i, 11, 54, 94, 132, 158, 190, 218, 257, 289, 313, 414, 448, 519, 555, 596, 602, 604, 664, 632, 651, 710, 731, 749, 784, 804, 833, 845, 1003

Perhaps due to Warham's dispute with Fox, LP i, 3066

See notes 1 and 2; Even Henry VII's attitude to war has recently been reinterpreted, I. Arthurson, 'The King's Voyage into Scotland: the War that Never Was' in England in the Fifteenth Century, D.T. Williams ed.

Herbert, p 8; CSPV, ii, 64; Their patronage was sought by those in the know LP i, 170; PRO SP1/229 f8

Councillors resented the Venetian ambassador Badoer's ability to gain access to the king at will and Henry's propensity to discuss foreign affairs with him freely, CSPV, ii, 67

CSPS, ii, 44

Surrey had probably favoured his marriage to Eleanor, daughter of Philip the Fair and granddaughter of Maximilian in the past, and possibly even now disliked her jilting.

Scarisbrick, op. cit., p 29


Surrey was involved in all this, LP i, 190 (34), 168

LP i, 69, 153, 385, 399, 406, 477, 498, 499, 519 (47, 51) 529 (1) 734, Add. i 85; CSPS ii, 36, 44; CSPV i, 45, 52, 63, 64

D. Hay ed., Vergil, p 161; CSPS ii 27, 44; CSPV ii, 1, 5, 11, 13, 14, 17; ibid. 11; Mattingly, Catherine of Aragon, p 116

CSPS ii, 44, This letter is also convincing evidence that councillors were dragging their feet over the league with Ferdinand, and the Spanish were adopting similar tactics with Fox and Ruthal by suggesting that they should be promoted to cardinals; LP i, 524, 546 (42), 579.

Bainbridge to Rome, Sir Robert Wingfield to the emperor, Scarisbrick, op. cit., p 45

CS1 PS ii, 44; Vergil, p 161

Hall, p 512; BL Titus A XIII, f 186, S. Pegge, Curialia, pp 2-9, LP i, 244, 257 (62) The men involved in the latter are as close as any council group comes to being under Surrey's leadership, the others being Buckingham, Ruthal, Herbert, Wolsey, Owen.


A. Crawford, 'John Howard', pp 124-7, 133-7, 141-4; LP i, 2820

LP i, 83

BL Galba B III, ff 4, 5, 6, 7; PRO E36/215, f 9. Carr had been substantially involved in trade with France and the Low Countries under Henry VII, PRO E36/214, f 20; C76/177, m 1, C76/180, C76/183, m 5

CSP1 V, 4, 167, 170; CSPS ii, pp 39-43, 45; LP i, 586

Rymer, Foedera, v, p 239-50; BL Galba B ii, f 141

LP i, 455, 1196; Vergil, p 164; Wingfield's father was a co-heir with
Surrey to the barony of Lewes, apart from the East Anglian connexion, but Sir Robert was well established by 1509, an usher of the chamber to Henry VII, and there are no obvious signs of proximity to Surrey, though he was an even more committed imperialist, and went on missions to the Low Countries in 1508 and 1509, *HP* ii, pp 642-3

150 *LP* i, 446; 576

151 BL Add. Ms. 6113, ff 79-80, *LP* i 670, 673

152 Gunn, 'French Wars', pp 32-3


154 Scarisbrick, op. cit., p 47; For the history of Margaret's dispute with James over Robert Barton, *LP* i, 12, 13, 14, 258, 484; Herbert, ii, p 7

155 Hall, p 523; *GC*, p 376; Herbert, ii, p 7; *LP* i, 525, 859

156 See above note 80; Edward's prolonged absence from court, from the revels over new year and epiphany 1511 (*LP* ii, p 1494-7) through the tourney for the birth of the prince on 12 February (BL Add. Ms. 6079, f 36b; Ellis, 2nd ser. i, p 179) and the funeral on 27 February (*LP* i, 707) suggest that he was overseas, perhaps making naval purchases for Henry, back by mid April and probably before, PRO E101/417/7 f 93

157 *LP* i, 724; 739

158 *LP* i, 793; 819; PRO E101/417/7, f 128; *LP* i, 809

159 PRO E36/1, f 39; *LP* i, 804 (35); 832; *CSPV*, ii, 116

160 LLoyd, *State Worthies*, p 156

161 Hall, p 525

162 The ships seem to have been the *Barbara* and *Mary Berking* owned by John Iseham and George Hayward, PRO E36/1 f 34, (3 entries) 35, *LP* ii, p 1451; *GC*, p 377; Hall, p 525. A third may also have been involved, *CSPV* ii, 119; Since it was clearly a spur of the moment decision it is possible that Henry acted without consulting his council.

163 Hall, p 525; Stow, p 489; PRO E101/55/30, *LP* i, 855

164 Hall, p 525; William Hattecliff supplied them, Lord Howard, John Hopton and Mr Mewtis being often there too, PRO E101/417/7, ff 20, 21, 22, 23, 45; *LP* i, 817, 833 (65); Their return was not agreed until December.

165 PRO E101/417/7, f 127; *LP* i, 804 (34), 817; 833 (65), 857 (19), 969 (7)

166 H.M. and P.S. Allen eds., *Fox*, p 54; *LP* i, 804 (29), 827, 833 (50, 58), 837, 924 (22); *CSPV* ii 119

167 PRO E36/1 ff 34, 35, 50, 59, 61, 62, 63, 68, 70; *TV* ii, p 534; H.M. and P.S. Allen eds., *Fox*, p 54; *LP* i, 998

168 H.M. and P.S. Allen eds., op. cit., p 54

169 Ibid.

170 *LP* i, 793; 965

171 Mattingly, op. cit., pp 116, 119; Vergil, p 162; *CSPV* ii, 70, 74, 117; *CSPS* ii, 57, 59; *LP* i, 969 (29), 939 (40)

172 *LP* i, 942

173 *LP* i, 1103, ii, p 1455

174 He retained her lands by courtesy, PRO C54/379 m 18d, indicating the birth of another child, which did not survive, after the contract of 1510. She was buried at Thetford Priory, where John Howard, first duke, the Bigods and Mowbrays lay, *VCH* Norfolk, ii, p 368.

175 *LP* i, 82; She was to continue so for another 14 years, BL Titus B i, f 383a

176 BL Titus B i, f 383 a, b, c; *LP* xi, 143, 976

177 SR iii, p 35, *LP* i, 1046; BL Titus B i, p 94

178 PRO E101/417/7, f 33 Loans to other family members were probably for the same purpose, ibid, f 71

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CHAPTER III

THE FIRST WAR WITH FRANCE AND SCOTLAND

In this chapter the part played by the Howards in Henry's first war with France will be assessed to establish how important it was, though only Lord Thomas's campaigns will be examined in any detail. The first part deals with the campaigns of 1512, beginning with the naval campaign of Sir Edward Howard, proceeding to the abortive Scottish campaign of his father, and lastly examining the Guienne campaign in which Lord Thomas played such a major part. In the second part, the Howard campaigns of 1513 will be examined, beginning with the naval campaign and going on to the northern campaign. In the third section the naval campaign of late 1513 and the first half of 1514 will be discussed, and conclusions drawn concerning Lord Thomas's performance in war, though the political consequences of the war for his family will be dealt with at the beginning of the next chapter.

1. The Campaigns of 1512

The Naval Campaign

Due to his expertise, Sir Edward Howard had probably been involved in naval matters from the earliest days of the reign, but from his return with Lord Thomas in July 1511 after their engagement with Andrew Barton, his continuous activity with the king's ships is well documented, thus his appointment, on 7 April 1512, as admiral of the fleet which was to be at sea by March, according to the treaty with Ferdinand of Aragon of November 1511, was a foregone conclusion. His absence from Christmas and New Year revels, the tournament celebrating the birth of the prince in January and funeral soon after, is probably explained by his naval responsibilities, which may have taken him to the Low Countries to recruit gunners and hoys as transports, but certainly involved him in getting a squadron to sea for patrolling duties as early as February.
The contemporary view of war as a profitable enterprise is neatly illustrated by the indenture by which Sir Edward agreed to serve the king with three-thousand troops, besides mariners and gunners. Henry was to have half of all the prizes taken, the ransom of all prisoners of the rank of captain and above, one ship of two-hundred tons if any such were taken, and the ordnance and equipment aboard all prizes, everything else going to the admiral for distribution as he saw fit. Edward's responsibilities were to clear the seas between the Thames and the Trade (Brest) of all enemy vessels, a separate squadron operating further north and Ferdinand having responsibility further south, the purpose being to secure control of the Channel and North Sea, to make safe the transportation of the army and interrupt communications between France and Scotland.

The nature of the terms under which he served makes it unsurprising that the fleet was largely commanded by Edward's associates. The squadron which put to sea in February was led by Edward Echyngham, an Ipswich associate of the Howards. The captain of the admiral's flag-ship the Mary Rose, was his cousin Thomas Wyndham, soon to be treasurer then vice-admiral, while many other East Anglians also served. Some were men he knew from his own seagoing days like John Iseham and William Sabyn, an Ipswich merchant and shipowner, others spears and knights and squires of the body, several, like the Howards, associated with the queen. Amongst the men who did not serve themselves but contributed retinues the East Anglian bias is still clearer, Oxford and Fitzwalter sending men, though the harmony prevailing in East Anglia at the time and resultant blurring around the edges of the affinities of the local nobility ensured that the gentry involved were not simply Howard followers. Edward himself served with the largest retinue of 220 men, probably drawn from his wife's lands.

The fleet put to sea in about mid April and immediately began to take French and Breton prizes. Louis XII was unprepared due to a belief that Henry would probably not go to war since, though it was well known that his young companions urged him on, his older councillors were known to advise against
war. In mid May, having had things very much his own way, Edward returned to Portsmouth to replenish his victuals and then escort the army to Guienne. The army did not sail from Southampton until 3 June, but escort duty performed, Edward fell to pillaging and burning the harbours and towns of the Breton coast, thus asserting Henry's dominance of the Channel. Though he met with little resistance his force was not so large that he could conduct raids far inland, or afford to leave detachments garrisoning fortresses, not even when he took the town of Brest and the local gentry offered to surrender the castle dominating the port if he would stop his attacks and garrison it. In late July the fleet put in to Portsmouth again for revictualling and remanning in order to prepare to meet the French fleet which was at last gathering at Brest.

At this juncture Henry appointed others of his intimates, Knyvet, Brandon and Henry Guildford among others, as captains of the choicest vessels, holding a banquet before their departure at which they swore brotherhood in arms, putting to sea on 9 August. A fierce engagement between the two fleets took place almost immediately off Brest, beginning with the firing of heavy ordnance and followed by fighting at close quarters. Knyvet and Carew in the Sovereign, coming to the assistance of Brandon, tried to board the French flagship the Cordelière, when the latter's magazine caught fire and, since they were grappled together, both ships were rapidly consumed in flames with the loss of most aboard them. Thus, though the French fleet was scattered, the English were deeply demoralised, and Sir Edward called a council of his captains to raise morale. This he may have done by a public undertaking not to look Henry in the face until he had avenged the death of his brother-in-law and close friend. In fact the news of Knyvet's death was thought sufficiently demoralising for Henry and Wolsey to decide to keep it secret lest it dampen enthusiasm for the war.

Since Edward had been largely unopposed and taken many prizes, Henry regarded the year's naval campaign as a success, and the admiral's reputation
was enhanced by it. Two important developments had taken place. In his absence at sea the admiral had found Wolsey, until 1512 a junior councillor, the man on whom he could rely to handle the demanding organisational task of supplying wages and victuals, thus a close co-operation developed between them.\textsuperscript{21} Moreover, since Edward found that the letters he directed to Henry tended to go unanswered, he also came to rely on Wolsey as his line of communication with the king. Wolsey, who had struggled long and hard for advancement, was not the man to fail to see the potential of a position which gave him continuous access to Henry on business which was closest to his heart and enabled the minister to demonstrate his organisational capacities, and he was soon able to put Howard in his debt by obtaining for him, on 15 August, the reversion of Oxford's post of Lord Admiral.\textsuperscript{22} Edward's response suggests that he was grateful to Wolsey, but nonetheless continued to regard his own relationship with Henry as paramount.\textsuperscript{23}

The loss of Knyvet was a considerable political as well as personal blow to the Howard family, for with Edward at sea, Thomas and Edmund in Guienne, Boleyn in the Low Countries and Surrey and Berners soon in the north, Henry turned increasingly to Brandon and the Guildfords for companionship, with demonstrable results in terms of an increase in grants to them and a fall off in grants to the Howards and their clients.\textsuperscript{24} Moreover, it was probably not unconnected with a further tragedy. Knyvet's wife Muriel was pregnant, and once the child was delivered it became clear that she would not recover. Her place in the queen's household and affections had clearly paralleled his own in Henry's, and they had named one of their sons Ferdinand after Katherine's father. Thus when Muriel made her will on 13 October at Lambeth, with her father and two eldest brothers at witnesses, she made her father its supervisor but left her wedding ring and her three sons and two daughters to the king.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{The Northern Campaign, 1512}

In July, when the Scottish invasion, which Surrey and Fox had always feared, looked imminent, Surrey was appointed to lead the third force to be
constituted, and commissions of array for the northern counties, which would supply the bulk of his force, were issued to him at the end of the month, and banners on 1 August. His own retinue of five hundred men included a body of archers drawn from his Sussex estates, while his staff were his step-son Berners, as marshal of the force, John Millet, his appointee to a tellership in the exchequer in 1509, as comptroller, and Edward Benstead, a Hertfordshire associate, as treasurer. In the event they went north to Pontefract, waited for a month, and since all was quiet returned to London without ever having to raise the army. Had they not appeared to be prepared James might well have invaded, and though the exercise was frustrating, not least from the point of view of cost, it confirmed the wisdom of hanging back until James had committed himself.

The Guienne Campaign, 1512

The other appointments in 1512, for the force for southern France, were officially made only in May 1512, perhaps because Henry intended to go to war in Normandy himself. Lord Thomas's relative, Dorset, was then appointed its commander, though Howard was later granted the reversion, his rank probably being considered too low to represent Henry in co-operating with Ferdinand. He clearly played an organisational role, for East Anglians, including companies from Norwich, Ipswich and Colchester, were recruited and, though the force was drawn from areas as far afield as Yorkshire and Cornwall, more of its contingents naturally looked to him for leadership than to Dorset. Amongst the four other noblemen serving, two, Lord Willoughby d'Eresby, (master of the ordnance) and Walter Devereux, Lord Ferrers, had Howard connexions, while amongst the noblemen who contributed retinues, most were associates of the Howards. Many knights and gentlemen from Norfolk and Suffolk again sent contingents or served themselves, while the responsibility given to Howard connexions outside the region like Sir William Sandys (treasurer), Sir Maurice Berkeley (marshal), and the service of others, such as Sir Edward Neville and Sir John Hussey, reinforce the impression of Howard patronage. The force
finally numbered about seven-thousand men, some five-hundred more than Henry was required to send by treaty.  

Lord Thomas served with a retinue of about four-hundred men, drawn from his father's, his first wife's, and his father-in-law Buckingham's estates, the largest contingent from the east Suffolk/Norfolk border and the city of Norwich, though there was a small Sussex contingent, and one from Yorkshire, probably from Anne's lands on North Humberside. The Stafford contingent was raised in Wales and was led by Howard's cousin William Gorges, a Somerset associate of the duke; Gorges, Edmund Howard, Anthony Knyvet, William Rous and Nicholas Appleyard were Howard's lieutenants.

Howard was commissioned to hold musters with others at Southampton from 2 May, but the departure of the force being delayed, he rode back with the king to Greenwich on 31 May to take part with Essex, Knyvett, Brandon, and Edward Neville in the splendid jousts held on 1 June, at which Henry consoled himself for not campaigning by carrying off the prize. On 3 June his magnificently arrayed force, largely shipped in Flemish and Spanish vessels, sailed under Henry's approving eye from Southampton, landing at La Passage, a little south of the agreed spot, and on 9 June it took the field near Rentaria.

The officers were disconcerted to find neither the Spanish force of two-thousand cavalry and four-thousand foot, nor carts and draught-animals which the Spanish were contracted to provide, nor any provision of victuals, though two Spanish noblemen arrived within three days to greet them and confirm that Ferdinand was far from ready. The English army then removed to a more suitable site a mile from the town of Fuenterrabia to wait, though heavy rain made this unpleasant. The council of war, mindful of Darcy's experience of Ferdinand in the previous year, arranged with the king of Navarre, on whose borders the force lay, that his subjects victual the army despite his official neutrality. These negotiations deeply displeased Ferdinand, who was preparing to annexe Navarre for his own strategic reasons, and thought her king responsible for Dorset's mistrust of himself.
The council further decided that in order to be able to move without waiting for Ferdinand's co-operation, beasts and carts to transport the army's gear and artillery should be acquired. John Stile, long since English ambassador at Ferdinand's court, but now assisting the army, succeeded in purchasing 200 mules and asses from the local people, albeit at inflated prices, but when they were put to the test they could by no means be induced to draw heavy carts for their new owners. Despite this setback discipline was good, regular drills were carried out, and some of the troops were occasionally occupied in repulsing exploratory assaults by the garrison of nearby Bayonne. Food was expensive, however, and when very hot weather followed the rain, the drinking of large quantities of local wine in place of beer led to an outbreak of dysentery.

On 8 July the only surviving letter of several Lord Howard had sent to his father was written, his purpose clearly being to provide evidence against Ferdinand and to warn Surrey (and Fox, Warham and Wolsey, to whom it was to be shown) that the army's dependence upon Spain was likely to be disastrous. The anger of the officers towards Ferdinand, born of the growing realisation of their impotence to undertake anything without him, found eloquent expression here. Since Howard belonged to the young set about Henry who had obviously favoured Anglo/Spanish military cooperation, there would appear to be some irony in his criticism of the king and council for trusting Ferdinand to the extent of relying on him for cavalry and transport. Above all he felt that the seriousness of the situation was not being acknowledged at home, and spoke not only for the officers one would expect him to be close to, Lords Ferrers, Willoughby and Broke, but apparently for the majority, in expressing some exasperation with Dorset, perhaps for his failure to inform Henry plainly of the facts and ask for clear instructions. He was deeply pessimistic about the prospects of holding the army together if it was idle for much longer, especially if a fatal epidemic which had recently broken out in the nearby Spanish towns, were to spread to the men.
After the first month of waiting, Stile, Dr John Knight and Sandys were sent to Ferdinand to ask for an explanation for the continuing delay, to extract an undertaking that he would arrive by a fixed date, and to ascertain his plans. Ferdinand's reply confirmed their worst fears. He turned down their proposal to besiege Bayonne and use it as a base for the conquest of Guienne, insisting instead that the conquest be carried out from Navarre, the joint force first securing the trans-Pyrenean route through Pamplona to Bearn and Dax. Dorset was now in a terrible dilemma. He had been instructed to cooperate with Ferdinand, but clearly perceived his intention of using the English to pursue his own territorial ambitions and doubted that he had any intention of attacking Guienne, since whatever was taken there would, under the treaty, fall to Henry. He therefore replied that Ferdinand's plan ran contrary to both his instructions and the treaty and would have to be referred home. As messages passed to and fro, mutual distrust deepened, and after a vague promise by Ferdinand on 19 July that Alva would join up with the English force, silence fell.

Towards the end of July worsening conditions and morale resulted in a serious incident in the camp when rumours began to circulate among Lord Willoughby's men that captains were being paid 8d per day for each man but passing on only 6d, a real issue since food was becoming more scarce and expensive. When Willoughby's officers arrested the ringleaders the situation became inflammable, and the council reached a decision that an example must be made of the prime agitators lest the whole army become unmanageable. Orders were given for those responsible to be handed over to Sir William Kingston, the provost marshal, and at least one was hanged with the result that order was restored by the beginning of August.

At about this time a letter arrived from Alva reporting that he had entered Navarrese territory on 23 July and taken Pamplona, the capital, on 25 July. He promised to link up with the English force once Navarre was secure but offered no hint as to how long this might take. Ferdinand wrote to Dorset at
greater length, congratulating the English on the Spanish success since their presence had been "quite providential", the French not daring to intervene in Navarre for fear of laying Guienne open to them. He excused his long silence by saying that Alva had been instructed to communicate with the English, and hoped that the forces might join up soon to advance on Bearn, but again failed to specify when or where.60

Dorset and his council were shaken, and after discussions two bold letters were written to Henry and the privy council on 5 August by the two liaison officers, Stile and Knight. Stile, who had not hesitated to tell Ferdinand that he failed to inspire trust in himself and the English officers, now sought to apprise his sovereign of their view of his father-in-law.61 He pointed out how the Pope and Emperor had made progress in Italy due to the English distraction of the French, while Ferdinand had done well in Naples and Sicily let alone in Navarre, thus, "Hyt is evydently seyn and knowen that by hys polocy and longe dryftys he attaynethe many thynges to other mens paynees."62 He therefore strongly advised that the English force advance alone, a policy he was making feasible by having obtained seventy-five carriages for guns and one-hundred oxen to draw them, and materials for the repair of field guns, while he was in the process of obtaining brimstone and saltpetre for gunpowder and having stone round shot and small pellet shot made from copper and iron.63 He had also arranged with the Bishop of Sigüenza for the hire of carts and carriages when the army was ready to move.64

Knight, who was close to Wolsey, was clearly out of sympathy with the officers, deeply depressed, and wanted to be recalled.65 He had attracted considerable odium for defending Wolsey when officers, including Sandys, had blamed him for their situation, and, worse still, for counselling patience with Ferdinand, clearly Wolsey's line, though one which was manifestly becoming unrealistic as parts of the force were declaring that they would go home at Michaelmas even if they should die for it.66 Knight was critical of the captains over the state of the army, maintaining that the men were in poor
condition, drills were forgotten and they were not even forced to muster properly to receive their pay.

During August opinion among the officers appears to have polarised as Ferdinand urged that they should join him in Navarre for a direct attack on Guienne, since the season was by then too far advanced for a siege of Bayonne. Despite the distrust of Ferdinand shared by the whole council of war, Lord Howard recommended compliance, as Ferdinand later learned from Spaniards who had been stationed with the English command. Perhaps Howard felt that there was more chance of influencing policy once the armies were joined: perhaps he thought the season too far advanced for a siege. We know that he had never believed in the feasibility of an English campaign in Guienne without the Spanish, especially when the element of surprise was lost and French troops returned from Italy. However, Dorset was immovable and would do nothing but send home for new instructions.

It is strange that despite the messengers sent to England from the force and from Ferdinand, no clear instructions were sent to Dorset until very late in the day. No doubt Henry was slow to distrust his father-in-law, and he may also have been unwilling to compromise his honour by sanctioning an attack on the neutral king of Navarre unless he were openly hostile. He and Wolsey may have considered that if Dorset and his officers held out for a siege of Bayonne, which they appeared likely to do unless instructed otherwise, Ferdinand would at last be forced to give in. When he in fact acted unilaterally against Navarre Henry appears to have supported him at first, but was soon voicing disappointment. On 3 September, knowing that Dorset had sent home, Ferdinand went onto the offensive, writing to Henry to complain about the marquis and win his son-in-law over to the new plan. Henry was slow to react, perhaps because the siege of Bayonne was his idea and he was unwilling to relinquish it. Though instructions were finally sent for the force to remain and cooperate with Ferdinand, they arrived only in late September or early October.
The council was thus left to its own devices, and Dorset veered between opposing views influenced, Ferdinand thought, by Jean of Navarre's proposal that he marry his daughter. As early as 28 August it had been agreed that Knight should go home to prepare the way for the return of the force. Then, on 7 September, Dorset wrote to Ferdinand for carts, beasts and guides, promising to join Alva by 13th, but two days before that he suddenly informed the Bishop of Sigüenza that the English army would not remain more than 25 days whatever its success, and would then go home, through France if the Spanish would not provide shipping. In late September or early October, but in which order we do not know, the weather deteriorated sharply, Dorset's health collapsed so that Howard took command, and Windsor Herald arrived with instructions for the army to stay, Ferdinand having continued to press for it to join him at St. Jean Pie de Port. When the council assembled to make a final agonised decision Knight again argued in favour of staying, raising the spectre of Henry's wrath, but he found little support among the officers. Only Howard declared that he was willing to remain and fight through the winter if others would stay with him "and gladlier he wolde dye for the honour of his master, the realme and himself than, contrarie to the kinges commaundement, with rebuke and shame, returne into Inglond." News of what was being said was leaked to Lord Broke's men, in whose camp the meeting was being held, and uproar ensued, Knight, Howard and those who had supported them going in fear of a lynching.

Ferdinand had proposed that the English break camp and be billeted in the towns and villages for the winter, and Hall suggests that this had taken place by this time, but the fact that there had been serious violence between English soldiers and Spanish villagers already, and that officers and men alike fiercely resented the Spaniards, surely rendered such a scheme unworkable. Thus Howard, though in command, was nonetheless forced to accept the inevitable, and so fell to organising the smooth and rapid shipping of the army without Ferdinand's help. Spanish ships were retained at Bilbao at English expense by Guyot de Heulle, captain of the Germans, supplies of water and wine
were obtained with the help of English merchants, and the voyage passed off without incident, the last of the force disembarking on about 4 November. The common impression that the army had been decimated by disease and desertion, so that very little of it dragged itself back, may have been founded on allegations of incompetence by Ferdinand and Knight, but is incorrect. The sums paid in wages did not decline until the end of August, and at the end of September they had recovered almost to their original level as a result of William Fitzwilliam's commission to recapture deserters. Only after 19 October was there a serious decline in the numbers receiving wages, due to the fact that part of the force had been shipped by then, while the payments of conduct money home from Southampton further demonstrate that large numbers of men had returned. Lord Howard returned with three-hundred men from a retinue which numbered four-hundred at most at the outset. Though many of the men were sick, and this more than any other factor probably forced the army's return on its officers, the latter had evidently never been seriously negligent, despite the demoralising circumstances.

This consideration was of no interest to Henry, who had nothing to show for heavy expenditure and had undoubtedly lost face in Europe. On 19 November a dramatic scene took place at Greenwich when all the officers but the absent Dorset knelt in humiliation to answer charges of grave misconduct before a furious king, the Spanish ambassadors and Ferdinand's special envoy, who had arrived simultaneously with the army bearing Ferdinand's version of events. This was based on a carefully planned strategy to discredit Dorset in particular, based on the correspondence between the two sides, and was apparently so successful even in the council meeting with noblemen like Buckingham present, that the officers made no mention of the Ferdinand's part in the disaster. Instead they attributed their return to a lack of victuals, mutiny by the men and Dorset's indecision. Though Henry raged, Katherine, whose father appreciated that a blood-letting would be counter-productive, intervened movingly to plead for her friends, and in response to this call upon his mercy
the king finally relented.°°

This scene was probably a device designed to salvage both the
noble/courtier war party, with Henry and Katherine at its head, and the
alliance with Spain, so crucial to the feasibility of its policy. It is
impossible to be sure who was behind it, but the fact that Wolsey had forwarded
the war by organising both campaigns as a result of the lack of enthusiasm of
his seniors, and knew that he had therefore been blamed by most of the officers
when things went wrong in Spain,°° makes it likely that it was his handiwork,
designed, not least, to rescue his own position as Henry's right-hand man. He
maintained to the end that the unlicensed return of the force was every bit as
bad as Ferdinand's behavior, a position which appears to have been not far from
Lord Thomas's.°° The latter's part in all this is obscure, though it is
noteworthy that he stood well with Ferdinand, who blamed Dorset for his
inflexibility over Bayonne but exonerated Howard. It may be significant in this
context that, while in 1512 Howard had addressed his letter intended as
evidence against Ferdinand to his father to be shown to Warham, Fox and Wolsey,
in 1513 he wrote mainly to Wolsey for practical and political support when on
active service.°°°

There can be no doubt that Howard felt keenly that his military
reputation had suffered as a result of the campaign, but it was not in this
respect alone that he and his fellows were disadvantaged. Unlike his brother
Edward he had not been able to recoup his outlay from the profits of war, thus
his hopes of repaying the first half of his two-thousand mark debt to the king
in March 1513 were dashed. As a result he decided that rather than hand over
the whole of Anne's inheritance until his debt was paid off, as had been agreed
in the terms for the loan, he would surrender the three manors he had been
granted outright in 1510 at the time of her settlement.°°°° This must have been a
painful decision, but the deal was undoubtedly advantageous to Howard and
strongly suggests that he could still rely on Henry's personal favour.

This probably resulted from the fact that, as the surviving evidence
concerning his part in the campaign strongly suggests, his own role had been above criticism, so that Ferdinand, and probably Henry too, believed that he would have made a better commander than Dorset. The latter appears to have been a strange choice, in that he clearly never trusted Ferdinand sufficiently to be able to work with him, and reacted to admittedly very difficult circumstances by retreating into inactivity, becoming increasingly vacillating and incapable of providing positive leadership, yet rejecting the advice of those of his council of officers who did see matters more clearly. Howard, as his letter demonstrates, was more than wary of Ferdinand, but appreciated the overriding need for action if the morale of officers and men alike was to be maintained. No doubt Ferdinand would have gained more than Henry by joint action, an unavoidable result of the flaws in the original arrangement, but Henry's military reputation would not have suffered so badly had Howard acquired the leadership sooner. He evidently had greater support among the officers, due to the composition of the force; his declaration that he would stay if enough others stayed with him suggests that he had support, and even when parts of the force were in a virtual state of mutiny, he was fully in command of his own retinue. His succession to the command came too late for him to be able to persuade a substantial portion of the officers to stay, but the fact that he accepted this, despite his disappointment, and nonetheless dedicated himself to organising the return of the force without loss suggests both considerable maturity of judgement and organisational capacity.

The Campaigns of 1513

The scene just described could not prevent the debate over the war being reopened, with Warham strongly opposed to its continuance. With the commanders of his army united behind him again, however, Henry was able to win the debate in another great council and in a parliament called for purposes of supply, and to use the fiasco in Guienne to secure overwhelming support for his own leadership of a force to France, albeit for a campaign in the north based on some degree of help from the Emperor, in short the campaign which Surrey had
probably always favoured. However, the mission of Boleyn, Young and Wingfield to Margaret's court was not finally crowned with success until 5 April 1513 when the Emperor and Charles finally entered the Holy League.

The Naval Campaign, 1513

Edward Howard was again appointed to command the fleet on 16 March, succeeding Oxford as Lord Admiral three days later as a result of the earl's death. In 1512 he had had a great advantage over the enemy in that the latter was very late in getting to sea, but in 1513 this was not to be repeated, for the French had been busily preparing. In the autumn of 1512, a squadron of galleys had been sent from the Mediterranean under the command of Prégent de Bidoux and later there was a change in the command of the northern fleet, admiral du Chillou replacing Clermont. The English fleet was expanded in the face of this threat, but this was to prove a mixed blessing, for it placed an additional strain on the already overstretched victualling system. In mid March Edward sailed from the Thames with forty-eight vessels, leaving Plymouth on 10 April for the French coast before he was adequately victualled, thus he narrowly prevented a surprise French attack on the English coast coming to fruition, but his soldiers were immediately on rations of a single meal and a single drink per day.

He caught the assembled French fleet at Brest (Prégent and his galleys being at St Malo taking on fresh water) and set about trying to engage it in battle. He attempted a frontal attack on the French ships from the sea, but Arthur Plantagenet's command, probably the Nicholas of Hampton, struck a rock and sank, demonstrating the high risks of entering the unknown and treacherous harbour without a pilot and under the fire of shore batteries. Having trapped the enemy, but under pressure since his victuallers did not appear, Howard may have sent a message to Henry inviting him to take command, but certainly suggested that the French fleet cowered in fear at Brest and might be decisively destroyed. Whatever Henry's reaction, the council sent a peremptory command to the admiral to get on and do his duty, which must have
cut deep.\textsuperscript{105}

On 22 April the situation deteriorated when the six galleys and four tenders under Prégent attempted to join the French fleet at Brest, and, manoeuvring effortlessly among the becalmed English ships, did enormous damage with their low-mounted Venetian basilisks, sinking William Compton's ship and holing one of the kings 'new barks' in seven places.\textsuperscript{106} One of the French tenders was taken, but the rest made the shallows of Blancs Sablons Bay near Le Conquet, where they moored among rocks and mounted their ordnance on bulwarks at either side, creating a narrow channel as the only means of approach.\textsuperscript{107} The English were shaken, Howard was convinced that the galleys must be eliminated prior to an attack on the remainder of the fleet, and the council agreed on a simultaneous land and sea assault.\textsuperscript{108} On 24th he detailed six-thousand men to land between the bay and Le Conquet to attack the galleys from the rear, while Ferrers led a seaborne attack. However, he called this off when Sabyn arrived with new instructions from Henry and Wolsey for an attack on the fleet at Brest, because the number of men required for the landing party involved effectively lifting the blockade of Brest temporarily.\textsuperscript{109}

Against the advice of Sabyn and others of his council, but following that of a Spanish captain called Charrán, Howard decided to lead a seaborne attack on the galleys which would require far fewer men, being launched from the five sizeable craft with shallow draft, and the ships' boats.\textsuperscript{110} Thus on 25 April he took command of a rowbarge, probably the Swallow, with Lord Ferrers in her sister-craft, the Sweepstake, and the crayers (small trading vessels) jointly commanded by Cheyne and Wallop and Sherbourne and Sidney, and a small rowbarge.\textsuperscript{111} Edward made straight for Prégent's much larger galley, boarded with Charrán and sixteen others, but, as a result of the disaster which had caused Knyvet's death, the two craft were not securely fastened and the rowbarge drifted away. When Howard and his men were driven back at pike point they had no line of retreat, were forced overboard and drowned, the admiral having deliberately removed his whistle of office so as not to be
recognised. The English vessels attacked in sequence, but could make little impression and suffered heavy losses inflicted by the guns on the rocks. When they withdrew to regroup in the bay their loss was discovered. Cheyne, Cornwall and Wallop then approached the French admiral and Prêgent under flag of truce, and learned that Edward had drowned. Ferrers was chosen to replace him, but the decision was made to return home, for victuals were very short, men were dying of the measles and other disease, and were unruly and demoralised. The fleet reached Plymouth on 30 April.

Henry, who received many tributes to Edward including a double edged one from James IV, was furious at his loss and this second unauthorised withdrawal of his forces when the shipment of his horses and armaments to France was already well advanced and the van of his force was due to sail on 15 May. Thus he immediately appointed Lord Thomas commander of the fleet and Lord Admiral, officially on 4 May, instructing him to avenge both his brother's death and his master's honour by taking the fleet back to Brest at once, and destroying the French fleet where it lay. Howard reached Plymouth on 7 May and found the fleet in no condition to sail, but promised, optimistically, to be at sea in a few days' time unless countermanded by Henry. In the meantime, however, he sought to change the plan. The captains and masters had convinced him that if the wind dropped or swung to the south-west while the fleet lay near Brest it would be totally at the mercy of the French. He therefore urged Henry that only if he carried a large party of men who could be landed for five to six days to attack from the rear, while the ships remained at full fighting strength, was an attack feasible. If Henry was not willing to give him the extra men he proposed to return to Brest in case something could be attempted without major risk, otherwise he would continue along the coast of Brittany raiding as his brother had done before, confident that if the French fleet emerged he could intercept it before it reached the west coast.

Henry's prompt response was to delay Howard's departure so as to give him 4,460 extra men from those who were soon to gather at Plymouth and Dover for
shipment to France, who, with 3,760 soldiers from the fleet, were to make up the landing party commanded by Charles Brandon, about to become viscount Lisle, another natural choice for the avenging of Sir Edward, given their close friendship. This left the fleet with about 4,000 men for the attack. The admiral was greatly relieved that his advice had been taken so well, as was his further proposal that the force assemble at Southampton, but the instructions issued to himself and Lisle, the handiwork of Wolsey and the council, so hedged them about with clauses demanding that they safeguard themselves, the fleet and the men that they must have felt severely constrained. The date agreed upon for boarding was 18 May and Howard set about gathering information about the harbour of Brest, which his officers knew well by now, and planning the strategy of his attack in detail. By 18 May he was concerned that the delay would result in the French leaving Brest. Two days later he heard that the French fleet had indeed begun to disperse, but though he questioned whether the expense of the enterprise had become greater than any benefits which might result, Henry insisted on the Brest attack.

Howard and the fleet finally reached Southampton at the end of May, where he had a harrowing interview with the king, declaring that he could not take responsibility for the result, given the great danger inherent in the enterprise, but the king was unmoved and urged him to take the risk. To make matters worse Lisle sued for, and won, release from the enterprise in Brittany and appointment as marshal and second in command of Henry's army in France, thus the project was made still more dangerous by the loss of the landing force. The king had hardly set out for London before Fox and Lisle countermanded his order to enter Brest harbour until they had spoken further with the king. Fox, who had written earlier to Wolsey that he thought a landing force of less than ten-thousand men too small and the four-thousand left aboard the fleet likewise too few, had clearly had his earlier doubts about the project reinforced. Howard faced a bitter dilemma, caught between Henry's commandment to undertake a venture which he and his naval advisers
believed could result in the destruction of the fleet, for which he would certainly be held responsible whatever Henry might have said, and Fox and Lisle's veto which blocked his only route to acceptable service, and that when Lisle had just deserted him to embrace a safer route to a reputation. 1.32

His response was to write an agonised letter asking for advice, and hinting at a favour, from the one man he felt could help: Wolsey. 1.33 The almoner had supported his brother, been his link with the king and his mainstay against the criticisms of councillors and courtiers alike. 1.34 Lord Thomas had had a heart to heart with Wolsey on his appointment, and was now uncompromising in declaring himself Wolsey's protégé, and Wolsey's alone. 1.25 Clearly, stepping into his brother's shoes was difficult, for he was aware that Edward had been criticised, both that year and the one before, for spending the king's money without winning a major battle, and knew that he was unlikely to do better, having less experience, while the French were certain to avoid battle unless joined by Scottish and Danish squadrons. With a veiled reference to Lisle, Howard hinted that he too would heartily welcome the chance to serve where he could achieve something. 1.46

He was given permission to dismiss some of the hired craft as he had suggested, to save money, but the raid on Brest was endorsed by the council. 1.37 He was told in no uncertain terms that he would be held responsible for any damage sustained by the navy, but he rejoined firmly that he would do his best but, "without some adventure none exploit off war wolbe acheved." 1.38 The revictualling of the fleet, delayed by contrary winds which confined it at Plymouth until mid June, resulted in a decision that, since Henry was then almost ready to cross to France, the raid should be timed to distract attention from his landing at Calais. Thus on 30 June a squadron escorted the king to Calais and on 1 July Howard and the main fleet landed a party in Blancs Sablons Bay just south of Brest, burning the town and properties in the immediate vicinity. 1.39 A storm in the Channel then scattered the fleet and necessitated repairs, but English naval activity was sufficient to force the fleet from
Scotland and Denmark, which left Leith on about 26 July, to take the long route round Ireland to France, delaying its arrival until September, two large vessels which had taken the direct route having been captured by the English.140

The naval campaign up to the point of Henry's departure lacked any such signal success as Edward had promised, such as the raid on Brest to destroy the French fleet and put that crucial port out of action for some time.141 Though, as Lord Thomas had suspected, his reputation was not enhanced by naval service, the considerable correspondence and other documentation concerning the campaign which survives suggests that, despite a painful initiation, Howard was establishing himself as a worthy successor to his brother. His handling of his captains, masters and men who, he declared on arrival with the fleet, were as willing to go to Purgatory as back to Brest to face the galleys, was exemplary.142 He took firm measures to deal with indiscipline and desertion, (including the rounding up of deserters, erection of a threatening pair of gallows at the quayside and obtaining instructions to shore authorities and captains alike to back his measures) while he begged Wolsey to see that no captain got license to accompany Henry to France lest it start a deluge.143 However, he also reversed the counter-productive effect of Henry's heavy censures expressed in his letter to the captains after the action with the galleys, by obtaining, through Wolsey, another expressing the king's gratitude, which greatly increased their will to serve.144 He further won the trust of captains and masters, which Edward had lost, by listening to them and making recommendations based on their experience, and being chary of exposing his men or his fleet to unjustifiable risk.145

Such problems Howard solved quickly, but he continued to be harrassed by the unwillingness of the impressed Spaniards to serve, especially once they heard of the Franco/Spanish truce,146 and above all the twin problems of victualling the fleet and contrary winds. The victualling, carried out from London, Portsmouth and to a lesser extent Plymouth, was technically less
directly his responsibility than it had initially been his brother's: it lay mainly in the hands of John Dawtrey and Richard Falshid in Southampton and William Pawne and George Lawson in London, with Fox and Wolsey as co-ordinators. In practice Howard took a very lively interest in the subject, appointing his own man to distribute the victuals among the fleet, and, since his brother's 1513 campaign had been confounded by putting to sea in the first place with inadequate supplies, he fought hard to be victualled for six weeks or a month before leaving and found he had Fox's support. Though the quality of beef and biscuit caused no further problems, he was often critical of the quality of the beer, which he tested regularly because it was crucial to the mood of his men, and he was anxious to see that the king was not cheated. It was the fact that it took so long to bring the fleet from Plymouth to Portsmouth before serious revictualling could even begin that confounded the full-scale raid on Brest, and this was due to the unsuitability of the prevailing winds. Howard was so embarrassed by this problem that he was reduced to writing that "agaynst the wynd I can not make shippes sayle", but here again Fox's letters supported his explanations.

Soon after his appointment he had expressed an eagerness to meet Fox at Southampton, to learn all he could teach him about naval affairs, and his letters support his assertion that he was devoting every spare moment to learning the tools of his new trade. His eagerness to learn, a willingness to supervise and where necessary become involved in the details of all aspects of his command, combined with a practical turn of mind which enabled him to find new solutions to vexing problems are all impressive, but perhaps the overwhelming impression is of his willingness to work long hours on administrative as well as practical matters, yet keep up an almost daily correspondence with Wolsey, Henry and the council, often in his own hand. If Henry harboured suspicions that Thomas lacked Edward's heroic qualities because of his failure to take the fleet back to Brest, there can be little doubt that he soon impressed Fox and other councillors as a suitable admiral.
The Northern Campaign, 1513*

The appointment of Surrey rather than Shrewsbury as defender of the realm against the Scots in the absence of the king, was natural enough considering Surrey's knowledge and leadership of the northern nobility and gentry in two campaigns in the 1490s against Scotland, his personal familiarity with James IV as a result of his 1503 embassy, and his recent insistence on the dangers of the Scottish threat.¹⁵⁴ Though Howard proximity to the queen, the regent in Henry's absence, put a chivalrous gloss upon what he later characterised as an appointment of great trust and honour,¹⁶⁵ at the time he probably felt disadvantaged at not accompanying the king, most of his nobility, many East Anglians, Fox and Wolsey (but not Warham, Ruthal or Lovell) to France in a campaign bound to bring honour and profit.¹⁵⁶ He had, after all, just served in the north, and must have hoped to reinforce his special relationship with the regent Margaret and her father the emperor by providing the link between them and Henry during the campaign. Instead Boleyn, who had developed good relations with Margaret in the course of his long embassy at her court, was appointed to join Henry in France and Berners, Surrey's master of the ordnance in the north in 1512, now joined Henry's force in the same capacity.¹⁶⁷ However, Lord Thomas was not released from his service at sea, as he would clearly have liked, and Edmund Howard also stayed behind.¹⁶⁸

Diplomatic efforts were made by the English to discourage James from assisting Louis XII in accordance with the Franco/Scottish treaty of March 1512.¹⁵⁹ However, mutual trust between the brothers-in-law being slight, the methods employed alternated disasterously between the carrot and the stick, Henry securing a papal interdict against Scotland to be published if James broke their treaty of 1510 to take up arms against him.¹⁶⁰ Though a Scottish fleet was being prepared, when Henry sailed for Calais on 30 June it was uncertain whether James would mount a major invasion of England.¹⁶¹ However, for James the die was cast when Henry entered French soil.¹⁶² On 11 July he sent a message to Louis that he intended to invade England during that month,
and letters summoning his host went out on 20 July. Five days later his fleet sailed for France, while his defiance calling on Henry to return was despatched to him on the next day and reached him on 11 August. In mid August his army began to assemble.

Surrey was too well informed to wait for this, being in receipt of constant reports on the preparations for war of the Scots from Sir William Bulmer, warden of the east march, Thomas Lord Dacre on the west, and Sir Ralph Evers, captain of Berwick, all of whom had spies in Scotland. On 21 July his retinue of five-hundred men mustered before Sir Thomas Lovell at Lambeth and on the following day the earl, with his servants Sir Philip Tylney as his treasurer, Sir Nicholas Appleyard, as his master of the ordnance, and his son Edmund as marshal of his army, led his men through London on the way north. On 1 August he reached Pontefract and again made it his headquarters, called a council of war, arranged for the artillery to be sent to Newcastle and set up a system of posts so that he might be rapidly informed of a Scottish attack wherever it fell and call for reinforcement speedily. He then sent letters to the nobility, gentry and towns of the seven northern shires ordering musters and requesting certificates of the numbers each recipient could have ready at twenty-four hours notice. He clearly proposed to wait until he had firm news that a Scottish army was mustering, for, as Dacre advised, it was vitally important to maintain a low profile lest James, seeing the English force in the field, delay fielding his own army until Surrey retired for lack of victuals and then fulfilled his treaty obligations the easy way by ravaging the defenceless marches.

The drawback of this policy was, of course, that English border lands and fortresses would be vulnerable to attack for some time before Surrey could come to their rescue; thus the earl made provision for Berwick, but received a confident reply from Ruthal's fortress of Norham when he made enquiries there. While at Doncaster he had already detailed Bulmer to raise two-hundred mounted archers over and above his normal retinue to patrol the border
on the east march, so as to give assistance to any of the northern fortresses should they be threatened. Early in August exactly the kind of attack he had anticipated occurred, when one of the great border lords, the Scottish chamberlain, Alexander, Lord Hume with two-thousand horse crossed into Northumberland, pillaging and burning the countryside. As he returned over the plain of Milfield on 13 August he found his path obstructed by Bulmer with one-thousand men, and in a set piece battle, for which both sides dismounted, the English won a classic victory, the Scots abandoning their booty to flee across the border.

Meanwhile, from all the regions of Scotland but the borders, contingents of James's army were converging on the Borough Muir outside Edinburgh. No firm evidence survives as to the size of James's force, but between thirty and forty-thousand men would argue well for his administration. More impressive still was the equipment and training of the men under royal auspices, for James had secured from France fifty men at arms and forty captains under a French captain, d'Aussi, who were divided up to drill each of the main Scottish divisions in the German or Swiss manner, with pikes sixteen to eighteen feet in length some of which James had bought abroad and others he had had made in Scotland. The French had also sent eight-hundred cannon balls, twenty-five thousand pounds of gunpowder, and eight light guns in the autumn of 1512, so he was able to field at least five curtalls, two culverin, four sacres and six serpentines as well as smaller weapons, all of remarkably fine, modern workmanship.

James reached the border with this formidable force on 22 August and laid siege to Norham castle. Under French guidance the Scottish artillery was used to devastating effect, the English expending their ammunition too quickly and being forced to surrender after five days, when James moved on to take the lesser forts of Chillingham, Etal and Ford. Surrey had news that James had laid siege to Norham on 25 August, the day he arrived in York, so he summoned his host to meet him at Newcastle a week later on 1 September, moving on the
next day to make way for those who were to follow. At Durham, probably on 29
August, he heard that Norham had surrendered, and to make matters worse a
terrible storm that night caused anxiety over his eldest son who was coming by
sea to assist his father. At Ruthal's cathedral at Durham the prior handed
over to Surrey the banner of St Cuthbert, around whom a powerful cult existed
in the north, as the standard of the men of the bishopric, its presence
underlining the fact that in northern eyes the army was raised to repel a
duplicitious invader. On 30 August Surrey reached Newcastle and was met by
Dacre, Bulmer, Sir Marmaduke Constable and many other gentlemen who were
admitted to his council, the decision then being made to take the field on 4
September at Bolton in Glendale. Surrey left Newcastle to reach Alnwick on 3
September. On that day the admiral with fourteen great ships reached Newcastle
and disembarked 1,241 men, having broken his journey at Hull for four days,
apparently to attend to the victualling of the northern force, and thus evaded
the storm. From Newcastle he marched to Alnwick where he met his father on 4
September, most of the force being delayed by foul weather and miry roads.

At the meeting of the growing council of war that night, the battle and
marching order of the army was agreed. The force of something over twenty-
thousand men was to be divided into two rather than three main divisions, each
with two wings. Surrey gave his heir the leadership of the van of circa
9,000 men, his brother, Edmund, commanding his right wing and Sir Marmaduke
Constable his left, each of roughly 1,500 men, while the earl led the rear ward
perhaps of only 5,000, with Dacre on his right and Sir Edward Stanley on his
left, each with roughly 1,500 men. By keeping the major commands in the
hands of himself and his eldest son, whose claim on the position of second in
command, by virtue of his status as admiral, councillor and friend of the king
was accepted, Surrey not only retained tight control over the army but also
avoided the dissension there would certainly have been over the selection of a
third commander from among the northerners, for his long experience of the
north made him sensitive to local tensions. Unlike James's force, Surrey's
had no pike-men but was armed with bills and longbows, and though he had a considerable train of ordnance the most modern pieces were with the king in France."

Surrey's great fear was that James would withdraw across the border before he could confront him, as he had done in 1496 and 1497. He therefore used James's offers concerning his prisoners to make contact via Rouge Cross Pursuivant, challenging him to battle in a manner which underlined the dishonour of withdrawal. Lord Thomas also sent a challenge, stating that he had sought battle with the Scottish fleet which had evaded him by taking the route via Ireland to France, that he had come to justify the death of Andrew Barton, and that the vanguard which he led would take no prisoner but the king himself in battle. On 5 September the English took the field and Islay Herald delivered James's reply that he accepted Surrey's challenge to battle by the following Friday afternoon, 9 September. Surrey praised James's "high and noble courage", but nonetheless pressed unsuccessfully to have both sides bound in £10,000 to perform the agreement.

On the same day the English force advanced in battle order to Wooler Haugh just north of the present Ewert Park so that only the plain of Milfield, an ideal battleground, lay between it and the Scottish force. On 7 September the English force waited all day in battle array for a Scottish attack, the Scots spasmodically firing into their camp, but in vain. In the late afternoon Surrey's council considered the position, for it was under exactly similar circumstances that James had withdrawn by night in 1497, and having moved from his encampment on both sides of the river Till near Ford to Flodden Edge, he was now astride the main route to Coldstream and the border which lay barely six miles to his rear. The unpalatable fact was that James had seized the initiative by taking up a virtually unassailable position, and could withdraw or wait for the English to attack under highly disadvantageous conditions or waste their victuals. Rouge Cross, who had just returned, confirmed the strength of the Scottish position. Flodden Edge rose to almost
600 feet, the slope before the Scots was steep, only one field wide and planted with a formidable array of artillery, while a great marsh lay to the left of the Scots and high ground to the right. Surrey, who was ill supplied with victuals, was reduced to trying to shame James into coming down to fight on "indifferent ground" but can have had little hope of success.¹⁹⁶

Only English movement could lure the Scots down, but if this were directly threatening it was likely to result in a prompt withdrawal. Thus on 8 September, in full view of the Scots, who were never much more than two miles distant, the English force in full battle array advanced towards James for a mile or more and, when this produced no effect, turned off to the right towards Bar Moor, giving the impression of an intended withdrawal to Berwick or attack on the Merse.¹⁹⁷ A new camp was set up that evening on sloping ground beside a wood where a small hill, almost certainly Dovehole Hill, protected the camp from the Scottish ordnance.¹⁹⁸ From the top of the hill the admiral reconnoitred the position of the enemy.¹⁹⁹ That night he put before his father and then the council his plan for meeting the situation which he had observed, namely that some divisions of James's army remained in his earlier camp on the west bank of the Till, which ruled out a Till crossing by the bridges at Ford or Etal which were probably guarded so that the English army would be cut to pieces as it crossed.²⁰⁰ Instead, he proposed a longer, out-flanking march along the Barmoor road to Bowsden, Duddo and Twizel Bridge, where the English would be out of reach and out of view of the Scots and could therefore afford to be mounted and strung out. Uncertain of English intentions at first, James would suddenly find the English army between his own and the border and be forced to fight at once or have his communications with Scotland cut.²⁰¹

At 5am the next morning the admiral with the van and the ordnance set out along this route ahead of his father, covering the fifteen miles by 11am when he crossed Twizel Bridge ahead of his men.²⁰² But for the border light horse, the whole army then dismounted and marched in full battle array, probably taking one of the more westerly of the four possible routes to Branxton, the
rear of the Scottish position, so as to cut off a Scottish withdrawal via Coldstream. The rearward followed along the same route much of the way, but forded the Till a little sooner at Milford, which is not now identifiable, and may then have advanced to the east of the van. Due to the mist, rain and the smoke screen the Scots had produced by burning their litter, the admiral could not be sure when he would come upon the enemy, who was clearly moving in response to the English advance.

As the van crossed a small brook near the foot of Branxton Hill, the air suddenly cleared and the Scots appeared not much more than a quarter of a mile before it. The admiral called a halt in a little valley, surprised at what he saw, for instead of being drawn up in a line several men deep the Scots formed four divisions and a reserve, strung out an arrow shot from each other and in regular, wedge shaped formations of deep columns in classic pike formation. He therefore sent a plea to his father, with his Agnus Dei for emphasis, to bring the rearward forward so that its right wing made contact with his own left and the army could be reorganised into four main blocks. During this period both sides fired at each other, the Scots harmlessly over the heads of the English, since they were on the hillside, but though the English guns may have had more effect, there were probably few of them as some at least had stuck in a bog soon after the Till crossing.

The battle began from left to right between 4 and 5pm, the Scots descending in complete silence and perfect order, while the English mounted the gentle slope to meet them. On the far right Edmund Howard with 1,000 Cheshire, 500 Lancashire and many Yorkshire men, amounting to at least 2,000, encountered the force of Hume, the earl of Huntley and other noblemen, and was probably outnumbered. Here the Scots seem to have succeeded in delivering the full shock which a body of pikemen perfectly coordinated can produce. Most of the Cheshire and Lancashire men, plus a portion of the Yorkshiremen, most the earl of Derby's tenants, fled at once, leaving Edmund to rally a very small force. His standard and standard bearer were hacked to pieces and he himself
was felled three times, but fought on stubbornly. Dacre with the reserve of 1,500 men came to his aid, but his brother Sir Philip Dacre and others were taken prisoner and about 160 of Dacre's men killed. The admiral also told off some of his men to go to Edmund's assistance, and since Hume's men did not return from the chase the remaining men held their own.

To the left, the admiral and the van, with the Banner of St Cuthbert, fought with the division of Huntley, Errol and Crawford, about 7,000 men strong, and may have had a numerical advantage. Here the ground was more uneven or the English archers more effective against the very lightly armed pikemen, for the Scots were brought to a standstill and the battle reduced to handstrokes, in which English bills and heavier armour proved their worth over the unwieldy pikes and short swords which were the second weapon of the Scots. Many of the Scots fled after a bitter struggle while the rest were slain with their leaders.

To the left again, Surrey, with Lord Darcy's son on his left, met James's force, and was somewhat outnumbered since it was considerably the largest of the Scottish divisions. The English discharged large quantities of arrows at the Scots before advancing, but with little effect as many of the Scots wore full armour. Again the Scots failed to break the English line with their first impact and were reduced to handstrokes for which their weapons were inferior, but the battle was extremely long and hard fought and no prisoners were taken on either side. As darkness fell Surrey may have observed that there was no focal point around which surviving Scots withdrew, but though he discovered afterwards that James had been killed within a spear's length of him, he could not then know that he was dead.

To his left Stanley with his Lancashire and Yorkshire men had met Lennox and Argyle's highlanders, far the worst armed and equipped and least disciplined of the Scottish divisions. Stanley probably used his bowmen to good effect, and either sent a detachment, or with his whole division, caught the Scots unprepared by climbing a steep incline to attack from the east or south-
east. The Scots fled at once in a westerly direction towards Surrey and James, and many were killed by Stanley's men who fell on James's division.

As darkness fell over Branxton field Surrey knew that he had gained the victory, since his scout reported that no Scottish force remained on the battlefield, and the Scottish ordnance and camp had been abandoned, but until the next day he could not appreciate how great it had been. He called his men together, offered his thanks to God and proceeded to knight forty captains, mostly northerners, but including his son Edmund, nephew Gorges, friend Lord Scrope of Upsall and his servant Appleyard, for their part in the victory. Wisely leaving Sir Philip Tylney with the admiral's men on the battlefield to guard all the ordnance, he retired with the rest of the army to the camp at Barmoor Wood which had been pillaged during the day by borderers, along with many of the army's horses and oxen for drawing the artillery. This was to seem unimportant when the wealth of the Scottish camp was revealed, Surrey acquiring two great gilt pots with James's arms on the lids which he owned and displayed proudly for the rest of his life. Surrey drafted a short message to the queen that night and Lord Thomas sent a detailed account of the victory for the king, open to the queen, and a summary for the council soon after.

James's body was found by Dacre and identified by two of his servants who were prisoners, but an archbishop, two bishops, two abbots, twelve earls and seventeen lesser peers, plus many knights and gentlemen lay dead with their king on the battlefield among what Surrey estimated as 7-8,000 Scottish dead. By contrast only one English gentleman had been killed and English losses, put by Lord Thomas as low as 400 men and by a more realistic contemporary at 1,200 men, were undoubtedly far lower than those of the Scots, many of whom were slain or drowned as they fled, since the English had deliberately destroyed the bridges to cut off a retreat.

There has been much debate over the reasons for the English victory and the great carnage among the Scots of all ranks, for Surrey and his contemporaries somewhat unhelpfully ascribed it to God and the justice of their
quarrel. On the face of it his force was certainly disadvantaged. It was outnumbered overall and poorly matched in battle with the Scottish divisions due to the rapid reorganisation, with serious consequences for Edmund Howard's division. The English force had much less modern weaponry and less drilling, had been less well victualled, was on the move for many days before the battle, and had endured a gruelling march on that day, part of it on foot, in wet, windy and muddy conditions. It had also fought uphill and into the wind. By contrast James had begun the campaign well, using his ordnance to good effect to win English fortresses and taking the initiative from Surrey by entrenching himself in a strong position from which he could be supplied from Scotland. Even when the English finally turned his position he moved sufficiently quickly to take Branxton Hill and be ready for battle before they could, retaining the high ground. Despite all this he lost the battle.

Perhaps the combination of the new fighting technique and the ancient preference for the high ground proved incompatible, in that the slope reduced the initial impact of his close packed pikemen, while the English bill was obviously the superior weapon in hand to hand combat, especially in combination with the heavier armour of the English. At least equally important was the fact that, though well drilled, sections of the Scottish force, particularly the borderers and highlanders, were uncommitted to James's cause, for the king had listened more to his French advisers than his own nobility, and the foreign presence reminded the Scots that they risked life and limb for no vital self interest, but for France. Thus Home's borderers did not assist James after defeating their immediate opponents, but characteristically pursued their own profit, while the highlanders showed little stomach for battle.

By contrast, the Howards appear to have had a greater hold over the English army, perhaps partly because several of the northern nobility were absent and their men came directly under their command, but largely because, through skilful use of the consultative process in the council of war and propaganda against the Scots as the invaders, they were able to weld the
English together to defend their territory.27 Thus, but for Derby's men under Edmund Howard, all of whose interests lay rather remote from the borders, the other divisions, including those of Dacre and Stanley, whom one might have expected to show some independence, came to the assistance of their fellows and fought to the bitter end. More crucial still, every action and word of the Howards suggests their contempt for the Scots and a supreme confidence that, if they could only bring James to battle, they would defeat him. This no doubt sprang from the fact that Surrey and his sons had tried twice before to confront James, and twice had the upper hand.234 This sense of superiority over the Scots was shared by northerners, and Bulmer's recent defeat of Home had only strengthened it.

Howard urging that their men should not take prisoners was another reason for the scale of the English success, for, though completely effective only in Surrey's and the admiral's divisions, this did prevent victory being subordinated to the search for private profit and led to great slaughter. 211 The psychological advantage of the English must have been reinforced by decisive, well co-ordinated leadership in battle, though no direct evidence of this survives. Surrey had the advantage of having experienced three major battles himself, and having the fullest cooperation of his sons and other commanders, was able to use his expertise. The very important contribution of the admiral, who was responsible for the strategy which finally brought James to battle and clearly relieved his 70 year old father of many burdens, is attested by the fact that his grant from the king was only slightly inferior to that awarded his father.236

After the battle Surrey marched to Berwick, Scottish victuals perhaps sustaining his men, and there disbanded his army on 14 September without waiting for money to pay them in full.227 Only the gunners in charge of the ordnance, which was to be shipped at Newcastle, and his own retinue remained in wages, and most of the latter he discharged at Alnwick a few days later.237 The victor of Flodden entered York in his hour of triumph with only a small
retinue, to keep costs down, but he did have with him the body of the king of Scots in a 'close cart' belonging to Sir William Percy, and several Yorkshire knights and their retinues. He was met there by his waiting wife, city dignitaries and the Abbot of St Mary's, who had supplied the wages for the campaign. The victory was celebrated in the minster on 24 September and he was feasted by the mayor before he returned in triumph to London. The admiral was not present, for with his men he had returned to Newcastle, taking ship by 18 September to resume his naval duties, but such was the impact of the victory that he did not entirely miss the feasting, for, while he lay off Yarmouth the city of Norwich went to the considerable expense of sending a gift of two swans, fresh salmon and hipocras, becoming the first East Anglians to salute the local family who had become national heroes.

3. The Naval Campaign of late 1513 and early 1514

The admiral, the nerve centre of a sophisticated system of naval espionage, had reasons for his speedy return to sea, for though the queen's council wrote to him about the middle of September for the disbanding of the main fleet on 26 of the month when wages ran out, his information led him to suspect a new threat. His earlier prediction, that with the arrival of the Scottish and Danish contingents the French would become more aggressive, was about to be fulfilled, and Sir Weston Browne's squadron, which he had left in the south when he went to assist his father, was inadequate to meet the new situation. The French fleet had been victualled late in the summer, the Scots and Danes arrived in early September, 400 extra mariners were then levied in Normandy and on 17 September Rouville, Grand Veneur de France, was appointed lieutenant general of the joint fleet. Thus nineteen of Henry's great ships were kept in service for another month, but it is doubtful that the English were fully aware of French plans to intercept Henry at sea on his return. These were frustrated by a violent storm which swept the Channel soon after the fleet had concentrated at Harfleur, causing the foundering of several vessels and dispersal of the remainder. Lord Thomas then led his fleet which, with
Flemish transport vessels, escorted Henry and his army home, presumably recounting for the king the details of Flodden and receiving his new title, earl of Surrey. On 24 October he escorted Henry to Dover, then returned to ship the remainder of the company, tents and stores.24r.

