KOREAN CHRISTIANITY AND THE SHINTŌ SHRINE ISSUE IN THE WAR PERIOD, 1931-1945: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the University of Hull

by

Sung-Gun Kim, B.A., M.A.

May 1989
ABSTRACT

Summary of Thesis submitted for Ph.D. Degree by
Sung-Gun Kim

on

KOREAN CHRISTIANITY AND THE SHINTŌ SHRINE
ISSUE IN THE WAR PERIOD, 1931-1945:
A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

The main theme is the differences in response among the churches
to the Shintō Shrine Issue in Korea under Japanese colonialism. The
central focus is an inquiry into the possible reasons why some
religious groups, including the Catholic and Methodist Churches,
should choose the way of compromise, while others, such as the
Presbyterian Church, represented by individual missionaries and the
Non-Shrine Worship Movement and the Mount Zion Sect, chose the way of
radical challenge and withdrawal. It is proposed in this study to
concentrate on three major churches - the Roman Catholic, the
Methodist and the Presbyterian.

This study offers, firstly, a detailed analysis of the content of
the debate, the attitudes and actions of the three churches towards
the shrine problem in their historical evolution since 1931;
secondly, an attempt is made to explain the different positions of the
three churches in terms of the sociology of religion and the sociology
of missions. The sociological consequences of religious experience
provide a general framework. The main assumption is that the
difference in ideological elements is more important in religious
institutions than has been usually thought. In explaining the
differences of position in the three churches, the following eight
factors are proposed: (1) Theological emphasis; (2) Church
structure; (3) World view; (4) Mission policy; (5) Relationship to
nationalism; (6) Relationship to non-Christian religions; (7) Early
historical experience; and (8) Nationalities of missionaries.

The thesis is divided into two parts: (1) Part I (Chapters One to Three) reviews the theoretical and methodological literature relevant to the study of the Shintō Shrine Issue. It also surveys the introduction of the two principal forms of Christianity (Roman Catholicism and Protestantism) in Korea, and examines modern Japan, State Shintō and Christianity.

(2) Part II (Chapters Four and Five) comprises a detailed analysis of the positions of the three Christian churches towards the shrine problem, and a systematic comparison of the different responses of the three churches by employing the above-mentioned eight factors.

Three key factors are proposed in respect of the denominational division in the matter of the Shintō shrine question: theological emphasis, mission policy and church structure. Attention is also drawn to the historical discontinuity in motivation between the Non-Shrine Worship Movement by the fundamentalists and the recent political struggle for justice by the liberals. The legacy of the ordeal of the Shintō shrine controversy in the 1930s remains as an obstacle to the reconciliation between ultra-conservative theology and liberal 'minjung' theology. It is therefore demonstrated in this thesis that the particular form of religious outlook is a relevant factor in its own right, which is not to be reduced to other variables. Thus for the purpose of this study, the tools of Weber seem to prove more effective than do those of Marx.
KOREAN CHRISTIANITY AND THE SHINTŌ SHRINE ISSUE
IN THE WAR PERIOD, 1931-1945: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY
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University of Hull for their proof reading of the final draft of the thesis. Mrs. Stella Rhind typed the manuscript, and I was also able to draw on her long experience of typing theses for Hull University for much valuable assistance in preparation.

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### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

#### A. Books and Journals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAS</td>
<td>Acta Apostolicae Sedis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJS</td>
<td>American Journal of Sociology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASR</td>
<td>American Sociological Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BJS</td>
<td>The British Journal of Sociology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDCWM</td>
<td>Concise Dictionary of the Christian World Missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHI</td>
<td>Dictionary of the History of Ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICSR</td>
<td>International Conference on Sociology of Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRM</td>
<td>The International Review of Missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IYSR</td>
<td>International Yearbook for the Sociology of Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSSR</td>
<td>Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCE</td>
<td>Korean Catholic Encyclopedia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMF</td>
<td>The Korea Mission Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAS</td>
<td>Modern Asian Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAJT</td>
<td>The Northeast Asia Journal of Theology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCE</td>
<td>New Catholic Encyclopedia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYRB</td>
<td>A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASJ</td>
<td>The Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRASK</td>
<td>Transactions Royal Asiatic Society Korea Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCE</td>
<td>World Christian Encyclopedia</td>
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#### B. Organisations

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<tr>
<td>CCKCS</td>
<td>Ch’ŏnjugyo chŏngŭi kuhyŏn chŏn’guk sajedan (The Roman Catholic Clerical Association for the Promotion of Social Justice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Missions Étrangères de Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPF</td>
<td>Sacra Congregatiō de Propaganda Fide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPG</td>
<td>The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPU</td>
<td>Sinsa pulch’ambae undong (The Non-Shrine Worship Movement)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes on Romanisation

The McCune-Reischauer System for Romanising Korean has been employed throughout this work. The McCune-Reischauer System is the most widely used Romanisation system amongst Western students. For the Romanisation of Japanese the present work has adopted the system of Romanisation generally known as the 'modified Hepburn' by the British Standards Institution since 1968. This study has also used the Wade-Giles System for Romanising Chinese characters.
Ordering of Oriental Names

According to Korean, Japanese and Chinese custom, the surname will appear first. However, certain names have appeared so often in the West in the reverse order that in some cases this has been retained. This has been done in the case of the following: David Chung; C.I. Eugene Kim; H.K. Kim; Joseph M. Kitagawa; T. James Kodera; C.S. Lee; Grant S. Lee; Andrew C. Nahm; L. George Paik; J.S. Ryang; David Kwang-Sun Suh; C.K. Yang; K.P. Yang and T.H. Yun.
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INTRODUCTION

The main theme of the present study is the differences in response among the churches to the Shintō Shrine Issue in Korea under Japanese colonialism. This was an important and controversial issue: as the editors of The International Review of Missions (IRM) recorded in the special issues for April, 1940 and July, 1940, one of the gravest questions confronting the Church during the war (1931-1945) was that of observance at State Shintō shrines in the Japanese Empire, especially in Korea.

State Shintō or nationalistic Shintō ideology was a means employed in the so-called peaceful offensive of Japanese military expansion. Although Japan had guaranteed China's territorial integrity by the Nine-Power Treaty (1922), Japanese troops suddenly invaded Manchuria on 18 September 1931 (in what is known as the 'Manchurian Incident'). In Manchuria the Japanese had invested huge sums of money in industrial developments; the country had reserves of oil, bauxite (for aluminium), coal, iron ore and foodstuffs, all of which could provide jobs and living-space for an expanding Japanese population already hard-hit by the 1929 world economic crisis. Moreover, Manchuria was an ideal springboard for a future attack upon China. Japanese expansion began with the Manchurian Incident; subsequently Japan expanded into the Asiatic mainland, and the chauvinistic authorities increasingly looked to State Shintō as the main force for intensifying patriotic loyalties.

The international and domestic situation of Japan after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident demanded an intensification of the policy of 'Japanisation' in Korea. The establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932 by Japan's expansionist authorities placed
Korea in a significantly new position in the areas of communication, economy, and defence of the Japanese Empire. In more concrete terms, Japan needed not only the material resources and the strategic position of the Korean peninsula but also the 'native manpower' for conscription. Thus, the need for the loyalty and devotion of the Korean people to the empire became, from the Japanese viewpoint, more urgent than ever before.

It was important that the Japanese should have authority and not only power. As a means of making Koreans loyal subjects, the Japanese administration attempted, at any cost, to bring about the cultural assimilation of Korea by urging the population to revere the emperor and to offer obeisance at Shintō shrines. Since the annexation of Korea in 1910 the expressed policy of the Japanese government had been to make all members of the subjected people into standardised Japanese subjects, both legally and psychologically. But the policy of cultural assimilation failed, mainly because of the widespread and institutionalised practice of racial discrimination. Forced worship at the Shintō shrines or daily bows in an easterly direction - to Tōkyō - (Tongbang yobae) annoyed rather than converted Koreans.

Historically in Japan a very important measure for strengthening the position of State Shintō or Shintō nationalism was the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyōiku Chokugo) on 30 October 1890 (See Appendix A). The fundamental principle of morality adopted in this reform was the Confucian-Shintō concept of reverence towards the proper authorities. But at the time of the Imperial Rescript religious teaching in the schools was prohibited as a result of the early Meiji government's granting freedom of religion in the Constitution. Under such circumstances the 'non-religious' status for the official cult of State Shintō was insisted upon.
Particularly from 1900 onwards officials were emphatic in their insistence that the state ceremonies were not religious in nature. From 1932 onwards the Governor-General of Korea required that all school personnel—principals, teachers, and students—should attend ceremonies at Shintō shrines. The Japanese authorities maintained that these ceremonies were in the nature of patriotic celebrations or national rites: shrine worship was not a religious act, but a political expression of patriotism. Some of the foreign missionaries accepted this contentious explanation and met the Japanese requirement; others looked upon the shrine ceremonies as religious worship, and they saw it as a matter for their conscience. In point of fact, there was a division of opinion and action among the various Christian churches on the matter of Shintō shrine attendance, which occurred to some extent along denominational lines. From the beginning, the Presbyterians concluded that the issue was clearly religious: between Christian monotheism and Shintō polytheism. The Methodist and Catholic missions, unlike the Presbyterians, yielded to Japanese pressure regarding observances at Shintō shrines. This point of division deserves more attention than has been given to it elsewhere.

The central focus of this study is an inquiry into the possible reasons why some religious groups, including the Catholic and the Methodist Churches, should choose the way of compromise, while others, such as the Presbyterian Church, represented by individual missionaries and Sinsa pulch'ambae undong (SPU), the Non-Shrine Worship Movement and a sect called Sionsan cheguk (the Mount Zion movement), chose the way of radical challenge and withdrawal. It is proposed in the present study to concentrate on three major churches—the Roman Catholic, the Methodist and the Presbyterian (see Table 1:
1984 saw the bicentennial of Catholicism and the centennial of Protestantism in Korea. The two principal forms of Christianity, Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, with over nine million members, are a close second to Buddhism. As we can see in Mission Statistics, 1939 (Table 1), in 1939 there were 141,243 Roman Catholics and 246,779 Protestants (179,483 Presbyterians, 28,439 Methodists and 38,857 others).

The first Protestant missionary societies to begin evangelistic efforts in Korea were the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (the American Northern Presbyterian Mission) and the Foreign Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church (the American Northern Methodist Mission). These two agencies started their work simultaneously, carried it on side by side, and have organised the majority of the churches existing in Korea today: Presbyterians are the largest Christian denomination with more than three million members; Methodists are the second largest Protestant denomination. Other Protestant denominations include Holiness, Baptist, Pentecostal, Church of Christ, Seventh Day Adventist, Salvation Army, Anglican and Lutheran. But these are not so significant, since their memberships are not as large.

As C.Y. Glock and R. Stark (1965) rightly point out, many social scientists in the USA take the essential unity of Protestantism for granted, thereby typically referring only to Protestant-Catholic-Jewish comparisons, not to variations in religious commitment within any of these general categories. For example, G.E. Lenski in The Religious Factor: A Sociologist Looks at Religion (1961) found that differences between the Protestant churches were small. But adopting a more international, comparative perspective, Glock and Stark conclude that "while Protestant-Catholic contrasts are often large
Table 1: Mission Statistics, 1939*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Statistics</th>
<th>Date When Founded</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Single Ladies</th>
<th>Totals</th>
<th>Full Membership</th>
<th>Catechumens and Probationers</th>
<th>Totals</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHURCH OF CHRIST MISSION</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>330</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENGLISH CHURCH MISSION</td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5,522</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>6,102</td>
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<tr>
<td>METHODIST MISSION</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>20,383</td>
<td>8,056</td>
<td>28,439</td>
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<td>ORIENTAL MISSIONARY SOC.</td>
<td>1907</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5,055</td>
<td>2,151</td>
<td>7,195</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRESBYTERIAN TOTALS</td>
<td></td>
<td>85</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>130,460</td>
<td>49,023</td>
<td>179,483</td>
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Australian Presbyterian Mission 1889
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Date When Founded</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Single Ladies</th>
<th>Totals</th>
<th>Full Membership</th>
<th>Catechumens and Probationers</th>
<th>Totals</th>
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| ""
| "" in the U.S. Mission 1892                          | 1884             | 45  | 44    | 29            | 118    | 92,051         | 28,051                      | 120,560|
| United Church of Canada Mission 1898                 | 1898             | 10  | 10    | 18            | 38     | 12,966         | 4,542                       | 17,508 |
| SALVATION ARMY                                       | 1908             | 5   | 5     | 6             | 16     | 8,626          | 9,376                       | 18,002 |
| 7th DAY ADVENTIST MISSION                             | 1904             | 9   | 7     | 3             | 19     | 3,911          | 3,377                       | 7,288  |
| ROMAN CATHOLIC TOTALS                                 | 183              | 95  | 278   |               |        | 130,573        | 10,670                      | 141,243|

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Date When Founded</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Single Ladies</th>
<th>Totals</th>
<th>Full Membership</th>
<th>Catechumens and Probationers</th>
<th>Totals</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Mission</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>24,490</td>
<td>3,384</td>
<td>27,784</td>
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<tr>
<td>French Mission</td>
<td>1831</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>96,753</td>
<td>4,385</td>
<td>95,138</td>
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<tr>
<td>German Mission</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>11,064</td>
<td>2,695</td>
<td>12,759</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irish Mission</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4,356</td>
<td>1,206</td>
<td>5,562</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL FOR 1939</td>
<td></td>
<td>317</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>304,669</td>
<td>83,413</td>
<td>388,082</td>
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<td>TOTAL FOR 1938 (incomplete)</td>
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<td>295</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>302,144</td>
<td>70,557</td>
<td>372,701</td>
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<td>TOTAL FOR 1937</td>
<td></td>
<td>304</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>312,243</td>
<td>77,589</td>
<td>389,832</td>
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<td>TOTAL FOR 1936</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>299,309</td>
<td>75,274</td>
<td>374,583</td>
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</table>

enough to be notable, they seem inconsequential compared to differences found among the Protestant groups. ² With this in mind this study focuses on the different positions of the Catholic church and the two leading Protestant denominations - the Methodist and the Presbyterian Churches - with regard to the Shintō Shrine Issue in Korea during the so-called war period, 1931-1945.

It is to be noted that under Japanese rule (1910-1945) most religions - Buddhism, Confucianism and Shamanism - in fact enjoyed the protection of the colonial authorities. Thus the overall religious response to the Japanese administration was not as antagonistic as that of other elements in Korean society. However, like Christianity, Ch'ŏndogyo, a syncretic religious movement influenced by Catholic teaching, suffered from Japanese oppression because of its strong nationalist orientation and messianism; but its strength in the leadership of Korean society at the end of the Japanese rule was minimal, as a consequence of the success of the authorities' severe persecutions since the 1919 Independence Movement.

The shrine-worship order and many others like it precipitated a crisis for Christianity in Korea, resulting in the closing of hundreds of mission schools and the withdrawal from the country of many foreign representatives of Christian organisations. The stand of the Presbyterian mission against this measure was particularly strong, and this led to the closing of its mission schools by 1938. In contrast, the Methodist and Catholic missions accepted Japanese pressure quietly, and so their schools were allowed to remain open. It is generally accepted that the shrine issue has substantially influenced both the character and direction of the Christian movement in post-liberation times. In this context, D.N. Clark in Christianity in Modern Korea (1986) notes the negative effect of the Shintō Shrine
Issue in the Korean Church:

During World War II, the resisters suffered severe persecution and even martyrdom, while others who co-operated suffered comparatively little. By 1945, deep schisms had developed all across the Christian community that reflected conflicting strains of nationalism, religion and collaboration. In the emotions of the period just following the War, even questions of atonement and forgiveness became controversial. Charges bred counter-charges, further complicated in later years by new pressures on the church imposed by Communist rule in North Korea. The Shinto Shrine Issue can be taken as a starting point for the study of the fractiousness which is so evident in the Korean church today.

When the Pacific War ended, in churches all over Korea bitter disputes erupted between those who had collaborated with the Japanese and those who had resisted. Disputes over orthodox theology drawn from the old struggle over Shintō worship, along with missionary roots (the comity system) and regional rivalries, have fragmented the church, especially for the Presbyterians. The shrine issue has contributed to greater institutional cleavage within the Presbyterian community than has been the case with other Christian groups, because members of this denomination were generally more active than others in resisting the Japanese on religious grounds.

Among four major Presbyterian denominations, the Koryŏ Presbyterian Church (Koryŏ-p'a, Koryŏ Seminary Faction), organised in 1949, is a relatively small fundamentalist group whose origins were substantially influenced by the earlier Shintō Shrine Issue. On the other hand, the Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea (Kijang-p'a, Chosŏn Seminary Faction) founded in 1954 is a more liberal group in style and theology, which came from the northwestern provinces of North Korea, the former Canadian mission territory (see Table 2: Map of Korean Missions). From the 1920s the leadership of Kijang-p'a was trained in Japanese schools with the support of the theologically liberal Canadian mission. When the theologically
Table 2: Map of Korean Missions*
( Allocation of Territory among Major Denominations in Korea )

conservative American missionaries, who had expanded their work since 1884, had to leave the country as a consequence of hostilities in 1940, leadership in theological education fell to the theologically liberal Canadian territory people, who as a whole did not see great harm in shrine worship and yielded to Japanese pressure. Hence the 'Liberated Saints' (the former-members of the SPU) specifically opposed the Chosŏn Seminary in Seoul based on new theology by those educated at liberal schools in Japan. Eventually the 'Liberated Saints' organised the Koryŏ Seminary in Pusan in 1946.

Unlike Presbyterians whose deep schisms resulted from disputes over the shrine issue, Methodists and Roman Catholics did not suffer similar fractious tendencies, since they, as a whole, had collaborated with Japan.

In order to approach the Shintō Shrine Issue appropriately, we must consider two preliminary theoretical questions: (1) problems of definition of religion; (2) the question of nationalism and religion. These will be considered in turn.

The case of the controversy of State Shintō observance in the Japanese Empire reveals that some of the established sociological definitions of religion are evidently drawn from Christian theological considerations. There are, however, functionalist definitions of religion in terms of its reference to things 'ultimate' (Parsons, Bellah and Yinger), but these cannot provide the paradigm by which the non-Western Shintō shrine case might be analysed, although they might seem to be an attempt to get away from western bias. In this respect W. Cohn rightly maintains that European languages, and only European languages, have ordinary words which clearly and unambiguously mean religion. There are indeed some limitations in the sociology of religion developed as a discipline originally in the
context of Christian culture. It is to be noted in the present context that Japanese Christians knew that religious words and expressions in the Japanese language did not always have the same meaning that was given by theologically-trained Westerners to the corresponding words in English. So an American missionary in Japan, looking at the Shinto shrine question in Japan from a new angle, wrote:

There is a question of nomenclature involved ... Then, in Japan what is meant by 'worship'? Not far from where we live, daily worship is paid by dozens of people to the spirit of a faithful dog, whose statue stands at the railway station where he awaited the return of his dead master. Buddhist masses are regularly held for the spirits of needles broken when sewing, and for the spirit of broken dolls. Bowing the head is not reserved for what we Westerners would term 'religious' occasions. The sentiment of awe which is at the centre of the Japanese idea of worship enters into many of their social conventions and habits. It is possible for Christians therefore to bow at shrines, even though these same shrines may be used by others for religious purposes. It means no more to them than our taking off our hats at that same shrine would mean to us, and we always do that.

M.E. Spiro stresses that any comparative study of religion requires, as an operation antecedent to inquiry, an ostensive or substantive definition that stipulates unambiguously those phenomenal variables which are designated by the term. Thus he remarks that by 'religion' he means 'an institutional aspect of society based on beliefs in a superhuman or supernatural realm'. This is a narrower and more precise definition for religion than functional definitions of religion. E. Krausz, following the work of Spiro, admits that ideologies or value orientations such as Communism or Marxism might undergo in some circumstances subtle changes which could bring them within the ambit of religion as more narrowly defined. Thus, for example, the cult of personality subtly transformed itself into the 'deification' of Stalin, the Communist dictator, by large sections of
the population in the Soviet Union, particularly during and at the end of the Second World War.

In this context we recall that the Japanese government, determined to create 'State Shintō', a new religious superstructure, from 1882 to 1945 advocated Shintō as a 'nonreligious' emperor cult and a patriotic national morality to which every Japanese, regardless of his or her religious beliefs and affiliations, was expected to pay homage. According to J.M. Kitagawa, those who subscribe to the view that Shintō is nonreligious in character point out that, strictly speaking, Shintō has no scripture comparable to the Bible or the Qur'an and that between 1882 and 1945 State Shintō prohibited preaching. Moreover, lacking a sophisticated cosmological, ethical, and metaphysical orientation, Shintō freely appropriated insights from the Yin-Yang and Taoist cosmological systems, from Confucian ethics, and from Buddhist metaphysics. Conversely, Kitagawa argues, those who cite the prominence of the priesthood, liturgies, charms, amulets, and parish organisations emphasise the religious character of Shintō. In his view, the issue has in a sense been settled by the disestablishment of State Shintō (Jinja Shintō), which has been legally recognised as a religion since the end of World War II. However, Kitagawa suspects that the debate on the problem of Shintō's own identity - is it a religion or is it something other than a religion? - will not stop here. For the historian of religions, Shintō presents some very difficult and disconcerting questions. But given the fact that the emperor cult subtly transformed itself into the deification of the emperor, particularly during the Pacific War, we could emphasise the 'religious' character of State Shintō.

Secondly, the Shintō Shrine Issue should be approached in the light of nationalism and religion. By 'nationalism' I mean 'a sense
of identity held by any group that prides itself on being a 'nation'. The similarities between nationalism and religion arise from the fact that both give the individual a social framework and then both elicit an emotional and enthusiastic devotion to that framework. Both can become totalitarian in their demands. Since nationalism can serve as a surrogate for religion, the problem of coexistence with other religions has always risen when it has been strong. Nationalistic thinkers must decide between these two conflicting and all-embracing world-views. Thus the conflict between church and state has been the essence of western history. A.J. Hoover in The Gospel of Nationalism (1986) maintains that nationalism and religion can coexist in three ways: (1) they may exist in violent opposition to each other; (2) a moderate form of nationalism may exist alongside of and be condoned or even bolstered by the traditional church; (3) nationalism may be inextricably combined and coordinated with the traditional religion so that the two almost lose their separate identities. The third relationship is the most desirable for the nationalist, and modern Japan provides an example of this.

However, not all religions are amenable to amalgamation with nationalism. In fact nationalism often comes into conflict with the so-called universal religions (e.g., Christianity) which are usually concerned with denouncing parochialism. Historically, in Japan the introduction of Christianity (Protestantism) coincided with the rise of aggressive nationalism. The charge that Christianity is 'unpatriotic' is met from the first to last in the history of the mission in Japan. Christianity was considered as a foreign religion which was a threat to the traditional Japanese faith. Under the pressure of this national sentiment there were a number of Christians
who attempted to show that there was no basic conflict between Christianity and Japanese patriotism. Therefore, in the climate of extreme nationalism during the War, for Japanese Christians it was important to be no less patriotic than their non-Christian compatriots. As a whole, Christian leaders in Japan saw quite clearly the difficulties that would be involved in a refusal to observe Shintō shrine practices, which were regarded as expressions of loyalty and patriotism. Thus the Japanese Christians, like all religious groups, compromised with Shintō nationalism without hesitation.

In the discussion of the Japanese Christian reaction to Shintō nationalism we should also consider the fact that Shintō was a part of Japanese culture. As Kitagawa rightly points out, relative to Shintō we should regard the matsuri (usually translated as ceremonials or rituals) as the 'inner' meaning; matsuri-goto (usually translated as government) as the 'outer' meaning; and saisei-itchi (unity of religion and government, or of the ceremonial and the political dimensions) as the principle relating the two.\(^{18}\) Japan had always operated on the principle of unity of government (matsuri-goto) and religion (matsuri). Thus a noted Shintō historian, Murakami Shigeyoshi, emphasises that "Shintō equals politics (matsuri-goto)".\(^{19}\) We could argue plausibly that for Japanese Christians attendance at Shintō rites was nothing more than an act of patriotism.

As a whole, the Christians in Japan had a conformist attitude to the Shintō Shrine question. Further, representatives of the Church from Japan proper acted as advocates for the authorities, pressing the government view upon Korean Christians. This, to be sure, precipitated a crisis for Christianity in Korea.

The Korean Shrine question and the Japanese Shrine question differed first in the fact that Koreans were not Japanese. What a
Japanese might accept from a patriotic standpoint may be obnoxious to a Korean. Again, the two questions differed in the fact that the issue was militantly pressed by the colonial government in Korea. In Korea, unlike Japan, Christianity became the vehicle for preservation of national hopes in reaction against Japanese domination. Here was a situation where the Christian missions were independent of the colonising power. The church was associated with a new nationalism. Hence, in Korea the fundamental conflict between the claims of Japanese Shinto nationalism and Christianity were naturally more serious than in Japan. Among all religions practised in Korea, Christianity presented the greatest problem because of its transcendental reference, its claim of universality for its doctrines, and particularly its close ties with the churches in the West. Also, because Korea was subjected to political methods of compulsion by colonialism, it was more difficult for the Christian Church in Korea than in Japan itself to solve the Shinto Shrine Issue. The assimilation policy by the Japanese Empire raised critical tensions among Koreans, especially Christian converts and individual missionaries. Although the Church at large in Korea collapsed, and the net result was eventually accommodation to the Shinto political standards, as was the case with the Church in Japan, the forces of resistance were much greater in Korea than in Japan.

Thus, a crucial caution arises in the sociological investigation of the Shinto Shrine Issue in Korea under the Japanese Empire: the church-state problem in a colonial setting cannot be approached without drawing a distinction. In the case of colonial Africa or India as a whole, two European agencies - the church and the state - in their mutual relations appeared in the colonial setting. On the other hand, in China, Korea and Japan, where all missionaries alike
were not citizens of the nation in control but 'aliens', the missionaries had to decide about their attitudes on international political questions.

In this context, the missionaries in the most complex situations were those in Korea under the Japanese Empire. Colonial Korea was in a unique position in the sense that there existed three different forces together: a Korean indigenous force, Japanese colonialism, and Euro-American influence through missions. Christianity gathered strength and support from Koreans who used church institutions as havens from Japanese oppression. When Japan ruled Korea, conditions combined to neutralise the contradictions between nationalism and Christianity that existed at the same time in China. Whereas Christian missions and churches in other colonies were seen as part of the imperialist presence, in Korea, whose master was a non-Western power, the (early) church was associated with a new nationalism. This point must be taken into consideration in the discussion of the church-state problem in colonial Korea. But in relation to Euro-American influence through missions, it was mainly American influence through Presbyterian and Methodist missions that moulded Korean Protestant churches. Unlike the European tradition, the American tradition, stressing the total segregation of church and state, made religion a subject of no official concern, relegating it to the sphere of private affairs. In brief, therefore, in the case of colonial Korea we cannot employ categories and generalisations which have been developed in the other colonial contexts where two European agencies existed.

Whilst there was a difference between the Japanese shrine question and the Korean shrine question, the few Christians who resolutely resisted shrine worship in the two countries showed a
remarkable similarity in their theology, namely a 'religious fundamentalism'. In Japan the Mukyōkai (non-church) group of Christians and the Holiness Church ministers formed a strong pocket of Christian resistance to the militarist state. They believed in a literal coming of Christ as the King of kings. The dissident Christians in Korea, like their Japanese counterparts, were religious fundamentalists. The Christians who struggled against the Shintō shrine worship attacked modern theological liberals. In the orthodox resistors, biblical fundamentalism Christian were by and large 'Adventists', who believed that the second coming of Christ to the world was near.

P.L. Berger in "Religious Liberalism and the Totalitarian Situation" (1960) observes that, although in general it is religious conservatism and the church bureaucracies which finally come to terms with the secular regime, it is correct to maintain that religious liberalism is more vulnerable to ideological infiltration in a totalitarian situation. In this context S. Bruce in "A Sociological Account of Liberal Protestantism" (1984) emphasises the 'precarious' feature of liberal Protestantism. Whilst liberals tend to see their aim in serving the secular world in a way that eventually erodes what is distinctive about their faith, conservative Protestants can avoid relativism by sticking firmly to certain historic statements of faith. In this respect the history of the so-called 'Japanese Christianity' claimed by the Japanese Congregational Church under the ultranationalistic fascist regime shows that religious liberalism, unlike religious conservatism, easily falls prey to totalitarian ideologies. The Korean Methodists' infamous movement of 'Japanisation of Christianity' in 1938 on the plea of 'Orientalising of Western orthodox Christian tradition' also exemplifies religious liberalism's
vulnerability to ideological infiltration in totalitarian situations. The document of reform - "Reform Plan for the Korean Methodist Church" (Appendix F) - adopted by the Korean Methodist Church on October 2, 1940, was one of the extreme cases of its utter obeisance to the reigning Japanese ideology.

The Shintō Shrine Issue provides the opportunity to investigate the sociological problems that relate to missions, e.g., missionary response to local cultures and its attitudes to the political authorities in the mission field. In general terms, missionary response to local cultures varies throughout the history of missionary effort; it varies according to the church in question, and also according to the culture where the mission is found. Similarly, missionary attitudes towards the political authorities can be sympathetic to an indigenous force, or can be influenced by the missionaries' own government at home, or by an alien colonial government.

Although there are certain valuable documents, many histories of missions, the reports of missionary societies, and monographs from the mission fields, it is true that these documents have rarely been utilised from the sociological point of view. In this respect, T.O. Beidelman's Colonial Evangelism (1982) is the first pioneering work which raises some general questions about the relationship between missions and colonialism. In his view, anthropologists and sociologists have been remiss in studying colonial institutions even if they give lip service to considering the total social context of the societies they investigate. 'Colonial institutions', he argues, should be studied because they provide insights into the development of the Third World. Given that the social universe of the Third World today resembles the colonial world which preceded it, the study
of institutions of colonialism would provide valuable insights into social features still evident in contemporary situations. In this sense, although all colonial organisations display similar characteristics, 'missions' are the quintessential example; they aim at the most far-reaching domination, attacking the most deeply held traditional beliefs and values as well as economic and political forms.

A rapprochement between sociological and historical studies has been evident in recent years. Thus, C.W. Mills rightly says all sociology worthy of the name is 'historical sociology'. The contrasting-type approach of social scientists often requires the examination of historical sources. Also some knowledge of world history is indispensable to the sociologist. The present work is a sociological study based on historical materials. The source materials relied upon include mainly academic writings on the Shinto Shrine Issue, missionary archives, missionary periodicals, the reports of missionary societies, histories of missions in Korea and Japan, contemporary Japanese periodicals, and other relevant publications written in English, Japanese and Korean. The perspective adopted will be sociological. That is to say, the present work proceeds on the assumption that people in groups act in ways which are constrained by the structures and processes of groups; and it is those constraining structures and processes which are the object of study. But it is hoped that this work will prove of interest not only to sociologists; there should be material of interest to the student of religious history, missiology, Korean church history, theology, international politics and Japanese studies. Following the principles of 'intellectual craftsmanship' outlined by Mills, I have tried to search for comparable cases within the histories of the various
Christian churches of Korea and Japan during the last war. In this present study undisputed facts in other disciplines have been incorporated where appropriate, yet any claims I might make to originality remain within the confines of sociology.

The Shintō Shrine question in Japan has attracted interest since the 1930s. There is no doubt that D.C. Holtom's Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism (1943) is the most important of recent scholarly contributions to an interpretation of the political implications of State Shintō. Historically, Holtom argues, the tensions between nationalism and universalism in Japan in the war (1931-1945) were concentrated in the area of the adjustment of Christianity to the claims of the military state. Holtom's thematic unity in his scholarly works is the political significance of State Shintō, that is, Japanese politico-religious policy in relation to world expansion. Lee Kun Sam's The Christian Confrontation with Shinto Nationalism (1966) examines the response of Japanese Christians to State Shintō. He argues that in its confrontation with the shrine worship problem the Japanese Church took a firm position at first, but later compromised with the growing militarist nationalism. In addition, he compares the Japanese and Korean Christian reactions to Shintō nationalism. C.H. Powles's "Foreign Missionaries and Japanese Culture in the Late Nineteenth Century: Four Patterns of Approach" (1969) has stimulated my own sociological investigation of the Shintō Shrine Issue in many ways. In order to compare and contrast the main differences in the approach of the various Christian traditions to Japanese culture, he has chosen to set up certain patterns of approach which approximate to the general characteristics of each type. These are as follows: (1) American Protestantism: a dialectic approach; (2) Roman Catholicism: a dualistic approach; (3) Russian Orthodoxy:
absorption into culture; and (4) Anglicanism: affirmation of variety. His typological approach provides a useful framework for the discussion of Christianity and culture.

Regarding the theological implications of the so-called 'Japanese Christianity' position, mention must be made of Takeda Kiyoko's "Apostasy - A Japanese Pattern" (1978). Takeda points out that Christianity in modern Japan manifested some unique qualities. First, Christian orthodoxy in Japan never became part of the Establishment as it did in Europe; it never ascended to a position of authority, either as a religion or as a political or social force. Rather, in a nation whose orthodoxy was the ideology of emperor worship, Christianity was regarded as a heretical opponent of the system. Christian heterodoxy in modern Japan (e.g., the 'New Theology' of the Meiji period as a form of rationalistic Christianity), Takeda argues, in fact often joined hands with anti-Christian 'orthodoxy' such as certain forms of the emperor system.

The Mikuni (Divine Land) Movement led by some Christians during World War II is another vivid example of a Christian offshoot combining with an ideology of social orthodoxy of that period, in this case ultranationalism. Regarding Japan as a divine land, they equated Christianity with ultranationalism. This led them actively to support worship at Shintō shrines. In a similar vein, E.E. Best in Christian Faith and Cultural Crisis: The Japanese Case (1966) argues that those who were most radical theologically were also the most nationalistic in Japan and thus suggests that there was a real connection in motivation between the two movements. With regard to the Shintō Shrine Issue this point deserves more attention than has been given to it elsewhere. The liberal Congregational or Kumiami Church, openly supporting government policy, initiated the so-called 'Japanese
Christianity' from the outset.

The present study owes much to J. Swyngedouw's "The Catholic Church and Shrine Shinto" (1967). Swyngedouw's work has remained remarkably relevant as regards the formulation of the object of my analysis. Swyngedouw, from the viewpoint of the sociology of religion, compares the Protestant attitudes towards the shrine problem with the Catholic position in Japan: in contrast with Protestants, Catholics were able to arrive at a uniform attitude on the shrine issue. This difference between the Protestant and Catholic attitude, he argues, can be attributed perhaps to a difference of church-structure. The structure of the Catholic Church is tightly institutionalised and even authoritarian; thereby the faithful are supposed to comply with a well-defined direction made by the Church. On the other hand, because Protestant Christians are divided into many denominations, its enforcement leaves much scope to individual interpretation. Furthermore, in connection with this first difference, Swyngedouw focuses on another point of difference: in defining their attitude, Protestants laid stress especially on the doctrinal aspect of the shrine question, while Catholics rather stressed the disciplinary and pastoral aspect. This needs more explanation. On the Catholic side, he argues, the question was seen from a different angle: stress was laid not on doctrine but rather on the practical problem of how Christians have to act in peculiar cases. In this sense, he points out, the Roman Instruction of 1936 which solved the shrine question in the Japanese Empire can be called 'disciplinary', although it seems to remain a point of controversy among Catholics themselves in what degree such a disciplinary instruction needs a theoretical basis. After discovering the difference in the points of emphasis, on both Catholic and Protestant
side, he finally notes another difference in the problem of 'Japanisation', of 'acculturation'. For the Protestant Christians, he argues, this adaptation movement, with its emphasis on doctrinal adaptation, is mainly a response to the preferences of the Japanese themselves, in contrast with what happens on the Catholic side. Regarding the reasons for this, Swyngedouw maintains that the Catholic attitude towards the shrine problem is rather the application of a more general principle of adaptation, holding good for the whole Church. As a matter of fact, he adds, the solution of the shrine problem in 1936 was not an isolated case: in 1935 the Catholics of Manchuria received permission to attend Confucian rites. Swyngedouw concludes that in the case of Japan we should consider the influence of government pressure on the Roman decision, but we should not forget either that the solution of the shrine problem in Japan remains the concrete application of an ecclesiastical policy carried out on a worldwide scale.

But what is interesting in this context is that the official attitude of the Catholic Church in Japan towards the shrine problem since 1952 is strikingly different from its counterpart in Korea. Despite the fact that participation was forbidden after the end of the Second World War, because the shrines became 'religion' again, the Japanese bishops in 1952 returned to the pre-war attitude. The official attitude of the Church can be summarised as follows: "It is lawful for the Japanese Catholics even now, according to the instruction of 1936 which allowed Catholics to participate and act in accord with the other citizens, to attend the rites of Shinto shrines, if there is a sufficient reason for such a participation". For the Japanese bishops a great nation such as the Japanese people needs some signs and symbolic manifestations of its tradition and national unity.
In their view, the shrine problem is therefore a matter of 'national symbolism'. In contrast Ch'ŏnjugyo chŏngŭi kuhyŏn chŏn'guk sajedan (CCKCS), the Roman Catholic Clerical Association for the Promotion of Social Justice, in 1985 finally broke an absolute silence about the Shinto Shrine question in the Catholic circle. With regard to the shrine question, the Clerical Association, unlike the Japanese bishops, frankly labelled their own pre-war attitude as a compromise and a subjection to the state because of the Church's defensiveness and the reflexes of a persecuted minority at that time. Given the present different positions towards their pre-war attitude between Japanese and Korean Catholics, Swyngedouw's conclusion that "the Catholic Church cannot accommodate herself in the domain of content of doctrine" may be called into question.

Moreover, with regard to the Shinto Shrine Issue, the difference between the Catholic attitude and that of the various Protestant churches should also be attributed to several other factors, e.g., the Church’s response to local cultures, the Church's attitudes to the political authorities. Otherwise we cannot grasp the reasons for the difference between the two churches in the matter of such an important and very delicate issue as to whether, and how far, they might be allowed to participate in ceremonies of State Shintoism. Also, given H.B. Hansen's assertion that "the early, formative period of missions is crucial for the latter pattern of church-state relations", we should examine the early historical experience of missions considering religion and politics. Nevertheless, as a whole, Swyngedouw's work has served as the beginning of my own sociological investigation of the Shinto Shrine Issue.

As we have indicated, there are some serious studies on the Japanese Shinto Shrine question, whereas we have only a few scholarly
works on the Korean situation. Furthermore, most of the previous writings on the Korean Shintō question were written from the perspective of Church/mission history or Christian theology or descriptive history, not in any consistent and sustained manner with meaningful reference to social theory outside the missionary context. As a result, they have on the whole failed to analyse the reasons for a division of opinion and action on the matter of Shintō shrine attendance among the various Christian Churches in Korea, which followed to some extent denominational lines.

With regard to this denominational division of attitudes regarding Shintō shrine worship, only a few studies have tried to analyse the possible reasons for either the subservient attitude in the Methodist and Catholic Missions or the stubborn resistance in the Presbyterian Missions. Ryu Sŏng-hŭi (1985) states the reasons for the Methodists' response as follows:

The main reason can be drawn from the fact that the Methodist Church in Korea was introduced in 1885 through Maclay, Superintendent of the Japan mission. Japanese Christians, as a whole, regarded the shrine practices as expressions of loyalty and patriotism.

On the other hand, on the reason for the fact that after the Japanese annexation the Roman Catholics had fewer conflicts with the Japanese administration, Kang Wi Jo (1967) comments as follows:

The main reason was that the Roman Catholic Church in Korea was not as strong as the Protestant population and lacked as much strength to confront the government. Also, the Roman Catholics did not meet so frequently as their Protestant brethren nor sing songs like "Onward Christian Soldiers", to arouse the suspicions of the authorities.

In relation to the reasons for subservience to Emperor worship on the part of the Roman Catholics, Yi Chin-gu (1988), from the perspective of the science of religion, rightly emphasises a revisionist policy with regard to the banned rites by the Holy See in
the early twentieth century. A turning point in Catholic mission history was the settlement of one of the most burning missionary problems in the Far East by Pope Pius XI in 1936: the permissibility of certain rites and ceremonies that are connected with 'ancestor worship', such as the cult of Confucius, and State Shintoism. But Yi Chin-gu does not examine this principle of wider latitude of adaptation in Roman Catholicism further. The principle of adaptation as an internal factor deserves consideration.

In addition, Yi Chin-gu admits the significance of political factors in the decision of Roman Catholicism with regard to Shinto shrine worship. According to Yi, the 1929 Vatican-Italy Concordat and the Tripartite Pact had in some way influenced the decision of the Vatican in 1936. Given that in 1936 Japan joined Germany in a so-called anti-Communist pact and this was extended to the Tripartite Pact in 1940, Yi's point can be accepted with qualifications. The Roman instruction of 1936 should be closely re-examined on political as well as theological grounds.

Incidentally, regarding the stubborn resistance in the Presbyterian Missions in Korea in the matter of the forced shrine worship, a conservative Presbyterian historian Yi Man-nyol (1981) maintains that the Non-Shrine Worship Movement (SPU) was the last invaluable participation on the part of Korean Christians in the anti-Japanese independence campaigns. In contrast, Yi Chin-gu criticises such an interpretation: it attempts to reduce the Shinto shrine question to one of politics only. Yi Chin-gu correctly points out that most of the members of the SPU, in point of fact, went along with the policy of Japanese cultural assimilation, e.g., Ch'angssi kaemyŏng (a campaign called establishing Japanese family names and changing given names), and Hwangguk sinmin sŏsa (an oath to the
Imperial Subject Rescript). Moreover, Yi Yong-hoon (1978), a moderate Presbyterian historian, has already stressed the case of Chu Ki-ch'ol in 1930. He was a representative figure of the SPU, who resisted the shrine worship and so lost his life; but he had admitted himself to be a subject of the Japanese Empire.

It is interesting in this context to find that Kim Yong-Bock (1981), a liberal Presbyterian theologian, traces the messianic politics of the minjung (the people of God) from the Tonghak Peasant Rebellion of 1895 to the March First Independence Movement of 1919 and on to the confrontation between Korean Christians and the Japanese imperial authority in the 1930s over the issue of Shinto worship. He characterises the whole recent history of Korea, in which Christianity has grown, as a battle between 'messianic politics' and 'political messianism'. He delineates three forms of political messianism in Korea during the last sixty years: (1) Japanese ultranationalism in the form of colonialism; (2) the North Korean Communist movement; (3) the military technocracy in South Korea. In the history of Korean Christianity before liberation it was a fact that the conservative fundamentalists resolutely resisted Shinto shrine worship. In contrast to this, the liberals and Catholics as a whole yielded to Japanese pressure at that time, thereby losing credence in the eyes of the Korean population. However, since the 1960s, especially the 1970s, they began to display a messianic political struggle against the military regime. Ironically, after liberation from the Japanese rule, the Koryo Seminary faction (former members of the SPU) have shown a rather conservative conformity. Taking into account this contrasting fact I would dispute Kim Yong-Bock's assertion that suggests a historical connection in motivation between the Non-Shrine Worship Movement (1938-1945) and the recent
political struggle for justice led by the liberal Protestants and Catholics. But this theme goes beyond the scope of the present study. Nevertheless from the foregoing discussion it seems to be important to consider various churches' historical relationships to nationalism in explaining their different attitudes towards the shrine problem.

In terms of the study of 'church struggles' it would seem to be an error to discount the influence of the 'pure' religious idea working in history. There are various interpretations of the major motives for the SPU. On the motives, Lee Kun Sam, a conservative Presbyterian theologian (Koryo Seminary), enumerates the following aspects: (a) obedience to the Commandments of God and Love for the Church; (b) eschatological expectation in its pre-millenarian form; (c) faithful witness to the divine truth; (d) the high estimate of martyrdom and the glory of God. Thus to re-examine the motives, beliefs and actions of the SPU in terms of Christianity and its rejection of the world would provide an indispensable argument to explain the radical challenge and withdrawal on the part of the conservative Presbyterians during the war time.

This study has two purposes. One is to offer a detailed analysis of the content of the debate, the attitudes and actions of the three major Christian churches - the Catholic, the Methodist and the Presbyterian - towards the shrine problem in their historical evolution, with the focus on the years since the 'Manchurian Incident' of 1931 (Chapter IV). The second is to attempt, for the first time, to explain the different positions of the three churches in terms of the sociology of religion and the sociology of missions (Chapter V).

For this purpose, what we propose is that we should consider several factors in order fully to explain the possible reasons for the
different attitudes of the three Christian churches on the Shintō Shrine Issue. In this context the sociological consequences of religious experience provide a general framework. J. Wach asserts that the influence of a religion on social relations and institutions will depend largely on 'the spirit which permeates the doctrines, cult, and organisation of a religious group'. The main assumption here is that the difference in ideological elements is more important in religious institutions than has been usually thought. In explaining the divisions of positions, therefore, I propose the following eight factors: (1) Theological emphasis; (2) Church structure; (3) World view; (4) Mission policy; (5) Relationship to nationalism; (6) Relation to non-Christian religions; (7) Early historical experiences; and (8) Nationalities of missionaries. The theoretical framework of the factors by which the denominational difference will be compared is presented separately in Chapter V.A.

Chapter I presents a review of the theoretical and methodological literature which is relevant to the study of the Shintō Shrine Issue. Chapter II generally surveys the introduction of the two principal forms of Christianity, Roman Catholicism and Protestantism in Korea. Chapter III examines modern Japan, State Shintō and Christianity. Chapters II and III offer background information for the later discussion. Chapter IV analyses in detail the responses of the three Christian churches towards the shrine problem in their historical evolution. Chapter V compares the different positions of the three churches by employing the above-mentioned eight factors systematically. In the conclusions of the work, the attempt has been made to offer some key factors which are related to the established body of sociological theory.

I believe that a sociological understanding of the contemporary
religious situation should contribute to every seriously interested person's grasp of the problems. Because I am a Christian, I care about the problems I discuss here. This study will, hopefully, stimulate new insights into the nature and limitations of Korean Christianity in the midst of explosive church growth. The subsidiary result of this project would be to add a fresh insight into the study of the 'church-state problem' in a colonial setting or the interaction between mission, church and state.
PART I
CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. Sociology and History

This is a sociological study based on historical materials, and accordingly it is necessary to consider whether sociologists and historians would approach the subject differently. Sociology and history are different academic disciplines, unlike each other in origin and intention, but dealing with the same subject matter: human interaction. From the recognition of this complex relationship arises the need to examine the actual or potential inter-dependence of sociology and history. There is a considerable literature pertaining to the interaction between historians and sociologists. In this context Richard Hofstadter anticipates the development of a somewhat new historical genre, which will be a mixture of traditional history and the social sciences. Peter Burke in Sociology and History (1980) supports the idea of a convergence of sociology and history:

What some of us would like to see, what we are beginning to see, is a social history, or historical sociology - the distinction should become irrelevant - which would be concerned both with understanding from within and explaining from without; with the general and with the particular; and which would combine the sociologist's acute sense of structure with the historian's equally sharp sense of change.

Similarly, E.H. Carr in What is History? (1961) had already noted the positive influence of sociology on history, remarking that "the more sociological history becomes and the more historical sociology becomes, the better for both". According to Carr, the reciprocal process of interaction between the historian and his facts, what he calls the dialogue between present and past, is a dialogue not between
abstract and isolated individuals, but between the society of today and the society of yesterday. The past is intelligible to us only in the light of the present. It is to be noted here that Carr emphasises that what distinguishes the historian from the collector of historical facts is generalisation: History is concerned with the relation between the unique and the general. In Carr's words on the relation between history and sociology:

Sociology at present faces two opposite dangers - the danger of becoming ultra-theoretical and the danger of becoming ultra-empirical. The first is the danger of losing itself in abstract and meaningless generalisations about society in general. Society with a big S is as misleading a fallacy as History with a big H. This danger is brought nearer by those who assign to sociology the exclusive task of generalizing from the unique events recorded by history ... The other danger is that ... of a sociology 'split into a series of discrete technical problems of social readjustment'. Sociology is concerned with historical societies every one of which is unique and moulded by specific historical antecedents and conditions. ... Sociology, if it is to become a fruitful field of study, must, like history, concern itself with the relation between the unique and the general.

There would be no need for the sociologist to turn historian, if the historians asked the questions that are crucial to the sociologist. All he would then have to do would be to use the historian's findings. The difference between historians and sociologists would be not in the methods employed but in the kinds of questions asked. The requirement for a historically oriented sociology could well be described as a combination of 'brains' and 'hard work', with 'brains' standing for conceptualisation and 'hard work' for a willingness to go to the sources.

For the former, Max Weber regarded the formation of typological concepts as the major contribution of sociology to history. If used as an auxiliary construct, typology mediates between the general and the unique. Weber's 'ideal types' - both the widely generalisable
and the historically specific variety - explicitly exaggerated and simplified the cluster of variables under investigation and simultaneously established the type as a measure of empirical deviation. The inductive construction of what Weber calls 'ideal-types' is an abstraction, an over-simplification and exaggeration of empirical external facts in order to clarify meaning. It is not exhaustive in the sense that it brings the full knowledge of an historical event to us. No method can do that. We can only 'impute causation' and 'trace relationships'; which is what the 'ideal-type' seeks to do.

The 'ideal-type', then, is a constellation of related facts, movements and events in history which may be built up as reason is applied to the empirical account of history in time. These concepts constitute realities which are of 'interest' to men. Thus the more theoretical and general our thought becomes about these realities, the less our resultant conceptualizations will be filled with concrete empirical events. The abstract theory is only roughly related to the practice. Any abstract conception based on genuine 'interest' can bring further understanding whether it has to do with the arts, politics, economics, religion, the family, or the community. In practice the number of possible 'ideal-types' is limited by the limited nature of man's interests. Thus we are saved from a hopeless relativism.

Weber's 'ideal-types' are of two fundamental kinds: an individualising concept and a generalising one. The first states what is to be explained. It takes the stuff of history. The phenomena 'capitalism' or 'socialism' may be outlined. A further division of this first kind of individualising concept deals with the realm of ideas, examples of which might be 'the Protestant ethic' in Weber's
own work, or any particular theology, system of doctrines or philosophy, examples of 'liberalism', 'modernism', 'fundamentalism' etc. They influence actors much, even though the actors themselves may not be able to explain them or even be consciously aware of them.\footnote{11}

If historical data are 'unique', then no historical generalisation is theoretically possible. Hence Weber suggested the ideal types as conceptual tools (for the historian) rather than as generalisations.\footnote{12} Weber asserted that the causal analysis of unique events requires a prior knowledge of the regularities of human conduct. In Weber's view it is this knowledge which sociology provides. For him sociology was an attempt to ascertain these regularities by means of a comparative analysis, which took the entire known history of mankind for its province. 'Regularity' means that certain types of conduct, or certain beliefs concerning the legitimation of authority, or certain kinds of leadership, could be formulated in such a way as to encompass the entire range of possible forms of behaviour.\footnote{13} According to Weber, the task of the historian is to explain the 'unique deviation' from the ideal type. In this sense, therefore, it may be said that history seeks to explain the unique, while sociology attempts to establish a complete 'inventory' of human behaviour in order to provide us with a knowledge of the range of recurrent types of individual conduct. As Cahnman and Buskoff suggest:

> Without such interplay between the general and the unique no explanation would be possible. In short, if some historians see no generalities in their data, it is because they do not look for them. In that case, historically trained sociologists, along with better-informed historians, must step into the breach.\footnote{14}

Sociology is neither history, nor economics nor political
science. Sociology, especially when it is dealing with historical material, is the attempt to interpret historical events in their relationship to one another. One school of thought, represented by Collingwood, can assert that an adequate description of what happened produces the explanation of why it happened. Of course, adequate description is the crucial term: adequacy presumably refers to sufficient causes and is likely to depend on implied or explicit hypotheses. Indeed, the processes—description and analysis—are reciprocal in practice. Thus for those who give prominence to analysis and explanation, responsible description, including statistical evidence, is an indispensable base. But the selection of facts for descriptive purposes always presupposes some criteria of relevance which, in turn, are grounded in an explanatory scheme.

As a whole, the task of history is to be concerned with the exacting, exhaustive interpretation of particular events. The historian must preserve the uniqueness of the concrete observation, whatever he may add to it in terms of explanation or interpretation. The sociologist is concerned with the why of the act. Since it is the responsibility of the historian to guard the uniqueness of particular events, he may appear to be dealing with less problematical material than does the sociologist. However, in his concentration on the particular or the unique, he may fail to discover the wider context of events. To compensate for its lack of concrete content and illustrative detail, sociology may well be able to offer, in Weber's terms, "a greater precision of concepts". The sociologist should discover dynamic relationships and levels of meaning in human activity that may otherwise be hidden.

Joachim Wach argues that there is a quantitative and qualitative difference between the approaches, methods, and goals of theology and
the general science of religion (phenomenology, history, psychology, and sociology of religion). While the method of theology is normative, that of the general science of religion is descriptive. According to Wach, the field of the sociology of religion is the individual, typological, and comparative study of religious groupings, religious fellowship and association as well as doctrine and rites. Wach's brief, historical critique of the sociology of religion can be a real point of departure.

Without the work of the historian of religion, the sociologist would be helpless. Yet neither can substitute for the other; whereas the former is interested in longitudinal lines of development, the latter tries to cut through these lines vertically. It is the sociologist's hope that his categories will prove fruitful for the organization of the historian's material.

In Roger Mehl's view, of all the auxiliary sciences of the sociology of religion, the history of religions is undoubtedly the most indispensable. It is true that the sociological interpretation of a religion must give an important and even decisive place to the history of the religion: every religion is characterised by a certain historical continuity and must be studied in space and time. No descriptive sociology is complete which does not push its inquiry as far as possible in time and correlatively in space. For it is of the nature of a religion to be transmitted and diffused. Only history permits us to understand how certain traits of religious communities derive from the mode of diffusion of the religion being considered, from the way in which it is established deeply or superficially. Also, whether one considers a religion in its transmission or in its diffusion, only history can enable us to understand how these processes have shaped the religious communities and the understanding which they have of themselves.

But we should also emphasise the different attitudes which
history and sociology take regarding these phenomena. History restricts itself to recording and describing the succession of stages and forms, in the attempt to see how they interact and condition one another. Sociology must be in possession of these historical data, in order, first of all, to avoid constructing an a priori conception of the religion being considered. A conception of a religion cannot be based solely on doctrinal considerations as they are presented to sociology by the religion's theologians.

The objective of the sociologist, however, is to construct religious types, types of religious communities, that are midway between the particular datum and the conceptual generalisation. The sociologist always moves between empirical particularity, which history studies, and conceptual generality, which the physical sciences study. Here we should add that this type constructed by sociology is always an ideal type. This concern to construct a typology is the primary distinction between sociology of religion and history of religions, which follows developments in their continuity and in the indefinite sequence of their forms. In brief, sociology is not the negation of history, although it proceeds in a different manner from history. Sociology refers to history and ultimately to historical events. But this reference which effectively operates in the life of groups takes very diverse forms. The sociology of religion provides many examples of Georges Gurvitch's 'tendential regularities': the sect has a tendency always to take identical attitudes vis-a-vis the church, for example, denunciation of the corruption of the church, of its hypocrisy, of its institutional, official nature, etc.

It is generally accepted that the credit for having been the first to conceive of a systematic sociology of religion belongs to Max
Weber. Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch were close personal friends, and the former influenced the latter deeply. In many respects Weber's work was complemented by the exhaustive studies of Troeltsch, which were limited exclusively to Christianity. On the basis of his studies of Christianity at the time of the Reformation, Troeltsch concluded that Christianity had always taken either the form of a distinct church or sect. As is well known, Troeltsch has had a profound influence in turn upon the thought of H. Richard Niebuhr, a theologian representative of a concern with the relationship between Christianity and sociology. In this context it should be stressed that Christian thinkers have been influenced directly or indirectly by Weber, who recognised the autonomous nature of the religious category. The point of prime importance to us is that in Weber's theoretical recognition of the autonomy of the religious category, along with other categories such as the political and the economic, the insights of sociology become complementary to those of theology rather than constituting another attempt to do away with them. Thus, Wach, in following Weber, summarises that "the sociology of religion will supplement but can never replace phenomenology, psychology, or history of religion, to say nothing of theology".

As Cahnman and Boskoff argue, in sociology types are not ends in themselves; they guide investigation by focusing attention on significant clusters and concatenations of fact and serve as a means of evaluating factual evidence as variations from typological patterns. Comparison offers indispensable support, because, without the search for variations, typology would cease to be a means to an end and become a dogmatic entity in its own right. If used as an auxiliary construct, typology mediates between the general and the unique, so much so that Weber regarded the formation of typological
concepts as the major contribution of sociology to history. Sociology, if it is to become a fruitful field of study, must, like history, concern itself with the relation between the unique and the general. But it must also become dynamic - a study not of society at rest, but of social change and development.  

With this in mind, the present study, based on historical materials, searches for variations of the three churches towards the Shintō Shrine problem during the war period. As a sociologist who is concerned with the why of the variations, I have made an effort to compare the different positions of the three churches by employing several typological concepts. In this sense this work is C.W. Mills' "Historical Sociology".

B. Sociological Understanding of Religion and Politics

1. The Relationship of Religion and Politics

The purpose of this section is to review existing sociological studies on the relationship between religion and the political order. The sociological study of society and religion is incomplete until their relations with each other on all levels are examined. In this context, the state merits special consideration because it is quantitatively and qualitatively the most important form of the secular institutions of society. The question of the relationship between religion and politics is of course a big topic, which has been subject to extensive theological and sociological comment. This review is by no means exhaustive: some of these studies have been selected in order to illustrate what seems to me a fairly common approach underlying the study of religion and politics.

Theoretically, religion may be related to the state in three
different patterns. Religion may actively ally itself with the state, either dominating it or supporting it as its instrumental force; religion may withdraw into seclusion by renouncing secular political life; or it may actively struggle against the state either to preserve itself or to gain political dominance.¹ Most religions have all three tendencies - fusion, disjunction, and creative tension between religious ideals and the world - in some sort of combination.² According to Peter Worsley, religion is neither intrinsically conservative nor revolutionary.³ It can be infused with any kind of social content, notably political. The relationship of religious beliefs, let alone movements and organisations, to the established power-system therefore varies and is not a matter for metaphysical pronouncement disguised as sociological generalisation. It requires empirical investigation to see what the case is. We cannot know a priori.

According to R.N. Bellah, the ability of religious values to exert long-term pressure on a society is dependent on some degree of structural differentiation of the religious institutions from other social institutions, especially the political institutions.⁴ Historically, religious and political institutions were relatively well differentiated in historical societies, compared to primitive and archaic societies. Purely secular political rationalisation in historic societies gave rise to serious social disruptions when the 'limit images' of religions were too sharply abrogated. Thus, as S.N. Eisenstadt has pointed out, the possibility of structural innovation in either the religious or political field and of the contribution of each to the development of the other is partly at least a function of the degree to which they are differentiated.⁵ Too close a fusion tends to inhibit progress in either.
Historically, the transitions from a priesthood serving a political association into a religious congregation was associated primarily with the rise of the great world empires of the Near East, especially Persia.\(^6\) Political associations were annihilated and the population disarmed; their priesthoods, however, were assigned certain political powers and were rendered secure in their positions. This was done because the religious congregation was regarded as a valuable instrument for pacifying the conquered.\(^7\) Therefore, in medieval Christianity in the Occident, in post-Reformation Lutheranism and Anglicanism, and in both Christianity and Islam in the Near East, a parish - a grouping different from the secular, political, or economic community which is missing in the religions of China and ancient India - was essentially a 'passive' ecclesiastical association and the jurisdictional district of a priest.

According to Max Weber, the power of the 'apolitical' Christian religion of love was not derived from interests in social reform, nor from any such thing as 'proletarian instincts', but rather the complete loss of such concerns.\(^8\) The same motivation accounts for the increasing importance of all salvation religions and congregational religions since the first and second centuries of the Roman period. This transformation was carried out, not only or even primarily by the subjugated classes who in their slave revolts had become the carriers of special anti-political religions, but principally by those who had lost interest in politics, who were without influence in politics, or who had become disgusted by politics. Thus the attitude of the early Christians towards the state was one of deep distrust and aversion. They refused to do homage to the image of the Emperor as a god, and many also opposed war and military service. The Christians regarded themselves as a separate
nation, the people of God. They withdrew from active participation in the courts and in public life, and formed a separate community, based on non-compulsion and brotherly love, which to their enemies seemed to be a state within the state. It should be noted that the early Christians rejected the ideas of loyalty to a specific fatherland, and this tradition can be traced through the whole history of Christianity.

The conflict of ascetic ethics, as well as of the mystically oriented temper of brotherly love, with the apparatus of domination (Herrschaft) which is basic to all political institutions, produced the most varied types of tension and compromise. In Max Weber's view, the polarity between religion and politics is least wherever, as in Confucianism, religion is equivalent to a belief in spirits or simply a belief in magic, and ethics is no more than a clear accommodation to the world on the part of the educated. Nor does any conflict at all between religion and politics exist wherever, as in Islam, religion makes obligatory the violent propagandising of a true prophecy which consciously eschews universal conversion and enjoins the subjugation of unbelievers under the domination of a ruling class dedicated to the religious war as one of the basic postulates of its faith, without, however, recognising the salvation of the subjugated.

Actual conflicts between concrete demands of a state and concrete religious injunctions arise only when a religion is the pariah faith of a group that is excluded from political equality, but still believes in the religious prophecies of divinely appointed restoration of its social level. This was the case in Judaism, which never in theory rejected the state and its coercion but, on the contrary, expected in the Messiah their own masterful political ruler, an
expectation that was sustained at least until the time of the
destruction of the Temple by Hadrian. Wherever communal religions
have rejected all employment of force as an abomination to God and
have sought to require their members' avoidance of all contact with
violence, without, however, reaching the consistent conclusion of
absolute flight from the world, the conflict between religion and
politics has led either to martyrdom or to passive anti-political
sufferance of the coercive regime. Hence, in Judeo-Christian cultures
religion is expected to be at odds with the world around it. While
the religious life must perforce be lived in this world, it is not to
be of it. Indeed, it is held to be the duty of priests and prophets
to take those who become enmeshed in the trivial affairs of this world
and turn them towards more eternal concerns. Thus, the church is seen
to exist in a hostile and evil world, and to have a sacred mission to
denounce and resist matters of the flesh, for all this shall pass
away.

But, somehow, Christian churches rarely seem to act upon these
principles. Despite a long line of prophets, saints, and reformers,
who have condemned the worldliness of the church, the majority of
religious leaders have been practical men who have gone about the
business of managing the mundane interests of religion. Thus Ernst
Troeltsch suggests that the history of Christian churches is best
understood in a dialectical process of two contradictory yet
complementary tendencies: 'compromise' with the world and 'tension'
with the world. He summarises the problems and dilemmas of
institutionalised religion as follows: the central ideals and values
of Christianity cannot be realised within this world apart from
compromise, and therefore the history of Christianity becomes the
story of a constantly renewed search for this compromise, and a fresh
Historically, the position of medieval Christianity in relation to the state as a whole oscillated or, more correctly, shifted its centre of gravity from one to another of several distinct points of view. At first the attitude of the early Christians towards the state was one of deep distrust and aversion. There was a complete abomination of the existing Roman empire. The empire was regarded as the dominion of Anti-Christ. Thus the early Christians refused to do homage to the image of the Emperor as a God. A second view was complete indifference to the state, and hence passive sufferance of the use of force, which was deemed to be unrighteous in every case. This entailed active compliance with all the coercive obligations imposed by the state, e.g. the payment of taxes which did not directly imperil religious salvation. For the true intent of the New Testament verse about "rendering unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's" is not the meaning deduced by modern harmonising interpretations, namely a positive recognition of the obligation to pay taxes, but rather the reverse: an absolute indifference to all the affairs of the mundane world. The early church was defeatist in its attitude towards the 'world', regarding the world as doomed, and expressed its optimism in its millennial hopes. In Weber's view, the first and the second attitudes belong primarily to the period of eschatological expectation.

When the millennial hopes began to wane and the church was forced to assume responsibility for political and economic life, there was little disposition to challenge the basic social customs and relationships in the name of the Christian ideal. Slavery, injustice, inequality of wealth, war, these all were accepted as ordained by the 'natural law' which God devised for man's sinful
state. Eventually, the prevailing institutions were accepted, even though the church was quite conscious of the conflict between them and its own ideal. Its natural determinism, its faith that nothing in nature or history could exist without the explicit will of God, gave additional support to this tendency. Thus, the third viewpoint entailed withdrawal from concrete activities of the political community such as the cult of emperors, because and insofar as such participation necessarily led to sin. Nevertheless, the state's authority was accorded positive recognition as being desired by God, even when exercised by unbelievers and even though inherently sinful. It was taught that the state's authority, like all the institutions of this world, is an ordained punishment for the sin brought upon man by Adam's fall, which the Christian must obediently take upon himself. Finally, the authority of the state, even when exercised by unbelievers, might be evaluated positively, due to our condition of sin, as an indispensable instrument for the social control of reprehensible sins and as a general condition for all mundane existence pleasing to God. It is to be noted that ancient Christianity did not really go beyond the last point of view in principle, even after it had been recognised as the state religion in 313. In this respect, it should be pointed out that the 'general' schema according to which religion customarily solves the problem of the tension between religious ethics and the non-ethical or unethical requirements of life in the political and economic structures of power within the world is to 'relativise' and 'differentiate' ethics into an organic ethic of vocation and a contrasting ascetic ethic. This holds true wherever a religion is dominant within a political organisation or occupies a privileged status, and particularly when it is a religion of 'institutional' grace. Rather, the great change in
the attitude of Christianity towards the state took place in the medieval church, as the investigations of Troeltsch have brilliantly demonstrated.25

In the matter of the political ethic, according to Troeltsch, in Catholicism the state belongs to the natural stage of existence, above which there rises the supernatural stage of Grace, which is completely indifferent to the state.26 In Catholicism, therefore, the state is sometimes utilised and glorified, sometimes treated merely as the material for and presupposition of something else, sometimes shorn of all authority and trampled under foot by the world-organisation of the Church. In this context it should be pointed out that the Eastern Churches assumed a national character, while the Western Church remained supra-national in spirit.27 Whilst the Roman Empire had elsewhere destroyed national independence, at all times the Eastern Churches have been bulwarks of nationality. Where history and theology had combined in the West to set Church over state, or even Church against state, the East preferred to view the church as operating within the state.28

The Greek Orthodox Church, the greatest of all Eastern Churches, was directed by a Patriarchate which was a state department of the Byzantine Empire, and her religious questions were often decided by the Emperors, largely on political grounds.29 Consequently, Eastern Christians did not fear a strong state, which is precisely what Byzantium and Moscow gave them.30 The Roman Popes, on the contrary, came to assert their independence, and for some time even their supremacy, in regard to the temporal powers. The liturgical and official language of the Roman Church everywhere was Latin. The cause of this difference was that the Greek Church grew up on the soil of ancient civilisations and under a government maintaining Roman
traditions, while the Roman Church developed partly on the ruins of the old Roman world, and partly among uncivilised peoples. The Roman Church, therefore, was absolutely indispensable to the temporal rulers for maintaining or building up an administration and civilisation. This gave the Roman Church a unique authority, even in purely temporal matters.

In Lutheranism the state is also a part of the natural order, but as such it is a necessary form of the activity of Christian love and of the Christian spirit; but since it is still essentially a product of the natural evolution of reason which punishes and heals sins, and as such is guided by God, it gains the supernatural dignity of a power which has been directly appointed by God, which, above all, must be endured and respected. The view of Luther, who absolutely rejected religious wars and revolutions as well as any active resistance, was that only the secular authority, whose domain is untouched by the rational postulates of religion, has the responsibility of determining whether political wars are just or unjust. Hence, the individual subject has no reason to burden his own conscience with this matter if only he gives active obedience to the political authority in this and in all other matters which do not destroy his relationship to God. Luther relieved the individual of the ethical responsibility for war and transferred it to the authorities. To obey the authorities in matters other than those of faith could never constitute guilt. Politics did not interest Luther. The Christian had simply to obey the orders of his government, however unjust and cruel it was. Every government was ordained by God, and wicked rulers were a divine punishment for the sins of their subjects. No right of resistance was admitted by Luther. In brief, Lutheran orthodoxy had appreciated the state, true,
but it still taught that the state existed mainly because of sin and that its chief function was to punish sin and protect the church. 35

But the romantic movement of the late eighteenth century lifted the state out of this role of mere watchdog. 36 Napoleon's conquest of Germany underlined even more the importance of the political state to protect the 'Volk'. During Prussia's 'Regeneration' (1807-15) many preachers, like Schleiermacher, sought to indoctrinate people in this new role for the state. Schleiermacher, whose influence was felt far beyond the boundaries of his fatherland, merely realised, as did Luther, but not the later German ecclesiastical leaders, that too close an interlocking of the religious and political organisations would in the long run accrue to the benefit of neither. In practice, however, he, with nationalist aspiration, often conceded to the omnipotent Prussian bureaucracy great ecclesiastical authority. 37 In spite of his demand for complete autonomy, he had clearly conceded the primacy of the state and merely advocated that it voluntarily impose upon itself certain limitations in ecclesiastic matters. Eventually he sincerely believed that in the divinely ordained historic evolution the German nation was destined to play a decisive role. 38 Schleiermacher taught that the state was, if not the kingdom of God, at least an expression of the will of God. 39 Thus many German Protestant clergymen in the twentieth century taught that the Christian must obey his government in the name of God and religion.

In this context we can note that Marx's critique of religion was directed specifically against the Protestantism of the Prussian state, and therefore against other forms of European state Protestantism. 40 In his view, "it was not the downfall of the old religions that brought the downfall of the old states, but the downfall of the old states that brought the downfall of the old religions". 41 If, as in
Protestantism, there is no supreme head of the church, he maintains, the domination of religion is but the religion of domination, the cult of the will of the government. Marx has raised the question of the relationship between religion and the political order as follows:

Christians live in states with differing constitutions, some in a republic, some in an absolute, some again in a constitutional monarchy. Christianity does not decide on the correctness of the constitutions, it teaches, as religion must: Submit to the authority, for all authority is ordained by God. The correctness of state constitutions is, therefore, to be judged not according to Christianity, not according to the nature, the essence of the state itself, not according to the nature of Christian society, but according to the nature of human society.

Thus, Marx's argument on religion and state was that since religion is a bulwark of the state, to attack religion was to attack the state. From his own experience, it was as much due to the protection of the state as to the survival value of its dogmas that the German version of Christianity survived in Prussia. The major thrust of his critique was directly against the use of Christian religion by the socially and economically exploitative Prussian State for its own ends, and by other similar Western capitalist states for the same purpose. Protestantism was a religion well suited, by its own nature, to such use by political rulers, for its ideas had a particularly close correspondence with the condition of men in a capitalist society. Marx's critique of religion in terms of its involvement with political rule is an important item on the agenda for the study of religion in its world setting.

Incidentally, however, we can say that in some respects Christianity, and particularly Calvinism, made it a religious obligation to defend the faith against tyranny by the use of force. Calvinism knew principled violence as a means of defending the faith. Here it is important to note that the main cause of separation between
Lutheranism and Calvinism was the difference in their ethical and social, rather than in their strictly theological doctrines. Connected with the former was the divergence between Martin Luther's intrinsic nationalism and the internationalism propagated by John Calvin. Thus, though the fundamental theological doctrines of Calvin are about the same as those of Luther, the influence of Calvinism on the national character was very different from that of Lutheranism.

Luther paved the way for the quietistic, 'patriarchal' doctrine of monarchical power which secured, and theologically justified, overwhelming state control over ecclesiastical affairs. Calvinism, on the contrary, began with the founder's radical use of state power and ended with the formation of the least politically controlled churches in the history of Christendom since 313. From the outset Calvin and his followers were far more internationally minded than Luther and his disciples. To be sure, as a born Frenchman, Calvin resented the empire's overbearing claims to universal leadership and generally repudiated the idea of universal monarchy as "most absurd".

To Luther God appeared as the loving father whose grace was extended to every fervent believer in him. Religion was primarily a matter of pious and humble feeling. Calvin conceived God as the stern, majestic ruler who had arbitrarily selected some men for salvation and condemned others to hell for enhancing his own glory. To him God was primarily power and will, and energetic action in the service of God was the best proof of belonging to the elect. While Luther preferred patient suffering to action and left public affairs to the existing authorities, Calvin aimed at founding the perfect Theocracy, a community of saints, or a new Chosen People, on the model of the Old Testament, and stressed strictest moral discipline. Thus, there was no room for toleration in his community. Though he,
distrusting the people as much as Luther did, rejected any right of revolution, events, nevertheless, gave Calvinism a revolutionary tendency.

F. Hertz explains the events as follows:

In several countries it [Calvinism] was taken up by the nobility in their fight against royal absolutism. In Scotland John Knox organized the Church on democratic and anti-hierarchical lines. His successor, Andrew Melville, once took King James VI by the sleeve, called him God's silly vassal, and added that there were two kings and kingdoms in Scotland, the commonwealth under King James, and the Church under Christ. No wonder that in France, where the national cause was widely identified with royalty, Calvinism appeared as a danger to national unity and this decided its fate.

Here it is noteworthy that in his *Institutes*, written under the impact of French persecutions, Calvin had to defend the conscientious resisters. Moreover, the obligation to bring about a revolution on behalf of the faith was naturally taught by engaging in wars of missionary enterprise and by their derivative sects. From this standpoint, the employment of force by the state can have moral sanction only when the force is used for the control of sins, for the glory of God, and for combating religious evils — in short, only for religious purposes. In Weber's view, Calvinism, unlike Lutheranism, knew principled violence as a means of defending the faith; thus Calvinism acknowledged the crusade, which was for Islam an element of life from the beginning.

In Ascetic Protestantism, like the Puritan ethic, the organization of the state is likewise in principle deduced from the Natural Law of the fallen state, but it is always estimated according to its rational purpose and subordinated to its responsibility not merely to God, but also to the people from whom it has received its mandate, whether legally or merely morally. Thus the honours,
offices, and dignities of the state are functions appointed by God and the people, but they do not proceed from inherent divine right within the government. Within the state, therefore, there is a strong sense of the equality of all in the presence of God. The main features of the attitude of Ascetic Protestantism towards the state are inclined towards a liberal or democratic conception of the state, apart from egalitarian theories; it tends to regard the state simply as something which must be endured; it glorifies its own national inheritance more for its religious mission than for its political greatness; and it likes to regulate international relationships according to peace principles, which are also reasonable, and from the business point of view desirable.

In this context it should be noted that the Puritans, the earlier generations in the development of ascetic Protestantism, were, by and large, not centrally situated in the main prestige structure. The rank and file were yeomen farmers, craftsmen, small merchants, and the like. The essential point is their extraordinary knowledge of and concern with the details of the Bible. Almost as much as the Jews they were 'people of the Book'.

Ascetic Protestantism views imperialistic and nationalist movements with a good deal of misgiving. Sometimes it rejects them on principle; sometimes it is able to justify them as an extension of Christian civilisation, whose sole genuine representative it feels itself to be; it has been entrusted with this destiny by God. It then regards itself in the light of the Old Testament as a 'Chosen People' and absorbs Imperialism into the aim of Foreign Missions.

In a discussion of the Western theories of Church-State relations the contribution of Max Weber, Ernst Troeltsch and Karl Marx should be considered. But it should be emphasised in this context that there
are indeed some limitations in the sociology of religion. Given that sociology developed as a discipline originally in the context of Christian culture, it would be no surprise that the early conceptions of religion that sociologists entertained were heavily suffused with the ideas, ethos, and atmosphere of Christianity. Some of the basic categories of analysis were all too evidently drawn from Christian theological concepts, such as the distinction between the sacred and the profane.\textsuperscript{58} Thus it was perhaps too easy for sociologists to assume that the Western case – that is the Christian case – provided the paradigm by which all other cases might be analysed.

In this respect, Max Weber did consider similar phenomena to the church/sect division in relation to other cultures, especially in his work on China.\textsuperscript{59} It is generally accepted that Weber tried to deal with the whole religious system, but, in his preoccupation with the non-emergence of capitalism in China, he failed to reach a satisfying synthesis.\textsuperscript{60} Moreover, at the beginning of his \textit{Sociology of Religion} (1964), he is uncertain as to how religion should be defined. Weber, like all other writers on Chinese religion, restricted its range to something less than the total system of religion-in-politics. Thus he gives 'animism in China' as an example of religion among the lower middle class, and particularly among the artisan.\textsuperscript{61} Furthermore, in Weber's view, official religion in China was merely formal and conventional and so distanced from the religious fervour of the masses.\textsuperscript{62} In contradistinction to Weber, C.K. Yang takes Chinese religion to be one entity. In his view, there was a systematic coherence between elite ideas and those of what he calls the common people.\textsuperscript{63} Moreover, Yang argues that the universal acceptance of the supreme power of Heaven over all gods and man provided the imperial power with an important religious basis for the political integration
of a vast country. In brief, he emphasises the interlocking of official and popular cults in the Chinese context. Similarly, Maurice Freedman assumes that "a country of China's extent and political cohesion would demonstrate a large measure of agreement on religious assumptions among all its people". Maurice Freedman's last paragraph includes some of the reasons why the Western theories of Church-State relations cannot be imported wholesale into the Chinese context:

And this great community of religion was achieved without a church, unless we choose to call the state itself a church, in which case one of the two terms becomes superfluous. Mandarins performed rites and commanded spirits in their official capacity; they were not priests... Chinese religion was in a sense a civil religion - not austere and cunningly calculated to serve political interests, but based upon a view of the interpretation of society and the universe, and upon a conception of authority that in the last analysis would not allow the religions to separate off from the secular. Caesar was Pope, Pope Caesar ... The Chinese state has on the whole been very successful - and to this day - in muting religious authority. This is one aspect of the religious unity of China.

Similarly, David A. Martin clearly points out that "there is no institution in Confucian society which can be described as a 'church' which exists separately from the pattern of conservative institutions". Just because Confucianism is the extreme case of simple conservation, the 'church' is merged in the social pattern and becomes invisible. In Martin's view, Christianity views the world as sacred only in principle (and not in fact), whereas Confucianism views the world as an immanent sacred harmony maintained, with occasional abnormal divergences, by the Mandate of Heaven. Thus the Christian Church must embody some reserve towards the world and towards 'natural relations' (e.g. those of the family), whereas Confucianism sanctifies these social relationships without reservation. The element of
Christian reserve, which is logically related to a sense of tension between body and spirit, implies a tension between Church and state. Christian societies tend therefore to achieve some distinction, however vestigial in some cases, between Church and State, the spiritual and the temporal.

On the traditional relationship of politics and religion in China, C.K. Yang's *Religion in Chinese Society* (1961) stresses that the 'diffused religion' of the Confucian State and social, economic, and family groups predominated over institutional religion. Diffused religion is conceived as a religion having its theology, cultus and personnel so intimately diffused into one or more secular social institutions that they become a part of the concept, rituals, and structure of the latter, thus having no significant independent existence. Yang delineates three forms of Chinese institutional religion: the classical religious tradition, universal religions like Buddhism and Taoism, and syncretic religious societies. In most periods of Chinese history religion consistently lent support to government. He points out that "in China the political role of religion was somewhat obscured by the dominance of Confucian orthodoxy in the function and structure of the state, for Confucianism had very prominent non-religious, secular features". The Chinese State developed a tradition of regulating, penetrating, and controlling institutional religion, as becomes apparent from the state persecution of heterodox sects. Thus J.J.M. de Groot terms the Chinese State "the most intolerant, the most persecuting of all earthly governments". In this sense it is generally accepted that universal institutional religion is definitely an alien idea in Chinese tradition. In the same vein, Chinese tradition is marked by the predominance of diffused over institutional religion. It has not formed separate
institutional churches on a Western model. The Confucian state sought to restrict the worship of Heaven to itself. As a result, the state always perceived religious heterodoxy as a political threat.

The Chinese religious conflict, therefore, was not between Church and state, as in the West, but between elite and popular politico-religious organisations. In C.K. Yang's words:

To assure itself of the desired support from religion and at the same time to minimize religious organizations as competitive political forces, the Chinese state exercised elaborate controls over religious belief and organization. But the success of such control was never complete. From time to time, religious beliefs and organizations rose to challenge the ruling power, and religion played an active role in rebellions and in the success of dynasties and governments. The sanctioning function, the governmental attempt to control religion, and the active participation of religion in the struggle for political power characterized the political role of religion in Chinese society.73

It is a fact that the Confucian legitimacy continued to suspect the institutional religions of Buddhism and Taoism. As a preventive measure, therefore, the state regulated the number of Buddhist and Taoist ordinations. It controlled the building of new temples and monasteries. The coming of Christianity, the foreign universal religion, into this traditional Chinese politico-religious milieu produced great cultural clashes.74 A Confucian culture like that of sixteenth-century China demanded that Catholicism ally itself with either Confucian or sectarian forms.75 In China Matteo Ricci and the Jesuits first chose the Confucian culture. The Pope overruled them with the Rites Decision, which had the inevitable effect of making Catholics peasant sectarians. In the early twentieth century Rome reversed itself and tried to reconstitute the Chinese State-Catholic Church alliance. This point will be discussed in detail later.76

Finally, it is to be noted here that the Chinese Confucian politico-
religious tradition heavily influenced Korea. Korean Catholics received their faith from Pei-ching and experienced many of the same trials as their Chinese brethren.

Such a religion as Judaeo-Christian religion is a 'universalistic religion' in that its religious system is based upon universal themes and applications, irrespective of race, colour, and social status. In contrast, the socio-political system, which represents the seat of authority and coercive power in modern polity, is based upon particularistic values; it must necessarily honour national sovereignty, defence of interests and security of its national community. Universalistic religion in its most uncompromising form fosters supranational loyalties that transcend and contradict the requirements of citizenship on which the very foundation of modern polity is based. Herein lies the one important element of potential tension and conflict between a universalistic religion and a particularistic socio-political system. According to Milton Yinger, if the church adheres too strictly to its universalistic ideals, it may be eliminated by the hostile socio-political system, or at best it may be replaced by a less universalistic church; yet if it accommodates too much with the particularistic claims and interests of the existing socio-political system, it may lose much of its prophetic appeal and ideals as a universalistic religion. Out of this real dilemma emerges religion's adaptive and accommodative adjustment to socio-political system.

Since nationalism often serves as a surrogate for religion, the problem of coexistence with other religions has always arisen when it has been strong. In relation to the present study modern Japan provides an example of amalgamation of nationalism with the traditional religion. Shintoism actively allied itself with the
state, supporting it as its instrumental force. Thus, in the discussion of the Japanese Christian reaction to Shintō nationalism, we should consider the fact that religion in Japan has usually been subordinated to protection of the state. But in the case of the Korean shrine question, we should take into account that Christianity presented the greatest problem because of its transcendental reference, its claim of universality for its doctrines, and its denunciation of parochialism.

2. Church, Denomination, Sect

The church/sect typology originally elaborated in the work of Weber was drawn from the context of Christianity. In his typology Weber emphasised a process of institutionalisation of sectarian forms of religious grouping in the direction of a church-type organisation. That is, Weber conceived of the development of sectarian groups towards a more church-based type of organisation. This implication can be drawn from his insistence on the routinisation of charisma, and it highlights a different interpretation from that of Troeltsch, who envisaged a dialectical resolution of the church-sect opposition and the development of a third type of religious organisation in the form of mysticism. Troeltsch proposed a basic distinction in Christian history between Church and sect, to which he added the concept of the mystical group. H. Becker translated the category of mysticism into that of 'cult'.

As regards the distinction between Church and sect Troeltsch regarded the Church as a socially inclusive institution which adapted the absolute law of God to the relativities and necessities of politics as well as tempering its demands to average possibilities.
The sect, however, regarded itself as an elect minority, proclaiming, or embodying the imminence of a new society and a judgement on the world.⁴ According to Roger Mehl, Troeltsch's point of view was more clearly sociological than Weber's in that Troeltsch asked the question of the role of social factors in the historical development of a religion.⁵ Troeltsch emphasised in his *The Social Teachings* (1912) that the church's social ethic and the idea of community which the church holds also must be given their just due.

It is generally accepted that Troeltsch tried to show that the necessities tied to the life of the cultic communities (the church, the sect, the mystical groups, that is, the three sociological groups engendered by Christianity) explain the development of dogma.⁶ This was true especially concerning Trinitarian doctrine and Christology, which Troeltsch did not consider to be inherent in the primitive evangelical deposit. Trinitarian dogma proceeded from the very nature of the cultic community of the church. It took a totally different form, much less objectivised and rationalised, in the sect and in mystical doctrine. Thus dogma, according to Troeltsch is, to a great degree, the fruit of a sociological determining by the religious group. That is to say, religious doctrine is primarily the expression of the religious vitality of a community gathered in worship.⁷

Bryan R. Wilson's use of the term 'sect' designates, unlike Troeltsch, simply the small religious group in which membership is voluntary and conditional upon some mark of merit.⁸ Such sects often claim extraordinary revelation which enables the significance of the Scriptures to be properly understood; the membership of the group tends to dominate a large part of the life of its members.⁹ It should be noted in this context that the sect's domination of its members need not be of a purely social character. It may be the
dominance of an ideology, a Weltanschauung. The sect is a clearly defined community; it seeks itself to rigidify a pattern of behaviour and to make coherent its structure of values; it contends actively against every other organisation of values and ideals, offering itself as an all-embracing, divinely prescribed society.

Joachim Wach distinguishes three types of organisation of Christian fellowship: the ecclesiastical body, the independent group or denomination, and finally, the sect. He avoids the term church as much as possible in this classification because it implies a theological (normative) decision. Martin points out that in the discussion of the sociology of religion comparatively little attention has been given to 'denomination' as an independent sociological type. According to him, the sect is a type of organisation which polarizes at extremes, that is, between omnipotence and impotence, amorality and perfectionism, complete authoritarianism and total lack of authority, intense activity and passivity, aggression and withdrawal. However, not all religious groups fall neatly into the division between Church and sect. In general the denominationalism may be distinguished from the sect because it is a reformist body which only rejects the wider society within the more embracing terms of an overall agreement. It is not revolutionary, either in espousing revolutionary violence or engaging in pacifist withdrawal.

The denomination is most clearly distinguished from the sect and most nearly allied to the Church in the sphere of eschatology. From the point of view of developing a set of theological indices of sociological character eschatology, that is, the doctrine of the last or final things, such as death, judgement, the state after death, is of prime importance. The sect, having members who are largely rejected and alienated, frequently expects a divine reversal of its
secular position or a total destruction of the corrupt material world in which members will be a select remnant miraculously transported to the New Jerusalem. As regards these eschatological events sectarian either wait passively, or actively prepare to engage in Armageddon when the trumpet shall sound. Meanwhile they refuse to consider any attempts to merely ameliorate present conditions and refuse to participate in wars for secular purposes. When the Divine Advent does not occur or when the holy war of Armageddon has failed in its object, the concept of the New Jerusalem is sometimes spiritualised and regarded as realized within the religious community.

By contrast, the denomination which has a genuine stake in the present social order retains the traditional eschatology of heaven and hell. This single fact places a sociological gulf between denomination and sect. In this context it should be noted that the Methodists, the Congregationalists and the General Baptists were never sectarian. The most striking aspect of the early history of these three representative denominations is a lack of the sectarian spirit. The non-sectarian origins of Methodism are even clearer. The primary leadership of the movement was, of course, middle class, and the whole ethos of Methodism reflected that fact.

According to Martin, another important, though neglected, theological index of sociological character, is found in the field of 'moral theory'. Here 'moral theory' refers not to discussions about the nature of 'ought' and 'good' but to religious dynamics of faith and works. In the field of 'moral theory' the sect may be absolutely perfectionist or entirely licentious: extremely ascetic or totally devoid of ethical notions. Whether it is one or the other and to what degree depends on its particular historical experience and on the other theological elements involved. The denomination, by
contrast, manages to avoid such extremes because it is fundamentally individualistic. Insofar as the denomination conceives of social perfection, it does so by beginning with the moralisation of the individual will. This individualistic emphasis of the denomination is of first-rate importance. By individualism one does not necessarily mean an egocentric or anti-social attitude, but a nominalistic rather than a realistic approach to the collective. Eventually Martin defines the term 'denomination' as follows:

The denomination does not claim that its institutional borders constitute the one ark of salvation. Its concept of unity is a unity of experience and its historical sense is likewise a unity of experience rather than an institutional succession. Its attitude to organization and to cultic forms tends to be pragmatic and instrumental, while its sacramental conceptions are subjective. This subjectivity is related to a fundamental individualism. In the field of eschatology its conceptions are traditional and in the field of moral theory its conception of the relation of faith to works is dynamic but balanced.  

In brief, the Church, the denomination, and the sect each stand in a specific relation to the twin polarities between individualism and collectivism and between conservation and change. 18 The denomination is individualistic while the Church is, on the whole, collectivist. In this sense Emile Durkheim says:

The only difference between Catholicism and Protestantism is that the second permits free enquiry to a far greater extent than the first ... It [Catholicism] is not restricted to mechanical ceremonies, but seeks control of the consciousness ... Nevertheless, the Catholic accepts his faith ready made, without scrutiny. All variation is abhorrent to Catholic thought. The Protestant is far more the author of his faith. The Bible is put in his hands and no interpretation is imposed upon him. The very structure of the reformed faith stresses this state of religious individualism. 19

Thus the Church is, in principle, at home in the unitary collective state. The struggle in which certain Churches are engaged
against contemporary Socialist States is basically on account of their totalitarianism in combination with atheism, not on account of their collectivism. \(^{20}\) In this respect it is to be pointed out that, like the sect, the Catholic Church can be classified as, in Lewis A. Coser's terminology, a 'greedy institution'. \(^{21}\) Greedy institutions are organisations and groups which make total claims on their members and which attempt to encompass within their circle the whole personality. In other words, greedy institutions seek exclusive and undivided loyalty. But unlike the sect, the Roman Catholic Church has a certain tolerance for marginal members.

The sect either drives the individualism of the denomination to the anarchist extreme or it drives the collectivism of the Church to the Communist extreme, although sectarian collectivism and ecclesiastical 'organicism' are, of course, phenomena radically different in kind. \(^{22}\) In Coser's words:

Sects claim the adherence of the whole person and are never content with segmental involvement. The early Bolshevik, or the Trotskyist, the adherent to a Protestant fundamentalist sect are all totally devoted to their sectarian group. They could partake of the pneuma of salvation or regeneration that resided in their sect only to the extent that they devoted themselves unconditionally to its characteristic spirit. The sect is typically intolerant of any departure from the "straight path", so that any member who may be tempted to bring forth ideas even minimally at variance with approved doctrine is castigated as a heretic and cut off from the community of his fellows as unclean and unworthy. The world of the sect is a stern world where the sheep and the goats are continually sorted anew to assure that only the most worthy - that is, those who are totally committed - remain in the company of the elect. \(^{23}\)

According to Coser, sects are groups that bring together men and women who consider themselves to be among the "elect" and who conceive of themselves as possessing a special type of esoteric knowledge or special personal qualities. In similar vein, Wilson says that the
ideal-type established sect in Christianity is an essentially minority religious movement, stressing doctrines, practices or experience which are divergent from those of the orthodox religious groups. A special relation is posited between the believer and Jesus Christ. The sect is without historical sense, and its self-interpretation describes its own mission as uniquely the purpose of God, and its own emergence as of special significance in the schemes of God. The sect is typically totalitarian, seeking to organise, or to dominate, the way of life of adherents.

In relation to conservation and change the Church is naturally a force for conservation. This accounts for the occasional ambiguity of its relation to collectivism, for example, the totalitarian ideologies in the modern age. The general psychological direction of the sect, however, is towards revolutionary change, but in conditions of acute disappointment or when the forces ranged against are overwhelmingly formidable, it may take a quietist and pacifist attitude. It is generally agreed that the sect which rejects politics may even sometimes have to descend into the political arena, so as to defend its own religious interests.

Martin concludes that the denomination flourishes in conditions and in countries where social change proceeds at a steady pace according to agreed criteria: insofar as acute social conflict exists, men either embrace the ascetic rigours of the sect or turn to the sources of continuity and stability found within the Church. As a social phenomenon the denomination is particularly characteristic of the United States of America and the British Commonwealth.

To summarise, the 'church' should be regarded as the established religious community, which is co-terminous with a widespread social order. It may well be that, with the rise of large religious bodies
within a particular national or secular community, the 'church' tends to become a 'denomination', one among a number of religious communities, which have to live together within the same social order.28

On the ideological level, the sect seeks to be divergent from, if not actively opposed to, the more generally accepted teaching of the 'church' or 'society'.29 In its behavioural aspect, the sect endeavours to establish strict codes, separate from the world, whilst its manner of worship is simple and intimate. In its organisation, its leaders are unprofessional, its statuses and roles are based on personal 'charisma', whilst its membership is mainly drawn from the lower classes.30

In contrast to this, ideologically, the 'church-type' has a developed doctrinal structure and upholds tradition, as a conservative force.31 In its behavioural aspect, this type reflects the folk-ways of the social milieu in which it is placed, whilst its rites and ceremonies are adjusted to meet most major occasions in the society's life, with which its own life is deemed to be co-extensive. On its organisational side, the members of the 'church-type' are born into the community.

As Martin has done, the 'denomination-type' needs to be explored.32 According to J.H. Chamberlayne, the 'denomination' recognises the concept of 'Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus' but recognises that other communions are embraced within the concept of 'Ecclesia', though not yet recognised in institutional terms.33

Incidentally, Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark maintain that "it seems unjustified to consider Protestantism as a unified religious point of view in the same sense as Roman Catholicism".34 Not that Roman Catholicism is monolithic either; clearly there are several
theological strands interwoven in the Catholic Church too, but there is at least some justification for treating them collectively since they constitute an actual, organised body. Protestantism, on the other hand, includes many separately constituted groups, and the only possible grounds for treating them collectively would be if they shared in a common religious vision. But this is clearly not the case. Thus, it is important to examine differences among Protestant bodies (denominations).

According to Glock and Stark (1965), at least four and probably five generic theological camps can be clearly identified among the American denominations.

The first, which we shall call the liberals, comprises the Congregationalists, Methodists, and Episcopalians, and is characterized by having a majority of members who reject firm belief in central tenets of Christian orthodoxy.

The second group, the moderates, is composed of the Disciples of Christ and the Presbyterians. This group is less secularized than the liberals, but more so than the conservatives, who are made up of the American Lutheran groups, and the American Baptists. The fundamentalists include the Missouri Synod Lutherans, the Southern Baptists, and the host of small sects.

Because of historic differences with Protestantism, the Roman Catholics are perhaps probably left to form a fifth distinct group by themselves. But on most theological issues the Roman Catholics consistently resemble the conservatives. 35

Here it should be recalled that, at the earlier stage of evangelistic work, American missionaries of 'Puritanic zeal and Wesleyan fervour' imposed on Korean Protestant churches the American brand of religious fundamentalism. 36 The American missionaries were trained in the background of conservative and fundamental theology and rigidly sectarian ethical views. As a result, fundamentalism held sway in the Korean peninsula. Higher criticism and liberal theology,
therefore, were deemed as dangerous heresies.

In relation to the present study, it should be taken into account that in the Korean context the denomination is most clearly distinguished from the sect and most nearly allied to the Church in the sphere of 'eschatology'. All the few Christians who resolutely resisted the Shintō shrine worship in Japan and Korea were sectarian fundamentalists. In orthodox biblical fundamentalism, Christian resistors were by and large 'Adventists', who believed that the second coming of Christ to the world was near. It is clearly demonstrated that the sphere of 'eschatology' is the one in which the denomination and the sect are most clearly distinguished. The question the next review will attempt to answer is what elements within religious fundamentalism are conducive to participation in political change. Also the socio-political implications of religious liberalism will be examined together.

3. Religious Fundamentalism versus Religious Liberalism

In this review, we will first of all make an effort to clarify fundamentalism and millenarianism. Against this background we will explore the phenomenon of American fundamentalism. Then the revolutionary potential of all millenarian movements will be examined. Finally, the review will cover the question of religious liberalism in totalitarian situations.

Two types of interpretation of fundamentalism have prevailed to date. The most common has been to look on fundamentalism as essentially the extreme and organised defence of a dying way of life. However, in 1970 Ernest Sandeen found the roots of fundamentalism in genuine doctrinal traditions. Basically, according to Sandeen, fundamentalism was the outgrowth of the 'millenarian' movement that
developed in late nineteenth-century America, especially through Bible institutes and conferences concerning the interpretation of Biblical prophecies. The movement's millenarian teachings, appearing in their most common form as 'dispensational pre-millennialism', divided all of history into distinct eras or dispensations. The final dispensation would be the 'millennium' or one-thousand year personal reign of Christ on earth. In Sandeen's view, these Bible teachers acquired from conservative Presbyterians at Princeton Theological Seminary the newly defined dogma that the Bible was 'inerrant' in every detail. Similarly, Ernest Tuveson believes that fundamentalistic Protestants in general are millenarian, and the version of millenarianism most common among fundamentalists is part of 'dispensationalism', a new form of the seven-day theory of the history of creation. The millenarian tradition, rather than the events of the 1920s, Sandeen argues, is crucial in understanding fundamentalism.

Marsden considers that Sandeen is certainly correct in supposing that millenarianism and Princeton theology are two of the important keys for understanding fundamentalism. Indeed, avowed 'fundamentalists' today are almost all strict millenarians who also insist on Biblical inerrancy. According to Marsden, if one traces the roots of today's strictly separatist and dispensationalist 'fundamentalism', Sandeen's central argument is seen to be basically correct. Yet, Marsden argues, this approach fails to deal adequately with the larger phenomenon of the militantly anti-modernist evangelism of the 1920s, known at the time as 'fundamentalism'. This broader fundamentalism in turn had wider roots, cultural as well as theological and organisational.

In Sandeen's view, "it is millenarianism which gave life and shape to the Fundamentalist movement". The great and lasting appeal
of the millenarian idea may be attributed in large measure to two elements: its promise of a utopian age, when the positions of oppressed and oppressors are reversed, as the culmination of history; and its suggestive outline of a revolution and a redeemer who will be able to break down the seemingly impregnable fortress of power and injustice. By and large, millenarianism is the religion of deprived groups. In general millenarian (or messianic) movements occur among strata and groups with the most 'archaic', to use Hobsbawm's term, consciousness, that is, consciousness belonging to the past.

Incidentally, Yonia Talmon defines "millenarian" movements as 'religious movements that expect imminent, total, ultimate, this-worldly collective salvation'. Some of Talmon's major characteristics of millenarian movements are worthy of recording for the following discussion.

1) The majority of millenarian movements are 'messianic': Salvation is brought about by a redeemer who is a mediator between the human and the divine.

2) Millenarian movements tend to be 'ecstatic': In many millenarian movements we encounter cases of hysterical and paranoid phenomena, mass possession, trances, fantasies.

3) The basic 'dualism' of millenarianism: This aspect is directly interrelated with the collective orientation. A fundamental division separates the followers from non-followers. History is viewed as a struggle between saints and Satan.

Vittorio Lanternari, from the viewpoint of historico-religious comparison, broadens the meaning of the word 'messianism'. Therefore, as a working hypothesis, he uses the term 'messiah' to
designate any being, singular or plural, more or less anthropomorphic, expected by a community as the future saviour in a religious context. From this he concludes: "we can therefore say that any prophetic movement has its messianic aspect, because in it a salvation is expected which will be brought by mythical beings of events, whatever they might be". Theologically, messianism is an eschatological phenomenon closely linked to an apocalyptic perception of history.

Here it seems necessary to draw some line of demarcation between millennial movements on the one hand and utopian movements and revolutionary socialism on the other. Norman Cohn draws this line primarily in terms of the element of salvationalism in the former. He proposes to regard as "millenarian" any religious movement inspired by the fantasy of a salvation which is to be collective, terrestrial, total and accomplished by agencies which are consciously regarded as "supernatural". The movements that this definition allows us to class together as millennial, have frequently a political as well as a religious character.

Marsden, acknowledging the importance of the millenarian background to fundamentalism, stresses other contributing factors such as nineteenth-century evangelical Protestantism, revivalism, the erosion of a solidly Protestant culture, opposition and antagonism to Modernism, and the emphasis on personal moral purity.

According to Marsden, one of the closest counterparts to American fundamentalism is English evangelicalism, and the differences between them are instructive. To the extent that conservative evangelicalism existed in the 1920s England, it differed significantly from the American variety in its general lack of militancy and impact on the culture and the churches. From this Marsden asserts that the American context provides a key for understanding 'fundamentalism'
- a twentieth-century movement closely tied to the revivalist tradition of mainstream evangelical Protestantism that militantly opposed modernist theology and the cultural change associated with it.\textsuperscript{19}

What was it in the American situation that fostered militant fundamentalism on such a large scale? Marsden approaches the question with three interrelated categories: social factors, religious-cultural traditions, and intellectual tendencies.\textsuperscript{20} First, for American evangelicals, until recently identified with cultural influences, the experience of 'displacement' in the period of the 1880s through the 1920s was especially traumatic. In addition, when a general sense of cultural alarm was felt just following World War I, it heightened the intensity of fundamentalist reactions.\textsuperscript{21}

With respect to war and religious beliefs, one might assume that war should have further religious effects and, similarly, that after the war there should be religious changes.\textsuperscript{22} On this point Samuel R. Friedman presents some hypotheses about religious effects of the American Civil War (1861-1865): i) The social reality of an enemy should increase the strength of beliefs in Satan; ii) The particular form of increased Christian religiosity would be revivalism.

In similar vein, Arlie J. Hoover in The Gospel of Nationalism (1986) says:

\begin{quote}
During and after each war [1813, 1870 and 1914] the German clergy claimed to see a definite revival of interest in religion among the populace. This revival expressed itself in religious experiences in combat, more Bible reading, increased church attendance, and increased prayer. During and after each war preachers warned their parishioners against the sins of national arrogance and over-confidence.\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

Second, to a remarkable degree American religious experience, and hence American culture, was shaped by what may be called (to modify a
phrase of Stanley Elkins) "the dynamics of unopposed revivalism". In contrast with England, Revivalism had little competition when it came to determining the distinctive characteristics of American religious life. Also lacking a strong institutional church and denying the relevance of much of Christian tradition, American Protestants were unified behind the principle of Scriptura sola. Indeed, the Bible played a major role in America's self-understanding. In the wake of the Revolution, Americans saw themselves as inaugurators of a new order for the ages, that is, a return to a pristine human condition. For Protestants this ideal was readily translated into Biblical primitivism.

In addition, unopposed revivalism often fostered anti-intellectualism. Richard Hofstadter, seeing anti-intellectualism as an important component of fundamentalism, asserts that evangelical Christianity repudiated elaborate theological scholarship in favour of emotional religious experience. Furthermore, the strong revivalist tradition in America doubtless contributed to the tendency to see things in terms of simple antitheses or dichotomies. The revivalist believed that the universe was divided into the realm of God and the realm of Satan, the righteous and the unrighteous. Revivalist hymns were full of simple contrasts between sorrow and joy, turmoil and rest, weakness and strength, darkness and light, defeat and victory, purity and impurity, guilt and forgiveness, the world and heaven. The whole revivalist impulse was based on the perception of an antithesis between the saved and the lost. In this dichotomised world view, ambiguity was rare.

Incidentally, it should be pointed out that fundamentalism arose primarily among groups with Reformed origins, such as Baptists and Presbyterians, and was quite rare on the Methodist side of American
revivalism, which emphasised the ethical rather than the intellectual aspects of Christianity. In this respect Pentecostalism is the movement of this tradition that parallels fundamentalism. Pentecostals also rejected modern culture but more in terms of intense personal piety than individuals separated from the world and than in terms of doctrinal warfare.

Third, whilst in British church life and especially in English constitutional history there was a deeply rooted awareness of the gradual development of traditions, the newness of America seemed to demand new departures and a break with the past. Americans had relatively little history of their own, and their national experience often seemed like a new dispensation, totally discontinuous with the past. Thus, primitivism was one response to this situation.

The characteristic view of history among fundamentalists has been dispensational premillennialism. Dispensational-premillennialism was originated in England in the early nineteenth century. Yet in the twentieth century it has apparently had relatively few adherents in England except among Plymouth Brethren, while in America it remains tremendously popular. The popularity of dispensational-premillennialism in twentieth-century America reveals that Americans lacked certain typically modern concepts of history. The assumptions central to most modern historical scholarship were that history is a natural evolutionary development and the corollary that the present can best be understood as a product of developing natural forces from the past. American historiography had long been dominated by supernatural, or at least providential, interpretations.

Much of the sociological literature dealing with religious fundamentalism stresses its conservative, right-wing, and frequently apolitical character. Seymour Martin Lipset, for example, argues
that fundamentalist religion 'drains off' energies and activities that
would normally be channelled into political protest ventures and
points out how centres of fundamentalism in Europe later were
transformed into areas of Communist strength:

Direct connections between the social roots of
political and of religious extremism have been
observed in a number of countries. In Czarist
Russia, the young Trotsky recognized the
relationship and successfully recruited the first
working class members of the South Russian
Worker's Union (a revolutionary Marxist
Organization of the late 1890s) from adherents to
religious sects. In Holland and Sweden, recent
studies show that the Communists are strongest in
regions which were once centres of fundamentalist
religious revivalism. 36

In general, as a theological label for traditional religious
dogmatism and textual literalism, fundamentalism is seldom perceived
as a vehicle for political change. 37 Fundamentalism has been fond of
arguing that a moral society could not be created by legislation, but
only by changing the hearts of individuals. Therefore, political
involvement was traditionally viewed as incompatible with the primary
task of fundamentalist religion. 38

Recently, however, some writers have shown interest in the
politicisation of fundamentalism as a new and significant
phenomenon. 39 In "Religious Fundamentalism and Political Change"
(1975), Harry H. Hiller sought an explanation for the sudden rise to
power of an innovative and new political party (based on an ideology
with roots in England) called Social Credit in the province of Alberta
in Canada. According to Hiller, the party's leaders were well-known
fundamentalist figures who were not previously engaged in politics but
who brought religion and politics together to initiate legitimate
political change. 40 The original political victory of 1935 involved
considerable protest and criticism of the established social order,
but the party slowly moderated to the point of being quite
conservative in tone. Why was fundamentalism conducive to this type of political participation? First of all, Hiller concludes, "because fundamentalism demands a prior allegiance to the religious text (in this case the Bible) over man-made religious institutional structures." He adds:

A recent definition of fundamentalism from within the camp illuminates the possibility of the emergence of this radical streak within the movement. Fundamentalism was referred to not only in terms of unswerving Biblical literalism but also as the 'militant exposure of all non-Biblical affirmations and attitudes'. Such a religious position could easily legitimate political criticism and activity when contextual factors facilitated it.

Lastly, Hiller emphasises that fundamentalism is always likely to participate in political change. In this respect, fundamentalism can be put into the category of pre-political movements. In fact, the opposite perhaps is more often the case. But when the socio-economic circumstances are appropriate, we might point out how fundamentalism can make political change tolerable, orderly, and possible.

James E. Wood, Jr., the editor of *Journal of Church and State*, wrote "Religious Fundamentalism and the New Right" (1980). In his view, clearly, fundamentalist Christians are forming a burgeoning new force in American politics and are shifting away from their traditional view that 'religion and politics don't mix'. The recent emergence of Christian fundamentalism as a new political force in American life, both as to its extent and its character, is significantly unlike earlier examples of the conservative role played by organised religion in American politics. Thus, Wood stresses that "the politicization of Christian fundamentalism is a very recent phenomenon". He asserts that the Moral Majority shows little awareness of the disparity between religious vision and political reality in a democratic society.
With regard to the reasons behind the emergence of the fundamentalist political movement, Wood explains that "the movement is no doubt meeting genuinely felt needs and frustrations of multitudes of people". Moreover, he warns of the dangers and defects of the movement as well: "There is, of course, the danger of religion's simply being used by politicians and religionists alike for the accomplishment of political ends".

In this context, Thomas M. Gannon, in his "The New Christian Right in America as a Social and Political Force" (1981), concerning the nature and potential influence of the emerging Christian Right in the U.S.A., dealt with the groups that comprise the movement - their numbers; religious affiliations; their political, economic, and social-cultural attitudes. To interpret the meaning of this movement, he paid attention to the relationship of the New Christian Right to previous major religious revivals in American history. From this he offered a tentative and preliminary assessment of the movement's actual and potential political impact. Gannon concludes that the fundamentally anti-political attitude of the New Christian Right largely explains their inability to function with any degree of success in the American political system. In other words, Gannon emphasises that the present-day New Christian Right, though it can be driven by moral indignation into the political arena, hardly proves able to move beyond denunciation to a long term political plan.

All millenarian movements contain progressive-revolutionary potential. According to Robert M. Anderson, the degree to which the revolutionary potential of a millenarian movement is realised depends upon how it views the coming Millennium. He asserts:

If the movement sees itself as the divine agent for building the Millennium within the present, then reform or revolution will be the likely result. If it sees the Millennium being brought
in miraculously from the outside without human effort, then withdrawal and accommodation will more likely be the consequences. The choice between these conceptions is not accidental, but is determined by such things as the class character, material and intellectual resources, ideology, and psychology of the movement, as well as the structure and stability of the social order.53

In this sense, Timothy P. Weber maintains that the descendants of the militant fundamentalists in the 1920s are still almost exclusively dispensationalists.54 Thus, first of all, it is worth clarifying 'dispensationalism' in the light of the revolutionary potential of a millenarian movement.

Dispensationalism is a theological system whose basic schema involves dividing history into periods corresponding to a particular form of intervention on the part of God.55 The schema claims to reconcile all the biblical prophecies of the Old and New Testaments read in a literalist fashion. The theory ends up devaluing the present, as it regards the time of current dispensation (the time of grace) as a parenthesis in the course of the history of mankind which will irrevocably end with the 'Great Tribulation', from which real believers will be spared through collective, secret 'abduction'.

We might agree with Sandeen (1970a and b) that dispensationalism induces withdrawal from the political sphere and leads to a lack of concern for public affairs. But Sandeen did not take into consideration the immense flexibility of the premillennialist system.56 In relation to this, we can assume, from the perspective of Anderson (1979), that if the movement's members, seeing themselves as the divine agents, view the coming Millennium as 'imminent', then reform or revolution will be the likely result. Thus, to better understand the revolutionary potential of a millenarian movement, we should consider dispensationalism in the light of premillennialist
eschatological vision. Furthermore, we should note that there is some 'ambivalence' in the fundamentalist project, which sometimes sees the world as heading for disaster which one can only hope to get out of in time, and at other times believes in the possible return of the model of the ideal nation blessed by God. 57

The end of the Victorian era had seen some significant developments in Protestant religious thought. Perhaps the most important was the popularity of what was rather arrogantly called 'the higher criticism'. 58 The so-called Fundamentalist movement in America looked at 'modernism' or 'liberal Protestantism' as heretical. Roman Catholicism's official response was one of almost exclusively negative impulse. Pope Pius X felt it necessary to condemn the so-called 'Modernist' heresy for its willingness to accommodate new thought. 59 It ought to be stressed here that 'the higher criticism' acquired one of its major strongholds among the Protestants of north and central Germany influenced by the Enlightenment. 60

German scholars had begun to search for the historical Christ, the real figure who had been buried under the various myths of the early gospel writers and the early Christian church. Steve Bruce expresses the intellectual approach of German scholars as follows:

> Every civilization has its own world-view; its own set of background beliefs expressed through its language. The early Christians were not different in this respect. Thus while Christ was a real historical figure, what we know about him has been heavily overlaid with the world-view of the people of his time. In order to discover what God really intends for us we must strip away the Hebrew and Aramaic myths and get to the real heart of the Christian message. 61

The 'higher criticism' was coupled with a desire to remove the miraculous and supernatural elements from Christianity in order to produce a rational version of the faith which would be acceptable to a culture which knew about science and technology. The rationalism of
the higher criticism gradually permeated all the major Protestant denominations. But the confessional Protestant churches were little touched by the excesses of liberal theology. The 'higher criticism' was not only a theological movement. It tended also to be socially liberal and progressive. The liberals believed that the gospel entailed Christians being socially reformist, because the improvement of people's material conditions would make them more receptive to the preaching of the Word. But the conservatives tended to the view that man was past redemption and that only religious conversion could improve anything. For this reason they thought that one should preach the gospel, get men saved, and then social and economic reform and prosperity would follow naturally from a saved population acting righteously.

With regard to theological circles, it was in the Presbyterians, especially in the U.S.A., that the fundamentalist-liberal controversy became noticeable. In this context we can recall that scriptural literalism was a prominent characteristic of Protestantism in the U.S.A. The other main root of fundamentalism was the modern revival of millenarianism, traceable in the United States as far back as 1878. The connection between scriptural literalism and millenarianism was clear. Therefore, historically, the creeds were a major obstacle for liberal Presbyterians. Although Presbyterians, as Protestants, accepted the Bible as the only standard of authoritative knowledge, they accepted the Westminster Confession of Faith and the Longer and Shorter Catechisms as 'subordinate' standards. These were documents drawn up by a group of 'divines' in the 1640s and accepted by the Church of Scotland in 1647. They had long been an embarrassment to liberal Presbyterians.

In Steve Bruce's view, therefore, "liberal Protestantism appears
as a continual impulse to modernise the faith, to abandon the confines of old creeds, and to accommodate the thought and practice of the churches to that of the secular world". It is also to be noted that liberal Protestantism is historically and sociologically close to ecumenism. Liberalism is probably essential to the modern ecumenical movement, that is, 'a movement within the Christian church towards unity on all fundamental issues of belief, worship, etc.' In this respect ecumenism can be viewed as the interactional counterpart to liberalism. The former depends on the latter and reinforces it. But it should be emphasized in this context that "ecumenism is only made possible by moderating claims about one's own uniqueness".

Some have stressed that there is an affinity between liberal Protestant circles and the idea of a National Church. As Bryan Wilson observed, the ecumenical spirit provided a strategic defence against creeping secularisation. The ecumenical aspect of the National Church concept was just as attractive in this respect to North Americans as to Englishmen, allowing for a broadly based effort to advance the social role of the churches. The liberals maintained: 'The Church should not content herself with saving individuals out of the world, but should save the world. Society is the subject of redemption'. For the supporters of the National Church idea, generally speaking, the State was the nucleus of the National Church. It can be recalled in this connection that in English Canada, the movement for a National Church also made some headway. The concept of church union ultimately bore fruit in a most concrete way with the formation of the United Church by the Methodists, Congregationalists and some liberal Presbyterians in 1925. Here also a consistent blending of the concept of the National Church with Social Christianity, similar in pattern to groups in England and the United
States, was maintained. We should not underestimate the influence of the German historical school on the minds of many socially reforming liberal Protestants.

Here we can point out that in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the most critical period that Christianity has ever endured, nationalism as a secular surrogate for religion grew as orthodox Christianity declined. It does not seem an accident of history. It arose immediately after the Enlightenment had showered its caustic criticisms on Christianity. 73

Lutheran orthodoxy dominated the religious scene in northern and central Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but it was by no means unopposed. One of its major opponents was pietism, a movement that had its roots, like orthodoxy, in the Reformation. 74 Because they emphasised personal piety and the practical and ethical aspects of Christianity rather than the dogmatic, they were called 'pietists'. They opposed the creedal intolerance of Lutheranism. Pietism attacked traditional orthodoxy by belittling dogma. Rationalism - another component of the eighteenth-century mind - attacked dogmatic religion by contrasting it with secular scholarship and science. Hence both pietism and rationalism worked to undermine dogmatic orthodoxy. Both rejected the authoritarian and doctrinal approach to religion. Thus E. Walter Zeeden says: 'Rationalism turned Christianity into a matter of practical living so that it actually did give up dogma and sacrament'. 75

With regard to Germany as the home of religious modernism, both pietism and rationalism stressed religious toleration. 76 In Prussia one found more champions of tolerance than any other part of Germany. It was largely due to Prussian tolerance that northern Germany was to lead the world in the development of religious liberalism. The new
theology had its roots in German rationalism.

It is generally accepted that pietism contributed to the rise of German nationalism. In Germany, the movement of pietism came before the rise of rationalism and thus, by its rejection of dogma, helped prepare the people for a reception of rationalism. According to Arlie J. Hoover, "the most important contribution that pietism made to the rise of nationalism was to combine with the general rationalistic attack upon orthodoxy and thus help to create a void in the minds and hearts of men, a void which in turn was soon to be filled with a new loyalty, the nation".77

In this context we should point out that the theology of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) altered the traditional picture of God.78 He did not consider God to be transcendent, but almost wholly immanent. This is a very crucial distinction in the sense that "it is easy for a man to make a God of the State or the Volk if he already believes that God is immanent in the creation".79 As German theology approached the twentieth century it emphasised immanence and cultural Protestantism more and more. Hence, the First World War, by no accident, contained the most vigorous efforts at blending nationalism and religion. The German Protestant pastors contributed to the worship of the nation-state by trying to harmonise their German nationalism with their Christian universalism.

The theoretical implications of the 'German Christian' position represented the standpoint of Liberalism or Modernism in other lands.80 In Hitler's Third Reich the Confessing Church was persecuted because it did not 'co-ordinate' with the new religion of National Socialism. The sect or movement of the so-called 'German Christians' attempted to combine Christianity with National Socialism.81 One of the distinctive elements in the teaching of the
'German Christians' was their attitude to the myth of Blood and Race, to the National Socialist philosophy in general, and to the person of Hitler. 'Positive' Christianity had no proper theological content; it indicated merely a positive attitude to National Socialism.

In similar vein some have focused on the relationship between the suicide of Liberalism and the emergence of the totalitarian state. George Andrew Beck argues that by a strange confusion of ways and yet by an inner logic the Liberal movement brought us to the verge of the totalitarian state.

This idea of nationalist aspirations brings us to the other great fruit of Liberalism, the extension of state interest in, and eventually of state control of, education. It may seem at first sight strange that the Liberal mind, which sought the emancipation of individuals from the restrictions of control, helped in fact to establish a form of control which has perhaps done more than anything else to condition the minds of citizens to the service of the state and the government. The trouble with the Liberals was that they never thought out their principles - nor followed them to a logical conclusion ... They represent, in fact, a curious compromise between a pacific cosmopolitanism which was a hangover from the 18th century and an aggressive nationalism which became so violently effective in the latter part of the 19th century. Thus the Radicals in France, the left Liberals in Italy, the Austrian Liberals, were all more ready supporters of conscription and military expansion in the 1860s and 1870s than any of the so-called Conservative groups. It was in like manner the Liberals who were the supporters of policies of administrative centralization and national unification.

According to Paul J. Tillich, the present social situation in the Western countries of 1937 was marked by a disintegration of the older moral standards and social groups which had accompanied the economic crisis of late capitalism. This resulted in a general and far-reaching social and psychic insecurity which in turn expressed itself in a rejection of individual moral responsibility and in the flight
into collectivistic totalitarianism. In this situation, in his view, liberal Protestantism could not furnish a principle of reintegration because its own principles did not themselves transcend the disintegrating secularism. This was true of its thought, in which it depended on the increasingly meaningless intellectual life in general; and it was true of its action, in which it was drawn into the increasingly contradictory social life both within and between national states. Tillich concludes:

Consequently people who are embarrassed by the meaningless of their existence generally prefer the opposed tendencies: fundamentalism, Barthianism, Buchmanism. These people want to have a principle transcending their whole disintegrated existence in individual and social life. But the difficulty is that these movements use ununderstandable symbols which are powerless for dealing with the present. Barthianism, for example, has shown its power of saving the German church from paganization in giving theological aims to a group of struggling ministers, but it has not been able to reintegrate the younger generation or the masses of disintegrated proletarians or even middle-class persons ... Hence Protestantism still has to discover a possible approach which will enable it to cope with the world-situation.

Incidentally, with regard to the problem of intellectuals and Fascism, some have shown that in any society liberal intellectuals who want direct political impact often, to a great extent, risk sacrificing much of their independence of thought in exchange for the chance to affect national policies. Fascism had great intellectual appeal because it promised a 'new society'.

As Bruce has shown, in order to explain sociologically the fact of liberal Protestantism vis-a-vis the secular world, one must consider the internal dimension of the relationship between liberal Protestantism as a set of beliefs and its social organisation. When liberal Protestantism is to be compared with conservative Protestantism, the former can be distinguished by its particularly
precarious belief system. The Word of God may still be the ultimate source of authority for liberal Protestants but the Word must be 'interpreted', 'de-mythologised' and 'understood'. Human reason and culture act as a filter between the Word of God and consciousness. Recognising the role of reason and culture in interpretation opens up the possibility of relativism. How does one authoritatively define what is needed for salvation? This is not a serious problem for the Catholics and the Orthodox because the tradition and the officials of the Church resolve disputes. Also conservative Protestants can avoid relativism by sticking firmly to certain historic statements of faith. Creeds and catechisms are used to police the boundaries of the faith. 89

Beliefs must be organised for the commitment of the believing community. In this sense Georg Simmel emphasised the significance of individual affiliation with the groups: "He is determined sociologically in the sense that the groups 'intersect in his persons by virtue of his affiliation'". 90 Similarly Coser established 'the functions of social conflict' as a sociological verity. 91 Punishing those that reject what one believes as well as promoting it are very good for the commitment of the believing group. Generally speaking the adherent to a Protestant fundamentalist sect is totally devoted to his sectarian group. 92 The sect is typically intolerant of any departure from the 'straight path'. If creeds cannot be constructed, as in the case of liberal Protestantism, then the world cannot be divided into those with the saving truth and those without it. There is no sense in which heretics can be identified and punished.

In contrast to liberal Protestantism conservative beliefs can be stated dogmatically and simply. They can be used as membership tests and hence as means of identifying the unsaved. However, liberals tend
to see their aim in serving the secular world in a way that eventually erodes what is distinctive about their faith.\textsuperscript{93} Liberal Protestantism has been unable to prevent its accommodation to the secular world coming very close to absorption by the world. Also it makes sense to note that there are conservative Protestants in large bodies (denominations), who are more sectarian than liberal Protestants. Regarding the present study, although in general it is religious conservatism and the church bureaucracies which finally come to terms with the secular regime, it is correct to maintain that religious liberalism is more vulnerable to ideological infiltration in a totalitarian situation.

C. Sociology of Missions

The purpose of this section is to review existing sociological studies on Christian Missions. In 1932 Kenneth S. Latourette said:

\begin{quote}
It [the Christian missionary enterprise] is conducting its activities on every continent and among the large majority of the nations and peoples of the earth ... It is operating in the midst of a fluid world ... Surely no other enterprise demands for its largest usefulness more continuous, fearless, honest and painstaking investigations of the conditions which it confronts, and of its methods and results.\end{quote}

Given the social significance of missions, and the vast amount that has been written about them, it is ironic that there is not so much literature on the sociology of missions. Although there are certain valuable documents, many histories of missions, the reports of missionary societies, the monographs from the mission fields, it is true that these documents rarely have been utilised from the sociological point of view.\textsuperscript{2} Thus the characteristic of the sociology of missions is that it constitutes 'virgin' territory. In this respect T.O. Beidelman's \textit{Colonial Evangelism} (1982)\textsuperscript{3} is worthy of
note. This study is about Africa, but raises some general questions about the relationship between missions and colonialism; also Ch. I discusses general questions about the sociology of missions.

According to Beidelman, anthropologists and sociologists have been remiss in studying colonial institutions even though they give lip service to considering the total social context of societies they investigate. In fact some missionaries themselves wrote considerable studies in the form of histories and analyses to facilitate mission work, though not in any consistent and sustained manner with meaningful reference to social theory outside the missionary context (e.g., Max Warren, *Social History and Christian Mission* (1967)). In this respect, 'colonial institutions' should be studied not only because they provide invaluable insights into the development of the Third World but also because they reveal striking similarities with Western complex social organisations. 4

The social universe of the Third World today resembles the colonial world which preceded it. It is in this sense that the study of 'defunct' institutions of colonialism would provide insights into social features still evident in contemporary situations. Studying such aspects of contemporary societies is often discouraged, although little opposition is met today in studying the colonial past. It is easy to criticize colonial rule in terms of exploitation, injustice, and ethnocentrism; such accounts are common and have led to cheap and easy judgements. Rather than this, in Beidelman's view, "what is required is analysis and review that allow us to perceive the colonial world as a system, both in terms of its thought and values and in terms of the ways it was organised". 5 A basic feature of what is usually termed colonial activity is simply the interaction between disproportionate social groups which possess in different degrees the
powers to dominate. Although all colonial organisations display similar characteristics, missions are the quintessential example; they aim at the most far-reaching domination, attacking the most deeply held traditional beliefs and values as well as economic and political forms.  

In this present review, it might be appropriate to itemise explicitly the sociological problems that relate to missions: 1) the concept of mission; 2) sources of missionary effort in Christianity; 3) Western penetration of non-Western societies and the position of missionary effort within that historical situation; 4) social composition of missionary organizations, and recruitment patterns of missionaries (these vary according to the church in question); 5) missionary response to local cultures (this varies through history of mission effort; it varies according to the church in question, and according to the culture where the mission is found); and 6) missionary attitudes to the political authorities in the mission field (these can be indigenous, or from the mission's own government at home, or from an alien colonial government).

An issue of the *American Journal of Sociology* (1944) was largely devoted to missions. Robert Ezra Park in "Missions and Modern World" maintains that "the task of missions has been to create from the existing social and cultural units a common culture and a moral solidarity in which all can share". According to him, Christian missions are outposts of European civilisation; their staffs are intermediaries and interpreters between the two worlds. Hugh Stuntz, from a Christian perspective, emphasises in his "Christian Missions and Social Cohesion" that despite its division and disunity in time of crisis "Christianity has proved to be a binding influence for social solidarity". Eventually he concludes that "unless Christian
missions can offer the healing influence of a great loyalty in situations where former faiths have been disinherited, the result of the impact of Western culture on non-European life will produce confusion and chaos".  

In contrast to the 'sententious and glib' papers of Park and Stuntz, G. Gordon Brown in "Missions and Cultural Diffusion" shows some insights into the sociology of missions. According to Brown, missionaries represent a subculture within Western culture. They stress theology and the moral taboos more than do their fellow-countrymen. "Missionaries and the groups which actively support them are definite subcultures". They are a religious subculture; this again can be analysed with a theological subculture and an ethical subculture. Also he distinguishes two methods of transmission of culture on the part of the missionary: the deliberate and the inadvertent method. As a man with a purpose, the missionary will deliberately and systematically teach theology, ethics and morals. But also, as a participant in a culture, he will have certain basic attitudes which are not part of the essential ethic of Christianity. These attitudes will manifest themselves in unsystematised but nevertheless consistent reactions to situations. It is to be noted in this context that some of the content of culture transmitted is changed in the process of transmission. Or what missionaries accomplish is characteristically a compromise between Western and indigenous ways. In his view, if an alien culture which has its own systems of thought, its own morals, and its own attitudes and values, is complex, if it is what is called a civilisation, there will be conscious resistance to a new theological system. In this sense, many histories of missions show that missionary attitudes to Africa and Asia seem to be different.
The diffusion of new ethical concepts and the introduction of new social groupings may modify, weaken, or destroy the indigenous social organisation. In a society which practises ancestor worship, G.G. Brown argues, Christian theological beliefs may weaken family and kin solidarity. Cultural arrogance reaches its heights in the missionary because of the very nature of the attitudes and values which induced him to become a missionary: "Go ye into the world and preach the gospel to every people" is at once the charter of the missionary's activities and an expression of his intention.

In brief, according to G.G. Brown, missions are simply one of several agencies for the diffusion of Euro-American culture. The missionaries stress the theological and the ethical. So they propound a theological system which other members of their society do not take too seriously. And they are more intensely concerned with the minor taboos of their culture: tobacco, drink, and verbal prohibitions against obscenity, profanity, and blasphemy.

It is Roger Mehl in *Traité de sociologie du protestantisme* (1965) who explicitly suggests that "the missionary phenomenon can be viewed as a sociological phenomenon". For the simple reason, Mehl stresses that mission is a well-dated historical phenomenon. Given that the emergence and expansion of Christian mission, in the first place, can be situated in the context of the historical development of Christianity, Mehl's point on sources of missionary effort in Christianity should be examined in detail.

It is true that mission is part of the essence of the church, since the gospel is not a doctrine for initiates but a good news to proclaim to the ends of the earth. In this sense a non-missionary Christianity is a contradiction in itself. In spite of the profound dynamism of the gospel which enabled the diffusion of Christianity
throughout the ancient world, however, at the same time, it is a fact that the church, once established, sometimes ceases to be missionary, and for long periods. It is a fact that when Western Christendom was established, protected by political power, it was more preoccupied with shoring up the outer walls to protect itself from the Infidels than with being missionary. Particularly, although the Reformation has not lost sight of the idea of an apostolate, it was not at all missionary. In other words, it was content with evangelizing Christians. In the sixteenth century, the real aim of the first 14 Calvinist missionaries was to create a Brazilian refuge for the persecuted French Reformed. Whereas Catholicism showed signs of great missionary vitality, especially in China, Protestant missions did not really begin until two centuries after the Reformation. But then it came about as a sort of explosion. Protestant missionary societies multiplied at an accelerated pace, overtaking and even outstripping Catholic missionaries. What is its sociological meaning? On this import, Roger Mehl proclaims the following two important facts.

Firstly, the Protestant missionary movement began before the churches had commenced their process of 'disestablishment', that is, 'deprivation of the church of established status'. The missionary work itself was 'contemporaneous' with the signs of 'disintegration' - a greater freedom and a greater mobility of the churches - which showed up here and there in a Christendom which continued to alienate itself from the civilisation and politics of the Western states. In this context it should be pointed out that the principal missionary enterprises initially were of 'Anglo-Saxon origin', that is, 'Anglo-American Protestantism' rather than 'German Lutheranism'. This was due to the fact that while the latter was centred on the state and
closed in upon itself, the former saw already existing signs of a greater freedom and a greater mobility of the churches. Finally, within the established churches (France and Germany) themselves there already existed small 'revivalist' and 'pietist' circles which took missionary work in charge. As these signs multiplied, missionary work expanded, but for a long time, missions appeared as 'private' enterprises. It was only during the years 1930-1940 that a radical change of perspective took place. Thus it is important to note that the early development of Protestant missions was based on the 'margins' of the established churches, and the frontiers were strongly tainted with 'pietism' and 'individualism'.

Secondly, in regard to the general evolution of society, it is necessary to mention that missionary expansion was contemporaneous with 'colonial expansion'. At the end of the eighteenth century colonisation took a new form: the colonial powers no longer were content to establish commercial settlements on the coasts; they began to want to exploit colonial territories in depth. The missionary appeared in the wake of the colonialist, merchant, or soldier. Thus it was a fact that a solidarity was established between 'colonisation and mission'. It is necessary to emphasise that this solidarity was not consciously desired by missions. Indeed, there are numerous facts that attest to the existence of conflicts between colonization and the missions. However, it is inevitable that Christianity often appears to the indigene to be one of the forms of 'White superiority'.