Early in November all but the three largest Scottish ships returned home and the French fleet was laid up, but a tense atmosphere prevailed and French naval preparations continued, the fleet being retained in the ports of St. Malo, Harfleur and Dieppe to facilitate concentration before the enemy in the spring.247 For the same reason most of Henry's ships were laid up for the first time at Portsmouth, already the usual port for embarkation and disembarkation, instead of being brought into the Thames, so that the admiral, who was probably responsible, was busy during the winter making it safe by the construction of bulwarks and trenches for the mounting of artillery to repel a seaborne attack, and the laying of chains across the harbour mouth.248 A force of 350 men under four of his captains was maintained there even after the major threat had subsided, as were sixty gunners.249 About the middle of November it appears that an attempt was made to attack French shipping at Harfleur, for one of the three English squadrons at sea in different sectors through the winter to safeguard shipping, probably Gonson's, landed nearby and burnt and pillaged, only withdrawing when Rouville gathered a force to repel the invaders.250-1 Despite patrols the seas were by no means safe even between Dover and Calais, though it is impossible to say which side suffered greater losses.251 In England, much attention was paid to coastal defence, with beacons standing primed, local levies within 20 miles of the coast kept ready to turn out when the alarm was given, and strict watches kept.252

The admiral, now known as earl of Surrey, was at Portsmouth or Deptford making preparations for the 1514 campaign throughout January and February, but for repeated brief visits to council and Parliament.253-4 By 24 February he was receiving replies to his letters to those supplying troops for the fleet, on 18 April commissions for musters at Portsmouth were issued, on 24 April he was
appointed admiral for the campaign, his soldiers embarking the next day, and on 30 April the fleet put to sea. It consisted of forty-six combatant vessels and fifteen victuallers with nine-thousand men aboard, but, presumably for reasons of administration, the admiral did not join it until 24 May. By then the naval war was well under way, for during April Prégent de Bidoux with about nine galleys and a few foists had landed at Brighton during the night, to evade detection, and succeeded in looting and burning most of the little town before the local levies could gather and drive the French off at daybreak. This successful raid, almost certainly the first of the war on the English coast, produced considerable pressure on the admiral for retaliatory action, not least because half of the place belonged to his father, though it is questionable whether the French knew this. The main fleet not being ready, he sent Sir John Wallop with about nine vessels and eight-hundred men to make retaliatory raids in Normandy, where they landed repeatedly, burning shipping at Treport, Etaples and other minor ports.

When the admiral joined the fleet, then under Wyndham, attempts were underway to attack the galleys, which had shifted their base from Brest to Boulogne to attack shipping between Dover and Calais and prevent Henry's crossing for the major campaign he planned in France by forming part of a coordinated attack on Calais itself, to prevent which Lovell was sent to Calais. Wyndham had already sent ten of the smallest ships, the rowbarges and galleys, under Sherbourne and Bull, to attack Pregent's galleys. They had tried with five vessels to come between the galleys and Boulogne and then turn on them, the other part of the squadron remaining out of sight initially. However, Prégent was far too vigilant to allow any English vessels to come between him and the safety of his base. The admiral planned to try again by sending two squadrons of ten ships, which were to approach from opposite directions and try to get between the galleys and Boulogne, but if this failed he suggested a coordinated land and sea attack, of the type almost mounted the previous year on Brest, using three thousand men from Calais for the landing.
unsuitable winds prevented this second attempt on the galleys, but Surrey wrote to Norfolk, Fox and Wolsey that he intended to go over himself in one of the small ships with the next suitable wind, and if Prégent lay outside the harbour, which he doubted, he would wreak considerable destruction without serious loss. However, he stated categorically that if the gallies lay within the harbour an attack was only to be attempted "with them that woll cast themselff a way wilfully." Though his letters read like an extension of conciliar debate, in that he continually made suggestions but expressed his readiness to defer to councillors of greater experience like his father, Fox and Wolsey, he clearly did not share their obsession, or more probably the king's, with the galleys. He advised that they be contained by a small squadron while the main fleet sailed west to undertake raids on the French coast, and had the full support of all his captains in recommending this.

He added a secret postscript which demonstrates how fully he was aware of negotiations with France, saying that if peace was about to be concluded as a result of the arrival of the duc de Longueville, sending the main fleet west would occasion unnecessary expense. However, as naval action assisted the peace process by making the French more anxious to come to terms, the admiral was evidently instructed to make other raids and continue the patrol of northern waters to prevent the arrival of a French force under Albany in Scotland. Lovell wrote on 5 June that he had heard from Surrey that he intended to mount a raid at about that time to revenge Brighton. This was delayed by revictualling and contrary winds, but on 13 June Surrey and Wyndham landed with a party near Cherbourg and burnt the countryside for four miles to the west, three to the east up to the town walls, and two miles inland, sparing only religious establishments. At the same time a second party of seven-hundred men under Wallop, Gonson, Sabyn and others landed further west where they undertook a similar raid, thus Surrey could tell Henry that he was no longer in the Frenchmen's debt for the burning of Brighton, sending Sir Edward
Towards the end of July peace negotiations with England were sufficiently advanced for Pregent and his galleys to be ordered back to the Mediterranean to help defend the castle of Godefa at Genoa, the last trace of the duchy of Milan and French dominion beyond the Alps. English vessels arrived at Woolwich and Erith for laying up from 26 July, the soldiery having been paid off on the south coast as before. On 2 August Norfolk, Wolsey and Fox were finally commissioned to conclude a treaty to be sealed by the marriage of Henry's sister Mary, who had recently been jilted by Charles and the emperor, to Louis XII, and on 7 August the treaty was signed, on 10 August published, and on 20 August ratified by Henry. On 11 August a group of councillors inspected the fleet and its equipment, delivering the tackle to John Hopton, keeper of the storehouses at Erith and Deptford, and the ordnance elsewhere, nine ships then remaining to come into the Thames from Southampton. The long naval war had come to an end, Surrey's work with the navy tailed off rapidly, and a great burden was lifted from his shoulders.

Of all aspects of the 1512-14 war, the naval war, which was the least spectacular, produced most innovations in the technical, tactical and administrative spheres largely because it was the one where hostilities were most sustained. There was no decisive naval battle, though Henry and his admirals assiduously sought one, because Louis was unwilling to risk his fleet in a theatre of war he regarded as secondary, and where he was thus content with a holding operation. However, Henry's 1513 campaign in France and English raids on the French coast and ports, intended to provoke a show-down and assert English dominance over the Channel and North Sea, to discourage French and Scottish privateers and interrupt communications with Scotland, did force the French to take the naval war increasingly seriously. The French galleys prevented a major raid on the most important French port, Brest, and tied down the English fleet for a while, because it had no vessels of equal
size, manoeuvrability and fire power. However, the fact that the grand enterprises planned by both sides did not come to fruition suggests that they were unrealistic given the sailing capabilities of the ships, which left them very vulnerable to changes in the wind, and the manifold organisational problems of victualling.²²⁷

Nonetheless, there were important developments. The English fleet was increased by building and purchase from twenty-four combatant vessels in the spring of 1512 to forty-six in the spring of 1514, or from a total of forty-eight ships to a total of sixty-one.²²⁸ A commensurate growth necessarily took place in naval dockyards, naval offices began to multiply, while important lessons were learned about the victualling of so large a fleet, particularly the necessity of setting out with a complement of victuals for at least a month.²²⁹ The admiral and the council, (in 1512 and 1513 effectively Wolsey) remained the dual centres of naval administration, but in the matter of tactics the king and council always made the decisions on the advice of the admiral, except during the period of Henry’s absence in France.

Both Howard admirals had been appointed by Henry to be constantly at sea and carry out a highly aggressive policy. Their correspondence reveals that, while they shared certain attributes as men and as admirals, notably high levels of energy and determination, an enthusiasm and flair for solving practical problems and a strong sense of both the king’s and their own honour, there were marked differences between their styles of leadership. Responsibility appears to have sat relatively light upon the shoulders of the highly favoured, popular and experienced seaman, Sir Edward, whose attitude, admired by Henry, is summed up in his remark that a seaman had to be resolute to the point of madness.²³⁰ He tended towards impatience with the details of naval organisation which necessarily underpinned a campaign, preferring, in 1513, to put to sea and confront the enemy without being properly victualled. Though admired by his officers and men, he did not always listen to sensible advice, apparently failed to maintain discipline when under severe pressure and
became rash when his honour had been impugned.  

His brother was a different man in character and circumstance. He was heir apparent to a great earldom, and thus closer to his father, less intimate with the king, less experienced at sea, and more aware of the responsibilities of leadership. He won the trust of his captains and masters by listening to and taking their advice, promoting them whenever he could and taking great pains to see that they received royal recognition for each enterprise they undertook. Though he was clearly approachable, he made sure he was feared and respected as much as loved by his men, just as Echyngham had recommended. With regard to satisfying his superiors, the circumstances of Edward's death meant that he perceived, as his brother had apparently not, that he must strike a balance between Henry's desire for spectacular results at any cost and the more considered and cost-conscious aims of his councillors, who had a variable but often great influence on the king. Thus, like Edward, he sent the king glowing reports of naval successes, but he was less inclined to extravagant promises and, unlike his brother, took it upon himself to point out to Henry as tactfully as he might, the risks inherent in instructions which he regarded as foolhardy. 

Indeed it was from councillors, in 1513 above all Wolsey but to a lesser extent Fox, and in 1514 also his father, that he sought advice and instructions. Unlike Edward, he made every effort to please them as much as the king, seeking their tutelage and addressing even Wolsey, who was only about a year his senior, as his mentor, where Edward had used terms of equality. Thus he clearly acknowledged that preserving the ships and men under his command was his responsibility and constantly sought to pursue a strategy which would give the king the best value for money, carefully husbanding royal resources and ostentatiously demonstrating that, unlike Edward, he did not make war for private profit. Under him English naval policy thus became less heroic, more complex and long range, reflecting the fact that the new admiral was less the fearless warrior and much more the strategist, planner, organiser.
and administrator. If Henry had initially failed to appreciate these attributes as virtues in his admiral, Howard's part in the victory at Flodden established him in his master's eyes as a man of courage and ingenuity. Thus the war, which offers the first opportunity to get close enough to assess the character and abilities of Howard, played a crucial role in his transformation from that of a jousting companion, but not an intimate associate of the king, to that of a respected and valued servant whose abilities merited a voice in that august body, the king's council.
Notes

1. PRO E36/1 ff 34, 36, 59, 63; In March he sold the king his ship the Mary Howard for £666 13s. 4d., PRO E36/215, f 167
2. PRO C76/192, m 14; He is here described as "experiencia"; CSPS ii, 59
3. LP i, 2, p 1497; BL Add. Ms. 6079, f 36b; LP i, 707
4. LP i, 1076; 1080; 1453; CSPV, ii, 174
5. PRO C54/379, mm 13, 6d
6. Ibid.
7. BL Add. Ms. 27,451, ff 11, 14, 22; PRO E36/215, f 675
8. PRO E36/2
9. PRO E36/2; The number of Howard associates seems to have increased rather than diminished thereafter, cf. PRO E101/62/17
10. Ibid.; Knyvet provided 24, Heydon 10, Broughton 17, Arthur Hopton 20, Oxford 208, Fitzwalter 20, Calthorpe 9, Shelton 25, Townshend 12, Bedingfield 10, Heveningham 20, Wentworth 20, Brandon 20, Anthony Wingfield 12, Sherbourne 21, Hobart 20, Waldegrave 12, Drury 1
11. PRO E36/2
12. LP i, 1062, 1201
14. LP i, 1239; Hall, p 532 He knighted several of his captains including Wyndham, Henry Shernbourne, Thomas Lucy and William Perton, the first pair Howard and the second de Vere associates.
15. Hall, p 533; LP i, 1240; 1242; 1301
16. LP i, 1260; 1316 (25); A. Spont ed., op. cit., p xxiv
17. Hall, p 534; CSPV ii, 199, 200; Knyvet was commissioned to assist in Edward's victualling, LP i, 1316 (25); Spont ed., op. cit., p xxi n. 1
19. Hall, p 535; CSPV ii, 199, 200
20. LP i, 1356; CSPV ii, 199
21. PRO SP1/229, ff 46, 92; C76/194, m 2
22. PRO SP1/229, f 92
23. Ibid.
24. LP i, 1524 (3, 5), 1804 (2, 26, 54, 55, 57) 2055 (26); S.J. Gunn, Charles Brandon, pp 8-9
25. TV ii, p 516
26. LP i, 1206; 1287; 1365 (3); PRO E101/417/6, 7
27. PRO E36/1, f 103
28. Ibid.
30. LP i, 1176, PRO C76/194, m 2
31. PRO E36/3; SP1/2 f 111; BL Othello E XI, ff 32-40
32. PRO SP1/2 f 111; BL Othello E XI, ff 32-40
33. BL Othello E XI, ff 32-40
34. PRO SP1/2, f 111; Of these 400 were pikemen under Guyot de Heulle; CSPS ii, 59, 65.
35. PRO SP1/2, f 111; E101/56/5, ff 27, 28; For Anne's lands, CAD v, p 539
36. PRO E101/56/5, ff 17, 23; B. Harris, Edward Stafford, Third Duke of Buckingham, pp 92, 141; The territorial connexion of these men with the Howards was strong: William Rous was of Dennington, Suff., Nicholas Appleyard of Bacon Ash, Norf. and his petty captains included Robert Bardwell of West Sheringham, Norf., Thomas Wiseman, of Thornham Magna, Suff., Edward Bray of Stote D'Abernon, Sussex, John Hanford of Cresswell, Norf. and perhaps Edmund Wingfield, LP i, 1496.
37. PRO C76/194, m 2
38. Hall, p 533-4; LP ii, 2, pp 1498-9, 1457
39. LP i, 1239; Hall, p 528
40. Hall, p 528

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41 Ibid.; Herbert, Henry VIII, ii, p 9
42 D. Hay ed., Vergil, p 175-9; J.S.C. Bridge, A History of France from the Death of Louis XI, iv, pp 173-8; CSPS ii, 68, 70
43 PRO E101/56/5, f 12; Hall, p 528; For Stile see introduction to CSPS ii
44 Hall, p 528-30; The French town of St Jean de Luce and various border villages were also destroyed, Hall, p 531
45 Ibid.
46 PRO SP1/2, f 119
47 Ibid.
48 PRO SP1/2, f 119; Hall, p 529
50 CSPS i, 59; Vergil, p 165; Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p 51
51 Vergil, p 183; CSPS ii, 68
52 CSPS ii, xlv
53 Hall, pp 329-30
54 Ibid.; PRO SP1/2, f 119
55 LP i, 1319, 1356; P. Boissonade, Histoire de la Réunion de la Navarre à la Castille, 1479-1521, pp 372-6
56 LP i, 1320; Canestrini ed., op. cit., pp 85-8
57 LP i, 1326, note in cipher
58 Ibid.
59 LP i, 1326; PRO E101/56/5, ff 9, 10, 11, 12
60 LP i, 1326; This cleric was Ferdinand's liaison officer resident with the English command.
61 LP i, 1327
62 Ibid., 1372, 1356
63 Vergil, p 181
64 CSPS i, 68
65 PRO SP1/2, f 119
66 Eg. Kingston's mission at the end of August, PRO E101/56/5, f 12 and end of September, PRO SP1/3, f 108; Ferdinand sent Martin Dampies, then Jean Sepulveda, CSPS ii, 68; Scarisbrick, op. cit., p 51
67 CSPV ii, 183; Gunn, 'The French Wars of Henry VIII', p 36
68 CSPV ii, 186, 205
69 LP i, 1369
70 CSPV ii, 183; 205
71 By Windsor Herald, Hall, p 532; LP i, 1485
72 CSPS ii, 68; Bridge, op. cit., p 191
73 LP i, 1356, 1461; CSPS ii, 68; Canestrini ed., op. cit., p 118
74 Hall, p 531; PRO SP1/229, f 91; CSPS ii, 68
75 H. Ellis, Original Letters, 2nd ser. i, 194; Boissonade, op. cit., pp 372-6
76 Ellis, op. cit., 2nd ser. i, 194
77 Hall, p 532; Ellis, op. cit., 2nd ser. i, 194
78 Hall, p 531-2; Hall's chronology is confused here, while his dates for the return of the force are likewise too late.
79 PRO E101/56/5, ff 15-17; SP1/3 ff 34, 108; LP i, 1444; BL Stowe Ms. 146, ff 18, 19, 20
80 Eg. Bridge, op. cit., pp 185, 187
81 PRO E101/56/5, f 2
82 Ibid. ff 19-27; LP i, 1435
83 PRO E101/56/5, f 27
84 Hall's accounts of the measures taken to maintain order, and what Sandys's accounts reveal of espionage, victualling, the recapture of deserters and other details suggest considerable efficiency, PRO SP1/3, f 108; E101/56/5
85 Total expenditure was over £46,630, PRO SP1/3, f 108: Anglo-Imperial relations, LP i, 1436, 1468, 1487, 1492: Ferdinand claimed that the English return forced him to make a truce with France, CSPS ii, 70
86 CSPS ii, 68, 72
87 Dorset's correspondence with Ferdinand of 7 and 11 September, (lost) caused
the council to admit that he and his officers had behaved badly, while his marriage negotiations with the king of Navarre were also condemned, CSPS ii, 72; CSPV ii, 211.

88 Ibid.; G. Mattingly, Catherine of Aragon, p 127
89 H. Ellis, op. cit., 2nd ser. i, 194
90 LP i, 1356
91 LP i, 1852, 1875, 1883, 1886, 1907, 1965, 1971
92 PRO C54/379, m 18d
93 Vergil, p 197; Pollard, Wolsey, p 17
94 CSPV ii, 215; Hall, p 535 The queen's part in promoting the war should not be overlooked, CSPV ii, 87. A number of her servants took an active part in its campaigns, PRO SP1/3 f 200
95 LP i, 1750, 1764
96 PRO C66/619, m 22; C54/379, m 5-6;
97 Spont ed., op. cit., xxii
98 Ibid., xxx
99 Spont ed., op. cit., p xxiv; M. Oppenheim, A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy, p 81
100 H. Ellis, op. cit., 1st ser. i, 60
101 Bridge, op. cit., iv, pp 216-7; Ellis, 1st ser. i, 60; Spont ed., op. cit., p 153
102 Spont ed., op. cit., p 122
103 LP i, 2305, iii (150); Hall, p 536
104 Spont ed., op. cit., p 122; Hall, p 536; Herbert, ii, p 13; LP i, 1771; 1808
105 Hall, p 536
106 Spont ed., op. cit., pp 51-2, 146
107 Ibid.; Hall, p 536
108 Hall, p 536
109 Ibid., Spont ed., op. cit., p 146
110 Spont ed., p 143; Hall p 537, "And some saied he did it without counsaill, and so he hath sped."
111 The rowbarges were vessels of approx. 80 tons, G.V. Scammell, 'War at Sea Under the Early Tudors: Some Newcastle-upon-Tyne Evidence', Arch. Aeliana (1960) p 79 n. 24; Spont ed., pp 146-7
112 Spont ed., op. cit., pp 147-8
113 Ibid., pp 133, 149; BL Calig. D VI, ff 106-7 Edward had forbidden the throwing of wildfire into the gallies, though they could have been destroyed easily this way, PRO SP1/3 f 200.
114 Spont ed., op. cit., pp 148-9; LP i, 1825. His armour was sent to the French royal ladies and his body embalmed, Spont p x1, but his burial place is unknown.
115 Ibid., pp 150-1
116 Hall, p 537
117 LP i, 1844, 1922; Spont ed., 74, 76. He had just been chosen for the Garter, Anstis, op. cit. i, p 275, but even before had a penchant for invoking St George, Spont ed., p 124
118 G.G. Cruickshank, Army Royal, pp 13-16
119 PRO C66/621, m 20; C82/392; BL Calig. D VI, ff 106-7
120 BL Calig. D VI, ff 106-7; PRO SP1/3, f 200
121 BL Calig. D VI, ff 106-7 Clearly always the opinion of the council of officers, see notes 108-10 above.
122 Ibid.; This was also the advice Sabyn gave Henry, Spont ed., p 142
124 PRO SP1/4, f 22
125 PRO SP1/229, f 151
126 Goring, op. cit., p 256; PRO SP1/229, ff 168-9
127 PRO SP1/229, ff 168-9, 170
128 PRO SP1/4 f 79
129 S.J. Gunn, Charles Brandon, p 15; C.G. Cruickshank, Army Royal, p 26
130 PRO SP1/4, f 79
131 PRO SP1/4, f 22
132 Fox clearly sympathised, PRO SP1/4, f 78
133 PRO SP1/4, f 79
134 eg. Ellis, op. cit., 1st ser. 1, p 151 where Edward referred to Wolsey as
his "speciall frende" and sent all his messages, including a letter to his
wife, through him.
135 PRO SP1/4, f 79; BL Calig. D VI, ff 104-5
136 PRO SP1/4, f 79
137 Letter of c. 6 June (lost), referred to in PRO SP1/4, f 81
138 PRO SP1/229, ff 187-8
139 Hall, p 540; J. Stow, Annales, p 491
140 C. de la Ronciere, Histoire de la Marine Francaise, iv, pp 111-2, n 3
141 H. Ellis, op. cit., 1st ser. 1, p 150
142 PRO SP1/3, f 200
143 Ibid.; BL Calig. D VI, ff 104-5; PRO SP1/229, ff 187-8; Echyngham had
begged Wolsey that the new appointee as admiral be an outsider, "noble.
discrete, wise and sadd. that he may [be feared and loved", Spont ed.,
op. cit., p 150
144 BL Calig. D VI, ff 106-7; PRO SP1/3, f 200; SP1/229, ff 163-4
145 BL Calig. D VI, ff 106-7; SP1/4, f 79
146 PRO SP1/229, f 167; Scammel, op. cit., p 196
147 Spont ed., pp xi-xiv; Rymer, Foedera, p 327; LP i, 1864; C. Platt,
Medieval Southampton, for biographical details on Dawtrey and Palshid.
148 William Symons, LP i, 1855; LP i, 1975
149 Edward had complained bitterly of sharp practice in the supply of salt beef
earlier that year, Spont ed., op. cit. p 104; LP i, 1864; PRO SP1/229,
ff 187-8, eg. over cables PRO SP1/229, f 188-9
150 PRO SP1/4, f 4; SP1/229, ff 163-4; 166; 167; 168-9; SP1/4, ff 129, 30, 67;
SP1/229, f 170; It was impossible for the whole fleet to leave Plymouth
with anything but a northerly wind and the prevailing winds were south
westerly.
151 BL Calig. D VI, ff 104-5
152 Eg. He suggested that lighters be brought from the Thames to Portsmouth
to speed the loading of beer, and had trenches dug to store beer out of the
hot sun, PRO SP 1/229, f 187-8; For his diligence, PRO SP1/3 f 200 written
at 11.30 pm, SP1/229, f 178 written at 6.00am.
153 PRO SP1/229, f 187-8
* A brief note on the major contemporary narrative sources for the battle
is a necessary preface to this chapter.
1. The first notice of it, referred to here as Surrey's Message, is not
widely known, consisting of a secretarial draft of 13 lines from Surrey
to the queen on the night of his victory referred to in CSPV ii, 309.
It is now in an American collection, but Dr John Guy kindly provided me
with a photocopy of it brought by an unknown visitor to the PRO. It is
followed by the draft of another letter excusing the fact that he had
still not written at length, and jottings for a longer report.
2. Far more informative is the 'Gazette', a list of points addressed to
the master of the king's posts and signed by Lord Howard, written
within days of the battle (RCHL 2d M. 16, printed in full in J. Pinkerton,
History of Scotland, pp 456-8, LP i, 2246) This is a draft for, or more
likely a summary of, the more detailed account he sent to the king (lost)
which reached Queen Katherine on 16 September, LP i, 2283.
3. Identical with no. 2 are the 'Articles of the Bataill', but for the
omission here of a list of the Scottish dead, (PRO SP1/J 7751)
4. A more detailed, independent account written very soon after the battle
is that of an eyewitness, probably a Northumbrian in Surrey's division,
known as the Trewe Encounter. It agrees well with nos. 2 and 3 and
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other unimpeachable sources and was first printed in 1513 by Richard Facques of St Paul's Churchyard, (reprinted, D. Laing ed., Proc. Soc. Antiq. of Scotl., vii, pp 143-52)

5. Brian Tuke's letter to Richard Pace in Rome of 22 September, the only surviving one of many he sent out with the news is largely based on the Gazette, contains some inaccuracies due to exaggeration for propaganda effect, and some additional information, (CSPV ii 316)

6. Of the chroniclers Hall's account is detailed, clear, agrees well with nos 2, 3 and 4, and provides additional information, much of which can be verified from official records and which probably came from Howard's fuller report. Holinshed's account does not, unusually, follow Hall, but again agrees well with the main sources, containing some additional information. Stow has a few minor points of interest, but Vergil is very brief and largely inaccurate on Flodden.

Shrewsbury was first proposed, but by 23 January Surrey was named to stay CSPV ii, 219 and he was appointed in late February LP i, 1662 (57); See Chapter 1, p

154 Weever, Funeral Monuments, p 558
155 Hall, p 555; LP i, 2067 Warham was in partial disgrace due to his dispute with Fox, LP i, 1094; 1942; 2019; 2046; 2098; 2163; 2405; Ruthal stayed as bishop of Durham and territorial lord of much of the northeast, and Lovell was invaluable due to his wide experience as an administrator, J.C. Wedgewood, HP 1, 555-6; DNB xii, pp 175-6.

157 LP i, 1338; PRO E101/56/25 ff 44, 64; LP i, 2051
158 PRO SP1/4 f 79
159 LP i, 1089; 1206; 1287; 1602 (27); 1662 (2); 1624; 1690; 1735; 1775
160 LP i, 1655; 2029; 2036
161 J.D. Mackie ed. Letters of James IV of Scotland: Treasurers Accounts, iv, 413 no. 559; LP i, 1914; 1960; 2014; 2026; 2096
162 LP i, 1647; 1776; J.S.C. Bridge, History of France, p 214
163 J.D. Mackie ed., no. 557; lxvii; C. Oman, History of the Art of War p 299
164 Hall, p 556; LP i, 2122
165 Hall, p 556; Oman, op. cit., pp 297-9
166 LP i, 1645; 2026; 2913
167 PRO E101/56/27; Hall, p 555
168 Goring, op. cit., p 261
169 Hall, p 556; PRO E101/56/27
170 Hall, p 556; A. Conway, Henry VII's Relations with Scotlans and Ireland, p 112
171 Hall, p 556
172 Hall, pp 555-6; LP i, 2651
173 LP i, 2283; Holinshed, p 591
174 'The Flodden Death Roll', Scot. Antiq. (1899)
175 Oman, op. cit., p 299; All contemporary sources give larger figures.
177 LP i, 1504; Mackie ed., op. cit., p lxii; M. Wood ed., op. cit., p xl, 11st
178 Hall, p 557; LP i, 2279, 2394; The captains of Norham and Chillingham were sent as prisoners to Falkland, J. Stuart, G. Burnett eds., Exchequer Rolls of Scotland, xiv, pp xxxviii, 9
179 Hall, p 557; A. Raine, York Civic Records, iii, p 41; Goring, op. cit., p 261
180 Hall, p 557
181 Ibid.; J. Raine, St Cuthbert; B. Colgrave ed., Two Lives of St Cuthbert introduction; J. Raine ed. The Rites of Durham, pp 4-7
182 PRO E101/56/7; Hall, p 557
Jerningham, Edward Yelverton and William Sabyn while the rest, William Sidney, Stephen Bull, Ralph and William Ellercar, Walter Loveday, Thomas Carew, Thomas Danby, George Witwang and James King had all served his brother; Victuals, PRO E101/56/28

184 Hall, p 557
185 J.D. Mackie, 'The English Army at Flodden', Misc. Scot, Hist. Soc., (1951) pp 61-9, tables pp 65, 69; Hall, p 557; Stowe, p 826 but the Trewe Encountre gives 7 September as the date for these decisions, p 144
186 Hall, pp 557-8; Trewe Encountre, pp 144-5 list the retinues; PRO SP4/1; Gazette, p 457; LP I, 2386; 1159; Mackenzie, op. cit. p 47;
187 There was trouble even over the admission of Dacre to the council of war, on which the Howards insisted, LP I, 2378
188 Cruickshank, op. cit., pp 72-7; Surrey had only one spear in his retinue and 42 demi-lances, PRO E101/56/27
189 GC, pp 278-8; Holinshed, pp 516-7
190 Ellis, 1st ser. i, 86; Hall, p 558; Stow, op. cit., p 827
191 Hall, p 559; CSPV ii, 316 where Howard undertakes to lead the van on foot, and says he will not spare James, both exaggerated.
192 Ibid., Trewe Encountre, p 145; W. Busch, 'Englands Kriege im Jahre 1513', Historische Vierteljahrschrift (1910) pp 471-2
193 Hall, p 560
194 Ibid.: Trewe Encountre, p 146; see note 189 above
195 Hall, p 560; Weever, op. cit., p 558 where it is "impregnable".
196 Ibid.; Stow, op. cit., p 827; The force was having to drink water, Trewe Encountre, p 147.
197 Busch, op. cit., pp 472-3; Trewe Encountre, p 147; Holinshed, p 595; Hall, p 561
198 Identified by Busch from descriptions in Hall and the Trewe Encountre.
199 Hall, p 561
200 Holinshed, p 595; F. Elliot, The Battle of Flodden and Raids of 1513, pp 50-2
201 Holinshed, p 595; Hall, p 561; Weever, op. cit., p 558 for intention of cutting James off from Scotland.
202 Hall, p 561; 'Gazette', p 456
203 LP I, 2283; Trewe Encountre, p 147; 'Gazette', p 456
204 Hall, p 561; Holinshed, p 595 'Gazette', p 155 is unhelpfully imprecise.
205 LP I, 2283
206 Hall, p 561
207 Ibid., 'Gazette', p 456; CSPV ii, 316; Stow, op. cit., p 828
208 Trewe Encountre, p 148; Holinshed, p 596
209 Trewe Encountre, p 147; Holinshed, p 596; Hall, p 561
210 'Gazette', p 456; CSPV ii, 316
211 Ibid.
212 CSPV ii, 316; Trewe Encountre, p 148; 'Gazette', p 457; Hall, p 562 records that a report of this caused trouble in Henry's camp in France where Derby was, E.W. Ives, in 'Patronage at the Court of Henry VIII', pp 352-355 assesses 'A Ballate of the Batelle of Floden Feeld foughhte betwene the Earle of Surrey and the King of Skotes' BL Harl. 293, 367. The suggestion of a feud between Surrey and Derby is fanciful, but the division of his forces to place some under the leadership of Edmund Howard, the blood relationship between Howards and Stanleys notwithstanding, was unwise since he was unknown to the men.
213 Stow, op. cit., p 828; He slew Sir David Home; Trewe Encountre, p 148
214 'Gazette', p 457; Trewe Encountre, p 148; LP I, 2913
215 Rotta in W.M. Mackenzie, The Secret of Flodden, p 121; LP I, 2283; 2460
216 'Gazette', p 456; Trewe Encountre, p 145
217 LP I, 2283; Trewe Encountre, p 150; 'Gazette', p 456; Hall, p 562
218 CSPV ii, 316
219 LP I, 2283; Hall, p 562
220 Surrey's Message; 'Gazette', p 457
Accounts vary considerably here as to the reasons for Stanley's success though all agree it was complete, Hall, p 562; Holinshed, p 597; 'Gazette', p 457.

222 Surrey's Message, see below note 226.

223 'Trewe Encountre', p 151, Echyngham clearly came with Surrey and not the fleet, PRO E101/61/27, and was therefore knighted by him, but other captains were knighted by the admiral.

224 Surrey's Message; 'Gazette', p 457; Hall, p 564; LP i, 2283

225 Cambridge Ms. Dcl. 3. 86; CSPV ii, 341

226 See note on sources above.

227 Surrey's Message, later notes; This figure does not include those killed in flight; Hall, p 564; LP i, 2913; 'The Flodden Death Roll', Scot. Antiq. (1899); Weever, op. cit. p 559

228 CSPV ii, 340, 316; LP i, 2283; 'Gazette', p 457; Hall, p 563; Trewe Encountre, p 150; Weever, op. cit., p 559 where considerable English casualties are acknowledged.

229 Surrey's Message; Weever, op. cit., p 559; PRO SP1/5, f 41; CSPV ii, 316; Ruthal was convinced that St Cuthbert had interceded and wanted James's body left at Durham, but Surrey declined, LP i, 2283, 2284

230 Surrey described himself after the battle as being "soo ferre weryed with labour and fro being without mete and drynk and lak of slepe that I am right weke at this hour, but tomorough I trust to be freshe. . ", Surrey's Message; LP i, 2283, 2651; J.D. Mackie, 'English Army at Flodden', Misc. Scot. Hist. Soc. (1951) p 80; Trewe Encountre, pp 147, 150

231 LP i, 2283; The invasion was reckoned to be the Bishop of Moray's doing by Dacre, LP i, 2378 and Trewe Encountre, p 150

232 There is frequent mention of meetings of the council for the purposes of drafting messages to James and agreeing strategy in all the sources; LP i, 2283.

233 Both at Ayton and in the action with Andrew Barton.


235 Trewe Encountre, p 148. The Scots did take prisoners on a much greater scale, p 150; LP i, 2381; 2386 for Dacre's assertion he was too busy to take prisoners which shows that Henry and Wolsey concerned themselves with profits from this source.

236 LP i, 2684 (1, 2)

237 LP i, 2238; PRO E101/56/27; BL Egerton, 2603, f 30

238 J.D. Mackie, 'English Army', p 81; PRO E101/56/27

239 A. Raine, York Civic Records, iii, p 41; J.D. Mackie, 'English Army' pp 73-4; LP i, 2546

240 PRO E101/56/27; NRO Chamberlain's Account Roll, 4-5 Henry VIII, total cost £1 8s. Od.

241 LP i, 2260, 2304 no. 5

242 PRO SP1/4, f 79

243 Spont ed., op. cit., 87, 88, 89, 91, 94, xliii; LP i, 2275

244 LP i, 2304, no. 4; Spont ed., op. cit., pp xliiv, 96

245 Spont ed., op. cit., 98, p 189 note 1

246 LP i, 2478 nos. 2, 3; Hall, p 567 slips up giving the month as September.

247 Spont ed., op. cit., 95, 97, 98, 101, 102, 105, 106

248 LP i, 2574, 2680, 2680; PRO SP1/230, f 94

249 PRO SP1/230, f 94, LP i, 2680

250 De la Roncière, op. cit., iii, pp 113-4; Hall, p 567; Spont ed., p 189 note 1

251 Spont ed., op. cit., 99; LP i, 3087, 3092

252 LP i, 2574, 2825, 2828

253 LP i, 2913, 3614, iv, nos. 92, 88, 80, 88, 89; PRO C54/382, m 13; LJ i, pp 20-41

254 LP i, 2669, 2759, 2763 nos. 1, 2, 3, 2861 no. 33, 2863 no. 2

255 LP i, 2842, 2888, 3151

256 Hall, p 569; For Prégent's strength Spont ed., 104, note p 199; J. Gardiner -132-
'Contemporary Drawing of the Burning of Brighton', TRHS (1907); A. Anscombe
'Pregent's Raid in Sussex, 1514', TRHS (1914); L.C.C. Laughton, 'The
Burning of Brighton by the French', TRHS (1916)

257 As part of the Barony of Lewes, VCH Sussex, vii, p 254, worth £12 13s.
p.a. according to the 1524 valor, PRO C54/392, m 3
258 LP i, 2938; Holinshed, p 602
259 BL Calig. D VI, f 108; LP i, 2854, 2875, 2888
260 BL Calig. D VI, f 108
261 Ibid.
262 PRO SP1/230, f 188
263 Ibid. This is no figure of speech but a matter which had been debated in
connexion with manning the galleys with oarsmen and recruitment for the
dangerous attack on Brest. Prégent's oarsmen were convicts chained to their
posts, Spont ed., p 71, n. 1, and Saby had urged in 1512 and 13 that the
use of convicts be considered, Spont ed., p 143, but Edward Howard had not
pursued it, preferring to nurture reckless courage in his men.
264 BL Calig. VI, f 108; PRO SP1/230, f 188
265 LP i, 2956, 2957
266 BL Calig. D VI, f 108; LP i, 2605, 2681; Spont ed., p 104
267 LP i, 2974
268 BL Calig. D VI, f 249, f 250; LP i, 3009, figures are spurious. No more
than 20 vessels and c. 2,000 men can have participated in the raids given
the total number of ships at sea, LP i, 2842, 2888 and the various
squadrons then operating; in the north, LP i, 3051, 3148 between Dover and
Calais, LP i, 3148, no. vi, blockading the galleys and escorting the
Zeeland fleet, LP i, 2946.
269 Typically the letter informing Henry of his success was written personally
by Surrey, BL Calig. D VI, f 249, but he sent a second to the council
requesting that letters of thanks be sent to the vice-admiral and captains,
BL Calig. D VI, f 250
270 Spont ed., op. cit., p 110
271 LP i, 3137, 3614 iv, 776
272 LP i, 3111, 3129, 3136, 3226 no 24
273 LP i, 3137, 3148, ix
274 M. Lewis, The Navy of Britain, p 432; E.W. Fowler, English Sea Power In the
Early Tudor Period, p 30; Oppenheim, op. cit., pp 52, 83
275 De la Roncière, op. cit., iii, p 116; Spont ed., op. cit., pp xiii-xlili
276 Spont ed., op. cit., pp xxx-xxx1
277 PRO SP 1/4 f 4, 29
278 LP i, 2968, 3012, 1661 no. 3, 2842, 2888; Spont ed., p 83
279 C.S.L. Davies, 'The Administration of the Royal Navy under Henry VIII:
The Origins of the Navy Board', EHR, (1965) pp 271-2
280 M. Lewis, Navy of Britain, p 343
281 He had not prevented the wastage of casks and bows and arrows, LP i, 1913;
PRO SP1/4, f 67, SP1/3, f 74, SP1/229, ff 187-8; Clowes, op. cit, p 457; On
discipline Echyngham is equivocal out of loyalty, Spont ed., 76
282 BM Calig. D VIII, f 250
283 Spont, op. cit., p 76; He referred to Brandon as his cousin, PRO SP1/229,
f 163 and also wrote to Wyndham as such, whereas Edward had tended to
address the latter by his office, LP, f 2305, 3614, p 1519 171 and 172
284 PRO SP1/4, f 79
285 BL Calig. D VIII, f 249; PRO SP 1/230, f 188
286 See note 286 below for Wolsey; others LP i, 2946, 2959, 3001
287 He addressed Wolsey as "Myn owne gode master awlmosner" and signed himself
"Your owne", PRO SP1/3 f 200, or used "Yours Asswredly", eg. PRO SP1/229,
f 166, 167, BL Calig. D VI, f 104 but his reliance is best demonstrated by
PRO SP 1/4, f 79; For Edward and spending, Spont ed., p 124
288 PRO SP1/229, f 187; Cables, PRO SP1/229, f 168, bows, PRO SP1/ 229, f 187;
profit, PRO SP1/4, f 81

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PART 2

THE EARL OF SURREY, 1514–1524
In following Surrey from the war period into the years beyond, the researcher is confronted with so marked a decline in the quantity and quality of the source material available that it is difficult to avoid the impression of a camera moving back from the close-up to a distant, often blurred image. The cessation of the correspondence which his service away from court generated is one obvious cause, but an additional problem arises after 1515 because the screen is often filled by the man who finally emerged as the prime beneficiary of the war, Thomas Wolsey, so that other rising stars including Surrey and Suffolk, the chief rival to the Howards after Flodden, often appear to have bit-parts. Though courtiers were affected by Wolsey's rise, none suffered more in this respect than his fellow councillors, whom he is widely held to have outclassed, rendered superfluous and progressively excluded from real influence in foreign and domestic affairs alike, so that some retired in disgust, others rebelled and were humiliated, and the remainder worked in his shadow. Yet the fact that even Henry can appear to be insignificant suggests that a distortion is at work in the sources. The problem lies in the fact that, combining theatricality, eloquence, indeed charisma with the memorandum making, annotating and record keeping habits of a well trained clerk, Wolsey was effectively a public relations genius with a hotline to the future.

My aim in this chapter is, therefore, to attempt to piece together the careers of Surrey, his father and their following in court, council and the localities in the first years of Wolsey's greatness, as far as the severe inadequacies of the source material allow. In particular we must ask how far the Howards were obscured by Wolsey, and whether there is any basis for the widely held view that after 1514 Norfolk was unimportant in comparison with Wolsey, and Surrey was the minister's leading rival. However, the first part
of the chapter consists of a summary of political developments at court during the war years and immediately after, when Wolsey was only one of several beneficiaries of the war and the Howards probably perceived the real challenge as coming from Brandon. The second part deals with the period from Wolsey's appointment as chancellor to Surrey's departure for Ireland in 1520.

1. Politics from 1512 to the end of 1515: rivalry with Brandon.

The very considerable contribution of the Howards to the war has already been outlined, but its political significance is reinforced by the observation that in both 1512 and 1513 the family raised something in excess of 1,000 men for their own retinues, mainly from East Anglia. More important than the size of the Howard tenantry per se, was the family's ability to recruit an impressive proportion of the East Anglian gentry to serve or contribute retinues to the campaigns in which they took leading roles. This was partially due to the fact that at the outset of war Oxford was no longer fit to fight, had no adult heir to lead his affinity in his place, and had endorsed the Howard succession to his role in the region by marrying his heir to Surrey's daughter. This was not the only reason for Howard military leadership of the region, for Surrey's prominent role in the council, and above all his family's proximity to the royal couple, the initiators of the war, were crucial in attracting men beyond the former Mowbray affinity to the Howards. However, mixed fortunes in war resulted in there being no Howard to lead the many East Anglians who joined the army royal in 1513. Though Berners and Essex were appointed to responsibility in Henry's force, it was Charles Brandon Viscount Lisle, increasingly the king's favorite since the deaths of Knyvet and Edward Howard, who as marshal and second in command became the natural point of focus for East Anglians.

Though he had been Sir Edward's closest friend and was his executor along with Edward's wife, Surrey and his heir cannot have relished his success, for tensions existed between them by this date. Appearance suggest that Sir Robert Brandon, Charles's uncle and the only remaining member of the family resident
In East Anglia, had been deliberately ignored by Surrey, while none of the Brandons appear to have been associated with the Howards or the inner ring of their affinity in trusteeships and the like despite former mutual membership of the Mowbray affinity." Indeed, conflict between Charles's grandfather, Sir William Brandon, and Surrey's father at the succession of the young fourth Mowbray duke of Norfolk, when Brandon bore much responsibility for the increasing lawlessness of the Mowbray affinity in its rivalry with the de la Poles, may well have been at the root of Surrey's attitude. The Brandons had continued to have a reputation for riot in East Anglia thereafter, but had abandoned the Yorkist cause and been on the winning side at Bosworth. Though Charles became very close to Edward and Knyvet, he probably annoyed Surrey by showing a complete disregard for the status quo in East Anglia in his pursuit of advancement.

However, with the death of Knyvet and then Muriel, who made her father her executor, a far more serious occasion for bad feeling arose, for it appears to have emerged that Knyvet had sold the wardship of his step-daughter, Surrey's granddaughter Lady Lisle, to Brandon on easy terms. Surrey, his sons and Boleyn held the lease on all the Lisle lands to the use of Knyvet and Muriel and clearly declined to surrender it. More than financial considerations may have been at issue here, for the record with regard to women of both Charles and his father was such that Surrey had reason to view the prospect of his eight year old grand-daughter growing up in his household with concern. Brandon had his position confirmed by a royal grant of the wardship on 3 December, but continued to be unable to implement it. An accommodation was finally reached, for on 7 January the Howards were granted a portion of the rent they owed in arrears, and on 12 February a release from all demands in respect of the lease, while in the same month Brandon contracted to marry his ward when she reached a suitable age and was created viscount Lisle. Only then did the Howards surrender the lease and Brandon's surveyors gain access to the estates, but they were headed by Oliver Pole, the Lisle, Knyvet and Howard.
administrator of the lands. In April 1513 Brandon thus finally obtained a second grant and gained indisputable control of the Lisle lands, but it had not been easy.

When Edward, who may have had a part in the resolution of this dispute, was killed soon afterwards, and Lord Thomas was appointed to undertake the Brest attack in cooperation with Lisle, they were on sufficiently good terms for Howard to refer to him as his cousin. However, relations deteriorated when, instead of using his favour with Henry to help Howard persuade the king of the dangers they and Fox clearly foresaw in the royal strategy, Lisle negotiated his own release from the enterprise so as to join Henry in France, where rewards were bound to be more easily and more safely won. This must have confirmed the Howards in regarding Brandon as a fair weather soldier and an opportunist untroubled by conscience, whose main concern was to avoid making the sacrifices in the royal service which Knyvet and Edward had made, or indeed, undertaking unglamorous service far from the fount of bounty as several members of the Howard affinity, such as Wyndham and Boleyn were then doing, and as others of the Howard affinity had done in 1512. Moreover, the execution of Edmund de la Pole and the natural death of Oxford opened up new possibilities in East Anglia. Under these circumstances Lisle's military success in the Low Countries, and 'courtship' of the regent Margaret, which must have looked like an attempt to usurp the special relationship which the Howards had enjoyed with her court, cannot have pleased Surrey and his heir and may have made them the more determined to bring James to battle.

In any event, the scale of the Howard victory and particularly the death of James, made an impression on popular opinion, and thus had an impact on English politics, which has been largely overlooked. The Howards did what all the court, and especially the king, had been striving to do: to equal or surpass the ancient triumphs of English chivalry, and thus regain the ground which the family had lost. It is revealing of the degree to which those in the know believed Henry to be under the influence of Wolsey and Lisle at this time.
that Ruthal thought it necessary to advise the former that unless the king rewarded the Howards appropriately his nobility would never again willingly undertake the dangers of military service.\textsuperscript{29} It is clear, however, that Henry required no such prodding, but on the contrary was so delighted with news of a victory which made him the toast of Europe,\textsuperscript{24} that he responded with the spontaneous advancement of Surrey to the dukedom of Norfolk and Lord Thomas to his father's earldom. Only ten days after the battle, when the hanaper paid the senior Howard's annuity as earl marshal, it referred to him as duke of Norfolk, and this is not the only example of the new titles being used by others, while on 11 November Norfolk signed himself as such.\textsuperscript{25} It was important for the Howards that their retainers, the captains of the fleet, many of whom had served continuously, and men like Echyngham, who had voluntarily forgone the glamour of the French campaign to serve with Surrey, reaped the rewards of their loyalty to the Howards.

The queen was probably not exceptional among those who had stayed behind in comparing achievements in France with those at home unfavourably, which, no doubt, aggravated the inevitable jealousies.\textsuperscript{26} Wolsey may have conducted unflattering investigations into financial aspects of the northern campaign,\textsuperscript{1} and rumours circulated to the detriment of Edmund Howard, clearly the weakest link in the Howard chain, though Henry refused to entertain these, and Edmund came out of the war quite well, boasting the courtesy title Lord Howard as a result of his father's elevation.\textsuperscript{28} However, both royal pride, which demanded that the successes in France be acknowledged, and Henry's paramount consideration that winter, the creation of a favorable atmosphere for the renewal of the war on a grander scale than ever,\textsuperscript{2} required a gesture which would reconcile all those who had fought in 1513 by equal acknowledgement of their service.

Thus, when Henry presided over the grand celebration of English arms at Lambeth Palace on Candlemas day 1514, at which Norfolk and Surrey received their patents, Lisle was raised to the dukedom of Suffolk and Herbert to the
earldom of Worcester. Unlike the Howard grants, these were not spontaneous rewards for outstanding military service, despite the part both had played in the successful siege of Tournai, for on 12 December and as late as 9 January 1514 Lisle was still referred to by the wardrobe and in a patent as such, the first indication of his impending creation as duke of Suffolk coming from the Venetian ambassador as late as 12 January. Moreover, whereas Norfolk was granted estates worth £384 p.a. in tail, as well as the famous addition of James’s arms to his own, and Surrey lands worth over £333 p.a. for life, Suffolk received a castle and manor, and Worcester only the usual fee of £20 p.a. for an earl.

Worcester’s promotion had wide support on the council, as a result of his Beaufort blood and dedicated service, but Brandon’s, transparently the result of royal favour, shocked many, and cannot have been greeted with enthusiasm by the old guard, not least Norfolk. The support of Wolsey, who was himself rewarded with the bishoprics of Tournai and Lincoln, was probably crucial, for he and Lisle, whose prospects advanced together during the 1513 campaign, had become close, and the effect of Flodden was naturally to draw them together to protect their gains. If Henry hit upon the idea of raising Brandon to the dukedom of Suffolk to promote his marriage to Margaret of Austria and so improve military cooperation with the Habsburgs, while, at the same time, conclusively excluding Richard de la Pole who had served the French king in arms in 1513, Wolsey had every motive for encouraging him.

Born in Ipswich himself, he may well have been sensitive to the implications of a further increase in Howard power in East Anglia. Flodden had placed the Howards in a stronger position to press for the remaining de la Pole lands than Lord Thomas had been in 1510, when he obtained a large portion of them in lieu of his first wife’s inheritance. By the end of 1513 the family’s position in East Anglia was formidable indeed, and it was unlikely that Henry would be able to deny Norfolk control over the de Vere estates and offices during the minority of the heir, his son-in-law, especially considering the
fact that a not insignificant portion of both consisted of the original Howard patrimony or lands and offices which had once been held by his father. This would mean that long established Howard dominance of eastern Norfolk and Suffolk was extended through the west of both counties well into Cambridgeshire and far south into Essex, giving Norfolk and his heir a land base and following far greater than that which Oxford or any Mowbray had ever possessed in the region. It was a prospect which would have given any king pause, and Wolsey, along with other councillors schooled by Henry VII, can have had no doubt of the advisability of introducing some form of potential check on the local power of the dukedom, despite the proven loyalty of the new incumbent and his heir.

Thus neither Norfolk nor Surrey obtained additional lands in East Anglia, though in May 1514 the duke was duly granted control of the de Vere lands and offices. Norfolk's Flodden grant consisted of a disparate collection of lands spread over nine counties, all remote from both East Anglia and Surrey and Sussex, so that for the first time since his father under Richard III, the duke of Norfolk became a substantial landowner outside the Mowbray heartlands, though, with the exception of ten manors in Shropshire, they were thinly spread. Not long after he was, however, able to exchange the remotest of these, in Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, for additional manors in Shropshire, Oxfordshire, Wiltshire, Berkshire and Gloucestershire. Surrey, by contrast, acquired a life interest in a homogeneous estate, that of the late viscount Beaumont in Lincolnshire, which, like the de la Pole lands, had been administered by Southwell, and was then held by Oxford, who had married Beaumont's widow. This estate, which lay for the most part between Spalding and Newark, with some property further north and in Lincoln itself, was considerably the easier to administer, since his father already owned lands no far distant in an area south of the Wash between King's Lynn and Spalding. These were administered by Norfolk's right hand man, Sir Philip Tylney, who was a landowner himself in the area, and Surrey also had other influential connexions with lands nearby: William, Lord Willoughby and Sir John Hussey.
In October 1514 Surrey was admitted to all three Lincolnshire benches, though his father did not appear on the commissions for the counties where he had acquired land.44

Since Suffolk’s de la Pole castle and manor lay in Berkshire he had not impinged on the Howards; indeed he seems to have realised that his rapid rise had aroused jealousies which could be dangerous and assumed a new modesty.4 He remained chiefly at the king’s side, avoided working meetings of the council where he would clearly have been surrounded by hostility but naturally assumed a greater role in ceremonial, where he was probably forced to look to Norfolk for a lead, given the hostility of Buckingham, the senior duke, to the new elevations.46 The salutary experience he had had of Howard power before Flodden, the subsequent growth thereof, and the fact that Surrey held crucial de la Pole lands probably suggested the wisdom of cultivating the Howards, but though he and Surrey were united in promoting the new campaign, a strong element of competition remained. Suffolk began well with an appointment to recruit fighting men in Flanders,47 but Surrey had the advantage of being rather less dependent on war for a role in affairs, due to a standing and acceptability in council which the other lacked. He used his new status and weight to promote the offensive which Henry and Wolsey were planning in the face of renewed opposition. He was appointed “earl marshal” of the new campaign on 24 April, for the army by sea.48 Though his activities with the navy in the winter and spring of 1514 were demanding of his time, he was, unlike Suffolk, appointed a trier of petitions for England in the new Parliament, along with his father and other great officers of state and councillors of the inner ring, no doubt because both Henry and Wolsey valued his support for the war in parliament.49 Both he and Norfolk attended the state opening on 5 February, when Warham made his famous anti-war speech, and on 8 February and four subsequent occasions he appeared in fourth rank among the earls, a precedence he claimed by virtue of being the son of a duke. On 17 February, however, his case was discussed after consultation with Garter King of Arms and he was
demoted to the penultimate position among the earls in accordance with his own creation.\footnote{2} Nothing daunted, he continued to attend regularly through February, March and early April, like his father.\footnote{3}

At court, playing his part as an earl in ceremonial and martial occasions, his status was not equal to Suffolk's, but as a result of Flodden his prestige was as great. His Garter nominations at the chapter held at Greenwich on 23 April are interesting, suggesting as they do that he did not follow his father slavishly, except where family interests were concerned.\footnote{4} For instance both nominated their neighbour Lord Fitzwalter, who had supplied tenants for their campaigns, Lord Dacre and Sir Edward Stanley for their part at Flodden, and their distant relative the earl of Derby, but Surrey typically sought to promote Lord Ferrers, who had served under him at sea, and other fellow jousters. Norfolk's desire to promote members of his family in a competitive atmosphere may be seen in the fact that for the first time he nominated a member of his family to the Garter, his step-son Berners. As before Surrey took part in the May joust as a challenger, and, with his father attended Sir Edward Stanley's creation as baron Monteagle on 21 May, the result of Stanley's part at Flodden and probably of Howard patronage.\footnote{5}

Whereas Suffolk apparently attended only large meetings of the council Surrey's presence at workaday sessions was clearly frequent before he went to sea, for his naval responsibilities required his participation in deliberations concerning the war, and he also had a voice in matters relating to Scotland which were very much to the fore.\footnote{6} The war had brought other members of the Howard affinity to the council board, all of whom seem to have become increasingly regular attenders in the years which followed. Berners was there already, but Boleyn and Wyndham now appeared as well as other men associated with the Howards in the past who had risen through the war, like Sir William Sandys.\footnote{7} Whether they tended to support Norfolk in council must be extremely doubtful, however, and their attendance was probably so much less frequent than his that it would hardly have been significant if they had. The addressees of
letters to the council including the admiral, suggest that in the spring of 1514 power was shared by Norfolk, Fox and Wolsey, the greatest change from pre-war days clearly being the rise of the latter.\footnote{143}

If there had been rivalry over the exercise of influence in foreign affairs in 1513 - and Suffolk's mission in the Low Countries looked like renewing it - Norfolk's retention of an important role in Anglo-Imperial relations is suggested by the facts that in April Spinelly addressed a letter to him, Fox and Wolsey, and he authorised the payment of the expenses of a servant of Margaret of Austria on his return to her.\footnote{18} This, together with his standing after Flodden, may have determined his considerable exercise of patronage in the appointments of the household and jousters who were to accompany Henry's sister Mary when she became princess of Castile by her marriage to Charles at Calais, on 15 May.\footnote{19} No doubt the Howards were pleased when Margaret begged Henry not to send Suffolk to the Low Countries since the fact that Europe buzzed with rumours of their forthcoming marriage was compromising her politically, and threatening her Anglophile policies.\footnote{1} Any satisfaction which the severance of Suffolk's ties with the Low Countries may have given the Howards was shortlived, however, for it soon became clear that matters were going seriously wrong with the alliance. Ferdinand's conclusion on 13 March, of a truce with France including his allies was a bitter blow the third he had delivered Henry,\footnote{20} but Maximilian's acceptance soon after was far worse, especially since it was becoming clear that the emperor did not intend to carry out the marriage arranged the previous autumn, despite preparations on the English side.\footnote{21} This marriage had first been negotiated by Norfolk in 1507 and there can be no doubt that he remained deeply associated with it, and suffered accordingly.\footnote{22}

When the agreed date for the marriage passed there was no escaping the fact that Henry's honour had been seriously impugned, and councillors appear to have been united in endorsing the complete reversal of English foreign policy which Wolsey and Fox had been exploring.\footnote{23} This had an important attraction for
them, but particularly for Norfolk, quite apart from the defence of Henry's honour. The duke had had a business training, and there is evidence which suggests that in the matter of royal finances, for which he had overall responsibility as treasurer, he could not happily see expenditure outstripping income. He may have opposed the setting up of the spears on the grounds of cost, it is probable that his support of the French war had always been lukewarm for the same reason, and he had kept costs to an absolute minimum during the Flodden campaign. By 1514 royal finances had suffered severely from the war, and it was perfectly clear that even the most generous Parliamentary grant could not make any real impression on the problem. That Wolsey had taken up and was now following to its logical conclusion a concern which had initially been Norfolk's and that of other senior councillors, and had their support for that reason, seems clear. Grants to Howard relatives and particularly the concession to Norfolk on 29 May of the custody of de Vere lands and offices, could well be significant, for the king, who did not concern himself with pedestrian matters like finance, remained enthusiastic about the war and it would have been difficult to cool his belligerence or detach him from the imperial alliance if the victors of Flodden, with much to gain from both, had continued to urge him to fight.

There are indications that Surrey, whose many letters of 1513 and 1514 bear witness to his acute awareness of the financial problem, was also a supporter of the peace. The fact that at the procession to Henry's investiture with the papal cap and sword on 21 May, he went arm in arm with the Venetian ambassador in the place of honour preceding the king, indicates his association with the change of direction in policy, for Venice was France's closest ally. Moreover, when he went to sea late in May he was fully aware that there would be no invasion of France and the aim of his campaign was to assist the negotiators in obtaining the best possible terms for peace. Norfolk's agreement with this policy is clear, since in June he joined other councillors of the inner ring in informing the emperor's envoys that had Henry not been
treated like a boy by his father-in-law and Maximilian no drastic action would have been required to restore his honour. "When the envoys took pains to see Norfolk alone they found him every bit as tight lipped as Fox. Only Wolsey threatened, cajoled and finally asked outright what the intentions of the emperor were. Moreover, Norfolk's presence with certain leading councillors at Wanstead, on 30 July, when Mary renounced her contract with Charles, constituted an open signal of his support for the new policy."

On 2 August, when negotiations with the French were complete, Norfolk was appointed with Fox and Wolsey to conclude the treaty for peace and the marriage of Mary to Louis, and took part in its signing on 7 August. "It seems unlikely that he played a substantial role in negotiations, for Louis had no doubt that it was Wolsey who had persuaded the king and his sister, neither of whom were easily converted, to the new alliance." However, the fact that Norfolk obtained a French pension which was initially larger than Wolsey's is indicative of the very great importance attached to his compliance, due to the great influence he had with the king and on opinion at court. "Both the duke and his heir attended the proxy marriage of Mary at Greenwich on 13 August whereby they publicly supported the alliance, which was even less popular with Henry's subjects than it was with the king. "In mid September Norfolk was among those who corroborated Henry in telling Margaret's envoy in no uncertain terms that the failure of the marriage alliance with Charles was entirely the fault of the imperialists, though he and other councillors took pains to assure Margaret and the emperor that no aggression was intended against them."

Not surprisingly in the circumstances, Norfolk, who had accompanied the princess Margaret to her marriage in 1503, was appointed to head the party which was to escort Mary to France, and her household was little altered from that when she was to be princess of Castile. "Berners had been one of the first to be appointed, as her chamberlain, and was therefore deeply involved in preparations prior to her departure, while his daughter Jane was to be her chamberer. "Of her gentlewomen, several, including the Boleyn daughters came
from families more or less close to the Howards, but Howard patronage is far more readily apparent among the noblemen and women who were to be in her entourage for the twenty-day mission. These included the duchess of Norfolk and her daughter Anne, countess of Oxford, Surrey and Lord Edmund Howard, Surrey's former relatives by marriage the earl of Devonshire and marquis of Dorset, the latter's wife, his ubiquitous brothers, Lord de la Warre, Norfolk's neighbour and friend in Sussex, Lord Montague and his wife and Ruthal, whose presence in the entourage rather than the group of councillors who went ahead to negotiate with Louis suggests continuing identification with Norfolk since Flodden. Amongst the bannerets and knights there were Howard and de Vere servants, others with territorial connexions with the family, and many who had served under them in war as well as some courtiers/jousters long associates of Surrey.

Contemporary descriptions of the magnificence of Mary's entourage at its departure and the loans taken out by its members beforehand bear witness to the expense involved in representing her brother. Lord Edmund borrowed £100 to equip his retinue of a hundred horses, which was to uphold Henry's honour at the jousts in celebration of the marriage, and Surrey had fifty-eight. As with James IV in 1503, Norfolk, whose savoir faire as a courtier tends to be overlooked, rapidly ingratiated himself with Louis perhaps to the annoyance of the royal bride, as in 1503. In a friendly letter mainly concerned with the postponement of the celebratory jousts, the duke informed Wolsey of the growing importance of the heir apparent, Francis, whom not only Robertet but also Louis consulted daily, assuring him that the prince spoke well and wisely. Even before this letter arrived a decision was made to send Suffolk to France, ostensibly to participate in the tournament and advance negotiations for a meeting between the kings, but with instructions from Henry to arrange an offensive alliance against Ferdinand which were kept secret from other councillors and particularly Norfolk. Clearly the idea of hitting back at his father-in-law was the main attraction of the new alignment for Henry. While
Wolsey is unlikely to have encouraged this, since it would have been as costly as any other war, he supported the depatch of Suffolk, a valuable friend, probably because he was concerned that the Howards were making very useful contacts at the French court which might destroy the primacy he had gained in Anglo-French relations.

An episode revealing of the tensions at the English court began the day after the marriage on 10 October, when Mary's escort was preparing to leave, because Louis dismissed Mary's 'mother Guildford' and most of her household servants with Norfolk's acquiescence. Mary complained bitterly to Henry, convinced that had Wolsey accompanied her instead of Norfolk he would have looked after her interests better, but it is doubtful that she made any complaint to Norfolk. Suffolk, writing to Wolsey from Canterbury when the news reached him, was immediately convinced of a plot by Norfolk and Surrey to secure the dismissals because the servants in question were of Wolsey's choosing and not theirs. He believed that their intention was to make Mary unhappy so as to discredit Wolsey and himself, probably because they had persuaded her to marry Louis in the first place. His reaction was to speed up his departure before the returning Howards could have it countermanded, which he begged Wolsey to resist.

This letter appears to be convincing evidence of competition for influence in foreign affairs between the Howards on the one hand and Suffolk and Wolsey on the other. Rivalry between these groups, with Fox in the Howard camp, was, in Margaret of Austria's view, at the root of the treaty with France. However, even if Suffolk did know Wolsey's mind as well as he thought he did, his interpretation has serious flaws. Norfolk's freedom as head of the mission was actually severely circumscribed, in that he was forced to consult with Ruthal and the other councillors who had gone ahead: Worcester, Do wra and West, all of whom knew that in allowing Louis complete licence with regard to Mary's servants Norfolk was simply following the instructions which had been issued to them jointly. Thus, if the Howards had influenced Louis's decision —147—
over the dismissals, they would have had to do so secretly, an exercise requiring great influence indeed. Moreover, though there was a Howard contingent among the ladies who were not dismissed, some Howard appointees did lose their jobs, the most prominent among them being Berners, while in the case of Lady Guildford at least it is clear that she was fired because Louis took a personal dislike to her. Significantly, when Louis's explanations were weighed by Henry and his councillors, Norfolk's stance was ultimately endorsed though by then the storm had passed as Mary was happy again.

There had been something of a ruffle in Anglo-French relations, but this had been less the result of a desire on the part of the Howard party to disrupt the peace, as Suffolk thought, than of competition over the exercise of influence in the countries with which Henry had important relations.

Suffolk's mission, which kept him and Dorset in France until the end of November, was successful in most respects and made him an obvious choice to extricate Mary and her jewels when Louis died at the end of 1514. By countenancing Suffolk's hopes of marrying Mary himself, but making him promise not to do so in France, Henry gave him a vested interest in preventing Francis marrying her off to a French nobleman so as to preclude her return to the marriage market, which Wolsey and other councillors feared. Once home the likelihood of her remarriage to Charles of Castile, which councillors, the regent Margaret and most of Henry's subjects clearly favoured, was very great. No doubt Norfolk heartily disliked the choice of Suffolk for this mission, and feared that Henry was not opposed to his marriage to Mary, for the king had bought back at least one de la Pole estate in the winter of 1514, and in early 1515 Suffolk was granted the bulk of the inheritance, partly in reversion. Most galling for Surrey was the grant to Brandon of the manor of Claxton, which he had forfeited in payment of his war debt.

The "constant practices" of Norfolk and other councillors to prevent the marriage were defeated not by Henry, Wolsey or Suffolk but by Mary. She had not been easily persuaded to marry Louis in the interests of peace, and had done so
on the understanding that on his death she would be free to marry where she
chose. That her choice would be Suffolk was probably well known at court,
but he was fully aware that this match would meet with strenuous
opposition and was confirmed in her fears by the arrival in France of Friar
Langley, head of the Observants in England, almost certainly sent by Norfolk
and the council, who came as her confessor and warned her none too subtly not
to marry Suffolk because, like Wolsey, he had diabolical powers. Knowing she
could place no trust in her brother's promise, given the pressures on him, she
employed tears, and the threat that she would have nothing further to do with
Brandon unless he married her at once, to persuade him to break his promise to
Henry, taking the blame upon herself after the marriage.

Suffolk's enemies, who probably included most of the council at this
point, fuelled Henry's anger at the clandestine marriage, just as the duke
cleverly warned Henry they would. There was a row in parliament on 29 March
when it appears that no one but Wolsey supported Suffolk, and the Howards were
certainly present.' The imposition of very heavy financial penalties on
Brandon was probably Wolsey's device intended not only to assuage the king's
anger, but also to satisfy or at least silence his enemies. Suffolk also
lost three of the offices at court and in Southwark through which he had risen;
Norfolk and Lord Edmund had some interest in that area, and the fact that Sir
Henry Shernbourne, who replaced Brandon in the marshalcies of the Fleet and
King's Bench, showed considerable attachment to the Howards is suggestive.
Further, the fact that Suffolk was forced to return the Lisle wardship and
marriage, which was then sold to Katherine, countess of Devonshire for her son
Henry, suggests the Howard touch.

Though Suffolk had gained a royal wife, a glowing prospect for his
children and a secure place at Henry's court, his marriage compromised him
politically. He had proved himself a useful envoy to Wolsey, but as soon as
Suffolk apprised his friend of the marriage Wolsey instructed him to abandon
his negotiations with Francis for the return of Tournai, his bargaining
position being ruined by his need of Francis's help. Though he finally succeeded in extracting most of what Henry demanded in terms of Mary's due from France he behaved as if he was heavily in the French king's debt, which made him a distinct liability when Wolsey's policy depended increasingly on fencing with France. He had the strongest personal interest in maintaining peace with France, for upon this depended the continued payment of his wife's dower, a very substantial part of his income at this time. Worse still, his links with France resulted in Albany attempting to use him as a mouthpiece, which led to his effective exclusion from political debate regarding Scotland. Thus Suffolk's role as a councillor was limited for many years to come.

In East Anglia, where he took seriously his role of replacing the de la Poles, Howard entrenchment meant that he needed the family's goodwill, especially since he faced considerable difficulties in constructing his landed base there as many of the de la Pole lands he had been granted were in the hands of previous grantees. Surrey held about seventeen per cent of the whole de la Pole estate, which included parts of the honour of Eye including Wingfield Castle, the ducal seat and naturally important to the new duke. Surrey's attitude may be deduced from the fact that late in November 1514, when he realised which way the wind was blowing, he obtained a grant to cut down one hundred oaks in Wingfield park, a typical act of despoliation of an estate for short term profit. In December 1515 he sold Suffolk the four de la Pole manors he held outside East Anglia for one thousand marks in cash, but declined to sell the East Anglian lands which lay quite close to his seat at Kenninghall. In January 1516 Suffolk negotiated an "almost ruinous lease" with Surrey, whereby he paid a cash rent of £413 6s. 8d. p.a. for lands worth about £431 p.a. Moreover, the estate officials appointed by Surrey kept their places, so that Howard influence in the area was hardly reduced by the lease. By May 1516 Suffolk had found that he could not pay the rent, so a number of his feoffees and councillors acceptable to Surrey were bound in recognizances for increasingly large sums to guarantee the payments, which they
Though Surrey milked Suffolk for all he was worth and took pains to guarantee the continuance of his own influence in the area, the Howards were probably not entirely hostile to Brandon's advent, and it is unlikely that his difficulties in attracting a following outside his close relatives were due to their machinations. In the summer of 1516, when Mary first came to East Anglia, she requested and was sent venison from Framlingham and hunted there, as did Suffolk with Fitzwalter and Curzon soon after, while Surrey sent venison to the groom of Suffolk's chamber. Moreover, in 1517 Surrey joustcd in Suffolk's team, wearing the device C and M. Though Howard/Brandon relations were not cordial, they do appear to have settled into a new pattern.

2. The Howards and Wolsey, 1515-1520

Suffolk's marriage and resultant partial political disablement so that he became less the ally and more the client of Wolsey, contributed to the rapid consolidation of Wolsey's position, and by late 1515 he was not only archbishop of York, but also a cardinal and chancellor. If the Howards grudgingly accepted Suffolk when he became a member of the East Anglian establishment, it is hardly surprising that Wolsey's attainment of new status seems to have resulted in a reduction of the rivalry Suffolk had believed existed between Wolsey and Norfolk over the direction of foreign affairs. Their work together in 1507-8 meant that there were areas of agreement between them which became clearer once Wolsey was sufficiently well established not to have to follow every whim of the king. That Surrey, who had acknowledged Wolsey's abilities and looked to him for advice and support when on active service in 1513, should have been willing to accept his growing authority is unsurprising, for he was one of the king's friends whose employment Wolsey had championed when senior councillors had probably been unenthusiastic. Our knowledge that at the height of his power Wolsey could be proud, overbearing and rude to the great, tends to obscure the fact that to climb as he did must have involved the more widespread deployment of the charm he used so effectively on the king.
the Howards were worth cultivating is obvious: far more so than Suffolk, because they were far better established, both in the localities and in the council.

The Howard role in government: parliament, council and exchequer

Though the surviving fragmentary records of council meetings in diverse sources are a relatively small proportion of the whole, they suggest that both Howards took their contribution to government as treasurer and admiral very seriously, and the much better records of attendance in the 1515 Parliament confirm this. In 1515 Surrey had no naval service to prevent him attending the lords, thus of the 36 meetings during the first session of the parliament he was present at 33, one more than his father and four more than Wolsey. In the November-December session, for which the presence is known for twenty-seven of the thirty meetings, he attended sixteen and Norfolk twenty-five. These figures, coupled with the bills put before the parliament, some of which were clearly intended to address the difficult financial situation of the crown and the damage done to trade by the war, strongly suggest that the treasurer and admiral were active in pushing through government legislation, formulated with Wolsey in council.

The duties of the treasurer, as embodied in his oath on taking office, were to "do and purchase the king's profit", look to the interests of rich and poor alike, and counsel the king. Wolsey's rise had no impact on Norfolk's inclination to take all this seriously. He obtained a regrant of the treasurership in 1514, presumably to strengthen his position, but it is likely that he and Wolsey were in considerable harmony over the need to reduce royal spending drastically, by means of an act of resumption, and the abolition of the spears in April 1515, which may have been intended to reduce pressure for war on the king as well as being a means of saving £2,000 p.a. in wages. The years 1513-14 had seen the completion of rationalisations in the exchequer of receipt conducted from within the exchequer, obviously with Norfolk's approval, but other reforms in these years, for instance the decision to
produce annual accounts in 1519, were imposed from above. They were undoubtedly part of a new drive to improve governmental efficiency which probably originated with senior councillors as much as Wolsey.

It is worth pointing out that Norfolk's power over the treasurer's patronage within the exchequer was undiminished by Wolsey's rise, indeed some of the new appointments he made from 1513 were of men particularly close to himself. Amongst the tellers, he appointed John Jennings, apparently from Surrey, in 1513 and Henry Everard, a neighbour in Suffolk and longtime recipient of venison from Framlingham, in 1514, when Sir John Daunce, one of his earlier appointees who had done sterling service during the war, was promoted to an auditorship. Both of these men, like his previous appointees John Hasilwood, John Millet, and Robert Fowler, became active agents in crown finance during the years under review. Norfolk was also able to appoint a clerk of estreats for the first time in 1513, Thomas Walsh, and a foreign apposer, Thomas Pymme in 1515. In 1517 he created a second clerkship of the pells, in survivorship, for John Uvedale, a Yorkshireman by origin, who had been entrusted with the commissariat on the Flodden campaign, was granted arms immediately thereafter, and was Norfolk's secretary by 1518 at the latest. Moreover, several of Norfolk's servants availed themselves of his control of the exchequer court to bring cases in these years. Though he probably dealt personally with foreign merchants, Sir John Cutte, the undertreasurer, carried out day to day exchequer business, while in 1515 and 1516 we have rare evidence of Norfolk's relations with Sir Thomas Lovell, the chancellor, who received venison from him. This may have something to do with the fact that in 1516 the reversion of his office was granted to Norfolk's step-son Berners, paving the way for an increase in family influence in the exchequer.

The increasing Howard presence in the council has already been discussed, but it was qualified by some reduction in the power of Norfolk, from a peak after Flodden when he tended to be addressed first in correspondence directed to the council. On 29 October 1515 the new Venetian ambassador, Giustiniani,
described Norfolk as a person of extreme authority and said he took pains to visit him frequently. However, once Warham had resigned as chancellor and Wolsey had taken his place it was not long before, in January 1516, Giustiniani was referring to Wolsey as "ipse rex". In April he wrote that he went to see Wolsey on all his business, for all really depended on him, though it seems clear that he, Norfolk, Suffolk, Ruthal and Surrey were working together. As a result of the retirement of Fox and Lovell, by August 1517 Giustiniani wrote that Wolsey was not just a cardinal but effectively king. Lest this be taken to indicate that Norfolk had been completely eclipsed by Wolsey, it is worth noting that in his closing report at the end of 1519 Giustiniani wrote that though he thought Wolsey dominated policy making in all the king's affairs, Buckingham, Norfolk and Suffolk were all very great men, but Norfolk was "very intimate with the cardinal".

**Foreign policy and naval affairs**

Though Wolsey's direction of a foreign policy designed to win Henry the status in European affairs which he craved has long been accepted, Norfolk's record of attendance in council and fulfilment of the role of government spokesman on foreign affairs suggests that they were generally in agreement. By mid 1515 it was evident that despite efforts by both Wolsey and the Howards to form good relations with the new king of France, the greatest potential benefit of the alliance, and one in which the Howards were particularly interested, that of settling the government of Scotland in the hands of Queen Margaret and a body of pro-English councillors, was not to materialise as had seemed likely under Louis. When Albany was despatched to Scotland in the summer of 1515 to be regent, it was manifest that English policy had failed, and conciliar debate of the issue reached a crescendo. Giustiniani wrote at the end of October that Norfolk had said that Albany's actions on his arrival had angered the English, that a new war with Scotland was likely, and that such a war did not contravene the treaty with France. Wolsey spoke just as bitterly as Norfolk about Albany in early January, and the ambassador reported that
preparations for a campaign in the summer were underway, though by 7 February these had revived negotiations.¹⁵¹

Improving relations with the Habsburgs in the same period, though a response to French aggression, revived Norfolk's role and may have reflected his bias, based on considerations of trade and customs revenues. From mid 1515 efforts were made to improve conditions of commerce with the Low Countries, while a treaty for mutual defence was signed on 29 October.¹⁵² Henry was pleased because he hoped to fight Francis, and in June Maximilian thought this likely, but financial constraints suggested instead a policy of employing the Swiss to fight for Henry and assisting the emperor with a loan.¹⁵³ The renewal of war, and even the cheaper alternative of funding of others to fight France was unpopular among councillors, but there is evidence which suggests that Norfolk, like Ruthal, supported Wolsey.¹⁵⁴ Norfolk was soon involved in efforts to attain a closer alliance with Charles which were wrecked when the latter concluded the treaty of Noyon with Francis in August 1516, Maximilian joining him at the end of the year.¹⁵⁵ However, in 1517 the progress of Francis in Italy drew the Habsburgs closer to England, and once more Norfolk played an important role in negotiations, obtaining a pension from Charles to add to his French pension.¹⁵⁶ In February there was talk of a meeting at Calais, and in May renewed negotiations with the Low Countries to relieve pressure on English merchants.¹⁵⁷

Surrey's office of admiral gave him a greater or lesser voice in foreign policy, and more or less naval work according to the international situation. In peacetime he was not generally involved in the keeping of the king's ships, which was in the hands of John Hopton, clerk comptroller, but when, in June 1517, it became desirable to build a new and secure dock next to the storehouse at Deptford for five of the great ships including the Mary Rose, it was Surrey and John Heron, treasurer of the chamber, who indentet with Hopton for its construction for a fee of six-hundred marks, and Surrey who laid down the specifications.¹⁵⁸ The admiral's overriding concern during these years was in
dealing with the effects of continuing piracy in the Channel and North Sea, which was essentially a political problem. However, unsettled conditions had stimulated piracy against English shipping by native as well as French and Scottish vessels. In January 1515, for example, Surrey was detailed to go from London to Beaulieu near Southampton with a small retinue to take possession of John Brigandine's ship, laden with captured Spanish and Breton goods, and in March 1515 and January 1516 two commissions were issued to Surrey and his deputies to hear complaints against English pirates. It is unlikely that Surrey generally presided over his court of admiralty, leaving this to his steward Christopher Middleton, LLB.

Relations with Scotland were improved by Wolsey's treaty with Albany of July 1516, confirmed by James V in January, but French piracy remained a serious problem because of the unwillingness of Francis to make concessions. Indeed, he encouraged French piracy and privateering as a means to sustain Albany's regime, which depended on the maintenance of communications between France and Scotland. In February 1517 Surrey had nine vessels patrolling in the north under the command of Thomas Denys, vice admiral of the north. In February 1518 Giustiniani reported that an English fleet was being prepared, though not so great a one as the council was claiming, and the intention clearly was not simply to intercept Albany, for whose return to Scotland ships were then being prepared in France, but also to make the French more eager to come to terms. To underline the point Henry inspected the fleet at Southampton. The treaty of London ended this escalating confrontation, though matters of piracy were not speedily settled. In 1519 Wolsey took up the cause of English merchants, and a commission was issued in May to Surrey, Tunsall, master of the rolls, and Middleton to hear the complaints of English merchants against French pirates in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. Though this committee sat, without Surrey, and drew up a long list of cases for submission to the French, Wolsey and ambassador Boleyn were much taxed to obtain any favourable outcome.
Though there is no direct evidence of Howard involvement in Wolsey's grand scheme for an alliance of all the European powers as a means of containing French aggression, the Howards clearly had a vested interest in a measure which would benefit East Anglians and merchants generally by increasing security at sea, and solve the Scottish problem.\textsuperscript{169} Not only Norfolk and Surrey, but also Berners, Boleyn, and Wyndham participated in two quite large council meetings in the crucial first two months of 1518 when the raising of men for war was discussed.\textsuperscript{169} The Howards had prominent parts in the series of treaties of early October, Norfolk, Ruthal, Worcester and Ely being commissioned to negotiate, while Norfolk, Surrey and Boleyn signed the first document.\textsuperscript{170} Norfolk was also a signatory to the agreement for the meeting of Henry and Francis, and both attended Henry's swearing to the marriage treaty and the celebrations.\textsuperscript{171} Howard approval is confirmed by the contribution of younger members of Norfolk's family to its success. In April 1518 Berners and John Kite, Bishop of Armagh, had been sent to Charles in Castile in embassy, where the former proved himself both diligent and able, and in November Boleyn, Lord Edmund and other Howard associates were sent to Paris to promote the new friendship and especially the meeting.\textsuperscript{172} Though Edmund's role was purely ceremonial, Boleyn, whose relationship with Wolsey appears to have recovered from a bad patch in 1515-16, was entrusted with negotiations, and during 1519 reported regularly on his embassy's progress.\textsuperscript{173}

The death of Maximilian in January 1519 was unfortunate, for it inevitably resulted in competition between Charles and Francis for the imperial crown, and when in mid May Norfolk expressed a hope that one of the German princes might be chosen, he was no doubt thinking of the preservation of peace.\textsuperscript{174} Another indication of the far greater harmony prevailing between the Howards and Wolsey in 1520 than in 1513 and 1514, and of the seriousness of their commitment to the royal service, lies in the fact that when the meetings of Charles and Francis with Henry finally took place, Surrey, who had initially been listed to participate, was willing to forgo two of them in order to take
up his new mission in Ireland, and Norfolk did not object to staying behind to head the council with Fox, who was called from retirement. Moreover, Berners and Wyndham stayed to assist him on the council. Clearly Wolsey had guaranteed the continuance of Norfolk's French pension, and he was well represented by Lord Edmund and Boleyn and his wife, while, as in ceremonial occasions at the English court, Howard associates among the gentry went to France in considerable numbers.

The Howard role in court ceremonial

Court ceremony and entertainment had been lavish and frequent since the accession of the young king, but with the arrival of Wolsey both were turned to account to dramatise and reinforce political ends, especially in foreign policy. It is thus probably indicative of Howard approval of Wolsey's policies, as well as attachment to the crown, that both Surrey and Norfolk went to the expense involved in attending almost every important court event of the period in question. Surrey continued to appear in the grandest jousts of these years. He tilted as one of six defenders in May 1515 at the joust in honour of the new treaty with France, was a knight waiter to Henry in 1516 at the joust in honour of Margaret of Scotland's visit, and a defender in 1517 at the joust in honour of the Flemish delegation, which probably marked his last appearance in the lists at the age of 43. His brother Edmund also jousted in May 1516 and at Guisnes in 1520, where he was chosen by Henry to fight Francis, a sign of his skill. In 1518 Surrey took part in the mask at Wolsey's splendid celebration of the Treaty of London, when he and his niece Margaret Guildford were one of twelve couples, this being the only recorded occasion on which he danced in a court mask.

Norfolk and Surrey were resplendent and prominently placed at the banquet given by the king at Greenwich in early May 1515. When Wolsey received his cardinal's hat in November, Norfolk and Surrey significantly took prominent roles in the ceremonial. The christening of the Princess Mary at Greenwich in February 1516 suggests the proximity of the Howards to the royal
couple. Wolsey was godfather, the countess of Devonshire was one godmother, being the princess's great aunt, and the duchess of Norfolk, who had no such obvious relationship, the other. Norfolk assisted at the baby's head, Surrey bore the taper, and Boleyn was one of four canopy bearers, but the countess of Surrey's position in Katherine's affections was demonstrated by the fact that she carried the princess. At the obsequies for Ferdinand of Aragon later in the same month Norfolk was chief mourner and Surrey a mourner with other noblemen.

At the banquet at Greenwich of 7 July 1517, for the French and Flemish delegations, Surrey held the basin in which Henry washed his hands, while even Lord Edmund attended on the king. When, in the summer of 1518, Campeggio was finally admitted to England after Wolsey had obtained his legateship, Norfolk lead the reception party which met him at Blackheath at the head of a group of nobles including Surrey, and at the procession to the great hall when Henry received him at Greenwich on 3 August, Surrey walked between the two legates bearing the king's sword. On 27 September at Blackheath Surrey, with a retinue of 160, lead the splendid reception committee for Francis's envoy Bonnivet, admiral of France and thus his counterpart, and accompanied him into London. Three days later he took Bonnivet to Greenwich by barge. He played an important part, as we have seen, in the celebration of the success of this mission, attending the proclamation of the general peace and celebratory masses at St Paul's on 3 October, and the celebrations at Wolsey's residence. When the betrothal of the Princess Mary to the dauphin was enacted on 5 October, Norfolk was prominent, Wolsey placed the ring on the baby's finger and Surrey passed it over the second joint. At dinner thereafter the earl sat on the left of the king while Wolsey and Campeggio sat on Henry's right. In February 1519 Norfolk was again chief mourner, this time for the emperor Maximilian, at St Paul's, but Surrey does not appear to have taken part. However, both Howards naturally attended prominently there on 15 July at the celebration of the election of Charles V.
Since Norfolk was the second ranking nobleman in the realm, with a special responsibility for ceremonial as earl marshal, his record is not surprising, though it confirms that he enjoyed a much greater proximity to the king and queen than did Buckingham, the senior duke. In the case of Surrey, however, it is clear that his place in court ceremony far outstripped his rank amongst the nobility as seen in Parliament, or in council. Compared to other noblemen, the Howards were clearly pillars of the regime, and only Suffolk, Worcester and Shrewsbury could come near them. Moreover, it is striking that in the same period the most lavish court ceremonies, which required enormous numbers of participants so as to impress foreigners with the extent of devotion to the king, found many knights and esquires of the body participating on a scale which they had not done since the coronation. While not wishing to underplay Suffolk or Essex's contribution to the number of East Anglians who attended, many had Howard and de Vere connexions, while others were close to the Howards elsewhere or had been during the war. The ability to recruit such men to do costly service at court clearly made the Howards very useful.

Despite the fact that the sources available for the court are unhelpful with regard to the day to day presence of the Howards, it is not difficult to substantiate the claim that the Howards were very much leading members of the court nobility. The ordinaries of the court drawn up during the reorganisation of 1519, show that both Norfolk and Surrey had permanent residence there, as, of course, did Surrey's wife Elizabeth, who remained one of the queen's ladies in waiting attendant on her in rotation with others. Presumably especially when his countess was with Katherine, Surrey was often at court. The royal couple visited the Howards on several occasions in these years, apparently for the first time. In May 1516 Henry, Katherine and Mary dined at Norfolk's Lambeth residence, and later the king progressed in the south, going to Southampton on 10 August, probably accompanied by the admiral. Between 10 and 13 June 1518, Henry and the court visited Southampton, where Surrey had prepared for them, while in 1519 the king and queen and members of the court
dined with Norfolk at his Lambeth residence on 26 January. In May the queen made a pilgrimage to Walsingham, going out of her way to visit Surrey and his countess at Kenninghall on 10 May on her return journey. In the same year the king stayed at Horsham, almost certainly at Norfolk's house, Chesworth Place.

The Howards continued to be well represented at court, with Norfolk's daughter Elizabeth Boleyn in attendance on the queen, and step-daughter Margaret Bryan transferring from hers to the Princess Mary's household in 1516 to become her governess. Boleyn and Berners were often at court and in 1516 William, Lord Willoughby d'Eresby, a close friend and associate of the Howards, married one of the queen's Spanish ladies, Maria de Salines. However, a new generation of Howard relatives, made up of men in their early twenties and women a little younger, was also coming to the fore. Lest it be thought that they can have had little in common with Surrey, who was forty-one in 1515, it is worth remembering that his wife Elizabeth was not yet twenty herself. The Bryan connexion continued to be useful to both sides. In November 1514 Elizabeth Bryan, daughter of Sir Thomas and Surrey's half sister Margaret married Nicholas Carew, a squire for the body, who came from Surrey like the Bryans; Henry gave the young couple no less than £500 as a wedding gift. Her elder sister Margaret had already married Sir Henry Guildford, who became master of the horse in 1515 and received venison from Framlingham in 1516, while their brother Francis Bryan, who had served under Surrey as a captain in the fleet in 1513, began to make an impact at court at much the same time as his brother-in-law Carew. Both appeared in jousts and revels regularly from 1515, though Carew had made his first appearance in a mask as early as October 1513. The ladies were probably almost as much in evidence at court, for Elizabeth Carew participated in at least one mask, in 1518, and Margaret Guildford in at least three, in 1514, 1515 and 1518. Carew and Bryan became intimates of the king in much the same way that Edward Howard and Thomas Knyvet had been, and were appointed gentlemen of the privy chamber in 1518.
Nor did the Knyvets disappear from court. Eleanor Knyvet, (nee Tyrrell) Sir Thomas's mother, was paid an annuity for the upbringing of her grandchildren. Suffolks bought the wardship of the eldest, Edmund, in 1516, but it came into the Howard sphere when he resold it for a profit to Wyndham. Sir Thomas's youngest brother, Anthony, who had served as a lieutenant in Lord Thomas's retinue in Guenene in 1512, and was an esquire for the body, took part as an attendant to Henry with his brothers Edmund and Jasper in the 1516 tilt, jousted himself in 1517 and attended the banquet afterwards, and jousted at the field of cloth of gold in 1520. Clearly, Henry liked him, and he was to go on to make a career for himself as a gentleman of the privy chamber.

The direct consequences for Norfolk and Surrey's access to royal patronage of having relatives and associates close to the royal couple are far from clear. Probably they ostentatiously went through Wolsey - Norfolk could have no disagreement with the minister's drive to control and limit royal grants generally attributed to him - but the possession of alternative means of access gave them useful leverage. It would have been very hard for Henry, Katherine or Wolsey to refuse reasonable Howard requests, given the scale of Howard service to the crown and the proximity of the family to them at the heart of the court, royal ceremonial and government. From 1514 the Surrays took up the former practice of Sir Edward Howard and Norfolk of giving new year's gifts to the king, and of course receiving them in return, the duchess of Norfolk giving also to the Princess Mary. This practice had been growing steadily since the beginning of the reign, but at this date Surrey and his wife were still members of a select group, and thus had a special call on the king's goodlordship.

The Flodden grant and the de Vere wardship were obviously the most important grants to the Howards in these years, but in February 1516 Surrey, who had paid off all his previous crown loans, borrowed a thousand marks. In June 1517 he bought a wardship from Henry for £300, to be repaid in three
yearly instalments, but in 1519 he owed the king £600, probably due to a new
loan taken out for another wardship shared with Thomas Jermyn, a west Suffolk
gentleman. Lord Edmund and Sir William Rous, a closer Suffolk neighbour of
the Howards, were also bound in 1517 to pay £200 in one year's time. Lord
Edmund had been rolling over earlier debts successfully, but in 1514 after the
loan of the additional £100 to go to France, he was required in the review
carried out by Fox and Wolsey to pay back £50 p.a. until the £375 he owed was
paid off, and Berners likewise until the £350 he owed was paid back. Surrey's
debts were small and rapidly paid off compared with those of Suffolk
and several other noblemen, and, his obvious solvency apart, this may have been
because he was chary of taking too much advantage of royal favour lest it
prejudice his chances of becoming treasurer on his father's retirement.

In 1515 Lord Edmund acquired the post of provost marshal and, apparently
as a result, began to be paid regularly for the 'catching of thieves'. Despite the military overtones of the title, it appears to have been a post
within the jurisdiction of his father as earl marshal which made him
responsible for violations of the peace within a twelve mile radius of the
court. It brought him an impressive salary of £1 a day, much of which was
spent on retaining twenty men in his service. The many grants and
appointments obtained by Boleyn during these years suggest that he was adept at
using his own and his wife's proximity to the royal couple, while their son
George became the king's page in 1518. Indeed the fact that, unlike Norfolk
and Surrey, he was not willing to accept Wolsey's mediation in the distribution
of royal patronage was clearly the reason for the difficulties between them. In
1515 Henry promised him the controllership of the household on Poynings's
promotion to the treasurership, but it was only after he was forced to put
himself entirely in Wolsey's hands, due to his absence on embassy in France,
that he obtained the controllership of the household in 1520 and, when Poynings
died, the treasurership in 1521.

Wyndham, who was probably happy to continue to look to Norfolk for
patronage, seems to have formed a far better relationship with Wolsey. Apart from the Knyvet wardship he bought from Suffolk, he obtained another in 1517, and in 1518 that of the heir of Sir Robert Southwell jointly with Edward Knyvett, also being named to attend the field of cloth of gold. Other East Anglians close to the Howards, like Sir Henry Shernbourne, Sir James Hobart, John Goldingham and John Heydon secured grants, while Surrey's neighbour Henry Noone, esq. obtained a loan.

The Howards and Wolsey's domestic policy

It is tempting to suggest that the picture of substantial agreement between Wolsey and the Howards on foreign affairs and in the management of royal finances holds for the policy of governmental reform in general, but solid evidence is lacking. As a longserving councillor of Henry VII, Norfolk probably recognised the desirability of tightening royal control over the ruling section of society and improving justice, which had swung heavily in favour of local elites since 1509. He and other councillors were probably involved in formulating the proposals outlined by Wolsey to a full council session before the king on 5 May 1516, which he, Surrey and Boleyn attended. However, as senior nobleman/councillor, Norfolk probably felt the delicacy of his position keenly, and was therefore happy to stay in the background and let Wolsey take full responsibility for his proceedings against Northumberland, Dorset, Bergavenny, Hastings, Sir Edward Guildford and Sir Richard Sacheverell.

He was, perhaps, glad of an excuse to absent himself soon after, as Warham, Fox and Shrewsbury had done, for the latter's chaplain reported to the earl that he was severely ill and likely to die at precisely the time when Shrewsbury himself was feigning continued ill health to avoid having to come up to court. Surrey, by contrast, attended the large and probably acrimonious council meeting towards the end of May from which he, Dorset and Bergavenny were reportedly "put out". But for Vergil's ludicrous claim that Surrey once attempted to stab Wolsey, this is the only occasion on which we have anything
approaching solid evidence of serious disagreement between Wolsey and Surrey up to this point, but it is so slender as to defy definitive interpretation.\textsuperscript{237} The fact that neither Surrey nor his father ever appeared on the lists of those whose loyalty was momentarily doubted by Henry and Wolsey, as even Suffolk did, suggests that they maintained good relations with the cardinal, not least because Norfolk understood and approved of his aims.\textsuperscript{238}

One of the best pieces of evidence for the solidarity of the Howards with the regime emerges from the episode known as Evil May Day. Conditions of trade were generally adverse for English merchants during and after the 1512-14 war, while relations between the crown and the city of London were less than totally harmonious.\textsuperscript{239} In 1516 merchants complained vigorously to the council; indeed, they were probably behind the posting of two slanderous bills against Henry and his council in London in April 1515, a matter debated with Norfolk present, when a decision was made to collect the handwriting of all the merchants in the city to discover the culprit.\textsuperscript{240} No doubt Norfolk hoped that trade treaties with Charles would ease the situation, but new levies imposed on English merchants at home probably made them feel that they were funding the emperor's war.

The treasurer and admiral were necessarily aware of this discontent through their contacts with merchants and in the city, where, as earl marshal, Norfolk still had a theoretical responsibility for law and order since it lay within a twelve mile radius of the court.\textsuperscript{241} They clearly knew when, in April 1517, a city broker, John Lincoln, persuaded a priest, Dr Bele, to preach against foreigners to a large gathering in the city, and were aware of the fear this produced among resident aliens.\textsuperscript{242} They were therefore prepared to act when, at about 11 pm on the eve of May Day, the apprentices of merchants and artificers rioted and began attacking the homes of the foreign community. The city authorities were slow to react, though Thomas More, who was close to the Howards, did exhort the crowd to go home quietly.\textsuperscript{243} Surrey with a small force then broke down one of the locked city gates and opened another to admit his
father and Shrewsbury with more men, driving the rioters before him into the
arms of Norfolk, Shrewsbury, Docwra and Bergavenny with small forces. Over
four hundred arrests were made then and on the following day, when the Howards
brought more and more men into the city, in order to make more arrests and
intimidate the citizens into quiescence. The Venetians, among others, suggest
that it was because of this prompt policing action that no foreigners were
killed, though Hall, a Londoner himself and clearly highly biased, played down
the seriousness of the riot, suggesting all was over before the Howards came on
the scene.

Some rioters were examined by the council and sent to the Tower. On 4 May
Norfolk, Surrey, Shrewsbury, and the mayor of London presided over their trial
for treason by special commission of oyer and terminer. The main purpose was
clearly to discover who had orchestrated the whole event, but apart from
Lincoln, no one of substance could be implicated. On the next day Norfolk
proceeded to judgement. Thirteen were found guilty and condemned to be hanged,
drawn and quartered, whereupon, to intimidate the citizens, ten mobile gallows
were moved to strategic places about the city and Lord Edmund Howard, in his
capacity as provost marshal, set about teaching London a lesson it would not
easily forget. Hall claims that he was extremely cruel to the offenders,
many of whom were young, and that Norfolk's servants egged him on and insulted
the citizens because the duke harboured a grudge against them for the slaying
the previous year of a lewde priest of his, but it impossible to substantiate
this unlikely story.

On 7 May Lincoln was executed but the others involved with him were
reprieved temporarily when a message came from the king. On the following day
the council, including Wolsey, Norfolk, Surrey, Shrewsbury, Boleyn and Wyndham,
met to advise Henry on the forthcoming audiences with city authorities and
prisoners. At Greenwich three days later Henry was accusatory and hostile
towards the city delegation, asserting that the authorities had winked at the
riot because they sympathised with the cause, where they might easily have
suppressed it. However, when on 22 May he and his council, including Norfolk, Surrey and Shrewsbury, received city elders and the prisoners at Westminster, the stage was set for another Wolseian showpiece. The cardinal accused the city and prisoners of the gravest misdemeanors, whereupon they begged for mercy, then he and the councillors sued for them to the king and Henry finally relented, Wolsey closing with an exhortation to treat foreigners well.

When there were further agitations in September the city authorities suppressed them with speed and vigour. The complaints of merchants were acknowledged, however, for efforts were made to improve the conditions of trade, especially with the Low Countries. However, on the day after the celebration of the election of Charles V as emperor at St Paul's on 7 July 1519, the council, including Norfolk, met to consider ways of preventing another outburst of violence in London, and it was decided to forbid the Imperial and Spanish ambassadors from rejoicing openly. In addition, from 10-17 July, searches were carried out in the areas surrounding London for agitators, to be repeated simultaneously in all districts on 22 October. Among these commissions Norfolk and Berners headed those for Southwark, Bermondsey, St Olaves, Kentish St, the Bank and Paris Garden and Norfolk that for Lambeth and Lambeth Marsh. Lord Edmund and his relative by marriage, Sir John Legh, headed that for Kennington, Newington, Camberwell, Peckham and Clapham, and Edmund alone Wandsworth, Battersea and Wimbledon. While these commissions were clearly based on the possession of a landed interest in the areas concerned, they are also striking evidence of Wolsey's preference for relying on the Howards over, for instance, Warham, despite the fact that they came at a time when he had launched his second assault on the bastions of privilege, this time involving the Howards more directly.

In 1518 Wolsey's quest for indifferent justice in star chamber involved him in a case which had been brought by one Margaret Salowes against Norfolk's bailiff of Bungay, Richard Wharton, an unpopular man facing a battery of suits
in star chamber.\textsuperscript{266} The examination of witnesses Wolsey arranged on the spot was to be carried out by a well briefed Wyndham and his cousin Sir Roger Townshend. However, Wharton refused to acknowledge the tribunal and the presence at the proceedings of Blennerhasset, steward of Norfolk's household, and Uvedale, the duke's secretary, who announced that Norfolk's pleasure was that Wolsey's appointees should not meddle in the affair, prevented serious business, though Wyndham and Townshend did examine the complainants.\textsuperscript{267}

Wyndham then fell ill and the outcome is unknown, but if the case was settled at all it was almost certainly with Norfolk's active compliance. Though Norfolk was generally well disposed to Wolsey, even when he interfered in East Anglian affairs - on his visit in 1517 he hunted at Framlingham and was presented with 12 bucks\textsuperscript{268} - when control of the duke's administrative machine in his own country was at risk Norfolk appears to have dug his heels in so that there was little that Wolsey could do.

Norfolk was probably a major contributor to the second bout of reforms, of 1519, designed to involve the king more directly in government and thus overcome tension between court and council due to the differing directions in which they had tried to influence Henry since 1509, causing recurrent problems particularly over war and grants.\textsuperscript{269} At the ousting in May of some of the minions, including Bryan and Carew, apparently for their encouragement of the king in undignified frivolity and costly gambling, Norfolk remarked revealingly to the Venetian ambassador that Henry had "come to himself".\textsuperscript{270} His suggestion that Giustiniani congratulate Wolsey on the change may indicate that he sought to involve the cardinal in what appears to have been a move inspired by senior councillors, largely in Wolsey's absence.\textsuperscript{271} Indeed, the fact that Norfolk, Ruthal, Worcester and Marney were appointed to reorganise the royal household may have significance in this regard.\textsuperscript{272} The sincerity of Howard commitment to reform may be judged by the fact that there was further reform in exchequer practices, Berners became involved in the tiresome business of hearing poor men's causes in star chamber, and Surrey undertook the challenge of reforming
Nonetheless Wolsey's quest for indifferent justice continued to cause difficulties for the Howards. Both Norfolk and Surrey attended the council meetings at which Sir William Bulmer was examined for having been retained by Buckingham though he was the king's sworn servant. They cannot have been indifferent, for Bulmer had served well under them at Flodden and might reasonably expect their support. Further, the charge implied criticism of Buckingham himself, with whom Surrey was on good terms and for whom he acted at times as a court agent. Both Howards were among the group of councillors who interceded for the humiliated Bulmer at the meeting at which Henry ultimately pardoned him.

However, potentially the most serious problem for the Howards in these years concerned the uncovering of a dispute in Surrey which had resulted in the perversion of justice over several years and thus came close to Norfolk. The session just mentioned marked the culmination of a crown case in star chamber against the Surrey JPs Lord Edmund Howard, his relative by marriage Sir John Legh and their rival Sir Matthew Browne. The charges, of maintenance, embracery, bearing and retaining, were clearly well founded. Of the three accused, Howard was the only one to admit his guilt on most counts, plead ignorance of the law, and beseech Wolsey and other councillors to be mediators for him to the king. His case proceeded ore tenus, probably resulting in an early pardon and the avoidance of the humiliation of appearing before king and council with the others after Bulmer, when Browne's position was particularly serious due to his persistent perjury. Lord Edmund's misdemeanors appear to have begun in 1515, when he became provost marshal and acquired a sizeable retinue. It seems that he was not engaged in upholding his father's interests, though it is worthy of note that the sessions which Browne was accused of having subverted were held at Guildford and Reigate, where Norfolk owned part of the manors, while Browne was probably a tenant at Dorking, where Norfolk held at least part of the manor which belonged to the barony of Lewes,
of which Lord Edmund was probably already steward.\textsuperscript{272} No doubt Norfolk's advice was an important factor in Edmund's rapid submission and consequent pardon.

In early 1520 Wolsey apparently stepped on Howard toes again, when on 24 January he had a large body of Suffolk and Norfolk JPs and gentlemen before him and the council to explain their failure to execute justice effectively and give pledges for better conduct.\textsuperscript{273} Most of these were more or less close associates of the Howards, but it may be that Norfolk and Surrey, who were both present, were happy for Wolsey to apply the iron fist, leaving the velvet glove to them.

The Earldom of Surrey

The 1512-14 war had transformed Howard's standing and his lifestyle. The circumstances of his creation as an earl had added greatly to his prestige, as had his office of lord admiral, his frequent attendance of council and parliament as well as the court, and the knowledge that he would inherit a dukedom. He had become a nobleman of great consequence, whose daily life ought to have been surrounded with far more ceremony than hitherto, and, since his wealth had become considerable, he was able to show the liberal hospitality expected of a man of his rank.\textsuperscript{274}

It is not possible to calculate Surrey's total income in these years at all accurately, though his landed income was probably as much as £1,200 p.a. His Lincolnshire lands yielded about £400 p.a., and the parts of his wife's jointure he held probably £280 p.a. (the rest remaining in his father's hands).\textsuperscript{275} Of his first wife's lands which he held after her death by courtesy, he retained at least two manors, one worth £11 and the other probably £37 p.a. The de la Pole lands he had sold to Suffolk, or, in the case of the East Anglian manors, leased to him for £413 p.a., while he also received £7 for the farm of part of Costessey which he had somehow retained.\textsuperscript{276} His wardships appear to have been carefully managed to yield almost £100 p.a., and in 1515 or 1516 he bought the manor of Winfarthing close to Kenninghall, which yielded about £80 p.a. and by 1519 he had acquired and farmed out other lands in
Mendham, Suffolk, for a further £8 p.a.. Though we know nothing of his estate management during these years, he does appear to have been quite litigious, primarily due to his pursuit of debtors.

His non-landed income was probably substantial too. It included his annuities as an earl and as lord admiral, but the perquisites of the latter office, and ventures associated with it were probably more lucrative, even if he was not directly involved in trade as his brother had been.

Having noted the way in which Surrey took advantage of Suffolk's problems in securing the de la Pole estates to gain financial advantage, it is unsurprising to learn that he wasted no opportunity which the office of admiral offered, but exploited it with the utmost efficiency. In the year he was appointed he found time, despite the war, to bring a case in chancery concerning a cargo of Flemish woad wrongfully captured as French goods and sold first to him and then to the defendants. It appears that despite the Howard position in East Anglia he had difficulty, as had Oxford, in realising the profits resulting from his rights as admiral of the coast in Norfolk and Suffolk, and that this was the reason for his decision, at Michaelmas 1516, to let the office. Stephen Draper, the son of a Norwich mercer who had commanded his own ship during the war, rented it for seven years at a fee of twenty-five marks p.a., but Surrey reserved the right to all wrecks worth more than ten marks. Nor was this the most lucrative joint venture Surrey entered into with Draper. The admiral also asserted his rights to wrecks and admiralty jurisdiction in Ipswich, where the town had its right to these reaffirmed in 1519, for early in 1520 a decision was made by the town to send a delegation to London to petition Surrey for "the quiet enjoying of the same".

The admiral let the ballasting of ships in the Thames during pleasure to Thomas Spert, master of the Mary Rose and a trusted servant of the admiral during the war, at a rent of £10 p.a. In 1517, probably after the city's humiliation over Evil May Day, Surrey was taking gravel and sand in the Thames.
within what the city regarded as its preserve and selling it. The city’s response was to assign its own appointees to do likewise, and report if they were interfered with by the admiral. On 4 May 1518, the problem persisting, the court decided to send a delegation of four persons to the admiral to point out that he was infringing the liberty of the city. Clearly the matter was not resolved, for in December 1520, after one of the city’s appointees had had his lighter confiscated by officers of the admiral while taking ballast, a decision was made by the chamberlain and his court to send someone to speak with Christopher Middleton. The outcome is not, unfortunately, known.

The captains who had served under Surrey in war naturally continued to look to the earl for advancement, so that it is likely that he benefited from their business ventures. In 1514 William Gonson obtained licence to export 100 sacks of wool, Christopher Coo was appointed bailiff of certain royal manors in Norfolk and then deputy butler of King’s Lynn, while William Sabyn’s career in the royal service as well as in trade burgeoned after the war. Surrey’s effectiveness as a patron has already been noted vis à vis the case of his close neighbour, Henry Noon. His activity clearly concentrated on Norfolk, where the provisioning of his household at Kenninghall alone gave him wide connexions, and necessitated frequent contact with Norwich. As became his increased status, in 1514 and particularly in 1517 he built up the deer parks in Norfolk, his own at Winfarthing and his father’s at Earsham near Bungay, with deer from Framlingham, so as to be able to distribute his own largesse and entertain visitors to hunting. He does not disappear from the Framlingham parker’s accounts entirely, for he visited in 1519, sent warrants for groups of his servants who went there or to Ipswich on business, but it became a rarity for him to order venison to be sent to Kenninghall or command gifts to be sent out, as to the sheriff of Norwich in 1518. His standing in the county may be judged from the fact that his own contacts with Norwich and King’s Lynn in these years are documented in their records; both towns made him expensive gifts, generally in the form of delicacies, when he visited or was in residence.
at Kenninghall, while looking to him as a patron. Private individuals in the area also sent delicacies to the Surreys at Kenninghall.\textsuperscript{294}

The fact that he must inherit his father's estates before long necessarily gave him wider interests in the region too. He and his brother Lord Edmund, who was allotted an inheritance in Suffolk in Norfolk's will of 1516 and was no stranger to East Anglia in these years, replaced their father as the chief feoffees of the Howard following in East Anglia.\textsuperscript{295} Moreover, though Surrey already retained influential men in Lincolnshire, and certainly administered his own estates, having his own lawyers, household and estate officials, his father's auditor Henry Chauncey audited his accounts, as part of a team of Norfolk's councillors who descended for the annual audit.\textsuperscript{296} No doubt Surrey also attended his father's council at Framlingham on occasion, by these means preparing for his eventual succession.

Surrey clearly lived up to his dignity. The reports of court observers testify to the fact that he fulfilled his ceremonial role with flair, that he dressed magnificently, in the height of fashion, a large and glittering retinue proclaiming his wealth and status on such occasions.\textsuperscript{297} Not being the man to waste his resources, his retinue could also be modest according to the needs of the moment.\textsuperscript{298} We know that once he was admiral the king provided him with four trumpeters to herald his approach, and he appears also to have had a band of musicians in his employ to play at mealtimes.\textsuperscript{299} In the eight months from June 1519 to February 1520 Surrey's comptroller expended almost £239 on the wages of his above stairs servants, food and other necessaries for the family and household, suggesting an expenditure of about £400 p.a. despite the fact that the earl and countess and many of their servants were often in London.\textsuperscript{300} No doubt his household had grown, while the quality of the servants he could attract had probably improved. At Michaelmas 1519 he was retaining eight gentlemen of quality, including lawyers, twenty yeomen and seventeen grooms, which cost him £28 for the quarter, quite apart from his below stairs servants.\textsuperscript{301}
However great Suffolk's triumph in his marriage and the birth of his son in these years, Surrey had certainly not been disappointed in his own second marriage. Great care and considerable expense were lavished on the nursery, an independent department of the household, and its inmates, for by November 1519 it catered to the needs of the Surreys' three children, Henry, "Lord Howard", named for the king, "Lady Mary", probably named for the princess, and "Master Thomas". Not surprisingly it had already attracted outsiders, a Lady Katherine, and Margaret and Elizabeth Devenish. In late 1519 and early 1520, when he was preparing to leave for Ireland, taking his family and household with him, Surrey was in every sense well established, and could look forward to a still brighter future in the royal service.
Notes

1 A.F. Pollard, Wolsey, pp 107-9; G.R. Elton, Reform and Reformation, p 78; D. Starkey, Henry VIII, p 64; J. Guy, The Cardinal's Court, p 29
3 PRO SP1/2, f 111; E36/2; E36/1, f 103; E101/56/27; E101/62/17
4 PRO SP1/2; BL Otto E XI, ff 32-40; PRO E36/2; E101/56/25; SP1/3, ff 181-4; E101/62/17; E101/62/27
5 PRO C142/28/2
6 E. Anglians, PRO E101/56/25; Gunn, Charles Brandon, pp 8, 16-18
7 TV ii, p 534; Edward left him one of his bastard sons and his chain of office as his "special trusty friend".
8 D. MacCulloch, Suffolk and the Tudors, p 57; BL Add. Ms. 27,451; Add. Ch. 16,554; Add. Roll 17,745
10 Gunn, 'Charles Brandon', pp 4-5
11 See above p 67
12 TV ii, p 516; PRO E36/215, f 669; The price was £1,500 over 7 years for lands worth about £800 p.a.
13 LP i, 257 (40)
14 Gunn, 'Charles Brandon', pp 4, 48-51
15 LP i, 1524 (5); SBT DR 5/2892
16 LP i, 1602 (12); 1662 (26); Hall, p 535
17 SBT DR 5/2913, 2914; Gunn 'Charles Brandon', pp 11, 26
18 LP i, 1804 (5)
19 PRO SP1/229, f 163
20 Gunn, Charles Brandon, pp 15-16
21 Oxford died on 11 March 1513, and De la Pole was executed on 4 May.
22 H. Miller, Henry VIII and the English Nobility, p 15
23 PRO SP1/5, f39
24 LP i, 2261, 2285, 2278, 2355, 2478; CSPV ii, 11, 309
25 LP i, 2315, 2382, 2386, 2463, 2484 (17)
26 PRO E101/61/27; Queen, LP i, 4451
27 J.D. Mackie, 'English Army' Misc. Scot. Hist. Soc. (1951) p 84; LP i, 2651
28 LP i, 2283; Hall, pp 563-4
29 Miller, op. cit., pp 15-16
30 Hall, p 567; BL Harl. 4,900, f 29b (45); Add. Ms. 29,549, f 10
31 LP i, 2506, 2617 (44); CSPV ii, 371
32 PRO C82/401; SR 5 Henry VIII, cc 9, 11
34 D. Hay ed., Vergil, p 190; Gunn, Charles Brandon, pp 16, 27 35 Miller, op. cit., p 15; W.C. Richardson, Mary Tudor, pp 158-62
36 PRO C54/378, m 16 no 13; C66/124, m 17
37 Crawford, op. cit., pp 27-30
38 MacCulloch, op. cit., p 55; BL Add. Ch. 16,571
39 This may account for the curious omission of both Norfolk and Surrey from the Suffolk commission for the subsidy of 1514 and low profile of their men in all the counties where they held land by comparison with the 1515 Act, SR iii, 5 Henry VIII, c 15-17, c 26
40 LP i, 2964 (80); These included the de Vere office of lord chamberlain.
41 PRO C82/401
42 SR 6 Henry VIII, c 19
43 PRO C82/401; CPR 1485-94, p 222; LP i, 709 (14)
44 LP i, 2684 (2); HMC De L'Ise and Dudley, p 223; BL M 772 (49) item 994
45 PRO E101/56/25; SC11/837; C82/401; Hussey's seat at Sleaford lay close to Beaumont lands, hence he farmed Folkingham, Arundel Ms., A 1588, m 1
46 LP i, App. I, pp 1539-40, 11, 789

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47 Hall, p 582
48 Gunn, 'Charles Brandon', p 48; Buckingham took no part in the creation proceedings and had his primacy confirmed in the acts of parliament for the new dukes.
49 LP i, 2684 (34)
50 LP i, 2836 (2)
51 LJ ii, p 18
52 BL Add. Ms. 5758 ff 16-17; LJ i, p 24; J.E. Powell and K. Wallis, The House of Lords, p 546
53 LJ i, pp 24-41. For the reliability of presence lists see A.F. Pollard 'The Authority of the Lords Journals in the Sixteenth Century', TRHS (1914)
54 J. Anstis, Order of the Garter, p 276
55 Hall, p 568; LP i, 2931
56 LP i, 2378, 2913
57 Ellesmere Mss. 2654, 2655
58 LP i, 2718, 2782, 2913, 2959, 3018, App 3, no. 7
59 LP i, 2782, p 1464
60 LP i, 2692, 2741
61 LP i, 2654, 2670, 2941; J.G. Nichols ed., Chronicle of Calais, p 74; Gunn, Charles Brandon, p 30
62 LP i, 2758; CSPS ii 164; CSPV ii, 401
63 LP i, 2366, 2374, 11 2656, 2743, 2758
64 See above pp 38-9
65 LP i, 2611, 2928, 3018, 3268
66 Crawford, op. cit. pp 94-5
67 D. Lloyd, State Worthies, p 155; J.D. Mackie, 'English Army' p 84; LP i, 2651
68 F.C. Dietz, English Government Finance, p 91; Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p 82; S.J. Gunn, 'The Act of Resumption of 1515' in Origins of War, pp 8-9
70 LP i, 2861 (16) 2964 (53, 63, 80)
71 PRO SP1/229, ff 170, 187, 205; SP1/4, f 79; SP1/230, f 188v
72 CSPV ii, 445
73 LP i, 2946
74 LP i, 3018
75 LP i, 3101
76 LP i, 3111, 3129
77 LP i, 3124; Hall, pp 569-70
78 CSPS ii, 193
79 LP i, 3146, 3089, 3240, 3268
80 LP i, 3268, 3257
81 BL Vit. C XI, f 150
82 Ibid., f 150; PRO SP1/230, f 260
83 J. Leland, Collectanea, pp 701-3; BL Vit. C XI, f 153
84 Eg. Norfolk's servants Sir Philip Tynney and Sir Nicholas Appleyard.
85 CSPS i, pp 210-12, 505, ii 500; PRO SP1/230, f 260; LP ii, p 1465
86 PRO SP1/230, f 262; LP ii 3325, 3348; For their rewards CSPV i, p 212
87 H. Ellis, op. cit., 1st ser. i, 115, 117
88 BL Calig. B II, f 32
89 LP i, 3424, 3426, 3472, 3476, 3477, 3578, 3580; CSPV ii, 469
90 W.C. Richardson, Mary Tudor, pp 110-11
91 Ellis, op. cit., 1st ser. i, 115, 117; LP i, 3361, 3370
92 LP i, 3376
93 LP i, 3210
94 PRO SP1/230, f 247
95 LP i, 3357, 3416
96 LP i, 3416, 3440, 3441
97 LP i, 3376
98 Gunn, Charles Brandon, pp 32-3

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99 LP ii, 5, 16, 85, 224
100 Hall, p 581; LP i, 3208, 3210, 3245, ii, 106, 180
101 Gunn, Charles Brandon, p 32; LP ii, 94
102 LP ii, 173
103 LP ii, 227
104 Ibid.; Richardson, op. cit., pp 139-40, 146-7
105 LP ii, 138, 225; He had been on a diplomatic mission during the Howard led regency of the queen, LP i, 2394, 2423, the Observants being close to her, D. Knowles, Religious Orders of England iii, pp 206-7
106 Richardson, op. cit., pp 128-85; LP ii, 226
107 LP i, 203, 367
108 CSPV iii, 1486; LJ i, pp 38-9
109 LP ii, 237
111 This appears to have involved an accommodation between the opposing parties in that Suffolk was allowed to retain her lands until she came of age, PRO SP1/11, f 11, C66/624, m 29.
112 LP ii, 224, 304
113 Gunn, Charles Brandon, pp 55-8
114 LP ii, 834, 913, 1025, 1025, 1030
115 Gunn, 'Charles Brandon', Appendix
116 PRO C66/623, m 21
117 PRO C54/382, m 15
118 PRO C54/382, m 2, SC12/23/29, SC12/37/16; Gunn, Charles Brandon, p 41
119 NRO Jerningham 1 T 176 D1, m 18v; see also note 291.
120 PRO C54/384, m 2, 388 m 26, 390 m 14; Gunn, op. cit., p 42
121 Gunn, op. cit., pp 45-58
122 BL Add. Roll 17,745, mm 6-8
123 Hall, p 592; LP ii, 3462; but in 1518 there was further trouble over the de la Pole estates, PRO SP1/232, f 81
124 Gunn, 'Charles Brandon', p 63; A.F. Pollard, Wolsey, pp 20-1, 55, 58
125 See above, pp 38-9
126 PRO SP1/4, f 79; See above pp 102-3
128 I am grateful to John Guy for his updated figures on the known council attendances of the Howards during Wolsey's chancellorship, 1516 to 1529. These show that Surrey attended 47 per cent of meetings where presence lists are extant, despite his prolonged absences on service between 1520-4, and Norfolk a still more impressive 86 per cent.
129 LJ i, pp 18,
130 SR iii, pp 153, 178
131 Black Book of the Exchequer, PRO E36/266
132 LP i, 2772 (4); The regrant is mysterious since there appear to have been no omissions in his first patent, CPR 1494-1509, p 239
135 See BL Titus B I, ff 182-182v for his prominent roll in reform in 1519.
136 J.C. Sainty, Officers of the Exchequer, p 119; Jennings had been a customer, LP, ii, 544, 2399, p 877; HP i, p 501; Everard was of Denston, Suffolk and was close to the Howards, BL Add. Ms. 27,451 ff 15, 18; LP ii, 2829, iv 6061; W.A. Copinger, The Manors of Suffolk, iv, pp 276-7; TV, p 557: Daunce, HP ii, pp 22-3
137 Especially Fowler, see index to LP ii, and iii, also Mixed Obligations p 1483 etc.
138 Sainty, op. cit., pp 90, 83
139 HP iii. pp 508-9; PRO STAC2/34/29

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PRO IND/1/7346, 6 Henry VIII x 3, 8 Henry VIII x 2, 11 Henry VIII x 2, 12 Henry VIII. They were from diverse counties where he held land.

LP ii, p 1475, 1490; PRO E36/216, ff 346-9; Alsop, op. cit., pp 181-4; Cutte, LP ii, 254, 2949, p 1442 etc.

BL Add. Roll 16, 554 m 2; Add. Roll 17, 745, m 6

LP I, 2964 (53), 11, 1945

R. Brown, trans., Four Years at the Court of Henry VIII, The Despatches of Sebastian Giustiniani, i, pp 109-9, 110, 138

Ibid. i, pp 168, 215; LP ii, 1380, 1386, 1495, 2259 Ruthal had replaced Fox as privy seal.

R. Brown, trans., Giustiniani, ii, p 115

Ibid., 11, p 316

Giustiniani's reports leave no doubt of Norfolk's role, but he is also recorded as making disbursements to persons bringing news from abroad, eg. LP ii, p 1469.

Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp 86-7

R. Brown, trans., Giustiniani, pp 125, 128, 130, 138

Ibid., pp 161, 165, 176; LP ii, 1380, 1386, 1421, 1495, 1505

LP ii, 723, 912, 976, 974, 978, 1087, 1262

LP ii, 2105; Scarisbrick, op. cit., pp 88-93

Warham resigned in December 1515, Fox in May 1516, and Lovell and Suffolk may have absented themselves, R. Brown, trans., Giustiniani, ii, p 250, as Shrewsbury certainly did, G. Bernard, Power of the Early Tudor Nobility, pp 19-20. For Norfolk and Ruthal, LP ii, 1386, Brown ii, pp 250, 260, 265-9

LP ii, 2462, 2486; Scarisbrick, op. cit., pp 95-6

LP ii, 2896, 3437, p 1474, 3872

LP ii, 2903, 3221, 3223, 3267, 3762

Hopton LP i, p 1467, 11, 4606; BL Add. Ch., 6289

LP ii, 235, 826, 1429; A.A. Ruddock, 'The Earliest Records of the High Court of Admiralty, 1515-58' BIHR (1949)

PRO E101/56/10/7; LP ii, 235, 1429

Named in all the commissions discussed in the text; PRO HCA30/1.

LP ii, 2757

Ibid., 2949

LP ii, 3896, 3952, 3954, 4058; R. Brown trans., Giustiniani, ii, pp 155-7

PRO E101/417/2, f 116, I am grateful to Neil Samman for this and other references on the royal itinerary; CSPS ii, 1041

LP iii, 272

Ibid. 275, 375, 531

It remains uncertain whether Norfolk or Surrey was directly involved in trade at this date, but many of their associates were, eg. PRO SP1/19 ff 146-8, LP ii, 416, 3756

Ellesmere 2655, f 12, also in June and July, f 12

LP ii, 4467, 4469, 4475, 4483, 4504,

BL Harl. 433, f 294

LP ii, 4135, 4136, p 1480; Anthony Knyvet was sent to Flanders, p 1480

Ibid., 57, 70, 100, 111, 118, 121, 129, 131; E.W. Ives, Anne Boleyn, pp 12, 15-17

Brown trans., Giustiniani, ii, p 270

LP iii, 702 (2): R. Brown trans., op. cit., ii, pp 253-6; Surrey took part in negotiations for a trade agreement in April with Charles, LP iii, 741

LP ii, 873, 895

Ibid. 702, 906; Hall, p 614; J.G. Nichols ed., Chronicle of Calais, p 19

S. Anglo, Spectacle, Pageantry and Early Tudor Policy, p 4; D Starkey, in The English Court, p 77; H. Miller, English Nobility, p 92

LP ii, pp 1504, 1507-9, 1510, 1935; Hall, p 584, 591-2

Edmund did particularly well in 1516, Hall, pp 584, 613

LP ii, 4483, 4504; Hall, p 595

Brown trans., Giustiniani, i, p 91

LP i, 1153
Hall, pp 593-4 describes him receiving Bonnivet in "a coate of riche tissue cut on cloth of silver, on a great courser richly trapped, and a great whistell of gold set with stones and perle hangyng at a great and massy chayne baudryck-wise".

Rank in parliament followed date of creation, while as admiral he was probably ranked fifth in council.

Most tended to be primarily courtiers; Essex, Dorset, Devon and Suffolk at this date, or primarily office holders and councillors; Worcester and Shrewsbury; H. Miller, English Nobility, pp 81-2, 92

Norfolk was the natural patron of de Vere followers until his son-in-law obtained livery in 1520, but there was little exclusivity.

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Earl of Warwick and Lord of the Bedestar was the natural patron of de Vere followers until his son-in-law obtained livery in 1520, but there was little exclusivity.

The degree of control Wolsey exercised over royal patronage in these years is far from clear.

In 1514 Surrey was one of 14 noble and 40 gift givers overall, in 1520 one of 23 and 87, and in 1532 one of 31 noble and 132 overall, see N. Samman, op. cit., Chapter V, Tables A and B; Boleyn, Francis Bryan and Sir Henry Shernbourne also gave from 1517, Table C.