A confusion between colonialising nation and mission was often possible, even more so because the utilisation of the mission by the colonial power for political ends was often observed; the first Dutch missionaries from the end of the seventeenth century were practically without ties with their church. They were dependent on the state and
on the Indies Company, and consequently had to follow their directives. The missions therefore were in danger of becoming the 'camouflage' for a political operation in the midst of international competition. Facts of this type abound in missionary history and they counterbalance numerous other facts witnessing to a real independence of mission in relation to politics. Briefly speaking, Mehl emphasises that mission must be aware of its 'sociological conditioning', not with the pretension of escaping from all sociological context or of somewhat discarnating itself, but of making a critique of its context. 20 In a similar vein, Jozef Boel in Christian Mission in India: A Sociological Analysis (1975), stresses the contextual element of missionary work: the society in which missionary work is carried out. 21

Max Warren, Canon of Westminster in 1967, in Social History and Christian Mission (1967), said that the British missionary movement was in part an expression of a far wider development - the social emancipation of the 'under-privileged' classes in Britain. 22 According to him, this development owed its inspiration to influences as diverse as the Evangelical revival, the Industrial Revolution, and the social upheaval across the Channel in France. The nineteenth century in Britain was full of 'fundamentalist by conviction', that is, 'inner-directed' men, and not a few women, and it was an age of incredibly expanding horizons, geographically speaking as well as in the mind. The Industrial Revolution, for all its brutality, provided for a greater number than ever before 'an age of opportunity'. In Warren's view, this sense of 'inner-direction', believed implicitly to be that of the Holy Spirit, is the true secret of the dynamism shown by the missionaries of that century. Another fact to be noted about the men who in the first half of the nineteenth century offered for
missionary service is that a number of them were ordained men drawn from the same social and economic background as the 'skilled mechanics'. Warren emphasised that the modern missionary movement in the first part of the nineteenth century was essentially a movement of the 'petit bourgeoisie'. With the middle of the century a change took place. Every sending society can record offers of service from men who had acquired not only secondary education but also university degrees. From this we can support Mehl's first assertion that the early Protestant missionaries were restricted by the boundaries and frontiers.

In the matter of the concept of mission, incidentally, "Christian missions", as Beidelman says, "represent the most naive and ethnocentric, and therefore the most through-going, facet of colonial life". Imperialistic colonialism involves a sense of mission, of spreading a nation's vision of society and culture to an alien, subjected people. Colonialism exhibits an expansionist and proselytising ethos based on a sense of both duty and domination and manifested in a policy of paternal guardianship. Here Rene Maunier's insight should be noted: colonialism is not mere contact between races but 'a contact of social types' providing some source of relationship between human groups. In this sense colonialism is a social and therefore an ideological and moral phenomenon. It is a fact that anti-imperialism is a relatively new cause; very few people of whatever political persuasion rejected imperialism in Britain, until fairly recently.

According to P. Beyerhaus and H. Lefever's summary of the views of six missionary thinkers (Anglo-American: Henry Venn, Rufus Anderson, Roland Allen, J. Merle Davis; German: Gustav Warneck, Bruno Gutmann) whose writings have had great influence over the last
150 years, all of them consciously or unconsciously belong to the colonial era. This supports Mehl's and Beidelman's assertion of the confusion between colonisation and mission. The six thinkers were all influenced, naturally, by the climate of their times, though not all in the same way. In this sense, all over the Third World 'zones of missionary comity', that is to say, allocation of territory among major missions were established. This reflects missions as examples of colonial organisation.

Mission, in the very exercise of its activity, causes a certain number of sociological problems in the mission field, by reason of its profound and subtle ties with Western civilisation. In this context, therefore, Latourette stated that nineteenth-century Christian missions were largely a paternalistic enterprise, a kind of spiritual imperialism.

Generally speaking, we can say that Christian mission has not always been very attentive to the 'social disturbance' which it introduced, by the very fact of its evangelical action, among the peoples of foreign lands. In this context it should be stressed that the Christianity which engaged in missionary action beginning in the eighteenth century was the Christianity of an already profoundly secularised society, in other words, of a society where the churches had become societies differentiated in relation to the global society. They certainly exercised a large influence over this society, but the principal structures of this society were in the process of 'secularisation'. It was already possible to live in these societies without being Christian. Denominational membership had become a 'private' affair or was on the way to becoming it. The 'pietist' overtones of many missionary societies were precisely a 'reflection' of this situation. Furthermore, the whole of technical, economic,
political, and social evolution was produced, especially in the nineteenth century, outside the influence of the churches. A common morality existed, undoubtedly impregnated with Christianity but distinct from it. It was this situation which led the Christian missions to think through their apostolic action. However, they could not measure the 'sociological' far-reaching and unexpected effects of their action.

Christian missions went out to confront completely different civilizations. To attack the native religion through the preaching of the gospel was, consequently, to call into question the whole social structure. Thus it was important to have a policy of social 're-rooting' of the individual converts. However, the missions, because of their Western point of view and because of the 'undeveloped state of sociological reflection', could not have had such a policy. The type of community which the missions develop is, in effect, 'totally different' from that of the surrounding communities. Various forms of co-operation must be set up between them and pagan society. Otherwise the indigenous people will run all the risks of 'uprooting'. The church will then play only the role of a 'temporary refuge'. On this matter Beidelman says:

The most poignant and destructive aspect of evangelism in Africa was the missionaries' failure either to appreciate fully the integrated quality of traditional African life or to appraise realistically the discordant bases of their own societies [which underwent profound secularization]. Yet missionaries thought they could introduce modern life and beliefs into Africa according to their own ideal Christian terms, devoid of disruptions by the secular forces present at home. It was never clear whether missionaries wished to convert Africans into Black Europeans or to create a new type of Christian, innocent about material goods and politics ... In their attitudes toward Western modernism and African tradition, missionaries appeared confused and contradictory ... Missionaries introduced disruptive attitudes characteristic of the
supposedly materialistic and corrupt societies they left behind, even as they attempted to stamp out traditions which actually supported the communal cohesion they admired.

Beidelman was, it is true, hostile to the activities that missionaries were engaged in; and it is true that the missionaries studied by him were very rigid in outlook. But it is generally true that missionaries failed to appreciate the full implications of their actions. Hence the new society - the church - did become 'isolated' from the global community. In offering the individual a new community, the church must not 'isolate' him from the human community to which he belongs. It must not 'denationalise' him in Christianising him. In other words, the church must try to avoid being a community closed in upon itself, which isolates its members and prepares a 'refuge' for them that shelters them from all social, political, and cultural problems.

It is much more difficult to resolve this problem for Protestantism than for Roman Catholicism. Protestantism, since its beginnings, has presented itself as a form of Christianity that stresses the breaks between faith and doctrine on the one hand and traditions and rites on the other hand. Thus Catholicism is more 'adroit' in the working out of syntheses and more easily shelters certain forms of 'syncretism' than does Protestantism.\(^3\) In this sense the Catholic missionary theorist, L.J. Luzbetak, defines accommodation as "the respectful, prudent, scientifically and theoretically sound adjustment of the Church to the native culture in attitude, outward behaviour, and practical apostolic approach".\(^3\) The most famous example of such ideological compromise involved the sinecisation of Jesuits in China.\(^3\)

It is well accepted that while Roman Catholics show tolerant accommodation towards indigenous beliefs and institutions, Protestants-
are in more aggressive hostility toward them. Several factors are cited, the most common being that Catholics view conversion as a gradual affair while Protestants demand dramatic, radical change in conduct. It is also maintained that Roman Catholics view their work in terms of a broader community while Protestants tend to emphasise the individual.

However, these are merely tendencies; generalisations are dangerous where we are considering, in the case of Catholics, a huge international institution and, in the case of Protestants, hundreds of different systems of belief and conduct. In this connection we can point out that the German missionary thinkers, e.g., Gustav Warneck, unlike the English and American thinkers, particularly emphasised the 'indigenous' character of the young churches as churches related to the soil of the country in which they were planted. Warneck, thus, deplores the introduction of Western denominational differences into mission churches. He lays very great stress on the need for the church to be 'truly indigenous': Any folk customs which are not spiritually incompatible within the Christian religion are to be preserved with imagination and warm-heartedness.

Similarly, the Scottish Presbyterian missionaries in northern Malawi showed an understanding of 'Africanity'. For example, T. Cullen Young in the Livingstonia mission urges that Christianity should build on what already exists; thus many had spoken of 'planting' of 'Christianity', but 'rooting' was a different matter. Pursuing this analogy he argues that it is important to analyse the soil as well as the seed. He also repeatedly criticises the notion of 'ancestor-worship', suggesting that rather one should think in terms of a conclave of the living and the dead. He argues throughout that traditional beliefs need enlargement through Christianity. It is
widely agreed that the Scottish missionaries, who showed a much more sympathetic attitude to African culture than was usual, have been unusually forthright in their support for African nationalism. In this respect it should be pointed out that the first Protestant church in Korea was founded under the influence of Scottish Presbyterian missionaries who studied Korean and then translated scriptures in Chinese Manchuria in the 1870s.

In addition, many have shown that the Roman Catholics tend to form more concentrated missionary colonies whereas Protestants favour more diffuse groups scattered over the countryside. This may be because Catholics enjoy a centralised autonomy. According to David R. Heise, the 'concentrated' approach is more characteristic of churches with multi-level, centralised organisations while the 'diffuse' approach is more characteristic of churches with flat, decentralised structures. In a sense, tighter control by a Catholic hierarchy reduces internal conflicts within a mission. It should be noted in this context that Catholics more readily accommodate themselves both to government policies and to local cultures, presumably because of their more international perspective.

According to Beidelman, Protestants and Roman Catholics have sharply different views on the religious significance of literacy. Protestants place deep importance on individual reading and inspiration from scriptures and therefore give priority to translating the Bible into indigenous languages. Thus R.E. Park stresses that Protestant missions have made native peoples literate, thus paving the way for a secular press among the so-called colonial peoples - a first step in developing a sense of themselves. This new literacy which the missionaries are responsible for has also brought incipient nationalism. The relation between conversion and literacy assumes
greater importance because of the relation between literacy and wider, secular aspects of European life.

But the degree of literacy is dependent primarily upon the educational resources of the mission. In this respect we should recall that mission education underwent further secularisation after the First World War when diminished economic support led missions to seek government subsidies. Although conservative missionaries objected that this would confuse the Gospel with Western civilisation, few missions rejected the course. Missionaries had little choice between subsidisation and giving up schools altogether. Without government support they could not absorb modern standards and techniques. To mission purists, although educational and medical services earn secular praise, they dilute the energy and funds for evangelism and make missions vulnerable to government control. An earthly organisation corrupts the Church. This view, however, is not typical of most modern missionaries, who emphasise such social services.

While Protestants remain in the front of linguistic research in many parts of the Third World, Roman Catholics discourage unsupervised study of the Bible and attach more religious significance to the liturgy and priestly instruction. Roman Catholics do not see education tied to enabling natives to read mainly for religious purposes. Hence Roman Catholics accommodated themselves to the colonial government's needs and support for more secular education.

In an essay on missionaries in the Far East, R.P. Beaver contends that nationalism has little importance for missionaries. In this sense it is interesting that A. Carleton, a missionary, criticises D.R. Heise, one of the few sociologists who wrote about missions, for failing to grasp this. In contrast, M.D. Markowitz emphasises the
important relations between Belgian colonial politics and the Roman Catholic Church, in contrast to non-Belgian Protestants. 

Beidelman's words on the relationship between mission education and the new nationalism led us to explore further the problem of the relations of missions to governments:

... The uneasy relation between Christianity and modern society in Europe and America drifted to Africa as well, often transmitted by mission education until it bred "the new nationalism which desired to be both African and technological at the same time and had at least the suspicion that Christianity was an enemy of both".

During the course of the missionary years, one of the most serious issues for the Western missionaries was the problem of the relations of missions to governments. At the Edinburgh Conference of 1910, the most important Protestant missionary conference ever held, the Report of the Commission on Missions and Governments strongly recommended to the Conference that it take steps for appointment of a special committee to draw up a brief statement of recognised principles which underlie the relations of missions to governments. Finally, a preliminary statement of principles prepared by the committee was published in The International Review of Missions for the information of the missionary authority and of the missionary body. The essence of the preliminary statement is as follows:

1) The missionary remains a subject of his own Government, unless he chooses to naturalize himself elsewhere.

2) The convert in the foreign mission field remains a subject of his Government.

3) The relation of the missionary to the convert is purely religious.

4) Every independent state has full control of municipal regulation within its borders.

5) The admission, or regulation, of missionary work is no exception to this
principle. As towards the Government of a Country, the right of a missionary to enter, and to pursue his work, when such right exists, is civil, not religious, in nature; and as such is conditioned and controlled by the Government, just as any secular occupation is.

6) Care should be taken to distinguish moral and natural rights and duties from legal. One should not infer a legal right to preach the Gospel from a spiritual obligation. There is no connection between two.

Among the above six formulations, it is noteworthy that the last principle which distinguishes legal rights from moral ones, to some degree, reflects the aforesaid general schema of Weber. According to him Christianity as an institutionalized religion customarily solves the problem of the tension between religious ethics and the non-ethical requirements of life within the world by differentiating ethics into religious ascetic ethics and contrasting political ethics. We can still maintain that the Christian church belongs to the conservative forces.

Nathan Söderblom, who was the Archbishop of Uppsala, clarified the relationship between Christian missions and national politics: "Like all Christians, missionaries are enjoined by the New Testament to offer up prayers for the authority governing the country in which they live and to observe impeccable obedience and respect for its orders, as long as these are not incompatible with the commandments of God. But it is also required that missions and missionaries should be regarded and treated as being first and foremost servants, not of politics and temporal authority, but of Christ. Any other principle could only mean death and corruption for missions". Here again we can note that even the twentieth-century Bishop Söderblom was standing on the aforementioned fourth position of Weber which evaluates the authority of the state positively. As far as this position is
concerned, according to Weber, ancient Christianity did not really go beyond it in principle.

Historically, modern non-Roman missions have generally adopted the policy of 'non-interference' in the political affairs, either domestic or foreign, of the nations where their missionaries work. Therefore, G. Fisher, who had gone from the United States to the mission field (Japan) in 1898 and was honorary National Secretary of the Young Men's Christian Association of Japan, attacked some Protestant missionaries in the Far East who violated this rule on the ground that the meddling of the Roman missionaries with political matters in Japan let the country seal itself against Christianity for 250 years. After the First World War, it was in the Far East that the issues of the relations of missionaries to international political questions were sufficiently 'acute'. It was true that the political conditions obtaining there were unprecedented and complicated and the missionaries were, Fisher saw, inevitably in the very thick of the 'maze'.

The conditions were unprecedented for obvious reasons, growing out of the economic and political rivalries of various nations, but also out of the presence of a highly civilised, aggressive but non-Christian nation, Japan, which was at the same time an 'object' of Christian missionary effort.

Moreover, in Fisher's view, the situation in India and other British territories was somewhat different, at least for the British missionaries, by virtue of the fact that they were citizens of the nation in control, whereas in China, Korea, and Japan all missionaries alike were 'aliens' and should therefore be guided by the same principles. Thus Fisher's assertion seems to have more validity than James L. Barton's simple view: "If he is in a country over which his own government rules, his position is made doubly difficult because of
the tendency on the part of the native populations to regard him as a department of the government itself. In this respect, Beidelman illustrates how ethnicity must be considered within a larger and shifting context. The following examples show how ethnicity relates to patriotism and imperialistic sentiments.

During the earliest period of missionary contact, the British exerted political influence at Zanzibar and Mombasa. Without British connections, the CMS could not have meddled in Arab and African affairs. During the subsequent period of German rule, the CMS was critical of colonial rule and defended African interests. In contrast, after the British received the Tanganyikan mandate, the missionaries warmly supported local colonial doctrine and were hostile to African criticisms of the status quo.

As a second illustration of ethnic variables, contrast the Belgian Congo with Tanganyika. In the Congo, Belgian Catholic orders were integrated into the colonial power structure and until shortly before independence were uncritical of the regime, whereas Protestants, mainly from English-speaking nations, were less sympathetic. In Tanzania, Catholics were rarely of British background and were unsympathetic to British rule. Shortly before African independence, Catholics covertly backed nationalist activities, while Protestants, mainly British, remained conservative and uncritical.

George F. Steward, in 1912, examined the policy of the United States of America insofar as missionaries in foreign parts, especially China, were concerned. The continued intercourse of China and the United States led to the treaty of 1903. Article 14 of this treaty not only stated in detail the rights of missionaries but at one and the same time indicated the policy of the United States in regard to missionaries in foreign parts. The treaty specifically provided that "missionaries shall not interfere with the exercise by the native authorities of their jurisdiction over Chinese subjects." A failure to comply with this provision would undoubtedly cause the United States to withdraw protection to the missionary or to the
mission implicated, because such action would be not merely inconsistent with the treaty but a distinct violation of its express terms. In brief, Steward calls attention to the role which the missionary should play in the land of his residence; for, if he attempts in any way to interfere with the political development of the country where he is located, he not only involves the home government in controversy but defeats the purpose of the mission.

Thus, as Fisher has already shown, in China, Korea and Japan, where all missionaries alike were not citizens of the nation in control but 'aliens', the missionaries had to decide about their attitudes on international political questions. In this context, it should be noted that the most 'thorny' missionaries were the missionaries in Korea. So Edwyn Bevan, who visited Korea and was an Honorary Fellow of New College, Oxford, described the problematic situation in Korea as follows:

Here they have before them one of those states of conflict between a foreign government and an inflamed nationalism in which any missionary may well find it hard to show unconcern, if he [the missionary] desires to be a human friend to people among whom he lives, whilst it is impossible for him to side with the Japanese Government without seeming to set Christianity against liberty, or to side with the Korean nationalists without abusing the confidence of the Japanese Government.

The church-state problem in a colonial setting, or, those features of the church-state problem which are peculiar to a colonial society can not be approached without distinction. In the case of colonial Africa as a whole, two European agencies - the church and the state in the process of establishing and organising themselves - each with different objectives, were appearing on the African stage. Their links with Europe, their mutual relations and their relationships with their respective counterparts are all factors which must be taken into consideration. Moreover, we can also consider the
influence of 'the ancient European institution of the Establishment'. On the other hand, Korea under Japanese Empire was in a unique situation in the sense that there existed three different forces together: a Korean indigenous force, Japanese colonialism, and Euro-American influence through missions. In relation to Euro-American influence, it was mainly American influence through Presbyterian and Methodist missions that moulded Korean Protestant churches. As is well known, unlike the European tradition, the American tradition has stressed the total separation of church and state. This tradition naturally precludes an established church. It makes religion a subject of no official concern, relegating it to the sphere of private affairs. Thus, in the case of colonial Korea we can not employ categories and generalisations which have been developed in the other colonial contexts where two European agencies existed.

It was true that a very real problem confronted missionaries in Korea. According to Fisher, practically no one, whether foreigner or Japanese, doubts the assertion of the missionaries that they knew 'nothing' in advance of the Samil Independence Movement in 1919, and did 'nothing' to foment it, but rather encouraged the Koreans to aim at gradual reforms. But the Japanese government and public, not unnaturally, accused the missionaries of meddling in these events. In this respect we can recall that nationalism in the Orient came into being as a reaction to Western and Japanese political, military, and cultural Imperialism. Historically, while in Japan the introduction of Christianity (Protestantism) coincided with the rise of aggressive nationalism, in Korea Christianity (Protestantism) became the vehicle for the preservation of national hopes in reaction against Japanese domination. The fundamental conflict between the claims of Christ and Japanese messianic nationalism were recognized by many. This
charge that Christianity is unpatriotic is met from first to last in the history of the mission. In contrast, Korea presented the outstanding instance of the identification of nationalism with Christianity in the Far East.

But the American missionaries, possessed of their own peculiar ideas about separation of Church and state, non-interference in politics, and the supranationality of missions, from the early period attempted to minimise the political factor, although they have had to acknowledge its existence. The missionaries, convinced of the necessity of keeping the Church entirely out of politics, discouraged nationalism and endeavoured to keep the converts from participation in anti-Japanese movements. The missionaries thought that they were being neutral and impartial, but in the eyes of Koreans they were committing themselves to the Japanese. Moreover, in fact, many a missionary was far less dispassionate and objective in analysing the policies of his adopted country than those of his own home land. This could easily be demonstrated in the case of missionaries to Japan, for example, from the time of Verbeck to that of Bishop Harris, whom the Koreans considered to be a Japanese agent, down to the apologists for the nation during the last Japanese invasion of China. In this connection, R.P. Beaver quotes a part of the volume entitled The Missionary Outlook in Light of the War, published in 1920:

Provincialism is always a bar to progress, whether exercised in a village, or at a capital, or in a mission area. It is religiously no less than politically belittling. ... It is pleasing to the traveller in mission areas to note the real enthusiasm of the true missionary for his adopted people and their interests, political as well as social. ... Yet it must yield to the demands of Christian internationalism, which seeks to promote friendliness among all nations. China, Japan, and Korea must eventually become in some sense a Far Eastern unit. Only the missionary who can think soberly in terms of the Far East as a whole, whether his definite task is Manchuria, Korea,
China, Japan, or the Philippines, will be a wise and helpful leader in the next quarter century.

The Missionary Outlook rebuked the partial attitude on the part of missionaries, admonishing them. In his paper, Fisher classified two possible attitudes for the missionary to take on international political questions which involve the nation where he resides: 1) a public declaration of his convictions regarding the question at issue; 2) strict neutrality and reticence. According to Fisher, the first attitude is one of 'openly' taking sides, on the ground that political questions, almost without exception, are inextricably bound up with the moral and humane principles for which Christianity stands.

One objection to this attitude is that, no matter how emphatically the missionary disclaims partisanship and political motive, his action is in danger of being resented not only by the nation criticised, but even by members of the very nation he is defending. As a matter of fact, Fisher continues, the open activity of missionaries in China in opposition to Japan's claims in Shan-tung has unquestionably raised an 'obstacle' in the path of Christianity in Japan.

In contrast with the popular objections to the first attitude, it is noteworthy that J.H. Oldham, who was editor of The International Review of Missions in 1920, proclaimed a rather liberal, active viewpoint on the issue of nationality and missions. It deserves a long citation:

Nationality is thus both for good and for evil one of the most powerful forces in human life ... A force so powerful [nationality] is one which Christian missions cannot 'ignore'. Among the peoples of Asia and Africa the sense of 'nationality' has been stimulated by the experience and fear of political domination and economic exploitation by Western nations ... Among peoples with different mental and emotional characteristics, with a different history and different social institutions, the Gospel in
proportion as it is really apprehended by them must inevitably express itself in forms of thought and worship 'different' from ours ... We are confronted with the undesirable fruits of 'denationalization' (in many parts of the mission field) ... Christian missions must take 'a definite attitude' towards the political and economic aspects of Western nationalism ... If the hearts of Asiatic and African peoples are embittered against Western nations on account of their 'selfishness' and 'injustice' ... The task is far from easy. The line which separates faithful witness to Christian principle from advocacy of a particular political programme is often difficult to find. To reach a 'sound' judgement in complex and intricate questions of political and economic relations demands 'wide knowledge' and 'trained intelligence' ... But the recognition of these difficulties does not mean that the task should be avoided but that it must be approached with the necessary caution, knowledge and wisdom. If missionary bodies fail to enter their protest where it is needed against the unchristian elements in Western nationalism their Christian witness is to that extent impaired. We cannot preach convincingly in word what we deny in national act and policy. The range of missionary duty has expanded until it includes not only to winning of individual souls but the endeavour to Christianize the national policies of the professedly Christian nations, and the former part of the task will be handicapped if the latter is ignored.

Welcoming the work undertaken by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, a Commission on Oriental Relations as a step in the right direction, Oldham finally declared the need of 'a Christian doctrine of nationality'. He demanded that Christian missions take a 'definite' attitude towards the political and economic aspects of Western nationalism. In addition, he also maintained that responsible missionaries must 'actively' oppose policies and practices of selfishness and injustice. Given that the situation of 1920 was dominated by the policy of 'non-interference' in the political affairs, his point of view seems quite impressive in the light of 'real' Christianization.

The majority of missionaries, the conservative proponents of the
policy of non-interference, in the 'embryonic' state of sociological reflection which was due to their lack of knowledge and trained intelligence chose the 'easy' way. Thus they could not confront the critical issue actively.

The second attitude which Fisher classifies is that of 'strict neutrality and reticence' towards the whole question at issue, regardless of the fact moral principles may intimately be concerned. It rests primarily on the ground that the missionary, like his Master, is commissioned only to establish the spiritual kingdom of God directly in the hearts of individuals, and that any attempt to deal directly with political matters would 'jeopardise' his spiritual authority as well as his friendly relations with the people and the government whose guest he is, and would thereby defeat his ultimate purpose. The proponents of the neutrality principle based their argument on the example and teaching of the Lord. They said:

The records show Him not as protesting against the abuses of Roman rule, but as teaching His disciples to support it by paying taxes and acknowledging its authority. He appears also to give some warrant to the doctrine that mundane political and economic power is under the domination of the 'prince of this world', and that the children of the Kingdom must be 'resigned' and not surprised if the world does 'go to devil', but simply devote themselves to serving out of the world those who will constitute the 'invisible' and eternal realm of the Spirit. Any attempt to build the city of God in the corporate life of men on 'this' earth is 'foredoomed' to failure. It cannot be let down from God out of earth, but its citizens must be snatched out of earth into 'heaven'.

The strategic response of the Christian mission to nationalistic pressure has followed three main lines: recruiting and training an indigenous clergy to whom the control of the churches is committed, fostering the adjustment of the Church and Christian community to the indigenous culture, and an attempt to establish the supranationality
of the missionary. 80

In this respect 'devolution' or the transfer of control from the mission organisation to the responsible national church body accompanied the rise of a more native clergy in Protestant circles. 81 The counterpart of devolution in the Roman Catholic mission is the establishment of national hierarchies with indigenous bishops. China led the way in this development. So the first six Chinese bishops were consecrated in 1926 together in Rome, and others were constantly added to their ranks. Archbishop Tien was elevated to the dignity of Cardinal. The first native Japanese Bishop was consecrated to the see of Nagasaki in 1927. All foreign bishops offered their resignations in 1940, and since then the Japanese hierarchy has been entirely under native leadership.

Finally, as Beidelman stresses, it is essential to consider any missionary group in terms of the nationality, socio-economic background and cultural background of its members. 82 In relation to nationality, in the case of Japan, since the clergy and laity were ardentlly nationalistic and the missionaries were in the main also warmly pro-Japanese, a sharp clash between the government and the Church and mission was long avoided. The fact that in World War I Japan was an ally of the United States, Britain, and France, from which most missionaries came, helped to postpone the conflict. Here Beaver explains.

The decade of the 1920s was the time of transition, and after the Manchurian Incident of 1931 militaristic totalitarianism was firmly in the saddle, hostility towards former allies was manifested, the national citizenship of the majority of missionaries became a handicap, and increasing pressure was exerted on all Christian agencies and institutions. After the invasion of China in 1937 many Protestant missionaries were forced to give up their pro-Japanese position and some found it necessary to leave the country. The Roman Catholic Church brought in new orders with
missionaries of German and Italian nationality, countries with which the nation was to be allied in the next war. The shrine issue brought conflict into the open. The Roman Catholic hierarchy in 1932 accepted the assurance of the Ministry of Education that the rites were patriotic and not religious, and in 1936 the Propaganda confirmed this decision. Protestants were divided, but the nationals on the whole accepted the government's view while missionaries were more likely to regard the rites as religious.

The cultural background of missionaries exerts an influence in ways not necessarily determined by their Christian beliefs and work, and it also relates to the broader colonial milieu in which these missionaries function. Yet most studies of missionaries ignore the socio-cultural background as well as nationality and tend to consider all missionaries as essentially the same. These features should be considered in any discussions of missions in the modern world.

And it should be noted that there are striking differences between Roman Catholics and Protestants, yet the differences within Protestant or Catholic groups seem nearly as great. This caution leads us to do closer study.
CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF KOREAN CHRISTIANITY

A. The Pre-Christian Religious Heritage of Korean Society

Historically, Korea's first contact with Christianity (Roman Catholicism) was made in the 17th century, when Confucianism was the State religion of the Yi dynasty (1392-1910 AD). When the two different cultures met, the Korean people had lived under the Neo-Confucian belief system, which was based upon Zhu Xi's\(^1\) strict doctrinal interpretations, for over four centuries. The process scholars call 'Confucianisation' may be traced to late fourteenth century Korea, when literati, inspired by the Neo-Confucian vision of a virtuous society, in the service of the newly risen Yi dynasty attempted a thorough transformation of Korean society. By the seventeenth century Korea was an overtly Confucian society, an identity some Koreans maintain to this day.\(^2\) It is an interesting fact that Confucianism in no other society in East Asia took as strong a hold on the culture as it did in Korea during the Chosŏn dynasty (1392-1910). Although Confucianism originated in China, it never had the overall impact on Chinese cosmopolitan society that Neo-Confucianism had on Korea over the 500 years of the last dynasty. As James H. Grayson has pointed out, "it is only in Korea that we find a society in which the predominant political, cultural, and social influences were and are Confucian".\(^3\) It should be noted in this context that "it has been a curious fact of Korean religious history that Koreans have tended to preserve cultural traits which have been lost or distorted in their homeland".\(^4\) The vitality of both the Buddhist and Christian traditions in Korea might be understood against

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this background.

No outline history of Korean Confucianism fails to stress the sharp break between the centralised, formalistic, and institutional Confucianism of pre-Yi times and the far more diffused, intellectual, and philosophic Confucianism of the Yi period with its powerful and widespread influence on Korean social as well as institutional life. In this respect, 'ancestor rites' became one of the most emphasized aspects of Korean Neo-Confucian life. Yi dynasty Confucian reformers were to transform the loosely structured clan system of the Buddhist Koryó dynasty (918-1392 AD) into a tidy configuration of patrilineal, primogenitural families and lineages. The Neo-Confucians saw in 'ancestor worship' a demonstration of the moral content of proper social relationships. A well-tended ancestral shrine and a chesa ritual scrupulously performed demonstrated and perpetuated 'propriety', ethical and orderly behaviour in a harmonious society. The form and content of ancestor rituals, the mode of storing tablets, and the designation of ritual heirs were vigorously specified. Ancestor worship was the major instrument for imposing a patrilineal pattern on Korean society at the beginning of the Yi dynasty, and Confucianism was used to stamp out Buddhism and 'spirit worship'.

For Confucians, contrary to the Buddhists' belief that the dead would disappear into the air, the ancestor ritual was a medium through which the living could express filial piety by recruiting the ancestors' favours (pobon) and keeping their memories alive (ch'uwón). Indeed, the failure to perform ancestral rites was taken as evidence of insufficient filial piety and was punishable by law.

The Japanese of the early Tokugawa period used Neo-Confucian doctrine sparingly, to provide the rationale for their political
hegemony, not as in Korea to reshape the basis of social relations. In Japan, Confucianism was primarily a concern of the ruling elite and the associated scholarly class. The Neo-Confucian scholars of Japan, like those of Korea, dealt with the critical issue of ancestor worship and in that context stressed the importance of agnatic descent. But Japanese society was destined to handle these matters in ways quite outside the Neo-Confucian formulation of the proper rites for the ancestors. Not only did women participate fully in the rites, but also ancestor worship in Japan came to be observed in an almost exclusively 'Buddhist mode'.

When the Roman Catholic Church, regarding 'ancestor worship' as an act of idolatry and forbidding its practice in 1715, met with the rigid Neo-Confucianism in Korea, the end result was bloody persecutions. Those who actually responded quickly to Catholicism were fundamentally the avowed Confucians, in education and even in the earliest experiences of their childhood. They had been born under a dynasty which tried to be 'more Chinese than the Chinese' by imposing what were regarded as the 'pure' Confucian values upon all its subjects. They were searchers for truth and they felt they had found the way to the truth in the Catholic books. Nevertheless, it is difficult to conceive of their understanding the new-found doctrines in a way that would be fundamentally at variance with their Confucian backgrounds. They might reject the 'ancestor rites' at the command of their new religious leaders, but nothing could quickly change the basic habits of thought and underlying values inculcated in them since their earlier days and, consciously or not, influencing all their perceptions and behaviour.

In terms of Confucian dualistic spatial symbolism, the people thought of the world as mutually incompatible large spheres.
the Neo-Confucian vision, *ki* 'material force', the mundane vehicle of *li*, or the Supreme Ultimate, is divided into *yin* (the negative principle in nature) and *yang* (the positive principle in nature), the opposite but interdependent and complementary forces that represent, respectively, darkness and brightness, quiescence and activity, cold and heat, female and male, Earth and Heaven, and a broad range of similar dualities. Both forces are involved in every concrete being in the universe. In line with this, for example, Choe Che-u, the founder of the Tonghak (Eastern Learning) movement, compared Soguk (Western Learning) or Catholicism to *yin* and Eastern Learning to *yang*, with the purpose of controlling *yin* with *yang*.

Thus, Confucian spatial symbolism caused, in E.J. Hobsbawm's term, 'archaic' consciousness among the people, and as a result 'simple dichotomies' prevailed in them. In this respect, it is noteworthy that Confucianism, the most 'archaic' of the historic religions, best shows a permanent possibility of 'regressive' tendency. In brief, the 'dichotomised world view' as an authoritarian, militaristic and exclusive (cliquish) ideology was a basic character of the pre-Christian society. Indeed, more than any of the other Confucian political cultures, Korean culture had been characterised by 'extremes'.

Moreover, the Confucian valuing of family relationships no doubt contributed to the strong sense of division between in-group and out-group which characterised all the East Asian cultures. In Korea the basis of social relations was the feeling that trust would automatically be extended to family members and to those in analogous groups, while all others should be viewed with suspicion. Clannishness was understood and accepted as normal behaviour.

However, this Confucian society in Korea was not entirely
Confucianistic. Buddhism, though oppressed, exerted its influence continuously upon the people after the Buddhists were ostracised by the Confucian society. Prior to Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism, Mahāyāna (Sanskrit "greater vehicle") Buddhism from China influenced the Koreans for over ten centuries, until the end of the Koryŏ Dynasty. 

It flourished most in Silla and was adopted as the state religion as a measure calculated to gain the favour and protection of China. While the ruling class accepted Buddhism as the protection of the state, the other popular sects of Buddhism, the Māitrīya (Sans., the Buddha-to-be) Buddhism, combined with the indigenous folk shamanism, prevailed among the commoners.

According to J.H. Grayson's Early Buddhism and Christianity in Korea (1985), it was Hui-yuan, following the example of his teacher Tao-an, the founder of the lay cult of Māitrīya, who founded a cult of Amitābha for the laity in A.D. 402. Amongst the masses, this new movement, 'Pure Land' Buddhism, quickly became the most important force in Silla Buddhism. 'Pure Land' places emphasis neither on scriptural study nor on a life of good works, but simply in faith in the grace of Amitābha. By the mid-eighth century in Silla, Buddhism was no longer a foreign religion but an integral part of Silla's culture. Buddhism had taken firm hold of the minds of members of all classes of the society. In this context it should be pointed out that Grayson's final stage of Buddhism in Silla (A.D. 742 to 936) saw the rise of non-doctrinal sects, which attracted the masses of that time by appealing to a mixture of simple faith in the grace of Amitābha and shamanism, in the midst of their increasingly chaotic conditions. As Silla grew and expanded culturally and politically, doctrinal and intellectual Buddhism flourished, but when the social and political structure came unhinged, a more inward-looking and
individualistic form of Buddhism became fashionable. Māitrēya, known as the 'Messianic Buddha' who comes from the West Paradise to rescue the people from suffering, formed a decisive ideological backbone for the Unified Silla dynasty of the Three Kingdoms Period. Towards the end of that dynasty, the Māitrēya Messianic Buddhism influenced the popular resistance movements against dynastic regimes. Even during the Neo-Confucian Yi dynasty, the idea of the Māitrēya Buddha was 'alive' among the people.

The Confucianistic society was not free from Taoistic influence also. Taoism was formally introduced into Koguryŏ in 624 from China. Taoism has never been an organised religion in Korea, but it has also continuously influenced the society as a philosophy as well as 'superstition'.

As for the 'messianic' traditions, we can note the popularity of Chŏnggam nok prognostication. Chŏnggam nok is a number of books of prophecy, handed down from ancient times. It combines prophecy and geomancy to speak specifically and apocalyptically about the southern part of Korea. As a kind of 'theodicy of the unprivileged', this prognostication with its potentially subversive prophecy, especially aggravated the sense of crisis in the individual members of society, and became a menace to the government.

Behind all these imported religions there existed a pre-Confucian, pre-Buddhistic and pre-Taoist religion, an indigenous belief. In its primitive stage, Shamanism, a faith common to all tribes ranging throughout North-eastern Asia, particularly Mongolia and Siberia, grew into the national ethos of the Korean people. The primitive ethos of the Korean people derives from Shamanism, a polytheistic and polydemonic religion based on nature worship. The core of Shamanism is the animistic belief in the presence of spiritual
beings. Shamanism adopted from Buddhism, most of the accretion of magic, of charm-making, crystal-gazing, and dream interpretation. Thus, Mircea Eliade describes Shamanism as 'techniques of ecstasy'. In brief, spiritual exorcism, direct communication with the Holy Spirit and healing are the major aspects of Shamanism.

In addition to the animistic belief, one of the important characteristics of Shamanism is the unity of religion-philosophy and the state in the primitive way of life. For this feature, the foundation myth commences with the Heavenly Emperor (God) who had a son who wanted to come to the world to help people.

In Korea's shamanistic pantheon there developed a concept of a hierarchy of the gods. Above all the spirits stood one supreme ruler named Hananim. Koreans regarded Hananim as the celestial God of the Heavenly Kingdom. Korean faith in Hananim was an integral part of Korean thought from primitive times. Conviction of belief in him was strengthened, not reduced, by the introduction of the amorphous Confucian concept of ch'ŏn (Chinese: t'ien). Furthermore, Korean Neo-Confucianists of the Yi dynasty fell strongly under the influence of their own indigenous religious beliefs, which in part called for a personalized view of God. Their interpretation of Zhu Xi, long the accepted exponent of Confucian doctrine identifying God with reason and law, proved to be a Korean deviation. Whereas Zhu Xi tended to rule out a personal God, Korean Confucianists tended to affirm one.

At the very outset of their proselyting effort missionaries recognized Hananim as a distinctive Korean deity, unusually suited to their own conception of God. It was easy to accept him as the counterpart of the Christian god; there was no need for dispensation. As Robert Scott observed:

The Koreans have always Hananim, a name which covers the idea of the one supreme mind, one God.
This God of the Koreans is similar to the God of the Jewish Old Testament.

... On this deep-seated monotheism the Christian missionary has built the amazing success.

Hananim was a point of contact with Korean culture the like of which missionaries in China did not have. In Korea and Christianity (1967), Spencer J. Palmer concludes that "As a personal transcendent God, clearly the supreme deity of the Korean people, Hananim was uniquely suited to prepare the Korean people for belief in the Christian God".35

Thus, we can assume that the Korean religious heritage, such as the monotheistic concept of God, longing for salvation, messianic hope, eternal life in the Great Beyond, and so on, were helpful, rather than harmful, for the rapid progress of Christian evangelism.36 Likewise they could serve to mould the characteristics of the young Korean Christianity.

B. The Early Korean Churches

1. Catholic Missions

"Korea presents an ideal historical laboratory to compare the introduction of the two principal forms of Christianity, Roman Catholicism and Protestantism".1 The results of this comparison would provide useful information for a comparison with the growth and development of Christianity in China and Japan, but this goes beyond the scope of the present historical overview. This section is based upon the assumption that the early, formative period is crucial for the later pattern of church-state relations.

Catholicism was introduced to China through Matteo Ricci (1552-
1610), a Jesuit priest. He took 20 years to work his way step by step from the Portuguese community at Macao to the court at Peiping. The Jesuits brought modern European science and published several hundred scientific works in classical Chinese. Ricci, on his part, believed that if Christianity were to enter deeply into the life of China, it had to find contact with Confucianism. He permitted Chinese Christians to 'kowtow' to their ancestors and the emperor because he felt that these kowtows were basically 'secular' rites. He gave up the Western practice of preaching in a chapel and talked to small groups. The Jesuits established friendships with several high officials of the late Ming dynasty, including some in the Tung-lin Academy group of moral reformers. In the waxing and waning of political influence, Jesuit fortunes were tied to the reform groups.

The Pei-ching Jesuits served as the link between Europe and China for more than 100 years. However, the Rites Controversy ended their effectiveness. The Jesuits had approved the Chinese veneration of ancestors as merely 'civil' rites. They had also maintained that the classical terms shang-ti and t'ien could be considered equivalents of the Western 'God'. Dominican and Franciscan friars, newly arrived from the Philippines, accused the Jesuits and their converts of participating in pagan rites and destroying essential monotheistic articles of faith. After a long ecclesiastical struggle, the Pope finally supported the Dominican and Franciscan position with the bull Ex illa die in 1715. In the eyes of the Jesuits, it was the death blow to the Chinese church. The local Chinese churches went underground as a consequence of the succeeding proscription of Christianity.

We can only understand the early Catholic missions against this socio-cultural environment of China: Korean Catholics received their
faith from Pei-ching and experienced many of the same trials as their Chinese brethren.6 Through the Korean envoys, who visited China annually, Catholicism spread to Korea.7 Donald N. Clark in Christianity in Modern Korea (1986) writes on Catholic beginnings:

The Korean church began with a small group of eighteenth-century Confucian scholars from the out-of-power political faction, Silhak, or the School of Practical Learning. The purpose of Silhak was a rejuvenation of Korean Confucianism through a clearer understanding of man's relation to nature - "the investigation of things". Among the texts studied by the Silhak scholars was a smuggled copy of The True Doctrine of the Lord of Heaven [T'ien-chu Shih-i], a Chinese work by the seventeenth-century Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci. Ricci's description of the Christian God seemed much like that of the Neo-Confucian Supreme Ultimate, and they decided to learn more. This was risky. The Pope's condemnation of ancestor worship in 1742 had scandalized Korean Confucianists; the church was therefore anathema to the orthodox atmosphere of the Yi dynasty of Korea.8

Some have pointed out that Catholicism may have been practised in Korea a full generation prior to the time when it was first believed to have begun around 1770.9 The Chŏngjong taewang sillok states that in 1758 many of the inhabitants of Hwanghae and Kangwon Provinces had ceased the performance of the chesa rites, or memorial rites for deceased ancestors. "As Catholics were forbidden to perform the chesa rites", Grayson says, "it is possible that the cessation of their performance may have been due to Catholic influence".10

But it is generally accepted that it is not until the last quarter of the eighteenth century that particular intellectual circles, that is, disciples of the thought of Yi Ik took up the practice of Catholicism avidly.11 The Silhak scholar Yi Pyŏk and his friends persuaded Yi Sŏng-hun, son of a recently-appointed Korean tribute envoy bound for China in 1783, to accompany the envoy, find out everything he could, and bring back books. Yi Sŏng-hun did more:
in Pei-ching he became a Christian himself and was christened Peter, a name suggesting his destiny as founder of the Korean church. When he returned home in 1784, he carried books, crucifixes, images and information about Christian rituals. Then he joined with Yi Pyŏk to found a small lay congregation of Catholics. This was Korea's first-known Christian church.\(^\text{12}\) It is important to note here that in the history of Christian missions the Korean recipients of the Gospel took the initiative in the establishment of an organisation to carry out most of the functions of the Church by themselves.\(^\text{13}\) Unlike many other lands, where the Christian religion was first brought by foreign missionaries, in Korea it began with a kind of 'self-study' (self-directed study) of Christian literature by natives.\(^\text{14}\)

Grayson points out that, given the very rapid spread of Catholicism within the intellectual circle of Yi Ik, it is not surprising to learn that the first known opposition to it came from another member of the same circle.\(^\text{15}\) Some disciples of the thought of Yi Ik became convinced that the doctrine of Catholicism threatened the basis of a Confucian society. This was not the only opposition to the young church. Numerous Korean Christians were put to death as waves of persecution followed. The persecution of the Korean Neo-Confucian Yi Dynasty exceeded that of the Ch'ing.\(^\text{16}\) It should be noted in this context that the initial persecution of the Catholic Church was not simply a matter of the suppression of unconventional beliefs, but was also a matter of containing the political power of certain factions at the royal court. The political affiliation of certain upper class Catholic adherents was a factor in the rejection of the Church.\(^\text{17}\) From the outset Catholicism had attracted many yangban scholars from among the Namin scholars who were excluded from access to political power.
The Four Great Persecutions took place in 1801, 1839, 1846, and 1866. Catholic scholars invariably gave up their rank and assumed humble trades, especially that of potter, in remote villages. The fact that potters could travel freely from market to market helped them to arrange for the clandestine movement of priests. Potters, of course, were socially too insignificant to attract much notice from the authorities. Persecution brought a general decline in the number of Catholic believers, and by the turn of the nineteenth century most converts were drawn from among people from the lower social status. In short, it was people from the lower social classes rather than the higher, the uneducated rather than the educated, and the poor rather than the better off who were now attracted to Catholicism. Catholicism in the nineteenth century no longer had an appeal to the intellectual class, but continued to survive because it offered hope to members of the inferior class in traditional Korean society.

One can observe that the two belief systems - Neo-Confucianism and Catholicism -, claiming the absolute truth, can take extremes, particularly when Catholic Christians uncompromisingly and resolutely rejected the Confucian state's claims of pre-eminent political power. The end result was persecution and bloody martyrdom of Christians. Aside from factional strife (political), the ancestor worship issue at the court and the orthodox doctrine of Neo-Confucianism became acute causes of confrontation. In Grant S. Lee's views, therefore, if the ancestral worship issue had been treated by the Church merely as a custom and permitted, an unnecessary clash could have been avoided and many lives of the faithful could have been saved. A Confucian culture like that of Korea demanded that Catholicism ally itself with either Confucian or sectarian forms. In
this sense the Pope's overruling of the Jesuits with the Rites Decision had the inevitable effect of making Catholics peasant sectarian. In the Korean case persecution fostered rural Catholic ghettos with a special religious ethos. According to W.E. Biernatzki et al. in *Korean Catholicism in the 1970s* (1975), Korean Catholic texts stressed the eternal dichotomies: this world and the next, body and soul, time and eternity, secular and sacred. Thus Min Kyong-suk, a Catholic scholar, stresses that the Church in the nineteenth century selected only those aspects which were most consoling to the psychology of a suffering and persecuted Church. Min Kyong-suk continues:

Such escapism and individualism, perhaps, were excusable during the era of persecution, but the fact that such a mentality continued to prevail through the modern period of Korean Catholicism seems to show that it was not something accidental to individual Catholics at a particular time but rather was endemic to the Catholic ethos as such. The primary function of the Church, it seems, had been to provide a camp and shelter for refugees not merely in the physical sense but, more important, in the psychological sense ... in the majority of cases, the Church remained a final shelter and an end in itself. Other characteristics of conventional Catholicism, whose meaning we earlier located in a fundamental dualism, such as authoritarianism and a ghetto mentality are likewise traceable to the joint operation of the Catholic world view, the mentality of Shamanism and Confucianism and the social conditions which reinforced both.

We can conclude that the ethos of Korean Catholicism was not an accidental phenomenon, that its origin was deeply rooted in the past, and that such a past was chiefly constituted by the soil of the indigenous personality shaped by Shamanism and Confucianism and further vitiated by the result of government persecutions.

In this respect, L.G. Paik, a Protestant scholar, criticises the Catholic Church of the modern period:

... the infallible Roman Church has a great many
shortcomings. Their converts are untaught of the Scripture. From the foundation of the church by Yi Sŏng-Hun in 1784 to 1866, eighty-two years had passed, but no attempt had been made to translate a single Gospel or any portion of the Bible. Their emphasis on ecclesiastical institutionalism occupies such a paramount place that even new converts began the practice of their faith by setting up a hierarchy, rather than by growing in grace and life. Their political activities perhaps are the most undesirable features of the missionary proselyting methods of Roman Catholics.

... As in Vietnam, Korea saw the French missionaries as the forerunners of French imperialism.

It was a fact that the Catholics became involved in political activities which were seen to be traitorous to the Korean state. In contrast the Protestant missionaries, mostly Americans, stressing non-interference in politics, from the early period of their mission attempted to minimize the political factor, although they had to acknowledge its existence.

Finally, it is important to point out in the present context that Roman Catholic missionaries in Korea before 1911 (the year in which the German mission was founded) all came from France. The French mission was founded in 1831. At the turn of the twentieth century, Catholic mission was carried on primarily by the Missions Étrangères de Paris (the Paris Foreign Mission Society, hereafter MEP), a great French missionary congregation that had long been at work in the Far East. The Society recovered sufficiently from the ruin brought by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars to resume foreign missionary work. The French MEP in the Far East had close ties with government and the armed forces that Catholics maintained at home. Because the French missionaries identified with their government, they were accustomed to deal directly with governments.

To summarise the early history of Catholic missions, acceptance of the new doctrine by some led to general rejection by the majority
of the Confucian literati and the government, resulting in nearly a hundred years of direct and indirect persecution. Nearly a third of Catholic history in Korea was under conditions of severe suppression. A further third of the Church's history is taken up by a period of slow recuperation from the shock of persecution and passive acceptance of a totalitarian regime. During the early period Korean Catholicism showed a slow rate of growth and development in spite of extreme persecution.

After waves of repression, Korean Catholics finally won legal protection through Korea's treaty with France (1886), which guaranteed the safety of Catholic converts. As the years passed, the work of the French MEP fathers was augmented by the work of an international Catholic missionary force, whose different orders were assigned to different areas of the peninsula: German Benedictines in the northeast (1911), American Maryknollers in the northwest (1927), and Irish Columbans in the southwest (1933).

2. Protestant Missions

When Catholicism entered Korea, social criticism was confined more to the intelligentsia, and the power of the government was unimpaired; however, Protestantism came in at a time when the structure and values of traditional society were being widely criticised, and when the central government's ability to function was greatly impaired. While the Korean Catholic community was suffering in the nineteenth century, the Protestant faith was also putting down roots. In Chinese Manchuria, in the 1870s Scottish missionaries studied Korean and then translated scriptures, which they passed on itinerant Korean merchants. The merchants in turn set up small family congregations in Korea. The first Protestant church was founded in Soraе, Hwanghae
Province, by a merchant named Sŏ Sang-yun. In this context, we can assume that the Scottish cultural and religious background and the democratic structure of Presbyterianism in some measure influenced the founding of the first church. Here again we can note that the development of the Church in Korea from the first depended upon the efforts of the Koreans themselves. Before any foreign missionaries actually engaged in evangelism on Korean soil, Christianity had been brought there by local evangelists.

The late nineteenth century was marked by ceaseless challenges from outside powers to open Korea's gates, and she was finally pressured into signing a series of treaties with such Western powers as the United States of America, Germany and France, as well as with neighbouring Japan and Russia. With the opening of the country to foreign interests came freedom of religion, and foreign missionaries poured into Korea during the period from 1884 to 1908. The first Protestant missionary societies to begin evangelistic efforts in Korea were the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, and the Foreign Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church. These two agencies started their work simultaneously, carried it on side by side, and have organised the majority of the churches existing in Korea today.

In the history of the missionary enterprise in America, the year 1880 marks the birth of a new missionary interest among students in theological seminaries. Among the early missionaries to Korea, many made their decisions for foreign mission work either during or following the first Inter-Seminary Convention held in October, 1880. In the Convention, they believed that the Lord would hasten his coming and that the time had come to preach the gospel of the kingdom in all the world for a witness unto all nations. Paul A. Varg asserts, in
his "Motives in Protestant Missions, 1890-1917" (1954), that "it was in the prevailing spirit of Moody revivalism that the missionary movement found its deepest religious source". The Moody type of revivalism did not emphasise theology. Instead it exploited the guilt complex and preached justification by faith. Varg comments on the Moody revivalism:

What is conceived to be the evils of its day raised no questions about the social order and the solution to all ills it conceived to lie in the redemption of the individual. Stated in religious terms, it had a passion for souls and it was this sense of urgency which served as a major impetus to the foreign missionary crusade.

The dynamic force underlying the missionary movement was the revivalistic spirit. The theological liberals, for the most part, frowned on both revivals and the missionary crusade. It was the conservatives who provided the leadership for the missionary cause. Thus the typical missionary of the first quarter of the century after the opening of the country was a man who still kept the Sabbath much like his New England forebears a century earlier. He looked upon dancing, smoking, card-playing, and the drinking of liquor as sins in which no true follower of Christ should indulge. In theology and biblical criticism he was strongly conservative, and he held as a vital truth the premillenarian view of the second coming of Christ. Thus higher criticism and liberal theology were deemed as dangerous heresies. The dichotomy of literal Biblicism and the social gospel, a mark of Protestant missions in China (and for that matter, Japan), never found a place in Korea. Under the impetus of a programme directed by American missionaries of 'Puritanic zeal and Wesleyan fervour', fundamentalism held sway in Korea. For example, in the case of baptised members, failure to keep the Sabbath or to attend worship regularly without legitimate excuse was considered sufficient reason
for discipline. Such members were debarred from taking part in the communion service.

The first Protestant missionary to come with the intention of residing permanently in Korea was Dr. Horace N. Allen, of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. He was appointed by the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions to China as a medical missionary in 1883, and drifted around in Shang-hai and Nan-king until September of 1884. To gain access to Korea, he came not as a missionary but as physician to the U.S. Legation in Seoul. A short-lived palace coup in December 1884 gave him the chance to heal the wounds of a Korean prince, thereby earning the gratitude of the king and permission to start a clinic. He also won toleration for religious missionary work in Seoul. In 1885 missionary work began in earnest with Horace G. Underwood and Henry G. Appenzeller, Presbyterian and Methodist, respectively. 10

Missionaries, mostly American, of two leading denominations, Presbyterian and Methodist, initiated various cultural and social welfare activities, in addition to regular mission work, and established high schools, junior colleges, medical clinics, Bible translation (Korean), publication of periodicals, and youth movements such as the YMCA and the YWCA. Through these activities and the organization of democratic churches, early Protestantism in Korea resulted in promotion of democratic values and became associated with the ideology of an independent national state. Thus R. Pierce Beaver says:

Korea presents the outstanding instance of the identification of nationalism with Christianity in the Far East. Within a few short years many citizens of a nation which had ruthlessly persecuted Christianity and made martyrs of scores of Roman Catholics and their missionaries, found in the Church, especially the Protestant denominations, the vehicle which could most
effectively preserve the national language, keep alive national aspirations, and strengthen the character of the people under oppression. The defeat of China by Japan on Korean soil, Japanese pressure on the King, and the murder of the Queen at Japanese instigation, all in 1895, gave birth to Korean nationalism, and subsequent aggression and domination continued to foster it.

In similar vein, many have emphasised that the prestige of Protestantism was reinforced by the presence of many Christians among the nationalists. In spite of the fact that there were also Christians who collaborated with Japanese in the latter part of the colonial period, Korean Christianity never became associated as such with imperialism. Whereas Christian missions and churches in other colonies were seen as part of the imperialist presence, in Korea the church was associated with a new nationalism. Christianity in Korea became the vehicle for the preservation of national hopes in reaction against Japanese domination. Protestantism was warmly welcomed not only as a religious creed but also for its political, social, and cultural ideals and activities. The strength of its appeal was due in part to a psychological factor - the acute feeling of the Korean people that belief in Christianity would atone for the failings of their society that led to the loss of Korea's nationhood. Thus, it is very interesting to note that, in spite of the deliberate effort on the part of the Japanese westernisers, the Korean public seems to have never ceased to identify Western civilisation with Christianity.

It was a fact that, at the earlier stages of evangelistic work, American missionaries imposed on Korean Protestant churches the American brand of religious fundamentalism. The American missionaries, trained in a background of conservative and fundamental theology and rigidly sectarian ethical views, preached love and perseverance to the Korean Christians who were burning with
resentment over the loss of national sovereignty. The Korean Christians accused some missionaries of playing 'traitor', threatening them with death.\textsuperscript{15} The missionaries led a revival movement in 1907 in an attempt to steer the Korean church towards non-politicisation.\textsuperscript{16} As they intended, the nature of the Korean church switched to a 'revival passion'. Furthermore, the missionaries, who had checked the theological growth of the Korean church, hoped to confine Korean clergy within their own theological and socio-ethical boundaries. Therefore, the intellectual level of Korean clergymen was extremely low. When the first World Mission Council met in Edinburgh in 1910, the theological destitution of the Korean church emerged as a major issue.\textsuperscript{17}

A second feature of the Korea mission programme was indifference to the social application of Christian theology.\textsuperscript{18} The Presbyterian missionaries in Korea invited Rev. John Nevius, a missionary to China, to Korea for a week's discussion of a mission policy in 1890. The "Nevius Method" (Appendix B), named after John Nevius, was elaborated originally in a series of articles appearing in the 1883 issues of the Chinese Recorder. The plan was not popular in China but gained practically unanimous acceptance among the Korean missionaries after Dr. Nevius visited Sŏul in 1890. In addition to the Nevius Method - self-support, self-government and self-propagation - the Presbyterian Mission Council adopted a written mission policy as early as 1893.\textsuperscript{19} This is the first and a remarkable statement of the policy of American missionaries in Korea. The first article of the policy states: "It is better to aim at the conversion of the working class than that of the higher classes", and the second article was: "The conversion of women and the training of Christian girls should be an especial aim, since mothers exercise so important an influence over future
generations''. Thus American missionaries consciously made the lower-
class populations and women and children their sociological targets
for evangelisation. The missionary outreach towards the mass of
common people was certainly the major reason for such increase in
church membership. The thought of the Korean churches, particularly
among the common people, was fixed on a new world. For the deprived
and the oppressed converts the present world was regarded as so
utterly lost that it could not possibly be saved. The duty of
Christianity was to preach deliverance: to exhort, baptise, and
gather in the elect preparatory to Christ's second coming.

The non-intellectual, and indeed almost anti-intellectual,
approach of the American missionaries in proselytising the Korean
masses became quite apparent when missionaries began to reflect on the
question of theological education, that is, the training of Korean
church leaders.20 The Rev. W.D. Reynolds in 1896 had set forth some
ideals and principles for the training of the Korean ministry
(Appendix C). There were three negatives and four positives, but the
most important part was the restriction on "higher education" for
Protestant ministers. The initial setting of a low standard of
theological education has hindered the educational level of Protestant
ministers ever since. In this sense, Yi Kwang-su a talented young
Korean writer, in 1917, writing on "Defects of the Korean Church
Today", made the following interesting observations:

Another bad fruit is the contempt for learning. To say that the church which
found schools despises learning, sounds like a contradiction; but a real Christian
so-called treats learning with the greatest contempt, calling it 'worldly
knowledge'. Arguing that the 'worldly knowledge' weakens faith, he regards
learning as a temptation of the devil and an enemy of the soul ... In
church schools no attention is paid to natural science, geography or history - the essential
subjects in a modern curriculum. The most surprising thing is the opposition of church
officers, like pastors and elders, to the 'worldly knowledge' ... Be the cause what it may, to despise knowledge is the sure road to destruction. It is indeed a regrettable attitude.\textsuperscript{21}

The anti-intellectual approach of the missionaries on the training of the Korean ministry was the root cause of the long criticised anti-intellectualism of Korean Protestantism in its eventful century of growth and progress. At the earlier stage of evangelistic work by the missionaries, it was too easy for them to impose on Korean Protestant churches the American brand of religious fundamentalism.\textsuperscript{22} This choked the development of Protestant theology by Korean theologians until the 1970s. Thus various schisms within the Protestant churches in Korea since 1950 have been deeply rooted in American Protestantism and American religious anti-intellectualism.\textsuperscript{23}

Schisms and divisions in Korean churches since 1950 also have missionary roots. When the American missionaries drew up mission policy in 1893, they adopted a comity system and divided the country into the several mission 'territories' (Table 2. Map of Korean Missions).\textsuperscript{24} The agreement was never made official, but it became an important working principle. The Northern Presbyterians and the Northern Methodists occupied the northwestern provinces, including P'yonyang and Ùiju. The Southern Presbyterians, the Baptist and the Northern Methodists were working in Ch'ungch'ŏng Province. The middle provinces such as Hwanghae and Kangwŏn went to both Northern and Southern Methodists. The southeastern province, Kyŏngsang Province except for the Pusan area, which the Australian Presbyterians had occupied, was occupied by the Northern Presbyterians. To make the demarcation of mission territories complete, the liberal Canadian missions later claimed the northeastern provinces of Hamgyŏng.

This division of Korea into mission territories according to the missionaries' own denominations was a direct carry-over from American
denominationalism. This hampered various continued efforts on the part of Korean Christians for church union, that is, the establishment of one united Christian Church in Korea. This almost innocent-looking division of mission territories along geographic lines also made later church schisms very intense and harmful for the healthy ecumenical development of Korean Protestantism.

Incidentally, the Presbyterian missionaries began their work under the wing of the government. Consequently, their policy was to win the favour of the state, that obstacles might not be unnecessarily placed in their way. Once having gained a foothold through the establishment of the government hospital, they pursued the policy of maintaining the status quo and of avoiding the opposition of the conservative party. Presbyterian policy was, therefore, conservative and cautious. The Methodists, however, were more aggressive. The appointment of Dr. R.S. Maclay of Japan, as the first superintendent of the Korea mission, led to friendly relations with the Japanese. Maclay was deeply impressed by the prominent position and liberal policy of the Japanese government in Korea during his visit in 1884. Methodist missionaries entered with letters of introduction from the Japanese to acquaintances in Korea, and at once began their missionary labour among the Japanese connected with the legation. To break down prejudices among the Koreans, they built hospitals and dispensaries in different sections of the city, constructed one of the first prominent school buildings in the heart of the capital, and inaugurated extensive school work for girls. The Board increased the missionary force and budget as rapidly as resources at home would permit. Thus the Presbyterians won favour with the government by acquiescing in its policy, and the Methodists gradually gained the confidence of the populace through their
philanthropic institutions.

In brief, when we review the early history of Protestant missions in Korea, we can grasp the outstanding characteristics of the Korean church which were not, despite Dr. L.G. Paik's view, transitory defects: (1) the inherent conservatism of the Church, (2) the want of the social application of Christianity, and (3) the low intellectual standard of the Korean Christians. Moreover, we should pay attention to the significance of the division of Korea into mission territories according to the missionaries' own denominations in the light of schisms in Korean churches in post-liberation Christianity. Also it is interesting to note the difference in missionary policies between the Presbyterians and the Methodists.

Around the time that Christianity was first introduced into Korea, the country was in the process of being taken over by Japan. Enlightened Christians took the lead in anti-Japan struggles; this national movement, however, was never supported by missionaries nor had it any theological backing. Missionaries were, in general, against the participation of Korean Christians or churches in the political (anti-Japanese) movement. In fact, they endeavoured to thwart such anti-Japan struggles by all available means. Missionaries had to protect the church - they did not want to see church members hurt in an anti-Japanese uprising, and they did not want to antagonise the Japanese for fear of losing their right to work in Korea. Missionaries were successful in de-politicising the Korean church through the emotion-filled revival movement of 1907. The great revival movement should be understood from this perspective. Emerging victorious in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, Japan placed Korea under its de facto control and in reality began its colonial rule of Korea with a support from the Roosevelt's United States and other Western
powers. In 1904 American President Roosevelt mediated the Portsmouth Peace Conference between the Russians and the Japanese. Presbyterian missionary, Dr. H.N. Allen, struggled to represent Korean interests to the American government, urging it to take a pro-Russian line, but to no avail. Roosevelt and the Japanese traded Korea for the Philippines by the Taft-Katsura Agreement. 31

On March 1, 1919, a nationwide independence movement was formed against the Japanese colonial government, and Korean Christians were participants. But missionary involvement was conspicuous by its absence. 32 The movement was organised by Korean laymen and Korean church leaders, together with Ch'ŏndogyo followers in Korean style, with no violence and with no plan for armed resistance. Again, out of humanitarian concern, American missionaries wrote reports and letters about Japanese atrocities and Korean suffering. Certainly, they could not do anything for Koreans in concrete terms, except taking care of the wounded, the imprisoned and the fugitives. It must have been a frustrating position for them. According to an announcement by the Japanese resident-general, there were 3,200 anti-Japan demonstrations from 1 March to 31 December 1919, in which 19,525 persons were arrested, including: 14 Sich'ŏngyo followers, 55 Catholics, 2,283 Ch'ŏndogyo followers and 3,272 Protestants (Methodist 560, Presbyterian 2,486, Congregational 7, and other Protestants 320) (Table 3. The Religious Affiliation of Those Arrested between March and December 1919). Also 16 of the 33 signatories of the new "Declaration of Independence" were Christian leaders.

Whilst not a few missionaries denounced the barbaric massacres perpetrated by the Japanese, Methodist Bishop H. Welch expressed discontent at the fact that the Independence Declaration was read at many churches. 33 Moreover, Methodist Bishop Smith argued that the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ŏndogyo</td>
<td>2,268</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sich'ŏngyo</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confucianist</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
<td>2,254</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>2,486</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congregational</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Protestants</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Religions</td>
<td>21</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3,809</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>3,007</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19,054     471   19,525  100.0

*(Japanese) Gendarmerie Headquarters in Korea, Chōsen san-ichi
dokuritsu sōjō jiken (The March First Independence Disturbance
Incident in Korea), Tokyo, Gennandō, 1969, p. 449).*
sufferings incurred by Christians during the March 1 Independence Movement were of the Christians' own making.34

According to Song Kŏn-Ho, Korean leaders, in particular leading Christians, in connection with the Independence Movement, misunderstood the principle of national self-determination that then United States President Wilson had advanced.35 The principle of national self-determination was the shortest and last item of the four principles Wilson put forth with an eye to eastern Europe. In other words, the principle was intended chiefly to call on European countries to maintain a power balance among themselves. Korean Christians, however, pinned excessive expectations on the principle, wishfully believing that Wilson would work for the independence of Korea. This wishful thinking was one of the stimulants of the Movement. Wilson, however, gave no word of support for the Korean's struggle for national independence, although they struggled for nearly one year. The Koreans' independence struggles, for which they shed so much blood, were completely ignored in the international community, especially by the United States government.36

From this there appeared two new phenomena in Korean society.37 The first was the public's departure from the church. Because the church had taken the lead in anti-Japan struggles, the public had had faith in it, and conscientious youths thronged to the church. When their struggles were ignored by the United States, which they had expected would support their movement for national independence, the youth sought another direction. Thus the movements of workers, farmers and students were begun. These new popular movements dealt a blow to the church. Now the Christian church was in a serious crisis. The people's general attitude towards Christianity was strikingly different from the past.
Japan invested its huge surplus profits earned through World War I in its colony of Korea and steadily expanded industrial facilities for arms build-up, consolidating a system of colonial exploitation. Workers and farmers suffered from colonial and semi-feudal exploitation. The number of labour disputes and tenancy disputes increased sharply in the 1920s. As the struggles of workers and farmers increased in number, they became organised movements, developing into anti-Japan campaigns. Towards these anti-Japan drives the church, then under the control of missionaries, not only remained aloof but also tended to disapprove. In this context, it is noteworthy that, after the March 1 Independence Movement, as a reaction to the world opinion, the new colonial administration tried to improve its relations with the missionary community. The Saitō government modified the policies governing missionary work in Korea. The Japanese authorities sought to have the conservative churches counter the anti-Japan sentiments that were sweeping Korean society.