The wards were Lord Fitzhugh's son and Robert Ashfield.
224 PRO STAC 2/2 f 182; LP II, I, p 1473, 4, 8; cf. L.B. Smith, A Tudor Tragedy pp 39-40
226 PRO STAC2/2, f 182
227 LP I, 2964 (63) 11, 1363, 3489, 3756, p 1475; I11 306
228 E.W. Ives, Anne Boleyn, pp 15-16
229 PRO STAC 2/34/29; PCC 3 Bodefelde
230 LP I, 3424, II I, p 1490; I11 347 (27)
231 Shernbourne, LP II, 510, 3096; Hobart, LP II, 671; Goldingham, LP II, 555; Gonson, LP I, 3049 (1); Heydon, LP II, 4325; William Sabyn, LP II, 4509; Noon, LP II, 1364, of Shelfanger next to Kenninghall, he supplied the earl's household with wheat and rye, NRO NRS 2378 II D.4. ff 6v, 7v
232 Fox clearly had this perception, P.S. and H.M. Allen eds., op. cit. p 83
233 Ellesmere 2654, f 23, 2655, f 10; Henry, Katherine and Mary dined with Norfolk afterwards, LP III, 1861
234 J. Guy, The Cardinal's Court, pp 27, 30-1; Hall, p 585
235 G. Bernard, Power of the Early Tudor Nobility, pp 17-18, 20-21
236 E. Lodge, Illustrations of British History, i, 21 Probably for just that meeting.
237 Vergil, p 264
238 LP II, 4057, 4060
240 LP II, 2949, 2738; Ellesmere 2655, f 10; In March 1516 Surrey had promised to be the city's special goodlord, introducing for debate in council articles devised by the city to maintain the privileges of Londoners against foreigners, L. Lyell, F.D. Watney eds., Acts of Court of the Mercer's, p 443
241 PRO E/36/216, f 346-9; LP II I, p 1490; Norfolk owned a house at Brokenwharf and property in Tyburn, and Surrey at Stepney and both were feoffees to Norfolk's servant Sir Nicholas Appleyard who had extensive properties in St Mary Aldermary and St Trinity the Less, CLRO Hustings Roll 231, no 21; Other connexions LP I, 3107 (13): CLRO Rep 2, f 180b
242 R. Brown trans., Giustiniani, pp 70, 72-3 is Stow's account; Hall, p 589
243 I am grateful to Roger Virgoe for showing me his unpublished note on BL Add. Ch. 16,547 where More is paid an annuity of 40/- from the receipts for Hunsdon from 1515-17 for legal advice.
244 Vergil, pp 243-5; R. Brown trans., Giustiniani, ii, p 71
245 R. Brown trans., Giustiniani, ii, pp 71, 75; Hall, p 590
246 Hall, pp 590-1
247 Stow, p 923; Hall p 591 calls him knight marshal, the older title.
248 Hall, p 589
249 Ellesmere Ms. 2654, f 24; Hall, p 590
250 Hall, p 591
251 R. Brown trans., Giustiniani, ii, pp 74-5
252 LP II, 3697
253 Ibid, 3437, 3491, 3649, 3762
254 LP III, 364
255 Ibid., 365
256 PRO STAC2/34 f 29; J. Guy, Cardinal's Court, p 66; D. MacCulloch, Suffolk and the Tudors, p 322
257 PRO STAC2/34 f 29; Despite Wyndham's report to Wolsey there is no doubt that he remained primarily attached to Norfolk and Surrey, PRO C54/385, m 18; NRO NRS 2378 II D.4; TV II, p 579; LP II, 4624
258 BL Add. Roll 17,745, m 12; Norfolk and Edmund were also in trouble for enclosing, J.J. Scarisbrick, 'Wolsey and the Common Weal', p 63; LP II, 3291

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The patrician group with which Henry spent most of his time tended to regard war as the most effective means of self advancement, whereas councillors saw it in terms of a serious drain on royal resources.


Hall, p 598 insists that it was the work of the council, and Wolsey was indeed ill at the time in question and appears to have been called in only at the stage of formulating the proposals for reform, Walker op. cit., pp 19-22

LP ii, 491, 528, 576 (19), 577 Norfolk's long service in Edward IV's household, and as steward to Richard III amply qualified him for this.

Guy, op. cit., pp 37, 42

Ellesmere Ms. 2655, ff 14, 25

LP ii, 2283 Bulmer had been knighted in 1497 by Surrey, as he then was, during a northern campaign, and joined Surrey jnr. in Ireland in 1520, HP i, pp 542-3

He may have entered Buckingham's service through Surrey, for the earl was undoubtedly on good terms with his father-in-law, LP ii, 482, 2987

Ellesmere Ms. 2655, f 24v

Guy, op. cit., pp 72-3; Archaeologia xxv, p 376

PRO STAC2/2 ff 178-82, 10/4 pt. 5; He had entered the Middle Temple in 1510 but probably never studied the law, H.A.C. Sturgess ed., Register of Admissions i, p 7.

Guy, op. cit., p 73, note 151

All were part of the barony of Lewes, VCH Sussex vii, pp 5-6, VCH Surrey iii, p 235; Arundel Ms. A 477, A 1047 both for 1525-6.

Ellesmere Ms. 2655, f 16

BL Harl. Ms. 6615 discussed in M. Girouard, Life in the English Country House, pp 46-7

Valued at £333. 6. 8d in 1514, PRO C82/401, but yielded £426. 5s. 2¾d. In 1525-6, Arundel Ms, A 1047 m 5; Jointure SR 3 Henry VIII, c 16 p 34 which is 9 manors and a hundred, of which Surrey held only 4 manors, A 1260, A 1647.

PRO C54/378, m 16 no 13. He still held Wilmington, Kent, in 1525-6, A 1047, m 5, and Stepney, which had been granted separately, until April 1520, LP i, 414 (44). The value of Stepney in 1510 when granted may have been £37. 16s. 10d., calculated from PRO SP1/12, mm 47-8. Re Suffolk, PRO SC12/23/29, SC12/37/16, Costessey NRO NRS 2378 11 D.4, f 2v

That of Robert Ashfield, obtained with Jermyn, brought in rent from tenant, Marjorie Ashfield, the ward's mother, of £3. 10s., probably for a half year and £40 per half year from Jermyn who had custody, NRO NRS 2378 11 D.4; F. Blomefield, History of Norfolk 1, 182; Arundel Ms. A 1260, A 1647; NRO NRS 2378 11 D.4.

C. Rawcliffe, The Staffords, p 175 Table VIII, 'Cases brought by members of the baronage in the Common Pleas between Hilary 1513 and Michaelmas 1515', where Surrey lies just behind Northumberland and Buckingham in the cases brought for debt, but far behind them overall.

£40 p.a. as an earl, and a substantial fee as Lord Admiral. Petitions from merchants, such as that desiring no other ship to be freighted to oriental parts before the petitioner's, handled by the admiral, must have yielded worthwhile perquisites, LP ii, 4331

Where the royal service was concerned he could show unexpected restraint, as when, in January 1515, he crossed 1¼d. off a claim for reimbursement for travelling expenses on naval affairs, though it must be said that he secured repayment within a fortnight, PRO E101/56/10/7
281 ECP iv, b 321, no. 82
283 NRO G 4/2; PRO E101/62/17
284 NRO NRS 2378 11 D.4, ff 1-2
285 N. Bacon, Annals of Ipswich, pp 192-3
286 LP ii, 3459; PRO E101/62/17; BL Stowe Ms. 146, f 106
287 CLRO Rep. 3, f 176
288 Ibid., f 204
289 CLRO. Rep. 5, f 154v
290 LP i, 2861 (16), ii, 4461, p 1454; PRO SP1/19, f 146-8; HP ii, p 242
291 He was supplied with rabbits by the warrener of Claxton, one of the de la Pole manors returned to the crown and granted to Suffolk, NRO NRS 2378 11 D.4, ff 19, 19v, 20 and his steward went there f 37v; Gunn, 'Charles Brandon', p 80
292 BL Add. Roll 16,554, mm 1-2 is 1514, 20 deer to Winfarthing, 23 to Earsham; Add. Roll 17,745, m 9-10 is 1516, 31 to Earsham, m 13-15 is 1517, 121 deer to Winfarthing and the same number to Earsham
293 BL Add. Roll 17,745, m 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 17, 18, 19
294 NRO Chamberlain's Account Roll, 1514-15, shows him receiving spice bread, wafers, hipocras, and half a porpoise delivered to Kenninghall, for 1518-19 shows the provision of horses to Surrey and lord Willoughby, Surrey's attendance at the city's expense with the justices at the Friars Minor, gifts sent to the queen when she was at Kenninghall; Gunn, 'Charles Brandon', p 80 n. 137; NRO NRS 2378 11 D.4, f 33v, eg. Sir Thomas Lovell, the Prior of Norwich and Thomas Tyrrell.
295 Arundel Ms. T 1; Edmund appears not only in the Framlingham parker's accounts but also in King's Lynn in March 1516, KL/C39/71; PRO CP25/2/25/155, f 39, CP25/1/51/362, f 8; LP ii, 4624;
296 Earliest accounts for Lincolnshire are for 1525-6, Arundel Ms. A 1047; NRO NRS 2378 11 D.4, f 38v, Wyndham countersigned, f 27 for the audit
297 See Hall and Giustiniani's accounts in R. Brown trans., op. cit.
298 An earl's retinue on ceremonial occasions was 40 men, but like other peers Surrey often rode with less, BL Stowe Ms. 146, f 127; PRO E101/56/10/7
299 LP i, 2803, 3614, ii, p 1519 vi, (170); WDRO W130, ff 114, 150v from R.W. Ingram et al., Records of English Drama, p 220; G.R. Proudfoot, Records of Plays and Players in Norfolk and Suffolk, Malone Soc. Coll. (1980-1), notes KLBRIO KL C39.71, where the minstrels of Lord Edmund Howard are paid 20d. in 1515-1516
300 NRO NRS 2378 11 D.4, f 38v
301 Ibid., f 35v, Robert Appleyard, Francis Clopton, Edward White (lawyer), Ralph Dawtry, Anthony (Knyvet?), Richard Parker, Thomas Seman (chaplain) Alan Goldingham. Steward of the household was William Hals, comptroller Robert Holdich, receiver James Daniel.
302 Ibid., ff 21, 34, 36, 38, purchases for, 23, 27, 27v, eg. sugar candy from Diss, f 10Av, blue ribbon for Lord Howard from Norwich, f 36v, silk and red roses and shoes for all three, ff 37-37v. The children also travelled to London on occasion, f 38
303 Ibid., ff 36v-37v; The Devenishes appear to be members of an East Sussex family, one of whom sat as MP for Lewes in 1555, HP ii, p 40.

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CHAPTER V

THE LORD LIEUTENANCY OF IRELAND, 1520-1522

The Irish Problem and Reform Movement

The reform of the king's Irish lordship, on which Surrey embarked in 1520, was entirely of a piece with other items on the ambitious list of reforms proposed in 1519, and indeed wider reforms attempted in England during Wolsey's chancellorship. In Ireland, as in England, the overriding aim was clearly to extend royal control and improve royal government and justice, not least by curbing those who abused the power delegated to them to further their own interests. In the case of the Irish lordship, royal authority had always been particularly weak due to three main factors: the fact that it was a highland region and therefore difficult to govern, like Wales and the English north, the partial nature of the original Norman conquest, which meant that the colonists were constantly at war with Irish chiefs, and the permanent absence of the king, as a result of which his administration was headed by a deputy. Since by the late middle ages the cost of employing an English deputy and force in Ireland far outstripped his Irish revenues, the king was normally constrained to employ a local magnate whose territorial power, private retinue and reputation were such that he could rally the colonial community for regular campaigning, and inspire fear in the Irish. Given the remoteness of Dublin from the English court, it followed that only a king of great determination and force of character could exercise sufficient control over such a deputy to ensure that he governed as much in the royal interest as his own.

Henry VII achieved a pragmatic understanding with Gerald Fitzgerald, eighth earl of Kildare, in 1496, which facilitated the consolidation of the late fifteenth century revival of the lordship vis-a-vis the Irish, but, being essentially personal, this understanding was terminated by the death of the king followed by that of the earl in 1513. Kildare's son, the ninth earl,
succeeded him as deputy, but it was not long before the state of the Irish lordship became the subject of a stream of complaints soliciting royal intervention, from both traditional enemies and supporters of the Geraldines. Some of these show a humanistic concern with the commonweal, which, it was implied, had suffered with the erosion of royal authority, and were probably prompted by a knowledge that this would strike a chord with the new English regime. Among the most influential complainants were John Kite, Wolsey's appointee to the archbishopric of Armagh in 1513, and other Englishmen preferred in Ireland early in the reign. The fact that this concern was echoed by local-born members of the Dublin administration and Pale gentry (normally loyal to the Geraldines) – Sir William Darcy, former under-treasurer, Sir Patrick Finglas, chief baron of the exchequer, and Robert Cowley, a former Kildare servant – amounted to a significant departure.

Kildare and several of his advisers were called to England in 1515, where Darcy tabled his articles on the 'decay of Ireland' for a council meeting on 24 June. Though Kildare emerged unscathed and returned to Ireland with his authority unimpaired, this was probably because Henry was not much interested in Ireland. The seeds of doubt had taken root in the council, however, and in 1516, when Kildare did not respond favourably to a rare intervention by Henry over the Ormond inheritance, he perhaps lost his chief supporter. In 1518 he was again having to reply to complaints about his rule, in July Henry was taking an ominous personal interest in Irish correspondence, and in January 1519 the deputy was once more summoned to London when Sir Piers Butler (recognised in Ireland as earl of Ormond), Cowley and Darcy gave evidence against him. The royal conversion to enthusiasm for administrative reform in mid 1519 resulted in two memoranda on the reform of Ireland, and before Christmas Henry was debating the means with his council. Kildare had angry exchanges with Wolsey there, and in January the Venetian ambassador made the first report that Surrey was to replace him as deputy, though his official appointment as lieutenant did not come until 10 March.
The problems to be addressed by Surrey's mission are best understood in the light of the complaints of the reformers. English and Anglo-Irish writers alike implied that the parlous state of the lordship resulted from a combination of royal neglect and absenteeism among the elite, which had lead to the shrinkage of the effective area of royal control. As the crown lost the ability to organise the colonists for their defence they were forced to look to the great earls of Kildare, Desmond, Ormond and Ulster who had large retinues, but who, enjoying increasing independence, extorted coyne and livery and similar dues to maintain their armies, even in counties adjoining their own. The result, it was argued, was the increasing localisation of politics and the growth of a pernicious form of bastard feudalism akin to Gaelic dynasticism, which manifested itself in feuds between the Anglo-Irish in the pursuit of which they often allied with Irish chiefs in blatant disregard of the interests of the crown and more humble colonists. One result had been the loss of the earldom of Ulster to the Irish, while the logical culmination of the process, according to Darcy, Cowley and Finglas, who thought it already far advanced, was the annexation by Kildare of the last bastion of crown control, the Pale, because the disposition of his estates made him crucial to its defence. Here, they wrote, the population was suffering increasing poverty and oppression as it bore the costs both of royal administration of the lordship and of Kildare's ambitious dynasticism.

These men, who sought Kildare's replacement by an Englishman, were well placed to detail the earl's abuse of his authority and encroachment on the king's patrimony. For instance they alleged that, since he was all powerful in the Pale, he levied coyne and livery, cartage and other impositions there as he chose. Nor could the Irish council redress the balance of power in the royal favour for, but for a few posts which were reserved to the king, Kildare controlled all appointments to the Dublin administration, and so dominated the council. He was accused of failing to consult it even on the crucial issue of making war on the Irishry and levied the king's subjects to make war in his own
interests. Furthermore, the fact that he was allowed the Irish revenues to cover administrative costs, his retinue and his own fee without rendering account, led him to treat the royal patrimony as his own. It is thus easy to see why his removal appeared to be a prerequisite for any attempt at institutional and political reform, even though this implied the substitution of an English force for his retinue, and would require English subventions to meet the new deputy’s fee and expenses. However, Darcy, among others, maintained that Irish revenues, efficiently collected, were already capable of meeting more than ordinary expenditure and could be expanded, and this proved to be attractive bait to Henry.

The Aims of, and Planning for, Surrey’s Mission

Though his instructions do not survive, there is ample evidence of their content which reveals that, apart from the crucial reconnaissance aspect, Surrey was enjoined to enlist all loyal political forces in the revivification of the lordship by calling a great council and parliament so as to legislate to improve royal revenues. He was to institute a thorough-going overhaul of the administration, including that of justice and even the church, so that it might play a useful supporting role. He was to call disobedient lords to their allegiance, reconcile those at war with each other and lead them and the colonial community in punitive attacks upon the recalcitrant Irish, so that they too would acknowledge Henry’s suzerainty and accept a modified form of English law. Though Surrey was initially fully occupied militarily, royal policy, unconstrained by the exigencies of life in Ireland, was developed by Henry and elucidated by Wolsey in directions increasingly remote from the realities faced by the lieutenant.

In a letter apparently composed in June, Surrey and his council were enjoined at the outset to try to bring in not only the Anglo-Irish lords but also the Irish to assist the lieutenant by the use of “politique practises”, which included devices of renaissance statecraft such as the sowing of discord among the Irish and the kidnapping or detention of their leaders. Once they
were thoroughly undermined in this way the king proposed in the following year to send a greater force for their conclusive subjugation. Rather than confining his aim to the revival of the lordship and particularly the Pale, Henry had thus returned to the original aim of the monarchy of subjugating the whole island. The well-known royal letter which Surrey received in September, in which Wolsey developed this theme in characteristically sonorous style, went further in advocating restraint in the use of force, and suggested that instead the lieutenant should, when meeting Irish and Anglo-Irish lords, lecture them lovingly on the benefits of peace, prosperity, good government, justice and loyalty so that the latter might be moved to cooperate militarily and the former, where necessary, return to him the lands they occupied which "notoriously apperteyneth unto Us". It was, of course, the last item which was the real stumbling block, for while Henry based his claims in Ireland on ancient title, Gaelic law recognised only lengthy occupation. In other respects Henry was willing to be surprisingly accommodating, suggesting the adaptation of the rigours of English law to suit his new Gaelic subjects who, once absorbed by the rule of law, would gradually be anglicised.

The choice by Henry and Wolsey of Surrey to implement these policies suggests that his reputation had continued to grow since the first French war. Though the mission had an important military aspect, where Surrey's experience, particularly of northern border warfare, must have recommended him, statesmanlike diplomatic and administrative abilities, such as his father had shown in ruling the north, were essential, while his commission to assess all aspects of the situation and make concrete proposals testifies to great faith in his judgement. Furthermore, though Surrey had a personal connexion with Ireland, in that a Mowbray ancestor had been involved in the original conquest, and estates which had long ceased to be worth administering had descended to Norfolk, without a real commitment to the royal service and the reform of the Tudor state, Surrey would not have been willing to forsake the comforts and prestige of his life in England for heavy viceregal responsibilities in a land
known for disease, dearth and its ability to wreck reputations and impoverish those who served there.\textsuperscript{31}

This impression of the great trust and hope vested in Surrey is confirmed by the initial provisions made for him. Proposals included the setting up of a privy council to advise him, made up of three councillors from England as well as the English and Anglo-Irish councillors already in Dublin, while the exceptional size of his projected force at one thousand men and artillery further suggests the importance accorded to the mission.\textsuperscript{32} Of the men, four hundred were initially intended to be yeomen of the king's guard, whose presence indicated Henry's commitment to Ireland and support of his deputy. Most important of all, however, was a late decision to appoint Surrey to the prestigious title of lieutenant rather than deputy, a title previously reserved for princes of the blood.\textsuperscript{33} In order to represent Henry and the power and values of his renaissance monarchy the better, Surrey's wife was temporarily released from her service to the queen, and with her children and household accompanied her husband to Ireland to form the centre of a court clearly designed to impress and to outshine Kildare's.\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{Arrival in Ireland}

On 23 May 1520, after three months of preparation and a delay, Surrey and his party disembarked from the galleasses \textit{Katherine} and \textit{Rose} at Wood Key in Dublin. When, four days later, on Whitsunday, he processed to Christchurch with the mayor and city dignitaries presumably for his swearing in, there is no doubt of the impression they made on the citizens or the hopes his arrival engendered among the crown's loyal subjects.\textsuperscript{35} The situation which greeted Surrey was, however, very different from that which had been envisaged at the planning stage in England. Instead of calling a great council to enlist loyal subjects in the pursuit of reform and progressing round the lordship, Surrey was thrown at once into crisis management and campaigning.\textsuperscript{36}

This was the direct result of the detention of Kildare in England, in part because the Irish had feared him personally, but largely as a result of
his plots to disrupt Surrey's rule from the moment of the outsider's arrival, so as to safeguard his own influence in the Pale and throughout the lordship and prove his indispensability to the crown in managing the Irish threat. As a result of the activities of his agents in the Pale, where he held more land than the crown, most of its aristocracy, who formed the political core of the lordship, withheld their cooperation from the lieutenant. Even those who at heart welcomed royal intervention were, from the outset, sceptical of its endurance, given the precedents, and feared Kildare's vengeance on his return. In the mountains beyond the borderlands, where Kildare and his father had expanded their control outside their traditional estates, so that many Irish chiefs paid blackrents to them, the chiefs received letters from him urging them, by a judicious mix of threats and promises, to invade and lay waste the Pale and the marches. Nor was it only in the midlands that Kildare incited rebellion, for he sent messages to O'Neill and O'Donnell in the north and to the south, where he urged attacks upon the Butlers and their allies in renewal of the ancient Geraldine/Butler feud.

Military Expeditions of 1520

Surrey therefore had to establish his and his master's authority before he could proceed with other parts of the reform programme by proving himself a more fearful opponent than Kildare, by subduing the Irish and intimidating into obedience the Anglo-Irish who did not acknowledge his authority. He had hardly arrived before he received news of imminent trouble in three quarters. He called a hosting immediately and embarked upon the first of three major expeditions of that year. It was at this point that he discovered the full military consequences of the hostility of Kildare, for he had "the leest assistance of the Englishre that ever was seen", 48 horse and 120 foot as against the c. 1,000 levies Kildare could normally raise. He was shocked to discover that the Palesmen were prepared to be raided rather than defend themselves and incur Kildare's wrath, but such an invasion would seriously undermine his own and Henry's reputation in Ireland.
His own force, which therefore had to bear the brunt of the first campaign, did not come up to the original intention of 1,000 men besides gunners. While he was to have had 400 yeomen of the guard, he in fact had 220 at the outset. He was also to have had 100 Irish horse and 24 gunners at royal expense, apart from his own retinue, which was to have consisted of 50 English mounted archers and spears and 50 footmen, 100 Irish horsemen and 300 kerne. This retinue was not to be in royal wages, as had been the norm in the 1512-14 war, Wolsey insisting on a reversion to the old indenture system to keep costs to the crown low. Thus Surrey was given a nominally generous salary of £2,000 but expected to meet the wages of his retinue, at 6d a day for horsemen and 4d for footsoldiers, from this. He had clearly not accepted this arrangement when he arrived, but despite his vigorous protests he appears to have been held to it, with the result that from the outset he could not afford to maintain so large a retinue as had been intended. He had probably supplied in full the English contingent of his retinue, but he raised only half the Irish troops; 50 instead of 100 horse and 150 instead of 300 kerne. With the 100 Irish troops in royal wages his force therefore appears to have amounted to about 670 men, apart from gunners, though it may not have been maintained even at this level.

This force, with the meagre levies from the Pale, would have been inadequate to meet some of the confederacies Surrey faced in his two campaigning seasons in Ireland had not Sir Piers Butler and his allies come to assist Surrey as soon as they might, towards the end of his campaign against O'More, and turned out regularly thereafter, thereby roughly doubling the lieutenant's forces which at best amounted to 1,600 men. While Surrey naturally valued Butler and his Irish adherents highly as a result, his inevitable reliance on Kildare's chief rival in the lordship undermined the image of impartiality in Irish affairs which the crown was anxious to convey.

Despite the circumstances, Surrey's three armed progresses in 1520 were not simply military in character, the lieutenant being careful to begin with
calls for the trouble makers to put in pledges and so avert the use of force.\textsuperscript{52} Force usually involved the burning of villages and destruction of the countryside of the leader of the confederacy or the most accessible of his allies to bring them to submission.\textsuperscript{52} The role of diplomacy, in which the council played an important part, should not, therefore, be overlooked, nor the importance of the royal representative and councillors showing themselves in remote districts as had been enjoined in the early memoranda.\textsuperscript{54} Surrey did not lack support from privy councillors, though he was not as well attended on progress as was intended.\textsuperscript{55} For example, when he was forced to go North to deal with O'Neill and to the midlands to restrain O'More, he sent William Rokeby, Archbishop of Dublin, a Yorkshireman by birth but an Irish councillor since 1512, with Darcy and other noble councillors to arbitrate between Desmond and Sir Piers Butler, whom the former was about to attack.\textsuperscript{56} Negotiations were long and difficult, but on 10 July the team returned, terms of truce having been arranged, and Sir Piers freed to assist Surrey, while by about the same date O'More had also submitted.\textsuperscript{57}

O'Neill continued to cause trouble, but after an attack upon his vassal-chief MacMahon, he too submitted.\textsuperscript{58} In September, Desmond broke his bond and made an unprovoked attack upon Cormac Oge MacCarthy, a Butler adherent, so suddenly that Surrey and the council were unable to intervene. He duly suffered a heavy defeat near Mourne Abbey, but though this was not displeasing to Surrey, the situation demanded the progress of the lieutenant with some of his council to those parts to reconcile the enemies lest Desmond seek revenge for his defeat or the Irish victors, emboldened by success, attack the colonists elsewhere.\textsuperscript{59} Surrey's vigorous campaigning was undoubtedly responsible for the submission of many Irish chiefs during the summer.\textsuperscript{60}

The Problems of Campaigning

Surrey's rapid, pre-emptive strike into the midlands against O'More had revealed serious weaknesses in his force. Being relatively slow moving, his army could not make contact with opposing forces, detachments of which were
able to exploit its traverse through difficult terrain by ceaselessly harrassing it in the rear. Thus Surrey proposed to increase the ratio of horse to foot by dismissing enough yeomen of the guard to replace them with 80 northern horse. He met with no opposition, only a long delay in hearing from home, but a hundred light horse under Sir John Bulmer, who had served at Flodden, were mustered at Chester by 10 August for shipment to Dublin with a further fifty Welsh light horse under Sir Rice ap Thomas. They arrived only late in the campaigning season, and Surrey complained to Wolsey that he had requested spears, yet all but thirty of the northerners were archers, and a motley crew at that. He therefore asked that "where we bee, and daily shalbe thoos that shalbe next the daunger, to give us ample power to furnysh us with suche as we thynk shalbe moost mete." This was duly granted, though either Henry or Wolsey was clearly picqued, having thought to please the earl, and remarked sarcastically that "capitains, percaas, wolbe better pleasid with men of werre after their appetites and chosing than of any other".

The advice that Surrey beware of employing more Irish than English horse was infuriating because it was precisely the meagre budget from home which forced an increasing resort to Irish horsemen who could find their own forage in winter. By the time Wolsey's reply arrived Surrey had discharged fifty of Bulmer's men and waged twenty good local 'English' horse and thirty Gaelic. Thereafter he appears to have been satisfied that his force was suitably tailored to meet Irish conditions.

Yet these were not the only problems Surrey had had to overcome to field a reasonable force. On his arrival he was horrified to find that as a result of Kildare's neglect, Dublin Castle, the centre of the Irish administration as well as military operations, was ruinous and that considerable works must be undertaken before it could be used. He was particularly unlucky in that 1520 was a year of both dearth and severe plague in Ireland. The former exacerbated a situation which would anyway have been difficult, for the Pale was only just self-sufficient in food, and always had difficulty in supplying large enough
quantities for its forces to undertake long excurses away from Dublin. Without
the cooperation of the authorities and merchants there and in Drogheda Surrey
would not have found this possible. Moreover, the high cost of food due to
scarcity, rendered his men's wages inadequate. In his first letters to Henry
and Wolsey he took up the plight of the horsemen, who were finding it
impossible to feed themselves and their mounts on 6d a day. This lead to a
decision in England, following Surrey's suggestion, to resume a practice for
which Kildare had been heavily criticised; that of taking coyne and livery for
the maintenance of the Irish light horse. Henry and Wolsey satisfied themselves
by making a distinction between taking it "after the auncient accustomable
maner there used" and the extortions of Kildare, but how much meaning this had
in practice is doubtful, and it was unlikely to impress an Irish parliament.
As a result, Irish horse were the cheapest troops to maintain, which explains
Surrey's bias in their favour.

Ordinary foot-soldiers too were badly hit by the price of food and
especially drink by the late summer, since unlike the yeomen of the guard on 6d
a day they had only 4d, with the result that they were having to spend their
entire wage on food and had nothing left for clothing. Surrey's own men, whom
he had waged to live outside his household made "soo pyteful compleynt" that he
felt obliged to take them in instead. In early September he begged Wolsey to
have pity on the soldiers and increase their wages by at least a penny, though
with typical shrewdness he advocated that this be done by way of a reward
rather than an increase in wages which would set a precedent. The high cost
of victuals raised a further problem, for Henry and Wolsey had instructed
Surrey that when on campaign he should make a charge to the men over and above
the cost of the food to pay for the cartage or carriage of the victuals. That
was, of course, impossible under the circumstances, and Surrey bore the cost
himself initially. He then protested that he would not and could not continue
so to do. Ultimately Henry and Wolsey were forced to acknowledge the
seriousness of financial problems and increase his second half-yearly allowance.
The morale of the men was further undermined by the high incidence of disease and particularly plague, due to the combination of the weather and crowded, insanitary conditions. Dysentery was rife, so that part of the force must always have been sick, apart from the lives that were lost to this slow killer. Sir John Bulmer, who arrived in September 1520, claimed never to have had a day's good health in Ireland, and was so ill by November that Surrey sent him home, while the earl fell victim to a long and severe attack of dysentery himself in the autumn of 1521. More serious in its effect on morale was the plague, of which there was a particularly severe outbreak in the summer of 1520 which caused much disruption in the Pale. Since Dublin was badly affected, Surrey was forced to billet his men in twenties and thirties in small Pale towns which were initially free of it. But the disease spread like wildfire. In early August Surrey reported that in O'Neill's country people fled their homes to die in the open like animals, and added that he had lost three members of his household in Dublin. He asked permission to send his wife and children to Wales or Lancashire to stay near the coast until the epidemic was over, for there was no place with "clere aire" in Ireland. Mortality reached a peak in September, but though slow communications with the king resulted in his family remaining, none of its members fell ill. In 1521 there was a much less serious outbreak, but Surrey reported at the end of the year that during the two years he had lost over 60 men of the king's retinue to plague, and 60 to dysentery.

Needless to say all this, combined with evasive Irish tactics in the field, undermined morale. Many of the English were anxious to leave Ireland almost as soon as they arrived, none more so than the yeomen of the guard, who offered to take wages of 2d or even 1d per day to return to England, so long as their normal wages of 4d were resumed after the Irish enterprise was over. By 23 July Surrey was being pestered daily by guardsmen seeking licence to return on every imaginable excuse, and he begged Wolsey to see to it that Henry

from £3,300 to £4,000.77
granted none, for fear of the deluge which would follow. Soon after he
discovered that 18 ordinary soldiers had conspired to desert and turn pirate,
an event which revealed that his commission did not grant all the powers
normally enjoyed by a lieutenant, nor the power he had sought before he left,
of life and death over his force, as Dorset had had at Guienne and he had had
as admiral. This was duly granted with another to dub knights, but did not
arrive until the first season's campaigning was over, and was even then not
adequate, suggesting that it was largely by force of character that he held his
men together under highly adverse conditions in 1520.

The Reform of the Administration

Provisions made for Surrey in this sphere, as in the military, seem to
have fallen somewhat short of original intentions and were likewise undermined
by Kildare's influence. However, it appears that Wolsey established for the
first time a privy council in Ireland for advice and support of a lieutenant
who was new to Irish affairs. Unlike Sir Edward Poynings in 1495, Surrey was
not provided with English administrators with a knowledge and experience of the
machinery of government in England. Nor did he receive a great deal of
support and cooperation from home during his absence, because Henry, Wolsey and
other councillors were already deeply involved in other matters: the Field of
Cloth of Gold and meetings with Charles V in 1520, Buckingham's trial and the
deteriorating continental situation which meant that Wolsey was in Calais from
July to November 1521. Thus a degree of sloppiness prevailed, revealed by the
late arrival of the desperately needed half yearly payments and the matter of
the powers in Surrey's commission.

The only English addition to the administration was Sir John Stile,
merchant and former ambassador to the court of Ferdinand of Aragon, who was
appointed treasurer of war and under-treasurer, though he was, on his own
admission, ignorant of "the course of the exchecker". Sir John Wallop also
accompanied Surrey to Ireland, and probably sat on the Irish council, but his
role was predominantly one of military command and liaison with Henry.
from Stile, Surrey had on his privy council Englishmen with experience of Ireland - namely archbishop Rokeby, Hugh Inge, bishop of Meath, John Rawson, prior of Kilmainham, and John Kite, who returned to Ireland after attending the Field of Cloth of Gold.96 Most active and trusted among his Irish officials/privy councillors were Patrick Bermingham, whom Henry confirmed C.J.K.B., and Patrick Finglas, 2.J.C.P., whom Surrey appointed chief baron of the exchequer in February 1521.96 Both of these men were loyal to the crown and impartial, in the opinions of Surrey and Stile.97 Of the nobility who participated actively, the lords of Gormanston, Howth and Trimbleston, 2.J.K.B., seem to have attended most, though Surrey distrusted Howth at first due to his relationship with Kildare,98 and none of these was as close to Surrey as Butler.99

As head of the administration Surrey made some initial changes in the officials serving under him apparently in an attempt to reduce Kildare's influence. He clearly had hopes of Richard Delahide, C.J.C.P., who retained his office when Surrey replaced six of the eight justices.100 Stile seems to have lumped him with Surrey's new appointees, however, who were, in his view, all hopelessly partial to Kildare.101 The difficulty from Surrey's viewpoint was in finding suitable candidates who would not favour Kildare, for though educated in England, often in the Inns of Court, such men almost all originated in the Pale.102 Among the most active in Surrey's administration were Kildare's critics Sir William Darcy, who was a close adviser to Surrey and appointed customer of Drogheda in 1521, and Robert Cowley who was close to Butler, and appointed by Surrey king's attorney, comptroller of the customs for Dublin, and clerk of the council.103 Surrey also appointed a few members of his own retinue closely associated with himself to office. Sir Henry Shernbourne was appointed comptroller of the customs and cocketts in Drogheda, John Wiseman became second chamberlain, and Ralph Framlingham, a serjeant-at-arms.104 No doubt Surrey intended to reward them, but the appointments of Shernbourne, Darcy and Cowley may indicate an effort to increase customs revenues by the elimination of
It was intended at the outset that reform of the administration at the centre and the local level was to be accompanied by a reform of the Irish church which might play an important role in promoting law and order by winning 'hearts and minds'. In an early memorandum Wolsey envisaged the dispatch of a commissary to Ireland who would summon senior clergy and enlist their support by encouraging the clergy and friars to preach the message of loyalty to the crown and enacting that all men making war on the lieutenant be cursed and the censures fulminated against them "after most fearful and terrible manner". How much of this programme was carried out is uncertain, but we do know that Surrey and his council, in cooperation with Wolsey, took great care that suitable candidates were preferred to positions of power in the Irish church. The united bishopric of Cork and Cloyne fell vacant in 1520, whereupon great suit was made to the lieutenant which occasioned revealing exchanges with Wolsey. Surrey and the council were united in a desire to see an Englishman appointed who would live in his see and "dare and will speak and roffle when need shall be." The lieutenant appears to have shared with other councillors the detailed examination of the candidates to assess their learning and "vertuous conversacion" and a unanimous decision was made in favour of Walter Wellesley, who was Prior of Conall in Kildare but no supporter of the earl. He combined learning and virtue with "a singuler mynde . . to English ordre" and did not balk at becoming a government spy. Though in the end Wolsey did not promote Wellesley to Cork and Cloyne, Surrey, having discovered him, recruited him by appointing him keeper of the rolls in June 1521.

Apart from the diplomatic role of Surrey's privy council, by far its most pressing duty was to increase royal revenues, since the royal intention was that most, if not the entire cost of the administration, lieutenant's fee and wages of his force should be met, after the first six months, from the lordship's revenues, as this had been achieved under Poynings in 1495. The recovery of the revenues was to be debated in Surrey's first great council and
achieved by three means: first by improving the efficiency of the collection of royal rents, customs and the subsidy and of royal justice both in the Pale and beyond, second, by legislation to expand taxation, and lastly, by the recovery of royal estates lost to the Irish. Due to his long immersion in military matters Surrey had no opportunity to call a great council or parliament initially, thus it was only in the first area that a start could be made at once by officials, and this was urgent.

Since the office of treasurer was left vacant, the burden fell squarely upon the shoulders of the ill-prepared John Stile. He found not only confusion in all the revenue courts, but that a general account had not been produced after 1503-4, so that he had no recent precedent to guide him and thus no idea of what the revenues should amount to or when they were due. When he tried to unravel the situation by interviewing previous incumbents in the relevant offices they were universally obstructive, and he wrote that even the new appointees "do not theyr delygences for the kinges profytes as they schuld do". He not surprisingly felt isolated and inadequate and soon requested expert help from England, though none was sent until Surrey had returned.

When in 1521 he had formed some picture of the amount of past revenues he informed Wolsey that, so far as he could see, Darcy's statement that the revenues exceeded ordinary expenditure (which was about IR£610 p.a.) by 2,000 marks p.a. was false. In 18 and 20 Henry VII they had amounted to a little over IR£1,500, but he doubted that they would amount to IR£1,400 in 1520. This was partly due to the poverty of tenants and the abandonment of farms, but above all to the state of war, as a result of which courts were not held and collectors and receivers too busy to make their returns into the exchequer, while much land was devastated, particularly in county Kildare in 1521. In the event he levied c. IR£1,500 at least in theory, representing a restoration to the levels of 1495 and 1496. While sufficient to meet the ordinary costs of administration, which was already economical, it was far from capable of meeting Surrey's fee and the wages of his force; thus the administration
lurched from one financial crisis to the next, and English subventions during Surrey's lieutenancy finally amounted to about £18,000.120

In late August 1520 Surrey and the privy council wrote that Kildare's appointees had collected the revenues and subsidy due at Lady Day 1520, and that no further revenues would come in until late in Michaelmas term.121 This was not in fact accurate, for the revenues for Hilary and Easter terms did come in eventually, but they were right in thinking that the administration faced a very lean period, since two thirds of the revenues normally came in during Michaelmas and Hilary terms.122 On 13 September Stile paid out in wages the last of the money he had brought over, new wages being due on 12 October, and since nothing could be had on credit and borrowing was nigh on impossible, the situation was such that Surrey feared mass desertion.123 He was already very short of money himself and had to replan his expedition to Munster to return before wages ran out.124 Thus the arrival later in the month of Bulmer with news that the king reluctantly accepted responsibility for extraordinary expenditure which could not be met from Irish revenues was a relief.125 However, although Wallop was given £4,000 to take to Stile in that month, because of the delay in his arrival due to contrary winds (long since anticipated by Surrey, Stile and Kite) the administration became quite desperate.126 On 3 November Surrey wrote that he could not issue out of Dublin to defend the Pale if it were attacked for he, the treasurer and his captains had not £20 among them, and this despite the fact that he had used both his private income and fee.127

It is uncertain when the second half yearly payment arrived, but the letter from Henry which accompanied it urged Surrey to attend to the revenues so that in future the cost of maintaining his force was born by them.128 Petchie's arrival at the end of April 1521 with 1,000 marks for emergencies helped the situation but was again accompanied by instructions to Surrey to attend to the revenues.129 Though the third half yearly payment arrived in July 1521, by October Stile was again worried about money, as Surrey was having to
spend heavily on the defence of the Pale, and he was forced to use money for
Surrey's fee which had been intended for wages for the army. He remained
unhappy about the recovery of the revenues, which Surrey had admitted in the
autumn of 1520 he had been too busy to consider when having to make war.
Stile thus requested Wolsey to instruct the lieutenant to look into it and be
more favourable to him in his work, without, of course, revealing that he had
complained, but in March 1522 Stile still had the same problems.

There had clearly been tension between the two over the revenues, with
Surrey angrily defending the collectors he had appointed. This sprang from
the fact that, given his penury, offices were the only form of reward which the
lieutenant could offer his supporters, and this probably led to the appointment
of men with military skills rather than efficient administrators. Moreover,
Stile expected him to assist in the recovery of the revenues and put pressure
on his appointees when he and they were urgently and constantly required in the
field. Underlying all this was the fact that Surrey, who had been forced to
serve on disadvantageous terms which meant that he subsidised his campaigns
from his own fee and landed income, could even then not significantly mitigate
the recurrent state of financial crisis. Far from remaining aloof from the
funding of war so as to be able to get on with its execution as he had
hoped, he was repeatedly forced to write begging letters to Henry and Wolsey
concerning the waging of his force, which was difficult enough to hold together
even when well paid. Though he and Stile often shared these worries, as
treasurer-at-war Stile was, on instruction, uniformly niggardly with the
lieutenant, to the point where Surrey was charged personally with the
garrisoning of a captured castle, the sending of his letters to the king, and
the maintenance of the two vessels he came over in and their preparation for
the return journey. It is therefore understandable that, when already sick
with dysentery, Surrey vented on his treasurer some of the frustration he felt
with Henry for his failure to accept reality concerning the inherent inadequacy
of the Irish revenues to meet the cost of English intervention, and supply
money promptly when it was needed as his father had done.\textsuperscript{139} He probably recognised the impossibility of increasing the royal revenues to an adequate level by such means alone, and clearly did not enjoy being asked to perform the impossible in this as in other respects.\textsuperscript{139}

The second means of increasing the revenue already mentioned was by legislation in the Irish parliament, where other reforms too might be enacted, but Surrey's continual absorption in war and diplomacy throughout the summer of 1520 caused a long delay in summoning the great council and Parliament.\textsuperscript{140} We know that the lieutenant played an important role in the formulation of the legislative programme prepared in Ireland in late 1520, and took the opportunity offered by the despatch of the bills to England for amendment and approval to send Finglas to air their views on the Irish reform.\textsuperscript{141} Parliament was convened in May 1521 but its seven sessions between that date and its dissolution in March 1522 were dictated largely by military exigencies.\textsuperscript{142} Again, we know nothing of the part Surrey played in parliament or of its debates. It appears that government bills resuming the customs, cockets and fee-farm rents of towns in the south-west, and imposing a royal monopoly on salt imports were rejected by the colonists, who did not share Henry's view that the recovery of his Irish patrimony should be funded chiefly by his subjects in Ireland.\textsuperscript{143} A proposal to double the subsidy in return for the renunciation of coyne and livery, as under Poynings, had been abandoned at an earlier stage, presumably because there was no hope of it being passed.\textsuperscript{144} Only three reforming measures, providing against the failure of justice for lack of Jurors, proscribing the burning of corn which caused famine, and forbidding the export of wool, appear to have been passed when Surrey dissolved Parliament in March 1522.\textsuperscript{145}

**Surrey's Analysis and Recommendations for Reform**

The third means of increasing royal revenues, and, it soon became clear, the only one which held out any hope of very substantial improvements, was the recovery of crown lands occupied by the Irish.\textsuperscript{146} Surrey had not long been in...
Ireland before he embarked upon what he regarded as his most important duty, that of advising Henry how this and the extension of his power in Ireland might be achieved, and what stood in its way. Among the first obstacles he identified was the great power of Kildare and the fear he inspired, both among the Anglo-Irish and the Irish, which made it impossible for Surrey to win the assistance of most of the Pale, many of the colonists and Irish beyond, however often he repeated that Kildare would not be allowed to return. His outrage at "the seditious practises, conspiracies and substill driftes of th'erle of Kildare, his servauntes, ayders and assisters" in fomenting rebellion is understandable. Henry's response was to appoint Wolsey to examine Kildare and promise that he would suffer as an example if found guilty, but this depended on Surrey obtaining proof of his treason and, not surprisingly, no one in Ireland was willing to furnish it. The closest Surrey got to the letters Kildare had sent was to hear an account of the contents of that addressed to Mulroney O'Carroll from O'Carroll's brothers who had been present when it was first read out. Receiving much support from the Butlers and the reformers, both deeply anti-Kildare, Surrey did not give up easily, and urged that action be taken against the earl, advocating the interrogation in the Tower of Kildare's secretary, William Delahide, who he thought had written the letters.

The measured attitude of the crown, demonstrated in a failure to license any such proceedings, to label Surrey's revelations "oonely presumptions and uncertain conjectures" and to go on talking as if Surrey could rely on assistance from the Pale, must have been deeply frustrating to the lieutenant when he was faced daily with chaos resulting from Geraldine plotting, which occupied him so continuously as to prevent him addressing other aspects of his mission. In September 1520 Surrey was informed that, Wolsey's enquiries having got nowhere, it had been decided to release Kildare out of ward and put him under surety not to leave England without special license, which Henry gave his word he would not grant, adding that this ought to satisfy
the lieutenant and his council and silence the rumours circulating in Ireland. This showed a failure either to grasp or to accept the seriousness of Surrey's problems, but worse was to follow, for soon after a marriage was arranged between Kildare and Dorset's daughter Elizabeth Grey. Since she was related to the king this marriage stood in a long tradition of attempts by the monarchy to bind Irish deputies more closely to itself, and was a clear indication that, far from having written Kildare off, Henry was leaving the door open to restoring him to power sooner or later.

News of this development spread in Ireland like wildfire, severely undermining the stance Surrey had adopted that no one need fear Kildare's vengeance because he would never be allowed to return to a position of authority, making Surrey appear either a liar or a fool. His chances of winning the support of those Palesmen, colonists and Irish chiefs who had remained aloof was clearly gone for good; he rightly anticipated that even those whom he had pacified would rise with renewed vigour once winter was over, and reported that both races predicted that if Kildare returned the Irish would confederate to destroy the Englishry rather than be destroyed themselves. It is not surprising, therefore, that it appears to have been at this point that Surrey's heart went out of his Irish mission. However, with commendable pragmatism he adapted his tactics to fit the shift in royal policy, and when news reached him that winter of a new and dangerous conspiracy whereby Scottish troops under Argyll were to link up with O'Neill's rebels, he suggested that Henry send considerable reinforcements, or Kildare himself to assist him. Moreover, to combat a confederacy in Munster in the spring he instructed Ormond and Darcy to put the Irish in fear by whatever devices came to mind, and afterwards praised their assertion that a great power was being sent from England under Kildare. None of this should be thought to indicate that Surrey's view of Kildare had been transformed, however. His successful efforts to involve Ormond in the Dublin administration, (though Henry would not appoint him treasurer as Surrey wished) suggest that the lieutenant, looking to the time when he would
withdraw, was trying to construct an alternative regime to Kildare's, and he conducted a campaign to have Ormond appointed deputy when he left Ireland.\(^\text{162}\)

If the lieutenant found soon after reaching Ireland that he was out of step with royal policy over Kildare, the same could be said of other aspects of policy on which he had been instructed to comment. We have seen that he had been directed to begin by making no distinction between the Anglo-Irish and Irish, but encouraging all 'rebels' to come in with gifts, promises of land title, knighthoods and the like, and then undermining those who resisted by sowing discord among them in preparation for a final military assault which would bring Henry control over the whole island.\(^\text{163}\) As early as 23 July, on his return from his first hosting, Surrey declared his belief that the Irish would not be brought to good order except by force, which, he believed would require a large army, much time and heavy expenditure, though he implied that the result would be worthwhile, for the soil was as good as that of England.\(^\text{164}\) In August he sent Wallop to the king, probably to persuade him of the need for conquest, as well as to pursue his case against Kildare.\(^\text{165}\) In the meantime he struggled on, on 6 September informing Wolsey that all Irishmen were at peace and desirous of his good will, though he had no belief that this would continue for long.\(^\text{166}\) In the middle of December he again wrote uncompromisingly to Henry of his unshakeable belief that Ireland would never be brought to obedience except by conquest, and asked Wolsey to see to it that if such an expensive policy were not to be pursued he might return home rather than waste the king's money, for he could certainly achieve no more than to keep the peace (with difficulty) which was not to the honour or profit of Henry, and at his own great cost.\(^\text{167}\) He then sent Finglas to the king on Parliamentary business, and, no doubt, to canvass his views further.\(^\text{168}\)

**The Change in Policy of the Winter of 1520-21**

Between campaigning seasons the situation developed rapidly as a result of the approaching expiry of the English truce with Scotland and the possibility of war under the terms of the treaty of London, due to
deteriorating relations between France and the Empire. Surrey feared a powerful combination of Irish rebels and Scottish invaders and sent letters and then Wallop to court to secure an additional three hundred horse and five hundred foot.\textsuperscript{169} Henry disliked this news and was inclined to be dismissive of the new threat because he was already contemplating war with France and Scotland.\textsuperscript{170} Indeed, he may have suspected that the lieutenant was trying to force his hand in providing the larger army he had repeatedly talked of, despite Surrey's humble declaration that he was always ready to serve where Henry required and with whatever force he chose.\textsuperscript{171} Sir John Petchie, who had long connexions with the Howards, was sent to Surrey carrying a message explaining the new priorities to the lieutenant, which was to be kept secret from his council.\textsuperscript{172} He informed him that no extra troops could be provided, though he had brought a thousand marks for use in emergencies, while to save money he must confine himself to the defence of the Pale, long since the major concern of the monarchy (most of the lands it retained in Ireland were concentrated there) where he would have the help of Henry's loyal subjects.\textsuperscript{173} The conquest of Ireland was therefore to be put on the back burner for three years, and Surrey was enjoined to resort to "circumspecte practices and provident devises" such as bribes and rumours that a large force was to be sent from England. The danger having passed and Henry hinting that his services might soon be required in a more rewarding field of endeavour, Surrey humbly submitted, and Petchie confirmed that he had shown himself conformable to the royal will.\textsuperscript{174} Henry had sweetened the pill by saying that in confining himself to the Pale he would "do unto us as acceptable pleasur and servyce as thowz ye conqueryd a grette part of that land."

On 30 June, however, Surrey wrote a letter probably delivered by Petchie, which gives outstanding proof of his courage in standing by his convictions. He began with a wholesale condemnation of the use of 'politique practices', which he regarded as the cause of the problems he then faced because, as he had often declared, in Ireland only force was respected, Irish chiefs being more than
willing to make whatever promises were required when it suited their purposes but breaking them with equal alacrity.\textsuperscript{175} He therefore advocated conquest, either in piecemeal fashion, which would require a force of 2,500, since the Irish were bound to combine when they knew Henry's intentions, or by rapid means beginning in several parts simultaneously, in which case 6,000 men would be required. He declined to guess how long either means would take, but reminded Henry that it had taken Edward I ten years to conquer Wales and Ireland was five times the size and the problems of supply much greater. Whenever new land was conquered fortresses and defensible town walls would have to be built, and the land colonised by English settlers, for English settlers were already thin on the ground in the Pale and the Irish pasturalist population was too set in its ways and too small for more than a third of the country to be farmed on the English model.

His report was in some sense a reaction to those being sent by other councillor/reformers who shared his view but were concerned above all to encourage the continuation of royal involvement in Irish affairs, and so were inclined to paint a far rosier picture of Surrey's achievements in Ireland than was warranted by the facts.\textsuperscript{176} Unlike them Surrey's intention clearly was to make Henry fully aware that nothing worthwhile had been or could possibly be achieved in Ireland without a major, sustained investment, which he well knew Henry was not inclined to make because of his belief that his honour depended primarily upon a high profile in European affairs, a belief that Surrey did not question.\textsuperscript{177} Clearly the earl was frustrated and anxious to be recalled so that he might serve "wher my poure, well wyllyng servyce may appere". This does not, however, invalidate his highly competent, realistic assessment.

The immediate result was neither Surrey's recall, nor his full adherence to Henry's injunctions. He implied that the use of rumours could only be effective in the short term and asserted that he could not rely on Henry's subjects in the Pale as the king imagined.\textsuperscript{178} Indeed, after receiving his new instructions he awaited the return of Thomas Jermyn, whom he had sent to Henry
for permission to attack a confederacy gathering in the west to invade the Pale, and from 9-24 July he was engaged in campaigning against the confederacy of O'Connor, O'More and O'Carroll. Though he, like Butler, devastated parts of their territory, had the better of the one engagement that actually occurred, took prisoners and O'Carroll's castle of Monasteroris, which he regarded as a useful base for pushing the boundaries of the Pale west, he was not able to suppress the rising. On 29 July he set out again to come to the defence of Naas in Kildare, which was likely to fall since the Geraldines were divided. He had appointed the earl's brother to defend the county in the hope that he might unite them, but he had joined the Kavanaghs and despite Surrey's efforts the county was thoroughly laid waste. There was also trouble in the north. When war between O'Neill and O'Donnell was ended by a truce at the end of July, Surrey hoped for the assistance of the former at least, but this never came, for rivalry between them, kept alive by the lieutenant since they would have posed a serious threat if firmly banded together, effectively prevented either assisting him. Butler therefore remained his most important supporter, though his adherence ruled out the cooperation of his local rival, Desmond.

Surrey had reasons for failing to restrict his activities to the Pale as narrowly as Henry had demanded. He may have felt that he would undermine both his own and the king's standing in Ireland by deserting the towns and more distant colonists who had supported him. Personal considerations probably influenced him too, for the Irish lands on which the Howards had a claim lay in the south, in and around New Ross, which explains to some extent the excellence of his understanding with the Butlers. However, by far his overriding consideration must have been that the most effective means of defending the Pale had always been to attack the Irish confederates threatening it in their own countries, and this was especially so for Surrey since he could not depend upon the Palesmen defending themselves, or lead their defence since, according to his own assertion, he went in fear of his life there.
Surrey's Withdrawal

By mid September 1521 Surrey was writing to Henry asking to be recalled before winter and reiterating the pointlessness of his remaining in Ireland with inadequate resources to achieve anything lasting. He added that he could not maintain his expenditure from his own pocket, and had fallen sick with dysentery, which he could not shake off and feared would kill him. Since he received no response, he wrote in mid October to Wolsey, whom he had used throughout as his intermediary with the king, but again without any result, though the king had expressed a wish that he return as early as 4 October. The delay in recalling Surrey (the letter so doing was written on 30 or 31 October) does not call for the sinister explanation which Vergil and Palsgrave offered. Communications with Ireland were usually very slow, and there was much debate as to who was to succeed him, dragged out due to Wolsey's absence. Increasingly desperate, Surrey made the shrewd move of opening a correspondence with Richard Pace, the royal secretary, during November and on 2 December informed him that his dysentery was so bad that he had had 22 attacks within 24 hours. The king's letter licensing him to return speedily to discuss provisions for his successor, leaving Butler as deputy-lieutenant, must have arrived soon after. He left in December and reached England before the end of January.

Given the decision that to replace Surrey with another Englishman was too expensive, as England was soon likely to be at war, it was a personal triumph for the earl that he was able to persuade the king and council to appoint Butler deputy and retain Kildare in England, though they could not be persuaded to continue some level of military assistance to the new deputy, which was essential if his rule was to be effective since his own lands lay so far from Dublin. The inducement offered to Butler was recognition in England as earl of Ormond with a favourable settlement of the Ormond succession dispute through the marriage of his son to Anne Boleyn, a device of Surrey and the Irish privy council. Thus Surrey returned to Ireland in March 1522 for three weeks to
dissolve Parliament, disband his retinue, install Butler in the deputyship and reconcile the Irish council as best he might to his own permanent withdrawal.197

Conclusions

Historians are united in endorsing what would clearly have been Surrey's own verdict upon his lieutenancy in Ireland, namely that nothing of lasting value was achieved.198 This, it is clear, had little to do with Surrey himself, but was the direct result of the way in which the crown's intervention had come about, false premises concerning the situation in Ireland which shaped Surrey's instructions, and inadequate planning.199 The disparate forces (Kildare's magnate rivals, Anglo-Irish reformers and English humanists) which had combined to bring pressure to bear on the king to intervene, had been forced to play down such aspects of that situation as were likely to make the whole proposition unattractive, and exaggerate the prospects for advancing Henry's honour by extending royal control and thus recovering revenues and lands lost to the Irish, obviously far the most potent inducement to the king to act.200 The false premises underlying Surrey's instructions consisted, firstly, in overestimating support for the crown and whichever representative it chose to rule the lordship and ignoring the power of local factors in Irish politics and the entrenched position of Kildare.201 The second blind spot concerned the Irish revenues, where, despite Henry VII's experience, his son and the English council were unwilling to accept that revenues could not be improved by administrative and diplomatic means alone to a level where they could support an English deputy and force, and reform thus become self-sustaining. Thirdly, and most crucially of all, the policy adopted for reducing not only the Anglo-Irish earls but also the Irish chiefs to obedience was quite unrealistic, though not without enlightened features. Based on the principle of surrender and regrant, it nonetheless failed to come to grips with the fundamental issue of crown lands in Irish hands.202

It has been argued that much more could have been achieved by Surrey had
he had Kildare with him in active support, and that the policy of detaining him in England made the expedition self-defeating.\textsuperscript{203} This view overlooks the fact that Butler and the most vocal of the reforming administrators were deeply hostile to Kildare and had convinced Wolsey, the English council and the king that he was himself part of the problem which afflicted Ireland and inimical to reform. They were right in that the localisation of politics which afflicted Ireland also affected Kildare, so that there were Irish chiefs upon whose friendship the stability of his own territories depended. Thus, as Poynings had found with his father, Kildare was by no means to be relied upon in a situation where he had not chosen the Irish enemies to be attacked.\textsuperscript{204} Moreover, as Surrey himself noted, any serious attempt by Henry to reconquer lands held by Irish chiefs was likely to overcome local loyalties on the Irish side and provoke a concerted response as long as the threat lasted.\textsuperscript{205} Surrey’s record of persistent negotiation to heal rivalries among the Anglo-Irish earls and win their support suggests that there are no grounds for thinking that it would have been possible to unite them for the conquest of Irish held territories, unless under grave threat themselves, because of the system of interacting local alliances which disregarded the racial issue.\textsuperscript{206} Thus considerable military assistance from England was essential under any circumstances.

Given the fact that Surrey achieved little in Ireland through no fault of his own, it is pertinent to assess what the episode reveals of his abilities and character in a situation of great responsibility, where constant financial and military crises and the failure of the king to accept the realities of the situation brought endless stress and frustration. It appears that Surrey went to Ireland in the hope of beginning a military reconquest, and that his experiences while there confirmed his view that lasting reform could only be achieved by these means. The vigorousness of his ceaseless campaigning, despite the fact that he soon appreciated that he was engaged merely in a holding operation, is striking and confirms his oft reiterated view that only might was effective in Ireland. His success in tailoring an effective fighting force and
holding it together in 1520 without the aid of martial law, despite disease, dearth, and adverse fighting conditions, testifies to a personality in which authority and severity were matched by a concern for the welfare of his men which made him respected.

It cannot be said, however, that in his military orientation he was out of step with the Irish privy council, who had the power to veto such activity, or that it meant that he disregarded his instructions to use policy. With the help of councillors he faithfully negotiated repeatedly with Anglo-Irish lords and Irish chiefs alike, offering inducements to good behaviour and fair words. Indeed, though he appears never to have had much faith in the efficacy of these methods, he demonstrated a striking agility in this field of statecraft, while yet managing to convey an impression of himself and his master as honourable and reliable.

It has been said that he demonstrated no administrative capacity whatever in Ireland. This judgement is certainly too harsh, for, except in winter, he had very little opportunity to turn his attention to the reform of the Irish administration and was forced to rely on his deputies, who were neither as numerous nor as skilled as was desirable, and came up against resistance from Kildare's supporters. Despite the dearth of relevant source material, it is clear that when in Dublin he presided at meetings of the privy council, heard cases before it and took an interest in reforming the church. He also undertook important improvements in the fabric of the Irish administration, such as the rebuilding of Dublin Castle and the recovery, ordering and provision of new chests for the safekeeping of records, such as the statute rolls. It seems likely that, just as one of Surrey's early aims was to find proof of Kildare's manipulation of the administration to his own advantage, so latterly it was his intention to strengthen it so that it was capable of operating without Kildare's cooperation. No doubt he had the fullest support of the privy council in this, though it remained in the dark as to his intention of withdrawing so soon from Ireland.
Indeed, the Irish privy council professed the highest opinion of his performance as lieutenant and protested vigorously at his departure.\textsuperscript{213} Nor was this an isolated view, for despite the fact that Surrey's period in Ireland was one of constant disillusionment for the king and Wolsey, the letters of both repeatedly praised and thanked him.\textsuperscript{214} Indeed, in deliberating upon his successor, Wolsey wrote to the king, "remembering as well the nobility of blood with the degree and authority that he is of, as also his wisdom and active towardness, hard will it be to find any other English captain to do more, or as much, as he hath done in that role."\textsuperscript{215} In Ireland Surrey was remembered for his magnificence, (simple people thought him the king's son) impartiality in matters of justice, which elicited comparisons with Solomon, uprightness and reliability, and habit of paying his way rather than extorting from the population, all the more remarkable considering his penury. Thus, with the passage of sufficient time, William Hussey, who had been a minor figure in his administration, credited him with having presided over a period of prosperity and plenty rather than destruction, dearth and disease, so echoing bardic outpourings on successful Gaelic chiefs.\textsuperscript{216} Indeed, painful as Surrey's service in Ireland undoubtedly was, it played an important part in the development of his career. Not only did he become the resident expert on Irish affairs at Henry's court, and the man to whom all Irish visitors naturally resorted, but his experience of government in one of the borderlands greatly increased his status as a councillor.\textsuperscript{217}
Notes


2 G.R. Elton, Tudor Revolution in Government, pp 36-40

3 S.G. Ellis, Tudor Ireland, pp 20, 26

4 S.G. Ellis, Reform and Revival, English Government in Ireland, 1470-1534, p 4


6 They included one from the dowager countess of Kildare, PRO SP60/1, f 29

7 Particularly true of Kite's contributions, B. Bradshaw, The Irish Constitutional Revolution of the Sixteenth Century, pp 48-57

8 DNB xi, pp 232-3; LP iii, 2907, 2977

9 D.B. Quinn in A. Cosgrove ed., p 658; Darcy, see Book of Howth, Calendar of Carew Manuscripts (CCM) v, pp 192-3

10 CCM i, no. 2; SP ii pt. 3, no. 1

11 Ellis, Tudor Ireland, pp 103-4 for Kildare's dilemma.

12 Ibid., pp 104-5

13 LP iii, 576, 670; G.R. Elton, Reform and Reformation, p 80

14 D. Hay ed., Vergil, p 265; CSPV ii, no. 7; LP iii, 1719

15 CCM i, no. 2; Breviate CCM i, 1, p 2; BL Lansdowne Ms. 159; SP ii pt. 3, no. 1

16 SP ii pt. 3, no. 1 pp 9-10; The reformers called for the revival of the old system of defence whereby all landholders rather than great lords carried the burden.

17 Bradshaw shows that the hostility of the reformers to Gaelicisation was directed at Gaelic dynasticism as a rival political system, ibid. p 42


19 Bradshaw, op. cit., p 45; Quinn in A. Cosgrove ed., pp 660-661; Darcy and Cowley had apparently fallen out with the ninth earl, while Butler laid charges amounting to treason.

20 CCM i, pp 6-8; SP ii pt. 3, no. 1, pp 12-13

21 Ellis, Reform and Revival, pp 32-5, 56

22 Quinn in A. Cosgrove ed., p 661; Ellis, Reform and Revival, p 16

23 The reformers were not blind to Kildare's military effectiveness, SP ii pt. 3, no. 1, pp 16-17; Ellis, Reform and Revival, p 85

24 SP ii pt. 3, nos. 2, 3, 12, 14, 18, 19, 20, 26; PRO SP60/1, f 42

25 SP ii pt. 3, no. 2

26 This had hardly entered the purview of Anglo-Irish reformers, Bradshaw, op. cit., pp 43-4, 53

27 SP ii pt. 3, no. 12

28 Ellis, Tudor Ireland, pp 111-13

29 SP ii pt 3, no. 20

30 GEC ix, pp 602-3

31 This clearly underlies Palsgrave and Darcy's charges against Wolsey concerning Surrey's 'banishment' to Ireland, LP iv, 5749-50

32 PRO SP60/1, ff 28-30, 69-72

33 Ellis, Reform and Revival, pp 12-13

34 Quinn, 'Tudor Rule in Ireland, 1485-1547', London Ph.D. (1933) p 249

35 LP iii, 669, 800, p 1540; TCD Ms. 543/2, from Quinn just cited.

36 PRO SP60/1, f 42

37 There was a precedent for this in his father's behaviour when replaced by Poyning, Ellis, Tudor Ireland, p 76; Bradshaw, op. cit., pp 75-6


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This figure is arrived at by adding the numbers given in a memorandum of early 1520, entitled "The army for Ireland besides the deputy's own charge", PRO SP60/1, ff 69-72, to those in the indenture sent to Surrey probably soon after his arrival in Ireland, referred to in PRO SP1/20, f 112. This interpretation of the figures has support, Hall, p 601. PRO SP60/1, ff 69-72; LP iii, App. 15; Though 400 jackets were supplied for them, LP iii, p 1540, they were clearly loath to go, having the far more attractive prospect of attending Henry to France.

PRO E101/248/21 I am grateful to Steven Ellis for a transcript of this document; Wage rates to his retinue were lower than those the 1530s.

Other indication of numbers, SP ii pt. 3, no. 3; Surrey's own force may have dwindled as Stile clearly thought, SP ii pt. 3, no. 25

PRO SP60/1, f 49; Butler brought 500 men of his own while Shrewsbury's steward of Wexford and Butler's Irish allies brought about another 150 men, SP ii pt. 3, no. 3

For Surrey's relations with Butler, SP ii pt. 3, nos. 3, 4, 8, 10, 13

SP ii pt. 3, nos. 2, 3, 8

SP ii pt. 3, nos. 2, 3; LP iv, 2405

PRO SP60/1 f 28, SP60/1, f 30

CCM pp 15-16; LP iii, App. 15

SP ii pt. 3, no. 2

SP ii pt. 3, nos. 3, 8

SP ii pt. 3, nos. 3, 12; PRO SP60/1, f 39

SP ii pt. 3, nos. 8, 13; PRO SP60/1, f 47; Bagwell, op. cit. i, p 133

SP ii pt. 3, nos. 3, 12, 13

SP ii pt. 3, nos. 2, 3; PRO SP60/1, ff 69-72; PRO SP1/20, f 112 He dismissed 117 yeomen of the guard.

He did not hear until 6 September, SP ii pt. 3, no. 7

LP iii, App. 15; PRO SP60/1, f 47

PRO SP60/1, f 47

SP ii pt. 3, no. 12

SP ii pt. 3, nos. 12, 13

SP ii pt. 3, no. 13

At a cost of £400, PRO E101/248/21

SP ii pt. 3, no. 3

SP ii pt. 3, no. 7

SP ii pt. 3, no. 2

Ibid.; PRO SP60/1, ff. 71; Ellis, Tudor Ireland, p 80

SP ii pt. 3, no. 7; LP iii, 669

SP ii pt. 3, no. 7

PRO SP1/20, f 112

Ibid.

SP ii pt. 3, no. 12

PRO SP60/1, f 65; SP ii pt. 3, no. 25

SP ii pt. 3, no. 13; PRO SP60/1, f 65

Even the sessions were disrupted, LP iii, 963

SP ii pt. 3, no. 3

PRO SP60/1, f 39

SP ii pt. 3, no. 7; LP iii, App. 15

PRO SP60/1, f 65

SP ii pt. 3, no. 2

SP ii pt. 3, no. 3

SP ii pt. 3, no. 7

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88 Ibid.
89 SP ii pt. 3, nos. 12, 13
90 LP iii, 670; Ellis, Reform and Revival, pp 41-2
91 Ellis, Tudor Ireland, pp 80-81
92 For the financial crises which resulted, pp 20-1; SP ii pt. 3, nos. 12, 13, 15, 22, 25
93 G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, p 152; SP ii pt. 3, no. 31
94 LP iii, 670; Ellis, Reform and Revival, pp 41-2
95 For the offices of councillors see Ellis, Reform and Revival, Appendix; Rawson became treasurer of Ireland at Surrey's instance in February 1522, LP iii, 2087; Kite was well known to the Howards and had been on embassy in Spain with Surrey's half-brother Berners, DNB xi, pp 232-3
96 Finglas had served under, but become an opponent of, Kildare, Ellis, 'Kildare Ascendancy', Irish Hist. Studs. (1977) pp 247-8
97 For the state of the customs see Ellis, Reform and Revival, pp 72-4
98 Howth had been chancellor of the exchequer, Ellis, Reform and Revival, p 223; CCM, Book of Howth, p 191; Signatures SP ii pt 3, nos. 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 28, 29
99 SP ii pt. 3, no. 10
100 Ellis, Reform and Revival, p 34
101 SP ii pt. 3, no. 25
102 Bradshaw, op. cit., p 35
103 Darcy, PRO SP60/1, ff 39, 63; SP ii pt. 3, no. 3; Surrey calls Cowley his servant, SP ii pt. 3, no. 7; Ellis, Reform and Revival, p 37
104 PRO E101/248/21; Both Shernbourne and Wiseman were East Anglians and had served as naval captains under Surrey, (PRO E101/62/17) the former was also at Flodden, PRO E101/61/27
105 For the state of the customs see Ellis, Reform and Revival, pp 72-4
106 Kildare influence was a problem here too, for example the Prior of Monastereven was suspected of conveying some of Kildare's letters and perhaps even engaging Irish rebels, SP ii pt. 3, no. 7
107 PRO SP60/1, ff 69-72
108 PRO SP60/1, f 42 It was accepted by both them and Wolsey that pluralism was the only means of obtaining good candidates, PRO SP60/1, ff 69-72
109 PRO SP60/1, f 45
110 Bagwell, op. cit., i, p 288; Ellis, Reform and Revival, p 220
111 SP ii pt. 3, no. 12; Ellis, Tudor Ireland, p 81; Quinn, 'Tudor Rule', London Ph.D. (1933) p 251; Ellis, 'Henry VII and Ireland' in England and Ireland in the Later Middle Ages, J.F. Lydon ed., pp 244-5, 249
112 LP iii 670, iv, 80; SP ii pt. 3, no. 2, 12, 18
113 SP ii pt. 3, no. 22
114 SP ii pt. 3, nos. 22, 25
115 SP ii pt. 3, no. 25; Quinn, 'Tudor Rule', pp 268-9
116 SP ii pt. 3, no. 22; Even Darcy was unhelpful, SP ii pt. 3, no.
117 PRO E101/248/21; Quinn, 'Tudor Rule', p 270
118 This included over £500 in arrears, most of which was outstanding in 1538, Ellis, Reform and Revival, p 84
119 Ibid. pp 81; Though Stile's figure for wages etc. is £509 p.a. there are omissions amounting to about £100, Ellis, Reform and Revival, p 81
120 Quinn, 'Tudor Rule', p 272, table
121 PRO SP60/1, f 40; Also Kite, LP iii, App. 15
122 Quinn, 'Tudor Rule', p 256, based on figures for 1495-6
123 Ibid.; LP iii, 963; SP ii pt. 3, no. 7
124 SP ii pt. 3, no. 8; PRO SP60/1, f 47
125 SP ii pt. 3, no. 20
126 LP iii, p 1543; see notes 121, 123
127 SP ii pt. 3, no. 13
128 SP ii pt. 3, no. 12
129 Or at least most of the cost, SP ii pt. 3, no. 18
130 SP ii pt. 3, nos. 22, 25 He reported Surrey's fruitless expenditure on
'gifts' to the Irish, thus unwittingly criticising Henry's policy.

131 PRO SP60/1, f 42
132 SP ii pt. 3, nos. 25, 31
133 SP ii pt. 3, no. 25
134 SP ii pt. 3, no. 22
135 PRO SP1/20, f 112
136 PRO SP60/1, f 40; SP ii pt. 3, no. 7, 8
137 SP ii pt. 3, no. 31
138 Stile wrote "...he is a grete lord, and some tymes hasty, more than nedithe", SP ii pt. 3, no. 25
139 Quinn in A. Cosgrove ed., p 665; The bulk of revenues came from the Pale where the annual subsidy was its most important element, but the tax base was fully exploited, Ellis, Reform and Revival, pp 67-86, 105
140 SP ii pt. 3, no. 3, PRO SP60/1, ff 69-72, 42
141 SP ii pt. 3, no. 16; LP iii, 1182
143 Quinn, 'The Early Interpretation of Poyning's Law', Irish Hist. Studs. (1941) p 248; Ellis, Tudor Ireland, pp 110-111
144 LP iii, 1182
145 The last, intended to promote a weaving industry, may owe something to Surrey, who as an East Anglian probably knew its employment and wealth generating potential.
146 Particularly in Ulster and Connaught, Quinn in A. Cosgrove ed., p 665
147 SP ii pt. 3, no. 20
148 SP ii pt. 3, nos. 3, 14, 18
149 SP ii pt. 3, no. 2
150 CCM, p 17; SP ii pt. 3, no. 3
151 SP ii pt. 3, nos. 3, 7
152 SP ii pt. 3, no. 7
153 SP ii pt. 3, nos. 12, 18
154 SP ii pt. 3, no. 12
155 SP ii pt. 3, no. 7
156 Ellis, Tudor Ireland, pp 82, 98
157 SP ii pt. 3, no. 7
158 Ibid., and no. 15
159 Witness his first plea to be recalled, SP ii pt. 3, no. 15
160 SP ii pt. 3, no. 18
161 PRO SP60/1, ff 49, 63; SP ii pt. 3, no. 10
162 SP ii pt. 3, no. 13; Quinn, 'Tudor Rule', p 252
163 PRO SP60/1, ff 28, 30
164 SP ii pt. 3, no. 3
165 PRO SP60/1, f 40
166 SP ii pt. 3, no. 7
167 SP ii pt. 3, no. 15
168 SP ii pt. 3, no. 16
169 SP ii pt. 3, no. 18
170 LP iii, 1220
171 SP ii pt. 3, nos. 18, 19
172 From 1514 he was the farmer of Norfolk's Kent manor of Eastwickham, (Arundel Ms. A 1247; BL Add. Ch. 16,547) attended Mary Tudor to France in 1514 in a Howard picked entourage (J. Leland, Collectanea, p 702) jousted often with Surrey (N. Samman, op. cit., Appendix IV) who nominated him for the Garter in 1516 and 1518, as Norfolk also did in 1521 (Anstis, op. cit., pp 278, 284, 287)
173 SP ii pt. 3, no. 18
174 SP ii pt. 3, no. 19
175 SP ii pt. 3, no. 20; PRO SP60/1, f 65
176 He refers in his letter to the reports being sent by other councillors though none of this date survive, but see SP ii pt 3, nos. 28, 29
177 SP ii pt. 3, no. 20

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A truce was finally taken in mid October.

See also no. 19. O'Donnell and his ally, Hugh McNeill held former crown lands, which coloured Surrey's attitude.

Bradshaw, op. cit., p 73; SP ii pt. 3, pp 57, 63, 75

GEC ix, pp 602-3

Bradshaw, op. cit., pp 72-3

PROI Ms. 1A 49 136, p 61 (Ferguson's extracts from Irish Memoranda Rolls, M.R. 12 Henry VIII, m ? destroyed 1922) I am grateful to Steven Ellis for a transcript of this document; SP ii pt. 3, nos. 20, 22 p 79

Quinn, 'Tudor Rule', p 274

Ibid.

Quinn, 'Tudor Rule', p 274


Bradshaw, op. cit., p 79
CHAPTER VI

THE SECOND WAR WITH FRANCE AND SCOTLAND, 1522-4

1. The Naval War in 1522

When Surrey returned to court from Ireland for about a month in late January 1522, it was not simply to give his views on the question of his successor there, much less to recover his health. Though Wolsey was still hopeful of negotiating a truce or peace between Francis I and Charles V to forestall England's declaration of war against France under the terms of the treaty of London, such a result was becoming increasingly unlikely. Under the terms of the treaty of Bruges, concluded in August and signed in late November 1521 to provide against his failure, Henry was committed to launch his fleet with three thousand men aboard to clear the Channel and 'English seas' for the emperor's passage from the Low Countries to England and thence to Spain. Charles was to give Henry a month's notice of his crossing to England in the spring of 1522, and his arrival would precipitate Henry's declaration against Francis one month later, though a multilateral invasion of France was not intended until 1523. By the time Surrey reached home, pressure to put the fleet to sea was mounting. Henry had contemplated launching a naval attack with the aim of knocking out the French fleet in the summer of 1521, and since then much had occurred to make this more desirable: Albany's return to Scotland in November 1521 and the renewal of the 'auld alliance' soon after, the growth of French and Scottish piracy — in the new year privateers lay off English ports to descend on emerging merchantmen — and a French raid on the English coast on 8 January. Moreover, though the emperor had not named the date for his crossing, he was exerting pressure to have the English fleet put to sea, and had ambassadors at Henry's court specifically to monitor naval progress.

If the king was more impatient for war with France than Wolsey, as he appears to have been, the return of Lord Admiral Surrey from Ireland, and his
vice-admiral of 1520, Sir William Fitzwilliam from embassy in France at about the same time, was probably very welcome. Henry and the Howard brothers had almost precipitated the first war with France in 1511 by naval action, and as a member of a family with a history of attachment to the house of Burgundy, and a strong commitment to the protection of commerce, Surrey was bound to approve of the treaty of Bruges. His immediate activity at the highest level is known, for as early as 3 February he had an appointment to take Jacques de Caestres, one of the imperial ambassadors, to inspect the royal ships. However, if Henry had envisaged that naval dominance would be achieved, as in the 1512–14 war, by putting the fleet to sea ahead of its French and Scottish counterparts he was disappointed. Preparations for a naval campaign were made, but Wolsey worked to preserve England’s neutrality until Charles’s arrival. He could argue that the emperor might be greatly delayed, that to keep the whole fleet at sea throughout the spring and summer would be very expensive when bad harvests had pushed the cost of victuals to unprecedented levels, and that Henry faced the likelihood of a long, financially draining war.

Persuaded of the need to limit expenditure, Surrey and Fitzwilliam evolved a naval strategy intended to secure the seas while yet enabling the navy to retain a low profile. Letters of marque may have been issued, but Wolsey continued to seek redress for English merchants through diplomatic channels, treating similar French claims seriously. A small squadron was despatched to patrol between Dover and Calais and another to convoy merchant shipping, but the first was detailed not to show itself off French ports, nor intercept French craft to gather intelligence of French naval preparations, which was obtained instead from spies operating by land from Calais, where Surrey’s half-brother Berners was lieutenant. French vessels encountered by the Dover–Calais patrol were treated as neutrals as late as May, when hostile naval action was begun against Scottish ports by another squadron under William Saby. Moreover, in an effort to avoid an escalation of naval activity Wolsey informed the French at various times that royal ships were being prepared for
convoying duties and to escort the emperor to Spain, and thus did not violate the terms of the treaty of London.  

Despite Surrey's initial cooperation with Wolsey, there are signs in the correspondence of the imperial ambassadors that by his final return from Ireland in early April Surrey had come round to Henry's more bellicose view, and even acted as his mouthpiece, though it is also possible that he was simply anxious to please Charles. He proposed on 15 April that he and Fitzwilliam head an English escort of eleven vessels to meet Charles at Gravelines, since the date of Charles's crossing could not be kept secret.  

He reported on naval intelligence to the ambassadors on Henry's instruction, and repeatedly affirmed his devotion to Charles's interests, pledging to serve him as faithfully as his father had served his ancestor, Charles the Bold. The ambassadors reported that Surrey was shrewd and in Henry's most secret counsels as a preface to disclosing his advice to Charles in late April. This was that the emperor and Henry act as if all hope of a truce with the French had passed, and that Charles set forth for Spain as soon as possible so that his attack on France from the south might be launched, this being the best means of safeguarding the Low Countries in his absence. All this contrasted markedly with Wolsey's advice, and was music to Charles's ears. He responded with a fulsome letter promising his goodlordship.  

As the date of Charles's oft deferred arrival drew near and French acts of hostility multiplied, Wolsey changed his tactics and threw himself into planning the short, sharp naval campaign Surrey favoured in the hope of driving Francis to seek an early truce. Late in April the Imperial ambassadors reported that Surrey and he were eager that when Charles had arrived in England a devastating assault should be launched against France by the combined English and Spanish fleets to signal England's entry into the war, rather than waiting, as planned, until Charles had been escorted to Spain. The proposed aim was an attack on the French fleet if it was at sea, or the new port of Le Havre, or, with an additional force aboard ship, a landing in Normandy or Brittany to
devastate a port. As in the last war the object was to eliminate the French fleet (obviating the need to maintain the whole fleet at sea all summer), cripple French trade and customs, protect the coasts of the Low Countries and England and facilitate an English seaborne invasion. Surprisingly Henry, who had proposed exactly this tactic both in 1513 and in 1521, raised objections to it now, perhaps anticipating that Charles would think it more in England's interests than his own and in essence a ploy to force him to increase his naval contributions and hasten the despatch of the Spanish fleet. However, since Wolsey was so complete a convert as to be willing to advance Henry's declaration of war from a month after Charles's arrival to the moment of it if Charles approved the plan, he eventually agreed, though preferring an attack on Bayonne or Bordeaux to a northern port.

On 22 April Surrey was appointed admiral to escort Charles (and licensed to retain seven hundred men); and Fitzwilliam was his vice-admiral. By then both were engaged in feverish naval preparations, Wolsey having had to admit that the whole English fleet could not be ready as soon as Charles wanted to cross. Fitzwilliam was soon securing his passage at the head of the Dover-Calais squadron, while on 23 May Surrey with 11 vessels crossed to Calais and may have met the emperor at Gravelines in place of Dorset and conducted him to Calais. The crossing to Dover passed without incident, and Charles arrived on 28 May to an enthusiastic reception and found that the difficulties over cooperation experienced to date disappeared once he and Henry were together. The negotiation of two further treaties followed, since both monarchs were anxious to make France feel the weight of their combined strength and Henry to avenge recent attacks on the Calais Pale and coordinate the naval assault with his declaration of war. Surrey was not involved. On 8 June Charles had appointed his "dear cousin" admiral of his fleet so that he might command the Joint Anglo-Imperial navy, but by 31 May he was at Southampton, with councillors Sir Richard Wingfield and Sir Richard Jerningham, sent to speed up the launch of the main fleet for the attack on Le Havre.
The Problems of Naval Mobilisation

On 8 June, in response to orders to sail, Surrey was forced to report that there was no question of the whole English fleet setting out in the near future since neither Fitzwilliam and his squadron, who had been driven into the Downs by a gale, nor the ships still in the Thames, could reach the rendezvous at Southampton due to strong westerly winds. Though the vice-admiral had arrived by 10 June, the victual for his ships had not, but the lading of victuals was anyway delaying the fleet's departure. The small squadrons which had put to sea early in the year had been victualled without great difficulty but, as in the previous war, the simultaneous supply of five thousand men for three months at sea overstretched the system. Victualling, which was particularly problematic in 1522 due to shortages, was carried out as before by appointees in London, Southampton and Portsmouth, where the king's largest brewhouses were located. On this occasion the collection of casks, a perennial constraint to victualling, was begun early in the year, but filling them was another matter.

Fitzwilliam complained to his London victuallers on 10 June that he had casks but no beer and was told to try to obtain it in Southampton, and on 13 June he, Surrey, Jerningham and Wingfield complained bitterly to Henry about the failure of the London victuallers to meet his needs at the end of May as promised. Surrey then informed Wolsey that the Portsmouth victuallers, who were to supply his requirements, and had promised enough for two months, were unable to meet their target either. Once all the men were embarked and the fleet was under sail, it emerged just how serious the shortfall was. His own ships had twenty days' supply of meat, fish and biscuit and one month's supply of beer, and that twenty days later than promised, while none of Fitzwilliam's were supplied for more than three weeks, most for two, and some for only one week. In letters to Henry and Wolsey Surrey accused the victuallers of negligence and inefficiency. On visiting the brewhouses at Portsmouth he had found operations halted for lack of money and so given the victualler two
hundred marks from his own pocket. He suggested that reliable men be appointed to speed the process in London and Portsmouth, and made provision to have the victualling ships escorted from the Thames to Southampton, leaving a team of one hundred men there to reload and send them on to him at sea. As late as 3 July the supply ships had not reached the fleet off Brittany, and Surrey was supplying Fitzwilliam's ships from his own, reducing the range of his beer supply to 12 days. He promised to remain at sea as long as it held out, and drink water on the return journey. The fleet was at sea for about sixteen more days, or a month in all, which is hardly impressive.

Another problem encountered by the admiral before his departure concerned the coinage used for wages. Surrey had had proclamations read at Winchester and Southampton to enforce its face value, since it was in a very poor state. However, this measure had no effect and he wrote that his men could not obtain the full value of the king's crown, nor change it, and were suffering accordingly. He advised that "streite lettres" be sent to the mayors and sheriffs to enforce the proclamations, while the shortage of silver, which meant that exact wages would not be payable in the following month, be overcome by Henry sending £600 or £700 worth of silver in place of part of the crowns held by the paymaster. He wrote to Wolsey, "I doubt not this matier shalbe displeasaunte to your grace, but not somouche as it is to me, for I am continually troubled with the clamor of the same, not knowing howe to remedye it."

Further vexation was caused by three Venetian galleys which were at Southampton on their annual trade visit, and had been impressed at the suggestion of the emperor. In theory they might fill the gap in Henry's navy caused by a lack of large craft with shallow draft and powerful ordnance which could manoeuvre in a calm, a gap felt keenly in the actions off Brest in the last war when French galleys had been brought from the Mediterranean. There were reports that galleys would be deployed by the French again, though Surrey was sceptical of this. The Venetian galleys presented as many problems as
they solved, however. They were specialised craft, manned by rowers chained to their posts who understood only Italian, thus it was unrealistic to think of using them without their crews and masters as Wolsey did.49 This meant that the compliance of the Venetian state was required, but despite Imperial, English and Papal pressure, Venice was determined not to join the alliance against France.50 Moreover, the Venetians stood to lose large profits from the round trip if it could not be completed to schedule and it had already been delayed.

When Wolsey first informed the Venetian ambassadors on 31 May that the galleys were needed to accompany the emperor to Spain, the response was grudging compliance if the goods already loaded in two of them, and their crews, were left aboard. Wolsey would not agree, but avoided explaining that they were required to transport men for the attack on Brittany.51 Surrey in Southampton did not maintain the deception, and so quickly informed Henry that in his view the Venetians were pro French and would not cooperate with him but only delay his enterprise to give the enemy time to prepare.52 He pragmatically advised Henry to release them, giving them two months to clear his ports and no protection thereafter, for if this were done "I doute not all the chargis your grace shall susteyne this yere upon the se wolbe well payed for".53 Henry, Charles and Wolsey rejected this advice, and the galleys were ordered to unload their cargoes, which they began very reluctantly to do. Nine days later Surrey and the councillors with him reported that they had had the Venetians before them to press them over the delays, when they maintained a willingness to accompany the emperor, but declined to take part in any attack on France without instruction from Venice.54

At this Surrey commanded them on pain of their lives to speed up the unloading and wrote to Henry that he was "fayne to use unto theym displeasaunte and sore termes" but had no faith in the result. Later that same day the captains returned to him to refuse to do any service beyond accompanying the emperor, and offered themselves up for imprisonment. The admiral and his advisers sent Gonson to court to urge Henry to abandon the plan, and open the
letters of Venetian merchants and ambassadors alike lest they inform the French of the intended attack. Henry was obdurate, thus Wolsey continued to deny any intention of using the galleys against France and simply applied more pressure. He was soon exasperated by their further efforts to resume their voyage, and ordered the removal of some of their gear so that they could not sail, at which Surrey mounted their ordnance to defend Portsmouth harbour.

Thus, though the Venetians avoided participation in the war against France, their three galleys became important pawns in the bargaining over the republic's entry into the alliance and were unable to sail until the end of June 1523.

On 21 June Surrey had written vis a vis the delays, that he feared the victualling problem more than contrary winds. However, having embarked his men and left Southampton on 19 June, some three weeks later than planned, he still lay off St Helens on 23rd, the wind being in the right direction but very light. To save time Surrey took the decision, against the advice of the ships' masters, to "ply the tides", allowing the ebb tides to carry them west and anchoring during the floods. By 27 June they had reached Portland by these painful means, bound for Dartmouth where they must await a wind to carry them over to Brittany. On 30 June the fleet lay before Dartmouth but that evening a northerly wind sprang up which took them to the French coast by the following day.

Using the crucial element of surprise, Surrey landed immediately to assault the port of Morlaix, which had the advantage of being well known to English mariners because of its peacetime trade with England. A beachhead was secured and the soldiery, amounting to seven thousand men, mainly archers, with a detachment of yeomen of the guard, fifty of whom acted as Surrey's bodyguard, and fourteen light guns, were ashore and ready by 8.00 am for the five mile march to the town walls. The local gentry who gathered to meet the force fled at the first shots, though the town put up a spirited defence. Surrey divided his force into three to surround the walls, with Lords Fitzwalter and Curzon in
charge of the other divisions. Entrance was gained at one of the gates where Sir Richard Wingfield, Nicholas Carew, Francis Bryan and Sir John Wallop led the assault. Gunner Christopher Morris took such accurate aim at the lock of the wicket gate that it was hit, the gate flew open, and the defenders were overpowered in the smoke and confusion which resulted. The main gate was then opened, the soldiers on the other side of the town entered, and Surrey was soon able to erect his banner in the market place. The men were allowed to pillage the town, until a trumpet summoned them and Surrey gave orders for the town to be systematically burned, but for the churches. Then the men were summoned to their standards and at about 6.00 pm the force made an orderly withdrawal, setting fire to villages as they went. As a point of honour, camp was made on land for the night, so that the French had the opportunity of offering battle.64

On the following day the force reembarked virtually without loss, and the fleet entered the harbour of Morlaix, which had been carefully buoyed by some of the ships' masters who knew it, and fourteen craft which lay within it burned. Then the fleet sailed on to St Pol de Léon, and the smaller craft were used to enter the harbour of Pympol where a landing was briefly made and craft burned despite a spirited defence, before the English withdrew. From there they sailed on to Brest and again entered the harbour with the smaller craft and landed, burning the houses near the castle. Though the coast of Brittany was rapidly alerted to the presence of the English fleet, and efforts were made to meet Surrey's attacks, repeated landings were made even beyond Brest and the campaign was no less profitable than Edward Howard's in the last war, while English losses, in terms of both ships and men, were smaller.65 After Morlaix Surrey knighted several of the gentlemen who had participated, including some gentlemen of the privy chamber such as his relative Francis Bryan, and, since the gentlemen serving naturally included many of Surrey's local associates, he also knighted Giles Hussey, Thomas More, and John Cornwallis.67 Apart from informing Henry of the attack, Surrey reported, in characteristic fashion, the
valiant service of the men and asked Wolsey for letters of thanks to be sent. He also informed the emperor, who had left England on 7 July and received the news of Morlaix and other raids while still at sea.

The fleet returned to Cowes on 21 July and Surrey rode at once to Henry at Easthampstead to report the details of his success. On 23rd they reached London where at a banquet Henry praised the admiral's "paine and hardynes", but his reward had come as early as 12 July, soon after news of Morlaix reached the king, when he and his father were granted in tail six manors which had been Buckingham's on the north Norfolk coast. Surrey attended a council meeting at York Place at which it was decided to follow up this campaign in the light of the agreements reached with Charles, and his success at sea confirmed his leadership of an army into France in cooperation with Charles's forces in the Low Countries. Fitzwilliam took over the command of the largest squadron at sea and dealt with the Spanish fleet which arrived at Portsmouth by 9 August, but Surrey remained active in naval affairs while at Calais preparing to march into France between 5 August and 1 September. His naval correspondence demonstrates a high level of knowledge of the maritime activities of Henry's subjects, a keen tactical appreciation of the country's vulnerable points, and an ability to redeploy rapidly to meet the changing demands on the navy. The naval regulations he and other councillors had formulated at Southampton prior to sailing are evidence of his determination to curb the indiscipline which had undermined his brother's campaigns, while the fact that he seized the opportunity to visit Dartmouth in late June, and made an impressive assessment of its suitability for laying up Henry's largest vessels for the winter, are indicative of his naval expertise at this date.

It is instructive to compare Surrey's conduct in his naval campaigns of 1513 and 1522. Obviously the latter was far the more successful, largely because French resistance was feeble and there were no French galleys to contend with. However, the victualling problem had by no means been overcome and Surrey complained about the risks of being on the enemy's coast without
adequate supplies. Nonetheless he executed the raid on Brest which neither he nor his brother Edward had been able to accomplish in the first war, and his highly disciplined attack on Morlaix was very successful. His letters leave no doubt that the admiral was a different man in 1522. Secure in the impressive naval and maritime expertise he had acquired since his sudden appointment to replace his dead brother, and supported by a staff which included many of his own clients or men whose careers he had advanced, he could consult with his ships' masters on a more equal basis and overrule their opinions when he thought a risk worth taking. In 1513 Surrey had written to Wolsey as a humble client, constantly seeking advice and relying upon him to justify his actions to Henry and his council, while he addressed the king less often and with great humility. In 1522, by contrast, he wrote equally frequently to both, addressed Henry directly on all the major issues, and complained to him more vehemently over the shortcomings of the victuallers, or the pointlessness of trying to take the Venetian galleys than he did to Wolsey. Of course he looked to Wolsey for all executive action, and despite differences of opinion their relations appear to have been good.

2. The Campaign in Picardy and Artois

This Anglo-Imperial campaign has been condemned by historians on the grounds that the advantages which accrued to the allies from it were by no means commensurate with the destruction it brought to the French countryside. Contemporary sources suggest that this reflects a modern outlook which fails to take account of sixteenth century attitudes to war, or the specific aims of the campaign. On the other hand, there were real problems. The diplomatic background is instructive. Wolsey had avoided any commitment to a joint field campaign in 1522 in the treaty of Bruges, though Henry took responsibility for the defence of the Low Countries in Charles' absence in Spain. In late April 1522 Charles was trying to lure Henry into sending more men to Calais, claiming that Picardy was denuded of French troops, and proposing a joint field campaign once the seas had been secured. Calais was indeed strengthened, and when in
May Wolsey suddenly changed his tune, resolving that since England must declare war her intervention should have maximum impact, though it was not until Charles was in England that plans for a joint field campaign were made, and this concession was used to postpone the 'great enterprise' to 1524. For the other side, Charles signed the treaty without consulting his regent in the Netherlands, his aunt Margaret, and his council there who would have to implement it, paying more attention to diverting Francis from Spain and Italy than to the vexed issue of financing another offensive.

On 2 July, in a treaty signed at Waltham, Henry and Charles agreed to field a joint force between 1 August and the end of October, Henry providing 10,000 men and enough artillery for two batteries, under Surrey, and Charles 250 men at arms at least, 1,000 horse, 3,000 German foot and 1,000 to 2,000 Spaniards and twelve field guns, under Count Buren, captain general of the Low Countries. This army of about 16,250 men, was to be victualled from the Low Countries. Boulogne was to be besieged unless the joint council of war thought this impracticable, in which case the force was to do "the greatest mischief" to the enemy that could be devised. Charles had been pleased with the despatch of English troops to Calais as early as 7 June, though only small numbers had crossed, but from 11 July Wolsey was deep in preparations for the campaign, and Charles's ambassadors in England wrote to Margaret to raise troops, and draft horses and carts for the English force as agreed in the treaty, since they expected no delays. There were delays, however. Surrey, with his own retinue and Fitzwalter's, did not sail from Southampton until 4 August, and though some men had by then been shipped from Dover, the bulk of the force had not.

The arrival of large numbers of men created problems in Calais. Even before they had started to arrive the council there had indicated concern over firewood needed for baking and brewing, and when Surrey arrived shortages, especially of beer, were becoming acute. Sandys at Dover informed Wolsey that Surrey had written to the commissioners there to hold the arriving retinues in
England until the problem had been overcome, and every effort was made to
persuade Henry's subjects to rally to the victualling of Calais.92 Surrey,
Fitzwalter and Sandys wrote to Henry after their first meeting with their
Imperial counterparts, that it had been decided to link up some fifteen miles
into the Boullonais and that the army must therefore carry victuals for eight
days.93 An inspection confirmed that Calais and the Pale could not feed the
whole army while it lay there, let alone provide victuals for the march. Bread
was in very short supply, the wind was too light to drive the windmills, and
horse and hand mills had to be used to grind wheat. They advised again that the
army be held in England until sufficient bread and beer had been supplied. On
20 August Wingfield and Jerningham sent an urgent appeal to Wolsey, for Surrey
and the council were in despair at news that the cardinal had countermanded the
earl's orders to hold the force.94 Wolsey was rightly confident of the
victualling but negligent in failing to inform Calais, for despite the shipment
of the bulk of the force from Sandwich and Dover between 22-28 of August, chaos
did not ensue.95

At an early council of war at Gravelines Surrey, under instruction from
Wolsey, conceded to the imperialists that as a result of the delays it was too
late in the season to lay siege to Boulogne or Montreuil, the former of which
Henry greatly favoured.96 With Thérouanne and Hesdin, these were strategically
the most important fortress towns within reach, and were therefore garrisoned
by the French forces under the command of the duc de Vendôme, lieutenant-
general and governor of Picardy, and La Trémoille, governor of Burgundy.97
Since the French forces would be outnumbered by the allies, it was decided to
bypass these French garrison towns and lay waste the countryside as far south
as Amiens, destroying all the smaller towns and fortresses in their way.98 On
30 August Surrey and his force, amounting to seven thousand men and including
two hundred yeomen of the guard, marched forth from Calais.99 Surrey's
influence in the force spread far beyond his own retinue. The captains of the
army included those who had been at Morlaix with Surrey, and other prominent
**Table 6.1  Surrey's Itinerary in France, 1522**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sat 30 Aug</td>
<td>March from Calais to Coquelles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun 31 Aug</td>
<td>Remain Coquelles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon  1 Sept</td>
<td>March to Guines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tues 2 Sept</td>
<td>March to Ardres; Burgundian army camped a mile away</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wed  3 Sept</td>
<td>Remain Ardres to consult together; Francis at Amiens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thur  4 Sept</td>
<td>March together to Valley of Licques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri  5 Sept</td>
<td>Remain Licques as Burgundians lack victuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sat  6 Sept</td>
<td>March to Lottinghem; Surrey's raiders destroy 2 castles, villages and country 4 m. about and take cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun  7 Sept</td>
<td>Remain Lottinghem victuals short; more burning and pillage; Duc de Vendôme at Montreuil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon  8 Sept</td>
<td>March to Daumerne; destroy town, castle and 8 m about</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tues 9 Sept</td>
<td>March to Bourthes; 400 French show but flee; 500 burning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wed 10 Sept</td>
<td>March to Vaux in Emperor's dominions for consultations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thur 11 Sept</td>
<td>Remain Vaux; burn Vendôme's castle and town of Hucqueliers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri 12 Sept</td>
<td>Remain Vaux waiting for victual; French appear briefly; Vendôme communicates re prisoners, accuses very foul war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sat 13 Sept</td>
<td>Remain Vaux waiting for victual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun 14 Sept</td>
<td>March to Blainiow; debate and decide to spoil the area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon 15 Sept</td>
<td>From Blainiow; destroy Fruges castle; victual short</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tues 16 Sept</td>
<td>March to Blangy take Fressin, castle of Pont-Remy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wed 17 Sept</td>
<td>Destroy Fressin; to town of Hesdin on advice of Beaurain and invest it; Beaurain takes Dompiere castle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thur 18 Sept</td>
<td>Remain Hesdin; harrassed by locals, victuals interrupted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri 19 Sept</td>
<td>Remain Hesdin; attempts to mine walls begin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sat 20 Sept</td>
<td>Remain Hesdin; French force to Dompiere; Guildford sent to St Omer to escort powder and victuals, others to Calais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun 21 Sept</td>
<td>Remain Hesdin; Burgundians yield Dompiere; Surrey hears Margaret to discharge 2,000 men as she can't pay wages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon 22 Sept</td>
<td>Hesdin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tues 23 Sept</td>
<td>Hesdin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wed 24 Sept</td>
<td>Hesdin; Surrey informs Vendôme of Albany's retreat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thur 25 Sept</td>
<td>Hesdin; joint council decide to raise seige on Saturday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri 26 Sept</td>
<td>Hesdin; army to lose another 50 men at arms, first report of plague among Spaniards and Germans, 4 of latter dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sat 27 Sept</td>
<td>Hesdin; Burgundians sceptical Doullens can be won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun 28 Sept</td>
<td>Hesdin; Burgundians keen to attack Doullens; Francis gone not to Abbeville but to St Germain en Laye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon 29 Sept</td>
<td>En route to Doullens; 47 of Imperial force dead of plague and 9 English, 2 of them Surrey's own household servants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tues 30 Sept</td>
<td>En route to Doullens; countryside abandoned due to plague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wed  1 Oct</td>
<td>Find Doullens largely abandoned by French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thur  2 Oct</td>
<td>Doullens, burnt town and environs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri  3 Oct</td>
<td>At Doullens; sudden heavy rain and cold at night, many men die, Spaniards and Germans desert in numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sat  4 Oct</td>
<td>Retreat from Doullens towards Arras in Emperor's dominions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun  5 Oct-15 Oct</td>
<td>March Arras, Béthune, St Omer, Calais</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources** Letters of Surrey and Sandys, Hall, Chronicle of Calais
East Anglians and others with territorial connexions with the Howards elsewhere.\textsuperscript{100} The forward was commanded by Fitzwalter, the baggage and ordnance which followed by Curzon, the horse under Sir Edward Guildford came next, then the middleward led by Surrey (Lord Edmund Howard with him) and the rearward was commanded by Sandys and Wingfield.\textsuperscript{101}

An early and serious blow to the joint campaign was Buren's illness, a "fervent ague", so that by 26 August he had appointed de Bevres, admiral of Flanders, to stand in for him temporarily in command of his Flemish, German and Spanish troops, to act with du Roeulx, governor of Artois and marshal of the army, Egmont, Wassenaere, Beaurains, Fiennes and Hesdin.\textsuperscript{102} By the time the joint army of about eleven thousand men took the field it was clear that Buren would not recover in time to participate at all. The problems this caused arose from the fact that de Bevres did not possess the authority of Buren, and the other Burgundian noblemen were relatively young or inexperienced in war, and of equal status.\textsuperscript{103} The result was that much time was spent in councils of war, debating alternative strategies at every step of the way, with decisions already taken being reversed almost daily, which exasperated both Surrey and Sandys.\textsuperscript{104} Relations between the two sides were good because Surrey was highly cooperative. He had hardly met the Burgundian noblemen before he sent Henry a list of names requesting letters of thanks and encouragement,\textsuperscript{105} and showed tact, patience and subtlety in his dealings with them, cultivating such close contact among the officers that Wolsey was moved to advise him on the necessity of maintaining a distance lest Charles become too confident of England.\textsuperscript{106}

Surrey's approach was not simply based on respect for Charles, or Burgundian military traditions, but represented a deliberate attempt to overcome a real conflict of interests between Charles and Henry.\textsuperscript{107} It is noteworthy that, despite constant disputes, no polarisation along national lines took place. The Burgundian commanders were fundamentally concerned to protect their borders, and hesitant about provoking the French when they barely had the resources to defend them, though they were not blind to the attraction
of winning honour for Charles and themselves. They had all, from the first, opposed a siege of Boulogne, as being more in England's interests than their own and leaving the border further east exposed, and at the meeting of the two armies were keen to destroy the heart of the Boulonnais if they had enough victual, before marching rapidly on Amiens to offer battle, the only "noteable acte" feasible at that time of year. However, soon afterwards they forgot their own arguments against a siege so late in the year when Beaurains made the suggestion that after three days in the Boulonnais they besiege Thérouanne, which would be very useful to their own defences, since it would anyway be dangerous to go far south without leaving horsemen to contain the French garrisons. Surrey at first thought this just a ploy to draw the joint force eastward to protect the frontier, but it soon appeared that it was seriously contemplated by Bevres, Fiennes, Roeulx, and Beaurains. Surrey then struck a deal whereby the Imperialists would first help him destroy the Boulonnais, then he would accompany them to Thérouanne, but with Hesdin and Wassenaere cool about the siege he secured the rejection of this plan, and the readoption of that for a rapid march to the Somme, this time through the centre of the Boulonnais, so that Francis at Amiens would be forced either to offer battle or accept considerable humiliation.

However, while the Burgundians were willing to take prisoners for ransom and pillage in time honoured fashion, with the exception of Wassenaere and Hesdin they were hesitant to burn for fear of what the French would do in retaliation when the joint force was disbanded. Assurances that, in accordance with the terms of the treaty, English forces would not be withdrawn before the campaigning season was over, were no doubt offered again by Surrey, but his primary method of dealing with the situation was to launch enthusiastically into burning so that there was no longer any point in holding back. Thereafter he was pleased with Burgundian cooperation and in high hopes of a rapid advance on Doullens. However, when the joint force had got further south, Beaurains pressed for a siege of Hesdin, on the grounds that the
castle's defences had an important weakness, so that though it had a garrison of over one thousand men, it might be taken quickly and need not hold up progress for long. The English, who seem to have been convinced by the technical reasoning, and who had been instructed again to be cooperative as long as no siege longer than 12 days was attempted, agreed, though without enthusiasm, if we are to believe the later claims of Surrey and Sandys.

Though Henry and Wolsey endorsed the plan, it proved to be the greatest mistake of the campaign, for eleven days out of the thirty-five in the field were spent before the walls of Hesdin. The defences of the castle were very strong so that mining would take too long, but worse still the plague raged within the town, and spread to the troops. The town was burned, but Sandys was disgusted at the loss of honour, and Margaret convinced that the siege would not have been attempted had Buren been present.

The second obstacle to a rapid advance was the victualling problem. Before the army left Calais Wolsey had urged Margaret to facilitate its provisioning, and Surrey had sent her a more specific request to issue placards granting exemption from all tolls and respite of debts to those victualling the joint force. The hire of carts for transporting the victuals had been started soon after the treaty was signed, but even though the fielding of the force was delayed the victuals were slow to arrive, which meant that there was an initial delay in starting out because the Imperial force lacked victuals. Thereafter it proved necessary after almost every advance to halt for a day in order for new victuals to arrive. This did not mean that time was wasted, for divisions went out in different directions to destroy the countryside about. However, both Surrey and Sandys complained in their letters of the delays caused in this way, and of the fact that it was necessary to detach part of their horse to escort the victuallers, including at one point the commander of the English horse, Sir Edward Guildford. Once encamped at Hesdin the supply
line was occasionally cut by enemy action. While Imperial victualling left much
to be desired, after a poor start English victualling, not demanded by the
treaty, became effective and continued right through to the end of the
campaign.\(^{127}\) This consisted mainly of beer supplied to the English force from
London and Calais, the men being more content when drinking beer than the
Rhenish wine which Margaret could provide.\(^{128}\) While poor victualling did not
cause the final abandonment of the campaign it accounts largely for the fact
that the force did not penetrate further south to or beyond the Somme as
planned, for supply lines would then have become dangerously attenuated and
therefore required the detachment of a larger section of the force to guarantee
them, which was impossible given its strength.\(^{129}\)

A further problem of the joint campaign was the difficulty Margaret
encountered in financing Charles's contribution to it as laid down at Waltham.
As soon as she received the terms of the treaty she sent Hesdin to England to
say that she would fulfil them, but for sharing the cost of the supply train,
which she could not do due to a severe shortage of cash.\(^{130}\) If Henry would not
accept troops in lieu, then she needed a loan from him. Not surprisingly this
request, coming on top of others from Charles, met with a firm refusal,\(^{131}\) but
her problems in raising money quickly were real enough, as Sir Robert
Wingfield, in residence at her court, confirmed, and compounded by the fact
that she was informed late by Charles that she must find wages for the two
thousand Spaniards disembarked from the fleet to join the army, over and above
the other troops.\(^{132}\) Surrey had heard as early as 6 September from Wingfield of
Margaret's problems and wrote to Wolsey of the "slouthe of my lady in sending
money" to pay her troops, reporting that the Spaniards had mutinied twice for
pay already.\(^{133}\) To press her, Wolsey reported Surrey's words to the Imperial
ambassadors, as a result of which she was angry with him and defended herself
vigorously. Surrey was naturally annoyed by this and said as much, begging
Wolsey to treat his reports to Henry and himself as confidential, and asserting
that he would be able to achieve more by cooperation with Margaret than if he
were alienated.  

She and her ministers gave Wingfield a blow by blow account of their problems in obtaining credit, and personal sacrifices in support of the campaign, but were evasive about when wages would run out, for fear of being accused of failing to meet Charles's treaty obligations.  

Thus it came as something of a shock to Surrey and the English commanders in the field when, as early as 21 September, he received a letter from Margaret asking credence for Wingfield's letter to his brother Sir Richard which informed them that Margaret was forced to withdraw two thousand men for lack of money for wages. Soon after she ordered Fiennes and fifty men at arms back to the border.  

As things fell out these reductions were only a contributory factor in the decision to end the campaign early, but Surrey's observations make it clear that, had conditions been favourable to raiding beyond the Somme, these reductions would have made him unwilling to advise it, for there they would be out of easy contact with Charles's dominions and vulnerable to encirclement by the French.

Other factors too caused the abandonment of the campaign. While the pickings had been excellent in the early days when people were ill-prepared for the force, as it progressed south the French had more warning and had cleared the villages of moveables, or the inhabitants had left of their own volition due to the plague. Thus there was no prospect of obtaining victuals from the countryside as communications with Flanders became more difficult, and little attraction in going deeper and deeper into a land wracked by an alarming outbreak of the plague, especially since members of the force were already dying of it. The weather deteriorated towards the end of September and more men fell sick, so that by 26th it was not thought possible to continue for more than a fortnight. However, it was rising deaths from the plague followed by the sudden change in the weather on the night of 3 October, when heavy rain fell and the temperature dropped dramatically, with consequent deaths from exposure, which forced the termination of the campaign at Doullens, some miles
short of Ancre, and the Somme at Bray which the Imperialists had recently hoped to see. Thereafter it became almost impossible to transport the artillery and there was much desertion amongst the Spaniards and Germans.

The withdrawal was well organised. From Arras the English artillery was taken to Lille by the Burgundians, whence it was shipped first to Antwerp, and thence to Calais, so that Surrey's march back to Calais was unencumbered, and took only ten days. He was anxious to return and ship the men as soon as possible to save money in wages; indeed his parsimony did not please them, but his efficiency is apparent, for he reached Dover himself, in the wake of his force on 24 October. His relations with Margaret had been restored by the fact that he left her one thousand horse and a thousand men to guard the frontier through the winter. The French emerged from their garrison towns for retaliatory raids into Artois, as Margaret had predicted, though these were inconsequential.

Conclusions

On arrival at court Surrey received a warm welcome from the king. Indeed, the impression that Henry and Wolsey were pleased with his own and his army's performance, and satisfied with the outcome of the campaign in general is reinforced by the fact that Surrey felt strong enough to apply for his ageing father's office of lord treasurer in early December, and found Henry favourable, and Wolsey prompt in issuing letters patent. The obvious discrepancy between their view and that of historians is best explained by the fact that they viewed the enterprise as a relatively minor, somewhat ad hoc undertaking with limited aims, a prelude to war proper, which might nonetheless warn Francis of the difficulties of fighting on several fronts, show him that the allies were capable of effective cooperation, and take pressure off Charles in Spain and the Borders of the Low Countries. These limited ambitions were fulfilled. Francis at Amiens, and Vendôme and Trémoille moving between the major garrison towns, had to watch the burning and destruction without being able to challenge it. Vendome was only seven miles away at Montreuil when his
own town and castle of. Hucqueliers were destroyed by the invading force, and Trémoille vacated Doullens just before the joint force destroyed it. No doubt the French strategy of holding the fortresses but abandoning the countryside was sound, but it was not honourable, and Surrey was right in interpreting Vendôme's accusations of foul warfare and the French outcry against Wolsey as signs of their humiliation, for honour had been lost. Lastly, the campaign was an extremely useful dress rehearsal for the more serious invasion of 1523 prompted by Bourbon's defection to the allies, for much was learned from it.

From the point of view of Surrey's performance, the campaign shows him at his most resourceful. His own preference was to march towards Amiens where Francis lay, destroy Doullens, Corbie and Bray and offer him battle, for he saw from the outset that this was the only way that a notable act of war could be performed in that year. As a shortage of victual and pay for the Imperial troops made this impracticable, he favoured ravaging the county of Boulogne, probably because his experience of warfare in upland areas had taught him the usefulness of reducing the ability of the opposing side to launch counter attacks. Though the county of Boulogne was not on the breadline, in widely destroying buildings of a far more solid nature than those in upland areas, he ensured that a long period of recovery (he mentioned seven years) would be required, and the French ability to distress the Flemish borders and those of the Calais Pale would be reduced in the meantime. Of course he and his captains did not fully have their way, but by cultivating good relations with the Burgundians they penetrated seventy miles from Calais and wrought great destruction over a wide area. This was due to Surrey's ability to win the cooperation of others, and a notable degree of unity of purpose on the English side. By comparison with the Imperial forces the English were a model of orderliness and obedience. While this was to a considerable extent due to Wolsey's exertions, it also reflected Surrey's authority, efficiency in catering for their needs and superior experience of large-scale campaigning.
3. Surrey's Lieutenancy in the North, 1523-4

Despite the fact that the northern border was an important theatre of war in Henry's second conflict with France, Surrey's mission, totalling thirteen months based at Newcastle during 1523 and 1524, had much in common with his lieutenancy in Ireland. Like the Irish lordship, the far north was a somewhat inaccessible frontier region of the Tudor state where crown control was relatively weak partly because, except in emergencies, the primary aim was to keep costs low. The chief difference between the two lay in the relative weight of the forces beyond the frontier, for while Henry's Irish enemies enjoyed no political cohesion and were in every sense on the periphery of European affairs, the Scottish kingdom had a history of unity and a far higher profile in Europe, based on trade, and her 'auld alliance' with France which had long proved an effective means of upholding her independence when her more powerful southern neighbour was in expansionist mood. The result was that while Surrey's duties in the north, as in Ireland, combined military, diplomatic and administrative components, and generated an even greater wealth of correspondence, it was also far more highly charged, for here Henry was not seeking a feasibility study, but demanding immediate results, for his honour and international standing were directly at risk.

Henry had a highly traditionalist outlook, which meant that he had difficulty in accepting Scotland's independence and saw his relations with her entirely in the light of her 'auld alliance' with France. He normally regarded the king of France as his arch rival, and war between them as the means par excellence of enhancing his honour; thus in 1522 he was pleased to accord this role to Francis I, whose highly military interpretation of honour precisely matched his own. The role of Scotland in this relationship was clearly that of spoiler, therefore she must be dominated or annexed, but crucially eliminated from her traditional role in any reckoning with France. With his brother-in-law James IV, a renaissance prince after his own heart, Henry had had a relationship of deep distrust, and in 1513 his honour had been
magnificently vindicated by the destruction of James and virtually his entire nobility at Flodden. Though a golden opportunity had thus been created for Henry to play a major role in Scotland as caring uncle during the long minority of James V, his heavy handedness had reinforced Scottish fears and driven the lords to demand that Francis send the next in line to the Scottish throne, John Stuart, duke of Albany, to head the regency council as governor.  

Between 1514 and 1522 Henry's relations with Scotland continued to be dominated by those with France. During periods of better Anglo-French relations, when Albany was kept away from Scotland, Henry did not make the necessary investment to construct an effective pro-English party under the leadership of his sister Margaret, her second husband Archibald Douglas, earl of Angus, the Homes and the earl of Arran, all of whom were susceptible because they held estates in the Scottish borderlands which were vulnerable to English depredations. Margaret, who was distrusted in Scotland because she was Henry's sister, was impecunious and powerless during these periods, for her jointure was unpaid and her brother made no attempt to assist her. When Albany was in the country she fared better as long as she endorsed his rule internationally as being in the best interests of her son, but at times when she listened to Henry and refused to comply she was separated from James, her only source of influence. The person of the young king was naturally the focus of faction struggle. Henry schemed to have him spirited away into England and brought up in his care, holding out a place in his own succession as an inducement, but Margaret clearly recognised that if James left Scotland he was more certain to lose his first inheritance than gain a second.  

Thus Henry was forced to undermine Albany's authority in Scotland by devious means, instructing Thomas, Lord Dacre, who generally had the rule of the borders as warden of all three marches, and enjoyed a network of connexions in Scotland, to provoke jealousy, dispute, faction and where possible direct opposition to Albany among the Scottish lords. A second string to Henry's bow involved the destruction of the Scottish borders, whereby he put pressure
on the lords to abandon France for the sake of peace. There were problems with this policy, however, in that the French had insisted upon the inclusion of Scotland in the Anglo-French treaties of 1514 and 1518, and Henry's sense of honour required that he be above reproach. Thus Dacre was instructed to provoke the Scots to break the truce, so that the English might respond legitimately in greater force. This was not difficult to arrange, since raiding was endemic in border society, which barely recognised national boundaries. Thus while Albany tried to keep the peace with England as part of his efforts to bring order to Scotland, Henry just as busily fomented border warfare, disorder and rebellion. Though the years in question were turbulent ones, Henry never succeeded in making the Scots abandon Albany, thus when he went to war with Francis in 1522 Scotland promised to prevent him committing his full resources against France just as she had in 1512.

Again there was talk of dealing the Scots a decisive blow before embarking upon an invasion across the Channel so as to avoid the expense of war on two fronts. In January 1522 Henry threatened war and in April sent seven ships to raid the Firth of Forth, while the borders were garrisoned and regular incursions carried out. Shrewsbury was appointed lieutenant of the north, but disaster was only narrowly averted by Dacre concluding an unauthorised truce when Albany's forces reached the west border, the earl having failed to concentrate his force in time. Though Wolsey viewed the truce as *operatio dextrae excelsi*, Henry smarted at having been outmanoeuvred by Albany, and planned in 1523 to remove Scotland from the reckoning before the 'great enterprise' was launched. His choice of Surrey as lieutenant indicated serious intent, given his reputation in Scotland as a result of Flodden, his considerable experience of the north and border campaigning as a young man and his standing at this time as England's premier commander. However, Surrey's performance in Ireland and diplomatic skills may have been regarded by Wolsey as crucial, for he had clearly not abandoned the hope that cheaper, non-military efforts to remove Scotland from the conflict would succeed.
March to June 1523: the Intensive Use of Border Warfare

Henry wanted an early, decisive strike, before a papal truce could be arranged, and on 10 January Wolsey informed the English ambassadors with Charles that Surrey with thirty thousand men would attack Scotland by land in April, while three thousand men assaulted Edinburgh by sea and a fleet with seven thousand patrolled to prevent Albany returning from France in strength. If Henry really planned early action on this scale he was unrealistic, for the re-establishment of garrisons in all the border forts, and the provision of ordnance, supplies, victual and carts for transport was a time consuming exercise. Artillery and supplies had to be shipped north and carts and cart horses obtained from as far south as Yorkshire, while it was only possible to keep cavalry on the borders once the grass was up. Surrey was appointed and commissioned to array the men of the ten northernmost shires on 26 February, two days after funds were released for his campaign. He was in Newcastle with his retinue by 8 March, and by the end of the month had ten thousand men on the border. The men serving under him bear witness to the importance of the projected exercise. Dorset, who had served under Shrewsbury, was appointed warden of the east and middle marches (with Sir William Bulmer under him on the east march and Sir William Eure on the middle march), Dacre warden of the west march, where his territorial power was greatest, while Sir William Compton, Sir William Kingston and Dorset's brothers also served, one as captain of Wark.

From 2 April to the end of June a series of devastating warden raids along the whole length of the border, planned by Surrey and Dacre, systematically destroyed all the fortresses and habitations on the Scottish side to a depth of 8 miles, the purpose being to make it impossible for the Scots to lay garrisons for raiding the English marches, or for a Scottish army to attack England before the next harvest was in. Surrey himself led a major raid from Berwick on 18 May in which Cessford Castle was slighted, after which he regarded his task as accomplished, for in early April Wolsey had written
that the great invasion might be off. In an attempt to convince the king, Surrey wrote that the borderers thought the raids had been more beneficial to England "then if Etenborough and three of the beste townys of Scotland had be brent and distroyed." Henry was pleased but not satisfied, for though the lords were driven to defensive measures, even in Edinburgh, and sent pleas for assistance to France and Denmark, the destruction did not induce them to abandon Albany, whose return they confidently expected before long. On 15 May Henry turned down papal proposals for an immediate truce, and at the end of the month, having been encouraged by some Friars Observant returning from Edinburgh, and by Dorset, to think that the Scots were wavering, he instructed Surrey, Compton and Kingston to follow the marquis to court in post for consultations. However, before Surrey left he was to prepare an invasion with 20,000 men, which had soon grown to a sixteen to eighteen day invasion to Edinburgh of 25,000 men and a coordinated naval assault on Leith with 2,000 men.

The June Reappraisal

Neither Surrey, Dacre nor Wolsey were in favour of this enterprise, though the surviving evidence does not directly implicate the cardinal in the coordinated efforts of the first two to frustrate it. Surrey had already outlined to Henry, Wolsey and the council the problems which made lengthy invasions virtually impossible, especially before late summer, and the provisions he felt were necessary to meet the force Albany was likely to field on his return. He clearly believed a large force would have to be mobilised when Albany returned, and to do so in advance would be both costly and unwise, since the levies never served willingly twice in the same year. Dacre's view of Henry's plans, which we do have, must have matched Surrey's. In response to a letter from Wolsey setting out his own doubts and soliciting detailed comments, and Surrey's warning that "I have not had a little too doo to let the greate invasion whiche nowe dependeth moche upon your certificate", Dacre waxed eloquent. The lords were not wavering as was supposed, though
Albany was later than expected, and it was most unlikely that Henry's goal of prising them from France would be achieved by these means, for only a small part of Scotland could be destroyed, too little to prevent Albany raising an army, especially as the destruction of the grain essential to the provisioning of an invading force was impossible until the harvest was in. Arrangements for transport would be problematic and very costly, while the destruction of Edinburgh would at best enhance Henry's honour, and Dunbar castle, where a French garrison and ordnance lay, was impregnable. In conclusion, nothing to justify the cost could be achieved before harvest time.  

Nor was this Dacre and Surrey's only attempt to halt campaigning. Though Dacre had carried out raids on 10th and 29 June as Surrey's deputy in the earl's absence (from 4 June to the end of July) Surrey had hardly left before Dacre made deft overtures to Margaret and Scottish chancellor Beaton to induce them to appeal to Henry for a truce to Michaelmas. Though Henry was persuaded to abandon his great invasion plan, largely because the defection of Bourbon had raised the more enticing prospect of a campaign in France, he remained belligerent, insisting on the largest incursion yet to destroy the sizeable town and fortress of Jedburgh, still convinced that only military pressure would cause the Scots to abandon France. Wolsey favoured a dual approach, for Surrey was instructed on his return to launch a campaign of intrigue under Dacre's direction, acting as Margaret's contact with the English court. On 3 August he opened a correspondence with her and the lords regent to persuade them, by a judicious mixture of exhortation, bribery, reports of Francis's multiplying problems, and threats of more military action on the borders, to take the eleven year old James from tutelage at Stirling, "rule hym and the realme according to theyr honours and duties to their soverain lord", and open peace negotiations with England to forstall Albany's return.  

Margaret was by no means disinclined to this, for it promised to bring her greater influence than she had had since her second marriage had ended her brief regency under James IV's will, but she saw a stumbling block in Henry's
half-heartedness, (he offered nothing to counter Albany's control of Scottish benefices and lavish gifts) and needed evidence of his commitment to the English party, without which she could not win over enough of the lords.197 Surrey, who recognised the impossibility of obtaining this since Henry would not be a suitor to the Scots, sought to attain his ends by flattering and encouraging Margaret and assuring her of her brother's reliability.198 His efforts were undermined, however, by Henry's failure to reply to her letters,199 and Surrey reported to Dacre in mid August that the Jedburgh raid was "sore called upon" by Henry and Wolsey.200 He was genuinely unable to carry it out for several weeks because the necessary ordnance and gunpowder were held up in London, and he wrote on 27 August alleging reasons which show Dacre's influence, why a further delay of 20 days would be necessary, attempting to reconcile them to this by a lesser incursion in the meantime.201

Surrey, and Dacre (who did not have to send copies of all his correspondence with the Scots to court and therefore had more freedom to negotiate) wished to give the Scots time to come round by delaying the destruction of Jedburgh until Scottish councillors had met on 31 August, when Margaret hoped to obtain their backing for her plans since Albany would then be over two weeks late in returning.202 In fact, the French narrowly carried the day by presenting a forged letter from Albany promising that he would soon come in force.203 Margaret then wrote to Henry and Surrey in another naive attempt to secure from Henry letters to the chancellor, bishop of Aberdeen and earl of Argyle, offering peace if they abandon Albany.204 Surrey, who had been upbraided by Wolsey (much to Henry's satisfaction) at the end of August for having fallen prey to Scottish guile in delaying his attack,205 nonetheless urged Margaret to use his forthcoming raid to Jedburgh as the occasion for liberating James by announcing his determination to halt the suffering of his subjects.206 He promised to respond immediately to an appeal from James, and was optimistic enough to seek instructions from Wolsey as to what he should do if peace was offered just as he began his attack on Jedburgh.207
By 6 September, however, he and Dacre had learned that Margaret had probably failed conclusively, but he continued to encourage her. He was suspicious that her denunciation soon after of border raiding as ineffective in forcing the lords to abandon France, and recommendation that he attack Edinburgh with 1,000 men, was motivated by panic and a wish to be escorted safely to England before Albany arrived. He was understandably angry, not only because she discounted his devastation of the Scottish borders, but also because she reopened the old debate by recommending Henry's original plan. He was apologetic but firm in informing Wolsey that an attack on Edinburgh was out of the question, as it required more men than he had, while the transportation for supplies could not be obtained in time, for to go even as far as Jedburgh required extraordinary measures. On 22 September, convinced that Margaret was being manipulated by the lords who were playing for time for Albany to arrive, he led his force of just under nine thousand men into Scotland for four days to destroy Jedburgh. On the same day Henry was suddenly optimistic of the success of Surrey's intrigues, but this did not prevent him, four days later, reflecting with sarcasm to Wolsey on Surrey's late awakening to the deviousness of the Scots. He was soon mollified, however, by the earl's account of the total destruction of this garrison town twice the size of Berwick, even though the Scots had avoided battle.