In September 1919, while the Independence Movement was going on, the Presbyterian Church launched an extensive revival drive called the Forward Movement. In the three-year crusades, provincial Presbyterian meetings staged revival drives of their own. The Methodist Church too launched a great revival campaign, named the Century advance, in 1919. In 1923, it again initiated a drive to double the number of Methodist followers. As a result of the movement the numbers of churches and followers increased from about 1,700 and 111,000 in 1919 to 2,200 and 195,000 in 1926. Once the revival drive was over, however, Christian influence waned. In the case of the Presbyterian Church alone, the number of churches declined by 12 and the number of followers by 35,000.

Shocked at their influence despite the earlier revival movements,
the Presbyterian and Methodist churches launched yet another revival drive in 1929. The new crusade began with street-side preaching at Kwanghwamun in Seoul, which coincided with a national fair in Seoul and thus drew quite an audience. A total of 98 evangelical lectures were given over a 50-day period, with remarkable success. Here, the Japanese government made an attempt to have the conservative churches oppose the anti-Japanese drives that were sweeping the country.

In 1930, the Presbyterian Church established the Committee for the Study of the Means of the Advancement of the Church to begin studies on the numerical growth of the church. Instead of standing with the people who struggled to ensure their own survival, the church remained within the church-yard, trying to solve the people's troubles through preaching and Bible reading. In 1929, 80 percent of the Korean population lived in the rural areas, and up to 75 percent of Korean Christian followers were in the rural areas. The Presbyterian synod established a rural division in 1928 and a branch at each meeting, launching such programmes as the creation of model villages, founding of farmers' schools, publishing of a farmers' newspaper and the operation of credit unions. Similar programmes were also launched by the Methodist Church and the YMCA. Of course, they were better than none, but they failed to have any sizable effect on farmers' lives, since they could not go beyond the rural organisation of the Japanese authorities. The basic cause of farmers' poverty lay in colonial exploitation by Japanese imperialists.

As Korean Christianity remained within the precincts of the church, refusing to take part in the new popular movements or to bear the cross, mysticism as an unusual phenomenon swept Christian circles during the 1920s and 1930s. In addition, the church faced a serious problem with the demand by Japan for worship at Shinto shrines.
Before closing this section, we must add some points about the development of the early Protestant Church in Korea. The Church accepted and rejected certain key values of the traditional cultures. In Grayson's words:

It [the Church] found in the belief in Hananim, the Lord of Heaven of the traditional religion of Korea, a parallel to the God of the Hebrews. By adopting this term for God, the early missionaries were saying to the Koreans that the God whom they knew was the same God who revealed Himself in Jesus Christ. On the other hand, they felt quite proper about rejecting the polytheistic system in which this belief in a Supreme Being was enmeshed. In this, they were supported by the Confucianists who likewise scorned superstition. Just as they felt compelled to reject polytheism, the early missionaries likewise rejected the chesa ceremony. This brought them into conflict with the Confucianists who held it to be the centrepiece of morality and virtue.

Also, as did the Catholic Church, the Protestant churches proclaimed a doctrine of hope, but coupled this emphasis with a programme of social and political involvement. In the case of the Catholic Church, the mentality of the ghetto, of an isolated group shut up within itself and profoundly satisfied with its own comforts and glories had continued long after the end of persecution, thereby depriving the Church of significant involvement in society. For the most part, the Catholic Church showed tranquil development during the period of colonial domination. The Japanese do not seem to have been as harsh with the Catholics as they had been with the Protestants. The penetration and growth of Protestantism in Korea can be explained in some measure by the association of Christianity with a sense of Korean nationalism (Table 4. Statistics for Christianity [1920] in Korea).

But, as Song Kôn-Ho (1985) has already pointed out, Christianity and nationalism (the nationalist social movement) in Korea is controversial. It was a fact that the Christians, especially...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>Churches and Preaching Houses</th>
<th>Converts Koreans</th>
<th>Converts Foreigners</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Japan Methodist Church</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1,087</td>
<td>1,089</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan Presbyterian</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,057</td>
<td>1,057</td>
<td>2,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Congregational</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>1,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>2,752</td>
<td>2,752</td>
<td>5,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian Mission</td>
<td>1,899</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Church Mission</td>
<td>1,332</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvation Army Mission</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic Mission</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Benedict Mission</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Orthodox Mission</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist North Mission</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Day Mission</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oriental Miss. Society</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,166</td>
<td>2,386</td>
<td>2,386</td>
<td>5,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>3,246</td>
<td>2,490</td>
<td>2,490</td>
<td>5,736</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (Nakazawa, Kiyoshi, Relations Between the Government and Christianity in Chosen, Educational Affairs Bureau, Government-General of Chosen, 1921, p. 22).
Protestants, had lost their leading roles in anti-Japan struggles after the Independence Movement of 1919 had been ignored by the United States of America. This trend was certainly reinforced by the lack of concern for some of the realities of life in Korea at the time.\textsuperscript{46} It should be noted in this context that the attitude of the missionaries was mixed with their other-worldly spiritualism. In line with these attitudes, the conservative Christian majority in Korea stressed spiritual questions and tended to avoid conflict over temporal issues.\textsuperscript{47} To express this in Max Weber's terms, for conservative Protestants, "the world would remain as it was until the Master would come again".\textsuperscript{48} Thus the Saitō government in the 1920s tried to make the conservative churches move in opposition to the anti-Japan sentiments on the part of the Korean populace. In the political realm, the majority of conservative Christians, as a whole, heeded the Apostle Paul's advice in Romans 25:40: "He who resists the authorities resists what God has appointed".

On the other hand, however, as D.N. Clark concludes, "earlier in this century Christianity (Protestantism) in Korea was very important as an alternative to the other great force for change - Japan".\textsuperscript{49} Christianity gathered strength and support from Koreans who used church institutions as havens from Japanese oppression. When Japan ruled Korea, conditions combined to neutralise the contradictions between nationalism and Christianity that existed at the same time in China.\textsuperscript{50} Whereas Christian missions and churches in other colonies were seen as part of the imperialist presence, in Korea whose master was a non-Western power, the (early) church was associated with a new nationalism.
A. The Roots of Imperialism in Japanese Culture

It is generally accepted that nationalism is associated with awareness of cultural identity, i.e. the nation's image of itself with regard to those characteristics - geographical, racial, historical, religious, linguistic - that are held to be common to its members.

In Japan's case, among the various components of national identity, we can note that the geographic setting of the Japanese is one of relative isolation. Throughout most of its history Japan has been perhaps the most isolated of all the major countries of the world. As a result, long before the Japanese embraced nationalism in the modern sense, there was a well-established convention among them that Japan was a single state, subject ultimately to one monarchical authority.

Certainly isolation has produced in the Japanese not only a distinctive pattern of culture but also a strong sense of self-identity. On this matter Reinhard Bendix comments as follows:

Japan is an island empire that was successfully conquered only once (at the end of World War II) in her entire history. Thus the tremendous internal divisions which mark Japanese medieval history had no adverse effect upon the cultural coherence of the country. Because of her insular position, Japan's political divisions and instability never exposed her to the cumulative effect of wars and alliances from the outside.

Here we should point out that "there already existed by 1868 (the Meiji Restoration) a set of assumptions about what constituted 'Japaneseness' - a Japanese self-image - which Meiji nationalism was to incorporate and extend". "This self-image", W.G. Beasley argues,
"was a product of the Edo experience".  

Until the sixteenth century Japan was restlessly in contact with its two closest neighbours, Korea and China. Then for more than two centuries, from 1638 to 1853 (Edo or Tokugawa Period), Japan's rulers took advantage of their natural geographic isolation to fix on the country a firm policy of seclusion from the outside world, whereby the Japanese were almost completely kept apart from foreign contacts. It was a unique experience at a time of quickening international and interregional relations elsewhere in the world.  

Against this background of separation from the rest of the world, however, potentials for nationalism were emerging in the Edo society of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Relations with China in this period contributed more pervasively to Japanese self-knowledge and so in the end to national consciousness. Since the fifteenth century there had been a resurgence of Chinese cultural influence in Japan, especially in such fields as painting, Zen Buddhism and Confucian Philosophy. Despite the continuing process of emulation, in sixteenth-century Japan there were recognisably 'Japanese' cultural traditions. Thus in Edo Society Chinese and Japanese traditions were co-existent: beside Buddhism stood Shinto; beside Confucianism, Bushido (the Way of the Warrior). 

After more than a century of civil war the Tokugawa family adopted Neo-Confucianism as the social ethic of the warrior class samurai with a view to reinforcing social and political stability and civilising them from soldiers to bureaucrats. Certainly the Confucian teaching on the virtue of loyalty had a considerable effect on the evolving ethic of the warrior class: Bushido. The introduction of Chinese Neo-Confucianism into Japan by the Tokugawa family caused almost no friction or disharmony; only the doctrine of abdication and
rebellion presented difficult problems.\textsuperscript{9} This needs some explanation. Neo-Confucianism as a validation of imperial absolutism remained in some degree at odds with Japanese political realities: the authority of the Japanese imperial house rested on a claim to direct descent from the sun-goddess Amaterasu, not on the Emperor's observance of Confucian precepts.\textsuperscript{10} In G. Sansom's view, the emperors of Japan described themselves as 'manifest gods', which was contrasted with the Chinese concept of 'mandate of heaven'.\textsuperscript{11}

In the eighteenth century Shintō scholars eventually denied the validity of the Chinese tradition itself.\textsuperscript{12} The eighteenth century, the period immediately preceding contact with the modern civilisations of the West, saw the development of a challenge to Confucianism in the name of a specifically Japanese set of alternatives. For example, Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801), as a famous scholar of National Learning (Kokugaku), rejected Confucianism and Buddhism as imported ideas. In Motoori's thought we may find an indication of the results of Japanese self-awareness, which had matured in the peaceful society of the Edo Period.\textsuperscript{13} Motoori, the second great leader of the Shintō revival, upholds the traditional account of the divine creation in all its unembellished simplicity while rejecting the rationalistic cosmogony of the Chinese:

\begin{quote}
The true way is one and the same, in every country and throughout heaven and earth. This Way, however, has been correctly transmitted only in our Imperial Land. Its transmission in all foreign countries was lost long ago in early antiquity ... The 'special dispensation of our Imperial Land' means that ours is the native land of the Heaven-Shining Goddess who casts her light over all countries in the four seas. Thus our country is the source and fountainhead of all other countries, and in all matters it excels all the others ... our country's Imperial Line, which casts its light over this world, represents the descendants of the Sky-Shining Goddess ... The Imperial Line is destined to the nation for eons until the end of time and as long as the universe
\end{quote}
exists. That is the very basis of our Way ... But their [foreign countries'] dynastic lines, basic to their existence, do not continue ... 

In Motoori's view, the Sun Goddess is a universal deity as well as a national one, but she has shown special favour to the Japanese and guides them to a special destiny. Not only by asserting that Japanese kami (the term 'kami' corresponding to 'deity'), not Chinese sages, were the original creators of the Way, but also by dismissing ethical principles as something appropriate only to peoples whose behaviour needed correction, like the Chinese, not to those whose behaviour was 'naturally' good, like the Japanese, Motoori reversed the Confucian criteria of cultural primacy in favour of Japan. In this reversion, it is noteworthy that he did emphasise the dynastic continuity of Japan and the relative turbulence of China as evidence of their respective moral standings, which deserves our special attention.

It is generally accepted that the thoughts of Motoori came to function as one of the main sources of Japanese nationalism. Given the assertion that "one cannot understand the imperialist mentality without taking account of its roots in nationalism", it is not surprising that Maruyama Masao, the authority on Japanese intellectual history, has turned his attention to the early roots of Japanese thought, going as far back as the Kojiki (Record of Ancient Matters), discerning in the 'ancient substratum (kosō) certain patterns that have persisted to the present'. In the study of theory and psychology of ultra-nationalism, Maruyama says, "His Majesty was heir to the Imperial line unbroken for ages eternal and he rules by virtue of the final injunction of his ancestors".

Similarly, emphasising that Japanese ultra-nationalism did not suddenly appear in the post-Meiji period, Nakamura Hajime traced its
beginnings to the very remote past. 21 "It goes without saying", Nakamura asserts, "that ultra-nationalism developed in close relation with the worship of the Emperor as a living god". 22 The divine nation-concept and the principle of ultra-nationalism have thus a close connection with Emperor worship. According to Nakamura, the motives for compiling histories (e.g. Kojiki and Nihon shoki) in Japan was, in contrast with China, to record selectively, on the basis of Japan's consciousness of itself as a state distinct from the rest of the world, the facts of Japanese history, emphasising as central the genealogy of the Imperial House. 23 Historically, the continuity of the imperial institution (and the Imperial House) constitutes one of the undeniable and remarkable 'facts' of Japanese political history. 24

Japan has literally been a 'single country' from the beginning of its political history. In other words, in Japanese nationalism the particular state of Japan came to be the sole standard upon which all judgements were based. 25 For the important reasons of Japan's exclusive concern for herself, Nakamura noted the insular position of Japan:

The natural basis for Japan's exclusive concern for herself is, I believe, the insular position of Japan, isolation from the Continent by water; there is also the historical fact that Japan has known the existence of foreign nations only indirectly, as in the cases of the Mongolian Invasion and World War II. 26

The Western threat from the time when the seclusion policy came under challenge in the late eighteenth century led some Japanese to think of their own country as being the same kind of entity as those which threatened it. 27 Moreover, Honda Toshiaki, writing in 1798, had seen Japan, not only as a country in the European sense, but also being politically and economically in competition with other such countries. The reforms he advocated were designed to make Japan 'the
richest and strongest country in the world'. Specifically, he maintained that if his advice were followed there would eventually be "a great island of Japan in the East comparable with the island of England in the West ... two most wealthy and powerful nations".  

By the 1850s and 1860s, this sort of competitive international ambition became almost a cliché of Japanese documents on foreign affairs, the so-called 'Britain of the East' analogy enjoyed its greatest publicity in the early days of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. For a time in Tōkyō it became customary to couple the toast to the 'Empire of the rising sun' with that to the 'Empire on which the sun never sets'. Thus Yazu Masanaga's 'Universal Regional Geography for Middle Schools', published in 1896, states:  

Generally speaking Britain can be compared with our Japan. This similarity to Japan is particularly noticeable in such respects as Britain's character as an island kingdom, its relationship to the continent, the size of its territory and population, its maritime climate and the nature of its coastline. Should we therefore say that Britain is the Japan of the West?  

The Japanese sense of being somehow a separate people or being unique, as 'the Britain of the East' analogy in modern Japan shows, is probably a natural product of Japan's relative isolation geographically and throughout early history. The Meiji period inherited a belief that Japan was engaged not only in a struggle for survival against countries that could be described as its peers, but also in a process of emulation of which the aim was to achieve parity of esteem. This determination to be 'civilised' which had long had China as exemplar, was now directed towards the West.  

Given that traditionally the most blatant assertions of national superiority have usually been associated with obvious fears of inferiority, "Japan's early expressions of nationalism were", we can safely assume, "largely in reaction to a Japanese sense of inferiority
Certainly, we cannot deny in Japan's pre-Meiji history the conscious use of Chinese models. The traditional consciousness of cultural borrowings from China and of catching up with the West in modern times has helped make the Japanese very self-conscious in developing their distinctive culture and national identity.

Finally, in clarifying the historical evolution of Japanese self-image in the world, one should not underestimate the implications of the relative isolation of the Japanese populace, which mainly derives from its insular position. Also we may admit that the beginnings of Japanese ultra-nationalism in the post-Meiji period, especially in the catastrophic events after 1930, can be traced to the very remote past: Maruyama has remarked that "a tendency to military expansion was an inherent impulse in nationalism long before the so-called age of imperialism in the nineteenth century"; Nakamura has stressed that "the boast that Japan was the best country in the world has existed from very early time ... The notion of Japanese superiority is most boldly expressed in the concept of the Divine Nation"; while Bellah comments that "the structural weakness of national Shinto in the earlier period should not lead one to Chamberlain's conclusion that modern state Shinto was an invention of a few clever leaders of the Meiji Restoration. Almost every expression of Japanese nationalism in both the Tokugawa and Meiji Periods (and, indeed, earlier) can be seen as an expression of national Shinto". The cultural significance of the institution of the Emperor is a thing unique to Japan, for it is not to be found among other peoples, and it did not appear suddenly after the Meiji Restoration (1868); on the contrary, an incipient tendency of this kind had existed since ancient times. The legend of the ancestors of the royal house was successfully connected with the legend of the
creation of the universe: the divine authority of the Imperial House is enhanced by the fact that its lineage is connected with the legend of the creation of heaven and earth. The doctrine of imperial divine descent was, no doubt, reinforced by the undeniable and remarkable 'facts' of the continuity of the imperial institution itself in Japanese political history.

Here we again note the insular position of Japan which kept her, in contrast with the relative turbulence of China, from breaking the dynastic continuity. On this matter Hall explains:

Isolation and the homogeneity of the Japanese populace also meant that warfare was always civil war, a condition which may account for the frequent lack of completeness in the outcome of greater power struggles in Japan.

Protected from conquest by foreign powers because of their isolation, the Japanese islands themselves never seem to afford a geographic base of sufficient size so that a rival indigenous dynasty might gain sufficient power to challenge the established order.

The phrase 'Dai Nippon' (Great Japan) and the concept of the Divine Nation expressed by some religionists — e.g. "Our Great Nippon is a Divine Nation. Our Divine Ancestors founded it" (Kitabatake Chikafusa, a Shintō writer of the 14th century), "Japan is a Divine Nation" (Nichiren, the Buddhist reformer of the 13th century) — were, we can safely assume, in the Japanese view, derived from Japan's association with the Sun Goddess (Amaterasu). Nichiren, in the context of his messianic view of history, regarded the Japanese emperors as the spiritual embodiments of the Sun Goddess and considered the God of War to be the guardian of the Japanese nation.

According to D.M. Brown, the geographical isolation of Japan has not only made the Japanese feel that they inhabit a separate area, but it has kept them apart from the life of their nearest neighbours, leaving them free from invasion and giving them a historical
continuity and cultural unity that have been very significant in the rise of national consciousness. 43

We are now ready to draw some conclusions from the above examination of the Japanese self-image. Japan's superiority in the world was, we could assert, deeply rooted in the very remote past in two historical facts: one is the continuity of the imperial institution and the other is a Japanese inferiority complex in relation to continental China. But it is true that we cannot analyse these two factors without taking into account the insular position of Japan as an important causal force that helped to produce these two effects.

This assertion can be further justified by the so-called 'Britain of the East' analogy: the post-Meiji Japan had for some time 'Great Britain' as exemplar. What seems particularly noticeable in this analogy is Japan's identification with Britain in such respects as Britain's character as an island kingdom and its relationship to the continent. "What was the main ideological factor that kept the Japanese people in slavery for so long and that finally drove them to embark on a war against the rest of the world?". 44 In order fully to clarify the intellectual structure of Japan's ultra-nationalism our concern should be directed "not merely to the external system of coercion that determined the low level of political consciousness we find today in Japan", but rather "to the all-pervasive psychological coercion, which has forced the behaviour of Japan into a particular channel". 45

The following, therefore, is an explanation of some characteristics of Japan's religious history in the light of religion and politics (nationalism). One of the primary assumptions of this part is that "nationalism and religion arise from the fact that both
give the individual a social framework and then both elicit an emotional and enthusiastic devotion to that framework ... both can become totalitarian in their demands". In Japan, we can find that nationalism has been so inextricably combined and co-ordinated with the traditional religion that the two almost lost their separate identities.

B. Characteristics of Japan's Religious History

1. Religious Primitiveness

Generally speaking, as time elapsed, many of the great 'national' religions in history have perished. Others survived, but there were changes and reconstruction. An interesting example of a religion preserving its original character with but minor transformation is Shintō. In clarifying the epochs of Japanese history of religion, Anesaki Masaharu classified two aspects of the Shintō religion - communal and national - and emphasised the enduring vitality of Shintō. He states:

These two aspects of the Shinto religion, communal and national, were gaining in force at the dawn of the historical age, and that tradition plays even nowadays a considerable part in the social and spiritual life of the nation.

Similarly, in Wach's view, "Shinto is one of the most impressive examples of the quasi-identification of a people or nationality with deities considered to be its representatives (ancestors)". Shintō has existed in Japan without any founder since the time the ancestors of the Japanese people began living in this land. The core of Shintō belief is the communal religious experience accumulated in the actual lives of the Japanese for many centuries.
Thus, A.K. Reischauer, as a missionary in Japan, noted "a persistence of religious primitiveness" in religion in Japan. In his view, "an amazingly large percentage of the population is still quite religious but clings to religions of a crude and primitive type". It was, and is, a fact that in spite of the somewhat lofty elements in Japan's spiritual possession there have persisted alongside it a large number of things that belong to the primitive, e.g. the native Shintō.

Primitive Shintō can be characterised as animism or belief in spirits generally referred to as 'tama'. 'Tama' can be thought of as a kind of 'mana'. From the south the Japanese people got their earliest and still perhaps their deepest religious impulse. The idea of 'mana' is familiar in the oceanic world. In Japan this mysterious dynamism is called 'Kami'; the element of power that inhabits and activates all unusual objects and persons. We may call this primitive animism; in Japan it has come to be called Shintō, "the Way of the Gods". It lives in the village shrine with the patron deity and the year-round festivals of the food cycle, and in the household shrine, recalling the presence of the ancestors. At the peak of veneration stand the Sun-goddess and the Chieftain of the tribe. Given that ancestor worship rested on belief in the spirits of the ancestors, it appears that 'spirit-belief' has stood at the centre of Japanese religiosity from primitive times to the present day.

With the spread of rice agriculture in Japan, rice-planting rituals began to assume a central position in Shintō; particularly emphasized was the relationship between the rice plant and its tama. People seem to have thought that the spirit of their land entered the rice plants and brought them health, wealth, long life and other blessings. Since prehistoric times rice has been the prevailing crop, and in modern times more than one-half of the entire cultivated area.
of Japan is still in rice. Therefore, it is not strange that one of the most popular Shintō cults — Inari, even now, is the rice cult.

2. Protection of the State

A second characteristic of Japan's religious history, which has a close connection with ultra-nationalism, is that religion in Japan has usually been subordinated to other interests, especially "protection of the state" and treated as a mere instrument for achieving other ends, that is, a convenient instrument of state.

It is widely accepted that Japanese culture rewards intuition rather than analysis, emotion rather than rationality. The Japanese people are better in practical matters than they are in abstract thinking. In this sense, Nakamura points out the absence of a critical spirit based on universal human reason as a conspicuous characteristic of the Japanese way of thinking in the past, and this uncritical attitude appears in the way of thinking which reveres the living emperor as divine. These characteristics, to be sure, have helped to determine Japanese culture. Japanese religion, which has affected Japanese traditional culture and its reformation for many years and has influenced Japan below the surface, in its more indigenous expressions follows the genius of the people in being empirical and practical rather than metaphysical; ritualistic instead of abstruse.

In early Shintō centred on the animistic worship of natural phenomenon there was no theology or even a concept of ethics, beyond a abhorrence of death and defilement and an emphasis on ritual purity. Shintō was originally an unorganised religion, having hardly any system of doctrine. The native cult was entirely lacking in
metaphysics.

The original interest in Confucianism was not in its abstractions, but in the ethical relations it bore to Chinese governmental and political institutions. Buddhism's chief attraction was that it was the vehicle of continental culture, and could be used to centralise the Japanese state. Roman Catholic Christianity was admitted in the later middle ages because the Japanese rulers believed they had to accept the Portuguese religion in order to engage them in commerce.

Being eclectic, the Japanese mind is receptive to contrasting religious systems. Once established in Japan, therefore, the new religion becomes subject to the eclectic processes at work in the environment. In this context it should be pointed out that "the Japanese never developed the idea, so prevalent in South and West Asia as well as the West, that a person had to adhere exclusively to one religion or another". Certainly pre-modern Japanese were usually both Buddhists and Shintoists at the same time and often enough Confucianists as well. It seems true that religion in Japan has never really stood in its own sovereign rights or been widely accepted as the supreme thing in life. 'What will the given religion do to or for the existing social institutions - the family, the state, the Kokutai (National polity in its spiritual foundations)?' This is a question that should be asked of any religion in Japan, for religion ought to have a real bearing on these values.

We can assume that there is an intimate relation between religion and the fundamental structure of society. Although religious exclusivism may turn out to be confined to only a few religions of which Christianity is one, specifically Japanese factors need to be examined as well. Thus we can safely say that Japanese
society, unlike the West, with greater emphasis on particularistic relations and relativistic judgements, has reinforced Japanese people's relativistic attitude towards religion. In a society like Japan, in which intergroup relationships may reasonably take precedence over universal principles, ethics may be more relativistic or situational than universal.13 Thus, some observers have characterized Japan as having a shame culture rather than a guilt culture like that of the West, that is, shame before the judgement of society is a stronger conditioning force than guilt over sin in the eyes of God.14

It is against this relativism that one needs to set the instrumental character of religion in Japan. It is generally accepted that all three of the great religious strands in Japan - Shintō, Buddhism, Confucianism - had close relations to the political sphere in the early periods of Japanese history. The earliest records we have of Shintō indicate the emergence of a state cult out of what is clearly a primitive tribal religion.15 The Yamato people consolidated their hegemony over central Japan about the middle of the sixth century. It is clear that Yamato was the base for the ancestors of today's emperor. Yamato managed to establish its own version of the mythology. The oldest political myths, the Kojiki (Record of Ancient Matters) and the Nihon shoki16 (Chronicles of Japan) that tell of how Yamato, with the emperor at its centre, conquered other realms, were written by government order at the beginning of the eighth century. In mythological terms, they tell of how the heavenly kami (amatsukami), with the sun goddess Amaterasu Ōmikami at their centre, brought the earthly kami (kunitsukami) under control. These kunitsukami are thought to be the kami of the early tribal kingdoms, the deities of the primitive Shintō.17
Given this mythic past, we can assume that the Japanese prehistoric relationship between government and religion should have been virtually indistinguishable. This basic assumption about the harmony between religion and the polity was early formulated in the expression, *saisei-itchi*, which means the "unity of religion and government, or of the ceremonial and the political dimensions".\(^{18}\) This unity of religion and government is reflected in the ancient Japanese word for government, *matsuri-goto*, which literally means 'festival affairs', or more broadly, 'religious observances' or 'worship'.\(^{19}\) It should be noted that the Japanese national myth was officially taught as historic fact in the decades immediately prior to Japan's military defeat in 1945.\(^{20}\)

In the process of the Japanese assimilation of Buddhism we can point out that Buddhism was accepted by the Japanese as significant for the support of the state.\(^{21}\) It is particularly noted here that the adoption of Buddhism was begun in the diplomatic relations between the Imperial Family and a foreign country (Paekche, Korea). Buddhism was adopted by the Court with the first regard for the protection of the State.

In concrete terms, when Buddhism was first introduced in the sixth century, both those who favoured the new religion and those who opposed it did so avowedly on the grounds of what it would do for or against the welfare of the State.\(^{22}\) Historically Japanese Buddhists carefully picked out such doctrines as would be convenient for, or not inconsistent with, their nationalism.

The attitude which Indian Buddhism assumed toward the State was, from the time of its origin, one of cautiousness. This attitude was unacceptable to the Japanese, according to whose realistic, nationalistic view the Japanese State was absolute, and its sovereign,
the Emperor, sacred. Thus the Japanese who accepted Buddhism on a large scale refused, nevertheless, to adopt its concept of the State, which to them appeared to run counter to the native idea of the 'state structure' (Kokutai). Instead, they welcomed the sutra Konkōmyō-kyō (The Golden Radiance Sutra) and some later scriptures of Mahāyāna Buddhism because these have a theory that a monarch is "a son of divine beings" (Tenshi, devaputra) to whom has been given a mandate of Heaven and whom Heaven will protect. The traditional and conservative Buddhism of the primitive type came here to be called the "Lesser Vehicle" (Hinayana) in Japan and looked upon with contempt; the Buddhism which came to be called the "Greater Vehicle" (Mahayana), which allowed the Japanese to pursue their religious ideals in conformity with their view of the State, was adopted by them.

The above mentioned theory of 'divine monarch' was not peculiar to Buddhism; however, this idea came especially to be stressed by the Japanese. Then, when Buddhism was finally propagated, it was done so largely under official patronage, and early in its history care was taken to see that its teachings were properly harmonised with the existing order of things.

According to Nakamura Hajime, the concern for the State as an idea, however, did not belong logically to the doctrines of most sects of Buddhism in Japan. It was with the Nichiren Sect that it came to constitute an essential motive. In Nichiren's view, religion must serve the State. To him the existence of the State was the prerequisite for the flourishing of Buddhism. He said:

The nation prospers because of Buddhism; and Buddhism becomes precious because people revere it. If the Nation perish and people disappear, who will revere Buddhism? ... If there be no overthrow of the State and no destruction on Earth, thy body will be safe, thy mind will be at ease.

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Thus, in Japan, Buddhism, which is a universal religion, was adopted and spread as a religion serving the interests of the State.

A similar tendency can easily be discerned in the process of the Japanese assimilation of Confucianism. Although in the past the Japanese adopted Chinese thought and culture on a large scale, still they have exercised particular care not to injure the distinctive characteristics of the Japanese State.\footnote{28} Since the Confucian concept of the State was formulated in accordance with the needs of Chinese society, it naturally contained a number of points with which the more thorough-going of the Japanese nationalists could not agree. In this sense the doctrine of abdication and rebellion presented difficult problems. Thus, in regard to the government of the State, although reference was made to the 21 Chinese dynastic histories, the political practices of abdication and righteous rebellion were not initiated.

The State conceived by Chinese philosophers was an ideal or model state; on the other hand, the state that the Japanese nationalists had in mind was the actual Japanese state.\footnote{29} This was the reason why Japanese nationalism, nurtured, so to speak, by Confucianism, had ultimately to deny the authority of Confucianism.

Hence, in spite of the widespread acceptance of Confucianism, the Chinese and Japanese forms of it have differed in their emphasis. In this context the comparison of the place of political and integrative values, of the polity and the integrative system in China and Japan, can perhaps reveal the differences of the two countries.\footnote{30} The relative importance of loyalty and filial piety may be taken as an important index of this comparison. The basis of Chinese Confucianism was the virtue of filial piety. Thus, since a basic element in their thought was the idea of the change of dynasties, the idea of loyalty to the State could not occupy the central place in their ethical
scheme. Not only did the value of filial piety take precedence over loyalty, but loyalty itself had a very restricted focus. In Japan, on the other hand, loyalty clearly superseded filial piety. Filial piety did not compete with loyalty, it reinforced it. We may see in the following quotation from Nichiren that filial piety in the last analysis for the Japanese meant loyalty:

... When a father opposes the sovereign, dutiful children desert their parents and follow the sovereign. This is filial piety at its highest.

Certainly, in Japan, due to the hierarchical structure of society, the particular virtue of loyalty to the Emperor occupied the highest place among all virtues. Thus while most Confucianists kept silence and avoided coming to grips with a contradiction between the ancient Japanese form of government and Chinese Confucian theory, some nationalistic Confucianists, e.g. Fujita Tōko (1806-1855) of the Mito school, argued that the doctrines of abdication and of righteous rebellion were "definitely not applicable" to Japan. Consequently, there was no other course than to interpret this contradiction as did Fujita Tōko.

'Protection of the State', one of the most dominant concerns in the Japanese mind, was thus firmly established in religion. This attitude towards religion with its insistence that everything, including religion, be subordinated to the State was essentially incompatible with the idea that religion should stand in its own right or be accepted as the supreme thing in life. Hence Christianity, which condemned subservience to the monarch, was thought to destroy the very foundations of the social order in Japan.
3. Hostility Towards Christianity

It is generally accepted that the charge that Christianity is 'unpatriotic' is met from first to last in the history of the mission in Japan.\(^1\) The fundamental conflict between the claim of Christ and Japanese messianic nationalism were recognised by many.\(^2\) Thus most of the replies of missionaries to the questions sent out by Commission IV of the Edinburgh World Missionary Conference (1910) remarked on the supposed contradiction between loyalty to the Emperor and loyalty to Christ, which saw Christianity as opposed to patriotism in Japan.\(^3\)

One cannot hope to understand the profound distrust of Christianity on the part of the Japanese without some understanding of its early historical roots in the Tokugawa period. The events in the early period offer a background to what was to happen to Christianity three centuries later. It may be recalled that St. Francis Xavier, a Jesuit missionary, went to Japan in 1549 and that Roman Catholic missionaries were most active throughout the remainder of that century. It is to be noted that this was a period when the Tokugawa were not yet securely in power; in 1603 they secured the Shogunate and retained that power until the restoration of the Emperor in 1868. Many of the lords who were against them, for example, in Hizen and Choshu, took a lively interest in the new faith and this, as much as the fear of foreign imperialism, accounted for the opposition of the Bakufu (Tokugawa government) to Christianity.\(^4\) E.E. Best in *Christian Faith and Cultural Crisis: The Japanese Case* (1966) points out the reasons for the Bakufu's hostility towards Christianity:

The Tokugawa had closed the country to foreign contact during the seventeenth century not only because they felt their enemies within the country to be in too close association with persons from foreign powers. Christianity took root and therefore the greatest number of priests and converts were to be found precisely in the fiefs most opposed to the Bakufu, that is to say, in
Satsuma, Choshu, and Hizen. The government felt threatened both from within and from without. The destiny of early Christianity in Japan was largely determined by its interaction with three successive military dictators who accomplished the tight control of Japan, namely Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu. According to G.D. Lama, the first part of Japan's Christian century, from 1549 to 1587, may well be described as the era of patronage; the second part, from 1587 to 1614, may be described as the period of antagonism.

In the first era, it should be noted that Francis Xavier, a typical sixteenth-century European in several ways, did not particularly separate the cause of Christ and the cause of Portugal. Jesuit missionaries following Xavier, thus gained the co-operation or allegiance or even the conversion to Christianity of feudal lords through suggesting the advantages of Portuguese trade or military aid. In this sense, they could be accused of confusing their religion with their nation. Jesuit missionaries used their connections, and local rulers benefited. This was particularly true in western Japan. From 1569 the Jesuit fathers eagerly sought and gained the favour of Oda Nobunaga, who was then not aware of the facts of Portuguese and Spanish colonialism. Oda Nobunaga encouraged the Jesuits as a reaction of his avowed hate of Buddhist institutions. The political and military activities of the Buddhist warrior monks posed a major threat to the ascendant Oda Nobunaga. So he found the Jesuits useful for his purposes.

After Oda Nobunaga's death, Toyotomi Hideyoshi seemed favourably disposed towards the Jesuits at first, but finally became suspicious that the Jesuits who had been involved in manipulating and playing the market in the Portuguese silk trade in order to support its mission in Japan might become the basis for subversive co-operation among the Christian feudal lords of Kyushu. Toyotomi Hideyoshi issued his famous edict of expulsion in 1587, thereby giving no room for
participation in the profits of commerce on the part of the Jesuits. From this time the missionaries were seen as a possible threat: Christianity was seen as 'an external force and one engaged in political intrigue'.

During the second era, from 1587 to 1614, the suspicions of Toyotomi Hideyoshi toward the missionaries were deepened by religio-political and commercial rivalries among Roman Catholics, that is, Portuguese Jesuits and Spanish Franciscans. He became increasingly aware of the association of missionaries and European soldiers in colonial outposts such as Manila.

After the San Felipe incident in 1596 Toyotomi Hideyoshi became more determined than ever to banish Christianity from the land. In an effort to save a rich Spanish galleon, the San Felipe, wrecked near the harbour of Tosa in modern Shikoku, one of the officers told the Japanese officials of the method by which Spain had conquered the world. They were told that this method was first to send in agents of her Christian faith to win people to her and then to take over political control of the country. Thus Laman concludes as follows:

No doubt the religious and political rivalries of Europe that were reflected so virulently before the eyes of Ieyasu strengthened his determination to banish all missionaries and drive the Christian faith out of Japan.

The prevailing impact left on the Japanese mind over the centuries has been that "Christians are people of strange disobedience, of alliance with subversive elements in Japanese society, and of direct connections with conquering powers from the West". This fear and hatred of Christianity was a tragic legacy from Japan's first chapter of the foreign Christian mission and it came to life with redoubled force in the modern century. Given the religious and political rivalries of Western missionaries in the first
century of Christianity in Japan, "the missionaries seemed incapable of distinguishing between their apostolic mission and their nationalism". 19

In the proclamation of Toyotomi Hideyoshi against Kirishitan (Japanese form of Christian) missions issued in 1587, the first clause of the edict expressed the Shintō idea that Japan was the land of the gods, and that Japan could not tolerate a religion denouncing the national deities as false ones. 20 It is to be noted that emphasis of the writer (Yakuin Zensa or Tokuun) on the national gods was not an independent Shintō tenet but an expression of the prevailing syncretic Buddhico-Shintō idea. Similar was the case with Tokugowa Ieyasu's proclamation of 1614 which was directed against Christianity.

In this context, Fabian's book Ha Daiusu (Deus Destroyed) 21 published in 1620 deserves our attention. This book which marks a milestone in the exclusion of Kirishitan missions from Japan can be seen from his confession of the reason why he had deserted the church. 22 In the seventh section, treating of the Ten Commandments, his refutation is concentrated on the first commandment, pointing out that herein lies the source of all the evils of the Kirishitan religion because it justifies one to be disobedient to parents, to violate national laws, and even to commit parricide or regicide when deemed necessary for observing the first commandment. The polemic in this section is a most violent one, evidently intended for the justification of any severe measures against the Kirishitans. 23 Also Fabian bitterly complains of the haughtiness of the foreigners and expresses his personal dissatisfaction with them. Thus, it was the incompatibility of Christianity and the native morality of self-dedication to the clan and the Emperor which resulted in the persecution of Christianity. 24
In similar vein, Buddhist and Confucianist refutations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries also shared the view of Fabian's critics of Christianity, that its propaganda aimed at upsetting national traditions and at subjugating the people to a foreign religion. Moreover, the Buddhist pantheistic stand attacked Christian monotheism. 25

The denunciation of Christianity as a means of political conquest was common to all the critics of Christianity and was unquestionably accepted by the whole people during the centuries of seclusion and prohibition. The nineteenth century Japanese also remained deeply hostile to Christianity. 26 As one missionary historian, J.B. Piolet, already noted in 1902, the distrust the Japanese had of doctrines coming from outside the country was one of the chief impediments to Christianity in Japan: the Japanese suspected that embracing the Christian faith also meant embracing a foreign nation. 27

C. Ultra-Nationalism and State Shinto

Brown describes the so-called 'ultra-nationalism' or 'extreme nationalism' in Japan's modern history as follows:

At the time of the February Twenty-sixth Incident of 1936, tension in Japan's relations with China was building up once more. And in the next year a War broke out which did not come to an end until Japan's surrender to the Allied Powers in 1945. In those eight years the Japanese government constantly attempted to arouse the people to a greater awareness of the danger facing the nation, and to a deeper sense of loyalty to the Emperor. Political, religious, and educational institutions, as well as all forms of communication and all types of entertainment, were utilized in a broad 'spiritual mobilization' program. Nationalism thus reached a level of development that has been identified - and with justification - as ultra-nationalism. 2

The post-1936 ultra-nationalism was in large part a government-propelled movement which engendered feelings that included a powerful
sense of Japanese mission to establish a new order in East Asia\(^3\) and also a strong fear of foreign enemies—Britain and America. All news and other propaganda efforts were constantly pointing out the injustice of Anglo-Saxon attitudes and policies towards Japan.

It goes without saying that, in the Japanese context, ultranationalism developed in close relation with the worship of the Emperor as a living god. In fact, Emperor worship was the most influential form of belief in Japan up to 1945; and even today after the defeat, the Emperor holds his position by virtue of his significance as a symbol of the unity of the Japanese nation.\(^4\) Here we should explore how Emperor worship has directly moulded the way of thinking of the entire Japanese people.

Such a tendency of thought did not appear suddenly after the Meiji Restoration (1868). As we have demonstrated earlier, it would seem that the tendency to regard the Emperor as divine has existed in Japan since very ancient times.\(^5\) In the older Japanese language, the word oyake (public) originally had the sense of the 'principal family', which meant the Imperial House. In contrast, all the people were called koyake (minor families). Thus the Imperial House came to be regarded as the principal ancestral family of all the Japanese.\(^6\) Thus the author of 'The Way of the Subject' even writes as follows on the relationship between the public and the private domains:

What we normally refer to as 'Private life' is, in the final analysis, the way of the subject. As such, it has a public significance, in that each so-called private action is carried out by the subject as part of his humble efforts to assist the throne ... Thus we must never forget that even in our personal lives we are joined to the Emperor and must be moved by the desire to serve our country.

Maruyama in 'Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism' (1963) points out the negative implications of the failure to draw any clear
line of demarcation between the public and the private domains: "there was in principle no basis in Japan for freedom of belief up to 1945".8

Further, since the Imperial House was originally conceived as having the position of ruling the entire Japanese people, the Imperial House has no 'surname'.9 Consequently, there appeared anyone aiming at becoming the highest ruler in place of the Imperial House. Of course, in Japan's long history there were a few rebels, but even they recognised the Imperial authority. The unique fact that Japan has been ruled by Emperors belonging to a line unbroken for countless generations has, we can assume, reinforced the divine nation concept in the way of thinking of the whole Japanese people. The divine nation concept and the principle of ultranationalism have a close connection with Emperor worship.

R.N. Bellah, attacking the view that modern State Shintō was an invention of a few clever leaders of the Meiji Restoration, asserts that by the end of the Tokugawa Period there would have been general consensus on the primary tenets of national Shintō concerning the special divine ancestry and nature of the emperor, and Japan as 'the land of the gods' among those of almost all religious commitments.10 In line with this Japanese nationalism, Bellah continues, "national Shinto was not incompatible with other religions and this is the basis of the assertion by the Meiji government that State Shinto is not a religion".11 In this context we recall that the Japanese government, determined to establish 'State Shintō', a new religious superstructure, from 1882 to 1945 advocated Shintō as a 'non-religious' emperor cult and a 'patriotic' national morality to which every Japanese, regardless of his or her religious beliefs and affiliations, was expected to pay homage.12
We turn our attention now to government and religion as Japan came into the modern period. The 'modern period', beginning with the opening of Japan to the West in the middle of the nineteenth century, has spanned about 100 years. Here we can only highlight the several major policies relating to government-religion relations, within the context of rapid modernisation.

In the immediate pre-modern period, a conjuncture of the Confucian stress on loyalty and a revived interest in Shintō began to have explosive consequences.\(^{13}\) The rulership at this time was in the hands of a military dictator, or Shōgun, hereditary in the Tokugawa family. The emperor was relegated to purely ceremonial functions in the palace at Kyōto. With the Tokugawas incapable of rallying any kind of effective, unified national response to the Western threat in the mid-1800s, imperial loyalists stepped into the power vacuum with the cry, "Restore the Emperor!".\(^{14}\) Though Emperors had pretty much lost their prominence for many centuries in the Tokugawa Period, the Emperor was the latent symbol of national unity.

In the words of R.N. Bellah:

As economic and social conditions deteriorated under Tokugawa rule, important elements in the population became alienated from the political status quo. They proved extremely receptive to the religious message of the revival Shintoists and legitimist Confucians, who insisted that the true sovereign was the emperor and that the Shogun was a usurper. According to their conception, the emperor is divine, descended from the sun-goddess, and his direct rule of the Japanese people could be expected to bring in a virtually messianic age.\(^{15}\)

Now, in the national emergency, imperial loyalists appealed to the ancient tradition of the sacred imperial family as the focal point for pulling the nation together. It is to be noted in this context that the emperor, as a religious symbol, appears to have remained alive in popular memory.\(^{16}\) No doubt the people's attitude towards,
and feelings about, the emperor became an important element in establishing Japan as a modern nation. The combination of factors — the seclusion of the real emperor, and the enhancement of the emperor-image through literature, song, and drama on the one hand, and through the mission work of the itinerant onshi on the other — made the religious symbolism of the emperor stronger than ever before. It is against this background that we can understand the development of the Meiji government's national unification policy.

Historically the government's national integration policy depended heavily on two devices: the device of the imperial tour and the nation-as-a-family ideology. The most important way through which the government fostered devotion to the emperor among the common people was the device of the imperial tour, until the kazoku kokka (the nation as a family or household) ideology had become firmly established through the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 as a chief sacred text of State Shinto and a basis of all Japanese education. In Mori Koichi's words on the tour device:

The common people regarded the emperor as a mana-laden being whose presence would bring them worldly benefits ... They received the emperor as a marodogami, a kami whose visit they hoped would bring them bumper crops and happiness ... People regarded the emperor-spirit as remaining in things even after the emperor himself had returned to the imperial court. In the Meiji era their faith in the emperor-spirit remained strong.

During the early part of the Meiji era, the imperial tours gave substance to the common people's notions of the emperor. To a certain degree this policy was successful. This faith, however, was not sufficient to mobilise them for rapid, nationwide modernisation. On the foundation of popular faith in the emperor, quickened by the tours, the government erected and institutionalised the nation-as-a-family ideology. This ideology reflected not only a German theory of
state absolutism (kokka yukitai, or "state organism") but more importantly Japanese tradition, namely a Confucian element centred in filial piety and loyal devotion to the Emperor, the father of the nation, and a more prominent Shintō element focused in the sacred charge given by the highest Shintō kami, the "Sun Goddess" Amaterasu, to the imperial line of emperors. 21

It has been recently revealed that the Japanese people, who cooperated in the emperor's war (World War II), generally lacked a principle that might have enabled them to resist the nation-as-a-family ideology, since "the Japanese State, being a moral entity, monopolized the right to determine values". 22 This ideology, in fact, was from the outset immanent in the national structure. The primarily particularistic orientation of Japanese society prevented them from discovering any viable alternative to an emperor-centred nation. 23 The attitude of absolute submission to a specific person of a specific authority can by no means treated simply as a social phenomenon of a feudal society. Rather this attitude of total submission could be clearly observed among the modern Japanese, and it culminated in ascribing absolutely divine attributes to the individual at the top of the hierarchy of Japanese society. 24 Emperor worship is thus established. Ultra-nationalism developed in close relation with this worship of the Emperor as a living god.

The modern Japanese state was deliberately established on a foundation which unified government and religion. 25 There was in the early Meiji period an attempt to make Shintō into the national (state) religion, the official patriotic religion of Japan, and a determined effort to root out all rival religions including Buddhism, the chief religious tradition with little relation to the imperial claims to divinity. 26
Nevertheless, the grave and forceful protests of Western powers on the subject of Christianity, plus serious unrest among the masses devoted to Buddhism, forced the abandoning of the policy of religious persecution.\(^{27}\) Consequently, the government included in the constitution of 1889 a clause guaranteeing freedom of religion. Here it should be emphasised that the Western countries which had recently inflicted on the Japanese certain unfair trade treaties, which the Japanese hated and resented, made it clear that these treaties would not be revoked unless the Meiji government established a policy of religious freedom.\(^{28}\) The Westerners feared that a Shintō state religion would generate anti-Western sentiments, thereby blocking trade relations with Japan.

At the same time the government continued its support of the State Shintō cult, whose main aim was the veneration of the emperor. It is to be noted that the Shintō priesthood tended to identify religion as a whole with Christianity; their dislike of Christianity hastened their conclusions that Shintō should not be regarded as a religion.\(^{29}\) At the same time, intellectuals were drawing the same conclusion, but for a different reason: because they discerned in Shintō neither doctrine nor ethics. The result was a limited consensus that Shintō was not a religion. In this intellectual atmosphere, the government declared that State Shintō was not a religion but merely an expression of patriotism, thereby solving their seemingly contradictory support of the state Shintō cult.\(^{30}\) This time, unlike the first effort in early Meiji, the second effort to exalt State Shintō not as a religion but rather as a "non-religious" patriotic cult was a success.\(^{31}\) In W.M. Fridell's words:

> If State Shinto was to be treated as a religion, it came under the position of the Meiji Constitution, which guaranteed freedom of religious belief. This would make Shinto a matter
of personal choice, for, if it was a 'religion among religions', a Japanese subject would be free to align himself with it or not, according to inclination. This was not good enough for the authorities. When it came to participation in the national Shinto patriotic cult, they did not wish to permit any choice. For this reason, State Shinto was officially understood to be a nonreligious national ethic, to which the religious freedom provision of the Meiji Constitution did not apply.

It should be pointed out in this context that the idea of divine kingship is very common throughout the world, and the identity of state and religion is not uncommon. Also the predominant form of political civic ritual in the modern world, and certainly including industrial societies, is the ritual of nationalism. Given all this, the government's definition of religion for political purpose was not a distortion of religion in the Japanese context: State Shintō was but a modern expression of the prehistoric Japanese formulation, saisei-itchi, 'unity of religion and government'. Furthermore, the ultra-nationalistic decades prior to and during World War II saw the systematic propagation of the state ideology and national mythology, with no contrary positions permitted, all within a police-state context.

It is generally accepted that the political civic rituals surrounding the monarchy, such as the Coronation of Elizabeth II as head of the Church of England in 1953, served to unite people of many different denominations. The Coronation as a ritual of communion, brought the whole nation into a ritualistic dedication to the basic values of English society. The symbolism of the monarchy has been one of the major symbols of English nationalism. Similarly, in the case of modern Japan, the fact that observance of State Shintō rituals was incumbent on every loyal subject, regardless of his private religious associations, in effect made State Shintō a kind of
superfaith of national loyalty. Hence this time, unlike the first effort in early Meiji, the second effort to exalt State Shintō not as a religion but rather as a 'non-religious' patriotic cult was a success.

It is of incidental interest (although Anglicanism is not one of the main examples considered here) to note that some Anglican missionaries were aware of this comparison and drew it explicitly. The British missionaries of the Anglican Church in Japan simply - and naively - identified the Japanese imperial institution with their own romantic view of the British crown.35 This identification made it easy for their Japanese converts to accept their own social system as compatible with Christian teaching. Little of the tension between loyalty to emperor and faithfulness to Christianity, discernible among the Japanese converts, seems to have been present in the Seikōkai (the Anglican Church).36 But as C.H. Powles, an ordained priest of the Anglican Church of Canada who has worked in the Nihon Seikōkai (the Anglican Church of Japan) since 1949, rightly comments, "the great weakness of the Anglican position - affirming variety and even identifying with it - lay in its inability to grapple with the factors in Japanese culture which logically contradicted Christian belief".37 For Christians to accept that "there is not a supreme power which transcends the Emperor", basically a Shintō doctrine, meant that they would have to neglect the transcendent element in their own faith.

From as early as 1899, the government had attempted to pass bills in the national Diet to tighten supervision of 'the religions', which meant everything except State Shintō.38 But the 1899 bill failed in the Diet. In 1926 the authorities appointed a Religious System Inquiry Commission (Shūkyō Seido Chosakai) to consider how the government should regulate the religious bodies of the country. In
1929 they created a corresponding Shrine System Inquiry Commission (Jinja Seido Chosakai) to study the whole question of State Shintō, especially the nature of State Shintō. The Commission eventually came up with the conclusion that it was a national ethic, not a religion. It is to be noted that from the Manchurian Incident in 1931, when nationalistic tensions mounted in connection with Japan's military ventures on the Asiatic mainland, that the authorities increasingly looked to State Shintō as the main force for intensifying patriotic loyalties. It is generally accepted that the period down to the Manchurian Incident of 1931 might be called the preparatory period of Japanese ultra-nationalism. While it should be emphasised that the fascist movement was not something that suddenly arose after 1931, there is no doubt that the Manchurian Incident acted as a definite stimulus to Japanese fascism. The extreme nationalism was illustrated by the 'new policy' of 1933. In the platform it was stated that the first line of Japanese defence must be Manchukuo and the mainland South Sea Islands. Policy sections dealing with 'popular thought' asserted that "the spirit of the national foundations should be vindicated and developed", the educational system should be reformed with this in mind, and religious sentiment (of course, Shintō), should be cultivated among the people. After the outbreak of the China Incident in 1937 the 'spiritual mobilisation' programme (Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin Remmei, 1938) was more carefully planned in order to provide a more effective means of channelling the thoughts of the populace along approved lines. In carrying out 'spiritual mobilisation', State Shintō and the publication system were of course relied on.

D.C. Holtom, a Baptist missionary in Japan and authority on Shintō, in 'State Shinto and Religion' (1938) rightly points out the
problem of the status of State Shintō in the ultra-nationalistic Japan and the colonised Far East:

One of the most important and difficult problems of modern Japan undoubtedly centres in the status of State Shinto. Are the ceremonies of the Shinto shrines, maintained by the Japanese government as a primary agency for giving unified official direction to the national mind, essentially religious in nature or are they non-religious? Issues connected with this question are momentous for the fate of Christianity in Japan and perhaps the entire Far East ... The consideration of State Shinto carries us over at once into the realm of sacred institutions and ideas that are regarded as having ultimate significance for the integrity of Japanese national organization and polity. Phases of the situation that seem essentially valid are intricately commingled with super-rational racial sentiment and propagated by a strong bureaucratic utilitarianism.

Though in the 1920s there was a strong tendency to differentiate religion and state ideology, in times of stress, such as the late 1930s and early 1940s, religion was completely subordinated to and fused with a monolithic ideology, an ideology which had demonic consequences both for Japan and for the rest of the world, especially Korea. In the case of Korea, after the Manchurian Incident, the Japanese interests of political unification resulted in requirements of Shintō conformity even more severe than those in Japan proper.

Here Bellah in "Religious Aspects of Modernization in Turkey and Japan" (1958) concludes:

But, in fact, serious religious problems remain. All religious groups with the exception of the Christians were compromised by their connection with the nationalistic orgy. In the absence of any really vigorous religious life, except for the popular faith-healing cults and the small Christian community, the religious impulses of the Japanese people find expression for the more radical in the symbol of socialism, for the conservatives in a longing for a new and more innocent version of State Shinto.

From the Judeo-Christian point of view, like that of Bellah, we would have to say that to exalt a national ideology above God was
clearly a blasphemous perversion of religious reality. To evaluate a Japanese religious pattern on the basis of such Western assumptions seems to be unfair. The more correct question would be: was State Shinto a distortion of religion in the Japanese context?

Given that the Japanese government has always used religious rites for the support of political rule, State Shinto was but a modern expression of that prehistoric Japanese formulation, saisei-itchi, or the "unity of (Shinto) rites and government". There has been no transcendent religious norm for judgement over society: political symbols and institutions have always been at the very top of the Japanese value system.

If we consider the consistent pattern throughout Japan's religious history in the light of religion and politics, modern State Shinto was not so much a distortion of Japanese religion. In most Japanese eyes, to be religious was not incompatible with the demand to co-operate with and support government. In this sense, Japanese Christianity as a whole was, in fact, no exception. (This problem will be explored further in the next part). 'Co-operation' with government has not been seen as a corruption of religion; rather, the Japanese have instinctively felt it was a good thing that the two most basic dimensions of society, government and corporate religion, were harmoniously compatible, rather than fighting each other, as has been the most characteristic pattern in the West.

In the case of Japan, "nationalism may be so inextricably combined and co-ordinated with the traditional religion that the two almost lose their separate identity". This relationship is, no doubt, the most desirable for the nationalist, especially for the ultra-nationalist; amalgamation of nationalism and religion is preferable to coexistence or conflict.
However, in general terms, not all religions are amenable to amalgamation with nationalism. When nationalism comes into conflict with the universal religions, e.g. Christianity and Buddhism, nationalistic thinkers have found it necessary to modify the traditional religion. Here we can note that Japanese (ultra) nationalism took most of its primary symbols from a mixture of (Shintō) primitivism and Confucianism, both because these were central to Japanese tradition and because the agrarian military class played the major role in the shaping and protection of the modern nationalist movement.52 Maruyama's excellent analysis of Japanese Fascism supports this point: the insistence on the family system may be termed a distinctive characteristic of the Japanese fascist ideology.53

In this context we must not fail to consider the important role played by Confucianism, which is closely linked with the central cult of the family, or, more strictly speaking, Neo-Confucianism, in the development of the 'immanent theocracy' of the new imperial regime in modern Japan.54 Despite the fact that Confucianism never claimed to be a religious system, it provided the ethical foundations of the 'immanent theocracy', exemplified by the throne in which both God and Caesar were rolled into one.55 This helps us to understand the Confucian development after 1891, especially the Confucian revival from 1918 to 1933, in modern Japan.

W.W. Smith is the author of Confucianism in Modern Japan (1973), a study of conservatism in Japanese intellectual history, which deserves some review in the light of Shintō and Confucianism as conservatism. According to Smith, it is true that in such important changes as the development of mass movements in modern Japan, the growth of Japanese nationalism, or the industrial transformation of
Japan, Confucianism played a minor role. Despite this, interest in
Confucianism existed in modern Japan, and after some years of neglect,
Confucianism began a period of recrudescence which reached a climax in
the Second World War.\footnote{56} It was during the Tokugawa period (1603-
1868) immediately preceding the modern era that Confucianism
flourished most widely in Japan. But in the Meiji period (1868-1912)
Confucianism no longer satisfactorily explained natural phenomena or
was effective in dealing with the kind of problems which Western
industrial and commercial techniques were bringing to Asia. Under
such circumstances, Confucianism suffered a severe decline and was
notably disregarded during the first decades of the Meiji period.
Nevertheless, according to Smith, in contrast to its disappearance as
a force in modern China, Confucianism never died out in modern Japan.

During the Meiji period, Confucian ethical principles had to be
subordinated to the claims of nationalism. As a result, in the
Imperial Rescript on Education of the Emperor Meiji (Kyōiku Chōkō,
1890) the five Confucian virtues associated with the Confucian social
relationships were declared to be a fundamental part of the Japanese
heritage. Confucian ethics were henceforth no longer foreign, but a
part of pristine Japanese traditions; and while this did not
automatically imply a revival of organised Confucian institutions in
Japan, it suggested that the most effective way for Confucianists to
re-establish their prestige and influence was by having Confucianism
serve the aims of the state. Smith concludes:

\begin{quote}
This emphasis on the practical value of
Confucianism in modern Japan is crucial for under-
standing the development of Japanese intellectual
history, for the situation in 1890 was basically
a repetition of that in the Tokugawa period when
Confucianism also had been adopted because it was
deemed useful in achieving desired ends.\footnote{57}
\end{quote}

Historically, after 1933, the trends apparent in the development
of Confucianism in Japan from 1918 to 1933 became accelerated, but the most prominent of these was the growing identification of Confucianism with the Japanese spirit, the Imperial way, and the Japanese kokutai (national polity). In this context, to appreciate this amalgamation of Confucian ideas into the increasingly nationalistic ideology of Japan during these years, it should be borne in mind that the nationalisation of Confucianism was not an experience unique to Confucianism alone. Universal religions like Christianity and Buddhism also were made to play a part in fostering Japanese nationalism and ideas of loyal service to the state. D. C. Holtom rightly pointed this out in his book Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism (Chapters IV and V). In Smith's view, however, Confucianism came to be characterised as purely Japanese - far more so than the other universal creeds, Christianity and Buddhism. At the same time, in propaganda and political activities on the Asiatic continent, Japanese leaders continued to emphasise the common heritage provided by Confucianism for uniting all Asia.

In this respect, Smith also points out Japanese support for Confucianism in Korea. He comments:

One of the earliest examples of how the Japanese attempted to take advantage of the universal appeal of Confucianism in their political activities in Asia was in Korea.

Briefly speaking, Japanese encouragement of Confucianism in Korea was one of a number of measures made primarily to indicate the devotion of the Japanese to certain Korean traditions. By choosing traditions such as Confucianism, which had existed in both countries, it was possible to appeal to a common background which served to minimise the attraction of Korean nationalism. In the same vein, Kang Wi Jo in his dissertation - "The Japanese Governments and Religions of Korea" (1967) - stresses that Korean Confucianism under the Japanese
administration maintained a considerable continuity with traditional observances and did not undergo any drastic changes. According to Kang, it was a fact that the response of Korean Confucianists to the Japanese administration was not as antagonistic as that of other elements in Korean society.

Lastly, as Maruyama has shown, the other distinctive characteristic of Japanese fascist ideology relates to the emancipation of the Asian nations in the so-called Greater Asia Principle. The ideal of the emancipation of the Asian peoples from European colonialism flowed strongly through Japanese fascism. But this ideal was tied up with another, namely, that Japan should seize hegemony in Asia in place of European imperialism. Maruyama discusses 'Asianism' simply as a characteristic of Japanese fascist ideology. This 'Asianism' is important for us to understand the underlying motives of Japan's overseas expansion of State Shintō during the war period, 1931-1945. This point will be discussed later.

D. Japanese Christianity and the Shintō Shrine Issue

1. Nationalism and Christianity

Since people respond similarly to both nationalism and religion, it does not surprise us to find that in history the worship of the State or nation very often tends to be associated with periods of scepticism in religion. History shows that nationalism arose immediately after the Enlightenment had showered its caustic criticisms on Christianity; and it acquired one of its major strongholds among the continental peoples most influenced by the Enlightenment, the French and the Protestants of north and central Germany. Thus of all the
countries of Europe, Germany was peculiarly suited to become the home of 'religious modernism'. In the case of Germany, it is widely accepted that German Protestant pastors, except a minority of supporters of the 'Bekennende Kirche', tried to harmonise their German nationalism with their Christian universalism. The sect or movement of the so-called 'German Christians' attempted to combine Christianity with National Socialism.

Historically, in Japan the introduction of Christianity (Protestantism) coincided with the rise of aggressive nationalism. Hatred and suspicion of Christianity, nurtured for over two centuries, were not easily driven from the people's minds. Rather, from time to time, when the so-called Christian nations in the West did something contrary to the interests of Japan, such as the passing of the Oriental Exclusion Act by the U.S. Congress, anti-Christian sentiment flared up.

With the promulgation of the Constitution (1889) and the Imperial Rescript on Education (1890), the 'immanent theocracy' of the Meiji regime was firmly established. In this situation, Christianity came under severe attack as an unpatriotic religion. Among all religions practised in Japan, Christianity presented the greatest problem to the government because of its transcendental reference, its claim of universality for its doctrines, and its close ties with the churches in the West. Christianity was considered a foreign religion which was a threat to the traditional Japanese faith. Under the pressure of this national sentiment, it should be pointed out that there were a number of Christians who attempted to show that there was no basic conflict between Christianity and Japanese patriotism. As a reaction to the serious charge that "Christians lack patriotism", Christian leaders became more earnest in displaying their patriotism.
morbid nationalism thus fostered increased friction between them and
the foreign missionaries. For example, Reverend Yokoi Tokoi advocated
a 'Japanese Christianity' independent of all foreign influences.

It needs to be noted in this context that those who were most
radical theologically were also the most nationalistic in Japan.
This suggests that there was a real connection in motivation between
the two movements. In the same vein, N. Micklem displays an insight
into the theological implications of the 'German Christian' position,
indicating that in principle, though not in form, it represents the
standpoint of Liberalism or Modernism. Here we can trace the
impact of the new theology, with its roots in German rationalism, on
Japanese Christianity. German liberalism exercised a pervasive,
permeating influence within the church in Japan. In 1885 what is
sometimes termed the 'older liberalism' of Germany made its entrance
into the Japanese Christian world with the coming of the General
Evangelical Protestant Mission Board (Allgemeiner Evangelisch-
Protestantischer Missionsverein). This society was the first
attempt of liberal Christianity to enter the field of Christian
missions on a specific and declared liberal basis. Thus Best says:

No consideration of the way in which the Japanese
Church expressed its faith during this period
(1890-1911) would be complete without a more
detailed account of the influence of the "new
theology" and of higher criticism in general upon
the life of the Japanese church.

In the 1890s ... Internal problems arose in the
church as a result of the spirit of nationalism
and the "new theology" both of which tended to be
embraced by the same group indicating a
relationship between them.

The liberal Congregational or Kumiai Church, supporting
government policy, initiated the so-called 'Japanese Christianity'
from the outset. Bruce, in "A Sociological Account of Liberal
Protestantism" (1984), shows exceptional insight into liberal
Protestantism as a particularly 'precarious' belief system. Unlike conservative Protestantism which avoids relativism by sticking firmly to certain historic statements of the faith, in his view, essential features of liberalism, e.g. the possibility of relativism, made it especially vulnerable to assimilation by the secular world. When applying this to the case of Japanese liberal Christianity, we can safely say that creeds and catechisms were not used to police the boundaries of the faith and that thereby the Japanese Church compromised with nationalism. The Roman Catholic Church in Japan easily justified its adoption of the principle of accommodation on the grounds of the alleged purely civil character of the official ceremonies of State Shintō in 1936. This point will be discussed further later.