The Encounter with Albany and the Scots

While Surrey was at Jedburgh, Albany landed with three thousand French troops and some impressive ordnance at Kirkudbright, having evaded the reduced English patrols. Surrey's immediate reaction was to request instructions which demonstrate not only his grasp of the strategic situation but also of the unpleasant fact that Henry must weigh honour against expenditure. He wrote that if he mustered his own force when Albany mustered the Scots he would be able to prevent him taking any English fortresses or laying waste the countryside as James IV had done in 1513, but upholding Henry's honour would entail having the whole force in wages for a considerable period, which would be costly. If, on
the other hand, Henry was willing to countenance some destruction of the marches he could wait until he had firm news that Albany was advancing and where he would strike, a course of action suggested by Wolsey’s earlier scepticism that an invasion would materialise.215 The response of king and cardinal was unequivocal: his preparations should keep pace with Albany’s to prevent an invasion, on coming to the border he should camp as near to Albany’s force as possible but not give battle unless at a great advantage, and having waited for the Scots to consume their victuals profitlessly, he should attack as they withdrew. These instructions pleased Surrey, for they reduced the risks to a minimum.216

Though he had hoped to return home at Michaelmas,217 he flung himself into preparations with vigour. Exhausted after the Jedburgh raid, he nonetheless set out on the next day to inspect the forts of the east march to see that they could withstand a short siege, beginning with Wolsey’s castle of Norham, and planned to visit the west borders to advise Dacre.218 At Norham and Wark he gave orders for the construction of earthworks, though he was generally satisfied, but at Berwick the castle walls were thin and there were several large breaches in the town walls which it would be impossible to repair completely in time. He would therefore put a garrison of six thousand men into Berwick, a considerable proportion of his whole force.219 As early as 27 September he instructed all the nobles and gentry of the counties in his commission to have their men ready at an hour’s warning.220 He was granted the continuance in wages of the two thousand Yorkshiremen raised for Jedburgh to lie in garrison to defend the border against small incursions when the moon was full, and a new campaign of border raiding was begun on 1 October.221 He gave orders for the English borderers to move their cattle and corn eight miles into England to prevent the Scottish army taking them, and had crossing points over border streams, especially the Till, made impassable to slow the advance of the Scots.222 With royal approval he told Bulmer to make a last attempt to win over the Homes and Angus’s brother, who were anxious to protect their border
estates, but ultimately feared Albany more.\textsuperscript{223}

Though Surrey at first showed a healthy scepticism towards the reports flooding in from Scotland of the size and modernity of the force Albany had brought, he soon became nervous.\textsuperscript{224} In April he had requested four thousand German pikemen in lieu of eight thousand of his thirty thousand Englishmen to encounter Albany, hoping by their example to instruct the English, but he now had to reconcile himself to exactly the kind of force that had fought at Flodden.\textsuperscript{225} He requested a hundred gunners in addition to the thirty-six he had, but could be spared only forty.\textsuperscript{226} With Dacre preparing Carlisle while Dorset, Compton and Kingston, whose presence he had been promised in the event of an invasion, were back at court, only Thomas Magnus, archdeacon of the East Riding, remained to assist him.\textsuperscript{227} He begged Wolsey to send the earl of Northumberland and other northerners then going to court back to join the army and swore that, whatever his success, Henry and Wolsey would never again persuade him to undertake so great a charge with so little help.\textsuperscript{228} Five days later he begged Wolsey to have noblemen and gentlemen of the household sent to him, perplexed that none were offering their services, for at the heart of the code of chivalry was the rule that young men must seek honour through battle.\textsuperscript{229} There is a warning reminiscent of the ousting of the minions in 1519 in his remark that kings who favour "dauncers, dicers and carders" and fail to encourage young men to take the trouble and risks involved in military service will be poorly served, as their servants will lack the experience of warfare necessary to become good commanders. He repeated his request for southerners, and then heartily wished that Wolsey were at Durham to advise him.\textsuperscript{230} His pleas were largely practical, for he needed the help of southerners, particularly men close to the king whom he could appoint to command sections of the force under him to avoid the kind of jealousies that developed all too easily in northern armies.\textsuperscript{231} However, he undoubtedly felt isolated and overburdened with work and responsibility and wanted a council of war commensurate with the gravity of the situation.
On 12 October Wolsey answered Surrey's worries point by point in a letter in which, despite his irritation with Surrey's complaints at delays in his replies, he sought to reassure the earl comprehensively.232 Albany's force could not be as large as was reported; Albany was spreading false rumours and putting a brave face on matters; no sudden invasion could be mounted due to the distances involved and the time which must be consumed in victualling; the wet weather would make it virtually impossible to transport his ordnance, and besides, when James IV, who could rely upon the Scots as Albany could not, had invaded under much more favourable circumstances Surrey and his father had nonetheless killed him at Flodden, as the Scots would remember. He concluded ringingly, "either the said duke myndeth not, or if he mynde he may not, or if he may he shal not with the good will and benivolence of the Scottes make any mayn invasion this yere into Englande". Though Surrey knew, as Wolsey could not, how close the English had come to disaster at Flodden,233 his sense of proportion was restored, though mainly by the news that Dorset, Carew, Bryan, Baynton and others were on their way to join him, and reflected that if the duke was as passionate as was reported he was no fearful adversary.234

Wolsey had put his finger on Albany's problems accurately, and his army mustered and advanced increasingly slowly.235 Despite the excellence of English espionage Surrey, was not able to learn where Albany would strike, due to the duke's secrecy,236 and therefore had a system of posts set up, so that he might know as soon as possible where the attack fell, and his men might be concentrated speedily.237 He hoped that it would not be on the west march, which was weakest, and spread rumours of a naval attack on Leith to discourage Albany from leaving the east coast exposed.238 Greatly relieved and encouraged when contingents of his force began to arrive at Newcastle from 20 October (the date at which most of Albany's force was to muster outside Edinburgh) Surrey solved the dual problems of a lack of accommodation for so many men, and the long march remaining between the main force and the border, by sending eight to nine thousand men under Dorset and Darcy ahead to Alnwick, and others to
various points along the road north. On 28 October Surrey was himself at Alnwick, Dorset at Berwick and Darcy at Bamborough, while garrisons already lay in all the forts of the east border, for it had become clear by then from the direction of his advance that Albany's attack must fall there.

The disadvantages inherent in the efficiency of Surrey's preparations now became clear, for from 23 October he wrote to court several times of his growing fear, shared by his council of war, that Albany would not advance, with the result that the expense had been in vain. When the Scots did advance he was delighted, though there were further delays before they reached the border. Surrey held back because, in addition to his early instructions to wait for the Scots to exhaust their victual, he had received a message by Dorset from Henry to go no further than St Cuthbert's banner could go, by which the border was clearly intended. He was happy to comply with this, for he found his men very willing to defend England but not keen to invade Scotland. On the night of 31 October Albany prepared to bombard Wark from the northern bank of the Tweed, and a detachment of Scottish borderers burned some deserted border villages. On 2 November the whole English army, amounting to between thirty and forty thousand men, concentrated at Barmoor Wood near Ford, chosen because it was the camp of the English army on the night before Flodden.

His experience at Flodden, where the English force had had to reorganise at the last moment to meet the Scots on a long front influenced Surrey's organisation, in that he seems to have formulated two alternative formations, one the more common vanguard and main force, each with wings, and the other, the order of battle of which we have details, a long line with himself at the centre. At 3.00 am on 3 November Surrey received a message from Sir William Lisle, who with one hundred men was defending Wark, asking him to advance to his assistance as he could not hold out for another day. After the initial bombardment, about one thousand French troops and five hundred Scots had crossed in boats in the afternoon of 2 November to assault the castle, and
though they had gained the inner ward Lisle’s men had rallied so effectively as to drive them out completely. Surrey with five thousand mounted men set out at once over the roughly five miles to Wark which he reached by daybreak, the main army following behind, in the hope of trapping at least part of Albany’s force on the south bank of the Tweed, and thus forcing an engagement. He found, not only that the assault force had withdrawn across the Tweed, but also that Albany’s ordnance and whole army had removed on receiving news of an English advance. By that night Surrey no longer expected an engagement, though he could not afford to withdraw to Berwick until Albany had gone so far that he could not return, and on the following day wrote that the Scots had left Eccles for Lauder on hearing that some of Surrey’s force had crossed the Tweed. By 13 November he had paid off the whole force at Berwick but for 1,600 men whom he retained in garrison pending further instructions.

Surrey saw Albany’s withdrawal as an act of cowardice which brought dishonour on himself and Francis. There is no doubt of the eagerness of Surrey and his captains to offer battle within England, and Hall reports that in reply to an attempt by Albany to negotiate, Surrey had issued a stinging defiance. In truth Albany was also keen to fight, but as Wolsey had predicted, the Scottish lords, remembering Flodden, were, like their English counterparts, willing to defend their own country but unwilling to risk invasion. The debate among them over how far they should go in support of France while their king was a minor had been fuelled by Surrey’s propaganda, for he had always pointed out that the hostility of Henry was entirely due to their adherence to France. The attitude of the lords explains why those who had crossed the Tweed had been Frenchmen and borderers, and Albany’s remark to outraged Scottish borderers on his retreat that he could not invade because he had “no convenyente company so to doo”. Indeed, he apparently feared betrayal to Surrey if he forced the lords to cross into England.

The barrier which the Tweed represented at the height of the encounter should not be overlooked in assessing the reasons why no battle took place.
The river was so swollen, due to the heavy rains, that it was not fordable, and several men lost their lives in crossing by small boats to and from Wark. The Scots had not reached the border quickly enough for the whole army to cross safely before the English force was close by. Had they crossed, their line of retreat would have been cut off by the river, and, in the event of a tactical withdrawal or defeat they could have expected a massacre even greater than that which had followed Flodden, when many men had been killed in trying to cross the Tweed. The outcome of the encounter was thus largely determined by the instructions issued to Surrey not to lag behind Albany's advance, the reticence of the Scots in mustering and invading and problems of deteriorating weather and supplies which made it impractical for them to await a better opportunity.

Henry shared Surrey's view of the outcome and sent him a letter of thanks and praise, predicting that the winning of the Scottish lords would be facilitated by it. The sententious phrasing is almost certainly Wolsey's, and this is significant because, just as the campaign came to a climax, Wolsey had dictated a commentary on Surrey's last letter whereby it appears that he was highly critical of the earl for raising the force too early, due, he thought, to inadequate espionage, with the result that much unnecessary expense had been incurred. Sufficient evidence survives to discount his view of English espionage, while the first charge is unreasonable in the light of the instructions issued to Surrey. Had he held back it is probable that, as in 1497 and on previous occasions, the Scots would have invaded, done enough destruction to satisfy honour, and withdrawn before the English army could offer battle. This was an eventuality which Surrey had to avoid, especially since he had no licence to invade Scotland, for it would bring dishonour to himself and Henry. Wolsey's fit of bad temper was probably caused by his financial difficulties which were so acute that he had to go to Henry for a loan from the privy purse, but, as on the other occasions when he became irritated with Surrey, the mood appears to have passed quickly.
Surrey had wrongly predicted that Albany's power in Scotland was gone forever. This judgement was based upon the attitude of Scottish borderers, whose opinion rarely represented the country, and before long Margaret's letters of fear for herself and her son overturned it. It was, of course, in his interest to predict a quiet winter on the border, for almost four years in constant service had left him "decayed" in health and in his purse and desperate to return south to recover and attend to his affairs. Dacre, who was persuaded to stand in as his deputy until Easter, would have preferred a truce, but as Surrey predicted, Henry was adamant in refusing to recognise Albany's authority, thus the latter's secret overtures to Surrey produced no result. At the beginning of December, having put matters in order, Surrey left for London, and though instructions to return to Newcastle reached him on the road, he went on to court to plead for leave during the months when no military action could be carried out, preparing the way with a message to Wolsey and a sign of his compliance in returning his household to Newcastle. He was very well received, and obtained his suit, not least because of the great savings involved in employing Dacre in his place.

The Diplomatic Offensive of July-December 1524

Throughout the winter Surrey was involved in debating relations with Scotland, and in occasional communication with Dacre. The decision not to encourage Margaret to leave Scotland, but to keep her happy with small sums of money, as advised by Surrey, was adhered to, and though she was separated from James soon after the campaign, Henry's neglect and Albany's struggle to obtain permission from the lords to leave for France drew them together again, for though Albany would have liked to conclude a truce comprehending France to allow him to leave, the Scots were as obstructive as Henry. On 24 February Scottish borderers raided in the East March, forcing Dacre to resume border warfare, and at the end of April he launched a large, three pronged attack. By then Wolsey had learned by intercepting Albany's mail that he was planning another major invasion late in June with Danish assistance.
became clear that he would not obtain this, he decided to return to France, and having obtained leave of absence until the end of August, he finally sailed on 20 May. Prospects for ending his rule then looked better than ever, and Henry not only wrote encouragingly to Margaret and the lords but also added a new string to his bow in the person of Angus, whom he had persuaded to escape from captivity in France and come to England to be briefed.

In July it was decided to send Surrey, now duke of Norfolk, back to Newcastle to promote the release of James and the ending of his minority. Norfolk was to placate Margaret and arbitrate between her and Angus, a delicate matter for which Dacre was ill qualified since she was not only incensed by Henry's treatment of her but above all by Dacre's recent blunt accusations of disloyalty to her brother and son in reaching an understanding with Albany. She knew how close the Dacres and Douglases were, and was deeply suspicious of both. Norfolk was also to mediate between Angus and Arran so that the latter, who had joined Margaret's party along with Lennox, would not be jealous at Angus's return but join him in a pro-English regime. Moreover, Angus was to accompany Norfolk to urge the peace which Henry desired in order to be able to devote his full attention to France, but could not honourably seek. He was also to do Henry's dirty work. The plan agreed between Henry, Wolsey and Angus was for a meeting to be arranged on the border between Scottish councillors, including Beaton, and Norfolk and Angus, at which Angus would kidnap Beaton, thus removing far the most powerful, and consistently pro-French element from the Scottish scene without implicating Henry.

Predictably, none of this went according to plan. The Scots were not unduly anxious for a truce despite the heavy border raiding and did not trust Henry sufficiently to allow Beaton to attend. Plans for the border diet were advanced by Dacre, but Wolsey and Henry lost all interest in them when there was no chance of capturing Beaton, to the evident surprise of Norfolk. Margaret, though ready to overlook her brother's neglect, was implacably hostile to Angus and hinted that she would change sides if Angus were allowed
Norfolk, who was in constant contact with her, advised that she should not be pushed, as she was gathering a party alone, and Wolsey agreed, assisting her by assuring Beaton that he would have a place in the new order. On 30 July the young king was brought to Edinburgh and proclaimed, the lords swore obedience to him, and on 20 August the Scottish Estates officially ended his regency, though Margaret had had to imprison the dissident chancellor and bishop of Aberdeen. This represented a considerable triumph for English diplomacy, as Henry acknowledged in providing the queen, through Norfolk, with a bodyguard of two hundred men for James and money to her, Arran and Lennox. Henry agreed to the immediate cessation of border hostilities and on 4 September Norfolk and Dacre concluded a three month truce with Scottish commissioners, during which the Scots were to send ambassadors to London.

However, relations between the Tudor siblings were soon strained. The main problem was Angus, whom Henry suspected could command a wider following than Margaret, though of course he would have preferred them to rule together. She maintained that Angus would deprive her of all her revenues and usurp her authority if he returned to Scotland, but Henry kept pressure on her to act in his interest by holding Angus in the wings. In September, Norfolk and Wolsey, having failed to win Beaton over, exerted pressure on Margaret to hand him over for imprisonment at Berwick. This, she soon established, would deeply offend Scottish sensibilities, so she declined, much to Henry's annoyance. She told Norfolk unequivocally that rather than accept Angus she would defect to the French party, and, using the only leverage she had on her brother, delayed the sending of ambassadors to make peace until Henry promised to detain him in England, though this meant sacrificing her desire to make a peace which would greatly enhance her reputation in Scotland. Margaret soon suspected that Norfolk, whose integrity she had trusted, was being influenced against her by Angus and Dacre, and his dogged attempts to bring about a reconciliation irritated her. He only lost

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sympathy for her when she repeatedly committed errors which he advised her to avoid, learning of them through his own steward William Hals, whom he had sent to her with money and advice. In the previous year Norfolk had tried to persuade the lords regent to take upon themselves the business of government in the interest of the young king, and now he advised Margaret to underpin her rule by bringing in as many of the lords as possible, holding frequent council meetings and seeing indifferent justice done. From 12 September on he received reports of increasing complaints that she was doing the reverse. She used the two hundred man bodyguard to overawe all opposition and took counsel of none but Arran, himself far from impartial, which drove other lords into the camp of Beaton and the French. By November Henry Stewart had caught her eye; he was elevated to the treasurership of her household and soon said to have more influence than Arran.

Henry responded to this deteriorating situation by reaching an agreement with Angus pledging to help him if Margaret turned to France, but attempting to control him once in Scotland. He also overcame the dictates of pride to send two envoys to Margaret to advise her, both politically and spiritually, but they found her so furious over Angus that they had no influence over her. When, by releasing the chancellor and bishop of Aberdeen, Margaret confirmed that she was moving towards France, as Norfolk had feared, Angus was allowed to return to Scotland. The estates deposed Albany in late November, but the auld alliance was confirmed. The truce with England was extended, but talks in London for a peace and marriage between Mary and James foundered on the refusal of the Scots to renounce their treaties with France. Norfolk returned south in December with Dacre, glad to leave an unrewarding task in the hands of the envoys. Towards the end of February Margaret's authority was reduced by the estates and a new governing council constituted, but it was not many months before Angus seized power and proved himself still less loyal to Henry's interests than Margaret.
The Administration of Law and Order in the North

Quite apart from his military and diplomatic duties, Norfolk had a third task in the improvement of civil order in the border counties and the north. On his return north after his consultations with the king in June 1523 Surrey travelled via York and Durham accompanying the justices to the sessions. He reported to Wolsey that they had sat for four whole days hearing poor men’s causes at York but could not have dealt with all the "infynyte complaintes" in a month, and then tackled "the gretteste dyvysion amonges the gentilmen that ever I sawe in any contre", calling up the parties in three major disputes which threatened violence, so as to arbitrate between them. Before the sessions were over eight thieves were also executed. There was little business at Durham, where only an Irishman was executed, so Surrey and the judges moved on to Newcastle. In 1524 he again sat with attorney general Ralph Swillington and John Porte at York from 30 July, on his way north, and at Newcastle from 10 August with Dacre, Bulmer and Tempest too, but no report of these sessions survives.

The most severe problems, as reflected in the sessions, were in the county of Northumberland, which Surrey pronounced to be "mooste oute of justice and good ordre of all others". Just prior to the 1523 session four thieves escaped from Alnwick castle and eight from Newcastle, though Surrey and the judges still had eleven others before them. Despite the persuasions of the judges, they could find no one to testify against these thieves. This, they thought, was partly due to the fact that few of the Northumberland gentry did not keep thieves themselves and were therefore in fear of what might be laid to their own charges, but principally to a widespread belief that Surrey’s enforcement of law and order would be as shortlived as any in the past. The remedy Surrey advised was that a man be appointed to replace him who was in a position to ensure that justice was done regularly and he also reported that the justices thought a council in the north ten times more necessary than in...
Wales. Apparently, like Dacre he already favoured the appointment of Lord Percy, the son of the earl of Northumberland, as warden of the east and middle marches, whom he believed capable of doing a good job, especially if he were provided with advisers, and sent well ahead of his own recall so that he might instruct him.\textsuperscript{318}

The problem in Northumberland was serious despite Surrey’s reputation and frequent declaration that he would deal summarily with reivers and robbers which had the effect of reducing the problem while he was in residence.\textsuperscript{319} The problem was rooted in the administrative methods adopted in recent years to keep costs to a minimum.\textsuperscript{320} Dacre, who had been warden of all three marches since 1511, was attractive as such because he would serve with only a small salary or none at all on the west march, and on the east and middle marches with small salaries only for the lieutenants serving under him.\textsuperscript{321} This he could do because of the unique concentration of most of his estates (fifty-five per cent) in the border counties of Cumberland and Northumberland which meant, not only that he had a personal interest in border security, since some of his lands lay open to even minor incursions by the Scots, but also that he could raise between four and five thousand men from among his own tenantry to serve on the borders at next to no charge. The chief problems of Dacre rule were that his own influence was greatest in Cumberland, while on the east march he had few tenants and found it hard to get the cooperation of the local gentry, thus as warden general he had to devote most of his energies and such troops as he got from the crown to the needs of the eastern marches.\textsuperscript{322} Moreover, his estates in north east Cumberland gave him connexions in the heartland of endemic lawlessness among the border surnames, the upland areas, particularly Tynedale and Redesdale, where geography and overpopulation stimulated reiving and robbery in the surrounding area.\textsuperscript{323} In wartime he could organise five hundred men from each to raid north westward into Scotland, but generally the inhabitants were undiscriminating, and when the Scottish marches were laid waste, as they were in the first months of Surrey’s rule, they necessarily
turned their attention south eastward to lowland Northumberland and Durham. Dacre had survived complaints against him for failing to keep order by the gentry of these counties in 1518, but in 1523-4 the Northumberland gentry again lodged complaints about his failure to control the border surnames.324

Surrey's position was delicate. Dacre welcomed his appointment as lieutenant, since he was happy to be relieved of his heavy responsibilities in the east and middle marches and negotiations with Scotland, which had recently brought Henry's ire down upon him,325 and looked to Surrey to help him persuade Henry to appoint Lord Percy when he was recalled.326 For his part, Surrey valued Dacre's impressive ability to raise men to serve on the borders, his local knowledge and connexions in Scotland, and his vast experience of border warfare, relying heavily on him in planning his border raids, and turning to him frequently for information and advice.327 From the outset his policy was to work with Dacre, though this was not always easy. Dacre was not used to taking orders in conducting border warfare, however tactfully they were worded, and often thought Surrey unnecessarily cautious.328 In particular he was stubbornly inattentive to the discipline necessary in a large force, which at Jedburgh resulted in him losing large numbers of his horses in a stampede.329 On such occasions Surrey urged his own opinion on Dacre, and sometimes asked Wolsey for support, but never became dictatorial.330

With regard to matters of justice Surrey appears to have adopted a similar approach, despite the fact that there was much more pressure on both of them from London.331 Soon after his arrival he visited Dacre at Morpeth to obtain an undertaking from him that the Redesdale men would make redress for all robberies committed since Lord Ros's departure, and Fenwick, Dacre's keeper in Tynedale, did likewise,332 while Surrey made proclamation that to obtain redress lowlanders should submit their bills to himself and Dorset at Newcastle or Alnwick by 1 May, which resulted in a long account of the wrongs done and sustained on both sides.333 Surrey's vigorous start had some effect, for when he had been in the north for about six weeks Dorset reported in some puzzlement.
that there had been no fresh offences since his arrival. The king and Wolsey were not satisfied, however. Wolsey wrote to Dacre in early June insisting on the arrest of the perpetrators of a notorious murder in his bishopric of Durham, and towards the end of the month Surrey, acting as Dacre's patron and friend, advised him from London that the king, cardinal and council were so outraged by the robberies by Tynedale and Redesdale men that he must capture two or three of the most notable Redesdale thieves.

Dacre attended the unsatisfactory Newcastle sessions with Surrey, and on 12 July reported to him that he had had the inhabitants of Redesdale before him and was sure he would be content with their demeanour. Towards the end of the month Surrey was examining all the books of indictments, but in mid August warned Wolsey that he wanted to defer trials for a while, no doubt because he was busy and like Dacre needed the goodwill and service of the men of Northumberland for war with the Scots. Towards the end of August he did write to Dacre to send him some witnesses in a case, and on 2 September he reported to Henry the capture and execution of two thieves of Tynedale, two of Redesdale and two from elsewhere in Northumberland, suggesting an effort to make an example in all the most troublesome areas. However, two of Dacre's tenants at Gilsland had been rescued from justice by eighty of their kinsmen, whereupon the country had risen to capture one of the rescuers. Dacre was trying to take as many of them as he could, whom Surrey planned to teach a lesson on the consequences of defying the king's laws. Three days later Surrey warned Dacre that he had heard rumours that the rescue could not have taken place without Dacre's connivance and urged him to take some of the culprits quickly, assuring him it would do him more good than the winning of five thousand marks. Dacre's reply was that the rescuers had not returned home, but he would seize them as soon as they did, and by 5 October he had some of them in ward, though he wanted to defer executions until the encounter with Albany was over.

In his letter to Henry of 2 September Surrey took the opportunity to
bemoan the state of the east and middle marches, and begged Henry again to send
his successor well in advance of his own recall. By October Surrey was
anxious about this, having already agreed to extend his service from Michaelmas
to Allhallowtide, and was ready to acknowledge that Percy was not likely to be
ready in time, not having been warned. Instead he suggested to Wolsey that
Dacre be appointed again, as, though he was unpopular on the east march, he
would receive more help there now Lord Percy was his brother-in-law. When
Albany's army had retreated, Surrey again immediately urged that Dacre was best
qualified to serve in his place until Percy was ready, because of the large
number of men he had at his command on the borders. He protested that the
borders had never been in better order than they were then, thus no useful
purpose would be served by his staying on, and as long as Dacre was regularly
urged to do sharp justice all would be well since he was more capable of
arresting the trouble makers than any other. His advice was followed, though it
was only with the greatest reluctance that Dacre agreed to step into Surrey's
shoes until Easter, and then preferred the title of his deputy to that of
warden-general because it struck more fear into both the Scots and the men of
Tynedale and Redesdale. Before he left, Surrey made every effort to see that
the borders remained quiet in his absence, laying down rules and taking pledges
for the good behaviour of Tynedale and organising the king's officers to
cooperate effectively.

During Surrey's absence Dacre reported to him several times that all was
quiet in Tynedale and Redesdale and asked his help in seeing redress done in
Durham. When he was accused by Wolsey of failing to deal with growing
disorders he denied on 1 April that there had been any and then blamed Fenwick
and Heron, the keepers of Tynedale and Redesdale, whom he said could descend
suddenly to take thieves there as he could not. Wolsey had insisted that
before he be relieved of the east and middle marches he must restore them to
the state Surrey had left them in, but Dacre maintained that they were already
in better order than they had been under Surrey. However, under continuous

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pressure he did capture some notorious reivers and in May and July put several
to death, while Heron too became notably more active.34 Norfolk continued his
work in administering justice on his return, and at the end of September Wolsey
pronounced himself pleased.350 When Norfolk left, Dacre accompanied him for the
trial in London of the cases brought against him, but Norfolk regarded this as
a small matter soon dealt with, suggesting that he understood the difficulties
of Dacre's position in that his military duties clashed with the dictates of
justice.351

Conclusions

Of the three components which made up Norfolk's mission in the north the
military task was the one in which he had most expertise, and here he displayed
all the competence, vigour and efficiency which one might expect. His ability
to assess a situation rapidly, foresee and overcome the difficulties of
campaigning in remote areas by careful planning, and to find ingenious
solutions to military problems as they arose on campaign are all well
documented here.352 Where his own knowledge was deficient, as in the niceties
of border warfare, he made good use of Dacre, setting about acquiring a new
expertise by learning from those who had it just as he had when first appointed
admiral. Though he admired Dacre's knightly hardihood he was by no means
uncritical of his neglect of military discipline, though not as critical as he
was of courtiers who showed no appetite for acquiring military expertise. With
regard to military policy he showed some independence of thought, disagreeing
with Henry's policy of a massive invasion early in the year on the grounds that
it was impractical, and postponing the Jedburgh raid as long as possible
because Dacre had convinced him that the Scots were likely to make peace if not
pressed. He does not seem to have shared the complete scepticism of Margaret as
to the efficacy of border warfare in weaning the Scots from France, though he
may have been less convinced than Henry of its value in relation to its cost.
His campaign against Albany offers much evidence that Norfolk was anything but
a rash man. He sought instructions and carried them out religiously, glad to
avoid taking the high risks which he and his father had taken at Flodden. Once again he showed himself a reliable patron to all who served under him. He was disciplinarian, but careful to avoid jealousies, and took pains over the welfare and payment of his force.\textsuperscript{3s3}

His diplomatic task was one in which he was largely directed by Wolsey, who informed him of the aims of the policy being pursued and instructed him in some detail as to what he should write to whom. He put a great effort into this, writing numerous, lengthy letters, often late at night, and despatching news and correspondence with great speed and efficiency.\textsuperscript{3s4} He showed little inclination to question policy directly, though in late 1524 when working with Dacre he worked harder for Angus than Wolsey required, and with Magnus and Radcliffe disregarded Wolsey's instructions to be harsh with Margaret, which they felt were likely to be counterproductive.\textsuperscript{3s5} He also showed individuality in the way he interpreted certain aspects of policy. For example, he put more effort and skill into trying to influence the Scottish lords to assume the reins of government than Wolsey had envisaged, though it is impossible to tell how much effect this had. His handling of Margaret shows that despite a respectful and courtly manner, which contrasted markedly with Dacre's, he could be not only highly persuasive but also ingeniously manipulative.\textsuperscript{3s6}

With regard to law and order Norfolk seems to have had a realistic appreciation of the situation. The force of his personality and reputation allowed him to heal rifts among the northern gentry and win their cooperation, and while he was in residence all but minor offences by reivers and robbers came to a halt. However, he clearly appreciated that this was a temporary respite, and sought a more permanent solution to the problems of the east and middle marches. The one he favoured was in some respects backward, but in others forward looking. With full cognisance of the need to keep costs to a minimum,\textsuperscript{3s7} he favoured giving authority to the noblemen with power to enforce the law; Dacre in the west march and Lord Percy, whose father had by far the greatest landed influence in the east, in the east and middle marches. This
would enable government to be carried on without providing garrisons except in
time of war, while the tendency to be partisan might be counteracted by the
provision of councillors to advise the wardens, which he clearly regarded as
more likely to be effective than instructions and censures from distant London.

The correspondence between a great officer of state and the chief
minister in constant consultation with the king inevitably reveals much of all
three. Of Norfolk we learn that he missed being at the centre of affairs and
often felt isolated (he did not take his wife and family with him) and
overburdened, for whatever his task he clearly preferred to work closely with
others. He was not a man who could take responsibility lightly, and described
in the autumn of 1523 to Wolsey how, when on active service, he could neither
eat nor sleep properly and so lost weight which he could never regain until
relieved of responsibility. Apart from the burden of championing the honour
of his master, which often complicated his task considerably, he had a great
reputation of his own to live up to. At the assault on Cessford Castle, which
proved invulnerable, he was unexpectedly offered its surrender if the garrison
was allowed to depart with bag and baggage. To maintain his own and Henry's
reputation for ferocity, he had his captains make open suit to him "for a
colour" before agreeing. In a letter to Wolsey written before his encounter
with Albany, in which he begged him to look after his children if he was
killed, he made it clear how little he feared death compared to the dishonour
of defeat. He did not like to have dishonourable tactics associated with his
name and preferred to operate by cultivating trust and confidence. He chafed at
being expected to hold Angus under false pretences to save Henry's honour,
and perhaps deliberately failed to grasp Wolsey's plot for the capture of
Beaton, hoping like Dacre to effect a real peace. He did not despise the Scots,
as Henry probably did, and wrote to him of the hardihood of those he
encountered on the Jedburgh raid. On its eve he had also written a letter to
Wolsey revealing how conscious he was of his reputation and that he would have
liked above all to make peace between the kingdoms. Having done his best to
persuade the Scots to release James from tutelage and sue for peace he wrote that he feared they would blame him if he failed to accept their offers of peace, and what the English would say if he accepted and the Scots later proved perfidious. 364

Despite the considerable effort Norfolk put into his missions in the north, the returns were not very impressive. This was largely the result of the fact that Henry's policy towards Scotland was unrealistic and inconsistent, though just how far Norfolk perceived this and questioned its underlying premises when at court we cannot know. Relying on Wolsey entirely as his patron and informant while away from court, he was bound to implement the policies he was given and do his best to make them work, providing Wolsey tirelessly with all the data available on which to base decisions. When he did attempt to circumvent instructions in the hope of attaining Henry's aims more quickly or cheaply he was not very lucky. 365 What he gained from the mission was an understanding of Scottish politics and of the problems of border government to complement his Irish experience, giving him an unrivalled expertise on the council in the problems of governing peripheral areas of the Tudor state to add to the military experience which the years of war had further reinforced.
Notes
1 CSPS, Further Supplement (FS) 2; Hall, p 629
3 CSPS ii, 355, clauses 16, 20; LP ii, 1796, 1802; K. Brandl, Charles V, p 199; G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, p 187
4 LP ii, 111, 1440; 1454
5 LP ii, 1734, 1735, 2012, 2032; Vergil, p 297; Hall, p 629; CSPS FS, p 27; On 10 January the Merchant Adventurers, anxious to protect their shipping, admitted Surrey as a brother, L. Lyell and F. Watney eds. Acts of Court of the Mercers Co., pp 553, 558
6 CSPS FS, pp xii-xiii, 13-14; LP iii, 1796
7 LP iii, 2007, HP ii, pp 142-5
8 CSPS FS, p 46
9 LP iii, 2012, 2014, 2065, 2073; CSPS FS, p 19; Scarisbrick, op. cit., p 133
10 LP iii, 2028, 2126, 2127, 2174; Hall, p 632
11 CSPS FS, p 100
12 Grafton, p 319; LP iii, 2027, 2224; CSPS FS, p 83
13 LP iii, 2130
14 CSPS FS, pp 27, 100; LP iii, 2027, 2109, 2135, 2169, 2219, 2220
15 LP iii, 2269, 2357 no. 2, App 33; Hall, p 634
16 LP iii, 1991, 2008, 2224; CSPS FS, pp 26, 30
17 CSPS FS, pp 119, 122, 123, 134
18 Ibid.
19 CSPS FS, p 136
20 CSPS FS, p 124, 128
21 Ibid., p 128
22 CSPS FS, pp 124, 125-6, 128; R. B. Wernham, Before the Armada, p 101
23 CSPS FS, pp 44, 45, 54, 66
24 CSPS FS, pp 125, 129
25 LP iii, 2213
26 Ibid., 2193; CSPS FS, pp 96, 98
27 LP iii, 2269, App 35, 2288; Hall, p 677; Grafton, p 320
28 G. Mattingly, Catherine of Aragon, p 156-7; Renaissance Diplomacy, p 172; LP iii, 2305
29 Treaties of Windsor and Waltham, LP ii, 2333, 2360, 2290, 2309
30 Herbert, p 49; CSPV, 463; LP ii, 2304, 2308
31 BL Calig. D VIII, f 343
32 PRO SP1/24, f 242
33 CSPS ii, 355, clauses 16, 20; PRO SP1/24, f 315; LP Add. 1, 344
34 James Bettes and Richard Palshide customers in Southampton and Portsmouth and Edward Weldon in London, LP ii, 2021, 2750, 3282, 3376 no 1, Add. 1, 344
35 LP iii, 2065
36 LP Add. 1, 341; PRO SP1/24, f 242, 251
37 LP iii, 2308, 2320
38 PRO SP1/24, f 315
39 Ibid., ff 315, 318, PRO SP1/25, f 16
40 PRO SP1/24, f 315
41 Under William Symons whom he had appointed in 1513, LP 1, 1855
42 PRO SP1/25, f 22
43 Hall, p 643 gives the date of Surrey's return.
44 LP iii, 2283, 2392; Hall, pp 642, 632, 656
45 PRO SP1/25, f 17
46 Williamson, Maritime Entreprises, pp 48-9; CSPV ii, 457, 463; CSPS ii, c11, cliv
47 Williamson, op. cit., pp 353-6
48 CSPS FS, p 122; LP iii, 2220
49 Williamson, op. cit., pp 48-9, 149, 353
50 Ibid., 266-
50 Scarisbrick, op. cit., p 133
51 CSPV iii, 463, 465, 470; Herbert, p 45
52 PRO SP1/24, f 223
53 It is uncertain whether he was referring to customs duties payable, or suggesting that the Venetians would pay well for an early release.
54 PRO SP1/24, f 242
55 Ibid., f 251; CSPV iii, 474
56 CSPV iii, 470, 484; LP iii, 2320
57 CSPV iii, 493, 502; Albion, p 255
58 Ibid., 513, 522, 537, 555, 608, 700; Vergil, pp 310-12
59 PRO SP1/24, f 315
60 PRO SP1/24, f 318
61 PRO SP1/25, f 16
62 BL Calig. D VIII, ff 251-2; PRO SP1/25, f 22
63 Hall, pp 642-3; Chronicle of Calais, p 31; His own report to Henry, referred to in LP iii, 2362, does not survive; A.A. Ruddock, 'The Earliest Records of the High Court of Admiralty' B IHR (1949) p 143
64 CSPS FS, p 140
65 Hall, p 642
66 Charles's ambassadors wrote immediately after Morlaix that English booty was reckoned at 2,000 angels and the damage done the French at 500,000 crowns, CSPS FS, p 140; D. Hay ed., Vergil, p 298
67 Cornwallis was bailiff of Wynnfarthing in 1519, NRO NRS 2378.11.D4, Hussey was bailiff of Carethorpe, Arundel Ms. A 1047; More was employed at Bungay, and Costessey, SRO T4373/103 Acct 1512-13, PRO SC6/3369, NRO NRS 2378.11.D4
68 PRO SP1/25, f 22
69 Vergil, p 296 and Herbert, p 50 say that Surrey escorted Charles to Spain, but this is wrong.
70 Hall, p 643
71 PRO C82/520 cites the dangers both had faced in defending the kingdom.
72 Hall, p 643
73 LP iii, 2409, 2419, 2430, 2442, 2458, 2459, 2463, 2471
74 PRO SP1/25, f 66; BL Calig. B II, ff 177-8
75 BL Calig. B II, ff 177-8, D VIII, f 252; PRO SP1/24, f 318, SP1/25, f 17
76 LP iii, 2296; BL Calig. D VIII, ff 251-2
77 PRO SP1/25, f 22
78 Lord Edmund Howard, Edward Bray, William Gonson, William Sabyn, Christopher Coo, Robert Appleyard, a gentleman of Surrey's household, served as captains, LP iii, 2480; Coo was in trouble for a time, LP iii, 2341, 2357, 2374, 3158, Add. i, 343, and Shernbourne, 3071
79 As in plying the tides, PRO SP1/25, f 26
80 PRO SP1/24, ff 315, 318, 223, 242, 251 This was presumably because he knew that now Henry was taking all the important decisions.
81 Scarisbrick, op. cit., p 171; J.S. Brewer, LP iii, pccxviii-ix; C. Oman, Art of War, pp 322-3; K. Brandt, Charles V, p 194
82 CSPS FS, pp 140, 152; LP iii, 2958; Hall, p 646-8; also Herbert, pp 119-21
83 CSPS ii, 355; LP iii, 2453
84 CSPS FS, pp 129, 131
85 Dacquay's accounts, C.T. Martin ed., Archaeologia (1883), p 328; LP iii, 2238
86 LP iii, 2638; K. Brandt, Charles V, p 194; J. de Iongh, Margaret of Austria pp 191-2
87 CSPS FS, 442
88 LP iii, 2306, 2309; Archaeologia (1883), p 328
89 CSPS FS, p 140
90 LP iii, 2213, 111, 2408, 2419
91 LP iii, 2334, PRO SP1/25, ff 117-8
92 PRO SP1/25, ff 117-8; 2438 v, vi
93 At Wast, BL Calig. D VIII, ff 256-7
94 PRO SP1/25, ff 130-1

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These Burgundian noblemen were all councillors and members of Charles's household, Brandi op. cit., pp 55-6, and Hesdin was maître d'hôtel to Margaret; Beaurains, who had been brought up with Charles, A. Henne, Histoire du Règne de Charles V en Belgique, ii p 350, had already communicated with Henry, LP iii, 2386, 2387

Buren, P.C. Moliuysen et al. eds., Nieuw Nederlandhs Biografisch Woordenboek iii, pp 324-5; Henne, op. cit., iii, pp 79-80; BL Calig. D, f 264; Calig. E II, f 123

BL Calig. D VIII, ff 256-7; LP iii, 2466, 2467 These Burgundian noblemen were all councillors and members of Charles's household, Brandi op. cit., pp 55-6, and Hesdin was maître d'hôtel to Margaret; Beaurains, who had been brought up with Charles, A. Henne, Histoire du Règne de Charles V en Belgique, ii p 350, had already communicated with Henry, LP iii, 2386, 2387

BL Calig. D VIII, ff 275-6; G.W. Bernard, War, Taxation and Rebellion, p 10

BL Calig. D VIII, ff 275-6; G.W. Bernard, War, Taxation and Rebellion, p 10

BL Calig. D VIII, f 259

BL Calig. D VIII, ff 263-4

Ibid. Wassenere and Hesdin were evidently reliable allies of England,

BL Calig. D VIII, f 266

BL Calig. D VIII, ff 266, 221, 271

See later PRO SP1/26, f 63

BL Calig. D VIII, f 266

BL Calig. D VIII, f 273

BL Calig. D VIII, f 221, Calig. E II, f 123

BL Calig. D VIII, f 268

BL Calig. E II, f 123; BL Calig. D VIII, ff 275-6

PRO SP1/26, f 96; Hall, p 648. According to Hall the English wanted to assault it but the Burgundians did not and as it would go to Charles they did not pursue it.

Hall, p 648; BL Calig. D VIII, f 275-6; PRO SP1/26, f 63

BL Calig. D VIII, f 2593

PRO SP1/26, f 63


LP iii, 2456, 2491; BL Calig. D VIII, f 263-4;

BL Calig. D VIII, f 265

Ibid., ff 263-4, 271, 221, 275-6, Calig. E II, f 123

BL Calig. D VIII, ff 275-6

LP iii, 2456

BL Calig. D VIII, ff 275-6

CSFS FS, p 144; LP iii, 2387, 2404

LP iii, 2433

LP iii, 2515, 2547, 2553, 2558, 2638

BL Calig. D VIII, ff 253-4; Wolsey knew of this in August, LP iii, 2450

BL Calig. D VIII, f 278

LP iii, 2527, 2534, 2558

BL Calig. D VIII, f 275-6

BL Calig. D VIII, f 275-6

Great numbers of cattle, sheep and horses were taken, Hall, p 648

BL Calig. D VIII, f 276; PRO SP1/26, f 63; The plague was severe in Paris, L. Lalanne ed., Journal d'un Bourgeois de Paris, pp 38-9;

Hall, p 648; BL Calig. D VIII, ff 275-6

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He narrowly escaped serving by indenture as Wolsey would have liked to save money, 2859, and had wages of £5 per diem.

Wolsey was motivated by a need to avoid unnecessary expense.

He suggested his reply must have been intercepted by the French, and explained to Wolsey that this was just a device.

He actually fell sick, BL Calig. B VI, f 330

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In February Captain David Falconer had recommended a captain of Lanzknechts to him, CSPScot. I, p 12

Bodl. Tanner Ms. 90, f 47; BL Calig. B VI, f 330

CSP iv, pp 37, 46

H. Ellis, 1st. ser. 1, 223

BL Calig. B VI, ff 330, 339

CSP iv, p 44; BL Calig. B VI, ff 544-5, 330

BL Calig. B VI, ff 376-8

See above p 113

LP iii, 3445; Ellis, 1st ser. 1, 223 He also noted against him that he took no advice.


LP iii, 3365, 3368, 3385, 3403, 3404, 3409, SP iv, 49

BL Add. Ms. 24,965, f 52

BL Add. Ms. 24,965, ff 55, 56

All the northern lords attended; H. Ellis, 1st ser. 1, 228; By housing his men properly he was able to hold back for several days.

LP iii, 3472; BL Calig. B II, ff 31-2; BL Add. Ms. 24,965, f 60

H. Ellis, 1st ser. 1, 228; BL Calig. B VI, f 364

BL Calig. B I, f 362, B II, f 31

BL Calig. B VI, f 355; Vergil, p 318; In fact Northumbria had in Cuthbert's time stretched to the Firth of Forth, D. Hay, 'Problem of the Frontier', TRHS (1975) p 79

BL Calig. B VI, f 360; cf. Hall, p 666

Hall, p 666; Ellis 1st ser. 1, 232; LP iii, 3489

H. Ellis 1st ser. 1, 232; It also had good communications with Berwick whence the army's victual came, BL Calig. B II, f 179

BL Calig. B VI, f 360; It numbered between 30 and 40,000 men

Ellis 1st ser. 1, 232; SP iv, 52; Hall, p 666; Buchanan, p 399

Hall, p 666

BL Calig. B II, f179; SP iv, 51

SP iv, p 53; LP iii, 3528; PRO SP49/2, f 56

Ellis, 1st ser. 1, 232; SP iv, p 51; This view was publicised by Skelton in his verse "How the Doughty Duke of Albany like a Coward Knight ran away Shamefully with an Hundred Thousand Trailling Scots and Faint-hearted Frenchmen Beside the Water of Tweed", G. Walker, John Skelton and the Politics of the 1520s, pp 28-30; V.J. Scattergood ed., John Skelton: Poems Hall, pp 665-6; Communications by pursuivant, BL Calig. B III, f 51

LP iii, 3538; As in 1522, Buchanan, op. cit., p 398; Eaves, op. cit., pp 120-1, 149

His last appeal, BL Calig. B VI, f 358 misdated in LP iii, 3449 was intercepted by Albany who was furious over it, BL Calig. B VI, f 356

SP iv, p 52

LP iii, 3538

Hall, p 666; G. Ridpath, The Border History of England and Scotland, p 517; The English discussed destroying bridges and excavating fords but this proved too costly. Luckily the rain did their work.

Hall, p 564; Weever, Funeral Monuments, p 559

Eaves, op. cit., p 149; Surrey reported foul weather, BL Calig. B II, f 179

Ellis 1st ser. 1, 237-8

BL Calig. B II, f 31

On espionage see note 236 above and Eaves, p 149; BL Calig. B VI, f 544

A. Conway, Henry VII's Relations with Scotland and Ireland, pp 110, 112-13

On 17 October, SP 1, 144; Surrey, who said from the outset that he would need £20,000 to pay his force, LP iii, 3360, rightly anticipated great difficulties obtaining the money, LP iii, 3360, 3365, 3405, 3412, 3472, 3477, 3481, 3482, 3506, 3509, 3512, and praised Wolsey's dedication to the royal interest in sending £2,000 of his own, 3515.
Surrey's shrewd response seems to have been to ignore such letters and reply to the more good humoured ones which invariably followed.

SP iv, pp 52, 53

Suffolk's return was crucial, LP iii, 3576

SP iv, pp 57; PRO SP 49/2, f 42; Ellis, 1st ser. I, 223, 236;

BL Calig. B II, f 179

LP iii, 3566, 3544;

BL Add. Ms. 24965, f 194

BL Calig. B II, f 175;

LP iii, 3536, 3576, 3626

SP iv, 60; LP iii, 3536, 3576, 3626

PRO SP 49/2, f 59

In March 1524 Surrey participated on foot in a court joust, Hall, pp 674

LP iii, 3515, 3574, 3626

Dacre received 40s. p.d. as against £5.00 for Surrey, and cut the garrisons by over 500 men

In England 1–2,000 mks would hardly please. Wolsey approved highly of this reasoning but thought half as much enough in Scotland, LP iii 3400

Eaves, op. cit., p 155

LP iv, 144, 278

CSPS FS, p 319

Eaves, op. cit., p 159, His final departure.

LP iv, 315, 473, 474 He kept up military pressure by border raids; Head, op. cit., p 9

T. Otterbourne ed., Duo Rerum Anglicanum ScriptoresVeteres ii, p 617

LP iv, 289, Otterbourne ed., op. cit., ii, p 606, 609

LP iv, 469, 490, 573, 600; Buchanan, op. cit., pp 108–114, 143, 147

LP iv, 489, 562, 563, 668, 703, 704, 745

Otterbourne ed., op. cit., ii, p 617; G.G. Smith, 'Two Chancellors', p 351

LP iv, 532, 53; SP iv, p 549

SP iv, p 80; LP iv, 490, 491, 528, 562, 573

SP iv, p 84; LP iv, 523, 526, 571

LP iv, 540, 551, 560, 561, 584; Eaves, op. cit., p 160

LP iv, pp 96, 112, 120; LP iv, 699

LP iv, 621

LP iv, 473, 474, 663, 701; Buchanan, op. cit., pp 200–201

LP iv, 491, 532, 549

LP iv, 529, 535, 651; SP iv, p 120

SP iv, p 128

LP iv, 573, 600, 672, 703, 704, 713, 728, 750

LP iv, 573, 637, 656, 637, 728; She was right, 576, 582, 597, 598

LP iv, 601, 613, 727, 739, 750

LP iii, 3272, 3337, 3449, iv 636, 651, 657, 658

LP iv, 651, 658, 727, 729; SP iv, 146

LP iv, 651

Eaves, op. cit., p 162; Buchanan op. cit., p 202

SP iv, p 159

SP iv, p 138; LP iv, 672, 729; Archdeacon Magnus and Roger Radcliffe of Henry's privy chamber.

LP iv, 672, 754, 762, 766, 800; SP iv, p 218

R.K. Hannay and D. Hay eds., Letters of James V, p 112

Hall, pp 695–6; LP iv, 834, 836, 906, 988

SP iv, p 271

Eaves, op. cit., p 168; Buchanan, op. cit., pp 212–13

Kite's reports had informed Wolsey of the consequences of the fact that no quarter sessions were held and no sheriffs appointed in Cumberland and Northumberland in the prevalence of theft, LP iii, 2271, 2328

PRO SP 49/2, ff 17–17v

Sir Robert Constable v Sir Ralph Ellerker and Sir John Constable; Sir Richard Tempest v Henry Saville; Sir Ralph Ellerker sen. v Edward Gower

PRO SP 49/2, f 17v
All Norfolk's letters of this period, referred to in Wolsey's, are lost.

PRO SP49/2, ff 17-18, and again, PRO SP49/2, f 21

318 BL Calig. B VI, f 372; SP iv, p 37, 51; LP iii, 2536, 2645, 3295, 3322, 3384, 3508; cf. his similar proposals later, M.L. Bush, 'The Problem of the Far North' Northern History (1971) p 49

PRO SP49/2, ff 32, 60-1; SP iv, p 53; LP iii, 2963, LP iv, 893

322 Ibid., p 13

323 S. Ellis, op. cit., pp 14-15; LP iii, 3181

324 S. Ellis, op. cit., pp 3-4

325 LP iv, 2574

326 S. Ellis, 'Border Baron', p 16; See note 318 above

327 LP iii, 3242, 3339, 3364, 3365, 3384, 3419, 3428, 3459, 3509, 3515

328 SP iv, p 28; LP iii, 3334

329 He would not camp within the pallisade, H. Ellis, 1st ser. i, 214

330 Ibid.; LP iii, 3322, 3339, 3349

331 LP iii, 3095, 3128, 3304, LP iv, 220, 133, 687

332 LP iii, 2963, 3173

333 LP iii, 2963, 3181

334 LP iii, 2963; LP iv, 893

335 LP iii, 3095, BL Add. Ms. 24,965, f 19

336 LP iii, 3147, 3173

337 LP iii, 3195; S. Ellis, 'Border Baron', p 14

338 LP iii, 3278, PRO SP49/2, f 21

339 PRO SP49/2, f 21

340 BL Add. Ms. 24,965, f 41

341 LP iii, 3306, 3395

342 PRO SP49/2, f 21

343 PRO SP49/2, f 32

344 PRO SP49/2, ff 46, 49

345 LP iii, 3531, 3544

346 PRO SP49/2, ff 60-1; LP iii, 3598

347 LP iii, 3666, LP iv, 10, 25, 28

348 LP iv, 220, 133 (misdated in LP), 279

349 LP iv, 279, 328, 329, 346, 427, 482 Wolsey was pleased, 405

350 LP iv, 497, 687

351 LP iv, 893; SP iv, 241

352 BL Calig. B II, ff 156-9; H. Ellis, 1st ser. i, 214-8; SP iv, p 28

353 PRO SP49/2 ff 11-12; LP iii, 3039 (Dorset), 3158 (Dacre), 3241 (Yorkshire gentry), 3534 (Ringley), 3536 (Magnus), 3545 (Heron), LP iv, 821 (Cavendish), 3349, 3381, 3506, 3512

354 Eg. LP iv, 3381; The survival of part of his letter book shows that his normal practice was to draft letters there which his secretary then wrote out, but he often made holograph additions to letters and sent many holographs. His secretary also made copies of all incoming post.

355 LP iv, 615, 687, 733, 672, 728, 750, 762, 835, 889, 906; He provided crucial support and encouragement to Magnus and Radcliffe, 814

356 LP iv, 728

357 Bush, op. cit., pp 43, 46-9

358 University of California, B. 49; In 1524 he had only 50 servants with him not expecting to stay long, 822, 672

359 PRO SP49/2, f 49

360 BL Calig. B II, ff 156-9

361 H. Ellis, 1st ser. i, 228; See also his more than conventional "my poore
honour saved" to Margaret, BL Add Ms. 24965, f 33
362 Eg. *vis a vis* Margaret, *SP* iv, pp 169, 812; Angus 733, 750
363 Ellis 1st ser. 1, p 218
364 *SP* iv, p 20
365 *LP* iii, 3071, 3158, 3277, 3338, 3381, 3394, 3515, 3536
PART 3

THE DUKE OF NORFOLK, 1524-c.1525
CHAPTER VII

THE FAMILY, ESTATES AND AFFINITY, 1520–c.25

Before the third duke of Norfolk came into his landed inheritance in 1524 at the age of 50, he had become one of the king's most esteemed advisers, entrusted with the most challenging and delicate military, diplomatic and administrative undertakings to call for the skills and authority of a nobleman. Yet his dedication to the royal service, amply proven by his willingness to serve away from home and court alike for much of five successive years, necessarily imposed a strain, not only on his health, but also on his finances and potentially on his authority at the heart of the Howard power base, East Anglia. This authority was to be put to the test in May 1525 in a way which could not have been foreseen, and the final chapter of this study examines his handling of a serious crisis on his own doorstep. Before turning to the Amicable Grant, however, it is essential to assess his power by examining his finances, estates, family, connection among the nobility, and affinity in the first half of the 1520s.

Finances

While his father lived, Surrey's landed income, at something over £1,000 p.a., supplemented by the perquisites of his office as admiral, was not such as to enable him to undertake prolonged service without some difficulty, since his wages were not sufficient to meet the cost of maintaining two households, as he often did, one of them of viceregal lavishness. Of all his missions, only the purely military campaign in Picardy and the naval war are likely to have yielded net profits through booty, prisoners and prizes, and it is questionable how far these offset his probable losses in Ireland and even, perhaps, in the north. He was, of course, able to secure better terms with each successive appointment as his value to Henry rose, culminating in £5.00 per day, so that the financial hardship he suffered in Ireland was undoubtedly
reduced in his later service. No doubt his appointment in 1522 to his father's lucrative office of lord treasurer, whereby he acquired Norfolk's long-held position in the state and became a regular attender of the privy council in peacetime as well as in war, was intended, in part, as a handsome pecuniary reward. \(^4\) Though the wording of the grant to the Howards of the duke of Buckingham's north Norfolk lands suggests Henry's intention to reward Surrey for his military service, the income went initially to the second duke, perhaps to reconcile him to the loss of the treasurership and his stewardships in Buckingham's estates in Essex and Suffolk. \(^5\) In 1523 Surrey was assessed on his goods rather than his lands, they being the greater, at £1,000,\(^6\) so he already had the trappings of wealth before he came into his inheritance. On his father's death his financial worries were over. Like many other noblemen, he secured special livery of his lands, and, succeeding to his father's role in the state and the king's counsels, he probably acquired immediately such others of his sources of income as his imperial and French pensions.\(^7\)

1. The Admiralty and Trade

The direct yield of the office of admiral is unquantifiable. It included a substantial fee, the perquisites of the high court of the admiralty and fees and gifts from the Staplers and Merchant Adventurers to facilitate the escort of their fleets.\(^8\) Both of the latter were undoubtedly more lucrative in time of war, or poor relations with France, which were characterised by a marked increase in privateering. The court of admiralty, where Christopher Middleton continued to preside as Howard's deputy, dealt largely with mercantile disputes and instance business in peacetime, but it also received commissions of oyer and terminer in cases of piracy, murder and criminal offences at sea, and these, but above all its prize business, expanded vastly in war time.\(^9\) This, of course, meant a very welcome increase in perquisites to the admiral. We noted in chapter 4 that Surrey had pursued his jurisdiction and profits as admiral vigorously in the period up to 1520, and there is every indication that this continued. For example, one suspects that he was looking to expand or reclaim
his jurisdiction when in October 1522 he issued a writ as admiral to the
bailiffs and constable of Colchester to summon twenty-four men from the port to
appear before him or his admiralty commissioners on the following day at
Arlesford, under penalty for non-appearance, for an enquiry into "certain
articles pertaining to maritime law." 10

The most important development in the 1520s was the admiral's entry into
the troubled waters of European trade. He may already have owned a craft.
During the second war with France there is a reference to "the admiral's bark",
and when inspecting Dartmouth in 1522 he had written, perhaps indicatively,
that if he owned ships of the value of Henry's he would not hesitate to winter
them there after carrying out the improvements he had recommended.11 If he had
engaged in trade before the 1520s, when he could borrow money on the strength
of his future prospects, it must have been on a modest scale, and the high
risks involved are neatly illustrated by the unfortunate experience of one of
his proteges in the navy, Christopher Coo.12 By early 1523 at the latest,
Surrey himself had taken the plunge in a way which throws light in quite
unexpected directions: on his closeness to Wolsey, his standing in government,
his relations with Burgundy, even on Anglo-Imperial relations after Pavia.

He appears to have bought out Wolsey's share in what may have begun as
a joint venture between them involving certain Scottish and Flemish goods
captured in a Scottish prize and then apparently shipped for sale to
Middelburg.13 In the spring of 1523 these goods were arrested by officials of
the town, on the grounds that they belonged to Flemings. 14 Both trade and
political relations with the Low Countries had been difficult since Suffolk's
campaign had ended in recriminations, with English merchants complaining that
exchange rates were unfair and they were ill treated in Netherlandish courts.
From the first, Surrey had Wolsey's help in pressing the regent Margaret,
through the imperial ambassador, Louis de Praet, for the return of the goods,
for by 12 January 1524 the latter wrote of having sent the regent Margaret many
letters on the issue.15 By then the pressure was clearly getting too much, and
he asked Margaret to consider how powerful Wolsey and Norfolk were, and how much confidence Henry placed in them, and begged her to satisfy them if at all possible. When Margaret's maître d'hôtel Hesdin visited the English court soon after, he carried back the same complaints and probably pressed for a rapid solution, since he had been a correspondent of both the Howards before 1522, and formed a good understanding with Surrey then.17 By mid February de Praet was reporting that Wolsey and the admiral threatened that the latter would recoup his costs through letters of marque issued against the Netherlanders, a threat which was repeated on several occasions.18

The English ambassador Knight meanwhile pressed Margaret and her council to expedite the hearing of the case,19 and she clearly bestirred herself, since in the spring there were hopes in England of a rapid solution, with Norfolk writing to her on 18 June with thanks for causing his goods to be released and compensation for the arrest paid.20 She replied in September that she had paid expenses of three hundred livres but had no power to liberate the goods which were in arrest "a requeste de partie", and even the emperor was powerless to do this without reimbursing the plaintiff himself.21 Norfolk's agents, John Thetford and William Barton, therefore employed local lawyers to make an inventory of the seized goods and pursue the matter through the courts in Malines and Brussels over no less than sixteen months.22 In February 1525 Margaret apologised to Knight about the way Norfolk's case had been handled, but explained that she could do little when the adverse party made suit continually and conducted itself ably. She maintained her intention that Norfolk would get reasonable compensation, adding that she recognised how important this was to relations between the emperor and Wolsey.23

When Joos Lauwerens, a member of Margaret's council, visited England as her envoy in April, he was continually assailed by Wolsey and Norfolk, both of whom complained that their loyalty to Charles seemed to mean nothing in practical terms, while the issue of letters of marque was again threatened.24 Norfolk, clearly exasperated by this point, said he would give ten thousand
crowns never to have heard of the ship and the goods, and that he was particularly grieved at the dishonour done him, for although everyone in England reckoned him a good Burgundian, Charles would do nothing for him. The envoy's reply was that the conduct of his agents had set matters back, for while Norfolk had said he would accept four thousand crowns in compensation his agents had demanded nine thousand and Margaret had not known what to do. To this Norfolk replied that he would accept four thousand if his pledges were discharged, but so far the money was in the hands of those who had given security for him and he had received not a crown. Later he complained bitterly to his former companion in arms, de Bevres, and on visiting de Bevres, Lawerens found Norfolk's agents there complaining of his conduct of matters.26

In June Margaret again wrote to Norfolk in response to a letter from him, though neither letter survives,26 but by then it had been decided to send to her Sir Robert Wingfield, who had considerable influence at her court. He wrote to Norfolk that he, Bevres and the president of Malines had made strong representations, but a further misunderstanding had arisen over what Margaret had promised, and she maintained that she had never agreed to discharge his sureties and pay his costs of four hundred crowns as she could not be answerable for matters that depended on the course of the law.27 In mid December Wingfield reported to Wolsey that he had presented Norfolk's complaint to Margaret before the council of Malines and asked for a letter to the president of the town asking him to proceed to judgement. This she granted.26 The judgement of the court, reported by Wingfield on 21 February 1526, was not pleasing to the English, however. Norfolk was to retain the goods of the Scots, but make restitution of those belonging to the men of Middelburg, a judgement Wingfield deemed might have been given two years before. He thought the Burgundians had delayed to see "how the world would frame", and were now on such good terms with France that they cared little for anyone else, and took it as an indication that if Henry planned to go to war he must do so without them.29
Though Wingfield was certainly correct in his estimate of the attitude of Margaret and her council towards further war with France, the English view of Margaret's performance was unfair, in that her influence in such matters was indeed limited. Her mistake was, perhaps, in responding to constant pressure in a more encouraging tone than was warranted. Norfolk's painful and costly experience of how trade could go wrong does not appear to have put him off entirely, though it may have made him more reticent to deal in prize goods. In late January 1525 he obtained a license to export three hundred quarters of wheat, presumably intending to do so from East Anglia, where there was generally a surplus. The later 1520s saw him championing those who produced surpluses of foodstuffs there for export, and the mercantile fraternity, in a manner which suggests not only his concern with the customs as treasurer but also an understanding of the delicacy of trade and economic forces which probably resulted from his own involvement in both.