Sumiya Mikio points out that the weakness of Japanese Christianity was that it possessed a strong moral and ethical orientation without, at the same time, possessing a deep sense of the transcendent character of Christianity. The practical, rationalistic background which resulted from the ethical school of Confucianism and Bushidō made it easy for the young church to accept an interpretation of Christianity which de-emphasised its transcendental character. The growing spirit of nationalism was reflected within the life of the church. In Best's view, Japanese Christians were, on the whole, 'confused by the issues of nationalism'. Apart from Uchimura Kanzō, who sensed the idolatry in the Japanese emperor-institution and who from the time of the Russo-Japanese War was radically opposed to Japanese expansionism, and a few of the Christian Socialists, the great majority of Christians were completely confused as to their relationship to their own society. In the war years until the end of the Second World War it became very
apparent that Christians in Japan, with the exception of some martyrs, found no other recourse except to succumb to the principle of 'immanental theocracy' of the government. 20

Best maintains that Uchimura Kanzō, unlike most of the Japanese Christians, did not fail to understand the pressures which his own culture was exerting upon him. Similarly, the editors of Sources of the Japanese Tradition (1958) writes that "Uchimura Kanzō (1861-1930) stands as a striking example of the attempt by a deeply dedicated man to integrate his new-found Christian faith into his personal and public life as a true Japanese". 21

But some dubious points of his thought regarding nationalism and Christianity are to be noted. He publicly defended the moral rectitude of Japan's war against Ch'ing China only two years later; 22 his 'No Church' (Mukyōkai) Christianity reached its culmination in his nationalistic millenarianism or eschatological yearning, deepened by World War I, that saw 'Japan as the central locus of the Second Coming of Christ'. 23 For the latter, World War I shattered his remaining hope for the Christians of the West, which led him to the conviction that Japan, no longer the West, was now called to serve as the mediator between the past and the future, between the West and the East, all for the whole world. He considered it providential that Japan was geographically situated between America as the western frontier of the western culture and the eastern frontier of the Indo-Chinese culture. He regarded modern Japan as the confluence of both the eastern and western cultures and therefore the microcosm of the whole world. 24

Many have pointed out that Uchimura's prophetic vision or his nationalistic eschatology has precedents among the founding fathers of Kamakura Buddhism, particularly Nichiren, who set Japanese Buddhism
apart from its continental counterparts. Nichren regarded the centre
of the Buddha land no longer to be India or China but Japan.
T.J. Kodera notes that in Representative Men of Japan Uchimura
counted Nichren among them. Thus it should be borne in mind that
even in Uchimura's nationalistic millenarianism, like Nichiren's
nationalistic eschatology, there exists a strong 'Japan-centred
mentality' which drove Japan into a disastrous war. Given the example
of Uchimura, we can conclude that in the time of victories Japanese
Christians, not unlike the populace, naturally developed religious
nationalism. When war broke out, many Christian leaders, having never
developed what might be termed a 'Christian political philosophy',
simply accepted the government's stand and supported the war effort in
both the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese wars. There was,
however, a small group of articulate Christian socialists and
pacifists. Thus, like all religious groups, Japanese Christians
compromised with the nationalistic orgy: Japanese Christianity showed
a full accommodation to the Shintō political standards.

A survey of representative materials of the years just before and
during World War II indicates, as one might suspect, three general
theological movements in Protestant circles in relation to the issue
of nationalism: (1) syncretism, or another venture in 'Japanised
theology'; (2) dualism, or a theology of the two realms; (3) a
theology of resistance. It is suggested that the movement towards
resistance drew its greatest undergirding influence from biblical
orthodoxy. Patriotic Christian leaders, with their non-theological
and ethical tendencies and their unsophisticated biblicism, for the
most part made a passive adjustment to the authoritarian government
and concentrated on the expansion of their respective churches.

Finally, it is interesting to note that, while the problem of war
crimes is the subject of heated debate among Protestant theologians in Japan since the late 1960s, there is hardly any sign of such re-evaluation on the Catholic side. Similarly, the Catholic Church in Korea also maintains a perfect silence about the shrine problem. This point will be covered later.

2. Korean Assimilation and Japanese Christianity

It has been pointed out by many that many Japanese Christians strongly supported the so-called government policies of doka (assimilation of the Koreans). Since the annexation of Korea in 1910 there were sweeping campaigns to eradicate the Korean national identity under the slogan "Japan and Korea are One Entity" (Nai-Sen ittai). Before turning to the general views which Japanese Christians (especially Protestants) held about Korea during the colonial period, the overseas expansion of State Shintō and the policy of 'Japanisation' should be examined very briefly. The following are Holtom's words:

The rise of modern Japan to ascendancy in Far Eastern affairs has been accompanied by an impressive geographical expansion ... Japan is 'moving in' onto the continent of Asia with the totality of her cultural possessions. This movement is not merely military and political. In ... education, religion, Japan is projecting something like a migration onto the mainland ... The tenacity which the Japanese government has pressed the Shinto issue in Korea and elsewhere points to its significance as the guarantee of the establishment of inner authority over subjected peoples.

The expressed policy of the Japanese government in these districts (Formosa and Korea) is to make all members of the indigenous populations into standardized Japanese subjects, both legally and psychologically.

W.G. Beasley in Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945 (1987) points out that after 1930 (though there had been indications of it as early as
the First World War) Japanese leaders set out to substitute a 'Japan-centred' system of imperialism in East Asia for that which they had inherited from the nineteenth-century West. To do so required both a restructuring of economic patterns and the promotion of a specifically 'Asian' ideology. We may recall here that, according to Maruyama (1963), 'Asianism' is a characteristic of Japanese fascist ideology.

In this context it is to be noted that the Japanese attempted to bring about cultural assimilation of Koreans at any cost. This needs explanation. The international and domestic situation of Japan after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in 1931 demanded an intensification of the policy of 'Japanisation' in Korea. In more concrete terms, since 1931 Japan needed not only the material resources and strategic position of the Korean peninsula, but also the "native manpower". In C.S. Lee's words:

The government had, of course, a choice of more than one way of conscripting Koreans. There was the precedent of the British in India during the First World War, when independence was promised as a reward for submitting to conscription. But this alternative was not very attractive. The promise of independence would only enliven the nationalist movement, as it had done in India, and complete independence of Korea after the Japanese victory would weaken the empire.

Thus, the only practical alternative was to accelerate the assimilation process. The efforts to 'Japanise' the Koreans can be divided into two categories: (1) to discourage or suppress communication of symbols that tended to perpetuate the memory of Korean independence, and (2) to inculcate a new Japanese identity. For the latter, Japan's interest in political unification in Korea resulted in requirements of Shinto conformity even more severe than those in Japan proper. This extended even to the prohibition of the right to discuss whether or not State Shinto is a religion. But -
forced worship at the Shintō shrines or daily bows in an easterly direction - to Tōkyō - (Tongbang yobae) annoyed rather than converted Koreans. And in Korea, where Christianity became the vehicle for the preservation of national hopes in reaction against Japanese domination, the fundamental conflict between the claims of Japanese Shintō nationalism and Christianity were naturally more serious than in Japan. Here we can note that one of the other reasons for the failure of the policy of cultural assimilation was the widespread and institutionalised practice of racial discrimination.  

Now we turn to the general views which Japanese Protestants held about Korea since 1910. In this respect, Matsuo Takayoshi's detailed study on "The Japanese Protestants in Korea: the Missionary Activity of the Japan Congregational Church in Korea" (1979), is one of the pioneering works on the matter. The Congregational Church stands at the 'extreme left' among the various Japanese Protestant sects in emphasising 'liberal theology'. The missionary activity of the Japan Congregational Church was launched in 1911 to play the role of religious spearhead to help achieve Japan's spiritual conquest of the Korean race with direct aid from the Government-General of Korea, which was trying to suppress the existing Korean Christians who would not co-operate with the 'doka' policy.

Ōyama Tosuke of the Congregational Church, under the toxin of Japanese imperialists, maintained that one of the objectives of the missionary activity in Korea was "to rid Christianity in Korea of foreign influences and to develop a new, voluntary Christianity of an Oriental nature". Moreover, he emphasised that "if the Japanese Christians were not able to assimilate the Korean Christians, this would permanently and irreversibly antagonize the whole Japanese nation against Christianity". 

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In Ōyama's assertions we can find that at that time every Japanese Christian still faced the historically rooted charge that "Christianity is unpatriotic". Doubtless the charge against Japanese Christians, who were still a minority group, led them to be more earnest in displaying their patriotism.

In contrast with the Congregational Church leaders, there were a few leading Protestants - Uemura Masahisa, Yamaji Aizan, and Uchimura Kanzō - who not only approved of the patriotism of the Korean people but also attacked Japanese missionary work in Korea. 12

With the beginning of the Manchurian War in 1931 began the state of emergency (hijōji) that lasted until the end of the Second World War. In 1936 Japan joined Germany in a so-called anti-Communist pact. This was extended to the Tripartite Pact in 1940. At home the Ministry of Education published, in 1937, Kokutai no Hongi (Fundamentals of Our National Polity), stressing the unique mission of Japan ruled by a divine emperor. 13 In 1937 representatives of major religions were called upon to form the Great Unity League of Religions. The Roman Catholics established the National Committee of Catholics for Foreign Propaganda, for enlightening Catholics of other countries in regard to the nation's true aims and motives. In 1939 the infamous Religious Organisations Law was enacted in order to place all aspects of religions under strict government control. In 1940 34 Protestant churches were compelled to form one "Nihon Kirisuto Kyōdan" (Church of Christ in Japan - commonly referred to as "the Kyōdan"), in order to be recognised as a religious organisation, the only other Christian body recognised by the Religious Organisations Law being the Roman Catholic Church. 14

In 1944, eventually, the Kyōdan, along with the Roman Catholic Church, joined the Japan Wartime Patriotic Religious Association, in
co-operation with the Shintō and Buddhist bodies. As Joseph M. Kitagawa, the authority on Japanese religion, admits, during the war period the Christian churches as much as other religious groups were exploited by the government as an ideological weapon. In brief, the majority of the Protestants, precisely because they, as a minority power in Japan, had accepted the State and had been so integrated into the mainstream of Japanese society, could not stand outside that stream and judge their nation's actions. In regard to their attitude towards Korean assimilation, Japanese Protestants adopted the conformist attitude during the last war, which, to be sure, did precipitate a crisis for Christianity in Korea. However, the church in Japan, in spite of her compromising attitude towards the militaristic absolute government in war time, could not draw a definite line between pre-war and post-war. It was more than 20 years later that the church in Japan awakened to her failures. This was expressed in "Confession of Responsibility During the Second World War" issued in 1967 in the name of the moderator, Suzuki Masahisa of the Church of Christ in Japan.
PART II
CHAPTER IV


A. Japanese Government Policy on State Shintō and Religious Education

The attitudes of the Christian bodies in Korea towards the shrine problem cannot be fully understood without some knowledge of the early history of the Japanese government's policy on State Shintō and religious education since the annexation (1910). Here I only give a summary.²

Shintō shrines had existed in Sŏul (Seoul) and Pusan before the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. But only Japanese nationals worshipped there. In 1910, at the time of the Japanese annexation of Korea, the government officially adopted a policy of building shrines in Korea to meet the increased needs of the Japanese who would be living there.³

In response to the recommendations of the Governor General of Chosŏn (Choson, Korea) for a National Shrine in late 1918, the Central Shrine of Chosŏn on Namsan in Sŏul was built in 1925.⁴ After that, throughout the country, in each county a shrine was established. In 1925 the temple at Sŏul was changed in name from Chosŏn jinja to Chosŏn jingū, giving it the highest designation and prestige.⁵ This change triggered a protest among Japanese Shintoists as to who specifically would be worshipped. Some Japanese scholars insisted that Korea's mythological founder, Tan'gun, should be enshrined rather than Japanese kami.⁶ They argued that should a Korean god be enshrined, this would be favourably regarded both in Korea and Japan; that Shintō shrines were foreign to Korean traditions and could only
Japanese government leaders were caught on the horns of a dilemma. After a meeting to deal with the question—how best to designate the shrine in Korea so as not to imply that it was a National Korean Shrine, something separate and independent of Japan, yet also avoid confrontation over the issue of worship of a specifically Japanese kami—the decision was that the Namsan shrine should be dedicated to the spirit of the land, or chirei rather than kokurei, the spirit of the nation. "This", Spencer J. Palmer says, "was an ingenious artifice for composing a Shrine-board that would not be emotionally objectionable to Koreans, representing the essence of the Korean spirit without admitting in the least that Koreans were unique or distinctively non-Japanese". There was also a subtle prejudice against the Koreans involved here, since this was a tacit affirmation that Korea did not have a god which was equal to the Sun-goddess. "Amaterasu Ōmikami" (founder of the Japanese state).

Incidentally, the so-called "Educational Crisis", in terms of the question of the formal teaching of religion, came between the years 1915 and 1925. In 1911 the colonial government made known publicly that "the essential principle of education in Chosen shall be the making of loyal and good subjects by giving instruction on the basis of the Imperial Rescript concerning Education". Thereafter, the new regulations of the Government General made it plain that if the school was to exist at all new regulations must be secured. Article VI.2 of the revision of regulations for private schools in 1915 (Appendix E) was the chief stumbling block. It was against the
teaching of the Bible and the holding of religious exercises in the schools. No new charters or permits were to be granted for schools so attempting to combine education and religion, while existing schools were given but ten years of 'grace' to conform in this and other aspects. Confrontation was therefore not only about shrine worship. A further dimension of religious objections to the revision was the fact that in Japan Shintoism had been declared not a religion, but merely a system of state and national ceremonies, a cult of patriotism.

So far as could be judged at the time, mission and church schools were offered the choice of giving up all Bible teaching, chapel services, prayer at school ceremonies, etc., etc., or closing their doors altogether at the end of the ten-year period. In short, 'ten years of grace' were given in which to conform to the new ordinance, after which all unregistered schools would have to be closed.

This presented a serious problem and test of faith both to the missionaries and to the Korean Church. Why should we run schools if we could not teach our Christian religion in them? On the other hand, if our schools were closed all Christian children would be compelled to go to government schools and be taught by non-Christian teachers. Some of the missionaries argued in favour of registration on the grounds that half a loaf is better than no bread.

As the 'years of grace' went by, the government put pressure on mission and church schools, saying that if they wished to continue their schools they should make application at once. On this the division of opinion was not strictly along denominational lines, but in the main the Methodist missions took the position that existence of the schools and their efficiency was of greater importance than the retention in the curriculum of formal religious instructions.
Following this policy the Pai Chai Hak Tang (Paejae haktang), the oldest of the mission schools, early conformed to the revised regulations and became a recognised Higher Common School. A great deal of feeling was aroused by the oldest mission school falling in line with such haste, and denominational divisions were greatly deepened by the action and policy.

The Presbyterians in many cases went to the other extreme. A promising school under the charge of the Southern Presbyterian Mission in Sunch'ŏn was closed rather than take out a permit under the new regulations. Many Church primary schools also closed mainly on account of the religious exclusion article. At the Northern Presbyterian Mission meeting held in P'yŏngyang in 1917, the question of registration or non-registration was acute. A number of the leading educational workers insisted that they should decide at once to comply with the new educational ordinance. They said that the students in their schools were demanding that they register because students from non-registered schools were not admitted to government high schools. Eventually, however, by a large majority the mission decided that they could not support with mission money schools that could not teach the Bible.

After the "Manchurian Incident" in 1931, used by the militarists and those in power to unify the mind and strength the loyalty of the people, Shintō's nationalistic character was more and more accentuated, and shrine worship was urged. This was a further development; not only were church schools to have their Christian teaching undermined, but a positive attitude to the Shintō ceremonies was also to be expected. Especially the loyalty and devotion of the Korean people who were resident in a new significant place for the defence of the Japanese Empire, became, from the Japanese viewpoint,
more urgent than ever before. To make Koreans loyal subjects to the empire, the Japanese government in 1935 urged all Koreans, including mission school students, to participate in Shinto ceremonies. In trying to bring all Koreans to the Shinto ceremonies, the government took the position that Shinto ceremonies were not religious but patriotic acts. The government explained:

The veneration of her illustrious dead in places specially dedicated to their memory has been a national custom of Japan for ages past, and the state ceremonies for this purpose are treated by the Government as distinct from those of a purely religious nature.

Japanese efforts to force Christian obeisance at Shintō shrines in Korea reached a crisis point with government demands that worship must be carried in Christian schools at P'yŏngyang, where Christianity was largely concentrated. Statistics show that as late as 1938, about 80 percent of the churches and of the Christians in the territory of the Presbyterian Mission were in that area of North Korea. It is estimated that about 75 percent of all the more than 600,000 Protestant Christians were situated there. In 1936 George S. McCune, President of Union Christian College at P'yŏngyang, was removed as President because of his refusal to take his pupils to the Shintō shrine. From the beginning Presbyterian missionaries at P'yŏngyang were among the first to make a strong and uncompromising stand against the shrine ceremony. They concluded that the issue was clearly 'religious' between Christian monotheism and Shintō polytheism. In the end, the southern Presbyterians closed their schools altogether rather than compromise. The northern Presbyterian mission followed suit or turned over its schools to Korean control for a while, but in 1938 eventually decided to close all schools including Chŏng Sin girl's school and to withdraw from Chosŏn Christian College. It should be noted in this context that the populace of Korea at that
time expressed their deep regret at the decision to close on the part of missions. The Tonga Ilbo, a leading nationalist newspaper, treated the decision with great regret. 27

After the pressure on Christian schools, the government increased pressure here and there upon Christian individuals, pastors and prominent elders, to attend the shrines. 28 As the editors of The International Review of Missions, who had received a great mass of documentation on this matter, recorded in the special issues for April, 1940 and July, 1940, one of the gravest questions confronting the Church at that time was that of State Shintō observance in the Japanese Empire, especially in Korea. Before the issues of IRM The Japan Christian Quarterly also noted the shrine issue under the title of "the missionary's dilemma" in its editorial notes. Its cynical ending reflects the seriousness of the problem: "What is the missionary to do? There seems to be no answer to this". 29

B. The Catholic Church

The Roman Catholic Church, which readily accepted the Government's definition after 1936, had understood the Shintō ceremonies to be 'religious' in earlier years; 1 Catholics in Korea before 1936 understood the participation in Shrine ceremonies as 'idolatry'. Thus when attendance at shrines was demanded of all schools in the country in 1931, it was refused by Presbyterian and Roman Catholic educators. A Korean Catholic priest at that time frankly told the authorities that he would die rather than concede attendance. He further declared that the issue was so fundamental that it allowed no local solution, but must be settled between Tōkyō and the Vatican. 2 Therefore we should clarify the historical evolution of the Japanese Catholic
Church in terms of its attitude to the Shinto shrine question, because Rome's instructions in 1936 solved the "Shrine Issue" for the Catholics in the Japanese Empire, which included Korea at that time. For the Roman Catholic church, this issue was fundamental in a way in which the educational issue had not been, since in Korea and Japan Roman Catholic educational activities had been minimal.

Even the earlier position of the Roman Catholic Church of Japan on the shrine problem, in Holtom's view, reveals beyond doubt the reservations that Catholicism in Japan entertained towards Shinto as a state religion. For example, a Bishop of Nagasaki told his people in 1918: "It [Shrine worship] is an organised form of reverence paid to supernatural beings and must be regarded as a religion. ... We regret exceedingly that as Catholics we cannot accept the interpretation given by the government nor can we visit the shrines and engage in the services for the dead nor can we ever pay respect to the so-called gods".\(^3\) As late as 1931, the Bishop of the same diocese, himself a Japanese, declared that State Shintō was only a primitive religion.\(^4\)

After the Manchuria Incident in 1931, Shintō's nationalistic character was more and more accentuated, and shrine worship was urged by the militarists in power to unify the mind and strengthen the loyalty of the people. Under the stress of circumstances, the attitude of the Christian Churches moved in a new direction. The negative attitude prevalent up to now seemed impossible to maintain.\(^5\) In the same year occurred a protest by a group of students of Sophia University who refused to perform shrine worship at the Yasukuni Shrine. The reaction of public opinion was vehement. Finally, the following year, the Archbishop of Tōkyō requested the Ministry of Education to pass an official judgement about the significance of shrine worship for schools. The answer of the Ministry of Education
stated that "making students perform shrine worship has an educational basis. It is nothing but an expression of patriotism and loyalty". The church accepted this declaration, and Catholic students were allowed to participate without conscientious objections. In other words, the Church changed their former attitude for the protection of their own organisation.

Despite the 'practical' solution of the problem, the confrontation between the State and the Catholic Churches, in fact, grew sharper. A violent anti-Catholic movement, partly attributed to the negative attitude of the Catholics towards the shrines, launched by the military authorities in 1933, destroyed Churches, banished the missionaries (Canadian Franciscans) and compelled many faithful to leave the villages.

As a result of this defamation, the Catholic Church felt herself forced to take a clear stand towards this national polity. It is noteworthy in this context that exactly from the years 1934-1935 Catholic reviews began to publish more articles about the patriotism of the Japanese Catholics in a much more positive sense than before. And until 1935 the confrontation between Church and State seemed restricted to the Church and its authorities in Japan, but now, for the first time, Rome entered the scene. A letter, which was sent to the Apostolic Delegate in Tōkyō, from the Congregation of the Propagation of the Faith (1 May, 1935) reads: "The integral explication of Catholic doctrine should not be altered, not even in case it does not agree with the Japanese spirit. Yet it is not only becoming but even a duty to recognise and accept, as a basis of the supernatural work of the Church, the natural good which lies in the national Spirit of the Japanese".

Furthermore, Rome's decision on May 28 of 1935 to permit the
Catholics of Manchuria to attend at Confucian shrines influenced the Japanese Catholics to support more positively the policy of the government of placing the shrines outside the sphere of religion and of making shrine worship a kind of spiritual basis for the people. In this context, Rome's authorisation to allow ceremonies in honour of Confucius throughout Manchukuo (Manchuria) deserves our special attention. This point will be discussed in detail later (Ch. V, E. "Mission Policy").

Before the Rome instruction on imperial Shintoism in 1936, in consequence of the official approbation from Rome (28 May 1935) on the rites in honour of Confucius in Manchukuo, Mgr. Marella, the Apostolic Delegate, issued an instruction to the superiors of the various religious institutes and congregations in Japan:

... If, after examination, the religious or civic character of an act remains dubious, it is preferable not to give any explicit solution. It is sufficient to give the general principle to the faithful, namely: if the act which is at issue is not considered in public opinion as a profession of faith in a pagan religion, but rather as the traditional manifestation of natural feeling, it can be considered in practice as being not in opposition to the faith ... This broad view of things is by no means a purely opportunistic attitude inspired by the present difficulties, and does not imply at all a contradiction with the attitude of the Japanese Church in the past. It is without any doubt that the significance, commonly attributed to these semi-religious, semi-civic, manifestations has evolved very much, and that, what was considered 21 years ago as an act above all religions, is more and more interpreted as a civic manifestation under a form externally traditional and religious. The Church does not but adapt herself to this evolution in a spirit of large comprehension of the traditions and of the legitimate aspirations of the Japanese people.

This instruction of the Apostolic Delegate, however, was not yet an official declaration from Rome, but it took only five months before formal approval came. The Roman institution is dated May 25, 1936 and dealt with Catholicorum officia erga patriam. Because this
instruction is the official position of the Church towards the problem of the shrines, we can consider it as the most important document in the relations between the Catholic Church and the Japanese State, and accordingly between the Church and Shrine Shintō. The New Catholic Encyclopedia informs us about the background for the Roman instruction in 1936 as follows:

A year later (1936) Pius XI, the Pope of Missions, gave further emphasis to the movement of harmonizing Oriental traditions with Catholic culture when, through a SCPF decree in favour of the Church of Japan, a far-reaching programme of permissions was promulgated with respect to certain ceremonial usages in imperial Shintoism (the Jinja Shrines), as well as matrimonial, funeral, and other social customs, all hitherto under the Christian ban.

On May 25, 1936, the SCPF instructed the Catholics in the Japanese Empire, which included Korea at that time, to accept the government order. The instruction with regard to shrine worship is summarised at the end of the document in the following terms:

The Ordinaries in the territories of the Japanese Empire should inform their faithful that the civil authorities (as is clear from their explicit declarations frequently given) and also the common estimation of cultured persons attribute to the ceremonies held at the National Shrines (Jinja), civilly administered by the Government, a mere signification of patriotism, namely, a meaning of filial reverence towards the Imperial Family and the benefactors of the country. Therefore, since rites of this kind are endowed with a purely civil value, it is lawful for Catholics to join in them and act in accord with the other citizens, after having made known their intentions of this be necessary for the removal of any false interpretations of their acts.

As a result of this official pronouncement of the Church, the Church and State relations in Japan developed from then on without any trouble. Likewise the instructions solved the "Shrine Issue" as far as the Roman Catholics in Korea were concerned. In consequence of this Vatican decision, Korean Catholics had the duty to obey the laws
of the State. 17 As a matter of fact, however, in most Korean Catholics' eyes the Church was seen to collaborate with an unprecedented imposition by the imperialist Japanese government upon Korean national institutions. 18 The standing of the Church in Koreans' eyes was seriously affected when Archbishop Marella, the Papal Ambassador to Japan, went so far as to recommend Shinto worship to the Church's Korean members. Their disappointment with the Church seemed to be ignited earlier by the very fact that the Roman Catholic Church reversed its position surprisingly and in 1931 permitted the faithful to practise ancestor worship, whose prohibition by the Church had been a chief cause of the Korean persecution.

But unlike Protestants (especially Presbyterians), Catholics in Korea who had been indoctrinated to remain 'neutral' by the Church did not protest against Japanese oppression. 19 Only towards the end of the Japanese occupation did the Church begin to show resistance to such oppressions. 20 In R.T. Baker's report, there were three or four priests who were imprisoned for the matter of obeisance to Shinto symbols. 21 According to a few sources, 22 there were several priests and laymen who resisted individually against the instructions of Rome and were finally jailed. But all the sources do not give the names of resisters. As a whole Catholics reported very rough times during the war period, although their position vis-a-vis the Japanese was eased somewhat by the Vatican's recognition of Manchukuo. 23

C. The Methodist Church

Korea is a somewhat unique mission field in that it has been organised on a comity plan among the major denominations from abroad, and there are really only two major Protestant churches in the field,
Presbyterian and Methodist. The 1937 statistics of church membership are revealing: 109,963 Roman Catholics and 120 missionaries; 281,939 Presbyterians and 140 missionaries; 54,654 Methodists and 67 missionaries; 10,445 Holiness adherents with most of them removed in 1937; 8,688 Episcopalians and 27 missionaries; 6,387 soldiers of the Salvation Army and 19 missionaries; 5,096 Seventh Day Adventists and 9 missionaries.

As for the Shrine Issue, in general, the Methodist Church like the Catholic Church, acquiesced in State Shintō observance. Unlike the Presbyterians, the Methodist and the Catholic missions quietly accepted Japanese pressure (1935) with the edicts of the government regarding observances before the Shintō shrines, so their schools were allowed to remain open. But it should be noted that, according to C.A. Saucer, Treasurer of the Central Council of the Korean Methodist Church at that time, since 1930 when the new autonomous Korean Methodist Church was organised, Methodist schools were not directly under mission control. Each school had a board of trustees consisting of both missionaries and Korean Christians. As a rule, Methodist missionaries kept silent on the issue of students of Christian schools attending shrine ceremonies. It is noteworthy in this connection that the closure of schools was action taken by the Presbyterian Missionary Community, while at the same time Korean organisations were seeking permission to take over the schools and operate them. In point of fact, the great majority of Korean Christians of all denominations protested vigorously, even violently, against the policy of closing the schools. There were some Korean Christians who would be willing to die for their faith, if need be, yet they had no scruples against the students and teachers going to the shrines. Finally, the Korean Bishop of the Methodist Church...
felt that parents whose children were involved should be the ones to decide the circumstances under which the schools should continue to operate. The Methodists decided to continue to operate mission schools. On this IRM reports:

Korean Methodist Christians as a body, and generally as individuals, have no objection to conformity. The Korean ex-Bishop [J.S. Ryang] and the present Bishop [Chung Choon-soo] were both of the party who visited Ise [the National Shrines]. The schools have made no difficulty about attending the shrines. The policy of Methodism in Korea does not provide for separate mission opinion. The missionary point of view has not been voiced by the missionary body as such. There are strong differences of individual opinion in the group.

As is evident from the last sentence of the quotation, the missionaries of the Methodist Episcopal Church ('Northern Methodist') were divided in opinion. While the efforts of the Northern Methodist Mission were concentrated upon west Korea, those of the Southern Methodist Mission were focused on a triangular territory, from Songdo to Sŏul and thence to Wŏnsan. Accordingly, in R.E. Shearer's view, it was the education-centred Southern Mission rather than the Northern one that felt much more pressure from the Japanese government, which always wanted to control the schools. For example, on 29 January 1936, the Hon. T.H. Yun, Dr. J.S. Ryang (General Superintendent of the Korean Methodist Church), both of Southern Methodists, and seven other leading Christians (Presbyterians and Methodists), went on invitation to the educational department of the Governor-General. On that occasion, Mr. Watanabe, the head of the educational department, declared: "Attendance upon the shrine is not religious but a government ceremony. It is not an act of worship, but is the paying of the highest respect to ancestors. The educational system has the object of training loyal subjects as well as giving them knowledge. Therefore, school teachers and pupils must make
obeisance at the shrines". In face of this demand the General Superintendent and T.H. Yun showed compliance. When the government urged the Methodist General Assembly in 1938 to put the Shinto ceremonies to the vote, the then General Superintendent J.S. Ryang arbitrarily asserted that the decision was unnecessary since the shrine worship was indeed a duty of loyal subjects. In September of the same year, Bishop Ryang, with Mr. Watanabe's approval, had printed and circulated Watanabe's statement widely to all Methodist schools and churches, and had advised observance of the required shrine attendance. Thus the sufferings of the Methodists became not very serious afterwards.10

In general, the Methodist missionaries had no conscientious objections to accepting the statements of the authorities and attending the ceremonies when attendance was required.11 The Methodist Mission agreed with the Korean Methodist Church, accepting at face value the word of the Japanese authorities that the ceremonies were patriotic and had nothing to do with religion.12 They kept their schools open, although, by the end of the war years, their Christian character had been radically altered. So "these schools", C.D. Fulton evaluates, "survived the war, but not as Christian schools".13 Eventually a statement presented to the Foreign Work Committee of the Board of Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church (South) on 3 May 1937, concludes thus:

Having reviewed the educational situation in Korea and being fully aware of the grave difficulties Christian education faces in that country, the Joint Committee records its confidence in the Methodist missionaries and nationals and its appreciation of the consecration and division with which they have met the government educational requirements. We assure them of the prayerful sympathy and support of the Joint Committee in their efforts to keep clear and strong the Christian witness in the Korean church schools. We agree with the position of the Japan Christian
Council for the present: that Christians should accept the government’s interpretation that these shrines are not religious, and help to make that interpretation known and understood in their own circles and among the people at large.14

Thereafter the document of reform - "Reform Plan for the Korean Methodist Church" (Appendix F) by Bishop Chung Choon-Soo - adopted by the Korean Methodist Church on 2 October, 1940, was one of the extreme cases of its utter obeisance to the reigning Japanese ideology.15 But it should be borne in mind that throughout the whole reform campaign of five long years the rank and file of Korean Methodists held out against the leadership.16 So R.T. Baker, a Methodist missionary, judges, "It was not the case of a defecting church, but simply of defecting leaders, because the church never went along with the reforms but was powerless to stem the pro-Japanese tide". Thus Baker's assertion deserves more attention, but it will be considered in the next part (Ch. V. H.2, "Early Historical Experience").

As regards the rejection of worship at the shrines, there were some Methodists17 who resisted individually against the Shintō shrine observance, but, generally speaking, the net result for Korean Methodism itself was, in Holtom's terms,18 as for Catholicism, 'full accommodation' to the Shintō political standards.

D. The Presbyterian Church

As has been shown, after concentrating on the schools in the mid-1930s, the government pressure to go to the Shintō shrines quickly became a major problem for the missions largely in control of the schools. Having accomplished the compliance of the Christian schools, after 1938 the government pressure for control placed the Korean national church in the spotlight. The Governor-General called.
offering obeisance at Shintō shrines as patriotic duty, and many Christians simply went along with it. Many Protestants, including majorities of several foreign missionary organisations, left the Shintō shrine observance for individuals to decide as a matter of conscience. The Presbyterian establishment, however, from the outset called it 'idolatry', setting the stage for a major confrontation between church and state, and also among members of the church who dissented from the views of the leadership. As for the shrine issue and closing the Christian schools, the attitude of the Presbyterian missionaries, unlike that of the Methodists, was generally against participation in the shrine obeisance.

The missions in Korea of the Presbyterian Church in the United States ('Southern Presbyterian'), very strongly conservative in theology, held that it was better to close the schools than to conform to the government requirements. The 'Southern' Presbyterian Mission's attitude was outlined by the executive secretary at the time, Dr. C. Darby Fulton:

The mission was unanimously of the mind that we could not participate in the shrine ceremonies without compromising vital Christian principles. We were not dealing with something that lies in the realm of non-essentials, but with basic beliefs of the Christian Faith: something so elementary as to be a simple question between monotheism and polytheism.

The Southern Presbyterians refused conformity and closed all the schools. A statement of policy to be followed was promulgated in February 1937 by the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions of the Church. It contains 13 clauses, of which the following may be quoted:

IV. Nevertheless, in view of recent developments that seem to render impossible the continuation of our educational work without compromise of Christian principle we hereby reluctantly instruct our Korea mission to take appropriate steps for the closing of our schools in due process.
XI. Regarding the disposal of school properties in this emergency, we cannot approve their transfer for school purposes either by gift, loan, rental or sale to any group or organization that would be unable to maintain the Christian principles upon which our schools have stood ... As there are essential reasons of conscience for the closing of the schools, we cannot see our way clear to transfer the property given for distinctly Christian education to other agencies, however well intentioned, in order that they may conduct schools under the same limitations.  

This action was endorsed by the General Assembly of the Church, meeting at Montreat, North Carolina, in May 1937.

Recognising the increasing difficulties of maintaining the mission schools, the commissioners from the Board of Foreign Missions in New York made some recommendations to the missions in Korea of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. (‘Northern Presbyterian’) in July 1936, of which the following as the key policy may be quoted:

We recommend that the mission approve the policy of retiring from the field of secular education. To do this in an orderly manner will require some time; it will also involve the questions of the future management of the schools and of the use or disposal of the property. Close co-operation with the officials of the government will be necessary.

The majority of the Northern Presbyterians held it was better to close the schools than to conform to the government requirements, though there was a 'strong' minority that protested vigorously against this position. The minority of these missions were in favour of conformity in shrine attendance on the part of schools. It is noteworthy in this context that the voices urging moderation were primarily those of the 'educators' of the mission staff, the group, in H.M. Conn's view, traditionally more 'liberal' than the ministers.  

Eventually, the Northern Presbyterian Mission withdrew from the field of higher education also, although not without strong disagreement within the Mission as to how to withdraw, and not without
some notable lapse of time before the completion of the withdrawal. The disagreement seems to appear most clearly in the debate that raged at the annual meeting of the Korea Mission in July, 1936, over the proposed recommendations of the Executive Committee regarding the disposal of the Mission's educational institutions. The recommendations were eventually adopted by a vote of 69-16. A substitute motion, proposed by Dr. Horace H. Underwood, the then President of Chosŏn Christian College in Sŏul, was eventually defeated by a vote of 67-19. Underwood's proposals provided that Mission schools should be closed separately and only when the actual persecution materialised. As a result of the motion, some schools were closed and others were transferred to Korean management. It was in 1941-1942 that the final school relationship was severed by the "Northern" Presbyterian Mission, five to six years after the initial action taken. By contrast, it should be noted that, the 'Southern' Presbyterian Mission decided in late 1935 to withdraw, and by September, 1937, the last of the ten mission schools had been closed. The reason for the delay on the part of the 'Northern' Mission might be explored in terms of mission policy. This will be examined in the next chapter (Ch. V. E. "Mission Policy").

A minority in the "Northern" Mission took the position that they could accept the government's statement that the ceremonies were not religious and comply with the order. However, it should be added that only a few of this minority actually went out to the shrines. Also we can stress here that Chosŏn Christian College in Sŏul did not close but continued to function until 1941, under the presidency of Northern Presbyterian missionary H.H. Underwood. Underwood, a leading missionary, accepted the Government definition of Shintō as non-religious. The Mission voted in 1938 to withdraw from Chosŏn
Christian College, but action was delayed.

Another minority in the "Northern" Mission including Rev. Bruce F. Hunt felt such strong dissatisfaction with the home Board over the shrine issue and over liberalism in the Korea Mission that many resigned. About 15 resignations from the Korea Mission since 1936 were mainly due to these reasons. The missionaries who resigned were a small but vociferous faction.

In 1936 the mission of the Presbyterian Church of Australia passed its resolutions, of which the following may be quoted:

We recognise our obligations to promote the virtues of obedience and loyalty in our students. We desire that our schools should participate in all national ceremonies. But since we worship one God alone, Creator and Ruler of the Universe, and because to comply with an order to make obeisance at shrines which are dedicated to other spirits ... would constitute for us a disobedience to His expressed commands, we therefore are unable ourselves to make such obeisance, or to instruct our schools to do so.

This motion was unanimously carried: The Mission spoke strongly against the shrine. Later, however, in conformity with the desire of certain of the educationists and influenced by suggestions from the board in Australia, in practice a certain amount of concession was made, though there were never stated alterations of the mission policy. Actually, by arrangement with and consent of the provincial modern authorities (Kyōng-Nam Province), it was permitted that mission schools attend the shrines at times when no Shintō ceremonies were in progress; the schools gave token of their loyalty not by the conventional obeisance but by standing in prayer to God for Japan.

This compromise proved unsatisfactory alike to the authorities and to the mission. In other words, the mission did manage to establish a semi-official arrangement with provincial authorities,
omitting obeisance, but later the arrangement was condemned as unacceptable. The authorities asserted that the only reason why schools had so conducted themselves (i.e., with prayer to God at the shrines instead of obeisance to the kami) was official interpretation that the prayer to God was obeisance to the kami. No other interpretation was acceptable to the highest authorities. Late in 1938 the provincial authorities demanded full conformity. It should not be overlooked here that in the Mission there were apparently enough voices (mostly educationists) suggesting 'a certain amount of compromise' that the Mission found it necessary to repeat its action again in January 1939. Finally, the Mission met in January 1939 and passed the following:

In development of mission policy as enunciated in February 1936 we now resolve that both in church and school we dissociate ourselves from attendance at the shrines.

This we do from a conviction that in the act of bowing at the shrines is inherent a token of assent to claims which we believe to be contrary to the truth of God, truth concerning which it is our primary duty as Christians to bear witness.

Further, that we seek to maintain our Christian witness in education and our goodwill and helpfulness to Japan by efforts to continue our schools.

The Board of Foreign Missions of the United Church of Canada (the former Presbyterian Church of Canada) did not issue instructions to the missions in Korea regarding policy of the Shintō shrines, but the missionaries were preponderantly in favour of conformity. This decision also was not unanimous. There was at least one resignation in protest; one woman educationist resigned from her school rather than conform.

It is noteworthy in this context that in the 1930s the United Church of Canada, being a union of several denominations since 1925,
could not be held to the doctrine and confession of the Presbyterian Church.\textsuperscript{22} In September, 1926, the 25th General Assembly broke with Young, who had favoured the Presbyterian Confession and form of government, and decided to work with those who differed greatly from Presbyterian Church ideas, because the latter were in the majority. So the Canadian Mission began afresh. After the departure of Young, William Scott came from Manchuria to become Mission chairman in Hamhŭng, and Kim Kwan-sik and Cho Hŭi-yŏm came from America to join in the educational work. The Rev. Kim Kwan-sik was later elected the first t'ongnisa of the United Korean Christian Church, which was completely under control of the government in July 1945.\textsuperscript{23}

The turning point for the Christian churches, especially the Presbyterians, was the approval of Shintō shrine worship by the Presbyterian General Assembly of 1938, P'yŏngyang.\textsuperscript{24} Before the 27th General Assembly, the government coerced the presbyteries into accepting shrine worship. Eventually in February 1938 P'yŏngbuk Presbytery, the biggest one, approved Shintō shrine worship, and earlier in time than the General Assembly 17 out of 23 presbyteries in the country obeyed the government. The 'surrender' of the Presbyterians was made by unusual use of police power and pressure. When the session began, high police officials sat in front facing the delegates and no debate or negative votes were allowed. Under such pressure the assembly resolved that participation in shrine ceremonies was not religious and thus did not conflict with the teachings of Christianity, but was an act of patriotism. With this, a serious rift opened between the Korean church and the missionaries.\textsuperscript{25} The missionaries\textsuperscript{26} denounced the assembly for its action and, as legal owners of the mission schools, voted to close the schools rather than allow their students to participate in Shintō rituals. And most
missionaries resigned from all presbytery organisations, though continuing to help as individuals whenever possible. This, in turn, alienated many Christian families, whose children's education was at stake.

The Korean Church at large after 1938 followed the same course which the Church in Japan took, compromise and surrender to the power of the State. The 'official approval' of the shrine attendance by the largest and most powerful Christian denomination in Korea gave an effective tool to crush any Christian resistance to participation in shrine ceremonies. Now the "Shrine Issue" was virtually solved as far as the government was concerned. However, government dealing with Christians became tougher and more oppressive.

As the Presbyterian General Assembly and other ecclesiastical bodies collapsed in their witness to the uniqueness of Christianity, Presbyterian ministers and Christians met the issue by opposing the action of the General Assembly. The resisting ministers, evangelists, elders or deacons, visited the still courageous, sympathetic church groups and individual Christians to persuade them against Shrine worship, which activities were often called Sinsa pulch'ambae undong (SPU, Jinja Fusampai Undo in Japanese) or Non-Shrine Worship Movement (1938-1945). The strongest resistance was shown in the provinces of P'yŏngan south and north, and Kyŏngsang south, and also among the Korean Christians in Manchuria. As a result, nearly 200 local churches closed their doors, about 2,000 persons were arrested, and among them more than 50 died in prison because of the shrine issue in Korea, and 20 or so were released at the end of the Second World War.

SPU leaders had already judged their Christian 'co-religionists' who bowed at the shrines to have 'apostatised' from the faith, and to
be no longer worthy of fellowship. A deep rupture based on what was morally right had already taken place. In the view of these 'die-hard' conservatives, new 'unorthodoxy' and 'liberalism' had entered in and adulterated the church. To SPU leaders it was a form of 'spiritual adultery' that Christian pastors bowed before the Japanese kami.

The Korean resistance to shrine worship had three centres: first, in the P'yŏngan provinces in the north (Yi Ki-sŏn, leader) and the south (Chu Ki-ch'ŏl, leader); second, Kyŏngsang south Province (Han Sang-dong, leader); and third, Manchuria (B.F. Hunt, leader) (Table 5. The Leaders of the Non-Shrine Worship Movement).

The Korean resistance in P'yŏngan both south and north provinces centred on P'yŏngyang, the Protestant city of 'Jerusalem' in Korea. In P'yŏngyang the Presbyterian Seminary was located since 1902. The stronghold of the Presbyterian Church in Korea was P'yŏngan Provinces, north-western areas, and P'yŏngyang city came to be the centre of the resistance to shrine worship.33

The motives, beliefs and actions of the SPU Korean Christians are well illustrated in the experience of one of the most prominent exponents: Yi Ki-sŏn (1879-1950).34 Yi Ki-sŏn was a revivalist minister of P'yŏngan north Province. He believed in a clear-cut distinction between the Creator God of the Bible and all the so-called false gods and idols. He judged Shintō kami worship to be a violation of God's commandment against idolatry. He believed that Christ's second coming was at hand. Shrine worship was 'spiritual adultery' and contradictory to Christian doctrine. He was a very important voice in heaping accusations of sin upon those who compromised. He urged other Christians to come back to their original faith. After his activities for the SPU, he was arrested and imprisoned in 1940.
Table 5: The Leaders of the Non-Shrine Worship Movement (1938-1945)*

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<th>Province</th>
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<td>Yi Ki-sŏn, leader</td>
<td>Pak Sin-gún, Deacon</td>
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<td>Yi Pyŏng-hŭi, Deacon</td>
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<td>Yi Pyŏng-hŭi, Deacon</td>
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Table 5 (continued)

IV. Manchuria
Han Pu-sŏn, Missionary, Leader

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<td>Pongch'on</td>
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<td>Musun</td>
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<td>Andong (Antung)</td>
<td>Ch'oe Yong-sam</td>
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Chŏlla South Province
Son Yang-wŏn

(After his release in 1945, he was active in re-establishing Christianity in North Korea until he was killed there in 1950).

The most prominent foreign missionary to undergo imprisonment at the hands of the Japanese was B.F. Hunt (Han Pu-sŏn), a leader of the SPU in Manchuria. The Rev. Hunt was born in Korea of a Presbyterian missionary home and was a missionary himself in Korea until 1936, belonging to the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., but he withdrew from the Home Church on the issue of modernism and joined the American Presbyterian Church which later changed its name to the Orthodox Presbyterian Church of America. In his tenacious stubborn faith, the shrine issue was perceived as a purely religious problem, a stark confrontation between Jehovah and the false gods of the Japanese.

Here we should note a sect called Sionsan cheguk (the Mount Zion movement, 1944) centred at the Pohyŏn mountain, Ch'ŏngsong, Kyŏngsang north Province. This sect changed its name to Sionsan kyohoe (the Zion Presbyterian Church of Christ) on the 20th August, 1945. This extremely pietistic, premillenarian (Adventist) sect was an offshoot from the Northern Presbyterian Church. It put up one of the last, strongest shows of resistance to the Japanese shrine demand in all Korea.

The Mount Zion sect owed its distinctive teachings to the sect founder Pak Tong-gi's biblical studies and exegesis. In his early days Pak learned Chinese classics for seven years under the supervision of his paternal uncle Cho Pyŏng-guk, a prominent figure of the anti-Japan resistance movement. Later in 1926 Pak Tong-gi entered the Tongsan Bible School in Taegu carried on by the Northern Presbyterian mission. In 1940 he, the then evangelist of the Todong Presbyterian Church, Kyŏngsang north Province, claimed to have
experienced a prophetic vision of the resurrected Jesus Christ during his prayer. In 'the vision-trance type of transformation' (A.F.C. Wallace's terms) Pak attested that the Old Testament was unfolded in front of him at Joel 2: "Sound the alarm in Jerusalem! Let the blast of the warning trumpet be heard upon my holy mountain! Let everyone tremble in fear, for the day of the Lord's judgment approaches (Joel 2:1) ... Sound the trumpet in Zion! Call a fast and gather all the people together for a solemn meeting (2:15) ... Everyone who calls upon the name of the Lord will be saved; even in Jerusalem some will escape, just as the Lord has promised, for he has chosen some to survive (2:32)".

As a protest against the collapse of the Presbyterian General Assembly of 1938, which eventually resulted in the closing of his church in 1942, Pak withdrew from his job and settled down in the rural village of Ch'ŏngsong. Over 1,000 followers, with increased individual stress as a result of the intensified policy of 'Japanisation' in Korea during the Pacific War, gathered around the charismatic leader Pak, who strongly proclaimed that salvation could be achieved only by withdrawing from the 'apostatised' churches which bowed at the Shintō shrines. Among the followers there were three ministers (Hwang Yu-ha, Cho Song-dae, Yang Ha-u) and four elders (Chŏng Sŏn-jun, Hwang Tal-su, Ch'oe Chŏng-su, Chŏng Un-hun).

Under the charismatic leadership of Pak Tong-gi, the members of the schismatic Mount Zion sect considered themselves to be those who had been given an opportunity of becoming a people chosen to be saved. Their numbers remained small and rarely exceeded 1,000. The very name 'Mount Zion' was introduced by the founder of the movement, who cited Hebrews (N.T.) 12:22 and the Revelation (N.T.) 14:1 at the time of severe stress: "But you have come right up to Mount Zion, to the city
of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem; and to the gathering of countless happy angels”; "Then I saw a Lamb standing on Mount Zion in Jerusalem, and with him were 144,000 who had his Name and his Father’s Name on their foreheads”.  

Like other adventists in history, the message of the Zion sect centred upon the kingdom of God, and its early establishment on earth, preceded by the second advent of Jesus Christ.

The members of the Zion sect accepted the Bible as the only source of knowledge of God and His revealed purposes. As all adventists tend to relate biblical prophecies to their own times and to recognise contemporary events as fulfilling these pronouncements, from the evidences of the Scriptures and from the signs of the times, the members of the Zion sect believed that the second advent of Jesus was now imminent: the occasion of wars, great earthquakes, famines in many lands, and so on, was believed to be predicted in the Scriptures (Luke 21; Matthew 24; Mark 13) - all served to make evident to the Zion sect concerned that their own time was indeed the time of the end of the existing dispensation. Thus, the present time was seen as an interim period before the establishment of the millennium, and the political events of the present time were regarded from the point of view of the fulfilment of the prophecies of the Bible, preliminary to the end of this dispensation: "But when you see Jerusalem surrounded by armies, then you will know that the time of its destruction has arrived. Then let the people of Judea flee to the hills. Let those in Jerusalem try to escape, and those outside the city must not attempt to return. For those will be days of God's judgment, and the words of the ancient Scriptures written by the prophets will be abundantly fulfilled" (Luke 21:20-2). The Mount Zion sect believed the Second Advent imminent on the basis of allegorical and
dispensational interpretations especially of Daniel (O.T.) and Revelation (N.T.).

Among the leading members of the Mount Zion sect, like the adventist sect Christadelphians, or brethren in Christ in Britain begun by Dr. John Thomas, careful scrutiny of international affairs was prevalent in their attempt to see how biblical prophecy was being fulfilled. A wide variety of international events were received with great excitement and in one way or another fitted into the pattern of things prophesied. Regarding World War II as the 'Armageddon' (the Revelation 16:16), the Zion sect prayed publicly for an Allied victory.

As regards the Shinto Shrine Issue, the Mount Zion movement judged worship at the Shinto shrines and daily bows in an easterly direction - to Tōkyō - to be a violation of God's commandment against idolatry. What is interesting in this context is that the Zion sect tried to identify particular biblical passages with the warning against worship at Shinto kami (Amaterasu Ōmikami, the Sun-Goddess): "Then he brought me into the inner court of the Temple and there at the door, between the porch and the bronze altar, were about twenty-five men standing with their backs to the Temple of the Lord, facing east, worshipping the sun! 'Have you seen this?' he asked. '"Is it nothing to the people of Judah that they commit these terrible sins, leading the whole nation into idolatry, thumbing their noses at me and arousing my fury against them!" (Ezekiel 8:16-7).

The members of the Zion sect, therefore, burnt Japanese flags and every Shinto symbol, for example, kamidana (god-shelves) in the homes, they could lay their hands on, closed churches and ex-communicated members and pastors who had traffic with the Japanese, gloried in deaths as martyrs, took their sons out of schools rather than have
them receive a 'Babylonian education'. \textsuperscript{49} For all this they were persecuted by the Japanese authorities and removed from all Presbyterian connections in Korea. In May 1945, the leader, the staff and some followers (33 people) were arrested and imprisoned at the Pohyŏn mountain, Ch'ŏngsong. \textsuperscript{50}

The radical aspect of the Presbyterian Church, especially the SPU and the Zion sect, in regard to the world view on the state deserves some attention. This point will be explored further in Ch. V.D. "World View".
CHAPTER V

KOREAN CHRISTIANITY AND THE SHINTO SHRINE ISSUE (2):
THE CATHOLIC, THE METHODIST AND THE PRESBYTERIAN
POSITIONS COMPARED

A. Theoretical Framework

The central focus of this study is an inquiry into the possible reasons why some religious groups, such as the Roman Catholic Church and the Methodist Church, should choose the way of compromise and others, such as the Presbyterian Church, especially the individual missionaries, the Non-Shrine Worship Movement, and the Mount Zion Sect, the way of radical challenge and withdrawal. Historically, as regards the attitude of the Korean Churches to the Issue, the Presbyterians (the largest Protestant group), unlike the Methodists (the second largest Protestant group) and the Roman Catholics, did not yield to Japanese pressure easily. It was a fact that there was a division of opinion and action on the matter of Shintō shrine attendance among the various Christian Churches, which followed to some extent denominational lines. Thus the following is a theoretical framework of comparison of the three major churches - the Roman Catholic, the Methodist and the Presbyterian - in connection with the Shintō Shrine Issue.

Sociology is the social science that deals with the development, organisation, and behaviour of human groups. Sociological study of religion is based on the recognition that both religious life and the church as its institutional expression are profoundly social. Every religious organisation has some degree of formalism or institutionalisation. This is true even of religious groups whose ecclesiasticism
is least developed and of those so informally and loosely organised that they claim to lack organisation altogether. In point of fact, in religious groups whose formal and established organisation in connection with the church is least developed, formalised group judgements defining and evaluating the person are more frequent and burdensome than in the ritualistic churches. The ecclesiasticism of the sect is a different sort from that of the established church, but it is not a whit less institutionalised. Religion cannot have currency without developing some generalised form, and generalised form implies habits resistant to change which are the essence of institutionalisation. In brief, the church is a social structure. In the pursuit of its goals it functions as a social entity in a social world. This means that, like other institutions, it is subject to the play of social forces in both its formation and its operation.

The church as a social institution is a major subject in the sociology of religion. The church is a peculiarly appropriate object for sociological study because it is a collective undertaking, an association of people organised to act together. As such, the church is subject to the play of all the basic social processes operating in human societies. The character of each organisation is affected by the conditions out of which it originates. It must develop some kind of structure on behalf of its mission or objective. This structure involves separation of people into different roles. This entire organisational structure is peculiarly subject to the play of such sociological processes as formalisation or institutionalisation, bureaucratisation, conflict, and integration. As a consciously functioning enterprise with an identity recognised by its membership, it is confronted by the surrounding world in which it must operate. The institution must deal with this world; it devises policies and

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practices to meet the problems and requirements that flow from its efforts to exist and operate in its own specific social setting. It tries to protect or advance its particular interests and values. All of these matters are conditions and needs that confront every human organisation. But since beliefs are so important in religion, social scientists analysing the church must be even more involved in the study of normative behaviour and group values than those who study most other segments of society. The intensity of meaning involved in the practice of religion as a causative variable is very important. The definitions and explanations men attach to situations in which they find themselves are of great importance to their conduct. In this context, because of the way it combines empirical research with experiential insight (Verstehen), the sociology of religion has been viewed as an art as well as a science.

The cardinal aspects of the church can be and have been studied from many different points of view. While the historian's perspective focuses upon unique or distinctive factors in the case of a specific church or set of churches, sociological analysis of the church pertains to many of its general features. In its concern with general processes, sociological analysis relies heavily on comparative and conceptual study of churches. However, the process of establishing an adequate sociological typology to categorise various religious communities is still being hammered out, though certain terms have come to have a wide acceptance, e.g., Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch's distinction between the 'sect' and the 'church'.

A religious institution may be considered as composed of conceptual and ideological elements; of usages, ritual and behavioural patterns; of associational and organisational elements as well as the material and instrumental aspects - which together serve
to channel the activities of human beings towards the satisfaction of religious needs. 6

As for the first and second elements, much has been written on the relation of belief and practice in religion. What are the respective relations between doctrine and cult, theology and worship? The most plausible interpretation would seem to be that which considers the theological and the practical as being inextricably intertwined. 7 No act of worship can exist without some conception of the divine, nor can a religion function without at least a modicum of cultic expression.

Given the integrating power of doctrine and worship, we can safely assume that "the attitude of the individual towards society in all its forms and the influence of a religion on social relations and institutions will depend largely on the spirit which permeates the doctrines, cult and organisation of a religious group". 8 In a brilliant study Max Weber has attempted to characterise typologically different religious attitudes as they are found in some of the world religions. 9 Religious experience itself stimulates the development of characteristic attitudes, e.g., the support of Christian exclusiveness or the openmindedness to the non-Christian religions. These in turn are concretised in thought and action, e.g., martyrdom or apostasy. Thus differences in religious experience itself seem to be key factors.

In connection with this, it is noteworthy that Joachim Wach asserts that religious experience is basically composed of: a) theoretical expression: doctrine; b) practical expression: cults; and c) sociological expression: communion (the state of sharing religious beliefs and practices). 10 Wach's assertion needs to be reworded in terms of etymology.
Firstly, as regards 'theoretical expression', 'doctrine' means 'a principle of belief', 'doctrīna-docēre' in Latin is 'to teach'. Thus by referring to 'doctrine' we should emphasise 'teaching' or 'a thing taught' in a religious context. The 'content' of the doctrine (intellectual expressions of religious experience) revolves about three topics of particular importance - God, the world, and man. In other words, theological, cosmological, and anthropological conceptions are continuously being evolved in terms of myth, doctrine, and dogma. The nature of God or the gods, the origin and growth of deities (theogony), and their attributes, the relation of the deity to the world and its justification (theodicy) - all are delineated and expounded in the theology (a system of theological doctrine). Cosmogony is a theory or a myth of the origin of the universe, while theological anthropology, including soteriology (the doctrine of salvation) and eschatology (the doctrine of the last or final things, such as death, judgement, the state after death), ponders over the origin, nature, and destiny of man.

Secondly, in connection with 'practical expression', 'cultus' means 'formal worship'. 'Cultus-colēre' in Latin is 'to worship'. Wach calls 'cultus' the act or acts of the homo religiosus: worship. E. Underhill divides these acts into (1) ritual (liturgical pattern), (2) symbols (images), (3) sacraments (visible things and deeds), and (4) sacrifice. Underhill's classification is very useful for a systematic inquiry into the nature, relation, and meaning of cultic acts.

Thirdly, regarding 'sociological expression', 'communion' means 'spiritual intercourse, fellowship, interchange of transactions, union in religious service'. In Latin 'commūniō' came from 'commūnis' which means 'common'. By communion Wach refers to the sociological
expressions of religious experience, which complement the theoretical and practical expressions. 18 In other words, he stresses that vital religion, by its very nature, must create and sustain a social relationship. Eventually he concludes that "the sociologist of religion will have to study and to classify with care the typologically different organizational structures resulting from divergent concepts of religious communion. He will trace their historic development, and it will be his task to investigate different ideas of fellowship in religion, a concept ubiquitous in all periods and in all parts of the world". 19

From the rewording of the foregoing, and recognising the advantages of the typological approach, I propose two crucial factors to compare the different positions of the three churches: 1) 'theological emphasis' (in Wach's terms, the theoretical and practical expressions of religious experience), and 2) church structure (in Wach's terms, the sociological expressions of religious experience or organisational structure).

With regard to 'theological emphasis', it is possible to classify on a continuum at least five distinguishable parties: fundamentalist, conservative, moderate, liberal and modernist. 20 Moderate fundamentalists and liberals often remain together in the same church. But, hyper-fundamentalists, failing to gain control, often depart to establish new churches or to join those they know to be "true to the Word of God". In this context it should be noted that the fundamentalist-Modernist controversies in the 1920s was transplanted to foreign lands through missionaries.

Although most Protestant fundamentalists were strongly anti-Catholic, Catholicism meets all theological requirements of the fundamentalists' minimum five-point definition. The chief difference
is that the ultimate authority is not an infallible Bible but an infallible Church. Ritual is, for the Catholic, a conservative force that firmly binds him to a system.

In connection with 'church structure', as a whole, I follow the Congregational, Presbyterian and Episcopal models. Roger Mehl provided three types of Protestant ecclesiastical structures from the perspective of the sociology of missions: a) the episcopal type; b) the Presbyterian synodal type; and c) the Congregational type. Mehl's typologies can be summarised in the following way.

1. The episcopal type is represented by Anglicanism and, with certain variations, by the Lutheran Church of Sweden. Both refer to the idea of a hierarchy in continuity with the apostles. The Church of England resembles the Roman Catholic church in the sense that it is theoretically a church directed by one sole hierarchy, under the authority of two bishops, one being primate. Anglicanism is usually more in line with Swedish Lutheranism, by contrast to both Methodism and other forms of Lutheranism, which has maintained or restored the Episcopacy constitution although in a less distinct type.

2. The Presbyterian synodal type, generally of Reformed tradition, is characterised by the fact that the organisation consists of a hierarchy of assemblies and councils, which rests on the base of the parish, the basic cell of the church. This regime has been called democratic and anti-Episcopalian. Whereas the Episcopal system became more flexible by the intervention of synodal assemblies, the Presbyterian synodal system tends to take a step towards the Episcopal system.
3. The Congregational type certainly is a rather late product, which expresses a very strong individualism. Nevertheless, it also expresses one of the components of Reformed ecclesiology, in the sense that it accentuates the single local congregation, which in its eyes expresses the whole reality of the church. It is present in Baptist churches and in many Congregational churches.

Current conceptualisation of the Congregational, Presbyterian and Episcopal models of church structure suggest that the differential allocation of authority represents the distinguishing characteristic between various forms of church organisation. In this respect D.O. Moberg offered useful typologies of church structure including the Roman Catholic Church. In his view, the three basic organisational forms of churches, the Episcopal, Presbyterian, and Congregational types, roughly correspond to political monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies, respectively. Episcopal polity, best illustrated by the Roman Catholic Church, is dominated by an ecclesiastical hierarchy which controls appointments of the parish clergy and exercises discipline over them. Authority flows from the highest offices down to the members. Presbyterian polity is dominated in theory by the constituent church bodies, but in fact by the clergy, who control the denomination's synods or presbyteries and comprise a hierarchy of ecclesiastical oligarchs. Elders in the local church tend to exercise a similar aristocratic type of control. The Presbyterian Church is an example. Congregational churches, such as Baptists, are loosely organised, with members collectively as the source of authority.

According to Moberg, in Episcopal churches power flows from top levels of the denomination downward to the local churches and its members, while the opposite prevails in congregational bodies. Presbyterian groups fall between the two, with authority flowing out
from the middle level of elders and presbyters to both the lower level of the local church and the higher level of the denomination.

The present study has concentrated on the three churches - the Roman Catholic, the Methodist and the Presbyterian. Thus, it seems proper for the study to use parts of both Mehl's and Moberg's typologies. For the Roman Catholic Church I would use Moberg's, for the Methodist Church Mehl's. Regarding the Presbyterian Church, it seems reasonable to consider both assertions: Mehl stresses its democratic and anti-Episcopalian character; Moberg emphasises the role of the middle level, elders and presbyters, in its polity.

Incidentally, as was shown, 'religious experience' itself stimulates the development of characteristic attitudes towards society in all its forms, e.g., the support of Christian exclusiveness or the openmindedness to the non-Christian religions. In relation to the Shinto Shrine Issue in the Japanese Empire, therefore, I add three factors: 1) 'world view'; 2) 'relationship to non-Christian religions', and 3) 'relationship to nationalism'.

As regards 'relationship to a non-Christian religion', the question whether Korean Christians did support Christian exclusiveness or not is crucial in the sense that, if not, there would be no religious objection to worship at Shinto shrines. In general terms of the sociology of missions, missionary response to local cultures varies through the history of mission effort; it varies according to the church in question, and also according to the culture where the mission is found.

Similarly, with reference to 'the relationship to nationalism', missionary attitudes to the political authorities in the mission field can be indigenous, or from the mission's own government at home, or from an alien colonial government. In this respect Korea, under the
Japanese Empire, was in a unique situation in the sense that there existed three different forces together: the Korean indigenous force, Japanese colonialism, and Euro-American influence through Christian missions. The Christian missions were, unlike Africa or India, independent of the colonising power. Thus the church was associated with a new nationalism.

Finally, another three factors should be included in the comparison: 1) 'mission policy', 2) 'early historical experience', and 3) 'nationalities of missionaries'.

The strategic emphasis in mission policy has often been a variation of theological emphasis in a religious institution. More significant than the variation of outward form of mission such as education, evangelisation, etc., have been the inner differences in the understanding of the nature of missionary work, which have led to the wide variation in practice in the course of missionary history. In relation to the shrine question, the goal of education and the idea of conversion were controversial among missionaries. In general terms, the inner differences in the understanding of 'education' and 'conversion' on the part of missionaries can be set out in the form of pairs of opposites: (1) Either: education is to be supplied without discrimination to all who are desirous of receiving it - Or: education is to be reserved for Christians; its aim is not evangelisation but the production of a Christian elite. (2) Either: conversion, or decision for Christ, is the aim of all Christian preaching - Or: the idea of conversion should be excluded from the start; the aim is the creation of a climate of mutual understanding.

In general, Catholicism is more adroit in the working out of syntheses and more easily shelters certain forms of 'syncretism' than does Protestantism. The most significant characteristic of
Catholic mission policy is its world-wide policy of 'accommodation'. Although generalisations are dangerous, there are striking differences between Roman Catholics and Protestants with regard to 'accommodation'.

Regarding the significance of 'early historical experience', it is generally accepted that the early, formative period of missions is crucial for the latter pattern of church-state relations. The Shintō Shrine Issue in the Japanese Empire is important because it reveals the problem of 'Church-State Relations' in the colonial setting. Thus we should examine the early historical experience of three missions considering religion and politics.

In addition, as T.O. Beidelman stresses with great insight, it is essential to consider any missionary group in terms of the nationality, socio-economic background and cultural background of its members. These features should be considered in any discussions of missionaries in the modern world. Among these, the factor 'nationalities of missions' needs more attention than has been given to it. At the time of the shrine issue, 1931-1945, there were three (American, Australian, Canadian), one (American), and four nationalities (French, German, Irish, American) in missions of the Presbyterian, Methodist and Roman Catholic churches respectively.

To summarise, the difference among the positions of the three churches can be attributed to the differences of: 1) theological emphasis; 2) church structure; 3) world view; 4) mission policy; 5) relationship to nationalism; 6) relationship to non-Christian religions; 7) early historical experience, and 8) nationalities of missionaries. With this framework in Chapter V some sociological observations will be made in an effort to compare the Catholic, the Methodist and the Presbyterian positions.
B. Theological Emphasis

1. The Catholic Church

'Accommodation' is the technical term used especially in Roman Catholic missionary circles to describe attempts to adapt or assimilate the gospel to local situations and, by omission or suppression of certain Christian customs which might be regarded as offensive to non-Christians, to make the acceptance of the gospel easier for them.\(^1\) The two most famous instances of accommodation are the work of Matteo Ricci in China and of Robert de Mobili in South India.

As regards expressions of religious experience, among the Christian Churches the Roman Catholic Church is notable for her emphasis on 'worship' and for the richness of the complicated and elaborate patterns of ritual and symbolism used to express it. So liturgical practice, otherwise known as the Mass, has always occupied the very centre of Roman Catholicism. The Mass is the very centre of Catholic worship and the heart of Catholic belief.\(^2\) Hence, in the case of 'accommodation', the Roman Catholic Church, unlike the Protestant circles, has historically laid stress not on the theological expression of religious experience, i.e., doctrine, but on practical expression, i.e., the matter of cult.\(^3\)

According to J.B. Pratt, we can distinguish between two types of worship, one of which aims at making some kind of effect upon the Deity or in some way communicating with him, while the other seeks only to induce some desired mood or belief or attitude in the mind of the worshipper: the former he calls "objective worship"; the latter "subjective worship". Objective worship appears more distinctively in Roman Catholicism, and subjective worship in Protestantism.\(^4\)
Catholic Church in every part of the world means to be (as the Hindu temple means to be) not a meeting house for worshippers but a place where, in a particular sense, God dwells. The heart of Catholicism for its most spiritual children is its belief in the peculiar presence of God within the Sacrament; and it is this that makes the Catholic church building mean so much more to the good Catholic than the Protestant meeting house can ever mean to anyone. The subjective effect of the objective methods used by the Catholic Church is very considerable.  

The Catholic Church in Korea supports Pratt's argument. After waves of repression the church finally won legal protection in 1886 as a consequence of Korea's treaty with France, which guaranteed the safety of Catholic converts. French missionaries began their work by constructing some conspicuous church buildings. The following description is interesting:

The Catholics made conspicuous changes in the skyline of Seoul by erecting major churches at Yakhyon and in Myeong-dong. St. Joseph's Church at Yakhyon was the first brick building in Korea. The Cathedral in Myeong-dong, today the mother church of Korean Catholicism, designed by Frenchmen and built under the supervision of Chinese contractors, was consecrated in 1898. Some Koreans grumbled that the building's height—the steeple was 69 metres high—violated conventions forbidding construction of anything which could overlook the royal palace; but the king let it stand, partly because in the volatile international atmosphere of Korea he thought it best not to alienate the French.

Similarly, we can also note the fact that from 1912 to 1918 the Japanese government had saved money for the purpose of establishing a National Shrine on Namsan, a hill overlooking the City of Seoul, and between 1918 and 1925, for eight years, they spent 1,570,000 yen to build the Central Shrine of Chosen on Namsan. In this context, with regard to the practical expression of religious experience, as Wach...
points out, both Roman Catholic systems of divination and Japanese Shintoism commonly have the performance of cultic acts as part of a comprehensive system of interpretation of the cosmos, of the will of the deity. Here, as for worship, we can assume that there is a similarity between Roman Catholicism and Japanese Shintoism. This matter will be explained further afterwards.

On the side of theoretical expressions of religious experience, Roman Catholicism meets all theological requirements of 'the fundamentalists' minimum five-point definition. On most theological issues the Roman Catholics consistently resemble the conservatives. As Moberg stresses, the chief difference is that the ultimate authority is not an infallible Bible but an infallible Church. Revelation as interpreted by the Church hierarchy and tradition rather than empirical rationalism is to Catholic the basic source of truth.

Contemporary modernism in Catholicism sprang up at the same time as it did in Protestantism and for basically the same reasons. The centralised organisation of the Church, however, made it simple to compel modernists either to conform to its teachings or to leave the Church. The Encyclical Pascendi Gregis in 1907 by Pope Pius X brought an end to modernism's development in the official Catholic press and pulpits.

Modernists in Catholicism have been less likely to leave their Church than those in Protestantism. The emotional effects of mystic ecstasy, the subjective effect of the objective methods, come to the Catholic modernist in the religious ritual which centres on the Mass, even if he no longer believes in the truth of the articles of faith. Ritual is, for the Catholic, a conservative force that binds him so firmly to a system that the appeal of reason is of no avail in his efforts to break his church bonds.
In the case of Korean Catholicism, the theology was not so much "Korean" as European. It was formed first indirectly through the theological and devotional works written by the Jesuits in China, later through the preaching and catechesis by French missionaries during the persecution, and since 1886 also through the translations from European theology and spirituality. The greater part of the old Prayerbook as well as of hymnals, catechisms, and theological and devotional literature read in the Korean Church have been in fact direct translations from Europe and, as such, have reflected the outlook of pre-conciliar popular European Catholicism.

The early Church stressed only those aspects which were most consoling and appealing to the psychology of a suffering and persecuted Church. A consequence of the theology of "withdrawal" from the world was the emphasis on solitude, contemplation, and the abnegation of the flesh. Given that Catholic behaviour is, to a certain degree, determined by the specifically Catholic outlook on life, of which theology is the conceptual expression, the theology of "withdrawal" should be emphasised in the conformist attitude of Korean Catholicism. The Catholic world-view or theology in the wide sense will be considered closely later (D. "World View").

2. The Methodist Church

As for the expression of religious experience - doctrine, worship and communion - the Methodist Church, in general terms, shows a 'moderate' (median) character.

The proclamation regarding the Unification and organisation of the Korean Methodist Church declared: "1. The evangelical faith (which has been interpreted by Mr. Wesley in the Articles of Religion and in his Sermons and Notes on the New Testament) is our heritage and
our glorious possession; 2. As with Mr. Wesley in the earliest General Rules in the United States, the conditions of membership are moral and spiritual rather than theological. We sanction the fullest liberty as his character and his works approve themselves as consistent with true godliness. 1

Methodism places particular stress on personal religion and social responsibility. 2 Under the tradition of John Wesley who was first of all the advocate of a 'practical' Christianity and was antagonistic to a 'theological system', theological soundness is less important than good conduct. 3 Wesley was to be the mediator between the "traditional" Protestantism of the Reformation which had flourished in England during the seventeenth century and the "modern" Arminian Protestantism which had become characteristic of Latitudinarian 4 Anglicanism. 5 Wesley appealed to both the Puritan sense of man's degenerate state as well as to the Arminian insistence on personal responsibility, on free will and good works. Departing from the determinism, the doctrine of predestination of Calvin, the Arminians saw man as endowed with free will, capable of choice and morally responsible for his conduct. The heart of the Arminian doctrine, "conditional justification" - election is not absolute but conditional - is contrasted with that of antimonianism, 6 which stresses justification by faith alone under the influence of the Reformation Protestantism of Calvin and Luther.

And there are, in fact, important links between Wesleyan Arminianism and Enlightenment liberalism. 7 Wesley stood firmly in the tradition of John Locke, the apostle of English liberalism. Thus Wesley was distinctive in his theology (evangelical Arminianism), in his flexibility (willingness to use laymen), and in his optimism (Methodists unlike the Reformed Churches, refused to give way to
apocalyptic speculations).

Within a generation Methodism became the largest American denomination, due to the appeal of an Arminian theology whose individualistic, democratic, and optimistic emphases found a positive response in an expanding society where traditional patterns of authority and deference were succumbing to egalitarian challenge. This missionary optimism is the main reason why English Methodists in the mass never surrendered to the millenarian speculations of the Reformed Churches. 9

The cohesive features of Methodists were its Evangelical Arminianism, itinerant ministry, connectional structure, sense of religious community, and emotional fervour. Arminianism, itinerancy, connectionalism and piety made up Methodism. As a result, intricate theological disputes troubled Methodism a good deal less than the more cerebral Puritanism of the seventeenth century.

The fundamentalist-modernist controversy generally did not create much furor within Methodism. Reasons for this seem to give important clues to the understanding of the conformist attitude on the part of the Methodists regarding the Shinto shrine observance. According to Donald Burton Meyer, "Theologically, the principle of the personal experience of the individual as the only test of faith left Methodism open on the one hand to dilution of its testimony, depriving it of a clear tradition of witness, while on the other hand left it, of all the major denominations, least susceptible to the polarisation of the fundamentalist-modernist controversy".

Given that all the Christians who resolutely resisted against shrine worship in Korea and Japan were religious fundamentalists in their theology, we can regard the Methodists' moderate (mediating) character of religious thinking, represented by Wesleyan Evangelical
Arminianism, as the germ of the Korean Methodist Church’s accommodation in the 1930s.

Moreover, we should note that the period of 1919-1934 (after World War I) signifies the dominance of evangelical liberalism throughout the United States, and the Methodist theological seminaries in America, at least in the North, unlike the Presbyterian theological seminaries, were for the most part dominated by the 'liberal' spirit. Here and there a conservative voice was heard and respected because of its quality, but for the most part the Methodists' mood was 'liberal'. So Gerald Kennedy, the editor of The History of American Methodism, says, "There was a tendency to adjust our religious thinking to the spirit of the age". In evangelical liberalism, creedal affirmations and doctrinal formulations, including biblical statements, were acknowledged to be but human interpretations of religious experiences and thus subject to continual restatement. The credo of evangelical liberalism envisaged less emphasis upon ecclesiology and displayed a lack of interest in the question of the sacraments and worship.

The members of the episcopacy in the United States generally reflected the prevailing mood of liberalism of the time. In Southern Methodism, Bishop John Monroe Moore indicated his allegiance to and dependence upon liberal theologians. Bishop Edwin Du Bose Mouzon cautiously placed himself - and Methodism - as 'mediating' between the fundamentalists and the modernists, favouring the latter and their living dynamic theology.

It was a fact, in this context, that the liberal Methodists, in contrast with the extreme conservatives (mostly Presbyterians), generally did not see a great harm in the Shintō shrine worship in the 1930s. This can be partially explained by the credo of liberalism
itself which had less emphasis upon 'ecclesiology' and a lack of interest in the question of the 'sacraments and worship'.

3. The Presbyterian Church

On the matter of religious experience, the Presbyterian Church in Korea was and is very conservative in theology. When the Japanese began to put political pressure on the American missionaries over the question of Shintō shrine worship, the stand of the Presbyterian Mission was particularly strong, and this led to the closing of the mission school by 1938. Similarly, after the Korean Presbyterian General Assembly's unavoidable decision of participation in the Shinto ceremonies in 1938, unlike the Methodists and the Roman Catholics, resisting individual Presbyterians, known as the Non-Shrine Worship Movement (SPU), visited Christian church groups and individual Christians throughout the peninsula to strengthen them against shrine worship.¹

It is widely agreed that most of the early Presbyterian missionaries were, on the whole, strict fundamentalists.² And, since subsequent theological education was almost solely in the hands of the missionaries, strict fundamentalism was the pattern taught to Korean converts. The method of theological education was a kind of indoctrination of certain fundamental creeds, with no room for objective criticism. This kind of approach, to a certain extent, brought satisfaction to the Korean people during the colonial period, since they had little opportunity to participate in their national or cultural life. Thus any theology other than fundamentalism was carefully suppressed by an incessantly growing ecclesiastical hierarchy within the Presbyterian Church.

Fundamentalism, generally, can be defined as follows: (1) the
infallibility and inerrancy of the Scriptures; (2) the Trinity, including the Virgin birth and deity of Jesus Christ; (3) the fall of Adam and the need for personal regeneration based on the substitutionary atonement of Christ; (4) the bodily resurrection of Christ and his ascension; (5) the personal and imminent return of Christ; (6) the everlasting bliss of the righteous dead after their resurrection, and the everlasting and conscious torment of the unbelieving following the final judgement.

Some men and groups, of whom J. Gresham Machen and Westminster Theological Seminary are examples, who have been identified popularly with Fundamentalism, have vigorously denied kinship. Yet it is undeniable that many who deny kinship with Fundamentalism hold similar theological viewpoints but are demarcated by sociological differences, primarily concerning standards of Christian conduct.

In Korean Presbyterianism we can recognise the emphasis of some theological features drawn from strict fundamentalism: Moody's Revivalism and pietism, biblical literalism and eschatological thinking. Furthermore, Korean Presbyterian churches seem to have some common emphases in their missions: 1) the tradition of solid, careful, biblical preaching; 2) a belief in the value of education for its own sake but also as a means for the inclusion of the gospel; 3) a strong church sense. Thus John C. Smith, a missionary of the Northern Presbyterian Mission, depicts three major features of the Presbyterian Church in Korea; 1) the concentration of missionaries of one theological emphasis, that is, a 'conservative' one; 2) the Church in Korea is a Church which studies the Bible; and 3) the Church of Korea has also demonstrated once again that there is an 'extreme fundamentalism' which rates 'orthodoxy above ethics'.
Here we should remember the fact that stubborn Presbyterians refused to follow the order of Shintō shrine worship on 'religious' grounds. According to J. Wach, we can distinguish between the theoretical expression of religious experience, i.e., doctrine, and the practical expression of religious experience, i.e., worship or cults. When applying this to the Presbyterians' case of shrine Shintō, we can say that the orthodox Presbyterians would not accommodate themselves in the domain of content of 'doctrine' because of their Reformed belief in a theology based on the Word of God or the Presbyterian tradition, which pays special attention to Scripture. Historically their particular emphasis on doctrinal orthodoxy has been exhibited in their successive schisms over doctrine in the Korean Presbyterian churches (See Table 6).

C. Church Structure

1. The Catholic Church

On its church structure side, the Roman Catholic church offers us an example of a perfectly hierarchical religious society. In contrast to the Protestant understanding of authority, which is indeed 'hazy', the Roman Catholic position has the virtue of being 'unambiguous' and 'clear-cut'. The Catholic church is, in fact, one of the few world-wide hierarchical organisations which have effective power. Max Weber ranked the Catholic Church among those "distinctly developed and quantitatively large bureaucracies". It rests entirely on the hierarchy, the sole dispenser of the sacraments which guarantee salvation. For a Catholic, the church is first of all the Roman See, whence emanates all initiative. In this society, it is certainly not impossible for initiatives to come from the base, but they must
Table 6: Presbyterian Denominations in South Korea, 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official Name</th>
<th>Begun</th>
<th>Congregations</th>
<th>Affiliated</th>
<th>Names and Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bible Presbyterian Church of Korea</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>13,951</td>
<td>Schism ex Koryŏ Presbyterian Ch. Fundamentalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional Korean Presbyterian Church</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Taehan Yesugyo Changno-hoe (Ho-Hŏn) (Legal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Korean Presbyterian Church</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>Split with USA fundamentalist support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesus Presbyterian Church</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5,016</td>
<td>Taehan Yesugyo Changno-hoe Toheŏhŏe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head Presbytery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea Jesus Bible Presbyterian Church</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Taehan Yesugyo Songgyŏng Changno-hoe. Presbyterian schism over doctrine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea Presbyterian Church (Conservative)</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>One of Presbyterian schisms over doctrine.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korea Reformed Presbyterian Church</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>7,260 Taehan Yesugyo Kaehyŏk Changno-hoe. One of many fundamentalist schisms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Bethel Presbyterian Church</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>Small fundamentalist indigenous group of Presbyterian background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Bible Presbyterian Church</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>21,190</td>
<td>One of larger Presbyterian schisms over fundamentalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Christian Reformed Presbyterian Church</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>8,225</td>
<td>Presbyterian schism over doctrine and fundamentalism, with USA support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koryo Presbyterian Church</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>102,125 Taehan Yesugyo Changno-hoe (Ko-Sin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian Church in Korea</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1,991</td>
<td>550,790 Taehan Yesugyo Changno-hoe (Hap-Dong). NAE. Anti-ecumenical schism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>218,287 Han'guk Kidokkyo Changno-hoe (Ki-Jang). Liberal schism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6 (continued)</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian Church of Korea</td>
<td>1884</td>
<td>2,348</td>
<td>534,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian Church of Korea (Non-Assembled)</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian Church of Korea (Reformed Faith)</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian Church of Korea (Restored)</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian Church (Neutral)</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>7,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian Church (Revolutionary Rehabilitated)</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure Presbyterian Church of Korea</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4,229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6 (continued)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reconstruction Presbyterian Church</strong></td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>3,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zion Presbyterian Church of Christ</strong></td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total affiliated (mid-1980)</strong></td>
<td>6,143</td>
<td>1,497,081</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

attain considerable magnitude before they can affect the decisions of the Holy See, which alone can give them authority.

The Pope, elected for life by the Assembly of Cardinals, is the supreme head of all the bishops, of all the clergy, and of all the faithful. As the visible representative of Christ and holding his power only from God, the Pope has a power of absolute jurisdiction in questions of doctrine and of morals, and generally in whatever touches the lives of the faithful and of the parishes. To be sure, these monarchical powers do not mean that the Pope absorbs all the functions. The Episcopal organisation is the essential relay system of pontifical authority, with the bishops acting only under the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff. Within their dioceses, however, all secondary powers have been left open to the course of evolution. Theoretically, the powers of the bishop are considerable; in fact, however, these powers are very restricted. Within this Roman Catholic tradition, therefore, most pronouncements of the Pope and of the hierarchy have always tended to be understood by the laity as authoritative statements of the interpretation of divine truth. Although in the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church a distinction is made between statements of doctrine, which are infallible, and matters of discipline, which may vary from time to time and from place to place, in practice this distinction is not readily recognised by most Catholics.

In 1831 the vicariate of Korea was separated from the diocese of Pei-ching and entrusted to the Paris Foreign Mission Society, which provided the nine bishops to 1942. Bishop A. Mute (1890-1933), who succeeded F. Ridel and J. Blanc, became the first apostolic vicar of Sŏul in 1911, when Taegu was separated as a vicariate. On Bp. Andrian Larribéau's resignation, Paul Ro, the first native Korean bishop, was
made apostolic administrator (Jan. 8, 1942) and vicar (Nov. 10, 1942). The Vatican appointed a Korean bishop in 1946. 7

Thus, at the turn of this century Catholic mission work was carried on primarily under the auspices of the Paris Foreign Mission Society (MEP), whose missioners, with emphasis on ecclesiastical institutionalism, managed the Catholic headquarters in Seoul. 8 The Catholic Church, unlike the Protestants, operated hierarchically under the direct authority of the pastor and bishop. Here we might expect the early Korean Catholics to have carried over from their Confucian and monarchical tradition a highly authoritarian view of God. From the same source they could be expected to have inherited a tradition which sacralised hierarchy and authority in social relationships. It should be noted that, in this respect, when applied to the clergy this authoritarian tendency would be reinforced by the central role played by the priest in the Catholic communities during the persecutions (1791-1866). 9 Thus wider ecclesial identity and sense of unity came not from a regional or national council, but through the Holy See, as the symbol of unity for the universal Church. In short, the structure of the Catholic Church is tightly institutionalised and even authoritarian. In this respect the Church of Korea was and is no exception.

The major consequence of the fact that the Catholic Church has had a teaching authority in morals that is foreign to Protestant experience is a much greater diversity in the kinds of Protestant ethics than in those of Roman Catholic moral theology. 10 Thus, when the Church prescribes a well-defined direction, the faithful are supposed to comply. While within Protestantism, which is on the whole inclined to place stronger emphasis on the individual and on his direct responsibility to God, whereby there are wide ranges of
difference in the evaluation of the role of the individual according to the various conceptions held by the different denominational communities, within Catholicism, which is marked by collectivism mainly due to the authoritarian organisational structure, the social and organic communion, and the integrating power of worship, there is a uniform attitude.\textsuperscript{11}

Here it is important to point out that the Roman Instruction of 1936, which solved the "Shrine Issue" as far as the Roman Catholics in the Japanese Empire were concerned, was not stringent obligations emanating from the infallible Church magisterium; moreover, attendance at shrine worship was not an obligation but a permission.\textsuperscript{12} However, that the Catholics showed a uniform tendency to conform to the instruction reflects their collectivism.

2. The Methodist Church

As regards church structure, the Methodist Church, as a whole, shows the episcopal type which is best represented by Anglicanism and, with certain variations, by the Lutheran Church of Sweden.\textsuperscript{1} It is important to stress in this context that John Wesley and George Whitefield were English and their religious movement began as a part of the established Church of England.\textsuperscript{2} In more concrete terms, with its prime movers, John and Charles Wesley, who had had some traditional link with the Church of England, Methodism, in contrast to some sects, retained 'church-type' features from the beginning.\textsuperscript{3} Even in the early Methodist Societies, though the emphasis lay on individual conversion, the collectivist spirit was strong. Since 1930-1940 (the decade of unification within British Methodism) the Methodist Church of Great Britain has developed into a church-type.\textsuperscript{4}

Methodism owed much to the Anglican via media.\textsuperscript{5} Anglicanism and
the Lutheran Church of Sweden refer to the idea of a hierarchy in continuity with the apostles. For the Anglicans this succession has a dogmatic value and assures the validity of sacramental acts; for the Swedish, it is a historical fact without dogmatic significance. The Church of England resembles the Roman Church in the sense that it is theoretically a church directed by one sole hierarchy, under the authority of two archbishops, one being primate. Each province contains an assembly which can make canonical decisions and which is composed only of representatives of clergy. 6

As a matter of fact, while Anglicanism would come more in line with Swedish Lutheranism, the Methodist form of churches has maintained or restored the episcopacy constitution in less distinct types of Episcopalianism. The Methodist Church attaches no doctrinal significance to the episcopacy: the episcopacy is not a higher order of the ministry but an office. 7 The episcopacy is primarily a structure which maintains the principle of autonomy in the church and removes it from the movements of governments of assemblies. But it is a fact that "the Methodist churches have tended to work on a highly centralised system", 8 therefore, by whatever name a Methodist superintendent be called, he has always had the power (though this has come to be greatly limited through the years) to station ministers in the respective charges. 9 Since the Methodist Church is an episcopal form of government, the control of the Church rests in the hands of the bishop, and it is clear that the leadership problem would be settled only by the selection of a bishop.

As regards the church structure, in organising the autonomous Korean Methodist Church in 1930, Korean Methodist Christians carefully tried to avoid the autocratic methods of government. 10 In keeping with this democratic trend they adopted the term episcopacy, election
of district superintendents, inclusion of laymen in the annual conference and on the committee of appointments, and other changes from traditional Methodist polity.

However, Richard T. Baker, a Methodist missionary in Korea, stresses that "the Methodist connection, with its episcopal polity was seized upon by the Japanese police for control through its top-down organisational structure". Here, in addition to its episcopal polity, we should not miss the fact that especially the leaders of Korean Methodists presented a sad record of defection. This problem will be examined further afterwards. (H. "Early Historical Experience").

In fact, all the democracy was set aside by 'the adoption of the new constitution' under police pressure in March 1941. The head of the church became a dictator and the independent Korean Methodist Church went into eclipse. Methodists were regimented under a t'ong-ni-sa or director-general, selected by the police for a term of four years. This director-general selected all district supervisors, the members of all central committees. He could dismiss pastors, suspend them from appointment, or cancel their ministerial qualifications at will. The annual conferences were dissolved. That mass arrests during World War II were less among the Methodists than among other denominations showed the fact that the Methodist church was fully under control. By contrast, in the spring of 1942 many Presbyterian ministers were imprisoned, some forced to resign.

3. The Presbyterian Church

As regards church structure, the Presbyterian synodal type, generally of Reformed tradition, is characterised by the fact that the organisation is constituted by a hierarchy of assemblies and councils,
which rests on the base of the parish, the basic cell of the church.\textsuperscript{1} 

The parish is administered by a Presbyterian council which often has the prerogative at least of choosing the pastor and recommending his nomination. Above the parish there are elected national and regional consistorial assemblies, composed of both laymen and clergy.

Generally, the Presbyterian polity has been called democratic and anti-episcopalian: democratic in the sense that it rests on the people, the members of the parishes; anti-episcopalian in the sense that the presidents of the various executive councils are elected for terms, and are presidents only in their councils, hence they do not have an intrinsic authority.

According to Moberg, the Presbyterian Church is an example of 'Presbyterian' polity. Presbyterian polity is dominated in theory by the constituent church bodies, but in fact by the clergy who control the denomination's synods or presbyteries and comprise a hierarchy of ecclesiastical oligarchs.\textsuperscript{2} Elders in the local church tend to exercise a similar aristocratic type of control. In Moberg's view, in the Presbyterian Church, authority flows out from the middle level of elders and presbyters (ministers) to both the lower level of the local church and the higher level of the denomination.\textsuperscript{3}

In the case of the Presbyterian church polity in Korea, the Presbytery adopted the Presbyterian form, which provides three courts; an individual church is governed by the session, which is composed of the minister and the elders elected by the members of the church; the Presbytery is a higher court composed of the ministers and elders from sessions within a defined district; while the General Assembly, the highest court in the Presbyterian Church, is composed of ministers and elders elected by the Presbytery.\textsuperscript{4} With regard to the relationship of the foreign missionaries to the Korean Church, the form of government
provided that:

Ordained foreign missionaries working in connection with the Presbyterian Church of Korea shall be members of the Presbytery and of the General Assembly, but, in respect to discipline and appointment by the parent Churches and their Missions, shall remain under the parent Churches by whom they were commissioned. Their connection as full members shall cease when by a two-thirds vote of their number, they think it wise to withdraw, at which time the Supreme Court shall determine their relation to it as may seem best.3

It should be noted in this context that, in the 1930s, unlike Methodist missionaries who had already lost their control over the Korean Methodist Church and mission schools, Presbyterian missionaries were not only voicing their opinion in educational work, but also in church circles.6 In 1938, the Presbyterian General Assembly meeting in P'yŏngyang was so under the control of the police that it approved attendance at the shrine unanimously. But this did not prevent some eight or ten missionaries from very briefly stating their opposition to the measure. A serious rift opened between the Korean church and the missionaries.7 The missionaries denounced the assembly for its action and, as legal owners of the mission schools, voted to close the schools rather than allow their students to participate in Shintō rituals. This exemplifies the strong authority of missionaries regarding government of the Korean Presbyterian Church in 1938. Moreover, the missionaries took the lead in the Non-Shrine Worship Movement afterwards.8 Seven of the 60 leaders of the SPU were missionaries. B.F. Hunt was assigned to be the leader of the Movement in Manchuria. In brief, the fact that ordained foreign missionaries in the Presbyterian Church of Korea still retained membership of the Presbytery and of the General Assembly at the critical time of 1938 should be considered in the discussion of the different positions between the Methodist and the Presbyterian Church with regard to the
As regards the Presbyterian polity, two other points can be pointed out. Given that the individual church (parish) is the basic cell of the Presbyterian Church and the Church rests on the members of the individual church, we can assume that the decision of the General Assembly, the highest court, is not as influential as in the case of the Methodist Church. Here we can recall the fact that, after the approval of the General Assembly of 1938, Presbyterian ministers and laymen opposed the action of the General Assembly and, finally, under the leadership of the Rev. Chu Ki-ch'ol, launched the Non-Shrine Worship Movement independently.

In similar vein, unlike the episcopal polity which had the top-down organisational structure, the local presbyteries of the Presbyterian Church in Korea, with a looser democratic organisation, were not so easily controlled by the Japanese police. For example, in 1938, while 17 Presbyteries, including the biggest P'yôngbuk Presbytery, were controlled by the police, six Presbyteries did not submit to the government on the matter of the shrine worship.

D. World View

1. The Catholic Church

As for the attitude towards 'the world' in general, that is, the world view, the outlook of the Korean Catholic Church from the persecution period up to the eve of Vatican II (1962) was extremely homogeneous. The Four Great Persecutions took place in 1801, 1839, 1846, and 1866, whereby Catholic scholars - the initial converts - invariably gave up their rank and assumed humble trades, especially that of potter, in remote villages. During the long persecutions,
Korean Catholics had withdrawn into scattered rural ghettos, far from the mainstream of the nation's life.²

Given that religious experience itself stimulates the development of characteristic attitudes towards the world in general and towards society in particular, to clarify the world view of the Korean Church in the 1930s requires an examination of the major themes and tendencies of the official Catholic prayerbook, Sŏnggyo Konggwa (The Prayerbook of the Holy Church).³ Between 1886 (the French treaty) and 1968 (the year of publication of the new prayerbook, Sŏnggyo Konggwa) the prayerbook went through at least 40 printings and served as the spiritual guidebook of nearly every Korean Catholic of that period. It should be noted that little evolution took place in the text between 1886 and 1966.

The prayerbook was by no means unorthodox, and parallels to it could easily be found in Europe and America during the 19th century.⁴ In the prayerbook God is seen as an absolute monarch whose main interest is to preserve his own power. The violation of the least prescription of the complex legal system God has 'imposed' on man seems to be interpreted as a slight to his royal dignity, demanding severe and exact punishment. Certainly, Korean Catholics had ample experience of earthly kings and yangban who inflicted severe punishments precisely because they saw their power threatened. With this the Confucian background of the Church's founders should be borne in mind. The extension of this to their idea of God was the most natural thing for simple people with limited sources of information about their religion. In this respect it is noteworthy that, although the initial converts were scholars, this situation changed as Catholics fled to rural villages. Many later converts came from low social origins and included numerous widows, orphans, and outcasts.
Catholicism remained a religion of farmers and potters. In addition, throughout the prayerbook the virtues most emphasised are those of 'conformity', such as obedience, humility, and filial piety, and those of 'withdrawal', such as virginity and silence. The emphasis on conformity, it seems clear, is in accord with the monarchical conception of God and the hierarchical conception of the Church, while the emphasis on withdrawal is the logical corollary of the negative conception of the world. The negative attitude towards the world and great stress on eschatology in the Korean Catholic Church emerged from the persecution period. The present study will deal with this point later. (H. "Early Historical Experience"). Signally absent is the balancing reference to the virtues of 'freedom' and 'involvement', i.e., the virtues required for the exercise of independent rational judgement, responsible freedom, courage to challenge social injustice, etc.

It was this interpretation of Catholicism, then, that was presented to Korean Catholics for their belief and practice during the formative years of the Korean Church. For the most part, of course, it was not Korean but was, in fact, a distilled and selected version of the popular theology current in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries. Much of it was, in fact, written by European missionaries, starting with the Jesuit pioneers in China. We must examine the religious environment in which the European expressions of Catholicism took root, the pre-existing framework of religious world views which determined Korean's basic religious values.

It is important to stress in the present context that Roman Catholic missionaries in Korea before 1911 (a German mission was founded in that year) all came from France. At the turn of the 20th century, the French MEP enjoyed a complete monopoly of Catholic
missionary work. Thus we can assume that it was the French Catholics' religious world views which, to a great extent, determined Korean's basic religious values. The French missionaries in the Far East were innately conservative and unwilling to pioneer in the manner that their Jesuit forebears had done. Their conservatism resulted not only from the theology of culture but also from the position in which Catholics found themselves in French society at that time.

The Catholic view of culture, traditionally enunciated by Saint Thomas Aquinas, assisted in the dual approach. It consisted of a twofold view of the world, in which nature and grace, reason and revelation, the world and the Church, each stood in hierarchical relation to the other. The two areas were autonomous and separate, but did not oppose each other. So, as for the attitude towards government, from the New Testament onwards, the Catholic Church has upheld a high conception of the right of governments to be obeyed, and sees civil society as ordained by God as the natural framework of human life. The Church recognises that civil society exists in its own right, and that those who come to hold authority are themselves the judges of what policies they will pursue; "The Catholic Church strives always to render unto government the things that are governments". The Church is exceedingly slow and reluctant to say anything which could trouble the minds of the faithful about their duty as citizens, or about indicating to individuals that they should refuse to obey a command of their government.

As for the posture of Catholics in post-revolutionary France, French Catholics first supported the revolution of 1848 but later, terrified by the socialism of its leaders, they became overnight the conservative party and supported the counter-revolutionary coup of Louis Napoleon. During the Third Republic the Roman Catholic party
was mainly 'monarchist'. Their political views moved steadily to the right. 16

The French MEP in the Far East had the same close ties with government and the armed forces that Catholics maintained at home. So L.G. Paik, an authority on the history of missions in Korea, wrote: "As in Vietnam, Korea saw the French missionaries as the forerunners of French imperialism and the priests as the pilots of the gun boat". 17 Because they identified with their government, they were accustomed to deal directly with governments.

Under the supervision of the conservative French fathers, the Roman Catholics in Korea, unlike the Presbyterians, lacked as much strength to confront the government, and therefore had fewer conflicts with the Japanese administration. 18 The following report by one officer of the Government General of Chōsen supports this:

Scarcely a single Korean follower of the Roman Catholic mission, the English Church, the Salvation Army and certain other denominations was arrested or imprisoned, for the simple reason that members of these missions stood aloof from politics and took no part whatever in the disturbances. 19

In sum, as far as Korean Catholics' world view during the formative years is concerned, passivity and obedience to authority, already "virtues" highly valued in the post-reformation Catholicism brought from Europe, especially France, were reinforced by an almost identical emphasis in Confucianism.

2. The Methodist Church

The dominant theme of the Methodist world view was 'evangelical pietism', an attitude at once complex and contradictory. 1 In order to understand Methodist political attitudes, it is necessary to examine evangelical pietism as the moral structure of Methodist politics. The
constant element in the attitude of Methodists, who followed a more humanistic or Arminian tradition, was the attempt to define the issue of secular politics, particularly power politics, in 'moral' terms. 2 This attempt could be termed 'evangelical pietism'. 3 In terms of this pietist viewpoint, all secular conflicts over matters of power are treated as epiphenomena of basic moral issues emanating from the character of men as individuals.

Historically, the position of medieval Christianity in relation to the state as a whole shifted its centre of gravity from a complete abomination of the existing Roman Empire to complete indifference to the state, and hence passive sufferance of the use of force, which was deemed to be unrighteous in every case. 4 For the latter position, this entailed active compliance with all the coercive obligations imposed by the state, e.g., the payment of taxes which did not directly imperil religious salvation. In Max Weber's view, the true intent of the New Testament verse about "rendering unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's" (Romans 13:1) is not the meaning deduced by modern harmonising interpretations, namely, a positive recognition of the obligation to pay taxes, but rather the reverse; an absolute indifference to all the affairs of the mundane world.

Two other viewpoints were possible: One entailed withdrawal from concrete activities of the political community, because and insofar as such participation necessarily led to sin, and the other position evaluated the authority of the state, even when exercised by unbelievers, due to our responsible sins, as an indispensable instrument for the social control of reprehensible sins and as a general condition for all mundane existence pleasing to God. 5

Of these four points of view, according to Weber, the first two mentioned belong primarily to the period of eschatological
expectation, but occasionally they came to the fore even in a later period. As far as the last of the four is concerned, ancient Christianity did not really go beyond it in principle, even after it had been recognised as the state religion.

In this respect, it should be pointed out that the 'general' schema according to which Christianity customarily solves the problem of the tension between Christian values (religious ethics) and secular politics (the non-ethical or unethical requirements of life) is to 'relativise' and 'differentiate' ethics into an organic ethic of vocation and a contrasting ascetic ethic. Thus, historically, 'evangelical pietism', under the influence of the last of the four positions - here used loosely to denote an ascetic movement of inner spiritual conviction which swept over Europe and America during the eighteenth century - attempted first of all, to change the world by converting individuals within it, but it also maintained the world by giving tacit or open support to legitimate politics. Secondly, it compartmentalised religion and politics, while occasionally lending support to moral campaigns whose aim was to clean up political life.

Korean Methodism has shown the same features of evangelical pietism: firstly, it is widely agreed that evangelism has been and is notably successful in the Methodist churches. As far as we can trace the origin of the revival, the evangelistic movement in Korean mission history was begun in 1903 by a group of missionaries of the Methodist Mission. American Methodist missionaries of Puritanic zeal and Wesleyan fervour felt keenly the estrangement between the Japanese and Korean people, which seemed to presage a general uprising. There was every reason for the pietistic missionaries to avoid such an occurrence. In L.G. Paik's view, "they not only understood the hopelessness of fighting for the lost cause but foresaw
the danger of making the younger Christian Church a political agency." 1

In this context, it is widely admitted that missionaries were successful in 'de-politicising' the Korean Christians through mass revival meetings. 12 Missionaries were against the participation of Korean Christians or churches in the political (anti-Japanese) movement. In fact, they endeavoured to thwart such anti-Japan struggles, which were mostly led by enlightened Christians by all available means. 13 Thus the policy of non-involvement towards Korea's internal politics initially contributed to friendly and even cordial relations with the colonial government; the missionaries merely accepted the Japanese administration as the powers that be.

Secondly, as regards the principle of separation between religion and politics, most leading missionaries of the Methodist Church, supporting this principle avowedly under the tradition which usually compartmentalises religion and politics, made every effort to support evangelism and moral campaigns. 14

According to Bryan S. Turner and Michael Hill, in evangelical pietism, once simple withdrawal from overt support for and interest in secular politics becomes impracticable, then two reactions become possible: support for existing governments or an attempted moral coup. 15 When applying this to the Korean Methodist case of the Shinto Shrine issue, we can safely say that, among other Christian denominations, the pietistic Methodist Church and Christians, especially their missionary and native leaders, preponderantly supported the Japanese government and at the same time launched the Evangelistic Campaign in the 1930s. For example, M.B. Stokes, a leading Methodist missionary contributed an article "Personal Evangelism and the Korean Church" in The Korean Mission Field
Attacking the forces of materialism and atheism, he advocated:

Efficient preaching of the Gospel to individuals is most urgent ... How can we stir up in the Korean Church the spirit of evangelism again? This is our problem, the problem of the missionary as well as of the Korean leader. I am wholeheartedly behind the present plan for the Evangelistic Campaign in Korea ... We need a fresh Pentecost in Korea today. Again she must go through the purifying fire of the Holy Ghost.

In brief, the pietistic Methodist Church, with the principle of separation between religion and politics, stressed spiritual questions and tended to avoid conflict over temporal issues. The pietists thought that "no human action can accelerate the coming of the kingdom, but man should prepare himself for its coming". They placed the emphasis upon religious sentiment. In the community of the pietists, one attitude towards the world is apparent: "the recognition of the tremendous importance of charismatic gifts of the spirit". The world will remain as it is until the Master comes again. Thus the individual is required to abide in his position and in his calling, subordinated to the ruling authority.

3. The Presbyterian Church

In the sphere of world view in relation to the state, the Presbyterian Church in Korea, under the influence of strong Calvinistic tradition, showed a somewhat 'radical' aspect. When the contents of the confession of faith that the new church adopted at its first session in 1907, the confession was borrowed from the Presbyterian Church of India, with the exception of the example. The new church adopted the Westminster Confession of Faith and the Larger and Shorter Catechism as worthy exponents of the Word of God. The new church also adopted the Westminster Shorter Catechism. The
Confession itself consisted of 12 articles of strong Calvinistic trend. It affirmed the sovereignty of God, the deity, procession of the Holy Spirit, the predestination of men, the irresistibility of grace, a belief in sacraments, bodily resurrection, and final judgement. By adopting this Confession, a formula of belief was legislated for the people and given them in a finished form without waiting for an expression of growing Christian experience. Thus, here we can affirm that the new church was in the prevalence of a strong Calvinistic tradition in which the Reformed faith was motivated and informed by central attention to Scripture.

As regards political spirit, the two Confessions - Lutheranism and Calvinism - differ fundamentally. Lutheranism, in its conception of the Law of Nature, is thoroughly conservative; and in its complete confidence in God's providence it regards the powers called into being in the natural course of things as ipso facto instituted by God and commissioned to be the protectors of the justitia civilis. Lutheranism is thus far politically favourable to absolutism, but, on the whole, is essentially conservative and politically neutral. Quite different was the development of the political spirit of Calvinism. Generally speaking, its state-adaptation of the Law of Nature is at bottom also conservative; it prefers a modified aristocracy, as is not surprising in view of its original connection with the Genevan republic, and the prominence which it gives to the aristocratic idea of predestination. But in its great struggles with the Catholic governments which proscribed the pure word of God, that is to say, the Huguenot, Netherlandish, Scottish, and English struggles. In Ernest Troeltsch's view, "Calvinism gave a much more radical development to its Law of Nature. It successfully established the principle of resistance, which must be
exercised on behalf of the Word of God in the face of ungodly authorities". The individual is required to resist the ruling authority, "where it commands him to perpetrate a sinful deed".

When applying this principle of resistance to the Presbyterian martyr's case when faced by the demand of Japanese shrine worship, the faithful could not but resist the ungodly authority and its crude religio-nationalism. In this respect, Lee Kun Sam, using the Protocols on the martyrs, pointed out appropriately the major motives for the Christian resistance (mostly Presbyterians) in Korea, which have been widely accepted: a) Obedience to the Commandments of God and Love for the Church; b) Eschatological Expectation and Personal Commitment to Christ's Kingship; c) Uncompromising Witness to Divine Truth and Christian Responsibility to the Church and State; d) The High Estimate of Martyrdom and the Glory of God.

In order to understand the motives fully, however, we should possess some knowledge of the Korean church's 'futuristic dispensationalism' in connection with 'syncretism'. Generally, dispensationalists seek to understand God's dealings with man in terms of 'them'. All of them believe that we now live in a time before the tribulation which will precede the end of this world and before the millennium (Christ's reign of 1,000 years); and that the 'rapture' of the church, when Christ will take all its members into heaven, will occur without warning and without the knowledge of the world. The viewpoint holds to the consistent use of normal, plain or literal interpretation of Scripture.

It should be pointed out in this context that historically the Bible had a special place with the 'mass' of Korean Christians, especially Presbyterians. We can assume that they liked the Bible much better than the rigid doctrines developed in and for the West.
With this J.S. Gale, a Presbyterian missionary, made an interesting thesis:

The Oriental mind, whether possessed by literati, or coolie, is cast in the same mind. They all think alike in figures, symbols, pictures. For this reason, I believe that allegory and suggestive literature have a special place with them.

If we accept that "in mission countries the syntheses or rather simple amalgamations between the elementary forms of paganism and a poorly assimilated Christianity should be born so easily",\(^9\) then, it is not a surprising fact that one of the greatest stamps of any formal dispensational theological influence came in the early Korean church's concept of the Kingdom of God and in its adherence to the more simplistic rules of interpretation used by the system.\(^10\) As a result of 'superficial Christianisation' (Mehl's terms), the dispensational principle of exact literal interpretation and exact literal fulfilment of all prophetic promises would fit in very well in a church just discovering the Bible for the first time, a church ill-equipped to employ the resources of history, language and theology in the study of Scripture.\(^11\)

In this respect, the members of the Mount Zion sect (1944), the extremely pietistic, premillenarian (Adventist) sect drawn from the Northern Presbyterian Church, which showed the last, strongest resistance to the Japanese shrine demand in all Korea, seem to represent the futuristic dispensational approach properly. They, believing the Second Advent imminent on the basis of allegorical and dispensational interpretations especially of Daniel (O.T.) and the Revelation (N.T.), took their sons out of schools rather than have them receive a 'Babylonian education'. And furthermore, regarding World War II as the 'Armageddon'(Rev. 16:16), they prayed publicly for an Allied victory.\(^12\)
Generally, the purely religious interest is dominant in only a small minority of persons. In this sense the resisting individual missionaries, the SPU and the Zion Sect in the Presbyterian Church were good examples of the influence of purely religious ideas. They reflected to a large extent the teaching of Jesus in the New Testament regarding the attitudes towards power.

In Weber's view, Jesus held in general that what is most decisive for salvation is an absolute indifference to the world and its concerns. The kingdom of heaven is at hand; let man give the Caesar that which is Caesar's own - for what profit is there in such matters? The individual is required to abide in his position, subordinated to the ruling authority, save where it commands him to perpetrate a sinful deed.

From the foregoing attitude, only now can we understand that all the members of the SPU and the Zion Sect had admitted themselves to be subjects of the Japanese Empire, or subordinated to the ruling authority, but after 1938, when the Japanese authority commanded the Presbyterian Church to commit a sinful deed, i.e., shrine worship, they rose up and began to attack the legitimacy of State Shintoism on religious grounds rather than political grounds.

In the circles of Presbyterian missionaries, as a whole, Romans 13:1 was interpreted literally. This was clearly stated by the American board of the Presbyterian mission, the largest and most active missionary community in Korea: "Loyal recognition is, I believe, the sound position. It is in accord with the example of Christ, who loyally submitted himself and advised His apostles to submit themselves to a far worse government than the Japanese, and it is in line with the teaching of Paul in Romans 13:1 ("Let every person render obedience to the governing authorities; for there is no
authority except for God, and those in authority are divinely constituted). This sort of conservative Protestantism with regard to power should be emphasised in interpretations on the major motives for the individual missionaries, the SPU and the Zion Sect. The concern of Protestants to attack or to deny the legitimacy of absolute power has in many circumstances encouraged them to withdraw from the reality of power struggles. Thus we would maintain that the Non-Shrine Worship movement was a religious movement rather than a nationalistic movement.

E. Mission Policy

1. The Catholic Church

In general terms, the weak points of the early mission activity in the Roman Catholic Church were lack of adaptation, neglect in the formation of a native clergy, and too close a bond between church and state. With the emergence of Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide (SCPF) in 1622, missionary control was centralised in Rome, thus giving it a more international character. The 19th century witnessed a gradual recovery of the missionary enterprise, now firmly supervised by SCPF and zealously promoted by the Popes. Mission work achieved a universal character. At the beginning of the 20th century missiology began to receive attention in the Roman Catholic Church, thereby accomplishing the acceleration of the process of adaptation. 'Accommodation' in Roman Catholic missionary societies means 'attempts to adapt or assimilate the gospel easier for them' [the indigenous population]. In this respect, the three decades which followed 1914 were halcyon ones for the spread and consolidation of the Roman Catholic Church in non-Occidental lands.
The first and most prominent aspect of mission policy we can find in the Catholic Church is its interest in the Church itself. A papal policy has always had the interest of the church as its primary objective. Since the Roman Catholic bishopric of Rome traditionally thinks that the whole of the Church's foreign missionary work is clearly dependent upon the favour of secular Powers, the first purpose of the diplomacy of the Holy See is 'to watch over the spiritual interests of the Church', and the many and varied activities involved therein. This means that the Holy See will attempt to secure as favourable conditions as possible for the Catholic Church, as it exists and works in different countries. Here we can comprehend its 'practical' position. This position can be very clearly illustrated in the case of Poland:

Polish Catholics obey a Communist Government which is unrepresentative, but always with reservations of their own, seeking to maintain their rights as Catholics, the right, for instance, to see that their children inherit their religion, and are not forcibly indoctrinated with Marxism, which is also atheism, in the State schools. As the Church sees it, individual Polish Catholics should follow the leadership of the hierarchy, and the hierarchy will act prudently, making a 'practical' judgement about what is best in situations which are changing all the time ... There is a willingness on the part of the Church to tolerate acts of economic policy which are offensive to Catholic doctrine on property, if, in return, the Catholic Poles are not molested in the exercise of their religion. Provided acquiescence is never misunderstood as approval, these are the inevitable compromises with anti-Catholic governments.

The Roman Catholic Church, based on a hierarchical structure, has always been very well aware of the reality of power and in this sense it has been far more 'realistic' in recent times than has Protestantism, which is divided and its churches frequently confined to a particular nation or cultural area. Compared with Protestantism, Roman Catholicism would appear to be relatively
The second significant characteristic of Catholic mission policy is its worldwide policy of 'accommodation'. The Church, historically, has practised accommodation as a most important missionary technique. The Church never set up a barrier against any culture, against any legitimate custom or practice that had grown up from the native soil. She was always at pains to adapt herself to the particular genius of the nation she evangelised. But some Catholic scholars proclaimed that "accommodation as sanctioned and practised by the Church has nothing in common with syncretism", or: "The Catholic Church cannot accommodate herself in the domain of content of doctrine". In other words, they say, "Catholicism never fused with pagan religions", "It never compromised with polytheism, never surrendered any of its dogmatic and moral teachings", "The Church is neither indulgent nor indifferent to pagan beliefs", and so on. In spite of these complicated apologetics, it is an undeniable fact that the Church in her endeavour to spread the kingdom of Christ has always practised 'accommodation' as an important strategy.

In this respect it is sufficient to point out that 'accommodation' is the technical term used especially in Roman Catholic missionary circles. As a supporting example of the Church's accommodational character, we can stress the difference in mission policies on aboriginal customs between the Catholics and Protestants (especially Presbyterians). According to D.E. Walker's study on Nez Perce Acculturation (a northwestern North American Plateau Indian culture) (1968), Catholic policy on aboriginal customs differed markedly from that of the Presbyterians. While Presbyterians emphasised a complete break with past customs, e.g., aboriginal ceremonials composed of shamanism, tutelary spirits and sorcery, and
banned not only all that was non-Christian, but most that was obviously non-Euro-American, Catholic missionaries, showing a much greater tendency to retain an active approving interest in past customs, introduced very few organisational changes that affected everyday life, and in general emphasised a continuity with the Nez Perce past. 11

Incidentally, the 'universal' ('Catholic') Church, considering international politics because of the very interests of the Church, often produces ecclesiastical accommodating policies which are carried out on a 'worldwide' scale. 12 In this respect, by 1939, the Catholic Church settled one of the most burning missionary problems in the Far East: the permissibility of certain rites and ceremonies that are connected with "ancestor worship", the cult of Confucius, and State Shintoism. 13 According to the New Catholic Encyclopedia, five discernible currents brought about a "revisionist" policy by the Holy See: 1) the development of historical studies, through which modern problems of ethnic adaptation were re-evaluated in the light of similar situations facing Christianity in the Greco-Roman world; 2) a more ecumenical doctrine of grace and other spiritual forces latent in non-Christian peoples, such as those of the ancient religions of the East; 3) the rise of nationalisms in the East and their introduction into the mainstream of international politics; 4) a secularising of thought patterns; 5) formal declarations by high government representatives that state-prescribed acts of reverence, whatever their primitive origin and meaning, express today nothing of religious cult but only the national virtues of good citizenship. 14

As is well known, Matteo Ricci and the Pei-ching Jesuits, by believing that, if Christianity were to enter deeply into the life and feeling of China, it had to find points of contact with Confucianism,
served as the link between Europe and China for more than 100 years. However, the Rites Controversy ended their effectiveness. The Jesuits had approved the Chinese veneration of ancestors as merely 'civil' rites. Dominican and Franciscan friars, latecomers, accused the Jesuits and their converts of participating in pagan rituals and destroying essential monotheistic articles of faith. Eventually the Pope finally rejected the Jesuits with the bull *Ex illa die* in 1715. As a result, the Chinese emperor proscribed Christianity, and the local Chinese churches went underground.\(^\text{15}\) Similarly, in Korea the Catholic position on ancestor worship resulted in the first government persecution of Catholicism in 1791.\(^\text{16}\)

In the 20th century the challenge of the Chinese rites first thrust itself into the open in the wake of armed conquest and the creation in February 1932, under the tutelage of Japan’s expansionist authorities, of the short-lived state of Manchukuo. By its attempt to promote civic unity through the *Wang Tao* (Royal Way), the new government made the cult of Confucius obligatory on the native Catholics. On this a mission secretary writes:

> The Japanese in Manchuria look upon the Confucian shrines as the equivalent of their own Shinto ones in Korea, Formosa and Japan. They were chosen, first because they were actually in existence, and second, because they involved nothing new to the Chinese mind ... The services at the Confucian shrines in Manchuria are identical with those held at Shinto shrines in Korea.

Because of its extraordinary gravity, the [Manchurian] case was referred to the Pope, Pius XI (14 May, 1935). Rome’s decision on 28 May 1935 reflected its 'revisionist' policy of the 'era of enfranchisement' in regard to the rites the Church had outlawed for more than 200 years under stringent sanctions.\(^\text{18}\)

In concrete historical terms, after pronouncing the programme of toleration for Manchukuo (1935), a year later Pius XI, the Pope of the
Missions, gave further emphasis to the movement of harmonising Oriental traditions with Catholic culture when the far-reaching programme of permissions was promulgated with respect to certain ceremonial usages in imperial Shintoism as well as matrimonial, funeral, and other social customs, all hitherto under the Christian ban. By this time the principle of wider latitude of adaptation had become a settled policy.  

It is found applied, and in the same emphatic terms, to a particular case of funeral rites in the Belgian Congo (1938).

Here, however, in the case of Manchukuo and Japan, we should not minimise the influence of Japanese government pressure on the Roman decisions. As a matter of fact, the Japanese government had suggested establishing diplomatic relations with the Vatican as early as 1922, having realised during the First World War that "the Vatican is an excellent source of information".

According to Owen Chadwick, between October and the middle of 1937 the British regarded the Pope (Pius XI) as a man in Mussolini's pocket. This was 'a Fascist Pope'. After the Lateran treaty of 1929, especially since 1933 the relationship between the Fascist Italian government and the Church was cordial. This Fascist government saw the historic Church as a main part of the international influence of Italy, both in the past and in the contemporary world.

Pope Pius XI's personal experiences in Poland during the Russo-Polish war of 1920 left him with a hostility to Bolshevism and a conviction of its danger to a Christian Empire. This fear and enmity were reinforced by the terrible persecutions of innocent Catholic priests or nuns in Mexico and Spain. Many Italians believed that the only viable alternative to Mussolini's government in Italy was a Communist regime. For Italy the choice was between Fascism and
Communism.

On the invasion of Abyssinia by Mussolini in October 1935, the League of Nations regarded it as blatant and immoral aggression. In this context, E.H. Carr minuted on 27 November, 1935:

Everyone concerned in directing Vatican policy is (so far as we can discover) 'strongly Fascist in sympathy', so that that policy is bound to be tinged by a strong Italian bias. The most that can be expected, is that they will maintain a certain semblance of decency.25

When the Lateran treaty was concluded, the danger was foreseen that the predominantly Italian character of the Vatican might become suspect in more than one quarter, once it and the Italian government were reconciled. During the Second World War there was a feeling - not universal, but looming out again and again in the documents - that the Pope's organisation was but the international propaganda wing of Mussolini's policy.26

In 1935 Japan withdrew from the League of Nations and the next year joined Germany in a so-called anti-Communist pact. This was extended to the Tripartite Pact in 1940. By 1942, when it established diplomatic relations with Japan, the Vatican was now in full diplomatic contact with all the Axis Powers - but not with any of the Allies.27 There is indeed a certain affinity of spirit and method between the political totalitarianism and the authoritarian types of Christianity, e.g., Roman Catholic.28

Given that the Vatican finally established diplomatic relations with Japan in 1942 on her own account, we might say that the interests of Catholics themselves came before all others, including the rightness or wrongness of national causes.29 Who could believe that the decision of the Vatican was not inspired at all by any political considerations? In general terms, Roman Catholic effort tended to follow political interests rather than spiritual ideas except in the
In this context, from the Manchurian Incident (1931) to the end of the Second World War (1945), the position of the Roman Catholic Church was, in Koreans' eyes, 'collaboration':

In a surprising and very revealing development during the same period, the Roman Catholic Church reversed its position and in 1931 permitted the faithful to practice ancestor worship. The Church also took a conciliatory position with regard to the 1936 Japanese demand that all Koreans worship the Japanese gods in their Shinto shrines. The demand was stirring vehement opposition by patriotic Koreans. The standing of the Church in Koreans' eyes was seriously affected when Archbishop Marella, the Papal Ambassador to Japan, went so far as to recommend Shinto worship to the Church's Korean members. The Church was seen to collaborate with an unprecedented imposition by the imperialist Japanese government upon Korean national institutions.

The third distinguishable feature of Catholic mission policy is its lack of emphasis on educational institutions. Unlike the Protestants, even after the period of persecution, the Catholic Church in Korea did not emphasise schools. The reports on the Catholic educational work for 1923 show 166 elementary schools with 8,987 pupils in all taught by 363 teachers and one secondary school with 188 students and 9 teachers. These figures are contrasted with those of the Presbyterian missions (1923): 749 elementary schools with 40,702 pupils in all taught by 1,300 teachers and 42 secondary schools with 4,733 students and 219 teachers.

As a result of choosing not to emphasise schools, Catholics in Korea had fewer conflicts with the Japanese administration which had originally wanted to control the schools completely, especially after the Manchurian Incident. Similarly that there were not many children to be protected and educated seemed to influence the Church to conform to the government demand without hesitation.
2. The Methodist Church

On its side of mission policy among the Christian churches in Korea, the Methodist Missions emphasised philanthropic institutions, e.g., schools and hospitals. It is important to note in this context that in 1884 the veteran missionary to China and Japan, Robert S. Maclay, the "foster father" of the Korea Mission of the Methodist Episcopal Church, requested the king of Korea to permit them to open a school and undertake medical work in Korea. The king carefully examined the petition and in accordance with Maclay's request decided to authorise the Methodist Mission to commence hospital and school work in Korea. But this favourable decision contained no official permission to purchase or to rent property. Thus, Maclay, the then Superintendent of the Methodist Mission in Japan, asked the American Minister, Foote, to purchase a piece of property near the Legation. Upon his return to Japan, Maclay recommended that the Mission Board "begin educational and medical work, using no disguise as to the ultimate object being evangelisation", and added: "schools would be welcome, and hospitals are a necessity". He further assured the Board that there was no fear of opposition from the Korean government.

Thus the pioneer missionaries of the Methodist Church to Korea, in order to break down prejudice among the Koreans, built hospitals and dispensaries in different sections of the city, constructed one of the first prominent school buildings in the heart of the capital, and inaugurated extensive school work for girls. Among seven pioneer members, while five members devoted themselves to the institution work, only one worked as an evangelist. The Board increased the missionary force and budget as rapidly as resources at home would permit. Unlike the Presbyterian Missions, the Methodists put more money into philanthropic institutions. For example, according to
Charles D. Stokes' study (1947), the allocation of mission funds in 1927 between the Northern Methodist Missions and the Northern Presbyterian Missions (both occupying the same territories - northwestern areas) was as follows:  

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<th>Evangelical Work</th>
<th>Educational Work</th>
<th>Medical Work</th>
<th>Other Work</th>
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<td>The Northern Methodist Missions</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Northern Presbyterian Missions</td>
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The medical policy of the Methodists was extension, while the Presbyterians adopted the programme of concentration on hospital work and the training of Korean doctors. The Methodist medical work was started among the poorest class and carried on for the neediest.

Similarly, while most Presbyterian missionaries thought that education was to be reserved for Christians, the aim being not evangelisation but the production of a Christian elite, Methodist missionaries emphasised that education was to be supplied without discrimination to all who were desirous of receiving it; its aim was evangelisation. Thus we can note that between the Presbyterians and the Methodists there were 'the inner differences in the understanding of the nature of missionary work', which led to the wide variation in practice in the course of missionary history in Korea.

Here it is important to remember that nowhere could one better gauge the impact of 'liberalism' than in the field of religious education. In other words, we can assume that, among missionaries generally, educationists tend to be more liberal than evangelists. This assumption can be applied to the Presbyterian bodies: the
minority of the Missions who were strongly against the decision of school closing were 'liberal educationists', e.g., H.H. Underwood. Historically, as new knowledge was disseminated through education, the fundamentalist-modernist controversy in Protestantism in the 1920s often became one of the educated and worldly-wise versus the uneducated and unsophisticated. Educated people were more likely to be theologically liberal than those with little or no education.

In sum, the Methodist missionary's emphasis on institutions, especially on schools, was mainly the result of their broad and humanistic understanding of the nature of missionary work. The Methodist education missionaries and (some of the liberal missionaries of the Canadian Presbyterian Church) thought that education was to be applied without discrimination to all. They had originally emphasised its aim as 'evangelisation'. But later they gradually came to regard education as the most important work, irrespective of whether it was religious education or not. And "conversion", they thought, "is a by-product of education".

Now we can recognise the reasons why the Methodist Missions, unlike the Presbyterians, accepted Japanese pressure quietly with the edicts of the government regarding observances before the Shintō shrines for the mission schools. Firstly, the educationists as the majority group of the Missions did not see a great harm in shrine worship, because their credo of liberalism lacked interest in the worship. Secondly, as a more important reason, they would not, in fact, close their schools since, unlike the Presbyterians, education was everything to them.
3. The Presbyterian Church

The Korean American treaty of 1882 was silent on the matter of religious toleration. In L.G. Paik's view, "one of the features of the treaty which won the favour of the intolerant Korean officials may have been the absence of permission for religious propaganda". In this respect the Mission Board of Presbyterians, because of the unstable political situation and the impossibility of carrying on extensive mission work, did not increase the staff or appropriations until after 1890. Unlike the somewhat aggressive Roman Catholics and Methodists, Presbyterian missionary policy was conservative and cautious. The Presbyterians pursued the policy of maintaining the status quo and avoiding the opposition of the Korean conservative party. Thus they won favour with the government by acquiescing in its policy by the year 1890. On the other hand, the Methodists gradually gained the confidence of the populace through their philanthropic institutions.

On the matter of mission policy, after 1890 the Presbyterian Missions, first of all, emphasised 'conversion' or decision for Christ, as the aim of all Christian preaching and personal contacts as the most effective method of evangelisation. So Samuel A. Moffet, who had arrived in the field in 1890, underlined in 1909 that "the Mission and the Church have been marked pre-eminently by a fervent evangelistic spirit, a thorough belief in the Scriptures as the Word of God, and in the Gospel message of salvation from sin through Jesus Christ".

As Korea was one of the youngest Protestant foreign mission fields, missionaries had naturally used the methods that had been previously evolved elsewhere. Thus, from the beginning, the Presbyterian Mission Council in Korea adopted a written mission policy
as early as 1893. The most remarkable feature of the policy was its "mass line": "It is better to aim at the conversion of the working class than that of the higher class". Thus the Presbyterian missionaries consciously made the lower-class population and women and children their targets for evangelisation. And the "Nevius Method", named after John Nevius of the China field, was not popular in China but gained practically unanimous acceptance among the Korean missionaries, especially among the Presbyterians, after Nevius visited Seoul in 1890. In the principles of the "Nevius Method", it is widely accepted that one of the most important principles is: 'the Bible central in every part of the work', that is, the central emphasis on the Bible. In spite of the defects of the plan in terms of theological education, there is no disputing the fact that the Korean church grew most rapidly in precisely the 'northwestern' areas of the peninsula - which had traditionally shown more openness to change and new ideas than the southern areas - where the Nevius Plan was practised most faithfully.

The Bible is the fundamentalist's sole basis of faith and conduct. The Bible is believed to be the Word of God, not simply to contain it, as liberals contend. By its very nature fundamentalism resists changes in doctrine and contends for the truth. In this sense, essentially, "the fundamentalist mentality is that of a closed and authoritarian mind". Emphasising the letter more than the spirit of the Word, fundamentalists do not attempt to reform society through a social gospel as modernists did. Instead the Bible becomes a "paper pope" to fundamentalists. Appealing to the emotions and conscience with the assurance of strong faith, fundamentalists often make more progress in evangelism than liberals, who lack the zeal and fervour of a dogmatic message related to a theory of history in which
people can find comfort and security in times of anxiety and confusion.\textsuperscript{12} 

By the Nevius Plan, though the Christian message had to be oversimplified for the mass of new Korean believers, missionaries were able to gain many 'true believers' among the Korean masses. It is important in this context to point out that John Ross, of the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland, had translated the New Testament into Han'gul (Korean script), the language of the common people, as opposed to that of the nobility, who preferred the use of Chinese. The conservative missionaries did emphasise memorisation of biblical passages and following the letter of the scripture; thereby the common people of Korea, who were the first to learn Korean script and the first to be awakened by Christian literature, became dogmatic literalists in their Christian belief.\textsuperscript{13} The term "fighting fundamentalist", is a direct outgrowth of the controversial, negativistic spirit in fundamentalism.\textsuperscript{14} It has been called a "stubborn religion" which is "a twentieth-century movement of protest and unrest; it is apocalyptic, prophetic, critical of modern life and apprehensive of the future".\textsuperscript{15} Authoritarian dogmatism gives evangelism a clear objective: to lead people to accept Jesus Christ as Saviour. In short, the "mass line" and the "Nevius Plan" in Korea contributed to the strength of the Presbyterian Church under persecution.\textsuperscript{16} And during the Japanese religious persecution it was the mass of 'true' believers, mostly dogmatic literalists in their Christian belief, who remained most faithful to their belief to the end.

Incidentally, from the beginning, the Presbyterian missionaries (except a liberal minority) in Korea understood education was to be reserved for Christians. In other words, they thought that the aim of
education in missionary work was not evangelisation but the production of Christian elite. Therefore, for a considerable period in the history of P'yŏngyang Union Christian College, in which, though several missions co-operated, the work was chiefly supported by the Northern Presbyterians, no non-Christian students were admitted; the policy was confessedly "narrow" in the sense that it sought to serve the Christian community only and to attain a single objective rather than offer a broader selection. 17

George S. McCune of Northern Presbyterian Mission, president of Union Christian College, refused to take his pupils to the Shintō shrine. Consequently, he was removed as president in 1936 and the P'yŏngyang mission schools were closed in March of 1938; and in May of that year the Board of Foreign Missions in New York directed that all Presbyterian schools in Korea be closed. 18 But it was in 1941-1942 that the final school relationship was severed by the "Northern" Presbyterian Mission, five to six years after the initial action taken. By contrast, it is to be noted that the "Southern" Presbyterian Mission decided in late 1935 to withdraw, and by September 1937, the last of the ten mission schools had been closed.

Part of the reason for the delay on the part of the "Northern" Mission seems to have been the hesitancy of the home Board, whose liberal policy of education, unlike the conservative Korea Mission, had been directed at non-Christians as well as Christians, in supporting the Korea Mission policy against the Shrine. 19 According to Lee Kun Sam, "the modernist-influenced mission board in New York did not see great harm in shrine worship". 20 Thus Bruce F. Hunt and some missionaries in the "Northern" Mission eventually withdrew from the Korea Mission for this and other reasons. 21

From the foregoing discussion, we can say that the inner
differences in the understanding of the nature of education as a mission work was an important factor for individual missionaries and Mission Boards in deciding whether to close mission schools or not.\textsuperscript{22} The confessedly 'narrow' policy for education on the part of the extremely conservative, that is, fundamentalistic missionaries of the Presbyterian Church is contrasted with the submission of the liberal missions such as the Methodist and the United Church of Canada Missions to the Japanese pressure. Their schools, which had been supplied without discrimination, were allowed to remain open.