In 1525, which saw the elevation of Henry's illegitimate son to the duchy of Richmond in June, in an attempt to provide for the succession, Norfolk relinquished his patent as admiral, which he had been granted for life, so that the nine year old duke of Richmond could be appointed lord admiral in July. It was an office and a title in which Howard had won great prestige, and it had probably given him particular satisfaction, in that as admiral he had followed in the footsteps of his grandfather and others of his Howard ancestors, but he was over fifty years old and possibly no longer anxious to go to sea. His combination since 1522 of the offices of admiral and treasurer had been unusual, while the latter office was so important that he lost nothing in status by relinquishing the admiralty. He probably recommended the new vice-admiral, Arthur Plantagenet, Viscount Lisle, half-brother of his first wife, who had served well as a captain under him, whom he had recommended to head the Portsmouth garrison in 1514, and nominated for the Garter in 1524. The compensation Norfolk secured for resigning from the admiralty was by no means insignificant. First, there was the grant in tail male of his Lincolnshire
lands which he had acquired after Flodden for life only, in part exchange for which he sold to the crown the manors of Hunsdon and Eastwick. Secondly, perhaps as a result of his support for the policy of grooming Richmond for the succession, he acquired a special relationship with the new duke, who was to become the companion of his heir, Surrey, and husband of his daughter, Mary.

2. The Treasurership

The second duke surrendered his patent as treasurer on 3 December 1522 at Chesworth, where he seems, most unusually, to have spent the whole Michaelmas term, rather than attending the council. Perhaps at the age of seventy-nine he had finally found constant business too much, though since he attended Parliament in the spring of 1523 and was travelling about East Anglia still later, it is clear that his health had not failed conclusively, and he may simply have been anxious to secure his heir's succession to the office in his lifetime and retire to put his own affairs in order. Surrey's letters patent were issued two days after his father relinquished office, and he thereby acquired not only the second great office of state, immediately becoming a regular attender of the council that autumn, but also a fee of £365 p.a. with the perquisites of the court and the potential for great profit in the form of the sale of customs posts. In 1540, when the political climate was very different, Norfolk was to claim that he had accepted no such gifts and, with the exception of two officers, had placed his patronage in the customs at the royal disposal. This sounds like exaggeration for effect, though there may have been some truth in the claim, but if he did so from the outset he was certainly more scrupulous than his father who had, for example, sold the customership of Newcastle for £55 in the early years of the century.

In the matter of his patronage within the exchequer, as a result of his father's tenure of office since 1501 he inherited a bureaucracy already well staffed with Howard appointees, and his half-brother Berners was, of course, chancellor. Naturally he went on to appoint men close to himself when vacancies arose. William Gonson, who had served under Howard at sea in both wars and

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become one of his most trusted naval aids, then been appointed a gentleman usher of the chamber, and was to become keeper of the naval storehouses at Erith and Deptford after John Hopton in September 1524, was granted the reversion of John Jennings's tellership of the exchequer in 1523, and on 4 December 1524 admitted to office. The same year saw the appointment of William Ashby, who had a Surrey connection with the Howards and had had a case tried in the exchequer court in 1519-20, as clerk of the estreats. In 1525 after an apparent lull, Norfolk and his servants began to use his court again occasionally to pursue common law cases, as in his father's time. In one such case Norfolk had arrested the offender, one Thomas Ketyll of Kings Langley, Herts, for forcibly entering his close at Abbots Langley and depasturing his cattle. One of Norfolk's lawyers, substeward of his Suffolk lands, Robert Tollemache, brought two cases in as many years, in the first of which he had also arrested the offender. Since these cases were almost invariably abandoned unfinished it appears that the main purpose was to bring pressure on the duke's opponents or those of his servants, and if this was the aim the exchequer court was clearly a useful place to do so since delays were minimal.

The sources available tell us little of Norfolk's activities as treasurer when in London in the period under review here. Like his father before him, his main concern was, almost certainly, to counsel the king in financial and trade matters and flowing from these, foreign policy. His letters in 1523-4 from the north of England are full of advice on cost cutting, the cheapest way of pursuing any given policy, and even how much should be spent on entertaining the king's sister Margaret. He clearly considered it his duty to see that Henry got value for money in all his undertakings, and, though in his absence Wolsey had the demanding task of funding the king's armies and fleet, which meant arranging credit, when not absent on military service Norfolk may well have shared this role with the chancellor. He certainly took a very keen interest in the crucial debates over a subsidy to fund the war in the Parliament of 1523, receiving detailed reports from an unknown member of the
lower house while in the north, and was, not surprisingly, involved in the
collection of the loan there.\textsuperscript{50} His knowledge of commodities, prices, trade
routes and markets, and his understanding of the influence of war upon these,
as revealed particularly in his correspondence during the second half of the
1520s, demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of the basis of the country's
and the crown's prosperity.\textsuperscript{51} It was as much his outlook as treasurer as his
loyalty to the Habsburgs which was to cause him to doubt the wisdom of
renouncing the imperial alliance in favour of the French in 1526, and
especially dislike making war on England's chief trade partner, the Low
Countries.\textsuperscript{52} In the event his fears proved fully justified.

3. The Estates

Though Howard's financial position was transformed on the death of his
father, his total landholdings were not as great as the second duke's. The
latter had characteristically planned for his own death with great
meticulousness and circumspection, calling on no less a person than Warham for
advice in the drawing up of his will of 1516, and making additions in 1520
because of Surrey's departure for Ireland.\textsuperscript{53} His second wife, Agnes Tylney, who
had brought him no dowry, was well provided for. Her jointure, which his heir
could hardly expect to recover in his lifetime since they were close in age,
was worth almost £359 according to the 1524 valor, that is £40 more than
Elizabeth Stafford's,\textsuperscript{54} and in the will Surrey was called upon to witness
formally that it was worth less than five hundred marks p.a. and declare
himself "well contented and pleased" with the assignment.\textsuperscript{55} Agnes was endowed
with the Howard house and lands in Lambeth, and as her jointure she received
the ex-Mowbray barony of Bramber, including the important family residences of
Chesworth near Horsham, Bramley in Surrey, and the first duke's Tendring
inheritance and early acquisitions: the Stoke by Nayland house and estate on
the Suffolk-Essex border, outlying parcels of land in west Suffolk, and the
Howard lands and tenements in nearby Colchester, with the remaining manor and
its appurtenances in south Lincolnshire.\textsuperscript{56}
A further group of lands worth 400 marks p.a. (only about £242 in the
valor) was devised by the will, but would also ultimately return to the heir.
These consisted almost entirely of Mowbray lands at the heart of the ducal
estates in Suffolk. Lord Edmund was to have for life the manor of Kettleburgh
and its well-spread appurtenances worth almost £36 on his father's death, with
a further £6 p.a. from his half-brother Richard's lands. Lord William, the
second duke's eldest son by Agnes, was to have for life other Suffolk manors
worth almost £35 when all his father's debts and expenses had been paid. His
younger brother Richard, who died before he could benefit by the will, should
have had the Northamptonshire manor of Chacombe worth over £47 p.a., with the
deduction already mentioned, and his brother Thomas was to have Bidlington in
Sussex, worth £16 p.a., while a life provision was also made for any unborn
sons Norfolk might leave. His unmarried daughters were each to have 300 marks
for their dowry from the income of the Suffolk lands when their father's debts
and expenses had been settled, and £134 was set aside for the duke's tomb. Because the duke lived another eight years, three of his four daughters were in
fact married before he died.

The third duke obtained special livery of his inheritance, whereby the
normal procedure of undertaking inquisitions post mortem in all the counties
where his father had held land seems to have been bypassed so as to speed his
entry, a not uncommon favour, but perhaps partly an inducement to him to return
speedily to the north in the summer of 1524 as Henry and Wolsey wished. The
valor of the ducal estates, which was delivered to Henry's council on 8 July
1524 as part of the suit, ought to provide an exceptionally accurate assessment
of their value, since on the same day an indenture was drawn up between the
king and Norfolk providing for a royal audit of his lands at will, and laying
down severe penalties for several specified methods of rendering an
undervaluation. There is nothing exceptional in this. The estates of the
second duke were valued at £2,202, and then groups of lands which did not
descend to the heir immediately were deducted. These obviously included the
dowager's jointure and lands devised in the will, but also others: the jointure of his wife Elizabeth, his father's manors held by recovery and/or in the hands of feoffees, and Buckingham's former lands, which left him, as the document emphasises, with an unimpressive £613 worth of his inheritance immediately at his disposal, on which he king might demand a fine for livery.

Though no consolidated estate account for 1523-4 survives, the provision made in the indenture for an inspection of Norfolk's estate accounts strongly suggests that the valor was based upon it, an impression reinforced by a surviving compotus of all his estates for the year Michaelmas 1525-6.6 By that time, needless to say, he held all of his inheritance save the first two categories set out in the valor. Comparing the figures in the valor with those of the compotus and other surviving estate accounts is difficult, since these are accounts of different types and stages in the accounting process, but cautious conclusions are possible. While on the basis of the valor a net income from the ducal estates inherited by the third duke of £1,968 might be predicted, in fact Norfolk's net income from the same lands in 1525-6 appears to have been rather lower at £1,796. Though a substantial reduction, the evidence provided by accounts for individual manors where they exist for several years suggest that this sort of fluctuation was not unusual.

The compotus shows that Norfolk had a gross annual income from the lands he administered, including his estates as earl of Surrey, of £2,109 and a net income of £1,597. When added to his income of £413 p.a. from his first wife's de la Pole lands in East Anglia held by Suffolk, this produces a net annual landed income of just under £2,010. This placed him among the handful of wealthiest men in the country. The estates were divided for administrative purposes into five receiverships:6 the first, that of Sir Philip Tylney, made up of the core of the ducal estates in East Anglia; the second, that of James Daniel, a blood relative, consisting of his Flodden grant in Lincolnshire and the portions of his wife's dowry and lands he had purchased in East Anglia which he had held as earl of Surrey; the third, that of Richard Wenman,
consisting of much of the second Duke's Flodden grant spread over eight counties; the fourth, that of Henry Wylbardham in Shropshire, also from Norfolk's Flodden grant; and the fifth, that of Thomas Michell, made up of the Howard share of the former Mowbray lands in the barony of Lewes.

The table on page 287, which breaks down these accounts, reveals that though between eighty-five per cent and ninety-three per cent of Norfolk's income in each receivership came from rents and farms, other sources of income were quite important, especially in the receiverships where the Howards often resided. In the first two receiverships, the centre of the dukedom and earldom respectively, and the fifth, like the first consisting of hereditary, ex-Mowbray lands, but in Sussex and Surrey, the stewards kept the lord's courts regularly, and perquisites from them amounted to seven per cent of receipts in the first two, and ten per cent in the last, as against one per cent in the third and three per cent in the fourth. Timber resources were clearly being exploited quite intensively on some manors, and particularly in the second receivership, where sales of wood made up as much as fourteen per cent of receipts. This high rate of exploitation may well have been a hangover from Surrey's days as earl when he had, perhaps, been forced to eat into capital reserves.

Total outgoings amounted to almost £513 or twenty per cent of gross receipts. The cost of administering such widely-spread estates was surprisingly low everywhere at between point nine and three percent of yields. Expenditure on repairs was likewise quite low, amounting to six per cent and almost nine per cent of yields in the first and second receiverships (the heart of the dukedom and former earldom respectively) but was very low elsewhere, with none apparently being carried out in the fourth, Shropshire receivership in this year. The payment of retainers, fees and wages to lawyers and estate officials were substantial, however, amounting in total to a reasonable twelve per cent of gross income, but seventeen per cent in the second receivership (the lands Norfolk had held as earl of Surrey) and almost sixteen per cent in the fourth,
**Analysis of the Comptus of all Norfolk's lands, Michaelmas 1525-1526**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Receiverships</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Receiver</td>
<td>Tyne</td>
<td>Dani</td>
<td>Wenman</td>
<td>Wilbardham</td>
<td>Michell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>East Anglia</td>
<td>Lincs.etc</td>
<td>8 Counties</td>
<td>Shropshire</td>
<td>Suss/Surr</td>
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**Receipts (Charge)**

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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agistments</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale of wood</td>
<td>59.14</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2.16.10</td>
<td>19.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perq. of courts</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>22.11</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>2.16.10</td>
<td>19.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rents and farms</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>153.9</td>
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| Total             | 1,213 | 313 | 292 | 98 | 191.13 |
| Arrears           | 128.13 | 45  | 36  | 1.17 | 56.19 |

**Outgoings (Discharge)**

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fees</td>
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<td>124</td>
<td>24.18</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>24.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expenses</td>
<td>26.14</td>
<td>14.12</td>
<td>2.16.7</td>
<td>3.711</td>
<td>6.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Repairs</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>6.14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total             | 222.16 | 203.1 | 34.8 | 18.16 | 33.13 |

**Gross Income:** £ 2,109. 8. 2%

**Total Expenditure:** £ 512.15. 2

**Net Income:** £ 1,596.13. 0%

1. Source; Arundel Ms. A 1047. Blanks in the figures indicate no sales of wood, agistments or repairs in the receivership specified in that year.

2. Despite the fact that this account book was compiled at the audit to reveal at a glance the yields and costs in each receivership, for comparison with other years, it essentially records the liability of each receiver to Norfolk. Thus the arrears do not indicate what tenants owed, but the sum in the hands of the receiver, rents paid in instalments and debts which may or may not be paid. Nor can an account for a single year reveal what proportion of arrears had accumulated over a long period and was made up of bad debts.

3. Since Norfolk continued to receive an income of £413 from his first wife's de la Pole lands held by the duke of Suffolk, (PRO SC1/12/23/29, SC12/37/16; C54/384, m 2) his net income from land at this time was higher than the comptus reveals at £ 2,009. 13. 0%
whereas in the first they were under ten per cent, in the fifth nine and a half
per cent and in the third, made up of the widely spread manors, eight and a
half per cent. This partly reflects the fact that in 1514, when Surrey and
Norfolk had received their Flodden grants, they had completely lacked influence
in Lincolnshire and Shropshire, where they had hopes of building up a coherent
estate, and so sought to redress the situation by giving sinecure stewardships
and receiverships to knights and gentlemen of substance and local influence,
often known to them at court.

Yields from the Howard estates fluctuated from year to year, but appear
over longer periods to have been stable or rising slightly in some cases in the
period covered by this study, though of course it is always possible that the
figures reflect additions to manors by purchase. Accounts for the Tendring
inheritance centring on Stoke-by-Nayland, which survive in three compoti at
roughly ten year intervals (Michaelmas 1495-6, 1506-7 and 1514-15) show
receipts rising from £95 to £102, and then £106, while net income rose still
more markedly, from £69 to £74 and then £99. However, with only three figures
to go on it would be unwise to conclude too much from this, especially since
the Stoke estate was valued at £93 in the 1524 valor. While assigned rents
and farms had fallen marginally, the properties let under shorter leases, often
of seven years, rose from £50 to £57 and remained at that level in 1514-15.

A group of Suffolk manors in the first, central receivership, (Earl
Soham, Bungay, Walton with Trimley, Staverton and Bromeswell, Hollesley and
Sutton, Donningworth, Hoo and Cratfield) for which we have accounts in 1512-13
and 1519-20, show some minor rises and other minor falls in gross receipts
and net income, and fairly stable administrative costs, suggesting, insofar as
such inadequate data can suggest anything, overall stability. For the
Framlingham group, also in Tylney's receivership (Framlingham, hundred of Loos,
Kettleburgh, Hacheston, Peasenhall, and Kelsale) we have a better spread of
accounts covering 1495-6, 1502-3, 1503-4, 1509-10 and 1510-11. In this group
it is noteworthy that arrears generally fluctuated considerably, except between
the years 1509-10 and 1510-11 when they generally remained fixed, with the exception of Willington in Bedfordshire where arrears stood at the same figure throughout. Sometimes arrears stood at nil for several years. For the other receiverships we lack the necessary detailed accounts to be able to make comparisons.70.

Though in contrast to those of the Staffords and Percies in the same period,71 the surviving documents concerned with the administration of the Howard estates are too fragmentary and too limited in content to reveal much of the Howards' relations with their tenantry or their tenacity in defending their rights,72 it appears that, while both dukes did resort to common law suits to pursue or intimidate habitual trespassers and poachers, both in Common Pleas and occasionally in the exchequer of pleas, they were much less litigious than the duke of Buckingham or earl of Northumberland.73 Moreover, they showed no inclination to suspect and hound their ministers and officers as Buckingham did,74 and seem to have adopted an opposite policy in dealing with the problem of corruption which deprived every landowner of some portion of his income. We know from a letter of Magnus when he was serving under Surrey in the north that, though apt to be hasty in accusing others of responsibility for leaks of important information, the earl had what Magnus regarded as an almost naive faith in the absolute reliability of his own household staff and retainers.75 He recommended many men who had served under him, and was notably willing to come to their assistance when in trouble.76 The estate accounts seem to bear out this impression. Wages and fees to his estate personnel were generous, household servants were in several cases given estate posts to boost their income, and the compotus of 1525-6 reveals that rewards were paid to three men who were outstandingly efficient in the duke's recently inherited central receivership.77 His approach, based on providing an incentive to efficiency, probably owes something to the business history of the family, but also reflects a clear-sighted personal assessment that if he were to pursue his own servants for debt the loss of his reputation for goodlordship, and the possible
consequent decline in the quality of servants he could attract, would far outweigh any likely financial gain.

**Estates Administrators**

In the receiverships remote from the heart of the dukedom, ministers in the upper echelons were often men of considerable local influence, substantial landowners, JPs and sometimes sheriffs and/or MPs, many of them with court connexions. They were probably chosen to compensate for the lack of local Howard influence to protect their estates and interests, and were retained in office over many years. For instance, in the third receivership, Wenman, who came from an Oxfordshire gentry family which was to provide an MP later in Henry VIII's reign, administered the most widely spread estates, which had formerly belonged variously to John, duke of Bedford, William, Lord Morley, and Sir William Stanley. Apart from receiving a fee of £4 p.a. as receiver, he was bailiff of four manors in Oxfordshire and Gloucestershire with further fees of at least £2. His service to Norfolk undoubtedly strengthened his local position still further, for in 1516-17 he brought a case in the exchequer court against the sheriff of Oxfordshire. Also in the Howard employ in this receivership was the still more distinguished Sir John Giffard of Chillington, a Staffordshire JP and sheriff of the county for no less than six years during the reign, and a subsidy commissioner in 1513 and 1524, who had risen to great local power through a distinguished career at court and in war, and was to sit in Parliament for his county in 1529. He was the Howard bailiff of Wolverhampton at an impressive fee of £6 1s. 8d. Others connected to the Howards through their lands in this receivership were Thomas Unton, chief steward in Oxfordshire, Berkshire and Wiltshire, who received £2, and Sir John Petchie's widow, farmer of Eastwickham, Kent, whose husband had jousted and fought beside the Howards, and John Grey, farmer at Barley, Hertfordshire.

The fourth receivership, consisting of lands in Shropshire, to which the second duke had added by purchase, was more compact, and correspondingly less distinguished in its administrators, though this may also reflect the fact that
Norfolk did not normally expect to raise his tenantry there in time of war. The receiver himself was paid £3 6s. 8d, though Sir Richard Brereton, a JP and subsidy commissioner in 1523 and 1524, who was collector at Acton Burnell, amassed fees of £7 1s. 8d. and Robert Legge, though of much lower status, was important as bailiff of three manors with a fee of £1 13s. 4d.

In the fifth receivership, consisting of the barony of Lewes, a former Mowbray estate, there was no such problem for Howard influence as in the third and fourth, and ministers had long connections through the estates with the Howards and Mowbrays before them. Thomas Michell, son of John Michell of Cuckfield, was receiver, forester of Worth and custodian of Cuckfield, and amassed a fee of £6 7s. 6d p.a. while his brother John, who had been custodian of Framlingham castle for at least 10 years, was sub-steward of the barony with £1 6s. 8d. Thomas was a subsidy collector in 1524 and both were to be appointed to the bench in Sussex and sit as local MPs in 1529 through Norfolk's influence. The honorary title of chief steward of the barony, and fee of £2 10s., had gone to Lord Edmund Howard, whose wife's lands lay close to his father's, while Sir Edward Bray of Henfield and Selmerston near Lewes, (younger brother of Sir Edmund who was also attached to the Howards) was farmer of part of Meeching and active in estate administration. He had served on land and sea under Surrey in both wars with France, was sheriff in 1521, a JP from 1523, and a subsidy commissioner, and was to sit as MP for Lewes in 1529.

Alfred Berwick, a wealthy citizen of Reigate whose influence in the town was useful to the Howards, since they had property there, and who was also a subsidy commissioner in 1523 and 1524, and MP for Horsham in 1529, received an impressive fee of £6 13s. 4d. Thomas Audley, a substantial citizen of the town of Lewes was bailiff there, and John Blennerhasset, fourth son of the steward of the second duke's household, who himself had a legal training and was later to serve on the third duke's council, was farmer of Tyburn.

In the second receivership Surrey could have faced a problem in 1514 because Howard influence in Lincolnshire was slight, and confined to an area
south of the Wash which was distant from his new lands, while he was naturally anxious to recruit from his tenantry in the county in time of war. He did have powerful friends in the county, however; indeed its most powerful resident was already in office in certain of the estates he acquired and it would have been sheer folly to remove him. He was Sir John Hussey of Sleaford, administrator of the royal wards, JP and custos rotulorum in 1515, with whom the Howards had had a long association. In 1525-6 he remained chief steward of Folkingham Castle and farmed the agistments there, receiving an impressive £16 13s. 4d. in fees. Sir Giles Hussey, knighted by Surrey after Morlaix where he had probably led the earl's Lincolnshire tenants, was collector at Caythorpe and received a modest £2 0s. 10d by comparison, but Thomas Danby, collector at Folkingham made £6 1s. 4d., and Roger Folyat at Riskington £4 11s. 4d. There were other fees at £3 and above, including that of Humphrey Walcotte, sub-steward of the Lincolnshire lands, but John Hennege, sub-steward at Lynwood with a very modest fee was a JP in Lindsey and a subsidy commissioner in Holland. Nor was it only in Lincolnshire that Surrey had looked to powerful friends. His administration of his first wife Anne's well-spread lands had presumably first suggested such a policy. Of these only Wilmington in Kent remained, but here an old associate, Sir Edward Guildford, who was a JP and on the subsidy commissions, was chief steward with £2.

Surrey's bailiff at Winfarthing was distinguished. Sir John Cornwallis of Brome, who had land also in Norfolk and Essex, was a tenant at Framlingham Parva, and received £4 from his bailiwick. An appointment like this, to a manor right next to Surrey's chief residence as earl at Kenninghall, confirms that he was not simply concerned to recruit men of stature to protect his own interests, but rather that he sought to bind to himself men who had the capacity and will to serve under him in war. His grants of estate offices thus served a similar purpose to the grants of annuities made by fifteenth century noblemen to retain the service of leading gentry, and he followed the practice of several other early Tudor noblemen in appointing such men to sinecure estate
offices to avoid the danger of infringing Henry VII's legislation against retaining. In this case we know that Cornwallis was indeed with him at sea and at Morlaix in 1522, when he was knighted by Surrey, and not surprisingly, several of the earl's and his father's estate officials, not only from East Anglia, were also in his retinue in the north in 1523.

Surrey's receiver-general while he held the title of earl was James Daniel, a cousin, member of a family which had fallen into misfortune and been rescued by John Howard, the first duke, and risen over three generations in the Howard service. James himself had been in Howard's personal service since 1510, and probably long before, and was called esquire in 1519 when he had a servant of his own. In 1523 and 1524 he was appointed to the subsidy commission for Kesteven. He received a fee of £13 6s. 8d, a sum comparable only with that received by Hussey and Tylney, the latter as receiver in the central circuit. Other large fees were, however, paid to Henry Chauncey, auditor and chief financial expert to both dukes, who had also served Surrey in the same capacity while he was earl, and received £8 13. 4d. Other well-rewarded servants employed in the household, but also given responsibility and thus fees from the estates were Robert Holdich, esquire, comptroller of the household, who was also steward of his castle of Folkingham, and received £5 p.a. from it, William Hals, esquire, steward of his household, and Richard Clifford and Laurence Englefield, gentlemen of the household, who received £10 each in fees. Edward White of Shotesham, the only lawyer exclusively of Surrey's council, rather than shared with his father, received £2 13s. 4d.

Turning to the first, central receivership, where fees and wages were under nine per cent of yields, Sir William Gascoigne of Cardington, Beds., who was a JP and sheriff four times during the first half of the reign, and a member of Wolsey's household, was chief steward of Norfolk's one non-East Anglian manor of Willington, Beds. Not surprisingly, he stands out as the only man of distinction who had not actually risen to influence through the Howard service. The rest were men like Sir Philip Tylney, brother-in-law to the
second duke, receiver in the central circuit, chief steward in Norfolk and
Suffolk, who himself owned land in Suffolk, Norfolk and Lincolnshire, had
become a JP in Norfolk and Suffolk, sat on a wealth of commissions and even
taken part in ceremonials occasions at court with his wife as a result of Howard
influence.110 He received a total of £13 6s. 8d. from the third duke as he had
from the second. Also high in the ranking was Sir Thomas Blennerhassett of
Frenze, Norfolk, who had been steward of the second duke’s household, and his
feoffee and executor, and retained his office as parker at Lopham and, no
doubt, his place on the ducal council, with a fee of £6 1s. 8d.111 Henry
Chauncey of Norwich, again a feoffee and executor to the second duke, continued
as auditor and leading financial adviser to the third duke, and his value to
the Howards is revealed by the fact that in 1525-6, as a result of the
amalgamation of the earldom and dukedom, he collected a total of £21 from all
of the receiverships.112

Estate staff in lower positions in this receivership were generally long
serving and well paid, for in East Anglia the Howard service was undoubtedly
highly prestigious. Three, at least, received fees as high as £6 p.a. Two of
them, William Hals, parker at Kenninghall, and Roger Austen, parker and bailiff
at Earl Soham, were important servants of the third duke who had administered
parts of the countess of Surrey’s jointure which had remained in the second
duke’s hands during his lifetime. It was hardly surprising that Norfolk should
wish to reward them on coming into his inheritance. The third, John Rushbrooke,
was the bailiff of Buckingham’s former manors in Norfolk, again a man whom the
third duke might particularly have wished to reward.113 There was one other fee
of £5, several of over £4 and others of over £3, for instance to parkers, such
as William Rous who had succeeded the long serving Richard Chamber at
Framlingham, or Mathew Harman, feodary in Suffolk. Like those in the top rank,
many of these estate administrators in the central receivership and other lands
long held by the family, had served the Howards, or came from families which
had done so, over many years. For example, John Markes, bailiff and collector
at Stoke-by-Nayland, who does not appear in the 1525-6 account, since that manor was part of the dowager's jointure, was in office for at least 20 years.\textsuperscript{114}

In 1525-6 nine lawyers, divided into three categories for payment, were retained of the ducal council and paid from the central receivership, though perhaps only the third category worked exclusively for Norfolk and the greatest might certainly expect additional rewards for particular work undertaken on his behalf. They were John Spelman, Robert Norwich and Sir Humphrey Wingfield, each paid £2 p.a., William Conningsby, John Hynd and Robert Tollemache, each paid £1 6s. 8d., and Humfrey Dowland, William Knightley and Nicholas Mynne, each paid £0 13. 4d.\textsuperscript{115} The household accounts for 1526-7 reveal that other notable East Anglian lawyers also visited at times, and probably had business with the duke, so this is by no means a full list of his legal advisers.\textsuperscript{116}

\textbf{The Power of the Dukedom of Norfolk in East Anglia}

The ceremonial surrounding the passing of the second duke, on 21 May 1524, was a great event in the lives not only of his family but of East Anglians, serving to underscore at the same time the power of the dead duke, which would be inherited by his heir, and the royal master the dukes served. Both Norfolk's tomb and his funeral procession reveal that he and his family had no doubt of his place in history. He was to be buried at the Cluniac priory church at Thetford, the capital of the ancient kingdom of East Anglia, where his father and his Bigod and Mowbray ancestors were buried in the family foundation.\textsuperscript{117} The tomb, a towering stone rectangle elaborately carved with both New Testament scenes and classical motifs, costing £132 6s. 8d., proclaimed to all who saw it his wealth, his modernity, and the importance of his achievements, for it occupied a commanding position under the arch of the original apse, before the high altar in the quire of the enormous priory church, where it effectively blocked any view of the altar from the nave.\textsuperscript{118} Most significant of all, the story of his life in English was incorporated in the tomb. This has a heroic quality, emphasising his great military experience
and prowess, (above all his momentous victory at Flodden) and his many years of exalted service to the monarchy, especially the Tudor monarchy, from which, it is made clear, he derived his standing. The fact that at his burial he owed not a groat to any man, in itself reminiscent of pronouncements on Surrey’s conduct in Ireland, is also emphasised.\footnote{119}

His funeral, which cost no less than £1,340, was a tour de force.\footnote{120} At Framlingham 440 yards of black cloth decorated with escutcheons of his arms were hung in the principal public rooms and the chapel where the corpse lay flanked by four great columns bearing torches. Three masses a day were said for his soul by nineteen mourners, Lord William taking the place of his eldest brother as principal mourner since business detained him in London, and at night twenty-eight of the household kept vigil. The heir had returned by 22 June, when the great procession set out from Framlingham, headed by 3 coaches of friars, Norfolk’s chaplain and other clerics. There followed the ducal standard borne by an esquire, Edmund, the son of the late Sir Thomas Wyndham, nephew of the second duke,\footnote{121} and the knights, esquires and gentlemen of the household rode behind him. The banner was borne by Sir Edmund Bray, representing the Surrey/Sussex connexion, and was followed by the duke’s coat of arms borne by Carlisle Herald, the helmet and crest by Windsor, the target of arms by Clarencieux, and the coat of arms to be offered to the priory by Garter. The chariot itself was drawn by great horses, finely decked with escutcheons of his arms, some in gold, and attended by six gentlemen, and was followed by the chief mourner, other family members riding two by two, the chamberlain and master of the horse, leading a sumpter horse trapped with cloth of gold with escutcheons. Last came nine hundred lords, knights, and gentlemen, all in black gowns with hoods. Funeral attire was provided for 1,900 people in all, and at least 400 carried torches in the procession.

Along the way the procession was met at each town and village by its minister leading a smaller one singing service, and a donation of 6s. 8d. was made to each church, with five escutcheons of the ducal arms. At Hoxne the
procession was met by the bishop of Norwich, who had a residence there, and who processed to the church at Diss, where a dirge was sung that night, and a service performed early the next morning before the procession resumed its progress towards Thetford. There it was received outside the town by four orders of friars, and at the Abbey by the bishop of Ely, the abbot of Thetford, the abbot of Wymondham and the prior of Butley, while the priors of Dodnash and Woodbridge and the abbot of Hulm, Northumberland were also in attendance at least by the following day. The coffin was carried by six knights and six gentlemen into the abbey church, which was hung throughout with the ducal banners, pencils and devices and lit with seven hundred lights centring around the railed bier where one hundred wax effigies of bedemen were grouped.

The impressive service whereby the dead duke was honoured and laid to rest and his heir succeeded him was performed on the following day, the new duke's role exactly paralleling that which Henry VIII had played at his father's funeral in 1509. The royal heralds, including Richmond, not so far mentioned, the noblemen present and men of the dead duke's family played crucial parts. They were Lords Fitzwalter and Willoughby, Norfolk's lifelong associate and friend, then among the family Lord Edmund and Lord William Howard; the dead duke's sons-in-law, Sir Thomas Boleyn, the young earl of Oxford, who had married Anne, his eldest daughter by Agnes, Lord Fitzwalter's heir, who was espoused to their second daughter Elizabeth, and Sir Rice ap Thomas's heir Griffith, who was espoused to Catherine, fourth of Agnes's daughters. Of the close family only the dead duke's step-son lord Berners, who was in active service at Calais, was missing. Lord William made the offering at the first mass, and for the second mass the heir was brought to the offering by Garter and Clarencieux. The bishop of Ely, who sang the high mass, received the ducal coat of arms, sword, target, helmet and crest from the heralds who brought the lords, two by two to present them, and the bishop then conferred them on Norfolk's heir. After the family, household members made their offerings, and each of the lords in order of rank placed pallis of cloth
of gold on the hearse before departing. The abbot of Hulm gave the funeral sermon and finally Clarencieux "declared the deeds of the noble prince", the six gentlemen removed the coffin to its brick vault below the tomb, earth and holy water were sprinkled, and all staves of office broken and cast into the grave. Afterwards £100 was distributed in alms to the poor, and 300 priests received a shilling each and his dinner to sing for his soul. There followed a magnificent feast at which four hundred messes were served.

The second duke's goods, and his disposition of them add to the impression of him created by his will and his funeral. Though his image as a military man clearly meant much to him (he had, after all commissioned a translation of Sallust's *Bellum Jugurthinum* a few years previously) his tastes were not narrow. Nor do we lack evidence of his affection for his family, and especially his wife. By his will of 1520 he left all his household goods to her, with the exception of their great bed of state, covered in cloth of gold, white damask and black velvet, and his fine set of counterfeit Arras depicting the story of Hercules, also at Framlingham. An inventory of his goods at the castle, including his horses, was taken a week after his death for Wolsey by John Seintclere, esquire, a de Vere servant. They were valued at £1,090 and suggest a lifestyle of luxury, but this figure is very low compared to the £4,000 worth of goods he was assessed as owning, apparently in Suffolk, in the previous year. The inventory seems only partial, for some items of high value which one would expect to find, for instance jewelry, his Garter robes and his library are not listed. Presumably they had been given away by the duke on his deathbed, removed by the family, or were passed over.

His collection of tapestries and counterfeit Arras, the primary art form of the day, indicates both his interests and the fact that the principal chambers intended for public display were the great chamber, dining chamber and chamber at the great chamber end, where the pieces of highest value were hung. The more private rooms were less expensively furnished, and the hall quite inexpensively considering its size. Both classical and military themes were
represented, but with the exception of a counterfeit Arras showing the story of Lazarus in the chamber at the hall end, religious themes were not favoured outside the chapel. In the great chamber were the eight pieces of highly valuable counterfeit Arras of the story of Hercules left to his heir, which had been commissioned for the room, and Hercules also appeared in two further costly pieces hanging in the chamber at the great chamber end. In the inner chamber four pieces told the story of Alexander, and in the dining chamber there was one large piece depicting a joust and its partner depicting a tourney, both probably costly, while a chimney piece tapestry of the story of King Arthur was in store in the wardrobe. In the dining chamber there were also three tapestries depicting the Sibyl, and he had others, mainly verdures with ladies, beasts and men, or a foal and tree.

The multitude of soft furnishings, including hangings and covers for beds, were frequently embroidered with the ducal device of the white lion and red rose, or occasionally a George, and he had many foot carpets. Of his own jewelry, worth under £56, perhaps only the pieces which were very well known remained, namely his collar of the Garter, a chain with a George and 3 buckles and 2 pendants with Georges. Lastly, there was "a thing with a turkes (turquoise) that my lord used to were in his lift tyme", probably a brooch. Most of his clothes listed, worth £51 in all, were black, fully furred and "sore worn", though he could still impress at 80 in a gown of black velvet with a square cape, sprinkled with his arms, worth £10, or another of crimson velvet lined with black satin worth £6. The chapel was princely in its furnishings, because he had "great pleasure in the service of God", the plate alone being worth £156, and printed song books existed in such quantity as to confirm that, not unusually for a man of his rank, he kept a choir. His household plate was not insubstantial either, amounting to £309. This included the two great gilt pots captured from James IV at Flodden. Though the ducal seat, Framlingham, was only one of Norfolk's residences, and his great house at Lambeth, where he sometimes entertained the court, is likely to have been more luxuriously
furnished.

Power in Brick and Stone

The second duke had been a great builder and improver of his many residences, but of these few descended immediately to his heir. The house at Lambeth, Tendring Hall at Stoke by Nayland, Chesworth Place and Bramley all went to the dowager duchess Agnes, though, as in the second duke's lifetime, family members probably continued to exchange houses regularly. Certainly Norfolk used Stoke in 1527 and 1528. This is not surprising, for even had she been unpopular with her eldest step-son, and there is no evidence that she was, Agnes could hardly help being in constant contact with him, for her brother, Sir Philip Tylney, his receiver in the central circuit probably continued to oversee her Suffolk estate. At court Norfolk and his wife were, of course, entitled to bouche of court, even following the reorganisation of 1526, but the quartering of their servants was a problem when Agnes was using Lambeth, and they were forced to rent accommodation in its vicinity for the overflow, or send their retinue home. Though the ancient curtain walls of the second duke's great castle at Framlingham contained a large and sumptuous brick residence at his death, as the inventory reveals, of which only some of the chimneys now remain, it is not surprising if, soon after succeeding to the dukedom, and perhaps particularly after giving up his modern residence at Hunsdon to the king, he decided to build for himself. Perhaps this was largely from a need to imprint his own personality when all his homes bore the stamp of his father.

Probably in late 1525 he began to build a great, modern, brick palace, in the shape of a letter 'H' at Kenninghall, the residence which had always been part of his wife's jointure and which they had used most in the past. He chose a new site outside the moat of the old Mowbray house, which meant that construction could take place at a pace he could afford without disrupting life there, and two surviving inventories give a strong impression of the grandeur of the new house, with separate suites of apartments on the first floor for the
duke and duchess, following the arrangement in royal palaces based on
continental models. As a point from which to administer his East Anglian
estates, which now spread as far as the north Norfolk coast, it had advantages
over Framlingham, which lay too far to the south and east. Its proximity to
Norwich, a great regional centre, was another consideration. Besides, other
peers like the duke of Suffolk, Lord Willoughby, and to the south and west lord
Fitzwalter and the earls of Oxford and Essex could keep the country in order in
Suffolk and Essex. Norfolk, by contrast, lacked the steadying presence of a
resident aristocrat with a close court connexion, and after the riots of early
1525 this was probably regarded as important by Henry and his council.
Framlingham remained the chief ducal seat for years to come, however, and the
place where family, affinity and administrators foregathered over Christmas and
new year to mix business with pleasure.

Family, Dynasty and Connexion

The new duke of Norfolk now presided over a very large and growing
family, and this brought its responsibilities and problems as well as its
pleasures. Despite his long absences on service, and his wife's continued
rotational service to the queen, which resulted in much travel, his own family
had continued to grow since our last glimpse of it in the household account of
1519-20, when it consisted of two boys and a girl. In 1523, when he wrote to
Wolsey for the wardship of Lord Monteagle's heir, his family had clearly grown
by at least one girl. His relations with his wife were good, and she seems
to have handled business matters for him at court and in East Anglia in his
absence. In November 1524 she not only thanked Wolsey for furthering several of
her suits, but also begged him to show his kindness to them by speeding her
lord's return from the north, having expected him before Allhallowtide but
having heard nothing of late. As an examination of surviving household
accounts below will demonstrate, social intercourse among Howard family
members, relations by marriage and members of the East Anglian nobility was
frequent.
During the lifetime of Buckingham, who seems to have had a greater affection for his sisters and daughters than the male members of his family,\textsuperscript{147} the Surreys were clearly in frequent contact with him. They even acted at times as his agents at court, where they attended much more frequently than he in the later teens.\textsuperscript{149} When they were in Ireland, servants passed to and fro taking correspondence between them.\textsuperscript{149} There is, thus, evidence to contradict the third duke's unlikely assertion, made under extraordinary circumstances many years later, that Buckingham had hated him above all men.\textsuperscript{150} The Stafford duke was sometimes assisted by his slightly older son-in-law and Surrey's father in his dealings with the king; indeed his relationship with Norfolk was such that in November 1520 he instructed his chancellor, Robert Gilbert, to go to Norfolk whenever he needed advice in the conduct of the ducal affairs in London, thank him and his duchess for their kindnesses to him and say that he had "as grete truste in them as eny chyld they have".\textsuperscript{151} Buckingham's fall from grace, trial and execution, which caused the second duke to weep on pronouncing sentence, therefore represented both the loss of a family member and a political failure for the Howards, who clearly had no doubts of his loyalty to the crown, and had probably sought to mitigate his worst follies.\textsuperscript{152}

Surrey's policy statement in 1523 on the marriage of his daughters, elicited by his suit for the wardship of the young Lord Monteagle whom he wanted to purchase for one of them, is instructive.\textsuperscript{153} Not for him the great expense entailed in marrying them into the upper ranks of the nobility as Buckingham had married his daughters;\textsuperscript{164} he apparently regarded a baron with lands worth about £1,000 p.a. as the optimal son-in-law, though what he did not mention may be as important here as what he did. The Monteagle barony had been created as a result of Sir Edward Stanley's sterling service at Flodden, which had caused both Howards to nominate him for the Garter and probably lobby for his elevation to a barony;\textsuperscript{155} thus he clearly respected the family and probably genuinely wished to protect the heir's inheritance during his minority. Though he did not obtain the wardship, for which there was strong competition, he
probably had some part in the compromise which was finally reached, whereby Sir John Hussey, with whom he had had a long and close relationship, obtained the wardship jointly with Lord Darcy.  

His attitude towards the marriage of his daughters seems consistent with that of his grandfather and father, neither of whom regarded financial considerations as being of paramount importance in marriage, but rather sought to strengthen local alliances in the areas where they had interests, and perhaps also to keep their children accessible. Both had shown the usual concern to provide for their younger sons by good marriages which kept them in the family orbit and retained them on their own and their heir's councils. They naturally sought to marry their heirs well, but even here, where the real profit was to be made, they had not allowed financial considerations to dominate over longstanding associations. In April 1525, while in East Anglia, the third duke wrote to Wolsey to remind him that Henry had promised him the wardship of one of John, Lord Marney's two daughters, for he had heard that Marney was on his deathbed. Norfolk probably intended the girl for his younger son Thomas, and this would not have been the first marriage between the families, for the first duke had married one of his step daughters to the first Lord Marney. Norfolk obtained the wardship of Elizabeth Marney, for which he paid £613, while that of the second girl went to Lord Fitzwalter so that she might marry one of his younger sons, and Norfolk headed the feoffees for the jointure, thus further strengthening the Howard/Ratcliffe connexion.

Both the first and second Howard dukes had chosen not to marry women of high rank when free to select their own brides at their second marriages, though they could both then have made very handsome profits. The third duke's second marriage had been a different matter altogether, in that he had badly needed to marry a woman with a large dowry to finance his war preparations in 1512, though the connection of both of his wives with the queen's household may have been of paramount importance. The exalted marriages of two of the second duke's daughters by Agnes, to the earl of Oxford
and earl of Derby, the second of which did not take place until 1529 and was arranged by the third duke, were prompted by special circumstances which may have brought the cost of their dowries down. In the latter case the fact that Derby was also a co-heir of the Mowbrays and distant relative is significant, while in the former the desire of the thirteenth earl of Oxford to protect his inheritance during the minority of his heir, by attaching him to a cousin and old friend, was all-important.\footnote{166}

The most distinguished of the marriages of the second duke's children, to a man with a landed income of about £2,260 p.a.\footnote{166} was also the most unhappy and brought the Howards considerable problems. It took place in about 1520 when Oxford gained livery of his lands at 21,\footnote{167} and proved disastrous despite the fact that the young earl must have known his bride, and had turned down the opportunity offered by Henry to renounce a marriage arranged for him when he was very young and marry Margaret Courtenay instead.\footnote{168} He had been brought up by Norfolk between 1514 and his coming of age and had learned military skills. Thereafter Norfolk took a paternalistic interest in promoting him, so that in the year of his majority he and Anne attended Henry to the Field of Cloth of Gold and met Charles V, while Norfolk not only nominated him for the Garter consistently from 1522 but appears to have lobbied his fellows in 1523 and 1524 to do likewise.\footnote{169}

Oxford's behaviour on obtaining his majority and control of his estates may indicate covert rebellion against the authority who had dominated his adolescence, for whom his wife was, of course, an ideal proxy. Anne was a well educated young woman of considerable force of character, and quickly found fault with her husband's riotous and extravagant living. The problem was too delicate for the duke and the executors of the thirteenth earl to wish to handle directly, but Anne, who stayed with the countess of Surrey in 1523,\footnote{170} clearly had her family's support in taking her complaint to the king and Wolsey,\footnote{171} who alone might wield that blend of temporal and spiritual authority and impartiality which the case demanded. The result was that by early 1524
Wolsey had drawn up a tripartite indenture between himself, Oxford and the executors, laying down a new regime for the earl, and had him bound in £2,000, and six sureties in five hundred marks each to observe it. The Oxfords were to break up their own household, which had split hopelessly into warring factions behind husband and wife, and to return to live with her father while the earl learned discretion and the proper management of his affairs. His council, headed by John Josselin, an old de Vere servant, was reconstituted, and the number of their servants limited to reduce expenses. Though Oxford could nominate these, Wolsey had the right of veto and might dismiss any of them whenever he chose. Furthermore, Oxford was ordered to temper his excesses for his own good. For the sake of his prosperity, he was to renounce his excess in making grants and annuities and buying costly attire; for the sake of his health he was not to indulge in rich food and hot wines, late nights, excessive hunting and other dangerous sports; and instead of encouraging the malicious tales of his servants against his wife, he was to treat her "lovinglie, familiarie and kindlie" so that they might live in harmony and have children.

This document is so authoritarian, and lays the blame so entirely on the shoulders of Oxford, that he could not but resent and resist it. Though he did not openly defy the king and Wolsey he could use delaying tactics, and it is likely that he had not returned to Framlingham by the time of Norfolk's death a few months later. The letters of the countess to the cardinal later in the year make it clear that he avoided going up to court - where more pressure might be put on him - as long as he could, and he showed little inclination to change his ways. Nor, in her view, did Sir John de Vere, the heir apparent, and other executors encourage her husband to reform, though Sir Robert Drury, who had enjoyed a position of trust in the counsels of the de la Poles, de Veres and Howards, clearly sympathised with her. It was in the context of an apparently irretrievable breakdown in the marriage, Oxford's apparent determination to undo his health and his inheritance, and good social relations
between the new duke and duchess and Lady de Vere, wife of Sir John at least, 177 that Norfolk persuaded Oxford to enfeoff him, Fitzwalter and Rochford (Boleyn was raised to the peerage in that year) with a second, large jointure for Anne. 178 He may well have had royal approval, for the intention was, perhaps, not simply to provide very well for her if Oxford should die young and Sir John prove hostile, but to remove as large a part of the de Vere inheritance as possible from Oxford's control so that it could not be squandered and granted away. 179

Seen in isolation even semi-altruism on the part of the Howards may seem unlikely, but put in the context of the long-standing Howard/de Vere relationship, where each family had at times enjoyed the income of, but also efficiently administered the landed inheritance of the other, and the trust the thirteenth earl had placed in the Howards to safeguard his inheritance, it is likely. 180 Moreover, when after the inevitable early death of Oxford in mid 1526 the countess-dowager was faced with direct action by Sir John de Vere, in the form of two attacks on Lavenham park, part of her second jointure, and the occupation by force of Castle-Camps, part of the first, which drove her to make appeals to Henry, Wolsey, Suffolk and her half-brother Norfolk, 181 the latter was unwilling to do anything without the approval of Henry and Wolsey. 182 He was understandably concerned above all to maintain good relations with all those who held de Vere estates. Indeed, Norfolk and Suffolk recognised the need for a thoroughly impartial settlement of the problem in the new situation, and both sat on the committee of noblemen who finally achieved a settlement between the three parties involved, the fifteenth earl, the dowager countess Anne, and the heirs general between 1529 and 1532. 183

The fact that Norfolk was anxious to achieve a royally sponsored, and lasting settlement of the de Vere inheritance problem is indicative of his awareness that, like his father between 1513 and 1524 and the thirteenth earl of Oxford from 1485 to 1513, he must maintain good relations with all who had influence in the region if he was to be the prime representative of the king.

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there. Of course, his prestige, high office and frequent attendance at court and in council gave him a great advantage, but there can be little doubt that he was deliberately adopting a conciliatory stance and fostering unity. His relations with the duke of Suffolk, which, in a continuation of the old coolness between the Howards and Brandons had probably not been particularly warm during his father's tenure of the dukedom, now began to improve, particularly during 1525 when they cooperated over the Amicable Grant. The Radcliffes, who had once been rivals of the Howards for influence in Norfolk, were now not only reconciled but becoming ever closer members of the family, and relations with Norfolk's half-brother Berners and Lord Willoughby d'Eresby seem to have been as close as ever. The earl of Essex, whose sphere of influence was more distant, was, nonetheless, a feoffee and visitor.

Much the same applied to the upper gentry in the region, though we lack parkers' accounts for the Howard deer parks for these years, which would detail how wide the distribution of ritual gifts was. While the Howard affinity remained well defined, it was apparently expanding, at least temporarily, as a result of the six years from 1514-20 when the de Vere estates and offices had been under Howard control, followed by the ineffectual leadership of the young fourteenth earl of Oxford. Beyond the affinity, however, a large number of East Anglian gentry families, even in the west of the region which had not traditionally looked to the Mowbrays, took pains to maintain good relations with the duke of Norfolk as well as with their local lord, and this is not surprising given that relations among the nobility were generally good. Suffolk's lack of an adequate home in the region tended to cancel out the effect of his proximity to the court in making him an effective rival, and, perhaps also because Norfolk had a more eminent and experienced council, it was he who was widely popular as a feoffee and an executor.

The commissions of the peace, and special commissions for the loan and subsidy in East Anglia in these years contain what look like many Howard appointees. Of the new JPs appointed in Suffolk and Norfolk in these years both
Howard associates and those who came from families normally associated with the de Veres were doubtless sympathetic to Howard influence. They were Thomas Barnardiston, Richard Brooke, William Drury, Edward Echyngham, Thomas Jermyn, Robert Reynolds, and Thomas Tey in Suffolk, and Richard Brooke, Christopher Jenny, Francis Moundford, William Wotton, and Edmund Wyndham in Norfolk. The subsidy commissions of August 1523 and 1524 and local collectors appointed in April of the latter year are interesting, for they demonstrate how much greater was Norfolk's influence in East Anglia than in any of the other counties where he held land, including Lincolnshire and Surrey and Sussex. In the remoter counties where he had interests only one or two men linked to the duke through his estates were appointed, and then almost certainly not by his influence. In Lincolnshire much the same was true, though James Daniel was appointed, almost certainly at Norfolk's request, in Kesteven. In Surrey Lord Edmund Howard headed the commission and Sir Edmund Bray was also appointed, but only four of a commission of thirty were linked to the Howards. In Sussex matters were not so different, for though Sir Edward Bray and John and Thomas Michell were appointed, there were still only about seven men out of thirty-four who were close to the Howards. Matters were very different in East Anglia. About ten of the fifty-six commissioners in Suffolk were servants of, or very close to the Howards, and about two thirds had known associations. In Norfolk, of fifty-eight commissioners some twenty had close links with the duke, and more were his servants than in Suffolk.

Norfolk's standing in the region is made graphically clear by two surviving household accounts, listing visitors, and a comptroller's account listing household servants, quite apart from the estate accounts already discussed. These documents also provide a rare insight into the lifestyles of the Howards, and give some indication as to how this changed with the acquisition of the dukedom. As early as 1519-20, for which an account of the comptroller of the household at Kenninghall, Robert Holdich, survives, the SURREYS' household servants were drawn from far and wide. They included
younger sons of families long in Howard service, like the Appleyards of Braken Ash, Norfolk, of whom Robert was a gentlemen of the household by 1519, the Goldinghams of Belstead, Suffolk, represented by Alan, later of Banham, Norfolk, also a gentleman of the first rank with a wage of 26s. 8d. a quarter, or the Jolys of Framlingham, of whom John was a yeoman. However, Francis Clopton, scion of the Melford family of west Suffolk, and a gentleman of the second rank earning 13s. 4d. per quarter, would normally have gravitated to the de Vere service. His fellow Ralph Dawtrey was almost certainly a relative of John Dawtrey of Hampshire, and came into Surrey's service via the naval connexion, while Richard Parker seems to have entered Surrey's service as a result of the proximity of Lord Morley's lands to Howard estates in Hertfordshire. Among the yeomen of the household there was Richard Clifford from Lincolnshire, Robert Say from Hertfordshire, and Christopher Moseley from Warwickshire, among the East Anglians. Unfortunately we lack comptroller's accounts, and therefore the names and numbers of household servants later, but a muster roll of 1523 confirms that many of these household servants, right down to the level of Thomas of the buttery, served in the earl's retinue in the north, along with other connexions from Sussex, such as Reynold Bray, and East Anglians from all over the region, like Thomas Carew, William Wentworth, Edmund White, Leonard Heydon, Ralph Framlingham, Roger Rokewood, John Townshend and Edmund Inglish.

It is impossible to be certain what proportion of the household the eight gentleman, including a priest and a lawyer, twenty yeomen and nineteen grooms paid by the comptroller at Michaelmas 1519 at Kenninghall represent. It may be the full household in attendance at any given time, for household men highly active in collecting money from all the receiverships in 1525-6, like George Wyndham, then Norfolk's chaplain, John Blennerhasset and George Peryent, may have entered the third duke's service later, from his father's household. The 1523-4 caterers accounts for Stoke and Hunsdon are less helpful in giving only the number of messes served to servants, the mass of whom gathered to eat
in the great hall, though there were usually messes for the lowlier servants in the kitchen and sometimes in the bakehouse, brewhouse or porter's lodge.\textsuperscript{202} Even in Surrey's absence in 1523 there were often seven messes of servants, and at Christmas, when the Surreys had ridden to the court with an unknown number of servants, eleven gentlemen, twenty-two yeomen and fifteen grooms of the household ate in thirteen messes in the hall. Thus it seems likely that Surrey's household as earl grew with his worship when he became treasurer from about fifty to sixty or seventy. With the inheritance of the dukedom his household increased to support his new rank, and he probably took over many of his father's servants. In 1526-7 there were sixteen gentlemen of the household, fifty-two yeomen and thirty grooms in attendance on one occasion, and a figure of over a hundred servants in total seems likely.\textsuperscript{203} This was far from extravagant at a time when the norm for a man of his rank would be between one and two hundred household servants.\textsuperscript{204}

Whether as earl and countess, or as duke and duchess, the Howards commonly ate with about twenty persons at their table, knights, gentlemen and the countess's ladies, and this number was not diminished when the countess was on her own. When he was in residence meals were served to him and his wife in his chamber; when she was alone meals were served in her chamber, and on these occasions probably little of the elaborate ritual prescribed for an earl in the late fifteenth century was followed.\textsuperscript{206} Only when guests of the rank of marquis or earl were present were they served with all due state in the great chamber, though when her father-in-law the duke of Norfolk and his family visited her at Stoke in 1523 they all dined in the lord's chamber, presumably because this was essentially a family occasion and this allowed just the right blend of ceremony and familiarity. The family clearly never ate in the hall.

Between April 1523 and mid January 1524, when Surrey was in service in the north, the countess did not accompany him, nor reside at Kenninghall as they often did, but divided her time between her father-in-law's houses at Stoke-by-Nayland during the spring and summer, and Hunsdon, where she removed
at the end of October, presumably to make her frequent visits to London and the
court easier. At both houses she received a constant stream of visitors. On
6th and 7 August Norfolk and his whole family visited the countess, as we have
seen, including the duchess Agnes, their daughters Anne, countess of Oxford,
the Ladies Elizabeth and Dorothy, and the younger of their two sons, Lord
Thomas. Family members who called at Stoke on other occasions were Lord William
Howard, Catherine, Lady Rice, Anne countess of Oxford, who also came to stay
alone, though her errant husband did join her briefly. Lady Marney, probably
Isabel, widow of Lord Henry and the first duke's step-daughter, also visited
and Lady Elizabeth Wyndham was much in residence. She was the recently bereaved
widow of Surrey's cousin Sir Thomas, and co-executor of his will with
Surrey. The Surreys clearly took her under their wing after the death of her
husband, and her second marriage to Lord Fitzwarin in 1525 was negotiated for
her by Norfolk, Sir Richard Wentworth and Sir John Seymour. Family visitors
to Hunsdon included Lady Margaret Bryan, Surrey's half-sister, governess of the
Princess Mary and mother of Sir Francis, and Lady Morley and her daughter
mistress Parker; lady Morley returning a second time to join the New Year
festivities since the Morleys had a manor nearby at Hallingbury, besides other
lands nearby in Essex and Hertfordshire.

Amongst the nobility passing through at Stoke were the duke of Suffolk
and the earl of Essex, though servants of the king, the dowager countess of
Oxford, the earls of Arundel and Lady Willoughby also found lodgings, as did
the earl of Kent's at Hunsdon. Other important visitors came to Hunsdon, where
apart from Lady Bryan, Lady Parr visited the countess soon after her arrival,
as did Francis, gentleman usher to the queen, and Sir Henry Grey and his
wife. Surrey returned to Hunsdon from the north on 7 December staying
briefly, and again between 15th and 22nd, when he and the countess left to
spend Christmas at court, returning on 8 January. They then entertained on a
considerable scale, among others Lord Fitzwalter, who stayed for four days over
Epiphany, and the marquis of Dorset, who had served under Surrey in the north,
and had called in before they came home from court. He returned for two days, leaving with Surrey on 16 January when their departure brought festivities to an end. 21

Of the many others of consequence who visited Stoke and Hunsdon most were local and had a long association with the family, such as Sir Thomas Tey of Marks Tey, Essex, and Brightwell Hall, Suffolk, and his wife; Lady de Vere, a Clopton of Long Melford, a Draper, probably Stephen, of Norwich, merchant and admiral of Norfolk and Suffolk, who probably had business dealings with the earl, as perhaps did John Harbottle, merchant, of Ipswich. 21 Members of the families of Surrey’s retinue in the north also called at Stoke or Hunsdon. 21

The countess’s removal to Hunsdon was assisted by Surrey’s cousin John Timperley and Robert Holditch, who came with their own servants, and a larger number of gentlemen, yeomen and grooms probably on loan from Norfolk. On Surrey’s return John Holland, his private secretary, came with him, and in mid December others obviously in his own as well as his father’s council gathered briefly at Hunsdon, including Blennerhassets, Chauncey and Daniel, presumably to welcome him and discuss estate affairs, but a larger and longer meeting of his council seems to have occurred after his return from court, between 10–16 January, when Holditch, Chauncey, Blennerhasset, Sir Richard Southwell, Timperley, and the obscure Mr Burwell and Mr Woddowe attended.

The second set of accounts is for 1526–7, when Framlingham had become the main residence of the new duke and duchess. 217 This set of accounts portrays a more ‘normal’ year, in that Norfolk was not occupied in service away from home, but each year necessarily had its unique pattern of comings and goings. At this time both he and the duchess made several visits to Kenninghall perhaps to see the progress of the building of their new house. The ten year old Surrey and his brother Lord William stayed at Framlingham throughout the year, the household remaining at almost full strength but for the company of ladies and gentlemen who normally ate with the duke and duchess, generally twenty or just over, as in 1523–4. Norfolk’s extended absences coincided broadly with the law
terms, though they were rather longer, for he was away in the period between 7 October-7 December, 21 January-9 May, 14 May-6 July and, lastly, 23 July-18 September, when he was with the court during its summer progress. The duchess spent longer periods at home, staying back when he rode to London, and on one occasion returning before him, but, as in 1523-4 she was clearly actively serving the queen for extended periods of a month to six weeks at a time, and spent the summer of 1527 with the court as he did. They both lodged at court and at Lambeth, and were clearly putting up their riding household, which amounted at its greatest to forty persons, at the Saracen's Head, Lambeth, as well as at Lord Broke's house.216

The duchess expressed a piety almost certainly acquired in the household of Queen Katherine, which she had entered at the age of twelve, by observing a fish day on Wednesday as well as the usual Friday. She also evinced a marked taste for pilgrimages, and clerics of widely differing stamp, from the parish priest, monks from East Anglian houses and a hermit from Coggeshall, to priests from London, two Friars Observant from Greenwich and two scholars from Cambridge were visitors. Norfolk hunted on two occasions, one with his wife, who, however, returned home rather earlier than he. Neither the duke nor the duchess always rode about the country with great retinues, but rather tailored the company to the occasion. Thus he rode to Kenninghall and back over four days with only seven in January, and to London on one occasion with only eight, though on another occasion when leaving for an extended period he rode there with what looks like his riding household of thirty-two. She took eight (two gentlemen and six yeomen) with her on a day trip to the Rod of Grace at Kersey, sixteen to Walsingham for four days, and twenty to the shrine of Our Lady at Ipswich, for the day. However, when she returned from London on 17 April 1527 she brought forty persons back with her, only fifteen of whom dined with her, the rest being the major part of the duke's servants of lower rank. Amongst family members not yet mentioned the countess of Oxford still visited often, and lady Marney still called.
The account opens on 1 October when the duke's council was apparently concluding its most formal meeting of the year around Michaelmas, the end of the accounting year. Since the duke and duchess spent an extended Christmas and New Year at home that year many of the council visited them again then, as did other members of the local elite. Business was probably discussed, but the council proper assembled again for a serious meeting soon after Norfolk's return on 18 September and continued through to the end of the account some ten days later. Although attendance at the two Michaelmas meetings was by no means identical, several men attended both and can confidently be regarded as regular members of Norfolk's council. These included Sir Philip Tylney, who appeared frequently at Framlingham in 1526-7 since he lived nearby, though he had not been at Stoke or Hunsdon in 1523-4 when he was not in Surrey's employ. Blennerhasset and Chauncey also attended, as they had in 1523-4. Other important men who appeared several times to advise Norfolk were the Suffolk lawyers Lionel Tollemache and Humphrey Wingfield, while Sir Anthony Wingfield, whose association with the Howards predated his service as Brandon's chief steward, was clearly close to both dukes at this time. Lord William Howard attended the council, James Daniel was present then as before, but Mr Mannock of Bures, who had land in Stoke-by-Nayland and had also visited regularly in 1523-4, is not known from other documentation to have been an important servant. Other potential council members were Messrs Dene, Webb and Crane, the latter probably Robert, of Sudbury, a de Vere tenant and later a Suffolk JP.

Sir Edward Knyvett, the late Sir Thomas's half-brother who had inherited Buckenham in his place, visited Framlingham very frequently and obviously had a close association with the new duke, based on the proximity of his seat to Kenninghall, while other important knights who visited were Sir Edward Echyngham, Sir Arthur Hopton, Sir William Waldegrave, Sir Robert Drury, Sir Richard Wentworth, Sir Thomas Wentworth, Sir Thomas Tyrrell, Sir John Willoughby, Sir Christopher Willoughby and Sir William Rous. Most of them came while the duke and duchess were in residence over Christmas and New Year, when
as many as 235 visitors were entertained on 30 December. Relationships which had been established by the second duke were clearly being maintained, for all these knights had received gifts of venison on a regular basis from the park at Framlingham up to the time the account ends late in 1519.223

Many of those visiting Framlingham had longstanding links with the Howards, like the councillors already mentioned and the Boleyns, Everards, Rouses, Timperleys, Southwells, Waldegraves and Allens, but others with no clear attachments now appeared at Framlingham.224 Among the families traditionally associated with the de Veres who visited were the Springs of Lavenham, Cloptons of Melford, Waldegraves of Bures and Drurys of Hawstead.225 Adherents of Lord Willoughby who also served the Howards as a result of the proximity of Howard and Willoughby estates and friendship between the families were Thomas Rush and Christopher Harman.226 Many of Brandon's relatives, or adherents inherited from the de la Poles, in the former category the Seckfords, Wingfields, Audleys and Hoptons and in the latter certain of the Tyrells, visited Norfolk, Emery Tyrrell having even served in Surrey's retinue in 1523, though he may not have been a member of that branch of the family close to Brandon.227

Norfolk's power in the region and at court was, thus, clearly thought to be very great. Nor was it only the rural population which wooed him, for in 1523–4 the city of Norwich, with which he had been in frequent contact when resident at Kenninghall, sent him several gifts of dog fish, pike, eels, turbot, crayfish and roach.228 In fact, the influence of the duchy, which had traditionally been strongest in eastern Suffolk and south eastern Norfolk, had spread to the west of both counties as a result of the long de Vere minority when the lands and offices of the earldom of Oxford had been in the second duke's hands. The third duke had not simply inherited a dukedom with much enhanced influence from his father, but had added to it the estates, and above all the very wide contacts he had built for himself in Norfolk as a result of making Kenninghall his chief residence while he was Lord Howard and earl of
Effectively this meant, as the building of his new house was to
demonstrate, that the duke of Norfolk was now to be paramount to a much greater
degree than hitherto, in the county from which he derived his name.
Notes

1 When he was in the north, resident in the Newcastle, his wife was not with him but resided at Stoke-by-Nayland and Hunsdon, University of California, UC B 49.