F. Relationship to Nationalism

1. The Catholic Church

With regard to the relationship to nationalism, in general, Roman Catholicism seems to be 'dubious'. The Roman Catholic Church, which had been a loyal ally of colonialism, struggled intensely with the Rhodesian State between 1959 and 1979 under the impact of African nationalism.\textsuperscript{1} Catholicism is an important ingredient in Latin American nationalism.\textsuperscript{2} Nevertheless, in the context of colonial Korea, in contrast to the Protestant missions, which were the focal points of resistance, the Catholics tried to remain 'neutral',\textsuperscript{3} or took a 'conciliatory' position.\textsuperscript{4} While half of the 33 signers of the 1919 Independence Declaration were Protestants, none was Catholic. According to the religious affiliation of those arrested between March and December 1919 (total 19,525), while Presbyterians constituted 12.7 percent (2,486) - the majority - and Methodists gained 2.9 percent (518), Catholics were only 0.3 percent (55).\textsuperscript{5} In 1919, at the time of the Independence Movement, the Catholic Church had 44 foreign missionaries, 23 Korean priests, 93 nuns, and 88,000
members. So the Japanese officials publicly admitted that members of Catholic missions stood aloof from politics.

If we review the early history of Christian missions in Korea, we can find a difference in the attitudes towards the Korean government of the Yi dynasty between Catholic missions and Protestant missions. It is widely accepted that, whereas the Protestants (particularly Presbyterians) were pro-Korean government, the Catholics, remaining a religion of farmers and potters in the rural areas since the persecutions, were not pro-Yi government. The Roman Catholic Church’s emphasis upon loyalty to a foreign ecclesiastical institution caused understandable alarm among the Korean rulers. Their political activities were perhaps the most undesirable features of the missionary proselytising methods of Roman Catholics. Following the advice of their teachers, the Korean converts did not hesitate to engage in political activities. They not only deceived officers of their government, but also violated the law of the land. After the persecution of 1801 Alexander Hwang, a convert, wrote a letter to the bishop of Pei-ching proposing that the Roman Catholic nationals of Europe send armed troops to conquer Korea and make it safe for Catholicism. The work of the Catholic mission progressed more favourably after the French-Korean treaty (1886), but the Korean government officials’ antagonistic attitude towards the French missionaries continued.

Similarly, it should be mentioned that from the foundation of the Catholic Church in 1784 no attempt was made to translate a single Gospel or any portion of the Bible into Han’gŭl (Korean alphabet), and so the converts were untaught of the Scripture. The Bible had never been translated into Korean in toto, and until the 1960s only the New Testament was available in Korean. The renaissance of Han’gŭl by
the Protestant missionaries (the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland) formed the basis of a new vernacular literature closely associated with a reformist nationalist movement. The father of this new national literature was a convert to Protestantism, So Chae-p'il who established the first newspaper, Tongnip sinmun, or "Independence News", issued three times weekly in English and Korean.

In a series of discussions held at Sogang University in November 1968, in which a broad spectrum of the Catholic Church was represented, it was unanimously pointed out that Catholic life in Korea has several distinctive features which form, as it were, the spiritual ethos of Korean Catholicism. Among such features the following are noteworthy with regard to their relationship to nationalism: intellectual stagnation, indifference to social problems, lack of moral leadership for the Korean society at large, and the consequent general isolation of the Church from the mainstream of life.

As Min Kyong-suk has stressed with great insight, for the years since 1886 (the Korean-French treaty), histories literally do not say a word on the presence of the Catholic Church in Korean society at large; it is as though the Church had withdrawn from the scene of Korean history altogether. Church histories do record a few incidents of persecution, especially in Cheju Island around the turn of the century, but apart from such incidents the history of the Korean Catholic Church since 1886, as it is recorded in Church histories, is mainly a history of bishops, priests, religious congregations, and convert statistics. References to the presence of the Church in the larger society are conspicuously absent. In view of the fact that the period since 1886 has been perhaps the most turbulent period in the history of modern Korea such
absence is greatly significant.

It is to be noted here that in contrast to the early period, when Koreans took the initiative in introducing Catholic doctrine, the Korean Church leadership passed for the most part to French missionaries after the treaty imposed by the French government upon the Korean government in 1886, granting freedom of religion. In the case of French missionaries, their attitudes to the political authorities in Korea were from the French government. The French MEP was closely allied to the development of French expansionism in Asia. Although many Christian missionaries could be accused of confusing their religion with their nation, this confusion seems to have been particularly acute with the French Catholics. During the 19th century all communications between Rome and Pei-ching had to pass through Paris. This situation was made worse in that for a long time (1831-1911) the French missionaries were the only representatives of the Catholic Church, which was not the case with the Protestant churches.

For example, when the Russians withdrew from Sŏul on April 25, 1898, they manipulated matters in such a way that a large number of Frenchmen were placed in government positions. Dr. Arthur Judson Brown, of the Foreign Mission Board of the Northern Presbyterian Church, who visited Korea in 1901, reported: "All these Franco-Russian schemes are materially aided by the Roman Catholic Church in Korea ... The relations between the French political plans and the French Catholic mission are very close. The Legation and the missionaries work together so openly that the typical priest is commonly believed to be a quasi-political French emissary". Under the domination of the French missionaries, who were incapable of distinguishing between their apostolic mission and their
nationalism, when the Japanese annexed Korea in 1910, unlike Protestant missions, the Catholics tried to remain neutral. During the period of the Japanese occupation of Korea the Catholic Church lost vigour and became dormant.\textsuperscript{28} Thus after the Independence Movement of 1919 there were leaflets sent to members of the Catholic Church, which by order of the Pope took a negative attitude towards the Movement, saying, "Although the Pope is your leader from a religious point of view, from a racial point of view are you not brothers and sisters of men and women of the Korean race who were massacred by the Japanese?"\textsuperscript{29} When the Japanese government insisted that Christians perform Shintō rites, the Church naturally went to mollify the government.\textsuperscript{30} During World War II the reigning French bishop at Taegu was forced to resign in favour of the Japanese priest Father Hayasaka.\textsuperscript{31} The Vatican appointed a Korean bishop in 1946, and the Catholic churches of the Taegu region have been under Korean control ever since.\textsuperscript{32}

2. The Methodist Church

As regards the relationship with nationalism, the missionary attitude of the Methodist Church in Korea to the political authorities in the mission field during the colonial period, as a whole, was from the Japanese colonial government. With this we should note that those who reacted most strongly against the anti-Japan movement by the Korean Church and individual Christians were missionaries, especially the Methodists.\textsuperscript{1} For example, two Methodist missionaries - G.H. Jones and W.B. Scranton - called on the Japanese Resident-General Itō Hirobumi at his residence to say that the rumours that among Christian missionaries there were some who did not like the policies of the resident-general were simply false accusations stemming from some
Korean's ill feelings towards missionaries. They then expressed their sincere concurrence, on behalf of the missionaries, with the resident-general's policies aimed at enlightening the Korean people. As a result the three leading missionaries (Jones, Scranton and Harris) were threatened with death after the Methodist missionaries rejected the Koreans' request for assistance in their campaign to oppose the Japanese protectorate of Korea (1905).

The individual Christians in the Methodist Church had been associated with a new nationalism until the March First 1919 Independence Movement, but since the 1920s they remained within the precincts of the church, refusing to take part in the anti-Japan national movement. Under the influence of pro-Japanese missionaries, individual Methodist Christians were less active than the Presbyterians in participating in the anti-Japan national movement. In the Korean Conspiracy Case (October 1911) fabricated by the Japanese rulers who had intended to crack down on the Sinmin-hoe - an anti-Japan independence organisation formed chiefly of Christian leaders of the northwestern area, where Christian influence was especially strong - among the 123 arrested, 86 were Presbyterians and only eight were Methodists. The most prominent of the arrested, Yun Chi-ho (T.H. Yun), a leading Methodist educator and one of the respected Christian national leaders, gave up anti-Japanese struggles because of the torture he suffered and became pro-Japanese. And in the case of the March First 1919 Independence Movement, while Presbyterians constituted 12.7 percent (2,486, the majority) of those arrested (total 19,525) in 1919, Methodists were only 2.9 percent (518). In fact, among 33 signers in the Korean Declaration of Independence 15 were Christians, of whom nine were Methodists. But it is noteworthy in this context that among the nine Methodist signers
there were Chung Choon-Soo (Chŏng Ch'ŏn-su) and Pak Hi-do, who later became the most notorious defectors.

One thing that should not be overlooked in connection with this sudden change of posture in some Methodist leaders is that Korean leaders, in particular leading Christians, misunderstood the principle of national self-determination that the then United States President Wilson had advanced. The principle was intended chiefly to call on European countries to maintain a power balance among themselves. Korean Christians, however, had pinned excessive expectations on the principle, wishfully believing that Wilson would work for the independence of Korea. This wishful thinking, especially among the leading Methodist Christians, was one of the stimulants of the March First Independence Movement of Korea. Wilson, however, gave no word of support for the Koreans' struggle for national independence, although they struggled for nearly one year. In brief, the Koreans' independence struggles, for which they shed so much blood, were completely ignored in the international community, especially by the United States of America government. We can affirm this ignorance in the report on United States Policy Regarding Korea (declassified in 1982):

All appeals received during 1919 from Korean nationalist leaders in the United States for assistance and recognition of the "Republic of Korea" were filed by the Department of State without acknowledgement ... Korean nationalists endeavoured to have the American Delegation to the Washington Arms Conference (1921-1922) take up the questions of Korean independence at the Conference. The American Delegation, however, ignored this plea.

When their struggles were ignored by the United States, which they had expected would support their movement, the public's departure, especially conscientious youths, from the church as a new phenomenon began. Furthermore, at the same time, the ignorel
by the United States and Western Christian countries undoubtedly contributed, in the Korean Methodist circles, to the formation of an anti-missionary spirit in the course of various attempts to form a new national Church. In this context, we can note a historical link between newly gained national identity and anti-Westernism in younger churches.

Historically, the Methodist leaders - Chŏng Ch'ŏn-su, Sin Hŭng-u, Pak Hi-do - who had been strongly Western missionaries for their implantation of divisions among the churches there, consequently formed the autonomous Korean Methodist Church in 1930, led the movement of 'Japanisation of Christianity' in 1938 on the plea of 'Orientalising of Western orthodox Christian tradition'. In Pak Sun-gyŏng's critical view, the Methodist leaders' legitimation of the Japanisation of Christianity reflected nothing other than the mere change of their 'master': from Western Power (Christianity) to non-Western Power (Japan).

3. The Presbyterian Church

As regards the relationship to nationalism, it is widely acknowledged that the Korean Christians of the Presbyterian Church played a key role in the anti-Japan nationalist movement. Most assassinations carried out after 1906 involved Christians of the northwestern areas. The assassins of Itō Hirobumi in October 1909, of D.W. Stevens, a pro-Japanese American adviser to the Korean government, in San Francisco in March 1908, and the would-be assassin of Yi Wan-yong, the Korean prime minister in December 1909, were Christian converts.

During the period of 1897-1906 the number of Korean Christians
expanded greatly.² The rise of the Church was doubtless helped by the political turmoil and social disorder of the time. People needed something to ease the frustrations caused by the ineptitude of their own government and the ascendancy of the Japanese. Christianity was very important as an alternative to the other great force for change - Japan.³ As such, Christianity gathered strength and support from Koreans who used church institutions as havens from the Japanese. The church was rapidly transformed into an anti-Japanese instrument. As D.N. Clark has noted, when Japan ruled Korea, conditions combined to neutralise the contradictions between nationalism and Christianity that existed at the same time in China.⁴ Patriotism backed by religion is strong indeed. This may be the reason why the Presbyterians were so powerful in the whole of North Korea (more than a quarter of all the missionaries were concentrated in North P'yŏngan Province) and had contacts with the strong independence movement in the Chien-Tao area, in the north-east of China.⁵

Two events played a crucial part in the way in which the Church was viewed by the general populace: the Conspiracy Trial of 1911 and the Independence Movement of 1919.⁶

The Government-General of Chosén claimed that it had uncovered a plot to assassinate the Governor-General, Terauchi Masataka (1852 to 1919) on December 29, 1910.⁷ Early in the following year, investigations were begun which led to the arrest of 124 persons, 123 of whom were brought to trial. 105 of these men were imprisoned on the basis of evidence of very dubious origin which was most probably obtained under torture. Ninety-seven of the original number were Christians. The target of the "Terauchi Assassination Plot" by the Japanese rulers in 1911 was the Sinmin-hoe, an anti-Japan independence organisation formed chiefly of Presbyterian leaders of Songch'ŏn,
Chi'ngju and P'yŏngyang, the northwestern areas, where Christian influence was especially strong. Ninety-seven arrested Christians comprised 86 Presbyterians, 8 Methodists, 2 Congregational, and 1 Roman Catholic. The difference in the number arrested among different Christian denominations reflects the fact that the target of the Trial was 'Presbyterians' of the northwestern areas.

The Independence Movement of 1919 was composed of a large number of Protestant Christians. Nearly half of the signers of the Declaration of Independence were Protestants. The suppression of the Christians was fierce and churches suffered a severe blow (see Table 3. "The Religious Affiliation of Those Arrested between March and December 1919"); 16.4 percent of the entire number arrested were Christians (the number of Christians in the population in 1919 was only 1.6 percent). It is to be noted that among the 16.4 percent of Christians in those arrested, Presbyterians comprised 12.7 percent. This also reveals that Presbyterians were the most active in the independence movement.

One should not overlook the fact, that even if they were all Christians, the Korean clergy and laity had a clearly different standpoint from that of the foreign missionaries of various nationalities. During the Independence Movement, as an organised group, the missionaries never had anything to do with the movement. Moreover, despite severe investigation by the authorities, only ten out of about 400 missionaries were suspected of having been involved. But on the whole there is no doubt that they were sympathetic to the Movement. Robert E. Speer, Secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church of the U.S.A. articulated the universal feeling of the missionaries as follows:

This spirit of nationalism [in Korea] is inevitable and it is invaluable. It is not in
conflict with the idea of a unified humanity. It is essential to its realisation. The same God who made of one blood all nations of men, assigned them also their racial and national character and destinies to the end of a perfect humanity. The development of state consciousness, state conscience, state ambition, state duty, is a development in the will of God for man.14

However, before the annexation of Korea in 1910, the majority of the Presbyterian missionaries came under, in J.S. Gale's classification, 'indifference' and 'recognition'.15 By 'indifference' Gale, a prominent Canadian Presbyterian missionary scholar, meant to define the attitude of those who believed that it was wrong and useless to oppose the present rule and accordingly washed their hands of it. By 'recognition' he meant acceptance of the new order of things and convincing others of it. The Presbyterian missionaries, like Gale, who considered 'recognition' to be correct, in general, accepted the new political order and did their utmost to convince their adherents. It should be pointed out in this context that even George McCune, a principal of Union Christian College, P'yŏngyang, a Northern Presbyterian missionary, was not anti-Japanese.16 Numerous insinuations of direct complicity in the conspiracy case of 1911 were made against McCune and other missionaries in the northern provinces, though they were not brought to trial.17 When Sir Claude MacDonald, the British ambassador in Tōkyō, made a journey to Korea in the autumn of 1911, McCune told Sir Claude that he had lost no opportunity for impressing upon his pupils the absolute necessity of accepting the inevitable and becoming good citizens of the Japanese Empire.18

In this respect we can safely assume that the indifferent or tolerant attitude of the Presbyterian missionaries in the matter of the political authorities had neutralised the development of state consciousness on the part of the Korean converts. As Song Kŏn-ho
rightly points out, the church in the 1920s, then under the control of missionaries, not only remained aloof but also tended to disapprove of the social movements by workers, farmers and students, which began after the United States' repudiation of the Independence Movement. These new popular movements dealt a blow to the church. In its failure or refusal to understand such a new social movement, Christianity gradually moved away from its central role on the historical stage of society. It should be noted here that in 1929 the Japanese authorities, by the revival movements, sought to have the conservative churches counter the anti-Japan sentiments that were sweeping Korean society. As Korean Christianity remained within the precincts of the church, refusing to take part in the historical scene, mysticism, an unusual phenomenon, swept the Christian circles during the 1920s and 1930s.

Against this background we can understand that Chu Ki-chō'l, a graduate of Union Christian College (P'yongyang), a representative figure of the Non-Shrine Worship Movement (1938-45), had admitted himself to be a subject of the Japanese Empire in 1930. His attitude towards the political authorities seems to have been built along the lines of the New Testament's instructions: "Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's". But when the church faced a serious problem with the demand by Japan for worship at Shintō shrines since 1932, Chu, who had submitted to the ruling authority, resisted stubbornly against the authority because it commanded him to perpetrate a sinful deed. In Chu's view, to worship at Shintō shrines definitely violated the first and the second of the Ten Commandments. Thus it seems rather unreasonable to affirm that resistant Presbyterians to the Shintō Shrine Issue took part in the historical development of society during the time from 1932 to 1945.
Since the 1920s Korean Christianity had gradually moved away from its earlier central role in the society. In this sense the Presbyterian Church was no exception.

Finally, however, we should remember that John Ross of the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland prepared the first translation of the New Testament into the Korean vernacular language. Before the translation of the New Testament in 1877, he published the first grammar of the Korean language in English, and in 1879 the first history of Korea in English. By 1882, he and his colleague, John MacIntyre, had completed the translation of the New Testament into Korean and had it published with the assistance of funds from the National Bible Society of Scotland. Ross's method of missionary work was Pauline as he termed it. Consequently, he laid great stress on colporteur work. Before Protestant missionaries arrived in Korea, the Ross version of the New Testament was already circulating throughout the country. Ross's sympathetic attitude to Korean culture reflects the Scottish missionaries' support for the nationalism of the country in which the mission was established.

It is widely accepted that, in Korean modern history, Han'gul (the Korean alphabet) was the 'precursor of nationalism'. In Kim Yong-Bock's view, the fact that Christian literature, especially the Bible, was translated and written in the Korean vernacular script had a significant implication in the shaping of the language of the lower class; and under the Japanese rule the vernacular language was the language of the ruled, not that of the ruler. One cannot separate the message from the medium - the language. Given that the Presbyterian Church was, according to the central emphasis of the Bible in the Nevius system, the Bible-centred Church, we can safely assume that there was a positive relationship between Korean
nationalism and Presbyterians.

G. Relationship to Non-Christian Religions

1. The Catholic Church

In its attitude to non-Christian religions, and non-Christian forms of worship, the Roman Catholic Church has been more sympathetic than the Protestant churches. St. Thomas Aquinas's great works, the Summa Theologica and the Summa Contra Gentiles, have always been regarded as the highest authority in the tradition of Catholicism. This may be partly attributed to the fact that, in spite of the theoretical rigidity of its dogmas, Catholicism has in practice been more sympathetic than Protestantism in its attitude to non-Christian forms of worship. Catholic missionaries have often been pioneers in adopting non-Christian customs. Sometimes this has gone so far that it has been checked by higher ecclesiastical authorities. For example, in 1715 the Pope condemned the 'adoption' of ancestor-worship by the Catholic missionaries in China. But it has been supported by some Catholic theologians of high repute. Notable among these were the Jesuit Cardinal de Lugo, Baron von Hugel, and Jacques Maritan.

What is more, the Reformation did not bring about any immediate change in the predominant Christian attitude of hostility to other religions, in other words, the combative spirit of the great Continental Reformers did not predispose them to look for any good features in the non-Christian religions, on the other hand, in the Roman Catholic Church the Reformation did evoke the movement known as the Counter-Reformation, which stimulated a fresh enthusiasm for Missions to the heathen. St. Francis Xavier in India and Japan in
the 16th century, and the Jesuit missionaries in China in the 16th and
17th centuries are the important examples of Christ-like self-
sacrifice, devotion and heroism.

But the general attitude of the Catholic missionaries towards the
non-Christian religions remained as it was before the Reformation. They went out with love for non-Christians in their hearts, but not
with any thought of appreciating the non-Christian religions. Their
purpose was simply to rescue souls from the clutches of heathenism in
this world and from the fires of Hell in the next. They went to give,
and not to receive; to save, not to co-operate.

Here we should note that the first Korean contact with the Roman
Catholic Church came through Japanese Christian soldiers who invaded
Korea in 1592. It is reported that they were converted as a result
of the work of St. Francis Xavier and his successors.. The real
foundation of Roman Catholicism in Korea, however, was laid in the
18th century by native Koreans coming from China. Korean visitors in
Pei-ching, where a great Jesuit pioneer Matteo Ricci had begun his
work in 1601, brought with them some books of Western knowledge
including Ricci's book on the True Doctrine of the Lord of Heaven. Matteo Ricci held that the rites of Confucianism and ancestor worship
were purely social and political in nature and could be practised by
converts, thereby in China converts were allowed to retain much from
their non-Christian inheritance. It was in the year 1777 that a few
celebrated Confucian scholars became interested in the new doctrines
written by Ricci and commenced practising the precepts of the books.
In 1783, Yi Sung-hun, the first ordained priest of the Korean church
later, went to Pei-ching with the annual embassy and was converted and
baptised there. Thus we can assume that there was some of Matteo
Ricci's accommodating influence in the establishment of the Church in
But the encounter between Confucianism and Catholicism on Korean soil was not a happy one. The seed of conflict and eventual clash was inherent in the respective character of the two world views of that period. Ever since Confucianism became the state religion of the Yi dynasty, it had been rigid, dogmatic, and intolerant towards dissenters. Three centuries of unfortunate experiences, mostly of internal and external threats to its integrity—such as the Protestant Reformation, decades of religious wars, and the challenge of the French Enlightenment—had rendered Catholicism both self-defensive and polemical, and by the time it arrived at the Korean scene at the end of the 18th century it was as rigid in its dogmatic adherence and as exclusive in its attitude towards heterodoxies as was Confucianism.

The Korean Church history shows that many faithful members of the Catholic Church were to be tested and finally persecuted for the radical difference of world views. Despite the suspicion that their way of life drew upon them from non-Christians, the early converts abandoned all superstitious pagan rites, and preached the Gospel openly. During the persecutions the most heretical element of the Christian religion was its abandonment of the established rite of sacrifice to the deceased, the basic ethical and ritual principles of Confucianism. Bitter attacks were also directed against preaching heaven and hell, which was deluding the people, the critics thought. Many Confucians believed that Catholicism did not take cognizance of the king and parents, but recognised only God. Given that the general attitude of the Catholic missionaries towards the non-Christian religions remained as it was before the Reformation and the missionaries went out with love for non-Christians in their hearts,
but not with any thought of appreciating the non-Christian religions, the fact that the faithful members of the Church in Korea rejected the Confucian ancestor rites on account of their exclusiveness, and thereby finally died as martyrs in the cause of their faith seems quite natural. Furthermore, we can also note that dichotomies - this world and the next, body and soul, time and eternity, secular and sacred - abound in the sources regarding the persecution-records of police interrogations of the martyrs, exhortations by priests to the persecuted Christians and their survivors, letters of Church leaders, hymns and prayers.  

In sum, as far as the attitude to non-Christian religions is concerned, we can safely assume that the Korean Catholic Church has shown 'self-complacent exclusivism'. The exclusivism might be stronger during the persecution period. What was the Church's attitude then to State Shintoism, a non-Christian religion in the post-persecution period? This question leads us to study the historical legacy of persecution in the light of church struggle (see H. "Early Historical Experience", 1. The Catholic Church).

2. The Methodist Church

In relation to non-Christian religions, like the Catholic missionaries, the most difficult question that the Protestant missionaries had to face was 'ancestor worship'. By them ancestor worship was declared to be contrary to the Christian religion. But there is no record which provides a comparison between the Methodist Church and the Presbyterian Church in terms of their attitude to ancestor worship.

As part of their Jubilee celebration, the Korean Methodist Church had published a translation of The One Volume Bible Commentary, known
also as The Abingdon Commentary on the basis of theological 'liberalism', which received a fierce attack from the conservative Presbyterians. Pak Hyŏng-nyong's summary (1964) of the contents of The Abingdon Commentary represented the Korean conservative's basic approach to the work:

It might as well be called the compilation of all liberal theological thought. The book interpreted the Bible by the destructive higher critical principles and examined the history of revelation with the prejudice of religious evolution. It therefore questioned or denied the traditional authorship and dating of many books of the Bible ... A great many miracles recorded in the Bible were flatly denied or explained away on a naturalistic principle as humbugs. Besides this, it denied the virgin birth of Christ, questioned his deity ... It denied Jesus' physical resurrection, and affirmed that the idea of physical resurrection was first introduced through the Jewish apocalyptic literature. Besides these, one can find there many more liberal statements opposing orthodox doctrines.

On attitudes to non-Christians, Raymond J. Hammer classifies three main tendencies: (1) The identification approach; (2) The exclusivist approach; (3) The mediating approach. In general terms, as regards attitudes to non-Christians, the Methodist Church in Korea has shown, in Hammer's terms, the mediating' approach. While the mediating approach is anxious to stress fundamental truths in Christianity, this approach leaves the way open for a dialogue between faiths. In this context the indigenisation theology' (Korean theology) initiated mostly by those Methodist theologians who were comparatively liberal in theology, e.g., Yun Sŏng-bŏm, at the beginning of the 1960s did nothing but reaffirm the idea of the Methodist Rev. Ch'oe Pyŏng-hŏn - "The Western God that is the Oriental God" - in the 19th century. The idea of Ch'oe Pyŏng-hŏn is ultimately identical with that of Matteo Ricci: "The Chinese God that is the Christian God". In similar vein, Pyun Sun-Hwan, a prominent
theologian in the Methodist Theological Seminary at Seoul, in the tradition of the mediating approach, emphasised that, in order to overcome religious imperialism (or exclusivism), Christianity must give up the past proselytism and should have an open attitude in order to have dialogue with other religions, standing on an equal basis.6

This open and mediating attitude drawn from their liberal theology, I think, was relatively more amenable to Shrine Shinto worship than the exclusive attitude of extremely conservative Presbyterian groups.

3. The Presbyterian Church

As regards the attitude to non-Christian religions, the Presbyterian Church in Korea showed the 'exclusive approach'1 (Raymond J. Hammer's) in the sense that it was so anxious to stress the crucial character of Christ for man's destiny and understanding of the world. In this approach, the other faiths are sometimes regarded as man's search for God, whilst Christianity is regarded as the one religion which points to God's initiative. Christ is thus considered to be the judge of all religious faiths.

Thus, Arthur J. Brown, one of the General Secretaries of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., comments on the missionary in Korea before 1911 in these terms:

The typical missionary of the first quarter century after the opening of the country was a man of the Puritan type. He kept the Sabbath as our New England forefathers did a century ago. He looked upon dancing, smoking and card-playing as sins in which no true follower of Christ should indulge. In theology and Biblical criticism he was strongly conservative, and he held as a vital truth the premillenarian view of the second coming of Christ. The higher criticism and liberal theology were deemed dangerous heresies. In most of the evangelical churches of America and Great Britain, conservatives and liberals have learned to live and work together in peace, but in Korea
the few men who had 'the modern view' have a rough road to travel, particularly in the Presbyterian group of missions.

The early missionaries in Korea came almost exclusively from the area where the Old-School ideas were dominant. It was natural that Nevius and his Korean colleagues were extreme conservatives or fundamentalists, since their training had been along these lines. The Korean missionary church was radically affected for many years by those missionaries who constituted its first trained leadership. In other words, in the early years the extremely conservative missionaries continued to be almost the only theological guide of the church. In the theological division between adherents of the social gospel and American fundamentalism, Charles Allen Clark, one of the prominent teachers in P'youngyang Seminary, belonged with the fundamentalists. In 1937, five years after the appearance of Rethinking Missions, Clark quotes a 1926 statement of faith drafted by the Northern Presbyterian Mission: "We recognise that in the ethnic faiths and other non-Christian religions, there is much to be commended; nevertheless, we believe that in Christianity we have something unique in history, a supernatural religion with power to transform men for time and for eternity, and we believe that no compromise can be made with other religions". Thus the Presbyterian missionaries' attitude towards non-Christian religions seems clear: the exclusive approach. We can note the same attitude in Korean Presbyterians. As was shown before, the 24th General Assembly of the Northern Presbyterian Church in Korea attacked the Methodists for publishing a translation of The Abingdon Commentary on account of its 'liberal' statements opposing orthodox doctrines, and consequently they issued a prohibition to Presbyterian believers not to buy and read the book.
Regarding the rise of liberalism in the Presbyterian Church, Kim Yang-sŏn, a church historian, notes the withdrawal of the United Church of Canada (the former Canadian Presbyterian Church) in 1925. The United Church of Canada, being a union of several denominations (Presbyterians, Baptists and Methodists), could not be held to the doctrine and confession of the Presbyterian Church. After liberal William Scott became Mission chairman in Hamhŭng, liberalism took its beginning here. Scott interpreted Scripture critically. From this time on, the Conservative-Liberal split could be clearly seen. Quite a number of pastors followed the United Church of Canada theological position. In brief, as regards the attitude to other non-Christian religions, the liberal missionaries and Korean pastors in the Canadian Mission followed the 'mediating approach' like their Methodist colleagues. Both the United Church of Canada and the Methodist Church accepted the Shintō shrine worship without hesitation, and so their schools were not closed until the early 1940s.

Thus, in general terms, only the stubborn (orthodox) Presbyterians could not compromise with other religions such as State Shintoism because of their strict 'exclusivism' to other non-Christian religions. But for those liberal Christians who had a more sympathetic attitude - the 'mediating' approach - to other religions, there was already room for compromise.

H. Early Historical Experience

1. The Catholic Church

The theological outlook of the early Church (1784-1886) as expressed in the thoughts and sentiments of the martyrs on the eve of their martyrdom is extremely homogeneous, consistent and clear. The
first thing which strikes the reader of early Catholic literature, especially the martyrology, is the intense and persistent preoccupation of the early Church with the thoughts of impending divine judgement and the prospect of heaven and hell. Here we can quote what John Lee wrote in prison six days before his martyrdom in 1840 as the representative outlook of the persecuted Church as a whole. Confronted with the fast-approaching end of his life, he offered his final reflections on the basic situations of man in this world:

This life is only an instant, and the body is indeed an empty thing ... How can one be so senseless as not to think of the terrible judgement to come? ... For mercy's sake, do take every means not to fall into the deceitful snares of the three enemies: the world, the flesh, and the devil.

Besides Father Andre Kim, the Persecution of 1839 claimed the lives of three of the 12 French missionaries and over 200 other believers. The final Persecution of 1866 took a toll of over 8,000 martyrs, almost half the total believers in the country.

Historically, the world view that emerged from the persecution period was a negative attitude towards the world and great stress on eschatology. According to Min Kyong-suk, a view of the world and the flesh as negative, as it was, would have encouraged those virtues and practices which were considered to be most conducive to 'withdrawing' man from the world and 'protecting' him against its dangers. "And that is in fact what happened. That the spirituality of the early Church was essentially a spirituality of withdrawal is so clear from the pages of existing Church histories and martyrologies".

The treaty with France, in 1886, gave religious freedom to Korean Catholics, but the habits of a century of catacomb-like existence were hard to throw off. Although the process of institutionalisation moved quickly, missionaries and Korean Catholics alike preferred to
maintain a 'low profile'. Except for the Cheju Island riots of 1901, in which about 700 Catholics were killed in retaliation for such highhanded practices as the destruction of mystic shrines, the Church disappeared from the country's history books after 1886, and even its own internal historical records are made up of little more than the appointments of bishops, the establishment of parishes, and other routine details of institutional growth.\(^9\)

Therefore, if the Korean Church can be said to have emerged from the 'catacombs' in 1886, it did so only to seal itself away again in a rural "ghetto", apart from the main stream of Korean life, culture and history.\(^10\) Generally the "ghetto" Church is viewed as a beleaguered and victimised institution, beset on every side by enemies.\(^11\) Hierarchical authority is tightened; specialisation is increased along lines having to do with offence and defence; emphasis is placed on training the younger generation for the faith and bringing the laity under the direct supervision of the clergy. Direct political involvements are eschewed, and even forbidden, for the laity who represent the church as worldly missionaries. There is, then, a withdrawal from the political arena, especially at the formal and governmental levels.\(^12\) In brief, the Catholic ghettos move to a strategy of influence that combines confessionalism with the establishment of specialised structures that are to insulate Catholicism from secular forces.

Similarly, during Japanese colonialism the Catholic Church, retaining the defensiveness and the reflexes of a persecuted minority, tried to remain 'neutral'.\(^13\) Thus the important reason why the Catholic Church took a conciliatory position with regard to the 1936 Japanese shrine worship demand seems to be her 'defensiveness', the historical legacy of persecution. In this respect, it was the Roman...
Catholic Clerical Association for the Promotion of Social Justice (Ch'ŏnjugyo chŏngŭi kuhyŏn chŏn'guk sajedan, CCKCS) that broke a complete silence about the Shintō shrine question in the Catholic circle. With regard to the shrine question, the CCKCS frankly admitted the Church's defensiveness and the reflexes of a persecuted minority.

2. The Methodist Church

In order fully to understand the conformist position of the Methodist Church in connection with the Shintō Shrine Issue, we should inquire about the historical nexus between Japan and the Methodist Church in Korea. Historically, as is well known, the Methodist Church in Korea was introduced in 1885 through R.S. Maclay, Superintendent of the Japan Mission. The appointment of Dr. Maclay of Japan, as the first superintendent of the Korean Mission, led to friendly relations with the Japanese. Methodist missionaries entered with letters of introduction from Japanese to acquaintances in Korea and at once began their missionary labour among the Japanese connected with the legation. As a result, the first convert came in 1886 from the Japanese legation.

Through invitation from Baron T.H. Yun, the Southern Methodist Church entered Korea in 1895. A member of a political group that wanted to Westernise, Yun had earlier been driven from his homeland, and went to Shang-hai. Later he studied at Emory and Vanderbilt Universities, in the U.S.A. With a more favourable political climate - a pro-Japanese regime - in Korea, Yun was recalled from his teaching position in Shang-hai's Anglo-Chinese College to become a cabinet minister. While in that post, he invited the Southern Methodist Church to enter Korea.
Moreover, in 1904, Bishop M.C. Harris of the Methodist Church, North, who had served the Church for many years as a missionary in Japan, and had been decorated by the government, was elected as the 'missionary Bishop' for Japan and Korea. The episcopal residence, however, was in Japan. Bishop Harris was the most conspicuous example of those who were charged with being partisans of Japan. Thus British Consul-General Bonar thought that he went to an undue extreme. Bishop Harris was even believed by some of their colleagues to be a 'Japanese agent'. He knew the Japanese better than others. It was natural, therefore, that he should be kindly disposed towards them. Hence, Bishop Harris was, in Koreans' eyes, quite generally considered an agent of the Japanese government rather than a Bishop in the Christian church. When an article criticising missionaries appeared in the Japan Times, Harris as a Methodist bishop wrote a rebuttal in the 7 May, 1907 issue of the Yomiuri shimbun, which said in essence:

Our three leading missionaries (Jones, Scranton and Harris) were threatened with death after we rejected the Koreans' request for assistance in their campaign to oppose the Japanese protectorate of Korea. Please understand that missionaries are not the enemy of the Japanese people. Rather, we, as the most faithful friends of Japan, work in concert to promote well-being through Christian reconciliation between the Japanese and Korean peoples. In my opinion, resident-general Ito's policies deserve the highest praise. I would like to confess that I am the staunchest supporter of the resident-general's rule of Korea.

It was a fact that Prince Itō, the first Resident General of Chōsen, was on specially good terms with Bishop Harris. Prince Itō donated 10,000 yen towards the erection fund of a Methodist Church in P'ŭngyang and also contributed 10,000 yen a year for several years to the Korean Y.M.C.A. - a Christian organisation that accepted non-Christians - in Seoul, formally organised in 1903, which was controlled
mainly by the powerful laymen of the Methodist Church, e.g., Yun Chi-ho, Sin Hùng-u.9

Similarly, it is noteworthy that Nakarai Kiyoshi, a Japanese officer in Governor-General of Chōsen, attached a writing of Bishop Herbert Welsh of the Methodist Church (which was published in The Korean Mission Field, March 1920) to his book, Relations Between the Government and Christianity in Chosen (1921). Under the heading of "The Missionaries' Attitude Towards the Government in the Present Crisis", Bishop Welsh warned against any far-reaching reforms. He was appointed Bishop of the Northern Methodist Church for Japan and Korea in 1916.

Given that the 'missionary bishop' elected by the Methodist Church in America would exercise full episcopal power in his field, and the missionary bishops were men who in every respect gave the type of leadership and provided the episcopal supervision of a higher order in the lands to which they were assigned,10 it is not a surprising fact that, after the pro-Japanese bishops (Harris, Welsh), J.S. Ryang, the first Korean general superintendent of the national Church (1930-38) initiated the close affiliation with the Japanese Methodist Church.

A Korean student migration (Baron T.H. Yun included) to Japan began in 1882.11 During the restoration of the conservative Taewongun, many leaders of the radical party, e.g., Kim Ok-kyun, Pak Yong-hyo and Sŏ Kwang-bŏm, went to Japan to study the progress of the country and became profoundly impressed by it.12 The Protestant missionaries in Japan, especially R.S. Maclay, became acquainted with the liberal-minded students. These missionaries befriended the Korean political refugees, who were progressive but inexperienced patriots. Before coming to Korea in 1884 Maclay had
formed a friendship with Kim Ok-kyun. Kim Ok-kyun was the leader of the "Reform Party" and also one of the high officials in the Foreign Department of the Korean government. Maclay sent a letter written in Japanese, which he had brought with him, to the king through Kim Ok-kyun. In this letter or petition Maclay requested permission to open a school and undertake medical work in Korea. Thus, in earlier times there was an affinity between progressive Korean elites and pro-Japanese Methodist missionaries.

3. The Presbyterian Church

D.N. Clark in Christianity in Modern Korea (1986) concludes that "much of the early growth of the church (especially the Presbyterian Church) and the popularity of its institutions should be understood in the light of the fact that Christianity enabled Korean believers to feel both patriotic and modern at the same time". It was a fact that Christianity gathered strength and support from Koreans who used church institutions as a place of calm and safety from Japanese oppression earlier in this century. As was shown before, the church, particularly the Presbyterian Church, was associated with a new nationalism. This was unlike the situation in Africa or India, where the Christian missions were not independent of the colonising power. During the years of the Japanese regime, thus, the pressure on the Presbyterian Church was most extreme, more so than on the other churches. This leads us to examine the early historical experience of the Presbyterians in connection with missionary policies.

As is well known, among Protestant churches, the Presbyterian church in the U.S.A. (the "Northern" Presbyterian) sent the first resident missionary to Korea in 1884. Dr. Horace N. Allen, the first resident missionary, was at once appointed physician to the American
Allen, a medical missionary under the Presbyterian board, was assigned to China in 1883, and drifted around in Shanghai and Nanjing until September of 1884, when he came to Korea to open missionary work. Some of the prominent men in Shanghai offered him letters of recommendation to foreigners who were in governmental and diplomatic service in Korea, and encouraged him to go to the newly opened country by assuring him a rather lucrative service.

By saving the life of a wounded prince, during the Kapsin coup of 1884, which temporarily overthrew the conservative government of the time, Allen won the favour of the court and was made the court physician. At the request of Dr. Allen, the Korean Government Hospital (Kwanghye-won) was established in 1885 and Allen was placed in charge of it. In 1887 he resigned his connection with the Mission Board to become a secretary of the Korean Legation at Washington. In 1889 he became the secretary of the American Legation at Seoul. He held the Korean post until 1905. He was thrice decorated by the Korean king.

The Presbyterians began their work under the wing of the Korean government. Consequently, their policy was to win the favour of the state, that obstacles might not be unnecessarily placed in their way. Once having gained a foothold through the establishment of the government hospital, they pursued the policy of maintaining the status quo and of avoiding the opposition of the conservative party.

At least six of the members of the Mission were physicians to the royal family. Moreover, several times Dr. H.H. Underwood was asked to accept the position of Adviser to the Educational Department, but he declined. There were also social contacts between the royal family and the missionary community. During times of political crises the
counsel and help of the missionaries were often sought by the
Government. From the time of the murder of the Queen, in October,
1895, for seven weeks, two of the foreign community were on guard near
the King each night. In view of the friendly relations with high
officials, it is not surprising that the old animosity against
Christianity and the anti-foreign feeling disappeared.

The cautious mission board did not increase the staff or
appropriations until after 1890. Presbyterian policy in the earlier
years was, therefore, conservative and cautious.\(^8\) The Methodists,
however, were more aggressive.\(^9\) As we have pointed out, the
appointment of Dr. Maclay of Japan, as the first superintendent of the
Korea mission, led to friendly relations with the Japanese. In brief,
the Presbyterians won favour with the conservative Korean government
by acquiescing in its policy. In contrast, the Methodist missionaries
with Japanese connections showed affinity with many leaders of the
radical Korean party.

Also, the affiliation between the Korean court and the early
Presbyterian missionaries can be contrasted with the fact that the
Roman Catholic Church was not as tactful in its relationships with the
Korean court.\(^10\) The Catholic Church began to build their cathedral
on a site which overlooked one of the royal palaces and the Chong-Myo,
the shrine dedicated to the royal ancestors. The refusal to change
the site when requested to do so led to a decree prohibiting
evangelism and religious propaganda in May of 1888.\(^11\)

The fact that the Presbyterian Church in Korea was associated
with a new nationalism during the years of the Japanese regime can be
partly attributed to the cordial relationship between the early
Presbyterians and the Korean court in the formative period of the
Church.
I. Nationalities of Missionaries

1. The Catholic Church

Finally, in nationalities of mission bodies, the Catholic Church under Japanese rule comprised four nationalities: French, German, American and Irish. Through the early 20th century, Catholic mission work was carried on primarily under the French MEP fathers (founded 1831), whose missioners managed the Catholic headquarters in Sŏul. Their leader, Archbishop Mutel, presided over a vicariate which covered all of Korea and part of Manchuria.

Another area of Catholic work was created in 1911 when Taegu became the headquarters of Korea's second vicariate. The Taegu establishment supervised all Catholic work in the southern provinces of Kyŏngsang and Chŏlla until the 1930s, when the Chŏllas were subdivided into separate prefectures. During World War II the reigning French bishop at Taegu was forced to resign in favour of a Japanese priest.

As the years passed, the work of the MEP became bigger by the work of an international Catholic missionary force, whose different orders were assigned to different areas of the peninsula: German Benedictines in the northeast, American Maryknolls in the northwest and Irish Columbans in the southwest. The Benedictines arrived in 1911 and suffered a period of suppression as enemies of the Japanese during World War I, since they were Germans. After the War, they were given charge of the northeast (the Hamgyŏng Provinces), and served this area between 1921 and 1941. As Japan expanded its Asian conquests, Japanese authorities in Korea arrested American and Irish missionaries and placed French missionaries under house arrest. But in the Second World War, since Germany and Japan were allies, Father
(by then Bishop) T. Boniface Sauer and the German Benedictines were able to maintain their work after nearly all others were expelled. Thus Bishop Sauer, in reply to the Korea Mission Field's inquiry about 'withdrawal', said that "till now we have no trouble in our mission work" on January 22, 1941.

Northwestern Korea became the province for American Catholic work in 1923, with the arrival of the Maryknollers. They were assigned to work in the P'yŏngan Provinces, sharing the area with the American Northern Presbyterians. It is to be noted here that, in general, "American Catholics are Americans first and Catholics second on most matters of politics and social action". Condemnation of the heresy of Americanism (defined as an attitude of mind which is open to the modification of Catholic teachings in order to win converts) by Pope Leo XIII in 1899 may have slowed the process of internal change, but it did not prevent it. Catholicism in the U.S.A. clearly bears the imprint of American culture. The American Maryknolls were expelled by the Japanese during World War II. Thus we can maintain that it was the intention of Japan to drive out all missionaries, especially Americans, from Korea, thereby reducing American influence in Korea to the vanishing point during the war. The Shintō shrine worship controversy which was begun in 1932, we can say, involved the Japanese Government and American missionaries.

The southwestern areas of Korea were assigned to a mission of Irish Columbans, who arrived in 1933. The Columbans established a new vicariate in Kwangju, South Chŏlla Province. North Chŏlla Province became a separate church prefecture entirely under Korean leadership in 1937. Some Irish missionaries were arrested by the authorities, but, as a whole, the Irish Catholic Mission did not withdraw during the Second World War. In reply to the KMF's inquiry (1941) about
'withdrawal', Owen MacPolin, Prefect Apostolic of the Irish Columbans, answered very briefly: "There has been no withdrawal so far and no withdrawal is imminent nor contemplated. We have no special plans for 1941; we will try to carry on as heretofore as far as circumstances will permit ... I anticipate that you will get similar answers from the other Catholic Missions in Korea". 12

Similarly, in the case of French Catholic Mission (Soul, Taegu), during World War II no withdrawal of the missionaries of the Mission was made. 13 According to Bishop A.J. Larribeau, the only change was that a Korean, priest or layman, took the place of the foreign missionary, as president of any group for patriotic activities, as was natural. 14 The French missionaries, like the other Catholic Missions in Korea, confirmed their work in peace, as if things were all calm around them.

By the eve of World War II the Catholic missionary societies operating in Korea could point to a number of successful institutions and a substantial number of converts - 1217,643 in 1937. 15 Local leadership, however, was still quite weak. In D.N. Clark's view, for a combination of reasons - territorial, organisational, financial and political - the Korean Catholic Church was heavily dependent on foreign assistance. 16

It is widely accepted that the Catholic position during World War II was eased somewhat by the Vatican's recognition of the puppet state of Manchukuo and the presence of so many German and French missionaries in Korea. 17 According to mission statistics (December 31, 1939), compiled by E.W. Koons, there were 278 foreign Catholic missionaries: American Mission 58; French Mission 132; German Mission 71; and Irish Mission 17. 18 In this respect a report on Korea in 1946 is interesting:
The Roman Catholic Church in southern Korea is largely under the supervision of missionaries from France, Ireland and Germany - countries with which Japan was not at war. I am told that these people were not under as much suspicion and were not molested as much during the war as the Protestants, who were largely the products of American and British missionary work.

Indeed, it was a fact that the Catholic missionary organisations, except American missions, had no trouble in their work in the early 1940s, at the time of withdrawal of Protestant missionaries from Korea. The Roman Catholic missions seemed least affected. The Department of State, U.S.A., in the autumn of 1940, announced that all American citizens in the Far East should withdraw to the United States. This suggestion came at an opportune time for American missionaries in Korea, inasmuch as their work was severely hampered by the attitude of Japanese officialdom in Korea towards continued missionary work there. When the editor of KMF in 1941 asked representatives of all missionary organisations concerned to give their views of 'withdrawal', the Catholic Missions, unlike most Protestant Missions, answered that they had no trouble in their mission work, and no one had the intention of withdrawing.

The strategic intention of chauvinistic Japan in forcing attendance of foreign missionaries who were mostly American at Shintō shrine ceremonies from 1932 (after the Manchurian Incident) was to drive them out of Korea before the opening of the war. Other missionaries, particularly the German Benedictines, were allowed to work after nearly all the others were expelled, since Japan and Germany had been allies during World War II. Thus, the nationalities of missionaries should be considered in explaining the divergent attitudes on Shintō shrine attendance between the various Christian churches. In this respect the majority group of the Roman Catholic missionaries were, unlike the Protestants (who were mostly Americans),
from countries with which Japan was not at war—France, Germany and Ireland. American Catholic missionaries comprised only 20 percent of foreign Catholic missionaries in Korea at the time of the shrine worship controversy.

2. The Methodist Church

American missionary agencies did not take positive steps to open a mission in Korea itself until after the coming of the first Korean Embassy to the United States (1883-1884). After 15 years of effort, in the course of which the United States of America first sought to achieve its goal in conjunction with France, then used the direct approach to Korea, followed by appeal to the good offices of Japan and of China in turn, the United States finally succeeded in establishing commercial relations with Korea (the Shufeldt treaty, May 22, 1882). Soon after the conclusion of the Shufeldt treaty, the United States despatched L.H. Foote to represent his country in Seoul. One of the first Protestant missionary societies to begin evangelistic efforts in Korea was the Foreign Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church. In 1897 the Korea Mission of the Southern Methodist Church was created. Thus Methodist missionaries in Korea were all Americans. Historically, with the coming of the Russo-Japanese War, the United States inclined to favour Japanese control of Korea as against Russian control. In the years following the annexation of Korea by Japan the American Government was in no position to take a strong stand on questions affecting Korea, in view of the fact that the United States had readily agreed to a formal Japanese protectorate over Korea in 1905 and had made no serious objections to annexation in 1910.
The rise of Japanese chauvinism in the years following the Manchurian Incident indirectly affected American interests in Korea, because of the development of the shrine worship controversy, beginning in 1932, which involved the Japanese Government and American missionaries.

The U.S.A. Department of State refused to be drawn into the controversy of the shrine worship. It took the position that the Japanese were not violating any treaty, international agreement, or Japanese law by their requirement of compulsory attendance on the part of American missionaries at Shintō shrine ceremonies. The Japanese maintained that these ceremonies were in the nature of patriotic celebrations or national rites. According to a report of the U.S. Department of State, some of the American missionaries accepted this contention and met the Japanese requirement: others looked upon the shrine ceremonies as religious worship, hence a matter for their conscience. In an instruction to the American Consul General at Seoul, dated September 11, 1937, the Department stated that the solution of the problem was one for the missionaries to work out with the Japanese Government.

Here we can recall that the Methodist missions, unlike the Presbyterians, from the beginning, accepted Japanese pressure quietly, with the edicts of the Japanese government regarding observances before the Shintō shrines. The policy of Methodism in Korea did not provide for separate mission opinion. In general, the American Methodist missionaries had no conscientious objections to accepting the statements of the Japanese authorities that the ceremonies were patriotic and had nothing to do with religion.

In this context it is to be noted that the Foreign Work Committee of the Board of Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church (South) on
3 May, 1937, concluded: "Christians should accept the government's interpretation that these shrines are not religious, and help to make that interpretation known and understood in their own circles and among the people at large." This statement reflects the position of the Department of State (March 9, 1936) - "the Japanese are not violating any treaty". Therefore, we can say that there is similarity between the Board of Missions of the Methodist Church and the Department of State positions in the sense that both accepted the statement of the Japanese government at its face value.

In the same context, it seems important to examine the reasons for withdrawal of the Methodist Mission in 1941. As tension between the United States of America and Japan increased, the Department of State, in the autumn of 1940, suggested that all American citizens whose presence in the Far East was not absolutely essential withdraw to the United States. On February 20, 1941, the Board of Missions of the Methodist Church in New York ordered all missionaries' 'immediate withdrawal' on the ground that American citizens were advised to withdraw from an area by the Consul. Thus, from this action, we can infer that the decisions of the U.S. Department of State with regard to the Far East were very influential with the Board of Missions of the Methodist Church. The main policy of the United States of America regarding Korea (1910-1945) was "acceptance of the status quo". By the order of the Board of Missions, the Methodist missionaries withdrew from Korea. Before the declaration of war against America in December 1941, by April 1941, all missionaries except the northern Presbyterians had accepted withdrawal as the only course.
3. The Presbyterian Church

At the time of Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945) there were four separate Presbyterian missions: two from the United States of America—Southern Presbyterian and Northern Presbyterian—and one each from Australia and Canada. But the United Church of Canada (the former Presbyterian Church of Canada), being a union of several denominations—Methodists, Baptists, and some Presbyterians—since 1925, did not hold to the doctrine and confession of the Presbyterian Church.1 The majority of the Church in Korea differed greatly from Presbyterian Church ideas. Regarding the shrine worship demand, the missionaries of the liberal United Church of Canada were preponderantly in favour of conformity.2 The missionaries of Southern and Northern Presbyterian (America) and the Presbyterian Church of Victoria (Australia), from the outset, were generally against participation in the shrine obeisance on religious grounds.

In this context we can note that the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., in December 1939, appealed to the Department of State, saying that the forced attendance of missionaries at Shinto shrine ceremonies was embarrassing the mission work of the churches.3 Presbyterian missionaries looked upon the shrine ceremonies as religious worship, hence a matter for their conscience. In reply to the appeal of the Presbyterian Church, the Department suggested that the matter be taken up with the Japanese Ambassador in Washington.4 Standing on the policy of 'acceptance of the status quo', the Department refused to be drawn into the shrine worship controversy.

At the suggestion of withdrawal by A.G. Marsh, the American Consul in Seoul, by Christmas, 1940 more than 90 percent of the Protestant missionary body had left the country.5 Thus, American
influence in Korea was being gradually reduced to vanishing point.\textsuperscript{6} It was a fact that Japan intended to drive out all missionaries from Korea.\textsuperscript{7} It should be noted in this context that "by April 1941, the Northern Presbyterian Mission remained the lone Protestant Mission which had not accepted withdrawal as mission policy".\textsuperscript{8} The Northern Presbyterian Mission acknowledged the precautionary cable which had been sent from the State Department advising withdrawal of women and children and men with no urgent business. But, nevertheless, the Mission voted to maintain the maximum continuing group.\textsuperscript{9} Rev. E.H. Miller reported:

\textit{But this large number of missionaries are remaining and are doing their Christian work. These missionaries are committed by their own faith and perseverance to do this. They wait in patience, believing a better day will come ... The Board has, by its actions, expressed its willingness to support these missionaries in such a program.}\textsuperscript{10}

\textit{On October 21, 1940, His Britannic Majesty's Consul General, G.H. Phipps, announced that "in view of present uncertain conditions all British subjects should now consider leaving Japanese or Manchurian territory at an early date".}\textsuperscript{11}

Thus, the Executive Committee of the Australian Presbyterian Mission in Korea discussed the question of withdrawal in October 1940, but they decided to take no action as a Mission, leaving it to individuals to act as they felt the Holy Spirit was guiding them.\textsuperscript{12} The Australian Presbyterians reaffirmed that only the personal conviction of a call to remain in the present crisis should keep members in the field.

In the case of the Canadian Mission in Korea, the Boards issued orders that would take all the ladies and some of the men home in Spring, 1941, and the missionaries decided to withdraw on account of suggestions from Mission Boards and Consular Officials' precautionary-
measures. From the foregoing discussion, we can point out that the British government's order to withdraw was not seriously respected on the part of the Australian Mission. Here we can recall that the Northern Presbyterian Mission acknowledged the U.S. government's precaution, but, nevertheless, the Mission voted to maintain the maximum continuing group. Thus, with regard to 'withdrawal', the Northern Mission and Australian Mission reacted similarly. It should be stressed in this context that most of the members of the Non-Shrine Worship Movement - individual missionaries, Korean Presbyterians - came from the territories of the Northern Mission and Australian Mission - the Provinces of P'yŏngan south and north, and Kyŏngsang south respectively.
A. The Responses of the Three Christian Churches on the Shintō Shrine Issue

Historically, while in Japan the introduction of Christianity (Protestantism) coincided with the rise of aggressive nationalism, in Korea Christianity (Protestantism) became the vehicle for the preservation of national hopes in reaction against Japanese domination. Much of the early growth of the Church and the popularity of its institutions should be understood in light of the fact that Christianity enabled Korean believers to feel both patriotic and modern at the same time.

But after the Independence Movement of the Koreans in 1919 had been dismissed by Wilson and quelled by the bayonets of Japanese troops, the public, especially conscientious youths, departed from the church which had taken the lead in the anti-Japan struggles. The anti-Japan movements organised by workers, farmers and students were disdained by the missionary controlled churches. In its failure or refusal to understand such a new social movement, Christianity gradually moved away from its central role on the historical stage of society.

From the Manchurian Incident of 1931, when Japanese chauvinism increased in connection with Japan's military ventures on the Asiatic mainland, the Japanese authorities increasingly looked to State Shintō as the main force for intensifying patriotic loyalties. The establishment of Manchukuo in 1932 after the Manchurian Incident placed Korea in a new significant place in areas of communication, economy, and the defence of the Japanese Empire. The loyalty and devotion of the Korean people to the empire became, from the Japanese viewpoint, more urgent than ever before. As a means of making Koreans
loyal subjects, the Japanese administration, which had attempted to bring about cultural assimilation of Koreans at any cost, urged all Koreans to participate in Japanese State Shinto ceremonies.

The Japanese authorities required that all school personnel - principals, teachers, and students - attend ceremonies at Shinto shrines. Furthermore, the government exerted pressure upon the Church both in Japan itself and, more especially, in Korea to conform in the matter of shrine attendance. The Japanese maintained that these ceremonies were in the nature of patriotic celebrations or national rites. This assimilation policy by the Japanese Empire raised critical tensions among Koreans, especially Christian converts and individual missionaries.

In the preceding chapter I have surveyed the attitudes of the three Christian bodies - the Catholic, the Methodist and the Presbyterian - towards the Shinto Shrine Issue in their historical evolution. The attitudes of the Christian bodies in Korea towards the shrine problem cannot be fully understood without some knowledge of the early history of the Japanese government's policy on religious education and responses on the part of missions since the annexation (1910).

The so-called 'Educational Crisis', in terms of the question of the formal teaching of religion, came between the years 1915 and 1925. The government was against the teaching of the Bible and holding of religious exercises in the schools. Therefore, mission and church schools were offered the choice of giving up all Bible teaching, chapel services, prayer at school ceremonies, etc., or closing their doors altogether at the end of 1925. This presented a serious problem and test of faith both to the missionaries and to the Korean Church.

On this policy of the government the division of opinion was not
strictly along denominational lines, but in the main the Methodist missions took the position that existence of the schools and their efficiency was of greater importance than the retention in the curriculum of formal religious instruction. Following this policy the Pai Chai Hak Tang (Paejae haktang), the oldest of the mission schools, early conformed to the government's policy and became a recognized Higher Common School. A great deal of feeling was aroused by the oldest mission school falling in line with such haste, and denominational divisions were greatly deepened by the action and policy.

The Presbyterians in many cases went to the other extreme. In the Southern Presbyterian Mission many schools were closed mainly on account of the religious exclusion policy rather than take out a permit under the new regulations. In the Northern Presbyterian Mission a number of the leading educational workers insisted that they should comply with the new educational ordinance. Eventually, however, by a large majority the Northern Presbyterian mission decided that they could not support schools with mission money that could not teach the Bible. From the beginning Presbyterian missionaries at P'yŏngyang, where Christianity was largely concentrated, concluded that the issue was clearly 'religious', between Christian monotheism and Shintō polytheism.

Unlike the Protestants, the Catholic Church in Korea, even after the period of persecution, did not emphasise schools. As a result, the Catholics, who had not many children to be protected and educated, had fewer conflicts with the Japanese administration that had originally wanted to control the schools completely.

In the matter of Shintō shrine attendance, firstly, the Roman Catholic Church, which readily accepted the Government's order after
1936, understood the Shintō ceremonies to be 'religious' in earlier years; Catholics in Korea before 1936 understood the participation in Shrine ceremonies as 'idolatry'. A Korean Catholic priest declared that the issue was so fundamental that it allowed no local solution, but must be settled between Tōkyō and the Vatican. Eventually, Rome's instructions of 1936, which instructed the Catholics to accept the Japanese government order, solved the 'Shrine Issue' for the Catholics in the Japanese Empire, which included Korea at that time.

As a matter of fact, however, in most Korean Catholics' eyes, the Church was seen to 'collaborate' with an unprecedented imposition by the imperialist Japanese government upon Korean national institutions. The standing of the Church in Koreans' eyes was seriously affected when Archbishop Marella, the Papal Ambassador to Japan, went so far as to recommend Shintō worship to the Church's Korean members. Their disappointment with the Church seemed to be ignited earlier by the very fact that the Roman Catholic Church surprisingly reversed its position and in 1931 permitted the faithful to practise ancestor worship, whose prohibition by the Church had been a chief cause of the bloody persecutions in Korea.

But Korean Catholics who had been indoctrinated to remain 'neutral' by the Church did not protest against Japanese oppression. It is a fact that the Catholic Church both in Japan and Korea maintains a perfect silence about the shrine problem.

Secondly, as regards the Shrine Issue, the Methodist Church, in general, like the Catholic Church, acquiesced in State Shintō observance, and so their schools were allowed to remain open. As a rule, Methodist missionaries, who lost their control since 1930 when the new autonomous Korean Methodist Church was organised, kept silent on the issue of students of Christian schools attending shrine
ceremonies. In general, the missionaries had no conscientious objections to accepting the statements of the authorities. The mission agreed with the Korean Methodist Church, accepting at face value the word of the Japanese authorities that the ceremonies were patriotic and had nothing to do with religion. The policy of Methodism in Korea did not provide for separate mission opinion. Korean Methodist Christians as a body and, generally, as individuals, had no objection to conformity.

Finally, as for the Shrine Issue and closing the Christian schools, the attitude of Presbyterian missionaries, unlike that of the Methodists, was generally against participation in the shrine obeisance.

But here we can note that there was a 'strong' minority that protested vigorously against the position of the majority. In the Northern Presbyterian Mission some educators were in favour of conformity in shrine attendance on the part of schools. They accepted the Government definition of Shinto as 'non-religious'.

In contrast, another minority in the Northern Mission including Rev. Bruce F. Hunt, who later underwent imprisonment at the hands of the Japanese, felt so strong a dissatisfaction with the liberal policy of the home Board over the Shrine Issue and over the issue of modernism in the Korea Mission that many of them resigned. About 15 resignations from the Korean Mission since 1936 were mainly due to these reasons. The missionaries who resigned were a small but vociferous faction.

The turning point for the Christian churches, especially the Presbyterians, was the approval of Shinto shrine worship by the Presbyterian General Assembly of 1938, P'yŏngyang. However, the surrender of the Presbyterians was made by unusual use of police power.
and pressure. With this approval, a serious rift opened between the Korean Church and the missionaries. The missionaries denounced the assembly for its action and as legal owners of the mission schools voted to close the schools rather than to allow their students to participate in Shinto rituals.

The 'official approval' of the shrine attendance by the largest and the most powerful Christian denomination in Korea provided an effective tool to suppress any Christian resistance to participation in shrine ceremonies. But Presbyterian ministers and laymen met the issue by opposing the action of the General Assembly (Non-Shrine Worship Movement or Sinsa pulch'ambaeg undong). The strongest resistance was shown in the provinces of P'yŏngan south and north, and Kyŏngsang south, and also among the Korean Christians in Manchuria. As a result, nearly 200 local churches closed their doors, about 2,000 persons were arrested, and among them more than 50 died in prison because of the Shrine Issue in Korea.

A sect called the Mount Zion movement (Sionsan cheguk) (1944), an extremely pietistic, Adventist sect drawn from the Presbyterian Church, put up one of the last, strongest shows of resistance to the Japanese shrine demand in all Korea. The sect, regarding World War II as the 'Armageddon', prayed publicly for an Allied victory, burnt Japanese flags and every Shinto symbol, closed churches and excommunicated members and pastors who had traffic with the Japanese, gloried in deaths as martyrs, took their sons out of schools rather than have them receive a 'Babylonian education'.

In brief, historically, as regards the attitude of the Korean Churches to the Shinto Shrine Issue, unlike the Presbyterians (the largest Protestant group), the Methodists (the second largest Protestant group) and the Roman Catholics yielded to Japanese pressure
easily. Even though the final net result for Korean Christianity itself was full accommodation to the Shintō political standards, some extremely conservative Presbyterians and a few other church Christians - most religious fundamentalists, who held the adventist's view of Christ's return - attacked modernistic liberals in theology who did not see great harm in the Shintō shrine worship, and resisted Japanese State Shintoism to the bitter end.

B. Comparison of the Catholic, the Methodist and the Presbyterian Positions

'The dilemma of the churches', in the sense that the struggle between a religious interest and loyalty and other powerful interests of men which often contradict the religious teachings, is especially sharp during war. During a war it is particularly difficult to maintain the balance between church compromise and the radical challenge of sects. Generally, as regards the typical responses of religious groups to this dilemma, there are two fundamental types: the sect type and the church type. The former, preferring to maintain its ideal in a small, intimate community, makes a radical challenge either directly or implicitly to those aspects of society which contradict its ideal. The latter, however, takes the steps necessary to maintain the status quo despite its failure to come up to the religious ideal, and thereby establishes itself alongside the ruling powers. By this means the church maintains a good deal of influence. Most of it, however, is not religious influence but simply secular power clothed in religious garb.

In terms of the present study - Korean Christianity and the Shintō Shrine Issue - the major question which we have raised is concerned with the reasons why some religious groups, such as the Catholic Church and the Methodist Church, should choose the way of
compromise and others such as the Presbyterian Church, especially the individual missionaries, the Non-Shrine Worship Movement, and the Zion Sect, the way of radical challenge and withdrawal. The difference between the positions of the three churches - the Catholic, the Methodist and the Presbyterians - can be attributed to the differences of (1) theological emphasis; (2) church structure; (3) world view; (4) mission policy; (5) relationship to nationalism; (6) relationship to non-Christian religions; (7) early historical experience, and (8) nationalities of missionaries (Table 7: A Comparison of the Eight Factors with Regard to the Roman Catholic, Methodist and Presbyterian Churches).

These several factors are actually intermingled. But if we consider the sociological consequences of religious experience - the attitude of the individual towards society in all its forms and the influence of a religion on social relations and institutions will depend largely on "the spirit which permeates the doctrines, cult, and organization of a religious group" - then we can, I think, propose some key factors.

Here it should be emphasised that there was a prominent denominational difference between the Presbyterian Churches and the Methodist Churches on the Korean scene. So, C.A. Sauer, treasurer of the Methodist Missions in Korea, observed in 1939:

Wittingly or unwittingly, the mission groups which established the territorial bounds built up psychological attitudes in their followers which made it extremely difficult to join the church of the other denomination. Differences in church polity, differences in creed, differences in Bible interpretation, differences in outlook upon life - all these made the problem of changing one's denomination seem like a matter of giving up one's religion altogether.

As a result, Christianity in Korea is controversial. Disputes over theology have led to proliferation of denominations and sects.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>(1) theological emphasis</th>
<th>(2) church structure</th>
<th>(3) world view</th>
<th>(4) mission policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Church</td>
<td>* church above the Bible</td>
<td>* episcopal polity</td>
<td>* obedience to authority</td>
<td>* ecclesiastical interests</td>
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<td></td>
<td>* emphasis on worship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* political accommodation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* conservative theology</td>
<td>* collectivism</td>
<td>* emphasis on conformity</td>
<td>* no emphasis on educational institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist Church</td>
<td>* ethics above orthodoxy</td>
<td>* episcopal polity</td>
<td>* evangelical pietism</td>
<td>* institutional emphasis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* emphasis on ethics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* conversion by-product of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* moderate liberal theology</td>
<td>* collectivist spirit</td>
<td>* separation between</td>
<td>* universal education</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>religion &amp; politics</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Presbyterian Church</td>
<td>* orthodoxy above ethics</td>
<td>* synodal polity</td>
<td>* conservative attitude to power</td>
<td>* Nevis methods</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* emphasis on doctrine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* emphasis on conversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* fundamentalist theology</td>
<td>* individualism</td>
<td>* principle of resistance to ungodly authority</td>
<td>* education for Christian community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor</td>
<td>(5) relationship to nationalism</td>
<td>(6) relationship to non-Christian religions</td>
<td>(7) early historical experience</td>
<td>(8) nationalities of missionaries</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Church</td>
<td>* hostility to Korean nationalism * loyalty to foreign ecclesiastical authority</td>
<td>* ecclesiastical exclusivism</td>
<td>* severe persecution * government animosity</td>
<td>* 80% of missionaries from countries not at war with Japan missionaries followed directives from Rome/not from home governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist Church</td>
<td>* politically suspect by Korean government * missionary recognition of Japanese authority * pro-Japanese attitude/no national consciousness</td>
<td>* dialogue between faiths</td>
<td>* friendly relations with Japan * closer affinity with progressive elite and pro-Japanese missionaries</td>
<td>* all missionaries from America/acceptance of the status quo no American government interest in Shrine worship controversy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian Church</td>
<td>* pro-Korean government * missionary indifference/ recognition of Japanese authority * no contradiction between Christianity and new nationalism</td>
<td>* no compromise with other religions</td>
<td>* friendly relations with the court</td>
<td>* missionaries from countries at war with Japan Northern Presbyterian &amp; Australian Missions not subservient to decisions of governments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- and even a few new heterodoxies such as the Unification Church of the Reverend Moon Sun Myung and the Olive Tree Cult of Elder Pak T'ae-sŏn. Class and regional rivalries have further fragmented the church, as have political crises under Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945) and the cold war era. The early missionaries may have been somewhat responsible. Although they co-operated and tried to create a unified Korean Presbyterian Church, there are now four major Presbyterian denominations in Korea. Other Protestant denominations suffer similar fractious tendencies, but they are not so conspicuous, since their memberships are not so large.

In this conclusion, I propose three key factors for the denominational division in the matter of the Shintō shrine question: theological emphasis, mission policy and church structure.

Firstly, as regards theological emphasis, there seems to be a positive relationship between liberal theology and conformist attitude to the Shintō Shrine worship. 'Theological emphasis', e.g., religious fundamentalism and religious liberalism etc., was a key factor which made differences in the attitude to the shrine issue, especially between the Presbyterians and the Methodists. As regards the attitude to non-Christian religions, while the fundamentalistic Presbyterians showed strict exclusivism, the liberal Methodists exhibited sympathy.

It is generally accepted that liberal Protestantism is a particularly 'precarious' belief system. Unlike conservative Protestantism which avoids relativism by sticking firmly to certain historic statements of the faith, essential features of religious liberalism, e.g., relativistic position, made it especially vulnerable to assimilation by the secular world.

When applying this to the case of liberal Methodism in Korea, we can safely say that creeds were not used to police the boundaries of
the faith, and so the Church compromised with the Shintō Shrine Issue. I think the open and mediating attitude of Methodists towards non-Christian religions, which resulted from their liberal theology, was relatively more amenable to Shrine Shintō worship than the exclusive attitude of extremely conservative Presbyterian groups. In this context it should be pointed out that, as a whole, the educators of the mission, traditionally more 'liberal' than the ministers, irrespective of their denomination, were in favour of conformity in shrine attendance on the part of schools.

Incidentally, in its attitude to non-Christian religions, non-Christian forms of worship, the Roman Catholic Church, in spite of the theoretical rigidity of its dogmas, has in practice been more sympathetic than Protestantism.

But as far as the attitude to non-Christian religions is concerned, we can say that the early Korean Catholic Church under the strong influence of combative missionaries still showed 'exclusivism' during the persecution. During the Japanese colonial era, however, the Catholic Church, retaining the defensiveness and the reflexes of a persecuted minority, tried to remain 'neutral'. One of the important reasons why the Church took a conciliatory position with regard to the 1936 Japanese shrine worship demand seems to be her 'defensiveness', an historical legacy of persecution. The Church, as a persecuted minority, took the steps necessary to maintain the status quo.

Secondly, we can note the importance of 'mission policy' as the other key factor. The most significant characteristic of Catholic mission policy is its world-wide policy of 'accommodation'. The Church in her endeavour to spread the kingdom of Christ has always practised 'accommodation' as a most important missionary strategy.

Thus, the Catholic Church, considering the international politics
because of her very interests of the Church, often produces ecclesiastical accommodating policies which are carried out on a 'world-wide' scale. In this sense, by 1939, the Church settled one of the most burning missionary problems in the Far East: the permission of certain rites and ceremonies that are connected with 'ancestor worship', the cult of Confucius, and State Shintoism.

In concrete historical terms, in 1936 the Pope gave an emphasis to the movement of harmonising Oriental traditions with Catholic culture, including the permission of certain ceremonial usages in imperial Shintoism hitherto under the Christian ban. By this time the principle of wider latitude of adaptation had become a settled policy.

Here, however, we should not minimise the influence of Japanese government pressure on the Roman decisions. As a matter of fact, the government had suggested establishing diplomatic relations with the Vatican in 1922, having realised during the First World War that "the Vatican is an excellent source of information". Given that the Vatican finally established diplomatic relations with Japan in 1942 on her own account, we might say that the interests of Catholicism itself comes before all others, including the rightness or wrongness of national causes. Who can believe that the decision of the Vatican was not inspired at all by any political considerations?

By 1942 the Vatican was now in full diplomatic contact with all the Axis Powers - but not with any of the Allies. There is indeed a certain affinity of spirit and method between the political totalitarianisms and the authoritarian types of Christianity, e.g., Roman Catholic. In this context, during the war period, 1931-1945, the position of the Roman Catholic Church was, in Koreans' eyes, 'collaboration'.

The other distinguishable feature of the Catholics' mission
policy is its lack of emphasis on educational institutions. Unlike the Protestants, even after the period of persecution, the Catholic Church in Korea did not emphasise schools; therefore the Catholics had fewer conflicts with the Japanese administration on the matter of religious education and shrine worship.

Incidentally, from the beginning, the Presbyterian missions and the Methodist missions showed a distinguishable difference in their theological emphasis and, in more general terms, in their ideological elements. The missionaries of the two denominations, according to the comity plan between them, had preached a different gospel, and it eventually resulted in a battle on two fronts - ideological and strategical - that is, liberals versus fundamentalists, education versus evangelism for both Methodists and Presbyterians. The strategical emphasis in mission policy has often been a variation of theological emphasis of a religious institution. More significant than the variation of outward form of mission such as education, evangelisation etc., have been the inner differences in the understanding of the nature of missionary work which have led to the wide variation in practice in the course of missionary history.

While the Presbyterians in Korea, apart from a minority of liberals, thought that education was to be reserved for Christians, the Methodists maintained that education was to be supplied without discrimination to all who were desirous of receiving it. For the Presbyterians, unlike the Methodists, the aim of education was not evangelisation but the production of a Christian elite.

The Methodist missionaries' emphasis on institutions, especially on schools, was mainly the result of their broad and humanistic understanding of the nature of missionary work. Thus they had originally emphasised the aim of education as 'evangelisation'. But
later they gradually came to regard education as the most important work, irrespective of whether it was religious education or not. And "conversion", they thought, "is a by-product of education".

The educationists as the majority group of the Methodist missions did not see great harm in Shintō shrine worship. They, unlike the Presbyterians, would not close their schools because education was everything to them. Eventually, the Methodist Missions accepted quietly Japanese pressure on the matter of shrine observance.

But the mission policy of education on the part of the Presbyterians was confessedly 'narrow' in the sense that it sought to serve the Christian community only and to attain a single objective rather than offer a broader selection. Therefore, they finally decided to close mission schools rather than conform to the Japanese government requirements.

Finally, in terms of church structure as a key factor, it should be pointed out that the Japanese ruling clique adopted a policy to streamline the church into one unified agency for ease and speed of control. Christianity in the Japanese Empire was, in fact, treated in a fairly uniform way elsewhere, from Korea to the islands of the sea.

In general terms, it is a fact that "the Methodist churches have tended to work on a highly centralised system"; therefore, whatever name a Methodist superintendent be called, he has always had power. Since the Methodist Church is an episcopal form of government, the control of the Church rests in the hands of the bishop, and it is clear that the leadership problem would be settled only by the selection of a bishop.

In this respect we can recall that the autonomous Korean Methodist Church was established in 1930 under the leadership of pro-Japanese Koreans. Missionaries were squeezed out of positions of
leadership and control, a movement disguised as the nationalisation of the church. As a result, in the eyes of the Japanese police, in the 1930's church-state battle - the 'shrine question' - the Methodist connection, with its episcopal polity, was in the most vulnerable position. Thus we cannot underestimate the nature of the Methodists' top-down organisational structure, which enabled the Japanese police to seize the Methodist Church without difficulty.

All democracy was set aside by the adoption of the new constitution ("Reform Plan for the Korean Methodist Church") under the police pressure in March, 1941. The head of the church became a dictator and the independent Korean Methodist Church went into eclipse. Methodists were regimented under a t'ong-ni-sa or director-general, selected by the police for a term of four years. This director-general selected all central committees. He could dismiss pastors, suspend them from appointment, or cancel their ministerial qualifications at will. The annual conferences were dissolved.

Incidentally, given that the Japanese government, expecting to control the Catholic Church through the Vatican directly, suggested establishing diplomatic relations with the Vatican as early as 1922, and that the Vatican's instruction in 1936 solved the 'shrine issue' as far as the Roman Catholics in the Japanese Empire were concerned, we can admit the authoritarian power of the Catholic Church structure.

The Catholic Church is, in fact, one of the few world-wide hierarchical organisations having effective power. So Max Weber ranked the Church among the most distinctly developed and quantitatively large bureaucracies. As the visible representative of Christ and holding his power only from God, the Pope has a power of absolute jurisdiction in questions of doctrine, of morals, and generally in whatever touches the lives of the faithful and of the parishes.
Within this Roman Catholic tradition, therefore, most pronouncements of the Pope and the hierarchy always tended to be understood by the laity as authoritative statements of interpretations of the divine truth.

The structure of the Catholic Church is tightly institutionalised and even authoritarian. In this respect the Church of Korea was no exception. Within the Church marked by 'collectivism', in the sense that the individual was seen as being subordinate to the authoritarian organisational structure, the social and organic communion, and the integrating power of worship, there was a uniform attitude.

In the Roman Instruction of 1936, attendance at shrine worship was not an obligation but a permission. However, that the Catholics in Korea showed a uniform willingness to conform to the instruction reflects their collectivism. In contrast with Presbyterians, who had the loosest organisation not so easily controlled by the State, Catholics were able to arrive at a uniform position towards the shrine problem.

As regards church structure, the Presbyterian synodal type, generally of Reformed tradition, is characterised by the fact that the organisation is constituted of a hierarchy of assemblies and councils, which rests on the base of the parish, the basic cell of the church. Generally the Presbyterian polity has been called democratic and anti-episcopalian: democratic in the sense that it rests on the people; anti-episcopalian in the sense that the presidents of the various executive councils do not have an intrinsic authority.

Hence, in the case of the Presbyterian church polity in Korea, the decision of the General Assembly, the highest court, was not influential as was the case of the Methodist Church. Thus, the local
presbyteries of the Presbyterian Church, with a looser democratic organisation, were not so easily controlled by the Japanese police.

C. Some Theoretical Considerations

The problem of 'Church-State Relations' is, no doubt, one of the controversial themes in the religious history of every country. But the church-state problem cannot be approached without drawing an important distinction. There is a difference between the relationship of religion and the state which prevails in many non-Christian countries and the pattern which has generally obtained in the West. In non-Christian countries which have the tradition of the relative positions of orthodoxy and sectarianism, exclusiveness and conversionism are less widespread than in their Christian counterparts. In the Japanese tradition, it is probably fair to say that apostasy never became an important problem until after the arrival of Christianity, which rejects, on principle, the possibility of coexistence with idolatry and superstition.

The church-state problem was particularly controversial in the religious history of colonial Korea. Her master was an anti-Christian, non-Western power and her young church was associated with a new nationalism. All Christian missionaries who were not citizens of the nation in control, and Korean converts who were subjects of the Japanese Empire, had to decide on the problem of Emperor Worship. It is true that the idea of a divine kingship is very common throughout the world, and the identity of state and religion is not uncommon. The problem which arose during the war period (1931–1945) in connection with Emperor Worship or Shrine Shintō (Jinja Shintō) as an identity of state and religion shows the complexities which characterise the relations between Church and State or, in a broader
sense, between religion and government. For the ordeal of the Shinto shrine controversy in the 1930s, missionaries who had to decide about their attitudes on international political questions may have been somewhat responsible. As Clark points out, "Some American missionaries counselled resistance (and thereby got Korean converts into trouble with the Japanese) and other missionaries tried to be neutral (and later were accused of advising their Korean converts to collaborate)".\(^8\)

A further problem was that the notion of 'religion' meant different things in Eastern and Western languages. Moreover, some were prepared to condone Shrine worship in terms of 'civic ritual'. Bocock has distinguished this from religious ritual in terms of whether or not the charismatic objects related to are connected with the holy sphere. Such a distinction holds good even when such objects are set apart from the profane world.\(^9\)

Complexities of this nature have made it inevitable that different churches would respond in different ways. This was true for the missions; and also the Korean churches were totally unprepared to cope with the problem. On this matter we can point out two important reasons: (1) the under-development of Protestant theology by Korean theologians, (2) the failure of the establishment of one united Christian Church in Korea. As far as (1) is concerned, the initial setting of a low standard of theological education mainly resulted from the anti-intellectual approach of the American missionaries who in proselytising the Korean masses hindered the educational level of Korean church leaders. As for (2), the division of Korea into mission territories along geographic lines as a direct carry-over from American denominationalism hampered various continued efforts on the part of Korean Christians for church union.

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It should be emphasised in this context that in the early years of the 1930s the conflict between the two streams of theology — liberals versus fundamentalists — began to come to the surface in Korea: within the conservative Presbyterian community, the largest Christian denomination, for the first time by 1934 liberalism's influence became a problem for the whole church.\(^{10}\) As some writers have already commented\(^ {11}\), the basic conflict at the 1934-1935 Presbyterian Assemblies was 'theological'. Given that after 1938 the government pressure placed the Korean national church in the spotlight with the Shintō shrine controversy, we might say that the Church Struggle was not merely, as many Christian writers assumed, the struggle between Church and State, but rather between rival theological parties within the Church: the conservative and liberal wings. Within the Presbyterian circle, which was generally more active than others in resisting the shrine issue on religious grounds, disputes over theology/fundamentalism have fragmented the church (See Ch. V.B.3; Table 6: Presbyterian Denominations in South Korea, 1982). Behind the 1951 schism, when two Presbyterian denominations of nearly equal size emerged, lay the old struggle over Shintō worship.

With regard to the nature and limitations of Korean Christianity in the midst of explosive growth we can note the fractious tendencies which were reinforced by the severe trial for the church because of the Shintō Shrine Issue. Additionally, if we consider that the history of the Church Struggle is a vehicle for proving the validity of the theological viewpoints\(^ {12}\), we could not miss the historical discontinuity in motivation between the Non-Shrine Worship Movement and the Mount Zion Sect by the fundamentalists and the recent political struggle for justice by the liberals. This historical disconnection and the fractious tendencies, we can conclude, have
choked the healthy ecumenical development of Korean Protestantism. The legacy of the ordeal of the Shintō shrine controversy in the 1930s stands as an obstacle to the reconciliation between the ultra-conservative theology and liberal minjung theology. 13

It is therefore demonstrated in this thesis that the particular form of religious outlook is a relevant factor in its own right, which is not to be reduced to other variables. It is hoped that the influence upon theology of other factors, especially historical, has been adequately demonstrated. But each religious organisation in question stands in the last analysis for a particular view of its own relationship to the secular world, and this is reflected in the differences in response to the Shintō Shrine Issue.
NOTES

Introduction

2. Ibid., p. 121.
4. For the weakness in functionalist definitions of religion see C. Campbell, Toward a Sociology of Irreligion, 1971, pp. 128-44.
7. Ibid.
11. Ibid., n. 42.
13. Ibid.
16. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
17. Ibid., p. 5.
21. D.N. Clark, Christianity in Modern Korea, op.cit., p. 52.


27. Ibid., p. 215.


34. Ibid., p. 186.


37. Ibid., p. 661.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., p. 662.

40. Ibid., p. 659.

42. Ch'ŏnju-gyo ch'ŏngŭi kuhyŏn chŏn'guk sajedan, ed., Han'guk ch'ŏnju kyohoe-ŭi wisang (Standing of Korean Catholic Church), 1985, pp. 19-20.


54. Kim Yong-bok, "Korean Christianity as a Messianic Movement of the People", in the Commission on Theological Concerns of the Christian Conference of Asia, ed., Minjung Theology, pp. 183-93.


56. J. Wach, Sociology of Religion, 1944, p. 49.

Chapter I.A


5. Ibid., p. 49.

6. Ibid., p. 58.

7. Ibid., pp. 59-60.

8. Cahnman and Boskoff, "Sociology and History", op.cit., p. 3.


11. The second basic kind of "ideal-type", the generalising concept, begins by attempting to explain what we would call tendencies or trends in history through testing various hypotheses which have occurred to us as a result of a consideration of a given course of history. See Shils and Finch, Max Weber and the Methodology of the Social Sciences, op.cit., pp. 90-100.


13. Ibid., p. 522.


16. Ibid., p. 3.

26. H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Social Sources of Denominationalism*, 1929. Troeltsch has had an equally strong influence upon John Bennett and Reinhold Niebuhr, representative of a concern for the ethical implications of the relationship between Christianity and sociology for Christian social action.
29. Cahnman and Boskoff, "Sociology and History", *op.cit.*, p. 11.

Chapter I. B.1

7. Thus, by virtue of decrees promulgated by the Persian kings from Cyrus to Artaxerxes, Judaism evolved into a religious community under royal protection, with a theocratic centre in Jerusalem. See *Ibid.*


16. Ibid., p. 1000.


22. Ibid.


25. Ibid.


30. Parker, *Christianity and the State in the Light of History*, op.cit., p. 79.


36. Ibid.


38. Ibid., pp. 141.


41. Ibid., p. 23.

42. Ibid., p. 37.


48. Ibid., p. 122.


50. In Troeltsch's view, early Calvinism, like Lutheranism, had an equally strong sense of authority, and only permitted a subsidiary ideal of utilitarian-rational interference in circumstances where the ruling powers of the State were unchristian in their behaviour. See Troeltsch, *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*, op.cit., p. 811.


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65. Ibid., pp. 40-1.


67. Ibid.


69. Ibid., p. 301.

70. Ibid., p. 104.


73. Ibid., p. 105.


75. Ibid., p. 45.

76. See Ch. IV.B. "The Catholic Church".


80. See Ch. III.B.2. "Protection of the State".


4. Martin, Pacifism, op.cit., p. 3.


6. Ibid.


10. J. Wach, Types of Religious Experience, 1951, Ch. 9.

11. Ibid., p. 197.


15. Ibid., pp. 210-1.

16. Ibid., pp. 219-20.

17. Ibid., p. 221.

18. Ibid., p. 222.


24. Wilson, Sects and Society, op.cit., p. 326.


29. Ibid.

30. But, Benton Johnson has pointed out that the sect does not necessarily emerge only among the religious poor. See Benton Johnson, "Critical Appraisal of Church-Sect Typology", American Sociological Review (ASR), xxii, 1957, pp. 91-2.


32. See Martin, "the denomination", op.cit.


34. Glock and Stark, Religion and Society in Tension, op.cit., p. 121.

35. Ibid., pp. 120-1. Denominationalism seems still to be a major fact in American religious life.

36. See Ch.II.B.2. "Protestant Missions".

Ch. I.B.3


4. Ibid.


10. Ibid., pp. 166-72.

12. Ibid., p. 63.


17. Ibid., pp. 221-2.


20. Ibid., pp. 224-32; Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (Hereafter Fundamentalism), op.cit., pp. 222-8.


27. Hofstadter, ibid., p. 111.


41. Ibid., p. 390.


45. Ibid.


47. Ibid., p. 413.

48. Ibid., p. 419.

49. Ibid., p. 420.


53. Ibid.


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56. T.P. Weber, *Living in the Shadow of the Second Coming*, op.cit., pp. 175-6; With Augustine – whose doctrine became official in the medieval Church – there are two opposing attitudes towards the prophecy. One, known as pre-millennialism, holds that, after a long period of sorrows, Christ will return to inaugurate the millennial age. The post-millenialist opinion regards the millennium as some form of allegory, and expects the Advent only after it is completed. See Tuveson, "Millenarianism", op.cit., p. 224.


71. S.A. Barnett, "A National Church and Social Reform" in Church Reform, 1888, p. 159.


74. Ibid., p. 7.


77. Ibid., p. 11.


80. Nathaniel Micklem, *National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church*, 1939, p. 50; For details, see also Ch. III.D.1. "Nationalism and Christianity".

81. Micklem, *National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church*, op.cit., p. 48. Thus, in some sense, the Church Struggle was not primarily the struggle between Church and state, but rather between rival parties within the Church. See J.S. Conway, *The Nazi Persecution of the Churches*, 1933-45, 1968.


84. Ibid., p. 241.

85. Ibid., pp. 241-2.


89. Ibid.


92. Ibid., pp. 98-103.

93. Bruce, "Liberal Protestantism", *op.cit.*, p. 413.

Ch. I.C


4. Ibid., p. 29.

5. Ibid., p. 214.

6. Ibid., p. 29.

7. It is generally accepted that sub-cultural differences of social class can be seen more clearly in the case of British missions because the class lines are more clearly drawn in Britain than America. See G. Gordon Brown, "Missions and Cultural Diffusion", AJIS, Vol. 50, 1944, p. 215.


10. Ibid., p. 188.


15. Ibid., p. 217.

16. Ibid., p. 214.

17. This work in French was translated by James H. Farley in 1970: The Sociology of Protestantism, London, SCM Press Ltd.


25. Maunier, ibid., p. 5.

27. Beidelman, Colonial Evangelism, op.cit., p. 11.
34. A.H. Rowbotham, Missionary and Mandarin: The Jesuits at the Court of China, 1942.
36. Ibid., p. 19.
39. Ibid., pp. 114-5.
40. Ibid., p. 103.
41. For details, see Ch.II.B.2. "Protestant Missions", and Ch. V.F.3. "The Presbyterian Church".

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58. Ibid., p. 518.


61. Ibid., p. 10.


63. Ibid., p. 78.


65. Ibid., p. 324.


67. Ibid.


71. For details, see Ch. III.B.3. and D.1.

72. Beaver, "Nationalism and Missions", op.cit., p. 35. For details, see Ch. II.B.2. "Protestant Missions".


79. Ibid., pp. 521-2.

80. Beaver, "Nationalism and Missions", op.cit., p. 38.

81. Ibid., pp. 38-40.


83. Beaver, "Nationalism and Missions", op.cit., p. 31.


Ch. II.A.

1. Zhu Xi (Chinese, 1130-1200) brought the various strands of China's early Neo-Confucian revival to a systematic unity; he is generally identified as 'orthodox' Neo-Confucianism. For Yi dynasty Neo-Confucianism see M.C. Kalton, "Early Yi Dynasty Neo-Confucianism: An Integrated Vision", L. Kendall, et al., eds., Religion and Ritual in Korea Society (hereafter Religion and Ritual), 1987, pp. 9-25.


4. Ibid., p. 22.


17. Ibid.


20. The sudden development of Pure Land thought was due primarily to the efforts of Wŏn-hyo's evangelism during his later years. See Ibid., p. 50.


25. Chung Chai Sik, "Religion and Cultural Identity - The Case of Eastern Learning", op.cit., p. 120.

35. Palmer, *ibid*.

Ch. II.B.1.
3. The Chinese ceremony of prostration [Chin. k'o, knock, t'ou, head]; See 'kowtow' in Chambers, *op.cit.*, p. 70.
10. *Ibid*.
11. Yu Hong-nyŏl, Han'guk ch'ŏnju kyohoe-sa, *op.cit*.


15. Grayson, Early Buddhism and Christianity in Korea, op.cit., p. 73.


20. Ibid.


26. For details, see Ch.III.B.2.


28. Ibid., p. 36.


30. D.N. Clark, Christianity in Modern Korea, op.cit., p. 11.
Ch. II.B.2.


5. Ibid., pp. 96-7.


7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., p. 70.


11. R. Pierce Beaver, op.cit., p. 35.


20. Ibid., p. 11.


24. L.G. Paik, The History of Protestant Missions in Korea, op.cit., pp. 198-201. For the data when Korean missions were founded, see Table 1, "Mission Statistics, 1939".


28. Ibid., p. 427.


34. Song Kŏn-Ho, "A History of the Christian Movement in Korea", op.cit., p. 27.

35. Ibid.


41. Ibid., p. 29.


43. Ibid., p. 128.


47. Ibid., p. 39.


50. Ibid., p. 52.

Ch. III.A.


2. Nationalism in the modern sense in this study refers to the pursuit of national independence and a commitment to national unity with awareness of cultural identity.


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14. Tsunoda Ryusaku, et al., *Sources of the Japanese Tradition*, 1958, pp. 520-3. This excerpt - "The True Tradition of the Sun Goddess" - is from Motoori's *Precious Comb-box* (Tama Kushige), the contents of which are meant to 'comb' out the snarls of intellectual confusion.


18. Both the Japanese themselves and those few Westerners who read Japanese language generally regard Maruyama Masao as one of the most creative and stimulating writers on Japanese intellectual history. He is perhaps best known for his studies on the influence of neo-Confucianism and on the development of nationalist thought in the modern period. For his studies in English see *Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan*, 1974.


32. Fisher, ibid., p. 344.


40. Probably the earliest use of the phrase Dai Nippon is found in some writings by Dengyo. Dengyo (767-822), who had studied in China, was more keenly aware than his contemporaries of the fact that Japan's territories were smaller and her wealth and resources much more limited than China's. See Nakamura, Ways of Thinking of Eastern People, op.cit., p. 434.


45. Ibid., p. 2.


Ch. III.B.1.

1. In Joachim Wach's view, in the religion of folk (nationality) - e.g., the Greeks, Japanese, Hebrews, and English - the unifying factors were not racial homogeneity but common experiences and destiny. On 'national cults' see Wach's Sociology of Religion, op.cit., pp. 92-7.


5. The term Shintō (the national cult of Japanese) is a combination of the two Chinese characters shin ("kami") and tō ("the way"). According to Karl Florenz, the term 'Shintō' originated only after the introduction of Buddhism in order to differentiate between the indigenous cults and the beliefs and practices of the newly transplanted religion of the Buddha. Joseph M. Kitagawa, "Some Remarks on Shintō", *History of Religions*, Vol. 27, No. 3, February 1988, p. 229.


7. According to Origuchi Shinobu, belief in tama, which was not innate to man or natural objects but entered from outside, antedated belief in kami. For 'tama' see Origuchi Shinobu, "Reikon no hanashi" (The Story of the Soul), in Origuchi Shinobu *zenshū* (Complete works of Origuchi Shinobu), Vol. 3, 1955, p. 261.


Ch. III.B.2.


9. Ibid., p. 25.


20. R. Kinghall, Education for a New Japan, 1949, Chap. V.


24. Ibid., p. 438.


29. Ibid., p. 436.


34. The Mito schoolmen, headed by Lord Nariaki and eloquently spoken for by Fujita Tōko and Aizawa Seishisai (1782-1863) came to be known as the group which advocated "reverence to [meaning eventually "restoration of"] the emperor and repulsion of foreigners" (sonnō jōi). For the Mito school see Tsunoda, *Sources of the Japanese Tradition, op.cit.*, pp. 591-603.


Ch. III.B.3.


21. Fabian, the ex-monk of Zen and Irman published a Kirishitan book of refutation of Buddhism, Shintō and Confucianism. But he who, later, an apostate, wrote a refutation of Christianity and used nearly the same materials and points emphasised in the former book for his attacks upon Christianity. The Ha Dajusu is the only book of the kind ever printed. See Anesaki, "Japanese Criticisms and Refutations of Christianity in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries", op.cit., pp. 1-5.

22. Anesaki, ibid., p.3.

23. Ibid., p. 4.


27. Here it should be added that the Christian missionaries, especially the French Catholics in the Meiji period, could be accused of confusing their religion with their nation. This situation was made worse in that for a long time the French missionaries were the only representatives of the Catholic church, which was not the case with the Protestant churches. See Lehmann, "French Catholic Missionaries in Japan in the Bakumatsu and Early Meiji Periods", op.cit., p. 388.

Ch. III.C.

1. In fact, Japanese expression Kokka Shintō (State Shintō) seems not to have been used by the Japanese in their writings during the time the national cult was actually in operation. Instead, they usually simply referred to the national shrine system in prewar Japan as "the shrines". Or, more formally and definitively, they used the adjectival expression, Kokkateki Shintō (National Shintō). Kokka Shintō in the Japanese language, therefore, was a term created ex post facto following the Pacific War to designate an identifiable series of Shintō events and institutions in the prewar past. It is true that in the prewar period, Daniel Holtom,
as well as some other foreign writers and Katō Genchi, a prominent Shintō expert, used the term "State Shintō" when they wrote in English for foreign readers. When I use the term "State Shintō", I am departing from the practice of the Japanese themselves during the pre-Pacific war period. For this note I owe much to W.M. Fridell's view on the term "State Shintō". See Fridell, "Modern Japanese Nationalism", op.cit., p. 168, n.1.


3. The Pacific War, in fact, was officially designated by the Japanese as the Greater East Asia War.


11. Ibid., p. 54.


17. The Grand Shrine of Ise, in financial difficulty due to the wars, sent out onshi (low-ranking Shintō priests) who travelled the length and breadth of the country, distributed shrine amulets and almanacs, offered prayers, received donations, and organised village-level voluntary religious associations that went or sent representatives to Ise. As a result, the increasing numbers of common people, unlike samurai and nobles in the wars, made pilgrimages to the Grand Shrine of Ise. See Mori, "The Emperor of Japan", op.cit., p. 544.

18. Mori, ibid., p. 545.

26. Ibid., pp. 125-8; Bellah, "Religious Aspects of Modernisation in Turkey and Japan", op.cit., p. 4.
27. Bellah, ibid., p. 5.
32. Ibid., p. 166.
35. Powles, "Foreign Missionaries and Japanese Culture in the Late Nineteenth Century: Four Patterns of Approach", op.cit., pp. 26-7. It is true that whilst in most forms of western Christianity history and theology had combined to set church over state, or even church against state, the Anglican stressing the divinely autonomous authority of government preferred to view the church as operating within the state. See R.H. Bainton, The Reformation of the Sixteenth Century, 1956, p. 236.
37. Powles, op.cit., p. 28.
38. Fridell, op.cit., p. 165.

41. Seiyūkai platform of 6 July 1933, p. 19. Quoted by Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan, op. cit., p. 374. The Seiyūkai is one of the two major political parties in the decade or so prior to the Second World War. The Seiyūkai and the Minseitō were never able to establish the principle of party government and fought a losing battle with growing military authoritarianism in the 1930s. They were finally dissolved in 1940. See Maruyama, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, op. cit., pp. 313-4.


44. Holtom, Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism, op. cit., p. 166.


47. Ibid.


50. Ibid.


55. Ibid., p. 249.


57. Ibid., p. 235.

58. Ibid., p. 147.

59. Ibid., p. 166.

60. Ibid.

62. Ibid., p. 197.


64. For Japan's overseas expansion of State Shinto, especially to Taiwan and Korea, see Murakami Shigeyoshi, Tennōsei kokka to shūkyō (Religion and the Emperor System), 1986, pp. 207-17.

Ch. III.D.1.


2. Ibid., p. 10.


4. Micklem, National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church, op.cit., p. 47.


   The Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 (Appendix A) reflected the new emphasis upon Shinto traditions. The Rescript was a clever device to deepen state absolutism and to counter any revolutionary movement, especially Christianity. See D.M. Brown, Nationalism in Japan, op.cit., pp. 115-6. Also see Best, Christian Faith and Cultural Crisis, op.cit., p. 148.


10. Micklem, National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church, op.cit., p. 50.

   In Kitagawa's view, the prestige of Christianity was seriously undercut by the "new theology", Unitarianism, and scientific theories. See Kitagawa, Religion in Japanese History, op.cit., p. 242.

12. The liberal influence of the Allgemeiner Evangelisch-Protestantischer Missionsverein was supplemented and extended by the entrance into Japan, in 1887, of the Rev. A.M. Knapp, a
representative of the American Unitarian Association. Japanese leaders looked on Unitarianism as that form of Christianity in which the essential Christianity was freed from supernaturalism. It needs to be noted that Unitarianism never exerted an influence in the church comparable to that of German liberalism. See Germany, Protestant Theologies in Modern Japan, op.cit., p. 10; For the German East Asia Mission (Deutsche Ostasiemission) see B.L. Goddard, ed., The Encyclopedia of Modern Christian Missions, 1967, pp. 222-3.


19. Ibid., pp. 151-70.


The majority of Christians in Japan have recently declared that participation in the state emperor cult is permitted. In all decisions of this nature the following points are to be considered: (1) When participation in such acts of the state is demanded, is it clearly a matter of the worship of other gods? If it is, then refusal is the clear obligation of Christians. (2) If there is doubt about whether it is a religious or a political act, then the decision will depend on whether by a Christian's participation in it, the Church of Christ and the world are offended, that is, if by participation at least the appearance of a denial of Jesus Christ is given. If this is not the case according to the common judgment of the Christians, then nothing stands in the way of participation. But if it is the case, then here also participation will have to be refused.


24. Kodera, "Uchimura Kanzō and His 'No Church Christianity'", *op.cit.*, p. 388.


32. See Ch. IV.B. "The Catholic Church".

Ch. III.D.2.


Ch. IV.A.

1. For a detailed historical study on the Shintō Shrine Problem in Korea during the 1910s and 1920s see Kim Sŏng-t'ae, "Ilbon sindo-ūi ch'imm'u-va 1910-20 nyŏnda-e 'sinsamunje'", op.cit.; Han Sŏk-hŭi, "Chŏnsiha chosŏnin-ūi sinsa ch'ambaekangyo-ŭi chŏhang", op.cit.


3. In 1910 there were 42 Shintō shrines and 171,543 Japanese in Chosŏn (Korea). Government-General of Chosen, Annual Reports on Chosen (1910).

5. Jingū is the highest designation for a Japanese Shintō temple and is applied to the two Ise temples, to some special temples where Imperial ancestors of Emperors are enshrined. Jinja is a term of wider or more generalised application, although it is a matter of pride for the 'first temple' of a certain region, or country. J. Herbert, *Shinto: The Foundation of Japan*, 1967, p. 128.


12. "Educational Ordinance of 1911", Chapter I, Art V; See Appendix D.


14. "Article VI,2. In the case of a school coming under the foregoing clause [schools giving general education] it is not allowed to add any subject of study other than those set forth in the regulations for common schools, girls' higher common schools, industrial schools or special schools", quoted in Underwood, *ibid.*, p. 196.


27. 29 June 1938.


Ch. IV.B.


10. Henceforth SCPF.


13. Swyngedouw, *ibid*.


17. D.N. Clark, Christianity in Modern Korea, op.cit., pp. 12-3.


Ch. IV.C.

1. On the allocation of territory among major denominations in Korea see Table 2, "Map of Korean Missions".


3. For the writings of the Methodist circle, see Yi Sŏng-sam, Han'guk kamni kyohoe-sa, 1930-1945 (The History of the Korean Methodist Church, 1930-1945), 1986, pp. 183-9; C.A. Sau'er, Methodists in Korea 1930-60, 1973, pp. 120-1.

4. Sau'er, ibid.


6. IRM, No. 114, April 1940, p. 177.

7. IRM, No. 115, July 1940, p. 310.


11. IRM, April 1940, p. 183.


17. Because of the Shrine Issue Choe In-gyu, Deacon and Yi Yong-han died in jail, and Yi Chin-gu, Minister, Kwŏn Wŏn-ho, Evangelist, and Choe Han-ho were put in jail. For details see Han Sŏk-hŭi, *op.cit.*., p. 321; Yi Sŏng-sam, *op.cit.*., pp. 188-9.


Ch. IV.D.


2. IRM, April 1940, p. 183.


5. Ibid., p. 307.


7. Ibid., p. 164, n. 74.


14. This statement was adopted at the meeting of the missionaries in Chinju (February 1936), quoted in *The Mission Chronicle*, March 1939, p. 15.


20. The Canadian Presbyterians opened their mission to Korea in 1898. From the beginning they were more liberal. See L.G. Paik, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 276-9; Chun Sung Chun, 1955, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 82. The Canadian Mission, and particularly the United Church of Canada, is given great credit for the rise of liberalism in the field. In the early years, before 1925, the Canadian Presbyterian Mission seems to have been functioning in Korea largely under the conservative leadership of men like Grierson, McCrae, Foote, Young, Robb, and others, but later arrivals, like Scott, Frazier, and MacDonald, were liberals. However, since they accepted the direction of the older missionaries, their liberalism did not directly affect the church. In 1925, with the formation of the United Church, by the Methodists, Congregationalists and some Presbyterians, that picture changed. The home church with the Canadian Congregational and Methodist Churches formed the United Church of Canada, which assumed the field in Korea. The direction of the new mission was placed in liberal hands. From this time on, the new mission was a centre of liberalism. See Kim Young Sun, \textit{History of the Korean Church in the Ten Years Since Liberation (1945-1955)}, p. 56; J.W. Grant, \textit{The Canadian Experience of Church Union}, pp. 29-30. Also for the cooperation between the United Church of Canada and the Methodist Missions in Korea, see Saucer, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 42-3.


24. Every writing on the Shrine Issue points out the Presbyterian General Assembly of 1938 as the turning point for the Korean national churches. On the implication of the Assembly of 1938 see particularly Lee Kun Sam, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 168-9; D.N. Clark, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 13; Han Sŏk-hŭi, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 330-1.


26. At the time the Assembly was composed of 80 Korean pastors, 85 elders and 28 foreign missionaries. All the officers were Koreans. They were warned not to oppose any action favourable to Shrine obeisance. See Palmer, "Korean Christians and the Shinto Shrine Issue", p. 146. Among the missionaries William Blair and B.F. Hunt led the resistant actions against the Rev. Hong Taek-ki, the then Moderator. See Kim Yang-sŏn, \textit{Han'guk kidokkyo-sa yŏn'gu},


33. For the historical link between Manchuria and north-western Korea with regard to the Christian resistance against Japanese imperialism, see An Ushiku, TennEsei to Chŏsenjin (Koreans and the Emperor System), 1977, pp. 265-92.


37. Baker, Darkness of the Sun, op.cit., pp. 188-9; Chŏng Un-hun, Ilbon cheguk-si sionsan kyohoe t'ujaeng-sa (A Resistance History of the Presbyterian Church of Zion under the Japanese Empire), 1984, pp. 136-200.

38. Kim Nam-sik, Ilche-ha Han'guk kyohoe sojongp'a undong yŏn'gu (A Study on Sectarian Movements in Colonial Korea), 1987, pp. 113, 120-1.


41. Chŏng Un-hun, A Resistance History of the Presbyterian Church of Zion, op.cit., p. 79.

42. Wilson, Sects and Society, op.cit., p. 231.

43. Pak Kŏn-han, "Sionsan kyohoe-ŭi yaksas" (A Brief History of the Presbyterian Church of Zion), in Chŏndo chunggŏ charyo (Presbyterian Church of Zion Witness 1982-1985), 1985, p. 44.

45. For the teachings of the Christadelphians, see B. Wilson, *Sect and Society*, op.cit., pp. 219-35.


50. Baker, *ibid.*; Pak Kôn-han, op.cit., p. 44.

Ch. V.A.


6. Chamberlayne, "From Sect to Church in British Methodism", op.cit., p. 139.


11. 'Doctrine' in Chambers, op.cit., p. 368.


13. 'Cult' in Chambers, op.cit., p. 305.


17. 'Communion' in Chambers, op.cit., p. 255.


19. Ibid., p. 34.


Ch. V.B.1.

1. See article on 'accommodation', in CDCWM, pp. 3-4.


6. D.N. Clark, Christianity in Modern Korea, op.cit., p. 11.


8. Wach, Sociology of Religion, op.cit., p. 27.

9. Protestant fundamentalism rallies around five basic doctrines: the infallibility and inerrancy of the Bible, the deity and Virgin Birth of Jesus Christ, His vicarious atonement for the sins of mankind, His bodily resurrection from the dead, and His second coming - a bodily, visible return. See Moberg, The Church as a Social Institution, op.cit., p. 282.


13. Ibid., p. 295.


15. Ibid., pp. 8-18.

Ch. V.B.2.

1. KMF, January 1931, p. 3.


4. Broad or liberal, especially in religious belief; a member of a school of liberal and philosophical theologians within the English Church in the later half of the 17th century: one who regards specific creeds, methods of church government, etc., with indifference, see "latitude", in Chambers, p. 713.


6. 'Antimonian' means one who denies the obligations of moral law: one who believes that Christians are emancipated by the gospel from the obligation to keep the moral law, faith alone being necessary. See "antimonian" in Chambers, p. 52.


10. Ibid., p. 58.


15. McCutcheon, op.cit., p. 262.
16. Ibid., p. 264.

Ch. V.B.3.


3. "Fundamentalism" in CDCWM, p. 221.


5. "Presbyterian Missions", in CDCWM, p. 495.


Ch. V.C.1.


6. For details, see article on "Seoul, Archdiocese of (Seulensis)", in NCE, Vol. 13, pp. 96-7.

7. D.N. Clark, Christianity in Modern Korea, op.cit., p. 11.


Ch. V.C.2.


3. Chamberlayne, "From Sect to Church in British Methodism", op.cit., p. 147.

4. Ibid., pp. 147-8.


12. "Reform Plan for the Korean Methodist Church" (Statement made by Bishop Chung Choon Soo, of the Korean Methodist Church, Seoul, Ch'ŏsen, October 10, 1940 and adopted by the General Board of the Korean Methodist Church). (Appendix F). This reform plan was finally adopted by the General Assembly in March 1941. See Yi Sŏng-sam, Han'guk kamni kyohoe-sa, 1930-45, op.cit., pp. 194-209.


Ch. V.C.3.


3. Ibid., p. 95.


Ch. V.D.I.


5. Hanson, *Catholic Politics in China and Korea*, op.cit., p. 27.


7. Ibid., p. 12.


11. Ibid., p. 21.

12. D. Woodruff, *Church and State in History*, 1962, p. 120.


17. L.G. Paik, op.cit., p. 43.


Ch. V.D.2.


5. Ibid., p. 231.


8. Turner and Hill, op.cit., p. 163.

9. According to John C. Smith, a missionary of the Northern Presbyterian Church, evangelism in Korea was and is successful in the Presbyterians, the Methodists and the Holiness churches. See J.C. Smith, "Policy Lessons from Korea", op.cit., p. 321.


11. Ibid., p. 369.


14. The pietistic missionaries were: H.D. Appenzeller, M.C. Harris, George H. Jones, W.B. Scranton. See Pak Sung-gyŏng, Minjok t'ongil-kwa kidokkyo (Christianity and the Unification of Korea), 1986, pp. 36-7.


18. Ibid., p. 294.

Ch. V.D.3.


3. Ibid., p. 114.


11. Ibid.


Ch. V.E.1

1. "Accommodation", in CDCWM, pp. 3-4.


10. CDCWM, p. 23.

12. For Vatican politics in connection with the international politics see Murphy, "Vatican Politics: Structure and Function", op.cit.


17. IRM, July 1940, p. 313.


24. Ibid., p. 7.


33. Underwood, Modern Education in Korea, op.cit., pp. 87-9; Biernatzki, Korean Catholicism in the 1970s, op.cit., p. 8.

34. Underwood, Modern Education in Korea, op.cit., p. 89.

35. Ibid., p. 50 ff.

Ch. V.E.2.

1. L.G. Paik, The History of Protestant Missions in Korea, op.cit., p. 82.


13. Ibid., p. 289.


Ch. V.E.3.


2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 159.


8. Palmer, Korea and Christianity, op.cit., p. 27.


12. Ibid., p. 283.


15. Ibid.


17. Underwood, Modern Education in Korea, op.cit., p. 127.


Ch. V.F.1.


20. Ibid., p. 20.


25. See Table 1, "Mission Statistics, 1939".


31. Hanson, _Catholic Politics in China and Korea_, _op. cit._, p. 27.

32. D.N. Clark, _Christianity in Modern Korea_, _op. cit._, p. 11.

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Ch. V.F.2.


2. Ibid.; D.N. Clark, _Christianity in Modern Korea_, _op. cit._, pp. 8-9.


4. Song Kŏn-Ho, _op. cit._, p. 26; D.N. Clark, _op. cit._, p. 9.

5. For details see Table 3 "The Religious Affiliation of Those Arrested Between March and December 1919" and Table 4 "Statistics for Christianity (1920) in Korea".

6. Song Kŏn-Ho, _op. cit._, p. 27.

7. U.S. Policy, _op. cit._, Part I, pp. 36-7.

8. Song Kŏn-Ho, _op. cit._, p. 28.

10. Min Kyŏng-bae, "Ilche malgi Han'guk kyohoe-ŭi saengt'ae" (Korean Churches in the Last Phase of Japanese Imperialism", Kidokkyo sasang, August 1974, pp. 52-65.


Ch. V.F.3.


3. D.N. Clark, Christianity in Modern Korea, op.cit., p. 51.

4. Ibid., p. 52.


7. Ibid.


10. Grayson, Early Buddhism and Christianity in Korea, op.cit., p. 126, Chart XI "Comparative Church Growth Statistics".


16. MacDonald to Grey, 22 February 1912, quoted in Ku Dae-yeol, ibid., p. 33.


19. Song Kön-Ho, op.cit., p. 28.
21. Song Kön-Ho, op.cit., p. 28.
22. Ibid., p. 29.
23. Ibid., p. 30.
26. Ibid., p. 103.
28. Kim Yong-Bok, ibid.

Ch. V.G.1.
2. See the article on Thomas Aquinas in The Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV.
4. Ibid., pp. 115, 125-8.
5. Ibid., p. 116.
10. Ibid., p. 73.

For Roman Catholicism and the Enlightenment, see Hugh McLeod, Religion and the People of Western Europe 1789-1970, 1981, pp. 8-10, 98-9, 102-6; for Roman Catholicism and the Protestant Reformation, see McLeod, ibid., pp. 37-9.

12. Ibid., p. 18.


Ch. V.G.2.


3. Quoted in Conn, ibid.


5. Pyun Sun Hwan, "Other Religions and Theology", Sinhak-kwa segye (Theology and the World), No. 11, Fall 1985, pp. 20-1, 31.

6. Ibid., p. 19.

Ch. V.G.3.


5. Conn, op. cit., p. 156.


7. Ibid.

Ch. V.H.1.


2. Ibid., pp. 9-10.


7. Ibid.


12. Ibid.


Ch. V.H.2.


4. Ibid., p. 307.

5. Ibid., p. 414.


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Ch. V.H.3.

1. D.N. Clark, *Christianity in Modern Korea, op.cit.*, p. 52.


Ch. V.I.1.


2. Hanson, *Catholic Politics in China and Korea, op.cit.*, p. 27.


4. Hanson, *op.cit.*, p. 27.


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14. Larribeau, *ibid*.


18. *KMF*, January 1941, No. 1, p. 15. See also Table 1 "Mission Statistics, 1939".


Ch. V.I.2.


10. *Ibid*.


14. Grayson, *Early Buddhism and Christianity in Korea*, op.cit., p. 120.

Ch. V.I.3.


2. IRM, July 1940, p. 310.


4. Ibid.


7. A despatch reported that it was the intention of Japan to drive out all missionaries from Korea. Grew (American Ambassador in Tokyo) to Hull, December 8, 1939, MS, Department of State, file 395.1163/89, quoted in **U.S. Policy**, Part I, p. 40, n.4.


10. Ibid.


Summary and Conclusion

1. Yinger, *Religion in the Struggle for Power*, op.cit., Ch. VII.


5. Ibid., p. 2.

6. Presbyterian Church of Korea (ecumenical), 4,100 churches
   Presbyterian Church of Korea (non-ecumenical), 5,062 churches
   Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea, 892 churches


APPENDIX A

The Imperial Rescript on Education
(Kyōiku Chokugo, 1890)

*(From Ryusaku Tsunoda, et al., editors, Sources of the Japanese Tradition, New York, Columbia University Press, 1958, pp. 646-7).*

Know ye, Our subjects:

Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting, and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education. Ye, Our subject, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husband and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore, advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.

The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their Descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is Our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you, Our subjects, that we may all attain to the same virtue.

October 30, 1890
APPENDIX B

The Nevius Method (1890)*

* (From C. A. Clark, The Korean Church and the Nevius Methods, Seoul, 1937, p. 4 ff).

1. Personal evangelism and wide itineration by the missionaries.

2. The Bible central in every part of work.

3. Self-propagation: every believer, including converts, a teacher of someone else, and a learner from someone else better fitted; every individual and group seeking by the "layering method" to extend the work.

4. Self-government: every group under its chosen unpaid leaders; circuits under their own paid helpers, who will later yield to pastors; circuit meetings training the people for later district, provincial and national leadership.

5. Self-support: with all chapels provided by the believers; each group, as soon as founded, beginning to pay towards the circuit helper's salary; even schools to receive but partial subsidy, and that only when being founded; no pastors of single churches provided by foreign funds.

6. Systematic Bible study for every believer under his group leader and circuit helper; and for every leader and helper in the Bible classes.

7. Strict discipline enforced by Bible penalties.

8. Co-operation and union with other bodies, or at least territorial division.

9. Non-interference in lawsuits or any such matters.

10. General helpfulness where possible in the economic life problems of the people.
APPENDIX C

Three Negative and Four Positive Principles for the Training of the Korean Ministry (1896)*


Negative

1. Don't let him know for a long time that you have an idea of training him for the ministry.

2. Don't employ him as a preacher or evangelist on foreign pay if you can help it.

3. Don't send him to America to be educated, at any rate in the early stage of mission work.

Positive

1. Seek to fit him to a high plane of spiritual experience. Let him strive above all else to be a 'Holy Ghost Man'.

2. Ground him thoroughly in the Word and in the cardinal facts and truths of Christianity.

3. Train the young pastor-to-be to endure hardness as a good soldier of Jesus Christ.

4. As Korean Christians advance in culture and modern civilisation, raise the standard of education of the native ministry. Seek to keep his education sufficiently in advance of the average education of his people to secure respect and prestige but not enough ahead to excite envy or a feeling of separation.
APPENDIX D

Educational Ordinance of 1911
(Chapter 1, General Plan)


ART. I. Education for Koreans in Chōsen shall be given in accordance with this ordinance.

ART. II. The essential principle of education in Chōsen shall be the making of loyal and good subjects by giving instruction on the basis of the Imperial Rescript concerning Education.

ART. III. Education in Chōsen shall be adapted to the need of the times and the condition of the people.

ART. IV. Education in Chōsen is roughly classified into three kinds, i.e., common, industrial and special education.

ART. V. Common education shall aim at imparting common knowledge and art, special attention being paid to the engendering of national characteristics and the spread of the national language.

ART. VI. Industrial education shall aim at imparting knowledge and art concerning agriculture, commerce, technical industry and so forth.

ART. VII. Special education shall aim at imparting knowledge and art of higher branches of science and art.
APPENDIX E

Revisions in Regulations for Private Schools
(Some Articles of Ordinance No. 24 of the Government-General of Choson, 1915).


ART. VI.2 The subjects of study and their standard in a private school other than a Common School, a Higher Common School, Girls' Higher Common School, an Industrial School or a Special School, but giving common, industrial or special education shall be fixed after the model of the regulations for common schools, higher common schools, girls' higher common schools, industrial schools or special schools.

In the case of a school coming under the foregoing clause it is not allowed to add any subject of study other than those set forth in the regulations for common schools, higher common schools, girls' higher common schools, industrial schools or special schools.

ART. X.2. Teachers of a private school giving a common, industrial or special education shall be those well versed in the national language (Japanese), and having scholarly attainments sufficient to teach the subjects in such a school.

The foregoing provision shall not be applied to teachers teaching, exclusively, a foreign language, the Korean language, Chinese literature, or to teachers of any special art.
APPENDIX F

Statement made by Bishop Chung Choon Soo, of the Korean Methodist Church, Keijo, Chōsen. 2.10.40

and adopted by the

General Board of The Korean Methodist Church

It is urgent and proper that our Christians realize the true spirit of our country and the policy of amalgamation of Japan and Chōsen ("Naisen Ittai") as the people behind the guns; therefore we, the General Board of the Korean Methodist Church, hereby take lead in deciding upon and putting into effect the following:

Reform Plans for the Christian Church

I. Right Guidance of Thoughts

1. To cause to understand the principles of the New Order in East Asia and the amalgamation of Japan and Chōsen.

2. To make (our people in the Churches) understand that the Christian idea of brotherhood is realized in the principle of "eight pillars under one universe". (N.B. "Hakko Ichiu" or universal family idea, ascribed to Jimmu Tennō, the founder of the Empire, 2,600 years ago).

3. To make (our people) understand the unity of patriotic loyalty and the Christian ideal of sacrifice.

4. To forbid the idea of the sovereignty of the people as contrary to the national policy of the Empire.

5. To oppose individualism that has degenerated into selfishness.

6. To oppose the idea of liberty which has degenerated into a devouring of the weak by the strong.

7. To extirpate cruel and irreligious communism.

II. Reforming Education

1. National Polity shall be taught in
   a. Theological seminary.
   b. Colleges and professional schools.
   c. Middle and primary schools through the ethics course.

2. Military Training
   a. Military training shall be given in the theological seminary.
   b. New emphasis shall be placed upon it as already taught in colleges and middle schools.
3. Theological Education

The Gospel (Christ's teachings and example) shall be the fundamental basis of theological training, separating therefrom Jewish history and pagan thoughts and usages which have crept in on the path of Western cultural progress, and giving a clearer exposition of the Gospel by the traditions and philosophies of Oriental saints.

III. Social Education

1. Disseminating and Upholding the Imperial Way. This shall be done by:
   a. By attendance at shrines.
   b. In the Church organs.
   c. By printed matter.
   d. By lectures.
   e. By discussion group meetings.
   f. In Bible study classes.
   g. In special evangelistic meetings.
   h. In personal preaching, etc.

2. Defence against Communism: National Defence
   a. By means of the Union of National Spiritual Mobilization Movement.
   b. By patriotic societies in the Churches.

IV. Support of the Army

1. Church members should be encouraged to enlist voluntarily in large numbers.

2. To make Church members understand the meaning of military duties.

3. Church members should do their utmost to prevent espionage.

V. Unified Control of Organisations

1. The Korean Methodist Church and the Japan Methodist Church shall bring to reality their union. (See report, Unification Comm.).

2. The Korean Methodist Church and its organisations, men's and women's work, receiving financial support from abroad, shall become independent of such support.

3. Churches and institutions shall avoid placing in a position of leadership or representation, any foreigner.

4. The Methodist Theological Seminary shall be entirely made over.

5. The Central Council which is organised with the Methodist Missions shall be dissolved, (but a committee of five, of whom one shall be the Bishop shall be chosen to contact the missionary group).

6. In order to put into effect the above articles an executive secretariat of appropriate size shall be appointed by the Bishop.
GLOSSARY OF CHINESE CHARACTER TERMS

Amaterasu Ōmikami 天照大神
Amatsukami 天津神
An Chung-gun 安重根
Anesaki Masaharu 城崎正治
An I-suk 安利淑
An Ushiku 安宇植
Bakufu 幕府
Bushidō 武士道
Chae-Kŏn 再建
Ch’ang ssi kaemyŏng (Sŏshi kaimei) 創氏改名
Cheju 濟州
Chëju Province 濟州道
Chesa 祭祀
Chien-tao 閔島
Ch’ing 清
Chinju 晉州
Chirei 地霊
Ch’oe Che-u 崔濟愚
Ch’oe Han-ho 崔漢鎧
Ch’oe In-gyu 崔仁圭
Ch’oe Pyŏng-hŏn 崔炳憲
Ch‘olla Province 全羅道
Chŏndo ch’unggŏ charyo 傳道證據資料
Ch’ŏndogyo 天道教
Chŏng Chae-sik (Chung Chai Sik) 鄭載植
Chŏng Chun-su (Chung Choon Soo) 鄭春洙
Chŏnggam nok 鄭鍾皓
Chonggyohak yŏn’gu 宗教學研究
Chŏngjong taewang sillok 正宗大王實錄
Chŏngju 定州
Chŏngmyo 宗廟
Ch’ongnisa 總理師
Chŏngsŏn Girls School 貞信女學校
Ch’ŏngsong 靑松
Chŏng Tae-wi (David Chung, Chung Tae-wi) 鄭大偉
Han Sŏk-huí 韓雪晦
Hap-Tong 合同
Hijōji 非常時
Hinayāna Buddhism 小乘佛教
Ho-Hon 護憲
Honda Toshiaki 本田利明
Hongi 本気
Hong Taek-ki 洪澤麒
Hui-yuan 虎遠
Hwangguk sinmin sōsa 皇國臣民誓詞
Hwanghae Province 黃海道
Hwang Sa-yŏng (Alexander Hwang) 黃聖永
Hwang Yu-ha 黃維河
Inuma Jirō 飯沼二郎
Ilbon chekukchuŭi-ũ Chosŏn chibae 日本帝國主義の朝鮮支配
Ilbon cheguk-si sionsan kyohoe t'uaeng-sa 日本帝國時山岳教會闘爭史
Ilbon kidokkyo-sa 日本基督教史
Ilche-ha Han'guk kyohoe sojongp'a undong yŏn'gu 日帝下韓國教會
Ilche malgi p'asischum-kwa Han'guk sahoe 日帝末期政治と韓國社會
Inari 櫻氷
Ise Shrine 伊勢神宮
Itō Hirobumi 伊藤博文
Jimmu Tennō 神武天皇
Jingū 神宮
Jinja 神社
Jinja mondai to Kirisutokyō 神社問題とキリスト教
Jinja seido chosakai 神社制度調査會
Jinja Shintō 神社神道
Kamakura Buddhism 鎌倉佛教
Kami 神
Kamidana 神棚
Kang Chae-ŏn 姜在彦
Kang Wi Jo 姜渭祚
Kangwŏn Province 江原道
Kapsin Coup 甲申政變
Katō Genchi 加藤玄智
Kazoku kokka 家族國家

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Keijō 京城
Ki 氣
Kidokkyō sasang 基督教思想
Kidokkyō-sa yôn'gu-hoe 基督教史研究會
Kidokkyō-wa yôksa ūisik 基督教歴史意識
Ki-Jang 基長
Kijang-p'a 基長派
Ki Sŏn-ju 吉善宙
Kim Chae-Jun (Kim Chai Choon) 金在俊
Kim Kwan-sik 金範植
Kim Nam-sik 金南植
Kim Sŏng-gŏn (Kim Sung-Gun) 金成建
Kim Sŏng-tae 金承台
Kim Yang-sŏn (Kim Yang Sun) 金良善
Kim Yong-bok (Kim Yong-Bock) 金容福
Kindai Nihon no keisei to Kirisutokyō 近代日本の形成とキリスト教
Kindai Nihon no shûkyō to seiji 近代日本の宗教と政治
Kirishitan 吉利支丹（切支丹）
Kitabatake Chikafusa 北畠親房
Kitagawa 北川
Kodera 小寺
Koguryŏ 高句麗
Kojiki 古事記
Kokka Shintō 國家神道
Kokka sŏdŏn ho 國家總動員法
Kokkateki Shintō 國家的神道
Kokka yûkitai 國家有機體
Kokugaku 國學
Kokumin seishin sŏdŏn remmei 國民精神總動員連盟
Kokurei 國靈
Kokutai 國體
Kokutai no hongi 國體的本気
Konkōmyōkyō 金光明教
Koryŏ 高麗
Koryŏ-p'a 高麗派
Kosin 高神
Kosŏ 古礎
Kowtow 敲頭
Koyake 子家
Kukhak yŏn'gu-wŏn 国学研究院
Kumiai Church 組合教會
Kunitsukami 国津神
Kwanghwamun 光化門
Kwanghyewŏn 廣惠院
Kwangju 光州
Kwansei Gakuin University 關西學院大學
Kwŏn Wŏn-ho 權元浩
Kyŏdan 教團
Kyŏiku Chokugo 教育勤語
Kyŏngsi Province 京畿道
Kyŏngju 廣州
Kyŏngsang Province 廣常道
Kyūshū 九州
Lee Ki-baik 李基白
Li 理
Mahāyāna Buddhism 大乘佛教
Manchukuo 滿州國
Manchurian Incident 滿州事變
Maruyama Masao 丸山真男
Matsuo 松尾
Matsuri 祭
Matsuri-goto 祭事
Meiji 明治
Meiji Restoration 明治維新
Mikuni Movement みくに（御園，皇園）運動
Ming 明
Minjok t'ongil-kwa kidokkyo 民族統一과基督敎
Minjung 民衆（民衆）
Min Kyŏng-bae 閔庚培
Mito School 水戶學
Mori Kōichi 森孝一
Motoori Norinaga 本居宣長
Mukyŏkai 無教會
Mun Sŏn-myŏng （Moon Sun Myung）文鮮明
Murakami Shigeyoshi 村上重良
Myŏng-dong 明洞

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Risshō ankoku ron 立正安國論
Saisei-itchi 祭政一致
Saitō Makoto 齊藤實
Samurai 侍
Sasangnye 思想界
Sawa Masahico 澎正彦
Seikōkai 聖公會
Seiyūkai 政友會
Sekai 世界
Shang-hai 上海
Shang-ti 上帝
Shan-tung 山東
Shintō 神道
Shintō no shukyō hattasu shi-teki kenkyū 神道の宗教変遷史的研究
Shintō to Kirisutokyō 神道とキリスト教
Shōgun 將軍
Shogunate See Bakufu
Shōwa 昭和
Shūkyō seido chosakai 宗教制度調査會
Sich'ŏngyo 侍天教
Silhak 實學
Silla 新羅
Sillok 實錄
Sŏ Il-so (Shim Il-Sup) 沈一燮
Singminji sidae Han'guk-ŭi sahoe-wa chŏhang 植民地時代韓國의社會와抵抗
Sinhak chinam 神學指南
Sinhak-kwa segye 神學과世界
Sin Hŭng-u 申興雨
Sinmin-hoe 新民會
Sinsa pulch'ambae undong (Jinja fusampai undo) 神社不參拜運動
Sionsan cheguk 帝國神學
Sionsan kyohoe 神教會
Sŏ Chae-p’il 徐載弼
Sŏ Chŏng-un (Suh Jung Woon) 徐正運
Sŏhak 西學
Sŏ Kwang-bŏm 徐光範
Sŏ Kwang-sŏn (David Kwang-Sun Suh) 徐洸善
Sŏ Myŏng-wŏn (R.E. Shearer) 徐明潤
The Chinese God that is the Christian God. 上帝即天主
The Western God that is the Oriental God. 西洋之天即東洋之天

The Chinese God that is the Christian God. 上帝即天主
The Western God that is the Oriental God. 西洋之天即東洋之天

T’ien 天
T’ien-chu Shih-i 天主實義
Todong Presbyterian Church 道洞長老教會
Tokugawa Ieyasu 徳川家康
Tokugawa Period 徳川時代
Tōkyō (Tokyo) 東京
Tomura Masahiro 戸村政博
Tonga Ilbo 東亞日報
Tongbang hakchi 東方學誌
Tongbang yobae 東方禮拜
Tongshak 東學
T’ong-Hap 統合
T’ongni 統理
Tongnipsinmun独立新聞
T’ongnisa統理師
TongsanBibleSchool東山聖經學教
Tosa土佐
ToyotomiHideyoshi豊臣秀吉
UchimuraKanzō內村鑑三
UchimuraKanzōzenshū內村鑑三全集
UemuraMasahisa植村正久
Üiju義州
Wŏn-hyo元曉
Wŏnsan元山
Yakuinzensō施薙院宗伯
YamajiAizan山路愛山
Yamato大和
Yang陽
YangChusam(J.S.Ryang)梁柱三
Yangban兩班
Yasukunijinja(Shrine)靖國神社
Yen園
YiChingu(Minister)李鎭九
YiChingu李鎭鎬
YiChongsŏng(RheeJongsung)李鍾聲
YiIk李翼
YiKisŏn李基宣
YiKwangSu李光洙
YiMan-nyŏl李萬烈
Yin陰(Yŏm)
Yin-Yang陰陽
YiSŏng-sam李成森
YiSu-jŏng李樹庭
YiSŏng-hun李承煥
YiWan-yong李完用
YiYŏng-hŏn李永熾
YonseiUniversity延世大學校
Yomiurishimbun讀賣新聞
YuHong-nyŏl柳洪烈
YunCh’i-ho(T.H.Yun)尹致昊
YunSŏng-bŏm尹聖範
ZenBuddhism禪佛教
ZhuXi朱熹
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