2 *LP* iii, 2541; Coo's prizes were substantial, *LP* iv, 83

3 *LP* ii, 3515

4 The fee was £365 p.a.

5 PRO C82/520; C54/392, mm 3, 4; SP1/29, ff 177, 177v

6 H. Miller, 'Subsidy Assessments of the Peerage', *BIHR* (1955) pp 19-20

7 *CSPS* ii, 600; *LP* iv, 3619

8 *LP* i, 1948 (13); L. Lyell and F.D. Watney eds., *Acts of the Mercers* pp 419, 536, 553

9 PRO HCA39/1, parts 1 and 2; A.A. Ruddock, 'The Earliest Records of the High Court of Admiralty', *BIHR* (1949) p 140


11 *LP* iii, 2480; BL Calig. D VIII, ff 251-2

12 PRO SP1/19, ff 146-8, PRO C54/387: *LP* iii, 575, 2028

13 *CSPS FS*, pp 432, 307, 312

14 *LP* iv, 1987

15 *LP* iv, 1987; *CSPS FS*, p 432

16 *CSPS FS*, p 432

17 Ibid., p 307; *LP* iv, 1302

18 *CSPS FS*, p 307; 312

19 *LP* iv, 1101

20 *CSPS FS*, p 312; *LP* iv, 646

21 *LP* iv, 646

22 PRO SP1/32, f 53

23 *LP* iv, 1092

24 *CSPS FS*, p 438

25 Ibid.

26 *LP* iv, 1404

27 *LP* iv, 1408

28 *LP* iv, 1819

29 *LP* iv, 1987

30 Margaret was at a low ebb at this juncture, A. Henne, *Histoire du Regne de Charles V en Belgique*, iii, pp 19, 20-3, 25

31 *LP* iv, 1049 (28)

32 *LP* iv, 3649, 3703, 5048

33 PRO C54/395; SR 21 Henry VIII, c 22; He did, however, relinquish his patent as admiral after receiving his new patent, PRO SP1/35, f 259

34 It had been a crucial part of his style, and he had a magnificent seal as admiral; a fully rigged ship with his arms in the midst of the hull, PRO HCA30/1, part 1, no 61 has the best example attached.

35 PRO E101/62/17; *LP* ii, 4409, i, 2574; Anstis, op. cit., p 364–6

36 H. Miller, *Henry VII and the English Nobility*, pp 168, 217-18; He did continue to use Hunsdon occasionally, *LP* iv, 3301

37 *LP* iv 3301; For his role at the creation, *LP* iv, 1431, nos 1, 8

38 *LP* iii, 2544, 2700; Ellesmere 2655, f 18

39 He was, as usual, a receiver of petitions for England, *CSPV* iii, 663; Tucker, op. cit., p 139, fn 71

40 *LP* iii, 2700; Ellesmere 2655, f 18; Wolsey may have extracted a promise that he would not sue to Henry for the office of earl marshal on his father's death.

41 H. Miller, *English Nobility*, p 171

42 *LP* i,

43 *LP* i, 3000 iv, 297 (20), 693 (25): PRO E36/266, f 71; E 164/69

44 PRO E405/192, 196, 199, 205, 206; J.C. Sainty, *Officers of the Exchequer, List and Index Soc*. xviii

45 Sainty, op. cit., p 90; PRO IND7346, 11 Henry VIII
PRO IND7346, 17 Henry VIII

Ibid., 17 Henry VIII at Tattingstone, Suff., 18 Henry VIII at Raydon, Suff.; A younger brother of Lionel, retained, Arundel Ms, A 1047

Eg. LP III, 3039, 3277, 3381, 3384, 3405, 3515, 3536 re Margaret, LP III, 3381, 3400

Cf. his father, LP II, p 1475, 1490; PRO E36/216, ff 346-9

LP III, 3024, 3040, lv, 214.

See above note 32

LP iv, 3663, 5415

Arundel Ms., T 1; PCC 23 Bodefelde

PRO C54/392, mm 4, 3

Arundel Ms., T 1

PCC 23 Bodefelde; PRO C54/392, mm 4, 3

Arundel Ms., T 1

J.M.W. Bean, *Decline of English Feudalism*, pp 262-6

PRO C54/392, mm 3, 4 and 6, 7

PRO C54/392, mm 3, 4 This does not include his £40 annuity as duke.

Arundel Ms, A 1047

See table. Norfolk had not reorganised his receiverships on a geographical basis at his inheritance, and so avoided offending supernumeraries.

Oxfordshire, Berkshire, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire, Staffordshire, Warwickshire, Hertfordshire and Kent.

In calculating the percentage of total income which each category represented the additional £413 of income from Brandon, for lands which had been part of this receivership, is ignored.

There must also have been hidden costs in deductions at source of firewood and the like by bailiffs, collectors and receivers. In calculating the percentage of gross income which each category of expenditure represents, the £413 from Brandon has been included.

SRO S1/13/19. 4 (3): BL Add. Roll 215 Apart from the large Stoke complex of manors and properties in the town itself and nearby Nayland, these are Earl’s Hall with Polstead in Prittlewell, Essex, and properties in Colchester, mainly inns bought by John Howard.

PRO C54/392, mm 3, 4

SRO T4373/103, 2 rolls; PRO SC6/Henry VIII/3369

SRO T4373/225, 2 rolls covering 4 years; BL Add. Ch. 16,560 for 1509-10

Eg. there is only one account for another East Anglian group; Halvergate, South Walsham, Forncett, Forncett Knights, Lopham, Dickleburgh and Siseland, for 1524-14, PRO SC6/Henry VIII/2561, and only one for 1517-18 for the third receivership, BL Add. Ch. 16,547, then somewhat different as a result of sales and purchases.


Ibid., Table viii, p 175, 'Cases brought by members of the English Baronage in the Common Pleas between Hilary 1513 and Michaelmas 1515'

BL Add. Ms. 24,965, f 78

LP III, 2960, 3039, 3364, 3512, 3534, 3536, 3545, iv 823, 3276

Arundel Ms, A 1047, Robert Crowne, a humble collector, John Mountney, bailiff of Prittlewell, and John Woodcock, custodian of the swans at Bungay.

I have not tried to establish whether any of these ministers other than Hussey had been in office in the lands in question before they came to the Howards, though this is possible.

HP III, p 58; He fought under Suffolk in France in 1523, LP III, 3288, and so may have served there under Surrey in 1522, but no accounts for this campaign survive.

PRO SCII/837, I am grateful to Helen Miller for this reference.
81 Arundel Ms., A 1047
82 PRO IND7346, 8 Henry VIII
83 *HP* ii, pp 209-10; G. Wrottesley, ed., *Collections for a History of Staffordshire*, pp 110-118
84 BL Add. Ch. 16,547; Arundel Ms., A 1047; Unton had contracted to marry his heir to Berners's daughter Mary in 1510-11, BL Harl. Ms. 972, f 62. I am grateful to Roger Virgoe for this reference. For problems over East Wickham which caused Norfolk to seek Wolsey's help, *LP* ii, 2564
85 He had done some minor buying and selling to consolidate his gains in 1514, *LP* i, 372, 11, p 1470, 111, 1164
86 Arundel Ms., A 1047
87 *HP* ii, pp 597, 599; BL Add. Ch. 16,560; NRO Phi/606/4; *SRS* v 54, p 86; Thomas sat for Regate and John for New Shoreham.
89 *HP* i, pp 421-2; *Surrey Recs. Soc.* v 56, pp xxvi, 84; Arundel Ms., A 1047 He was worth only £54 in 1524 but had granted away his controllership of the port of Chichester and made over 400 marks in jointure for his daughter-in-law, probably acquired through the Howards, Eleanor Hussey.
90 *HP* i, pp 423-4; *CCR* ii, 815; *LP* i, 392, iv, 28
91 *LP* iii, p 1365, 2145 (18); Arundel Ms., A 1047; Blennerhasset studied at the Middle Temple like many of the Howard connexion, and at Cambridge, and married a daughter of Sir John Cornwallis.
92 *HP* ii, pp 500-6; *J. Corder ed. The Visitation of Suffolk* i, p 148
93 Arundel Ms. A 1047, 1588
94 Hall, p 642; Arundel Ms., A 1047
95 Arundel Ms., A 1047; *LP* i, p 1365, 2145 (18)
96 *LP* i, 3282; iv, 464 (2), 547; Arundel Ms., A 1047
97 NRO NRS 2378 11 D. 4; Arundel Ms., A 1260, 1647, 1047
99 Blomefield, op. cit. 1, pp 205-6; J. Corder ed. *The Visitation of Suffolk* i, p 148
100 PRO SP1/28, f 284, lists 121 men by name.
101 A. Crawford, 'John Howard', pp 105-6
102 BL Add. Ms. 27,451, f 17; NRO NRS 2378 11 D. 4, f 1; Arundel Ms. A 1647, 1260, 1047
103 *LP* i, 3282; iv, 547
104 Arundel Ms. A 1047
105 See below note 112 for Chauncey
106 Blomefield, op. cit. 1, p 119, vi, p 74, 89; NRO NRS 2378 11 D. 4, f 1; In 1524 he was worth £50 at Redeham, W. Rye, 'Norfolk Subsidy Roll 15 Henry VIII', *Norf. Antiq. Misc.* (1883); Arundel Ms., A 1047
107 NRO NRS 2378 11 D. 4, f 1; NRO Jer/1/620, 1; *LP* i, 3120, 4v 613, 651; Arundel Ms. A 1047
108 Blomefield, op. cit. v, p 506; NRS 2378 11 D. 4; Arundel Ms., A 1047; *LP* iv, 2218 (25) may be a grant to him
109 *HP* ii, pp 195-5; BL Add. Ch. 16,560; Arundel Ms., A 1047
111 *HP* i, pp 443-4; Blomefield, i, p 141; SRO S1/13/19.4 (3), 4373/225, 2-3 Henry VIII; PRO E327/354, C54/380 no. 10 m 22, STAC 2/34/29; BL Add. Ch. 16,560, 16,547; *CAD* i, 11/27 B3999; TV ii, pp 602-4; Worth £200 at Framlingham in 1524, S.H.A. Hervy ed., *Suffolk in 1524*; Arundel Ms. A 1047 -319-

Sir Thomas had died in 1522, *TV* ii, p 579-87

D. MacCulloch, *Suffolk and the Tudors*, p 49

The name Hulm is not clear in the manuscript, but the words "near Alnwick" are. Leigh Hunt, op. cit., p 373. Perhaps the second duke had patronised the abbey while residing in the north.

BL Harl. 3504, f 265, Harl. 6079, f 31

John de Vere, fourteenth earl of Oxford, *GEC* x, pp 244-5

Henry Radcliffe, Viscount Fitzwalter, Earl of Sussex, *GEC* xii, p 521; The Howards nominated Fitzwalter for the Garter quite frequently, Anstis, op. cit., pp 276, 278, 283, 290, 358, 364

*S. H. A. Hervy ed., The Subsidy of 1524*, pp 19-20

The term tapestry usually refers to pieces made of wool, whereas counterfeit Arras indicates high quality, often silk with thread of gold and/or silver, producing a shimmering effect, T. Campbell, 'Wolsey's patronage of Tapestries', paper read at the conference 'Cardinal Wolsey: Church, State and Art', Cambridge, September 1988

*TV* ii, pp 602-4; The eight piece set was worth £63 13s. 2d.

It appears that he did not have a second set of tapestries to rotate with those hanging, unlike Wolsey. Indeed by comparison with the cardinal his collection at Framlingham was modest, Campbell, op. cit.

Cf., for instance, lord Monteagle's jewels, *LP* iii, p 1253-7 or the thirteenth earl of Oxford's, *W.H.S. Hope ed. 'Last Testament and Inventory', Archaeologia (1915); He left all his gems and jewelry to his wife, *TV* ii, pp 602-4; I am grateful to Philippa Glanville for her comments on the jewelry and plate in this inventory.

Leigh Hunt, op. cit., p 367

Weighing 356 oz., with James's arms on the lids.

*LP* iv, 4192

*LP* iv, 1939

Pembroke College Ms. 300, on 17 April she returned with 40.

Cambridge Ms. Dcl. 3. 86; M. Howard, *The Early Tudor Courtier's House*, pp 55-7

For the second duke's building there, *Survey of London, South Bank and Vauxhall*, xxii, p 137

M. Howard, op. cit., pp 17, 28, 82-3, 116; Entries in the household book of 1526/7 suggests that he was building there then, Pembroke College Ms. 300

Pembroke College Ms. 300

*LP* iii, 2960

Ibid., iv, 802
148 LP ii, 2987
149 LP iii, 1285
150 LP xxi, 554, p 283; cf. Harris, op. cit., p 177
151 H. Ellis, 1st ser., i, pp 220-1; Norfolk was steward of his lands in Essex and Suffolk, PRO SP1/29, ff 177-177v
152 L.W. Vernon Harcourt, His Grace the Steward and Trial of Peers, pp 435-41; W. Cobet et al., State Trials, pp 286-8
153 LP iii, 1285
154 Harris, op. cit., pp 54-6
155 Anstis, op. cit., pp 276-7; H. Miller, English Nobility, p 211; He was among Mary's Howard picked entourage in 1514, LP i, 3348, no. 3
156 CCR ii, 815; LP i, 3348 no. 3; D. Head, 'Life and Career of the Third Duke'
157 LP iii, 1285
158 The marriages of Sir Edward and lord Edmund Howard, are discussed in chapter 1, and the second duke's provisions in his will for his younger family also demonstrate this principle, Arundel Ms., T 1
159 The marriage of the second duke to Elizabeth Tylney, was advantageous, but that of the third to Anne, daughter of Edward IV quite unprofitable initially, see above, p 7
160 PRO SP1/34, ff 131, 162
161 LP iv, 2203, 3324, 5508; PRO C54/392, m 25
162 LP iv, 1073
163 Margaret Chedworth had a London background and Agnes Tylney was upper gentry, the sister of Sir Philip, his receiver.
164 See above, pp 77-8
165 Rising Howard fortunes also account for increasingly good marriages.
166 S.J. Gunn, Charles Brandon, p 85
167 LP iii, 956
168 GEC, x, pp 244-5; LP i, 2964 (80); This paternalistic attitude seems to have been typical of noble fathers-in-law, cf. Suffolk and Monteagle, Gunn, Charles Brandon, p 95, 131
169 LP iii, p 249, 906; Anstis, pp 290-2, 385-60, 364-6
170 University of Calif., UC B 49, from 11-15 October.
171 LP iii, 2932, no. 3
172 Archaeologia xix (1821) pp 62-5
173 Ibid.; BL Harl., 295, f 155; LP ii, 2932
174 Archaeologia xix, (1821) pp 64-5
175 LP iii, 2932, nos. 2, 3
176 Ibid., nos. 5, 6
177 University of California, UC B 49, 3 May
178 GEC x, 244-5; PRO C54/394, m 17
179 Again cf. Suffolk's behaviour over Monteagle, Gunn, op. cit., p 131
180 See above pp 10-11
181 PRO C54/394, m 17; LP iv, 106 no. 4, 5, 6, 2372
182 PRO SP1/39, f 90; His report to Wolsey on his communications with both Sir John and his sister when Oxford was on his deathbed reveals his efforts to get both to submit to Wolsey's mediation, PRO SP1/38, f 2311
183 Ibid., Gunn, Charles Brandon, p 85
184 R. Virgoe, 'Recovery of the Howards in East Anglia', pp 8-9, 11-12
185 See above chapter 2; D. MacCulloch, Suffolk and the Tudors, p 57
186 In 1525 their Garter voting was almost identical, Anstis, p 367-9
187 Leigh Hunt, op. cit.; University of California, UC B 49; Pembroke College Ms. 300
188 RP vi, p 480 no. 16; Visited Stoke-by-Nayland, University of California, UC B 49, 16 September 1523
189 University of California, UC B 49; Pembroke College Ms. 300; PRO SP1/28, f 248
190 Gunn, op. cit., p 53; MacCulloch, op. cit., p 60
191 For Suffolk's council, Gunn, op. cit., p 50-53; TV ii, p 557; LP ii, 4624, -321-
192 MacCulloch, op. cit., Appendices 1 and 2
193 LP iii, 3282, iv, 214, 547
194 Figures based on the first subsidy commission, LP iii, 3282; Eg. in Oxfordshire Wenman was not appointed, but Thomas Unton was, while in Shropshire also receiver Wilbardham was not appointed but Richard Brereton was.
195 Alfred Berwick was added at the second commission, LP iv, 547
196 University of California, UC B 49; Pembroke College Ms. 300; NRO NRS 2378 11 D4
197 NRO NRS 2378 11 D4, wage payments ff 34v-36
198 Sir Nicholas Appleyard, d. 1517, had been an important Howard servant, Blomefield, op. cit., v, p 247; PRO PROB 11/19/4; Robert was in office at Earsham, Arundel Ms. A 1047., John Goldingham, d. 1516, had also been an important servant of the second duke, SRO T4373/225, 1495-6, NRO Phi/606/4, Alan was his second son; Nicholas Joly had long been in the third duke's service, BL Add. Roll 17,745, m 8 and was bailiff of Framlingham in 1525, Arundel Ms. A 1047
199 Francis Clopton was later to be a JP, MacCulloch, op. cit., Appendices 1 and 2
200 PRO SP1/28, f 248; Possibly all of those listed were retained by Surrey on a long term basis, since they are drawn from a group of 16 from gentle families, and are interspersed with known household servants.
201 NRO NRS 2378 11 D4, f 35; Arundel Ms., A 1047
202 University of California UC B 49; NRO Rye Ms. 74 caterer's accounts for 26 August to 17 October 1525 at Kenninghall, which lists all food items bought each day, and their cost, but is still harder to translate into the number of mouths being fed, R. Howlett, 'The Household Accounts of Kenninghall Palace in 1525', Norfolk Archaeology (1904)
203 Pembroke College Ms. 300, Monday 1 October.
204 M. Girouard, Life in the English Country House, p 15
205 BL Harl. H.R. ff 26-30, 33v-34v, cited in Girouard, op. cit., pp 47-50
206 University of California, UC B 49
207 Lady Rice was one of the second duke's daughters by Agnes who had married Sir Rice ap Griffith, GEC ii, p 311
208 Née Wyfold, daughter of Margaret Chedworth by her first husband.
209 TV ii, pp 579-87; She was Wyndham's second wife, the daughter of Sir Henry Wentworth of Nettlestead.
210 PRO C54/392, m 15
211 CCR 1500-09, 609; Richard Parker, perhaps her younger son, was in Surrey's service, as we have seen, GEC ix, pp 221-4
212 LP ii, p 872, iii, p 1367, iv, p 237, 6490 (20)
213 University of California, UC B 49
214 Wife of Sir John, later fifteenth earl of Oxford, GEC x, 245-7
215 For Harbottle see MacCulloch, op. cit., pp 303-6
216 PRO SP1/28, ff 248-9
217 Pembroke College Ms. 300
218 Ibid., f 1
219 He was already Surrey's bailiff in the hundred of Loos in 1509, SRO 4373/225 1-2 and 2-3 Henry VIII.
220 Corder, op. cit. pp 7-8; John Crane was bailiff of Forncett and his heir Robert had married the daughter of Richard Southwell, but the family also had a longstanding de Vere connexion, notes of S. Flower; For George Mannock, J. Pound ed., Military Survey of 1522, p 35
221 I am grateful to Roger Virgoe for information concerning the Knyvets; LP ii, 4624
222 BL Add. Ms., 27,451; Add. Roll 16, 554; Add. Roll 17,745
223 Pembroke College Ms. 300
225 W.H.S. Hope ed., in Archaeologia (1915) p 275
226 MacCulloch op. cit., p 57; Arundel Ms., A 1047
227 Gunn, *Charles Brandon*, pp 45-53; This may not be that branch of the Tyrrell family close to Brandon.
228 NRO Treasurer and Chamberer's Account Roll 1523-4
229 See, for instance, the provenance of his foodstuffs and other purchases, NRO Rye Ms. 74; NRO NRS 2378 11 D 4
230 R. Virgoe, 'Recovery of the Howards', p 20
In his recent book on the Amicable Grant, Bernard devoted a chapter to the role of the dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk in East Anglia, in which he argued convincingly against suggestions that they provoked refusals and disturbances or attempted to capitalise on troubles which had arisen spontaneously in order to undermine Wolsey, and concluded that the evidence shows their handling of the situation to have been "a shining example of the service nobility of later medieval England at work, straining to secure acquiescence in a stiff royal demand, soothing reluctant contributors and dealing firmly with rebellion." 1

The purpose of this chapter is not to rehearse the arguments which Bernard has so ably expounded, but rather to select from the surviving evidence, which includes a number of very revealing letters from Norfolk to Wolsey, items which powerfully reinforce the analysis of Norfolk's guiding principles and mode of operation as revealed in earlier chapters of this study.

It is a point worth making that the year which was to present Norfolk with the greatest crisis in his career to date had promised him great things. In the early weeks of the year he was much involved with Wolsey in dealing with foreign ambassadors; in short he had returned from the north to the heart of government.2 Charles V's dramatic and unexpected victory at Pavia and capture of Francis on 24 February, news of which reached England on 9 March,3 immediately moved Henry to plan an invasion of France in person to claim his hereditary rights, and, on 10 March, Wolsey informed the imperial commissioners that Norfolk was to lead the vanguard in a march on Valenciennes where the royal ordnance was stored.4 His force, it was soon determined, was to consist of twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse, while a further twenty thousand foot were to be led by Henry.5 On 11 April Norfolk was duly appointed and informed by Wolsey, whom he thanked heartily for his support, that he was now
to cross ahead of Henry, and a book was drawn up of the noblemen and their retinues who would serve under him. Though the surviving material is far from complete, it appears that, predictably enough, East Anglians and others with landed and other associations with Norfolk were to predominate. Sir William Fitzwilliam, who had a Sussex connexion with the Howards and had served under Norfolk in Guienne and at Morlaix as well as at sea, was to be marshal, and Sir Thomas Cheyne, a tenant of Norfolk who had also served under him before, his assistant. Lord Curzon, from Ipswich, who had also served with Norfolk repeatedly, was to be master of the ordnance, while his assistants, Edward Ringley and Richard Cavendish, had won Norfolk's commendations in earlier campaigns. Lord Fitzwalter, now so closely bound to the Howards, and Sir Robert Wingfield, who had furthered Norfolk's cause over the arrest of his goods with the regent Margaret, were the first two members of the council of war to be named.

All this suggests not only that Norfolk was happy to undertake active service for the sixth year in a row, and confident of mobilising his own following, but that 1525 promised to repay him for his dedication to the royal service in far less auspicious circumstances in previous years. The attractions of the campaign are obvious. Profit was probably the least important of them, though campaigning in France was usually reckoned profitable, and there was the distinct possibility that in joining with Henry's force in the recovery of his inheritance in France, grants, at least of office in any lands or towns captured, might result. Prestige was, however, by far the prime attraction. Norfolk, who had been appointed admiral of the Anglo-Imperial fleet by Charles in 1522, and prided himself on his service to the emperor, had cooperated very effectively with the Burgundian nobility and Margaret's councillors when campaigning in Picardy, and the opportunity of serving both Henry and Charles actively, which held the possibility of easing somewhat strained relations between them, must have been attractive. Above all, however, there was the consideration that, in terms of the chivalric ideals in which Norfolk had been
educated, there was no higher or more worthy enterprise for a knight of St George than to fight for king and country against his traditional enemy. A resounding victory in France, or the capture of French territory, might bring glory which would transcend even Flodden.

Norfolk thus had every reason to wish to see the necessary funds for the project obtained from Henry's subjects, and appears to have approved of the Amicable Grant on the basis that it was the only feasible method of raising money sufficiently quickly. Indeed, his experience of delays which had resulted in the campaign in 1522 starting very late, with unfortunate consequences, made him anxious that the money should be collected rapidly so that the campaign might be launched before the summer was too far advanced. In East Anglia, one of the richest parts of the country and therefore the most crucial, Norfolk had responsibility for the county whose name he bore, and his letters reveal that, despite the heavy demands for taxation in recent years, he aimed at a model response which would set an example to the rest of the country and release him quickly to return to London to make his war preparations.

Such success would reinforce in Henry's eyes the impression of his indispensability in the region given by the numbers of captains and men he could raise for the campaign. He clearly had a large part in drawing up the commission for the grant, and had space left for particularly useful citizens of Norwich whom he might identify once he had returned to Norfolk.

His own negotiations for the grant in Norfolk, though not entirely straightforward, were, nonetheless, particularly successful because very deftly handled. He set out from London for Kenninghall in late March, ordering the sheriff of Norfolk to assemble at Norwich, on 29th of the month, the influential gentlemen of the county who were to be put in commission to secure acquiescence in the grant, and on whose zeal and enthusiasm so much would depend. On the day before this meeting was scheduled he conferred with Sir Roger Townshend and Sir John Shelton at Kenninghall, reading to them and his lawyer Edward White, who had just brought them from Wolsey, the instructions,
commissions and letters concerning the grant, his purpose being to win their consent and assistance in working on the other commissioners. His faith in these three men and their ability to influence the higher gentry among their countrymen was not misplaced, as he later informed Wolsey. When he arrived at Norwich he did not proceed to a full meeting with the other commissioners, but summoned six or seven more "of the moste wysiste of the shire, and of those whiche I supposed I moght doo mooste with". The next morning he addressed six or seven more and won them over before summoning the rest. By these means he obtained the assent of all the commissioners to the grant of one sixth of their goods, and their signatures bearing witness to this, and then gave them the assessments for the first loan to go by and divided the hundreds of the shire between them. He also appointed fires to be lit in every town on 2 April to celebrate Charles's victory and "discrete persons" to address the crowds and encourage enthusiasm for an invasion of France that summer.

On 31 March he met with the mayor of Norwich and leading citizens whom he had added to the commission, and, no doubt following the same procedure he had used with the other commissioners, informed them of Charles's successes in Italy, Francis's capture and other continental developments which rendered the present an ideal moment for Henry to make good his claims in France. Having read to them the letter and instructions to commissioners, so informing them of the rate demanded, he showed them the signatures of the gentlemen commissioners of the shire who had assented. The citizens, who included some of the wealthiest men in the shire, were not as easily persuaded as the gentry had been, and asked for permission to confer together. After dinner they returned to him, saying that they agreed that the moment was indeed auspicious for an invasion of France, and that they were very willing to assist the king but could not raise as much money as was required, since the whole city was unlikely to be able to furnish so much, and that the money was needed to pay the wages of the many employees in the textile industry, otherwise severe unemployment in city and countryside alike would result. They therefore offered
to pay in plate instead, valuing it below commercial rates. Norfolk was clearly impressed with their argument and, in characteristic fashion, withdrew to confer with Townshend, Shelton, Ellis, baron of the exchequer, and his lawyer White. They soon agreed on Norfolk's response, which was very gracious, but insisted on the need to refer their offer to the king and Wolsey. At this the citizens made a direct appeal to his goodlordship, as the gentlemen of the shire had already done, asking him to intercede with the king so that the rate at which they paid was no higher than that paid anywhere else. This Norfolk freely promised to do. He also recommended strongly that the offer of plate be accepted, for he was convinced that there was not enough cash in the county to meet the demands of the grant, probably because he was aware that exchange rates had caused an outflow of English coinage to the continent. He suggested that payment in plate be accepted and currency for use in France be coined from it if Henry would lose very little by the change, for it would greatly encourage the citizens that their offers were taken in good part, a consideration which he thought important. Despite the problems, he was clearly pleased with the cooperation he had secured, and told Wolsey that he doubted that London and the other cities would prove as amenable.

Instead of proceeding immediately with the commissions throughout the shire as he had planned, Norfolk held back so as to coordinate the activities of his commissioners with those Brandon was organising in Suffolk. The point of this was that if either county proved recalcitrant the other should not have time to be influenced by its bad example. In the meanwhile he swore his commissioners to secrecy. The plan was that from 6-8 April the commissioners were to practice with all those worth £20 and over in both counties, and from 10-12 April with those worth less than £20. On 10 April Norfolk wrote to Wolsey that he had had "no smalle besines to bryng the kinges commaundement to good effecte in theis parties", and highly praised the diligence of his commissioners. When they could not induce interviewees to consent they were sending them to the duke in dribs and drabs, amounting to at least 100 persons,
and he had successfully talked them all round to consenting. Indeed, of those worth £20 and more he believed that not as many as twenty had refused in the whole shire. He had, moreover, carefully selected men whom he could trust who were also influential there to deal with Great Yarmouth and King's Lynn, along with Townshend, on whom he relied particularly.32 To encourage those who had already assented and those who had not yet, Norfolk asked Wolsey for letters of thanks to be sent, a characteristic ploy of his for cementing relations between the king and his subjects as well as his own intermediary position.

The work took slightly longer than expected, but both Norfolk and Suffolk appear to have been more concerned about the operations of French warships off the East Anglian coast than the attitude of the people at this time.33 On 14 April Norfolk, who was at Kenninghall, confirmed that in his county all who had been approached had agreed to the grant, and only Great Yarmouth and King's Lynn and a small hundred remained to be dealt with.34 Thus, like Suffolk, he promised to be with the king for the St George's Day festivities.35 As Bernard has suggested, when they were with Henry they appear to have urged the king that he moderate his demands because they foresaw a severe disruption of the East Anglian economy. They succeeded in this, apparently securing a rate half the size of the original, but it does not seem that the demands were adjusted elsewhere.36

On 28 April Norfolk was at Hunsdon on his way back to Norfolk, and by 30 he had informed almost half of the citizens of Norwich of the revised demand, and was expecting to go to the middle of the county to assist the commissioners there, though due to severe pains in his right thigh and knee he could not ride all over the shire as he had planned.37 Rumours that London and other shires had refused the grant at the original rate were by then causing trouble, with East Anglians believing that only they had proved willing to pay, and now expecting to be let off. Worst of all, news had reached Norwich before his return that on 26 April Wolsey had agreed that Londoners might pay only what they would give of their own free will, as a result of which the mayor and
The situation then deteriorated rapidly in the textile producing areas of Babergh and Cosford hundreds in south-west Suffolk, perhaps because of Brandon's attempt at the first sign of trouble to disarm the mob, though it must be said that, since his de la Pole lands lay in the east of the county, he lacked the natural authority there which Howard enjoyed in Norfolk. His reaction seems to have been to turn at once to the senior duke for advice, this being made all the easier by the fact that they shared the services of the important local lawyer Sir Humphrey Wingfield, and Sir Robert Drury, the de Vere servant and associate of Norfolk, who had been assisting Suffolk. Although Norfolk did not personally hold land in Babergh and Cosford at this time, his contacts and authority there were not insignificant. The natural lord of the area was, of course, the de Vere earl of Oxford, but since the fourteenth earl was young and showed no inclination to take on a role of local leadership, his following, headed by Drury, still looked to his brother-in-law Norfolk, whose father had controlled the de Vere properties and offices until 1520, as we have seen. Indeed, the risings are unlikely to have occurred if the area had been subject to strong de Vere rule, such as that exercised by the thirteenth earl of Oxford. Norfolk's authority in the area did not flow solely from his relationship with Oxford, however. The long Howard tenure of Tendring Hall, Stoke-by-Nayland, and its large estate, since the previous year in the hands of the dowager duchess for her lifetime, meant that Norfolk, who had often lived there, had important contacts in the area. One of the Mannocks, leading citizens of Stoke, was a member of his council by 1526-7 and a Mr Hammond of Nayland was a visitor. Stoke itself was a small cloth producing
town on the edge of the textile area, but the Howard estate included outlying properties stretching as far into the troubled area as Buxford, Higham, Waldingfield and Layham. Norfolk therefore had a natural interest, and private sources of information, in the area.

Though there were commotions all over the textile areas, produced by clothiers laying off their workers because they could not pay them and pay the grant, matters came to a head around Lavenham, where as many as four thousand people had gathered at the market place on 4 May and at Sudbury market place on 5 May. By 8 May the two dukes had informed Wolsey several times of the problem there, and were seven miles apart but meeting daily, busily raising their own tenants and those of their gentry following to encounter the rebels by 11 May at the latest and prevent them marching on London as they seem to have planned to do. On 9 May the earl of Essex and Lord Fitzwalter, who had had less success in Essex than Suffolk, let alone Norfolk, in their respective counties, reported a similar rising of about a thousand people near Stansted in Essex, incited by the Suffolk rebels, and had suspended operations to await instructions. Suffolk characteristically favoured a rapid military solution to the problem initially, but Norfolk, with his habitual caution and presumably much better intelligence to go on, persuaded him against this. In their joint letter of 8 May to Henry they strongly advised the king, whom they evidently thought likely to be the source of belligerent instructions rather than Wolsey, to meet the protests with "dulce meanes", for the number of men who could be trusted to fight their neighbours on this issue would be very small indeed. It is true that they expressed this fear in regard to counties other than Suffolk, but according to Hall the small numbers of men Brandon had been able to raise made it clear that they would not fight their neighbours. Norfolk seems to have raised a larger following, according to Hall, mainly in Norfolk, but his actions show him to have been anxious not to put his authority over his men to the test.

On 11 May the dukes informed Wolsey that they had brought their forces of
about four thousand men to the edge of the area in revolt, but were not attacked, apparently because a local gentleman had had the foresight to remove the clappers from the bells of Lavenham church which were to provide the signal for the attack.\textsuperscript{64} They then quickly won the initiative, so that within two days four thousand rebels had come to submit to them near Bury in their shirts, including the most troublesome elements, the inhabitants of Lavenham and Brent Eleigh.\textsuperscript{65} How had they brought about this sudden collapse of the revolt? The answer is that they had been lucky that the rebels had hesitated, no doubt struck by the folly of attacking the king's two most able generals, but they had been clever in exploiting this hesitancy to enter negotiations immediately. MacCulloch has shown that the rebels consisted of the poorest cloth workers, for whom unemployment was indeed a disaster, and largely the poorer members of the agricultural community, who were also unemployed as a result of the financial demands on their masters, but that the Suffolk gentry were solidly behind the dukes, along with the wealthy clothiers.\textsuperscript{66} The fact that only the lowest social classes were involved in the rebellion undoubtedly gave the dukes a strong position from which to negotiate. Norfolk naturally used his own local contacts as go-betweens, and their identity strongly suggests that the revolt was not aimed directly at the local employers and upper orders of society.\textsuperscript{67}

Thomas Jermyn, with whom Norfolk had jointly purchased a wardship in 1519, and who had served under him in Ireland, when he had been entrusted with messages to Henry, was the chief negotiator, along with his brother-in-law John Spring, son of the great clothier of Lavenham who had died two years before.\textsuperscript{68}

It appears that Norfolk sent his intermediaries to the rebels in his name alone, perhaps because Suffolk was already \textit{persona non grata} amongst them, asking to be informed of their intention.\textsuperscript{69} This moderate approach seems to have undermined the hot-heads, and the rebels replied that they were loyal to the king. At this the duke either went to them, an act of some personal courage if true, or had sixty representatives come to him to voice their grievances, but since all tried to speak at once he was forced to ask for one spokesman,
and John Green, a weaver from Melford, made the well known and highly articulate speech claiming poverty as the reason for their revolt.⁶⁰ All accounts agree that Norfolk responded with sympathy and understanding, though without diminishing their crime, indeed the dukes reported to Wolsey that they had "made a long rehearsal the best we could to aggravate their heinous offence, declaring the same to be high treason".⁶¹ The dukes then promised that if they would depart to their houses handing over four of their leaders to represent them, they would intercede with the king for their pardon, which they trusted to obtain.⁶² The fact that the rebels did indeed disperse without any promise of the remission of the grant or guarantee of obtaining a pardon is indicative of the very great respect and trust which they had in Norfolk, due, no doubt, to his popular reputation in East Anglia.

The dukes were immediately at pains to convince Henry and Wolsey that they had dealt with the rebels with suitable severity, emphasising the humiliation involved in the first public submission and the fact that there would be a second elsewhere. They also prided themselves on having got the leaders into their hands, but wrote of "this unhappy people that this foolishly have used themselves".⁶³ They clearly did not want to see executions, and interpreted their instructions as meaning that this could be avoided since the rebels had submitted without a fight.⁶⁴ However, Wolsey wanted a fearful example set, and wrote to them on 15 May saying that judges would be sent to sit on a commission of oyer and terminer and asking for them to provide the necessary information. However, by 17 May the dukes had been informed that, on the basis of the information they had provided, the judges advised that the offenders be indicted for riot and unlawful assembly.⁶⁵ This undoubtedly pleased Norfolk, since he had told the rioters that this was what they could expect from their first meeting. A special session of the two commissions of the peace was held at Lavenham on 18 May by eight JPs probably chosen by Norfolk; himself and Suffolk, Curzon, Drury, Sir Richard Wentworth, Sir Anthony Wingfield, Sir Philip Tynney, Sir John Heveningham, Humphrey
Wingfield and Thomas Jermyn.\textsuperscript{66} Some 525 men were indicted, while their four leaders languished in the Fleet until their appearance in Star Chamber at the end of May, where they were lectured by the king's legal council, and then pardoned.\textsuperscript{67} The moderation shown almost certainly reflects Norfolk's efforts, in which he was supported by Suffolk, to persuade king and cardinal that nothing was to be gained by bloodshed.

On the matter of the grant, the dukes had foreseen problems as soon as the rebellion was over, for if the areas where rebellion had been raised were let off as a result, the men of Norfolk and much of Suffolk who had consented would be enraged, and the reputations of the dukes severely undermined. The only solution, they thought, was either to make the grant voluntary, in which case it would amount to very little and take longer to collect, or fix on a lower rate that could be collected universally.\textsuperscript{68} By 12 May they wrote that they were getting news of preparations for similar revolts in other counties including Essex and Cambridgeshire, and felt that the king should call his council to him to debate the whole matter of the grant again, a debate to which they very much wanted to contribute.\textsuperscript{69} By 15 May the king and Wolsey, no doubt well aware that they would argue for its abandonment, had decided to withdraw their demands for an Amicable Grant, though this meant the abandonment of the invasion of France and led directly to the treaty of the More in August 1525.\textsuperscript{70}

Norfolk's role in trying to raise the Amicable Grant in Norfolk and in suppressing the rebellion which followed in south-west Suffolk is instructive, not only because it confirms much that this study has suggested about his preoccupations and mode of operation, but also because it illustrates particularly vividly the two facets of the role of the nobility in early Tudor England and the potential for conflict between them. All Norfolk's actions and words demonstrate that he was fully aware that his effectiveness as a channel between court and country depended upon having the trust of both sides in the equation. It was not enough for him simply to be the king's loyal agent in his own country, and to concentrate on satisfying Henry and Wolsey. He was, at the
same time, responsible to the commissioners, substantial men and taxpayers of
his county, indeed ultimately even to the poor rebels of Suffolk, and their
trust in him depended upon his ability to ensure that they were fairly and
sympathetically treated by the government. A fine balancing act was probably
always required to fulfil these complementary roles successfully, but the
degree to which they would come into conflict over the Amicable Grant cannot
have been anticipated.

Faced with this conflict Norfolk showed remarkable agility and
determination in trying to satisfy both sides, but despite the excellence of
his relationship with the king and Wolsey at this time, he did not entirely
escape criticism.\textsuperscript{71} Wolsey was clearly fully aware of the conflict of loyalty
he was experiencing, and was therefore vigilant for any sign that he was
putting his local reputation above the crown's interests. Thus he was initially
sceptical of the valuations of the Norfolk gentry, suspecting that the duke was
winking at undervaluation, and also took him to task for promising both the
gentry and citizenry of Norwich that they should pay no more than people
elsewhere, a promise which was hardly unreasonable. Norfolk found it necessary
to explain himself, saying that he had by no means allowed that the grant
should be conditional, but only discussed this issue after they had all
signed.\textsuperscript{72} Part of the reason why Wolsey disliked his approach was probably
because it put pressure upon him to produce an equally satisfactory result in
London, where the citizens were notoriously inclined to resist royal demands.\textsuperscript{71}

When the rebellion developed in Suffolk, Wolsey and Henry were far away and
speedy intervention was of the essence if it was not to be repeated elsewhere,
thus Norfolk and Suffolk had a relatively free hand. Norfolk clearly took the
lead, drafting and even adding in his own hand to many of their letters, but he
was careful to involve Suffolk in his every move.\textsuperscript{74} As in his dealings in
Norfolk, he did his utmost to satisfy both sides, but again Wolsey seems to
have thought that the dukes were inclined to be too lenient on the rebels.\textsuperscript{75}

Norfolk showed himself fully aware of Wolsey's sensitivity to the fact
that much of the violent hatred expressed by the rebels was directed against
the cardinal, for he wrote that when meeting with the rebels he and Suffolk had
pointed out that violence against any of the king's councillors, and especially
the greatest of them, was treason. 76 Henry and Wolsey finally accepted the
judgement of the dukes, and they received thanks and praise from both, 77 while
in an effort to improve his reputation in East Anglia, the cardinal stood
surety for the rebels who appeared in Star Chamber and obtained a grant to pay
their expenses while in prison and a present in silver for each of them. 78 This
last, rather exaggerated act, suggests that Wolsey was almost as concerned
about his reputation in the localities as was Norfolk in East Anglia. Probably
he envied the dexterity of the duke, who, even under the most testing
circumstances had so skillfully played the dual role of loyal subject and
goodlord to his countrymen.
Notes


2 CSPS iii, pp 4-5, vi, pp 390, 394

3 Bernard, op. cit., pp 31-2

4 CSPS iii, pp 86-8

5 Ibid., pp 87, 92, 118, 125

6 BL Calig. E III, f 4; PRO SP1/34, f 149

7 GEC xi, pp 118-122; HP i, pp 634-5; SRO T4373/103 Acct 1512-13

8 Ringley: Hall, p 643; LP i 13534; Cavendish: LP iv, 685, 821, 3276

9 See above pp 275-6

10 S.J. Gunn, 'French Wars of Henry VIII', in Origins of War, p 43

11 Eg. Brandon in 1513, S.J. Gunn, Charles Brandon, p 18

12 See above p 228

13 S.J. Gunn, 'French Wars', pp 34-5, 40-1

14 Bernard, op. cit., pp 152-3

15 See above chapter 6

16 BL Cleo. F VI, f 267, 258; PRO SP1/34, f 164

17 The 1524 subsidy commission and commission for the loan, LP iv, 214, 547 were clearly used; BL Cleo. F VI, f 258

18 BL Cleo. F VI, f 267

19 Ibid.

20 BL Cleo., F VI, f 258

21 Ibid., f 267

22 BL Cleo., F VI, f 258

23 Ibid., f 267

24 Gilt plate at 4/- per oz., parcel gilt at 3/8d. and white plate at 3/4d.

25 William Ellis had long been a JP in Norfolk and was a subsidy commissioner in 1524, LP, iv, 137 (23), 895 (26), p 236

26 BL Cleo., F VI, f 267; for Wolsey's reaction, f 258


28 BL Cleo. F VI, f 267

29 PRO SP1/34, f 131

30 Ibid.

31 BL Cleo. F VI, f 258

32 Ibid.

33 PRO SP1/34, f 131; LP iv, 1260

34 PRO SP1/34, f 149

35 LP iv, 1260

36 Bernard, op. cit., pp 56, 59

37 PRO SP1/34, ff 162, 164

38 PRO SP1/34, f 164

39 Ibid.

40 Hall, p 699

41 S.J. Gunn, Charles Brandon, p 43

42 Ibid., pp 39, 45, 50-2; Arundel Ms. A 1047; Hall, p 699

43 DNB vi, pp 57-8; HP ii, pp 57-8

44 D. MacCulloch, Suffolk and the Tudors, p 55

45 Pembroke College Ms. 300

46 Arundel Ms T 1 provides most detail on the Stoke estate, though see also the accounts SRO S1/13/19.4; BL Add. Roll 215; Waldingfield was one of the centres of the trouble, PRO KB29/157, mm 5-6

47 PRO KB9/497/7, 8, 9

48 PRO SP1/34, f 190; Chronicle of Ellis Griffith, HMC Report on Ms. on the -337-
Welsh Language (1898) 48th app. part i, p iv

49 LP iv, 1321
50 HMC Wales, i, pp ii-iv
51 PRO SP1/34, f 190
52 Hall, pp 699-700
53 Ibid., p 700
54 BL Cleo. F VI, f 261; HMC Wales, i, pp ii-iv
55 BL Cleo. F VI, f 261
56 MacCulloch, op. cit., pp 295-6
57 Bernard, op. cit., p 146-7
58 Ward, Robert Ashfield, PRO E36/216, f 354, 177; NRO NRS 2378 11 D. 4; LP iii, 800, 1377; Jermyn was of Rushbrooke, a collector of the subsidy in Suffolk in 1524 and to the bench in December of that year, LP iv, 547, 961 (20); Hall says that Jermyn was the chief negotiator, p 700
59 Hall, pp 699-700
60 The two somewhat divergent accounts come from the chroniclers Hall and Griffith, HMC Wales, i, pp ii-iii
61 BL Cleo. F VI, f 260
62 Hall, p 700
63 BL Cleo. F VI, ff 260-1
64 Ibid.
65 BL Cotton Ms. App. L, f 12; PRO SP1/34, f 209
66 PRO KB29/157, mm 5-6; KB9/497, mm 6-9
67 Hall, p 702
68 BL Cleo. F VI, f 261
69 PRO SP1/34, f 196
70 PRO SP1/34, f 209
71 Bernard, op. cit., pp 77-8, 83
72 BL Cleo. F VI, f 258
73 R.R. Sharpe, London and the Kingdom, i pp 337-8
74 PRO SP1/34, f 190
75 PRO SP1/34, f 209
76 BL Cleo. F VI, f 260
77 BL Cotton Ms. App. L, f 12
78 Hall, p 702

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CONCLUSIONS

What does this study of the early life and career of the third Howard duke of Norfolk reveal about him beyond what was already well known? How far did he live up to contemporary ideals of what a nobleman should be and in what respects, if any, was he exceptional among the nobility? How far does the study, though only partial, tend to confirm or refute the judgements discussed in the introduction that he was unprincipled, servile but politically adept, and/or unintelligent, unsophisticated, even brutal? Inevitably, the source material available for an assessment of some aspects of Norfolk's life and career in the period covered by this study is much better than for others, but it is, nonetheless, possible to achieve a coherent picture of his motivations, how they influenced the development of his career, and his success or otherwise in fulfilling his aims.

His early life, which has been ignored in the past because the surviving evidence is slight and hard to come by, is nonetheless crucially important, for even without any records of his schooling it is manifest that the ill-educated, unsophisticated, unintelligent, unprincipled portrayal is wide of the mark. Both his father and his grandfather were well educated men of broad experience and considerable sophistication, and brought up their sons and particularly their heirs to carry forward proud family traditions of service to the crown which went back many generations in the Howard family. Thus, in accordance with what contemporary humanists were writing of the desirability of more than a purely military education for the nobility, to fit them better for their elevated role at the centre and in their own localities, Norfolk was a man who could operate happily in at least three languages, wrote long, coherent letters (quite often in his own, regular hand) used Latin tags in those to Wolsey, could refer back in history for examples, and demonstrated a detailed knowledge not only of English history, and particularly military history, but also of classical and later continental campaigns. Clearly, in educating his sons and
The Howard recovery after Bosworth, possible only because Henry VII...
recognised Surrey's chivalric devotion to the ideal of service to the crown *per se*, was such that he and his family had by then succeeded in rebuilding much of the earlier Howard relationship with the court. Lord Thomas had married the queen's sister at the age of twenty-one, and took part in royal ceremonial and was often at court thereafter. Indeed, both descriptions of his role and appearance on ceremonial occasions, and his letters, suggest a courtliness which has tended to be overlooked, seen, for example, in his tendency to use ritual phrases which belittle his own possessions, abilities and achievements. Howard association with the queen was further advanced at the accession of Henry VIII when Surrey's daughters and step-daughter entered the service of Katherine of Aragon, the younger generation of male Howards and their brothers-in-law being among the associates of the king who portrayed themselves as her knights. Magnificently arrayed, at court and particularly in the tilt yard, these men proved that they shared with the king not only the appearance and ideals of chivalry on the Burgundian model, but also the expertise which Henry needed in his commanders if he was to make the impact in Europe which he sought, and were therefore natural choices for the Garter and appointments in war. These launched their careers.

No doubt the example of his ancestors and his interpretation of honour were important in motivating Lord Howard to achieve excellence in the military arts, somewhat against the odds, for he lacked the imposing physique of his brother Edward, Brandon and Henry and many of their friends. This may have forced him to think harder about tactics from an early age and created an expectation that warfare required much hard work and detailed planning. However, it is also clear that he had natural flair, and his enthusiasm for technical developments in the military field and practical problem solving comes through in his graphically descriptive letters to an equally enthusiastic king. The energy and dedication with which he addressed the task of becoming an expert in naval affairs when he was appointed to replace his dead brother as admiral in 1513, demonstrates his appetite for new skills and his attitude to
service, while he was equally quick to learn the peculiarities of warfare in such highland areas as the north and Ireland, and adapt his force and his tactics accordingly. He never balked at seeking advice from those whom he believed had more expertise than he in any particular sphere, but made the fullest use of their knowledge to advance his own. Like his father, he perceived the crucial role of consent in armies raised under signet letters, and thus the importance of consultation with the captains who brought their tenantry to serve under him. His correspondence written while on campaign documents his extensive use of the council of war, while his remarks about the duke of Albany in 1523 reveal that he regarded a wilful refusal to take advice as a serious flaw in a commander. Indeed, the very real fear of defeat and the loss of honour this would bring to the king and himself, made him anxious not to face a major engagement without colleagues of adequate rank and experience with whom to consult, and he showed no inclination to take heavy responsibility in the military, or any other sphere, singlehandedly. He felt his honour much bound up in performing the role of patron to those who served under him, and always used the device of obtaining letters of thanks from the king to reward and encourage them in the royal service.

He also operated on the assumption that, even at the level of the rank and file, an army could not simply be commanded, but must be cajoled into service and carrying out orders under difficult conditions. He took pains over the accommodation, victualling and payment of his force, and, above all, the supply of beer which was crucial to the cooperation of Tudor armies and navies. Always ready to fight for the welfare of his men, though at the same time conscious, as a royal councillor, of the need to keep costs to a minimum, he also imposed a strict discipline, and clamped down hard at the first signs of disorder. He clearly considered all but light losses among his force unacceptable, whatever Henry might say to the contrary, and careful planning and calculation of the risks involved in any given strategy characterised his approach to campaigning. He was certainly not a rash or a wilful commander, as
his brother Edward could be. As he became more confident and better established, he was increasingly willing to tell Henry and Wolsey what was, and what was not, feasible in the military and naval spheres. In 1513 he failed to take the fleet back to Brest as Henry commanded him to do, his captains and masters having convinced him that it would lead to certain destruction, but contrary winds came to his assistance by delaying the project until it was too late. In 1523, by contrast, he declined, apologetically but firmly, to march on Edinburgh without enough men or adequate supplies and transport. The tactic employed at Flodden, of a feint on Berwick, followed by an encircling march, in which he seems to have had a major part, was the most risky he attempted in these years, but it is important to note that the Howards needed to bring James to battle to rescue Henry's, their own and the national honour, and confident of the will of their men to repel the invader, and the risks were fully debated in the council of war, thus spreading responsibility.

By 1525 Norfolk was Henry's premier commander, his natural choice for appointment to lead the van of his army into France. The fact that Norfolk accepted happily, though this involved serving in the field for the sixth year in succession, underlines his dedication to the royal service and his perception that his honour was much bound up with it. His selection for service in France, hopefully in cooperation with the emperor's forces, was undoubtedly due in part to his success in cooperating with the Burgundian commanders in 1522. Norfolk's quite considerable skills as a diplomat should not be underrated, for they are well documented in his letters written while in Ireland, in France and on the Scottish border. The Venetian ambassador described him in 1531 as affable, and it is clear that however conscious he was of his birth, he could charm, and had no difficulties in building good relations with people of all ranks. He was apparently patient and tactful in negotiation when occasion demanded, and generally flexible and open to compromise, though he could be doggedly determined in carrying out royal policies when so instructed. He could also be highly manipulative, as his
correspondence with Margaret and the Scottish lords, or the knights and
gentlemen of Norfolk over the Amicable Grant, clearly reveals.

Ideals of service did not, of course, conflict with the profit motive,
for the openhandedness and goodlordship which the Howards clearly perceived as
being essential to their honour and that of their master, were costly.
Particularly in the years before he inherited the dukedom, when he must have
been under financial pressure particularly in war time, Norfolk had a cool and
calculating eye to his own financial advantage and exploited his office as
admiral ruthlessly. He probably also used his office as treasurer for its
monetary advantage as well as to advance the careers of his clients, but may
have been rather more circumspect about this. His perception of his prime
responsibility as treasurer appears to have been to play a very full part in
advising the king, particularly on finance, trade, and foreign policy. Like his
father, he became a regular attender at the council once appointed treasurer,
habitually in London during term time and beyond, when not absent on service.

Almost all the evidence we have of his relationship with Wolsey comes
from the periods when he was away from court, though this does provide wider
clues. When first appointed admiral by the king in 1513, Howard looked to
Wolsey for advice and support while away from court, and there are echoes of
this patron-client relationship in their correspondence into the mid 1520s.
When away from court Howard relied on Wolsey not only to oversee all the
details of his military requirements and executive action of all sorts, but
also to further his private suits with the king. It must be doubtful that
Wolsey was his only agent when away from court, for he had many relatives
there, but he and his father were involved with Wolsey in conciliar efforts to
exercise some degree of restraint and control over royal grants, and were
therefore anxious to go through 'official' channels. Given the dedication of
the Howards to the royal service it was difficult for either Henry or Wolsey to
refuse their reasonable requests, and the family and its clients did well in
the years under review.
Norfolk clearly approved of Wolsey's dedication to the royal service and his capacity for working on a wide range of subjects in great detail at the same time, and clearly admired his mental agility, ingenuity and optimism. When faced with difficulties on service away from the centre he always turned to Wolsey for advice, most notably expressing a fervent wish to have the cardinal in Durham to advise him when Albany's invasion was imminent in late 1523. Over affairs of state, and particularly foreign policy, Wolsey and the Howards clearly had differences of opinion at times, for the cardinal did not share the Howard bias towards the imperial alliance, based on a tradition of service to Burgundy and important economic considerations, in particular the crucial wool and cloth trade with the Low Countries. It is neither surprising nor unnatural that there should have been debate and differences among royal councillors at the highest level, and does not appear to have led to a permanent deterioration in the relationship of either the second or the third dukes with the minister in the period covered by this study. On the contrary, the second duke, and also the third once he had been admitted to the treasurership, were commonly reckoned to be very close to Wolsey. Both undoubtedly derived some advantage from the fact that Wolsey's taste for the trappings of power meant that unpopular policies originating with the king or the council tended to be ascribed to him. Nor is it surprising that for the most part there was cooperation between the two greatest officers of state, for their broad aims were essentially the same, namely to further the royal interest.

The third duke's relationship with his father is largely undocumented, due to the fact that the private correspondence of neither survives, but his father's influence on his aspirations and the overall shape of his career should not be underrated. He clearly owed his desire to further the reputation of his family in the annals of chivalry to his father's early teaching and example, and learned practical military skills from him too, in the same way, no doubt, that he in turn had learned from his father the first duke, and so forth over many generations. Perhaps he wrote to his father as well as to
Wolsey for advice when on active service away from court, but the evidence is lacking. He clearly learned much from his father about other aspects of the functions and responsibilities of a nobleman, in particular the handling of his business and estate affairs, his council and his affinity, for while earl of Surrey he shared, and on his succession to the dukedom inherited, several of his father's servants. It is not surprising, therefore, that his demeanor as the most important servant of the crown in East Anglia echoes that of his father and relative, the thirteenth earl of Oxford.

Insufficient source material survives to indicate any difference in attitude between the second and third dukes. The second duke's recovery of his local influence after the disaster of Bosworth was nothing if not masterly, though based squarely on occupying the role of royal agent. To be effective in this role, which involved channelling communication both up to the court and down to the localities, the Howards had to achieve the cooperation of other noblemen in the area, maintain good relations with the gentry beyond their own estates, take pains to secure the promotion of local men attached to or amenable to themselves to offices such as that of JP, stewardships and subsidy commissions and the like, and recruit them for attendance in court ceremonial, and in war. In both wars with France the Howards proved their ability to recruit for such service not only men from their own affinities in East Anglia, Surrey and Sussex, and other counties where they held land, but also men from areas beyond the range of their own affinity in East Anglia. The acid test of Norfolk's effective influence in the region came in 1525 with the Amicable Grant, and it demonstrates how great that influence was by then. Not only did Norfolk secure greater acquiescence in the grant in the county whose name he bore than any other royal commissioner in any other county, but his reputation and influence were sufficiently strong to enable him to defuse a potentially serious rebellion in south-west Suffolk. Anxious to satisfy both royal demands and those imposed by his local role, he succeeded in avoiding the bloodshed of ritual executions which the king and Wolsey appear to have wanted. Moreover, he
demonstrated an understanding of the poor rebels (who feared unemployment and starvation) which is echoed in his remarks about the borderers and Irish peasants, suggesting that he was far from unsympathetic towards the plight of the poor, whatever his tactical use of the blanket destruction of tracts of land on the borders and in the Boulonais.

As an important part of the honour culture and his local role, Norfolk took his reputation for goodlordship very seriously. He was liberal in his hospitality, and, no doubt, in his ritual gifts of venison from Framlingham as his father had been, and generous in the fees he paid to his estate and household officials. He was therefore able to command the services of men from established families from all over East Anglia, and many of the region's best lawyers. His reputation for goodlordship, which spread well beyond East Anglia, combined with his rank in council and proximity to the king, made him a popular trustee. As a general rule his role as goodlord complemented rather than clashed with his role as royal servant, but there was always the potential for a clash when Henry required him to undertake duties which he perceived to be dishonorable. While Wolsey, who was a cleric and not a nobleman, was generally willing to shoulder considerable blame and odium to protect the reputation of the king, Norfolk clearly balked at this. He did not wish to be involved in the plot to capture the Scottish chancellor Beaton in 1524, but tried instead to initiate bona fide negotiations which would render it unnecessary, and clearly disliked his instructions to hold Angus on the border, if necessary by locking him up, without informing him that he did so by royal order. Similarly in the matter of his ill-starred trade venture to the Low Countries, he was deeply annoyed by Margaret's failure to secure a rapid and favourable outcome, for it suggested that, despite his own and his family's service to Charles V, he was held in small esteem by the emperor.

By 1525 Norfolk occupied an enviable position. Since his succession to his father's dukedom his financial worries were over, his estates in several areas of the country gave him wide contacts, and his second marriage had
resulted in two sons and two daughters. Not only was his position in the royal affections as assured as anyone’s could be, but his wife was close to the queen and still in active service in her household, while he also had several other relatives in important positions at court. His position in the council was equally prominent and assured, for, by virtue of his office as treasurer, he stood second in rank to Wolsey, while his expertise was exceptionally wide-ranging and gave him a natural voice in most areas of debate. Not only did he have the knowledge of trade and finance which had enabled both his father and grandfather to make important contributions to government, but he had an unrivalled knowledge too of the most marginal and difficult areas of the Tudor state to govern, the northern borders and Ireland. His military and naval experience made him virtually indispensable in time of war, both as an adviser and in the field. Nor was his loyalty to the crown open to question, for he had risked himself in battle to defend Henry’s honour repeatedly, and taken on more than one thankless task in the royal service. He was, in short, outstanding in his fulfilment of the duties demanded of contemporary noblemen: attendance in war, attendance at court, attendance in council, acting as ambassadors and diplomats, and ruling their own countries in the royal interest as well as their own. His contemporaries saw him, not surprisingly therefore, as a shining example of a man of the highest principles, a man of honour, for he had not only been born noble, but by his actions had continually striven to confirm his worthiness of his status in society and exalted position in the state.
Notes

2 J.R. Hale, Renaissance War Studies, p 336
4 G.W. Bernard, The Power of the Early Tudor Nobility, pp 185-197 reviews contemporary attitudes to and demands of nobility expressed in literature.
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Summary of Thesis submitted for Ph.D.

by

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on

THE EARLY CAREER OF THOMAS, LORD HOWARD, EARL OF SURREY AND THIRD DUKE OF
NORFOLK, 1474-c.1525

The purpose of this study is to examine, in more depth than hitherto, the early career of a man who has had a very bad press since Victorian times, but who has been increasingly recognised as occupying a central role in the politics of the reign of Henry VIII. Thomas Howard was the scion of a family with a tradition of royal service which had risen fast through able service to the Yorkist kings. He married the sister of Henry VII's queen and was much at court, but also played an important role in his father's reconstruction of the Howard power base when the family regained its estates in East Anglia and Surrey and Sussex after Bosworth. Lands in right of his wife came with the accession of Henry VIII, when Thomas and his relatives, who shared a chivalric enthusiasm for war with the young king, favoured war with France. This brought them commands, and Thomas proved that his courage was matched by organisational skills when the king gave him his dead brother Edward's post of admiral, even before the resounding victory he shared with his father at Flodden transformed his status. As earl of Surrey and duke of Norfolk the Howards then competed for influence in foreign affairs with Suffolk and Wolsey, but the former lost ground by marrying Henry's sister without permission, and Wolsey and the Howards, who attended the council assiduously, cooperated increasingly. In 1520, as part of Wolsey's reform of government, Surrey undertook demanding service in Ireland, but being denied the resources to undertake a reconquest he was happy to return in 1522 to fight in France in cooperation with imperial forces. In 1523-4 he served in a military, diplomatic and administrative capacity in the North and in 1525, when he had succeeded to his father's dukedom, he was chosen to lead the largest force yet into France. This campaign was not to be, since Henry's subjects would not supply the money required, but Norfolk demonstrated his dexterity and dedication to serving both the king and his own locality by quelling dangerous riots in Suffolk without bloodshed. By then he was treasurer and, after Wolsey, the most dedicated and able servant Henry had.
Picardy Campaign 1522.

- major garrison towns
- other towns
- places attacked or destroyed
- intended targets